Military History of Late Rome 565–602 1848848528, 9781848848528

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Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

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For my wife Sini and children Ari and Nanna for their patience; and for the late George T. Dennis for having revived my interest in this era after years of study devoted to modern history I dedicate this volume in particular to Ari. His enthusiasm towards military history and wargaming has made Father proud. In the midst of the editing process came the very sad news of Barnaby Blacker’s death. I dedicate this book to his memory. May he rest in peace.

‘If you want to acquire a reputation for generosity, therefore, you have to be ostentatiously lavish; and a prince acting in that fashion will soon squander all his resources, only to be forced in the end, if he wants to maintain this reputation, to lay excessive burdens on the people, to impose extortionate taxes, and to do everything else he can to raise money. This will start to make his subjects hate him, and, since he will have to impoverish himself, he will be generally despised. As a result, because of generosity of his, having injured many and rewarded few, he will be vulnerable to the first minor setback, and the first real danger he encounters will bring him to grief.’ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. by George Bull, 92–3 ‘Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared. The bond of love is one which men, wretched creatures that they are, break when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective. The prince must nonetheless make himself feared in such a way that, if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated… and the prince can always avoid hatred if he abstains from the property of his subjects and citizens and from their women… But above all a prince must abstain from the property of others; because men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.’ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. by George Bull, 96–7

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The Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Dr. Ilkka Syvänne

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First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Pen & Sword Military An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd Yorkshire – Philadelphia Copyright © Dr. Ilkka Syvänne 2022 ISBN 978 1 84884 852 8 The right of Dr. Ilkka Syvänne to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed and bound in the UK by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.

Pen & Sword Books Limited incorporates the imprints of Atlas, Archaeology, Aviation, Discovery, Family History, Fiction, History, Maritime, Military, Military Classics, Politics, Select, Transport, True Crime, Air World, Frontline Publishing, Leo Cooper, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing, The Praetorian Press, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe Transport, Wharncliffe True Crime and White Owl. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk Or PEN AND SWORD BOOKS 1950 Lawrence Rd, Havertown, PA 19083, USA E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.penandswordbooks.com

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Contents

Acknowledgementsvi List of Platesvii List of Maps and Diagramsix Introductionxi Abbreviationsxii Chapter 1

Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565

1

Chapter 2

Enemies and Allies

21

Chapter 3

Augustus Justin II (565–578)

43

Chapter 4

Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)

127

Chapter 5

Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)

162

Appendix I: The First Turkish Empire324 Appendix II: The Couched Lance Technique and the Strategikon328 Notes330 Bibliography359 Index365

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Acknowledgements

F

irst of all, I would like to thank the commissioning editor Philip Sidnell for accepting this proposal for a book, and for Professor Geoffrey Greatrex for having recommended me. Special thanks are also due to copy editor Matt Jones, Barnaby Blacker, Tara Moran, and other staff at Pen & Sword for their stellar work and for the outstanding support they have given me. I would also like to thank many of my friends and family for their support and patience. I owe special thanks to Perry Gray whose perceptive comments have improved the argumentation significantly. I also owe big thanks to Jyrki Halme for the re-enacting photos. If there are any mistakes, they are the sole responsibility of the author.

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List of Plates

A fully equipped multipurpose trooper from Thrace. (Author’s drawing) Footman throwing darts. The Strategikon (12.2.16.39–46) instructed those of the skoutatoi (shield-bearer) footmen who had lead-pointed darts (mattiobarbuli, martiobarbuli, martzobarboula, plumbatae) to throw these at the right distance (ca. 40–60 m) from the enemy line. The darts were usually placed inside the shield five apiece. In this example I have assumed that the footman was not among the front ranks but was one of the rear-rankers who used a javelin instead of a kontarion-spear. He has thrust the javelin into the ground so that he can grasp it immediately after he has thrown the darts, but he could equally well have held it in his left hand or placed it on the ground. He uses the above-head javelin/dart technique which was safer to use in a phalanx than the softball/cricket throwing style. The skoutatoi equipped with the kontarion probably placed their spears on the ground. The plumbata tribolata was designed to act as a sort of caltrop so that when large numbers of these were thrown the darts formed a defensive field of caltrops. (Author’s drawing) Mauricius Tiberius (Maurice). (Author’s painting) Two skoutatoi equipped lightly for difficult terrain and infantry archer. (Author’s drawing) Three Roman heavy infantry skoutatoi. (Author’s drawing) David’s confrontation with his brother Eliab, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, ca. 629–30. (Public domain) A Berber/Moor infantry javeliners and a Berber/Moor mounted javeliner. (Author’s drawing) Three Slavic footmen. (Author’s drawing) Avar cataphract. (Author’s drawing) Chosroes II Parwez as horseman in the Taq-i-Bustan relief. (Author’s drawing) Four Roman horsemen charging with the lance held shoulder high. (Author’s drawing) Visigothic soldiers. (Author’s drawing) Coins of Justin II, Tiberius II. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com) Nubian infantry archer. (Author’s drawing) Nubian cataphract. (Author’s drawing partially after Carl Arriens) Nubian spearman. (Author’s drawing after Heath) Roman front rank cavalry lancer charging. (Author’s drawing) Lombard lancer charging. (Author’s drawing) A Roman officer in light gear. (© Jyrki Halme) A high ranking Roman officer either from the regular army or from the imperial bodyguards. (Author’s painting) A Roman officer (e.g. dux, magister militum vacans or local pagarch) from Thebaid, Egypt, bordering Nubia. He has Nubian blood in his veins.

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viii  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 A Roman officer in light gear. (© Jyrki Halme) A coin of Maurice. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com) A Roman front rank fighter equipped with scale armour and ridge helmet, the latter of which remained in use until the early seventh or eighth century (opinions vary) after which it was entirely replaced by segmented helmets which were already in use at this time. (© Jyrki Halme) A coin of Phocas. (Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com) A textile roundel depicting two horsemen in combat. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 6th or 7th century. (Public domain) A silver plate depicting Chosroes II during the hunt. (Ebersolt) Maurice (Mauricius Tiberius) in 581 when he was still strategos of the eastern front. (Author’s painting) Standard-bearer with the ‘Christ image not made by human hand’. I have here made the guess that such standard bearers would still have worn traditional costume. (Author’s drawing) A small bust of Phocas, British Museum. (Author’s photo) Chosroes II Parwez (590–628). (Author’s painting, which is a combination from two different sources: the Louvre bronze bust and Hottenroth’s reconstruction of a Sasanian/Sassanid ruler) Chosroes II Parwez. (Author’s painting after Taq-i-Bustan relief) Emperor Maurice (Mauricius Tiberius) depicted in his court attire. (Author’s painting, combining the body of Justinian (Ravenna Mosaic) with the head of Maurice in one of his coins) Roman cavalry charging at the Battle of Melitene in 576. (Author’s drawing) Strategos Philippicus in 586. (Author’s drawing)

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List of Maps and Diagrams

Provinces in the Notitia Dignitatum xiii Places visited by Zemarchus in Central Asia xiv Persiaxv The Neighbourhood of Ctesiphon xvi Persian Front xvii Upper Mesopotamia xviii Persian Front Eastern Section xix The Nile Delta xx Environs of Alexandria in the Barrington Map xxi North Africa xxii Sea of Marmara with its Surrounding Regions xxiii Approaches to Constantinople xxiv City of Constantinople xxv City of Tomis  xxv Imperial Palace of Constantinople xxvi The Avar-Roman Wars on the Balkan Peninsula (left side) xvii The Avar-Roman Wars on the Balkan Peninsula (right side) xviii Thessalonicaxxix Ratiariaxxix Sirmiumxxix Balkansxxx City of Dvin xxxi Modern Reconstructions of Ravenna xxxi Lombard Italy xxxii Italian Places xxxiii Neighbourhood of the city of Rome xxxiv City of Rome xxxv Spainxxxvi Roman Administration in 565 1 The Military and Palatine Administration in ca. 565 2 Military Deployment c. 565 3 Standard Infantry Formations 13 Other standard infantry formations 13 Marching formation in difficult terrain 15 Large cavalry army 16 The cavalry formations for armies of 5,000–15,000 men 17 The cavalry formation for armies less than 5,000/6,000 men 17

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x  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The Roman tactic of surprise attack against the Slav villages 22 Slavic tactics 23 Nomadic Battle Formation 25 Scythian Drill 25 Germanic cavalry charge 28 The two standard Persian cavalry formations 36 Some typical battle formations used by the Sasanians 37 Himyarite battle formation 41 Persian War in 572–3 81 The City of Nisibis 82 The City and Siege of Dara 88 Major Operations in 575–577 100 Battle of Melitene 1 106 Battle of Melitene 2 108 Battle of Melitene 3 109 Battle of Melitene 4 110 Battle of Melitene 5 111 Persian Front: Principal Operations in 577 116 Persian stratagems and Maurice’s revenge, summer-autumn 578 123 Amida and Arzun/Chlomaron 124 Siege of Sirmium in 579–582 143 Roman Double Offensive in 579 148 Military Operations in 580 151 Battle of Constantia/Constantina (Tella) in June 581 155 The Battle of Constantia in June 581 158 Hispalis and Italica 177 Frankish kingdoms in 583 before Chilperic’s assassination 184 Frankish kingdoms in 587 according to the Treaty of Andelot 194 The Roman campaign in Italy in 590 201 The Battle of Nymphius/Tigris River in 582 206 Philippicus’s Manoeuvres in 584 209 Battle of Solanchon 1 214 Battle of Solanchon 2–3 216 Persian Front in 586 219 Martyropolis230 Singidunum and Augustae 238 Campaigns in 583–585 243 Cavalry Marching Methods and Logistics with the army of Comentiolus 245 Campaigns in 586–587 247 Persian Front in 591–593 274 Battle of Lake Urmiah in 593 277 Battle of the Plain of Canzak in 593: Phases 1–3 279 Battle of Iatrus in 598 307 Priscus’s First Battle in 599 312 Priscus’s Second Battle in 599 313 Priscus’s Fourth Battle in 599 315

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Introduction

T

he intention of this penultimate volume in the eight-book series is to present an overview of all of the principal aspects of Roman military history during the years 565–602. Under the Emperor Justinian I the Romans had reconquered most of the west they had lost in the previous century and they were in position to reconquer the rest. This would have required generals of Belisarius’s calibre and emperors of Justinian’s calibre. The Romans had neither. Instead they got Justin II and mediocre commanders and wars simultaneously on all fronts. It took until the late 590s for the Romans to restore the situation. This was the handiwork of Tiberius II and Maurice, both of whom were able emperors, but then the Roman Empire faced its next challenge when Maurice was overthrown by Phocas. What happened then will be described in the final volume of the series. The era under scrutiny is among the most important in Roman history because it was then that the most important Roman military treatise was produced by Maurice and his innermost circle of advisors. This treatise became the bible of the Byzantine military, as the late George T. Dennis described this remarkable text. The reforms introduced by Maurice were later to form the basis for the thematic armies of the succeeding centuries. This text follows the same principles as the previous books and includes direct references to the sources only when my conclusions can be considered controversial or new. I have also not included descriptions or analyses of the sources used and their problems, because there already exists expert literature devoted to this subject. When I refer to some chronicle, the exact point of reference can be found in the annalistic dating even when I do not always state this in the narrative. In this study, when I refer to Spain I mean the whole of Iberian Peninsula, including Lusitania (modern Portugal). The aim has been to present all events in chronological order, but this has sometimes been abandoned for the sake of clarity, so some events in certain parts of the Empire (e.g. Italy, Spain, the Balkans, North Africa, Egypt, East) are dealt with in separate chapters. This is the same approach as that of ancient authors like Procopius and Theophylact. As far as the language, transliteration, and titles are concerned, I have usually adopted the easiest solutions. I have used the transliterations the Romans used or which are otherwise commonly used. I have also adopted the practice of the Oxford UP and used capital letters for all offices which could be held by only one person at a time. I have also used capital letters for all specific types of troops and military units. However, when I have referred to several office holders simultaneously (e.g. comites/counts, duces/dukes) I have used small letters. All illustrations, drawings, maps and diagrams etc. have been drawn and prepared by the author unless stated otherwise. I have used the Barrington Atlas as the principal source for the maps.

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Abbreviations

Cav. Cavalry Com. Dom. Comes Domesticorum (Count of Domestics) Corippus ILIAM Flavius Cresconius Corippus, In laudem Iustini Augusti minoris CRP Comes Rei Privatae (Count of the Privy Purse) CSL Comes Sacrarum Largitionum (Count of the Sacred Largess) GT Gregory of Tours HC Heavy cavalry HF History of the Franks HI Heavy infantry HL History of Lombards/Langobards Inf. Infantry Isid. HRGVS  Isidorus of Seville, Historia de regibus Gothorum, Vandalorum et Suevorum JE John of Ephesus LC Light cavalry LI Light infantry LP Liber Pontificalis Mag. Eq. Magister Equitum (Master of Horse) Mag. Ped. Magister Peditum (Master of Foot) Mag. Eq. et Ped. Magister Equitum et Peditum (Master of Horse and Foot) Mag. Mil. Magister Militum (Master of Soldiers) Mag. Off. Magister Officiorum (Master of Office) MGH Monumenta Historia Germaniae MGH AA Monumenta Historia Germaniae Auctores Antiquitissimonum MVM Magister Utriusque Militiae (Master of All Arms of Service) MVM Praes. Magister Utriusque Militae Praesentales (Praesental MVM) OGL Origo gentis Langobardorum Or. Orations PLRE Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, see Bibliography PP Praefectus Praetorio (Praetorian Prefect) PPG Praefectus Praetorio Galliarum PPI Praefectus Praetorio Italiae et Africae (PP of Italy and Africa) PPIL Praefectus Praetorio Illyrici PPO Praefectus Praetorio Orientis PSC Praepositus Sacri Cubiculi (Leader of Sacred Bedroom) PVC Praefectus Urbis Constantiopolitanae (Urban Prefect of Constantinople) PVR Praefectus Urbis Romae QSP Quaestor Sacri Palatii (Questor of the Sacred Palace) REF2 The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars, see Bibliography

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Chapter One

Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565

The General Situation in 565

J

ustinian I the Great had left his successor Justin II a mixed heritage. The Empire was larger and wealthier than he had received it, but thanks to his own policies its armed forces were well below their paper strength. Justinian I had amassed wealth through corrupt means for both his own aggrandisement and for his massive building projects. The latter encompassed fortification and refortification projects throughout the Empire, and the building of churches and monasteries. The former were meant to secure the Empire from enemy invasions but in the absence of adequate numbers of soldiers these were not sufficient for this task. The building and financing of the religious establishments was meant to secure the support of God for the Roman Empire, but in truth this was money wasted because what the soldiers needed were their salaries. Justinian I had compensated for the deficiencies in the defensive organization with skilled diplomatic manoeuvring and well chosen monetary payments to foreign peoples. The haughty Justin I and hawks like him did not understand that the military successes of Justinian I had been possible only thanks to this.

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2  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

Roman Society, Administration and Military in 565 At the apex of Roman society stood the Emperor with the title of Augustus, who had the imperial administrative machinery to assist him. In addition to this official hierarchy there existed an unofficial hierarchy which was based on the closeness of the person to the Emperor. The best example of this is the role of the Empress Theodora under Justinian I, but basically anyone who had access to the Emperor could wield considerable influence upon him. These included all present in the palace, the most important of whom were usually the family members, eunuchs and commanders of bodyguard units (in particular the Comes Excubitorum). There still existed senates in Rome and Constantinople, but the former had lost most of its importance because it was no longer the place where the Emperor resided. The senate of Constantinople retained some of its importance because the Emperor often sought to gain the support of its wealthy members for his own projects. However, it could also be bypassed when the Emperor so desired. Midsixth century Roman imperial administration was divided into three sections: 1) Military (Foederati, Comitatenses, Limitanei); 2) Palatine; 3) Imperial and Fiscal Administration.

Roman Armed Forces in 565 In 565 the Roman armed forces consisted of: 1) the imperial bodyguards (excubitores commanded by the Comes Excubitorum; scholae commanded by the Comes Scholariorum; protectores domestici commanded by the Comes or Comites Domesticorum);1 2) units posted in the capital or nearby (The walls/teiche under Praetor; numeri/noumera marines under praefecti?; vigiles/vigla and urbaniciani under Praefectus Urbi), 3) spies (kataskopoi) served

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4  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 under Magister Officiorum; 4) praesental forces (central field armies) called stratiotai (soldiers) commanded by the praesental magistri; 5) comitatenses (field armies) now called stratiotai commanded by the regional magistri (per Orientem, per Armeniam, per Thracias, per Illyricum, per Italiae, per Africam, per Spaniae); 6) limitanei (frontier forces), also called stratiotai commanded usually by the duces; 7) bucellarii (private retainers) – command structure depended on the employer; 8) foederati (federates) and other mercenaries commanded by the Comes Foederatorum; 9) The Imperial Fleet, posted in the capital under praefectus or archegos or nauarchos who was a subordinate of a praesental magister or strategos; 10) provincial fleets each under praefectus or archegos and each of whom was a subordinate of a regional magister or strategos; 11) allies (symmachoi); 12) civilian paramilitary forces. On the basis of the Strategikon we know that the optimates were also a special category of cavalry troops at this time, but their position within the hierarchy is not known. However, since we know that they later formed the core of the Thema of the Opsikion, it is probable that they were included in the imperial bodyguards or among the praesental armies. At this time the divisions between the different categories of troops were blurred. In practice units from the praesental armies, comitatenses, limitanei and foederati could be posted to serve wherever needed even while they still retained their official standing. The Armenian Field Army formed a special category within the regular forces because it consisted mostly of the feudal retinues of the Armenian nobles. The boundary between the regular stratiotai and foideratoi was equally blurred. Both could include natives and foreigners, but obviously the former consisted mostly of natives and the latter mostly of foreigners. The only real difference lay in the terms of service. The terms of service among the foederati varied according to the contract made. They were mercenary troops employed by the state. This means that the only difference between the mercenary bucellarii and the foederati was that the bucellarii were recruited, equipped and paid by a private employer while the foederati was equipped and paid by the state through paymasters called optiones. It is similarly difficult to establish where the boundary lay between the regular foederati and symmachoi because for example Procopius (Wars 7.33.13) considered some of the Heruls settled on Roman territory and serving under their own commanders as symmachoi and others as foederati. One may therefore seek the difference for these two categories in the terms of their treaties – perhaps the foederati were required to serve wherever ordered while the terms of the symmachoi determined where they were expected to serve. It is also possible that there already existed a special category of bucellarii which was maintained by the Emperor, because the Strategikon included these as a special category of troops.

The generals The Emperor was the supreme commander of all armed forces, but after the reign of Theodosius I the emperors usually left the actual command of the armies to their subordinates. The Emperor had sole authority over military appointments so he could choose anyone he liked for any position and could create special commands at his whim. The next in descending order below him were the praesental magistri, the regional magistri (East, Armenia, Thrace, Illyricum, Africa, Italy, and Spain), the honorary magistri, and

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  5 below them the comites and duces in charge of frontier forces. However, in practice the emperors were in the habit of listening to the advice of those who were close to him. It was thanks to this that the Comes Excubitorum, scribones and eunuchs of the bedchamber were often held in higher esteem than the magistri. It was also thanks to this that these persons were often given special commands in which they outranked the magistri. The mercenary Federates were a special case. They had one overall commander, the Comes Foederatorum, but in practice they could serve under any high-ranking commander as required by the situation. The Federate Arabs were a special case within this category of troops even when they served as subordinates of the higher-ranking Roman commanders. This was probably one of the reasons why Procopius considered them as symmachoi rather than as foideratoi. The Federate Arabs were commanded by their own tribal leaders/sheiks each of whom held the title of phylarchos. All of these then served under a single supreme commander who in 565 was the Ghassanid sheik Arethas (al-Harith ibn Jabalah). In recognition of this position, Arethas simultaneously held the titles of basileus, phylarchos and patricius from ca. 528 until his death in 569. The Romans recognized that this official hierarchy was sometimes too inflexible for the needs of the moment. A prime example of this is the appointment of Belisarius to the position of strategos autokrator (dux imperator, general-emperor) for the campaigns in Libya and Italy. This gave Belisarius the temporary powers of the emperor for the duration of the campaign. Closely related to this are the following: 1) the creation of the overall commander for a section of a front (e.g. in the Balkans or East as happened several times after 565); 2) the uniting of civilian and military powers under a magister; 3) the uniting of civilian and military powers under an exarchus/exarchos; 4) the division of the army under strategos (overall commander) and hypostrategos (second-in-command) in the Strategikon (written in the 590s). The other generals served under these two strategoi, regardless of their official rank in the hierarchy. In the Strategikon the subordinates of the strategos and hypostrategos were called merarchai (commanding a max. of 6–7,000 men) and moirarchai (commanding a max. of 3,000 men) so that the moirarchai of the optimates were called taxiarchoi. The military hierarchy of the bucellarii (private retinues) varied according to their size. On the basis of the household of Belisarius we know that the greater households consisted of: 1) the overall commander (efestōs tē oikia, majordomo), 2) a treasurer (optio); 3) officers (doruforoi/doryforoi); 4) privates/soldiers (hypaspistai). These private retinues formed yet another special case in the military hierarchy. Some commanders like Belisarius placed greater trust in their own men and so placed their men in command of regular forces, Federates and allies. As has been noted by Franziska E. Schlosser, the position of bucellarii was not as pronounced during the reign of Maurice as previously. None of the generals who served under him had enough bucellarii to enforce their will on the other officers and soldiers in the same manner as Belisarius. Under Justin II his nephews Justin and Justinian still had powerful retinues, but this was probably no longer the case under Tiberius II and certainly not under Maurice. In the Strategikon the bucellarii were treated as better equipped regular troops, which implies that the state had acquired stronger control over the forces hired by individuals. What this meant in practice is uncertain because even under Justinian, the Emperor had full powers over the bucellarii. The instance in

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6  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 which Justinian I removed all bucellarii from Belisarius demonstrates this in no uncertain terms.2 Furthermore, as we shall see in Military History of Late Rome Volume VIII, one of the commanders of Maurice, Priscus, went on to acquire a huge army of bucellarii of his own and acquire a personal powerbase. It is probable that he obtained these when he had been dispatched to Armenia by Maurice to transfer the Armenians to the Balkans to secure his own standing vis-à-vis the usurper Phocas. It is therefore likely that most of his bucellarii consisted of Armenians. So it was probably only later when these forces became the bodyguards of Heraclius that the bucellarii were finally incorporated into the state structures so that they became part of the Thema of Optimaton and eventually a Thema of their own with the name of Boukellarion. Thus the likely reason for the smaller personal retinues under Maurice is that he did not allow his commanders to obtain large forces of their own for security reasons. The Strategikon (1.3.23–4) names taxiarchoi as moirarchai of the optimates. We find the title taxiarchos several times in positions of important commands in the text of Theophylact, which may mean that the strategoi often appointed members of the Optimates to important positions in the same manner as Belisarius had used his bucellarii. This, however, is uncertain because we do not know if Theophylact used the term in its technical sense, but still something that readers should keep in mind when the title appears in the text. Were the Optimates imperial bucellarii?

Unit Structures and Grading In 565 the regular Roman forces consisted of various types of units that had been created at different points in time. The two basic types of units were those created before the third century (legions, alae, turmae, auxilia), and the new types of units created in the third and fourth centuries (vexillationes, cunei, auxilia palatina, scholae). The older types of units, the legions and the auxiliaries, retained most of their old structures. Their hierarchy consisted of the tribunes under whom served centurions (these had a hierarchy of their own) while their cavalry units were led by tribunes, centurions and decurions. In addition to this there existed temporary units that were detached from their mother units which were therefore ad hoc creations of varying sizes with temporary commanders who could be praepositi, tribunes, duces, centurions etc. These ad hoc temporary groupings were already called, in military slang, throngs of men (Latin sing. drungus pl. drungi; in Greek sing. drouggos/droungos, pl. drouggoi/droungoi) in the third century, but the first attested use for the new title drungarius (in Greek drouggarios/droungarios) for such a throng dates from the early seventh century. In the Strategikon the droungos meant both an irregular group of soldiers and an irregular unit order in combat. However, I would not preclude the possibility that it could have been used even earlier. Even if the following list of Lydus3 from the sixth century includes some dated earlier material, it still shows us roughly how many different types of troops and grades existed. The list is borrowed from my earlier monographs and it partially follows Bandy’s edition of Lydus.

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  7 Lydus’ Legions: alai apo ch hippeôn alae of 600 horsemen (former auxiliary cavalry) vexillatiōnes apo f hippeôn vexillationes of 500 horsemen (former legionary cavalry) tourmai apo f toxotôn hippeôn tourmae of 500 mounted archers legiōnes, legiones apo hexakischiliôn legions of 6,000 infantrymen  pezôn tribounoi, dēmarchoi, tribuni, tribunes ordinarioi, taxiarchoi, ordinarii ducenarii and centurions? signiferai, sēmeioforoi, signiferi, standard-bearers (during Vegetius day called draconarii) optiōnes, optiones chosen men (centurion’s deputies/vicars) or registrars vēxillarioi, doryforoi, vexillarii, spear-bearing men belonging to vexillationes, i.e. legionary cavalry mēnsōres mensores, camp-surveyors toubikines, salpistai pezōn tubicines, infantry buglers boukinatōres, salpistai hippeōn bucinatores, cavalry buglers kornikines, keraulai cornicines, horn-blowers andabatai, katafraktoi andabatae, cataphract cavalry mētatōres, chōrometrai metatores, land-surveyors archytēs kai sagittarioi, toxotai kai arquites and sagittarii, archers and arrowbeloforoi bearers praitōrianoi, stratēgikoi praetoriani, praetorians, general’s men lagchiarioi/lanchiaroi, akontoboloi lanciarii, lance-throwers dekemprimoi, dekaprōtoi decemprimi, heads of ten horsemen, decani benefikialioi, hoi epi therapeia tōn beneficiales, those giving medical aid to the   beteranōn tetagmenoi veterani/veterans. torkouatoi, streptoforoi, hoi tous torquati, torc-wearers who wear necklaces maniakas foreuntes (rewarded for bravery), and those who wear maniaces arm-guards. brachiatoi, ē toi armilligeroi, pselioforoi brachiati or armilligeri, bracelet-wearers (rewarded for bravery) armigeroi, hoploforoi armigeri (armour-bearers), arms-bearers (hoplonbearers) mounerarioi, leitourgoi munerarii, servants or soldiers (munifices) doing fatigues and services dēputatoi, afōrismenoi deputati, deputies appointed for a specific task auxiliarioi, hypaspistai auxiliarii, auxiliaries (note the use of hypaspistai/ shield-bearers for foreign troops which is suggestive for their later use as a term for bucellarii) kouspatōres, fylakistai cuspatores, gaolers imaginiferai, eichonoforoi imaginiferi, imaginarii, image-bearers, i.e. bearers of the emperor’s image okreatoi, pezoi sidērōi tas knēmas ocreati, infantry with iron greaves to protect the   peripefrakmenoi calves armatoura prima, hoplomeletē prōtē armature prima, first arms service armatoura sēmissalia, hoplomeletē armature semissalis, advanced arms practise   meizōn  hastatoi, doryforoi hastati, spearmen

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8  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 tessarioi, hoi ta symbola en tōi kairōi tēs tesserarii, who announce the watchword to the  symbolēs tōi plēthei perifēmizontes soldiers at the time of encounter dracōnarioi, drakontoforoi draconarii, the bearers of the dragon standard adioutōres, hypoboēthoi adiutores, adjutants samiarioi, hoi tōn hoplōn stilpnōtai semiarii, the polishers of arms baginarioi/vaginarioi/thēkopoio vaginarii, scabbard-makers arkouarioi, toxopoioi arcuarii, bow-makers pilarioi, akontistai pilarii, javelin throwers beroutarioi, veroutarioi, diskoboloi verutarii, throwers of verutum/spiculum javelin (Veg: shaft 3.5 ft, iron tip 5 in.) founditōres, sfendonētai funditores, slingers ballistarioi, katapeltistai (katapeltēs de ballistarii, catapult-men. A catapult is a kind of   estin eidos helepoleōs, kaleitai de tōi city taker/siege engine; it is called by the  plēthei onagros) soldiers/multitude onager (wild ass) binearioi, vinearioi, teichomachoi vinearii, wall-fighters or men who fought with the siege sheds primoskoutarioi, hyperaspistai, hoi primoscutarii, shield-bearers who are now called   legomenoi protēktōres protectores primosagittarioi, toxotai prōtoi primosagittarii, first archers (i.e. mounted bodyg. or commanders of LI?) klibanarioi, holosidēroi. kēlibana gar hoi clibanarii, the horsemen who wear iron armour,   Rhōmaioi ta sidēra kalummata kalousin, anti tou kēlamina for the Romans call iron coverings celibana, that is to say celamina flammoularioi, hōn epi tēs akras tou flammularii, who bear at the end of their spears   doratos foinika rhakē exērtēnto scarlet banners expeditoi, euzōnoi, gymnoi, hetoimoi expediti, well-girt, lightly clad and mobile, ready   pros machēn for battle (i.e. non-encumbered with baggage train and lightly equipped for ease of movement) ferentarioi, akrobolistai ferentarii, skirmishers kirkitōres, hoi peri tous machomenous circitores, who go about the fighters and   periiontes kai chorēgountes hopla give them arms  mētō epistamenoi machesthai adōratōres, beteranoi, teirōnes adoratores, honourably retired soldiers; veterani, those who had grown old while in service; tirones, recruits not yet permitted to fight.

As noted, in addition to these there existed ‘newer’ units which were organized as shown on the left-hand side. The hierarchy on the right side of the attached diagram shows how the older and newer units were simplified for practical use by Maurice in his Strategikon. The older names survived but it was this simplified and improved system of Maurice which became the official standard usage among the military during his reign and which received official sanctioning in the military hierarchies of the thematic armies (themata) created during the reign of Heraclius. The following list is based on the comparisons of grading by J. Haldon (1999, 109) and R.I. Frank. As can be seen, Strategikon streamlined and rationalized even the newer simplified structures.

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  9

Conditions of service The regular forces (stratiotai and limitanei) consisted mostly of volunteers, but traditional conscription was used whenever there were not enough volunteers available. After 20 years of service, soldiers were entitled to honourable discharge (honesta missio). However, to get the full privileges of a veteran (emerita missio) they had to serve for 24 years. Soldiers could also be entitled to be relieved of duty (causaria missio) on the grounds of wounds, injuries or old age. The treaty soldiers, the foederati and bucellarii, obviously consisted only of volunteers, and their terms of service varied according to the contract they had signed. It is usually assumed that in the sixth century, soldiers no longer received the yearly salary called stipendium. Now their salary consisted of rations called annona (bread, meat, wine and oil) and capitus (fodder), which were usually converted into money in peacetime. In addition to this they received an annual stipend to buy their uniforms and equipment, but soldiers usually preferred to pocket the money. It was because of this that soldiers were sometimes poorly equipped for fighting. As we shall see, it was this problem that Maurice set out to correct when he sought to convert payments in money into payments in kind. This solution both saved money and ensured that the men would be better equipped, but it was strongly opposed by the soldiers. In addition to this, soldiers received periodical donatives in cash, but their number had been lowered by Justinian I. He had abolished the quinquennial donative. The limitanei supplemented these salaries with the annual yield coming from their farmlands or businesses. The same was true for some of the foederati who had been granted farmlands in return for soldiering. It should not be forgotten that soldiers also had personal wealth which depended on their family background and numbers of years in service. Many soldiers were quite well off and could also possess slaves. The praetorian prefects were in charge of logistics. They governed the gathering of rations and fodder from taxpayers through vicars and governors which were then stored in the storehouses. The next level in the organization consisted of the ‘regimental

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10  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 quartermasters’, called actuarii, and their subordinates, the optiones, who distributed provisions to units. The law gave soldiers the option of commuting their rations into money, but only with the consent of the taxpayer. The reality was different. The actuaries usually demanded the whole tax in gold which they then did not forward to the soldiers; instead they used the gold to buy rations and fodder at a cheaper price enabling corrupt actuaries to pocket the difference. The option of commuting rations and fodder into gold was usually not available during wartime, because in those conditions soldiers and horses needed their provisions. When soldiers moved from one place to another special officials known delegatores accompanied them and organized the collection of supplies along the route of march which the optiones then collected by issuing receipts to the taxpayers. If large numbers of soldiers were moved from one place to another the Emperor appointed a special praetorian prefect to organize the supply of the army. Field armies were usually billeted in cities and villages so that, excepting some privileged professions (e.g. teachers, doctors and clergy), all citizens were required to surrender a third of their house to these unwanted guests, in addition to which soldiers often demanded, illegally, so-called pickles (bedding, wood, oil, or in extreme cases free supper) from their hosts. However, this was not the worst that their hosts could expect from unruly soldiers. The worst guests abused their hosts, raped the women and robbed whatever they could. Several emperors issued laws against these abuses, but the repeated complaints in the sources prove that they were ineffective. Another form of corruption was also available to the officers and wealthy. The wealthy could bribe officers to exempt them from duty, and vice versa the officers could demand to be bribed.

Supporting services Armies did not only need men who fought in the line of combat. They needed all sorts of supporting organs to function. The Roman state provided all of these. There were state-owned factories which produced standardized arms, equipment and clothes. The state also educated and trained specialists for every possible need that the armed forces could face during peace or wartime. These included, for example, workmen, carpenters, bowyers, metal workers, artillerymen, artisans, medics, doctors, veterinary doctors, cooks, armourers, architects, engineers, siege engineers, and even chaplains to take care of the spiritual needs.

Combined arms combat Roman combat tactics were still based on combined and joint arms tactics, as they had always been, but the cavalry was clearly the dominant arm because of the types of enemies the Romans faced at this time. The general fighting quality of the period infantry varied greatly, according to the numbers of men available and skills of the commander. It was only thanks to the general improvement in training and drilling under Maurice that the infantry achieved very high combat efficiency. Infantry tactics were traditional. The phalanx with its variations continued to be used in all its different forms, but there was a clear preference for the use of the hollow square/oblong array. Cavalry tactics were also traditional and based on variations of cavalry formation with two lines. Phalanxes

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  11 consisted of rank and file formations of heavy infantry in which there were typically 4, 8, 16 or at most 32 ranks of heavy infantry footmen. Light infantry was usually placed behind the heavy infantry, but it could also be placed between the files, or on the flanks, as required, and could also be used for harassment and pursuit of the enemy. Infantry phalanxes consisted of smaller units. The most important of these were: a) the meredivisions (sing. meros) consisting of at most about 6,000–7,000 men (i.e. these equalled legions); b) 2,000–3,000 men moirai (sing. moira); c) about 200–400 men tagmata/ arithmoi/banda. Cavalry was typically posted on the flanks and the reserves for both infantry and cavalry were posted behind the front line where required. Armies of less than 24,000 footmen were deployed as three phalanxes (mere). Armies of more than 24,000 footmen were deployed in four phalanxes (mere). If there were large numbers of footmen, these could be placed outside the cavalry wings. The basic building blocks of the infantry were the tent groups that formed a file in combat. They consisted of ten men of whom eight were soldiers, one recruit and one servant. Standard deployment patterns were: lateral phalanx with mere side-by-side either as a single line if baggage train followed, or as a double phalanx if baggage train did not follow. The other standard formations were: a) the hollow square/oblong; b) oblique arrays to outflank; c) rearward-angled half-square (epikampios opisthia) which was usually used against cavalry; d) forward-angled half-square (epikampios emprosthia); e) wedge (embolos/cuneus) unit formation to break through enemy array; f) hollow wedge (koilembolos) unit formation against wedge; g) convex (kyrte); h) crescent (menoeides) to outflank; i) mixed formation (cavalry placed between infantry mere) used against enemy cavalry. The Peri Stragias/Strategikes (34) also includes variants of one, two or several lines of phalanxes in depth, and the use of multipurpose soldiers armed with both bows and melee weapons. Combat drills also enabled the units to manoeuvre independently of each other so that they could for example open up the formation for enemy cavalry/ elephants to pass through, or to form a wedge or to form a hollow wedge, or double-front (in practice usually faced all directions) or double phalanx etc. Infantry unit orders were: a) open order for marching; b) close order (shields rim-torim in width) and foulkon (shields rim-to-boss in width with a shield roof) for battles in open terrain; c) kneeling foulkon (shields rim-to-rim in width with spears pointing and shield roof for three to four front ranks) against cavalry; d) multipurpose spearmen and archers against cavalry (front rank shooting at the chest of the horse and then following at higher trajectory until the horses came so near that they adopted the spear wall); e) drouggos/droungos irregular array for difficult terrain and for situations in which speed was of the essence. Roman heavy infantry consisted of various categories: a) heavy infantry skoutatoi in its standard gear wearing armour (mail, scale, lamellar, muscle) and helmets (various types: ridge, segmented, one piece), shields (typically round or oval ca. 80–90 cm in width, but even rectangular shields were used) with darts, kontarion-spear, spathion-sword and sometimes also shin guards; b) multipurpose (melee weapons and bows) armoured heavy infantry of Strategias/Strategikes (16) with extra large shield about 1.5 m high; c) lightly equipped heavy-armed footmen with a small to medium sized shield (the ‘skoutatoi’, shield-bearers) were armed with spathion (medium to long sized two-edged

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12  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 swords), semi-spathion/machaira (short sword), darts (plumbatae placed inside shield), and shorter spear. If there were large numbers of heavy infantry, they were required to be able to use bows, so these were also carried. The Strategikon demanded that if there were more than 24,000 footmen, then half of the footmen were to consist of archers.

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  13

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14  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The light infantry consisted of: a) archers; b) slingers; c) javeliners. The foot archers were also instructed to use arrow-guides, which had two benefits: a) enemies could not reuse their darts; b) the arrow-guide doubled the shooting range (max. ca. 500–600 m). The light infantry was at its best in harassment of the enemy, in pursuits, and in difficult terrain. The third category of foot soldiers consisted of dismounted cavalry. They were equipped with standard cavalry gear, which meant that they included both heavy and light infantry variants within the same formation but with the difference that their heavy formations had smaller shields than their infantry counterparts. Hence they had less protection against enemy missiles than actual footmen. The best footmen were obviously the specialists. Spears were used in three different ways in combat: a) as a spear-wall with four ranks pointing forward while others behind supported the attack with missiles (this was used against both infantry and cavalry); b) the first row/rank could throw the extra-long spear or javelin and use the sword while those behind supported the front-rankers with their spears and those behind them with missiles; c) the first three ranks placed their spears on the ground, after which the two front ranks aimed their arrows directly at horses, while those behind shot their arrows at higher angle, and all then adopted the spear wall when the enemy cavalry came close. Roman cavalry forces of the time were the best in the world and had proved themselves in combat repeatedly during the reign of Justinian I. The cavalry consisted of two basic classes: a) the natives which were thoroughly trained; b) recruits from ‘barbarian lands’ which possessed basic fighting skills at the time of their recruitment but which could require additional training to reach Roman standards, especially in the field of mounted archery if these consisted of men of Germanic origin. Like their infantry, the Roman cavalry was divided into units of mere (sing. meros) consisting of at most about 6,000–7,000 horsemen, 2,000–3,000 horsemen moirai (sing. moira) and about 200–400 horsemen tagmata also called as banda (sing. bandon, flag).

Fighting in difficult terrain4 Fighting in wooded, rough or otherwise difficult terrain consisted of fighting in marching formation (see the diagrams). This was the tactic adopted in wooded areas, rough terrain, narrow passes, and against the Slavs and Antae. It required a lightly equipped army without wagons and which did not have many horsemen. Men were required to carry only the most essential supplies and equipment. Soldiers did not carry any heavy armament such as helmets, long spears, or mail coats. In such cases the ‘heavy infantry’ skoutatoi (shield-bearers) carried only shields, swords and javelins. Depending on the size of the army, the lightly equipped shield-bearer infantry (skoutatoi) was deployed in two, three or four phalanxes (mere), each two, three, or four ranks deep. These phalanxes were placed about a stone’s throw apart from each other and marched in column formation except when the Romans reached open terrain that allowed the use of the normal phalanx. In this case, the columns made a quarter turn and formed the lateral phalanx formation. The cavalry and/or baggage trains (consisting of mules and horses) were posted so that the baggage trains were behind the phalanxes and the cavalry behind the trains. The extreme rear of the formation was always protected by

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  15 a rear guard consisting of a detachment of heavy and light infantry. In addition to this, a protective screen, consisting of light infantry and lightly equipped heavy infantry, and/ or of a small unit of cavalry, proceeded about a mile ahead of the main body. The rest of the lightly-equipped infantry, with possible small cavalry detachments, were posted in irregular four to five man groups on the flanks for their protection. Most of the archers were kept with the phalanxes since they were useful in rough, steep, narrow, and open terrain, whereas the javelin throwers were particularly useful in the thickly wooded areas.

The main striking force of this array consisted of lightly-equipped soldiers deployed outside and around the phalanx structure. These consisted of irregularly deployed four to five man throngs (droungoi, drouggoi) in which three to four men were armed with javelins and shields, and one with a bow. For safety purposes these droungoi were deployed so close to the main body that they could still hear its trumpets and bugles, and they were deployed one after the other so that they could protect each other’s back. If the leading droungos encountered enemy resistance, the groups following were expected to attack the enemy’s rear if possible. The main objective of the light infantry was always to seize the higher ground and get above the enemy. The leaders and men of these droungoi were clearly expected to be able to operate independently of each other without any outside supervision. The men of these droungoi were the crème-de-la-crème of the Roman infantry.

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16  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

Cavalry warfare The Roman cavalry was equipped as dual purpose troops with bows, spears and swords, and they typically wore armour (muscle, mail, scale, lamellar, ersatz), helmets (ridge, segmented, single piece) and shields (smaller than the infantry variants), but there were also ethnic units like the Heruls that did not wear any armour. The quality and amount of armour and equipment depended on the type of soldier and personal wealth. Roman combat doctrine as expounded in the Strategikon (1.2.35–8) required that the horses of the officers (archontes = dekarchoi, pentarkhoi, tetrarchoi, and two file guards), chosen men, and in particular those posted in the front rank, were to be equipped with: 1) iron chamfron/head-piece to protect their heads; 2) peytrals/breastplates of iron or quilted/ padded armour, or alternatively peytrals and neck-guards/crinets used by the Avars.5

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  17 Horses could be armoured or not, but in pitched battles the horses of the front rankers were usually armoured. The armoured cavalry consisted of two basic variants: a) horse with frontal armour (peytral, crinet) and head-piece (chamfron); b) horse with full armour (crinet, peytral, flancard, crupper) and head-piece (chamfron). Cavalry organization also consisted of multiples of tent groups (each with ten men) which fought as files in combat. The better the unit, the less deep it was, so in an elite unit there could be five troopers each of whom had a squire. At the other end of the spectrum were the regular units in which there were eight troopers and two squires. The standard cavalry formations were: a) a large army with over 10,000/12,000/15,000 horsemen which had three divisions with outflankers and flank guards in the first line, four divisions with units between them in the second line, and a third line with two units on the flanks; b) a medium sized force of 5,000/6,000–10,000/12,000/15,000 horsemen which had three divisions outflankers and flank guards in the first line, two divisions with a unit between them in the second line; c) small forces with less than 5,000/6,000 horsemen that had three divisions with outflankers and flank guards in the first line, and one division in the second line; d) if there were over ca. 50,000 horsemen, the extra men were to be posted outside the regular array either on the flanks or as a third line. In addition to this, the Romans could have separate units of ambushers as the situation allowed. The cavalry used three different unit orders: a) open order for marching; b) droungosirregular in difficult terrain or when speed was necessary, say in skirmishing or pursuit;

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18  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

c) close order used in pitched battles. The mere-divisions were divided into units of koursores (runners, skirmishers) on the flanks and defensores (defenders) posted in the centre. The koursores used the irregular array in skirmishing and pursuit while the defensores protected by using close order because it gave them a psychological advantage over the irregular array (the closeness of the men and horses gave added confidence and made flight more difficult). Typically a Roman cavalry attack was done at a canter/trot so that the close order could be maintained, but if the koursores had skirmished before this they could be in the droungos array. In some cases, however, Romans did charge at full gallop if it was considered advantageous. If the enemy retreated, then the koursores pursued them in irregular order while the defensores protected them. If any of the front division was forced to retreat, the divisions of the second support line moved forward to protect them. Standard combat tactics were: a) If the Romans outnumbered the enemy, they outflanked the enemy on both sides; b) If the Romans had roughly equal numbers, they outflanked on the right; c) If the Romans had fewer men, the centre meros attacked before the wings.

Siege warfare Period siege tactics were highly sophisticated and based on Greco-Roman traditions. With the exception of the Persians all the rest of the foes that the Romans faced at this time were no match for them. They still employed all sorts of stone throwers and artillery pieces (ballistae, onagri, repeating ballistae, trebuchets), mounds, tunnelling, fire-bombs,

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Introduction: The Roman Empire in 565  19 ‘hand grenades’, siege towers, battering rams, borers, drills, various types of sheds, fire hose to spread fire etc. Siege warfare can be divided into defensive and offensive techniques. The standard features in offensive sieges were: a) terms of surrender offered to the enemy at first to avoid a costly siege; b) the use of surprise attacks if possible; c) use of a traitor; d) if the enemy had refused to surrender, then assault in foulkon formation with ladders, and possibly sheds; e) if the first assault had failed, the building of siege engines and use of mounds and mines against the enemy; f) if the place was considered too costly to take by other means, then starving of the defenders to surrender. The standard defensive siege techniques were: a) the use of scorched earth policy to make the attack difficult if there was prior information of the enemy invasion; b) the building of sophisticated fortifications with enough provisions placed inside to withstand a siege; c) the exploitation of defensive features like walls and towers and the use of siege engines to negate the attack; d) the sending of a relief army against the besiegers; e) the use of a diversionary invasion; f) the employment of guerrilla warfare against the besiegers to force them to leave; g) if all else failed, then the Romans offered terms of surrender.

The Roman Navy The Roman navy was a professional force which was supported by professional marines. It had permanent bases all over the Empire, and in addition posted detachments and patrols to protect sea lanes and commerce wherever needed. Its superior ship designs and professional fleet gave the Romans naval supremacy on the Black and Mediterranean seas. This enabled them to support their land armies e.g. by transporting troops and supplies. As an internal security measure the Imperial Fleet stationed at Constantinople possessed greater numbers of larger ships (eg. bireme and trireme dromons) than the provincial fleets. The fast and agile dromons (war galleys) formed the backbone of the Roman fleet. The most commonly used dromon was the single-banked version. The standard naval combat formations were: a) single line abreast with reserves; b) the double line/phalanx with reserves; c) convex to break through the enemy centre; d) crescent to outflank; e) circle for defence. The largest ships were always positioned where the Romans intended to break through the enemy array. The Romans posted in advance of these two to three ships as scouting and skirmishing ships. Transport ships were usually placed behind the dromons. During this era the Slavs and their masters the Avars attempted to challenge Roman naval supremacy, but to no avail because the small Slavic canoes, boats and ships were no match for the dromons. During this era the principal form of naval combat took place in the rivers because it was along these that the Slavs lived. The commander of the riverine fleet was either nauarchos (the admiral) or the strategos. Depending on the size of the fleet his divisional commanders were called either moirarchai or merarchai. Ships used in riverine combat were either medium or small. The Romans divided the large riverine fleet into three divisions. Warships led the convoy of ships; cargo ships were in the middle; while some warships served as rearguards. Naval combat

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20  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 formation consisted of a single line abreast drawn from one bank of the river to another. Surplus ships were stationed as the second or third line and the lines were separated from one another by a bowshot. There were two different variants for river crossings: unopposed and opposed. In the former case a small force of infantry, both heavy and light, was shipped secretly across to protect the building of a bridge. When the crossing was contested, the admiral cleared the opposing bank with his ballistae-carrying ships. In short, the supremacy of the seas was also extended to the river frontiers.

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Chapter Two

Enemies and Allies

T

he principal enemies of the Romans at this time were the Germanic peoples (Visigoths, Gepids, Lombards, Franks), Slavic peoples (Sklavenoi, Antae), Hunnic and Turkic peoples (Sabiri Huns, Avars, Turks), and Moors, Nubians, Arabs and Persians, with their allies and subjects.

The Slavs and Antae1 We have already seen how the Antae and the Slavs (Sklavenoi) made their first appearance as enemies at the beginning of the sixth century. These peoples formed a specific type of enemy, obtaining a chapter of their own in the Strategikon of Maurice. The Sklavenoi (henceforth Slavs) inhabited roughly the area between Lake Neusiedler (near Vienna) and the Novae, in other words the Moesia/Pannonia. The Antae were located somewhere at the curve of the Black Sea between the Dniester and the Dniepr rivers. In 565 the situation in the Balkans was calm. The Balkans had been heavily fortified by Anastasius, Justin I and Justinian I. The Romans had decisively defeated all enemies they faced there, including the Avars. Justinian had created a network of alliances in the area and the peoples and tribes located acted as counterbalances against each other. Therefore Justin II inherited a Balkans which was securely in Roman hands. The Slavs and Antae were just two groups in this grand Roman game of chess. The Slavs and Antae were not considered serious threats; the Strategikon categorized them as enemies that could always be engaged in pitched battles. They were poorly organized and poorly equipped. The Romans could expect to win every time they were able to collect at least a medium sized force to oppose them. Fortifications, however, could not stop the mobile and lightly equipped Slavs. They could abandon the main highways and bypass fortifications. Furthermore, they were not hindered by water obstacles because they could use their monoxyles (ranging in size from canoes/boats to Viking-size long boats) to cross them. It was only when the Slavs had gathered their booty on wagons to transport it back home that the Romans could catch the invaders with relative ease. The main problem for the Romans was that they often lacked sufficient field forces to engage the Slavs because of their continuous wars elsewhere, which sometimes made it possible for the Slavs to remain on Roman territory for years on end. The Slavs and Antae loved freedom. They lived in small groups based on family or groups of families. They lacked unified social and political structures. They were led by chieftains who could cooperate, but equally well they could operate independently of each other. However, when chieftains found good reasons for cooperation and chose a single leader for the duration of the campaign, the size of the invading Slavic army could be huge (100,000 men plus non-combatants). This could be when they believed

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22  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 the Romans lacked adequate forces. This, however, did not improve the general fighting quality of the force. The only professional soldiers were the retinues of the wealthier chieftains. The fact that they lacked established peacetime leaders made it difficult for the Romans to negotiate with them. It was because of the above that the Strategikon (11.4) recommended dividing the enemy with alliances and the use of surprise attacks. When invading Slavic lands Maurice instructed the general to leave superfluous baggage and a moira of cavalry behind. This acted both as a guard and as a threat against the Slavs so that they would be unable to unite. The Roman troops were lightly equipped with materials for building bridges, and the navy was used where needed. The Strategikon recommended the use of two different tactical measures so that the Slavs would be unable to flee and unite. The first was to attack simultaneously from two directions: the hypostrategos (second-in-command) was to advance c.22–30 km through unsettled land behind the Slavic settlements, after which he was to start pillaging while the strategos advanced from the other direction; this confused the Slavs. Soldiers were not to take any prisoners if the Slavs put up any resistance so that they could advance quickly. The second tactic was used when there was only one suitable road. In this case the hypostrategos took a half or more of the army while the strategos followed. The hypostrategos was instructed to advance quickly and detach about one to two banda per Slavic settlement and continue his march as long as there were enough tagmata in his command (not further than c.22–30km). He was to retain three to four banda (c.1,000–2,000 horsemen) as a reserve. After this, the hypostrategos turned back and gathered up the pillagers along the route of his march while the strategos did the same from the other direction. The idea was to destroy the enemies with surprise attacks in their own homes. The Strategikon also advised the general to avoid the wooded terrain in summer as much as possible and operate only in the open areas. The recommended method was to invade during the winter when trees were bare. This made sense: the enemy in their villages could not hide if they managed to flee. But as we shall see this was not the way the Roman soldiers wanted to fight. They also wanted to rest during the winters.

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Enemies and Allies  23 The vast majority of Slavic soldiers consisted of the unarmoured light infantry carrying large oblong shields or small shields, knives, and two to three short javelins. All could throw stones well and at least some used slings. The Croats also used axes. Some carried wooden bows and arrows smeared in poison. It was because of this that the Strategikon instructed soldiers to prepare themselves for combat by taking an antidote. The Slavs appear to have used their own peculiar archery draw, which sacrificed power to rate of fire. In addition, the Slavs possessed high quality cavalry forces, which probably consisted of the wealthier Slavs and their retinues and of the remnants of Germans and Huns. It was these that were probably later called Druzhinas, i.e. military retinues of the voivodes (clan chieftains) and zupans (subordinates of the voivodes). Their elite cavalry forces were also well equipped.

The Slavs and Antae specialized in ambushes, sudden attacks, and raids. The Slavs were aware of their relative weakness in pitched battles against the Romans and therefore usually avoided open and level ground except when marching with wagons loaded with loot, which they could then form as a defensive wagon laager in emergencies. On open and level ground the combined cavalry and infantry armies of the Romans had a clear advantage over the lightly-equipped and poorly organized Slavs and Antae. However, if they chose to fight, they had their own peculiar way of fighting. At the start of the battle they first shouted all together (possibly howling like wolves) and moved forward a short distance to see if their opponents would lose their nerve. If this happened, they would attack violently, the Slavic leaders and kings leading from the front. If not, they turned around and ran to the woods. This flight, however, could be a feigned flight meant to induce the enemy to come into their chosen terrain, the forest, and it was in the woods that the lightly equipped Slavs were at their best. The Romans adopted a number of countermeasures and tactical adaptations to overcome the Slavic advantages in wooded terrain, but above all they avoided it. Marching in wooded terrain required the adaptation of equipment and formation to the circumstances.

The Nomadic Foe: the Turks and Avars2 The principal nomadic foe the Romans faced during the period 565–602 were the Avars. The other hostile groups fighting against them were the Turks, Bulgars and Sabiri Huns (possibly a Turkic group), but the last did not operate independently. They acted only

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24  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 as allies of Persia. The Avars and Turks resembled each other and the Huns proper, but unlike their Hunnic brethren the Sabirs also served as infantry (probably dismounted horsemen) in sieges. The best analysis of the combat methods of the nomads is provided by Maurice’s military manual Strategikon (11.2). The principal methods were the same as always: deceit, surprise attacks, and cutting off supplies. The sizes of the nomadic forces varied from one tribe and confederation to another, but none attained the massive numbers wielded by Attila. Typical numbers for nomads on the run consisted of 10,000 to 20,000, but these did not pose any serious military threat to the Romans because they were usually only fugitives seeking a new place of abode. It was only when they had managed to establish themselves in some location like the Avars did that they became a threat. It was the size of the Avars’ army that was the real threat, not their fighting tactics. They could put to the field armies of 60,000 to 100,000 horsemen plus the forces provided by their allies or subjects. The basic tactical unit of all of the steppe peoples was a tümän/tümen, which theoretically consisted of 10,000 men divided into 1,000–man units. However, in practice the strength varied greatly. The nomads divided their territories into districts called ‘arrows’ (Old Turkic oq, pl. ogdz, later – ģuz, Hunnic pl. oģur, later – ģur) each of which was required to provide one tümän for the confederacy of several tribes. The nomadic way of life was based on herding of horses and other animals, and the ability to control the herds of horses was based on castration. Therefore, the typical warhorse of the nomads was a gelding. These were more docile than stallions and mares and therefore more easily handled. The steppe ponies also had one major advantage over the horses of the sedentary peoples: they could survive merely by grazing. The wealthier nomads were equipped with a composite bow, lance (c.3–4 metres), sword, lasso, wicker shield or small shield (pelte/parma), segmented helmet (it often had a nasal which demanded a straight or intermediate archery position, including on horseback), and chain mail or scale or lamellar armour, and their horses could also be armoured (lamellar, scale, hides, felt). On the basis of the Strategikon it would seem that all the Avars wore the full panoply of equipment, but it is still probable that the poorer Avars wore less armour than the wealthy elite. The same is true of the Turks and other nomads, but the Avars and Turks were both better equipped with armour than most nomadic peoples; the Turks were particularly famous for their metal working. The better-equipped men among the nomads were always placed in the front ranks, followed by members of their tribal followers or members of their kin or clan whom they led. The standard combat formation of the nomadic peoples in the Strategikon consisted of a single line of irregular sized units. These units were further divided into smaller irregular units of about 40–50 horsemen. The nomads always posted a separate reserve behind, which acted as ambushers or support troops as needed. The spare horses were placed behind the first line. The baggage train was placed two to three miles behind the array and a separate guard was delegated for it. See the attached diagram. The nomads appear to have deployed their units in ranks and files – as did the Romans, Alans and Mongols – with the armoured troops in front to protect the lightly equipped. The nomadic attack began with a charge towards the enemy while shooting arrows. If

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Enemies and Allies  25

the enemy showed any signs of disorder, the attack was immediately pressed home. If the enemy stood their ground, the nomads retreated in irregular droungos (wedge) arrays while shooting backwards; if the enemy pursued, the nomads attempted to ambush them or outflank them. If neither of these took place, the charge was repeated again and again until either their arrows ran out or enemy resistance collapsed. The Turks and Avars were particularly fearsome enemies because they were equally effective at long range with bows and at close quarters with spears and swords. Another typical nomadic tactic was the use of lassoes to break up the cohesion of the enemy formations. In addition, the nomads could employ a tactical manoeuvre which was meant to confuse the enemy, called in the Strategikon the Scythian drill as the Romans had copied it from the nomads (see the attached diagram).

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26  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 When the Romans employed cavalry, it was advantageous for them to charge against the nomadic battle formation immediately, before it could spread out or manoeuvre, but not to follow too far if they fled because the Huns often placed an ambush behind their line. However, it was more advantageous for the Romans to use a combined army of cavalry and infantry in which the infantry had a dominant role. The successes of Maurice’s forces against the Avars prove this well. The Romans also had other advantages over the nomads. With the exception of Sabirs, the nomads proper were inept both as besiegers and when besieged. Their siege tactics

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Enemies and Allies  27 consisted of surprise attacks, betrayals, blockades or ravaging of the countryside to obtain payments. The situation changed only when the nomads could obtain into their service Roman turncoats.

The Light-Haired Peoples3 All of the Germanic peoples were grouped together as one general category in the Strategikon, which suggests that they all shared essentially the same cultural characteristics. During this era the Franks were generally speaking on friendly terms with the Romans so that the only hostile groupings the Romans faced were the Gepids, Lombards and Visigoths. Maurice and his staff knew this enemy inside out. The Romans had had several centuries of experience fighting against the Germanic peoples; they also possessed units drawn from the ranks of these peoples. The Strategikon judged all the light-haired races to be bold and dauntless in battle, considering even a short retreat to be a disgrace. They were particularly good at handto-hand combat, either on horseback or on foot. Their armament consisted of shields, lances, and short swords slung from their shoulders (= Lombards/Langobards). It was the duty of every warrior to exact vengeance if their comrades were killed. Their battle line was formed according to tribe, kinship, and common interest. The soldiers were arrayed in ranks and files for combat, the front of the battle line being even and dense. Their attacks were always impetuous and undisciplined, whether on horseback or on foot. They were also disobedient towards their leaders. They disliked complicated manoeuvres, and despised good order, especially on horseback. The impetuous cavalry attack at full gallop was a frightening sight to anyone unused to it. However, the Roman tactic of advancing in tight formation at a trot or canter was usually more than a match for it. In an impetuous charge, the cohesion of the formation was usually broken well before contact was made with the enemy, as the faint-hearted and those on slower horses would get left behind. Moreover, when the bolder men on faster horses approached the orderly perfectly-aligned tight cavalry formation of the Romans and saw that their comrades were not following them, they usually fled. In contrast, the Roman tactic of advancing in close order at a trot or canter ensured that they would stay together as a block. This was why the Roman cavalry formations could expect to defeat enemies which charged impetuously in disorder. However, in the case of the Germanic cavalries this advantage was not as pronounced as it was with other enemies, because the warrior ethos of the Germanic peoples ensured that they usually charged into contact even when their formations had become broken. They saw retreat as cowardly. They were also ready to dismount and fight against very superior numbers if they faced trouble. The Germanic peoples were by far the most dangerous enemies to face in pitched battles at this time. It was because of this that the Strategikon advised the strategos to avoid pitched battles with the Germans, especially in the early stages. Maurice recommended ambushes, sneak and surprise attacks, and stratagems, which were typical features of nomadic warfare. It was also preferable to dampen their eagerness for combat by cutting off supplies of their provisions, especially of wine, and by subjecting them to the discomforts of heat or cold. Their leaders were also known to be greedy men who could be bought with a suitable bribe.

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28  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The Roman army was advised to fight against them in the same manner as the Persians fought against the Romans. The strategos was to pitch his camp on rugged and difficult ground, and he was advised to use uneven and wooded terrain to break up the cohesion of the Germanic cavalry charge. The flanks and rear of the Germanic battle formations were vulnerable to ambushes because the Germans typically did not use adequate scouts or other security measures. Their marching camps were also disorganized and vulnerable to night attacks with archers. In sum, the Strategikon recommended the use of nomadic and Persian tactics against the Germanic peoples. This was a sound recommendation because Belisarius had used both with very high success rate against the Ostrogoths. Regardless of these cautions, the Strategikon still accepted the use of regular battles against the Germanic peoples if the conditions for it were favourable.

The Lombards The freeman class formed the backbone of the Lombard army and because of this their armies could be huge. In 565 the Lombards were still allied with Rome, but this changed when they began their trek to Italy. Then they possessed an overwhelming numerical advantage over the Romans, so it is clear that the Romans were in trouble from the beginning even without the secret support of the Lombards by Narses the eunuch. The entire Lombard nation was described as an exercitus (army). They considered military service as their duty and privilege. At the top of the military hierarchy were the king (when such existed) and duces. The flower of the Lombard army consisted of their horsemen. Each horseman/knight was expected to possess a squire/attendant. The Lombard knight was typically equipped with a helmet, mail-shirt, greaves, great lance (contus) or shorter spear or javelin, short sword, and spatha. The less wealthy were equipped with lances and shields. The poorest served as bow-armed footmen. The Lombards did possess some mounted archers, mostly drawn from the ranks of allied peoples, but the Lombard knights relied primarily upon their lance and war-horse. During this period the Lombard knights continued to use the contus with two hands, but the spear and shield combination was on its way to becoming the favoured melee system because the shield provided better protection against enemies that fielded mounted archers. In siege warfare the Lombards were quite inept. Their principal ways of capturing cities were surprise, betrayal and blockade. This meant that the Roman coastal cities were basically invulnerable against the Lombards as long as they were not betrayed by their citizens. The Lombards obtained a navy when they conquered Italy, but it was not big enough to challenge the Romans.

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Enemies and Allies  29

The Visigoths of Spain The principal problem for Roman Spain was that it was on the periphery of the Roman Empire. Therefore the Romans did not concentrate adequate numbers of men there. The Romans were therefore lucky that Visigothic Spain was militarily weak despite the fact that it could place large numbers of men into the field. It was usually internally divided and its military structures were inadequate. The Visigoth army consisted of the levies and the retainers of the nobility. At the top of the hierarchy was the king with his own retinue (fideles, gardingi). These may have been commanded by the comes spathariorum. The officers held Roman titles: the commanderin-chief was called the dux exercitus Hispaniae and his generals the preapositus hostis or comes or dux exercitus. The core of the Visigoth armies consisted of the nobility and their retinues (bucellarii and saiones) who fought on horseback. These retinues were equipped with ring-mail or scale-armour, helmets, round shields, lances, javelins, swords, daggers, and even maces and axes. They relied primarily on hand-to-hand combat to win battles. The rest of the army consisted of levies. These, both the Visigoths and locals, served in a unit called the thiufa led by thiufadus which consisted of the units led by quinqentarius, centenarius and decanus. This implies a decimal unit structure of 1,000 man units with subdivisions of 500, 100 and 10, but this may have varied in practice. These levies consisted of infantry (spearmen, slingers, archers, club-men) which was usually disorderly, undisciplined, poorly equipped and often unwilling to serve. The Visigoths retained the late Roman systems of provisioning, which means that they usually possessed enough provisions and therefore the Romans were unable to use the denial of provisions recommended by the Strategikon. However, thanks to poor organization and poor siege skills the Visigoths were unable to fully exploit this. They also possessed a navy of sorts, but it was no match for the Romans.

The other Germanic peoples The other Germanic peoples who concern us here consisted of the Franks, Heruls and Gepids. All these were allied with the Romans at this time. The Franks possessed truly huge armies of both infantry and cavalry with typical Germanic characteristics despite the fact that they had old Roman infantry and cavalry units with their uniforms and standards in their service. The principal reason for this was that the rest of the army consisted of Frankish or Burgundian tribesmen. This had the result that their system of provisioning was inadequate, their combat tactics Germanic and their siege skills rudimentary. In contrast to other Germanic peoples the infantry formed the flower of the Frankish army, which was reflected in its size. Also the cavalries were more expensive and difficult to maintain while it was easier and cheaper to maintain large numbers of footmen. The Frankish infantry was particularly lightly equipped because they usually did not use helmets or armour. Their typical armament consisted either: a) of the pair shield and throwing axe with a sidearm of axe or sword; or b) of two angon-javelins and shield such that the warrior used the second angon and/or sword for close quarters fighting. Even if the Franks possessed archers, they preferred close quarters fighting. The old Roman units which survived among the Franks were equipped in late Roman

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30  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

manner. The Frankish kingdom was very divided from within so that its rulers and magnates fought continuous civil wars against each other. These features influenced their combat performance as Roman allies. The Heruls and Gepids valued warrior qualities above all else, even to their own detriment, but neither of these groupings posed a threat to the Romans during this era. Heruls had become Roman Federates and the Gepids were soon destroyed by the Lombards and Avars. Both groupings fought primarily as light lancer or sword-wielding cavalry, and the remnants of these peoples were therefore valuable as recruits to the Romans.

The Moors/Berbers4 The Moors of North Africa defy easy definition because they consisted of several different tribes which were sometimes united as one massive confederate force. They were typically lightly equipped without any armour, small shields, and carried two javelins. In combat they used terrain or palisaded camps as bases of attack. Thanks to the fact that the Moors were lightly-equipped they did not pose any serious threat to the Romans in open level terrain except when they greatly outnumbered them. Their only real advantage over the Romans was that they could use deserts and mountains as places of refuge. But the Romans could counter this by isolating them in these areas until they either wanted to seek decision by battle or wanted to return to a treaty relationship with the Romans. The principal problem facing the Romans was that this area was considered a periphery and so they had not posted large forces there. This means that when the Moors formed large confederacies, the Romans faced serious problems. The typical solution to this was to unite both civilian and military powers under a single individual, the exarchus Africae. It was very rare for the Romans to send reinforcements to North Africa/Libya.

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Enemies and Allies  31

The Nubians In the mid sixth century the Nubians (ancient Noba/Nobatae) were divided into three different kingdoms: Nobadia in the north; Makuria in the middle; and Alwa in the south. The kingdoms of Alwa and Nobadia usually maintained a cordial relationship, but Nobadia and Makuria fought several wars against each other. It was thanks to the efforts of the Empress Theodora that in about 543 Nobatia had converted to the Monophysite form (Miaphysite, Jacobite) of Christianity rather than the Chalcedonian (Melkite) form. In contrast Makuria was converted to the Chalcedonian faith in about 568. The King of Nobatia then helped in the conversion of the kingdom of Alwa in about 580 with the result that Chalcedonian Makuria invaded Nobatia and Roman Egypt. The great irony in this is that the Monophysite Nobadae were fighting on behalf of the Romans whose Emperor supported the Chalcedonian doctrine. Nubian societies retained their tribal character, but with some sophisticated features. Each of the three Nubian kingdoms was ruled by a king and sub-kings, and each of the supreme kings had royal bodyguards and royal army (the tribe of the king) below whom served the armies of the sub-kings. The king held absolute power and the succession passed through the matrilineal line. After Makuria had annexed Nobatia in about 580–1, it had one ‘Great King’ with absolute powers and below him a minimum of thirteen ‘kinglets’. These kinglets had lost their military powers and so were allowed to act only as priests for their tribes. The actual power in these tribes was in the hands of an eparch, the Greek equivalent of the Latin praefectus (praetorio). On the basis of the Arab and Old Nubian sources the eparch could also have the titles of ‘Lord of the Mountain’ (Magister Officiorum?), ‘Lord of the Horses’ (Magister Equitum?), ‘Lord of the King’s Horses’ and so forth. Each of the eparchs had a vice-eparch (i.e. vicarius) to assist him. The rest of the titles also betray clear Roman influence: the primicerius, promeizon, protodomesticos of the palace (Comes Domesticorum?), domesticos, tetrarchos (no details known), Tricliniaris of the Domesticos, Tricliniaris of No, Domesticos of Pachoras, Potentiary (?) of Nan-Nokko, Meizoteros (?) of Adouou, Silentiary (?) of Nobatia, Ness of Nobatia, Ness of the Domesticos, and Tot of Michaêlk(l) and (?) Motiko(l) of Ibrim. The exact functions of these in a Nubian context are not known, but it is clear that the Nubian kingdom of Makuria was well organized. We also know that the Nubians had a navy, which probably came into existence after the Persians had conquered Yemen in about 570 and the Romans made no attempt to regain it. In other words, the Romans no longer retained permanent naval presence in the Red Sea. This would have made it necessary for the Nubians to obtain some sort of navy to protect their traders. Makuria possessed at least two navarchoi. There exists evidence for the existence of the Great Admiral (Meizonanavarchos) for the year 1069, but this office might have existed earlier than this.5 The Nubian infantry was particularly famous for its archers, which employed both wooden self bows and composite bows. We know this because: a) The Romans recruited entire units of Nubian archers; b) The Muslims called the Nubians the nickname ‘archers of the eyes’ because they were crack shots; c) In 642 Amr b. al-Asi dispatched Abdallah b. Sa’id Abi Sahr with 20,000 men into Nubia which the Nubians opposed with 100,000 men so that the Muslims suffered the worst defeat they had ever suffered according to Ahmad al-Kufi.6 According to al-Baladhuri (vol. 1, pp. 379–82), the Nubians were so

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Military History of Late Rome 565–602 Plates.indd 1

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Roman dart-thrower. For the full caption, see the list of plates, p.vii.

Mauricius Tiberius (582-602). Drawn after a black and white photo of the painting of Maurice taken from the manuscript of John Zonaras (Mutinensis graecus 122, Modena, Italy, 15th century). The colours in this image are hypothetical guesses.

Below left and centre: skoutatoi (shield-bearers) equipped lightly for difficult terrain. Below right: Infantry archer using regular bow and arrows. He could also be equipped with arrow-guide and darts.

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Three Roman heavy infantry skoutatoi ready to fight on regular terrain.

One of the David Plates in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, ca. 629-30 (public domain). It depicts David’s confrontation with his brother Eliab. Note the late Roman equipment worn and its close resemblance to hoplite gear. Note also the adoption of the Persian practice of using a covering for the helmet.

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Left: A typical Berber/Moor infantryman. Right: A typical Berber/Moor mounted javeliner seated on a Berber horse. These horses grew to about 5 feet high, were hardy and could carry a lot of weight, and they were bad tempered and kicked! The Berbers were justifiably famous as horse javeliners. They also possessed large numbers of unarmoured light infantry equipped as spearmen, slingers and bowmen, and a small number of mounted archers.

Below left: Slavic axe-man typically used by the Croats. The shield emblem is generic and is taken from a Vendel era shield pattern because its edges resemble the edges of a shield depicted in a 6th-7th century Slavic figurine. Below centre: The most common type of warrior in the armies of the Slavs and the Antae was the lightly equipped javeliner who carried a shield, two to three javelins and a knife. Colour scheme and shield after Gorelik. Below right: A typical Slavic foot archer. The Slavs used a mix of wooden and composite bows and typically poisoned their arrows. The Slav archery draw consisted of locking the little finger, the ring finger and middle finger on the string while holding the index finger outstretched along the arrow. Faris and Elmer, Arab Archery, 43-5.

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An Avar cataphract Horse: iron stirrups; saddle with a high pommel; lamellar armour with Chinese-style metal chamfron. Man: a segmented Kuppelhelm-helmet; lamellar cuirass with shoulder pieces, cuisses and brassards of iron strips; straight single-edged sword, a spear with a pennon, a shield behind the back which was rarely used, a quiver, and an unstrung bow in a bowcase. Adapted from Gorelik as a composite of a Turk and Avar (14-7) on the basis of the fact that the Avars were originally a subject tribe of the Turks. The use of Chinese and Central Asian style lamellar armour (see Syvänne, Aurelian, 139) is based on the fact that when Maurice (Strategikon 1.2.35-39) details the types of horse armour the Roman cavalry was required to use he gave as alternatives the following: chamfron of iron (head-piece/helmet); peytral (chest-piece/ breastplate) of iron or quilted/padded patchwork, or alternatively Avar type chamfron and flancard. This leaves open what Maurice meant by the Avar type of horse armour, and it is equally unclear what he meant by the peytral of iron. However, from other sources we know that the Romans used iron for plate, segmented, scale and mail armour so it is probable that Avar armour was not one of these. This means that the likeliest candidates for Avar horse armour would be boiled leather armour, which the Romans used sometimes, or lamellar armour made of plates of iron/steel or of boiled leather. My educated guess is that Avar armour meant primarily lamellar armour of iron/steel plates. The reason for this guess is that the Avars certainly had enough metal for this, which is best demonstrated by their use of iron stirrups. They are actually credited with the introduction of iron stirrups in Europe, although this is uncertain because it is certain that the stirrup was known in Europe well before this. The Avars are also claimed to have brought to Europe peculiar types of quivers, spear-heads (clearly copied from the Chinese), their peculiar style of long composite bow, straight singleedged blades which were later transformed into sabres, and saddles with high pommels.

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Chosroes II Parwez in the Taq-i-Bustan equestrian relief.

On the basis of the evidence the lance technique in which the lance was held as if it were a javelin (above arm) was one of the techniques used by the Roman cavalry. The above image is based on the equestrian statue of Chosroes II, but in the Strategikon the rider was instructed to lean forward while holding his shield so that it also protected the horse’s head. In fact, it may have been the preferred technique in the Strategikon of Maurice, if Maurice’s text is interpreted in this way (see Appendix 2). It enabled its user to choose between two combat techniques: 1) the rider could throw the lance to gain an advantage of distance over the enemy using the lancing technique; 2) by leaning forward the rider could choose to lance the enemy.

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Left: A coin of Justin II. Right: A coin of Tiberius II. Source: Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. www.cngcoins.com.

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Top left: Nubian infantry archer. The Nubian foot archers were among the best in the world and actually performed far better than the Romans or the Sasanians against the Muslims. Below left: Nubian cataphract. The painting is based on circumstantial evidence. On the basis of an extant sixth-century relief of a cataphract (the line drawing after the British Museum original) we know that the Yemenites possessed cataphracts of the type that have remained in use in Africa until modern times. I have therefore here made the conjecture that the type of armour has remained roughly the same and I have painted the image partially after the watercolour painting of Carl Arriens (1912) which depicts a Nigerian horseman in padded armour. However, I have made some changes (e.g. removed the stirrups) to adapt it to sixth-century circumstances. David Nicolle has suggested that the strange padded armour which protected the riders’ feet originated in Persia, but I would tentatively suggest that it actually originated in Africa and specifically in Makuria. In short, I suggest that the Nubians of Makuria possessed superb cataphracted cavalry mounted on equally superb Dongolawi horses. Below right: Nubian spearman drawn after Heath.

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Top left: Roman front-rank cavalry lancer charging against the enemy as instructed by the Strategikon. The image shows one of the equipment variants in use. Top right: Lombard heavy cavalry lancer charging. Lombard lancers might wield their spear with two hands, or they might use only one hand and carry their shield in the other. Below left: A Roman officer in light gear. (Photo © Jyrki Halme)

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A high ranking Roman officer either from the regular army or from the imperial bodyguards.

A Roman officer (e.g. dux, magister militum vacans or local pagarch) from Thebaid, Egypt bordering Nubia. He has Nubian blood in his veins.

A Roman officer in light gear. (Photo © Jyrki Halme)

A coin of Maurice. Source of photo: Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. (www.cngcoins.com)

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A Roman front-rank fighter equipped with scale armour and ridge helmet, the latter of which remained in use until the early seventh century or the eighth century (opinions vary) after which it was entirely replaced by segmented helmets which were already in use at this time. (Photo © Jyrki Halme)

A coin of Phocas. Source of photo: Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. (www.cngcoins.com)

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A textile roundel depicting two horsemen in combat. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, sixth or seventh century (public domain). Note the direction of the horses and the way the horsemen are holding their javelins.

A silver plate depicting Chosroes II during the hunt. (Source: Ebersolt)

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A small bust of Phocas, British Museum. (Author’s photo)

Standard-bearer with the ‘Christ image not made by human hand’. I have here made the guess that such standard-bearers would still have worn traditional costume.

Mauricius in 581 comes excubitorum comes foederatorum magister militum per orientem strategos autokrator Maurice (Mauricius Tiberius) in 581 when he was still strategos of the eastern front.

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Above left: Chosroes II Parwez (590-628), the last great Sasanian ruler (Xusrō II Aparwēz/Khosrow II Parvīz/Khusro II Parvīz). The painting is a combination from two different sources. The head is based on the bronze bust currently in the Louvre which is usually dated to the sixth or seventh centuries, but a fifth century date is also possible. The headgear identifies him either as Perozes/ Peroz I (459-84), or as Chosroes II, or as one of his successors. I have here made the assumption that he is Chosroes II. The rest of the reconstruction is based on Hottenroth’s reconstruction of a Sasanian/Sassanid ruler. Above right: Chosroes II Parwez painted after the Taq-i-Bostan relief. Below left: The Emperor Maurice (Mauricius Tiberius) in his court attire. The painting combines the body of Justinian from the Ravenna Mosaic with the head of Maurice on one of his coins.

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Roman cavalry charging at the Battle of Melitene in 576. I have here depicted the Romans using the couched lance technique. This technique is depicted in period works of art and so was definitely one of the techniques used during this era. However, it is possible that the preference changed when Maurice became Emperor (see Appendix 2). The drawing borrows several elements from earlier works of art which may be noted by those with keen eyes.

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32  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 accurate they would scarcely miss and were able to shoot out the eyes of the Muslim attackers. Baladhuri (8.1., 237, tr. Hitti p. 379) added the following: Muhammad ibnSa’d… said,7 ‘I have been to Nubia twice during the caliphate of Umar…, and I never saw a people who are sharper in warfare than they.’ They fought far better against the Muslims than either of the superpowers, the Romans or the Persians. It is therefore no wonder that the Romans had so much trouble with them when they invaded in about 581–3. It was only thanks to the extraordinary efforts of Aristomachus that Roman Egypt was spared further damage. On the basis of archaeological evidence we know that the Nubians used spears, halberds, small spears or javelins, leather shields, and single-edged swords. Recent research suggests that they may have had crossbows too. The rarity of archaeological finds of body armour suggests that most of the soldiers were equipped either with rigid leather armour or padded armour or did not possess any. It is clear that most of the Nubians were lightly-equipped. The Nubian cavalry consisted of camel mounted troops and regular cavalry. The Nubians possessed two types of horses, the Makurian horses which were known to be very small, the size of an ass, and the true war horse, the Dongolawi Horse. The former was probably used either as a transport or pack animal, but the latter was well suited for military use. It was bigger than the Arab, had excellent stamina and was very obedient.8 It was presumably this latter type of horse that the Nubians equipped with some sort of armour, which is likely to have resembled the armour depicted in the accompanying illustration of the Yemenite cataphract. I would suggest that the Yemenite armour actually originated in Nubia/Sudan and that it was because of the trade contacts that we find this type of armour in use in the later kingdom of Mali and India.9 It is probable that it did not originate in Persia because we do not possess any evidence for the use of such armour in that region.

Sasanian Persia10 General Overview The two greatest empires of late antiquity were Rome and Sasanian Persia. Of these two, Rome possessed the larger population and the more flourishing economy, even after the fall of West Rome. Furthermore, its strategic and economic centre of gravity, Constantinople, was far more secure than the Persian capital Ctesiphon. Ctesiphon lay within easy reach of the Roman armies that could invade either by using the Tigris or the Euphrates route. Besides the Persian defenders, the main sources of distress for invading Romans were the unbearable heat during the summer months accentuated by disease and insects. Any threat to the Sasanian political and economical centre of gravity in the general area of Ctesiphon was bound to result in political upheaval thanks to the loss of prestige of the Sasanian ruler. In contrast, the defences of Constantinople, its Theodosian Walls and the Imperial Navy, ensured the survival of the Roman Empire until 1453. The Persian Army The Persian Empire was hierarchically organized to support the state and its military forces. It was the most sophisticated enemy the Romans ever faced. Persian military forces consisted of: a) light and heavy cavalry; b) light and heavy infantry; c) elephant

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Enemies and Allies  33 corps; d) allies; e) navy; f) logistical support. Their permanent military establishment was numerically inferior to the Romans, but with the addition of the feudal forces of the nobility the Persians could obtain numerical superiority over the Romans. In fact, Persian combat doctrine required the commanders to seek overwhelming advantage in numbers. The Cavalry Heavy cavalry formed the backbone of the Persian army. Chosroes I Anushirwan had reformed it so that after him its core element consisted of the heavy cavalry (Asawaran/ Savaran) provided by the Azadan nobles and Dehkan lesser nobles. He also unified the armament of this heavy cavalry so that everyone was required to possess the following equipment: helmet, hauberk, breastplate, mail, gauntlet, girdle, thigh-guards, shield, lance, sword, battle-axe, mace, bowcase, two bows and bowstrings, a quiver with thirty arrows, two extra bowstrings, a lasso, a sling and stones, and horse armour. The lightarmed cavalry of the Sasanians consisted mostly of allies (e.g. Arabs, Turks, Huns) or mercenaries. Below are two examples of Sasanian heavy cavalry cataphracts from the seals of sixth century spahbeds. For other examples, see the Plates.

The Infantry The Persian infantry consisted mostly of poorly trained peasants who provided both archers and spearmen. The spearmen were equipped with huge oblong curved shields covered with wickerwork and rawhide or wattle mantlets, and they provided protection for the foot archers placed behind them. The footmen were usually posted behind the cavalry in combat to protect them so that the infantry played a greater role usually only in difficult terrain or in sieges. The only true elite force of the Sasanian infantry were the allied force of the Dailamites/Dilemnites/Daylami (each man typically equipped with a shield, spear or pike, a sword and a small dagger/dirk) and the descendants of the

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34  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 so-called Murmillones. The quality of the Daylami was so high that they were used as bodyguards by Chosroes II Parwez. The Structures After the reforms of Chosroes I Anushirwan, Persian military organization was built around four regional spahbeds (north, south, east and west). The idea behind this division was to restrict the powers of the nobility, but in practice it was to lead to a regionalization of the armed forces so that the soldiers in each area started to see their spahbed as their protector and patron. This process was eased by the fact that most of these forces consisted of feudal forces which were always prepared to seek a patron. In addition to this there existed the royal army, with its bodyguard units which served under the direct control of the commander of the bodyguards and shahanshah. The elephant corps was located in the royal parks and hunting grounds and was under the direct control of the ruler. Most of the naval forces of the realm appear to have been under the spahbed of the south because his lands included the entire coastal area of Persia proper. These, however, never played as significant role as Roman naval forces because Persia relied mainly on its cavalry to win battles and wars. It was thanks to their well-organized administrative and military organization that the Persians were able to organize, collect and train armies far in excess of the capabilities of the other enemies of Rome. The Sasanians had codified their military practices into a collection of military manuals that dealt with all aspects of war. Vestiges of these are still visible in the fragments of the Ayin Nameh and Muslim military treatises. Even their religious book Avesta contains a military section entitled the Arteštarestan ‘warrior-code’. However, the most important inheritance for later generations were their archery treatises which ensured the survival of the most sophisticated archery techniques that mankind has ever developed. The Persian approach to warfare was methodological and highly sophisticated. Their military doctrine expected that soldiers were recruited, trained and equipped according to the instructions laid by Chosroes I; that they would always possess accurate information about the enemy through their spies and scouts; and that their campaigns would be well organized (reconnoitring, enough supplies, fortified marching camps etc) . It is usually thought that the Sasanian army was organized according to the decimal system (a wašt of 100 men; 1,000 men of drafš; 10,000 men ‘division’ gund), but on the basis of the narrative sources it is probable that their organization resembled that of the Romans so that a century (100 men) contained in that figure recruits and servants who did not take part in the actual fighting unless the enemy reached their marching camp. The size of Persian field armies could be huge, even as large as 120,000 horsemen, with footmen and servants in addition. However, armies of this size were gathered only for major campaigns. It was more typical for the larger armies to consist of between 20,000 and 90,000 horsemen. The typical distribution pattern that the Persians adopted against the Romans was to post two armies against the Romans, the smaller one with 20,000 horsemen and the larger one 50–90,000 foot and horse. However, as said, the Persians could assemble larger forces when necessary. Persian Tactics Sasanian military doctrine was flexible. They could use diplomacy, stratagems, guerrilla warfare, wars by proxy and so forth to achieve their goals. If these did not work, then

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Enemies and Allies  35 they might resort to a massive invasion of Roman territories. This was usually done to extort money from the Romans for wars against the nomads, because the Persians lacked the financial means of the Romans. In such cases the Persians relied on the holy trinity of heavy cavalry, archery and numerical superiority. On the basis of the Strategikon, Ayin Nameh, Muslim military treatises and narrative sources, we are in a position to know the basic details of their combat methods. Their marching formation consisted of the vanguard, the rear guard, the wings, and the centre. They used trumpets and drums to lead forces. They used religious ceremonies and speeches before battles to encourage the men. The Persians valued personal bravery and often sought single combats before or during battle. Their ideal place for battle was where they could locate on higher ground with the wind and sun behind them to facilitate their archery. Shouting, war cries and drumming were used to scare the enemy. According to the Strategikon, the Persians used single line and double line cavalry formations which were divided into three divisions (mere), centre, right, and left. The front of the formation was even and dense while the depth of the units reflected their quality. The Strategikon considered the flanks of the formation vulnerable because the Persians did not use adequate flank guards. The centre had four or five hundred additional picked troops. Some of the Muslim military treatises divided the Persian array so that it consisted of the outer left wing, left wing, centre, right wing and outer right wing. This could be interpreted so that the outer wings were the Roman outflankers and flank guards, but on the basis of the Ayin Nameh (and Strategikon’s referral to insufficient flank guards) it is likelier that the left, centre and right wing corresponded with the Strategikon’s centre. The relevant quote is given below: ‘I read in the book Ayin: There has been established the custom to place during the battle the warriors who are left handed on the left wing, so that they may, facing the enemy, shoot to both sides. And …, that horsemen should fight in front, and this is not observed during a mutual advance or flank movement. And (also), that for ‘the heart’ (of the army) an elevated place should be chosen [The seeking of high ground and difficult terrain so that the enemy could be subjected to a prolonged shower of arrows is confirmed by the Strategikon and narrative sources.] and endeavours should be made to place it there, for the warriors of the right and the left wing (can) not (be) overcome and beaten, even if they sustain great losses, as long as the ‘two chief parts’ hold firm, but if the ‘two chief parts’ are beaten, the firmness of the right and left wing is useless. And when the army is growing weak, let the warriors of the right wing and the ‘two chief parts’ advance [this makes it likelier that the left, centre and right wing of the Muslim military treatises meant the centre of the Strategikon.]; as regards the left wing it shall not attack, unless it is attacked by a dangerous enemy; – then they (i.e., the warriors of the left wing) shall repulse the attack of the enemy. Whereas the warriors of the right wing and of the ‘two chief parts’ may enter into action with those attacking and return again to their own ranks in order to enter again (into action); the warriors of the left wing may do this only when falling back, and it is not possible for them once having returned, to enter (into action). … And when the majority of the warriors of the army are tried intelligent and valiant (men), it is best for the army, that the enemy should be the first to attack; whereas, when the majority are inexperienced and the battle cannot be avoided, then it is

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36  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 better for the army to be the first in attacking the warriors of the enemy. And it is not advisable for the army to fight with the enemy, unless it surpasses the enemy four times or three times in number [Note how large a superiority in numbers was the goal in Persian combat doctrine. It was because of this that we find the huge numbers in the sources.]; but, when it is the enemy, that attacks, then (the army) is allowed to fight, if it surpasses the enemy in number by one and a half approximately; but when the enemy invades (our) country, it (the army) is allowed to fight even when it is in lesser numbers. … And (let) the war be postponed as much as possible, for, indeed, during the same insolent deeds and cunning and underhand dealings are displayed by those fighting. But, if the battle cannot be avoided, let them fight with light weapons [this means archery]. And let them occupy for the camp and disposition of the troops some locality covered, woody and supplied with water; and let the enemy have at his disposal the plains and the lowlands.’ Ayin-nameh, tr. Bogdanov, 13–16 with my comments in parentheses in italics.

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Enemies and Allies  37

The narrative sources confirm the general accuracy of this. The rest of the Muslim military treatises that include Persian material, and the narrative sources, allow the making of the following additions. When the Persians outnumbered the enemy they could attempt to encircle it with a crescent formation (regular crescent or crescent with flank guards). If the two sides were roughly equal in size, the Persians could attempt to outflank on the right flank, just as the Ayin Nameh instructs above. If the enemy possessed the numerical advantage, the Persians were expected to avoid combat, or use difficult terrain, ambushes, feigned flight etc, and only if that was not possible could they try to break the enemy centre with a convex attack. In extreme emergencies the Persians might adopt the circle formation by dismounting their men; or they fled. The diagrams above show the principal combat formations used by the Sasanians, including those in which infantry was present. In the Strategikon, Roman counter-measures against the Persians consisted of two basic tactics: 1) they sought to use large numbers of cavalry lancers in open and level territory, which shortened the time the Romans were forced to stay under Persian arrows; 2) the Romans sought to use infantry and dismounted cavalry when the Persians were deployed in difficult terrain or on high ground. Both of these tactics proved very successful during the latter half of the sixth century, which shows the accuracy of the instruction. However, it was not cavalry warfare that made the Persians particularly dangerous foes for the Romans but their outstanding siege skills in combination with the use of large masses of men. It was this that made it possible for the Persians to conquer well fortified cities and then hold on to their conquests. The Persians possessed two main advantages over the Romans in siege warfare: they had more archers than the Romans; and in defence the Persians were far more tenacious than the Romans. The Sasanians possessed a navy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, but it was no threat to the Romans because it would have needed to pass through the Canal of Trajan to get to the Mediterranean. As well

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38  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 as this, its ships consisted of dhows which were inferior as warships against the nailed galleys – the dromons – that the Romans used. The Persians could threaten the Romans with a navy only by conquering coastal areas in the Mediterranean or the Black Sea and then by using local resources. However, as we shall see in MHLR Volume VIII, even with these resources the Persians were no threat to the professional Roman navy.

The Arabs and Yemenis before Muhammad11 Before Muhammad and the advent of Islam, the Arabs/Saracens the Romans faced in the Middle East consisted of a great variety of different tribes and tribal confederacies, from Mesopotamia to Arabia and Yemen. Some of these were urbanized and/or sedentary while others were semi-nomadic or entirely nomadic. Some of the tribes of Mesopotamia, the Syrian Desert, Arabia and Sinai were located within Roman borders (inner limes), others were just outside it (outer limes), while others travelled between these areas. Some of these tribes were fully Romanized and sedentary and employed as regulars, while others had retained their tribal structures, even when sedentary, and were therefore treated as barbarian federate tribes. The tribes of the buffer zone, i.e. the outer limes (which included sedentary, semi-nomadic and nomadic tribes), were also engaged to act as federates against the semi-nomadic or nomadic tribes still further away. The Romans sought to control the non-Romanized Arabs (Bedouins and other Arabic groupings) by supporting loyal Arab sheiks/phylarchs (i.e. by supporting a local warlord). The loyalty of these tribes depended on their treatment and ultimately on the existence of adequate regular military forces in the area. Those located further away consisted of independent tribes and clients of Persia. During this era the Christian Ghassanids served as the principal federate grouping on the Roman side while the mainly pagan Lakhmids of alHira served as the principal clients of Persia. Justinian I the Great had made Arethas (al-Harith ibn Jabalah), the Ghassanid sheriff/ sharif/sheik/phylarch, supreme commander of all Arabs/Saracens in Roman service so that Arethas held simultaneously the titles of basileus, phylarchos and patricius from ca. 528 until his death in about 569. His successor as sheriff/sheik of the Ghassanids and supreme ruler of all Arabs with the same titles of basileus, phylarchus and patricius was his son Alamundarus whose heroic escapades will be viewed in some detail in this volume. As we shall see, the Ghassanid lands were located both within the Roman borders and outside it, but the Ghassanids usually spent their spring season in tents in the region of Jabiya and the rest of the season just outside the city of Sergiopolis (Rusafa). This was no accident. The Ghassanids were Monophysite Christians who venerated in particular Saint Sergius whose shrine was in Sergiopolis.12 The armies of the Federate Arabs, the Bedouins bordering the Roman Empire, and the Arab allies of Persia, resembled each other. Both employed camels as their means of transport of men and supplies, and used horses for fighting. It was very rare that their camels were used as mounts in combat. The use of camels as beasts of burden provided the sedentary Arabs and Bedouins with the ability to move in deserts from one oasis to another. The deserts acted as launching pads for attacks and as places of refuge. The Arab horses were already justifiably famous for their incredible speed; it was this that gave the Arab cavalries greater mobility on the battlefield than any of their enemies, while it was

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Enemies and Allies  39 the camels and knowledge of the deserts that gave the Arabs a strategic advantage over the Romans. The Romans needed Arabs to counter the threat posed by the Arabs. On the basis of the narrative sources, the federate Ghassanids sought to take full advantage of their highly mobile horses by equipping their cavalry with light gear, but their enemies, the Lakhmids, may have adopted the opposite course because their armies included Persian cataphracts. All males of the Bedouin tribes were warriors who took great pride in their fighting skills, bravery and self-control. All males learnt from early childhood riding skills, use of swords, bows, and spears and how to survive in trying living conditions. These skills were extolled in poetry; poets preserved for posterity the memory of feats of fighting and the names of the individuals and tribes. Their poems had an important role in establishing tribal solidarity and in the reputation of the tribe and its members. The poems eulogized their riding skills, skills with sword, spear and bow, and often referred to the booty obtained (e.g. women carried off on the saddles). Their expertise with their keen-edged swords was the Bedouin’s greatest source of pride, so it is no surprise that they fought particularly well with it.13 All Arab armies included light cavalry lancers (spears, javelins, sword, shield, and possibly some armour and helmet) and mounted archers.14 In addition, there were very small numbers of cataphracts armed with bows and melee weapons. The Arab Federates in Roman service used a combination of Roman, native and Persian equipment while the Lakhmids used primarily Persian and their own gear. The evidence suggests that the armies of Central Arabia consisted mostly of camel-mounted infantry, who fought with short swords, long spears, and bows; but spear-armed horsemen were also employed. The standard marching array of the Arabs and Bedouins (khamis) consisted of the centre, two wings, vanguard, and rearguard, that could readily be deployed for combat in various ways. Long contact with Greek, Roman and Persian cultures had influenced Arab and Bedouin tactics in many ways; they combined them with their own native ways in unique manner. The narrative sources from the era of Muslim conquests prove that the Arabs could employ all of the tactical combinations that the Romans and Persians used, in addition to which they were able to use their desert fighting skills. This amalgamation of different tactical systems was the result of uniting the different tribes under a single banner. But this was obviously not the case before Islam united these tribes. Before that the different tribes and tribal groupings used tactics with which they were all familiar. However, there were still some unifying elements present in all of these. Those tribes that employed primarily cavalry employed two basic tactics: 1) a charge at a gallop in loose and irregular formation (could include the use of archery), which, if successful, was followed by a pursuit, and if not, it was repeated; 2) a slow and methodical cavalry attack with units arrayed in close order. And those tribes that employed infantry almost always deployed their infantry in tightly arrayed phalanxes which were supported by small numbers of cavalry. Open terrain made this a necessity, but when needed they still knew how to fight in looser formation in difficult terrain. The Arabs that lived along the coasts used ships and boats (dhows), but these did not pose any naval threat to the Romans. Yemen and Yemenites were a special case for the Romans due to its strategic importance in the Indian trade. Yemen consisted of three tribal kingdoms: Saba, Hadramawt and

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40  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Himyar, of which Himyar had the dominant position. It was an area that the Romans usually controlled by means of an alliance with the Aksumite king of Ethiopia who would control Yemen through his client king of Yemen, or alternatively with a direct alliance with the ruler of Yemen. For the history of these alliances, see the previous volumes in this series. The ancient Yemeni military structure had four different elements:15 1) The national troops called the Khamis under the king, or one of his generals; 2) Levied troops from the highland communities; 3) Cavalry (light and heavy); 4) Bedouin allies/mercenaries. One can estimate that the combined Khamis-armies of the three kingdoms (Saba, Himyar, Hadramawt) would consisted of about 9,000–12,000 men, in addition to which came the feudal forces, levies and Bedouins. The full potential of the Himyarite forces in Yemen alone cannot have been much fewer than 30,000–40,000 men, in addition to which came the forces of the various client kingdoms (perhaps 30,000–40,000).

The vast majority of the Yemenite forces were infantry. The main weapons of the infantry were dagger and spear, but swords were also used by the wealthy. In addition, they had men armed with bow, sling and axe. In other words, the infantry consisted of specialized units of heavy infantry (armed as pikemen) and light infantry. Their pikemen were apparently deployed like the Macedonian sarissa-armed pikemen in phalanx formations in which the pikes of the first five rows extended beyond the formation and formed an almost impenetrable wall of pikes against anyone approaching from the front. On the basis of later sources, like the thirteenth century Gotha Manuscript (pp.51–2) which consists primarily of much older treatises, it is possible that the Yemenis and later the Muslim armies deployed their pikemen in five ranks of pikemen behind which were duellists, servants, and the baggage train (consisting of camels, asses and their handlers).16 For the duration of the march, the infantry was usually mounted on camels and then dismounted for combat. The poor who could not afford a camel rode pillion.

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Enemies and Allies  41 Cavalry forces made up 10–25 per cent of the army and consisted of specialized heavy and light contingents, the latter being usually drawn from the Bedouins. On the basis of a carved plaque from the region of Shabwa in Yemen dated to the late antique, David Nicolle has recently (23 November 2018) suggested that the Yemenis used a very peculiar type of cataphract cavalry in which the rider placed his legs inside the horse armour. Nicolle claims that the only other evidence for the use of such armour comes from the Hoysala carvings from twelfth/thirteenth century south-western India. On the basis of this Nicolle suggests that the man shown in the Shabwa carving was one of the Persian asvārān/savaran (asāwira) who had been sent by Chosroes I to occupy Yemen in about 570–4, and that the Indian depictions of this armour result from late Sassanian influence or early Muslim armies. However, I would suggest that this interpretation is not correct. We do not possess any evidence for the use of this type of armour in Persia/Iran. Yemen and Arabia were in constant direct contact with India – they even imported Indian steel ingots and Indian steel swords – and I would suggest that it is possible the Yemenis also imported this very peculiar type of horse armour from India, but there is an even likelier explanation for the appearance of this armour in Yemen. Contrary to what Nicolle claims, there is evidence for the use of such armour outside Yemen and India. The Africans of Nigeria and the Niger area used this precise type of horse armour. Considering that this type of padded armour is particularly typical for the African cavalries, I would suggest that the likeliest place of origin for it is Africa and in particular Makuria with its famous cavalry mounted on Dongolawi horses. The problem with this is that the evidence for this is late and the armour is padded armour. Regardless of how one interprets the material,

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42  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 it is clear that the Yemenis possessed super-heavy cataphracts that were a match for any other heavy cavalry in the world. The attached battle formation illustrates nicely how well-ordered and disciplined the Himyarite battle formation was, especially its infantry divisions. The battle formation provided an all-around defensive perimeter for the commander/king and presented a solid front against enemies in the front. It also provided several layers of reserves. The cavalry was posted so far back that the horsemen could be considered as ambushers. The Yemenite navy seems to have consisted of dhow merchant ships and of pirate vessels. The dhow was and is an easily manoeuvred seaworthy sewn vessel that was powered by one or two lateen sails. The largest ships could have had three masts. The dhows consisted of a variety of specialized vessels which in modern times have been classified according to the type of the hull. These include the following: baghlah, batil (pirate vessel), boum, ghanjah, jalibut, sambuq/sambuk/sanbuq, and zaruq. See the illustrations. The bulk of the Yemenite ships were posted in the ports of Mukhawan, Aden, Qana, and Oman. Each of these ports could have about fifty large cargo vessels at any time. The principal naval tactic with the sewn ships was the boarding of enemy vessels after their crews had been subjected to a rain of missiles. Despite their great size, these ships were still vulnerable to being sunk by the stronger oar- and sail-powered Roman warships with their nailed hulls.

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Chapter Three

Augustus Justin II (565–578)

3.1.  JUSTIN II: THE SANE YEARS 565–574 Justin II secures the throne1

T

he mighty Emperor Justinian I passed away during the night 13/14 or 14/15 (this is likelier) November 565. In laudem Iustini Augusti minoris written by Flavius Cresconius Corippus in about 566–7 gives us the details of what happened next. The news of the death was brought to the Sophiae Palace, where the curopalates/cura palatii Justin (Iustinus), nephew of the Emperor Justinian, resided. The bearer of the news was Praepositus Sacri Cubiculi Callinicus, a close friend of Justin. He was Chief Eunuch of the Bedchamber so he was the first person of importance to know of the death of the Emperor and therefore in a position to deliver the message to those he wanted to. Callinicus had already informed the Senate of the death and the senators had been instructed to get to the Imperial Palace on the double. The nephew of the Emperor Justin had risen to a prominent position in the imperial court largely thanks to his family connections. He was not only a relative of Justinian, but he had also married Sophia, the granddaughter of the Empress Theodora. Sophia’s support was instrumental because she had her own powerbase within the court. She was also ambitious and pushed her husband on; she had abandoned her Monophysitism to give her husband a better chance of gaining the throne. This marriage connected Justin with two important power blocks within the court. Justin had become curopalates and so had risen to a prominent position during the last years of Justinian’s reign when the Emperor started to pay less attention to the governance of the Empire due to his weakening

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44  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 health. Family relations and his position as curopalates enabled Justin and Sophia to forge important connections with those whose opinions mattered. These included the most important state officials and senators. The list of people who had urged Corippus to write the panegyric of the rise of Justin II to power in 566 gives us some of those names. They included not only Callinicus, but also Quaestor and Magister Officiorum Anastasius (he held this position after March 565 until early 566); Comes Sacrarum Largitionum Magnus; Theodorus, son of Peter the Patrician (Peter was the Mag. Off. until March 565 and his son Theodorus from 566 until the reign of Tiberius II); and a secretis Demetrius. The patrons of Corippus also included Thomas, whose position is unknown beyond the statement of Corippus that Thomas had made peace in Africa. Averil Cameron suggests that he was the Praetorian Prefect of Africa after Justinian’s nephew Marcian had defeated the rebellion in Africa in about 564. He may have returned to Constantinople by the time Justinian had died. Most importantly, Justin had managed to have his protégé Tiberius appointed Comes Excubitorum. Tiberius was a young and handsome Thracian who had been brought to the attention of Justin while he was still only a notary by the Patriarch Eutychius. As we shall see, his good looks had also gained the attention of Sophia. The fact that Justin was supported by both the eunuchs, including the spatharii (sword-bearers/bodyguards) among them, and by the excubitores, gave him an advantage over all other possible candidates for the throne. Consequently, when Justinian then died, Justin and his helpers put into effect a plan that they had prepared in advance. Callinicus took Justin and Sophia to a room overlooking the sea. Averil Cameron is likely to be correct that this was located in the Sophiae Palace where the couple were residing and which overlooked the harbour of Sophiae. Therefore Justin and Sophia appear to have built this palace before they came to the throne. When the pair had taken their seats, the senators arrived. It was then that Callinicus took charge of the proceedings and claimed that Justinian had appointed Justin as his successor and then greeted Justin as Augustus which the Senate confirmed by bowing and kissing the feet of the royal couple. Justin feigned reluctance but then agreed to take the throne. He lacked military experience, but this did not matter. He had the backing of the most important persons present in the court. This was not unprecedented: Arcadius, Theodosius II, Anastasius and Justinian had lacked military experience. After this, Justin, Sophia and the senators went to the Imperial Palace, which was guarded by the excubitores, to pay their respects to the deceased emperor. In the morning the demes (‘the people’) – the circus factions paired as Greens (spring), Reds (summer) and Blues (autumn), Whites (winter) – gathered in the circus to cast their vote. However, in this case the Senate had made certain that all the demes could do was just to acclaim Justin while the imperial couple went to church (Corippus fails to state which one) where they gave a public declaration of their orthodox faith. After this, the couple returned to the palace for the crowning ceremony. Servants dressed Justin with the imperial robes, boots and diadem. He wore imperial tunic, white robe with gilded edges reaching the knees, shining purple/red boots, a shining golden gem-studded belt around his waist, a purple chlamys adorned with gold-covered shoulders and right arm, and a golden fibulabrooch with hanging jewels. The proceedings started with a military crowning. A man called Armatus held in his right hand a golden torque, proclaimed Justin Emperor three times, placed the torque on Justin’s neck, and Justin thanked him by appointing Armatus

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  45 tribune. The torque-crowning was usually performed by the campiductor of the lanciarii and Averil Cameron quite rightly suggests that this was also the case now. Then four chosen young men brought a great circular shield. Justin stepped on top of it and the men performed the shield-raising ceremony.2 Then followed the religious crowning ceremony. The Patriarch of Constantinople blessed Justin and placed the diadem on his head. Justin delivered his inaugural speech to the Senate and palace officials in which he promised to correct the situation resulting from the mismanagement of the Empire by Justinian during his last years. The most important of these promises were to rule together with the Senate and to pay back the forced loans that Justinian had taken from the senators. The senators fell down and showed obeisance. Justin II had now been confirmed as Emperor by the Senate, officials, armed forces and Patriarch. It is clear that this crowning signalled the rise of the importance of the Senate over that of the army. Justin II did not even make a speech to the soldiers. His crowning was presented as a fait accompli to the soldiers just as it was presented to the demes gathered at the circus. This was a coup of sorts, and Justin’s policies were directed at pleasing senatorial opinion, which favoured an aggressive stance against the barbarians. This meant that the senators would not have to contribute from their own resources money given to the barbarians in return for peace; but this was problematic because neither were the senators willing to contribute for the upkeep of the army. It was only now that Justin II had been confirmed in his office that he, the Senate and the highest ranking officials proceeded to meet the demes in the circus. This sequence had removed from them the possibility of affecting the outcome of the election and not all of them were happy about it. Each of the demes shouted long life for Justin and prayed for the life of Sophia, thereby confirming the couple. However, when the Emperor started his speech, the people left their seats and flocked in front of the Emperor. According to Corippus, the people held in front of them chartae (deeds of debt) and pleaded Justin to repay the debts of Justinian. Justin responded by paying them from his own pocket: his attendants brought his gold from his private funds, and then paid the debts, after which the chartae were burned. Corippus represents this as an act of generosity, but as has been recognized for a long time, it was in truth forced on Justin. He needed to pacify the populace. And this was not the end of the trouble, because next came women weeping for their imprisoned husbands and sons. These must have consisted mainly of members of the circus factions who had been imprisoned in the last years of Justinian for rioting, banditry and piracy. Justin released them all and then returned to the Imperial Palace. This was not all. Justin II and Sophia also remitted the tax arrears for the following year (Novella 148). The last years of Justinian’s reign had seen a financial crisis in which the people had been unable to pay their taxes while the Emperor had resorted to forced loans taken primarily from the senators and bankers with the result that there was a bankers’ conspiracy against him in 562. See MHLR Vol.6. Theophanes (AM6060) records that Sophia forgave the debts that bankers owed to the couple in 567, which suggests the same, namely that the couple felt it necessary to appease the populace and the bankers. After the couple returned from the Circus, Justin appointed his son-in-law Baduarius as curopalates because his appointment as Emperor had vacated this post. According to Evagrius, his first act as Emperor was to end the Three Chapters controversy of Justinian and return to their sees all those who had opposed Justinian’s religious policy.

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46  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Then Justin acted to remove the principal threat to his rule, his relative Justin the son of Germanus. He was still holding the Danube line against the Avars and was now recalled to Constantinople. Justin son of Germanus had a distinguished military career behind him and was probably the best general alive at the time, so he posed a very real threat. According to Evagrius, these two Justins had agreed amongst themselves that since both were equally likely to be nominated as Emperor, the one that lost the contest would be nominated as his successor as Caesar. Thus Justin son of Germanus did not revolt when Justin II summoned him to Constantinople; on his arrival Justin welcomed his namesake, and then removed his hypaspistai (shield-bearers), doryforoi (spear-bearers) and somatofylakes (bodyguards). Then Justin II invented accusations against Justin son of Germanus and exiled him to Alexandria. When he reached Alexandria, assassins sent by the imperial couple had him killed in bed. The severed head of Justin son of Germanus was then brought back to Constantinople where the imperial couple then kicked it around the room. Soon after this, also in 566, followed the conspiracy of Aetherius and Addaeus. The former had been curator of the domus of Antiochus, which was an important imperial property. He had been accused of having plotted against Justinian in 560 and 562 (see MHLR Vol.6). The latter was the serving City Prefect. Both of these men had plotted to get rid of Patriarch Eutychius in January 565 and they had also offered to Justinian the help of a magician (John of Nikiu 90.55–9 with Whitby) and both had been members of the senatorial council under Justinian. It is therefore not surprising to find them cooperating now to overthrow Justin II – unless of course the two were falsely accused just to get rid of potential troublemakers. When captured Aetherius admitted to having planned to poison the Emperor, but Addaeus swore that he knew nothing of such plans. The two men were beheaded. As he was being led to his execution, Addaeus claimed that he had been falsely accused but stated that his fate was still just because he had killed Theodotus, the prefect of the palace, by witchcraft. Evagrius was uncertain if this was true, but still considered the execution just on the grounds that both men were sinners: Addaeus was a pederast while Aetherius had used false accusations to gather property for the Emperor. Evagrius’s characterization of Justin II is not flattering. According to him, Justin’s lifestyle was depraved and luxurious and he was ready to sell any office in return for cash, even priesthoods. He also instituted a heavy tax on ships’ cargoes of wine, and started taxing the bread distributed to the citizens of Constantinople; each householder had to pay this to receive his share of the state bread. In the nineteenth century Bury (73ff.) noted that seeking the support of the Senate weakened Justin’s position vis-à-vis the wealthy aristocrats. Indeed Justin warned his successor Tiberius to beware of the power of the nobles. However, Justin had one important advantage over the aristocrats, including the military men. He was the most important patron in the Roman Empire. As Emperor he decided who held which offices and who was in favour and out of favour. Those who thought that they could obtain better advancement in life by overthrowing the reigning ruler might do so by seeking a new patron – usually from one of the imperial families – who could then usurp power. It was because of this that emperors always kept members and former members of the imperial family under close watch. It was these men that posed the principal threat to the

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  47 rulers, and it was imperative for emperors to find out if they had held suspicious secret discussions with other important figures, including the senators. Justin’s religious policies were initially conciliatory. Once in power, he abandoned Justinian’s Aphthartodocetism immediately and then sought to find a way to reconcile the Chalcedonians and Monophysites. However, before he was able to begin this project, there was an outbreak of religious problems in Alexandria and Egypt, which required military intervention in about 566. The man put in charge of pacifying the churches of Egypt and Alexandria was Photius, the stepson of Belisarius (he was the son of Belisarius’s wife Antonina). He had become an abbot of the New Monastery of Jerusalem. He had been schooled well in the arts of war by his stepfather so the mission was a success. We do not know what the circumstances were but it has been suggested that the problems arose from the death of the Monophysite Patriarch Theodosius in June 566.3 Justin II had started negotiations with the deceased patriarch before his death, but his death did not put a stop to the Emperor’s efforts. He and John Scholasticus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, gathered a theological assembly in Constantinople where the Tritheists (‘Monophysites’ who considered the Holy Trinity to represent three gods), Monophysites and Chalcedonians sought to reconcile their differences. The end result of these discussions took the form of an edict in 567 in which Justin included all the points on which the three sides agreed. The compromise was not accepted by many of the Monophysite monks of Syria, but the leading Monophysites, including Jacob Baradeus, continued their efforts to find a solution that would be acceptable to all. In 571 the joint efforts seemed to bear fruit, Jacob Baradeus and the leading Monophysite bishops agreeing to a compromise edict which stated that Christ had one nature that was both divine and human (Severan Monophysitism) and that Christ had both divine and human natures that were united in him (the Chalchedonian doctrine). The Monophysites and Chalcedonians therefore agreed that they believed in the same Christ even if they expressed this differently. All seemed well, but then something unexpected happened: the Monophysite bishops were unable to convince their followers to accept the compromise because it indirectly endorsed the Chalcedonian doctrine. Now Justin II had had enough. He outlawed Monophysitism again and launched a new persecution.4 The timing of this persecution could not have been worse. It took place at a time when the Romans needed the goodwill of the Monophysite Ghassanid Arabs and when they needed the goodwill of the Syrian and Armenian churches. One of the first signs of the beginning of the persecution was the visit of Photius, stepson of Belisarius, in Constantinople in 571. Photius took with him the Monophysite bishop Conon and imprisoned him for three years in the New Monastery of Jerusalem, the Abbot of which he was.5

Justin II’s New Aggressive Foreign Policy The first barbarians to find out the change in Roman strategy were the Avars, whose embassy arrived on the seventh day after the death of Justinian on 23 November 565. The news travelled fast. The meeting of the envoys and Justin II is described in some detail by Corippus in Book 3 of his In laudem Iustini Augusti minoris/In Praise of Justin II and by Menander (fr. 8.1). Justin’s answer was bold: The Romans would no longer pay any

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48  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 subsidies in return for peace. This signalled a change in policy, which was popular among the senators and populace for two reasons: it demonstrated Roman supremacy over the barbarians, and signalled the lightening of the tax burden – although the latter proved short-lived.6 Justin II was lucky that this refusal to pay subsidies did not result in immediate conflict. It is clear that the reason for this was that the Avars had been thoroughly chastised by Justin son of Germanus and Bonus, the commander of his household troops, and the Avars felt it necessary to strengthen their position before trying their luck again. Instead the Avars directed their attention towards the Franks of Thuringia who had defeated them before. They had attacked Thuringia after the death of King Lothar/Chlotar in 561, but before 566. It is therefore possible that their first campaign took place at any point in time between 562 and 566. This first campaign of the Avars had ended in complete defeat. The King of the Austrasian Franks, Sigibert/Sigibertus, defeated them near the River Elbe and Khagan Baian sent envoys to beg peace and supplies to enable the Avars to return to their homeland. The Avars were lucky because Sigibert faced troubles elsewhere. His brother Chilperic, King of the Neustrian Franks, had captured a number of his cities and had also attacked Rheims. Therefore Sigibert granted the peace and supplies for the journey and then proceeded to defeat his brother. However, the Avars repeated their invasion in 566 and this time they crushed the Frankish army in the very same place where they had been defeated. Most of the Franks fled so that the Avars were able to surround and imprison the king with his followers. Sigibert bought his freedom with a large bribe and a peace treaty that was so favourable for the Avars that it lasted the lifetime of Sigibert.7

The End of the Gepids in 566–7 and the Lombard Invasion of Italy in 568–748 Lombards vs. Gepids 565–7 In the meantime new developments had taken place in the Balkans. Alboin, king of the Lombards, and Cunimund, king of the Gepids, had become personal enemies. The reason was that in about 565–6 Alboin had developed a desire for Cunimund’s daughter Rosamund, and when she had refused his pleas and advances Alboin captured her in an ambush so that he could rape and have her. The capture and rape resulted in a war between the Lombards and Gepids in early 566. When the Lombards gained the upper hand in the conflict, Cunimund dispatched an embassy to Justin II begging him for assistance. In return for this help, Cunimund promised to hand over to the Romans Sirmium and all the territory south of the river Drave. Justin was delighted and ordered strategos Baduarius, his son-in-law, to collect the forces in Scythia and Moesia and then march to help the Gepids. When Alboin learnt of the arrival of the Roman army, he sought peace and pleaded for a marriage pact. Cunimund refused to listen and the two sides fought a pitched battle which ended in a decisive Roman victory so that the allied forces were able to pillage the possessions of the enemy. After this Alboin appears to have bought a peace or truce with a number of concessions which included at least the returning of Rosamund to her father Cunimund because we find her among her own people during the next stage of the conflict (PD HL 1.27).

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  49 This was not the end of the war. Alboin now hated Cunimund more than ever and still desired to have Rosamund as his wife, so he decided to destroy Cunimund by any means possible and lay his hands on Rosamund once more. Alboin was well aware that this was impossible as long as the Romans supported the Gepids. However, he was lucky: Cunimund failed to deliver his promises to the Romans. Furthermore, Justin’s refusal to pay the tribute demanded by the Avars had soured the relationship between them. The Avars were only waiting for an opportunity to turn against the Romans. Consequently, when the envoys of Alboin arrived promising to make the Roman territory accessible to them in return for alliance against the Gepids, the Khagan Baian was prepared to accept the suggestion. However, he was also an experienced player on the international stage and pretended that he was either unable to join them or unwilling to do so. By doing so he managed to extort from the Lombards one tenth of their livestock and a promise of getting half of the booty together with all the land of the Gepids.9 When Cunimund learnt of the alliance between the Avars and Lombards, he dispatched envoys to Justin with the same promises as before, namely that he would hand over Sirmium and all the land south of the Drave. By now Justin knew that he could not trust Cunimund to keep his promises, but since he was unwilling to break up the alliance he pretended that the Roman forces were so badly scattered that he could not send help immediately. Menander does not accept this report to be accurate, saying it is unbelievable that Cunimund would have promised the same lands twice. However, I accept it, because stranger things have happened, and most importantly because there has to be some reason for Justin’s sudden change of heart. At the same time as this happened Justin also received an embassy from the Lombards who asked him to conclude an alliance with them. They did not succeed, but they obtained from Justin II the promise that neither side would receive any help. The fate of the Gepids was now sealed, but the end result was not favourable for the Romans.10 Furthermore, as we shall see, this was not the only mistake Justin and Sophia made in 567. It was in about 567 that they insulted Narses the Eunuch. When the Lombards and Gepids were then advancing against each other in 567, the Gepids learned to their shock that the Avars had also attacked from another direction. However, Cunimund was not distracted. He decided to deal with the Lombards first. Consequently, the two sides fought a battle, but the winners were the Lombards. Alboin killed Cunimund and made a drinking goblet out of his skull, which was called either a scala or patera. He also took a great number of captives of both sexes, and most importantly he captured Rosemund, whom he married, to his detriment. After the victory over the Gepids, Alboin’s name spread far and wide (the Bavarians and Saxons taking particular note) and a special kind of weapon was named after him. The surviving Gepids were then divided up between the Lombards and the Avars. In other words, the wily Baian had managed to obtain all he desired without any great effort on his part. But the Romans exploited the situation and attacked the Avars soon after the Lombards had departed to Italy on 2 April 568. The Avars were defeated and forced to evacuate the Gepid territories they had captured. On top of this the Romans also granted a place of refuge for Usdibad the Gepid and his followers. Baian considered these men as his subjects by way of conquest. One suspects that this Usdibad and his men had betrayed the Avars and that it was because of this that they received protection from the Romans. The Roman

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50  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 commander who achieved these great successes was Bonus, the former maior domus of the strategos Justin son of Germanus (see MHLR Vol.6). This was not his first success against the Avars, because in about 561–2 he and his employer Justin son of Germanus had defeated all Avar attempts to cross the Danube. He was clearly a man well qualified for the task of facing the Avars.11 Narses invites the Lombards into Italy in 567 It was then, according to the story preserved by Paul the Deacon and a number of other sources, that Narses the Eunuch invited the Lombards to Italy. This question has divided historians into those who accept this version and those who consider it a fabrication. I belong to those who do not see any compelling reasons to doubt the unanimous evidence presented by the later sources – and it should be remembered that the Chronicle of Isidore of Seville and Liber Pontificalis that mention the betrayal were written only about fifty years after the invasion. The annalistic sources date the Lombard invasion to the year 568, the time when the Lombards arrived in Italy. This means that the invitation took place either in late 567 or very early in 568 because the Avars were not promised the Lombard lands when the Lombards asked their help against the Gepids.12 According to the fullest version preserved by Paul the Deacon (HL 2.5), Narses had accumulated vast wealth during his command of the Italian armies, which had aroused the envy of the Romans so that when Justin became Emperor they dispatched envoys to Justin and Sophia to make a number of insinuating accusations against Narses. The ravages caused by the pestilence which struck in particular the province of Liguria at about this time must have also influenced opinions in a situation in which Narses was clearly living in the lap of luxury. These envoys presented an ultimatum to the imperial couple. Either they were to sack Narses from office or they would hand over Rome to the barbarians. The Emperor asked for Narses’s version of the events, but he answered the Emperor’s request in too high-handed fashion by stating curtly that he, Narses, should only be punished if he had done any wrong to the Romans. This enraged the proud Emperor, who immediately dispatched Longinus to replace Narses. The Empress added insult to the injury by stating that eunuch Narses’s place was among the girls of the women’s chambers. Narses replied that he would weave such a web that she would not be able to remove it from her back as long as she lived. According to Fredegarius/Fredegar (3.65), Sophia sent a golden instrument used to spin wool with the result that Narses stated that he would spin such a thread that neither the Emperor nor Empress would be able to find the end, and this he indeed did according to the unanimous opinion of the sources. After this, Narses naturally feared to return to Constantinople and therefore withdrew to Neapolis (Naples) and sent messengers to the Lombards who invited them to Italy. Alboin decided to accept the invitation of Narses presumably because he knew that Italy would possess wealth beyond his wildest dreams. It is possible that Narses summoned the Lombards into Italy officially as foederati to make the invitation more appealing to them while masking his real intention from the Roman authorities. However, this is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, the details of Alboin’s negotiations with the Avars suggest that he intended to invade Italy. Secondly, it is unlikely that the Lombard sources would not have dwelled on Roman duplicity if they had called them into Italy because that would have given further legitimacy to their claim on the land. It is worth noting that when

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  51 the Ostrogoths had been sent into Italy by the Emperor Zeno, they repeatedly reminded Zeno’s successor Anastasius that they had acted as Roman foederati when they did so. Had the Lombards been officially given the status of foederati with their own lands, one would expect that one would find them making pleas to the imperial authorities to respect their part of the bargain, just as the Ostrogoths did to Anastasius. Hence it is practically certain that Narses invited the Lombards into Italy as invaders and that he promised the north of Italy to them by way of conquest. Before his removal from office Narses was also in a position to prevent effective defence of these areas. Alboin asked his old friends the Saxons to join him, with the result that 20,000 Saxon and Thuringian men with their wives and children left their homes in Thuringia held by Sigibert and proceeded to join him. When Sigibert learnt of this, he sent some of the Suevi/Swabians/Alamanni followers to occupy these lands. Alboin also collected any others who wanted to join their trek. These consisted of the provincials of Pannonia and Noricum, and of the Swabians/ Suevi beyond the Danube, Sarmatians, Bulgars, Heruls, surviving Gepids and others. He also promised Pannonia to the Avars on condition that the Avars would allow them back if the Romans forced them out of Italy. This suggests that the intention was to invade Italy.13 Even if Paul the Deacon does not say so, it is possible that Alboin’s plan was to incite the Avars against the Romans in the Balkans. By giving the Avars their former lands, the Lombards strengthened the Avars and basically created such conditions in which the Avars and the Romans would eventually face each other on the battlefield. When these two fought against each other neither could pose a threat to the Lombards. This worked beyond his wildest dreams because the strengthened Avars became one of the principal threats to the Romans. Alboin, his people and allies, began their trek to Italy two days after Easter 568. Modern historians have given several different estimates of the size of the invading force ranging from 80,000 to 200,000 adult males plus their families. On the basis of the evidence regarding the Ostrogoths (200,000 men in the standing army in 536), I am inclined to suggest that there were at least 200,000 men able to bear arms plus the elderly, women and children because the Lombards were able to advance simultaneously in so many different directions. As noted by Wolfram, it is probable that the Lombards reached the fortress city of Forum Julii (Cividale, mod. Friuli) in May 568.14 They met no resistance, because Narses had planned it that way. Narses had undoubtedly ordered the Roman soldiers garrisoning the Julian Alps to allow the Lombards to pass through unhindered. However, it has also been suggested that there was no resistance because the ravages of the pestilence of ca. 566–7 had left the area practically defenceless. But, as noted, I am inclined to follow what is stated in the extant sources. Alboin decided to garrison the city of Cividale to make certain that it would stay in their hands, most likely because this secured them a route of retreat back into Pannonia. He chose his nephew and equerry (strator) and marshal/master of the horse (marpahis) as dux of Friuli. This was a novel decision, modelled after the system used by the Romans and Ostrogoths, which combined the control of the city and its surrounding territory, the civitas. The Lombards had not had any duces before this. This was now where the border stood and it was therefore placed in the hands of a dux. The importance of the post becomes evident from the fact that Gisulf was allowed to choose the best of the leading kin-groups, called

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52  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 farae, as his garrison forces together with choice herds of mares, presumably for breeding purposes.15 There were several important factors that enabled the Lombards to conquer so much of Italy: 1) Narses had invited the Lombards so there was initially no resistance to their arrival; 2) The Romans did not have unified command at the beginning of the invasion because a successor had not yet been found for Narses; 3) even if the Romans had as many comitatenses and limitanei in Italy as they had in Thrace (we do not know how many soldiers the Romans had but it is unlikely they would have had as many men as in Illyricum or Thrace after Justinian’s reign), these would have been spread throughout the length of Italy, which means that none of the Roman garrisons had sufficient numbers to engage the Lombards in battle even after the Lombards scattered around Italy. The Lombards advanced slowly westwards, which allowed the Romans to make preparations, but what resistance there was was strictly at the local level. There was no organized defence of Italy because after the sacking of Narses the Romans either lacked the organizational skill needed or did not possess the means to do so. In my opinion, it is likely that both are true. Narses’s successors were clearly not on a par with this great wargelding, and it is not even certain that his successor had arrived by the time the invasion started. Furthermore, it is more than likely that by 567 a significant portion of the forces serving in Italy consisted of the bucellarii of Narses. The only number that we have for his bucellarii dates from the year 552 when he had 400 men with a fighting component of 300 men, but it is clear that he would have increased their number after that even if none of the sources mention it. It would be strange if, as Paul the Deacon says, Narses had unscrupulously enriched himself, that he would not have increased the numbers of his bucellarii, as Belisarius and his fellow officers had. These forces would have formed the fighting elite of the Roman forces in Italy, as they did elsewhere in the Empire. For these developments, see MHLR Vol.6. It is clear that these men would not have been available for the defence of Italy in a situation in which Narses sought to cause as much trouble for the imperial couple as he could. However, when Narses was living in retirement in Naples, he did have a sort of change of heart, because he returned to Rome to live in the Imperial Palace on the Palatine Hill when Pope John III (LP 63) travelled to Naples and pleaded for his help. This event is usually dated to 571, but in my opinion 569–70 would seem likelier. The fact that Narses was able to secure Rome against the Lombards means that he had retained some of his bucellarii even when he lived in retirement. It would have been these bucellarii that secured him against the revenge of the imperial couple. According to Liber Pontificalis 63, Narses stayed in Rome for a long time before he died and was then taken back in a lead coffin with all his riches to Constantinople. Most modern authors date his death to roughly 573/4,16 but I would date it slightly later on the basis of Paul the Deacon’s account (3.12). He dates Narses’s death to the period when Tiberius II was still only a Caesar in 574–78, but since Tiberius became Caesar only in December 574 it is clear that Narses died later than the usually assumed date. Furthermore, on the basis of the order of events in Paul the Deacon’s Historia Langobardum 3.12 it is likelier that it took place just before the enthroning of Tiberius II as Augustus, so that the likeliest date would be 577. This, however, is not conclusive. Any date between 575 and 578 would obviously fit the bill. This means that Rome was secured by Narses and his bucellarii at least until 575, possibly 578.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  53 After Cividale, Alboin conquered Aquileia, so the Lombards appear to have divided their forces for logistical reasons. The northern route ran along the Via Postumia by way of Treviso, Vincentia (Vincenza), Verona, Brescia, and Bergamo. At Oderzo, the Lombards met with so strong a resistance that they had to bypass it – in fact it remained in Roman hands for two generations. The southern route ran along the Via Annia, but here the Lombards met with strong resistance. Altino, Patavium (Padua), Mons Silicis (Monselice), Mantua and Cremona all remained in Roman hands. The same was true of the fortresses along the southern slopes of the Alps from the Aosta Valley to Lake Como. Similarly, the lagoons from Grado to Venice remained in Roman hands. The slow advance of the migrating mass gave the bishops time to decide what to do. The archbishop of Aquileia fled to Grado and the archbishop of Milan fled to Genoa, but most of the local bishops and priests chose to remain with their flocks under the Arian Lombards. Alboin entered the former imperial city of Milan (Mediolanum) on 3 September 569 and it was from this that the Lombards dated the beginning of their rule of Italy. After this Alboin marched south against Pavia (Ticinum) which was an old Roman garrison city and royal city of Theoderic the Great, so it possessed a sizable garrison well prepared to resist the invaders. Alboin was forced to put the city under siege, which lasted for three years.17 The length of the siege proves that the Lombards blockaded the city from a distance which enabled the defenders to bring supplies inside the city every now and then. The Lombards were typical Germans: they were not good at storming cities. But eventually Pavia surrendered. The Lombards invade Gaul in ca. 570–2 It was then, in about 570, that the Lombards divided their forces. While Alboin stayed with his men to besiege Pavia the rest of the leaders and tribes serving under him continued their invasions. Some marched to Frankish Burgundy, which was the kingdom of Guntram, while others advanced as far as Tuscany. Those who advanced into Burgundy were opposed by the forces under Guntram’s patrician Amatus. The Lombards defeated and killed him in battle, took much booty, and then returned to Italy. The sources do not mention why the Lombards invaded the territories of Guntram in 570 and in subsequent years until 574. Christie (80–1) has suggested that it may have been to demonstrate their power to the Franks, or just to pillage, or to annex territory, or that Guntram’s brother Sigebert/Sigibertus had just bribed them to invade Guntram’s territory – the fact that Sigibert later settled the Saxons into his territory speak in favour of the last option. The forces sent to Tuscany were likewise successful. The only places which were still in Roman hands in 572 were Rome and Ravenna and some fortified places in the north (e.g. Lake Como) and along the coast. The Romans simply did not possess enough soldiers in a situation in which Justin II had broken the peace with Persia. According to Paul the Deacon, the reason for the success of the invasion was that the Romans had no courage to resist them in the aftermath of the great pestilence of 566–8 and the great famine of 569. As noted above, I would also suggest that the survival of the city of Rome was the result of the return of Narses in about 569–70. The second of the reasons for the success appears to have been the sheer size of the invading horde (PD HL 2.26).18 In about 571 the Lombards repeated their invasion of Burgundy, but at this time they were opposed by King Guntram’s patricius Ennius Mummolus, who was one of the

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54  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 best commanders of the age. The Lombards advanced as far as Plan de Fazi, near the town of Embrun, where they were surrounded by the Burgundians led by Mummolus. Mummolus had surprised the invaders in the middle of a forest. He felled trees around the enemy and thereby formed a rampart around them. He killed or captured most of the invaders and only a small contingent managed to fight their way through to tell the story of their defeat.19 In 572 the Lombards repeated their attack by dispatching 20,000 Saxons into Gaul. This time they managed to advance as far as the neighbourhood of Riez where they pitched their camp near a villa at Estoublon. The idea behind sending the Saxons must have been that they consisted mostly of infantry, better suited to fighting in forests and difficult terrain than the Lombard cavalry. But the Saxons dispersed to pillage the villas of the nearby towns. Mummolus exploited this by attacking them when they were scattered. He slaughtered thousands, only stopping when it got dark. The Saxons had managed to regroup by the following morning and opposed Mummolus with a line of battle. The Saxons, however, had had enough. They send envoys to beg for peace. Mummolus accepted this in return for gifts and the return of all prisoners and booty.20 Lombards, Franks and Romans 572–4 Things were progressing better for the Lombards in Italy. Pavia surrendered after a siege that had lasted for three years and some months and Alboin was finally able to enter it. However, something unexpected then happened. When Alboin had gone to Verona to celebrate his success, he ordered his wife Rosamund to drink wine from the skull of her father Cunimund. This was too much for her to bear so that she formed a plot to kill her husband. She convinced Helmichis, the king’s squire (scilpor) and armourbearer, to join the plot and he in his turn convinced Rosamund that they would need the help of Peredeo, who was a very strong man. Peredeo, however, was unwilling to commit so great a crime, but Rosamund found a way. She put herself in the bed of her dressing-maid with whom Peredeo used to sleep and thereby Peredeo accidentally had intercourse with the queen. This naturally frightened Peredeo so that he too joined the plot. The actual murder was committed by Helmichis on 28 June 572. The king was unable to defend himself because the queen had bound his sword and he could not draw it. Helmichis seized the royal treasure and married the queen, but failed to become king because the Lombards did not accept him. The Lombards chose Clef as their new king in about August 572. The plotters were therefore forced to ask the help of Longinus, the new Prefect of Italy. He provided them with a ship so that Helmichis, Rosamund and Albsuinda (daughter of Alboin and Rosamund) and their followers, together with the Lombard treasure, were taken to Ravenna. Once there Longinus convinced Rosamund to murder her new husband Helmichis so that he, Longinus, could marry her. The plan, however, failed. When Helmichis was bathing and had drunk from a poisoned drink brought to him by Rosamund, Helmichis realized that he had been poisoned and forced her also to drink. Both died. All Longinus could do was to send the Lombard treasure, with Peredeo, to Constantinople.21 As most modern authors have suggested, it is probable that this plot was hatched by Longinus to win the war by unconventional means. I agree. However, another motivation was undoubtedly to acquire the captured Lombard treasury. This treasure would

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  55 certainly have helped Tiberius to begin his recruiting drive of barbarian troops into the Roman army in 574–5. For this, see the discussion later. In about 570–72 (exact date unknown), Sigibert, king of the Austrasian Franks, dispatched envoys to seek peace with Justin II. Sigibert needed peace because he was at war with his brother Guntram. The envoys Warimar the Frank and Firminus from Clermont-Ferrand travelled by sea to Constantinople. The envoys were successful and returned in the following year.22 I would suggest that Sigibert and Justin had concluded an alliance against the Lombards. The reason for this is that the Saxons and Thuringians, who had joined the Lombards and who were now invading Burgundy, had originally been subjects of Sigibert. This made the Lombards the enemies not only of Guntram but also of Sigibert. When the abovementioned Saxon invaders had returned from Gaul to Italy, they appear to have formed some sort of agreement with King Sigibert and apparently also with Guntram. Sigibert appears to have promised to grant them back their original lands if they marched through the territories of Guntram to Thuringia. So this time they took with them their families and all their possessions. In 573 they divided their forces into two divisions: one army advanced through Nice, the other through Embrun. They united their forces again near Avignon. It was harvest time so the invaders were able to collect the harvest while plundering the flocks. When they reached the bank of the Rhône, and prepared to cross into the territory of Sigibert, the invaders faced the massive force assembled by Mummolus. Mummolus informed them that they would not be allowed to cross unless they paid in full for their pillaging. The Saxons paid thousands of gold coins and were allowed to cross the river. This means that both Guntram and Sigibert had agreed to receive the Saxons and that it was only when the Saxons had failed to respect the property of Guntram’s subjects that Mummolus acted. This soured the relationship to such an extent that the two kings had to organize an assembly of bishops in Paris in 573 to resolve their differences, but the assembly failed in its purpose. All this took place against the background of the continuing war between the forces of Sigibert and Chilperic. In the meantime, the ca. 20,000 (number of losses unknown) Saxons who had returned were unwilling to concede anything to the Suevi who had been settled on the former lands. As a result, the two fought a war in which the Saxons were defeated so decisively that they ceased to be a threat to anyone.23 Some time before 31 August 574, the servant of King Clef murdered him. We do not know if the Romans had any role in the murder, but if they did, it was effective, because the Lombards were without a king until 584. The fact that the Lombard duces did not elect a new king proves that most of the duces thought it preferable to operate on their own. If the Romans were behind this, then it serves as a good example of the skills of the new de facto ruler of Italy Tiberius II, whose rise to power in 574 is described later in greater detail. The fragmentation of the Lombard realm suggests that their different tribes and clans and their duces had not been happy with the rule of Clef and that they did not want a new ruler. Henceforth each of the duces held possession of his own city, so that Zaban ruled Pavia (Ticinum), Wallari Bergamo (Bergamum), Alichis Brescia (Brexia), Euin Trent (Tridentum), and Gisulf Cividale, in addition to which there were thirty other duces each in charge of his own city. This situation persisted for the next ten

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56  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 years. This meant two things. Firstly, the power of the dux in each city and surrounding area increased. Secondly, the Lombards lacked the coherence to respond to offensives conducted against them.24 After the death of King Clef, the Lombard duces did not give up their hopes of conducting raids into Gaul. In 574 three Lombard duces, Amo, Zaban and Rodan/ Rodanus, did so. I would suggest that Amo marched past Embrun to raid the villa of SaintSaturnin/Machoavilla (Manosque), near Avignon. Mummolus had received this villa as a gift from Guntram, so this attack was directed against him personally. Zaban marched through the city of Dea (Die) to Valentia (Valence). Rodan marched to Gratianopolis (Grenoble). Amo captured all the towns in the province of Arles and then marched to the stony area called La Crau near Massilia/Massalia (Marseilles). He also besieged Aquae (Aix), which bought its freedom with 22 pounds of silver. Mummolus responded by assembling an army with which he first attacked Rodan who was besieging Grenoble. Mummolus was able to find a ford which enabled him to cross the Isère and engage the enemy. The Lombards suffered a defeat and Rodan, wounded by a lance, was forced to flee with his surviving 500 men across the mountains and woods to Zaban who was then besieging Valence. The two united their forces and advanced to Ebredunum (Embrun). Mummolus brought with him a large force and engaged them in a pitched battle. The Lombards were annihilated and their leaders forced to flee to Italy, where they stopped in front of Secusium (Susa), which was in Roman hands under the magister Sisinnius. They were not well received, even if they were allowed inside the town. An envoy then arrived from Mummolus and told Sisinnius in the presence of Zaban that Mummolus would get there soon. When Zaban heard this he fled immediately, and when Amo learnt of these events he too fled from Italy, but because he was retreating in the middle of winter snows, he was forced to abandon most of his booty – it is these winter snows that prove that the duces invaded after the death of their king. The defeated Lombards were forced to pay 12,000 solidi to Guntram and to concede territories in Italy, including Aosta and Susa – although it is probable that these cities were actually in Roman hands and remained in their hands, but this is not known for sure.25 Marius of Avenches records for 574 the invasion of Provence by the Lombards and Moors. I agree with Pringle (p.41) that the Moors in question are likely to have consisted of the Barbaricini Moors who inhabited Sardinia rather than the Moors of North Africa. On the basis of this I would suggest that the Lombard invasion of Provence included a naval component, which is not mentioned by Gregory of Tours, and that these pirates raided the southern coast with relative impunity while the Lombard land forces suffered a defeat. The acceptance of the retreating Lombards inside Roman-held cities, as mentioned above, suggests that the Romans had reached an agreement with these Lombard duces, which begs the question, what was the Roman role in these events? The fact that the Lombard king Clef was murdered by his own men in 574 suggests the possibility that the Romans could have had some role in the murder and that they could also have formed an alliance with the duces who invaded Gaul. The evident use of the Barbaricini Moors from Sardinia also suggests this. Had the Romans instigated this invasion of Guntram’s territory in support of their ally Sigibert? In my opinion this is likely, for the reason stated below. This would be the first instance of a pattern in which the Romans supported

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  57 the Austrasian Franks against Guntram. It is clear that the agreement that Sigibert and Justin had reached in about 572 worked to the advantage of both parties. We should see the events in Gaul during the years 573–4 against this background. In 573 Sigibert had lost territory to his brother Chilperic in 573 so that in 574 he assembled forces beyond the Rhine and advanced against Chilperic. He then needed the permission of his brother Guntram to cross the Seine because Guntram and Chilperic had in the meantime formed an alliance. Sigibert sent Guntram an ultimatum that he would declare war on him if he was not allowed to cross. Guntram saw no alternative but to agree. Sigibert was now able to advance against Chilperic with the result that the frightened Chilperic sued for peace and gave back the territories his forces had conquered in 573.26 In my opinion, it is unlikely to be a coincidence that the abovementioned Lombard duces invaded the lands of Guntram at a time when Sigibert needed to convince his brother Guntram to allow him to cross the Seine. On the basis that the Liber Pontificalis (63, Vita Iohannis) states that it took more than ten months for the new pope, Benedict I, to be elected after the death of Pope John III on 13 July 574, Hodgkin (5.193) has speculated that the Lombards had cut off communications between Rome and Constantinople. However, this is taking the evidence a bit too far. A far likelier explanation is that the insanity of Justin II was the cause of the delay. Before his official appointment as Caesar in December 574, Tiberius was obliged to take into account the wishes of both Sophia and Justin.

The Visigoths and Romans under Augustus Justin II in 565–7427 Historians have not reached a consensus for the date when theVisigothic ruler Athanagild/ Athanagildus died, but it was some time between 567 and 569. Athanagild had revolted against Agila, Visigothic king of Spain, in about 550/551 and had asked Justinian to help him. This Justinian did, with the result that the Romans were able to reconquer parts of southern Spain. The Visigoths had then united under the rule of Athanagild who then asked the Romans to return their conquests, but in vain, with the result that the former allies became enemies. However, all of Athanagild’s attempts to reconquer the territories lost to the Romans ended in defeat. It is possible that some of these attacks against the Romans took place during the reign of Justin II because Isidore of Seville fails to give us any specific dates in the relevant section, 47, of his History of the Goths. Thompson correctly points out that Athanagild left his successor a kingdom in ruins; Romans held the area between Cartagena and Malaga and also Cordoba which had been in revolt since the reign of Agila; peasants were rebelling; the tribes of Asturia were in revolt; the Roman Senate of Cantabria was either seeking to establish an independent state or was seeking to join the Roman Empire; and then there were the Suevi in Galicia who had never been fully subdued by the Visigoths. Athanagild’s successor was Liuva I (568/9–571/3). Liuva divided the realm with his younger brother Leovigild/Leuvigild/Leovigildus (ca. 568/9–584). Liuva gave his brother Leovigild control of Spain proper while he retained control of Septimania (Gallia Narbonensis and southern Gaul roughly up to the Rhône) so the division was more than fair. Leovigild married Athanagild’s widow Gosuintha/Goisuintha to strengthen his position. He became sole ruler of the Visigoths when his elder brother

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58  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Liuva died four years later. Leovigild was one of the most active rulers the Visigoths ever had. Not only did Leovigild conduct military campaigns almost every year, he also united his subjects under his rule by removing the divisions between the Goths and Romans. With this in mind he produced a new law code called the Antiqua which abolished the prohibition of intermarriage between Goths and Romans with the idea that they all were citizens of the same Empire. Leovigild also sought to remove the religious differences between the Arian Goths and Orthodox/Catholic Romans by making the entire realm Arian. He exiled bishops who did not accept his view of a unified country and religion. Unsurprisingly, this part of his project ended in failure. The Catholic faith was just too strongly entrenched in Spain for this to be possible. Leovigild directed his first military campaign against the Romans in 569/70. He laid waste the region of Bastitania (the region around Baza/Basti between Malaga and Cartagena) and the city of Malaga. In 571 Leovigild captured Medina Sidonia with a night attack thanks to the fact that the city was betrayed by Framidaneus. He executed the garrison and returned the city to the Goths. Leovigild continued his campaign in the south in 572, capturing Cordoba where he slaughtered the enemy soldiers and returned the city to the Gothic fold. It is usually assumed that Cordoba was in rebel hands and not in Roman hands because John of Biclar (20) states that Cordoba had been in revolt against the Goths for a long time when it was captured.28 In my opinion this can equally well mean that they had first revolted under Agila and then joined the Romans when they appeared on the scene. In addition to this he captured a number of other cities and fortresses which John of Biclar fails to mention. In the meantime, Miro the king of the Suevi fought against the Ruccones/Runcones/ Roccones. The Ruccones are not known, but the translator of John of Biclar, Kenneth Baxter Wolf (p.66, n.34), and Thompson (1969, 64, 161), both suggest they were a Cantabrian people. This is indeed possible. If we identify the Ruccones as Cantabrians, this suggests two possibilities: 1) that the Ruccones meant the breakaway Roman Senate of Cantabria that Leovigild later subdued and which was also fighting against the Suevi; 2) that the Ruccones were a separate Cantabrian people nominally subjects of either the Suevi or Visigoths, as Thompson suggests. If they were subjects of Leovigild it is possible that the Suevi attacked them as Roman allies to distract the Visigoths in the midst of a successful campaign. However, the first alternative is likelier. The series of Roman defeats make it clear that the Romans were unable to spare any extra troops to Spain in a situation in which they were fighting in Italy, North Africa and the Balkans and were preparing to fight a major war against Persia. However, this is not the entire picture, because we have to remember that Athanagild had been unable to achieve the same thing with greater resources. Therefore, the series of defeats suggest two alternative interpretations: It is possible that Leovigild was more gifted as a military commander than his father Athanagild had been, or alternatively that the Romans were more poorly led than before. The last alternative is certainly something we should consider possible because under Belisarius the Romans were able to achieve miracles even when badly outnumbered. In 573 after the death of his brother Liuva I, Leovigild invaded Sabaria and pillaged the Sappi and thereby annexed the province. The location of Sabaria is unknown. Thompson suggests that the Sappi were an Asturian people and that Sabaria got its name from the Sabor, a tributary of the Douro (Dubrius). In

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  59 573 Leovigild sought to secure his position by appointing as co-rulers Hermenegild/ Ermenegildus and Reccared/Reccaredus, his two sons from his first marriage (Leovigild had divorced her). This division of the realm restricted the electoral rights of the Gothic nobility because Leovigild had now chosen his own successors, each with his own portion of the realm to rule. After this, Leovigild turned his attention against the Roman Senate of Cantabria, Basques/Vascones and Suevi/Suebi. In my opinion, it is probable, even if unprovable, that the Romans had bribed the Basques and Suevi to create distractions for the Visigoths, and in light of the fact that Leovigild was forced to fight against these two nations the policy was successful. The same concerns the Roman Senate of Cantabria. It would not be too far-fetched to think that the Romans were in touch with the Roman Senate of Cantabria. The other possibility is that Leovigild had concluded a peace with the Romans so that he could concentrate on the northern theatre, but this is less likely because it was he who faced an enemy invasion in the north and because Tiberius (who was more ready to conclude peace agreements than Justin) was appointed Caesar only in December 574 (see later), although it is also possible that these enemies just exploited the death of Liuva when they thought Leovigild would be preoccupied with his war against the Romans. In 574 Leovigild entered Cantabria and destroyed the ‘invaders of Province’, captured Amaya/Amaia and restored Cantabria under his rule. It was then that Leovigild killed the Senate of Cantabria which included a senator called Abundantius. As noted by Thompson (1969, 61–2), this implies that the members of the Senate were wealthy Romans who had apparently sought to set up an independent state, but I would not preclude the possibility that their ultimate aim would have been to rejoin the Empire.

North Africa and Egypt under Justin II in 565–74 As noted in the previous volume, troubles with the Moors resumed in 562. It was then that John Rogathinus assassinated Cusina when the latter arrived to collect the payments his Moorish forces expected. John was probably corrupt and had simply stolen the money meant for the Moors. The sons of Cusina raised a revolt and when this news was brought to Justinian in December 562 he dispatched his nephew the magister militum Marcian (Marcianus/Markianos) with an army to pacify the Moors. Marcian achieved a military success so that the new Prefect Thomas was able to conclude a peace in about 564–5. Therefore when Justin II was raised on the throne the situation was calm again. According to Pringle (40), his reign brought fresh energy back into the imperial administration after the neglect of the last years of Justinian. In North Africa this manifested itself in the new defensive works at Thibursicu Bure (565–69) and probably also at Tignica. According to the annalistic account of John of Biclar,29 North Africa/Libya was in flames in about 568–9. He does not mention the reason for this, but it is clear that it had resulted from Justin’s refusal to continue the monetary payments to the Moors, because this was his unwise and arrogant policy everywhere. According to John of Biclar, in 569 the Garamantes sought peace with the Romans through envoys and promised to covert to Christianity. The Romans granted both requests immediately. This means that before this there had been a conflict of which we know nothing except that it ended in Roman

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60  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 victory. Roman North Africa/Libya remained a restless place where the razzias of the Moors came at regular intervals between peaces that were in truth only truces. The fact that both Libya and Tripolitania were controlled from Egypt suggests that some dux or comes who held command in Libya or Tripolitania or Egypt was the man who had brought about this victory over the Garamantes in 569. As I point out later, it is possible that this man was Aristomachus. There were other troubles too, and fighting in this general area from Tripolitania up to Egypt during the reign of Tiberius and beyond, but I will discuss these later in the context of the reigns of Tiberius and Maurice. The Garamantes were not the only ones who were causing trouble at this time. The Moors (Mauri) of Mauretania under their king, Garmul, killed Theodore the Prefect of Africa in 569 (John of Biclar 8, 48). This implies that the Romans suffered some sort of military setback at this time. The Moorish foederati probably murdered the Prefect because he had stolen their money, as many Roman officials had done in previous decades (see MHLR Vol.6). Or possibly it was a consequence of Justin’s policy of not paying any barbarians any money in return for peace. But one cannot exclude the possibility that the death resulted from an invasion of some other Moors. However, it is still clear that the Romans scored some military or diplomatic successes in Mauretania at this time, because John of Biclar (9) notes that the Maccuritae who lived in the Oursenia region (north-central Algeria) became Christians. It is therefore possible that if the foederati had revolted and killed the Prefect they were immediately (if temporarily) pacified after this. But it is even likelier that these were two separate events, because for the next year, 570, John of Biclar (11) records a Roman defeat in battle by the Moors.30 According to him, the Roman magister militum Theoctistus was defeated and killed in battle by the Moors commanded by the ‘most powerful king’ Garmul and it was he who had also killed Theodore. Next year, 571, the Romans and Moors fought again, with the result that the Romans were defeated and their commander magister militum of Africa Amabilis was killed by Garmul. As Pringle (41, 373) notes after Hildefonsus (de Vir. ill. 4) and Paul of Merida (Vit. Patrum Emer. 3), life was becoming too dangerous for comfort, so the monk Donatus and his seventy companions abandoned Africa in 571 and so did Nunctus during the reign of the Visigothic King Leovigild (568–86). The Romans needed to do something if they wanted to retain North Africa. John of Biclar records for the year 573 the arrival of the embassy of Maccuritae in Constantinople. They brought with them elephant tusks and a giraffe which they offered to Justin as signs of their friendship. If Garmul was their leader then the two sides had concluded a peace in about 572, but as noted it is probable that we are dealing with two different groups of Moors. It is possible that these Maccuritae allied themselves with the Romans and that this alliance enabled the Romans to defeat Garmul. The sources do not record any military activity in North Africa until 578, which may suggest that the Romans and the Maccuritae had indeed defeated Garmul and/or that the Moors and Romans had concluded a peace that satisfied both until 578, or that our defective sources just fail to mention any details of such military activity for that period – there were certainly some instances of endemic banditry that the sources fail to record. We possess even less information of what was happening in the southern border of Egypt. We know that Nobatia had been converted to the Monophysite sect in about

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  61 543 thanks to the efforts of the Empress Theodora and that in about 568 Makuria was converted to the Chalcedonian sect. This obviously deepened the already existing tensions between Nobatia and Makuria. It is also clear that the Persian conquest of the Roman client state of Himyar/Yemen in 570 must have affected the trading network in this area significantly. There is every reason to believe that this caused problems and it is possible to think that the building of the defensive wall on the island of Philae under the leadership of decurio et dux augustalis Thebaidis Theodorus recorded in an inscription dated to 14 December 577 is a reflection of this. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that we find soon after this the Nubians invading Egypt during the sole reign of Tiberius. It is probable that the Nubians had started their raids even before this and that the building of the walls was a reflection of this. The island of Philae had obviously been the place where the Blemmyes and Nobadae/Nubians had worshipped Ammon and which had been closed by Justinian with the idea of Christianizing the natives. This may suggest that there was still some resistance against Christianity in the area. However, it is also possible that this was a reflection of the hostility between Monophysite Nobatia and Chalcedonian Makuria in a situation in which the Emperor could be thought to side with Makuria due to its religious stance.31

The Avar War in 569–74 As noted above, the Romans under Bonus had broken the peace with the Avars by attacking them immediately after they had gained control of the territory formerly held by the Gepids. The Avars had suffered a defeat and had been forced to evacuate the lands thay had only recently gained. The Khagan Baian was not happy and invaded again, probably in the spring of 569. On the basis of Menander (fr. 12.4, 12.5.33ff.), just before this the Emperor Justin had sent envoys (interpreter Vitalianus and Comitas) with money to Baian to conclude peace between the two nations, but Baian was not pacified with this. He imprisoned the envoys and invaded Roman territory with the intention of capturing Sirmium. It was then that the two antagonists, Baian and Bonus, faced each other once again on the battlefield. The Avars tried to scare the Romans with a wild cacophony of howling and beating of drums. This was ineffectual because Bonus had warned his men of it in advance. The Romans responded in kind. They struck their shields, raised battle-cries, sang victory songs and struck their wooden water canteens. This means that Bonus fielded a combined force of cavalry and infantry against the nomadic Avars – a wise decision, for the Avar cavalry could not achieve anything against disciplined infantry. Unfortunately we do not know what the result of the battle was. All that we know is that Bonus was wounded in the combat and that the Avars were then able to assault the city of Sirmium, but with poor results. This does not necessarily mean that the Romans suffered a defeat, but it does mean that they had been unable to defeat the Avars decisively.32 The failure to take Sirmium with an assault convinced Baian to seek peace, so he dispatched envoys to Sirmium to negotiate. This was observed by civilian lookouts posted on top of a public bath. Once it became obvious that the Avars were seeking to negotiate and were not attempting to attack again, Bonus decided to send others to discuss terms. His doctor, Theodorus, advised him not to go lest the enemy learn of his wound. However, when the Avar envoys saw that the general was not among the Roman negotiators, they

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62  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 suspected he had died. They demanded the presence of the general. This forced the hand of Theodorus. He treated the wound with medicine and allowed the general to go outside the city gates so the Avars could see him. The Avars quite rightly blamed Bonus and the Emperor for the war, but they still expressed their willingness to negotiate peace terms. Bonus had good counter-arguments. It had not been the Romans who initiated the hostilities but rather the Avars. This was true from the Roman point of view because the Gepid lands were considered Roman territory, and the Romans had also agreed to pay money in return for peace which the Avars had rejected. Bonus then suggested that they would send envoys to meet the Emperor Justin II to discuss the terms of peace because Bonus lacked the authority to do so. Baian accepted this, but stated that he would need some symbolic gifts (a silver plate, a small sum of gold and a Scythian tunic) to keep his tribes happy. He had marched through Scythia with nothing and it was impossible for him to return without having achieved anything. Bonus, his advisors, and the archbishop of the city, all thought these demands reasonable despite their symbolic implications of a tribute relationship, but they were afraid to give the Avars anything without the consent of the Emperor. So they pretended they did not have these items and suggested Baian should ask the Emperor directly for them. Baian took this as an insult and threatened the Romans with an invasion. Bonus responded that such an attack would end in disaster. Baian’s response was that he would use men he did not mind losing. So the Khagan decided to put further pressure on the Romans by sending 10,000 Kutrigur Huns across the river Save to pillage Dalmatia while he recrossed the Danube with all of his men into the territory previously held by the Gepids. In other words, Baian indirectly admitted a defeat by evacuating the neighbourhood of Sirmium. Bonus had once again protected Roman territories with great success.33 We do not know what happened next, but we know that soon after this Baian and the Romans concluded a truce. We do not know the fate of the Kutrigur contingent that raided Dalmatia. What is known is that Baian then demanded that the Romans pay the Avars gold in return for not pillaging Roman territory. Vitalianus then ordered on his own initiative the Prefect of Illyricum to give him 800 nomismata of gold, which he then forwarded to the Avars. This proves that this Vitalianus was a man of some importance, which means that if he is to be identified as the imprisoned interpreter (above) that he also held some other positions in the imperial administration. Baian then dispatched Targites with this Vitalianus to Justin II. Baian’s demands to the Emperor were: give Sirmium to the Avars; pay the Avars the same as Justinian had paid to the Kutrigurs and Utigurs; return Usdibad the Gepid and his followers back to their masters. Justin refused outright and stated that war would be in the interest of the Roman Empire. Justin promised to prepare bows, horses and huge forces of infantry for the invasion of the Avar-held territories. At the same time, Justin reprimanded Bonus for having allowed the Avar embassy into his presence with such proposals. Justin also ordered Bonus to prepare for war. The Avars, however, were not yet prepared to give up their demands. Therefore Baian dispatched Targitius once again to Justin II. Justin’s response was full of anger. He promised to dispatch Tiberius as supreme commander to solve all outstanding problems between the two.34 According to Menander (fr. 12.7ff.), Justin made Tiberius autokratôr stratêgos for the war against the Avars in about 569/70 so that he held the supreme command of all

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  63 forces in the Balkans as if he were an Emperor. The PLRE 3 suggests that this meant the combining of the titles magister utriusque militiae and comes excubitorum. This is possible, but it is likelier that this meant some temporary overall command with the Latin title dux/ magister imperator. This is the position that Belisarius had when he had been sent against the Vandals and Ostrogoths (see MHLR Vol.6) and which the Strategikon of Maurice implies with the temporary general terms strategos (overall commander/general) and hypostrategos (second-in-command/lieutenant general). According to John of Biclar, in 570 the Avars advanced as far as Thrace, but Tiberius defeated them decisively so that he was able to enter Constantinople in triumph. This means that Bonus had been unable to defend the crossings or that he guarded another section of the river (e.g. the area around Sirmium) while the Avars crossed the Danube further to the east, for example in Scythia.35 It is usually assumed that the Avars repeated their attack immediately and that Tiberius suffered a defeat in 570 or 571,36 but I am inclined to accept the dating preserved by Theophanes (AM 6066, 574) and Evagrius (5.11). This conclusion also receives support from the following: 1) the Avars would surely have needed some time to recover from the crushing defeat that they suffered in 570; 2) Justin II was already planning to break the peace with Persia in 571 and it is a lot easier to see him willing to do that if his armies had been victorious just before this; 3) two sources date the war to 574; 4) the Turks accused the Romans of duplicity in about 575/6 on the grounds that they had concluded peace with the Avars, which must refer to the peace that had only just been concluded (Menander fr.19.1–2). Furthermore, Evagrius not only dates the war to 574, but also implies that Tiberius had fought against the Avars just before being appointed Caesar in 574. Therefore it is clear that it took until about 573/4 for the Avars to invade again, as the sources state. The timing was perfect. The Avars exploited the problems the Romans were facing in the east (see later). Therefore it is not surprising to find that this time the Romans were heavily outnumbered and that Tiberius was ready to negotiate. It is clear that Menander’s fragment 15.1 belongs precisely to this point in time because we find the Avar Khagan presenting demands to the Romans through his envoy Apsikh, the acceptance of which Tiberius recommended to the Emperor. It is easy to see why Tiberius would have preferred the maintenance of peace in a situation in which he did not have adequate forces available for him in the Balkans in 573/4 and therefore agreed to settle the Avars as foederati on Roman soil in return for hostages in the form of the sons of the leading Avars. This, however, was not acceptable to the haughty Justin. He wanted the sons of the Khagan/Khan as hostages. This was not acceptable to the Khagan and Tiberius had no alternative but to fight. His first orders were for Bonus to guard the river crossings against the inevitable invasion.37 Some time after this the Avars invaded, probably during the winter months of 574 when the Danube froze, and Tiberius and the other Roman generals decided to engage the Avars in some unknown location where there were hills. The situation seemed opportune, because the Avars were descending from some hill in small groups and, so the Romans believed, in disorder. But this was a mistake. It was a tactic of the nomads to fight in small scattered groups of horsemen. In fact the Romans had engaged their enemy in the worst possible terrain. The Avar mounted archers had not only numerical superiority but also the advantage of terrain on their side. The Romans were badly mauled and Tiberius was

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64  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 only just able to get away. The only positive thing for the Romans was that now Tiberius could negotiate with the Avars without incurring the wrath of the Emperor. The two sides agreed to a truce so that the Avars could send another embassy to Justin. Now even the pompous madman Justin could be convinced to sign a peace treaty. The two sides reached an agreement and the war ended. When the Avar envoys were returning, they were robbed of their horses and other valuables by the scamareis, the local bandits in the Balkans. The envoys protested to Tiberius who conducted a search for the culprits with the result that he was able to restore some of the robbed property back to its owners. The PLRE3 notes on the basis of Eustratius (V. Eutychius 67, PG 86.2.2349) that Tiberius was present at Sirmium at some stage of the war because the Patriarch Eutychius (then exiled at Amaseia) predicted in a letter that he would become Emperor.38

Justin II and Chosroes I in 565–7239 The relationship between Rome and Persia was tense after the death of Justinian in 565. There were several points of potential conflict between the two: the unsolved question of Suania; the question of monetary payments to the Persians; the status of Christians in Persarmenia; the conflicts between Arabs; and finally the question of Yemen and the trade routes to India and Africa. Each of these problems could cause a war. The Suanian Question40 The diplomatic protocol followed at the time demanded that the Romans and Persians would send envoys with gifts to each other to officially announce the death of rulers and the appointment of new ones. Justin II did this in 567. However, he sought to accomplish more than just the formal announcement of the change of rulers. The truce of 562 had left the question of Suania unresolved (see MHLR Vol.6) and he wanted to solve it once and for all by buying the territory from the Persians. Therefore his envoy, patrician John of Callinicum, son of Domentiolus, was instructed to offer money for this territory. The importance of the small barren mountain tract of Suania arose from its strategic position. It was an area which enabled the Persians both to attack Lazica and to bring tribesmen from the north of the Caucasus range to assist them in this. John travelled on the double to the city of Dara/Daras where he had to wait for ten days because the Persians were celebrating a festival called Frurdigan/Fravardighan (in Greek nekuia) in the city of Nisibis in July 567. This was the last festival in the Persian calendar before the New Year and it was during this festival that the spirits of the dead appeared. John exploited this lull by restoring the water supply of the city. After this, the Persians allowed John to continue his journey to Ctesiphon. The negotiations proved anything but easy. Justin II had stopped the payments to the Saracens that Justinian had agreed to. Chosroes acted as their spokesman, but John countered skilfully. He noted that the payments had not been part of the treaty and that Justinian had paid them out of good will. Furthermore, that obligation had expired with the death of the giver. It was only then that John was able to raise the issue of Suania. Chosroes and his advisors, the Zikh, Yesdegusnaph and others, trapped John with their apparently kind response. They promised to hand over Suania in return for a cash payment if the Suani themselves accepted this, after which the Persians would

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  65 dispatch an ambassador to confirm the treaty. John foolishly swallowed the bait and sent envoys to the Suani who refused to become Roman subjects. Unlike John, Chosroes had known what their answer would be. His sole intention had been to weaken the Roman negotiating position. When Justin II learnt of this, he was enraged, and considered John to be incompetent. As promised, Chosroes then dispatched Zikh as his envoy to discuss the question of Suania. Justin II realised that it was not in his interest to receive him. To strengthen his own hand, Justin II assembled a session of the Senate which decided that the Romans would not accept any of the proposals made by Zikh. This time Justin dispatched Timotheus – a man who had accompanied John – to convey the message that the Romans would not accept any of the Persian proposals. Zikh, who was already ill, became depressed and died, and so did John, son of Domentiolus – had they both contracted the same illness? The Persians did not give up, but sent a new envoy called Mebod (Māhbōdh) who probably belonged to the Suren family (of whom, more later). His entourage included the Saracens, who again presented the same demands as before. This time Justin managed to stall the negotiations with procedural manoeuvres, and the Persians and Saracens had to return home without having achieved anything. The Saracens were steaming with anger and prepared to start military operations to get what they wanted. On the basis of the timeline provided by the account of John of Ephesus (see the quote later) these negotiations lasted until about 569/70. The Alliance with the Turks41 In about late 568 or early 569 an embassy from the Turks arrived in Constantinople bearing most welcome news. They proposed a military alliance against Persia. The Khagan of the Turks, Sizabul/Silziboulos, was seething with anger over the treatment his envoys had received in Persian hands. The Turks had just before this destroyed the Hephthalite kingdom with the help of Katulph the Hephthalite (the Hephthalite king had raped his wife42) and this man had now offered his services to the Persians. It was because of Katulph’s advice that the Persians secretly poisoned two of the Turkish envoys. The Persians also forbade Sizabul’s Sogdian subjects from selling silk in Persia and thereby initiated a trade war with the Turks. . It is no wonder Justin II was prepared to stall the negotiations concerning Suania. He had no other options open to him. Justin grasped the opportunity eagerly and dispatched Zemarchus the Cilician, the MVM per Orientem, as his envoy to Turkish Khagan Sizabul in August 569. When Zemarchus reached Sogdiana, the locals offered iron for sale to demonstrate to the envoy that they had iron mines in the area. After this the shamans performed an exorcism to purify those who entered their territory. Then the envoys were taken to meet the Khagan on a mountain called Ektag, or in Greek the Golden Mountain. The location is not known, but on the basis of the name it was probably in the heartland of the Turkish realm, the seat of power of the Khagan of the Eastern Turks. Some historians have suggested that Ektag (Ak-takh) means White Mountain and identify it with Mount A-kie-tien (White Mountain in Chinese), while others identify it with the Altai Mountains because its name means ‘Golden’.43 Khagan Sizabul demonstrated his wealth and power to the envoys through various means. These included the showing of a mobile golden throne placed on two wheels, and lavishly decorated tents/yurts, gilded wooden pillars, silken hangings, a golden couch supported by four golden peacocks, and vast numbers

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66  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 of wagons laden with silver objects. However, the principal means of convincing the envoy of the value of making an alliance with the Turks was a demonstration of Turkish military might. Therefore Sizabul ordered Zemarchus to accompany him with twenty followers and attendants while the other Romans stayed where they were. Then Sizabul gave gifts to the Romans, and a female slave captured from the Kherkhir (Khirgiz) tribe for Zemarchus’ personal pleasure.44 The Turkish army marched from the Golden Mountain to a place called Talas45 where they were met by a Persian envoy. His aim was to prevent the invasion and alliance. Sizabul soon made it clear to the Persian envoy that all of his efforts would be in vain and that he meant business. This, however, did not frighten the Persian. He forgot all protocol and let his rage show. After this, the Persian departed. However, he had learnt one important thing, which was the presence of the Roman envoy among the Turks. This had its consequences soon enough. Sizabul called Zemarchus into his presence while he ordered his army to be prepared for an invasion of enemy territory. Sizabul reaffirmed his promises of friendship and dispatched Zemarchus back home with an envoy of his own called Tarkhan (envoy/councillor) Tagma. The previous envoy Maniakh had died meanwhile, but his son was now told to accompany Tagma. Sizabul and his retinue returned to their companions and then began their homeward trek. The neighbouring tribes wanted to attach their own envoys to this retinue, but Sizabul allowed only the Kholiatai to do that. Therefore the journey back took the Romans across the river Oekh (either the Jaxartes or the Oxus) to the first city of the Kholiatai and from there through a series of fortresses until they reached an enormous, wide lake (either Lake Aral or the Caspian Sea).46 Zemarchus rested there for three days and dispatched a messenger named George to Constantinople to inform the Emperor in advance of their arrival. George and twelve Turks took the shortcut through the desert while Zemarchus travelled along the sandy shores for twelve days until he reached the rivers Ikh (Emba), Daikh (Ural) and, after passing some other lakes, the river Attila (Volga). Then he arrived in the lands of the Ugurs (an unknown tribe variously identified with the Uighurs, Utigurs or Urogi, but could also be the Hungarians). The Ugurs warned the envoys that there were 4,000 Persians posted in ambush in the woods by the river Kophen (Kuma) – this was the Persian reaction to the knowledge that there had been Roman envoys in the court of the Khagan! The leader of the Ugurs, who was a client king of the Turks, provided the retinue with skins filled with water so that they could cross the desert. The envoys then travelled to a lake and from there on to another lake where the River Kophen empties. From there they dispatched scouts to see if there really were Persian ambushers waiting for them. The scouts reported that they could see no-one, but all the same the retinue marched cautiously to the land of the Alans because they feared the Oromuskhi tribe (unknown, but it has been suggested that these are Moskhoi/Meskhoi). When the travellers reached the land of the Alans, they asked for an audience with their ruler Sarosius, who gladly received them but on condition that the Turks were disarmed. A three-day quarrel ensued, but Zemarchus managed to convince the Turks to give up their weapons. Sarosius advised Zemarchus to avoid the road running through the land of the Misimians because the Persians were waiting for their arrival in Suania. The probable reason for Zemarchus’s readiness to use the road leading through Suania is that Rome and Persia were at peace and it should have been safe. In 571 the situation,

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  67 however, was already reaching a boiling point and the Persians were quite prepared to kill the Roman envoys. Sarosius’s advice was to use the route via the Dareine Road to Apsilia instead. Zemarchus followed this advice. However, to fool the Persians he dispatched ten men with silk along the road leading into Suania so that the Persians would expect the envoy to follow soon after them. Zemarchus reached the city of Rogatorium (unknown) and then the coast of the Black Sea. Once there he boarded a ship that took him to the River Phasis, and from there he took another ship to Trapezus. After this he used the public post to get to Constantinople. The whole trip had taken two years to accomplish so that Zemarchus and the Turkish envoys reached the imperial capital in the summer of 571. The news was very pleasing for the Emperor Justin II. The Turks had in the meantime launched an invasion of Persia with great success and had laid waste much of it. The Khagan’s suggestion that the Turks and Romans would invade Persia from two different directions was gladly accepted by Justin. The Arabs and the Superpowers in 565–7447 The sources do not mention any large-scale military operations between the Arabs of the two superpowers before about 569/70, which suggests that the Arabs abided by the treaty. The probable reason for this is that the Lakhmids could still hope to obtain the tribute they had been previously paid by Justinian as long as the negotiations between the Romans and Persians lasted. However, this does not mean that there would not have been banditry or other wars fought between the Arabs. The first instance of the wars between the Arabs is mentioned by Ibn Qutayba. Irfan Shahid has proved the information in it to be accurate. According to Qutayba, al-Harith (Arethas) ibn-abī-Shāmir campaigned against the Jewish oasis of Khaybar in Hijaz (located north of Medina) in ca. 567. It is probable that this operation coincided with the mysterious expedition of Abraha King of Yemen against the city of Mecca, which came to be known in the Islamic tradition as the Expedition of the Elephant. It has traditionally been dated to 570, but, as several of the secondary sources noted in the endnotes state, it is these days often considered to have taken place earlier. If it took place in 567 then there is every reason to suspect that the Romans had a hand in the operation because the Jews traditionally sided with the Persians and we have two Roman client states attacking Jewish Arabs from two different directions. Abraha’s attack achieved nothing because it was stopped by ‘birds dropping stones’, which probably means humans were throwing stones, that convinced the Ethiopian overlords of Yemen to turn back. However, the Ghassanid/Jafnid attack against Khaybar succeeded. Theophylact Simocattes (3.9.6) claims that the Romans later accused the Persians of having caused the war by attempting to incite the Himyarites to revolt against the Romans. This is not exactly confirmed by the Arabic sources, but one possibility for such incitement could be the time when the Expedition of the Elephant took place. The birds dropping stones could mean that the local Yemenites rose against their Ethiopian overlords and caused the abandonment of the campaign against Mecca and Jewish Arabs who would have favoured the Persians over the Romans. The situation changed in about 569/70 for three reasons. Firstly, the Lakhmids in Persian service had some hope of regaining their financial payments from the Romans only as long as the negotiations lasted. Secondly, the feared Ghassanid/Jafnid leader

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68  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Arethas died in about 569. This removed from the picture the man the Lakhmids feared most. Thirdly, the Persians became aware of the negotiations between the Romans and Turks in about 570. The situation is described in some detail by John of Ephesus.48 The same information can also be found in Bar Hebraeus (Budge tr. pp.79–80): ‘The anger of Justin against Marcian [Marcianus] arose from no fault of the latter, but rather from the unbusinesslike habits of the king himself, who allowed the underhand dealings of the weak court of Constantinople to come to light by a carelessness as indefensible as the treachery it disclosed was base…. The Tayenses, or Arabs of the north, were at that time divided into two sections, of which the one was allied with Rome [the Ghassanids/Jafnids], the other with the Persians [the Lakhmids/Nasrids]. Of the former Harith [al-Harith/Arethas] was king, and was held in such general awe and terror by all the nomad tribes, that as long as he lived, no one ventured to disturb the peace. But upon his death [dated usually to 569 but could also have taken place in 570] the Arabs in alliance with Persia looked with contempt upon his sons and princes and army… Accordingly they gathered themselves together, and pitched their camp in Harith’s territories [Shahid p.341 correctly notes that this means that the Ghassanids also had lands of their own just outside the Roman limes], bringing with them all their flocks, and vast herds of camels. But when Mondhir [al-Mundhir ibn al-Hārith/ Alamoundaros/Alamundarus], Harith’s eldest son, heard of it, he was very wroth, and burnt with zeal, and taking with him his brothers and sons and nobles and all his army [Shahid p.341 once again correctly notes that the Ghassanid royal house fought as a family and that all of them took part in the wars], he suddenly fell upon them, whereas they had expected that he would never venture to make any resistance. They were utterly defeated, therefore, and put to the sword, and their king Kabus [Caboses], when he saw the fierce onset made by Mondhir and his troops [this was a surprise attack conducted by fast moving cavalry], and that they had broken through and overpowered and slaughtered his hordes, turned his horse, and fled with a few companions, and succeeded in making his escape, but saved nothing of his property. And Mondhir entered, and took possession of Kabus’ tent, and his entire encampment, and all his baggage, and his herds of camels. Several also of his relatives he made prisoners, and some of his nobles, but the rest he put to the sword. And next he crossed over the Euphrates, and pitched his camp in the territories of Kabus, and marched inland to the distance of sixty leagues, and arrived at the place where the herds and all the riches of the Persian Arabs were. [Shahid pp.342–3 notes that it was three mansiones distant from the capital al-Hirah/Hira – a location which is likely to be Ayn Ubagh.] There he pitched his camp for some time, and the hordes of Kabus, on seeing their master’s well-known tent erected so far in their land, boldly came to it, expecting to find their king there, but on entering, found themselves in Mondhir’s camp, and were seized and put to death, except some of note, who were kept as prisoners. [Shahid pp.342–3 rightly praises the military acumen of Mondhir/ Alamundarus/al-Mundhir] And after staying there as long as he chose, he set out upon his return with much spoil, consisting of herds of horses and camels and armour and so forth. And after some time had elapsed, Kabus also collected his

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  69 forces, and sent to Mondhir, bidding him to meet him in battle [I agree with Shahid pp. 343–6 that even if it is possible that Kabus’ challenge took place when Alamundarus was withdrawing from Lakhmid territory, it is inherently likelier that the challenge took place after the Lakhmids had had some time to recover and regroup. However, I disagree with Shahid in the timing of the campaigns. Shahid places the first campaign to the year 569 and the second to 570. The first campaign would have taken place soon after the death of Arethas, but this could also mean the next year, so I would place it to 569–70. The second of the campaigns took place after the Lakhmids had had time to regroup and after Marcianus had been appointed MVM per Orientem, which means that it would have taken place some time between mid-summer 572 and March-April 573. The likeliest period would be March-April 573 because this would explain why Justin sacked Marcianus in the account of John.]… But Mondhir sent in reply, ‘Why do ye trouble yourselves? for I am already on my way.’ [This means that Alamundarus was aware of the enemy plans and made a pre-emptive strike into enemy territory] And not only did he consent and make preparations, but with the word effected also the deed. For he met them suddenly in the desert, when they did not expect him, and fell upon them, and threw them into confusion, and slew most of them; and again they fled before him. But inasmuch as we have previously given an account of these achievements elsewhere in our history [this section is no longer extant], our purpose now is to record the iniquitous plot formed against him in violation of all right feeling after these glorious victories, and so great a triumph in two successive battles. For, as Mondhir imagined that his success would be acceptable and extolled by the king, he wrote to him an account of all that he had done, and his complete victory; and added a request that he would send him gold that he might hire troops; because he expected that certainly they [the Lakhmids] would gather their forces once more to attack him. [It has long been recognized (e.g. Shahid p.346; Edwell et al. p.256) that this proves that, even if Alamundarus had achieved great victories, he had also suffered casualties so that he needed Roman help to replace the losses with mercenaries] And when king Justin heard that he had written to him to send him gold, he was angry, and very indignant, and reviled him, and vowed vengeance against him, and secretly determined in his heart to murder him by some artifice or other. [Modern historians like e.g. Shahid p. 349 have justifiably considered Justin’s reaction as a sign of his increasing mental problems. Bar Hebraeus explains why Justin reacted as he did (tr. by Budge, 80): ‘Justinus determined to kill Mundar as if he had been the cause of the Persians invading the land of the Rhomaye.’ In other words, in 573 the mentally unbalanced Justin accused Alamundarus of the war that he had been planning at least since 571 and which he, Justin, had started in mid-summer 572. However, it is possible that the mere request for gold by a ‘barbarian’ would have sufficed as a reason for Justin.] Thus… Justin wrote a letter to the patrician Marcian [This dates Alamundarus’s request for gold to the latter half of 572 or early 573, because Marcian assumed his post as magister militum per Orientem some time in summer 572] with the intention of having Mondhir secretly put to death; and the letter was as follows:49 ‘I have written to Mondhir the Arab to bid him to come to thee; see, directly that he comes, that thou take off his head, and write and inform me of it. To Mondhir I have written in

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70  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 these words: Because of some matters of importance, I have written to the patrician Marcian, requesting him to confer with thee; go therefore to him immediately without delay, and consult with him upon the matters in question.’ [Marcian was Alamundarus’s superior so it would not have aroused Alamundarus’s suspicions if he was ordered to meet Marcian.] But,… the letters, by the providence of God, were changed, and the name of Mondhir himself was inscribed upon the despatch, directing Marcian to take off Mondhir’s head; while, by some mistake or other, the letter intended for Mondhir was directed to Marcian [This was certainly the mother of all blunders]… Mondhir received the despatch which gave directions to Marcian to take off his head; and Marcian, on the other hand, that which required Mondhir to go to Marcian, to hold the proposed conference… [This ultimately led to the sacking of Marcianus. Bar Hebraeus (tr. by Budge p.80) states it as follows: ‘Now the king Justinus thought that Marcion had informed Mundar… and because of this he was angry with him and arrested him.’ ] And being filled with anger, he [Mondhir/Alamundarus] collected all his people, and bade them provide for his safety, saying, ‘If you see anyone whomsoever sent unto me from the king of the Romans, if he has but a small escort, seize them, and keep them closely guarded outside your encampment; but if the escort is numerous, at once advance boldly and fall upon them, without giving the slightest credence to anything whatsoever which they shall say unto you, or permitting them to approach on any pretence into the neighbourhood of your encampment.’ [Shahid p. 357 notes that this implies that Alamundarus and his army was on Roman soil at that time] And thus uninterruptedly day and night the Arab hordes kept armed watch in defence of their king... And when the Persians and the Arabs under the Persian rule, heard the news, and learnt that they had now nothing to fear from Mondhir, and that he would not trouble himself to engage in war for the sake of the Romans, who had tried to murder him, they boldly made preparations for invading the Roman territory, and laid it waste with fire and sword as far as Antioch [This refers to the Persian invasion which took place in 573. A fuller account is provided later in the appropriate place] and elsewhere, and took the inhabitants prisoners, and utterly ruined all these countries, and returned to their land with a mighty spoil. But Mondhir was full of grief and lamentation at the treachery of the Romans towards him, and at the devastation wrought by his enemies, and the wealth which they had carried away from the Roman land; and therefore he gathered his people, and withdrew into the deserts. [Shahid p. 357 correctly states that it was only now in 573 that Alamundarus withdrew from Roman territory into the desert] All meanwhile who heard of the wickedness which had been purposed against him, without fault on his side, were greatly displeased, and blamed it … And when the king heard that this was said on all sides, and learnt moreover that Mondhir had abandoned all care of the Roman territories [This implies that Alamundarus had until then protected at least those territories of the Roman Empire where his encampments were, but that he now abandoned even that], he sent orders to the chiefs and generals in the East, commanding them to go to him, and persuade him to be reconciled to them. And when many of them sent to him, the answer he returned to each one was: ‘Be well assured, that anyone whosoever who comes unto me from the Roman dominions, I shall resist his approach by

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  71 force, so that either he shall kill me, or I will kill him… ‘And this state of things continued for two or three years, during which repeated attempts were made to prevail upon him to consent to a reconciliation, but he would not permit anyone to approach him, but sent about Justin’s despatch, commanding his murder, in all directions, and shewed it to everyone. [It has been recognized ever since the days of Stein (p.51, n.6, ‘Mundar bar Charet’) that the period when al-Mundhir refused to fight on the behalf of the Romans lasted from 572 until 575]… The discovery… of Justin’s treachery against Mondhir [Alamundarus], brought about by the carelessness of the clerks at Constantinople, was the sole reason why Marcian was deprived of his command at the very moment when the capture of Nisibis seemed certain, whereby the eastern confines of the Roman territories would have been secured against the inroads of the Persians.’ John of Ephesus 6.2–5, tr. by Smith 369–75, 379 with my comments in parentheses. As noted by Irfan Shahid (1995, 360), the desertion of al-Mundhir (Alamundarus) and his elite Ghassanid cavalry spelled trouble for the Romans. The Arabs had bred a superior species of horse that could outrun all other horses on short distances. The Roman and Persian horses had the advantage in frontal encounters as they were larger and heavier, but the Arabic horses were faster over short distances, giving them the advantage over all their enemies on the tactical level. The following quote from Evagrius shows this nicely: ‘For this people [Scenite Arabs] are invisible by any other than themselves, on account of the fleetness of their horses [these were the already famous Arab horses]; when hemmed in, they cannot be captured; and they outstrip their enemies in retreat.’ Evagrius 5.20, tr. by anon. 1846, 277–8 with my comments in parentheses. This superiority persisted in the coming centuries too, as is shown by the instructions included in the Praecepta Militaria (2.101–111/2.10) written by the famed tenth century soldier-emperor Nikephoros II Phokas. He warned that the Roman cavalry should not try to pursue the Arabitai because the Arab horses were so fast that it was impossible to overtake them. The Arabs could choose when and where they would fight and they could outmanoeuvre their enemies in pitched battles thanks to their superior speed which also enabled them to flee if things did not turn out as expected. The Romans needed Arabs and their horses to be able to catch enemy Arabs.50 However, this was not the whole extent of the problem because the Romans lacked the means to catch the Arabs. This was also the case on the strategic plane after Justinian abolished the camel corps (MHLR 6, p.79). This means that the Romans were unable to operate in the deserts unless they spent time collecting camels from the civilians. There is a clear difference in the operational capabilities of the Roman armies before and after Justinian’s idiotic decision, for which see for example the campaigns that took place under Anastasius (MHLR Vol.5, 178–80). The Red Sea Route and Yemen in 570–74 The Roman accounts prove that the Persians were aware of the negotiations between the Turks and the Romans and it was this that changed their attitude towards the situation in Yemen.51 The resulting war is briefly noted by the Roman sources in this context,

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72  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 while the Arabic sources provide a more detailed account that places the events in local context. In 570 Himyar (Yemen) was a Roman client state ruled by a Christian Ethiopian soldier class under their new king Masruq b. Abraha (Sanatourkes of Theophanes of Byzantium). Masruq was the younger son of Abraha and he had succeeded his elder brother Yaksum b. Abraha in power in 570. Tabari (i.945ff.) provides two slightly different versions of what happened. According to Ibn Ishaq’s version, Yaksum treated Himyar and the Arabs oppressively while he took their women as sexual partners. His successor brother Masruq continued this oppression with the result that Sayf b. Dhi Yazan al-Himyari, whose patronymic was Abu Murrah, went to meet the Emperor to complain about the behaviour of the Abyssinians. Sayf asked the Emperor to send his army to Himyar and then rule it as a part of the Roman Empire. The Emperor refused, so Sayf travelled to the court of alNuman b. al-Mundhir at al-Hirah where he complained about the persecution and asked for help. The Lakhmid king answered that he was due to make his yearly official visit to the Persian royal court to demonstrate his loyalty and that he would take Sayf with him. Sayf was then introduced to Chosroes and granted a hearing. Chosroes’ answer was that Himyar was far away and poor in resources, nothing but sheep and camels, and he did not want to commit the Persian army to such a campaign. But Chosroes gave Sayf 10,000 dirhams and a robe of honour. I would suggest that the 10,000 dirhams could be the incitement to revolt referred to above (Theophylact 3.9.6) – Chosroes was bribing Sayf to begin a revolt. Sayf was not satisfied with this. He wanted military help. So he distributed money to the common people. When this was reported to Chosroes, he summoned Sayf back. Sayf claimed that the money was of no interest to him because the mountains of Yemen were made entirely of gold and silver. This aroused the interest of Chosroes who assembled his marzbans and advisers. Timothy Power (pp.81–2) notes after Michael Morony that probably natural resources did play a role in the Persian decision to occupy Yemen, and that there is evidence that the Persians created a silver-mining industry in Yemen after they had conquered it. However, as we shall see, there were also commercial reasons. One of Chosroes’ advisors suggested he release from his prisons all those who had been condemned to death and send them to Yemen, because it would cost him nothing to do so. Chosroes accepted the advice. There were altogether 800 men and the best qualified was chosen as their commander. The man in question was an elderly man of high birth called Wahriz. Wahriz was given everything necessary for the campaign plus eight ships to carry 100 men each. When the fleet reached the open sea, two of the ships sunk with all hands, so only six of the ships reached Yemen, in the region of Aden. Eight hundred men may seem a small number to send, but we should remember that the size of the opposing army was not likely to be large because the largest purely Himyarite army mentioned by the sources consisted of only 16,000 men (see MHLR Vol.1). Even if this refers to the Himyarite army and not the occupying Ethiopian army it is clear that it cannot have been much larger than this. Once the men had disembarked, Wahriz asked what help Sayf could provide. Sayf ’s answer was that he would provide Wahriz with as many Arab soldiers and Arab horses as he wished. When Masruq b. Abraha heard of their arrival, he assembled his Abyssinian

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  73 army and marched against the enemy. The two armies encamped close to each other. Wahriz dispatched his son Nawzadh with a cavalry detachment to skirmish with the enemy so that they would learn how the enemy fought. This resulted in the death of Nawzadh. Wahriz was grief-stricken, angry, and more determined than ever to destroy the enemy. The two sides drew up their armies in combat formations and prepared to fight. Wahriz asked the locals to point out their king for him. They told him he was the man on the elephant with a crown on his head and a red ruby on his forehead. Wahriz asked them not to kill him. Then they waited for a long time and Wahriz asked what the king was now riding. The locals said that he was now on a horse, and Wahriz again ordered them not to kill him. Then after a long while, Wahriz once again asked what the king was riding, and when he was told that the king was now riding a mule, Wahriz called him a weakling. This suggests that the battle had lasted for so long that the elephant and horse of the Abyssinian king had become tired and the king had been forced to mount a mule; indeed it suggests that Wahriz had intentionally prolonged the battle so that the enemy would become tired. Wahriz then took his stiff bow, asked the men to fasten his drooping eyelids up, and then he shot at the king. The arrow hit the ruby on the king’s foreheard and came out at the nape of his neck. Masruq was thrown backwards from his mule and the Abyssinians gathered around him. The Persians charged and slaughtered the disordered enemy forces which fled in all directions. After this, Wahriz advanced to the capital San’a and secured Yemen for Persia. Chosroes recalled Wahriz and made Sayf ruler of Yemen with the responsibility of paying a fixed annual poll tax and land tax to the Persians. A second version is provided by Hisham. It claims that Abraha took away the beautiful wife of one Abu Murrah al-Fayyad Dhu Yazan, who then asked the Lakhmid king to assist him in getting help from Chosroes against Masruq. Chosroes was unwilling to commit his army and asked Abu Murrah to wait. However, Chosroes did nothing and Abu Murrah died. Then Abraha died too and soon after him also his son Yaksum. It was then that Abu Murrah’s son decided to seek help from the Romans because Chosroes had not given any help to his father. The Emperor, however, answered that he would not provide any help because the Abyssinians were Christians. Therefore, he sought help from the Persians once again. Chosroes now gave the son money, which the latter distributed to the population, with the same result that Chosroes agreed to assist him with 800 criminals who were put on board eight vessels. The commander of these was Wahriz, whom Chosroes counted as the equal of a thousand horsemen – this may mean that he had held the rank of hazarbed/chiliarches. I would suggest that he was a member of the Mihran family because Theophanes of Byzantium calls this commander Miranus (a corruption of Mirranes/Mihran?). Two of the ships sunk with all hands and only six reached the coast at Hadramawt. There is a discrepancy regarding the place of landing, but it is entirely possible that the fleet put on land first in Hadramawt from where it then continued its journey to Aden. Masruq marched against them with an army of 100,000 men which included Abyssinians, Himyarites and Bedouins. The figure is likely to be an exaggeration. My suggestion is that the army consisted of about 40,000 men (see the reasons later) while the opposing rebel force probably consisted of about 20,000 Arabs from Hadramawt and Himyar plus the 600 Persian horsemen and some sailors. Wahriz encamped his army with its back to the sea to make escape impossible. The two sides

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74  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 agreed to a truce to conduct negotiations. Then after ten days Wahriz’s son went near the enemy encampment without his father’s permission. The son rode into the camp and the Abyssinians killed him. If this account contains a germ of truth, then I would suggest that Wahriz was attempting to surprise the enemy inside their camp with a cavalry attack which failed when his son died. The story, however, claims that it was the killing of the son that broke the truce, and the two sides prepared for combat on an appointed day. Wahriz ordered the ships to be fired and the extra provisions destroyed so that the men would fight with desperation. This was a standard stratagem of commanders and the story rings true. Wahriz ordered his men to remain steadfast in battle and to wait for his order to shoot a five-arrow volley. This the people of Yemen had never seen; it was a specialty of the Persians. Masruq was mounted on an elephant wearing a crown and a ruby on his forehead. He led the army forward into the attack. The eyesight of the elderly Wahriz was not good and he asked the men to point out where the king was. Masruq soon dismounted from his elephant and mounted a horse. When this happened, Wahriz asked his men to prop his drooping eyelids open with a bandage52 so he could see the foe. Wahriz then told his men to point out where the Abyssinian king was. Once he was sure where the king was, he ordered his men to shoot while he pulled the string of the bow. An arrow hit the king in the forehead and he fell from his horse. The volley of arrows killed many of the enemy, and when they saw their king killed, they fled. The booty that the rebels captured from the enemy camp was enormous. Each Persian horseman got 50 or 60 Abyssinians, Himyarites or Bedouins as captives. If each of the roughly 600 men (some of them would of course have died) got this many captives, it would imply that there had been more than 30,000 men in the enemy army, hence my guess that there had been about 40,000 men. Wahriz ordered the Abyssinians massacred, after which he advanced to San’a and obtained the submission of all of Yemen. The rest of the story comes again from Ibn Ishaq (Tabari i.957–8). He states that once Wahriz had left, Sayf started hunting Abyssinians, exterminated all excepting those he took as his personal slaves. Some he employed as spear-armed runners in front of him, until one day they suddenly surrounded Sayf and killed him, after which one of the Abyssinians became king of Himyar once again. When Chosroes learnt of this, he sent Wahriz with 4,000 Persian soldiers to Yemen with orders to kill all the blacks (i.e. Abyssinians) and mulattos. The men chosen for the task were elite Daylami mountaineer infantry perfectly suited to the mountaineous terrain of Yemen. Wahriz accomplished the mission, after which he was appointed Viceroy of Yemen, a position which he held until his death. He was succeeded by his son al-Marzuban until he died too and was succeeded by his son Binajan. Binajan’s successor was his son Khurrakhusrah, but Chosroes Parwez replaced him with Badhan and the post ceased to be the privilege of a single family. Theophanes the Confessor (AM 6064, a.572) refers to an embassy sent by the Ethiopians to Constantinople to ask for help against the Persians who had overtaken Himyar, and to the Roman answer that the King of Ethiopia should immediately attack the land of the Persians (i.e. Himyar). As noted by Power (78–9), this piece of text has been taken from Malalas where its location corresponds with the embassy of Justinian described by Procopius. On the basis of this it has been suggested that Theophanes has misplaced this to the reign of Justin II, but I agree with Power that it is possible that there were actually two similar Roman initiatives. In fact, I would suggest that there were.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  75 The reason for this is that the dating of this initiative coincides roughly with the already described killing of Sayf by the Abyssinians after which Himyar was once again ruled by an Abyssinian king (Tabari i.957–8). In other words, there is every reason to believe that after the Persians had overthrown the Roman client king of Himyar, Justin II gave the Ethiopians his permission to reconquer Himyar, which they then did. The reason why the Ethiopians needed imperial permission was that after Abraha had become king of Himyar, both Aksum and Himyar were client kingdoms of Rome. The commercial aspect of the conquest of Yemen becomes apparent from al-Tabari’s text i.965. This states that after the conquest of Yemen Chosroes dispatched one of his commanders with a numerous army to Ceylon. This dates the operation to the period after 573 and it is probable that it was the reason why Chosroes sought a one-year truce with the Romans in 574 – when he held the upper hand (see later). It would have enabled him to transfer his elite soldiers from the west to the Indian Ocean in 574–5. The Persian commander attacked the king of Ceylon, killed him, and then conquered the island so that he was able to send to Chosroes a huge amount of booty and jewels. This account has been dismissed as a fable by, for example, the translator Bosworth,53 but in my opinion it is more than likely that there is at least a germ of truth in it. The Romans had previously collected taxes from some of the states of India, and Ceylon could easily be one of those states; it would not be too far-fetched to conjecture that once the Persians controlled the traffic of the Red Sea they would try to assume the same position the Romans had held. Their dhows were obviously not as good as the Roman war galleys, but this does not mean that they could not have attempted the same.54 However, it is still uncertain whether the Persians really conducted such an attack as is claimed by al-Tabari’s source, because it is possible that a mere demonstration of naval force (a so-called show-of-theflag operation) after the conquest of Yemen could easily have been enough to convince the ruler of Ceylon to start paying tribute to the Persians in return for keeping the sea routes open to the Roman Empire. Nonetheless, I would still suggest that the Persians did attack Ceylon and that it became a client state of Persia. The Persians certainly possessed elite soldiers capable of defeating numerically superior foes, even if their navy was not on a par with that of the Romans, and the circumstantial evidence does back this up. The second of Wahriz’s campaigns in Yemen can be dated to 573. The Persians would also have possessed enough men for such an operation immediately after it, because they obtained a one-year truce in 574. Hence there is every reason to believe what al-Tabari states. The persecution of Christians and the Persarmenian revolt in 570–255 The prospect of military alliance with the Turks emboldened Justin II to support the Persarmenians against their overlords in 571. By this time Rome and Persia were on the brink of war and both sides knew it. The Persians were well aware of the negotiations between the Romans and the Turks and it is therefore not surprising that Chosroes had responded affirmatively to the request of help by a Himyarite prince. The expulsion of the Aksumite Ethiopians from Yemen would effectively close the trade route from the Red Sea to India and Africa from the Romans, which in its turn put further pressure on the Romans to agree to the terms of Chosroes (see below). It is probable that we should see the persecution of Persarmenian Christians in the light of this worsening relationship between the two superpowers such that – even if it is

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76  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 not stated by the sources – the Persians aimed to gain stronger control over their subjects, the Persarmenians, by forcing them to become Zoroastrians. This had the exact opposite effect, like almost all persecutions in history. In other words, the aim of unifying the subjects under a single religion merely created a centrifugal phenomenon in which the subjects sought to flee from this persecution. The eleventh-century Armenian historian Stephen of Taron/Asolik describes the circumstances of the Persarmenian revolt against the Persians as having resulted from the actions of Chihor-Vshnasp of the Suren clan who had been appointed hazarapet (chiliarch, leader of a thousand men, a sort of prime minister) of Armenia by Chosroes. This Chihor-Vshnasp then oppressed the Armenian nobles and even committed adultery with their wives. This enraged bdeashkh (vitaxa) Vardan the Mamikonean, son of Vasak. Vardan bided his time, his opportunity coming on 2 February 571 when he killed the marzban with a sword and threw him to the ground. Stephen’s account leaves open if we should identify this marzban with the hazarapet Chihor-Vshnasp Suren, but it is likely that he meant one and the same. All Armenian princes rebelled at the same time and received help from the Romans, after which Vardan, his relatives and other nobles fled to Constantinople. On the basis of Evagrius’s account (5.7), it is clear that the revolt was premeditated and that it had Roman blessing. According to Evagrius, the Persarmenians dispatched an embassy to Justin II in secret before the revolt and begged to become Roman subjects. Justin swore an oath to do this with the result that the Persarmenians killed their overlords and Justin then admitted the Armenian refugees into the Roman Empire, after which Justin stopped paying attention to the problem and spent his time in the lap of luxury provided by the imperial court. The other period author, John of Ephesus, provides us with an even better account, which he obtained from eyewitnesses and it is therefore worth quoting him at length. This account can be combined with the above, as my comments will show: ‘When the Magians and princes of the Persians learnt that by the commandment and will of the king of the Romans, all persons, in every land and city of his dominions, were required to conform themselves and come over to his faith [It is possible that this is true, but I would suggest that the principal reason for the forcible conversion was an attempt to put the Persarmenians under tighter control while John of Ephesus’ aim was to accuse Justin and other Chalcedonians of the persecution of the Persarmenians because they persecuted the Monophysites. I.e. it was the model provided by Justin that convinced the Persians to adopt similar measures]… They therefore assembled together and begged an audience with Khosrun [Chosroes]… And… Khosrun… consented thereto and accepted their counsel; and immediately began with the Christians first, and sent and seized three bishops and many of the clergy [It is this that suggests that the measure was meant to place the Persarmenians under tighter control when there was a threat of war with Rome] … he commanded that they should be that instant flayed, and die. And many evils besides he inflicted upon the Christians, and their monasteries and churches were everywhere levelled to the ground, and multitudes bound and thrown into prison… And this then, and much more, was related by these bishops as having been said and done at this time by the

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  77 king of the Persians previously to the revolt of Armenia to the Romans, and which was occasioned by his command that fire-temples should be erected throughout all that part of Armenia which was subject to his rule [John of Ephesus refers here to the eyewitness accounts]. His next measure, as Catholicus and his companions proceeded to relate, was to send a Marzban to our territories, attended by an armed force of two thousand cavalry, who came first of all to our city [Dvin], and commanded us to erect a firetemple… I [Catholicus is here relating the following story to John of Ephesus] burnt with zeal, and stood up against him. I and all the people of the city… and [marzban] in obedience to Khosrun’s commands, began by main force to mark out the site, and to dig and lay the foundations, and to build the walls; while at the same time he made determined preparations for battle. And I besought him again and again, but availed nothing… finally I sent everywhere to all the people of the land [This would have been the opportunity that Vardan the Mamikonean had been awaiting], and when they heard the news, they burnt with zeal for the faith’s sake in Christ, and assembled all as one man, to the number of ten thousand, armed for battle either to live or die for Christ, and firmly determined not to permit a Magician and heathen temple to be built in their land. And when there were assembled all the princes and chieftains of the land, we went to the Marzban, to the place where he was building the fire temple, and had a long conference with him, and boldly resisted him… A long conference followed in which the Marzban protested to the people assembled that he must build the temple according to his orders… But when he saw their readiness and their preparations to resist him, and perceived moreover that they were stronger than himself, he retired with threats nevertheless and protests against their conduct; and returning in great anger to the king [Chosroes], informed him of all that had taken place. And he [Chosroes]… was roused to anger, and burnt with indignation, and vowing death against all the people of the land, he sent against them the Marzban with a body of fifteen thousand men ready for war, with instructions to exterminate any who ventured to resist his commandment, and erect there a shrine for a temple of fire. But the people of the land, when they heard thereof, assembled together to the number of twenty thousand men [The Armenians were clearly up to their task because they assembled a larger force than they faced], and made ready for battle… [The Persarmenian force also included the Christian King of Iberia Guaram/Gorgenes I; for the sources, see PLRE3 Guaram 1]. And on the arrival of the Persians drew themselves in order of battle against them; shouting ‘In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ’, they moved onward to the attack. And Christ broke the foe before the children of the land, and then utterly destroyed them as one man, and slew the Marzban [Stephen of Taron claims that Vardan did this in person], and took off his head, and sent it to the patrician Justinian, who was encamped at that time at Theodosiopolis [Probably Erzurum/Karin rather than the other Theodosiopolis Resaina, so Justinian would have been in charge of the Roman forces facing Persarmenia] in the marches. … And when these things had taken place, and the whole people of Greater Armenia saw that a fierce war was stirred up against them from the wicked kingdom of the Persians, they all gathered themselves together from one end of it to the other,

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78  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 and ran for refuge to the kingdom of the Christians… take refuge in the Roman realm, that it may deliver us from the savage violence of the Magicians. [According to Sebeos 8, Thomson tr. p.6, Vahan Prince of Siwnik, rebelled from the Armenians and sided with the Persians. It is probable that it was this that made Vardan’s position untenable without Roman help]. And all this, and much more, Catholicus of Dovin [Dvin], and the other bishops who were with him, related in the presence of our merciful king and queen, and of the whole senate: but we have admitted only a small portion of it into our history; for they also recounted the details of the repeated conflicts and devastations which followed, and in which the Persian hosts had more than once been vanquished, and their elephants captured; but which we at present must omit for want of space [Since the information comes from Catholicus and bishops, this suggests that the Persians sent reinforcements to Armenia which eventually forced the Persarmenians to flee to the safety of the Roman Empire. The refugees included the Christian King of Iberia Guaram/Gorgenes I and his followers]. Such then is a short abstract of the account of Catholicus of Dovin, the capital of Persarmenia, related to us in the royal city of Romans, by him, and the other bishops and the numerous noblemen who accompanied him, in the presence of many witnesses:… large presents and regal honours paid them, and high dignities granted them, and some royal residences and chief monasteries were set apart for their abode, and an income assigned sufficient for their proper maintenance; and titles of high rank were also sent to the leading men in the land, as also a large subsidy of gold, and orders that no tax should be levied for three years for the king of the Romans, but that they should do their best to assist those who… were warring in their defence, and that of the whole of Armenia against the Persians. [This means that the Romans had gained about 20,000 Armenian and Iberian soldiers – probably all cavalry – into their service and that Justin paid them handsomely.] And this they did for a long time, and the Magician people fell before the Christians on numerous occasions in the first six years of the time during which the war lasted. Of these events we will subsequently give some brief particulars in their proper place. As for Catholicus, at the end of two years he died at Constantinople.’ John of Ephesus 2.18–22, tr. by Smith 118–26, with my comments in parentheses. Chosroes was prepared to overlook this transgression of the peace agreement between Rome and Persia if the Romans returned the fugitives. The Emperor refused to do this, because he trusted that the support provided by the Turks tilted the balance in his favour. Furthermore, in Roman eyes the Persians had already broken the peace by providing help to the Himyarite rebels against the Aksumites. Therefore the support given to the Persarmenian rebels became the official casus belli. However, all sources are unanimous in their view that the real cause of the war was the yearly payments of 500 lbs of gold to the Persians, because Justin thought such payments of tribute to be unworthy of the mighty Roman Empire. Justin seems not to have made adequate preparations for the war. Instead he seems to have had a deluded view of the strength of the Roman military forces in relation to her enemies. He also overestimated the value of the Persarmenian and Turkish support while he underestimated the problems that a war with Persia would cause in other theatres like the Balkans, Italy and Spain. The exact territorial goals beyond the

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  79 reconquest of Suania, Armenia and Nisibis with its surrounding areas are not known, but it is probable that Justin also aimed to annex Arzanene. Arzanene was a strategic province in Persian hands located between Armenia/Persarmenia and Tur Abdin. It was thanks to this central position that the Persian army posted in Persarmenia could threaten Romanheld Tur Abdin and other areas east of it. By possessing both Arzanene and Tur Abdin, the Roman armies posted there could threaten the Persians from a central position if they invaded either Syria or Armenia/Cappadocia. Justin’s grand strategy was based on his belief that constant attack was the best form of defence, and he stated this in his Novel (149.1) dated to 569. It was this policy that he followed in all of his decisions, but he did nothing to ensure that there would be adequate military forces available for such a policy. He was clearly a civilian with very little understanding of military matters.56

Samaritan Revolt before 57257 Both John of Ephesus and John of Nikiu record a Samaritan and Jewish revolt for the reign of Justin II. The crushing of the revolt was entrusted to the ‘monk’ Photius/ Photios (by now the Abbot of the New Monastery of Jerusalem), the stepson of Belisarius, because he had been bred in the profession of arms and had accompanied Belisarius on his campaigns before he had been forced to take the monkish dress (see MHLR Vol.6). As noted above, there could not have been any better teacher of military skills than Belisarius, and Photius’s accomplishments as military commander prove this to have been the case. Photius’s army consisted of the monks, spatharii (sword-bearers, imperial bodyguards who were often eunuchs), despotikoi (members of the imperial family, the ‘despots’, who were presumably accompanied by numbers of bucellarii), domestici/domestikoi (imperial bodguards who usually served as officers for the scholarii) and exercitus romanorum (regular Roman army). According to John of Nikiu, the Emperor sent a monk of high rank called Photius with a numerous army, which means that the revolt was taken seriously. Photius then defeated the rebels and instituted a reign of terror with people being killed, tortured and exiled at his whim. Justin gave Photius full powers to act as he pleased for two reasons: the reign of terror pacified the Samaritans, Jews, and local Christians and the clergy; and most importantly it brought gold into the imperial coffers. After the revolt had been crushed, the extortion of money for the Emperor by legal and illegal means became the principal task of Photius. He did not even hesitate to extort money from bishops, magistrates, governors and other lords. The sums extorted were huge. For example, Photius was able to steal 300 lbs of gold from the Bishop of Askalon – the Bishop was left hanging on a rope for three days before he paid; and he was only one of the important persons who were put through the rack figuratively speaking. The terror unleashed by Photius and his monks and soldiers lasted for the next twelve years, until his death, after which he was replaced by another monastic bully, Abraham, who now became Abbot of the New Monastery of Jerusalem. The principal agents of this terror were the monks, who acted as secret operatives for Photius, and the administrative centre of Palestine was the New Monastery of Jerusalem. One can perhaps draw a comparison with the later inquisitors and Jesuits of Spain in this context. The special powers given to Photius are a good example of the fact that the emperors were not bound by the law or hierarchies – they were a law unto themselves. The special powers exercised by the

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80  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 monks and other members of the clergy with imperial approval during this time are a good example of how the emperors could put anyone in charge of anything at their whim. The exact date of the revolt is unknown, but there are three clues: We know that it took place before 572 because when Photius was crushing the Samaritan revolt the Samaritans of Palestine (presumably under torture) accused the Quaestor Anastasius, who was by birth a Samaritan, of being an idolator. The term means a pagan, but the circumstances suggest that Anastasius was accused of being a Samaritan. We know that Anastasius held the office of Quaestor between ca. 565 and 571/2, which means that the accusation had to take place before 572. The charge, however, was dropped and no inquiry was made because Anastasius went hither and thither and gave bribes to everyone. The second of the clues is that Justin II passed a law in 572 which removed from the Samaritans many of their previous rights. The third of the clues is the sequence of events in the text of John of Ephesus, who places Photius’s trip to Constantinople (3.1.31) in 571, just before the crushing of the Samaritan revolt (3.1.32). My own guess is therefore that the revolt took place in 571–2 and that Photius acted as de facto ruler of Palestine until about 583/4. His services in this area were clearly indispensable for the emperors because he retained his tyrannical powers until the reign of Maurice.

THE PERSIAN WAR IN 572–458 Combat Operations in 572 John of Epiphania and Evagrius state clearly that Justin’s decision to begin the war against the Persians was made in haste without adequate preparations. Justin’s plan appears to have consisted of a two-pronged invasion of enemy territory, one army advancing into Persarmenia while another army operated in Mesopotamia. The Persarmenian Theatre from mid-summer 572 until the end of the year59 Justinian son of Germanus was in charge of the northern theatre as MVM per Armeniam. His forces consisted initially at least of those posted under him plus the Persarmenian deserters under Vardan. These forces invaded Persarmenia probably in late summer 572 and put the Persians in the city of Dvin/Dubius under siege. The city was destroyed from top to bottom and the Persians expelled from it. However, in the process of taking the city the Romans torched the church of St. Gregory, which was near the city, because the Persians had turned it into a storehouse. This caused great uproar among the Armenians with the result that the Emperor Justin replaced Justinian with John to calm down the populace. The victory over the Persians brought the desertion of the rest of Persarmenia (with the exception of Vahan of Siwnik). It was at the latest then that the Lazicans (and presumably also the Iberians), Abasgians and Alans under Saroes joined the Roman army because we find them siding with the Romans the next year. The Persians in their turn were supported by Vahan of Siwnik, Sabirs, Daganes (mod. Dagesthan) and the Daylami/Dilimnites. The Mesopotamian Theatre from mid-summer 572 until the end of the year60 While things progressed well in the northern theatre, the situation was not so bright further south. Justin II appointed his relative patrician Marcianus as MVM per Orientem and dispatched him to take charge of the campaign in Mesopotamia in summer 572.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  81 Marcianus was nephew of the Emperor Justinian and his mother was Justin II’s maternal aunt. Marcianus was an experienced commander, but Justin did not give him adequate forces to accomplish his mission. In the words of Evagrius (5.8), he had only a very few soldiers, and even those were unarmed. He also had some farm workers and herdsmen who had been pressed (conscripted) into service. So he was in no position to begin major operations against the Persians. All he could do was dispatch 3,000 hoplites (these are to be interpreted as heavy cavalry and not as infantry) to raid Arzanene under Theodorus, Sergius of Rhabdion and Juventinus, the commander at Chalcis. Each of the commanders probably had about 1,000 horsemen. They made a raid into Persian territory, took some booty and then returned as fast as possible. This was the whole extent of Roman activity in the Mesopotamian theatre in 572. Marcianus, however, had not stood idle. He trained and equipped his men and spent his time organizing the logistics for the forthcoming campaign. Michael Whitby is certainly correct in stating that it was because of this that later Syrian sources (Michael Syrus; Chron 1234) claim that the delay was caused by a ruse of the Persian marzban in Nisibis. The Roman sources make it clear that the delay was not caused by any ruse but by the lack of resources which Marcianus needed to rectify. Because of this the Persian marzban was able to prepare his defences. This he did by expelling the Christian population, by gathering supplies, and by felling trees around the city walls to give his men a clear line of fire.

Combat Operations in 57361 The Persarmenian Theatre in 573 In the Persarmenian theatre the Persians had not been idle. Chosroes appointed a new commander to replace Vardan Vshnasp. His name was Mihran Mihrewandak (Golon Mihran, the father of Bahram Chobin). His army of 20,000 men consisted of the Persians,

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82  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Persarmenian apostates, Sabirs, Daganes and the Daylami/Dilimnites. He had a large force of elephants. So the Persian army was a combined army that included infantry, elephants and cavalry. The Romans under John opposed this force with a combined army consisting of Romans, Persarmenians, Iberians, Lazicans, Abasgians, and Alans. The Persians suffered a crushing defeat on the plain of Khalamakhik (unknown but probably close to Dvin). The Romans captured all of the elephants and Mihran was able to save his life only with difficulty. He and the very few survivors fled all the way to Persia.62 The Mesopotamian Theatre until May 57363 In the meantime there had been two main developments in the southern theatre of war. Firstly, on the basis of John of Ephesus’s text (see above) it is probable that the Saracens in Persian service threatened the southern flank in about March 573. Secondly, Marcianus had completed his preparations for the invasion of Persian territory and when the winter season had ended in about March 573 he started operations by leading his army from Edessa towards Nisibis. Marcianus defeated the Persians under Mihran at Sargathon (eight miles west of Nisibis) killing 1,200 men and taking captive 70 men, while the Romans lost only 7 men.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  83 After this, Marcianus advanced against the fort of Thebothon, about thirty miles south-east of Nisibis, with the probable idea of isolating Nisibis from the routes leading from Singara. He besieged the fort but abandoned the attempt after only ten days and then marched to Dara on Easter Eve, 8 April 573. I would suggest that it was the success of Alamundarus against the Saracens in the desert that convinced Marcianus to abandon the siege. There was no longer any need to secure the southern flank. On the same day, 8 April, Marcianus received from Justin II the explicit order that he was to besiege Nisibis immediately. He had no alternative but to comply, and did so. Evagrius claims that the siege was conducted so ineffectually that the Persians did not even bother to close their gates, but the Syriac chronicles give an entirely different account. They claim that Marcianus prosecuted the siege with great effectiveness, that the Romans built ramparts and a palisade all around the city and used siege engines and towers, and that Marcianus was close to capturing the city when a man called Acacius Archelaus arrived. He had been dispatched by Justin II with the purpose of sacking and humiliating Marcianus. Period and later authors provide conflicting reasons for this. John of Epiphania and Theophylact claim, while Evagrius implies, that it was because of the too-slow persecution of the siege of Nisibis, while Theophanes of Byzantium claims that the enemies of Marcianus accused him of imperial plans (the alleged saving of Alamundarus could have been used to lend credence to this claim if one assumes that the plotters claimed that these two men formed an alliance). In my opinion the likeliest reason is what John of Ephesus claimed, namely that Justin II suspected that Marcianus had purposely spared Alamundarus.64 The reason for this conclusion is that it would seem strange if Justin II had first ordered Marcianus to begin the siege of Nisibis in April only to dismiss him for negligence as soon as May. The exchange of messages between the Emperor and MVM per Orientem could take place in as few as six days, so it is clear that Justin should have been well aware of what was taking place during the siege. It is also possible to connect the sacking of Marcianus with the information provided by Evagrius (5.9). He claims that the expelled Bishop of Nisibis and the persecuted Christians in Persia provided timely and accurate information of Chosroes’s preparations for war and of his campaign plans to Gregory the Bishop of Theopolis, who in his turn transmitted this to the Emperor. Evagrius claims that Justin did not believe Gregory because the rumours claimed that Chosroes was dead or dying, and even if the reports of the approach of Chosroes from the south along the Euphrates were true the haughty Justin was still convinced that the Persians would be defeated. Evagrius follows this with a description of how Marcianus was sacked. In my opinion this may imply that Justin II actually believed the report and that he had sent Magnus to the theatre of operations (he makes an appearance as a commander immediately after the siege of Nisibis ended) because he was on friendly terms with Alamundarus whose help would have been needed for the protection of the southern flank and that Justin accused Marcianus of having bungled the whole situation and therefore removed him from office immediately, possibly in an effort to placate Alamundarus. I would also suggest that the Saracens that Alamundarus had defeated were actually the vanguard of Chosroes’ main army and that it was because of this that Alamundarus failed to follow up his success by invading Lakhmid territory as he had previously, and that Alamundarus was aware of the collection of the Persian army in ‘Assyria/Babylonia’,

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84  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 and that it was because of this that he asked Justin II to send him gold. In other words, I would suggest that Alamundarus knew that he needed money to buy the services of mercenaries to face the Persian army. The foedus of Alamundarus obviously determined what he was entitled to receive and the request to obtain more would have been considered an insult by a man such as Justin. Marcianus begged Acacius to delay his mission for two days so he could capture the city, but to no avail. According to John of Ephesus, Acacius insulted Marcianus in front of all his troops, grabbed him, threw him to the ground, cut his girdle and finally struck him on the cheek. Marcianus’s successor was Theodore Tzirus, son of Justinian. He, however, no longer possessed the authority to continue the siege, because the theatrical dismissal of Marcianus had demoralized the army. John of Ephesus claims that the army fled immediately, but in my opinion the accounts of Evagrius and Chronicle 1234 are to be preferred in this case. According to these versions it was the reaction of Marcianus and his friends to the sacking that led to the final collapse of the whole campaign. The farce was complete when Marcianus and his friends among the commanders secretly left the Roman camp the following night and entered the city of Dara. When the Roman army then saw the tent of Marcianus overturned and his standard missing, the whole army became disordered. It was then that the lochagoi and taxiarchoi (terms used by Evagrius)65 broke the siege and scattered in different directions. The Romans abandoned their siege engines and tents, but John of Ephesus’ account makes it clear that the retreat was not conducted in complete disorder because they left an infantry unit behind to protect the withdrawal. In the words of John of Ephesus (tr. by Smith, 369): ‘When the Persian army… saw the breaking up and sudden retreat of the Romans, and Marcian’s standard overthrown, they were astonished… and armed and pursued after them, and fell upon a body of infantry which remained behind, and defeated and slew most of them, and returned to the city, laughing and mocking at what had happened to the Romans of their own selves.’ Some of the Romans under John son of Timostratus made their way to Dara. The siege of Nisibis had been short, starting after 8 April and ending in late May, but still long enough for the Persians to assemble the massive army under Chosroes himself for the relief of the city. The Siege of Dara in about June-November 57366 Chosroes began his counterstrike against the Roman invasion forces in May. He had assembled a massive relief army: 1) According to Chronicle 1234 (66), he had 23,000 cavalry, 40,000 infantry, and 120,000 farmers; 2) Theophanes Byzantinus 4 (FHG IV.271) claims that the Persian army consisted of 40,000 cavalry and over 100,000 infantry; 3) Tabari (i.959) states that he had 90,000 men; 4) Michael Syrus (Michael Rabo, 10.3, p.393) puts the strength of Chosroes’s army at 123,000 horsemen and 104,000 footmen. These figures can be reconciled to a certain extent if one assumes that Chosroes began his campaign with the soldiers and added the farmers to its strength only later when he besieged Dara, and that Theophanes Byzantinus’s figure for the infantry included farmers. The figure of 40,000 horsemen of Theophanes corresponds better with what we know of the sizes of major cavalry armies, but we cannot exclude the possibility that Chosroes had an exceptionally small cavalry force at his disposal because he had dispatched some of his men to Persarmenia while others had been sent against the Turks.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  85 In such a case it would be entirely possible that Chosroes had only 23,000 horsemen at his disposal, as Chronicle 1234 claims, especially if this was after Chosroes had sent Adarmahan with 6,000 horsemen into Syria. It is also possible that Theophanus confused 40,000 infantry (Chron. 1234) and 40,000 cavalry with each other; but it is equally possible, or even likelier, that Chronicle 1234 has left out 100,000 horsemen from the figure of 123,000 horsemen or that the Chronicle mentioned only the knights and left out their squires. Even if it is impossible to be certain of the size of Chosroes’ army, I would still suggest that he initially had approximately 40,000 horsemen and 40,000 footmen, which were later strengthened with peasants for the siege of Dara. Chosroes’s plan was to surprise the Romans by marching his army from the south along the Euphrates and Khabour rivers to Nisibis rather than using the usual route from the east across the Tigris. When the Persian army reached the fort of Ambar at a distance of five days from Circesium, the city marking the Roman border, Chosroes dispatched Adarmaanes/Adarmahan with 6,000 Persian and Saracen cavalry across the Euphrates to pillage Roman territory in Syria. According to Michael the Syrian (Michael Rabo, 10.8, p.391), the reason for the dispatch of Adarmahan into Syria was that the Persians and Saracens learnt of the desertion of Alamundarus so they knew that their invasion would not be opposed. The two armies, the cavalry force under Adarmaanes on the western bank of the Euphrates and the Persian army on the eastern bank, seem to have marched alongside each other to Circesium where the force was divided so that Adarmahan turned towards Antioch while Chosroes continued his march along the Khabour towards Nisibis. Adarmahan’s raiding force probably had a two-fold function: first, it ravaged enemy territory, second, it tied up enemy resources in defence of other cities that could have been used to harass Chosroes. Adarmahan achieved success because nobody opposed him, so his forces were able to pillage Barbalissus, Qasrin, Beth Dama, Gabbulon, Haleb, the region surrounding Chalcis/Qinnasrin, Gazara/Jazira, ‘the mountain’, and the suburbs of Antioch.67 His advance was helped by the absence of Alamundarus, but this was not the only reason for his success. The advance of the Persian main army north under Chosroes isolated the bulk of the Roman forces from these raiders. Following this, Adarmahan put Apamea under siege. For a map, see MHLR Vol.6. Its defenders made the foolish mistake of believing that Adarmahan would behave in the same manner as Chosroes in 540 when they had opened the gates for the invader and he had left the city unharmed. The citizens believed they could trust Adarmahan when he promised the same, but this devious Persian pillaged the city. All the inhabitants and anything of value were captured and the city burned to the ground. It was presumably then that the Persians captured the True Cross of Apamea. After this he marched to join Chosroes, who had in the meantime advanced against Dara. Adarmahan’s route was blocked by the forces serving under Comes Sacrarum Largitiorum Magnus, but Justin II had given him too small a force so all Magnus could do was withdraw into the fortress of Mardis.68 According to both John of Ephesus and Michael the Syrian, Adarmahan brought 292,000 captives for Chosroes, which shows the extent of the damage caused to the Romans by their naive trust in the promises of Adarmahan. As noted earlier, Chosroes had continued his march north, and what happened next is best described by John of Ephesus:

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86  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 ‘For no sooner had the Persian king heard of Marcian’s fall, and the breaking up of the armies before Nisibis, [Michael Rabo,10.9, p.392] than he determined to take full advantage of the mismanagement of his enemies, and assembling a powerful force, arrived rapidly at that town, and found the engines and machines which Marcian had erected still standing before it. And with these he forthwith commenced the siege of Dara, having removed thither all Marcian’s engines of war, and applied them to his own use, for which purpose he had brought all kinds of artificers with him [According to Chron 1234, Chosroes brought with him 120,000 farmers, which I take to mean stonecutters and other civilian labourers/farmers used to support the besieging force. It is probable that he collected these from the inhabitants of Nisibis and other neighbouring regions in Persia after he had decided to besiege Dara]. His first act was to command the stone-cutters and others to make a cutting through a hill which lay on the east of the city outside the aqueduct, in order to divert the water; and when, as was said, they found the stone hard, they lit fires upon it, and cooled it when hot with vinegar, and so made it soft for working. He further set up against the city all the engines which Marcian had constructed against Nisibis, and invested it, and used every device of war for its capture during a period of six months. Among his machines were two towers, which he erected, but the Romans devised a plan for setting them on fire, and were successful, and burnt them, although all egress from the city was impossible. [Other sources state that the Persians used battering rams and artillery pieces and that they attacked night and day to tire the defenders and built two mounds presumably for the two towers.] On the side of the besieged, the generals were John, the son of Timostratus [PLRE3 Ioannes 87], a man of great warlike ability [in contrast Evagrius 5.10 accuses him either of neglect or treachery], and Sergius, the son of Shaphnai [PLRE3 Sergius 7: he had been one of the three commanders Marcianus had sent against Arzanene in 572], and others. But Sergius… was struck by an arrow and died. After a time the Persian king, not finding the siege making progress, removed his tent and pitched it on a mountain on the northern side of the city, whence he could see everything that was done within. And there also he ordered a tower to be built on more elevated ground, opposite a great turret which rose higher than the rest, and which they called Hercules. And against this the besieged found all their efforts unavailing, while the besiegers were able to strengthen their tower, and bring it up close to the city. Sometime before this, when the king saw that his vast works had not terrified the inhabitants, he had given orders for a brick wall to be drawn all round the outer fortifications, that if they made a sally, they might be caught within it. But when he saw all his stratagems were in vain, he fell ill, as was said, and was afraid that he would die. He, therefore, sent a messenger to the city, requesting them to appoint someone to confer with him. Now there was there at the time a famous and illustrious man, named Cometes [as noted by Michael Whitby in Evagrius p.270, n.45 we should probably see this as a title Comes so that it could mean John the son of Timostratus, which in turn lends some credence to Evagrius’ accusations; but this is mere speculation], whose office it was to interpret between the Romans and the Persians, and him the citizens chose as their deputy. And after a conference, the king said to him, “Tell the citizens they must give us five talents as ransom for the city, and we will withdraw from it.” But he, as he acknowledged afterwards, being

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  87 confident that the city was impregnable, did not tell them of the king’s offer. And when the king saw that the appointed day had passed by, and that they despised him, and sent him no answer, he was the more angry and full of great wrath; and attacked the city again, and strengthened and increased the tower which he had last built. But the Romans now despised and mocked him… But this over-confidence led them to neglect the maintenance of a proper force upon the wall, especially as the cold was now great and intense; and they even came down from the ramparts, and went to their houses to eat and drink. But when the Persians saw that the wall was no longer guarded by the Roman soldiers, and that the tower which they had built exceeded the height of the fortifications, they set their invention to work, and fastened planks together, until they reached the wall, and passing over, they occupied the whole of it on one side of the city [the northern side] and then started to descend within [This account implies that there was no double wall on the northern side, or alternatively that John and other sources have left out the taking of the proteichisma by the Persians]. And when on a sudden a cry was raised, that the city was taken, as the Persian army was far more numerous than the Romans, they were panic stricken and in confusion; and all ran in crowds to the gates of the city to endeavour, if they possibly could, to escape. And when the Persians saw how numerous they were, they again were afraid, and anxious, and held back, and gave the Romans room to flee, lest they should turn and defend themselves. The Romans then ran to all the gates, and shouted for the keys, and search was made, but no keys could be found, for the generals had hidden them [Chron 1234 claims that the Romans were trying to flee to the citadel, but the leaders did not allow them in. This actually makes more sense because the Persians had surrounded the city with a stone wall; but it is not conclusive]; and as they saw that the Persians were growing every minute more numerous, and that whole city was already full of them, and they were hemmed in on all sides, and flight was impossible, they recovered their courage,… and for seven days, with the gates still closed, they slaughtered one another, till the city was full of corpses, the smell of which became so unbearable that they were obliged to drag them away, and throw them into the river and the cisterns. And when the Persians saw that they were losing great numbers of their men, and that they could not get possession of the city, and take its spoil, being terrified moreover at the Romans, they fled and mounted upon the wall, and took council how they might effect their purpose by fraud. They sent a message… saying… make peace. And as the Roman host now despaired of their lives… they accepted the proposal,… and laid aside their arms… but upon this a strong body of Persians entered the city, and at first both sides mingled with one another in peace, but soon they began to plunder the city, and the fraud and perfidy of the Persians was made manifest. For they turned round and proved false to their word, and seized the Romans themselves, and put most of them to the sword; and the rest they threw into chains, and took them to their king, with their nobles, and women of rank, and their princes; and the king commanded them to be drowned in the river which flows by… An immense quantity of gold was gathered, more, as was said, than a hundred or even two hundred talents, and piled before him. As we are not however acquainted with the exact sum, we do not wish to decide falsely… The king, then, when he saw all this gold, called for the chief men of the city, and said to

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them, “I did not ask of you so much as the hundreth part of the gold which is here piled up to be given as ransom for your city and then I would have gone away. For this effect I sent to you by Cometes, and ye paid no heed to me.” And when they heard these words, they swore unto him that they had never heard the proposal. And having summoned Cometes to convict… he sentenced him to death, but subsequently

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  89 said… “I will not slay thee.” But he commanded that both his eyes should be put out. And thus he spoiled the city of a vast and incalculable prey, and took the people captive, and emptied it of its inhabitants, and left in it a garrison of his own, and returned to his land with an immense booty of the silver and gold taken from the inhabitants and the churches and every where else… Nor was Dara the only place spoiled by Khosrun.’ JE 6.5–6, tr. by Smith, 379–85 with my comments in brackets. This siege demonstrates the greater determination of the Persians in offensive sieges in comparison with the Romans. It is also notable that after Justin II’s morale-reducing measures, the Roman armies were in such disarray that they could not even collect a large enough relief army in six months to save this strategically important city. The booty the Persians took from Roman territory on this occasion was tremendous, as was the damage caused. The Persians did not only pillage several cities, but they also killed vast numbers of Romans and took even greater numbers of captives. According to Michael Syrus (Michael Rabo, 10.9, p.393), the Persians killed 150,000 Romans at Dara alone and took 90,000 captives, while Adarmahan took 292,000 captives. There is no reason to doubt these figures, because the Persians could pillage at their will and it is clear that they took some sizable and populous cities during this campaign. The defeat led to the replacement of Theodore Tzirus with Eusebius (Menander fr.18.2). The accounts of Michael Syrus (Michael Rabo, 10.10, p.395) and John of Ephesus (6.7) speak of Chosroes’ efforts to convince the Turks to join the war against the Romans. He attempted to bribe them. He chose 2,000 beautiful maidens from the ranks of the captives and dispatched them as gifts to the Turks, but they managed to kill themselves by drowning near the borders of the Turkish Empire. As we shall see, this setback did not prevent the Persians from achieving their aim of turning the Turks against the Romans. The conclusion of the peace between the Romans and Avars roughly at the same time or just after it as these maidens were travelling to ‘Turkey’ in early 574 convinced the Turkish Khagan that the Romans had betrayed their alliance with him.

3.2. THE INSANITY OF JUSTIN II AND CAESAR TIBERIUS IN POWER 574–8 574: The Mental Illness of Justin II and the Appointment of Tiberius as Caesar69 In 574 the many setbacks, especially the loss of Dara and the bad conscience resulting from the killing of innocents, affected the already weakened mental stability of the Emperor Justin II, and his growing mental problems could not be hidden from the public. Justin went completely mad and screamed and howled like the madman he was. In terror he went from one place to another, and then hid himself under pillows. At times he barked like a dog, then bleated like a goat, then mewed like a cat and crowed like a cock. The Empress Sophia had to install metal bars on his windows to prevent him from jumping from them. She also chose strong young men as chamberlains to guard and restrain him if necessary by tying him into his bed. The only thing that could restrain him for a moment was to say that the Bogle (Chorth the son of Gabolo, i.e. al-Harith the son of

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90  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Jabal, which we should probably interpret to mean Alamundarus) was coming for him, which frightened him so much that he froze and then ran to hide under the bed. The chamberlain guards could calm him by pulling him around in a little wagon or by playing organs. However, there were still moments of lucidity during which Justin understood what was happening around him. The extant texts of Menander (fr. 18.1–2) and Evagrius (5.11–3) suggest that it was during the period after Justin went mad but before Tiberius was appointed Caesar that the Empress Sophia ruled with the help of Comes Excubitorum Tiberius. The Persian ruler Chosroes understood that the situation was opportune for the conclusion of a peace. He understood that if he took the initiative it would be easier for the Romans to accept this peace. He clearly wanted to concentrate his forces against other foes, the likeliest candidates being Ceylon (see above) and the Turks in the east. Therefore he dispatched an envoy called Jacob to Justin, but it was Sophia who received him. Sophia in her turn dispatched one of the palace physicians called Zacharias to negotiate. The Romans proposed to pay one lump sum of 45,000 gold nomismata in return for a one-year truce which left out Armenia. The MVM per Orientem Eusebius was recalled from the East at the same time, presumably because his performance had not been satisfactory. In addition, Sophia promised to send a delegation to discuss terms for ending the war permanently. Chosroes accepted these terms, and the Romans recalled the strategos Eusebius to Constantinople. The conclusion of this truce is dated by Stein (48) to February-March 574 and by Whitby (1988, 259) roughly to the end of March. It was at the same time as the Persians and Roman negotiated the truce, or immediately after it, that the Romans fought the abovementioned war against the Avars during which Tiberius was severely worsted and escaped only with difficulty and which resulted in the conclusion of a peace very favourable to the Avars. The likeliest time for the Avar invasion of the Roman territory is the winter of 574 while the Danube was frozen. This was one of the defeats that deranged the already unstable Justin. On the basis of John of Ephesus’s account, Sophia would have been quite happy to rule alone, but others, and in particular the Senate, wanted a strong male hand in charge of matters of the state. Therefore the Senate took counsel with Sophia and forced her hand. It was decided that Comes Excubitorum Tiberius would be appointed Caesar and put in charge of the conduct of the multiple wars. He was Sophia’s choice, and the appointment was also confirmed by Justin during one of his lucid moments. On 7 December 574 Justin publicly nominated Tiberius as Caesar with the imperial name Tiberius Constantinus, warning him not to be led astray by the royal dress and become filled with empty pride, and not to commit evil deeds that would anger God. Evagrius describes Tiberius as follows: ‘Tiberius was very tall, and by far the most noble in person not only of sovereigns but all mankind; so that, in the first place, his beauty was deserving of sovereignty [no wonder the empress Sophia was so fond of him]. In disposition, he was mild and compassionate, and gave cordial reception to all persons at their first approach. He deemed wealth to consist in aiding all with largesses, not merely so far as to meet their wants, but even superfluity; for he did not consider what the needy ought to receive but what it became a Roman emperor to bestow. He esteemed that

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  91 gold to be adulterated which was exacted with tears: on which account he entirely remitted the taxation for one year, and released from their imposts the properties which Adarmanes had devastated, not merely to the extent of the damage but even far beyond it. The magistrates were also excused from the necessity of making unlawful presents, by means of which the emperors formerly made a sale of their subjects [i.e. Tiberius curbed corruption by ending the sale of offices].’ Evagrius 5.11, tr. by Anon. 1846, 266–7 with my comments inside paretheses. Tiberius took care of the wars, especially on the Persian front, while Sophia and Justin during his lucid moments had the final say. Sophia refused to allow Tiberius’ wife Ino and their two daughters into the Palace; they lived in a house nearby – there was to be only one Augusta in the Imperial Palace. Tiberius appears to have secured his own position within the Palace complex by appointing his own trusted notarius (secretary) Mauricius/Maurice son of Paulus/Paul as his successor in the office of Comes Excubitorum.70 We shall hear a lot about this Maurice later. He is the future Emperor and author of the military treatise Strategikon. Maurice was clearly Tiberius’s most trusted lieutenant.

Tiberius II’s Strategy in 575 As new de facto ruler, Tiberius II’s initial strategy was to secure his position and buy time for the rebuilding of the Roman armies. The latter he aimed to achieve by concluding truces with both the Avars and the Persians. Tiberius’s aim was to use the resulting period of relative peace by recruiting more men into the badly undermanned armed forces. The distribution pattern of these new forces suggests that Tiberius II’s initial aim was to defeat both the Persians and the Lombards in 576. It is also likely that Tiberius dispatched some men to North Africa (probably after the Romans had achieved successes in the east in 576), because we find Gennadius taking an offensive there in 578. The probable aim of such an operation would have been to secure the grain supply from North Africa to Italy and the rest of the Roman Empire. One may suspect that Tiberius II’s aim was to turn his armies against the Avars once these other fronts, especially the Persian front, had been secured. As we shall see, this is what the Avars suspected. Tiberius II was clearly prepared to let the Balkans suffer while his armies conducted offensive operations elsewhere, even in such far flung places as Spain, where, as we shall see, Roman armies were on the offensive in 582. It is possible that the reason for this was the general disorder and lawlessness that prevailed in the Balkans. It sufficed to protect the important centres and cities. Once made Caesar, Tiberius acted with great energy. Bury notes (see also the quote above) that his first measure, in December 574, was to end the sale of state offices. In addition to this, he sought to end the wars with the Avars and Persians so that he could concentrate forces against the Lombards while he strengthened the army with a massive recruiting drive. In short, Tiberius’s strategy was to deal with one foe at a time. Luckily for him, the Avars and Persians were also seeking peace with the Romans. As noted before, the Avars had concluded peace with the Romans after Tiberius had suffered a defeat in their hands earlier in 574, and the Persians had also concluded a one-year truce. The Avars were prepared to continue to follow this agreement. This time Tiberius agreed

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92  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 to pay 80,000 nomismata per year in return for peace, possibly the same sum as had been agreed earlier.71 Several sources make it clear that Tiberius was known for his generosity. It was partly his generous nature, but it is also clear that Tiberius sought to endear himself to the Senate, populace and army. He remitted taxes for one year in April 575 by quartering the taxes in gold for the next four years, and freed those from taxes who had suffered as a result of enemy ravages. Sophia became worried that this would empty the state coffers. Therefore she removed the keys to the treasuries and took control of taxation. Sophia granted Tiberius a fixed allowance so that he would not overspend. After having gained some military experience, Tiberius knew that in warfare numbers mattered. Therefore, one of his first actions during the winter-spring of 575 was to recruit more men into his armed forces while he sought peace from both the Avars and Persians. Justinian I had left too few men for the Romans to cope with all of the difficulties, and Justin II had not addressed this problem either. The recruiting drive of Tiberius is mentioned or implied by several sources (Theophanes AM6074, i.e. in 581/2; Evagrius 5.14; Theophylact 3.12.2–4; John of Ephesus 6.13). It is usually assumed that all of these sources refer to only one recruiting drive, so the recruitment of 150,000 men mentioned by Evagrius and Theophylact in 575 and Theophanes’ 15,000 Tiberiani in 578 (Theophanes’ dates are three to four years off so his 581/2 means 578) is considered to refer to the same recruiting drive. In my opinion this is a mistake. It is clear that there were at least two separate recruiting drives, one in 575 and another in 577–8. The reasons for this conclusion are that Theophanes states that the 15,000 barbarians were called Tiberiani and put under Maurice, the Comes Excubitorum who was appointed their commander with the title Comes Foederatorum. The name Tiberiani implies that Tiberius was now Augustus, and the appointment of Maurice as Comes Foederatorum can be pinpointed to the period after he had replaced Justinian as MVM per Orientem and strategos autokrator (= dux imperator, overall commander of the eastern front) in late 577. Before this Maurice had served in the capital as Comes Excubitorum. Furthermore, and most importantly, Theophanes dates the forming of the Tiberiani to the period after the death of Justin II in October 578. It is therefore likely that once Maurice arrived in the East he decided that he needed more men to replace the men lost by Justinian in 577. Justinian must have lost large numbers of men because, as we shall see, he went on to suffer a very severe defeat. The new recruits that replaced these losses became known as the Tiberiani. However, it should be kept in mind that the title Tiberiani does not conclusively prove that they had been formed when Tiberius was Augustus. It is possible that the unit was so named because Tiberius was already de facto ruler in 578, or that the unit was renamed after Tiberius became Augustus.72 In short, Caesar Tiberius launched a massive recruiting drive immediately. According to Evagrius (5.14) the recruiting drive collected 150,000 excellent horsemen from Roman territories (Paeonians/Pannonians, Mysians/Moesians, Illyrians, Isaurians) and from the tribes beyond the Alps in the vicinity of Rhine (Franks, Burgundians, Alamanni, Saxons, Lombardians and others) and from the Massagetae and other Scythian nations (Huns, Bulgars, Slavs, Gepids and others). Unlike most modern historians, I accept this larger figure, because this explains better why the Romans were able to resume offensives in Italy, North Africa, Spain and the East. Of particular note is the fact that this recruiting drive

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  93 was extended as far as the Frankish kingdoms. This was a major recruiting campaign. The Romans were clearly desperately seeking men who had some weapons experience. The soldiers so acquired can be considered to have been mercenaries seeking better terms of employment in imperial service. If the diagram of the meros of the Foideratoi in the Strategikon (3.6) represents a typical barbarian cavalry unit recruited, then only one in eight recruited barbarians (one page/squire in a file of eight) consisted of young and inexperienced men. It is therefore probable that the men who now entered the Roman army as federate cavalry consisted of men whose average age was perhaps 25–30.73

Italy and Gaul during the reign of Caesar Tiberius in 575–78 The death of the Roman ally Sigibert, King of the Austrasian Franks, in 575 The year 575 saw the Frankish kingdoms fighting against each other, which had significance for the Romans because of their alliance with the Austrasian Franks. Chilperic again allied with Guntram against Sigibert so his forces were able to advance as far as Rheims. When Sigibert heard of this, he assembled the forces beyond the Rhine and marched to Paris. Once there he ordered his forces in Châteaudun and Tours to advance against Theudebert son of Chilperic. Sigibert’s commanders duces Godigisel and Guntram Boso defeated and killed Theudebert in battle. When Chilperic learnt of this, he realized that Guntram had once again betrayed him. So Chilperic took his wife and sons inside the walls of Tournai and waited for the arrival of Sigibert’s forces. Several of the commanders of Chilperic informed Sigibert that they would be prepared to desert to his side. When Sigibert heard this, he dispatched an advance guard to besiege Tournai, intending to follow them with all speed. When Sigibert reached the villa of Vitry, the soldiers of Chilperic raised him on a shield and elected him king. But then something unexpected happened. Two young men who had been dispatched by Queen Fredegund, wife of Chilperic, pretended they had something to tell him. Fredegund had given them poisoned scramasaxes, and when Sigibert came near them, the assassins struck him from both sides. Sigibert cried loudly, fell to the ground, and soon died. This was a well-planned assassination because the men sent by the Queen managed to kill Sigibert’s chamberlain Chargisel at the same time, and seriously wounded Sigila the Goth. Sigila was later captured and tortured to death. I would suggest that the readiness of some of the commanders of Chilperic to surrender had been a ploy which had been used to lure Sigibert to Vitry so that he could be assassinated. When the messengers brought the news, Chilperic sallied out of Tournai and buried his brother with due honours. Sigibert’s wife Brunhild and 5-year-old son Childebert were in Paris when Sigibert was assassinated. Sigibert’s former dux, Gundovald, then took charge of matters, secretly taking Childebert away from Paris and proclaiming him king on 25 December 575. This shows that the real power was in the hands of the nobility, the seniores, the leading figure among them being Childebert’s tutor and guardian Gogo. Brunhild and her daughters were less lucky, because Chilperic advanced there and then exiled her to Rouen and the daughters to Meaux. The death of Sigibert naturally weakened the Austrasian Franks so that both Chilperic and Guntram started hostilities against them in 576.74 The death of their ally Sigibert was obviously a blow to the Romans.

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94  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Romans, Franks and Italy in 575 And what was the Roman role in these matters? This time we have no definite evidence for their involvement on behalf of Sigibert against Guntram. The only references we have of Frankish and Lombard activities for 575 consist of the attack of Sigibert’s forces into Italy when he captured the fortress of Anagnis (Nano) just north of Tridentum (Trento) in the Brenner Pass. This suggests that preparations were being made for the invasion of Lombard-held territory by the forces of Sigibert from the north for 576. I agree with Wolfram that this implies an alliance between Sigibert and Rome. In my opinion the aim would in all probability have been to support the imperial offensive which was launched under Baduarius in 576. This in turn suggests that there was no need for any Roman operations against Guntram in 575 and that he betrayed Chilperic to Sigibert without any help from the Romans. When the Lombards learnt of the Frankish invasion, dux Ragilo marched there and plundered Anagnis, but when he was returning with his booty he was defeated and killed in the field of Rotalian by Chramnichis, leader of the Franks. Chramnichis exploited his victory by advancing against Trento. The fighting took place mostly in the valley of the Etch in Tyrol from Meran up to Trento. Chramnichis pillaged the area and then retreated, but this time it was his turn to be defeated. The dux of Trento, Eoin, pursued and killed him in a place called Salurnis (Salurn). This victory secured the Brenner Pass for the Lombards.75 The victory over the Franks also made the reputation of dux Eoin. He was now a man of some importance. Therefore it is not surprising to find that Eoin married Walderada, daughter of the King of Bavaria Garibald I, in the same year or in 578 – the reason for the uncertainty is that modern historians are divided over how to date the different pieces of evidence in Paul the Deacon’s History of the Lombards. This alliance between the Lombard and Bavarian duces was of the utmost importance for the defence of northern Italy against Franks and a bad setback for both the Franks and Romans.76 Even if the Lombard efforts in Gaul had failed dismally, their duces had been phenomenally successful in Italy in 570–75. By 575 the Lombard duces controlled most of Italy, being able to establish new important duchies at Lucca, Spoleto and Benevento. The imperial territories consisted of scattered cities and fortresses so that the Romans had to rely on sea communications. The key cities Rome and Ravenna were connected by a narrow strip of land.77 Things looked grim for the Romans. But it is clear that the lack of unified command after the murder of Clef in 574, the desertion of some of the Lombard duces to the Roman side, and the recruiting drive of barbarians (which included Lombards) into the Roman army by Caesar Tiberius II in 574–5, opened the opportunity for the Romans to start an offensive in Italy in 576 (see later). The Romans’ money worked wonders. However, the Romans were not supported by the Austrasian Franks, as had clearly been planned, because Sigibert had been assassinated and the Franks had failed to capture the forts of the Brenner Pass. The Roman offensive in Italy under Baduarius in 576 Caesar Tiberius II appears to have dispatched Patricius and Comes Stabuli Baduarius to Italy in 575 to take charge of the planned offensive against the Lombards in 576. The assassination of Clef, the truce with Persia (see below) and the recruiting drive of Tiberius

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  95 had created the right circumstances for it. The only thorn in the side was the fact that Sigibert had been assassinated and the Frankish kingdoms had become embroiled in a civil war, and the Lombards had retained control of the Brenner Pass so the Romans could not expect any help from the Franks. The choice of Baduarius as commander was a good one because he had previously defeated the Lombards in 566 so there was every expectation that Roman arms would triumph under him. The offensive in Italy began in 576, but contrary to expectations the Lombards defeated Baduarius in battle. The short text of John of Biclar (a.576) does not state why the Romans suffered a defeat. All he adds to this is that Baduarius died soon after in Italy. On the basis of this it is possible to speculate that Baduarius had been wounded in the battle and because of this was defeated, but obviously there is no definite evidence for this. It is also possible that the Romans had been defeated because some of their recently recruited barbarians, especially the Lombard duces, possibly deserted in the battle, but again there is no definite evidence to back up this guess. All we know is that the Romans were defeated in battle and that the Lombards once again resumed their offensive in Italy, so after this they were invading the whole of Italy. The Lombard successes in Italy in 576 -9 According to Liber Pontificalis, the Lombards captured large numbers of Roman cities between 576 and 579 because they preferred to surrender than to starve. The information in John of Biclar (50) confirms this. According to him, the Romans fared particularly badly in war in 578. One of the cities the Lombards besieged was none other than the eternal city of Rome. When Tiberius II78 learnt of this, he dispatched a fleet of corn ships from Egypt to Rome. Liber Pontificalis states that it was in the midst of these troubles that Pope Benedict II died on 30 July 579 and was succeeded three months and ten days later by the new Pope, Pelagius II, on 26 November 579. He was ordained without the imperial mandate because the Lombards besieged the city. Therefore the corn ships probably arrived after the nomination of Pelagius, but that is not certain. Possibly the Lombard siege ended in 579 not as a result of the arrival of the corn fleet but because of the rains that caused the Tiber to flood making life miserable for the besiegers. In short, it is entirely plausible that the relief fleet arrived before the death of Benedict in July 579 and possibly even before the death of Justin II in October 578 and that whatever forces the Romans had (there would have been soldiers in the fleet, in Rome, and in Portus/Ostia) managed to take the supplies inside the city, but that the Lombards were able to cut off communications again and resume the siege. What is practically certain is that we should connect this with a fragment of Menander which mentions that patrician Pamphronius had come from old Rome to Constantinople to ask for help against the Lombards. Caesar Tiberius responded that he was unable to send an army to Italy because he needed all his available forces against Persia – this dates the request to the period after the severe defeat suffered by Justinian in 577. Tiberius therefore gave Pamphronius about 3,000 pounds of gold (according to Goffart’s calculation p. 16, 18 about 426,000 solidi) to bribe some Lombard leaders to desert to their side so that they could then be dispatched east. If the Lombards refused, Pamphronius was instructed to try to buy the alliance of some of the Frankish leaders. Does this mean that Pamphronius bribed the Frankish leaders that we subsequently find siding with the Romans? This raises another interesting possibility.

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96  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 If the Romans dispatched their corn fleet from Alexandria to Rome in 578, it is possible that it had another task too, namely the support of the operations of Gennadius against the Moors. If this alternative is true, then it is probable that the fleet carried at least some reinforcements and supplies to both Gennadius and the city of Rome.79 The Frankish Realm in 576–8 Meanwhile, there had been important developments in the Frankish realm. Chilperic, King of Neustrian Franks, had attempted to exploit the opportunity provided by the death of Sigibert and the desertion of several of the duces who had formerly served under Sigibert. In 576 he dispatched his son Merovech to Poitiers, but only with the result that Merovech went to Rouen where he married Brunhild, the widow of Sigibert. Chilperic naturally suspected treason and marched there, after which he captured Soissons with Merovech. Then Chilperic imprisoned his son Merovech. This had clearly been a desperate and foolish attempt by Merovech and Brunhild to gain power, their aim being to fill the vacuum created by the death of Sigibert.80 This took place at the same time that several of the former duces of Sigibert deserted Chilperic and joined ranks with Sigibert’s son Childebert II. Chilperic, however, continued his campaign. He dispatched Roccolenus/Roccolen to Tours, which was under Guntram Boso and therefore considered King Guntram’s territory. Roccolen demanded that Bishop Gregory of Tours surrender Guntram Boso. Gregory of Tours refused. Then Roccolen became ill and started to withdraw to Poitiers, but died on the last day of February 576. Following this, Chilperic sent his son Clovis/Chlodovechus against Tours. Clovis marched through Touraine and Anjou and captured Saintes. Mummolus, Guntram’s dux, responded with a diversionary campaign and invaded the Limoges region where he defeated Chilperic’s commander Desiderius. Desiderius lost 5,000 men and escaped only with great difficulty. Mummolus then retreated through Clermont, which was partially pillaged and laid waste, after which he retreated back to Burgundy. Chilperic was not alone in his exploitation of the death of Sigibert. Guntram also conquered territory from the Austrasian Franks, the most important conquest being the capture of part of Marseilles, which later became one of the reasons for the continued hostility between the Burgundian and Austrasian Franks and which led to Roman intervention in Frankish internal politics. In 577 Guntram’s two sons died of illness, with the result that Guntram concluded a peace with Childebert II and made him his successor. Now that both Guntram and Childebert were allies they demanded that Chilperic return the lands he had occupied illegally, but with no result. The alliance of Guntram and Childebert obviously spelt trouble for Chilperic, but he continued his operations by capturing Poitiers which belonged to Childebert.81 As we shall see, Chilperic’s response to the alliance against him was to send envoys to Constantinople in 578; but soon after that, new developments changed everything. Chilperic clearly wanted the Romans to mediate because the Austrasian Franks were their allies.

Visgothic Spain under Caesar Tiberius II in 575–7882 In 575 the Visigoths continued their offensive in Spain, which was bad news for the Romans, who could potentially lose their allies before they could obtain enough resources

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  97 to resume their own offensive. According to John of Biclar (36), Leovigild marched to the Aregensian/Auregenses Mountains (near Orense in Galicia), conquered it and took its lord Aspidius with wife, children and riches back to his home. Aspidius would have been a subject of the Suevi. In 576 Leovigild continued his campaign against the Suevi so effectively that their king Miro begged for peace which Leovigild granted for a short time. It enabled Leovigild to turn his attention against the Romans who no longer had the Suevi as allies in the north. With the Persian war continuing, Caesar Tiberius did not have any men to spare for Spain. All he could do was try to bribe the Franks to serve as his allies, and with this in mind his diplomats were busy there. Therefore in 577 Leovigild invaded the Roman-held territory at Oraspena in southeastern Spain, west of Cartagena, captured its cities and fortresses and added these back to his domains. Soon after, the common people, the peasants (i.e. Romans), revolted against the Goths, but with little success. The Goths crushed all resistance. Thompson suggests (1969, 62–3) that since there is no evidence for foreign involvement, either in the north or south, it is probable that the peasants in the south and the nobles in the north were just seeking independence. This is possible, but it is obviously an argument from the silence of the sources. In my opinion it is equally possible that both groups were seeking to rejoin the Roman Empire but were unable to do so when the Empire lacked adequate means for launching an offensive in their support. In fact, it is very likely that the imperial government would have fomented revolts in the background by all means possible, such as promising the rebels help which never materialized, just like some modern superpowers do when it suits their interest. It is clear that these revolts served Roman interests in the area by keeping the enemy preoccupied. Now that the breakaway regions had been brought back to the Visigothic fold, Leovigild felt satisfied and did not wage any wars in 578. Instead, he founded a city in Celtiberia which he called Recopolis/Reccopolis after his younger son and co-ruler. With this he assumed the imperial right of founding new cities. This is how the situation stood at the end of Justin II’s reign in 578.

North Africa and Egypt under Caesar Tiberius II in 575–8 We possess very little information about events in North Africa and Egypt when Tiberius II was still Caesar. As noted above, the sources do not record any military activity in North Africa until 578. It is impossible to say whether this results from defective sources or from some military success or some treaty conducted by the Romans and Moors. The area certainly faced endemic banditry that the sources fail to record. We face the same problem of dearth of information for the Egyptian frontiers. However, the Persian conquest of the Roman client states of Himyar/Yemen in 570 and the subjection of Ceylon under Persian rule must have badly effected the Roman trading network on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This must have had repercussions in Aksum, Nubia (Nobatia, Makuria, and Alwa), and Egypt. The troubles seem to have started already when Tiberius was Caesar and possibly even before that. The renewal of troubles is in evidence in the building of the defensive wall on the island of Philae under the leadership of decurio et dux augustalis Thebaidis Theodorus recorded in an inscription dated 14 December 577.

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The Persian and Balkan Fronts in 575–6 Peace Negotiations and Operations in 575 Tiberius knew that the one-year truce with the Persians would end in about March 575.83 Therefore he dispatched envoys (quaestor Trajan/Traianus and court physician Zacharias) to negotiate a continuation of it, while also dispatching Justinian son of Germanus to take command of the armies of the east. Once in office, Justinian started to train the newly recruited troops so they would be combat-ready when the campaign season started in summer 575. Tiberius sought a truce of three years while the Persians sought a truce of five years with yearly payments to the Persians. The Roman envoys agreed to the Persian terms, but the Emperor did not. While these negotiations were going on, Tamkhosro/ Tamchosroes raided the territory close to Dara, but this attempt to apply pressure was cut short by the arrival of Justinian near the scene. The appointment of Tiberius as Caesar and de facto ruler led to a reconciliation between the Romans and Alamundarus/al-Mondhir the Ghassanid in 575. This was of utmost importance for the Romans, because, as noted above, they needed the Arabs to fight against other Arabs. The return of the Ghassanids into the Roman fold tilted the balance of power in the area in Roman favour. This is described by John of Ephesus: ‘But after king Mondhir [Alamundarus] had given way to his indignation [He had distributed Justin’s orders to kill him everywhere to show the injustice done to him] and stood with his forces carefully on his guard… for a period of three years, more or less, then, as being a Christian, [Alamundarus was a Monophysite/Miaphysite and therefore not on good terms with the central government on grounds of religious persecution] and grieved at the miseries which had fallen upon the Roman territories, and full of anger against the Persian Arabs, [as pagans these were not only his blood enemies, but also his religious enemies] who had carried fire and sword, and made captives of the people as far as Antioch, and had returned to their land with an immense spoil and prisoners without number, he determined to make peace, and take up arms for the Roman state. [It is clear that it was the rise of Tiberius as Caesar in December 574 and the nomination of Justinian as MVM per Orientem in early 575 that were decisive for the timing of Alamundarus’s peace proposals. Alamundarus did not trust any overtures made in the name of Justin, whereas he seems to have trusted Justinian probably because he knew him.] And as he would not consent to receive the letters which were constantly sent to him from the king by the hand of many of the princes [these would presumably be the patricians]… he finally determined himself to send to the patrician Justinian, the son of Germanus, who at that time was head and commander-in-chief over the armies of the Romans in the East, a message to this effect: “Because I know thee to be a Christian, and a nobleman who fears God, if thou wilt go to the house of the blessed Mar Sergius at Resef, [St Sergius was the warrior saint of the Christian Arabs whose martyrion was located at Resafa/ Sergiopolis] and send me word, I will come to thee there, with my men armed ready for battle: and if peace meet me… we will converse together… [This times the letter to the first half of the year 575, the period when the one-year truce with the Persians was in effect or had just ended].

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  99 When the patrician Justinian received the message, he was very glad, and sent in answer, “Entertain no suspicions of me… and trouble not thy army…” And when Mondhir received this answer, he proceeded thither immediately, … and took but few attendants [He clearly trusted Justinian because Justinian’s words could have been a ruse]… the two remained alone before the shrine in which were deposited the bones of the holy Mar Sergius… they departed in confidence and peace with each other and great joy. And when the news reached king Justin and the senate, they also rejoiced greatly, that Mondhir had consented to make peace; and subsequently letters of peace and reconciliation were interchanged between the two kings. And after a short time, the warlike and spirited king Mondhir, being full of anger at the audacity of the Persian Arabs, and desirous of tearing away and stripping them of the prey which they had taken from the Roman territory, quietly gathered his brothers, and all his relatives, and his sons, with their forces, and bade them immediately make rapid preparations, and get their arms and provisions ready, and meet all together on the second day at his tent. And on their assembling with great promptitude, he revealed to them his purpose saying: “Immediately, without anyone separating himself or withdrawing from us, let us all fall suddenly on Hirah, the capital of Noman in the Persian territories; [As also noted by Shahid p. 379, Alamundarus clearly recognized the need for secrecy in surprise invasion and attack and also the likelihood that the news of such an invasion would leak out if anyone was allowed to separate from the army] for to punish their boastfulness, and insulting violence against the Christians, God will deliver them into our hands.” [This was a holy war against infidels.] Immediately therefore they set out with speed, and reached Hirah, and fell upon it suddenly, when its inhabitants were in peace and tranquillity; and they surprised them, and put to the sword and destroyed the garrison there, [The garrison consisted of the famous Dawsar (1,000 Tanukhid Arabs) and the al-Shahba (the ‘Brightly Gleaming’, who were 1,000 Persian Savaran cataphracts); this shows that Mundhir the Ghassanid’s cavalry army was a truly effective striking force able to take on any enemy force there existed at the time] and overthrew and uprooted and burnt the whole town, with the exception of the churches. And Mondhir pitched his tent in the middle of it, and remained there five days, and bound such Arabs as he had taken prisoners, and drove off all the booty of Hirah, and everything which they had captured and brought away from the Roman territories, and all their herds of horses and their camels, and so returned to his land, in great triumph, and after a decisive victory. And it even more increased his glory and magnificence, that he liberally gave presents to all the churches and monasteries of the orthodox, [In this case this means the Monophysites/Miaphysites because John of Ephesus was coreligionist of Alamundarus] and especially to the poor.’ John of Ephesus 6.5, tr. by Smith, 377–9 with my comments in parentheses. Shahid dates Alamundarus’s campaign to the period after the one-year truce had ended in the summer of 575 but before the new three-year truce was concluded later in the same year. I agree with this dating. The pillage of the enemy capital was a major achievement. This success finally brought Alamundarus the recognition that he would already have deserved in 572. Alamundarus was called to Constantinople where he was confirmed

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as a client king, being crowned in 575. It is probable that he got the lesser crown which was called in Syriac klīlā (a circlet or band studded with jewels) while he got the more elaborate crown called in Syriac tāgā in his next visit to Constantinople in 580. He would also have been given red boots and cloaks to signify his position as client king.84 In the end, after the attack of Tamkhosro had failed and Alamundarus had pillaged alHira, the Persians agreed to a truce of three years, which left out Armenia, and to annual payments of 30,000 gold nomismata to the Persians. The Persians knew that Tiberius was only seeking to buy time so he could then engage the Persians with additional forces, but neither were the Persians entirely honest. As we shall see, Chosroes was also planning to begin operations against the Romans, and he was presumably planning to use the Roman money to buy more soldiers. And he did not restrict his operations only to the Armenian theatre, because he advanced into Cappadocia and would have undoubtedly advanced even further had his operations met with greater success.85

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  101 And where did Tiberius get the money for all his expenses? At first he obviously just used whatever was in the state coffers; but when Sophia realized what Tiberius was doing she put a stop to it. It is quite possible that this and whatever Tiberius then argued convinced the imperial couple to grant enough to fund the raising of the forces, but one should remember that the capture of the Lombard treasury in 572 would have brought in substantial amounts of money – probably enough to fund all projects. Paul the Deacon (3.12) claims that Caesar Tiberius found a gold hoard inside the Palace by digging below a marble slab which had a cross on it. According to Paul, Tiberius obtained 10,000 lbs of gold from this hoard; but Paul also mentions that Tiberius gave it to the poor. In addition, Paul claims that while Tiberius was still Caesar he was able to get his hands on the riches of Narses too. Narses had hidden many tens of thousands of pounds of gold and silver. These were also distributed to the poor. This means that Tiberius probably obtained the necessary funds for military expenses solely from the state treasury and the captured Lombard treasury. It is no surprise that Tiberius was so fondly remembered by the sources, populace and soldiers. The generosity of Tiberius was unparalleled. In the northern theatre of operations, the Roman Army of Armenia under Kours (Cours, Koursos, Krous, Qwrys, probably the general/strategos) and Theodorus (probably the lieutenant general/hypostrategos) was on the offensive. It is possible that these were two independently operating field armies united for this purpose, but I would consider it likelier that Kours was the superior of the two on the basis of the fact that the sources show him taking the initiative repeatedly. This army invaded Persian-held Albania in 575 and occupied it after which they took hostages from the Albanians, Sabirs, Alans and other tribes, and then retreated to Roman territory. This proved to be a mistake. The Alans and Sabirs sent envoys to Byzantium to negotiate. They were kindly received by Tiberius, who promised to give them double the amount they had received from the Persian king. The envoys were overjoyed, but the joy proved short-lived because soon after this arrived the news that in spite of having handed over hostages the Albani and Sabirs had still revolted and joined the Persians. Tiberius therefore met the envoys again, saying that he would be generous to those who surrendered to him but those who opposed him would have to taste the sword. Tiberius was angry at his generals because they had settled on receiving only hostages and not transported the entire population into Roman territory. When the strategoi Kours and Theodorus learnt of the revolt of the Albani and Sabirs and of the reaction of Tiberius, they invaded Albania again, either in late 575 or early 576, and forced the population to migrate to the Roman side of the river Cyrus. This operation preoccupied both commanders well into the spring of 576. Roughly at the same time, magister militum Romanus, son of the patrician Anagastes, conquered Suania and captured their king alive, whom he then took to Constantinople.86 The Slavic invasions begin anew in about 576–8 According to John of Biclar (41–2), in the tenth year of the emperor Justin II (575/6) the Sclaveni (i.e. Slavs) pillaged many Roman cities and emptied them of people. He also states that in the same year (this must actually mean 577, see below) the Avars deceitfully blockaded the coasts of Thrace and made navigation dangerous. John then continues his account by stating that during the first year of the imperial rule of Tiberius (578/9) the Avars ravaged Thrace and besieged Constantinople from the Long Wall. According to

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102  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Menander (fr.20.2), in the fourth year of the reign of Tiberius (7 Dec 577–7 Dec 578), the Slavic army of 100,000 men devastated Thrace and many other areas. This is basically all we know of these invasions. This leaves open the problem of dating and the nationality of the invaders. The claim that the invaders would have been the Avars is contradicted by Menander (fr.21) who states that in 578 the Avars had been at peace with the Romans ever since Tiberius became Caesar. Furthermore, at the time the Avars did not occupy any land next to the Black Sea and they did not possess any naval capabilities. The solution of both Michael Whitby (1988, 87), Walter Pohl (80–1), and many others to this problem is that the Avars of John of Biclar were actually Slavs, and I agree with this view. The subsequent Avar campaign against the Slavs on behalf of the Romans makes it clear that the Slavic invaders in question lived just north of the Roman province of Scythia. Then there remains the problem of dating. It is clear that John of Biclar has left out the year 577, which complicates the issue. This has divided historians into those who think that the Slavs invaded in 577 (e.g. Whitby, 1988, 87) and those who think they invaded in 578 (e.g. Pohl, 80–1; Curta, Table 4). I would suggest that they invaded in the winter of 576–7, which agrees with the dating provided by John of Biclar. Secondly, it is clear that the blockading of the coast of Thrace and the pillaging of Thrace belong to the same invasion, and once again my solution to the problem of dating is that both John of Biclar and Menander are correct, so that the Slavic invasion started in late 577 and continued until early 578. My own guess on the basis of the above and on the basis of what we know of other ongoing operations in 576–8 is that the Slavic invasion of 576/7 resulted from two things: 1) The troop transfers to Italy to support the offensive led by Baduarius against the Lombards; 2) The troop transfers to the eastern front in 575–6 to support the Roman offensives in Persarmenia, Albania and Mesopotamia. This created a power vacuum which the Slavs who inhabited the area just north of the province of Scythia (Dobrudja) exploited by pillaging Scythia and possibly also Moesia. The Roman response was very feeble and encouraged the Slavs to renew their invasion in late 577 when they learnt that the Roman defences had been weakened even further by the troop transfers from Thrace to the Eastern Theatre in late 577 under the leadersip of the new overall commander of all eastern armies, Maurice, and presumably also to Gennadius in Africa.87 The troop transfers in late 577 left Thrace open to invasion. The previous success encouraged massive numbers of Slavs (100,000 men on land plus the fleet) to join the attack under the overall command of King Daurentius. Tiberius did not have enough men to oppose them because all possible forces were needed against the Persians, so he asked the Avar Khagan Baian to make a diversionary attack against the Slavic homelands so that the invaders would be forced to evacuate Roman territory. Notably, Tiberius faced a similar problem in Italy – all he could do in defence of Roman-held Italy against Lombards was to send gold there in the hope that it would be possible to bribe some of the Lombard duces to change sides. Baian was more than eager to do this favour for the Romans for his own personal reasons because King Daurentius and other Slavic chieftains had previously refused to acknowledge the Avars as their masters and had even had the audacity to kill Baian’s envoys. Therefore, Tiberius ordered Quaestor Exercitus John to assist Baian. So John travelled to Pannonia where he shipped 60,000 thorakoforoi (armoured) Avars across the Danube in large transports (‘holkasi makrais’).88 The Avars

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  103 then travelled overland to Scythia where the Romans shipped them across in doublesterned ships (‘amfiprymnais tôn neon’). The Slavs did not try to oppose the Avars, but fled to wooded terrain. The Avars torched their villages and fields, and pillaged anything of any value.89 The Battle of Melitene in 576 In early 576 Tiberius made the miscalculation that there would still be enough time for a round of negotiations with the Persian shahanshah Chosroes, and he dispatched two embassies, one to the Turks, another to Chosroes. The first embassy Tiberius II dispatched was led by Valentinus and its object was to convince the Turks to join the war against the Persians.90 This proved a vain hope. The Turks were not in any mood to support the Romans against the Persians because in their eyes the Romans had betrayed them by concluding peace with the Avars, their former slaves. The granting of a place of asylum or the conclusion of any sort of peace with a tribe or tribes that were considered to be slaves of a ruler/khagan/khan in the steppes was the greatest insult that such a ruler could think of. It was because of this that the Khagan Sizabul was leading a massive army against the Roman-held city of Bosporus. The Romans appear to have been completely unaware of this development. However, before Sizabul could launch his invasion, he died, and then the envoys arrived at the war camp of this great ruler. There had also been other changes in the administrative organization of the Turkish realm before the arrival of Valentinus. Either as a result of Sizabul’s death or because of his own decision, the Turkish realm was being divided into eight parts (it had previously consisted of four). The senior ruler among them was called Arsilas (Arslan = lion); none of these rulers was in any mood to support the Romans. The Roman envoys first reached the war camp of Tourxanthus/Turxanthus, who was busy organizing the burial of his father, so it is not surprising that the reception was ice cold. It was only with difficulty that Valentianus managed to convince Turxhanthus to allow them to keep their lives. Turxanthus accused the Romans of duplicity and bragged that he had just destroyed the Alans and Unigurs, and that he was prepared to march to the gates of Constantinople. The Alans inhabited the territory just north of the Caucasus and were apparently allied with Rome. The Unigurs lived east of the Black Sea and had previously been defeated by the Avars in about 560, with the implication that they were their client tribe. In other words, this time the principal targets of the Turkish attack were both the Avars and the Romans. Turxanthus also bragged that the Turks under Bokhan (Buqan), Anagai/ Anagaeus (chief of the Utigurs) and himself were poised to take the city of Bosporus next. Once the Turks possessed the former Kingdom of Bosporus (the eastern half of the Crimea), they could also take Roman-held Cherson which, as we shall see, they did in about 579. Turxhanthus ordered the Roman envoys to participate in the burial of his father, which they did in customary manner by slashing their own cheeks with daggers. According to a seventh century inscription by the Turkish Khagan Bilge, the ambassadors from Boklii Cholii, China, Tibet, Avar, Rome, Kyrgiz, Uch-Kurykan, OtuzTatars, Kytans, and Tatabs were present at the funeral. It was after the funeral that Turxanthus dispatched the Roman envoys to meet the Turkish leaders of the interior, and in particular his brother Tardu (Turkish Tarduš;

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104  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chinese Ta-T’eou) who dwelled on Mount Ektel (Golden). Pohl suggests that Tardu was the senior brother who had the title of yagbu before he assumed the title Khagan, while Turxanthus had only the lesser title of shad, and that he had the father’s favourite residence. In my opinion it is possible that we should identify this Tardu with the abovementioned Arsilas, because it is clear that Tardu had the final say in this matter. The Roman envoys made a futile trip – all they got to come back with were their lives and slashed faces. When they returned, Bosporus had already been taken by the Turks. Cherson had fallen by 579. Tiberius was still operating under the false impression that he had time on his hands in early 576.91 The reason for this was that it was usual for the Persians to appear on the border only in August, so Tiberius thought there would be enough time for one more round of negotiations. He dispatched Theodorus son of Bacchus as his envoy to Chosroes. Theodorus’s mission was to convey the message that Tiberius was now prepared to send Roman high officials to the border to discuss the terms of lasting peace. It is possible that Tiberius was now aware of the impending Turkish attack on the Crimea and really sought peace, but it is equally possible that Tiberius’s only goal was to delay the beginning of the Persian offensive by false peace negotiations until the troops were paid and marched north.92 Whatever the truth, when Theodorus reached Chosroes, the latter was about to begin his invasion of Persarmenia. There was a huge hole in the defenses between the armies of Armenia and the East. Chosroes’s goal was clearly to exploit this division of the Roman armies by invading before they could unite their forces. The commander of the Eastern armies, Justinian, was also late arriving on the scene, because he had received his orders late. On top of this, he had to tarry until he obtained the necessary money to pay the soldiers. The timing of the invasion to early spring had clearly surprised the Romans. As noted above, Chosroes exploited the division of the Roman armies by advancing through Artaz and Bagrewand. The forces under Kours and Theodorus were in Iberia while the Eastern Field Army was still scattered up in its winter quarters. Therefore in the initial stages of the invasion the only opposition facing Chosroes consisted of the Persarmenians under Vardan Mamikonean. As we have seen, his army was said to consist of 20,000 horsemen, but it is certain that he did not have this many men available at the time because the forces of the Iberian King were with Kours and Theodorus. Therefore Vardan chose to avoid contact with Chosroes and wait for the arrival of Kours and Theodorus. As a result, Chosroes could march unopposed to Theodosiopolis. We do not know the exact strength of Chosroes’s force. There are several ways to guess. One is to use the army strengths suggested by military manuals, which suggest an upper limit of 40,000–56,000 horsemen for the cavalry (these sources are unhelpful for the estimation of the size of infantry forces). The second is to make an educated guess on the basis of the information provided by the narrative historians. As we have seen, Chosroes in 573 probably used an army of about 40,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry plus masses of workmen. This is probably the best basis for guessing the size of the force in 576. In short, I would suggest that Chosroes had about 40,000 cavalry, 40,000 infantry, and others needed to support them (servants, workmen, artisans, engineers, logistical services, elephants, doctors, medics etc). And what was the size of the Roman army opposing them? The best source for this is Maurice’s Strategikon, which describes the army of the time. The diagram of the large

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  105 cavalry army in this treatise has 31,930–35,030 horsemen when each bandon is assumed to have an average of 310 men.93 This figure is consistent with the figures given by John of Ephesus 6.28 for the Roman army operating in Armenia in c. 582 under the commander of the armies of the East John Mystacon and his lieutenant general Kours. This, however, represented the strength of the united armies of the whole eastern frontier after the defeat in 577 and in a situation in which Maurice had also taken a significant portion of it with him to Constantinople – the rest would obviously have been left in their garrisons. On the basis of this, one can guess that the overall strength of the Roman field armies of Armenia and the East was not less than 50,000–60,000 horsemen, of which about 20,000– 30,000 would have been commanded by Kours. On the basis of this and what happened in the course of the campaign, I would suggest that the Cavalry Army of Armenia had about 12,000 horsemen under Kours (about 5,000–8,000 being left in Iberia) and that it was reinforced by about 10,000 Armenians (the rest being left in Persarmenia and Iberia). I would suggest that since Justinian arrived late on the scene, he was able to assemble only about 25,000 horsemen in haste, the rest being left in their garrisons. The figure of about 25,000 horsemen for the army of Justinian may in fact be an underestimation, but a safe one, because none of the sources imply that the Romans had enough of a numerical advantage in this battle to post extra men to the flanks of the first line to immediately outflank the Persians. In sum, my conservative guess is that the Romans had about 47,000 horsemen plus their servants and support troops operating against Chosroes deployed as two separate field armies. The principal reasons why the Romans used only cavalry were: 1) They had been surprised so it was impossible to assemble adequate infantry forces fast enough; 2) The Persians relied mainly on their cavalry to win battles; 3) The Romans could conduct a very effective guerrilla campaign against the Persians by relying only on fast-moving cavalry forces. When the news of the Persian invasion arrived, Kours acted with alacrity. We do not know if the second strategos on the scene joined forces with Kours or remained behind, for example in Iberia or Lazica. Kours ordered the immediate evacuation of civilians and animals and most importantly he marched so fast to the scene of operations that he managed to reach Theodosiopolis in time to prevent its capture. John of Ephesus claims that the Romans had more than 120,000 men so that Chosroes then marched forward to another city (i.e. Satala on the same road), but the Romans followed and prevented its capture as well. The figure of 120,000 is definitely an exaggeration and credible only if one assumes that it includes all the Roman military personnel plus the allied Armenians and Iberians in the northern theatre of war.94 It is clear that Kours did not bring this many horsemen with him and I would suggest that in this case he probably had only one tenth of the figure, in other words 12,000 horsemen. A few years later Kours’s division consisted of 20,000 horsemen altogether, so he would have left about 8,000 men behind to complete the operations in Iberia. The presence of the Roman field army under Kours made it impossible for the Persians to conduct sieges. Kours showed himself to be a skilful guerrilla leader. The frustrated Chosroes decided to try his luck against Caesarea in Cappadocia, but his hopes were again foiled by the fast moving Armenian army. The Persians were just too slow because their infantry, workmen, servants, baggage train, siege train, royal entourage etc slowed it down. In contrast, the Roman cavalry army of Armenia could march from one supply depot to another without a large baggage train.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  107 The ancient sources also show that Kours managed to foil Chosroes’s next attempt, which was to take Caesarea. Kours blocked his route. When Chosroes realized this, he turned around and burned Sebaste/Sebasteia instead. In my opinion, however, it is possible that Chosroes tricked Kours away from Sebaste by moving towards Caesarea, and then turned around against the now less well-defended Sebaste, which the Romans now evacuated in haste. Most modern historians think on the basis of John of Ephesus that Chosroes marched straight from Sebasteia to Melitene, but in my opinion it is likelier that Chosroes again made an about turn towards Caesarea. The route would now have been open, because the Romans would have shadowed Chosroes again when he marched back north to Sebasteia. The reason for my conclusion consists of two parts: Firstly, according to Evagrius’s account, the battle of Melitene occurred immediately after Chosroes had advanced towards Caesarea.95 Secondly, none of the accounts mention the river Melas, which would have been between the Persian army and Melitene had they advanced from the direction of Sebasteia. This river could only be crossed safely using bridges, as can be seen from the accompanying map ‘Battle of Melitene 1’ drawn after the Barrington Map. It is very difficult to think that the Romans would have failed to exploit such an obstacle if the Persians approached from that direction. However, since it is possible that the sources have just omitted the detail concerning Melas, I include both alternatives in the following analysis. Regardless, if Chosroes turned around again and tried to capture Caesarea, as is implied by Evagrius, it is still clear that Kours must have been able to forestall Chosroes again, because the sources do not contain any information about the sacking of Caesarea. What is certain is that when Chosroes’s attempts had been brought to naught through the skilful use of guerrilla warfare by Kours, Chosroes decided to withdraw via Melitene to home territory. It was now the right time for the Romans to use one of their standard defensive strategies: they assembled their field armies for a decisive pitched battle against an enemy that had been weakened by the combination of guerrilla warfare and defence in depth. The Romans were able to unite their two principal field armies, the Armenian Army under Kours and the Eastern Field Army under Justinian, without the Persians noticing. This appears to have been achieved so that while Kours shadowed Chosroes, Justinian blocked the route. When this happened, the army of Kours bypassed the Persians unobserved, presumably during the night, and formed the second hidden combat line the next day. The other possibility is that Kours had just used a smaller skeleton force for the shadowing of Chosroes while he marched his main force unobserved to Melitene. When the day of the battle dawned, Chosroes was unaware of the presence of the forces under Kours. Therefore he marched his army out of the marching camp and prepared for battle. Both sides followed their standard combat doctrines to the letter so that all the standard pre-battle procedures were followed and the armies assumed their standard formations. The Roman sources mention only the harangue given by Justinian to his troops, but it is certain that Chosroes did the same. The Persian magi, generals, and king would have done their best to encourage their men after the dismally disappointing campaign. The Persians arrayed their cavalry in two lines, behind which were the infantry and camp, but the Romans resorted to a stratagem. They hid their second line and reinforcements by placing them just behind the first line. How this was done is decribed by the Strategikon. The Roman first line was initially deployed in open

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108  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 order with lance pennons, flags and standards up in the air to make their line appear as wide and formidable as possible, while the second line was deployed in close order with lances, flags and standards pointing towards the ground to hide its presence. See Battle of Melitene 2.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  109 When the armies began to move towards each other, the Persians swallowed the bait and sent their second line to the flanks of their first to encircle the Roman cavalry. It was roughly then that the horsemen of the first Roman line removed their lance pennons, closed up their formation and advanced, while the second line halted in its place to assume its role as reserves, and the formation became ‘deep’, as stated by Theophylact. See Battle of Melitene 3.

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110  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Consequently, when the Persians then outflanked the first Roman line in crescent formation, they were shocked to find that the enemy had a reserve. It was now the Persian wings who were attacked in flank by the flank divisions of the second Roman cavalry line. The Persians fled, using the Parthian shot. Unfortunately for the Romans, Kours and his men failed to stick to the battle plan to attack the flank and rear of the Persian formation. Instead, they began to plunder the Persian camp. See Battle of Melitene 4.

The presence of the shahanshah’s treasures and concubines proved too much for military discipline to control. The cavalry unit that reached the king’s baggage train first pillaged it, deserted their colours, and was never seen again. These men became immensely rich at one great stroke of luck. However, the disorder caused by the killing, pillaging and looting gave Chosroes the chance to reform his peasant infantry into a hollow square/circle, which presented a wall of shields against all directions, and then rally and regroup his defeated cavalry inside the infantry formation. The Persian peasant infantry has clearly received its bad reputation undeservedly. The general quality of the professional Roman infantry was undoubtedly better, but this battle shows that one

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  111 should not underestimate the combat performance of the Persian peasant infantry, even in the most demanding of situations. The desperate Persians fought their way through the encircling cordon of Roman cavalry to the mountains. See the maps Battle of Melitene 1 and 5. It was now impossible to stop the Persians because they were already arrayed as a solid infantry formation.

Regardless, it is still clear that the Persians had suffered a very serious defeat. They had lost not only many soldiers and most of their camp followers, but also almost all of their supplies, while the shahanshah had lost his concubines and treasury – which alone would have been a very serious blow to the morale and prestige of the ruler. It is probable that like the Roman cavalry the Persian cavalry carried in their saddlebags some bread, barley, preserved meat and a small flask of water. This would have given them perhaps two to three days’ before they ran out of their remaining supplies (Strategikon

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112  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 7.1.10). The horses would have been given water before the battle (Strategikon 7.1.9). It is probable that the infantry, or rather their servants, carried with them some food supplies and water. Taken together it is clear that the Persians were now facing the prospect of starvation if they could not fight their way out of their predicament. However, there was one thing in favour of the Persians. Thanks to the disobedience of Kours, the Roman forces were now divided in two with the Persians in between. This gave Chosroes a chance to engage the Romans separately, which he did by marching against the camp of Justinian which lay on the opposite side of the mountain where he had taken refuge. Justinian opted to avoid contact and fled with his forces. The Persians outnumbered him at least two to one. It would not have been wise to fight in such a situation, especially when Justinian knew that time was on his side. The flight of Justinian opened the route to the city of Melitene, which Chosroes grasped.96 It is likely that he hoped to obtain supplies from there, but his hopes were dashed. Justinian had wisely evacuated the city in advance so that all the frustrated Persians could do was to burn the deserted Melitene. It is important to keep in mind that it is unlikely that the Persians would have found enough supplies from the marching camp of Justinian either, because Roman combat doctrine demanded that most supplies and non-combatants would be left 30–50 miles away from the enemy in a base camp (in this case probably a city) and that only just enough food would be taken to the marching camp for the battle.97 Meanwhile, Justinian and Kours had reunited their forces. They knew full well that time was on their side, and therefore decided to play a ruse to keep the Persians where they were for one more day so that their supplies would fail them completely. They challenged the Persians to battle, which Chosroes accepted. As the armies stood opposite each other, neither side was willing to commit itself to attack, not even when the Romans tried to provoke with feigned attacks. In fact it is remarkable how well Persian discipline held, after so many misfortunes. When the night approached the armies withdrew to their camps. During the night the Persians tried to flee over the Euphrates. But the Romans were well prepared for this eventuality. Their scouts informed the generals of the Persian flight, and the Roman army started a relentless pursuit of the retreating Persians. The Persians panicked when they heard the approaching shouts and noise of the pursuing Romans and the rest of their chaotic flight up to the Euphrates was butchery. According to John of Ephesus and Michael Syrus, when the Persians saw the Romans pressing upon them, they galloped into the river where more than a half of their army drowned. This may imply that the Persians lost all of their infantry and half of their cavalry. Subsequent operations seem to prove this guess, because in the next few years the Persians used only cavalry. This was therefore a major defeat. As a result of it, the aging and humiliated Chosroes decreed a law according to which the shahanshah should never take the field in person except when the fight was against another king. It was just too humiliating to be defeated by a mere general. Justinian exploited his victory to the hilt and pursued the fugitive king. He was unable to catch Chosroes but he pillaged Persian territory up to the Caspian Sea and then retreated from there to Persarmenia at his leisure the following spring.

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  113

The Persian and Balkan Fronts in 577–8 The peace negotiations with Persia and the Roman defeats in 57798 It was now the turn of the Persians to seek peace. Chosroes dispatched an envoy called Nadoes to Tiberius to suggest peace negotiations. Tiberius agreed. He could now negotiate from a position of strength. Tiberius dispatched Theodorus the son of Peter (Comes Sacrarum Largitionum, as former Magister Officiorum he was eminently qualified), consulars John and Peter, and court physician Zacharias to the border to negotiate. When they reached Constantia in Mesopotamia, they waited for the arrival of Mebod Sannakhoerugan in the vicinity of Nisibis and Dara. Meanwhile Chosroes executed imperial referendarius Asterius (judicial clerk and messenger), who was in Persian hands at that time, because he had tried to write to the Emperor not to negotiate but to attack while the Persians were in deep trouble. The negotiatiors and local governors from both sides met each other at Athraelon. The Persian envoys demanded that the Romans evacuate Persarmenia and Iberia, hand over the rebels and follow the treaty formerly agreed with Justinian I. The Romans categorically refused to pay anything in return for treaty. The two sides agreed to a compromise. The Persians dropped the demand for payments while the Romans agreed to return Persarmenia and Iberia, if the rebels and locals were allowed to evacuate those countries. In addition, Tiberius suggested that the Persians return Dara to the Romans in return for money or some other payment. Chosroes was on the point of agreeing, but then came surprising news from Persarmenia, which is described in some detail by John of Ephesus as follows: ‘Success had now for some time attended the Roman arms, and their generals had gained great glory in many important victories, and had vanquished all who were sent to oppose their progress: they had also captured and subdued the northern tribes, who previously had been subject to the Persians, and further carried their devastations for many scores of leagues into the enemy’s dominions and penetrated within a hundred miles of his capital, spoiling everything in their way, and especially carrying off the elephants, until they had filled Constantinople with these animals. The full account of their successes would exceed the limits of our history, but all Persia trembled before them. When however, in the year 880 of Alexander (A.D. 577) the Persian king withdrew to his dominions [this refers to when the Roman army had advanced into Persarmenia and Persia after their victory over Chosroes in 576], the Romans laid all care aside, and were elated with pride, as men who had valiantly withstood the king in person. Henceforth they acted as though they had nothing to fear, and imagined that now at length they were finally delivered, and at rest from all wars and conflicts. And similarly the troops in their camps were full of over-confidence, and carelessness, and had put off their arms and sent their horses away to pasture [standard safety protocols would have demanded that the servants collect the fodder, but this precaution was not followed], when suddently their outposts came in, and said, “Arise, and arm yourselves: for the Persian army is upon you, with the Marzban Tam Khosrun [Tamchosro/Tamkhosro/Tankhosdro/ Tamkhusro/Tamchosroes]: look to yourselves.” But they ridiculed the idea, and said, contemptuously, “Do you think they would venture to come and find us and show

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114  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 themselves to us?” And they paid no attention, nor troubled themselves to get ready; so that, as my informants said, the Persian army was upon them, when they were not only not prepared for battle, but not ready even to show their faces. When then they saw them approaching in long files, firm as a wall, [the good order of the Persian army is also stressed in the Strategikon] a panic and terror fell upon them all alike, and confusion: for they had not brought in their horses, and were occupied solely with eating and drinking and gluttony: and some were here, and some there. And as each one caught sight of the enemy, he was terrorstricken, and began to flee at full speed: and others caught the infection, and fled, because their comrades fled: and the generals, when they saw themselves left alone, and their troops were in full flight, fled too: and he who could get his arms, and catch his horse, mounted and rode away; and he who could not catch his horse, fled away on foot, carrying his arms at first, but when he grew tired with running, he threw them away upon the road, and fled weaponless. And some of those who were mounted, and had their arms with them, on growing tired threw them away; or if their horse grew weary, they dismounted, and fled away on foot. As for the Persians, they followed them at their leisure, not so much pursuing after them, as jesting and ridiculing and laughing at them [The Strategikon noted that Persians pursued in good order], because when they [the Romans] were a hundred and twenty thousand in number [after the recruiting drive of Tiberius there is no reason to doubt this number, but I would still suggest that this figure included the servants, squires, workmen, engineers, logistical services etc. and that the 120,000 men meant the whole Roman force posted in Persarmenia and Iberia], while they themselves were not more than thirty thousand [This reflected both the weakened state of the Persian forces at this time and also the wisdom of the Persian commander Tamkhosro. According to Menander fr. 20.3, Tamkhosro did not bring with him useless masses of low-class rabble or elephants, but only the most warlike and best-armed men, in particular the elite Asavaran/Savaran knights. John of Ephesus recounts the same events with less detail at 2.24, but there is one slight discrepancy between these two, which is that at 2.24 he states that the Romans had ‘not fewer than a hundred thousand men’, a detail which is not really in disagreement with his other figure of 120,000 men. All the rest of the details are the same, including the strength of the Persian army. My own suggestion is that the Romans had perhaps 50,000 horsemen and squires etc. in the camp that the Persians now overran with 30,000 horsemen], they were thus panic-striken and fled away, though they had not been terrified nor fled from their king. And thus at last, shame and an ill name fastened upon all the Roman armies, with their commanders; for the Persians did not so much as draw sword against them, nor bend the bow, nor shoot a single arrow, but gathered up the arms and coats of mail, which they had scattered in their flight, and their breastplates, and shields, and helmets, and spears and swords, and lances and bows, and quivers full of arrows, beyond numbering. And the cause of their defeat, as all men said, was that the Romans had made God angry: for when they entered the northern territories of the Persian realm, where people are all Christians, … and finally, in impious sport, they even went so far as to seize hold of little children, of one and two years of age, and taking them by one leg, and another by the other, threw them as high up in the air as they could, and then caught them as they fell on their spears and swords, and

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  115 running them through, cast them to their dogs. Nor did they confine their cruelty to children, but treated the monks also with contempt, and slew and plundered them: and still more, they dragged out of their retirement the hermits, … and hung them up, and tortured them, and mutilated them with their swords, saying ‘Bring us gold and silver’. And the nuns they tortured in similar manner, … When such were the excesses allowed by the lax discipline of the Roman camp, it is no wonder if Armenia began to grow weary of its defenders, and willingly made terms again with the Persians. [The despicable treatment of the Persarmenians by their supposed liberators obviously turned friends into foes and led at least some of them to make a separate peace with Persia. It is probable that the principal reason for the lax discipline which caused the Roman soldiers to abuse the locals and which led to the defeat was the presence of masses of barbarian recruits of Germanic origin who despised discipline in general] … when finally the Persians… promised the Armenians in writing not to do them any evil, nor remember offence against him, they then all deserted the Roman side, and the whole country delivered itself up to him, except those princes who had taken refuge with the king at Constantinople. Omitting them, the number of those who surrendered was twenty thousand men [This suggests that in the coming years the Persarmeians provided 20,000 cataphracted feudal knights for the Persians when necessary. The size of the Persarmenian forces had clearly diminished in the preceding years], and the government of the Persian king was restored there as of old. Of those who stayed at Constantinople, the leading men were Vardun with his retinue, and the king of a tribe who also had come over to the Romans, and whose name was Gorgonis; and both were still treated with great honour… The war, however, upon their account lasted for several years afterwards.’ John of Ephesus 6.10–11, tr. by Smith 398–403 with my comments in parentheses. According to Sebeos, Tamkhosro conducted two campaigns against the Romans during his two-year tenure and was victorious in both. The first of these was fought in Basean at Bolorapahak where Murts and Araxes joined and the other in Bagrewand at Ktʻni (Kethin, location unknown). The geographical positions suggest that the first victory against the Romans was achieved at Kethin and the second at Bolorapahak. This could suggest that he may have pursued the Romans and defeated them again, but it is likelier that the second victory was achieved when Justinian marched against Adarmahan in Mesopotamia in this same year so that Tamkhosro defeated the Romans who had been left behind (see later). In short, it is likely that Justinian was defeated decisively only once, as implied by the Roman sources. The crushing defeat and the defection of at least some of the Persarmenians and Iberians obviously changed the balance of power so that Chosroes was no longer willing to agree to the already agreed peace terms. However, the fact that the Romans were promising to hand over Persamenia and Iberia to the Persians in return for the city of Dara during the peace negotiations in 579 shows that the Persians had been unable to reconquer those countries in their entirety. Regardless, it is still clear that they did recapture some of the territory lost, which included at least the city of Dvin and its surrounding areas and some portions of Iberia too. The obvious reason for this is that the Romans had annihilated the Persian infantry corps near Melitene in 576. The fact that both Tamkhosro and Mebod used only

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116  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 cavalry forces during the years 577–8 suggests that the infantry that had accompanied Chosroes I in 576 had been the best infantry the Persians possessed, a fact which is borne out by their ability to form a defensive circle around their ruler in the midst of a disastrous defeat. In short, Tamkhosro lacked the means to take the cities and forts that the loyal Persarmenians and Iberians retained.99 Tiberius persisted in his attempts to secure the peace with the terms previously agreed and promised secretly to the Persians a payment of money in return for Dara. The payment could obviously be seen as a payment of tribute and it was because of this that only Zacharias and Comes Excubitorum Maurice were in the loop of information on the Roman side. The Persians refused. Both sides were playing for time: the Persians presumably to put more pressure on the Romans now they had the advantage, and the Romans to buy the services of ever more Germans to their side. As noted above, according to Menander (fr. 22), Caesar Tiberius dispatched Pamphronius to Italy with 3,000 lbs of gold with instructions: 1) to bribe as many Lombards as possible to switch sides because Tiberius was unable to send any reinforcements to Italy; 2) to convince as many of the bribed Lombards as possible to fight for the Romans in the east against the Persians; 3) if the Lombards refused to desert, Pamphronius was to attempt to buy some of the Frankish chieftains to their side. It is possible the results of this recruiting drive formed the core of the force that came to be known as the Tiberiani if the unit in question was formed in about 578/9 (see later).

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  117 Persian negotiating tactics and the appointment of Maurice as strategos in 577–8 What happened next is described by John of Ephesus 6.13,100 Menander (fr.23.1ff.) and Theophylact (3.15.8ff.). It is probable that the lightning raid of Adarmahan mentioned by John of Ephesus 6.13 formed part of the Persian negotiating tactic, and that because of this Tamkhosro achieved his second success against the Romans in Persarmenia at Bolorapahak: ‘But the Persians not only took measures for their defence, but also invaded the Roman territories: for there had been present at the conferences a powerful Marzban, named Adormahun [Adarmahan, Adarmaanes, Ardahmon, Adarmon, Adramon]; and no sooner were the negotiations broken off, than being enraged at some reproaches addressed by the ambassadors to himself, he collected his troops, and began to waste and burn everything on which he could lay hands, in the districts round the strong towns of Dara, and Tela [Tella/Constantia], and Telbesme [Tell Beshmai], and Resaina [Theodosiopolis], sparing neither churches not monasteries [i.e. the Persian commander devastated the area right in front of where the negotiations had taken place]. And thus he wasted and burnt and slew as far as Tela [Constantia]; to the inhabitants of which town he sent saying, “Deliver unto us your city, lest the same fate happen to you as to the people of Dara and ye perish [refers to the capture of Dara in 573]”… But the people of Tela [Constantia] answered, “We cannot surrender our town to you, for we have received letters, with the intelligence that the patrician Justinian is already on his march, and has with him sixty thousand Lombards [After the previous defeat Justinian would have been in the Roman held portion of Armenia with the forces that had survived the Persian surprise attack with the task of keeping Tamkhosro in check. The ‘60,000 Lombards’ would not have been the entire force at his disposal. He would have left other forces behind to act as a shielding force against the army of Tamkhosro. Despite what John of Ephesus states, it is unlikely that the entire force would have consisted only of Lombards, but it would be equally wrong to think that the army that Justinian led south would have consisted of about 6,000 meros of Lombard foideratoi – the obvious reason for this is that a small force would not have forced Adarmahan to retreat]: and were we now to surrender ourselves to you, he would come, and utterly exterminate us from the land.” Upon hearing this, the Persians withdrew, but not until they had burnt the great and magnificent temple of the Mother of God, which stood outside the city: and having done whatever other mischief they could, they retreated to Dara [As noted above, Justinian’s march to Amida was exploited by Tamkhosro who defeated the remaining Roman forces at Bolorapahak.]’ JE 6.13, tr. by Smith 406–8 with slight changes and my comments in parentheses. On the basis of the following quote from John of Ephesus, the disagreements between the Roman generals had played an important role in the Roman inability to respond to these Persian raids with any effectiveness. This was also true in the 576 invasion when disagreements affected the outcome of the battle of Melitene. One may assume that the distribution pattern of the Roman army in the East was the primary cause for the disagreements, with each commander seeing things only from his own perspective. On

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118  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 the basis of Evagrius (5.19), Tiberius sacked Justinian because of the complaints made against him, while the second version of John of Ephesus (6.27) states that it was the death of the supreme commander that resulted in the quarrels of the generals who had served under him. As we shall see, this latter version is incorrect because Justinian was still very much alive when Tiberius became Augustus. It was then that the future Emperor Maurice made his first appearance as a military commander in late 577. What happened next is well described by John of Ephesus, Evagrius and Menander: ‘As the Roman reverses in the East had arisen from the want of a good understanding among the generals, who carried their quarrels by the letter even into the Caesar’s presence, [this version mentions only the quarrels between generals, but in 6.27 John falsely states that the generals quarrelled only because Justinian had died] he determined to send thither an officer of his own court, whose name was Maurice [Mauricius, the future Emperor], and who held the same post which he had himself possessed before he was made Caesar, being Comes Excubitorum, or count of the bodyguard, for which reason he is generally known by the name of the Count Maurice. Having summoned him, therefore, he gave him orders to proceed to the East as commander-in-chief of all the forces there, with authority to govern and direct and control all the generals and tribunes of the whole army, and that no one should venture, on any pretext, to transgress his orders and the word of the mouth. And further, he gave him power to appoint and to dismiss any officer from the service at his sole discretion; and he sent with him many talents to provision the troops [this was of the utmost importance when one wanted to retain the loyalty of the Roman forces which must have been mercenaries fighting for salaries and booty], having also just previously commissioned Gregory the Prefect of the Praetorian Guards – a man who had distinguished himself in all the affairs of Armenia – to proceed thither to administer and take charge of the sums of money disbursed for the army. No sooner then had the illustrious Maurice received his order, than he set out on his journey, and arrived first in Cappadocia; where he began to collect troops [JE 6.27 adds that Maurice marched to Cappadocia because he was a native of Arabissus and that he conscripted large numbers of young men from Cappadocia]; and numerous Romans and excubitores, and scribones [officers of the excubitores; JE 6.27 adds palaceguards], and common soldiers had accompanied him from the capital to enlist under his standard [this transferral of forces from the Balkans created a power vacuum, which was exploited by the Slavs who invaded with 100,000 men and ravaged Thrace, Greece and many other places some time between 7 December 577 and 7 December 578, see Menander frgs. 20.3 , 21 with Blockley’s dating in notes 257, 260], which was now joined by hosts of Iberian and Syrian recruits. [JE 6.27 adds that Maurice obtained many recruits from the province of Anzitene in Armenia when he reached Syria. Note, however, that in contrast to the previous recruiting drives, the vast majority of the force that Maurice gathered consisted of natives.] Directly then that he had gathered an army, he marched forward and encamped between Armenia and Syria, at the town of Citharizon [this central position enabled Maurice to march either to Mesopotamia or Persarmenia] and there he assembled all the generals, and conferred with them, and appointed them their posts, and gave them their orders, and encouraged them, and

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  119 sent them away.’ JE 6.14, tr. by Smith 408–9 with slight changes and my comments in parentheses. ‘Tiberius, being by this time in possession of the crown on the death of Justin, supersedes Justinian, since he had not been equally successful against the barbarians, and appoints Maurice to the command of the forces of the East; [this is incorrect because Maurice was appointed commander in late 577] a person who derived his descent and name from the elder Rome, but, as regards his more immediate origin, he was native of Arabissus in Cappadocia [this is the only piece of information we have of the descent of Maurice and it suggests that he was a descendant of Roman settlers in Cappadocia]; a man of sense and ability, and of unvarying accuracy and firmness. Being staid and precise in his mode of living and manners, he was temperate in his food, using only such as was necessary and simple, and was superior to all other indulgences of a luxurious life. [These simple habits endeared him to the soldiers when he was in command, but the Spartan lifestyle made him too insensitive and strict towards the soldiers as we shall see. He was a disciplinarian.] He was not easily accessible to the solicitations of the vulgar, nor too easy a listener in general; [These qualities made Maurice appear haughty and insensitive towards the needs and wishes of the soldiers and also prevented him from getting first-hand knowledge of the mood of the soldiers.] well knowing that the one tends to produce contempt, and the other leads to flattery. Accordingly, he granted audiences sparingly, and those only to the persons on serious business, and closed his ears against idle talk, not with wax, as poets say, but rather with reason; so that this latter was an excellent key to them, appropriately both opening and closing them during conversation. So completely had he banished both ignorances, the mother of audacity, and also cowardice, which is at the same time a foreigner and neighbour to the former, that with him to face danger was an act of prudence, and to decline it was a measure of safety; while both courage and discretion were the charioteers of opportunity, and guided the reins to whatever quarter necessity directed: so that his efforts were both restrained and put forth, as it were, by measure and rule… the details of his greatness and excellence.’ Evagrius 5.19, tr. by Anon. 1846, 275–6 with my comments in parentheses. ‘Maurice. He was made general of the East by Tiberius Caesar. Although he had not been trained in war and conflict, he was intelligent, serious and perceptive. He combined in himself the two opposites, high-mindedness and gentleness, both free of arrogance or hauteur. [Evagrius’ account and the subsequent events of Maurice’s reign, however, suggest that he acted in a manner that could seem arrogant to outside observers, because Maurice’s decisions were governed solely by reason.] Such was Maurice when he became general, and his tenure in office increased his reputation further. Before Maurice, the son of Paul, took command of the war in the East, the Romans did not build a ditch and were completely ignorant of the technique [this was presumably one of the reasons for the defeat in 577, and was probably because the army included so many barbarians of Germanic origins]. But when he held the command which set him on the path to the throne, he made them do again what they had neglected through laziness. Since the Romans had not wished to do it, it had been forgotten. For to those who are unwilling, hard work is an enemy [Menander

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120  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 fr. 23.4 adds that Maurice restored discipline so that the soldiers were no longer abusing their subjects, which had been the reason for the defection of the Persarmenians. The Romans held both Persarmenia and Iberia more securely after this].’ Menander fr. 23.1–3, tr. by Blockley 199–201 with my comments in parentheses. The above quotations show why Tiberius lost his confidence in the abilities of Justinian to lead the Roman armies, if he did not die as claimed by John of Ephesus.101 Tiberius’s choice as Justinian’s successor was his trusted man Maurice, the Comes Excubitorum, with Narses serving as his second-in-command (hypostrategos). Maurice lacked military experience, but he was a fast learner and was destined to become one of the most important military thinkers of all ages. His second-in-command, Narses, also lacked military experience. He was a former sacellarius and bodyguard of Justin II and according to a late source a cubicularius of Tiberius.102 In both cases the apparent reason for the appointments was their closeness to Tiberius and their perceived loyalty to him. From late 577 onwards the Roman armies in the east were therefore led by a troika consisting of strategos Maurice, hypostrategos Narses and Praetorian Prefect Gregory, the last of whom was in charge of payments and supplies. Maurice proved to be the right man for the job. He conscripted, recruited and drilled the army during the winter 577–8 and spring 578 so well that the Persians were afraid to face it on the battlefield. It was during the term of Maurice as commander of the armies of the east (both Armenian and Eastern Field Armies) in 577–82 that he demonstrated calculated favouritism towards his relatives for the first time. He appointed his cousin or nephew Domitianus/Domitian as Bishop of Melitene in about 580. He was to become Maurice’s close confidant and adviser, and can be considered to have been his most important advisor. It is possible that he had acted in this capacity before, in 577–8, and this was why Maurice made him Bishop of Melitene, though without the official authority to do so. It is therefore clear that Maurice sought to improve his position from the start through nepotism if necessary – a side of him which manifested itself particularly strongly during his reign. In addition, it was during these years that Maurice formed a close working relationship with the officers serving in the eastern front whose support he needed later. A discussion and quote of this side of Maurice’s career will be discussed later in greater detail.103 Besides the titles of Comes Excubitorum, Magister Militum per Orientem and Comes Foederatorum, Maurice would also have held the title strategos autokrator (= dux imperator, overall commander in this case of the eastern front). His first task, however, was the recruiting of replacements for the men lost under Justinian. Maurice took with him a large force from the West, including the excubitores and scribones, and marched to Cappadocia, his native lands. The large force from the West is likely to have included units and detachments from the regional field army of Thrace, federate units permanently posted in Thrace and units also from the praesental armies. At this time the units of the praesental armies were scattered throughout the Empire wherever they were needed to bolster the existing forces. It is less likely that Maurice would have taken units from the frontier forces, the limitanei, but it is possible if it was deemed necessary, as the reign of Justinian shows. We just do not know what units Maurice took with him. This troop transferral created a power vacuum in the Balkans, which was exploited by the Slavs

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  121 who invaded with 100,000 men and devastated Thrace and other places in 577–8. Once in Cappadocia, Maurice levied a large force of natives and then added to their number more men from Iberia, Syria and Armenia once he reached Syria. It is possible that Maurice recruited some of the 15,000 barbarians who became known as the Tiberiani, but on the basis of Theophanes (AM 6074, 581/2) it is likelier that the Tiberiani were actually formed out of the Lombards and Franks that Pamphronius had recruited in late 577 to early 578 and would have arrived in Constantinople in about late 578 where Tiberius then clothed and armed them and sent them against the Persians. It should be noted that it is possible that a significant number of these barbarian foederati were actually Romans because, because the foederati had included native Romans ever since the days of Honorius. Whoever these Tiberiani ‘barbarians’ were, Maurice became their commander with the title Comes Foederatorum in about 579/80. As stated, it is probable that the barbarians in question received their name Tiberiani from Tiberius after he had become Augustus in September 578. Persian stratagems and Maurice’s counter-attack in 578 According to Menander (fr. 23.1, 23.6) while the peace negotiations were still going on in 578, Chosroes gave Tamkhosro in Persamenia the order to raid and pillage until the Roman envoy Trajan brought the gold for the truce. It is therefore not surprising to find the Romans in the north facing Tamkhosro. But Chosroes had already decided to break the truce in Mesopotamia even though there were still forty days left of it to run. He had learnt that Tiberius was organizing a very large army and was already sending horsetransports to the East. These are the reinforcements that Tiberius kept on sending to Maurice as each new group of barbarians arrived from the west. It is probable that they were placed in the unit that came to be known as the Tiberiani. Having been advised to do so by the chief negotiatior Mebod, Chosroes ordered Mebod (Mebodes, son of Surena, Māhbōdh) to invade Roman-held Mesopotamia near Dara. This gave to the Persians the advantage of surprise. Mebod was given 20,000 horsemen, of whom 12,000 were Persian thyreoforoi (shield-bearers, probably cataphracts) and hippotoxotai (mounted archers), the remaining 8,000 consisting of Saracens and Sabirs. Mebod was the strategos; Sapoës, son of Meairanos (Shapur, son of Mihran), was his hypostrategos. This is to be identified with the invasion by the barbarian strategos Sarnachorganes, mentioned by Theophylact (3.15.11–2). It was the stratagem of Tamkhosro mentioned below, which is preserved by John of Ephesus, that enabled both Mebod and Tamkhosro to conduct their raids unopposed. Tamkhosro lured Maurice to Theodosiopolis (Karin) which left the areas south of it undefended. Mebod raided the areas surrounding Constantia (Tella) and Theodosiopolis (Resaina) while Tamkhosro raided areas just north of them. Mebod was fearful of a Roman counter-attack and returned quickly, occupying the abandoned Roman fortress city of Thannuris (exact location unknown). However, as discussed below, it is possible that he sought refuge there because Maurice had cut off his route of retreat by advancing into Beth Arabaye. Tamkhosro’s stratagem in 578 We have two versions of what happened next. Firstly, there is Theophylact’s version (3.15.11–12) which states that the Persian commander in Armenia, Tamkhosro, invaded

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122  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 past the Roman fort of Citharizon close to Amida, ravaged everything and then retreated by way of Arzanene. It leaves out the stratagem that the Persians used to fool Maurice, which is described in detail by John of Ephesus (6.14, 6.27) as follows: ‘And for two months he remained there [at Citharizon], and his [Maurice’s] name spread abroad, and fear fell upon all the Persians, who saw that the Roman armies were more numerous and more powerful than themselves. Being afraid then of meeting them in open battle, they contrived a stratagem, and while their real object of attack was that part of Armenia which borders upon Persia, they sent to the inhabitants of Theodosiopolis [Karin/Erzurum] the following message: “After thirty days, be ready, and meet us in battle.” And when the Romans received this message, they sent to inform the count Maurice, who immediately gave orders that his whole force should get ready for the encounter. But the Persians, immediately that they had sent the message, the object of which was to deceive the Romans, put their stratagem into execution, and made their preparations, and gathered their forces, and crossed over into their territories [According to JE 6.27, the Persians left their positions unobserved in the middle of the night, which means that they had been opposite the Roman scouts until then to make their challenge believable], making their inroad unawares at a place near Maipherkat [Martyropolis]. And as soon as they had entered the Roman territory, they began to devastate and burn all the land of Sophene [the account of Theophylact, however, clarifies the order of advance, which was that Tamkhusro marched past Citharizon to Sophene and from there to Martyropolis], and especially the churches and monasteries; and in the same way they treated the district of Amid [Amida]; and on approaching the town itself, they burned all its suburbs, up to its very walls, and destroyed every church, and the large monastery situated there. And for three days they besieged the city; but when they saw that they could not take it by storm, and were afraid lest Maurice should come upon them with his army and put them to the sword, they raised the siege, and resumed their devastation, burning and spoiling the whole land of Mesopotamia like thieves [This is exaggeration, because the Persians retreated via Arzanene] and finally wheeling around, retreated into their own country… The date of this invasion was the year of Alexander 888 (ad 577), being the same as that on which Maurice had travelled thither from the capital; and the time spent by them in this rapid raid, and their hurried flight back to their own land, was eighteen days [JE 6.27 and 6.34 state that it lasted only fifteen days].’ JE 6.14, tr. by Smith, 409–11 with my comments in parentheses. In other words, Tamkhosro skilfully fooled the still inexperienced Maurice to leave his strategic position at Citharizon so that he could march past it to ravage the unprotected Roman territory in Sophene, Martyropolis and Amida (see the map), the last of which he besieged in vain for three days before retreating through northern Mesopotamia to Arzanene and from there back to the portion of Persamenia still held by the Persians before Maurice could catch him. The lightning campaign lasted only 15 or 18 days.104 When Maurice learnt of the Persian treachery, he was furious.105 Despite suffering from fever, he was determined to catch the double-crossing Persians. This, however,

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  123

proved impossible because the Persians had fled before him. Maurice apparently tried to cut off Tamkhosro’s route of retreat by marching to Arzanene/Arzun, but he was too slow because Tamkhosro fled through Arzanene to Armenia before Maurice reached the scene. When Maurice realized that he could not capture Tamkhosro, he decided to exact revenge on the inhabitants of Arzanene by burning and destroying everything. Since the inhabitants of this area were ‘true Christians’ (John of Ephesus’ term, which probably means the Monophysite Armenians), the locals begged the Romans to save their lives. When Maurice learnt this, he ordered all those who wished to live and serve the Christian king to bring their goods and load them on their own horses, and all those who would join the Roman army within three days would be allowed to live. The rest he would kill without mercy. This order saved many lives. According to Theophylact, the Romans took 10,090 ‘Persian’ prisoners who were then settled on the island of Cyprus by Tiberius. Agapius of Membij (p.438) claims that 40,000 captives were deported to Cyprus. The Roman soldiers were so pleased with the success that they gave a third of the booty captured to their successful commander. The Romans captured the fort of Aphumon and several other forts in the area and then besieged Chlomaron (in this case Arzun, the capital of Arzanene). Some of the details of this siege are provided by Menander and John of Ephesus. According to the former, the Romans assaulted the circuit wall, used artillery and dug mines, with the result that the commander of the city, Binganes, dispatched the local bishop to Maurice to negotiate. Binganes offered gold and silver as a ransom for the city. Maurice countered by promising Binganes a higher rank than he held in Persia and twice the amount of wealth he had. Binganes, however, was loyal to Persia, and so once again attempted to buy

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peace, this time with precious sprinklers of perfume, chalices and vessels taken from the churches. Maurice refused to accept these because he was fighting for Christ. Maurice then instructed the bishop secretly and dispatched him back inside the city. But the bishop did not keep his word but was found out favouring the Persians – this means that Maurice had probably attempted to persuade him to betray the city. Therefore, the next time the bishop came out, he was arrested and the Romans continued the siege. However, from John of Ephesus we learn that finally Maurice accepted the ransom money to end the siege and continued his campaign. Maurice then divided his army into two marching columns. One was dispatched over the river Zirma under Kours and Romanus to lay waste to the eastern side of the Tigris river while Maurice himself marched along the western side of the Tigris laying waste to everything there. According to Agathias, Chosroes had taken summer residence in the village of Thamnon in the Carduchian Mountains not far from Arzanene, because he wanted to spend the summer in a cooler clime. Now he could witness the devastation caused by the Romans and was faced with the prospect of coming face to face with the marching column under Kours and Romanus. The sight and knowledge of what was happening caused him immense grief, so he was hastily taken to his palaces in Seleucia and Ctesiphon. His health collapsed and he died soon afterwards in about February/ March 579. According to Theophylact, Maurice invaded the lands of Arabia (Beth Arabaye) near Nisibis. The retreat of Tamkhosro back to Armenia meant that there were simply not enough Persians to protect this area. In my opinion it is probable that Maurice was attempting to block Mebod’s route of retreat with the result that Mebod now hurried to Thannuris and used it as his place of refuge – although it is probable that he fled from there to Singara, because Maurice’s next target of attack was Singara, which he captured and destroyed. One possible reason for Maurice’s march there was to pursue the Persian

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Augustus Justin II (565–578)  125 commanders – as noted, Mebod is a particularly plausible candidate in this context, but if he retreated to Singara it is clear that he fled before Maurice reached the city. The Persian commanders in the area (including, among others, Mebod and Adarmahan) were clearly heavily outnumbered by the Romans and, as we shall see later, Mebod accused Tamkhosro of his defeat. After this Maurice and the other Roman division returned to Roman territory and Constantinople because the winter season was approaching. A second possible reason might be developments in the capital. Tiberius had been nominated Augustus on 26 September 578 and the ailing Justin II died on 4 or 5 October 578. It is therefore likely that it was Tiberius who greeted his old friend as Augustus when the victorious commander returned to the capital for celebrations. The consequences of the Persian war in the Balkans in 577–8 As noted above, the transferral of forces that accompanied Maurice to the East (and also to Africa106) created a power vacuum in the Balkans. True to their predatory nature, this was immediately exploited by the Slavs who invaded with 100,000 men and ravaged Thrace, Greece and many other places some time between 7 December 577 and 7 December 578. The Romans were unable to respond in any effective manner; they did not possess enough men to engage any of the invading columns. However, Tiberius decided to exploit the fact that Baian had shown willigness to retain peace with the Romans in return for cash payments. Therefore he suggested that Baian would lead his Avars against the Slavs. Baian in his turn was eager to do that because the invaders included Slavs that had refused to recognize him as their overlord. The Slavs in question lived north of the province of Scythia on the other side of the Danube where the Antae had lived at one point in time. Their leader was Daurentius, under whom were a number of other chieftains. The idea was to make a diversionary invasion so that the invading Slavs would be forced to return home. Baian agreed and Tiberius dispatched John, governor of the isles (quaestor exercitus) and praetorian prefect of Illyricum, to assist the Avars. John travelled to Pannonia and ferried 60,000 armoured horsemen across in large transports to the Roman territory. From there Baian crossed into Illyricum and thence to Scythia where his horsemen recrossed the Danube in double-sterned ships. Once across, the Avars torched the Slavic villages and fields and drove and carried away everything they could. The Slavs did not attempt ro resist but fled into the woods. The Avars were still able to release tens of thousands of Roman captives, which they then duly returned to their homes.107 The fact that the Slavs renewed their invasion later means that the diversionary invasion was a success: they evacuated Roman territory and retreated back to their own lands in 578.

3.3.  JUSTIN II THE INSANE EMPEROR 565–78 Justin II is one of those emperors of whom one is hard pressed to find anything good to say. But he can’t have been all bad if he managed to rise to the throne. It is clear that he knew how to form alliances with like-minded persons who supported him. This was no mean achievement when there were other far better qualified candidates for the throne. His supporters must have consisted primarily of those who thought like him. In other words, his supporters consisted of those who thought that it was unworthy of the great

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126  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Roman Empire to pay any money to the barbarians in return for peace and who thought that the best defence was to be constantly on the offensive. Justin and others like him did not understand what such a policy meant in practice, or what sort of resources it demanded. I do not underwrite the usual claim that the Roman Empire would have lacked the necessary resources, because it was able to restore the situation with far fewer resources by 602. The reason for the failures lies solely in the decisions made by Justin II, the Empress Sophia, and their flatterers. They did not understand the strategy, and they did not understand that they would need much larger military forces than they possessed to be constantly on the offensive. Justin and his followers did not make any of the necessary preparations even for such plans as they had, while they systematically created enemies everywhere by their refusal to pay tribute/ protection money, and by making innumerable other mistakes. Excluding the insults levelled at barbarians, the most important of the mistakes made by Justin II and Sophia were the insulting of key figures like Narses the Eunuch; the attempted assassination of Alamundarus; the sacking of Marcianus just when he was about to capture Nisibis. Among his better decisions was the appointment of Tiberius II as Caesar and then Augustus, although it is probable that this was primarily the result of intervention by his wife Sophia. In short, Justin II was not only clinically insane but also practically insane in his policies. He almost destroyed the Empire and very nearly undid everything that Justinian and Belisarius had achieved.

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Chapter Four

Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)

Tiberius Nominated as Augustus in September 5781 In September 578 the death of Justin II was nearing and it was therefore decided to secure Tiberius’s position in advance by appointing him Augustus, which Justin did on 26 September 578. Once this took place, Tiberius no longer felt it necessary to follow the wishes of Sophia and he brought his wife Ino and children to the Palace and nominated Ino as Augusta which was then confirmed by the demes. Since Ino was a pagan name, the demes demanded a Christian name for her. The Blues wanted to change her name to Anastasia while the Greens wanted to call her Helena. Tiberius opted for Anastasia. When Justin then died on 4 or 5 October 578, Tiberius made it clear that there was only one ruler. Sophia was not happy about this, and she started to hatch plots against Tiberius, but she was not the first to devise a plot to assassinate Tiberius. It was Justinian the son of Germanus who as a member of the imperial family felt that he had a stronger case for being Emperor, as he certainly did. After the burial of Justin, Justinian and populace expected that Tiberius would go to the Hippodrome as was the custom. Therefore, Justinian placed assassins in the Hippodrome in the expectation that Tiberius would arrive, soon to be declared Augustus. Tiberius, however, went to the holy shrines where he prayed, after which he returned to the Palace in the company of the Patriarch, prefects and consulars. He was dressed in the imperial garb and crowned with the diadem, and took his seat on the throne while those present acclaimed him Emperor (and so once again it had been the Senate and the Patriarch who had central role in the crowning of the Emperor, but this is not surprising in light of the fact that Tiberius was already Augustus). When the acclamations were heard by the would-be assassins, they understood that their

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128  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 plans had come to naught and they withdrew. A few days later Justinian came to court, threw himself on the ground and begged for his life in return for fifteen centenaria of gold. Tiberius pardoned him and asked him to take his residence in the Palace, undoubtedly because it was easier to put him under surveillance that way. Sophia, however, decided to exploit this. When Tiberius then went to his country estates to enjoy the wine harvest for a month, she secretly summoned Justinian to her quarters where she hatched a plot to make him the ruler. Tiberius heard of the plot and returned to the Palace at the double, pardoned Justinian again, deprived Sophia of her retinue and put her under house arrest. After this Tiberius suggested a matrimonial alliance: Tiberius’s daughter would marry Justinian’s son and Justinian’s daughter would marry Tiberius’s son2 – but nothing came of it. This suggests two possibilities. Firstly, that Justinian informed Tiberius of Sophia’s plot and because of this Tiberius suggested the marriages. This is the likelier alternative. Secondly, that Justinian’s movements within the Palace were closely observed and Tiberius was therefore aware that Justinian had visited Sophia’s quarters.3 Tiberius’s grand strategy As Emperor, Tiberius’s first strategic priority was the ending of the war with Persia on terms that he found acceptable. All other fronts came second in his plans but, with the exception of the Balkans, they were not entirely neglected. Tiberius not only continued his massive recruiting drive among the Germanic and other peoples, but also recruited natives. This is clear from the recruiting conducted by Maurice in 577–8. It is clear that the same policy was also followed in the next years because the army constantly needed new recruits. Tiberius’s aim was to build such a large army that it could defeat the Persians and ultimately the rest of the enemies the Romans were facing. He knew that numbers mattered. He had money but not enough soldiers. Events in Spain and North Africa show that some of the new soldiers Roman money had bought were either sent there or kept in these locations after recruitment had taken place. The best evidence for this is the offensives that the Romans began in Spain and North Africa under Tiberius. In these cases it is clear that it was the Roman army that was on the offensive. However, in Italy and Gaul Tiberius followed a different strategy. His representative Pamphronius undoubtedly did buy the services of some Lombards, of which some would have remained in Italy, but most were sent to the east. The former, however, were not sufficient for the beginning of an offensive against the Lombard duces. Thanks to the embassies dispatched by the Franks to Constantinople it was possible to plan a different strategy in which the Romans and their Frankish helpers would try to get rid of their king, Guntram, so that the other Frankish kings could support the Romans both in Italy and Spain. This involved many stages of plotting and changes of allegiances, but in the end the fruits of this Machiavellian policy became evident under Maurice.

Gaul and Italy under Augustus Tiberius II in 578–824 The year 578 was important for the Romans because it was then that the Frankish King Chilperic dispatched his envoys to Constantinople. These diplomatic manoeuvres took place against the continuing wars in Gaul. In 578 Chilperic continued his campaigns and subjected Bretagne/Brittany under his rule, but then made a mistake by imposing

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  129 heavy taxation throughout his kingdom that caused serious discontent by the next year. The embassy to Constantinople proved a success, but according to Gregory of Tours the envoys returned to Chilperic only three years later in 581 because they feared to land in the port of Marseilles while Chilperic and Guntram were at war – Guntram held a half of this city. Instead they landed in Visigothic territory (allies of Chilperic at the time) where they were shipwrecked. However, they still managed to bring back to Chilperic the most important gifts of Tiberius, together with a sizable gift of gold coins. Tiberius had clearly been pleased with the idea of alliance and was ready to spend money to secure it. He needed Frankish soldiers in Italy and for his eastern wars. According to John of Biclar, the Romans had waged a really disastrous war against the Lombards in 578. Therefore it is not surprising that in 579 the situation had become so desperate in Italy that the Senate of Rome and the Pope sent a joint embassy to Tiberius to ask him to defend them against the Lombards. The Emperor faced a difficult situation. The wars in Armenia and the East required all the available men. And there were other troublespots: the most important of these was the Balkans; others were North Africa, Spain and Egypt. Regardless, Tiberius despatched a small force from those available to him and made every effort to win over to the Roman side some of the Lombard duces and other leaders with gifts and promises. The effort proved a success. Large numbers of Lombard chiefs accepted the bribes and changed sides, thereby improving the Roman position both in Italy and the East.5 This also gave the Romans the chance to resume the offensive in Italy if they could also get the Franks to act as their allies. However, it is clear that sending a small force to Italy meant that Tiberius weakened the defences in the Balkans even further, just when the enemies were about to launch the largest invasion in this area since the days of Justinian. In the meantime, while the envoys of Chilperic were in the east, important new developments had taken place in Spain and Gaul. Visigothic King Leovigild had obtained Childebert II’s sister in marriage for his son Hermenegild in 579, after which he had concluded a de facto alliance with Chilperic in 580, sealed with Chilperic’s promise of his daughter in marriage to Reccared, the son of Leovigild. The Suevi, the enemies of Leovigild, were attempting to conclude an alliance with Guntram in 580, but these envoys were captured by Chilperic’s operatives. In fact, the alliance bore fruit immediately because the armies of Leovigild and Chilperic attacked the Suevi from two directions in 581, but with differing results – Chilperic’s army was destroyed while Leovigild was victorious. Another important development was the death of the remaining sons of Chilperic and Fredegund, which paved the way to the conclusion of the alliance between Chilperic and Childebert II against Guntram in 581,6 which was sealed with the adoption of Childebert II as son and successor of Chilperic. This treaty was sealed while Childebert’s tutor Gogo was still alive, but he died soon after this so that his successor as tutor and nutritor of Childebert II was Wandelen.7 It was at the latest in 581 that Mummolus and Guntram Boso, the duces of King Guntram, started working for the Austrasian Franks. Next year we find all of these parties, Neustrian and Austrasian Franks and the duces Mummolus and Guntram Boso, working on behalf of the Romans. On the basis of this it is probable that Roman diplomacy and money were working in the background, so it would not have been only Chilperic who received money from the Romans. I would suggest that the Italian patrician Pamphronius,

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130  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 who had been given about 3,000 pounds of gold (ca. 426,000 solidi) in about 577–8, had put the money he had been given to good use, in addition to which obviously came the money that Tiberius had sent to Italy in 579 as a result of the Italian embassy. The strategic aim of these diplomatic manoeuvres was clearly to produce circumstances in which the Franks could be used as allies against the Lombards, and the Romans certainly needed allies in Italy because the Lombards were continuing their ravages; even Naples was put under unsuccessful siege by the Dux of Beneventum Zotto in 581.8 In other words, the Romans followed the same strategy as had been used by Justinian during his Italian campaigns (see MHLR Vol.6). In this case it included the neutralization of the Burgundian King Guntram, who was not an ally. The alliance with Childebert II enabled Chilperic to seize Périgueux and other cities from Guntram in 581. Guntram responded with operations in 582, but when Chilperic planned to invade Guntram’s territory in revenge, Guntram managed to avoid the invasion by paying a hefty compensation for the damages. This means that both Chilperic and Childebert II were Roman allies in 581–2, but the operations in Spain were complicating the situation. As discussed in another chapter, Childebert’s sister had been married to Hermenegild, but he had raised a revolt against his father in about 579 and the Romans were helping him. This was problematic because in 580 the other Roman ally, Chilperic, had allied himself with Leovigild by promising to give his daughter in marriage to Reccared. The Roman response to the problem was to betray Hermenegild to his father in 582 while capturing his wife and child as hostages to put pressure on Childebert II to invade Lombard-held territory in Italy, which then took place during the reign of Maurice in 584. Some time between 578 and 582 Guntram Boso, one of the duces of King Guntram, visited Constantinople on a secret mission, which he appears to have done on behalf of Childebert II and Queen Brunhild against his own King Guntram (GT HF 6.24, 6.26, 7.34, 9.28, 9.32). Since Childebert II and Chilperic concluded an alliance in about 581 (GT HF 6.1, 3, 11) the likeliest date for this would be 581, but the problem with this is obviously the claim of King Guntram in 582 that it had taken place a few years ago. If the latter is true, then the plans had been in motion for a long time and were likely to have resulted from Roman diplomacy and money. Guntram Boso invited the Frankish refugee Gundovaldus/Gundovald to Gaul to claim his inheritance as a son of the late King Lothar/Chlothar.9 Tiberius agreed to this plan because he not only allowed Gundovald to return but also gave him treasure with which to buy allies. The likely reason for Tiberius’s readiness to support such an operation would have been that Guntram was the only Frankish king who was not allied with the Romans. On top of this, ever since ca. 574 he had maintained peaceful relations with the Lombards. If the Romans could overthrow Guntram with the help of the plotters, Childebert II could invade the north of Italy on behalf of the Romans without having to fear what Guntram might do. However, Guntram Boso was not the only plotter: he had as an accomplice some unnamed dux with whom he shared his loot in 582. On the basis of subsequent details it is clear that this dux was Mummolus. Mummolus had fled to Avignon in 581, and it is clear that Guntram’s agents had become aware of his treacherous plans. It is also clear that both of these duces had formed a secret alliance with the Austrasian Franks of Childebert II who in his turn was an ally of the Romans.10

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  131 Modern historians have presented several theories for the call of Gundovald to Gaul. The principal ones are: 1) Brunhild, the widow of King Sigibert, sought a new husband to rule with her; 2) the plotters aimed to overthrow Chilperic; 3) the plotters aimed to place Gundovald on the throne with the aim of uniting the entire realm under him; 4) to raise Gundovald as King of Aquitaine; 5) the idea was to depose Guntram and replace him with Gundovald. My own view is that the likeliest of these was the toppling of Guntram. This was sought by both the seniores of Austrasia and by Brunhild, the latter in order to marry Gundovald. In short, Brunhild had her own reasons to invite Gundovald which were not in contradiction with the interests of her son Childebert II. It is this version that receives most support from the account of Gregory of Tours. He records Guntram’s suspicions regarding the course of events and I find those suspicions well-founded. According to Gregory of Tours, Guntram accused one of the seniores of Austrasia called Ebregisel of having advised Brunhild to marry Gundovald and overthrow Guntram with his help. Goffart has opposed this interpretation because such a marriage would have possibly weakened Brunhild’s position11 and because in his opinion Gregory of Tours shows Guntram’s suspicions to rest merely on his own paranoia.12 This is obviously not conclusive. It is actually quite probable that King Guntram’s suspicions were wellfounded even if he was unable to find confirmation of them. After all, Gregory’s account still proves that Guntram was always so well informed of activities in the Austrasian kingdom that he was able to know in advance of the arrival of envoys and why they had been dispatched. Furthermore, as we shall see, it is clear that Guntram had precise knowledge of the role of Guntram Boso in these events and of the motives behind his actions. Such detailed information could have come only from a double agent or double agents placed inside the Austrasian court. Therefore, it is likely that King Guntram had good grounds for his suspicions. In short, my opinion is that Guntram had good reasons for all of his suspicions because the actual events on the ground support such conclusions. Brunhild had her own reasons to invite Gundovald, and they were not in contradiction with the interests of her son. It was then in 582 that Gundovald arrived in Gaul. He landed at Marseilles in the part held by Childebert II – the other half was in the hands of Guntram – and was received by Bishop Theodore. Theodore was party to the plot and therefore received Gundovald with open arms and provided him with horses so that he could travel to Avignon where Mummolus resided. Guntram Boso, however, arrested Bishop Theodore and accused him of an attempt to subjugate Gaul under the Romans. Then Theodore produced a letter which had been signed by Childebert’s most important leaders to prove that he had not acted on his own. Does this mean that the Romans had bribed important members of the Austrasian court to overthrow the Franks? In my opinion this sounds unlikely because the Romans were in no position to conquer Gaul. However, it does receive support from the fact that we find Bishop Theodore later involved in the murder of Chilperic. If Bishop Theodore had like-minded men in the Austrasian court they could theoretically have succeeded if they first overthrew King Guntram by replacing him with Gundovald and then murdering both Childeric (as happened in 584) and Childebert II. After this they could have killed Gundovald and declared their loyalty to the Roman Emperor. This would certainly explain why one of the key plotters in Burgundy, Guntram Boso, suddenly turned against Gundovald. The other possibility is that Guntram Boso and Mummolus

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132  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 just decided to exploit the opportunity and loot the money brought by Gundovald and then explain it by claiming that Gundovald was acting as a Roman puppet. The third alternative, the likeliest (discussed in detail below), connects this change of goals with the changes that had taken place in the alliance structures in Visigothic Spain and Gaul. Whatever the truth, Guntram Boso suddenly abandoned the original plan and pretended that he was now acting on behalf of King Guntram. Guntram Boso then took Theodore – and another bishop, Epiphanius of Fréjus, a refugee from Lombard-held Italy – before King Guntram. Both were accused of having plotted with the Romans, but when King Guntram interrogated them he found them not guilty. However, both were still imprisoned, and Epiphanius died while in custody.13 After this, Guntram Boso went to meet Mummolus and Gundovald in Avignon. Guntram Boso and Mummolus duly looted from Gundovald the enormous treasury of money given by the Romans and divided it amongst themselves. Then Guntram returned to Clermont-Ferrand while Gundovald withdrew to an island to await further developments. The island in question must have been in Roman hands, because only the Romans could provide him with a safe place of refuge. Following this, Guntram Boso visited the court of Childebert II, apparently either to explain or report his actions. Goffart has suggested that it was then that Guntram Boso brought 50,000 solidi from the treasury of Gundovald so that the Austrasian Franks would then attack the Lombards. I do not find this convincing. Gundovald’s treasury was meant for his own use to usurp power from Guntram. We are here dealing with two different instances of the Romans providing the Franks with money for different purposes. The Romans gave Childebert II 50,000 solidi in return for the invasion of Italy, and the ‘enormous treasury’ for Gundovald to finance his overthrow of King Guntram.14 When Guntram Boso then returned to Clermont-Ferrand to stay with his wife and daughters, he was arrested by King Guntram who laid the following accusations before him: 1) Guntram Boso had invited Gundovald to Gaul; 2) Guntram Boso had gone to Constantinople on a secret mission a few years ago. King Guntram was clearly aware of the movements of his dux Guntram Boso. Guntram Boso defended himself by claiming that it had been Guntram’s commander Mummolus (this implies some sort of reconciliation between Mummolus and Guntram after Mummolus’s flight to Avignon) who had received Gundovald and shown him hospitality in Avignon. Guntram Boso promised to deliver Mummolus into Guntram’s hands if he released him. The king, however, wanted to punish Guntram Boso for the wrongs he had committed. But Guntram Boso managed to dissuade him by promising his son as hostage. After this Guntram Boso collected his own forces from Clermont-Ferrand and Le Velay and advanced to Avignon. Mummolus was aware of the approach and had devised a stratagem to kill Guntram Boso and his men. He had tampered with the boats on the River Rhône so that when Guntram Boso and his men were midway across the boats sank. Some of the men drowned, but Guntram Boso and most of his men managed to swim to the opposing shore and reach the vicinity of Avignon.15 Mummolus had improved the defences of Avignon, digging a shallow channel from the Rhône so that the entire circuit of the city was now protected by the river and walls. This new section of the river was fordable, but Mummolus had dug deep pits into the riverbed as booby-traps. When Guntram Boso reached the scene, Mummolus suggested

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  133 that he cross with some of his men to meet him. When they did so, one of the closest friends of Guntram Boso fell into one of these traps and sunk because of the weight of his chainmail. It was only with the greatest difficulty that one of Guntram Boso’s men was able to save this man by stretching out his lance. Mummolus and Guntram Boso exchanged insults and then returned to their men. After this, Guntram Boso began a full scale siege with the help of troops provided by King Guntram. When Childebert heard of the siege, he was angry because he had not given Guntram Boso permission to do it. So Childebert dispatched Gundulf with a relief force against the besiegers. When Guntram Boso heard of his approach, he raised the siege and fled. Gundulf and Mummolus appear to have pursued him as far as ClermontFerrand. A few days later Mummolus returned to Avignon. This appears to have taken place in early 583. Also that year Chilperic and Childebert renewed their alliance against King Guntram.16 This begs the question, why did the duces Guntram Boso and Mummolus suddenly betray Gundovald when their secret employer Childebert II was still fighting against Guntram? Besides the two alternatives already mentioned there was a third one which was connected with the alliance structures in Gaul. In this case the change of plans would have been caused by two developments that took place in 581–2. As noted by Goffart (e.g. p.9), the first of these was the birth of a son, Theoderic, to Chilperic and Fredegund so that Chilperic no longer needed Childebert as heir. The second was that Childebert II, or rather his caretaker government, learnt of the betrothal of Chilperic’s daughter with Reccared from the Visigothic envoys that visited the Austrasian court (GT HF 6.18). It should be remembered that this took place against the background in which Reccared’s brother Hermenegild was married with the sister of Childebert II. In addition to this, the Austrasian Franks must have known that Chilperic had abandoned his campaign against Guntram in 582 and had settled their differences in return for a payment of money (GT HF 6.19), not to mention the general distrust towards Chilperic because it had been he and Fredegund who had assassinated Sigibert. In other words, Chilperic now had an heir and he had also concluded an alliance (Leovigild) and a truce (Guntram) with the enemies of Childebert. In such circumstances it is easy to see why Childebert’s court and their allies among the duces of Guntram would choose to rethink their goals. It was not necessarily wise to attempt to overthrow Guntram in a situation in which he could be needed against Chilperic, especially so because Guntram was still without an heir. Furthermore, it is probable that the original plan had consisted of an attack by Chilperic, which had been abandoned (GT HF 6.19), and of the revolt of Gundovald, which would have been supported by the rebel duces and Austrasian Franks. The absence of the former part of the operation would in all probability have sufficed for the abandonment of the latter – the conspirators could easily have thought that they would be left alone without any help. The above and the chapter below show that the plotting was so thick in the kingdoms of Francia and Gothia that it was difficult for the Emperor to react to them in a timely manner from his capital. The situation had already changed by the time his plans could be put into effect. However, it is still clear that the Romans got from the Franks what they wanted: soldiers for their wars and occasional interventions in Italy. It was Maurice who reaped the fruits of this policy.

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Visigoths and Romans under Augustus Tiberius in 578–8217 In 579 Leovigild made a diplomatic coup by obtaining Childebert II’s sister (the daughter of King Sigibert of the Austrasian Franks) as wife for his son Ermenegildus/ Hermenegild/Hermangild. The wife’s name was Ingundis and she was also the daughter of Brunichildis/Brunhild who was the daughter of the Visigothic king Athanagild/ Athangild and Gosuintha/Goisuintha, the second wife of Leovigild. In other words, Ingundis was the granddaughter of Gosuintha. Ingundis was 12 years old and staunchly Catholic. Despite her young age she wielded power far beyond what one would expect from so young a girl. When the bride arrived the second wife of Leovigild Gosuintha attempted to force her to convert to the Arian Sect, but in vain, with the result that Gosuintha lost her temper and beat Ingundis. At the same time Leovigild sent Hermenegild into his own domains around Seville, which were located right next to the domains controlled by the Romans. This proved to be a mistake because once there Hermenegild came under the influence of a Catholic monk called Leander, the older brother of the Chronicler Isidore of Seville. It was then thanks to the influence of Leander and Ingundis that Hermenegild converted to the Catholic faith in 579 and raised the flag of revolt together with the faction controlled by his stepmother Gosuintha. It is not too difficult to seek the reason for the revolt. The founding of Reccopolis was a sign that Leovigild favoured his younger son Reccared. The reason why Gosuintha fomented the revolt is not known. Perhaps she just hated her second husband. Hermenegild presented himself as a victim of Arian persecution and concluded alliances with the Romans, Suevi (who were also Catholics), local Roman magnates, and the Frankish relatives of his wife. Hermenegild dispatched an envoy to Constantinople to seek help from the Emperor Tiberius. The fact that the Romans were invading Spanish lands in 582 proves that he was successful (Gregory HF esp. 5.38 with 6.18, 6.40, 6.43, 8.18, 8.28).18 The first measures of Leovigild were to strengthen his own position. He convened a synod of Arian bishops in 580 to find a compromise formula to satisfy both the Catholics and Arians which ended up satisfying no-one, just like all of the previous attempts. In addition to this, Leovigild concluded an alliance with Chilperic, one of the kings of the Franks (Gregory HF 6.18ff.), which could be used as a counterbalance against the Austrasian Franks of Childebert II, but the alliance between Chilperic and Childebert in 581 made this option theoretical. Regardless, both rulers, Chilperic and Leovigild, continued their negotiations until the death of Chilperic in 584. In 581 Leovigild marched against the Basques, who were apparently allied with his rebellious son, and captured a part of Vasconia and founded a city called Victoriacum (mod. Vitoria). In my opinion, we should probably connect the 581 attack against Vasconia by Chilperic’s dux Bladastes/Bladast (GT HF 6.12) with the alliance formed between Leovigild and Chilperic. In other words, these two rulers invaded Vasconia simultaneously from two directions, but with differing results because Bladast lost most of his army. However, the distraction provided by Bladast was still a success from Leovigild’s point of view because this enabled him to conquer a part of Vasconia. At the same time as these events took place, Leovigild apparently negotiated with his son, but in vain, so Leovigild assembled all his forces for an invasion. John of Biclar (53–5) claims that Leovigild merely assembled his forces in 582 and that his attack took

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  135 place in 583, but on the basis of Gregory of Tours it is clear that Leovigild actually began his operations against his rebel son during the reign of Tiberius in 582. Leovigild’s first act was to bribe the generals of Tiberius with 30,000 pieces of gold (see below) to desert Hermenegild after which he attacked the city of Merida (ancient Emerita), which he captured in 582 (Gregory HF 6.18). The capture of Merida cut off Hermenegild from his Suevi allies. Of particular importance is the fact that Gregory of Tours (HF 5.38, 6.18.) states that the Romans were actually invading Visigothic territory while Tiberius was still in power. I would suggest that the reason why the Romans were able to start an offensive in Spain had resulted from the recruiting drive of Tiberius. According to Evagrius 5.14 and Theophanes AM 607419, Tiberius recruited 150,000 horsemen in about 575 and 15,000 horsemen in about 578/9, not to mention the recruiting of Lombards and Franks with the money given to Pamphronius in about 578/9. It was thanks to this continual recruiting of soldiers that the Romans possessed enough men to conduct offensive operations as far as Spain. Some of these men were clearly sent there or had stayed in their place of recruitment.20 Reccared was in no position to start the offensive against his son when he was forced to defend himself against the invading Romans. This is how matters stood at the end of the reign of Tiberius II Constantinus.

North Africa and Egypt under Tiberius in 578–82 The sources do not record any military activity in North Africa from about 573 until 578. This doesn’t mean there wasn’t any – there was certainly endemic banditry in the area. Our sources are not complete, and those that we have are not detailed enough to draw any definite conclusions. The next conflict in North Africa recorded by the sources took place in 578. According to John of Biclar, it resulted from the appointment of Gennadius as Magister Militum Africae and re-appointment of Thomas as Prefect. Tiberius was seeking to re-establish Roman dominance in the area.21 It was then that Gennadius, the Magister Militum of Africa, pillaged Moorish lands, and defeated in battle King Garmul, who had killed Theodore, Theoctistus and Amabilis. John claims that Gennadius killed Garmul with a sword, which may imply that Gennadius followed the heroic example set by John of Troglita22 and killed Garmul in person, possibly in a duel or in battle. It is quite probable that Tiberius had sent some of the newly recruited ‘barbarians from Europe’ as reinforcements for Gennadius in North Africa and that these reinforcements then enabled him to begin the offensive against the Moors. The reason for this suspicion is that the Roman offensives usually took place only when reinforcements had been sent there from elsewhere. This, however, does not preclude the likelihood that Gennadius also strengthened his army through regular recruitment/conscription of locals. If Tiberius also sent reinforcements to Africa, as is likely, then this would certainly have also contributed to the dearth of men available for the defence of the Balkans against the massive hordes of Slavs and Avars after 578.23 The probable transferral of forces to Africa suggests that in late 577 or early 578 Tiberius still trusted that the Avars would keep the peace and that the Avars would protect the Balkans against the Slavs as their foedus with the Romans required. This was a calculated risk. Tiberius appears to have thought that the Slavs and Avars counterbalanced each other. He played for time and transferred

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136  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 troops from one theatre to another on the basis of risk assessment. This time his plan appears to have been to conclude peace with the Persians and then transfer those forces to the Balkans. The military success of Gennadius gave the Romans the opportunity to strengthen their hold over Africa and the improvement of its defences. Tiberius built a series of new fortifications. The one at Iunci Sofiana was completed already when Justin II was alive so it represented defensive measures taken before the resumption of the offensive. The new fortifications that were built after the Moors had been defeated consisted of those at Aïn el-Ksar, Mascula Tiberia, Anastasiana (Hr. Sguidan) and Tubernuc. In short, Tiberius was following traditional Roman defensive policy in which the territories were secured by building new fortifications with garrisons in them.24 The account provided by John of Nikiu (95.1–21) of the exploits of Aristomachus during the reign of Tiberius II prove that the change in the power relationships in the Red Sea/Nile area after 570 resulted in renewed troubles on the southern border of Egypt, the first evidence of which is the wall building activity on the island of Philae recorded for the year 577. We do not know exactly when Aristomachus received his command or what position he held – all we know is that he was appointed to this position during the reign of Tiberius II (578–82). According to John of Nikiu, Aristomachus overstepped his authority and forced all the other officers and troops to obey his orders. It is probable that he was one of the duces of the Diocese of Aegyptus (for details of the defensive organization of Egypt, see the reign of Phocas in MHLR Vol.8), none of whom was superior to the others. Nikiu’s account also suggests that Aristomachus collected a sizable force of bucellarii on his own authority (proved by the fact that his men did not obtain regular annona) and that he built boats that he then used for travel in Egypt to enforce the orders of the Emperor in the course of which he overstepped his official authority by forcing other duces to obey him. He also posted cavalry forces in Nikiu without the authorization of the Emperor Tiberius. This overstepping of authority resulted from a war against barbarians in which Aristomachus had shown himself fearless, bold and successful. As already discussed, the change in the balance of power in the Red Sea theatre brought about by the Persian conquest of Yemen resulted in regional troubles for the Romans. The PLRE3 has on the basis of John’s account made the suggestion that Aristomachus probably held the position of dux et augustalis Thebaidis which means that Nikiu was outside his jurisdiction when operating in Nikiu, but other offices are also possible because the PLRE3 made this suggestion solely on the basis of Aristomachus’s command of the forces in Nubia during the reign of Maurice. Since there was no official arrangement for the provisioning for the cavalry in Nikiu, they took from the locals what they needed. The result of this was that both high and low ranking persons levelled complaints against Aristomachus. Tiberius dispatched Andreas to Alexandria with orders to capture Aristomachus without violence. Tiberius also ordered all of the forces in Egypt to obey Andreas and assist him in the war against the barbarians. This obviously means that there was fighting during the reign of Tiberius and that Aristomachus had taken command over all the armies without authorization, as the complaints made clear. Andreas set out to achieve his goal through a stratagem. He asked Aristomachus to meet him and the Patriarch (whose presence was meant to lull Aristomachus into a false sense of security) in the

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  137 name of the Emperor in Alexandria. Aristomachus did not suspect anything. After all he had performed his duties well, so he went to meet Andreas, who had prepared a light vessel near the shore. When Andreas and Aristomachus then walked towards the seashore to celebrate the festival of St Mark the Evangelist, Aristomachus was apprehended by the attendants and soldiers of Andreas and thrown into the waiting vessel, after which Aristomachus was taken to Constantinople. Tiberius interrogated Aristomachus for a few days and found no fault in his conduct. So Tiberius restored Aristomachus to his command and dispatched Aristomachus back to Alexandria where ‘all the people loved him’. On the basis of what happened next, I would suggest that Aristomachus was given a large command which encompassed all of Egypt, Libya and Tripolitania. In other words, I would suggest that he was given officially the command that he had misappropriated on his own authority. It is possible that he held the title Exarch. If so, it would have been Tiberius who first created this office thanks to the bravery of Aristomachus. Alternatively Aristomachus held some other title, for example strategos autokrator (dux imperator), that gave him overall command of all the forces in the area. Once back in his ‘own command’, Aristomachus continued the war against the barbarians with great success. Andreas had obviously held this position while Aristomachus had been away. This fighting appears to have taken place either at the very end of Tiberius’s reign or at the very beginning of Maurice’s, because Aristomachus subsequently explained his actions to Maurice. In the words of John of Nikiu (95.13, tr. by R.H. Charles, 1916): ‘And he exhausted the barbarians in the province of Nubia and Africa, who are named Mauritanians, and others named Marikos (Mazikos). He destroyed them and laid waste their country, and took their possessions as booty and brought them all in chains by the river Gihon (Nile) in the land of Egypt, for the engagement had taken place on the banks of the river.’ This means that Aristomachus defeated both the Nubians in Nubia and Moors in Africa. The Moors in Africa suggests that Aristomachus had also fought in Libya and/or possibly in Tripolitania because those areas were under his jurisdiction.25 On the victory on the banks of the Nile: it is possible that the Moors had united their forces as a confederacy, as they did once in the early fifth century, and had advanced east (see Vol.3) before being defeated by the Nile; but I would still suggest that it is likelier that the victory on the banks of the Nile referred to the victory over the Nubians, while the victory in Africa meant victory over the Moors.26 It is possible that the trouble with the Moors coincided with the operations of Gennadius and should be connected with it, while the fighting with the Nubians proves that the disruption in the trade networks caused by the Persian conquest of Yemen had resulted in renewed trouble with the Nubians – this trouble cannot be connected with the christianization policies of Justinian, because the troubles started only when the Persian invasion had resulted in the change of power relationships in the area. In fact, in my opinion, it is entirely possible that the Persians had fomented the trouble with suitable bribes and promises. The account of John of Ephesus (4.5–11, 4.49–53) gives us the likely identity of the Nubians that Aristomachus faced during the reign of Tiberius. According to him, the Empress Theodora had dispatched Julianus/Julian to the Nobadae/Nobatae with the result that they converted to the Monophysite creed. This work had been continued by Theodorus/Theodore and then after him by Longinus. In about 574/5 the king of the Alodaei/Alodia/Alwa sent envoys to the king of Nobadea/Nobatia in which he asked

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138  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 him to send their bishop Longinus to them to convert them as Christians. However, it was just at that moment that Longinus received letters from Alexandria which requested him to go there. Longinus returned to Alexandria in about 574/5. Some time after that the king of the Nobadae asked Longinus to return, which Longinus answered in the affirmative. The Alexandrians who opposed him sought to prevent this by sending a letter to the Emperor in which they asked the ruler to depose him from his bishopric, which the Emperor refused to read. This means that the imperial policy was to allow the Nobadae to retain their Monophysite faith because it was clearly advantageous for the Romans to divide the different Nubian groups. When Longinus then returned to the Nobadae, the king of the Alwa sent another letter to the king of the Nobadae, requesting him to send Longinus to them. When the Alexandrians learnt of this they sent two of their Orthodox bishops to the Alodaei with a letter condemning Longinus. This did not work. The Alodaei wanted to be baptized by the same man who had baptized the Nobadae as Monophysites. Longinus saw immediately how advantageous it would be for him to baptize the Alodaei and agreed to the request made. The king of the Nobadae was not happy, but provided adequate escort and guides for Longinus. The route was blocked by the Makuritai/ Macuritae Nubians. These had been converted by the Romans into the Chalcedonian sect in about 568.27 It was because of this that the king sent Longinus to the Blemmyes so that they would conduct Longinus to the Nubian kingdom of Alwa by using a circuitous route further inland. According to John of Ephesus, the Macuritae had learnt of this, so they posted guards both at the mountain passes and plains as far as the ‘sea of weeds’.28 Longinus, however, was able to avoid being caught thanks to the circuitious route taken, but he lost his retinue of camels and other beasts of burden in the desert. This took place in 580. The key piece of evidence in the above account is the hostility of the Chalcedonian Macuritae against the Monophysite allies of Rome, the Nobadae of Nobatia. It implies that the Nubians who attacked Roman-held Egypt were the Macuritae (Nubians of Makuria), which in turn implies that the Macuritae had defeated the Nobadae of Nobatia after 580.29 This in its turn dates Aristomachus’s defeat of the Nubians and Moors to 581/3. It is ironic that the Monophysites of Nobatia were fighting for the Roman Empire against the Chalcedonians of Makuria when the latter sect was the one favoured by the imperial court.

Peace negotiations with Persia in 578–9 Tiberius exploited the great successes achieved by strategos Maurice in 578 by making another attempt to conclude peace with Persia. He desperately needed to transfer the Roman armies to the Balkans because the Slavic invasion in 578 had proved that he could not trust the Avars to keep the area pacified. He had been forced to transport the Avars from their abodes to the Slavic lands in order for them to create a distraction for the Slavs who were invading Roman territory.30 He understood that Roman dependence on the goodwill of the Avars was fraught with danger. Therefore, he was eager to achieve a peace in the east. As a gesture of goodwill he returned many of the Persian prisoners-of-war, in particular those of high birth, which included several relatives of Chosroes. After this he

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  139 sent the imperial physician Zacharias together with spatharius Theodorus31 as his envoys to Chosroes. Both were given more exalted status to improve their standing as envoys. Zacharias became ex-prefect and Theodorus strategos (i.e. honorary magister militum). Tiberius’s peace proposal was that the Romans would return Iberia, Persarmenia, and the fortress of Aphumon together with Arzanene, in return for the city of Dara. Meanwhile the badly humiliated Chosroes had come to the conclusion that it was in his interest to make peace. He had already dispatched Ferogdath (Ferogdatês) as his envoy. When he reached Constantinople, Tiberius dispatched a message for his envoys to wait until he had concluded his negotiations with Ferogdath. Tiberius presented the same terms to the envoy and stated that he had two or three months to conclude the peace. Tiberius knew that if the conclusion of the peace took any longer, the delay would mean that the Persians were in truth preparing for war. Therefore he dispatched Maurice to the east roughly at the same time so that the Roman armies would be prepared for whatever took place.32 According to Menander, the Persians would have concluded the peace on the terms suggested if Chosroes had lived, but he died in about February/March 579 and was succeeded by his son Hormizd whose first objective was the securing of the throne.33 This entailed the killing and blinding of relatives who could pose a threat, and the demonstration of manly qualities in the form of fighting. Hormizd also sought to stem the power of the magnates, massacring 13,600 nobles and magian clergy, while he sought support from the petty nobles and those members of the magian clergy who wanted to persecute the Christians – the last of these obviously hindered negotiations with the Romans and Persarmenian rebels. Therefore Hormizd stalled the negotiations by making it difficult for the envoys to present their case quickly. During the negotitiations Mebod claimed that Maurice’s successes had resulted only from Tamkhosro’s retreat to Armenia. In other words, Mebod accused Tamkhosro of the failure of his attack in Mesopotamia. Since he was the higher ranking of the two, his view carried the day. Tamkhosro was sacked and replaced by Varaz Vzur. The Roman envoys were under house arrest in difficult conditions for three months, after which their return was made as long and difficult as possible. When both envoys became seriously ill, the Persians finally allowed them to return by the most direct route. The Persians used the intervening time to store supplies in Nisibis and Dara, and for the raising of the army. This policy had been advised by Mebod, the chief negotiator and astabadh (equivalent of magister officiorum). When Tiberius learnt this, he ordered Maurice to prepare for war, assisting him in every possible manner. According to Menander (fr. 23.9), the most important of these was the fact that now the army had received its salaries and was therefore well-disposed to Maurice and Tiberius; but this was only half the truth because from John of Ephesus (6.28) we learn that the Armenian army had not received its salaries in the spring. The prioritizing of the Persian front meant the neglect of the Balkan front. The death of Chosroes had come at a really bad time for the Romans. Had he lived, the Romans could have transferred the bulk of their forces against the enemies that emerged in 579.

The troubled Balkans in 578–8234 The campaign the Avars had fought on behalf of the Romans in 578 had demonstrated to them the weakened state of the Roman Empire. It was simply unacceptable for the Avar

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140  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Khagan that he could not provide his followers with the rich pickings available in the Roman Empire while the Slavs who opposed his rule were doing so.35 As horse-mounted people, the Avars faced one serious problem: they could not cross the Danube as easily as the Slavs because they were not as skilled in woodworking as them. The Romans had to ship them across the Danube in the summer of 578 so they could conduct a campaign for them. Baian resorted to a stratagem. According to John of Ephesus, Baian asked Justin II to provide him with Roman artificers and masons to build him a bath. He then used these men to build a bridge over the Danube. This appears to have taken place in late summer/autumn 578 because earlier in 578 the Avars had not been able to cross the Danube without Roman help. In 579 the Khagan Baian continued his pretence of being an ally of the Romans by dispatching Targitius as his envoy to Constantinople to receive the agreed yearly payment of 80,000 nomismata. This gesture fooled the Romans; they were entirely unprepared for what happened next. The fact that Targitius was able to return safely with the gold and merchandise means that the Slavs had not yet started their invasion of Roman territory which is recorded for this year by Menander and John of Biclar.36 One may guess that this took place in early summer and was then the reason why the Avars could claim to have come to assist the Romans as they had in 578. It is also probable that Baian exploited this invasion to his advantage. He knew that the Romans with their small numbers of men available could hardly pose a threat to the Avars when they already faced Slavic invaders in Thrace, Greece and Illyricum.37 The Slavs in question were the same as had invaded Thrace in 577–8, which means that there were at least 100,000 of them invading Roman territory at this time. What is notable about this invasion, which is not stressed enough by Menander, is that according to John of Biclar the Romans expelled the Slavs from Thrace. This means that Tiberius had enough units to protect the immediate vicinity of the capital, at least when the invaders had scattered in different directions as the simultaneous invasions of Greece and Illyricum suggest. We also know that the Slavs who had invaded Greece and Illyricum were no longer on Roman soil in 580 because they repeated their invasion only in 581. Unfortunately we do not know what it was that convinced them to leave. It is possible that it was the defeat the Slavs had apparently suffered in Thrace; or the Romans defeated these too; or that the Slavs had just gathered enough booty and wanted to return home. Baian was afraid of the Roman navy, so he made a surprise attack while employing a series of stratagems to delay the Roman response in 579. He also collected all the ships he could lay his hands on in Upper Pannonia and built huge troop-transports, which were not built according to shipwrights’ standards but in whatever way they could. Baian put as many soldiers and oarsmen he could on them and then sent the vessels down the Danube (Danuvius) past Singidunum while he marched his army on land to the River Save (Savus) to the spot where he intended to build a bridge. The Roman strategos at Singidunum Sethus threatened that he would not allow the Avars to build a bridge over the Save without the Emperor’s permission. The Khagan called his bluff. Baian knew that Sethus lacked the resources to stop him. But he still decided to play for time, probably because he knew that his hastily-built navy with its inexperienced rowers and sailors was vulnerable if the Roman fleet attacked. Therefore, he claimed to have come to assist the Romans against the Slavs as in the previous year, and demanded that the Romans ship his

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  141 men across the Danube just as they had in 578. Sethus and the Romans in Singidunum knew this was just an excuse, but they thought that they had too few men and ships left to engage the Avars. According to Menander, many of the Roman dromons were absent because the Avars had surprised the Romans. In my opinion it is quite probable that they had been sent downstream against the Slavic homelands to create a diversion. Baian appears to have known this because he now played another psychological trick: he threatened the Romans with military action if they interfered. So, the Romans agreed to allow Baian to send an envoy to Tiberius if Baian swore a solemn oath that he would not attack Sirmium. This Baian did, and he used the time he had bought well: he ordered his entire army to build a bridge before the Emperor could learn of it. When the Avar envoys reached Constantinople, the Emperor Tiberius was not fooled by the Avar excuses that they had come to help the Romans against the Slavs and that the Romans should provide them with ships to cross the Danube. Tiberius faced a problem. He had trusted that the Avars would maintain the peace, and Sirmium was unprepared for a long siege. Tiberius had not placed adequate supplies in it. Furthermore, Tiberius did not possess even a tiny force with which to engage the Avars. The Slavic invasion tied up the remaining Roman forces. So Tiberius acted as if he trusted the Avars, but warned them that the Turks had occupied Cherson in the Crimea and that they might threaten them from behind. The Avar envoy saw through the pretence, but stated that he would convey the warning to Khagan Baian – he was one of those who favoured war with the Romans. Tiberius gave the envoy presents, a small escort of soldiers, and sent him on his way. When the envoy was crossing into Illyricum, he was killed by the Slavs who were raiding the area. This means that the Slavs who inhabited the lower Danube had by this time advanced into Illyricum. However, it is also possible, as Pohl (85) suspects, that the Romans got rid of the unwelcome ambassador by claiming that he was killed by the Slavs. Whatever the truth, the Khagan had already dispatched another envoy, whose name was Solakh (Solachos). He reached Constantinople a few days later with the message that the Avars had now completed the bridge over the Save and that the Avars had now cut off the city of Sirmium from access to Roman supplies. The Avars demanded that the Romans evacuate the city and hand it over to the Avars. As regards the tribute payments, the envoy stated that the Avars were satisfied with them and demanded nothing more. The envoy excused the Avars’ behaviour by stating that Baian feared that the Romans would turn against the Avars once they had defeated the Persians and that they could use Sirmium as their bridgehead. Baian was also well aware that in the past the Romans had enticed many peoples into their territory with gifts only to destroy them shortly afterwards. He did not want the same fate for his people. It is clear that Baian fully understood how the Romans operated – they were completely untrustworthy as allies and masters – and that his only chance of survival was to exploit any Roman weakness. Tiberius was simultaneously angry and griefstricken. His answer to the Avars was that he would rather betroth one of his two daughters to the Khagan than surrender Sirmium. After this he organized the defence of the city as well as he could. But he had no soldiers available to him. He had already given every available soldier to the embassy that had arrived from Italy in 579, and simply had none left. So he sent strategoi (generals), hegemontes (probably both duces/dukes and comites/counts38), and lochagoi (tribunes39) to enable the city garrison to defend itself. Some of these men reached the

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142  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 city via Dalmatia, others via Illyricum. It is probable that these officers did not only bring with them their military expertise but also their retinues of bucellarii, and that was what was most important in this case. These could easily have consisted of thousands of elite soldiers – the state may have lacked soldiers but the individual officers had their own. The arrival of the Roman officers with their military retinues from both Dalmatia and Illyricum demonstrated to the Khagan that he needed to block those routes too. So in 580 he built a second bridge over the Save, clearly somewhere between Sirmium and Drina (Dreinos), and within sight of Sirmium (reason for this given below). Now the city was blocked from all directions and the Avars settled on starving it into surrender. Therefore in 581 the Avars dispatched another embassy to Tiberius with the same demands. This time it was Tiberius who temporized, to buy time to put into effect his plans. Tiberius had decided to make a multifaceted concerted effort to destroy the bridges so that the city could be relieved. His plan consisted of three elements. Firstly, he tried to entice the Lombards and other tribes against the Avars. Secondly, he instructed the strategos Theognis (possibly MVM per Illyricum) to recruit an army against the Avars – it should be noted, however, that it is possible that Theognis was actually subordinate to Narses, see next. Thirdly, Tiberius acted as if he was willing to accept the Avar proposals. With this in mind, Tiberius dispatched gloriosissimus cubicularius et (?proto-) spatharius Narses (also sacellarius in 565/74) as his envoy to the Avars probably in autumn 581,40 having dispatched another envoy in advance to inform the Avars of the arrival of Narses. Tiberius’s instructions for Narses were that he should prolong the negotiations as much as possible. His secret orders for Narses were that he was to take command of the Lombards and others if they arrived on the scene and then he was to destroy the Avars completely. For this Tiberius gave Narses a sizable army (presumably recruited locally plus some units drawn from the forces guarding the imperial capital and possibly also from the east) and plenty of gold. This was not enough for the patriotic Narses: he added his own gold to the play and recruited more men for the army. The whole force and all the valuables were loaded onto ships. It is probable that Tiberius decided to send these men on ships because it was during this same year that the Slavs invaded the Balkans again. Most of the gold and valuables were placed on a single ship, which was commanded by one of Narses’s chief officers and protected by a special guard of eunuchs (undoubtedly spatharii). This vessel sunk on the very first day of the trip, but Narses learnt of it only when he reached the mouth of the Danube. Narses was grief-stricken and contracted a serious disease which proved fatal. This paralyzed this part of the plan. The second part, namely enticing the Lombards and other tribes to attack, also failed. This meant that the Romans could use only the army collected by Theognis for the relief of the city. If he advanced from Illyricum, then he probably used the Drina to ship supplies and men, but if he was a subordinate of Narses, he sailed first along the Danube to the Save where he then stopped at the islands of Casia and Carbonaria (see the accompanying map). This latter option is in my opinion the likelier because it would be strange if the army had not sailed on after the death of Narses. As noted above, the Slavs of the Lower Danube repeated their devastating invasion of Roman territory in this year, 581. According to John of Ephesus, the Slavs overran the whole of Greece, the country of the Thessalonians, and all Thrace. They captured, devastated and burnt the cities and forts and enslaved the populace until they became

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144  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 masters of the whole country and settled in the lands they had occupied. According to John of Ephesus this was still the situation at the time of his writing in 585. It was this invasion that made it necessary for Narses and his army to travel in ships to the Danube, and it was because of this that the Romans could initially use only the forces that Theognis had managed to recruit and conscript locally in Illyricum.41 It was probably in 582 that Theognis led his newly recruited army against the Avars, when he reached the islands of Casia and Carbonaria (unknown, probably islands in the river Save shown on the above map). This proves that Theognis’s army was on board ships, which makes it probable that Theognis had joined Narses’s fleet, but this is only a guess. The Avars proposed negotations. Theognis agreed. Baian rode to the scene, dismounted and took his seat on a golden throne which had a double-layer of linen above it. His guards held shields like a defensive wall in front of his chest and face so that the Romans could not assassinate him with arrows. Then Theognis and his retinue arrived and took their places a short distance from Baian. Baian declared that the Romans should give up the city because its supply routes were blocked from both sides. Theognis replied that Baian should prepare for battle because he would offer him one the next day. This was the end of the discussions. The two sides departed. The Romans and Avars fought for three days inconclusively. However, it is possible to make some important observations about this combat on the basis of Menander’s text. Menander rightly accuses Solomon, the commander at Sirmium, of cowardice and lack of military skills because he did not attempt to destroy the poorly-built bridge that blocked the route to Dalmatia when the Avars under Apsikh had abandoned it and gone to the other bridge to bring help to Baian’s contingent. This means that Theognis had been successful in his combat against Baian, despite having few men of whom a large number were recent (green) recruits. This demonstrates how effective the Roman infantry, even small numbers of them, could be against an enemy that relied only on cavalry – and it is likely that most of the men who were on board the ships consisted of footmen. The sources do not provide us with any details of the battle, but in the light of the length of the battle it is probable that the Romans used a hollow infantry square from which their cavalry made sorties against the Avars. The reason for this conclusion is that the Avars used only cavalry and the hollow square was the standard defensive combat formation the Romans used in most cases when they had to face enemy cavalry in open terrain.42 The square shape was next to impossible for the cavalry to break up as long as Roman morale held; this resulted in long battles. When it then became clear after a battle that had lasted for three days that Theognis could not defeat the Avars, and failed to destroy the bridges, he abandoned the attempt and informed Tiberius: Theognis did not have enough men and the situation in Sirmium was desperate; the populace had resorted to cannibalism. When Tiberius learnt this, he instructed Theognis to end the war if the Khagan would allow the inhabitants of the city to leave with only one cloak and their lives. Baian accepted this, but added that the Romans must pay him the tribute that they owed from the past three years and, most importantly, he demanded that the Romans return to him one of his subjects who had committed adultery with his wife. Baian made it absolutely clear that the last mentioned was the most important of the terms: he would not make peace unless this fugitive was returned to him. The man in question was the Avar Shaman Bookolabra, a man about

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  145 whose exploits we will hear more during the reign of Maurice. Theognis responded that it was impossible to find a single fugitive who had decided to hide because the Roman Empire was so large; he might even be dead. Baian accepted this excuse but demanded the Roman leaders swear an oath that they would search for him diligently and if they found him they would hand him over to Baian. The Romans were also required to inform the Khagan if the man had died. This was the end of the war. When the Avars entered the city and saw the misery, they felt compassion for the victims and brought them food and wine – but many ate too much and died. After this, the inhabitants and soldiers were evacuated, and the Avars not only took possession of Sirmium but even settled in it. However, they were nomads and not city dwellers. They did not know how to live in a city. Most importantly, they did not organize a fire brigade. In late 583 or in 584 the city was completely destroyed by fire. The Avars did not know how to prevent the spread of the fire – they were barbarians. The nomadic Avars did not understand the importance of maintenance work either. The wooden bridges had collapsed by 588. Therefore the Avars had to abandon their hard fought conquest not long after they had conquered it. As noted by Pohl (86) the loss of Sirmium was a very serious blow to the Romans. Its importance was not only strategic but also psychological. Its strategic significance has been overestimated, because the Avars had been able to penetrate as far as Thrace even before they gained possession of Sirmium, but it was valuable as a symbol: it was the furthest outpost of the Empire in the Balkans. In the words of Pohl: ‘It symbolized the emperor’s readiness to defend a fortress on the border.’ The loss of Sirmium led to the collapse of morale in the other cities and forts in the Balkans.

The Persian Front in 579 We possess two sources which tell us what happened after the negotiations between the Romans and the Persians broke down. These are Theophylact and John of Ephesus. Many modern historians follow Michael Whitby and dismiss the traditional dating based on Theophylact and claim that the campaign that he describes took place in 580.43 The reason for such a claim is that the negotiations would have lasted the whole year because Hormizd delayed the Roman envoys. This is an assumption which is not backed up by the sources. Theophylact (17.1–4) dates Maurice’s campaign against the Persians precisely to the summer following the enthronement of Hormizd. This is also implied by Menander (fr.23.8–9) who states that Maurice was sent to the east at the beginning of the spring in 579 with orders to be ready to begin military operations if the new Persian ruler did not agree to conclude peace within two or three months. The delays that the Persians devised did not last long. Menander states that the Roman envoys left the Persian capital after they had spent three months there, returning in the summer. Even with delays the return trip is unlikely to have lasted more than two to three months at most.44 Therefore it is clear that Theophylact’s dating is correct – after all, his account is based on period sources. The Romans started their operations in late summer 579. When Maurice had the information he needed, he started his operations. The texts of John of Ephesus and Theophylact show that there was fighting on both main fronts. According to John, in the north the Romans were commanded by two generals

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146  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 (stratelatai) John/Ioannes Mystacon/Mystakon and Kours (Cours, Curs, Kurs).45 On the basis of John’s text, Kours may have been the strategos and John the hypostrategos, but this is uncertain because John’s source was clearly either Kours himself or someone who revered him (e.g. a veteran from his army). It is also possible that both John Mystacon and Kours were two independently operating magistri who cooperated in Armenia, but I would still consider it more likely that one of them was the superior with the title of Magister Militum per Armeniam. The Persians had used well the extra delay of perhaps two months that Hormizd had managed to obtain. They had gathered 50,000 soldiers in readiness to advance against the Romans. On the basis of Sebeos (p.11), the Persians were commanded by Varaz Vzur. We do not know the overall size of the Roman army because John mentions only the contingent that served under Kours. It was 20,000 strong, which means that the Romans were probably not greatly outnumbered by the Persians. However, the Roman commanders faced a far more serious problem: their soldiers refused to fight. They had not received their full salaries – had their salaries been embezzled by their officers? When Tiberius learnt of this, he sent Domnizolus/Domtzolus, the Curator of the Royal Palace of Hormisdas. He provided him with a large sum of gold and orders to appease the soldiers. Once the arrears had been paid the soldiers were once again ready to fight, and none too soon because it was then that the Persian marzbans sent a message to the Roman stratelatai saying (JE 6.28, tr. by Smith, 438): ‘Why do we thus sit opposite one another like women? Let us come forth into the plain, and fight with one another.’ Both armies clearly consisted of cavalry. The stratelates Kours saw an opportunity in these words – after all, he had been trained in the wars of Narses the Eunuch. His answer was that he did not have his entire army with him and was therefore unwilling to advance against the Persians, but if the Persians would come to him, he promised to fight them. The Persians accepted the challenge and advanced to a distance which enabled Kours to launch a surprise attack: ‘And that same day Curis [Kours] quietly prepared only his own division [This suggests that he also had the authority to arm John’s division. But it is not certain. It is entirely possible that the two men were equal in rank or that John was actually the superior of the two. It is possible that Kours only sought glory and booty for himself], which consisted of about twenty thousand men, and at night, just before daybreak, he set out, when they [the Persians] in their camp were resting and sleeping without care, and fell upon them, like fire that is left in the wood, and as the flame which burneth the mountains: and struck them with terror and panic, and put them to the sword, or made them prisoners, except a few who escaped. Among the prisoners were a Marzban, and his son. He further spoiled their camp, and returned in great triumph, bringing with him their arms and horses.’ JE 6.28, tr. by Smith, 439 with my comments in parentheses.46 This means that Kours had almost annihilated the entire Persian army of 50,000 horsemen with his 20,000 horsemen. There is one problem with this however, which is that Sebeos (p.11) claims that the Persian Marzban Varaz Vzur fought a battle in Vanand at the village of Utʻmus (unknown), where he was at first defeated, but was then victorious. Sebeos also claims that Varaz stayed in office for only a year, after which he departed and was

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  147 succeeded by the great Parthian (this refers to the Parthian branch of the Arsacids) and Pahlaw (this refers to the Persian branch of the Arsacids) Aspet (cavalry commander). This man was clearly a high-ranking noble, a reflection of the importance of Persarmenia in Persian overall strategy. According to Sebeos, the Aspet conducted a victorious campaign in Shirakawan (Shirak) and stayed in Persarmenia for seven years. Now it is difficult to reconcile this information with what is in the text of John of Ephesus, but we should prefer John’s version in this case for three reasons: he was a period author who used eyewitnesses as his sources; Sebeos’s account is very condensed and sometimes unreliable; Varaz stayed in office only for a year. Varaz would have been appointed when Mebod dismissed Tamkhosro so his capture by Kours would have taken place roughly a year after this. It is quite possible that Sebeos or his source has confused the victory of Aspet in Shirak the next year with the events of the preceding year. It was soon after this that the Roman stratelatai in Persarmenia received a Persian visitor. According to John of Ephesus (6.29),47 Chosroes had sent his favourite son into hiding because he knew that the Persian ‘Senate’ (i.e. magnates and magi) opposed his appointment as next ruler – this shows how limited the powers of the Persian ruler were. Rumours of this travelled as far as the Roman Empire. The Persian visitor claimed that he was this man and promised to hand over Hormizd to the Romans if they gave him an army. The Roman stratelatai believed him because he was accompanied by many Persians who confirmed the story. So they sent him to Tiberius. The Persian man was escorted with royal pomp to Chalcedon. Tiberius ordered him to stay there to be examined. The Persians had dispatched an embassy under a Persian ‘Spatharius’ to Tiberius to discuss terms of peace, presumably in late 579 or early 580, and Tiberius now dispatched them to meet the man who claimed to be their ruler – the presence of these envoys shows that their defeats had convinced the Persians to resume peace negotiations. The Persians claimed that he was an impostor, and the Spatharius pulled his hair and threw him to the ground. For John of Ephesus this confirmed that the man was an impostor, but in my opinion this confirmed him as ‘the real McCoy’ for Tiberius. Tiberius duly gave the fugitive prince a place to reside and granted him an allowance of three talents, and the prince duly converted to Christianity. I would strongly suggest, in spite of the fact that none of the sources say so, that the arrival of this Persian man was the reason why Maurice attempted to reach the Persian capital next year. The idea was to install this Persian man on the throne, who was indeed likely to be the Persian prince he claimed to be. Further south, Maurice formulated his strategy for the campaign year 579. This is what we find in the text of Theophylact. Maurice collected his forces. He dispatched Romanus, Theodericus, and Martinus as an advance guard across the Tigris to pillage the interior of Media, and followed them into Persia. The Romans pillaged the most fertile lands of the Persians in Media and spent the whole summer season in the systematic slaughter and destruction of Persian territory. Theophylact fails to state which route Maurice and his subordinates took. This leaves open several possibilities. It is possible that he invaded with the whole army, in which case he must have left behind some soldiers to keep an eye on the Persian garrisons in Dara and Nisibis. In this case he either marched past these soldiers into Media or he marched behind them from Arzanene across the Tigris and then to Media. If it was only the three subordinates who pillaged Media, then Maurice would have remained behind with the main army with which he tied up the Persian garrisons

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at Dara and Nisibis. He would have achieved this by staying somewhere close to these cities, for example in Mesopotamia, or Arzanene, or Corduene, while his subordinates pillaged the interior of Media. Whatever the truth, the campaign was a great success and Maurice was able to feel satisfied with the results when he returned to Roman territory to spend the winter in Caesarea in Cappadocia where he probably recruited more men for the major campaign that was planned for next year. The plan was to invade the Persian heartland and capture Ctesiphon. It is probable that the aim was to install the fugitive Persian prince on the throne.

The Persian Front in 580 Alamundarus’s exploits in early 580 Tiberius invited the Ghassanid sheik Alamundarus (Mondhir/al-Mundhir) to Constantinople in late 579 with the idea of heaping honours upon him. Tiberius knew that the Romans needed Arabic support if they hoped to achieve what he had in mind, which was to march to Ctesiphon through the deserts to install the fugitive Persian prince on the throne. Therefore he gave Alamundarus the royal crown (see above p.100), the right of which had never before been granted to any Arabic chieftain. He also gave him gold and silver, magnificient dresses, saddles and bridles of gold, and armour. Alamundarus also had demands of his own: he intervened on behalf of the Monophysites. Firstly, he asked the Emperor to release the imprisoned Alexandrian clergy, which the Emperor granted. Secondly, he asked Tiberius to stop all religious persecution, which Tiberius

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  149 promised too. When Alamundarus then began his journey back and reached Antioch, he ordered the patriarch to stop the persecution, and the patriarch immediately sent letters to this effect. When the Diaphysites (followers of the Chalcedonian doctrine) in the capital learnt of this they complained in vain to Tiberius.48 Then bad news arrived: the Saracens in Persian service were seeking to exploit the absence of Alamundarus. They and their Persian allies were about to attack the territories held by Alamundarus’s sons and brothers. But Alamundarus was too fast for them. When the Saracens and Persians had arrayed their army for combat, Alamundarus made a surprise attack and slew most of them. This implies that Alamundarus attacked his enemies from the flank and/or behind just when the two sides – the sons and brothers of Alamundarus and the Saracens and Persians – were arrayed against each other in battle formations. The tribesmen of Alamundarus were certainly aware of the imminent arrival of their sheik, so the positioning of the armies opposite each other had the enemy in the ideal place. The arrival of Alamundarus was therefore a moment of great joy for his relatives: he had saved them while obtaining glory and booty at the same time. He was welcomed royally into the capital.49 However, then arrived another piece of bad news for Alamundarus. The Orthodox churchmen had not kept their promises to Alamundarus – once back in Alexandria Damianus started to act against the Monophysites both in Alexandria and elsewhere. Damianus sent new letters to Syria and other places to invalidate the letters that the Patriarch of Antioch had sent on behalf of Alamundarus (these letters had carried the orders to end the persecution of Monophysites). When Alamundarus learnt of this treachery he became very sorrowful,50 and no wonder: Justin II had attempted to murder him and now Tiberius had not prevented the persecution of his fellow religionists as promised. And all this took place when he would soon have to join Maurice in a campaign against the Persian heartland. Maurice’s operations in 580 51 Maurice’s campaign plans for 580 consisted of three elements: 1) He intended to march to Ctesiphon via the bridge that crossed the Tigris with the aim of installing the Persian furtive prince on the throne (my guess); 2) On the basis of Chronicle 1234 (74, p.165) Alamundarus commanded a separate contingent of Arabs and Romans, which I interpret to mean that Maurice had ordered him to keep an eye on the Persians at Nisibis and Dara; 3) Maurice ordered the Persarmenian army to attack Dubius (Dvin) and Iberia. Maurice prepared a fleet of grain transports on the Euphrates to support his operation and marched to Circesium where it probably joined the expedition.52 I would suggest, contrary to the prevailing view, that it is unlikely that Alamundarus joined the main expedition as claimed by John of Ephesus and Theophylact because this explains the claim of Menander that it was the disobedience of Maurice’s subordinates that caused the failure of Maurice’s own campaign – the false impression that both Alamundarus and Maurice advanced together to ‘Babylonia’ would have resulted from the fact that both had invaded Persian territory while only one of them, Maurice, advanced further south. The Roman army under Maurice advanced quickly and easily to where the great bridge over the Tigris was expected to be, probably because the Persians had concentrated most of their men in Mesopotamia and Persarmenia, but then came a nasty surprise. The Persians

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150  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 had destroyed the bridge when they had learnt of the invasion. John of Ephesus claims it was this that caused Maurice to abandon the campaign. According to him, Maurice was extremely irritated and accused Alamundarus of treachery. He claims that Maurice suspected that Alamundarus had warned the Persians in advance so that they had been able to destroy the bridge. John of Ephesus states in no uncertain terms that in his opinion this accusation was false, but it is easy to see why Maurice could have entertained such thoughts. Firstly, Maurice, like most Romans, considered all Arabs to be treacherous bandits. Secondly, he was undoubtedly aware that Alamundarus felt cheated because Tiberius had not fulfilled his promises of putting a stop to the persecution of Monophysites. But I am inclined to agree with John of Ephesus that it is unlikely that Alamundarus betrayed the plans – the Persians would have been aware of it anyway soon after the Romans crossed into Persian territory at Circesium. However, I would suggest that John of Ephesus’s account is purposely distorted to deflect guilt from his fellow Monophysite. I fully agree with Michael Whitby (1988, 273) that there is another far more important reason for the abandonment of the campaign when Maurice reached the crossing point of the Tigris. The cutting of the bridge was not a problem for Maurice. He could have used his ships and built a pontoon bridge. The real reason for the abandonment of the campaign was that his lines of communication were threatened by Adarmahan, the Persian commander at Nisibis, which Theophylact is quite correct in stating. In contrast to Michael Whitby, I connect this with the disobedience of Alamundarus. This explains far better what happened than John of Ephesus’s text which is too partial to his fellow Monophysite. On the basis of Menander’s accusation that Maurice’s subordinates failed to obey his orders and put him in mortal danger, and on the basis of Chronicle 1234, it appears probable that Alamundarus did not accompany Maurice during his thrust south as claimed by John of Ephesus, but had been posted further north somewhere near Callinicum with his Arabs and Roman reinforcements. However, true to his offensive spirit, Alamundarus was unwilling to remain at his stations and invaded Persian territory on his own initiative and marched south where he then besieged the fort of Anatha. According to this text, the Arabs and Romans attempted to capture the place by using boats, but the Persians defeated this attack with ballistae. It was when the Arabs and Romans were still besieging Anatha that Adarmahan launched his diversionary invasion of the now defenceless Roman territory and threatened Maurice’s route of retreat. Adarmahan invaded and raided the territory around Constantia and Resaina (Theodosiopolis), and then destroyed Oshroene, the territory around Edessa. Then he marched to Callinicum on the Euphrates, thereby threatening the line of retreat of both Alamundarus and Maurice. It was clearly this disobedience of Alamundarus and the diversionary invasion of Adarmahan as stated by Theophylact that caused Maurice to abandon his campaign – the destruction of a bridge would not have hindered the Roman, who had a fleet at his disposal. Maurice torched his grain ships and marched on the double back north. There are now two alternatives for what happened next. Firstly, there is the version in Chronicle 1234 which states that when Alamundarus learnt that Adarmahan had advanced against Callinicum, he hastened there. Alamundarus then inflicted a defeat on Adarmahan on Saturday, but the night put a stop to the fight. According to Chronicle 1234, on the Sunday morning, when the armies were arrayed for

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  151

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152  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 battle, Adarmahan sent a message to Alamundarus stating that they should postpone the fighting until Monday because it was wrong to fight on a Sunday. The Romans agreed to this, which then enabled Adarmahan to extricate his army from a difficult position. According to Chronicle 1234, the Persians used an old stratagem to achieve this, which was to light the lights in their camp and then flee into the darkness of the night. It is not surprising that the exhausted Romans were unable to catch the fleeing Persians. En route to Nisibis, Adarmahan pillaged the monastery of Qartmin. I would consider this version the likelier: it would have been Alamundarus who hastened back as fast as possible to correct his own mistake before Maurice. This also explains why the Romans failed to defeat Adarmahan decisively in the first battle. It is difficult to see how the combined forces of Maurice and Alamundarus would not have defeated their heavily outnumbered foe immediately, but it is easy to see why Alamundarus with his far fewer men had not achieved this. If Maurice had then reached the scene after the first battle, the postponement of the fighting until Monday would have made sense for both: for Alamundarus, he was a devout Christian; and for Maurice, his forces had marched through the night and were probably exhausted and welcomed the postponement too. In this case it would have been both Maurice and Alamundarus who received the letter, as claimed John of Ephesus – this would reconcile the sources – but it is also possible that Alamundarus received the letter alone and was awaiting the imminent arrival of Maurice and his main forces and was therefore happy to postpone the fighting. The second of the versions, which is in Theophylact, John of Ephesus and Bar Hebraeus, is that it was Maurice who engaged Adarmahan at Callinicum.53 This means that Alamundarus accompanied Maurice during his ‘Babylonian campaign’ or that it was during his retreat that the enraged Maurice met Alamundarus at Anatha and then ordered him to follow. There are several problems with this. It is entirely possible that the condensed account of Theophylact credits Maurice with the victory that caused the flight of Adarmahan while in truth it had been achieved by Alamundarus. Secondly, John of Ephesus does not even mention a battle. He only states that when Alamundarus and Maurice had returned from Persian territories, they were wearied after their journey and therefore agreed to postpone the battle until Monday. It is easy to see that leaving out the battle between Alamundarus and Adarmahan on Saturday enabled John of Ephesus to leave out the details concerning Alamundarus’s exploits which are mentioned by Chronicle 1234, which in its turn enabled him to lay the blame for the failures solely on Maurice. Whatever the truth, in both versions Adarmahan was then able to extricate his army from the predicament and flee to Persian territory. The Monophysite John of Ephesus chose to reprimand the Romans and presumably Maurice for this failure – in his account it was not the disobedience of Alamundarus that caused the defeat. John notes that the Romans had 200,000 soldiers who ate at the Emperor’s expense but were unable to prevent Adarmahan from pillaging and then from fleeing from Roman territory. This and his earlier comments make it possible to calculate the size of the Roman armies in the east: the Persarmenian army had 120,000 men and the Mesopotamian army 200,000 for a total of 320,000 for the entire east. This figure is well in keeping with the other evidence that we have. Procopius (Wars 6.28.10, 6.28.17) implies that the Roman Empire had more than 500,000 men in 540 before Justinian allowed its size to diminish, while Agathias stated

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  153 (5.13.7) that the earlier emperors had 645,000 men before Justinian let the number fall to 150,000. It is clear that the recruitment campaigns of Tiberius and Maurice were not the only ones that took place during the war years when each commander would have sought to enrol into their depleted units anyone they could. Therefore the Romans could have attained the figure of 320,000 men by filling the ranks most of which would obviously have garrisoned cities and forts. But when one also considers the larger recruiting campaigns of Tiberius (150,000 foederati and 15,000 Tiberiani) and Maurice (the recruiting of natives) this becomes certain. And we should not forget that the native Armenian forces consisted of feudal levies, which means that they could be commanded to contribute more men than they regularly did. The above, however, has made one thing clear. It was the disobedience of the subordinates that led to the disasters of 580, as stated by Menander. This was not the end of fighting in this southern section of the frontier. The Persians had meanwhile collected their Saracen allies, which they had strengthened with a division of the Persian army. Their target was the territories of Alamundarus and their aim was to exact revenge. The Persians failed to appreciate the effectiveness of Alamundarus’s network of spies among the Arabs. Alamundarus learnt of this immediately and was able to collect his followers for a surprise attack. He surprised the invaders and only a few escaped; the rest were killed or captured. Alamundarus exploited his success by advancing directly to al-Hirah (Hira), which he again pillaged and burnt. This victory undoubtedly saved Alamundarus for the moment because, according to John of Ephesus, Tiberius reconciled Maurice and Alamundarus with each other by using middlemen. This, however, proved short-lived. According to John of Ephesus (6.19), it was then that two pious monks of Arabic origin arrived from the Antioch built by Chosroes I. Their message was that there were 30,000 Roman prisoners in the city with only 500 Persian guards, and if the Emperor would just send one Roman general to the scene the Roman prisoners would kill their Persian guards and return to Roman territory. According to John, these men were dispatched to Tiberius by the Roman generals at the border, but Tiberius paid no attention to it, which is not surprising in light of the failures of 580. The failure of the ‘Babylonian’ expedition in 580 was not the only failure that Maurice faced in that year, and not the only one which resulted from the disobedience of his subordinates. According to Menander, Maurice had ordered his generals to advance against Dvin and Iberia, but this plan also failed thanks to the disobedience of generals. We do not have any details of this, but the fact that the new Persian Marzban, the Aspet (commander of cavalry), defeated the Romans in Shirak (Sebeos 9/71, pp.11–2) suggests that the Roman commanders did not advance against Dvin as ordered by Maurice, but apparently tried to march directly to Iberia and were caught by the Persians while attempting this. According to Menander, the name of the Persian commander who achieved this victory was Azarefth (clearly the name Azarethes in Procopius, which may mean the Hazaraft rather than Asparapet). Among the booty taken were 800 white horses which the Persian commander then displayed in a triumph.54 The probable reason for the disobedience of the Roman commanders was that they had learnt that the Persians had bribed some of the Iberian feudal lords to change sides. This conclusion depends solely on the trustworthiness of the very untrustworthy Georgian Chronicles which not only confuse rulers with each other but which can also

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154  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 misplace events.55 However, in this case the text does correspond with the circumstances. Therefore there is reason to believe that Hormizd did indeed dispatch his son Chosroes (Chosroes Parwez/Khosro Abarwiz/Abarwez, the future ruler) to Albania with orders to bribe Albanians and Iberians to the Persian side, and the success of this mission caused the Roman generals to forget their orders. Michael Whitby (1988, 273, n.50) suggests a possibility that we should identify the Great Parthian and Pahlaw Aspet (commander of cavalry) who defeated the the Romans in Shirak with Chosroes Parwez. This is a distinct possibility if we assume that the Azarethes/Azarefth was the acting commander while Chosroes served as its figurehead commander – the title of Aspet would not be a problem here because it was the title meant for the ruler of Persarmenia, Iberia and Albania in this case. The Persian Empire proper had its own Aspet drawn from the ranks of the magnate families to keep them happy. However, I am inclined to agree with Howard-Johnston and Tim Greenwood (Sebeos Vol.2, 166–7; Sebeos Vol.1, p.12, pp.14–5) that the Parthian and Pahlaw Aspet/ Asparapet/Sparapet (commander of cavalry) meant a member of the Suren family who was the father of Chosroes Parwez’s mother and of Vndoy (Bindawayh/Bindoes) and Vstam (Bistahm/Bestam/Bistam). He served in Armenia from 580 until his recall in 586 when Hormizd had him killed. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the grandfather and grandson served in the same area. It is possible that the killing of the Aspet soured the relationship between father Hormizd and son Chosroes. I connect Menander’s fragment 26.6 (taken from Exc. de Sent. 45) with the immediate aftermath of the failed ‘Babylonian’ and Persarmenian expeditions. This fragment states that Maurice fell into despair because the Persians had defeated him. This had not bothered him while he was busy leading his armies, but severe depression hit as soon as he had the chance to relax and reflect. He rehearsed helplessly over again and again what he could have done differently to prevent the disaster. This proves that not only was he a normal human being but also a conscientious commander prepared to learn from his mistakes. The obvious reason for the failures was the disobedience of the subordinates, as stated by Menander, and it was this that made it difficult for Maurice to see what he could have done differently.56 Once Maurice had got over the worst of his depression, he returned to the capital to spend the winter there. It was there that he accused Alamundarus of the failure of the campaign. It is clear that the plans for the following year were discussed at the same time by Emperor Tiberius, Maurice and advisors. They involved another attempt to conclude peace with Persia. The failure of the bold attempt to capture the Persian capital convinced the Roman high command to change their strategy; the aim was now the conclusion of an honourable peace with Persia. As we have seen, the Persians had also been putting out feelers regarding this possibility in late 579.

The Persian Front: The Battle of Constantia or Monocarton in June 58157 The peace negotiations continued in 581 and at the beginning of the summer the two sides agreed to meet at the current border between the two. The Romans were again

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  155 represented by Zacharias the Sophist, but the Persians had a new negotiator, Andigan, because the previous negotiator, Mebod, was now at the royal court. Zacharias made Mardis his headquarters while Andigan rested at Dara. Tents were set up midway between them by the Roman protector of the borders (a rank in the imperial bodyguards); he was in charge of organizing the meetings. Both sides were represented by Christian bishops, the Persians by the Bishop of Nisibis and the Romans by the Bishop of Constantia. Both sides had also assembled their armies close by, ready to engage the enemy if the negotiations broke down. Maurice was at Monocarton near Constantina/Constantia (Tella) while, according to Menander, Tamkhosro had encamped by the river Mygdonius near Nisibis. Adarmahan served as Tamkhosro’s second-in-command. These two locations had access to both water and fodder and were therefore ideal for the cavalry armies that both used. The Romans, however, faced a problem. The quarrels between Maurice and Alamundarus had boiled over, resulting in open disobedience by Alamundarus. He refused to join Maurice’s army. Maurice undoubtedly had other Arabs in his forces, but their numbers were insignificant without Alamundarus’s men. According to Menander the negotiations broke down again because the Persians demanded the yearly payments agreed by Justinian while Tiberius was unwilling to accept this under any circumstances. However, John of Ephesus claims that it was actually Marzban Tamkhosro’s fault that the negotiations broke down. He promised shahanshah Hormizd that he would defeat the Romans and they would winter at Antioch. Hormizd then sent him to take command of the army, despite the fact that there were several other

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156  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 high ranking generals and officials present. John also claims that the Persians immediately besieged Constantia (Tella) and that it was because of this that the Romans attacked him. On the basis of Menander this seems improbable – the two sides met somewhere close to Monocarton (on the road between Nisibis and Tella) and there was no siege. When the negotiations broke down Zacharias wrote immediately to Maurice and told him to advance to the plain before Constantia to fight a battle against the Persians, while Tamkhosro advanced there from Mygdonius. The fact that the city of Monocarton lay on the road leading from Nisibis to Constantia suggests that the battle was fought very close to Monocarton rather than close to Constantia. We can learn all the necessary details from the texts of Menander, Evagrius, John of Ephesus and Michael Syrus/Rabo. The text of Evagrius gives us the principal details,58 which can then be complemented with details provided by John of Ephesus, Michael Syrus and the Strategikon: ‘He [Maurice] also engaged Tamchosroes and Adarmanes the principal Persian commanders, who advanced against him with a considerable force [This was the Persian main army and therefore at least 50,000 horsemen strong]; but the nature, manner, and place of these transactions I leave others to record, or shall perhaps myself make them the subject of a distinct work, since my present one professes to treat matters of a very different kind [this was a Church history]. Tamchosroes, however, falls in battle, not by the bravery of the Roman soldiery, but merely through the piety and faith of their commander [This suggests that Maurice preplanned the progress of the battle so as to entice Tamkhosro to a place where he could be killed]; and Adarmaanes, being worsted in the fight and having lost many of his men flies with precipitation, and this too, although Alamundarus, the commander of the Scenite barbarians, played the traitor in declining to cross the Euphrates and support Maurice against the Scenites of the opposite party. [This proves in no uncertain terms that Alamundarus disobeyed Maurice and refused to join his army before the battle. In light of their previous quarrel and the previous treatment of Alamundarus during the reign of Justin II it is not surprising that Alamundarus reacted to Maurice’s order in this way. He did not trust him. However, it is also clear that Alamundarus would have had another good reason for his disobedience, which is that his own territories were threatened by Persian Saracens and he was obviously unwilling to leave them undefended.] For this people are invincible by any other than themselves, on account of the fleetness of their horses; when hemmed in, they cannot be captured; and they outstrip their enemies in retreat. Theodoric too, commander of the Scythian troops [Comes Foederatorum in charge of the centre of the Roman front line foideratoi], did not so much as venture within range of the missiles, but fled with all his people [In light of what happened and the crediting of the victory to the piety of Maurice, I would suggest that the flight was planned so that Tamkhosro would follow to a place where he could be targeted from both flanks. If not planned, then it was fortunate].’ Evagrius 5.20, tr. by anon. 1846, 277–8 with comments in parentheses. John of Ephesus and Michael Rabo add some important details missing from Evagrius and Menander. According to both, before the battle a Roman officer named Constantine (Constantinus)59 captured a Persian spy from whom he learned the dress and usual

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  157 position of the Persian commander Tamkhosro, which was in the centre of the enemy line. In the words of John of Ephesus: ‘He posted himself on one of the wings [this is likely to mean the koursores wings of the second line]; and having caught sight of the Marzban in the centre of the Persian army, he charged so vigorously at him, that he penetrated into the enemy’s ranks, and making straight for Tam Khosrun, smote him with his lance, and unseated him, and threw him from his horse; and turning his lance, he smoted him again, and pierced him through [This handling of the spear shows the unmistakable signs of the method described in the Strategikon. The spear was clearly held shoulder high (possibly in a couched lance position) with a leather loop around the hand, which explains Constantine’s ability to turn his lance towards the ground after the initial impact]… But he was now himself surrounded by the Persians and slain;… but when the Persians saw that Tam Khosrun… was slain, in spite of his boasts… and further, became aware that they were hemmed in on all sides by their enemies [This proves nicely that the flight of Theoderic in the centre had lured the Persian centre forward so that the middle reserves of the Roman line were able to surround them from both sides. This charge was obviously led by the koursores wings, one of which included Constantine, the killer of Tamkhosro. My own suggestion is that this had been planned in advance by Maurice and that it is very likely that the targetting of the enemy leader who had already once fooled Maurice formed a part of the plan. It is probable that Maurice was also present when the enemy spy was interrogated], they turned their backs, and were hotly pursued by the Romans and Arabs, who slew and unhorsed many of them, to the number, as was said, of several thousands; but as we do not know the certainty, nor how to distinguish the truth from the false rumours which fly abroad, we have not recorded the exact numbers told us [John’s text therefore maintains that there were Arabs present in Maurice’s forces. It is possible that John has attempted to hide the betrayal of his coreligionist with this, or that Alamundarus did not control all of the Arabs, the latter being likelier]. It is certain, however, that many of them fell, and three other princes were said to have been slain [The Persian battle line had five commanders: outer left wing, left wing, centre, right wing and outer right wing so that the Persians lost four out their five wing commanders. This was a severe defeat], and all their pride brought to shame. After this defeat, they first halted at the river Bethvashi and encamped there for three months, waiting for an opportunity for renewing the contest; but finding themselves unable to stand up against the Romans, they retreated into their own land in disgrace.’ JE 6.26, tr. by Smith, 434–4 with comments in parentheses. In sum, it is probable that when Maurice learnt where and how Tamkhosro led his forces, he formulated a plan to entice the Persian centre under Tamkhosro forward into the trap prepared for him. This suggests that the two armies were probably evenly matched in numbers so the Romans did not have enough men to outflank the enemy. In short, even if Maurice had more than 50,000 horsemen, his battle array was still not wide enough to outflank the Persians even with the additional units posted on the flanks. Note, however, that in the accompanying reconstruction I have assumed that both sides had about 50,000

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horsemen so that the Romans did not have extra units outside their so-called Italian Drill Formation. In other words, I have made the assumption that Maurice had only as many men as the largest battle formation in the Strategikon had and none posted outside it. Theoderic feigned flight. Tamkhosro swallowed the bait and charged after the federates. It was then that the two reserve divisions of the Roman centre charged into the flanks of the advancing Persian centre and hemmed them in. One of the men who performed this was Constantine, who targetted the enemy commander and killed him. The death of the overall commander and the crushing of the Persian centre led to the collapse of the Persian army. We learn from Evagrius the name of the only Persian wing commander to survive the defeat. He was Adarmahan – a man who had by now managed to flee twice from the grasp of Maurice. This, however, did not end the Persian threat, because as cavalry most of the Persians still managed to flee and regroup. It is possible that it was the absence of Alamundarus and his swift Arab horses that prevented Maurice from destroying the enemy completely. The Arabs that Maurice had were apparently too few for the accomplishment of this. Whatever the truth, it is clear that Maurice was satisfied with the result and did not try his luck against the now desperate foe. He appears to have remained in the East until July 582 (JE 5.13) during which time he reorganized the defences and strengthened the fortifications throughout the East. For example it is probable that he built the fort of Samocharta in Sophanene during this lull in hostilities. Something that probably kept Maurice preoccupied during this time was the problem of Alamundarus, and then his son Naamanes (al-Numan). Chronicle 1234 (74, pp.165–6), John of Ephesus (3.40–1, 3.54), Evagrius (6.2), Bar Hebraeus (p.82–3) and Michael Rabo (pp.416–7), provide a discussion of what happened.60 It was thanks to the information that Maurice provided of the treacherous disobedience of Alamundarus that Tiberius decided to capture him by subterfuge. He dispatched the Syrian Magnus, who was a close friend of Alamundarus (or so Alamundarus thought). Magnus used as an excuse a visit to the town of Churin which he had founded and surrounded with a wall; the town had a church which was

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  159 to be concecrated. This formed the story which he used to lure his friend to visit him there. To make the story even more believable he took with him the Bishop of Antioch. Alamundarus was delighted and accepted the invitation and even agreed to the request of taking only a small retinue of bodyguards and then leaving them outside the walls. This enabled Magnus to capture Alamundarus. His retinue was frightened away by the appearance of the Roman soldiers, and Alamundarus was taken to Constantinople where he was allowed to live in the same house as previously with a stipend to support him. He was accompanied by one wife, two sons and a daughter. However, Alamundarus had left behind four sons. They started a war of revenge, apparently in the autumn of 581, which they then continued until 582. It is probable that this kept Maurice in the East at least until about mid-July 582. Then the worsening health of Tiberius made it imperative for Maurice to be present in the capital, which he reached a few days before 5 August 582 (JE 5.13). The eldest of the sons was Naamanes/Namanes (al-Numan) and it was he who began the campaign of revenge by advancing against Magnus’s fort when Magnus had left. The Arabs killed and captured the people in it, torched the place and took everything of any value as booty. After this, the Arabs proceeded to raid the whole of Arabia and Syria and neighbouring regions; but they did not kill anyone – they only robbed them. Then, after they had divided the spoils of the previous raid, they did it again, and the country folk in these areas retreated to the safety of the cities. However, the Romans had an effective counter-measure against the Arabs. They cut off the supplies of corn. This meant that pillaging was the only source of food for the Arabs, and when the country dwellers had withdrawn inside the cities even this was no longer available. The Roman local leaders and commanders then sent the sons a message to give up their raiding – this suggests that by then Maurice had left for the capital. The sons responded by directing their attack against Bostra with the idea of obtaining their father’s armour and other royal property that had been deposited there. This shows that the city of Bostra was the headqarters of the Arabic Federates when they were loyal to the Romans. The local Roman commander led his men outside against the sons because he despised them as roving Arabic bandits, but this proved a grave mistake. The Arabs killed the commander and large numbers of his men. The inhabitants of Bostra reacted by handing over to Alamundarus’s sons their father’s possessions. The sons then returned to their desert encampment. When Tiberius learnt of this, he dispatched Magnus back to the East with orders to install a brother of Alamundarus on the throne and to capture Alamundarus’s sons. The commanders in the area were ordered to cooperate with Magnus. He failed in his mission and died soon after his arrival. These operations probably took until the summer of 582. According to Michael Syrus/Rabo (p.417), Constantinople faced a serious shortage of bread in 582. In the case of Constantinople the likely reason for the sudden shortage was probably the devastation of Thrace caused by the Slavic hordes. Tiberius tried to alleviate it by distributing horse feed, lentils, chickpeas, rice and bread crusts. He also brought corn from Egypt and Thebaid, but this proved insufficient because these areas were also suffering from famine, probably due to the fighting mentioned by John of Nikiu (95.1–21) for the reigns of Tiberius and Maurice. It was now that the people of the capital started to feel the consequences of barbarian invasions – the simultaneous destruction of fields in nearby Thrace and faraway Egypt, which was the breadbasket of the Empire,

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160  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 resulted in famine. The populace found a new source of subsistence by turning to fishing; there was an abundance of fish available, especially tuna. In places which were more distant from the sea, the people grew such things as lettuce and melons. It is probable that these shortages were why Maurice failed to launch an offensive against the Persians in the spring of 582 – there would have been a shortage of bucellatum (hard tack).

The Death of Tiberius II on 13 August 58261 Despite being relatively young, the health of Tiberius II started to show signs of failing during the summer of 582. The situation was so grave that Tiberius II had to choose a successor. Tiberius, however, did not choose only a single successor but nominated two, so on 5 August both Germanus, the patrician and governor of Africa, and Maurice, the Comes Excubitorum, were elevated as Caesars and betrothed to the daughters of Tiberius: Charito with Germanus and Constantina with Maurice. Michael Whitby has speculated that Tiberius’s plan at this stage might have been to divide the Empire between these two: Maurice to have the east and Germanus the west. According to Whitby, the choice of Germanus as Emperor of the west would have been particularly suitable because he was the son of the elder Germanus and Gothic princess Matasuntha. In other words, Germanus combined the imperial blood of the east with the Ostrgothic royal house and the house of Anicii, the last of which had already provided western emperors. However, as noted by Whitby, whatever Tiberius’s plans were, his early death made them void. On 13 August Tiberius ate a bowl of mulberries, after which he fell ill. Caesar Maurice, who may still have held the office of the Comes Excubitorum, was there to press his case. The civilian, military and ecclesiastical bigwigs were assembled at the Palace of Hebdomon and Tiberius was carried there on a litter. According to John of Nikiu, Tiberius wanted Germanus to be appointed as his successor, but the humble Germanus refused the honour. This left Maurice as the only choice. Tiberius ordered his Quaestor John to deliver a speech in which Maurice would be designated as his successor and Augustus. After this, Tiberius placed the crown on the head of Maurice and enrobed him with the double cloak of purple. The account of Nikiu has been doubted because he was hostile towards Maurice, but should we? In my opinion we should not. If Whitby’s identification of Germanus as son of Germanus and Matasuntha is correct, and we have no reason to doubt this, Germanus would have had a far better right to the throne than Maurice, and it is this that could have influenced his preference for Germanus. And why would Germanus have refused? That is easy to answer. As a former and possibly still acting commander of the excubitores, Maurice would have had their support, not to mention the support of the rest of the generals and soldiers thanks to his stellar performance as their commander. Similarly, Maurice probably had the support of many civil servants because he had formerly served as a notary. This means that Maurice was in full control of the situation when the Emperor’s health collapsed. One may even speculate that the bowl of mulberries had been poisoned to speed up the death of the Emperor and that Maurice and his supporters were behind this. Obviously there is no proof of this, but I would not preclude this possibility in light of what John of Nikiu states about the preferences of Tiberius himself. After all, Germanus’s wife Charito was Tiberius’s elder daughter and hence likely to be married

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Tiberius II Constantinus (578–82)  161 to his favourite. The opportunity was there for Maurice to act, and it would be strange if he failed to grasp it.

Tiberius II, the young handsome Emperor The reign of Tiberius II had been marked by frantic efforts to correct the mistakes of Justin II. He sought to do this by spending money on the military while seeking to concentrate his principal effort against the Persians. His goal on this front was to restore the status quo as it had been before Justin II started the war, but without the payments agreed by Justinian. He did not follow this policy with the other main enemy, the Avars. He was prepared to pay them tribute, up to a point. He was willing to give them Sirmium in return for peace, but he did so only under duress. Excluding North Africa, where Tiberius launched a successful offensive, on other fronts of lesser importance (Spain, Gaul, Italy and Balkans) Tiberius relied mainly on combinations of bribery, diplomacy, use of hostages, and other underhand methods. He was largely successful, but the benefits of these operations were largely reaped by his successor Maurice. He was a popular Emperor, universally liked, largely thanks to his generosity and affable nature. He tried to reconcile differences within the Empire rather than exacerbate them, as had been the habit of Justin II. His spendrift habits endeared him to all, but this was also his major defect as Emperor. He spent so lavishly that he left the state coffers largely empty for his successor.

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Chapter Five

Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)

5.1. THE FIRST YEARS 582–587 5.1.1. Background The beginning of Maurice’s reign and his troubles. There is no better way to start an account of the reign of Maurice than to quote John of Ephesus, who provides us with a vivid picture of its first days. John’s account has always formed the core of every study of Maurice’s reign: The God-loving king Maurice sat upon the royal throne, and showed himself, and was proclaimed as emperor, and began to manage and administer such matters as belong to the kingdom; and after the time of mourning for king Tiberius had passed, he made great preparations, and arranged the affairs of the kingdom, with much pomp and magnificence, such as suits the majesty of kings… After the royal banquet,… and royal shows, the queen proved with child, and in due time a son was born to them in the purple, on the 4th day of August 894 (ad 583), and they named him Theodosius in allusion to Theodosius II, who was the only one besides from the time of Constantine downwards who was born in the purple… Upon the birth… of the child, general rejoicing was made, especially because there were persons entirely unfit for so high an office, looking forward to and making preparations for seizing the kingdom by force; but on the day of this infant’s birth, their projects were extinguished and brought to an end;… [These refer to the plots against Maurice in 582–3. Most of these plots appear to have sought to replace Maurice with Germanus. Maurice solved the problem by bethrothing the newly born Theodosius to the daughter of Germanus. See e.g. Schlosser, 50–1.]

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  163 At the beginning of his reign, the king sent for his father, an old man named Paul, and his mother, and his brother, whose name was Peter [Petrus], and his two sisters, one of whom was a widow, and the other the wife of Philippicus. The latter he first of all appointed as comes excubitorum [582–602]; and subsequently elevated him to the rank which he had himself previously held, of commander-in-chief over all the Roman armies in the East, in which capacity he sent him to levy fresh forces to carry on the war against the Persians [in 584]. And next he made his father head of the senate, and chief of all the patricians, and gave him and his son Peter, the king’s brother, the entire property of the great patrician Marcellus, brother of the later king Justin [We do not know if Marcellus was still alive when this took place, but I would suggest that it is entirely possible that he had been one of those who had attempted to overthrow Maurice and was therefore punished in 583]…. And next he gave his father and mother another house near the church (of S. Sophia) and his own palace. Soon after he gave his sister and her husband Philippicus a large and strong-built house, on the western side of the city, in the suburb called Zeugma, while his other sister, the widow, received a new and well-built mansion, lately erected by the patrician Peter [It is not known if he was alive when this took place. It is also possible that he had been involved in some plot, although it is possible that he was executed or otherwise punished because he was interested in sorcerers and demons and promoted the Manichean religion. See PLRE3 Petrus 9.]… He also gave to his other relatives large and noble houses belonging to the crown, and studiously enriched them in wealth and rank and honour, and gave them high offices near the royal person [i.e. Maurice sought to secure his own position by nominating his relatives to all the important positions near his person. This was obviously nepotism, but a wise move: he could trust them]… One relative, however, needs more particular attention, namely, Domitian, metropolitan of Melitene. Already Maurice, when sent by Tiberius to the East with the title of count, had shewn his devotion to the interest of his family by making him bishop of Melitene in Cappadocia; and when, after… he had returned to the capital, and had been made king, immediately Domitian hastened to him, and became his counsellor and most intimate adviser, and the person who thought for him, and encouraged him in all the severe and painful difficulties with which he had to contend in the wars which pressed upon him on all sides, with the heathen and Magian peoples of the Persians, and the barbarous and savage tribes who came from the ends of the world, and are called Avars, and also with the Slavonians. And in all these difficulties the bishop of Melitene was the king’s comforter and counsellor, although he was still but a young man [Domitian was clearly Maurice’s most important confidant and counsellor]… On Maurice’s elevation to the crown, his chief difficulty arose from finding that the lavishness of Tiberius had exhausted the treasures which Justin had stored up in the palace. For upon his becoming king, he found large sums of gold secretly hoarded there, which his predecessor had gathered by unjust means;… he began spending and scattering and dispersing it on all sides, sometimes fittingly and compassionately, or in the usual largesses to the army; and sometimes without thought or reason… and finally, he was obliged to open the treasures of king Anastasius and take money from thence [This proves that at least some of the emperors gathered treasuries bearing their

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164  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 names and that Anastasius’s successors Justin I, Justinian I and Justin II did not touch this emergency treasury, which raises the question, why had Justinian failed to tap these resources when his soldiers had not received their salaries and refused to fight?]. But when he departed from this world, and Maurice became the king… he found the palace swept clean… and was compelled therefore to take possession of any money that was discovered, or came in from the taxes, and withhold his hand, and effect savings in the expenses of the army [This was very bad for the morale of the army for its combat readiness], and hoard it up, saying, “I must not disperse and scatter the money, but collect and store it up, that I may have the means of purchasing the peace for the state.” [I.e., money was needed for payments to the Avars and also for other payments that Maurice made to obtain allies, for example Gaul, Italy and Spain.] And with this he withheld his hand, and refrained from many of the customary observances, until he was much ridiculed and scoffed at by many, and called a close-fisted and miserly fellow, who could benefit and enrich none but his own relatives. [This was the inevitable consequence of Maurice surrounding himself with trustworthy relatives while being miserly towards others. However, it should be noted that the only group among these others that mattered was the army and, as we shall see, to these Maurice should have been more generous than he was. Maurice always had the means at his disposal for obtaining the necessary money for his army. He could have tapped into the riches of the Roman upper classes and church. The likeliest reason for his unwillingness to do so is that as a former career civil servant he identified himself as a member of the Constantinopolitan upper class and sought their support for his rule. In the light of his bad relationship with his army, it would have been wiser for him to tap these resources even if it angered the upper classes and church. However, this was not in his character. He was a cold, logical man who expected everyone to follow his orders ‘as if they were his subordinates in the army’ without taking into account the reaction that it could cause among the soldiers and populace.] He set his heart on the rebuilding and restoration of his native town of Arabissus. For this purpose he sent officers into all quarters to collect skilful artificers in the working and chiselling of stones, and builders and carpenters, and masons, and smiths, and mechanicians, and all other kinds of craftsmen, and stationed there a troop of soldiers, to keep them constantly engaged in the building, each occupied with his own branch of labour. [This was a means of keeping the soldiers busy during the winters to maintain their combat-readiness. Had he allowed them too much ease, it would have been difficult to force them to do the necessary physical labour during the campaign season. It also benefitted his native city.] His first command was that the church should be … rebuilt on a larger and more magnificent scale… his next order was for the erection of an extensive hospice… [This shows that Maurice gave a high priority to the spiritual and medical needs of the populace] and next… a large town hall, and long and handsome porticoes… and magnificent basilicas, and a palace, and a strong wall. And much conversation and murmuring was made thereat; for people said, “Every day he complains about the Roman armies, which labour and fight in behalf of the state, and says, I have no gold to distribute among them [These would have certainly included soldiers who were engaged in the building project. The evidence was right in front of their eyes. This shows how unwisely Maurice acted in this case.]; and

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  165 while there are numerous strong cities, both in the East and West, captured and laid in ruins by the barbarians, to which all he has to say is, I have no money to give, how is it that he now expends… all these talents in rebuilding a town, which never was of consequence, nor of any value to the Roman state?”1 But Maurice soon had a worse enemy to contend with than the murmurs of his citizens; for two years after he had undertaken the restoration of his native town, and while the works were being rapidly pushed onwards to completion, suddently a great and terrible earthquake happened… threw down the whole of Arabissus, and levelled all the buildings in it, new and old, to the ground… though the king Maurice was greatly vexed and troubled… yet will he not desist from rebuilding it a second time; for all the artificers whom he had collected still remain there [this would mean the year 585, when John of Ephesus’s account ends].’ JE 5.14–23, tr. by Smith 351–62 with slight changes and my comments in parentheses. Maurice the Emperor and his collaborators2 John of Ephesus, the letters of Pope Gregory and some other sources enable us to learn who belonged to Maurice’s inner circle. Pope Gregory considered the abovementioned Domitian (cousin or nephew), Maurice’s wife Constantina, and his widowed sister Theoctista to be the most influential figures in Maurice’s court; the Patriarch of Constantinople Johannes (Ioannes, John) and royal doctor Theodore were also influential and close to the Emperor. The text of John of Ephesus adds to the list Maurice’s mother, his sister married to Philippicus, and some other relatives. The royal court of the Austrasian Franks sent letters to Maurice’s infant son Theodosius (probably because they would be read by the father), to Maurice’s father Paul, to an unnamed Empress (probably Constantina), to his mother-in-law Anastasia, to Domitian, to Patriarch Johannes, and to the papal apocrisarius. As noted by Michael Whitby, the only obvious absentee from this inner circle is the Caesar Germanus. Whitby is certainly correct to note that it was Germanus’s strong claim to the imperial throne that made him suspect. He was married to Tiberius’s daughter Charito and had distinguished Anician and Amal ancestry. He was a dangerously powerful figure in the court, which Maurice subsequently sought to disarm by marrying his son Theodosius to Germanus’s daughter. I would add another important figure to this list: Gregory, the Bishop of Antioch/Theopolis. As we shall see, he was the trusted go-between to Maurice and the army, and Maurice and Chosroes II Parwez. This should be kept in mind when one reads the text of Evagrius (6.7) who was Gregory’s lawyer. Evagrius had access to one of the most important figures in the East. In the field of military appointments, Maurice trusted primarily the members of his family, so his brother Peter (Petrus) held high commands in the 590s while his brother-inlaw Phillippicus was appointed Comes Excubitorum in 582 and then as strategos autokrator of the armies in the East in 583. Another trusted military figure was Comentiolus, to whom Maurice had become acquainted when he was Comes Excubitorum – in 583 Comentiolus was a scribo, an officer of the Excubitores, but he was appointed dux or comes rei militaris in Thrace in 584 and MVM Praesentalis in 585. Another was Priscus, who held high military positions from 588 onwards. He was a gifted commander and was therefore trusted with important commands, but he did not belong to the inner circle. Others included the patrician Romanus, John Mystacon and Narses, all of whom had served under Maurice

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166  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 in the East. His military officers included men of Germanic origin such as Ansimuth, Ariulph, Godwin (PLRE 3 Guduin) and Kours, but these never reached the inner circle where decisions were made. Maurice was in the habit of retaining those commanders who implemented his orders to the letter; he did not tolerate inefficiency or failure. But he followed a double standard: he demoted or sacked those who did not belong to his inner circle, but if the person belonged to his inner circle or was otherwise known as an able commander, like Priscus, then they were only rotated from one high command to another or to some other theatre of war. These men were staunchly loyal to the Emperor. All mutinies against the Emperor were led by lower-ranking officers. As Michael Whitby notes, we have far less evidence for the civilian administration. Maurice may have created the office of logothete (financial controller), but how this office relates to the praetorian prefects and other chief officials is not known. It was an important office because the logothetes were not only in charge of provisions and payments to the troops but could actually serve as commanders of entire armies during this period. Maurice’s policies towards the aristocrats followed the example set by his predecessors Justinian I and Tiberius. Like them he formed a close relationship with them, the best evidence of which is his reluctance to tap the financial resources of the upper classes and church for military use. The support of the aristocrats for the Emperor was important, but as Olster (pp. 23–38) notes in his study of Phocas’s reign one should not overestimate the power of the aristocrats, because it is clear that they did not form a unified powerblock. The Emperor had sole power over their careers. It was when their hopes were dashed that they might seek to overthrow him. It is clear that one should not overestimate the power of the East Roman aristocracy. The real power behind the throne was always the armed forces. Furthermore, as Whitby notes, Maurice’s reign saw one possible important new development, which was the forming of a closer relationship between the Emperor and the Circus Factions; it is possible that Maurice actually created the new official controllers for the Blues and Greens which are recorded for the first time in his reign. Maurice might have sought to use the Circus Factions as a counterbalance against the aristocrats, while also providing him with another organized military force for the defence of the capital. This conclusion, however, may result merely from the uneven survival of evidence, because the circus factions/ demes certainly played a role in the defence of the capital and also in the appointment of the emperors well before his reign. The Religious Policy of Maurice3 Maurice appears to have been staunchly Chalcedonian in his religious views, but his religious policies were still moderate and pragmatic. Initially he was so moderate as to pass a law forbidding the forcible conversion of the schismatics. Furthermore, he was reluctant to pass death sentences. This moderation resulted in suspicions that Maurice was a heathen magician, a view which can be found for example in the Chronicle of John of Nikiu (98.1–13, 102.9). The same suspicion was apparently initially shared by the Patriarch of Constantinople John, because in 583 he forced Maurice to execute a prominent learned man called Paulinus much against his will, and then forced him to initiate persecution of pagans. However, it is still clear Maurice was not a pagan, but a devout Chalcedonian, as can be seen both from his policies and from his military treatise the Strategikon.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  167 Maurice’s approach to religion was pragmatic. He followed a policy of religious moderation as long as the Persian war lasted in the East. It was only after the war had ended that he initiated a policy of forcing Easterners to become Chalcedonians. In the West Maurice followed a policy of religious moderation while the war with the Lombards lasted. This was so as not to alienate people, but was also to strengthen the position of John, the Patriarch of Constantinople, vis-à-vis the Pope. The aim was to centralize control of the Church in Constantinople where the Emperor could supervise its activities better. Therefore, Maurice sought to prevent any attempts by the Pope to interfere in the affairs of the Eastern Church and any attempts by the Pope to launch persecutions of heretics either in the West or East. This was vehemently opposed by the Pope, and as we shall see it also affected military operations in Italy when the Pope chose to follow a different policy from that adopted by Maurice and his Exarch of Italy. The Strategikon of Maurice4 The principal source for the military doctrine of the period is the Strategikon of the Emperor Maurice. The internal evidence suggests that it achieved its final form between 592 and 602. The post quam date is the Avar surprise of the Roman cavalry at Heracleia in 592, the ante quam date is the downfall of Maurice in 602. It was in 602 that the Emperor ordered the troops to winter in enemy territory, as recommended in the Strategikon. Modern historians have not found a consensus regarding its exact date and authorship; they have variously attributed the treatise to Urbicius, Maurice, Heraclius, Justinian (the son of Germanus, Justinian’s nephew), Philippicus (Maurice’s brother-in-law), and to imperial circles in the 590s.5 In my view the treatise was written by none other than the Emperor Maurice himself, to whom it has traditionally been credited. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that most of the manuscripts name him as the author. The treatise seems to consist of two military policy statements for two different wars. The text imparts a presence of authority such as one would expect from an Emperor giving instructions to his generals (strategoi). The generals in their turn were required to distribute written drills to their officers (e.g. Strategikon 3.5.122–3). My personal view is that the original version of the Strategikon consisted of the first eleven books because Book 11 ends with an epilogue, but it is possible that it had even fewer books originally and that additional material was inserted to it when the final version was produced.6 This first version of the Strategikon deals primarily with cavalry tactics (Books 1–7) and matters relating to the eastern front (2.1, 2.6, 3.8, 7.B.2, 9–10). It is probable that this half of the Strategikon was partially rewritten and updated when the final version was written. The first half of the treatise can be dated on the basis of two incidents in the early reign of Maurice. The object was to ensure that the generals would follow proper cavalry tactics and proper combat protocols on the eastern front. The first defeat which would have inspired Maurice to write a military treatise was that of the Roman cavalry under John Mystacon at the Battle of Nymphius in 582; it was caused by the use of a single cavalry line. Maurice wanted his generals to take fully into account the lessons learned from contacts with the Avars by the previous Emperor, Tiberius, and general Bonus.

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168  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The treatise includes instructions to keep adequate scouts when besieging. It is probable that this instruction was added because of the siege of Akbas in 583 during which the Persians surprised the Romans.7 Subsequent operations on the eastern front reflect the instructions of the Strategikon, which to me suggests that it was then that Maurice distributed the first version to the generals. In short, it is practically certain that the first half of the treatise was authorized or written as a military policy statement by the Emperor Maurice during the winter of 583/4 to ensure successful operations under Philippicus. It is also possible that Philippicus and others contributed to this treatise at this point. However, it is possible or even probable that the treatise contains a number of other layers of dates of composition. For example, book 7 appears to summarize all of the necessary information regarding the use of cavalry. I would suggest that these other layers of composition include the original notes of Maurice himself when he was appointed strategos autokrator of the Eastern frontier in 577–8. He did not possess any military experience so it was necessary for him to consult as many military treatises as possible. These treatises clearly included texts that we know nothing about, and also drill manuals with Latin commands. The second half of the Strategikon consists of the 12th Book, which is divided into separate treatises. The first portion of the 12th Book (12.A-B) deals with infantry tactics that relate particularly to the situation in the Balkans, while the short sections (12.CD) following it introduce material concerning marching camps and hunting as a form of military training. The internal evidence therefore suggests that the 12th Book was written after 592 as a response to the situation in the Balkans. It was in this area that the Romans concentrated on the use of infantry. It is probable that the 11th Book dealing with the different types of enemies was added to the original treatise at this juncture. The reason for this conclusion is that the 7th book (7.A.Pr.) already included instructions for the cavalry on how to deal with different types of enemies.8 The 12.A details a number of infantry formations of which the epikampios opisthia was recommended against the Avars, which again betrays a general tendency to relate the second section of the work to the problems faced in the Balkans. In sum, the infantry section and the sections of the 11th Book, dealing in particular with the Slavs and Avars, all point to the same conclusion: Maurice issued a new military treatise for his generals that took into account the special circumstances of fighting against the Slavs and Avars in the Balkans. Maurice’s own input in the contents is certain, because it was none other than Maurice himself who consistently insisted upon the need of the army to winter in enemy territory or in the Balkans despite the resistance of the soldiers. Maurice was blind to the feelings of his soldiers. He thought only in terms of the most efficient way to achieve the goal in question.9 The earliest order for the army to winter in the Balkans was made by Maurice in 593. Therefore he had already decided what would be the most efficient way of defeating the Slavs. It is therefore likely that the final version of the Strategikon was written before this.10 It is practically certain that Maurice compiled the treatise with the assistance of other military men, but it is also clear that the final form of the treatise was his own choice. I would put the date of the writing of the Strategikon to the year 593 when the military policy to be followed in the Balkans was formulated. It was also during that year that the Persian war ended,11 which enabled Maurice to reformulate his military goals

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  169 against the Avars and Slavs. It should be kept in mind, however, that the extant text of the Strategikon is not the original version as Maurice intended it, which means that it is possible that it contains some later revisions of his original text. Despite the fact that Maurice’s Strategikon is clearly unique in its high quality, it is still a reflection of Roman military traditions for which there is in some cases evidence already from the Republican era. It is a compilation of older treatises, drill manuals and contemporary lessons. It is clear that the work included other independent works that underwent considerable revision before ‘republication’, including cross-references, imparting a degree of homogeneity to the text and updating it with the personal experience of the author and his inner circle.12 The earlier texts used as sources or as models by Maurice included at least: Book 7 of the Codex Theodosianus for military laws; the Strategicus of Onasander; some earlier military treatise(s) like Vegetius’s Epitoma rei militaris or Urbicius’s Tactics; and some official military pamphlets or drill manuals. It is immediately obvious that the cavalry (1.1–5, 2–7) and infantry (12.B) treatises must have been drawn from some unknown earlier military treatises or drill manuals or their combination. The influences of the Avars, Slavs, Lombards and others reflect mostly the lessons learned by the previous two generations of officers. Most of the direct borrowings from earlier known treatises are among the military maxims.13 The quality of Maurice’s treatise was simply outstanding, but the combat methods and tactics he recommended were still traditional. All had earlier precedents. The only clearly detectable change from earlier military treatises is that Maurice gave greater importance to cavalry tactics when fighting against the Persians, but it may be that because of the high quality of Maurice’s Strategikon the unknown military treatises he used simply disappeared. There may have been some changes made in organizational arrangements, including uniform terminology for units and officers even while traditional titles and unit identities were still maintained. The reorganization of the eastern armies by Maurice when he assumed command of them in 577–8, and his military policy as manifested in the Strategikon, improved the effectiveness of the Roman armies markedly. The Romans were on the offensive after Maurice set out standard methods of fighting the various types of enemy. However, Maurice’s Strategikon marks also an abrupt break with the past. Under Justinian, who came from a Latin-speaking area of the Balkans, the official language was still Latin, so his law collection was written in Latin; but now the official language was Greek. The Strategikon is written in Greek for officers who spoke Greek. It retains the old Latin commands, but introduces new Greek terminology (e.g. strategos, hypostrategos). In other words, the Strategikon is a reflection of the gradual Hellenising of vocabulary. It is also a reflection of the brigading of permanent units of different sizes into temporary battlefield entities such as tagmata/banda, moirai and mere. It is possible that Maurice created a new unit of imperial bodyguards out of the troops that had served under him, because the Strategikon includes a unit called the optimates; after the Muslims had pushed the Romans into Anatolia we find a unit called optimates in the Thema of the Opsikion. We find a new officer called Komes Opsikiou and Spatharius for the reign of Heraclius14 who may have been their commander, but it is equally possible

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170  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 that this Komes Opsikiou was the commander of Heraclius’s personal bodyguards, the former bucellarii of Priscus, who may have received the name Optimates. All of this, however, is mere speculation. Persian and Balkan Fronts in 582–92: the general strategy One of the first actions of Maurice as Emperor was to appoint a successor for himself for the Eastern front. His choice was John Mystacon. John had orders to continue the offensive in the limited area of Arzanene in 582. The Eastern front retained its importance for Maurice in the coming years, but one can discern that the overall strategy was now based on the continuation of the war of attrition that had been formulated after the failure of the 580 offensive and that the Romans would now perform only three types of operations: 1) raids in Persarmenia and the southern half of the frontier; 2) sieges of individual cities and forts for the purpose of gradually advancing Roman-held territory; 3) the reinforcement of existing cities and forts while building new ones to secure borders and conquests and to gradually extend them. The sources concentrate their attention almost solely on the limited fighting that took place in Upper Mesopotamia (principally Arzanene and Tur Abdin), but one may guess that there would also have been fighting further north in Persarmenia and Iberia and further south in the deserts between the Arabs. The aim of this war of attrition was to convince the Persians to agree to an honourable peace without any payments of tribute and in which the Romans would regain Dara from the Persians in exchange for territories the Romans had captured from the Persians. Then there was the question of the Arab Federates. Having experienced the problems first hand, this was one of Maurice’s priorities. This problem was satisfactorily solved by the dissolution of the Ghassanid Kingdom in about 583; because of this we see them once again fighting alongside the Roman armies. The Persian civil war was to change the strategy. There were also new developments in the Balkan theatre. When Maurice took the throne he received envoys from the new Khagan of the Avars, the son of Baian (whose name is not known). The embassy presented new demands to the new Emperor Maurice in 582. Maurice’s principal objective was to avoid war with the Avars while the objective of the new Khagan was to demonstrate his power to his subjects by humiliating the Roman Emperor. The result was war, in 584. During this time the Khagan formed alliances with the Lombards and Slavs. Maurice’s strategy was to use allies to distract the Lombards, Slavs and Avars so he could concentrate his forces against the Persians. He paid the Franks to attack the Lombards and the Antes/Antae to attack the Slavs while he formed an alliance with the Turks against the Avars.15 Strictly speaking Michael Syrus does not state that Maurice formed an alliance with the Turks, but the circumstantial evidence makes it clear that he did. After the beginning of the war with the Avars Maurice made a major change in strategy. He started to consider the Balkan front one of his priorities. Because of this he was ready to negotiate with the Persians in early 584. The presence of the hostile forces of Slavs and Avars so close to the Roman capital was menacing, and because of it he concluded a truce with the Lombards in late 585 or early 586 which enabled him to transfer forces from Italy against the Avars and Slavs. He would never again neglect the Balkan front in the same manner as his predecessor Tiberius II. The first offensive was undertaken in 588.

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5.1.2.  North Africa and Egypt under Maurice in 582–9 North Africa in 582–9 Maurice became Augustus on 14 August 582 and his reign saw further troubles in North Africa, which proves that the defensive arrangements made during the reign of Tiberius II Constantinus were not sufficient. However, it is clear that these were not the fault of Gennadius, who had been kept in office throughout the reign of Tiberius, because he was not only retained in office by Maurice but actually promoted to the newly created office of exarchus Africae some time before July 591. This office combined both military and civilian offices so that the exarch could direct local resources more efficiently for the support of military operations.16 The troubles with the Moors must have started soon after Maurice took the reins of power because according to Theophylact by 589 the fighting had continued for some time and then the Moors surrendered because they had suffered a series of crushing defeats.17 According to Theophanes AM 6080 (587/8), the Moors caused great troubles to the Romans. The beginning of the troubles can therefore be dated to 583/4, if his dating is three/four years off as it often is. The other option is obviously that in this case Theophanes’s dating is accurate. If so, this would date it to 587/8, but this dating would not explain Theophylact’s wording.18 Gennadius, however, was the right man for the job. He inflicted a series of defeats on the Moors so that by about 589 the Romans had repeatedly slaughtered the Moors in a series of encounters and battles. The Moors begged for peace and surrendered in 589. In my opinion it is therefore likely that Gennadius served as exarchus Africae during 584–89 so that the combination of civilian and military duties took place during the conflict rather than after it. The likeliest date for the creation of the office would be 583/4, simultaneous with the office of exarchus Italiae which is dated to have existed in about 584 (dating in PLRE3). Denys Pringle has listed the names and extent of the civil provinces that Gennadius controlled as exarch. They consisted of six civil provinces (exarchiai): Carthago, Numidia, Mauritania Prima (former provinces of Mauritania Sitifensis and Mauritania Caesariensis), Mauritania Secunda (Septem), Sardinia (with Corsica) and Byzacium. George of Cyprus claims that Mauritania Secunda also controlled not only Septem but also Spain, Minorca and Maiorca. The province of Tripolitania/Tripolis had been added to the diocese of Egypt. This means that the exarch’s military duties consisted of the control of all of North Africa from Byzacium to Septem and Spain, Minorca and Maiorca. This is clearly problematic in light of the fact that the Roman magister militum Spaniae acted independently in Spain. It has been suggested that George of Cyrus has made a mistake or that the magister in Spain just had greater freedom of operation than the rest of the officers serving under the exarch as Pringle has suggested.19 I agree with Pringle. It is probable that the position of exarch was higher than the position of magister so that the exarch of Africa was superior to the magister of Spain, but in such a manner that in practise the magister acted independently when necessary. Troubled Egypt in 582–89 John of Nikiu’s text (95.1–21) and the exploits of Aristomachus can be used as evidence for the creation of some kind of larger regional command in Egypt for the beginning of

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172  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Maurice’s reign. As noted earlier, Aristomachus achieved some major successes against the Moors and Nubians towards the end of Tiberius II’s reign and/or at the beginning of Maurice’s reign. He did not only defeat them, but took the war to their country where he ravaged their home territories. It is quite possible or even probable that the transferral of Tripolitania into the Diocese of Aegyptus (see the reign of Phocas for further details of the distribution of soldiers) took place when Aristomachus was in charge of operations. This was a major achievement, but with it came the danger of imperial jealousy. However, on the basis of his previous experience (see the reign of Tiberius II) Aristomachus knew that some envious persons would slander him to the Emperor so he decided to forestall this by asking an audience from Maurice, which was granted to him. The victory that Aristomachus had achieved must have been significant because Belisarius had faced similar slanders after his successes against the Vandals and Goths. Aristomachus brought many gifts for the Emperor, and Maurice was so impressed that he appointed him Praefectus Urbis Constantinopolitanae while the Empress Constantina appointed him curator domus Augustae. Aristomachus distinguished himself as PVC, building a large bronze reservoir with aqueducts which later made it possible to extinguish a fire that broke out in the city, and other important buildings. This made him immensely popular, but it made some envious and a logothete Leo/Leon and a prefect levelled several accusations against Aristomachus to the Empress Constantina. John of Nikiu names one of these accusations, that Leo claimed on the basis of astrology that Aristomachus planned to assassinate the Emperor and marry the Empress. Probably John mentioned it because it brought home to all readers how ridiculous the accusations were. However, Constantina was frightened and told the Emperor who acted accordingly by removing Aristomachus from office after which he was exiled to the ‘island of Gaul’. The location is not known. This was a sad end for one of the most able military and civilian leaders of the age. After Aristomachus had left, Egypt faced another series of troubles, but this time the cause was not external but internal, as so often in Egyptian history. The source for this is the Chronicle of John of Nikiu (97.1–30). He narrates the events after he has described the reinstatement of Chosroes II on the throne, but the exact date is not known because John of Nikiu’s narrative of the reign of Maurice is not in chronological order. All we know for certain is that the troubles took place after ca. 583 during the reign of Maurice. I would date them to 588–9. The reasons are given below. According to John of Nikiu, there were three brothers called Abaskiron, Menas (PLRE3 Menas12) and Jacob/Iacobus (PLRE3 Iacobus3) in the city of Aikelâh/Aykelâh (Zâwjâ), which was near Alexandria (ca. 30 km south-east). Abaskiron the ‘scribe’ (PLRE3 Abaskiron, topoteres or tribunus) was the eldest of the brothers and he had a son named Isaac. Johannes/Ioannes/John, the Prefect of Alexandria (PLRE3/Ioannes 169, dux et augustalis Alexandriae) appointed these three brothers and Isaac as governors of several cities in Egypt. The exact position of these four men is not known. Martindale suggests in the PLRE3 that they could have been either topoteratea (administrators serving under the augustalis of Alexandria) or military tribuni. Anyway, the position enabled all four to attain great wealth which went to their heads. They attacked the Blue Faction and sacked the cities of Benâ and Bûsîr (Busiris, Abusir) without the permission of the governor of the province. Martindale (PLRE3 Abaskiron) suggests that the governor of the province/prefect of the canton meant the pagarch (who supervised the

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  173 collection of taxes), but in my opinion it is probable that it actually meant John, the Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae, so that the four men could easily have been pagarchs themselves.20 It would certainly explain why they were able to enrich themselves. The targeting of the Blue Faction may have had political implications if the events of the end of Maurice’s reign can be used as possible evidence for his own position towards the factions. It was the Blue Faction that demonstrated unwavering support for Maurice while the Greens took the lead in opposing him. This may imply favouritism of the Blues by Maurice. On the basis of this, one possible or probable date for this uprising in the Nile Delta would be 588–9, the year when the Roman Army of the East revolted with the result that there were several other troubles in the East (e.g. Theophylact esp. 3.2.10–11, and also 3.5.11–16, 3.8.4–8). The four men burned Busiris with its public bath while the ‘governor of the city of Busiris’ fled because the inhabitants of the city of Aykilah wanted to kill him. This last piece of evidence suggests that the principal military force at the disposal of the four men consisted of the inhabitants of their native city. On the basis of John of Nikiu (97.14), the name of the governor of Busiris was Zacharias (PLRE3 Zacharias6), a former general and father of the general Theodorus (PLRE3 Theodorus 59). The targeting of Zacharias suggests some personal motive for Abaskiron and his brothers. The governor of Busiris managed to make his way all the way to Constantinople where he informed the Emperor Maurice of the destruction of his city and of the attempted assassination of him. John, the Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae, also wrote a report of these events to Maurice. Maurice was naturally angered and ordered John to remove the four men from office, but this was easier said than done because they had meanwhile assembled a large force of daring men whom they had provided with horses, swords and other weapons, while they had also seized large numbers of grain ships carrying food for the citizens of Alexandria. The previous actions of Aristomachus undoubtedly served as an inspiration to daring men. The blockade had resulted in famine, which in turn led to trouble. The Alexandrians attempted to kill John, but failed. After this the inhabitants sent a letter of complaint to Maurice with the result that Maurice replaced John with Paulus (PLRE3 Paulus26) and recalled him to the capital to give a report of his own conduct. Maurice accepted John’s explanation and reinstated him back in office and gave him full authority over the city of Aykilah. When the inhabitants of Aykilah heard of the imminent return of John, they started a full-scale revolt throughout Egypt both on land and sea. The Tanânîkûn, Lakûrîn, Elmatrîdîn Elmasr, the Blue and Green Factions, and the ‘enemy of God from Bûsîr’ (Busiris) assembled in the city of Aykilah where they opened negotiations with Eulogius the Chalcedonian Patriarch of Alexandria, Ailas the Deacon, Mînâs (Menas) the assistant, and Ptolemy (Ptolemaios/PLRE3 Ptolemaeus3) the commander of the barbarians (foederati?). Their common purpose was to get rid of John, because they thought he would punish them for the actions they had taken. The rebels sent the daring Isaac with his freebooters to the Mediterranean where he managed to capture and sink large numbers of ships. After this he raided Cyprus and took much booty. Following this the rebels captured grain ships and imperial taxes in addition to which they forced the prefect of the city (must be Paulus) to send the taxes to them. The latter suggests that the rebels exchanged the grain ships for money.

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174  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 When John then reached Alexandria, he witnessed the great damage that the rebels had done to it. John appears to have been able to surprise the freebooters of Isaac because John of Nikiu states that he captured large numbers of ‘daring ones’ together with their ships in Alexandria after which he punished them. This action instilled great fear in the hearts of the rebels. The implication is that Maurice had given John a fleet with marines that he then used effectively to capture the rebels and their ships. The inclusion of the Patriarch of Alexandria and commander of the foederati in the above discussions, the location of the devastation (Alexandria), and the capture of the ships at Alexandria, all suggest that Alexandria had also revolted against Maurice at this time. In short, this was an important military operation for the restoration of order in the breadbasket of the Empire. On his arrival John assembled the forces of Alexandria (the soldiers and marines that John had brought with him plus those local soldiers and marines that had been accepted back into service), Egypt (which probably means those parts of the Ducate of Aegyptus that had remained loyal, presumably Aegyptus I so that Aegyptus II would have been in rebel hands), and Nubia (i.e. Thebaid) to attack the inhabitants of Aykilah. The list of forces means that the Dux Arcadiae had joined the rebels, as had Ptolemy the commander of the foederati from Alexandria. The loyalist forces were therefore divided by the rebel forces posted between them. According to John of Nikiu, the general Theodorus (PLRE3 Theodorus 59) came to John’s assistance. This is not surprising because Theodorus was the son of Zacharias, the man whom the rebels had attempted to kill in Busiris. He was a man valuable for the loyalist cause because he had previously served under Aristomachus. On the basis of the above and the subsequent campaign, it is probable that Theodorus was the Dux Thebaidis in charge of the Nubian border. Theodorus sent a secret letter to John in which he requested trained troops able to shoot with the bow. In addition, he requested the release of two men from prison, Cosmas son of Samuel and Bânôn (Banon) son of Ammon. One may make the educated guess that after their initial losses resulting from the loss of Alexandria the rebels had at least 5,000 professional soldiers from Aegyptus, perhaps 3,000 from Arcadia (Arcadia possessed ca. 3,422 men), perhaps 3,000 from the Circus Factions, and perhaps about 30,000 from the ranks of the pirates/bandits/ citizen militias/police forces, for a grand total of about 8,000 professionals and 33,000 paramilitary forces. It is more difficult to estimate the size of the loyalist forces because we do not know how many men John brought with him and how many of these he then dispatched to Theodorus. However, we know that he needed at least 63 warships (the provincial fleets are usually estimated to have possessed at least 62 dromons and one trireme) and about 10,000 men to overcome the Alexandrian fleet/pirate fleet. I would suggest that he brought with him about 100 ships plus troop transports that carried perhaps about 20,000 men. If he left 10,000 men behind in Alexandria to protect the city and to man the ships, he could have dispatched about 10,000 men and 60 ships to strengthen the army of Theodorus. Since the overall strength of the Army of Thebaid was about 6,844 men, Theodorus probably could have taken about 5,000 men north. This would have been sufficient to face the forces of Arcadia and force them to retreat northwards, but it was not enough to face the entire rebel force. Therefore, it is clear that the loyalists needed to unite their forces.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  175 Theodorus ordered Cosmas to proceed by land while Banon would proceed by sea. These two men presumably commanded the reinforcements sent by John. John of Nikiu unfortunately fails to specify to where the two men proceeded and where they met the forces of Theodorus. All he says is that once the armies had united, Theodorus and his men burned the rebel camp after which they advanced to Alexandria all the men, the bow-armed youths, and some stone-slingers. This implies that Theodorus marched with his men from Thebaid through Arcadia close to the Egyptian Delta where he united his army with those brought by Cosmas and Banon. It is probable that this rebel camp was the marching camp of the Army of Arcadia, and that the rebels had attempted to use the Army of Arcadia to isolate the Army of Thebaid from the loyalist forces of the north. However, I would suggest that the loyalists did not face the Army of Arcadia in Arcadia, but somewhere further north so that the Army of Arcadia would have been posted somewhere north of Babylon, possibly behind the Trajanic Canal or just north of the place where the two branches of the Nile (Bolbitic and Pelusian mouths) meet. The other alternative would be that the loyalist forces met at one of the major mouths of the Nile east of Alexandria (Pelusiac, Tanitic, Phatinitic, Sebennytic, Bolbitic), but this is less likely as it is difficult to believe that the rebels would not have attempted to prevent the unification of the loyalist armies. It is also probable that Theodorus now obtained further reinforcements from the Dukate of Augustamnica even if John of Nikiu does not say so. Once Theodorus had reached Alexandria, he took with him the five men, including Cosmas and Banon, whom he had released from prison. These men were used to obtain deserters from the ranks of the enemy. When Theodorus then reached some unnamed river (clearly the major branch of the Nile west of Aykilah), he deployed his army for combat. The loyalists were on the western bank of the river and the rebels on the eastern bank. The location implies that now Theodorus obtained reinforcements from Pentapolis/Libya before he marched against Aykilah. Theodorus embarked the ‘sturdy men’ (i.e. infantry) on the boats and made a landing on the eastern bank of the river. He left Cosmas and Banon with a numerous force of cavalry on the western bank. Just as Theodorus had foreseen, these two men were able to undermine the morale of the men on the opposite side of the river. They pointed out the hopelessness of the rebel situation. They cried that the Roman Empire was not enfeebled or subdued so they should not oppose the general. This brought results. Many of the rebels now deserted to the loyalists and joined the Roman troops. After this the Roman army attacked the inhabitants of Aykilah (this implies that only the citizens of Aykilah resisted) and defeated them. The inhabitants of Aykilah fled by night to a small city named Abûsân and from there towards Alexandria. The Romans (i.e. their mounted archers and other cavalry forces) pursued the fugitives and captured Abaskiron, Menas, Jacob, and Isaac. The four men were put on camels and paraded through Alexandria after which they were thrown into prison. On the basis of the above analysis of John of Nikiu’s text it is clear that Maurice faced far more serious troubles in Egypt and in the East in general than has been previously understood. The loss of Alexandria and most of the Nile Delta together with Arcadia to the rebels was a major problem for the Emperor in a situation in which the Eastern Field Army was in revolt not to mention the other problems Maurice was facing at the same time in other areas. The loss of the Egyptian grain could have been the final nail in his coffin had it not been ended by the swift military action of John and Theodorus.

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176  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602

5.1.3. The Visigoths and Romans during the Reign of Maurice in 582–60221 Leovigild and the Romans In 583 Leovigild launched his well-prepared main attack against his ungrateful son Hermenegild (John of Biclar 65–6). According to Gregory of Tours (5.38), Leovigild had bribed the commander of the Roman army with 30,000 pieces of gold to change sides in 582/3. In my opinion there are no compelling reasons to see this as an act of treason by the Roman commander. It is in fact quite probable that the commander had been instructed to act in this way, because the previous instance in which the Romans had supported a Catholic/Orthodox usurper, Athanagild, he had turned against them. It is entirely possible that the Roman strategy was to incite the Visigoths against each other to cause them maximum damage which the Romans then exploited by re-conquering territory in Spain. In fact, when one connects this with the change of strategy in Gaul, it becomes probable that the abandonment of both Hermenegild and Gundovald in Gaul (see pp.130–3) were just a part of the same set of diplomatic manoeuvrings by the Romans in which the men in question were just pawns. Regardless of the reasoning given above, it is still clear that one cannot entirely preclude the possibility of corruption and treason, as implied by the bribery of the commander, because the Roman officer cadre was corrupt to the bone. It should be noted however that if bribery and corruption were the real reasons for the abandonment of Hermenegild, it did not result in any disaster for the Romans. Consequently, when Hermenegild left his wife in Seville and led his army against the invader, the Roman commander and his men either did not join them or fled, with the result that Hermenegild was forced to flee to Seville. Once there, Hermenegild decided to attempt a stratagem rather than use his numerous but poorly trained army (consisting of ‘thousands of men’ – perhaps the citizen militia of Seville). This may imply that Hermenegild had been abandoned by the Romans in the middle of a battle, losing most of his Visigothic retinue, but this is uncertain. However, the Romans had definitely abandoned Hermenegild by the time he decided to attempt the stratagem. Hermenegild’s stratagem was to post 300 chosen soldiers inside the fortress of Osser (the springs of Osser near Seville), which means that Leovegild was advancing from Merida to Seville. Gregory of Tours (6.43) fails to specify how Hermenegild hoped this would work, which leaves two possibilities: that the intention was merely to delay his father Leovigild until Suevic reinforcements arrived; or that the intention was to use these 300 men as ambushers behind Leovigild’s forces if he advanced past them to besiege the city. However, Leovigild learnt of their presence and attacked the fortress with his entire force; the defenders were all killed and the place burned down. We have two different versions of what happened next. According to John of Biclar, Miro, the King of the Suevi, attempted to relieve Seville when Leovigild had already besieged it but was defeated and killed so that his son Eboric succeeded him. According to Gregory of Tours (HF 6.43), immediately after the capture of Osser, Leovigild learnt that Miro/Mir was close by in readiness to attack him with his army. This enabled Leovigild to surround Miro’s forces so that Miro was forced to concede a defeat and swear loyalty to him. After this Leovigild allowed Miro to return to his kingdom, where he died in bed

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because his health had been weakened by bad water and the poor air of Spain. His son Euric renewed the pact with Leovigild, but in the same year Audeca/Andica, the man who had married his sister, raised an army with which he overthrew Euric. Euric was first made a deacon and then a priest while Audeca married the widow of Miro. John of Biclar dates these events to 584–5. Gregory’s account is to be preferred in this case, because it is clear that John of Biclar has condensed the events.

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178  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 John of Biclar (66) is the only source to give any details of the subsequent siege of Seville. According to him, Leovigild first subjected the city to hunger, after which he inflicted damage with the sword, and then finally by blocking the Baetis River. The sequence is likely to be wrong. It is probable that Leovigild first attempted to storm the city with the sword and when this failed he resorted to the blocking of the Baetis River (Guadalquivir) after which followed hunger and presumably also thirst. Similarly, according to John of Biclar (67), Leovigild tightened the siege next year in 584 by restoring the walls of the ancient city of Italica near Seville. It is probable that this formed a part of the tightening of the siege which led to the abovementioned hunger. According to John of Biclar, at the same time as this took place, Audeca (584–5) usurped power in Galicia and married Siseguntia, the widow of Miro. Eboric was made a monk. The blockade was ineffective because Hermenegild was able to flee to imperial territory (John of Biclar 69), and despite the blockade and hunger, Seville did not surrender. Since Hermenegild was later captured at Cordoba, this implies that Cordoba lay in imperial territory, which in turn implies that Hermenegild must have handed it to the Romans in return for their support. The fact that the Roman magister had been bribed of course means that Hermenegild was not safe in Cordoba. According to John of Biclar, when this had taken place the forces of Leovigild stormed and conquered Seville. Leovigild exploited his victory by capturing the rest of the rebel cities and fortresses, after which Hermenegild was apprehended in Cordoba. According to Gregory of Tours (HF 5.38), Hermenegild had sought refuge in a church (clearly in Cordoba), where Leovigild sent Recared/Reccared to convince him to surrender. The reason why Leovigild could not resort to the use of force was that the city was probably still in Romans hands. John of Biclar is clear that Hermenegild had fled to Roman-held territory and Gregory of Tours (HF 6.40, 8.18, 8.28) makes it clear that Leovigild was unable to force the Romans to surrender Hermenegild’s wife. Because of this Hermenegild had handed over his wife and son to the imperial army for safekeeping. However, I still agree with Herwig Wolfram and others that the Roman magister had agreed to hand this city back to Leovigild in return for the bribe, but the circumstances also prove that the magister was not ready to hand it over before Hermenegild surrendered. He clearly wanted to maintain the pretence that the Romans had protected the refugee and the city. The existence of coins minted by Leovigild which bear the text CORDOBA BIS OPTINVIT prove that he recaptured it in 584.22 Reccared convinced Hermenegild that he would suffer no humiliation by surrendering. This, however, was not true. Leovigild deprived Hermenegild of his followers, took him to Toledo, exiled him to Valencia, and Cordoba was handed over to the Visigoths.23 The Romans had plans for Hermenegild’s wife. Ingund/Ingundis was the sister of Childebert II, King of the Austrasian Franks. The plan was clearly to use her as a bargaining chip (i.e. as a hostage) along with sizable bribes that Tiberius and Maurice had already paid to her brother Childebert to invade Lombard Italy on behalf of the Romans. The rumour of her being shipped to Constantinople mentioned by Gregory (HF 8.18) was clearly part of this plan. In truth, Ingund had died in Africa en route to Constantinople in 584 or at the latest 585. The plan also worked because Childebert invaded Italy in 584 and again in 585. However, neither of these campaigns brought any tangible results for the Romans or the Austrasian Franks.24

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  179 Now that the revolt of Leovigild’s son Hermenegild had been crushed it was the turn of the Suevi to face the Visigothic music. Leovigild advanced against them immediately in 585, defeated and captured King Audeca, and made Galicia a province of the Visigoths. Audeca was tonsured as a monk. This was the end of the kingdom of the Suevi. The Romans could no longer use them as allies. Hermenegild was killed by Sisbert at Tarragona in the same year. It is not known why Hermenegild was there because his place of exile was Valencia. Perhaps he had left his place of imprisonment and tried to raise the revolt again, or perhaps he tried to flee to the kingdom of the Austrasian Franks and had to be assassinated before he could do further damage. Alternatively, perhaps he had been taken there on the orders of his father and then executed. The former is likelier in particular because according to John of Biclar (73–75) the Burgundian Franks were invading Gallia Narbonensis at this same time. This suggests Hermenegild might have been trying to flee to the Franks while the Franks were invading Leovigild’s territory. We have two versions of the invasion of Septimania in 585, which took place soon after the Gundovald affair had collapsed; it is practically certain the Burgundian Franks did this as Roman allies. As noted, it is also probable that the Suevi were Roman allies too. According to Biclar, when the Franks invaded Gallia Narbonensis, Leovigild dispatched his son Reccared to meet them. He was unable to do it himself because in 585 he was busy fighting against the Suevi: the just subjugated Suevi had raised a revolt under the leadership of Malaric; it was crushed by the generals of Leovigild. Reccared defeated the invaders, drove them back from Gallia Narbonensis, and then captured large numbers of enemy and two fortresses, one through surrender, the other after a battle. He also captured a fortress called Ugernum on the edge of the Rhône, after which he returned to his country. According to the longer version provided by Gregory of Tours (HF 8.28–30), Leovigild had sent a letter to Fredegund which was found by the agents of King Guntram just when he was about to invade Septimania. Fredegund was the widow of Chilperic I, who had been murdered in 584, the ally of Leovigild. Leovigild had asked Fredegund to prevent the invasion of Septimania by any means possible. This included the suggestion to murder Childebert II and his mother Brunhild (also a Visigothic princess) and the making of peace with Guntram. Fredegund had previously assassinated Sigibert, the father of Childebert, and she was fiercely protective of her underage son Chlotharius/Lothar, so the letter of Leovigild carried some weight. Furthermore, Fredegund and her son were at the time allied and protected by Guntram, which should have helped her in peace negotiations. However, Childebert and Guntram were allies at this time and Guntram had adopted Childebert as his son, so Guntram immediately warned Childebert of the assassination plot. Consequently, when the assassin clerics of Fredegund attempted to carry out their mission, all were captured, interrogated and punished. In other words, the invasion plans were well-known in Spain and Leovigild attempted to prevent it by any means possible, but the special operatives of Guntram were even better at their job than those of his enemy. At this time, in 585, both Guntram and Childebert appear to have acted as allies of Rome because Guntram invaded Septimania while Childebert invaded Italy. The invading army of Guntram was massive but undisciplined. It included not only Burgundians but also people from beyond the Saône, the Rhône and the Seine. His force

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180  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 was divided into two armies. The first consisted of men of Bourges, Saintes, Périgueux and Angoulême (i.e. from Aquitania) and they advanced as far as Carcassonne. The Carcassonnais had left one of the gates open thus allowing the invaders inside without resistance, but once they had entered the city quarrels arose between the citizens and invaders with the result that the invaders marched out again. It was then that Terentiolus, the former comes of Limoges, was killed just outside the gate by a stone thrown from the walls. The citizens ran out and cut off his head which they took inside the town as a trophy. This sight frightened the invaders so badly that they abandoned all of their booty and fled. The sequence of events suggests that the Carcassonnais had used a ruse which allowed them to kill the enemy commander. The Goths set ambushes on their route of retreat so they suffered further losses, and the rest fell into the hands of the people of Toulouse who took revenge for their earlier treatment at the hands of their ‘own Frankish army’. The survivors were allowed to return to their homes. The second part of his force advanced from Burgundy under dux Nicetius. It destroyed the crops and herds along the Saône and Rhône, killed large numbers of men, torched buildings, slaughtered clergy and civilians, pillaged churches and other property, and they did this even in their own territory. This force eventually reached the neighbourhood of Nîmes where they ravaged the surrounding areas, burned the houses and crops, cut the olive-groves and destroyed the vineyards. They were unable to achieve anything against Nîmes itself, so they marched on to other towns. These cities were well-fortified and supplied with all the necessities, but dux Nicetius, who had started the expedition with the men of Clermont-Ferrand, besieged them with his own men and other forces serving under him. Nicetius’s forces achieved nothing until he resorted to a ruse. At some unnamed city he promised the inhabitants that they would not suffer any harm if they allowed him in. The inhabitants foolishly believed him and allowed his army in, with the result that the Franks pillaged everything and enslaved the people. Nicetius and the other commanders had now obtained some booty so they decided to return home. When the force reached the neighbourhood of Clermont they pillaged all the churches near the public highway. However, their return proved difficult, because they returned by the same route they had come, on which they had destroyed the crops, and so the soldiers suffered from severe hunger. The commanders in charge of these operations were clearly quite incompetent. On top of this, the locals gathered up enough courage to harass them, and altogether more than 5,000 invaders died. It is therefore not surprising that Guntram was angry. The frightened leaders of this expedition sought a place of refuge from the Church of Saint Symphorian the Martyr at Autun. Guntram summoned the bishops and nobility and suggested they should execute one or two of the commanders as warning examples. The commanders excused themselves by claiming that they could not control their men because had they done so they would have faced a revolt. The punishment was apparently not carried out because at that moment a messenger arrived with the news that Reccared had invaded. He had captured the castle of Cabaret, ravaged the territory of Toulouse, taken captives, attacked the castle of Beucaire near Arles where he had taken captives and booty, and marched to Nîmes, which served as his headquarters. Guntram’s response was to appoint comes stabuli Leudegisel as replacement for Aegyla/Egilan Calumniosus (probably the successor of Terentiolus) with the task of protecting the Arles region with an additional

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  181 4,000 men as his frontier guards while Nicetius, dux of Clermont, acted as his protective vanguard force along the border. Reccared and Romans In 586 Leovigild died and was succeeded by his son Reccared/Reccaredus (586–601). This succession did not follow the Visigothic custom which required election by Gothic nobility, but Reccared’s position was so strong that he rose to the throne without resistance. One of the first actions of Reccared was to make peace with his father’s wife Goisuntha (Goisuintha/Goiswinth). Goisuntha advised Reccared to dispatch envoys to the courts of Guntram and Childebert to seek peace, but with mixed results. Guntram did not even receive the envoys, but Childebert received them and concluded a peace. Reccared’s next move was to raise the ante. He launched an offensive and raided the territory of Guntram around Narbonne with the idea of convincing Guntram to agree to the peace too. This did not work. Reccared converted to Catholicism in February 587. The reason for this conversion is not known. Thompson speculates it is possible that there were already so many Visigothic converts that it made sense. He correctly points out that the conversion did not play any important role in the dealings with the Frankish kings, even if it ultimately helped to ease their relationship. It is also possible that he did this to gather support for his rule among the native Romans. On paper the conversion made him a natural ally of the Romans, but in practice it did not protect him from the Romans or the Franks. While Childebert continued to maintain peace and gave his provisional permission for the marriage of his sister Chlodosind/Chlodosinda to Reccared (Childebert also wanted the permission of Guntram), Guntram remained as hostile as ever. He did not trust the Visigothic ruler. However, the reaction of the Arian sect to the conversion was hostile. Reccared faced troubles between his conversion in February 587 and the end of 590. He faced his first trouble in 588. It was a revolt led by Sunna, the Arian Bishop of Merida. It was supported by some Gothic comites civitatis, the most important of whom were Segga and Vagrila, but the vast majority of those who joined the revolt were still Catholics who just opposed the new ruler. They intended to kill Masona, the Catholic Bishop of Merida, and to replace the king Reccared with Segga. Claudius, Dux of Lusitania, crushed the revolt.25 According to John of Biclar (86), Guntram the Frankish King of Burgundy dispatched his general Desiderius against theVisigoths in 587, but Reccared’s Gothic generals defeated and killed both Desiderius and a multitude of Franks. Gregory of Tours (HF 8.45) gives further details. Dux Desiderius and comes Austrovald advanced against Carcassone, but the Carcassonnais had learned of this well in advance. When the two armies faced each other, the Goths feigned flight with both Desiderius and Austrovald in hot pursuit. When Desiderius then reached the city gate with only a handful of men because their horses were exhausted, the citizens surrounded and killed all of them. When Austrovald heard that Desiderius had been killed he fled and went to meet Guntram who then appointed him dux instead of Desiderius.26 In 588 after the defeats Guntram finally appeared to accept the pleas of peace from Reccared. He provisionally accepted the marriage pact between Reccared and

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182  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chlodosinda/Chlodosind, but instead of putting this into effect Guntram dispatched a 60,000-strong army under Boso (not to be confused with Guntram Boso) to Gallia Narbonensis/Septimania where he pitched his camp next to Carcassonne in 589. The reason for the sudden change of heart seems to have been that in early 589 Reccared faced a conspiracy and revolt. The conspiracy led by Goisuntha was found out and therefore easily crushed, but the second of the problems, the revolt, was more serious and it was this that convinced Guntram to act. The rich comites called Granista and Wildigern, the Arian bishop Athaloc and other Arians revolted in Narbonne and asked help from Guntram/Gunthram, which he eagerly provided to exact revenge for the invasions conducted by Reccared. As noted by Thompson, this shows how little importance the Franks gave to the fact that Reccared had converted to Catholicism. The Franks were now supporting the Arian revolt against the Catholics. Guntram’s policies were clearly based on realpolitik. Reccared ordered Claudius, the commander of Lusitania, to intercept the invaders, which he did successfully.27 According to Isidore of Seville (54), Claudius achieved the greatest victory ever achieved by the Goths. Thousands of enemy were killed and captured and the survivors were pursued to the boundaries of the Visigothic kingdom. This indeed seems to be the case if the figures of John of Biclar (91) are correct. He claims that Claudius defeated in battle almost 60,000 Franks with scarcely 300 men (plus their squires?). The battle was decided with the death of the Frankish commander Boso in an ambush. The Franks were put to flight, their camp seized and the army slaughtered.28 This may sound incredible, but both John Biclar and Gregory of Tours do state that the result was incredible. They credit the victory to the conversion into the Catholic faith. Reccared also faced a series of invasions by the Romans and Basques/Vascones. It is probable that the Romans coordinated their invasions with those of the Basques and Franks. This suggests a possibility in which the Romans had sent some new reinforcements to Spain. However, unlike before, these invasions appear not to have resulted in any new conquests/reconquests for the Romans because according to Isidore (54) these fights seemed more like military training in the manner of wrestling contests than real wars – i.e. these were wars of manoeuvre much akin to some of the condottiere wars of Renaissance-era Italy. The Romans were not able to exploit fully the troubles of Reccared thanks to the conspiracies and Frankish invasions between the 587 and 590 some of which they may have in fact encouraged, either openly or in the background. The conversion of Reccared to the Catholic faith signalled that he intended to change policies. It was because of the conversion that he returned property confiscated by his Arian father. It endeared him to his Catholic subjects and also apparently with the Romans as we shall see. Then in May 589 or 590 Reccared took the next logical step by convening a holy synod in his capital Toledo.29 It was now that all of his non-Catholic subjects, the Goths included, converted to the Catholic/Orthodox sect. This meant that all of his subjects were finally united under the same faith and ruler – the Suevi had already converted earlier. In my opinion, there are reasons to think that the conversion of the Goths also signalled a change in Reccared’s relations with the Romans.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  183 An inscription states that a man called Comenciolus (i.e. Comentiolus/Komentiolos) was patricius and magister militum Spaniae in September 589/August 590, and that he had one of the gates of Carthago Nova (Cartagena) strengthened. If this Comenciolus is to be identified with Comentiolus, the usual assumption is that he was back in the East as MVM per Orientem by about autumn 589 so the inscription would date from the period after Comentiolus had already left.30 The identification is not certain (Comenciolus vs. Comentiolus), but very likely, and receives further support from my re-dating of the events in the Eastern frontier. In other words, he was in office when the inscription was made. And why would Maurice have sent his trusted man to Spain? One possible answer would be that he (or someone called Comenciolus with similarly high status) was sent to negotiate with Reccared, the end of which was the conclusion of the peace between the empires – because there has to have been a period of peace between the empires for Isidore of Seville (55) to be able to call Reccared peaceful, gentle and a good man. I would suggest that the conversion of the Goths to the Catholic/Orthodox faith in 589 or 590 formed a part of the deal achieved between Comentiolus/Comenciolus and Reccared in 588–9. The peace also meant that the Romans stopped their incursions into the Visigothic realm, because according to Isidore (54) the aggressors had been the Romans and Basques and not the Visigoths. This suggests a possibility in which Maurice concluded a peace with Reccared so he was able to transfer some of his forces from Spain to Italy, the Balkans and/or the East. Italy is a distinct possibility because the Romans started a major campaign there in 590 and it is closer to Spain. After the failed campaign against Septimania in 589, Guntram started to harbour suspicions that Childebert had hostile intentions, so he closed his borders. Guntram accused Childebert of concluding an alliance with the Goths and that it was because of this that his army had been wiped out and that Brunhild had advised Childebert to do so. There were other likely reasons for this suspicion too. Earlier in 589 Guntram had advised Childebert to accept the peace offering made by the Lombards and when Childebert had not followed it was all too easy for Guntram to suspect that Childebert’s real intention was to invade his territory. After all, Childebert had already assembled an army in readiness with the official intention of invading Italy, which he could use for this purpose. Furthermore, as I have noted above, it is probable that the Romans and Reccared concluded a peace with each other at the same time as Guntram’s forces invaded Reccared’s territory. It would have been easy in such circumstances to think that the Romans had double-crossed both Guntram and Childebert and after that for Guntram to start to think that both the Romans and Childebert had double-crossed him. Guntram assembled a council of bishops in November 589 to discuss this suspicion, which cleared the air. Brunhild gave an oath in which she vowed that she was not guilty of the accusations, so all could return to home. Guntram opened the borders again and Childebert’s forces invaded Lombardian territory in conjunction with the Romans in 590. After the campaign in Italy failed Guntram was finally able to convince Childebert to conclude a peace with the Lombardians. It is easy to see why Guntram did not want to help the Romans anymore.31 It is probable that some of the Arian Goths detested the conversion of 589 or 590, because immediately after this we find a member of Reccared’s own household, the provincial general Argimund, leading an assassination attempt against him. This was yet

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184  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 another attempt on Reccared’s life in quick succession. The plot was detected and the culprits punished, so the Romans could breathe a sigh of relief. It is probable that the peaceful period between Reccared and the Romans occurred during the years 589 and 601. Reccared died in 601 and was succeeded by his son Liuva II. He was killed in about 602/3 by Witteric who usurped power. This was the end of the dynasty of Leovigild and the end of the peace between the Romans and Visigoths.

5.1.4.  Gaul and Italy under Maurice in 582–92 Diplomatic manoeuvres and wars 582–4 582: Emperor Maurice followed the same strategy in Italy and Gaul as had been followed by his predecessor Tiberius II and before him Justinian I the Great, which was seeking

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  185 allies in Gaul for use in Italy. One of his first actions as Emperor, Maurice appears to have concluded or rather renewed an alliance with the court of Childebert II. Maurice paid the Austrasian Franks 50,000 solidi for their help against the Lombards. This also entailed the continuation of the alliance with both the Neustrian and Austrasian Franks. In short, Maurice’s strategy in Italy was based on taking the offensive with the help of his Frankish allies. On the basis of Michael Syrus (Michael Rabo 10.21, p.423), some of the Lombard duces in their turn allied themselves with the Avars some time between very late 582 and summer 583. Michael the Syrian claims that the Lombards were subjects of the Avar Khagan, but this is strictly speaking not true, though I would not preclude the possibility that these duces could have temporarily recognized the Khagan as their overlord. 583: In 583 Chilperic and Childebert II renewed their alliance against Guntram. Even if not stated by the sources, it is not unlikely that the Romans acted as mediators between these two courts, because both were their allies. Chilperic exploited the alliance immediately by invading the territory of Guntram. However, Guntram was able to inflict a decisive defeat on Chilperic before he could get any help from the Austrasians. The reason for this was that the lower ranks (minor populus) in the army of Childebert II had raised a mutiny against Bishop Egidius and other advisors so that the Austrasian forces were unable to join their ally Chilperic. In their opinion these men were betraying their kingdom. It had been Chilperic who had assassinated Childebert’s father Sigibert. Meanwhile, Chilperic sued for peace, which Guntram agreed to grant in return for compensation. Goffart has rightly suggested that the mutiny of the minor populus of Childebert II meant that the pro-Guntram faction had ousted the dominant seniores faction from power. This means that the two sides could now resume their negotiations for a joint alliance against Chilperic. Guntram returned half of Marseilles to Childebert in 584 and the two sides now agreed to conduct a joint campaign against Chilperic.32 584: This means that Childebert and Guntram had now formed an alliance against both Chilperic and the Visigothic King Leovigild, ally of Chilperic, while Childebert remained allied with the Romans because he conducted a campaign against the Lombards in 584. It begs the questions, was Chilperic still a Roman ally, and what was the status of Guntram? Guntram and Childebert were now enemies of Leovigild, but he was no longer the enemy of the Romans, because the Romans had betrayed his son Hermenegild to him while the Romans had taken Hermenegild’s wife and child for safekeeping – as hostages. Furthermore, Chilperic and Leovigild were allies, their alliance being sealed with the final details pertaining to the marriage contract between Chilperic’s daughter with Leovigild’s son early in 584. Soon after this Theoderic, son of Chilperic, died. The death of the heir changed the political equation again.33 Some time in the spring or summer Leovigild sent an envoy called Oppila to meet Chilperic because he was worried that Childebert II would invade his territory because he had imprisoned his son Hermenegild while Hermenegild’s wife was in the hands of the Greeks. Chilperic was likewise worried that Guntram and Childebert would invade so he was also eager to reaffirm their alliance. Chilperic prepared for the war by withdrawing to Cambrai, after which he sent messengers to his duces and comites to repair the walls of the cities and take their families and property inside. After this he marched his army towards

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186  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 the enemy frontiers in a threatening manner, but never crossed the borders. This kept his enemies on their toes. Meanwhile, Fredegund bore Chilperic a new son, Lothar, as heir, but his existence was kept hidden to protect him against possible enemies.34 The alliance between Guntram and Childebert neutralized the threat posed by Chilperic so that Childebert was able to lead his army into northern Italy against the Lombards probably in the summer 584, because it was then that some of the Lombard duces from the north were fighting against the Romans in Istria as allies of the Avars (Michael Syrus 10.21). One of the preparatory measures that Maurice adopted for this appears to have been the creation of the office of exarch in Italy (exarchus Italiae), because Decius is attested to have been exarch of Italy on 4 October 584.35 As with the exarchus Africae, the office of exarch combined civilian and military offices under a single commander. The Frankish invasion was aided by the fact that the Lombards lacked unified command, on top of which some of the ducal armies were absent because they had invaded Istria. The Lombard duces locked themselves inside their cities. The Franks were unable to take the cities so the invasion resulted in a stalemate. Since the Lombard duces lacked unified authority, they were forced to sue for peace, which they did by submitting formally to Childebert’s authority with oaths and by paying tribute. Childebert considered this a mission accomplished and returned to Gaul. The Austrasian Franks were just as unreliable as allies as the Franks had been when Justinian I had used them as his allies against the Ostrogoths in Italy. They always had their own goals. The Austrasians considered their military goals fulfilled when the Lombards recognized the Austrasians as their lords by paying tribute to them. The Romans had a different view of the goals of the alliance which the Austrasians just pretended to share as long as it was in their interest. The Romans always sought to submit the Lombards under their rule. The Austrasian army was then disbanded because we find Childebert II later assembling a new force for the invasion of Spain, but this campaign was abandoned. The likely reason for this was that Hermenegild had already surrendered and Childebert’s sister was in Roman hands. When Emperor Maurice learnt that Childebert had made peace with the Lombards, Maurice felt cheated and demanded through envoys that Childebert return the 50,000 solidi that had been sent to him. Childebert was so sure of his power that he did not even bother to answer, but then he heard the news/rumour that his sister Ingund had been transferred to Constantinople – this was quite clearly Roman disinformation meant to convince Childebert to act as they wished, and, as we shall see, it worked because Childebert invaded Italy again in 585.36 It was clearly the success of the Austrasian Franks in 584 that convinced most of the Lombard duces to reconsider their stance against the choosing of a king. They needed unified command to be able to survive a major invasion like that which had taken place in 584. Their choice fell on Authari, the son of their previous King Clef. He was given the name Flavius in imitation of the practice followed by Theoderic the Great. This name gave him an imaginary connection with the Flavian imperial house of Vespasian, a connection which had also been claimed by some of the later Roman emperors and Odoacer and also by the Visigothic kings after Reccared. All of the subsequent Lombard kings used this name to gather them supporters from the local Italian population. The duces agreed to give up half of their taxes for use by the king so that he would possess adequate resources

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  187 against the enemy. The duces had previously controlled two thirds of the taxes; this meant that one third of the taxes were now allocated for local self-government, one third for the duces and one third for the king. The choosing of the new king naturally meant the breaking up of the agreement between the Franks and Lombards. The Lombard duces no longer recognized Childebert as their king. However, Authari was not recognized by all of the Lombard duces or by those Lombard leaders who had joined the Romans. The most important of the former were the dukedoms of Beneventum and Spoleto because they had nothing to fear from the Franks, while the most important of the latter group was dux Droctulf/Droctulfus. He was originally a Suavian/Alamannian who had been taken captive by the Lombards and raised as a Lombard. He eventually rose to become a dux, but not unnaturally he deserted to the Romans at the first opportunity.37 Fredegar 4.45 gives us a different account of what took place. He claims that during the time the Lombards lived under twelve duces (an incorrect figure) they handed over to Guntram the cities of Aosta and Susa (of these at least Susa was actually in Roman hands). This clearly describes the events of the year 574 already described above. Fredegar states that then each of the twelve duces sent envoys to Maurice to beg for peace and protection while also dispatching envoys to Guntram and Childebert who begged their help and protection in return for an annual tribute of 12,000 solidi. The twelve duces gave Guntram the valley of Lanzo as a pledge and then submitted to his rule. Then they chose dux Authari as their king with the permission of both Guntram and Childebert, while another similarly named dux (possibly Droctulf) handed his duchy to the Emperor Maurice. Fredegar claims that Authari continued to pay the tribute until he died and so did his son. There are several problems with this account. Firstly, it is clear that the Lombard duces had previously submitted to Childebert II and not to Guntram. Secondly, it is unlikely that Guntram and Childebert would have jointly given permission for the Lombards to choose a king. Thirdly, it is very unlikely that Authari paid the Austrasian Franks anything when he became king because the Austrasian Franks invaded his territories in 585 – however, it is possible that they paid that amount to Guntram alone to sow disagreement between the kings. However, it is still probable that Fredegar has preserved us bits of information that were based on real events. I would suggest that the above refers to the situation when the forces of Childebert invaded Italy in 584 and that it was because of this that the twelve Lombard duces dispatched envoys to Maurice, Guntram and Childebert, and that the sending of envoys to Guntram was meant to divide the Franks so that Guntram would convince Childebert II to abandon his campaign. From the more reliable Gregory of Tours we learn that the Lombards were eventually forced to submit to Childebert II, so it is clear that the efforts of the duces had been in vain. Considering the fact that Fredegar is not among the most reliable of the sources, it is possible that he has confused events so that the 12,000 solidi would have actually been the sum of money the Lombard duces paid as tribute to Childebert in 584. Similarly, if Fredegar has muddled up the material, it is not too far fetched to think that the transferral of the tributes from Guntram to Childbert was one of the reasons for Guntram’s sudden hostility towards Childebert II. Regardless of these doubts, I would still suggest that Fredegar has preserved the truth in this case so that the 12 duces and then Authari did indeed pay Guntram the 12,000 solidi tribute and continued to do so to obtain his neutrality in a situation in which the

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188  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 appointment of Authari as a king of the Lombards broke up their treaty with Childebert. Whatever the truth about the payments, we know that the relationship between Guntram and Childebert II soured later that year. This becomes evident in the context of the death of Chilperic I and in the Gundovald affair. Guntram might have thought that Childebert had bypassed his interests in Italy, and after all the Gundovald affair had been meant to overthrow him. The Romans and sections of the Austrasian royal court clearly did not accept Guntram’s conciliatory stance towards the Lombards. It is also clear that the nomination of Authari as king was not made with the permission of Childebert, while it is probable that he was nominated with the approval of Guntram and because of this we find this account in Fredegar’s Chronicle. One of the first actions of Authari as king was to secure the Lombards’ position in the north. This entailed the crushing of any opposition to his rule. Paul the Deacon mentions only the dux Droctulf, who had pledged allegiance to Maurice, but if we think that Fredegar has preserved for us the original number of duces who chose Authari, then we may think that perhaps about twenty duces in the north did not join ranks with Authari. There was nothing that Authari could do about the dukedoms of Spoleto and Beneventum, because Roman-held territories were between them. Therefore, even if Paul the Deacon mentions only the operations against Droctulf, it is probable that Authari waged other campaigns too in the north to secure his position. According to Paul the Deacon, Droctulf had fled to Brexillus (Brescello) on the bank of the Po (about ten miles from Parma on the Aemilian Way) where he had been joined by Roman soldiers. Droctulf resisted the Lombards bravely but was defeated and forced to flee to Ravenna. It is not certain whether this event took place in late 584 or in early 585 before the Frankish invasion of Italy or later in 585 after the Frankish invasion of Italy.38 The assassination of Chilperic I and the end of the Gundovald affair in 584–539 The years 584–5 saw important developments taking place in Gaul, which merit detailed analysis because they influenced the events in Spain and Italy. As already noted, the leading members of the court of Childebert II formed a plot to kill Guntram in about 580–1 and with this in mind they had called Gundovald back from Constantinople to Gaul in 581. The Emperor Tiberius II supported this because he wanted to obtain the support of the Austrasian Franks against the Lombards. The plotters consisted at least of Brunhild, Bishop Egidius and Ebregesil. Ebregesil apparently convinced Brunhild to marry Gundovald so that the two kingdoms would be joined through marriage. The role of Wandelen, the tutor of Childebert, is uncertain, but I would suggest that he did not belong to the plotters because his name is nowhere mentioned in this context. The plotters convinced the Burgundian duces Mummolus and Guntram Boso to join the plot; it was the latter who travelled to Constantinople with the letters of the leading members of Childebert’s court. This first part of the plot came to nothing because when Gundovald arrived in 582, the Austrasian Franks no longer trusted Chilperic and neither did the Romans. In fact, Chilperic had become an enemy of both by allying himself with the Visigothic King Leovigild. Therefore, when King Guntram and Childebert then became allies in 584, the same leading members of Childebert’s court together with Mummolus decided to assassinate Chilperic while Gundovald was recalled to Gaul. It is likely that the Romans supported

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  189 this goal because they had given Gundovald a place of refuge. Also, the murder of Chilperic would prevent his alliance with Leovigild. They were assisted by high ranking Neustrian Franks who included at least duces Desiderius and Bladast, bishops Sagittarius and Bertram, wealthy Chariulf, Waddo and the treasury officials who deserted to Childebert after the death of Chilperic. Of these at least Desiderius had conspired with Mummolus on behalf of Gundovald in 582. Waddo delayed the retinue of Rigunth, the daughter of Chilperic who had been dispatched to Spain, so that her treasure could be used to support the usurpation of Gundovald while an assassin sent from the court of Childebert killed Chilperic. After the assassination had been completed, the first setback for the plot was that they did not know that Chilperic and Fredegund had had a son – Lothar. When Guntram learnt this, he changed his plans. He decided to protect Fredegund and Lothar, and it was this that convinced many of the nobles of Chilperic’s kingdom to side against both Childebert and Gundovald. The second of the setbacks was the secret letter of Gundovald falling into the hands of King Guntram, the contents of which he was able to confirm by torturing the envoys sent by Gundovald. This in turn enabled him to convince Childebert to turn against his advisors (had they supported unification with the Roman Empire?) and abandon the plot so that Guntram could concentrate all of his forces against Gundovald. Strangely enough this outcome was still a success from the Roman point of view because it had prevented the alliance between the Neustrian Franks and the Visigoths of Spain. The Gundovald affair had not alienated Guntram and Childebert. Gundovald had just been a pawn in the game the aim of which had been to get rid of Chilperic. Both were to serve as allies of Rome in this year, 585, because Guntram invaded Visigothic territory while the forces of Childebert II invaded Lombard-held territory. See also the chapter dealing with Visigothic Spain. After the death of Gundovald, Guntram continued his efforts to punish those that he held responsible for the murder of his brother Chilperic, but this led to troubles with the court of Childebert. Guntram imprisoned Bishop Theodore because he held him responsible for the murder, and because of this Childebert failed to follow the agreement made between the kings. In fact Childebert’s ultimatum was that if any harm came to Theodore there would be trouble. The two courts patched up their differences. Theodore was allowed to return to Marseilles while Childebert’s court punished Guntram Boso for other reasons, so the latter was forced to flee. It was this reconciliation that enabled the Romans to use the Frankish kings against their enemies in the coming years.40 Joint operations of the Franks and Romans against the Lombards in Italy in 584–9041 582–4: As noted above, the Emperor Maurice followed the same strategy in Gaul and Italy as his predecessors Justinian I the Great, Justin II and Tiberius II.42 He had sent 50,000 solidi in about 582 to the court of Childebert II, and because of this Childebert dispatched his forces to north Italy in 584 with the result that the Lombard duces submitted to his authority. The plotting within the Frankish realm delayed the operation until 584, which means that the Lombard duces who had allied themselves with the Avars were not distracted by the Frankish invasion, as had clearly been planned by Maurice. Michael Syrus (Rabo 10.21, p. 423) states that the Lombards captured two Roman cities, which I take to mean some cities in Istria or Dalmatia because Michael Syrus was discussing events that took

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190  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 place in the Balkans. When the Frankish invasion of Italy was stopped when the Lombards promised to pay tribute in 584, Maurice demanded the money back from the unreliable Franks, but his request was ignored. There appear to have been three reasons for this: 1) the negotiating position of the Franks was strong; 2) Childebert and Brunhild planned to invade Spain to help Hermenegild and his Frankish wife Ingund; 3) the plan was altered to assassinate Chilperic and replace him with Gundovald. As noted above, the change in plans in the use of Gundovald appears to have been done with Roman acceptance because the murder of Chilperic prevented the conclusion of closer ties between the Neustrian Franks and Visigoths. Gundovald was allowed to leave his island refuge while Maurice sent a new payment in gold for the Austrasian Franks in 584 so that they would attack the Lombards in 585. It appears probable that the attack of Lombardian Italy was delayed. The envoys of the Emperor Maurice would not have demanded the return of the gold that Maurice had given to Childebert II in the previous year if the attack had taken place when planned. The likely reasons for the delay were: 1) the Gundovald affair that continued into 585; 2) the temporary disagreement between Guntram and Childebert resulting from the arrest of Bishop Theodore by Guntram’s men. Once the kings had patched up their differences, they were prepared to put into effect their campaigns. However, the Visigothic King Leovigild was aware of the invasion plans of Guntram and therefore dispatched a secret letter to Fredegund. Leovigild instructed her to kill Childebert and Brunhild immediately, and then buy peace from Guntram by any means possible. He would provide the money if necessary. Once these errands had been achieved Fredegund was to reward Bishop Amelius and Lady Leuba (mother-in-law of Bladast), because it was thanks to them that they were able to exchange secret messages. However, the letter in question fell into the hands of King Guntram’s operatives. The secret network included some peasants and the letter was found in their possession. Guntram’s secret service was clearly among the best of its age. It was always abreast of what was happening. This enabled Guntram to warn Childebert. Fredegund, however, got the message by an alternative route and attempted to assassinate Brunhild, but without success. 585: Guntram then duly invaded Septimania in 585. His stated purpose was to exact revenge against Leovigild for the treatment of Hermenegild and his wife Ingund, sister of Childebert II (see the chapter on Visigothic Spain) while Childebert II invaded Italy. The reasons for Childebert’s campaign against the Lombards were the demand made by the Roman envoys and the false claim that Ingund had been transferred to Constantinople. It was presumably mainly the latter that convinced Childebert to dispatch his army across the Alps. The campaign, however, proved a fiasco when the commanders quarrelled with each other. The quarrel followed tribal lines: the Franks were on the one side and the Suevi/Alamanni on the other. Soon after this Childebert II learnt that Ingund had died and that the Romans held her son Athanagild in Constantinople. So he dispatched Babo and Grippo as his envoys in late 585 or early 586 to Constantinople to negotiate the release of Athanagild. This naturally failed because Athanagild was too valuable for the Romans as a hostage. Maurice planned to use him as leverage in future negotations with the Austrasian Franks whose help he needed against the Lombards in Italy in the coming years.43

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  191 According to John of Biclar, Authari defeated the Romans in battle in the third year of Maurice (585) and then captured Italy while killing large numbers of Roman soldiers. It is not entirely certain whether this refers to the defeat suffered by Droctulf at Brexillus and/or to a separate battle under the command of exarch Smaragdus, or some other commander who suffered a defeat somewhere near Ravenna. On the basis of Paul the Deacon (3.18), the former appears to be true, because he claims that it was after the defeated Droctulf and Romans withdrew from Brexillus to Ravenna that Authari and the Romans concluded a truce for three years. It is not known what had happened to exarch Decius (had he been killed at Brexillus and his successor Smaragdus concluded the truce?) or when Smaragdus had succeeded him. The help provided by the Austrasian Franks was clearly quite ineffective. They were not particularly reliable allies. The truce enabled the Romans to transfer forces from Italy to the Balkans where they were more urgently needed; Droctulf served in the Balkans in 587.44 586: It is possible on the basis of Paul the Deacon’s account (HL 3.13, 3.19) of Droctulf ’s career that there was also fighting in the neighbourhood of Ravenna which took place either in late 585 or in 586 (the latter being likelier), before the signing of the three-year truce between Authari and the Romans, if his account follows chronological order as it appears to, but it is even likelier that this fighting took place only after the signing of the truce because the parties to the conflict were the Romans and the Dux of Spoleto and the latter was not a subject of Authari. According to Paul, after Droctulf had fled to Ravenna, he began operations against the Lombards that occupied the Classis, the harbour of Ravenna. The first Dux of Spoleto Faroald had captured and plundered the Classis during the reign of Tiberius in ca. 579 (PD HL 3.13) and it is possible that it was still in his hands in 585, but it is also possible that he had in the meantime abandoned it and captured it again in 585, because if Paul’s account (HL 3.19) follows chronological order Faroald captured Classis through treachery after Droctulf had retreated to Ravenna. The former, however, is likelier. It is entirely possible that Paul was just referring to the capture he had mentioned in 3.13 and that the matter became timely again when the Romans with the help of Droctulf started operations to regain Classis from Faroald who was not protected by the truce. According to Paul, the Romans and Droctulf prepared a fleet and then used it to fight on the Badrinus (Padreno, one of the mouths of the Po about thirty miles from Ravenna) and it was there that the Romans with the help of Droctulf defeated a countless host of Lombards so that Classis was liberated from Lombard oppression. After this we find Droctulf fighting against the Avars in Thrace in 587, which means that the abovementioned events probably took place in 586. In 586, Pope Pelagius II asked Maurice to instruct Smaragdus to support him against the heretic bishops, which Smaragdus did in 586. Smaragdus followed this same policy in future years because he apparently thought that it was in the interest of the Emperor to support the position of the Pope – the Pope had an important role in Roman diplomacy. The Church was basically an arm of the state; the clergy guided the populace and soldiers on behalf of the ruler and conducted diplomatic and even military missions. The Romans were not alone in using the Church: all of the successor states relied on their clergymen for various tasks. In the Frankish realm the priests were even used as assassins. However,

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192  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 in this case the Emperor Maurice did not share the views of the Pope Pelagius II, because the Pope’s hard stance against the schismatic bishops of Istria/Histria caused troubles. When Bishop Elias of Aquileia wrote to Maurice in 587 to complain about the actions of Smaragdus, Maurice ordered Smaragdus to stop his harassment of the schismatics in 587. On the basis of this it is clear that the actions of Smaragdus against the schismatics were also influenced by his personal convictions.45 Meanwhile, there was a change in the powers behind the throne of Childebert.46 After the failed Italian invasion, Childebert and his mother Brunhild assembled the leaders on the King’s estate at Breslingen in the Ardennes where Brunhild pleaded on behalf of her daughter who was being held hostage in North Africa, but to no avail. A court of inquiry was held against Guntram Boso in an inheritance case with the result that Guntram Boso fled and his property in Clermont-Ferrand was confiscated. This breakup in relations was important for the future. Wandelen, Childebert’s tutor, died soon after this, but this time Brunhild did not appoint a successor but took the reins of power into her own hands for the short period there was before Childebert took control of his own estate. Brunhild’s first measure was to confiscate whatever Wandelen had taken from the state treasury. The return to power of Brunhild and her faction did not cause any problems for the Romans in Italy because they had a three-year truce in effect, but it resulted in the conclusion of peace between the Visigoths of Reccared and Childebert in 586, so Guntram alone continued to fight against the Visigoths. Probably because of this, Guntram dispatched comes Syagrius as his envoy to the Emperor Maurice in Constantinople in 587. According to Fredegar, Maurice appointed Syagrius as patrician, but their mutually hatched conspiracy never came to fruition. We do not known what the aim of this conspiracy was. All that we know is that nothing came of it. 587: However, there was a conspiracy in the realm of Childebert II in 587 which was led by dux Rauching, who had previously (and possibly also now) acted as a sort of spy master for Childebert. Rauching had formed an alliance with the leading nobles of Neustria (Ursio and Berterfred/Berterfredus/Berthefried) so that Rauching would kill both Brunhild and Childebert after which they would divide the realm: Rauching would rule Champagne in the name of Childebert’s elder son Theudebert while Ursio and Berthefried would rule the rest in the name of Theuderic. King Guntram, however, learnt of the plot and informed Childebert, and Childebert had Rauching executed. Then, in November 587, Guntram and Childebert concluded the Treaty of Andelot, which solved their differences, after which Childebert’s forces destroyed Ursio and Berthefried. Fredegar (4.8) states that the conspirators were Rauching, Guntram Boso, Ursio and Bertefred who were then executed, and adds that Leudefred, Dux of the Alamanni, managed to save himself by escaping. This suggests a widespread conspiracy, but one which was exposed thanks to Guntram’s effective spy organization. Of interest is the fact that Childebert’s men found that Rauching had in his possession as much gold as a king. This can be interpreted in three different ways: 1) Rauching had amassed a massive amount of gold through corruption; 2) Ursio and Berthefried had bribed Rauching; 3) Maurice had bribed Rauching. The third alternative could mean that Maurice and Syagrius had planned to have Brunhild and Childebert assassinated because

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  193 they had concluded a peace with Reccared and that Guntram exploited this information to conclude an agreement with Childebert’s court which was then dominated by his enemy Brunhild. Whatever was behind the above events, in practice they did not influence the policies of the Franks towards Visigothic Spain or Lombard Italy. When Reccared converted to the Catholic faith in 587, it did not convince Guntram to put a stop to his campaigns against the Visigoths. And the agreement between Guntram and Childebert did not change the attitude of Childebert’s court towards Reccared. In fact, in late 587 Childebert promised his sister in marriage to Reccared, if Guntram agreed. In other words, if the Roman goal had been to resume hostilities against the Lombards before the truce ended it resulted in nothing, and there are reasons to believe that it was their goal because the hostilities between the Lombards and Romans resumed in 587. The aggressors were the Lombards. But on the positive side for the Romans, Guntram continued his campaigns against the Visigoths. The murderous psychopathic Queen Fredegund had not been idle either. She had dispatched secret messages to the Visigoths while she had also dispatched assassins against Guntram. The assassination attempts failed miserably largely thanks to the security measures of Guntram. Fredegund was clearly acting as an ally of the Visigoths, as she had in 585. It was then that Guntram launched his planned campaign against the Visigoths, for which see page 181.47 The three-year truce between the Romans and the Lombards was set to end in 588, but in truth it had ended in 587 when King Authari dispatched two armies against the Romans. The first was sent to Istria/Histria under the command of Euin/Eoin, dux of Tridentum (Trento). He plundered and burned until the Romans concluded a oneyear truce with him. He was therefore able to bring a sizable booty for his king. The second was dispatched against magister militum Francio, a friend and associate of Narses, who had held the island of Comacina (in Lake Como) for twenty years. The Lombards besieged the island for six months after which Francio was allowed to leave in return for his surrender.48 It is possible that we should connect the Lombard invasion of Istria with the same time period when Maurice ordered Smaragdus to stop the persecution of schismatics in Istria. Smaragdus had started this persecution without imperial approval on behalf of Pope Pelagius II. Maurice clearly considered the persecution unwise because it caused divisions among the defenders at a time when they were under enemy attack. However, Smaragdus disobeyed the Emperor and continued the persecution. The new one-year truce enabled him to resume his persecution of the schismatics, so he visited Aquileia (Grado) in 588 and exacted revenge on the bishops who had complained about his behaviour. Elias of Aquileia had died, but Smaragdus captured his successor Severus and three other Istrian bishops and took them to Ravenna. Once there he forced them to communicate with Bishop John of Ravenna. In other words, Smaragdus forced these bishops to recognize John as orthodox in his beliefs and their superior. Smaragdus’s actions were lèse-majesté. Smaragdus had failed to obey a specific imperial order. It is therefore not surprising that he was removed from office in 589. According to Paul the Deacon, Smaragdus was sacked because he had gone mad. It is unclear whether he had really suffered a mental breakdown or whether he was considered to have gone mad because he had disobeyed the Emperor.49

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Maurice once again resorted to the standard strategy of using Franks against the Lombards. We do not know what means Maurice used to convince the Austrasian Franks to operate on his behalf, but one may guess that it consisted of a hefty bribe in gold. In late 587 or early 588 the Lombards had attempted to break up the alliance by giving a hefty gift to the Austrasian Franks and a marriage proposal from King Authari to Chlosind sister of Childebert II. Childebert had agreed to this but then changed his mind when the Visigothic envoys arrived immediately afterwards. Now Childebert II promised his sister to Reccared. Gregory of Tours states that the reason for the change of heart was that Reccared had converted to Catholicism. It was also then (probably in late 587 or early 588) that Childebert dispatched an embassy to Maurice. According to Gregory of Tours, he promised to undertake the campaign now that he had failed to carry out before,

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  195 which was to campaign together with the imperial forces for the purpose of driving the Lombards out of Italy. This suggests that Childebert had temporarily thought of doublecrossing the Romans by concluding an alliance with the Lombards and that he had had a change of heart after this. One possible reason for that would have been possible Roman involvement in the conspiracy of Rauching and/or in the Syagrius conspiracy, but nothing certain is known about this.50 It is probable that the abovementioned embassy of Gregory of Tours is the same that carried several of the so-called Austrasian Letters some of which were addressed by Childebert to the Emperor and others by Brunhild to the Empress. The embassy consisted of four envoys: Grippo, Ennodius, Radan and Eusebius. The embassy had two goals. The first was to ask for the release of Ingund’s son Athanagild and his return to Gaul; the second was the abovementioned promise to carry out the delayed invasion of Italy. En route to Constantinople, the envoys appear to have made a stop at Genoa to deliver a letter from Childebert II to Laurentius, the exiled Bishop of Milan, to instruct him to ask for military help from Smaragdus for the Franks.51 588: However, there were other remaining obstacles for the Frankish campaign in Italy in early 588. Childebert had not fulfilled all of the clauses of the agreement of Andelot, so he was forced to dispatch Gregory of Tours and Felix of Châlons as his envoys to the court of Guntram to convince Guntram of his good intentions, which was especially important in circumstances in which he had agreed to a marriage alliance with Reccared, the enemy of Guntram. Childebert also asked Guntram to provide assistance for him in the forthcoming Italian campaign so that the entire country could be subjected to imperial rule. Guntram refused. His excuse was that Italy was suffering from a terrible epidemic and he had no intention of dying as a result. The disease (probably bubonic plague), however, spread also to the Frankish realm, from Marseilles to Saint-Symphorien-d’Ozon near Lyons, but not further north, which proves that Guntram’s measures against the spread of the disease were at least partially adequate. Childebert’s Italian campaign in 588 turned out to be a disaster. The commanders that he sent engaged the Lombards in combat but were cut to pieces. Some were killed, others captured, and the rest made their way back home with great difficulty. According to Gregory of Tours, the slaughter of the Frankish army was greater than anything that could be remembered. However, despite the poor performance of the Franks, the Romans still benefitted from the distraction that they created, because according to John of Biclar the Romans inflicted defeats on the Lombards with the help of the Franks and so were able to bring a part of Italy back under their control. The poor performance of the Frankish commanders had another positive result for the Romans: it convinced Childebert to lead his army in person against the Lombards next year – he had to wipe out the shame.52 589: In early 589 a strange incident took place. Brunhild sent Ebregisel (one of the seniores of Austrasia) to Spain to present gifts for Reccared, the future husband of Chlodosind. Guntram’s operatives, however, told Guntram that Ebregisel’s mission had a different purpose. They stated that Ebregisel had been dispatched to present gifts to Gundovald’s sons, who then lived in Spain, so that they would return to Gaul to marry Burnhild so that

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196  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 they could then kill Guntram. Guntram therefore posted guards to all roads and captured Ebregisel. When Guntram then accused him of this and of the earlier Gundovald plot, Ebregisel denied all and stated that the gifts were for Reccared. Guntram accepted the explanation and allowed him to go. We do not know if there was any truth in the claim of Guntram’s operatives, but we do know that if there was it never came to fruition. If there was truth in it, then one might think that Brunhild would have wanted to convince both Reccared and the sons of Gundovald to act as her allies in the killing of Guntram. The marriage proposal can also be true, because it was in August 589 that Childebert II established his son Theodobert as king of Soissons and Meaux with a royal household and court of his own. It is easy to see that grandmother Brunhild could have seen herself overlooked, so might have started to dream of her own court. As noted above, the preparations of Childebert included the sending of a letter to the Bishop of Milan who was then a fugitive in Genoa. The letter asked the bishop to inform Smaragdus of the impending invasion so that he could send Roman forces to assist. Paul the Deacon’s account (3.30) shows what measures the Lombard King Authari took to protect the northern approaches into Italy. He sent envoys to the Bavarian King (Rex Baioariorum) Garibaldus/Garibald to ask for the hand of his daughter Theudelinda in marriage. The Bavarians were in control of Noricum so Authari could expect this alliance to serve him well. Garibald agreed, but before the marriage could be celebrated the Austrasian Franks invaded in strength in 589 – to wipe out the shame of the massacre of their army in 588. The Austrasian army under King Childebert was massive, as befitted the situation. The Franks inflicted a crushing defeat on the Bavarians, so the road was open for the invasion of the north of Italy. Theudelinda and her brother Gundoald fled to Italy with the sad news, but the royal wedding was still celebrated on 15 May 589. The defeat of the Bavarians and the massive size of the Austrasian army frightened Authari, and he immediately dispatched envoys bearing gifts together with a peace proposal. The Lombards promised to pay a yearly tribute to Childebert in return for peace, and to provide him military assistance whenever and wherever he needed. The Romans were apparently unable to exploit the situation fully because energetic exarch Smaragdus was on his way out of office; he suffered some sort of mental breakdown. However, his successor was the at least equally energetic Romanus, who appears to have had a long military career behind him. Childebert sent messengers to Guntram to ask his opinion of the agreement. Guntram’s advice was to conclude the treaty. So Childebert ordered his troops to remain where they were and wait for confirmation of the treaty, which never came. It was then after this that Guntram dispatched his army against Reccared (see pages 181–2) with disastrous results. On the basis of this, Guntram now suspected that the previous reports of the treacherous activities of Brunhild were correct after all. But the conflict was resolved when Brunhild took an oath before the bishops that she had not had any such plans.53 Childebert had again dispatched envoys to the Emperor Maurice in 589. The mission was led by Grippo, Bodegiselus and Evantius. When the envoys were at Carthage, a servant of Evantius stole a valuable object from a local merchant and then when the two met by chance on the street the servant killed the merchant with a sword. This resulted in the intervention of the ‘Prefect of Carthage’ who dispatched soldiers and armed civilians to apprehend the Frankish envoys. Bodegiselus and Evantius were killed, and Grippo and

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  197 other surviving members protested. The Prefect tried to calm the Franks and organized their trip to Constantinople. Maurice was not pleased about this and promised to punish the culprits in any manner Childebert wanted. The envoys returned in early 590, and the Austrasian Franks and Romans cooperated during the campaign season of 590 as planned.54 The Romans sorely needed the help of the Franks in Italy because the Lombards continued their ravages in 589. It is possible that the mental breakdown of Smaragdus had something to do with this, and one may assume that his replacement with the able Romanus was meant to correct the situation. We know only some of the details. According to Theophylact, the Lombards threatened Rome, but that is all we know of this. We also know that Zotto, the Dux of Beneventum, was particularly active in the south. His forces captured Monte Cassino with a night attack and after this they captured Atina either in 589 or 590. The forces of the ducate of Beneventum had already captured Aquinum, sixty miles north-west of Beneventum, in about 577. By the time of his death in 591, Zotto’s forces had penetrated as far as Apulia, Lucania and Calabria.55 590: The principal sources for the joint Italian campaign of the Austrasian Franks and the Romans in 590 are the so-called Austrasian Letters 40–41 from the Exarch Romanus to Childebert II, History of the Franks (10.3) by Gregory of Tours, and History of the Longobards (3.31–4.1) by Paul the Deacon. I will begin the analysis with Hodgkin’s condensed translation (5.272–4) of the relevant passages from the Letters 40–41 with some minor changes and my comments in parentheses in italics.56 The Roman strategic aim was to crush the Lombardic Kingdom in the north of Italy once and for all with Frankish help so that they could then use the remnants of Lombard forces as their foederati where needed. We heard from your messenger, the Vir Magnificus, Andreas, how earnestly your Glory desired to stop the effusion of Christian blood and to liberate Italy from the unspeakable Lombards [Note the purpose of the campaign]. We heard and reported to the most clement Emperor and to his Augusta (your most serene sister) that for this purpose you had ordered the most flourishing army of the Franks to descend into Italy. Even before their arrival God gave us, in answer to your prayers, the cities of Modena, Altino and Mantua, which we won in fight and beat down their walls, hastening as we did to prevent the unspeakable ones from attacking the Franks before our arrival. [This means that the Romans had conducted a military campaign against the Lombards before the Austrasian Franks invaded in 590. It is possible that this took place in 589 and that it was partially because of this that the Lombards sued for peace, or that this campaign took place early in 590 as a preliminary operation for the main campaign. This means that the Romans had now regained possession of the cities they lost in about 569.] Then we heard that the Vir Magnificus (your general) Chedin [dux Cedinus/ Henus/Chenus] was encamped with 20,000 men [corrected from 2,000, ‘viginti milibus’] near the city of Verona, and had sent an ambassador to Authari with some talk about terms of peace. That king had shut himself up in Ticinum [Pavia]; and

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198  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 the other dukes and all their armies had sought the shelter of divers fortresses; we saw ourselves on the point of joining the Roman army to the 20,000 of Chedin, supporting them by our dromones on the river [This probably means that the Romans used dromons on the Po and that they were to be used in the decisive siege of Ticinum], besieging Ticinum and taking captive king Authari, whose capture would have been the greatest victory [Hodgkin summarises after this the next portion of the letter by noting that the Exarch mentioned that Chedin dispatched three dukes Leudefred/ Leudefredus/Leufrid, Olfigandus/Olfigand and Raudingus/Rauding to Ravenna where the Exarch had received them with due honours and presents]. While we were urging Chedin to this course and anxiously consulting your dukes as to each step to be taken against God’s enemies and ours, what was our amazement to find that they [Hodgkin suggests here that they probably mean Chedin and Audovald], without any consultation with us, had made ten months’ truce with the Lombards, abandoned the opportunities for booty, and marched suddenly out of the country. [One wonders whether the Austrasian Franks used these invasions only for the purpose of getting bribes from the Romans while creating the opportunity to get more loot from the Lombards. Their constant readiness to abandon campaigns in return for money suggests that the Franks could have thought it beneficial not to destroy the Lombards so they would serve as buffer between them and the Romans. The other possibility is of course that the sources present the actual course of events and that the Frankish commanders and their soldiers were just not prepared to fight a long and difficult war in Italy.] If they had only had a little patience, today Italy would be found free from the hateful race, and the wealth of the unspeakable Authari would have been brought into your treasury; for the campaign had reached such a point that the Lombards did not consider themselves safe from the Franks even behind the walls of their cities. [The Emperor Maurice in his Strategikon 11.3 quite rightly criticized the ability of the Franks and other lighthaired races to stay in the field for prolonged periods of time, and the disobedience and greediness of their commanders. This lends credence to the versions preserved by the narrative sources.57 This means that the joint and combined operations by the Franks and Romans had brought the Lombards to their knees so it would have been possible to end the Lombard kingdom there and then had all of the Franks persisted in their effort. In this case it was the desertion of just one of the three principal Frankish leaders that caused the plan to fail. One of the weaknesses of the Frankish realm was the relative independence of different duces vis-à-vis each other and their kings.] For ourselves (besides the previously mentioned successes) Parma, Rhegium [Reggio/Regium Lepidum] and Placentia [Plazenca] were promptly surrendered by their dukes to the Holy Roman Republic, when we marched to besiege these cities. [This suggests that the Roman strategy for the year 590 probably consisted of a twopronged attack just like the Frankish invasion. The first army apparently concentrated at Modena, advanced along the Via Aemilia and captured Rhegium, Parma and Placentia en route with the aim of putting Authari under siege at Ticinum/Pavia, while the Frankish army advanced through the Septimier Pass to join them. The second of the armies was probably concentrated at Mantua with the aim of besieging Verona together with the Franks who advanced via the Brenner Pass. It is probable that the Romans had also posted a third field army – a shielding force – at Altino/Altinum, the purpose of which

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  199 would have been to protect the flank against the dux of Istria Grasulf. The threat posed by the Istrian Lombards could be significant if they obtained help from the Slavs or Avars.] [Hodgkin unifies the contents of the two letters here and starts the translation of Letter 41.] We received their sons as hostages, returned to Ravenna, and marched into the province of Istria against our enemy Grasulfus/Grasulf. His son, the magnificent Duke, Gisulfus/Gisulf, wishing to show himself a better man than his father, came with his nobles and his entire army, and submitted himself to the Holy Republic. The glorious patrician, Nordulfus/Nordulf [a Lombard dux who had deserted to the Roman side], having come by the favour of our Lords [Emperor and Empress] into Italy, gathered his men together again and in concert with the glorious Osso and his Roman army recovered several cities. Now, as we know that your anger is kindled by the return of your generals, leaving their mission unaccomplished, we pray you to send speedily other generals, more worthy of your trust, who may fulfil the promises made by you and your pious ancestors. Let them come at such a time that they may find all the enemy’s harvest in the field [This suggests that the Austrasian Franks had invaded too early in the year and had as a result suffered from famine and had to abandon the campaign too soon]. Tell them to inform us by what routes and at what dates we may expect them. And, above all things, we hope that when, with good luck, the Frankish army descends from the Alps, the Romans, on whose behalf we as your aid may not be subjected to pillage and captivity; that you will liberate those who have been already carried off into bondage; and that you will direct your generals not to burn workshops, so that it may be clearly seen that it is a Christian nation which has come to the defence of Italy. [This shows how undisciplined the invading Franks were. For Italians their ‘help’ was an enemy attack, and the return of the captives was undoubtedly very high in the list of desirable things.] It is also worthwhile to quote both Gregory of Tours and Paul the Deacon at length. The first translation of Gregory of Tours 10.3 is by Lewis Thorpe (pp.549–51) with slight changes and my comments in italics in parentheses: When King Childebert received Grippo’s report, he immediately ordered his troops to march into Italy, instructing twenty of his dukes to lead them in a war against the Longobards [Childebert clearly acted as a Roman ally in this case]… Duke Audovald [Audovaldus], supported by Wintrio [Dux of Champagne], raised a contingent in Champagne, advanced as far as Metz, which was on his line of march… killing so many men and doing so much destruction, that you might have imagined that he had been sent to attack his own country. The other dukes did much the same… As soon as they came to the Italian frontier, Audovald turned to the right with six of the other dukes [This means that there were seven dukes altogether with Audovald as their overall commander; the other dukes included Wintrio and Olo], and advanced as far as the town of Milan [i.e. they advanced through the Septimier Pass]. From there he moved into the open countryside, where they all pitched camp. Duke Olo was foolish enough to approach Bellinzona, a strongpoint belonging to Milan, in the Canini lowlands [area where River Ticino flows

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200  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 into Lake Maggiore]. There he was hit in the chest by a javelin and fell dead. Those of his men who were plundering the countryside for supplies were attacked by the Longobards and cut down where they stood… The Franks learned that the Longobards were encamped on the bank of [Lake Lugano]. They marched towards it, but, before they could cross… a Longobard stood up on the opposite bank, wearing a cuirass and with his helmet on his head, and waved a spear at them. He issued a challenge to the Frankish army… this was a signal which the Longobards had agreed upon. A few of the Franks managed to cross. They fought with this Longobard and killed him. Then… all the Longobard army wheeled round in retreat and marched away. The main force of the Franks crossed over, but not a single Longobard could they discover… The Franks returned to their own camp, having failed to take a single prisoner. Envoys then arrived from the Emperor to announce that a support-group was on its way [Gregory of Tours, who was a wellinformed insider, clearly thought that the Romans and Franks were allies]. ‘In three days… we will march our forces…’ The Franks waited six days. As far as they could see not a single man ever came. [If this is not a face-saving lie, then the reason for the failure of the Roman army to appear lay in the betrayal of Henus who conluded ten months truce with the Lombards without any permission.] Cedinus [Chedin/Henus/Chenus], with thirteen dukes [this figure seems to include Henus], turned left on entering Italy. He captured five strong-points and extracted oaths of allegiance. [Henon advanced through the Brenner Pass which belonged to the Dux of Tridentum/Trento.] His army suffered greatly from dysentery, for the climate was new to the troops, and did not suit them. Many died as a result; then the wind changed and rain fell, which brought the temperature down a little, so that those who were ill became well once more. [The difficulties that the light-haired peoples had in the heat are also noted in the Strategikon of Maurice 11.3.] There is little more to tell. For nearly three months the troops wandered about in Italy, but they achieved nothing and inflicted no losses on the enemy, who had shut themselves up in strongly fortified places. They failed to capture the King and avenge themselves on him, for he was safe inside the walls of Pavia [Ticinum]. As I have told you, the soldiers suffered very much from the heat and lacked proper food. In the end they turned homewards, having subjected to King Childebert’s authority those parts which his father had held before him… They also brought back some booty and a number of prisoners… On their journey home their supplies were so short that before they reached their native land they had to sell their weapons and even their clothes to buy food. [Gregory fails to mention the conclusion of ten months’ truce by Henus without the authority of the king: Henus basically betrayed the dukes who had marched to the neighbourhood of Milan, and the Romans.] [Authari]… sent envoys to King Guntram. ‘It is our wish… to be true and obedient… Let there be peace and concord between us. We will give you support against your enemies…’ King Guntram received this message graciously and sent the envoys to his nephew King Childebert’s court… other messengers arrived to say that King [Authari] was dead and that [Agilulf, dux of Turin] had taken his place… King Childebert agreed to a truce and then dismissed them.

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202  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The above map with the caption summarises the course of the war in 590. Even if it is clear that the account of Paul the Deacon (3.31–4.1) agrees closely with the account of Gregory of Tours, he adds other important details, and because of this I include a quote from it below (tr. by Foulke 141–51) with my comments in italics in parentheses: At this time also when Grippo, the ambassador of Childebert… returned from Constantinople and announced to his king how he had been honourably received by the emperor Maurice and that the emperor… promised that the insults he had endured at Carthage would be atoned for. Childebert without delay sent again into Italy an army of Franks with twenty dukes to subjugate the nation of the Langobards. Of these dukes Auduald [Audovald], Olo and Cedinus [Chedin/Henus/Chenus] were quite distinguished [This has usually led historians (see e.g. PLRE3) to assume that these were the three leading dukes of the expedition. However, on the basis of Gregory, I would suggest that even if Olo was an important dux, he was still under the command of Audovald, as was another important dux, Wintrio]. But when Olo had imprudently attacked the fortress of Bilitio (Bellinzona), he fell wounded under his nipple by a dart and died. When the rest of the Franks had gone out to take booty they were destroyed by the Langobards who fell upon them while they were scattered in various places. But [Audovald] indeed and six dukes of the Franks came to the city of Mediolanum (Milan) and set up their camp there some distance away on the plains. In this place the messengers of the emperor came to them announcing that his army was at hand to aid them… ‘After three days we will come…’ But the dukes of the Franks watched for six days, according to the agreement, and saw no one… Cedinus indeed with thirteen dukes having invaded the left side of Italy [Brenner Pass] took five fortresses from which he exacted oaths (of fidelity). [PD HL 4.3 shows that dux Mimulf on the island of St Julian in Lake Orta was one of the Lombard leaders who surrendered to the Franks.] Also the army of the Franks advanced as far as Verona and after giving oaths (of protection) demolished without resistance many fortified places which had trusted them suspecting no treachery from them. And the names of the fortified places they destroyed in the territory of Tridentium (Trent) are these: Tesena (Tisino), Maletum (Malé), Sermiana (Sirmian), Appianus (Hoch Eppan), Fagitana (Faedo), Cimbra (Cembra), Vitianum (Vezzano), Bremtonicum (Brentonico), Volaenes (Volano), Ennemase (Neumarkt) and two in Alsuca (Val Sugana) and one in Verona. When all these fortified places were destroyed by the Franks, all the citizens were led away from them as captives. But ransom was given for… Ferrugis (Verruca)…58 Meanwhile, since it was summer time, the disease of dysentery began seriously to harass the army of the Franks on account of their being unused to the climate, and by this disease very many of them died. Why say more? When the army of the Franks was wandering through Italy for three months and gaining no advantage – it could neither avenge itself upon its enemies, for the reason that they betook themselves to very strong places, nor could it reach the king from whom it might obtain retribution, since he had fortified himself within the city of Ticinum (Pavia) – the army… determined to go back home. And while they were returning to their country they endured such stress of famine that they offered first

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  203 their own clothes and afterwards also their arms to buy food before they reached their native soil. … Meanwhile king Authari dispatched an embassy with words of peace to Gunthram, king of the Franks [The Lombards attempted to divide the Franks and use Guntram to put pressure on Childebert]… The ambassadors were received pleasantly by him but were directed to Childebert… In the meantime, while king Authari’s messengers were stopping in France, king Authari… died at Ticinum (Pavia) on the nones (5th) of September [590] from poison he had taken… And straightaway an embassy was sent by the Langobards to Childebert… to announce to him the death of king Authari and to ask for peace from him… he dismissed the aforesaid messengers with the promise of peace. But because queen Theudelinda pleased the Langobards greatly, they allowed her to remain in their royal dignity… And she, taking counsel with the prudent, chose Agilulf [also known as Ago], duke of the people of Turin, as her husband and king of the nation of the Langobards… [One may assume that Agilulf was behind the poisoning of Authari and seized the throne as suggested by OGL 6. It is also possible that the queen was involved in the murder so that she could marry Agilulf.] The nuptials were celebrated with great rejoicing and Agilulf… assumed the royal dignity at the beginning of the month of November… [Agilulf] sent Agnellus, Bishop of Tridentium (Trent), to France for the sake of those who had been led captive by the Franks from the fortified places of Tridentium. And Agnellus… brought back with him a number of captives whom Brunhilde… had ransomed with her own money. Also Euin [Eoin], the duke of the people of Trent, proceeded to Gaul to obtain peace and when he had procured it he returned. 591:59 The Romans were unable to renew their offensive in the north in 591 just as Agilulf was unable to attack the Romans. There were seven reasons for this: Firstly, as the Letters 40–1 show, Romanus was expecting to conduct a joint campaign with the Franks which did not materialize because the Franks had concluded a peace with the Lombards. From this date onwards the Romans could not expect any help from the Franks. There were three reasons for this: the Lombards paid large annual sums of tribute to the Franks; the drought, famine and plague in Italy made campaigning there unattractive, and soon after this the Franks were in no position to help the Romans; and King Guntram died in early 593, after which Childebert II united the Frankish kingdoms, but he died in 596 and this caused a prolonged civil war because all the heirs to the throne were underage and some of the Austrasian nobles did not accept Brunhild as a dowager queen. Secondly, there was a dreadful drought and famine in Italy lasting from January to September in 591, which naturally made it difficult to support any military operations unless one brought provisions from elsewhere. In addition to this the territory of Tridentum/Trento suffered from locusts. Thirdly, each of the previously captured towns, cities and forts required a garrison. This meant that the size of Romanus’s field army became smaller with each new success. He did not have enough men to conquer the entire north of Italy without Frankish help.

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204  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Fourthly, Ravenna, Gradus and Istria suffered from a plague which was just as bad as the one thirty years before. It is therefore not surprising that the Romans did not continue their campaign of reconquest in 591. Fifthly, the letters of Pope Gregory prove that the new Dux of Spoletum, Ariulf/ Ariulfus, began military operations against the Romans in 591 and thereby distracted their attention. His objective appears to have been the capture of Rome. The sixth of the reasons was that the new King of the Lombards, Agilulf, faced a number of revolts against his rise to power. Christie (p.87) suggests that these should be connected with the Frankish-Roman operations of 590, but in my opinion it is likelier that, with the exception of Mimulf, these uprisings should rather be connected with the murder of Authari and the rise of Agilulf. These duces did not accept what had happened. This means that Agilulf was also in no position to begin major operations against the Romans. The seventh of the reasons appears to be that the Avars invaded Lombard territories, either on their own initiative or as allies of Rome. That there was a state of war is proved by the peace agreement that Agilulf made with the Avars in about 592–3 (Paul Deacon 4.3–5). Having dispatched envoys to the Franks, Agilulf ’s first action was to put to death the dux of the island of St Julian (S. Giulio in the Lago d’Orta just west of Lago Maggiore) Mimulf/Mimulfus because he had so often surrendered to the Franks. Next he marched against Gaidulf, the dux of Bergamum (Bergamo), who had rebelled. Gaidulf asked for peace, which Agilulf granted after Gaidulf had given him hostages. However, Gaidulf rebelled immediately and shut himself up in the island of Comacina in Lake Como. This island fortress was strategically important because the Roman treasure of Francio was still there. Agilulf attacked the island, drove away Gaidulf ’s men and captured the treasure. The dux of Tarvisium (Treviso), Ulfari, also rose against the new king, but was soon besieged and captured by him. It is therefore not surprising that Agilulf concluded a peace with the Avars in about 592–3. As already noted, the fact that Agilulf needed to conclude a peace with the Avars makes it likely that the Avars had attacked some of the Lombard settlements in and to the east of the Julian Alps some time after the Lombards had given them their former lands in Pannonia. According to the letters of Gregory the Great, Ariulf and his Lombards reached the neighbourhood of Rome and put to the sword people outside the very walls of the city. Gregory begged the recipients of his letters to bring help to the distressed city. In practice Gregory was acting as a war leader: in September 591 he promised to dispatch soldiers to help magister militum Velox probably stationed at Perugia, as suggested by Hodgkin. However, on 27 September 591, the Pope informed Velox that he had withheld his help because Velox had warned him in the previous letter that the enemy was assembling against Rome; but now Gregory thought it advantageous to send some of his soldiers to Velox as previously planned. The Pope also asked Velox to have a conference with ‘our sons’ mag.mil. Vitalianus and Martius (should probably be identified with mag.mil. Mauricius below) and then together decided what would be the most beneficial course of action. Gregory also begged Velox to attack the despicable Ariulf from behind if he advanced against Ravenna or Rome. However, the dreaded invasion of Ariulf did not

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  205 materialize during the fall/winter 591/2. It is probable that he first attacked and defeated the Romans at Camerinum (Camerino) and then attacked the cities of the Adriatic coast because Gregory mentions in a letter sent to the Bishop of Ravenna in July 592 that Fanum had been burned by the Lombards in 591 and that they had taken many captives for ransom.60

5.1.5.  The East 582–92 The battle of the Nymphius/Tigris rivers in autumn 58261 One of the first decisions of Maurice as Emperor was to promote John the Moustached (Ioannes/Johannes Mystacon)62 as supreme commander of the Eastern armies (strategos) and Kours/Curs/Cours as his hypostrategos. In my opinion it is possible that John Mystacon’s successor as Magister Militum per Armeniam was Heraclius, the father of the future Emperor Heraclius the Younger, because he was a native of Armenia and therefore an ideal candidate. Theophylact implies that the Romans had the initiative because he states that John encamped his army at the crossroads of the Nymphius (Batman) River and the Tigris with the aim of engaging the enemy there. The Persians facing him were led by a man who held the title of Kardarigan (Black Falcon63). John Mystacon arrayed his army in three divisions.64 He led the centre of the army himself while the second-in-command Kours led the right wing and the Lombard Ariulph/Arioulph led the left. When all of the commanders, including both the strategos and hypostrategos, were in the same line, it is unlikely that the battle formation would have had any reserves. The Persians arranged their army in the same way. John’s aim appears to have been to outflank the enemy with a longer line and it seems to have worked at first. According to Theophylact, the Persians fled because they feared that the opposition would be able to attack with advantage, which means that the Roman battle formation initially outflanked the Persians. However, in practice the Romans attacked with only two divisions: only the divisions of John and Ariulph advanced because Kours did not join the others out of jealousy over the appointment of John Mystacon. They had previously been colleagues in Armenia and if my speculation about their respective ranks is correct Kours had actually been the superior of the two until the defeat he suffered in 580 because he had disobeyed Maurice. The other possibility is that the two men had equal standing but it was the disobedience of Kours that had caused the defeat. As already noted, if these two men had equal standing in Armenia or John was Kours’s superior, it would also explain why Kours failed to cooperate with John when, for example, he surprised the Persians with a night attack in 579. There is another possible explanation for what happened. It may have resulted from the use of the single line that allowed the troopers better chances of avoiding combat, as the Strategikon warned.65 It is entirely possible that the story of the betrayal was spread by John Mystacon to absolve himself of the blame of the defeat which could have resulted from the adoption of the single combat line without any reserves. However, on balance, in light of the past behaviour of Kours, I am inclined to agree that Kours did betray his fellow commanders out of jealousy and purposely refused to join the attack. Regardless of the behaviour of Kours, the attack of the two other divisions, the left and centre, forced the Persians into retreat; but it is probable that this resulted merely

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206  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 from the fact that when the two armies were about to fight the Persians observed that the Roman battle line, including the division of Kours, outflanked them. However, when both the Persians and the attacking Romans noticed that Kours’s division was not following, the tables were turned. The Persians may also have had reserve units posted behind that enabled them to renew the fight, but Theophylact does not mention them and it is therefore unlikely that there were, even if this would explain why the Romans had tired horses while the Persians did not – it is equally possible that the Persians merely changed horses, because they certainly had spare horses available to them somewhere in the rear. The Persians turned around while the Romans fled towards their camp on the higher ground. The chase of the Persian army had exhausted the Romans’ horses, which, combined with the difficulty of reaching the higher ground where their camp was situated, led to many casualties among the Romans. The weakness of the single line formation in this case is clear: it made it easy for Kours to betray his fellow commanders. The Emperor appears to have accepted the accusation against Kours because none of the sources mention him after this battle. The likeliest punishment that he received for his behaviour is dishonourable discharge, and probably exile, because Maurice was strongly opposed to the shedding of blood in imperial matters (Evagrius 6.2).

The neutralization of the Arabic Federates in about 583–4 One of the first measures that Maurice took as Emperor in 582 was to exile his old nemesis Alamundarus to Sicily, despite the fact that most of those around him appear to have demanded his execution. It was not in the nature of Maurice to use capital punishment; it was only because of severe pressure by the Patriarch John that Maurice agreed to impale the pagan Paulinus in 583. We also know that some time in the reign of Maurice, Naamanes/Namanes (al-Numan), the son of Alamundarus, visited Constantinople. We no longer possess the original narrative of John of Ephesus for this. Basically all we have left are the headings of John’s text (6.38–45) and the undated summary of John’s narrative in Michael the Syrian (10.21). On the basis of the order of the headings, the likeliest date for this visit would be 584, as suggested by REF2 (p.168), but 583 is also possible because John was in the habit of moving back and forth in his narrative. This is the era during which it would have been possible for the new Emperor to present himself as a man who did not agree with the policies of his predecessor so as to convince Naamanes to come to the capital. Maurice promised Naamanes that if he would fight against the Persians and accept the doctrines of Chalcedon, Maurice would release his father from exile.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  207 Naamanes was willing to accept the first condition, but not the latter because he was a staunch Monophysite. Just as important, his tribesmen were Monophysites and would have killed him if he converted. Maurice’s response was to imprison him after which he was sent to join his father in exile on Sicily. Maurice was inflexible when he thought he was right. This decision resulted in the breaking up of the Christian tribal confederacy that had been created under Justinian. It split into fifteen groups, each led by a different chieftain. Most joined the Persians, some abandoned their lifestyle and became city dwellers, others converted to the Chalcedonian doctrine and joined the Romans.66 The breaking up of the troublesome Arabic kingdom was obviously in the Roman interest at the time, so it was a victory of sorts for Maurice, but one cannot escape the fact that the whole problem had come about as a result of Justin II’s insane attempt to murder one of the best commanders the Romans ever had. It was one of the worst legacies of Justin II. The sieges of Akbas in 58367 In the spring of 583, it was the Persians’ turn to launch an offensive under Kardarigan. He put the city fortress of Aphumon under siege. According to Theophylact, the unnamed Roman taxiarchos whom he later calls ‘strategos’ opted to create a diversion to the Persians by attacking the fortress of Akbas/Ocba, which the Persians had managed to build when the Romans were distracted by their troubles. According to the Strategikon (1.3.23–4), taxiarchoi were the moirarchai of the Optimates, which may mean that the Roman force consisted at most of 3,000 men, but this is inconclusive because it is possible that Theophylact used the title in an unofficial manner. This fortress was strategically placed on a hill opposite the city of Martyropolis so that it controlled the river Nymphius. Regardless of the title and name of the Roman commander who besieged this fortress, it is clear that it was done at the behest of the strategos John Mystacon. Kardarigan had arranged with the garrison of this fortress that if the Romans attempted to take it they would light signal fires to inform him. This enabled him to march his army from Aphumon to Akbas and surprise the besieging Romans at the first hour of sunlight. The dismounted Persians stood in battle array behind the Roman army and then launched a barrage of arrows at them which completely overwhelmed the Romans. It pushed the Romans to the edge of a cliff. Some jumped off into the river Nymphius, some were captured, the rest saved themselves by fleeing down the foothills of the mountain or down the cliffs. Maurice used this siege as a warning example in his Strategikon. The besiegers were required to post guards around them and not allow themselves to be surprised like the taxiarchos/strategos had been in this case. It was because of this that Evagrius stated that John’s combat record was mixed. He had both successes and failures. Theophylact fails to mention the effect of this, but one may guess that the Persians did not attempt to besiege Aphumon again this year. The Romans, however, did besiege the fort of Akbas again, presumably in about June. This time the commander was strategos Aulus, which may mean that John Mystacon had been replaced, but it is far likelier that it was done at Aulus’s behest while John Mystacon countered any possible countermoves by Kardarigan with the forces under him. The reason for this conclusion is that Theophylact states that John Mystacon was replaced by Philippicus only in 584. Aulus invested the fort from all sides and reduced its defenders with a tight blockade. The Persian garrison

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208  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 asked to be allowed to leave. Aulus agreed. The garrison then came down to the river to quench their thirst but many died from drinking too much. The rest were allowed to return to their country as promised. Aulus razed the fortress to the ground leaving not one stone upon another and cast all the building materials down from the mountain top. With Martyropolis the Romans already had a strong fortress in this area, so it suited them to destroy this fort and ensure the Persians would not be able to rebuild it. Philippicus’s campaign of manoeuvres in 584 The first half of 584 was spent in peace negotiations. The Persians had dispatched an envoy to Constantinople, Maurice dispatched his own envoy in response, and Hormizd sent another embassy to Maurice. It is possible that the Persians were now ready to negotiate for two reasons. Firstly, all of their offensives against the Romans had ended in dismal failures. Secondly, it is probable that the Turks were preparing to launch a major campaign against Persia at this time. We do not know why the Turks were planning to attack the Persians but it is possible that the Persians had had a role in the revolt of the Hephthalites and others against the Turks which the Turks had crushed in 582 and of which the Turkish Khagan had informed Maurice, as Theophylact’s text shows. In my opinion there is every reason to suspect that Maurice and the Turkish Khagan were actively negotiating from 583 onwards about the prospect of attacking the Persians jointly. In addition, the Romans and Turks appear to have been negotiating about the prospect of concluding an alliance against the Avars.68 In the beginning of 584 Maurice replaced John Mystacon with his brother-in-law and Comes Excubitorum Philippicus so that the latter became strategos of all of the eastern forces. Philippicus went first to Monocarton where he strengthened its defences. The city was apparently renamed Tiberiopolis at the same time. After this he assembled his army near the mountain of Aisouma (Karaca Dağ).69 He stayed there as long as the negotiations lasted. In my opinion the likeliest reason for the breakup of the negotiations in autumn is that Maurice was unwilling to make any concessions to the Persians when he knew that the Turks were about to invade Persian territory. The lull in hostilities was beneficial for the effectiveness of the Roman army because it enabled Philippicus to restore discipline. According to Evagrius (6.2), Philippicus forbade his soldiers luxuries and thereby made them obedient to his commands. This presumably represents the move of the army from Monocarton to the foothills of Karaca Dağ where the army had to live in tents. It is probable that Philippicus had the first version of the Strategikon as his guide. At the beginning of autumn Philippicus marched to the Tigris and from there in several stages to a place called Carcharoman/Karcharoman. There he learnt that Kardarigan was about to move from Nisibis via Maïacariri on Mount Izala (Tur Abdin Plateau). In other words, he was marching towards Carcharoman. Philippicus’s plan was to lure Kardarigan away from Nisibis to chase him. Now Philippicus knew that Kardarigan had swallowed the bait, so he was able to march to the plain adjacent to the city of Nisibis where he pitched his camp on some higher ground (my guess is that it was Melabason) and from there he then pillaged the area around Nisibis. When Kardarigan learnt of this from a farmer, he marched back and tried to catch the Romans, but Philipppicus gathered his forces, bypassed the enemy, and moved his camp to Mount Izala where he then deposited his booty under a strong guard. After this, Philippicus marched on to the river

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210  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Nymphius. The Persians appear to have marched to Mount Izala in an effort to block his route of retreat, so Philippicus was able to launch another raid on Persian territory by advancing to Bearbaës (Beth Arabaye), which he proceeded to pillage with vengeance. When the Persians learnt of this they spurred their horses on so hard that most of them perished. When Philippicus learnt that the Persians were approaching, he divided his forces in two to confuse the Persians. The general himself withdrew to Sisarbanon and from there to Rhabdion and from there to the camp where he had deposited the loot – the Persians were unable to follow because their horses were too exhausted – while the other half fled to Theodosiopolis. The latter group had to withdraw through waterless terrain, and when they were running short of water they decided to kill all their adult captives ‘out of mercy’ while they saved the children ‘out of pity’. Nevertheless, the children died of thirst too. This campaign shows how one could keep an enemy off balance by constant outmanoeuvring. Philippicus was clearly a clever commander and worthy of the trust Maurice put in him. Roman operations against the Persians in 585 As noted above, there is every reason to suspect that from 583 onwards the Turks and Maurice negotiated with each other about the prospect of an alliance against the Persians and Avars. The initiative apparently came from the Turkish Khagan because it was his envoy who arrived in the Roman capital. Maurice was undoubtedly delighted, but then something happened: Maurice welcomed Scythian refugees from Turkish territory. This would have been the greatest possible insult to the Turks. One could easily think that this was a mistake of Maurice’s, but it is quite possible that he knew what he was doing and that he preferred to have the Avars as his neighbours rather than the mighty Turks. He also knew that the Turks would attack the Persians anyway, even without an alliance, which they did in about 585.70 According to al-Tabari, Shabah, the supreme ruler of the Turks, attacked the Persians with 300,000 warriors until he reached ‘Badhghis’ and ‘Harat’ (northwestern Afghanistan); other accounts put the figure at either 300,000 or 400,000. The former is likelier. According to Thaalibi, the Khagan advanced at the head of 100,000 horsemen to Balkh (Bactra), which I take to mean that the massive Turkish force was divided into separate armies, which is only natural for such a massive invasion force. It is also clear that they needed the numbers because the Sassanian Empire was well organized, heavily fortified and possessed large armies.71 On the basis of the likely date of Bahram Chobin’s campaign against the Turks (ca. 587–8), and the time the Turks abandoned their campaign against the Avars (ca. early 584), I would pinpoint the beginning of the Turkish campaign against the Persians roughly to 585–6. Tabari claims that this attack coincided with the Roman offensive against the Persians with 80,000 men. This, however, was not a sign of an alliance between the Turks and Romans because Tabari also states that Shabah sent the Persians a message stating that he would march against the Romans through their lands. Tabari also states that the Khazars invaded Derbent/Derbend with a large army and inflicted damage on the Persians, while two Arabic chieftains called Abbas the Squinter and Amr Blue-Eyes pitched an encampment near the Euphrates and raided the cultivated and irrigated part of Mesopotamia in the middle Euphrates region. This shows that Maurice was successful

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  211 in breaking up of the kingdom of Alamundarus. These two Arab chieftains were now performing the same services as Alamundarus had. It is of note that the information in Tabari is in full agreement with that provided by Michael the Syrian, who states that it was roughly at this time that three Scythian brothers arrived from Scythia, one of whom was received by the Romans (this was the Roman insult against the Turkish ruler) while the other two, of whom the eldest was called Khazarig, hence the name Khazars, advanced against Caspia (Derbent) with 20,000 horsemen. It is possible that these two brothers had already formed an alliance with the Romans against the Persians – their brother served as Federate Roman commander! One may assume that the Roman forces in Iberia and Persarmenia cooperated with them, even if we do not possess any information about their activities during this period.72 It is therefore not surprising that the Persians took a certain amount of punishment in the coming years. According to Theophylact, Philippicus launched an invasion of a Persian-held part of Arzanene in 585 and captured vast amounts of booty. Philippicus, however, had to leave his campaign unfinished, because he was struck by a severe illness (gout or some fever?). He withdrew to Martyropolis, gave command of the army to Stephanus, and appointed Apsich the Hun as his hypostrategos. Just before mentioning Philippicus’s illness, Theophylact includes a long discussion of Philippicus’s qualifications as commander, which were certainly impressive. Philippicus was known for his learning. He had acquired his military knowledge from the experts of the past, admiring in particular the great Scipio Africanus who had forced Hannibal to abandon his Italian campaign by making a diversionary invasion of Carthagian territory. It is clear that Philippicus would have been one of the men who contributed to the writing of the Strategikon of Maurice.73 As noted by Mary and Michael Whitby in their translation of Theophylact, this seems out of place because Theophylact has not mentioned any Persian invasion of Roman territory. There is a likely and easy explanation for this: Theophylact has misplaced his next piece of information, which was that Kardarigan attacked Monocarton, recently renamed Tiberiopolis, but was unable to reduce it because Philippicus had strengthened its defences the previous year. In fact I would suggest that it was because of this siege that Philippicus made the diversionary invasion of Arzanene which then forced Kardarigan to abandon the siege. Theophylact follows this with the statement that when Kardarigan realized that he was unable to take Monocarton, he marched against Martyropolis. I would suggest that Kardarigan marched against Martyropolis because he learnt that Philippicus had retreated there because of his illness. When Kardarigan then reached the scene he burnt the Church of the Prophet John about twelve miles west of Martyropolis. On the following day Kardarigan marched to Zorbandon (location unknown, but clearly near Martyropolis) and forbade his men from leaving their ramparts on any account. He spent the following eight days there and then returned to his own country. Mary and Michael Whitby suggest that the Persians withdrew via the Illyris Pass to Persarmenia, but I consider a retreat to Nisibis likelier. I would connect all the above with the following two facts: Theophylact fails to mention any operations undertaken by Stephanus; Theophylact states that the strategos (i.e. Philippicus) shook off his illness, broke camp and then returned to Byzantium because it was winter by then.74

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212  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 My suggestion is that when Kardarigan, who was in front of Monocarton, learnt from his spies that Philippicus was severely ill at Martyropolis and had handed command to Stephanus, he tried to force the Romans to fight a pitched battle. This did not take place, because Philippicus took back command when he had recovered and when he received the news that the Persians had torched the Church of the Prophet John Philippicus then led the army towards the Persians under Kardarigan, who, realizing that Philippicus was back in command, retreated to Zorbandon where he pitched a fortified camp in a strong location and refused to fight the Romans. When after seven or eight days Philippicus realized the Persians were not going to leave their ramparts, he withdrew to winter quarters and so did Kardarigan. Battle of Solanchon in 58675 At the beginning of the spring in 586 Philippicus travelled from Constantinople to Amida. When he arrived he was met by a Persian embassy led by Mabodes/Mebod, the experienced Persian diplomat. His presence as envoy suggests that he was probably no longer in favour with Hormizd who had retained him in Ctesiphon from 579 onwards. The war with the Romans had not turned out as he expected. Philippicus assembled his tagmatarchoi, lochagoi, hypaspistai (his bodyguards) and the distinguished members of his army to listen to what the Persian envoy had to say. Mebodes stated that the ruler of Persia was a lover of peace and was prepared to end the conflict if the Romans would agree to pay him gold and other gifts, because the Romans were the ones who had started the war. This angered the crowd and Philippicus ended the meeting and dismissed the embassy. The Persians dispatched a new envoy a few days later. He was the Bishop of Nisibis and he repeated the same request. This time Philippicus conveyed the proposal to Maurice by courier. Maurice’s response was adamant: no. Philippicus marched to Mambrathon where he assembled the army for the campaign season. He tested its combat readiness and then marched it to Bibas (Tel Bes) by the river Arzamon (Zergan). It is probable that his army consisted of both infantry and cavalry, but with more cavalry than infantry. On the following day and in preparation for the forthcoming Persian invasion, Philippicus marched his army towards the uplands and encamped in the foothills of a densely populated part of Mount Izala (Tur Abdin Plateau) so that the camp was on the left of Izala or Izala was on the left of the camp depending on the translation.76 Philippicus ordered that his men were not to disturb the farmers who were engaged in their labour. He had chosen this location well. To reach this place the Persians would have to march from Bouron through a waterless terrain and the Romans would then block their access to the river Arzamon. Kardarigan/Cardarigan, the Persian commander, decided to engage the Romans nevertheless. He first assembled the magi to encourage the soldiers with promises of victory, after which he loaded up herds of camels with water skins. The camels also carried large numbers of fetters of iron and wood in the expectation of Roman captives.77 Like the good commander he was, Philippicus dispatched scouts under Sergius, the lochagos of Mardis (Mardin), to reconnoitre and to obtain prisoners for interrogation. Under him served two Arab sheiks/phylarchs, Ogyrus and Zogomus. Irfan Shahid (pp.551–2) has identified Zogomus with the Arabic name Dujʻum who therefore belonged to the Zokomids, the ruling house of the Salīhids. These had been the principal

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  213 Arabic foederati of the East Romans during the fifth century, with the implication that they were back in favour after the imprisonment of the Ghassanid/Jafnid Naamanes. Shahid suggests that Ogyrus means the Arabic name Hujr, with the implication that he belonged either to the Ghassanids or Kindites. My own suggestion is that he would be Ghassanid, because there were certainly Ghassanids who were willing to change their allegiance. I would also guess that we should identify these two men with the two Arab sheiks of Tabari who had raided Persian-held Mesopotamia in 585, so one of them was Abbas the Squinter and the other Amr Blue-Eyes. The scouts performed their mission admirably78 capturing several barbarians whom they interrogated by torturing them. The prisoners revealed Kardarigan’s whereabouts, both his current camp and earlier ones. When the strategos was informed of this, he suspected that the enemy would attack on the following day because it was Sunday. The scouts confirmed this the next morning. The Persians were approaching to fight a battle. Philippicus prepared his army for battle. The armies faced each other on the plain of Solanchon, which was excellent terrain for the Roman cavalry lancers. Philippicus arranged his army in three divisions, behind which were the reserves.79 The left wing was entrusted to Eilifreda, the commander of garrison forces from Emesa, and Apsich the Hun. It is possible that one of them was actually in charge of the left wing reserve. It is probable that Apsich was the senior of these two because he had previously served as Stephanus’s hypostrategos in 585. The taxiarchês/taxiarchos Vitalis commanded the right wing. The centre was commanded by hypostrategos Heraclius. This Heraclius was the father of the future Emperor Heraclius the Younger. As previously noted, he may already have been the Magister militum per Armeniam because he was a native of Armenia and therefore an ideal candidate to succeed John Mystacon after John had been promoted to Magister Militum per Orientem in 582.80 It is clear that Philippicus fielded a large cavalry army, but the sources fail to state how large. In my opinion, a figure of more than 50,000 horsemen is likely because the immediate collapse of the Persian flanks suggests that the Romans outflanked the Persians on both sides. Tabari claimed that the Romans invaded with 80,000 men. Any extra cavalry units above 50,000 horsemen would have been posted separately to the flanks of his first line, as stated by the Strategikon (1.4.23–31). The general was expected to use his own judgment where to place these men: in the flanks or rear, or for use in ambush or encircling. After the army had been arrayed in battle formation Philippicus paraded a miraculous image, one of those ‘not made by human hand’ to encourage his troops. This is a good demonstration of Philippicus’s skills as a commander. He knew both from the ancient treatises and from period practices that the soldiers needed to believe that the God was on their side. With this in mind he had brought the most powerful of the talismans, the ‘supernatural’ image of Jesus, to the scene of operations. This was probably either the Camuliana/Kamoulianai image of Jesus or the Edessan image.81 He then dispatched the image to the fortress of Mardis (Mardin) to be under the guardianship of Symeon, the Bishop of Amida, who had been posted there for this purpose. This means that the city of Mardin was right behind the army. The progress of the battle shows that the Romans had superiority in numbers. The Persians also deployed their army in three divisions. The right flank was commanded by Mebodes/Mebod, the centre by Kardarigan, and the left flank by

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214  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Aphraates. The position of Mebod in the battleline shows that the ruler Hormizd had indeed lost faith in him. The reconstruction of the Persian formation is here based on my doctoral dissertation which makes the assumption that the Persians would have used tripartite formation deployed in two consecutive lines, the battle array represented in the Strategikon. The Strategikon also stated that the Persians had too few flank guards and posted an extra 400–500 men in the middle. The 400–500 horsemen may have been deployed as a wedge. It is probable that this extra unit in the middle was used when the army was not commanded by the shahanshah himself, because the military treatises in the Persian tradition place the extra reserves to both flanks when the ruler (on the right) and his hazarabed/vizier (on the left) were present. The military treatises in the Persian

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  215 tradition divide their battle array into outer left wing, left wing (one of the two chief parts), centre (the heart), right wing (one of the two chief parts) and outer right wing, each consisting of three units. The centre of the battle line would have consisted of the three divisions in the middle (left wing, centre/heart and right flank). Just before the battle Kardarigan resorted to a desperate measure. He ordered the Persians to burst open their skin flasks so that they would fight with greater determination to get access to the river Arzamon behind the Romans. This suggests that Philippicus had outmanoeuvred the Persians, and that the Persians were indeed outnumbered by their opposition. According to Theophylact, it was after the Jesus image had been dispatched to the rear that the officers of the front line begged Philippicus to move to the rear because they feared that their general could become embroiled in the combat. This means that Philippicus led the front line until the charge, after which he took his position in the second line. The Roman right drove the Persian left wing off the field, but instead of pursuing the fleeing Persians, they started to plunder the Persian camp. Because of this some of the units of the Persian left wing were able to regroup in the centre. The Roman arms also met with success on the left. The left division pursued the routed Persian right wing for twelve miles to Dara. In this case the reserves of both Roman wings followed their front units.82 The Roman centre had been less successful. The reinforced Persian centre probably outflanked the Roman centre so it had to retreat to the safety of the reserves under Philippicus, which gave the Persians a chance to regroup the remnants of the army.83 Even if not stated by Theophylact, this halt in the battle may imply the use of caltrops (or horsebreakers) by the Romans between their battle lines, because they had chosen the battlefield. Now when the Roman flank divisions were out of action, the Persians had the advantage of numbers. The Persians gained numerical advantage because some of their left flank units were able to regroup behind their centre. In response, the remaining Romans were forced to dismount so that they could face the remaining Persians with a wall of spears.84 The order to strike at the horses with spears was supposedly given by a lochagos named Stephanus.85 However, afterwards he strenuously denied giving any such order. He undoubtedly feared the jealousy of his superior(s). This incident shows that individual commanders could and did show personal initiative. The resulting infantry formation of the dismounted cavalry was probably the epikampios opisthia or square formation with cavalry reserves, because they needed to counter a superior cavalry force on the plain. Apparently while this was going on Philippicus tried to save the day by using a stratagem to induce his disobedient right wing back to the fight. He took off his distinctive and conspicuous helmet and placed it on Theodorus Ilibinus, one of his bodyguards, and ordered him to ride to the right wing and order them back to combat. In this he succeeded. The right flank stopped its looting, regrouped, and attacked the rear of the Persian formation. This was the decisive moment in the battle. The Persian centre panicked and fled. The success of this stratagem implies that Philippicus’s helmet had some sort of facial covering, probably in the form of mail. According to Theophylact, some of the Persians managed to flee to a hill, where they were besieged for three or four days, after which Stephanus left a route open for them

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216  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 to flee, as the ancient military precepts recommended. He did not know that Kardarigan was among them. When Stephanus then returned to Philippicus, the latter reprimanded him for not having reduced the Persians to surrender, which Stephanus defended by noting the difficulty of attacking the hill. When the Persians then descended from the hill they encountered some of the Romans who were returning to their camp after their long pursuit with the result that many of the Persians were killed and 1,000 captured and sent in chains to Constantinople. The disaster for the Persians was aggravated by the fact that they had no water. In short, Theophylact claims that Philippicus did not authorize the release of the Persians from the hillock, but Evagrius (6.3) claims the opposite. According to him, the Persians were released to speed up the peace negotiations. Kardarigan fled to Dara. Its defenders did not allow him in, but insulted him for his failure. Three or four days after the battle a panic arose in the Roman camp that the Persians had acquired reinforcements and were about to attack. This rumour was shown to be ridiculous by hypostrategos Heraclius who charged out of the camp to see if he could see any Persians but there were none. The next day, Philippicus rewarded the men for their bravery and attended to the wounded.86 For diagrams of the battle, see below.

Chlomaron 586: The Siege and Battle87 The success at the Battle of Solanchon enabled Philippicus to ravage Arzanene. The civilians fled to their caves and underground shelters where they had stored bread and barley-cakes. The Romans at first could not find them, but then some captives revealed the secret openings, in addition to which the Romans beat the ground to find where there were echoes. The Romans enslaved large numbers of locals. After this, Philippicus pitched his marching camp near Chlomaron to besiege it. Modern historians (e.g. The Barrington Atlas) think that there existed two Chlomarons, Arzun/Tigranocerta (capital of Arzanene) and fort Chlomaron opposite Aphumon. This has led some to think that Philippicus besieged the fort. But I agree with the older view of Michael Whitby that this is Chlomaron the capital of Arzanene. Philippicus placed magister militum Theodorus (the former colleague of Kours) in charge of protecting the besiegers against possible Persian

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  217 attempts to relieve the city. He was a native of this area (Tur Abdin) so Philippicus could expect him to perform his duties well.88 It was then that two local Arzanene leaders, Maruthas and Jovius, deserted to the Roman side and promised to guide the Romans to places which had good natural defences where the Romans could build fortresses. These would enable the Romans to gain full control of Arzanene. Philippicus was delighted because he was seeking strongpoints for this precise purpose. He instructed his hypostrategos Heraclius to reconnoitre one such place in the company of these two deserters. Heraclius and his party consisted of twenty horsemen without helmets and armour because they did not expect to encounter any Persians. This was a mistake. Kardarigan had used the intervening break in hostilities well. He had regrouped the remnants of his army and had hastily enrolled civilians (probably mostly peasants) and herds of baggage animals and camels and was fast advancing to relieve Chlomaron. Heraclius was taken completely by surprise by the sudden appearance of the Persian army. At first he tried to trick the enemy by boldly continuing forward, but the enemy was not fooled. They fled to a high ridge where the Persians attacked them. They then fled to another ridge and then another. The following night Heraclius sent a messenger to Philippicus to warn him of the approach of the enemy. Zabertas, the commander of the fortified city of Chlomaron, had meanwhile slipped out of the city. He guided the approaching Persian relief army to an advantageous position close to the besieging Romans. Theodorus had performed his duty of protecting the besiegers poorly. Philippicus learnt of the arrival of the Persian relief army in the morning, and ordered the trumpets to sound to recall the troops that had scattered outside the camp. Since the Persians knew they would be unable to withstand the Roman attack (probably a cavalry charge) after their previous defeat they took position behind a great ravine, as advised by Zabertas. Since the Roman army was the same as before, it seems probable that it consisted mostly of cavalry. The Romans attempted to attack across the ravine, but in vain. The Persians, whose force undoubtedly had infantry (peasants) among their ranks, forced the attackers back. Unfortunately, the sources do not mention the composition or the battle array of either party. During the next night, the Persians moved behind the Romans by a circular march. Once again the Roman sentries under Theodorus failed to detect them. According to Theophylact, the Persians took positions on the upper slopes of the same mountain on which Chlomaron was located; both the city and fort have higher ground nearby so both would be plausible alternatives. It is because of this that some modern historians think that Philippicus was besieging the fort opposite Aphumon. However, in my opinion the city is to be preferred because it is difficult to think that the Persians would have resorted to such a desperate measure as they did now if they had besieged only the fort. When the Persians then occupied the higher ground, the Romans had to extricate themselves from their position. Now both sides were encamped so close to each other that the neighing of the horses could be heard. The next night, leaving most of their baggage behind, the Romans beat a hasty retreat across the ravine.89 Initially the retreat was chaotic because of the moonless night, but subsequently the Romans appear to have formed an infantry square since the Persians continually harassed the rear of the Roman formation with arrows. It was dawn when the Romans reached the spot where they were to cross the Redwan River to the fortress city of Aphumon, which was opposite the fort of Chlomaron. This means it

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218  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 had taken the whole night for the Romans to reach this position, which again supports the conclusion that the Romans had been besieging Chlomaron/Arzun and not the fort which was opposite Aphumon. Unbeknown to the Romans, their hasty flight came as a God-sent gift for the Persians. They were hungry, but now they were saved by the provisions which the Romans had left behind. Kardarigan had relieved Chlomaron. This battle stands as an example of excellent Persian generalship through which the Roman advantage in cavalry charge was completely negated, but it was still a gamble that could have ended badly for the Persians. Its success completely depended on the terrain and on the Persian ability to outmanoeuvre the Romans. In open terrain the Roman cavalry had the advantage, but this choice was not always available to them when they besieged forts or cities. But the principal culprit for the Roman failure was obviously Theodorus and his sentinels. It was because of his negligence that the commander of Chlomaron had been able to flee to Kardarigan and that the Persians managed to surprise the Romans. When the Roman army reached the safety of Aphumon, Philippicus convened a general assembly at midday and gave the soldiers a chance to shout abuse at Theodorus, who was therefore publicly humiliated before the entire army. Philippicus appears to have considered this sufficient punishment because Theodorus was not demoted. The loss of the baggage train meant that Philippicus could not stay where he was. Therefore, he led his army across the Nymphius River to Amida with the Persians harassing his retreat. Theophylact claims that Philippicus lost many men, but as has been noted by the Whitbys he exaggerates both the extent of the troubles and casualties. This is proved by what Philippicus did next. Firstly, he restored forts below Mount Izala (Tur Abdin Plateau), and repaired old forts, one of which was called Phathacon and another Alaleisus, and placed garrisons in them. The Whitbys suggest that Alaleisus was probably located at the Bitlis Pass (the cleisura of Balaleison) which connected Arzanene with Persarmenia, while they identify Phathacon with Atachas, which guarded another of the passess crossing the Taurus. Neither of these was in or near the Tur Abdin Plateau, which is probable why Theophylact mentions these separately. The restoration of these fortifications shows that Philippicus’s strategy was to isolate Arzanene from any sources of help.90 Once this work had been done, Philippicus delegated a part of the army to Heraclius with orders to raid Persian territory. Philippicus was afflicted with such pain that he could not lead the raid in person. Heraclius posted his force opposite Tur Abdin Plateau on the banks of the Tigris and then left Thamanon. As noted by the Whitbys, this means that Heraclius began his campaign on the eastern side of the Tigris. This in its turn means that Philippicus had led the army there before being incapacitated by his pain (possibly gout or some injury like falling from a horse?) and is confirmed by the fact that the Romans had fortified and garrisoned Alaleisus in the Bitlis Pass. Heraclius marched south, crossed the Tigris, marched west, pillaged Beth Arabaye, and then circled past Theodosiopolis and rejoined the main army under Philippicus. It is probable that the two met at Amida. This was the end of the campaign season. Philippicus sent the men to their winter quarters, which they could enjoy to the fullest because they had just received their annual wages. As noted by Michael Whitby, the large-scale restoration of the forts in Arzanene and Tur Abdin and the raid of Heraclius prove that the Romans retained decisive military superiority in the region.91

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220  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Rock Fort and Beïudaes in 58792 In the spring of 587 Philippicus was again unable to campaign because of his sickness. Consequently, he gave two-thirds of the army to his hypostrategos Heraclius (probably already MVM per Armeniam) and the rest to Theodorus (native of Tur Abdin) and Andreas.93 The latter served as an interpreter and intermediary between the Federate Arabs and Philippicus and was therefore instrumental for the Romans. This Andreas was tasked with instructing the Arabs on how to raid the Persian territories, which proves that they were conducting such operations in Middle Mesopotamia even though the sources do not mention it. The Romans had the initiative on their side because the Persians had their hands full in the East where the Turks had invaded with 300,000 men. The Romans under Heraclius besieged a strong Persian fort on a rock. The location is unknown but one may assume that it was in Arzanene because the two other commanders were in Tur Abdin.94 The Romans built helepoleis and mēchanai for the purpose of reducing the fort and the Persians responded by constructing mattresses to soften the impact of Roman stones and rocks. The stone throwers the Romans used in this case were probably trebuchets, but the aim of the shots left something to be desired because according to Theophylact some of the shots were too long and flew right over the fort – this latter detail might suggest that the fort was a small one. However, most of the shots found their mark and the siege continued unabated. The relentless bombardment by helepoleis and mēchanai continued day and night. In the end they captured the place and Heraclius installed a Roman garrison there. This shows how stone throwers could capture Persian fortresses if they bombarded for long enough. Meanwhile, Theodorus and Andreas were engaged in restoring the fort of Matzaron. While there they learned from local farmers that Beïudaes (Sina Judaeorum, Sinas, mod. Fafi) was insufficiently garrisoned. Beïudaes was ten miles from Matzaron. The Romans attempted to surprise the Persians during the night using cavalry. The plan failed because the Romans arrived in daylight. The Persians, who had occupied the tower of the fortified rock blocking the only approach to the fortress, showered the Romans with missiles the minute they arrived. They threw stones and used catapults. The Romans dismounted from their horses and attacked the rock. While the rest provided covering archery, some of the Romans formed a foulkon and, gradually moving step-by-step while being bombarded by the catapults, forced the Persians to flee to the fortress. The Romans occupied the tower and rock and besieged the fort proper. At this stage they apparently brought to the scene some stone throwers. Some time later the Romans launched a full scale assault of the main fort. Their covering archery forced most of the defenders away from the parapet. The foulkon advanced to the wall and a man called Sapeir, carrying sharp spikes that he placed at the joints of the construction, attempted to scale the wall. One Persian had remained behind and twice pushed him down onto the foulkon below. The second time, Sapeir had grasped the parapet so firmly that the Persian could only push him over by pushing down the parapet which had been weakened by the Roman bombardment. It is this that proves that the Romans had brought stone throwers to the scene. However, Sapeir’s third attempt proved successful. He killed the Persian with his sword and cut off his head. Sapeir’s older brother followed his example and after him other Romans, ropes were attached to the wall, the gates were cleared with archery, and then opened. The Romans killed

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  221 until their bloodlust had been satisfied and then captured the survivors. After this the commanders put a Roman garrison in it. The ability of the cavalry to dismount and fight as infantry in sieges is evident as is the requirement of possessing an adequate garrison to defend a fortress. These operations had consumed the entire campaign season so Philippicus sent the army to its winter quarters and then left for Constantinople. He left Heraclius as acting commander with the duty of exacting penalties from those who had deserted the army. This shows that there were problems with discipline, but we are not told what had caused them. There was probably relative quiet in the Armenian theatre of operations because the (likely) MVM per Armeniam Heraclius was fighting in the Mesopotamian theatre. The transfer of John Mystacon to the Balkans also proves that Maurice transferred men from the Armenian army there in about 586/7. In addition we learn from Sebeos that Maurice transferred 2,000 Armenians under Smbat Bagratuni and Sahak Mamikonean to the Balkans because the events of 586 had proved there was an urgent need for reinforcements. In short, Maurice transferred forces from both Italy (e.g. Droctulfus) and from Armenia (2,000 elite cavalry) plus whatever additional forces may have accompanied John Mystacon.95 This means there were not enough men available for a full-scale offensive in the Armenian theatre. The Military Mutiny of the Eastern Army in April 588–April 58996 According to Theophylact, when Philippicus was still en route to Constantinople he learnt that Maurice had replaced him with Priscus. Because of this he wrote a letter to Heraclius when he reached Tarsus. He ordered him to return to his command in Armenia (headquarters in Theodosiopolis/Erzurum) and leave the command of the Eastern armies to Narses. As noted by Michael Whitby, the division of the army into separate commands for the Armenian and Eastern theatres would have made it more difficult for Priscus to begin his operations the following spring and he could therefore have been motivated by this; or alternatively he was motivated by a worry that the army might mutiny making it wiser to divide it in two. The latter certainly receives support from the fact that there were multiple desertions in 587. Furthermore, the Emperor’s order to lower the soldiers’ salaries had reached him before he began his journey to Constantinople. Philippicus had decided not to publish it. It is therefore clear that Michael Whitby has a point when he suggests that Philippicus may have been on his way to meet the Emperor to convince him to abandon his plan. This version of events also gets support from Theophanes who states that Philippicus had refused to publish the Emperor’s order because he feared it would result in an uprising and it was because of this that he lost his position.97 Theophylact claims that Philippicus now ordered Priscus to tell the soldiers that the Emperor had decided to lower their salaries by a quarter because he was jealous of him (Maurice may have tried to compensate for this by making adjustments to their terms of service and acquisition of equipment). Michael Whitby suggests that Maurice may have wanted to reduce military pay because his quinquennial donative was due then and this placed extra strain on the Empire’s financial resources. This is the likeliest reason for this decision, but it was not a wise one given the fact that the state clearly possessed the necessary financial resources – a fact which is proved by the ability of the Emperor

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222  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 to bribe the soldiers whenever he needed to. It only made him look mean, and, as noted above, I am inclined to agree with Michael Whitby and Theophanes that Philippicus attempted to convince the Emperor to abandon his plan. Whitby is correct to point out that there exist two versions of this event, one that paints Philippicus in a positive light, and Priscus’s version which accuses Philippicus of the troubles.98 The new strategos, Priscus, reached Antioch in the beginning of the spring 588. He ordered the army to assemble at Monocarton. When he reached Edessa he was met by Dux Phoenices Libanensis Germanus (whose headquarters was at Damascus). The two spent four days together and then left. Priscus took with him the Bishop of Edessa to perform the necessary Easter church services. He also had the acheiropoietos (an image not made by human hand) with him. Germanus had clearly briefed Priscus on the potential trouble he faced when he reached Monocarton. It is clear that the two would not have spent four days together if it was just a standard briefing. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Priscus took with him the bishop and acheiropoietos. Both could be used not only to motivate the soldiers but also to calm them. Germanus went ahead of his commander to prepare a reception. When Priscus then arrived two days later, he was greeted by the entire army and its officers about three miles from the marching camp. They were in full battle array to honour their new commander on 16 April 588. However, Priscus was a proud man and not easily approached. He believed the soldiers would be easier to control through fear. He was therefore a man in the mould of his Emperor Maurice and it is probable that he was dispatched to the East because of this. This spelled trouble. It was an old military custom that when the army came to meet its new commander, he would dismount and then walk through the ranks to the camp to show his respect to the soldiers, but Priscus did neither. He arrogantly rode past the soldiers to the camp. The soldiers took this as an insult, which it was, but Priscus did not understand this because in his opinion this was the way soldiers should be treated. The soldiers did not act on their anger for two days, but when Priscus announced the Emperor’s decision to reduce salaries and make adjustments to the terms of service the situation changed. Now all hell broke loose. Priscus did not know how to handle the situation. He was not a master of rhetoric and camaraderie. On Easter Sunday, 18 April 588, the angry soldiers assembled around the strategos’s tent carrying stones and swords. When the general came out to ask what the commotion was about the soldiers shouted that they no longer had a leader. It was only then that Priscus realized what was happening and, bathed in sweat and fear, he tried to calm the men by uncovering the acheiropoietos, which he gave to Eilifreda with orders to carry it around the army so that they would come to their senses. This only angered the soldiers more. They started to pelt the object and Priscus with stones. Then the frightened Priscus grasped a horse from one of the Emperor’s bodyguards and fled. While doing so he came across some grooms who were pasturing the soldiers’ horses. They tried to stop him but failed, and Priscus was able to reach Constantia. When Priscus reached Constantia, he dispatched couriers to all the commanders in the cities and forts with orders not to lower the soldiers’ salaries as the Emperor had instructed. He then asked medics to attend to the wounds and bruises he had received from being pelted with stones.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  223 In the meantime the mutinous soldiers flattened the commander’s tent and looted his property while the higher ranking officers fled. Soon after this Priscus dispatched the Bishop of Constantia to the camp with the message that Maurice had changed his mind. He had a letter to prove it. Priscus accused Philippicus of the lowering of the salaries. He claimed that it was he, Priscus, who had persuaded Maurice to change his mind. Meanwhile the army had chosen Germanus as their leader. He had tried to refuse, but the threat of death convinced him to accept the unenviable position. Consequently it was Germanus who received the bishop and who then represented him to the soldiers, which was a further source of anger. The soldiers demanded Priscus be thrown out of Constantia, then they tore down the imperial statues, destroyed paintings of the Emperor, and shouted that they would not accept a shopkeeper as their ruler. Priscus fled to Edessa from where he dispatched its bishop as envoy to the soldiers, but with the same result. The army was in anarchy. The soldiers abused civilians and there was general lawlessness throughout the East. As we have already seen, the breadbasket of the Empire, Egypt, was one of the places affected by this. It was only thanks to the intervention of Germanus that this did not result in an attempted overthrow of the Emperor.99 When Priscus informed the Emperor of what had happened, Philippicus was restored to command. Priscus, however, retained the Emperor’s trust, because he was next given command of the Balkan armies. Philippicus reached the East in about June/July 588. Meanwhile the soldiers had selected forty-five delegates whom they dispatched to Edessa to represent the decision of the soldiers to the general. They ordered Priscus to leave Edessa, but Priscus defended himself well before the envoys and managed to convince them that he was not the person who had committed the injustice towards them; it had been Philippicus. The delegates conveyed the message to the soldiers, but it was not well received. The envoys were lucky to escape with their lives; they were only expelled from the camp. The next move of the rebels was to collect a force of 5,000 to besiege Priscus at Edessa. It was then that Theodorus arrived with the news that the Emperor had replaced Priscus with Philippicus. Priscus couldn’t have been more delighted to go, and he left for Constantinople. When the soldiers were told that Philippicus was about to reach Monocarton, they decided not to accept him. So Philippicus decided to stay away in the neighbourhood of Beroe and Chalcis. The news of the revolt of the Roman army had by then reached Persian ears, who decided to try to exploit the situation even though most of their men were in the East fighting the Turks. The Persians, who probably consisted of local garrison forces, attacked the city of Constantia. Germanus, however, managed to convince 1,000 of the rebels to join him for the relief of the city, which he managed to achieved with this puny force. When one remembers that in 540 the two duces of Lebanon could take 6,000 horsemen from their own territories to Antioch, it becomes clear how little authority Germanus exercised. He did not possess enough authority to command even his own regular forces. However, the success of this relief operation and the Persian activity enabled him to convince more men to take arms in defence of the Roman Empire. This time he managed to convince 4,000 men to assemble under his banner and invade Persian territory in revenge.

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224  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Then Aristobulus, the special envoy of the Emperor, arrived (curator domus divinae rerum Antiochi). He was able to convince the soldiers with bribes and persuasive words to end their mutiny. This demonstrates that the money to pay the soldiers always existed; it was only a matter of how the Emperor set his priorities. The army was then marched to Martyropolis and another detachment was sent to raid Persian territory. I would suggest that the intention was to distract the Persians from attacking Romans who were fleeing from Persian territory (see below). The commander of the raiders was once again Germanus, but the Persians under Maruzas marched against the invaders so Germanus decided to retreat across Arzanene and the Nymphius River back to Martyropolis. It is probable that Maruzas’s army had been strengthened by the Armenian Army of Aphraates (Sebeos p.12). This implies that the Roman Army of Armenia under Heraclius was facing similar troubles as the Mesopotamian Army. Maruzas followed hot on Germanus’s heels, who exploited this eagerness and engaged and defeated the Persians in a major battle close to Martyropolis. The Persian general was killed and two commanders (taxiarchoi) of the wings were captured alongside 3,000 other prisoners. Only 1,000 Persians managed to reach Nisibis. This sequence suggests that Germanus ambushed the Persian cavalry with cavalry as he had induced them to follow him, but the details are too few to make certain conclusions. The glory achieved as a result of this battle and the booty taken removed the hostility that the soldiers had towards the Emperor. The grateful soldiers sent to the Emperor his share of the booty together with the head of Maruzas and the Persian banda (flags). When this took place the strategos Philippicus was in Hierapolis waiting to hear of the end of the revolt. This marked the end of the campaign season because the winter had set in, and the army was disbanded to its winter quarters. There had been an important development in the region of Bizaë (Beth Huzaye) in Media near the cities of Susa and Bendosabora (Gundishapur). This place had a fort called Giligerdon and close to it was the Castle of Lethe. The last mentioned was the famous prison of Oblivion where Persian rulers put foreigners and high-ranking Persians who had incurred the royal wrath. It was there that Chosroes I had placed the Roman captives taken from Dara in 573. These captives formed the majority of the prisoners, but there were also Kadasenes (Cadusii, Cadusenians) who inhabited the mountains along the southern shore of the Caspian Sea100 (their presence among the captives means that they had revolted against their Persian overlords fairly recently), and others. Their common sufferings united all of these men from different races, customs and languages against their oppressors. It was the men of Dara who took the lead in the rebellion. They used whatever tools they could find as weapons and then attacked the guards on the agreed signal. They killed the guards, but the prison also had a strong garrison of soldiers and the fighting became prolonged. However, in the end the Roman convicts were victorious and led their fellow convicts out of the fort. En route they encountered others who tried to oppose them, but they were always victorious and were able to reach Roman territory roughly at the same time as Germanus was fleeing from the Persians to Martyropolis and while the Romans were opposing the reinstatement of Philippicus (because of this he was staying at safe distance in Tarsus). The timing suggests a probability that these actions were coordinated so that it was Germanus’s campaign that prevented the Persians from engaging the fleeing captives.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  225 It was probably some time during this chaos that the Romans lost the fortress of Akbas to the Persians. We know that they had regained it because the Romans were forced to besiege it later. When spring 589 arrived the Emperor secured the loyalty of the army with the distribution of the customary gold. Germanus and others, however, were summoned to Constantinople to stand trial for their actions. All were condemned to death, but the merciful Emperor pardoned them and in fact honoured and rewarded them.101 However, the distribution of money and the summoning of the rebel leaders to the capital did not solve the situation because the army had believed the lies spread by Priscus to exonerate himself and believed that it had been Philippicus who had advised the Emperor to lower their salaries. It required the intervention of the Bishop of Hieropolis, Gregory. The best description of this episode and what followed after is by Evagrius: ‘Accordingly the emperor remunerates the troops with largesses of money [this took place in spring 589]; and withdrawing Germanus and others, brings them to trial. They were all condemned to death; but the emperor would not permit any infliction whatsoever; on the contrary, he bestowed rewards on them. During the course of these transactions, the Avars twice made an inroad as far as the Long Wall, and captured Anchialus, Singidunum, and many towns and fortresses throughout the whole of Greece, enslaving the inhabitants, and laying everything waste… in consequence of the greater part of the forces being engaged in the East. Accordingly, the emperor sends Andrew [Andreas], the first of the imperial guards, on an attempt to induce the troops to receive their former officers. [The sight of the Avars so close to the capital seems to have led to a change in strategy. Now Maurice sought to end the war in the east through offensive so that he could then transfer the men to the Balkans.] ‘Since, however, the troops would not endure the bare mention of the proposal, the business is transferred to Gregory [Bishop of Hieropolis; Evagrius was his lawyer], not only as being a person competent to the execution of the most important measures, but because he had earned the highest regard from the soldiery, since some of them had received presents from him in money, others in clothing, provisions, and other things, when they were passing his neighbourhood at the time of their enlistment on the basis of the register. [In his translation of Evagrius, on p.301 Whitby notes the importance of this sentence. It shows that the Roman soldiers were conscripts.] Accordingly, he assembles, by summons despatched to every quarter, the principal persons of the army at Litarba, a place distant from Theopolis about three hundred stadia; and, though confined to his couch, addressed them in person, … ‘Having thus addressed them, accompanying his speech with many tears, he wrought an instantaneous change in the minds of all… They immediately requested permission to retire from the meeting, and to deliberate among themselves… After a short interval they returned, and placed themselves at the disposal of the bishop. However, on his naming Philippicus to them, in order that they might themselves request him for a commander, they declared that the whole army had on this point bound themselves with fearful oaths: but the bishop, undeterred by this,… said, that he was a bishop by divine permission, and had authority to loose

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226  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 and bind both upon earth and in heaven… administering to them the communion of the immaculate body; for it happened to be the second day of the holy passion week. After he had feasted them all, to the number of two thousand, upon couches hastily constructed on the turf, he returned home the following day. It was also agreed that the soldiers should assemble wherever they might choose. Gregory in consequence sends for Philippicus, who at the time was at Tarsus in Cilicia, intending to proceed immediately to the imperial city [i.e. he had abandoned hopes of being admitted back into command]; and he also reports these proceedings to the government, communicating at the same time the prayer of the soldiery respecting Philippicus. Accordingly, they meet Philippicus at Theopolis, …and, on receiving a solemn promise of amnesty, they return to their duty with him.’ Evagrius 6.10–3, tr. by anon. 1846, 295–300 with some changes and comments in parentheses. War in 589 and the Battle of Suania102 The year 589 marked a change in Maurice’s strategy for the Eastern theatre of war. He sought to resume the offensive, to bring about an end to the conflict there and enable him to transfer troops from the East to the Balkans and other places. It was the revolt of Iberia in 588 against the Persians that provided him with the opportunity. We learn from Juansher (included in the Georgian Chronicles, p.228ff.) that in 588 Chosroes II Parwez had left Iberia and Albania to bring help to his father. This created a regional power vacuum that gave the Iberians the chance to revolt and ask Maurice to give them a king and military help. Maurice’s choice was Gorgenes/Guaram I,103 the man who had fled to the Roman Empire in 572. Juansher states that Guaram was prince/governor of Klarjetʻi and Javakhetʻi. However, as I have already noted in the context of the events of 572, he was actually their former king so he was merely being returned to the throne. Maurice also appointed Guaram I as curopalates and gave him a sizable war chest with which to buy a mercenary army of Ossetes (Alans), Durjuks and Didos from the north (north of the Caucasus Mountains). These were to be put under Georgian/Iberian eristavis (nobles) and united with the national Iberian/Georgian army. In 589 this combined force invaded Atrapatakan (Media Atropatene), which lay in Persian territory proper. On the basis of Sebeos’s account (p.15), it is probable that the Mazkʻutʻkʻ (usually denoting the Huns, they are the same as the Khazars of Michael the Syrian) supported this invasion. None of the sources specifically mention what the Armenian army under Heraclius did during this period, but it is easy enough to join the dots from the account provided by Juansher who states that the Roman army invaded Persian territory at the same time as Guaram I. The Persian commander on the scene, Aphraates, did not possess enough men to oppose the Romans, Iberians and northerners. These invaders, however, were in for a nasty surprise. Bahram Chobin of the great Mihran family had defeated the Turks decisively in 588–9104 and he reached the theatre of operations in the summer of 589. When the news of the arrival of this army reached the Romans and northerners, both retreated back to their own territories (Juansher p.230). On the basis of Sebeos (p.15), Bahram intercepted and defeated the Mazkʻutʻkʻ and killed their king in battle. It is possible that it was the news of this defeat that had convinced the Romans and northerners to flee from Media Atropatene. Guaram I retreated to his own

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  227 territory and prepared to defend it against Bahram by strengthening the fortifications in the area. Bahram exploited his success by advancing into Suania, which he pillaged and then retreated back to the River Araxes. He sent the booty to the ruler in ‘Babylonia’. This only served to increase the envy that Hormizd felt towards his very successful commander. Bahram’s success against the Turks and the tremendous amount of booty and glory he cornered for himself were a thorn in the flesh of a ruler who did not lead armies in person, not to mention that Hormizd felt that he had got too small a share of the loot. See later. When Maurice learnt of Bahram’s raid of Suania, he appointed Romanus to take the command of the Roman forces in Colchis/Lazica. It is probable that Maurice feared the prospect of the Persians reaching the Black Sea. The fact that it was Romanus and not the commander of the Armenian army who launched the counter-offensive in 589 means that the Roman and Persian armies of Armenia, respectively under Heraclius and Aphraates, effectively neutralized each other probably somewhere between Dvin and Theodosiopolis during this period. Romanus took the offensive and invaded Albania. When Bahram learnt this he was delighted. He was eager to engage the Romans because he had not faced them before. Bahram tried to lure the Romans further into Persia by using the classic nomad method of feigned retreat. He retreated towards Canzacon by crossing the nearby river, but Romanus realized what Bahram was up to and persuaded his overly eager soldiers not to follow. Then he dispatched fifty scouts to shadow the enemy. The scouts encountered two Persian scouts dressed in Roman uniforms who claimed to know where the Persians were. The Roman scouts were fooled by this and most were captured. Three managed to escape back to Romanus to tell him what had happened. Bahram learned from the tortured prisoners that Romanus’s army was actually small. He turned back immediately. Romanus retreated to Lazica where he collected more men and tested the mettle of his forces. He chose 10,000 men, leaving the others in a base camp, and marched towards Bahram. His 2,000-man vanguard met and defeated the Persian vanguard. Most of the Persians were killed during the pursuit that was continued up to the Persian camp and some ravine. Romanus feared to engage the numerically superior enemy, but the eagerness of the soldiers led him to prepare the men for combat. Both armies encamped in the plain of Albania, a ravine extending from the River Araxes separating them from each other. On the third day, the Persians asked from the Romans for permission to cross the ravine if the Romans would not cross to their side. The request was granted. After the crossing, Bahram tried to steal a victory through some unnamed stratagem but his attempt failed as Romanus was an experienced man not easily fooled by tricks. On the fifth day after the Romans had reached the plain, both armies deployed for battle in three divisions. We know the size of the Roman army. It was 10,000 horsemen strong and outnumbered by the enemy, but we unfortunately do not possess any reliable figure for the size of the Persian host. Bahram had had 70,000 men when he marched against the Turks, but it is unlikely that he would have brought all of them here. Perhaps he had brought only the chosen elite of his army, which consisted of 12,000 horsemen, into which he would have added some other men from local forces to make something like 20,000 men altogether. The Romans were heavily outnumbered so initially they attacked only with their centre. The Persians were badly mauled. In panic Bahram moved men from his left flank to counter this Roman cavalry charge.

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228  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 This weakened the Persian left wing, which the Romans exploited by charging at it. The Persian left wing collapsed and the entire Persian army took flight. The Romans pursued relentlessly and Bahram suffered his first defeat. As Michael Whitby has noted, Bahram, whose recent experience was in nomad warfare, had clearly forgotten the impact of a Roman cavalry charge.105 The battle appears to have been conducted as the Strategikon recommended for outnumbered armies. The first to engage the enemy was the centre division. The rapid collapse of the Persian left suggests that Bahram may have used a single line, but the presence of a second line cannot be ruled out. The Roman exploitation of the weakened Persian left is reminiscent of the Battle of Tricamarum. Theophylact’s text implies the use of a single line by Romanus, but his earlier deployment of the army in depth during the approach and the date of the battle suggest the use of the standard battle array of two lines. Furthermore, Romanus is not credited with heroics, so probably remained behind. This was a major achievement and it is not surprising that Romanus was next appointed exarchus Italiae with the title of patricius. It is there that we find him in charge of the Roman offensive in 590. The defeat of Bahram, however, had not been decisive. Most of his men survived because his army consisted of cavalry. But the defeat had one major consequence: Hormizd dismissed Bahram. He also insulted him by making him dress in female clothing.106 On the basis of the Eastern sources it is clear Hormizd believed that Bahram had embezzled most of the booty captured from the Turks in 588–9, and the defeat by the Romans was an excuse to get rid of a potentially dangerous commander. Dinawari claims that the suspicion was planted in Hormizd’s mind by his Chief Vizier Yazdan Jushnas. Yaqubi claims that the suspicion resulted from the claims of Barmudhan, the captured son of the Turkish Khagan Shabah. He told Hormizd that Bahram had obtained massive amounts of booty from the Turks and that he had handed to the ruler only a very small portion of it. This was then confirmed by those who had accompanied Bahram during the campaign. When Bahram then chose not to resign, Hormizd dispatched Sarames to bind Bahram in fetters. The simultaneous demand to hand over the loot taken from the Turks, however, was ill-conceived because in truth Bahram had shared most of it with the troops. When Bahram, who was at the time wearing the female clothing sent by Hormizd, announced the demand of Hormizd to the men, they revolted and installed Bahram as their ruler. The leader of Hormizd’s envoys, Sarames, was given special treatment. Bahram had him trodden into the ground by one of his largest war elephants. Bahram then led his rebel army to his feudal domains in the city of Rayy in Media, assembled allies and prepared to meet the royal army, while he sought to sow discord between father Hormizd and son Chosroes II Parwez, which was followed by several moves and counter-moves. It took until 592 for Bahram to gain the throne.107 Betrayal of Martyropolis by Sittas Regardless of the many dramatic events in the north and east, the principal theatre of operations in 589 was still the Mesopotamian theatre. It saw a dramatic development in the form of the loss of Martyropolis to the Persians. The principal sources for the Mesopotamian theatre are Theophylact and Evagrius, but it is the latter who provides a fuller account of what unfolded and it is therefore once again worthwhile to include his

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  229 accounts of the events. The following took place roughly at the same time as Philippicus and the soldiers were reconciled after Easter 589: ‘A certain Sittas, one of the petty officers [In his translation of Evagrius p.305 Whitby correctly notes that Sittas’s title dekadarchos means that he was a commander of ten men, i.e. commander of a file / tent group contubernium] stationed at Martyropolis, considering himself aggrieved by the commanders in that place [It is probable that there was also a religious element in this, for which see the discussion below], betrays the city, by watching the withdrawal of the troops which occupied it, and introducing a Persian battalion under colour of being Romans. [Theophylact 3.5.11–3 provides a different version. According to him, Sittas persuaded 400 Persians to pretend to be deserters. He then convinced the townsmen to admit them inside because they had deserted to their side. Once inside the Persians captured the place.] He thus obtained possession of a place which was most important for the Romans; and, retaining most of the younger females [They were used as sex-slaves], expelled all the other inhabitants, except a few domestic slaves. ‘Philippicus in consequence marched thither, and invested and besieged the city, without being provided with things necessary for the siege [The loss of the city had been a surprise and there had not been any time to make plans or preparations because Philippicus had regained control of the army only very recently]. Nevertheless, he maintained his operations with such means as he possessed, and, having run several mines, threw down one of the towers. He was unable, however, to make himself master of the place, because the Persians continued their exertions through the night, and secured the breach. When the Romans repeatedly assaulting, were as often repulsed, for the missiles were hurled upon them from vantage ground with unerring aim, and since they were suffering greater loss than they inflicted, they at last raised the siege, and encamped at a short distance, with the sole object of preventing the Persians from reinforcing the garrison. By the order of Maurice, Gregory visits the camp, and induces them to resume the siege. [This was a wise precaution; the soldiers had suffered high casualties under the leadership of a man whom they believed had advised the lowering of their salaries. It was not the commander, but the bishop who pleaded with them. Note that Evagrius was in a position to know these things.] They were, however, unable to accomplish anything, from their utter want of engines for sieges. [They needed in particular ballistae and trebuchets. One wonders where they had been stored, because the Romans had had them in 587. The likeliest answer is Martyropolis in 588, which had served as the base of operations for the Roman army when Germanus had marched from there against the Persians.] In consequence, the army breaks up for winter quarters [late 589], and numerous garrisons are left in the neighbouring forts, to prevent the Persians from secretly introducing succours into the place. Evagrius 6.14, tr. by anon. 1846, 300–2 with some changes and comments in parentheses. According to Chronicle 1234 (79, pp.168–9), it was also in 589 that Maurice ordered Stephanus, the Bishop of Carrhae (Harran), to start a persecution of pagans in that city.

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230  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Stephanus acted as instructed. Many of the pagans were converted, and those who refused were cut in half with a sword and left hanging to serve as warning examples. The Prefect of Carrhae, Acindynus, was officially Christian but in truth he was a closet pagan. His secret was betrayed by his scribe Honorius with the result that he was publicly crucified. This was a shrewd move by Honorius, because he succeeded Acindynus in office. I would interpret this persecution to have been a reaction to the betrayal of Martyropolis. Maurice was clearly aware that the strategic city of Carrhae was full of pagans who could have sided with the Persians like Sittas. In fact, it is probable that the persecuted pagans of Carrhae were Zoroastrians. This conclusion receives support from the name of the betrayer of the city of Martyropolis: Sittas was probably an Armenian108 and therefore quite possibly a Zoroastrian, as many Armenians were. In short, this persecution of pagans was a security measure against the Zoroastrian community of Carrhae so that it would not betray the city to their co-religionists as Sittas had done at Martyropolis.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  231 War in 590 and the Battles of Martyropolis and Tsalkajur The year 590 saw a continuation of the previous operations, except that now Bahram was in Rayy where he minted 10,000 silver dirhams with Chosroes II Parwez’s image which he distributed secretly in Ctesiphon. This poisoned Hormizd’s mind so that he planned to kill Chosroes as an accomplice of Bahram. Chosroes, however, was too quick for him. He fled to Azerbaijan (Media Atropatene) where he was joined by several generals and nobles. The location and subsequent events (see later) suggest that Chosroes obtained the support of the formidable Daylami infantry. The plot of Bahram had worked like a dream. Hormizd interrogated Vstam (Bistam) and Vndoy (Bindoes), the two uncles of Chosroes, about the whereabouts of his son. They pleaded innocence. Hormizd did not believe them and imprisoned them. All these events took place presumably in 590. However, the dating of the different moves by Bahram and Hormizd in relation to what took place in the war against the Romans is not known with certainty, excepting that on the basis of both Evagrius and Theophylact they lasted until 592.109 The following is from Evagrius, with some changes and my comments in parentheses: ‘ In the succeeding summer, [i.e. in 590; this dating has not been accepted by Whitby (1988, 288–90; Evagrius, 306), REF2 (170–1) or Martindale (PLRE3 Comentiolus 1), but I see no reason to doubt it. Evagrius was a contemporary and his dating is also confirmed by Theophylact 3.8.12] on the re-assembling of the army, and the advance of the Persians, a severely contested battle is fought before Martyropolis [Theophylact 3.5.14–5: The Persian commanders were Mebodes/ Mahbodh son of Surenas, and Aphraates. At this time Aphraates was commander of the Persian army in Armenia, which means that Hormizd dispatched significant numbers of men from Persarmenia to the Mesopotamian theatre of war. This means that Heraclius in Armenia had not performed his job well. He should have tied the Persian army of Armenia to the north. Aphraates reinforced Mebodes because the latter had insufficient men. The likeliest reason for this is that Mebodes had been forced to send some of his men to Hormizd who needed them against Bahram in Rayy and also against his son Chosroes II who was in Azerbaijan/Atropatene. Sebeos p.12 claims that marzban Hrahat, i.e. Aphraates, marched to Nisibis where he was defeated, but then gained victory, after which he was victorious in Bznunik at Tsalkajur near Lake Van. As noted above, I connect the defeat at Nisibis with the victory of Germanus in 588 near Martyropolis, which means that Aphraates’s victory must have taken place now and that the victory near Lake Van took place immediately after]. Though the advantage was on the side of Philippicus, and many Persians had fallen, with the loss of one distinguished chieftain, [Theophylact 3.6.3: Mebodes was killed by a Roman missile] a considerable body of the enemy made their way into the city; which was in fact their main object [i.e. this was a victory from the Persian point of view]. Thenceforward the Romans gave up the siege in despair, as being unable to encounter this force, and they erected a rival city at the distance of seven stadia [i.e. they actually continued the blockade and siege], in a stronger position on the mountains, in order to carry on counter operations. Such were the proceedings of the army during the summer; it broke up on the approach of winter. [This would be in late 590; Theophylact (3.5.16) includes a more sober assessment of the defeat. According to him, when Maurice heard of

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232  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 this, he dismissed Philippicus immediately and replaced him with Comentiolus. He had just arrived from Spain so the timing was perfect. In my opinion the likely reasons for the inability of Philippicus to prevent the reinforcement of the city were that his men were not fully motivated to serve under him, and the Persians probably outnumbered him. The Persian force consisted of the forces of Persarmenia and Mesopotamia while Heraclius was apparently still in Armenia.]’ Evagrius 6.14, tr. by anon. 1846, 302. I would suggest that the battle where Aphraates defeated the Romans at Tsalkajur in Bznunik close to the north-west shore of Lake Van took place when he was returning from this battle and that Heraclius was trying to intercept the retreating Persian army with bad results. This is obviously a conjecture, but it is unlikely to be a coincidence that we find a new commander, John Mystacon, in Armenia the next year, 591 (he was presumably appointed already in the autumn 590), and that we find Heraclius serving as a subordinate of Comentiolus. Maurice had clearly demoted Heraclius because of his two failures, the first of which was that Aphraates had been able to join Mebodh and the second of which was that Heraclius had been defeated by him. The fact that Theophylact fails to mention any of this is not surprising because he was writing when Heraclius’s son Heraclius was Emperor: Theophylact was clearly seeking to please him every possible way by extolling the achievements of the father while keeping complete silence of any of his failures. The Persian war from 591 until March 592 and the Battle of Sisarbanon and Siege of Akbas In 591 Maurice’s plan was to launch a double offensive in Persarmenia and in Mesopotamia. He was of course aware of the Persian civil war. Both Roman armies now had new commanders. In the north the target was the Persamenian capital Dvin. The man in charge of this campaign was John Mystacon. However, before he could put the plan into action it was brought to an uprupt end by the conspiracy of some Romans and Armenians to desert to the Persians. The prime movers in this plot were the Armenians under Smbat Bagratuni who sought to recreate the Armenian Kingdom with Persian help. It is probable that it happened early in John’s command, which I date to late 590–early 591 on the basis of the sequence of events in Sebeos.110 Their plan was to assassinate John and then join the Persians. The plot, however, was uncovered. Maurice dispatched Domenziolus, an illustres and one of the leading senators, to the scene to investigate. He nipped the revolt in the bud by arresting the key plotter Sumbatius (Smbat Bagratuni) and his seven accomplices who were dispatched in chains to the Emperor. After a trial the judges ordered them to be thrown to wild beasts. According to Sebeos, the gigantic Smbat Bagratuni was an exceptionally strong man. First he killed a bear, then a bull, and finally a lion, all with his bare hands. The audience and the Empress demanded that he be pardoned111 and Maurice consented. True to his character, Maurice pardoned them all. Smbat was sent to Africa with the title of tribune. It is probable that this mutiny hindered the capture of the Persarmenian capital this year and John Mystacon was able to begin the planned siege only in late 591.112 In Mesopotamia the targets were Nisibis and its surrounding neighbourhood, and continuation of the siege of Martyropolis. The man in charge was Maurice’s trusted

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  233 henchman Comentiolus. When Comentiolus approached Nisibis from the north, he was opposed by the Persian army at Sisarbanon. We have two descriptions of the ensuing battle of Sisarbanon, one by Evagrius and another by Theophylact. We possess very few details and Theophylact’s account is marred by his pro-Heraclian propaganda, but we still possess enough evidence to construct the principal features of this important battle: ‘Comentiolus, a Thracian by birth, is sent out as a successor in the command to Philippicus. He engaged the Persians with great spirit, and would have lost his life by being thrown to the ground together with his horse [Comentiolus led the counter attack], had not one of the guards mounted him upon a led horse, and conveyed him out of the battle. In consequence, the enemy fly with precipitation, with the loss of all their commanders, and retire to Nisibis; and fearing to return to their king, since he had threatened them with death unless they should bring off their commanders in safety, they enter into the insurrection against Hormisdas, now that Varamus [Bahram Chobin], the Persian general, had already entertained that design with his party on his return from his encounter with the Turks. In the meantime, Comentiolus, having commenced the siege of Martyropolis, leaves the greater part of his army, and himself makes an excursion with a chosen body of troops to Ocbas [Akbas], a very strong fortress, situated on a precipice on the bank opposite to Martyropolis, and commanding a view of the whole of that city. Having employed every effort in the siege, and thrown down some portion of the wall by catapults, he takes the place by storming the breach. In consequence, the Persians thenceforth despaired of keeping possession of Martyropolis. ‘While such was the course of these events, the Persians killed Hormisdas… They established as his successor his son Chosroes against whom Varamus [Bahram] advanced with his troops. [This condenses the events somewhat.]’ Evagrius 6.15, tr. by anon 1846 pp. 302–3 with my comments in parentheses. In short, on the basis of Evagrius’s text it is clear that Comentiolus engaged the Persians at Sisarbanon and won decisively.113 However, we have an entirely different account in Theophylact. He claims that in the middle of the battle Comentiolus abandoned his army and fled to Theodosiopolis, and that it was Heraclius, the father of the Emperor Heraclius, who with his exceptional personal courage saved the day while fighting bravely and skilfully with his spear. The Persian commander Aphraates was killed and the Persians fled to their camp, which was taken the next day with its contents. It is clear that Theophylact has covered up the flight of the centre of the frontline under hypostrategos Heraclius and the heroics of Comentiolus (probably in charge of the second line where the strategos was expected to be) which was only mentioned by Evagrius. It is clear that Comentiolus was the man who put a stop to the flight and regrouped the fleeing centre of Heraclius with the help of his two reserve divisions and bodyguards. The battle was a major victory because all the Persian commanders were killed.114 The victory had three major consequences. Firstly, it enabled Comentiolus to continue the siege of Martyropolis without having to fear any Persian interference. Secondly, it enabled Comentiolus to tighten the siege by reconquering Akbas with effective siege artillery (the catapults are likely to be trebuchets). He achieved this before the onset of

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234  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 winter in 591. Thirdly, and most importantly, it resulted in the defection of the garrison of Nisibis to Bahram in late 591. The final stage of the Persian Civil War and the Flight of Chosroes (autumn 591–spring 592)115 The success of Comentiolus against the Persian garrison of Nisibis at the Battle of Sisarbanon in 591 was the pivotal moment of the Persian civil war. The surviving leaders of the defeated force feared the reaction of Hormizd and decided to defect to the rebels’ side. According to Theophylact, the leaders of Nisibis met Bahram at the crossing of the Great Zab somewhere close to the Tigris. Bahram had marched there so he could unite his forces with those that the new rebels brought with them. Subsequent events, however, prove that some of the forces posted in Nisibis stayed loyal to Hormizd and fled to Ctesiphon at this time. The numerous referrals in the eastern sources to Bahram’s presence in Rayy at the time of the deposition of Hormizd, and the claim of Agapius (after Theophilus of Edessa) that Bahram was fighting against the Daylami when Hormizd was overthrown, should be seen to refer to a second army of Bahram which he had left behind to keep Chosroes II Parwez in check while he advanced to the Great Zab to unite his army with the army of Nisibis.116 When the two armies met, Bahram ordered guards to be posted so that Hormizd would be kept in the dark of developments that took place. When Hormizd learnt that his scouts could not make their way north he guessed what had happened and assembled a new army from the districts around Ctesiphon and placed it under ‘Magister Officiorum’ (i.e. Hazaraft) Pherochanes with the mission of opposing Bahram who was north of the Great Zab. Hormizd appears to have tried to make a surprise attack against Bahram’s feudal domains in Rayy, because Theophylact states that Hormizd was in Media (3.3.3) while Bahram was moving towards Media (3.2.1).117 Pherochanes (Farrukhan?118) asked Hormizd to release the imprisoned Zadespras so that he could join him on the campaign. Zadespras had been imprisoned because he had embezzled money from Martyropolis. Hormizd was therefore annoyed, but agreed.119 When the two men then came close to the crossing of the Great Zab, Zadespras deserted to the rebel’s side as a revenge for his imprisonment. Though Theophylact does not say so, it is possible that he took with him the vanguard of the army. Pherochanes had no intention of following his example but tried to convince the rebel to put down his arms both with words and bribes. Bahram refused, so all Pherochanes had achieved was to finance the rebellion with his gifts. On top of this, Pherochanes was forced to retreat from the crossing because his provisions ran short thanks to the fact that Bahram had stayed in this area and his army had consumed everything. Bahram was aware of the enemy’s low morale so he decided to turn them to his side by sending messengers to them who pointed out the crimes of Hormizd. When Pherochanes’s soldiers heard these accusations, they knew the claims were correct and started to make plans to overthrow Hormizd. However, contrary to what Bahram hoped, the subordinates of Pherochanes sought to replace Hormizd with his son Chosroes II Parwez. The leading men in the plot were Zoarab (leader of the Dilimnite/Daylami tribe) and Sarames the Younger. The latter was to become the commander of Chosroes’s bodyguards. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that one of the key figures in this plot was a leader of the Daylami and that Bahram’s men were at that time fighting against the Daylami in the area where Chosroes had fled. The two men assassinated their commander

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  235 Pherochanes in the night. Hormizd learned the news five days after it happened. This suggests that Hormizd was indeed in Media, as claimed by Theophylact. As stated, in my opinion the likeliest reason for his presence there was that he was planning to attack the powerbase of Bahram in the area of Rayy. The news of the revolt of his army panicked Hormizd, who hurried back to his capital with the intention of reaching it before the rebels did. Once there, Hormizd assembled all the forces he could and then assembled a council of his leading nobles to decide what to do next.120 Hormizd decided to abandon his capital and seek a place of refuge among the Lakhmids of al-Hira. His plan was to take the treasure and all his men across the Tigris by using the pontoon bridge of Vehkawat just south of Ctesiphon and then cut the cables of the bridge. This seems to have demoralized his followers because they were ready to listen to the whispers of Vndoy (Bindoes) and Vstam (Bistam/Bestam). These two had been imprisoned earlier by Hormizd, but according to Theophylact, on the third day (after the arrival of Hormizd?) Bistam broke into the prison (he had presumably been released earlier by the rebels) and released Bindoes. Immediately after this, the rebel army that had formerly served under Pherochanes burst into the palace at the third hour and Bindoes grasped Hormizd and handed him to the bodyguard for detention. Theophylact claims that when Chosroes heard this he fled from his usual residence to Azerbaijan – but, as we have seen, this took place earlier. However, it is possible that he had meanwhile advanced from Azerbaijan to Media because it had been abandoned by his father, which would also imply that the army that Bahram had left behind had not been sufficient to contain Chosroes when Hormizd had also appeared on the scene. When Chosroes learnt that his supporters had ousted his father, he hurried to the capital. Theophylact claims that when he got there he allowed his father to present his case, but the arrogant tone of the overthrown ruler angered those who had overthrown him to such an extent that at the instigation of Bindoes they killed the favourite son and wife of Hormizd right in front of him and then blinded him. The rebels well remembered what had happened when Cavades/Cobades/Kavadh had been allowed to regain the throne and did not intend to repeat their mistake. Immediately after this the rebels led Chosroes up to the royal throne where he was proclaimed shahanshah. This took place on 15 February 592.121 According to Theophylact, Chosroes treated his deposed father with kindness for a while, but then had him beaten to death with clubs and cudgels when he insulted him. This has usually been suspected as a later Roman fabrication, but in my opinion it is likelier to be true than the eastern versions that blame the followers of Chosroes. The first order of business for Chosroes II was securing his position. He sought to achieve this by two means: he bribed the nobility with gold, and released those who had been imprisoned by his father. On the sixth day of his reign (20.2.592), he dispatched a courier to Bahram with bribes and promises to obtain his surrender. Bahram’s response was haughty, but Chosroes II Parwez tried one more time while making preparations to encounter the rebel’s army. According to Theophylact, Chosroes’s army consisted of three main elements: the men he had brought from Azerbaijan; the forces that had formerly served under Pherochanes; and some of the men from the garrison of Nisibis. In my opinion this list leaves out the men who had formerly served under Hormizd, because it is clear that most of them changed

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236  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 sides immediately after he was deposed (unless of course one of the three groups includes them). Chosroes placed Sarames in command of the right wing, Zamerdes in command of the left, and Bindoes in command of the centre and rearguards (opisthofylakes). After this, he led the army to a nearby river because the rebel’s army was already close to the scene. It is probable that it was the Nahrawan Canal.122 The deployment pattern of the army suggests the use of a single long line with reserves posted only behind the centre. The aim would have been to make the formation as wide as possible for the purpose of preventing the crossing of the river. The reserves would then be directed to wherever the enemy tried to get across. Both sides naturally dispatched spies to observe the approach of the enemy, as can be learnt from the accounts of Tabari and Dinawari. It was from them that Chosroes learnt that the commander of Bahram’s right wing was Mardān Sīna al-Ruwaydaštī while the commander of his left was Yazd-Jušnas son of Halabān. The spies also informed Chosroes that Bahram was a devout man and that his army would arrive shortly. The two sides skirmished for a day, but while Bahram built a fortified camp behind him, Chosroes chose to lead his forces back into the capital. This left the rebel in command of the ‘battlefield’ with the result that the morale of Chosroes’s army collapsed. Chosroes rightly doubted the loyalty of his commanders and put to death a number of them during the night. Bahram gauged the situation correctly and decided that the best strategy was not to attack the enemy but to convert the soldiers to his side. Theophylact (5.6.5–10) also states that Bahram’s revolution was supported by many wealthy Jewish traders who financed the usurpation attempt. According to Theophylact, Chosroes had come to the same conclusion, because on day two he started to make preparations for the escape of his harem. This means that some of the preparations that other sources mention for the day of the flight probably took place earlier, as one would actually expect. This includes in particular the claim that Chosroes asked the Nestorian Catholicus Mar Isho-Yabh to accompany him to exile, which he refused to do.123 This means he was already planning to seek a place of refuge from Maurice. The stalemate lasted for seven days because Chosroes refused to commit his army to a battle. Then Bahram prepared a night attack because there was no moon. Bahram first attacked the baggage animals and then the allies (symmachoi)124 and when many of them had been killed the rest of the army deserted to Bahram. Bistam and Bindoes took the lead and led Chosroes, his harem, children, relatives and thirty remaining bodyguards across the Tigris using the pontoon bridge, after which they cut the cables.125 According to Theophylact, the fugitives then considered their options. Some of his friends advised Chosroes to flee to the Turks, or Azerbaijan, or the Caucasus mountains, but Chosroes looked up to heaven and allowed his mare to decide the direction of the flight; it was towards the Roman Empire. The eastern sources mention only two options: whether Chosroes should seek help from the Lakhmids of Hira or from the Romans. Michael Whitby (1988, 296) is correct to point out that after crossing the Tigris, the only really viable options available for Chosroes were the Romans and Lakhmids. But in my opinion it is probable that some of Chosroes’s friends suggested the other options too, even if the army of Bahram was between them. Whitby is similarly correct to point out that the story of the horse deciding where to go is at variance with the preparations for a flight that Chosroes started to make on day two of the face off – but I would not rule it out. He could

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  237 have guided his horse in the desired direction with subtle movements of feet or hands, so as not to hurt the feelings of those whose advice he discarded. Chosroes II Parwez and his entourage were guided through the desert leading to the Euphrates by a man called Khurshīdhān (Khurshēdh). In the middle of the desert126 they arrived at a monastery on the edge of the cultivated land. When they were sleeping, the pursuers sent by Bahram Chobin appeared under Bahrām son of Siyāwush. Bindoes woke up Chosroes and asked him to give him his weapons and equipment and then sent him away fleeing. When the pursuers then reached the monastery, Bindoes showed himself in Chosroes’s equipment from the top of the monastery. Bindoes then asked the pursuers to wait until next morning when he would surrender to them without a fight. Bahram agreed to this. The following morning, Bindoes revealed the stratagem and was taken to the capital in chains. It was thanks to this that Chosroes was able to save himself. According to Theophylact, when Chosroes reached the Euphrates he fled along it towards the Roman border. Their route took them past the forts of Abbaron and Anatha/ Anathon to Circesium. According to Dinawari (95), one day and one night after leaving the monastery Chosroes came across two Arabs who stopped in front of him. Chosroes was fluent in Arabic and asked one of them who they were. He answered that he was Iyās son of Qabisa from the tribe of Tayy. Dinawari claims that Chosroes then went with him to the town of Yarmuk where he met Hālid son of Jabala, the Ghassanid, and that his horsemen escorted Chosroes to the Emperor. This is patently false, but it is probable that it contains a germ of truth. Theophilus of Edessa’s account as it is preserved in Agapius, Michael the Syrian, and Chronicle 1234 also state that Chosroes contacted Abu Jafna Nuʻman ibn al-Mundhir (i.e. son of the Alamundarus who was at the time exiled in Sicily) whose headquarters were at Sergiopolis (Rufasa) so that he would present his case before the Emperor.127 It is quite probable that the Roman version of the events has left out the involvement of their Arabic federates in these events. I would suggest that Chosroes did indeed meet two Arabic scouts who belonged to the Ghassanids en route north and that these two escorted Chosroes and his entourage north along the Euphrates to the camp of Jafna (and not to Yarmuk as in Dinawari). Jafna was at the time raiding Persian held territory (Theophilus, p.47). Jafna then abandoned his raid and escorted the valuable captive Chosroes to Circesium. Bahram wanted to legitimize his power by obtaining the acceptance of the nobility and magi (Theophylact’s Persian Senate) and therefore assembled the Persian magnates on 6 March 592, but contrary to his hopes he did not receive their full support. The magi in particular opposed him. According to Dinawari (94), the greatest of the marzbans present, Mūsīl the Armīnī (i.e. Mushel the Mamikonean), opposed Bahram Chobin openly and stated that the Isbahbad Bahram128 could not rule while Chosroes lived. Bahram’s answer was that everyone who opposed him should leave immediately and that he would cut off the heads of those who were in Ctesiphon three days later. Mūsīl the Armīnī and all those who thought like him, 20,000 men, left immediately and marched to Azerbaijan where they stayed waiting for the arrival of Chosroes. Then on 9 March 592 Bahram crowned himself king and dispatched an envoy to Martyropolis with instructions not to pay any attention to the orders of Chosroes. The courier, however, was captured by the Romans who besieged the city. In the meantime, Bahrām, son of Siyāwush, had brought his prisoner Bindoes to Bahram Chobin on 7 March 592.129

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5.1.6. Balkans 582–92 Balkans in 582–85130 582–3: Meanwhile, the Avar Khagan Baian had died, and when his successor (name unknown) learnt of the elevation of Maurice as new Emperor, he dispatched an embassy to Maurice to test him. The Khagan’s first demand was that the Romans should send him elephants as a present. Maurice wanted to keep the peace so he chose and dispatched the most impressive pachyderm from the imperial stables – the Romans bred elephants in captivity. When the Khagan saw the beast, he ordered it returned to Maurice. He then demanded the Emperor send him a golden couch, but again he sent it back as unworthy of him. The idea was to demonstrate the power of the new Khagan over the Roman Emperor and how inconsequential his gifts were. After this the Khagan demanded the Romans pay 20,000 gold nomismata, more than previously agreed, so the yearly payments would amount to 100,000 nomismata. The Emperor angrily refused. Michael Whitby is probably correct in suspecting that Maurice had now come to the conclusion that if he now agreed the Khagan would only demand more. These negotiations lasted from the autumn 582 until summer 583.

The Khagan’s surprise attack in 583–4 The Khagan’s response was a surprise attack during the harvest time in 583.131 His first target was Singidunum, which was totally unprepared for the attack because most of its inhabitants were in the fields collecting the harvest. The Avars were able to reach the city gates before they were even closed. Members of the Roman garrison rushed to the gates in an attempt to prevent the Avars from entering. Theophylact claims that this resulted in heavy fighting in which many Avars lost their lives, but all the same the city was captured. After this the Avars pillaged many other neighbouring cities and forts with ease, and then they destroyed Viminacium and Augustae (Augusta, Ogost). As Pohl notes,

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  239 this implies that the Avars bypassed at least the cities of Bononia (Vidin) and Ratiaria (Arčer). The Avars continued their advance as far as Anchialus on the Black Sea coast. This implies that the Avars once again bypassed many cities and forts to reach Anchialus. One imagines that perhaps they were too heavily garrisoned. The Avars did not attempt to take Anchialus – they only blockaded it from the land side by placing their encampment in front of it, after which they pillaged the surrounding villages from their base camp. The famous baths nearby were saved because the harem of the Khagan wanted to bathe in them. According to Michael Syrus, it was then that the Avars found the purple robe of Anastasia, the wife of Tiberius II, which had been donated to the local church. The Khagan put it on and stated that the Roman Empire was now his. This was obviously highly amusing to the Romans – the Khagan was wearing a woman’s robe when claiming to rule the Roman Empire. Michael Syrus claims that at this time the Khagan had as his subjects and allies both the Lombards and Slavs. The former captured two cities, presumably somewhere in Istria or Dalmatia rather than in Italy, while the Slavs pillaged the areas in Thrace in conjunction with the Avars and areas further south as far as Corinth. As every modern historian has noted, Michael Syrus and all the Roman historians (e.g. Theophylact and John of Ephesus) have exaggerated the control excercised by the Avars over the Slavs and Lombards – the latter two usually operated independently of any Avar influence whatsoever. The exact sequence and level of cooperation between the Avars and Slavs is not certain. As Pohl (p.94) has noted the Slavs had not yet settled in Roman territory but always returned north, even when they had remained pillaging in Roman territory for years. This means that it was possible for the Khagan to conclude treaties with the Slavic chieftains who were already pillaging Roman territory and/or with the leaders who had already returned to their own lands north of the Danube. However, on the basis of Michael the Syrian’s account it would seem probable that the Khagan concluded a treaty with the Slavs, who were already on Roman soil for the following reason (although it is still possible that these Slavs had already invaded the western half of the Balkans as allies of the Avars earlier in 583): According to Michael, the Slavs were pillaging Roman territory and had advanced as far as Corinth – this implies that it was then that the Slavs reached the Peloponnese (for which there is also some evidence in the form of coin hoards132) – Maurice paid the Antae to attack the capital of the Slavs to create a distraction which would force the Slavs to evacuate Roman territory. The Antae duly pillaged the Slavic capital, but only with the result that the Slavs became more enraged and marched against Anchialus. This would imply the possibility that the Khagan and the Slavs, who were already pillaging Roman territory, formed an alliance and that the Avars and Slavs approached the city of Anchialus from two different directions. The problem with this is that it is possible that John of Ephesus, the source of Michael Syrus, has confused the Avars and Slavs with each other in this case,133 and it is also clear that Michael has confused the events of 583 and 584 with each other. The circumstantial evidence, however, does back it up. The fact that Theophylact fails to mention the Slavs in this context is not conclusive because he, like the Romans in general, thought that the Slavs acted as puppets of the Avars and could therefore be considered as Avars. Anchialus lay to the north of the territories that the Slavs had been pillaging and it is therefore easy to see that while the Avars approached it from one direction the Slavs approached it from

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240  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 the south because they were seeking to return to their own territories to exact vengeance on the Antae. It is easy to see that in such circumstances the Avars and Slavs concluded an alliance and why the Avars suddenly marched as far in Thrace as the coastal city of Anchialus without attempting to pillage any of the cities between it and Augustae. The aim was to conclude a joint attack with the Slavs. According to Theophylact, after three months had passed Maurice dispatched Elpidius and scribo Comentiolus as his envoys to meet the Khagan at Anchialus. The envoys presumably travelled in ships to the harbour city. There the Romans asked for a treaty, which the Khagan answered with the threat that he would advance as far as the Long Wall. Elpidius did not react to this, but Maurice’s trusted man Comentiolus reacted with an angry tirade as a result of which the Khagan put him in irons, crushed his feet, tore his tent to pieces and threatened to kill him. On the following day the Khagan’s passions had been calmed down by the arguments put forth by his leading men – the sanctity of the envoys was worth respecting. Therefore, the envoys were allowed to return to their Emperor. It did not take long for the Khagan to be humbled. The Romans appear to have bribed the Turks to invade the Avar territories with the result that the Khagan hastened back to Sirmium. This means that Sirmium had not yet been burnt to the ground, so we can date its destruction roughly to very late 583 or early 584. Was this a special Roman commando operation? The Khagan, however, managed to avoid having to face the Turks by sending a ransom (eight kentenaria of gold) to them in return for not attacking his domains – the Turks were clearly unreliable allies, but it is also possible that the Romans contributed by being unreliable allies themselves. On the basis of Comentiolus’s reaction it would seem likely that he was aware that Maurice had formed an alliance with the Turks to attack the Avar territories, which was the reason why the Avars returned in haste to their territories as stated by Michael the Syrian.134 In short, the Avar invasion ended with the arrival of the news of the threat of Turkish invasion during late 583 or early 584. According to Michael the Syrian, roughly simultaneously with this three Scythian brothers with 30,000 Scythians arrived from Mount Imaeon, marching for sixty days until they reached the Don in the winter or spring 584. It is probable that these fugitives were former supporters of Khagan Tardu who lost a power struggle against Apa Khagan in about 582/3 (see Appendix 1). Then one of the brothers, called Bulgarius, crossed the Don with 10,000 men and marched to the Danube. There he asked Maurice for permission to settle in Roman territory. Maurice agreed, so the 10,000 Scythians were settled in Upper and Lower Moesia and Dacia. According to Michael, they became the core population of the Bulgarian nation, which means that they were later united with the Hunnic Bulgars already attested earlier in the century invading Roman territory so that this tribe became the leading tribe in the confederacy. The other brothers remained in the east and settled in ‘Bersalia’, which was where the Romans had built Caspia (‘the Port of the Turanians’, probably Derbent/Derbend), Bulgaria and Poguria, and become later known as the Khazars after the eldest brother Khazarig. This presumably means the north and north-western coastlines of the Caspian Sea, with the implication that in the past there was some Roman presence in that area of which we know next to nothing. If Maurice did receive fugitives from Turkish territory at this time and before the Avar Khagan bought peace from the Turks, it would explain why the Turks accepted the Avar

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  241 ransom. On the other hand, if Maurice accepted these refugees after the Turks had abandoned their campaign, it can be seen as Maurice’s revenge for breaking the alliance. The former, however, is inherently likelier. In either case, it is clear that Maurice acted wisely. It was not really in his interest to have the Turks reach the Danube. We possess another piece of evidence for the arrival of refugees from the Turkish Empire in the text of Theophylact (7.8.16–7). On the basis of the Chinese Sui shu and Theophylact, several western subject peoples of the Turks, the most important of which were the Hephthalites, revolted and were crushed in 582. According to Theophylact, the Turkish Khagan informed Maurice of these events. It was as a result of this that Tarniach, Kotzager and Zabender united with the Avars. They had 10,000 men altogether. Pohl suggests that the Avar Khagan had received these reinforcements just before his campaign and that it was this that explains his successes, and that Comentiolus had also referred to this when he stated in his speech to the Avar Khagan that the territories that the Khagan had was sufficient both for the Avars and newcomers.135 In my opinion, these are not to be identified with the Scythians of Michael the Syrian but represent a separate group which had indeed reinforced the Avars just before their campaign in 583 and which would also have served as the principal reason for the eagerness of the Turks to march against the Avars. I would also suggest that the Turkish embassy that reached Maurice in 583 suggested a joint alliance with the Romans against the Avars and Turks and a joint alliance against the Persians too, which Maurice was more than eager to accept. What we do not know is, when the Scythians of Bulgarius arrived, did this influence the readiness of the Turks to accept the Avar ransom money? There is also reason to suspect that the Turks considered the Persians to have been behind the revolt of the Hephthalites and others because they and others invaded Persian territory in about 585–6. In the following year (584) Maurice again dispatched Elpidius as his envoy to the Avar Khagan, but not Comentiolus. He was not welcome in the Avar court and Maurice had a more important task for him thanks to the loyalty he had shown. The Romans were now ready to accept the increase in the payments so the Khagan was ready to accept the Roman proposal of peace. He dispatched Targitius as his ambassador to Constantinople both to conclude the treaty and to receive the payment of 100,000 nomismata/solidi. The Slavic invasion in 584 and Roman counter-attack in 584–5 The Slavs, however, invaded soon after this, and both Maurice and Theophylact considered this as evidence of Avar duplicity. In their opinion the Avars had incited them, but modern historians have rightly suspected that the Romans overestimated the control the Avars exercised over the Slavs, especially over the Slavs of Scythia who they had previously tried to subject under their rule and failed. The Slavs would have been eager to invade without any order from the Avars. Regardless, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the Roman suspicions were well-founded (i.e. the Avars acted treacherously) or that the Roman view of events was based on a different interpretation of the international law. It is quite possible that the Slavs recognized the Avars as their overlords by paying them tribute. In such circumstances the Romans obviously considered the Slavs to be subjects of the Avars with the implication that they expected that the Avars would seek to prevent their client tribes from invading Roman territory. The nomadic Avars did not necessarily share this view. It is entirely possible that their expectation was that their client states

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242  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 just paid them tribute. What these did to others was not their concern. In short, it is quite possible that even if the Slavs were subjects of the Avars, they could invade Roman territory without any incitement from the Avars to do so. The Slavic invasion was again on a large scale. They marched as far as the Long Walls. The Slavic army must have numbered at least 100,000 warriors, as before. It is possible that one of the miracles in the hagiographic collection Miracles of St. Demetrius took place now. The miracle in question is the one in which 5,000 Slavs tried to surprise the city of Thessalonica but were ‘miraculously’ detected so that the Thessalonicans sallied out and defeated them. This took place on Monday, 26 October, and on the basis of this it is usually dated to either 604 or 610. However, I agree with Florin Curta that this might be a mistake, because in the hagiographic collection the miracle precedes the siege of Thessalonica in 586.136 Since this conclusion is uncertain I have included an account of this siege in the context of the events of 610 (see MHLR Vol.8). Whatever the truth about the Thessalonica incident, when the massive Slavic horde was near the Long Walls, it resulted in panic in the capital. Maurice enrolled into the army everyone who could carry arms, even members of the clergy. It is possible that this invasion coincided with the Lombard conquest of the two cities in the Balkans mentioned above because the text of Michael the Syrian confuses the events of 583 and 584. This means that it is possible that Maurice also thought that the Avars were behind the simultaneous Lombard invasion in the Balkans if it took place in 584 rather than in 583. Maurice also dispatched commissioners to every quarter to conscript anyone they could lay their hands on. These commissioners abused their position: they apprehended children from parents and confiscated beasts of burden, oxen and chicken for the army. After this, Maurice led this force, the demes (may mean both populace and the circus factions, or only the latter; the circus factions are the likeliest in this case), and his personal force of soldiers (included probably imperial bodyguards and the praesental forces)137 to the Long Walls and manned it. After this, Maurice appointed Comentiolus as commander of the expeditionary army and dispatched him against the Slavs just outside the Long Walls. Comentiolus drove the Slavs away from the Walls and pinned them against the river Erginia where he inflicted a massive defeat on the Slavs. This was presumably in late summer or early autumn. It is probable that Comentiolus had a combined force of infantry and cavalry because this was the ideal type of force for facing the Slavs in pitched battles in the Strategikon. This forced the Slavs away from the immediate vicinity of the capital, and the delighted Emperor rewarded Comentiolus with the position of MVM Praesentalis (which also implies the presence of a large force of infantry because the praesental forces were mostly infantry). When summer arrived in 585 the Romans continued their counter-attack against the Slavs. Comentiolus marched to Adrianople and rested his men there. Then he advanced against the Slavs under the leadership of Ardagastus whose camp was close to the fort of Ansinon. According to Theophylact, Comentiolus engaged Ardagastus at daybreak, with the implication that he made a night attack against the Slavs and the Roman army was marched during the night so that it could surprise the Slavs in their encampment at dawn. The Slavs were utterly defeated and driven out of the Astike (an area in Thrace). This enabled Maurice to push the defensive zone of the capital further north. According to Michael the Syrian, he did this by building the so-called ditch of Maurice, which was

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244  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 probably completed in 586. See the accompanying map, in which the location of the ditch is drawn after Michael Whitby. The Slavs and Avars invade in autumn 585138 The two crushing defeats inflicted on the Slavs by the able and loyal Comentiolus were remarkable achievements. It was now possible just by continuing the offensive to push the Slavs out of Roman territory. However, in the same year the so-called Bookolabras incident took place which changed all plans.139 He was the shaman who had slept with Baian’s wife, the search for whom had been one of the terms of the peace treaty in 582. While he and seven Gepids were attempting to flee to the Turks, travelling along the Danube, they were caught by one of the Roman commanders at Libidina140 some time during the reign of Maurice. In my opinion 584–5 is probable, in light of the subsequent events. The shaman was then duly dispatched to the Emperor. The shaman convinced Maurice that the Slavs who were invading Roman territory at that time had actually been sent by the Avars, so when the Avar ambassador Targitius arrived in the spring of 585 to collect the 100,000 solidi, Maurice was in no mood to make the payment. Instead he imprisoned Targitius on the island of Chalcitis for six months. Targitius understandably considered the presence of the Avar shaman in the Roman court to break the terms of the peace. This incited the Khagan to launch an invasion in the autumn 585. He pillaged Aquis, Bononia, Ratiaria, Dorostolon, and Tropaion along the Danubian frontier zone, and then turned south and pillaged Zalpada, Marcianopolis and Pannasa. I would suggest that the Khagan obtained Slavs as his allies on the way, even though Theophylact fails to say so, because he marched just south of the territories held by the Slavs in Scythia. Furthermore, the Miracles of St. Demetrius state that the Khagan dispatched the Slavs and other barbarians against Thessalonica in 586. The Khagan wintered on Roman territory somewhere in Scythia in 585–6. The Roman counter-attack and Avar response in 586–7141 In early 586 Comentiolus assembled his forces in Anchialus and then marched north with his cavalry and some infantry against the Avars who been wintering on Roman territory in Scythia. The Romans were helped by the fact that Maurice had concluded a threeyear truce with the Lombards in late 585/early 586 which enabled him to transfer some of his forces from there to the Balkans. The most important of these was the transfer of the Lombard dux Droctulf/Droctulfus to the Balkans, whose presence in the Balkans is attested for the first time in 587. Maurice also transferred 2,000 elite Armenian feudal cavalry to the Balkans under Sahak Mamikonean and Smbat Bagratuni (he was allowed to return home immediately after the forces had arrived in Constantinople) and probably some of the regular forces of Armenia under John Mystacon, also in 587.142 These reinforcements, however, did not arrive in time to help Comentiolus in early 586. However, it should be noted that, even if this is not mentioned by any of the sources, it is probable that some of the Lombards and Armenians were already in the Balkans fighting against the Slavic invaders in Greece in 586. Comentiolus was not the only commander operating against the Avars. Theophylact mentions that taxiarchos Ansimuth commanded infantry in Thrace. Probably Ansimuth served as Comentiolus’s hypostrategos; his official title is not known. These forces were

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  245 probably posted on Maurice’s Ditch because we find them later attempting to reach the Long Walls. This means that the Roman forces were scattered, some fighting against the Slavs in Greece, some posted on Maurice’s Ditch, and others with Comentiolus. The rest of the Roman armies were even more scattered. They were in their various postings, some in cities, others in forts. As noted, the Avars appear to have stopped the fighting for the winter and the Khagan withdrew further north and placed his base camp near the Roman city of Tomi from which he dispatched raiders to the surrounding areas.

Comentiolus appears to have decided to exploit the scattering of the Avar forces for the winter, aiming to target the different Avar groups separately probably during the winter season in early 586. He appears to have used only cavalry, leaving his infantry in his base camp. Comentiolus had 10,000 men of whom 4,000 were reported as being unable to fight; no reason is given for this. The unfit men were left to guard the base camp with its baggage somewhere south of Marcianopolis. Comentiolus divided the remaining 6,000 men into three divisions. Martinus led the right wing, Castus the left. Behind them, Comentiolus led the centre. See the accompanying diagram of the array. The aim was probably to use guerilla tactics with cavalry until the infantry army in Thrace could

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246  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 be assembled and brought to the theatre of operations.143 The camp of the Khagan was targeted when the Avars were out pillaging. The scattered Avars were completely taken by surprise (which means Comentiolus had attacked them during the winter season). Castus surprised one encampment near Zalpada at dawn, but then he made the mistake of trusting his bodyguard to take the captured booty back to the main army. The barbarians regrouped next morning and managed to recover the booty from the escort it had been given. Meanwhile, Martinus surprised the Khagan’s encampment near Tomi. The Khagan managed to save himself with difficulty by fleeing to an island in one of the nearby lagoons. Five days later, the Romans learnt this from the Avar deserters, but by then it was too late and the Khagan had fled again. The next day Martinus and Castus met each other at a location agreed the day before with Comentiolus, but Comentiolus did not. Comentiolus appears to have received an order from Maurice not to advance any further but to preserve the army intact for further guerrilla warfare. This was criticized by syntagmatarchos Rusticus, but the Emperor’s wish was the law. So Comentiolus withdrew to Marcianopolis. When Martinus and Castus learnt of this, they withdrew to Marcianopolis too. The whole army was then united in Comentiolus’s camp, including those unfit to fight. Comentiolus then led his army to one of the defiles in the Heamus range called Sabulente Canalion where he rested the army for two days. After this he dispatched Castus and Martinus to intercept the Avars at separate river crossings. Theophylact fails to mention the river but Walter Pohl (p.97) is undoubtedly correct in guessing that it is Panysus (Kamčaja). Martinus was to ambush the Avars in the vicinity of a wooden bridge while Castus was to advance to a stone bridge. The two failed to cooperate effectively. When Martinus observed that the enemy was just about to cross the river, he withdrew to Comentiolus. Castus surprised and destroyed the enemy’s advance party on the other side of the river, and returning by a different route, decided to meet Martinus at the other bridge. This, however, was not possible because the sun was already setting. So he spent the night where he was, and when the sun rose and he began to march to the other bridge, he encountered the enemy head on. His division was scattered in flight and he was taken prisoner. The Avars had also bypassed Comentiolus’s position by advancing along the coast close to Mesembria, almost cutting off his route of retreat to Constantinople. When Ansimuth learnt of the Avar approach, he assembled his infantry forces and attempted to reach the safety of the Long Walls. At this time his forces may have been north of Maurice’s Ditch, probably marching to join Comentiolus because the Avars from Mesembria managed to intercept them. However, Ansimuth made the mistake of leading his forces from behind without a covering force so that he was captured by the Avar vanguard. Theophylact fails to state what happened to his infantry force, but since he does not mention its destruction it probably reached the Long Walls. This is not surprising because the Avar cavalry was ill-suited to breaking up a retreating Roman formation of hollow square with cavalry support. Thereafter, Comentiolus tried to withdraw towards Constantinople, skirmishing on the way. The forces were marching parallel to each other. On the third day, Comentiolus appears to have become aware that the main base camp of the Avar Khagan was now close by, so he assembled his officers for a discussion. Theophylact claims that one

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248  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 pessimistic tribune was shamed by one veteran whose words encouraged the men to fight. Comentiolus therefore led the men from the Haemus range to Calvomuntis and Libidurgon (both locations unknown). When the Romans saw the Khagan with his tents dispersed, Comentiolus arrayed his army into a single formation and marched it towards Astike where he rested it for a night. The following morning he led it against the disorderly camp of the Khagan.144 Comentiolus would have captured the Khagan had he not been extremely unlucky. One of the baggage animals shed its load and was dragging it about. The owner of a baggage animal was in front of the animal while those behind the animal shouted ‘Turn! Turn!’ But the words ‘Torna! Torna!’ resembled the cavalry command ‘Torna mina!’ (Strategikon 3.5.44) and the entire cavalry force made an about turn. The infantry and/or servants were apparently following behind. This enabled the Khagan to beat a hasty flight and save his life. However, some of the Roman units realized the mistake, made another about turn, attacked the poorly defended enemy camp and killed most of the Avars there. This enabled Comentiolus to reach the Long Walls with some success to his record, but it was not enough in the eyes of the populus, who insulted Maurice openly for the capture of Castus and Ansimuth. In truth, Comentiolus had achieved remarkable successes with very small forces against a numerically superior foe, and it was only very bad luck that he had not captured the Khagan twice. The Emperor knew this. According to Theophylact, when the Khagan had managed to regroup his forces, he attacked Roman cities and captured the fort of Appiaria on the Danube. The target of the Khagan’s attack proves that all of the Avars had fled towards the north after Comentiolus’s successful attack against the Khagan’s main encampment. It was only when the Avars had reached the Danube area that the Khagan was able to regroup his panicked and scattered forces. This proves that Comentioulus had been far more successful than Theophylact claims. Theophylact was clearly using a pro-Priscus source which was hostile towards Comentiolus.145 The capture of Appiaria was a matter of luck. The Avars managed to capture a soldier called Busas, who they threatened with death. Busas promised that the citizens of Appiaria would pay a ransom for his life. The Appiarians, however, refused to pay anything because they had been bribed by a man who had slept with the wife of Busas. So Busas then promised that he would help the Avars to capture the city. He taught the Avars how to build a siege engine for long range assault – probably a trebuchet or onager, at this date the former is most likely. Thanks to this the Avars captured Appiaria and a number of other heavily fortified Roman cities and forts. It is not a coincidence that the Avars had taken Sirmium by blockade rather than by bombarding it with trebuchets. They were amateurs in besieging. Following this, the Avars advanced against Beroe, but they failed to capture it because the locals put up a spirited fight. They also paid a small sum of money to the Khagan to get rid of him. The Avars then proceeded against Diocletianopolis. This time they had to abandon the attempt empty-handed because the defenders used their mural artillery and other siege engines so effectively that the Avars were unable to approach the defences. The next target was Philippopolis. Here the citizens fought with dogged determination from their ramparts and battlements and the Avars abandoned their attempt. Their next target was Adrianople, where they met with the same fate. The route taken by the Avars shows that they bypassed Maurice’s Ditch. This may mean that Ansimuth had attempted

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  249 to reach not the Long Walls as stated by Theophylact but Maurice’s Ditch, so it would have been his men that manned it now and convinced the Avars to bypass it. Whatever the truth, it is clear that the Avars considered the Ditch now too difficult to cross, which probably means that it had been reoccupied by Roman forces. Siege of Thessalonica in 586146 According to the Miracula Sancti Demetrii, in 586 the Avar Khagan dispatched the Slavs and other barbarians against Thessalonica when Maurice refused give him what he wanted. For a map of Thessalonica, see the maps section. However, it should be kept in mind that the siege might in truth have been undertaken at the instigation of the Slavs who were already in Greece. It is quite possible that they knew they would need help from the Khagan to overcome the formidable defences of the city. If this was the case, the Khagan was happy to oblige. However, I am inclined to accept the text of the Miracles of Saint Demetrius and combine it with the information provided by Theophylact. I would therefore suggest that these Slavic invaders consisted mainly of men who joined the Khagan after his retreat north somewhere near Appiaria in the spring of 586. It is in fact possible that the Khagan attacked this city in order to help the Slavs across the Danube. These men would then have joined the Khagan and would have bypassed the Ditch of Maurice in the company of the Avars. It would then have been because of this that the besiegers of Thessalonica had trebuchets. Busas taught them how to build them. When the combined army of Avars, Slavs and other barbarians reached the vicinity of Adrianople, the Khagan dispatched his allies against Thessalonica. However, I would not rule out the presence of Slavs already in Greece, because it would be strange if they had not joined the Slavs and other barbarians when they appeared to besiege Thessalonica. This brings to light an important point about technology transfers during the ancient period. As I have already noted in MHLR Vol.3 (p. 248) and Britain in the Age of Arthur (pp.207–8), the Romans had forbidden anyone to teach the barbarians how to build ships on pain of death. The Busas incident tells us that although the Slavs had served in the Roman army for at least forty years (see MHLR Vol.6 for examples) they had apparently not learned in all that time how to construct these artillery pieces. The Slavs were skilled woodworkers and craftsmen so if even one of them had learnt the skill and returned to his home after retirement the genie would have been out of the bottle. The Busas incident proves that this did not happen. This shows that the Romans maintained very tight security. However, though Busas taught the Avars these building techniques, it is likely that it was actually the Slavs who built and operated the trebuchets, because they were skilled carpenters unlike the nomadic Avars. The timing of the attack against Thessalonica was impeccable. Most of the city’s garrison and its commander were fighting against the Slavs in Greece while the civil authorities were in Constantinople. Furthermore, the citizens had just been hit by an epidemic and were therefore in a weakened condition. Lastly, many people were outside collecting their harvests. According to Archbishop John, the invading army consisted of 100,000 men. On Sunday, 22 September 586, the Slavic vanguards arrived sooner than expected. But in the darkness they attempted to the take wrong place, the fort of Saint Matrone. They realized their mistake in the morning and advanced against the city proper. They again attempted to take it by surprise, but their attack was successfully and

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250  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 ‘miraculously’ prevented by a single soldier who was at his post. He thrust his spear at the first enemy on the ladder who then fell on those who followed him. The alarm was sounded and the rest of the guards returned to their posts. The Romans were clearly surprised by the speed of the enemy attack and possibly also by its direction. When the main barbarian army arrived, the barbarians surrounded the city with a shield wall/phalanx; they did not bother to build proper siege ditches and palisades around the city. The invaders then spent two days preparing their siege engines. These included the helepoleis (siege towers or heavy trebuchets, the former being likelier), iron battering rams, petroboloi (trebuchets) to throw stones of enormous size, and tortoises (sheds).147 From the third to the seventh day they used them. The first detailed description of the traction trebuchet (a tetragonal tapering tower with men pulling ropes inside to swing the pole that threw the rock) in the west is in the Miracles. At first the besiegers advanced their tortoises against the wall under covering fire of the archers and stone throwers. The sappers inside the tortoises with their scythes and pickaxes undermined the wall while the battering rams caused more damage with each strike. The first attempt failed when the besiegers realized their dry hides were insufficent protection against the fire bombs used by the defenders. They withdrew their machines and resurfaced them with bloody hides taken from newly butchered animals. On the third day, the besiegers started bombarding the city with rocks thrown by trebuchets while the tortoises with their sappers advanced against the walls. The Slavs also tried to build some sort of pontoon bridge/platform to threaten the sea walls, but the roughness of the sea made this impossible. The counter-measures adopted by the defenders were successful. The battering ram attacking the Cassandreotic Gate retreated when the Romans posted opposite it a crane with a hook that would have lifted its head up had the ram been brought forward. When the attackers inside the tortoises were making good progress, the defenders responded by sallying out, forcing the attackers to abandon their equipment. After this, the Slavs continued bombarding with the trebuchets. The besiegers placed over fifty trebuchets against the eastern wall, but to no avail. The defenders hung mattresses on their walls to soften the impacts. Furthermore, because of the inexperience of the crews, most of the stones of the besiegers landed short or went over the wall. Moreover, the defenders were able to destroy the attacking trebuchets with their own stone throwers. The Miracles of St. Demetrius contain the following piece of information for the sixth day: After the siege had ended the locals learnt from the Slavic deserters that the Slavs saw a huge army of Romans sallying out of the city on the sixth day and that it was this which demoralized them. The Miracles attributes this to a miracle and claims that it was not true because the city was empty of people. It is easy enough to see through this hagiographic nonsense. The defenders made a sally on the sixth day in strength, which then demoralized the besiegers. When the besiegers rested on the seventh day, some of the barbarians were no longer willing to attack, the Roman sally of the previous day had demoralized them, and the besiegers started fighting among themselves. According to the deserters that fled to Thessalonica, they were forced to do so by hunger. On the eighth day the enemy camp was empty and there were hordes of deserters in front of the gates who wanted to surrender in return for food. The apparent cause of the failure of the siege was the success of the defence combined with the difficulty of provisioning the large besieging army. I

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  251 would also suggest that the Romans had used scorched earth tactics and guerrilla warfare throughout the campaign to deny supplies to the invaders. This was standard tactics. The siege demonstrates the importance of experience in siegecraft. The Avars and their Slavic artillerymen were no match for the Roman ones. Also the defenders would have known the distance of each point outside the wall so they could target the enemy engines with great accuracy. Droctulfus and John Mystacon vs. the Khagan in 587148 Despite knowing how well Comentiolus had performed, Maurice had to replace him to calm those who were publicly accusing him of the capture of Castus and Ansimuth. Maurice’s first measure was to buy the freedom of Castus from the Avars, but Theophylact fails to tell us what happened to Ansimuth. Perhaps he had died in captivity or perhaps he was similarly ransomed. Maurice replaced Comentiolus with John Mystacon (John the Moustached). He appointed the able and experienced Lombard dux Drocton/ Droctulf/Droctulfus/Droctulft as his second-in-command, and dispatched them to relieve Adrianople. The presence of Drotulfus and John Mystacon means that Maurice transferred soldiers from both Italy and Armenia to the Balkans to put a stop to the Avar offensive. This means that these theatres had fewer men available for operations in 587–8. The Lombard King Authari could not resist the opportunity and broke the threeyear truce in 587. As regards Comentiolus, Maurice knew that his performance had been stellar, so he honoured him with the title of patricius and appointed him Magister Militum Spaniae where he is attested in this office in 589.149 In 587 Droctulfus defeated the Avars by using feigned flight with his Lombard cavalry. When the Avars were in headlong pursuit, Droctulfus’s forces turned about and encircled the pursuing Avars. The surprised Avars scattered. The nomads were always vulnerable to the tactic of feigned flight. Theophylact fails to mention the presence of ambushers in this context, but it is very likely there were some. However, it was also possible to surround the pursuing enemy cavalry by having the wings of the fleeing cavalry retreat slower than the centre. Theophylact does not give the strategos John Mystacon any role in this victory, which may indicate that Droctulfus achieved it alone as he claimed. If this is the case then John was probably in the rear bringing up the infantry hollow square while Droctulfus was in charge of the cavalry vanguard, but it is also possible that the pursuing Avars were ambushed by the main forces under John. The strategos John and hypostrategos Droctulfus did not pursue the fleeing Avars presumably for two reasons. Firstly, the Romans were probably outnumbered by the enemy, and secondly they were undoubtedly aware that the favourite nomadic tactic was the very same feigned flight that Droctulfus’s forces had just performed. This flight, however, was real and the Avars retreated to their own territory. The Avars had taken a severe beating both in 586 and 587 and so had their Slavic allies in front of Thessalonica in 586. The Campaign of Priscus in 588150 In 587 Droctulfus and John Mystacon had forced the Avars to retreat away from Roman territory, but the Khagan was not deterred by this setback. Furthermore, the Slavs continued their raiding activity throughout 587–8. The Khagan repeated his demand for higher tribute payments, but Maurice refused to even receive the envoys. He had

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252  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 posted a garrison in Singidunum, presumably drawn from the forces that had arrived in the Balkans in 586–7 and inflicted a defeat on the Avars. He apparently considered this sufficient for the task of defending Roman territory. The Avar Khagan ordered his Slavic subjects to build boats to cross the Save, which proves that the two bridges that they had previously built were in a state of advanced decay. The local Roman garrison launched a pre-emptive strike and torched the Slavic boats.151 This was clearly an operation in which the Romans used their river fleet in combination with garrison forces. The enraged Khagan responded by besieging Singidunum, but abandoned it after only seven days when the citizens paid a ransom of 2,000 gold solidi, a gold-inlaid table, and clothing. As noted by Michael Whitby, this is clearly an instance in which local interests overrode state interests. Now the Avars were able to retreat to Sirmium to continue their boat-building unhindered. The Avars crossed the Save in midsummer when the forage was plentiful and advanced in five days to Bononia. When Maurice learnt of this, he appointed Priscus to command all the troops in Europe with the title of strategos. Officially he held probably the position of Magister Militum per Thracias. He had just arrived from the East as a result of the mutiny of the army against him and the Emperor. Due to the mutiny of the Eastern Field Army, the situation was difficult, so Priscus was given an ad hoc force of whatever was available in the capital and Thrace. Priscus appointed Salvianus as his hypostrategos and dispatched him with 1,000 horsemen to protect one of the passes (probably the Shipka Pass) while he presumably sought to protect the other passes of the Haemus range/Stara Planina to prevent the Avars reaching the plains of Thrace. Salvianus reached the pass on the fifth day and then made a reconnaissance of the other side. There he came across the Avar vanguard and retreated back into the pass as he was heavily outnumbered. The Avar advance guard attacked immediately, but the Romans were able to hold on to the pass despite heavy casualties. The fighting lasted for the entire day, after which the Avars withdrew. The following morning, the Khagan dispatched Samur with 8,000 men against the Romans, but the Romans again held their ground. On the third day the Khagan led his entire force against the Romans, but postponed the attack until the fourth. Salvianus, feeling unable to oppose the entire enemy army, withdrew during the night and marched to join Priscus. The Avars learnt of the Roman retreat on the fourth day so the Avars then marched through the pass on the fifth day. Three days later the Avars reached Sabulente Canalion (probably the Valley of the Roses that began at the southern end of the Shipka Pass and extended west). Michael Whitby is likely to be correct in suggesting that Priscus retreated to the second Roman line of defence, which was Maurice’s Ditch, and did not attempt to protect the cities north of it, so the Avars were able to march to Anchialus unhindered. There they torched the church of the martyr Alexander, and it was there that the Avars managed to capture a reconnaissance party of Priscus. Theophylact claims that the prisoners did not disclose anything and misled them with fictitious stories; but subsequent events prove that the Avars were not misled. The Avars breached Maurice’s Ditch at its eastern end while Priscus’s army was west of them and threatening Priscus’s line of retreat to Constantinople. Priscus was forced to make a hasty retreat while the Avars continued their march to Drizipera which they reached five days after leaving Anchialus. The Avars assaulted Drizipera but the citizens fought bravely and defeated them. On the basis of this it is likely that there were at least some soldiers inside the city. The barbarians constructed

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  253 siege engines on the seventh day of the siege. The defenders responded by opening the gates and arraying themselves in close order against their enemy. Theophylact represents this as an illusion/miracle that caused the Avars to flee, but in my opinion this should be taken with a grain of salt. It is clear that the illusion consisted of citizens boldly arrayed against the enemy in open territory in front of the gates. However, I agree with the Whitbys (Theophylact, 1986, p.165.n.27) that one of the reasons for the abandonment of the siege must have been that it was preferable for the Avars to prevent Priscus’s retreat to Constantinople. I would also not preclude the possibility that the Khagan could have thought his position between the army of Priscus and the city to be too vulnerable. The Avars reached Perithus/Heracleia five days after they had abandoned the siege of Drizipera. They appear to have marched past the Long Walls to reach Heracleia because they are claimed to have reached it during this campaign. This means that the Avars now blocked Priscus’s route of retreat to the capital. We have two versions of what happened next. According to Theophylact, Priscus attacked the Avars immediately, but was defeated because the enemy had the advantage of numbers, so Priscus then retreated with his infantry to Didymoteichon. I agree with Michael Whitby that this should probably be connected with the incident mentioned by the Strategikon. The version preserved by the Strategikon suggests that the Avars fooled Priscus with a stratagem. The hiding of this in the text of Theophylact is not surprising because he was clearly using a source written during the reign of Phocas which was partial towards Priscus and hostile towards Comentiolus, Petrus and Maurice. When the Khagan reached Heracleia he drew his forces in combat formation in front of his own camp for several days in succession without making any effort to engage the army of Priscus. Thereby the Avars made pretence of being afraid of the Romans because they lacked the courage to engage them in combat. The Romans were therefore lulled into a false sense of security, and Priscus allowed his cavalry to encamp outside the fortified infantry encampment. When the Khagan learnt this, he attacked the unprotected Roman cavalry forces at night and annihilated them. Priscus was then forced to retreat with his infantry to Didymoteichon. The fact that he was able to do so under these circumstances proves that his infantry forces were of very high quality. The destruction of the Roman cavalry force was why Maurice became angry with Priscus and why this incident found its way into the Strategikon as a warning example. After this Priscus attempted to slip past the Avars to the safety of Constantinople, but the Avars caught up with his forces near Tzurollon so that Priscus was forced to seek shelter there with his infantry. The Avars duly besieged him vigorously. When Maurice heard this, he was upset and fearful of what would happen. On the fourth day after he had had heard the bad news, he came up with a brilliant plan – a stratagem to fool the enemy. Maurice summoned a bodyguard of his and told him to allow himself to be captured by the Avars. The bodyguard was given a letter in which the Emperor advised Priscus to fight with resolve because Maurice had dispatched a fleet and army to attack the enemy homelands and their families. The false envoy was duly captured three days later and his letter was read by the Avars. Because of it the Khagan negotiated a settlement with Priscus and agreed to a small ransom. After this the Khagan retreated to his home territory on the double to protect it against the fictitious navy. Maurice was an indeed a true master of warfare and stratagems.

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254  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The Balkans in 589–92152 The Avars appear to have been preoccupied by other troubles during 589 to 593, or alternatively Maurice had later sent a navy to threaten their homelands after which the combined forces at Singidunum were sufficient to keep the Avars at bay. The Slavs, however, continued their ravages, as recorded by Theophylact for 589. The details provided by Theophylact, and in particular the fact that he does not mention any major actions, prove that the Romans were in the process of securing their hold on Thrace and the Danube line. Even though conditions remained unsettled, the letters of Gregory show that Roman fortunes recovered even in Illyricum during those years. In the confused account of Theophylact, which combines several different campaigns of Maurice, Maurice took charge of operations himself when he heard that the Avars were planning another campaign. Theophylact dates this in several different ways, but a solar eclipse features in one of them. The problem is that there were two solar eclipses that would fit. The first took place on 4 October 590, the second on 19 March 592. But I agree with Michael Whitby that the former date is the likelier, on the basis that Maurice’s trip took place during his ninth year in power and because he visited both Anchialus and Heracleia during this trip to inspect the damages caused by the Avar invasion of 588. The senators, Patriarch, Empress and his children all begged Maurice not to lead the army in person. Maurice kept his head, but when he started his journey and reached Hebdomon on 4 October 590, he learnt that the Persian envoy Dalauzas (probably also known as Dolabzas) had arrived. Maurice returned to Constantinople and settled the embassy’s request as well as he could and then returned to lead the campaign in person. He sought divine favour for his campaign, visiting Hagia Sophia and then the Church of Pege. Maurice understood the importance of using religion to motivate the soldiers, and the soldiers and the Emperor prayed together. He then marched along the Via Egnatia and gave alms to the beggars at Rhegium. When he reached Rhamphus, he placed the Life Giving Wood of Christ at the head of the marching column. He rode behind it and behind him followed his bodyguards. When Maurice reached Selymbria, he presumably added forces from its garrison for the campaign. He boarded a ship for Perinthus/Heracleia but was forced to land because of a storm, so he entered Heracleia mounted on his royal horse. There he provided funds for the rebuilding of the church of the martyr Glyceria which had been destroyed by the Avars in 588. In 610 the Emperor Heraclius visited this same place. Maurice then continued his march north. The incident that took place immediately after leaving Perinthus proves that the soldiers travelled with their wives, because when a woman who was giving a birth to a child annoyed the Emperor with her cries, he dispatched a bodyguard to see what was happening. The bodyguard found the child was deformed – it had no eyes, misshapen hands and arms, and a tail. He took the parents and the child to the Emperor, who ordered the child killed as a monster. Christianity did not provide protection for the handicapped. En route the attendants of the Emperor hunted deer with bows and spears. Hunting was one of the forms of military training; it was beneficial for the soldiers not only from the military prespective but also because it provided venison. During the hunting a soldier of Gepid origin murdered a young bodyguard of Maurice’s because of his gold decorations. Maurice examined the matter like a detective and ordered the Gepid interrogated through torture. But apparently he was found innocent at this stage because he was only caught in 593 (see later).

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  255 On the following day Maurice’s bodyguards captured three men with lyres who were called ‘Slavs from the western ocean’. The Khagan had asked for their alliance, but they had not agreed to it; the two countries were too far apart. These three men were the ‘Slav’ envoys who had brought the answer to the Khagan who had then prevented them from returning home. These three had then fled to Roman territory. Maurice received them with open arms and sent them to Heracleia. We know of no Slavs living on the Atlantic coast, which means either that the men belonged to some other tribal grouping who lived there (Irish, Picts or Frisians?), or that they were Slavs or some Fenno-Ugric tribesmen who lived on the Baltic coast, or some other tribe even further north (e.g. the Bjarmians). Some tribe from the Baltic is probably the likeliest and shows that the Avar Khagan was at this time desperately seeking new allies against his enemies, which included the Franks, Slavic subjects, Turks and Romans. After this, Maurice continued his journey to Anchialus where he stayed for fifteen days. It is probable that his presence there was enough to convince the Khagan to abandon his plans for the winter campaign in 590–1. He appears to have turned his eyes towards the Lombards, against whom he fought in 591, with the result that Agilulf concluded a peace with them in about 591/2. Maurice inspected the damage the Avars had done in 588, after which he provided funds for the repairs. After this, he returned to the capital where he received envoys both from the Persians and from the Franks. Theophylact claims that the Frankish envoys had been sent by Theuderic II, but Theuderic only became king in 596, which means Theophylact has confused two different embassies. However, it is probable that the Franks had sent envoys in late 590 to make excuses for their poor combat performance in Italy in 590 while also making their excuses for the acceptance of money from the Lombards in return for not attacking them in 591. The war against the Lombards kept the Avars preoccupied during 591–2, so the Romans were able to strengthen their position in the Balkans further.153 That the Lombards and the Avars were at war at this time is proved by the peace agreement that the Lombard King Agilulf made with the Avars in about 592–3 (Paul Deacon 4.3–5). One wonders if the Avars acted as Roman allies in Italy. The reasons for this suspicion are: 1) The Franks had accepted money from the Lombards in 590 and had refused to participate in the Roman offensive in Italy in 591; 2) In the context of the events in 593, Theophylact (6.6.8) refers to an alliance between the Romans and Avars which had been negotiated by Priscus. The last mentioned is usually thought to mean buying peace from the Avars when they had besieged Priscus in Tzurullon (Theophylact 6.5.16), but it is actually doubtful whether Priscus had the authority for such a treaty; also, Theophylact refers to the assembling of Avar forces in late 590 for a campaign against the Romans which then caused Maurice to lead an army in person to Anchialus. This means that the treaty must have been negotiated after that, and it is precisely in 591 that we find the Avars operating against the Lombards in Italy. This implies that Maurice dispatched Priscus to negotiate with the Avars immediately after he had returned to Constantinople and had learnt that the Franks would not participate in the offensive in Italy in 591. After the previous payments and negotiations the Avars already knew Priscus, so he would have been an ideal candidate for this. This would then have brought Priscus back into imperial favour so that he was given command of the troops again in 593. It should be noted, though, that all of this is just learned speculation based on circumstantial evidence.

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5.2.  THE YEARS OF GLORY 592–602 5.2.1  North Africa and Egypt 589–602 North Africa 589–602 The next recorded events for North Africa are the congratulations for the victories won by the Exarch Gennadius against the Moors in the letters of Gregory the Great dated July and August 591. These letters also praise Gennadius’s efforts to convert the newly conquered peoples to Christianity. However, as noted in PLRE3, it is equally possible that Gregory refers to earlier victories such as those just recently achieved in 589 (see above). The Pope also pleaded Gennadius to persecute the Donatists, but with no result. This was a wise decision of Gennadius, because had he done as asked, he would only have created unnecessary disturbances in the areas under his rule.154 The next event mentioned by the sources – Theophylact Simocattes (7.6.6–7) – is the revolt of the Maurusii (Moors) in Libya mentioned in roughly 595. The resulting innumerable horde frightened both the Carthaginians and Gennadius and he decided to overcome them with a ruse. Gennadius pretended that he was ready to accept all the demands made by the barbarians, they relaxed their vigilance, and he attacked them while they were celebrating. The attack was a complete surprise, the Moors were slaughtered in great numbers and the Romans obtained masses of booty. This was the end of the Carthaginian war so there was peace in Libya. Pringle notes two possible explanations for the use of the term ‘Carthaginians’ in this context. Firstly, it is possible that Gennadius allowed the Moors to invade all the way up to Carthago Proconsularis or even up to the environs of the city of Carthage as a ruse. Secondly, it is possible that Theophylact just used the term ‘Carthaginians’ in the general sense to mean any place within the exarchate of Carthage. I agree. It is possible Theophylact could have meant either. However, the first alternative is likelier, because Gennadius was seeking to win through guile. The fright of the Carthaginians would have resulted from the fact that the Moors had been allowed to advance to the environs of the city of Carthage while the overconfidence of the Moors would have resulted from the fact that they had been able to achieve this and from the concessions made by Gennadius. This would have enabled Gennadius to launch his surprise attack from within the city against the disorganized camp posted in front of it. Even if the principal ruse of Gennadius was to agree to the demands made by the Moors, in my opinion this does not preclude the existence of some military encounters before this, because it is clear that some feigned cavalry encounters in which the Moors had bested Roman cavalry forces would have given Gennadius’s ruse additional credence. However, there is no definite evidence for this. The silence of the sources after this suggests that the area was now finally pacified. However, North Africa still witnessed one major disaster during the reign of Maurice. The plague reappeared and ravaged the African provinces from 599 until 600.155 The above is basically all we know of the major events that took place during the exarchate of Gennadius and reign of Maurice. However, we have some other small pieces of information. Some time before October 596 Gennadius had appointed tribunus Anastasius to govern Corsica. He was so good at his job that both the Corsicans and Pope Gregory the Great pleaded Gennadius to reappoint him in October 596. At the same time, Gennadius had called comes Ruferius together with some other Corsicans from

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  257 Corsica to Africa. They too got a letter of support from the Pope in October 596. It is also known that the fort at Limisa was built when Gennadius was exarch and that it is probable the forts at Bordj el-Ksour and at Agbia date from the reign of Maurice. In other words, the Romans continued their standard defensive doctrine. We also know the names of three Praetorian Prefects of Africa for the reign of Maurice: an inscription at Limisa mentions some John as Prefect under Gennadius; Pantaleon was Prefect in July 594; Innocentius was Prefect in July 600. The last mention of Gennadius in the sources dates from September/October 598 when Gregory the Great recommended the mercenary Lombard commander Droctulfus to him; PLRE 3 suggests he either retired or died some time between September 598 and July 600, but as noted by Pringle it is possible that he was still in office as late as 602. However, I am inclined to agree with PLRE3, because the contents of the letter Pope Gregory sent to the newly appointed Prefect Innocentius in July 600 suggest this. The Pope congratulated Innocentius for the appointment, but does not mention Gennadius. The Pope inquired about the preparation of a fleet of warships for use in Sardinia against the threatened Lombard invasion. One would expect such inquiries to have been sent to Gennadius if he was still in office. This suggests that he had by then either died or retired. We also know that Maurice appointed Heraclius, father of the future Emperor Heraclius, as Gennadius’s successor some time during his reign. This means that this appointment took place probably in 598–600, even if one cannot entirely preclude the possibility that it took place later in 601–2.156 Future events show that despite the plague of 599–600 Maurice handed Africa to his successors in better condition than he had received it. After 595 North Africa saw a period of relative calm that enabled Heraclius to use it as his launching pad to usurp power in 608. It was then that North Africa assumed greater importance in the destinies of the Roman Empire. Egypt 589–602 According to John of Nikiu (97.18, 97.26–9), John (PLRE3 Ioannes 169) remained Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae for a long time, during which he ‘had many great works constructed in the sea at the cost of great exertions. And he did not return to the city of Byzantium till he died.’157 This presumably means improvements to the harbour of Alexandria and possibly also to the harbours of other cities. In my opinion the likeliest reason for this would have been the lessons learnt from the revolt of the three brothers and Isaac, the aim of which would have been to make it more difficult to capture ships from harbours for piratical activities. John was succeeded by patrician Constantinus (PLRE3 Constantinus 12 patricius and Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae158). Constantinus investigated the crimes of the four rebels (Abaskiron, Menas, Jacob, and Isaac) then still held in prison, and found them all guilty. The three brothers were executed, but Isaac was exiled to the island of Atrôkû. Their accomplices were given corporal punishment or their goods were confiscated. Aykilah and Abusan were burned to the ground. Roughly at about the same time as this took place in the Delta region (in 591/2?), there were troubles in the south in the ‘province of Akhmim’ (Akhmim was another name for the city of Panopolis), which was located near Ptolemais, Panopolis and Abydos which belonged to the Ducate of Thebaid. A man named Azarias raised a flag of revolt there and armed a large force of Ethiopian slaves and brigands with whose help he seized the

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258  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 imperial taxes. The locals feared the slaves and barbarians and sent an urgent plea for help to the Emperor. Maurice responded by sending a distinguished commander with a sizable force of Egyptians and Nubians against the rebel Azarias. However, before the two armies could come to grips, the rebel leader panicked and he and his men fled on their horses to the summit of an arid mountain. The troops besieged him for a long time until the rebels ran out of water and food (they ate all their horses). Azarias and all his followers died of hunger and thirst. The fact that the inhabitants of Thebaid sent a plea for help all the way to the Emperor shows that the duces of Egypt were incapable of cooperating to crush the revolt. It also proves that the Roman response to troubles in this area was very slow. The fact John of Nikiu states that the revolt was crushed by the Egyptians and Nubians suggests that the imperial army consisted of the soldiers posted in Aegyptus and Thebaid, but it may also imply that the general enrolled Egyptian civilians and Nubian tribesmen into the army. After this Egypt appears to have witnessed a period of peace during which the only matter worth reporting was the appearance of ‘two creatures in human form, one resembling a man and the other a woman’ in the river Nile. This sight was witnessed by the Dux et Augustalis Aegyptis Menas in office in 598/600 and he reported it to the Emperor.159

5.2.2.  Gaul and Italy in 592–602 Exarch Romanus’s remaining years in office 592–6 592:160 It was in this year that the newly-installed Pope Gregory the Great started to criticize Romanus for two reasons. The first of these was that Romanus did not persecute the schismatics Histrian/Istrian bishops in 591–2. In fact these bishops praised Romanus to the Emperor in 591. The second concerned Gregory’s disapproval of the strategy of Romanus, which forced Gregory to act as his own military commander for Rome and its surroundings. Romanus had transferred most of the garrison of Rome to Narni and Perusia/Perugia. In Gregory’s opinion, Romanus should in early 592 have either allowed peace negotiations with the Lombards or he should have conducted active campaigns against them. We do not know why Romanus did neither, but one may guess that the problems of the previous year (famine, plague) and the threat posed by the forces of Agilulf made him unwilling to commit his quite probably weakened forces to combat the forces of Ariulf. Each of the cities and forts conquered by Romanus in 590 required a garrison, on top of which he would also have lost some men to plague. It is also clear that the Emperor had forbidden any negotiations. However, in my opinion, as will be made clear, the likeliest reason for the inactivity of Romanus lay in the use of a double agent to mislead the enemy and the Pope. The defence of Rome and its environs was entirely in the hands of the Pope and his soldiers and in the hands of those magistri militum who obeyed his commands. However, in my opinion it is clear that Velox at Perusia and Mauricius/Martius at Narnia were both actually following the orders of Romanus to stay where they were and did not pay any heed to the instructions of Gregory. As noted by Hodgkin (5.348) in the nineteenth century, the central strategic issues that dominated the strategies of both the Lombards and Romans concentrated on two things. Firstly, the large cities of Rome, Ravenna, Naples and Genoa were still in Roman hands.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  259 These were the principal bases from which the Romans could project their power against the Lombards. The second of the issues was the avenues of communication between these cities, and of these the central one was the land connection along the Via Flaminia which connected Ravenna with Rome while it isolated the Lombard kingdom of Agilulf from the Lombard duchies of Spoleto and Benevento. The city of Spoleto/Spoletum was actually located on the Via Flaminia, but this was not enough to sever the land communications between Ravenna and Rome. After the death of the first Dux of Spoletum/Spoleto, Faroald, in 591, the duchy fell into the hands of Ariulf. As noted above, he began military operations against the Romans immediately, but since he directed most of his operations against the cities of the Adriatic coast in late 591 to early 592, Pope Gregory was able to make further preparations against the impending invasion. In early 592, Gregory sought to strengthen the little towns of Sutrium and Nepe on his northern front about thirty miles from Rome. Ariulf appears to have begun his military operations against Rome in April, and in June 592 the Pope wrote to magistri militum Mauricius (probably to be identified with Martius, above) and Vitalianus to attack Ariulf if he marched against Rome. Magister militum Aldio informed Gregory of the invasion of Ariulf on Rome and the Pope wrote back to Aldio stating that the magister militum (probably Castus) had taken positions to oppose Ariulf. The Pope asked Aldio to attack Ariulf from behind, which he did not do. Soon after this, magister militum Vitalianus visited the Pope to carry the oral and written commands of the Pope to his fellow officers. The Pope was both military general and religious leader at the same time. On 11 June 592 the Pope received a threatening letter from dux Ariulf in which he informed the Pope that the citizens of Suana (Sovana) had promised to surrender to him, with the implication that all resistance against him would prove futile as his men would soon take Rome too. The Pope attached this letter to the message he dispatched to the magistri Mauricius and Vitalianus with instructions to check the veracity of Ariulf ’s claim and to take hostages from the inhabitants of Suana to make certain that their loyalties would not waver. If the generals learned that the inhabitants had betrayed the Romans to Ariulf, the Pope ordered the generals to decide on their own how to deal with the matter. Gregory also informed the generals that Ariulf ’s forces were then concentrated at Nardiae (means probably Narni161). He instructed the generals to be on their guard against Ariulf, and if Ariulf advanced against Suana the Pope instructed the generals to make a diversionary attack against his ducate. The extant letters of Gregory fail to say what happened to Suana, but Hodgkin is likely to be correct in his guess that the town fell to the Lombards, because so many other towns, cities and forts fell to the Lombards in 592. The two Lombard duces of the south appear to have coordinated their operations against the Romans, because we find the Dux of Beneventum, Arichis (Arigis, Aregis, Arogis), besieging Naples in 592. Arichis had been sent to Beneventum as successor of Zotto by Agilulf in 591, which means that he apparently recognized Agilulf as his superior. This begs the question, what was the role of Agilulf in these matters? I agree with Hodgkin’s speculation (5.366) that it is possible to think that Agilulf ’s operations against the abovementioned rebel duces lasted until 592 while Arichis and Arichis’s ally Ariulf distracted the Romans during 592. But in my opinion it is even likelier that Agilulf had crushed the rebel duces by early summer 592 so that he was then able to cooperate in

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260  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 some fashion with Ariulf in the region of Perusia/Perugia during mid-to-late summer 592; but this is obviously speculation. If Ariulf and Agilulf coordinated their action at this time, which is a distinct possibility in light of the events of 593 (PD HL 4.8), then their common aim would have been to cut off the land route between Ravenna and Rome. The apparent reason for the sudden cooperation of the Lombard leaders is that Authari had died and Agilulf appears to have been acceptable not only to Arichis but also to Ariulf. The Romans, however, appear to have placed a double agent into the army of Ariulf who kept them well informed. No help was forthcoming from Romanus, either for Rome or Naples, so it was Gregory once again who took the lead. As noted above, it is not known why Romanus remained inactive. It has led Hodgkin (5.359–60) to speculate that Romanus wanted to use every soldier he had to secure the land communications between Ravenna and Rome and especially the strategic city of Perugia (Perusia). This is indeed possible, but it is also possible that his plans of joint operations with the Franks and the weakening of his army caused delays. Similarly, it is clear that the famine and plague of the previous year would have delayed operations in 592, because it would have been necessary to bring supplies and reinforcements further away to make any operations possible, not to mention the possibility that Agilulf could have been cooperating with Ariulf so that it was actually Agilulf who captured the strategic city of Perusio/Perugia in summer 592 (see PD HL 4.8 for reasons).162 However, in my opinion the likeliest reason for the inaction of Romanus was that the patrician and dux of Lombard origins Nordulf had deserted to the army of Dux of Spoletium Ariulf in 591–2, and he had done this as a Roman double agent. The inaction of Romanus was meant to make the desertion believable so that Nordulf and his band of mercenaries were able to gain the trust of Ariulf with some easy conquests of no great importance. The reasons for this conclusion will be given later. It was then thanks to the inactivity of Romanus that Gregory dispatched the ‘magnificent tribune’ Constantius to take command of the soldiers posted in Naples with orders to defend it. In about June-July, Ariulf, with his generals Auctarit (Authari) and Nordulf, again advanced to the walls of Rome – the inclusion of Nordulf among the invaders means that he had deserted back to the Lombard side some time in 591–2 and in my opinion it is likely he did so as a double agent. This made Gregory so angry towards Romanus that he sent a letter to the Bishop of Ravenna saying that he sought to conclude a separate peace with Ariulf. With the exception of the Theodosiaci, who had not received their donative and were therefore unwilling to fight, all the regular soldiers had been withdrawn from Rome and sent to Perusia and Narni by Romanus so the Pope thought there was no alternative available to him. Gregory asked the Bishop’s help in convincing Romanus to conclude a separate peace with Ariulf. The Pope also instructed the Bishop to urge Romanus to dispatch a dux with soldiers to Naples immediately because it would otherwise be lost to Arichis. Gregory also informed the bishop of the quarrel he had with Romanus over the heretics of Istria and that he intended to bypass the Exarch by writing directly to the Emperor. After this letter, Gregory appears to have acted as he threatened to do, meeting Ariulf in person and concluding a separate peace with him by paying a hefty tribute in return for peace. The Pope claimed that the payment was made to convince Ariulf to join the Roman cause. This did not materialize.163 In my opinion, it is probable that Nordulf had advised Ariulf to agree to the peace and that the idea behind

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  261 this was to remove the threat of Ariulf from the play so that Romanus could concentrate his army against Agilulf, and that this was done without the knowledge of the Pope. The usual interpretation among modern historians is that the conclusion of a separate peace by the Pope without permission roused Romanus to action to undo Gregory’s work. This is what Hodgkin for example suggests. Romanus marched his army straight from Ravenna to Rome. The fact that Romanus began his operations against the Lombards only after he had visited Rome has been used as evidence that it was the unilateral actions of Pope Gregory that stirred him into action. The two men then patched up their differences somehow and, according to Liber Pontificalis and Paul the Deacon, Romanus returned to Ravenna. It had clearly been the peace between the Pope and Ariulf that had enabled Romanus to march unhindered to Rome. This begs the question, was the peace a ruse against the Lombards initiated originally by Romanus through the services of Nordulf to remove Ariulf ’s army from the vicinity of Rome, or was the peace between the Pope and Ariulf an entirely independent initiative of Gregory? In my opinion the former is likelier, but obviously not conclusively so. In other words, I think it possible that Nordulf lured Ariulf away from the vicinity of Rome and that he did this as a double agent acting for the Romans. The explanation for this conclusion follows a few pages later. The peace between the Pope and Ariulf removed the fear that Agilulf would attack Romanus’s army from the north/north-west while Ariulf attacked from the south/south-east. En route back to Ravenna, Romanus proved once again that he was a first rate commander. He reconquered Sutrium (Sutri), Polymartium (Bomarzo), Horta (Orte), Tuder (Todi), Ameria (Amelia), Perusia (Perugia), Lucioli/Luceolis (Cantiano) and many other cities. This means that the Lombards had captured them earlier in 592. As noted above, in my opinion it is probable that all of the Lombard leaders cooperated against the Romans in 592, so it would in probability have been Agilulf who captured Perusia while Ariulf may have captured some of the places (e.g. Sutrium, Polymartium, Horta, Tuder, and Ameria, Narni) closer to Spoletum and Rome. Notably Exarch Romanus placed the Lombard dux Maurisio in charge of the recaptured city of Perusia. This suggests that either Perusia had been originally captured from the Romans by dux Maurisio on behalf of Ariulf or Agilulf and that he then deserted to the Romans when Romanus approached, or that this dux Maurisio had joined the Romans earlier and was just posted at Perusia when Romanus retook it. 593–6:164 In 593 the Franks reappear on the map because it was then that Childebert II appointed Tassilo as King of the Bavarians. Tassilo used this position by attacking the Slavs, whom he defeated returning home with a sizable booty. One wonders whether this attack against the Slavs was conducted as a Roman ally because it certainly served Roman interests that the Slavs were distracted by attacks from their rear. These Slavs would not be attacking Roman territories. When King Agilulf learned of the campaign of Romanus, he assembled his army at Ticinum, marched across the Po and then put Perusia under a siege some time in the spring of 593. In my opinion this is a good indication that Perusia had been captured by his forces in 592 and not by those of Ariulf. The city fell after a siege lasting for some days after which the dux Maurisio was captured and killed. Following this, Agilulf besieged Rome in about June 593 or later in the same year – the exact date is not known, suggestions vary from June 593 to March 594. This means that Agilulf had advanced

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262  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 through the cities previously recaptured by Romanus up to the walls of Rome, which once again suggests the possibility that it may have been the forces of Agilulf that had captured some of the cities that Romanus recaptured in 592. The Pope took his place on the battlements and saw the Roman roped captives being led like dogs to slavery among the Franks (the Franks bought them). Pope Gregory, his namesake Prafectus urbis Romae Gregory, and magister militum Castus led the defence. Agilulf opted to achieve his aim by a blockade, and when it started to cause famine the frightened Pope Gregory decided to seek a separate peace from King Agilulf too. Pope Gregory met Agilulf on the steps of the basilica of St Peter outside the city and managed to convince Agilulf to grant Rome a separate peace. Eduardo Fabbro suggests in a chapter entitled ‘I was made bishop not of Romans but of Lombards’ that Pope Gregory may have been planning to conclude a separate deal with Agilulf even before this. This is indeed quite probable. From this date onwards, Pope Gregory tried to convince Exarch Romanus to agree to the peace negotiations with the Lombards in which he, the Pope, would have acted as a mediator. In fact, in his letter to the Bishop of Milan the Pope went so far as to state he would guarantee the good behaviour of the Lombards if the Bishop could reconcile Romanus with Agilulf. These attempts did not meet any success because both Romanus and Emperor Maurice were opposed to the peace. In fact Maurice was livid with Pope Gregory because he had concluded the separate peace, and livid with PVR Gregory for supporting him. Maurice did not hold the Church, and especially not the Pope, in high esteem at this time. Maurice was also seeking to prevent soldiers and civil servants from evading their patriotic duties by becoming priests or monks. Gregory opposed this and sent a letter to that effect. Why had the Emperor forbidden soldiers from seeking the way of salvation? Why were the soldiers of the Emperor forbidden to become soldiers of Christ? Gregory stated that he had distributed the Imperial Edict as he was duty-bound to do, and that he had included a memorandum which stated that the Edict of the Emperor was abominable in the eyes of God. We do not know what the response of Maurice was to this affront by the Pope, but it is clear that it cannot have endeared the men to each other. Hodgkin has speculated that the Edict was not put into effect in practice. This, however, is speculation. In my opinion it is more or less likely that the Edict was put into effect in those areas which were firmly in Imperial control, but not necessarily in those areas where the Pope was in control. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the Imperial family favoured John the Faster, the Patriarch of Constantinople, over the Pope. The Emperor and the Pope quarrelled over other Church matters too. The Emperor chose Maximus as Bishop of Salona while the Pope’s candidate was Honoratus. The Pope accused Exarch Romanus of having accepted a bribe for the installation of Maximus as Bishop. In 594 Maximus in his turn accused the Pope of the murder of Bishop Malchus, which the latter denied. By 595 the Pope and the Emperor were on more cordial terms. The Pope thanked the Emperor for thirty pounds of gold that the Emperor had sent for the Church. He also informed the Emperor that magister militum Castus had distributed the donative to the soldiers brought by the same messenger. The donative put a stop to indiscipline in the ranks. Even if we do not possess the letters of Castus, it is clear that he too communicated with the Emperor and Exarch.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  263 Gregory had not given up his efforts to convince Romanus to begin peace negotiations with Agilulf, and he basically acted as Agilulf ’s representative/agent in this matter. The Pope informed Exarch Romanus in May 595 that Agilulf accused the Romans of having broken the terms of the truce concluded with the Pope and that if Romanus would not conclude the peace, Agilulf threatened to make another separate truce with the Pope, while the Lombards would capture several islands and other places from the Romans as a punishment. This presumably means that the Imperial Roman army had broken the terms of the truce concluded between Agilulf and the Pope and that the Imperialists had either reconquered territory from the Lombards or had raided lands held by them; or that the breaking of the peace meant the desertion of Nordulf back to the Roman side; or that the Lombards mistakenly thought that the Romans had sent the Avars against them (Agilulf concluded peace with them in about 596–7 which means there had probably been fighting in 595 probably as a result of the Avar campaign in Dalmatia165). The Pope advised Romanus to conclude the truce so that the Romans would be able to strengthen their defences during the respite, but to no avail because the Emperor saw these attempts as treachery. Gregory also informed the Exarch and Emperor that Ariulf was prepared to desert to the Romans, but this was not believed by either and for a good reason. In fact, Emperor Maurice accused the Pope of treacherous disloyalty and stupidity. To quote from Hodgkin’s translation of Gregory’s response to Maurice (p.383): ‘It follows there, that when I, my Lord’s most serene letters, am said to have been deceived by the wiles of Ariulf, and am called ‘simple’, without the addition of ‘prudent’, your meaning, without doubt, must be that I am a fool… As for my report concerning Ariulf, that he was ready with his whole heart to come over to the Republic, you do not believe me. That means that I am accused of telling lies… I have long perceived that more confidence is reposed in Nordulf [this means that he had ‘deserted’ back to the Roman side and was advising Maurice] or in Leo than in me, and now those who come between us receive more credence than is given to my assertations.’ It is therefore clear that the letters of the Exarch Romanus to Maurice had been quite hostile towards the Pope, and that Nordulf and Leo had advised Maurice. In fact, it is easy to see why the Roman generals would have accused the Pope of treachery if he prevented the coordination of the Roman war effort by his meddling while pleading on behalf of Agilulf and Ariulf. However, as is noted by Eduardo Fabbro in his chapter ‘Gregory, the simpleton’, the Emperor forgave ‘simpleton’ Gregory and punished only the magister militum Castus for negligence of duty during the siege of Rome by Agilulf. One wonders what the role of Nordulf was in these operations because it is clear that both Maurice and Romanus believed him and Leo rather than Gregory. As we have seen, Nordulf was a Lombard dux who had deserted to the Roman side some time before 590 when he had been sent back to Italy as a patrician, but he had then deserted back to the Lombard side so we find him advancing against Rome in 592. Could he have been a Roman double agent? In my opinion it is quite possible or even probable that he was, so that it would in all probability have been he who had brought about the peace between Ariulf and Gregory in 592, which then enabled Romanus to march to Rome without hindrance and

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264  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 then reconquer the territories north of Rome on his return trip. The PLRE3 (Nordulfus) suggests after Goubert that Nordulf had deserted back to the Roman side and had then returned to Constantinople where he then provided advice to Maurice on Lombard matters. This is quite probable. What is certain is that he had definitely deserted back to the Roman side by the time Gregory wrote his letter to Maurice because Gregory would not have been aware of the advice given by Nordulf to Maurice had he still been by the side of Ariulf as a Roman double agent. Gregory was not only at odds with the Emperor and the Exarch but also with the Patriarch of Constantinople John who sought equal standing in the Church with the Pope, so with the full backing of the Emperor he called himself Ecumenical Patriarch in a letter he sent to Gregory. This aroused the ire of the Pope who wrote an angry letter to John, but at the same time he sent conciliatory letters to both the Emperor and Empress to convince them to support his position vis-à-vis John. In the end the rulers did not have to take sides because John died that year. Maurice’s choice as new Patriarch of Constantinople was Cyriacus, who had been a friend of Gregory when the latter had stayed in Constantinople. This suggests that Maurice was earnestly seeking to end the quarrel so that all of the resources of the Empire could be directed for a common cause. This solved the problem, even if Cyriacus continued to call himself Ecumenical Bishop to the indignation of Gregory. The two men were still on friendly terms, and the Pope thanked the Emperor for the choice of Cyriacus. This did not change the relationship between the Pope and Exarch. Gregory continued to urge Exarch Romanus to conclude a peace with the Lombards, but Romanus remained deaf to all such requests. The Pope’s chartularius (secretary) Castorius was the man who acted as intermediary between Gregory and Agilulf. This made him hated in Ravenna, not only by the soldiers but also by the citizens. They believed their city was impregnable and would not accept any surrender to the barbarians. On the basis of the letters of Gregory the principal target of enemy attacks in late 595 and early 596 was Campania where the Lombards caused havoc. Since this area was between Rome and Naples, the probable perpetrators of these activities were the duces Ariulf and Arichis. In addition to this, we learn from Gregory that the Lombards captured at least Crotona in the foot of Italy in 596, which proves that the forces of Arichis had marched really far south. Agilulf appears to have been neutralized by a civil war that he was fighting against Lombard duces, because we learn from Paul the Deacon (HL 4.13) that the Lombard dux of Verona, Zangrulfus, revolted against Ago/Agilulf in ca. 596 and was then executed. Warnecautius was also executed at Ticinum in the same year, which suggests that he too had rebelled against the king. One wonders if Roman diplomacy played a role in these events. In about 596 Gregory received large gifts of money from Theoctista, the Emperor’s sister, and Theodore the Physician, to pay ransoms. This means that the only person able to help them was the Pope and all he could do was to send money to ransom captives from the Lombards.166 At about the same time, Gregory could sigh a relief because Exarch Romanus died, probably by April 596, and his successor Callinicus was ready to listen to the advice of the Pope. The downside of the death of this able commander was that there was no-one who could either exploit the civil war that Agilulf was fighting in 596 or who could organize a defence of Campania and south of Italy.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  265 Exarch Callinicus 597–602/3 597–602:167 We know very little of the events of 597 and 598, but it is clear that the relationship between the Pope and the new Exarch Callinicus was far better than it had been with Romanus. This does not mean that it was trouble-free, because we learn from a letter of Gregory that scholasticus (legal adviser) Andreas at Ravenna had warned him in advance that there were two people in the retinue of Callinicus who were hostile towards the Pope. The Pope clearly had his own spies too. Gregory’s letter to deacon Cyprian in May 597 states that Exarch Callinicus had not answered Gregory’s letter because Callinicus was then busy in the valley of the Po. Hodgkin (5.411) suggests that this probably means that Callinicus was negotiating for peace. In my opinion it is far likelier that Callinicus was busy because Agilulf was attempting to capture cities that were in Roman hands (e.g. Placentia, Mantua, Brexillum) – the peace negotiations would not have required the presence of Callinicus in the valley of the Po because such missions were performed by envoys. The new Exarch Callinicus was prepared to use the good services of the Pope for the conclusion of a peace with the Lombards. The peace negotiations probably started in late 597 or early 598. These negotiations cannot have started without the prior acceptance of Emperor Maurice. Hodgkin (5.422) has suggested that the changed attitude towards peace negotiations resulted from the Avar incursions, of which the invasion that reached the vicinity of Thessalonica in 597 was probably decisive. The Avar embassy that visited Agilulf in Milan in this year was probably connected with these strategic manoeuvres. The Avars asked Agilulf to conclude a peace with them, which Agilulf agreed to do either in late 597 or early 598. This means that the peace that the Avars and Lombards had concluded in about 591/2 had been broken after that, so it is likely that there had been some fighting in the Lombard-held territories in Istria and the Dukedom of Friuli probably in 595 (see the chapter on the Balkan wars of 592–602). The peace with the Avars gave Agilulf the opportunity to launch a major invasion of Roman-held territories in 598, just as it gave the Avars the chance to concentrate their forces against the Franks in 598. The Avars invaded Thuringia in 598, with the result that Brunhild was forced to conclude a humiliating peace treaty with the Avars in the name of her grandsons Theudebert and Theuderic in about 598/9. Hodgkin suggests that the reason for the small numbers of extant letters of Gregory for the period 1 September 597 to 31 August 598 (only 35 while the average was 63) was that the communications between different parts of Italy was ‘disturbed by hovering swarms of Lombards’. I agree that this is the likeliest reason for this. Hodgkin also notes that this is confirmed indirectly by Gregory’s own words which refer to the need to keep vigilance on the walls of Terracina just sixty miles from Rome. However, his letters also prove that Rome was not attacked or even harassed, which naturally resulted from the fact that Gregory had taken the Lombard side in the negotiations. The likely reason for the widespread Lombard raiding is that they wanted to put pressure on the Exarch to agree to the terms they had presented. The letter (9.4) from Gregory to Januarius, Bishop of Sardinia, proves that the mediation of the Pope through his representative abbot Probus had brought the first tangible results in summer 598 because both King and Exarch had accepted the terms of the peace. However, the truce was not yet signed by all parties. The Exarch and the

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266  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Pope both demanded that Ariulf and Arichis should also sign it. Regardless, this situation still gave Callinicus the chance to begin operations against the Slavs, presumably in the general region around Istria/Dalmatia. He defeated these Slavs before May 599.168 However, the Pope still urged the Bishop to maintain vigilance against the Lombards. This warning followed in the footsteps of Gregory’s previous warnings to both the Bishop and the Exarch of Africa Gennadius to be prepared for Lombard attacks against Sardinia. As noted by Hodgkin, these warnings had not been heeded with the result that the Lombards had attacked the island with much damage. Hodgkin suggests that the likely target of this attack had been the capital, Caralis, and I am inclinded to accept this educated guess as very likely. The Pope therefore urged Januarius to learn from his earlier mistakes, and promised to send any help that might be needed for the defence of the island. This means that even after the two sides had agreed to sign the peace treaty between Agilulf and Callinicus, the Pope was still cautious about its success and urged everyone to be on guard against possible surprise attacks until the agreement was actually signed and confirmed. The principal problem was that Agilulf needed to persuade the duces Ariulf and Arichis to join the treaty, which he finally achieved either in late 598 or in spring 599 when the two sides concluded a truce for two years. Then the Pope warned Bishop Januarius again because by then Gregory knew that Agilulf would not renew the truce but would attack. Januarius was instructed to use the lull well to strengthen the defences of Caralis and other places and to store provisions in them. The Pope was also concerned about the attitude of Ariulf during these negotiations, because Ariulf had agreed to the truce only if no act of violence was committed against him (which might mean almost anything) and because Ariulf had also demanded that Arichis should be included in the truce. Furthermore, Ariulf ’s trusted advisor Warnefrida/Warnilfrida had not sworn to keep the truce. The Pope refused to sign the peace unless Agilulf ’s representatives brought satisfactory answers from Ariulf. Gregory was also personally hurt by the disparaging words of Agilulf as reported by vir clarissimus Basilius to Gregory – had these words been purposely misrepresented by Basilius on behalf of the Emperor so that the relationship between the Pope and Agilulf might be soured? As noted by Hodgkin, the Pope’s view of Ariulf and Agilulf had changed dramatically. Gregory had started to suspect the wisdom of agreeing to the peace that he had himself sought for so many years. The Pope and Emperor were now both suspicious of the motives of the Lombard leaders, but, as noted, the differences were smoothed over sufficiently for the two-year truce to be signed in the spring of 599. The timing of the conclusion of the peace was fortunate for Agilulf because according to Paul the Deacon (HL 4.13) he soon, in 599, faced the revolt of Dux of Verona Zangrulf, Dux of Bergamo Gaidulf, and Warnecautius, possibly at Pavia (Ticinum, he was probably Dux of Pavia) because he was later put to death there. Paul the Deacon mentions in the same chapter just before mentioning the crushing of the revolts the conclusion of the perpetual peace between Agilulf and Theuderic, the King of the Franks. It is therefore probable that these Lombard leaders facing the Frankish border did not accept the conclusion of the humiliating peace (it included the payment of tribute) with their ageold Frankish enemies. I would suggest that Agilulf concluded the peace in preparation for the forthcoming face-off with the Romans. The other less likely alternative is that it

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  267 was because of these revolts that Agilulf concluded the peace with the Franks by agreeing to pay them tribute so he was then able to crush the Lombard leaders. If this alternative is correct then we do not know why the Lombard duces revolted in 599. It is possible that they just did not like to be ruled by Agilulf, or that they did not like the conclusion of peace with the Romans and/or Avars. However, regardless of the timing of the events it is easy to see why the Franks were prepared to conclude peace with Agilulf. They had just been defeated by the Avars and needed money. It was probably the peace between the Franks and Lombards that in the letters of Gregory led to the fear that the Alamanni were about to invade Italy, which never materialized. The conclusion of the peace at this time was also fortunate for the Romans, because the plague of 598 spread from the Balkans into Ravenna and other coastal cities all of which were badly ravaged by plague in about 599–600. The same plague also devastated Rome leaving hardly enough men to man the walls. Furthermore, the garrison in Rome was in a state of rebellion in about 599 because they had not received their salaries. Because of this Pope Gregory wrote to Erogator (paymaster) Donellus to come without delay to pay the soldiers what they were owed. Exarch Callinicus did not believe the truce would last, so towards its end, either in late 600 or in early 601, his soldiers made a surprise attack on Parma and captured the daughter of Agilulf from his first marriage together with her husband Gudescale (Gottschalk), the latter being probably the Dux of Parma. The aim of Callinicus was to use them as hostages to persuade Agilulf to act as the Franks had acted when the Romans had their relatives in their hands. This was a serious mistake. Agilulf was not a man to be persuaded this way. The Franks had been far easier to persuade because their young ruler Childebert II had been under the guidance of his mother Brunhild who allowed her motherly love to interfere with politics. If Callinicus had become aware of the negotiations between the Avars and Lombards (see later), it is possible that the capture of Agilulf ’s daughter was an attempt to prevent this alliance. We do not know what the role of the Emperor Maurice was in these events, but it might have been him who ordered Callinicus to make the surprise attack to capture Agilulf ’s daughter. Agilulf ’s answer was swift. He dispatched workmen to the Avars to build ships to use against the Romans. The workmen were evidently native Romans and the ships they built were dromons, and it was with these that the Avars captured some unnamed island in Thrace. At the same time, Agilulf attacked Patavium (Padua). The Roman garrison resisted bravely but surrendered when the Lombards shot fire-bombs into the city. The city was levelled to the ground, but the surrendered Romans were allowed to return to Ravenna. It was then that the envoys from the Avars arrived to meet Agilulf. The two sides now concluded a perpetual peace, which also meant a military alliance against the Romans. Because of this the Avar envoy continued his journey to Gaul where he warned the Franks to keep peace with the Lombards or else. After this, in 601, 602 or 603, the combined forces of the Lombards, Avars and Slavs raided Istria. The invaders ravaged the lands and then retreated with the booty taken. In the Po valley the Lombards achieved another success by capturing the Mountain of Flint (Monselice). According to the text of Paul the Deacon, Dux Gaidwald of Tridentum revolted against Agilulf in about 601/2. Dux Gisulf of Friuli was also hostile towards Agilulf, but we do not know whether he now revolted against Agilulf or whether he was

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268  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 still allied with the Romans. My own guess is that the latter was the case. It is easy to see why the duces of Tridentum and Friuli would have been hostile towards Agilulf. The principal enemies of the Dux of Tridentum were the Franks, and the principal enemies of the Dux of Friuli were the Avars and their Slavic allies, and we should not forget that it had been the Slavs that Callinnicus had defeated before May 599. It is quite possible that he did this together with the Dux of Friuli. The alliance between Agilulf and the Avars was certainly also directed against Friuli. It is therefore probable that these two duces sided with the Romans when Callinicus attacked Parma, so the Roman plan would have consisted of two elements: 1) a surprise attack against Parma to obtain hostages; 2) the use of two important north-eastern Lombard duces to divide the enemy forces. Because of this the first military operation of Agilulf was directed against Istria. It is clear that he did not only target Roman Istria but also Lombard-held Istria under the Dux of Friuli, so the Lombards attacked from the west while the Avars and Slavs attacked from the east. It is also probable, even if Paul the Deacon fails to mention it, that Agilulf attacked the territories held by the Dux of Tridentium at the same time. The victories in Istria and Monselice were not the only reasons for Agilulf to rejoice. In 602/3 Queen Theudelinda gave birth to a son, Adalwald/Adaloaldus. He was baptized into the Catholic faith on Easter Day, 7 April 603. King Agilulf did not convert, however, but remained Arian thanks to the so-called Three Chapters controversy. It was in Lombard interests to protect the schismatic churchmen of Italy who opposed the Pope and the Emperor. The decisive event in the war between the Lombards and Romans did not take place in Italy but in Constantinople, where Emperor Maurice was overthrown by Phocas in November 602. Phocas recalled Callinicus, who was probably the main architect of Roman operations, and replaced him with Smaragdus, who had earlier served as Exarch of Italy before he had ‘lost his mind’. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that it was after the murder of Maurice and the replacement of the Exarch Callinicus with Smaragdus that we find the two rebel duces Gaidwald of Tridentum and Gisulf of Friuli surrendering to Agilulf. Roman operations must have been in a mess when their architect was removed from the scene.

5.2.3.  THE EAST 592–602 The Restoration of Chosroes II and the Battle of Canzacon (March 592–Summer 593)169 Negotiations and Preparations in March 592–Spring 593 Probus (dux?) allowed Chosroes and his entourage inside Circesium at dawn.170 Probus knew the value of the fugitives and showed them the greatest possible courtesy. Then, on the second day, Chosroes asked Probus to allow him to send a written message to the Emperor asking for his help. Probus informed his superior Comentiolus in Hierapolis of what had happened and Comentiolus dispatched couriers to carry Chosroes’s message to the Emperor as quickly as possible. Maurice was delighted. Comentiolus received Chosroes with due honours at Hierapolis in late March as instructed by the Emperor. On the ninth day (presumably after his arrival at Hierapolis, which would therefore be early April) Chosroes dispatched a ‘satrap’, Miragdun,

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  269 to Martyropolis with orders for the defenders to hand over the city to the Romans. This, however, was only for show because he had already dispatched another envoy to Martyropolis with instructions to defend the place and not pay any attention to the public proclamations. The idea behind this was to retain the city as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. This, however, is unlikely to have been the principal reason for the refusal of the defenders to surrender because, as Michael Whitby (1988, 298–300) has pointed out, the defenders included Sittas and other Roman turncoats and also the Persians who had sided with the usurper Bahram Chobin. The most important move of Chosroes on the ninth day was that he dispatched Bistam to Armenia with orders to go to Azarbaijan (Media Atropatene) to secure it for him. With this in mind Bistam was instructed to contact the MVM per Armeniam John Mystacon who was at that time besieging the Persarmenian capital Dvin. According to Theophylact, when Chosroes faced a temporary delay in his hopes of returning to his kingdom, he sought to meet the Emperor in person. This is usually interpreted to mean that there was a further delay, but in my opinion the nine days mentioned above could already be seen in this light, so it was still early April when Chosroes attempted to travel to Constantinople. This, however, was prevented by Maurice because if Chosroes left the immediate vicinity of the border it would strengthen Bahram Chobin’s hand among the frontier armies. Then, because of this, at the beginning of the spring171 Chosroes sent ambassadors to the Emperor. Maurice received them on the third day. This means either that the envoys travelled really fast, like the famous courier Palladius in the reign of Theodosius II,172 or that the third day meant after their arrival at the court. Either way, Maurice received them in April 592. The envoys presented their case and promised Martyropolis, Dara, and roughly a half of Armenia and Iberia in return for Roman help. The Persians would keep Dvin, the capital of Persarmenia, and Tpʻkhis (Tbilisi/Tpilisi), the capital of Iberia. Their argument was that by making moderate promises they would avert trouble in the future. This was a wise argument, indeed something that the peacemakers of the First World War should have kept in mind. The usurper Bahram Chobin promised much more than this and it is clear that Chosroes’s negotiators knew about this when making their case. According to John of Nikiu (96.11–4), Maurice assembled his magistrates and officers (i.e. his imperial council) to discuss the proposal. Patriarch John stated that he could not trust the man who had murdered his own father. Sebeos (p.19) claims that this was the view of the Senate. In other words, the Senate agreed with Maurice’s council. Both sources, however, state that Maurice decided to accept Chosroes’s proposal. The terms were fair, the backing of the legitimate ruler made the cause just, and the ending of the war would enable Maurice to transfer soldiers to the Balkans. Maurice clearly trusted Chosroes to keep his promises better than the usurper Bahram because he was personally indebted to him. From Theophylact we learn that Maurice then took his decision to the Senate to obtain its seal of approval, which they naturally granted. After this, Maurice decreed officially that the Romans would support Chosroes against Bahram Chobin, and started to make diligent preparations for the campaign against the usurper. Maurice certainly remembered the previous occasion when he had attempted to instal a Persian Prince on the Persian throne in 580 and which had ended in failure. He wanted to make certain that the same mistakes would not be repeated this time.

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270  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Preparatory moves in summer 592–spring 593 Maurice dismissed Chosroes’s envoys Samen and Chosroperozes and released the highranking Persian captives held by the Romans as a sign of goodwill. When Comentiolus and Chosroes learnt of the decision, they travelled to Constantia (Tella) where they met an important envoy, Domitianus, Bishop of Melitene, the second most important man in the Empire and the main confidant and advisor of the Emperor. He was accompanied by Gregory, Bishop of Antioch, another of Maurice’s trusted men. They apparently urged Chosroes to secure Nisibis, because it was then that Chosroes dispatched envoys there. They also appear to have been there to instruct Chosroes in Christian doctrine, because he claimed to be interested in becoming Christian. His interest in Christianity and other gestures he made (see later) were obviously meant to convince the Romans that he was a man of his word. When Bahram Chobin learnt of the reception that Chosroes had received, he dispatched envoys of his own to Maurice with promises to hand over Nisibis and all the territory up to the Tigris. Maurice could not be bought. It was then that the leading satraps (Theophylact’s term) of Bahram’s realm formed a plot to get rid of Bahram. The eastern sources also claim that Maurice gave his daughter Maria in marriage to Chosroes II to secure the alliance. This is not mentioned by any of the ‘Roman sources’ and it would therefore be easy to consider it as a romantic fabrication, but it is not impossible. The reason for this is that the pro-Heraclian sources would certainly not have wanted to acknowledge the Persian claim to the Roman throne, just as all of them deny that Theodosius son of Maurice would have reached Chosroes II in 602. In fact, all claim that he was a pretender even though he was recognized by Narses. Many western historians consider the marriage between Maria and Chosroes unlikely because Roman emperors were not in the habit of using imperial marriages to form alliances with foreign peoples. But this fails to take into account that this practice was used by none other than Heraclius himself. He could easily have copied the idea from Maurice. In short, even if one cannot be absolutely certain, I would suggest that it is likelier that the eastern sources are correct when they suggest that the alliance was sealed by a marriage and because of this Chosroes II was instructed in Christian doctrine by none other than Maurice’s most trusted advisor Domitianus.173 According to Dinawari, Bahram Chobin had put his namesake Bahrām, son of Siyāwush, in charge of guarding the important prisoner Bindoes. This had far-reaching consequences because Bindoes convinced Bahrām son of Siyāwush to change sides. However, on the basis of Theophylact, Bahrām son of Siyāwush was not the only one to plot against Bahram Chobin. The leading ‘satraps’ (Theophylact’s term) formed a conspiracy to assassinate Bahram Chobin. The leaders of this cabal were Zamerdes, and Zoanambes the Persian. They selected as many men from the army as possible and released Bindoes from prison and appointed him as their leader. Bahram Chobin learnt of the impending attack in the second watch of the night and armed his guards to receive the attackers. The result was a vicious night battle, which ended in the victory of Bahram Chobin. Bindoes and his companions managed to flee to Azerbaijan, but the rest of the plotters were captured and trampled by elephants the following morning.174 When Bindoes arrived in Azerbaijan he converted some of the locals to Chosroes’s side while assembling those who already supported Chosroes. The latter group undoubtedly

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  271 included Mushel Mamikonean (Mūsīl the Armīnī) and his 20,000 men. Then on the tenth day of his arrival he sent a courier to John Mystacon to inform him of what had happened. John arrested the envoys and informed Maurice of this with a letter. Maurice ordered John to help the supporters of Chosroes by all possible means. Bistam had arrived the previous day so John now informed him of recent developments. Bistam in his turn informed Chosroes, with the result that Chosroes was able to convince the garrison of Nisibis to change sides. Its commander received a large bribe and Chosroes obtained control of almost all the territory up to the River Tigris, keeping this secret from Bahram. Meanwhile, John Mystacon abandoned the siege of Dvin, although he was on the point of capturing it thanks to the effective bombardment of the walls with stone throwers – the agreement had left it in Persian hands – and marched to Azerbaijan. Sebeos (16) claims that the Romans took possession of the land, killed all the men and women, took all the plunder and captives and booty, and then returned to their own land. This is partially incorrect, or at least misleading, because we know from Theophylact that John actually stayed in Azerbaijan with Bindoes until the Romans started their operation to instal Chosroes back on the throne. According to Theophylact, John gave Bindoes a large sum of money from the Emperor who then distributed it to his forces. This means that loyalists now controlled all the territory in Azerbaijan and posed a direct threat to the family domains of Bahram Chobin in Rayy. After these developments, the two cities that kept the Romans in place were Martyropolis and Dara. The former was still under siege, and when the public announcements of Chosroes had not brought about the desired results, Domitianus took charge of matters. As noted above, Michael Whitby (1988, 298–300) is certainly correct in stating that the real reason for the refusal of the garrison of Martyropolis to surrender did not lie in the duplicity of Chosroes but in the composition of its defenders. It included Sittas and the other Roman deserters, and the Persians who had previously sided with Bahram. Domitianus convinced the defenders of the futility of further resistance – it was only a matter of time until the Romans would take the city they had been besieging for three years. He also lubricated his words with bribes, which divided the defenders into two groups. He then dispatched a praepositus sacri cubiculi (name unknown), who had been sent by Maurice to act as Chosroes’s royal bodyguard, with instructions for the defenders, namely: the Persians should leave the city immediately and encamp near Nisibis. The city was thereby surrendered. The Romans then searched and found Sittas and the other plotters and demanded that Chosroes hand them over. Chosroes readily did this and Comentiolus had Sittas killed by torture and fire in front of the army to serve as a reminder of what happened to traitors. The other traitors received punishment as well, after which Domitianus held a festival for the salvation of Martyropolis. Both Higgins (47) and the Whitbys (Theophylact, 127) suggest that this happened on 16 February, the day of commemoration of the Persian martyrs in Martyropolis. This is quite possible, but other important events took place before this. The Battles of Lake Urmiah and the Plain of Canzacon in 593175 The following pages demonstrate that the Romans and Persians, or rather the Emperor Maurice, formulated a plan which consisted of the following elements: 1) securing Tur Abdin for the Romans and Chosroes; 2) defeating any force that approached this region;

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272  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 3) dispatching detachments of Romans and Ghassanid Arabs with Mebodes and 2,000 Persians to the Persian capital when Bahram’s main army was distracted elsewhere; 4) marching the Roman Eastern Army east while the Roman Armenian Army under John Mystacon with its allies marched from Azerbaijan, uniting somewhere near the Tigris and then marching against Bahram. The most important element in this plan was the securing of Tur Abdin, which was the result of the lessons learned by Maurice after the failure of his 580 campaign. It appears to have been Maurice’s precondition for his help. In the meantime Bahram Chobin had not remained idle but had made preparations of his own. The fact that John Mystacon and Bindoes were threatening his domains in Rayy meant that Bahram had to march there. To secure the capital while he was away, Bahram posted forces in strategic locations and appointed generals in charge of them. Miradurin was given a large force and posted at Anathon. He dispatched Zadesprates with a sizable force to Nisibis. Zadesprates in his turn dispatched couriers to Solchanes, commandant of Nisibis, in which he informed him of his imminent arrival. Zadesprates was unaware that Solchanes and other officers of Nisibis had been secretly bought by Chosroes, so Solchanes sent the messengers in chains to Chosroes. On 7 January 593 Chosroes in his turn went to Sergiopolis to pray to Saint Sergius to assist him. He promised to return to the shrine the gem-studded golden cross that its citizens had sent to his grandfather Chosroes I in 542 if the saint would deliver Zadesprates into his hands. Considering the location, the headquarters of the Ghassanid Arabs, it is clear that Chosroes was seeking to please its leaders in advance of the campaign against the Persian capital, because it is clear that the Ghassanid Arabs formed a part of this plan even if it is not specifically mentioned by Theophylact. Solchanes resorted to a stratagem. He dispatched one Rhosas/Hormisdas with a cavalry force against the approaching larger force with instructions to use trickery. Rhosas found Zadesprates in a fort near a village in the district of Charcha. Rhosas approached the fort in the night when Zadesprates was asleep. He gained entrance with the claim that he brought reinforcements from Bahram Chobin. The wine-soaked Zadesprates was woken from his sleep, Rhosas and his men got in, and once inside they killed everyone. The head of Zadesprates was taken to Chosroes in Constantia. At about the same time, the soldiers posted in the fort of Anathon rebelled and sent the head of their commander to Chosroes, which he received on 9 January. According to Theophylact (5.2.5–6), it was then, on 10 January, that Chosroes publicly converted to Christianity and dispatched envoys to Maurice who informed the Emperor that circumstances had changed and it was now the time for the Emperor to assist him. To me this suggests that Maurice had made a precondition for his full-scale military assistance, which was that Chosroes would have to prove that he had enough support for his cause among the Persians, and that it would be possible to secure Tur Abdin before the Roman army then invaded Persian territory. Maurice agreed that now the time was ripe for action, and in addition to military assistance he dispatched a massive sum of money to Chosroes. Chosroes gave a written receipt for the loan and then distributed the money to his men. The public conversion of Chosroes was believed by the Romans, with the result that Gregory, Bishop of Antioch, returned to his see. Soon after this, Chosroes sent Sarames to Maurice with instructions to demand the replacement of Comentiolus, because he had insulted Chosroes and delayed the recruitment of allies. Maurice agreed to this and replaced Comentiolus

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  273 with Comentiolus’s hypaspistês Narses (then an officer of the bodyguards, the former hypostrategos of Maurice). In the beginning of spring 593, the preparations were finished and Narses and Domitianus led the Roman army to the fort of Mardes/Mardis, ‘three parasangs’ from Dara/Daras. It was then that the garrison of Nisibis publicly proclaimed Chosroes as shahanshah, after which Narses led the army in front of Dara. Chosroes then entered the city, but made the mistake of entering its shrine, which enraged the inhabitants of the city – Chosroes’s public conversion was apparently not believed. Furthermore, Chosroes had clearly entered the city without allowing the Romans inside. Domitianus demanded that Chosroes leave and threatened to take the army back to Constantia. Chosroes obeyed. On the sixth day after his arrival at Dara, Chosroes received from Maurice royal regalia to support his claim to the Persian throne and a royal escort consisting of Maurice’s own guardsmen so that Chosroes would possess a royal retinue. Chosroes did not trust the Persians so he needed Roman bodyguards to ensure his safety. When the Persians saw the extent to which the Romans were backing Chosroes, many deserted from Bahram’s side, the number increasing daily. It was only then that Chosroes officially handed over Dara to the Romans and sent the satrap Dolabzas with the keys of the city to the Emperor. In preparation for the launching of the main campaign, Chosroes placed his wives and children in the city of Singara because it was strongly fortified, and difficult to capture because it was in the middle of a waterless terrain. Then he ordered Mebodes to march with 2,000 men via Singara to the royal cities of Babylonia. Theophylact’s account claims that it was indeed Chosroes who took the initiative in these matters and who gave the orders, but the details (namely the presence of Romans in Mebodes’s army and prayers to St Sergius) prove that these actions were actually undertaken in full cooperation with the Romans and in my opinion it is clear that the man behind all of these operations involving Roman forces was actually none other than Maurice himself. These forces were dispatched south in the spring. According to Theophylact, when Bahram learnt that Chosroes was advancing with Roman forces, he gathered his own men and started his own operations. This is misleading because the following account shows that at the beginning of the campaign season Bahram was not near the advancing forces of Narses but in all probability advancing against the Roman forces in Azerbaijan and that Bahram turned against Narses only after he learnt that Narses was advancing. Had Bahram advanced from Ctesiphon towards Narses, he would have met Mebodes and his men en route, and this did not happen. According to Theophylact, it was already the beginning of the summer when the allied force left Dara and marched to Ammodius. It was there that Domitianus mounted a mound and encouraged the troops with an uplifting speech. This speech is important for its core message. Domitianus promised that death in combat would bring eternal life to the soldiers. Another of its key points was that Bahram would lose because his cause was not just because he did not belong to the royal family. After this Domitianus confirmed Narses as strategos and returned to Roman territory. The army encamped near the River Mygdon/Mygdonius (which ran past Nisibis) while Sarames was sent as a vanguard to secure provisions. The army reached Nisibis on the third day of marching and then halted to await the arrival of the Armenian Army from Azerbaijan. This means that the

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  275 idea was to unite the armies before the campaign and that the Armenian contingent was late arriving. Then Chosroes took the lead. He chose 1,000 men from his guards with orders to cross the Tigris and reconnoitre the opposite side. Bahram had had similar thoughts and had dispatched Bryzakios with a sizable force to see what the Romans were up to. The forces of Chosroes surprised these men during the first watch of the night near the River Greater Zab, and captured their commander. When the news was brought to Chosroes, he was able to convince the Romans to cross the Tigris because Bahram was nowhere near. The Romans encamped at Dinabadon and then on the following day crossed the River Greater Zab. If accurate, this could have been achieved only with a forced march and a really speedy crossing, but it is possible that Michael Whitby (1988, 302) is correct in his suggestion that Theophylact has condensed the account. In the meantime Mebodes had advanced to Babylonia unopposed. He dispatched an envoy to the overseer of the treasury with orders to prepare a proper reception for his army. The overseer showed the letter to his superior, the comptroller of the royal treasures, who had been left in charge of the capital.176 His reaction was to collect all his soldiers and leave Seleucia in the middle of the night for the safety of Ctesiphon. When Mebodes learnt that the soldiers had fled from Seleucia, he approached it in the middle of the night and ordered the Roman soldiers to shout their war cry and kill anyone they encountered. This frightened the inhabitants and they surrendered. The panic spread to Ctesiphon with the result that the comptroller fled from Ctesiphon to Antioch of Chosroes while the inhabitants of Ctesiphon surrendered the city and its royal treasury to Mebodes and his Roman army.177 Then Mebodes dispatched a message to Persian Antioch written in Roman script. As noted earlier, the inhabitants of this city consisted of Antiochians captured by Chosroes I. Mebodes promised them freedom if they would hand over the fugitive supporters of Bahram. This was easily achieved and the Roman prisoners got their freedom. On the sixth day after his arrival Mebodes killed many of the Jews who had supported Bahram because it had been with the support of their wealth that Bahram had usurped power. These Jewish traders and bankers controlled the Red Sea trade and had grown immensely rich as a result. The main army under Narses and Chosroes continued their march from the Zab to Alexandriana, the location of which is uncertain but it probably means Arbela as Micheal Whitby (1988, 302) suggests. From there they marched to Chnaithas. On the following morning Narses dispatched Comentiolus, tagmatarches of the right wing, with 1,000 cavalry to secure the crossing of the Lesser Zab. The scouts Bahram had dispatched learnt of this, and he sought to gain control of the bridge before the Romans. On the following day, the Roman scouts captured one of Bahram’s scouts and learnt of this. So the Romans decided to use another crossing. Narses dispatched Rufinus, son of Timostratus, to secure another crossing for the Romans in advance. On the following day the main army followed, crossed the river, and invaded the territory known as Nanisenes (close to Rowandus). The Romans had therefore turned north. They continued their march across the Zagros probably by using the Keli Shin Pass and from there to the village of Siraganon near Lake Urmiah, which enabled them to join forces with the Armenian contingent.178 Bahram learnt of this at midday. He had by then reached the vicinity of Lake Urmiah, where he learned of the approach of the Roman Army of Armenia from the other

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276  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 direction. The Roman scouts learnt of this, so John Mystacon and Bindoes arrayed their army with a river separating them from Bahram. This river is likely to be the Tatavi, as the Whitbys suggest. On the following day, John and Bindoes turned south in an effort to bypass Bahram.179 John and Bindoes were outnumbered by Bahram’s army, which consisted of 40,000 troops. This figure probably does not include his infantry which was always left at the camp with the servants. It is therefore not surprising that John and Bindoes attempted to avoid contact. According to Sebeos (p.20, p.22) the Armenian contingent (he fails to specify that it was actually the Roman army of Armenia) consisted of 15,000 horsemen and the army of Bindoes of 8,000 Persians for a total of 23,000 horsemen. According to Theophylact, the combined forces of Narses, John and Chosroes consisted of 60,000 soldiers, which would leave 37,000 soldiers for the main army. I would therefore suggest that Narses brought with him approximately 37,000 horsemen plus the squires, infantry, servants and others that were needed to support them, for a total of 50,000 men180 and that John Mystacon brought with him approximately 23,000 horsemen plus squires etc, so the combined host probably consisted of 100,000 men of whom 60,000 were cavalry used for actual combat duties.181 Narses appears to have learnt of the presence of John’s army three days later, so he dispatched messengers to John with orders not to engage the Persians before the armies were united. Chosroes also received messengers from Mebodes, who informed him of the capture of the capitals with the royal treasury. On the fifth day, three encampments later (this means Narses’s camps), the two Roman armies were united so that it was now preferable to seek a decisive battle with the outnumbered enemy. The time scale, the armies meeting on the fifth day, and the presence of Bahram’s army between the two Roman armies, would make it more likely that John actually withdrew along Lake Urmiah north-east and then around the lake so the Romans would have joined each other somewhere on the western side of the lake. If one interprets the events in this manner, then Theophylact’s statement (5.8.8) that John turned away towards the south could be taken to mean that he first turned away and then in the final phase of his march around Lake Urmiah he marched south to unite with Narses. Cavalry could be marched about 80 kilometres a day so the distance of about 350 km by going around the lake would fit this time-scale precisely. In my opinion, this is the likeliest reconstruction, but in the reconstruction presented in the map on page 277 I have followed Theophylact literally, so the extra time for uniting the armies would have resulted from manoeuvring the Roman armies so that Bahram was unable to prevent them from uniting their forces. Bahram knew that he was in trouble and attempted to surprise the Romans with a night attack, but the difficult terrain foiled his plans. At sunrise his army was quite visible. Since Bahram’s men were eager to fight, they advanced with much shouting and clamour, but the Romans kept absolute silence. However, according to Theophylact, Bindoes and Sarames were unable to calm their men. Narses reinstated discipline among the allied Persians and the army was deployed in three divisions. According to Theophylact, Narses and Chosroes commanded the centre, Sarames and Bindoes commanded the right wing, and John commanded the left. This description is problematic because the Strategikon instructs the commander to place the extra men outside the normal meros-structure, which would mean that the

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  277 ca. extra 10,000 Persians would have been placed outside the proper structure. A second problem is that this would have given Bindoes and Sarames control over the Roman right wing with its support troops, which after all had such an important figure as Comentiolus as their tagmatarchês (Theophylact 5.8.1). It is therefore possible that Theophylact has made a mistake here, possibly an intentional one, because his account has a tendency of denigrating the achievements of Comentiolus. It is therefore possible that the Roman army was actually divided into the left, centre and right, outside which were the Persians. The ability of the allied Persians to act on their own and Theophylact’s references to the Romans coming to their assistance suggests this. Regardless of these reservations, in the following discussion I have given my benefit of doubt to Theophylact and assumed that he has given us the correct battle formation, so the right wing front consisted of the Persians. In other words, I am assuming that Comentiolus was indeed only a tagmatarchês of the right wing reserves, which actually saved the day by defeating Bahram’s left wing. Theophylact hid this fact from his readers.

Bahram’s forces were also arrayed in three parts, but instead of engaging, he withdrew his army to the mountain slopes in fear of the superior Roman numbers and cavalry lancers. The diagrams show a simplied version of his formation. In reality, his centre would have consisted of three divisions each with three units. Once on the high ground, Bahram probably dismounted part of his force. This resulted in the defection of 500 of his men. The Romans decided to hold their positions because the enemy had the advantage of the terrain on their side, but the impetuous Chosroes ordered an attack of the right wing. Bindoes and Sarames climbed the mountain and were soundly beaten by Bahram’s men. The Romans saved the day by deploying themselves against the pursuers. These would have consisted of the right wing reserves serving under Comentiolus.182 See the above diagrams. After this, Bahram withdrew and marched through difficult terrain to avoid the devastating effects of the Roman cavalry lancers. However, the Roman army caught up with his army while it was marching through open terrain (plain of Canzacon/Canzak) near the River Blarathos. According to Sebeos (pp. 20–2), the night before the battle Bahram tried to bribe Mushel Mamikonean with the promise of restoring the Armenian kingdom and enlarging its borders, which the latter answered with the promise of crushing him the following morning.

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278  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 The Romans deployed their men in a triple formation, which in this case means the standard formation. The presence of the reserves is certain and it is also clear that Comentiolus was once again in charge of the right wing reserves behind the Persians. Bahram also deployed his army in triple formation. His army consisted of cavalry, infantry and elephants. Bahram himself assumed the command of the centre while the wings were under allied commanders. The armoured war elephants were posted in front of the allied cavalry wings and were used as a defensive bulwark against the cavalry lancers which Bahram had learnt to respect. I have made the assumption that the allied cavalry posted in the wings were deployed as a single line because Bahram had fewer men. This also seems to have been the usual deployment pattern when the Persians used elephants in front of their cavalry. The tactic was that the war elephants first created openings which were then exploited by the Persian cavalry deployed as rhomboids. In this case, however, the units were probably not deployed as rhomboids but in whatever manner the allies deployed their cavalry units. The infantry appears to have been behind to protect the camp, or alternatively as the first line of the centre just as Bahram Chobin had used them against the Turks in 588. I have here made the assumption that the infantry were posted in front of the camp.183 When the cavalry lines advanced into contact, Bahram moved to the left wing with some of his reserves and crushed the right wing of the Roman army, which in this case probably means the Persians under Bindoes and Sarames. The Persian attack was probably conducted by the wings while the centre was left behind. Bahram again defeated his Persian opponents while the Romans under Comentiolus saved them again. Bahram exploited the situation by attacking the now exposed Roman centre and charged with the elephants against Narses. According to Theophylact, Narses was unconcerned about the elephants and charged the middle of the Persian array. The attack was probably directed simultaneously against the Persian centre and the outflanking Persians. Since this charge completely disrupted the cohesion of the Persian array, it is probable that the elephants were turned against their owners, as had so often happened in the past to those who had used these beasts, and that the Persian centre collapsed. Narses with his men killed both horsemen and infantry during the pursuit. The Roman left wing under John had been at least equally successful. According to Sebeos, the mounted Armenian nobility (azatagund) turned the elephants back against their owners and then attacked the Persian encampment.184 The success of John Mystacon may have enabled Narses’s simultaneous attack against Bahram and the Persian centre. During the flight, 6,000 Persians sought shelter from a hillock but were taken prisoners, and as night was falling the Romans defeated the remaining elephants by encircling and capturing them. The Romans and Armenians found and looted the royal treasure from Bahram’s camp, loaded it onto camels and mules, and carried it away. The Persians of Chosroes, however, were able to lay their hands on some of this loot with the result that it was taken to the treasury of Chosroes.185 The diagrams opposite show the main features of the battle. The Romans retreated inside the fortified camp for the night and on the following day they looted the corpses lying in the field. Narses chose 10,000 horsemen for the pursuit of the enemy and put them under Marinus, the commander of Chalcis. The allied pursuers he placed under Bistam; they were ordered to pursue Bahram. Chosroes ordered the captured Persian horsemen and riders of elephants stripped, and then had elephants trample them into the ground.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  279

It is possible that the Roman sources have hidden the personal heroism of Chosroes before and during the battle. The account is preserved in garbled form by Ferdowsi (c.1932ff. 8.288ff., Davis ed. p.785ff.) and al-Tabari (i.1000). The Romans were certainly capable of blackening the reputation of Chosroes II Parwez by any means possible because he inflicted so many humiliating defeats on them in the course of the years 603–626.

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280  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 According to both, Chosroes made a personal commander’s reconnaissance of the enemy’s positions, during which he was almost captured and killed by the enemy. Both also claim that when the Persians advanced against each other Chosroes advanced in front of his own men, as did Bahram. According to Ferdowsi, Bahram shot one arrow at Chosroes which stuck in his brocade, after which Chosroes reached Bahram and thrust him with his lance, which broke on impact because Bahram wore quality armour. Then Chosroes hit Bahram on the helmet with a sword. It broke and a portion of it remained lodged in Bahram’s helmet. After this, their soldiers arrived and started fighting against each other until the two sides separated and returned to their camps – the Persian sources in their turn are in the habit of hiding setbacks and this is why they fail to state what happened to Chosroes’s wing and how it was saved by the Romans. If such an incident took place – and I would not preclude this because such heroic encounters between commanders were typical among the Persians, indeed a similar encounter took place between Heraclius and Razates in about 627 (see MHLR Vol.8) – it is likelier that it took place during the second battle rather than during the first because according to Ferdowsi’s account the Roman army was on a hill before it descended onto the plain where the battle was fought – this would fit better the description of the terrain close to Canzak. The Romans marched to Canjak/Canzacon three days later to avoid the stench of the corpses, and then, according to Theophylact, Chosroes held victory celebrations for the Romans. John of Nikiu (96.15–9) claims that during the celebrations Chosroes offered the Romans poisoned food and fodder, but the plot was disclosed by some of the Chosroes’s magi. Narses then ordered all food and fodder provided by the Persians to be fed either to dogs (note the presence of war-dogs) or cattle as a precaution. When they then died, Narses withdrew the Roman army in anger. This possibly happened, because such a stratagem is included in the Strategikon, but it is strange that Theophylact does not mention it because he is overtly hostile to Chosroes. The two armies were in separate encampments a day’s distance apart. According to Sebeos (24–9), Chosroes accused Mushel Mamikonean of treachery. Some of his followers claimed that Mushel had captured Bahram but then allowed him to flee. I would suggest that this is possible. If so, it would have been a Romano-Armenian ploy, the purpose of which would have been to incite a Persian civil war after Chosroes had regained the throne. This is by no means as far fetched as it may sound. At first Chosroes attempted to lure Mushel into his tent without his followers, but this failed because Mushel suspected treachery and, as noted above, he may have had good reasons to be wary. He selected 2,000 men, then chose 50 of them to act as his bodyguards. Then when he entered his tent he chose only seven. When Mushel left he captured one of Chosroes’s guards who confessed the king’s plans. Mushel then took his case before John Mystacon. The story of the guard was confirmed by the commander of Chosroes’s guard, who after all was Roman just like the other guard. Mushel therefore demanded that Chosroes should be killed lest he cause trouble in the future. According to Sebeos, the Romans then took a part of the booty that belonged to Chosroes and sent it to Maurice together with the accusation levelled against Chosroes. The convoy was given a guard of 400 men under Mushel Mamikonean himself. When Chosroes learnt of this, he sent men to capture the loot and kill Mushel secretly, but the Romans learnt of this straight away and killed all of them. Maurice retained Mushel and his men in the capital for use against the invaders in the Balkans.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  281 According to Theophylact, Marinus and Bistam arrived on the tenth day and informed them that Bahram had managed to flee. Bahram had clearly lost the war. His intention was to seek a place of refuge among the Turks. Dinawari (p.98) has a different account of the pursuit. He claims that Chosroes sent 10,000 horsemen in pursuit under Sābūr son of Abarkān, who caught up with Bahram, but only to be defeated by Bahram, who continued his flight. It is possible that this was a separate group, or that only the Persians managed to catch up with the fugitive. After this Bahram’s route was blocked by the army of Karins in Gurgan, but they were defeated by Bahram, so he was able to reach the Turkish Khaganate. He was given a place of refuge.186 According to Theophylact, after it had become apparent that Bahram was fleeing towards the Turks, Chosroes felt that he no longer needed the Romans, so he sent them back home and then marched to Babylonia. According to Michael the Syrian, Chosroes gave each Roman soldier 400 drachmas in addition to the booty that they had gathered. Theophylact fails to mention any of this because of his hostility towards Chosroes II Parwez. On the basis of Sebeos, it is clear that the relationship between the Romans and Persians was already tense because of the Mushel incident, and if we are to believe John of Nikiu, Chosroes even attempted to poison the Romans. Troubles with the Jews In 593 (the 11th year of Maurice) there was an incident in Antioch that resulted in the expulsion of the Jews from the city. A Jew had urinated on an image of the Virgin Mary. When Maurice learnt of it, he ordered all Jews to be thrown out of the city.187 It is unfortunate that we do not know if there were other similar disturbances that involved Christians and Jews and which preoccupied the local authorities and military forces under them, but one may assume that there were because the relationship between the Jews and Christians had been tense ever since Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, as we have already seen, the Jewish merchants and bankers of Persia had supported Bahram Chobin while Maurice had supported their enemy Chosroes. It is quite probable that the Jewish community in general disliked both Maurice and Chosroes. This incident took place in the same year as Maurice and Chosroes were fighting against Bahram and his Jewish helpers, and in fact it is possible that it took place while the fighting was still going on. Agapius fails to specify the exact date.

The immediate results of the Persian war188 Chosroes fulfils his promises in 593 When Chosroes reached the capital, he started to fulfil his promises. However, he clearly knew this was dangerous to him, because he dispatched a message to Maurice in which he asked him to send 1,000 Romans to act as bodyguards for him. According to Theophylact (5.13.1), Maurice did so. They must have consisted of volunteers. Chosroes sent the gold gem-studded cross back to Sergiopolis with a gracious message, and fulfilled his promises concerning the borders. According to Michael the Syrian and other eastern sources, he also sent Maurice gifts, gold, silver and precious stones, which I take to mean the repayment of the forty talents of gold (Michael’s figure) that Maurice had given to

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282  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chosroes to cover his expenses. On the Roman side of the border, the peace with Persia enabled Maurice to transfer troops from the East for a campaign in Thrace in 594. As noted by James Howard-Johnston (2021, 19), the most important part of the secession of the areas in Armenia to the Romans was that it gave the Romans full control of all three major passes leading across the Armenian Taurus mountains. This enabled the Romans to transfer forces from Armenia to the Mesopotamia theatre and vice versa far faster than the Persians could. He is also correct to point out the loss of prestige that resulted from these concessions. Chosroes’s favourite wife Sirin was a Christian In addition to this, Chosroes demonstrated his friendliness towards Rome by allowing the Persians to convert to Christianity and by allowing them to build churches. Chosroes needed peace with Rome when he was facing troubles in Persia. In the following year, 594, Chosroes even married a Christian woman from Khuzistan, called Shirin/Sirin. And this seems to have been only the first of his Christian wives, if Maurice’s daughter Maria had not been the first – Sebeos claims he had several. It should be kept in mind that the later eastern sources claim that Maurice married his daughter Maria to Chosroes before the campaign against Bahram Chobin started and that it was from this marriage that his successor and eldest son Cavades/Siroes was born.189 There is no concrete evidence for this in the close-to-period western sources, but as noted one should not automatically place it in the category of later romantic embellishments. The reason for this is that the pro-Heraclian sources had every reason to forget this inconvenient detail, just as they conveniently forgot that Theodosius son of Maurice managed to reach Chosroes in 602 (see MHLR Vol.8). Shirin, however, became Chosroes’s favourite and principal wife, so Shirin was able to act as a protector of Christians throughout the realm. Shirin was Chosroes’s first love from his youth, but he had to forget her until he gained the throne while he married Maria for political reasons. Signs of Shirin’s influence over her husband were the church and monastery built near the royal palace and the conversion of masses of Persians into the Christian faith. According to Sebeos, she was even able to prevent the transfer of the bones of the Prophet Daniel when Maurice had requested it and Chosroes had agreed to it. Maurice’s Armenian policies and the Vahewuni incident in autumn 594/spring 595 According to Sebeos, immediately after having received the territories promised, Maurice conceived a plan for Armenia. It consisted of two elements: 1) the transfer of Armenian princes and their troops to Thrace to weaken the ability of the Armenians to resist the Romans while also providing soldiers for use against the Slavs and Avars; 2) the conversion of Armenia to the Chalcedonian doctrine. With this in mind Maurice sent a letter to Chosroes II Parwez, possibly in 593 but at the latest in the spring of 594. Maurice suggested the Romans transfer Armenian princes to Thrace while Chosroes transferred Armenian princes from his sector to the east. Chosroes agreed. This agreement appears to have also contained a clause in which Chosroes agreed not to receive Armenian princes as refugees in his sector even when they had feudal lands there.190 Maurice began the project in summer 594 by ordering the Armenian princes to assemble their feudal forces for transferral to Thrace. When the Armenian nobles then

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  283 learnt of this order, their reaction was to flee to Persian-held territory. Those Armenian princes who possessed lands in the Persian sector of Armenia formed the bulk of these fugitives. This last detail suggests that Maurice’s letter to Chosroes had included a request to gather Armenian princes and nobles from the Persian sector for use in Thrace. The idea was to prevent the possibility of flight from the Roman sector to the Persian sector. This and the reaction of the Armenian princes of the Roman sector also indicate that the order was unprecedented in three ways. Firstly, Maurice had assumed royal powers over all of the Armenian lords, including princes whose lands lay in the Persian sector. Secondly, the Armenians of the Roman sector expected to serve in the East. Thirdly, Maurice seems to have planned to send most of the Armenian feudal forces to the west in an effort to squash any possible hopes of Armenian independence while increasing the numbers of elite cavalry in Thrace. Chosroes’s reaction, however, was not exactly what he had promised to Maurice. He received the fugitives with open arms and bribed them with gifts to secure their loyalty for himself. Maurice was a by-the-book man who expected that the soldiers and feudal forces would follow his orders without any need for additional bribes, but Chosroes understood the power of a well placed bribe. He planned to follow the same policy towards the Armenian princes of his own sector. He dispatched a hamarakar (auditor/ logothete) of Vaspurakan with a hefty treasury to convince the Armenian princes of his own sector to remain loyal to him. When the princes Samuēl Vahewuni, Atat Khorkhoruni, Mamak Mamikonean, Stepʻanos Siwni, Tʻēodoros Trpatuni and Kotit lord of the Amatunikʻ, went to meet the hamarakar with 2,000 cavalry on the borders of Atrpatakan (Azerbaijan, Media Atropatene), they captured the treasure but left the hamarakar unharmed. They planned to use this money to buy the Huns to their side in an effort to gain indepence for Armenia with their help. However, when the princes reached Nakhchawan (on the Araxes at the border of Persia and Armenia), they started to quarrel amongst themselves because they did not trust each other. So the princes divided the spoils and encamped at a wetland called Chahuk (a district in Siwnik). In the meantime, the hamarakar had returned to the court with the result that Chosroes had a change of heart. Maurice had been right after all. Consequently, he asked Maurice to dispatch a Roman army to help him against the Armenians while he sent the hamarakar of Vaspurakan back to Armenia. Maurice ordered Heraclius, the MVM per Armeniam, to assist the Persians – this means that Heraclius had been given back his old command. Heraclius united his forces with Chosroes’s army at Nakhchawan, after which he sent messages to the rebel princes in which he pleaded with them to submit to the authority of Chosroes their king because he wanted to avoid the shedding of the blood of fellow Christians. The hamarakar promised the rebel princes they would be forgiven and that they could keep the treasure they already possessed. This divided the rebels into two groups. Mamikonean, Stepʻanos Siwni, Kotit lord of the Amatunikʻ, and others with them swore loyalty to Chosroes. Samuēl Vahewuni, Tʻēodoros Trpatuni and Atat Khorkhoruni chose to flee. They passed through the village of Sawdk (inland from the south-east corner of Lake Sevan), reached the land of the Aluank (Albania), and attempted to reach the Huns (on the basis of Michael the Syrian these would be the proto-Khazars). Having crossed the river Kur, they encamped. The Roman army reached them and encamped opposite them. Since the rebels had not

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284  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 yet obtained help from the Huns, they submitted to the Romans. In other words, now the Romans did the same as the Persians – they gave a place of refuge for rebel Armenian princes from the Persian sector. The hamarakar assembled the other nobles, the ones who had submitted to Chosroes, formed them into gunds (units, divisions, contingents), and urged them to be in readiness to follow their feudal duty when called to do so. When Samuēl Vahewuni, Tʻēodoros Trpatuni and Atat Khorkhoruni then reached the Roman sector, only the last remained true to his word and was summoned to the Imperial Palace at Constantinople where he was received with honours and gifts and then sent to Thrace (in 595). Samuēl Vahewuni, however, rebelled. He obtained support from Sargis, Varaz Nersēh, Nērses, Vstam, and Tʻēodoros Trpatuni. Their plan was to kill the Roman curator when he was staying in the spa near Karin (Theodosiopolis). The plan, however, was exposed, and the curator was able to flee inside the city. The rebels attacked the spa but found it empty. After this they fled to Korduk with the intention of holding out in a fortress there. The Roman army under Heraclius and Hamazasp Mamikonean pursued them (the Roman army was on the spot already because Theodosiopolis was its headquarters). The rebels crossed the river Jerm (the Bohtan-su, a tributary of the Tigris) by the bridge of Daniel, which they then destroyed. They planned to defend themselves along the bank of the defile against their pursuers. The Romans stopped opposite them and were about to abandon the chase when they encountered a local priest. They forced him to show them a place where they could cross the defile. He led them to a ford downstream, so the Roman army were able to cross and the rebels fled to the fortress. The Romans divided their force into three groups. One group was posted to guard the fortress from the rear, the second protected the bridgehead and entrance to the valley, and the third attacked the fortress. The Romans captured the fort and butchered most of the rebels. Nērses, Vstam and Samuēl were killed. Varaz Nersēh, Nērses, and some others were captured and taken to Theodosiopolis where they were decapitated as a warning to others. Tʻēodoros Trpatuni was the only one of the leaders who managed to escape. However, when he reached the court of Chosroes, Chosroes handed him over to the Romans, and the Romans tortured him to death very slowly. This was the end of the Armenian revolt.

The Roman eastern frontier and Persia in 593–602191 Chosroes reorganizes his realm in 593–5 When Chosroes reached Ctesiphon in 593 he made good his promises to the Romans. He also started to reorganize his realm, appointing trusted men to important posts. He rewarded his uncles first. Bindoes was put in charge of the diwans and treasuries and Bistam was appointed governor of Hurāsān (Khurasan/Khorasan), Qūmis, Gurgān, and Tabristān, in other words, the border region facing ‘Central Asian Turkey’, the area to which Bahram had fled. He was therefore the Spahbed of the East, in other words one of the four spahbeds/viceroys of the realm. Chosroes obviously nominated three other marzbans/viceroys for the remaining three regions of the realm. Bahram Chobin killed in December 594 The first problem Chosroes needed to deal with was Bahram. En route to the safety of the Turkish realm, Bahram had defeated Qārin (Karin Family), Jabalī Nihāwandī, the

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  285 Viceroy of Khurasan and Gurgan, and he was now protected by the Turks. This means that the fugitive Bahram had enough men of his own to defeat the principal Persian force facing the Turks. If he could add the Turks to his strength Chosroes would be in trouble. Chosroes urgently needed a solution to this problem. He dispatched a man called Hurmazd Jurābzīn/Hurmuz Jarabzin (Dinawari, Tabari, Thaalibi) or Bahram Jarabzin (Yaqubi) to the Turkish Khagan – Zalabzan of Roman sources. It is probable that Dinawari is correct, so the ambassador was none other than Hurmuz Jarabzin, the marzban who had previously acted as envoy and agent for Hormizd and who had managed to lure the previous Turkish Khagan to the place where Bahram Chobin had defeated and killed him. It was typical for the Persians and Romans to use the same envoys/ diplomats repeatedly because they were familiar with the customs of the opposing side and had formed personal relationships with them. The envoy’s task was to renew the peace treaty between Persia and ‘Turkey’ and if possible to convince the Khagan to kill Bahram. We have two versions of what happened next. According to Sebeos, the Persian envoy was successful and Bahram was killed; while according to Dinawari, Yaqubi and Tabari Hurmuz’s words only angered the Khagan with the result that Hurmuz resorted to another trick. He convinced Khatun, the dim-witted wife of the Khagan, to kill Bahram, claiming that he posed a threat to her, her husband and children. She sent an assassin armed with a dagger who accomplished the deed. Before his death, Bahram nominated his brother Mardān-Sīna as his successor. He died on the first day of the Persian New Year, the Nawruz, which presumably means the first day after the spring equinox in 594 – in other words the day after 19/21 March because the spring equinox varies between those dates. After this the followers of Bahram Chobin considered it too dangerous to remain in Turkish territory, and with Bahram’s sister Kurdīya leading the way in Bahram’s armour they fled to Khorasan and from there to Gurgan following the Tabaristan road all the way to Daylam/Deylam. The locals welcomed them and asked them to stay there. The killing of Bindoes and revolt of Bistam in 595 Now Chosroes believed his position was secure. According to both Sebeos and Dinawari, Chosroes decided that it was the right time to exact vengeance on his uncles Bindoes and Bistam for the murder of his father. This obviously conceals the real reason, which was that these two men were too powerful and Chosroes wanted to remove them because they posed a potential threat to him. But as we shall see, there is yet another possible reason. Dinawari claims that the murder of Bindoes resulted from the quarrel between Bindoes and Chosroes. When Chosroes had ordered Bindoes to send 400,000 dirhams to a polo player, Bindoes had refused to do so because it was a waste of money. In response Chosroes had Bindoes’s hands and feet cut off after which the people stoned him to death. Then Chosroes invited Bistam to his presence with the intention of killing him, but Bistam learnt what had happened to his brother and was able to flee to Daylam where he was received by the former supporters of Bahram Chobin. Dinawari’s account receives credence from the fact that it is strange that Chosroes did not seek to kill both Bindoes and Bistam at the same time – hence it is quite possible that there was a public quarrel. However, anon. Guidi/Khuzistan Chronicle (p.16) preserves a different account. According to this text, Bindoes was trying to flee to his brother Bistam but was caught.

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286  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 His right hand and foot were cut off and then he was taken to Bē Lāpāt (Gondishapur) and crucified. This would mean that Bindoes was fleeing either because he had learnt of Chosroes’s intentions or he was himself planning to launch a revolt. In either case, this version is as plausible as Dinawari’s. My own suggestion is that the flight and killing of Bindoes had resulted from Bindoes’s attempt to assassinate Chosroes. This explains why Bistam was not killed at the same time and why Chosroes needed Roman bodyguards. According to Dinawari, the murder of Bindoes took place in the spring, which probably means spring 595 rather than 594 because the murder of Bahram Chobin had taken place after the 19/21 March in 594 and the news would have taken time to reach the Persian court. Chosroes would not have killed Bindoes before he knew that Bahram Chobin was dead. Furthermore, there had to be a period of time between the death of Bahram and the revolt of Bistam during which Chosroes II did not require the services of the Armenian princes. Had Chosroes needed their services in 594, he would have assembled Armenian princes for a campaign in 594. As we have seen, in 594 he only demanded that they should be ready to fulfil their obligations if needed. I would suggest it is also probable that Smbat Bagratuni (the lion killer) was then dispatched by Maurice to serve as bodyguard for Chosroes. Smbat Bagratuni had served previously as tribune in Africa and was soon to become a trusted man of Chosroes. The best place to earn such trust would have been in the bodyguards. When Bistam reached Daylam (Gelum and Delum), the leader of Bahram Chobin’s men Mardān-Sīna convinced Bistam to marry Bahram’s sister Kurdīya and claim himself as shahanshah because he belonged to the Arsacid family and had better rights to the throne than Chosroes because he, Bistam, was a descendant of Dareios III while Chosroes was descendant only of the shepherd Sāsan. So this was the propaganda that Bistam then spread to undermine Chosroes’s position. According to Dinawari, many of the Parthian magnates supported Bistam. He gathered support not only from the Daylam and the remnants of Bahram’s army but also from Gilan, Babr (Ardabīl), Taylasān (Taleshan) and from Bistam’s own house from the region of Iraq. He managed to assemble an army of 100,000 men, which he led to Rayy. He then dispatched raiding columns in all directions. There were three major raids. One reached Hulwan on the eastern side of the River Diyala, another reached Saymara (Luristan), and the last marched to Masabadhan (Elymais). This was an invasion on a wide front. Bistam minted coins with the Rayy mark and legend Pērōz Vistān for seven years, so his revolt lasted until 601/2.192 What happened next is discussed by Sebeos and Dinawari. It has resulted in two very different reconstructions by A. Shapur Shahbazi and by Howard-Johnston and Greenwood. The former spreads the account of Dinawari to cover the entire length of Bistam’s usurpation, while the latter two unite the accounts of Sebeos and Dinawari while giving precedence to that of Sebeos. I agree with the latter approach, but I suggest that there were two major battles, one at Hamadan (Dinawari) and another at Rayy (Sebeos), not just one at Rayy as suggested by Howard-Johnston and Greenwood, and that both battles took place in 595. The reason for this suggestion is that Chosroes Parwez built a memorial at Taq-i-Bostan (Takt-i-Bostan) right next to the city of Hamadan. The route from Ctesiphon to Rayy also goes through Hamadan, making it likely there were two battles. From Sebeos (21, pp.40–1) we learn that Chosroes dispatched a royal command to the Armenian princes to assemble their forces and march to the royal court in about

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  287 spring 595. The princes consisted of Gagik Mamikonean, Pap Bagratuni, Khosrow lord of Vahewunik, Vardan Artsruni, Mamak Mamikonean, Stepʻanos Siwni, and Kotit lord of the Amatunik. They were welcomed at Ctesiphon by Chosroes and then sent to Ispahan/ Isfahan. Their mission was to hold this important city against the usurper because we find them there after the flight of Bistam (Sebeos 23, pp.42–3). In other words, these Armenian princes were probably not among the Armenians who fought against Bistam at Hamadan and Rayy. Sebeos (22, pp.41–2) also mentions that Emperor Maurice gave Chosroes a Roman field army to crush the usurper. Sebeos unfortunately fails to mention who the commander of the Roman forces was, but I would suggest that he was Maurice’s brother Petrus who was nominated as dux of all the armies of the East (Chron. 1234, 76, p.167, 21–22, i.e. as strategos autokrator). Martindale (PLRE3 Petrus 55) suggests that if the information is correct Petrus must have served in this capacity in 595–602, but he also suggests that this is likely to be a mistake. I disagree. On the basis of Sebeos it is clear that Chronicle 1234 has preserved the correct name. He would have replaced Narses in 595. In other words, after successfully completing his campaign against the Slavs in 594, Petrus was immediately sent to the East. The next time Narses is recorded as being in the East is 601–2, while Petrus served in the Balkans.193 The second of my suggestions is that Comentiolus served as his hypostrategos, and that it is because of this that Theophylact fails to mention any of this. We found Comentiolus as tagmatarchês of the right wing in the army that assisted Chosroes in 593, and the next mention of him in the sources dates from 598 to 602 when he served in the Balkans. It is therefore very likely that he remained in the East until about 597/8. The other possibility is that Narses remained in the East and served as hypostrategos (Magister Militum per Orientem?) under the Emperor’s brother strategos Petrus, possibly with Comentiolus (magister militum vacans?). Heraclius appears to have remained in Armenia in the aftermath of the troubles that took place in 594–5.194 Had he accompanied the expedition we would surely have learnt of this from Theophylact, who was partial towards him. According to Dinawari, Chosroes responded to the three-pronged invasion of Bistam by dispatching three armies against them. Each consisted of 12,000 horsemen. He gives the names of only two commanders: Sābūr son of Abarkān, and Hurmazd Jurāzbīn. These three armies appear to have united with each other at the same time as the enemy columns retreated to their king Bistam in Hamadan. There followed a stalemate until Chosroes had assembled 50,000 horsemen as reinforcements for the 36,000 horsemen. Chosroes led this army in person, using the marching route which Hurmazd Jurāzbīn had advised him to use. The two armies joined somewhere in the Zagros Mountains. Chosroes then led the united army to the plains where he followed the Hamadan road until they reached the ‘interior’ of Hamadan. The plains of Hamadan were ideally suited for cavalry combat. Chosroes built a fortified camp and waited for the arrival of his foe. Bistam marched to the scene and the stage was set. Both armies obviously had infantry in their camp, but as far as can be gauged from the evidence they did not participate in the actual combat. It is of particular note that Dinawari’s figure of 50,000 horsemen is precisely the same figure that the eastern sources claim that Maurice gave Chosroes against Bahram. It is therefore possible that the sources have confused two different campaigns. To recap,

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288  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Thaalibi claims (668) that Maurice gave Chosroes 50,000 men under Sergius against Bahram while Theophilus of Edessa, Michael the Syrian, Bar Hebraeus and Chronicle 1234 state that Maurice gave Chosroes 40,000 men (20,000 from the Army of Thrace and 20,000 from Armenia and Bucellarians) while Chosroes himself had 10,000 Persians (Chron. 1234 names Romizan as their commander) for a total of 50,000 men.195 I would suggest that the eastern sources have preserved the composition of the army that Maurice dispatched to help Chosroes in 595. In this case the Army of Thrace (or rather ‘Theme of Thrace’) should not be taken literally in its technical sense but only as forces that were posted in Thrace at the time. These were now then transferred to the East together with Maurice’s brother Petrus, or rather they were probably transferred back to the East after they had previously been transferred from there to the Balkans in 593. The Bucellarians and Armenians should naturally be interpreted to mean soldiers already close to the scene of operations. The 10,000 Persians would of course be the famed Immortals who would have remained with Chosroes in the capital when he had dispatched the three armies against Bistam. It is of note that Chronicle 1234 claims that their commander was Romizan/Shahrbaraz, the famous general and then shahanshah of the next century. It should also be kept in mind that at this time this famous Persian corps in all probability included Romans and Armenians so it is clear that Maurice and the Romans really did their utmost for Chosroes at this time. Chosroes’s army therefore consisted of 40,000 Roman cavalry, 36,000 Persian cavalry and 10,000 Immortals. This means there were roughly equal numbers of Romans and Persians in his army. The Battle of Hamadan in about early autumn 595 According to Dinawari, the two armies slaughtered each other inconclusively for three days somewhere near Hamadan. This is not surprising because the two sides were roughly evenly matched and neither side had the advantage of terrain. Chosroes had 86,000 cavalry while Bistam had 100,000. It is impossible to guess what the battle formations were. The Romans and Persians may have had their own separate formations, or perhaps the Persians were added to the Roman array on the wings. Bistam would probably have just added new units to the flanks in the standard way. It is clear that Chosroes was the nominal overall commander of his army, but I would still suggest that the Roman commanders, and in particular Petrus, played a major role in the decision making, and one may guess that the professional commanders on the Persian side would also have guided the impulsive and young Chosroes in the right direction. It is probable that Theophylact and other Roman sources after him have failed to note the decisive role of Maurice’s brother in this campaign due to the falsification of evidence in the sources they used. This falsification took place during the reign of Phocas and resulted in the glorification of everything that Priscus did while everything that Comentiolus and Petrus did was either passed over in silence or completely misrepresented. Dinawari claims that Chosroes then decided to end the stalemate with a stratagem. He asked Kurdī son of Bahrām Jušnas, brother of Bahram Chobin, to convince his sister Kurdiya, wife of Bistam, to murder her husband and promised to reward Kurdiya by marrying her and by making her offspring his successors. Kurdī sent his wife to meet Kurdiya and both Dinawari and Yaqubi claim that Kurdiya agreed to this scheme and assassinated Bistam in his drunken sleep. On the basis of extant coins and Sebeos we know that this is not

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  289 true, but there may be a germ of truth in it if we assume that the stalemate ended as a result of the defection of Kurdiya with some of the former followers of her brother Bahram Chobin and that it was because of this that Bistam retreated to Rayy. It is easy to see that the young Kurdiya would have preferred the young and handsome Chosroes as her husband over Chosroes’s elderly uncle Bistam. She had not been asked for her opinion when she had been married to Bistam. However, it is entirely possible that Bistam had just suffered more casualties than the other side and so chose to retreat to Rayy where the two armies fought next time. This would not be surprising because practically all of the cavalry battles between Romans and Persians after ca. 578 had ended in Persian defeats, and it would not be too bold a guess to assume that the Roman and Armenian cavalries had once again inflicted more casualties on their enemies than the other way round. Battle of Rayy in late 595 or early 596196 According to Sebeos, the two armies fought near Rayy, and this time the forces of Chosroes achieved a resounding victory over the army of Bistam. Unsurprisingly, the Armenian Sebeos particularly praises the performance of the Armenian cavalry, but in light of their generally high standard this is likely to be true. On the basis of the fact that the Armenian princes of the Persian sector were at Isfahan, it is clear that most of the Armenians who distinguished themselves came from the Roman sector. There was one Armenian in particular who appears to have distinguished himself in combat. This man was Smbat Bagratuni. The best proof of this is that after this battle Chosroes made him overall commander of the war against Bistam and other rebels in about 595/6. Bistam was forced to flee north to the Elburz Mountains which lay just behind Rayy. Bistam fortified his position there so Chosroes was unable to inflict a decisive defeat on the rebel. When Chosroes realized he could not dislodge his enemy from his strong position, he returned to his own capital while Bistam went to the land of Gelam (Daylam) to secure its loyalty for him, and then marched to Parthia, the original home of his kin. The Romans apparently returned home at this stage of the war, so defeating Bistam was left to Chosroes. The fight proved a long one, lasting until about 601/2. The Armenian princes joined Chosroes in Ctesiphon and some died natural deaths while there; these included Gakig Mamikonean and Khosrov lord of the Vahewuni. Mamak Mamikonean was dispatched to Armenia to obtain more men, but when he reached Dvin he too died a natural death. Stepʻannos Siwni quarrelled with his paternal uncle, causing the other princes of Siwnik to accuse him of rebellion, with the result that Chosroes ordered him killed during the fast of Holy Week in 596. Chosroes’s men ambushed Stepʻannos’s accomplice Kotit Amatuni near Nisibis. When the men of Stepʻannos’s and Kotit Amatuni learnt of this at Isfahan (they had been left as garrison forces there), they rebelled, looted the royal treasure from the auditor’s house, and then fled towards Gelam (Daylam) where they expected to join the rebel army of Bistam. The Persians under Peroz chased after them and killed some, but the rest managed to reach Gelam. Bistam, however, was not there, so they joined his forces in Parthia. The Final Phases of the Rebellion in 595–604197 Chosroes appointed Smbat Bagratuni as marzban/marzpan of Vrkan/Gurgan (southeast of the Caspian Sea) either in very late 595 or early 596. He was given command

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290  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 of both Persian and Armenian troops and his orders were to march to the land of his appointment. This area was in the hands of the rebel Bistam, which means that Smbat Bagratuni was given command of the war against the usurper. The road to this area passed through the Elburz Mountains and Gurgan/Hyrcania, or as Sebeos calls those areas, Amal, Royean, Zrēchan and Tabarastan. Smbat defeated the forces posted there and then conquered the territory of Vrkan. This means Bistam was forced to flee further east while the forces of Smbat blocked his most direct route to Iran and Babylonia. Most importantly, the great walls of Gurgan now lay between Bistam and these areas. The Walls of Gurgan were now manned by the loyalist forces under Smbat Bagratuni. Therefore, the impressive walls served as a protective bulwark against the rebel forces in Parthia. In short, Smbat had been able to overcome the difficulties posed by the Elburz Mountains and the fortifications of Gurgan in the single campaign season of 596. This was a major accomplishment, which the combined Roman and Persian army had not been able to achieve in 595, and Smbat achieved it with far fewer men. Considering the terrain, I would suggest that Smbat brought with him a large contingent of infantry. This was the end of major operations until about 601/2. Bistam fought in the east during 597–600 and according to Sebeos (25, pp.45–6) he managed to carve a kingdom for himself by subjecting two Kushan kings, Shawk and Pariovk, under his rule in about 599–601.198 The Khuzistan Chronicle/Anonymous Guidi (8–9) claims that the Kushans were actually Turkish kings. Then Bistam launched his next attempt to gain the throne. Sebeos claims that he attacked ‘Asorestan’ (Assyria) with a massive army to oust Chosroes. The invasion force consisted of four separate armies each placed at a distance from each other. The front consisted of three armies with Bistam in the centre, and the rear consisted of the Kushan army of Pariovk. Then, before the army even reached Gurgan, something happened. Pariovk regained his freedom by resorting to a treachery. He tricked Bistam into sending away his guards so he was able to ambush and kill him. Pariovk seized Bistam’s wife and treasury and then went on his way. When the other armies learnt of this a few days later, they scattered. The ‘Gelum Army’ (Daylami) and the Armenians of Isfahan decided to march to Daylam. Smbat and Shahr Vachrich tried to block their route with a large army in the village of Khekewand, somewhere in Komsh (just south of Tabarastan), but the Daylami routed them even though they had only 2,000 Daylamites (incredible if true, but possible because the Daylami were elite infantry) so the refugees were able to reach their strongholds in Daylam. The last one to flee was Smbat, and this saved his honour and his post. Chosroes cashiered Shahr Vachrich.199 Next year (ca. 601/2) the surviving rebel forces reunited and marched to Tabarastan (south coast of the Caspian Sea). Smbat assembled his forces against them and inflicted a decisive defeat on them such that the remnants of this force surrendered to him. Chosroes honoured Smbat with gifts and by appointing Smbat’s son Varaztirots (he was a hostage at the royal court) as his butler. Smbat held the marzbanate for eight years, returning to the Persian capital in 603/4. The Romans lost a great commander when Smbat was allowed to go to Persia. The above account shows why there was peace between Persia and Rome from 593 until 602. Chosroes faced continuous troubles from 593 until 602/3.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  291 Roman held Armenia in 595–601 and the revolt of Atat Khorkhoruni in 601200 Roman-held Armenia was in a tumultaneous state thanks to the religious policies of Maurice, which consisted of the promotion of the Chalcedonian doctrine, but it remained relatively peaceful until 601. The reason for this lay in the wise policies of Maurice. He had transferred all the potentially troublesome Armenian princes to Thrace while Chosroes had transferred them from his sector to the East. The result was that the Armenian Church split into Chalcedonian and Monophysite branches. Maurice followed the same religious policy in Iberia, but there he achieved greater success because the Iberian Church converted to the Chalcedonian faith.201 Atat Khorkhoruni had been one of the troublesome princes of Armenia. His domains were in the Persian sector and he had revolted against the Persians in 594, but as we have seen he was then given a place of refuge in Roman territory in return for military service in Thrace. In 601 Maurice summoned him to the palace, to which he went in the company of seventy men. The seventy men were obviously knights, so we have to add at least one squire per horseman to this figure. The Emperor gave him a worthy reception and gifts of gold, silver vessels and other treasures. Sebeos describes Atat as a great patricius. This means that Atat and his feudal forces had distinguished themselves in combat against the Slavs and Avars some time between 595 and 601, but the date of the reception at court suggests that the great services of Atat belong to the year 600. It is probable that Atat was then appointed patricius in the manner described by Constantine Porphyrogennetos in the Book of Ceremonies (De Ceremoniis 1.48). After the ceremony, Maurice ordered Atat to rejoin his forces in Thrace, but instead of doing this Atat exploited the opportunity provided by his visit to Constantinople. After he left the capital he turned to the coast and boarded the first ship he came across. The crossing of the Straits required special imperial permission, and Atat managed to convince the sailors that he had authorisation from the Emperor to do so – did he use some imperial document to fool the possibly illiterate sailors? Once on the Asian side, he travelled to Armenia in great haste. It took several days for the Romans to learn of his flight, but by interrogating people they learnt what had happened, what route he had taken, and what were his intentions. The garrisons of several cities were alerted, and Atat and his seventy knights had to fight eight or ten times before they reached Nakchawan, where the Persians gave him a place of refuge. The Roman stratelat (stratelates = general) gathered his men and advanced against Nakhchawan and surrounded it. The stratelat may have been Suren, because Sebeos lists the magistri militum per Armeniam after 593 as follows: John Mystacon, Heraclius, Sormēn (Suren, Surenas). Therefore, if the stratelat in question commanded Armenian forces, he was a member of the famous Parthian family. The other possibility is that the stratelat was the Magister Militum per Orientem Narses, because Chosroes demanded his dismissal at about this time for some unknown reason. See below. When Chosroes learnt of this, he dispatched the Parsayenpet202 with an army against the Romans. When the Romans learnt of the approach of the Persian army they retreated. Therefore, dispute over the rebel Atat did not result in open warfare. Atat was summoned to the Persian court and given a stipend. Atat regretted his decision almost immediately because after the usurpation of Phocas in 602 he assembled Arabian horses and brigands in an effort to flee back to the Roman Empire. It is probable that he found Chosroes’s plan to support

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292  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Maurice’s son Theodosius detestable and preferred to see Phocas on the throne. But Atat’s plans were found out and he was executed with cudgels. The persecution of Monophysites and other Christian ‘heretics’ was followed elsewhere in the East. Maurice clearly thought that peace with Persia would give him a chance to unify all the territories under a single religious interpretation based on the Chalcedonian doctrine. This means that Maurice, like so many other rulers in history, thought that they could hold territories securely only when they were unified under the same religion and administration. In this he made the same mistake as all rulers before and after him, which was that these unifying policies resulted in immediate problems because they were inevitably vehemently opposed by those who were subjected to them. For such a policy to succeed, it would have required a long period of peace with the neighbours, and contrary to Maurice’s expectation this was not possible at this time, through his own fault. It was because of this single-minded promotion of the Chalcedonian doctrine that we find Maurice sending his most trusted advisor the Metropolitan/Bishop of Melitene Domitianus in charge of purging the followers of Severus in the East in 599. It is clear that it had been Domitianus himself who had advised Maurice to adopt this policy. Maurice gave Domitianus full authority to do what he considered necessary and gave him a military force under Sacellarius.203 The first target of Domitianus was Mesopotamia. When he reached Edessa he faced the first problems of this policy. Some of the monks of the Orientalian Abbey converted, but the vast majority refused and even insulted the Emperor and Domitianus. Domitianus ordered Sacellarius to lead the monks outside the southern gate where they were then killed and thrown to the moat. The soldiers slaughtered 400 monks in this massacre. The other possibility, a policy of religious tolerance to unify the Empire, just did not come into the minds of men like Maurice and Domitianus.204 Arabia, Mesopotamia and Armenia in 602205 As the year 602 began, the two empires were still at peace, but there were already signs of trouble in the air, and the Atat Khorkhoruni incident was not the only one of these. At some unknown point in time, when Chosroes’s forces were still fighting against Bistam, the Arab allies of Rome raided parts of ‘Babylonia’. According to Theophylact this angered Chosroes to such an extent that he was prepared to launch an attack of revenge, but he thought otherwise when he received Maurice’s envoy, the Praetorian Prefect George (Georgios), pleading Chosroes to maintain the peace. Chosroes also wanted to retain the peace because the revolt of Bistam had not been resolved. This was a major achievement. However, when the envoy George then returned to the imperial court he made a serious mistake. He claimed publicly that it was only thanks to his own efforts that the peace had been achieved. According to Theophylact, this angered the Emperor who apparently felt envy towards the ambassador because of his statement. In my opinion, on the basis of the above the likeliest date for this incident is 601/2 when Bistam launched his last offensive against Chosroes. It was also at about the same time that Chosroes grew angry with Narses, the commander of the Roman army at Dara (i.e. he was probably the Magister Militum per Orientem) and demanded his dismissal. Theophylact fails to mention the reason. Michael Whitby (1988, 305–6) makes two suggestions. One possibility is that Narses became

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  293 involved in the religious dispute of the Christians of Nisibis. This resulted in the exile of the Bishop of Nisibis, Gregory of Kashkar, in 601, but it did not resolve the situation because the inhabitants of Nisibis revolted and killed the Persian marzban in May 602. Chosroes sent an army, which sacked the city. The second of the possibilities is that Chosroes held Narses responsible for the Arab raid because it was ultimately his duty to keep the Arab foederati in check. I would add a third to this list, that it had been Narses who had marched to Nakhchawan to besiege Atat Korkhoruni. In short, despite the difficulties, Maurice managed to maintain the peace in the East, and thanks to it Maurice was able to send Priscus to Armenia to assemble 30,000 horsemen with their 30,000 households for transfer to Thrace in 602. The term household obviously entails population transfer, so it is clear that Maurice’s order had a double purpose. Firstly, he wanted to resettle deserted areas of Thrace with new settlers who would then defend those lands. Secondly, he wanted to remove the troublesome Armenians from their homes to improve the Roman hold on those lands. The 30,000 households mean that Maurice was planning a major transferral of population. Each had at least one knight and a squire, but it is clear that most of the households had several knights (fathers and sons, or feudal lords with their followers, etc). The project, however, was never carried out, because Phocas revolted.

5.2.4. The Romans Restore the Danube Frontier in 592–602 The Strategikon and instructions for war in the Balkans It was roughly in about 592–3 that the final form of the Strategikon was produced by Maurice and his staff. The reason for this conclusion is that it was during the winter of 593–4 that Roman soldiers were for the first time ordered to stay north of the Danube in Slavic lands during the winter because the Slavs could not then hide themselves in the rivers and lakes or in the woods. This entailed the addition of some details to Book 11 and Book 12 to the Strategikon and some other streamlining to the text. This streamlining was done in such a manner that the old ending of the original version was retained in Book 11. The most significant parts of this new addition were how to use infantry and how to fight in difficult terrain. Tactics continued to be based on the phalangite formations and tactics first devised by the Macedonians, but adapted to meet the threat posed by the Avars and Slavs in the Balkans. By putting all this in writing Maurice hoped his officers would follow his tactical and strategic combat doctrines to the letter. The methods were based on old Greco-Roman military traditions and earlier military treatises, even the lightening of the equipment of the shield-bearers (skoutatoi), for the concept of fighting on difficult terrain was not new. However, there was one major change that Maurice introduced, for pitched infantry battle in open terrain. During the reign of Justinian, on the basis of the training scheme in De scientia politica dialogus, the skoutatoi (shield-bearers) were expected to fight against other shield-bearers using primarily their spears.206 In other words, they were expected to fight like the hoplites of old times. Now Maurice reintroduced the older legionary pilum tactic for such combat. According to the Strategikon, when the skoutatoi had closed their ranks properly and were at a distance of one bowshot from the enemy, the light-armed psiloi started shooting arrows, and when the skoutatoi had advanced close enough to the enemy, they threw their darts

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294  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 (martzobarboula) and other missiles (rhiptaria), if they had them. After this, the skoutatoi advanced to within range and threw their spears (kontaria) as if they were javelins and fought with swords (spathia, sing. spathion from the Latin spatha) while maintaining their position in the formation. The men behind them were to protect their heads with shields while using their spears in support of the front rank. It was presumably because of this that the soldiers continued to train to fight like hoplites in mock battles while also training with swords.207 The above instruction on how to use spears as javelins is curious because on the basis of the Strategikon we know that the skoutatoi usually used the longer cavalry kontarion and adopted the shorter version only for use in difficult terrain. The longer cavalry kontarion (contus) was roughly 3.7 metres long. Its length is confirmed by the Strategikon and Peri Strategias, both of which have the spears of ranks one, two, three, or alternatively ranks one, two, three and four, protruding in front of the array when the skoutatoi faced the enemy with spears.208 This raises the problem that throwing a 3.7 metre long spear is difficult. This difficulty would obviously diminish its effectiveness as a missile. A possible solution to this problem is that the different ranks had different spear lengths: that the front rank had shorter spears than the rear ranks. We actually possess possible period evidence for the use of such a battle formation in the so-called the Byzantine Excerpts of Polyaenus’s Stratagems (Hypotheseis), if it is dated to the sixth century. The problem is that any date from the sixth century until 850 is possible, even if the sixth century is likeliest on the basis of its use of late-Roman military terms.209 In this treatise the spearpoints of the first three ranks were at an equal distance from the front, which means that each rank had spears of different lengths. This would have enabled the front rankers to throw their shorter spears effectively while ranks two to four were still able to support the front rank with their spears. I would suggest that this is indeed what happened and that the skoutatoi in the phalanxes always had spears of different lengths with them210 unless ordered to use only the shorter spears, as in difficult terrain. This is indirectly confirmed by the Strategikon which notes in the context of infantry attack that the skoutatoi could have other types of missiles (rhiptaria) besides their darts. It should also be noted that the use of spears of different lengths to project the spear-points at equal distance was not new. It can also be found in the sixth century Peri Strategias and in the Hellenistic military treatises (e.g. Aelian 14.7; Asclepiodotus 5) which the Romans continued to copy and which were also used as sources by Maurice for the Strategikon.211 In sum, I would suggest that Maurice reintroduced the pilum tactic into infantry combat and that he did this by varying the lengths of the spears, as had been done in the earlier Hellenistic treatises, and in the sixth century excerpts of Polyaenus, the Hypotheseis. The advantage of using the pilum tactic with spears in conjunction with the sword was that it instilled aggression into the men. The throwing of spears created disorder in the enemy ranks just before the melee, and the use of swords required the men to advance to close quarters, and this made them more agressive and frightening to the enemy. This aggression was bound to improve the combat efficiency of infantry. Now Maurice required the soldiers to winter in the Balkans. This was the most effective way of dealing with the Slavs because they could not use the woods, waters and swamps as their hiding places. Furthermore, the cold weather kept them in their villages, where they were easier to destroy. It was only rational for the Emperor to command his men

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  295 to engage their enemies in the winter, but the rank-and-file did not like fighting in the winter. They wanted to spend winters with their families. And who can blame them?212 Priscus’s offensive against the Slavs in 593–4213 In 593 at the start of the spring Maurice appointed Priscus in command of the campaign against the Slavs. He had regained imperial favour possibly thanks to his services as an envoy to the Avars. Priscus (strategos) took command of the cavalry in person and assigned Gentzon (hypostrategos) in command of the infantry. Maurice ordered Priscus to prevent the Slavs from crossing the Danube by conducting offensive operations in enemy territory. These instructions and the presence of Ardagastus north of the Danube prove that the Romans had forced the Slavs away from Roman territory so that major operations were now conducted on enemy territory. Maurice had come to the conclusion that offence was the best defence. It was wiser to engage the Slavs in their own lands than chase their raiding forces in Roman territory. The just-completed text of the Strategikon contained precise instructions on how Maurice expected this to be done. The Roman strategos was expected to travel lightly and engage the enemy with swift surprise attacks before the Slavs could unite their forces. See Chapters 1–2. The Roman forces were assembled at Heracleia in the spring. Priscus stayed there for seven days while the forces arrived. On the seventh day Priscus held a review of allies, counted his forces and distributed the annual salaries to the troops. We do not know who the allies were but one may assume that they included the Lombards and Armenians who had been sent to the Balkans in 586–7 and possibly some of the federate tribes that had been settled in Thrace in the previous two centuries. Contrary to usual assumptions, it is in my opinion improbable that there would have been additional forces sent from the East because, as already discussed, the decisive battles against Bahram Chobin took place in 593.214 There was no need for them. Maurice’s show of the flag operation to Anchialus and the subsequent clearing up of Slavs from Roman territories show that the Romans possessed adequate forces in the Balkans to continue the offensive into enemy territory. After this Priscus marched to Drizipera in four camps, staying there for fifteen days. It is probable that the families of the soldiers were left there so they would not be in danger during the campaign. I take the stay of fifteen days to mean that Priscus trained and drilled the army there in preparation for the campaign. Once satisfied with the results he led his army north. Priscus reached Dorostolon in twenty camps. The Roman preparations had not escaped the attention of the Avar spies, and he received an envoy from the Khagan. The Khagan accused the Romans, and in particular the architect of the peace, Priscus, of breaking the peace. Priscus countered by saying that the war was not against the Avars but against the Slavs and that the Slavs were not covered in the treaty. We do not know why the Khagan failed to act now, but we know that he made no move to prevent the Romans from crossing. In my opinion the likeliest reasons are: 1) he was still fighting against the Lombards, and that because of this Roman action he hastily concluded peace with the Lombards; 2) these Slavs were not really subjects of the Avars even though the Khagan claimed lordship over them, so the Roman operations actually helped him even though he claimed otherwise. On the twelfth day after Priscus’s arrival the Roman army crossed the Danube in ships. According to Theophylact they had been built on the spot on Priscus’s orders. This means

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296  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 that the Romans had brought the ships, or rather boats, in pieces on their wagons and that they were now assembled for the crossing. After the crossing the ships were left behind to lighten their load. Priscus was able to successfully surprise the Slavic army of Ardagastus in the middle of the night and ravage his territory. Ardagastus had been planning to mount an invasion of Roman territory, but the Romans had forestalled him with this pre-emptive strike. Ardagastus mounted an unsaddled mare and fled, but when his route of flight was blocked he (probably with some of his followers) dismounted to fight. He was defeated, but was still able to swim across the river to safety. Pohl (p.172) identifies this as the river Argeş. Ardagastus’s warriors were butchered and his lands ravaged. The prisoners were put in wooden fetters in preparation for sending to Constantinople with the aim of demonstrating the great achievements of Priscus. Priscus was eager to please Maurice and decided to flatter him by sending him much booty. The Slavs of Ardagastus had gathered vast amounts during their invasions of Roman territory, so there was plenty to show now. Priscus divided the booty so that the Emperor and each of his offspring were given a separate share of the loot, so most of the booty was given to the imperial family. The soldiers were of course upset and raised a mutiny. But Priscus managed to calm the ‘friends, soldiers and allies’ with a speech made in Latin. He pointed out that their great heroism would be made to known to the Emperor and people only if they would witness them with their own eyes. The soldiers were convinced. Even if Theophylact fails to say it, one may assume that Priscus promised to make good their losses from future spoils of war. The war booty was therefore dispatched to Constantinople. Tatimer (who PLRE3 describes only as an ‘officer’) was assigned to guard it with 300 men. On the sixth day after they had began their journey they came across a band of Slavs. This shows that even if major operations were conducted on the northern side of the Danube, Slavs still raided Roman territory in small groups. At midday, when the Romans were carelessly grazing their horses, the Slavs attacked. The Roman horsemen were without their horses and fought on foot. Tatimer and his few men fought boldly but were overpowered and forced to flee. Tatimer was wounded by missiles and only with difficulty reached the Roman infantry which had rushed to the scene to save their commander. The infantry engaged the Slavs and defeated them in a fierce fight, capturing fifty barbarians, after which they returned to their camp. So Tatimer was able to take the spoils of war to the Roman capital where the news was received with great joy. It was presumably then that the Gepid who had killed Maurice’s bodyguard because of the gold decorations he wore decided to take a risk. He took the golden belt to a goldsmith to melt it down. The goldsmith suspected foul play and informed the praetor plebis (responsible for order in the city) who sent seven men to capture the Gepid. The Gepid claimed he had obtained the belt in the 566 war and was therefore released. Then one of the attendants of the praetor remarked that the man was too young, so the men ran after the barbarian and brought him back to the court. The president of the court tortured the Gepid until he confessed. He was then fed to the wild beasts in the arena after which his remnants were burned.215 Maurice then dispatched Tatimer back to Priscus with orders to inform him that he and his soldiers should stay in enemy territory through the next winter, 593/4.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  297 In the meantime, polemarchos (i.e. strategos) Priscus had continued his campaign. After two days searching for enemy, Priscus sent taxiarchos Alexander to reconnoitre the territory on the other side of the river Helibacia, which Pohl (p.173) identifies with the river Ialomiţa. This is probably a modified example of one of the standard ways of operating against the Slavs in the Strategikon which in this case meant that Alexander was sent in advance to surprise the Slavs with cavalry while the general followed in his footsteps at a slower pace. Alexander crossed the river and encountered an advance party of Slavs. These had been sent there by their ruler Musocius to reconnoitre the Roman army. The Slavs were forced to flee to the nearby swamps and woodland. The Romans pursued them up to the swamp and Alexander ordered an immediate retreat to a safe distance. He then surrounded the Slavs and tried to torch the woods, but with no result because of the damp conditions. Then he had a stroke of luck. A Gepid who had been a Christian in the past deserted to the Roman side and pointed out to them the avenues of entry, which allowed the Romans to destroy the advance party. The Gepid gave Alexander a full report of all enemy activies and advised the Romans to make a surprise attack against Musocius who was at 30 parasangae away (about 100 miles). Alexander took the Gepid and his captives to his superior. The Gepid advised Priscus to attack Musocius, but there was a catch: there was a river between Musocius and the Romans and Priscus had left his raft-building materials behind. The Gepid promised to obtain canoes from the Slavs through a stratagem. Priscus agreed to the plan and had all the Slavic prisoners killed so that they would not slow down the army. The Gepid then went to meet Musocius and claimed that he could save the remnants of Ardagastus’s forces if Musocius would give him canoes. He was clearly held in high esteem because Musocius agreed. The Gepid therefore took 150 canoes and 30 rowers and sent them to the other side of the river Paspirius. Pohl (p.165) identifies this with the river Buzāu. The Gepid then returned secretly to the Romans and was given 200 men under Alexander to ambush the Slavs. They were posted near the river in hiding. When the Gepid then started singing Avar songs the following night to signal the time for attack, Alexander led his men forward and killed the sleeping Slavs. Priscus used these 150 canoes to ship 3,000 men across. They made a surprise night attack and defeated the Slavs who were still in a drunken sleep because Musocius had celebrated the funeral of his brother with plentiful liquor. What ensued was a night of slaughter until Priscus put a stop to it. Musocius was captured alive. Then the rest of the army and their equipment was shipped across. The soldiers were overjoyed by the success and started to celebrate with wine, disregarding their sentry duty. The Slavs regrouped and made a counterattack. Only hypostrategos Gentzon’s timely deployment of infantry saved the army from total destruction. Priscus executed the officers of the watch and flogged some of the men. Tatimer then arrived with the news that the soldiers were to stay in enemy territory through the winter. This caused mutiny. Priscus promised to lead the men back, thus disregarding the Emperor’s order. This decision amazed the Khagan of the Avars who appears to have taken this as a sign of weakness that he could exploit. According to Theophylact, the Khagan envied the Roman successes. He wanted if possible to demonstrate his strength to his followers. Probably Maurice understood these barbarian traits and that was one of the reasons for his order for the troops to stay in enemy territory

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298  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 for the winter – after all the barbarians were also in the habit of wintering in enemy territory when possible. Maurice, however, appears not to have understood the need to please his own soldiers, whose support he needed to stay on the throne. He expected them to obey whatever he ordered them to do – after all, they were soldiers and expected to obey orders. Maurice was a military genius, but he was no Caracalla who understood the need to maintain the loyalty of the soldiers with bribes. Sensing weakness, the Khagan sent Slavs in his service across the Danube to block the Roman routes back home. They appear to have advanced against Zalpada, Aquis and Scupi (not to be confused with the famous Scupi/Skopje) during the winter of 593–4 (Theophylact 7.2.2), which means indeed that they stood between the Roman army and their homes. At the same time the Khagan dispatched envoys to Priscus to ask why the Romans were withdrawing. Priscus answered with lies. Three days later he learnt that the army of the Khagan was nearby in readiness to attack and that the Khagan had sent the Slavs across the Danube. In my opinion this means that the Khagan had by then concluded peace with the Lombards which released his army for use against the Romans. Priscus dispatched the doctor Theodorus as his envoy to the Khagan, who was convinced by both the peace party (the ‘doves’) led by Targitius and by the arguments of the envoy, to let the Romans through if they handed over part of their booty. Priscus was willing to do this but his soldiers were not. They apparently wanted to keep the rewards of their toils even if they had to fight for it. In the end Priscus was able to convince the men to give their 5,000 prisoners to the Khagan in return for keeping all the rest of their booty. It has been noted by Pohl (p.175) that this meant the acknowledgement that the north of the Danube belonged to the Avar sphere of influence, even if the Khagan at the same time accepted that the Romans had the right to campaign against the Slavs in his area. According to Theophylact, then the Khagan opened the route and allowed the Romans to cross the Danube. Priscus led his men to Drizipera through the Slavs who were raiding the area and then went to Constantinople. Michael Whitby (1988, 160) suggests that Priscus may have led the army that far south out of professional jealousy towards his successor Petrus, but in my opinion the likelier reasons were that the families of the soldiers had been left there and that the areas north of Maurice’s Ditch were being pillaged by the Slavs. The soldiers would not have been able to rest if the enemy was close by. When Priscus reached the court, Maurice accused him of simplicity and reprimanded him for the foolish surrender of the booty to the enemy. With this Maurice meant the 5,000 Slavic prisoners given to the Avars. It is probable that these prisoners formed the most valuable part of the booty captured from the Slavs, which explains Maurice’s reaction. Maurice duly replaced Priscus with his own brother Petrus. Pohl (p.170) suggests that the release of the 5,000 prisoners ‘obliterated much of the military effect of the operation’. This is probably too drastic a view of the situation, because most of the prisoners would have consisted of women and children who did not add much to the enemy’s military strength, and the prisoners who had been captured from Ardagastus’s tribe had already been transported to Roman territory. However, Pohl may have a point, because there has to be a reason why Maurice (Strategikon 9.4) called Priscus a simpleton when he himself advised the strategos to hand over to the enemy a part or all of the plunder in situations in which he could not withdraw without serious

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  299 danger. It is possible that Maurice considered the return of captives worse than the return of other kinds of booty – the captives could have been posted as human shields around the marching formation. However, there are other potential reasons for Maurice’s anger. Above all, Maurice would have believed Priscus was careless to have let himself get in such a weak position in the first place. Priscus’s position was potentially dangerous not only because the Avars were between him and the Danube, but even more so because he could not cross the river without first obtaining a means of crossing. This happened because Priscus had not obeyed Maurice’s order to stay in enemy territory, and because Priscus had left behind his raft-building materials when he crossed the Danube the first time. He could have overcome these problems if he had prearranged a fleet in advance. It is also possible that Maurice considered the threat posed by the Avar army an insufficient reason to release the prisoners. The Slavs on the other side of the Danube were definitely pushovers and did not pose any obstacle for the Roman army once it had crossed the Danube, and Maurice appears to have thought that the Avars would have been equally easy to overcome. Petrus’s campaign in 594216 Petrus’s command started badly, because Maurice tried to economize on soldiers’ salaries, possibly as a punishment for their disobedience the previous year. Petrus started his journey from Perinthus/Heracleia which clearly served as one of the most important military bases at this time, and journeyed to Drizipera where Priscus had left his army. Thence he continued to Odessus. On the fourth day after reaching that city, Petrus published Maurice’s letters to the soldiers. One of these stated that henceforth the soldiers’ salaries would consist of three parts: clothing, equipment and gold coins. This caused great resentment because the soldiers thereby lost two thirds of their salary. Maurice’s order undoubtedly had two motives: 1) it ensured that the soldiers were properly equipped because they had not used their entire allowance for its intended purpose; 2) it saved money for the exchequer. The mutinuous soldiers abandoned their general and pitched a new camp four miles away. However, Petrus then managed to calm the soldiers with the more pleasing of Maurice’s letters. These included pensions for wounded soldiers, and that the children of those whose fathers had fallen in combat would be enrolled into service with their fathers’ salaries. According to Theophylact, these words persuaded the soldiers to submit to the will of the strategos and Emperor, but he fails to say what this meant in practice. I take it to mean that the soldiers accepted the reduction in salary in return for the other benefits. The strategos/polemarchos Petrus informed his brother the Emperor of what had happened and four days after this he began his campaign. When the Romans reached Marcianopolis, Petrus dispatched a 1,000-man vanguard under taxiarchos Alexander to reconnoitre the whereabouts of the Slavs who had raided the region. They came across a Slav raiding force of 600 men who had previously participated in the pillaging of Zaldapa, Aquis and Scupi/Scopi. The Slavs promptly killed all their adult male captives so that they would not pose any threat and placed the women and children in the middle of a wagon laager. The Roman cavalry was initially unwilling to engage with them because their horses were vulnerable to javelins – the vanguards were meant to move fast so their horses were not armoured. Taxiarchos Alexander ordered them to dismount with a

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300  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Latin command. After this both sides used only missiles, until one of the Roman soldiers climbed onto one of the wagons and killed everyone around it with a sword. This enabled the rest of the Romans to break through the barricade, whereupon the Slavs killed the rest of the captives. The Slavs suffered the same fate. Alexander and his men reached the strategos two days later and Petrus reached the battlefield on the fifth. When he could confirm the results of the battle in person he rewarded the heroes. On the following day Petrus organized a massive hunting expedition as a form of military training in the course of which he came across an enormous boar which had been hiding. When the barking of the dogs grew louder the boar charged at Petrus with the result that he wheeled his horse in flight, crushing his left foot against a tree. This resulted in a delay because Petrus was in great pain. This incident is interesting because it proves once again that the Roman armies were still accompanied by dogs that could be used in hunting and guarding. We do not know if they used them in warfare.217 Maurice was infuriated by the delay and ordered his brother with multiple insults to continue the campaign. Petrus followed the order even though he was still in great pain, and after four camps reached the Slavic lands, which means the area across the Danube, where he then apparently conducted successful operations, which Theophylact’s hostile source fails to mention. He probably crossed the river close to Dorostolon/Durostorum, like Priscus the previous year. Ten days after the beginning of these operations, Petrus received an order from his brother to return to Roman territory immediately and stay in Thrace because the Emperor had learnt that the Slavs were planning to attack Constantinople. In the account of Theophylact, Petrus marched first to Pistus, then to Zalpada, and then to Iatrus. This has obviously misplaced the order in which Petrus reached each place. Petrus would have marched via Pistus and Zalpada to Dorostolon and then across the Danube and then returned to the Danube opposite Iatrus where he then crossed to the Roman side of the river. Thence he marched past the fort of Latarkium to Novae which he reached on 22 August, because its inhabitants demanded he stay there the next day and celebrate the festival of martyr Lupus. He was able to continue his march on 24 August. His next camping sites were Theodoropolis followed by Curisca. On the third day he reached Asemus. The garrison of Asemus received Petrus in style by parading in front of him in full armour with their banda (flags) flying. This impressed Petrus so much218 that he wanted to add them to his own army, but this was opposed by the garrison and its citizens because the Emperor Justin (which Justin is not known) had given them exclusively to their city. The garrison fled to the church and Petrus sent taxiarchos Gentzon (presumably still commander of the infantry) to fetch them, but he did not want to assault the church. Petrus was infuriated and demoted Gentzon, then on the following day he sent a scribo (officer of the excubitores) to drag the bishop to the Roman encampment which was a mile from the city. When the citizens saw this, they threw out the scribo, closed the gates and started singing insults to the general. It would have been sheer madness to assault one’s own city, so Petrus gave up his plans and continued his march. Six days later, Petrus dispatched 1,000 men across the Danube to reconnoitre the enemy. They came across 1,000 Bulgars who were marching in a carefree manner – there was peace between the Romans and Avars at the time. But it is clear that these men had

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  301 been sent to keep an eye on what the Romans were up to. Petrus ordered the vanguard to attack, and they engaged the Bulgars with javelins (akontia). This shows that the Roman cavalry still used javelins in combat, at least when they were equipped lightly for scouting duties; the Strategikon accepts that those barbarian recruits (i.e. mainly Germans) who were not skilled with bows could use javelins, and it is possible that the vanguard consisted of these. The Bulgars acted with professionalism and dispatched envoys to the Romans to put a stop to the fighting because the two nations were at peace. The commander of the contingent (syntagmatos exarchos) sent the ambassadors to meet Petrus, who was eight miles away. Petrus ordered the vanguard to kill the enemy. So the Bulgars made a counter-attack and forced the Romans to flee, after which they retreated in good order. The Khagan sent envoys to Petrus to complain about this, and Petrus managed to pacify them with gifts and plausible excuses. Petrus therefore continued his campaign north of the Danube, reaching another river on the fourth day. He chose twenty men to act as his spies/scouts and sent them across the river. They travelled only during the nights and slept during the days. By chance a group of Slavs came across them when they were sleeping. They had not posted anyone as guard so they were easily captured, and thereby the local Slavic ruler, Peiragastus, learnt of the Roman plans. He concealed his forces in the woods close to the intended river crossing. When 1,000 Romans had crossed, Peiragastus launched his men from their ambuscade and killed all of them. Petrus now decided to send his forces across in strength. First, the Romans built rafts. Probably they looked something like the ones depicted below. This suggests Petrus did not repeat the mistakes of Priscus in 593.

The Romans then used their rafts to pepper the enemy with arrows and missiles, which the Slavs were unable to endure. In this exchange a missile killed Peiragastus, which resulted in the flight of the Slavs from the river bank. After the Romans reached the riverbank, they encircled the Slavs, who fled in total disarray, but the Romans’ pursuit was hampered by a lack of horses, so it was short. This amphibious battle shows the importance of good intelligence. It also shows the superiority of the Romans in archery, river crossings and organization over the Slavs. On the following day the Roman guides made a mistake and led the army to a waterless place. Pohl suggests that the Romans had now reached the Bărăgan steppe. The soldiers were forced to drink wine instead of water, and on the third day of the march they were

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302  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 in trouble. However, then a certain barbarian prisoner revealed that the Helibacia river was only four parasangae away (11 miles). When the Romans reached the river the Slavs were hiding on the opposite bank. They were able to kill with javelins large numbers of Romans who rushed to the river to drink. The Romans then assembled their rafts again and crossed the river. Theophylact claims that when the Romans reached the opposite side they were defeated and forced to flee, and then because the barbarians had defeated Petrus he was replaced by Priscus. It is probable that Theophylact’s proPriscus source has once again exaggerated the defeat that Petrus suffered, because if he had really been so severely defeated it would be strange if he was able to withdraw from Helibacia River to Roman territory. It is far likelier that he just suffered a setback and retreated because the winter season was approaching. This time Maurice did not order the troops to winter north of the Danube because the previous order had resulted in trouble. This was actually a lucky break because some of these men were needed in the east the next year. The simultaneous transferral of the Armenian princes replaced some of these forces. Even though the campaign cannot be described as an outstanding military feat it is still clear that Petrus had achieved his principal mission which was to prevent the Slavs from invading Roman territory which Priscus’s previous campaign had failed to achieve. In other words, Petrus had achieved more than Priscus. Petrus was now transferred to the East where he led the Roman army that Maurice sent to support Chosroes II against Bistam in 595. Petrus was appointed supreme commander of all forces in the East, which shows that Maurice did not see his accomplishments in 594 as a failure. Priscus’s campaign in 595219 In 595, after Petrus’s ‘disappointing’ performance, Priscus was reappointed strategos of Thrace. He assembled and reviewed the army in the Astike. Theophylact claims that it was then discovered that the army had suffered numerous casualties during Petrus’s command. Priscus wanted to let this be known to the Emperor, but his wiser advisors managed to convince him that this was not in his best interests. Following this Priscus marched north, after fifteen camps crossing the Danube and then after four days reaching the Upper Novae. There the envoys of Khagan reached him to complain that Priscus had broken the treaty. Priscus claimed he was there to hunt, which the envoy answered with a counter-argument, and so forth. On the tenth day after his arrival in the Upper Novae, he received the news that the Avars were destroying the walls of Singidunum and were forcing its population to migrate to Avar territory. This means that the Avars had defeated the garrison of Singidunum and captured the city while Priscus and the Avar envoys were exchanging arguments. We can piece together what had happened by combining the accounts of Sebeos and Theophylact. On the basis of these we can calculate that it was in about late 594 or early 595 that Maurice transferred large numbers of Armenians under their chief nobles to Thrace and that he nominated Mushel Mamikonean as their commander. According to Sebeos’s text, these men were elite fighters who could ‘stand firm and fight in the line of spearmen’. They were dispatched to the western regions of the Danube, which I take to mean Singidunum. In other words, these men were not sent to reinforce the army of Priscus but to be deployed as a separate force.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  303 According to Sebeos, the peoples of the western regions of the Danube (i.e. the Avars) and the Romans were fighting a fierce war at the time these Armenians reached it, which must mean the same approximate time Priscus was marching on the northern side of the Danube towards the Upper Novae. This means that the Khagan had attacked Singidunum roughly at the same time that he had sent his envoys to meet Priscus. Again according to Sebeos, the Romans then inflicted a crushing defeat on the Avars with the result that they were forced to flee across the Danube. The Romans then informed the Emperor of the glorious victory and there was much rejoicing in the Imperial Palace. However, then the enemy raided the ‘inner part of the land and passed through some narrow places’, which I take to mean that the Avars invaded Dalmatia. The Romans made the mistake of following them. The Avars then positioned themselves in front of them in some unnamed pass and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romans. This implies that the Roman army was ambushed. Large numbers of Armenian nobles and their forces were slaughtered in the disaster. The remaining Romans were barely able to flee to the fortresses of Thrace.220 The Avars captured Mushel Mamikonean and executed him. Singidunum was lost. Sebeos claims that Maurice’s response was to assemble another army with orders to stay on the defensive. It is possible that Maurice dispatched them as reinforcements to Priscus in 595 or that he retained this force in Thrace for the protection of the capital. When Priscus learnt the fate of the citizens of Singidunum he sailed along the river and berthed at the island of Singan about 45 kilometres from the city. Priscus disembarked his army and brought dromons to the scene. Then he went to Constantiola where he boarded a dromon. Priscus on board the ship and the Khagan on the river bank then discussed the situation, but with no results. Priscus therefore decided to send an army under taxiarchos Godwin (Goudouis, Guduin, Gouduin; PLRE3 Guduin) against the Avars while he threatened the Avars from the island of Singan. This kept the Avar force divided into two. This was one of the methods the Strategikon recommended for use against the Slavs in this area. Godwin sailed to Singidunum, which was at the strategic junction of two rivers, the Sava and Danube. The frightened Avars hastily refortified the town by assembling their wagons in front of it, but then fled because they feared the Roman navy and the civilians inside the city. Singidunum was therefore saved with minimum Roman effort. This was a superb piece of generalship by Priscus and Godwin. The Khagan then turned his attention towards Dalmatia. He reached the city of Bonkeis (unknown) after several camps, following which his forces sacked forty forts in the area. When this was brought to the attention of Priscus, he had to react to it. Since Priscus could not leave the Danube line undefended, he was unable to sent more than 2,000 soldiers – under taxiarchos Godwin – to shadow the Avars. Priscus was also subject to the order of Maurice (mentioned by Sebeos) to remain on the defensive. This was the lesson learnt from the defeat of the Armenian force. Godwin indeed acted more wisely than the Armenians and used the rough terrain to his advantage to avoid detection when he shadowed the Avars. Thanks to this he was able to observe the enemy army from a hidden vantage point. He then sent thirty foot soldiers to shadow the enemy. They captured three drunkards, from whom it was learned that the Avars had placed 2,000 men to guard their war booty. The Romans were therefore able to conceal themselves in a ravine and attack the rear of the escort. The spoils of war were thus recovered, and the Avar campaign had ended in failure.

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304  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 According to Theophylact the Khagan was depressed as a result of these setbacks, so there was a cessation of hostilities for eighteen months from autumn 595 until summer 597. However, a more likely explanation for this inactivity is that the Avars were fighting against the Lombards and Franks during those months. The Avars appear to have continued their Dalmatian campaign northwards up to the lands held by the Lombards because they concluded peace with them in about 597/8. The Lombard King Agilulf may have suspected that the Romans had instigated this attack (for which see pp.265–6), but as we have seen, this was groundless. The second of the Avar campaigns was fought against the Bavarians and their overlords the Franks. The Bavarians exploited the difficulties of the Avars in 595 by attacking their subjects the Slavs with 30,000 men. It is possible that the Roman campaigns north of the Danube contributed to this by lowering Avar prestige in the area; the Romans had attacked the nominal client tribes of the Avars. However, I would not preclude the possibility that they did this as Roman allies, because soon after this we find the Franks asking for an alliance with Rome in return for money. However, it is possible that this actually resulted from their own troubles with the Avars, which followed soon after this.221 According to Paul the Deacon, the Khagan came to the assistance of his Slavic allies and butchered the entire Bavarian force. It was now that the Italians saw buffaloes for the first time, which means the Avars probably brought them with ‘Befulci’ Slavs (they cared for the buffaloes and acted as a vanguard for the Avars) when they fought against the Lombards. It is possible that the Bavarian campaign was a continuation of the Dalmatian campaign, and that the Avars marched through Lombard territory to Bavaria and then continued from there to Thuringia against the Franks. However, on the basis of Paul the Deacon these appear to have been two separate campaigns, because he states that the Avars marched from Pannonia to Thuringia which implies that after the Dalmatian and Bavarian campaigns the Avars deposited their booty at home and only then marched against the Franks. This campaign took place in 596 because Queen Brunhild was then reigning in the name of her grandsons Theuderic and Theudebert.222 Childebert II King of the Franks had died in about 596. He was succeeded by his sons Theudebert and Theuderic. Theudebert was placed on the throne of Austrasia with its capital at Metz while Theuderic II received the throne of Burgundy with its capital at Orleans. Both were still minors so the real power was in the hands of their grandmother Brunhild. It was presumably immediately after this that Brunhild sent envoys to Maurice to request an alliance against the Avars, because she knew that the Avars would invade in that same year to punish the Bavarian invasions. However, nothing came of this alliance for two reasons: 1) Maurice refused to give any money in return for it; 2) the war was over before the envoys returned. The Avars defeated the Franks but Brunhild was able to buy their withdrawal with money so the Avars returned to their homes to punish the Romans for their previous actions.223 The Avar invasion in 597–8.224 The Avars launched a surprise attack against the Romans in summer 597. It is not known why this came as a surprise to the Romans. Perhaps it was an intelligence-gathering failure, or alternatively the Romans had just miscalculated the situation. Perhaps they were expecting that the war between the Avars and the Franks would continue into 597.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  305 However, as we shall see, the truth of the matter appears to be that this is yet another example of Theophylact hiding the mistakes of Priscus. The Avars marched against the city of Tomi/Tomis. When Priscus learnt this, he reacted to it immediately by marching to the scene. Both sides encamped near the city. According to Theophanes, Priscus was in Singidunum and the Avars surprised him by using another invasion route. This is not mentioned by Theophylact, which brings up interesting possibilities about his use of sources, because it is clear that Theophanes is using another source besides Theophylact for the events of this year; Theophanes’s text preserves several details which are missing from Theophylact. If both Theophylact and Theophanes were using the same source or sources, Theophylact chose to hide anything that could have placed the actions of Priscus in poor light. If Priscus had positioned himself at Singidunum, it means that the Avar Khagan had outmanoeuvred him. Neither side made any decisive move during the summer, autumn or winter, so there was a stalemate in which both sides waited for the other side to give up. According to Theophylact, the Romans were starting to suffer from famine when the spring came and it was then that a miracle happened close to Easter (30 March 598). The Khagan sent an embassy to the Romans with a promise of provisions. Priscus was suspicious, but when the two sides had given guarantees of good conduct he agreed to a five-day truce. According to Theophylact, the Khagan then sent wagons loaded with provisions to the Romans, while Theophanes claims that it was Priscus who sent 400 wagons to collect the provisions from the Avars. On the fourth day of the truce, the Khagan asked Priscus to send him Indian spices. Priscus duly sent pepper, Indian leaf, cassia, cinnamon and saussurea.225 This shows how well the international spice trade worked at this time. The Romans had all the necessities for a good life at their disposal and the Khagan wanted a taste of the same. The delivery of the spices could of course be presented to the subjects of the Khagan as a sign of Roman subordination to his rule, so it provided a good excuse for what happened next. According to Theophylact, the day after the truce ended the Khagan learned that Comentiolus was approaching and was about to arrive at Nicopolis, which meant that Comentiolus’s army was about to cut off the route of retreat. The Khagan hastily dispatched ambassadors to Priscus. They requested the cessation of hostilities between Priscus and the Khagan so that the Avars could retreat. Priscus agreed to this. If we decide to trust the above account, it proves that Priscus made a mistake when he marched his army close to the Avars and the city of Tomis. Tomis was a fortified coastal city, easy to provision by sea. See the maps on pp.xxv, xxviii and xxx. But although Priscus’s encampment was close to Tomis, he was not able to avail of its supplies. Apparently the Avars were also able to cut off Priscus’s lines of supply, so the Avars were effectively besieging Priscus’s army. Priscus did, however, possess Indian spices, which suggests that the Romans were feeding his army with supply columns. This version is not necessarily true. It is possible that the pro-Priscus source wanted to find some plausible excuse for Priscus’s decision to conclude peace with the Avars when Maurice had already dispatched Comentiolus to assist him. The so-called hunger was then a suitable excuse for Priscus not to wait for the arrival of Comentiolus, and later for his inaction when the Avars pursued the army of Comentiolus. It is quite possible that professional jealousy played a role in this. The route which Comentiolus took proves that he was advancing via Nicopolis to the road that ran along the Danube and which Priscus had taken earlier

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306  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 when he had marched from Singidunum to relieve Tomis. Priscus’s army was therefore west of the Avar army, so Comentiolus was expecting to join his force without having to face the Avars. When Priscus had concluded his peace with the Avars, he allowed the Avars to get past his own army so that they were able to march immediately against the army of Comentiolus who was not expecting to face them. In other words, if true, the Khagan had now fooled Priscus twice. Theophylact fails to say why Comentiolus was marching towards the Danube, but Theophanes’s text tells us that Maurice had sent Comentiolus with an infantry force to help Priscus. Comentiolus had only very recently come back to the capital from the highly successful Persian campaign of 595, so it is clear that his services in the East recommended him to this task. According to Theophylact, Comentiolus had already reached the city of Sucidava, which was 70km west of Tomis as birds fly (on the basis of The Barrington Atlas), when he learnt that the Khagan was advancing against him. This means that the Avars were one day’s march from Comentiolus if they left behind their wagons and used only their cavalry. This was obviously not possible, because the Avars could not leave their wagons behind when they marched past Priscus towards Comentiolus. This would have betrayed their intentions. However, the actions of Priscus still bordered on treason. He did not inform his colleague and did nothing to help him when the Avars marched west. Comentiolus beat a hasty retreat, reaching Iatrus on the seventh day. He pitched a marching camp there. Comentiolus knew that the Avars were 20 parasangs from them (about 75 miles (Theophylact) or 30 miles (Theophanes)), and secretly dispatched an envoy to the Khagan in the middle of the night. According to Theophanes and John of Antioch (frg. 316), it was claimed by some sources that Maurice had secretly ordered Comentiolus to betray this army to the Avars because of their indiscipline. We can discard this claim as later propaganda spread by Priscus and Phocas. It is because of this that Michael Whitby (1988, 162) suggests that Comentiolus may have offered the Khagan safe passage, but the fact remains that it is possible or even probable that the sending of the messenger secretly during the night is a later fabrication. What follows next suggests the opposite. Both Theophanes and Theophylact claim that Comentiolus ordered the men to arm themselves in the middle of the night without telling them they were about to fight a battle in the morning. The result was that he disordered his army, because the men had not armed themselves properly for combat. Theophylact states that the soldiers were wearing coats of mail because they were expecting only to be reviewed. At dawn, when the Romans saw the Avars arrayed in combat formation two miles in front of them, they cursed their commander. I would suggest that this contains a germ of truth: it is possible that it means that as the soldiers probably expected only a review they had put on their coats of mail in haste without their defensive padded undergarments (subarmalis, thoracomachus), so the soldiers now had to return to their tents to arm themselves properly for combat. This would have been typical behaviour for old veterans like, for example, the future Emperor Phocas who accompanied this army.226 In truth this would not have been the general’s fault but the fault of the lazy soldiers who wanted to avoid having to put on all of their gear. The other possibility is that the soldiers did indeed wear the entire panoply (both padded coats and armour) so the actual problem at this time was that the soldiers were not expected to wear armour on top of their padded

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  307 coats because they were to conduct a fighting retreat through difficult terrain southwards. It should be remembered that the Strategikon instructed footmen to be equipped lightly for difficult terrain to avoid the extra fatigue caused by armour. According to Theophylact, Comentiolus then disordered the army by moving men from the centre to the left, men from the left to the right flank, and by sending the right wing to guard the baggage – which resulted in their flight. As discussed in my doctoral dissertation, the only reasonable explanation for this is that the Romans assumed the square formation. For this, see the attached schematic diagrams. The diagrams represent a simplified version with four divisions for the sake of clarity. Theophylact continues in the same vein by stating that Comentiolus then ordered the right wing (now the rear of the hollow square formation) to guard the baggage and flee immediately. In truth this was not a flight. The rear portion of the hollow square took the baggage train two miles to the rear and then built a new marching camp while the remaining two thirds of the army protected it. It is therefore quite clear that both Theophylact and Theophanes make several completely unfounded accusations against Comentiolus. On this basis it is impossible to know for sure which of the following accounts is true, if any. The reasons for the inactivity of the Avars were: 1) they had made a night march to reach the Roman encampment (which suggests Theophylact’s 75 miles is likelier than Theophanes’s 30); 2) The Romans in front of them were arrayed as an epikampios opisthia behind which was still another infantry formation protecting the building of the camp.

Theophylact continues in the same vein and states that in the middle of the following night Comentiolus chose a group of picked men as scouts and ordered them to flee secretly. This obviously means that Comentiolus dispatched scouts to find out if the route of retreat towards the Shipka Pass was secure. The next morning Comentiolus is then said to have equipped himself with steel, after which he pretended to be going on a hunting expedition four miles away. Theophylact claims that Comentiolus actually fled and left the army to be butchered by the Avars. Michael Whitby (1988, 162) is likely to be correct when suggests that in truth Comentiolus cleared the route of retreat from possible Avar forces. The distance given, four miles, suggests that Comentiolus’s scouts had found an Avar ambush at that distance and that he had cleared it in person with his elite cavalry. On the basis of later accusations levelled against Comentiolus, it is clear that he had not made his plans known to the entire army, so his absence was interpreted by some of the men (including Phocas) as treacherous flight. Theophylact goes on to claim that the soldiers learnt of the flight of their commander only at midday, with the result

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308  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 that they fled forty miles without a leader in total disarray. There may be a germ of truth to this, because the Avars were able to capture soldiers who they demanded a ransom for soon after. Nevertheless, the commander was soon united with his men, so the disorder did not last for long (he was only four miles from the army). It is quite possible that the excitable Phocas, hekatontarchos (centurion) and member of the Excubitores, was the instigator of the disorder when he noted that Comentiolus was absent. As an excubitor he would have been among the first to observe that the strategos was not in his tent. His reaction speaks much about his nature – he was a suspicious character prone to seeing conspiracies. Theophylact then claims that the Avars crossed the Iatrus, pursued the Romans, attacked them, and that the Romans fled in complete disarray. He goes on to claim that the Avars bypassed the Romans and blocked the cleisurae (narrow passes of the Haemus range), which in this case presumably means the Shipka Pass. It was then that the supposedly defeated, disordered and panicky Roman army somehow found the discipline to form a phalanx and force their way through the barbarians. As can be seen, all this is pure propaganda. The Romans were at no stage in complete disorder or defeated. There appears to have been some disorder during the first stage of the flight when the soldiers did not know where their commander was, but once he rejoined his men there was no panic or disorder. Theophanes does not make the claim that Comentiolus would have abandoned his army at any point during the campaign. He only states that Comentiolus disordered it through his own actions, which is partially true; but it is clear that it resulted mainly from the excitable character of Phocas. The rest of the 40-mile retreat was evidently orderly. A disorderly leaderless army could not have fought its way through the enemy-held passes. It is clear that the retreat was conducted under Comentiolus’s personal leadership, because the army arrived in Thrace with him. In fact the good quality of Comentiolus’s leadership and his infantry forces shines through. The Romans were able to retreat and fight their way home, even though the enemy occupied passes while other forces pressed them from behind. Theophylact then goes on with his unreliable story by stating that Comentiolus next fled to Drizipera where the townsmen closed the gates and sent him off with insults and stones and he continued his flight to the Long Walls. As we shall see, the real reason for the refusal to admit Comentiolus and his men inside Drizipera was that its inhabitants were suffering from the plague. It was the right thing to do. If we compare Comentiolus’s achievement now with that of Priscus in 588, he demonstrated superior command abilities. In 588 Priscus had lost his cavalry force thanks to a stratagem, and he had not been able to reach the Long Walls with his infantry but had been besieged by the Avars. On top of this, it was now thanks to the mistakes and inactivity of Priscus that Comentiolus had to make this fighting retreat. However, Priscus’s inactivity after the army of Comentiolus had passed through the Haemus Range is acceptable because, as we shall see, the area south of it was suffering from plague. Priscus clearly did not want to lead his army there. Instead, from Theophanes we learn that he led his army back to Singidunum and thereby blocked the Avars’ route of retreat. The Avars followed in the footsteps of Comentiolus and attacked and sacked Drizipera. According to Theophylact, they burned the church of Alexander and destroyed his tomb and were therefore punished with the plague. Now the plague hit the Avar army hard. The

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  309 Khagan lost seven of his sons and was grief-stricken. The flight of Comentiolus and the arrival of the Avar army appear to have caused panic in Constantinople, but according to Theophanes it did not affect the Emperor who calmly led the excubitores and the various units of the army to the Long Walls and garrisoned it while the populace (presumably including the circus factions) guarded the city. Theophylact states that Maurice took men from the circus factions with him to the Long Walls. The Army of Thrace sent ambassadors to the Emperor to accuse Comentiolus of treachery. One of these envoys was the future Emperor Phocas. This suggests that there were indeed some who thought that Comentiolus had left his army leaderless at Iatrus when he went ahead to clear the route. The Emperor assembled a judicial court to hear the case against Comentiolus. Philippicus appears to have been placed in command of the Army of Thrace while the case was being investigated. According to Michael Rabo/ Syrus, it was then that the Bulgarians began to ravage Thrace. Philippicus marched against them, defeated them, and returned home.227 This is once again indicative of the tendency of the pro-Phocas/Priscus sources used by Theophylact and Theophanes to hide all the achievements of the men close to Emperor Maurice. According to Theophanes, the Senate demanded that Maurice send an envoy to the Khagan to discuss peace terms. It is probable that Theophanes is correct when he says the ransom negotiations of the Roman soldiers took place now. The soldiers to be ransomed consisted in all probability mostly of the soldiers that the Avars had captured when they marched to Tomis and the soldiers and families from Drizipera. The disorder in the Roman army that served under Comentiolus cannot have lasted for long; it is unlikely that it would have suffered serious losses. According to some later sources, the Avars had captured 12,000 Roman soldiers during this campaign, but it is clear that the bulk of these prisoners were taken not from the army of Comentiolus but from the forts along the Danube and from Drizipera.228 The Khagan first asked one nomisma/solidus per soldier, which Maurice refused. Then the Khagan asked half a nomisma per man, but the Emperor refused to pay even four keratia (there were 24 keratia per nomisma). Maurice probably refused to pay the ransom because he believed they would have the plague. The Khagan’s answer was to kill all the prisoners, after which he made the demand that the yearly tribute should be increased by 20,000 solidi (Theophylact) making the total yearly tribute 120,000 solidi, or by 50,000 solidi (Theophanes) making the total 150,000 solidi. In addition, the Danube was set as the border between the two empires, but the Romans were given permission to attack the Slavs on the other side. The sources make it appear as if Maurice was forced to agree to this, but the truth must be that Maurice did not consider it wise to attempt to engage the plague-ridden enemy in combat; it was wiser to let the enemy take the plague with them to their homes. The refusal to pay a ransom for the Roman soldiers appeared even worse to the Army of Thrace, especially when Maurice still agreed to increase the yearly tribute to the Avars who had killed their comrades. Priscus, who was at Singidunum, was clearly ordered not to attempt to prevent their return to their homes. The refusal to ransom the soldiers caused much hatred towards the Emperor, especially among the Army of Thrace, and he was publicly accused of avarice. Possibly Maurice felt that he had committed a sin in this matter: he wrote letters and sent gifts to all the

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310  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 patriarchal sees, communities and monasteries asking them to pray on his behalf that God would forgive his sins. However, if Maurice’s aim had been to avoid the spread of plague from Drizipera to Constantinople, he failed. According to Agapius (p.439–40) and Chronicle 1234 (82, p.171), Constantinople was hit hard by the plague in 598. According to the former 400,000 lost their lives, according to the latter, 380,000. There was also a great earthquake in Syria on 19 January 598 which left many cities in ruins. One was Antioch, again. A great portion of its walls and houses were levelled. It is clear that these disasters must have affected the ability of the Romans to conduct their operations, especially in Thrace, Scythia and Illyricum too. Agapius and Michael the Syrian (included in Theophilus of Edessa, 52–3) record other disasters for the 590s, which affected primarily Syria. These include a great plague and gale in 590–1, an earthquake in 591–2, and a heatwave in 596 that destroyed trees and harvests of grapes, olives, vines and other crops. In 598 there was such heavy rainfall that many places were flooded, after which followed locusts which again destroyed harvests, and in 599 there was another earthquake followed by exceptional snowfall. These disasters clearly had an impact on the imperial economy, but we should not overestimate their importance, because Maurice always found cash for whatever needs there were, and he left huge reserves of cash for his successor. Furthermore, there is no sign of these disasters affecting the Roman ability to assist Chosroes against his enemies in 593 and 595. The principal vice of Maurice – if not his only vice – was his tendency to penny-pinch. It was apparently after the retreat of the Avars that Maurice assembled the judicial hearing of the case against Comentiolus at the Silentium in the Imperial Palace. The Army of Thrace was already boiling with anger towards the Emperor because he had refused to ransom the soldiers from the Avars, but now he added fuel to the fire. Phocas spoke so angrily against both the Emperor and Comentiolus that afterwards one of the patricians pulled his beard because of his audacity towards his ruler. Maurice did not punish Phocas for his words. But the keeping of this rabble-rouser and agitator in the ranks of the imperial bodyguards and security apparatus proved to be a fatal mistake. On top of this the Emperor cleared Comentiolus of all charges levelled against him.229 It is probable that Maurice’s judgment regarding Comentiolus was the correct one. The fact that the army reached Thrace together proves that Comentiolus had not abandoned his army as claimed by the ambassadors. Furthermore, as noted, Comentiolus was able to bring his army back home, unlike Priscus in 588. In fact, Maurice appointed Comentiolus as strategos and Priscus as his hypostrategos. In other words, he rewarded Comentiolus. According to Theophanes, it was now that Phocas and others like him formed their plot against the Emperor. The glorious battles of 599230 In summer 599 Maurice appointed Comentiolus as strategos and dispatched him to join his forces with those of Priscus so that they would campaign together against the Avars. In the meantime the Avars had probably suffered another setback. Callinicus, the Exarch of Italy (PLRE3), had inflicted a defeat on Slavs before May 599. It is quite possible that these Slavs were subjects of the Khagan somewhere in the general region of Istria/ Dalmatia. The armies of Priscus and Comentiolus were united at Singidunum. Four days

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  311 later the two commanders assembled their forces and Priscus delivered to the troops the Emperor’s message that the peace between the Romans and Avars was at its end. The Romans then travelled to the island of Viminacium, which was located in front of the destroyed city of Viminacium. According to Theophylact, Comentiolus fell sick there. The Khagan learnt of these developments and immediately raided Roman territory while dispatching his four sons opposite the island to prevent the crossing of the Danube. The Romans built rafts, made a forced landing and drove the enemy away from the river bank, after which they built a fortified camp. This took place while both commanders, Priscus and Comentiolus, were observing the events from the island. Theophylact claims that Priscus was unwilling to take command of the army alone and tarried on the island, until repeated messages from the soldiers changed his mind so that he convinced Comentiolus to allow him to take command of the soldiers. I agree with Michael Whitby (1988, 164) that it is likely that Comentiolus performed operations that were vital to the campaign’s success but which were not recorded by Theophylact. Given the extent of fabrications against Comentiolus, Petrus, Philippicus and Maurice in the sources written during the reign of Phocas it is next to impossible to know for certain what these were, but I will present my best educated guess in the following analysis. On the second day after his arrival in the Roman camp Priscus ordered the ships to depart and anchor close to the destroyed city of Viminacium. Priscus feared that the presence of the ships would enable the soldiers to flee to the island. Therefore, he was forcing the soldiers to fight or die. Priscus observed that the enemy was eager to fight so he arrayed his army for combat on the fourth day after his arrival. The army under Priscus’s command advanced out of the camp in three divisions and attacked by using the square formation. The other possible interpretation is that the three divisions were formed as an epikampios opisthia (rearward facing half-square) so that the encampment formed the rear of the four-sided formation. The reason for this is that the ‘four-sided’ formation is claimed to have provided security for the camp. The Avars employed fifteen units, each of which probably consisted of a moira of 3,000 horsemen each231 for a total of 45,000 horsemen. They would have been deployed in the standard manner with a single line of twelve units and three units as reserves. The battle was hard fought, but ultimately the Avar cavalry was unable to break the Roman infantry formation. The Romans lost 300 men killed while the Avars suffered 4,000 casualties.232 This probably means that Priscus had first used the standard cavalry formation with three divisions, behind which he had placed infantry support with the aim of inducing the Avars to pursue the cavalry up to the Roman infantry. It was then that Priscus opposed the Avars with the single four-sided formation. If he used the hollow square proper, as is likelier when the aim was to lure the enemy to fight a battle, it indicates that he had advanced away from the camp to such a distance that the camp did not provide security for the formation. However, I will give both versions in the following diagrams because it is possible to interpret the evidence in different ways. On the third day after the previous battle (Theophylact) or on the following morning (Theophanes) the Avars renewed the fight. According to Theophylact, Priscus marshalled his force in three divisions in such a way that the flanks (ta kerata) were committed to split apart at once and admit the Avars, so the Avars would be surrounded in the hollow in the middle. As a result of this manoeuvre, the Avars lost 9,000 (Theophylact) or 8,000 (Theophanes) killed and the Romans achieved a major victory.

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There are different ways to explain this text of Theophylact. Priscus might have ordered his units to assume the antistomos difalangia formations such that the flanks of the units wheeled inwards and created openings for the Avar units to enter so they could be placed between two phalanxes and destroyed. This is the least likely option because Priscus used three divisions (syntaxeis), with the implication that the flanks were the wing divisions. This implies that he used a grand tactical manoeuvre, which means either the crescent that Narses had used against the Gothic cavalry at Taginae, or the forward-angled half-square (epikampios emprosthia) that Narses had used at the Battle of Casulinus River. The latter was the array that the great Scipio Africanus had used at Ilipa and versions of which were included by Vegetius in his list of combat formations.233 Both are possible

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  313 and are therefore given below. However, the epikampios emprosthia is likelier on the basis of the splitting of the flanks (ta kerata perischisai), since this array with its variants is the only formation of antiquity that was used in this manner. Notably the same formation could also be adopted when the original battle formation was the epikampios opisthia, one of the standard arrays used against cavalry. In that case the epikampios emprosthia could be formed just by marching the flanks forward in a column formation – this is what Hannibal did at Cannae 216 bc. The diagram of the epikampios emprosthia shows the principle of how the heavy-armed were deployed to protect the archers. The Romans returned victorious to their encampment when the sun sank.

On the tenth day after this (Theophylact) or the third day (Theophanes), the Avars renewed their fight by arraying themselves in a single division formation (which I take to mean the use of the single deep line) with the apparent purpose of breaking through the Roman line. By now Priscus appears to have advanced away from the landing site because the enemies were forced against a swamp. Priscus had arrayed his forces in three divisions in an advantageous position blocking the enemy’s only route of retreat. He also had the advantage of wind. This was his third battle. The Avars had to use the single formation to try to force their way through. According to Theophylact, Priscus outfought the enemy with his two wings and drove the enemy against the swamp below them. This simply means that the strategos again surrounded the enemy, and again used the crescent or forward-angled half-square which included the cavalry wings. The outflanking was easily achieved because by now the Romans outnumbered the enemy. According to Theophylact the Avars lost 15,000 men in this battle, including four sons of the Khagan. Theophanes states that the Avars were driven into the marsh and many drowned, including the sons of the Khagan. At this point in his account Theophanes adds important information which is missing from the account of Theophylact. The following quotes clarify the sequence of events: ‘…after routing them and driving the Avars into the waters of the marsh, drowned many of them. Amongst these the Chagan’s sons were drowned. The Romans won a conspicuous victory. The Chagan, having gathered numerous forces, advanced

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314  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 against the Romans. After having joined battle, the Romans routed the barbarians and gained a victory more remarkable than all others. Priscus, having drawn up a force of 4,000, ordered them to cross the river Tissos and to spy out the movements of the barbarians.’ Theophanes AM 6093, tr. by C. Mango, R. Scott with the assistance of G. Greatrex, p.407 = CSHB, Bonn 1839, p.435 lines 9–12. ‘A great multitude had perished in this swamp and the Chagan’s sons were drowned there, Priscus procured the most glorious victory. In this battle then, fifteen thousand barbarians were annihilated. And so the Chagan, who survived at great peril [Note that this refers to a battle which is not mentioned because in the previous battle Priscus had fought and killed Chagan’s sons! This is the key piece of evidence that Theophylact has left something out], came to the river Tissus; on the thirtieth day the barbarian assembled a great force. When he took the initiative for a fourth battle and the Roman general had heard of this, Priscus encamped at the river Tissus.’ [After this follows a description of a battle that came before the incident in which Priscus sent the 4,000 men across the Tissus. It would be possible to interpret the battle between Priscus and the Khagan at Tissus as the great battle mentioned by Theophanes, but there is one important catch which is that Theophylact refers to a battle which the Khagan had lost before this battle. Therefore, it is likely that Theophylact has left out the battle in question, which has been preserved by Theophanes. The only person against whom the Khagan could have fought this battle is Comentiolus because Priscus had fought against his sons.] Theophylact 8.3.7–8, tr. by Mary and Michael Whitby, Theophylact, p.212. In sum, it is clear that while Priscus engaged the sons of the Khagan north of the island of Viminacium, the Khagan advanced against the Romans. It is equally clear that Comentiolus then led his army against the Khagan and achieved ‘a victory more remarkable than all others’. In other words, he achieved a greater victory over the Avars in a single battle than any other Roman commander, Priscus included. However, the Khagan survived this battle ‘at great peril’ and then regrouped the remnants of his army and marched against Priscus. He had basically only one field army left, which consisted of men that Comentiolus had defeated and of those who had not joined either of the Avar armies before this, because it is unlikely there would have been many men left from the army that his sons had led. The Khagan chose the only viable option available to him, which was to exploit the separation of the Roman forces: he led the remnants of his army against the weaker Roman force. The Khagan assembled the remnants of his forces at the Tissus River. When Priscus learnt of this, he marched his army to the Tissus River. According to Theophylact, Priscus marshalled his forces in inverse order, placing the left contingent on the right and the centre on the left. This means that he assumed the epikampios opisthia formation to meet the forces of the Khagan. The following diagrams show in simplified form how the epikampios opisthia formation was assumed. The Avars had twelve divisions which I interpret to mean 36,000 men. Theophylact credits the Romans’ victory to their resolution. The use of the infantry in the covered epikampios opisthia formation proved its worth against the nomadic horseman. This was Priscus’s fourth battle.

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  315

Priscus exploited the victory by sending 4,000 men across the Tissus to reconnoitre enemy movements. They surprised three Gepid settlements in succession and killed 30,000 drunken Gepids. The Gepids had not learnt of the defeat of the Avars and had been drinking to celebrate a local festivity. This means the defeated Avars had fled in another direction. The Romans then took prisoners with them and joined Priscus on the other side of the river. However, since the Avar army consisted of cavalry, the previous battle had not destroyed their entire army. It had only caused its rout. It is probable that the pursuit had been performed with extra caution because the Strategikon warns against pursuing nomads because of the danger of feigned flight. This means that probably most of the Avar cavalry had escaped. It was these that reassembled on the twentieth day (after the previous battle?) at Tissus, to where Priscus returned. He appears to have been able to force the Avars back against the river, because they were killed, drowned or captured. According to Theophylact, Priscus captured 3,000 Avars, 8,000 Slavs and 6,200 other barbarians. Theophanes claims that Priscus captured 3,000 Avars, 800 Slavs, 3,200 Gepids and 2,000 other barbarians. The Slavs had probably been used as ‘Befulci’ in this battle, which means the Avars had posted them in front of their array as cannon fodder. This was Priscus’s fifth major battle in 599. According to Theophylact, Priscus dispatched these prisoners to Tomi, but the Emperor unwittingly released them as a gesture of goodwill when the envoys of the Khagan asked him to. Theophylact claims this was because Maurice had not yet learned of the successes of Priscus.

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316  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 It is clear that this series of battles caused the balance of power to shift to the Romans’ advantage, if only they could have exploited it more fully. This was Maurice’s plan, but he was unable to carry it out because he was overthrown and murdered. According to the version preserved by Theophylact, when Priscus had achieved the great successes just described, Comentiolus suddenly woke up from his slumber, just before the winter season, and marched from Viminacium to Novae and from there through Trajan’s Pass to Philippopolis. The veteran who was instructed to act as a guide resisted: he predicted that it would be extremely difficult to get through the pass in the wintry conditions. Comentiolus paid no heed and ordered the army to continue the march. Theophylact claims that the weather was exceptionally cold and many of the men and most of the baggage animals died, so when Comentiolus reached Philippopolis he spent the rest of the 599/600 winter there and continued his journey to Constantinople only in the spring. This account and the preceding one are further signs of the tendency of Theophylact to blacken Comentiolus’s reputation. It is also likely that the retreat from the north through Trajan’s Pass was forced on Comentiolus by his unruly soldiers who were unwilling to remain in the north. The war in the Balkans 600–602234 The Balkans from 600 until early 601. The Balkans was peaceful during this period, presumably because the Avars had been so thoroughly trashed. The Khagan launched a diplomatic offensive to improve his position by concluding an alliance with the Lombards. His aim was to counter the Roman-Frankish alliance, which appears to have existed at this time. Agilulf was probably prepared to negotiate because an alliance with the Avars improved his position vis-à-vis the Romans and Franks. It is also possible that the patricius and exarchus Callinicus had already captured the daughter of Agilulf together with her husband from Parma by late 600 or early 601 and had taken them to Ravenna. This would certainly have made Agilulf ready to conclude the alliance, but it is even likelier that the kidnapping of Agilulf ’s daughter was a Roman response to the negotiations, if they were aware of them. Whatever the truth, Agilulf was looking for allies. After the kidnapping of his daughter, Agilulf dispatched shipwrights to the Avars who constructed ships for the Khagan with which help he then captured an island in ‘Thrace’. In addition, the Khagan asked the Franks to keep the peace, which they did.235 We do not know why the Romans did not resume their offensive in 600. One may guess that 600 was spent in preparations for the resumption of the offensive the next year and that new forces were recruited and trained to replace those lost in previous years. It is also possible that some sort of peace agreement or truce was in effect and/or that Maurice was just cautious in a situation in which there were troubles with Persia. In 601 Maurice appointed his brother Petrus as strategos of Europe. Petrus moved to the Danube, made camp at a place called Palastolon (Palatiolum) at the mouth of the River Osam, and passed the summer there. When the autumn came, he marched to the ‘Dardanian Province’ because intelligence told him the Avars had assembled at a place called the Cataracts (the stretch of the Danube just south of the Iron Gates) and that Apsich, the hypostrategos of the Avar army, had assembled forces there. Apsich’s goal was to capture the Cataracts because the 80-km stretch from the River Morava downstream was turbulent and difficult to sail ships upstream. Because of this the Romans towed their

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  317 ships along the south bank of the river. The Avars’ strategy was to prevent the Romans from rowing their ships upstream so that they would not be hampered by the presence of the Roman navy.236 The Avars aimed to prevent the Romans from using their river fleet, while they built ships of their own with the help of the Roman shipwrights brought from Italy. It is therefore possible that it was then that the Avars captured the ‘island in Thrace’ which Paul the Deacon mentions. This is not mentioned by our Roman sources; it is likely to be some unimportant short-term capture of one of the many islands of the Danube. When the Romans reached the opposite shore, Petrus negotiated with Apsich who demanded they hand over the Cataracts in return for peace. This only angered Petrus and both sides withdrew to winter quarters. Meanwhile the Khagan had moved to Constantiola while Petrus returned to Adrianople in Thrace. In the autumn of 601 an important event took place in Constantinople. This was the marriage of the daughter of Germanus (Caesar under Tiberius II and Maurice’s rival) and Maurice’s son Theodosius III. This united the two most powerful families of the Empire. Theophanes dates the marriage to November 601 while the Chronicle Paschale dates it to February 602. The festivities lasted for seven days, 9–15 February 602. Mary and Michael Whitby have suggested an attractive solution to the problem in dating which reconciles both sources. They suggest that the marriage took place in November 601 but its celebrations took place on 9–15 February 602, because Maurice then tried to pacify the unrest at the capital – between these two dates there was a food shortage at the capital which led to rioting on the Feast of Candelmas on 2 February 602. A man dressed as a monk ran from the Forum to the Chalke sword-in-hand and shouted that the Emperor would die by the dagger. Another man called Herodianos predicted that Maurice would be killed. The most dangerous time for the Emperor was when he was to celebrate the Feast with the people, as custom required. The masses started to pelt the Emperor and his entourage with stones when they were making supplications. Germanus hid Theodosius under his cloak and secretly took him to safety. This proves that Theodosius had already married his daughter. In the meantime, the Emperor had sent his bodyguards to restore order with distria (iron maces, sing. distrion). This was effective and the Emperor did not even have to interrupt the litany. He and his retinue then continued to the church of the Mother of God (Theotokos) called Lachernae/Blachernae, which the angry populace exploited by once again pelting them with stones. When the Emperor had completed the ceremonies in the church which housed the Robe of the Virgin Mary, he returned to the Palace. On the following day he apprehended the most vocal of the rioters and disciplined them with minor punishments. Maurice was a lenient ruler.237 In 602 the Romans appear to have been patrolling the border to ensure the enemy would not attempt to cross it, when spies informed Maurice that the Avars were trying to surprise the Romans with an attack on Constantinople. Therefore, he ordered Petrus to leave Adrianople and advance against the Slavs on the other side of the Danube. Petrus wrote to the skribon/scribo Bonosus to prepare ferry-boats for his army. Petrus appointed Godwin as hypostrategos. Godwin crossed the river in boats, defeated hordes of Slavs and took a great amount of booty and many captives. This appears to be a textbook example of a lighting attack against the Slavs on the opposite shore as recommended in the Strategikon. After these successes the soldiers demanded to be allowed to return to

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318  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 their own side of the border, but Godwin managed to keep them north of the Danube for a little longer. When the Khagan learnt of this he dispatched Apsich to destroy the Antae who were allied with the Romans. This was clearly meant as a punishment, but it did not turn out as he expected because it resulted in the defection of large numbers of Avars to the Roman side. The Khagan was upset by this turn of events and tried to win back to his side those who had defected.

5.3. THE OVERTHROW OF MAURICE IN 602: THE END OF AN ERA238 The order for the troops to winter in enemy territory and the usurpation of Phocas After this Maurice made the fateful decision of ordering his troops to winter in the lands of the Slavs. His purpose was militarily sensible. It was time to take advantage of the situation the Avars and Slavs were in. This was the recommended course of action Maurice had written into the Strategikon. The trees would be without leaves, and the rivers, lakes and marshes would be frozen, so the enemy would be easy to find and destroy. The soldiers would also be able to live off the land. The problem with this was of course that Maurice had a reputation for avarice and the soldiers interpreted the order in this light. The soldiers had other reasons too for their unwilligness to spend the winter in the north. They feared what would happen to their horses – it was expensive to replace them. They also disliked living under canvas in harsh winter conditions surrounded by hostile tribes. Most importantly, they wanted to take their booty safely back home to their families and friends. Consequently, when the order to winter in enemy territory came in the autumn 602, Petrus knew he was in trouble. When the general announced the order to the troops there was mutiny. The soldiers therefore crossed the Danube to the Roman side and encamped at Palastolon in a state of fury. At the time Petrus was ten miles away. Theophylact says this was a mistake. Petrus should have joined the army. Instead, he called Godwin to meet him on the third day after their arrival. Petrus showed the letters the Emperor had sent him and pointed out his predicament. This convinced Godwin to follow the order. Godwin returned to the camp and convinced the soldiers to follow the Emperor’s order. The soldiers marched past Asemus to Curisca with the intention of building rafts and ferry-boats so they could cross to the northern side of the Danube. However, while they were constructing the ferry-boats they were hit hard by stormy cold weather and completely lost their appetite for winter campaigning. This was exploited by the agitator and rabble-rouser Phocas who managed to turn the soldiers into open mutiny. As excubitor and hekatontarchos Phocas was supposed to be in charge of preventing mutinies, but he did the opposite. The troops chose eight men as their representatives and sent them to meet Petrus. One of them was Phocas. They requested permission to return home for the winter. Petrus sent a messenger to the Emperor who responded that the army should winter in enemy territory. According to Theophylact, Maurice’s letter said that the soldiers were to live off enemy land so that they would not need to be fed at the state’s expense. If true, this was a horrible mistake. When Petrus got this order, he summoned the army’s representatives and promised to meet them the following day. Petrus was in a difficult position because, unlike Belisarius

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  319 earlier in the sixth century, he did not possess a strong body of personal bucellarii to keep order in the army. He summoned Godwin and in despair told him of the orders he had received from his brother. According to Theophylact, Petrus was in tears and accused his brother of the sin of avarice. It is indeed possible that this was the real reason for Maurice’s folly, if the contents of the letter have been reported accurately. Petrus felt unable to oppose his brother’s order, so he assembled the taxiarchoi and revealed to them the contents of the letter. The taxiarchoi told Petrus that this was impossible, but in spite of this Petrus addressed the troops. The soldiers mutinied openly. They withdrew from the encampment and convened an assembly of their own – a sort of revolutionary ‘soviet’ – and when the officers saw this they fled and came to Petrus. The next day the soldiers held another assembly. They appointed the agitator Phocas as their commander and raised him on a shield. The shield-raising ceremony suggests that he was proclaimed Augustus. When Petrus learnt this, he dispatched a courier to his brother and fled. Phocas and the rebels then started their march towards Constantinople. Maurice’s reaction to the usurpation and his fall from power When Maurice heard the news, he at first pretended nothing had happened, and held chariot races to keep the factions and populace happy. At the same time he let the people know through heralds that they should not be worried about the disorder of the army. Then on the fourth day Maurice summoned the faction leaders Sergius and Cosmas to the palace and asked how many men they had at their disposal. Sergius, the leader of the Greens, said he had 1,500 soldiers in his rota book, Cosmas said there were 900 Blues ready to fight. Soon after this Germanus and Theodosius went outside the city for riding and chariot-driving at Callicrateia. Phocas dispatched an envoy to Theodosius who stated that the army would want to replace Maurice either with Theodosius or with Germanus, because they would no longer tolerate the rule of Maurice. When the news of this was brought to the Emperor, he immediately ordered his son back to the city with a letter, and on the following day ordered Comentiolus to take command of the troops posted at the Theodosian Walls. These included both the circus factions and the regular soldiers. Then Maurice had Germanus brought inside the palace for interrogation. Maurice accused Germanus of treachery and claimed as proof of this the rebel army’s promise of imperial rule to Germanus or Theodosius and the fact that the mob had not looted the horses of Germanus when they had looted everyone else’s horses. These so-called proofs suggest that Phocas’s intention had all along been to divide the enemy with fictitious promises. In particular it should be noted that one of the standard stratagems used in antiquity to cause divisions among the defenders was not to pillage the domains or other property of some important person in the territory invaded. In short, there is every reason to believe that Phocas was able to sow the seeds of distrust between Maurice and his son Theodosius and Germanus. It is strange that such an experienced man as Maurice could not see past these lies and stratagems. On the other hand, it should still be kept in mind that we cannot pass any final judgment on this issue, because Maurice was better informed than us. The meeting between Maurice and Germanus had ended without a definite decision, but Theodosius warned his father-in-law (Germanus) to flee if he valued his life. This suggests that Maurice may have intended to get rid of Germanus by some less obvious

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320  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 means. Germanus believed the warning and assembled his bodyguards and went to the Church of Theotokos. When Maurice heard this, he ordered the eunuch Stephanus, the tutor of his sons, to convince Germanus to leave the church, but Germanus’s bodyguards prevented this. In the following night Germanus fled to the Church of Hagia Sophia. The breakup between Germanus and Maurice was now in the open. Learning this, Maurice hit his son Theodosius with a staff and accused him of warning Germanus. Maurice sent his bodyguards to fetch Germanus, with the result that the populace rose in support of Germanus because they now hated Maurice. They convinced Germanus to leave, but he returned when one member of the church staff shouted that he should go back inside. This resulted in massive unrest, with the populace shouting insults at the Emperor. When the faction members on the Theodosian Wall heard this, they abandoned their posts and joined the rioters. They went on to torch the house of Constantinus Lardys, the Praetorian Prefect of the East, because it was he who Maurice had put in charge of collecting taxes. Maurice now considered his position hopeless and fled in the middle of the night with his family by boarding a dromon which was loaded with money. It is clear that Maurice had by now also lost the support of the excubitores and scholae and all the rest of the soldiers, because it was their stance that decided the fate of the Emperor and not that of the common mob. It is therefore possible that by then the henchmen of Phocas had corrupted the key members of those units, although it is possible that the mere sight of the populace shouting in unison against the Emperor was enough to convince them that Maurice was not to be saved. The Nika revolt of 532 shows that even when the excubitores and scholae joined the populace, the Emperor could still win if he had enough loyal regular soldiers on his side under loyal commanders. In this case it appears that no troops stayed loyal to the Emperor. Because of an exceptionally strong south wind, Maurice was unable to reach his intended destination. Also he was badly afflicted by gout and temporarily forced to halt. He ended up in Chalcedon where he sought refuge from the Church of the Martyr Autonomus. From there he dispatched his son Theodosius together with the trusted tax collector Constantinus Lardys to Chosroes II. The same night, members of the Green Faction opened the gates and went to meet the usurper who was by then nearby. In the meantime, Germanus was attempting to usurp power himself and sent a silentarius Theodorus to meet the Green Faction leader, Sergius, to convince him to back his claim. He apparently accepted a bribe and assembled the senior members of his faction, but they opposed the plan because Germanus was known to be a supporter of the Blues. When Germanus heard this, he changed his plan and vowed loyalty to the usurper to save himself. In the meantime, the Greens proclaimed Phocas at Rhegium and convinced him to come to the Hebdomon for the official crowning ceremony. The Patriarch and the Senate were told to attend. Phocas was crowned, and on the following day entered the city in the royal carriage drawn by four white horses after which he entered the palace. After this he held chariot races, as was customary. The next day Phocas rewarded his soldiers and crowned his wife Leontia as Augusta. The factions quarrelled with each other during the chariot races, the Blues becoming enraged and pointing out that Maurice was not yet dead. When Phocas heard this, he realized that his position was not secure until Maurice and all his sons were dead. So he dispatched

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  321 soldiers to Chalcedon. They killed Maurice at the harbour of Eutropius. Theophylact claims they first killed all of his sons in front of him and then killed the grieving father. As we shall see in Military History of Late Rome Volume VIII, this was a lie, the purpose of which was to legitimize Heraclius’s rule. Theodosius survived to lead the Persian and Roman armies against the usurper Phocas.

5.4.  MAURICE AS EMPEROR

The reign of Maurice was both a blessing and a disaster for those who came after him. Maurice restored Roman fortunes during his first ten years in power: he 1) cleared the Slavs from the Balkans, restored the border to the Danube, and made the city of Singidunum the border post against the Avars; 2) he had stabilized the situation in Spain with a combination of stratagems, military action and diplomacy, so the area saw a period of peace; 3) the Moors and Nubians had been pacified with decisive military action; 4) he had manipulated the Franks so that they posed no threat to the Romans and could be used as allies in Italy; 5) The Romans had launched a counter-offensive against the Lombards thanks to the skilful diplomatic manoeuvres of Maurice; 6) The Romans held the upper hand in the war against the Persians so were poised to exploit the Persian civil war when Chosroes II sought refuge among them. On the other hand, Maurice’s excessive economising had caused him problems. He had tried to economize with the soldiers’ salaries in the East in 588 with the result that the main field army of the East revolted and unrest followed throughout the East, the most serious of which was the mutiny of the army of Egypt. However, Maurice managed to pacify the army of the East through diplomacy and the Army of Egypt through

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322  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 military action. All this could have been foreseen. All of these troubles were the result of Maurice’s stubborn nature and inordinate thriftiness. The next decade, from 592 until 602, saw Roman arms triumphant. This was the result of two policies of Maurice: 1) He manipulated the different enemies through skilful diplomacy which gave Roman forces everywhere the opportunity to shift the balance of power in Roman favour; 2) He reformed the army, simplifying its command structures, and gave soldiers and officers exact instructions on combat doctrine in the Strategikon. The Romans inflicted a series of defeats on the Persians thanks to the fact that they had supported the legitimate ruler Chosroes II against the usurpers. Maurice had acted with moderation and had not sought the complete destruction of the Persian Empire. The quick victory in the East enabled Maurice to transfer forces to the Balkans. The Slavs and Avars were thoroughly defeated and the Romans were in a position to extend their possessions when the fateful year 602 arrived. Then Maurice committed his greatest folly. He had economized with the soldiers’ salaries, and he had refused to ransom Roman captives from the Avars, so his relationship with the army was already tense. Furthermore, he had angered the populace with his stingy economic policies, so he was not popular at home either. It was in these circumstances that he gave the order for his army to winter north of the Danube in enemy territory. The reasons for this were perfectly logical. However, it did not take into account the feelings of the army. The soldiers considered it yet another instance of the Emperor being stingy at their expense; on top of which they could not even hope to be ransomed by this Emperor if the enemy captured them. This situation was exploited by rabble-rouser Phocas, who inflamed the passions of the simple soldiers. Maurice was just too stubborn to understand the situation, so Phocas was able to get himself raised as Emperor. The usurpation of Phocas resulted in a calamity for the Romans because it divided them, which enabled the Persians to conquer most of the Roman domains in the East. The details are analysed in greater detail in Military History of Late Rome Volume VIII (602–641). It was not Maurice’s fault, it was the fault of his successor, who was not suited to be a ruler. It was with good reason that neither Maurice nor Philippicus had promoted Phocas to higher rank. Phocas did not possess the right abilities to be commander. Thanks to the testament that Maurice composed when he was ill in about 596/7, we get a glimpse of what his future plans may have been. According to Theophylact, in his testament Maurice divided the Roman Empire into three parts. His eldest son was appointed Augustus of the East with his capital in Constantinople. His second son, Tiberius, was appointed Augustus of Italy and the Tyrrhenian Sea (Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica) with Rome his capital. The rest of the Empire was to be divided between the underage sons. Bishop Domitianus would serve as their guardian until they attained maturity. We do not know how many sons Maurice had in 596/7, but he had six in total, so one may imagine that at least one of the sons would have controlled North Africa with Carthage, another Spain, and another in control of some unknown area. I would suggest that the idea was to make one son Emperor of Gaul, if it was ever restored into the Roman Empire. The division of the Empire between his sons means he did not consider it necessary to get the approval of soldiers, Senate and people. The Empire was his to divide it as he pleased. The contents of the testament show that he considered it his duty to reconquer the territories the Empire had previously possessed. In my opinion,

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Mauricius (Maurice) Tiberius (582–602)  323 considering the superb performance of his armies, had he not been overthrown this could have been achieved.239 George Ostrogorsky’s (80) summary of Maurice’s reign describes it succinctly: ‘Maurice was one of the most outstanding of Byzantine rulers. His reign marks an important step forward in the transformation of the worn-out late Roman Empire into the new and vigorous organization of the medieval Byzantine Empire… By the decisive measures which he took, Maurice did at least secure for the Empire a part of the western possessions for some time to come. He regrouped the remnants of Justinian’s conquests and created exarchates of Ravenna and of Carthage, and by means of a strictly military organization he tried to ensure their adequate defence… Their organization pointed the way towards militarization of Byzantine administration and foreshadowed Heraclius’s introduction of the system of themes.’ In short, regardless of the end he met, the Emperor Maurice was without doubt one of the greatest Roman emperors, and probably the greatest of the Roman military theorists. His military treatise the Strategikon became the theoretical basis of East Roman military science and influenced even the military reformers of the early modern age. It was Maurice’s greatest legacy for generations to come. In ensuring that Romans knew how to fight, it ensured the survival of the Roman Empire long enough for the birth of Western civilisation, with its advanced science and democracy.

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Appendix I

The First Turkish Empire1

T

he origin of the first Turkish Empire is not known with certainty and neither are its ethnic origins. However, what appears certain is that most of the tribes that made up the Turkish people spoke some Turkish dialect and that there were also Turkish tribes living outside this Empire just as there were tribes of other ethnic and linguistic origins living within it. According to Chinese sources, the Turks were a fugitive people which settled in the Altai where they manufactured iron implements. The place where they did this was called Gold Mountain. In about 551/2 the Turks revolted under their leaders, the brothers Bumin and Ishtemi, against A-na-kui, the Khagan/Chagan/Kaghan/Qağan of the Juanjuan (Ruan-ruan/Rouran), and killed him, thereby overthrowing the Juan-juan Empire. Bumin was the senior brother and therefore the Great Khagan of the tribe, but he died soon after this and was succeeded by his son Kuo-lo (Issik), who in his turn died only a few months later in 553. His successor was another son of Bumin called Muhan/Muqan (usually believed to have ruled in 553–72, however see below). At this time the Turkish Empire was divided into two halves (Eastern Turks centred on Mongolia and Western Turks in Central Asia) each of which consisted of two halves (there were therefore four Turkish khaganates: Central, Eastern, Western, and Western Frontier). The Eastern Turks were ruled by Muhan, who was the senior Khagan as Central Khagan, and the Western Turks ruled by his uncle Ishtemi/Istemi (yabğu, the Khagan of the Western Frontier). Soon after his accession Muhan began a campaign of conquest by destroying the remnants of the Juan-juan, after which he defeated the Kitans in the east and the Kirghiz in the north. In the meantime, Ishtemi campaigned against various tribes in the west (included the Avars) and reached the Aral Sea in about 555. In about 556/7 Ishtemi concluded an alliance with Chosroes I of Persia, which was sealed with a marriage pact. Chosroes married Ishtemi’s daughter (their offspring became the shahanshah Hormizd IV). It was because of this that Chosroes I had been so willing to conclude a truce with the Romans in 557. The result of this alliance was the crushing of the Hephthalite kingdom by about 561/2. The border between Persia and the Turks was set at the Oxus River. This meant that the Turks and Persians were now neighbours and that the Sogdian merchants had become Turkish subjects. It was the latter that was to have great significance because the Sogdians wanted to sell the Chinese silk directly to the Persians and Romans and when the Persians did not accept this, the Sogdians convinced the Turks to allow them to negotiate with the Romans. The first contact between the Romans and Turks took place before the Sogdian intervention in 563, when a Turkish delegation arrived in Constantinople. It had been sent by Askel, King of the Kermikhions. Sinor suggests that Askel was one of the minor khagans of the realm, of which there were eight by the 570s, which means that Askel

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The First Turkish Empire  325 could have been the Western Khagan or one of the other lesser khagans formed after the conquests. The Sogdian-inspired embassy led by Maniakh (see the narrative) arrived in 568. These envoys had been dispatched by Silziboulos/Sizabul. Justin II was pleased and dispatched Zemarchus as his envoy in 569. Both the Romans and Turks were at pains to demonstrate that neither needed the merchandise of the other. The Romans had demonstrated that they had a silk industry of their own and the Turks demonstrated to Zemarchus that they possessed iron in abundance and could sell it too. The status of Sizabul has caused some speculation, because Menander states that he was the most powerful of the four khagans. Modern historians have usually either identified him with Ishtemi (e.g. Lebedynsky) or have suggested that he was once again one of the lesser khagans (e.g. Sinor). I do not accept this interpretation because Sizabul’s home territory was the Golden Mountain, the seat of power of the principal Khagan. In other words, in my opinion we should accept Menander’s statement at its face value. He was a very well informed author. Whatever the status of Sizabul, he invaded Persian territory in 569/70 and inflicted serious damage on it. Both sides sent several embassies to each other in the course of the following years, but the most important of these was the embassy led by Valentinus/Valentine in 576. He was met by Turxath, who was mourning for his recently deceased father Silziboulos/Sizabul. It is usually thought that Khagan Muhan ruled in 553–72 and was succeeded by his younger brother Taspar/Tobo (572–81), but this must be wrong if Sizabul was supreme Khagan in 568–76. This means there is need to reinterpret the sequence of Turkish rulers for each of the halves of the Empire. When Valentinus arrived in 576 the Turks were on a warpath against the Romans because they had received the fugitives in their territory. It was only with difficulty that the Roman envoys kept their lives. This time the Turkish realm was divided into eight khaganates, of which the senior one was claimed to have belonged to Arsilas. Valentinus was not sent to meet him, but a lesser Khagan called Tardu/Tardush (Ta-t’ou). Tardu was therefore the superior of Turxath, but still of a lesser rank than Arsilas, which means that he was Khagan of the Western Turks, as modern research has suggested. Unsurprisingly, Valentinus’s efforts did not bear fruit. When Taspar/Tobo died in 581, he was succeeded by Ishbara/Nivar (in Chinese sources She-tu, or Sha-po lüeh). Muhan’s other son, Ta-lo-pien, who had the title Apa Khagan, did not accept this. Apa suffered a defeat and and sought help from Tardu, who supported him with 100,000 men. Nivar was in great trouble, but he obtained help from his father-in-law, the Sui Emperor Kao-tsu of China. The price for the help was high. Nivar was forced to accept client status. Apa Khagan was defeated, but he was not satisfied with his lot and turned against his benefactor Tardu, who was now in his turn forced to flee to the Sui court. Nivar died in about 587 and was succeeded by Bagha/Ch’u-lo-hu (587–8). Ch’u-lo-hu managed to capture Apa in 587. Nivar’s successor as Khagan of the Western Frontier was Niri/Ni-li (587–604?). Sinor notes that very little is known about Ni-li, even his date of death is uncertain. Sinor suggests that Ch’u-lo-hu was the Turkish Khagan who invaded Persia and was then killed by Bahram Chobin with an arrow – the Chinese sources state that he was killed by a stray arrow when fighting in the West. This is indeed possible. Ch’u-lo-hu’s successor was Nivar’s son Yung-yü-lü/Tu-lan/Tulan (588–99). Bahram’s revolt then caused a reversal of fortunes: the Turks initially backed Bahram but then abandoned him and concluded a peace with Chosroes II Parwez.

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326  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 In 594 the ousted Tardu made a comeback. He defeated Yung-yü-lü (Tu-lan), Khagan of the Eastern Turks (588–99), and became lord of the seven races, master of the seven climes, by the time he dispatched a letter to Emperor Maurice in 598. This presumably means that Tardu ruled seven out of the eight khaganates – only one khaganate under Tulan resisted and when he was killed in 599 Tardu reunited the Turks. We do not know the details of this embassy, but one may assume that some sort of alliance was proposed to Maurice. Nothing came of this. Maurice was murdered in 602 and in 603 Tardu was forced to flee as a result of the revolt of Töläš, a western Turkish tribe, to the region of Koukou-Nor. After this he disappears from the pages of history. Tardu’s death resulted in the break-up of the Turkish Empire into two competing halves, the East which was ruled by Yami/Jan-kan as a vassal of China (the Sui dynasty installed him on the throne) and the independent West which was ruled until ca. 604 by Nili and after him by Heshana/Chu-luo (604–11). Tardu’s grandson Sheguy/Shegui (611–26) recaptured some of the domains and became the Khagan of the Western Turks in 611. Under his successor Tong Yabghu/Tong ye-hü (618–28) the Western Turks achieved their greatest size, but soon after this the rising power of the Tang dynasty turned their attention towards the Tarim basin and the Western Turks. It is often suggested that it was the Khagan of the Western Turks Tong Yabghu who dispatched his nephew Bori Shad to help Heraclius in 627, but this is open to discussion because it is quite possible (in my opinion likely) that the helpers were actually Khazar Turks who did not recognize Tong. But at the same time I would not preclude the possibility that Bori Shad did indeed help Heraclius in another manner, which is that he led the campaign against the Eastern possessions of Persia at the same time as Heraclius launched his counter-offensive in the West with Khazar help. The Eastern Turks were ruled by Jan-kan until his death in 609. His successor was his son To-ki (Shih-pi Khaghan), but unlike his father he was no longer a loyal ally of the Sui-dynasty. He failed to send soldiers to assist the Chinese when agreed and then in 615 made a surprise attack in an effort to capture the Chinese Emperor Yang-ti who was vacationing near the border. The Sui Empire collapsed in a series of revolts, which made the Turks the most powerful players in the area. All the competing Chinese warlords sought to gain their support, but To-ki preferred to watch events from the sidelines until he agreed to give thousands of horses and some hundreds of men to Li Yüan in return for a large bribe. Li Yüan and his sons, who included Li Shimin (the future Emperor Tang Taizong 626/7–649), soon captured the capital Ch’ang-an and so founded the Tang Dynasty, but it took until 623 for the Tang to unite the whole country under their rule. Initially the Tang were forced to pay the Eastern Turks large amounts of tribute, and this was also true for the beginning of the reign of Li Shimin who assassinated his brothers and ousted his father in 626. Li Shimin took the name Tang Taizong. Li Shimin, however, was one of the greatest military commanders of all time and knew how to play the steppe politics. He knew that if the Turks were left to their own devices they would start to fight against each other if they were skilfully manipulated by Chinese money and diplomacy. To-ki had died in 619 and had been succeeded by his brother Hsieh-li Khagan. His position was not accepted by all, and he had alienated many of his relatives by employing Sogdian administrators. The end result was a civil war in 627–9 which was exploited by Li Shimin. He dispatched his forces to the steppes in 629, with the result

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The First Turkish Empire  327 that the Eastern Turks were subjected under Chinese rule. When the Western Turks then became embroiled in civil wars of their own after the 630s, the Chinese were well poised to exploit the situation. The Tang subjected the Western Turks with a series of campaigns in 640–57, so they too became a Tang protectorate. The Eastern Turks remained under Chinese rule from 630 until 682.

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Appendix II

The Couched Lance Technique and the Strategikon

O

n the basis of the Strategikon (3.5.29–36), it is possible that the foideratoi/foederati cavalry that were recruited in the 570s made one very important contribution to the Roman cavalry tactic which was the adoption of the couched lance technique as the preferred way of charging at the enemy. The reason for this conclusion is that the Strategikon demanded that the troopers leaned forward (the leaning forward implies the couched lance technique but is not conclusive because leaning forward was also used with the overhand technique), covered their heads and a part of the horse’s neck with their shields, and held their lances as high as their shoulders/upper arm (kai tous kontous anabastazontôn1 epi tous hômous). The problem with this conclusion is that even if the preposition epi with the genitive can mean ‘rest at, on, at, by, near, to, or towards’ it usually means ‘above something’, and it is so translated into German by Ernst Gamillscheg (p.157), while George T. Dennis (p.38) translated it: ‘hold their lances high as their shoulders’. However, when it is taken together with the leaning forward while using stirrups, it is possible that the actual meaning is the couched lance technique. Such a conclusion gets additional support from the numerous works of art that depict the lance underneath the armpit, some of which are included below. However, the Strategikon (1.2.30–3) also includes material which can be used to contradict this conclusion. The horsemen were required to possess two lances (‘kontaria duo’) in case the first one missed

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The Couched Lance Technique and the Strategikon  329 its mark (‘astochountos’), which implies the use of the lance for throwing. Similarly, whereas the front rank footmen had previously used their spears like hoplites, now Maurice required them to throw them. This implies that Maurice considered the throwing of the lance more effective in combat because the thrown spear reached the enemy earlier than the couched lance. Regardless, on the basis of the works of art it is clear that both the overhand technique (used for throwing and thrusting) and the couched-lance technique were both used in practice. Note, however, that the way in which the lance was held in cavalry combat was of less importance than the maintenance of the cohesion of the close order formation, which is also nicely shown by the fact that neither the Mongol nor Mamluk2 heavy cavalries adopted the couched-lance technique as their main attack tactic – both preferred to use their spears with two hands.

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Notes

Chapter 1    1. It is probable that the so-called optimates were introduced into the imperial bodyguards after 565 because we find a meros called optimates in the Strategikon. The date when this unit was created is not known. One possibility is that the unit was the so-called 15,000 strong Tiberiani who served under Comes foederatorum and Excubitorum Maurice in 578.   2. Schlosser (92–7) with MHLR Vol. VII.    3. Based on the edition and translation of Bundy (Lydus, pp.69–75) and Syvanne, MHLR Vol.1.    4. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Chapter 6.1.8. Much of the same can be found from MHLR Vol.6.   5. I have here accepted Haldon’s (Leo, Taktika, Commentary, p.177) interpretation of the meaning of the word kentouklon (quilted or padded) rather than G.T. Dennis’s interpretation as felt. Chapter 2    1. This analysis is entirely based on Syvänne, 2004, Chapters 6.1.8, 10.4 much of which is also in MHLR Vol.6. The most important sources for the Antae and Slavs are the Strategikon (11.4) and Procopius (Wars 7.14.21–30).    2. Based on Syvänne (2004, Chapter 10.2) and MHLR vols. 1–6.    3. This chapter is based on Syvänne, 2004.    4. Based on Syvänne (2004) and Military History of Late Rome vols.1–5.    5. All the titles are from Welsby.    6. Referral to Ahmad al-Kufi in Welsby, 68.    7. The Muslim sources always present their material by stating their source or sources.    8. This is based on Syvänne, MHLR Vol.1 and Welsby.    9. See my draft paper in academia.edu and Facebook.   10. This is based on Syvänne (2004–2016, MHLR vols.1–6) and the text in MHLR vols. 7–8.   11. This is based on Syvänne (2004, and MHLR vols. 1–8, esp. vols. 1, 7–8). Other sources mentioned where relevant.   12. ibid. with Kennedy, 2007, 36–7.  13. Ibid. 39–42.   14. ibid. with Kennedy (2001, 168–78; 2007, 39–42, 58–61).   15. For the sources, see MHLR Vol.1.   16. It is clear that even if the Gotha Ms. (51–2) states that ‘in our own day’ the Muslims deployed their pikemen only five deep, this piece of information came from some older treatise. The best proof of this is the Praecepta militaria 1.7 of Nikephoros Phokas which specifically states that even the sons of Hagar had greatly reduced the depth of their formations because there was no longer any need to follow the Macedonian model of 16 deep (or occasionally 12 or 10 deep according to Nikephoros) phalanx. According to Nikephoros, the 16 ranks formation was necessary only when one faced elephants or used other tactical manoeuvres requiring depth that the Macedonians were in the habit of using. The problem is that we do not know when the Muslims reduced their ranks except that it clearly took place before the 950s. My own suggestion is that the Muslims did it early on because they were usually outnumbered

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Notes 331 so there existed a need for the reduction of the ranks to match the length of the enemy line and what better way to do that than by reducing the ranks when one could trust in the loyalty, experience and morale of the men. The Muslim soldiery certainly consisted of elite veteran soldiers schooled in the wars of Muhammad and al-Riddah and their morale was superb. Chapter 3    1. This chapter is primarily based on Evagrius (5.1ff. with the comments of Michael Whitby in the translated version); Theophanes (AM6058–9); Corippus (ILIAM) and Averil Cameron’s comments (118ff. with additional sources mentioned therein) regarding it and secondarily on PLRE3 (under names mentioned that give additional original sources); Bury (68–79), Groh (37ff.) and Stein (1ff.).    2. Averil Cameron (Corippus, ILIAM, 159–61) discusses the role of the torques-crowning and shield-raising in the context of the crowning of the emperor. She claims that shield-raising and torques-crowning were both on the way out at this time. The crowning of Justin II with the military torques is claimed to have been replaced by public diadem crowning after this and that the last shield-raising ceremony took place when Phocas I was crowned in 602, but it was not part of the inauguration ceremony proper. Averil Cameron claims that after this, with the possible exception of the crowning of Nikephoros II Phokas, shield-raising ended until Theodore II Laskaris revived it in the thirteenth century. Psellus’ reference to shieldraising in the crowning of Leo Tournikios in 1046 and the examples of such ceremonies in the Madrid Skylitzes are dismissed as antiquarian or as representations of iconographic themes. I do not agree with this view, but consider these instances as genuine examples of the continuation of the ceremony. It was because of these that the shield-raising ceremonies were included in the Book of Ceremonies of Constantine Porphyrogennetos.   3. See PLRE3 Photius 2 for the role of Photius in these events.    4. The religious policies of Justin II are well summarised by Treadgold, 219–22.    5. For the role of Photius, see PLRE3 Photius 2.    6. This chapter is primarily based on Evagrius (5.1ff. with comments of Michael Whitby in the translated version); Menander fr. 8.1; Theophanes (AM6058–9); Corippus (ILIAM) and Averil Cameron’s comments (179ff. with additional sources mentioned therein) regarding it and secondarily on PLRE3 (under names mentioned that give additional original sources); Bury (68–79), Groh (37ff.) and Stein (1ff.).    7. This is primarily based on Paul the Deacon (HL 1.27ff.); Origo Gentis Langobardorum; GT (HF 4.23ff, esp. 4.23, 4.29); Menander (fr. 8.1ff., fr.11ff. with comments of Blockley); Marius of Avenches (a565ff.); Annals of Ravenna (a.565ff.); John of Biclar (a.565ff.), Continuator of Prosper (a.565ff.); and on the secondary sources which include additional references to original sources: Christie (58ff.), Bury (115ff.), Wolfram (284ff.) and PLRE3.    8. The following is primarily based on Theophylact 6.107ff.; Paul the Deacon (HL 1.27ff.); Origo Gentis Langobardorum; GT (HF 4.23ff.); Menander (fr. 8.1ff., fr.11ff. with comments of Blockley); GT (HF 4.23ff., esp. 4.23, 4.29); Marius of Avenches (a565ff.); Annals of Ravenna (a.565ff.); John of Biclar (a.565ff.), Continuator of Prosper (a.565ff.). Other sources are mentioned when used. The principal source for the exploits of the Lombards/Langobards is Paul the Deacon, but Gregory of Tours, Menander and Theophylact in particular provide important additional material.    9. Menander fr. 12.1–2; PD HL 1.27.   10. Menander fr. 12.2; PD HL 1.27.  11. PD HL 1.27; Menander frgs 12.1–6 (esp. 12.5.28ff.).  12.  PLRE3 Narses 1 (lists the sources; Martindale, 925, does not accept the story that Narses invited the Lombards solely on the basis that it is inconsistent with his record and with his peaceful retirement at Rome; this does not take into account the fact that he would not have been the only plotter who survived in the sixth century; past services were often enough to

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332  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 prevent punishment); Fauber 176ff. (lists the sources; analyzes the evidence and lists earlier historians who accept or do not accept the role of Narses); Herrin (203–4) considers the accusation levelled at Narses to be an example of a prejudiced attitude towards the Armenian eunuch (I disagree); Christie (61–3). Fabbro (chapter 1) tentatively accepts the invitation of Narses but suggests that he invited the Lombards to serve as ‘regular’ foederati soldiers in the Roman army. Fabbro dismisses Christie’s tentative suggestion that the Lombards may have been invited to serve as symmachoi allies (one form of the foederati) settled on land. Fabbro then suggests that this army revolted in 569. I consider Paul the Deacon’s version more credible.  13.  PD HL 2.5ff. Fabbro (Chapter 2) offers a very different version of the events in 567–72 on the basis of his reinterpretation of the evidence which is based on the claim that the sources are incorrect when they claim that Narses called the Lombards into Italy as a revenge and that we are in truth here dealing with a revolt of the Lombard foederati that had been called into Italy by Narses. I agree with his basic statement that the Lombards would have been called in as foederati by Narses (his purpose was to mislead), but I do not agree with the rest of the argumentation. Narses’s intention would have been to allow them in as allies so he could exact revenge of the imperial couple. Fabbro divides the situation so that Narses first called the Lombards to serve in the Roman army while the rest of the Lombards remained behind in Pannonia. I disagree with this. The Lombards clearly migrated as a people as Paul the Deacon states. The Lombard soldiers then mutinied against the Romans. The Lombards who had remained in Pannonia then defeated the Gepids without the participation of Alboin in 571 and migrated to Italy while leaving behind the burned Pannonia. Fabbro bases this argument and the dismissal of Paul the Deacon’s version on the date of the destruction of the Gepids by the Lombards in Biclar. He dates it to 571.   14. Modern historians have not found any consensus opinion for the date of the arrival of the Lombards in Italy. Some date it to 568, others to 569. For the reasoning, see the secondary sources mentioned. However, considering the fact that Pannonia is very close to Italy, I do not find it credible that it would have taken until 569 for the Lombards to reach Italy when they began their migration just after Easter 568.  15. PD HL 2.5ff.; PLRE3 Alboin, Gisulfus; Christie, 63ff.; Wolfram 285ff. For the number of Ostrogoths, see MHLR Vol.6 (518–565). The figure comes from Procopius. He is a reliable witness and was certainly in a position to know. There were records of the size of the Ostrogothic force in Italy that he could use as his source, because the Italian civilian authorities were required to provide supplies and equipment for them. The size of this force is actually smaller than the Romans possessed in Italy in the early fifth century: the combined size of the Sarmato-Alan settlers in the north of Italy and the regular units in the Notitia Dignitatum.  16. PLRE 3 Narses 1 discusses the various theories and sources.  17. PD HL 2.10ff.; PLRE3 Alboin, Narses; Christie, 76ff.; Wolfram 288ff.  18.  PL HL 2.26ff.; GT HF 4.42; PLRE3 Alboin, Mummolus; Christie, 78ff., Wolfram, 290ff.  19. GT HF 4.42, PD HL 3.4. For the use of this tactic by others, see my Britain in the Age of Arthur and MHLR Vol.2.  20. GT HF 4.42; PD HL 3.5.  21. PD HL 2.27ff. Dates are from PLRE3. While in Constantinople, Peredeo killed a lion. This did not please the emperor who ordered him blinded. Peredeo later hid two small knives in his sleeves and invited two patricians to hear a secret that he wanted to share with the emperor. When they were close enough, he killed them both and thereby got a measure of revenge for the loss of his eyes. Fabbro (chapters: Cleph and the end of monarchy, Settlement and collapse, Economic woes and the breakdown of taxation) is of the opinion that Alboin’s successor, Clef (Cleph), like Alboin before him did not control much beyond the Po Valley from Milano to Treviso and that he and Alboin were both killed by their soldiers (Fabbro

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Notes 333 considers this as a Roman federate army in revolt) because they failed to provide the soldiers the security that they had promised. He thinks that the local leaders then decided to get rid of them and support their soldiers through raiding or by finding employment with the Romans. This last part of his analysis is probably correct. The Lombard dukes were evidently dissatisfied and wanted to improve their position as independent chieftains. However, Fabbro has not noted that both kings had already lost control of the various chieftains under them before Clef ’s murder because some of the Lombard duces clearly invaded south of Italy because the dukedoms of Spoleto and Beneventum appear to have been in existence when Clef was murdered in 574, i.e. the Lombards controlled far more territory than the lands directly under Clef.  22. GT HF 4.40, 5.5; Fredegar 3.64; PLRE3 Guntchramnus, Sigibertus 1, Warinarius, Firminus1.  23.  GT HF 4.42, 4.47ff.; PD HL 3.6ff.; Fredegar 3.68ff.  24.  PD HL 2.31ff.; Marius of Avanches and other sources mentioned in the PLRE3 and Foulke’s translation of PD. Pabst Foulke’s translation (p.87–8) lists the following 36 cities as likely Lombard dukedoms: Friuli, Parma, Cremona, Ceneda, Piacenza, Como, Treviso, Modena, Lodi, Vicenza, Brescello, Vercelli, Verona, Asti, Tortona , Trent, Ivrea, Alba Pompeia, Brescia, Turin, Acqui, Bergamo, Mantua, Lucca, Novara, Altino, Chiusi, Milan, Mariana, Perugia, Pavia, Feltre, Benevento, Reggio, Belluno, Spoleto.  25. GT HF 4.43, PD HL 3.6; Fredegar 3.67–8, 4.45, Christie, 81–2.  26. GT HF 4.49.   27. Based on John of Biclar, 6ff., and Isidore of Seville, 49ff., and Gregory of Tours (HF see index under relevant names). The modern studies by Aragones (57–64), Thompson (1969, 18–9, 57–62), Wolfram (265ff.) and PLRE 3 Agila 1, Athanagildus 1, Ermenegildus, Leovigildus, Liuva, Reccaredus 1 have also been found useful.   28. For some examples, see the list of the modern studies in the beginning of the chapter.   29. The following account is based on John of Biclar, 8–9, 11, 16, 28, 48.   30. Pringle (40–1) interprets this and following differently: he, e.g., considers the conversions results of diplomacy. I consider it far likelier that some sort of military activity preceded the diplomacy, especially because it involved the conclusion of peace between the two sides, but obviously it is possible that it did not.  31. PLRE3 Theodorus 35; Stein, 58–9; Syvänne, MHLR Vol.6, 46; Welsby, 32–4.   32. Menander fr. 12.3–5.   33. Menander fr. 12.5.   34. Menander fr. 12.6–8.   35. John of Biclar a.570.  36. E.g. PLRE3 (Tiberius Constantinus 1), Whitby (1988, 87) and Blockley (Menander, 270) date the defeat to 570–71 while Pohl (2018, 77) accepts the dating in the sources, i.e. I agree with Pohl that the dating 574 in Theophanes and Evagrius is correct.   37. Menander fr. 15.1–5.   38. Menander fr. 15.1–5, 21, 25.1; Evagrius 5.11; Nic. Call. 17.39; Theophanes AM 6066.   39. This chapter is based on the sources collected in REF2, 135–42, the most important of which are the fragments of Menander (9.3–10.5) and the texts of John of Ephesus and Evagrius.   40. The principal source for the negotiations concerning Suania is Menander fr. 9.1–3. Other sources mentioned in REF2, 135–6.   41. The principal source for this is Menander fr. 10.1–5, 13.5, but the shorter versions can be found in other works e.g. in JE 6.23 and REF2, 137. See also Appendix 1.   42. This was obviously the principal motivation, i.e. revenge, but it is clear that he may have also hoped for some reward.   43. Discussion of alternatives in Menander/Blockley p.264, n.129.   44. Menander fails to say why, but it is clear she was given as a sex slave.   45. This place is famous for the battle in which the Arabs defeated the Chinese in 751.

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334  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602   46. The exact route is unknown and many theories have been presented. A summary of them can be found in Menander/Blockley, p.265, n.140.   47. This chapter is based on primarily on: JE (quotes of the relevant parts included); Evagrius 5.6ff.; Tabari i.898–9, i.945–58, i.965, i.988; ibn. Qutayba 1.149; Theophanes of Byzantium FHG 4.270–1; Theophanes Confessor AM 6064 (a.572); John of Epiphania FHG 4.274; REF2, 136ff. (translated quotes from the sources); Shahid 1995, 322ff.; Power, 76–85; Bowersock, 2013, 116–8; Hoyland, 56–7; Schippmann, 2001, 66–7; Edwell et al., 258.   48. The sources also provide another account of the war waged in the deserts at this time. Evagrius (5.5–6) states that the Scenite Arabs were active in the Sinai before Gregory, the leader of the monasteries of Byzantines at Jerusalem and of Mount Sinai, was recalled to become an Archbishop in 570. This Gregory was besieged by the Scenite Arabs on Mount Sinai, but Gregory defended the place with success. It is not known if these Scenite Arabs were the Lakhmids in Persian service. If they were then the attack probably took place in about 569–70. I have not included this in the main body of the text because it is likely that similar attacks took place in the Sinai every now and then – it was for that reason that the Monastery of Mount Sinai had been fortified during the reign of Justinian I.   49. Whitby (1988, 257–8) does not accept this. In his opinion it is likelier that Alamundarus took bribes from Chosroes in 573 and excused this with the claim that Justin had tried to assassinate him. I disagree. The order to kill the Arab sheik after a request to get more gold is entirely in keeping with the character of Justin II who always reacted badly when a ‘barbarian’ made such requests.   50. Note, however, that on the basis of Balami (2.304) the Romans also possessed horses that could compete with the Arab horses. According to him, the Romans gave Chosroes II Parwez a night coloured horse, which was faster than any other horse on earth, and that Chosroes loved this horse dearly, and when the horse died Chosroes ordered a sculpture of the horse made which was still standing in Kirmanshahan/Kermanshahan when Balami was alive. This shows that the Romans possessed truly fast horses, but at the same time it is clear that their armed forces did not possess them in sufficient numbers to be able to match the speed of the Arab cavalry. Furthermore, it is possible that the night-coloured horse that the Romans gave Chosroes II was actually an Arab horse rather than a horse chosen from the Imperial Stables.   51. Even if the following account is indebted to the secondary studies mentioned previously, it differs in places from them. It is basically my interpretation of the different versions included in al-Tabari. An account of this conquest can also be found in: al-Thaalibi (616–9); Balami/ Belami Vol.2, pp-203–19, 250.   52. The description rather suggests that his eyesight was not really hindered by drooping eyelids, but by poor vision resulting from age or from some other reason. The propping up of his eyelids with a bandage may well mean that the men changed the focus of his eyes so he could focus on the enemy. Anyone interested to see how this affects the eyesight can pull the skin of the forehead or nose in different directions to see how it affects the ability of the eyes to focus on different distances.   53. It is also not to be found in the histories of Ceylon/Sri Lanka by de Silva or Mendis. Neither is it in Sandhu’s A Military History of Ancient India. It is another instance in which local sources are silent about defeats suffered.   54. The Romans used detachments from their Alexandrian Fleet periodically on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean in show of flag operations which had secured for them control over the trade network from Egypt to India and Africa. See e.g. the references to Aksum, Himyar, India, Iotabe, and Yemen in the index of MHLR vols. 1–6.  55. The principal sources are: JE 2.18ff.; Stephen of Taron 1883, p.131ff. (1907, p.60.1ff.); Evagrius 5.7; Menander fr. 16.1; Michael the Syrian (Michael Rabo, 10.7, p.387ff.); these and other sources are also quoted in REF2 (137–42) and PLRE3 Guaram 1.   56. Whitby (1988, 250–4) plus the sources already mentioned.

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Notes 335   57. PLRE3 Anastasius 14 and Photius 2 summarize the evidence with references to the sources. The principal sources are: JE 3.1.29, 3.1.31–2, 3.2.29; John of Nikiu 94.17; Justin Novella 44.   58. The following account is based on the sources mentioned in REF2, 142–151; PLRE3 Ioannes 88, Iustinianus 3, Marcianus7, with sources mentioned therein; and Bar Hebraeus p.77ff. and Syvänne (2004, 2009) plus other sources which are mentioned in separate footnotes.   59. Whitby, 1988, 254–6; PLRE3 Ioannes 88, Iustinianus 3, Marcianus 7, with sources mentioned therein and also collected in REF2, 142 150.  60. ibid.   61. Syvänne (2004, Appendix Nisibis, Dara); PLRE3 Ioannes 88, Iustinianus 3, Marcianus 7, with sources mentioned therein and also collected in REF2, 142–50; with additional sources mentioned in separate footnotes.   62. Sebeos 8, Thomson tr. 6–7; PLRE3 Ioannes 88, Iustinianus 3, Marcianus 7, with sources mentioned therein and also collected in REF2, 149–50.  63. John of Ephesus 6.2–5, Theophylact 3.10.4–11.2; Michael Syrus (Michael Rabo, 10.8, pp.390–1); REF2 142–5; Syvänne (2004, Appendix Nisibis, Dara); Whitby, 1988, 254–8; PLRE3 Ioannes 88, Iustinianus 3, Magnus 2, Marcianus 7, Theodorus 31, with sources mentioned therein and also collected in REF2, 142–50.   64. Since Whitby (1988, 257–8) does not accept John of Ephesus’ claim that Justin wanted to kill Alamundarus, he has been forced to come up with an alternative version, which is that Justin ordered the dismissal of Marcianus because of his failure to take Thebothon.   65. These terms can be interpreted in different ways. REF2 (143) calls them simply multitude while Whitby (Evagrius, 267–8) translates them as captains and brigadiers. The lochagos can be the leader of a file or unit. If one interprets it in the former way then the taxiarchoi would simply be higher ranking officers, but if one interprets the lochagoi as commanders of units then there are two possibilities: 1) one can think that they would mean tribunes and the taxiarchoi the duces and other higher ranking officers,; 2) if one interprets them to mean even higher ranking officers then the lochagoi would mean the tribunes and duces (and probably also comites) while the taxiarchoi would mean magistri vacantes/strategoi/stratelates.   66. The account is based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix, Dara2, which in its turn is based on: John of Epiphania 4–5 (FHG 4.275); Chr.1234, 66, pp.160–1; John of Ephesus 6.2, 6.5–6; Evagrius 5.9–10; Theophanes Byzantinus 4 (FHG 4.271); Theophylact 3.10.4–11.2; Michael the Syrian (Michael Rabo, 10.8, pp.390ff.); REF2 146–150. The equipment of the Romans at the siege of Nisibis in 573 was taken by the Persians and used against Dara. Evagrius’ text 5.10 of this siege may also betray the use of trebuchets/mangonels. McCotter (2003) notes that words signifying trebuchet, mangonel (Europe) and mandjanik (Arabic), derive from the Greek manganon (device, siege engine, crane), which does indeed suggest that the device was of Roman origin.   67. List of places from Maksymiuk, 75–7.   68. Whitby (Evagrius, 269, n.43) suggests that Magnus, who was a native of Syria and trusted by Alamundarus, had been dispatched there to patch up the differences between the Romans and Alamundarus. I agree.   69. Especially JE 3.2ff.; Menander frg 18.1ff.; Evagrius 5.11–4; PLRE3 further sources under their names; Schlosser, 42–3; Stein, 46ff.; Bury 76ff.   70. It is usually thought that Maurice was appointed as Tiberius’ successor in the office of comes excubitorum in 574. However, the text of Menander Protector (fr. 20.2) allows one to interpret that he was still Tiberius’s notarius in 577. See Blockley’s comments about this in note 254 on p.280 in which he refers to the use of punctuation to clear up this confusion. I agree with this view because when Menander states that Maurice acted as Tiberius’s imperial secretary to protect the secrecy of the peace negotiations he acted in this capacity so that the imperial scribes did not write down the ruler’s instructions. It is the latter which suggests the probability that Maurice was no longer a notarius in 577.

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336  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602   71. Menander fr. 25 with other sources mentioned elsewhere in this same chapter with PLRE3, further sources under their names; Stein, 57ff., Bury 77ff.  72. PLRE3/Mauricius lists the sources. Martindale (PLRE3/Mauricius) suggests that recruiting took place during the winter 577/8.   73. It is possible that these new Germanic recruits made one important contribution to the Roman cavalry charge: the introduction of the couched lance technique as the principal charging method. For this, see Appendix 1.  74. GT HF 4.50ff.  75. PD HL 3.9; Wolfram, 295. For a completely different interpretation of the period of Lombard interregnum described here and below, see Fabbro (Chapter 3 The battle for Italy, esp. the sub-chapter The interregnum and the recreation of the monarchy).  76. PD HL 3.9–10; Wolfram, 295.  77. Christie, 82–3.  78. LP 63 claims that the emperor who dispatched the ships was Justinian I. This should of course be amended to Justin II. However, it is clear that the person who dispatched the ships was Tiberius who at that time held the title Caesar. This is confirmed by Menander’s fragment 22. The time when the relief fleet arrived is uncertain. It could have taken place either before the death of Benedict on 30 July 579, or after the choosing of his successor Pelagius on 26 November 579. However, the fact that the siege was still going on at the time of the death of Benedict does suggest that it may have arrived only in very late 579.  79. LP 63–4; JB 48, a.578; Menander fr. 22.   80. I.e. I disagree with Goffart (27) that Brunhild’s only rational goal in marrying the son of Chilperic would have been to be released from imprisonment. It is clear that a marriage between the widow of a king and son of another king aimed higher than this, i.e. gathering support for the pair. The best proof of this is the reaction of Chilperic.  81. GT HF 5.1ff.   82. Based on John of Biclar 36ff. Isidore of Seville, 49ff. The modern studies by Aragones (57– 64) and Wolfram (265ff.) have also been useful.   83. The following is based on: Menander fr. 18.2ff.; Theophylact 3.12.2ff.; JE 6.5ff.; Evagrius 5.11ff.; REF2, 151ff. Other sources are mentioned where relevant.  84. Shahid, 377–89.   85. Still based on Menander fr. 18.2–4 (plus 23.1); Theophylact 3.12.2ff.; JE 6.5ff.; Evagrius 5.11ff. with comments of Whitby p.271.   86. Menander frgs 18.5–6; Biclar a.576. Biclar dates the conquest of Suania to 576, but it is entirely possible that it took place a year earlier.   87. These campaigns are analyzed in subsequent chapters.   88. There is absolutely no reason to doubt this figure, as has usually been done. The 60,000 armoured horsemen is well in keeping with what we know of other large nomadic armies. Furthermore, the Romans were certainly in a position to know how many horsemen they shipped and fed.  89. Menander fr.21–2; PLRE3 Ioannes 91 (PP Illyrici and quaestor exercitus).   90. The sources for the embassy to the Turks: Menander fr.19. 1–2 with Blockley’s comments; Pohl, 79–80.   91. The following account is entirely based on Syvänne (2004/Appendix, Melitene; 2009 and sources mentioned therein); Sebeos 8 (pp.7–8). The last mentioned Saga article is available online at academia.edu and includes quotes from the original sources and reasoning behind the conclusions. The only major change in the following discussion is that I am now prepared to accept the larger figures for the armies that are included in the sources. I discuss the reasons for this in most of my studies. Here it suffices to note that the ancient sources are consistent in their figures, both when they give smaller and larger armies. The smaller forces were used in theatres or circumstances where there was no need for larger armies, and larger

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Notes 337 armies were used in circumstances where they were necessary e.g. when facing major powers like the Avars and Persians. The larger sizes that the sources give us from the bc dates until the Middle Ages are not only consistent but also well within the capabilities of these societies. As noted in MHLR vols.3–5, the fact that Napoleon was able to use an army of 600,000 men in sparsely populated Russia should put to rest all doubts that one may have about the ancient figures. As regards the campaign and battle of Melitene, Stein (62–9, map at the end of the book) dated both to 575 and accepted that there was a battle, while Whitby (1988, 262–6) dates the campaign to 576 and does not accept that there was any such battle as was described by Theophylact. I have accepted Whitby’s dating, but I disagree with the rest of his reconstruction. I also reconstruct the battle differently than Stein. The reasons for my conclusions are detailed in my 2009 article.   92. It is unlikely that the Roman sources would have dwelled on the treacherous intent of their own diplomacy.   93. Syvänne, 2004, 74.   94. The figure of 120,000 men would be theoretically possible because the independent Armenia had 120,000 fully armoured cataphracts (MHLR Vol.1, 101–3), but since we know that the total force at the disposal of Vardan Mamikonean and the King of Iberia had been only 20,000 horsemen in 572 it is unlikely that the total with the addition of the Armenians would result in an army of 120,000 for the Romans.   95. If one reads the text of John of Ephesus as devil’s advocate, it becomes apparent that his text does not preclude this either: ‘he [Chosroes] attacked and burned Sebaste with fire. But he could take neither booty nor captives, because the whole land had fled from before him. Crossing next from thence, he began to retreat towards the East, in the hope, if possible, of escaping homewards’. The retreat could easily have been conducted by using the Caesarea road which must have been open by then because the Romans would have followed Chosroes back north when he advanced against Sebesteia. I have included both alternatives here.   96. It is possible that the sources fail to mention the River Melas in the context of this battle because the crossing of it took place after the flight of Justinian. This is why I have included two alternative routes for the Persians after the capture of Sebaste.   97. Syvänne, 2004, 109–12.   98. Menander fr. 20.1–2; JE 6.10–13. Other sources mentioned where relevant.   99. Sebeos (Howard-Johnston ed. p.11); Menander fr. 20.2–3, 23.1–8, 23.11. 100. Modern historians (PLRE3 Iustinianus 3; Whitby, 1988, 260) from the time of Stein (p.81 n.5) onwards have not accepted this piece of information, but have connected it with the events of 575. The reason for this claim is that now the Persian commander is Adarmahan and not Tamkhosro. This is by no means conclusive. The Persians certainly had several different commanders operating on their long western front, this time one for Persarmenia (Tamkhosro) and another for Mesopotamia (Adarmahan). I therefore prefer to follow what is stated in the period sources. 101. It is sometimes assumed that Justinian lost his life in the surprise attack because JE 6.27 states that he had died. This, however, is usually thought to be false. For this, see PLRE3/ Iustinianus 3. 102. PLRE3 Mauricius, Narses 10. 103. PLRE 3 Domitianus, Mauricius; Whitby, 1988, 14ff. 104. Also in Agapius of Membij, p.438; Menander fr. 23.9.94–7. 105. The following is based on JE 6.14–5, 6.27, 6.34; Menander fr. 23.4–8; Theophylact 3.15.13– 16.4; Evagrius 5.19; Agathias 4.29.9–10. For slighly different reconstructions of these events, see Whitby (1988, 268–9); Stein (74–6); Maksymiuk, 75–8. 106. See the reign of Tiberius II. 107. Menander frgs 20.3, 21, 25.

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338  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chapter 4   1. JE 3.7ff.; PLRE3 under the names mentioned with referrals to the sources therein; Groh; Stein; Bury (78ff.).    2. Tiberius had three children, but it is usually suggested that only the two daughters were alive before he became Caesar because only two of the children accompanied Ino to the Palace. However, it is possible that this son was already old enough to be married and therefore not in need of maternal care. See PLRE3 with the sources mentioned.    3. GT 5.50, Paul (HL 3.12); PLRE 3 Iustinanus3 with extra sources.    4. This is based primarly on Gregory of Tours, Paul the Deacon and John of Biclar. These and other sources can be found from the PLRE3 under each individual name mentioned. Other sources are mentioned in the endnotes when relevant.    5. John of Biclar 50; Menander fr.24.    6. In the background on 5 Oct. 581 the Pope urged the Bishop of Auxerre (lived on the domains held by Guntram) to do his utmost to prevent an alliance between the Lombards and Frankish kings. For this, see Hodgkin, 5.239–40. One may assume that the Pope was particularly worried about Guntram because the two other kings (Chilperic and Childebert  II) were allied against Guntram while they were also allies of Rome.    7. This and following is based on GT HF 5.26ff. (esp. 6.1–2); PD HL 3.13. See also the chapter on Spain for further sources.   8. Hodgkin 6.71.    9. I agree with Goffart that it is practically certain that Gundovald was indeed the illegitimate son of the late king Lothar. The reverend attitude towards him shows this.  10. GT HF 5.17ff.; Goffart, 9ff. Note, however, that Goffart does not see the plot to have been formed against Guntram. His view is that the aim was just to place a Merovingian on a throne in a situation in which Chilperic no longer had a legitimate son to succeed him and this situation changed when Chilperic then got a son in 582.   11. Goffart contradicts himself on pages 23 and 25, because in the former case he claims that Brunhild would have lost her power by marrying Gundovald while on the latter page he states that Brunhild’s position within the court of her son was so meaningless that she could not have had any role in the invitation.   12. Goffart presents the different views including his own in his excellent article ‘The Frankish Pretender Gundovald, 582–585’ with analysis of the evidence together with references to the relevant parts of GT.  13. GT HF 6.24ff.  14. GT HF 6.24ff. The key weakness in Goffart’s theory (12–7) is that there is no mention of Gundovald’s treasury being divided in three. It was divided between Guntram Boso and Mummolus. Furthermore, GT is clear (6.24, 6.42) that Gundovald had a treasury for his own use that had been given to him when Tiberius was in power and which was divided between two duces and that Maurice then sent a separate sum of money for Childebert in return for assistance against the Lombards. There is no need to postulate only a single dispatch of money, because the sources are full of instances in which the Romans constantly send money for all kinds of purposes – some are even mentioned by Goffart. The fact that Tiberius raised 150,000 barbarian men in 575, and the sending of about 426,000 solidi with Pamphronius to Italy in 578 for the purpose of bribing Lombards and Franks and the sending of money to Chilperic and Gundovald in 581–2, should be enough evidence that the Romans sent money to Gaul several times. There is no need to postulate only a single dispatch of money. Goffart has also suggested that Gundovald would not have fled to imperial-held territory like Corsica or Sardinia, but to Le Frioul off Marseilles or Hyères off Toulon or the Lérins islands off Cannes. Goffart thinks that Corsica would have been too far away, which is not true. Furthermore, in his opinion, further contacts between Gundovald and Romans are unlikely. I do not agree with this view. It is far likelier that Gundovald fled to Roman territory because he knew he would be safe there.

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Notes 339  15. GT HF 6.26.  16. GT HF 6.26.   17. John of Biclar 63ff.; Isidore of Seville HG 49ff. HS 91; GT HF 5.38, 6.12, 6.18, 6.40, 6.43, 8.18, 8.28. Other sources including secondary ones mentioned where relevant. For a different version of the events, see also the secondary sources: Aragones, 57–64; Wolfram, 265ff.; Thompson, 1969, 65ff.; PLRE3 under the names mentioned.   18. Thompson interprets the evidence very differently (66–73). In his opinion the Romans did not offer any support.   19. Analysis of the evidence in the chapter describing the appointment of Tiberius as Caesar in December 574.   20. Contrary to most modern historians I am inclined to accept the figures given by the sources, because they explain better why the Romans were able to resume the offensive as far as Spain and north Africa.   21. John of Biclar a.578; Pringle, 41; PLRE3.  22. See MHLR Vol.6.   23. Also noted by Pringle (41). However, please note that I interpret the evidence concerning the recruiting drive differently. Pringle thinks that the men sent with Gennadius consisted of some of the 15,000 Tiberiani recruited in 578 (Theophanes AM6074), but in my opinion it is clear that they were recruited to serve under Maurice in the east because Maurice was their Comes Foederatorum. The men sent under Gennadius consisted of the armed forces that existed in 578 so they included men who had been recruited in 575 (Evagrius 5.14) and also of regulars who had been recruited into the armed forces through the regular recruiting/ conscription process.  24. Pringle, 41.   25. It is quite possible that it had been he (for example as a dux Libyae or dux Pentapoleos or Comes et Dux Tripolitanae) who had originally forced the Garamantes to beg for peace in 569. There had to be a string of military successes for Aristomachus to become so proud as to wrest command of all of the forces in the area without the official authorization to do so. He certainly had an apt name for a military hero.   26. For a different interpretation of the evidence, see Pringle 43 with PLRE3.   27. Welsby 33 after John of Biclar.   28. According to John of Ephesus, the Alodaei/Alwa were an Aethopian tribe, but it is probable that Alodia means the Nubians of the Kingdom of Alwa which was the southernmost of the Nubian kingdoms and which was built on the ruins of the ancient civilization of Kush/ Meroe. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that Makuria/Macuria was located between Nobadia and Alwa. This, however, is not certain, because John of Ephesus has preserved a letter from the king of the Nobadae to Theodore of Alexandria in which the king claims that when the previous kings had sent embassies to the Alodaei it had taken as long as eight to ten years for them to return whereas it now took only about 200 days for Longinus to send an embassy from the king of Alodia to him. On the face of it, this would suggest that the Alodaei were located somewhere in the Sahara desert (ancient sources claim there were Aethopians in the Sahara), but on the basis of Longinus’s letter, also preserved by John of Ephesus, this is unlikely. This letter states that a river served as the border of the Kingdom of Alodia/ Abyssinia and that there were heretical Christians in the kingdom. This makes it possible that Alodia was somewhere west or south-west of Aksum and that we are really dealing with an Ethiopian/Abyssinian tribe – the other alternative being that we are indeed dealing with the Nubian Kingdom of Alwa as usually suggested.   29. Welsby (35, 83–5) notes that Makuria had conquered Nobatia between 580 and 652, but notes that we do not know how this happened. This account of mine hopefully pinpoints this event more accurately because it is clear that it happened before Aristomachus defeated the Nubian invaders.

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340  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602   30. See the reign of Justin II.   31. According to Menander he was a Basileios machairoforos (King’s sword-beaerer). PLRE3 Theodorus 36 interprets this that he was probably a scribo (officer of the excubitores) but also makes the suggestion that he was a spatharius because the machaira-sword could imply the spatharii. I prefer the spatharius.   32. This and the following is based on Menander fr. 23.8–9; JE 6.29; Sebeos (p.11); Tabari i.991ff.   33. The Persian rulers did not only distinguish themselves with different helmets and crowns, which can be seen in their coins, but also with different colour schemes. According to Isfahani (p.74), Hormizd (Hurmuz b. Khusraw) had red embroidered vest, sky-blue trousers and green crown, and when he was sitting on a throne he had a mace in his right hand and a sword in his left. It is possible that this depiction of Hormizd, like all the rest in the text of Isfahani, came from a special book that depicted all Sassanian rulers which is mentioned by Masudi (p.102). Theophylact (4.3.7–8) describes Hormizd’s clothing as follows: emerald green helmet, golden gem-studded tiara with inset rubies and pearls, gold-decorated trousers. In short, on the basis of Isfahani’s text each of the Persian rulers had different colours for their clothing, which means that Hormizd could be distinguished from his green helmet and green crown.   34. This chapter is based on: Menander fr. 25.1–2, 27.1–3; JE 6.24, 30–3; John of Biclar, 53–63; Theophylact 1.3, 1.24; Theophanes AM6075; Evagrius 5.12; Michael Syrus/Rabo, 414–5, 419; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix/Sirmium. Secondary sources are included where relevant.  35. Pohl, 83.   36. John of Biclar’s information (53) is confused. The date he gives is the 11th year of Leovigildus (579) and the 3rd of Tiberius (581). On the basis of JE and Menander it is clear that 579 is the correct year. Furthermore, he confuses the Slavs and Avars with each other by stating that the Avars were expelled from Thrace while they captured parts of Greece and Pannonia. It would have been the Slavs who were expelled from Thrace while they captured parts of Greece, and it would have been the Avars who captured parts of Pannonia (actually the area around Sirmium).   37. According to Whitby (1988), the Slavs penetrated as far as the Peloponnese during the reign of Tiberius.  38. Blockley translates hegemôn as comes/count, but I have here made the guess that it could mean both.   39. I agree with Blockley that the likeliest translation for lochagos is tribune. The other possiblity would of course be that the hegemôn was comes and lochagos the dux.   40. Titles from PLRE3 Narses4.   41. It is possible that the first Slavic siege of Thessalonica described by the Miracles of St. Demetrius (1.100–115) occurred during this invasion. The Slavs tried to surprise the city with a 5,000-strong elite war party, but their approach was ‘miraculously’ detected, and the soldiers and populace sallied out to fight. After fighting for some time, the defenders routed the Slavs. However, in the MHLR series I have preferred either 584 or 610 – for the latter see the reign of Phocas. The miracle took place on Monday 26 October which for the reign of Phocas gives two possible dates, 604 and 610.   42. For the Avars, see Strategikon 11.2 and for the use of hollow infantry square against cavalry basically any of my previous studies. A good early example for the use of this tactic is the battle of Carrhae in which Crassus famously lost his life. It is worth noting that the hollow square obviously went on to serve in this same manner until the early 20th century.   43. See e.g. Whitby (1988, 271–2); REF2, 162–3. In contrast Martindale (PLRE3, Martinus 3, Mauricius 4, Romanus 4/7, Theodericus 2) and Blockley (Menander) quite rightly accept the dating – so do I.   44. The fighting march of Julian the Apostate’s army from the Roman border to Ctesiphon took from 1 April until 7 June and it involved several sieges, battles, and other obstacles. For this,

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Notes 341 see MHLR 2, 84–97. It is unlikely that the trip would have taken much longer for the envoys, even with the delays.  45. PLRE3 Cours, Ioannes 101 Mystacon.   46. Also in Michael Syrus/Rabo, 409–10.   47. Also in Michael Syrus/Rabo, 418–9.   48. JE 4.42. Also in Michael Syrus/Rabo, 412–4.  49. ibid.  50. JE 4.43ff.   51. Based on: Menander fr. 23.11; Theophylact 3.17.5–11; JE 3.40, 6.16–8; Evagrius 5.20; Chron. 1234 74 (pp.164–5); Bar Hebraeus (p.83); these and other sources collected in REF2, 162–5. For a different reconstruction of the campaign, see Whitby (1988, 272–4) and Stein (91–3).  52. See also MHLR Vol.2 (81ff.) for a description of Julian’s campaign against Persia. It is probable that Maurice followed similar procedures so the grain fleet was built in and around Samosata because there was plentiful supply of timber there. The army and fleet were then united close to Circesium and it is probable that this also took place in this instance.   53. In this version the combined force of Maurice and Alamundarus then met Adarmahan in battle somewhere near Callinimum. The reason for the failure of the Romans to defeat the enemy decisively then resulted from their long marching. Stein (p.98) suggests on the basis of Evagrius 5.20 that we should connect the flight of Theoderic with his ‘Scythians’ with this battle, but this is patently false. Evagrius connects this in no uncertain terms with the battle of Constantia in June 581.   54. Sebeos pp.11–2; Menander fr. 23.11 with Blockley’s comment on p.283. The fact that we cannot find this in John of Ephesus is easily explained. He used a source highly favourable to Kours/Cours so it is not surprising to find him omitting this defeat. If Kours was indeed the strategos and not John Mystacon, then this defeat resulted in his demotion so he became subordinate of his former subordinate John Mystacon. As the subsequent account of the battle of Nymphius/Batman River in autumn 582 shows, this is very likely.  55. REF2, p.162 dates this piece of information to roughly 580.   56. I disagree with Michael Whitby’s assessment (1988, 272) of the reasons behind the failure of the campaign. In his opinion the reason was Maurice’ own overambitious plan. When one realizes on the basis of Chronicle 1234 that the culprit was Alamundarus, it becomes clear that Menander (fr. 23.11) is correct to blame the defeat on the disobedience of the subordinates.  57. Based on: JE (6.26); Evagrius (5.20); Menander (fr. 26.1.72–9, 26.133–8), Michael the Syrian (pp. 2.347–8)/Michael Syrus/Rabo, p.415; Theophylact (1.9.4, 3.18.1–3); Menander fr. 26.1; Syvänne, 2004/Appendix/Constantina. According to John of Ephesus, this battle was fought in June 581. Michael Whitby and REF2 date the battle to the year 582, but I agree with John’s dating, a dating which is also accepted by Blockley and Martindale.   58. Whitby (Evagrius, p.283, n.73) suspects the possibility of confusing the events of 581 and 582, but there’s no compelling reason for this. Evagrius’ account is entirely logical.   59. According to Menander (fr.26.5) Tamkhosro was killed by some unknown soldier.   60. Sources also collected in PLRE3 Alamundarus, Mauricius 4, Naamanes.   61. This chapter is based on PLRE3/Tiberius Constantinus 1, Whitby (1988, 6–9) and Schlosser (44ff.) and original sources (mainly Theophylact, Michael the Syrian, Chronicon Paschale and Theophanes) mentioned therein. Chapter 5    1. This resembles the reaction of the Roman populace during the reign of Philip the Arab, when he and his brother Priscus showered money on their birthplace, the city of Philippopolis, while they taxed the population heavily. For this, see Syvänne, Gordian III and Philip the Arab, 158–9, 161–2, 177ff. Maurice basically repeated the mistake of Philip.    2. This chapter is based on Franziska E. Schlosser (46ff.), Michael Whitby (1988, 3ff.), Bury (83ff.) and the PLRE3 (Martindale) under names mentioned and sources mentioned therein.

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342  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602    3. The following is based on: Bury84–6; Treadgold, 232, 236; Narrative in this monograph. For Paulinus and sources for this event, see PLRE3 Paulinus3.    4. This is entirely based on Syvänne (2004) and follows it closely even in the notes.    5. The earliest surviving manuscripts that contain the Strategikon date from the tenth century. Most of the manuscripts name Maurice as the author. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that we don’t have the original text. There are some problems with the text, including probable later additions or lacunae. For example, diagrams 3.9–10, and the diagrams and text of 12.A show them. E.g. the text of the epikampios opisthia formation includes a reference (12.A.7.70–74) to a diagram that doesn’t exist unless it is the 12.A.2, but even in that case diagram 12.A.7 of the convex/epikampios formation lacks the reserve cavalry units and has too small a frontage.    6. I was the first to suggest in 2004 that the Strategikon was actually written in two stages by Maurice.    7. Str. 10.1. For example an instruction to distribute written drills to officers: Strategikon 3.5.122–3. Siege of Akbas: Theophylact 1.12.1–7. Discussion about the date of the siege: Dennis, 1981, 15–16; Dennis, 1984, xvi; Rance, 33–4.    8. The epilogue appended to the 11th Book is entirely separate from the rest of the book physically and in content and therefore it is likely that the description of the tactics to be used against the different enemies was simply inserted into the earlier treatise. The likeliest place for the ending of the original cavalry treatise is at the end of Book 10. This, however, is only my best guess. As noted in 2004, the other probable additions made to the original treatise include at least the general index, 2.2.7–8 and possibly the maxims because these were not carefully streamlined with the rest of the work.    9. Maurice ordering the soldiers to winter in enemy territory: Theophylact 6.10.1–3 (in 593); 8.6.2 (in 602). In 598 a provision in the peace treaty with the Avars stipulated that crossing of the Danube by the Roman armies was accepted ‘against the Slavs’ (Theophylact 7.15.14), i.e. the peace treaty with the Avars would have given the Romans permission to remain north of the Danube through the winter. In 599 Comentiolus marched towards Constantinople during winter with his army, but had to stay in Philippopolis until spring (Theophylact 8.4.3–8). This may suggest that the army had refused to stay in or near enemy territory during winter and that because of this Comentiolus made his ill-fated march.   10. See: Str. 11.4.82ff.   11. I have re-dated the ending of the Persian war on the basis of period evidence to 593. See the analysis later.   12. See Rance (81–102) for an analysis of the literary borrowings and the process of creating the final text. Kollautz, 92 and Shahid, 572, also regard the text a composition collected from a variety of independent works. In my view this is uncontested.  13.  Syvänne, 2004; Rance, 81–147. John Lydus 1.47 (written during Justinian I’s reign) mentioned the following military treatises, any of which can have been used as sources: Celsus, Paternus, Catiline, Cato, Frontinus, Renatus (Vegetius), Aelian, Arrian, Aeneas, Onasander, Patro, Apollodorus (siege engines), and emperor Julian (military engines). It is possible that Maurice used these or any number of other treatises of which we know nothing.  14. Chron. Pasch. a.626.   15. Michael Syrus/Rabo 10.21, p.423; GT 6.42.   16. Pringle, 41; PLRE3.   17. Pringle (41) dates the surrender of the Moors mentioned by Theophylact (3.4.8–9) to 584 while Whitby (tr. of Theophylact, 77) dates it to 589. I have here opted for the latter because it explains better the dating in Theophanes. The sequence of events in Theophylact also proves that Whitby’s dating is the correct one.   18. Pringle dates this referral to 587 on the basis of Theophanes’ own dating (587/8), but in light of the tendency of Theophanes to misplace events by about three to four years I have opted here for 583/4 because of this and because the change of rulers was a known cause of the

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Notes 343 troubles in antiquity. It was then that the previous agreements concluded between the tribes and the Roman Emperor became void and had to be renegotiated with the new Roman ruler.  19. Pringle, 42–3; PLRE3 Gennadius 1.   20. See e.g. Liebeschuetz (1974, 167–8) who suggests the same, and in general for the role of pagarch see Liebeschuetz.   21. John of Biclar 63ff.; Isidore of Seville HG 49ff. HS 91–2; GT HF 5.38, 6.18, 6.40, 6.43, 8.18, 8.28–30; Fredegar 3.86ff; PLRE3 named persons for additional references to original sources. Other sources mentioned where relevant. For alternative reconstructions see: Aragones (64–5), Wolfram (268ff.) and Thompson (1969, 64–113).   22. Thompson, 1969, 72. The bis in the coin refers to the fact that the city was taken in 572 and again in 584.   23. Wolfram (268) and Aragones (64–5). They suggest that the betrayal of Hermenegild took place when he had fled to Cordoba and that it was only then that Leovigild bribed the Roman magister. This, however, does not stand closer scrutiny because Gregory of Tours (HF 5.38) mentions that the betrayal took place when Hermenegild still possessed an army and that he advanced from his capital to meet the invading force of his father. However, I agree with them in that it is clear that the surrender of Cordoba formed part of the deal that Leovigild had made with the magister. For an alternative reconstruction, see Thompson (1969, 68ff.).  24. GT HF 6.42, 8.28, 8.30; Paul. Diac. HL .3.17, 3.22; PLRE3 Childebertus 2, Ingundis 2 with further sources therein.   25. Thompson, 1969, 93–108.  26. GT HF 8.28ff., 9.1; John of Biclar 80ff.; Thompson, 1969, 103.   27. The sources mentioned with Thompson (1969, 92–103).   28. Modern historians are in the habit of discarding such stories, but it is not quite as incredible as it sounds and finds a logical explanation in the account of Gregory of Tours (9.31). According to him, Guntram dispatched an army to conquer Septimania. Dux Austrovald advanced ahead of the rest to subject the city of Carcassonne. Boso and Antestesius were sent to subdue the other cities. When Boso then arrived he acted with great arrogance and scolded Austrovald because he had entered Carcassone without waiting for him. After this, Boso marched carelessly to Carcassonne with the men of Saintes, Périgueux, Bordeaux, Agen and Toulouse. This list of cities lends credence to the 60,000 men given by the Spanish sources. When the Goths heard of it, they placed an ambush. Boso pitched a camp beside the River Aude, sat down for supper, drank too much wine and was taunting the Goths in his drunken state. It was then that the Goths launched the first part of their planned ambush. They attacked, the Franks raised the alarm, and then the Goths feigned flight, with Boso and his men in hot and disorderly pursuit. Then the Goths who had been hidden rose up and put the pursuers between two forces. According to Gregory, almost the entire Frankish force was wiped out. This means the pursuers and not those who had remained behind in the camp. The death of the Frankish commander decided the fight. It was a case of sauve qui peut, as Lewis Thorpe (p.517), the latest translator of Gregory of Tours, states in his translation. Some of the Franks managed to mount their horses and flee. This means those who had stayed behind in the camp. The panicked Franks left behind all of their personal belongings and were just lucky to be able to flee. The Goths captured the camp and pursued the fugitives. According to Gregory, the Goths captured all the footsoldiers and killed almost 5,000 while they seized more than 2,000 men. Many of the prisoners were later freed by the Goths, undoubtedly because it was impossible to control so many prisoners with so few men.   29. Thompson dates the Council to May 589 but some others to the year 590.  30. PLRE3 Comentiolus 1.  31. GT HF 9.29ff.; PLRE3 for further sources.  32. GT HF 6.31ff.; Goffart, 9.

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344  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602  33. GT HF 6.32ff.; Goffart, 9–10. Note that I disagree with Goffart’s analysis regarding the power politics in the court of Childebert. In other words, I do not see any changes in the politics of the court of Childebert in 584–5 because he clearly remained allied with Guntram until the death of Chilperic. The cancellation of the invasion of Leovigild’s territory in late 584 does not yet mean that the alliance had been broken. It is probable that the cancellation resulted from the hopeless position of Hermenegild and from the fact that his wife Ingund was no longer in Spain.  34. GT HF 6.40ff.  35. PLRE3 Decius 2. He is the first recorded exarch of Italy.  36. GT HF 6.42ff., PD HL 3.17; John of Biclar, 70 (a.584). Fabbro (chapters: Under pressure, Byzantine bribery and blackmail: a review of the evidence) dismisses the evidence for the Roman use of bribery and blackmail to obtain the support of the Austrasian Franks in Italy. He claims that the invasions were the result of the Frankish policies who had their own interests in north of Italy and that the initiative rested solely with the Franks. I disagree. The sources refer to both Roman bribes and to blackmail in no uncertain terms to obtain Frankish assistance against the Lombards in Italy. This was not a new policy. Justinian I had sought the same when he used the Franks against the Ostrogoths (see MHLR Vol.6). However, I do agree with Fabbro’s general argument, which is that the Franks had their own goals when fighting in Italy which were not shared by the Romans.  37. PD HL 3.16, 3.18–9; Fredegar 4.45; Wolfram, 294–5, PLRE3 Droctulfus, Authari (further sources therein); Hodgkin 5.232–5. On the basis of Fredegar, Fabbro (chapter: The French connection: the creation of the Lombard monarchy) considers the appointment of Authari as king to have been instigated by Guntram as a diplomatic effort because it was easier to negotiate with a single king rather than with a multitude of duces. This fails to take into account both the circumstances (the Frankish invasion brought home the need for unified command) and the details in Fredegar. Fredegar stated that the Lombards asked for Guntram’s permission to appoint a king. I.e. they had already come to the conclusion that they needed a king and the initiative was taken by them. The principal aim for the Lombard duces in their diplomacy towards the Franks was to convince them to remain aloof of their conflict with the Roman Empire or at least to divide them. The last they probably achieved by paying 12,000 solidi to Guntram. It should be noted, however, that the Lombards failed to achieve their aim with the Austrasians, which in fact is not surprising because by appointing a king they stated their independence from the Austrasians.  38. PD HL 4.16–8.   39. See the beginning of the Gundovald affair during the reign of Tiberius II and Appendix 1.  40. GT HF 8.5–22.   41. The principal sources for this chapter are: GT HF 6.42ff. (esp. 6.42, 8.18, 9.25, 9.29, 10.3); LP 65–6; PD HL 3.21ff.; Copenhagen Continuator of Prosper 1530ff.; other sources are mentioned where relevant.   42. The following is based on GT HF 6.42, 8.12–4, 8.18, 8.28–9; PD HL 3.21–2.   43. PLRE3, Athanagild 2, Childebert II, Grippo, Babo; Goubert, 2.1.110ff. (analysis of the letters together with partial French tr.). For a different analysis of the material, see Fabbro (chapter The 585 campaign).   44. John of Biclar 79; PD HL 3.18. For additional sources, see PLRE3, Authari, Decius 2, Droctulfus, Smaragdus 2.  45. John of Biclar 79; PD HL 3.18. For additional sources, see PLRE3, Authari, Decius 2, Droctulfus, Smaragdus 2. For examples of the use of priests in the Frankish realm, see Gregory of Tours. On the basis of a letter of Pope Pelagius, Hodgkin (5.240–4, sources therein) has suggested that Pope Pelagius II wrote in 585 to his representative at Constantinople Gregory (the future Pope) that he should convince Emperor Maurice to send one magister militum or dux to Rome because the Exarch had written to him that he

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Notes 345 could not send any soldiers to help Rome. Hodgkin has suggested that this resulted in the removal of the inefficient Longinus from office and his replacement with exarch Smaragdus. This is obviously incorrect because we know that Decius was already exarch in 584. Hodgkin suggests it was thanks to the efforts of Smaragdus that Droctulf deserted to the Roman side and that it was then after his defeat that Authari and Smaragdus concluded the truce. This is obviously once again clearly incorrect. However, if we connect the letter of Pelagius II with the situation that prevailed after the defeat of Droctulf but before (or immediately after) the conclusion of the truce by Smaragdus then it makes more sense. The rift between the Pope, Emperor and schismatic bishops led by the Bishop of Aquileia had begun in 553. These bishops did not accept the decisions taken at the Fifth Ecumenical Council in 553 so they had formed an independent church. After their conquest of most of north Italy the Lombards protected these schismatics from the Pope and Emperor. It was only in 698 that the Lombard king allowed the reunion of the churches. For a short summary of this Three Chapters controversy, see Herrin (208–11, 223–9).   46. The following is based on GT HF 8.21–9.16.; Fredegar 4.6; with the chapter on Visigoths.  47. GT HF 8.43ff., 9.3, 9.11ff. (esp. 9.20); Theophanes AM 6080; PLRE3 Childebertus, Gunthramus, Fredegundis; Chapter on Visigoths.  48. PD HL 3.27ff.; Theophanes AM6080.   49. PLRE Smaragdus 2 (sources therein).   50. This and the following is based on. GT HF 9.20ff., PD HL 3.27ff.; Theophanes AM6080ff. For a different view of the events in 587–8, see Fabbro (chapter The 588 campaign).   51. PLRE 3 under the names mentioned (further sources therein); Goubert 2.1.135–7, 2.2.179–86.  52. GT HF 9.29,; John of Biclar 83 (dates this wrongly to the year 587); PD HL 3.29. For a different view of the events in 587–8, see Fabbro (chapter The 588 campaign).   53. This and the following is based on: GT HF 9.25ff.; PD HL 3.30ff.; PLRE3 Romanus 4 and 7, Smaragdus 2, Authari, Garibaldus 1, with further sources therein; Goubert 2.2.187ff. (a full analysis of the relevant letters between the different players in the MGH Epp. together with a partial French tr.). I have here accepted the suggestion in PLRE3 that we should identify Romanus 7 with Romanus 4 (son of Anagastes), so he was a very experienced soldier by the time he arrived in Italy. For a different interpretation of the events of 589–90, see Fabbro (chapter The empire strikes back). He considers the Frankish invasions to have been taken at their own initiative for their own strategic purpose. This view fails to take into account the Roman bribery and exchange of messages. The fact that the Romans had a different agenda from that of the Franks is not surprising. The Franks were not reliable as allies. The Roman expectation was that they would help them get rid of the Lombards, while the Frankish goals changed according to the circumstances.  54. GT HF 10.2–4; PD HL 3.31; PLRE3.   55. Theophylact 3.4.8; Hodgkin 6.72–3.  56. MGH Epp. III, pp.145–7. The following is based on the analyses of Hodgkin (5.272ff., 6.29ff.) and Goubert (2.2.187ff. ), but my analysis adds some new conclusions in some places. Fabbro attempts to prove in the chapters ‘What were the Franks doing in Italy?’ and ‘To tame a land’ and ‘The king, pope, and the rebels (590–602)’ that the Franks of Childebert II invaded north of Italy in response to Roman operations with the aim of preventing the Romans from conquering the north and to secure the status quo in the area so the Lombards would have continued to recognize the Austrasians as their overlords. This fails to take into account what is actually stated in the sources. Most importantly it suffers from one major logical oversight. If the goal of the Austrasian Franks was to restore the status quo in north of Italy because the Romans were conquering Lombard lands, why did the Romans then reprimand them from having abandoned the campaign and why did their commander Romanus ask Childebert to send his forces back the next year? Furthermore, if the Romans were as powerful as Fabbro claims, why did they not just conquer the north of Italy from the Lombards immediately

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346  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 after the Franks left? It is the other way around. The older view, which is based on a sound reading of the sources, is the correct one. The Romans lacked the means to conquer the north and they needed Frankish help to achieve this. Unfortunately for them, the Franks were not particularly reliable and/or effective allies.   57. An analysis of this can be found in e.g. Syvänne (The Age of Hippotoxotai, 367–89; MHRL Vol.1, 57ff.) and in the forthcoming Late Roman Combat Tactics due to be published by Pen and Sword Books.   58. Foulke identifies these after Hodgkin 6.30, 6.32 as follows: Tesena and Sermiana on the Adige, 10 or 12 miles south of Meran; Maletum in the Val di Sole; Appianus, opposite Dotzen; Fagitana, between Adige and the Avisio, overlooking the Rotalian plain; Cimbra, in the Val di Cembra on the lower Avisio; Vitianum, west of Trent; Bremtonicum, between the Adige and the head of Lago di Garda; Volaenes, a little north of Roveredo; Ennemase, not far south of Botzen; Ferrugis, near Trento.   59. The following is based on PD HL 4.1ff. with PLRE3 (persons mentioned).  60. PD HL 4.16. Hodgkin (5.350ff., 406–7, 365) provides an analysis of the contents of the letters of Gregory the Great. A list of these can also be found in PLRE3 under each individual involved. The ravages that the Lombards had caused there and elsewhere in Italy made it necessary for Gregory to unite bishoprics and ecclesiastical administration because there was simply no longer the economical means for them to remain separate. For a different analysis of the sources, see Fabbro’s chapter ‘The king, pope, and the rebels (590–602)’.   61. This entirely based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix, The Battle of Nymphius/Batman Rivers. This in its turn is based on Theophylact 1.9.1–11; Theophanes AM 6075 after Theophylact.   62. For the career of John, see PLRE3 Ioannes qui et Mystacon 101.   63. Whitby’s comment in Theophylact, p.32 n.49.   64. Theophylact (1.9.7) uses of the word moira, which would indicate the overall strength of about 6,000–9,000 men for the army, but it is clear that Theophylact used this term in nontechnical manner so his meaning is that the battle line was divided into three divisions/parts. Whitby’s translation (p.32) of the relevant section simply states that the army was divided into three parts, which indicates that he also did not use the word in its technical sense.   65. Comments against the use of a single cavalry line in the Strategikon (2.1.1–2.10). Strictly speaking, however, even the Strategikon allowed the use of a single cavalry line, but only when it was deployed in front of the infantry because the Strategikon had two variants for this: cavalry with two lines in front of infantry (Str. 12.A.3); cavalry with a single line (3 mere) in front of infantry (Str 12.B.23.19–27).  66. Theophylact 1.11.3–21 (Paulinus incident) with Evagrius 6.2. Sources also collected in PLRE3 Alamundarus, Mauricius 4, Naamanes.   67. Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Siege of Akbas; Theophylact, 1.12.1–13.1; Str. 10.1; Evagrius 6.3; JE 6.36–8 (only the titles of the chapters 37–8 are extant; for the rest of the likely contents of JE one has to rely on Michael 10.21); Whitby, 1988, 277–8, 292.   68. JE 5.18 and 6.37–9 (only chapter titles); Michael Syrus/Rabo 10.21; Theophylact (7.8.16–7); Tabari i.991–3. See also my discussion of the Turkish connection in the chapters dealing with events in the Balkans in 582–7, and Appendix 1.   69. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Philippicus’ Campaign in 584 and Theophylact 1.13.1– 12, 1.14.6, 1.15.11. The notes and maps of Whitby and the map of Maksymiuk have also been valuable for the reconstruction of the routes taken by Philippicus. See also Whitby, 1988, 278–9.   70. Michael Syrus/Rabo 10.21, p.423.   71. Tabari i.991ff.; Balami/Belami, 252ff.; Thaalibi, 655ff.; Masudi, 212ff.; Mirkhond, 394ff., Balami 259ff. The Turkish Khagan was actually directed to Balkh by a Persian ruse. The Persian ambassador pretended to negotiate so that Bahram could then target the Khagan in a place where the latter had fewer men available to him. See also Appendix 1.

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Notes 347   72. JE 5.18 and 6.37–9 (only chapter titles); Michael Syrus/Rabo 10.21, p.423; Theophylact (7.8.16–7); Tabari i.991–3 (Romans invading with 80,000 also in Mirkhond p.389). See also my discussion of the Turkish connection in the chapters dealing with events in the Balkans in 582–7. The refugees were likely to be the former supporters of Tardu who lost a power struggle against the Apa Khagan in about 582/3. For this, see Appendix 1.   73. Theophylact 1.14.1–5. It has often been suspected that Theophylact included the reference to Scipio Africanus to flatter Heraclius who conducted similar diversionary operations against the Persians. This is a good example of the faulty approach to the evidence presented by the sources. Philippicus was conducting similar operations well before Heraclius and it is more or less certain that it was Heraclius who learnt these techniques from Philippicus. For this, see MHLR Vol.8. There is absolutely no reason whatsoever to doubt that Philippicus was an admirer of Scipio.   74. Theophylact 1.14.1–10, Comment of the Whitbys (p.40 n.76) note that this out of place comment may have resulted from Heraclius’ invasion of Persian territory at the time Theophylact lived). They also suggest that the Persian operation against Martyropolis could have actually been undertaken by a separate Persian army operating from Persarmenia. I do not see any reason for this. The rest of the sources (all used Theophylact) collected in PLRE3 Philippicus, Stephanus 26, Apsich 2.   75. This is based on Syvänne, Appendix Solanchon (follows this very closely); Theophylact 1.15.1–15, 2.1.1ff.; Michael Syrus 10.21.   76. See Whitby/Theophylact, p.44 note 1. Whitbys (Theophylact, 1986, p.48 n.13) quite rightly note that the distance of the subsequent pursuit by the Roman left wing shows that the Romans had advanced to confront the Persians. The battle dispositions of the commanders may indicate that the left flank of the Romans offered them the chance of using ambushers. Haldon (2001, 53) places the battle on rising ground in the plain of Solanchon, with the left flank being well covered by the broken and hilly ground at the foot of the mountain.   77. This is how Theophylact states it, but it is not impossible that these actually meant caltrops tied into ropes.   78. The Arabic light cavalry was indispensable thanks to the speed of their horses and their expertise of desert warfare.   79. This battle has been seen as an instance of the Romans using only one battle line, but this is a misconception. Two points speak against it. Firstly, Philippicus left the front when the charge began and Heraclius assumed command of the centre. Secondly, when the centre subsequently fled it would have been impossible to regroup it without reserves. Haldon, 2001, 52–56 has only a single line, whereas Whitby (1988, 231, 281–2) clearly implies the use of the standard two-lines formation in his short discussion of the campaign.  80. PLRE 3 Heraclius 3 suggests that he became the MVM per Armeniam only in ca. 595, but in my opinion it is entirely possible that he held this position earlier so would have succeeded John Mystacon in about 582/3 and would have served in this capacity until ca. 589/90–591 when John (probably Mystacon) is attested as MVM per Armeniam. He was a native of Armenia and therefore an ideal candidate for the job. Furthermore, the position of hypostrategos implies that he had a very high rank in the hierarchy.   81. Three acheiropoieta or images not made by human hand are attested for the sixth century: 1) Mandylion of Edessa with an imprint of Christ’s face on a piece of linen, 2) Memphis image; 3) Kamoulianai image in Syria. The usual assumption is that the Kamoulianai image of God Incarnate (Christ) was the one used by magister militum Philippicus (general-in-charge) to instill courage and loyalty in the field army before the victorious battle of Solanchon against the Persians in 586 (Theophylact Simocattes 2.3.4–6). The Shroud of Turin is the most famous of the acheiropoieta images, but it is usually considered to be separate from the ones used by the Romans. For the use of religion in warfare see also Syvänne, 2019–20.   82. DMS 10 instructed the flank divisions to support the centre in case it needed help.

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348  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602   83. Theophylact, who wrote during Heraclius’ reign (son of Heraclius), chose not to dwell on the matter.   84. This also raises the possibility that the reserves consisted of infantry (note the quartoparthoi among the troops) and that the cavalry was dismounted to support it. However, the battle narrative contains only references to cavalry action, which makes this less likely. Furthermore, the quartoparthoi probably belonged to the Equites quarti clibanarii Parthi (Notitia dignitatum, Or. vii) and not to the infantry.  85. For fuller information, see PLRE3 Stephanus 26. He was one of Philippicus’s former bodyguards (an excubitor or bucellarius?) who served with him in the East in 585–6. In 585 he had been Philippicus’s choice as strategos while he was ill so he was a trusted man. He was a lochagos/tagmatarches, which may mean comes rei militaris or dux.   86. Theophylact 2.3.1–6.12; Theophanes AM 6078. Whitby (1988, 230) also notes that there is a minor discrepancy in the amount of time the defeated Persian remained on the hillock. It should also be noted that Theophylact’s ‘Heraclius source’ whitewashed Heraclius’ military achievements. See: Whitby, 1988, 230–33.   87. This is based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix, Chlomaron the Siege and Battle 586; Theophylact 2.7.1ff.; Theophanes AM 6078.   88. For the career of Theodorus, see PLRE3 Theodorus 32.   89. Theophylact actually claims that Philippicus abandoned his army and fled to Aphumon so his army had to extricate itself on it own. It is obvious that this piece of information is false and comes from some source extremely favourable to Heraclius, as has been noted by the Whitbys (Theophylact, p.55 n.21; Michael Whitby, 1988, 282–3).   90. The sources mentioned in the beginning of the chapter with Mary and Michael Whitby in Theophylact, 55–6; Michael Whitby, 1988, 282–4.  91. ibid.  92. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Beïuades; Theophylact 2.10.6–7, 2.18.1–26; Tabari i.991–3. Other sources mentioned where relevant.   93. The PLRE3 separates three different Andreases for this period: There is Andreas 10 who was dispatched by Tiberius to Egypt in 578/82 to handle the matter of Aristomachus (see the chapter dealing with Egyptian matters), whom Martindale suggests to have been a scribo/ scribon. Then there is the interpreter and officer of this year (587) Andreas 11. The third of the Andreases (Andreas 12) was sent by Maurice (see below) to persuade the soldiers to end their mutiny in 589. Martindale suggests that he held the rank of Comes Domesticorum. My own suggestion is that all three men were one and the same. These kinds of missions were the bread and butter of the officers of the imperial bodyguards. If Andreas had the rank of scribo in about 580, it is entirely possible that he had been promoted to Comes Domesticorum by 589 – however, I would not preclude the possibility that he held that rank already under Tiberius because a higher rank would have made it easier for him to convince Aristomachus to act in the desired manner. Whatever the truth, it is clear that the Andreas, who was interpreter and go-between of the strategos and the Arabs, is likely to have been a trusted man of Maurice and quite possibly one of the men who had advised Maurice in matters pertaining to the Arabs, including the breaking up of the Ghassanid kingdom.   94. As correctly noted by Whitby (1988, 284–5).   95. Sebeos 20, pp.38–40; Howard-Johnston and Greenwood, comments in Sebeos Vol.2, 178–9, Whitby (1988, 127, 291).  96. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Martyropolis 588; Theophylact 2.18.26, 3.1.1–5.10; Theophanes AM 6079; Evagrius 6.4–10. Other sources mentioned where relevant.   97. ibid. with Whitby, 1988, 286–7.  98. ibid.   99. This was not the only trouble the East was facing in spring 588. The city of Antioch was in the midst of a religious turmoil. Comes Orientis Asterius had a quarrel with Gregory the

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Notes 349 Bishop of Hieropolis. He assembled the mob and tradesmen on his side against the Bishop with the result that Maurice sacked Asterius and dispatched John to investigate the situation. A banker accused Gregory of having had sex with his sister who was about to be married and similar accusations were also levelled by others. Gregory appealed to the Emperor and a synod so the investigation was transferred to the capital. There the historian Evagrius acted as Gregory’s lawyer and managed to get him acquitted. Then Gregory returned to his see and Evagrius to Antioch. Evagrius states that this took place when the new reinstated commander Philippicus was tarrying near Beroe and Chalcis. It is this piece of information that dates these events. It was then in October in 588 that another disaster struck the East. Antioch suffered its third terrible disaster of the sixth century. In 526 it had lost 250,000 killed in an earthquake, in 540 it had lost its entire population to the Persians, and now it lost 60,000 more in an earthquake. See Evagrius 6.7–8 with Whitby’s comments. 100. Names from the note (p.77 n.16) in the translation of Theophylact by the Whitbys. 101. Martindale (PLRE3 Germanus 6 and 13) suggests it is quite possible that this Germanus is identical with the Germanus who held later consulship and served as magister militum in 602–4. I agree with this suggestion. 102. The reconstruction of the events of the years 589–92 are based on: Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Sisarbanon, Akbas 2, Suania, Lake Urmiah and River Blarathos/Plain of Canzak 591; Theophylact 3.4.6ff., 4.1.1ff.; Evagrius 6.10ff.; GC (Juansher) pp.228–31; Sebeos, 9 p.12ff.; ‘Theophilus of Edessa, pp.45–52 (Robert Hoyland’s reconstruction of Theophilus’ text on the basis of Chron 1234, Michael the Syrian, Theophanes, Agapius of Membij, which therefore nicely represents this in one continuous text); Yaqubi (187–91/118–21); REF2, 170–5 (a collection of translated sources). Other sources are mentioned where relevant. Readers should note that I date the sequence of events in the following pages differently from the previous secondary studies because I accept the dating of Evagrius. Unlike the later eastern sources, Evagrius was a period author whose friend Bishop Gregory was closely involved in all these matters and therefore unlikely to be wrong in his dating, as usually claimed by modern authors. We simply do not know how long it took from the revolt of Bahram in 589 until the killing of Hormizd and deposition of Chosroes Parwez because it involved Bahram’s stay in Rayy, minting of 10,000 silver dirhams and their distribution to undermine Chosroes Parwez’s position in his father’s eyes, the flight of Chosroes to Azerbaijan, and the different ploys that Hormizd then tried to save the situation, the march of Hormizd to Media against Bahram and then Bahram’s war against the Daylami. The argument that has been used against the dating in Evagrius, namely that Romanus was definitely in Italy by January 591, becomes meaningless when one realizes that the time period from the revolt of Bahram in 589 until the deposition of Hormizd was much longer than a few months. And this is confirmed by Theophylact (3.8.12) who states that Bahram ousted Chosroes Parwez in 592. One of the positive things about this dating is that it agrees with the inscription mentioning Comentiolus as patricius and magister militum Spaniae dated Sept 589–Aug 590 (see PLRE3 Comentionlus 1). With the current commonly-accepted dating scheme, this has resulted in the conclusion that Comentiolus must have left Spain by the time the inscription was made. This problem goes away when one accepts Evagrius’s dating. 103. Sources for Guaram I in PLRE3 Guaram 1, Stephanus 53. He ruled Iberia from 588 until his death in ca. 602 when he was succeeded by his son Stephanus (ruler ca. 602–27). Stephanus revolted against the Romans in 605–14, probably in 607/8, and became ruler of entire Iberia under the Persians; in 626 when Heraclius invaded Iberia, he remained loyal to Persia, and was besieged at Tiflis where he was killed in 627. 104. Bahram’s exploits also in: Balami/Belami, 252ff.; Thaalibi, 655ff.; Masudi, 212ff.; Mirkhond, 394ff. Higgins (36) dates the victory of Bahram on the basis of Firdausi as follows: Bahram defeated the Turks in a great battle between 22 July and 21 August 588; the whole campaign was over by 4 April 589. This sequence fits the information in Tabari (i.992–3). He gives two

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350  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 different sizes for Bahram’s army. One version states that Hormizd gave Bahram 12,000 chosen warriors for the task while another states that Hormizd assembled 70,000 men for it. My own guess is that both are true. Bahram had 12,000 chosen elite warriors which are to be included in the overall number of 70,000 men. Bahram surprised the Turkish Khagan Shabah in his camp and then killed him with an arrow during the battle that ensued. Yaqubi (187–90/118–21) and Dinawari (82–4) claim that Hormizd duped Shabah to Herat/Hirat where Bahram defeated the Turks with 12,000 men. According to Yaqubi, Bahram killed Shabah during the pursuit with a long spear. This would have been the victory in July/ August 588. The son of the Khagan (Barmudhah or Yaltikin) then marched against Bahram, but Bahram attacked and defeated him and the besieged him in a fortress. The best account of Bahram’s decisive battle with the new Khagan is in Thaalibi. According to him, Bahram’s battle array against the Turkish Khagan consisted of: infantry placed in front of Bahram; elephants placed behind Bahram; cavalry wings; and of a separate cavalry detachment behind, which was apparently sent in front of this army to feign flight (al-Thaalibi, 646–7). This means that Bahram opposed the Turkish cavalry with combined arms tactics. The fact that elephants feature so prominently in the accounts of Bahram suggest that the key to his victory was probably the employment of war elephants against the Turkish nomads who were unfamiliar with these beasts. The son surrendered and was then sent to Hormizd. Bahram took massive amounts of booty (Tabari claims 250,000 camel loads) and it was the division of this and subsequent booty taken by Bahram which caused troubles with Hormizd. 105. Whitby, 1988, 291. 106. In Dinawari (84–5) Bahram also received the women’s attire, but not because of his defeat at Roman hands but because Hormizd suspected that he had embezzled most of the booty taken from the Turks. Similarly in Ferdowsi, c.1844ff. (8.153ff.; Hormuzd 20–21). 107.  Theophylact 3.8.1ff., 4.1.1–3.15; Yaqubi 189–90/120–1; Sebeos pp.15–6; Tabari i.993; Dinawari 84–6;Theophilus of Edessa/Agapius, p.47. 108. The latest discussion of the origins of the name Sittas is by Ayvazyan (2nd ed., pp.37–8). It has been suggested that Sittas was a Gothic or Thracian or Armenian name, but on the basis of the evidence the case for the Armenian name is the strongest and this case increases this probability. 109.  Yaqubi 190–1, 121; Dinawari 86–7; Ferdowsi c.1857ff. (8.172ff.); Theophylact 3.8.12; Evagrius 6.13–7. 110. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (comments in Sebeos Vol.2, 178–9) and Whitby (1988, 127, 291) date this to 589. 111. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos Vol.2, 179) suspect that Sebeos has improved the story with the details of fighting with the wild beasts. This is possible, but we should not forget that the men in question were expert fighters and that it is not impossible for men to kill bears, bulls and lions with bare hands when one knows how. Such heroism would certainly explain why the audience in both accounts, in Theophylact and in Sebeos, was pleased that Maurice pardoned him. 112. Sebeos p.12, p.16, pp.38–40; Theophylact 3.8.4–8. 113. Whitby (1988, 288–90; Evagrius, 306), REF2 (170–1), Higgins (73), and Martindale (PLRE3 Comentiolus 1) date Comentiolus’s victory at Sisarbanon and the siege of Akbas to 589 because they do not accept the dating of Evagrius. However, as already noted, Theophylact confirms Evagrius’s dating scheme. 114. See: Theophylact 3.5.11–6.5; Theophanes AM 6080; Evagrius 6.15. Michael Whitby (1988, 232, 289–290) is correct to suspect the role of Heraclius at this battle. He considers that Theophylact tried to embellish his role. I fully agree. 115. The following is based on: Theophylact 4.1.1ff., Theophanes AM 6080; Evagrius 6.16–9; Theophilus of Edessa, 45–9 (contains the accounts of Chron. 1234, Michael the Syrian, Agapius, Theophanes); Michael Rabo/Syrus 10.23, pp.290–1; Agapius, 441ff.; Sebeos 15–8;

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Notes 351 Yaqubi 189–92/120–3, Dinawari 86–95; Thaalabi, p.655–71; Masudi, 212ff.; Mirkhond, 394ff.; Tabari i.993ff.; Ferdowsi c.1860ff (8.177ff.). Other sources are mentioned when relevant. Note that my reconstruction differs from the previous ones as I have taken into account the time it took for this civil war to unfold and because I reconstruct the campaigns of John Mystacon differently. I have used Theophylact as the core narrative because, in my opinion, he is not only the most detailed but also clearly the best of the sources. It is possible that he drew most of the information from John of Epiphania as stated by Whitby (1988, 292); whatever source he used, he was certainly well informed. 116. At Rayy: Dinawari 89; Yaqubi 190–1, 121–2. Fighting against the Daylami, Dilemnites: Theophilus of Edessa p.47 (Agapius). 117. Evagrius 6.14–15; Theophylact 4.1.1–3.3. 118. The name is Whitby’s suggestion (1988, 293). 119. Pherochanes and Zadespras of Theophylact are the same as Adhin/Yazdan Jushnas (Vizier) and his cousin in the eastern sources Yaqubi (190, 121), Dinawari (86–7) 120. i.e. I agree with Michael Whitby (1988, 294) that the council mentioned by Sebeos (16–7) took place. 121. I have here accepted the traditional dating for the day and month (as originally suggested by Higgins, p.73), but not the year because the period Roman sources are far likelier to be accurate in their dating than the much later eastern sources. 122. i.e. I agree with the suggestion of the Whitbys (Theophylact, p.115; 1988, 295). Tabari i.997 also mentions the Narawan river in this context. 123. Whitby (1988, 295) after Anon. Guidi 2. 124. These could be the Lakhmid Arabs, Daylami, Turks or any other non-Persian tribe. The likeliest, however, are the Lakhmids because Bahram had targetted the baggage animals likely to be camels just before this. 125. The information about the bridge comes from Sebeos (p.17). There are discrepancies in the Muslim sources regarding the identities and loyalties of different participants. According to Yaqubi (191/122), Chosroes’s army included Kurdi, brother of Bahram, and that it was his defection that forced Chosroes to flee. Yaqubi’s implies that this Kurdi was brother of Bahram Chobin, but Dinawari (90) has an entirely different version. According to him Kurdi was actually brother of Bahram Sharwin and stayed loyal to Chosroes. 126. This is Tabari’s version (i.998–9). Dinawari (91) claims that the monastery was close to the city of Hit. 127. Theophilus of Edessa, 47–9. 128. Does this mean that the Mihranid Bahram would have been also Ispahbudhan? This is possible if his mother belonged to the Ispahbudhans. This would also mean he was related to Bindoes and Bistam who belonged to the Ispahbudhan family. 129. The days and month are taken from Higgins 73 and Whitbys (Theophykact, 119). 130. Based on Theophylact 1.3.1–7.6; Theophanes AM 6075–6; JE 6.45–9 (only headings extant); Michael Syrus/Rabo, 10.21, p.423; Pohl, 89–95; Whitby, 1988, 140–5, Syvänne, 2004, Chapter on Avars. Note, however, that I accept the versions of Theophanes and Michael Rabo without caveats because there is in my opinion nothing improbable in these accounts. 131. In other words, I agree with the dating of Michael Whitby and Martindale (PLRE3, Comentiolus 1). Pohl (p.90) dates the campaign to 584, probably because Theophylact states that the treaty between the Romans and Avars did not last longer than two years (i.e. from 582 until 584), but the same sentence is possible to interpret that it lasted well less than that, and the sequence of events suggests that. 132. Corinth is located south of the Corinthian isthmus. Lists of coin hoards e.g. in: Kazanski, 199, 68; Curta, 169ff. So-called Slavic fibulae have also been found Greece, e.g. in Sparta. For this, see Curta, 247ff.

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352  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 133. This was a common problem for the Roman authors. Note e.g. how John of Biclar (41–2, 46, 53, 60) who lived some time in Constantinople has confused the Avars and Slavs with each other. 134. Pohl (p.92) is likely to be correct in suspecting that the Khagan treated Comentiolus so harshly because he suspected that the Romans had invited the Turks to invade his home territories. Comentiolus’ speech included an allusion to the Turks, which can be seen in this light. 135. Pohl 92–3; Whitby in Theophylact, 190–1. 136. I.e. as in my doctoral dissertation the Age of Hippotoxotai, I agree with Curta’s analysis (92–5) that it is possible that this incident took place before 586. 137. These included at least the excubitores, scholae, protectores domestici and possibly also bucellarii, spatharii and optimates and probably also units from the praesental forces. 138. The following account of the years 585–7 is based on: Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Thessalonica 1, Comentiolus 586–7 and Adrianople 587 Diocletianopolis 587. However, in contrast to my dissertation, I now see no reason to suspect the numbers in the sources, because they are consistent with all we know of the sizes of the barbarian hosts that were able to invade these areas. Other sources are mentioned when relevant or otherwise important. 139. Whitby and Whitby (Theophylact, 29) and Michael Whitby (1988, 145–6) date this to 586 even though Theophylact has not recorded the arrival of the new year. I disagree with this assessment and follow Theophylact. 140. Pohl (94–5) rightly points out the Freudian irony of this name. 141. The following account is still based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix, Comentiolus 586–7 and Adrianople 587 Diocletianopolis 587. That account is mainly based on Theophylact, 1.8.1– 11, 2.10.8–17.13. There are quite similar raiding tactics also in the Tactica (63, esp. 63.5) of Nicephorus Ouranos (c.1000). The campaign of the Avars was possibly accompanied by the Slav attack against Thessalonica and by the Lombard invasion of Istria (Paul 3.27). Other sources mentioned where relavant. 142. Sebeos 20, pp.38–40; Howard-Johnston and Greenwood, comments in Sebeos Vol.2, 178–9, Whitby (1988, 127, 291). 143. The campaign in Theophylact, 1.8.1–11, 2.10.8–17.13. See also Whitby, 1988, 145–51. There are quite similar raiding tactics also in the Tactica (63, esp. 63.5) of Nicephorus Ouranos (c.1000). The campaign of the Avars was possibly accompanied by the Slav attack against Thessalonica and by the Lombard invasion of Istria (Paul 3.27). 144. Theophylact 2.15.3–15.12; Theophanes AM 6079. 145. This shows nicely that the siege of Thessalonica by the Slavs was entirely separate from the Avar invasion which ended in complete disaster just like the Slavic one. 146. The following is based on Miracles 1.13–14 (1.13.117–14.65) and Syvänne, 2004 Appendix. Note that I have changed my views of this siege on the basis of the redating of the events that I have made. The date of this siege is contested. The date of the attack, Sunday 22 September, occurred only in 586 or 597. For a discussion of the dates, see: Whitby, 1988, 115–21; Korres. The year 586 is to be preferred because according to Theophylact (7.12.9) the Danube frontier did not see any fighting between autumn 595 and summer 597. However, there exists another alternative if Archbishop John remembered the exact date incorrectly. Both the Miracles (1.13.117–118) and Theophylact (1.6.4–7.1) contain information of a Slav invasion that was instigated by the Khagan. These may refer to the same instance. Whitby dates Theophylact’s invasion to 584. During this invasion, the Slavs advanced as far as the Long Walls and ravaged many other areas – perhaps the neighbourhood of Thessalonica was one? 147. I.e. there is no reason to think that the Slavs did not possess the necessary skills to build these as Michael Whitby did in 1988 (118), or to think that the Avars were far more skilled with them. It was the other way around. The nomadic Avars lacked the skills until this same year while the Slavic carpenters had them.

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Notes 353 148. The following account is still based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix, Comentiolus 586–7 and Adrianople 587 Diocletianopolis 587. That account is mainly based on Theophylact, 1.8.1– 11, 2.10.8–17.13. 149. See PLRE3 Comentiolus 1, the chapter dealing with Spanish affairs during the reign of Maurice. I am suggesting a new dating for his service in Spain on the basis of the sources. 150. Theophylact 6.3.9–5.16; Evagrius 6.10; Michael Rabo 10.21, p.423; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Priscus; Whitby, 1988, 151–5; Pohl, 163–71; Strategikon 9.2.11–4 with Dennis/Strategikon, 1984, p.95.n.2. I have here accepted the dating of Whitby because the Avar capture of Anchialus was dated by Evagrius to 588. Note that (in contrast to Michael Whitby) I connect Michael Rabo’s referrals to the Avar conquest of Anchialus with the events of the year 584 and not with this campaign because Evagrius states that it and Singidunum were captured twice. It would have been on the first occasion that Maurice threatened the Avars with the Turks and on the second occasion with the Roman fleet. 151. I.e. I agree with the Whitbys that this was the work of soldiers and not the work of local populace of Singidunum. 152. Theophylact 3.4.7, 5.15.12–6.3.8; Whitby, 1988, 156–9. 153. See the relavant chapter dealing with Italian matters. 154. PLRE3 (sources therein); Pringle, 43. 155. Theophylact 7.6.6–7; PLRE3 Gennadius (includes a list of Gregory’s letters that mention Gennadius); Pringle (43). 156. PLRE3 (sources therein), Pringle, 43. 157. Tr. by Charles p.159. 158. In my opinion it is possible that we should identify him as Constantinus Lardys (PLRE3 Constantinus Lardys 33 patricius, PPO Orientis, curator domus divinae), who was one of the leading senators and vehemently loyal to Maurice. He was curator domus divinae in 602. It is probable that his term as PPO Orientis had already ended before this. We do not know what offices he had held before being PPO Orientis, but if we identify him as the Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae after John we can assume he occupied this position during the early 590s after which he was appointed Praetorian Prefect of the East. 159. The sources listed in the PLRE3 Menas 10. 160. The following is based on: LP 66; PD HL 4.7ff. with the PLRE3 sources under the names mentioned; Goubert (2.1.98–9); and in particular to Hodgkin (5.354ff., 385–7, 6.92ff.) and his analysis of the letters of Gregory (MGH , Epistolae 1–2, Hanover 1887–99; these are also available online). It is clear that even after ca. 140 years Hodgkin’s analysis of the letters of Gregory remains the basis of all studies this included. Fabbro offers a completely different analysis of what happened after 592. In his chapter ‘Lombard rebellion redux’ he seeks to prove that the military campaigns of the Lombard dukes Ariulf (Spoleto) and Arogis (Benevento) against the Romans would have been Roman foederati who suddenly rebelled against the Romans. As a proof of his claim, he states that these two duces did not recognize the Lombard king in Pavia. This is patently wrong. As we have already seen, Authari and then his successor Agilulf were never recognized by all of the Lombard duces. This, however, is not to say that some of the Lombard duces who had previously served under the Romans could not have rejoined their own brethren when they thought it appropriate to. This was the way loyalties worked at this time. I.e. Fabbro is not entirely wrong. The Lombard duces were sometimes at peace with the Romans (possibly as foederati) while at other times they were at war with them. 161. Hodgkin (358–9) does not accept the changing of the name to Narni. 162. Hodgkin (5.366–8) thinks that all of these cities had fallen to Ariulf with the exception of Perugia/Perusia which in his opinion was probably captured by Ariulf or dux Maurisio. However, since the sources do not specifically state who had conquered them, there is room for speculation. Hodgkin’s speculation was that Ariulf captured all the cities mentioned except perhaps Perugia while I suggest the possibility that Perusia actually fell to Agilulf.

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354  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 163. I.e. I agree with Hodgkin’s (5.363ff.) general analysis of the sources. I also agree with Fabbro’s analysis (chapter Gregory, the simpleton) that Gregory paid the tribute to Ariulf in an effort to convince Ariulf to join the Roman armed forces. This obviously did not take place in practice and Gregory was accused of being a simpleton by the Emperor. 164. The following is based on PD HL 4.7ff.; Copenhagen Continuator of Prosper 1537, 1543–5; Goubert (2.1.98–101); and PLRE3 and Hodgkin (5.368ff.) with further sources under the names mentioned. 165. Paul the Deacon 4.12. 166. PLRE3 Stephanus 30. 167. PD HL 4.10ff.; PLRE3 with further references into the sources under each name; Hodgkin 5.410ff. (and 5.422ff., 6.93ff.) with further references into the sources. 168. Fabbro chapter ‘I was made bishop not of Romans but of Lombards’; PLRE3 Callinicus 10. 169. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix Blarathos and Theophylact (5.1.1–11.9). Theophylact is the principal source for all of these events. Other sources add very few details: Evagrius 6.19–20; Theophilus of Edessa 46–52 (Michael Syrus, Agapius, Chron. 1234, Theophanes); Sebeos 18–29; Yaqubi 191–5, 122–5; Dinawari 95–102; Tabari i.999–1001; Balami 297ff. 170. This means that the fugitives had arrived during the night. By waiting till morning Probus (PLRE3 Probus5) was able to make certain that it was not a stratagem to capture his fort. 171. The Whitbys (Theophylact, p.120 n.49) have needlessly suspected Theophylact’s dates. 172. See Syvänne, MHLR Vol.3, 266–7. 173. E.g. Mirkhond (398), Thaalabi (668), Masudi (221), Tabari (i.994), Balami (291); Tabari i.999ff.; Ferdowsi c.1923ff. (8.278ff.). 174. Dinawari (94–5) and Theophylact (4.14.10–4) have two different versions. In the former it was the guard Bahram who formed the plot with Bindoes while in the latter the satraps formed the plot and released Bindoes from the prison. I have here combined these two accounts. 175. Based on Syvänne, 2004, Appendix 1: Lake Urmiah and River Blarathos/Plain of Canzak 591; Theophylact 5.1.1ff. Sebeos 11–2, pp.18–29; Thomas Artsruni 2.3 152–5. Other sources will be mentioned where relavant. 176. The translation of the titles of the Persian officials has been taken from the translation of the Whitbys (Theophylact, p.139). 177. Notably, Theophylact (5.6.10) claims that the royal palace of Ctesiphon, the ruins of which are still visible, were actually built by the Romans loaned by Justinian to Chosroes I. 178. Whitbys in Theophylact, 142–4; Michael Whitby (1988, 302–3). 179. Whitbys in Theophylact, 143; Michael Whitby (1988, 303). 180. The minimum requirement was that every four man group of horsemen had at least one squire while the elite forces could have one squire per horseman, which means that the minimum number of squires for 37,000 horsemen was 9,250 squires. 181. Theophylact 5.9.4; Sebeos p.20, p.22. We possess other numerical information in the eastern sources, which are less reliable, not to mention the fact that it is likely that these sources have confused two occasions in which the Romans provided soldiers for the Persians. The second of these occasions is confirmed by Sebeos and is usually neglected when discussing events in the east. However, all of these eastern sources connect the sending of the Roman army with the year 593 as follows: Theophilus of Edessa (50–1, after Agapius, Michael Syrus 10.23, Chron. 1234) claims that Maurice dispatched the ‘Thracian Army’ (probably an anachronistic referral to the Theme of Thrace) (20,000 men) and Armenian (probably an anachronistic referral to the Theme of Armenia) and Bucellarian (this is an anachronistic referral either to the Boukellarion or Opsikian theme) armies (20,000 men) to assist Chosroes and that Chosroes had 10,000 Persians under Romizan (Shahrbaraz). These figures agree with Thaalabi (668) who claims that Maurice gave Chosroes 50,000 men under Sergius. Michael the Syrian (10.23) states that Maurice sent 20,000 men under John of Rasafia (John

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Notes 355 Mystacon), the commander of the host of Thrace and 20,000 Armenians and Bulgars under Anastasius. Bar Hebraeus (p.85) states that Maurice sent 20,000 soldiers under John the commander of the army of Tarkaye (Thrace) and Anastasius with 20,000 Armenians and Bulgarians. Mirkhond (398–9) claims that Maurice gave Chosroes either an army of 70,000 men (also in Balami, p.291) or ‘according to others’ an army of 100,000 men (Ferdowsi has 100,000 in 1925, 8.278 with Davis ed.p.783). The latter may in fact be the total number of men if one takes into account both armies (Armenia and Mesopotamia) with their squires, infantry, servants etc. However, Masudi’s claim (220) that Maurice gave Chosroes 100,000 cavalry is certainly wrong because it is contradicted by Theophylact unless one takes this as the total size of the force with the squires, infantry etc. However, see also the discussion of the second time the Romans sent an army to help Chosroes in 595. It is possible that all of these figures actually refer to that instance. 182. Theophylact 5.9.4–12. 183. Thaalibi (642–7): Bahram’s array against the Turkish Khagan had consisted of infantry centre, Bahram behind them, elephants behind Bahram, cavalry wings, a detachment of cavalry behind all which was probably sent forward to feign flight unless there was a separate detachment for that which Thaalibi failed to mention. According to Theophanes in the battle of the Plain of Canzak the Persian centre also collapsed. This would mean that the centre had advanced. However, it is likely that Theophanes meant only the final stage of the battle. The notice of the presence of the infantry among the Persians (Theophylact 5.10.11) belongs to the place where the Romans had already begun the pursuit of the enemy, which suggests that they were posted among the baggage and the ditch. However, it is still possible that Bahram used infantry in the centre, since this would explain the lack of details in the sources for the centre. The Roman cavalry centre would have preferred to remain in place when facing infantry. In this case, the Persian centre would have remained behind while the cavalry wings with their elephants advanced. However, the standard Persian use of infantry behind appears more likely and I have reconstructed the battle accordingly. It is inherently more likely that most of the native Persian cavalry occupied the centre when the wings consisted of allied cavalry as stated by Theophylact. Furthermore, the use of attack by the wings demanded that the centre was held back initially. 184. Sebeos, 11, p. 23, Theophanes AM 6081. 185. Theophylact 5.10.1–11.4; Theophanes after Theophylact AM 6081; Sebeos, 11, pp.18–23. 186. Dinawari 99–102, Tabari i.1001; Sebeos p.23. 187. Agapius, pp.439–40. 188. Based on Theophylact 5.10.7ff.; Sebeos p.24ff.; Dinawari 102ff.; Michael the Syrian 10.23; Masudi 222ff.; Mirkhond 400–1; Thaalibi 672ff.; Sebeos and Dinawari are the most detailed and important of these. 189. E.g. Mirkhond (398), Thaalabi (668), Masudi (221), Tabari (i.994), Balami (291); Tabari i.999ff.; Ferdowsi c.1923ff. (8.278ff.). 190. In my opinion Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos Vol.2, p176–7) have needlessly suspected that this as a later Machiavellian interpretation of the events by Sebeos himself. Both are forced to admit that Maurice’s scheme in the form that Sebeos claimed would have been beneficial for the Romans. Therefore, why should we doubt it? I agree with Armen Ayvazyan that Maurice did indeed initiate such a programme. For the prejudices of Maurice and other Romans towards the Armenians and for the policies of Maurice towards them, see Ayvazyan 107–124. Maurice’s aim was simply nothing less than to Hellenize the Armenians. Ayvazyan has also correctly noted that the reasons why the Armenians are not included in the list of enemies in Maurice’s Strategikon consisted of two elements. Firstly, a very significant proportion of the Roman military consisted of those Armenians. Secondly, after Chosroes had ceded most of Persarmenia to the Romans, Armenians were essentially Romans. 191. This is based on Dinawari 102ff., Sebeos 21ff, p.40ff. with the comments of Howard-Johnston and Greenwood Vol.2, 179ff.;Tabari i.1000–1;Yaqubi 193–5; Chron Seert. 481–2; Khuzistan

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356  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chronicle/Anon. Guidi, 8–9; Thaalibi 672ff.; Balami 296ff.; Masudi 222ff.; Mirkhond 400–1; Ferdowsi/Firdausi 43.1ff./C1867ff. (revolt of Bistam 43.44–7/C1980–5); Shahbazi, ‘Bestām o Bendōy’. The most important of these sources are Dinawari and Sebeos. 192. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos Vol.2, 179–2) place the revolt of Bistam to the years 594–599/600. They base their claim to the dating given by Chronicle of Seert, but with the claim that it dates the beginning of Chosroes’s reign to the wrong year. However, as we have seen, this is actually not true because the dating of the events in Evagrius and Theophylact proves the dating of the Chronicle of Seert correct. This Chronicle dates the beginning of the fighting between the forces of Bistam and Chosroes to the fifth year of Chosroes’s reign, and the Chronicle dates the beginning of his reign to the year 590/1, which means the fighting started in 594/5, the latter year being likelier because the murder of Bindoes took place in the spring. 193. See PLRE3 Narses 10, Petrus 55. I.e. on the basis of Chronicle 1234 I suggest that Peter/ Petrus replaced Narses in 595 and then returned to the Balkans in 600/1 so Narses returned to the East at the same time. 194. The other possibility is that he had already been replaced. Sebeos lists the magistri militum per Armeniam after 593 as follows: John Mystacon, Heraclius and Sormēn (Suren, Surenas) so it is possible that the last mentioned held the office for the rest of 595. However, it is inherenly likelier that Heraclius was kept in office also in 595 because he had performed his duties well enough in 594. 195. Thaalibi (668); other sources included under Theophilus of Edessa (50–1); and Dionysius of Tell Mahre, p.117. PLRE3 Shahrbaraz: Romizan (Rousmiazan, Rumiazan, Razmiozan, Razmiuzan, Khoream, Erazman) is better known as Shahrbaraz/Shahrvaraz (Wild Boar, also Sahr Varaz, Salvaras, Sarvaraz, Sarvarazas, Schahriar), but he obtained this nickname only in about 604 (see the reign of Phocas). His patronymic was Farrukhan (Farruhan, Feruhān). 196. Based on Sebeos 22ff. (94ff./p.41ff.). 197. Based on Sebeos 24–7 (95–100, pp.43–9). 198. Discussion of the dates by Thomson, Howard-Johnston, Greenwood in Sebeos Vol.1 pp.45.7 and Vol.2, pp.181–2. My dating differs from theirs in that I date Smbat’s marzpanate of Gurgan to the years 595/6–603/4. 199. One wonders if this Shahr Vachrich should be identified with Romizan Shahrbaraz. If he is to be identified with the famous Romizan Shahrbaraz then the reason for the great eagerness of Romizan in 603 (see the reign of Phocas) to fight against the Romans resulted from his own eagerness to regain royal favour. 200. Sebeos 30, pp.54–6; Michael Syrus 10.23, p.291; Chron. 1234 82, p.171. 201. Results of Maurice’s religious policy in Armenia and Iberia in Treadgold, 232. 202. The latest translators and commentators Thomson, Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos, Vol.1, 55) note that this title is unique to Sebeos and its meaning is unknown. 203. Chron. 1234 (82, p. 171) calls this officer Sacellarius, but it is probable that the officer in question actually held the office of sacellarius. 204. With the exception of attitude towards Christianity after the reign of Nero, the Roman policy towards the religions had been tolerance until the Empire became Christian. Monotheistic religions with a mission to convert everyone were obviously poorly suited to tolerate other religions. 205. Sebeos 30, pp.54–6; Theophylact 6.1.1–8, 8.15.3–4. 206. Discussion in MHLR 6, Appendix, 367–8. 207. Strategikon 12.2.14.9–10, 12.2.16, 39ff. with Syvänne, 2004. 208. See Dawson’s discussion of the terms of measurement in his article Fit for the Task. He prefers the shorter estimates, but I prefer the middle figures. 209. For a discussion of the dating of this treatise, see Syvänne, 2004, 21. 210. I suggested this already in MHLR Vol.2, 201.

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Notes 357 211. Strategikon 12.20.7–8; Peri Strategias 16.31–9, 36; Byzantine Excerpts of Polyaenus’s Stratagems (Hypotheseis) 18.8; Syvänne, 2004. 212. Syvänne, 2004, 16–9. 213.  Theophylact 6.6.1–11.21; Theophanes AM 6085–7; Strategikon 9.4; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix 2 Priscus’ Campaign in 593. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 214. E.g. Howard-Johnston and Greenwood (Sebeos 2.178) assume on the basis of Michael Whitby’s suggestion (1988, 158–62) that the Armenians were sent under Mushel Mamikonean to the Balkans in 593. As already noted this results from the misplacing of the final stages of the Persian war. 215. It was also during this period that two children with severe disabilities were born (four feet, two heads). They were seen as bad omens and therefore slaughtered on the Emperor’s orders. Theophylact 6.11.1. This again shows that Christians of the time did not have ‘Christian’ compassion towards the disabled. 216. Theophylact 6.11.2–7.7.2; Theophanes AM 6087–9; Sebeos 18, 90–1, pp.35–6; Syvänne, Appendix 2 Peter 594. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 217. Note also the use of war-dogs by the Roman cavalry in Persarmenia in 577 (chapter: The Persian and Balkan Fronts in 577–8) and in 593 (chapter: The Battles of Lake Urmiah and the Plain of Canzacon in 593). It is therefore quite clear that the Romans used war-dogs and I would not preclude that they could have been used in the same manner as the Finns used their dogs according to Montecuccoli (126). The Finns sent their dogs in advance of their cavalry to prepare their attacks during the 30-Years War. In this context it is notable that a shield fitting from Stabio, Canton Tessin, 6th/7th century (Bern, Historisches Museum, in Schutz, 2001, Fig.43) shows a horseman carrying a lance while his dog runs in front of him 218. Note the outstanding combat performance of the garrison of Asemus against the Huns in 447 (MHLR Vol.4, 90). 219.  Theophylact 7.7.1–5, 10.1–12.9; Theophanes AM 6090–1; Sebeos 18, 90–1, pp.35–6; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix 2 Priscus’s campaign in 595. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 220. It is thanks to this that we can separate this incident from the next Avar invasion of Dalmatia during the same year. The first had resulted in the destruction of the Armenian forces and loss of Singidunum while in the latter case the Roman commander who shadowed the Avars was not defeated. 221. Paul the Deacon 4.10–13; chapter on Italy. 222.  The war between Fredegund and Brunhild helped the Avars. 223. ibid with Fredgar 4.16–21 and Theophylact 6.3.6–8. 224. Theophylact 7.13.1–15.14, 8.1.9–10; Theophanes AM 6092–4; John of Antioch frg. 316; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix 2, Comentiolus: Fighting while Marching in 597/8. Other sources mentioned where relevant. For a different interpretation of the evidence, see Pohl, 187–91. 225. The list is based on the translation of the Whitbys, Theophylact, p.197. 226. Anyone who has ever been in armed forces learns these tricks very soon. In modern armies good examples of this behaviour are that backpacks are not filled to their full capacity for training so are lighter during marching, and the discarding of body armour by American soldiers in Vietnam. Soldiers are just as lazy as humans always are if the officers do not keep a close watch on them. 227. John of Antioch rg. 316; Michael Rabo 10.24 with PLRE 3 Phocas7 228.  Symeon the Logothete 107.4–5, tr. pp. 114–5; Constantine Manasses 3470–3520, tr. pp.143–5. These refer to an incident in which Maurice is claimed to have refused to ransom 12,000 Roman captives from the Khagan with the result that the Khagan had them killed. This turned the rest of the soldiers against Maurice. There are two versions of how this came about. According to the first, provided by Symeon the Logothete, after Priscus had conducted a highly successful campaign against the Avars (which in the context of the events

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358  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 of 597–8 is a lie), Maurice ordered the strategos to betray the army to the enemy. The reason for this order was that the soldiers had been found to be planning a revolt against Maurice. The strategos (clearly Comentiolus) acted as ordered with the result that the Khagan captured 12,000 soldiers. The Khagan first asked one solidus per man as ransom, and then a half solidus, but Maurice refused to pay. According to the second version provided by Constantine Manasses the Khagan had captured these soldiers as a result of plundering areas close to the Danube after which he offered them for ransom. This version is clearly more plausible. When Maurice refused to ransom them, the Khagan lowered his price but with no reaction from Maurice, so in the end the Khagan had the prisoners killed. In this latter case the reason for Maurice’s refusal to ransom the men was just that he preferred to keep the money. 229. ibid. 230. Theophylact 8.1.9–4.8; Theophanes AM 6094; Syvänne, 2004, Appendix 2 Viminacium: The battles near the Island Viminacium ad 599. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 231. I.e. I consider the size of the Avar force larger than in 2004 on the basis of the fact that the Strategikon (6.1) divides the meros into two moirai in the Scythian drill with the implication that this may have been the standard unit size. 232. Theophylact 8.2.10–12. Heath (1980, 51–2) interprets this as the Romans employing three infantry squares. 233. Vegetius 3.20 lists seven battle formations. The Greek epikampios emprosthia is included as two variants, the fourth and fifth formations. In the fourth version when the enemy was 400–500 paces from the Roman line both wings separated from the main line and attacked the enemy flanks suddenly. The fifth version was that the commander placed light-armed men in front of his first line so they protected the flanks. 234. Theophylact 8.5.9ff.; Theophanes AM 6094–5; Chron. Pasch. Olympiad 345, a.602. Other sources mentioned where relevant. 235. Paul the Deacon 4.20; Pohl, 194–5. 236. Comments of the Whitbys in Theophylact, 216; Pohl 195–6. 237. Comments of Mary and Michael Whitby (Theophylact, p. 215, n.17–8). 238. Theophylact 8.6.2ff.; Theophanes AM 6094–5; Chron. Pasch. Olympiad 345, a.602. 239. Theophylact 8.11.7–12, Schlosser, 70–2. Appendix I    1. For further information see: Grousset; Graff (2002); Lebedynsky (2007) 192–201; Barfield, 131–63; and the studies of Sinor in the bibliography. Appendix II   1. anabainô (to go up).    2. They called the couched-lance technique the Damascus-technique.

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Bibliography 361 Paul the Deacon (Paulus Diaconus), History of the Lombards/Longobards, tr. By William Dudley Foulke, Philadelphia (1907/ 1974); Pauli Diaconi Historia Langobardum, ed. L. Bethmann and G. Waitz, MGH, SRM V, Hannover (1887). Peri politikes epistemes (De scientia politica dialogus), Menae patricii cum Thoma refendario De scientia politica dialogus, edited and translated into Italian by C.M. Mazzucchi, Milano 1982. Peri strategikes/strategias, G.T. Dennis, Three Byzantine Military Treatises, CFHB XXV, Washington 1985, The introduction, text and tr. of the Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy, 1–135. H. Köchly and W. Rüstow, Byzantini anonymi Peri trategikes in Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller II.2, Leipzig 1855, 1–209, notes 311–55. Polyaenus, Edition and translation in Polyaenus, Stratagems of War, Vols. I-II, ed. and tr. by Peter Krenz and Everett L. Wheeler, (Chicago, 1994), Vol. II Excerpts of Polyaenus, 851–1003. REF2, The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars Part II ad 363–630. A narrative sourcebook, Edited and compiled by Geoffrey Greatrex and Samuel N.C. Lieu, London and New York (2002). Contains partial translations of several primary sources. Sebeos, The Armenian History attributed to Sebeos, Translated with notes by R.W Thomson, Historical commentary by James Howard-Johnston, Assistance from Tim Greenwood, 2 vols, TTH 31, Liverpool (1999). Sebeos’ History, tr. by Robert Bedrosian, New York 1985 (availabe online from Internet Archive). This text is also known by the names Pseudo-Sebeos and History of Khosrov. The referrals in the notes are to the Thomson edition, but the quotes are from Robert Bedrosian’s translation, which has been released into the public domain by him. His work in the promotion of Armenian studies is very significant indeed. It should be noted that Thomson’s translation is very close to Bedrosian’s translation. Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles, The, tr. by Andrew Palmer, TTH 15, Liverpool (1993). Strategikon, Das Strategikon des Maurikios, CFHB XVII, Vienna 1981, edited by G.T. Dennis and German tr. by Ernst Gamillscheg. Maurice’s Strategicon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, English tr. by G.T. Dennis, Philadelphia (1984). Mihaescu, Arta Militara (with Rumanian tr.), Bucharest (1970). Tabari, al-, The History of al-Tabari, ed. E. Yar-Shater, several translators, Albany New York 1985. Tafrij, A Muslim Manual of War being Tafrij al-Kurub fi Tadbir al-Hurub by Umar ibn Ibrahim alAwasi al-Ansari, edited and translated by George T. Scanlon, Cairo (1961). Al-Tha’alibi, Histoire des Rois des Perses par Aboû Mansoûr Abd al-Malik ibn Mohammad ibn Ismâ’îl al-Tha’âlibîhistorien et philologue Arabe de la Perse (A.H.350–430), Edition and French translation by Zotenberg, Hermann,Paris 1900, Réimpression 1979 Amsterdam. Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. de Boor, Leipxig (1883–5). The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor. Byzantine and Near Eastern History ad 284–813. Tr. by Cyril Mango and Roger Scott with the assistance of G. Greatrex, Oxford (1997). Theophilus of Edessa, Theophilus of Edessa’s Chronicle, tr. by Robert G. Hoyland. TTH 57, Liverpool (2011). Theophylact, Theophylacti Simocattae, Historiae, ed Carolus de Boor, Lipsiae (1887) Teubner. Theophylact Simocattes, The History of Theophylact Simocatta, tr. by Michael and Mary Whitby, Oxford (1986). Thomas Artsruni, The History of the House of Artsrunik, English translation by R.W. Thomson (Detroit, 1985). Vegetius, Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Epitoma Rei Militaris, ed. with an English tr. by L.F. Stelten, New York, Bern, Frankfurt, Paris (1990). Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science. Translated with notes and introduction by N.P. Milner. TTH 16, Liverpool, 1993, 2nd ed. (1996). West Syrian Chronicles, English Translation A. Palmer, The Seventh Century West Syrian Chronicles [TTH 15] (Liverpool, 1993). Yaqubi, Ahmad al-Yaqubi, tr. in The ‘History of the Kings of the Persians’ in Three Arabic Chronicles, tr. by Robert G. Hoyland, Liverpool 2018, 106–34.

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362  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Select Secondary Sources Arabs and Empires before Islam (2015), ed. G. Fisher. several contributors, Oxford. Aragonés, Daniel Gómes (2013), La invasión Bizantina de Hispania 533–625. El reino visigodo frente a la expansión imperial. Madrid. Ayvazyan, Armen (2014), The Armenian Military in the Byzantine Empire. Conflict and Alliance under Justinian and Maurice, foreword by Ilkka Syvanne, 2nd and expanded edition Paris. Bosworth, C. E., see al-Tabari. Bowersock, G.W., Throne of Adulis. Red Sea Wars on the Eve of Islam. Oxford (2013) Bury, J.B., (1889), A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene (ad 395 to 800). London and New York. —— (1911) The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth Century: With a revised Text of Kletorologion of Philotheos. London. The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, (1990), ed. Dennis Sinor, Cambridge. Curta, Florin, (2001) The Making of the Slavs, History and Archaeology of the Lower Danube Region c.500–700, Cambridge. Edwell Peter, with contributions from Greg Fisher, Geoffrey Greatrex, Conor Whately, and Philip Wood, ‘Arabs in the Conflict between Rome and Persia, ad 491–630’, in Arabs and Empires, 214–75. Fabbro, Eduardo (2020), Warfare and the Making of Early Medieval Italy (568–652). Routledge. Goffart, Walter (2012), ‘The Frankish Pretender Gundovald, 582–575’, in Francia 39, 1–27. Goubert, Paul, (1951) Byzance avant L’Islam (1), Tome premier, Byzance et l’orient sous les successeurs de Justinien, L’empereur Maurice, Paris. —— (1955) Byzance avant L’Islam (2.1) Tome second, Byzance et l’occident sous les successeurs de Justinien, I Byzance et les Francs. Paris. —— (1965) Byzance avant L’Islam (2.2) Tome second, Byzance et l’occident sous les successeurs de Justinien, II Rome, Byzance et Carthage. Paris. Graff, David A. (2002), Medieval Chinese Warfare 300–900, Routledge, London. Groh, Kurt Dr. (1889), Geschichte des oströmischen Kaisers Justin II. Leipzig. Grousset, René (4th ed. 1965), L’empire les steppes. Attila, Genghis-khan, Tamerlane. Paris. Haldon, John F. (2014), A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI, Washington D.C. —— Byzantium at War ad 600–1463, Oxford (2002). (2000/2001) The Byzantine Wars. Battles and campaigns of the Byzantine era, Tempus Publishing, Port Stroud. (1999) Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565–1204, UCL Press, London (1999). Herrin, Judith (2020), Ravenna. Capital of Empire, Crucible of Europe. Allen Lane. Higgins, Martin J. (1939), Reverend, The Persian War of the Emperor Maurice (582–602). Part 1. The Chronology, with a Brief History of the Persian Calendar. A Dissertation, The Catholic University of America Byzantine Studies Vol.1,Washington D.C. Hodgkin, T (1885–95)., Italy and Her Invaders. London. Oxford. Hoyland R.G. (2001), Arabia and Arabs from the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. London and New York. Howard-Johnston, J.D. (2021), The Last great War of Antiquity. Oxford. Inostrancev C.A. (1909), ‘Sasanian Military Theory’, Journal of the K.R. Cama Oriental Institute, 7–52. Translated from the Russian by Mr. L. Bogdanov. (The original Russian Sasaniskie etudy, Études Sassanides, St Petersburg, 1909,Chapter II, 41–82.) Contains a translation of Ayinnameh (Book of Regulations, 13–16). James, Edward (1988/1991), The Franks. Cambridge Massachusetts USA. Kazanski, Michel (1999), Les Slaves, Les origines Ier-VII siècle après J.-C. Paris. Kennedy, Hugh (2007), The Great Arab Conquests. London. —— (2001), The Armies of the Caliphs. Military and Society in the Early Islamic State, Routledge, London.

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Bibliography 363 Lebedynsky, Iaroslav, (2007), Les Nomades. Paris. Liebeschuetz, J.H.W.G., (1974), ‘The ‘pagarch’: city and imperial administration in Byzantine Egypt’, in The journal of juristic Papyrology 18, 163–8. Machiavelli, Niccolò, The Prince, Tr. George Bull, Penguin, London (1961/1981). McCotter, Stephen, (2003.1) ‘Byzantines, Avars and the Introduction of the Trebuchet’, at www. deremilitari.org. —— (2003.2) ‘The Nation which Forgets its Defenders will itself be Forgotten: Emperor Maurice and the Persians’, at www.deremilitari.org. Mendis, G.C. (1940), The Early History of Ceylon. 4th revised and enlarged ed., Calcutta. Montecuccoli, Raimondo, ‘Sulle Battaglie’ in Thomas S. Barker, The Military Intellectual and Battle, Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Thirty Years War, Albany New Yark (1975), 73–173. Munt, Harry with contributions from Touraj Daryaee, Omar Edaibat, Robert Hoyland, and Isabel Toral-Niehoff, in Arabs and Empires before Islam, ed. G. Fisher, 434–500. Nicolle, David, (2018) ‘Horse Armor and Warfare in the Medieval Islamic Middle East’, in Brewminate web publication posted on November 23, 2018. —— (1997) ‘Arms of the Umayyad Era: Military technology in a Time of Change’, in War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean 7th-15th Century, ed. Yaacov Lev, (1997). Olster, David Michael (1993), The Politics of Usurpation in the Seventh Century: Rhetoric and Revolution in Byzantium. Amsterdam. Ostrogorsky, George (1969/2005), History of the Byzantine State. Rutgers UP. Palmer, Andrew (1993), The Seventh Century in the West-Syrian Chronicles, tr. by A. Palmer, TTH 15. Liverpool. PLRE 3. Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire, edd. Martindale et al., 3 vols, Oxford (1971– 92). Pohl, Walter (2015), The Avars. Ithaca and London. Power, Timothy (2012), The Red Sea from Byzantium to the Caliphate ad 500–1000. Cairo and New York. Pringle, Denys (1981), The Defence of Byzantine Africa from Justinian to the Arab Conquest, 2 vols. BAR International Series 99 (i-ii). Oxford. Rance, Philip (1993), Tactics and Tactica in the Sixth Century: Tradition and Originality, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of St. Andrews. Sandhu, Gurcharn Singh Major General (2000), A Military History of Ancient India. New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad. Schippmann K. (2001), Ancient South Arabia. Princeton. Schutz, Herbert, (2001) Tools, Weapons and Ornaments. Germanic Material Culture in PreCarolingian Central Europe 400–750, Brill Leiden, Boston, Köln. Shahbazi, A. Sh., (1989), ‘Bestām o Bendōy’, Encyclopaedia Iranica II ed. E. Yarshater, London (1985), online edition December 15, 1989. Shahid Irfan (1995), BASIC = Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century, Volume 1. Parts 1– 2: Washington D.C. Shlosser, Franziska E. (1994), The Reign of the Emperor Maurikios (582–602). A Reassessment, Historical Monographs 14, Historical Publications St. D. Basilopoulos, Greece. Silva, K.M. de (1981), A History of Sri Lanka. Berkeley and Los Angeles. Sinor, Denis, (1999), ‘The First Türk Empire (553–682), pp.327–35 in The Türk Empire by D. Sinor and S.G. Klyashtorny, 327–47’, in the History of civilizations of Central Asia Vol.3, eds. B.A. Litvinsky, Zhang Guang-da and R. Shabani Samghabadi, Delhi. —— (1990) ‘The establishment and dissolution of the Türk empire’, in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, 285–316. Cambridge. Skupniewicz, Patryk (2017), ‘‘The bullae of the spahbedan. Iconographic remarks’’, in the Historia i Świat 6, 107–120. —— (2014), Sasanian horse armor. Historia i Świat 3, 35–81.

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364  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Stein, Ernst 1919), Studien zur Geschichte des byzantinischen Reiches vornehmlich unter den Kaisern Justinus II u. Tiberius Constantinus. Stuttgart J.B. Metlersche Verlagbuchhandlung. Syvänne, Ilkka (2015–2021), Military History of Late Rome, vols. 1–6. Pen and Sword. Barnsley. —— (2020), ‘Holy War and a Place in Paradise? Development of the East Roman Holy War from the 4th until the 11th Century’ Written with the generous support of the ASMEA Research Grant. —— (2019), ‘The Capture of Jerusalem by the Muslims’ Historia i Swiat 8, 37–58. Written with the generous support of the ASMEA Travel Grant. —— (2016), The Eyes and Ears: The Sasanian and Roman Spies ad 224–450’, Historia i Swiat 2016, Based on research paper of The 8th ASMEA Conference, Washington DC, 2015. Written with the generous support of the ASMEA Research Grant. —— (2009), ‘The Battle of Melitene in ad 576’, in Saga Newsletter 120 Aug/Sept 2009, 32–64. —— (2004), The Age of Hippotoxotai. Tampere. Thompson, E.A. (1969), The Goths in Spain. Oxford. Treadgold, Warren (1997), History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford UP. War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica, eds. Kurt Raaflaub & Nathan Rosenstein, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass., and London (1999). Welsby D.A. (2002), The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia. British Museum, London. Whitby, Michael (1988), The Emperor Maurice and his Historian: Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare. Oxford. Wolfram, Herwig (1990/1997), The Roman Empire and its Germanic Peoples, tr. by Thomas Dunlap. Berkeley and Los Angeles.

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Index

Abasgi, tribe, Abasgia, 80, 82 Abaskiron the scribe, Egyptian bandit, 172–3, 175, 257 Abbaron, fort, 237 Abbas the Squinter, Federate commander, 210, 213 Abdallah b. Sa’id Abi Sahr, Muslim commander, 31 Abraha, Aksumite/Ethiopian/Abyssinian king of Yemen, 67, 72–3, 75 see also Masruq, Wahriz, Yaksum Abraham, monastic bully, 79 Abu Jafna Nuʻman ibn al-Mundhir (son of Alamundarus), 237 Abu Murrah al-Fayyad Dhu Yazan, wronged husband, 72–3 Abundantius, Cantabrian senator, 59 Abydos/Abydus, city of, 257 Abûsân/Abusan, city of, 175, 257 Abyssinia, Abyssinians, Ethiopia, Aksum, Axum, 40, 67, 72–5, 78, 97, 257, 334, 339 see also Yemen Acacius Archelaus, imperial envoy, 83–4 Acheiropoietos, acheiropoieta, Jesus image not made by human hand, 213, 215, 222, 347 Acindynus, ‘Prefect of Carrhae’, 230 Acqui, city and dukedom of, 333 Adalwald/Adaloaldus, son of Agilulf and Theudelinda, 268 Adarmaanes, Adarmanes, Adarmahan, Adormahun Ardahmon, Adarmon, Marzban of Nisibis, Persian general, 85, 91, 115, 117, 125, 150, 152, 155–6, 158, 337, 341 Addaeus, conspirator, 46 see also MHLR 518–565 Aden, port city, 42, 72–3 Adige, Atesis/Athesis/Attisus, river, 346 Administration, Administrative, bureaucratic, bureaucrats, civil servants, ix, 2, 34, 59, 62, 79, 103, 118, 160, 162, 164, 166, 172, 262, 292, 323, 326, 346, 362–3 Adoratores, 8

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Adrianople, city, plain of, 242, 248–9, 251, 317, 352–3 Adriatic Sea, coast, 205, 259 Aeneas, 4th cent. bc, military theorician, 342 Aemilia, Aemilian Way, 188, 198 Aegyla/Egilan Calumniosus, Frankish commander, 180 Aegyptus, Egypt, Thebaid, vii, xi, 31–2, 47, 59–61, 95, 97, 129, 135–8, 159, 171–5, 223, 256–8, 321, 334, 348, 363 see also Alexandria, Nubia Aelian, Ailianos, Aelianus (2nd cent. ad military theorist), 294, 342, 359–60 Aetherius, conspirator, 46 see also MHLR 518–565 Africa, North Africa, Libya, Mauritania, Numidia, Pentapolis, Tripolitania, Tingitana, ix, xi–xii, 4–5, 30, 41, 44, 56, 58–60, 64, 75, 91–2, 97, 102, 125, 128–9, 135–7, 160–1, 171–2, 175, 178, 186, 192, 211, 232, 256–7, 266, 286, 312, 322, 334, 339, 347, 363 see also Moors, Nubia Agapius of Membij, chronicler, 123, 234, 237, 281, 310, 337, 349–51, 354–5, 359 Agila, Visigothic king, 57–8, 333 Agilulf, Agilulfus, dux of Turin and king of the Lombards (590/1–616), 200, 203–204, 255, 258–68, 304, 316, 353 see also MHLR 602–641 Agbia, fort, 257 Agen, men of, 343 Aikelah, see Aykelâh Ailas the Deacon, 173 Aïn el-Ksar, fort, 136 Aisouma (Karaca Dağ), mountain, 208 Akbas, fort, 168, 207, 225, 232–3, 342, 346, 349–50 Aksum, see Abyssinia Alaleisus, 218 Alamanni, Germanic tribal confederacy, 51, 92, 187, 190, 192, 267 see also Suevi

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366  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Alamoundaros/Alamundarus (al-Mondhir / al-Mundhir ibn al-Hārith, son of Arethas), Ghassanid/Jafnid king, basileus, phylarchus and patricius, 38, 68–71, 83–5, 90, 98–100, 126, 148–50, 152–9, 206, 211, 237, 334–5, 341 Alaleisus, fort, 218 Alans/Alani/Ossetes, Sarmatian tribal confederacy, 24, 66, 80, 82, 101, 103, 226, 332 Albani (Albano), Alba, Alba Pompeia, city and dukedom of, 333 Albani, Albanians, Aluank, Albania (coastal state of the Caspian Sea), 101–102, 154, 226–7, 283 Alboin, Lombard king (?–561–72), (PLRE3 Alboin), 48–51, 53–4, 332 Albsuinda, daughter of Alboin and Rosamund, 54 Aldio, Roman commander, 259 Alexander the Great, age of Alexander, 113, 122 Alexander, martyr, church of, 252, 308 Alexander, taxiarchos, (PLRE3 Alexander11 identifies the office with dux), 297, 299–300 Alexandria, city of, ix, 46–7, 96, 136–8, 148–9, 172–5, 257, 334, 339, 353 Alexandriana, see Arbela Alichis, dux of Brixia/Brexia/Brescia, 55 Allies, Ally, Alliance, v, 4–5, 21–42, 48–9, 51, 55– 8, 60, 65–6, 68, 75, 83, 89, 93–7, 103, 105, 125, 128–30, 132–5, 138, 140–1, 149, 153, 164, 170, 179, 181, 183, 185–6, 188–9, 191–6, 199–200, 204, 208, 210–11, 228, 236, 239–41, 244, 249, 251, 255, 259, 261, 267–8, 270, 272–3, 276–8, 292, 295–6, 304, 316, 318, 321, 324, 326, 332, 338, 344–6, 355, 362 see also Federates, Symmachoi Alps, 51, 53, 92, 190, 199, 204 Alsuca (Val Sugana), 202 Altino, city and duchy, 53, 197–8, 333 Amabilis, mag.mil., 60, 135 Amal, royal Gothic family, 165 Amal, area in Persia, 290 Amatunik, territory and family in Armenia, 283, 287, 289 Amatus, Guntram’s patrician, 53 Amaseia, 64 Ambar, fort, 85 Ambassador, envoy, embassy, messenger, courier, public post, 47–50, 54–6, 59–67, 74, 76, 86, 90, 93, 96, 98, 101–104, 113, 117, 121, 128–31, 133–4, 137, 139–42, 145, 147, 170, 180–1, 185–7, 189–90, 192, 194–7, 200, 202–204, 208, 210, 212, 217, 222–4, 228, 234–5, 237–8, 240–1, 244, 251, 253–5, 262, 265, 267–72,

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275–6, 285, 292, 295, 298, 301–306, 309–10, 315, 318–19, 325–6, 336, 339, 341, 346 message as a word, various types of messages, letter(s) as messages, 43, 64–5, 69–70, 83, 87, 98–9, 104, 117–18, 122, 131, 138–9, 141, 146, 149, 152–3, 159, 165, 173–4, 179, 188–90, 193, 195–200, 203–205, 210, 221, 223, 253–4, 256, 257, 259–60, 262–5, 267–8, 271, 273, 275, 281–3, 299, 309, 311, 318–19, 326, 339, 344–6, 353, 364 see also diplomacy Ambush, ambuscades, ambushers, surprise attack, night attack, trap, entrap, x, 17, 19, 22–8, 37, 42, 48, 58, 66, 68, 117, 140, 146, 149, 153, 157, 176, 180, 182, 197, 205, 213, 224, 234, 236, 238, 242, 246, 251, 256, 266–8, 276, 289–90, 295, 297, 301, 303–304, 307, 326, 337, 343, 347 see also Guerrilla, Stratagems Amelius, bishop, 190 Ameria, Amelia, 261 Amfistomos/amphistomos phalanx (double-front), see Circle Amida, x, 117, 122, 212–13, 218 Ammodios, Ammodius, city of, 273 Ammon/Ammonian Gurzil, god and name, 61, 174 Amo, Lombard dux, 56 Amr b. al-Asi, Muslim commander, 31 Amr the Blue-Eyes, Federate commander, 210, 213 Anagaeus/Anagai, chief of the Utigurs, 103 Anagastes, father of Romanus, 101, 345 Anagnis (Nano), fortress, 94 A-na-kui, the Khagan/Chagan/Kaghan/Qağan of the Juanjuan (Ruan-ruan/Rouran), 324 Anastasia (original pagan name Ino), empress, wife of Tiberius II, mother-in-law of Maurice, 91, 127, 165, 239, 338 Anastasiana (Hr. Sguidan) fort, 136 Anastasius, emperor (491–518), 21, 44, 51, 71, 163–4 see also MHLR 457–518 Anastasius, general, 355 Anastasius, Quaestor and Magister Officiorum, 44, 80, 335 Anastasius, tribunus, 256 Anatha, Anathon, fort, 150, 152, 237, 272 Anatolia, Asia Minor, 169 Anchialus, city of, 225, 239–40, 244, 252, 254–5, 295, 353

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Index 367 Andelot, Treaty of, x, 192, 195 Andreas, scribo sent to Alexandria (PLRE3 Andreas10), 136–7, 348 Andreas, vir magnificus (PLRE3 Andreas13), 197 Andreas, interpreter and officer (PLRE3 Andreas11), 220, 348 Andreas, Comes Domesticorum (PLRE3 Andreas12), 225, 348 Andreas, scholasticus (PLRE3 Andreas15), 265 Anicii, wealthy Italian family, 160, 165 Annona militaris, 9, 136 see also Booty, Salary Ansimuth, taxiarchos of Germanic origins, 166, 244, 246, 248, 251 Ansinon, fort, 242 Antae, Antes, Slavic tribe, 14, 21, 23, 125, 170, 239–40, 318, 330 see also Slavs Antestesius, Frankish general, 343 Antioch, city of, 70, 85, 98, 149, 155, 159, 165, 222–3, 270, 272, 275, 281, 306, 310, 348–9, 357, 360 ‘Antioch of Chosroes’/‘Better Than Antioch’/‘City of the Romans’, 153, 275 Antiochus, Domus/Palace of, Curator of, 46, 224 Antistomos difalangia, (facing double-phalanx), 312 Antonina, wife of Belisarius, 47 Aosta, Aosta Valley, 53, 56, 187 Apa Khagan, in Chinese Ta-lo-pien, 240, 325, 347 Apamea, Apameia, 85 Aphraates, Persian general, 214, 224, 226–7, 231–3 Aphthartodocetism, 47 Aphumon, fort, 123, 139, 207, 216–18, 348 Apocrisarius, Catholic office, 165 Apollodorus, Apollodoros, military theorist, architect, engineer, 342, 359 Appianus (Hoch Eppan), 202, 346 Appiria, Appiaria, Apiaria, fort and city, 248–9 Apulia, Apulians, 197 Apsich, Apsikh, Avar envoy and hypostrategos, (PLRE3 Apsich1), 63, 144, 316–18 Apsich the Hun, Roman commander, (PLRE3 Apsich2), 211, 213, 347 Apsilia, Apsilians, Apsilii, 67 Aquae (Aix), 56 Aqueduct, 86, 172 Aquileia, city of, 53, 192–3, 345 Aquinum, city of, 197

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 367

Aquis, west Balkans, 244 Aquis, east Balkans, 298–9 Aquitaine, 131 Araxes, river, 115, 227, 283 Arbela, Alexandriana, 275 Arabissus, city of, native city of Maurice, 118–19, 164–5 Arabs, Arabia, Scenite Arabs, Saracens, 5, 21, 31–3, 38–9, 41, 47, 64–5, 67–73, 82–3, 85, 98–9, 121, 124, 148–50, 153, 155–9, 170, 206–207, 210–13, 218, 220, 237, 272, 291–3, 333–5, 341, 347–8, 351, 360–3 Beth Arabaye, 121, 124, 210, 218 see also Allies, Abyssinia, Aegyptus, Federates, Ghassanids, Kinda, Lakhmids, Moors, Salīhids, Symmachoi, Yemen Aral, lake, 66, 324 Arbela, Gaugamela, 275 Arcadia, Dux Arcadiae, 174–5 Arcadius, East Roman emperor (395–408), 44, 362 Archegos (admiral), title, 4 Archers, archery, bow, crossbow, arrow, hippotoxotai, vii, 7–8, 11–12, 14–16, 20, 23–5, 28–9, 31–2, 33–7, 39–40, 62–3, 73–4, 114, 121, 174–5, 220, 250, 254, 293, 301, 313, 346, 352, 364 see also Missiles, Sieges Ardabil, (Babr), 286 Ardagastus, Slavic chieftain, 242, 295–8 Ardennes, 192 Aregensian/Auregenses Mountains (near Orense in Galicia), 97 Arethas (al-Harith ibn Jabalah), Ghassanid/ Jafnid sheik/phylarch/sheriff/sharif (basileus, phylarchus and patricius from 528 until 569), 5, 38, 67–9 Argeş, river, 296 Argimund, Visigothic general, 183 Arians, Arian Christians (Visigoths and Lombards), 53, 58, 134, 181–3, 268 see also Christians, Pagan Arichis, (Arigis, Aregis, Arogis), dux of Beneventum/Benevento, 259–60, 264, 266 Aristobulus, Aristobolus, Aristobolos, envoy, 224 Aristomachus, Roman general and PVC, 32, 60, 136–7, 171–4, 339, 348 Ariulf, Ariulfus, dux of Spoletium/Spoleto, 204, 258–61, 263–4, 266, 353–4 Ariulph, Arioulph, Arioulf, Roman commander, 166, 205

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368  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Arles, 56, 180 Armatus, tribune, 44–5 Armenia, Armenians, Persarmenia, 4, 6, 47, 64, 75–82, 84, 90, 100–102, 104–105, 107, 112–18, 120–4, 129, 139, 146–7, 149, 152–4, 170, 205, 211, 213, 218, 220–1, 224, 226–7, 230–2, 244, 251, 269, 272–3, 275–8, 280, 282–4, 286–93, 295, 302–303, 332, 337, 347, 350, 354–7, 360–2 Arrian, Arrianos, Arrianus (2nd cent. military leader, theorist and historian), 342, 359 see also forthcoming Syvänne, Septimius Severus, Appendix Arsacid, Parthian and Armenian royal family, 147, 286 Arsilas, Arslan, senior Khagan of the Turks, 103–104, 325 Artaz, 104 Arthur, King, Ambrosius Aurelius/Aurelianus, Utherpendragon, Riothamus, Dux Bellorum, High-King and Augustus, 249, 332 see also Syvänne, Britain in the Age of Arthur Artillery, ballista, catapult, katapeltes, scorpio, onager, trebuchet, mangonel, mandjanik, tormenta, stone thrower, artillerymen, bombardment, fire-bombs, fire-dart, petrobolos, petroboloi, 8, 10, 18, 20, 86, 123, 150, 220, 229, 233, 248–51, 267, 271, 335, 363 see also Fleets, Javelin, Missiles; Sieges Arzamon, (Zergan), river, 212, 215 Arzanene, 79, 81, 86, 122–4, 139, 147–8, 170, 211, 216–18, 220, 224 Arzun, see Arzanene, Chlomaron Asclepiodotus/Asclepiodotos/Asklepiodotos, military theorist (1st cent. bc), 294 Asemus, 300, 318, 357 Asia, ix, 364 Central Asia, ix, 324, 362–4 Asia Minor, see Anatolia Askalon, city and bishop of, 79 Askel, king of Kermikhiones/Hermichiones (Turks), 324–5 Asparaparet, see Aspet Aspet, Aspebedes (Asbed, Sparapet), 147, 153–4 Aspidius, lord of Aregensian/Auregenses Mountains, 97 Assassin, Assassins, Assassination, murder, murderer, x, 46, 54–6, 59–60, 69–71, 93–5, 126–7, 131, 133, 144, 149, 172–3, 179, 183, 185, 188–93, 203–204, 207, 232, 234, 254, 262, 268–70, 285–6, 288, 316, 326, 332–4, 356

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 368

see also Poison, Stratagems Assyria/Babylonia, 83 Assyria/Asorestan, 290 Astabadh, Persian mag.off., 139 Asterius, referendarius, iudes pedancus, (PLRE3 Asterius2), 113 Asterius, Comes Orientis (PLRE3 Asterius3), 348–9 Asti, city and dukedom of, 333 Astike (area in Thrace), 242, 248, 302 Astrology, 172 Asturia in Spain (not to be confused with Austuriani Moors), 57–8 Atachas, see Phathacon Atat Khorkhoruni, Armenian noble, 283–4, 291–3 Athaloc, Arian bishop, 182 Athanagild, Athanagildus, Visigothic king, 57–8, 134, 176, 333 Athanagild, son of Ingund, 190, 195, 344 Atrôkû island, 257 Atrpatakan, see Azerbaijan Attila, High-King of the Huns, 24, 362 see also MHLR 425–457 Attila river, see Volga Aude, river, 343 Audeca, Andica, King of the Suevi (584–5), 177–9 Audovald, Auduald, Audovaldus, dux, 198–9, 202 Augustae (Augusta, Ogost), x, 238, 240 Augustmanica in Aegyptus/Egypt, 175 Augustus, Augusta, Augusti, titles, v, xii, 2, 43–4, 47, 52, 57, 91–2, 118, 121, 125–8, 134, 160, 171, 197, 319–20, 322, 359 Aulus, strategos/MVM, 207–208 Austrasia, Austrasian Franks, 48, 55, 57, 93–4, 96, 129–34, 165, 178–9, 185–8, 190–1, 194–9, 203, 304, 344–5 see also Childebert I–II, Franks, Sigibert Austrovald, comes, 181, 343 Authari, Autharic, Autharith, Autharius, Lombard king (584–90), (PLRE3 Authari2), 186–8, 191, 193–4, 196–8, 200, 203–204, 251, 260, 344–5 Authari, Auctarit, (PLRE Auctarit, Authari1) Lombard dux, 260, 344 Autun, 180 Auxilia Palatina, Auxilia, Auxiliaries, 6–7 see also Allies, Federates Avars, nomads, vii, ix, 16, 19, 21, 23–6, 30, 46– 51, 61–4, 89–92, 101–103, 125, 135, 138–42,

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Index 369 144–5, 161, 163–4, 167–70, 185–6, 189, 191, 199, 204, 208, 210, 225, 238–42, 244–6, 248–9, 251–5, 263, 265, 267–8, 282, 291, 293, 295, 297–300, 302–18, 321–2, 324, 337, 340, 342, 351–3, 357–8, 363 see also Baian, Khagan Avignon, 55–6, 130–3 Avisio, 346 Aykilah, Aikelâh/Aykelâh (Zâwjâ), city and population of, 172–5, 257 Azadan, Persian nobility, 33 Azarethes (probably Hazaraft/Azareft/ Hazarabed/Chiliarch), 153–4 see also Aspet, Chosroes II Azarias, Egyptian rebel, 257–8 Azerbaijan (usually means Media Atropatene), 226, 231, 235–7, 269–73, 283, 349 see also Albania, Media Axe, battle-axe, francisca, bipennis, hatchet, halberd, 23, 29, 32–3, 40 Babo, envoy, 190, 344 Babr (Ardabīl), 286 Babylon, Babylonia, 83, 149, 152–4, 175, 227, 273, 275, 281, 290, 292 Badhan, governor of Yemen, 74 Badhghis, location, 210 Baduarius, Badourios curopalates, patricius, Comes Stabuli, strategos, MVM, 45, 48, 94–5, 102 Baetis River (Guadalquivir), 178 Bagha/Ch’u-lo-hu, Turkish Khagan (587–8), 325 Bagratunis (Aspetuni or Aspetians), 221, 232, 244, 286–7, 289–90 see also Pap, Smbat Bagrewand in Armenia, 104, 115 Bahram Chobin, Varamus, Persian usurper, 81, 210, 226–8, 231, 233–7, 269–73, 275–82, 284–9, 295, 325, 346, 349–51, 354–5 Bahram Jarabzin, envoy, 285 see also Hurmazd Jurābzīn/Hurmuz Jarabzin, Zalabzan Bahram Sharwin, 351 Bahrām, son of Siyāwush, 237, 270 Baian, Khagan of the Avars, 48–9, 61–2, 102, 125, 140–1, 144–5, 170, 238, 244 see also Avars, Khagan Baladhuri, historian, 31–2 Balami, historian, 334, 346, 349, 354–6, 359 Balkan, Balkans, ix, xi, 5–6, 21, 48, 51, 58, 63–4, 78, 91, 98, 113, 118, 120, 125, 128–9, 135–6, 138–9, 142, 145, 161, 168–70, 183, 190–1, 221,

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 369

223, 225–6, 238–9, 242, 244, 251–2, 254–5, 265, 267, 269, 280, 287–8, 293–5, 316, 321–2, 346–7, 356–7, 364 see also Antae, Avars, Bulgars, Slavs Ballista, see Artillery Bandon, arithmos, tagma (during this era usually 200–400 men and on average 310 men, but could be a larger unit too), bandon as a flag, 11, 14, 22, 105, 169, 224, 300 see also Tagma, Tagmatarches Banon, Roman commander, 174–5 Bărăgan steppe, 301 Barbalissus, 85 Barbaricini, Moors of Sardinia, 56 Basean in Armenia, 115 Basileus, basileios, king, title, 5, 38, 340 Basilius, vir clarissimus, 266 Basques/Vascones, 59, 134, 182–3 Bastitania, see Baza Battle, battles, word and battles in unspecified locations, engagement, defeat, victory, viii, x, 8, 11, 17–18, 21, 23, 26–36, 38, 42, 48–54, 56, 58, 60–1, 68–9, 71, 73–4, 77, 79, 81–2, 84–9, 94–6, 98, 103–17, 120, 122, 135, 143–4, 146–7, 150–4, 154–9, 167, 169, 171–6, 179–83, 185, 188, 191, 195–6, 199–200, 202, 204–207, 212–18, 222, 224, 226–8, 231–4, 236, 242, 244–8, 252–3, 255–8, 261, 268, 270–1, 276–80, 286, 288–91, 293–7, 299–316, 333, 336–7, 340–1, 346–50, 355, 357–8, 362–4 Battle of (note that several of these took place during sieges, some of these encounters are included only in the siege entries), see also Sieges, Tactics Abdallah b. Sa’id Abi Sahr vs. Nubians in 642, 31–2 Adrianople in 587, 251 Akbas (siege) in 583, 207 Alamoundarus vs. Lakhmids 1 in 569/70, 68, 83 Alamoundarus vs. Lakhmids 2 in 569/70, 68, 83 Alamoundarus vs. Lakhmids 3 in 572–3, 68–9, 83 Alamoundarus vs. Lakhmids 4 in 580, 149, 151 Alamoundarus vs. Lakhmids 5 in 580, 151, 153 Alboin (King of the Lombards) vs. Baduarius with Cunimund (King of the Gepids) in 566, 48, 95

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370  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Alboin (King of the Lombards) vs. Cunimund (King of the Gepids) in 567, 49 Amabilis vs. Garmul the Moor in 571, 60 Amatus vs. Lombards in 570, 53 Ansinon in 584, 242, 244 Avars defeat the Franks in 596, 304 Aykilah in 589, 175 see also Nile Badrinus (Padreno; Droctulf vs. Lombards), naval battle in 586, 191 Baduarius vs. Lombards in 576, 95 see also Alboin Bahram Chobin vs. Turks in 588, 226, 349–50 Bahram Chobin vs. Mazkʻutʻkʻ in 588/9, 226–7 Bellinzona/Bilitio in 590, 199–200, 202 Bolorapahak, see Tamkhosro Bonus and Justin vs. Avars in 561–2, 50 Bostra in 582, 159 Brexillus (Brescello; Droctulf vs. Authari) in ca. 584/5, 188, 191 Callinicum in 580, 150–2, 341 Callinicus vs. Slavs in ca. 599, 266, 268, 310 Camerinum (Camerino) in 591 (Ariulf vs. Romans), 204–205 Cannae in 216 bc, 313 Canzak, Plain of, in 593, x Canzakon, Plain of Canzak, in 593, 268, 271, 277–80, 295, 355 Carcassonne in 585, 179–80, 190 Carcassone in 587, 181 Carcassone in 589, 182–3, 196 Carrhae in 53 bc, 340 Carthage in 595, 256 Casulinus River in 554, 312 see also MHLR 518–565, 346ff. Clomaron in 586, 216–18, 348 Comentiolus’s guerrilla campaign against the Khagan in 586, 244–8 Comentiolus vs. the Khagan in 598, 305–10 see also Iatrus Comentiolus vs. the Khagan in 599, 313–14 Constantia/Tella in June 581, x, 154–8, 341 Ctesiphon in 363, 340–1 Ctesiphon 1 in 592 (Chosroes II vs. Bahram Chobin), 236 Ctesiphon 2 in 592 (revolt vs. Bahram Chobin), 270 Dara/Daras siege with battles in 573, 84–9 Daylami vs. Smbat in ca.601, 290 Drizipera in 588, 252–3

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 370

Dvin/Dwin/Duin (Dubious) in 570, 77 Elbe 1 in 562–6 (Sigibert vs. Avars), 48 Elbe 2 in 562–6 (Sigibert vs. Avars), 48 Embrun, Ebredunum in 574, 56 Erginia in 584, 242, 244 Franks and Romans vs. Lombards in 588, 195 Franks vs. Bavarians in 589, 196 Franks vs. Avars in ca. 596, see Avars Gennadius vs. Garmul the Moor in 578, 135 Gennadius vs. Moors in 583–8, 171 Godigizel and Guntram Boso vs. Theudebert in 575, 93 Godwin vs. Avars in Dalmatia in 595, 303 Godwin vs. Slavs in 602, 317–18 Guntram the King vs. Chilperic in 583, 185 Gurgan/Vrkan/Hyrcania (Bahram Chobin vs. Karins and others) in 594, 281, 284–5 Gurgan/Vrkan/Hyrcania (Smbat vs. Bistam) in ca. 595/6, 290–1 Hamadan in 595, 286, 288–9 Helibacia (Ialomits?) in 593, 297 Helibacia river in 594, 302 Heracleia in 588 (Priscus vs. Avars), 253 Heraclius vs Razates in about 627, 280 Iatrus in 598, x, 306–308 see also Comentiolus Ilipa in 205 bc, 312 Justinian, see Melitene, Tamkhosro Kethin, see Tamkhosro Khalamakhik, plain of, in 573, 81–2 Kours vs. marzban Varaz Vzur (Utʻmus in Vanand?) in 579, 146–8 Leovigild vs. Miro close to Seville in 582/3, 176 Leovigild vs. Audeca in 585, 179 Limoges in 576 (Mummolus vs. Desiderius), 96 Marcianopolis, vicinity in 594, 299–300 Martyropolis in 588, 224 Martyropolis in 590, 231–2 Melitene in 576, viii, x, 103–12, 116, 337 Monocarton, see Constantia Mummolus vs. Lombards in 571, see Plan de Fazi Mummolus vs. Saxons in 572, 54 Mummolus vs. Lombards in 574, see Embrun Mushel Mamikonean vs. Avars 1 (Singidunum) in 595, 252, 303 Mushel Mamikonean vs. Avars 2 (mountain pass in Dalmatia) in 595, 303 Nile (Romans under Aristomachus) in about 580–83, 137–8, 173, 339

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Index 371 Nile Delta (land and naval operations) revolt in 588–9, 172–5 see also Aykilah Nisibis siege with a rearguard fight in 573, 84 Nymphius/Tigris/Batman River in 582, x, 167, 205–206, 341, 346 Panopolis in ca.591/2, 257–8 Petrus vs. Peiragastus in 594, 301 Philippicus vs. Bulgars/Avars in 598, 309 Photius vs. Samaritans before 572, 79 Plan de Fazi near Embrun in 571, 53–4 Priscus vs. Ardagastus (at Arges?) in 593, 295–6 Priscus vs. Musocius in 593, 297 Priscus vs. Avars in 599 1, x, 311–12, 358 2, x, 311–13, 358 3, 313, 358 4 (at the River Tissus), x, 313–15, 358 5, (vs. Gepids), 315, 358 6, (fifth major battle), 315, 358 Rayy in 595/6, 286, 289 Roman prisoners of war vs. Persians in 588/9, 224 Roman vanguard vs. Bulgars in 595, 301–302 Romans vs. Avars in 568, 49 Romans vs. Garmul in ca. 573/4, 60 Romans and Franks vs. Lombards in 588, see Franks Rotalian Field in 575, 94, 346 Salurnis (Salurn) in 575, 94 Sargathon in 573, 82 Seville in 582/3, 176 Shipka Pass in 588, 252 Shirak, Shirakawan in 580, 146–7, 153–4 Singidunum, see Mushel Sirmium (Bonus vs. Baian) in 569, 61–2, 167 Sirmium (Theognis vs. Baian) in 582, 143–4, 167 Sisarbanon in 591, 232–4 Solanchon in 586, x, 212–16, 347 Suania in 589 (Romanus vs. Bahram Chobin), 226–8 Tabarastan ca.601/2, 290 Taginae, Tadinae, Busta Gallorum in 552, 312 see also MHLR 518–565, 340ff. Tamkhosro/Tamchosroes vs. Justinian (Bolorapahak?) in 577, 95, 105, 113–15, 117, 119 Tamkhosro vs. Romans at Kethin, Kt’ni (location unknown) in Bagrewand in 577, 105, 115, 119

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 371

Tassilo vs. Slavs in 593, 261 Tatimer vs. Slavs in 593, 296 Tella, see Constantia Theoctitus vs. Garmul the Moor in 570, 60 Thessalonica in ca. 584/5, 242 Tiberius vs. Baian in Thrace in 570, 62–3, 167 Tiberius vs. Baian in 574, 63–4, 90–1, 167 Tissus, see Priscus vs. Avars in 599 Tricamarum in 533, 228 Tsalkajur in Bznunik in 590, 231–2 Tzurullon in 588, 253, 255 Unigurs vs. Avars in ca. 560, 103 Urmiah, Lake, in 593, x, 271, 276–7, 295, 357 Wahriz vs. Masruq in 570, 72–4 Bavaria, 49, 94, 196, 261, 304 Baza, Basti, Bastitania, 58 Bearbaës, see Beth Arabaye Beïuades, (Sina Judaeorum, Sinas, mod. Fafi), 220–1, 348 Belisarius/Belisarios, MVM, patricius, strategos autokrator (dux/magister imperator), xi, 5–6, 28, 47, 52, 58, 63, 79, 126, 172, 318 see also MHLR 518–565 Bellinzona, Bilitio, 199, 202 Belluno, city and duchy, 333 Benâ, 172 Bendosabora (Gundishapur), 224 Benedict, Benedictus, I, Pope, 57, 95, 336 Beneventum, Benevento, duchy, 94, 130, 187–8, 197, 259, 333, 353 Berbers, see Moors Bergamo, Bergamum, city and dukedom of, 53, 55, 204, 266, 333 Beroe, Beroea in Asia, 223, 248, 349 Berterfred/Berterfredus/Berthefried, Neustrian noble, 192 Bertram, bishop, 189 Beth Arabaye (Arabia), Bearbaës, 121, 124, 210, 218 see also Arabia Beth Dama, 85 Beth Huzaye, Bizaê, 224 Bethvashi, river, 157 Beucaire, castle of, 180 Bibas (Tel Bes), 212 Bilge, Turkish Khagan, 103 Binajan, governor of Yemen, 74 Bindoes, Vndoy, Bindawayh, brother of Bistam, maternal uncle of Chosroes II, 154, 231, 235–7, 270–2, 276–8, 284–6, 351, 354, 356 Binganes, Persian commander at Arzun, 123

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372  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Bistam, Vstam, Bistahm, Bestam (usurper Pērōz Vistān), brother of Bindoes, maternal uncle of Chosroes II, 154, 231, 235–6, 269, 271, 278, 281, 284–90, 292, 302, 351, 356 Bistam, Armenian rebel, see Vstam Bitlis Pass, the cleisura of Balaleison, 218 Bjarmia, 255 Bladast, Bladastes, dux, 134, 189–90 Blarathos, river, 277, 349, 354 Blemmyes, African/Nubian tribe, 61, 138 see also Abyssinia, Nubians, Aegyptus, Yemen Bodegiselus, envoy, 196 Bodyguards/Bodyguard, somatofylakes, vii, 2, 4, 6, 8, 31, 34, 44, 46, 79, 118, 120, 155, 159, 169–70, 212, 215, 222, 233–6, 242, 246, 253–5, 271, 273, 280–1, 286, 296, 310, 317, 320, 330, 348 see also Bucellarii, Domestici, Excubitores, Optimates, Scholae, Spatharii Bohtan, Bohtan-su, Jerm, river, 284 Bokhan (Buqan), Turkish chieftain, 103 Boklii Cholii, tribe, 103 Bolorapahak at Basean where Murts and Araxes joined, 115, 117 Bonkeis, city of, 303 Bononia, Balkans, (Vidin), 239, 244, 252 Bonosus, scribo, skribon, 317 Bonus, head of Justin’s household and later strategos/stratiarchos at Sirmium, possibly with the title of MVM per Illyricorum (PLRE3 Bonus4), 48, 50, 61–3, 167 Bookolabra, Avar shaman, 144, 244 Booty, loot, pillage, robbery, spoils of war, 10, 21–3, 39, 48–9, 53–6, 58, 62, 64, 68, 70, 74–5, 81, 85, 87, 89, 94, 96, 98–103, 110, 112, 118, 121, 123, 130, 132, 135, 137, 140, 146–9, 152–3, 159, 173, 180, 193, 198–200, 202, 208, 210–11, 215, 218, 223–4, 227–8, 238–40, 244, 246, 256, 261, 267, 271, 278, 280–1, 283, 289, 296, 298–9, 303–304, 317–19, 337, 350 see also Prisoners, Salary, Slaves Bordeaux, 343 Bordj el-Ksour, fort, 257 Bori Shad, Turkish Khagan, 326 Bosporus, capital of the former kingdom of Bosporus, 103–104 Boso, Frankish general (not to be confused with Guntram Boso), 182, 343 Bouron, 212 Bremtonicum (Brentonico), 202, 346 Brenner Pass, 94–5, 198, 200, 202

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 372

Brescello, Brexillum, Brexillus, city and dukedom of, 188, 191, 265, 333 Brescia, Brexia, city and dukedom of, 53, 55, 333 Breslingen, king’s estate, 192 Brunhild, Brunichildis, Bruna, Visigothic princess (daughter of Athanagild and Gosuintha/Goisuintha), wife of Sigibert, queen of the Franks (ca.567–613), 93, 96, 130–1, 134, 179, 183, 188, 190, 192–3, 195–6, 203, 265, 267, 304, 336, 338 Bucellarii, famuli, armigeri, doryforoi/doruforoi, hypaspistai, hypaspists, efestos te oikia, majordomo, maior domus, optio, bandoforos, bandifer, late Roman personal retinue/ household of bodyguards, retinue in general, 4–7, 9, 22–3, 29, 46, 48, 50, 52, 66, 79, 115, 128, 136, 138, 142, 144, 159, 170, 176, 183, 189, 196, 212, 265, 273, 288, 317, 319, 348, 352, 354 bucellatum (hard tack), 160 household as a feudal unit, 293 see also Bodyguards, Thema Bulgars, Bulgarians/Huns, Scythians, Bulgarius (leader of ‘Bulgarians’), 23, 51, 92, 240–1, 300–301, 309, 355 see also Huns, Massagetae Bumin, Turkish Khagan, 324 Burgundians/Burgunds, Burgundy, Burgundian Franks, 29, 53–5, 92, 96, 130–1, 179–81, 188, 304 see also Franks, Guntram, Mummolus Busas, Roman soldier who betrayed the secrets of Roman siege artillery to the Avars, 248–9 Bûsîr (Busiris, Abusir), 172–4 Buzāu, river, 297 Byzacium, Byzacena, 171 Byzantium, Byzantion, city, (name used by Procopius and others for Constantinople), 101, 211, 257 see also Constantinople Bznunik, 231–2 Cabaret, castle, 180 Caboses, Kabus, king of the Lakhmids, 68–9 Cadusii, Kadasenes, Cadusenians, Kadusii, 224 Caesar, title, designated successor of Augustus, 46, 52, 57, 59, 63, 89–98, 101–102, 116, 118–19, 126, 160, 165, 317, 336, 338–9 Caesarea in Cappadocia, 105, 107, 148, 337 Calabria, Calabrians, 197 Callicrateia, 319

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Index 373 Callinicum, 64, 150, 152 Callinicus, PSC, (PLRE3 Callinicus2), 43–4 Callinicus, exarchus Italiae, (PLRE3 Callinicus 10), 264–8, 310, 316, 354 Calvomuntis, location, 248 Cambrai, 185 Camels, camel mounted, 32, 38–40, 68, 71–2, 99, 138, 175, 212, 217, 278, 350–1 Campania, 264 Canini lowlands, 199 Cannae, 313 Cantabria, area and Senate of, 57–9 Cappadocia, 79, 100, 105, 118–21, 148, 163 Captives, see Prisoners Caracalla/Caracallus, emperor (211–217), 298 Caralis, Caranalis, (Cagliari), 266 Carcassonne, Carcassonnais, 180–2, 343 Carcharoman, Karcharoman, location, 208 Carduchian Mountains, 124 Carrhae, Harran, 229–30, 340 Carthage, Carthago, Carthago Proconsularis, 171, 196, 202, 211, 256, 322–3, 362 Carthagena, Carthago Nova, Carthagiensis, 183 Caspia, Caspian Gates, Caspian Sea, 66, 112, 211, 224, 240, 289–90 see also Gurgan Castorius, Pope’s chartularius, 264 Castus, Roman commander, 245–6, 248, 251, 259, 262–3 Cataracts of the Danube, 316–17 Caucasus, 64, 103, 226, 236, 360 Cavades I, Cabades, Kavadh, Qubad, Kawâd, ruler of Persia (488–531), 235 Cavades II, Kavadh, Siroes, ruler of Persia (628), 282 Cavalry, horsemen, horses, cataphract, katafraktoi, mounted archers, clibanarii, hippotoxotai, kaballarioi, vii–x, xii, 4, 6–8, 10–11, 14–18, 22–4, 26–35, 37–42, 51, 54, 61–4, 68, 71–4, 77–8, 81–2, 84–5, 92–3, 99, 104–105, 107, 109–16, 121, 123, 125, 131, 135–6, 140, 144, 146–7, 153–9, 167–9, 173, 175, 181, 206, 210–15, 217–18, 220–4, 227–8, 233, 236–7, 242, 244–6, 248, 251–4, 256, 258, 272, 275–8, 281, 283, 287–9, 291, 293–7, 299–301, 306–308, 311–15, 318–20, 326, 328–9, 334, 336–7, 340, 342–3, 346–8, 350, 352, 354–5, 357, 363–4 see also Battles, Bodyguards, Bucellarii, Camels, Infantry under subentry Dismounted, Mules

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 373

Ceneda, city and dukedom of, 333 Central Asia, see Asia Centuriae, centurion, century, hekatontarchos, 6–7, 34, 308, 318 Ceylon, Sri Lanka, 75, 90, 97, 334, 363 Ch’ang-an, Chinese capital, 326 Chahuk, a wetland/district in Siwnik, 283 Chalcedon, city and council of, Melkite, Catholic, Orthodox, 31, 44, 47, 58, 61, 76, 99, 134, 138, 147, 149, 166–7, 173, 176, 181–3, 193–4, 206–207, 268, 282, 291–2, 320–1, 362 see also Christians, Arian, Monophysite Chalcis/Qinnasrin, 81, 85, 223, 278, 349 Chalke, place in Constantinople, 317 Champagne, 192, 199 Charcha, district, 272 Chargisel, chamberlain, 93 Chariot, charioteers, cart, wagon, carriages, 14, 21, 23, 66, 90, 296, 299–300, 303, 305–306, 319–20 Charito, daughter of Tiberius, wife of Germanus, 160, 165 Chariulf, wealthy Frankish noble, 189 Chedin, Cedinus, Chenus, Henus, dux, 197–8, 200, 202 Cherson, city in Crimea, 103–104, 141 Chihor-Vshnasp of the Suren clan, hazarapet and marzban of Armenia, 76 Childebert II, Childebertus, King of the Austrasian Franks (575–595/6), 93, 96, 129– 33, 178–9, 181, 183, 185–90, 192–7, 199–200, 202–203, 261, 267, 304, 338, 343–5 Chilperic I, Chilpericus, King of Neustria (561–584), x, 48, 55, 57, 93–4, 96, 128–31, 133–4, 179, 185–6, 188–90, 336, 338, 344 China, 103, 325–6 see also Sui, Tang Chiusi, Clusium, city and duchy, 333 Chlodosind/Chlodosinda, Childebert II’s sister, 181–2, 195 Chlomaron: 1)  a capital of Arzun/Arzanene (former Tigranocerta?) x, 123, 216–18, 348 2)  a fort opposite Aphumon, 216–18, 348 Chlotar/Lothair, see Lothar Chosroes I Anoushirvan/Anushirwan (Khosrov, Khosro, Khusro, Khusraw, Khosrun), ruler of Persia (531–579), 33–4, 41, 64–5, 72–8, 81, 83–6, 89–90, 98, 100, 103–13, 115–16, 121, 124, 138–9, 147, 153, 224, 275, 324, 334, 337, 354

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374  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Chosroes II Parwez (Khosrov, Khosro, Khusro, Khusraw, Khosrun), ruler of Persia (590–628), vii–viii, 34, 154, 165, 172, 226, 228, 231, 233–7, 268–93, 302, 310, 320–2, 325, 334, 349, 351, 354–6 see also MHLR 602–641 Chosroperozes, Persian envoy, 270 Chramnichis, Frankish commander, 94 Christians, Christianity, Christ, church, Jesus Christ, clergy, bishop, priest, patriarch, God, pope, monk, monastery, deacon, cathedral, catholicus, viii, 1, 10, 31, 38, 44–7, 52–3, 55, 57–62, 64, 70, 72–3, 75–81, 83, 89–90, 95–6, 98–9, 114–15, 117, 120, 122–4, 127, 129, 131–2, 134, 136–9, 147–9, 152–3, 155–6, 158–9, 162–7, 173–4, 177–83, 185, 188–93, 195–9, 203–207, 211–13, 215, 218, 222–3, 225, 229–30, 237, 239, 242, 249, 252, 254, 256–70, 272, 281–4, 291–3, 297, 300, 308, 310, 317, 320, 322, 334, 338–9, 344–7, 349, 351–2, 354, 356–7, 359–60 God, Mother of God (Theotokos), 1, 47, 70, 90, 98–9, 114, 117, 162, 173, 197–8, 213, 218, 262, 310, 317, 320, 347 see also Arians, Pagan, Monophysites, Chalcedon Chronicle 1234, 84–5, 149–50, 152, 158, 229, 237, 287–8, 310, 341, 356, 359 Chronicon Paschale, 341–2, 358–9 Churin, city of, 158 Cilicia, 65, 226 Cimbra (Cembra, Val di Cembra), 202, 346 Circesium, city of, 85, 149–50, 237, 268, 341 Circle, orbis (three variants: 1. a double–front, amfistomos phalanx which could face all directions when outflanked and be a circle; 2. a hollow circle, a rounded variant of hollow square/oblong formation used on land and at sea; 3. forces circling around the enemy), 19, 37, 110, 116 encircle, 37, 109, 251, 301 Citharizon, 118, 122 Cividale, see Friuli Classis, the main harbour of Ravenna, 191 Claudius, dux Lusitaniae, 181–2 Clef, Cleph, Clebus, Claffo, King of the Lombards (572–4), 54–6, 94, 186, 332–3 Clermont, Clermont-Ferrand, 55, 96, 132–3, 180–1, 192 Clovis, Chlodovechus, son of Chilperic I, 96 Chnaithas, location, 275

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 374

Club, mace, distrion, distria, hammer, staff, 29, 33, 235, 317, 320, 340 Colchis, see Lazica Comacina, island on Lake Como, 193, 204 Comenciolus, see Comentiolus Comentiolus, Komentiolos, Roman commander and trusted man of Maurice, x, 165, 183, 231–4, 240–2, 244–6, 248, 251, 253, 268, 270–3, 275, 277–8, 287–8, 305–11, 314, 316, 319, 342–3, 349–53, 357–8 Comes, comites, komes (companion, count, general), xi–xii, 2, 4–5, 29, 31, 41, 44, 60, 63, 85–6, 90–2, 94, 113, 116, 118, 120–1, 141, 156, 160, 163, 165, 169–70, 180–2, 185, 192, 208, 256, 330, 335, 339–40, 348 Comes Domesticorum, xii, 31, 348 Comes Excubitorum, 2, 5, 44, 63, 90–2, 116, 118, 120, 160, 163, 165, 208, 330, 335 Comes Foederatum, 4–5, 92, 120–1, 156, 330, 339 Comes Orientis, 348 Comes rei Privatae, xii Comes Sacrarum Largitionum, (Count of the Sacred Largesse), xii, 44, 85, 113 Comes Sacri Stabuli (Commander of the Royal Grooms), Comes Stabuli, 94, 180 Comes Scholariorum, 2 Comes Spathariorum, 29 Komes Opsikiou, 169–70 Comitas, envoy, 61 Comitatenses, 2, 4, 52 see also Bodyguards, Bucellarii, Domestici, Limitanei, Scholae, Stratiotai Como, lake and dukedom of, 53, 193, 204, 333 Conon, bishop ,47 Conscription, 9, 81, 118, 120, 135, 144, 225, 242, 339 Conspiracies, cabal, plot, 45–6, 54, 69, 83, 127–8, 130–3, 162–3, 179, 182, 184, 188–9, 192, 195–6, 231–2, 234, 270–1, 280, 308, 310, 331, 338, 354 see also Assassin, Poison, Factions Constantia, Constantina, Tella, city of, x, 113, 117, 121, 150, 154–6, 222–3, 270, 272–3, 341 Constantina, younger daughter of Tiberius II, wife of Maurice, 160, 165, 172 Constantine, Constantinus, in order of appearance: Constantine, Constantinus, Roman officer at the battle of Constantia, 156–8 Constantine I, Constantinus the Great, emperor (306–337), 162

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Index 375 Constantinus, patrician, (PLRE3 Constantinus12 patricius and Dux et Augustalis Alexandriae158), 257 Constantine, Constantinus Porphyrogennetos, emperor (913–59), 291, 331, 359 Constantinus Lardys, PP of the East, 320, 353 Constantinople (Byzantium), city, ix, xii, 2, 19, 32, 44–7, 50, 52, 54–5, 57, 60, 63, 65–8, 71, 74, 76, 78, 80, 90, 95–6, 99–101, 103, 105, 113, 115, 121, 125, 128–30, 132, 134, 137, 139–41, 148, 159, 164–7, 172–3, 178, 186, 188, 190, 192, 195, 197, 202, 206, 208, 212, 216, 221, 225, 241, 244, 246, 249, 252–5, 262, 264, 268–9, 284, 291, 296, 298, 300, 309–10, 316–17, 319, 322, 324, 332, 342, 344, 352 see also Byzantium Constantiola, 303, 317 Constantius, ‘magnificent tribune’, 260 Contus, kontos, kontoi, kontarion, contarii, kontoforoi, vii, 11, 28, 294 see also Lancers, Spear Convex (kyrte), 11, 19, 37, 342 Corinth, city and isthmus, 239, 351 Cordoba, 57–8, 178, 343 Corduene, Korduene, 148 Corruption, bribery, bribing, 1, 10, 27, 48, 53, 59, 72–3, 80, 89, 91, 95, 97, 102, 116, 129, 131, 135, 137, 153–4, 161, 176, 178, 192, 194, 198, 222, 224, 234–5, 240, 248, 262, 271, 277, 283, 298, 320, 326, 334, 338, 343–5 Corsica, 171, 256–7, 322, 338 Cosmas, Faction leader, 319 Cosmas, Roman prisoner and commander, 174–5 Council, councillors (words) including imperial, military, senatorial, city and Church councils, councilors, 46, 66, 87, 183, 235, 269, 343, 345, 351 Cours, Curs, see Kours Crau, La Crau, 56 Cremona, city and dukedom of, 53, 333 Crescent (menoeides), 11, 19, 37, 110, 312–13 Crotona, city, 264 Ctesiphon, ix, 32, 64, 124, 148–9, 212, 231, 234– 5, 237, 273, 275, 284, 286–7, 289, 340, 354 Cunimund, King of the Gepids, 48–9, 54 Curisca, camping site, 300, 318 Curopalates, cura palatii, 43–5, 226 Cusina/Cutzinas/Koutzines/Koutzinas/ Coutzinas, Moorish chieftain and MVM, 59 Cyprian, deacon, 265 Cyprus, 123, 171, 173

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 375

Cyrenaica, Cyrene, Pentapolis, 175, 339 see also Africa, Libya Cyriacus, Patriarch of Constantinople (595–606), 264 Cyrus, river, 101 Dacia, Dacians, 240 Dagger, knife, dirk, 23, 29, 33, 40, 103, 285, 317, 332 Dagesthan, Daganes, 80, 82 Daikh (Ural), river, 66 Dalauzas, Persian envoy, 254 Dalmatae, Dalmatia, 62, 142, 144, 189, 239, 263, 266, 303–304, 310, 357 Damascus, city of, 222, 358–9 Damianus, bishop, 149 Daniel, bones of the prophet, 282 Daniel, bridge of Daniel, 284 Danube, river, frontier, 46, 50–1, 62–3, 90, 102, 125, 140–2, 144, 239–41, 244, 248–9, 254, 293, 295–6, 298–306, 309, 311, 316–18, 321–2, 342, 358, 362 Dara, Daras, x, 64, 83–6, 89, 98, 113, 115–17, 121, 139, 147–9, 155, 170, 215–16, 224, 269, 271, 273, 292, 335 Dardania, 316 Dareine Road, 67 Dareios III, the Achaemenid ruler defeated by Alexander the Great, 286 Daylami, Dailamites, Dilemnites, Daylam, Deylam, (Gelum and Delum), 33–4, 74, 80, 82, 231, 234, 285–6, 289–90, 349, 351 De scientia politica dialogus, 293, 359, 361 Dea (Die), city of, 56 defensores (sing. defensor), 18 Dehkan, Persian petty nobility, 33 Demetrius, a secretis, 44 Derbend, pass, 210–11, 240 see also Caspia Desiderius, dux of Chilperic, Gundovald and Guntram (PLRE 3 Desiderius2), 96, 181 Despotikoi, members of the imperial family, 79 Dinabadon, 275 Dinawari, chronicler, 228, 236–7, 270, 281, 285–8, 350–1, 354–6, 360 Diocletianopolis, 248, 352–3 Diplomacy, diplomat, foreign policy, 1, 34, 47, 60, 64, 97, 128–30, 134, 161, 176, 184, 191, 212, 264, 285, 316, 321–2, 326, 333, 337, 344 see also Ambassador, Corruption, Gold, Strategy

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376  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Diyala, river, 286 Domenziolus, illustres, investigator, 232 Domestici, domestikoi, imperial bodyguards, and domestics and bodyguards of officers, Protectores, xii, 2, 31, 79, 229, 348, 352 Protectores, 2, 8, 155, 335, 352, 360 see also Bodyguards, Excubitores, Scholae Domitian, Domitianus, Bishop of Melitene, cousin or nephew of Maurice, trusted confidant and advisor of Maurice, 120, 163, 165, 270–1, 273, 292, 322, 337 Domnizolus/Domtzolus, the Curator of the Royal Palace of Hormisdas, 146 Donatists, 256 Donatus, monk, 60 Donellus, erogator (paymaster), 267 Dorostolon, Durustorum, 244, 295, 300 Dotzen, 346 Douro, Dubrius, river, 58 Drina, Dreinus, river, 142 Drizipera, 252–3, 295, 298–9, 308–10 Droctulf, Droctulfus, Droctulft, Drocton, Lombard dux in Roman service, 187–8, 191, 221, 244, 251, 257, 344–5 Droungos, drungus, droungoi, drouggoi (a throng), 6, 11, 15, 17–18, 25 Drouggarios, droungarios, drungarius, 6 Dux (general), duces, duke, dukes, vii, xi, 4–6, 28–9, 51, 55–7, 60–1, 63, 92–7, 102, 120, 128–30, 132–4, 136–7, 141, 165, 172–5, 180–1, 185–9, 191–3, 197–200, 202–204, 222–3, 244, 251, 257–61, 263–8, 287, 333, 335, 338–40, 343–4, 348, 353 Dvin, Dwin, Dovin, Dubius, Doubios, ix, 77–8, 80, 82, 115, 149, 153, 227, 232, 269, 271, 289 Eboric, son of Miro, King of the Suevi, 176, 178 Ebregesil, Ebregisel, Ebregiselus, Austrasian magnate, 131, 188, 195–6 Edessa in Oshroene, 82, 150, 213, 222–3, 292, 347 Egidius, bishop, 185, 188 Egypt, see Aegyptus Eilfreda, Roman commander, 213, 222 Elburz Mountains, 289–90 Elephant, pachyderm, 11, 32, 34, 60, 67, 73–4, 78, 82, 104, 113–14, 228, 238, 270, 278, 330, 350, 355 Elias, Bishop of Aquileia, 192–3 Elmatrîdîn Elmasr, 173 Elymais (Masabadhan), 286

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 376

Embrun, Ebredunum, 54–6 Emesa, 213 Ennemase (Neumarkt), 202, 346 Ennodius, envoy, 195 Envoy, see Ambassador Eoin, Euin, dux of Trento, 55, 94, 193, 203 Ephesus, see John of Ephesus Epikampios opisthia, emprosthia, 11, 168, 215, 307, 311–14, 342, 358 Epiphanius of Fréjus, 132 Erzerum/Erzurum, see Theodosiopolis Etch, 94 Ethiopia, see Abyssinia Eulogius the Chalcedonian Patriarch of Alexandria, 172 Eunuchs, 2, 5, 24, 28, 43–4, 49–50, 79, 126, 142, 146, 320, 332 Euphrates, river, 32, 68, 83, 85, 112, 149–50, 156, 210, 237 Euric, King of the Suevi (584), 177 Europe, 135, 252, 316, 335, 362–4 Eusebius, Roman commander, 89–90 Eusebius, envoy of Childebert II, 195 Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, 44, 46, 64 Evagrius, church historian, 45–6, 63, 71, 76, 80–1, 83–4, 86, 90–2, 107, 118–19, 135, 156, 158, 165, 206–208, 216, 225–6, 228–9, 231–3, 331, 333–7, 339–41, 346, 348–51, 353–4, 356, 360 Evantius, envoy, 196 Excubitores, 2, 5, 44, 63, 90–2, 116, 118, 120, 160, 163, 165, 208, 300, 308–309, 318, 320, 330, 335, 340, 348, 352 see also Bodyguards, Domestici, Scholae Factions in general, Circus Factions, demes, Blues, Greens, Reds, Whites, 44–5, 127, 134, 166, 172–4, 185, 192, 242, 309, 319–20 see also Militia Fagitana (Faedo), 202, 346 Famine, food shortage, 53, 159–60, 173, 199, 202–203, 258, 260, 262, 305, 317 Fanum, Fanus, Fanum Fortunae, mod. Fano, 205 Faroald, dux of Spoleto, 191, 259 Farrukhan, 234, 356 Federates, foederati, foideratoi, foedus (treaty or contract bound allies and mercenaries), 2, 4–5, 9, 30, 38–9, 50–1, 60, 63, 84, 92–3, 117, 120–1, 135, 153, 156, 158–9, 170, 173–4, 197, 206, 211, 213, 220, 237, 293, 295, 328, 330, 332–3, 339, 353

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Index 377 see also Allies, Ghassanids Felix of Châlons, envoy, 195 Feltre, city and duchy, 333 Fenno-Ugrians, 255 Ferdowsi, Firdausi, Persian poet/historian, 279–80, 349–51, 354–6, 360 Ferogdath (Ferogdatês), envoy, 139 Finance, banking, 1, 35, 45, 67, 132, 166, 221, 234, 236, 275, 281, 349 see also Corruption, Taxes, Trade Firminus, envoy, 55, 333 Flaminian Way/Via Flaminia, 259 Fleets (navy, naval, ships, shipping, galleys, trireme, six, five, liburnae, rafts, amphibious, barges, canoes, boats, ferry, vessel, skiffs, dhows, maritime, marines, rowers, sailors, navigate, seafaring, dromones, curraghs, neon, akatoi, ploia makra, triakontoroi,trieres/ trireme), 2, 4, 19–22, 28–9, 31–4, 37–9, 42, 46, 54, 56, 67, 72–5, 95–6, 101–103, 125, 129, 132, 136–7, 140–2, 144, 149–50, 173–5, 178, 191, 198, 240, 249, 252–4, 257, 267, 291, 295–7, 299, 301–303, 311, 316–18, 320, 334, 336, 341, 353 Foederati (Federates), see Federates Fortifications/Fortresses/Forts/Fortified/ fortified camp, carrago, wagon laager, Walls, fosse, trench, ditch, moat, hill forts, castra, castrum, battlement, rampart, enclosure, stockade, acropolis/akropolis, citadel, castle, base, 1, 8, 19, 21, 23, 37, 51, 53, 58, 61, 66, 83, 85–7, 94, 97, 101, 116, 119, 121–3, 136, 139, 142, 145, 150, 153, 158–9, 164, 170, 176, 178–80, 198, 200, 202–204, 207–208, 210, 213, 216–18, 220–2, 224–5, 227, 229, 233, 237–40, 242, 244–6, 248–52, 257–9, 262, 272–3, 284, 290, 292, 298–9, 300, 303, 305, 309, 320, 334, 350, 354–5 camp, fortified camp, stockade, wagon laager, carrago, marching camps in general (most of these were fortified even when not stated, the sole exception being camps where men just rested without expecting trouble and the Bedouin camps, but even these could be protected with rings of camels), 7, 23, 28, 34, 36, 54, 68, 74, 84, 103, 107, 110–12, 114–15, 119, 146, 152, 175, 182, 199–200, 202, 206, 208, 210–13, 215–17, 222–3, 227, 229, 233, 236–7, 239, 242, 245–6, 248, 250, 253, 256, 276, 278, 287, 289, 296, 299, 303, 306–307, 311, 316, 318, 343, 350, 355

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 377

rampart built around enemy, (battle and siege technique), 54, 83 see also Sieges Forum Iulii, see Friuli Framidaneus, traitor, 58 Francio, MVM, 193, 204 Franks (Sygambrians), Germanic confederacy, x, xii, 21, 27, 29–30, 48, 53–5, 57, 92–7, 116, 121, 128–35, 165, 170, 178–82, 185–91, 193–200, 202–204, 255, 260–2, 265–8, 304, 316, 321, 338, 343–6, 360, 362 see also Austrasia, Bavaria, Burgundy, Neustria, Thuringia Fredegund, Fredegundis, queen (died in ca.597), wife of Chilperic, 93, 129, 133, 179, 186, 189–90, 193, 345 Fredegar, Fredegarius, chronicler, 50, 187–8, 192, 333, 343–5, 360 Friuli, Forum Julii (Cividale, mod. Friuli), city and ducate/dukedom, 51, 53, 55, 265, 267–8, 333 Frontier, see Limitanei Frontinus, Roman general and military theorist, 342 Gabbulon, town (possibly to be identified with Gabala), 85 Gaidulf, dux of Bergamo, 204, 266 Gaidwald of Tridentum, 267–8 Galicia, 57, 97, 178–9 Garamantes, Moorish tribe, see Moors Garibald I, Garibaldus, Bavarian King (Rex Baioariorum), 94, 196, 345 Garda, lake, Lago di Garda, 346 Garmul, Moorish chief, 60, 135 Gaul, see Franks Gazara/Jazira, 85 Gennadius, Roman commander, 91, 96, 102, 135–7, 171, 256–7, 266, 339, 343, 353 Genoa, Genua, city of, 53, 195–6, 258 Gentzon, hypostrategos, taxiarchos, 295, 297, 300 George, Georgios, messenger, 66 George of Cyprus, 171 George, Georgios, PP, 292 Georgian Chronicles, 153, 226, 360 Georgia, 226 see also Iberia, Lazica Gepids, Gepidae, Germanic tribe, 21, 27, 29–30, 48–51, 61–2, 92, 244, 254, 296–7, 315, 332 Germanus the Elder, cousin of Justinian I, MVM, patrician, 46, 48, 50, 80, 98, 127, 167

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378  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Germanus the Younger, son of Germanus the Elder and Matasuntha, Caesar, patricius, 160, 162, 165, 317, 319–20 Germanus, Dux Phoenices Libanensis, leader of rebel army, 222–5, 229, 231, 349 Ghassanids/Jafnids (Thlabites), 5, 38–9, 47, 67–8, 71, 98–9, 148, 170, 213, 237, 272, 348 see also Arabs, Kinda, Lakhmids, Salīhids, Yemen Giligerdon, fort, 224 Gisulf I, Gisulfus, dux of Friuli (569–c.581), 51, 55, 332 Gisulf II, Gisulfus, dux of Friuli (590–c.610), son of Grasulfus, 199, 267–8, 332 Glory, 99, 113, 146, 149, 197, 224, 227, 256 Godigisel, Frankish commander, 93 Godwin, Goudouis, Guduin, Gouduin (PLRE3 Guduin), Roman commander, taxiarchos, hypostrategos, 166, 303, 317–19 Gogo, Childebert II’s tutor, 93, 129 Goisuntha, Gosuintha, Goiswinth, Visigothic queen, Athanagild’s widow, Leovigild’s wife, 57, 134, 181–2 Gold, golden, gold mines, gold coins, solidus, solidi, nomisma, nomismata, drachma, 10, 44–5, 50, 55–6, 62, 65, 69, 72, 78–9, 84, 87–92, 95, 100–102, 104, 115–16, 121, 123, 128–30, 132, 135, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 163–4, 176, 185–7, 189–90, 192, 194, 212, 225, 235, 238, 240–1, 244, 252, 254, 262, 272, 281, 291, 296, 299, 309, 334, 338, 340, 344, 358 Golden Mountain, 65–6, 325 see also Corruption, Diplomacy Goths, see Visigoths Granista, comes, 182 Grasulfus/Grasulf. dux of Friuli (575/81–590), brother of Gisulf I, 199 Greece, 118, 125, 140, 142, 225, 244–5, 249, 340, 351, 363 Gregory, Gregorius, in order of appearance: Gregory of Tours, Frankish chronicler, xii, 56, 96, 130, 133–4, 176–9, 181–2, 187, 194–5, 197, 199–200, 202, 331–3, 336, 338–9, 342–5, 360 Gregory, Bishop Antioch/Hieropolis/ Theopolis, 83, 129, 131, 134–5, 165, 225–6, 229, 270, 272, 348–9 Gregory, PP Orientis in 577/8, 118, 120 Gregory the Great, Pope (590–604), 165, 204–205, 254, 256–67, 344, 346, 353–4 Gregory, praefectus urbis Romae, 262

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 378

Gregory of Kashkar, Bishop of Nisibis, 293 Gregory, Archbishop of Jerusalem, 334 Grenoble, Gratianopolis, 56 Grippo, envoy, 190, 195–6, 199, 202, 344 Gudescale (Gottschalk), 267 Guerrilla Warfare, skirmishing, 8, 17–19, 34, 73, 105, 107, 236, 246, 251 see also Ambush, Sieges, Stratagems Gundoald, brother of Theudalinda, 196 Gundovald, dux of Sigibert, 93 Gundovald, Gundovaldus, son of Lothar I, usurper, 130–3, 176, 179, 188–90, 195–6, 338, 344, 362 Gundulf, Gundulfus, Frankish general, 133 Guntram, Guntchramnus, King of Burgundy (561–28 March 592, or 28 March 593), 53, 55–7, 93–4, 96, 128–33, 179–83, 185–90, 192–3, 195–6, 200, 203, 338, 344 Guntram Boso, 93, 96, 129–33, 188–9, 192, 338 Gurgan/Hyrcania/Vrkan, 281, 284–5, 289–90, 356 Guaram, Gorgenes, Gurgenes, Gourgenes, Guaram, curopalatus, King of Iberia (ca.588–601), 77–8, 226, 334, 349 Haemus Mountain Range, Stara Planina, 248, 252, 308 Hagia Sophia/Hagia Sofia, in Constantinople, 163, 254, 320 Haleb, location, 85 Hamadan, 286–8 hamarakar (auditor/logothete), 283–4 Hamazasp Mamikonean, 284 Hannibal, Carthagian tactical genius, 211, 313 Hazarapet, hazarabed, hazaraft, chiliarch (‘leader of thousand men’), sort of prime inister/ vizier/mag.off., in Persia and Armenia, 76, 153, 214, 234 Hebdomon, 160, 254, 320 Helibacia, river (Pohl identifies as Ialomiţa), 297, 302 Helmichis, Hilmegis, king’s squire (scilpor), murderer, 54 Hephthalites, White Huns, 65, 208, 241, 324 Heracleia, Heraclea, Herakleia (Perinthus), 167, 253–5, 295, 299 Heraclius Sr., MVM per Armeniam, hypostrategos, strategos, exarchus, 205, 213, 216–8, 220–1, 224, 226–7, 231–3, 257, 270, 282–4, 287, 291, 347–8, 350, 356

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Index 379 Heraclius Jr., emperor (611–641), 6, 8, 167, 169–70, 205, 213, 233, 254, 257, 270, 280, 282, 321, 323, 326, 347–9 see Syvänne, MHLR 602–641 Hermenegild, Ermenegildus, Hermangild, Visigothic usurper, 59, 129–30, 133–5, 176, 178–9, 185–6, 190, 343–4 Herodianos, prophet, 317 Heruli/Heruls, Germanic tribe, 4, 16, 29–30, 51 Heshana/Chu-luo, Turkish Khagan (604–11), 326 Hierapolis, 224, 268 Himyar, see Yemen Hippodrome of Constantinople (for maps see academia.edu/Ilkka Syvanne), 127 Hira, al-Hira, al-Hirah, capital of the Lakhmids, 38, 68, 72, 99–100, 153, 235–6 Hirat, Herat, 350 Hispalis, see Sevilla Histria, see Istria Honorius, emperor (393–423), 121 Honorius, scribe, prefect, 230 Hormisdas, Palace of, 146 Hormisdas/Rhosas, 272 Hormizd IV, Hormisdas, (Hurmuz b. Khusraw), Persian ruler (579–590), 139, 145–7, 154–5, 208, 212, 214, 227–8, 231, 233–5, 285, 340, 349–50 Horta, location, 261 Hsieh-li, Turkish Khagan, 326 Hulwan, city of, 286 Huns, Hun, 21, 23–4, 26, 33, 62, 92, 211, 213, 226, 283–4, 357 see also Bulgars, Kutrigur, Massagetae, Sabirs, Scythia, Utigurs Hurmuz Jarabzin, Hurmazd Jurābzīn, 285, 287 see also Bahram Jarabzin, Zalabzan Hypostrategos, second-in-command, 5, 22, 63, 101, 120–1, 146, 169, 205, 211, 213, 216, 217, 220, 233, 244, 251–2, 273, 287, 295, 297, 310, 316–17, 347 Iatrus, river, x, 300, 306, 308–309 Iberia (eastern portion of mod. Georgia, not to be confused with Iberian Peninsula), 77–8, 80, 82, 104–105, 113–16, 118, 120–1, 139, 149, 153–4, 170, 211, 226, 269, 291, 337, 349, 356 see also Georgia, Lazica Iberian Peninsula, see Spain Ikh (Emba), river, 66 Illness, see Plague

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 379

Illyricum, Illyria, Illyrians, 4, 52, 62, 92, 125, 140–2, 144, 254, 310 see also Dalmatia, Pannonia Illyris Pass, 211 India, Indian Ocean, 32, 37, 39, 41, 64, 75, 97, 305, 334, 363 Indulf, see Gundulf Infantry, footmen, vii, ix, xii, 7, 10–12, 14–16, 20, 23–4, 26–9, 31–4, 37, 39–40, 42, 54, 61–2, 74, 81–2, 84–5, 104–105, 107, 110–12, 114–16, 144, 168–9, 175, 212, 215, 217, 221, 231, 242, 244–6, 248, 251, 253, 276, 278, 287, 290, 293–7, 300, 303, 306–308, 311, 314, 329, 340, 343, 346, 348, 350, 355, 358 dismounted, dismounting, dismounted cavalry, 14, 24, 27, 37, 40, 74, 114, 144, 207, 215, 220–1, 222, 277, 296, 299, 348 see also Archers, Skoutatoi, Slingers Ingund, Ingundis, sister of Childebert II, wife of Hermenegild, 134, 178, 186, 190, 195, 343–4 Innocentius, PP in Africa, 257 Ino, wife of Tiberius, see Anastasia Intelligence gathering, information gathering, scouts, scouting, spying, spies (kataskopoi), reconnaissance, reconnoitre, counter intelligence, secret/special operatives, informant (words), 2, 19, 28, 34, 66, 79, 83, 112, 114, 116–17, 122, 131, 145, 153, 156–8, 168, 179, 192–3, 212–13, 217, 227, 234, 236–7, 252, 265, 275–6, 280, 295, 297, 299–301, 304, 307, 314–17, 364 see also Ambassadors, Assassins, Diplomacy Ioannes, see John Iotabe, Jotabe, island, 334 Irish, 255 Iron Gates, 316 Isaac, son of Abaskiron, pirate, 172–5, 257 Isauria, Isaurians, 92 Isfahan, 287, 289–90 Isfahani, chronicler, 340, 360 Ishtemi, Ishtemi (yabğu, the Turkish Khagan of the Western Frontier), 324–5 Isidore of Seville, chronicler, xii, 50, 57, 134, 182–3, 333, 336, 339, 343, 359–60 Istria/Histria, 186, 189, 192–3, 199, 204, 239, 258, 260, 265–8, 310, 352 see also Dalmatia Italy, Italia, ix–xii, 4–5, 28, 48–56, 58, 78, 91–5, 102, 116, 128–30, 132–3, 141, 158, 161, 164, 167, 170–1, 178–9, 182–93, 195–200, 202–203, 211, 221, 228, 239, 251, 255, 258, 263–5,

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380  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 267–8, 304, 310, 317, 321–2, 332–3, 336, 338, 344–6, 349, 353, 357, 361–2 Italian Drill, 158 see also Corsica, Lombards, Sardinia, Sicily Iunci Sofiana, fort, 136 Ivrea, city and dukedom of, 333 Jabalī Nihāwandī, Viceroy of Khurasan, and Gurgan, 284 Jacob Baradeus, 47, 90 Jacob, Jacobus, Iacobus, Egyptian rebel/bandit, 172, 175, 257 Javelins, pilum, pila, spiculum, lancea, akontia, akontion, angon, harpoon, vii, 7–8, 14–15, 23, 28–30, 32, 39, 200, 293–4, 299, 301–302 see also Missiles, Spear Jazira, see Gazara Jerm (the Bohtan-su, a tributary of the Tigris), 284 Jerusalem, city of, 47, 79, 334, 364 New Monastery of Jerusalem, 47, 79 Jews, Jewish, Judaism, rabbi, 67, 79, 236, 275, 281 see also Samaritans John, Ioannes, Johannes, in order of their appearance in the book, see below John of Ephesus (JE), church historian, xii, 65, 68–9, 71, 76–80, 82–5, 87, 89–90, 92, 98–9, 105, 107, 112–15, 117–24, 137–40, 142, 144–7, 149–50, 152–3, 155–9, 162, 165, 206, 239, 333–41, 346–7, 351, 360 John of Nikiu, historian, 46, 79, 136–7, 159–60, 166, 171–5, 257–8, 269, 280–1, 335, 360 John IV the Faster, Scholasticus, Patriarch of Constantinople (582–595), 47, 165–7, 206, 262, 264, 269 John III, Pope, 52, 57 John of Biclar, chronicler, 58–60, 63, 95, 97, 101–102, 129, 134–5, 140, 176–9, 181–2, 191, 195, 331, 333, 336, 338, 339–40, 343–5, 352, 359–60 John Rogathinus, 59 John of Callinicum, patrician, envoy, 64–5 John of Epiphania, historian, 80, 83, 334–5, 351 John, MVM per Armeniam (PLRE3 Ioannes88), 80, 82, 335 John, son of Timostratus, commander at Dara in 573 (PLRE3 Ioannes 87), 84, 86 John, PP Illyrici and Quaestor Exercitus, (PLRE3 Ioannes91), 102, 125, 336

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 380

John Mystacon, native of Thrace, MVM, 105, 146, 165, 167, 170, 205, 207–208, 213, 221, 232, 244, 251, 269, 271–2, 276, 278, 280, 291, 341, 346–7, 351, 354–6 John, consular, envoy, (PLRE3 Ioannes90), 113 John Troglita, Roman commander, 135 see MHLR 518–565 John, the Prefect of Alexandria (PLRE3 Ioannes 169, dux et augustalis Alexandriae), 172–5, 257, 353 John, Bishop of Ravenna, 193 John, Church of the Prophet John, 211–12 John, Archbishop of Thessalonica, 249, 352 John, PP in Africa, 257 John of Antioch, historian, 306, 357, 360 John Lydus, historian, 342, 360 John (PLRE3 Ioannes97), Comes Orientis 587/8, 349 Jovius, Arzanene leader, 217 Juanjuan (Ruan-ruan/Rouran), nomadic confederacy, 324 Julian Alps, 51, 204 Julian, Iulianus, Bishop of Nubians, 137 Julian, Island of Saint Julian, 202, 204 Julian the Apostate, Iulianus, emperor (361–3), 340–2 see also Syvänne, MHLR 284–361 & 361–395 Jushnas, Chief Vizier Yazdan Jushnas, Yazd– Jušnas son of Halabān, 228, 236, 351 Justinian I, Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Iustinianus I, emperor (527–565), vii, xi, 1–2, 5–6, 9, 14, 21, 38, 43–7, 52, 57, 59, 61–2, 64, 67, 71, 74, 81, 92, 113, 120, 129–30, 137, 152–3, 155, 161, 164, 166–7, 169, 184, 186, 189, 207, 293, 323, 334, 336, 342, 344, 354, 362–3 Justinian (Iustinianus), patricius, son of Germanus, MVM, (PLRE3 Iustinianus3), 5, 77, 80, 92, 95, 98–9, 104–105, 107–12, 115, 117–20, 127–8, 167, 335, 337 Justin (Iustinus), Flavius Marcus Petrus Theodorus Valentinus Rusticius Boraides Germanus Iustinus, son of Germanus, MVM, 5, 46, 48, 50 Justin I, Iustinus/Justinus I, emperor (518–527), 164, 300 Justin II (Iustinus, Justinus), curopalatus/cura palatii and emperor (565–578), v, vii, xi–xii, 1, 5, 21, 43–50, 53, 55, 57, 59–65, 67–71, 74–6, 78–81, 83–5, 89–92, 95, 97–9, 101, 119–20, 125–7, 136, 140, 149, 156, 161, 163–4, 189,

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Index 381 207, 300, 325, 331, 334–6, 340, 359, 362, 364 see also Syvänne, MHLR 518–565 Juventinus, Roman commander at Chalcis, 81 Kabus, Caboses, Lakhmid king, 68–9 Kao-tsu, Sui emperor of China, 325 Kardarigan, Cardarigan (title “Black Falcon”), Persian commander, 205, 207–208, 211–13, 215–18 Karin, Karins, Qarin, Parthian family, 281, 284 Karin, city of, see Theodosiopolis Kavadh, see Cavades Keli Shin Pass, 275 Kirmanshahan/Kermanshahan, 334 Kethin, Kt’ni (location unknown) at Bagrewand, 115 Khabour, Khabur, river, 85 Khagan, Chagan, Khan, 48–9, 61–3, 65–7, 89, 102–104, 140–2, 144–5, 170, 185, 208, 210, 228, 238–41, 244–6, 248–9, 251–3, 255, 281, 285, 295, 297–8, 301–306, 309–11, 313–18, 324–6, 346–7, 350, 352, 355, 357–8 Khagan, son of Baian, name unknown, 238–41, 244–6, 248–9, 251–3, 255, 295, 297–8, 301–6, 309–11, 313–8, 352, 357–8 see also Baian Khatun, wife of the Turkish Khagan, 285 Khazars, Turkish tribe (converted later into Judaism), 210–11, 226, 240, 283, 326 Khazarig, leader of the Khazars, 211, 240 Kholiatai, Turkish tribe, 66 Khorasan, Khurasan, Hurāsān, area in Persia, 284–5 Khosrov, Khosrow, lord of Vahewunik, 287, 289 Khurrakhusrah, governor of Yemen, 74 Khurshīdhān (Khurshēdh), guide, 237 Kinda, Kindite, 213 see also Arabs, Ghassanids, Lakhmids, Salīhids, Yemen Kirghiz, Khirgiz, Kyrgiz, Kherkhir, nomadic tribe, 66, 103, 324 Kitans, Kytans, 103, 324 Komsh, 290 Korduk, area, 284 Kotit, lord of the Amatunik, 283, 287, 289 Kotzager, nomad leader, 241 Koukou-Nor, region, 326 Kours, Curs, Cours, Koursos, Krous, Qwrys, Roman commander, MVM, 101, 104–105,

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 381

107, 110, 112, 124, 146–7, 166, 205–206, 216, 341 Koursores, runners, skirmishers, 18, 157 Kuo-lo (Issik), Turkish Khagan, 324 Kur, river, 283 Kurdī son of Bahrām Jušnas, brother of Bahram Chobin, 288, 351 Kurdi, son of Bahram Sharwin(?), 351 Kurdīya, Bahram Chobin’s sister, 285–6, 288–9 Kutrigur Huns, 62 Lakhmids, Nasrids, 38–9, 67–9, 72–3, 83, 235–6, 334, 351 see also Arabs, Ghassanids, Hira, Kinda, Salīhids, Yemen Lakûrîn, Egyptian rebel, 173 Lancers, lanciarii, vii, 7, 30, 37, 39, 45, 213, 277–8 see also Contus, Spear Lanzo, valley, 187 Latarkium, fort, 300 Laurentius, Bishop of Milan, 195 Lazica / Colchis (mod. Georgia), 64, 80, 82, 105, 227 see also Georgia, Iberia Leander, monk, 134 Lebanon, Libanon, 222–3 Legions, legionaries, 6–7, 11, 293 Leo, Leon, (PLRE3 Leon11), logothete, 172 Leo, (PLRE3 Leo 6), Maurice’s adviser on Italian matters, 263 Leo VI Wise, emperor and author of tactical treatises, 330, 362 Leo Tornikios, emperor, 331 Leontia, wife of Phocas, Augusta, 320 Leovigild, Leuvigild, Leovigildus, Visigothic king (ca. 568/9–584), 57–60, 97, 129–30, 133–5, 176–9, 181, 184–5, 188–90, 333, 340, 343–4 Lethe, Castle of Lethe, the famous prison of Oblivion, 224 Leuba, lady, 190 Leudefred, Leudefredus, Leufrid, Olfigandus, Olfigand and Raudingus, dux of Alamanni, 192, 198 Leudegisel, comes stabuli, 180 Le Velay, 132 Li Shimin, son of Li Yüan, the second Tang emperor of China (Tang Taizong 626/7–649), 326 Li Yüan, the first Tang emperor of China, 326 Libidina, location, 244

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382  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Libidurgon, location, 248 Libya, 5, 30, 59–60, 137, 175, 256, 339 see also Aegyptus, Africa, Cyrenaica Liguria, 50 Limisa, fort, 257 Limitanei, frontier troops, ripenses, riverine troops, frontier fleets, frontier, castrensis, border, 2, 4, 9, 52, 120 Liuva I, Visigothic king (568/9–571/3), 57–9, 333 Liuva II, Visigothic king (601–3), 184, 333 Lodi, city and dukedom of, 333 Logistics, see Supply Logothete, 166, 172, 283, 357 Lombards, Langobards, vii, ix, xii, 21, 27–8, 30, 48–57, 91–2, 94–5, 101–102, 116–17, 121, 128–30, 132, 135, 142, 167, 169–70, 178, 183, 185–91, 193–200, 202–205, 239, 242, 244, 251, 255, 257–68, 295, 298, 304, 316, 321, 331–3, 336, 338, 344–6, 352–4, 361 Long Wall of Anastasius, 101, 225, 240, 242, 245–6, 248–9, 253, 308–309, 352 Longinus, PP in Italy, 50, 54, 345 Longinus, bishop, 137–8, 339 Lothar I, Chlothacharius, Clotharius, Clothar, King of Franks (511–61), 48, 130, 338 Lothar II, Chlothacarius, son of Chilperic and Fredegund, King of the Franks (584–629), 179, 186, 189 Lucania, 197 Lucca, city and dukedom of, 93, 333 Lucioli/Luceolis (Cantiano), 261 Luristan, Saymara, 286 Lusitania (mod. Portugal), xi, 181–2 Lyon, Lugdunum, 195 Mace, see Club Macedonia, diocese, area, Macedonians, 40, 293, 330 Maggiore, Lake/Lago di, 200, 204 Magi (sing. magus), Zoroastrians, mobadh, members of the Persian clergy, 76, 107, 139, 147, 163, 212, 230, 237, 280 Magister, MVM, Mag. Off., Master, magistrates, vii, xii, 4–5, 31, 44, 56, 59–60, 63, 65, 69, 79–80, 83, 90–2, 98, 101, 113, 120, 135, 139, 142, 146, 165, 171, 178, 183, 193, 204–205, 213, 216, 220–1, 234, 242, 251–2, 258–9, 262–3, 269, 283, 287, 291–2, 335, 343–4, 347, 349, 356, 360 see also Hypostrategos, Strategos

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 382

Magnus, CSL in 565–573, Commerciarius in 573/8, Comes Domesticorum in 581 (PLRE3 Magnus2), 44, 83, 85, 158–9, 335 Maïacariri, location, 208 Maiorca, Majorica, Majorca, 171 Malaga, 57–8 Malaric, Suevi leader, 179 Maletum (Malé), 202, 346 Mali in Africa, 32 Mamak Mamikonean, Armenian prince, 283, 287, 289 Mambrathon, 212 Mamikoneans: Gagik Mamikonean, 287, 289 Hamazasp Mamikonean, 284 Mamak Mamikonean, 283, 287, 289 Mushel Mamikonean, 237, 271, 277, 280, 302–303, 357 Sahak Mamikonean, 221, 244 Vardan Mamikonean, 76–7, 104, 337 Maniakh, envoy, 66, 325 Mantua, city and dukedom of, 53, 197–8, 265, 333 Mar Isho-Yabh, Nestorian Catholicus, 236 Marcellus, nephew of Justinian I, brother of Justin II, patricius, MVM (PLRE3 Marcellus3), 163 Marcianopolis, city of, 244–6, 299 Marcianus, Marcian, Markianos, nephew of Justinian, cousin of Justin II, patricius, MVM per Orientem in 572–3 (PLRE3 Marcianus7), 44, 59, 68–71, 80–4, 86, 126, 335 Mardān Sīna al-Ruwaydaštī, brother of Bahram Chobin, Persian commander, 236, 285–6 Mardis, Mardes, Mardin, fortress, 85, 155, 212–13, 273 Maria, daughter of Maurice, wife of Chosroes II, 270, 282 Mariana, city and duchy, 333 Marinus, commander at Calchis, (PLRE3 Marinus5), 278, 281 Marius of Avanches, chronicler, 56, 331, 333 Marseilles, Massalia, Massilia, 56, 96, 129, 131, 185, 189, 195, 338 Martius, mag.mil. in Italy, 204, 258–9 see also Mauricius Martyropolis, x, 122, 207–208, 211–12, 224, 228–34, 237, 269, 271, 347–8 Maruthas, Arzanene leader, 217 Maruzas, Persian commander, 224 al-Marzuban, governor of Yemen, 74

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Index 383 Mascula Tiberia, fort, 136 Masona, bishop, 181 Masruq b. Abraha (Sanatourkes of Theophanes of Byzantium), 72–4 Massagetae Huns, 92 see also Bulgars, Huns, Kutrigurs, Sabirs, Utigurs Masudi, historian, 340, 346, 349, 351, 354–6, 360 Matasuntha, Matasuentha, granddaughter of Theoderic the Great, wife of Vittigis, wife of Germanus, patricia, 160 Matzaron, fort, 220 Mauretania/Mauritania Caesariensis, Sitifensis, Tingitana, see Africa see also Moors Maurice, Mauricius, Maurikios (Flavius Tiberius Mauricius), emperor (582–602), v, vii–viii, x– xi, 5–6, 8–10, 21–2, 24, 26–7, 60, 63, 80, 91–2, 102, 104–105, 116–25, 128, 130, 133, 136–9, 145, 147–50, 152–76, 178, 183–94, 196–8, 200, 202, 205–208, 210–12, 221–3, 225–7, 229–32, 236, 238–42, 244–6, 248–9, 251–8, 262–5, 267–73, 280–3, 286–8, 291–300, 302–306, 309–11, 315–23, 326, 329–30, 336–42, 344, 346, 348–50, 353–8, 361–4 notarius, 91, 335 Comes Excubitorum, 91–2, 102, 105, 116–25, 138–9, 145, 147–50, 152–60, 330, 335, 341 Comes Foederatorum, 92, 102, 105, 117–25, 138–9, 145, 147–50, 152–60, 330, 339, 341 MVM per Orientem, 92, 102, 105, 117–25, 138–9, 145, 147–50, 152–60, 330, 341 Strategos autokrator, 92, 102, 105, 117–25, 138–9, 145, 147–50, 152–60, 330, 341 Caesar, 160 Augustus, 128, 130, 133, 136–7, 160–76, 178, 183–94, 196–8, 200, 202, 205–208, 210–12, 221–3, 225–7, 229–32, 236, 238–42, 244–6, 248–9, 251–8, 262–5, 267–73, 280–3, 286–8, 291–300, 302–306, 309–11, 315–23, 326, 329, 336–42, 344, 346, 348–50, 353–8, 361–4 Maurice’s Ditch, 242, 245–6, 248–9, 252, 298 see also Strategikon Mauricius, Martius, MVM in Italy in 591–2, (PLRE3 Martius, Mauricius2), 204, 258–9 see also Martius Maurisio, Roman dux of Lombard origin, 261, 353 Maximus, Bishop of Salona, 262 Mazikos, Marikos, 137

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 383

Mazkʻutʻkʻ (usually denoting the Huns, but here probably Khazars), 226 Meaux, 93, 196 Mebod Sannakhoerugan, Mebodes (Mebodh, Mahbodh, Mobadh, i.e. priest?), Persian general, hazaraft/magister (PLRE3 Mebodes2), 65, 113, 115, 121, 124–5, 139, 147, 155, 212–14, 231–2 Mebod, Mebodes, Persian general in ca.590–3 (PLRE3 Mebodes3), 272–3, 275–6 Mecca, 67 Media, Media Atropatene, 147–9, 224, 226, 228, 231, 234–5, 269, 283, 349 see also Albania, Azerbaijan Medina Sidonia, 58 Medina in Arabia, 67 Melabason, a location, 208 Melas, river, 107, 337 Melabason, location, 208 Melitene, viii, x, 103, 107–12, 115, 117, 120, 163, 270, 292, 336–7, 364 Menander the Protector, historian, 47, 49, 61–3, 89–90, 95, 102, 114, 116–21, 123, 139–41, 144–5, 149–50, 153–6, 325, 331, 333–8, 340–1, 360 Menas, Mînâs the assistant, Egyptian bandit, (PLRE3 Menas12), 172–3, 175, 257 Menas, Dux et Augustalis Aegyptis (PLRE3 Menas10), 258, 353 Meran, location, 94, 346 Merida, Emerita, 60, 135, 176, 181 Meros (pl. mere, military division, roughly the equivalent of legion 6,000–7,000 men), merarches, merarchai, 5, 11, 14, 18–19, 35, 93, 117, 169, 276, 330, 346, 358 Merovech, son of Chilperic, 96 Merovingian, see Franks Mesembria, 246 Metz, capital of Austrasia, 199, 304 Michael the Syrian, Michael Syrus, Michael Rabo, chronicler, 81, 84–6, 89, 112, 156, 158–9, 170, 185–6, 189, 206, 211, 226, 237, 239–42, 281, 283, 288, 309–10, 334–5, 340–2, 346–7, 349–51, 353–7, 360 Mihran Mihranes, Mirranes, great Parthian/ Persian family and “personal” name, several Mihrans included under this name, 73, 81–2, 121, 226, 351 Miranus, 73 see also Bahram Chobin Milan, Mediolanum, city and duchy, 53, 195–6, 199–200, 202, 262, 265, 332–3, 361

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384  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Militia, paramilitary forces, police, 4, 174, 176 Mimulf, dux, 202, 204 Minorca, Minorica, 171 Miragdun, satrap, 268 Mirkhond, historian, 346–7, 349, 351, 354–6 Miro, King of the Suevi, 58, 97, 176–8 Misimia, Misimians, Caucasian tribe (neighbour of Apsilia p.301), 66 Missiles, darts, plumbatae, mattiobarbuli, martiobarbuli, martzobarboula, bele, vii, 11–12, 14, 42, 156, 202, 220, 229, 231, 293–4, 296, 300–301 see also Artillery, Archery, Javelins, Slingers Mixed Formation (a good example, the Battle of Callinicum in 531, see MHLR 518–565, 67–70 with forthcoming Late Roman Combat Tactics), 11 Modena, city and dukedom of, 197–8, 333 Moesia, Mysians, Upper and Lower, 21, 48, 92, 102, 240 Moira, moirai, moirarches, moirarchai, (regiment max. 2,000–3,000 men), 5–6, 11, 14, 19, 22, 169, 207, 311, 346, 358 Monastery, monks, nuns, nunnery, tonsured, 1, 47, 60, 76, 78–80, 99, 115, 117, 122, 134, 152–3, 178–9, 237, 262, 282, 292, 310, 317, 334, 351 Monocarton, 154–6, 208, 211–12, 222–3 Monselice, Mons Silicis, Mountain of Flint, 53, 267–8 Monophysites, Miaphysite, Jacobite Church, “heretic” Christians, 31, 38, 43, 47, 60–1, 76–8, 98–9, 123, 137–8, 148–50, 152, 207, 291–2 see also Chalcedon, Christianity Moors, Berbers, Mauri, Mauritanians, Maurusii, Mazikes, Marikos, Maccuritae (not to be confused with the Nubians of Makuria, Macuritae Nubians), Garamantes, vii, 21, 30, 56, 59–60, 96–7, 135–8, 171–2, 256, 321, 342 Morava, river, 316 Mount Izala (Tur Abdin Plateau), 79, 170, 208, 210, 212, 217–18, 220, 271–2 Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, 38, 331 see also MHLR 602–641 Muhan/Muqan, Turkish Khagan (553–72), 324–5 Mukhawan, port city, 42 Mules, asses, oxen, beasts of burden, 14, 38, 73, 138, 242, 278 see also Camels, Cavalry, Logistics

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 384

Mummolus, Burgundian general of Roman origins, Mundhir, al-, 6th cent. Arab sheik, see Alamoundaras Murts, river, 115 Musocius, Slavic chieftain, 297 Mygdonius, river, 155–6, 273 Naamanes/Namanes (al-Numan), the son of Alamundarus, 158–9, 206–207, 213, 341, 346 Nadoes, envoy, 113 Nahwaran Canal, 236 Nakhchawan, place, 283, 291, 293 Nanisenes (close to Rowandus), 275 Naples, Neapolis, Neapolitans, city of, 50, 52, 130, 258–60, 264 Narbo, Narbonne, Narbonensis, Septimania, 57, 179, 181–3, 190, 343 Narnia, Narni, 258–61, 353 Narses the Eunuch, MVM, 28 (PLRE3 Narses1), 28, 49–53, 101, 126, 146, 193, 312, 331–2 Narses, trusted general of Maurice, hypaspistês of Comentiolus MVM per Orientem, (PLRE3 Narses10), 120, 165, 221, 270, 273, 275–6, 278, 280, 287, 291–3, 337, 356 Narses, sacellarius, spatharius, envoy to Avars (PLRE3 Narses4), 142, 144, 340 Naval Tactics, see Fleets Navy, see Fleets Nepe, town, 259 Nērses, Armenian noble, 284 Nestor, Nestorians, 236, 359 see also Christians, Monophysites, Chalcedon Neustria, Neustrian Franks, 48, 96, 129, 185, 189–90, 192 see also Austrasian Franks, Burgundian Franks, Chilperic I, Franks Nicephorus Ouranus (military commander and writer turn of the 11th cent.), 352 Nicetius, dux, 180–1 Nicopolis, city of, 305 Nika Revolt in 532, 320 Nikephoros II Phokas, emperor, (author of Praecepta Militaria), 71, 330–1 see also the forthcoming Syvänne, Nikephoros II Phokas Nile, river, delta, ix, 136–7, 173, 175, 258 mouths of the Nile: Bolbitic, 175 Pelusiac, 175

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Index 385 Phatinitic, 175 Sebennytic, 175 Tanitic, 175 Nîmes, 180 Niri/Ni-li, Turkish Khagan (587–604?), 325 Nisibis, city of, x, 64, 71, 79, 81–6, 113, 124, 126, 139, 147–50, 152, 155–6, 208, 211–12, 224, 231–5, 270–3, 289, 293, 335 Nivar/Ishbara (in Chinese sources She-tu, or Sha-po lüeh), Turkish Khagan, 325 Nobatae, Nobatai, Nobatia, see Nubians Nobles, see Senators Nordulf, Nordulfus, Lombard dux, Maurice’s adviser on Italian matters, (joined the Romans probably during the recruitment campaign of Tiberius II. It is usually thought that he deserted back to the Lombards in ca. 591/2 because he had not received his salary, but it is here claimed that he did as a double agent because he soon after this deserted back to the Roman side as a trusted man), 199, 260–1, 263–4 Noricum, Nori, Norici, 51, 196 Novae, city of, Upper and Lower, 21, 300, 302–303, 316 Novara, city and dukedom of, 333 Nubians, Nobatae, Alwa, Makuria, vii, 21, 31–2, 60–1, 97, 136–8, 172, 174, 258, 321, 339, 364 Alwa, Alodaei, Alodia, 31, 97, 137–8, 339 Makuritai, Macuritae Nubians (not to be confused with Maccuritae Moors), 31–2, 41, 61, 97, 138, 339 Nobatae, Nobatia, Nobadea, Nobadia, 31, 60–1, 97, 137–8, 339 see also Moors al-Numan b. al-Mundhir, Lakhmid king, 72 Numidia, Numidians, 171 Nymphius, river, x, 167, 205, 207, 210, 218, 224, 341, 346 Odessus, (mod. Varna) city, 299 Oekh, river, (either the Jaxartes or the Oxus), 66 Ogyrus (Shahid identifies this with Hujr), phylarch, possibly a Ghassanid or Kindite, 212–13 Olo, dux, 199, 202 Oman, port city, 42 Opisthofylakes, rearguards, 236 Opsikian theme, Thema of the Opsikion, 4, 169–70, 354

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 385

Optimates, 4–6, 169–70, 207, 330, 352 see also Bodyguards, Bucellarii Optio, optiones (non–bucellarii), 4, 7, 10 Orense, 97 Oromuskhi, unknown tribe, 66 Orta, Lake, 202 Osam, river, 316 Osser, fortress, 176 Osso, Roman commander, 199 Ostia, old harbour of Rome, 95 Otuz-Tatars, 103 Oursenia region (north-central Algeria), 60 Pagan, pagans, god, gods, goddess, Hellene, 38, 80, 98, 127, 166, 173, 198, 206, 229–30 see also Christians Palace, Palatina (including auxilia palatina), Palatine, (see the maps of Constantinople and Great Palace in the maps sections and in Ilkka Syvanne’s academia.edu website/Great Palace), Imperial Palace, Great Palace in Constantinople, ix, 2, 31, 43–5, 91, 101, 127–8, 163–4, 284, 291, 303, 310, 317, 319–20, 338 Sophiae Palace, 43–5 Persian Royal Palace in Ctesiphon, 124, 235, 282, 354 Persian Royal Palace in Seleucia, 124 Palace of Hebdomon, 160 Palace of Hormisdas, 146 Imperial Palace in Rome, Palatine Hill, 52 Palastolon (Palatiolum), encampment, 316, 318 Palestine, 79–80 Palladius, courier, agens in rebus, 269 Pamphronius, Italian patricius, 95, 116, 121, 128–9, 135, 338 Pannasa, 244 Pannonia, Upper and Lower, 21, 51, 92, 102, 125, 140, 204, 304, 332, 340 Panopolis, city, 257 Pantaleon, PP in Africa, 257 Panysus (Kamčaja), 246 Pap Bagratuni, Armenian prince, 287 Paramilitary forces, see Militia Pariovk, Kushan king, 290 Paris, 55, 93, 359–63 Parma, city and dukedom of, 188, 198, 267–8, 316, 333 Parma, pelte, small round shield, 24 Paspirius, river, 297

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386  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Patricius, patrician, patricia, title/rank, 5, 38, 44, 53, 64, 69–70, 77, 80, 94–5, 98–9, 101, 117, 129, 160, 163, 165, 183, 192, 199, 228, 251, 257, 260, 263, 291, 310, 316, 332, 349, 353, 361 Paul, Paulus, (PLRE3 Paulus23), father of Maurice, 91, 119, 163, 165 Paulus, (PLRE3 Paulus26), dux et augustalis Alexandriae, 173 Paul the Deacon/Paulus Diaconus, 50–3, 101, 188, 191, 193, 197, 199, 202, 261, 264, 266–8, 304, 317, 331–2, 338, 354, 357–8, 361 Paul of Merida, 60 Paulinus, learned man/sorcerer, 166, 206, 342, 346 Pavia, see Ticinum Pege, church, 254 Pelagius II, Pope, 95, 191–3, 336, 344–5 Peloponnese, Peloponnessus, 239, 340 Pentapolis, five cities of Cyrene, see Cyrenaica Pentarchos, pentarchoi, pentarch, commander of five, 16 Peredeo, lover of Rosamund, 54, 332 Périgueux, 130, 180, 343 Peri Strategikes/Strategias, 11, 294, 357, 361 Peroz, Perozes, Persian general, 289 Persia, Iran, Eran, ix–x, xii, 18, 21, 24, 28, 31–9, 41, 53, 58, 61, 63–92, 94–5, 97–117, 120–5, 128, 136–9, 141, 145–58, 160–1, 163, 167–70, 205–208, 210–18, 220, 223–34, 237, 241, 254–5, 269–73, 275–8, 280–6, 288–93, 306, 316, 321–2, 324–6, 334–5, 337, 340–2, 346–9, 351, 354–5, 357, 360–4 see also Sasanians Persarmenia, (Armin), see Armenia Perusia, Perugia, city and duchy, 258, 260–1, 353 Peter, Petrus, Petros in order of appearance: Peter the Patrician, (PLRE3 Petrus 6), 44, 113 Peter, consular, envoy (PLRE3 Petrus17), 113 Petrus (Peter), brother of Maurice, curopalates, MVM, (PLRE3 Petrus55), 163, 165, 253, 287–8, 298–302, 311, 316–19, 356–7 Peter/Petrus Barsymes, CSL, PPO, (PLRE3 Petrus9), 163 Peter, Church, Basilica of St Peter, Apostle, 262 Phalanx, shieldwall, wall of shields, wall of spears, wall of pikes, pikes, sarissa, (various rank-and-file formations), phalangite, vii, 10–11, 14–15, 19, 33, 39–40, 110, 215, 250, 293–4, 308, 312, 330

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 386

see also crescent, convex, epikampios, spears, square, wedge Phasis, river and city, 67 Phathacon, (Atachas?), 218 Pherochanes, hazaraft (mag.off.), 234–5, 351 see also Jushnas Philae, island, Temple of Isis, 61, 97, 136 Philip the Arab, emperor (244–249), 341 see Syvänne, Gordian III and Philip the Arab Philippicus, Philippikos, Filippikos, Comes Excubitorum, married to Gordia (sister of Maurice), (PLRE3 Philippicus3), viii, x, 163, 165, 167–8, 207–26, 229, 231–3, 309, 311, 322, 346–9 Philippopolis, city of, 248, 316, 341–2 Phocas, Phokas, stratiotês, centurion, hekatontarchês, usurper, emperor (602–611), (PLRE3 Phocas7), viii, xi, 6, 136, 166, 172, 253, 268, 288, 291–3, 306–11, 318–22, 331, 340, 356–7 see also Phokas see also Syvänne, MHLR 602–641 Phoenicia (both), 222 Photius, Photios, son of Antonina, stepson of Belisarius, 47, 79–80, 331, 335 Phylarch, title, 5, 38, 212 see also Sheik Piacenza, city and dukedom of, 333 Picts, 255 Piracy, pirates, 42, 45, 56, 174, 257 see also Fleets Pistus, location, 300 Placentia, Plazenca, 198, 265 Plague, epidemic, pandemic, pestilence, disease, fever, illness, mental illness, madness, gout, pain, injury, 32, 50–1, 53, 65, 89, 96, 122, 142, 195, 202–204, 211, 218, 249, 256–8, 260, 267, 308–10, 320 Poguria, 240 Poison, Poisoning, antidote, 23, 46, 54, 65, 93, 160, 203, 280–1 see also Assassin Polymartium, (Bomarzo), 261 Pompeia, city and duchy, 333 Pontoon bridge, bridge of boats or ships, wooden bridge, bridging, 20, 22, 140–2, 144–5, 150, 235–6, 246, 250, 252 Portus, Portus Romanus, harbour of Rome, 95 Praefectus, Praefecti, PP, PPIL, PPO, PP, PPI, PPIT, prefect, xii, 2, 4, 9–10, 31, 44, 46, 54, 59–60, 62, 118, 120, 125, 127, 135, 139, 166, 172–3, 196–7, 230, 257, 292, 320, 336, 353

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Index 387 Praetor, praetor plebis, title, 2, 296 Priscus, strategos, MVM, (PLRE3 Priscus6), x, 6, 165–6, 170, 221–3, 225, 248, 251–3, 255, 288, 293, 295–303, 305–306, 308–16, 353, 357 see also MHLR 602–641 Priscus, brother of the emperor Philip the Arab, 341 Prisoners, captives, imprison, prison, dungeon, jail, 22, 45, 47–9, 54, 61–2, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 82, 85, 89, 96, 98–9, 123, 125, 132, 138, 146, 148, 153, 174–5, 179–80, 185, 187, 189, 198–200, 202–203, 205, 207, 210, 212–13, 216, 224, 227, 231, 234–5, 237–8, 244, 246, 251–2, 257, 262, 264, 270–1, 275, 278, 296–300, 302, 309, 315, 317, 322, 336–7, 343, 354, 357–8 hostages, 63, 101, 130, 132, 161, 178, 185, 190, 192, 199, 204, 259, 267–8, 290 see also Booty, Ransom, Slaves Probus, abbot, 265 Probus, dux, (PLRE3 Probus5), 268, 354 Procopius, historian, xi, 4–5, 74, 152–3, 330, 332 Propaganda, 233, 286, 306, 308 Protectores, see Domestici Provisions, see Supply Ptolemais, city, Akhmim, 257 Ptolemy (Ptolemaios/PLRE3 Ptolemaeus3) the commander of the barbarians (foederati?), 173–4 Qana, port city, 42 Qartmin, monastery, 152 Qasrin, location, 85 Quaestor, Quaestor Exercitus, questura/quaestura exercitus, xii, 44, 80, 98, 102, 125, 160, 336 Radan, envoy, 195 Ragilo, dux, 94 Ransom, ransoming, 27, 86, 88, 123–4, 202–203, 205, 240–1, 248, 251–3, 264, 308–10, 322, 357–8 Ratiaria, city of, ix, 239, 244 Rauching, dux, 192, 195 Ravenna, viii, ix, 53–4, 94, 188, 191, 193, 198–9, 204–205, 258–61, 264–5, 267, 316, 323, 331, 362 Rayy, (for the map of Rayy, see Syvänne, Caracalla, paperback 2022, ed. p.260), 228, 231, 234–5, 271–2, 286–7, 289, 349, 351 Reccared, Recared, Reccaredus, Visigothic king (586–601), 59, 129–30, 133–5, 178–84, 186, 192–6, 333 Reconnaissance, see Intelligence Gathering Red Sea, 31, 71, 75, 97, 136, 275, 334, 362–3

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 387

Resaina-Theodosiopolis, see Theodosiopolis Rhabdion, fort, 81, 210 Rhamphus, 254 Rhegium (Reggio, Regium Lepidum), 198, 254, 333 Rhegium near Constantinople, 320 Rheims, 48, 93 Rhomboid, rhombus, cavalry formation, 278 Rhône, 55, 57, 132, 179–80 Rhosas, see Hormisdas Rigunth, Frankish commander, 189 Roccolen, Roccolenus, Chilperic’s commander, 96 Rodan/Rodanus, Lombard dux, 56 Rogatorium (unknown city), 67 Romanus, MVM, exarchus Italiae, (PLRE3 Romanus4 with Romanus7), 101, 124, 147, 165, 196–7, 203, 227–8, 258, 260–5, 340, 345, 349 Rome, city of, see Battles, Sieges Rosamund, Rosimund, Cunimund’s daughter, wife of Alboin, 48–9, 54 Rotalian Field, 94, 346 Rowandus, city of, 275 Royean, area in Persia, 290 Ruccones/Runcones/Roccones, probably Cantabrian tribe, 58 see also Cantabrians Rufinus, son of Timostratus, Roman commander, 275 Rusticus, syntagmatarchos, 246 Saba, Kingdom in Yemen, 39–40 Sabaria, Sabar, Sappi, (Asturian people?), 58 Sabirs, Sabiri Huns, 21, 23–4, 26, 80, 82, 101, 121 Sabulente Canalion (location in Haemus), probably Valley of the Roses, 246, 252 Sābūr son of Abarkān, Shapur son of Abarkan, 281, 287 Sagittarius, bishop, 189 Saintes, 96, 180, 343 Saint-Saturnin/Machoavilla (Manosque), 56 Saint-Symphorien-d’Ozon, 195 Salary, salaries, donative, payment, arrears of payment, wages, ration, rations, fodder, 1, 9–10, 59, 118, 120, 139, 146, 164, 166, 218, 221–3, 225, 229, 260, 262, 267, 295, 299, 321–2 see also Annona, Booty, Ransom, Supplies (for tribute payments, see Tribute) Salīhids, Arabic tribe, 212 Salona, city of, 262

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388  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Salurn, Salurnis, location, 94 Salvianus, hypostrategos, 252 Samaritans, 79–80 see also Jews Samocharta, fort, 158 Samosata, 341 Samuēl Vahewuni, Armenian noble, 283–4 Samur, Avar commander, 252 San’a, capital of Yemen, 73–4 Saône, 179–80 Saracens, see Arabs Sarames, envoy (PLRE3 Sarames1), 228 Sarames the Younger, Persian commander (PLRE3 Sarames2), 234, 236, 272–3, 276–8 Sardinia, 56, 171, 257, 265–6, 322, 338 Sargathon, 82 Sargis, Armenian noble, 284 Saroes, Sarosius, Alan king, 66–7, 80 Sasanians / Sassanians, Sasanian Dynasty of Iran, viii, x, 32–4, 37, 359, 362–4 see also Persia Satala, city of, 105 Sawdk, village of, 283 Sayf b. Dhi Yazan al-Himyari, Abu Murrah, 72–5 Saymara, see Luristan Scholae, Scholarii, Scholarians, 2, 6, 79, 320, 352 see also Bodyguards, Domestici, Excubitores Scipio Africanus, Roman general during the 2nd Punic War, strategic and tactical genius, 211, 312, 347 Scupi, Scopi (not to be confused with the famous Scupi/Skopje), 299 Scythia (two meanings: province and steppes), Scythians, Scythian Drill, (the meaning of the terms Scythiannations/Scythians varied so that the Strategikon included only nomads in this category while other sources could include even the Slavs and Germanic foederati among them) x, 25, 48, 62–3, 92, 102–103, 125, 156, 210–11, 240–1, 244, 310, 341, 358 see also Avars, Bulgars, Huns, Kutrigurs, Massagetae, Sabirs, Slavs, Turks, Utigurs Sebasteia, Sebaste, 107, 337 Sebeos, Armenian historian, 78, 115, 146–7, 153–4, 221, 224, 226, 231–2, 269, 271, 276, 277–8, 280–2, 285–91, 302–3, 335–7, 340–1, 348–52, 354–7, 361 Segga, comes, 181 Seine, 57, 179 Seleucia in Mesopotamia, 124, 275 Selymbria/Eudoxiopolis. 254

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 388

Senators, Senate, senator, upper class, nobles, aristocrats, magnates (here grouped as all members of the moneyed elite including the senators), 1–2, 4, 9–10, 16, 22–4, 30, 33, 40, 43–7, 48, 50, 57–9, 65, 68, 70, 76, 78, 87, 90, 92, 97–9, 123, 127, 129, 134, 139, 147, 154, 163–4, 166, 172, 189, 192, 198–9, 203, 226, 231–3, 236–7, 254, 269, 275, 282–4, 286, 302–303, 309, 320, 322, 353 see also Patricius Septem, mod. Ceuta, (Septem Fratres, fort), 171 Septimania, see Narbonensis Sergiopolis (Rufasa/Rufesa), 38, 98, 237, 272, 281 Sergius, Saint, object of prayers at this time (Sergiopolis named after him), 38, 98–9, 272–3 Sergius of Rhabdion, son of Shaphnai, Roman commander, (PLRE3 Sergius7), 81, 86, 288, 354 Sergius, the lochagos of Mardes (Mardin), (PLRE3 Sergius12), 212 Sergius, demarch of the Green faction, 319–20 Sermiana (Sirmian), 202, 346 Servant, see Squire Severus, bishop, 193 Severus, heretic followers of, 292 Seville, Hispalis, x, xii, 50, 57, 134, 176, 178, 182–3, 333, 336, 339, 343, 359, 360 see also Isidore of Seville Shabah, Supreme Turkish Khagan, 210, 228, 350 Shawk, Kushan king, 290 Sheguy / Shegui, Turkish Khagan (611–26), 326 Sheik, sheriff, sharif, 5, 38, 148–9, 212–3, 334 Shield, clipeus, clipei, thureos, scutum,scuta, skoutatoi, parma, pelte, aspis, targe(t), vii, 7–8, 11–12, 14–6, 23–4, 27–30, 32–3, 39, 45–6, 61, 93, 110, 114, 121, 144, 250, 293–4, 299, 319, 328, 331, 357 human shields, 299 shielding force, 117, 198 Shipka Pass, 252, 307–308 Ships, see Fleets Shirak, Shirakawan, 147, 153–4 Sicily, Sicilian, 206–207, 237, 322 Siege Warfare, besiege, bombing, fire-bombing, assault, x, 8, 10, 18–19, 24, 26, 28–9, 33, 37, 53–4, 56, 61–2, 80, 83–9, 93, 95, 101–102, 105, 122–4, 130, 132–3, 141, 150, 156, 168, 170, 176, 178, 180, 198, 204, 207–208, 211, 216–18, 220–1, 223, 232–5, 229–33, 237, 242, 248–53,

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Index 389 255, 257–8, 260–3, 267, 271, 291, 293, 308, 336, 340, 342, 346, 349–50, 352 see also Artillery, Battles, Fleets Siege of Adrianople in ca. 586/7, 248 Aix, Aquae in 574, 56 Akbas in 583 (two sieges), 168, 207–208, 342, 346, 349 Akbas in 591, 225, 232–4, 342, 346, 349–50 Amida in 578, 122 Anatha in 580, 150 Apamea in 540, 85 Apamea in 573, 85 Aphumon in 583, 207 Appiaria in 586, 248 Avignon in 582–3, 132–3 Beïuades in 587, 220–1, 348 Beroe in 586, 248 Chlomaron (the city of Arzun) in 578–9, 123–4 Chlomaron (the city of Arzun) in 586, 216–18, 348 Comacina in 587, island on Lake Como, 193 Constantia (Tella), claimed siege in 581, 156 Constantinople, Long Walls, in 577–8, 101–102 Cordoba in 584, 178 Dara in 573, x, 84–9 Diocletianopolis in 586, 248 Drizipera in 588, 252–3 Dvin in 572, 80 Dvin in 591, 232, 271 Edessa in 588 (intended siege), 223 Fortress in 588, 350 Hill in 586, 216–17 Martyropolis in 589, 229–32 Martyropolis in 591–3, 232–3, 237, 271 Monocarton in 585, 211 Mount Sinai ca. 569–70, 334 Nakhchawan, 291, 293 Naples in 581, 130 Naples in 592, 259–60 Nimes in 585, 180 Nisibis in 573, 83–4, 335 Padua in about 600/601, 267 Parma in 590, 198 Pavia, Ticinum in 569–72, 53–4 Pavia in 590, intended siege which never took place, 198 Perusia in 593, 261 Philippopolis in ca.586, 248 Placentia in 590, 198

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 389

Rhegium in 590, 198 Rock Fortress in 587, 220–1 see also Beïuades Rome in 578–9, 95, 336 Rome in 593–4, 260–3 Seville in 583–4, 176–8 Singidunum in 583, 238, 353 Singidunum in 588, 252, 353 Singidunum in 595 (two “sieges”), 302–303, 353, 357 Sirmium in 569, 61–2 Sirmium in 579–82, x, 141, 248 Thebaid, an arid mountain in ca. 591/2, 257–8 Thebothon in 573, 83 Thessalonica in 584 (or 604 or 610), 242, 340, 352 Thessalonica in 586, 242, 249–51, 340, 352 Tiflis in 627, 349 Tournai in 575, 93 Treviso in ca. 592–3, 204 Tzurullon in 588, 253, 255, 308 Sigibert, Sigibertus, King of Austrasian Franks, 48, 51, 53, 55–7, 93–6, 131, 133–4, 179, 185, 333 Sigila the Goth, important man in Sigibert’s court, 93 Silentiarii, silentarius, silentiary, silentium, 310, 320 Silver, viii, 56, 62, 66, 72, 89, 101, 115, 123, 148, 231, 281, 291, 349 see also Gold Singan, island of, 303 Singara, city of, 83, 124–5, 273 Singidunum, x, 140–1, 225, 238, 252, 254, 302–303, 305–306, 308–10, 321, 353, 357 Siraganon, near Lake Urmiah, 275 Sirin, Shirin, Christian favourite wife of Chosroes II, 282 Sirmium, ix–x, 48–9, 61–4, 141–5, 161, 240, 248, 252, 340 Sisarbanon, Sisauranon, Sisauronon, Sisaurana, Sarbane, 210, 232–4, 349–50 Siroes, see Cavades Sisbert, murderer of Hermenegild, 179 Sisinnius, magister, 56 Sittas, dekarchos, traitor, 228–30, 269, 271, 350 Siwnik, Siwni, 78, 80, 283, 287, 289 Sizabul/Silziboulos, Khagan of the Turks, 65–6, 103, 325 Skoutatoi, hoplitai, hoplites, vii, 11, 14, 81, 293–4, 329 see also Infantry, Phalanx, Shield

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390  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Slaves, slavery, sex-slave, 9, 66, 74, 103, 142, 180, 216, 225, 229, 257–8, 262, 333 see also Booty, Prisoners Slavs, Slavs, Sclaveni, Sclavenoi/Sklavenoi, vii, x, 14, 19, 21–3, 92, 101–103, 118, 120, 125, 135, 138, 140–2, 159, 163, 168–70, 199, 239–42, 244–5, 249–52, 254–5, 261, 266–8, 282, 287, 291, 293–304, 309–10, 315, 317–18, 321–2, 330, 340, 342, 351–2, 362 see also Antae; Scythians Slingers, sling, 8, 14, 23, 29, 33, 40, 175 see also Missiles Smaragdus, exarchus Italiae (584/5–590; 602–608), (PLRE3 Smaragdus2), 191–3, 195–7, 268, 344–5 Smbat, Sumbatius, Armenian noble and hero, 221, 232, 244, 286, 289–90, 356 Sogdia, Sogdians, 65, 324–6 Soissons, 96, 196 Solchanes, commandant of Nisibis, 272 Solachos, Solakh, envoy 141 Solomon, commander at Sirmium, 144 Sophia, wife of Justin II, Augusta, 43–5, 49–50, 57, 89–92, 101, 126–8 Spahbed, spahbad, spahbod, Persian commander, 33–4, 363 Spain, Spaniards, Hispania, Iberian Peninsula, ix, xi, 4, 29, 57–8, 78–9, 91–2, 96–7, 128–30, 132, 135, 161, 164, 171, 176–7, 179, 182–3, 186, 188–90, 193, 195, 232, 321–2, 338–9, 344, 349, 353, 359–60, 364 see also Visigoths Sparapet, see Aspet Spatharii, spatharius, 29, 44, 79, 139, 142, 147, 169, 340, 352 see also Bodyguards, Domestici, Excubitores, Sword Spear, hasta, kontarion, contus, conti, kontos, kontoi, xyston, sarissa, sarisa, sarisai, pike, shafted-weapon, dory, doru, doration, doryforoi bodyguards (doru-spear-bearers = officers), vii, 5, 7–8, 11–12, 14, 16, 25, 28–9, 32–3, 39–40, 46, 74, 114, 157, 200, 215, 233, 250, 254, 293–4, 302, 328–30, 350 see also Artillery, Javelin, Lancers, Missile Spolitium (Spoleto), city and duchy, 94, 187–8, 191, 204, 259–61, 333, 353 Spying, see Intelligence Gathering Square, hollow/oblong square, 10–11, 110, 144, 215, 217, 246, 251, 307, 311–12, 340, 358 see also Crescent, Convex, Epikampios, Phalanx

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 390

Squire, squires, servants, attendant, page, camp followers (not including civil servants), 7, 11, 17, 28, 34, 40, 44–5, 54–5, 66, 85, 93, 99, 104–105, 111–14, 137, 182, 196, 248, 254, 276, 291, 293, 296, 354–5 St Julian, island (S. Giulion the Lago d’Orta just west of Lago Maggiore), 202, 204 Stephen, Stephanus in order of appearance: Stephen of Taron/Asolik, Armenian historian, 76–7, 334 Stephanus, lochagos (PLRE3 Stephanus26), 211–13, 215–16, 347–8 Stephanus, Bishop of Carrhae, 229–30 Stephanus, eunuch and tutor of Maurice’s son, 320 Stephanus, Stepʻanos Siwni, Armenian prince, (PLRE3 Stephanus29), 283, 287 Stephanus, ruler of Iberia (602–628), (PLRE3 Stephanus53), 349 Stephanus, envoy, (PLRE3 Stephanus30), 354 Stratagems, ruses, treachery, treacherous, betrayal, x, 27–8, 34, 49–50, 58, 68, 70–1, 74, 81, 86, 89, 93–4, 99, 103, 107, 112, 121–2, 124, 130, 132–3, 136, 140, 149–50, 152, 157–8, 176, 180, 185, 191, 196, 200, 202, 205–206, 215, 227–30, 237, 241, 253, 256, 259, 261, 263, 272, 280, 288, 290, 294, 297, 306–309, 319, 321, 337, 343, 346, 354, 357–8, 361 see also Ambush, Assassin, Guerrilla, Poison Strategikon (military treatise written by Maurice with his friends), v, vii, 4–6, 8, 12, 16, 21–5, 27–9, 35, 37, 63, 91, 93, 104, 107, 111–12, 114, 156–8, 166–9, 198, 200, 205, 207–208, 211, 213–14, 228, 242, 248, 253, 276, 280, 293–5, 297–8, 301, 303, 307, 315, 317–18, 322–3, 328–30, 340, 342, 346, 353, 355–8, 361 Strategos, strategos autokrator, strategoi, viii, 4–6, 19, 22, 27–8, 48, 50, 62–3, 90, 92, 101, 105, 117, 120–1, 137–42, 146, 165, 167–9, 205, 207–208, 211, 213, 222, 224, 233, 251–2, 273, 287, 295, 297–300, 302, 308, 310, 313, 316, 335, 341, 348, 358 see also Hypostrategos; Magister, Stratelates Strategy, strategic, strategies (words), 32, 39, 47, 64, 71, 79, 91, 107, 122, 126, 128, 130, 145, 147, 154, 170, 176, 184–5, 189, 194, 197–8, 218, 225–6, 230, 236, 258, 260, 265, 272, 293, 303, 317, 345, 361 see also Battle of, Stratagem, Diplomacy, Guerrilla, Ambassador, Poison

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Index 391 Stratelates, 146–7, 291, 335 see also Magister, Strategos Stratiotai (regular soldiers), 4, 9 see Comitatenses, Limitanei Strator, equerry, 51 Suana (Sovana), city, 259 Suania, 64–7, 79, 101, 226–7, 333, 336, 349 Suevi / Suebi / Suavi / Swabians, Germanic confederacy with tribes both in “Germania” and “Spain”, xii, 51, 55, 57–9, 97, 129, 134–5, 176, 179, 182, 187, 190, 360 see also Alamanni Sui dynasty, 241, 325–6 Sunna, Arian bishop, 181 Supply, Logistics, Supply Depots/Hubs/Bases, Food, Fodder, Oil, Supplying, Supplies, Supplied, Provisions, Water, Wine, Grain, Bacon, Meat, Barley, Straw, Wheat, Corn, x, 9–10, 14, 19, 24, 27, 29, 33–4, 36, 38, 46, 48, 53–4, 61, 64, 66, 74, 81, 86, 91, 95–6, 99, 104–105, 111–14, 118–20, 128, 136, 139, 141–2, 144–5, 149–50, 155, 159, 166, 173, 175, 177, 180, 200, 203, 210, 212, 216, 218, 225, 234, 250–1, 258, 260, 266, 272–3, 280, 297, 301, 305, 317, 332, 341, 343 see also Annona, Salary, Sieges, Trade Susa, Secusium, in Italy, 56, 187 Susa in Persia, 224 Sutrium, Sutri, town, 259, 261 Sword, gladius, gladii, spatha, spathion, semispatha, machaira, scramasax, bladed-weapon, 11–12, 14, 16, 24–5, 27–30, 32–3, 39–41, 44, 54, 68, 70, 76, 79, 87, 93, 98–9, 101, 114–15, 122, 135, 139, 142, 146–7, 169, 173, 178, 196, 204, 220, 222, 230, 280, 294, 300, 317, 340, 352 see also Assassin, Dagger, Spatharii Syagrius, envoy, 192, 195 Symeon, the Bishop of Amida, 213 Symeon the Logothete, chronicler, 357 Symmachoi, xymmachoi, 4–5, 236, 332 see also Allies, Federates Syria, Syriac, Syrian, words, 38, 47, 79, 81, 85, 100, 118, 121, 149, 158–9, 310, 335, 347, 359–61, 363 Tabaristan, Tabristān, Tabarastan, area in Persia, 284–5, 290 Tabari al-, historian, 72, 74–5, 84, 210–11, 213, 236, 279, 285, 334, 340, 346–51, 354–5, 359, 361–2

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 391

Tactics, tactic, tactical, as words, x, 10, 14, 18, 22–9, 34, 37, 39, 42, 63, 71, 117, 167–9, 245, 251, 278, 293–4, 312, 328–30, 332, 340, 342, 346, 350, 352, 359, 363 see also Ambush Antistomos, Amfistomos, Battles, Circle, Crescent, Epikampios, Phalanx, Square, Wedge. A fuller discussion in the forthcoming Late Roman Combat Tactics (2023) Taginae/Tadinae/Busta Gallorum, 312 Tagma, Turkish envoy with the dignity of Tarkhan/Tarchan, 66 Tagmatarches, tagmatarchoi, syntagmatarches (generic titles for commanders below the rank of strategoi; not to be confused with a commander of a tagma/bandon; sometimes used also as a wing commander or as acting commander/strategos), 212, 246, 275, 277, 287, 348 Tanânîkûn, location in Egypt, 173 Tang dynasty, 326–7 Taq-i-Bostan (Takt-i-Bostan), vii–viii, 286 Tarbesium/Tarvisium, see Treviso Tardu, Turkish Khagan, 103–104, 240, 325–6, 347 Targitius, Targites, envoy, 62, 140, 241, 244, 298 Tarim basin, 326 Tarniach, nomad leader, 241 Tarragona, 179 Tarsus, 221, 224, 226 Taspar/Tobo, Turkish Khagan (572–81), 325 Tassilo, King of Bavaria, 261 Tatabs, tribe, 103 Tatavi, river, 275 Taylasān (Taleshan), 286 Tayyaye, see Arabs, Lakhmids, Ghassanids Taxes, tax, taxpayers, revenue, monopoly, donative, crown-gold, ii, 9–10, 45–6, 48, 73, 75, 78, 92, 164, 173, 186–7, 221, 258, 260, 262, 320 see also Annona, Trade Taxiarchos, a generic title for subordinate commanders of the strategoi, 5–7, 84, 207, 213, 224, 244, 297, 299–300, 303, 319, 335 Terentiolus, comes, 180 Tesena (Tisino), 202, 346 Thaalabi, Thaalibi, historian, 210, 285, 288, 334, 346, 349–51, 354–6 Thamanon, Thamnon, village, 218 Thannuris, 121, 124 Thebaid, see Aegyptus

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392  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Thebothon, Thebatha, fort, 83, 335 Thema, themata, boukellarion, optimaton, opsikion, xi, 4, 6, 8, 169–70, 288, 354 see MHLR 602–641 Theoctista, Maurice’s sister, 165, 264 Theoctistus, MVM, 60, 135 Theoderic the Great, 53, 186 Theoderic, Theuderic, Theodericus, son of Chilperic and Fredegund (582–4), 133, 185 Theodericus, comes foederatorum, 147, 157–8, 340–1 Theodora, empress, wife of Justinian I, 2, 31, 43, 61, 137 Theodore/Theodoros/Theodorus in order of their appearance: Theodorus, son of Peter the Patrician, Mag. Off. 566–576; CSL 576, envoy (PLRE3 Theodorus 34), 44, 113 Theodore, the Praefectus Praetorio Africae in 570 (PLRE3 Theodorus30), 60, 135 Theodorus, decurio et dux augustalis Thebaidis (PLRE3 Theodorus35), 61, 97, 333 Theodorus, doctor, (PLRE3 Theodorus28; and possibly identical with Theodorus43), 61–2 Theodorus, (PLRE3 Theodorus32, MVM per Armeniam 574–5, served with Kours and Philippicus, 81, 101, 104, 216–18, 220, 223, 348 Theodore Tzirus, son of Justinian (PLRE3 Theodorus31; Martindale notes that the father Justinian is unknown, but it cannot be excluded that Theodorus was an illegitimate son of the emperor Justinian), MVM per Orientem 573, 84, 89, 335 Theodore, son of Bacchus, (PLRE3 Theodorus33), silentarius, proconsul Armeniae, envoy, 104 Theodore, Bishop of Marseilles, 131–2, 189–90 Theodorus/Theodore, Bishop of Nobadae/ Nubians, 137, 339 Theodorus, spatharius or scribo, honorary MVM, envoy (PLRE3 Theodorus36), 139, 340 Theodore the Phycisian, the Royal Doctor (personal doctor of Maurice in 593–7), (PLRE3 Theodorus44 and in my opinion possibly identical also with 28, 43) 165, 264 Theodorus, commander in Egypt (PLRE3 Theodorus 59), 173–5 Theodorus Ilibinus, bodyguard of Philippicus, 215 Tʻēodoros Trpatuni, Armenian noble, 283–4

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 392

Theodorus the Doctor, envoy of Philippicus to the Khagan in 593 (PLRE3 Theodorus43, possibly identical with 28 and in my opinion also with 44), 298 Theodorus, silentarius (PLRE3 Theodorus148), 320 Theodore/Theodoros II Laskaris, emperor at Nikaea (1254–8), 331 Theodosian Walls, 32, 319–20 Theodosiopolis, Karin, Erzurum, 77, 104–105, 121–2, 221, 227, 284 Theodosiopolis, Resaina, 77, 117, 121, 150, 210, 218, 233 Theodosius I, emperor (379–95), 4 Theodosius II, East Roman emperor (402/ 408–450), 32, 44, 162, 169, 269, 319 Theodosius, Bishop of Antioch, 46–7 Theodosius III, son of Maurice, Augustus after 590 (PLRE3 Theodosius13), 162, 165, 270, 282, 292, 317, 319–21 see MHLR 602–641 (Theodosius survived the massacre of his family to lead armies against Phocas) Theodosiaci, military unit, 260 Theodotus the Palace Prefect, 46 Theognis, MVM per Illyricum, 142, 144–5 Theophanes the Confessor, 9th century chronicler, 45, 63, 74, 92, 121, 135, 171, 221– 2, 305–11, 313–15, 317, 331, 333–4, 339–42, 345–6, 348–52, 354–5, 357–8, 361 Theophanes of Byzantium, Theophanes Byzantinus, historian, 72–3, 83–5, 334–5 Theophilus of Edessa, chronicler, historian, 234, 237, 288, 310, 349–51, 354, 356, 359, 361 Theophylact, Theophylaktos, Theophylactus, historian, xi, 6, 67, 72, 83, 92, 109, 117, 121–4, 145, 147, 149–50, 152, 171, 173, 197, 205–208, 211, 215–18, 220–1, 228–9, 231–42, 244, 246, 248–9, 251–6, 269–73, 275–8, 280–1, 287–8, 292, 295–300, 302, 304–9, 311–16, 318–19, 321–2, 331, 335–7, 340–2, 345–58, 361, 364 Theopolis, 83, 165, 225–6 Theudelinda, queen, 196, 203, 268 Thessalonica, city of, ix, 242, 244, 249–51, 265, 340, 352 Thessaly, Thessalia, 142 Theudebert, Theodebert, Theodobertus, son of Chilperic, 93, 192 Theudebert II, Theodobert, Theodobertus, son of Childebert II and concubine, King of the Franks (596–612), 265, 304

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Index 393 Theuderic II, Theoderic, Theodericus, son of Childebert II and Faileuba, King of the Franks (596–613), 192, 255, 265–6, 304 Theudelinda, daughter of the Bavarian king Garibald(us) and Walderanda, queen of the Lombards (ca. 589–616), 196, 203, 268 Thibursicu Bure, fort, 59 Thomas, patron of Justin II, PP Africae in ca.563/5(?) and in ca. 574–8, (PLRE3 Thomas15), 44, 59, 135 Thomas Artsruni, chronicler, 354, 361 Thrace, Thracians, vii, 4, 44, 52, 63, 101–102, 118, 120–1, 125, 140, 142, 145, 159, 165, 191, 233, 239–40, 242, 244–5, 252, 254, 267, 282–4, 288, 291, 293, 295, 300, 302–303, 308–10, 316–17, 340, 350, 354–5 Three Chapters controversy, 45, 268, 345 Thuringia, Thuringians, a part of Frankish realm, 48, 51, 55, 265, 304 see also Austrasia, Bavaria, Burgundi, Franks Tiber, river, 95 Tiberius II, Tiberius Constantinus, (Comes Excubitorum 565–74; Caesar 574–8; Augustus 578–82), v, vii, xi, 5, 44, 46, 52, 55, 57, 59–64, 89–98, 100–104, 113–14, 116, 118–21, 123, 125–30, 134–42, 144, 146–50, 153–5, 158–63, 165–7, 170–2, 178, 184, 188–9, 191, 239, 317, 333, 335–41, 344, 348, 364 Tiberius III, son of Maurice, 322 Tibet, 103 Ticinum, see Pavia Tignica, fort, 59 Timotheus, envoy, 65 Tingitana, see Mauritania To-ki (Shih-pi Khaghan), Turkish Khagan, 326 Töläš, a western Turkish tribe, 326 Tomi, Tomis, city of, ix, 245–6, 305–306, 309, 315 Tong Yabghu/Tong ye-hü, Turkish Khagan (618–28), 326 Tortona, Dertona, Dorthon, city and dukedom of, 333 Toulon, 338 Toulouse, 180, 343 Tournai, 93 Trade, commerce, merchant, tolls, customs, sea lanes, roads for commercial and logistical purposes, 19, 22, 31–2, 39, 42, 64–7, 72, 75, 105, 114, 137, 140, 156, 196, 236, 275, 281, 285, 287, 290, 305, 324–5, 334, 337, 349 see also Diplomacy, Fleets, Piracy, Slaves, Supply, Taxes

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 393

Trajan, Canal of, 37, 175 Trajan’s Pass, 316 Trajan/Traianus, quaestor, 98, 121 Trapezus, 67 Trent, Trento, Tridentum, city and dukedom of, 55, 94, 193, 200, 202–203, 267–8, 333, 346 Treviso, Tarbesium/Tarvisium, city and dukedom of, 53, 204, 332–3 Tribune, tribunus, (various), 6–7, 45, 118, 141, 172, 232, 248, 256, 260, 286, 335, 340 Tribute, payments and loans to foreigners, protection money, 1, 27, 49, 59, 62, 64, 67, 75, 78, 98, 100, 113, 116, 125–6, 133, 140–1, 144, 155, 161, 164, 170, 186–8, 190, 196, 202–203, 238, 241–2, 244, 251, 255, 260, 266–7, 281, 309, 326 see also Gold, Ransom, Silver Tripoli, Tripolitania, 60, 137, 171–2, 339 Tropaion, 244 Tsalkajur, location, 231–2 Tubernuc, fort, 136 Tudera, Tuder (mod. Todi), 261 Tulan/Tu-lan/Yung-yü-lü, Turkish Khagan (588–99), 325–6 Tur Abdin Plateau, see Mount Izala Turin, city and dukedom of, 200, 203, 333, 347 Turks, nomads, v, 21, 23–5, 33, 63, 65–8, 71, 75, 78, 84, 89–90, 103–104, 141, 170, 208, 210–11, 220, 223, 226–8, 233, 236, 240–1, 244, 255, 278, 281, 284–5, 290, 324–7, 336, 346–7, 349–53, 355, 363 Turxanthus, Turxath, Turkish Khagan, 103–104, 325 Tuscany, 53 Tyrol, 94 Tyrrhenian Sea, 322 Tzurullon / Tzouroulon, 253, 255 Uch-Kurykan, tribe, nation, 103 Ugernum, fort, 179 Ugurs, nomads, 66 Ulfari, dux of Tarvisium (Treviso), 204 Upper Classes, see Senators Urbicius, military theorist, 167, 169 Ursio, Neustrian noble, 192 Usdibad the Gepid, refugee, 49, 62 Utigur Huns, 62, 66, 103 see also Huns, Kutrigur Vagrila, comes, 181 Vahan, Prince of Siwnik, 78, 80

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394  Military History of Late Rome ad 565–602 Val di Sole, 346 Valence, Valentia, 56 Valentinus, envoy to Turks, 103, 325 Vandals, Germanic confederacy, xii, 63, 172, 360 Varaz Vzur, Persian marzban, 139, 146–7 Varaz Nersēh, Armenian noble, 284 Varaztirots, son of Smbat Bagratuni, 290 Vardan Artsruni, Armenian prince, 287 Vardan the Mamikonean, Vardun, son of Vasak, 76–8, 80, 104, 115, 337 Vardan Vshnasp, Persian commander, 81 Vascones, see Basques Vaspurakan, province in Armenia, 283 Vegetius, military theorist, 7–8, 169, 312, 342, 358, 361 Velox, mag.mil., 204, 258 Venice, 53 Vercelli, city and dukedom of, 333 Verona, city and dukedom of, 53–4, 197–8, 202, 264, 266, 333 Vicenza, city and duchy, 333 Victoriacum, Vitoria, 134 Vienna, 21 Viminacium, mod. Kostolac, 238, 311, 314, 316, 358 Visigoths, Goths, vii, xii, 21, 27–9, 57–60, 93, 96–7, 129, 132–5, 176, 178–86, 188–90, 192–4, 343, 345, 350, 360, 364 Ostrogoths, 28, 51, 63, 160, 172, 312, 332, 344, 350 Vitalianus, interpreter, (PLRE3 Vitalianus2), 61–2 Vitalian, Vitalianus, mag.mil. in Italy in 591–2, (PLRE3 Vitalianus3), 204, 259 Vitalis, taxiarchos/taxiarchês, 213 Vitianum (Vezzano), 202, 346 Vitry, 93 Vicenza, city and dukedom of, 333 Volaenes (Volano), 202, 346 Volga, river, 66 Vrkan, area in Persia, see Gurgan Vstam, uncle of Chosroes II, see Bistam Vstam, Armenian rebel, 284 Waddo, maior domus, comes civitatis, (PLRE3 Waddo2), 189 Wagon Laager, see Fortifications Wahriz, Persian conqueror of Yemen, 72–5 Wandelen, Childebert II’s tutor, 129, 188, 192 Warimar the Frank, Warimarius, envoy, 55, 333 Warnecautius, dux, 264, 266 Warnefrida/Warnilfrida, advisor, 266

Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 394

Wedge (embolos, cuneus, cunei), hollow wedge (koilembolos), 6, 11, 25, 214 Wildigern, comes, 182 Wintrio, Dux of Champagne, 199, 202 Yaksum b. Abraha, ruler of Yemen, 72–3 Yami/Jan-kan, Turkish Khagan, 326 Yaqubi, chronicler, 228, 285, 288, 349–51, 354–5, 361 Yarmuk, 237 Yazd-Jušnas son of Halabān, see Jushnas Yemen, Himyar, Hadramawt, Saba, x, 31–2, 38–42, 61, 64, 67, 71–5, 78, 97, 136–7, 334 see also Abyssinia, Aden, Arabs, Jews; Wahriz Yesdegusnaph, Persian advisor, 64 Zab, Greater and Lesser, rivers, 234, 275 Zaban, Frankish general, 55–6 Zabender, nomadic leader, 241 Zabertas, Persian commander, 217 Zabender, nomad leader, 241 Zacharias, court physician/doctor, diplomat, negotiator, (PLRE3 Zacharias2), 90, 98, 113, 116, 139, 155–6 Zacharias, topoteres(?) in Egypt, (PLRE3 Zacharias6), 173–4 Zadespras, Zadesprates, Persian rebel, 272 see also Jushnas Zagros Mountains, 275, 287 Zalabzan, 285 see also Bahram Jarabzin, Hurmazd Jurābzīn/ Hurmuz Jarabzin Zalpada, place, 244, 246, 298, 300 Zamerdes, Persian commander, 236, 270 Zangrulfus, dux, 264, 266 Zemarchus the Cilician. Zemarchos, MVM per Orientem, Roman envoy to the Turks, ix, 65–7, 325 Zeno I, Zenon, East Roman emperor (474–491), 51 Zeugma, 163 Zikh, Persian noble house and magnate, 64–5 Zirma, river, 124 Zoanambes the Persian, noble conspirator, 270 Zoarab, Dilimnite/Daylami leader, 234 Zogomus, phylarch (Shahid indetifies the name as Dujʻum), possibly a member of the Zokomids, the ruling house of the Salīhids, 212 Zorbandon, location, 211–12 Zoroastrian, see Magi Zotto, dux of Benevento, 130, 197, 259 Zrēchan, area in Persia, 290

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Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 395

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Military History of Late Rome 565–602.indd 396

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