Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel [1 ed.] 9780714657141

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Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy

Previous studies of military industrial policy in the developing world focused on political-econom ic effects. Using m ethodologies that focus on the production of complete w eapons systems - a m isleading gauge in a w orld of grow ing international defense cooperation - existing analytical m odels for military industrialization could not account for the rapid growth of Iraq ’s very significant military industry. By exam ining in detail the m ilitary-industrial policies of India, Israel, and Iraq - three of the m ost pow erful regional pow ers in the Cold W ar and post-C old W ar eras - this book re-addresses the issue of military industrialization in the developing world. It focuses on the im pact of secur­ ity perceptions on policy-m aking in producer states, and m akes use of recent literature re-examining the role o f regional state sub-systems in international relations and recent historical studies o f international techno­ logy and arms transfer. By focusing on the political-military aspects of military industrial p o l­ icies and exam ining how developing states have integrated military indus­ tries with national security policies, Tim othy D. H oyt creates a new fram ew ork for analyzing the rationale and effectiveness of these industries in the context of global and regional threats. This m odel explains the unusual development of Iraq ’s arm s industry and the emergence of ap p ar­ ently sim ilar industries elsewhere, while also providing new insights into the strengths and lim itations of Indian and Israeli military industrial sectors. This book will be of much interest to researchers and policy-m akers of defense policy and military industry, international relations, and regional studies (M iddle East and South Asia). Tim othy D. H oyt is Professor o f Strategy and Policy at the US N aval W ar College. H e teaches and researches a range of issues including classic and contem porary w arfare, strategic theory, conflict in the developing world, insurgency and terrorism , w eapons of m ass destruction, and security in the M iddle East, Persian Gulf, and South Asia.

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Khedive Ismail’s Army John Dunn

Yugoslav Military Industry 1918-1991 A m adeo Watkins

Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914-1918 The List Regiment Joh n Williams

Rostov in the Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 The key to victory Brian M urphy

The Tet Effect, Intelligence and the Public Perception of War Ja k e B lood

The US Military Profession into the 21st Century W ar, peace and politics E d ited by Sam C. Sarkesian a n d R ob ert E . Connor, Jr.

Civil-Military Relations in Europe Learning from crisis and institutional change E d ited by H an s Born, M arina C aparini, K arl H altiner a n d Jurgen Kuhlm ann

Strategic Culture and Ways of War Law rence Sondhaus

Military Unionism in the Post Cold War Era A future reality? Edited by R ichard B artle and Lindy Heinecken

Warriors and Politicians U .S. civil-military relations under stress Charles A. Stevenson

Military Honour and the Conduct of War From Ancient Greece to Iraq P au l Robinson

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Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy India, Iraq, and Israel

Timothy D. Hoyt

R

Routledge Taylor & Francis Croup

LO N D O N AN D NEW YORK

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, O X 14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, N Y 10017 Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business First issued in paperback 2011 © 2007 Timothy D. Hoyt Typeset in Sabon by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear All rights reserved. N o part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication D ata A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication D ata A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN10: 0 -7 1 4 -6 5 7 1 4 -X (hbk) ISBN10: 0-71 4 -6 8 5 8 2 -8 (pbk) ISBN10: 0 -2 0 3 -9 6 9 0 4 -9 (ebk) ISBN13: 9 7 8 -0 -7 1 4 -6 5 7 1 4 -1 (hbk) ISBN13: 9 7 8 -0 -7 1 4 -6 8 5 8 2 -3 (pbk) ISBN13: 9 7 8 -0 -2 0 3 -9 6 9 0 4 -5 (ebk)

Dedicated to my wife Lisa, with all my love, and our children Liam , Ben, and Jon. M ay their world be a better, more peaceful one than ours. I study w ar a n d politics in order that my children m ay study science and m athem atics, in order that their children m ay study a rt and music. John A dam s, in a letter to his wife A bigail

Contents

Acknowledgm ents L ist o f abbreviations an d acronym s 1

2

Introduction M ilitary industry in the developing w orld 2 The developing w orld: some structural considerations Regional powers L D C arms procurement L D C s and the international arms trade The study o f L D C arm s industries: analytical fram ew orks 7 Structuralist/dependency approach Econom ic/development approach Dom inance/w orld system approach Systemic/historical approach Existing fram ew orks: the m issing variable M ethods o f analysis 17 India B ackgroun d 22 Indian security perception M ilitary-industrial policy Structure of the Indian defense industry N ehru an d the age o f idealism : 1 9 4 7 -6 2 28 Selected indigenous arm s program s, 1 94 8 -6 2 The age o f realism : 1 9 6 3 -7 4 33 Selected indigenous arm s program s: 1 96 2 -7 4 Hegem ony unfulfilled: 1 9 7 4 -9 8 39 Selected indigenous arm s program s: 1974-98 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 5 : N ew threats an d opportunities 56 Conclusion 61

xii xiv 1

22

x

Contents

3

Israel B ackground 67 Israeli security perceptions The structure of the Israeli defense industry The pre-state period: 1 9 2 0 -4 8 74 Developm ent o f military industrial infrastructure: 1 9 4 8 -6 7 75 Selected indigenous arms program s: 1 9 4 8 -6 7 The boom years: 19 6 8 -7 3 83 Selected indigenous arms program s: 1 967-73 Overextension an d decline: 1 9 7 3 -9 5 91 Selected indigenous arms program s: 1 973-95 M anaging security in an uncertain w orld: 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 5 105 Israeli m ilitary-industrial requirements 106 The future: niche production or military-industrial and strategic dysfunction?

4

Iraq B ackground 115 Iraq ’s security perception Iraq ’s m ilitary-industrial base Em bargo, diversification, an d w ar: 1 9 7 4 -8 4 1 24 Selected indigenous arms program s, 1974-84 Pragm atism an d victory: 1 9 8 4 -9 0 129 Selected indigenous arms program s, 1984-90 The 1 990s: w hat m ight the industry have looked like? 138 The enduring puzzle: Ira q ’s strategic w eapons 143 Ballistic missiles Chemical w eapons Biological w eapons N uclear w eapons Why we don ’t know - continuing gaps Conclusion 158

5

Regional pow ers, security, and arms production: conclusions Case studies: patterns an d trends 164 India Israel Iraq

67

115

163

Contents

xi

Lessons learned: security an d military industry 170 A security-based m odel o f L D C arm s production 171 Category one: sustenance requirements Category two: quality maintenance Category three: ability to produce systems not available from other suppliers Category four: production of regional-specific weaponry and niche production R egional pow ers an d m ilitary industry in the evolving international system 179 N otes Select bibliography Index

187 268 283

Acknowledgments

This book has been a w ork in progress for over 15 years, and as a result I cannot truly do justice to all the people who deserve thanks. I will mention a few, and apologize to those who m ust be excluded, either for reasons of space or at their own request. Y ou all know who you are, and I am deeply grateful. This book is based on my PhD dissertation, written at the Johns H opkins School of Advanced International Studies - an experience made richer by my study with M ichael V lahos and George Liska. Robert O sgood and Roger H ansen served briefly as my graduate and dissertation advisors, respectively, before their untimely passing. Eliot Cohen w as kind enough to take on the difficult task of inheriting a m assive and unfocused dissertation project. I could not have completed my studies without his gentle and resolute prodding. It seems only right to express my deepest appreciation for the m embers of my dissertation committee - Eliot Cohen, Bruce Parrott, R obert H arkavy, Andrew Krepinevich, and Frederick H olborn. Their comments m ade this book a better one. The initial impetus for this research came from a study of ballistic missile production I w orked on at the Library of Congress’ Congressional Research Service. Colleagues at Georgetow n University’s Security Studies Program - Bernard Finel, Audrey Kurth-Cronin, Jim Ludes, and Elizabeth Stanley - challenged my assum ptions and pushed me in new directions. Faculty at the N av al W ar College provided crucial assistance and intellec­ tual support, particularly Andrew R oss, Drew W inner, and George Thibault o f the Distance Education Program - a fine colleague and a true gentleman. Special thanks are due to my m any colleagues in the Strategy and Policy Departm ent - the best o f all possible academ ic homes. M ichael Eisenstadt, Ephraim Inbar, Gerald Steinberg, Ariel Levite, Avner Cohen, and A haron Kliem an all contributed to my understanding of Israeli defense industry and policy, whether they realize it or not. T om M ahnken, Andrew Parasiliti, Ken Pollack, T am ara W ittes, Rich Lacquement, Ahmed H ashim , Bill Fuller, D avid Kaiser, Heidi Rutz, and George Baer challenged, and in some cases continue to challenge, my assum ptions about Iraq. M y w ork on India owes an enorm ous debt to Steve Cohen,

Acknowledgm ents

xiii

Devin H agerty, Sumit Ganguly, Peter Lavoy, T om Thornton, Rajesh Basrur, and M ichael Krepon. Research assistants never receive the recogni­ tion they deserve, but I could not have finished this without the help of Chris Connell, A aron Frank, K ate Dumouchel, and Jam es Quinn. My parents - Bill and Kathy H oyt - and my in-laws - R ob and Polly W right provided em otional, financial, and intellectual support. I love you all, and thank you so much for all your help in so many w ays. Lisa and I are blessed to have you in our lives. Finally, this book is dedicated to my own family. M y wife Lisa has suf­ fered with this project for over 15 years. W ithout her devotion and her strong editorial hand, this book w ould not have been completed. She is truly my better half, and this book is as much hers as mine. I love you, my dearest, and thank you for everything. I had hoped that my three sons Liam , Benjamin, and Jo nathan - w ould have the opportunity to live in a safer, m ore peaceful world, although events o f the new century present new challenges. I can only hope this book contributes, in some small way, to a better understanding of how to resolve the threats and conflicts that are emerging in the developing world. I firmly believe that to achieve peace, we m ust understand w ar - and I hope this book contributes to both pursuits. W akefield, Rhode Island

Abbreviations and acronyms

AAM A CD A ADS AEW A LH A SM ASW ASW AC A TB M ATGM ATV AW ACS C3I CO IN DPSU DRDO ELIN T ECM ESM EW FAC FAE FM S GDP GN P IAF IAI IC BM IDF ID FN IG M D P InAF INS

air-to-air missile Arms Control and D isarm am ent Agency Air Defence Ship airborne early warning A dvanced Light Helicopter air-to-surface missile anti-subm arine w arfare airborne surveillance and w arning aircraft anti-tactical ballistic missile anti-tank guided missile Advanced Test Vehicle airborne w arning and control system Com m and, Control, Com m unications and Intelligence counter-insurgency Defence Public Sector Undertaking Defence Research and Developm ent O rganisation electronic intelligence electronic counter-measures electronic support measures electronic w arfare Fast A ttack Craft fuel-air explosive Foreign M ilitary Sales G ross Dom estic Product G ross N ational Product Israeli airforce Israeli A ircraft Industries intercontinental ballistic missile Israeli Defense Forces Israeli Defense Forces N avy indigenous guided missile development program m e Indian Air Force Indian N av al Service

Abbreviations an d acronym s IN SA S IQ A F ISG ISL ISR O IR BM LCA LD C M BT M RBM MWS OF OIF OSP PAF R&D RPV SA M ShShM SIG IN T SIPRI SP SR B M SSM SSN TEL UAV U N M O V IC U N SC O M WMD

Indian Small Arms System Iraqi airforce Iraqi Survey Group Israeli Shipyards Limited Indian Space Research O rganisation intermediate-range ballistic missile Light C om bat Aircraft less-developed country m ain battle tank medium-range ballistic missile m ajor w eapons system ordnance factory O peration Iraqi Freedom Off-Shore Procurement Funds Pakistani Airforce research and development Rem otely Piloted Vehicle surface-to-air missile ship-to-ship missile signals intelligence Stockholm International Peace Research Institute self-propelled short-range ballistic missile surface-to-surface missile subm arine (nuclear-powered) transporter-erector launcher Unm anned Aerial Vehicle United N ations M onitoring, Verification and Inspection Com m ission United N ations Special Com m ission w eapon(s) of m ass destruction

xv

1

Introduction

This book exam ines three of the m ost im portant regional powers of the late twentieth century, assessing the relationship between changing security calculations and m ilitary experiences on m ilitary-industrial policy. This study provides a security-based context for evaluating arm s industries of Less-D eveloped Countries (LD C s).1 This perspective is often lacking in existing literature on military industries in the developing world, which focus on issues of economic opportunity costs and dependency. Exam ination of the arm s industries of regional pow ers, in this case India, Israel, and Iraq, is particularly im portant in the changing inter­ national environment. Regional pow ers represent the m ost prolific and sophisticated producers and consum ers of arm s in the developing world. They are also the states m ost likely to pose threats to regional and inter­ national stability. The security focus o f m ost of these states, however, remains rooted in existing regional military com petitions, and m ilitary and national security perceptions center on the capabilities of neighbors and traditional rivals. Focusing on the relationship between regional security calculations and m ilitary-industrial policies serves tw o im portant purposes. First, it facili­ tates more sophisticated and accurate assessm ents of the m otivation, development, and accom plishm ents o f L D C military industries. Existing m ethodology provides inadequate m eans for m easuring the relationship between national-security requirements and military industrial policy, and for assessing the practical benefits of LD C arm s production. In addition, this dem onstrates that the security policies of developing states provide im portant indicators for their acquisition, assim ilation, and development o f dual-use or m ilitary technologies in the future. If security perception significantly affects m ilitary-industrial policy, understanding regional security concerns provides a fram ew ork for analyzing and p o s­ sibly predicting technology assim ilation and potential arm s production in future aspiring pow ers. This study concludes with a model of securitybased m ilitary-industrialization, suggesting new m ethodologies for analyz­ ing the evolution and effectiveness of L D C military industries in the emerging international system and som e policy im plications.

2

Introduction

Military industry in the developing world The accum ulation o f military strength and technological m astery in the developing w orld since 1945 is significant and im pressive. In 1950, only a few states outside Europe and N orth Am erica possessed the capability to m anufacture and, with some foreign assistance, design military w eapons, equipment, and am m unition.2 By 1985, 55 L D C s produced arm s of some kind.3 Eight of these states accounted for over 90 percent of L D C arms production, and about a dozen states were considered ‘m ajo r’ L D C producers.4 The m embers of this ‘Dirty D ozen’ figure prominently in lists of poten­ tial proliferators o f ballistic missiles and chemical, biological, and/or nuclear w eapons.5 They represent the predom inant military actors in regional state subsystem s in the developing w orld which have been the site of regional or superpow er conflict and competition. Their intentions and capabilities, therefore, pose a greater potential threat to regional and, perhaps, global stability and security than the large number of smaller, less capable L D C s.6 The evolving international system looks increasingly to regionalism as a potential solution to problem s of security, economic development, and even ecological problem s.7 Arms production by prom inent regional actors requires careful evalu­ ation for three reasons. First, these states often seek or possess the means to engage in and prolong military conflict with neighbors or states in adjoining regions; second, they m ay seek the capability to deter external intervention with locally produced w eapons; and third, local arm s produc­ tion reduces the im pact of supply constraints on their foreign and military policies. Accurately assessing the intentions and capabilities of these regional pow ers, therefore, represents an im portant priority and challenge for policym akers and analysts. Existing surveys of L D C arm s industries fail to adequately explain vari­ ations in L D C military-industrial policies both within and between regions. They also fail, in many cases, to identify or explain distinctions between the capabilities of the leading LD C arm s m anufacturers, which can be classified as ‘regional pow ers,’ and the larger number of L D C p ro ­ ducers with m odest or insignificant capacity. In particular, m ost existing analysis of L D C arms production fails to adequately assess national secur­ ity perceptions and their im pact on military preparedness, military indus­ trialization and w eapons acquisition.

The developing world: some structural considerations The developing w orld consists o f a number of interacting but still distinct regional state-system s which vary in size, influence, and im portance to the international com m unity.8 Am ong the regional systems which have been identified since the early 1960s are South A sia, N orth Africa, and the

Introduction

3

M iddle East, and more recent studies exam ine the continuing development of various types of regional systems and balances o f pow er.9 Academ ic interest in ‘non-great’ pow ers grew in the late 1960s, due both to the expansion of the number of states in the United N ations and the surprising survivability of presum ably ‘w eak states.’10 The inter­ national hierarchy of pow er is not adequately defined by only tw o tiers, however, whether they be defined as strong and weak, core and periphery, or developed and developing. At a minimum, there appears to be a nar­ row ing of the economic and military gap between the m ost advanced countries in the developing world, including the so-called ‘newly industri­ alized countries,’ and the least advanced or sm allest of the developed w orld. These states form a middle tier in the international hierarchy, and have been referred to as ‘sem i-peripheral’ states.11 They also tend to be the m ost pow erful states in their regions. Recent analysis explores the im portance of regional security dynam ics, which lie somewhere between analyses o f systemic pressures and statelevel decision-m aking on perceptions of m ilitary threats and opportunities.12 Distinct regional ‘security com plexes’ are form ed in areas of cultural sim ilarity, and are identifiable because the prim ary security rela­ tionships of states in the system are concerned with other states in the system . Relative indifference, as between Pakistan and Iran, signifies the effective boundary of a regional system . These com plexes m ay overlap one another, and pow erful states m ay have interests in more than one security com plex.13 Analysis of regional systems illuminates the prim ary security relation­ ships in the developing w orld. Although L D C s m ay share certain broad g o als,14 aggregation o f the so-called Third W orld into a unitary actor or bloc is overly sim plistic.15 The developing w orld is part of a hierarchy of global pow er based on resource endowments, economic achievements, political influence, and military capabilities.16 L D C military industrializa­ tion is m ost advanced in states which are deeply involved in regional polit­ ical-military rivalries, or which boast significant military and economic advantages over m ost of their neighbors.17 Nevertheless, these larger pow ers still face m any of the security problem s and dilemmas com m on to m ost developing states. A ssessing the nature of the security threat to an L D C is often problematic.18 The internal fragility of the developing states is a pow erful factor in their definitions of ‘national security’. N o t all L D C s actually face imminent invasion: m ost suffer more from internal threats to regime maintenance than from external threats of territorial absorption .19 States whose prim ary concerns are threats to internal security, however, have little need to create sophisticated military industries. M any developing states also face poten­ tial external threats, from regional neighbors or outside forces. It is these threats which are m ost likely to create a demand for advanced military capabilities and an expanded m ilitary-industrial base.

4

Introduction

Regional powers Regional pow ers do not easily fit the traditional descriptions of ‘great’ or ‘w eak,’ but exist as significant powers in a more limited sphere. M artin W ight identifies the regional pow er as a separate type of state, which exists not only as a dom inant pow er within a regional subsystem , but also as a middle pow er in the extended international arena.20 Regional powers occupy a hierarchically distinct position am ong L D C s, and have greater requirements for externally-focused military forces. M ost analyses of regional powers focus on issues of scale, exam ining the potential for larger L D C s to w ork their w ay into the ranks of the so-called great pow ers, and concentrate prim arily on states with relatively larger territorial, p op u ­ lation, and economic resources.21 Regional pow ers, however, also compete with neighbors in fierce regional rivalries, and these com petitions are often unevenly m atched. These com petitions tend not to result in outright conquest - a strategy of limited territorial occupation has become increasingly com m on in regional w arfare.22 Even the acquisition o f limited am ounts of territory, however, can significantly destabilize regional pow er balances. Iraq ’s aims in 1980 were limited to freeing the A rab population of Iran - which sim ultaneously w ould have secured Iraq ’s control o f significant Iranian oil assets. Indian analyses of the K argil W ar of 1999 believe Pakistan engaged in ‘salami slicing’ - whittling off small portions of Indian territory, which over time could significantly tilt the balance of pow er in the region by destabilizing India internally.23 Regional conflict therefore can force local states to solicit military assis­ tance and alliance from external powers as a m ethod of balancing power, or as a means of cementing or challenging regional hegemony. Inter­ national support has not alw ays proven reliable. Pakistan, for exam ple, w as subject to abrupt im position of sanctions by its US ally in 1965 and again in 1990. The im pact of arms supply constraints on India, Israel, and Iraq will all be discussed in later chapters. Regional pow ers m ay also find themselves the targets of m ultinational arm s em bargoes or arms transfer limits (Israel under the Tripartite Pact), of broad international sanctions (Iraq, 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 ), or of targeted supplier controls (India after the 1974 nuclear tests). Ultimately, the prim ary security concern of regional states is the imme­ diate threat, which is usually regional rather than international. In the w ords of M ichael H andel: “ The pow er of a state is thus best m easured not against all other countries, but in relation to its neighbors, and by the degree to which the strength at its disposal matches its national goals and am bitions.” 24 ‘Balance of threat’ theory, a derivative o f the traditional balance of pow er calculation, argues that states assess threat in terms of aggregate power, geographic proxim ity, offensive capability, and aggres­ sive intentions.25 In a later article, W alt posits that small states are prim ar­

Introduction

5

ily concerned with proxim ate threats, even in the face of potential great pow er conflict on the horizon.26 Regional pow ers therefore allocate military expenditures prim arily in response to local threats. However, the role of local military industrial policy in addressing these threats - a crucial element of L D C arm s pro­ curement policies - is rarely addressed.27 Equally rare are studies in which regional conflicts are viewed as the prim ary m otivation for L D C arm s pro­ duction and military expenditures.28

LDC arms procurement Faced with threats to security or unfulfilled am bitions, L D C s m ust acquire military tools appropriate to national requirements. These tools range from basic items, such as uniform s, small arm s, amm unition and tents, to extremely sophisticated and com plex w eapons and com binations of w eapons, such as aircraft, tanks, ships, or missile batteries. The latter items often require foreign assistance for training, m aintenance, produc­ tion, and integration into national military structures. Developing states have tw o security-based rationales for im porting or producing high-technology w eaponry.29 Sophisticated equipment is often required to m atch arm s available to potential adversaries. In m ost cases, this requirement is determined by the regional military balance and the force structures of neighboring states. For exam ple, “ [t]he essential objec­ tive of India’s w eapons acquisition policy is to ensure that the armed forces are always equipped with w eapons that are qualitatively equal to those available to its adversaries.” 30 Sophisticated w eaponry is also used to overcome quantitative deficien­ cies relative to m ajor rivals.31 Technology acts as a force multiplier: it can, properly used, increase the com bat effectiveness of a military organization in a m anner equivalent to or greater than an increase in its size.32 Techno­ logy alone is not sufficient to ensure deterrence or defeat of the enemy. M ilitary forces m ust be trained and organized appropriately to m aximize the advantages of sophisticated equipment and take advantage of enemy w eaknesses.33 States which are inferior in either technology or military technique m ay attem pt to com pensate by attaining quantitative superior­ ity, or m ay pursue asymm etric strategies or strategies o f exhaustion.34 The Vietnam W ar and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan are cases of technologi­ cally inferior forces overcom ing superior adversaries. L D C arms procurem ent, therefore, m ust consider the same issues which affect military decisions in the developed world. If w ar is believed likely, states m ust prepare either for decisive and rapid defeat of their opponents or a long, drawn-out battle of exhaustion.35 LD C s possess the same ability to overestimate their own capabilities or underestimate their opponents that developed states have dem onstrated in five centuries of European w arfare.36 Whether the L D C seeks quantitative or qualitative advantage,

6

Introduction

or prepares for defense or aggression, it m ust still decide w hat w eapons are necessary and whether to procure them at home or abroad.

LDCs and the international arms trade The study o f arm s production in the developing w orld is intimately linked with analysis of the international arms trade. European m astery and appli­ cation of various technologies and development of m ilitary organizations and operations which exploited those capabilities led to the creation of the colonial empires and, in a very real sense, to the m odern international system .37 The dom inant industrialized powers of the early twentieth century remained the prim ary sources of arm s technology during the Cold W ar and afterw ards. Interest in the expanding military capabilities of developing nations began in the late 1960s, when the transfer of w eapons and production technology from the developed w orld shifted from surplus W orld W ar II equipment to advanced supersonic aircraft and m issiles. These early trends were noted in tw o large studies by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the M assachusetts Institute of Technology.38 The study o f arms trade relationships in the 1 9 5 0 -7 0 period em phas­ ized characteristics of the international system that were historically unique.39 The international arm s m arket w as dom inated, tem porarily, by tw o superpow ers, as other producer states attem pted to catch up with significant changes in conventional w eapons technology, particularly in the aerospace sector, and sim ultaneously recover from W orld W ar II. The superpow ers dom inated both production of existing types of w eapons and also development of new and increasingly sophisticated system s. Both superpow ers unabashedly used arm s supplies for geopolitical gain and ideological leverage. The potential for dependence and loss of political autonom y encouraged som e L D C s to pursue strategies of im port substitu­ tion, multiple sourcing for arm s, or local or cooperative industrial efforts. Interest in L D C military and m ilitary-industrial capabilities increased during the 1970s and 1980s. Developed states began selling extremely sophisticated arms to the periphery: these arm s dem onstrated significant effectiveness in regional conflicts.40 Grow ing military capabilities, com ­ bined with policies o f m ilitary-industrial autarky, self-sufficiency, and/or self-reliance,41 raised the possibility of com petition between developed and developing w orld arm s industries in the near future.42 The com bination of new producers, im proved competition, and independence-maximizing policies contributed to significant changes in the international arms trade during the 1 9 7 0 -8 5 period. Superpow er share of arms transfers fell from over 8 0 percent in the 1960s to 51.4 percent in 1985, while other developed suppliers increased their share to over 30 percent, creating opportunities for L D C s to avoid dependent relationships with superpow er suppliers.43 L D C s increased their share of arms exports

Introduction

7

from 5.9 percent of the global m arket to 16.6 percent in the 197 4 -8 4 period.44 This period m arked the high point of both L D C arm s industries and the international arms m arket. International arm s exports boom ed, due to increased oil wealth and new high-intensity regional conflicts, m ost con­ spicuously the Iran-Iraq W ar. G lobal arm s im ports grew from $22.9 billion in 1975 to $40.3 billion in 1984. L D C purchases increased from 7 2 .7 percent of global im ports to 80.1 percent; and im ports to the M iddle E ast and Persian G ulf grew from 30 percent of the global total to 43.3 percent.45 The international arms m arket collapsed after 1988. The value of the international arm s trade declined 70 percent, from $74 billion in 1987 to about $22 billion in 199 3 .46 The end of the Iran -Iraq W ar and the con­ traction of the international m arket nearly bankrupted the Brazilian defense industry.47 Other L D C and developed arm s industries suffered severely from reduced dom estic and international demand. Studies of the international arm s industry since that time focus on the im pact of global­ ization and the effects of substantial contraction due to the end of the Cold W ar and falling defense budgets (particularly in Europe).48 A few booklength studies have considered L D C producers in the post-C old W ar period.49 In general, however, interest in the topic has w aned, and studies have focused on the im pact of contraction on larger producers, and the changing nature of the arms m arket itself.50

The study of LDC arms industries: analytical frameworks As mentioned above, study o f L D C arm s industries evolved from the study of the Cold W ar international arm s trade. M oralist traditions found in these studies profoundly affect analysis of L D C arms production.51 The m oralist position criticizes both national arm s industries and the global arm s trade. Arms producers are viewed as pursuing profits at the expense of human lives, and w eapons are blam ed for international destabilization and as a prim ary, if not the sole, cause of military conflict. This position w as widely accepted during the 1 9 1 9 -3 9 period, when critics blamed private arm am ents firms for fomenting w ars around the globe and held these sam e firms responsible for W orld W ar I.52 M any o f the studies written in the 1970s took a sim ilar tone.53 LD C arms acquisitions and pro­ duction receive special vilification. The purchase or production of arms purportedly strengthens m ilitarist and anti-dem ocratic forces in developing societies, which leads to increased repression and violation of human rights.54 The im portance of the m oralist position lies in its broad support am ong analysts of the arm s trade and of L D C arm s production. M oralist arguments are param ount in the field of peace studies, which is dom inated by structural, rather than state-level, approaches. These place primary

8

Introduction

im portance on theories of im perialism , dependence, structural violence, and dom inance.55 Prominent scholars and institutes in the peace studies field constitute some of the m ost influential and devoted analysts of LD C arms production. Existing studies of L D C arms industries can be divided into three differ­ ent groups. First are studies of individual states, either in article-length form at or in individual volum es.56 These analyses are often excellent and extremely comprehensive, but lack a com parative perspective. The second group is volumes which use multiple case studies. The case studies m ay include developed states for com parison, or m ay focus strictly on the developing w orld.57 The third group is broad surveys, which analyze LD C production as a bloc.58 Four basic theoretical approaches are identifiable in the com parative w orks, used singly or in com bination. These approaches are structural/ dependency, economic/development, dom inance/w orld system, and histor­ ical/systemic. Each approach focuses on different aspects of the m otivation for L D C arms production, and proposes different m ethods for assessing its im pact. Each approach also has proponents and pessim ists, who view develop­ ments as potentially beneficial or fundam entally detrimental to national political-econom ic health and stability. Proponents do not necessarily advocate given m ilitary-industrial policies - in m ost cases, they are agnos­ tic. Proponents do, however, recognize that the trade-offs m ade by a given state in pursuing m ilitary-industrial policies m ay not be inherently harmful to the economy of the producing state, and that local production can in some circum stances represent a logical and cost-effective response to eco­ nomic and security problem s. Each of these approaches, and the argu­ ments of its proponents and pessim ists, will be exam ined briefly below.

Structuralist/dependency approach The structuralist/dependency approach focuses on the hierarchical nature o f politico-m ilitary pow er in the Cold W ar period.59 The industrialized nations form the upper tiers of the international hierarchies of both m ili­ tary and military-industrial capability, while former colonies and develop­ ing states constitute the lower tiers. Throughout the Cold W ar period, L D C s relied on the transfer of technology, equipment, training, and know ­ ledge from more industrially and militarily sophisticated pow ers. This dependence on outside supply m ade L D C s vulnerable to em bargo or the threat of em bargo, which could be used to influence their foreign and, in some cases, dom estic policies. M any L D C s have based their m ilitary-industrial program s, at least in part, on the need to overcome or m itigate potential dependence on outside suppliers. The issue of dependence has become an im portant, and in some cases the only, security-related variable in determining the effectiveness of

Introduction

9

L D C military industries.60 One analytically compelling m ethod o f assessing L D C arm s industries consists of com paring the products and program s of LD C industries with program s and products developed in a sim ilar time period in the developed producer countries in order to assess the effective­ ness of im port-substitution.61 Other studies focus on the opportunity costs and structural inequalities between developed m ajor arm s m anufacturers and the L D C s, m easured in economic and financial terms as well as in terms of available industrial, scientific, educational, and economic resources.62 Proponents using this approach, typified by Andrew R oss, emphasize the im portance o f L D C s increasing their levels of self-sufficiency, and grad ­ ually im proving im port-substitution program s in various m ajor w eapons systems and in overall arm s procurem ent.63 Other studies favorably assess the grow th of arm s exports and technology acquisition by L D C s.64 This position is exemplified by a m odel, entitled ‘the ladder of production.’65 These proponents emphasize technology as a process. ‘Technology is perhaps best understood as an abstract version of knowledge, an attitude tow ards life and a m ethod for solving its problem s.’66 The ladder of pro­ duction is viewed as a logical m odel of L D C m ilitary-industrial develop­ ment, through which L D C s gradually absorb technological processes and concepts and convert them into military and industrial capabilities. Pessimists focus on technology as a product, and on the inability of developing states to compete with established producers in the industrial­ ized world. These studies focus on production of m ajor defense items such as tanks, supersonic aircraft, and naval vessels, emphasizing the lesssophisticated nature of L D C defense products, their poor export perform ­ ance, and the continuing L D C dependency on im ports of advanced w eaponry.67 One of the m ost im portant aspects of this new dependency, according to pessim ists, is the gradual shift am ong the m ajor LD C Table 1.1 The ladder of production The ladder o f production describes a ‘ration al’ progression of technology absorption and production capabilities. 1 2

3 4 5

In the initial underindustrialized state, the L D C purchases foreign w eapons system s, and relies heavily on foreign trainers, technicians, and advisors. As the industrial and technical base m atures. The L D C assum es greater responsibility for upkeep, maintenance, and repair o f w eapons, decreasing reliance on advisors and trainers. After extensive fam iliarization with the new technologies, states m ove to local assem bly of foreign w eapons from im ported com ponents. Assem bly, in time, leads to licensed production with increasing proportions of local content and decreasing reliance on im ported com ponents and p arts. Technological assim ilation through use and production, in theory, leads to eventual use of acquired infrastructure for local research and development (R & D ), w eapon s design, and com pletely indigenous production.

10

Introduction

producers from im ports of finished products to im ports of m anufacturing technology, known as technological dependency. The pessim ists have a different m odel of L D C industrialization, called the im port-substitution industries (ISI) m odel. This m odel assum es that the theoretical objective o f all arms producers is to reach a state of autarky, competing at the international state-of-the-art in all m ajor w eapons systems. Using this objective as the ideal, the ISI model then com pares unit costs of production, dates of introduction of systems of com parable perform ance (‘technological age’), and occasionally R & D spending as an indicator of present and future com petitiveness.68 The m ost influential pessim ist critique is em bodied in the various w orks o f Stephanie N eum an. N eum an analyzes the potential for competitive L D C production and the continuing perform ance of m ajor L D C producers against the superpow ers in both export m arkets and in indigenous devel­ opment and design of m ajor w eapons system s.69 N eum an attributes the failures of L D C industries prim arily to issues of scale. M ost L D C s lack the scientific and technical expertise necessary to m aintain a first-rate militaryindustrial base or a top-of-the-line research and development establish­ ment. Failure to keep up with high-technology R & D condemns the LD C s to second-line products, forcing them to copy or acquire technology developed elsewhere and reinforcing the cycle of dependency. In addition, m ost L D C s lack the internal m arket necessary for the m ass economies of scale necessary to keep unit costs low. This inhibits both production of new systems (im ported systems of sim ilar or greater quality are less expen­ sive) and long-term export potential of LD C-produced w eapons.

Economic/development approach The economic/developm ent approach focuses on the economic opportunity costs of L D C m ilitary-industrial policies. Proponent analysts note that, in many cases, m ilitary expenditure leads to positive effects on national eco­ nomic grow th.70 L D C s seeking to m axim ize economic development, increase security, and achieve acceptance as sym bolic equals of the indus­ trialized w orld sometimes see m ilitary-industrial policies as a m eans of ‘jum p-starting’ both economic and defense objectives.71 Some studies indi­ cate that L D C military expenditures and arm s production can have p osit­ ive im pacts on the economy sim ilar to those found in industrialized states.72 W eapons m anufacture becomes another means of m anipulating economic growth and employment, and provides im portant options for national leaders seeking to m axim ize security within the constraints of limited budgets and resources.73 M ost analysts using the economic/development approach are pessim ists, and strongly oppose the concept of L D C m ilitary-industrialization.74 From a strictly economic viewpoint, investments in civilian sectors often offer better returns than m ilitary-industrial program s. M any L D C military

Introduction

11

industries operate inefficiently. Once start-up costs, im ported m aterials and technologies, and other foreign exchange expenditures are factored in, L D C unit costs generally exceed those of systems available on the inter­ national m arket. Additionally, the goods produced often prove inferior to those available from abroad at lower prices.75 Econom ic/development analysts propose an alternate set of m odels for L D C military industrialization. Some industries, including Brazil, Singa­ pore, and Israel, are described as ‘export-oriented’ defense industries because of their interest and involvement in international arm s exports. These industries, in m any cases, will have to focus on sophisticated, hightechnology products in order to compete with other international suppli­ ers. Other states, such as India, seek prim arily to provide satisfactory levels of long-term political independence, and are titled ‘im port substitution’ defense industries.76 In producing these m odels, analysts implicitly assum e that L D C mili­ tary-industrial policies result prim arily from consideration of economic factors, particularly the possibility of lucrative arm s exports.77 While eco­ nom ic factors certainly play a role in these decisions, some analysts con­ clude that states use the purported economic benefits of m ilitary industries prim arily as a justification rather than a m otivation.78 Little evidence exists which w ould indicate that exports provide the prim ary incentive for devel­ opm ent of an arm s industry.79

Dominance/world system approach The dom inance/w orld system approach represents an off-shoot of N orth South relations theories of the late 1 9 7 0 s.80 This approach takes the developed/developing stratification of industrial, economic, and military capabilities noted in the structuralist approach and extends it. The dom i­ nance approach assum es that continuing subordination of the developing w orld constitutes a m ajor priority of these higher-level states, and that the hierarchical structure is deliberately inflexible in order to m aintain this subordination.81 This approach stresses the pernicious im pact of technology on develop­ ing countries. M any of these writings, in fact, exhibit a strong anti­ technology bias. Some analyses refer to a condition o f ‘technologism ’, peculiar to the W est and inappropriate for L D C economic, m ilitary, or developmental requirem ents.82 Others question the rationality of increas­ ingly costly high-technology w eapons which perform only m arginally better on a unit-level than their less-expensive predecessors.83 The trend tow ards increasing cost and com plexity and diminishing improvements in unit capability is viewed as particularly harm ful to LD C s. This ap proach ’s analytical focus on high-technology and its relevance for L D C s is applied to both L D C military industries and LD C military requirements and tactics. Some analysts argue that L D C s have no

12

Introduction

requirements for high-technology arm s, or else should restructure their armed forces to use low-technology m eans to counteract technological advantages available to the developed countries.84 These analyses imply or state explicitly that the production o f high-technology military goods by L D C s is unnecessary, w asteful, and provocative.85 The dom inance approach also places particular emphasis on techno­ logical dependency and the recent surge in co-production and offsets as part o f international arm s deals.86 According to this approach, the fact that L D C s now rely on established industrialized producers for m anufacturing technology instead of finished products only indicates the extent to which dependency has been accelerated by L D C im port-substitution policies.87 Dom inance theorists argue that reliance on m anufacturing technology, available at enorm ous cost and rarely operable without significant foreign training and assistance, places labor-intensive developing economies more deeply into the cycle of dependency and continued economic and social vulnerability.88

Systemic/historical approach The last o f the m ajor approaches to L D C arms production is systemicI historical. This approach accepts m any facets of the other approaches, but attem pts to put them in a historical fram ew ork by studying the production and trade in arm s in other periods. Only a few book-length studies use this approach, but they are am ong the m ost im portant in the arms trade literature.89 The im portance of the systemic approach lies in its com parative nature. Variations and continuities within the international arm s m arket and the hierarchy of producers become easier to discern through exam ination of several different periods. This approach identifies a series o f different ‘tiers o f production,’ based on the diffusion of dom inant military-related tech­ nologies and the skills, techniques, and infrastructure necessary for their production. This approach therefore represents a significant expansion on the ‘developed/developing’ stratification prominent in other approaches. The analysis o f the diffusion of military technology and arm s produc­ tion bears considerable similarity to R aym ond V ernon’s product cycle, originally identified in the context of the spread of civilian technologies,90 which predicts the diffusion of m anufacturing capability in the following manner: 1 2

A product is invented in one state, and sold first dom estically and then later on the international m arket. As new products are developed, declining economic returns on invest­ ment prom pt the sale o f production technology overseas and the establishm ent of foreign subsidiaries to take advantage of lower cost factors.

Introduction 3

13

A bsorption o f m anufacturing technology and know-how combined with lower production costs eventually allow the new m anufacturer to export the product back to the original producer.

There are, naturally, significant differences between the production of military equipment, intended for defense of national territory, sovereignty, and interests, and the production of transistor radios, basketball shoes, and other civilian goods. States often attem pt to m aintain control over production and dissem ination of critical defense technologies - the Soviets produced special low-technology versions of their w eapons for export, and the US insists on end-user restrictions. Nevertheless, defense technology diffuses, through licensed production, espionage, reverse-engineering, or adaptation of dual-use goods based on related civilian technologies. The m ost extensive systemic study identifies five different tiers in the arm s production hierarchy, based on time of entry into the ranks of pro­ ducers, infrastructure, and production capability.91 This hierarchy is briefly described in Table 1.2.92 This expanded hierarchical structure, superim posed on several arms of transfer systems, illuminates the flexibility within and between tiers across various periods.93 China and the O ttom an Em pire, tw o o f the earliest users of gunpow der, fell from the ranks of the leading producers by the eight­ eenth century. France, Germ any, and the U K, which formed the first tier in the late nineteenth century, now constitute dom inant m embers of the second tier. In each system, smaller developed producers and states in the periphery m ade up the lower rungs of the second tier and the third tier. Even during the rise of industrialization and the dynamic grow th of European military power, regional pow ers existed, and created military industries and capabilities subject to some of the sam e constraints that are evident today. The O ttom an Empire, Jap an , and China, for exam ple, all failed to compete industrially or militarily with European great pow ers,

Table 1.2 The hierarchy of production Tier One:

Tier Tw o:

Tier Three:

Tier Four: Tier Five:

States which innovate at the technological frontier, and therefore tem porarily becom e the sole or dom inant producers o f a given arm s technology. States which produce at or near the technological frontier, and are capable of adap tin g existing technology to m arket and security requirements. States which copy and reproduce (apply) existing technologies, but which do not capture the underlying process o f innovation or adaptation. States which acquire and use existing technologies, but are incapable o f production. States which either acquire technologies and cannot use them or which do no obtain them at all.

14

Introduction

but used im ported and locally-produced military technology to great effect in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.94 V arious Indian principalities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries built significant military forces based on locally-produced or im ported arm s.95 In the early nineteenth century Egypt built a significant military industry based on French expertise.96 In the late nineteenth century, both China and Jap an developed local defense industries based prim arily around regional military requirem ents.97 In the case of Jap an , m ilitary-industrialization contributed to both eco­ nomic grow th and, after the R usso-Japanese W ar, great pow er status. Arms procurem ent and production in less-developed states and regional pow ers, therefore, is a phenomenon dem onstrated across a wide range of historical experience. D isaggregating the hierarchy of production by considering it in different eras provides valuable insights into trends in the arms industry. Systemic analysts challenge the bias against licensed m anufacture evident in other approaches. Licensed production, from this perspective, represents a natural and historically validated m ethod for states to create or m aintain competitive industries in times of significant technological change or increasing R & D or unit costs. When unit costs are low, and generations of equipment turn over rapidly, states replace their arsenals frequently and this in turn permits economies of scale that allow multiple m ajor produc­ ers. As unit costs increase, the number of m ajor producers falls, and more states are forced to rely on licenses and other transfers.98 Licensed m anufacture played a critical role in W orld W ar II. The Ja p a n ­ ese airforce w as based on an am algam ation of US, British, French, and Germ an technologies, R u ssia’s T-34 tank w as based on US designs, and the P-51 M ustang fighter only became effective after the US airfram e was merged with a British Rolls-Royce M erlin engine.99 Licensed production also played an im portant role in the re-establishment o f Europe’s arms industries after W orld W ar II. The US supplied billions of dollars in O ff­ Shore Procurement Funds, including joint N A T O projects and licensed production efforts.100 Systemic studies use analysis of products, in the form of w eapons p ro ­ duced, m anufacture under license, share of export m arkets, and overall military and R & D expenditure, in an effort to understand the diffusion of technological p rocesses. This contrasts significantly with other approaches to L D C arm s production, which view the products as sym ptom atic of an apparently irrevocable position of dependency on the part of the develop­ ing world. By distinguishing multiple tiers o f production and focusing on the historical process of technological change and diffusion, systemic analysis more accurately describes the position of both L D C and lesser industrialized producers in the global system.

Introduction

15

Existing frameworks: the missing variable Each of these approaches complements one or more of the others, and illu­ minates certain facets o f the global economy, the international arms m arket, and the international system as they affect LD C military-industrial decision-making. The focus on economic and system-wide factors, however im portant, ultimately fails to explain critical variables in the m otivation for and capability o f L D C arm s industries. Existing studies of L D C arms industries frequently attem pt to assess effect without adequately considering cause. States acquire arm s to defend them selves from aggression or to expan d their ow n pow er over neighbors. The bulk o f the current liter­ ature on L D C arm s production virtually ignores the m ilitary require­ ments which drive arm s purchases and production, and the m ilitary im plications of production on local and regional security relationships. Over tw o m illenia ago, Thucydides identified three m otives which deter­ mine the actions o f states: honor, self-interest, and fear.101 Contem porary analyses o f L D C arm s production virtually ignore the issues o f honor, which m ight also be defined as prestige, and fear (security), focusing pri­ m arily on self-interest defined in econom ic term s.102 Political and security m otives for arm s production are reduced in these studies to fear of dependency and loss o f auton om y.103 Dependency constitutes an im port­ ant factor, and experience of em bargo inarguably rem ains a significant variable in L D C m ilitary-industrial policy.104 This concept of dependence as the dom inant security m otive for L D C arm s producers, however, dem onstrates the existing focus on political-econom ic, rather than political-m ilitary, concerns. A ssessing the political-military considerations which drive LD C military industrial policy and arm s procurem ent requires a different analytical focus. O bjectionable though it may be to some analysts of L D C arms industries, the realist notion that the international system consists of indi­ vidual states competing for survival, power, and hegemony in an anarchic environment remains a critical tool for analyzing many aspects of LD C m ilitary-industrial decision-m aking.105 The procurem ent of w eapons reflects a state’s perceptions of and response to security threats and political am bitions. Possession o f arms or a reputation for successful use of arm s provides the dual benefit of deter­ ring potential aggressors from attem pting to carry out their objectives by force, and the option of compelling other states to comply with national objectives through threats or force.106 W eapons also provide the m eans, if diplom acy fails, to defend against enemy capabilities and/or attack enemy assets, including military forces, territory, or economic resources.107 Consideration of military-industrial policy in the absence of these politicalmilitary realities risks ‘m issing the forest for the trees.’ K rause assesses the m otivations for arm s production as pursuit o f

16

Introduction

pow er, w ealth, and victory in w ar.108 According to his analysis, only first-tier producers exhibit all three m otivations. Their quasi-m onopoly on state-of-the-art technology, developed first in response to victory in w ar (security/military) objectives and am bitions, allow s them to exploit the technology not only for wealth (profit) but also in the pursuit o f pow er the transfer of new technologies in return for alliances, bases, and other political gain s.109 Second-tier producers, initiating production after the innovators, are particularly active on the international m arket (wealth).110 These producers have difficulty keeping up with the technological state-of-the-art, and often m ust export abundantly in order to reach the economies of scale necessary to lower unit costs. This includes the sale of production technology, if necessary, in order to m aintain their defense industrial base. The third-tier of producers consists of late or inefficient industrializers: their rationale is prim arily victory in w ar, defined as security, regional hegemony, or global status and prestige.111 M ost w eapons producers, both industrialized and developing, can be classified as ‘partially dependent’ on im ported arm s, m anufacturing technology, or w eapons designs - a circum stance that is only increasing in the emerging globalized arms industry. This reality of partial dependence, also referred to as self-reliance, is fundam ental to understanding security policy in both developing and industrialized states. It reflects the changing nature of technology, the uneven distribution of technologies, skills, and capabilities, and the increasing com plexity of w arfare. M ost arms producers are neither superpow ers nor first-tier producers. W eaker states m ust, in theory, pursue rational arms procurem ent and p ro ­ duction policies, because of their fundam ental lack of resources.112 M any states attem pt to acquire and m aintain som e dom estic arms m anufacturing capability and exploit existing com parative advantages.113 Smaller industri­ alized second-tier arms producers m aintain rational m ilitary-industrial pol­ icies designed to m axim ize political independence while m aintaining adequate military capability vis-a-vis existing m ilitary threats and national am bitions.114 Estim ating the effectiveness of L D C arm s production, therefore, requires analysis of the security requirements and political am bitions of the producer states. M ajo r L D C producers include N orth and South Korea, Egypt, Israel, Chile, Brazil Argentina, South Africa, Taiw an, China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Iran, and Iraq .115 These are states which exist in distinct regional state sub-system s, are involved in rivalries with neighbors, and suffered em bargoes or threats to alliances which con­ tributed to concerns over security. Balanced analysis of the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of their respective industries, therefore, m ust reflect the security environments in which they interact, national goals and am bi­ tions, and experiences and expectations regarding the intentions of exter­ nal pow ers in their regions.

Introduction

17

Methods of analysis The accelerating pace of technological change and the development of m il­ itary techniques to convert new technology into decisive military cap ­ abilities form s a pattern which has dom inated w arfare, and by extension the international system, for centuries. This pattern m anifests itself at any given time as a global military culture - a rough hierarchy o f military capability.116 The m ost advanced states in this culture have m astered the technologies and/or techniques that constitute the contem porary inter­ national ‘state of the art.’ In effect, states innovate, adapt, apply, and acquire military skills in a manner sim ilar to their acquisition o f technology. States which function at levels closer to the global ‘state of the art’ have significant potential mili­ tary advantages over states operating further from the global standard. One m ethod o f im proving relative position in global military culture is through exposure to m odern w arfare and sophisticated military technique. Another m ethod is to increase a society’s exposure to and m astery of the technological skills and processes that are associated with the state of the art. A third is to increase fam iliarity and expertise with the m ajor military technologies available on the global m arket. The study of L D C military industries m ust encom pass the efforts of middle pow ers to improve their position in the global military culture. Evaluation o f industrial efforts also needs to reflect the applicability of production to regional security requirements. States rarely m ake rapid dra­ m atic positive shifts in either global m ilitary culture or in the global hier­ archy of production - but even some positive change signifies a substantial increase in m ilitary potential. This study will exam ine three of the m ost influential and im portant L D C arms producers of the late twentieth century. Israel and India repre­ sent the tw o m ost persistent and sophisticated LD C producers in the Cold W ar period. Each state created large m ilitary industries producing a wide range of conventional and unconventional arm s, and military-industrial policy in each state has been an im portant issue in both national security and economic debates since the late 1940s. Iraq, by contrast, provides an exam ple of a recent industrializer. These three states also represent different m odels of dom estic political and economic development. India, the w orld’s largest democracy, has one o f the w orld’s m ost pow erful and autonom ous civil services - and a tradi­ tion of virtual non-involvement by Parliament in security affairs.117 Israel’s highly participatory dem ocracy dem onstrates considerable sophistication and concern over military expenditures, foreign affairs, and national secur­ ity - with the prom inent exception o f nuclear w eapons development.118 Iraq represents a classic totalitarian state, where wealth, authority, and decision-making are concentrated in the hands of only a few individuals and public participation in national security decisions is, at best, minimal.

18

Introduction

These distinctions are im portant in determining the relative im portance of regime type and of bureaucratic and dom estic political influences on LD C m ilitary-industrial policy. As mentioned above, various authors have defined L D C production in terms of ‘export-oriented’ and ‘im port-substitution’ m odels, while others have stressed the im portance of dom estic economies of scale. The relation­ ship between these tw o separate variables is unclear. In order to compete effectively in the global arm s m arket, a state m ust be competitive in at least some high-technology areas. This level o f technological absorption only comes at substantial social and economic cost. Logically, only states with significant resource endowments w ould be able to afford these expenditures. In fact, however, there is not a clear relationship between size and technological competitiveness, at least at first glance. M ajo r LD C exporters have at various times included Brazil, China, Israel, South K orea, and Singapore - but never India, despite its vast resources and form idable scientific and technical establishment. Econom ic factors do not adequately explain international competitiveness in the arms sector. When the security variable is included, however, structural factors may provide greater insight. As mentioned above, technology can act as a force multiplier in w arfare, creating synergies and capabilities that allow smaller com batants to overcome quantitative disadvantages. It is possible that smaller size and resource endowments m ay act as a positive stim ulant to more rapid technological absorption and innovation. This absorption will be reflected in the capabilities demanded by the military, and therefore (over time) those w eapons produced by the country as part of a policy of self-reliance. Accordingly, smaller countries may have greater incentive to strive for globally competitive arms production than larger, relatively more secure countries. 119 119 Each of these states, therefore, responds to different types of security threats with relatively different resource endowments and different polit­ ical and economic systems. One critical issue for each is dependency w hat level of extra-regional influence is acceptable in order to m aintain national security? Another is technology and the im portance of quality versus quantity. A third is the acquisition of unconventional w eapons. This approach will identify com m on factors and create an additional, securitybased m odel of L D C military industrialization. In each case, the introduction will include a general discussion of the security dilemma and objectives for each state and an analysis of the potential o f the arms industry at the end of the Cold W ar. Analysis of the state’s military-industrial development will be broken into several periods, each bounded by significant international, regional, or dom estic events or crises. C om parison of policy priorities and changes between these periods, as the level of threat fluctuated, permits assessm ent of the im pact of these crises and threats on national military and military-

Introduction

19

industrial policy. This m ethodology also helps take the inevitable time lags associated with policy shifts and com plex projects into account. Specific m ilitary-industrial program s will be exam ined in each era, and when long-standing program s exist, such as aircraft production in India, they will be assessed in several different periods. Both conventional and unconventional w eapon production will be exam ined. Projects will be an a­ lyzed based on the initial objectives o f the program and the eventual im pact of the program on military encounters, regional military capability, and deterrence. The context in which decisions were m ade will be a m atter o f particular em phasis. W eapons are often produced long after program initiation, when political and security conditions have fundam entally changed. Technology will be analyzed as both a product, in terms of specific pieces of equipment, and also in terms of assim ilation - the acquisition of knowledge, technical skills, and infrastructure. The definition of ‘local pro­ duction,’ as a result, will take a lowest com m on denom inator approach based on US policy concerning co-production, which includes any program that: enables an eligible foreign government, international organization, or designated comm ercial producer to acquire the ‘know -how ’ to m anu­ facture or assemble, repair, m aintain and operate, in whole or in part, a specific w eapon, com m unication or support system, or an individual military item .120 Prevailing m ethodology for the study of L D C arm s industries relies pri­ marily on analysis of M ajor W eapons Systems (MW S), defined as ships, air­ craft, arm ored vehicles, and m issiles.121 The advantage of M W S as a unit of measure comes from relative ease of detection: they are easily quantified. ‘Bean-counting’ of m ajor w eapons systems, however, provides a demon­ strably inadequate means of assessing military capability. Iraq ’s m asses of arm or and relatively large and sophisticated airforce proved nearly w orth­ less in com bat against Coalition forces. Focus on M W S production pro­ vides a similarly inadequate measure of industrial capability and national military-industrial priorities. Production of artillery ammunition, for exam ple, m ay represent a far more im portant contribution to LD C military capability than the production of self-propelled artillery pieces, but only the latter are m easured by current m ethodology. Existing m ethodology also fails to examine the development and im pact of industrial facilities which specialize in repair and maintenance of existing military equipment. This study therefore shall exam ine five categories of military-industrial production. These are, respectively: 1

Endurance: the basic building blocks of military strength, including small arm s; light crew-served w eapons such as machine guns and

20

2

3 4 5

Introduction m ortars; ‘dumb m unitions’ such as artillery shells, aerial bom bs, and mines; auxiliary equipment such as tents, trucks, jeeps, uniform s, and tires; other m iscellaneous but unsophisticated items, and capabilities for repair and m aintenance of existing equipment. N on-platform w eapons: these include artillery pieces; battlefield rockets; various m issiles; guided w eapons; electronics system s; torpe­ does; and other naval ordnance. M odification program s: locally-designed m odifications of im ported equipment of all types. M ajor w eapons p latform s122: arm ored vehicles; aircraft; large naval com bat vessels (over 300 tons). Strategic system s: chemical and biological w eapons capabilities; nuclear w eapons developments; long-range (over 100 km) missiles; cruise m issiles; satellites and other space reconnaissance capability; and space launch vehicles.

The difficulty of obtaining accurate data on arm s issues is well-docum ented.123 Analysis based on the convenient and quantifiable factors of military spending and transfers o f m ajor w eapons systems provides an inadequate picture of national military capabilities, priorities, and militaryindustrial capability. SIPRI estimates consistently understated the cap ­ abilities of m ajor L D C producers such as Israel and Iraq .124 They utterly failed to reflect endurance or m odification capabilities which provide enorm ous benefits in actual armed conflict. The m ajority of data publicly available focuses on w eapons platform s (aircraft, ships, and arm ored vehicles), and places little im portance on the trade in or production of electronics system s, light and medium arms, and munitions. Evidence m ust therefore be drawn from biographical, anecdo­ tal, and secondary sources, as well as defense and military journals. Esti­ m ates of the effectiveness of logistics and maintenance systems will be primarily based on p ast com bat perform ance and on evidence o f the ability to produce significant portions of equipment locally. Consideration of technology as a process suggests that local m aintenance can provide know ­ ledge and skills which can lead to both enhanced military perform ance and m ilitary-industrial capability, and that local production can provide some of the skills and equipment necessary for im proving local m aintenance and support functions and, therefore, enhancing the effectiveness o f existing equipment in com bat.125 M odification and m odernization program s, using locally-produced or im ported subsystem s to upgrade w eapons effectiveness and extend service life of existing equipment, will receive particular atten­ tion, as these provide evidence o f the transfer of process skills and assim i­ lation o f technology. Where appropriate and available, standard data has been provided as a general means o f dem onstrating changes in military priorities and procure­ ment policy. This data is far from comprehensive, and often inconsistent.

Introduction

21

Expressions of military expenditures as a percentage o f G ross N ational Product (GNP) or G ross Dom estic Product (GDP) give a rough estimate of the im pact of m ilitary spending on a national economy, and changes in these figures m ay indicate increased or decreased concern with national security. D ata provided by the Arms Control and D isarm am ent Agency is used in m ost of these tables for the sake of consistency. Estim ates of mili­ tary spending and exports, particularly in the Israeli case, differ widely, and some inconsistencies are, regrettably, unavoidable. Errors in applica­ tion and interpretation of this data are the sole responsibility of the author. The conclusion will discuss the ram ifications for the study of L D C arms industries and the evolving international system, and present a securityb ased m odel of L D C industrialization that will, hopefully, spur further study. If regional security calculations dom inate the m ilitary-industrial pol­ icies o f significant LD C producers, this will both provide alternatives to existing analyses of military production and also a means, perhaps, for anticipating changes in the policies of future producers and aspiring pow ers. Focus on security issues as a policy determinant will encourage the development of new tools for assessing the rationality and costeffectiveness of L D C m ilitary-industrial policies and the potential direction of these policies in the future.

2

India

Background On A ugust 15, 1947, after alm ost tw o centuries of European dom ination, India achieved its independence. The new Indian state’s foreign policy eschewed violence as a m eans of settling disputes.1 As a leader of the N o n ­ Aligned M ovem ent, India w as theoretically comm itted to the concept of peaceful coexistence and resistance to participation in superpow er blocs.2 India refused to join either superpow er alliance network: It w as through ‘subordinate alliances’ for the purposes of defending their territories that the rulers of India lost their independence. By calling in a stronger pow er to help you in defending your independ­ ence, you subordinate your policies to the advice of the protecting power. Thus an alliance between states, which are not mutually dependent, but one of which is very much stronger while the other seeks protection, leads to the subordination of the w eaker partner.3 India’s quest for self-sufficiency in arm s production reflects this elite preference for independence. In practice, however, India’s behavior has been m ore traditional. The essentially realist doctrine of m andala remains a part of Indian political and strategic culture.4 N on-alignm ent has been used in com bination with more traditional m eans to further Indian regional and international objectives. India seeks the prestige and authority of a m ajor pow er, as well as recognition o f its role as the dom inant pow er in South A sia.5 India’s eco­ nomic and cultural predom inance within the region is indisputable.6 Indian claim s to great pow er status rest on a number o f factors, including the size of its population, the talent and creativity o f its scientific and technical sectors,7 its status as the largest democracy in the w orld, and its leadership in the Non-Aligned M ovem ent and role as the articulator of a m oral alternative to M achiavellian international politics.8 The Indian military exerts only m arginal influence in dom estic and international policy. The Army represented one of the prim ary sym bols of

India

23

Imperial authority, and repressed nationalist dem onstrations in the pre­ independence period.9 The Congress Party did not trust the military after independence, and deliberately undermined its authority, stature, and pres­ tige. Since 1962, the role and status o f the military in Indian society has grow n as a result of regional conflicts and international peacekeeping activities.10 The Indian arm ed forces have engaged in international conflicts or interventions on at least ten occasions since independence.11 Partition between secular India and M uslim Pakistan w as m arked by vicious rioting, m ass em igration, and w ar.12 From 1 9 6 0 -7 2 , India successfully annexed the former Portugese colony of G oa, suffered an ignom inious defeat to China in the H im alayan m ountains, and engaged in three separate conflicts with Pakistan. The last of these, in 1971, resulted in the secession of Bangladesh and the achievement o f regional hegemony under Prime M inister Indira Gandhi. In 1974 India dem onstrated its nuclear capability - a capability that remained m ostly theoretical until a second series of tests in 19 9 8 .13 In the 1980s and 1990s however, Pakistan’s development of nuclear capabilities neutralized India’s larger conventional forces.14 India’s armed forces engaged in border conflicts with Pakistan; helped suppress seces­ sionist and insurgent movements in Punjab, Kashm ir, and the northeast; intervened in Sri Lanka and the M aldives; and expanded in force structure and potential range of operations, including a series of aggressive military exercises on the Pakistani and Chinese borders. The utility of a large mili­ tary as a prestige instrument w as apparently attractive to political leaders, but India’s foreign and national security policy suffered from w hat has been described as an ‘absence of strategic thinking.’15 India’s national security policies shifted substantially after the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in 1 9 9 8 .16 India’s test w as prom pted by both international and regional considerations, including the threat of broad international sanctions against states which did not fall under the N uclear N onproliferation T reaty.17 Flaw ed assum ptions regarding the utility o f nuclear w eapons in regional politics - particularly the belief that nuclearization w ould force Pakistan to accept Indian regional ascendance were exposed in the Kargil conflict.18 These events contributed to a new Indian security posture, including a public nuclear doctrine, the develop­ ment of nuclear com m and and control structures, and increased emphasis on the role of the military in contributing to national security policy. India’s defense industry has been used as the prim ary exam ple of an ‘im port-substitution’ or im port-oriented m odel o f LD C military industries.19 The arm s industry reflects the desire of the Indian government for international prestige as well as military self-sufficiency, and has em phas­ ized high-visibility development and production o f the m ost m odern types of m ajor w eapons systems. The contribution of these efforts to Indian mili­ tary capability have been substantial - at least within the South Asian region. The w eapons which have been produced, often at great expense,

24

India

have m aintained and expanded India’s quantitative and qualitative m ili­ tary advantage over Pakistan.20

Indian security perception Under the Empire, Indian security revolved around the concept of ‘the barrack,’ a series of concentric rings of states or geographic regions which provided a buffer for the Indian heartland. Imperial policy focused on physically subduing the inner ring of the barrack, including the northwest frontier, the Indian O cean, and the Bay of Bengal, while neutralizing the outer ring through diplom acy, threat, and bribery.21 The partition of India removed the former northwest buffer, and placed a hostile Pakistan with unrealized territorial am bitions next to the Indian heartland at the same time that a resurgent China loom ed om inously in the northeast.22 In addi­ tion, W orld W ar II dem onstrated the vulnerability of the Indian Ocean to foreign interference. Since independence, India has required military force to respond to security problem s at four different levels: internal strife, regional conflict, extra-regional intervention from China, and superpow er interference in the regional system .23 Internal security threats arise from the multi-ethnic nature of the Indian state, and fall into tw o broad categories: com m unal or economic disturbances and separatist m ovem ents.24 M ost potential sepa­ ratist movements are located in peripheral regions. Chief am ong these are the restless tribal areas of the northeast and A ssam , where M izo and N aga rebels have been armed by China and Pakistan.25 N um erous other ethnic and com m unal insurgencies exist in India as well.26 In the W est, Kashm ir w as largely absorbed into India in 1947, despite its M uslim m ajority population, and remains a regional flashpoint today.27 Punjab is the home of m ost of India’s Sikh population, and a nationalist movement seeking an independent Sikh hom eland (‘K halistan’) began a violent insurgency in the early 1 9 8 0 s.28 Pakistan funded and supported insurrections in both regions. K ashm ir continues to represent the m ost likely spark for a future Indo-Pakistani conflict, as dem onstrated in both the 1999 K argil W ar and the 2 0 0 1 -0 2 ‘Com pound C risis.’ Pakistan represents the only threat to Indian regional dom inance.29 The assum ption that M uslim s and H indus required separate states inspired the creation of Pakistan, but India’s successful incorporation of a large M uslim minority into an avowedly secular national fram ew ork implicitly threatens this ‘tw o-state’ concept. The Pakistani military plays an unhealthy role in dom estic politics - experiments with democracy have been unsuccessful, and the army believes that its status as the defender of Pakistan and the prim ary sym bol of national unity permits it to freely intervene in both dom estic and foreign policy.30 Pakistan and India engaged in three m ajor w ars and one serious border skirm ish in the 1 9 4 7 -7 1 period. India seized the Siachen Glacier in 1984, sparking an

India

25

ongoing border skirmish. M ilitary exercises, unrest in Kashm ir and Punjab, and border tensions nearly led to w ar in 1 9 8 6 -8 7 and 1990. A Pakistani military incursion across the Line o f Control in Kashm ir led to a limited w ar in the K argil region in 1999, and terrorist attacks on the Indian parliam ent in N ew Delhi sparked a crisis that nearly led to w ar in both Jan uary and June of 2 0 0 2 . Pakistan has provided support for regional and international terrorist groups, but more recently has become an im portant US ally in the global w ar on terrorism .31 Indian policy tow ards both China and the superpow ers has been fundam entally defensive, focusing on isolation of the region and deterrence o f outside intervention. The Chinese threat also influenced India’s develop­ ment of nuclear w eapons and long-range ballistic m issiles.32 Superpower threats were m anaged diplom atically, including India’s Treaty of Peace, Friendship and C ooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971.

Military-industrial policy India’s defense industries are intended to provide those arm am ents and supplies necessary for national defense, and to ensure that India does not have to rely excessively on external supplies or foreign support. In the 1970s, there w as a gradual shift from a policy of self-sufficiency, or the pursuit o f autarky, to one o f self-reliance, which allow ed a higher level of defense im ports from politically trustworthy and reliable partners W estern Europe and the Soviet U nion.33 Because m ilitary-industrial efforts reflect India’s self-image and global status, the procurem ent process is subject to input from three groups: the military, political leaders and civil service bureaucrats, and economists. Each o f these groups has different key interests, which vie for predom inance subject to the availability of foreign exchange and financial reserves and changes in the security threat.34 The military desires to m atch the technological quality of w eapons available to traditional foes, prim arily Pakistan, and to respond rapidly to changes in the balance of forces. Importing proven w eapons already under production in the m ajor industrialized military pow ers provides the m ost satisfactory solution. Pakistan possesses very limited military-industrial capability, and m ust therefore purchase m ost m ajor w eapons systems abroad. India can then purchase a counter-balancing w eapons system and be assured of reasonably quick delivery. Political leaders and civil service bureaucrats attem pt to prom ote India’s political and military independence and to assert India’s claim to great pow er status. These priorities require the establishm ent of a dom estic mili­ tary-industrial base which can design, develop and produce the equipment required by the military. The civil service plays a critical role in this process: India’s military industries are specifically earm arked as the exclus­ ive responsibility of the state sector in the Industrial Resolution Policy of 19 4 8 .35 Bureaucrats and politicians prefer am bitious local R & D and

26

India

production program s to foreign im ports, arguing that only through exten­ sive local industrial program s can India ever achieve independence. Econom ists have a third perspective, strongly tempered by the limited availability of foreign exchange. Imports which fed the hungry or enhanced India’s long-term economic development generally received priority for scarce resources.36 Econom ists therefore supported a middle path - the im port of m anufacturing technology, which could be used to gradually increase India’s military production infrastructure and capabilities. India must, according to this view, accept some dependence on supplies of spare parts and m anufacturing technology in order to acquire technological skills and capabilities which can be transferred to the rest of the economy. Analysis of Indian security policy is com plicated by the virtual absence o f any long-term planning. India never com m issioned a white paper on defense in the twentieth century, and the role of the military in form ulating national security remained minimal until after the Kargil W ar.37 Security considerations, therefore, were generally defined in non-military terms, reinforcing perceptions that India lacks a coherent strategy.38 Because India seeks recognition as a great power, m ilitary-industrial policy often appears to prioritize sym bol over substance even though it has contributed significantly to national security.39

Structure of the Indian defense industry In the 1990s, the Indian m ilitary-industrial com plex consisted o f 39 ord­ nance factories (with more under construction),40 nine (later reduced to eight) defense public sector undertakings (DPSUs),41 and a vast array of public and private research, development and sm all production facilities. A separate Defense Research and Developm ent O rganization (D R D O ) over­ sees research and development (R & D ) for local production, although some firms also do ‘in-house’ R & D as well. The DPSUs were either established by the government, or were taken over or merged with government firms in an effort to nationalize the defense industries.42 Virtually all of India’s defense production is in the hands of the public sector, with the exception of some dual-use items, com ponents, and non-lethal equipment. Recent reform s are attem pting to open up the defense sector for participation by private firms, including those with up to 2 6 percent foreign equity - but state controlled industries dom inate the defense sector.43 In 1995, the Indian government announced plans to increase self-reliance and local p ar­ ticipation in defense procurem ent from 30 percent to 70 percent by 2005 an effort that has not been successful.44 Defense Public Sector Undertakings (D PSU s)45 The DPSUs m anufacture all o f the locally-produced m ajor w eapons systems for the Indian arm ed services with the exception of tanks and

India

27

artillery, which are produced at government Ordnance Factories. Several of the DPSUs, including Bharat Earth M overs Limited (BEM L) and Praga T ools Lim ited (PTL), actually produce the bulk o f their goods for the civil­ ian or dual-use industrial sector, and are only m arginally involved in the m anufacture o f defense equipm ent.46 Other DPSUs, particularly H industan Aeronautics Ltd (H A L), are involved prim arily in the design, development, and construction of expen­ sive and sophisticated w eapons systems for the armed forces. H A L has developed 11 types of aircraft from in-house R & D and produced 13 types under license. It also supports the Indian Space Research O rganization space vehicle program , along with Bharat Dynam ics Ltd (BD L).47 H A L suffers from low worker productivity levels, like m ost elements of the Indian defense sector. In 1999, H A L employed 5 0 ,0 0 0 w orkers, and pro­ duced $500 million in sales. In com parison, Israel Aircraft Industries employed 14,000 w orkers and produced $2 billion in sales.48 Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Bharat Dynam ics Ltd (BDL), and M ishra D hatu N igham (M ID H A N I) are involved in the high-technology arenas, including electronics, missile production, sophisticated com posite m aterials and super alloys. These sectors will be crucial if India wishes to compete in the international defense industrial sector in the twenty-first century. M azagon D ockyard Ltd (M D L) is India’s m ajor m ilitary shipyard. Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) in Calcutta are venerable, smaller shipyards which m anufacture corvette­ sized com bat vessels am ong other projects. All three shipyards produce prim arily for the civilian economy.49 The DPSUs produce a wide range of military and civilian goods, ranging from blankets to supersonic fighters. They are responsible for pro­ ducing a significant portion of India’s defense requirements, and contribute to Indian research and development efforts in the armam ents sector.50 Defense Research an d Developm ent O rganization (D R D O ) Shortly after independence, the Indian government established the Science Research and Developm ent O rganization, to carry out and coordinate high-technology research and development with military applications. The Defence Science Service w as established in 1952 to encourage young scien­ tists in defence-related research. The technical development establishments o f the three armed services and the Defence Science O rganization were combined into the Defence Research and Developm ent O rganization in Jan uary 1958. The Defence M inister’s Research and Developm ent C om ­ mittee w as constituted in 1 9 5 9 -6 0 to consider all D R D O -related m atters.51 D R D O received a m ajor boost in the early 1980s under V.S. Arunachalam , expanding its research labs by over 33 percent. By 1991, D R D O included 49 laboratories and establishm ents, and over 1,700 ‘research establishm ents,’ which N ehru once referred to as the ‘temples of m odern

28

India

India.’52 This number has now increased to 51 laboratories and establishm ents.53 D R D O employs 5,0 0 0 scientists and approxim ately 2 5 ,0 0 0 technicians.54 D R D O is responsible for alm ost all R & D for the ordnance factories, which have little or no ‘in-house’ capability.55 D R D O labs co op­ erate with the R & D facilities at other PSDUs, including H A L, BEL, and B D L .56 The Ordnance Factories The O rdnance Factories (OF) function alm ost exclusively for military requirements, and produce m ost of the arm y’s basic equipment. The O rd­ nance Factories are divided into five groups: the Clothing G roup, the Am munition and Explosives G roup, the W eapons G roup, the Arm oured Vehicles G roup, and the Vehicles G roup, and are sited throughout the country.57 The O F com plex employed over 177,000 people in 1990, but this number declined to about 133,000 in 2 0 0 2 .58 The O F com plex produces a wide range of products including small arm s, artillery, m ortars, am m unition, vehicles, tanks and other arm ored vehicles, rockets, optical and sighting devices, and anti-aircraft guns as well as basic supplies such as rope, tents, and clothing.59 O F production w as roughly 80 percent of the value of DPSU production in 2 0 0 1 -0 2 , and the O F com plex hoped to utilize more of its surplus capacity in the p ro ­ duction o f civilian g o o d s.60 In 2 0 0 2 -0 3 , the O rdnance Factories produced R s6 1 0 5 crores (61.05 billion rupees) in total value, of which R s7 5 6 crores (R s7.56 billion) were non-defense sales.61 The Ordnance Factories export to over 30 countries, but the value of exports w as only R s35 crores (R s350 million, or roughly $8 million) in 2 0 0 1 -0 2 .62 The Ordnance Factories are now able to produce m ost o f the w eapons and auxiliary equipment required for the Indian army. The fact that m ost o f these items lie in the low-to-medium range of technological sophistica­ tion m akes local production for the ground forces easier to achieve and sustain.63 The m ost expensive and sophisticated systems produced for the Army by the O rdnance Factories are tanks and other arm ored vehicles. The Ordnance Factories often, however, operate at very low rates of p ro ­ duction, which reduces efficiency and increases unit costs.

Nehru and the age of idealism: 1947-62 During India’s first 15 years of independence, the state suffered little exter­ nal menace. Relations with China, the ‘other’ A sian pow er, were cordial, but rarely w arm ,64 and India scrupulously avoided entanglements in other alliances. India’s prim ary security concern w as regional. Pakistan refused to succumb to India’s ‘n atural’ position of leadership in South Asia, failing in its military effort to rearrange the border in 1 9 4 7 -4 8 and in enlisting U N support for its position on K ash m ir.65 Pakistan signed the Baghdad

India

29

Pact in 1954, and eventually joined the C E N T O and SEA T O collective security agreements. By enlisting in US efforts to contain the Soviets in the N orthern Tier, Pakistan assured itself of both modern arm s and training.66 India solicited advice from W estern experts on its defense needs and policies, but opted for an aggressive high-technology procurem ent strategy that exceeded its immediate defensive requirem ents.67 The army w as dis­ trusted by the new nationalist leadership, who viewed it as a sectarian force which had supported an alien ideology.68 The new Indian govern­ ment exerted considerable efforts to find ways to reduce the status of the armed services, and the army in particular, in the first decade of India’s existence.69 The Indian republic inherited 16 ordnance factories and one clothing plant after partition.70 N ehru preferred autarkic arm s production to arms im ports, but military industry did not receive a high priority in India’s first decade of independence. 71 From 1 9 4 6 -5 0 , H A L expanded its facilities to permit the overhaul and conversion of w ar surplus C-47 transport aircraft.72 The government authorized design of several trainer aircraft, and a prototype of the pistonengined H T-2 first flew in 1951. The design w as put into production, with 169 being com pleted by the end of the production run in 1 9 5 8 .73 Aircraft m anufactured and assem bled under license in the 1950s included the Percival Prentiss M k 3 trainer aircraft and the Vam pire turbojet aircraft,74 which served first as a frontline fighter and then as a trainer and reserve com bat aircraft for tw o decades. The Indian government also persued licensed production of the G nat fighter and the indigenous development of the H F-24 M arut fighter.75 (See case studies). Aerospace technology w as a particular concern, due to British efforts to use supply of jet engines for Vam pire fighters to influence India during 1951 tensions with Pakistan.76 The appointm ent of V. K. Krishna M enon as M inister of Defence in April 1957 initiated a m ajor change in Indian defense procurem ent.77 He recognized, however, the political utility of controlling a large, centralized industrial em pire.78 A Defence Production Board w as created in 1955 to m anage all ordnance factories and to secure effective liaison and coopera­ tion with civil industry.79 The value of production at the O rdnance Facto­ ries doubled between 1 9 5 8 -5 9 and 1 9 6 1 -6 2 .80 Under M enon, India began negotiations for licensed production of a wide range of military equip­ ment, and began an extremely am bitious series of aerospace projects.81 Indian arm s procurem ent in this period reflected the relative status of the three armed services. The airforce received priority for im ported arms, including the purchase of highly sophisticated Hunter fighters from the UK over the objection of both the armed services and the Finance M inistry.82 India also began licensed production of the Soviet M iG -21.83 From 1 9 5 2 -6 2 , the InAF more than doubled in size and substantially increased its capabilities through the acquisition of advanced fighter and bom ber aircraft.84

30

India

N avy funding totaled between 2 and 10 percent of the defense budget.85 In the absence o f a m ajor regional naval adversary, navy funding represen­ ted the m ost expendable portion of the defense budget.86 The army presented a m odest list of requirements to the M inistry of Defence in 1 9 5 7 -5 8 . These focused prim arily on im proving army fire­ power, and replacing the motley assortm ent of vehicles and tanks in Indian inventory with more functional and uniform equipm ent.87 These requests were used by the M inistry of Defence as part o f the effort to expand the Ordnance Factories, but were not fulfilled until after the H im alayan W ar in 1962. The Indian national security and military apparatus, in early 1962, exemplified the w orst excesses o f politically-m otivated m ismanagem ent. The Indian army possessed a rich tradition o f professionalism and exper­ tise, and acquitted itself capably in conflicts with Pakistan and H yderabad. Table 2.1 Indian defense spending, 1 9 4 8 -6 7 Year

Defense spending (millions o f rupees) (a)

Defense spending (millions o f constant $1960)(b)

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

1,675 1,672 1,748 1,833 1,878 1,926 1,969 1,932 2,118 2,6 6 5 2 ,7 9 7 2,6 9 9 2 ,7 7 4 3,046 4 ,3 3 6 7,30 6 8,084 8,651 9 ,0 2 7 9,535

443 443 452 452 475 470 503 524 624 567 621 577 582 625 862 1,409 1,380 1,346 1 ,3 0 7 1,185

Defense spending as per cent o f G ross D om estic Product (c)

1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.6 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.1

M ilitary R&D spending (millions o f rupees) (d)

R & D as percentage o f defense expenditures (e)

15.0

0.54

31.2 5 1 .4 71 .4 82.3 97.2 114.6 116.0

1.0 1.08 0 .8 7 1.02 1.1 1.26 1.20

Notes a Figures from SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 206, SIPRI Yearbook 1978, pp. 42-4. b Figures from SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 206. c Figures from SIPRI Yearbook 1974, pp. 214-15. d Figures from SIPRI Yearbook 1972, pp. 222-3. e Figures from SIPRI Yearbook, 1972, pp. 226-7.

India

31

The InAF had, on paper, acquired significant qualitative and quantitative superiority over its Pakistani counterpart, and w as considered the m ost sophisticated airforce in A sia. The navy w as larger and more powerful than any in the region, m aintaining a large fleet of surface ships supported by an aircraft carrier. A ppearances were deceiving, however, and all three services suffered from serious logistics shortcom ings. The InAF w as unable to m aintain its aircraft, and w ould have been in serious trouble had it attem pted to fight against China in 1 9 6 2 .88 The N av y ’s m ost m odern vessels were inoperable due to poor maintenance and lack of spares.89 The occupation of G oa in December 1961 openly exhibited w eaknesses in logistics, planning, equip­ ment, and interservice coordination.90 India’s lack of preparedness w as vividly displayed in the H im alayan W ar of 1962. In the autumn/winter of 1962, an aggressive Indian policy of extending control over disputed borders in the H im alayas backfired. The Chinese army attacked on tw o fronts with multi-division forces, and the Indian army w as routed.91 Chinese forces overran Indian positions, m ade their interpretation o f the borders very clear, and then withdrew to those borders. This disaster forced a fundam ental shift in Indian defense and m ilitary-industrial policies discussed in the next section.

Selected indigenous arms programs, 1948-62 Case study: fighter aircraft— G n at (license) versus M arut (indigenous) GNAT LIG H T FIGH TER AIRCRAFT

In the m id-1950s, India sought to acquire aircraft in response to expan d­ ing InAF requirements and rapidly changing aerospace technology. The InAF significantly outclassed the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the early 1950s and aggressively sought to m aintain both qualitative and quantita­ tive superiority.92 The Vam pire, assem bled locally under license, lacked the capability o f emerging designs, and competitive aircraft were sought from both the U K and France. The U K offered licensed production of the Gnat fighter aircraft, designed by Folland C orporation and recently rejected as too limited for R A F requirem ents.93 A purchase agreement w as signed in 1956, with Folland agreeing to supply 25 intact aircraft initially, as well as 25 more in disassem bled form. After that, H A L w ould begin licensed production of the G nat at the Ban­ galore facility, including the Orpheus 701 engine.94 By 1962, H A L announced that the entire engine w as m anufactured indigenously.95 India acquired m ost o f the technology when Folland folded in the late 1960s, and as a result H A L eventually produced over 85 percent of the airfram e and 60 percent of the engine.96

32

India

The Gnat perform ed very capably in InAF service for over 30 years. The aircraft’s simple, robust construction m ade it easy to use and maintain. In the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, InAF G nats were praised for their effec­ tiveness against PAF Sabres, and production rates were increased at HALBangalore shortly after the conflict.97 M odified versions of the G nat stayed in service until the 1990s. TH E H F-24 MARUT

In d ia’s first attem pt at indigenous design and production of a m odern fighter aircraft w as a disaster. In d ia’s success in assem bly of the V am pire, and the rapidly advancing technology of jet aircraft engines in the 1 9 5 0 s, led to an Air S taff requirem ent for a M ach 2 com bat aircraft in the m id-1 9 5 0 s. An indigenous p rogram for design, developm ent, and production o f a supersonic fighter w as established. At the time the M aru t p rogram w as begun, India only barely p ossessed the capability to design and develop elem entary piston-engined trainers like the H T -2, much less state-of-the-art supersonic fighters. As a result, expertise w as im ported from ab ro ad in the form o f D r. K urt T an k - a Germ an engi­ neer w ho also aided Argentine and Egyptian aerosp ace efforts in the early C old W ar.98 The M aru t w as designed around the British Orpheus 12 engine p ro ­ duced by Bristol, and the original agreement covered the licensed m anufac­ ture of the Orpheus engine and all subsequent im provem ents.99 Unfortunately for India, the Orpheus 12 project, linked with a European cooperative aerospace effort, w as cancelled. Bristol offered to continue development if the Indian government w ould pay all costs, estim ated at $ 9 -1 0 million, but the Indian government refused and sought alternatives elsewhere.100 As a result, when the first M arut w as test-flown, it used O rpheus 703 engines and w as substantially underpow ered.101 India then sought engines from other sources.102 An agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to redesign the R D -9 engines used on the M iG -19 to fit the existing M aru t airfram es. The Indians anticipated that an R D -9 pow ered M aru t w ould only be capable of M ach 1.4, and still sought alternatives to upgrade the M aru t M k. 2 to true M ach 2 capability.103 The cost of this experim ent w as $3 million, but the engines perform ed 30 percent below design specifications.104 The first ten M arut M k I aircraft were obsolete when they entered service in 1964, relied heavily on im ported parts and cost more than a com parable or superior aircraft im ported from ab ro ad .105 The M arut design itself, while physically attractive, had fundam ental flaws. According to one report, the plane w as incapable of firing all four 30 mm cannon sim ultaneously.106 Only 75 percent of the aircraft originally ordered were built.107 Production of the M aru t ceased in 1975, alm ost 20 years after the decision to begin developm ent.108 Despite the failure of the aircraft to fill

India

33

its intended role as a M ach 2 interceptor, the M aru t continued to serve with the InAF as a trainer and ground attack aircraft into the early 1990s. ‘Endurance’ requirements India produced approxim ately 70 0 ,0 0 0 rifles in W orld W ar II.109 The LeeEnfield .303 bolt-action rifle remained standard issue in Indian service until the H im alayan catastrophe, despite efforts by the army to procure more m odern w eapons.110 The sem i-autom atic Ishapore rifle, an inferior local variant of the FN -FA L rifle, w as rushed into production, although it did not completely replace the Lee-Enfield as Indian army standard issue until 1 9 7 4 .111 Other m ajor w eapons platform projects During this period, H A L produced a series of indigenous trainers, includ­ ing the H T-2, the M arut Advanced Trainer (a version of the H F-24), and the H JT -16 K iran trainer/CO IN aircraft.112 H A L also produced the British H S-748 transport aircraft under license, after an agreement w as signed in 1959. Again, this program w as far too sophisticated to H A L at this time, and the program suffered delays and problem s with quality control.113

The age of realism: 1963-74 The H im alayan disaster wiped out India’s m oralistic policies of not accept­ ing military assistance from superpow ers.114 Several W estern states, includ­ ing the US, provided both equipment and industrial infrastructure for India’s rearm am ent.115 Grow ing Indo-Soviet political ties offered some prospect of deterring C hina.116 The navy acquired inexpensive Soviet Petya class frigates and Foxtrot class subm arines, after the U K did not respond satisfactorily to Indian requests.117 India supported its procurem ent policy with a m assive reorganization and recruitment drive in the military. Econom ies of scale for military industrialization, particularly small arms, munitions, and artillery, were readily available, as the number o f military personnel increased by alm ost 50 percent from 1 9 6 2 -7 5 .118 A llocation for the army increased from a p ro­ posal of R s2 .4 billion in M arch 1962 ($U S400 million) to R s5.71 billion ($U S800 million) in the 1963/64 budget.119 The new Indian defense scheme aim ed at fighting a two-front w ar, if necessary, by containing China in the H im alayas while sim ultaneously engaging and defeating Pak­ istan in Kashm ir and Punjab.120 Production in the ordnance factories increased fourfold in the year after the H im alayan crisis.121 Production of civilian goods at ordnance factories, which had reached a high of 28 percent of total production in 1 9 5 6-57, declined to only 3.6 percent by 1 9 7 9 -8 0 . The numbers of ordnance

34

India

Table 2.2 Indian military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 6 3 -7 3 Year

Defense expenditures (millions o f current $US)

Defense expenditures (millions o f constant $1972)

Defense expenditures as percentage o f G ross N ation al Product

Arm s im ports (millions o f current $US)

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1972)

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

1,238.31 1 ,2 6 9 .0 7 1,876.23 1,4 4 0 .4 6 1 ,2 9 0 .6 7 1,377.33 1,468.0 0 1 ,5 9 8 .6 7 2 ,0 3 8 .5 0 2 ,0 7 0 .3 9 2 ,2 8 7 .6 2

1 ,6 7 6 .8 4 1 ,7 0 0 .0 6 1 ,7 1 5 .9 7 1,551.41 1 ,523.33 1 ,6 3 2 .2 5 1 ,6 6 3 .4 9 1 ,7 4 8 .2 9 2 ,1 4 4 .7 1 2 ,0 7 0 .3 9 1 ,8 9 0 .6 5

3.74 3.53 3.70 3.32 3.02 3.13 3.02 3.05 3.69 3.60 3.12

189 127 136 278 101 168 142 100 235 205 180

2 5 7 .7 170.5 179.3 356.5 125.5 2 0 0 .7 161.8 108.0 2 4 2 .9 2 0 5 .0 170.4

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1963-1973

factories increased from 22 in 1 9 6 2 -6 3 to 33 in 1 9 8 0 -8 1 , and the number o f employees increased from 2 5 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 5 6 -5 7 to 113,000 by 1 9 7 3 -7 4 .122 The military industry prioritized specific military requirements, particu­ larly lower-technology items, basic w eaponry and munitions, which could be produced relatively easily by local infrastructure, and program s for the ground forces.123 Ten specifically configured m ountain units designed for H im alayan duty were equipped prim arily from O F production. Six addi­ tional regular infantry divisions were raised during this period to face Pakistan.124 Pakistan attempted to infiltrate large forces of irregulars into Kashm ir in August 1965, but this effort to provoke a rebellion failed.125 When India crossed the ceasefire line in an effort to deny the infiltrators critical routes o f entry into the province, Pakistan launched a m ajor conventional invasion on September 1. Initial Pakistani tactical successes prom pted India to expand the conflict, counterattacking in the Lahore region. Fighting quickly stalem ated across the front, and a ceasefire took effect on September 2 5 .126 The conflict provoked international intervention by both the W est and China. On September 7 -8 , the US, U K , and A ustralia declared an arms em bargo on both sides. This placed both sides under considerable logistic stress, although it appears that Pakistan w as more seriously affected because o f its dependence on US equipm ent.127 The Chinese government threatened to intervene on behalf of Pakistan, and the w ithdraw al of US support forced Pakistan into a closer politico-m ilitary relationship with China.

India

35

A new Indo-Pakistani war took place in Novem ber and December, 1971, the result of civil strife in East Pakistan. The Indian government supplied arms, training, and eventually artillery and conventional military support to Bangladeshi rebels. Unlike previous Indo-Pakistani encounters, the 1971 war was sharp and decisive. Pakistani attacks on Kashm ir were stopped within ten miles of the border, while East Pakistan w as overrun in tw o weeks. The US intervened both diplomatically and militarily, sending the aircraft carrier Enterprise and escort vessels into the Bay of Bengal while seeking assurances that India did not intend to dismember West Pakistan.128 After the collapse of Pakistani forces in the East, a ceasefire was negotiated.129 India relied increasingly on supplies of Soviet w eaponry through the 1960s. It still m aintained an effort to assure diversified arm s supplies, prim arily through licensed production efforts with W estern European pro­ ducers. The effort to reduce dependency w as both expensive and time­ consum ing, and relatively few locally-produced m ajor w eapons systems saw com bat in 1971. The m ajority of license-produced m ajor weapons systems entered the Indian order of battle after 1971, evidence of the long time-lag between m ilitary-industrial decisions - taken after 1962 - and actual delivery.

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1962-74 Case studies: the utility o f licensed production TH E V IJAYANTA TANK

The Vijayanta is a licensed version of the M k. 3 M B T , a private venture designed by Vickers. The Vijayanta uses the sam e 650 horsepower diesel engine as the British Chieftain tank, which m ay explain the confusion of some writers who refer to it as an Indian version of the Chieftain.130 The result w as a lighter, more m aneuverable and less-well arm ored tank than those fielded in m ost European armies, appropriate for India’s limited transportation infrastructure. Gen. J. N . Chaudhuri, later Chief of Army Staff of the Indian army, w as intimately involved in the establishm ent of specifications for the tank.131 An agreement w as signed in A ugust 1961 for the establishm ent of a heavy vehicle plant and the m anufacture of 1,000 tan ks.132 The Avadi T an k W orks were completed in 1965 at a cost of R s160 million ($25 million), and a production schedule of 100 tanks per year w as announced the next year.133 Several hundred V ijayantas served during the 1971 war. According to one report just before the conflict, the tank w as considered to be ‘a breakthrough,’ and w as much more m aneuverable than the Centuri­ ons still in service with the Indian arm y.134 The 105 mm gun provided an im portant potential advantage, outgunning any tank in the Pakistani Arm y.135

36

India

R eports of the V ijayanta’s com bat perform ance in 1971, however, are less positive. According to Brig. Gen. A .C . C ariappa, the V ijayanta’s perform ance w as so unsatisfactory that the Army ‘w as not confident enough to equip its arm oured divisions with an indigenous tan k’, and the Vijayanta ‘w as relegated to the infantry divisions as anti-tank protection w eapons which any gun or missile should accom plish with much less co st.’136 India im ported large numbers of T-55 tanks when Vijayanta p ro ­ duction failed to reach anticipated numbers in the late 1960s, and these played a much more im portant role than the V ijayanta in the 1971 war. M IG -21 FIGH TER AIRCRAFT

India sought supersonic aircraft to offset the tw o squadrons of F-104 Starfighters prom ised to Pakistan by the US in 1961, and as a result of delays in the M aru t project. India established sites for the M iG -21 produc­ tion effort at N asik (airframe construction) and K oraput (engine assembly and m anufacture).137 The first six M iG -21s delivered to India were unim­ pressive, lacking m odern fire control systems and dem onstrating an extremely short com bat rad ius.138 Later deliveries provided an im proved variant, and local participation and production w as given a higher priority after the 1965 w ar with Pakistan.139 H A L produced the M iG -21F L, M iG -21M , and M iG -21bis, and m odi­ fied the designs of the latter tw o aircraft to fit Indian needs and industrial capabilities. The M iG -2 1 M w as an Indian version of the M iG -21M F, with a pow erplant which produced less thrust, but also required less tita­ nium and fewer sophisticated construction techniques.140 H A L M iG -21bis versions used m odified M iG -2 1 M wings, which were cheaper and easier to produce.141 These m odifications did not significantly degrade the aircraft’s perform ance, but did ease dependence on expensive foreign com ponents. M iG -21 production has always required procurem ent of some parts from the Soviet U nion.142 In reality there has never been a ‘com pletely’ indigenous M iG -21 produced by India.143 The Soviets supplied production technology in a five-step process, and eventually only some of the m ost com plicated m aterials were im ported.144 While the M iG -21 initially cost more to produce in India than to im port, a production run of close to 20 years and over 500 aircraft eventually saved considerable foreign exchange, as production continued into the late 1 9 8 0 s.145 The M iG -21 continues in service with the InAF today, and m akes up a substantial portion of Indian com bat strength.146 Deliveries of spare parts remained a sensitive issue between India and the U SSR , as did Indian efforts to sell parts or whole aircraft to other L D C s.147 The industrial processes used in producing the M iG -21 were also applicable to licensed production of later generations of Soviet aircraft.148 India is presently com ­ mitted to a m ajor upgrade o f m any of its M iG -21s (see below).

India

37

‘Endurance’ requirements During this period India increased production o f the new Ishapore rifle at the Ordnance Factories. Other production included the French HotchkissBrandt m ortar, originally requested by the army in the 1 9 5 0 s.149 The per­ centage of Indian requirements met locally increased from 39 percent to approxim ately 50 percent in the 1 9 6 3 -6 6 period.150 Licensed production efforts attem pted to emphasize production of vital spares, but in 1970 the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) w as notified that only ten days of spares were on hand for Soviet-model M iG -21 fighters and M i-4 helicopters.151 Nevertheless, India’s endurance capabilities were certainly better in 1965 and 1971 than during the 1962 H im alayan conflict, when the InAF’s Hunter and Vam pire fighters were virtually unavailable for service due to lack of p arts.152 N on-platform weapons The O rdnance Factories produced the 75 mm Pack Gun/How itzer M k. 1, which equipped the m ountain divisions of the Indian army and remained in service into the 1 9 9 0 s.153 In 1972, India began deployment of the 105 mm Indian Field Gun, which w as used to replace the obsolescent W orld W ar II-era 25-pounders still in service. This w eapon is rem arkably sim ilar to the gun on the A bbot SP 105 mm supplied by the U K .154 India also produced the L-70 Bofors 4 0 m m AA gun and a 106 m m recoilless rifle.155 The SS-11 anti-tank guided missile w as produced under license at B D L .156 India also began production of the Soviet AA-2 Atoll air-to-air missile (AAM ) under license.157 M ajor w eapons platform s H A L produced tw o French helicopters under license, the A erospatiale SA 315B Lam a (known as the Cheetah in Indian service) and the SA 316B Alouette III (known as the Chetak). The Chetak is one of the few complete systems m anufactured at H A L to be exported to a ‘developed country.’ Unfortunately, it w as exported to the Soviet Union, which raised some concerns about the safety o f W estern technology in Indian hands.158 N eg o ­ tiations for the Chetak began in early 1962, and by 1966 the French were buying spares from H A L to take advantage of low labor costs in India.159 While the quality of the com ponents w as up to international standards, pilot training w as apparently a problem - one analyst notes that in 1985, the Indian accident rate for the Chetak/Alouette III w as ten times the w orld average.160

38

India

Strategic systems The Indian missile program has been closely identified with the Indian Space Research O rganization (ISR O ).161 In 1963, India launched a series of US sounding rockets from Indian soil. In 1965, the Indian government requested the design of the Scout sounding rocket from the US, which w as unclassified at the time. This w as provided, although US assistance to the space program ceased not long afterw ards.162 As the ISR O developed sounding rockets and later the SLV-3 satellite launch vehicle, India’s defense industries pursued their own missile and rocket R & D program . D R D O ’s first Chief Com ptroller, M aj. Gen. B. D . K apur, instituted a foreign training program for Indian scientists, as well as a curriculum in basic rocketry at the Institute of Armam ent Studies. K apur visited Switzer­ land in 1962, and agreed to a joint SA M development program known as ‘Project Indigo’ with the Swiss firm C ontraves.163 India’s interest in advanced missile systems, while unrealizable in the 1960s, continued as an im portant part o f D R D O ’s research program until the 1980s. The Indian nuclear program began even before independence, when Dr. H om i Bhabha convinced his friend Jaw ah arlal N ehru that research in nuclear energy w ould be crucial to India’s future. As early as 1946, Nehru stated that India w ould develop nuclear pow er for peaceful purposes, but that it might have to use the latest technological developments for security as well unless the international system changed.164 Indian signed agree­ ments with C anada and the US for the CIRUS reactor and supplies of heavy water in the 1950s. China’s 1964 nuclear tests sparked a rare Parliam entary debate on the nuclear issue.165 In late 1964, Prime M inister Shastri officially sanctioned a w eapons program , focusing on reducing the time needed to build nuclear arms to six m onths.166 H om i Bhabha, India’s first atom ic energy chief, argued for the start of an underground testing project, a program approved by Prime M inister Shastri but put on hold from 1966 until 1970 or 1 9 7 1 .167 The T rom bay plutonium -reprocessing plant w as com m issioned, producing sufficient plutonium for approxi­ mately tw o nuclear w eapons per year.168 The pursuit of nuclear capabilities, therefore, occurred under the direct control of the Prime M inister and a few close associates. The nuclear w eapons program utilized some o f India’s finest scientists, but had alm ost no military input. By the m id-1960s, after the deaths of both N ehru and Bhabha, the US w as in the process of creating a nonproliferation regime to control the spread of nuclear w eapons, and encouraged India to sign the N uclear N onproliferation Treaty (N PT). India rejected the Treaty, prefer­ ring to m aintain a nuclear option, and continued its nuclear w eapons program , culminating in a nuclear test in M ay 19 7 4 .169

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39

Hegemony unfulfilled: 1974-98 India’s security policy focused increasingly on threats from adjacent regions and relations with the superpow ers during the 1970s. The 1968 decision by the United Kingdom to pull forces back from east of the Suez Canal left a pow er vacuum in the Indian O cean, which w as increasingly filled by US and Soviet naval squadrons. The new US facility at Diego G arcia w as viewed with particular concern, as were improvements in SinoUS relations. Until 1971, the prim ary concern w as the land balance in the west and north. With relatively m odest defense expenditures, and relying heavily on local production, India secured itself on both fronts. As India asserted itself regionally, and sought great pow er status, the navy received increased priority in budget allocation.170 The navy’s share of the capital portion of the defense budget grew from 7 percent in 1963 to 49 percent in 1975, indicating the im portance of pow er projection and naval capabil­ ity in Indian security priorities.171 The navy’s new resources came at the expense of the ground forces.172 Both the army and InAF began m odest m odernization program s, but the navy received priority. The navy began expanding and re-equipping in the m id-1970s, while the other services had only just begun m odernization in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an im m ediate im pact on South A sia. The R eagan Adm inistration extended a $4 billion aid

Table 2 .3 Indian defense expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 7 2 -8 2 Year

D efense expenditures (millions o f current $U S)

D efense expenditures (millions o f constant $ 1981)

D efense A rm s expenditures im ports a s percentage (millions o f o f G ross current N atio n al $U S) Product

Arms im ports (millions o f constant $1981)

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

2 ,0 4 7 1,852 2,14 9 2,83 2 2 ,9 0 7 3,050 3,502 3,842 4,303 5,151 6,223

3,982 3,413 3,639 4,398 4,271 4 ,2 3 2 4 ,5 2 5 4 ,5 7 7 4 ,7 0 4 5,151 5 ,8 7 0

3.5 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.5

408 349 321 263 719 1,005 374 583 765 875 1,131

210 190 190 170 490 725 290 490 700 875 1,200

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982

40

India

package to Pakistan, including sophisticated F-16 fighter aircraft, M -48A 5 tanks, and T O W antitank m issiles. These new acquisitions, and the US training that accom panied them, significantly im proved Pakistani conven­ tional military capabilities. The US also perm itted transfer of military and dual-use technology to China, raising the possibility that the PRC could enhance its military capability. Indian security policy became less opaque and more explicitly militaryoriented in the 1980s. The ‘Indira D octrine’ asserted India’s right to inter­ vene in neighboring states if dom estic disorder there threatened to spread to India.173 The denial of external influence in South A sia became the unspoken focus of the ‘R ajiv D octrine,’ providing the rationale for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka (July 19 8 7 -M arch 1990) and the M aldives (Novem ber 1 9 88 ).174 Pakistan aggressively pursued nuclear w eapons capabilities, and by the middle of the 1980s it w as widely assum ed that Pakistan had sufficient w eapons-grade nuclear m aterial to create at least one nuclear device.175 This uncertain nuclear threat acted as a deterrent to Indian military action. It m ay also have encouraged Pakistan to take greater risks supporting sep­ aratist movements inside Indian territory.176 The Indian army attem pted to reorganize in the 1980s to better prepare for m odern mechanized w arfare, including the creation of new mechanized infantry divisions and air assault form ations.177 Plans called for a capabil­ ity to decisively defeat Pakistan in a short cam paign m arked by rapid arm ored advances.178 A rapid victory w as desirable for economic reasons the 1971 w ar cost approxim ately R s2 billion ($U S250 million at the time) per week. Future w ars were estim ated to cost closer to R s40 billion a week ($US2.5 billion, in 1990 dollars), by Indian calculations, and a decisive w ar might take 6 -8 w eeks.179 The m ilitary’s role and authority in internal security expanded d ra ­ m atically, assistin g the large forces o f local, state, and nation al police and p aram ilitary forces w hose prim ary concern is to provide for internal security.180 C onflicts in Punjab and K ash m ir becam e so severe that by the early 1 9 9 0 s, ap proxim ately 40 percent o f the Indian army w as deployed on internal security d u ties.181 Insurgents in both regions received Pakistani su p p o rt.182 From 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 , India created 36 battalion s o f the R ash triya R ifles, tasked specifically for counter­ insurgency d u ties.183 Table 2.4 R upee-U S$ conversion rates, 1 9 7 2 -9 2 1972

1981

1983

1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

7 .706

7.893

10.312

12.237

12.698

14.477

16.663

17.949

2 4 .5 1 9

2 8 .9 5 0

Source: The World Bank, World Tables, 1994 (Baltimore, M D : The Johns Hopkins Univer­ sity Press, 1994), pp. 346-7.

India

41

India and Pakistan staged m ajor m ilitary exercises which nearly esca­ lated to w ar on tw o occasion s during this period. The B rasstack s exer­ cise (1 9 8 6 -8 7 ) w as a m ajor test o f the Indian A rm y’s capability to carry out the new doctrine o f ‘persuasive deterrence.’184 B rasstacks w as a year-long, four p art series of exercises in which the m echanized forces of the Indian arm y carried out com bined arm s operations on an unprece­ dented scale close to the Pakistani b o rd er.185 Pakistan responded by m oving an arm ored division and other units to the border, which raised tensions and nearly spark ed o ff a w ar. The objective of these m aneuvers rem ains unclear. It is p ossible that the Indian leadership actually intended to provoke a w ar. O peration T rident - the reconquest o f the northern areas and Pakistan-held K ash m ir, ordered at the height o f the crisis - w as called o ff less than tw o hours before it w as scheduled to begin .186 As the result of Indian m isgovernance, an indigenous insurgency opened in Kashm ir in the winter o f 1989. Both political and m ilitary leaders in Pakistan saw this as an opportunity to re-open the partition issue.187 The Kashm iri insurgency coincided with Indian and Pakistani winter military m aneuvers, adding the threat of conventional escalation to an already volatile situation. Both India and Pakistan m aintained alerted forces in the region, although reportedly neither m oved heavy arm ored form ations avoiding a repetition of Brasstacks. The 1990 crisis reportedly included the actual deployment of Pakistani nuclear w eapons to air bases, although this has been disputed by many of the key players in India, Pakistan, and the U S.188 R obert G ates, the Deputy N ational Security A dvisor, m ade an emergency visit to the region to defuse the crisis. President Bush and President G orbachev of the Soviet Union issued a joint statem ent warning of the possible consequences of w ar in the region.189 The Kashm ir issue, in the eyes of the superpow ers and the inter­ national community, had finally become irrevocably linked with nuclear w eapons. Both India and China took steps to im prove their defensive positions and logistics capability in this period. In 1 9 8 6 -8 7 , the Indian army and airforce held joint exercises in the H im alayas to demonstrate India’s enhanced m ilitary capability and to act as political leverage in the continu­ ing dispute with China.190 According to anecdotal reports, a 1 9 8 6 -8 7 crisis with China at Som durong Chu in the H im alayas led Indian military leaders to ask what nuclear options India had available to respond to a Chinese tactical nuclear attack.191 Throughout this period, India’s conventional military capabilities dom inated all other potential regional adversaries combined. Am bitious force m odernization program s for all three services sought to upgrade Indian conventional military capability. These m odernization program s did not appear to correspond to any existing threat, and were viewed with concern by neighbors in South A sia and adjacent regions.192 In 1986-87,

42

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for the first time, India’s defense budget exceeded 4 percent of G N P, and Indian R & D funding for advanced w eapons increased by 800 percent in the 1 9 8 0 s. 193 The collapse of the Soviet Union undermined Indian military readiness, decreasing the availability o f spare parts and jeopardizing delivery of equipment on order. 194 Despite plans for the introduction o f a number of new w eapons systems and m ajor increases in force structure, the period 1 9 8 7 -9 2 w as m arked by a decline in overall Indian military expenditure and arm s im ports. 195 This decline seriously affected both m odernization efforts and readiness. 196 It also savaged ongoing program s at Indian defense industries. 197 The decline of the superpow er com petition quelled m any of India’s fears of the U S. 198 Improved relations with the US were slowed by policy disagreem ents, particularly regarding the transfer of dual-use technologies to strategic sectors of the Indian econom y. 199 US nonproliferation concerns frequently prevented technology transfer, causing great resentment in India. India faced further hardship from a financial crisis, which required the government to begin a m ajor economic liberalization effort in the 198 9 -9 2 period. 200 This crisis inflated India’s external debt and ran down foreign exchange reserves.201 Indian economic reform w orked, and w orked fairly quickly.202 As the economic situation im proved, India increased the defense budget. 203 The low cost o f Soviet-model equipment after the collapse of the W arsaw Pact invited exploitation, and at times it appeared that Indian m il­ itary procurem ent policy consisted prim arily o f periodic spending binges in the former Eastern bloc. 204 In the early 1 9 9 0 s, India reverted to m ilitary-in dustrial and security policies rem iniscent o f the N eh ru period. Im proved relations with external pow ers, including C hina, encouraged Indian governm ents to follow a policy focused on region al m ilitary concerns and glo bal sym bols o f pow er. The portion o f the defense budget dedicated to research and developm ent in creased steadily, from 1 percent o f the m il­ itary budget in the 1 9 6 0 s to ap p roxim ately 2 percent in 1 9 7 7 , and over 3 by 1 9 8 2 . 205 From 1 9 8 9 -9 3 , R & D spending increased from 4 .2 - 4 .9 percent o f the defense bu d get. 2 0 6 This increase w as initially asso ciated with increased num bers o f m ajo r w eapon s platform s in developm ent. By the 1 9 9 0 s, how ever, it ap p eared geared m ore to w ard s technology a cq u isition . 22 00 77 Local projects in the development stage included the Arjun tank, the Light C om bat Aircraft, the Advanced Light Helicopter, the Delhi-class missile destroyer, projects for the design of aircraft carriers and nuclear subm arines, a series of missile projects, and a new line of small arms. These projects all suffered from inconsistent political support and sporadic funding, with the im portant exception of the Indigenous Guided M issile Developm ent Program (IGM DP) (see case study). The low level of funding

India

43

Table 2 .5 Indian defense expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 8 1 -9 1 Year

D efense expenditures (millions o f constant $U S)

D efense D efense A rm s expenditures expenditures im ports (millions o f a s percentage (millions o f constant o f G ross constant $ 1991) N atio n al $U S) Product

Arms im ports (millions o f constant $1991)

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

3,542 4,175 4 ,6 6 7 5,18 8 5 ,5 2 7 6,064 6,870 6,944 6,74 2 7,48 7 7,189

5 ,2 8 8 5 ,8 6 8 6,304 6,708 6,895 7 ,3 6 7 8,090 7,874 7,314 7 ,7 8 7 7,189

1,642 3,936 1,756 1,681 3,244 3,888 3,533 4,195 4,231 1,768 800

3.3 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.4 3.0 3.0 2 .7

1,100 2 ,8 0 0 1,300 1,300 2 ,6 0 0 3,200 3,000 3,700 3,900 1,700 800

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992

alloted to these projects suggests that bureaucratic interests and sym bolic factors, rather than any pressing military commitment or pursuit of genuine self-sufficiency, drove their continued existence.

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1974-98 Case studies: licensed versus indigenous production A ircraft: M iG -29 versus LC A TH E M IG-29 ‘FU LCR U M ’

The Indians were offered the option of purchasing the M iG -29 during the visit of Defense M inister Ustinov, in early 1984. India’s plans to licensem anufacture the M irage 2 0 0 0 probably encouraged the Soviets to take steps to m aintain a valued custom er.208 The Fulcrum had not even entered Soviet service at this point, so the InAF w as being offered a truly ‘top-ofthe-line’ fighter. Shortly after U stinov’s visit, India declined the option of licensed production o f the M irage 2 0 0 0 .209 Although a M iG -29 deal w as trium phantly announced in m id-1984,210 India backed out of the deal when they realized they w ould get the export version of the M iG -2 9 .211 A new deal w as signed tw o years later, when the Soviets finally agreed to provide the ‘real’ version to India.212 The aircraft, originally intended for delivery in April or M ay of 1987, began arriving in January, due to increased Soviet production.213 R eports of negotiations for licensed production follow ed quickly.214

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The M iG -29 never entered production in India. Com petition with the indigenous Light C om bat Aircraft (LCA ), funding restrictions, and p rob ­ lems obtaining necessary com ponents from the former U SSR all con­ tributed to delays in the p rogram .215 An official government report, while not citing the M iG -29 aircraft by name, chronicled num erous problem s with the operation of a Soviet aircraft acquired in the late 1980s. Included am ong these problem s were prem ature failures of over two-thirds of the available engines, non-availability of critical radar com ponents and m ain­ tenance/repair facilities for avionics, and a failure on the part of respons­ ible authorities to fund and construct engine overhaul facilities.216 The inability of the Indian government to produce either the M iG -29 or the L C A (see below) jeopardized both the aerospace industrial base and InAF m odernization. India urged M alaysia, for exam ple, to purchase the M iG -29 under the assum ption that H A L could provide maintenance, spares, and upgrades.217 India recently signed a deal to buy navalized ver­ sions of the Fulcrum to equip its naval air arm - but the aircraft will be built in R u ssia.218

T H E LIG H T COM BAT AIRCRAFT (LC A )

H A L began research and development on a Light C om bat Aircraft early in 1980, and the aircraft has undergone a series of radical changes in design and specification since that time.219 Initially, the aircraft w as viewed as a replacement for the M iG -21 interceptor in the InAF inventory with a sec­ ondary ground-attack role. H A L w as already working on an engine designed specifically to provide extra pow er in tropical conditions.220 In 1985, the government announced that it had accepted the H AL design, and am bitiously planned for the flight of a prototype aircraft in 1 9 8 9 .221 The design changed late the next year, however, after a visit by then-US Secretary of Defense C aspar W einberger, who perm itted the trans­ fer of the General Electric F-404 engine (used in the F/A-18 Hornet) to India. The L C A program w as not proceeding on schedule, so the im port of the 11 G E F-404 engines might allow prototypes to fly at an earlier date an d secure US technological assistance on the G T X Kevari engine.222 The LC A design has clearly undergone considerable m odification since the original conception - the L C A ’s perform ance is com parable to a latemodel F-16 or M irage 2 0 0 0 .223 These technological enhancements have contributed to the substantial delays. The InAF hopes to have six in service by 2 0 0 8 -0 9 , aim ing eventually for 80 percent indigenous content.224 India’s aircraft industry is much less efficient economically than the aero­ space industries o f Israel, Germ any, and even Jap an , each of which faced crises in aircraft production during the 1 9 9 0 s.225 This raises questions about the unit costs and eventual number o f aircraft purchased by the InAF, which grew frustrated with delays in the LC A program over a decade ago and sought other alternatives. While the InAF ‘m uddled

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through’ the 1990s without substantial m odernization, LC A delays and costs im posed great hardships. L ack of a replacement for the aging M iG force contributed significantly to the InAF’s high accident rate in the 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 period. 226 T-72 (license production) vs. Arjun (indigenous development) T-72 TANK

India signed an agreement to purchase the T-72 in 19 8 0 . 2 2 7 A decision to produce the system under license w as reached at the end of 1983. 228 The first T -72s produced in India entered service in 19 8 8. 229 Production of the T-72 continued into the m id-1990s, but both W estern and Indian sources report that the Avadi plant w as utilized at a rate far below potential capacity. 230 230 According to some observers, the T-72 program represents one of the m ost effective licensed-production endeavors by the Indian defense industries. 231 It has been reported, for instance, that the license-produced T-72 has a higher level of indigenous content than the locally designed Arjun. 232 Iraqi T -72s, however, perform ed poorly in the G ulf W ar, and dem onstra­ ted unexpected vulnerabilities. 233 In spite of these flaws, though, the T-72 represented a substantial improvement over the older V ijayantas and T-55s in Indian inventory, and w as the m ost m odern tank available in the South Asian region in the 1980s and 1990s. Am bitious plans to modernize the T-72 force - ‘O peration R hino’ have begun. A round 1 5 0 -2 0 0 tanks will receive a full upgrade, including a new fire control system and pow er pack, reactive arm or, and navigational systems. The rest of the force will receive a partial m odernization. 234 India has purchased the related T-90S, which will be produced at Avadi in the future, indicating a continued reliance on R ussian designs.235 ARJU N TANK

The original requirement for an Indian tank design w as issued in 1970, with deployment intended for 1985. In 1982, it w as reported that all of the m ajor subsystem s, including engine, transm ission, arm or, fire control, and arm am ent, were proceeding well, and that ‘m ajor breakthroughs’ had occurred. 236 The tan k’s requirements were completely rewritten shortly thereafter, leading to substantial delays in development and production. 237 Am bitious requirements intended to anticipate changes in ‘state of the art’ technology led to unfulfillable dem ands on Indian designers and indus­ tries. Substantial effort w as put into developing a 1 ,2 0 0 -1 ,5 0 0 h p engine, but engine tests proved the design unacceptable.238 Other problem s identi­ fied at the first technical trials in July 1988 included lack of an auxiliary pow er unit, poor transm ission, exceedingly low average track life, failures

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in the hydro-pneumatic suspension system, p oor m aintenance, and failures in the m ain gun and fire control system .239 Senior army officers say the tank is too heavy, and will cause problem s with both tactical and strategic m obility.240 The Arjun is m odeled after W estern tank designs, with a high ‘castle’ turret and substantial em phasis on fire suppression systems and overall survivability. The tank utilizes many locally-produced subsystem s, includ­ ing the fire suppression system, night vision equipment, and nuclear-bio­ logical-chemical w arfare protection system s.241 The locally-designed 120 mm rifled gun is controversial.242 The Arjun is also too heavy for m ost of the bridges in the region.243 At present, 124 tanks have been ordered to equip tw o tank regiments. India is also pursuing a 155 mm SP artillery version using the Arjun chassis.244 An Arjun 2 variant is reportedly already in development, and India is also experimenting with a ‘T ank E X ’ version using a T-72 chassis and an Arjun turret.245 Overall, the Arjun has suffered unusual delays even for an Indian program and the program can only be judged as a failure like the H F-24 M aru t it will be produced in limited quantities for prim ar­ ily sym bolic reasons. N ew directions for Indian M ilitary Industry TH E IN DIGENO U S GUIDED M ISSILE DEV ELO PM EN T PRO GRA M (IGMDP)

The IG M D P w as initiated by the government, with the intention o f cutting the design-production-deploym ent cycle from 10-15 years down to 8-1 0 years.246 In order to carry out this extremely am bitious effort, an inno­ vative policy of integration w as instituted. Every effort w as m ade to ensure m axim um com m onality of subsystem s and technologies and minimize duplication of effort and w asted time. The IG M D P effort included 19 defense research laboratories, seven universities, and seven other institu­ tions (including the ISR O ). Production takes place at 19 public sector units, eleven ordnance factories, nine private sector corporations, and tw o other organizations.247 The IG M D P encom passes research, design, development, and produc­ tion of five separate missiles - Agni (M R BM ), Prithvi (SR BM ), A kash and Trishul (SAM ), and N ag (A TG M ). The Trishul w as first tested in the mid1980s, and is designed to have a faster reaction time and to be more resis­ tant to electronic counterm easures (ECM ) than Soviet-model SA M s. The system lacks thrust vector control facilities, which m akes the minimum range larger than com parable im ported systems in service. The Trishul w as intended to serve both the army and the navy.248 Trishul’s initial rapid development, however, did not translate into rapid deployment. The Trishul w as supposed to be deployed with the Indian N avy in 1992, but still had not reached deployment status in

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2 0 0 3 .249 India opted to buy R ussian and Israeli short-range SAM s instead. After over 70 flight tests, the Trishul remains ineffective.250 The failure of the Trishul, and the inadequate perform ance of R ussian replacements, delayed the deployment o f both local and foreign-produced surface ships for the Indian N av y .251 The Prithvi is a single-stage tactical missile that carries conventional and unconventional w arheads and reportedly has an accuracy of 5 0 -2 5 0 meters at m axim um range.252 With a 1,000 kg w arhead, the range is only 150 km: the m axim um range of 2 50 km is attainable only with a 500 kg payload. The Prithvi w as first tested on February 25, 1988.253 Prithvi has been deployed in the 222n d and 333rd Artillery G roups, and tw o addi­ tional groups (444th and 555th) are currently being raised. Prithvi will form an im portant component of a new artillery division authorized in 2 0 0 3 .254 A naval version called the D hanush is under development, to be launched from surface ships.255 The N a g is reportedly a third-generation ‘fire-and-forget’ A T G M using im aging infrared hom ing technology with top-dow n attack capability which will be m ounted on vehicles or attack helicopters.256 Despite the apparent sophistication and reported success of the N ag , India also arranged licensed production of vast numbers of M ILA N -II A T G M s.257 As of early 2 0 0 4 , the N a g still had not entered serial production. The A kash program suffered serious delays due to lack of the softw are necessary for operation of the phased array radar, which is integral to the missile system .258 The A kash will have a 25 km range, and a ‘ram rocket’ engine. There are reports that the A kash has been proposed as a possible A TB M , but its lack o f range and limited launch speed probably m ake this im practical w ithout significant m odification. The A kash w as designed in both ground and ship-based versions.259 In late 2003, analysts reported that the A kash w ould not be deployed, but w ould remain a technology dem onstrator at D R D O .260 The m ost im portant program is the Agni series o f ballistic m issiles. The initial variant, also called the Agni T est D em onstrator (TD ), w as a two stage rocket developed from the first stage of the SLV-3 space launch vehicle, and using the Prithvi twin-engined liquid fuelled m otor as a second stage.261 The range of the Agni system is about 2 ,5 0 0 k m (1,500 m iles).262 After the first Agni test launch, on M ay 22, 1989, then-Prime M inister R ajiv Gandhi proudly told Parliament that the Agni w as not a ‘w eapon system ’, but a dem onstration o f technology.263 The Agni w as tested again on M ay 29 , 1992 with a reported range of 1,550 miles, and a payload of 5 0 0 -1 ,0 0 0 kg (sufficient for a nuclear w arhead). A successful third test launch of an extended range version of the Agni w as carried out in early 19 9 4 .264 Agni T D , a platform -launched liquid-fueled missile, w as not an efficient w eapon, prom pting the development of a more survivable version. Agni 2, a substantially more sophisticated missile, w as first tested in 1999, tested again in 20 0 1 , and has now entered production and is

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preparing for deployment. Agni 2 is a m obile, tw o-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of approxim ately 2 ,0 0 0 -3 ,0 0 0 kilom eters.265 The first stage of the Agni 2 has also been deployed as a shorter-range variant called the Agni 1 with a 700 kilometer range.266 Agni 1 is the first nuclear deliv­ ery system specifically configured for covering Pakistani targets.267 Agni 1 will be deployed in the Indian arm y’s 334th Artillery G roup, and Agni 2 will be deployed in the 335th Artillery G roup.268 An Agni 3 version and an IC BM called the Surya, are reportedly in development. The IG M D P focused on close interaction between research and produc­ tion, and certainly produced some results in a much shorter time than m ost indigenous R & D efforts. The production and deployment records of the five m issiles, however, suggest that the program w as far from a com ­ plete success. It remains one of India’s m ost rem arkable military-industrial achievements, and set the stage for potentially more successful missile projects. There are a number o f reasons for IG M D P ’s com paratively strong showing. First, limited access to technology transfer forced a higher prior­ ity for indigenous research and development than in other defense-related projects. Second, private and educational institutions were deliberately integrated into the R & D and development process on a m ajor scale for the first time. Third, there is considerable technological overlap between the space program and the IG M D P, particularly in the Agni T D project. Fourth, missile design and development is relatively simple, especially when com pared with other aerospace technologies (particularly aircraft). Finally, there w as unusually close coordination between m ilitary users and designers.269 IG M D P also capitalized on existing research. An im portant research effort, predating the IG M D P, w as ‘Project D evil,’ which attem pted to reverse-engineer the Soviet SA-2 SA M used by the Indian military. The ultimate objective of this program remains unclear: one view is that it w as intended to convert SA-2 technology for SSM use.270 Other reports state that it w as an effort to reverse-engineer and produce the SA-2 indigenously.271 The end results of the program were the construction of tw o liquid-fuel m otors, later used as the basis of the Prithvi program and several failed prototype system s.272 ‘Endurance’ requirements India produces a range o f small arm s, including the Ishapore SLR rifle, a Belgian 9 mm pistol and the Sterling M k. 4 submachine gun, as well as 9m m , 7.62m m , 0.303 inch, and 12.7 m m am m unition.273 In the early 1980s, D R D O m ade a commitment to develop a new series o f 5.56 mm small arm s for the Indian armed forces called the Indian Small Arms System (INSAS). Both Heckler & Koch o f Germ any and Steyr of Austria offered to provide for India’s im m ediate needs and transfer technology

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worth $4.5 million for free. These offers were declined and D R D O spent the next decade, and approxim ately R s2 billion (about $U S100 million in 1990), reinventing a fam ily of small arm s based heavily on Steyr and H & K technology. In the meantime, India im ported A K -47 rifles from former W arsaw Pact nations to fill requirem ents.274 The IN SA S finally entered service in the late 199 0 s.275 India also produced 51m m , 81m m , 120m m , and 160m m m ortars and amm unition. A full line o f munitions w as also in production in this period, including 105 mm, 120 m m, and 125 mm tank amm unition, as well as anti­ tank and anti-personnel mines, aerial bom bs, and naval am m unition.276 The Ordnance Factories continued to produce the bulk of India’s non­ w eaponry equipment needs, although severe shortages of trucks and other logistics systems were reported in the 1 9 9 0 s.277 Shortages in spares and stockpiles plagued all three services - evidence that endurance capabilities did not receive a high priority.278 Items produced in India - from blankets to night vision goggles - were im ported from abroad, and munitions sup­ plies reached dangerously low levels for key equipment like the Bofors 155 mm heavy artillery piece.279 Local production of the 125 mm tank shell for the T-72 tank suffered from poor quality control - Israelim anufactured shells had to be im ported during the Kargil w ar, and recent reports suggest defective rounds still plague the arm y.280 The Ordnance Factories were not the only organizations w orking on endurance requirements in this period. D R D O m aintained three naval systems laboratories at Cochin, Bom bay, and V ishakhapatnam , which pursued torpedo, sonar, and sonobuoy research.281 Some efforts were m ade to support maintenance of Soviet systems no longer in production in R ussia, including a $210 million overhaul facility for the Soviet SA-6 missile at M eerut.282 Indigenization of spare parts for R ussian equipment remains a priority today.283 N on-platform weapons The 105 mm Light Field Gun entered service with the Indian army during this period. This w eapon is easily deployed by helicopter - an im portant advantage for Indian army m ountain divisions.284 The purchase of the Bofors FH -77B 155 mm gun/howitzer included options for licensed pro­ duction and the establishm ent of a new ordnance factory for amm unition production.285 Both the counter-trade offsets and the establishm ent of the local m unitions production line were m arked by serious delays and difficulties.286 Am munition m anufacture suffered long delays, but by 2000 India w as producing 155 mm am m unition for the Bofors guns.287 Spare parts remained a problem , and had to be im ported from Sweden on an emergency basis during the Kargil W ar.288 The Bofors played a critical role in Indian military operations during that conflict. The SS-11 anti-tank guided m issile w as produced under license at BD L

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through the 1980s, and India produced the M ilan and M ilan II under license.289 India also produces a version o f the Soviet G rad 122 mm rocket, and the BM -21 rocket launcher.290 This rocket may be capable of carrying cluster m unitions produced at the O rdnance Factories. India is producing the ‘Pinacha’ rocket and M ultiple Barrel R ocket Launcher, a 2 14 m m w eapon capable of firing cluster or high-explosive payloads up to 40 km .291

ELECTRO N IC EQUIPMENT

Grow th in the military electronics industry expanded significantly, particu­ larly in the afterm ath o f the 1971 W ar. In 1973, production of military electronics had a value of R s330 million: this nearly quadrupled to R s1 ,2 6 0 million by 198 3 .292 India’s m ilitary electronics industry - dom in­ ated by BEL, with some contribution from H A L - is far from comprehen­ sive or self-sufficient: many critical systems are im ported, and some others have been in development for decades. BEL produced sonar systems for the Indian navy, particularly the Advanced Panoram ic Sonar, Hull M ounted (APSOH) sonar system .293 BEL also produces naval com m unications systems and a variety of fire control and gun control equipment, radars, and antennae.294 BEL began delivery of the Indra-1 and Indra-2 low altitude surveillance radars to the Indian armed forces in 19 8 9 .295 BEL also produced night vision equipment, com ­ m unications equipment, console systems, and tank fire control systems for the ground forces.296 M odification projects TA NK PRO GRA M S

The mechanical failings of the Vijayanta were corrected after 1971, and production continued until the 1980s. Over 1,600 V ijayantas were p ro ­ duced,297 and by the end of the production run the V ijayanta had reached 95 percent indigenous content by value.298 V ijayanta m odifications in development or production include: a special SP artillery version known as the Catapult; an arm oured recovery vehicle; a bulldozer version; and a m odification for bridge-laying.299 At least 1,100 V ijayantas remained in service in the 1990s, com prising alm ost half of the Indian arm y’s 58 tank regim ents.300

GN AT/AJEET FIGH TER/TRAINER

In the afterm ath of the 1971 w ar, a decision w as m ade to produce an upgraded version of the G nat, to be called the Ajeet. H A L agreed, in 1972, that such a project w as feasible and within the capabilities of the company.

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The prim ary purpose for the program w as to increase the G n at’s limited range and payload in order to provide greater ground attack capability.301 The project experienced enorm ous delays, considering the relatively simple nature of the m odifications required.302 The Ajeet represents one o f the few instances of extensive m odification and upgrading of an existing design by the Indian aerospace industry.303 A pproxim ately 80 Ajeet strike fighters were fielded by the InAF in the 1980s, eventually retiring from service in 1991. Ajeets also served, unsuc­ cessfully, as trainers for new InAF pilots.304 The Gnat/Ajeet project, which provided effective com bat aircraft to the InAF for 30 years, represents one of India’s m ost successful m ilitary industrial program s. Other m ajor w eapons platform s O TH ER ARM O RED VEHICLES

India produces the Soviet BM P-2 arm ored infantry fighting vehicle, known in Indian service as the Surath. Production facilities were established in 1985, and production began in 1 9 8 7 .305 The BM P chassis w as intended as the basis for a series of arm ored vehicles. India also com pleted an agree­ ment with Slovakia for purchase and eventual licensed production of arm ored recovery vehicles based on the T-72 ch assis.306 O TH ER AIRCRAFT PRO JECTS

The InAF required a replacement for the aging Canberra bom ber to perform deep strike and interdiction duties, but it w as only in the late 1970s that sufficient hard currency could be found to fill this need.307 The ruling Jan ata Party encouraged the armed forces to look at non-Soviet options. The Jag u ar w as finally selected on the basis o f cost and delivery schedule.424 Licensed production of the aircraft w as arranged at the HALBangalore facility.308 Pakistan’s acquisition of m odern F-16A fighter-bombers in the mid1980s prom pted India to buy new fighters.309 N egotiations for the M iG2 3 /2 7 began in the summer of 1980, and a deal including licensed production options w as signed in the sum mer o f 19 8 3 .310 Production facili­ ties at N asik were established in m id-1984, and H A L has produced at least 100 M iG -27s with gradually increasing local content.311 It has also begun m odification projects to extend service life and im prove perform ance.312 France agreed to provide the M irage 2 0 0 0 , with an option for licensed production in India.313 An initial batch of 40 aircraft w as purchased, with a later batch of nine being ordered in the 1980s. M ore recently, ten more aircraft have been purchased, with mid-air refueling capability.314 The licensed production option w as eventually rejected to pursue other pro­ jects, particularly the M iG -29 program discussed above. It m ay be

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renewed at a later date, depending on resources or the perform ance of the LC A , as part of an additional purchase of up to 130 new aircraft.315 A critical shortcom ing is the lack of an advanced trainer. The InAF’s accident rate is one of the w orld’s highest, and can be attributed to decreased flying time and lack o f an advanced transition trainer.316 Despite the failure of the Ajeet trainer version, India put o ff purchase or produc­ tion o f an advanced trainer for over tw o decades. This problem w as only resolved with the recent agreement to purchase British H A W K trainer aircraft.317 The early 1980s also saw the initiation of a series of other licensed and indigenous program s at H A L, which were intended to provide for Indian needs in the 1990s. A replacement for the dom estically-produced Alouette IIIs led to the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) program . (See case study). H A L-K anpur produces the D ornier-228 utility aircraft, which entered service with the InAF and Indian navy as a transport, liaison, and maritime surveillance aircraft in the m id-1980s.318 The H S-748 aircraft, a licensed version of the Avro 748, served as a transport aircraft and trainer with the InAF, as well as functioning as a civilian airliner. The airfram e w as intended to be used for the Aerospace Surveillance and W arning Control aircraft (ASW AC), a concept in devel­ opment since the early 1 9 8 0 s.319 The ASW AC system suffered from severe delays, the result of both teething troubles and bureaucratic struggles.320 The ASW AC program w as abruptly and tragically terminated after a spec­ tacular crash killed m ost of the design team in 19 9 9 .321 India has since abandoned the ASW AC project, instead pursuing purchase of Israel’s P H A L C O N airborne radar system .322 ALH H ELICO PTER

In 1971 India entered an agreement with A erospatiale o f France (pro­ ducer o f the Alouette III and the Lam a) for design o f a new single-engine helicopter. In 1977, the InAF requested that the program be m odified to a two-engine design, a recom m endation which w as accepted by the govern­ ment in 1 9 7 9 .323 This effectively led to the cancellation of the single­ engine project, despite the fact that H A L had nearly com pleted the design.324 In 1984, the Indian government entered into a seven-year contract with M BB of Germ any for the design and development of the new twin-engined A L H .325 The twin-engined design w as intended to replace not only the Chetak and Cheetahs presently serving in the Army and C oast G uard, but also to serve in a naval version for ASW w ork. The A LH is designed so that the rear fuselage, engine, and tail assem bly can be m arried to a tandem front fuselage (presently in the early design stage) for a battlefield support/anti-tank role.326 It has also been specifically configured for the operating conditions of the H im alayan region. W estern analysts praised

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the project as successful and smooth-running: an unusual complim ent for an Indian design.327 It now appears that the A LH program w as delayed just short of produc­ tion in the early 1 9 9 0 s.328 H A L attem pted to m arket civilian versions of the helicopter in India and abroad, advertising that operating costs are 50 percent lower than for other helicopters in its class due to the fuel-efficient French engine.329 M ore recently, as additional funding became available, the A LH - now known as the ‘D hruv,’ has entered production for the Indian arm ed forces and for export.330

SHIPBUILDING

The expansion of the Indian navy w as accom panied by an increase in the use of local shipyards for production of naval vessels. The m ajor projects are briefly outlined below. After a spurt of significant local production effort in the 1980s, however, India’s shipyards lay idle for alm ost a decade, creating a problem of block obsolescence in the surface fleet by the late 1990s. SHISHUM AR ATTA CK SUBM ARINES

In the late 1970s, India began searching for a European partner to collaborate in the construction of diesel attack subm arines at the M azagon D ockyard in Bom bay. A deal w as signed in 1981 with HowaldtswerkeDeutsche-W erft A G N (HDW ) of Germ any, calling for the construction of tw o Type 1500 subm arines to be built in Germany, and for tw o more to be constructed in Bom bay at the M azagon D ockyards from Germ an parts. Some 350 Indian technicians were trained in Germany, and Germ an advi­ sors were m ade available to advise on licensed production of the sub­ m arines in India.331 The Germ an-constructed boats were com m issioned in 1986, and deliv­ ered to the Indian N avy in February 1 9 8 7 .332 In early 1984, M azagon D ockyards began the assem bly of tw o Type 1500 subm arines from parts. Prime M inister Indira Gandhi dedicated the opening of the new construc­ tion facilities, and stated that the tw o boats assem bled in India w ould enter service in 1 9 8 7 and early 1988, respectively.333 The Indian govern­ ment also announced its intention to take up the option to construct two further boats under license at M azagon , planning for a total of at least six Type 1500 boats in Indian service by the m id -1990s.334 The Shalki, first of the Type 1500 boats to be assem bled in India, finally w as launched in September 1989, and w as com m issioned into the navy in M arch 1 9 9 1 .335 Construction suffered from serious delays and abysm al quality control - none of the pressure welds on the first Indian-built boat passed inspection in 1986, an indication of extremely p oor w ork at M azago n .336 The second subm arine, known as the Shankal, w as finally

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com m issioned in M ay 1 9 9 4 .337 The option to produce the fifth and sixth subm arines under license w as cancelled in 1 9 8 7 -8 8 , due to a com bination of financial constraints and technical difficulties. Overall, the project proved too com plex for Indian industry. N UCLEAR SUBM ARINES

There have been persistent reports that India is attem pting to produce an indigenous nuclear attack subm arine called the Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV). Licensed production of attack subs, in theory, could provide the expertise and technical skills to design and build an indigenous SSN . One report alleges that a com m ission w as set up in 1977 to study the project.338 Other reports refer to a standing SSN program since 19 7 0 .339 The Indians became the first developing country to receive a nuclear subm arine from a superpow er. A ‘Charlie-I’ class SSG N (named C hakra in Indian service) w as leased from the Soviets in January, 1988 for a period of three years.340 Official announcements stated that the vessel w as pur­ chased for training purposes only, and it is reported that the subm arine w as extremely unreliable and unsafe, which necessitated its return.341 Research on the A TV continued throughout this period, but never approached the production stage.342 Current projections anticipate ATV production in 2 0 0 7 at the earliest, and reports hint at more leases from R u ssia.343

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

In the opinion of Indian navy leaders, the Indian navy requires three to five aircraft carriers.344 In 1988, it w as reported that the cost of an indigenous conventional aircraft carrier w ould be R s7 -8 billion (approxim ately $500 million in $US 19 8 8).345 Despite the cost, however, a plan w as announced in 1989 to build tw o conventional aircraft carriers at Cochin, India with French assistance. Due to limited construction dock capacity, the design w as restricted in size to about 2 8 ,0 0 0 tons with the capacity of 3 0 -4 0 air­ craft and helicopters.346 Serious design finally began in 1999, and facilities for building the vessel - called the Air Defence Ship (ADS) - were opened in early 2 0 0 3 .347 M ore recent reports state that the ship will be 37,500 tons, with a speed o f 28 knots, and will be ready by roughly 2 0 1 1 .348 This will be the largest m ilitary vessel ever constructed by India. LEAN DER CLASS FRIGATE

Six Leander class frigates were produced under license at M azagon D ock­ yards in the 1 9 7 0 s.349 The last tw o ships produced, the T aragiri and Vindhyagiri, received extensive m odification, including the removal of ASW m ortars to increase hangar space for the helicopters and the addition of

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SS-N-2 Styx SSM launchers and tw o triple ASW torpedo tubes. The Indian N avy planned that the earlier ships w ould also be m odernized and brought up to the standards of these last tw o vessels.350

GODAVARI CLASS FRIGATE

The G odavari class frigate is an indigenous Indian design, based on a ‘stretched’ version of the Leander class. The G odavari has a displacement of 3 6 0 0 tons, and a top speed of 2 7 knots, and is arm ed with Soviet m is­ siles, W estern electronics and tw o helicopters for ASW w ork. There are reports that due to the variety of Soviet, Western, and indigenous systems on the ship, there were problem s with equipment com patibility.351 The Type 16-A, or Brahm aputra class frigate, is a m odification of the G odavari. The lead ship took 13 years to produce, finally entering service in 2 0 0 0 . The other tw o sister ships entered service by the end of 2004. Although the class has a form idable missile armam ent, the lack of appro­ priate SA M systems - due to failures in both the Trishul project and in R ussian alternatives - contributed to the delay in actual deployment. A follow-on system - the Type 17 - is currently in production, based on Indian and R ussian technology. Three vessels have been laid down, but the IN plans a total of 12 vessels. The Type 17 is reportedly a ‘stealth’ ship, with a small radar profile.352

DELH I-CLASS (TYPE 15) D ESTRO YER

The largest locally-produced w arship to date is the Type 15 Destroyer Program . The lead ship - the D elhi - w as launched in early 1991, with tw o others on order.353 The D elhi w as intended to field a com bination of Soviet and Indian electronics and w eapons systems, including ESM /EC M , EW equipment and sonar by Bharat Electronics Ltd. and Indian-built SAM (possibly the indigenous Trishul) and ShShM m issiles.354 Failures in the Trishul program have forced India to purchase Israel’s Barak SA M system .355 All three Delhi-class ships are now in service. VIBHUTI CLASS CORVETTE

This license m anufactured version of the Soviet T arantul I class corvette contributes significantly to the surface ship strength of the Indian N avy, although this ship is too sm all for a m ajor oceanic role. The 450 ton Vibhutis, which are literally packed with missile launchers (four SS-N -2C and one SA-N-5), differ from the original Veer design in having different machinery, a 57 m m gun instead o f the Soviet 76 mm, and an improved and upgraded set o f counterm easures equipm ent.356

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KH UKRI CLASS CO RVETTES (TYPE 25)

The K hukri is the first m ajor w arship to be entirely designed and built by India. The new corvette boasts a heavy arm am ent of SSM s and SA M s, in addition to a 76 mm gun and a Chetak helicopter for ASW duties (eventu­ ally to be replaced by the A LH ). The K hukri uses a number of locallydesigned com bat electronics systems, including the navigation unit, com bat data system (except in the lead ship), E SM system, and air search radar (all built by B E L ).357 Later versions of the K hukri use the SS-N-25 ShShM , a significant im provem ent over the older SS-N-2.

Strategic systems The 160 kg A ryabhatta satellite w as launched in 1975, follow ed by the B haskara I (June 1979) and B haskara II (Novem ber 1981). The Soviet Academ y of Sciences also provided assistance in the establishm ent of a satellite tracking and ranging station (STARS) in Tam il N adu , which entered operation in 1 9 7 8 .358 O n July 18, 1980, the indigenous Space Launch Vehicle-3 (SLV-3) launched a 35 kg Rohini satellite into orbit.359 With this test, India became only the seventh nation to successfully put a satellite into space with an indigenous launch vehicle. The link between the Indian Space Research O rganization and D R D O w as m ade explicit with the establishm ent of the Indigenous Guided M issile Developm ent Pro­ gram m e (IGM DP) in 1 9 8 3 .360 India developed a substantial chemical w eapons production capability in the 1980s, which w as declared under the Chemical W eapons Conven­ tion and is in the process of being scrapped. In 1988, India declared to the 3rd U N D isarm am ent Conference that it had no chemical w eapon arsenal. In 1997, while signing the Chemical W eapons Convention, it acknow ­ ledged possession of an arsenal, but the details remain confidential.361 India also reportedly has some biological w eapons (BW) capability, and pursues BW program s for prim arily defensive purposes.362 India’s nuclear developments will be discussed below.

1998-2005: new threats and opportunities The South Asian security environment changed dram atically after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of M ay 1998, and then again after the calam itous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2 0 0 1 . Both events foreshad­ owed new Indo-Pakistani crises, as each state sought to capitalize on the new security situation. Pakistan hoped to exploit the increased inter­ national concern over regional stability, provoking a crisis in the Kargil region in 1999 in an effort to put pressure on India for concessions in Kashm ir. The terrorist attacks o f September 11, 2001 rejuvenated the U S-Pakistan defense relationship, but also strengthened Indo-US relations.

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After a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2 0 0 1 , India authorized an unprecedented military m obilization and attem pted to use coercive diplom acy to force Pakistani concessions and to undermine the US-Pakistan relationship. These efforts led to regional crisis, but were only m odestly successful. Any crisis in the region now takes place under the threat of regional nuclear escalation and of rapid international diplom atic intervention. M ilitary input to India’s nuclear program has been strictly limited by India’s military leadership. One of the m ost outspoken advocates o f Indian nuclear capability w as the former Chief of Army Staff, General Krishnasw am y Sundarji, and Indian army officers have desired a voice in the program since the 1 9 6 0 s.363 Despite these rare exceptions, India’s strong tradition of civilian dom inance of civil-military relations has largely isolated nuclear debates from professional military advice. It was not until 1988 that the then-Chief of Staff of the InAF and a small cadre of air force officers independently initiated notional planning for a nuclear force.364 In the late 1980s, regional crises - Brasstacks in 1 9 8 6 -8 7 and a border crisis in 1990 - took place in conditions of nuclear opacity. Both states were strongly suspected of possessing nuclear w eapons, and o f having some means (probably airborne) of delivering those w eapons in com bat.365 The post-1998 crises were fundam entally different, because both sides p o s­ sessed tested and verified nuclear w eapons capability.366 On M ay 11, 1998, India sim ultaneously detonated three separate nuclear devices - one reportedly a thermonuclear device, one a roughly H iroshim a-sized fission device, and the third a m iniaturized, subkiloton device.367 T w o days later, India staged tw o more tests of subkiloton devices. One of the subkiloton devices reportedly used a reactor-grade, rather than the purer w eapons-grade, m ix of plutonium .368 On M ay 28, 1998, after over tw o weeks of intense diplom atic activity, Pakistan also tested nuclear devices. The number of tests is still contested - Pakistani authorities claim ed five, but other analysts were unconvinced.369 T w o days later, on M ay 30, Pakistan tested another device, which it announced was ‘m iniaturized.’370 The yields of both Indian and Pakistani tests remain dis­ puted, but seismic evidence unquestionably confirms that both states deto­ nated nuclear w eapons.371 The new Vajpayee government believed the nuclear tests fundamentally changed India’s policy options and security conditions, both within the region and internationally. L. K. Advani, India’s hard-line H om e M inister, insisted that India’s tests w ould m ake Islam abad ‘. . realize the change in the geostrategic situation in the region’ and ‘roll back its anti-India policy, especially with regard to K ash m ir.’372 H e suggested that India’s dem onstra­ ted nuclear pow er w ould allow it to intervene forcefully across the Line of Control in response to future attacks in K ashm ir.373

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Although Indian elites recognize the threat posed by Pakistan to Indian territory and security, they often deny that Pakistan should play an im portant role in determining Indian nuclear policy.374 The official expla­ nations of the nuclear tests emphasized extra-regional or international factors, only mentioning Pakistan in the context of Chinese missile and nuclear proliferation to Islam abad .375 The military im plications of the nuclear tests did not receive much em phasis. Perhaps the m ost telling comment w as an interview with Prime M inister V ajpayee: India has never considered military might as the ultimate m easure of national strength. It is a necessary com ponent of overall national strength. I would, therefore, say that the greatest m eaning of the tests is that they have given India shakti, they have given India strength, they have given India self-confidence.376 All of this suggests that India’s elites focused prim arily on the symbolic, international ram ifications of the tests, and not nearly as carefully on the potential regional security im pact. This emphasis on sym bols rather than hard security concerns is reflected historically in much of India’s p o st­ independence foreign and national security policy.377 In the eyes of many analysts, the 1998 nuclear tests, and more im port­ antly Pakistan’s prom pt counter-tests, actually degraded Indian security in the near-term. Indian military leadership recognized this possibility but it appears to have been largely rejected by Indian political elites.378 A ccord­ ing to the Indian Kargil Review Com mittee R eport, as early as 1991 the Join t Intelligence Committee anticipated that Pakistan w ould use its nuclear capability to limit Indian conventional retaliation in the event of low-intensity conflict.379 Shortly before the Kargil operation w as dis­ covered, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Pervaiz M ush arraf announced that while nuclear w eapons had m ade large-scale conventional w ars obsolete in the subcontinent, proxy w ars were very likely.380 The K argil W ar of 1999 w as the first w ar in a nuclearized South Asia, and arguably the first real w ar between tw o nuclear states. Pakistan attem pted, for reasons that are still unclear, to use m ilitary coercion against India, infiltrating about 2 ,0 0 0 regular and irregular troops over the Line of Control near K argil.381 This operation w ould also provide substan­ tial support for the insurgency in K ashm ir, and draw off the attention of Indian security forces. Both India and the international comm unity interpreted this move as an invasion of Indian sovereign territory across an established border. Significantly, India did not escalate or expand the conflict by crossing the Line of Control or the border - a tactic India had first used in 1 9 6 5 .382 Both India and Pakistan m ay have alerted and/or deployed nuclear w eapons and delivery systems during the crisis.383 The K argil experience contributed to significant changes in Indian

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nuclear and military doctrine. India’s D raft N uclear Doctrine (D N D ) was issued in A ugust 1 9 9 9 .384 The D N D articulated a need for a survivable second-strike force, but also suggested that unlike the US-Soviet com peti­ tion, retaliation did not need to be im m ediate - only assured. In early 2 0 0 0 , M inister of Defense George Fernandes announced a new ‘limited w ar doctrine,’ stating that there w as a ‘strategic space’ in which conven­ tional com bat could take place without triggering nuclear deterrence.385 Both doctrines aimed at denying the Pakistanis any advantage through the threat of nuclear escalation in the future.386 The December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Indian Parliament caused an alarm ing crisis in the region. India initiated an unprecedented military buildup in response. Indian reports state that the Indian airforce and Indian com m ando forces were prepared to strike dozens of militant bases and several m ajor military targets within tw o weeks after the December 13 attack.387 The crisis w as tem porarily resolved in January 2002, after con­ cessions by the Pakistani government. In M ay of 2 0 0 2 , the crisis re-emerged in an even more dangerous manner. An attack by terrorist forces on the K aluchak barracks resulted in the deaths of dozens of innocent women and children. India responded by com bining India’s Eastern and W estern Fleets in the N orth A rabian Sea, placing param ilitary forces in Jam m u and K ashm ir under form al military com m and, and reportedly preparing another series of military strikes before the m onsoon season began in mid-June 2 0 0 2 .388 Again, efforts to coerce Pakistan into significant concessions did not achieve decisive results. In early 2 0 0 3 , India’s nuclear doctrine w as form ally approved, and a national com m and authority established as part of a form al com m and and control apparatus for the nuclear arsenal.389 A new Strategic Force C om m and has been created and secure posts for the N ational Com m and Authority are now under construction.390 The Indian navy is trying to carve out its place in the nuclear establishment, currently dom inated by airforce bom bers and army ballistic m issiles.391 India’s nuclear structure remains, then, a w ork in p rogress.392 As India enters the twenty-first century, it appears to have em barked on a m ajor m ilitary m odernization effort. The 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0 budget increased funding for space and nuclear-related activities by significant am ounts. The 2 0 0 0 -0 1 budget, reflecting the Kargil Crisis of the summer of 1999, called for a 28 percent increase in defense spending.393 By 2 0 0 3 , defense app ro­ priations were R s6 5 ,3 0 0 crores - roughly $15 billion. Despite the large annual increased throughout the 1 9 9 8 -2 0 0 3 period, however, real growth in the defense budget w as only m odest due to inflation, and defense spend­ ing in 2 0 0 3 still am ounted to only 2.4 percent of G D P.394 The army remains the predom inant service in terms of prestige and budget allocations - the army share of the 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0 budget w as 55.29 percent, com pared to 14.8 percent for the navy, 22 .4 9 percent for the air­ force, 6 .0 7 percent for research and development, and 1.35 percent for

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defense production. 395 Indian military leaders recently asserted that India’s conventional edge has declined significantly in an Indo-Pakistani conflict from 1.75:1 in 1971, to roughly 1.5:1 in 1990, to approxim ately 1.22:1 today. 396 One report states that the Indian military is now ‘vast but hollow .’ 397 In terms of new equipment, the army is purchasing new equipment in response to the K argil conflict - but while artillery fire control radars and m ountain gear have m oved to the top o f the priority list, the ‘big ticket’ item remains the purchase of the T-90 tan k. 398 Significant increases in expenditure for the O rdnance Factories suggests that m aintenance, spares, and logistic capabilities are also receiving renewed emphasis - ordnance factory sales increased from R s5 ,5 2 2 crores in 2 0 0 0 -0 1 to R s6,105 crores in 2 0 0 1 -0 2 . 399 However, reports stated that the ordnance factories still suffered from some quality control problem s. 40 0 In addition, Indian Unm anned Aerial Vehicles program s - a priority for the army - appear to be inadequate, and are being replaced by Israeli im ports. 401 Indian industry is also w orking on battlefield radars for the army, but these will compete with possible US im ports. 4 02 In 2 0 0 4 , the navy appears to be on the verge of halting a decade-long decline that included an institutional crisis with the dism issal of the N avy Chief in late 1998. 4 03 According to N aval Chief Adm iral M adhavendra Singh, the navy ordered no ships from 1 9 8 5 -9 5 - and this shortfall is being m ade up by both dom estic production and foreign orders. 4 04 As mentioned earlier, naval construction represents one of India’s m ost suc­ cessful local m ilitary industrial program s. According to Adm iral JG N adkarni (IN, retired), this is because the Indian N avy has been largely successful at defining its own requirements and keeping D R D O out of its program s - a significant condem nation of India’s leading defense R & D organization. 405 405 N ew production currently in the w orks includes the A D S, the Type 16A and Type 17 frigates mentioned earlier, and an impending arrangem ent for local production o f French-designed Scorpene-class conventional attack subm arines. 406 Other naval technologies in research or production include light and heavy torpedoes, a hull-mounted sonar array (H U M SA ), a sub­ marine sonar, a dunking sonar for helicopters, EW systems, and a naval variant of the L C A aircraft. 4 0 7 India has also tested the supersonic BrahM os anti-ship missile, jointly developed with R ussian assistance, with a range of roughly 300 kilometers and a 300 kilogram w arhead. 408 The lack of an advanced trainer, aging equipment and rigorous flight schedules for InAF have led to a very high accident rate in the last decade. Efforts to procure an advanced jet trainer have only recently been successful.409 H A L began research on a stealth aircraft - the M edium C om bat A ir­ craft - in 1997, although it is unlikely to enter production in this decade. 410 India and R ussia are reportedly cooperating on design of a fifthgeneration supersonic fighter aircraft. 411

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Reported efforts to expand the InAFs squadron strength from the current 39 to 60 will require a m assive increase in resources, particularly given the loss of 300 aircraft to accidents since 1990. 4 1 2 Current efforts to m aintain InAF strength include upgrading older M iG -21bis aircraft with R ussian assistance. 413 Deploym ent of the LC A is intended to begin this decade.414 Acquisition and licensed production of the very sophisticated R ussian Su-30M K I has begun, but the program suffered significant delays in setting up production. 41 5 In the meantime, the InAF will continue to rely heavily on older M iG -21 airfram es, and will probably continue to lose air­ craft to accidents at a rate of 2 0 -5 per year.4 1 6 India clearly intends to field a range o f nuclear forces. 4 1 7 The D N D does not explicitly rule out tactical nuclear w eapons, despite its adherence to a no-first-use policy, and some Indian analysts have discussed the tactical nuclear option. 41 8 India currently possesses sufficient w eapons grade plutonium to create an arsenal of roughly 60 w eapons. Using its more abundant stocks of reactor-grade plutonium , a less-efficient m aterial for w eapons design, this number could increase significantly, to the 7 5 0 -1 ,0 0 0 range. 41 9 Some Indian analysts have been calling for further tests to include both thermonuclear devices and neutron bom b technology. 420 India’s space capabilities have also been substantially upgraded. The head of India’s Space Research O rganization has prom ised an unmanned m ission to the m oon by 2 0 0 8 . 421 India has launched eight remote sensing satellites, nine com m unications satellites, and one m eteorological satellite. The Technology Experim ent Satellite launched in 2001 reportedly has one meter resolution, and the C artosat series preparing for launch in 2 0 0 4 -0 5 will have resolutions of 2.5 meters (C artosat 1) and one meter (C artosat 2), respectively. India’s PSLV can now launch a 1,500 kilogram payload, and cooperation with Israel on space technology appears extremely prom ising. 422 422

Conclusion For nearly 50 years India pursued, and failed to achieve, the elusive goal of ‘self-sufficiency’ — independence in production o f all m ajor com bat equip­ ment. The shocking experience of the H im alayan W ar forced India to reconsider its security policies. The policies of N eh ru’s successors reflected a more self-interested approach, and the traditional utility o f military capability received increased emphasis. India’s arms industries spent the 1960s responding to im m ediate requirements caused by the w ars with China and Pakistan. The defeat of Pakistan in 1971 firmly established India as the predom i­ nant pow er in the subcontinent. Indian military capability expanded to attem pt to fill new sets of security objectives, including an increased m ar­ itime role in the region and a self-perceived role as ‘regional policem an.’

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Ironically, India’s military expansion did not yield enhanced security. As Indian military expenditures climb, the m ajority of spending is still com ­ mitted to the ongoing antagonism with Pakistan. H ow has the Indian arms industry fulfilled the prim ary objectives of the Indian government? Despite its failure to ascend to the higher tiers of the arms production hierarchy, India’s m ilitary industry has significantly affected the m ilitary balance in the subcontinent. India has been successful in reducing dependence on foreign suppliers through local design, develop­ ment, assem bly, and/or production of military equipment. A critical requirement for the Indian armed services has been to m ain­ tain significant quantitative advantages in prim ary w eapons systems over Pakistan, as well as to m aintain adequate stockpiles o f m unitions and equipment to permit the w aging of high-intensity conflict. The Indian arms industry has provided these benefits for all three services, although not always consistently. In 1971, over half the InAF’s aircraft, half of the heli­ copter force, and approxim ately 25 percent of the tank fleet were m odels which India assem bled or produced locally, although some o f this equip­ ment had been im ported as a finished product.423 Indian production p ro ­ vided small arms, m unitions, and light and medium w eapons for the ground forces for 30 years, as well as providing unsophisticated munitions for the air force and navy. Although it receives little notice from Indian or other analysts, the bulk o f India’s defense production is substantially more sophisticated than that of China, due prim arily to India’s willingness to utilize licensed production. For exam ple, India produced the M iG-21 before the PR C, and India’s T -72, D elhi-class destroyer, and SU -30M K I are significantly superior to existing Chinese m odels. In the w ords of one recent Indian Chief of Army Staff: “ M odernization is a relative term. The question is: m odernization for w hat? Basically, in India, we have to keep reasonably up with our neighbors. So, if neighbors forces get m odernized, then we also have to get modernized to that extent.’424 This explains part of the preference for licensed production. It ade­ quately responds to m ost m ilitary needs, provides leverage against supply blackm ail by external pow ers, and dem onstrates Indian military and industrial capabilities. Only a few countries are capable of m anufacturing supersonic aircraft, or large surface w arships, or sophisticated diesel attack subm arines. Indian industrial capability therefore reflects India’s self-image as a grow ing pow er and a great nation. India produced approxim ately 4 7 percent of the value of all m ajor w eapons systems acquired since 1965.425 This large industrial effort should, in theory, provide the m eans to produce, maintain, and repair significant portions of the Indian m ilitary’s m ajor equipment, providing leverage against dependency on foreign supply and the means to assure sustained military operations in short-term and extended conflicts. In prac­ tice, this has not been the case.

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Table 2.6 Local share o f value in Indian m ajor w eapons systems procurem ent 1965­ 70 Prim arily indigenous production as percentage of overall procurem ent Licensed Production as percentage of overall procurem ent Indigenous production as percentage of im ports Licensed production as percentage of im ports C om bined local production as percentage of im ports C om bined local production as percentage of total procurem ent o f m ajor w eapons systems

1971­ 75

1976­ 80

1981­ 85

1986­ 90

T otal

31.4

40.3

34.9

34.4

2 2 .7

30.2

17.7

21.0

15.1

12.7

18.3

16.8

61.8

104.5

68.2

65.1

38.4

56.9

34.9

54.4

29.9

24.0

31.1

31.6

9 6 .7

158.9

98.2

89.2

69.4

88.5

4 9 .2

61.3

49.5

47.1

41.0

47.0

Source: SIPRI data found in Ian Anthony, ‘The “ third tier” countries: production of major weapons’, in Wulf, Arms Industry Limited, 370-3, 382-3. See pp. 368-9 for methodology. I have combined some of the data and created additional columns in order to further illustrate the range of indigenous efforts.

One o f the m ost attractive theories in the study of L D C arm s produc­ tion is the concept of the ‘ladder of production,’ discussed briefly in Chapter 1.426 India has consistently violated this theoretical ladder, skip­ ping or ignoring steps in pursuit of sym bolic goals. It has regularly rejected the possibility o f incremental improvements to existing arm s based on local R & D , preferring instead to purchase or develop entire new systems. The separation of the Indian defense sector from private industry m ini­ mizes the im pact of im ported defense production technology on the national economy.427 In the aerospace sector, sophisticated m anufacturing technology im ported at enorm ous expense has had virtually no im pact on the national economy. Separation of the defense and private sectors w as originally encouraged because quality standards in the civilian sector were often much lower than those in the defense industries. As India has integrated with the global economy, however, quality in many sectors now approaches or exceeds W estern standards. Retiring Chief of Army Staff Sharm a insisted that the government m ust m ake sure that O rdnance Factories and DPSUs ‘become more competitive in the m arket economy, and we should also diversify much of our needs to the private sector so that the competition am ong our own businessm en is available and that in itself will reduce prices.’428 Prime M inister V ajpayee recently noted the need to involve the military in defense research and development, and to ensure that the users of

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technology be firmly in the loop, as well as the desirability of having the private sector involved in R & D and production efforts.429 The fact that these rem arks are necessary more than 50 years after independence merely emphasizes the inadequacy of Indian military-industrial policy. Better uti­ lization of India’s enorm ous scientific establishm ent could substantially increase Indian military industrial competitiveness and alleviate techno­ logical shortfalls in the existing force structure. Research and development, with the exception of the IG M D P, has been sloppy and poorly supervised.430 The LC A project has now dragged on for alm ost 25 years, and the aircraft remains years from serial production. The G T X ‘K averi’ turbine, intended as its pow er source, has been under devel­ opment for tw o decades. India’s efforts to indigenize production often, in the w ords of one analyst, results ‘in a constant endeavour to reinvent the wheel.’431 Government reports condemn long delays in m ajor projects. The former director of D R D O , D r. V. S. A runachalam , adm itted that ‘in our eagerness to get m ajor projects, we gave unrealistic timefram es and very low budgets.’432 Dr. Abdul K alam , director of D R D O , identified critical p rob ­ lems in the Indian R & D establishment, including poor interaction with end users, overem phasis on in-house R & D projects, and poor adm inistra­ tion of available funds.433 Availability of funding for projects is a particular sticking point, whether in the R & D or production stages. The Indian budget process rarely facilitates extended funding comm itm ents. The budgeting process is designed to m axim ize civilian oversight of defense procurem ent, and com ­ plicates the possibility of easily shifting funds or of m aintaining consistent production rates over extended periods.434 Lack of a prepared national security policy or strategy severely com plicates long-term planning and coordination of industrial strategy.435 Some signs of positive progress are apparent. A recent announcement, creating a $5.5 billion fund for m odernization, m ay alleviate this problem .436 India has also comm itted nearly $1 billion (R s50 billion) to advance paym ents for foreign equipment, hopefully avoiding continued delays in the A JT , Gorshkov, and P H A L C O N purchases.437 The Indian government has allow ed foreign firms to purchase up to 26 percent of the share capital of certain defense related industries. The government also announced its decision to set up a Defence Procurement Board and take a long-term perspective on procurem ent needs 1 5 -2 0 years in the future.438 Serious w eaknesses are evident in m anagem ent of existing industrial program s. India has always been concerned about the availability of spare parts, and the possibility that the U SSR or other suppliers w ould practice ‘spare parts diplom acy.’439 Despite this, insufficient priority has been given to m anufacture of spare parts for Soviet equipment.440 In 1993, the Indians needed to im port small items, including hose pipes, rubber bungs, seals, and hydraulic oils for the M iG -21 aircraft and T-72 tank.441 Only months

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later, India went on a foreign shopping spree which included land mines, 125 mm tank shells for the T -72, and artillery rounds for 130 mm cannon.442 442 The m ost notable weakness in Indian defense industry, however, is the virtual absence of a significant refit and m odernization capability. The great strength o f the incremental approach and the ‘ladder of production’ is the gradually increasing ability to m odify existing equipment for the local com bat environment or to extend service life.44 3 India’s defense industry focused alm ost exclusively on the production of m ajor w eapons systems and platform s, and relied on im ported subsystem s and armam ents. The result is an industrial base which can design and produce airfram es, but which has difficulty installing a different radar or an im proved air-toair missile to improve perform ance. 4 44 The Indian arm s industry should be capable of far better, given the am ount of resources expended. India could now benefit substantially from a transfer o f technology and expertise from the civilian sector, and a general opening of the defense sector to new ideas and competition. India boasts a surfeit of talented sci­ entists, technicians, engineers, and com puter program m ers w ho could m ake substantial contributions to the Indian defense industry. Aircraft upgrades, for exam ple, are becoming increasingly dependent on softw are m odifications, and India boasts one o f the m ost vibrant com puter pro­ gram m ing industries in the w orld. The fact that the Indian ASW AC air­ borne early warning system could be held up over inadequate computer softw are suggests how inefficiently Indian defense industries are coordinated with the private sector. The IG M D P therefore offers a potential model for future Indian mili­ tary industrial efficiency and success. Unlike previous Indian program s, the IG M D P had rigorous standards, efficient m anagem ent, and strict deadlines for development and funding. The IG M D P is the first m ajor Indian R & D program which has incorporated both public and private sector technology establishments with consistent m ilitary support and oversight in the testing and development stages. There is no indication as yet, however, that this level of integration is being replicated in other Indian projects. If a local solution is not immediately available, however, India has been careful in m aintaining and creating new access to foreign technology. The m ost im portant new venue is the ‘Glide p ath ’ - the gradual opening of technological transfers from the United States as part o f the w arm ing of Indo-US relations. 445 India has agreed to participate in a missile defense program with the US, raising the possibility of both Indo-US technology cooperation and also transfers of the US-Israeli Arrow system to India. 446 The US recently offered to sell F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft to India, including technology transfer and licensed production rights. Differing perceptions of the role of technology in the relationship m ay still limit Indo-US cooper­ ation, however.4 4 7 Indo-Russian cooperation continues to blossom . The BrahM os

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represents a significant achievement, and m ay be deployed in 2 0 0 4 .448 India and R ussia are also discussing a new beyond-visual-range missile, merging an existing project at the R ussian firm N ov ato with R & D work being done at D R D O .449 India has agreed to help R ussia develop its G lonass satellite navigation system - a deployment that could have significant military im pact.450 Finally, the Indo-Israeli defense relationship continues to be extremely fruitful for both sides - one of the first exam ples of significant defense cooperation by mid-level producers in the new globalized defense industry. The P H A L C O N project, which the US denied to China, is a crucial dem onstration of that relationship, and of US com fort with technology transfer to India.451 India also seeks to w ork on missile projects with Israel, using Israeli expertise to flesh out D R D O ’s ideas - including the Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile.452 Space cooperation, noted earlier, remains a serious possibility as well. Skillful use of existing industrial infrastructure and more sophisticated foreign partners creates a genuine opportunity for India’s military industry to m ake significant strides in the near future. Given the history of poor m anagem ent and bureaucratic interference, it w ould be im prudent to hope for a rapid success. But as India’s military begins serious new plans for m odern w arfare, the role of Indian industry will be critical in determining the technological sophistication of India’s forces, in m axim izing the effec­ tiveness of India’s defense budget, and in determining India’s overall military capability on both a regional and global stage.453

3

Israel

Background Israel possesses the m ost technologically-sophisticated military industry of any developing country.1 Israel’s rapid military-industrial development is astonishing: in the period from 1 9 4 0 -9 0 , the Israeli arm s industry evolved from the m anufacture o f small arm s and explosives in tiny basem ent facto­ ries to the production and m odernization of supersonic fighter aircraft, sophisticated m issiles, tanks, and electronics system s.2 Israel’s defense industry developed in response to its abnorm ally threat­ ening security condition. Limited economic resources and constrained access to the international arms m arket forced the new state to carefully integrate military-industrial development into its overall economic and national security planning. The close links between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and their m ilitary-industrial base facilitated the research and development (R & D ) of unique and sophisticated com bat equipment tai­ lored for the M iddle East environment and the changing dimensions of the A rab threat. Careful deliberations by political and military leadership nur­ tured specific sectors of the industry which filled critical needs, occasion­ ally over the objections of economic counsel. For the m ost part, Israel’s early m ilitary-industrial policy stressed short­ term preparation over longer-term preparedness. Threats to Israeli survival were deemed imminent, and long-term investments in expensive infrastruc­ ture were seen as generally counterproductive. Investments in repair and m aintenance, as well as the gradual acquisition of sophisticated m odern­ ization and m odification capabilities, fulfilled m ost of Israel’s military requirements at minimal expense. This practical approach to industrial development, characterized by the ‘ladder of p roduction ’ m odel described in Chapter 1, began to unravel after the Six D ay W ar o f 1967. D iplom atic isolation, national pride, and increased econom ic resources contributed to a new belief that indigenous ‘across-the-board’ m anufacturing capabilities were essential to Israel’s security. The lure of ‘blue-and-white’ projects, designed and produced in Israel, nearly bankrupted the defense budget in the unhappy case of the

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Lavi fighter aircraft. During the 1990s, economic lim itations, the chang­ ing nature of the threat to Israel, and the unique characteristics of US m il­ itary assistance re-shaped Israel’s m ilitary-industrial infrastructure and policy. Israel’s m ilitary-industrial experience typifies both the m ost positive and negative aspects of less developed country (LD C) policies. Bolstered by a close relationship with political leaders and the military, local industry has reached internationally competitive levels in select technological niches and areas of com parative advantage, including electronics and m issiles. Other m anufacturing sectors in the economy have benefited from the defense program s and their high standards of m anufacturing and technological competitiveness. But Israel also succum bed to the lure of ‘self-sufficiency,’ and squandered scarce economic resources on high-profile but ultimately unsuccessful projects like the Lavi. The Israeli case offers many lessons for prospective L D C producers.

Israeli security perceptions3 The state o f Israel existed, until recently, in one of the m ost unrelentingly hostile national security environments im aginable. As the only non-Arab state in the M iddle East, Israel became the focus of A rab anim osity and pan-A rab am bition. The survivors of the H olocau st w ho fled to Israel after W orld W ar II found themselves faced with renewed threats of cultural and national annihilation. The ultimate objective of the A rab states has been defined as ‘politicide’ - the m urder of the politeia or political entity of Israel.4 The absence of potential regional allies forced Israel to seek sufficient military strength to deter or defeat an A rab coalition assault alone. As a result, Israeli national security policy emphasized the military aspects of security. This security concept w as intended to come to grips with a military dilemma: how to defend against an existential military threat in con­ ditions of non-existent defensive space (lack o f territorial depth), quantitative inferiority (in terms of force ratios) and w eak military staying pow er relative to that of the adversary.5 Geographic constraints and limited economic and m anpow er resources determine Israeli military policy. T o narrow the resource gap and incorpo­ rate new im m igrants into the economy, rapid economic development and industrialization is a priority.6 Israel’s small size, vulnerable borders, and highly concentrated population require the IDF to take the w ar to enemy territory as quickly as possible, in order to limit civilian casualties and dam age to infrastructure.7 Israeli policy demands decisive victory in every conflict, assum ing that each military encounter is merely a ‘round’ in an

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extended w ar with the A rab w orld.8 The first significant Israeli military defeat m ight mean national annihilation. IDF strategy is therefore driven by requirements to 1) limit casualties, 2) fight on enemy territory, 3) win quickly, and 4) win decisively.9 These requirements demand an offensive approach to fundam entally defensive g o als.10 The IDF m ust depend on superior quality in order to offset Arab m ass, dem anding the highest levels of competence from an army which is prim arily com posed of part-time reservists. The highest possible standards of efficiency in operations, m aintenance, and repair are critical in order to limit procurem ent expenditure but m axim ize available military capability. Israel m ust be able to fight, if necessary, in complete isolation from exter­ nal suppliers, and be able to call upon all national resources in the event of crisis. These all-encom passing requirements profoundly affected the evolu­ tion o f Israeli military industry.

The structure of the Israeli defense industry The structure o f the Israeli defense industry reflects both the socialist lean­ ings of the early L ab or governments and the gradual expansion of the private industrial sector. In the afterm ath of the Six D ay W ar, Israel m ade a distinct effort to incorporate private firms into the defense industry, a policy which w as m ost successful in the electronics industries.11 Econom ic constraints from the m id-1980s onw ard forced the Israeli defense industry to lay off thousands of w orkers - employment in the defense sector fell from 6 2 ,6 0 0 to 4 6 ,5 0 0 from 1985 to 1989 - and drove larger firms to export and diversify in order to survive.12 Israel exported a very high per­ centage o f its total m ilitary production - 70 percent in 1994 - and arms exports reportedly climbed from $2.2 billion to $3.3 billion from 1 9 9 2 -9 8 .13 By 2 0 0 0 , Israel w as the fifth largest arms exporter in the w orld, behind R ussia, France, the U K, and the U S.14 Israel’s arm s industries and m ilitary-industrial policy have been forced to evolve in substantial new directions since the end of the Cold W ar.15 Nevertheless, it w as the unique geopolitical environment of that Cold W ar - the superpow er competition, Soviet support for A rab nationalism , and the gradual development of a US-Israeli security relationship - that deter­ mined both the size and scope of Israel’s military industrial infrastructure and its global role. W hat follows is a snapshot of the Israeli arms industry in the im m ediate post-C old W ar period and a discussion o f recent trends. Government controlled industries M ASH A is the H ebrew acronym for the Renovation and M aintenance Centers o f the IDF Logistics Branch. One of these centers has specialized since the 1950s in renovation and m odification o f arm ored com bat vehi­ cles, beginning with W orld W ar II surplus halftracks and Sherman tan ks.16

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In the 1970s, M A SH A w as assigned responsibility for m anufacture o f the M erkava tank, although m anufacture of m ost of the parts w as subcon­ tracted. The IDF is thus unique am ong W estern producers in that it not only designed its own m ain battle tank, but is also ultimately responsible for its production.17 The IDF Com m unications and Intelligence Branches are also reportedly m ajor designers and, in some cases, producers of appropriate equipm ent.18 R A F A E L is the organization tasked with research and development and production of some of Israel’s m ost sophisticated defense systems. R A FA EL has been responsible for the development of over 100 different w eapons systems for the IDF since 1 9 6 7 .19 The original function of R A FA EL w as research and development (R & D ), with the responsibility for production o f systems accepted by the IDF being passed on to other firms. This research and development included a substantial role in Israel’s nuclear w eapons program .20 In the late 1960s, R A FA EL became a ‘closed economic unit,’ financed completely by m eans o f development and produc­ tion contracts. By 1986, R A FA E L had 6,5 0 0 w orkers, 70 percent o f whom were engaged in R & D activity and 30 percent o f whom were engaged in actual production.21 R A FA EL designs and develops the ‘cutting-edge’ equipment required by the IDF and unavailable elsewhere. The entire Israeli guided missile program w as conceived and initiated at R A FA EL, which also designed the PY RA M ID television-guided glide bom b and other precision-guided m uni­ tions.22 R A FA EL designed the T A L 2 cluster bom b to meet IAF require­ ments at a time when the US refused to supply these w eapons.23 R A FA EL has suffered from the changed international environment employment fell from over 7,500 in 1986 to 4 ,1 0 0 in 1999.24 The need to become self-financing also m oved R A F A E L’s priorities from pure research and development to actual production and com petition with other produc­ ers in both Israel’s industry and abro ad .25 R A F A E L’s exports - presum ably a m ajor money m aker - lagged well behind other Israeli firms as a percent­ age o f total output.26 Israel A ircraft Industries (IAI) is structured into four divisions, with a total of 17 plants.27 These divisions are Aircraft, Technologies, Electronics, and Bedek (the division responsible for m aintenance, upgrading, and over­ haul). In 1999, the w orkforce w as just over 14,000, down from a high of over 2 2 ,5 0 0 in the m id-1980s.28 IAI not only m anufactures a variety of systems for all branches o f the IDF, but also exports to approxim ately 80 different countries.29 By the early 1990s, IAI w as engaged in joint ventures and cooperative projects with 2 0 -3 0 US com panies, and had dem onstrated some success selling to the US m ilitary.30 IAI specializes in refitting com bat aircraft for both the IAF and a wide range of potential foreign custom ers. The firm produced and modernized aircraft for IAF needs, in addition to a range of tactical m issiles. IAI p ro ­ vides for the other IDF services as well, including small arm ored vehicles,

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and patrol vessels for the navy. IAI’s Elta division is a leader in the m anu­ facture of electronics systems, producing a wide range of ground and airbased electronic w arfare and electronic intelligence system s. 31 IAI has also become the leading producer of RPV/UAVs in the world. IAI produces com ponents for other m ajor com m ercial aircraft produc­ ers, including Boeing and M cDonnell D o u glas. 32 IAI hopes to enter the international space technology m arket, particularly the m anufacture of small satellites for com m ercial use. 33 IAI remains a pow erful exporter. In 1994 79 percent of its total production w as exported, and by 2000 IAI exports reached $ 1 .7 billion - 8.2 percent of all Israeli non-diam ond exports. 34 TAAS (Israeli M ilitary Industries) provides a wide variety of equipment for all three services and for the export m arket. 35 The com pany produces hundreds o f different items, including light arm s, am m unition, tank guns, air fuel tanks, artillery rockets, chaff/flare and other decoys and towed assault bridges. 36 Sales to the IDF accounted for about 40 percent of total sales in the early 1990s, with the rest being accounted for in the export m arket. 37 TAA S products include a number of now -fam ous w eapons and munitions designed and developed specifically for Israeli needs, including the Uzi submachine gun, the Galil family of infantry w eapons, and ‘H etz’ 105 mm tank ammunition. TAAS has been particularly hard hit by changes in the industrial environment. Employment at the firm fell from 14,500 in 1985 to 3,800 in 19 9 9 . 38 According to a recent report, TAAS received over $1.3 billion in government subsidies in the past decade. 39 TAAS has suffered from the increasing im portance of US military assistance in the defense budget, and w as forced to take a larger role in the export m arket in an effort to increase revenues. While exports reached 53 percent of total production in 1994, TAAS suffered a catastrophic 33 percent decline in sales the following year, emphasizing the vulnerability of export dependence.40 Efforts to merge the m ajor firms (IAI, TAAS, RAFAEL) or even to consolidate core business functions between them have been largely unsuccessful, and TAAS has apparently been the m ajor loser from inter-industry competition. 41 Israel Shipyards Lim ited (ISL) produces com m ercial vessels and w ar­ ships for the Israeli navy, including the R eshef and Aliya class missile attack craft. ISL suffered severely in the late 1980s, when the Israeli government terminated contracts with the shipyard and purchased S a ’ar 5 corvettes from a US firm. D rastic cost-cutting m easures stabilized the yard’s financial situation, which also engaged in increased maintenance w ork for the US N av y ’s Sixth Fleet. 42 Public-sector corporations 43 Tadiran is Israel’s leading electronics firm, established to ensure that the IDF had access to competitive electronics and com m unications equipment.

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A full line of com m unications equipment is produced, ranging from per­ sonal radios and portable equipment for individual soldiers to long-range com m unications and C3I netw orks, including significant international business.44 M ilitary sales, which reached 60 percent of total sales in the m id-1980s, but declined to the 45 percent m ark - a low level for any Israeli defense firm. This w as achieved prim arily through increased concen­ tration on lucrative civilian technologies, such as portable radios and con­ sumer electronics. The com pany suffered severely during the late 1980s, laying off 50 percent of its w orkforce.45 Elisra, a subsidiary of Tadiran, is the prim ary producer of electronic w arfare equipment in Israel, specializing in airborne self-protection systems. Elisra is involved in projects for the IAF, N avy, Signal Corps, and Intelligence, and sales to the IDF account for about 43 percent of total sales. H alf of these are airborne systems, including the SPS-2000 (a self­ protection system designed for front-line aircraft, like the F-15 and F-16), the SPS-1000, designed specifically for the aircraft upgrade m arket, and the SPS-65, designed for helicopters and low-flying aircraft.46 The com pany also produces a variety of E L IN T systems, as well as ESM /EC M systems for installation on the new S a’ar 5 corvette and other Israeli navy vessels.47 In 1999, elements o f T adiran and Elisra merged to create a powerful electronics conglom erate with significant export potential - over $300 million in sales in 1999 alone. The new Elisra G roup consists of Elisra Electronic Systems, T adiran Spectralink, T adiran Electronic Systems, BVR Systems Ltd., and Stellar. Elisra G roup exports roughly 60 percent of total sales, but only 7 percent to the United States, and has also apparently diversified substantially into the non-defense m arket. 48 Private firms El-O p Electro-Optics, half-owned by Tadiran, is an im portant producer of electro-optical systems, both for the IDF and for export m arkets.49 The prim ary areas of El-O p expertise are laser designators, night-vision equip­ ment, and H eads Up D isplays for various aircraft. El-Op produces a number o f systems used by the US military and the IDF, including elec­ tronic and electro-optic susbsystem s used in the US Apache attack heli­ copter, and the Rangefinder Target Designator Laser used in IAI’s Night Targeting System for Cobra helicopters. El-Op also produces the M ultisen­ sor Stabilized Integrated System, used on Israeli fast patrol boats for track­ ing and passive surveillance of both surface and air targets,50 and is a contractor in the M atad o r tank fire control system .51 Elbit w as established in 1966 with the objective of developing and p ro ­ ducing advanced computer-driven equipment for Israeli military requirem ents.52 Like Elisra, Elbit m anaged to increase sales during a time of m ajor defense cutbacks, an indication of both IDF priorities and of the ability of

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Israeli electronics firms to compete in the international arena. M ilitary sales account for approxim ately half of Elbit sales ($300 million in 1991), and about tw o thirds o f the com pany’s net profits.53 The com pany has thrived due to the increased im portance of defense equipment upgrades, which Elbit perform s on land, sea and air system s. The prim ary consumer of Elbit products is the US military (4 5 -5 0 percent of sales), follow ed at a great distance by the IDF (20 percent). Present projects at Elbit include the Phantom 2 0 0 0 upgrade program for the IAF and the central m ission com puter for IAF F-16s. Elbit perform s upgrade w ork for the aircraft of several foreign countries, including N orthrop F-5s, M iG -21s, and the Czech L-39 trainer.54 Elbit provides the fire control system for the M erkava tank, integrates sim ilar systems into both W estern and Soviet-bloc equipment, and produces a range of artillery fire control system s.55 The com pany has also developed com m and and control, ESM , and E L IN T equipment for naval vessels,56 and is one of the few m anufacturers in the w orld fully integrated ELIN T /E SM systems for subm arines.57 In 1999, Elbit and El-Op merged to create a firm with employment of roughly 4 ,0 0 0 , revenues of $720 million, and a varied custom er base divided roughly evenly between Israel (25 percent of sales), the US (25 percent), Europe (30 percent), and the rest of the w orld (20 percent).58 According to Defense N ew s, 94 percent of Elbit’s revenues came from the defense sector, com pared to only 60 percent for Elisra G roup. This sug­ gests that Elbit is more dependent on exports than Elisra, and at greater risk from the inherent fluctuations in the international arms trade.59 Israel has a large number o f smaller firms that act as producers and sub­ producers of military systems and com ponents. R ad a - an exam ple of these small firms - produces superb equipment for the IAF and inter­ national clients. R ad a specializes in com puters, autom atic test equipment, and airforce ground support equipment. Because of the high quality of its test and maintenance equipment, the firm is involved in large numbers of international aircraft upgrade program s.60 R a d a ’s tw o m ost im portant products have enorm ous force multiplier effects, but cannot easily be quantified because the systems themselves are inconspicuous and highly sensitive. The first is the A utom atic Test Equipm ent (ATE). According to Israeli reports, this system can substitute for multiple highly trained technicians.61 The second system is the computerized D ata Transfer Equipment (DTE), originally designed for the F-16 and now used on F-5s and M iragetype aircraft as w ell.62 The D T E transfers m ission data from electronic car­ tridges to avionics com puters, and processes inform ation much more rapidly than the original US system. This allow s greater efficiency and increases the effectiveness of the aircraft in com bat, while also simplifying post-m ission analysis.63 Small, efficient electronics firms like R ad a are now capable of m aking a m ajor im pact on the quality o f IDF equipment, particularly in the aerospace sector.

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The pre-state period: 1920-48 The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) evolved from small groups of Zionist set­ tlers, who formed independent self-defense cells as early as the 1880s to defend Jew ish settlements against attack.64 In September 1907, ten men founded a secret organization called B ar-G iora, nam ed after the leader of the Jew ish revolt of a d 7 0 .65 In 1909, a larger group calling itself H ashom er (Watchmen) w as formed, never num bering more than 100 m em bers.66 A rab riots and attacks in 1920 prom pted the establishm ent of the larger and better-organized H aganah, which eventually provided the basis for the IDF at independence in 1 9 4 8 .67 It w as under the auspices of the H aganah that semi-permanent cottage-type military industries were first established by Jew ish settlers. Early local production efforts included hand grenades, home-made bom bs, and other explosives. TAA S (T a’asiya Z v ai’it), the forerunner to Israeli M ilitary Industries, w as founded in 1933, and began budgeting for research and development o f w eapons in 1 9 3 7 .68 During W orld W ar II, a series of underground factories were estab­ lished which produced small arm s, including the versatile and easily p ro ­ duced Sten subm achine gun, ammunition, and 2-inch and 3-inch m ortars.69 By 1948, TAA S w as m anufacturing grenades, rifles, ‘D ro r’ light machine guns, British and ‘D avid ka’ m odel m ortars, Sten guns, and PIAT anti-tank w eapons, as well as amm unition for all of these w eapons.70 Israeli military leadership recognized the value of these industries: ‘The condition of the H agan ah is far from satisfactory. In the m atter of arm s we have become noticeably better off, by acquisition and independent manufacturing.’71 The leaders of the H agan ah felt that these light arm s w ould be sufficient to suppress local A rab resistance. David Ben Gurion, chairm an o f the exec­ utive o f the Jew ish agency (Yishuv) and later the first Prime M inister o f the state of Israel, w as not convinced. We w ould not be up against the A rabs of Palestine, but the A rab states. The H aganah, operating as an underground movement, could neither produce heavy w eapons nor train its m embers in their use. We m ust therefore buy heavy w eapons in good time and lay the foun da­ tions for an industry capable of building them. Clearly with the end of the w ar the United States w ould dism antle a large part of its arms industry. An effort m ust be m ade to obtain our necessary machinery from this source.72 Shortly after the end of W orld W ar II, TAA S purchased large am ounts of sophisticated arms production machinery from the US at the scrap metal rate of $75 per ton .73 Research, development, and industrial infrastructure constituted a high priority. In 1946, the budget for the H agan ah was

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67 0 ,0 0 0 Palestinian pounds, of which 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 were devoted to the arms industry. In 1947, the budget w as increased to 770,000 Palestinian pounds, of which 3 1 0 ,0 0 0 were earm arked for industrial program s.74 The form ation of the IDF in 1948 included the establishm ent of the Science C orps, which combined research and development organizations from all o f the services and government establishm ents.75

Development of military industrial infrastructure: 1948-67 Israel lost over 6,0 0 0 dead in the W ar of Independence, which amounted to approxim ately 1 percent of the 1948 population.76 C om bat in the con­ flict w as relatively unsophisticated - the few tanks available to the IDF, for exam ple, saw little action.77 M ost o f the fighting w as done by units of brigade size or smaller, with light wheeled vehicles, sm all arm s, m ortars and some light artillery. As a result, while the ID F’s local industrial base m ade a significant contribution to the W ar of Independence, it could not guarantee security in the future. The new Israeli state under the leadership of D avid Ben Gurion estab­ lished a tw o-track diplom atic and industrial policy to ensure supply and maintenance of adequate arm s. O n the one hand, Ben Gurion actively pursued a strategy of allying with a great pow er patron .78 Israeli diplo­ m atic efforts during much of this period focused on obtaining access to or membership in the W estern defense community. At the sam e time, however, Ben Gurion also initiated efforts to establish a sophisticated dom estic defense industry. The period 1 9 4 9 -5 5 saw the establishm ent and expansion of the firms which eventually became the prim ary producers in the Israeli defense industry. TAA S, for exam ple, expanded production over 50 percent by 19 5 3 .79 Emet, renam ed R A FA EL in 1959, combined the Science Corps of the various branches of the IDF, and began research and development o f a series of rockets, guided w eapons, and m issiles.80 M A SH A began renova­ tion and maintenance o f the ID F ’s diverse equipment stockpiles.81 As early as 1950, Ben Gurion advocated establishing an aircraft indus­ try. H is initial proposal w as the establishm ent of a maintenance plant which w ould produce spares for the 30 different types of aircraft then in IAF inventory. The plan w as opposed by economists and m ilitary advisers, w ho argued that the Israeli m arket w as too small to w arrant a m ajor investment in the aircraft industry, and that such an effort w ould either exceed Israel’s technical capacities or drain skilled labor to an unreason­ able extent.82 Ben Gurion insisted, and in 1952 the Cabinet authorized the establishm ent of Bedek, which w ould overhaul and refurbish IAF aircraft, gradually assum e responsibility for overhaul and m aintenance o f both civilian and m ilitary aircraft which Israel desired to purchase, and m ain­ tain El Al, Israel’s national airline.83 Ben Gurion also supported the establishm ent of an electronics firm

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(Tadiran) in response to the ID F’s requirements for batteries, again over the strong objections of economic advisors. At least initially, Israeli batter­ ies and transistors were not as good as im ported com petitors. In order to satisfy entrepreneurs who wished to create an Israeli electronics m arket, the new firm agreed to sub-contract heavily to the private sector, and to limit its production for the local civilian m arket to only 50 percent to encourage com petition.84 This effort at im port-substitution w as the first step in the creation o f w hat later became a w orld-class defense electronics industry. Ben Gurion reorganized the IDF and the Defense M inistry in 1950, reflecting concern over the ID F’s reluctance to cooperate in militaryindustrial development. The Defense M inistry w as given jurisdiction over finances and the acquisition, development, and production o f new arm s.85 In 1953, Ben Gurion decided that the nation’s service sectors w ould be tasked to provide support for the IDF, so that duplication of effort in m edical, transport, and other sectors w ould not be necessary.86 The new principle w as coined as ‘Let the army prepare solely for the battlefield, and let all the nation’s services provide support in w artim e.’87 Israel’s rudimentary protectionist policies focused on defense-related areas: chemicals, m etals, and machinery were considered particularly critical.88 Grants from the United States, financial transfers from the Jew ish diaspora, and the R eparations and R estitutions Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germ any (signed in 1953) provided the capital neces­ sary for development of industrial infrastructure.89 Acceptance of the Germ an reparations paym ents w as extremely controversial.90 Germ an reparations helped provide funding and dual-use technology for Bedek and the Israeli m etals industry, including establishm ent of the Urdan W orks and m ajor funding for K oor Industries.91 Despite Ben G urion’s am bitious plans, Israel’s military industry evolved on som ething of an ad hoc basis in response to IDF requirements and needs. The Tripartite Agreement between the US, U K, and France attem pted to balance and limit the quality and quantity o f arm s provided to M iddle East states.92 The lack of a reliable source of arm s necessitated that Israel purchase whatever equipment w as available from any supplier, regardless of the effects on standardization and maintenance, creating a logistics nightmare. Financial constraints also limited the ID F’s ability to procure new equipment. The IDF therefore emphasized ‘self-help’ policies - the m ost m odern available equipment w as procured, regardless o f source, and m od­ ified to fit Israeli needs.93 H igh rates of operability and high standards of maintenance for all equipment became m ajor priorities.94 Throughout this period, the budding Israeli arms industry w as forced to provide spare parts for a variety o f incom patible systems on a trial and error basis.95 These ‘endurance’ sectors constituted the m ost crucial contributions of the Israeli defense industry in this early period.

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As in m ost developing countries, the ground forces received priority - their capabilities were m ost integral to defending national territory. In addition, ground forces generally rely less on expensive technology and are therefore less expensive to equip. Lack of financial resources and assured suppliers forced the IAF to rely on used and frequently obsolescent equipment acquired from a variety of sources.96 The navy had the lowest priority, and was virtu­ ally ignored, as was the potential strategic role of the airforce.97 On O ctober 27, 1955, Egypt’s President N asser announced the finaliza­ tion o f an arm s agreement with C zechoslovakia which w ould provide Egypt with hundreds of sophisticated Soviet-model tanks and aircraft. Israel quickly negotiated an agreement with France calling for supply of jet aircraft, tanks, and amm unition stocks. Israel agreed in return to particip­ ate in planning and carrying out joint military operations against Egypt. These operations eventually included the British, and became the Suez cam paign of O ctober 1 9 5 6 .98

T able 3.1 Israeli m ilitary expenditures, 1 9 4 8 -6 7 Year

Defense expenditure (millions o f current Israeli p oun ds) (a)

D efense expenditures (millions o f constant $1960) (b)

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

16 22 28 49 49 49 50 57 122 183 212 243 294 313 396 511 700 825 1,131 1,772

2 6 .4 36.2 49.2 78.0 49.9 39.7 35.8 38.6 77.1 109.2 122.5 138.8 163.1 163.1 1 8 3 .7 228.1 2 9 6.9 325.3 3 4 6 .7 5 5 7 .4

Sources: a SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 206; SIPRI Yearbook 1974, p. 214. b SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 204. c SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p. 241.

D efense expenditures a s percentage o f G ro ss D om estic Product (c)

4.4 3.6 2.8 2.5 4.6 5.9 5.9 5.9 6.6 5.9 6.1 6.7 8.0 7.9 9.8 14.7

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Despite the close relationship between France and Israel, some effort w as m ade to diversify w eapons supplies after the 1956 cam paign. Israel acquired m ajor w eapons from several other N A T O states as well. Centu­ rion tanks were purchased from the U K, and the Federal Republic of Germany w as used as a conduit for both Germ an surplus w eapons (such as M -48 tanks) and covert US arms supplies in the early 1960s.99 The French connection, however, w as m ost critical for Israeli defense planning. From the Israeli perspective, industrial and technological cooperation w as at least as im portant as French arm s shipments. The Israelis looked at the grow ing French arm s industry as a model of industrial development. M ilitary industry therefore provided a means o f acquiring and absorbing the latest industrial techniques and technologies.100 France, in turn, sought a partner who could assist it in developing and m aintaining the highest technological standards, and w as particularly interested in the success of Bedek and Em et in the fields of aeronautics and missile development, respectively.101 The m ost obvious m anifestation of Franco-Israeli cooperation w as in the aerospace sector. Bedek, now known as IAI, expanded and began licensed production o f a modified version of France’s Fouga M agister trainer aircraft in 1 9 6 0 .102 French assistance in establishing the Dim ona nuclear facility w as crucial to the development of Israel’s nuclear w eapons capability.103 During this period, Emet (now renamed RA FA EL) w as involved in a series of sophisticated missile development projects, including the Gabriel ShShM , the Shafrir A A M , the Luz air-to-surface missile (A SM ), and the Shavit/Jericho SSM .104 C ooperation with the French on the m anufacture of solid-fuel rocket m otors w as particularly im portant, but at this same time Israel independently developed inertial guidance systems later used on the Gabriel missile and other system s.105 The successes of the 1956 Sinai Cam paign convinced the ID F that future operations should aim for a rapid victory, based on mobility, arm ored assault, and air superiority. This decision put a priority on the acquisition o f tanks and aircraft. Production of either, with the exception o f the Fouga M agister trainer, w as tem porarily beyond the capability of the arm s industry, but local m odifications and upgrades provided valuable infrastructure for later efforts, and substantially increased the capabilities of older w eapons purchased from abroad at relatively little cost. The money saved by m odifying m ajor land w eapons w as then available for the purchase of M irage fighters and other systems which could not be acquired or duplicated through Israeli efforts.106 The IDF w as aw are that military technology w as advancing much more quickly than the capacity of A rab social structures to absorb it - a condition which fundamentally favored Israel and its em phasis on qualitative superiority.107 IDF Chief of Staff M oshe D ayan emphasized continuing development of sophisticated equipment even though the 1956 Sinai Cam paign dem onstrated IDF

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shortages in critical areas including small arm s and basic transport.108 The m ilitary-industrial effort reached its peak in the creation of new w eapons for the tiny Israeli navy. The com bination of the locally developed Gabriel missile and the im ported S a ’ar attack craft produced a naval capability uniquely suited to Israel’s needs at m inimal cost (see below). From 1 9 5 8 -6 7 , in real terms, defense expenditure increased by ap proxi­ mately 15 percent per year, while G N P expanded about 5 percent per year.109 Industrial investment increased from 109.6 million Israeli pounds in 1956 to 5 2 7 .7 million in 1 9 6 4 .110 Grow th in the defense industries was twice the rate of grow th in other industrial sectors.111 Local defense indus­ tries produced few m ajor w eapons systems during this period, but an extensive industrial infrastructure w as established for both research and development and, if necessary, production of new w eapons.112 The arms industries were the only economic sector which avoided losing skilled per­ sonnel to emigration during the recession of 1 9 6 5 -6 7 .113 At the end of this period, Israel experienced the economic and political pressures of maintaining an advanced military-industrial infrastructure. The Arava transport, designed for both commercial and military markets, became a ‘m ake-work’ project to maintain employment at IAI. The IDF was unwilling to purchase the aircraft, but the program continued as a means of ensuring continued employment at IAI during the recession of 1 9 6 5 -6 7 .114 The Arava decision could not be justified on economic terms, nor under the wide umbrella of national security.115 The Eshkol government funded the program to protect against ‘brain drain,’ and to ensure that the infrastruc­ ture for a national aerospace m anufacturing capability existed.116 By 1966, Israeli arms supply w as diversified am ong several European states, and a sophisticated m ilitary-industrial infrastructure had been created. Strong political support, rational and focused economic invest­ ment, and dedicated R & D program s in this period provided Israel with a significant level of independence in production of small and light arms and amm unition, and the capability to carry out relatively sophisticated m odi­ fication projects for existing w eapons.117

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1948-67 Case study: technological innovation an d the Israeli navy The end of the Sinai conflict found the Israeli navy (IDFN) in disarray. The m ost neglected o f Israel’s three arm ed services, its three old destroyers could not protect Israel’s pre-1967 coastline from A rab raid s.118 The loss of a single destroyer w ould be a national catastrophe: in addition to the loss o f the ship, the 2 0 0 crew m embers included highly trained (and p o s­ sibly irreplaceable) technicians. By early 1960, ID FN leaders were consid­ ering a number of unorthodox options in order to find a role that the navy could perform effectively given its current lim itations.119

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The ID FN reassessed its needs based on Israel’s short w ar assum ption. It required fast naval units, large cruising radii, smaller crews than contem porary destroyers, but at least their equivalent in firepow er.120 A design which could, if necessary, be m anufactured in Israel at ISL w as pre­ ferred. The Jaguar-class patrol boat being built in the Federal Republic of Germ any (FRG) met all these requirements, once suitably m odified.121 Armed with ShShM s under development at R A FA EL the S a’ar project created an entirely new and effective kind of surface com batant, allowing the ID FN to protect the coast and carry out an aggressive naval cam paign against a distant A rab sea blockade. At the time, this w as the largest and m ost com plex project ever under­ taken by Israeli industry: based on unproven new technology, it w ould ‘m ake or break’ the navy.122 The ID FN tripled the number of men passing through the officers training course in order to m anage the project and learn the new technical skills required by the new state of the art equipm ent.123 The ID FN closely linked the program to national industrial cap ­ abilities at ISL to ensure adequate repair, m aintenance, and replacement of vessels. Developm ent of the Gabriel missile took eight years, and cost approxim ately $11 million. The first dozen S a ’ar boats were built at a cost of approxim ately $5 million each. This estimate m ay not include the cost of w eaponry and electronics, which were added after the ships reached Israel. Nevertheless, in 1 9 6 7 Israel could buy eight S a’ars for the cost of one surplus destroyer.124 The Israeli navy not only found an ap p ro­ priate solution to its dilemma - it found one which could be afforded with the resources available. The new Reshef-class missile boat, designed and produced by ISL in response to Israel’s expanded p ost-1967 coastline, had better armam ent and sea-keeping abilities, greater endurance and-range, and slightly slower speed than the original S a ’ar.125 Israel’s new fleet of attack craft proved itself in the O ctober W ar of 1973. The ID FN sank 15 A rab ships, at least half of which were destroyed by G abriels, and lost none.126 The close links between military and industry, com bined with a willingness to innovate in the face of apparently insoluble security problem s, provided an inexpen­ sive and effective solution which became a model for other L D C navies in the 1970s and 1980s. ‘Endurance’ requirements As early as 1954, basic aircraft maintenance w as underway at the Bedek plant. Within a year Bedek w as overhauling engines for the IAF which had formerly been sent to France for these services.127 By the 1960s, sales of locally produced spare parts and engine overhauls had become a profitable export business for IAI.128 Israel w as reported to be self-sufficient in the production of spares for the IAF, and local m anufacture accounted for 90 percent of ordnance and amm unition requirem ents.129

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N on-platform weapons By the m id-1960s, Israel w as self-sufficient in the m anufacture of small arm s.130 Am ong these w eapons w as the fam ous Uzi subm achine gun - over 1.2 million had been exported by early 1 9 9 5 .131 The Soltam firm became a m ajor producer of m ortars, including large-caliber Finnish Tam pella designs under license. Production of artillery received a low priority.132 W eapons: m odifications program s ARM O RED VEHICLES

Israel’s tank force has traditionally depended upon a relatively small number of modern, top-of-the-line tanks, when these are available, and a much larger number of older m odels which have been upgraded, modified, and sometimes alm ost completely reworked to Israeli specifications. Israel could not acquire m odern tanks until after the Sinai Cam paign, when the U K agreed to sell Centurions for the first time. Older Shermans, available from a variety of sources, constituted an im portant part of the IDF tank force.133 Overhauls of the Sherman and Centurion tanks provided substantial increases in perform ance. Shermans were upgraded with higher velocity 75 mm guns, and later with special medium velocity 105 mm w eapons, extending their useful com bat life by at least a decade.134 The newer Cen­ turion w as mechanically unreliable com pared to the older and simpler Shermans. These problem s were eventually resolved by replacing the engines, and older m odels had their 20-pounder guns replaced by N A TO standard 105 mm w eapons. The Israelis m ade over 2,0 0 0 m odifications to the Centurion, which greatly im proved its mechanical reliability.135 The IDF bought used halftrack infantry carriers for $5,000 each, and adapted them for local conditions. N ew m odels of the sam e equipment w ould have cost $40,000 each.136 The IDF fielded home-made SP artillery using the Sherman tank chassis with French and locally produced Soltam 155 mm how itzers.137 AIRCRAFT

The IAF relied on France for m odern aircraft through 1967, and the M irage III served with great distinction in 1 967 and 19 7 3 .138 The M irage III w as modified by IAI to fit IAF requirements, including strengthened wings, increased ordnance capability, and installation of an Israeli elec­ tronics package instead of the original system .139 Israeli engineers proposed a series of m odifications for the M irage III fighter which were later incor­ porated into the production model of the M irage V .140

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Strategic systems BALLISTIC MISSILES

Israel began development of surface-to-surface rockets and missiles in the early 1950s. The SSM project at R A FA EL produced a number o f proto­ types which were generically nam ed Luz, and tested in land, sea and airbased m odes. The name Luz has appeared at least once in m ajor W estern defense journals to describe a system believed in production, and accord­ ing to one Israeli report w as actually fielded with the IDF in 19 6 2 .141 The Jericho missile, according to W estern reports, w as conceived of as a collaborative effort between France and Israel. Israel w as extremely con­ cerned about Egyptian missile development at this time, as Germ an scien­ tists actively assisted Egypt in designing and producing several types of rockets in the early 1 9 6 0 s.142 The Shavit sounding rocket w as developed with French assistance and first tested in July 1961. R esponsibility for the Shavit/Jericho project w as transferred back to D assault of France in the m id-1960s, when the new Eshkol government decided to slow down the Israeli nuclear program in 19 6 3 .143 The first M D -620 (Jericho I) test failed on December 23, 1965. A second test in M arch 1966 w as successful, and the missile and technology were later transferred to Israel.144 Some reports state that tw o different m issiles, the M D -620 and M D -660, were developed with the help of D assault of France. T w o of 50 M D -660 m issiles, with a 450 km range, were reportedly delivered to Israel before the im position of the French em bargo in January 19 6 9 .145

N UCLEAR WEAPONS

Israel is widely believed to possess a considerable arsenal o f nuclear w eapons.146 Franco-Israeli cooperation on nuclear pow er and w eapons development began in the m id-1950s.147 N egotiations were highly com ­ partm entalized and secretive, and m any aspects of the deal took the form of oral agreements rather than written documents - in fact, some of the documents contained false d ata.148 The IDF w as not involved in the initial negotiations or practical considerations - these were all handled by Shimon Peres.149 Throughout the late 1950s France assisted in the construction of the nuclear reactor at D im ona, and in the design of the Jericho missile. A number of Israeli scientists resigned from the Israeli Atomic Energy C om ­ m ission in 1958. It has been argued that this w as a protest over the secre­ tive nature of nuclear w eapons research.150 M ore recent analysis, however, suggests that the resignation w as entirely procedural, and w as not a rejec­ tion of the nuclear program by the civilian scientific com m unity.151 Ben Gurion and Peres took great pains to disguise the costs o f the

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nuclear program . According to Avner Cohen’s analysis, the cost of the nuclear program in 1957 w as roughly 15 percent o f the defense budget, and nuclear-related expenditures then doubled in 1958. Funding for the nuclear program , therefore, substantially exceeded national outlays for research and development, which averaged 11 percent from 1 9 6 0 -6 7 . The nuclear budget came from private sources, including fund raising in the United States. The am ount w as kept secret, to avoid com parisons with the IDF budget (and possible com petition for financial resources) or a more vigorous dom estic debate on the nuclear issue. Israel informed the United States in 1961 that the entire nuclear agreement with France totaled $34 million, including all ancillary facilities. Shimon Peres, however, cites the cost at closer to $80 m illion.152 Under Levi E shkol’s leadership, the program w as increasingly used as an insurance policy - a m eans o f obtaining US political and later military support in return for non-w eaponization and non-testing.153 The first U S-Israeli security dialogue took place in July 1962, and a later meeting between Eshkol and President Johnson from June 1-3, 1964 contributed to better US-Israeli relations - although Johnson remained concerned about the Israeli nuclear program , and insisted on regular visits by US scientists.154 R A FA EL played an im portant role in providing components for the nuclear program , and tests at the facility were crucial to w eaponization.155 By 1966 or 1967, Israel had produced sufficient plutonium for at least one nuclear w eapon, and reportedly assem bled nuclear devices at the height of the 1 9 6 7 crisis.156

The boom years: 1968-73 Israel’s stunning success in the Six D ay W ar had im m ediate ramifications for Israeli defense and m ilitary-industrial policy.157 Israel’s European arms supply sources dried up after the conflict, and while the US began provid­ ing arm s, it used them as a political tool for influence in the A rab-Israeli conflict.158 The dram atic defeat o f the A rab coalition led to a united commitment by the A rab states to destroy Israel, codified in the ‘Three n o’s’ declaration at the K hartoum Summit later in 19 6 7 .159 The Israeli arm s industry expanded dram atically in this period, as defense expenditures skyrocketed.160 Em ployees in the defense sector rose from less than 10 percent of the total labor force in 1 9 6 6 -6 7 to over 19 percent in 1973, including about 1 2 ,000 new employees at TAA S and IAI.161 Defense industry employment jum ped from 14,000 in 1966 to 3 4 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 7 2 .162 M ilitary industrial growth from 1 9 6 6 -7 3 w as four times the rate of other industrial grow th.163 The average rate of growth in the m etals and electronics industries combined w as 13 percent per year, and grow th in electronics alone w as approxim ately 30 percent per year. From 1968-74,

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investment in m etals and electronics accounted for about one third of all Israeli investment, which increased the share of these tw o industries in all non-diam ond industrial exports from 15 percent in 1967 to 38 percent in 19 8 0 .164 M ilitary industrial production increased fivefold over the 19 6 6 -7 3 period, reaching $500 million in 1 9 7 3 .165 Israeli investment in defense research and development reportedly increased by over 300 percent between 1966 and 1 9 7 2 .166 For the first time, the government encouraged private firms to bid for defense contracts and become more involved in the defense sector. Elbit and El-Op, prominent firms in the electronics sector, were founded during this period.167 The occupation of the Sinai, the G olan Heights, and the W est Bank p ro ­ vided Israel with strategic depth and favorable defensive terrain for the first time in its history.168 The com bination of this new ‘com fort zone’ and the proven w eaknesses in the A rab armies led to an underestimation of the level of A rab threat, and an assum ption that w ar with the A rab states w as unlikely in the immediate future.169 The IDF became more influential in determining w eapons acquisition policies, and redistributed resources tow ards longer-term projects in Israel at the tem porary expense of more im m ediate requirem ents.170 The IDF increased procurem ent of locally p ro ­ duced goods by 86 percent from 1 9 6 7 -7 2 .171 The grow ing costs and uncer­ tain reliability of w eapons suppliers m ade economic argum ents for m ilitary-industrial expansion more attractive.172 After 1 9 6 7 Israel found itself in a single-supplier defense relationship. While the Soviet Union quickly resupplied the A rab forces after their

Table 3.2 Israeli military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 6 3 -7 3 Year (Israel)

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

D efense expenditures (millions o f current $US)

2 1 5 .6 7 2 8 8 .6 7 312.33 40 8 .0 0 63 5.8 6 7 09.43 9 6 4.0 0 1,38 2 .2 9 1,46 3 .8 5 1,49 0 .9 5 3,95 3 .1 0

D efense expenditures (millions o f constant $ 1972)

2 8 5.5 9 362.12 357.30 429.01 6 7 2.1 2 837.85 1 ,1 3 5 .9 4 1 ,484.03 1 ,4 9 1 .2 5 1 ,4 9 0 .9 5 3 ,2 5 5 .7 2

D efense expenditures as percentage o f G ro ss N ation al Product 8.58 9.91 8.96 10.64 16.32 17.70 2 1 .3 5 2 5 .9 2 2 3 .7 5 2 1 .6 2 45.41

Arms imports (millions o f current $US)

20.0 69.0 46.0 37.0 23.0 55.0 163.0 2 3 2.0 2 5 7.0 2 1 4.0 1,717.0

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-73

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1972)

27.3 92.6 60.6 47.4 28.6 65.7 185.8 2 5 0 .7 2 6 5 .7 21 4.0 1,625.9

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defeat, Israel’s European suppliers show ed progressively less support, and eventually cut off sales altogether. Israel had ordered 50 M irage V aircraft from France in 1966. The French government blocked delivery of the M irages, which Israel had already paid $70 million for, but permitted the transfer of spares for existing M irage III aircraft in IAF service until 1969, when a complete em bargo w as im posed.173 The French em bargo also affected delivery o f the remaining S a’ar missile boats, which had to be stolen by teams of Israelis from Cherbourg in December 1969. In 1966, Israel arranged to purchase the new Chieftain m ain battle tank from the U K , with an option for licensed production in Israel. After field trials, the Israelis proposed over 70 m odifications, which were prom ptly incorporated into the design. In N ovem ber 1969, just days before the con­ tract w as to be signed, the British backed out and canceled the agreem ent.174 As a result, the Israelis found themselves abruptly reliant on the US for supply o f their tw o m ost im portant com bat system s: tanks and aircraft. The US w as unwilling, however, to supply the m ost m odern M -60 tanks to Israel, instead selling older M -48s which the IDF prom ptly modified to the equivalent of an M -6 0 .175 While the US w as willing to deliver A-4s to the IAF, it refused to provide the significantly more sophisticated F-4E Phantom II m ulti-purpose fighter until O ctober 1968. In a meeting with A ssistant Secretary of Defense Paul W arnke on O ctober 22, 1968, however, Foreign M inister Eban and A m bassador Yitzhak R abin heard the quid pro quo for these aircraft: the United States w anted Israel to sign an unprecedented document. . . . We were asked to consent to a US presence in and supervision of every Israeli arm s m anufacturing installation and every defense institu­ tion engaged in research, development, or m anufacture - including civilian research institutions such as the W eizmann Institute of Science and Israel’s universities.176 Under these circum stances, it is not difficult to understand Israel’s concern over the reliability of the US arm s pipeline. The arms industry began devel­ oping indigenous ‘blue-and-white’ w eapons system s, including the M erkava tank, new versions of the S a ’ar fast attack craft, and the Kfir fighter, which could supplem ent or replace im ported systems in the event o f future pressure or em bargo. Because of the long-lead times associated with development and production of m ajor w eapons systems, m ost of these items did not enter service until the mid-to-late 1970s. The growth of the capability and the political influence of the arms industry inspired debate between factions of the IDF, led by Yitzhak R abin, former IDF Chief o f Staff, and the political leadership and Shimon Peres, former head of the Defense M inistry. R abin emphasized Israel’s long-term vulnerability in the absence of strong US support. Peres

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supported diversified supply through European sources including the UK, Germany, and France, and also encouraged the grow th and support of the local defense industry.177 The tw o factions clashed on prioritization of local industrial efforts. R abin favored procurem ent of m ajor systems from foreign suppliers, which offered guaranteed delivery schedules, lower prices and combattested equipment. R abin supported an Israeli industrial infrastructure for maintenance and m odification of existing systems, and particularly opposed projects with high unit costs. Peres strongly supported dom estic production o f m ajor systems as a means of hedging against foreign em bargo. H e also noted that the industrial capability already existed: it seemed only logical to use it, if only to m aintain the capability.178 R ab in ’s views illustrate a critical concept in Israeli, and other LD C , arms procurement. Israel consistently needs to m ake choices between konenut (short-term preparedness, focusing on im m ediate order of battle) and hitkonenut (preparation, or augmenting future capabilities). This con­ dition is not unique to Israel - all states m ust choose between short-term requirements and long-term investments and research when m aking defense allocations. Israel’s existential vulnerability, however, m akes these considerations more immediate and perilous than in m ost countries. In the 1 9 6 7 -7 3 period, Israel placed greater priority than ever before on hitkonenut.179 Despite the impressive achievements o f both the IDF and the Israeli military industries during this period, the close fit between security policy, military doctrine, and m ilitary-industrial priorities began to unravel. The psychological im pact of the recovery of alm ost all of historic Israel w as alm ost overwhelming, and possession o f the new territories led to debate over IDF military doctrine. Should Israel adopt a static strategy o f defending the border, or exploit its new-found strategic depth and conduct a m obile defense somewhere inside the new boundaries?180 The decisive victory of June 1967 turned into an extended conflict along the new borders, known as the W ar of Attrition, which increased in intensity as Egypt attem pted to inflict unacceptable casualties on the IDF, and dragged on for several years to an unsatisfactory stalemate. Im portant lessons o f the W ar of Attrition were neither absorbed into doctrine nor passed onto the defense industry in terms of requirements for future system s.181 The IDF failed to adjust to A rab advantages in fire­ power, and underestim ated the im portance of com bined arm s.182 The IAF paid insufficient attention to the ever-thickening A rab air defense belts based on im ported Soviet SA M s.183 M any of the Israeli-produced counter­ m easures which resulted from the 1973 w ar could have entered service earlier, if the lessons of the W ar of Attrition had been properly assim ilated. On O ctober 6, 1973, Israel w as attacked on tw o fronts by a well-armed and highly m otivated A rab coalition led by Egypt and Syria, with support­ ing contingents from num erous other A rab states. After serious initial set­ backs - according to some reports, on O ctober 9, 1973 M inister of

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Defense M oshe D ayan w as disturbed enough to order the arm ing of Israel’s arsenal of nuclear w eapons 184 — the IDF w as able to stabilize the situation on both fronts. The Israelis were then able to successfully launch sweeping counterattacks in the G olan Heights and the Sinai leading to eventual term ination of the w ar.185 Despite the overall success of the IDF, the w ar exposed grave deficien­ cies in Israel’s military forces, overall preparedness, and doctrine. Israeli military intelligence w as surprised by the A rab attack because of its incor­ rect assessm ent of A rab intentions and capabilities.186 The IDF w as sur­ prised on an operational level by new A rab tactics derived from previous Arab-Israeli conflicts and based on new technologies, including anti-tank guided missiles (A TG M s) and surface-to-air missiles (SA M s). The Arabs for the first time had access to SCUD SSM s, which provided the Arabs with a w eapon which could hit Israeli cities with im punity.187 Israel’s m obilization and logistics capabilities were severely tested, and inadequate stockpiles o f amm unition and spare parts led to critical short­ ages during the fighting. The IDF deliberately thinned out spares and stockpiles after the W ar of Attrition in order to focus resources elsewhere. A stockpile of 105 mm tank amm unition sufficient for 30 days of com bat w ould have cost $250 million, a considerable portion o f the Israeli defense budget at this tim e.188 Lack of tank transporters forced reserve arm ored units to move on their own tracks, which increased maintenance problem s and breakdow ns. D is­ tribution of am m unition w as poor, and artillery units received a low prior­ ity despite front-line units’ desperate need for covering fire and support.189 The IDF estimates that only 40 percent of its tank am m unition ever reached the front.190 The overall cost of the conflict w as frightening perhaps as much as an entire year’s G ross Dom estic Product.191 Local m ilitary-industrial efforts dem onstrated their effectiveness in key aspects of the conflict. Israel dom inated naval operations during the war. Israeli missile boats destroyed at least 15 A rab naval craft with no losses to them selves.192 The IDF w as able to quickly repair dam aged tanks and put them back into service, and the refitted Centurions and M -48s proved superior to any tanks in the A rab arm ies.193 Israeli-built and m odified M irages, N eshers, and Baraks were the pre­ ferred aircraft for air superiority m issions, releasing the more versatile American-built F-4s for attack sorties. Although over a quarter of the IAF w as lost during the w ar, the IAF dom inated air-to-air encounters, destroy­ ing 2 7 7 A rab planes while losing only six.194 Finally, during the actual fighting, R A FA EL w as reportedly able to analyze SA M w reckage, and come up with ‘the technological m eans to cope more successfully with the enemy’s missile threat.’195 The near-disaster of 1973 prom pted the comm itm ent o f even larger national resources, both financial and intellectual, to ensure Israeli secur­ ity. Between 1961 and 1975, annual military expenditures increased by 12

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times in constant dollars, and increased fourfold as a percentage of GN P. In com parison, in real terms, G N P only increased by three tim es.196 While this grow th w as significant, particularly relative to Egypt, the income of the A rab states as a whole w as increasing due to the rising price o f oil.197 Iraq ’s increasing economic strength and political intransigence w as a serious concern. Iraq ’s G N P increased from approxim ately 50 percent of Israel’s in 1972 to alm ost twice Israeli G N P in 1979 - all as a result of rising oil prices.198 The m ost im portant result of the w ar, however, w as to shake Israel’s confidence. Casualties were high, costs to the economy were severe, and A rab use o f oil as a political tool threatened Israel with political isolation.199 Oil wealth also permitted the A rab states to expand their armed forces quantitatively, and to purchase new w eapons which qualitatively were alm ost a m atch for the best IDF systems.

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1967-73 Case study: m ajor w eapons platform s TH E M ERKAVA TANK

The decision to design and produce the M erkava resulted directly from the British governm ent’s decision to cancel joint production of the Chieftain in 1 9 6 9 .200 Israel had been assisting in the design and development of the Chieftain since 1966, when tw o prototypes had been sent to Israel for testing, and the Israelis had suggested 70 design changes based on their com bat experience and specific needs.201 The decision to produce the M erkava using local industry and M A SH A (the maintenance and repair w orkshops of the IDF) w as m ade in 1969, at the urging of General Israel T al. The M erkava emphasizes protection, ease of repair, and minimizing the possibility of fire or amm unition explosion, reflecting IDF experience in 1967 and 19 7 3 .202 The result of this emphasis is an outstanding tank design, which entered production after only nine years in the development stage.203 Seventy to 80 percent of the M erkav a’s displacem ent by weight is devoted to crew p ro ­ tection, as com pared to 50 percent in m ost other M B T s.204 M erkava uses a very sophisticated Israeli-designed fire control system and m odular arm or.205 The M erkava production line involves over 200 firms, producing 3 0 ,0 0 0 different parts and employing 3,0 0 0 people.206 By 1990, app roxi­ mately 800 M erkavas had been built, and older versions were all being upgraded to more recent standards.207 The M erkava 4 tank recently entered service with the IDF, and will replace older American, British, and R ussian m odels in IDF inventory.208

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KFIR FIGH TER AIRCRAFT

The Kfir fighter, Israel’s first effort at local production of a top-of-the-line w eapons platform , integrated French and Israeli M irage technology with American General Electric J-7 9 jet engines, m anufactured under license by the Bet Shemesh Engine Factory.209 The Kfir w as based on the French M irage 5 airfram e, developed with Israeli assistance before the 1967 war. Com plete plans for the M irage 5, and for its A TA R -9C jet engine, were obtained through subversion of a Swiss engineer by Israeli intelligence.210 An early version o f the Kfir, known as the Barak or Nesher, reportedly flew in the O ctober W ar in 1973, and the first Kfir w as produced in 19 7 5 .211 The Kfir is equipped with Israeli avionics systems, and can perform both interceptor and ground attack roles.212 According to one Western assessm ent, the Kfir is more capable than the more well-known M irage F-1 aircraft of the Iraqi and French airforces, and alm ost as capable an air-toair fighter as early versions of the R ussian Su-27 Flanker.213 The com bat radius of the original Kfir is considerably greater than the M irage III or V, and later C2 and C 7 upgraded versions extended it further. It carried a greater w eapons load, m ore effective m issiles, and delivered them with greater lethality and accuracy due to Israeli-designed w eapons and avion­ ics. The canard wing technology which vastly increased its maneuverability w as also an Israeli innovation. When the Kfir w as designed, supplies o f m odern com bat aircraft to the IAF were uncertain at best. IAI quickly developed an effective substitute for im ported M irages which w as superior to existing IAF aircraft. IAI could have produced Kfirs and Neshers using the stolen A TA R -9C powerplant. The availability of the US J-79 engine im proved the perform ance of the aircraft substantially.214 In the event that supplies of w eapons were em bargoed by the US, the J-7 9 ’s status as a non-munitions item allowed Israel to stockpile engines and parts freely to tide them through a crisis.215 When analyzing the Kfir program , this context is critical, as the Kfir proved a relative failure as an export item. 216 The program w as designed, however, as an im port-substitution m easure in response to the French em bargo and US use of w eapons supplies as a m ethod of diplom atic pres­ sure. By the late 1970s, once continuing US supplies of more advanced F-15 and F-16 aircraft were assured, m aintaining the Kfir production line could no longer be justified as a national security requirement. N ew Kfirs were immediately m othballed and put in reserve status. Non-security factors, such as the prestige of fighter production, m aintaining em ploy­ ment at IAI, and the vain hope of Kfir exports, are more im portant in explaining continued production.

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‘Endurance’ requirements Israeli firms produced a complete line of am m unition for IDF require­ ments, but the high rate of IDF consum ption still m eant that approxi­ mately 35 percent of IDF requirements had to be im ported at this time.217 These requirements were relatively sm all: according to M oshe D ayan, the US Army used 2 1 ,0 0 0 shells in one evening in Vietnam , which w as more than the IDF used in both the Sinai Cam paign and the Six D ay W ar combined.218 M aintenance and repair capability proved critical in the 1973 O ctober W ar. According to one estimate, the IAF w ould have been down to 10 percent of its pre-war strength by the tenth day of the w ar.219 The IDF reportedly lost 9 00 tanks in 1973, but m any of these were restored to service during or after the conflict.220 The Y om Kippur War dem onstrated that Israel’s ability to quickly repair tanks and restore them to units in the field, com pensated for the ID F’s numerical inferiority.221 Between 1400 on O ctober 6, 1973 and 0800 on O ctober 7, 1973, the IDF had over 75 percent of its deployed tank force in the G olan Heights and Sinai knocked out. Within 24 hours, 80 percent of these dam aged tanks were returned to action, and some were knocked out four or five tim es.222 At one point or another, every IDF tank fighting the Syrians on the N orth ­ ern Front w as hit by shells. In contrast, m any of the 86 7 Syrian tanks abandoned in the G olan Heights were still in running order and were quickly repaired by the IDF. In total, the IDF listed only 100 tanks as irreparable losses after the w ar.223 N on-platform weapons Israeli producers supplied over 90 percent of the ID F’s requirements in small and light arm s as well as 7 0 -8 0 percent of required electronics.224 TAA S produced the 105 mm guns for IDF tank refit program s.225 R A FA EL began research on A A M s in the early 1960s, and produced the Shafrir I for IAF service later in that decade. The follow-on Shafrir 2 w as much more successful, and achieved a kill rate o f 6 0 -7 5 percent in the Y om Kippur W ar, destroying over 200 A rab aircraft in that conflict.226 The Shafrir 2 cost 20 percent less than im ported A A M s.227 IAI began production o f radars and com m unications systems for M irage 3 aircraft in the 1960s at the Light Industry Departm ent, later renam ed Elta.228 The Elta 2001 radar, which became standard equipment for IAF fighters in the 1980s, w as developed in response to the inability of the M irage 3 ’s Cyrano radar to pick up low-flying targets in 1967.229 M odification program s Israel significantly increased the capability of M -48A 2 tanks acquired from Germ any and the US through re-equipment by installing a locally p ro ­ duced 105 mm gun, a new engine, and eventually a new fire-control

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system .230 T-54/55 tanks captured from the A rabs in 1967 and T-62 tanks captured in 1973, were upgraded with 105 m m guns and new engines. These tanks have served in the IDF for over tw o decades, increasing tank inventory at minimal cost.231 Self-propelled artillery w as created locally by setting 155 mm and 105 mm guns on older tank chassis. The L-33 SP gun, using Soltam ’s M -68 155 mm howitzer, entered service in 1973.232 Tank and half-track chassis were also fitted with locally produced 120 mm and 160 mm m ortars.233 M irage 3 aircraft were m odified with im proved radar and engines, and a local m odification eventually form ed the basis of the Kfir design (described above). V autour light attack bom bers acquired from France in the 1950s were filled with US electronic w arfare equipment and used in the W ar of Attrition.234 Strategic systems Avner Cohen cites reports that Jericho-I missiles were deployed on O ctober 7, 1973, and again from O ctober 1 7 -2 0 , 1973.235 M issiles were deployed as a signal to both the US and the Soviet Union, but m ay also have reflected w orst-case planning (as late as O ctober 9, the situation in the G olan Heights w as not fully stabilized, and nuclear use w as reportedly considered).236 The Israeli nuclear program did not slow after the 1967 W ar. Perfunc­ tory US inspections o f the D im ona facility ceased, and production of plutonium continued. The US acknowledged - through leaks to the press that Israel had developed a nuclear capability in 19 70.237 The timing of this report - leaked to Hedrick Smith at the height of the W ar of Attrition - suggests that it m ay have been intended to influence Egyptian or Soviet calculations.238 During the O ctober W ar, Israel m ay have had as many as 25 nuclear w eapons available.239 N uclear-capable Jericho missiles were deployed in the Ju daean m ountains west of Jerusalem at H irbat Zachariah, and a squadron of F-4 aircraft w as assigned for nuclear w eapons delivery at Tel N o f airbase.240 These w eapons were deliverable by air, using F-4, A-4, and possibly M irage/Kfir aircraft, and perhaps by early versions o f the Jericho missile. Israel also began development of both chemical and biological w eapons during this period.241

Overextension and decline: 1973-95 The IDF expanded and modernized in the afterm ath of the O ctober W ar, reflecting the military ‘lessons learned’ and new political-econom ic realities.242 The ID F’s active forces increased over 100 percent and reservists increased from 2 2 5 ,0 0 0 to 3 2 2 ,0 0 0 between 1 9 7 1 -8 1 .243 Equipm ent for this expanded force w as produced or modified by local industry, and also

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purchased from the US. In the late 1970s Israel set a goal of producing 40 percent of total arms procurem ent dom estically.244 Israeli military industry adapted quickly to the new requirements of the ID F.245 Desire to use the local infrastructure for the rearm am ent process w as reflected by increases in defense R & D funding: from 1 9 7 4 -7 6 , Israel spend over $400 million on defense R & D .246 In real terms, defense outlays grew at an average annual rate o f five percent from 1 9 7 3 -8 1 , slower than the average rate o f increase in the previous decades, but still faster than growth in the economy as a w hole.247 This period also saw dynamic increases in Israeli military exports, averag­ ing 2 0 -2 4 percent growth per year over the 1967-84 period.248 Exports maintained production lines at full production levels, and provided im port­ ant sources of foreign exchange.249 Exports funded continued Israeli defense R & D - the Gabriel ShShM, for example, brought Israel more than $1 billion in exports, paying for its development costs more than ten times over by the m id-1980s.250 Export production also ensured that critical equipment was available in event of a crisis.251 For example, in 1973 50 percent of the workforce of AEL Israel Ltd. was called up for reserve duty in the October War. The firm still achieved tw o months production in one week by using m ost of the factories spare parts and all of the w ork in progress.252 It is clear that by 1984 Israel’s economy w as dependent on w eapons exports to an unhealthy extent. Arms exports as a percentage o f overall

Table 3.3 Israeli military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 7 2 -8 2 Year

D efense D efense D efense expenditures expenditures expenditures (millions o f (millions o f as current constant percentage $US) $ 1981) o f G ro ss N atio n al Product

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

1,476 3,142 3,036 3,780 4,083 4,103 3,70 7 5 ,2 3 2 5,4 2 4 4,3 7 4 E 5 ,8 3 8 E

2 ,8 7 2 5 ,7 8 6 5 ,1 4 0 5 ,8 6 9 5 ,9 9 9 5 ,6 9 4 4 ,7 8 9 6 ,2 3 2 5 ,9 3 0 4 ,3 7 4 E 5 ,5 0 7 E

17.6 34.1 28.6 31.9 32.7 30.0 24.3 30.8 29.3 20.3 25.5

Arms imports (millions o f current $US)

300 230 950 725 975 1,100 900 490 825 1,100 1,000

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-82 Note E = Estimate

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1981)

583 423 1,608 1,125 1,432 1,526 1,162 583 901 1,100 943

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industrial exports increased from 7 percent in 1967 to 15 percent in 1974, and grew to greater than 24 percent after 19 77.253 Israeli local defense p ro­ duction w as valued at $500 million in 1974, $1.4 billion in 1980, $2.25 billion in 1984, $2.4 billion in 1988, and $3.2 billion in 1990.254 In 1984, the government adopted an official policy of encouraging exports.255 At that time, alm ost 70 percent of the products produced by Israeli defense firms were purchased by the IDF, and about 30 percent of production w as exported. By the end of the decade, that proportion had reversed. In 1990, 78 percent of IAI’s $1.4 billion turnover w as exported. IAI accounted for approxim ately two-thirds of all Israeli defense exports that year.256 Between 1980 and 1986, R A FA EL m oved from less than 10 percent export turnover to more than 50 percent.257 Reliance on exports exposed Israeli firms to the fluctuations of the inter­ national arms m arket. Defense exports also endangered the secrecy of Israeli defense products.258 This concern w as expressed by M inister of Defense Yitzhak R abin in December, 1986, when he told the Knesset that he had perm itted R A FA EL to export sensitive technologies over the objec­ tions of all of the field security agencies.259 Exports also com plicated U S-Israeli defense cooperation, raising significant political concerns on both sides. This occurred both through the transfer of Israeli technology that the US sought to control and through re­ transfer o f technology with significant US content. Israeli missile coopera­ tion with South Africa led to strong protests by the US, and Israel eventually adhered to the M issile Technology Control Regime under US pressure.260 Israel has also been accused of m ajor transfers of US techno­ logy to China. During this period, Israel produced m ost o f its requirements in m uni­ tions, small and light arm s, and m ortars, but continued to purchase some munitions and small arm s from the US. Israel became at least theoretically ‘self-reliant’ in m ajor w eapons platform s during this period, and produc­ tion o f these platform s received increasing priority. The new M erkava tank w as introduced into service in limited numbers beginning in 1979. The Table 3 .4 Israel defense exports, 1 9 7 4 -8 4 Year

E x p o rts in current $ U S millions

Percent share o f defense exports in non-diam ond industrial exports

1974 1976 1978 1981 1984

96 322 554 875 1,400

10 26 28 21 >30

Source: Blumenthal, “ Influence of Defense Industry” , p. 174; Klieman and Pedatzur, Rearm­ ing Isra e l. . . , p. 79; Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry, p. 146.

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navy continued to receive the Reshef-class missile boat and also ordered the new Aliya-class.261 The m ost prestigious projects were associated with the IAF - the Kfir fighter entered service in 1975, and development of the Lavi fighter began in the late 1970s. Despite Israel’s rem arkable achievements in constructing m issiles, p lat­ form s, and other m ajor w eapons, the m ost fertile area for Israeli defense industry w as the field of m ilitary electronics. Investment to the electronics industry had increased m arkedly in the 1 9 6 8 -7 3 period, and the returns over the next decade were substantial. Over one third of all industrial investment in Israel from 1 9 6 8 -7 4 went to the m etallurgical and electron­ ics industries, and their funding increased 2.5 times from 1967 to 1968, and 3.5 times from 1967 (pre-war) to 19 7 2 .262 The ability to design, develop, produce, and retrofit com bat electronics onto existing m ajor w eapons platform s can extend the service life of exist­ ing equipment by decades. R ad ar, com m unications, jam m ing equipment, electronic w arfare, and missile guidance systems are all crucial to the sur­ vival and more effective operation of m odern w eaponry.263 The im port­ ance of military electronics, underestim ated by the IAF before the O ctober W ar, became apparent as the Israel faced increasingly sophisticated A rab air defenses.264 Throughout the 1970s, Israeli military electronics designed and p ro ­ duced increasingly sophisticated equipment first for the IDF, and later with great success for the export m arket. The Israeli electronics com plex is unusual in that, unlike production of other critical military system s, a relatively large share of the production capacity is in the hands of private industry. This led to difficulties: as Reiser has docum ented, from 1965 until the m id-1980s, the government frequently favored large governmentowned firms over private enterprises due to economic factors and em ploy­ ment concerns.265 The election of the Likud in 1977 ushered in a new era in Israeli stra­ tegic doctrine and planning. Israeli doctrine began to focus increasingly on non-traditional threats, particularly the Soviet Union and more distant A rab states such as Iraq and Libya.266 The test o f Israel’s new force struc­ ture and defense posture came in 1982, during O peration Peace for Galilee in Lebanon. Politically, the attack w as a disaster. The m achinations of Defense M inister Ariel Sharon ensured that both political and military leadership were unaware of the broad objectives of the conflict. W hatever political advantage Israel m ay have achieved in the first dram atic days of the conflict w as frittered aw ay in the siege of Beirut and the slaughter at Sabra and Shatila.267 The IDF invaded Lebanon on June 5, 1982. On June 9, 1982, during the fourth day of ground fighting, the IAF attacked the Syrian air defenses and wiped out 19 SA M batteries with no IAF losses.268 This success was m ade possible by a sophisticated com m unications network, which perm it­ ted the accum ulation and dispersal of near real-time intelligence. The

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proxim ity of the battle zone to Israeli territory m axim ized these advan­ tages.269 Israel coordinated ground and air strikes on the SA M batteries, using special locally-designed rocket-assisted rounds to increase the range of its 175 mm artillery.270 The air-to-air victory w as also overwhelming.271 After the destruction of its ground-based air defense network, Syria sent its airforce w as to contest the airspace over Lebanon and the G olan H eights. In a com bat enabled by locally-designed and modified Israeli electronics the IAF routed the Syrians and achieved complete air superiority.272 The ground w ar w as much less successful.273 Critics point to the failure o f the IDF to m aintain high rates of advance, and an unwillingness to maneuver or to fight at night, as well as a perceived preference for fire­ pow er over maneuver at odds with traditional IDF tactics.274 ‘It took only fifteen years for an army once known for its agility, flexibility, mobility, operational efficiency, and ability to respond quickly to turn into a heavy, coarse, and incredibly clumsy bureaucratic labyrinth.’275 During the 1 9 7 3 -8 2 period the close relationship between the military and local industry provided significant advantages for the IDF. Electronic w arfare, com m unications, com m and and control, and tactical intelligence all benefited from the development and deployment o f Israeli system s.276 The development and incorporation of Rem otely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), initially designed as a private project by Tadiran, into ID F inventory facilitated the IA F’s overwhelming success in annihilating SA M defenses in the 1982 w ar in Lebanon.277 These and other ‘blue and white’ systems proved themselves magnificently in com bat in 1982. In 1983, a large infrastructure w as in place for the development of sophisticated m issiles, ‘sm art’ munitions, and new generations of electronic w arfare equipment. Israel w as in position to take advantage of the tech­ nologies associated in US and Soviet thought with a new military-technical revolution: reconnaissance, long-range strike, and electronic w arfare capabilities, and associated improvements in guidance and munitions technology.278 Israel instead chose to focus much of its R & D and military-industrial expertise on the Lavi fighter aircraft (see case study). This decision dem onstrated the debilitating effects of political and economic interference on w hat had once been an efficient and cooperative relationship between Israel’s security requirements and military-industrial program s. The im portance of IAI as both an employer and as a sym bol of Israeli com peti­ tiveness in aerospace research weighed heavily on Israeli political leader­ ship, and there w as constant pressure to provide new projects for the firm in order to keep engineers employed.279 The high priority given to the Lavi project limited investment and research in other areas, and increased an already high level of dependence on the US for both technology and funding. Since 1973, US security assistance, and US technology transfer, has

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formed an increasingly critical portion o f the Israeli defense industrial effort.280 The US financial contribution to Israeli defense is significant: in 1986, US security assistance accounted for over 40 percent of the Israeli military budget.281 During the 1980s, increasing am ounts o f this were m ade available for use in Israel as part of the Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) fund. According to one report, from 1 9 7 6 -8 9 the US pum ped $6.5 billion into the Israeli defense industry using OSP and offsets.282 US funding became critical in the m aintenance of both military capabil­ ity and military production due to Israel’s severe economic turmoil in the late 1970s. R eal G N P growth shrank from an annual average of alm ost 6 percent in 1 9 5 1 -7 3 to less than 1 percent in the next decade. Inflation averaged 45 percent per year from 1 9 7 5 -7 9 , and peaked at 450 percent in 1 9 8 4 .283 Israel’s deteriorating economy led to the decision by a N ational Unity government in 1984 to take drastic fiscal m easures to limit inflation. In 1984 alone, alm ost $1 billion w as cut from the government budget, including a $258 million cut in defense expenditures.284 Beginning in 1984, Israeli defense spending shrank rapidly, and the allocation for local pur­ chases and im ports shifted significantly.285 Through the early 1980s, approxim ately 50 percent of Israeli dom estic military expenditures were spent on production or R & D .286 In June 1989, according to then-Minister o f Defense Yitzhak R abin, that figure had fallen to 35 percent,287 and this figure continued to shrink.288 Israel’s involvement in Lebanon (1 9 8 2 -8 5 ) and efforts to suppress the first Palestinian intifada in the late 1980s seriously strained the IDF

Table 3 .5 Israeli military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 8 1 -9 1 Year

D efense expenditures (millions o f current $US)

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

6,51 4 6,359 7,322 8,375 7,519 6,918 6,308 6,110 6,245 6,940 4,99 2

D efense expenditures (millions o f constant $ 1991)

9,725 8,939 9,890 10,830 9,380 8,404 7,428 6,928 6,775 7,218 4 ,9 9 2

D efense A rm s Arms expenditures im ports imports as (millions o f (millions o f percentage current constant o f G ro ss $US) $1991) N atio n al Product 22.9 2 0 .7 22.1 24.5 2 0 .4 17.4 14.3 13.0 12.6 12.6 8.1

1,200 925 500 775 1,000 500 1,800 1,200 1,100 460 460

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-92

1,791 1,300 675 1,002 1,248 607 2 ,1 2 0 1,361 1,193 478 460

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budget.289 The increase in IDF active and reserve forces, and the large stocks of equipment purchased in the late 1970s, required larger financial commitments to operations and m aintenance.290 The IDF began cutting back on stockpiles to save money as early as 1987.291 In addition, new equipment costs more to operate - the F-15 costs approxim ately twice as much per flight hour as the F-4.292 M aintenance of the post-1973 force structure at post-1984 budget levels further decreased the am ounts available for local procurem ent and R & D .293 IDF procurem ent relied heavily on American Foreign M ilitary Sales (FM S) funds, as salary and other expenses which m ust be met through the local budget continued to rise. After fixed costs were accounted for, only 2 5 -3 0 percent of the ‘shekel budget’ (the IDF budget, not including FM S funds) w as left for defense industrial infrastructure and new local procurem ent. Forty-seven percent of the shekel budget w as spent for salaries by the early 1990s. 294 As a result, the IDF increasingly bought equipment from the US that it formerly purchased from local producers.295 R & D spending suffered from changes in the economy and budget cuts: defense industries cut back their investments by two-thirds during this period, and decreased ‘in-house’ spending on R & D by 40 percent.296 It is estim ated that the Lavi program absorbed as much as 15 percent of the defense budget in the m id-1980s, and m onopolized R & D and production resources to the detriment of other industries and program s.297 This situ­ ation w as not alleviated by release of funds after the Lavi w as cancelled. Although $5.5 billion for new projects w as supposed to become available, 42 percent o f this w as spent on standard operating costs of the ID F.298 Israeli military-related R & D expenditures remained high - at least 5 0 -7 0 percent of all R & D is military related. Some analysts estimate that as much as 6 .7 -8 .0 percent of the m ilitary budget (approxim ately 2.7 percent of G N P in 1987) is devoted to R & D - still a substantial drop from the 11 percent of the 196 0 s.299 The future im pact of cuts in R & D m ay be determined more by restructuring of research priorities than by the actual loss of capital. The role of the United States in m aintaining Israeli military strength also changed. During the late 1970s, the US began to use sales of advanced technology as a political instrument to gain influence with A rab states. Israel still received advanced aircraft and other systems from the United States, in addition to large am ounts of military assistance,300 but the w eapons themselves were no more technologically sophisticated - in terms of hardw are and basic capabilities - than those supplied to specific Arab states. By the early 1980s, the US comm itm ent to Israeli qualitative superi­ ority had taken the form of technology transfer, rather than w eapons supply.301 This technology transfer w as far from one-sided. US designs profited from Israeli m odifications, and some of these m odifications became standard issue in equipment which w as later exported to A rab states.302 In short, the changing US-Israeli relationship created new

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dependencies on US supplies, and new constraints on Israel’s ability to create, field, and export qualitatively superior weaponry.

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1973-95 Case studies: m ajor w eapons platform s an d other systems TH E LAVI C O N TR O V ER SY 303

The m ost am bitious project, and greatest failure, of Israel’s defense indus­ tries w as the Lavi m ulti-purpose fighter aircraft. Originally proposed as a two-engine follow-on to the Kfir, the Lavi w as re-designed as a single­ engine ‘second-line’ fighter and approved by the Likud government in 1 9 8 0 .304 Later in that year, IAI w as able to convince Prime M inister Begin to approve a more sophisticated version with significantly increased air com bat capability - and consequently increased unit costs. Lavi development sapped resources and talent from all other sectors of the defense industry.305 By the time the first prototype flew over $1.2 billion in US FM S funds had been spent, and total development costs were estim ated at a minimum of $2.2 billion, of which the US w ould have p ro ­ vided $1.8 billion.306 The number of aircraft to be produced dropped from an original estimate of 4 0 0 -4 5 0 to approxim ately 300, only 100 o f which w ould actually serve with the IA F.307 It became apparent that production of the Lavi w ould require an increase in the IDF budget of up to $500 million annually for a decade, even assum ing continuing levels of US finan­ cial support.308 In fact, by 1986 the IDF w as facing severe budget constraints, increases in the budget were unlikely, and force quality and stockpiles were degrad­ ing from lack o f funding. M inister of Defense R abin w as adam ant in his opposition to the Lavi p rogram : ‘I will not let the Lavi destroy the IDF. Even if a m ajority in the Cabinet decides to go ahead with the project under the present conditions, I will not be able to implement that decision.’ 309 Arguments in favor of Lavi production centered around the im portance o f m aintaining a local capability for aircraft m anufacture 310 and the eco­ nomic im pact of ending the program .311 Some went so far as to argue that production of the platform itself w as necessary to spur innovation in sub­ systems and other technological niches. This argument, o f course, com ­ pletely ignored 30 previous years of Israeli innovation based on m odification of existing systems with locally-designed sub-systems. In fact, the Lavi w as extraordinarily dependent on US funding, techno­ logy, and expertise. A pproxim ately 60 percent of the aircraft’s parts were designed or produced in the US, and over 50 percent of the production costs w ould be spent in the U S.312 The m ilitary benefits of the Lavi versus other aircraft were a relatively small concern in the political debate,

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although the IAF provided substantial input in the design process. 313 Ulti­ mately, the Lavi proved too expensive an investment for IDF planners and the Israeli economy. On A ugust 30, 1987, in a 12-11 vote, the Israeli Cabinet voted to terminate the program . 314

ARROW ATBM

Israel is currently deploying the A R R O W anti-tactical ballistic missile system (A TBM ), developed jointly with the United States. The project, already in the w orks at the time o f the G ulf W ar, received increased prior­ ity after Iraqi missile attacks on Israel in 1991. The A rrow w as designed to kill missiles at ranges of up to 90 km, and w as specifically designed to attack missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 km, according to Western reports. 315 315 The US agreed to fund the development of the program , but w ould not pay for deployment. According to one recent report, the US had provided 65 percent of the $1.1 billion cost of the program as of September 2 0 0 0 . 316 Another report estimates the cost at over $2 billion, and the US share at roughly $700 million as of 2 0 0 0 . 317 US funding appears to have been applied solely to the missile itself - the Green Pine radar w as developed by Elta, and the Citron Tree battle m anagem ent center w as developed by T ad iran . 318 The Arrow w as successfully flight-tested September 14, 2000, declared fully operational in O ctober 2 0 0 0 , and w as formally accepted into service in M arch 2 0 0 1 . 319 The Arrow-2 interceptor has an interception range of up to 100 km, and can engage ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,500 km - including m ost SCUD variants currently on the m arket. 320 Israeli efforts to get US perm ission to export the A rrow system have not been successful. 321 A recent decision to give Boeing a 50 percent produc­ tion share in the Arrow however, indicates the unique new realities of Israel’s m ilitary-industrial policy. The decision for joint production reflects three m ajor Israeli concerns. First, production by a US firm increases the potential for surge production, in the event that m ore than three batteries (with roughly 300 interceptor missiles) are required. Second, it allows Israel to pay for A rrow production with US military assistance funds. Third, Israel hopes that production in the US will provide additional lever­ age on future export decisions, as US employment will be affected. 322 This arrangem ent will ensure that final assembly and integration takes place in Israel - perhaps assuring control over secret techniques or data. ‘Endurance’ requirements The IDF m aintains its commitment to minimizing casualties, and this commitment is reflected in Israeli arms developments. One exam ple o f this is the design of Blazer reactive arm or for tanks. This project w as under­ taken in the afterm ath of the 1973 w ar, and proved itself during the 1982

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conflict in Leban on . 323 The use of body arm or, while not an Israeli innova­ tion as such, decreased small arm s casualties by 20 percent in 1 9 8 2 . 324 The Y om Kippur W ar emphasized the im portance of large reserves of amm unition and spare parts. Ariel Sharon minimizes the im portance of the US resupply effort in the 1973 w ar, but also states that in tw o-and-a-half weeks o f com bat the IDF used 25 percent of available small arm s am m uni­ tion, 55 percent of available artillery shells, and 48 percent of available tank shells. Shells for the 175 mm guns were seriously depleted (these were especially im portant for attacking SA M sites from long distances). It appears the IDF might have found itself short of crucial am m unition had the conflict continued in the absence of US resupply and diplom atic intervention. 325 325 TAA S production soared from $72 million in 1972 to $550 million in 1 9 8 3 . 326 IDF stockpiles nearly quadrupled from 14 days for six divisions (1973) to 28 days for 11 divisions in 1982. The Israelis were reportedly willing to pay 25 percent more than im port costs for local production of sensitive munitions, in an effort to m aintain local production lines. 32 7 By 1987, the IDF had reportedly accum ulated 40 days of w ar reserves stocks. 328 The development of new ‘H etz’ 105 mm tank amm unition saved the IDF billions of dollars by m aintaining the effectiveness of Israeli tanks armed with the 105 m m gun, at the m odest cost of $ 2 0 0 -3 0 0 million in development and amm unition procurem ent. 329 This amm unition w as used with enorm ous success in the summer of 1982 during the Lebanon cam ­ paign, when kills were achieved against T-72 tanks at ranges of up to 3,5 0 0 m eters. 330 The IDF continued its long-standing comm itm ent to m aintenance, repair, and outstanding rates of readiness, and m anufactured spares for m ost of its equipment. Bet Shemesh Engine W orks, for exam ple, produced the G E J-79 engine under license, as well as the M arbore VI turbojet for the Fouga M agister/Tzukit, the Sorek 4 expendable turbojet for RPVs, and parts for the A tar 9C engine.331 N on-platform w eapons Israeli firms produce a wide assortm ent of com m unications systems, radars, and other sensors for IDF ground forces. Am ong the m ost notable are the DAVID and C O M B A T artillery fire control com puters, 332 the M atad o r and Lancelot tank fire control system s 333 and a series of surveil­ lance radars and electronic w arfare systems produced by Elta. The Israeli N avy relies heavily on local electronics for surface w arfare, although it im ports sonars and some other equipment from the US. The IAF relies alm ost entirely on locally-designed and produced avionics system s. 334 The firms o f Soltam and TAA S produced three versions of the basic 6 0 m m m ortar, three types o f 81m m m ortars, tw o types of 120m m

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m ortars and the unusually large (for W estern producers) 160 mm m ortar. 335 The 120 mm m ortar design produced by Soltam /IM I is also m anufactured by M artin-M arietta for the US Army under the designation M -2 8 5 . 336 Soltam has produced and modified a series of guns and how ­ itzers for the IDF and export. These include m odifications of the US M -114 155 mm howitzer, a 155 mm howitzer on a Soviet M -46 field how ­ itzer chassis, the M -68 and M -71 155 mm Gun/How itzers, and the M odel 839 and 845 155 mm howitzers. The M -68 and M -71 were also developed as SP versions. 33 7 In 1990, over half the ID F ’s tow ed artillery w as locally produced, but the m ajority of the SP equipment w as im ported from the U S. 338 Both TAA S and R A FA E L reportedly increased the priority of pro­ viding ground force equipment, particularly m issiles, during this period. 339 Israel also produces several multiple rocket launchers (M R Ls), including the M A R -290 (which fires 2 9 0 m m rockets) and the LA R -160 (160m m rockets), with a 3 5 0 m m version reportedly in development. TAA S also produces 2 4 0 m m rockets for captured Soviet M R L s used by the ID F. 340 The IDF deployed the M erkava III tank, which is equipped with a 120 mm sm oothbore cannon that w as reportedly designed and developed indigenously in less than tw o years - although estim ated production costs proved far off the m ark . 341 R A M TA , a subsidiary company of IAI, has designed and produced the R BY M k 1, and R A M V-1 and V-2 arm ored vehicles, which can carry machine guns, small cannon or 106 mm recoilless guns. 342 342 The Gabriel ShShM w as used with great success on Israeli missile boats during the 1973 conflict, and became a popular export item. The longerrange Gabriel M k 2 w as introduced into service in the m id-1970s, while the Gabriel M k 3 joined naval service in 1 9 7 9 -8 0 , and w as introduced in an air-launched version in 1982. There have also been reports of an addi­ tional m odel of the Gabriel called the Gabriel Long R ange (G LR) or Gabriel 4L R , which is reported to have a range of 1,400 km with a large enough payload to carry a nuclear w eapon. Other variants have a range of over 2 0 0 km with a 2 4 0 kg explosive or sub-munition w arhead. 343 The new S a ’ar-4.5, or Aliya-class, missile attack craft w as produced at ISL. Based on the R eshef design, it weighs 488 tons, and is capable of car­ rying a helicopter or naval RPV (H E L ST A R ). 344 Other vessels produced in Israel include the A shdod and Kishon class landing craft (produced in the mid 1960s), and the D abur and D vora patrol boats. The D vora has the distinction of being the sm allest known missile attack craft, although they usually are armed with cannon.345 Both the D abur and D vora have been offered for export, as have the Shapirit and A lligator m ulti-purpose patrol landing craft. ISL has also designed the Shaldag-class fast patrol boat as a private venture.346 In 1978, the Python 3 A A M entered service with the IAF. The Python-3 is very sim ilar to the US A IM -9 Sidewinder, but has a much larger w arhead. 347 The experience of the O ctober W ar increased the IA F’s

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demand for sophisticated air-to-ground m unitions of various kinds. These include both high-accuracy and high-lethality w eapons, as well as stand­ off w eapons for attacking SA M sites and other dangerous targets. The IAF reportedly deployed Luz-1 air-to-surface missiles in the 1970s, with a 200 kilogram explosive w arhead and a range of 80 km . 348 In the 1980s, R A FA EL developed the ‘Popeye’ stand-off missile, which has been sold to the US Air Force for use on the B-52 as a conventional stan doff w eapon. 349 The IAF also deployed the Tal-1 and Tal-2 cluster bom bs - developed as a result o f a US decision not to sell cluster bom bs to Israel - and now uses Elbit’s Opher terminal guidance systems to convert regular gravity bom bs into infrared-guided glide bom bs. 350

REM O TELY PILOTED VEH ICLES (RPV) AND UN M AN N ED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV)

The first m ajor Israeli RPV program w as initiated by Tadiran, after the suc­ cessful use of a number of US target drones to deceive Arab SA M defenses in the 1973 W ar. Tadiran developed an RPV called the M astiff, using in-house funding, and the first units were purchased by the IDF in 1975. Although IAI was disinterested in RPV/UAV technology when it was first available, it was encouraged to compete with Tadiran and eventually supplant it - an example of preference for state-owned companies over private industry. IAI has become the acknowledged international leader in the field.351 The IDF has used RPVs with enorm ous success, and Israeli industry has exported large numbers to the US and other custom ers. In the Lebanon W ar, RPVs reportedly were used as laser-designators for aircraft-carried sm art w eapons, and also m ay have carried cluster bom bs. RPVs provided near-real-time battle dam age assessm ent and reconnaissance capabilities for both ground and airforces, and m ay have been used as decoys to imitate strike aircraft. 352

BARAK/ADAMS CLO SE-IN WEAPONS SYSTEM (CIWS)

Although ID FN missile boats are fitted with the US Phalanx CIWS, they proved difficult to operate in high seas because of the vessels’ low free­ bo ard. 353 The solution w as the Barak CIWS based on vertically launched m issiles, which avoids the freeboard problem and utilizes Israel’s strengths in electronics and missile technology. 354 The Barak uses eight-tube launch m odules and an Elta fire control radar, which allow s the system to engage multiple targets at ranges of 500 meters to 12 km . 355 The A D A M S is vehicle m ounted, with sim ilar capabilities. Both systems are fully auto­ m ated and have been successfully tested. 356 The Barak has been exported to the Indian navy, which prefers it to both R ussian and indigenous shortranged SA M options, and also will be deployed on Israel’s S a ’ar 5 missile corvettes. 357 357

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M odification program s M ost US equipment is m odified by the ID F shortly after delivery. US-IDF cooperation on m odernization of the M -109 SP howitzer, for exam ple, revealed that Israel and US operational requirements differ significantly: there w as only a 6 0 -7 0 percent com m onality of design in this ‘standard issue’ equipm ent.358 Aran Electronics developed a m ajor m odification for the radar of the Improved H A W K SA M , and T adiran and M A B A T (IAI) upgraded the C happaral SA M .359 These upgrades enabled the continued effective operation of aging systems at considerably lower cost than their replacement with new ‘state-of-the-art’ w eapons.360 In addition, Israel reportedly m ade m ajor software m odifications to the Patriot A T B M in response to post-com bat assessm ent during the G ulf W ar.361 H arpoon ShShM s, purchased from the US, have been fitted with Israeli-designed guidance system s.362 IM I and Soltam artillery and m ortars designs are routinely retrofitted onto arm ored vehicle chassis. An arm ored personnel carrier, based on the Centurion chassis, w as also introduced in the early 1980s, in hopes o f pro­ viding infantry with better protection from A rab anti-tank w eapons.363 M ost of the parts, assem blies, and systems for the M erkava-3 are m anu­ factured locally. This enables the export of many systems based on M erkava technology which has also been used to upgrade other tanks.364 M -48s and Centurions were m odernized with indigenous fire control systems and Blazer reactive arm or to permit vastly extended service lives.365 IDF M -60 tanks have undergone significant m odernization status, including installing a more pow erful engine, new arm or and protection against ‘top-dow n’ missile attack, and m odification o f the turret ring to allow refitting of a 120 mm gun if necessary.366 The IAF relies increasingly upon indigenous m odifications of USsupplied aircraft to m aintain a technological edge over A rab airforces which often receive sim ilar equipm ent.367 IAI continues m odernization pro­ gram s for French (M agister, O uragan, M irage III/V, and Kfir), US (A-4, F4, F-5, F-15, F-16, S-2 Tracker, and Boeing 707) and Soviet (M iG-21 and M iG -23) airfram es. In addition to upgrades o f com bat aircraft, IAI m odi­ fies civilian airfram es for use as tanker aircraft, electronic and signals intel­ ligence (ELIN T/SIG IN T) duties, or maritime patrol.368 The m ost recent m ajor project is the IAI/Elta P H A L C O N - an AEW aircraft intended to supplem ent or replace E-2C H aw keyes. P H A L C O N costs about half as much as an A W A CS.369 P H A L C O N w as offered to China - but the sale w as canceled at US request.370 It now appears that India will acquire a P H A L C O N system, based on the R ussian Il-76 airfram e.371 IAI continues to provide m ajor m odifications for the F-16 project, based on specific Israeli operational requirem ents.372

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M ajor w eapons platform s Soltam has designed and produced very capable artillery designs for the IDF and for export, including the R ascal SP 155 mm system, designed for export,373 and the Sholef 155 mm SP system. The Sholef is reportedly an outstanding design which has not been produced because of lack of avail­ able funds for IDF procurem ent.374 In general, with the exception of the M erkava tank, Israel has ceased production and development of m ajor w eapons systems.

Strategic systems The Jericho II w as tested in the M editerranean in M ay 1 9 8 7 .375 While exact details o f the range, accuracy, and capability of the Jericho are unclear, m ost analysis assum es that the missile is nuclear capable, and has a range of at least 900 m iles.376 The Jericho-II variant is considerably more sophisticated than the Jericho-I, with an estim ated range of 1,500 km and a 1,000 kg payload, and entered service with the IDF in 1989. The test of a missile in South Africa, reportedly alm ost identical to the Jericho-II, dem onstrated a range of 1,400 km. The Jericho-II, like the Jericho-I, can be launched from truck or rail-based transporter-erector launchers (TELs), and 9 0 -1 0 0 are reportedly based in the cave com plex at Zachariah south of Tel Aviv.377 A m odified Jericho II with an added third stage m ay serve as the ‘Shavit’ booster for Israel’s O feq series satellites.378R eports from Lawrence Liver­ more Laboratories state that this booster m ay have a range of up to 7 ,5 0 0 k m if modified as a ballistic m issile.379 A Jericho-III m ay be in devel­ opment, with three solid-fuel stages and a liquid-fueled fourth stage. This w ould have a range of 4 ,8 0 0 km, in addition to probable use as an im proved satellite booster.380 According to recent reports, the Jericho-I has been retired from IDF inventory.381 An additional potential strategic delivery system is a locally developed cruise missile, possibly a m odification of an existing RPV or the Gabriel ShShM . R eports of cooperation with Iran in the 1970s on a w eapon code­ nam ed ‘Flow er’ m ay refer to such a project.382 Israel’s request for 50 T om ­ ahaw k missiles from the US in 2 0 0 0 w as rejected, and recent reports on the Gabriel 4 L R missile speculate on a version with a 1,400 km range, optim ized for subm arine launch. 383 The 1973 W ar spurred new developments and increased production at D im ona. According to the testim ony of M ordechai Vanunu, Israel secretly expanded the capacity o f the D im ona reactor during the 1970s from the original 24 m egaw atts (as designed in the late 1950s) to 150 m egaw atts.384 This theoretically allow s the production of up to 40 kg of plutonium per year.385 V anunu’s disclosures included photographic evidence that Israel w as producing lithium-6, lithium deuteride, and tritium, all of which are

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useful for more advanced nuclear w eapons, including boosted fission, ther­ m onuclear, and enhanced radiation devices.386 Analysis o f V anunu’s testi­ mony suggests that Israel’s nuclear arsenal includes between 60 and 300 w eapons of varying yields and sophistication.387 Israel m ay have created battlefield nuclear devices, and potentially enhanced radiation w arheads for tactical deploym ent.388 Israel is also believed capable of producing a wide variety of chemical w arfare agents.389 A 1990 statement by Science M inister Yuval Neem an indicated that Israel might retaliate ‘with the sam e m erchandise’ if attacked by Iraqi chemical w eapons.390 In O ctober 1992, an El Al 747 cargo jet crashed in Am sterdam , with ten tons of chemical precursors for nerve agent production on board. The resulting investigation suggested that Israel had been regularly m oving chemical precursors by cargo jet.391 Finally, Israel vigorously pursued space-based reconnaissance cap­ abilities, although these strained the state’s financial resources.392 Israel began pursuing this capability after the 1973 w ar. The O ffeq satellites were a prelude to later m odels with expanded capabilities, and the Shavit booster reportedly could m anage to put a satellite into an appropriate lowearth orbit for military surveillance m issions.393 IAI spent considerable resources developing a com m ercial and military space capability. It forcefully advocated development of the A M O S satel­ lite with some defense funding, over the strong opposition o f the ID F.394 The A M O S w as designed to provide phone, telex, television, and com m u­ nications for the entire country, as well as having additional transponders available for foreign custom ers.395

Managing security in an uncertain world: 1995-2005 The twin themes o f technological sophistication and independence imbue Israel’s military industrial policies. O ur independence and security depend to a significant extent on our scientific and technological research. Technology is particularly im portant in the security sphere. If we fall behind the rest o f the world in technological development, our security will be im periled.396 If there w as a genocide in Biafra — irrespective o f the political issues involved — it w as because the Biafrans failed to secure the arms they needed, while the N igerians received planes and guns from R ussia and Egypt.397 The incremental development o f Israel’s arms industry has been viewed, with some justification, as a suitable m odel for all developing militaryindustrial program s.398 Israeli military industry has also been used as a prim ary exam ple of a so-called ‘export-oriented’ model o f L D C defense industry.399

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Israel’s military industry developed and prospered, in large part, because of Israel’s unique security problem . Survival under conditions of existential threat, with limited financial resources, required close coopera­ tion and linkage between military, political, economic, and industrial p ol­ icies. Israel dem anded high standards and efficiency from the industrial infrastructure because of the competing dem ands of security and economic development. The lack of assured supplies of arms forced the Israeli arms industry to provide items unavailable to the IDF, and to upgrade and m odify older w eapons which were available. M ilitary policy also provided the m otivation for the development of high-technology sectors, competitive with the m ost advanced products in the developed w orld.400 Israel’s security concept dem anded the construc­ tion of a force which could achieve a rapid, decisive victory through pre­ emptive action on enemy territory. This required expertise in W estern-style m aneuver w arfare, and a force structure based around tanks and aircraft. Technology w as deliberately used as a force multiplier, and the governm ent prom oted high standards of technical expertise within the population by use of the IDF as a national education and train­ ing pool.

Israeli military-industrial requirements Israel’s industry m ust be prepared to assist and improve the ID F’s military capabilities in all strategic dimensions. The critical obligations of Israel’s defense industry are: 1

2 3

T o provide sustenance necessary for efficient operation o f the IDF in com bat, and to ensure industrial ‘surge capability’ in event o f an extended conflict. T o m axim ize quality of existing IDF inventory at minimum practical expense to national economic development. T o develop and produce local systems which are unavailable elsewhere or tailored to distinct Israeli requirem ents.401

The first category of production consists of ‘endurance requirem ents’: these include sm all arms, light arms and crew-served infantry w eapons, and ammunition. In addition, the local production of spare parts and crit­ ical logistic needs (tires, uniform s, basic military gear) is emphasized, in order to allow stockpiling in times of peace and surge production if neces­ sary in times of w ar to replace lost equipment. The second category revolves around m odification and m odernization capabilities. The IDF traditionally relied on older cast-off equipment. M odernization program s extend service life, and increase the capability of existing systems to m atch newer generations of equipment, which m ay or may not be available on the international m arket at higher cost. Israeli

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arm s industries have become adept at the retrofitting o f im ported equip­ ment with local products. The third category refers to the provision of equipment unavailable as a result of em bargo, political controversy, or international arm s control agreements, such as ballistic m issiles, or technology designed specifically to meet local military requirements which is unavailable elsewhere. The latter category includes the Gabriel ShShM and the use of RPVs instead of m anned reconnaissance aircraft. The link between producer and consum er is extremely strong in Israel, in stark contrast to m ost other national arm s industries. The scientist or engineer who w orks for the Israeli defense industry also serves as a reservist in the IDF, and is therefore intimately acquainted with the requirements for new system s, and the conditions in which they will be used. This relationship permits the local industry to focus on developing w eapons and capabilities which respond directly to IDF doctrine and requirem ents.402 The high standards of the IDF have forced Israeli industry to absorb critical technological capabilities and skills, with a positive im pact on the national industrial base and economy. For Israeli m anufacturers to ensure continued IDF orders, particularly during the development of the indus­ trial base, maintenance of the highest possible standards, effectively p aral­ leling those o f the industrialized W est, were required. These standards Table 3 .6 Local share o f value in Israeli m ajo r w eapons systems procurem ent

Prim arily indigenous production as percentage of overall procure-m ent Licensed Production as percentage of overall procure-m ent Indigenous production as percentage of im ports Licensed production as percentage of im ports C om bined local production as percentage of im ports C om bined local production as percentage of total procurem ent o f m ajor w eapons systems

1965­ 70

1971­ 75

1976­ 80

1981­ 85

1986­ 90

T otal

6.3

27.3

36.0

4 8 .4

44.3

34.2

0.4

0.8

0.0

0.2

56.5

95.2

79.4

52.2

0.6

1.5

0.0

0.4

6.7

37.6

6.7

37.6

57.1

96.8

79.4

5 2 .6

6.3

27.3

36.3

49.2

44.3

34.5

Source: SIPRI data found in Ian Anthony, “ The ‘third tier’ countries: production of major w eapons” , in Wulf, Arms Industry Limited, 370-3, 382-3. See pp. 368-9 for methodology. I have combined some of the data and created additional columns in order to further illustrate the range of indigenous efforts.

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have ‘spun o ff’ into the comm ercial industrial sector as well, with very positive effects on Israeli industrial exports. As a result of high standards and expanding technological expertise, the Israeli defense industry has excelled in a number of extremely profitable, high-technology areas, the m ost im portant o f which are missiles and elec­ tronics. In these niches, Israeli products compete effectively with inter­ national leaders. The com bination o f incentive and capability, together with the close cooperation between military and industrial sectors, ensures that sophisticated equipment which responds to specific IDF requirements can be developed very rapidly. M ilitary industry more than adequately fulfilled its prim ary m issions through 1973. By the early 1980s, however, Israel had to respond to changed strategic circumstances. Egypt, formerly the greatest potential threat, had been neutralized over the short-term by the Cam p D avid Accords. A rab armies m ade impressive strides in absorbing m odern tech­ nologies into their armed forces: while the qualitative gap had not closed, it w as certainly closing relatively faster than during the 1960s.403 The prim ary potential theater of the conflict shifted to the G olan Heights, where constricting terrain and the fortified positions on the Syrian border m ade rapid and decisive Israeli success problem atic at best.404 R apid and decisive victory appeared increasingly unattainable on the ground: war w ould instead be w aged by attrition, in a manner m ost favorable to A rab objectives and strategy.405 M ore im portantly, however, the prim ary military threat changed from conventional forces - where Israel could counter A rab quantitative superi­ ority with better quality, training, and doctrine - to unconventional means less amenable to qualitative solutions. First Iraq, and later Syria, Iran, and Egypt, acquired significant numbers of ballistic m issiles, prim arily derived from the aging SCUD . These missiles provided distant adversaries with the means to inflict significant physical and psychological dam age on the Israeli populace. M any of these states also acquired chemical w eapons, and pursued other form s o f W M D . The G ulf W ar, for the first time, involved an acceptance of foreign attack without retaliation, which some analysts fear inherently undermines Israel’s carefully fostered policy of deterrence through punishm ent.406 The prim ary threat to Israeli sovereignty and security has gradually shifted, over tw o decades, from a conventional external threat to an unconventional one. The intifada suggested for the first time that the Pales­ tinian population of Israel and the Occupied Territories could present a m ajor security problem for Israel. The first intifada w as resolved through the failure o f Palestinian political leadership - Y asser A rafat’s foolish support of Iraq during the G ulf W ar - and through the initiation of the O slo peace process, which prom ised Palestinians some substantial hom e­ land in the future. This future is now endangered by the failure of the Cam p D avid talks and events since 2 0 0 1 . The more recent A l A qsa

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intifada, m arked by suicide bom bings and public riots backed by armed insurgents, creates a vastly more difficult security threat for Israel than anything the Palestinians have m anaged since 1948. Israel’s operational and technological advantages over A rab conven­ tional forces are not easily translated into rapid, decisive success against a determined local insurgency. Israel has dem onstrated enorm ous efficiency in urban operations - particularly the capture of Jenin - and has also leveraged its technology and intelligence advantages through policies of selective assassination and efforts to bolster internal security, including the construction of a huge defensive wall. In addition to fundam ental changes in the regional security environ­ ment, Israel m ust also respond to a rapidly changing international arms m arket. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international arm s trade has become largely com m ercial in nature. Reduced global defense spending has forced consolidation of national arm s industries, increased the emphasis on joint development and production to increase efficiency, and created a highly competitive export m arket for a relatively smaller number of defense contracts. This poses significant concerns for Israel’s defense industry. Exports now account for over 7 5 percent of Israeli defense industry sales - export sales which have risen from $2.1 billion in 1999 to an anticipated $3 billion or more in 2 0 0 3 . The defense industry therefore depends on export orders to m aintain production lines and employment. Less than 2 5 percent of production is for the IDF, and this figure is unlikely to increase. C osts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict run as high as $3 billion annually, and the defense budget is declining due to the continuing budget deficit.407 Reliance on exports also carries risks on the political front. The IsraeliPalestinian struggle has affected Israel’s export efforts, and some potential buyers have reconsidered orders in light of the ongoing violence since 2 0 0 1 .408 Continuing conflict with the Palestinians effectively excludes Israel from the lucrative M iddle East arm s trade. It also constrains defense relationships with European states, including even Turkey - a highly prom ising partner in the late 1 990s.409 Delays in joint projects with the U K, reportedly at the behest o f the Foreign and Com m onwealth Office, have held up deliveries of UAVs from both Elbit and IAI.410 Israel m ay be engaging in some joint ventures, such as the R-Darter A A M co-produced by R A FA E L and South A frica’s Kentron, in an effort to bypass political objections to Israeli-produced w eapons.411 Israel has been able to find one consistent custom er - India - that remains unaffected by political tensions in the M iddle East. Israeli sales of the B arak SA M to the Indian navy have proven highly profitable.412 India purchases UAVs from Israel, as well as the Green Pine radar system used with the Arrow-2 A TB M system .413 India has also contracted for the P H A L C O N airborne radar on an Il-76 airfram e, and is reportedly eyeing cooperation on a range of missile systems including, possibly, the

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A rrow -2.414 Despite strengthening ties between the tw o governments, India cannot be counted on for sufficient sales to m aintain a $2 -3 billion annual export rate. Sales to China, reportedly 20 percent of Israel’s total exports and therefore a very significant partner, carry the political risk o f alienat­ ing both India and, more im portantly, the United States.415 Israeli defense industries still have considerable room for rationaliza­ tion. Three different firms produce and export missiles - IAI, TAAS, and R A FA EL - and three other firms compete for UA V contracts (IAI’s M alat and M B T , and Elbit’s Silver A rrow ).416 The mergers that created Elbit group and Elisra group led, in the case of Elbit at least, to a consolidated firm with revenues com parable to TAA S and R A FA EL. M ergers and priva­ tization efforts am ong the government-owned firms, however, were less successful, and efforts to consolidate core business functions am ong them has, so far, failed. As a result, Israeli firms are competing with each other for foreign orders, driving down profit m argins and even losing out on contracts due to corporate infighting. European firms remain reluctant to consider joint projects with Israel due to Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are obvious incentives for partner­ ship agreements with US firms. There are also, however, significant bar­ riers. One is Israel’s insistence on technology transfer and offset agreements - even though US law specifically prohibits Israel from demanding offsets.417 Another is US export control legislation, and increas­ ing US political pressure against Israeli exports to certain countries. US industry representatives point out that Israel effectively receives nearly $500 million a year in US OSP funding for R & D , m aking it difficult to determine the ‘true ow ner’ of the resulting technology.418 Israel could be indirectly funneling US aid dollars to undesirable recipients, at least from a US perspective.419 US assistance, as mentioned above, is critical for the maintenance of both IDF force structure and Israel’s defense industry. The use of OSP funds puts the US in the unusual position of providing economic assistance for Israel to use in developing industrial products and technologies which, in theory, could compete with US defense products. In practice, Israeli offi­ cials attem pt to spend OSP on specific, high-priority items which will only be produced in limited numbers and not offered on the export m arket.420 If Israel designs a local product and successfully sells it to or produces it in the US, it can then use US funding to procure sim ilar items for the IDF. US production lines have now been established for the Arrow-2, the Python-4 A A M , and the Popeye air-to-surface missile, am ong other system s.421 This shift to joint production outside the country alarm s Israel’s defense industry. Because Israel receives such a large percentage of its military budget in US FM S grants, this aid has a disproportionate im pact on Israel’s defense spending patterns.422 US FM S dollars constituted 19.2 percent of the expanded 2001 defense budget, and OSP represented an additional 5.9 percent.423 OSP is used prim arily to sustain Israeli high-

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technology research and development efforts. With declining defense budgets, Israel now spends shekels (the defense budget approved by the Knesset) on operations and m aintenance and personnel costs, and uses FM S dollars to purchase w eapons.424 Since the IAF receives priority in pro­ curement and R & D , and 52 percent of the IAF budget comes from FM S, this strongly limits the ability of dom estic contractors like IAI to compete for IAF w eapons contracts.425 The shekel crunch not only affects dom estic orders, but also the attrac­ tiveness of Israeli w eapons on the export m arket - few states are willing to order w eapons that are not employed by the m anufacturer, or otherwise proven in com bat.426 The shekel crunch limited the ability of IAI, for exam ple, to upgrade Israel’s older F-16 fighter aircraft - a project that might lead to billions in additional export w ork on European F-16s of sim ilar vintage.427 In the mid 1990s, Israel canceled continued procurement of the fam ous Galil rifle in favor of the US M -16 - because the M -16 could be bought with FM S funds.428 The new T avor 21 5 .5 6 m m rifle, designed in response to the new requirements of urban warfighting, remains on hold, despite its superiority to the M -16, because of shortage of funds.429 In effect, Israel and the US are draw ing into an unequal m ilitary-indus­ trial partnership, which is an extension of the vague but definite US comm itm ent to Israel’s security and survival. Israeli firms continue to participate in high-technology ventures with US firms that will m ake im portant contributions to US security, including Israel’s participation in the Join t Strike Fighter Project as a Level 3 partner.430 But Israel’s defense industry is increasingly becoming a junior partner to US firms, and decisions regarding Israel’s force structure, R & D , and procurem ent are dom inated by US military assistance and its lim itations.431

The future: niche production or military-industrial and strategic dysfunction? The decisions which determine the direction of Israel’s arm s industry, ulti­ mately, will be m ade by politicians. Despite the grow ing influence o f IDF leadership on military policy and procurem ent, industrial priorities are still determined by political leadership. A small group of individuals dom inates not only Israeli security decisions, but also industrial decisions, and the tension between tw o com peting approaches has steadily increased since the 19 6 7 Six D ay W ar.432 Israeli leaders have been forced to m ake choices regarding procurement which affect IDF short-term readiness and the long-term viability and expansion of the defense industry. Initially, the konenut m ul hitkonenut (preparedness versus preparation) debate provided the prim ary fram ew ork for determining industrial and, indeed, procurem ent priorities, subject to financial restrictions. Econom ic lim itations actually provided a powerful argument in support of industrial development, as local production could

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eventually substitute for im ports. Industrialization w ould not have been possible without foreign capital, however. A lm ost all Israeli m ilitary-indus­ trial capability evolved from the maintenance and repair base, which indic­ ates the prim acy of preparedness as a policy in the 1 9 4 8 -6 7 period. There were exceptions to this generalization, however. The explanation for them lies in the realm of the individual. Israel, in 1 9 4 8 -6 0 , was uniquely influenced by the decisions o f D avid Ben Gurion. N o other politi­ cian in Israeli history has had as great autonom y, or the ability to act in secrecy or indeed against the wishes of the m ajority of his political sup­ porters. As Avner Cohen has noted, the Israeli nuclear program could only have evolved in its unique opaque fashion during the 1950s, when Ben Gurion w as able to capitalize on unprecedented secrecy and centralization and on a unique w indow of opportunity with the French Fourth Republic.433 Ben Gurion w as ably assisted by Shimon Peres, whose bureaucratic and diplom atic skills shaped the future Israeli arm s industry in the 1950s. Since 1967, however, tangential, non-military issues play an increasing role in m ilitary-industrial and procurem ent policy. The shock of 1973 instigated a m assive buildup of all services and an expansion o f existing industries, including those developed in the 1 9 6 7 -7 3 period for production o f m ajor w eapons platform s. The increasing flow of capital from the United States and the comm itm ent of the Israeli government to increase military expenditures produced a brief but illusory period of unlimited resources. Projects which w ould have been scrutinized carefully in the money-tight 1960s were pursued and encouraged despite the availability of equivalent or superior w eapons from abroad.434 Dom estic political factors strongly affected this absence of oversight. Defense expenditures provided both Lab or and Likud governments with the means of influencing national employment and prosperity, at least at the m argins.435 The im portance o f local production and defense exports on the economy and the electorate w as enorm ous, given the historical role o f the Lab or Federation (Histadrut) in Israeli elections.436 Both Lab or and Likud needed to fund ‘blue-and-white’ program s in order to m aintain and, in some cases, increase, employment. Finally, defense industries provide an im portant sense of national self­ sufficiency and prestige. G randiose national projects which require a sense o f national commitment and sacrifice have a unique appeal and prestige in both developing and developed states.437 M ilitary industrial independence became, in the minds of political leaders, a vital sym bol of Israeli national achievement: ‘Israel had to apply herself to scientific and industrial devel­ opment if her effective stature w as to exceed the country’s territorial size. The establishm ent of an arm s industry w as her first confrontation with this need.’ 438 The notion of ‘self-sufficiency,’ by the late 1970s, had acquired a polit­ ical m eaning at odds with all previous Israeli policy. Rather than focusing on limiting dependence in crucial military technologies, Israeli policy

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m oved tow ards m axim izing independence in technologies which were readily available from the US. The enchantment with production o f expen­ sive, m ulti-purpose platform s reached heights of incredible economic frivo­ lity in the design of the Lavi, which w as in essence a very sophisticated F-16. Israel’s boom ing defense electronics industry provides the basis for upgrades of m ajor platform s of all types both within Israel and abroad, and m aintains a competitive edge over m ost other producers in critical niches such as electronic w arfare, avionics, and UAVs. Israel’s recent launch of the O fek series o f satellites, with military intelligence gathering capabilities, provides yet another exam ple of Israel producing sophistic­ ated technologies to provide capabilities unavailable elsewhere.439 The new T actical H igh Energy Laser program , which includes Tadiran, IAI,

Table 3 .7 US A C D A estim ates of Israeli A rm s Exports, 1 9 6 3 -9 1 A rm s exports, Israel: 1 9 6 3 -1 9 9 1 Year

E x p o rts (millions o f current $US)

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

2.0 1.0 1.0 0 1.0 9.0 3.0 5.0 0 10.0 20.0 30.0 50.0 140.0 60.0 120.0 2 6 0.0 140.0 370.0 4 3 0.0 2 1 0.0 5 7 5.0 725.0 700.0 725.0 4 6 0.0 925.0 4 4 0.0 380.0

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years

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R A FA EL, and the US firm TRW , is aim ed at a high-technology solution to the use of Katyusha type rockets by H ezbollah and other terrorist groups a problem virtually unique to Israel.440 Niches of excellence, therefore, remain - but the dilem m a of globalization, the distorting im pact of A m er­ ican military assistance, and the dependence on exports to retain industrial infrastructure guarantee that Israel will face difficult choices in the future. Israel’s military industry, until recently, enjoyed virtually unprecedented authority and prioritization within the dom estic economy. However, after over 50 years of service, it finds itself less relevant to IDF requirements, trapped in an unstable reliance on international exports to m aintain its infrastructure and capabilities, and exerting an unhealthy and possibly dysfunctional effect on the Israeli national economy. If there is a universal m essage to be found in Israel’s m ilitary-industrial development, it lies in the fundam ental lim itations of L D C capabilities vis-a-vis the prim ary industrial producers in the international system, and the success with which a small producer can respond to specific military capabilities required within a regional military competition. ‘Though it is fair to suggest that much m ay be learned from Israel’s experience, certain aspects w ould not suit other countries, for no tw o countries have exactly the same problem s. Israel’s system should be adapted, but it should not be copied.’ 441

4

Iraq

Background The development of Iraq ’s arm s industry provides a disturbing exam ple of the hidden industrial potential of a determined regional pow er. Iraq ’s arms industry does not fit neatly into the m odels of military industrialization discussed in Chapter 1: it focused neither on exports nor on incremental development of broad industrial capabilities, but instead follow ed a selec­ tive, pragm atic policy geared tow ards specific requirements. Projects selected focused on: 1 2 3

W eapons and technologies capable of being produced with existing or projected Iraqi industrial and technical infrastructure; Technologies deemed desirable for long-term Iraqi military-industrial objectives; or Systems not available on the international m arket but required for spe­ cific m ilitary or political objectives.

Iraq ’s military industry, as a result, repeatedly surprised W estern military analysts in the late 1980s by producing or m odifying w eapons of considerable sophistication, particularly w eapons o f m ass destruction (W M D ).1 The repressive and centralized nature of the Iraqi regime undoubtedly simplified military-industrial efforts: the absence o f dom estic opposition allow ed Saddam to devote an enorm ous proportion o f Iraq ’s industrial and technical resources for military ends. From 1 9 7 5 -9 0 , Iraq designed and built an enorm ous military-industrial infrastructure that eventually employed as m any as 100,000 people. Both overt and covert means were used to acquire sophisticated industrial technologies and tech­ niques from the industrialized states, particularly those which w ould permit the construction of unconventional w eapons. Iraq ’s military indus­ tries produced a wide range o f goods, from basic munitions to ballistic m issiles, and eventually subordinated the country’s entire industrial devel­ opm ent policy under the authority of the M inistry o f Industry and M ilitary Industrialization (M IM I).

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Iraq also represents a disturbing precedent as one o f the few regional pow ers willing to resort to the use of unconventional weaponry against both external foes and dom estic opponents of the regime. Iraq ’s chemical w eapons industry, acquired with rem arkable ease and little expense from a bevy of willing W estern suppliers, provided the m eans to save the B a ’ath regime in the 1980s. Iraq ’s unexpected nuclear w eapons capability dem onstrated the frailty o f existing non-proliferation policy and safe­ guards. In general, the Iraqi exam ple dem onstrates the inadequacy of exist­ ing m odels of L D C military industrialization. Despite the large and impressive quantities of high-technology equip­ ment Iraq am assed during the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi military remained a relatively unsophisticated fighting force.2 The Iraqi military has traditionally relied on firepower. This reflects, in part, the relative sim plic­ ity and effectiveness of modern artillery: Artillery is the m ost lethal branch o f the ground forces, and has inflicted the m ajority of all casualties in m ost w ars since 1914 . . . for high-intensity conflict, the relative im portance of artillery, as com ­ pared to infantry and arm or, has greatly increased since 1 9 4 5 .3 The Iraqi armed forces therefore emphasized endurance: maintenance of adequate supplies of small arm s, m ortars, artillery, and amm unition w as critical for Iraqi military operations. Iraq placed special emphasis on artillery in the Iran-Iraq W ar, where it w as the prim ary killer of Iranian troops.4 W estern military analysts have noted that Iraq employs artillery poorly, and the general preference appears to be for m assive barrages.5 M assed artillery provided lethality at m inimal cost, requiring fewer tech­ nical skills and training than maneuver w arfare, and risking fewer casual­ ties than infantry operations. It also could be applied to both internal and external threats. It is not surprising that Iraq focused on endurance as a critical m ilitary-industrial requirement. Em bargoes, financial restrictions, and military events played critical roles in the evolution of Iraqi military industry, but Iraq ’s policy did not focus on m ajor w eapons platform s. As a result, analysts of L D C arms industries alm ost completely m issed the growth of the Iraqi arm s industry and its military and political significance. Because that industrial develop­ ment w as prematurely halted, analysis of Iraq ’s arm s industry will focus on the 1 9 7 4 -8 4 and 1 9 8 4 -9 0 periods, follow ed by a brief discussion of w hat might have been - the trends and directions of Iraqi program s in 1990, and some conjecture about what Iraqi program s might have looked like if the first G ulf W ar had not occurred. The strategic w eapons p ro ­ gram s, of greatest interest to the average reader and the international community, will be broken out separately.

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Iraq’s security perception Iraq ’s security policy focuses on m any of the sam e types of threats as Israel and India - it m ust cope with hostile neighbors and regional adversaries, internal unrest and secessionist m ovements, and extra-regional threats. Unlike India and Israel, however, where civil-military relations reflect W estern traditions of civilian rule and m ilitary professionalism , a prim ary concern for Iraq is regime survival in the face o f competing political fac­ tions - which often included the military. As in m any other L D C s, the Iraqi military has a long history of political interference.6 The consolidation of political pow er in the hands of the B a ’athist regime since 1968 limited, but did not eliminate, the role of the military in Iraqi politics. The B a ’athist regime m aintained close control over m ilitary appointm ents and decision-making, and relied on parallel military organizations to ensure a loyal armed force in the event of a coup. Despite the B a ’athists efforts to control the military, at least tw o military coups were attem pted in the 1970s, and m any others in the 1980s and 1 9 9 0 s.7 Regime survival w as often the prim ary focus of Iraqi national security policy.8 The B a ’ath Party’s firm control over the military severely limited the role of the arm ed forces in m ilitary-industrial and security policy. One indication of the lack of m ilitary input in the security process is an exam i­ nation of key decision-makers in Iraqi m ilitary-industrial policy. The three m ost im portant figures in Iraqi m ilitary-industrial policy in the early 1980s were Saddam Hussein, Dr. Amer H am m oudi al-Saadi, and D r. Amer R ashid al-Ubeidi, all of w hom received honorary prom otions to Lt. General. T w o other key figures in Iraqi security policy were cousins of Saddam Hussein: brother-in-law Adnan K hairallah, who w as M inister of Defense before dying in a helicopter crash in M ay 1989, and son-in-law H ussain Kam il, who became the second-m ost pow erful m an in Iraq in the late 1980s, before defecting in 1995. On his inexplicable return to Iraq in 1996, Kam il w as m urdered by family members. It should surprise no one that the development of the Iraqi arms industry coincided neatly with Saddam H ussein’s consolidation of power, nor that its efforts were tailored to his grandiose regional am bitions.9 These am bi­ tions, however, were consistent with previous Iraqi regimes. Historically, Iraq seeks influence throughout the Islamic world, competing with Iran in the G ulf and with Egypt, Syria, and especially Israel in the M iddle East.

Internal security concerns The defense requirements of Iraq, like those of m any other developing countries, are driven by a melange of ethnic, geographic, economic, and ideological considerations. The form ation of Iraq out of portions of the O ttom an velayets (administrative districts) of M osul, Baghdad, and Basra

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after W orld W ar I left the state with disputed borders and internal ethnic and religious tensions. The first, and prim ary, concern o f the Iraqi military has been to m ain­ tain and extend the central authority of Baghdad over the peripheral areas and their ethnic and religious minorities, as well as m aintaining domestic security.10 Iraqi adm inistration, regardless of regime, has been dom inated by the largely Sunni M uslim region of Baghdad, and faced potential sepa­ ratist movements in the Kurdish northern province of M osul and the pre­ dom inantly Shi’ite M uslim province o f B asra.11 Every Iraqi regime has used authoritarian m easures to enforce obedience to the central govern­ ment. The emerging post-Saddam Iraqi regime m ay face a different problem , seeking to enforce authority in the center (with US and allied assistance) against the traditional Sunni elite. Central control w as threatened by separatist movements in the tw o peripheral regions, and further com plicated by economic issues: while Baghdad is the dom inant political center, M osul and Basra provinces provide 60 percent and 30 percent of oil production respectively.12 Iraq ’s geography provided some support for these separatist m ovements: the northern highlands (bordering Turkey and Iran) provide shelter for Kurdish insurgents, while the m arshes and sw am ps o f ‘riverine’ Iraq provide havens for rebels in the south.13 In the course of the Iran-Iraq rivalry, both sides attempted to exploit each others’ ethnic difficulties. The Iraqis supported Baluchi rebel movements in both Pakistan and Iran.14 On both sides of the Iraq-Iran border, the Kurdish population provided the base for a strong separatist movement. Uprisings broke out in the Kurdish region of Iraq in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, almost continuously in the period 19 6 1 -7 0 , 19 7 4 -75, throughout the Iran-Iraq W ar, and again in the aftermath of the G ulf W ar.15 Kurdish rebels numbered only a few hundred in 1921, but by the early 1960s between 15,000 and 2 0,000 peshm ergas (loosely organized Kurdish insurgents) rose against Iraq under the leadership of M ustafa al-Barzani.16 M ilitary requirements in the northern region escalated throughout Iraq’s history. In the 1930s and 1940s, only one or tw o brigades of Iraqi troops were required to maintain order (or suppress rebellion). By 1963, this had risen to eight brigades, in 1969 four divisions, and by 1974 six divisions over half the Iraqi Army - were used in government assaults on the K urds.17 Substantial Kurdish minorities live in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, with a smaller population in Syria. Kurdish rebels find sympathy, sanctuary, and support not only from Kurdish populations, but occasionally from neigh­ boring governm ents.18 Iran’s willingness to provide arm s and support for Kurdish rebels threatened Iraqi authority in the north. Iranian troops fought alongside the Kurds in 1 9 6 9 -7 0 , and supplied Kurdish troops with artillery and anti-tank guided missiles in 1 9 7 4 -7 5 .19 During the Iran -Iraq W ar, both sides attem pted to use Kurdish rebel groups against the other, and in the afterm ath of that conflict chemical

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w eapons were used by Iraq in an effort to end Kurdish resistance once and for all.20 As the Iraqi Army w as destroyed in O peration Desert Storm, Kurdish rebels rose again in the north in M arch 1990, claiming at one point to have liberated 95 percent of ‘K urdistan’.21 In the m id-1990s, nearly two-thirds of the Iraqi army w as stationed in the north, including five of Iraq ’s best divisions.22 In O peration Iraqi Freedom , Kurdish peshm ergas com bined with Coalition special forces units and the US 173rd A ir­ borne Brigade to liberate much o f northern Iraq.23 The threat of the Shi’ite population in the south is com paratively more recent. Although the m arshes in the Basra region have always been a haven for criminals and army deserters, the southern region did not become a threat to Iraq until after the Iranian revolution, when it became a strong­ hold of the Shi’ite D a ’wa m ovem ent.24 After 1980, and particularly after the first G u lf W ar, Iraq viewed the Shi’ite population in the south as a potentially pro-Iranian force - some analysts argue that Iranian support for Shi’ite rebel forces w as a critical casus belli in the Iran-Iraq W ar.25 An abortive rising after the G ulf W ar w as harshly suppressed by Republican G uard and regular military units, and the government drained much of the m arshland in an effort to deny shelter to rebels.26 R egional interests an d threats Iraq ’s m ost secure border is to the northwest. Turkey ceded the province of M osul to Iraq with some reluctance in the 1920s.27 It m ade no serious efforts to redefine the border after that point, although the issue has occa­ sionally emerged as a concern. In addition, Turkey and Iraq have sim ilar problem s with Kurdish separatists: neither state is interested in enlarging an already troublesom e ethnic problem . Iraq has been called ‘the eastern flank o f the A rab w orld’: it m arks for all practical purposes the meeting place o f A rab and Persian cultures.28 B a ’athist ideology calls for pan-Arab unity: the single m ost crucial element of this ideology is the requirement for an ‘A rab solution’ to the problem of Palestine.29 A rab unity w as used by Iraq to appeal for support in the Iran -Iraq W ar, and to appeal to the A rab m asses during the G ulf conflict. Although Iraq remained engaged in both regions, the focus of Iraqi prior­ ities shifted from the M iddle E ast to the G ulf after the overthrow of the monarchy, despite the grow ing influence o f B a ’athist ideology.30 Iraq has the potential to dom inate the Persian Gulf, or at least its Arab (southern) coastline. Iran, which dom inates the northern/eastern shore of the G ulf and shares a long land border with Iraq, has vastly greater pop u­ lation and economic resources than Iraq (see Table 4.1). Basra and Baghdad, Iraq ’s m ost im portant cities, lie close to the border with Iran, so strategic depth against Iranian attack is limited. Although Iran and Iraq were m embers of the ‘northern tier’ states which signed the Baghdad Pact in 1 9 5 4 .31 Iranian policy since the 1960s has focused on dom inating the

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Table 4.1 M iddle East and Persian G ulf security systems - 1990 Country

G D P (1990, $U S billions)

A rea (thousands o f km 2)

5 4 .7 12.4 3.1 (b) 4.4 3.3

38.3 18.5 (a) 5 .2 (a) 38.0 2.3

1,001.5 185.1 91.5 21.0 10.4

Persian G u lf Subsystem Iran 55.6 Iraq 18.7 Saudi A rabia (c) 17.1 Oman (c) 1.4 K uw ait (c) 2.1 United A rab Em irates (c) 2.2

(a) 97.6 (a) 35.0 73.0 7.8 20.5 (a) 23.3

1 ,648.0 4 3 4 .9 2 ,1 4 9 .7 2 1 2 .0 17.8 83.6

4 4 .9

780.6

C ore System Egypt Syria Jordan Israel Lebanon

O ther R egional Turkey

Population (in millions, 1990)

5 6 .7

Source: CIA World Factbook, 1990 (Washington, DC: 1990) Notes a GNP figures used instead of GDP. b Includes Palestinian population. c Includes expatriate and resident worker population.

G ulf region and limiting Iraqi influence. These goals have been pursued through a number of m eans, including m assive arms purchases and encouragem ent of internal instability in Iraq. The liberation of ‘A rabistan ’ (Khuzestan) has been a consistent part of Iraqi pan-A rabist rhetoric.32 Iraq used pan-Arab ideology as a rationale for settling nationalist and regional issues with Iran in 1 9 8 0 .33 The invasion of ‘A rabistan ,’ intended to be a rapid and decisive cam paign, w as astonish­ ingly unsuccessful, and dragged Iraq and Iran into an eight-year w ar of attrition which drove both states to near-bankruptcy.34 Although the Iran -Iraq W ar ended in 1988, no norm alization of rela­ tions or lasting peace followed. After the absorption of Kuw ait Iraq sur­ prised the rest of the w orld by proposing that Iran and Iraq exchange prisoners of w ar, accept the 1975 Algiers Agreement as the status quo, and retreat from occupied territories.35 During the G ulf W ar itself, Iraq used Iran as a sanctuary for both civilian and military aircraft, apparently antic­ ipating either use of Iranian airfields for military operations or return of the aircraft after the conflict.36 Iraq ’s strategic interest in the G ulf region increased with the expansion of oil production in the 1960s and the dram atic rise in oil prices after 19 7 3 .37 Grow ing Iranian military capabilities coupled with apparent hegemonic am bitions played a critical role in refocusing Iraqi strategic

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Table 4.2 Iraqi m ilitary expenditures, 1 9 4 8 -6 7 Year

Defense expenditure (millions o f current dinars) (a)

Defense expenditures (millions o f constant $1960) (b)

Defense expenditures as percentage o f G ross D om estic Produ ct (c )

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

6.0 6.6 7.0 7.7 11.8 15.2 16.7 17.2 2 5 .8 2 9 .7 31.0 35.8 4 2 .4 4 4 .8 48.2 58.3 66.1 80.6 83.9 83.8

13.5 18.8 2 1 .8 22.5 31.9 47.1 53.1 53.2 75.1 82.4 88.5 103.1 1 1 8 .7 123.5 132.2 153.6 181.2 223.1 2 3 2 .0 2 1 0 .8

4.4 5.6 4 .7 4.1 5 .7 6.5 6.0 6.7 7.1 6.9 6.9 8.3 7.9 8.8 8.5 8.4

Sources: a SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 204; SIPRI Yearbook 1974, p. 214. b SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69, p. 206. c SIPRI Yearbook 1973, p. 241.

priorities from the M iddle East to its eastern and southern borders.38 In the early 1970s, Iraq provided support for pro-B a’ath political groups in the m onarchies of the southern G ulf.39 The policy of ‘m oderation’ in the mid1970s, which w as so successful at propelling Iraq to a position of Arab leadership, included an acceptance of the A rab G ulf regimes and an end to support for subversion in the region. The Iran -Iraq W ar forced Iraq to rely on the G ulf states for financial support. Iran w as able to deny Iraq access to the G ulf as an oil shipping route, and the closure of the pipeline through Syria in April 1982 further crippled the Iraqi economy.40 Iraqi policy for the rest of the decade concen­ trated on access to the G ulf itself, either by arranging more favorable terms of Iraqi passage through the Shatt al-Arab (a cause of the Iran-Iraq W ar),41 or by expanding its coastline adjacent to the G ulf through lease or conquest from Kuw ait.42 Iraq ’s claim to Kuw ait, in particular, has been a fixture of Iraqi policy. In the late 1930s, Iraq ’s King Ghazi demanded that Kuw ait be absorbed

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into Iraq, a claim which lay dorm ant for some 20 years.43 After Kuw ait declared its independence in June 1961, then-President Q asim immediately proclaim ed that Kuw ait belonged to Iraq and threatened invasion. The Kuw aitis received prom pt m ilitary support from Britain, and a m ultina­ tional A rab force w as deployed in the autum n after Kuw ait w as accepted into the A rab League.44 In O ctober 1963, after Q asim w as overthrown by the military, K uw ait’s independence w as form ally recognized by Iraq. After the 1968 Revolution, Iraqi troops occupied a strip of territory on the border for alm ost a decade, with Kuw aiti requests for their w ithdrawal met by an Iraqi dem and for a lease on the W arbah and Bubiyan Islands.45 The G ulf W ar resulted, at least in part, from Iraq ’s continuing resentment of K uw aiti independence and desire for Kuw aiti territory. Iraq also desires a position of leadership and influence within the Arab community and the M iddle East. Iraq consistently sought to acquire or produce w eapons that allow ed it to strike Israel from Iraq. Israel m aintains a corresponding awareness of grow ing Iraqi military capabilities, in both the conventional arena (particularly after the Iran -Iraq War) and in the development of w eapons of m ass destruction.46 The raid on the O sirak nuclear reactor in 1981 effectively set back Iraqi nuclear w eapons develop­ ment by at least a decade. Saddam ’s fam ous statem ent of April 1, 1990, when he threatened to ‘m ake fire eat up half of Israel’ w as widely inter­ preted as a threat to use chemical w eapons.47 In the ideological sphere, Iraq offered a direct alternative to Egyptian leadership, particularly on the Palestine issue, and competed with Syria for leadership of the radical A rab factions.48 In M arch 1968, the Ninth N ational B a ’athist Conference resolved that ‘. . . the Palestinian movement w as the crucible of the A rab revolution and that the party m ust therefore exert all its energies in support of the m ovem ent.’49 The ideological struggle with Egypt for leadership of the A rab w orld appeared to have ended in Iraqi trium ph in N ovem ber 1 9 7 8 .50 The need for Egyptian support during the Iran -Iraq W ar, however, resulted in Iraq leading the effort to reincorporate Egypt back into the A rab w orld.51 The B a ’ath movement, originally centered in D am ascus, split in 1966 due at least in part to regional differences - Syrian B a ’athism focused on the W est, while Iraqi B a ’athism looked south and east.52 Relations with Syria soured after the Baghdad Summit Conference,53 and were further com plicated by the signing o f the Friendship Pact between the U SSR and Syria in 19 8 0 .54 Syrian support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq W ar not only broke the facade of A rab unity behind the Iraqi w ar effort, but also crip­ pled the Iraqi economy. Extra-regional objectives Iraq ’s desire to lead the A rab nation m anifested itself in what appeared before 1988 to be a set o f grandiose objectives: according to Saddam

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H ussein, ‘We w ant our country to achieve its proper weight based on our estim ation that Iraq is as great as China, as great as the Soviet Union, and as great as the United States.’55 The abrupt collapse of Iranian m orale and military capability in 1988 suddenly left Iraq, now dom inant in the region, in a position to pursue some of those objectives. In 1990, Saddam felt sufficiently confident of Iraqi pow er to threaten Israel with chemical attack, argue in front of the A rab Cooperation Council that Iraq w as a natural defender for the G ulf region, and declare that the US could be deterred from intervening in the region by the possi­ bility of taking substantial casualties.56 As events later proved, Iraq could not im pose its hegemony on the G u lf by force, and w as unable to expand its influence through military action.

Iraq’s military-industrial base Iraq had the m ost educated w orkforce in the A rab w orld in 1990.57 The literacy rate in Iraq is unusually high for an A rab state.58 The initial estab­ lishment o f a military-related scientific and technical infrastructure was assisted by a Palestinian consulting group called A rab Projects and Devel­ opm ent, which hired as many as 4,0 0 0 scientists and researchers to w ork in Iraq during the period 1 9 7 4 -7 6 , and designed a higher education system for the training of the future Iraqi elite. This higher education system helped the number of Iraqi students in technical fields to increase by 300 percent over the next decade to a total of 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 .59 Although few reliable num bers are available on Iraq ’s industrial w ork­ force, according to official figures there were approxim ately 170,000 industrial w orkers in 1 9 8 4 .60 By 1990, estim ates on the num ber of w orkers in Iraqi m ilitary industry alone ranged as high as 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .61 Even if m ost of these 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 jobs were created during the ‘boom years’ of 1 9 8 4 -8 9 , close to 40 percent of the Iraqi industrial labor force w as w orking in m ilitary industry. O f these, 2 0 ,0 0 0 w orked in the nuclear p rogram .62 In the w ords o f one regional expert, ‘ [W]hat w e’ve found is that Iraq now has the largest technical and scientific base in the M iddle East. I’d say Israel’s is qualitatively better, but in terms of num bers, Iraq is the largest.’63 For approxim ately a decade, the tw o m ost im portant government bodies with authority in the development of military industry were the M ilitary Industrialization Authority (MIA) and the State O rganization for Technical Industries (SO TI).64 The former body supervised the early ord­ nance factories and turnkey production sites, while the latter w orked on advanced technological and w eapons projects under the M inistry of Industry.65 Other military-industry related developments were supervised by the M inistry o f Defense through the Armed Forces W orkshops, which began m odifying arm ored vehicles in the second half of the Iran-Iraq W ar.66 All these efforts were eventually combined under the leadership of Hussein

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Iraq

Kam il and the M inistry of Industry and M ilitary Industrialization (MIMI) in the late 1980s. The range of authority of H ussein Kam il indicates the bureaucratic prim acy and overall im portance of the Iraqi m ilitary-industrial program . By A ugust 1990, M IM I w as the only office that could finance projects independently o f the Office of the President (Saddam H ussein).67 M IM I used all the resources at its disposal to continue procuring restricted technology until the start of the G ulf W ar, and its resources were form id­ able: ‘B aghdad uses aggressive covert techniques to acquire technology. The nuclear network - controlled by M IM I - uses Iraqi public sector enterprises, front com panies, foreign agents, and even civilian organi­ zations to procure technology.’68 M IM I was able to draw on both civilian and military-industrial resources, and had access to both legitimate and covert means of obtaining industrial technology. K am il’s new function included integrating all military and civilian industrial projects: this allowed unique opportunities for gaining access to Western technology.69 According to a July 1990 CIA report, M IM I supervised 2 5 -3 0 establishments producing primarily military supplies, spares, and w eapons.70 M IM I also controlled about 40 civilian ventures, including the Badush Dam , Petro-Chemical Com plex Tw o (PC-2), various fertilizer factories, and truck assembly plants.71 M ilitary and civilian pro­ curement were closely linked: ‘Their [MIMI] facilities w ork closely with civilian agencies to procure equipment and technology.’72 This included efforts to integrate specialty metals projects and civilian vehicle assembly lines to bolster tank, missile, and armored personnel carrier (APC) produc­ tion - an unusual and ambitious dual-use production effort.73 By 1990, it had become apparent that Iraq’s industrial acquisition program was explic­ itly tailored tow ards military ends: ‘many entities are false end-users, passing the materials acquired from foreign suppliers directly to enterprises involved in military projects, including chemical and biological w arfare’74 According to W estern intelligence sources, Baghdad had significant advantages in m aking this grandiose, but still substantial expansion of its defense industries a realistic goal, including cheap hydrocarbons, a positive long-term economic outlook, a large military establishm ent able to absorb high levels of production, an educated w orkforce, and a potential supply of custom ers on the export m arket for certain g o o d s.75 In just a decade, while fighting a m ajor regional conflict, Iraq had created a significant and, in some fields, technologically-sophisticated m ilitary-industrial base. This development will be discussed in tw o stages: the formative period of 1 9 7 4 -8 4 , and the m aturation stage of 1 9 8 4 -9 0 .

Embargo, diversification, and war: 1974-84 Iraq began acquiring large quantities of Soviet arms after the 1958 R evolu­ tion, when the new regime withdrew from the B aghdad Pact. Over the

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course of the next 15 years, B aghdad became dependent on Soviet supplies of arm s, spares, and m unitions.76 This grow ing dependence on Soviet arms disrupted Iraqi foreign and dom estic policies. In 1968, the Soviets used aid to the K urds as a bargaining chip for economic concessions from Iraq, and threatened to im pose an arm s em bargo on Iraq if the government did not negotiate with the K u rds.77 Although the Soviets supplied relatively m odern and sophisticated weaponry to Iraq, they im posed careful restric­ tions on m aintenance and training. Soviet technicians were the only per­ sonnel allow ed to m aintain and repair the m ost m odern equipment during the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 s.78 When the B a ’athist regime renewed arm ed conflict with the Kurds in 1974, the Soviets im posed an arms em bargo.79 The effects of this em bargo, combined with Iranian assistance to the Kurds, were extremely serious: By M arch 1975, ‘. . . [T]he situation became extremely dangerous when our m aterial and essential munitions cruelly began to run out. We had alm ost no more heavy artillery shells. O ur air force had only three bom bs left.’80 Once Iraq show ed proper deference, the Soviets immediately m oved to reestablish their arm s connection.81 The experience of em bargo encouraged Iraqi efforts to pursue both diversification of suppliers and indigenous pro­ duction o f some types of arm s.82 Iraqi arm s production, particularly of m unitions, began on a limited scale in 1 9 7 4 -7 5 .83 The first ‘turn-key’ pow der and propellant factories were delivered by the Soviets in 1 9 7 6 -7 8 .84 Iraq actively sought to decrease its dependency on the Soviet Union, turning to France as a supplier of arm s in a m ajor diversification

T able 4.3 Iraqi m ilitary expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 6 3 -7 3 Year

D efense D efense D efense expenditures expenditures expenditures (millions o f (millions o f a s current constant percentage $U S) $ 1972) o f G ross N ation al Product

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

171.99 2 3 8 .1 0 237 .7 5 235 .2 3 235.2 3 310.84 397.65 403 .2 5 491 .4 3 474.31 5 5 8 .1 4

2 1 7 .5 9 2 95.71 304.16 2 95.21 2 7 9 .0 3 382.38 4 7 6 .9 7 4 5 2 .5 4 4 8 9 .5 0 4 74.31 NA

10.22 12.49 11.36 10.46 10.25 12.34 14.76 13.60 13.44 1 2 .7 7 NA

Arm s im ports (millions o f current $US)

107.0 28.0 44.0 35.0 90.0 133.0 69.0 45.0 35.0 85.0 306.0

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1972)

145.9 37.6 58.0 44.9 111.8 158.9 78.6 48.6 36.2 85.0 2 8 9 .8

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effort. By 1979, Soviet supplies o f arm s to Iraq had dropped from 95 percent to 63 percent of total value of arms im ports. 85 Iraq also became a m ajor contributor to the A rab Industrialization O rganization in the m id-1970s, attem pting to use G ulf oil wealth and existing Egyptian m ilitary-industrial infrastructure to create a pan-Arab arms industry.86 Iraqi delegates declared at a U N Conference on Science and Technology in Vienna in 1979 that an objective for the year 2 0 0 0 was ‘[T]he development of the arm am ent industry in order to achieve self­ reliance and national security for both Iraq and the A rab w orld.’ 87 From 1 9 7 9 -8 3 , SO TI established a network for technology acquisition based on the existing Iraqi intelligence ap p aratu s. 88 The support of Iraqi intelligence for covert technology procurem ent efforts represented a critical enabling factor in Iraqi m ilitary-industrial policy. In 1980, Amer Rashid al-Ubeidi joined Amer H am m oudi al-Saadi at SO TI, and took charge of engineering projects and licensed production ventures with France. 89 SO TI supervised the Saad General Establishm ents, which built factories for mili­ tary purposes. 90 The State Establishm ent for Pesticide Production (SEPP) w as created in 1980 as a front for chemical w eapons production, and acted as the contracting agency for the Sam arra CW facility.91 The N A SSR State Establishm ent for M echanical Industries became the prim ary purchasing agent for missile technology and other military-industrial equipm ent.92 92

T able 4.4 Iraqi military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 7 2 -8 2 Year

D efense expenditures (millions o f current $US)

D efense D efense expenditures expenditures (millions o f as constant percentage $ 1981) o f G ro ss N ation al Product

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

734E 1,4 9 1 E 2,4 6 1 E 2,3 9 8 E 2,8 9 2 E 3,633E 4,0 2 0 E 5,1 4 7 E 8,658E 11,864E 11,689E

1,428E 2 ,7 4 6 E 4 ,1 6 8 E 3,723E 4 ,2 4 9 E 5 ,0 4 1 E 5 ,1 9 4 E 6,1 3 0 E 9,4 6 6 E 11,864E 11,026E

14.9 25.5 21.6 16.9 17.2 18.7 17.0 14.9 2 1 .7 48.2 4 6 .4

Arms im ports (millions o f current $US)

140 625 625 675 1,000 1,500 1,600 2 ,3 0 0 1,600 3,700 4 ,3 0 0

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 Note E = Estimate

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1981)

272 1,150 1,058 1,048 1,469 2,081 2 ,0 6 7 2 ,7 3 9 1,749 3,700 4 ,0 5 6

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127

By the m id-1980s, Iraq ’s declaratory intentions for the arms industry closely m irrored the classic rationale for L D C arms industrialization: use of the defense industry as a leading edge for advanced civilian industries and training; activation of associated industries such as chemicals and m etals; absorption/utilization of surplus labor; lower dependence and foreign exchange expenditure; acquire research and development skills and spinoffs for the civilian sector; minimize dependency and vulnerability to external actors; and reduce defense costs through local economies of scale and exports.93 Iraq placed special emphasis on security and secrecy of locally-developed defense item s.94 In September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. The im m ediate reaction of the Soviet Union w as to declare neutrality, and to im pose an arm s em bargo on both countries. According to then-Inspector General o f Iraqi Armed Forces General M ahm oud Tarek Shoukri, this em bargo did not have as severe an effect as the 1 9 7 4 -7 5 em bargo on Iraqi military capabilities: ‘Iraq had large stocks of spare parts and Soviet-calibre m unitions, and what we didn’t have on hand we were able to purchase elsewhere from Egypt and other A rab countries.’95 The second Soviet em bargo also spurred diversification efforts, as Iraq purchased arms from Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, E ast Germ any, Egypt, France, W est Germany, the United Kingdom , H ungary, Italy, Jordan, Libya, Poland, R om ania, Spain, and Switzerland during the 198 0 -8 2 period.96 The availability of Soviet-model equipment and spares from China, Egypt, and the W arsaw Pact states partially com pensated for the military effects of the Soviet em bargo. Iraq also purchased systems abroad which were designed to Iraqi specifications. The m ost prom inent of these w as the EE-T4 O gum arm ored gun system, which w as produced in Brazil for Iraqi requirements. Iraq also im ported the EE-3 and EE-9 arm ored/scout vehicles and the EE-11 wheeled arm ored personnel carrier from Brazil.97 Several years of w ar with Iran created significant financial instability. Although Baghdad had $35 billion in foreign currency reserves when the w ar began, these were exhausted by 19 8 3 .98 Oil production plummeted from approxim ately 3.48 million barrels per day in 1979 (the last pre-war year) to 0.92 million barrels per day in 1983, and oil exports were Iraq ’s prim ary foreign exchange earner.99 Iraq ’s military budget, however, remained at extremely high levels due to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1974-84 ‘Endurance’ requirements Iraq ’s turn-key munitions plants and rudimentary arm s production efforts in this period received relatively low priority and little positive press. According to a report on the arm s exhibition at Cairo in 1984

128

Iraq [M ]uch w as m ade of Iraq ’s appearance but the Iraqi booths were dom inated by giant pictures of Saddam H ussein and H osni M ubarak, which dw arfed a few artillery shells, land mines, and am m unition on display. Another Iraqi booth contained only autom obile tires. The Iraqi defense industry clearly has a long way to g o .100

Iraq ’s p oor showing at the C airo Exhibition in 1984 provided considerable incentive to increase indigenous efforts.101 It appears, judging by the expansion of production in the late 1980s, that m unitions production w as given increased priority after the initial stalem ate in the Iran-Iraq W ar. During the course o f the Iran-Iraq W ar, Iraqi engineers took increasing responsibility for maintenance and repair of various arm ored system s.102 Arm ored production, assem bly, and maintenance sites for the Iraqi armed forces have been identified at Al Ameen/Yusufiyah, Base W est W orld, Huteen, T aji, and Sam aw a.103 It is reported that during the early years of the Iran -Iraq W ar, Iraqi troops w ould abandon Chinese tanks that broke down, because they were cheaper to replace than to repair.104 M aintenance of the more com plex and higher-technology IQAF depended heavily on foreign advisors. When the Soviets im posed their em bargo on Iraq in 1980, they withdrew the technicians who serviced IQAF M iG -23s, and took the maintenance m anuals with them. This severely degraded the capabilities of the IQAFs best com bat aircraft.105 Shortly after Iraq negotiated the contract with D assault-M irage to pur­ chase M irage F-1 aircraft, it began negotiations to provide depot-level maintenance and engine overhaul in Iraq, but these services were not in place during the Iran-Iraq W ar.106 N on-platform weapons In August 1980, Iraq established the SAAD-13 project near M osul. This plant w as built by Thom son-CSF of France to produce military electronics.107 The entire output of the factory w as intended for military purposes, and by 1984 the plant w as assem bling m an-pack radios and other sophisticated products.108 In 1984, 2 5 0 of the total w orkforce of 3 ,0 0 0 were French ‘advisors.’109 M ajor w eapons platform s Iraq expressed interest in local m anufacture of aircraft as early as 1979, when it opened bidding on a contract for local production under license of advanced trainer aircraft.110 Iraqi interest in local m anufacture of advanced trainers continued through the Iran -Iraq W ar, and negotiations with British Aerospace were reported in 1 9 8 3 .111 Decisions on aircraft m anufac­ ture were postponed until after the Iran -Iraq W ar.

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Strategic systems Iraq is notorious for its use of chemical w eapons, first during the course of the Iran -Iraq W ar and later against Kurdish insurgents and civilians during ‘O peration A nfal’ in 1988. Up to 5,000 Kurds were killed in the chemical attack on H alab jah on February 26, 1 9 8 8 .112 It has been esti­ m ated that Iraqi chemical attacks caused 4 0 ,0 0 0 -5 0 ,0 0 0 Iranian casualties in the Iran-Iraq W ar including about 5,0 0 0 dead.113 This am ounted to approxim ately 5 percent of the estim ated one million Iranian military and civilian casualties.114 The basis of Iraq ’s CW industry w as laid in the Second Five Year Plan (1 9 7 6 -8 0 ), although it is likely that Iraqi interest in chemical weapons dates back at least to the 1 9 6 0 s.115 The principal CW production facility w as at the Sam arra com plex, identified as a ‘pesticide plan t’ under the authority o f the State Establishm ent for the Production o f Pesticides. Sam arra opened a production line for m ustard gas (HD) in September 1983, and its first reported use in battle w as in December of that year.116 N erve agents were used for the first time in response to the Iranian offen­ sive at M ajnoon Island in February 1 9 8 4 .117 Saddam H ussein w as reportedly a strong supporter o f CW production.118 After the destruction of the Tam m uz I reactor at O sriak on June 7, 1981 by the Israeli airforce, increased resources were m ade available for the production of CW agents.119 At this time, construction on the Salm an Pak facility w as also initiated, indicating serious interest in production of biological w arfare (BW) w eapons.120 Acquisition of nuclear w eapons constituted a critical part of Iraq ’s effort to become both the leading G ulf pow er and the leading A rab power. Iraq ’s pursuit of nuclear capability began in the 1960s, with the purchase o f an IR T -2000 research reactor from the Soviet Union, which became operational in 1 9 6 8 .121 The purchase of tw o nuclear reactors from France in 1976 provided the basis for a substantial nuclear w eapons program based on plutonium extraction.122 Purchase of the 30 Tam m uz research facility from Italy in 1978 (including special ‘hot cells’ for the extraction of plutonium ), tons o f natural uranium from N iger, Portugal, and Brazil, and o f the attem pted purchase of 2 5 ,0 0 0 pounds of depleted uranium from the W est Germ an firm N U K E M ensured that plutonium extraction could begin immediately when the O siraq reactor went on-line on July 1, 1 9 8 1 .123 The Israeli airforce destroyed the reactor on June 7, 1981.

Pragmatism and victory: 1984-90 The Iran -Iraq W ar did not go as planned. The initial blitzkrieg assault failed utterly, and the w ar rapidly deteriorated into a drawn-out attrition contest. Iraq w as forced to w ithdraw from Iranian soil by 1983, and fought a bloody defensive struggle in the northern m ountains and the

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outskirts of Basra for three years. Early in 1986, however, Iranian troops staged a surprise attack on the Al-Faw peninsula, seizing one of Iraq ’s few remaining ports and inflicting a serious defeat on Iraqi troops. Iraqi coun­ terattacks failed at a cost of thousands of casualties. M ore im portant for Saddam and Iraq, however, were the political ram i­ fications. Al-Faw w as not particularly vital for the Iraqi w ar effort, but its capture w as interpreted as a sign o f Iraqi weakness, and endangered lines of credit from W estern banks and G ulf states.124 France threatened to suspend transfers until Baghdad paid its outstanding debts.125 Local arms industry, therefore, received increased priority in Iraqi spending. Supply constraints only spurred Iraqi production efforts. For exam ple, threats to the supply of M irage F-1 and M iG -27 fighter-bombers provided incentive for accelerated development of Iraqi missile program s.126 Although IQAF strikes periodically targeted Tehran and other civilian centers, these attacks could only be carried out by M irages and M iG -27s, at a high risk o f losing skilled pilots and valuable aircraft. During M arch and April 1988, Iraq fired 203 missiles (all SCUD-B derivatives or m odifi­ cations produced indigenously) against residential areas and/or economic targets.127 These attacks produced just ten fatalities per missile (still three times greater than Germ an V-2 attacks in W orld W ar II), but had an enorm ous im pact on Iranian m orale, resulting in m ass evacuations of Tehran.128 Locally produced m issiles, therefore, successfully replaced much more com plex and sophisticated foreign w eapons for this m ission. The defense industries were reorganized in the 1 9 8 7 -8 8 period. Hussein

T able 4 .5 Iraqi military expenditures and arm s im ports, 1 9 8 1 -9 1 Year

D efense D efense D efense expenditures expenditures expenditures (millions o f (millions o f as current constant percentage $US) $ 1991) o f G ro ss N atio n al Product

Arm s im ports (millions o f current $US)

Arm s im ports (millions o f constant $1991)

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

6,780 11,290 13,870 16,520 12,470 13,780 13,930 13,740 11,020 11,890 9,459

4 ,3 0 0 7 ,1 0 0 6 ,9 0 0 9 ,2 0 0 4 ,9 0 0 6 ,0 0 0 5 ,9 0 0 5 ,4 0 0 2 ,3 0 0 2 ,8 0 0 0

6,419 9,981 9,320 1 1 ,9 0 0 6,113 7,289 6,947 6,123 2,495 2,912 0

1 0 ,1 2 0 15,870 18,740 2 1 ,3 6 0 15,560 16,750 16,400 15,580 11,960 12,370 9,459

2 5 .4 4 4 .7 39.1 44.3 37.9 4 7 .4 43.1 40.2 32.0 4 8 .0 74.9

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992

Iraq

131

Kam il, a cousin and brother-in-law to Saddam H ussein, w as assigned to SO TI in 1986 to w ork under al-Ubeidi.129 Kam il, a former bodyguard for Saddam H ussein, w as reportedly in charge o f the Special Security A ppar­ atus, also known as the Jihaz al-Amn al-K hass.130 In Jan uary 1987, Kamil became the new head of SO TI, and probably also of SEPP, combining two of the m ost im portant defense industrial agencies under his leadership.131 During 1987, SO TI became a full-fledged industrial ministry, and was renam ed the M ilitary Production Authority. Under K am il’s leadership, Iraqi m ilitary-industrial efforts became more efficient and productive. Increased authority w as given to project m anagers and priorities were focused on military requirements for the w ar against Iran and high technology research.132 Streamlined procedures allow ed new developmental efforts to be started alm ost immediately in response to requests from field comm anders. . . . Because of the war, all of us were in a hurry, and this allow ed us to cut red tape. For instance, we perform ed no feasibility studies in the norm al sense. Because we are all fighters we know the end-use of our w eapons . . . Sometimes a simple telephone call between a military user and m yself can get the process going . . . while some of us w ork on building a prototype, others begin designing production tools, etc.133 Prioritization of effort also increased the near-term im pact of Iraqi m ilitary-industrial production. H ussein Kam il inherited over 80 different m ilitary-industrial projects, many o f which overlapped each other and com peted for resources.134 One of K am il’s first actions in early 1987 was to give al-Saadi $400 million to expedite ballistic missile development.135 In A ugust 1987, the Al-Hussein missile w as successfully tested, suggesting that the additional funding m ay have paid quick dividends.136 Kam il also emphasized self-sufficiency. After the M ilitary Production Authority absorbed some of the Armed Forces W orkshops from the M inistry of Defense in 1987, W estern technicians at these facilities noticed that Iraqi engineers insisted on perform ing maintenance and repair w ork themselves, including rebuilding engines of arm ored vehicles and m odify­ ing Soviet and Chinese tanks with W estern electronics.137 Early in 1988, defense industrial structure w as shuffled yet again: the new M inistry of Industrialization and M ilitary Industrialization (M IM I) w as formed from the M inistry of Heavy Industry, and K am il’s M ilitary Production Authority.138 H ussein Kam il w as now in charge of Iraq ’s entire industrial apparatus, as well as heading pow erful Iraqi security/intelligence agencies which engaged in covert technology acquisition. By 1990, Kam il had appropri­ ated the Technical Corps for Special Projects from the M inistry o f Oil, and in O ctober 1990 he became the Acting M inister of O il.139 The CIA report ‘Iraq ’s Grow ing Arsenal: Program s and Facilities’ (July 1990) identified the

132

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State Establishm ent for Oil Refining and G as Processing as ‘. . . a dedicated front for procuring chemical w eapons related com ponents and production equipm ent.’140 Kam il therefore absorbed and dom inated all the diverse ele­ ments of the Iraqi m ilitary industrial apparatus, from foreign espionage to actual production - a situation which both centralized and consolidated industrial efforts and provided him personally with a pow erful domestic political and economic base. In M ay 1989, Kam il proclaim ed that Iraq w as implementing a defense industrial program intended to provide all of Iraq ’s basic industrial sup­ plies from indigenous sources.141 Other intelligence reports from the summer o f 1990 highlight Iraqi am bitions: ‘President Saddam Hussein apparently believes an expanded arm s industry will enhance Iraqi prestige and help solve security problem s identified during the w ar such as lack of reliable arm s supplies.’142

Selected indigenous arms programs: 1984-90 ‘Endurance’ requirements Iraq reportedly grew desperately short of am m unition after the Faw cam ­ paign in early 1986, and spent hundreds o f millions of dollars on emer­ gency procurem ent.143 This shortage spurred efforts to upgrade munitions production to ensure adequate reserves. As early as 1986, Western observers noticed that Iraq w as using larger quantities of home-built m unitions.144 Prior to the Persian G u lf W ar, Iraq possessed at least 19 state-run plants m anufacturing ordnance and artillery.145 These plants were con ­ trolled by SO TI, and their products included variants of the R PG -7 anti­ tank grenade launcher, hand grenades, and anti-personnel and anti-tank m ines.146 A lso, 7.65 mm pistols (Type 951 ), 9 mm pistols (Type 70), and a number o f Y ugoslav sm all arm s were produced under license, along with the the A l-Q adisiyaa 7.62 mm X 54 sharpshooter rifle (derived from the Soviet D ragounov), illum inator pistols, and 2 5 0 kg and 500 kg aircraft bom bs.147 Iraq exhibited a variety of indigenously produced light arm s and m unitions at C airo in N ovem ber 1987, including aerial bom bs, sniper rifles and K alash n ikovs.148 Iraq also reportedly developed anti-air­ craft artillery, including a seven barreled 3 0 m m gun and a ‘special’ 5 7 m m gun .149 Iraqi ordnance factories produced amm unition for all o f the w eapons listed above, as well as amm unition for 7.62 mm X 39 small arm s, 12.7m m and 14.5 mm machine guns, and 23 m m and 30 mm autom atic cannons.150 In addition, Iraqi m ilitary industries were reportedly capable of producing fuel-air explosives (F A E s)151 and cluster bom bs,152 and were developing infrared and television guided air-to-ground bom bs.153 Iraq also m anufac­ tured several varieties of naval m ines.154 By 1987, Iraq had become

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133

‘self-sufficient in amm unition, artillery am m unition, aircraft bom bs, m ortar bom bs, R PG s, rockets, tube-launched rockets, and m ortars.’155 By 1989, Iraq reportedly produced all m ortars and m ortar ammunition used by the m ilitary.156 At an arm s exhibition in Cairo in N ovem ber 1987, Iraq dem onstrated indigenously produced 60 mm, 81m m , and 120 mm m ortars and am m unition.157 High-explosive, sm oke, and chemical rounds for both m ortars and artillery were produced indigenously, and Iraq was reportedly self-sufficient in m ost types of artillery projectiles, charges, and fuses.158 According to Christopher Cowley, an engineer who w orked for G erald Bull upgrading and im proving Iraqi artillery capabilities, Iraq was self-sufficient in production of shells, propellant, fuses, explosives, and replacement barrels before the G ulf W ar.159 Other amm unition types produced included 100m m , 122m m , 130m m , 152m m , and 155m m shells.160 Perhaps the m ost interesting advance in Iraqi m unitions production is the evidence that they were developing a depleted uranium anti-tank round. U N S C O M inspections discovered some evidence that the Iraqis were experimenting with uranium to produce armor-piercing projectiles.161 According to W estern reports, the US sold specialized machinery to Iraq, which permitted it to build a factory to produce tungsten-carbide tool bits. These bits are used by the military for cutting and shaping depleted uranium flechettes for anti-tank roun ds.162 Iraq could obtain depleted uranium from its illicit nuclear program . N on-platform weapons Iraq showed great interest in m odern artillery, due in part to the doctrinal emphasis on firepower. In 1986, Iraq began producing the D -30 122 mm gun under license from Y u goslavia.163 A steel-forging plant w as under development at T aji in 1990 which w ould eventually be capable o f p ro­ ducing over 1,000 gun barrels per year (105 mm to 203 mm bores).164 Dr. G erald Bull provided Iraq with Extended-Range Full-Bore Base-Bleed (ERFB-BB) technology, which substantially increased the range of Iraqi 155m m guns.165 Dr. Bull assisted the Iraqis in m odifying 130m m D-46 Soviet/Chinese field guns to 155 mm, using barrels purchased abroad and then finishing the machining in-country. This substantially increased the range and destructiveness of the D -46.166 Iraq also began development and production o f the m assive Superguns. These were designed by G erald Bull on the basis of his experience in the US ‘H A R P ’ project and on surviving design plans for W orld W ar II Germ an V-3 long-range gun. The Supergun project, known as ‘Project Babylon,’ w as intended to produce an experim ental 3 5 0 m m prototype and tw o or more 1,000 m m guns with ranges of hundreds of kilom eters. The purpose of these guns is still unclear. There is some speculation that they were intended for use as satellite launchers, but they were also capable of

134

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firing enorm ous shells carrying large quantities of chemical and or biologi­ cal agents.167 The 3 5 0 m m gun w as theoretically capable of being moved about on its railw ay car, but the 1,000 mm guns were im m obile.168 Other analysts, however, report that the w eapons had a theoretical rate o f fire o f tw o rounds per minute, and that the initial tests o f the 350 mm prototype indicate that the guns were clearly designed as w eapons.169 Bull also reportedly began design of tw o more mobile, but still immense, artillery pieces for Iraq: a 350 mm gun with a 100 foot barrel, and a 600 mm w eapon with a 2 0 0 foot barrel. Both of these guns w ould have barrels which could be trained and elevated, substantially im proving accuracy and permitting engagement of a wider range of potential targets.170 Iraq used multiple-rocket launchers of Soviet design for both conven­ tional and chemical attacks. The M -87 system, at least portions of which were produced in Iraq before the first G ulf W ar, had tw o different configurations.171 The Ababil 50, in service with the Iraqi Army, w as a 262 mm rocket with a range of 50 km and a 95 kg w arhead. The system w as report­ edly capable o f carrying cluster and minelet w arheads as well as conven­ tional high explosive.172 The A babil 100, which w as under development, w as a 4 0 0 mm rocket with a 100 km range, also capable of carrying cluster and minelet m unitions.173 R eports after the G ulf W ar indicated that Ababil 100 rocket m otor production might have been resumed by the Iraqis.174 Iraq also purchased the sophisticated Brazilian A ST R O S II system .175 The Iraqis were im pressed with the high accuracy of the A ST R O S system, and provided both funding and development assistance to the project.176 Iraq m anufactured rockets for the system under license, called the Sijeel 30, 40, and 6 0 .177 The Laith battlefield rocket is probably an upgrade of the venerable Soviet F R O G (Free R ocket Over Ground) rocket, and w as in service with the Iraqi military before the G ulf W ar.178 A 5 5 0 m m rocket with a range o f 90 km, the Laith could carry conventional, cluster, or chemical w arheads.179 Iraq pursued a number of other short-range missile system s, m any of which were m odifications of Soviet surface-to-air m issiles. The K assir (reported 150 km range), Al-Rashid (reported 25 km range) and N issan ‘April 2 8 ’ (reported 1 1 0 k m range) were displayed at the Baghdad Arms Exhibition in M ay 1 9 8 9 .180 Other reports mention the B arak (an SA-3 variant), and other variants based on Soviet SAM s including the Fahd (SA1), the N issan (SA-2), and the K assir (SA-6).181 Iraq also m ay have gained access to data and plans for the Brazilian Piranha air-to-air missile. The team o f Brazilian rocket scientists working in Iraq from 1 9 8 9 -9 0 had extensive experience with the Piranha project, and Iraq reportedly expressed interest in acquiring blueprints for the system. It is also reported that a m ultinational team including Iraqi, Brazil­ ian, French, Germ an, Argentine, and Egyptian technicians had been w orking on an air-to-air missile called the ‘A l-Taq-H am ’.182

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135

The FAO-1 anti-ballistic missile w as displayed at Baghdad in 1989, where it w as reported that the missile had completed tw o successful test firings against incoming m issiles.183 Despite the considerable propaganda value o f this launch, it is clear that the Fao-1 test w as rigged. There is no evidence that the FAO-1 w as used during the G ulf W ars, and the missile itself reportedly bore a striking resemblance to the Soviet-designed SA-2 surface-to-air m issile.184 ELECTRO N ICS

The proportion of French technicians to Iraqi engineers at the SAAD-13 com plex dropped from 2 50 out of 3,0 0 0 in 1984 to a mere 20 advisors in 1989, evidence that m ost of the skills necessary for licensed production had been transferred successfully to the Iraqi w orkforce.185 By 1989, other new projects and production lines included SD E-125/552 H F portable transceivers (specifically dow n-graded from French requirements to make them more ‘grunt-resistant’),186 m icrowave and hybrid circuits, and com ­ ponents for various com m unications equipment and rad ars.187 An addi­ tional plant w as established at M ansur to produce other defense electronics.188 C ooperation with Thom son-CSF continued up until the G ulf W ar, and included licensed production of the Tigre early warning radar used on the Baghdad and Adnan AEW aircraft discussed later in this chapter. M odification TA NKS AND O TH ER ARM O RED VEHICLES

Self-propelled heavy m ortars, based on Soviet tracked vehicles (with four 120 mm m ortars) and E ast Germ an EFA 10-ton trucks (carrying 12 160 mm m ortars), were assem bled in Iraq. Another local m odification project w as a self-propelled 160 mm m ortar m ounted on a modified T-54 tank chassis.189 T an k m odification program s were reported as early as 1986, which attem pted to im prove obsolescent T -54/55/59 tanks which m ade up the bulk of the Iraqi tank force. M odified T-54/55 tanks were displayed at the Baghdad Arms Exhibition in M ay 1989 with a retrofitted 125 mm gun, and others were provided with applique arm or.190 This applique arm or w as an Iraqi product, m ade of sandwiched layers of steel and rubber.191 The problem s of putting a 125 mm gun in a turret ring designed for a 100 mm gun were not discussed - but it seems highly doubtful that this m odification could have been anything but a catastrophe. One report states that T-55s were assem bled in Iraq, and that other m odernization projects were underway there.192 Am ong these other pro­ jects were the retrofitting of Delft night vision equipment, and possibly of

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W estern fire control system s.193 These m odifications and improvements were apparently m ade at Iraqi Armed Forces depots, which were trans­ ferred to the authority of M IM I in 1 9 8 7 -8 8 . Iraq bought large numbers of Chinese T-59 and T-69 tanks during the Iran-Iraq W ar. Chinese-built T-59 tanks, an inferior copy of the T-55, were reportedly retrofitted with a 105 mm L 7 gun.194 Others had applique arm or fitted to provide additional protection against R PG and other infantry-carried anti-tank w eapons.195 Type 69 tanks were m odified with W estern rangefinders or applique arm or.196 It is reported, however, that m ost of the Iraqi tanks destroyed during the G u lf W ar were standard Soviet m odels, indicating that m odification program s were not actually fielded in great num bers.197 Iraq exhibited modified versions of the Soviet BMP-1 Arm ored Infantry Fighting Vehicle at the Baghdad Arms Exhibition. One report states that the vehicles were being produced under license.198 M odifications included replacing the m ain arm am ent, attachm ent of applique arm or to increase protection, and removal of the turret to m ake an am bulance version.199 AIRCRAFT

The poor showing of the IQAF in the 1 9 8 0 -8 4 period inspired techno­ logical innovation in several areas: first, to provide the IQ A F with cap ­ abilities which it needed but lacked; second, to acquire significant battlefield strike and interdiction capabilities for the ground forces which did not require use of the IQ AF; and third, to provide long-range strike capabilities which did not risk aircraft losses. Iraq modified existing aircraft in IQ A F inventory to improve perform ­ ance or provide capabilities which did not exist in Iraq and which could not be procured from abroad. Exam ples of this include the development of a laser-guided bom bing system which com bined French and Soviet tech­ nologies for the M irage F-1 fighter200 and the equipment of Soviet M iG2 3 /2 7 aircraft with refueling probes.201 Unsatisfied with the perform ance of Soviet A A M s, Iraq modified its large M iG -21 fleet (reportedly with Pak­ istani assistance) to carry French M atra 550 and 530 A A M s.202 Iraq also reportedly m odified An-12 and Il-76 aircraft as air-to-air refueling tankers.203 These m odifications provided the IQAF with im proved longrange strike capabilities and air-to-air com bat perform ance. The m ost am bitious Iraqi aircraft program s were the Baghdad and A dnan AEW , designed to cover gaps in the Iraqi air defense system. They required the integration of W estern and Soviet systems originally designed for other purposes to fill a distinct Iraqi requirement. According to some reports, the Baghdad and A dnan projects had significant Indian involve­ ment, suggesting a case of possible collaboration between tw o LD C industries.204 The Baghdad 1 w as unveiled at the Baghdad Arms Exhibition in M ay

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1989. It com prised a locally built Thom son-CSF Tigre-2 surveillance radar (m anufactured under license in Iraq in a ground-based configuration) posi­ tioned in a radom e under the rear o f the fuselage of a Soviet Il-76 Candid transport aircraft.205 The radar reportedly had greater than 180 degrees of scan, and could detect, track, and identify targets within a 350 km range.206 The B aghdad 1, according to some reports, w as used opera­ tionally in the last stages of the Iran -Iraq W ar.207 During the Baghdad arm s exhibition in 1989, H usayn Kam il, director o f M IM I, stated that an upgraded version w as in development. The ap p ar­ ent intention w as to add a fighter control capability, thereby providing more than just an AEW platform .208 The im proved version, known as the Adnan-1, had a rotodom e over the fuselage, and resembled the Soviet ‘M ain stay’ AEW version of the Il-76 C andid.209 R ad ar detection range was reported to be ‘several hundred kilom eters.’210 A second version, called the Adnan-2, w as test-flown shortly before the G ulf W ar, and w as reported to be more difficult to detect with rad ar.211 According to US sources at the beginning of O peration Desert Storm , the IQAF possessed at least three Baghdad/A dnan aircraft. One of these w as destroyed at Al T aqqadu m air­ field on Jan uary 23, 1991, and the other tw o flew to sanctuary in Iran later that m onth.212 The Baghdad and Adnan were designed to fill gaps in the Iraqi Integ­ rated Air Defense System (IADS). This system w as equipped with a m ix of standard Soviet and French system s, including some ground-based Tiger-G surveillance radars (called the SD A -G in Iraqi service) produced under license in Iraq.213 The IADS w as designed to protect against a modest-sized regional attack by Israel or Iran, and w as quickly overwhelmed by C oali­ tion air attacks in the G ulf W ar.214 The Baghdad and Adnan had no im pact on the air balance in the G ulf W ar.215 M ajor w eapons platform s ARM O RED VEHICLES

In 1989, Iraq unveiled the first prototype o f the ‘A ssad Babil’ (Lion of Babylon) tank, a derivative of the Soviet T -72.216 The agreement to produce the T-72 w as reportedly reached with the Soviets in 1986, and the tank w as initially assem bled in Iraq, with production o f some components beginning in 19 8 9 .217 The gun barrel and breach were eventually m ade in Iraq, along with parts of the turret and some electrical com ponents.218 It is possible, given reports of the T-55 upgrade program s, that signific­ ant portions of the T -7 2 ’s turret, rangefinder and m ain arm am ent were produced or assem bled in Iraq - or at least that Iraq had contracted to acquire those production capabilities. O perational experience indicates that Soviet tank guns w ear out quickly in com bat.219 Dom estic production o f gun tubes facilitates quick replacement and restoration to full com bat

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capability. Iraqi plants also carried out maintenance o f T -72s, and m anu­ factured some parts for their repair.220 According to Lt. General Amer al Saadi, the percentage of indigenous content in the A ssad Babil w as approxim ately 3 0 -4 0 percent value added, prim arily because of the high price of the electrical com ponents.221 According to some reports, Iraq resumed production o f the A ssad Babil after the first G ulf W ar.222 Iraq also attem pted to develop sophisticated self-propelled (SP) artillery. At the Baghdad Arms Exhibition of 1989, Iraq unveiled tw o new SP artillery pieces, designed with the assistance o f D r. Bull:223 the AlM ajnoon, a 155 mm gun-howitzer, which strongly resembled the South African G-6 SP howitzer; and the Al-Fao, a 210 mm gun-howitzer with a potential range of over 50 km .224 AIRCRAFT

After prolonged negotiation (including the rescheduling of paym ents for Iraq ’s form idable debt paym ents to France),225 a protocol for $6.5 billion w as signed with D assault, Thom son-CSF, and Snecma on M arch 21, 1989 for cooperation on the construction of maintenance and assem bly facilities for French aircraft in Iraq. The FA O project, originally known as Saad-25, called for the delivery of 54 M irage-2000 fighter-bombers, the construc­ tion of depot-level maintenance facilities (including engine overhaul) for IQAF M irage F-1s in Iraq, and the complete tooling and kits for 134 Alphajet trainers.226 According to a 1989 interview with Lt. Gen. Amer R ashid al-Ubaidi, Iraq intended to build an aircraft industry, and chose the advanced trainer as the first step which w as both sophisticated and realistically within Iraq ’s industrial capacity.227 This w as confirmed by comments from General H usayn Kam il H assan , director o f Iraq ’s M inistry of Industry and M ilitary Industrialization, shortly before the Baghdad Exhibition in 1989: We are negotiating with the Soviet Union and France to build up our own advanced jet . . . clearly Iraq is not able to produce such an air­ craft, though it is determined to urgently build a plant.228 Iraq also sought to design or license-produce an attack helicopter.229 As evidence of their continuing interest in indigenous helicopter program s (maintenance, development, and/or production), the Iraqis established the Al-Furnas helicopter maintenance and development center at M usayib after the end of the G ulf W ar, despite the U N em bargo.230

The 1990s: what might the industry have looked like? The G ulf W ar, 13 years of economic sanctions and arms em bargo, and O peration Iraqi Freedom effectively destroyed the Iraqi arm s industry. An

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intriguing question, however, is how Iraq ’s industry might have evolved if Saddam had not invaded Kuw ait. The following pages suggest that struc­ tural and financial obstacles w ould have kept Iraq from achieving some of its more grandiose am bitions, but that in fact the Iraqi military industry w as capable of considerable achievements that might have contributed significantly to Iraq ’s military capability - if it could have avoided provok­ ing the US and the international community. The Iran -Iraq W ar ended in stalem ate in 1988, although Saddam H ussein could claim a Pyrrhic victory by forcing Iran off Iraqi soil. Iraq, which had begun the w ar with $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves, w as approxim ately $ 7 0 -8 0 billion in debt.231 In addition, as a result of the w ar Iraq had suffered approxim ately 3 7 5 ,0 0 0 casualties.232 Econom ists and defense analysts assum ed that Iraq w ould enter into a period of lower defense spending and place a high priority on rebuilding dam aged eco­ nom ic infrastructure and civilian development projects. In fact, Iraq did not release significant numbers o f men from military service in 1989, and the military budget did not decline appreciably.233 Iraq ’s 1990 military budget w as $12.9 billion, or approxim ately $700 per citizen in a country where the average annual income w as $1,950. By m id-1990, Iraq had only enough cash reserves for three months of im ports and an inflation rate of 4 0 % . If not rescheduled, the required annual principal and interest paym ents on the non-Arab debt alone w ould have consum ed more than half of Iraq ’s estim ated $13 billion 1989 oil revenue. D ebt service in subsequent years w ould have had an equally deleterious effect.234 Despite these hard economic facts, military industrialization received the highest possible priority after the war. Iraq pursued both open arm s deals and also covert purchases in an effort to acquire sophisticated defense technologies as rapidly as possible. Iraq ’s efforts to secure unconventional w eapons, intended to deter US interference in the region and to influence the Arab-Israeli struggle, expanded perceptibly. The US Custom s Service detected increased efforts to procure missile, chemical and biological, and fuse technology.235 Iraqi spending on military industry and covert efforts to acquire techno­ logy and industrial capabilities accelerated rapidly even as im ports o f fin­ ished w eapons were decreasing.236 Iraq w as announced its intention to invest $20 billion in the establishm ent of the m ilitary-industrial base.237 Iraq ’s efforts to achieve m ilitary-industrial self-sufficiency elicited grudging respect and concern in W estern intelligence circles: ‘Although Iraq ’s states goals are alm ost certainly over am bitious, we believe the regime recognizes its lim itations and holds m ore pragm atic aspirations in private.’238 The difficulties faced by W estern export licensing agencies in the face of a coordinated policy of illegal acquisition were form idable, and were

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exacerbated by bureaucratic infighting and policy debates.239 In the words of Representative Annunzio of Illinois: Even though the United States had severe restrictions on sending carbon-fiber technology abroad, Iraq w as able to obtain glass-fiber technology through the United States export licensing process. The glass-fiber debacle dram atically illustrates how President Bush’s m andate to increase trade with Iraq w as at odds with the policy of limiting proliferation. Iraq ’s military industrialization strategy of m ixing military and civilian production within the same com plexes repeatedly caused nightm ares within the export licensing process.240 The Al-Arabi trading netw ork received over $1 billion in funds from Banco N ationale Lavoro-A tlanta, m ost of which w as spent on high prior­ ity projects including ballistic m issiles, the Supergun, and nuclear w eapons technology.241 The H ouse Banking Com mittee, which investigated BN LAtlanta stated that: The Banking Com m ittee’s investigation of B N L show that much of the $2.155 billion in loans provided to the M inistry of Industrialization and M ilitary Industrialization . . . were utilized to purchase military [sic] useful technology from the United States and Europe. B N L funds were used to purchase equipment for the new Condor II missile, the SCUD missile m odifications, the short-range A babil rocket, the 2 1 0 m m and the 155m m howitzer, Gerald Bull’s supercannon . . . sophisticated night vision equipment, and an artillery fuze factory.242 In addition to the sheer bureaucratic size and authority of the militaryindustrial infrastructure, and the close linkage with national intelligence and security services which permitted successful technology acquisition, a final indicator of the im portance o f the m ilitary-industrial effort is the am ount of money and trained m anpow er it required. The Iraqis spent $14.2 billion in 1 9 8 5 -8 9 on industrial technology, alm ost all of which had military applications.243 T o put this in perspective, according to US esti­ m ates Iraq spent approxim ately $24.5 billion on arm s im ports from 1 9 8 5 -8 9 . T otal im ports of all goods am ounted to $48.324 billion, so the percentage of total im ports spent on arm s is 50.8 percent for this five-year period.244 Im ports of defense-related m anufacturing technology therefore am ounted to 2 9 .4 percent o f total im ports in this period. This is an enorm ­ ous expenditure on industrial infrastructure during a period o f continuing high-intensity conflict, and is equivalent to 21.8 percent of the estimated military budget for these years.245 According to Kenneth Tim m erm an, Iraq spent the equivalent o f nearly $3 billion each year from 1 9 8 4 -8 9 on W estern technology, and evidence indicates that procurem ent w as increased even as a prim ary source of

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funds (BN L-A tlanta) w as shut down by Federal investigation. Infrastruc­ ture w as being acquired at a furious rate, but trained personnel did not exist to utilize it properly. In both missile and chemical w eapons facilities, sophisticated machinery remained out o f operation because the people with the skills or experience to fix it were in other sectors of the defense industry.246 The nuclear program had priority over all others, and this pri­ ority w as increased after the initial discoveries of Supergun parts in Europe.247 Iraq created a m ilitary-industrial policy that it lacked the econom ic and technological resources to support. Ira q ’s priorities lay in the uncon­ ventional w eapons field, and were very close to fruition. The prim ary capabilities of the Iraq ’s m ilitary industry, it appears, w ould have been m ost efficiently focused on unconventional w eaponry or endurance requirem ents. M odification p rogram s and m ajor w eapons platform s were excessively dem anding in term s o f both technical skills and finan­ cial resources, and unnecessary for Ira q ’s short-term security needs. They did, however, provide useful p rop agan d a, and had som e prestige value for the regime. Iraq ’s defense industry proved surprisingly resilient after the G ulf W ar. Early in the G ulf Crisis, a Congressional defense expert expressed disdain for the Iraqi military-industrial capability: ‘A strike against Iraq using ground-hugging cruise missiles could destroy all of that country’s m ajor defense industries within h ou rs.’248 In fact, Iraqi military industry w as subjected to considerably more intense bom bardm ent than a single salvo of cruise m issiles. Iraq ’s militaryindustrial capability w as a target for m assive Coalition airstrikes during the G ulf W ar, and much of their m anufacturing capability w as degraded, if not destroyed.249 By the end of the w ar, military production facilities had been severely dam aged. At least 30 percent of Iraq ’s conventional w eapons produc­ tion capability, which m ade sm all arm s, artillery, small- and largecaliber am m unition, electronic and optical systems, and repaired arm ored vehicles, w as dam aged or destroyed.250 Coalition air operations, however, failed to take into account the poten­ tial im pact of Iraqi m ilitary industry after the w ar’s term ination phase.251 The initial strategic bom bing plan, codenam ed ‘Instant Thunder,’ desig­ nated 84 strategic targets which, if severely punished, w ould theoretically degrade Iraq ’s military capability to wage offensive operations.252 Only 15 so-called ‘m ilitary support’ facilities were included in the target list, which focused on electrical plants, com m unications, and leadership targets. By Jan uary 15, 1991, 62 ‘military support’ targets had been selected. M ost of the industrial targets selected, however, were missile or unconventional w eapon-related.253 These targets had priority not only because o f the harm

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they m ight do to Coalition forces, but also in order to reduce Iraq ’s long­ term threat to the G ulf and M iddle E ast.254 The air cam paign differed from previous strategic air cam paigns in several w ays. O perations focused on degrading rather than destroying enemy capability.255 In Desert Storm , the overarching objective of the strategic portion of the air cam paign w as som ew hat different . . . [from the Second W orld War] . . . Instead of attacking the vital elements o f w ar production . . . the principal threat of the ‘strategic’ effort against Iraq seems to have been to inhibit and paralyze the very functioning of the Iraqi govern­ ment and its m ilitary forces.256 Iraq ’s w eapons o f m ass destruction (W M D) and missile infrastructure were high priority targets. Iraq ’s conventional military industries, however, received a much lower priority than in previous strategic bom bing cam ­ paigns. As a result, Iraq m aintained significant military capabilities in the post-G ulf W ar period despite a continuing U N em bargo.257 The survival of Iraq ’s conventional military industry reflects, in part, the short w ar focus of the Coalition leadership, and the lack of an overall political strategy. Saddam retained the military assets necessary to reassert and retain control of the country. Iraq m ade a substantial effort to relocate and/or conceal existing m anu­ facturing capabilities before the w ar broke out, and that the restoration of munitions and w eapons production w as a high priority in Iraqi rebuilding efforts after the end of the conflict.258 In 1992, Director of Central Intelli­ gence R obert G ates, told the H ouse Armed Service Committee that Iraq claim ed to have repaired ‘ . . . nearly 2 00 m ilitary industrial buildings and w as in the process of repairing m any others.’259 Iraqi Prime M inister M uham m ad al-Zubaydi told a visiting Greek delegation in A ugust 1992 that Iraq succeeded in reconstructing 87 percent of its factories, institu­ tions, and w eapons projects and w as em barking on ‘new, giant strategic projects.’260 After the G ulf W ar, a considerable portion of the defense industry w as reconstituted, although it operated at low productivity due to lack of machinery, spare parts, and other resources.261 Dozens o f plants resumed operating, as equipment stored before the G ulf W ar w as m oved back into facilities.262 The status o f m ajor conventional w eapons plants is uncertain, partly because m any which were known to exist (primarily small arms facilities) had not been located before the conflict. Thirty-three conven­ tional facilities had been identified before the G u lf W ar. As of the mid1990s, the status o f 19 were unknown. Ten were functioning or partly functioning, one w as rebuilt but possibly still not functional, tw o were heavily dam aged, and one w as non-functioning.263 Am ong the functioning plants were the Hutteen explosives com plex, the Al Ameen, Base West

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W orld, and T aji arm ored vehicle plants, the Salah-al-Din electronics facil­ ity, and the Saad 38 munitions plant at N ah raw an, which produced FAEs, cluster m unitions, and critical parts for artillery shells before the G ulf W ar.264 The im portance of the surviving arm s facilities, particularly those dedic­ ated to m unitions production, should not be underestimated. Iraq was subject to international em bargo for over 12 years from 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 . In that period, it had no access to any legitimate supplies of small or medium arm s amm unition, but w as still able to undertake substantial, multi-divi­ sion level cam paigns against both Shi’ite and Kurdish rebels. Some crucial equipment, especially for air defenses, w as sm uggled through the U N em bargo.265 If Iraq were depending purely on smuggling, however, this level of activity could have led to shortages of critical munitions and corre­ sponding changes in military operations, including the risk of higher casu­ alties in an already demoralized army. Recent military operations in Iraq suggest that Iraqi munitions plants m ay have continued functioning throughout the sanctions period. Several months after O peration Iraqi Freedom , American and allied units reported the existence of m assive, unsecured w eapons dum ps. Early reports spoke of 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 tons of m unitions in Iraq.266 Other reports speak of more than one million tons of m unitions.267 In com parison, the US armed forces p o s­ sessed 1.8 million tons of munitions in 2 0 03 for a much larger, more sophisticated military force.268 The sheer quantities of munitions available, after 13 years of arms em bargo, suggest that Iraqi military industries either had produced or were producing significant quantities of munitions for Iraqi use. These w eapons, regrettably, remain available for insurgents and opponents of the emerging new Iraqi government - a continuing legacy of Saddam ’s m ilitary-industrial ambitions.

The enduring puzzle: Iraq’s strategic weapons M uch of our knowledge regarding Iraq ’s w eapons of m ass destruction comes from the inspections carried out after the first G ulf W ar by the United N ations Special Com m ission (U N SC O M ), established under U N Security Council Resolution 687, and tasked with uncovering Iraq ’s various unconventional w eapons program s. U N SC O M w as created under the assum ption that its m ission w ould be over quickly. Instead, it became an extraordinarily pow erful organization drawing on resources from a number of national intelligence agencies, tasked with breaking down an extremely effective and well-funded Iraqi deception effort. From 1 9 9 1-98, U N SC O M carried out inspections of Iraqi facilities under increasingly strenuous conditions, including escalating Iraqi belligerence and official non-com pliance. U N S C O M ’s w ithdraw al left many questions about Iraq ’s industrial capabilities unanswered, but its investigations dem onstrated the m assive scope o f the Iraqi effort.269

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The results of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ensuing US occupation have raised difficult questions about the accuracy and politicization of US and British official statements and intelligence estimates in 2 0 0 2 -0 3 , and the assum ptions that drove those estimates. Enorm ous discrepancies exist between Iraq’s official admissions and the conclusions of Western and inter­ national observers based on inspections and Iraqi docum entation.270 Iraq made over a dozen ‘full and final disclosures’ of its W M D program s - each of which was definitively demonstrated to be inaccurate based on Iraq’s own official records. These materials and capabilities, unless accounted for, will remain available to the next Iraqi regime, or to other actors or factions. The Iraqi W M D threat has not been completely destroyed.271

Ballistic missiles In 1973, Iraq received its first SCUD short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM s) from the Soviet Union. For the next 15 years, Iraq continued to receive m issiles, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), spare parts, and other asso ­ ciated vehicles from the Soviets. The total eventually am ounted to 819 m issiles, 15 practice m issiles, and 11 T E Ls. By the early 1980s, Iraq had sufficient infrastructure to m aintain and repair its SC U D S.272 Iraq began a crash program in development and production of surfaceto-surface missiles during the Iran-Iraq W ar. This program involved m ulti­ national cooperative efforts, technology acquisition and theft, indigenous design and development, and increasingly sophisticated m odifications of existing liquid-fueled m issiles. Between 1980 and 1990, Iraq spent at least $3 billion on missile research and development.273 Am ong the m ajor Iraqi missile projects were SAAD-16 (later Al-Kindi State Establishm ent-a research and development center), Project 395 (an umbrella project synthe­ sizing Iraqi expertise from cooperative projects with Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and W estern Europe), Project 96 (a solid-fuel production facility), Project 124 (a missile body plant produced with W estern European assis­ tance), and Project 1728 (SCUD upgrade program ).274 Project 144 (a liquid-fuel production facility and research center) also developed special w arheads for the emerging missile force, including a concrete ‘kinetic energy’ w arhead (apparently intended for strikes against Israel’s Dim ona reactor) as well as chemical and biological w arheads.275 Al-Husayn surface to surface missile The Al-Husayn w as Iraq ’s first m odification of the Soviet-designed SCUD surface-to-surface missile, which lacked the range to hit ‘strategic’ targets during the Iran -Iraq W ar. Introduced in com bat in February 1988,276 the new Al-Husayn had a 600 km range, sufficient to hit m ost m ajor cities in Iran, but achieved this increased range by sacrificing over 75 percent of the explosive p ayload.277 An additional im provem ent w as a significant reduc­

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tion in ‘refire tim e’: the Al-Husayn could be reloaded and fired again in 60 minutes, com pared to the SC U D ’s 160 m inutes.278 The ‘diary’ of Iraqi missile com m ander Lt. Gen. H azzim ‘A bd-al-Razzaq al-Ayyubbi indicates an emphasis on fire and movement due to an awareness of the possibility of counterstrikes.279 Initial m anufacture of one Al-Husayn required the cannibalization of three SCUD-B m issiles.280 After the Iran -Iraq W ar it became clear that much, if not all, of the missile w as produced locally.281 One recent report states that in 1988, Iraq could produce three Al-Husayns per day.282 R eports from the G ulf W ar indicate that non-scavenged content in the m is­ siles fired in that conflict w as significant: The Al-Husayn missiles fired at Iran in 1988 were cannibalized from Soviet-supplied SCUD m issiles. However, it appears that at least some of the missiles launched in 1991 against allied forces were assembled from components obtained from W est Germ any and possibly elsewhere.283 According to recent reports, Iraq w as able to produce SCUD-type missiles indigenously, and not just from parts or com ponents supplied by the Soviets or scavenged from existing SC U D s.284 Al-Husayns were used extensively in the ‘W ar of the Cities’ in early 1988, and again during the G ulf W ar.285 According to W. Seth Carus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr, 189 were fired during the W ar of the Cities, 135 of which were aim ed at Tehran.286 By Jan uary 1991, Iraq had 220 Al-Husayns and 11 unmodified SCU D s in its arsenal, as well as ten M A Z -543 T ELS and four indigenous A l-Nida T E L s.287 A total of 88 missiles were fired in the Persian G u lf W ar (46 at the G ulf States and 42 at Israel).288 A l-Abbas surface to surface missile The Al-Abbas, a longer-range derivative of the Al-Husayn, w as originally tested on April 25, 19 8 8 .289 The new missile, designed to have a 900k m range, perform ed som ew hat below expectations, but its 800 km range was still a significant improvement over the A l-H usayn.290 Like the Al-Husayn, the Al-Abbas achieved part of it’s increased range at the expense of payload, which is estim ated at 1 0 0 -3 0 0 kg,291 and could be launched from the M A Z -543 Soviet launcher or the Iraqi Al-W alid.292 The Al-Abbas was a much more sophisticated undertaking than the Al-Hussein: it w as both more com plex and had a much higher level of indigenous content. Unlike the Al-Husayn, the Al-Abbas w as not just an upgraded SCUD-B. It used some of the same design specifications as the SCUD and m ay have used Soviet-built parts, but it w as an Iraqi missile and it had rolled off an Iraqi assembly line.293

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It appears that the Al-Abbas w as still under development during the G ulf W ar. After the w ar w as over, Iraq did not declare any Al-Abbas m is­ siles as part of the ceasefire agreement. 294 Al-Abid Satellite Launcher/Tam m uz-I medium range ballistic missile On Decem ber 5, 1989, to the surprise o f W estern intelligence analysts, Iraq tested the Al-Abid satellite launch vehicle.2 95 The Al-Abid w as an interesting hybrid construction, consisting of a first stage o f five clustered SCU D m otors, a second stage with a single m otor based on other Iraqi tw o stage rocket designs, and a previously unseen rocket m otor for the third stage. 296 W estern reports speculate that D r. G erald Bull m ay have been involved in this new project, as well as w orking on a more advanced project which involved ‘clusters o f eight SC U D s pow ered by a three-stage rocket’ which could put Southern Europe within easy striking range. 29 29 77 It is reported that the Al-Abid could launch a 350 kg satellite into space. 298 A m ilitarized version of the Al-Abid w ould be capable of a range of approxim ately 2 ,0 0 0 k m (approxim ately 1,200 m iles). 299 It is also reported that a smaller version of this system w as designed with a 1,200 km range, called the Al-W alid. 300 Shortly before the invasion of K uw ait, Iraq announced its intention to launch a satellite, reportedly of Sino-French origin, using the Al-Abid/Tam ouz-1 booster. 301 This project, obviously, never came to fruition. A l-H ijarah SSM The A l-H ijarah is a ballistic missile with a reported range of 750k m . The existence of the missile w as announced during the run-up to the G ulf W ar, and the name refers to the stones thrown by Palestinian dem onstrators against Israeli forces in the O ccupied Territories. 302 The A l-H ijarah was reportedly used against Israel and the G ulf States during the G ulf W ar, but little else is known about this system . 303 According to an Israeli report, Iraq claim ed to have used A l-H ijarah missiles in an attem pted attack on the D im ona nuclear facility during the G ulf W ar. 304 US sources believe that the A l-H ijarah is a shortened version of the A l-H ussein. 305 Condor II/B adr-2000 The Condor solid-fuel IR BM , a joint project between Argentina, Iraq, and Egypt, never entered production. Facilities for Condor R & D and produc­ tion have been identified during U N S C O M inspections in Iraq . 306 The Condor w as designed to be a solid-fuel, tw o-stage missile capable of deliv­ ering W M D with a range of 1,000 km . 307 The Israelis estim ated the total

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cost of the Condor project at $2.4 billion, and the cost of missiles at about $8 million each.308 The Condor, known in Iraq as the Badr-2000, w as a genuine m ultina­ tional project, involving Egypt, Iraq, and Argentina, with technical assis­ tance from W est Germany, Italy, and France. The Germ an firm M BB was a m ajor participant in the project, first through the cover of the independ­ ent consulting firm Consen, and later in m ore direct fashion.309 M BB was responsible for transferring US Pershing-2 missile technology to the project. According to a leading W estern proliferation analyst, The sam e M BB employee who w orked on the Pershing at the Penta­ gon also represented M BB in Iraq for the Condor, and thus w as in a position to transfer American missile technology to B agh dad.310 One reason for the apparent decline of the Condor project w as the success­ ful application of the M issile Technology Control Regim e to slow or elimi­ nate flow of crucial technologies to the participant nations.311 Some analyses argue that the Condor project may have been a safety project, used as a hedge against the possibility that Iraq could not successfully m odify SCU D s at hom e.312 This explanation, while intriguing, may understate the significance of the Condor project. In fact, it appears that Iraq attem pted to synthesize the knowledge gained in the Badr-2000 project with knowledge acquired from Brazil on the SCUD m odification program , under the umbrella of Project 395. The Iraqi-Brazilian cooperation in rockets and missiles dates to the early 1980s. Brazil’s Aerospace Technology Center (CTA) w as the organi­ zation in charge of Brazil’s sounding rocket and military missile program . C T A passed technical inform ation to the defense firm Avibras, which con­ structed the A ST R O S battlefield rockets based on the Sonda series of sounding rockets.313 Iraq w as involved in the financing of the A ST R O S project, and cooper­ ated in with C T A and other firms on solid and liquid fuel development in Brazil.314 The knowledge gained there w as applied in Project 395, and a team o f Brazilian rocket scientists headed by D r. H u go Piva (former head of C T A in Brazil) entered Iraq in the spring of 1989 to train Iraqi engi­ neers in rocket aerodynam ics, flight testing, on-board electronics, and rocket propellants.315 Despite reports of the demise of the Badr-2000 project when the Iraqis ceased funding the project in 1988, it now appears that Iraq withdrew from the m ultinational effort once it had obtained the necessary knowledge, and continued the project at home. The U N SC O M 6th R eport cites documents proving parallel develop­ ment between the Iraqi nuclear and surface-to-surface missile projects. In one document the M inistry of Defense ordered the Iraqi Atom ic Energy Com m ission to postpone a particular experiment until after an SSM test.316 Badr-2000 production facilities included the Dhu al-Fiqar factory at

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Falluja, the Tah al-M a’arik factory at Latifiya, and the al-Yaw m al-’Azim factory at M usayib.317 It appears that com ponents for the Badr-2000 con­ tinued to be produced after the G ulf War: Iraq is actively producing com ponents for the B A D R -2000 program , but A m bassador Ekeus has indicated that U N SC O M has identified the com ponents of this program which cannot be activated while U N SC O M is in Iraq .318 This strongly suggests that the B A D R -2000 program w as more than a ‘hedge,’ and remained a priority after 1988. Priorities within the m ilitary-industrial apparatus changed as a result of the G ulf W ar and subsequent U N inspections. Iraq modified its industrial plans in order to comply, on paper at least, with U N inspections and requirements. Iraq also took advantage o f loopholes in existing U N resolu­ tions. The im position o f lim itations on the range of ballistic missiles to 93 miles restricted Iraqi research, development, and production of longerrange systems, but did not apply to cruise m issiles. It is therefore not surprising to find that Iraq ’s new Ibn-al-Haytham missile research and development com plex w as heavily comm itted to cruise missile research.319 Cruise missiles are also better delivery systems for the FAEs - and perhaps the CW and BW agents - produced by Iraqi factories.320 Even before the G u lf W ar, Baghdad expressed considerable interest in air-breathing m issiles, including the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, the Chinese H Y-2 Silkw orm and the French Exocet anti-ship m issiles. According to Pentagon reports, Iraq had seven Silkw orm launchers and approxim ately 50 missiles at the beginning of the G ulf W ar.321 Four drones were displayed at the arms exhibition in Baghdad during O ctober, 1 9 8 8 .322 At the larger Baghdad Arms Exhibition of 1989, Iraq dem onstrated a series o f drones and RPVs, several o f which were reportedly indigenous designs.323 The Iraqis had at least three versions of a cruise missile called the Faw in development before the G ulf W ar. The Faw w as based on the SS-N-2 Styx, which used a liquid-fuelled m otor, and on the Chinese versions and derivatives available on the international arm s m arket (the HY-1 and HY2 Silkw orm ).324 The sm allest version w as the Faw -70, with a 7 0k m range, which appears to be a locally-produced version of the SS-N -2C or D Styx. It carries a w arhead of about 500 kg o f high explosive. The Faw 150 and Faw 200 were lengthened versions, with ranges of 150 and 20 0 km respectively.325 Iraq also w orked on other cruise missiles projects. The so-called ‘A babil’ (different from the battlefield rocket) w as reportedly a land-attack version of the M irach 600 RPV. This w eapon w as on display at the 1989 Baghdad Arms Exhibition, but apparently never entered service.326 There have been reports of a design for ram jet-pow ered cruise missile with a speed of M ach 3, although this extremely am bitious design w as apparently

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at least ten years from the prototype stage.327 During O peration Iraqi Freedom , Iraq did use ‘Seersucker’ shore-ship cruise missiles for an attack on the US M arine Corps H eadquarters (‘Cam p C om m an do’) in Kuw ait suggesting a continuing interest in cruise missiles for attacks against ground targets.328 Iraq also dem onstrated an interest in Rem otely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) and Unm anned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). Iraq experimented with spray tanks on both m anned aircraft and pilotless vehicles.329 U N SC O M w as particu­ larly concerned with a test of a 2 2 0 0 liter belly tank for a M irage F-1, m ounted on a remotely piloted M iG -21 fighter aircraft and apparently optim ized for spraying biological agents.330 The US also reportedly detected an Su-22 during the G ulf W ar that it suspected w as fitted out for BW attack.331 Iraq experimented with remotely piloted versions of the M iG -21 fighter aircraft - apparently unsuccessfully - and with the L-29 jet trainer.332 The latter conversion reportedly had a 600 km range with a 160 kg payload .333 The L-29 conversion is a significant capability, but incapable of carry­ ing the 2 0 0 0 liter spray tank - with a weight of at least 2000 kg - that Iraq tested in 1991. In the O ctober 2, 2 0 0 2 N ational Intelligence Estim ate on the Iraqi threat, the Director, Intelligence, Surveillance, and R econnais­ sance of the US airforce included a disclaimer stating that the US airforce did not agree that the Iraqis were developing UAVs prim arily (italics in original) for CBW delivery.334 Post-war investigations have confirmed the airforce analysts’ assum ptions that Iraqi UAVs were, as of 2 0 0 3 , inade­ quate for CBW delivery.335 Iraq did, however, m aintain tw o parallel RPV program s up through O peration Iraqi Freedom. The program run from Ibn Fernas w orked on both traditional reconnaissance drones and also conversion of m anned air­ craft. This program w as not declared to the U N until 2 0 0 2 , and was responsible for development of the RP-20, RP-30, and Pigeon RPV pro­ jects. A second RPV line, run from al-Rashid Airforce Base, remained the subject of investigation by the Iraq Survey G roup after the fall of Saddam ’s regim e.336 Iraq developed half a dozen different short-range missiles with ranges of less than 93 miles, and w as accused of m odifying SCU D -capable T E Ls for use with short-range rockets in an effort to circumvent the ceasefire agreem ent.337 Since Iraq dem onstrated, in the Al-Abid launch program , some expertise at ‘bunching’ clusters of shorter range rockets to produce longerrange, m ulti-stage system s, it w as reasonable to suspect that they might be capable of constructing a longer-range system from clusters of battlefield rockets as well. In 1992, Dr. R alph Ekeus (director of U N SC O M ) stated that ‘ . . . [T]here is no possibility without a m ajor new effort to reconstruct the missile p rogram .’338 Within six m onths, he had changed his mind. ‘Iraq is employing its best engineers, scientists and m anagers in the missile area . . .

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It m akes us very nervous to have all of the guys of any significance at the same place.’339 In 1995, Iraq w as caught covertly im porting parts and production equipment for ballistic m issiles.340 These included guidance com ponents and gyroscopes from operational Soviet-model sea-launched ballistic m is­ siles. One shipment w as intercepted, and Iraq later adm itted receiving a sim ilar shipment earlier that year.341 Iraq produced complete engines and other crucial systems for its missiles that were originally thought to be beyond its industrial capacity.342 N ew inform ation and Iraqi adm issions cast serious doubt on the ability of the U N to confirm that it had complete knowledge of any of Iraq ’s m any arm s production projects - a condition that only exacerbated W estern intelligence dilem m as throughout the 1990s and the run-up to O peration Iraqi Freedom .343 This confusion applied to missiles and also the more significant W M D program s. As of 1998, U N SC O M had destroyed or accounted for 8 1 7 of the 819 SCU D s supplied by the Soviet Union, as well as 19 T E Ls and 30 chemical and biological w arheads.344 U N S C O M supervised the destruction of 48 SCUD-type missiles and 11 m obile launchers, as well as 30 CW w ar­ heads and 20 conventional w arheads for SCUD-type m issiles.345 According to a 1999 U N S C O M report, however, U N SC O M could not account for tw o Soviet-supplied missiles and seven dom estically produced AlH usayn s.346 In 200 2 , W estern intelligence sought to gain international support for resuming inspections and, later, to justify m ilitary action against Iraq. British intelligence reported that Iraq still possessed 20 Al-Husayn missiles, and w as working on missiles with a range in excess of 1,000 km although these w ould not be operational until 20 0 7 . 347 This report also identified im portant rocket and missile research com plexes, including the al-M am oun plant, which replicated pre-Gulf W ar facilities linked to Condor fuel production.348 Other im portant missile-related facilities included the A l-Rafah N orth Liquid Propellant Engine Research, D evelop­ ment, Testing and Evaluation Facility, and the Al-M utasim Solid R ocket M otor and Test Facility (previously associated with the Badr-2000/C ondor project).349 US intelligence believed that Saddam m aintained ‘a covert force of up to a few dozen SCUD -variant missiles with ranges of 650 to 9 0 0 k m .’350 Inspections after O peration Iraqi Freedom indicated that Iraq had continued producing fuel useable only by illicit SCUD variants up through 2 0 0 1 .351 N o al-H usayns or SCUD derivatives have been found in Iraq since 20 0 3 , however. In 200 0 , Saddam ordered development of missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km. These included design of clustered engine liquid propellant m issiles. These projects were several years from completion, although Saddam reportedly w anted them in production within six m onths.352 Post­ w ar analysis of Iraqi documents also confirmed Iraqi efforts to purchase the N orth K orean N od o n g (also known as R odong) M R B M - and p o s­

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sibly an entire production facility for the missile - and indicate that Iraq m ade a $10 million down-paym ent in late 2 0 0 2 .353 U N and W estern experts also expressed concern about Iraq ’s develop­ ment of battlefield rockets. At least 50 A l-Sam oud liquid fuel missiles with a range of 150 km were produced between 1998 and 2002, and Iraq was reportedly m odifying the range of these systems in excess of the 150 km permitted by U N Resolution 6 8 7 .354 Four T ELs for the A l-Sam oud were paraded in Baghdad on December 31, 2 0 0 0 .355 This report asserts that ‘with substantial foreign assistance and an accom m odating political environment, Iraq could flight-test an M R B M by m id-decade.’356 The A l-Sam oud program w as ‘jury rigged out o f Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air and SCUD missile com ponents.’357 In both 1994 and 1997, Iraqi scientists were warned not to produce a rocket with a diameter of more than 600 mm, as it w ould probably exceed the 93 m ile/150km range restriction. A l-Sam oud 2 had a diameter of 760 m m .358 After careful evalu­ ation, experts reached the conclusion that the actual range of the AlSam oud w as 180 kilometers - a 20 percent increase over the U N restrictions.359 Inspectors also determined Iraq had im ported 380 rocket engines for the A l-Sam oud project in violation of U N sanctions.360 Post­ w ar evidence indicates that Iraqi engineering team s sought to use the SA-2 SA M engine for missiles with a range o f 250 km .361 The A babil-100 battlefield rocket, according to British intelligence reports, had been modified to a range o f 2 0 0 km .362 Similar concerns were expressed about another project - the Al Fatah SR B M .363This solid-fueled rocket reportedly reached a range of 100 miles in a test.364 Both AlSam oud and the A babil variants benefited from substantial foreign assis­ tance, both in terms of supply and also in research and developm ent.365 The creeping increase in Iraqi m issile range and sophistication, sup­ ported by successful efforts to procure com ponents, technologies, and even entire m issiles from abroad, suggests that the ‘substantial foreign assistance and accom m odating political environm ent’ US analysts w orried about w as actually emerging - albeit at a very gradual rate.366 Iraq appears to have been restoring its m issile developm ent and production capability - a process that w as only forestalled by international con­ frontation in 2 0 0 2 , and eventual invasion in 2003. Iraq launched 14 A babils and A l-Sam ouds during O peration Iraqi Freedom - nine were successfully intercepted by Coalition defenses. One missile, fired on M arch 27, 2 0 0 3 , w as intercepted just tw o miles from the allied com m and center at Cam p D o h a.367

Chemical weapons Iraq expended, by its own adm ission, over 100,000 chemical munitions against Iran.368 Iraq produced m ustard gas (H D), riot control gas (CS), and the nerve agents T abun (GA) and Sarin (GB), as well as cyclosarin (GF).

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M ustard is a persistent blister agent which remains a hazard for days, attacking exposed skin, lungs (if inhaled) eyes and mucus m em branes. The G-series nerve agents (sarin, tabun, cyclosarin) are more potent nerve agents that attack through inhalation or skin contact, overstimulating muscles or glands and causing convulsions and unconsciousness.369 Sarin and cyclosarin are non-persistent agents that attack prim arily through inhalation. T abun can remain a hazard for days.370 Iraqi w eapons suffered from significant impurities - tabun (GA) and sarin (GB) agents had a shelf life of only six w eeks.371 Iraq developed sophisticated doctrines for using these w eapons on the battlefield.372 Iraq also produced the persistent nerve agents V X and Som an (G D ).373 Iraq denied production of V X , but in 1998 U N S C O M inspectors found evidence that it had been loaded onto ballistic missile w arheads during the G ulf W ar.374 In addition to the production, filling and storage lines at Sam arra, Iraq had three production lines for precursor chemicals under construction at Falluja.375 A phosphate mining operation at A kashat, com ­ bined with a chemical plant at Al Q aim , provided organic phosphates for the production of Sarin and T ab u n .376 By 1990, Iraqi chemical w eapons production capability w as estim ated at between 1,000 and 5,000 tons of all types per year.377 This w as sufficient, by one account, to fill between 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 and 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 chemical munitions each year.378 Iraq received help, according to U N docum ents, from 31 m ajor foreign suppliers - including 14 from Germ any, three each from the N etherlands and Switzerland, and tw o each from France, the US, and A ustria.379 Iraq attem pted to conceal its CW production, leading to continuing confusion about the extent of this and other W M D program s. Iraq reported to the U N in April 1991 that it possessed 11 CW production facilities, but by late 1991 the U N had identified at least 4 8 !380 The ori­ ginal declaration claimed only 105 155 mm m ustard shells, but U N inspec­ tions eventually identified 12,694. Then, 4 5 ,7 5 5 filled m unitions and 78,765 empty munitions were identified by 19 9 2 .381 Iraq initially declared 355 tons of m ustard and nerve agents, and only 650 tons of ‘intermediate agents.’382 By early 1992, at least 225 tons of nerve agent and 280 tons of m ustard had been identified, and Iraq had modified its original assessm ent to include 3,173 tons of precursors.383 By m id-1994, the U N had destroyed 2 8 ,0 4 9 chemical munitions and over 4 8 1 ,0 0 0 liters of chemical agents and precursors.384 Recent intelligence estimates believe Iraq produced at least 2 ,8 5 0 tons of m ustard gas, 210 tons of tabun (GA), 795 tons of sarin (GB), and 3.9 tons of V X .385 Iraq reportedly m ade CW agents available for use in the 1990-91 G ulf W ar, but did not fire them at Coalition forces. 386 The Al-M uthanna com plex, the prim ary Iraqi CW production site, w as destroyed under U N supervision in 1 9 9 4 .387 U N SC O M surveyed 1,015 sites in Iraq from 1 9 9 1 -9 8 , carrying out 2 7 2 inspections, and the CW com plex w as a particular target. U N S C O M ’s accomplishm ents included:

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destruction of 4 0 ,0 0 0 CW m unitions, 2 ,6 1 0 tons o f CW precursors, and 411 tons of CW agents; dism antling the prime CW com plex at al-M uthanna; destruction o f 30 CW w arheads designed for ballistic missile delivery 388

Other reports note that U N SC O M destroyed 3 8 ,5 0 0 chemical munitions, 4 8 0 .0 0 0 liters of chemical agents, and 1.8 million liters of chemical precur389 sor. 389 British intelligence reports before O peration Iraqi Freedom noted that U N SC O M inspections had been unable to account for up to 360 tons of bulk CW agents, including 1.5 tons of V X ; up to 3,000 tons of CW pre­ cursors, including 300 tons specific to V X production; and over 30,000 munitions for CW and BW delivery.390 Over 2 0 ,0 0 0 artillery shells remained unaccounted for by the U N as of late 19 9 8 . 391 A CIA report cites discrepancies, based on inform ation provided to U N SC O M , of 6,000 CW m unitions.392 Another CIA report states that Iraq probably retained 1 5.000 artillery rockets and 550 artillery shells which could carry CW . 393 U N inspections before O peration Iraqi Freedom failed to discover these m issing items. Post-war interviews with Iraqi generals have revealed little. Each has denied having access to chemical w eapons, but assum ed that com m anders in neighboring units had them .394 A report by the head of the Iraq Survey G roup revealed little hard evidence of these m issing m aterials or stockpiled w eapons. M ultiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large, ongoing, centrally controlled CW program after 1991. Inform ation found to date suggests that Iraq ’s large-scale capability to develop, produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not completely destroyed - during O perations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years o f U N sanctions and U N inspections. 395 Review of documents and capabilities, however, suggest that Iraq could have begun producing m ustard gas within tw o months of an order to resume production. R estoration of sarin production has been estim ated at between six months and tw o years aw ay. 396 These statem ents confirm that, despite U N inspections, Iraq m aintained the ability to restore production o f chemical w eapons once sanctions were lifted.

Biological weapons Iraq ’s biological w eapons program remains the subject of great contro­ versy and concern. Inform ation on the program remains unreliable - for exam ple, the date the BW program began, relative to other Iraqi W M D

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program s, remains a m atter of som e confusion.397 Iraq adm itted after the G ulf W ar to military research in anthrax and botulism toxins, as well as research with brucellosis and tularem ia. N o evidence of w eapons or of facilities for filling w eapons w as discovered, although entire buildings from the Salm an Pak com plex were physically removed or detroyed prior to U N inspection.398 However, recent reports have listed over a dozen open air Iraqi BW tests in the 1 9 8 8 -9 1 period.399 U N SC O M inspections did not begin to reveal the extent o f the BW program until 199 5 .400 Iraqi adm issions, prom pted by the defection of H ussein Kam il to Jo rd an in the summer of 1995, detail a vast and com pre­ hensive biological w eapons effort.401 The BW com plex became an im port­ ant target for U N SC O M . The destruction o f the A l-H akam BW facility and its associated production equipment w as a substantial blow to Iraqi BW efforts.402 The documents released after K am il’s defection verified that Iraq had produced both botulinum and anthrax in significant quantities.403 These docum ents, and later Iraqi revelations, confirm that 1,500 gallons of anthrax toxin and 3,0 0 0 gallons of botulinum toxin were available and loaded on Iraqi missile w arheads and aircraft bom bs during the G ulf W ar. Iraq confessed to filling 25 missile w arheads and 166 aerial bom bs with BW agents.404 Iraq also produced a toxin which induced gangrene.405 Iraq admitted to production of 1 9,000 liters of concentrated botulinum, 8,500 liters of concentrated anthrax, and 2 ,2 0 0 liters of concentrated aflatoxin.406 Iraq produced the equivalent of over ten billion doses of BW agent before 19 9 1 .407 In 2 0 0 2 , British intelligence reported that growth m edia for BW w eapons - including up to three times the quantity of the 8,500 liters of anthrax that Iraq reported to the U N - remains at large.408 This report identified at least four w eaponized BW strains of concern - botulinum, anthrax, aflatoxin, and ricin.409 US intelligence reports confirmed that ricin had been tested in artillery shells.410 After O peration Iraqi Freedom , more evidence of the m ilitarization of ricin w as discovered.411 The renovation of the al-D aw rah Foot-and-M outh Disease facility without U N approval in 2001 raised particular concern. Al-Dawrah was one of tw o Biocontainm ent Level Three facilities in Iraq, and had been uti­ lized for BW research and production before 1991.412 An additional concern, raised in both intelligence reports and Secretary o f State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2 0 0 3 address to the United N ations, w as the possibility that Iraq m aintained m obile BW production facilities.413 Secretary Powell also raised the question of Iraqi research into other BW agents, mentioning gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, cholera, camel pox, and hem orrhagic fever. Other official statem ents have mentioned sm allpox, brucella, and Congo Crimean H em orrhagic fever.414 D avid K ay noted with concern the fact that Iraq researched techniques with nonpathogenic organism s (B. Thurengiensis and medicinal plants) that could have been

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applied to biological w eapons, including anthrax and ricin.415 This dem on­ strates the dual-use nature of scientific research, and the difficulties inher­ ent in both detecting and controlling biological warfare-related program s.

Nuclear weapons Iraqi nuclear efforts after the 1981 O siraq raid were secretive and circum ­ spect. A deliberate effort w as m ade to publicly appear to be complying with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while pursuing covert efforts to acquire the necessary m anufacturing technology.416 Public estimates of Iraq ’s nuclear program in 1990 stated that it w as at least five to ten years from developing nuclear w eapons.417 These estimates were widely off the m ark - a tribute to highly successful deception and cam ouflage efforts by Iraq. Iraq spent $ 7 -2 0 billion on its nuclear effort over a period of alm ost tw o decades.418 The nuclear program alone employed approxim ately 7,000 scientists and up to 2 0,000 w orkers.419 Iraq pursued multiple m ethods in an effort to enrich uranium to m ake bom b-grade m aterial, including gas centrifuge and chemical enrichment and electromagnetic isotope separation (EM IS). Research was also carried out in the fields of chemical exchange isotope separation and gaseous diffusion, but little progress w as m ade in either of these areas. The EM IS facilities - which required large com ponents known as calutrons were the m ost advanced project at the time o f the G ulf W ar.420 In addition, the O siraq control panels, instrum entation system s, and com puters all survived the Israeli raid in 1981, leading some U N inspec­ tors to suspect a secret underground facility for the production of plutonium.421 U N SC O M officials also reported evidence that Iraq was producing plutonium - a separate w eapons production line.422 A laboratory-scale plutonium separation program w as identified by U N SC O M inspectors.423 Iraq also reportedly carried out some research in laser isotope separation technologies.424 M ore disturbingly, Saddam started a crash program in 1990 to create a nuclear w eapon, and some reports state that Iraq had access to 30 kg of enriched uranium - enough to create at least one nuclear device.425 Iraqi defectors argue that a bom b design already existed in 1990 - but that it w as so enorm ous as to be virtually undeliverable.426 In fact, one report states specifically that ‘[W]e had a device capable of producing a nuclear explosion equivalent to a few kilotons of T N T . . the engineering estimates and sim ulation exercises we conducted put our device in the range of from one to three kilotons.’427 Iraqi scientists reportedly assured Saddam H ussein that when the cen­ trifuge program w as up and running, they w ould create enough H EU for one nuclear w eapon per year.428 Estim ates of potential Iraqi nuclear w eapons production run as high as 20 w eapons per year, if the G ulf W ar had not again postponed Iraqi nuclear am bitions.429 Iraq w ould have

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begun to produce significant am ounts o f highly-enriched uranium by 1992, and probably w ould have perfected a nuclear bom b design by that time.430 The author’s best estimate of Iraqi nuclear potential is included in Table 4 .6 . This table is based on the follow ing assum ptions. 1

2

3

4

Production of a nuclear w eapon requires approxim ately 10 lbs/ 4 .5 4 kg of plutonium ,431 or approxim ately 44 lbs/20 kg of weapons grade uranium 432. Some 9 0 -1 0 0 EM IS units, running at design capacity, produce approxim ately 15 kg of 9 3 % H EU annually.433 For the purposes of this analysis, the Tarm iya facility is assum ed to begin operation in Jan u ary 19 9 3 ,434 and the twin Ash Sharqat facility in Jan uary 1994. A 100-centrifuge cascade w ould have been available in 1993, with an additional 500-m achine cascade available in 1996.435 The Al Furat facility was capable of producing approxim ately 2 ,0 0 0 centrifuges per year,436 and reports state that Iraq had m aterials sufficient to build 1 0 ,0 0 0 -2 0 ,0 0 0 centrifuges.437 This estimate assum es that Iraq could add an additional 4 00 machines in 1997, and begin bringing 5,000 centrifuges on-line at a rate of 1,000 per year beginning in 1998. A 1,000 centrifuge cascade can produce enough H EU annually to make one nuclear w eapon.438 Finally, that 2 00 tons of natural uranium is approxim ately enough to provide H EU for at least 50 bom bs.439 U N SC O M inspectors dis­ covered 580 tons of natural uranium, as well as 1.7 tons o f enriched uranium supplied by Italy,440 so sufficient raw m aterials existed to produce at least 150 nuclear devices.

It w ould appear, therefore, that if Iraq had continued funding at the rate of the late 1980s, and if technology (particularly remaining m aterials necessary for centrifuge production) continued to be available, by 2000 Iraq m ight have covertly produced as many as 20 nuclear w arheads. If Iraq had pursued policies of ‘boosting’ the yields with lithium-6, this w ould have been a form idable deterrent to any state.441 In the first decade of the Table 4.6 Iraq: potential nuclear w eapons production in the absence o f desert storm Process

Year 1994

T o tal 1995

1996

1997

Centrifuge — EM IS 1

— 2

— 2

1 2

1 2

2 2

3 2

7 13

T otal

3

5

8

11

15

20

20

1

1998

1999

2000

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twenty-first century, Iraqi production rate w ould have continued to increase as more centrifuges came on line. US and W estern intelligence believed that Iraq still m aintained a nuclear program in 2 0 0 2 . 44 2 Defector reports and interviews indicate that Saddam ordered his Special Security O rganization to take charge of critical non­ nuclear com ponents from the bom b program after the first G ulf W ar, and that these com ponents were successfully hidden from U N SC O M through­ out the inspections. 443 One US intelligence report states that if Iraq received foreign supplies o f fissile m aterial, it could m anufacture a w eapon within one year. W ithout foreign suppliers, it could not m ake a w eapon until the latter half of the decade.4 4 4 The O ctober 2002 N IE estimates that with 2 5 ,0 0 0 centrifuges, Iraq could create enough H EU for tw o w eapons per year.445 445 Iraq w as attem pting to im port large numbers of very small (81mm) tubes, which could be used either for centrifuges or as com ponents of b at­ tlefield artillery rockets. Their im port w as specifically prohibited by the N uclear Suppliers G roup guidelines, and should have been banned to Iraq under U N sanctions. 4 46 Iraq ’s nuclear program w as the least developed of all of Iraq ’s W M D program s in 2 0 0 3 . International Atomic Energy Agency Director M oham m ed El Baradei rejected US claim s before the w ar and after several months of post-w ar exam ination, El Baradei released a statement noting that ‘[N ]o indication of post-1991 w eaponization activities were uncov­ ered in Iraq . . [T]he agency observed a substantial degradation in facili­ ties, financial resources and program s throughout Iraq that might support a nuclear infrastructure.’4 4 7 Some anecdotal evidence suggests that inform ation w as withheld from U N SC O M inspectors, and that eventually the nuclear program w ould have been restored. 448 A leading Iraqi nuclear scientist handed over documents and small com ponents from the centrifuge enrichment program that he had buried in his backyard in 1991. 44 9 Other interviews with former scien­ tists and other officials suggest that the program w as dism antled, but might have been restored over time.45 0 Iraq ’s nuclear program w as, ap p ar­ ently, effectively terminated by the com bination of Desert Storm and U N inspections. ‘ISG [Iraq Survey G roup], however, has uncovered no indica­ tion that Iraq had resum ed fissile m aterial or nuclear w eapon research and development activities since 1 9 9 1 .’451

What we don’t know - continuing gaps A barrage of criticism - some politically partisan - has been leveled at the US failure to find hidden W M D stockpiles, after using the argum ent that their existence justified military intervention in Iraq. 4 52 N o ‘sm oking gun’ has been found, and no evidence of an imminent Iraqi W M D breakout (or transfer to terrorist groups) has been identified.45 3 Both political and

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military analysts provided inaccurate assessm ents of Iraqi capabilities and doctrine.454 There are several possible explanations for the failure to find Iraqi W M D . The first, that the US and various intelligence agencies lied or fabricated evidence, does not seem accurate.455 M ost of the citations used in the previous sections from intelligence reports were derived from U N SC O M data focused on unresolved issues, and supplem ented by other means. The U N S C O M data is based on meticulous analysis of Iraqi archives and extensive interviews of Iraqi scientists and officials. Iraq had ample opportunity to disprove the accuracy of this data, and failed. It cannot be reasonably argued, therefore, that the bulk of this initial data is a fabrication by W estern intelligence. A second explanation is US incompetence, or at least lack o f foresight and proper planning. US planning for w ar term ination w as flawed at best, and troops were not properly prepared (or available in sufficient numbers) to carry out a rapid and thorough search of the country - particularly once local resistance (especially in the central Sunni region) m oved from episodic to organized. The US post-O IF W M D search w as poorly organ­ ized and coordinated.456 A third explanation is the unexpected success of Iraqi deception and concealment operations.457 This undoubtedly accounts for part of the explanation. Iraqi deception activities have been catalogued extensively, and their efforts against U N SC O M and U N M O V IC - m easured in the lack o f resolution of m any issues - were effective and, apparently, highly m otivated.458 The US relied heavily on defector inform ation - inform ation that is now suspect either as highly politicized or perhaps active Iraqi disinform ation.459 This report also points out that the Iraq Survey G roup is still sifting through over 30 million pages of Iraqi docum entation. Finally, it is also entirely possible, based on interviews and intelligence reports, that the Iraqi program had been placed in m othballs until the lifting of sanctions.460 This w as originally reported by H ussein Kam el after his defection in 1995, but could not be confirmed at least in part due to active Iraqi resistance to U N SC O M . N ow , many months into the occupa­ tion of Iraq and after a series o f truly intrusive inspections, the m othball option appears more plausible.461

Conclusion The Iraq case represents a significant exception to m any of the Cold W ar theories of LD C arm s development. Although Iraq w as subject to em bargo on a number of occasions, the Iraqi military industrial com plex does not represent a classic case of im port substitution, nor does it closely follow the ladder of production. It clearly w as not an export-oriented defense industry - although if the G ulf W ars had never happened, it m ight have seized a role in the international missile export business, as a com petitor to

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N orth K orea. Because of Iraq ’s oil wealth, the size of the Iraqi military, its grandiose regional objectives, its highly centralized and repressive regime, and its relatively technically skilled population, Iraq was able to create a large m ilitary-industrial infrastructure that m ade tangible contributions to Iraqi national security policy. In a relatively short time (1 978—90), with the expenditure o f vast am ounts of capital and labor, Iraq was able to create a surprisingly capable military industry.462 During the 1986—90 period, when military industrialization w as given steadily increasing priority in Iraqi economic planning, the results were rem arkable: development of a series of sophistic­ ated ballistic missiles (with constantly expanding indigenous content), covert nuclear development that shocked international observers in 1991, establishm ent one of the largest chemical and biological w eapons produc­ tion capabilities in the w orld, and an expanding conventional arms pro­ duction capacity which satisfied m ost of the Iraqi m ilitary’s requirements for light arms and amm unition and was venturing into licensed production and local m odification o f artillery, arm or, and aircraft. Broadly speaking, the Iraqis developed tw o different categories of w eapons: copies or licensed production of foreign systems, and hybrid designs either developed through joint ventures or with specific Iraqi modifications.463 Initial local input w as relatively limited, but by 1988—90 the industrial com plex w as providing innovative solutions to specific military requirements. Some of the hybrid systems combined W estern and Soviet com ponents, and substantially increased the capability of existing systems. . . . [T]he fact that m any new Iraqi systems are little more than m odifi­ cations of older w eapons or hybrids using established components is in reality a positive indication. In many Third W orld countries, and even in such states as Israel and South Africa with their developed industries, it is often the ability to adapt w eapons systems to local needs that is m ost rewarding operationally, technically, and financially.464 The Iraqi defense industry’s capability to respond to their military require­ ments should not be undervalued. Its contributions in the Iran—Iraq W ar were substantial. These included: 1 2 3

4

Production o f basic m unitions in large quantities (especially evident after 1986). Production of low-technology, high-lethality weaponry appropriate to a high-firepower conflict (m ortars, CW munitions, mines). Responsiveness to m ilitary requirements, particularly when technolo­ gies were not available from abroad (ballistic m issiles, aircraft m odifi­ cations projects, higher-technology munitions). Resourcefulness in acquiring technologies and capabilities abroad,

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Iraq through theft and/or collaboration, which fulfilled specific military requirements. Provision of w eapons which not only fulfilled operational military needs against Iran, but which also extended Iraqi military influence into the M iddle E ast and the struggle with Israel and, in theory, p ro ­ vided the basis for deterrence of extra-regional intervention by the United States.

Iraqi industry w as successful in adapting systems to m ilitary needs. The military, however, w as considerably less successful at utilizing the poten­ tial which both locally-produced and im ported w eaponry potentially p ro ­ vided. . . . Iraq tended to rely on high technology and static, heavily fortified and entrenched defenses. This emphasis often appeared to verge on an obsession with sophisticated technology as a ‘wonder w eapon ’, separ­ ate from the skills and knowledge of the men using it.465 The absorption of technical skills and technology to produce weaponry within the industrial com plex, apparently, w as less difficult than the absorption of the military skills required to m aster such w eaponry in com bat. Although the Iraqi army w as able to utilize m oderately sophistic­ ated technology with some effectiveness against Iran, the same w eapons and tactics failed utterly against the Allied Coalition in the G ulf W ar. In a little over a decade, Iraq engaged in tw o of the m ost significant high-intensity military conflicts in the late twentieth century. During this period, Iraq spent as much as $100 billion on advanced conventional arms and perhaps as much as $27 billion for w eapons technology and supplies.466 The industrial and technical infrastructure created by these invest­ ments is enorm ous, and the knowledge base of the 2 0 ,0 0 0 scientists and technicians and as m any as 100,000 industrial employees who w orked in these industries w as relatively unaffected by the G ulf W ar. The im portance and utility of Iraq ’s m ilitary-industrial program is best calculated by tw o m easurements: first, the enorm ous resources required to detect and m onitor Iraqi production facilities and the continuing uncer­ tainty surrounding the extent to which those facilities have been success­ fully concealed; and second, by the survival of the B a ’athist regime until April 2 0 0 3 . Iraq ’s residual m ilitary-industrial capability w as more than sufficient to m aintain it as a substantial and dangerous pow er in the Persian G ulf region, and to m aintain some level of Iraqi political and m ili­ tary influence in the core M iddle E ast through the Coalition invasion in M arch 2003. Despite the overthrow o f the B a ’athist regime, the US and Coalition occupation of Iraq, and the presence of over 1,200 US inspectors actively searching for W M D , the saga o f Iraq ’s m ilitary industry is not over yet. A

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new Iraqi regime is slowly emerging in the m idst of an ugly insurgency that could escalate into ethnic and religious civil war. The Bush adm inistration has focused on efforts to construct Iraqi military and param ilitary forces — but the perform ance of these local troops has been uneven at best. These troops will alm ost certainly rely on existing stocks of arms for their equip­ ment. Regional analysts have already expressed concerns about the resur­ rection of Iraq ’s military industry: The last thing Iraq needs now is a defense industry. W hat they need is to rebuild the country, and not to start to rearm again, and I hope that nothing will happen regarding the defense industries or military m od­ ernization in Iraq.467 A potentially more im portant issue is the question of W M D . The US will hand over government of Iraq to a regime much less comm itted to aggression or focused on W M D acquisition than the B a ’athist regime it replaces. Nevertheless, the new Iraqi regime will face many of the same security problem s that Saddam , and every preceding Iraqi regime, has faced — a more pow erful Iranian neighbor, Iraq ’s continuing interest in southern ports, the traditional claim to sovereignty over Kuw ait, and com petition in the Persian G ulf and M iddle East regions. A federalized Iraqi State might inadvertently find itself used as a sanctuary by Turkish Kurdish separatists. Iraq ’s security dilemma forces the government to find ways to create military power. Iraq ’s new military will be constrained in size, at least for a time, and focused on the difficult task of suppressing a m ounting Sunni insurgency —a task Iraq ’s army has never faced before. This leaves Iraq, at least in theory, vulnerable to external attack — from Syria, from Iran, or even from Turkey. This Iraqi vulnerability leaves the US with three policy alternatives — each with significant potential risk. The first is that the US can ‘cut and run,’ leaving Iraqi security in its own hands and getting out of the region quickly in an effort to minimize the political costs of the Iraq intervention, and freeing up forces for use elsewhere in the global w ar on terrorism. Some might consider this a pragm atic option. It is, alm ost certainly, also a recipe for the resurrection of Iraq ’s W M D program s. Faced with signific­ ant external threats, but lacking the economic and military resources to defend itself, an Iraqi regime w ould certainly find the restoration of some W M D program s a cheap and useful force multiplier. It seems difficult to believe that a US military, increasingly focused on counter-insurgency operations, w ould be able to eliminate Iraq ’s W M D capabilities before leaving, given the difficulties experienced in even locating them to date. Despite significant efforts, the Iraq Survey G roup has failed to identify or locate key m aterials and capabilities from S addam ’s program s that remain unaccounted for as of O ctober 2 0 0 5 .468 In addition, much of the necessary

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knowledge required to recreate some of the simpler forms of W M D reside in the thousands of scientists, technicians, and w orkers who survived Desert Storm and OIF. This knowledge base cannot be eliminated without m assive, and unacceptable, violations of hum an rights. A second option w ould be to focus on eliminating Iraqi W M D cap ­ abilities, even if that means more extensive US military comm itm ent in the region in the short term. Recreating Iraq ’s conventional military capability in a form that is both militarily robust and politically reliable will take years - and current policy seems focused on getting Iraqi security forces into the streets as quickly as possible, accepting the risks of inadequate training and higher Iraqi casualties. An increased US presence w ould free up additional personnel for the W M D search, ensuring that the remaining infrastructure is attacked system atically and uprooted in a more perm an­ ent fashion. The cost, of course, is greater strain on US military resources, and larger risk to US personnel in Iraq - as well as the political cost of appearing to continue to occupy Iraq, which will act as a lightning rod in the M uslim world. The third option is sim ilar to US policies elsewhere, where political lib­ eralization coincided with industrialization. If the US were to guarantee Iraq ’s security, and m aintain forces in Iraq to provide for external security, this w ould alleviate Iraq ’s need for W M D to defend itself. This policy has w orked successfully in South K orea, where US troop presence contributed not only to South Korean security and US nonproliferation objectives, but also to South Korean democracy. T o a lesser extent, it has also w orked in Latin America, and even in Taiw an. A credible US security guarantee, particularly at a time when US conventional m ilitary superiority is unri­ valed, counteracts the attractiveness of indigenous W M D as a military force multiplier. A US comm itm ent carries significant risks - unpopularity for the host government, continued long-term US presence in a politically volatile region, and force protection risks for US m ilitary on the ground in Iraq. The United States m ust choose its Iraq policy with the W M D issue firmly in mind. Perversely enough, now that the w ar for Iraqi W M D is over, the future o f Iraqi W M D rests in American hands. Given the unre­ solved nature o f the Iraqi W M D com plex, only continued US commitment in some form can prevent its resurrection.

5

Regional powers, security, and arms production

Conclusions

Perceptions of regional military and other security threats play critical roles in the development and direction of L D C m ilitary-industrial policy. The case studies demonstrate im portant patterns in the military-industrial policies of regional pow ers, particularly during times of serious military threat or regional crisis. These patterns appear to complem ent or, in some cases, contradict existing models of L D C military industrialization. The three m ost im portant observations are: 1 2

3

H igh levels of regional threat prom ote more rational, cost-effective utilization o f m ilitary-industrial resources. L D C s acquire, create and apply technologies in response to specific regional requirements, either creating new hardw are (niche innova­ tion) or utilizing hardw are in unexpected ways (conceptual innova­ tion).1 The role of individuals in determining the direction of L D C military industries is absolutely vital.

Each of these observations dem onstrates the inadequacy of existing models of L D C military industrialization, which focus on issues of eco­ nom ic efficiency and dependency. A theoretical model of a security-based L D C m ilitary-industrial policy, therefore, provides additional insight into both the historical and possible future m ilitary-industrial policies of aspir­ ing powers in the developing world. The case studies dem onstrate that regional threats and opportunities provide incentives for regional powers to acquire, assim ilate, produce, and sometimes design sophisticated new w eapons and technologies which strongly affect regional m ilitary balances and, potentially, international security. The collapse of the bipolar system, declining demand for new m ajor w eapons system s, and the increasing globalization of the international arms industry indicate that the future arms trade will be more comm ercial than ideological in nature. Unipolarity and the global w ar on terrorism create an unusually globalized international security environment. The US now m aintains a significant presence in regions that were once

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relatively isolated. This significantly affects the security policies of regional pow ers. The unprecedented stationing of US forces in Pakistan during O peration Enduring Freedom , for exam ple, both supported US operations and profoundly affected the evolution of the 2002 Indo-Pakistan nuclear crisis. Armed conflict remains a com m on means of resolving political, social, and economic tensions both within and across national boundaries. The demands on international institutions to intervene in these conflicts are greater than ever. US and U N policy will face potential difficulties from L D C producers, as dem onstrated by N orth K orea’s proliferation of ballis­ tic m issiles, Pakistan’s recent adm issions of transnational nuclear prolifera­ tion, and Iraq and Iran’s non-cooperation with international m onitoring regimes. Arms trade links between L D C producers com plicate arms control efforts, create and share significant military capabilities, and also minimize the im pact of international arms em bargoes. M ultinational agreements and international norm s banning shipment or production of certain types of w eapons or technologies are, apparently, easily undercut by determined producers and suppliers.

Case studies: patterns and trends India Despite its relatively large m ilitary-industrial inheritance, Indian military industrial policy in the 1 9 4 7 -6 2 period reflected India’s political concerns over the reliability and status of the army - essentially a domestic issue o f civil-military relations - and a preference for form over substance. India focused on symbolic, high-technology projects, particularly in the aerospace field. Expensive investments in im ported w eapons, industrial technology, and local research and development received priority over lower-technology items repeatedly requested by the ground forces that were well within the capacity o f local industry. The long-term prospects of India’s conventional arm s industry were essentially deter­ mined in this period by the preferences o f tw o individuals - Prime M inister Jaw ah arlal N ehru and his confidante V. K. Krishna M enon. N ehru and H om i Bhabha also created the infrastructure and driving intellectual force behind India’s nuclear w eapons program during this period. The 1 9 6 2 -7 4 period dem onstrated the transform ing im pact of increased levels of regional threat on m ilitary-industrial policy. Sophisticated indigenous R & D projects were dropped or de-emphasized in favor of licensed-produced or im ported systems. Local industry shifted from long­ term research and high-visibility projects that exceeded India’s industrial capacity to near-term production of items required by the armed forces in the new strategic environment. Endurance and non-platform w eapons

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were emphasized, leading to im proved utilization o f the Ordnance Facto­ ries, greater sensitivity to requirements for spare parts and logistics, and enhanced overall military readiness, m aintenance, and repair capability. Developm ent of nuclear w eapons also became a priority during this period as a result of the increased Chinese threat. The 1975—98 period indicates the im pact of declining threat on estab­ lished L D C military industries. The efficient utilization o f existing militaryindustrial infrastructure and resources were de-emphasized in favor of com petition with first tier-producers in a full range of production. Local designs for m ajor w eapons platform s received inadequate funding, remained isolated from India’s expanding private sector, and were not pri­ oritized in order of relative im portance — a recipe for inefficiency and waste that defeated India’s efforts to m ove up to the top tier of producers. When military capabilities o f regional opponents were enhanced, India balanced these capabilities by im porting new w eapons with long­ term licensing agreements. Endurance requirements were gradually de­ emphasized, and by the end of this period India w as again susceptible to logistics shortages. This experience suggests that military-industrial policy in an era o f rela­ tive security responds prim arily to non-security factors, including eco­ nom ic concerns, political and bureaucratic interests, and pursuit of the sym bolic m anifestations of great pow er status. Em erging threats during the 1975—98 period, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and resulting Pakistani rearm ament, prom pted changes in military procurem ent — including significant increases in defense allocations — but no urgent restructuring of m ilitary-industrial priorities. Since 1998, India has again re-evaluated its defense policy in light of the new nuclear environment and Pakistan’s continuing support for insurgency in Kashm ir and elsewhere. The im pact on military industry, so far, is only m odest. The key exception remains the nuclear/strategic sector, which clearly continues to receive both resources and bureaucratic priority. India is norm ally associated with the ‘im port-substitution’ model of military-industrialization described in Chapter 1, but this does not accurately reflect Indian policies. India has achieved im port-substitution in critical areas, particularly production for the ground forces at the Ordnance Fac­ tories. Im port-substitution of m ajor w eapons systems remains spotty, however, with priorities shifting between licensed production and indigen­ ous development. Exports have never been an Indian priority, and the ladder of production model —mentioned in Chapter 1 —appears an inade­ quate m ethodology due to the wide separation between military and civil­ ian industrial sectors and the relative absence of technology absorption and transfer across projects and sectors. Indian m ilitary-industrial policy is best described in realist terms. It is practical and cost-effective under high levels of threat, but pursues presti­ gious and high-profile projects when the regional environment appears

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relatively unthreatening. M ilitary-industrial projects have not unduly taxed Indian society, and m ay even have provided some positive stimulus to national economic development despite structural barriers.2 M ore gener­ ally, however, Indian m ilitary-industrial efforts remain unfocused, and have not led to significant levels of global competitiveness, broader techno­ logy absorption or economic improvement. This conclusion is particularly clear when India’s military-industrial achievements are com pared to Israel’s.

Israel For the first 40 years o f Israeli independence, geography and hostile neigh­ bors com bined to create a constant and extraordinary threat to the state’s continued existence. Israeli policy w as forced to prioritize between konenut (preparedness; im m ediate force structure and requirements) and hitkonenut (preparation; future potential), recognizing that m ilitary-indus­ trial autarky might become a future requirement due to political isolation. This dilemma, recognizable in the cases or India and Iraq as well, is funda­ mental to understanding the relationship between security and L D C m ili­ tary-industrial policies. From 1 9 4 8 -6 7 , Israel pursued a policy which m axim ized the valueadded benefits o f local military industry. Endurance requirements were emphasized. Scarce m ajor w eapons platform s needed to be m aintained at high levels of readiness and repaired immediately if dam aged, while m uni­ tions and light arms were urgently required by the large but poorly armed IDF. This value-added policy led to creation of an industrial infrastructure that could be expanded to more sophisticated and challenging projects in the future, including local m odification, design, and production of m ajor w eapons platform s. Three significant long-term projects were instituted in this period - the aircraft industry, the electronics industry and the nuclear program . The firm support of D avid Ben Gurion drove each of these projects despite opposition from military and economic advisors, and each w as enabled by the careful guidance of Shimon Peres. The role of individuals in key aspects of Israel’s military infrastructure, therefore, cannot be over­ emphasized. When funding w as available, local high-technology projects were pursued on a case-by-case basis, under the careful scrutiny of the IDF. The victory of 1 9 6 7 significantly changed Israeli assum ptions regarding both the regional military balance and military-industrial priorities. The assum ption that A rab forces were unlikely to attack Israel in the near future spurred a shift in industrial policy from preparedness to prepara­ tion. An influx o f foreign capital and significant growth in defense budgets facilitated a general expansion of industrial capabilities. M ajor w eapons platform s became an industrial priority due to em bargo

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and cancellation of contracts by European suppliers. Existing capabilities for m aintenance, m odernization, and light arms production expanded and remained critical for IDF force posture. The emphasis o f the Israeli m ilitary-industrial policy, however, shifted to the pursuit of self-sufficiency in m ajor w eapons platform s and overall m ilitary-industrial capacity. The 1973—95 period presented a series of dilemmas for Israeli planners. R apid expansion in A rab military capabilities threatened Israeli battlefield superiority. Israel’s economic productivity, however, suffered due to m assive defense expenditures, threatening long-term economic well-being and security. The defense sector, which constituted one of the largest sectors of the national economy, became increasingly vulnerable to changes in the international arms m arket and IDF procurem ent decisions. The US—Israeli security relationship posed threats to Israel’s political independence and long-term m ilitary-industrial self-sufficiency, at the same time that it funded a steadily increasing share o f Israeli military purchases and local military projects. From 1973—83, the IDF suffered from a near­ em barrassm ent of riches. The com bination o f US assistance and high local defense spending allow ed sim ultaneous expansion of force structure and qualitative upgrading of all branches of the IDF. After 1983, the availabil­ ity o f top-of-the-line US systems paid for with US aid dollars challenged entrenched and politically pow erful sections of the industry, particularly in the aerospace sector. Israel ultimately proved unable to sustain a policy o f self-sufficiency, particularly in m ajor w eapons platform s. The former close coordination between IDF requirements, Israeli national priorities, and military industry eroded. Declining defense budgets reduced IDF orders for locally-produced goods, and the availability o f US military assistance further endangered the IDF-local industry relationship. The Lavi disaster and other financial crises within the defense industry necessitated m assive layoffs and a still unfinshed restructuring of Israeli m ilitary-industrial infrastructure and policy. Israel’s security environment is currently in the m idst of im portant transitions. The overthrow of the Iraqi regime removes the m ost significant near-term conventional and unconventional threats to Israel. The presence of the US in the region may have reduced the likelihood of a revival of some pan-Arab or ‘frontline state’ alliance. At least for the near-term, therefore, the requirement for conventional m odernization to forestall a future A rab coalition m ay be receding. However, the global w ar on terrorism and the continuing struggle to resolve the Palestine dilemma also create m ajor obstacles for Israeli secur­ ity planning. Israel is now m enaced by a low-technology but very deter­ mined opponent that can strike publicly and with significant psychological effect inside Israel’s borders. Transnational and pan-Islam ic terrorist organizations threaten both Israel and the regimes of Israel’s neighbors. It is conceivable that this could destabilize or even topple regimes in Saudi A rabia, Egypt, Syria, or Jord an . Existing regimes, aw are of the galvanizing

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pow er of the Palestinian issue, could re-ignite or re-create pan-Arab or pan-Islam ic coalitions against Israel as a means of distracting domestic populations from considering regime change. Should Israeli military indus­ try, therefore, focus on preparedness? Or preparation? And what threat nuclear, chemical, conventional, terrorist - should receive priority? Israel’s military goods remain am ong the w orld’s best, dem onstrating the potential synergy between Israeli military requirements and hightechnology, locally-produced solutions. The IDF continues to demand a value-added industrial policy, with R & D spending focused on critical sophisticated sub-systems and non-platform w eapons. Scaling back the industry and reverting to a strictly value-added policy, however, will have adverse economic and political im pact because of the distorting role of the defense industry on Israel’s national economy. Israel is traditionally associated with tw o m odels of military-industrialization - the ‘export-oriented’ model and ‘the ladder of production’ dis­ cussed in Chapter 1. Neither of these m odels accurately reflect the im pact of security on Israeli m ilitary-industrial policy. In the 1950s, D avid Ben Gurion authorized several deliberately non-incremental investments in m il­ itary industry - the establishm ent o f aerospace, electronics, and nuclear w eapons program s. These program s reflected Ben G urion’s own com m it­ ment to hitkonenut, and his concerns over Israel’s long-term vulnerability. These decisions again dem onstrate the profound im pact of individuals on L D C m ilitary-industrial decision making. Decisions in the 1970s, particularly the continued pursuit of a ‘blueand-white’ fighter production capability, resemble the im port substitution model rather than the export m odel. Decisions in the 1970s and 1980s were heavily influenced by dom estic economic factors and the desire for international prestige. Ultimately, however, the driving factor in Israeli m ilitary-industrial policy has been national security requirements. These requirements still affect Israeli planning today, and undeniably had p osit­ ive spin-off effects on the civilian economy, particularly in electronics and other high-technology sectors.

Iraq Unlike India and Israel, the authoritarian rule of Saddam H ussein through­ out the period of Iraq ’s m ilitary-industrialization minimized the necessity to consider extraneous political factors. Iraq ’s policies reflect the demands of Saddam and a few select advisors and their perceptions of Iraq ’s secur­ ity condition. Iraq ’s early m ilitary-industrial policies, from 1 9 7 4 -8 4 , reflect a classic L D C approach to the experience of em bargo. The Soviet em bargo of 1974, which left Iraq virtually bereft of m unitions in the face of Kurdish rebel­ lion and Iranian covert support, forced Saddam to reevaluate the reliability of his prim ary supplier. Technicians were sent abroad for training, foreign

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experts hired, and ‘turn-key’ industrial facilities purchased in addition to a new policy based on gradual diversification of arm s suppliers. Increased emphasis was placed on unconventional w eapons. The Iran—Iraq W ar forced m ajor changes in Iraqi foreign and military policies. Iraq ’s arm ed forces proved incapable of converting superior technology into decisive military advantage. M any of its w eapons were too sophisticated for Iraqi personnel to operate or m aintain at W estern or even Soviet stan dards.3 The w ar turned into an extended conflict o f attrition, gradually threatening Iraqi political stability and economic well-being. Efforts by A rab allies and foreign suppliers to cut off credit and supplies in the m id-1980s raised the very real possibility of Iraqi defeat. Iraq responded by using local industry to enhance endurance cap­ abilities and to develop w eapons and technologies unavailable from outside suppliers. Iraq relied increasingly on locally produced chemical w eapons for both offense and defense. Locally-produced ballistic missiles replaced the ineffective Iraqi airforce for long range strikes on Iranian cities. Local m odification projects increased the range and capability of Iraqi strike aircraft, resulting in increasingly effective attacks on Iranian economic targets. Im proved endurance capabilities were evident in the increasing role of local technicians in depots and routine m aintenance, in expanded munitions production, and in the gradual development of p ro­ duction facilities for the artillery and heavy m ortars that played such a critical role in Iraq ’s firepower-intensive military operations. M ilitary-industrial program s continued to receive the highest possible priority in Iraq even after the defeat of Iran. Overt efforts included design of new types of artillery and an enorm ous production facility at Taji, licensed production of arm ored vehicles and tanks, and negotiations for assem bly and licensed production of jet trainers and M irage fighters. These priorities suggest that Iraq attem pted to adhere, at least at some level, to the ‘ladder of production’ model. Iraq also pursued sym bolic capabilities, including space boosters, satel­ lites, anti-ballistic m issiles, and the exaggerated capabilities of the Baghdad and A dnan aircraft. Iraq ’s enorm ous covert procurem ent network em phas­ ized unconventional w eapons production, including the Supergun, ballistic m issiles, and the m assive nuclear, chemical, and biological w arfare pro­ gram s. In the afterm ath of the Iran—Iraq W ar, then, Iraq continued to develop specific capabilities which filled political-military requirements, but also began to seek the sym bolic benefits of military industry and dem onstration of unexpected technological capabilities. In this respect, Iraq dem onstrated an alternative m odel for L D C military industrialization. Iraq ’s policies deliberately m ixed the ladder of production and im port substitution m odels described in Chapter 1, choosing the best or, in some cases, m ost feasible, of each. Throughout the Iran—Iraq W ar, Iraq avoided pursuing a broad spectrum o f m ajor platform production. Iraq instead pri­ oritized by m axim izing the efficient utilization of existing capabilities and

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infrastructure, and selectively seeking to assim ilate new and criticallyrequired capabilities determined by the leadership. The unexpected level of technological assim ilation can be deduced by the surprise which greeted each successive Iraqi industrial achievement. Iraq ’s military and industrial policies were suitable for regional conflict, but insufficient to compete with the global state of the art - a fact amply dem onstrated from 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 . S ad dam ’s foreign policies were inade­ quately synchronized with the m ilitary means at his disposal, and local industry could not m ake up the shortfall. Iraq did dem onstrate to other states that policies based on the Iraqi model might deter superpow er m ili­ tary intervention - although O peration Iraqi Freedom suggests the dangers and practical limits of such policies.

Lessons learned: security and military industry The inadequate historical perspective of existing studies of LD C military industrialization, the unwillingness to appropriately disaggregate either the hierarchy of international arm s production or distinctions within the developing world, and the failure to adequately consider political-military issues or the less-easily discerned aspects of m ilitary capability have led to unreasonably pessim istic assessm ents of the effectiveness of L D C military industries. As the case studies reveal, L D C m ilitary industries can con­ tribute positively to the m ilitary requirements of producer states at reason­ able cost. On consideration of all three cases, a pattern begins to emerge. During periods of relatively high military threat or vulnerability, militaryindustrial policies become relatively more rational - or at least efficient, in terms o f achieving tangible benefits at an affordable economic cost. Em phasis is placed on projects that are applicable to regional com bat and the m ost likely threats. Low er priority is given to sym bolic projects such as M ajor W eapons Systems, unless supply of particular items is threatened. Pursuit of elusive concepts such as self-sufficiency and autarky tem porarily ceases, and practical, cost-effective solutions within the lim itations of national technical and industrial capabilities are emphasized. The military has greater input, or at least oversight, in m ilitary-industrial plans and policy. As security threats decline m ilitary-industrial policy m oves aw ay from this rational calculus. Non-security factors, including bureaucratic prefer­ ence, dom estic politics, civil-military relations, prestige, and potential dom estic economic benefits become more im portant in determining mili­ tary-industrial policy. Excess capacity, especially in munitions and other low-technology items which were m ass-produced for grow ing force struc­ tures, creates new dilem m as for L D C producers. Accepting inefficient levels o f production to m aintain the infrastructure is one possible solution. Another alternative is encouraging exports o f excess production.

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It appears that states which begin development of m ilitary industries under low -threat conditions succum b more readily to this latter set of inefficiencies and tem ptations. The sym bolic and political aspects o f arms production dom inate policy decisions. This might account, in part, for the differences between arm s production in Latin Am erica, where cro ss­ border conflicts are rare and strongly discouraged by regional treaty and the US presence, and production in m ore conflicted regions such as the M iddle E ast and South A sia. Sym bolic projects, including pursuit of the elusive ‘across-the-board’ capability and self-sufficiency in M ajor W eapons Systems, reflect the desires of regimes to increase their dom estic and international reputation and to com pete sym bolically with the great pow ers. A security-based model of L D C arm s production, therefore, m akes an im portant contribution to existing literature, reflecting the responses of lesser pow ers to more highly m ilitarized regional m ilitary conditions. This m odel re-introduces the security dilemma into debate over the effectiveness of L D C production, and addresses the ram ifications of local arm s produc­ tion for regional insecurity and stability.

A security-based model of LDC arms production The procurem ent of arm s, in theory, responds to existing and potential threats to the purchasing or producing state. Security factors therefore play an im portant role in the determination of m ilitary-industrial policy. Given limited resources, an L D C should attem pt to m axim ize the positive im pact of m ilitary-industrial policy on the civilian economy, while sim ultaneously lowering dependence on foreign suppliers and providing capabilities neces­ sary to fulfill national military requirements. According to this security-based m odel, the critical obligations of a lower tier defense industry are: 1

2

3 4

T o develop an infrastructure for m anufacturing or supplem enting sup­ plies of ‘sustenance requirem ents’ for the armed forces in peacetime, and to m aintain the option of sustained surge production in times of w ar or em bargo. T o m axim ize the quality of existing m ilitary equipment at minimum expense through m odification and m odernization program s and p ro­ duction of ‘value-added’ sub-systems and non-platform w eapons. T o develop and produce critical military items unavailable from foreign suppliers. T o develop and produce items which are ‘regional-specific’ (appropri­ ate for local geographic, technological, m ilitary, or political require­ ments), or which m axim ize or create local com parative advantages (niche production).

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Category one: sustenance requirements The first category of production requirements are sustenance requirements: the building blocks of military strength. These include small arm s, light arms and crew-served infantry w eapons, m edium arms up to and including artillery, ammunition, and other consum ables. A lso included are m ainte­ nance, repair, and other logistics capabilities, and various forms of nonlethal military goods. In effect, this category combines the ‘Endurance’ category with segments o f the ‘N on-platform w eapons’ category discussed in Chapters 2 through 4. Production of small arms provides w eapons for both defense against external foes and for m aintaining internal security while requiring only minimal technical and industrial sophistication. Production of small arms and small caliber am m unition, unsurprisingly, represents the m ost w ide­ spread m ilitary-industrial undertaking in the developing w orld — by the early 1980s, over 40 states produced small arm s and/or ammunition locally.4 Production of crew-served w eapons, including machine guns, m ortars, light and medium artillery, and light anti-aircraft guns, provides low-technology, firepower-intensive w eaponry for the military at a reason­ able cost relative to im ported equipment.5 These w eapons permit an L D C military to gain substantial firepower superiority over rebel or insurrectionist movements and to carry out highfirepower attrition w arfare against local or extra-regional opponents. In the latter respect, firepower serves as a partial substitute for operational skill in com bat. States which cannot m aster advanced military techniques may still be able to achieve favorable military results by simply over­ whelming their opponents with shells. M ortars, for exam ple, are relatively primitive military instruments, but are estim ated to have accounted for approxim ately 50 percent of the casualties in W orld W ar II.6 Artillery has inflicted the m ajority o f all casualties in m ost m ajor w ars since 1914, and has increased in im portance relative to other ground com bat arms due to improvements in range, accuracy, and lethality.7 Local production of munitions and other consum ables is extremely im portant for states with external conflicts — running out of shells and bullets is an unacceptable reason for losing a war. Regional conflicts, particularly in the regions discussed in the case studies, have become highfirepower wars: expenditure of consum ables (and especially ammunition) has reached enorm ous levels.8 Iraq, for instance, expended over 400 artillery rounds per gun per day in early 1986, and is reported to have expended the equivalent of one US Army ‘w eek’ of munitions per w eapon per day in intense com bat.9 M ajor military powers consistently underestimate the requirements for consum ables in w ar — an experience shared by India in 1965 and 1999, Israel in 1973, and Iraq in 1974—75 and 1980. During W orld W ar I, Germ an gunners also fired as many as 4 0 0 —500 rounds per barrel per day

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in intense com bat - far exceeding the pre-1914 estimates for ammunition expenditure - and the British Army in the Falklands expended 450 shells per gun in one evening during heavy fighting.10 The potential utility of local m unitions production for L D C s has not received sufficient attention. Continuing production lines allow undis­ turbed sources of supply in the event of protracted, attritional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli W ar of Attrition or the Iran -Iraq W ar. The im portance of this capability has som etim es been misinterpreted, given the relatively short duration of m any L D C conflicts. One leading analyst of regional conflicts notes that Israel’s stockpiling of munitions indicates an inability to ‘surge’ production in the event of conflict: For Third W orld com batants, the ability to produce consum ables during peacetime has not translated into an ability to deliver sufficient resupplies to troops during com bat, particularly in high attrition battle situations. This has certainly been true for the Israelis, who are forced to mobilize a citizen army for w ar and, in so doing, seriously deplete their industries of the highly skilled technicians needed to sustain high production rates.11 In point o f fact, Israel provides exem ptions for critical employees in the arm s industries. This analyst argues elsewhere that: “ . . . [H ]ad the w ar [in Lebanon] continued at its high attrition rate, Israel w ould have had to turn to the United States for the resupply of m any spare parts and munitions for those systems originating in American industries.” 12 The lack of a timeframe here is irritating. Readers and analysts might w ant to know how soon the Israelis w ould have required US re-supply - a week? a month? a year? Israel produces spare parts for m any US systems, and even provides m ain­ tenance for a number of US aircraft based in Europe. Israel comm itted about 7 6,000 troops to battle in 1982 in eight divi­ sional grou p s.13 The low number of troops engaged m eans that relatively few conscripts were m obilized, m itigating any pernicious effect conscrip­ tion might have on the arm s industry. In addition, these w ould be small divisions, and given the sporadic nature of high-intensity com bat in the 1982 cam paign, IDF requirements for re-supply from the US might not have been nearly as stark as N eum an portrayed them due to the existence of significant stockpiles. These statements reflect a m isunderstanding of the nature of logistics, surge production, and of Israeli m ilitary-industrial capability. A ll nations, or at least those which take the possibility of w ar seriously, stockpile equipm ent.14 The difference between peacetime and wartime expenditure o f consum ables is significant - according to a report to Congress after the G ulf W ar, ‘ [D]emands for some things increased 20 to 30 times the peace­ time rate.’15 N o state (the US included) expects to immediately provide for

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this difference by direct shipments from production sites to the battlefield. There is, in fact, a distinction between ‘cold-base level,’ which m aintains inventories sufficient to sustain troops in preparation for w ar and during the early stages of com bat, and ‘hot-base level,’ which reflects wartime inventory levels. The latter are actually lower than cold-base levels because m obilized production lines will be constantly turning out new equipm ent.16 Surge production capacity is intended to increase production for wartim e, and to m ake up expenditure o f consum ables from stocks and equipment lost in com bat as quickly as possible —not to com pensate for inadequate stockpiles by rapidly m obilizing industrial capacity to meet wartime demand. In the case of high-technology w eapons, surge produc­ tion rates can be only m odest improvements over existing rates, and may take substantial time to achieve. N o t w ithstanding the rem arkable production increases achieved during O peration Desert Storm , substantial time w as required to reach m axim um production rates, even for some com m on, relatively inex­ pensive items . . . six to nine months was required to achieve m axim um production capacity for a variety of items. The time required to increase production rates of m ajor items is greater still. For exam ple, it w ould take 19 months to increase the A H -64 production rate from six to eight a m onth.17 A key indicator of L D C military preparedness, therefore, is stockpiles — and L D C industries can contribute substantially to these stockpiles in peacetime. L D C militaries stockpile equipment for the maintenance of w ar reserve stocks: W ar reserves are those stocks of m aterial am assed in peacetime to meet wartime increases in military requirements until industrial p ro ­ duction can meet demand. W ar reserves provide interim support to sustain operations until resupply began; stockage objectives are a func­ tion of, am ong other things, the threat and industrial base dynam ics.18 Israel experienced the traum a o f a shortage of w ar reserves in the 1973 conflict, when emergency US resupply was thought necessary to sustain IDF com bat operations.19 In 1973, the IDF could supply six divisions in com bat for 14 days, but by 1982 it could supply 11 divisions for at least 28 days — considerably greater capability than the eight small divisions actually fielded, again raising questions about the necessity for American re-supply.20 This capability increased to 40 days for a force o f 12 divisions and 2 0 independent brigades in the late 1 980s.21 Iraq had stocks for 10—30 days of intense com bat distributed down to the com pany level in the K uw ait Theater just before the G ulf W ar. Over 30 0 ,0 0 0 tons of amm unition were available in Kuw ait alone.22 In the after­

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m ath of O peration Iraqi Freedom , US forces discovered that Iraq had stockpiled between 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 and one million tons of m unitions - a supply over half the size of the entire American stockpile. 23 These basic am m unition supplies are cheap and well within the cap­ abilities of m any LD C producers, and stockpile requirements provide sub­ stantial economies of scale. Certain high-technology munitions, in fact, cannot be ‘surged,’ and m ust be stockpiled in some num bers. 24 Stockpiling from local production, then, is both rational and affordable for many LD C producers. M aintenance and repair capabilities, as seen in the case studies, are also critical, both to military perform ance and also because of the linkages with both military and m ilitary-industrial proficiency.25 Both India and Israel obtained substantial advantages over regional adversaries by being able to rapidly repair tanks on or near the battlefield. 26 Soviet analysts estimated that in com bat, 8 5 -9 0 percent o f the ‘new ’ equipment arriving in the hands of troops w ould come from the repair shops, rather than the factories. 27 27 N o t all L D C s can achieve significant capabilities in this arena. Despite improvements m ade to Iraqi maintenance capabilities during the Iran-Iraq W ar, US analysts estimate that at least 20 percent of the Iraqi airforce was grounded for lack of m aintenance in 1991. Iraq ’s army lacked the ability to carry out depot-level m aintenance, and repair of incapacitated systems in Kuw ait w as basically im possible even before the air cam paign began. 28 M aintenance and repair facilities, as described in the ‘ladder o f produc­ tion m odel’ can lead to enhanced production and m odification capabilities. Both Israel and Iraq utilized existing army maintenance depots as the basis for later tank m odification and production projects. This expansion of maintenance facilities can also contribute to supplies o f spare parts - a problem which has afflicted India on num erous occasions. 29 M any other regional pow ers appear to be emphasizing these types of sustenance cap ­ abilities in their military-industrial policies. These capabilities are also the area where technology as a process can be m ost easily transferred between the m ilitary and military industry. Fam iliarization with technological products through use, maintenance and repair increases the recognition of their strengths and lim itations on the battlefield as well as of the process and principles behind their design and assem bly. The ladder of production reflects this concept. In effect, this area of technological absorption is the place where the hierarchy o f production and the hierarchy o f global military culture m ost closely overlap.

Category two: quality maintenance The second category revolves around m odification and m odernization cap ­ abilities, and production of sub-systems which enhance capabilities of existing systems within the LD C arsenal. M ost L D C s m aintain substantial

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arsenals of older equipment which m ay be approaching the end of its active service life. M odernization program s extend service life and can increase the capability o f existing systems to m atch newer generations of equipment which m ay or m ay not be available on the international m arket at higher cost.30 The costs of retrofit are considerably less than those of buying new systems. For exam ple, the $1.56 billion to be spent by the govern­ ments of Belgium, D enm ark, the N etherlands and N orw ay [on air force m odernization] is a great deal of money. However, it will m ain­ tain over 400 m odern fighter aircraft in service whereas the same money w ould only buy 60 to 90 (depending on the designation) of com parable perform ance.31 Once w eapons systems become m ature, the rate of im provem ent in sub­ systems becomes faster than the rate of improvement in the w eapons systems themselves, and the systems themselves have substantially increased service lives. As w eapons systems grow older, they have tended to last longer as the rate of development decreases. In W orld W ar I aircraft became o b so ­ lete in tw o years or less, but in W orld W ar II some aircraft continued in service throughout the w ar. Ships exhibited the sam e phenomenon, m odernized W orld W ar I battleships doing good service in W orld W ar II.32 This phenomenon applies to other m ajor systems as well - the IDF still uses Centurion tanks designed in the late 1940s, and US B-52 bom bers are invariably older than their pilots. As repair, m aintenance, and/or production techniques are mastered, local m odification of foreign-supplied equipment allows the regional pow er to im prove the service life and perform ance of existing equipment. SIPRI analysis suggests that retrofitting offers virtually the sam e com bat pow er as a new system at 2 0 -3 5 percent of the cost.33 M odification program s allow L D C producers to increase the capability o f existing forces at substantial savings in defense expenditures. They also permit L D C s to utilize existing industrial and economic com parative advantages, or in some cases to create them. Israel’s sophisticated electron­ ics industry, for instance, allow s the Israeli airforce to m odify US-designed fighter aircraft with substantially enhanced perform ance and electronic w arfare capabilities, and provides fire control equipment that prolongs the service life and com bat effectiveness of over 3,000 older tanks in IDF inventory. Iraq com bined W estern and Soviet technologies in a number of projects for increasing the effectiveness of aircraft, m issiles, tanks, artillery, and guided w eapons.

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Category three: ability to produce systems not available from other suppliers The third category refers to the provision of equipment unavailable as a result of em bargo, political controversy, and international arms control agreements. Political restrictions and em bargoes, as mentioned above, provide strong incentive for local production o f arm s. It should not be surprising that many of the leading L D C arms producers are associated with the proliferation o f technologies which are theoretically controlled, including ballistic m issiles, chemical and biological w eapons, and nuclear w arheads. The supply of m ajor w eapons platform s, including tanks and aircraft, has been interrupted in some cases, creating requirements for local produc­ tion by LD C s. As mentioned above, much of the existing literature on L D C arms production focuses on m ajor w eapons system s, and questions the rationale for production on economic grounds. The Israeli experience demonstrates that it is not only possible for these systems to be produced largely, albeit not entirely, with indigenous technology, but that the systems can be militarily effective and relatively affordable. Israeli produc­ tion of the Kfir com bat aircraft and the M erkava tank are tw o exam ples. While both depend on im ported inputs (US engines), they contributed sub­ stantially to IDF force posture and potential military capability at com pa­ rable cost to im ported systems. Licensed production of the M iG-21 eventually saved India considerable foreign exchange during 20 years of m anufacture. Dependence and vulnerability to em bargo, however, is often exagger­ ated for political reasons. It is difficult to deny determined states access to both supplies an d technology. South Africa relied largely on M irage air­ frames and foreign technological assistance despite sanctions.34 Iraq con­ tinued to smuggle industrial technology and equipment even while under strict international em bargo. Iran has evaded US efforts to restrict its mili­ tary capability by using Chinese, R ussian, and other suppliers. The threat of undue dependency as a rationale for M W S production by LD C s is, in m ost cases, receding. Increasing com m ercialization of the m arket and efforts by producer states to m aintain existing infrastructure and employment provide strong incentives for exports. Both N A T O and former W arsaw Pact states have large inventories of surplus equipment which can be obtained cheaply and modernized with the assistance o f a variety of states, including both India and Israel.35 Opportunities for co ­ development or co-production of these systems m ay prove attractive to some L D C s, and industrial technology continues to proliferate through offset agreements in m ajor arms deals.36 These new m arket conditions further blunt the danger of ‘partial dependency,’ which is unavoidable for m ost states in any event in the globalizing international economic system .37 Although L D C m ajor w eapons system production m ay be declining,

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incentives for local development and production of other w eapons has increased. The Iran-Iraq and G ulf W ars dem onstrated the usefulness of ballistic missiles as both military and political tools. Given efforts to control the international trade and production of both m ilitary missiles and space-launch vehicles, this is an area where continued LD C emphasis on indigenous production capability can be expected. Production of cruise missiles is well within the capabilities of many regional pow ers. Iraq and N orth K orea are exam ples o f L D C producers that sucessfully pursued significant, and potentially exportable, production capabilities in these fields. Less-sophisticated w eapons can also be subject to controls, as recent U N em bargoes have proven, but these efforts can also be foiled by local production. Iraq and Serbia both m aintained sufficient dom estic produc­ tion of artillery, small arms, and m unitions to ensure regime preservation and to m aintain a form idable m ilitary capability vis-a-vis neighbors and potential external adversaries. Recent initiatives to ban the sale o f land mines, and to m onitor and/or control the sale of sm all arm s, will only serve as incentives for local production.38

Category four: production of regional-specific weaponry and niche production L D C m ilitary industries m ust also provide for military requirements spe­ cific to regional geography, environment, or com bat conditions which cannot be fulfilled elsewhere. W eapons produced by the m ajor suppliers often operate less efficiently in LD C com bat conditions, even when they appear to be specialized designs.39 Regional com bat frequently requires simpler, more robust equipment than the sophisticated devices available from prim ary arm s suppliers. This has been recognized for decades by the US government. ‘While some US high-technology equipment is entirely appropriate for low-intensity con­ flicts, a great deal of our standard equipment is too com plex and expensive for our Third W orld friends and allies.’40 Regional com bat also reflects the interplay of available technologies and w eapons available to both sides, encouraging the local development of counter-m easures and innovations to deny foes existing or potential advantages. Local production, in these cases, contributes to what Z e ’ev Bonen, former director o f the Israeli firm R A FA EL, refers to as ‘qualitative arms races,’ which are m arked by new development in defense technology.41 The proliferation of w eapons and technologies forces the militaries of all states to m ake difficult choices regarding procurem ent and force posture. Each service (airforce, navy, and ground forces) requires several different types o f prim ary com bat systems, depending on its perceived roles, m issions, and opposition, and m ust continue to respond to enemy

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im provem ents. States therefore seek to obtain systems that m axim ize their competitiveness in various com bat m ediums (air, land, sea) and deny the enemy the ability to use those same m ediums effectively. This often involves the creation or exploitation of new or undeveloped technologies.42 Focused research in these areas will lead to com parative advantages, or m ilitary-industrial ‘niches’, which are not only appropriate for local use but are also m arketable abroad. Israel, for exam ple, has developed glob­ ally competitive niches in missile production, RPV/UAV technology, and com bat electronics, prim arily in response to regional requirements. These niches created opportunities for technological surprise of opponents and provided a m eans for rapid response to emerging new threats. If there is a future for L D C arms exports, it is more likely to be in the niche or quality maintenance areas - prom pted by regional com bat experience and com parative advantage - than in direct com petition with higher-tier producers over increasingly limited numbers of expensive sophisticated m ajor w eapons platform s. Other countries (Israel is a good example) will compete in selected areas [of technology], such as remotely piloted vehicles and explosives techno­ logy. Indeed, if history is a guide, such countries may be able, because of their small size and focused efforts, to introduce certain technologies earlier than the wealthier but more ponderous superpowers.43 Even relatively under-industrialized states, such as Iraq, can create sub­ stantial arm s production capabilities based on local requirements and economies of scale that m ay be in great dem and on the international m arket. If Iraq had avoided the G ulf W ar, for instance, Iraqi SSM s might be a highly m arketable item - a niche N orth K orea now fills as the leading exporter o f ballistic m issiles. China has carved a niche in less-sophisticated m ajor w eapons system s, and sells inexpensive aircraft, tanks, and ships to a wide variety of custom ers. Specialization in high-demand niches, there­ fore, can provide its own economies o f scale, in addition to providing for specific regional needs. These developments m ay have substantial im pact on the future international arm s trade.

Regional powers and military industry in the evolving international system Analysis of L D C military industries during the Cold W ar reflected the static, dependence-dominated focus of studies of the international arms trade. The political and economic conditions o f the 1950s and 1960s, and their resulting im pact on arm s transfers and production, constitute signific­ ant anom alies in the longer history of the international arms trade.44 N ew w orks on the international arms trade take a more practical and historical approach to analysis.45

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These new analyses indicate significant changes in the international arms m arket in the afterm ath of the Cold W ar, including the shift tow ards a more comm ercial m arket.46 Ideology and political allegiance will play a less im portant role in arms sales, and supplier diversification will be easier to achieve. Financing and economic support, however, is less likely to be forthcom ing from suppliers, except possibly in the form of offset agree­ ments. A comm ercialized m arket does not mean that supply restrictions will not occur, or that they will be applied im partially. In the post-C old W ar world, em bargoes and supply restrictions have become a preferred tactic for international interference in both regional and internal conflicts.47 The prim ary motives for L D C military industrialization —military threats and opportunities, and avoidance of dependence on foreign arms suppliers — remain unchanged.48 In the emerging arms m arket, however, lower tier or new producers will not be able to compete with the sophistication or prices of available m ajor w eapons platform s, particularly in the aerospace sector. Even the US, the sole remaining first-tier arms producer, cannot m aintain an independent arms industry, relying at least in part on transfers of foreign-m ade parts and technologies.49 The wealthiest second-tier producers find local produc­ tion of new generations of m ajor platform s extravagantly expensive and inefficient.50 Production of new ‘state-of-the-art’ fighter aircraft, in particu­ lar, has become alm ost im possible except as part of a m ultinational consortium .51 Political and economic changes in the international system therefore call into question the whole concept of dependence as defined during the Cold W ar. In this new international environment, LD C arms industries, and indeed arms industries in general, m ust be reevaluated. Existing studies focus on what LD C industries have been unable to accom plish through com parison with higher-tier producers. Future studies m ust examine the very real accomplishm ents o f these industries on a non-global scale, and perhaps anticipate their potential in the changing international political and arms transfer system s. Security considerations have, after all, prom pted both Israel and Iraq to m ake unexpected leaps in industrial capability and technological assim ilation. Regional w arfare now poses a considerable threat to the international system. Rather than acting as a potential spark for conflict between the superpow ers, however, these conflicts now pose the possibility o f indepen­ dently escalating to the nuclear level.52 As regional pow ers achieve de facto nuclear status, regional conflict and extra-regional intervention carry significantly increased risks. The predom inant forms of conflict in the developing w orld are also changing. Regional w ars during the 1960s and 1970s were brief affairs, terminated by a com bination o f logistic shortfalls and superpow er interfer­ ence. L D C militaries, particularly those of the regional powers and m ajor

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L D C producers, are now capable of undertaking and sustaining highintensity conflicts of considerable sophistication and duration, or of funding, arming, and supporting insurgent groups in neighboring states.53 Local production of w eapons in response to regional conflict has im proved the capability of regional pow ers to fight w ars of attrition, and has decreased reliance on foreign technicians and experts. Due in part to local production, some regional powers are im proving their relative positions in the global military culture. The new international system poses several challenges for analysts. Pre­ vailing m ethodology for assessing the arm s trade and arms production is obsolete, and requires reevaluation. Developm ents in civilian and dual-use technologies offer significant potential if adapted for military use. Strat­ egies of technology acquisition m ay significantly enhance long-term mili­ tary capability in a number of states.54 Regional pow er producers figure prominently in international m arkets for some of these technologies, and therefore m ay play im portant roles in their development for military func­ tions. A considerable portion of the value of m odern M W S consists of elec­ tronic subsystem s. Electronics com ponents com prise at least 25 percent of the cost of a w arship, more than 30 percent of the cost of an aircraft, and over 40 percent o f the cost of a tank.55 Licensed production of electronics, as the Iraqi case dem onstrates, can be carried out by states which possess only rudimentary industrial infrastructure and are short of technicians. The increasing im portance of com puterized com ponents also offers opportunities for LD C s which have not previously been viewed as im port­ ant arm s producers but possess or are developing hardw are or softw are industries. A m ajor criticism of L D C m ilitary production, particularly from the economic perspective, is the failure o f L D C military-industries to transfer technologies and useable skills to civilian industries. As we have seen, this criticism is not universally valid. Close linkages between the Israeli civilian and defense sectors increased quality standards in certain high-technology civilian goods. India, on the other hand, deliberately separated the civilian and defense industrial sectors, inhibiting transfers of technologies and skills. Iraqi policy used military industrial projects to create and expand heavy industry and m anufacturing sectors o f the economy - a pattern seen in the Soviet Union and N azi Germ any in the 1930s - but it is unclear how much this w ould have benefited the civilian economy in the long run. The economic benefits of L D C military industrialization in the Cold W ar, therefore, m ust be viewed as m ixed, and analyzed on a case-by-case basis. This is due, in part, to the technologies and industries associated with m ajor w eapons systems in the Cold W ar Era. Production of these w eapons required development of capital and technician-intensive heavy industry, and posed severe strains on developing econom ies.56 R equire­ ments for these resources explains, in part, why m any of the prim ary LD C

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producers are also larger regional powers with significant potential economies of scale.57 This m ay not be the case in coming decades. The emergence of inform a­ tion technology as an im portant economic asset m ay contribute to a trans­ form ation of the international economic system — the phenomenon of globalization. This may lead, as well, to significant changes not only in the social, political, and economic organization of international actors, but also in the manner in which those actors m ake war. Theorists are divided over whether improvements in technology benefit or harm small, weaker states in the international system .58 T oday, many analysts argue that the international system lies on the brink o f a new Revolution in M ilitary A ffairs (RM A ) based on inform a­ tion technologies, precision-guided w eapons, and stealth technology.59 The notion of a ‘system of system s’ — sophisticated real-time comm unications and intelligence systems linked to more m obile, lethal, and widely sepa­ rated forces —continues to frame the debate about defense transform ation strategies and the shape and design of future military forces.60 These concepts are very relevant to L D C militaries and to L D C military industries. If new technologies are the key to future com bat —m issiles, pre­ cision-guided w eapons, and pilotless aircraft, for exam ple —this will lessen the demand or requirement for expensive, top-of-the-line military p lat­ forms that LD C s have historically produced only at significant economic inefficiencies. In regional w arfare, the possession and production of such w eapons may create significant military asymmetries against regional rivals — the same w ay that Israeli advantages in precision w eapons, or Iraqi advantages in chemical w eapons, created significant advantages against A rab or Iranian opponents. Em erging technologies in the form of sensors and inform ation systems have already been deployed by regional pow ers. Both Israel and India have launched satellites with significant military capabilities. Israel’s use of sensors and inform ation systems led to outstanding battle m anagem ent in the 1982 Lebanon conflict, integrating near-real time intelligence with pre­ cision-guided weaponry. In Israel’s case, at least, expertise in these tech­ nologies has contributed to economically productive developments in both military and comm ercial industries. India, an inform ation technology pow erhouse, has the potential to convert its civilian expertise into militaryrelated capabilities, provided it can overcome institutional and political barriers between civilian and military industries. Conversion of inform ation technology into a strategic w eapon, however, appears a distant prospect. The evidence of successful inform a­ tion operations, even by the United States, is rather limited. It is reported that inform ation operations were carried out in K osovo, but were deliber­ ately limited in scope.61 M ore recently, the Falun G ong spiritual movement jam m ed the Chinese governm ent’s Sinosat-1 satellite from June 23—30, 20 0 2 , affecting as many as 70 million people.62 Inform ation technology

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has proven critical in a supporting role to more traditional dimensions of w arfare - inform ation sharing, for exam ple, is an im portant force m ulti­ plier for US forces today. Nevertheless, claim s of a decisive role in the near future appear prem ature.63 Developm ents in range, guidance, and com m unications, however, now offer enorm ous potential military advantages. Some of these technologies allow long-range targeting and destruction of enemy forces with near-real­ time intelligence. Others permit greatly enhanced coordination of forces in space and time for m axim um m ilitary im pact. Still others allow realistic sim ulations of military engagements at a fraction of the cost and trouble of actual exercises. Inform ation system s, advanced data processing, sim ula­ tions, precision-guidance technology, long-range strike capabilities, and advanced sim ulation techniques are am ong the prim ary critical technolo­ gies identified by defense analysts in the coming era.64 Converting these technologies to m ilitary uses is still enhanced, however, by actual hands-on military experience. Regional conflict, there­ fore, m ay help determine the direction of the next ‘military revolution’ serving as a test-bed for the technologies and techniques o f future w arfare. Regional pow ers face several types of threats - low-intensity conflict against internal opponents of the state or regime, low-intensity cross­ border conflict with neighbors, mid-to-high level intensity ‘hot w ars’ within the region, and the threat of extra-regional intervention. Potential for these types of conflicts exists in East and South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the M iddle East, which are also the regions where L D C producers are m ost concentrated. Existing industrial structures in some of the prim ary regional power producers suggest that these states possess significant potential in critical new technologies. The new technologies rely on process skills and human capital, and can be acquired through education and training. Traditional m ilitary-industrial infrastructures based on heavy industry m ay not be necessary for a state to compete in these new technologies. India and Israel both have large and sophisticated electronics and com puter industries, in addition to existing m ilitary-industrial research and production facilities. South K orea, Singapore, and Taiw an all possess military-industrial infra­ structure in addition to advanced scientific and technical sectors. Unlike the W est, however, these states emphasize engineering and applied research, rather than speculative theoretical w ork.65 In the increasingly globalized com m ercial economy, knowledge is power. L D C s are more capable o f generating competitive hum an capital through dom estic education and by foreign study - than capital-intensive heavy industries. As L D C s become comm ercially competitive in the inform ation sector, they m ay become increasingly capable - at least poten­ tially - in emerging military capabilities and in the evolving global military culture. Integration of new com m ercial technologies and m ilitary industries or

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requirements, prom pted by regional threats, creates the potential for LD C producers to m ake significant contributions to the evolution of military capability, and perhaps to im prove their positions in the international m ili­ tary industrial hierarchy an d in global military culture. Existing connec­ tions between military and industrial sectors have, in some cases, already increased national technical capabilities and process skills. Israel, for exam ple, used military service as a means of exposing im m igrants to technology and educating them to much higher standards. At least one analyst has detected sim ilar trends in East A sian states, stating that the im pact of high military participation ratios on economic perform ance is m odest but detectable and significant.66 In the post-C old W ar era, then, the potential of L D C military industries lies in three fields. First, they can continue to provide sustenance require­ ments for existing or planned armed forces, increasing their endurance and staying pow er, and m aintaining and repairing equipment. This production can also be exported, if quality standards and production levels are high enough and there is demand for these goods on the international m arket Regional pow er producers will also continue to produce and m odify existing categories of w eapons for regional requirements, based on specific environmental needs, supply restrictions, and local military balances. Few o f these efforts will be competitive on the export m arket, as higher-tier producers will be able to achieve superior economies of scale in m ost w eapons categories and offer superior financing and offsets on m ost con­ tracts. Both of these capabilities will, however, contribute to the regional pow er’s military capability and position in global military culture, m ain­ taining competitiveness in regional security concerns and providing a deterrent to extra-regional intervention. Finally, and perhaps m ost im portantly, regional powers will continue to m odify, produce, and innovate new w eapons in niches and areas of com ­ parative advantage. Integration of these efforts with existing or developing comm ercial industries may result in im portant technological developments, as occurred with Israeli RPV production. These m ay provide opportunities for some regional pow er producers to im prove their standing in the inter­ national hierarchy, or even to contribute to changing the param eters of that hierarchy entirely. Cooperation in joint and co-development p ro ­ gram s, an increasingly com m on phenomenon in the globalized military industry, also allows for the creation of niches of com parative excellence. These capabilities, however, will remain limited in the near-term when com pared to the United States. Regional pow ers, therefore, are likely to pursue indirect or asymm etric strategies when the potential for conflict with the US is high. Indirect strategies do not rely on decisive military victory, instead attem pting to prolong the conflict, enlarge the theater of confrontation, and capitalize on non-military means for accomplishing political aim s.67 L D C m ilitaries, facing a potential US threat, will be tai­ lored for deterrence and, when possible, denying the effectiveness of crit­

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ical US military capabilities. Regional forces will be unbalanced - m ost L D C s prioritize ground forces, and the more technically-sophisticated air­ forces and navies receive secondary priority.68 Superior technology can be countered by appropriate doctrine and willingness to accept casualties the lessons of K orea and Vietnam are still valid. Local production may create nasty surprises, like the Iraqi ballistic missile force or Israel’s RPVs. O peration Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and O peration Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) have dem onstrated some of the tensions of the new US national security strategy - encom passing the overthrow o f hostile regim es.69 In an era where transnational terrorists thrive in regions of political chaos, the US m ust provide a stable successor regime or risk creat­ ing another haven of terrorism when it w ithdraw s. This requires large US occupation forces and garrisons - stretching US military resources to their limits. Future US m ilitary interventions may, therefore, look back to the more limited w ars of the 1990s as a means of degrading hostile military capability and coercing political concessions. If the US revisits these more limited w ars, leadership m ay also have to re-consider the strategic bom bing concept behind the air cam paigns against Iraq and Serbia. The US strategic bom bing cam paign in 1991 tar­ geted the functioning of the Iraqi government and military, rather than attacking vital elements of w ar production as in W orld W ar II.70 This focus minimized dam age to Iraq ’s m ilitary industry - dam age which was further reduced by Iraqi deception efforts and the overall lack of intelli­ gence regarding the scope of the m ilitary-industrial effort and the location of key facilities.71 Future air operations should reestablish military indus­ tries as high-priority targets. Local production of m unitions and light arms provides the firepower edge that many regimes rely on to keep insurgent and separatist movements in check. Limiting the ability of hostile regional pow ers to reconstitute their military strength locally will increase US and international leverage on these regimes. Intelligence efforts should also reflect the lessons of Iraq, in particular but also of the successful operational deception efforts o f India in the run­ up to the M ay 1998 nuclear tests. As O peration Iraqi Freedom and the U N inspections dem onstrate, intelligence collection and assessm ent remains far from perfect. Iraq ’s use o f covert netw orks and dual-use tech­ nologies will surely be im itated, and existing m ilitary-industrial producers already have prom inent com m ercial industries based around m any o f the m ost im portant technologies. In addition, we now see a new ‘pariah netw ork’ of proliferation with N orth K orea providing m issile technology to Pakistan and Iran, and Pakistan providing nuclear technology to N orth K orea, Iran, and Libya. The latter tw o efforts, in particular, apparently escaped W estern intelligence collection efforts for years. Identifying link­ ages between com m ercial and m ilitary-industrial facilities will require closer cooperation and coordination am ong and between US and inter­ national agencies.

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The production o f arm s indicates national or regime interest in increas­ ing the state’s position in global military culture. This m ay indicate or lead to dissatisfaction with the state’s relative position in global affairs - a con­ dition which some theorists argue m ay increase the likelihood of w ar.72 The connection between producers of conventional w eapons and states suspected of proliferating unconventional arm s is an additional reason for more careful m onitoring of these states. Unconventional solutions to mili­ tary problem s are, regrettably, cheaper than conventional arm s.73 Regional pow er arms industries have achieved some success in a number of areas. They have decreased dependence on outside suppliers, stim ulated an increase in the position of L D C producers in global military culture, and increased the ability of those producer states to fight p ro ­ longed w ars. This increased capacity acts as a deterrent to external aggres­ sion, and provides regional powers with the means to threaten and if necessary defeat neighbors by outlasting them in regional conflict. Local military industries have contributed positively to national military strength, and at times have saved foreign exchange and stim ulated local civilian industries. L ast but not least, local industries have developed dan­ gerous unconventional w eapons capabilities, and regional pow ers have used them or threatened their use in at least seven separate crises (Iraq 1 9 8 4 -8 8 , 1991; Israel 1973; India and/or Pakistan 1 9 8 6 -8 7 , 1990, 1999, 2 0 0 1 -2 ). As the international system becomes more pluralist and globalized, the im portance o f regional military capabilities will grow . H istorically, middle pow ers m ost often assert themselves when the international system is evolving, and they can create conditions which m axim ize their influence.74 The potential for regional conflicts to create the conditions for either revo­ lutionary new military capabilities or a breakdow n in international norm s will increase as the relative pow er of regional actors increases and new threats and opportunities drive changes in policies and allegiance. Regional pow er military industries and their relationship to regional and global m il­ itary capabilities deserve serious consideration and analysis at a time when these states prepare to assert themselves militarily, politically, and economically in a ‘new w orld order,’ and when so m any regional pow ers are threatened by, or seek to capitalize on, the global w ar on terrorism .

Notes

1 Introduction 1 This study will use the term ‘less-developed country’ (LD C ) purely for conve­ nience, although ‘developing country’ is probably a more accurate term. All non-European states, with the exceptions of Jap an , C an ada, A ustralia, N ew Z ealand, and the United States, are considered L D C s for the purpose o f this study. 2 Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International Stratification and Third W orld M ilitary Industries,’ International O rganization 38, N o . 1 (Winter 1984), 172; M ichael Brzoska and Th om as O hlson, ‘A rm s Production in the Third W orld: An O verview ,’ in M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson (eds), A rm s Produc­ tion in the Third W orld (London and Philadelphia: T aylor & Francis for SIPRI, 1986), p. 9. N eum an lists Argentina, Brazil, China, C olom bia, and India; Brzoska and O hlson list Argentina, Egypt, C olom bia, India, and N orth K orea. 3 This total includes the People’s R epublic o f China, which the Stockholm Inter­ national Peace R esearch Institute (SIPRI) does not include as a developing state. M ichael B rzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘Arm s Production in the Third W orld: An O verview ,’ pp. 16—17 (Table 2.3); Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘The Arm s M arket: W ho’s On T o p ,’ O rbis 33 (Fall 1989), 5 1 2 . 4 M ichael Brzoska and Th om as O hlson, ‘A rm s Production in the Third W orld: An Overview ,’ pp. 11—12; Ian Anthony, ‘The “ Third T ie r” Countries: Produc­ tion of M a jo r W eapons’ in H erbert W ulf (ed.), A rm s Industry Lim ited (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1993), pp. 3 6 2 —3. 5 See: ‘N avy R eport A sserts M an y N ation s Seek Poison G a s,’ N ew Y ork Times 10 M arch 19 9 1 ; and Proliferation: Threat an d R esponse (W ashington, D C : Office of the Secretary o f D efense, Jan u ary 2001). 6 See: The N atio n al Security Strategy o f the United States o f A m erica (W ashing­ ton, D C : The White H ouse, Septem ber 2 0 02 ), pp. 9—16. 7 Boutros Boutros-G hali, An A genda for Peace (N ew Y ork: United N ation s, 1992), p aragraph s 60—5; Brian L. Jo b (ed.), The Insecurity D ilem m a: N atio n al Security o f Third W orld States (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 1992); D avid A. Lake and Patrick M . M organ (eds), R egional O rders: Building Security in a N ew World, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), and Etel Solingen, R egional O rders a t Century’s D aw n : G lo b al an d D om estic Influences on G ran d Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 8 See, for exam ple, B. M . Russett, International R egions an d the International System , (Chicago: R and M cN ally, 1967); L. J . C antori and S. L. Spiegel (eds), The International Politics o f Regions, (Englew ood Cliffs, N J: Prentice-Hall, 1970); R. A. Falk and S. H . M endlovitz, R egional Politics an d W orld O rder,

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12 13

14

15

16

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Notes (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973); George Liska, The Ways o f Pow er (C am ­ bridge, M A : Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 3 6 5 -9 . W. H ow ard W riggins w ith F. Gregory G ause, III, Terence Lyons, and Evelyn C olbert, D ynam ics o f R egional Politics: F our System s on the Indian Ocean Rim (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1992); D avid J. M yers (ed.), R egional H egem ons: Threat Perception a n d Strategic R espon se (Boulder, CO : W estview, 1991). See D avid V ital, The Inequality o f States (O xford: Clarendon Press, 1967); A ugust Schou and Arne O lav Brundtland (eds), Sm all States in International R elations (Stockholm : A lm qvist and W iksell, 1971); D avid V ital, The Survival o f Sm all States: Studies in Sm all Pow er/G reat Pow er Conflict (London: O xford University Press, 1971); M arshall R. Singer, Weak States in a W orld o f Pow ers (N ew Y ork: The Free Press, 1972). See Im manuel W allerstein, The M odern W orld System, Vol. I an d II (New Y ork: A cadem ic Press, 1 9 7 4 , 1980); R aim o Vayrynen, ‘Sem iperipheral C oun ­ tries in the G lobal Econom ic and M ilitary O rder’ in H elena Tuom i and R aim o Vayrynen (eds), M ilitarization a n d A rm s Production (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s Press, 1983), pp. 1 6 3 -9 2 . See Kenneth N . W altz, M an, the State, an d War: a Theoretical A nalysis (New Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1954). Barry Buzan, ‘Third W orld Security in Structural and H istorical Perspective,’ in Brian Jo b (ed.), The Insecurity D ilem m a, pp. 1 6 7 -8 9 ; Barry Buzan, ‘A Fram ew ork for R egional Security A nalysis,’ in Barry Buzan and G ow her Rizvi (eds), South A sian Security an d the G reat Pow ers (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s Press, 1986), pp. 3 -3 3 ; Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear (second edition) (Boulder, c O : Lynne Rienner, 1991); R obert M . Rosh, ‘Third W orld M ilita­ rization: Security W ebs and the States They Ensnare,’ Jo u rn a l o f Conflict R es­ olution 32, (Decem ber 1988), 6 7 1 -2 . See A bdul-M onum M . A l-M ashat, N a tio n a l Security in the Third W orld, (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1985); M oham m ed A yoob (ed.), R egional Security in the Third W orld, (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1986); and A shok K apur, The Indian O cean: R egional an d International Pow er Politics, (N ew Y ork: Praeger Press, 1982). Som e analysts w ould disagree with this assertion. See, for exam ple, M oham m ed A yoob, The Third W orld Security Predicam ent: State M aking, R egional Conflict, an d the International System (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 1995). See D avis B. Bobrow and Steve Chan, ‘Simple Labels and C om plex Realities: N ation al Security in the Third W orld,’ in Edw ard A. A zar and Chung-in M oon (eds), N atio n al Security in the Third W orld: The M anagem ent o f Internal a n d E xtern al Threats (Aldershot, U K: Edw ard Elgar, 1988), pp. 4 4 - 7 6 . See A ndrew L. R oss, ‘The Arm ing of the Third W orld: Patterns and T ren ds’, SA IS Review 11 (Sum m er-Fall 1991), 6 9 -9 4 ; and Keith K rause, ‘Arms Im ports, A rm s Production, and the Q uest for Security in the Third W orld,’ in Brian Jo b (ed.), The Insecurity D ilem m a, pp. 1 2 1 -4 2 . A recent comprehensive study of security in the developing w orld is R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie G . N eum an, W arfare a n d the Third W orld (New Y ork: Palgrave Press, 2 0 0 1 ). See also Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Security and Conflict in the D eveloping W orld’ in M ichael Brown (ed.), G rave N ew W orld Threats to G lo b al O rder (W ashington, D C : G eorgetow n University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 2 1 3 -2 9 . See K al J . H olsti, ‘International Theory and W ar in the Third W orld’, in Brian

N otes

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22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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31

32 33

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Jo b (ed.), The Insecurity D ilem m a . . , pp. 37—8; K al J . H olsti, Peace a n d War: A rm ed Contests an d International O rder, 1 6 4 8 -1 9 8 9 (Cam bridge: C am ­ bridge University Press, 1991). M artin W ight, Pow er Politics edited by H edley Bull and C arsten H olbraad (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1978), p. 63. See, for exam ple, Rodney W. Jon es and Steven A. H ildreth, M odern W eapons a n d Third W orld Pow ers (Boulder, C O : W estview, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1984), p. 15; D iscrim inate D eterrence, R eport of the C om m ission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (W ashington, D C : Governm ent Printing Office, Jan u ary 1988), pp. 9—10; and The Future Secur­ ity Environm ent, R eport o f the Future Security Environment W orking Group to the C om m ission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy (W ashington, D C : The Pentagon, O ctober 1988), pp. 3—4. See Eliot A. Cohen, ‘D istant Battles,’ International Security 10 (Spring 1986), 155. From Surprise to Reckoning: The K argil Review Com m ittee R eport (New Delhi: SA G E, D ecem ber 15, 1999), 2 4 2 . M ichael H andel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank C ass & C o., Ltd., 1990), p. 52. Stephen M . W alt, The O rigins o f A lliances (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 2 1 —6. Stephen M . W alt, ‘Alliance, Threats, and US G rand Strategy; A Reply to K aufm an and L a b s,’ in Security Studies 1, no. 3 (Spring 1992), 46 5. A rare exception is Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry: Capability, Perform ­ ance an d Im pact (London: B rassey’s, 1992); See Edw ard A. K olodziej and R obert E. H arkavy (eds) Security Policies o f D eveloping C ountries (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1982); and Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.) D efense Planning in Less-Industrialized Countries (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1984). Other non-military rationales exist, of course. M an y states like to have a few high-technology aircraft, tanks, or large naval vessels for parades and dis­ plays. See M . W ight, Pow er Politics, p. 239. R aju G . C. Th om as, ‘Strategies o f Recipient Autonom y: The C ase o f India,’ in Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin, and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries: Supplier C ontrol or Recipient A utonom y? (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1989), p. 199. See, for instance, W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsider­ atio n s,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld M ilitary In dustrialization: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath and C o., 1986), p. 136. This w as also the explicit policy of the US vis-a-vis the Soviet threat. See W illiam J. Perry, ‘D esert Storm and Deterrence’, Foreign A ffairs 70 (Fall 1991), 68. Edw ard Luttw ak and Stuart L. Koehl, The D ictionary o f M odern War (N ew Y ork: H arperC ollin s, 1991), p. 226. See, for exam ple, Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘M ilitary Technology and Security,’ in G rave N ew W orld - Threats to G lo b al O rder ed. M ichael Brown (W ashing­ ton, D C : Georgetow n University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 17—37. N iederw erfungsstrategie (the strategy of annihilation) seeks decisive battle as the m eans of achieving political ends, hoping to destroy the enem y’s m ilitary capability or will to resist. E rm attun gsstrategie, or the strategy of exhaustion, seeks m eans other than decisive battle to achieve political objectives, raising the costs of continued conflict until they exceed the potential benefits of success for the adversary. See C arl von Clausew itz, O n War, edited and

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N otes translated by M ichael H ow ard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N J: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1976), especially pp. 5 7 7 - 6 3 7 ; H an s D elbruck, The H istory o f the A rt o f War, Vol. I: W arfare in A ntiquity translated by W alter J . Renfroe, Jr. (Lincoln, N E and London: University of N eb rask a, 1975), pp. 1 3 5 -4 3 ; G ordon A. C raig, ‘D elbruck: The M ilitary H istorian ’, in Edw ard M ead Earle (ed.), M akers o f M odern Strategy: M ilitary Thought from M achiavelli to H itler (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. 273. See Sun Tzu, The A rt o f W arfare, translated, with an introduction and com m entary, by R oger Ames (N ew Y ork: Ballantine, 1993), p. 1 0 7 (Chapter Tw o). Sun Tzu counsels against protracted w ar, but som etim es political objectives can only be accom plished, or enemy victory prevented, by deliber­ ately prolonging conflict - for exam ple, Britain’s decision to continue its struggle against N azi Germ any after the fall o f France in 1940, despite no immediate prospects o f success. Geoffrey Blainey, The C auses o f W ar, 3rd edition (N ew Y ork: Free Press, 1988), pp. 3 5 -5 6 . Studies o f this phenom enon include W illiam H . M cN eill, The R ise o f the West (C hicago: University o f C hicago Press, 1963); C arlo M . C ipolla, G uns, Sails an d Em pires, (M inerva Press, 1965); W illiam H . M cN eill, The Pursuit o f Pow er: Technology, A rm ed Force an d Society Since A .D . 1 0 0 0 (C hicago: Uni­ versity o f C hicago Press, 1982); Geoffrey Parker, The M ilitary Revolution (Cam bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1988); and C lifford J . R ogers (ed.), The M ilitary Revolution D eb ate (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1995). Am elia C. Leiss, G. Kem p, J. H . H oaglan d , J. S. Refson, and H . E. Fischer, A rm s Transfers to Less-D eveloped Countries, (C am bridge, M A : M assach u ­ setts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1970), which tracks data up to 1968, and SIPRI, The A rm s T rade with the Third W orld (N ew Y ork: H um anities Press, 1971), which covers the period 1 9 5 0 -6 9 . Arm s transfer patterns have been described as econom ic, geo-political, or ideological. See R obert E. H arkavy, ‘The Changing International System and the A rm s T rad e,’ in A nnals o f the Am erican A cadem y o f Political an d Social Science 535 (hereafter Annals, A A PSS), Septem ber 1 9 9 4 (R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie G. N eum an (eds), Special Issue: The A rm s Trade: Problem s and Prospects in the P ost Cold-W ar W orld), pp. 1 1 -2 8 ; SIPRI, The A rm s Trade With the Third World, pp. 1 7 -4 1 . M artin van Creveld. L esson s o f the Yom K ippu r War: H istorical Perspectives, W ashington Paper N o . 24 (Beverly H ills, CA: SA G E Publications for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975); and Uri R a ’anan, R obert L. Pfaltzgraff, and Geoffrey Kem p (eds), A rm s Transfers to the Third W orld: The M ilitary Buildup in L ess Industrialized Countries (Boulder, CO : W estview Press, 1978). Self-reliance, an Indian term, includes not only dom estically produced goods but also im ports from politically reliable states. R. G. C. T h om as, ‘Strategies o f Recipient Autonom y: The C ase o f In dia,’ pp. 1 8 6 -7 . See, for instance, Jam es E. K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld Arms Industries: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1986); The Future Security Environm ent; A ndrew L. R oss, ‘The Arm ing of the Third W orld . . . ’ From 1 9 6 0 -7 0 , the superpow ers accounted for 80 percent of arm s sales, and the next two largest suppliers only 5 percent. R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie G. N eum an (eds) ‘The C hanging International System and the Arms T rad e,’ pp. 2 0 , 2 2 . In 1 9 8 4 , France and Germ any com bined for 15.5 percent o f all arm s sales, and the European countries (N A T O and W arsaw Pact) su p­

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plied 31.4 percent of the total trade. A rm s C ontrol and D isarm am ent Agency (A CD A ), W orld M ilitary E xpenditures an d A rm s Transfers 1986 (hereafter W M E a T), (W ashington, D C : Governm ent Printing Office), pp. 9—10. W M E A T 1986, pp. 9—10. W M E A T 1986, pp. 6—9. W M E A T 199 3 —94, p. 9. See, for exam ple, Patrice Franko Jon es, The Brazilian D efense Industry: A C ase Study o f Public-private C ollaboration (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1992); and Ken C onca, M anufacturing Insecurity: The R ise an d F all o f B razil’s M ilitary-Industrial C om plex (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). See, for exam ple, Richard A. Bitzinger The G lobalization o f A rm s Production: D efense M arkets in Transition (W ashington, D C : Defense Budget Project, 1993); D efense Industry G lobalization : A Com pendium o f Papers Presented a t a Conference on ‘D efense Industry G lobalization ’ H eld on 16 N ovem ber 2001 (W ashington, D C : The A tlantic Council of the United States, February 2002). Jurgen Brauer and Paul Dunne (eds), A rm ing the South: The E con om ics o f M ilitary Expenditure, A rm s Production, an d A rm s T rade in D eveloping Countries (N ew Y ork: Palgrave M acM illan , 2 0 0 2 ); Richard Bitzinger, Tow ards a Brave N ew A rm s Industry? The Decline o f the Second-Tier ArmsProducing C ountries a n d the E m erging International D ivision o f L a b o u r in the D efence Industry Adelphi Paper # 3 5 6 (O xford: O xford University Press 2003). R andall Forsberg (ed.), The A rm s Production D ilem m a: Contraction and R estraint in the W orld C om b at A ircraft Industry, (C am bridge, M A : M IT Press, 1994); W illiam W. Keller, Arm in A rm : The Political E con om y o f the G lo b al A rm s T rade (N ew Y ork: Basic Books, 1995); Peter J. D om brow ski, Eugene Gholz, A ndrew L. R oss, M ilitary Transform ation a n d the Defense Industry After N ex t: The D efense Industrial Im plications o f Netw ork-Centric W arfare (N ew port, RI: N av al W ar College Press, 2 0 0 2 ). Christian C atrina, ‘M ain Q uestions of Research in The A rm s T rad e,’ in A nnals, A A PPSS 5 3 5 , p. 191. See George Seldes, Iron, B lo o d an d Profits: An E xp osu re o f the World-Wide M unitions R acket (N ew Y ork: H arper and Brothers Publishers, 1934); H . C. Engelbrecht and F. C. H anighen, M erchants o f D eath: A Study o f the Inter­ nation al A rm am ent Industry (N ew Y ork: D odd, M ead & C o., 1934); J. N oel Baker, D isarm am en t (N ew Y ork: H arcourt, Brace, & C o., 1926), am ong others. See Cindy C annizzo, The Gun M erchants: Politics an d Policies o f the M ajor A rm s Suppliers (N ew Y ork: Pergam on Press, 1980); Anthony Sam pson, The A rm s B azaar (N ew Y ork: V iking Press, 1977); Russell W arren H ow e, W eapons: the International G am e o f Arm s, M oney, an d D iplom acy (New Y ork, D oubleday, 1980); and George Thayer, The W ar Business: The Inter­ nation al T rade in A rm am ents (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1969). See, for exam ple, M ichael T. K lare, ‘The Unnoticed A rm s Trade: E xports of C onventional A rm s-M aking Technology,’ International Security 8 (Fall 1983), 68—90; Benjamin Beit-H allahm i, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms a n d Why (N ew Y ork: Pantheon Books, 1987). Bjorn Hettne, ‘Third W orld Arms C ontrol and W orld System C onflicts,’ in T h om as Ohlson (ed.), A rm s Transfer Lim itation s a n d Third W orld Security. (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1988), pp. 17—32. Exam ples include Aharon Kliem an, Israel’s G lo b a l Reach (London:

192

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

Notes Pergam on-Brassey’s, 1985); Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1989); Ron M atthew s, D efence Production in India (N ew Delhi: A BC Publishing H ouse, 1989); and Janne N olan , M ilitary Indus­ try in Taiw an an d South K orea (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1986). Exam ples include N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efence Industry: An International Survey (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1983), which includes one chapter on Israel and another on the developing w orld; Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in D eveloping Countries (Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, 1984); M ichael Brzoska and Thom as O hlson, A rm s Production in the Third W orld; Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D. M cLaurin, and Chung-in M o on (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries . . . A m ong these are M ichael M oodie, ‘Sovereignty, Security, and A rm s,’ The W ashington Papers 58, (Beverly H ills, CA: SA G E Publications, 1979); Ilan Peleg, ‘M ilitary Production in Third W orld Countries: A Political Study’ in Pat M cG ow an and Charles W . Kegley, J r (eds), Threats, W eapons an d Foreign Policy (Beverly H ills, CA: SA G E, 1980), pp. 2 0 9 - 3 0 ; Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification’; R obert M . Rosh, ‘Third W orld Arms Production and the Evolving Interstate System ,’ The Jo u rn a l o f Conflict R eso­ lution 34 (M arch 1990), 5 7 - 7 3 ; R obert E. Looney, Third-W orld M ilitary Expenditure an d A rm s Production (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1988); and, A. F. M ullins, Jr., Born A rm ing: D evelopm ent an d M ilitary Power in N ew States (Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 15, which exam ines states with p opulation s of over 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 that became independent between Jan u ary 1, 1957 and D ecem ber 31, 1981. The m ost influential of these studies are Stephanie G . N eum an, ‘International stratification,’ and M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, Arm s Production in the Third World. See also Christian C atrina, A rm s Transfers an d D ependence (N ew Y ork: T aylor & Francis/United N ation s Institute for D isarm am ent Research, 1988). The m ost comprehensive study o f L D C production defines strategic and polit­ ical issues in terms of changes in the international arm s transfer system and dependency. The conclusion adm its that political m otives are predom inant, but does not explicitly mention the issue o f security at all, focusing instead on dependency. M ichael Brzoska and Th om as O hlson, A rm s Production in the Third World, pp. 2 -5 , 2 7 9 -8 0 . This technique is used by M ichael Brzoska and Th om as O hlson, A rm s Pro­ duction in the Third W orld; and Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratifi­ cation ’ . Q uantitative studies o f L D C arm s industries include R obert M . R osh, ‘Third W orld A rm s Production and the Evolving Interstate System ’; D avid Kinsella, ‘The G lobalization of A rm s Production and the Changing Third W orld Secur­ ity C on text,’ pap er presented at the A nnual M eeting o f the International Studies A ssociation, 2 1 -2 5 February 1995; Ilan Peleg, ‘M ilitary Production in Third W orld Countries: A Political Study,’ pp. 2 0 9 - 3 0 ; H erbert W ulf, ‘Devel­ oping C oun tries,’ in N ichole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efense Industry: An International Survey (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1983), pp. 3 1 0 -4 3 ; Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification . . . ’; and Anne N aylor-Schw arz, ‘A rm s Transfers and the D evelopm ent of SecondLevel A rm s Industries’ in D avid J. Louscher and M ichael D . Salom one (eds), M arketing Security A ssistance: N ew Perspectives on A rm s Sales (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath, 1987) pp. 1 0 1 -3 0 . Andy Lee R oss, Security an d Self-Reliance: M ilitary D ependence an d Conven­

N otes

64

65

66 67 68

69

70

71

72

73

193

tional A rm s Production in D eveloping C ountries (PhD dissertation: Cornell University, A ugust 1984); A ndrew L. R oss, ‘A rm s A cquisition and N ation al Security: The Irony o f M ilitary Strength’ in Edw ard A. A zar and Chung-in M oon (eds), N atio n al Security in the Third W orld, pp. 1 5 2 —87. A ndrew L. R oss, The A rm ing of the Third W orld’ ; Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Technological T ransfer and the Future o f The Center-Periphery System: A R ealist Perspective,’ in The Jeru salem Jo u rn a l o f International R elations 11 (1989), 96—117; Lewis Snider, ‘Supplier C ontrol and Recipient A utonom y,’ in Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin, and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries, pp. 2 3 1 —70. The so-called ‘ ladder of production m odels,’ which attem pt to standardize a rational step-by-step form at for developing military industries appear to be based on the Israeli experience as described in Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling. (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1970), pp. 2 6 —7, 109—36. The simplified version o f the ladder of production used in Table 1.1 is derived from a num ber of sources. See, for instance, A ndrew L. R oss, ‘The Arm ing o f the Third W orld’ : pp. 82—3; Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State, pp. 17 1—4; Jam es E. K atz, ‘U nderstanding A rm s Production in D eveloping C oun tries,’ in Jam es E. K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in D eveloping C ountries, pp. 8—9; R obert E. Looney, Third-W orld M ilitary Expenditure, p. 103; and M ichael M oodie, ‘Sover­ eignty, Security, and A rm s,’ pp. 4 6 —7. M artin Van Creveld, Technology an d W ar, 2nd edition (N ew Y ork: Free Press, 1991), p. 312. Stephanie G . N eum an, ‘International stratification . . .’ ; M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘ C onclusion .’ See Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification . . . ’ , p. 174; M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘Arms production in the third w orld: an overview,’ pp. 2 4 —5. Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification . . .’ ; Stephanie G N eum an, ‘The A rm s M arket: W ho’s On T o p ?’ ; Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘A rm s Aid and the Superpow ers,’ Foreign A ffairs (Summ er 1988), 1 0 4 4 —66. Joseph J . John son, The R ole o f the M ilitary in U nderdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1962) exam ines the positive role that m ilitaries can play in L D C s. Emile Benoit, D efense a n d Econom ic G row th in D eveloping C ountries (Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, 1973) reached the surprising and m uch-debated conclusion that defense spending can have positive effects on L D C econom ies. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industries; Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plica­ tions o f Third W orld M ilitary In dustrialization: Sow ing the Serpent’s Teeth. The im portance of military industrial policy in Ja p a n ’ s rise as a great pow er and in France’ s post-w ar econom ic recovery is discussed in G erald M . Stein­ berg, ‘Technological Transfer . . . ’ and Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1970). See also Richard J . Sam uels, Rich N ation, Strong Arm y: N atio n al Security an d the Technological T ransform ation o f Ja p a n (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1994). Steve Chan and A lex M intz (eds), Defense, Welfare, an d G row th (N ew Y ork: Routledge, 1992); Bruce Russett, ‘Defense Expenditure and N ation al W ell­ Being,’ Am erican Political Science Review 76 (Decem ber 1982), pp. 7 6 6 —77; and W illiam K . D om ke, Richard C. Eichenberg and Catherine M . Kelleher, ‘The Illusion of Choice: Defense and W elfare in A dvanced Industrial D em o­ cracies, 1948 —1 9 7 8 ’ , Am erican Political Science Review 7 7 (M arch 1983), 19—35. R obert E. Looney, Third-W orld M ilitary Expenditure a n d A rm s Production.

194

Notes

74 See N icole Ball, ‘Defence and D evelopm ent: A Critique of the Benoit Study,’ in H elena Tuom i and R aim o Varynen (eds), M ilitarization a n d A rm s Produc­ tion, (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s Press, 1983), pp. 3 9 -5 6 ; United N ations, D epartm ent for D isarm am ent A ffairs, Econ om ic a n d Social Consequences o f the A rm s R ace an d M ilitary Expenditures (N ew Y ork: United N ation s, 1983); N icole Ball, Security a n d Econom y in the Third W orld (Princeton, N J: Prince­ ton University Press, 1988); Ruth Leger Sivard, W orld M ilitary an d Social Expenditures (Leesburg, VA: W orld Priorities, annual). 75 See SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third W orld, 7 3 8 -9 . 76 H erbert W ulf, ‘D eveloping C ountries,’ pp. 3 2 8 -3 9 ; Saadet Deger, M ilitary Expenditure in Third W orld Countries: The E con om ic Effects (Boston: R o u t­ ledge & K egan Paul, 1986), pp. 1 5 5 -6 4 ; C arol Evans, ‘ R eappraising ThirdW orld A rm s Production,’ Survival 28 (M arch April 1986), 9 9 -1 1 8 . The im port-substitution m odel found in these writings is quite sim ilar to that of the stuctural/dependency pessim ists. 77 This assum ption w as particularly attractive given the surge in Brazilian arms exports in the late 19 7 0 s. See Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System ,’ Political Science Q uarterly 104: (Winter 1 9 9 0 -9 1 ) 4, 5 7 9 - 9 6 , especially 5 7 9 - 8 5 ; and Scott D . Tollefson, Brazilian A rm s Transfers, Ballistic M issiles, an d Foreign Policy (PhD disserta­ tion, Joh n s H opkin s University, 1991). 78 M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘ C onclusion ,’ pp. 2 7 9 - 8 0 . These authors conclude, on the basis of the apparent Indian failure to achieve self­ sufficiency, that only an export-oriented policy m akes sense for L D C produ c­ ers, pp. 2 8 2 , 2 8 8 . 79 L D C s did m ake significant inroads into the arm s export business in the 1980s. M o st of these exports, however, were re-exports of previously im ported arm s, with or w ithout m odification. The re-export m arket com prised 43 percent of the international arm s trade in 1988. Lewis Snider, ‘Supplier C ontrol and Recipient A utonom y,’ p. 2 6 9. 80 See, for exam ple, The Brandt R eport, N orth-South: A Program for Survival (N ew Y ork: Pan Books, 1980). 81 A sbjorn Eide and M arek Thee (eds), Problem s o f C ontem porary M ilitarism (London: C room H elm , 1980); M ary K ald or and A sbjorn Eide, The W orld M ilitary O rder: The Im pact o f M ilitary Technology on the Third W orld (London: M acm illan, 1979); H elena Tuom i and R aim o V arynen, M ilitariza­ tion an d A rm s Production (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s, 1983); Helena Tuom i and R aim o Varynen, Transnational C orporations, A rm am ents, a n d D evelop­ ment (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1982). 82 A lexander W endt and M ichael Barnett, ‘D ependent State Form ation and Third W orld M ilitarization ,’ in Review o f International Studies 19 (1993), 3 2 1 -4 7 ; M ichael Barnett and A lexander W endt, ‘The Systemic Sources of Dependent M ilitarization ,’ in Brian L. Jo b (ed.), The Insecurity D ilem m a (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 9 7 -1 1 9 . 83 M ary K ald or, The B aro qu e A rsenal (N ew Y ork: H ill and W ang, 1981); Jam es Fallow s, N atio n al D efense (N ew Y ork: R andom H ouse, 1981). 84 See, for exam ple, H erbert W ulf, ‘D ependent M ilitarism in the Periphery and Possible Alternative C oncepts,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an and R obert E. H arkavy (eds), A rm s Transfers in the M odern W orld (N ew Y ork: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 2 4 6 -6 3 . 85 H erbert W ulf, ‘D eveloping C ountries.’ 86 The increasing diffusion o f m anufacturing technology is discussed in D avid J. Louscher and M ichael D . Salom one, Technology Transfer a n d US Security

N otes

87 88

89

90

91

92 93

94

95 96

97

98

195

A ssistance: The Im pact o f Licensed Production (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1987); D avid Louscher and Anne N aylor-Schw arz, ‘Patterns of Future ThirdW orld M ilitary Technology,’ in Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin, and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries . . , pp. 33—56; Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘C oproduction, Barter and Countertrade: O ffsets in the International Arm s M ark et,’ in O rbis 2 9 :2 (Spring 1985), pp. 183—2 1 3 ; Richard Bitzinger, T ow ards a Brave N ew A rm s In dustry.’ See, for exam ple, M ichael T. K lare, ‘The Unnoticed A rm s T rade . . . ’ . This approach can be noted in M ichael M oodie, ‘V ulcan’ s N ew Forge: Defense Production in Less-D eveloped C ountries,’ A rm s C ontrol T oday 10 (M arch 1980), 1—2, 6—8; M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘ C onclusion ,’ pp. 2 8 1 —2; N ichole Ball, Security an d Econ om y in the Third World. It is strongly contested by A ndrew R o ss in ‘The Arm ing o f the Third W orld . . .,’ p. 90; and also by Anne N aylor-Schw arz, ‘A rm s Transfers and the Developm ent o f Second-Level A rm s Industries.’ These book s are R obert E. H arkavy, The A rm s T rade an d International System s (C am bridge, M A : Ballinger, 1975); Keith K rause, A rm s a n d the State: Patterns o f M ilitary Production a n d T rade (Cam bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1992); Edw ard J . Laurance, The International A rm s T rade (Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, 1992). R aym ond Vernon, Sovereignty a t B ay (N ew Y ork: Basic Books, 1971). See also Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State . . . , pp. 12—34, 4 8 —5 2 , 64—70, 81—98; Ethan B. K apstein (ed.), G lo b al A rm s Production: Policy D ilem m as for the 19 9 0 s (Lanham , m D : University Press of Am erica, 1992), p. 111. Keith K rause, A rm s a n d the State . . . pp. 32—3, 81—99. See also A ndrew Ross. ‘ Full Circle: C onventional Proliferation, the International A rm s Trade, and Third W orld A rm s E xp orts,’ in Kw ang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin, and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries . . . , pp. 3—32 and Ian Anthony, ‘The ‘third tier’ countries . . .’ Anthony and Ross rank states on the basis of production of a ‘full spectrum ’ o f w eapons systems. K rau se’s estim ates are based on total m ilitary expenditure, total arm s exports, and R & D spending. A dapted from Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State . . . , pp. 31—2. K rause exam ines three system s: 1 5 0 0 —1 8 4 0 ; 1 8 4 0 —1945; and the C old W ar system. H arkavy focuses on the 1 9 1 9 —39 period and the C old W ar, while Laurance exam ines the 1 9 1 9 —39 system and then disaggregates the C old W ar system. Keith K rause, Arm s an d the State: Patterns o f M ilitary Production a n d Trade (C am bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1992), pp. 4 9 —52; Geoffrey Parker, The M ilitary Revolution (C am bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1988), pp. 126—8, 136—4 5 ; and C arlo M . C ipolla, Guns, Sails an d Em pires (M inerva Press, 1965), pp. 90—131. See Jerem y Black, European W arfare 1 6 6 0 -1 8 1 5 (N ew H aven, C T : Yale U ni­ versity Press, 1994), pp. 1—3, 15—2 4 , 7 8 —84, 2 0 0 —8. R. Vayrynen and T. O hlson, ‘Egypt: arm s production in the transnational context’ in M ichael Brzoska and Th om as O hlson (eds), A rm s Production in the Third W orld, pp. 106—7; M . E. Selim, ‘ Egypt,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in D eveloping Countries, pp. 123—5. Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State, pp. 68—71. For a general study including m ost o f these cases, see D avid B. Ralston, Im porting The European Arm y: The Introduction o f E u ropean M ilitary Techniques an d Institutions into the E xtra-E u ropean World, 1 6 0 0 -1 9 1 4 (C hicago: University o f C hicago, 1990). R obert E. H arkavy, The A rm s T rade an d International System s, p. 93.

196

N otes

99 R obert E. H arkavy, The A rm s T rade an d International System s, pp. 46, 1 7 0 -2 , 1 9 7 -8 ; John M ilsom , R ussian Tanks 1 9 0 0 -1 9 7 0 (H arrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1970), pp. 9 6 -1 1 1 . 100 Ethan B. K apstein, ‘Introduction: Explaining A rm s C ollab oration ,’ in Ethan B. K apstein (ed.), G lo b al A rm s Production . . . , pp. 6 -7 . 101 Thucydides, H istory o f the Peleponnesian War, Translated by R ex W arner with Introduction and N otes by M . I. Finley (London: Penguin, 1954), I.76.2, p. 80. 102 Even when these factors are identified, they receive little attention. See, for instance, H erbert W ulf, ‘D eveloping C ountries,’ p. 310, w ho identifies secur­ ity, regional hegem ony, and prestige as m ajor m otivations, and then fails to discuss the relationship between m otivation and end-product. See also M ichael M oodie, ‘Sovereignty, Security, and A rm s,’ pp. 2 4 -8 ; and Jam es Everett K atz, ‘U nderstanding A rm s Production in the Third W orld,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in the Third World, pp. 3 -1 3 for brief discussions o f the im portance o f am bitions and threats in determining m ilitary-industrial policy. 103 M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘Introduction,’ pp. 2 -5 and ‘ C onclu­ sion s,’ pp. 2 7 9 -9 0 , in A rm s Production in the Third World. 104 Em bargoes were identified as a key m otivator in Ilan Peleg, ‘M ilitary Produc­ tion . . .’ R obert M . Rosh, ‘Third W orld Arm s Production . . .,’ p. 69 con­ cludes that states which have experienced em bargoes begin military-industrial policies producing more arm s than states which have not experienced em bar­ goes. 105 R ealist w orks include H an s J . M orgenthau, Politics A m ong N atio n s: The Struggle for Pow er an d Peace sixth edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thom pson (N ew Y ork: Alfred A. K nopf, 1985); A rnold W olfers, D iscord a n d C ollab ora­ tion (Baltim ore, M D : Joh n s H opkin s University Press, 1962); M artin Wight, Power Politics edited by H edley Bull and C arsten H olb raad (N ew Y ork, H olm es & M eier, 1978); Kenneth W altz, Theory o f International Politics (N ew Y ork: M cG raw -H ill, 1979); and George Liska, The Ways o f Power. 106 K laus K norr, M ilitary Pow er a n d Potential (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath, 1970), p. 9. These factors m ay apply sim ultaneously - possession of w eapons, for exam ple, m ay deter potential aggressors an d com pel w eaker neighbors. 107 Glenn Snyder, D eterrence an d D efense: T ow ard a Theory o f N atio n al Security (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 3-4 . 108 Keith K rause, A rm s a n d the State . . . , pp. 2 - 3 , 8 -9 , 1 2 -1 8 . 109 This roughly corresponds with SIPRI’s category o f ‘geopolitical’ arm s sales. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third World, pp. 1 7 -4 1 . 110 SIPRI refers to this as ‘econom ic’ incentives for arm s transfers. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third World, pp. 1 7 -4 1 . 111 Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State . . . , pp. 9 7 -8 , 153, 181. K rause identifies these m otives in third-tier cases in all three historical arm s trade system s he exam ines. 112 M ichael H andel, Weak States in the International System , 2nd edition (London: Frank C ass, 1990), p. 3. 113 See R obert E. H arkavy, The A rm s T rade . . . , pp. 1 8 3 -2 1 0 ; and Keith K rause, A rm s an d the state . . . , pp. 3 4 -9 8 . 114 Sweden, for exam ple, pursued a m ilitary-industrial policy m axim izing independence from foreign supply, qualitative advantages, and sophisticated technology. Per H om strom and U lf O lsson, ‘Sw eden,’ in Nichole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efense Industry, pp. 1 4 0 -8 0 . Sweden and Italy im ported over 30 percent of their defense requirements

N otes

115 116 117

118 119

120

121

122

123

124 125

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despite their industrialized status. Andrew L. R oss, ‘W orld O rder and Arms Production in the Third W orld,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld M ilitary Industrialization: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth, p. 280. Ian Anthony, ‘The ‘Third T ier’ Countries . . . ’, pp. 3 6 2 -8 . A gain, SIPRI does not consider China to be a developing country. I have borrow ed this term from D avid Kinsella, in ‘The G lobalization of Arms Production and the Changing Third W orld Security C on text.’ See, for exam ple, Ravinder Pal Singh, ‘India’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking Volume I: China, India, Israel, Ja p a n , South K orea a n d Th ailand (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1998), pp. 4 8 -9 0 . See Avner Cohen, Israel an d the Bom b (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1998). M ichael Handel refers to two types of middle power: those with large popu la­ tions and underdeveloped economies, and those with small populations but highly developed economies. M ichael H andel, Weak States . . ., p. 23. Analysis of future military developments suggests that new technologies m ay create ‘pockets of capability’ allowing small states to hold off much larger ones. Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in W arfare,’ Foreign Affairs 75 (March/April 1996), 53. US D epartm ent of Defense Directive 2 0 0 0 -9 (ASD-I and L), International C oproduction Projects and Agreements between the United States and Other Counties or International O rganizations, 23 Jan u ary 1974. It w as only in the 19 8 0 s that m ajo r electronics system s, such as radar, were added to the list of M a jo r W eapons System s. See S IP R I Y earbook 1 9 9 2 , pp. 3 5 3 -4 . Sm all arm s, m ortars, artillery, am m unition, and non-arm ored vehicles are not considered in SIPRI data. This designation is drawn from Edw ard Luttw ak and Stuart L. Koehl, The D ictionary o f M odern War, p. 661, and differs from SIPRI’ s definition of an M W S. A m ajor platform constitutes, for this analysis, a self-contained com bi­ nation of w eaponry, detection or fire-control systems, transport capability, and a crew. See Henry Sokolski, ‘Will There Be an A rm s T rade Intelligence D eficit?,’ A nnals A A PSS 5 3 5 , pp. 1 5 8 -6 2 ; M ichael Brzoska, ‘Arms Transfer D ata Sou rces,’ Jo u rn a l o f Conflict Resolution 26 no. 1 (M arch 1982), pp. 7 7 -1 0 8 ; Edw ard J . Laurance and Joyce A. M ullen ‘A ssessing and Analyzing Inter­ national A rm s T rade D a ta ,’ in D avid J. Louscher and M ichael D . Salom one (eds), M arketing Security A ssistance: N ew Perspectives on A rm s Sales, pp. 7 9 -1 0 8 ; Edw ard T. Fei, ‘U nderstanding Arms Transfers and M ilitary E xpen­ ditures: D ata Problem s,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an and R obert E. H arkavy (eds), A rm s Transfers in the M odern W orld (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1980), pp. 3 7 -4 6 ; N icole Ball, Third W orld Security Expenditures: A Statistical C om ­ pendium (Stockholm : N ation al Defence Research Institute, M ay 1984), pp. 5 -3 9 ; Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State . . , pp. 2 1 6 -1 9 . Ian Anthony, ‘The ‘Third T ier’ Countries . . , ’ pp. 372, 378. An interesting study of this phenom enon is Christopher S. Parker, ‘N ew W eapons for O ld Problem s: Conventional Proliferation and M ilitary Effec­ tiveness in D eveloping States,’ in International Security, 2 3 :4 (Spring 1999), 1 1 9 -4 7 .

2 In d ia 1 Until 1983, the Indian governm ent officially held exports of military equip­ ment in conflict with Indian foreign policy objectives. Ron M atthew s, Defence

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Notes Production in India (N ew Delhi: A BC Press, 1989), p. 78; R aju G. C. Th om as, ‘Defense Planning in In dia,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1984), p. 243. Jaw ah arlal N ehru, In d ia’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches Septem ber 194 6 -A p ril 1961 (N ew Delhi: Governm ent o f India, 1961), p. 99. K. M . Panikkar, Problem s o f Indian D efence (N ew Y ork: A sia H ouse, 1960), p. 125. A rticulated by K autilya in A rthash astra (Statecraft), the doctrine of m andala assum es that one’s neighbor is an enemy, and that an enemy’s neighbor is an enemy of one’ s enemy, and therefore a potential ally. K autilya, The A rth ash astra, edited, rearranged, translated and introduced by L. N . Rangarajan (Penguin Books, India (P) Ltd., 1992). See also George K. Tanham , Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive E ssay (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 1992), pp. 23, 34—5; R aju G . C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 16—17; and also George M odelski, ‘K autilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Third W orld,’ A m er­ ican Political Science Review 58 (September 1964), 5 4 9 —60. South A sia is defined here as the region including A fghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burm a, India, the M aldives, N epal, Pakistan, and Sri Lan ka. See Lt. Gen. (Retired) A. H asn an H abib, ‘Southeast A sian Perceptions of India’ s Stra­ tegic Developm ent: An Indonesian V iew ,’ in R o ss Babbage and Sandy G ordon (eds), In d ia’s Strategic Future (N ew Y ork, St. M artin ’s, 1992), pp. 1 0 7 —21. A ccording to 2 0 0 4 data published in the CIA W orld F actbook at w w w .cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook, In dia’s 2 0 0 3 G D P of $ 3 .0 0 2 trillion (calculated in terms o f purchasing pow er parity) w as over four times the size o f the com bined total for the rest of the region, and alm ost ten times greater than Pakistan ($ 3 1 7 .7 billion). On Indian regional objectives, see M oham m ed A yoob, ‘India in South A sia: The Q uest for R egional Predom inance,’ W orld Policy Jo u rn a l 7 (Winter 1 9 8 9 —90), pp. 107—33. India has the third largest pool o f scientisis and engineers in the w orld, behind the United States and R u ssia. ‘The A sia—Pacific Region: Grow th and M o b il­ ity,’ M ilitary Technology (April 1990), 6 7 —9. See K anti P. B ajpai and Am itabh M attoo (eds), Securing In dia: Strategic Thought an d Practice (Essays by George K. Tanham with commentaries) (N ew Delhi: M an ohar, 1996). R aju G. C. T h om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 2 9 5 ; Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian arm y: Its C ontribution to the D evelopm ent o f a N ation (Berkely: Uni­ versity o f C alifornia Press, 1971). Jasw an t Singh, D efending India (London: M acm illan Press Ltd., 1999); and Ravinder Pal Singh, ‘India’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking - Volume I: China, India, Israel, Ja p a n , South K orea an d Th ailand (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1998), pp. 4 8 —90. Those ten occasions are: the first K ashm ir Conflict (1 9 4 7 —48); the absorption o f H yderabad (1948); the conquest o f G o a (1961); the H im alayan W ar with China (1962); the Rann of Kutch incident (April 1965); the Second Kashm ir Conflict (late sum m er 1965); the liberation o f Bangladesh (1971); the inter­ vention in the M aldives (1988); the Peacekeeping O peration in Sri Lanka (1987—90); and the K argil W ar of 1999. R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 92; M a jo r K . C. Praval, Indian arm y After Independence (N ew Delhi: Lancer’ s International, 1990), pp. 1—93. George Perkovich, In d ia’s N uclear B om b (Berkeley: University of C alifornia

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Press, 1999); R aj C hengappa, W eapons o f Peace (N ew Delhi: H arperC ollins Publishers India Pvt Ltd, 2 0 0 0 ); and Ashley J. Tellis, In d ia’s Em erging N uclear Posture: Between R ecessed D eterrent an d R eady A rsenal (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 2 0 0 1 ). Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Pakistani N u clear D octrine and the D angers of Strategic M y o p ia,’ A sian Survey X L I: 6 (N ovem ber/D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 ), 9 5 6 -7 7 ; Z a far Iqbal Cheem a, ‘Pakistan’ s N uclear Use D octrine and C om m and and C ontrol’ , in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J. W irtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: H ow N ew Pow ers Will Use N uclear, Biological, a n d Chem ical W eapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 1 5 8 -8 1 . See Tanham , Indian Strategic T h o u g h t. . . , pp. 5 0 -6 9 . Jasw an t Singh, D efending India and W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, ‘India’s N u clear Use D octrine,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds) Planning the Unthinkable . . , pp. 1 2 5 -5 7 . D eepa M . O llapolly, ‘M ixed M otives in India’ s Search for N u clear S tatu s’ , A sian Survey X L I, N o . 6 (N ovem ber/D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 ), 9 2 5 -4 2 ; Jasw an t Singh, ‘A gainst N u clear A partheid,’ Foreign A ffairs 77:5 (Septem ber/O ctober 1998), 4 1 - 5 2 ; ‘Paper Laid on the Table o f the H ouse on Evolution of India’s N u clear Policy,’ w w w .m eadev.gov.in/govt/evolution.htm . Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘K argil - The N u clear D im ension,’ in Peter Lavoy and Surinder R an a (eds), Asym m etric W arfare in South A sia (forthcom ing). H erbert W ulf, ‘D eveloping C oun tries,’ in N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efense Industry (N ew Y ork, St. M artin ’ s, 1983), pp. 3 2 1 -3 9 ; C arol Evans, ‘R eappraising Third-W orld A rm s Production,’ Sur­ vival 28 (M arch/A pril 1986), 9 9 -1 1 8 ; Saadet D eger, M ilitary Expenditure in Third W orld Countries, (London, Boston, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 1 5 5 -6 4 . Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal: D irection or D rift in D efence Policy (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1994). Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u est for Security: D efence Policies, 1 9 4 7 -1 9 6 5 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University o f C alifornia, 1967), pp. 9 -1 0 ; Ashley J . Tellis, ‘Securing the Barrack: The Logic, Structure and O bjectives of India’ s N av al E xp an sion ,’ in R obert H . Bruce (ed.), The M odern Indian N avy a n d the Indian O cean: D evelopm ents an d Im plications (Perth, A ustralia: Curtin University of Technology, 1989), pp. 8 -9 . Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , pp. 1 3 -1 5 . Barry Buzan and Gow her Rizvi (eds), South A sian Security an d the G reat Pow ers, (N ew Y ork, St. M artin ’s, 1986). Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘The W ar on Terrorism in South A sia,’ in Devin T. H agerty (ed.), South A sia in W orld Politics (Lanham , M D : R ow m an & Littlefield, 2005). Other separatist movem ents in the northeast include troubles with the Kheri and G eros tribes, as well as periodic unrest in T ripura and M an ipur. The N axalite C om m unist m ovem ent w as supported by the P R C until the mid1970s. R aju G. C. T h om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 5 4 -6 5 . The South A sia Terrorism Portal, w w w .satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/ index.htm l Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Power, Proxim ity and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashm ir as a N u clear Flashpoint’, and other chapters in Sum it G anguly (ed.), The K ashm ir Q uestion: R etrospect an d Prospect (London: Frank C ass, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 1 1 7 -4 4 . R aju G. C. T h om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 5 9 - 6 0 ; N an cy Jetly, ‘India: The D om estic D im ensions o f Security,’ in South A sian Security an d the G reat

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N otes Pow ers, ed. Barry Buzan and Gow her Rizvi (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1986), pp. 5 2 —3. Sources on Indo-Pakistani relations include W illiam J . Barnds, India, Pakistan an d the G reat Pow ers (N ew Y ork: Praeger 1972); G. W . Choudhury, India, Pakistan, B angladesh, an d the M ajor Pow ers (N ew Y ork: Free Press, 1975); G ulab M ishrar Prakhar, Indo-Pakistani R elations (Delhi: Ashish, 1987). The Pakistani arm y’s record in the form er is controversial, and in the latter is deplorable. Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Pakistan’s N uclear D octrine and the D angers o f Strategic M y o p ia.’ Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘The W ar on Terrorism in South A sia,’ and Praveen Swam i, ‘Terrorism in Jam m u and K ashm ir in Theory and Practice’ in S. Ganguly (ed.), The K ashm ir Q uestion . . , pp. 5 5 —88. An interesting twist on this relationship occurred in the m id-1990s when India purchased uranium for the T arap u r nuclear facility from China. ‘India Buying Chinese U ranium ,’ Washington Post, January 8, 1995. See also ‘India’s Letter to Clinton on N uclear Testing’, N ew York Times, M ay 13, 1998. R aju G. C. Th om as, ‘Strategies of Recipient A utonom y,’ in Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin, and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries: Supplier C ontrol o f Recipient A utonom y (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1989), pp. 1 8 6 —7. These concepts of the differing interests o f political leadership, econom ists, and military leaders are derived and interpreted from the various w ritings of R aju G . C. Thom as. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 126 (n. 2). R aju G . C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 195—2 3 3 . In fact, through 1 9 84 the Cabinet had never even discussed long-term strategy K. Subrahm anyam , ‘Com m entary: Evolution o f Defence Planning in In dia,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in Less-Industrialized States, pp. 269, 273 (n. 8). See also From Surprise to Reckoning: The K argil C om ­ mittee Review R eport (N ew Delhi: S A g E , 1999), pp. 2 5 2 —64. An interesting study is Verghese K oith ara, Society, State & Security: The Indian Experience (N ew Delhi: SA G E, 1999). Stephen P. Cohen, In dia: Em erging Pow er (W ashington, D C : Brookings Insti­ tution Press, 2 0 0 1 ); George Perkovich, ‘Is India a M ajo r Pow er?’ in The W ashington Q uarterly 27:1 (2003), 129—44. In 2003 the there were 4 0 O rdnance Factories (OFs) and one more still in construction in N alan d a, Bihar, A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (N ew Delhi: M inistry of Defence, Governm ent of India), p. 41 available at: m od.nic.in/ reports/welcom e.htm l. One of these units —Praga T o ols Lim ited, which produced prim arily for the civilian m arket — is no longer listed as a Defence Public Sector Unit by the M inistry of Defence A nnual Report. See A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (G overn­ ment o f India), p. 41. Useful studies o f the structure of the Indian arm s industry include Thom as G raham , ‘India,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in D eveloping C ountries (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1984), pp. 1 5 7 —91; Andy Lee Ross, Security an d Self-Reliance: M ilitary D ependence a n d C onventional A rm s Pro­ duction in D eveloping Countries (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University, PhD D isser­ tation A ugust 1984), especially pp. 316—4 5 5 ; Ron M atthew s, Defence Production in In d ia; R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, especially pp. 135—2 7 5 ; H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the unfulfilled quest for self-sufficiency,’ in M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson (eds), A rm s Production in the Third W orld ed. (London and Philadelphia: T aylor & Francis, 1986), pp. 125—45.

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43 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 41. 44 Ravinder Pal Singh, ‘India’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking . . , p. 57. 45 In 1993, all o f the D PSU s were entirely governm ent owned except for G oa Shipyards, Ltd. (GSL) which w as a m ajority (51.08 percent) governmentowned firm. India 1993 (N ew Delhi: M inistry of Inform ation and B roadcast­ ing, Jan u ary 1994), p. 74. 46 In 1992, the D PSU s produced R s2 1 .8 2 4 billion (about $ 7 5 0 million in 1992 $US) in defense goods and another R s1 2 .6 0 4 billion ($400 million) in civilian goods. M inistry of Defence, Governm ent of India, A nnual R eport 1 9 9 2 -9 3 , pp. 4 9 - 5 0 . Production in 2 0 0 1 /0 2 w as approxim ately R s61 billion (ap p ro xi­ m ately $1.5 billion) from the O rdnance Factories (12 percent civilian goods) and R s7 6 .6 6 3 billion (approxim ately $1.9 billion) at the D PSU s. Praga Tools Limited is no longer listed as a Defence Public Sector U ndertaking. A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), pp. 4 0 -5 6 . 4 7 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 47. 48 M oham m ed A bdullah, ‘ Beyond Bofors: India in Search of a R ational Procure­ ment Policy,’ M ilitary Technology (Decem ber 1999). 49 See H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the unfulfilled quest . . . , ’ p. 133. 50 D efense a n d Foreign A ffairs (April 1990), pp. 3 8 -4 1 ; In d ia’s D efence Public Sector: A Profile (N ew Delhi: M ehta, 1983); India 1 9 9 1 , pp. 7 3 -6 ; ‘Industry Builds Up Strength,’ Ja n e ’s D efence Weekly (hereafter JD W ) (M ay 26, 1990), p. 1039; A nnual R eport (various years); and text. 51 Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . , p. 127. 52 India 1991, pp. 8 9 -9 0 ; Jam es C lad. ‘Power am id poverty,’ F E E R (7 June 1990), 4 7 -9 ; ‘D R D O : O ff C ou rse,’ India T o day (September 15, 1992), 85. 53 Defence Research and D evelopm ent O rganization website at w w w .drdo.com / labs/index.shtm l. 54 Defence Research and D evelopm ent O rganization website at w w w .drdo.com / genesis.shtm l. 55 Ron M atthew s, D efence Production in In dia, pp. 9 6 -7 . 56 D espite this cooperation, however, Indian R & D has been criticized for a lack o f ‘cross-fertilization,’ and an obsession with pure research. See Jam es C lad, ‘Technical K n ock out,’ F E E R (June 7, 1990), 4 7 - 9 . 5 7 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 43 ; M atthew s, Defence Production . . , p. 91. 58 ‘India’s M ove T ow ard s Self-Reliance, and the N ew Search for Defense E xp o rts,’ Defence & Foreign A ffairs (hereafter D & F A ) (April 1990), 2 9 ; the 2003 R eport of the Com ptroller and A uditor General, Governm ent of India at w w w .cagindia.org/reports/defence/2003_arm y/index.htm . 59 India 1991, p. 73. See also A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent o f India) and other years. 60 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), pp. 4 0 -2 . 61 N on-defense sales were up over 25 percent from the previous year. A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent o f India), p. 4 4 . In the 1 9 8 0 s, only 3 percent o f O F production w as for non-m ilitary purposes. W ulf, ‘India: The Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 131. 62 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 45. 63 R aju G. C. T h om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 2 5 5 -6 . 64 Nehru refused to allow the Indian military to publish a pam phlet on Chinese tactics and doctrine in the early 19 5 0 s in an effort to avoid increased tensions. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 95. 65 See M ichael Brecher, The Struggle for K ashm ir (T oronto: Ryerson, 1953),

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N otes M ajo r K. C. Praval, The Indian arm y A fter Independence, pp. 2 1 —80; Chaudhury, P ak istan ’s R elations with India, 1 9 4 7 -1 9 6 6 , pp. 13—140. See also Dennis K ux, E stran ged D em ocracies (W ashington, D C : N atio n al Defense University Press, 1992), pp. 1—98 on early US—Indian relations, particularly regarding K ashm ir. Excellent studies of K ashm ir include Sum it Ganguly, The C risis in K ashm ir (W oodrow W ilson Center and C am bridge University Press, 1997); and R obert W irsing, India, Pakistan, a n d the K ashm ir dispute: on regional conflict an d its resolution (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1994). Dennis K ux, D isenchanted Allies: The United States an d Pakistan 1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 0 (Baltim ore, M D : The Joh n s H opkin s University Press, 2 0 0 1 ). A joint US/UK em bargo on both sides during the 1 9 4 7 —49 K ashm ir dispute caused w as the region’s first experience of the difficulties of military dependency. Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 90. See Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, pp. 4 1 —73. The attitude o f m any leaders w as best summ ed up by M oh an d as K. (M ahatm a) G andhi, w ho com m ented: ‘T o day they m ust plough the land, dig wells, clean latrines and do every constructive w ork that they can, and thus turn the people’s hatred of them into love.’ Cited in H erbert W ulf, ‘India: An Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 125. See Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , pp. 1 4 1 —63. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 126. ‘ . . . it w as m ore practical to have the capacity to m anufacture a second-rate thing in one’s own country than to buy a first-rate thing from outside,’ cited in Ian C. G raham , ‘The Indo-Soviet M iG D eal and its International R epercus­ sion s,’ A sian Survey 4 (M ay 1964), 825. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third W orld (N ew Y ork: H um anities Press, 1971) (hereafter SIPRI, The A rm s T rade (1971)), p. 745. Pushpindar C hopra, ‘Spinal C ord of the Indian Air Force,’ A ir International (January 1975), 10—11, cited in Am it G upta, ‘The Indian A rm s Industry: A Lum bering G ian t,’ A sian Survey 30 (Septem ber 1990), 848. Amit G upta, The ‘Indian A rm s Industry . . . , ’ p. 848; SIPRI The A rm s Trade With The Third W orld, revised edition (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier,1975) (hereafter SIPRI, The A rm s T rade (1975)), 33. Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H o c A rsenal, pp. 5 6 —9. George K. Tanham and M arcy A gm on, The Indian A ir Force: Trends an d Prospects (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 1995), p. 20. R aju G. C. T h om as, ‘The Armed Services and the Indian Defense Budget,’ A sian Survey 2 0 (M arch 1980), pp. 2 8 0 —1; Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u est . . , pp. 154—68. M enon w as also using the military to form a potential pow er base in the 1 958—62 period through the m anipulation of prom otions and assignm ent of defense contracts. See Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u est . . . , pp. 139—68; S. S. Khera, In d ia’s D efence Problem (Bom bay: Orient Longm an, 1968), pp. 7 3 —4; R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 123; and Francis H oeber, Yuan-li W u, W illiam R ood, M aclin Sum m ers, and Ellen H eckler, Technical R eport N o. 4 3 2 0 -3 ‘Boundary Conditions of the Sino-Indian Conflict,’ (M enlo Park, CA: Stanford Research Institute June 1963), pp. 7 5 —9. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 128. F E E R (M ay 2 1 , 1964), 370. Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u est . . . , pp. 5 7 —62, 140; T h om as G rah am , ‘India,’ pp. 157—68. See Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, pp. 4 8 —66. A good description of the M iG deal written shortly after its consum ation is

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103 104 105 106 107

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Ian C. G rah am , ‘The Indo-Soviet M iG D eal and its International R epercus­ sion s.’ See also Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 108. George K. T an ham and M arcy Agm on, The Indian Air Force . . . , pp. 2 0 -1 ; Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , pp. 1 0 9 -1 5 . The n avy’s share of the Indian defence budget at independence w as about 2 percent. This climbed to nearly 10 percent in 1962, and dropped back to 3 percent after the H im alayan disaster at the end o f that year. H orm uz M am a, ‘India’s N av al Future: Fewer Ships but Better,’ International D efence Review (February 1993), 1 6 1 -4 . R ear A dm iral J. R. Hill, M aritim e Strategies for M edium Pow ers (Annapolis, M D : N av al Institute Press, 1986); Ashley J . Tellis, ‘The N aval Balance in the Indian Subcontinent: D em anding M issions for the Indian N av y ,’ A sian Survey 25 (Decem ber 1985), 1 1 8 6 -2 1 3 ; Sandy G ordon, ‘Indian Defense Spending: Treading W ater in the Fiscal D eep,’ A sian Survey 32 (O ctober 1992), 950. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade (1975), 181; Lorne J . K avic, The Q u est . . . , pp. 1 5 8 -6 3 . Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u est . . . , pp. 1 1 1 -1 5 ; Ian G raham , ‘The Indo-Soviet M iG D eal,’ p. 825; SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . . (1975), p. 181; George K. Tanham and M arcy A gm on, The Indian A ir Force . . . , pp. 2 0 -3 ; SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . (1971), p. 7 5 1 ; Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, p. 77. See Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . , pp. 1 2 2 -5 . M a jo r K. C. Praval, Indian arm y A fter Independence, pp. 1 6 7 -7 1 . See Steven A. H offm an , India a n d the China Crisis (Berkeley, CA: University o f C alifornia Press, 1990); Shanti Prasad V arna, Struggle for the H im alayas (N ew Delhi, Sterling, 1971); Brig. Gen. J. D alvi, H im alayan Blunder (Bom bay: Thacker, 1969); Neville M axw ell, In d ia’s China W ar (London: Jon ath an C ape, 1970); and M a jo r K. C. Praval, Indian arm y . . . , pp. 1 5 0 -2 4 3 . R avi Rikhye, The M ilitarization o f M other India, pp. 3 5 -4 3 ; Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, pp. 5 6 -9 , 6 8 -9 . See D avid Saw , ‘Light C om bat A ircraft: A Recurring Tren d,’ M ilitary Techno­ logy (O ctober 1987), p. 69. D avid Saw , ‘ Light C om b at A ircraft: a Recurring Tren d,’ p. 69. The first O rpheus 701 cam e off an Indian production line on N ovem ber 2 1 , 1960. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 132. F E E R (February 15, 1962), 383. Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, p. 160. F E E R (Decem ber 9, 1965), 4 7 6 . Production eventually ceased in 1969. ‘H eading into O rbit’ , F E E R (June 5, 1969), pp. 5 5 6 -8 . See H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 134; Am it G upta, ‘The Indian Arm s Industry . . . , ’ p. 848. ‘India to E xport A ircraft,’ F E E R (January 4, 1962), p. 33. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 134, refers to this as a ‘fit o f pique.’ F E E R (July 13, 1961), 71. Prospective partners included the US, the Soviet Union, and Egypt. H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 135 and F E E R (Decem ber 9, 1965), p. 476. F E E R (July 2 6 , 1962), 184; Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q uest, p. 134. H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ 135. T h om as G raham , ‘In dia,’ p. 170; F E E R (January 30, 1964), 275. Prodyut D as, ‘A ircraft Resurgery Program m es: Their Role in D evelopm ent of A eronautical D esign,’ Indian D efence Review (July 1990), 113. H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the unfulfilled quest . . . , ’ p. 135; Am it G upta, ‘The

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113 114

115

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117 118 119 120

121 122 123 124 125

126

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N otes Indian Arm s Industry . . . ’ pp. 8 4 8 -9 ; Ja n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , pp. 7 9 -8 0 ; R aju G. C. T h om as, ‘A ircraft for the Indian Air Force . . . , ’ p. 88. R aju G. C. T h om as, ‘The Armed Services and the Indian Defense Budget,’ p. 293. H erbert W ulf, ‘India: an Unfulfilled Q uest . . . ’, p. 126. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u est . . . , p. 91; SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . (1971), p. 481. F E E R (O ctober 18, 1974), 32; T h om as G raham , ‘In dia,’ p. 168. Three versions of the K iran were produced: the M k . I, M k. IA, and M k. II. The Kiran II suffered from program delays and teething troubles when m ost o f its staff were transferred to w ork on the M aru t program . Lorne J . Kavic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 197. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . . (1971), p. 750. Nehru sent two letters to the US on N ovem ber 19, 1 9 6 2 . The first asked for the US to send a dozen squadron s of fighter aircraft to protect Indian cities. The second asked for tw o squadron s of B-47 bom bers for deep strike m is­ sions. Dennis K ux, E stran ged D em ocracies (W ashington, D C : N ational Defense University Press, 1992), p. 207. The US provided transport aircraft and assistance in establishing factories for the production sm all arm s and am m unition for the Indian army. F E E R (M ay 21, 1964), 370; Andy Lee R o ss Security a n d Self-Reliance . . , pp. 3 5 0 -1 ; and Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , pp. 1 9 8 -2 0 5 . See R. Chari, ‘Indo-Soviet M ilitary C ooperation: A Review ,’ in A sian Survey 19 (M arch 1979), pp. 2 3 0 - 4 4 ; Jyotirm oy Banerjee, ‘M o sco w ’ s Indian A lliance,’ in Problem s o f Com m unism 36 (January-February 1987), 1 -1 2 ; Dilip M ukerjee, ‘Indo-Soviet Econom ic T ies,’ in Problem s o f C om m unism 36 (January-February 1987), 1 3 -2 4 . Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 202. Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q uest . . . , pp. 2 4 2 - 3 ; International Institute for Stra­ tegic Studies, The M ilitary B alance 1 9 7 5 -7 6 (London: B rassey’ s, 1976), p. 54. R aju G . C. Th om as, ‘The Armed Services . . , ’ p. 288. R aju G. C. T h om as, ‘The Grow th o f Indian M ilitary Power: From Sufficient Defence to N u clear D eterrence,’ in R oss Babbage and Sandy G ordon (eds), In d ia’s Strategic Future (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1992), p. 53. F E E R (July 18, 1963), 158. Th om as G rah am , ‘In dia,’ p. 160. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . . (1975), pp. 1 8 2 -6 ; Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q uest . . . , p. 203; T h om as G raham , ‘In dia,’ pp. 1 6 7 -8 . Th om as G rah am , ‘In dia,’ p. 167. Sum it Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1 9 4 7 (O xford: O xford University Press, 2 0 0 1 ), pp. 3 1 -5 0 ; T.V . Paul, Asym m etric Conflicts: War Initiation by W eaker Pow ers (Cam bridge: C am bridge Univer­ sity Press, 1994), pp. 1 0 7 -2 5 . M ajo r K. C. Praval, Indian A rm y . . . , pp. 2 4 4 - 3 0 7 ; George K. T anham and M arcy Agm on, The Indian Air Force . . . , pp. 2 3 - 3 4 ; SIPRI, The A rm s Trade (1971), pp. 4 9 0 -4 . K. Subrahm anyam , ‘U nrecorded Lessons of O u r M ilitary H istory,’ Indian D efence Review (July 1990), 1 2 9 -3 2 . Henry K issinger writes that in the opinion of US analysts, Pakistan w as only 72 hours from annihilation at the time o f the ceasefire. H enry Kissinger, White H ou se Years, (Boston: Little, Brown and C o.), p. 912. This is hyper­ bole, but Indian army units were being m oved to the W estern theater.

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129 For accounts of the conflict, see R obert Jack son , South A sian Crisis (London: C hatto & W indus, 1975); Richard Sisson and Leo B. Rose, War an d Seces­ sion : Pakistan, India, an d the Creation o f Bangladesh (Berkeley, CA: Univer­ sity of C alifornia, 1990); Kissinger, White H ouse Years, pp. 8 4 2 —9 1 8 ; Parval, Indian A rm y After Independence, pp. 309—4 0 8 ; George K. Tanham and M arcy A gm on, The Indian A ir Force . . . , pp. 34—4 1 ; Sum it Ganguly, Conflict Unending, pp. 5 1 —78. 130 R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 2 5 6 —7; and H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest for Self-sufficiency,’ p. 138. 131 S.S. K hera, In d ia’s D efence Problem , p. 50. 132 Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 131. 133 F E E R (Decem ber 9, 1965), 4 7 6 ; and ‘A rm s for O blivion,’ F E E R (July 28, 1966), 135. 134 F E E R (O ctober 30, 1971), 7. 135 See IISS The M ilitary B alance 1 9 7 1 -1 9 7 2 , p. 50. 136 Brig. Gen. A .C . C ariap pa, ‘The Choice o f the M ain Battle T an k ,’ H indu, 23 April 1980, cited in R aju G .C . T h om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 165. 137 Ian G raham , ‘The Indo-Soviet M iG D eal,’ pp. 824, 829. 138 Lorne J . K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . . , p. 2 0 0 . 139 F E E R (Decem ber 9, 1965), 4 7 6 . 140 ‘M iG -2 1 M Production Ends After 10 Y ears,’ Delhi N atio n al H erald in English, N ovem ber 13, 1981, p. 6, in F B IS South A sia (Decem ber 1, 1981), E3. 141 J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 8 0 -8 1 , p. 91. 142 ‘India’s W estw ard G aze,’ JD W (January 9, 1993), 18—19. 143 In d ia’s D efence Public Sector: A Profile (N ew Delhi: M ehta O ffset W orks, 1983), p. 10. 144 Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, p. 158. 145 R aju G. C. T h om as, ‘Strategies o f Recipient Autonom y: The C ase of In dia,’ p. 193. 146 A recent estim ate concludes that the M iG -21 still m akes up roughly one-third o f the IAF force posture. See B h arat R ak sh ak at w w w .bharatrakshak.com /IA F/U nits/Fleet.htm l. 147 In the 1970s, the Soviets refused to allow the Indians to provide spare parts for Egyptian M iG -21s. See R aju G. C. Th om as, ‘Strategies of Recipient A u to­ nom y . . . , ’ p. 193. 148 See P. R. Chari, ‘Indo-Soviet M ilitary C ooperation . . . , ’ p. 2 3 9 . 149 SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . (1971), p. 4 7 7 . 150 SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . (1971), p. 743. 151 SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . (1971), p. 4 8 6 (n. 10). 152 SIPRI, The A rm s Trade ..(1 9 7 1 ) , 4 7 5 —6;Lorne J. Kavic. In dia’s Q uest . . , p. 144; George K. Tanham and M arcy Agmon, The Indian Air Force, pp. 20—3. 153 J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 643. 154 J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 6 4 3 —4 . R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 169. The arm y had requested that these 25 pounder guns be replaced in 1958. 155 D & F A (April 1990), 39. 156 ‘H eading into orbit,’ F E E R (June 5, 1969), 5 5 6 —8; J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ir­ craft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , p. 6 8 5 ; S IP R I Y earbook 1985, p. 4 3 5 . Production o f the SS-11 ceased in 1 9 8 2 —83: indigenization had reached 73 percent. India 1991, pp. 75—6. 157 F E E R (April 25, 1963), 2 0 7 , ‘H eading into O rb it,’ F E E R (June 5, 1969): p. 556.

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158 ‘ 8 H elicopters Exported to U SSR L ast Y ear,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 8 3 0 G M T , A ugust 10, 1984, F B IS South A sia (A ugust 13, 1984), E1. 159 F E E R (M ay 2 4 , 1962), 4 4 5 ; F E E R (A ugust 11, 1966), 2 8 5 . This represents one o f the relatively few cases where diffusion of arm s technology mimics the product cycle, and later producers sell back to the original m anufacturers as a result o f lower production costs. 160 Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H o c A rsenal, p. 125. 161 Jann e E. N olan , T rappin gs o f Pow er: Ballistic M issiles in the Third W orld (W ashington, D C : The Brookings Institutions, 1991), p. 4 1 ; R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 2 4 5 ; Ja n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , pp. 7 1 4 -1 5 . 162 Patricia A. M cFate and Sidney N . G raybeal, ‘A N ew Proliferation Threat from Space?’ in W. T h om as W ander and Eric H . Arnett (eds), The Proliferation o f A dvanced W eaponry: Technology, M otivations, a n d R esponses (W ashington, D C : American A cadem y for the A dvancem ent of Science, 1992), p. 99. 163 Tim othy M cC arth y, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ in W illiam C. Potter and H arlan W . Jen cks (eds), The International M issile B az aar (Boulder, CO : W estview, 1994), p. 2 0 2 . 164 Lorne J . K avic In d ia’s Q u e s t . . , pp. 2 7 -8 , n. 19. 165 A. G. N ooran i, ‘In dia’s Q uest for a N u clear G uarantee,’ A sian Survey 7 (July 1967), pp. 4 9 0 -5 0 2 . 166 George Perkovich, In d ia’s N u clear Bom b, pp. 6 0 -1 0 6 . 167 Rodney W. Jon es, M ark G. M cD onough with T oby F. D alton and G regory D. Koblentz, Tracking N u clear Proliferation: A G uide in M ap s an d C harts, 1998 (W ashington, D C : Carnegie Endowm ent for International Peace, 1998), p. 119, n. 11. 168 Tracking N u clear Proliferation: A G uide in M ap s a n d C harts, 1 9 9 8 , p. 112. 169 Indian nuclear developm ents from 1 9 4 7 -7 4 are covered in extraordinary detail in George Perkovich, In d ia’s N uclear Bom b, pp. 1 -1 9 0 . 170 K. M . Panikkar, Problem s o f Indian Defence, w as the first m ajor proponent o f Indian sea pow er. See also A dm iral S. N . Kohli, Sea Pow er a n d the Indian O cean (N ew Delhi: T ata M cG raw -H ill, 1978). 171 R aju G . C. Th om as, ‘The Armed Services . . . , ’ p. 2 8 9 . 172 The arm y’s share of defense expenditures declined from an average of 76 percent (1 9 6 2 -1 9 6 7 ) to 70 percent (1 9 7 1-8 0 ) to 63.9 percent (1 9 8 5 -9 0 ). Air force budget share remained at approxim ately 2 0 -2 5 percent, while navy budget share increased from an average o f 4 percent (1 9 6 2 -6 7 ) to 13.5 percent (1 9 8 5 -9 0 ). R aju G. C. Thom as, ‘The Armed Services and the Indian Defence Budget,’ p. 28 3 ; and Sandy G ordon, ‘Indian Defense Spending,’ p. 942. 173 Jerrold F. Elkin and M a jo r W. A ndrew Ritezel, ‘India,’ p. 5 2 3 ; Surjit M ansingh, In d ia’s Search for Pow er: Indira G an dh i’s Foreign Policy, 1 9 6 6 -1 9 8 2 (N ew Delhi: SA G E Publications, 1984); S. N ihal Singh, In dira’s India (Bom bay: N ach iketa Publications, 1978). 174 Jerrold F. Elkin and M a jo r W. A ndrew Ritezel, ‘N ew D elhi’s Indian Ocean Policy,’ N a v a l War College Review 4 0 (Autumn 1987), 5 0 - 6 3 ; Devin J. H agerty, ‘India’s R egional Security D octrin e,’ A sian Survey 31 (April 1991), 3 5 1 -6 3 ; K o u sar J. A zam (ed.), In d ia’s D efence Policy for the 19 9 0 s (N ew Delhi: Sterling, 1992). 175 See Leonard S. Spector, The U ndeclared Bom b (C am bridge, M A : Ballinger, 1988), pp. 1 2 0 -5 3 ; Leonard S. Spector, N uclear A m bitions (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1990), pp. 8 9 -1 1 7 ; ‘Pakistan Reported N e ar A tom A rm s Produc­ tion,’ W ashington Post, N ovem ber 4, 1 9 8 6 ; ‘We H ave The A-Bom b, Says

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P akistan ’s “ D r. Strangelove” ,’ O bserver (London), M arch 1, 1987; ‘Pakistan Able to Equip F-16s for N u clear B om bs’, W ashington Times, M ay 31, 1990; ‘Pakistan Tells o f Its A-Bomb C ap acity,’ N ew York Times, February 8, 1992. Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Pakistani N u clear D octrine and the D angers of Strategic M y o p ia’ ; and Z a fa r Iqbal Cheem a, ‘P akistan ’s N u clear Use D octrine and C om m and and C ontrol,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J. W irtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable .. The counterintuitive concept that nuclear capabilities m ay increase the likelihood of w ar is known as the ‘ stability-instability p a ra d o x .’ See Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance o f T error,’ in Paul Seabury (ed.), The B alance o f Pow er (San F ran ­ cisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 184—2 0 1 ; R obert Jervis, The M eaning o f the N u clear Revolution (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 19—22; and M ichael Krepon and Chris G agne (eds), The Stability-Instability P arad o x : N uclear W eapons an d Brinkm anship in South A sia (W ashington, D C : H enry L. Stim son Center, June 2001). Prasun Sengupta, ‘Indian Arm oured D octrine and M odernisation: T ow ard s a M odern Arm oured C ap ab ility,’ M ilitary Technology (M ay 1992), 2 9 —35; Sandy G ordon, ‘Indian Defense Spending . . ,’ p. 943. This policy w as known in India as ‘persuasive deterrence’ : if Pakistan caused problem s in K ashm ir, India w ould respond with a naval blockade and a rapid arm ored assault to the Indus River. ‘A M iddle-Aged M ilitary M achine’, India T o day (April 30, 1993), 29. C ol. Trigunesh M ukherjee, ‘Effective Defense Planning for the 1 9 9 0 s,’ in K ou sar J . A zam (ed.), In d ia’s D efence Policy fo r the 19 9 0 s, p. 33. IISS The M ilitary Balance 2 0 0 2 - 2 0 0 3 , p. 131. ‘A M iddle A ged M ilitary M achine,’ pp. 2 2 —30; ‘ On the K ashm ir Beat,’ JD W (M ay 21, 1994), 19—20. The US threatened to declare Pakistan a supporter o f terrorism because of its refusal to close down training cam ps in Pakistan O ccupied K ashm ir, also known as A zad K ashm ir. Pakistan agreed in 1990 to close down 31 cam ps during a peacekeeping visit by R obert G ates. See ‘US, Pakistan to Renew T alk s,’ W ashington Post, Jan u ary 11, 1995; ‘A G row ing R ealism ,’ India Today, June 15, 1993, pp. 62—3. For recent developments, Owen Bennett Jon es, Pakistan: Eye o f the Storm (N ew H aven, C T : Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ), p. 27; Patterns o f G lo b al Terrorism 2 0 0 2 (W ashington, D C : US D epartm ent of State, April 2 0 0 3 ). R ahul Bedi, ‘ Country Briefing: India — Divided Interests,’ JD W , M ay 21, 2 0 0 3 , at w w w 4.janes.com . An excellent study of the terrorist groups in K ashm ir is Praveen Sw am i, ‘Terrorism in Jam m u and K ashm ir in Theory and Practice,’ in G anguly (ed.) The K ashm ir Q uestion: R etrospect an d Prospect, pp. 55—88. ‘ O f Brinkm anship and Limited D eterrence,’ F E E R , April 9, 1987, pp. 36—7; ‘ Border B acklash ,’ F E E R July 2 7 , 1989, pp. 18—19. The m ost thorough account o f Brasstacks is K anti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheem a, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sum it G anguly (eds), B rasstack s an d Beyond: Percep­ tion an d M anagem ent o f Crisis in South A sia (U rbana, IL: The Program in Arm s C ontrol, D isarm am ent, and International Security, University o f Illinois at U rbana-C ham paign, Jun e 1995). For details, see Devin T. H agerty, The Consequences o f N u clear Proliferation: L esson s from South A sia (C am bridge, M A : M IT Press, 1998); K anti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheem a, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sum it Ganguly (eds), B rasstack s a n d Beyond .. . See Ravi Rikhye, The War T h at N ever W as: The Story o f In d ia’s Strategic

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N otes Failures (N ew Delhi: C hanakya Publications, 1988), p. 195; R aj C hengappa, W eapons o f Peace, pp. 3 2 2 -3 ; and P. N . H oon , U nm asking the Secrets o f Turbulence (N ew Delhi: M an as Publications, 2 0 0 0 ), p. 102. Sum it Ganguly, Conflict Unending: In dia-P ak istan Tensions since 1947, pp. 9 2 -3 . The nuclear deploym ent report com es from Seym our H ersh, ‘ On the N uclear Edge,’ The N ew Yorker (M arch 2 9 , 1993), pp. 5 5 -7 3 (now available at w w w .new yorker.com /archive/content/?040119fr_archive02). The claim is repeated in W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, C ritical M ass (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1994), pp. 6 0 -9 0 . A less alarm ist perspective is Conflict Prevention an d Confidence-Building M easures in South A sia: The 1990 Crisis O ccasional Paper no. 17 ed. M ichael K repon and M ishi Faruqee (W ashington, D C : The H enry L. Stim son Center, April 1994). Recent per­ sonal interviews with form er officials have persuaded this author that a nuclear device w as actually assem bled on the orders of then Army Chief of Staff M irza A slam Beg, ‘K ashm ir Issue M ay D raw a Sum m it Plea,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, June 1, 1990. These exercises, titled ‘ C hequerboard’ and ‘F alcon,’ tested Indian operations capability in the H im alayas. ‘ Eyeball to eyeball on the H im alayan Border,’ F E E R (April 9, 1987), 3 8 -9 ; ‘Tension on the Border,’ F E E R (M ay 7, 1987), 3 3 -5 ; ‘Border B acklash ,’ F E E R (July 2 7 , 1989), pp. 1 8 -1 9 . Stephen P. Cohen, ‘W hy D id India “ G o N u clear” ,’ in R aju G . C. Th om as and Amit G u pta (eds), In d ia’s N uclear Security (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 2 0 0 0 ), p. 22. R aju G . C. Th om as, ‘The Grow th of Indian M ilitary Power . . ’, p. 53. ‘D R D O : O ff C ou rse,’ India T o day (September 15, 1992), 85; Shekhar G upta, ‘India Redefines its R o le,’ Adelphi Paper 293 (O xford: O xford University Press for ((SS, 1995), p. 38. Up to 50 percent of the Indian airforce w as reportedly grounded by the need for engine overhauls and lack o f essential spares. See ‘India’ s M ilitary H it By Soviet C ollap se,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 4, 1992; ‘ R ussia, India Reach A ccord on D ebt, Trade, and D efense,’ Christian Science M onitor, June 29, 1993. By 1993, the serviceability of India’s M iG -29 squadron s w as only 30 percent, and the airforce w as cannibalizing whole squadron s of M iG -21s and A n-32s in order to provide spares for other squadron s of aircraft which rem ained in service. ‘A M iddle-Aged M ilitary M achine,’ pp. 2 3 -5 . W M E A T 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 66. ‘A M iddle-Aged . . . ’, p. 40. Production of rad ars, according to one official, dropped 75 percent in the early 19 9 0 s because of reduced access to foreign exchange. ‘In Reverse G ear,’ India Today, (N ovem ber 15, 1991), 131. Relations still remain strained through the m id-1990s. ‘Rhetoric fuels U S-India R ift,’ W ashington Post, February 24, 1994; John A nderson, ‘Su b­ continental D rift’ (O p-Ed), W ashington Post, M arch 2 0 , 1994. R aju G. C. Th om as, ‘US Transfers o f ‘D ual-U se’ Technologies to In dia,’ A sian Survey 30 (September 1990), 8 2 5 -4 5 . At one point, India w as reportedly down to only tw o w eeks w orth o f foreign exchange reserves, and money w as unavailable for defense im ports. ‘SP guns battle over In dia,’ JD W (A ugust 2 7 , 1994), p. 30; ‘Chinks in the A rm our,’ India T o day (N ovem ber 15, 1991), 1 2 9 -3 1 . The governm ent had to sell 90 tons of gold in 1991 to m aintain liquidity. Shekhar G upta, ‘India Redefines

. . . , ’ . p. 8. 201 Foreign exchange reserves excluding gold dipped from $ 4 .1 0 8 billion US in

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1989 to $1.521 billion in 1990, and rose again to $ 5 .7 5 7 billion by 1992. External debt rose from $ 5 5 .7 5 3 billion in 1 9 8 7 to $ 7 6 .9 8 3 billion in 1992. The W orld Bank, W orld Tables 1 9 9 4 (Baltim ore: The Joh n s H opkin s Univer­ sity Press, 1994), pp. 3 4 4 —7. Bimal Jalan , In d ia’s Econom ic C risis: The Way A head (Delhi: O xford India, 1992). For a more reserved assessm ent of the overall im pact of reform , see ‘The State of Reform in India,’ The E con om ist (A ugust 6, 1994), 2 9 —30. ‘India Stem s the Fall in its Defence Spending,’ J D W (M arch 12, 1994), 3. ‘Indian A rm s Buys Defy C ash Shortfall,’ J D W (M ay 8, 1993), 2 9 —30; ‘India’s W estw ard G aze,’ JD W (January 9, 1993), 18—19; ‘ Cut price w eapons chal­ lenge W estern S ales,’ JD W (April 3, 1993), 12—13; ‘R u ssia, India sign on joint aviation venture’, j D w (9 July 1994), p. 3; ‘SP G uns Battle O ver In dia,’ J D W (A ugust 27, 1994), 30. If R & D budgets for space and nuclear pow er projects were included, R & D expenses w ould have equalled about 7 percent of the 1 9 8 2 budget. R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 2 3 9 —4 1 . By 1986, military-related R & D com prised ab ou t 4 0 percent of all governm ent R & D spending. Air Vice M arsh al C .V . G ole (retired), ‘N ation al Security and the Role of Industry,’ in Indian D efence Review (July 1991), p. 126. A nnual R eport 1 9 9 2 -9 3 , p. 13. ‘D R D O : O ff C ou rse,’ India T o day (15 Septem ber 1992), 85; K. Santhanam , ‘ O pportunities and Prospects for Indo-US C ooperation in Defense Technolo­ gies,’ in The United States an d India in the P o st Soviet W orld, pp. 1 5 9 —66. Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, pp. 112, 124—6. ‘Plan T o Build M irage A ircraft D om estically Scrapped,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English 0 8 3 0 G M T 27, July 1984, in F B IS South A sia (July 27, 1984), E3. ‘D eal T o Purchase M IG -29 A ircraft Finalized’ , Bom bay The Tim es o f India in English, A ugust 6, 1984, p. 6, in F B IS South A sia (August 13, 1984), E1. R eports of licensed production appeared in the fall. ‘Review of N ation al Defense Preparedness D iscu ssed ,’ Delhi The H industan Tim es in English, Sep ­ tem ber 20, 1984, pp. 1, 16 by M K D har, in F B IS South A sia (O ctober 4, 1984), E1. R enato Contin, ‘M iG -29: A N ew Step in the “ M irror Policy” ,’ M ilitary Technology (April 1987), 1 2 2 —9. ‘AFP: India T o Purchase M iG -29s from Soviet U nion,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0 8 2 7 G M T , July 14, 1986, in F B IS South A sia (July 17, 1986), E1. ‘ “ First B atch” of M iG -29s Arrives From U SSR ,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0240 G M T , Jan u ary 4, 1987, in F B IS South A sia (5 Jan u ary 1987), E1. ‘Soviet Experts Arrive to A ssem ble M iG -2 9 s,’ Delhi P A T R IO T in English, 4 Jan u ary 1 9 8 6 [sic], p. 1, F B IS South A sia (January 12, 1987), E1; Renato Contin, ‘M iG -29: A N ew Step in the “ M irror Policy” ,’ p. 128; M ilitary Technology (January 1989), 254. See ‘India’ s M ilitary H it by Soviet C ollap se,’ W ashington P o st, O ctober 4, 1 992; Indian D efence Review (June 1991), 12 states specifically that the InAF lacks spares for the M iG -29 force. R eport o f the C om ptroller an d A uditor G eneral o f India fo r the Year Ended 31 M arch 1992, N o. 9 o f 1993, Union Governm ent, 1993, cited in George K. Tanham and M arcy A gm on, The Indian A ir Force, pp. 5 4 —7, 6 9 —71. A viation Week a n d Space Technology (14/21 D ecem ber 1992), 17 reported that India w as setting up a special overhaul facility for M iG -29s at a cost of $ 2 0 0 million.

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218 ‘Indian Fleet T o Add T w o A ircraft C arriers By 2 0 1 0 , N avy Chief S ay s,’ D efense N ew s, D ecem ber 2, 2 0 0 3 . 219 H A L m aintained research on supersonic fighters throughout the 1 9 7 0 s. Ron M atthew s, D efence Production in India, p. 99; J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ir­ craft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , p. 80; ‘The Price is H igh’ , F E E R (Decem ber 3, 1977), p. 36. 220 This engine is the Kevari turbine. ‘N ew Engine for Jet Fighters,’ H on g K ong AFP in English, 0619 G M T , April 30, 1982, in F B IS South A sia (M ay 7, 1982), E4. The Kevari still rem ained in developm ent in 2 0 0 3 . A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent o f India), p. 61. 221 ‘Defense M inister on Producing C om b at A ircraft,’ Delhi General O verseas Service in English, 1 3 3 0 G M T , M arch 27, 1 9 8 5 , in F B IS South A sia (M arch 28, 1985), E1. 222 D avid Saw , ‘Indigenous Fighter Production,’ M ilitary Technology, (June 1991), 89. The G T X program has also received assistance from the French firm S N E C M A : see ‘C ollaboration Invited for L C A Program m e,’ JD W (January 29, 1994), 8. 223 N icholas N ugent, ‘The Defence Preparedness of India: Arm ing for T o m o r­ ro w ,’ M ilitary Technology (M arch 1991), 36; Amit G upta, ‘The Indian Arms Industry . . .,’ pp. 8 5 1 -2 . 224 ‘L C A Breaks Sound Barrier D uring Flight,’ R ediff, A ugust 1, 2 0 0 3 at w w w .rediff.com . 225 ‘Eurofighter 2 0 0 0 : EF a la carte,’ International D efense Review (January 1993), 9; ‘Taiw an to Slash IDF Production,’ J D W (April 3, 1993), p. 5. 226 ‘Flying Coffins? M iG -23 Even M ore “ Lethal” ,’ Tim es o f India, July 8, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Poor M aintenance C au se of Indian Air Force’ s Chronic C rashes: R eport’, Agence France Presse, A ugust 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 . A ccording to the latter report, the Indian airforce lost 273 M iG aircraft to crashes between 1991 and 2 0 0 3 . 2 2 7 SIP R I Yearbook 1 9 8 2 , p. 2 1 5 , and also ‘India C oncludes W eapons D eal With The Soviet U nion,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 1841 G M T , M ay 2 7 , 1980, in F B IS South A sia (M ay 28, 1980), E1. 228 ‘M inister on P roposal T o Build T-72 T an k s,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0830 G M T , 14 D ec 1 9 8 3 , in F B IS South A sia (Decem ber 14, 1983), E2. 229 ‘D om estic Production of T-72 T an ks Begins,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0830 G M T , Jan u ary 19, 1 9 8 8 , in FB IS-N E SA (January 20, 1988), p. 61. 230 ‘Arjun D elays Bring V ijayanta U pgrade Back on T rack ,’ JD W (July 3, 1993), 19; ‘Arjun M u st Fight T -72M 1 for Place on the Production Line’ , JD W (Sep­ tem ber 1, 1994), 27; ‘A M iddle-Aged M ilitary M achine,’ p. 2 3 ; ‘SP Guns Battle O ver India,’ JD W (August 2 7 , 1994), p. 28. 231 Prasun Sengupta, ‘Indian Arm oured D octrine . . . ’, p. 32. 232 ‘Arjun M u st Fight T -72M 1 for place on the Production Line,’ J D W (Septem ­ ber 1, 1994), p. 27. 233 Enrico Bonsignore, ‘G ulf Experience R aises T an k Survivability Issues’, M ili­ tary Technology (February 1992), 6 4 -7 0 . 234 ‘In dia,’ J a n e ’s W orld Arm ies 15 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 235 ‘T -90 T an k Likely to Roll O ut by Dec. End,’ The H indu, O ctober 17, 2 0 0 3 . 236 ‘Briefs: Battle T an k D evelopm ent,’ reported in Delhi N atio n al H erald in English, July 8, 1 9 8 2 , p .1 , in F B IS South A sia (July 20, 1982), E5. 2 3 7 ‘R eport Criticizes D elay in T an k D evelopm ent,’ Delhi The H industan Times in English, July 2 4 , 1989, in FB IS-N E SA (August 11, 1989), pp. 4 5 -6 . 238 Amit G upta, ‘The Indian Arms Industry . . , ’ p. 850. See also ‘ Review of N ation al Defense Preparedness D iscu ssed ,’ Delhi The H industan Tim es in

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240 241 242

243 244 245 246 247 248

249 250 251 252

253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261

262 263 264

211

English, Septem ber 2 0 , 1984, pp. 1, 16 by M K D har, in F B IS South Asia (O ctober 4, 1984), E1; Ja n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 70. ‘ Researchers Say T an k Project Faces M ore D elays,’ H on g K ong AFP in English, 0753 G M T , 6 April 1990, in FB IS-N E SA (April 6, 1990); Prasun Sengupta, ‘Indian Arm oured D octrine . . .,’ p. 35; and Sanjiv Prakash, ‘Indian D efense: A C onscious Attem pt at Pragm atism ,’ in D & F A (April 1990), 43. ‘Arjun M u st Fight T-72M 1 for Place on the Production Line,’ JD W (Septem ­ ber 1, 1994), 27. J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artilley, 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 70. J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 70. Use of a rifled main gun is explicitly criticized in Eric Arnett, ‘M ilitary Technology: the C ase of In dia,’ SIP R I Y earbook 1 9 9 4 , p. 348. See Prasun Sengupta, ‘Indian Arm oured D octrine . . . , ’ pp. 2 9 —31. A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 64. ‘Arjun M B T ,’ J a n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . Indram il Banerjie, ‘The Integrated G uided M issile D evelopm ent Program m e,’ Indian D efence Review (July 1990), 99. Indram il Banerjie, ‘The Integrated G uided M issile D evelopm ent Program m e,’ 100. Indram il Banerjie, ‘The Integrated G uided M issile D evelopm ent Program m e’ , 101. The Trishul reportedly suffered delays from problem s with key guidance technologies. ‘The M issile M a n ,’ India T oday (April 15, 1994), 41. A dm iral J. G . N adk arn i, ‘Riding the W aves,’ Rediff, M ay 10, 2 0 0 3 at w w w .rediff.com . ‘Trishul is Blunt, so N av al Forces Seek B arak ,’ Tim es o f In d ia, A ugust 25, 2003. ‘N aval Chief Leaves for M o sco w ,’ Press T rust o f India, Jun e 16, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Indian Frigate C om m issions W ithout Full A rm am ent,’ Sea Pow er (July 2000). See Jann e E. N olan , Trappings o f Pow er . . , p. 45; India 1991, p. 77; Andrew Feickert and K . Alan K ronstadt, ‘M issile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South A sia,’ C R S R eport fo r C ongress (W ashington, D C : Library o f C ongress, 17 O ctober 2 0 0 3 ), p. 26. ‘India Succeeds in M issile Test Launching,’ W ashington Post, February 26, 1988, 24. ‘Army gears up to deploy A gni,’ Tim es o f In dia, Septem ber 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Army to Add Firepow er to A rsenal,’ Tim es o f India, M ay 12, 2 0 0 3 . ‘Armed Forces — In dia,’ J a n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent South A sia (2004), at w w w 4.janes.com . Sanjiv Prakash, ‘Indian D efense: A C onscious Attem pt at Pragm atism ’, D & F A (April 1990), 4 4 ; and also ‘N a g Tests Successful,’ JD W (July 7, 1990), 18. ‘India N egotiates M IL A N D eal,’ M ilitary Technology (February 1992), 97. ‘The M issile M a n ,’ India T oday (April 15, 1994), 41. D uncan Lennox ‘A T B M s and Beyond,’ JD W (M ay 2 2 , 1993); ‘Testing R eac­ tion s,’ F E E R (June 8, 1989), 38—9. ‘A kash ,’ Ja n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s (2004) at w w w 4.janes.com . Indram il Banerjie, ‘The Integrated G uided M issile D evelopm ent Program m e,’ p. 104. This also clearly connects India’ s missile (IGM DP) and space launch program s (ISRO). See D & F A , April 1990, 41 and Janne E. N olan , Trappings o f Pow er . . , p. 45. N icholas N ugent, ‘The Defence Preparedness of India . . .,’ p. 30. ‘Third Agni Test Launch Fulfills “ Set O bjectives” ,’ JD W (M arch 5, 1994), 18. The m issile w as five tons heavier, due to an increased fuel load.

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265 See Proliferation: Threat an d R esponse (W ashington, D C : Office of the Secret­ ary of D efense, Jan u ary 2 0 0 1 ); Peter Lavoy, ‘Fighting Terrorism , A voiding W ar: The Indo-Pakistani Situation,’ Jo in t Force Q uarterly (Autumn 2 0 0 2 ), 2 7 -3 4 . 266 ‘Agni 1/2/3,’ J a n e ’s Strategic W eapons System 4 0 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com 2 6 7 ‘India T ests M issile, Stirring a Region Already On Edge,’ N ew York Tim es, Jan u ary 25, 2 0 02 . 268 ‘Army G ears Up to D eploy A gni’, Tim es o f India, Septem ber 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 . 269 ‘The M issile M a n ,’ p. 44. 270 Tim othy M cC arthy, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ p. 2 0 3 . 271 See ‘Advanced Surface to Surface M issile T ests Planned,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 155 0 G M T , M ay 2 6 , 1989 in F B IS-N E SA (M ay 30, 1989), 61; ‘Defense Team to O versee G uided M issile Program ,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0753 G M T , July 20, 1 9 8 8 , in F B IS-N E SA (July 2 2 , 1988), 4 3 -4 . 272 Tim othy M cC arthy, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ p. 2 0 3 . 273 Forecast International/D M S M arket Intelligence Review, June 1990 ‘M arket Overview - India,’ p. 7. 274 ‘In dia’s Long R oad to N ew Rifle’, p. 30. 275 A nnual R eport 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0 , p. 65. 276 A nnual R eport 1 9 9 2 -9 3 , pp. 4 1 -2 . 2 7 7 See ‘A M iddle A ged M ilitary M achine,’ p. 24. 278 A nnual R eport 1 9 9 2 -9 3 , p. 14; Shekhar G upta, ‘India Redefines . . . ’, pp. 3 8 -4 3 . 279 Chris Smith, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal, pp. 1 5 2 -3 ; Review o f Procurem ent for O P V IJA Y (Army) (Delhi: Com ptroller and A uditor G eneral’ s Office, 2 0 0 1 ), w w w .cagindia.org/reports/defence/2001_book3/review .htm . 280 ‘Review o f Procurem ent for O P V IJA Y (Arm y)’; ‘T -90 tank likely to roll out be Dec. end’, The H indu, O ctober 17, 2 0 0 3 . 281 D & F A (April 1990), 41. 282 Indian D efence Review (January 1991), p. 12; and Tim othy M cC arth y, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er’ , p. 2 1 8 . 283 See ‘George Fernandes: In dia’s Defense M inister,’ D efense N ew s, February 2, 2004. 284 J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 3 , p. 643. 285 Bofors has been accused of paying bribes to extremely high-ranking Indian officials to secure this contract. See ‘N ew D eton ation s,’ India T o day (M arch 15, 1992; ‘D oing Business Between the Lines’, JD W (Decem ber 11, 1993), 28. 286 ‘Bofors: Counter-trade C on ,’ India Today (Septem ber 30, 1991), 8 1 -2 dis­ cusses the offset problem . See also ‘India Fills M unition G ap ’ , JD W (O ctober 9, 1993), 21 ; ‘SP G uns Battle Over In dia’, JD W (August 2 7 , 1994), 28; ‘Indian Army Buys D efy C ash Shortfall,’ JD W (M ay 8, 1993), 30. 2 8 7 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 1 , p. 56. 288 Review o f Procurem ent fo r O P VIJAY. 289 India 1991, pp. 7 5 -6 . ‘India N egotiates M IL A N D eal,’ M ilitary Technology (February 1992), 97. 290 Tim othy M cC arthy, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ p. 2 1 1 . 291 ‘Army to A dd Firepow er to A rsenal,’ Tim es o f India, M ay 12, 2 0 0 3 . 292 Ron M atthew s, D efence Production in India, pp. 8 6 -7 . Average growth in the value o f m ilitary electronics production during this decade w as 14 percent. 293 Jim Bussert, ‘Son ars o f the Indian N av y ,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (N ovem ­ ber 1992), 51 1 . 294 D & F A (April 1990), pp. 3 8 -9 . 295 See ‘Defense Forces T o Receive R ad ar From Local Firm ,’ Delhi D om estic

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297 298 299 300 301 302

303 304

305

306 307 308

309 310 311 312 313

314

213

Service in English, 0 8 3 0 G M T , A ugust 28, 19 8 8 , in F B IS-N E SA (A ugust 30, 1988), 45; and ‘Low-Flying A ircraft R ad ar D edicated to N atio n ,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 7 3 0 G M T , M arch 26, 1989, in FB IS-N E SA (M arch 2 8, 1989), p. 49. ‘Industry Builds up Strength’, JD W (M ay 2 6 , 1990), 1 0 3 9 ; ‘Bharat Electron­ ics: H igh Tech From India,’ M ilitary Technology (M arch 1990), 64; and ‘India Boosts Electronics C ap ab ility,’ International Defence Review (O ctober 1991), p. 1135. R eports conflict as to whether final production totalled 1 ,6 0 0 or 2 ,2 0 0 V ijayan tas. J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 72, 137. R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, p. 2 5 7 . A khtar M ajeed, ‘Indian Security Perspectives in the 1 9 9 0 s,’ p. 1089. See Prasun Sengupta, ‘Indian Arm oured D octrine . . . , ’ p. 31; Ja n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 71—2. ‘Arjun D elays Bring V ijayanta U pgrade Back on T rack ’, JD W (July 3, 1993), 19. J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -7 8 , p. 81; Ja n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ir­ craft 1 9 8 0 -8 1 , p. 88. Public Accounts Com m ittee, Seventh Lok Sabha, D elay in D evelopm ent and M anufacture o f an A ircraft (N ew Delhi: Governm ent o f India, 1982), p. 4, cited in Am it G upta, ‘The Indian A rm s Industry . . , ’ p. 854. The Ajeet reportedly had less than 60 percent com m onality of p arts with the Gnat. Andy Lee R oss, Security a n d Self-Reliance . . . , p. 4 0 5 . ‘India’s W estw ard G aze,’ JD W (January 9, 1993), 18—19; George K. Tanham and M arcy Agm on, The Indian A ir Force . . . , pp. 5 1 —5; H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 134. ‘ C om bat Vehicles T o Be Built in M a d ra s,’ Delhi General O verseas Service in English, 1330 G M T , A ugust 2 0 , 1985, in F B IS South A sia (A ugust 2 1 , 1985), E7; ‘ First C om b at Vehicle Finished,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 1530 G M T , A ugust 23, 1987, in F B IS-N E SA (A ugust 2 7 , 1987), E2. By 1991, India w as producing key com ponents including the 30m m gun and AT-4 Spigot A T G M . J a n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 389. ‘India in $31 .5 m D eal to Buy Slovak A R V s,’ JD W (January 15, 1994), 8. R aju G. C. Th om as, ‘A ircraft for the Indian Air Force . . . , ’ pp. 9 3 —6; A khtar M ajeed, ‘Indian Security Perspectives for the 1 9 9 0 s,’ p. 1087. ‘India to Get Ja g u a r Train ers,’ A viation Week a n d Space Technology (O ctober 23, 1978), 2 6 . Another reason w as to acquire the technology for the A dour 811 jet engine. Andy Lee R oss, Security an d Self-Reliance . . . , p. 410. ‘Indian Paper on A rm s D eal T alk s W ith US, U K ,’ C alcutta, The Statesm an in English, Jan u ary 2 0 , 1981, 1, 7 in F B IS South A sia (February 3, 1981), E4. ‘Pact for Licensed Production o f M iG -2 7 ’ s Signed,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0830 G M T , July 2 9 , 1983, in F B IS South A sia (August 2, 1983), E1. ‘IA F’s 100th Flogger “J ” ,’ j D w , (M ay 16, 1992), 839 reports that indigenous content reached 74 percent. A nnual R eport 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 3 , p. 62. See ‘Com prehensive D eal Planned For French M irage’, Delhi N atio n al H erald in English, N ovem ber 24, 1981, 1, 6, in F B IS South A sia (Decem ber 2, 1981), E1; ‘AFP: D eal Signed With France For M irage 2 0 0 0 ,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0 3 4 0 G M T , April 14, 1 9 8 2 in F B IS South A sia (April 14, 1982), E1; ‘Accord Signed W ith France For M irage-2 0 0 0 ’s,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0 8 1 4 G M T , O ctober 18, 1982, in F B IS South A sia (O ctober 18, 1982), E1. R ahul Bedi, ‘ Country Briefing: India —Divided Interests,’ JD W , M ay 21, 2003 at w w w 4.janes.com .

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315 See ‘French M inister’ s V isit to Boost Defence T ies,’ Tim es o f India, April 24, 2 0 0 3 , and Rahul Bedi, ‘C ountry Briefing: India - Divided Interests’ . 316 Interview with Air Chief M arsh al S. K. K aul, Chief of Air Staff, JD W (N ovem ber 6, 1993), p. 5 6 ; ‘In dia’s W estw ard G aze,’ JD W (January 9, 1993), 1 8 -1 9 ; ‘A M iddle-Aged M ilitary M achine,’ p. 25. The M iG accident rate is discussed in ‘Flying coffins? M iG -23 Even M ore “ Lethal” ’ ; C. M anm ohan Reddy, ‘M iG Accidents and A dvanced T rain ers,’ The H indu, A ugust 25, 2 0 0 3 . A defense o f the M iG aircraft program can be found in A K Goel, ‘D on ’t Shoot D ow n IAF O ver M iG M y th s’, The Indian E xp ress, A ugust 13, 2 0 0 3 . 317 The H A W K deal, which will include assem bly of 41 aircraft at the H A L Ja g u a r line in Bangalore, is noted in ‘ First Su-30 M K I Fighter to R oll O ut in D ec.,’ The H indu, Septem ber 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 . 318 A viation Week an d Space Technology (Septem ber 3, 1990), 2 5 ; and Aviation Week a n d Space Technology (M arch 9, 1987), 2 1 5 . 319 ‘Airborne Early W arning System To Be D eveloped’, Delhi D om estic Service in English, 1530 G M T , A pr 30, 1983, in F B IS South A sia (M ay 6, 1983), E3; ‘India Launches its O wn A w A c S P rogram ,’ F E E R (O ctober 17, 1985), 12. 320 See ‘U SSR O ffers Airborne Early W arning System ,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0 7 5 7 G M T , Jan u ary 5, 1 9 87 , in F B IS South A sia (January 5, 1987), E1; ‘Paper Reports D etails on Soviet AW ACS O ffer,’ Bom bay Tim es o f India in English, Jan u ary 5, 1987, p. 1, in F B IS South A sia (January 16, 1987), E2; Jam es Smith, ‘D evelopm ents in the Indian Air Force’, J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (N ovem ber 1991), 5 2 6 . 321 ‘C ollapse of R otodom e M ay H ave C aused A vro C rash ,’ The H indu , Jan u ary 13, 1999. 322 ‘Israel T o Sell R ad ars to In dia,’ Wall Street Jo u rn al, Septem ber 5, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Phalcon Will Fly in Indian Skies, Says Israel,’ Tim es o f In dia, Septem ber 10, 2003. 323 Ron M atthew s, D efence Production in India, pp. 1 0 0 -1 . 324 Amit G upta, ‘The Indian A rm s Industry . . .,’ p. 850. 325 ‘Agreem ent Reached W ith F R G Firm On H elicopters,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 8 3 0 G M T , July 2 4 , 1984, in F B IS South A sia (July 2 7 , 1984), E3. 326 ‘A LH First Flight L o om s,’ J D W (M ay 26, 1990), 1036. 327 ‘Farnborough ‘ 90: Slow A head,’ M ilitary Technology (Decem ber 1990), 80. 328 ‘In Reverse G ear,’ p .1 3 1 . 329 ‘O n the W ings o f H o p e,’ India T o day (O ctober 31, 1992), 5 8 - 9 . 330 See ‘Procurem ent, In dia,’ Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - South A sia at w w w 4.janes.com ; A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent o f India), p. 48. A ccording to recent reports, the helicopter will be m arketed by Israeli A ircraft Industries, and the US C ustom s Service intends to purchase as m any as ten helicopters. N eelam M atthew s, “ Push to Save D h ru v,” A viation Week & Space Technology (January 12, 2 0 0 4 ), 41. 331 ‘Agreem ent Reached With F R G on Subm arine Sale,’ H am b u rg D PA in Germ an, 143 7 G M T , D ecem ber 12, 1981, in F B IS South A sia (Decem ber 15, 1981), E2. 332 See C om bat Fleets o f the World, 1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 7 (A nnapolis, M D : N aval Institute Press, 1986), p. 2 3 8 ; and Ja n e ’s Fighting Ships, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 260. 333 ‘G andhi Stresses N eed T o Strengthen N av y ,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 8 3 0 G M T , M ay 6, 1984, in F B IS South A sia (M ay 7, 1984), E7. 334 Ja n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 260. 335 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 0 ; ‘ 1st Indigenously Built Subm arine Launched,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 8 3 0 G M T , Septem ber 30, 1989, in FB IS-N E SA (O ctober 2, 1989), p. 51.

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336 M ichael V lahos, ‘M iddle East, N orth African, and South A sian N av ies,’ P ro­ ceedings (M arch 1986), p. 57; M ichael V lahos, ‘ Regional N aval Reviews: M iddle East, N orth A frica, and South A sia,’ Proceedings (M arch 1991), 125. 337 K haleej Tim es (U A E), M ay 2 7 , 1994. 338 ‘AFP: “ Sou rce” Says Subm arine R eactor T o Be Built,’ H on g K on g AFP in English, 0535 G M T , M ay 11, 1983, in F B IS South A sia (M ay 11, 1983), E1. 339 ‘N uclear A m bitions,’ F e E r (Decem ber 24, 1987), 18. 340 ‘Indian N avy G oes N u clear,’ M ilitary Technology (February 1988), 8 7 -8 . 341 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 0 . According to ‘India Returns Soviet S S G N ,’ JD W (February 23, 1991), 2 5 4 , high m aintenance w as apparently a m ajor factor in not extending the lease. 342 See Eric Arnett, ‘M ilitary Technology: the C ase o f India,’ pp. 3 6 2 -3 . 343 ‘Procurem ent, India,’ J a n e ’s Security Sentinel - South A sia at w w w 4.janes.com R ahul Bedi, ‘ Country Briefing: India - Divided interests.’ 344 See Vice-Adm iral M . K. R oy (ret), ‘The Indian N avy from the Bridge,’ P ro­ ceedings (M arch 1990), 6 6 -7 4 . Ravi Rikhye, ‘N o b o d y Asked M e, But . . . , ’ Proceedings (M arch 1990), pp. 7 7 -8 . 345 M ichael V lahos, ‘M iddle Eastern, N orth African, and South A sian N avies’, in Proceedings (M arch 1988), 6 4 -6 . A ccording to V lahos, the entire Indian navy budget w as only R s 6.5 billion. 346 See J a n e ’s Fighting Ships, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 2 ; and M ichael V lahos, ‘M iddle East . . . ’ in Proceedings (M arch 1991), 125. 347 ‘Air Defence Ship Facility Inaugurated,’ The H indu, Jan u ary 24, 2 0 0 3 . 348 ‘N uclear C apabilities are M u st’, Tim es o f India, July 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Air Defence Ship All Set to Take Flight N ext Y ear,’ Tim es o f India, D ecem ber 10, 2 0 0 3 . 349 See S IP R I Yearbook 1973, p. 374; H erbert W ulf, ‘India: the Unfulfilled Q uest . . . , ’ p. 139; J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 265. 350 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 5 . 351 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 4 . 352 R ahul Bedi, ‘C ountry Briefing: India - D ivided interests’ and ‘India’s Stealth W arship to Be Launched on Friday,’ The H indu, April 16, 2 0 0 3 . 353 ‘India’s Delhi Launched,’ J D W (February 2 3, 1991), p. 2 9 5 ; Ja n e ’s Fighting Ships, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 4 ; M ichael V lahos, ‘M iddle East . . . ’ in Proceedings (M arch 1991), 125. 354 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 4 . ‘R u ssia M arkets Latest M issile A ttack C raft,’ JD W (January 8, 1994), p. 10. 355 ‘Trishul is Blunt, so N av al Forces Seek B arak .’ 356 See Ja n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , pp. 2 6 6 - 7 . 357 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 6 7 . 358 Ram esh Thakur, ‘India and the Soviet Union: C onjunctions and D isjunctions o f Interests,’ in A sian Survey 31 (Septem ber 1991), 832. 359 ‘Satellite Successfully Launched 18 Ju ly ,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 0 7 3 0 G M T , July 18, 1 9 8 0 , in F B IS South A sia (July 18, 1980), E1; ‘Gandhi M ak es Statem ent on 18 July Satellite Launch,’ Delhi ISI D iplom atic Service in English, 0831 G M T , July 19, 1980, in F B IS South A sia (July 19, 1980), E1, 2. 360 IG M D P uses ISR O test launch facilities, and the ISR O m akes use of D r D o and PSD U facilities to test and m anufacture new rocket and m issile technolo­ gies. Tim othy M cC arth y, ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ pp. 2 0 3 -5 . 361 Anthony H . C ordesm an, W eapons o f M ass D estruction in India an d Pakistan: An Overview (W ashington, D C : Center for Strategic and International Studies, Septem ber 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 3 -4 ; ‘Armed Forces, In dia,’ Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - South A sia (2004) at w w w 4.janes.com . A ccording to one report, the CW stock in question w as m ustard gas shells for WW 2 vintage

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N otes 25 pounder howitzers, in storage and not under Indian arm y operational control. See ‘ Chem ical W eapons,’ Federation o f Am erican Scientists website at w w w .fas.org/nuke/guide/india/cw . ‘Arm ed Forces, In dia,’ Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - South A sia (2004) at w w w 4.janes.com . M ajo r General Som D utt, India a n d the Bom b, Adelphi Paper 30 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966). George Perkovich, In d ia’s N u clear Bom b, p. 2 9 6 . W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu discusses possible Indian doctrine and perceptions in ‘India’ s N u clear Use D octrine,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds), Planning the U nthinkable . . , pp. 125—5 7 . See also V. Sudarshan, ‘India H ad N ukes and Delivery System in 1 9 9 4 ,’ O utlookIndia.com , M ay 19, 2 0 0 3 w w w .outlookin dia.com . Proliferation: Threat an d R esponse (W ashington, D C : Office of the Secretary o f D efense, Jan u ary 2 0 0 1 ), pp. 2 1 —30. See ‘The Prime M inister’s Announcement of India’ s Three U nderground N uclear Tests on M ay 11, 1 9 9 8 ,’ at w w w .fas.org/new s/india/1998/05/vajpayee1198.htm ; and ‘Press Conference’ (Dr. R. C hidam baram (R C), C hair­ m an, A EC & Secretary, D A E; D r. A. P. J. Abdul K alam (K), Scientific Advisor to R aksha M an tri and Secretary, D epartm ent o f Defence Research and Devel­ opm ent; Dr. Anil K ak o d k ar, D irector, BA R C ; Dr. K. Santhanam , Chief A dvisor (Technologies), D R D O ) M ay 17, 1 9 9 8 ,’ at w w w .fas.org/new s/ india/1998/05/980500-con f.htm ; and ‘Press Release on India’ s N uclear Tests, M ay 11 and 13, 1 9 9 8 ,’ at w w w .fas.org/new s/india/1998/05/prm ay1198.htm . R eactor grade plutonium is typically 65—70 percent Pu-239, and has other iso­ topes that lower the explosive yield of the nuclear reaction. George Perkovich, In d ia’s N uclear Bom b, pp. 4 2 8 —9. ‘Pakistan com pletes the current series o f nuclear tests . . Foreign Secretary, M r. Sham shad Ahm ed’s statem ent at the Press Conference in Islam abad on 30 M ay 1 9 9 8 ’ at w w w .fas.org/new s/pakistan/1998/05/980530-gop.h tm . Owen Bennett Jon es, P akistan: Eye o f the Storm (N ew H aven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ), pp. 1 8 9 —90. For a discussion, see H ilary Synnott, The C auses a n d Consequences o f South A sia ’s N u clear Tests, Adelphi Paper 332 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999), pp. 5 4 —6, and Ashley J. Tellis, In d ia’s Em erging N uclear Posture, pp. 5 1 9 —22. ‘India Ratchets Up Rhetoric against Pakistan and C hin a,’ Agence France Presse, N ew Delhi, M ay 18, 1998, cited in George Perkovich, In d ia’s N uclear Bom b, p. 423 , n. 102. See also ‘Pakistan Told to Roll Back Anti-India Policy’, Tim es o f India, M ay 19, 1998. ‘A dvani W ants T roop s to Strike A cross L o C to Quell Proxy W ar in K ash m ir,’ Rediff, M ay 2 5 , 1998 at w w w .rediff,com /new s/1998/m ay/25geo.htm . See Ashley Tellis, In d ia’s Em erging N u clear Posture (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 2 0 0 1 ), pp. 39—58. George Perkovich, In d ia’s N u clear Bom b, p. 4 1 9 and n. 82. A. B. V ajpayee, interviewed in India Today, M ay 2 5 , 1 9 9 8 , at ww w.indiatoday.com /itoday/25051998/vajint.h tm l. C. R a ja M ohan, C rossing the R ubicon: The Shaping o f In d ia’s N ew Foreign Policy (N ew Y ork: V iking, 2 0 0 3 ). On February 10, 1 9 9 9 , Indian Chief o f Army S taff General Ved M alik said ‘H aving crossed the nuclear threshold does not mean that a conventional w ar is ou t.’ John Cherian, ‘The political and diplom atic backgroun d,’ Frontline 1 6:12 (June 5 —18, 1999), w w w .the-hindu.com /frontline/fl1612/1612080.htm .

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379 The K argil Review Com m ittee R eport, pp. 1 9 7 -9 . 380 Statem ent by General M u sh arraf dated April 12, 1 9 9 9 , cited in The K argil Review C om m ittee R eport, p. 2 4 2 . See also his rem arks to the Pakistan M ili­ tary A cadem y in ‘Pak Defence Strong, Says Army Chief’, Independent, April 19, 1999. 381 Conflict Under the N uclear U m brella: Indian a n d P akistani Lesson s from the K argil Crisis Ashley J . Tellis, C. Christina Fair, Jam ison J o M edby M R -1450U SC A (Santa M onica: R A N D , 2 0 0 1 ); The K argil Review Com m ittee R epo rt; Praveen Sw am i, The K argil War revised edition (N ew Delhi: LeftW ord Press, 2000). 382 Indian m ilitary plans, in fact, alw ays viewed the option of infiltration or tribal and other param ilitary forces as equivalent to an invasion by Pakistani regu­ lars. Lorne J. K avic, In d ia’s Q u e s t . . , pp. 3 6 -7 . 383 See Bruce Riedel, Am erican D iplom acy an d the 1999 K argil Sum m it a t Blair H ouse, Policy Paper Series 2 0 0 2 (Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced Study o f India, 2 0 0 2 ) for reports that Pakistan prepared ‘nuclear tipped m is­ siles’; and Raj C hengappa, W eapons o f Peace, p. 4 3 7 for reports that India placed its nuclear arsenal at ‘ R eadiness State 3 ’ - ready to be m ated with Prithvi and Agni m issiles and M irage 2 0 0 0 aircraft for delivery. 384 See the D raft N u clear D octrine, A ugust 17, 1999, at w w w .indianem bassy.org/ policy/C TBT /nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.htm l. 385 ‘ Fernandes Unveils “ Limited W ar” D octrine,’ The H indu, Jan u ary 2 5 , 2 0 0 0 ; ‘When W ords H urt: N o limits on a “ limited w a r” , A siaw eek, M arch 31, 2 0 0 0 , vol. 26 , no. 12. 386 V. R . R aghavan discusses the internal contradictions in this policy in ‘Limited W ar and N u clear Escalation in South A sia,’ The N onproliferation Review (Fall-W inter 2 0 0 1 ), 1 -1 7 . 387 R ahul Bedi, ‘A Strike Staunched,’ Frontline 19: 12 (June 8 -2 1 , 2 0 0 2 ). 388 R ahul Bedi, ‘The M ilitary D ynam ics,’ Frontline 19: 12 (June 8 -2 1 , 2 0 0 2 ). 389 ‘N uclear C om m and A uthority C om es Into Being,’ The H indu, Jan u ary 5, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘N -option seeks to allay arm y’s fears’ , Tim es o f India, Jan u ary 6, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘ Cabinet C om m ittee on Security Review s Progress on O perationalizing India’s N u clear D octrine,’ Press Inform ation Bureau, G overnm ent o f India, Jan u ary 4, 2003. 390 Jo sy Joseph , ‘The Retaliation Will Be in M inutes,’ Rediff, M ay 12, 2 0 0 3 at w w w .rediff.com ; ‘N uke Panel Review s State o f the A rsenal,’ Tim es o f India, Septem ber 2, 2 0 0 3 . 391 ‘N uclear C apabilities are M u st,’ Tim es o f India, July 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ; R ear A dm iral R aja M enon (retired), A N u clear Strategy fo r India (N ew Delhi: SA G E, 2000). 392 See Ashley J. Tellis, In d ia’s Em erging N u clear Posture; Rajesh M . Basrur, ‘K argil, Terrorism and In dia’s Strategic Shift,’ India Review V ol. 1, N o . 4 (O ctober 2 0 0 2 ), 3 9 -5 6 ; A ndrew C. W inner and T oshi Y oshihara, N uclear Stability in South A sia (C am bridge, M A : Institute for Foreign Policy A nalysis, 2 0 0 2 ); and Rajesh M . Basrur, ‘N u clear W eapons and Indian Strategic C ulture,’ Jo u rn a l o f Peace Research 38:2 (2001), 1 8 1 -9 8 . 393 ‘Defence Budget Up As N ever Before,’ R ediff, at: w w w .rediff.com /busin ess/2000/feb/29bud16.htm . 394 ‘ Budget A llocates R s 6 5 ,3 0 0 cr for D efense,’ R ediff, February 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 . 395 The K argil Review Com m ittee R eport, p. 172. 396 ‘India H as Thin Edge O ver Pak M ilitary,’ Times o f India, June 13, 2 0 0 2 . ‘Army Seeks Swift M odernisation to Counter Pak,’ Times o f India, April 13, 2003. 397 ‘Pakistan C loses G ap With India on Conventional A rm s,’ The Statesm an, April 20, 2 0 0 3 .

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398 ‘India to Acquire T -90 T an ks, A JT s,’ Rediff, at: w w w .rediff.com /new s/2000/ m ay/16def.htm . 399 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 41. 400 ‘T -90 T an ks Likely to R oll O ut by Dec. End,’ The H indu, O ctober 17, 2 0 0 3 . 401 ‘Arm ed Forces Plan to Induct M ore U A V s,’ Tim es o f India, M ay 6, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘M ore U AVs to Step up Border R econnaissance,’ The H indu, M ay 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 ; A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), p. 60. 402 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), pp. 6 2 -3 . 403 ‘N av al Chief Vishnu Bhagw at Sack ed ,’ Tim es o f India, D ecem ber 31, 1998; ‘Bhagw at Incurred W rath of Key Lobbies in Defence M inistry,’ Tim es o f In dia, Jan u ary 7, 1 9 9 9 . The latter notes that A dm iral Bhagw at’ s insistence on local procurem ent m ay have played a role in his dism issal - the first time an acting service chief w as ever fired by an Indian government. 404 ‘First Stealth W arship Inducted into W estern Fleet,’ The H indu, A ugust 13, 2003. 405 ‘Riding the W aves,’ Rediff, M ay 10, 2 0 0 3 , at: w w w .rediff.com . 406 ‘India to Build, N o t Buy, Scorpene subm arines: G eorge,’ Tim es o f India, April 10, 003; ‘French M inister’ s V isit to B oost Defence T ies,’ Tim es o f India, April 24, 2 0 0 3 . 4 0 7 A nnual R eport 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 (Governm ent of India), pp. 5 8 -6 8 . 408 ‘First Brah M os Launch From a M obile C om p lex,’ The H indu, N ovem ber 11, 2 0 0 3 ; Rahul Bedi, ‘Country Briefing: India - Divided interests.’ 409 A deal w as finalized in the autum n of 2 0 0 3 , with India agreeing to pay $1.34 billion for 66 H A W K aircraft, 25 of which w ould be supplied by Britain and the rest assem bled in India. ‘India M ay Buy US Patrol A ircraft’, Financial Tim es, Septem ber 10, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘ First Su-30 M K I Fighter to Roll O ut in D ec.,’ The H indu, Septem ber, 2 0 0 3 . 410 ‘India Launches Stealth C om bat A ircraft Program ’ , Aviation Week an d Space Technology, Jan u ary 20, 1997. 411 ‘India, R u ssia D eveloping C om b at A ircraft,’ Tim es o f India, N ovem ber 10, 2003. 412 ‘IAF Plans Expansion to 60 Squ adron s,’ Tim es o f India, N ovem ber 7, 2 0 0 3 . 413 ‘M iG T ests to be C om pleted by Ju ly ,’ The H indu, April 24, 2 0 0 0 . 125 M iG 21bis will receive substantial upgrades. Rahul Bedi, ‘C ountry Briefing: India Divided Interests.’ 414 ‘L C A Breaks Sound Barrier D uring Test Flight,’ Rediff, A ugust 1, 2 0 0 3 pre­ dicts deploym ent beginning in 2 0 0 8 -0 9 . 415 ‘T alk s on W ith R ussia for Producing Su -3 0 s,’ Tim es o f India, April 24, 2 0 0 0 ; ‘R s7 ,3 1 7 crore Sukhoi D eal Runs into Turbulence,’ The H industan Times, M arch 31, 2 0 0 0 . See also ‘H A L to roll out Sukhois in 2 0 0 4 ’; ‘ First Su-30 M K I Fighters to R oll O ut in D ecem ber.’ 416 A ccording to one report, the IAF lost 552 aircraft and over 2 0 0 pilots in over a ten-year period in the late 19 8 0 s and 19 9 0 s. ‘India Rebuilds Defences a Y ear After K argil: R euters,’ Rediff, w w w .rediff.com /new s/2000/m ay/21kargil.htm . A ccording to ‘Procurem ent, In dia’, Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent South A sia (2004), India lost 2 7 3 aircraft from 1 9 9 1 -2 0 0 3 , and 4 2 per cent o f the losses were the result of human error and inadequate training. 4 1 7 For a discussion of possible force postures, see Ashley J . Tellis, In d ia’s E m erg­ ing N uclear P osture. 418 Brahm a Chellaney, ‘Tactical N u k es’, The H industan Tim es, Jan u ary 2 6 , 1999; Gurm eet K anw al, ‘D oes India N eed T actical W eapons,’ Strategic A nalysis (M ay 2003), w w w .idsa-india.org/an-m ay-03.htm l; Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘The Buddha Frow ns? Tactical N uclear W eapons in South A sia,’ in Brian A lexan­

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der and A listair M illar (eds), T actical N uclear W eapons: Em ergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environm ent (W ashington, D C : B rassey’s, Inc., 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 95—109. ‘India and P akistan ’s Fissile M aterial and N u clear W eapons Inventory, end of 1 9 9 8 ’, w w w .isis-online.org/publications/southasia/stocks/1999.htm l. D r. P. K. Iyengar, form er chief of the Indian A tom ic Energy C om m ission, has argued both points. See ‘In Testing T im es,’ Tim es o f India, February 17, 2 0 0 0 ; ‘India Should Test N eutron Bom b, Says A EC Ex-chief,’ Tim es o f India, M ay 1, 2 0 0 0 . ‘ISR O Chief Prom ises the M o on in 5 Y ears,’ Tim es o f India, Septem ber 3, 2003. M ark H ew ish and Lee K ass, ‘O bservation From O rb it,’ International Defense Review, D ecem ber 1, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘India, Israel Yet to W ork O ut Specifics of Space C oop eration ,’ The H indu, Septem ber 10, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Israel O ffers Satellite Pictures o f K ash m ir,’ The H indu, February 12, 2 0 0 4 ; ‘C ountdow n Starts for PSLVC 5 ’ s Launch,’ Tim es o f India, O ctober 15, 2 0 0 3 . Figures based on IISS The M ilitary B alance 1 9 7 0 -7 1 . Statem ent of retiring Indian Chief of Army S taff Sharm a, June 30, 1990, cited in ‘ O utgoing Army Chief Sharm a Interviewed,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 1545 G M T , June 30, 1990, in F B IS-N E SA (July 3, 1990), pp. 5 9 —61. Based on SIPRI data from Ian Anthony, ‘The ‘Third T ier’ C oun tries,’ pp. 3 62—83, in H erbert W ulf, A rm s Industry L im ited (O xford: O xford University Press, 1993), pp. 370—1, Table 17.1. The m ost sophisticated version of this ladder is found in Keith K rause, Arms a n d the State: Patterns o f M ilitary Production an d T rade (C am bridge: C am ­ bridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1 7 1 —4. T ransfer of skills is further ham pered by the lack of labor mobility between the private sector and the defense sector. Jam es C lad , ‘Technical K nockout’ , pp. 48—9; Andy Lee R oss, Security an d Self-Reliance . . . , pp. 4 5 2 —3. Thom as G raham , ‘In dia,’ p. 169 m entions the lack of forw ard and backw ard linkages with the civilian econom y. ‘ O utgoing Army Chief Sharm a Interviewed,’ Delhi D om estic Service in English, 1545 G M T , June 30, 1 9 9 0 , in FB IS-N E SA (July 3, 1990), pp. 5 9 —61. Air M arsh al C. V. Gole also argues for integration o f production with the private sector. Air Vice M arsh al C. V. Gole, ‘N ation al Security and the Role o f Industry,’ p. 131. ‘ ‘Peace Constituency Larger Than T h at o f H ostility: P M ,’ The H indu, N ov em ­ ber 3, 2 0 0 3 . See Eric Arnett, ‘M ilitary Technology: the C ase o f India,’ pp. 343—65. M an oj K. Josh i, ‘D irections in In dia’s Defence and Security Policies,’ in Ross Babbage and Sandy G ordon (eds), In d ia’s Strategic Future, p. 77. ‘D R D O : O ff C ou rse,’ p. 85. ‘The M issile M a n ,’ India T oday (April 15, 1994), 44. See R aju G. C. Th om as, Indian Security Policy, pp. 119—28. Subrahm anyam , ‘C om m entary . . . , ’ pp. 2 6 9 , 2 7 3 ; ‘A M iddle-Aged M ilitary M achine,’ pp. 23, 30. ‘India: $5.5 Billion For The M ilitary,’ N ew York Tim es, February 5, 2 0 0 4 . ‘ Governm ent to Pay R s5 ,0 0 0 cr. Advance for Defence D eals,’ The H indu, M arch 5, 200 4 . ‘Armed Forces, In dia,’ Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - South A sia (2004). H erbert W ulf, ‘India: An Unfulfilled Q uest . . .,’ p. 127. ‘India’s M ilitary H it By Soviet C ollap se,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 4, 1992;

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N otes ‘South A sian N ation s Scram ble For A rm s After Soviet C rack u p ’, W ashington Post, Jan u ary 5, 1992. ‘In dia’s W estw ard G aze,’ J D W (January 9, 1993): pp. 1 8 -1 9 . Inability to replicate m inor items such as these indicates an extrem ely lax approach tow ards logistics and avoidance o f dependence on foreign supplies. ‘Indian Arm s Buys Defy C ash Shortfall,’ pp. 2 9 -3 0 . A com parison here is apt: both Israel and India purchased Centurion tanks from the U K in the 19 5 0 s. India’s were removed from the order o f battle in the early 197 0 s, and were sold to South Africa for scrap. Shekhar G upta, ‘India Redefines . . . , ’ p. 4 8 . Israel’s Centurions (see C hapter 3) have been extensively modified and upgraded, and remain in service today. Prodyut D as, ‘A ircraft Resurgery Program m es . . ’ ‘India and US T o Im prove T ies,’ W all Street Jo u rn a l, Jan u ary 20, 2 0 0 4 . ‘Tw o Join M issile Defense P rogram ,’ W ashington Tim es, Jan u ary 14, 2 0 0 4 . See Juli M acD on ald, Indo-U S M ilitary R elationship: E xpectation s a n d Percep­ tions (W ashington, D C : Office o f the Secretary o f D efense, Office of Net Assessm ent, O ctober 2002). India Test Fires Brahm os M issile,’ Tim es o f India, O ctober 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 . ‘India, R u ssia in T alk s for a N ew M issile,’ Tim es o f India, M arch 5, 2 0 0 4 . ‘K optev: Satellite D eal Will Be Signed Soon W ith In dia,’ M oscow Tim es, Jan u ary 30, 2 0 04 . ‘Phalcon W arning System Will be Delivered in “ N ear Future” : Sh alom ,’ The H indu, February 12, 2 0 0 4 ; ‘N ow , IAF Gets Eyes in the Sky,’ Tim es o f In dia, M arch 8, 2 0 0 4 . D avid C. Isby, ‘India Seeks M issile co-O peration with Israel’, Ja n e ’s M issiles an d R ockets, N ovem ber 1, 2 0 0 3 at w w w 4.janes.com . ‘Army D rafts N ew W ar D octrine,’ The H indu, M arch 5, 2 0 0 4 . This new “ C old Sta rt” doctrine prom ises significant changes in both organization and equipment.

3 Israel 1 Israel’ s status as a ‘ developing country’ is now , in fact, debatable. Less than 50 years ago, however, Israel’s econom y w as dependent on two export p ro d ­ ucts (citrus and diam onds), and m anufacturing and industrial goo d s were the prim ary im ports. Israel’s national borders were im posed by colonial pow ers and international organizations, and the new governm ent initially had strong socialist, anti-capitalist leanings. In short, Israel’s econom ic structure w as quite sim ilar to other late-industrializing developing countries, and its ability to transcend these initial econom ic lim itations should be viewed as rem ark­ able. See M ichael Barnett, Confronting the C osts o f War: M ilitary Power, State, a n d Society in E g y pt an d Israel (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 1 4 -1 7 , 6 7 -7 8 . 2 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data indicates that from 1 9 6 5 -9 0 , roughly 1/3 of Israel’s high-technology M W S were acquired from local firms. Ian Anthony, ‘The “ Third T ie r” C oun tries,’ in H erbert W ulf (ed.), Arm s Industry Lim ited (O xford: O xford University Press, 1993), pp. 37 0 -1 . 3 The discussion which follow s is a distillation of a num ber of key sources on Israeli political-m ilitary doctrine and strategy. A m ong these are Y oav BenH orin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic D octrine R A N D R -2845-N A (Santa M onica, CA: The R A N D C orporation, Septem ber 1981); Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y: 1874 to the Present (N ew Y ork: M acm illan,

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11 12 13 14

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1985), especially pp. 1 1 5 —23 and 145—63; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y (N ew Y ork: H arper & R ow , 1975), especially pp. 1 19—23; Helen C hapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study (W ashington, D C : US Governm ent Printing Office, 1990), especially pp. 2 6 7 —72; Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, ‘Israel’s Deterrence Strategy R evisited,’ Security Studies 3 (Winter 1 993/94), pp. 330—5 8 ; Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Army (N ew Y ork: Universe Books, 1970), especially pp. 37—5 4 , 62—71, 96—108; Efraim Inbar, ‘Israel’s N ew M ilitary D octrine,’ N a v a l War College Review 36 (January—February 1983), pp. 2 6 —4 0 ; A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel: D efense Procurem ent Through the 19 9 0 s (Jerusalem : Jerusalem Post, 1991), especially pp. 2 3 —5 0 ; M ichael H andel, ‘The Evolution o f Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Q uest for A bsolute Security’, in W illiam son M urray, M acG regor K n ox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds), The M aking o f Strategy: Rulers, States, an d War, (C am bridge: Cam bridge University Press) pp. 5 3 4 —78; and Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1992), pp. 1 2 5 —7 and 2 2 6 —38. Y ehoshafat H arkabi, A rab Attitudes To Israel, translated by M isa Louvish (N ew Y ork: H art Publishing, 1970), p. 37. At the time this w as written, shortly before the Six D ay W ar, A rab pronouncem ents hinted darkly at genocide. Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport, p. 125. Israel’s m ilitary-industrial policies in the 19 5 0 s and 19 6 0 s, based around m odification o f aging equipment, saved precious foreign exchange. W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld M ilitary Industrialization: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1986), pp. 1 3 6 —7. In 1948, one-sixth of the Jew ish population in Palestine w as concentrated in the Jerusalem area. Y uval N e ’em an, ‘Conceiving a Balanced Budget for a Budding N atio n ,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 1 9 8 0 s: Its Econ om ics a n d Politics (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984), p. 3. The pre-1967 borders allow ed Jord an to place artillery only nine miles from the M editer­ ranean, and it is only 30 miles from the w est end of the G olan H eights to the M editerranean. A haron Y ariv, ‘Strategic D epth,’, Jeru salem Q uarterly 6 (Fall 1980), pp. 3—12. Helen C hapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study, p. 2 6 7 ; Y oav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic D octrine, p. 4; M a jo r General Israel T al, ‘Israel’s Defense D octrine: Background and D ynam ics,’ M ilitary Review (M arch 1978), 23. From 1956—80, over 75 percent of the ID F budget went to the IAF and the A rm ored C orps, reflecting the em phasis on quick victory. Y oav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic D octrine, p. 43. Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, ‘Israel’s Deterrence Strategy Revisited,’ p. 331; and Yigal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Army, p. 43 argue that Israel is a status quo power, seeking only to survive. For an opposing perspective, which views Israel’s intentions as ultimately hegemonic, see Zachary T. Irwin, ‘Israel: An A spiring H egem on’, in D avid J . M yers (ed.), Regional H egem ons: Threat Perception an d Strategic Response (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1991), pp. 63—96. M ichael Barnett, C onfronting the C osts o f War, p. xi. Office o f Technology A ssessm ent, G lo b al A rm s Trade, O TA -ISC -460, (W ash­ ington, D C : US Governm ent Printing Office, Jun e 1991), p. 89. SIP R I Y earbook 1994, p. 4 7 1 ; S IP R I Y earbook 1994, p. 4 6 6 ; S IP R I Year­ book 2000, p. 302. ‘Israeli Defense Industry H as a Perennial Proving G round for Production,’ D efense N ew s, June 11—16, 2 0 0 1 , p. 44.

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15 For exam ple, em ploym ent in state-controlled com panies fell from over 4 0 ,0 0 0 in 1991 to 2 4 ,0 0 0 in 1994. The com bined loss of the three state-controlled firms in this period totaled $ 1 .6 billion. S IP R I Y earbook 1996, p. 448. 16 G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 95. 17 A lex M intz, ‘Arm s Production in Israel,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 3 (Spring 1987), 93. 18 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 1 4 4 -5 . 19 G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 95. 20 See Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1998); and Avner Cohen, ‘N u clear A rm s in C risis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons o f the 1 9 6 7 and 1973 W ars,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: H ow N ew Pow ers Will Use N uclear, Biological, an d Chem ical W eapons (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 1 0 4 -2 4 . 21 ‘R A FA E L - a nam e to be respected,’ M ilitary Technology (Septem ber 1986), 146. 2 2 ‘Israeli Industry’ , Special Advertising Supplem ent, J a n e ’s D efence Weekly (hereafter JD W ), June 12, 1993, p. 10. 23 ‘R A F A E L ,’ p. 151. 2 4 G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 96; S IP R I Y earbook 2 0 0 0 , p. 330. 25 A ccording to a recent interview, R A FA E L only receives 1 5 -2 0 percent o f its total revenue from R & D funding. See interview with G iora Shalgi, President and General M anager, R A FA E L A rm am ent D evelopm ent Authority, Israel at w w w .defencenew s.com (M ergers, Y ear 2 0 0 0 N ew File). 2 6 R A FA E L exported 28 percent of total production in 1996, com pared to Elbit’s 82 percent. S IP R I Y earbook 1996, p. 448. 2 7 ‘IAI: A Partner for the W orld,’ M ilitary Technology (M ay 1992), 74. 28 SIP R I Yearbook 2 0 0 0 , p. 328; G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 96. Em ploym ent dropped from 2 2 ,5 0 0 in 1986, before the cancellation of the Lavi project, to 1 6 ,0 0 0 in 1989. 29 ‘IAI: A Partner for the W orld,’ p. 74. IAI annual sales, according to this article, were approxim ately $1.6 billion, m ore than 80 percent of which were export sales. 30 ‘Transform ation and Developm ents at IAI: Interview with M oshe Keret, President of Israeli A ircraft Industries,’ M ilitary Technology (September 1991), 29. 31 See J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , pp. 2 3 8 -4 0 , 3 1 8 -2 0 , 6 5 3 -4 , 701, 8 5 0 -1 , 8 9 3 -4 . 32 ‘IAI: A Partner for the W orld’ p. 77. 33 Paul H irschhom , ‘Battle Fatigue,’ The Jeru salem P o st M agazine (February 26, 1993), 13. 34 SIP R I Yearbook 1 9 9 6 , p. 4 4 8 ; ‘Business A round W orld G row s for Israel A ir­ craft Industries,’ D efense N ew s (M ay 7, 2001) 22. 35 Prior to 1990 , TA A S w as p art o f the M inistry o f D efense. TA A S w as renamed Israeli M ilitary Industries (IMI) in the 19 5 0 s, and renamed TA A S again in the 1990s: the terms will be used interchangeably. G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 96; ‘Israel: Soaring to Singapore and Points Beyond,’ Special Advertising Supple­ ment, JD W , February 19, 1994, 11. 36 ‘Industry: Riding on the W ave of N ew D em an ds,’ JD W , February 15, 1992, 238; see also G lo b al Arm s Trade, p. 96. 37 ‘Industry: R iding’ p. 2 3 6 . Reductions in IDF orders in the late 19 8 0 s had dis­ astrous effects on T A A S’ financial condition. G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 96. 38 G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 97; S IP R I Y earbook 2 0 0 0 , p. 330.

N otes

223

39 ‘Israel Plans to Privatize IM I,’ D efense N ew s, N ovem ber 19—2 5 , 2 0 0 1 , p. 16. 40 SIP R I Yearbook 1 9 9 6 , 4 4 8 ; S IP R I Y earbook 1997, p. 241. 41 ‘Israeli M erger Success Eludes Governm ent Firm s,’ at ww w .defensenew s.com (M ergers, Y ear 2 0 0 0 N ew s File); ‘Israeli C om panies M erge M issile M arketing E fforts,’ D efense N ew s, June 11—17, 2 0 0 1 , p. 24. 42 G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 97. 43 These firms are owned by the H istadru t through the K o o r industrial holding com pany. 44 T adiran is the second source contractor for the US A rm y’s SIN C G A R S com ­ m unications system. M ilitary Technology, O ctober 1 9 8 8 , 198. 45 Em ploym ent fell from a high of 1 3 ,0 0 0 in 1986 to 6 ,5 0 0 in 1991. G lob al A rm s Trade, p. 96. Sales rem ained stable, grow ing from $ 6 2 0 million in 1986 to $700 million in 1 9 9 1 , indicating a substantial increase in productivity. D uring this period, however, T adiran sold its 5 0 percent share of the M azlat firm, which specialized in RPV s, to IAI. This effectively removed it from the RPV/UAV m arket, despite the fact that T ad iran ’ s efforts had pioneered the Israeli RPV industry. 46 ‘Israel: Soaring to Singapore,’ pp. 4 —5; J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , pp. 894—86. 4 7 ‘Industry: R idin g,’ p. 2 3 9 ; J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , pp. 7 0 1 —2. 48 ‘Israel M erger Success Eludes Governm ent Firm s.’ 49 G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 99. Sales rose from $ 8 7 million in 1 9 8 7 to $130 million ($87 million in exports) in 1992. ‘Israeli Industry’ : p. 6. 50 ‘Industry: R idin g,’ p. 2 3 9 . 51 J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , p. 375. 52 ‘Israeli Industry,’ p. 4. 53 ‘Industry: R idin g,’ p. 2 3 9 ; G lo b a l Arm s Trade, p. 99. 54 ‘Israel: Soaring to Singapore,’ p. 3. 55 J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , pp. 70—2; M ilitary Technology (M ay 1987), 78. 56 ‘Industry: Riding, p. 2 4 0 ; ‘Israel: Soarin g,’ pp. 3—4. 57 ‘Israeli Industry,’ p. 4. 58 Interview with Y ossi Ackerm an, President and Chief Executive Officer, Elbit System s Ltd. at w w w .defensenew s.com (M ergers, Y ear 2 0 0 0 N ew s File). 59 See w w w .defensenew s/com /current/top100/2001chart3.htm l; Tim othy D. H oyt, ‘Israel’s M ilitary Industry —The O ther Side of G lobalization ,’ Defense Industry G lobalization : A Com pendium o f Papers Presented a t a Conference on ‘D efense Industry G lob alization ’ H eld on 16 N ovem ber 2001 (W ashing­ ton, D C : The A tlantic Council, February 2 0 0 2 ), pp. 1 9 3 —2 0 5 . 60 T otal turnover in 1989 w as only $ 2 2 million, 82 percent o f which was exports. G lo b al A rm s T rade, pp. 86, 99. 61 A ccording to contem porary reports, the US navy used six trained technicians, w orking twelve hours to identify less than 60 percent o f the potential electron­ ics m alfunctions on one of their aircraft. A TE does the job with 100 percent accuracy in half an hour. ‘ R ad a Rides Shifts in Defense M ark et,’ Jerusalem Post, A ugust 9, 1990. 62 ‘Israel: Soaring to Singapore,’ p. 8. 63 ‘Avionics on the U p,’ Jeru salem Post, O ctober 11, 1991; ‘Local Firm M an u ­ factures C om puters for F -16s,’ Jerusalem Israel Television N etw ork in Hebrew , 190 0 G M T , Decem ber 5, 1 9 9 0 , in F B IS-N E SA , D ecem ber 19, 1990, p. 42. 64 Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Arm y, p. 4;. Z e’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli A rm y, p. 1.

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65 Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli A rm y, p. 2; and D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, (N ew Y ork: Funk & W agnall, 1971), pp. 8 2 4 -5 . 66 Helen Chapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study, p. 2 5 3 ; Z e ’ev Schiff A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 2 -3 . 67 Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 6 -1 8 . While the H agan ah ’s prim ary m ission rem ained defensive, m ore m ilitant groups em erged from fac­ tions within the Z ionist leadership in the late 193 0s. The m ost fam ous of these w as Irgun Z v a ’i Leum i (also called Irgun or Etzel), led by M enachim Begin. The other w as Loham ei H erut Israel (also known as Lehi or ‘The Stern G an g’ after its leader, A vraham Stern). The H agan ah later form ed elite strike units, called the Palm ach, which form ed the core o f the ID F during the W ar of Independence. Y oram Peri, ‘Civilian C ontrol D uring a Protracted W ar,’ in Zvi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 19 8 0 s, p. 65; Y itzhak R abin, The R abin M em oirs, p. 45; and N ad av Safran, Israel: The Em b attled Ally (C am ­ bridge, M A : Belknap, 1981), p. 320. 68 Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ p. 119. Other early products included Am erican and R ussian rifle grenades. See Yigal Allon, Shield o f D av id (N ew Y ork: R andom H ouse, 1970), p. 161. 69 The m etal for the w eapons w as acquired from wrecked aircraft in the Negev desert. TA A S also re-machined the barrels of ancient rifles, and produced large am ounts of sm all arm s am m unition. These m ortars were also copied from standard British issue. Y igal Allon, Shield o f D avid, pp. 1 6 2 -4 . 70 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1989), p. 13; Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, (N ew Y ork: R andom H ouse, 1970), p. 109; D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, pp. 118, 248. 71 A ddress by Y israel Galili, C om m ander in Chief of the H aganah , to the N ation al Council o f H istadru t (General Federation of Labor) in Septem ber 1947, cited in Y igal Allon, The M aking o f the Israeli Arm y, p. 177. 72 D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, p. 55. 73 Som e o f the machinery w as put to immediate use. O ther machinery w as too com plicated to be used and rem ained in storage until the 19 6 0 s when Israeli w orkers finally acquired sufficient skills to em ploy it productively. Y igal Allon, Shield o f D avid, p. 187; D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, p. 56; Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 110. 74 D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, p. 59. 75 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 3; and A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l. . . , p. 71. 76 Anthony H . C ordesm an, The A rab -Israeli M ilitary Balance an d the A rt o f O perations (Lanham , M D : University of America Press, 1987), p. 9. Helen C hapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study, p. 2 5 6 ; M ajo r General Israel Tal, ‘Israel’s Defense Doctrine: Background and D ynam ics,’ M ilitary Review (M arch 1978), 2 4 -6 . 77 D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, pp. 2 6 8 -9 . 78 M ichael Barnett, C onfronting the C osts o f War . . . , pp. 16, 169; Sam uel J. R oberts, Survival or H egem ony: The Foundations o f Israeli Foreign Policy (Baltim ore, M D : The Joh n s H opkin s University Press, 1973), pp. 1 8 -1 9 . 79 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 18. The num ber of TAAS em ployees increased from 1 ,0 0 0 to 2 ,3 0 0 in the 1 9 4 9 -5 0 period. Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent o f the Israeli Defense Industry,’ pp. 1 2 1 -2 . 80 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 2 4 -5 ; A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel, p. 71; Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel: Case Study for International M issile T rade and N on-Proliferation,’ in W illiam C.

N otes

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

90 91

92

93 94 95 96

97 98

99

100 101 102

225

Potter and H arlan W. Jen cks (eds), The International M issile B az aar: The N ew Su ppliers’ N etw ork (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1994), pp. 2 3 5 —6. G lo b al A rm s Trade, pp. 9 3 —4. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 26. D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, p. 630. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 132—5. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 28. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 34. Y uval N e ’em an, ‘Conceiving a Balanced Budget . . , ’ p. 8. M ichael Barnett, C onfronting the C osts o f War . . . , p. 167. The value o f Germ an reparations paym ents from 1 9 5 3 —66 has been estim ated at between $ 7 0 0 —821 million: see Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 2 9 —30, and M ichael Barnett, C onfronting the C osts o f War . . , p. 64. A ccording to Barnett, Germ an reparations funds accounted for 2 0 —25 percent o f the governm ent developm ent budget from 1 9 5 3 —66, and the D iaspo ra con ­ tributed an additional $ 1 2 0 million during this period. From 1 9 5 0 —73, the state had little reliance on private capital for investment. M ichael M ichaely, ‘Israel’s Dependence on C apital Im ports,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 3 (Spring 1977), pp. 4 2 —9. Protests by opposition leader M enachim Begin nearly brought the state to civil w ar. M ichael Barnett, C onfronting the C osts o f War, p. 64. A pproxim ately 38 percent of all Germ an reparations paym ents took the form o f ships, machinery, and equipm ent. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry, p. 30. Egypt and Israel received m atching supplies of equipm ent from the U K under the terms of the Tripartite Agreement. Israel, Syria, and Egypt, for exam ple, all received M eteor fighters in 1 9 5 2 —5 3 . SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With the Third W orld revised edition (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1975) (hereafter SIPRI, The A rm s T rade (1975)), pp. 2 1 1 —12. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 26. Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Arm y, p. 49. Aharon Kliem an, Israel’s G lo b al R each: A rm s Sales a s D iplom acy (N ew Y ork: Brassey’ s, 1985), p. 17. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 36—5 0 ; Benjamin K agan, The Secret Battle fo r Israel, (Cleveland and N ew Y ork: W orld Publishing C o., 1966), pp. 157—89. Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 1 3 2 —3; Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Army, pp. 5 1 —2. For accounts o f Israeli military success in 1956, see Edw ard Luttw ak and Dan H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 1 3 8 —64; Z e’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli A rm y, pp. 86—100; Chaim H erzog, The A rab-Israeli Wars, (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1984), pp. 109—4 1 ; Ariel Sharon, W arrior: An A utobiogra­ phy with D avid C hanoff, (London: M acD on ald, 1989), pp. 1 3 3 —53. Peres states that the ID F received M -48 tanks from the Bundeswehr as the G erm ans received newer m odels, and notes that Israel received military equip­ ment valued by the A rabs at 5 0 0 million Israeli pounds w ithout ever paying a cent. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 7 7 —85. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 31—65, 114—17. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 2 3 —5, 33—5, 41. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 128—9. Israeli engineers m ade multiple m o di­ fications to the M agister, and the aircraft continued in IAF service for decades after extensive m odernization. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 54; Ja n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 149.

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103 Leonard Spector, N u clear A m bitions with Jacqueline R. Smith (Boulder, CO : W estview Press, 1990), pp. 1 4 9 -7 4 ; Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1991), pp. 3 3 -7 1 ; Sylvia C rosbie, A Tacit Alliance (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1974); Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B o m b . 104 Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel: A C ase Study . . . ’, pp. 2 3 5 -7 . 105 Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel: A C ase Study . . . ’, p. 235. 106 W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ p. 136. 107 Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s Arm y, p. 68. 108 ‘ID F -B arn door of opportunity,’ Jeru salem Post, M ay 17, 1991. 109 Eliezer Sheffer, ‘The Econom ic Burden o f the Arms Race Between the C on ­ frontation States and Israel,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed), Israeli Security Planning . . . , pp. 1 4 2 -6 5 . 110 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 50. 111 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , p. 75. 112 The value o f m ajor w eapons systems produced in Israel, either under license or with significant local content, as a percentage o f total m ajo r w eapons p ro ­ curement, am ounted to only about 6.8 percent in 1 9 6 5 , 4 .8 percent in1966, and 1.9 percent in 1967. Percentages based on SIPRI data in Ian Anthony, ‘The ‘Third-Tier C ountries’ . . . ’, Table 17.1, pp. 3 7 0 -1 . 113 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 72. 114 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 5 5 , 60. 115 IAI has attem pted to m aintain a foothold in the civilian aerospace m arket, but local designs have rarely been successful. ‘Israel A rm s E xports Spur C oncern,’ Aviation Week a n d Space Technology, (Decem ber 1976), p. 13; ‘Sw ords to Ploughshares turns L oss to Profit,’ Jeru salem Post, July 4, 1989; Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ p. 123. 116 Em igration, particularly in the science and engineering sectors, is alw ays an issue of concern in Israel. From 1948 to 1986, between 4 0 0 ,0 0 0 and 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 Israelis em igrated. Helen C hapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study, p. 89. 117 SIPRI, The A rm s T rade (1975), p. 2 0 8 ; SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third W orld (N ew Y ork: H um anities Press, 1971) (hereafter SIPRI, The Arms T rade (1971)), pp. 7 6 8 -8 1 . 118 A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f Cherbourg (N ew Y ork: Seaver Books, H enry H olt and C om pany, 1988), p. 2 9 . An Egyptian frigate bom barded Tel Aviv on O ctober 31, 1956 during the Sinai C am paign. Chaim H erzog, The A rab-Israeli Wars, p. 138. 119 A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f C herbourg, p. 2 7 . A m ong the options considered were the establishm ent of an ‘ all-com m ando’ navy or elimination o f the surface force and concentration on subm arines. 120 C om m ander Eli R ah av, Israeli N avy (Retired), ‘M issile B oat W arfare: Israeli Style,’ Proceedings (M arch 1986), pp. 1 0 7 -1 3 . 121 The Ja g u a rs were purchased with a $ 6 0 million defense grant provided by the W est Germ an governm ent in M arch, 1960. A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f Cherbourg, p. 41. 122 C aptain Peleg Lapid, Israeli N avy (retired), ‘Electronics in the Israeli N av y ,’ ID F Jo u rn al, (Decem ber 1984) pp. 1 3 -1 8 . 123 A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f Cherbourg, pp. 57, 60, 179. 124 A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f Cherbourg, pp. 67, 73. 125 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , pp. 2 9 7 -8 . 126 For m ore description o f the naval cam paign in 1973, see C om m ander Eli R ahav, ‘M issile Boat W arfare: Israeli Style,’ pp. 1 1 2 -1 3 ; A braham R ab i­ novich, The B o ats o f C herbourg, pp. 1 7 7 -3 0 6 ; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an

N otes

127 128

129 130 131 132 133 134 135

136 137

138 139 140 141

142 143

144 145

146

147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

227

H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 394—5; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli W ars, pp. 3 1 1 —14; Anthony Cordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern W arfare V olum e I: The A rab Israeli Conflicts 1 9 7 3 —1989 (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1990), pp. 1 0 4 —8. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 128—9. G erald Steinberg, ‘Israel,’ in N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efence Industry: A C om parative Study (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s, 1983), p. 300. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . . (1971), pp. 7 6 8 —9. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade . . . (1971), pp. 7 6 8 —9. ‘After Y ears of Relying On Its Own W eapons, Israel Look s A b road ,’ Wall Street Jo u rn a l, June 2 7 , 1995. Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 2 1 7 —18. Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 1 2 6 —30. D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert (O xford: B rassey’s, 1989) pp. 2 9 —30; 54; J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 86—7. D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert, pp. 5 2 —5; Ja n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 84—7; Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, pp. 5 8 —9, Table 2.9. Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 26. ‘The Artillery C orps, 1948-Present,’ ID F Jo u rn al, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1987); Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 180, 2 1 8 , 329; Enrico Po, ‘Self-Propelled Artillery for the 9 0 s,’ in M ilitary Technology (Decem ber 1986), 18—39, 2 0 —1; J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 5 7 5 —6. Lon N ordeen, Fighters O ver Israel (N ew Y ork: O rion B ooks, 1990), p. 201. Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 195, 199. G erald Steinberg, ‘Israel,’ p. 281. Shimon Engel, ‘The Long R oad from M o lo tov C ocktails to M issiles, Tanks, and L asers,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Summ er 1988), p. 2 6 ; Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel: A C ase Study . . ’ Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 105. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry . . . , pp. 4 4 , 60—1; Shlom o A ronson, The Politics an d Strategy o f N u clear W eapons in the M iddle E a st: O pacity, Theory an d Reality, 1 9 6 0 -1 9 9 1 , with O ded Brosh, (Albany, N Y : State U ni­ versity of N ew Y ork Press, 1992), p. 86. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 232. SIPRI, The A rm s T rade With The Third W orld (1971), pp. 7 8 0 —1. The M D 620 reportedly had serious technical problem s. ‘Israel to Receive Lance M is­ siles, F -15s,’ A viation Week an d Space Technology (September 15, 1975), 16. Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption; Leonard Spector, N u clear A m bi­ tions, pp. 14 9 —74; Shlom o A ronson, The Politics an d Strategy . . ; Frank Barnaby, The Invisible B om b : The N u clear A rm s R ace in the M iddle E a st (London, I. B. T aurus, 1989); Peter Pry, Israel’s N uclear A rsenal (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1984); Avner Cohen, Israel an d the Bom b. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 54. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 59. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 64. Shlom o A ronson, The Politics an d Strategy, p. 62. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 71. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 67. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 236. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, pp. 171, 203.

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155 Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, pp. 2 2 7 -3 3 . 156 A ccording to Cohen, Israel created two nuclear devices on M ay 2 8 , 1967. Avner Cohen, Israel a n d the B o m b , pp. 2 7 3 - 4 . For CIA estim ates, see Leonard Spector, N uclear A m bitions, p. 153; Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, p. 186. 157 For accounts of Israel’s victory, which increased the territory of the state by alm ost 35 percent (not including the Sinai), see Chaim H erzog, The A rab-Israeli Wars, pp. 1 4 3 -9 1 ; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 2 0 9 -9 8 ; Z e’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Army, pp. 1 2 4 -4 4 ; Ariel Sharon, Warrior, pp. 1 7 9 -2 0 3 ; Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin M em oirs pp. 1 0 0 -2 1 ; Raful Eitan, A Soldier’s Story (New Y ork: Shapolsky Publishers, 1992), pp. 9 5 -1 0 8 ; Brig. Gen. S. L. A. M arshall, ‘The Army of Israel,’ Military Review (April 1968), pp. 3-9 ; M ichael B. Oren, Six D ay s o f War: Ju n e 1 9 6 7 an d the M aking o f the M odern M iddle E a st (O xford: O xford University Press, 2002). 158 Yitzhak R abin, The R abin M em oirs, p. 132; D avid Pollock, The Politics o f Pressure: Am erican A rm s a n d Israeli Policy Since the Six D ay War (W estport, C T : G reenw ood Press, 1982). 159 A nw ar el-Sadat, In Search o f Identity (N ew Y ork: H arper & R ow , 1977), p. 188. 160 Defense expenditure rose, in real terms, approxim ately 2 0 percent per year from 1 9 6 7 -7 3 , com pared to G N P grow th of about 10 percent per year. Eliezer Sheffer, ‘The Econom ic Burden of the A rm s R ace,’ pp. 143, 150. 161 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 79. The defense industry share o f new em ploym ent in industry w as over 36 percent - o f 5 5 ,0 0 0 new indus­ trial jobs created, 2 0 ,0 0 0 were in the defense industry. N aftali Blumenthal, ‘The Influence of Defense Industry Investment on Israel’s Econom y,’ in Zvi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning, p. 173. 162 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel, pp. 7 6 -7 . 163 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l. . . , p. 73. 164 N aftali Blumenthal, ‘The Influence of Defense Industry Investm ent,’ pp. 1 6 9 -7 1 . 165 N ad av Safran, Israel: The Em b attled Ally, p. 117. 166 G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 94. After 1967, military R & D expenditures surpassed all civilian R & D expenditures com bined. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 9 6 -7 . 167 M ichael Barnett, Confronting the C osts o f War, p. 199. 168 Y oram Peri, ‘Political-M ilitary Partnership in Israel’, International Political Science Review 2 (1981), p. 304. 169 Helen C hapin M etz, Israel: A Country Study, p. 2 6 0 ; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli W ars, p. 2 2 7 . 170 Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 3 6 0 -1 . 171 N aftali Blumenthal, ‘The Influence of Defense Industry Investm ent,’ p. 169. 172 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 1 1 -1 2 . 173 Yitzhak R abin, The R abin M em oirs, p. 64; Stew art Reiser, The Israeli Arms Industry, pp. 8 4 -5 ; G erald Steinberg, ‘Israel: H igh Technology Roulette,’ in M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson (eds), A rm s Production in the Third W orld (London and Philadelphia: T aylor and Francis, 1986), p. 167. 174 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 9 9 -1 0 0 , 195; Gerald M . Stein­ berg, ‘H igh Technology Roulette’ , p. 175. In the 1973 w ar Britain also refused to supply the Israelis with spares and am m unition for their Centurion tanks. R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie N eum an, ‘Israel,’ pp. 1 9 3 -2 2 3 , in Jam es E. K atz (ed.), A rm s Production in the Third W orld (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1984), p. 196.

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175 G erald M . Steinberg ‘H igh Technology R oulette,’ p. 175; Aharon Klieman and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . . , p. 170; J a n e ’s A rm our and Artillery, 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 154. 176 Yitzhak R abin, The Rabin M em oirs, 141—2. An alternate account is Avner Cohen, Israel a n d the Bom b, pp. 312—15. 177 Yitzhak R abin, The R abin M em oirs, pp. 5 4 —5; Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 4 4 —5; A lex M intz, ‘The M ilitary-Industrial C om plex: American Concepts and Israeli Realities,’ Jo u rn a l o f Conflict Resolution 29 (Decem ber 1985), 627. 178 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 73—4; Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 4 4 , 5 5 , 1 9 3 —4 ; Y itzhak R abin, The R abin M em oirs, pp. 5 4 —5; Efraim Inbar, ‘The American A rm s Transfer to Israel,’ M iddle E a st Review 15 (Fall 1982, W inter 1982/3), 46. 179 Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 3 6 0 —1. 180 Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 3 1 8 —19; Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 1 7 8 —82; Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport, p. 20 1 . 181 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 93—6; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli Wars, pp. 2 1 0 —23; Z e’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Army, pp. 181—9; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, pp. 314—2 7; Avi Schlaim and Raym ond Tanter, ‘Decision Process, Choice, and Consequence: Israel’s Deep Penetration Bom bing in Egypt, 1 9 7 0 ,’ W orld Poli­ tics 30 (July 1978), 4 8 3 —5 1 6 . 182 Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport, p. 2 0 0 ; M artin V an Creveld, The Sw ord a n d the Olive: A Critical H istory o f the Israeli D efense Force (N ew Y ork: PublicAffairs, 1998), pp. 195—267. 183 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 5 3 —4; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Army, pp. 347—52. 184 N a d a v Safran, Israel: The Em b attled Ally, pp. 4 8 8 —9; Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, pp. 2 2 3 —40; ‘H ow Israel G ot The B om b,’ Time (April 12, 1976), 39—4 0 . M ore recent analysis suggests that these reports were exaggerated. Avner Cohen, ‘N uclear A rm s in C risis Under Secrecy . . ,’ pp. 117—22. 185 Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Army o f Israel, pp. 337—97; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli Wars, pp. 2 2 7 —323; Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, Lesson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I., pp. 14—113; Z e’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli A rm y, pp. 2 0 7 —2 9 ; M artin V an Creveld, ‘M ili­ tary Lessons o f the Y om K ippur W ar,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 3 (Fall 1977), 1 14—24. 186 Avi Schlaim , ‘Failures in N ation al Intelligence Estim ates: The C ase of the Y om K ippur W ar,’ W orld Politics 2 7 (April 1976), 3 4 8 —88. 187 See Yuval N e ’em an, ‘Conceiving a Balanced Budget . . . , ’ pp. 10—11; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli Wars, pp. 2 2 7 —8; Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Army, p. 337; Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli A rm y, p. 215 . 188 Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli A rm y, p. 362. 189 Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, V ol. I, p. 21; Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Army, p. 215. 190 M ajo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘ Lessons of W ar: The ID F in Lebanon ,’ M ilitary Review (A ugust 1984), 62. 191 M artin Van Creveld, The Sw ord a n d the O live, p. 2 5 2 ; H irsh G oodm an, Isra el’s Strategic Reality: The Im pact o f the A rm s R ace (W ashington, D C : The W ashington Institute for N e ar East Policy, 1985), p. 8.

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192 A braham Rabinovich, The B o ats o f Cherbourg, pp. 2 0 5 -3 0 6 . 193 Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Army, p. 223. 194 The IAF lost a total of 104 aircraft in the conflict, but only six in air-to-air com bat. The A rabs lost 2 7 7 aircraft in air-to-air com bat: 183 to M irages and N eshers, and 94 to F-4s. Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 217, 220; Lon N ordeen, Fighters over Israel, p. 200. 195 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, Rearm ing Israel . . . , p. 128; Eliezer Cohen, Israel’s B est D efense (N ew Y ork: O rion Books, 1993), p. 4 2 6 . 196 N ad av Safran, Israel: The Em b attled Ally, p. viii. 197 In 1950, Egypt’s G N P w as 4.5 times that of Israel, while by 1 9 6 7 the dif­ ference had shrunk to only 1.5 tim es. N a d a v Safran, Israel: The E m battled Ally, pp. 2 6 0 -1 . 198 Eliezer Sheffer, ‘The Econom ic Burden of the A rm s R ace,’ p. 152, Table 8.4. 199 N ad av Safran, Israel: The E m battled Ally, p. 4 9 6 ; Sharon R. M urphy, The Foreign Policies o f Israel an d South A frica: A C om parative Study (PhD disser­ tation, University o f N otre D am e, April 1985), p. 109. 200 Peter H ellm an, ‘Israel’ s C hariot of Fire,’ in A tlantic M onthly 2 5 5 (M arch 1985), 8 1 -9 5 ; D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert, pp. 1 5 5 -6 9 . 201 M ajo r (Reserve) Louis W illiam s and Lt. C ol. Y ehuda W einraub, ‘The M erkava: A N ation al Enterprise,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (M ay 1984), 4 6 ; Z vi V olk, ‘T an k s Lead the W ay,’ ID F Jo u rn al (Summ er 1990), 2 2 -3 . 202 A ccording to the IDF, M erkava crewmen suffered 5 0 percent fewer casualties than the crews of other tank m odels in the 1 9 8 2 Lebanon conflict, and no M erkava crewmen suffered burns. ID F Jo u rn a l (Fall 1985), 7; M ajo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘Lessons o f W ar,’ pp. 5 0 -1 . 203 Z vi V olk, ‘T an ks Lead the W ay,’ p. 25. 204 D avid Eshel, ‘M erkava M k .3 : Israel’s N ew Spearhead,’ M ilitary Technology (July 1989), 67; Richard Sim pkin, ‘From A rray to D isarray: Tactical Aspects o f Active and Reactive A rm or,’ in M ilitary Technology (April 1986), 2 3 . This is possible, at least in part, because o f the positioning o f the engine in the front of the tank, where it provides additional protection for the crew. 205 D avid Eshel, ‘M erkava M k. 3 . . . , ’ p. 68, and ‘ID F T akes O ff the W raps. N ew M erkava “ A rguably Best T an k in the W orld” ,’ Jeru salem Post, M ay 4, 1989. 206 Z vi V olk, ‘T an ks Lead the W ay,’ p. 25. 2 0 7 Christopher Foss, ‘M B T U pd ate,’ pp. 3 4 5 -5 2 , JD W , Septem ber 1, 1 9 9 0 , 347. 208 ‘M erkava M k 4 M B T ’ Ja n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com 209 Bet Shemesh produced the J-7 9 under license, but it relied on the US for provi­ sion of 40 percent o f the parts. G lo b al A rm s T rade, p. 97; Gerald M . Stein­ berg, ‘Israel: H igh-Technology R oulette,’ pp. 167, 174. 210 D an Raviv and Y ossi M elm an, Every Spy a Prince (Boston: H oughton Mifflin C om pany, 1990), pp. 2 0 3 -4 . 211 J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , p. 100. 212 J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , pp. 1 4 6 -7 . 213 Jam es F. D unnigan, H ow To M ake War (N ew Y ork: W illiam M orrow and C om pany, 1988), pp. 1 6 4 -1 6 5 . 214 The J-79 weighs less than the French engine, produces more thrust, and is more fuel-efficient, increasing com bat radius. Edw ard Luttw ak and Koehl, The D ictionary o f M odern War, (N ew Y ork, H arper Collins, 1991), pp. 3 2 7 -8 (see ‘K fir’). 215 US arm s export restrictions place limits on the transfer o f lethal equipment, but the J-79 could be transferred freely as a non-lethal item. Israel could,

Stuart

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217 218 219 220

221

222 223 224

225 226

227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238

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therefore, order as m any as it could pay for, but could not export the Kfir w ithout US approval. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 0 4 -5 . Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . ., p. 140. IAI recov­ ered $1 billion o f the $ 2 .5 billion cost in Kfir-related exports, but m ost of these took the form of know-how, parts, and upgrading of French M irages in foreign service. ‘State C om ptroller Criticizes D ecisions on Lavi,’ Jerusalem Post, July 1, 1987, in F B IS-N E SA , July 2, 1987, L 2 -3 . M artin J . M iller, ‘Israel’s Q uest for Self-Sufficiency,’ M ilitary Review (M arch 1973), p. 70. M oshe D ayan, Story o f M y Life: An A utobiography (N ew Y ork: W illiam M o rrow and C o., 1976), p. 283. ‘ Battle D am age R epairs,’ A erospace (The R oyal A eronautical Society, D ecem ­ ber 1992), 12; Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Army, pp. 2 1 7 , 2 2 0 . R obert E. H arkavy, ‘A rm s Resupply D uring Conflict: A Fram ew ork for A nalysis,’ in Christian Schm idt (ed.), The Econ om ics o f M ilitary Expenditures (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1987), p. 2 4 9 ; M ichael Brzoska and Frederic S. Pearson, A rm s a n d W arfare: E scalation , D e-Escalation, an d N egotiation (C olum bia, SC : University of South C arolina Press, 1994), pp. 9 0 -1 1 1 . M a jo r (Reserve) Louis W illiam s and Lt. C ol. Y ehuda W einraub, ‘The M erkava: A N ation al Enterprise,’ pp. 4 6 - 6 3 . Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, V ol. I, p. 102. John S. Coutinho, ‘Battle D am age A ssessm ent and R epair,’ M ilitary Review (February 1988), 5 4 -6 2 . Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli Wars, p. 306; Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, pp. 61, 102. Statem ent by M inistry of D efense, M arch, 1973 cited in Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 98; M artin J . M iller, ‘Israel’s Q uest for Self­ Sufficiency,’ p. 68, which states that Israeli sources provide 90 percent of IDF sm all, light, and m edium arm s and am m unition. N a d a v Safran, Israel: The Em b attled A lly, p. 275. J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1987/8, p. 7 5 0 ; J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 9 8 , p. 6 8 7 . M ore recent editions of Ja n e ’s have reduced some of these claim s - ‘Python 3 ’ Ja n e ’s A ir-Launched W eapons 42 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com states that the Shafrir 2 w as responsible for over 100 kills in 1973. M ilitary Review (O ctober 1973), p. 97. G erald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel,’ p. 2 8 1 ; Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry’ , p. 123. ‘N ew C apabilities Increasing R apidly,’ A viation Week an d Space Technology, April 10, 1978. D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert, p. 5 5 ; Ja n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 83, 154. Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, p. 329; J a n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 38. J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 5 7 5 -6 . Edw ard Luttw ak and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y, p. 329; D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert, p. 49. Lon N ordeen, Fighters O ver Israel, pp. 109, 114. Avner Cohen, ‘N u clear Arms in C risis Under Secrecy,’ pp. 1 1 8 -1 9 . Avner Cohen, ‘N u clear Arms in C risis Under Secrecy,’ pp. 1 2 0 -1 . ‘US A ssum es the Israelis H ave A-Bom b O r Its P arts,’ N ew York Tim es, July 18, 1970. Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, pp. 3 2 4 -3 8 .

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239 Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, p. 179. One o f the earliest public reports concerning Israel’ s arm ing of nuclear w eapon s in the 1973 conflict is ‘H ow Israel G ot The B om b,’ Time, April 12, 1 9 7 6 , which reports that Israel possessed 13 w eapon s at the time of publication. See also ‘CIA: Israel has 10—20 A -W eapons,’ W ashington Post, M arch 15, 1976. 240 See Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, pp. 173, 179, 2 1 5 , 2 2 5 —31. 241 The best article on this subject is Avner Cohen, ‘Israel and Chem ical/Biologi­ cal W eapons: H istory, Deterrence, and A rm s C on tro l,’ in The N on prolifera­ tion Review (Fall—W inter 2 0 0 1 ), 2 7 —53, available at cns.m iis.edu/ pubs/npr/vol08/83/83cohen.pdf . See also ‘N B C C apabilities, Israel,’ J a n e ’s N uclear, B iological an d Chem ical D efence (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 242 Yitzhak R abin, The Rabin M em oirs, p. 290. 243 Aryeh Shalev, ‘The A rm s R ace in the M iddle East in the 1 9 8 0 s,’ in Zvi Lanir, Israeli Security Planning . . ., pp. 75—90. 244 Efraim Inbar, ‘The American Arms Transfer . . .,’ p. 48. SIPRI data indicates that Israel produced about 40 percent o f the value of all m ajor w eapons system procurem ent in the 1 9 74 —84 period. Ian Anthony, ‘The Third-Tier . . ,’ pp. 370—1. 245 If all dom estic production in the 1 9 7 3 —84 period w as spent instead on im port­ ing defense equipm ent, Israel w ould have spent at least $1 billion m ore in foreign exchange during this period. W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ p. 138. 246 Efraim Inbar, ‘The American A rm s Transfer . . .,’ pp. 4 6 —7. 2 4 7 Eliezer Sheffer, ‘The Econom ic Burden . . , ’ p. 144, Table 8.1. 248 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 2 0 4 . Arms exports, particularly high-technology items, have a ‘value-added’ benefit o f m ore than 5 0 percent. This is m ore than twice the level of diam onds, Israel’ s other m ajo r export item. Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ p. 119. 249 Arm s exports reportedly accounted for 25 percent o f the value of all Israeli industrial exports in 1 9 8 4 —85. A haron Kliem an, Israel’s G lo b al Reach, p. 1. 250 Gerald M . Steinberg, ‘Indigenous A rm s Industries and Dependence: The Case o f Israel,’ D efence A nalysis 2 (Decem ber 1986), p. 304. 251 Interview with D r. Aharon Kliem an, February 1 9 9 3 , and Aharon Klieman, Israel’s G lo b al R each , p. 58. 252 ‘N ew C apabilities Increasing R ap id ly,’ A viation Week an d Space Technology, April 10, 1978. 253 Throughout this period, Israel’ s ratio o f exports to im ports w as grow ing: from 5 6 .6 percent in 1 9 7 6 to 75.8 percent in 1 9 8 5 . M uch of this ‘healthy grow th’ w as due to w eapon s exports. A haron Kliem an, Israel’s G lo b al Reach . . . , p. 97; Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 124. 254 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . ., pp. 78, 84; G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 86, Table 5 .2 , and p. 100. IAI exported only about 8 percent of total sales in 1971, and over 70 percent in 1 9 8 6 . Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ p. 123. 255 G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 89. 256 ‘Transform ation and Developm ents at IAI,’ M ilitary Technology, Septem ber 1991, 31. 2 5 7 ‘R A FA E L —A N am e to be R espected,’ M ilitary Technology (September 1986), 146—51. 258 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 4 3 —50. 259 B oston G lobe, D ecem ber 18, 1 9 8 6 , 28, cited in Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 206. 260 Israel has been accused of transferring both A rrow and Jericho technology to

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264 265 266 267

268

269

270 271

272 273

274 275 276

277 278 279

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South A frica. ‘US Suspicions D elay C om puter Transfer to Israel,’ Chicago Tribune, N ovem ber 9, 1989; ‘President W aives Sanctions for Israel: S. African Firm Cited in M issile Parts D eal,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 2 7 , 1 9 9 1 . ‘Israel, Pressed by US, Puts Lim its on Its Export of M issile Technology,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 4, 1991. ‘South Africa Engages in R ow With Israel O ver Past M ilitary T ies’, Christian Science M onitor, July 19, 1994. J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , pp. 2 9 7 -8 . N aftali Blumenthal, ‘Influence of the Defense Industry,’ p. 169. See also Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 80. G ow ri Sundaram , ‘M ilitary Electronics in Israel: Second-W orld Requirem ents in a Third-W orld C ountry,’ International D efense Review (January 1982), pp. 5 9 -6 7 . Shimon Engle, ‘Airborne Electronic W arfare,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Winter 1987), 3 4 -4 1 . Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 9 2 -5 , 2 3 1 -3 . Efraim Inbar, ‘Israel’s N ew M ilitary D octrine,’ N a v a l War College Review 26 (January-February 1983), 2 6 -4 0 . Z e ’ev Schiff and Ehud Y a ’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1984); Ariel Sharon, W arrior . . , pp. 4 0 8 -5 2 2 ; Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 2 3 9 - 6 2 ; Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli W ars, pp. 3 3 9 -7 0 ; Anthony Cordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, 1 1 7 -2 2 8 ; M a jo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘ Lessons of W ar’; W. Seth C arus, ‘The Bekaa V alley C am paign ,’ W ashington Q uarterly 5 (Autumn 1982), 3 4 -4 1 . Chaim H erzog, The A rab -Israeli W ars, p. 347. Four m ore Syrian SA M batter­ ies were severely dam aged. In the 1973 w ar, by com parison, only three of 36 Syrian SA M batteries were destroyed, and only five dam aged. Schiff, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y, pp. 1 6 0 -1 . Stanley Sienkiewicz, ‘Som e M ilitary Lessons of the W ar in Lebanon ,’ in Jam es Brown and W illiam Snyder (eds), The R egionalization o f W arfare (New Brunswick, N J: Transaction Books, 1985), pp. 8 5 -9 5 . M artin Van Creveld, The Sw ord an d the O live, p. 295. Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, p. 202 ; The A rab -Israeli W ars, p. 362. The Syrians lost 91 aircraft in air-to-air com bat. Z e ’ev Schiff, A H istory o f The Israeli Arm y, p. 162. Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, pp. 2 0 0 -1 0 . Im manuel W ald, The W ald Report, is extrem ely critical o f the ID F higher com m and echelons, and of the capability of the ground forces to function effectively at the operational level; M a jo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘ Lessons of W ar,’ pp. 4 7 -9 . Z e ’ev Schiff and Ehud Y a ’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War, pp. 1 6 8 -7 1 ; M ajor Richard A. Gabriel, ‘Lessons o f W ar,’ pp. 62, 65. Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport, 4, p. 2. Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, pp. 1 1 0 -1 1 , 1 5 8 -6 4 , 184. A lm ost all of the IA F’ s electronic w arfare and com m unications systems were either locally built or m odified. R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie N eum an, ‘Israel,’ p. 20 1 . Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 102, 1 0 5 -6 , 1 9 2 -5 . H irsh G oodm an and W . Seth C arus, The Future Battlefield an d the A rabIsraeli Conflict (N ew Brunswick, N J: Transaction Publishers, 1990). Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 9 2 -5 , A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 2 2 9 -3 1 .

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280 D ore G old, Israel as an Am erican N o n -N A T O Ally, JC S S Study N o . 19 (Jerusalem : Jerusalem Post, 1992). From 1 9 4 9 —63, US aid to Israel totaled $800 million. In 1973 alone, US assistance reached $ 2 .4 billion. N ad av Safran, Israel: The Em b attled A lly, p. viii. 281 JC S S M iddle E a s t M ilitary B alance 1986, pp. 1 3 5 —6, 2 6 0 . US aid am ounted to between 30 percent and 4 2 percent o f Israeli military expenditures each year in the late 19 8 0s and early 1 9 90 s. A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . ., p. 67. 282 M arth a W enger, ‘The M oney Tree: US Aid to Israel,’ in M iddle E a s t R eport (M ay—A ugust 1990), 12. 283 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 142; Raym ond J . Ahearn, ‘Restructuring the Israeli Econom y,’ C R S R eport for C ongress 9 2 -7 3 8F (W ashington, D C : The Library o f C ongress, Septem ber 2 5 , 1992). 284 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 150. 285 From 1984—90, the ID F lost 2 0 percent of its budget in real terms. ‘M ajor C uts in Israeli Defense Budget,’ M ilitary Technology (February 1990), 5 6 —7. 286 In practice, this am ounted to between 2 0 —33 percent o f the total defense budget. G erald M . Steinberg, ‘Israel,’ p. 2 8 6 ; A lex M intz, ‘The M ilitary-Indus­ trial C om plex . . .,’ p. 635. 2 8 7 M a ’ariv in H ebrew , Jun e 13, 1989, cited in D ore G old, Israel a s an Am erican N o n -N A T O A lly, p. 7. A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . ., p. 67, report that dom estic military contracts accounted for 45 percent o f the ‘ shekel budget’ (non-FM S funds devoted to defense) in 1985, and only 28 percent in 1989. Y itzhak Rabin stated that dom estic military p ro ­ curement had fallen from $2 billion in 1982 to $1 billion in 1 9 8 9 . Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , p. 79. 288 According to Reiser, local military expenditures fell from more than 20 percent of G N P in the 1970s to less than 12 percent in 1989. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 125. Other sources state that domestic military purchases fell from 11.5 percent of GDP in 1981 to 8.2 percent in 1990. Roby N athanson, ‘Recent Israeli and W orldwide Trends in M ilitary Industries,’ ID F Jo u rn al 21 (Fall 1990), p. 28. In F Y 1992, the ‘shekel’ portion of the defense budget was about 9 percent of G N P, or less than $3 billion, com pared to $1.8 billion in US FM S grants. ‘Israeli M inistries Part Paths on M ilitary Budget Plans,’ Defense New s, August 19, 1991. 289 The G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 88. The im pact o f the intifada on the ID F is dis­ cussed in M artin V an Creveld, The Sw ord an d the Olive, pp. 335—52. 290 Aharon K liem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . ., p. 29; Pinhas Z usm an , ‘The D ynam ics o f Grow th, Technological Progress, and Force Build­ ups —Som e Strategic T rad eo ffs,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning . . . , p. .240. 291 ‘U prising M ay C ause Stockpile C u ts,’ Jeru salem Post, July 6, 1988, in FBISN E SA (July 8, 1988), 2 8 —9. Statem ent by D eputy Chief of the General Staff Ehud Barak, ‘The A rm y’s R earguard Budget Battle,’ Jeru salem P o st, 14 April 1989. 292 Aryeh Shalev, ‘The A rm s Race in the M iddle East in the 1 9 8 0 s,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning . . . , p. 83. 293 G lo b al Arm s Trade, p. 88; Aharon K liem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l. . . , p. 65. 294 Only about one-third of all procurem ent expenditures com e from the shekel budget, and only 2 0 —25 percent o f these are high-technology items. Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 29, 63. 295 Israel stopped buying tires or uniform s at home, as it w as cheaper to purchase

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308 309 310

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them abroad with US dollars. A haron Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ­ ing I s r a e l . . . , pp. 1 6 5 -6 ; G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 88. G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 89. Tim Guest, ‘C ’etait Lavi,’ M ilitary Technology (O ctober 1987), p. 144. Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing I s r a e l . . . , p. 95. Aharon K liem an and Reuven Pedatzur, Rearm ing Israel . . ., pp. 5 6 -7 . M intz states that the ID F controls about 5 0 percent o f all governm ent R & D spend­ ing. A lex M intz, ‘Arms Production in Israel,’ pp. 8 9 -9 9 . US m ilitary assistance allowed access to US emergency stockpiles prepositioned in Israel. This effectively saved the ID F $ 1 0 0 million. ‘ID F Could Use Stored US G ear During C rises,’ Tel Aviv H a ’aretz in H ebrew, Septem ber 24, 1990, in FB IS-N E SA (September 2 5 , 1990), 3 5 -6 ; ‘US, Israel Undergo Sweeping Review o f M ilitary Relations,’ Jerusalem Post, September 16, 1992. D ore G old, Israel a s an Am erican N o n -N A T O Ally, p. 13. Steven L. Spiegel, ‘US Relations W ith Israel: The M ilitary Benefits,’O rbis 30 (Fall 1986), 4 8 3 , 4 9 5 . IAI anticipated larger sales to the US m ilitary than it did to the Israeli military in 1 9 8 9 . ‘Search for N ew Business A broad Pays D iv­ idends: IAI Seeks N ew V istas to Keep Brains T icking,’ Jeru salem P ost, M ay 23, 1989. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 7 1 -8 4 ; D ov S. Zakheim , Flight o f the L av i (W ashington, D C : B rassey’s, 1996). A production run of 4 0 0 - 4 5 0 aircraft w as envisioned. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli Arm s Industry, p. 175. N aftali Blumenthal, ‘The Im pact of Defense Industry Investment . . . , ’ p. 176. G raham C lark, ‘ Lavi Bares its Teeth,’ in M ilitary Technology (O ctober 1986), 138; Anthony Cordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, V ol. I., p. 2 5 8 ; D ore G old, Israel a s an Am erican . . . , p. 9. Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, pp. 1 7 8 -9 . In 1 9 8 7 Israeli cost esti­ m ates assum ed that over 2 0 0 units of a 300 aircraft production run w ould be exported. Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, p. 2 5 8 . G erald M . Steinberg, ‘ Lessons o f the Lavi,’ M idstream (N ovem ber 1987), p. 4. ‘ Rabin Presents C onditions for Continuing L avi’ , M a ’ariv (in H ebrew ), June 8, 1987, F B IS-N E SA (June 9, 1987), L 6 -7 . The technologies developed in the Lavi project w ould be relevant prim arily in the event o f a follow -on aircraft project. ‘State Com ptroller Criticizes D ecisions on Lavi,’ Jeru salem Post, July 1, 1987, in FB IS-N E SA (July 2, 1987), L 2 -3 . The Lavi project reportedly involved 9 0 0 0 engineers and scientists, and a total o f 2 0 ,0 0 0 jobs in various industries were affected by the Lavi cancellation. G erald M . Steinberg, ‘ Large-scale N ation al Projects as Public Sym bols,’ C om ­ parative Politics 19 (April 1987), 335, 341. G erald M . Steinberg, ‘ Lessons o f the Lavi,’ 3; Statem ent by Yitzhak Sham ir in M ilitary Technology (O ctober 1986), 146. C lark, ‘Lavi Bares its Teeth, p. 140. ‘ Cabinet V otes on Lavi P roposal 30 Aug: Decides to Term inate Production,’ Tel Aviv ID F in H ebrew , 0838 G M T , A ugust 30, 1 9 87 , in FB IS-N E SA (A ugust 31, 1987), L1. See ‘Chetz D ata Revealed’ , JD W , 25 A ugust 1990, 2 5 5 . ‘A rrow D estroys Incom ing M issile in Succesful T est,’ Septem ber 14, 2 0 0 0 (based on Jerusalem Post reports, Septem ber 1 4 -1 5 , 2 0 0 0 , found in the Jew ish Virtual Library at: us-israel.org/jsource/U S-Israel/A rrow 0900.htm l). ‘Israel M issile U pdate 2 0 0 0 ,’ w w w .w isconsinproject.org/.

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318 ‘Israel Unveils Arrow-2 Anti-Ballistic M issiles System ,’ M iddle E a st Intelligence Bulletin, N ovem ber 1999 at w w w .m eib.org/artivles/9911_m e3.htm . According to this report, the US funded 78 percent o f the cost of the project. 319 ‘Jun e 19, 2001 Israel A ircraft Industries,’ A rrow Anti-Ballistic M issile System W on the Flight A w ard 2 0 0 1 ,’ at: iai.co.il/dow s/dows/Serve/item /English/ 1.1.11.1.44.h tm l 320 ‘A rrow 2 ,’ Ja n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s 3 9 (2003), w w w 4.janes.com . 321 ‘IAI R eadies Short-list for US A rrow Partner,’ D efense N ew s, O ctober 2, 2 0 0 0 , pp. 3, 2 8 ; ‘E xport Strictures C ould H am per US M issile Transfer to A llies,’ D efense N ew s, Jan u ary 29, 2 0 0 1 , 3, 19; ‘Turkey Seeks Perm ission for A rrow Buy,’ D efense N ew s, July 2 3 - 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 , 11. 322 ‘Boeing to build half of the A rrow A T B M ,’ J a n e ’s M issiles an d R ockets, M arch 1, 2 0 0 3 . 323 G. R . V ered, ‘ Evolution of B L A Z E R Reactive A rm our and its A daptation to A FV s,’ M ilitary Technology (Decem ber 1987), 5 3 -5 . 324 M ajo r Richard A. G abriel, ‘ Lessons of W ar,’ p. 58. 325 Ariel Sharon, W arrior . . , p. 344. 326 Efraim Inbar, ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ p. 122. 327 ‘On the C h eap ,’ M ilitary Technology (February 1987), pp. 9 8 -1 0 0 . 328 M ajo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘ Lessons of W ar,’ pp. 6 0 -2 ; Anthony H. C ordesm an, The A rab-Israeli M ilitary B alance . . . , pp. 5 0 -1 ; ‘On the C h eap,’ p. 99. 329 W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ pp. 1 4 0 -1 . 330 W. Seth C arus, ‘The Bekaa V alley C am paign ,’ p. 35. The H etz is also in service with the US and Germ an arm ies. W olfgang Flume, ‘Israeli Defense Industry: Peacetime Link in the Econom ic C hain ,’ M ilitary Technology (Feb­ ruary 1987), 95. 331 J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 1 , p. 7 1 0; J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 8 5 -1 9 8 6 , pp. 8 6 1 -2 . 332 J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , p. 71; M ajo r Richard A. Gabriel, ‘Lessons o f W ar,’ pp. 5 6 -7 . 333 Anthony C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern W arfare, vol. I, p. 184; Ja n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , p. 375. 334 Shimon Engle, ‘Airborne Electronic W arfare,’ pp. 3 4 -4 1 . 335 FI/D M S, ‘M arket Overview, Israel,’ (Septem ber 1990), p. 15. 336 M ilitary Technology (M ay 1988), 144, and (A ugust 1990), 91. 337 J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 6 4 7 -5 1 . 338 IISS The M ilitary B alance 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 1 , p. 107. At least 300 of 5 7 9 towed pieces were Soltam 155 mm o f various m odels. 339 Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry, p. 198. 340 J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 2 9 -3 0 . 341 A critical account of the 120m m gun development can be found in Gerald Steinberg, ‘Israel’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking Volume I: China, India, Israel, Ja p a n , South K orea an d Thailand (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1998), pp. 1 2 3 -4 . 342 FI/D M S ‘M arket Overview, Israel’ (Septem ber 1990), 15 and ‘Force Structure, Israel,’ p. 9; J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 2 2 7 -3 1 . 343 J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1987/8, p. 4 8 0 ; ‘G abriel,’ Ja n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s 4 0 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 344 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 297. 345 J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , pp. 2 9 8 -9 . 346 The SE A L team s of the US navy reportedly favored the Shaldag because of its speed and size. International D efence Review (O ctober 1992), 1 0 17 ; ‘US Law

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358 359 360 361

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M ay Block N avy From Buying Israeli Patrol B o at,’ D efense N ew s, Septem ber 2, 1991. See Ja n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 9 8 , p. 7 5 0 ; ‘Python 3 ,’ Ja n e ’s AirLaunched W eapons 4 2 , (2003), w w w 4.janes.com . J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 7 7 -1 9 7 8 , p. 688. ‘ $8.9 million H ave N a p D eal Signed,’ JD W , April 14, 1990, 6 7 4 ; ‘U SAF Arms B-52s W ith Israeli M issile,’ Flight International (A ugust 29, 1990), 7. J a n e ’s W eapons System s 1 9 8 7 -1 9 8 8 , pp. 806—7; C lifford Beal, M ark H ew ish, Bill Sweetm an, ‘ Bolt From the Blue, Part 2 ’ International Defence Review (Decem ber 1992), 1179. Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Role o f the Periphery in Technological and C onceptual Innovation,’ in Emily O . Goldm an and Leslie C. Eliason (eds), The D iffusion o f M ilitary Technology an d Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 179—2 0 1 ; and Stew art Reiser, The Israeli A rm s Industry . . , for a m ore extensive discussion. ‘IM I Reveals M otorized D eception D ron e,’ Tel Aviv Yedi-ot A haron ot in Hebrew , N ovem ber 14, 1988, in F B IS-N E SA (N ovem ber 18, 1988), 32; W. Seth C arus, ‘The Bekaa Valley C am paign ,’ pp. 39—41. M ichael V lahos, ‘M iddle Eastern, N orth African, and South A sian N av ies,’ Proceedings (M arch 1989), 1 4 8 —9. ‘IAI: A Partner for the W orld,’ p. 78. Sharone Parnes, ‘BA RA K : Israeli N avy ’ s Anti-M issile System ,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Summ er 1990), 4 1 —7; M artin Lew os. ‘Point Defense and the Barak 1 M issile,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Spring 1987), 39—44. ‘Israel’s Barak M issile Tests Successfully A gainst D ecoy At S ea,’ Defense N ew s, A ugust 26, 1991. ‘ Eilat (Saar5) C lass (F S G H M ),’ J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 2 0 0 3 , w w w 4.janes.com ; ‘India Seeks M issile C o-operation With Israel,’ J a n e ’s M issiles an d R ockets, N ovem ber 1, 2 0 0 3 . D ore G old, Israel a s an Am erican N o n -N A T O Ally, pp. 2 7 —8. F I/D M S ‘M arket Overview, Israel,’ (Septem ber 1990), 11. ‘Air Force Unveils N ew A ntiaircraft System ,’ Tel Aviv H atzofe in H ebrew , July 15, 1987, in F B IS-N E SA (July 16, 1987), L5. ‘ID F Installing “ Unique Im provem ents” in P atriot,’ Jeru salem Voice o f Israel and ID F R ad io N etw ork in H ebrew , 0 5 0 0 G M T , Jan u ary 31, 1991, in FBISN E SA (January 31, 1991), 35. J a n e ’s Fighting Ships 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 2 9 8 . J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 85—8, 5 7 5 —6. Z vi V olk, ‘T an k s Lead the W ay,’ p. 26. D avid Eshel, C hariots o f the D esert, p. 5 5 ; W . Seth C arus, ‘The Bekaa Valley C am paign ,’ p. 36; J a n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 83—7, 154. T am ir Eshel, ‘N ew Life for the Israeli M -6 0 s,’ M ilitary Technology (June 1989), 88- 9; ‘ID F D isplays N ew Patton M odel 7 ’ . Jeru salem P o st, February 1, 1989. D ore G old, Israel a s an A m erican N on -N A T O Ally, pp. 14, 73; Tony G adot, ‘Israel’s A ircraft U pgrading P rogram ,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Fall 1985), 13—18. ‘IAI: A Partner for the W orld,’ M ilitary Technology (M ay 1993), 7 3 —9; J a n e ’s A ll The W orld’s A ircraft 1991/2, pp. 146—50. ‘Phalcon Set for M ay D elivery,’ JD W , April 2, 1994, 10; ‘Phalcon on C ourse for D elivery,’ International D efence Review (O ctober 1992), 1015; ‘Phalcon AEW A ircraft M ak es Public D ebut,’ JD W , June 2 6 , 1993, 8. This led Israeli officials to note that ‘we can ’t brush up against genuine US strategic interests, even if we don’t see eye to eye on w hat constitutes a

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380 381 382 383

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N otes genuine strategic interest.’ K uti M o r, D eputy D irector General of Israel’s M in ­ istry of D efense, in ‘Israel Plans to Return Phalcon, A bsent Spy R a d a r,’ D efense N ew s, July 2 3 - 2 9 , 2 0 0 1 , 3. ‘Israeli R ad ars for Indian A w A C S ,’ The H indu, 4 D ecem ber 2 0 0 3 . ‘Israel Says ‘N o T h an k s’ T o F/A -22,’ D efense N ew s, N ovem ber 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , 1. By 2 0 0 9 , Israel will have over 360 F-16s in operation. M ilitary Technology (O ctober 1989), 166. See also J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 574. ‘Germ any L o ok s A gain at Foreign H ow itzers,’ International D efense Review (M arch 1993), 195; A haron K liem an and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel . . . , p. 120; J a n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 5 7 4 -5 . ‘Intermediate Ballistic M issile Reportedly Tested,’ Paris A FR in English, 1803 G M T , July 21, 1 9 8 7 in FBIS-N ESA (July 22, 1987), L5. Russian intelligence believes that 100 Jericho 2 missiles with a 750 km range were deployed from 1 9 7 7 -8 1 , and that the tests in the late 1980s were a modified, Jericho 2B with increased range. ‘R ussia Spots a G as L eak,’ The M iddle E a st (June 1993), p. 19. Jann e E. N olan and A lbert D . W heelon, ‘Third W orld Ballistic M issiles,’ Scientific Am erican (August 1990), 36. ‘Jericho 1/2/3 (Y A -1/Y A -3),’ Ja n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s 4 0 (2003), w w w 4.janes.com ‘O FFE Q -2 Into O rb it,’ M ilitary Technology (M ay 1990), 104; ‘Israel Launches Second O ffeq ,’ JD W , April 14, 1990, 678. Steven E. G ray, ‘Israeli M issile C apabilities: A Few num bers T o Think A bout’ (N ew M exico: Law rence Liverm ore L aboratory/Z D ivision, O ctober 7, 1988) estim ates a range of 4 ,5 0 0 k m with a 1 ,1 0 0 k g w arhead or 7 ,5 0 0 k m with a 5 0 0 k g w arhead. Other reports estim ate a range o f 4 ,0 0 0 km with an 8 0 0 k g w arhead. Steve Fetter, ‘Israeli Ballistic M issile C apabilities,’ Physics an d Society 19 (July 1990), 3 -4 . ‘N B C C apabilities, Israel,’ Ja n e ’s N uclear, B iological an d Chem ical Defence (2003) at: w w w 4.janes.com ‘Jericho 1/2/3 (Y A -1/Y A -3),’ J a n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s 4 0 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com D an Raviv and Y ossi M elm an, ‘The M id east G oes M A D ,’ W ashington P ost (Op-Ed), July 15, 1990. ‘Procurem ent, Israel,’ J a n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - Eastern M editer­ ranean (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com ; ‘ G abriel,’ J a n e ’s Strategic W eapons System s 4 0 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com V anunu’s testim ony is available in ‘Revealed: the Secrets of Israel’s N uclear A rsenal,’ Sunday Tim es (London), O ctober 5, 1986; and ‘ France A dm its it gave Israel A -B om b,’ Sunday Tim es (London), O ctober 12, 1 9 86 . See also Louis T oscan o, Triple C ross: Israel, The A tom ic Bom b, & The M an Who Spilled The Secrets (N ew Y ork: Birch Lane Press, 1990). Other reports rate the reactor capacity at between 75 and 2 00 M W . See ‘N B C C apabilities, Israel,’ J a n e ’s N uclear, B iological an d Chem ical D efence (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, pp. 2 0 2 - 3 . US analysts believe the reactor runs at a lower output o f 4 0 - 7 0 m egaw atts, which w ould produce approxim ately 15 kg of plutonium per year. Leonard Spector, N uclear A m bi­ tions, pp. 172, 173 (note b). Leonard Spector, N uclear A m bitions, pp. 1 6 1 -2 ; Frank Barnaby, The Invis­ ible Bom b . . , pp. 2 5 - 4 5 . Barnaby is a form er scientist in the British nuclear program , as well as a m ember of SIPRI, whose analysis is based on interviews with V anunu as p art of the Sunday Tim es article cited above.

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387 Leonard Spector, N u clear A m bitions, p. 162, estim ates 6 0 —100 w eapons, som e of which are boosted to the 4 0 —5 0 kiloton range and others of which are ‘ superboosted’ to 100 kilotons yield. The upper figure is based on Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, pp. 2 7 6 , 312, 318—19; and ‘D im ona et a l.,’ The E con om ist (M arch 14, 1992), 4 6 ; ‘N B C C apabilities, Israel,’ J a n e ’s N uclear, B iological a n d Chem ical D efence (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com 388 For reports that the ID F has deployed both tactical and enhanced radiation ‘neutron’ w arh eads with ground forces, see Seym our M . H ersh, The Sam son O ption, pp. 2 7 6 , 312, 3 1 8 —19; ‘N B C C apabilities, Israel,’ Ja n e ’s N uclear, B iological a n d Chem ical D efence (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com 389 Avner Cohen, ‘Israel and Chem ical/Biological W eapons . . ’ R ussian intelli­ gence believes Israel has produced chemical w eapons since the m id-1960s. ‘ R ussia spots a gas leak.’ 390 Interview with Israel radio cited in ‘Israeli Sees Chem ical O ption A gainst Iraqis,’ N ew York Times, July 2 8 , 1990. 391 Avner Cohen, ‘Israel and Chem ical/Biological W eapons . . ’ and ‘N B C C a p ­ abilities, Israel,’ J a n e ’s N uclear, B iological a n d Chem ical D efence (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 392 ‘ C om m entary Analyzes N eed for M ilitary Satellite,’ Tel Aviv H a ’aretz in H ebrew , Jun e 27, 1 9 90 (‘A M ilitary Satellite for Israel,’ C om m entary by Z e’ev Schiff), in FB IS-N E SA (28 June 1990), pp. 2 7 —8. 393 The O ffeq-2 weighed only 325 pounds, and stayed in space for two m onths. The earlier Offeq-1 had rem ained in space for 118 days. ‘Israel Launches Satellite into Surveillance O rb it,’ W ashington Post, April 4, 1990; ‘Israel Shoots for a M o o n ,’ Christian Science M onitor, M ay 15, 1990. 394 ID F analysis estim ated that the price tag w ould be at least twice IAI’s $250 million developm ent p rop osal. ‘C lear O pposition in ID F to A M O S Satellite,’ Jeru salem Post, O ctober 5, 1988; ‘Sham ir O rders “ Freeze” on A m os Satellite Project’, Tel Aviv H a ’aretz in H ebrew , D ecem ber 2 3 , 1988, in FB IS-N E SA (Decem ber 28 , 1988), p. 36. 395 ‘Israel Shoots for a M o o n ,’ Christian Science M onitor, M ay 15, 1990. 396 D avid Ben Gurion, Israel: A Personal H istory, p. 368. 397 Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 31. 398 The so-called ‘ladder of production m odels’ described in C hapter One, appear to be based on the Israeli experience as detailed in Shimon Peres,D a v id ’s Sling, pp. 26—7, 109—36. 399 Saadet D eger, M ilitary Expenditure in Third W orld Countries (London, Boston, and Henley: Routledge & K egan Paul, 1986), pp. 1 5 5 —65; C arol Evans, ‘ R eappraising Third-w orld Arms Production,’ in Survival 28 (M arch/A pril 1986), 9 9 —118; and H erbert W ulf, ‘D eveloping C oun tries,’ in N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efense In du s­ try, pp. 336—9. 4 0 0 The m ilitary’s dem and for W estern stan dards and quality control drove corre­ sponding standards in Israeli industry. W. Seth C arus, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ p. 135; A haron Kliem an, Israel’s G lo b al Reach, p. 55; Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 114. 401 For a slightly different perspective, see A lex M intz and G erald Steinberg, ‘ C oping With Supplier C on tro l,’ pp. 1 4 7 —8. 4 0 2 This results in significant econom ies in the developm ent and procurem ent process, com pared to US and European industries. W olfgang Flume, ‘Israeli Defense Industry: Peacetime Link . . , ’ p. 93; Steven L. Spiegel, ‘US Relations With Israel: The M ilitary Benefits,’ pp. 4 8 1 —8. 403 Francis T u sa, Esq., ‘A spects of Arm s A bsorption in A rab A rm ies,’ in Defence

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N otes Y earbook 1 9 9 0 (London: B rassey’ s, 1990), pp. 3 4 1 -5 4 ; H irsh G oodm an and W. Seth C arus, The Future Battlefield . . , pp. 7 3 -1 5 0 . H irsh G oodm an and W. Seth C arus, The Future Battlefield . . ., p. 65. Stuart A. Cohen, ‘Israel’s Changing M ilitary Com m itm ents, 1 9 8 2 -1 9 9 3 : C auses and C onsequences,’ in Jo u rn a l o f Strategic Studies 15 (September 1992), 3 3 0 -5 0 ; D ore G old, ‘Israel and the G u lf C risis: Changing Security Requirem ents on the Eastern Front,’ W ashington Institute for N ear E a st Policy M em orandum 15 (W ashington, D C : W ashington Institute for N ear East Policy, D ecem ber 1990). Joseph Alpher, ed., War in the G ulf: Im plications for Israel (Jerusalem : Jerusalem Post Press, 1992), especially Parts II and IV; Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, ‘Israel’s Deterrence Strategy Revisited,’ pp. 3 3 0 -5 8 . ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’s D en,’ J a n e ’s D efence Weekly, February 26, 2 0 0 3 at w w w 4.janes.com . ‘M id east Violence Im perils Israeli A rm s E xp orts,’ D efense N ew s, June 1 8 -2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , 12; ‘Israeli Leaders M ove to C om b at N egative Perceptions,’ D efense N ew s, July 1 6 -2 2 , 2 0 0 1 , 13. ‘Israel Low ers Public Profile on Alliance W ith Turkey,’ D efense N ew s, D ecem ­ ber 4, 2 0 0 0 , 34. C ooperation with Turkey has also been affected by Israeli arm s exports to Greece, including new EW systems for the F-16 fighter air­ craft. ‘Pentagon’ s W aiver A llow s Israeli EW G ear on Greek F -16s,’ D efense N ew s, D ecem ber 1 0 -1 6 , 2001 p. 3. ISL is also producing S a ’ar 4.5 missile boats for the Greek N avy. ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’s D en’. ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’ s Den . . ’ The R-D arter, though offered as a joint product, is virtually identical to R A F A E L’s D erby m edium range A A M . ‘D erby,’ J a n e ’s A ir-Launched W eapons 42 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com ; and ‘Air-To-Air M issiles: C om m and o f the A ir,’ J a n e ’s D efence Weekly, M ay 2 8 , 2 0 0 3 at w w w 4.janes.com ‘Indian N avy to Buy M ore B arak SA M System s,’ J a n e ’s M issiles an d Rockets, A ugust 1, 2 0 0 3 at w w w 4.janes.com ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’ s Den . . . ’ ‘India Seeks M issile C o-operation with Israel,’ J a n e ’s M issile a n d R ockets, N ovem ber 1, 2 0 0 3 at w w w 4.janes.com ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’ s Den . . ’ ‘Israel: A erospace in D epth,’ International D efense Review, February 1, 2 0 0 2 at w w w 4janes.com ‘Lockheed M artin Eyes Israeli Start-U ps to Satisfy O ffsets,’ D efense New s, April 2, 2 0 0 1 , p. 20. ‘Barak Urged to be Firm on Sales of A ircraft to China; Industry, Government O fficials Bristle at US D em an ds,’ D efense N ew s, April 3, 2 0 0 0 at w w w .defensenew s.com (E xports, Technology Transfer: Y ear 2 0 0 0 N ew s File). The US w as negotiating to lower the num ber o f ‘problem nations’ that required consultation before Israel could export to them. ‘US, Israel N ear A ccords on Exports, Strategic T ies’, D efense N ew s, Septem ber 11, 2 0 0 0 , 4, 20. D ore G old, Israel as an Am erican N o n -N A T O Ally, pp. 9 -1 0 . ‘Israel M o D M ay Cancel Lockheed-M artin-R A FA EL D eal: M inistry Official O bjects to US Production Line for Python-4,’ D efense N ew s, April 3, 2 0 0 0 , at w w w .defensenew s.com (E xports, Technology Transfer: Y ear 2 0 0 0 N ew s File); ‘Python 4, Python 5 ’ J a n e ’s A ir-Launched W eapons 42 (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com ‘Israeli Execs Decry Shift to US Buys,’ D efense N ew s, Septem ber 11, 2 0 0 0 , pp. 4, 20

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423 ‘ Limited W ar Forces Israel to Boost Defense Budget,’ D efense N ew s, N ov em ­ ber 26 —D ecem ber 2, 2 0 0 1 , 6. 4 2 4 ‘Israeli Execs Decry Shift to US Buys: Israeli Critics R ap N egative A spects of US A id ,’ D efense N ew s, N ovem ber 19—25, 2 0 0 1 , 10. 425 ‘Air Force Claim s Bulk of Israel’s Procurem ent Fun ds,’ D efense N ew s, D ecem ­ ber 3—9, 2 0 0 1 , p. 30. 4 2 6 ‘ Funding W oes Block Israeli Use o f D erby M issile,’ D efense N ew s, M ay 7, 2 0 0 1 , p. 10. 4 2 7 ‘IAI Seeks M arket for U pgrade W ork on A ging F -16s,’ D efense N ew s, Jan u ary 29, 2 0 0 1 , p. 16. 428 ‘After Y ears O f Relying On Its O w n W eapons, Israel Look s A b road ,’ Wall Street Jo u rn a l, June 2 7 , 1995. 429 ‘Procurem ent, Israel,’ J a n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - Eastern M editer­ ranean (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com ; ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’s Den . . ’ 4 3 0 ‘Israeli Defence Industry: In the Lion ’s Den . . .’ 431 Aharon Kliem an and Reuven Pedatzur, Rearm ing Israel . . , pp. 1 3 9 —231 discuss different Israeli options for the future, one of which is grow ing dependency on the US. 4 3 2 G lo b al A rm s Trade, p. 89; Im manuel W ald, The W ald R eport, pp. 2 2 3 —38. 433 Avner Cohen, Israel an d the B om b, p. 341. 4 3 4 Im manuel W ald, The W ald R epo rt, pp. 2 4 0 —2. 435 A lex M intz and M ichael D . W ard, ‘The Political Econom y o f M ilitary Spend­ ing in Israel,’ Am erican Political Science Review 83 (June 1989), 5 2 1 —33; Y oram Peri, ‘Political-M ilitary Partnership in Israel,’ pp. 3 0 3 —15. 436 Defense industrial investment accounts for up to 5 0 percent of all industrial investment in Israel. A lex M intz and M ichael D . W ard, ‘The Political Economy . . . , ’ p. 523; A lex M intz, ‘The M ilitary-Industrial C om plex . . . , ’ p. 629. 4 3 7 G erald M . Steinberg, ‘ Large Scale N atio n al Projects . . . ’ 438 Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 113. 439 The Ofek-3 satellite w as launched successfully in 1 9 9 5 . See ‘Spy Satellite Sent A loft By Israel,’ W ashington Post, April 6, 1995. Ofek-5 w as launched in 2 0 0 2 to m onitor Syria, Iraq, and Iran. ‘Procurem ent, Israel’ Ja n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - Eastern M editerranean (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 4 4 0 ‘Procurem ent, Israel,’ J a n e ’s Sentinel Security A ssessm ent - Eastern M editer­ ranean (2003) at w w w 4.janes.com . 441 Shimon Peres, D a v id ’s Sling, p. 166.

4 Iraq 1 The Com prehensive R evised R eport o f the Special A dvisor to D C I on Ir a q ’s W M D with A ddendum s (3 volum es), (W ashington, D C : Governm ent Printing Office, 2 0 0 5 ), w w w .gpoaccess.gov/duelfer/index.htm l (herafter D uelfer Report) is the exhaustive official study o f Iraqi W M D . 2 Kenneth M . Pollack, A rabs a t War: M ilitary Effectiveness, 1 9 4 8 -1 9 9 1 (Lincoln, N E : Council on Foreign Relations and University of N eb rask a Press, 2 0 0 2 ), pp. 14 8 —267. 3 Edw ard Luttw ak and Stuart L. Koehl, The D ictionary o f M odern War (New Y ork: H arper & Collins, 1991), p. 51. 4 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry: Capability, Perform ance, an d Im pact (London: Brassey’ s, 1993), p. 190; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y: H ow the West A rm ed Iraq (Boston, N ew Y ork, and London: H oughton and M ifflin, 1991), p. 170. Iraqi artillery w as responsible for over 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 Iranian

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N otes deaths in the Iran -Iraq W ar. W illiam Scott M alon e, D avid H alevy, and Sam H em ingw ay, ‘The G uns o f S ad d am ,’ W ashington Post, February 10, 1991. The Iraqi Arm y: O rganization an d Tactics (N ation al Training Center H an d ­ book 1 0 0 -9 1 , 3 Jan u ary 1991, Fort Irwin, CA), pp. 1 1 7 -2 6 ; C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War: Final R eport to C ongress (W ashington, D C : D ept. of D efense, April 1992), pp. 345, 359. M ajid K hadduri, ‘The Role of the M ilitary in Iraqi Society,’ in Sydney Nettleton Fisher, (ed.), The M ilitary in the M iddle E a s t (O hio State University Press; C olum bus, O H : 1963), pp. 4 1 - 5 2 ; M oham m ed A. T arbush, The R ole o f the M ilitary in Politics: A C ase Study o f Iraq to 1 9 4 1 , (London; KPI Limited, 1982). Helen C hapin M etz (ed.), Iraq : A Country Study (U.S. Governm ent Printing Office; W ashington, D C : 1990), pp. 2 4 1 - 3 ; Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 1 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N J, 1993), pp. 2 9 - 3 1 ; and M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like A Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future o f Iraqi M ilitary Pow er,’ Policy Papers 3 6 (W ashington, D C : W ashington Institute for N ear East Policy, 1994), 9; and Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm : The C ase for Invading Iraq (N ew Y ork: Council on Foreign Relations and R an dom H ouse, 2 0 0 2 ). Sam ir al-Khalil, Republic o f Fear (N ew Y ork: Pantheon Books, 1989). Sam ar al-Khalil w as a pseudonym for K anan M ak iya. Adel D arw ish and Gregory A lexander, Unholy Babylon (N ew Y ork: St M artin ’s Press, 1991); Judith M iller and Laurie M ylroie, Saddam H ussein an d the C risis in the G u lf (N ew Y ork: Tim es Books; 1990); Efraim K arsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam H ussein: A Political B iography (N ew Y ork: The Free Press; 1991); and A m atzia Baram , Building T ow ard C risis: Saddam H u say n ’s Strategy fo r Survival (W ashington, D C , W ashington Institute for N ear East Peace, 1998). Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y; Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threaten­ ing Storm . John Devlin, ‘Iraq ,’ in Edw ard K olodziej and R obert E. H arkavy (eds), Secur­ ity Policies o f D eveloping C ountries (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1982), p. 229. In the first decade follow ing the overthrow o f the Iraqi m onarchy in 1958, 80 percent of top governm ent posts were controlled by Sunnis, and only 16 percent by Shi’ites. Iraq ’s population is approxim ately 2 0 percent percent K urdish, and the Shi’ite and Kurdish population together constitute ap p ro x i­ mately 80 percent o f Iraq’ s population. Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict . . . , pp. 8, 4 3 , 415. N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory (A nnapolis, M D : N av al Institute Press, 1991), p. 11. John M . Collins, ‘M ilitary G eography o f Iraq and A djacent A rab Territory,’ C R S R eport for C ongress 9 0 -4 3 1 R C O (Library o f C ongress, W ashington, D C , Septem ber 7, 1990). C laudia W right, ‘N eutral or N eutralized: Iraq, Iran and the Superpow ers,’ in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (eds), The Iran -Iraq War: N ew W eapons, O ld Conflicts (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1983), p. 173. John Devlin, ‘Iraq ,’ p. 2 3 0 . Phebe M arr, The M odern H istory o f Iraq (Boulder, C O : W estview; 1985), p. 176. John Devlin, “ Ir a q ,” 2 3 8 ; Phebe M arr, The M odern . . , p. 2 2 2 ; M irella Galletti, ‘L ’ultim a rivolta curda in Iraq ,’ Oriente M oderno 55, 1975, 4 6 2 -7 2 , cited in M arion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1 9 5 8 : From Revolution to D ictatorsh ip (London: KPI Lim ited, 1987), pp. 1 6 8 -9 .

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18 Helen C hapin M etz, Iraq . . , p. 61; H aim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi Relations, 1 9 6 8 -1 9 8 8 : In the Shadow o f the Iraq -Iran Conflict (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 34—5, 2 4 9 , 251. 19 Phebe M arr, The M odern . . , pp. 179, 2 2 2 , 2 3 3 ; H aim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi . . , p. 125. 20 M u stard gas and the nerve agent G B were used on civilians, ‘Press Release from Physicians for H um an Rights and the Arms Project of H um an Rights W atch,’ April 2 9 , 1993. 21 Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf C o n flic t. . , p. 411. 22 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . .,’ p. 48. 23 W illiam son M urray and M ajo r General R obert H . Scales, The Iraq War: A M ilitary H istory (Cam bridge, M A : Belknap Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 186—95; Andrew F. Krepinevich, O peration Iraqi Freedom : A First-Blush A ssessm ent (W ash­ ington, D C : Center for Strategic and Budgetary A ssessm ents, 2 0 0 3 ); O p era­ tions in Iraq : First Reflections (London: M inistry o f Defence, 2003) available at w w w .m od.uk/linked_files/publications/iraq2003operations.pdf. 24 Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq: Eastern Flank o f the A rab W orld (The Brookings Institution: W ashington, D C , 1984), p. 17. 25 C lau dia W right, ‘N eutral or Neutralized. . . ’ p. 176; Stephen R. Grum m on, ‘The Iran—Iraq W ar: Islam Em battled.’ The W ashington Papers 92 (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1982), 9; D aniel Pipes, ‘A Border A drift: O rigins of the C on ­ flict,’ in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (eds), The Iran -Iraq War: N ew W eapons . . , pp. 3—25; Phebe M arr, The M odern . . , p. 2 9 2 ; Anthony H . C ordesm an, The G u lf a n d the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1984), p. 397. 26 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 68; Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm . . . 27 Helen C hapin M etz, Iraq . . , p. 38. 28 Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq: E astern . . . The Iranian province of Khuzestan (also called A rabistan), has a large A rab population and has been a focal point for B a’ athist pan-A rab rhetoric, which provided one of the pretexts for Iraq ’ s invasion of Iran in 1980. See N azih N . M . Ayubi, ‘A rab R elations in the Gulf: The Future and Its Prologue,’ in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (eds), The Ira n -Iraq War: N ew W eapons.., p .1 5 0 29 H aim Shemesh, S o v ie t- Ir a q i. . , p. 72. 30 Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq : Eastern . . , p. 138; Helen C hapin M etz, Iraq . . , p. 208. 31 Phebe M arr, The M odern . . , p. 117; and Peter M ansfield, The A rabs (Penguin: London, 1979), pp. 2 9 3 , 317. 32 N azih N . M . Ayubi, ‘A rab Relations . . , ’ p. 150. Less than half the population o f Khuszestan are ethnic A rabs: the fact that 90 percent of Iran’ s oil reserves are in the province probably played a critical role in Saddam H ussein’s calcula­ tions. Daniel Yergin, The Prize (New Y ork: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 710. 33 FBIS-M E A (September 29, 1980), E3. It is w orth noting that under Gen. Q asim Iraq pressed a claim to sovereignty over the anchorage of A badan. Phebe M arr, The M odern . . p. 180. 34 Iraqi casualties during this conflict are estim ated at 1 2 0 ,0 0 0 dead, 3 00,000 w ounded, and 7 0 ,0 0 0 prisoners. Iraq ended the w ar over $ 8 0 billion in debt, with reconstruction costs estim ated at $ 3 2 0 billion. G u lf War Air Power Survey (hereafter GW APS) Volum e I, ‘Planning R eport,’ 5 6 (W ashington, D C , 1993); Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern War Volum e II: The Iran—Iraq W ar (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1990). 35 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict . . . , pp. 107—9. This

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N otes effectively relinquished whatever minor assets Iraq had gained from eight years o f bloody w ar, and m ust be seen as a m ajor concession on the p art of Saddam . M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 74; C onduct o f the G u lf War: Final R eport to C ongress (W ashington, D C : Governm ent Printing Office, April 1992), p. 29. O n A rab airforces and sanctuary, see M ajo r R onald H. Bergquist, The R ole o f A irpow er in the Iran -Iraq W ar (M axw ell AFB, A L: Air University Press, D ecem ber 1988), pp. 1 -1 5 , 6 9 -8 2 . Oil prices rose from $ 1 .8 0 per barrel in 1970 to $ 1 1 .6 5 a barrel in December 1973. D aniel Yergin, The Prize, p. 625. Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq : E astern . . , p. 138. H aim Shemesh, Soviet-Iraqi . . . , p. 73; Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq : Eastern . . . , p. 139; Helen C hapin M etz, Iraq . . . , p. 2 0 6 ; C laudia W right, ‘N eutral or Neutralized . . . , ’ p. 173. The 50 percent decline in Iraqi GD P from 1 9 8 0 -8 2 w as due to a 76 percent decline in oil production. See Basil al-Bustany, ‘D evelopm ent Strategy in Iraq and the W ar E ffort,’ in M . S. El-Azhary (ed.), The Iran -Iraq War: An H istor­ ical, E con om ic an d Political A nalysis (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s, 1984), p. 76. Stephen R. G rum m on, ‘The Iran -Iraq W ar: Islam Em battled,’ p. 3; Peter H unseler, ‘The H istorical Antecedents of the Shatt Al-Arab D ispu te,’ in M . S. El-Azhary (ed.), The Ira n -Iraq War . . . , pp. 8 -1 9 . On at least tw o occasions during the Iran -Iraq W ar, Sadd am approached the K uw aitis with a request to lease W arbah and Bubiyan. Frederick A xelgaard, ‘A N ew Iraq? The G u lf W ar and Im plications for US Policy,’ The W ashington Papers 133 (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1988), 75. Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict . . . , p. 42. Phebe M arr, The M odern . . . p. 181. Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict . . . , p. 44; Phebe M arr, The M odern . . . , p. 221. D ore G old, Israel an d the G u lf Crisis: C hanging Security Requirem ents on the E astern Front, Policy Focus Research M em orandum N o . 15 (W ashington, D C : W ashington Institute for N ear East Policy, D ecem ber 1990), 4, 9 -1 0 . Speech by Sadd am H ussein on April 1, 1990, reported in FB IS-N e A (April 3, 1990), 35. Phebe M arr, The M odern . . . , pp. 117, 2 2 0 - 5 . Cited in T areq Y. Ism ael, ‘Ideology in Recent Iraqi Foreign Policy,’ in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (eds), The Ira n -Iraq War . . . , p. 111. It w as not until 1983 that Iraq actually accepted the 1948 U N partition of Palestine. See Helen Chapin M etz, Iraq . . . , p. 2 0 8 . N azih N . M . Ayubi, ‘A rab Relations . . . , ’ p. 150; T areq Y. Ism ael, ‘Ideology . . . , ’ p. 117; Phebe M arr, The M odern . . . , p. 2 4 4 . Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 1 , pp. 15, 21; Helen Chapin M etz, Iraq . . , p. 2 0 8 . Christine M o ss H elm s, Iraq : E astern . . , p. 139. Phebe M arr, The M odern . . . , p. 2 4 5 ; Frederick W. A xelgaard, ‘A N ew Iraq? . . . , ’ p. 77. H aim Shemesh, S o v ie t-Ira q i. . . pp. 2 5 1 -3 . Speech by Sadd am H ussein, Jan u ary 2, 1980, cited in G W A PS Volum e II: ‘O peration s,’ p. 62. G W A PS V olum e I: ‘Planning R epo rt,’ p. 64. July 1990 executive branch report cited in C ongressional Record, July 27, 1992, H 6 6 9 9 . See also M ichael A dam s (ed.), The M iddle E a s t (N ew York: Facts on File, 1988), pp. 2 1 3 - 1 4 . Education and literacy certainly declined during more than a decade of sanctions, 1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 3 .

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58 A ccording to one report, in 1 9 9 0 Iraq’ s illiteracy rate of 1 0 .7 percent w as lower than any country in the M iddle East except for Israel (8.8 percent). The E con om ist B ook o f Vital W orld Statistics (N ew Y ork: Tim es Books, 1990), pp. 2 0 9 —10. 59 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 19. 60 Helen C hapin M etz, Iraq . . , p. 148. A ccording to Unified A rab Econom ic R eport 1989 (Abu D habi), in 1 9 8 6 Iraq had a total o f 1 9 3 ,3 9 2 em ployees in the m anufacturing and industrial sectors. 61 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 107; G. W illis, ‘ Open Sesam e: Baghdad Show Reveals Iraqi M ilitary-industrial C apabilities,’ International D efence Review (June 1989), 836. 62 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . .,’ p. 19. 63 Ahmed H ashim , quoted in ‘US Is Building Up A Picture of V ast Iraqi Atom P rogram ,’ N ew York Tim es, Septem ber 2 7 , 1991. 64 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 106. Sayigh refers to the ‘ G eneral’ O rganization for Technical Industries. The State O rganization for Technical Industries w as the new nam e (as o f 1975) for the form er State O rganization for W ar Industries. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 36. 65 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 106. 66 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 107. 67 ‘Very Tight Inner Circle Surrounds Iraq’ s President,’N ew York Tim es, Jan u ary 27, 1991. 68 C IA report from late sum m er 1989, cited in C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 7 3 . 69 This w as facilitated by Iraqi industrial structure. A ccording to Lt. Gen. al-Saadi, ‘ O ur experience in the w ar taught us that you can ’t have separate factories for civil and military products. You have to have both types of production in a single factory.’ Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 289. 70 C IA Report, ‘Beating Plow shares Into Sw ords . . .,’ cited in Congressional R ecord, July 21, 1 9 9 2 , H 6 3 4 2 . 71 C IA R eport, ‘Iraq ’s G row ing Arsenal: Program s and Facilities,’ July 1990, cited in C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 7 1 . The Badush D am project w as used as a front for purchasing equipm ent for the C on d or missile program , and PC-2 w as used as a front for G erald Bull’s supergun project. 72 ‘ Beating Plow shares . . . , ’ cited in C ongressional Record, July 2 1 , 1992, H 6342. 73 June 1989 intelligence report, cited in C ongressional Record, July 2 7 , 1992, H 6699. 74 July 1990 C IA Report, ‘Iraq ’s G row ing Arsenal . . . , ’ cited in Congressional R ecord, July 21, 1 9 9 2 , H 6 3 4 2 . 75 July 1990 executive branch report cited in C ongressional Record, July 27, 1992, H 6 6 9 9 . 76 The Soviet share of Iraqi arm s supplies w as 95 percent in 1972. Kenneth T im ­ merm an, The D eath L o b b y . . , p. 25. 77 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 10—11; H aim Shemesh, S o v ie t- Ir a q i. . , pp. 134—5. 78 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 17—18. 79 Kenneth R. Tim m erm an, ‘Iraq: Tactical and technical im plications for T o m o r­ row ’s H istory B ook ,’ M ilitary Technology (July 1986), 128. 80 Speech by Sadd am H ussein on Septem ber 17, 1980, cited in Kenneth Tim m er­ m an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., pp. 23 and 399(n). 81 Soviet military aid to Iraq had a value o f $ 1 .6 billion from 1 9 5 8 —74,

2 46

82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89

90 91 92

93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101

102 103 104

N otes $1 billion in 1975 alone, and $5 billion from 1 9 7 6 -8 0 . Helen Chapin M etz, Iraq . . . , p. 2 2 9. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 18; Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ili­ tary Industry . . , pp. 103, 105. Interview with Lt. Gen. Am er H am m oudi al-Saadi, M iddle E a s t D efense N ew s (hereafter M E D N ew s), M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 5. M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 1. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 5 , 120. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . , pp. 3, 169. Cited in Sim on H enderson, In stan t Em pire: Saddam H u ssein ’s A m bition for Iraq (San Francisco, CA: M ercury H ouse, 1991), p. 124. This w as assisted by the efforts of Sadd am H ussein ’ s half-brother, Barzan alTikriti, w ho w as then head of the foreign branch of Iraqi intelligence. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 157. See also Sim on H enderson, Instant E m pire . . . , pp. 1 5 5 -6 8 . Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 80. Al-Ubeidi and Al-Suadi received the com plim entary rank of Lt. General, an indication o f their bureau­ cratic stature. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 107. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 1 1 0 -1 1 ; Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . , p. 107. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . , p. 107. A ccording to tw o US intelli­ gence reports from July 1990 (‘Beating Plow shares Into Sw ords: Iraq ’s Defense Industrial P rogram ’ and ‘Iraq’ s G row ing A rsenal: Program s and Facil­ ities’ ), other State Establishm ents involved in Iraqi military industry include Badr General Establishm ent, Sadd am State Establishm ent, Al Q a Q a a State Establishm ent, and Hutteen State Establishm ent. Cited in C ongressional R ecord, July 2 1 , 1992, H 6 3 4 2 . Interview with Ali Q asim al-O gabi in A l-Thaw rah (Baghdad), O ctober 11, 1987, cited in Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . . , pp. 3 -4 , 104. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . , pp. 3 -4 . Kenneth Tim m erm an, ‘Iraq: Tactical and technical im plications . . .,’ p. 128. ‘Stockholm Institute Publishes A rm s Suppliers L ist,’ Vienna W ochenpresse in Germ an, February 7, 1991, p. 4 3 , in F B IS-N E S, February 7, 1 9 9 1 , pp. 1 4 -1 5 . N ick C o o k and D ou glas Barrie, ‘Iraq ’s A rsenal: the W eapons Facing the W est,’ J a n e ’s D efense Weekly (hereafter JD W ), A ugust 18, 1990, p. 230. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 131. Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern W ar, V ol. 2, p. 4 7 . Oil export earnings am ounted to 9 0 -9 5 percent o f the total value of Iraqi annual exports. Patrick C law son, ‘H o w H as Saddam H ussein Survived? Econom ic Sanctions, 1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 3 ,’ M cN air Paper 22 (W ashington, D C : N ation al Defense University, A ugust 1993), 12. M ichael Collins Dunn, ‘C airo Exhibition R eport,’ D efense an d Foreign A ffairs, (Decem ber 1984), p.1. The Iraqis reportedly realized that they m ight m ake considerable savings if they produced m unitions at home and stopped im porting $ 6 0 0 million of Egyptian m unitions annually. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 193. Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 107; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 275. M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like A Phoenix . . . , ’ pp. 9 5 -6 ; ‘Iraq “ able to expand m il­ itary cap ability ” ,’ JD W , July 10, 1 9 9 3 , 9. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 87.

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105 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 88. 106 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 26. 107 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 107. SA A D -13 w as later re-named the Salah-al-D in project. 108 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 80. 109 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 4. 110 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 56. 111 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 149. 112 Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern W ar, Vol. 2, p. 5 1 7 . 113 M ike Eisenstadt, ‘The Sw ord of the A rabs: Iraq ’ s Strategic W eapons,’ Policy Papers 21 (W ashington, D C : The W ashington Institute for N ear East Policy, 1990), 6; Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War , V ol. 2, p. 5 1 7 ; ‘US Experts D ou b t Power of Poison G a s,’ W ashington Post, D ecem ber 14, 1990. 114 Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern W ar, Vol. 2, p. 5 1 8 . 115 Kenneth Tim m erm an, D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 35—6; T h om as L. M cN augher, ‘ Ballistic M issiles and Chem ical W eapons: The Legacy o f the Iran—Iraq W ar,’ International Security 15 (Fall 1990), p. 7; W illiam E. Burrow s and Robert W indrem, C ritical M ass: The D angerous R ace for Superw eapons in a F rag­ menting W orld (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1994), p. 46. 116 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y, pp. 134—5; T h om as L. M cN augher, ‘ Ballistic M issiles and Chem ical W eapons . . . , ’ p. 17; and Anthony H . Cordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern War, Vol. 2, pp. 5 0 8 —15. 117 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 135; and Anthony H . C ord es­ m an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern War, Vol. 2, p. 514. 118 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath Lob b y, p. 48. 119 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y , pp. 105—6. 120 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y, p. 106. Salm an Pak w as the prim ary Iraqi facility for reseach and development of BW agents, and w as heavily dam aged in the G ulf W ar. M ike Eisenstadt, ‘The Sw ord of the A rabs: Iraq ’s Strategic W eapons,’ Policy Papers 21 (W ashington, D C : The W ashington Institute for N e ar East Policy, 1990), pp. 7—9. 121 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 29; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . .’ , p. 2 0 ; Leonard S. Spector, N u clear A m bitions with Jacqueline R. Smith (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1990), pp. 194—5. This reactor w as ulti­ m ately upgraded to five m egaw atts capacity. 122 The reactors in question were a 70 M W reactor (Tam m uz I or O siraq) and a sm aller 800 kW research reactor (Tam m uz II). Spector, N u clear A m bitions, p. 187; M ike Eisenstadt, ‘Sw ord of the A rabs . . . , ’ pp. 10—11; Kenneth Tim m er­ m an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 30—3. 123 R obert Richter, an IAEA official present at the spring 1981 inspection of the Tuw aitha com plex, calculated that Iraq could m anufacture a plutonium device by 1983, and be building five w eapons annually by 1985. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 5 9—60, pp. 9 8 —100; M ike Eisenstadt, ‘The Sw ord of the A rabs . . . ’ , pp. 9—11; Jed C. Snyder, ‘The R o ad to O siraq: B agh dad’s Q uest for the B om b,’ The M iddle E a s t Jo u rn a l (Autumn 1983), pp. 5 6 5 —93; G ary M ilhollin, ‘The Iraqi B om b,’ The N ew Yorker (February 1, 1993), 49. 124 D avid Segal, ‘The Iran—Iraq W ar: A M ilitary A nalysis,’ Foreign A ffairs 66 (Summ er 1988), 961.

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125 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 105; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 2 7 - 3 0 , 2 4 9 . 126 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 1 5 , 2 3 0 , 2 4 9 ; Adel D arw ish and Gregory A lexander, Unholy Babylon, p. 137. 127 See chart in Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, Vol. 2, p. 366, based on a w orking paper by G ary Sick. 128 Th om as G. M ahnken and Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘The Spread of M issile Techno­ logy to the Third W orld,’ C om parative Strategy 9, 248. 129 Kenneth K atzm an, ‘Iraq ’s C am paign to Acquire and D evelop H igh Techno­ logy,’ C R S R eport for C ongress 9 2 -6 1 1 F (W ashington, D C : Library of C on ­ gress, A ugust 3, 1992), 15. 130 Kenneth K atzm an, ‘Iraq ’s C am paign . . . , ’ p. 9. K am il is also identified as being head of the ‘Secret Security O rgan ization.’ C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1 9 9 2 , H 7 8 7 3 , citing July 1990 C IA report ‘ Beating Plow shares Into Sw ords . . . ’ 131 Kenneth K atzm an ,’Iraq ’s C am paign . . , ’ p. 15. H is chief deputies rem ained alUbeidi and al-Saadi. 132 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 5 9 , 2 7 5 , 289. 133 Interview with Lt. Gen. Am er Rashid al-U baidi. M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, p. 6. Al-Ubaidi, like other leaders o f Iraq’ s m ilitary-industrial efforts, w as not a professional military officer or a warfighter. H e w as a B a’ath Party ideo­ logue, but also apparently a skilled engineer and adm inistrator. 134 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 3. 135 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 2 5 5 . The funds were used to expand the Saad-16 missile R & D plant, the Project 96 solid-fuel plant, the Project 124 m issile body construction plant, and the A l-A nbar Space Research Center. 136 Other analysts have noted that ‘ . . . the beginnings and ultim ate success o f the range-extension program coincided with the rise to pow er of H ussein K am el.’ Tim othy V. M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’ s T o x ic Arsenal: Chem ical and Biological W eapons in the G ulf W ars,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J. W irtz (eds), Planning the U nthinkable: H ow N ew Pow ers Will Use N uclear, Biological, a n d Chem ical W eapons (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 2 0 0 0 ), p. 55 n. 28. 137 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 275. 138 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 2 8 8 . 139 Kenneth K atzm an, ‘Iraq’s C am paign . . . ’, p. 15. 140 Cited in C ongressional R ecord, July 21, 1992, H 6 3 4 2 . 141 July 1990 intelligence report, cited in C ongressional Record, July 2 7 , 1992, H 6699. 142 US intelligence report from the sum m er of 1990, cited in C ongressional R ecord, July 2 7 , 1992, H 6 6 9 9 . 143 Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, Vol. 2, pp. 2 2 2 , 2 6 2 . 144 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 231. 145 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 335. 146 These included versions o f Soviet and Italian ground mines, as well as a Soviet m odel m oored contact mine - see N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, p. 2 1 1 . 147 FI/D M S M arket Intelligence Report, M iddle E a s t an d A frica (N ovem ber 1990), ‘Iraq ,’ p. 8. 148 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. 149 ‘M inister Denies M issile Industry C oop eration ,’ Baghdad IN A in A rabic, 1600 G M T , April 2 7 , 1989.

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150 Forecast International/D M S (N ovem ber 1990) ‘M iddle East M arket Overview, Iraq ,’ p. 3; M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. 151 ‘Iraq has Bom b Sim ilar to an A tom ic W eapon,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, O ctober 5, 1990; ‘Fuel-Air W arhead for Iraqi S C U D s,’ Flight International, O ctober 10, 1990, 5. 152 ‘ C risis in the Gulf: The M en W ho M ade Sadd am D an gerou s,’ The Independ­ ent, A ugust 2 6 , 1990; Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The L esson s o f M odern War, V ol. 2, p. 4 7 4 . 153 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 116, 126; W . Seth C arus, ‘ Cruise M issile Proliferation in the 1 9 9 0 s,’ W ashington Papers 159 (W estport, C T: Praeger, 1992), 68. 154 John Boatm an, ‘Threat from Below the W aterline’, J D W (Septem ber 22, 1990), 502. 155 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 5. See also N ick C o o k and D ou glas Barrie, ‘Iraq ’s A rsenal: the W eapons Facing the W est,’ JD W (A ugust 18, 1990), 230. 156 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 5; F I/D M S (N ovem ber 1990), ‘M arket Intelligence R eport-M iddle East and A frica: Iraq ’, p. 8. 157 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. A ccording to Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary In du s­ try . . . , p. 108, production of m ortars and shells only began in 1987. 158 ‘Iraq’ s Form idable A rray of G u n s,’ JD W (February 2, 1991), p. 136. Western intelligence reported that Iraq w as extremely interested in acquiring modern fuse technology: see testim ony of C ustom s Service cited in C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1 9 9 2 , H 7 8 7 6 . 159 ‘The G uns of S ad d am ,’ W ashington Post, February 10, 1991. 160 F I/D M S (N ovem ber 1990), ‘M iddle E ast M arket Overview: Iraq ,’ p. 3; M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 2. 161 U N SC O M R eport S23283 (December 12, 1991), 41 reports that at the Hatteen project at Al-Atheer, Iraqi authorities stated that 3 .5 k g of uranium metal were used to build ten arm or piercing ‘bullets’ . Iraqi authorities claimed that three of these had been used, and exhibited three more to inspectors. 162 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 314; ‘British E xports to Iraq ,’ M E D N ew s, Septem ber 2, 1991, 2. 163 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 3; Ja n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery, 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 647; Frank C hadw ick, G u lf War Factb ook (Bloom ington, IL: G D W Inc., 1991), p. 65. 164 Alan George, ‘Forging Line or Gun Barrel Project?,’ D efence (August 1990), 4 7 8 - 9 ; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 323; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . .,’ p. 96. 165 ‘Iraq: H eir to H A R P Project?’, JD W (April 2 1, 1990), pp. 7 7 0 -1 . 166 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, p .2. These m odifications m ay have been based on Y ugoslav kits. J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -9 3 , pp. 647, 687. 167 Ezio Bonsignore, ‘ “ Program m e B abylon ” and “ O peration Bertha” : Fact or Fiction,’ M ilitary Technology (June 1990), 6 2 -5 ; ‘US, Britain Knew o f Super­ gun, D esigner S ay s,’ W ashington Post, Jan u ary 16, 1992. U N S C O M inspec­ tors believe that the gun w as developed for BW delivery: See ‘T ext o f A ugust 14, 1991 Press Briefing by O fficials of U N Inspection Team on First V isit to Iraq ’s Biological W eapons Facilities,’ pp. 1 -2 , and U N Press Release IK/46 which accom panied the briefing. 168 Ian K em p, ‘D r. Gerald Bull’ s D eadly Legacy’ , JD W , N ovem ber 2 4 , 1990; Ian K em p, ‘The Execution of Project Babylon’, JD W , N ovem ber 2 4 , 1 9 9 0 , p. 1010. 169 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 3 7 0 -1 ; Sim on H enderson, Instant E m pire . . . , pp. 1 4 2 -5 4 .

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170 Jam es A dam s, B u ll’s Eye (N ew Y ork: Tim es Books, 1991), p. 261. 171 W. Seth C arus, ‘Long R ange R ocket Artillery in the Third W orld,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (O ctober 1991), p. 471. 172 W. Seth C arus, ‘ Long-range R ocket Artillery . . . , ’ p. 4 7 7 (chart), M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, p. 8; Ja n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 2 8 , 7 4 4 —5. 173 W. Seth C arus, ‘ Long-range R ocket Artillery . . . , ’ p. 4 7 7 (chart); M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, p. 8; and J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 728. 174 Tim Ripley, ‘D estroying Iraq’ s Ballistic M issiles,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (O ctober 1992), p. 4 6 0 . ‘U .N . T eam Sets D aily Inspections at Iraqi M issile Research C enter,’ W ashington Post, Jan u ary 2 7 , 1993. 175 ‘Stockholm Institute Publishes A rm s Suppliers List’ , Vienna W ochenpresse in Germ an, February 7, 1991, 4 3 , in F B IS-N E SA , 7 February, 1991, 14—15. A ccording to SIPRI data, Brazil supplied 98 A stros system s and 9 6 0 rockets for these systems in the 1 9 7 9 —89 period. 176 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 183—4. 177 W Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., ‘Iraq ’s Al-H usayn M issile Program , Part I,’ Ja n e ’s Soviet Intelligence Review (M ay 1990), pp. 2 0 4 —9; J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 728. 178 The Laith and the F R O G share a com m on launcher: the Soviet-designed ZIL135. The Iraqi Army, p. 9. 179 W. Seth C arus, ‘Long-range R ocket Artillery . . . , ’ p. 4 7 7 (chart); Ja n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 728. 180 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, pp. 7—8. 181 See D uncan Lennox, ‘Iraq’ s Short-Range Surface-to-Surface M issiles,’ p. 58; and Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 112. In A ugust 1993, U N observers m onitored an Iraqi test of a modified SA-2 missile. ‘U N witnesses Iraqi rocket test’, B oston G lob e, 3 A ugust 1993. 182 ‘Brazilians Probe Links with Iraq ’, JD W , 2 6 M ay 1 9 9 0 , p. 9 8 9 ; ‘Brazil Rebuffs Critics of M issile Aid to Iraq ,’ Insight (Septem ber 10, 1990), 40; Scott D . Tollefson, Brazilian A rm s Transfers, Ballistic M issiles, an d Foreign Policy: The Search fo r A utonom y (PhD dissertation, Baltim ore: Joh n s H opkin s Uni­ versity Press, 1991), pp. 335—40. 183 See ‘M inister on Successful Anti-M issile M issile T est’ , Baghdad D om estic Service in A rabic, 1700 G M T , N ovem ber 30, 1988, in f B i S-N ESA , December 1, 1988, 29; ‘T V Airs Film on M issile,’ Baghdad i N a in A rabic, 1 7 3 0 G M T , N ovem ber 30, 1988 in F B IS-N E SA , D ecem ber 1, 1988, 29. 184 D uncan Lennox, ‘Iraq ’s Short Range . . . , ’ p. 5 8 , states that the missile appeared to be a m odification of the Chinese H Q -61 surface-to-air missile, a reverse-engineered version o f the Soviet SA-2. 185 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 4. 186 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. 187 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 4. 188 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 95; ‘Iraq “ able to expand m ilitary capability” ,’ JD W , July 10, 1993, 9; M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 4. 189 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2; J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 77, 573. 190 J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 6 —7. 191 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 115. 192 Jagdeep Singh, ‘After the W ar, The Exhibition,’ M ilitary Technology (August 1989), 60—2. 193 Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, V ol. 2, p. 4 4 0 ; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 275. 194 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 3 2 —3.

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195 N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, p. 295. 196 J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 6 -7 . 197 N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, p. 110; Ja n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery, 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 77. 198 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 115. 199 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry . . , p. 115; Ja n e ’s A rm our a n d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , p. 319. 2 0 0 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 2. The system com bined a Thom son ‘A tlis’ laser designator pod with the Soviet X -2 9 L laser-guided bom b, and used Iraqidesigned softw are and hardw are adap tors. The Soviet missile provided greater explosive pow er and range than existing French systems. 201 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. According to General H usayn K am il H assan, director of M IM I, the M iG -23 w as capable of refuelling other aircraft in m id­ air. See ‘Iraq N egotiating to Buy French M irage Fighters,’ Reuters, April 27, 1989, A M Cycle. 202 F I/D M S (N ovem ber 1990), ‘Iraq: Force Structure,’ 2, 5. 203 J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 145; Tam ir Eshel ‘Iraqi Thrust Tow ard Strategic W eapons: A M ini-Superpow er in Form ation ,’ M ilitary Technology (June 1990) 9 8 -1 0 0 ; Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, V ol.2, p. 2 4 2 and M ike Eisenstadt, ‘The Sw ord of the A rabs . . ’, p. 26. 2 0 4 ‘India to T est A vro-748-based AW ACS Program in M id -1 9 9 1 ,’ D efense and Foreign A ffairs Weekly, O ctober 1 5 -2 1 , 1990; Jam es Smith, ‘D evelopm ents in the Indian Air Force,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (N ovem ber 1991), 526. 205 J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 145; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 3 3 6 -7 . 2 0 6 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 2; ‘M inister Denies M issile Industry C oop eration ,’ Baghdad IN A in A rabic, 1 6 0 0 G M T , April 2 7 , 1 9 8 9 , in FB IS-N E SA (April 28, 1989), 18. 2 0 7 J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 145; M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 2. 2 0 8 ‘M inister C ables Sadd am on Production of A W A C S,’ Baghdad D om estic Service in A rabic, 1800 G M T , July 3, 1989 in FB IS-N E SA (July 5, 1989), 25; ‘ Baghdad T V Show s Film of Latest M ilitary Technology, Show s Adnan-1 A ir­ plan e,’ Baghdad IN A in A rabic, 1750 G M T , D ecem ber 7, 1989 in FBISN E SA (Decem ber 8, 1989), p. 24. 209 Sim on M itchell, ‘W ho O w ns Iraq ’s N ew A EW ,’ International D efense Review (February 1993), 156. 2 1 0 J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 145. 211 ‘Iraqis Show O ff Im proved R ad ar Plane,’ D aily Telegraph, Jan u ary 4, 1991. 2 1 2 J a n e ’s A ll the W orld’s A ircraft 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 145. M itchell, ‘W ho Owns Iraq ’s new A EW ’ . 213 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 4; Kenneth R. Tim m erm an, ‘Iraq: Tactical and Technical Im plications for T o m orrow ’ s H istory B o ok ’, M ilitary Technology (July 1986), p. 135. 2 1 4 N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, pp. 1 4 8 -5 4 . 215 N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, p. 154. 2 1 6 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 2 8 9 ; ‘Iraq “ Able to Expand M ilitary C ap ab ility ” ’ , p. 9; ‘ Local Version o f T-74 T an k Under Production,’ C airo M E N A in A rabic, 0 6 2 5 G M T , Septem ber 13, 1 9 8 9 , in F B IS -N E S (Sep­ tem ber 13, 1989), 31. 2 1 7 ‘Industry M inister D iscusses M ilitary Production,’ C airo A l-A khbar in A rabic, 7 M ay 1989, p. 7, in F B IS-N E SA (M ay 9, 1989), 1 8 -2 1 .

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218 ‘Iraq ’s A rsenal: the W eapons Facing the W est,’ p. 2 3 0 . 219 Lt. C ol. D avid Eshel (IDF, retired), ‘Sadd am H ussein ’s Spearhead —A C om bat A ssessm ent,’ M ilitary Technology (January 1991), 2 5 5 . ‘Iraq’ s Army: H it H ard By The Blockade’, New sw eek, 29 O ctober 1 9 9 0 , 2 6 ; ‘Iraq Tries to O ffset U .S. W eapons W ith Low -Technology Strategies,’ N ew York Tim es, N ovem ber 25 , 1990. 220 See U N S C O M R eport S 2 3 2 8 3 , p. 2 5 ; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like A Phoenix . . . , ’ pp. 94—5. 221 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, p.4. 222 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘The Iraqi Armed Forces T w o Y ears O n .’ Ja n e ’s Intelli­ gence Review (M arch 1993), 121—7; ‘Iraq “ Able to E xpand M ilitary C ap ab il­ ity” ,’ p. 9. 223 Ian K em p, ‘D r. Gerald Bull’s D eadly Legacy,’ p. 1009. 224 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1 9 8 9 , 4; Kevin T o olis, ‘The M an Behind Iraq ’s Super­ gun’ , N ew York Tim es M agazine, A ugust 26, 1990, 5 0 ; Ja n e ’s A rm our an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 5 7 2 —3, 5 8 3 —6. 225 George G raham , ‘France Reaches Rescheduling A ccord With Iraq For 2 .4 Bn Pds D ebt,’ Financial Tim es, Septem ber 16, 1989. 226 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 7; D efense Electronics (February 1989), p. 10. 2 2 7 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 6. 228 ‘Iraq N egotiating to Buy French M irage Fighter’, Reuters, 2 7 A pr 1989, A M Cycle. 229 M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 6. 230 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 95. 231 Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict, p. 39. 232 Conduct o f the Persian G u lf War, p. 11. 233 W M E A T 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 67. 234 Conduct o f the Persian G u lf W ar, pp. 3—4; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 389. 235 Testim ony of the C ustom s Service to the H ou se W ays and M eans Com m ittee, 1991, cited in C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 7 6 . 236 Steve R. Bow m an, Richard F. Grim m ett, R obert D . Shuey, and Z ach ary S. D avis, ‘W eapons Proliferation and C onventional Arms Transfers: The O u tlook in M id -1 9 9 2 ,’ C R S R eport for C ongress 92—9 9 4 E N R (W ashington, D C : Library of C ongress, D ecem ber 31, 1992), p. 35. 2 3 7 ‘A L-ITT A H A D on M ilitary In dustrialization,’ Abu D habi A L -IT T A H A D in A rabic, N ovem ber 18, 1988, p. 1 in FB IS-N E SA (N ovem ber 2 2 , 1988), 21. 238 Intelligence report from July 1 9 9 0 , cited in C ongressional Record, July 27, 1992, H 6 6 9 9 . 239 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . ; Alan Friedm an, Spider’s Web: The Secret H istory o f H ow the White H ouse Illegally A rm ed Iraq (Bantam: N ew Y ork, 1993). 240 C ongressional Record, July 2 7 , 1 9 9 2 , H 6 7 0 0 . 241 C ongressional R ecord, A ugust 10, 1 9 9 2 , H 7 8 7 5 —7876. 242 C ongressional R ecord, Septem ber 2 5 , 1992, H 9 5 0 4 . 243 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 352. 244 See W M EAT, 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 109. 245 W M E A T 1 9 9 1 -1 9 9 2 , p. 67. 246 M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like A Phoenix . . ,’ pp. 6 2 —3, 89. 247 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . ., p. 385. 248 ‘M issile Strike A gainst Iraq M ulled on H ill,’ W ashington Tim es, Septem ber 10, 1990. 249 ‘The G ulf W ar: Chem ical W eapons Location U nknow n,’ Financial Tim es,

N otes

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252 253 254

255 256 257

258

259

260 261 262 263 264 265

266

267 268 269

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February 27, 1 9 9 1 , reports that ‘ . . . all Iraq ’s factories m aking artillery and artillery m unitions were now “ non-operation al” . . . ’ according to London defense officials. Conduct o f the Persian G u lf War, p. 213. This argum ent is developed further in Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Iraq ’ s M ilitary Industry: A Critical Strategic T arget,’ N atio n al Security Studies Q uarterly IV, N o . 2 (Spring 1998), 3 3 -5 0 . GW a P s Volum e I: ‘Planning R epo rt,’ p. 118. G W A PS V olum e I: ‘Planning,’ pp. 1 4 6 -7 , 161. ‘D evelopm ent o f this p art of the air cam paign plan revealed a philosophical difference between short-range military and long-range political objectives.’ G W A PS V olum e I: ‘Planning,’ p. 164. G W A PS V olum e II: ‘ O perations’, p. 34. G W A PS V olum e II: ‘ Effects and Effectiveness’ , p. 10. The G W A PS report em phasizes that analysis of attacks on Iraqi military support and industry are subsum ed into the discussion o f attacks on N B C W and m issile production facilities. See G W A PS V ol. II: ‘Effects and Effective­ ness,’ p. 273 . This suggests the lower priority given to conventional m ilitary industrial infrastructure. ‘Iraqi Factories,’ JD W , N ovem ber 3, 1990, 867; C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . ., p. 2 0 8 ; ‘H ow Sadd am is Picking Up the Pieces a Y ear After “ S torm ” ’, JD W , February 2 2 , 1992, p. 2 8 4 ; ‘Iraq “ able to expand m ilitary cap ability ” ,’ p. 9; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ pp. 6 2 -5 , 8 8 -9 6 . ‘Testim ony of R obert G ates before the H ouse Armed Services C om m ittee,’ M arch 27, 1992. G ates specified that capability for limited production of artillery, munitions, and possibly arm ored vehicles had been restored by early 1992. M E D N ew s, Septem ber 2 8 , 1992, 3. M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . .,’ p. 88. ‘Iraq “ able to expand military cap ab ility ,” p. 9. M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like A Phoenix . . .,’ pp. 9 5 -6 . M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like A Phoenix . . . , ’ pp. 9 5 -6 ; ‘Iraq “ able to expand m il­ itary capability” ,’ p. 9. ‘ G lobal C rossing, Iraqi D efenses, and The Chinese C onnection,’ N ew sm ax.com , M arch 25, 2 0 0 3 , w w w .new sm ax.com ;‘Iraq Strengthens Air Force W ith French Parts,’ W ashington Tim es, M arch 7, 2 0 0 3 . See w w w .cn n .com /T R A N SC R IP T S/0310/01/ltm .18.htm l, for an interview with Eric Schmitt of the N ew York Tim es on O ctober 1, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Iraq Aw ash In M ilitary W eapons’, Christian Science M onitor, O ctober 20, 2 0 0 3 . ‘Iraqi A rm s Caches Cited in A ttack s,’ N ew York Tim es, O ctober 14, 2 0 0 3 . ‘Iraq’ s C onventional Arm s Supply Bigger Than U.S. T h ought,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, O ctober 17, 2 0 0 3 . Richard Butler, The G reatest Threat: Iraq, W eapons o f M ass D estruction, and the C risis o f G lo b al Security (N ew Y ork: PublicAffairs, 2 0 0 0 ); Tim Trevan, Sad d am ’s Secrets: The H unt fo r Ir a q ’s H idden W eapons (London: H arperCollins Publishers, 1999); and the idiosyncratic Scott Ritter, En dgam e: Solving the Iraq Problem - O nce an d For A ll (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1999); Alfred B. Prados, Iraqi Challenges a n d U.S. M ilitary R esponses: M arch 1991 through O ctober 2 0 0 2 , R eport for C ongress N ovem ber 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , R L 3 1 6 4 1 (W ashington, D C : C ongressional Research Service). See Statem ent by D av id K ay on the Interim Progress R eport on the Activities o f the Iraq Survey G roup (ISG) Before The H ouse Perm anent Select C om m it­ tee on Intelligence, The H ou se Com m ittee on A ppropriations, Subcom m ittee

2 54

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272 273 274

275

276 277

278

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280 281 282 283

284 285 286

287 288 289 290

N otes on D efense, an d the Senate Select C om m ittee on Intelligence, O ctober 2, 2003 (available at the Central Intelligence Agency w ebsite, w w w .cia.gov/cia/ public_affairs/speech es/2003/david_kay10022003.htm l). A ccording to D avid K ay, the quantities of W M D related m aterial that remain at large could probably fit in a tw o-car garage. Statem ent o f D avid K ay, p. 2. Tim othy V. M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’s T o x ic A rsenal,’ p. 54. Anthony H . C ordesm an, ‘Iraq and W eapons of M a ss D estruction,’ S. 5 0 6 2 . See Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 2 5 2 —7; ‘Germ an Intelli­ gence R eport re: Iraqi Activities in the area of nuclear technology and missile developm ent date April 5, 1 9 9 0 ’ cited in C ongressional Record, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 8 1 . Tim othy V. M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’s T o xic A rsenal,’ p. 55; A vigdor H aselkorn, The Continuing Storm : Iraq, Poisonous W eapons, an d Deterrence (N ew H aven: Y ale University Press, 1999), pp. 72—3. See ‘President O rders M issile C ode-N am ed “ A l-H usayn” .’ Baghdad IN A in English, 1225 G M T , 1 M arch 1988, in FB IS-N E SA (2 M arch 1988), p. 25 The w arhead w as reduced from 8 0 0 k g to 1 9 0 k g . Seth C arus and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., ‘Iraq ’s Al-H usayn M issile Program : Part O ne,’ in Ja n e ’s Soviet Intelligence Review (M ay 1990), 2 0 4 —9. Anthony H . C ordesm an, ‘Iraq and W eapons of M a ss D estruction,’ S. 5 0 6 2 . This m ay have been due to stream lined procedures and better training, rather than m odifications to the m issile or launcher. ‘Forty Three M issiles on the Z ionist Entity,’ A l-’A rab al-Yaw m (in Arabic) FBIS-N ES-98—326, N ovem ber 2 2 , 1998, especially his entries for September 16—17, 1990 . See also Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Revolution and C ounter­ Revolution: The Role of the Periphery in Technological and Conceptual Innovation,’ in Emily O . G oldm an and Leslie C. Eliason (eds), The D iffusion o f M ilitary Technology a n d Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 17 9 —2 0 1 . D uelfer R eport, Vol. 2, ‘Delivery System s,’ p. 4; W. Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr, ‘Iraq ’s Al-H usayn . . Part O ne,’ p. 205. M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 7. ‘This [the Al-H usayn] is clearly a case o f a w eapons program with significant local content.’ Timothy V. M cCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Saddam ’s T oxic Arsenal,’ p. 55. W. Seth C arus, ‘M issiles in the Third W orld: The 1991 G u lf W ar,’ O rbis 35 (Spring 1991), p. 2 5 3 . Germ an parts accounted for approxim ately 25 percent o f Iraq ’s missile com ponents: a larger portion than any other country except for Iraq .’Germ an Firms Primed Iraq ’s W ar M achine,’ W ashington P o st, July 23, 1992. Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , p. 169. C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . ., p. 16. W. Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., ‘Iraq ’s A l-H usayn M issile Program , Part 2 ,’ J a n e ’s Soviet Intelligence Review (June 1990), p. 2 4 2 . Anthony H. C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, Vol. 2, p. 366, use a figure of 203 m issiles fired, based on data from G ary Sick. Timothy V. M cCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, ‘Saddam ’s T oxic Arsenal,’ p. 70. C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . ., p. 226. ‘N ew M issile W ith 900-km Range Launched 25 A pr,’ Baghdad IN A in A rabic, 1543 G M T , 25 April 1988 in F B IS-N E SA (April 2 6 , 1988), 24. W. Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr, ‘Iraq ’s Al-H usayn M issile Program , Part 2 ,’ p. 245.

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291 Anthony H . C ordesm an, ‘Iraq and W eapons of M ass D estruction,’ S. 5 0 6 2 . ‘ Germ an Intelligence R eport . . . , ’ cited in C ongressional R ecord, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 8 1 , estim ates the w arhead at 4 0 0 k g . 2 9 2 The Iraqi Army, p. 9; M E D N ew s, M ay 8, 1989, 7. 293 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 290. 2 9 4 See M ilitary Technology, (M ay 1991), 78. 295 W. Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr, ‘Iraq’ s Al-H usayn M issile Program , Part 2 ’, p. 2 4 6 . See also ‘Satellite-carrier R ocket System T ested,’ Baghdad Voice of the M asses in A rabic, 1 1 3 6 G M T , D ecem ber 7, 1 9 8 9 , in FB IS-N E SA (Decem ber 8, 1989), 2 3 , and ‘2,000-km R ange M issiles Produced,’ Baghdad V oice of the M asses in A rabic, 1230 G M T , 7 D ecem ber 1989, in FB IS-N E SA (8 D ecem ber 1989), 23. 296 D uncan Lennox, ‘Chem ical W arfare: Extending the R ange of D estruction’ , JD W , 25 A ugust 1990, 2 6 7 ; Stephen J. H edges and Brian D uffy, ‘Iraqgate,’ U.S. N ew s & W orld Report, M ay 18, 1992, 42. 2 9 7 Pam ela Pohling-Brow n,’Sales Boom Expected,’ International D efense Review (February 1993). p. 146; Ian Kem p, ‘The Execution of Project Babylon,’ p. 1 010; Jam es A dam s, B u ll’s Eye, pp. 2 2 6 -7 . 2 9 8 T am ir Eshel, ‘Iraqi Thrust Tow ard Strategic W eapons: A M ini-Superpow er in F orm ation ?,’ p. 99. 299 ‘ C ountries in the M iddle East A dding N ew M issiles to their A rsenals,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, D ecem ber 2 4 , 1989. A ccording to other reports, the military version has a 1 ,6 8 0 mile range: see ‘Ruthless M adm an with a N uclear D ream ,’ Sunday Tim es, April 15, 1990; ‘H usayn C onfers N am es on Rocket, M issile System s,’ Baghdad IN A in A rabic, 1125 G M T , D ecem ber 9, 1989, in F B IS-N E SA (Decem ber 12, 1989), 20. 300 T am ir Eshel, ‘Iraqi Thrust T ow ard Strategic W eapons . . ,’ p. 99. 301 ‘Satellite Launch Planned’, JD W , July 2 1 , 1990, 74; ‘Iraq Readies Satellite,’ W ashington Post, February 7, 1990; ‘Governm ent “ R ead y ” T o Launch Satel­ lite,’ Paris R ad io M onte C arlo in A rabic, 1 7 0 0 G M T , February 6, 1 9 9 0 , in F B IS-N E SA (February 7, 1990), 2 2 . The satellite program m ay also have had Brazilian assistance. ‘Iraq Set to Launch First Spy Satellite,’ Insight, December 18, 1989, 38. 302 ‘Sadd am C laim s to H ave N ew M issile Th at C an H it Israel,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 10, 1990. 303 Conduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . , p. 16; ‘S ad d am ’s “ new ” m issile puzzles experts’, Financial Tim es, O ctober 10, 1990. 304 ‘Iraq: We Fired N ew M issile at D im on a’, Jeru salem Post, February 18, 1991. 305 G W A PS V olum e II: ‘ Effects and Effectiveness,’ p. 319; Tim othy V. M cCarthy and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’ s T o x ic A rsenal,’ p. 55. 306 U N S C O M R eport S /2 3 1 6 5, O ctober 2 5 , 1991, p. 31; Tim Ripley, ‘D estroying Iraq ’s Ballistic M issiles,’ p. 460. 307 ‘ Germ an Intelligence R eport . . . , ’ cited in C ongressional R ecord, A ugust 10, 1992, H 7 8 8 1 ; D uncan Lennox, ‘Iraq’ s Short Range Surface-to-Surface M is­ siles,’ p. 58. 308 W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, Critical M ass, p. 471. 309 Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 1 5 0 -4 . 310 G ary M ilhollin, ‘Building Sadd am H ussein ’s B om b ,’ N ew York Tim es M aga­ zine, M arch 6, 1 9 9 2 , p. 34; W illiam E. Burrows and R obert W indrem, Crit­ ical M ass, pp. 4 6 7 , 4 7 1 ; and Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 153. 311 A ndrew Slade, ‘C on d or Project in D isarray ,’ JD W , February 17, 1 9 9 0 , 2 9 5 ; ‘Argentine Gives M issile Parts to U.S. for D isp o sal,’ N ew York Tim es, 7

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314 315

316

317 318

319

320 321

322

323 324 325 326 327

328

329 330 331 332

N otes M arch 1993; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., ‘Ballistic M issile D evelopm ent in Egypt,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (O ctober 1992), 4 5 2 —8. W. Seth C arus and Joseph Bermudez, Jr, ‘Iraq ’s Al-H usayn M issile Project, Part I’, p. 204 . G ary M ilhollin and D avid D antzic, ‘M u st the U.S. Give Brazil and Iraq The B o m b?,’ N ew York Tim es (O p-Ed), July 29, 1990; Alfred M anfredi, et al., ‘Ballistic M issile Proliferation Potential o f N o n -M ajor M ilitary Powers: An U pdate,’ C ongressional Research R eport for C ongress 8 7 -6 5 4 SPR (W ashing­ ton, D C : Library of C ongress, A ugust 6, 1987), pp. 17—19, 2 5 —32; ‘C risis in the Gulf: The M en W ho M ak e Saddam D an gerou s,’ Independent, A ugust 26, 1990. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 248. G ary M ilhollin and D avid D antzic, ‘M u st the US Give Brazil and Iraq The B o m b?,’ ‘ Brazil R ebuffs Critics o f M issile Aid to Iraq ,’ Insight, Septem ber 10, 1990, 40; ‘ Brazilians Probe Links W ith Iraq ,’ JD W , M ay 2 6 , 1 9 9 0 , 989; ‘C risis in the G ulf . . , Independent, A ugust 2 6 , 1990. Scott D . Tollefson, Brazilian A rm s Transfers . . ., pp. 3 3 5 —43. U N S C O M R eport S/23122, O ctober 8, 1991, 3—4. See also U N S C O M R eport S/23165, O ctober 2 5 , 1991, pp. 5, 23 for linkage of S S M and nuclear research. M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like a Phoenix . . .’, pp. 35—6. Statem ent by Rep. D ante Fascell o f Florida, C ongressional R ecord, O ctober 2, 1992, Extension of R em arks, E 2 8 8 4 . N ote that this production, detected by U N S C O M officials, w as taking place 18 m onths after the G u lf W ar. W. Seth C arus, ‘Cruise M issile Proliferation . . . , ’ p. 10; ‘U .N . Team Sets D aily Inspections at Iraqi M issile Research C enter,’ W ashington Post, Jan u ary 27, 1993. W. Seth C arus, ‘Cruise M issile Proliferation . . ,’ p. 82. C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . , p. 2 5 9; ‘Stockholm Institute Publishes Arm s Supplier L ist,’ Vienna W ochenpresse in G erm an, February 7, 1 9 91 , 43 in F B IS-N E SA (February 7, 1991), 14. See ‘D ron e’ Exhibited,’ M an am a W AKH in A rabic, 2 0 5 7 G M T , O ctober 3, 1988, in FB IS-N E SA (O ctober 4, 1988), p. 18; ‘M ilitary D isplays LocallyM ade M issiles, D ron es’ , M an am a WA k H in A rabic, 1730 G M T , 5 O ctober 1988 in F B IS-N E SA (O ctober 6, 1988), 31. N orm an Friedm an, D esert Victory, pp. 109—10; Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 119. W. Seth C arus, ‘Cruise M issile Proliferation . . , ’ p. 37. J a n e ’s A rm or an d Artillery 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 , pp. 7 6 0 —1. W. Seth C arus, ‘Cruise M issile Proliferation . . . , ’ pp. 40, 1 2 9 —30. ‘Iraqi M issile Plan Linked to British Firm s,’ Independent, N ovem ber 4, 1990; Alan George, ‘U K foils Iraqi cruise m issile,’ Flight International, O ctober 2, 1990, p. 4. ‘A Poor M a n ’ s Air Force,’ N ew York Times, June 19, 2 0 0 3 . D uelfer Report, Vol. 2, ‘Delivery System s,’ pp. 37—41 details Iraqi plans to increase the Seer­ sucker’s range to 1 ,0 0 0 km. Ira q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction: The A ssessm ent o f the British G overn­ ment (September 2 0 0 2 ), p. 11 (hereafter Ira q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction). A vigdor H aselkorn, The Continuing Storm , p. 161. A vigdor H aselkorn, The Continuing Storm , p. 31. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s (Central Intelligence Agency, O ctober 2 0 0 2 ), p. 22 (hereafter Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Pro­ g ra m s).

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333 A ndrew Feickert, Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction (W M D) C apable M is­ siles an d Unm anned A erial Vehicles (UAVs) C R S R eport for C ongress (C on ­ gressional Research Service, M arch 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 ), p. 4. 334 See ‘Key Judgm ents: Iraq ’s Continuing Program s for W eapons of M ass D estruction’, available at w w w .fas.org/irp/cia/product/Iraq-w m d.htm l. 335 ‘Air Force A ssessm ent Before W ar Said Iraqi D rones Were M inor Th reat’ , Baltim ore Sun, A ugust 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘A ir Force D oubts D rone T h reat,’ Wall Street Jo u rn al, Septem ber 10, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Air Force A nalysts Feel V indicated On Iraqi D ron es,’ W ashington P o st, Septem ber 26, 2 0 0 3 . 336 Statem ent by D av id K ay , p. 8. 337 ‘U .N . Team Sets D aily Inspections at Iraqi M issile Research C enter,’ W ashing­ ton Post, Jan u ary 2 7 , 1993; Tim Ripley, ‘D estroying Iraq ’s Ballistic M issiles,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (O ctober 1992), 4 5 9 -6 2 . 338 Cited in ‘For the R ecord’ (O p-Ed), W ashington Post, July 2 8 , 1992. 339 ‘U N Team Sets D aily Inspections at Iraqi M issile Research C enter,’ W ashing­ ton Post, Jan u ary 2 7 , 1993. 340 ‘Iraq Buying M issile Parts C overtly,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 14, 1995; ‘Jord an Seizes M issile Parts M eant for Shipm ent to Iraq ,’ W ashington P o st, D ecem ber 8, 1 9 9 5 ; ‘U N Is Said T o Find R ussian M arkin gs on Iraq-Bound M ilitary Equipm ent,’ W ashington P o st, D ecem ber 15, 1995. 341 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s, p. 22. 342 ‘N ew s Brief,’ Christian Science M onitor, Septem ber 22, 1995, 2; ‘ C rash N u clear Program by Iraq Is D isclosed,’ N ew York Tim es, A ugust 26, 1995. 343 ‘Iraqis Fooled W eapons M o n itors,’ W ashington Tim es, A ugust 23, 1995. The IA EA declared in 1994 that Iraq had ‘come clean’ on its nuclear program : adm issions after H ussein K am il’ s defection indicated that there w as much the IA EA did not know ab ou t Iraqi nuclear program s. 344 A ndrew Feickert, Iraq: W eapons o f M ass D estruction . . , p. 1. 345 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 40. 346 S/1999/99 U N S C O M R eport on The Status of D isarm am ent and M onitoring, Jan u ary 29, 1999, cited in A ndrew Feickert, Iraq : W eapons o f M ass D estruc­ tion . . , p. 3. 347 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, pp. 2 7 , 2 9 -3 0 . 348 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 30. 349 U nclassified R eport to Congress on the A cquisition o f Technology Relating to W eapons o f M ass D estruction a n d A dvanced C onventional M unitions,1 Ja n u ary Through 3 0 Ju n e 2 0 0 2 , p. 5, available at w w w .cia.gov/cia/reports/ 721_reports/jan_jun2002.htm l. 350 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s, p. 2. 351 Statem ent by D av id K ay, pp. 3, 8; D uelfer R eport, Vol. 2, ‘Delivery System s,’ p. 1 states that the Iraq Survey G roup found no evidence Iraq had retained SCU D -type m issiles after 1991. 352 Statem ent by D av id K ay , p. 7. 353 ‘ Baghdad R ecords Show H ussein Sought M issiles, Other Aid A b ro ad ,’ Wall Street Jo u rn al, N ovem ber 3, 2 0 0 3 . See also ‘For The Iraqis, A M issile D eal T h at W ent Sou r,’ N ew York Tim es, 1 D ecem ber 2 0 0 3 . 354 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 27. 355 U nclassified R eport to Congress on the A cquisition o f Technology Relating to W eapons o f M ass D estruction an d A dvanced Conventional M unitions, 1 Ju ly Through 31 D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 , p. 4 (available at w w w .cia.gov/cia/reports/ 721_reports/july_dec2001.htm l). 356 U nclassified R eport to Congress on the A cquisition o f Technology Relating to

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N otes W eapons o f M ass D estruction a n d A dvanced Conventional M unitions, 1 Ju ly Through 31 D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 , p. 4. ‘Banned M issile M ight Well Be Used In A W ar,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, February 25, 2 0 0 3 . ‘Blix G ets Aid on Iraqi M issile Issue,’ W ashington Post, February 4, 2 0 0 3 . ‘Experts Confirm N ew Iraq M issile Breaks U .N . Lim it,’ N ew York Times, February 14, 2 0 0 3 . ‘U .N . W eighs Blix’ s Plan to Test Iraq’s C om pliance,’ W all Street Jo u rn al, Feb­ ruary 20, 2 0 0 3 . Statem ent by D av id K ay , p. 7. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 6. ‘Blix Gets Aid on Iraqi M issile Issue,’ W ashington Post, February 4, 2 0 0 3 ; Statem ent by D av id K ay, pp. 8-9 . ‘Panel: Iraq Broke Lim it On M issiles,’ W ashington Post, February 13, 2 0 0 3 . Statem ent by D av id K ay, p. 9. U nclassified R eport to Congress on the Acquisition o f Technology R elating to W eapons o f M ass D estruction a n d A dvanced Conventional M unitions, 1 Ju ly Through 31 D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 , p. 4; D uelfer Report, Vol. 2, ‘Delivery System s,’ p. 2 reports that Iraq w as receiving design assistance from R ussia for the AlSam m oud II missile, and technology from several Eastern European states. ‘A Poor M an ’ s Air Force,’ N ew York Tim es, June 19, 2 0 0 3 . Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , p. 170. Tabun is roughly four tim es as deadly as m ustard. A vigdor H aselkorn, The Continuing Storm , p. 20. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, p. 8. A vigdor H aselkorn, The Continuing Storm , p. 27. Tim othy V. M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’s T o xic A rsenal,’ p. 64. Tim othy V. M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’s T o xic A rsenal;’ Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Revolution and C ounterrevolution,’ pp. 1 8 9 -9 2 ; The Iraqi Arm y: O rganization a n d Tactics, pp. 1 6 1 -9 . U N Press Release IK /27, June 2 4 , 1991, p. 2. ‘Iraqi N erve G as Tests Confirm ed’ , W ashington Post, Jun e 25, 1998. ‘Tests Show Nerve G as in Iraqi W arheads,’ W ashington Post, June 2 3 , 1998. U N S C O M S /2 3 16 5 , pp. 5, 2 7 ; Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , p. 233. Kenneth Tim m erm an, The D eath L o b b y . . . , pp. 5 1 -2 . See M ike Eisenstadt, ‘Sw ord o f the A rabs . . . , ’ p. 5; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘Like A Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 30; W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, Critical M ass, p. 46; Anthony H . C ordesm an, ‘Iraq and W eapons of M a ss D estruc­ tion,’ S 5 0 6 6 ; Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 11, which estim ates capacity of at least 4 ,0 0 0 tons per annum. M ike Eisenstadt, ‘The Sw ord of the A rabs . . . , ’ p. 7. ‘Iraq Chem ical Arms Condem ned, But W est Once Looked The Other W ay,’ N ew York Tim es, February 13, 2 0 0 3 . Both US firms are now defunct. Anthony H . C ordesm an, ‘Iraq and W eapons of M a ss D estruction,’ S5 0 6 2 . Terry Gander, ‘Iraq: The Chem ical A rsenal,’ J a n e ’s Intelligence Review (Sep­ tem ber 1992), p. 4 1 4 . ‘Iraq W eapons D eadline Expires W ithout A ction,’ W ashington Post, July 26, 1991. Terry Gander, ‘Iraq: The Chem ical A rsenal,’ p. 4 1 4 ; ‘Iraq’ s Chem ical W eapons Found T o Be Potent,’ Christian Science M onitor, Jan u ary 23, 1992; U N Press Release IK /68, O ctober 24, 1 9 9 1 , p. 1.

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384 ‘Seventh R eport o f the Executive C hairm an o f U N S C O M ’ , U N SC D ocum ent S/1994/750, June 2 4 , 1994. 385 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 13. 386 Tim othy V . M cC arth y and Jon ath an B. T ucker,’S ad d am ’s T o x ic A rsenal,’ p. 70. 387 ‘Iraqi C om plex D ism an tled,’ W ashington Post, June 15, 1994, 388 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 40. 389 Sharon A. Squassoni, Iraq : U N Inspections fo r W eapons o f M ass D estruction R eport for C ongress (W ashington, D C : C ongressional Research Service, 28 M arch 2 0 0 3 ), p. 4. 390 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 16. 391 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 22; Sharon A. Squassoni, Iraq: U N Inspections, p. 4. 392 U nclassified R eport to Congress on the A cquisition o f Technology Relating to W eapons o f M ass D estruction an d A dvanced C onventional M unitions, 1 Jan u a ry through 3 0 Ju n e 2 0 0 2 , p. 6, available at w w w .cia/gov/cia/reports/ 721_reports/jan_jun 2002.htm l; Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P ro­ gram s, p. 10. 393 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s, p. 10. 394 ‘H ussein W as Sure O f Own Survival,’ W ashington Post, N ovem ber 3, 2 0 0 3 . 395 Statem ent by D avid K ay , p. 6. 396 Statem ent by D avid K ay , p. 5. See also ‘The M edia Ignored the Real W M D N ew s,’ Boston G lobe, N ovem ber 9, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Baghdad R ecords Show H ussein Sought M issiles, Other Aid A b road ,’ W all Street Jo u rn al, 3 N ovem ber 2 0 0 3 . 397 Sharon A. Squassoni, Iraq : U N Inspections, p. 8; Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , pp. 176, 2 5 9 ; D uelfer Report, Vol. 3, ‘B iological,’ pp. 5—6. 398 ‘T ext o f 14 A ugust 1 9 9 1 : Press Briefing by O fficials of U N Inspection Team on First V isit to Iraq ’s Biological W eapons Facilities,’ 1—2; IK /46 U N S C O M press release accom panying briefing; ‘U N Panel D escribes Iraq’ s A nthrax T h reat,’ W ashington Post, A ugust 15, 1991. 399 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, 15, lists 14 separate open air tests that Baghdad has adm itted. 4 0 0 Tim Trevan, S ad d am ’s Secrets: The H unt fo r Ir a q ’s H idden W eapons (London: H arperC ollins, 1999); ‘Iraq H ad Program For Germ W arfare,’ W ashington Post, July 6, 1 9 9 5 ; ‘Iraq A dm its It Produced Germ A rsenal’ , N ew York Tim es, July 6, 1995; Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, p. 15. 401 The 40 crates of docum ents ‘ discovered’ shortly after K am el’s defection con ­ tained over 6 0 0 ,0 0 0 pages o f docum ents — but had clearly been vetted and sanitized before release to U N S C O M . Tim Trevan, S ad d am ’s Secrets, pp. 3 31—2. 4 0 2 Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 4 0 ; D uelfer Report, Vol. 3, ‘Biologi­ cal,’ p. 1 states that the destruction of A l-H akam effectively ended Iraq ’s BW program . 403 Tim Trevan, S ad d am ’s Secrets, pp. 326—7. 4 0 4 Tim Trevan, S ad d am ’s Secrets, pp. 331, 342. 405 ‘Iraq’ s Dirty Secrets,’ U.S. N ew s an d W orld R eport, Septem ber 11, 1995, pp. 4 1 —3; ‘2 M onitoring G roups Accuse Iraq O f W ithholding D ata on W eapons,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 12, 1995; ‘Plagues in the M ak in g,’ New sw eek, O ctober 9, 1995: pp. 5 0 —1; ‘Iraq A dm its W orking on Biological W eapons System s,’ W ashington Post, A ugust 19, 1 9 9 5 ; ‘U .N . Envoy D etails Iraq ’s A dm ission o f Germ A rsenal,’ W ashington Tim es, A ugust 2 4 , 1995.

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N otes Tim Trevan, Sad d am ’s Secrets, p. 342. Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , p. 172. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 16. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction, p. 24. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, p. 17. ‘Iraqi Scientists Recount Effort To M ake W eapon O ut O f R icin,’ Wall Street Jo u rn al, July 18, 2 0 0 3 . Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, p. 16. This possiblity is discussed in Ira q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s, p. 17. The text of Secretary Powell’s address is available at w w w.un.int/ usa/03print_clp0205.htm . It refers to as m any as seven m obile BW labs using as many as 18 trucks. See ‘Key Judgm ents . . ’ for the O ctober 2 0 0 2 N IE ’s estim ate that ‘chances are even’ that Iraq had w eaponized sm allpox. N o evidence of sm allpox w eaponization has been identified. ‘N o Sm allpox Found in Iraq H u n t,’ Philadelphia Inquirer, Septem ber 19, 2 0 0 3 . The other claim s were m ade by governm ent officials after O peration Iraqi Freedom . See ‘W hite H ouse Begins N ew Effort To Build Iraq Su pp ort,’ W ashington P o st, O ctober 9, 2 0 0 3 . Statem ent by D av id K ay, pp. 4 -5 . W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, Critical M ass, p. 41. W arren H . Donnelly, Iraq an d N uclear W eapons, C ongressional Research Issue Brief, D ecem ber 21, 1 9 9 0 , p. 10 cited in Law rence Freedm an and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict, p. 220. D avid K ay, ‘Bom b Shelter,’ The N ew Republic, M arch 15, 1 9 9 3 , 1 1 -1 3 ; ‘Countering Iraqi W eapons of M a ss D estruction: The G ulf C risis and Beyond,’ cited in C ongressional R ecord, Septem ber 30, 1992, S 1 5 7 4 8 ; ‘Iraq Is Said T o H ave H idden N u clear Records From U N ,’ N ew York Times, O ctober 14, 1991; M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 19. A more recent report states that the nuclear program cost $18 billion over a 19-year period. Shyam Bhatia and D aniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun: Saddam H u ssein ’s N uclear Threat to the United States (W ashington, D C : Regnery Publishing, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 38, 307. M ichael Eisenstadt, ‘ Like a Phoenix . . . , ’ p. 19; W illiam E. Burrows and R obert W indrem, Critical M a ss, p. 5 9 ; rem arks of D irector o f Central Intelli­ gence R obert M . G ates to the C om stock Club as reported in ‘G ates W arns of Iraqi N u clear A spiration s,’ W ashington Post, D ecem ber 16, 1992; ‘S ad d am ’s N uclear W eapons D ream : A Lingering N ightm are,’ W ashington P ost O ctober 3, 1991. U N S C O M R eport S/23 2 1 5 , N ovem ber 14, 1991, p. 19. G ary M ilhollin, ‘The Iraqi B om b,’ p. 50. ‘Iraq Trying to M ak e Plutonium, T oo, U N Aide S ay s,’ N ew York Tim es, Feb­ ruary 13, 1992. U N S C O M R eport S/23 1 6 5 , p. 5. Khidhir H am za (with Jeff Stein), Sad d am ’s Bom bm aker: The Terrifying Inside Story o f the Iraqi N uclear an d B iological W eapons A genda (N ew Y ork: Scrib­ ner, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 9 4 -1 0 5 . Shyam Bhatia and D aniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, pp. 9 -1 0 , 3 7 -4 1 . Khidir H am za, S a d d a m ’s B om bm aker, p. 334. The program w ould have relied on constructing a 50-centrifuge cascade and enriching IA EA -safeguarded fuel at Tuw aitha. D uelfer Report, Vol. 2, ‘N u clear,’ p.4. K hidir H am za, S ad d am ’s B om bm aker, pp. 2 3 9 - 4 0 ; Shyam Bhatia and Daniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, p. 317; Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , p. 173.

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K hidir H am za, S ad d am ’s B om bm aker, p. 334. Shyam Bhatia and D aniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, p. 152. W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, Critical M a ss, p. 59. Shyam Bhatia and D aniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, p. 317. This report further states that by 1999, a second design existed. Leonard S. Spector, N u clear A m bitions, pp. 71, 150. The 20 kg figure is a com prom ise between the 15—25 kg (33—55 lb) cited in Leonard S. Spector, N uclear A m bitions, p. 154. Other reports not that Iraq ’s w arhead designs were far too large for available m issiles. Shyam Bhatia and D aniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, p. 317; K hidir H am za Sad d am ’s B om bm aker, pp. 2 3 9 —4 0 . Iraq w as offered a m ore efficient nuclear design by A. Q . K han in 1990. See G au rav K am pan i, Proliferation U nbound: N u clear Tales from Pakistan (February 23, 2 0 0 4 ), at cns.m iis.edu/ pubs/w eek/040223.htm . S/22986, A ugust 28, 1991, p. 3. The U N S C O M team believed this w as the approxim ate capacity o f the Tarm iya com plex in the short term. The Ash Sh arqat com plex, a twin to Tarm iya, w as approxim ately 85 percent complete, but destroyed in 1991. U N S C O M inspectors felt the Tarm iya plant w ould be operational with 90—120 EM IS units in 6—18 m onths. S /2 2 7 8 8 , July 15, 1991, pp. 11—12. S/23165, O ctober 2 5 , 1991, p. 22. S/23215, N ovem ber 14, 1991, p. 49. G ary M ilhollin, ‘Building Saddam H ussein ’s B om b ,’ N ew York Tim es M aga­ zine, M arch 6, 1992, 34; W illiam E. Burrow s and R obert W indrem, Critical M a ss, 59. G ary M ilhollin, ‘A M id east D ilem m a: W hat Is Saddam H ussein ’s N uclear T im etable?,’ W ashington Post (O p-Ed), N ovem ber 25, 1990, estim ates that 1 ,000 centrifuges produce ab ou t one b om b’s w orth of H E U annually. Recent discoveries from the A. Q . K han netw ork suggest that inefficient P-1 cen­ trifuges could create 0 .5 —1.0 bom bs per 1 ,0 0 0 centrifuges per year, and more efficient P-2 versions could create 0 .7 5 —1.5 w eapons per 1 ,0 0 0 centrifuges per year. See G au rav K am pan i, Proliferation U nbound . . . G ary M ilhollin, ‘A M ideast D ilem m a . . .’ D iana Edensw ord and G ary M ilhollin, ‘Iraq’ s Bomb —an U pd ate,’ N ew York Tim es (O p-Ed), April 2 6 , 1993. Iraq planned to produce 2 2 0 pounds of lithium-6 annually. S /2 3 6 1 5 , p. 23; S/23215, p. 10; ‘U .N . Says Iraq W as Building H -Bom b and Bigger A -B om b,’ N ew York Tim es, O ctober 15, 1 9 9 1 . As of 1989, Israel had produced a p p ro x ­ imately 375 lb o f lithium-6, which according to one analyst w as sufficient to build 35 boosted-fission w eapons of approxim ately 1 0 0 k t yield. Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bom b (London: I.B. T aurus, 1989), p. 25. See Ira q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction; Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s; ‘Key Findings . . . ’; and Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm , pp. 17 3 —5. K hidir H am za, S ad d am ’s Bom bm aker, p. 334; Shyam Bhatia and Daniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun, pp. 2 8 9 , 3 0 3 —20. Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction P rogram s, p. 1. ‘Key Judgm ents . . .’ These tubes were specifically mentioned by Secretary o f State Powell in his February 5, 2003 address to the United N ation s. ‘US Claim O n Iraqi N uclear Program Is C alled Into Q uestion,’ W ashington P o st, Jan u ary 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘D epiction of Threat O utgrew Supporting Evidence,’ W ashington P o st, A ugust 10, 20 0 3 .

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4 4 7 ‘W eapons Inspectors: Iraqi N uke Program W as In D isarray ,’ USA Today Sep­ tem ber 9, 2 0 0 3 . 448 Statem ent by D av id K ay , pp. 6 -7 . 449 ‘Scientist: N uke Program W asn ’t R estarted,’ USA Today, July 18, 2 0 0 3 . 450 ‘Iraqi Says H ussein Planned T o Revive The N uclear Program D ism antled in 1 9 9 1 ,’ N ew York Tim es, Jun e 27, 2 0 0 3 . 451 D uelfer R eport, Vol. 2, ‘N u clear,’ p. 6. 452 Exam ples of these kinds o f critique include ‘W here Are Iraq ’s W M D s?,’ N ew sw eek, June 9, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘H unt For Iraqi A rm s Erodes A ssum ptions,’ W ash­ ington Post, April 2 2 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘US T o Step Up Its Search For Banned A rm s,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, April 20, 2 0 0 3 . 453 See, for exam ple, Kenneth K atzm an, Iraq : W eapons Program s, U N Require­ ments, an d US Policy C R S Issue Brief For C ongress (W ashington, D C : C on ­ gressional Research Service, Septem ber 2, 2 0 03 ). 454 ‘A nalysis o f Iraqi W eapons “ W ron g” ,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, M ay 31, 2 0 0 3 . 455 This argum ent, or at least the argum ent that intelligence interpretation w as severely politicized, can be found in ‘Straw , Powell had Serious D ou bts over their Iraqi W eapons C laim s,’ G u ardian, M ay 31, 2 0 0 3 . 456 ‘A Chronicle of C onfusion In The H unt For H ussein ’s W eapons,’ N ew York Tim es, July 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 . T o be fair to US forces, hunting for W M D in an area the size of France while consolidating control over a conquered country and then fighting a determined insurgency is an extraordinarily difficult task. Jam es Fallow s, ‘Blind Into B agh dad,’ The A tlantic M onthly (January/February 2004) at w w w .theatlantic.com /issues/2004/01/fallow s.htm 4 5 7 This point is well-documented in Statem ent by D av id Kay. 458 Ibrahim al-M arashi, ‘H ow Iraq C onceals And O btains Its W eapons of M ass D estruction,’ M iddle E a s t Review o f International A ffairs V ol. 7, N o . 1 (M arch 2 0 0 3 ), available at m eria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a5.htm l. 459 ‘U .S. Suspects It Received False Iraq T ip s,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, A ugust 28, 2003. 460 Charles Duelfer, form er deputy chairm an of U N S C O M , m akes this argum ent in ‘N o W eapons D oesn ’t M ean N o T h reat,’ W ashington Post, O ctober 6, 2 0 0 3 . See also D uelfer Report, Vol. 1, ‘Regime Strategic Intent - Key Find­ ings,’ p. 1. 461 ‘Blix D ow ngrades Prewar A ssessm ent of Iraqi W eapons,’ W ashington P o st, June 22, 2 0 0 3 ; Kenneth M . Pollack, ‘Spies, Lies, and W eapons: W hat Went W rong?’ The A tlantic M onthly (January/February 2 0 0 4 ) at w w w .theatlantic. com /issues/2004/01/pollack.htm ; ‘ Regim e’ s Priority W as Blueprints, N o t A rsenal, D efector T old U N ,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, April 2 6 , 2 0 0 3 . 462 D uelfer Report, Vol. 3, ‘A ddendum - Iraq’s M ilitary Industrial C apability Evolution of the M ilitary Industrialization C om m ission.’ 463 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 124. 464 Yezid Sayigh, A rab M ilitary Industry, p. 127. 465 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran an d Iraq a t W ar (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1988), p. 8. See also Pollack’s extensive and critical analysis of Iraqi m ilitary capabilities in A rabs a t War. 466 Statem ent of Senator M cC ain, C ongressional R ecord, Jan u ary 28, 1994, S346. These figures, particularly for industry, are nearly twice those used by Kenneth Tim m erm an in The D eath L o b b y . . . 4 6 7 Retired M ajo r General A m os Y aron, D irector General o f Israel’s M inistry of defense, quoted in ‘ Rebuilding Iraq’ s M ilitary,’ D efense N ew s, June 2, 2 0 0 3 . The author w as personally interviewed by reporters on this subject on at least tw o occasions in April and M ay, 2 0 0 3 .

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468 ‘US “ All W ron g” on W eapons: R eport on Iraq C ontradicts Bush A dm inistra­ tion C laim s,’ W ashington P o st, O ctober 7, 2 0 0 4 .

5 R egional pow ers, security, and arms production 1 See Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Role of the Periphery in Technological and C onceptual Innovation,’ in Emily O . Goldm an and Leslie C. Eliason (eds), The D iffusion o f M ilitary Technology a n d Ideas (Stanford, C A : Stanford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 179—2 0 1 . 2 See M ichael D . W ard, et al., ‘Econom ic Grow th, Investment, and M ilitary Spending in India, 1 9 5 0 —1 9 8 8 ,’ in Steve Chan and A lex M intz (eds), D efense, Welfare, an d G row th (N ew Y ork: Routledge, 1992), pp. 119—36. 3 The Iraqi Arm y: O rganization an d T actics, N ation al Training Center H an d ­ book 100—91 (Fort Irwin, CA: N ation al Training Center, Jan u ary 3, 1991), p. 14; G u lf War A ir Pow er Survey V olum e II: ‘O perations’ (W ashington, D C : Pentagon, 1993), pp. 33 (n. 62), 7 5 —7. 4 See M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson, ‘Arm s Production in the Third W orld: an O verview ,’ in M ichael Brzoska and T h om as O hlson (eds), Arms Production in the Third W orld (N ew Y ork: T aylor & Francis for SIPRI, 1986), Table 2.3, pp. 16—17. 5 Ian Anthony, ‘The “ Third T ier” C ountries: Production o f M ajo r W eapons,’ in H erbert W ulf (ed.), A rm s Industry Lim ited (O xford: O xford University Press, 1993), p. 377, points out that am ong the m ajor L D C producers, large calibre artillery (1 0 0 m m and up) has been one of the items m ost easily produced. 6 Guy H artcup, The Silent R evolution: D evelopm ent o f C onventional W eapons, 1 9 4 5 -1 9 8 5 (London: B rassey’s, 1993), p. 156. 7 Edw ard Luttw ak and Stuart Koehl, The D ictionary o f M odern War (N ew Y ork: H arperC ollins Publishers, 1991), p. 51. 8 M ichael T. K lare, ‘W ar in the 19 9 0 s: G row ing Firepow er in the Third W orld.’ Bulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists 46 (1990), pp. 4, 9—13 9 Anthony H . Cordesm an and A braham R. W agner, The Lesson s o f M odern War, Volume II: The Ira n -Iraq War, (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1990), p. 452. 10 M artin V an Creveld, C om m and in W ar (C am bridge, M A : H arvard University Press, 1985), pp. 184—5; M a jo r General Julian Thom pson, The L ifeb lood o f War: Logistics in A rm ed Conflict (London: B rassey’s, 1991), p. 38. 11 Stephanie G. N eum an, M ilitary A ssistance in Recent W ars: The D om inance o f the Superpow ers, (N ew Y ork: Praeger Press with CSIS-Georgetow n University, 1986), p. 69. 12 Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘Arms and Superpow er Influence: Lessons From Recent W ars,’ O rbis 30 (Winter 1987), pp. 7 1 2 —13. 13 Anthony H . C ordesm an and A braham R. W agner, L esson s o f M odern War Volume I: The A rab-Israeli Conflicts, p. 118; and Chaim H erzog, The ArabIsraeli W ars, (N ew Y ork: V intage Books, 1984), p. 344. 14 Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘Third W orld M ilitary Industries: C apabilities and C on ­ straints in Recent W ars,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an and R obert E. H arkavy (eds), The L esson s o f Recent W ars in the Third World, V ol. 2 (Lexington, M A : D. C. H eath 1987), p. 164. 15 C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War: Final R eport to Congress, Pursuant to Title V o f The Persian G ulf Conflict Supplem ental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act o f 1991 (Public Law 1 0 2 —25), (W ashington, D C : Pentagon, April 1992), F-55.

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16 Ethan B. K apstein, The Political E con om y o f N atio n al Security: A G lob al Perspective (N ew Y ork: M cG raw -H ill, 1992), p. 68. 17 C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . , F-55. The US did attem pt to surge p ro ­ duction o f other items, including air-launched sm art munitions, electronics, machine guns, tank am m unition, and m issiles. See ‘Pentagon Speeds D evelop­ ment, Production o f Arms for G ulf U se,’ W ashington P o st, D ecem ber 29, 1990; ‘M issile O utput Reaches W ar R ate,’ D efense N ew s, Septem ber 10, 1990. 18 C onduct o f the Persian G u lf War . . . , F-59. 19 Ariel Sharon, W arrior: An A utobiography with D avid C h an off (London: M a c ­ donald & C o., 1989), p. 344. 20 Richard A. Gabriel, ‘Lessons of W ar: The ID F in Lebanon ,’ in M ilitary Review 64, no. 8 (August 1984), 45. 21 W olfgang Flume, ‘O n the C heap’ , M ilitary Technology (February 1987), 98; The M iddle E a st M ilitary Balance 1 9 8 6 (Jerusalem : Jerusalem Post for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 264. 22 G W A PS Vol. I, ‘Planning R epo rt,’ pp. 7 3 -4 ; G W A PS Vol. II, ‘Effects and Effectiveness,’ p. 194. 23 See w w w .cn n .com /T R A N SC R IP T S/0310/01/ltm .18.htm l, for an interview with Eric Schmitt of the N ew York Tim es on O ctober 1, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Iraq A w ash In M ili­ tary W eapons,’ Christian Science M onitor, O ctober 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Iraq ’s C onven­ tional A rm s Supply Bigger Than US T h ought,’ L o s Angeles Tim es, O ctober 17, 2 0 0 3 ; ‘Iraqi A rm s Caches Cited in A ttacks,’ N ew York Times, O ctober 14, 2003. 24 See C onduct o f the Persian G u lf W ar . . . , F-55. 25 Christopher S. Parker, ‘N ew W eapons for O ld Problem s: Conventional Prolif­ eration and M ilitary Effectiveness in D eveloping States,’ in International Secur­ ity, 2 3 :4 (Spring 1999), 1 1 9 -4 7 . 26 R obert E. H arkavy, ‘A rm s Resupply D urin g Conflict: A Fram ew ork for A naly­ sis,’ in Christian Schm idt (ed.), The Econom ics o f M ilitary Expenditures (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1987), pp. 2 4 8 - 9 ; M ichael Brzoska and Frederic S. Pearson, A rm s an d W arfare: E scalation , D e-escalation, an d N egotiation (C olum bia, SC : University of South C arolina Press, 1994). 2 7 M a jo r General Julian Thom pson, The L ifeb lood o f War . . , p. 306. 28 g Wa PS Volum e I, ‘Planning R eport,’ pp. 7 8 -9 . 29 Ralph Sanders, A rm s Industries: N ew Suppliers a n d R egion al Security, (W ash­ ington, D C : N atio n al Defense University, 1990), p. 4 3 ; Am it G upta, ‘Third W orld M ilitary Industries: N ew Suppliers, D eadlier W eapons,’ O rbis 37 (Winter 1993), 5 7 -6 8 . 30 D avid Isby, ‘The International M arket for C om b at A ircraft,’ M ilitary Techno­ logy (Septem ber 1992), p. 12. 31 SIP R I Y earbook 1991, p. 2 2 7 . 32 Archer Jon es, The A rt o f War in the Western W orld (U rbana and C hicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 5 4 8 . 33 SIP R I Y earbook 1 9 9 3 , p. 4 5 6. 34 See Sanders, A rm s Industries . . . , pp. 6 7 -7 5 . 35 A ndrew J Pierre (ed.), C ascade o f A rm s: M an aging Conventional W eapons Proliferation (W ashington, D C : Brookings Institution Press and W orld Peace Foundation, 1997). 36 Jacqu es Ganzler, A ffording D efense (Cam bridge, M A : M IT Press, 1989), p. 2 1 5 . See also Stephen M artin (ed.), The Econom ics o f O ffsets: D efence Pro­ curement an d C ountertrade (Am sterdam : H arw ood A cadem ic Publishers, 1996). 37 D avid M ussington, A rm s U nbound: The G lobalization o f D efense Production

N otes

38 39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

265

(W ashington, D C : B rassey’s, 1994); Richard A. Bitzinger, The G lobalization o f A rm s Production: D efense M arkets in Transition (W ashington, D C : Defense Budget Project, 1993); Richard Bitzinger Tow ards a Brave N ew A rm s In du s­ try? The Decline o f the Second-Tier A rm s-Producing C ountries an d the E m erg­ ing International D ivision o f L a b o u r in the D efence Industry Adelphi Paper # 3 5 6 (O xford: O xford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ). Iraq, for exam ple, produced several types of mines, and had stocks estim ated at 10 million in 1 9 9 0 . The Iraqi Arm y: O rganization an d Tactics, p. 154. One exam ple is the Soviet PT-76 am phibious light tank, designed for com bat in the European theater. Used by Indian forces in the Bangladesh cam paign in 1971, it proved com pletely inadequate: the fast current and wide rivers in the subcontinent caused the tan k ’s engine to overheat after 30 minutes, and the tanks eventually had to be towed across the river. M ajo r General Julian T hom pson, The L ifeb lood o f War . . , p. 2 4 3 . D iscrim inate D eterrence: R eport o f The Com m ission O n Integrated L o n g ­ Term Strategy (W ashington, D C : Governm ent Printing Office, Jan u ary 1988), p. 20. Z e’ev Bonen, ‘The Technological A rm s R ace,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Secur­ ity Planning in the 1 9 8 0 s: Its Politics an d Econom ics (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984), pp. 108—27. Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Role of the Periphery in Technological and C onceptual Innovation,’ for a m ore extensive discussion of m ilitary innovation in the developing w orld. The Future Security Environm ent, R eport o f the Future Security Environment W orking G roup, subm itted to the C om m ission on Integrated Long-Term Strat­ egy (W ashington, D C : The Pentagon, O ctober 1988), p. 27. Keith K rause, A rm s a n d the State: Patterns o f M ilitary Production an d Trade (Cam bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1992), pp. 5, 2 0 7 —8. The fact that the C old W ar provided a p oor starting point for analysis o f the arm s trade is becom ing widely recognized. See S IP R I Y earbook 1988, pp. 197—8. See, am ong others, Keith K rause, A rm s an d the State . . ; Edw ard J . Laurance, The International A rm s T rade (Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, 1992); Fred­ eric S. Pearson, The G lo b al Spread o f A rm s: Political E con om y o f Inter­ national Security (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1994); ‘The A rm s Trade: Problems and Prospects in the Post-C old W ar W orld’, The A nnals o f the American A cadem y o f Political a n d Social Science 535 (Septem ber 1994), special editors R obert E. H arkavy and Stephanie G. N eum an; and Barry Buzan and Eric H erring, The A rm s D ynam ic in W orld Politics (Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner, 1998). R obert E. H arkavy, ‘The C hanging International System and the Arm s T rad e,’ in A nnals, A A PSS 5 3 5 , pp. 2 5 —8; Frederic S. Pearson, The G lo b al Spread o f A rm s, pp. 103 —8. In the period 1 9 9 0 —93 alone, the international com m unity im posed twice as m any arm s em bargoes as it had in the entire C old W ar period. Ian Anthony, ‘The “ third tier” countries: production o f m ajor w eapon s,’ p. 364 (note 8). Ilan Peleg, ‘M ilitary Production in Third W orld Countries: A Political Study,’ in Pat M cG ow an and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (eds), Threats, W eapons and Foreign Policy SA G E International Y earb ook of Foreign Policy Studies N o . 5 (Beverly H ills: SA G E, 1980), pp. 2 2 6 —7. Theodore H . M o ran , ‘The G lobalization o f A m erica’s Defense Industries: M a n ­ aging the Threat of Foreign D ependence,’ in International Security 15 (Summer 1990), 5 7 —99. ‘Ja p a n ’s Defence Industry: Slow Sep pu k u,’ The Econ om ist, June 10, 1995, 58.

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51 See the Lockheed M artin brochure for the F-35, stressing the participation of eight m ajo r partners and the im portance of international partners in reducing costs. A vailable at w w w .lm aeronautics.com /products/com bat_air/x-35/partners.html 52 Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Power, Proxim ity and Paranoia: The Evolution of K ashm ir as a N u clear Flashpoin t,’ in The K ashm ir Q uestion: R etrospect an d Prospect (London: Frank C ass, 2 0 0 3 ), pp. 1 1 7 -4 4 . 53 Eliot Cohen, ‘D istant Battles,’ in International Security 10 (Spring 1986), 160; M ichael T. K lare, ‘The State o f the Trade: G lobal A rm s T ransfer Patterns in the 1 9 8 0 s,’ in Jo u rn a l o f International A ffairs 4 0 (Summ er 1986), 1 -2 1 ; M ichael T. K lare, ‘W ar in the 19 9 0 s: G row ing Firepow er in the Third W orld,’ Bulletin o f the A tom ic Scientists 4 6 :4 (1990), 9 -1 3 . 54 Richard A. Sam uels, ‘Rich N ation, Strong A rm y’: N atio n al Security an d the T echnological Transform ation o f Ja p a n (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University Press, 1994). 55 H elena Tuom i and R aim o Varynen, T ransnational C orporations, Arm am ents, a n d D evelopm ent (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s, 1982), p. 5 3 ; M ichael A. M orris, E xp an sio n o f Third W orld N avies (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1987), p. 59; Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification and Third W orld m ilitary industries’, International O rganization 38 (Winter 1984), 1 9 7 (n. 79). 56 Relevant industries include the follow ing United N ation s International Standard Industrial C lassifications, p. 371 (iron and steel); p. 372 (nonferrous metal); p. 381 (metal products); p. 382 (m achinery (non-electrical)); p. 383 (electrical machinery); and p. 384 (transportation). See H erbert Wulf, ‘D eveloping C oun tries,’ in N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Structure o f the D efense Industry (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1983), pp. 3 2 3 -5 . 5 7 Stephanie G. N eum an, ‘International stratification . . ’, pp. 1 8 1 -7 . 58 A rgum ents that sm all states suffer from technological change are found in D avid V ital, Weak States in the International System (O xford: Clarendon Press, 1967), especially C hapter 4; and R obert L. Rothstein, Alliances an d Sm all Pow ers (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1968), p. 2 0 . Others argue that changes in technology offer the potential for w eak states to redress existing im balances. M artin W ight, Pow er Politics, H edley Bull and Carsten H olb raad (eds) (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1978), p. 256. 59 Eliot A. Cohen, ‘A Revolution in W arfare?,’ Foreign A ffairs 75, N o . 2 (M arch/April 1996), 3 7 -5 4 . 60 A dm iral W illiam O w ens (with Ed Offley), L iftin g the F o g o f War (N ew York: Farrar, Strauss and G iroux, 2000). 61 M ichael G. V ickers, ‘Revolution Deferred: K osovo and the T ransform ation of W ar,’ in War O ver K oso vo, p. 196. 62 ‘ Banned Falun G ong M ovem ent Jam m ed Chinese Satellite Signal,’ W ashington Post, July 9, 2 0 0 2 . The operation forced the Chinese governm ent to cancel a live b road cast of a speech by President Jian g Zem in, and transm itted Falun G an g video feed for brief periods of time. 63 Colin S. G ray, E xp loration s in Strategy (W estport, C T : Praeger, 1996), p. 102. 64 W . Seth C arus, ‘M ilitary Technology and the Arm s Trade: Changes and Their Im pact,’ A nnals A A PSS 5 3 5 , pp. 1 6 3 -7 4 . 65 Em phasis on applied settings probably has m ore relevance for military applica­ tions. Jam es Everett K atz, ‘Factors Affecting M ilitary Scientific Research in the Third W orld,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld M ilitary In dustrialization: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth (Lexington, M A : Lexing­ ton, 1986), p. 2 9 7 . See also Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Elusive T ransform ation:

N otes

66

67 68 69

70 71 72

73

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Science, Technology, an d the Evolution o f International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Erich W eede, ‘M ilitary Participation, Econom ic Grow th, and Income Inequal­ ity: a C ross-national Study,’ in Steve Chan and A lex M intz (eds), Defense, Welfare, an d G row th, pp. 2 1 1 —30. G erard C haliand (ed.), The A rt o f War in W orld H istory (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of C alifornia Press, 1994), p. 45. Y igal Allon, The M aking o f Israel’s A rm y (N ew Y ork: Universe Books, 1970), pp. 5 1 —2; Eliot Cohen, ‘D istant Battles,’ pp. 1 5 0 —4. The N atio n al Security Strategy o f the United States o f A m erica (W ashington, D C : The White H ouse, Septem ber 2 0 0 2 ). The problem s o f utilizing conven­ tional m ilitary forces in a global w ar on terrorism are discussed in Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘M ilitary Force and the W ar On T errorism ,’ Audrey Kurth Cronin and Jam es M . Ludes (eds), A ttacking Terrorism : Elem ents o f a G ran d Strategy, (W ashington, D C : Georgetow n University Press, 2 0 0 3 ), p p .1 6 2 —85. GW A PS V olum e II: ‘Effects and Effectiveness,’ p. 10. Tim othy D . H oyt, ‘Iraq’ s M ilitary Industry: A C ritical Strategic T arget,’ N atio n al Security Studies Q uarterly IV, N o . 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 33—50. M ichael D avid W allace, War a n d Rank A m ong N ation s (Lexington, M A : D .C . H eath, 1973), pp. 24, 72; R obert Gilpin, W ar an d Change in International Politics (Cam bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1981), pp. 30—4. According to a 1969 U N report, the costs o f producing m ass casualties in a square kilom eter w as $1 for biological w eapons, $ 6 0 0 for nerve agents, $800 for nuclear w eapons, and approxim ately $ 2 ,0 0 0 for conventional weaponry. Cited in Richard D anzig, ‘ Biological W arfare: A N ation at Risk —Time to A ct,’ N atio n al D efense University Strategic Forum 58 (January 1996), p. 1. M artin W ight, Pow er Politics, pp. 5 4 , 65.

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K oith ara, Verghese; Society, State & Security: The Indian Experience (N ew Delhi: SA G E, 1999) K ux, Dennis, India an d the United States: E stran ged D em ocracies. W ashington, D C : N ation al Defense University Press, 1991. K ux, Dennis; D isenchanted A llies: The United States an d Pakistan 1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 0 (Baltimore, M D : The Joh n s H opkin s University Press, 2 0 0 1 ). M acD on ald, Juli, In d o -U S M ilitary R elationship: E xpectation s a n d Perceptions (W ashington, D C : Office of the Secretary o f D efense, Office of N et Assessm ent, O ctober 2 002). M atthew s, Ron, D efence Production in India (N ew Delhi: A BC Press, 1989). M axw ell, Neville, In d ia’s China War (London: Jon ath an C ape, 1970). M cC arth y, Tim othy V., ‘India: Em erging M issile Pow er,’ in W illiam C. Potter and H arlan W . Jen cks (eds), The International M issile B azaar: The N ew Suppliers’ N etw ork (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1994), pp. 2 0 1 —33. M ohan, C . R aja, C rossin g the R ubicon: The Shaping o f In d ia’s N ew Foreign Policy (N ew Y ork: Viking, 2 0 0 3 ). Ollapolly, D eepa M ., ‘M ixed M otives in India’s Search for N u clear S tatu s,’ A sian Survey X L I, N o . 6 (N ovem ber/D ecem ber 2 0 0 1 ), pp. 9 2 5 —42. Panikkar, K. M ., Problem s o f Indian D efence (N ew Y ork: A sia H ouse, 1960). Perkovich, George, In d ia’s N uclear Bom b (Berkeley: University of C alifornia Press, 1999). R agh avan, V. R., ‘Limited W ar and N u clear Escalation in South A sia,’ The N o n ­ proliferation Review (Fall—W inter 2 0 0 1 ), 1—17. Sidhu, W aheguru Pal Singh, ‘India’ s N uclear Use D octrine,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: H ow N ew Pow ers Will Use N uclear, Biological, an d Chem ical W eapons (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 125—57. Singh, Jasw an t, D efending India (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s, 1999). Singh, Ravinder Pal, ‘India,’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking - Volume I: China, India, Israel, Ja p a n , South K orea an d Thai­ land (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1998), pp. 4 8 —90. Sisson, Richard and Leo B. Rose, War an d Secession: Pakistan, India, a n d the C re­ ation o f Bangladesh (Berkeley, CA: University of C alifornia, 1990). Smith, Chris, In d ia’s A d H oc A rsenal: D irection or D rift in D efence Policy (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1994). Subrahm anyam , K ., N uclear M yths an d Realities: In d ia’s D ilem m a (N ew Delhi: A BC Publishing H ouse, 1981). Subrahm anyam , K ., ‘Evolution of Defense Planning in India,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : D C H eath & C o., 1984), pp. 2 6 5 —74. Tanham , George K ., Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive E ssa y (R -4207USDP. Santa M onica, CA: R A N D C orporation, 1992). Tanham , George K. and M arcy A gm on, The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D C orporation, 1995). Tellis, Ashley J., In d ia’s E m erging N u clear Posture: Between R ecessed Deterrent an d R eady A rsenal (Santa M onica, C A : R A N D , 2 0 0 1 ). Tellis, Ashley J. C ., Christina Fair, and Jam ison Jo M edby, Conflict Under the N uclear U m brella: Indian an d Pakistani L esson s from the K argil Crisis M R -1450-U SC A (Santa M onica: R A N D , 2 0 01 ).

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Israel Allon, Y igal, The M aking o f Israel’s A rm y (N ew Y ork: Universe Books, 1970). Allon, Y igal, Shield o f D avid: The Story o f Israel’s A rm ed Forces (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1970). Barnett, M ichael, C onfronting the C osts o f War: M ilitary Power, State, an d Society in E gy pt an d Israel (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1992). Ben Gurion, D avid, Israel: A Personal H istory (N ew Y ork: Funk & W agnall, 1971). Ben-Horin, Y oav and Barry Posen, Israel’s Strategic D octrine, R A N D R -2845-N A (Santa M onica, CA: The R A N D C orporation, Septem ber 1981). Ben-Meir, Yehuda, N atio n al Security D ecisionm aking: The Israeli C ase (Jerusalem , The Jerusalem Post, 1986). Blumenthal, N aftali, ‘The Influence of Defense Industry Investment on Israel’s Econom y,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 1 9 8 0 s: Its Politics a n d E con om ics (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984), pp. 1 6 6 -7 7 . C arus, W . Seth, ‘Israel: Som e Econom ic and Social C onsideration s,’ in Jam es Everett K atz (ed.), The Im plications o f Third W orld M ilitary Industrialization: Sow ing the Serpents’ Teeth (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath and C o., 1986), pp. 1 3 6 -5 0 . Cohen, Avner, Israel an d the Bom b (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 1998). Cohen, Avner, ‘N uclear A rm s in C risis under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons o f the 1 9 6 7 and 1973 W ars,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: H o w N ew Pow ers Will Use N uclear, B iologi­ cal, an d Chem ical W eapons (N ew Y ork: C olum bia University Press, 2 0 0 0 ), pp. 1 0 4 -2 4 . Cohen, Avner, ‘Israel and C hem ical/Biological W eapons: H istory, Deterrence, and A rm s C on tro l,’ The N on proliferation Review (Fall-W inter 2 0 0 1 ), 2 7 - 5 3 , at cn s.m iis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/83/83cohen.pdf G old, D ore, Israel a s an Am erican N o n -N A T O Ally: Param eters o f DefenseIndustrial C ooperation (Jerusalem : The Jerusalem Post Press, 1992). G oodm an, H irsh and W. Seth C arus, The Future Battlefield an d the A rab -Israeli Conflict (N ew Brunswick, N J: Transaction Publishers, 1990). H andel, M ichael I., ‘The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Q uest for A bsolute Security,’ in W illiam son M urray, M acG regor K nox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds), The M aking o f Strategy: Rulers, States, an d War (C am bridge: C am bridge University Press, 1994), pp. 5 3 4 -7 8 . H ark abi, Y., A rab A ttitudes To Israel (N ew Y ork: H art, 1971).

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H arkavy, R obert E. and Stephanie N eum an, ‘Israel,’ in Jam es E. K atz (ed.), Arms Production in the Third W orld (Lexington, M A : Lexington Books, 1984), pp. 1 9 3 -2 2 3 . H ersh, Seym our M ., The Sam son O ption (N ew Y ork: R an dom H ouse, 1991). H erzog, Chaim , The A rab -Israeli W ars (N ew Y ork: V intage Books, 1984). H oyt, Tim othy D ., ‘Israel’s M ilitary Industry - The Other Side of G lobalization ,’ Defense Industry G lobalization : A Com pendium o f Papers Presented a t a C on­ ference on ‘D efense Industry G lob alization ’ H eld on 16 N ovem ber 2001 (W ash­ ington, D C : The Atlantic Council, February 2 0 0 2 ). Inbar, Efraim , ‘The D evelopm ent of the Israeli Defense Industry,’ Encyclopedia Ju d a ic a Yearbook 1988/9, pp. 1 1 9 -2 5 . Inbar, Efraim and Shmuel Sandler, ‘Israel’s Deterrence Strategy Revisited,’ Security Studies 3 (Winter 1993/94), 3 3 0 -5 8 . K liem an, A haron, Israel’s G lo b al Reach (N ew Y ork: B rassey’s, 1985). K liem an, A haron and Reuven Pedatzur, R earm ing Israel: D efense Procurem ent Through the 19 9 0 s (Jerusalem : The Jerusalem Post for the Jaffee Center for S tra­ tegic Studies, 1991). Lanir, Zvi (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 1 9 8 0 s: Its Politics an d Econom ics (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984). Lanir, Z vi, ‘The Q ualitative Factor in the Israeli-Arab Arms Race of the Late 1 9 8 0 s,’ ID F Jo u rn a l (Fall 1985), 2 7 -3 8 . Levite, Ariel, Offense an d D efense in Israeli M ilitary D octrine (Boulder, C O : W est­ view Press, 1988). Luttw ak, Edw ard, ‘Defense Planning in Israel: A Brief R etrospective,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1984), pp. 1 3 1 -4 4 . Luttw ak, Edw ard and D an H orow itz, The Israeli Arm y (N ew Y ork: H arper & Row , 1975). M ichaely, M ichael, ‘Israel’ s Dependence on C ap ital Im ports,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 3 (Spring 1977), 4 2 -9 . M intz, A lex; ‘The M ilitary-Industrial C om plex: American Concepts and Israeli R ealities,’ Jo u rn a l o f Conflict Resolution 29 (Decem ber 1985), 6 2 3 -3 9 . M intz, A lex, ‘A rm s Production in Israel,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 13 (Spring 1987), 8 9 -9 9 . M intz, A lex and G erald Steinberg, ‘C oping with Supplier C ontrol: The Israeli Experience,’ in Kwang-Il Baek, R onald D . M cLaurin and Chung-in M oon (eds), The D ilem m a o f Third W orld D efense Industries: Supplier C ontrol or Recipient A utonom y (Boulder, C O : W estview Press 1989), pp. 1 3 7 -5 1 . M intz, A lex and M ichael D . W ard, ‘The Political Econom y of M ilitary Spending in Israel’, Am erican Political Science Review 83 (June 1989), 5 2 1 -3 3 . N e ’em an, Y uval, ‘Conceiving a Balanced Budget for a Budding N atio n ,’ in Zvi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 198 0 s (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984) pp. 3 -1 3 . Peres, Shim on, D a v id ’s Sling (N ew Y ork: R andom H ouse, 1970). Peres, Shim on, The N ew M iddle E a st (N ew Y ork: Henry H olt and Com pany, 1993). Peres, Shim on, Battling fo r Peace (N ew Y ork: R andom H ouse, 1995). Rabin, Yitzhak, The Rabin M em oirs (Boston: Little, Brown & C o., 1979). Reiser, Stew art, The Israeli A rm s Industry (N ew Y ork: H olm es & M eier, 1989).

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Safran, N ad av , Israel: The Em b attled Ally (C am bridge, M A : Belknap, 1981). Schiff, Z e ’ev and Ehud Y a ’ ari, Israel’s Lebanon War edited and translated by Ina Friedm an (N ew Y ork: Sim on and Schuster, 1984). Schiff, Z e ’ev, A H istory o f the Israeli Arm y: 1 8 7 4 to the Present (N ew Y ork: M acm illan, 1985). Sheffer, Eliezer, ‘The Econom ic Burden of the A rm s R ace Between the C onfronta­ tion States and Israel,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Planning in the 198 0s: Its Politics a n d Econ om ics (N ew Y ork: Praeger Publishing, 1984), pp. 1 4 2 —65. Steinberg, Gerald, ‘Israel,’ in N icole Ball and M ilton Leitenberg (eds), The Struc­ ture o f the D efence Industry: A C om parative Study (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’s Press, 1983), pp. 2 7 8 —309. Steinberg, G. M ., ‘Israel: H igh Technology R oulette,’ in M ichael Brzoska and T h om as Ohlson (eds), A rm s Production in the Third W orld (London and Philadelphia:Taylor and Francis, 1986) pp. 163—92. Steinberg, Gerald M ., ‘Israel: C ase Study for International M issile T rade and N o n ­ Proliferation,’ in W illiam C. Potter and H arlan W. Jen cks (eds), The Inter­ nation al M issile B azaar: The N ew Suppliers’ N etw ork (Boulder, C O : W estview, 1994), pp. 2 3 5 —53. Steinberg, G erald, ‘Israel,’ in Ravinder Pal Singh (ed.), A rm s Procurem ent D ecision M aking Volume I: China, India, Israel, Ja p a n , South K orea an d Thailand (O xford: O xford University Press for SIPRI, 1998). T al, M aj. Gen. Israel, ‘Israel’s D octrine of N atio n al Security: Background and D ynam ics,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 3 (Summ er 1977), 4 4 —57. V an Creveld, M artin, ‘The M aking o f Israel’ s Security,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in L ess Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath & C o., 1984), pp. 115—30. V an Creveld, M artin, The Sw ord a n d the O live: A Critical H istory o f the Israeli D efense Force (N ew Y ork: PublicAffairs, 1998). W ald, Em m anuel, The W ald R eport: The D ecline o f Israeli N atio n al Security Since 1 9 6 7 (Boulder: W estview, 1992). Yariv, A haron, ‘Strategic D epth,’ Jeru salem Q uarterly 6 (Fall 1980), 3—12. Z usm an , Pinhas, ‘The D ynam ics of Grow th, Technological Progress, and Force Build-ups — Som e Strategic T rad eo ffs,’ in Z vi Lanir (ed.), Israeli Security Plan­ ning in the 19 8 0 s: Its Politics an d Econ om ics (N ew Y ork: Praeger, 1984), pp. 2 3 9 —60.

Iraq Al-Khalil, Sam ir, Republic o f Fear (N ew Y ork: Pantheon Books, 1989). Baram , A m atzia, Building T ow ard C risis: Saddam H u say n ’s Strategy for Survival (W ashington, D C : W ashington Institute for N ear E ast Peace, 1998). Bhatia Shyam and Daniel M cG rory, Brighter Than The B agh d ad Sun: Saddam H u ssein ’s N u clear Threat to the United States (W ashington, D C : Regnery Pub­ lishing, 2000). Butler, R ichard, The G reatest Threat: Iraq, W eapons o f M ass D estruction, a n d the Crisis o f G lo b al Security (N ew Y ork: PublicAffairs, 2000). C arus, W. Seth, ‘Defense Planning in Iraq ,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in L ess Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : D . C. H eath & Co., 1984), pp. 2 9 —52.

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Com prehensive R eport o f the Special A dvisor to the D C I on Ir a q ’s W M D (W ash­ ington, D C : Central Intelligence Agency, Septem ber 30, 2004) at w w w .cia.gov/ cia/reports/iraq_w m d_2004/ Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp, Iran an d Iraq a t War (Boulder: W estview, 1988). Devlin, John , ‘Iraq ,’ in Edw ard Kolodziej and R obert E. H arkavy (eds), Security Policies o f D eveloping C ountries (Lexington, M A : Lexington, 1982), pp. 2 2 7 -4 5 . Eisenstadt, M ichael, ‘ Like a Phoenix From The Ashes: The Future o f Iraqi M ilitary Pow er,’ Policy Papers 3 6 (W ashington, D C : The W ashington Institute for N ear East Policy, 1994). El Azhary, M . S. (ed.), The Iran -Iraq War: H istorical, E con om ic an d Political A nalysis (N ew Y ork: St. M artin ’ s Press, 1984). Farouk-Sluglett, M arion and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1 9 5 8 : From Revolution to D ictatorship (London and N ew Y ork: I. B. Tauris & C o. Ltd., 1990). Freedm an, Law rence and Efraim K arsh, The G u lf Conflict, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 1 : D iplom acy an d War in the N ew W orld O rder (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1993). G ordon, M ichael R. and General Bernard E. T rainor, The G enerals’ War: The Inside Story o f the Conflict in the G u lf (Boston and N ew Y ork: Little, Brown & C o., 1995). H am za, Khidhir (with Je ff Stein), S a d d a m ’s Bom bm aker: The Terrifying Inside Story o f the Iraqi N uclear a n d B iological W eapons A genda (N ew Y ork: Scrib­ ner, 2 000). H elm s, Christine M o ss, Iraq : Eastern Flank o f the A rab W orld (W ashington, D C : The Brookings Institution, 1984). H enderson, Sim on, Instant Em pire: Saddam H u ssein ’s A m bition fo r Iraq (San Francisco, CA: M ercury H ouse, Inc., 1991). Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction: The A ssessm ent o f the British Governm ent (September 200 2 ). Ir a q ’s W eapons o f M ass D estruction Program s (Central Intelligence Agency, O ctober 2 002). K arsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi, Saddam H ussein: A Political Biography (New Y ork: The Free Press. K hadduri, M ajid , ‘The Role of the M ilitary in Iraqi Society,’ in Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), The M ilitary in the M iddle E a s t (C olum bus, O H : O hio State Univer­ sity Press, 1963), pp. 4 1 -5 2 . M arr, Phebe, The M odern H istory o f Iraq (Boulder, C O : W estview Press, 1985). M cC arth y, Tim othy V . and Jon ath an B. Tucker, ‘S ad d am ’s T o x ic Arsenal: C hem ­ ical and Biological W eapons in the G u lf W ars,’ in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D . Sagan, and Jam es J . W irtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: H o w N ew Powers Will Use N uclear, Biological, an d C hem ical W eapons (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell U ni­ versity Press, 2 0 0 0 ). M urray, W illiam son and M a jo r General R obert H . Scales, The Iraq War: A M ili­ tary H istory (Cam bridge, M A : Belknap Press, 2003). Pollack, Kenneth M ., A rabs a t War: M ilitary Effectiveness, 1 9 4 8 -1 9 9 1 (Lincoln, N E : Council on Foreign Relations and University o f N eb rask a Press, 2 0 0 2). Pollack, Kenneth M ., The Threatening Storm : The C ase fo r Invading Iraq (New Y ork: Council on Foreign Relations and R andom H ouse, 2 0 0 2 ).

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Ritter, Scott, E n dgam e: Solving the Iraq Problem - O nce an d For A ll (N ew Y ork: Sim on & Schuster, 1999). Staudenm eier, W illiam O ., ‘Defense Planning in Iraq: An Alternative Perspective,’ in Stephanie G. N eum an (ed.), D efense Planning in L ess Industrialized States (Lexington, M A : D . C . H eath & C o., 1984), pp. 5 3 —66. The Iraqi Arm y: O rganization a n d Tactics, N ation al Training Center H an d b ook 100—91 (Fort Irwin, CA: N ation al Training Center, Jan u ary 3, 1991). Tim m erm an, Kenneth R., The D eath L o b b y: H ow the West A rm ed Iraq (Boston, N ew Y ork, and London: H oughton & M ifflin C om pany, 1991). Trevan, Tim , Sad d am ’s Secrets: The H unt for Ir a q ’s H idden W eapons (London: H arperC ollins, 1999).

Index

A babil rockets 134, 151 Adnan aircraft 137 Advanced Light Helicopters (ALHs) 52—3 advanced trainer aircraft 5 2 , 60, 128, 138 A dvani, L. K. 57 A erospace Surveillance and W arning C ontrol A ircraft (ASW AC) 52 A erospace Technology Center (CTA, Brazil) 147 A fghanistan 39—40 Agni ballistic m issiles 4 7 —8 air-to-air m issiles 134 airborne self-protection systems 72 aircraft carriers 54 aircraft m odification 73, 1 3 6 —7 Ajeet fighters 5 0 —1 A kash program 47 A l-A bbas m issiles 145—6 Al-Abid satellite launch vehicles 146 Al-Arabi trading netw ork 140 A l-Fatah SR B M program 151 A l-Faw 130 A l-H ijarah m issiles 146 A l-H usayn m issiles 144—5 A l-Sam oud m issiles 151 analytical fram ew orks of L D C arm s industries see fram ew orks of L D C s arm s industries anti-ballistic m issiles 135 A rab arm s industry 126 A rab Industrialization O rganization 126 A rab states: isolation of Israel 67, 68, 83; role of Iraq in unifying 119, 121, 122, 123; technology transference from the U SA 97; use of new technologies 87, 108; wealth 88; see also individual countries A rabistan (Khuzestan) 120

A rava transport 79 Arjun tanks 4 5 —6 Armed Forces W orkshops (Iraq) 123 arm ored vehicles 5 1 , 81 A rm s C ontrol and D isarm am ent Agency (USA) 21 arm s em bargoes see em bargoes arm s transfer limits 4 A rrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic M issiles 99 Artillery Saturation R ocket Systems (A STR O S) 134 A runachalam , Dr. V. S. 64 ‘A ssad Babil’ tanks 137 A utom atic Test Equipm ent (ATE) 73 B a’athist Conference (1968) 122 B a’athist regime see Iraqi regime B adr-2000 project 1 4 7 —8 Baghdad 118, 119 Baghdad 1 aircraft 136—7 Baghdad arm s exhibition (1989) 137, 138, 148 balance of threat theory 4 —5 balancing pow er 4 ballistic m issiles: Agni series 4 7 —8; im portance 178; in Iraq 131, 144—8; in Israel 82, 104 Bangladesh 23 B arak Close-in W eapons System (CIWS) 102 battlefield rockets 151 Bedek 78, 80 Beirut 94 Ben Gurion, D . 74, 75, 112, 166, 168 Bhabha, H . 38, 164 biological w eapons: Iraq ’s covert acquisition 124, 1 5 3 —5; in Israel 91; potential of the Superguns 133—4; range 154

2 84

Index

Blainey, G. 5 body arm our 100 Bonen, Z . 178 Brasstacks exercises (1 9 8 6 -8 7 ) 4 1 , 57 Brazil 147 Bull, D r. G. 133 C airo Exhibition (1984) 128 C airo Exhibition (1987) 132 carbon fiber technology 140 C ariap pa, A. C. 36 cause/effect approach to L D C s arms industries 15 chemical w eapons: as a deterrent 139; foreign supplies 152; in the G u lf W ar 152; in India 56 ; Iraqi concealment 153; Iraqi threat to Israel 122, 123; Iraq ’s covert acquisition 124, 126, 139; in Israel 91, 105; potential of the Superguns 1 3 2 -3 ; relevance to Iraq ’s future 1 6 1 -2 ; use against Iran 1 5 1 -2 ; use against Kurdish rebels 1 1 8 -1 9 Chieftain tanks 88 China: and India 4 1 ; and Israel 110; niche production 179; nuclear tests 38; and Pakistan 34 Chubin, S. 160 com m ercialization of arm s trade 177, 180 com m unication systems 72, 94, 100 C ondor project 1 4 5 -7 cruise m issiles 104, 1 4 8 -9 C zechoslovakia 77 D ata T ransfer Equipm ent (DTE) 73 Defence Production Board (India, 1955) 29 Defense M inistry (Israel) 76 Defense Public Sector U ndertakings (DPSUs, India) 2 6 - 7 Defense Research and Developm ent O rganization (D R D O , India) 26, 2 7 -8 , 48, 49 defense spending 2 1 , 42, 62, 64, 70, 83, 159; see also individual countries D elhi-class (type 15) destroyers 55 dependence 8 -9 , 15, 18 deterrence: acquisition of chemical w eapons 139; im portance of possession of arm s 15; persuasive 41, 1 8 4 -5 , 186; role of Iraq 160, 170; use by India 25; use by Israel 108; use by Pakistan 40; use of m issiles 91

developing w orld: emergence into international arm s trade 2 - 7 , 6; place in hierarchy of global pow er 3; structural considerations 2-3 D im ona reactor 82, 104 diplom acy 57 dom inance/w orld approach to L D C s arm s industries 1 1 -1 2 D raft N uclear D octrine (D N D , 1999) 59 D vora craft 101 econom ic/developm ent approach to LD C s arm s industries 10-11 econom ies o f scale 18, 175 education 123, 183 EE-T4 O gum arm ored gun system 127 Egypt: attack on Israel 86 -7 ; relationship with Israel 77, 82, 107; rivalry with Iraq 122 Ekeus, D r. R. 149 El Baradei, M . 157 E l-O p (Electro-O ptics) 72, 73 E lb it 7 2 -3 electronics: im portance in the international system 181; in India 50; intelligence systems 71; in Israel 68, 7 1 -2 , 73, 7 5 -6 , 8 3 -4 , 90; subsystem s 181 E lisra 72 em bargoes 4, 107, 1 2 5 -6 , 127; French 85; on India/Pakistan 34; on Iraq 124, 127, 168; significance for Iraq 143; Soviet 1 2 4 -5 Emet 78 em ploym ent 10, 71, 83 endurance requirements: in India 33, 37, 4 8 - 9 ; in Iraq 1 2 7 -8 , 1 3 2 -3 ; in Israel 8 0 -2 , 90, 9 9 -1 0 0 ; overview 1 9 -2 0 export licensing agencies 1 3 9 -4 0 export-oriented m odel 11, 18, 1 0 5 -6 , 168 exports 11; com m ercial 108; from Israel 73, 89, 92, 93, 101, 103, 113; influence of U SA 99; of m ajor w eapons platform s 105; o f missile attack craft 101; of Rem otely Piloted Vehicles 102; repercussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 109; role in the international arm s m arket 93, 109; to India 102 false-end users 124

Index Faw cruise missile program m e 148 Fernandes, G . 59 fighter aircraft: in India 29, 3 1 -3 , 36, 4 3 -4 , 5 0 - 1 , 61; in Israel 68, 89, 95, 98, 113, 177 fire control systems 73, 100, 103 firepower 172 force multipliers 5, 18, 183 foreign com ponents 36 foreign exchange 26 Foreign M ilitary Sales (FM S, USA) 97 fram ew orks o f L D C s arm s industries 7 -1 6 ; broad surveys 8; cause/effect approach 15; dom inance/world approach 1 1 -1 2 ; econom ic/developm ent approach 1 0 -1 1 ; im plications for study 16; the m issing variable 1 5 -1 6 ; m oralist position 7; structuralist/dependency approach 8 -1 0 ; study o f individual states 8; system ic/historical approach 1 2 -1 4 ; volum es/m ultiple case studies 8 France: arm s supply to Iraq 1 2 5 -6 ; and India 51; and Israel 78, 81, 85; technology 89 The Future Security Environm ent (W ashington, 1988) 179 future w arfare 18 2 -3 Gabriel system 101 G andhi, R. 47 G ates, R . 142 Germ any 53 Glide path 65 globalization 7, 163 G n at fighter aircraft 3 1 -2 , 50 G o d avari class frigates 55 G reat Britain see United K ingdom guidance systems 78 G ulf W ar (1 9 9 0 -9 1 ): air cam paign 142; effect on Iraqi arm s industry 1 3 8 -9 , 1 4 1 -2 ; effect on Iraq ’s nuclear am bitions 1 5 5 -6 , 156; origins 122; presence o f chemical w eapons 152; significance for Israel 108; survival of Iraqi military industry 1 4 2 -3 H agan ah 74, 75 H andel, M . 4 H ashim , A. 123 helicopters 37, 5 2 -3 H F-24 M arut see M arut hierarchy of pow er 3, 180

285

hierarchy of production 13 high-technology 1 1 -1 2 , 18; in Indian DPSUs 2 7 ; in Iraq 126, 131; value to Israel 108 H im alayan W ar (1962) 31 H industan A eronautics Ltd (H AL) 27, 29; developm ent of a Light C om bat Aircraft 4 4 ; developm ent o f stealth aircraft 60; indigenous trainers 33; licensed productions 31; production of the Ajeet 5 0 -1 historical/system ic approach to L D C s arm s industries 1 2 -1 4 hitkonenut (preparation) 86, 111, 166, 168 hum an capital 183 H ussein, Kam il see al M ajid , H ussein Kam il H asan H ussein, Sadd am 117, 1 2 2 -3 im port-substitution m odel 9, 10, 11, 18; in India 2 3 - 4 , 165; in Iraq 1 6 9 -7 0 ; in Israel 76, 89, 168 India: background 2 2 - 4 ; Brasstacks exercises 41; and China 2 5 , 2 8 , 31, 41; defense problem s 64, 65, 66; econom ic developm ent 17, 18; foreign policy 2 2 , 33; im pact of em bargoes 34; and Israel 61, 66; and Pakistan 2 4 - 5 , 2 8 -9 , 34, 35, 3 9 -4 0 , 62; political leaders 2 5 - 6 , 38; and R ussia 4 2 , 65, 66; security perception 24; significance of K ashm ir 2 5 , 34, 40, 4 1 ; and the U SA 4 2 , 56, 65 Indian Air Force: defense spending 59; expansion 61; lack of an advanced trainer 5 2 , 60; logistical problem s 31 Indian army: defense spending 59; growth 40; internal security duties 40; m ountain divisions 49; recruitm ent/reorganization 33; role in the nuclear debate 57; status 30, 39 Indian navy: defense spending 30, 59; expansion 5 4 -6 ; increased budget 39; logistical problem s 31; naval construction 60; nuclear role 59; use of technology 60 Indian Parliam ent 5 7 , 59 Indian Sm all Arms System (INSAS) 4 8 -9 Indian Space Research O rganization (ISRO) 38 Indian Unm anned Aerial Vehicles 60

2 86

Index

India’s defense spending: 1 9 4 8 —6 7 3 0 ; 1 9 6 3 —73 3 4 ; 19 7 2 —82 3 9 ; 1 9 8 1 —91 43; airforce 59; army 30, 33, 59; conclusions 62; econom ic reform s 42; funding issues 64; im portance of short cam paigns 4 0 ; m odernization projects 41—2, 64; navy 30, 39, 59; research and development budget 42, 59, 64; space/nuclear activities 59 India’s endurance requirements: conclusions 62; im portance of supplies 40; Indian Sm all Arms System (INSAS) 4 8 —9; Indigenous Guided M issiles Developm ent Program 42, 46 —8; logistics problem s 31, 33; quality control 4 9 , 60, 63; role o f the O rdnance Factories 37, 49, 60; spare p arts diplom acy 6 4 —5 India’s indigenous arm s program 4 2 —3; aerospace projects 2 9 ; Arjun 4 5 —6; G n at fighter aircraft 29, 31—2, 5 0 —1; licensed production 35—6, 62; Light C om bat A ircraft (LCA) 4 4 —5, 64; M aru t fighter aircraft 32—3; M iG fighter aircraft 2 9 , 36, 4 3 —4, 61; m odification projects 5 0 —1; T -72 tanks 45; V ijayanta tanks 35—6, 50 India’s m ajo r w eapons projects: aircraft industry 44, 51—2, 5 2 —3, 54; arm ored vehicles 5 1 ; indigenous trainers 33, 60; labor costs 37; local share of value 63; research and developm ent budget 42; shipbuilding 53, 54—6, 60; stealth aircraft 60; subm arines 5 3 —4, 60; see also India’ s nuclear w eapons India’s m ilitary industrial policy: defense/private sector involvement 63—4, 65; expansion of military role 40; foreign exchange 2 6 ; as a grow ing pow er 2 2 , 2 4 , 61, 62; im port-substitution m odel 2 3 —4; im portance of self-reliance 25, 61; lack o f national security policy 64; and the ladder of production 63; m ism anagem ent 30—1; m odernization program 4 1 —2, 64, 65; regional concerns 39, 56; role of politicians 2 5 —6; role of technology 2 5 , 2 9 , 34, 42, 65; w eapons acquisition policy 5 India’s non-platform w eapons: am m unition m anufacture 49;

electronic systems 5 0 ; guided m issiles 4 9 —50; region com patible w eapons 4 9 ; role of the O rdnance Factories 37 India’s nuclear w eapons: D raft N uclear D octrine (D N D ) 5 9 ; justification for m aintaining 5 8 ; nuclear capabilities 61; nuclear subm arines 54; nuclear tests 5 6 , 5 7 ; role of K argil W ar 5 8 —9; role o f military leadership 57; significance of K ashm ir 41, 56 , 57; significance of terrorist attacks 59 India’s strategic system s: biological w eapons 5 6 ; chemical w eapons 56; Indigenous G uided M issiles D evelopm ent Program (IGM DP) 56; nuclear program s 38; satellites 56; space program s 38, 61; see also India’ s nuclear w eapons India’s structure of defense industries 2 6 —7, 2 8 —9, 33—4 Indigenous G uided M issile D evelopm ent Program (IGM DP) 4 6 —8, 56 , 65 Indira D octrine 40 Indo-Pakistani W ar (1971) 35 industrial technology 140 inertial guidance systems 78 Instant Thunder 141—2 Integrated Air Defense System (IADS, Iraq) 137 intelligence: accuracy pre-O peration Iraqi Freedom 144, 150; British 150, 153, 154; future recom m endations 185 international arm s trade 6—7; decline 7; effect on Israel 109; and the impact of globalization 7; introduction of the developing w orld 6; role of regional pow ers 179—86; role of the superpow ers 6 international sanctions 4 intifada 1 0 7 —8 Iran: cooperation with Israel 104; invasion by Iraq 127; policy tow ards Iraq 1 1 9 —20; role in shaping Iraqi strategic priorities 1 2 0 —1 Iran—Iraq W ar (1 9 8 0 —88): conclusions 169; econom ic effect on Iraq 139; Iraqi dependence on G ulf states 121; relevance to developm ent of arms trade for L D C s 7; as a source of problem s for Iraq 129—30; use of K urdish rebels 118—19; as a w ar of attrition 173

Index Iraq: background 1 1 5 -1 6 ; and Brazil 147; conclusions 1 5 8 -6 2 ; econom y 17, 121; higher education system 123; and Israel 122; and the Soviet Union 1 2 4 -5 ; and the U SA 1 6 1 -2 Iraqi A ir Force (IQ AF): advanced trainers 138; Baghdad/A dnan AEW 1 3 6 -7 ; helicopter program s 138; m odifications 136; technological innovation 136 Iraqi regim e: authoritarian m easures 118; contribution to militaryindustrial infrastructure 115; overthrow 1 6 0 -1 ; prestige of w eapons 141; significance 117; view of indigenous arm s industry 132 Iraq ’s defense spending: 1 9 4 8 -6 7 121; 1 9 6 3 -7 3 125; 1 9 8 1 -9 1 130; industrial infrastructure 140; significance 159 Iraq ’s electronics 128, 135 Iraq ’s endurance requirements: C airo Exhibition 1984 128; foreign advisors 128; im portance of artillery 116; O rdnance Factories 132; supply constraints 130 Iraq ’s indigenous arm s program : covert operations 150; licensed production 138; local production 132, 145, 1 5 9 -6 0 ; missile systems 134, 1 4 4 -6 ; rocket launchers 134; self-sufficiency 131, 133, 139; stockpiles 1 7 4 -5 Iraq ’s m ajor w eapons platform s 128, 13 7 -8 Iraq ’s military industry: acquisition of technology 126, 131, 144; conclusions 127, 1 5 8 -6 2 ; diversification efforts 127; effect of Soviet em bargoes 1 2 4 -5 ; future issues 1 6 0 -1 , 1 6 1 -2 ; im portance of Kam il 1 3 1 -2 ; organization 1 2 3 -4 , 1 3 0 -1 ; overview 1 1 5 -1 6 , 1 2 3 -4 ; procurem ent o f technology 124; role of Iran -Iraq W ar 1 2 9 -3 0 ; role of U N inspectors 148; supply constraints 130; survival p ost G ulf W ar 1 4 2 -3 ; theories o f arm s developm ent 1 5 8 -9 ; w orkforce 123 Iraq ’s m odification program m es 1 3 5 -6 , 1 3 6 -7 Iraq ’s non-platform w eapons 128, 1 3 3 -4 , 151 Iraq ’s nuclear w eapons: deception 155;

287

experim ents with uranium 133; hidden stockpiles 157, 158; intelligence 157; potential production 156; as a priority 141; research reactors 129; U N S C O M inspections 143, 1 4 7 -8 Iraq ’s security perception: A rab threat 1 1 9 -2 0 , 122; extra-regional objectives 1 2 2 -3 ; im portance of Baghdad 118; im portance of K uw ait 1 2 1 -2 ; internal security concerns 1 1 7 -1 9 ; regional interests 1 1 9 -2 2 ; role o f K urds 1 1 8 -1 9 Iraq ’s strategic system s: C on d or IR B M program m e 1 4 6 -7 ; covert acquisition 116, 126, 139, 152; hidden stockpiles 1 5 7 -8 ; range o f biological w eapons 1 5 4 -5 ; range of chemical w eapons 1 5 1 -2 ; RPVs/UAVs 149; Sam arra com plex 129; Superguns 1 3 3 -4 ; U N S C O M inspection 153, 154; use of chemical w eapons against K urds 129 Israel: and the A rab states 88; background 6 7 -8 ; defense industry structure 6 9 -7 3 ; and Egypt 77, 108; im pact of em bargoes 85, 107; and India 61, 1 0 9 -1 0 ; and Iran 104; and Iraq 108; and O peration Peace for Galilee 9 4 -5 ; security perception 67, 6 8 -9 , 106; significance o f the Six D ay W ar 1 1 0 -1 1 ; and South Africa 93; and the U K 85, 88; and the USA 83, 85, 93, 9 5 -6 , 9 7 -8 , 1 1 0 -1 1 Israeli A ircraft Industries (IAI) 7 0 -1 , 78; developm ent of the Kfir aircraft 89; effect of shekel crunch 111; m odifications 81, 103; origins 75; production of radars and com m unication systems 90; role in the Lavi project 95 Israeli airforce 87, 89, 95 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 76, 77, 7 9 -8 0 , 81, 87, 95 Israeli governm ent: control of industries 6 9 -7 1 ; cutting defence budgets 96; diplom atic aim s 75; dom ination of military policy 111; effect on defence expenditure 112; failure in the Lebanon 9 4 -5 ; im portance o f Ben Gurion 112; preference for stateowned com panies 102 Israeli navy (i D f N) 77, 7 9 - 8 0 , 80, 87

288

Index

Israel’ s defense spending: 1 9 4 8 —67 7 7 ; 1 9 6 3 —73 84; 19 7 2 —82 92; 1 9 8 1 —91 96; and em ploym ent 83; exports 93, 113; funding from USA 83, 9 5 —6, 98; increases 79, 83—4, 87—8; local share o f value 107; on nuclear w eapons 82—3; p ost O ctober W ar 1973 87—8; research and development 70, 7 4 —5, 92, 95, 97; role of Defense M inistry 76 Israel’ s electronics industry: export m arket 94; investment 94; military role 94, 95; niche production 179, 182; origins 75—6; research and developm ent 84; significance 1 1 3 —14, 176; standards 68, 71—2, 102, 108; use o f technology as a force m ultiplier 106 Israel’ s endurance requirements: m aintenance 87; need for reserves 100; in the O ctober W ar 1973 90; reactive arm or 9 9 —100; self­ sufficiency 80; spare parts 87, 100, 106; trial and error 76 Israel’ s m ajor w eapons platform s: A rrow A T B M program 99; Kfir fighters 89; Lavi fighters 9 8 —9; M erkava tanks 88—9 Israel’ s military industrial policy: conclusions 79, 106, 114, 1 6 6 —8; developm ent 75—9; diversifying w eapons suppliers 78; exportorientated m odel 105; importsubstitution m odel 76; ladder of production m odel 6 7 —8; military exports 92—3, 107—8, 109; need for rapid victory 78; overview 106; preparation issues 67, 86, 87; relationship between military and industry 80, 111—12; and self­ sufficiency 68, 93, 105, 112—13 Israel’ s m odification program s: aircraft 81; arm ored vehicles 81, 91; of equipm ent from U SA 103; fire control system s 90—1; m odernization 103, 106; upgrades 73; use of technology 103 Israel’ s non-platform w eapons 81, 90, 100, 101, 102 Israel’ s nuclear w eapons: D im ona reactor 82; im portance of the O ctober W ar 1973 104—5; nuclear capabilities 70, 87, 112 Israel’ s strategic system s: chemical

w eapons 105; m issiles 82, 91, 104; space-based reconnaisance capabilities 105 Jericho m issiles 82, 104 Jih az al-Amn al-K hass (Special Security A pparatus) 131 joint production 99, 109, 110, 184 K aluch ak barracks 59 K am il, H ussein see al M ajid H ussein K am il H asan K argil W ar (1999) 4, 2 3 , 2 4 , 25 , 56, 5 8 —9 Kashm ir: nuclear w eapons threat 41; role o f Indian arm y 4 0 ; role in the nuclear debate 5 7 ; significance for India 2 4 , 2 5 , 56 K ashm ir (1965) 34 Kfir fighter aircraft 89 K hairallah, A. 117 Khukri class corvettes 56 Khuzestan (A rabistan) 120 konenut (short-term preparedness) 86, 111, 166 K rishna M enon, V. K. 29 K urdish rebels 118, 119—2 0 , 124 K uw ait 121—2 labor costs 37 ladder of production: com pared to Iraqi m odel 158—9, 169—70; in India 63, 65, 165; overview 9; relevance to Israel 67, 168 Lavi fighter aircraft 68, 95, 98—9, 113 L D C s see Less-D eveloped Countries Leander class frigates 5 4 —5 Lebanon 94—5, 9 6 —7 Less-D eveloped Countries (L D C s): arm s procurem ent 5 —6; definition 187; and the international arm s trade 6—7; relevance of external threat 3; research 2; role o f internal threat 3; role o f political-m ilitary rivalries 3; see also fram ew orks of L D C s arms industries licensed production 14; com pared with indigenous development 4 5 —6; com pared with indigenous production aircraft 4 3 —5; conclusions 62, 177—8; of the G n at 31—2; in India 35—6, 4 3 —5, 4 5 —6, 49, 5 1 , 61; in Iraq 136; in Israel 89, 177 Light C om bat A ircraft (LCA) 4 4 —5

Index local production: definition 19; im portance in Israel 100; in India 34, 36, 44, 46; Iraq 132, 145, 1 5 9 -6 0 , 169; in Israel 88, 89, 90, 9 1 -2 , 93; of the Kfir fighter aircraft 89; of the M erkava tank 88; of m issiles in Iraq 130; in the security-based model 1 7 2 -3 , 1 7 8 -9 M -16 rifles 111 m aintenance 87, 175 al M ajid , H ussein Kam il H asan 117, 1 2 3 -4 , 1 3 0 -1 , 154 m ajor w eapons platform s: in India 33, 37, 42, 63; in Iraq 128, 1 3 7 -8 ; in Israel 104; overview 19, 20; in the security-based m odel 1 7 7 -8 m ake-w ork projects 79 M aru t 32-3 M A SH A (Renovation and M aintenance Centers) 69, 75 mergers 110 M erkava tanks 88, 101, 103 m etals 8 3 -4 M iddle East arm s trade 109, 120 military capability 17 military expenditure see defense spending M ilitary Industrialization Authority (M IA, Iraq) 123 M inistry o f Industry and M ilitary Industrialization (M IM I, Iraq): acquisition o f restricted technology 124; authority 115; inception 131; scope of pow er 1 2 3 -4 m issile attack craft 101 m issile program s: as a deterrent 91; in India 38, 4 6 -8 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 5 6 , 65, 66; in Iraq 130, 131, 134; in Israel 82, 91, 99 m issiles: air-to-air 134; A l-A bbas 1 4 5 -6 ; A l-H usayn 1 4 4 -5 ; antiballistic 135; cruise 104; Tam muz-1 146; use against Israel 108 m odels o f military industrialization: conclusions 1 6 3 -4 ; Indian case 1 6 5 -6 ; Iraqi case 1 6 8 -7 0 ; Israeli case 1 6 6 -8 ; lim itations 170-1 m odernization 41, 4 2 , 64, 103, 106, 176 m odification program s: effect on expenditure 176; of the ID F 76, 78, 106; in India 5 0 - 1 ; in Iraq 1 3 5 -7 ; in Israel 81, 85, 9 0 -1 , 91, 101, 103;

289

overview 20; in the security-based model 175 N a g Anti-Tank G uided M issiles 4 7 N asser, G. A. 77 naval construction 5 4 - 5 , 60, 80 N ehru, J . 2 8 , 2 9 , 38 nerve agents 152 N eum an, S. G. 173 niche production 1 7 8 -9 , 184 Ninth N atio n al B a’ athist Conference (1968) 122 non-platform w eapons: in India 37, 4 9 - 5 0 ; in Iraq 128, 1 3 3 -5 ; in Israel 81, 90, 1 0 0 -2 ; overview 20 nuclear capabilities: Iraq ’s covert procurem ent o f technology 124, 133; of Israel 78, 104; as a priority for Iraq 141; U N E S c O m reports 1 4 7 -8 N u clear N on proliferation Treaty (N N T ) 38, 155 nuclear reactors 82 nuclear subm arines 54 nuclear tests 38, 5 6 , 5 7 , 58 nuclear w eapons: as an insurance policy 83; dism antlem ent in Iraq 157; funding 83; future considerations 185; in India 2 3 , 38, 4 8 , 5 9 , 61; in Iraq 123, 1 5 5 -7 , 156, 1 6 1 -2 ; in Israel 70, 78, 8 2 -3 , 87, 91; in Pakistan 2 3 , 4 0 ; significance in the K argil conflict 5 8 -9 O ctober 1973 W ar see Y om K ippur W ar O ffeq satellites 105 Office of Sponsored Projects (OSP) funding 11 0 -1 1 oil 7, 88, 1 2 0 -1 , 127 O peration Enduring Freedom 185 O peration Iraqi Freedom : concealm ent of chemical w eapons 153; effect on Iraqi arm s industry 1 3 8 -9 ; role of intelligence estim ates 144; role of the K urds 120; significance 185 O peration Peace for Galilee (1982) 94 O peration Rhino 45 O peration Trident 41 O rdnance Factories (O F): development 3 3 -4 ; in India 37, 49; in Iraq 1 3 2 -3 ; overview 28 O rpheus engines 32 O sirak nuclear reactor 122

2 90

Index

Pakistan: destabilizing regional pow er 4; and India 35, 36, 41, 5 1 , 59; nuclear capabilities 2 3 , 40, 4 1 , 56; reliance on US equipm ent 34; role of the army 24; and USA 36, 4 0 , 5 6 ; see also K argil W ar Panikkar, K. M . 22 partial dependence 16 peace studies 7 -8 Peres, S. 86, 105, 112, 114 persuasive deterrence 41 P H A L C O N project 66 pilot training 37 politicide 68 politics 15 Powell, C. 154 preparedness 86, 87, 111 Prithvi m issiles 47 private firms 7 2 -3 process skills 20 procurem ent 133, 140-1 produ ct cycle (Vernon) 1 2 -1 3 Project Babylon 1 3 3 -4 protectionist policies 76 public sector corporation s 7 1 -2 qualitative advantage 5 quality control 49, 5 3 , 60, 63 quantitative advantage 5 Rabin, Y . 85, 86 R ad a 73 radars 90, 100 RA FA EL (Israel Armament Development Authority) 70, 75, 83, 90 Rajiv D octrine 40 reactive arm our 99 real-time intelligence 94 reconnaissance capabilities 105 regim es 1 7 -1 8 , 117, 186; see also Iraqi regime regional pow ers 4 - 5 ; asym m etrical relationships with U SA 1 8 4 -5 ; definition 4; destabilizing pow er balances 4; role in the international arena 4, 1 7 9 -8 6 regional security 2, 3 regional state-system s 2 -3 regional-specific w eaponry 1 7 8 -9 Rem otely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) 95, 102, 107, 149 Renovation and M aintenance Centres see M A SH A research: into regional state systems

2 - 3 ; into relevance o f regional pow ers 4; lim itations o f study 5; see also Stockholm International Research Institute (SIPRI) research and development: in India 2 7 -8 , 42 , 4 6 , 4 8 , 6 3 -4 ; in Israel 70, 7 4 -5 , 84, 92, 95, 97; as a m eans of constraining L D C s 10 resource gap s 68 retrofitting 103, 107, 135 Revolution o f 1968 122 Revolution in M ilitary A ffairs (RM A) 182 Saad General Establishm ents 126 al Saadi, Dr. A. H . 117, 126 S a ’ ar project 80, 85, 101 Sam arra Chem ical W eapons facility 126 sanctions 4, 151, 157 satellites 56, 61, 105, 113 Scorpene-class conventional attack subm arines 60 security systems 120 security threats: assessm ent 3; balance o f threat theory 4 -5 ; im portance in LD C military industrialization 163; in the study of L D C s arm s production 15 security-based m odel: changing nature of technologies 1, 16, 175; deterrent effect 15; im pact on military organization 21; im portance of local production 1 7 2 -3 , 1 7 8 -9 ; key factors 171; m aintenance issues 175; niche production 1 7 8 -9 ; production of regional-specific w eaponry 1 7 8 -9 ; production of sm all arm s 172; quality m aintenance 1 7 5 -6 ; research overview 1 8 -2 1 ; role o f stockpiles 1 7 3 -4 ; sustenance requirements 1 7 2 -5 ; use of force 15 self-reliance 16, 25 , 93 self-sufficiency 9; and India 61; in Iraq 131, 133, 139; Israel 68, 80, 1 1 2 -1 3 semi-peripheral states 3 Shafrirs 90 Sharon, A. 94 shekel budget 97, 111 shipbuilding see naval construction Shishum ar attack subm arines 5 3 -4 Sh’ ite population 120 short-range m issile systems 134, 144 sim ulations 183

Index Sinai C am paign (1956) 78 Six D ay W ar (1967) 67—8, 83 solid fuel rocket m otors 78 Soltam 100, 101 sonar systems 50 South Africa 93, 177 Soviet Union see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics space reconnaissance capabilities 105 spare parts: conclusions 173—5; im portance to the Israel Defense Forces 76, 87, 100, 106; self-sufficiency in Israel 80; as a source of problem s for India 36, 42, 49, 60, 64—5 State Establishm ent for Pesticide Production (SEPP, Iraq) 126 State O rganization for Technical Industries (SO TI, Iraq) 123, 126, 131 stealth technology 60, 182 Stockholm International Research Institute (SIPRI) 6 stockpiles 157, 158, 173—4, 174—5 strategic system s: in India 38, 5 6 , 61; in Israel 82—3, 91, 1 0 4—5; overview 20; see also Iraq’ s strategic systems; nuclear w eapons structuralist/dependency approach to L D C s arm s industries 8—10, 15 subm arines 53—4, 60 subordinate alliances 22 Suez C an al 39 Supergun project see Project Babylon superpow ers 6—7 supplier controls 4 surge production 99, 106, 174 Syria 86—7, 122 system o f system s 182 system ic/historical approach to L D C s arm s industries 12—14 T -72 tanks 45 TA A S (T a’ asiya Z v ai’ it) 71, 74, 90, 100 T a ’asiya Z v a i’it see TA A S Tadiran 71—2, 75—6, 102 Tam m uz-1 m issiles 146 tank arm am ents 35—6 tank transporters 87 tanks: arm or 99; Chieftain 88; in the ID F 90—1; in Iraq 1 3 5 —6; M erkava 88, 101, 103; repair 90; T -72 45 technologism 11 technology: acquisition 126, 131, 144; as an econom ic asset 182;

291

com plicating international relations 93; definition 19; as a force multiplier 5, 18; im portance to India 2 6 , 42, 47, 4 8 , 53, 65; im portance to Israel 95, 105; L D C s dependence on developed w orld 9—10, 12; negative im pact 11; as a process 2 0 ; in the security-based m odel 175; stealth 182 Technology Experim ent Satellite 61 terrorism : im portance o f regional actors 186; in India 5 6 —7, 5 9 ; role in international arm s trade 161—2; role of Israel 167 threats 4 —5 tiers o f production 12—14, 1 3 , 16 training 5, 4 0 , 183 Trishul 4 6 —7 Turkey 119 al Ubeidi, Dr. A. R. 126, 131 U K see United Kingdom U N Conference on Science and Technology (1979) 126 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): effect o f invasion of Afghanistan 39—40; em bargoes on Iraq 124, 127, 168; involvement in production of M IG-21 36; relationship with Israel 91; role in Indian Ocean 39; role in the international arms trade 6, 35; role in Iraq’s acquisition of arms 124—5; significance of collapse 42 United K ingdom (UK) 85, 88, 150, 153, 154 United N ation s sanctions 148, 151, 157 United N ation s Special Com m ission (U N SC O M ) 143, 149, 150, 152 United States of America (USA): asymmetrical relations with regional powers 184—5; funding for Israel 83, 95—6, 98—9, 110; importance of security 111; imports from Israel 72, 73; intelligence issues 150, 157, 158, 185; intervention in Indo-Pakistani conflict 35, 36; planning for w ar termination in Iraq 158, 162; problem s with technology sharing 93; relationship with India 33, 56, 65; relationship with Israel 68, 71, 85, 89, 91, 93, 110, 167; relationship with Pakistan 39—40, 56; role in Indian Ocean 39; role in the international arms trade 6; technology transference to A rab states 97

2 92

Index

Unm anned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 102, 149 U N S C O M see United N atio n s Special Com m ission upgrades 73, 78, 81, 103 US export control legislation 110 U SA see United States o f America U SSR see Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics V ajpayee, A. B. 58 , 63 V a n u n u ,M . 10 4 -5 Vernon, R. 12 -1 3

Vibhuti class corvettes 55 V ijayanta tanks 3 5 -6 , 50 W ald, I. 68 W ar of Attrition (1 9 6 8 -7 0 ) 86 W ar of Independence (1948) 75 W orld W ar I (1 9 1 4 -1 8 ) 17 2 -3 W orld W ar II (1 9 3 9 -4 5 ) 14, 176 w orld/dom inance approach to L D C s arm s industries 1 1 -1 2 Y om K ippur W ar (1973) 8 6 -8 , 91, 100, 1 0 1 -2 , 112