Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe: Debating Policies and Cultural Approaches (Politics of Citizenship and Migration) 3030756254, 9783030756253

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POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION

Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe Debating Policies and Cultural Approaches Edited by Annemarie Profanter · Elena Maestri

Politics of Citizenship and Migration

Series Editor Leila Simona Talani, Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, London, UK

The Politics of Citizenship and Migration series publishes exciting new research in all areas of migration and citizenship studies. Open to multiple approaches, the series considers interdisciplinary as well political, economic, legal, comparative, empirical, historical, methodological, and theoretical works. Broad in its coverage, the series promotes research on the politics and economics of migration, globalization and migration, citizenship and migration laws and policies, voluntary and forced migration, rights and obligations, demographic change, diasporas, political membership or behavior, public policy, minorities, border and security studies, statelessness, naturalization, integration and citizen-making, and subnational, supranational, global, corporate, or multilevel citizenship. Versatile, the series publishes single and multi-authored monographs, short-form Pivot books, and edited volumes. For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the series editor Leila Simona Talani ([email protected]), or Palgrave editor Anne Birchley-Brun ([email protected]).

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15403

Annemarie Profanter · Elena Maestri Editors

Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe Debating Policies and Cultural Approaches

Editors Annemarie Profanter Faculty of Education Free University of Bozen-Bolzano Brixen, Bolzano, Italy

Elena Maestri Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milan, Italy

ISSN 2520-8896 ISSN 2520-890X (electronic) Politics of Citizenship and Migration ISBN 978-3-030-75625-3 ISBN 978-3-030-75626-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: Jasmin Merdan/Moment/Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank all those who have made this book possible and have always encouraged our research and studies: all the contributors to this volume and our respective Universities, the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (UCSC) of Milan and the University of Bolzano-Bozen (unibz) for their constant support given to the organisation of our research-work within their scientific programmes. Our special thanks go to the University of Bolzano for its support in organising a workshop in December 2018 that brought together social, cultural and political experts and signalled the prelude to this collaborative endeavour. We are also grateful to Penelope-Jane Watson, who attentively revised our volume, and to Carmen Lechner, a research assistant of the University of Bolzano-Bozen, who helped tirelessly in the editing process.

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Praise for Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe

“Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe: Debating Policies and Cultural Approaches’ sheds new light on the complexity involved in the variegated and multifaceted migration interactions between Europe and the Muslim world. It does so by drawing on a rich selection of migration relationships, which greatly add to the existing knowledge about one of the most relevant and debated migration connections of our time.” — Joaquín Arango, Professor of Sociology, Complutense University Madrid, Spain

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Contents

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Introduction Elena Maestri and Annemarie Profanter

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Migration and the Muslim World: Perspectives and Challenges Elena Maestri

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Migration, Integration and Belonging: Pakistani Migrants in Britain and in the United Arab Emirates Gennaro Errichiello

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Migration Changes and Integration Challenges in the Moroccan Case Altea Pericoli

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Ceuta and Melilla: Integration or Coexistence in a Plural Society Sergio Castaño Riaño

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The Veil as Perceived and Real Boundary for Spanish Muslim Youth: Case by Case Regulation in Light of Discrimination and Individual Rights Claims Colleen Boland

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Resource Mobilization and the Institutional Frameword of Islam: The Integration of Muslim Turks in Germany Menna Taher

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Immigration in Europe and Italy: Different Perspectives, Shared Challenges? Annemarie Profanter Conclusion Annemarie Profanter and Elena Maestri

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Colleen Boland holds an M.A. in near and Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and a Ph.D. in Sociology and Anthropology from the Complutense University of Madrid, specializing in migration studies. She has served as Managing Editor of the international quarterly International Journal of Health Services and as Research Manager at the Common Action Forum. Currently, she is a postdoctoral researcher at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, working on the European Commission Horizon 2020 ITFLOWS (IT Tools and Methods for Managing Migration Flows) project, where one of her roles includes co-leading the Gender Committee. Gennaro Errichiello works for the Office for National Statistics (UK). He was awarded a full scholarship from Loughborough University where he earned his Ph.D. in Social Sciences in 2018. He worked as a Research Associate in the project on general UK elections (2017) and as a University Teacher at Loughborough University (2017–2020). In 2011, he was awarded a full scholarship from the European Social Fund to attend the Masters in Global Migration at Swansea University. Between 2003 and 2005, he was a Research Associate in the project “The woman in the Mediterranean” in collaboration with the University of Naples “Federico II”. He also worked in non-profit organizations and taught Italian as a second language. In 2002, he graduated in Sociology of the Muslim World from the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. He has xi

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published articles in peer-reviewed journals and presented papers at many international conferences. Elena Maestri is a Professor of History and Institutions of the Muslim World at the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore). She has carried out extensive research on the history, politics and societies of the Gulf Arab States, on gender issues and Islam, development and cooperation in the GCC, the old and the new media in the Arab-Muslim world. She has participated in a great number of international conferences and workshops, and she is author and co-author of a number of books and many specialized studies, research papers, articles and book chapters. Arab Women and the Media in Changing Landscapes was co-authored and coedited by her and was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2017. Her most recent volume, The Arabian City and its Territory. Historical Identity and Heritage Issues was published in 2019 by EDUCatt (Milano). Altea Pericoli is a Ph.D. candidate at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Faculty of Political Sciences. Her research interest concerns political and social dynamics in the MENA region, with a focus on humanitarian and development aid implemented by Islamic actors and the Gulf States in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. She is a Teaching Assistant in History and Institutions of the Muslim World at the Catholic University in Milan and visiting researcher at Durham University Business School and Vienna University, Department of Near Eastern studies. Annemarie Profanter is an Associate Professor of Intercultural Pedagogy at the Faculty of Education of the Free University of Bolzano, Italy. She received her two doctorates in Education and Psychology and a master’s degree in Psychology of Education from the University of Innsbruck, Austria, and from the University of London, UK. Since 2004 she resided periodically in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula conducting fieldwork and visiting fellowships for international institutions such as “The City University of Science and Information Technology” in Peshawar, Pakistan and the American University affiliated, “Dhofar University” in Salalah, Sultanate of Oman, as well as “Prince Mohammed University” in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. She is currently working on projects addressing Arab women’s experiences in the Gulf and has recently published a documentary on polygyny

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in collaboration with the Ministry of Information in Oman. Her current research also includes Islamic integration and migration issues in Europe. Sergio Castaño Riaño is an Associate Professor at the University of Valladolid (UVa) and International University of La Rioja (UNIR). He also works as a senior researcher at the International Center for Strategic Studies (ICSS). He gained his Ph.D. in European Studies in 2013. Dr. Castaño has published various papers analyzing Islam in Europe and the Islamist organizations’ impact in various European countries. Besides being a devoted academic, Sergio Castaño is a political analyst and collaborates with independent think tanks and media across the globe. Menna Taher is a lecturer of Political Science at Cairo University. She holds a Ph.D. in Euro-Mediterranean studies from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. In her Ph.D., she tackled the issue of integration of Muslim Minorities in Europe, a comparative study between France and Germany. She has thirteen years of experience in British education, mainly teaching Political Thought and Philosophy. She is currently undergoing training in the field of journalism.

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1

Fig. 2.2

Fig. 2.3

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3

Fig. 5.1

Muslim population in the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Source Pew Research Center, 2009) Muslim majority States acceded to the 1967 Protocol on the status of refugees and accession dates (Source Elaborated by the Author on information from UNHCR Malaysia [2019]) Remittances received (% of GDP) in 2019—Top 20 OIC countries (Source Elaborated by the Author on World Bank data) a Inflow of Moroccan migrants in European countries. Compared data among 2000, 2004, 2015 and 2017. b Inflow of Moroccan migrants in European countries (qualitative trend) (Source elaborated by the Author on OECD.STAT, 2019) a Inflow of Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa in Morocco. Compared data among 2000, 2005, 2015 and 2017. b Inflow of Sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco (qualitative trend) (Source Elaborated by the Author on UNDESA International Migrant Stock, 2019) Percentage of households with emigrants by region and urban/rural situation (Source Elaborated by the Author on OECD, 2017a, b) Ceuta, Melilla and the Straits of Gibraltar (Source Google Maps 2021)

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List of Tables

Table 2.1

Table 2.2

Estimated number of immigrant workers in the GCC region from Asian countries that are main remittances destination Estimated number of Catholic immigrants in the GCC countries (2001)

42 45

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction Elena Maestri and Annemarie Profanter

Trans-Mediterranean networks that are historically rooted and wellestablished form the basis of immigration from the Muslim world to Europe. The Mediterranean coincides with the line of contact between Islam and Christianity and, therefore, represents an area where geopolitical relations between Christians and Muslims are of great importance in terms of historical relations (conquest, colonization, etc.), territorial claims and immigration. This migratory dimension is undoubtedly that which is most focused upon today due to its political, economic and social repercussions. Since ancient times, migratory flows have been a characteristic of the Mediterranean area, and our epoch is characterized by large-scale north–south movements. Often uncontrolled and poorly managed, these flows have been causing rising social tensions and political reactions in Europe over the decade (Younès, 2013, p. 31). European

E. Maestri (B) Dipartimento Di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] A. Profanter Faculty of Education, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Brixen, Bolzano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_1

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societies are more and more marked by diversity and this is not without consequences, as far as these societies’ core identities are concerned: migration from Muslim to western countries is often perceived as a challenge to local identities. Historically rooted antagonism towards Islam by Christianity and towards Christianity by Islam, which is related with well-known phenomena such as the Crusades, colonialism, pan-islamism and jihadism, has enhanced certain negative mutual cultural sentiments in contemporary times. At the same time, the challenge posed by migration and identity issues also pertains to Muslim countries. People’s ways of acting, understanding and looking at ‘the other’ are affected by multifarious factors. Who is ‘the other’ when focusing on Muslim and European countries? It may certainly be either a Muslim migrant to Europe or a Muslim naturalized European citizen, on the one hand, but it may also be a European citizen with a Judeo-Christian/Western cultural background to a Muslim nation, on the other hand. Moreover, one cannot forget the category represented by Muslim or non-Muslim migrants to Muslim countries and regions related with migratory routes linking Africa, Asia and Europe (i.e. the Gulf, Turkey and North Africa). Diversity, given the change in perspective it brings, always tends to cause fear and suspicion: hence, the importance of dealing with the phenomenon of migration by exploring how it is perceived and faced in some different Muslim milieus, both in the south and in European countries. All of this is strictly connected with the transnational dimension of migration from a sociological perspective (Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007). This volume highlights a selection of Muslim cultural contexts and countries. Large numbers of migrants to Europe come from North Africa, but growing flows from the Arab East and Asia are attested as well. North African countries are themselves forced to tackle the problem of uncontrolled immigration with people coming from sub-Saharan Africa. These migration flows bypass control systems both on entry in the Sahara, as well as on leaving, for example at the checkpoints in Ceuta or Melilla. The countries of the Maghreb have been placed in a difficult position. Governments are not prepared to offer economic protection or opportunities to immigrants coming from the south which creates tension, on the one hand, with sub-Saharan sending countries and, on the other hand, with (southern) European countries, due to the ‘inability’ of North African States to control their borders, in relation both to their own citizens and immigrants from other countries, leaving by sea or by land and crossing

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the Mediterranean. The European judgement and imperative that countries ought to control their borders does not consider the fact that most Asian and African States have porous land borders, which easily affects the irregular mobility of peoples and goods and makes border areas highly insecure. As far as Arab-Muslim immigration is concerned, Fargues (2004, p. 1349) had already portrayed a scenario with growing Arab migration to Europe: ‘migration from the Arab east, the Mashriq, has been recently growing and might gain momentum in the coming years as a result of declining demand for migrant labour in the Gulf, a region that for more than three decades has been a major destination for eastern Arab migrants’. Along the same lines, 15 years later Bani Salameh (2019) refers to the increasing numbers of immigrants especially from the ‘Arab Spring countries’, which create disastrous situations for migrants, in both the sending and receiving countries alike. Thus, migration is referred to as a shared challenge for countries of emigration and countries of immigration. The issue of African migration was a high-priority issue at the EU-Arab League Summit in Egypt in 2019 pointing to the increase in the number of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa via North Africa and the consequences of the Arab Spring, the crisis in Syria, in Yemen and Libya (Joannin, 2019). According to statistics of the UN High Commission for Refugees, in 2019 Europe received 3.5 million refugees; among the main host countries were Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Greece and the UK. Through cooperation agreements with countries of the Maghreb, Europe’s borders have been externalized, in order to ‘control’ the rising number of Muslim immigrants and refugees reaching the southern shores of Europe. The European border has been ‘offshored’ to Africa in order to continue to maintain the so-called ‘fortress Europe’ (Gaibazzi et al., 2017). The most recent trends in migratory flows from Africa and Asia towards Europe, however, cannot overshadow the fact that Europe disposes of a considerable non-migrant Muslim population, citizens with Muslim faith born and raised in Europe. ‘While Muslim identity is often measured directly, in some cases it must be estimated indirectly based upon the national origins of migrants’ (Hackett et al., 2019, p. 95). Although exact numbers on religious adherence are difficult to obtain as official censuses often do not furnish this information, estimates of

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the Muslim population in Europe report numbers of 25.8 million, corresponding to 4.9% of the overall population as of 2016 with Germany, the UK and France having the largest Muslim populations (Hackett et al., 2019, p. 95). The question arises: are identity and citizenship constructed along physical frontiers? Or, have migratory movements and transnational motilities initiated a new paradigm of global citizenship? By definition a citizen ‘is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership’ (Leydet, 2014). The challenges to any state that come with globalization, as well as the transformation of liberal democracies, have led the concept of citizenship to be rethought, particularly in a transnational sense. Marshall defines citizenship as ‘full membership of a community’ including political, social and civil elements (Marshall, 1950, p. 8). The concept of citizenship has been at the centre of lively debates in the Arab and Muslim worlds, it is intertwined with issues related to migration of Arabs and Muslims as well. While the discourse on al-watan (the homeland/fatherland), as it has been developing in Gulf Arab States, for instance, stresses that ‘citizenship’ (jinsiyya) implies the right to have a passport from the state, and that only ‘nationality’ (muw¯ atana) implies a citizen’s real belonging to ‘the nation’, the specific tribal structure and the special privileges associated with it. Pan-Arabism and political Islam have been challenging this idea of nationality from different perspectives throughout the last century. Transnational and supra-state identities have strengthened against Arab territorial/tribal nationalism (wataniyya). Naturalization of Arab immigrants in the Gulf has been hindered by this nationalism, as it clashes both with revolutionary pan-Arabist nationalism (al-qawmiyya) and pan-Islamist ideologies which insist on the pre-eminence of the Muslim ‘nation’ (umma). Against this backdrop, immigrants in the Gulf cannot think to become citizens, but the host state needs to function not only for the nationals (muw¯ atin¯ın) but also for all the multicultural and multi-religious population living in its territory. This is the paradox of the Gulf and its exceptionalism which, despite the well-known and often debated cases of abuses of immigrants in the region, also has stories and experiences of migrants which can be of use in trying to define new paradigms for Europe. Therefore, ‘a growing number of scholars suggest that traditional citizenship is fundamentally illiberal in today’s global world’ (Bloemraad, 2004, p. 390). Acquiring citizenship or a national identity implies not

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only the acquisition of rights and obligations with respect to the state but it also interconnects citizens to a specific community (Hobsbawm, 1992). Due to an increase in international migration and the attention given politically and socially to the ethnic diversity within the state, the fact that most states today have a multicultural demographic has been tied to the definition of citizenship and civic identity (Heater, 2013). ‘The notion of “transnational belonging” is at the heart of postnationalist thinking on the “deterritorialization of nation-states”, while dual or multiple citizenship is an essential aspect of the political threat that transnationalism poses to nation-state integrity and sovereignty’ (Conway et al., 2008, p. 381). In fact, through the naturalization of immigrants the question of dual or multiple citizenships becomes ever more pertinent. Historically, the concept of dual or multiple citizenships is a rather recent phenomenon: In 1963 the Council of Europe signed the ‘Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality’, which was undersigned without reserve by Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Ireland, Spain and Great Britain signed the section of the convention that referred to compulsory military service in case of multiple citizenships. Up until the Cold War era, the phenomenon of multiple citizenships was linked to a suspicion of treason and espionage, and many states automatically denationalized those citizens who acquired citizenship elsewhere. Over recent years, however, attitudes within the European context regarding dual and multiple citizenships have changed and only a few states demand that passports be returned if citizenship in another country is obtained (Sochin, 2012). However, ‘if the world is increasingly transnational, each successive cohort of immigrants will be more likely to claim dual citizenship’ (Bloemraad, 2004, p. 395). Of prime importance in this discussion of dual citizenship, particularly for immigrants, is the acquisition of the right to active and passive suffrage since the right to vote is linked to citizenship. Goppel argues for the acknowledgement of at least the right to active suffrage for even new immigrants and those who will be fundamentally affected by the policies of their host country for the next two or three years (Goppel, 2012).This idea stands in contrast to the regulations in place, as these rights are dependent on nationality based on a retrospective period of stay. In addition, key elements with reference to citizenship in the post-spring 2011 area of some states of the MENA region such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco were: (a) the holding of elections; and (b) the possibility to vote

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for nationals residing outside the national territorial boundaries (Brand, 2014). ‘Increasingly common [also for the MENA region] as well is the extension of the vote to nationals living abroad’ (Ibid., 55). Bloemraad states that ‘dual citizenship is both a cause and effect of transnationalism: Dual citizenship can facilitate transnationalism— multiple passports provide easy access to and rights in different geopolitical spaces—and it designates dual identities, reflecting attachment to both sending and receiving countries’ (Bloemraad, 2004, p. 394). In fact, many immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa take part in two societies: They try to build their lives in the host countries while maintaining ties with their homelands. ‘Not just working and educational contexts, but also people’s political activities and social support practices are increasingly transnational’ (Pitkänen et al., 2012, p. 221). Faist notes that the impacts of transnationalization on citizenship have not been fully explored and the notion of cross-border social networks also aids understanding of immigrants’ experiences. Transnational processes can create transnational communities made up of social relationships existing across borders by means of which individuals take part in social lives in two or more countries (Levitt, 2004). New technologies facilitate simultaneity of movement and communication with greater frequency, speed and regularity. Different means of dynamic relationships between here and there, home and host are, according to Tsuda, multifaceted: while engagement may increase in one society this may lead to less involvement in the other, and the diverse levels of engagement do not have a direct impact upon each other since increased engagement in the host country may lead to increased or relatively decreased engagement in the host country (Tsuda, 2012, pp. 631–649). It was noted that, in many cases, transnational migration is gradual. Migration started for one reason, after which another reason emerged that prolonged the stay. For instance, students ended up either working in the host country after finishing their studies, or returned later for professional or family reasons. (Pitkänen et al., 2012, p. 208)

Through naturalization immigrants gain access to political rights and have the possibility of integrating politically and socially in their host country. Moreover, with reference to the European Union they gain additional rights, for example the right to live, work and travel within the EU

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member states. National ‘belonging’, however, is the prerequisite of a European political identity: in order to be a ‘European citizen’ one must first be a citizen of one of its member states, e.g. an Italian, French or a German citizen (Martinello, 1995). This idea of a supra-citizenship comprises the diverse cultural and political identities corresponding to the single member states of the EU. However, these definitions of belonging only refer to the formal elements which, for immigrants, mark different elements of the process of integration. At the same time and often regardless of formal belonging there are many obstacles to integration such as socio-economic marginalization, discrimination and racism which persist regardless of citizenship acquisition and are a challenge to the integration of first and second generation immigrants alike (Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014). The question arises: what are the different national patterns of integration of selected countries of the EU and sending/receiving Muslim nations? Through the identification of diverse national patterns of integration and their comparison the question of their effectiveness, weaknesses and strength can be gained and, hopefully, conclusions can be drawn leading towards a model of integration. In the social sciences three main conceptual views on (cultural) integration have been stressed: assimilation theory, multiculturalism, and structuralism as well as segmented assimilation: While (a) assimilation theory stresses the fact that immigrants’ original and cultural behaviour patterns tend to disappear until they ‘melt into the mainstream culture through an inter-generational process of cultural, social and economic integration’ (Algan et al., 2012, p. 5); (b) multiculturalism underlines the co-existence of heterogeneous ethnic groups alongside a majority group, and (c) the structural approach observes ‘how differences in socioeconomic opportunities relate to differences in social integration of ethnic minority groups’. Thus, the respective social and economic structure of a host country has an effect on the immigrants’ ability to integrate and to access economic benefits. Instead, (d) segmented assimilation theory focuses on how ‘various socio-economic and demographic factors (education, native language proficiency, place of birth, age upon arrival and length of residence in the host country) interact with contextual variables (such as racial status, family socio-economic backgrounds and place of residence) to produce specific cultural integration patterns of a given cultural minority group’ (Algan et al., 2012, pp. 6–7). It stresses three

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possible patterns of integration: upward mobility through economic integration into structures of the majority group; downward mobility through assimilation and integration in the underclass; and merely economic integration but with continued adherence to the values and identity of ones’ cultural origin. According to the policies applied in diverse host societies, the economic and cultural integration patterns of different immigrants vary. Thus, the integration discourse of the last decades has focused on differing national paradigms or models of integration applied in the different European member states: for example, Germany has aspired to a social policy towards immigrants whereas the UK has focused on multiculturalism. In other words, Germany, has been described as stressing an ethnic nation concept that places its ‘Volk’ first; thus, immigrants are hardly accepted as citizens but still they are included in nearly all social policy institutions. In the UK, in contrast, cultural differences are acknowledged, and ethnic identities of immigrants are maintained (Heckmann & Schnapper, 2003, p. 9). Given the cultural and linguistic diversity of the European member states and the fact that integration affairs come under the responsibility of the individual nations, things are not straightforward. The question arises not only of how applications of patterns and dynamics of integration differ across different EU member states but also how they differ across immigrants of different ethnic groups and religious faith. Which institutional contexts are more or less likely to accommodate the cultural integration of immigrants? To sum up, the study of cultural and socio-economic integration patterns of immigrants seems of paramount importance, as such patterns determine how the expression of cultural differences is translated into individual behaviour and national public policy. The required adaptations that immigration trends impose upon European democracies raise the question of how these requirements are met by the single nation states. In 2010 the political leaders of Germany, Great Britain and France declared the multicultural failure of Europe pointing to the dysfunctional organization of some ethnocultural groups in the nation state. Research has shown that interethnic tolerance and the creation of a unified multicultural space is not a direct consequence of multicultural policies adopted (Karsanova, 2018). This idea of a multicultural Europe as the answer to social and cultural diversity has been challenged by various authors: multicultural policies have been implemented as a response to diversity and

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have, at the same time, tried to institutionalize it. Minority communities have been seen as homogeneous groups relating to the same cultural, ethnic, religious values and behaviour, for example when referring to a singular, Muslim community. This discourse although originally meant to manage diversity has facilitated its very division (Malik, 2015). Thus, the impact of geographic migration is tackled as a multifaceted phenomenon affecting social, political and educational institutions in the adopted homeland. Migrants’ internalized experiences in relation to homeland cultural frameworks or subcultures in the adopted homeland are central in creating an analytical framework. Studies show that it is crucial not only to take both realities into account but to create a link between them in order to understand the immigration experience. The change of place of residence leads to a cultural frame switching, entailing the development of bicultural identities flexible enough to adapt to new societal structures while retaining cultural citizenship in one’s country of origin. This process calls for a re-conceptualization and application of new paradigms for designing ways in which aspects of acculturation might be reinforced, while marginalizing barriers are minimized. The definition of a cultural socio-spatial safety zone is one which can function as both a support and, at times, also as a barrier to integration. Native culture often reacts to the host culture’s educational and political framework as a threat. Political integration as affected by the perseverance of ‘source country effects’ is one example of the complexity of the interrelation of multi-ethnic societies. However, bonds between descendants of immigrants and their ancestors’ country can become looser with second or third generations. A first essential step to address such complexity is to overcome all the stereotypes and unclear notions, which keep circulating about Islam, Muslims and Arabs in Europe. Such unclear notions are amplified by the media and those opinion-makers who contribute to further disinformation in civil society. All of this contributes to further confusion about differences in Muslim migrants’ origins and culture, differences which are increasingly exploited by some European political propaganda. The latter, while aiming to gain support from disoriented people, feeds fear of the uncertain, of the unknown and of ‘the other’. Speaking of migrants of ‘Muslim origin’ is quite wrong, as it ignores the fact that there are millions of Muslims who come from countries differing from one another in terms of history, traditions and interpretation of Islam. Moreover, religion is only one of the factors that shape

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an individual’s identity, which means that bridging the gap between origin and destination cannot be set apart from the effort to improve our awareness of the complexity of the issues at stake. The gap may be even larger between Muslim identities and migration patterns, trajectories and experiences, both in Europe and in those Muslim countries that are a destination for migrants. Therefore, this work aims to add some relevant information to the existing authoritative literature on this topic: The volume attempts, moreover, to contribute to the two fields of migration studies and Muslim minorities studies, by moving beyond a Eurocentric approach and providing some interdisciplinary insights. The analysis of the intersection of religious identity with migratory status and trajectories offers critical insights into the migration literature that is willing and able to place the focus squarely on the role that Islam, in its various interpretations, has played and continues to play in migration narratives, policies and practices. Specific case-studies are investigated by authors who engage with a variety of local realities and migration flows, and within a collective approach aimed at overcoming the ‘Muslim-migration nexus’. Against this backdrop, the words of Ricote, the wealthy Morisco in Don Quixote, seem to be particularly fitting even for our times, when referring to such nexus and to the harshness that some political attitudes and decisions may assume on the basis of a ‘religious identity’. Two centuries after the fall of the Emirate of Granada (1452) and the ensuing forced conversions of Muslims to Christianity in the 17th century Iberian Peninsula, around 300,000 people labelled ‘of Muslim origin’, or Moriscos, were deported to ‘Berberia’, as they were thought to belong to those ‘Muslim lands’ in North Africa. Nonetheless, Ricote would complain about this, saying ‘we weep for Spain […] after all, we were born here and it is our native country’. Moriscos, in Cervantes’ world, admit that in Berberia, when they settled in Algeria, were not well accepted or integrated (García Valdés, 2008). Sharing Islam as a religion or as a value system is just one aspect to be considered among many, no less relevant others. This was a fact in the past, when Muslims and Christians interacted, met, fought and co-existed, and it is a fact in our present, marked by more and more uncertainty, abuse of power, environmental disasters, regional conflicts and new forms of conflict both in the west and in the Muslim world. The issue of identity comes to the fore in areas which are more and more part of a ‘global village’, that are pluralistic in their religious and

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cultural dimensions. Acknowledging this pluralism and richness in diversity, in the light of history, is a crucial step forward in the thinking and the behaviour of the individual, the community, the leaders and the state. In the preamble of Morocco’s Constitution (Dust¯ ur) of 2011, for instance, we read that the Kingdom ‘is a fully sovereign Islamic State keen to preserve its national unity and diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the fusion of its Arab, Islamic, Amazigh and Saharan-Hassanic components, enriched by African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences’ (Kingdom of Morocco, Al-Dust¯ ur, 2011, p. 2). None of this prevents clashes between different sub-cultures and life patterns, in which Islam plays its own role, even within those states that strive to find a new balance between tradition and modernity, in the light of Islamic values. The diversity of migrants coming from Muslim majority countries raises some questions: which Islam are we talking about? What is the cultural background of migrants from ‘Muslim countries’? Are they Arabs? Are they Muslim Arabs or Christian Arabs? Are they nonArab Muslims and, if so, from where? Berbers, Turks, Kurds, Iranians, Pakistanis, Afghans and many more migrants from different Muslim majority countries and ethnic groups are among the migrants in Europe. Their cultures, languages and traditions are quite different from one another and quite far also from the cultural context of the Arabian Peninsula, cradle of Islam. Among the so-called ‘Arabs’ there are also those Christians of the Middle East who have absorbed the Arab-Islamic culture since the first centuries of Islam, without converting to the new religion. Arab identity and Arabism cannot be easily defined. They are fluid and slippery concepts. The well-known British army officer John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha) in his work ‘A Short History of the Arab peoples’, while insisting on the ‘extremely striking’ differences between the various Arabic-speaking communities, makes clear distinctions between South Arabians (Yemenis), Arabians, Syrians, Iraqis, Egyptians and North Africans, mainly of Berber descent. No doubt, such an approach was modified in other ‘Histories of the Arab Peoples’ by the twentieth century historiography in European languages, while Arabism and Arab nationalism supported more and more the ideas and values of a shared cultural heritage. And yet, heterogeneity was and continues to be a relevant fact. Not surprisingly, Wilfred Thesiger, after his travels in and around Arabia, in 1959 wrote that in the Middle East about fifty years earlier, ‘the word Arab, generally speaking, meant an inhabitant of Arabia, and was often

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regarded as synonymous with the Bedu’, adding that ‘tribesmen who had migrated from Arabia to Egypt and elsewhere, and still lived as nomads [in those countries] were spoken of as Arabs’ (Thesiger, 1994, p. 14). Arabic literary language (al- ‘arabiyya al-fusha) shared by all Arab speakers became a unifying pillar within the ideal of unity pursued by PanArab nationalism: Sati‘ Al-Husri in 1955, while developing the theory of Arabism in his own view, had written that ‘the country of the Arabs’ could not be considered only the Arabian Peninsula, but it had to include all the Arabic-speaking peoples (Al-Husri, 1955, p. 8). He could not ignore that diglossia was the norm even where Arabic language was studied at school and that, on the contrary, the only ‘Arabic language’ known and spoken by most people in Arab countries, was their own Arabic dialect (al- ‘arabiyya al- ‘ammiyya). All the same, a well-defined cultural heritage expressed in classical Arabic became a cohesive force in the ideology of Arabism and the pursuant Arab nationalism which opposed the borders established by colonial powers. The political unity of the umma was and is re-proposed in the wider Muslim world by Islamist ideologies and political Islam, insisting on ‘Islamic nationality’ and supporting the idea of a transnational Islamic State. In the Indian sub-continent, al-Mawdudi (1939, p. 35) stated that nationality can be founded exclusively on the Islamic religion, against all the other nationalisms, but the history of a given territory, its cultural and physical aspects represent structural elements that challenge this totalitarian and totalizing vision of Islam. Accepting and recognizing a set of shared memories, values and traditions actually strengthens the bonds with the territory, the ‘fatherland’, in large parts of this Muslim world, both among Arab and non-Arab Muslims, which can contribute to the acceptance of the imported concept of ‘nation-state’ as well. Inherent heterogeneity in the Muslim world is a fact, and this has enhanced confusion and an uneasiness to understand more thoroughly the social and political phenomena connected with peoples’ mobility from and to Muslim countries. Changing lenses to investigate case-studies of relevance in this field would allow us to move from the native/origin environment to the regional and the trans-national level, in order to reach a destination environment, where marginalization and challenges to integration are deeply intertwined with identity crises, disruptive ideologies, abuses and violence. Networks and linkages between the migrants’ origin (the ‘homeland’) and destination (the ‘host country’) affect the diaspora groups that are

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shaped by their exposure to such interactions and by the persisting sentimental and material links with their homeland (Sheffer, 1986) and their idea of homeland, which is not necessarily identified with a welldefined country or nation-state: ‘homeland’ can be a either a village, an ethnic/religious community or a group sharing a certain trans-national ideology, going beyond the restricted borders of a single country. The definition of diaspora as a ‘traveling term’ by Sheffer clearly indicates that it can refer to ethno-national groups as well as other kinds of ‘formations’, including ‘members of trans-national groups adhering to the same ideology’ (Sheffer, 1986, p. 10). Arab nationalists and Islamist Muslims are examples of formations of this kind, although we cannot ignore that internal conflicts and fractures within their sub-groups are further variables to be considered. This volume on ‘Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe. Debating policies and cultural approaches’ aims to add innovative scholarship on some relevant aspects related to the complexities of the phenomenon of migration involving Muslim countries. The Mediterranean migration pattern is highlighted by the inclusion of several viewpoints, trying to define a broader picture incorporating both destination and points of origin. The reasons for this are varied: Scholars are often specialized either in migration studies or in Islamic countries of the MENA region and thus concentrate on only one side of the coin, and global interconnections are consequently neglected. Analyses presented in the following chapters refer to a common conceptual framework that implies the existence of a pattern of migration from origin countries, both from Africa and from Asia, towards European countries. The volume explores three basic hypotheses. The starting point of the investigations is represented by the impetus of globalization that continues to gather energy: against this backdrop, more and more emigrants leave home pursuing dreams of a better life for themselves and their families. The first hypothesis relates to practices in relation to immigration and models of inclusion and/or integration in the Maghreb, since it is a region of both immigration and emigration. The hypothesis that follows from this is that Islamic immigrants converging towards Europe come from widely divergent communities scattered, primarily, throughout North Africa, the Middle East and South–East Asia. In other words, they represent a great variety of local cultures. Cross cultural pluralism on the part of the nation-states comprising the European Union is one avenue

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for moving the dialogue between different cultural frameworks into a more compatible form. These two sections provide a background to the final section on selected countries of the EU, their policy and public attitudes towards immigration. The third hypothesis relates to features of the migration pattern of ‘new’ immigration countries of Southern Europe such as Italy and Spain as compared to ‘old’ countries like Germany and Great Britain. ‘A relatively high level of irregularity’ of immigrants is characteristic of the first group which stems from the widespread informal economy in these countries and the consequent implementation of regularization programs (Okólski, 2012, p. 271). The book is structured in eight chapters and it is based on the identification of case-studies and migration patterns which shed light on a series of means and approaches that can contribute to ‘positive’ co-existence and/or integration in host countries. The research and publication project leading to this volume was conceived within a workshop aimed principally at social, cultural and political scientists held at the Free University of Bolzano-Bozen, Italy, in December of 2018, focusing on case-studies related to migration in the Muslim world and Europe. The disciplinary interest of this workshop enabled the authors to identify a series of relevant issues related to this topic, still in need of exploration and/or further systematic analysis. Therefore, our book is aimed at examining some specific case-studies relating to three Muslim countries that can be both origin and destination: Morocco, Turkey and Pakistan, and two destination areas: Europe (in particular Italy, Spain, Germany and Great Britain) and the Gulf (Dubai). The ‘Islam factor’ emerges, and the European and Gulf regions are confirmed at the global level as extremely important destination areas in terms of incoming migratory flows. In the light of the case-studies under investigation some positive patterns are identified as well as legal vacuums and shortcomings. The ‘Islam factor’ comes to the fore in its complexity and refers to the challenge of managing diversity of Muslim migrants, who are increasingly confronted with different and sometimes conflicting visions regarding the place of Islam in a pluralistic world and the place of pluralism in Islam. This is a challenge for Europe, but it is also a challenge for the countries and regions of the Muslim world most involved in the phenomenon of migration and mobility. The second chapter will focus on this part of the world, the destination of rising numbers of refugees, stateless people

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and labour migrants, coming from Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike. After an outline on migrant and refugee flows in the Muslim world, Elena Maestri deals with the hijra (migration) from the Islamic perspective and the juridical dimension related to migration management. Kaf¯ ala, as an Arab-Islamic mechanism to govern migration, is analysed in its interlinks with the institution of the dhimma, the ‘protection’ granted to non-Muslim believers of revealed religions and the presence of nonMuslim labour migrants in the Gulf is also tackled, in a context which still attracts great numbers of migrants from all over the world and from Asia in particular. Chapter 3 by Gennaro Errichiello develops the notion of ‘migration project’ by exploring the case of Pakistani migration to the Gulf (Dubai as a destination) and Great Britain, dealing also with migration networks and the role of associations and families in these two destination environments marked by significant differences. Despite variations in migration patterns in Europe, on the one hand, and in the Arab Gulf countries, on the other hand, cultural, juridical and sociological aspects are confirmed in both destination areas as pivotal in their interlinkages with political, religious/ideological and economic factors. All of this makes the enhancement of economic and cultural cooperation between Europe and the Gulf an important aspect, within a wider framework of improved coordination and exchange of information between Europe and the Muslim world involved in one way or the other in migration issues. The objective is to shed light on specific cultural, economic and juridical aspects related to the development of new models of cooperation on migration issues, and of constructive co-existence and/or integration in host societies and countries. Integration and belonging emerge as two important aspects of migration. Integration, which is a policy pursued by the British authorities, seems to have failed in its aim of encouraging the equal and full participation of migrants in mainstream society. In the UAE, where integration is not pursued by the authorities, the Pakistani middleclass migrants seem to have developed a sense of belonging in spite of their temporary status and the hierarchical social structure existing in the country. Developing a sense of belonging can certainly contribute to a ‘constructive co-existence’ as a first necessary step towards a much more complex process of integration still so difficult to achieve in all those destination countries striving to manage diversity and to ensure social cohesion at the same time. Coordination and exchange of information on

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migratory flows, between Europe and Muslim countries involved either as origin or destination, can help to arrive at shared strategies and patterns to be adopted. The aim is to improve both human security and social growth within the wider Mediterranean region, whose balances and imbalances so deeply affect the future of all of us. Other investigated case-studies follow, intended as contributions towards initiating a necessary debate on the identification of new possible models of integration, and of human-centred development and cooperation strategies in societies marked by immigration. Thus, a thread linking one contribution to the other aims to give coherence to our discourse as a group. The ‘re-territorialization of Islam’ in host countries, within an appropriate legislative framework, can give the community (their associations and organizations) a positive role. Its representatives, within a bottom-up approach contributing to integration and reinforcing the idea of ‘state’ and ‘citizenship’ have a role to play. Given that migrants may be active agents within a migration project, we think that neglecting this aspect in Europe does not help the institutions of host countries to address the challenges posed by ‘the south’. Thus, there are several questions to be addressed on this side of the Mediterranean and on the ‘other side’ and perhaps common approaches can be developed: Arab sending countries have been trying to optimize economic benefits and at the same time adopt strategies to strengthen the ties emigrants maintain with their home countries and cultures. This, however, is not favourable to the integration process and the development of a model of a multicultural Europe: ‘sharing wealth but not identity with host societies does not seem to be a sustainable stance’ (Fargues, 2004, p. 1368). Taking Morocco as an example, Chapter 4 by Altea Pericoli aims to analyse the migration flows from this country to Europe and its historical evolution, in order to understand the main traits and give a picture of the heterogeneous Moroccan diaspora in Europe. The study has a particular focus on the migrant community originating in the Rif, one of the main migrant-sending regions in the country. It takes into consideration the link between migration and development due to the remittance flow, which is five times higher than official development aid in Morocco. Migration flows have, over time, influenced policies and approaches to the migration management both on the Moroccan and European agenda. The issue of migration is a key element for a partnership which has linked

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EU and Morocco for several decades, promoting EU-Moroccan cooperation on readmission, border controls and protection. So, in the last part, the chapter will examine the new Migration Policy that Morocco launched in 2013, its strengths and weaknesses, its meaning in the geopolitical context and the real capability of the Kingdom to implement it. Sergio Castaño Riaño in Chapter 5 studies the singular case of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish cities located on the north coast of Africa whose location and singularities have conditioned the process of integration of Muslims since the 1980s. To a great number of migrants, Ceuta and Melilla represent their first contact with Europe. Moreover, the two cities have a singular social reality with two predominant groups. On the one hand, people of Spanish background inhabiting the towns since the 15th Century and, on the other hand, people of Moroccan origin. Moroccans lived excluded in Ceuta and Melilla until the 1980s, but the migrant process initiated in this decade allowed them to assume more relevance and, today, people of Moroccan background represent almost half of the total population. The chapter will refer to the two communities as Christians in the case of the group with Spanish cultural tradition and Muslims for the social sector whose origins are in Morocco. Boundaries are both physical and cultural. The fact that the Islamic headscarf is often perceived in Europe as one of the symbolic manifestations of religious diversity and of physical boundaries between Muslim minorities and others, needs to be carefully considered, since Islam is not only a religion, but a ‘system’. Colleen Bolland in Chapter 6 draws attention to the case of ‘the veil’ in Spain. Issues of the headscarf intertwine with the juridical dimension in Islam, with political Islam and the ‘different versions of Islam’ going beyond mere religious symbolism. Within improved strategies and models of education and integration, diversity and political ideologies in the religious sphere need to be addressed in their interaction with destination environments. In addressing practical approaches to youth inclusion, Spain provides an especially interesting case study: it boasts a relatively recent immigration trajectory in comparison to other European states, and a diverse society with linguistic, regional and national pluralism that necessitates accommodation and multilevel governance. Bolland proposes analysing, case by case, how both regulation and experiences of discrimination reflect the intersectionality of the debate surrounding the Islamic headscarf in Spain, as an example and part of the wider European context.

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The veil can represent a perceived or real boundary to Muslim youth’s inclusion. The latter is intrinsically bound up with the development of citizenship and integration, as well exemplified in Chapter 7 by Menna Taher, focusing on Sunni Muslim Turks in Germany. The institutionalization of Islam, the role of religious organizations in the integration process and the headscarf debate are presented by Taher, who evaluates the two variables of the role of religious organizations and the institutional framework of Islam, while pointing out the lack of leadership and real representatives of Muslims in Europe. The German state’s approach is explored with the case of the Sunni Turkish minorities in Germany and their experience, trying to explain to what extent these minorities have adapted to the opportunities offered to them. The issue of generalizing the problems of Muslim minorities in the west is dealt with, taking into account the peculiarity of each European state, which is illuminating in terms of presenting different solutions that suits each system. While trying to avoid generalizations, we cannot ignore that a shortcoming in immigration policies is a trait common to many European nations. Annemarie Profanter in Chapter 8 deals with this specific aspect, by highlighting the case-study of Italy which, besides being a country of emigration is also a country of immigration and often the first point of arrival in Europe. The author starts with an overview of Italian immigration history, the political agenda of the right-wing government with Salvini as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister (2018–2019), targeting especially immigrant populations. The essence of this chapter sheds light on the fact that in Italy, and in many other European countries, many different laws have dealt with immigration, but practically none with the cultural or religious impact of the presence of immigrant population and their original cultural reference system. The mosaic of languages, cultures, religions and ethnic groups constituting the so-called immigration population is discussed with reference to points of origin. The broader focus is on the migrant population in the European Union, shedding light on EU migration policies as well as the asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF). Beyond the definition of a common European Asylum System the strategies adopted to support legal migration to EU States in line with the needs of the labour market are analysed and interpreted with reference to the construction of an identity which is based on multiple belongings and transnational trajectories.

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Bibliography Algan, Y., Bisin, A., Manning, A., & Verdier, T. (2012). Cultural integration of immigrants in Europe. Oxford University Press. Al-Husri, S. (1955). al-‘Uruba awwalan. Dar al-Tali’a. Al-Mawdudi, A. (1939). Bayna al-Da‘wa al-qawmiyya wa al-rabata al-islamiyya. Dar al-Arabiyya. Bloemraad, I. (2004). Who claim dual citizenship? the limits of postnationalism, the possible ties of transnationalism and the persistence of traditional citizenship. International Migration Review, 38(2). Brand, A. L. (2014). Arab uprising and the changing frontiers of transnational citizenship: Voting from abroad in political transitions. Political Geograph, 41, 54–63. Conway, D., Potter, R. B., & Bernard, G. (2008). Dual citizenship or dual identity? Does ‘trans-nationalism’ supplant ‘nationalism’ among returning Trinidadians? Global Networks, 8(4). Fargues, P. (2004). Arab migration to Europe: Trends and policies 1. International Migration Review, 38(4), 1348–1371. Gaibazzi, P., Dünnwald, S., & Bellagamba, A., (Eds.) (2017). EurAfrican borders and migration management: Political cultures, contested spaces, and ordinary lives. Springer. García Valdés, C. (2008). Life and literature. Tolerance in cervantes’ works. In M. Vibha & I. Arellano (Eds.), Cervantes and Don Quixote. Emesco Books. Goppel, A. (2012). Staatsbürgerschaft und Menschenrechte. MenschenRechtsMagazin, 2, 169–181. http://www.zora.uzh.ch/78348/1/Staatsb%C3%BCr gerschaft_und_Men-schenrechte.pdf. Accessed 12 January 2020. Hackett, C., Stonawski, M., Potanˇcoková, M., Connor, P., Shi, A. F., Kramer, S., & Marshall, J. (2019). Projections of Europe’s growing Muslim population under three migration scenarios. Journal of Religion and Demography, 6(1), 87–122. Heater, D. (2013). What is citizenship. John Wiley & Son. Heckmann, F., & Schnapper, D. (2003). The integration of immigrants in European societies: National differences and trends of convergence. Lucius & Lucius. Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. Cambridge University Press. Joannin, P. (2019). Migration at the heart of the EU-Arab League Summit. https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0504-migrat ion-at-the-heart-of-the-eu-arab-league-summit. Accessed 16 January 2020. Karsanova, E. S. (2018). To the question of ethno-cultural policy of contemporary states. Upravlenie, 6(2), 67–72. https://doaj.org/article/e8251699adbe 4188a768fbb2d54b25a6. Accessed 23 January 2020.

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Kingdom of Morocco’s. (2011). Al-Dustur [The constitution]. Government Press. Levitt, P. (2004, October). Transnational migration: When “home” means more than one country. In Migration information source. http://www.migration policy.org/article/transnational-migrants-when-home-means-more-one-cou ntry. Accessed 23 January 2020. Levitt, P., & Jaworsky, N. B. (2007). Transnational migration studies: Past developments and future trends. Annual Review of Sociology, 33. Leydet, D. (2014). Citizenship. In The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Spring edition. http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/archives/spr2014/entries/citize nship/. Accessed 23 January 2020. Malik, K. (2015). The failure of multiculturalism: Community versus society in Europe. Foreign Affairs, 94, 21–0/2. https://search-proquest-com.lib proxy.unibz.it/docview/1658668714?accountid=26471. Accessed 20 January 2020. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. Cambridge University Press. Martinello, M. (1995). European citizenship, European identity and migrants: Towards the post-national state? In R. Miles & D. Thränhardt (Eds.), Migration and European integration: The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Pinter. Okólski, M. (2012). Europe, a continent of immigrants—A conclusion chapter. In M. Okólski (Ed.), European immigrations: Trends, structures and policy implications. Amsterdam University Press. Pitkänen, P., Içduygu, A., & Sert, D. (2012). Current characteristics of migrant transnationalism. In P. Pitkänen, A. Içduygu & D. Sert (Eds.), Migration and transformation: Multi-level analysis of migrant transnationalism. Springer. Salameh, M. T. B. (2019). Migration from the Arab spring countries to Europe: Causes and consequences. In A. Al-Masri & K. Curran (Eds.), Smart technologies and innovation for a sustainable future. Advances in science, technology & innovation (IEREK Interdisciplinary Series for Sustainable Development). Springer. Sheffer, G. (Ed.). (1986). Modern diasporas in international politics. Croom Helm. Sochin, D. M. (2012). Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft bei Naturalisierung. Eine europäische Situations analyse unter spezieller Berücksichtigung Liechtensteins. Arbeitspapiere Liechtenstein-Institut. http://www.liechtensteininstitut.li/ Portals/0/contortionistUniverses/408/rsc/Publikation_downloadLink/ LIAP_037_0.pdf. Accessed 20 January 2020. Thesiger, W. (1994). Arabian sands. Motivate Publishing. Triandafyllidou, A., & Gropas, R. (2014). European immigration: A sourcebook. Asghate.

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Tsuda, T. (2012). Whatever happened to simultaneity? transnational migration theory and dual engagement in sending and receiving countries. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 38(4), 631–649. Younès, M. (2013). L’entreprise au défi des religions. Regards croisés à partir du bassin méditerranéen. Chronique Sociale.

CHAPTER 2

Migration and the Muslim World: Perspectives and Challenges Elena Maestri

Introduction After the 2011 revolts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the subsequent tragic wars both in the MENA and in sub-Saharan Africa, migratory flows towards Europe have involved rising numbers of displaced Muslim peoples, which has enhanced Islamophobia propaganda in most European countries.1 The “subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic people and their culture” (Said, 1978, 56), throughout the last century, has contributed to a series of stereotypes about Islam in European environments, where plurality and diversity within Islam are often ignored, and the deep cultural differences between the various countries of the so-called ‘Muslim world’ are rarely taken into consideration. All of this has opened the way for western media and political discourse to nourish negative propensities against Muslim migrants, by constructing

E. Maestri (B) Dipartimento Di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_2

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the image of Muslims in much more negative frames than the followers of other religions. While the highest percentage of the world’s Muslims live in countries where they are the majority, there are growing numbers living in countries as religious minorities (see Fig. 2.1): in Europe they are growing as religious minorities not only in Germany, France and the UK, but also in countries like Italy and Spain, only most recently affected by significant migration flows from the Muslim world. Migratory flows coming from Africa and Asia and the delicate issue of migrants’ integration in their countries of destination are at the core of thorny debates in Europe, yet most of these are quite sterile, without the effort to understand the cultural and historical framework of the countries and regions of origin. The development of Muslim beliefs, institutions and practices cannot be decoupled from the background of the fragmented socio-cultural Muslim contexts extending from North Africa to South and Southeast Asia. Islam as a religious belief is only one of the features to be considered when it comes to migrants coming from these contexts. And yet, Islam is both a religion and a ‘system’, affecting the juridical sphere and social attitudes, but within this ‘system’, variety is a fact, and distinguishing one given community from the other means having to ask each time, which Islam? The multifarious facets of the religious factor in its complexity, and of the different currents in contemporary Islamic thought and ideologies, come to the fore and relate directly to the challenge of managing the diversity of Muslim migrants, who are more and more often confronted with different and sometimes conflicting “visions for the place of Islam in a pluralistic world and for a place of pluralism in Islam” (Brown, 2009, 298). This is a challenge for Europe, but it is also a challenge for the countries and regions of the Muslim world ever more involved in the phenomenon of migration and mobility, like the Middle East. The uprisings of 2011 and the following events in the Arab world triggered important and dramatic changes, leading to unprecedented threats to security, to wars, inter-sectarian conflicts and inter-state rivalries and to extremely serious humanitarian crises, as in Syria and Yemen. Rising fragmentation has favoured terrorism, irregular migration and human trafficking, organised crime, corruption and new displacements. Thus, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has become the destination of rising numbers of refugees and stateless people and, within it, the Arab Gulf countries are confirmed as the top south destination of labour migrants, coming from Muslim and non-Muslim

MIGRATION AND THE MUSLIM WORLD …

Fig. 2.1 Muslim population in the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Source Pew Research Center, 2009)

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communities alike, but they are also the destination of irregular migration flows. Against this backdrop, rebuilding the Arab region is nowadays increasingly seen by some local intellectuals and leaders as a process that cannot be detached from pluralism and cooperation in the light of human and Islamic values, although a clear view on a coherent model is still to come: separation between State and religion may be advocated by a minority, while the need to work on reforming the system in Islam is more widely supported, although from different perspectives (Aboul Gheith, 2019). No doubt, unresolved political issues affect calls for cooperation and coexistence in society and between societies. The Palestinian diaspora, with a total number of refugees amounting to almost 3.9 million stands out in the literature, as it has deeply marked the history of the Middle East since the birth of Israel in 1948, the nakba, ‘the catastrophe’ to Palestinians. This diaspora was followed by further intense mobility in the region, which was both planned and forced. No doubt, the Palestinians in exile, mainly residing in the Arab world, well exemplify the fact that displaced and dispersed people never forget their ‘Lost Homeland’, which contributed in their case to the creation of a Palestinian national identity in exile in host countries: here their identity has been shaped and re-shaped, even in cases of ‘integration’, or ‘coexistence’ (Schulz & Hammer, 2003). Less territorialised identities of migrants and diasporas in the Middle East and in other parts of the Muslim world no doubt intertwine with trans-nationality, and the tension between a national and transnational identity (Cohen, 2008), as the homeland lives on in the imagination and in the habits of migrants, even when they share the same religion as their hosts. Thus, in the light of the most recent migrant and refugee flows in this part of the world, we ask how Islam is affecting diasporic identities, given the approach to hijra (migration) in Islamic history and perspectives. An analysis of these issues represents a first step in shedding new light on how the phenomenon of migration has developed over the last decades, and how it has been managed in the countries of the region that have emerged as top destinations of the main flows in the new century. Against this backdrop, the migration pattern of the Gulf Arab countries is explored in its main dynamics and shortcomings: while differing completely from any possible pattern of integration, it can however ensure some positive levels of coexistence of both Muslim and non-Muslim migrants in most Islamic environments of the region. While literature has generally focused on migrants’ human rights and migrants’ remittances

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as regards this area (Dresch, 2006; Naufal & Genc, 2014), this chapter would like to take into consideration some sociological implications of migration in the Gulf, as far as the role of family networks in dynamic migration projects and the support of interculturality are concerned. Within this framework, the relevance of literature interlinks with the insights gained in fieldwork throughout the region since the 1990s.2

Migrants and Refugees’ Flows in the Muslim World: An Outline Migratory flows are not only a south–north phenomenon. Warfare, discrimination and economic problems have also been generating growing numbers of both refugees and labour migrants within the south. No doubt, the number of Muslim countries that are not only places of origin, but also transient areas and destinations have been rising in the new century. According to the 2018 UN Migration Agency report, there were certainly more non-Arab Muslim countries, like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia and Turkey, than Arab countries among the top twenty places of origin in 2015. Only two Arab countries, namely Syria and Egypt, figured in this list, being the former a major point of origin of refugees and the latter of economic migrants. The most significant non-Arab Muslim countries that are both origin and destination are Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Turkey, while the top destinations among Arab countries are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Jordan, although only Jordan, in this group, has been attracting more refugees than economic migrants (IOM, 2018,19). The streams of migration for work purposes are certainly different from the streams of people displaced in their attempts to escape war, persecution and discrimination. UNHCR data and estimates of refugees in some countries of the Muslim world are much more impressive than anywhere else; most destinations in this part of the world are represented by states that did not ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and the subsequent 1967 Protocol (see Fig. 2.2). The already mentioned phenomenon of Palestinian refugees in the MENA, tracing back to the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict and augmented after later conflicts in the region, led to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), aimed specifically at providing ‘assistance and protection for some 5 million registered Palestine refugees’ in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the

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Afghanistan.............................................30 Aug 2005 Albania....................................................18 Aug 1992 Algeria ......................................................8 Nov 1967 Egypt ......................................................22 May 1981 Iran (Islamic Republic of)....................... 28 Jul 1976 Kazakhstan.............................................. 15 Jan 1999 Kyrgyzstan.............................................. 8 Oct 1996 Mali......................................................... 2 Feb 1973 Mauritania............................................... 5 May 1987 Morocco.................................................. 20 Apr 1971 Nigeria .................................................... 2 May 1968 Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic).............. 18 Jan 1980 Senegal ..................................................... 3 Oct 1967 Somalia ...................................................10 Oct 1978 Sudan......................................................23 May 1974 Tajikistan ................................................ 7 Dec 1993 Tunisia .................................................... 16 Oct 1968 Turkey .................................................... 31 Jul 1968 Turkmenistan............................................ 2 Mar 1998 Fig. 2.2 Muslim majority States acceded to the 1967 Protocol on the status of refugees and accession dates (Source Elaborated by the Author on information from UNHCR Malaysia [2019])

West Bank (UNRWA, 2019). The recent war in Syria trapped and fragmented further the community of about 250,000 Palestinians living in the country since 1948, but the most recent years have witnessed striking numbers of other displaced Muslim communities: since the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989) great numbers of Afghan refugees have inundated, in several stages and up to the present, both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, while since 2017 about 900,000 Rohingyas, fleeing ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, have been driven to seek refuge in Bangladesh first of all, with rising rates of them reaching Malaysia and Indonesia as well (UNHCR, Malaysia, 2019). The case of Syria represents the worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. According to some informal but authoritative estimates, this Middle Eastern country of about 19 million inhabitants before the war—90 per cent of whom are Muslims—has been emerging as the top origin country of refugees worldwide, with estimates reaching around 11 million displaced people between 2011 and 2018, a

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great number of them scattered between Turkey and other neighbouring countries in the MENA (Mirakian, 2019). Around 5.6 million Syrians left their country for Middle Eastern destinations, like Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf Arab States, while the rest reached other countries outside the region. Despite all the problems and challenges in refugee camps, it is interesting to identify cases in which the forced displacement of Syrians led to the start of new economic projects founded on family/tribal ties and networks, often rooted in historic migratory flows. At the outset of the uprising in Syria in 2011, not surprisingly, some displaced tradesmen and manufacturers with historic tribal ties and business networks linking them with the south—Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula—managed to transfer their capital and their skills there, and a positive paradigm founded on the resilient dynamism of Arab tribal networks developed in the case of these refugees, even in countries that had not ratified the 1967 protocol. In such a way Syrians, with their skills and capital, had a direct impact on the Jordanian economy, both in agriculture, especially in the Jordan Valley, and in the industrial domain, as many Syrian investors moved their factories to Amman, Irbid, Sahab and Al Aqaba in 2011, following their countrymen who had escaped the 1982 Hama massacre. Within this framework, forced displacement and the economic impact of migration intertwine to construct a paradigm in which new interactions may emerge and are consolidated by transnational tribal structures, networks, identity and culture linking the historical Bilad al-Sham and its neighbouring regions and contemporary nation-states. It is a hybrid paradigm that ignores the refugee status in its ‘Western definition’, since it ignores modern state borders, while referring at the same time to ancient tribal ties and tradition. Tribalism often continues to play a social role in many parts of the MENA, but the state-building process, as witnessed in Jordan and the Gulf Arab countries, may have led to the emergence of state institutions that co-opted the structures of tribal society (Alon, 2009; Peterson, 2016) to try and look for new balances founded on the existing social contract (bay‘a). Legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. Within an ‘Arab-Islamic tribal model’, the leaders’ personal approach to the people, as well as lineage and lines of support make this peculiar statehood paradigm quite different from the statehood paradigms of the Arab republics. The fact that a large part of the population in Jordan is Palestinian, the economic problems of the country and its rising unemployment rates are other

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aspects to be considered, when we see that the above-mentioned ‘hybrid paradigm’ could not prevent rising stigmatisation by Jordanians of the hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria. No doubt, the burden for the State was alleviated both by the ability of some refugees to create economic opportunities and by the regional and international aid and grants, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, received by Jordan for hosting Syrian refugees. The Hashemite Kingdom did not have access to the Convention on refugees, like most countries in the MENA, but the increase in mechanisms and policies aimed at integrating Syrians into the Jordanian economy and labour market, between 2011 and 2018, was a positive consequence of local and international cooperation at various levels. Obtaining permanent residence and having access to healthcare and education, however, are confirmed as major problems shared with other categories of inhabitants in this country, which makes full integration extremely difficult (Jaber, 2018). The concepts of citizenship, nationality and statelessness in the whole MENA come to the fore, and they certainly need further investigation. In North Africa, the most important countries of origin and transit of migrants are Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.3 They have recently become destination countries of new uncontrolled south-south flows, which have increased especially as a consequence of the war in Libya and of conflicts in sub-Saharan countries. Both regional instability and climate change have been emerging in West Africa among the most relevant factors impacting on the traditional positive migration patterns of local pastoral communities, like the Fulani for instance. While in these contexts seasonal migration was not traditionally conceived as a response to poverty or destitution, but as a way to ensure a secure livelihood (Hampashire, 2002), new factors arose in to disrupt this positive paradigm: the fall of Qaddafi in Libya led to the flows of Tuareg fighters from Libya towards Mali and Niger, which led to increased threat in the Sahel from jihadism, arms trafficking, contraband traffic, oil trafficking and, last but not least, human trafficking, reaching out to the outlets of North Africa and, only as a second step, but not always, from there to Europe (Ghanem, 2018). When focusing on labour migration in the south, no doubt the region of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), encompassing Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), comes to the fore. Here multiethnic, multicultural and multireligious environments have emerged and developed as the largest recipients of

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labour migrants since the 1970s, within a peculiar migration management pattern, strictly related with the history of the Arabian Peninsula. Such a pattern, despite its shortcomings, which sometimes lead to serious abuses and always prevent integration, has contributed to sustaining migratory flows to this area and to make it the third most important destination of international labour migration, after North America and Europe, in the contemporary world. A circular migration framework seems to be appropriate to describe the temporary labour migration to the Gulf Arab countries, involving both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, who share a lack of agency in terms of obtaining permanent settlement or citizenship in the host country (Babar & Gardner, 2016, 54). All of this is rooted in the traditional Arabian understanding of the mobility and protection dynamics of tribes, but such an understanding, in its modern adaptations, emerges as largely inconsistent with the evolving Islamic thoughts on migration, although the picture is more fragmented and made even more complex by the presence of irregular migrants, refugees and stateless people. While adaptations in the Gulf are mostly depicted in their negative impact on migrants’ lives, with emphasis on discrimination and exploitation, the possibility of dynamic community formation and active migration projects within south-south networks in this region is not precluded, as they intertwine with transnationalism and the role of the ‘Islam factor’, within a dimension in which illiberal practices extend beyond the State (Thiollet, 2016, 20): Muslim migrants’ formal and informal organisation here is marked by significant differences in comparison with European environments, but it confirms the relevance of both cultural/religious and economic aspects on migration projects, in which tradition, family networks, social pressure and Islamist ideologies may play a more or less relevant role.4

Hijra in Islamic Perspectives and Juridical Dimension The Qur’an recommends hijra (migration) when believers are threatened and forced to commit wrongdoing (z.ulm); it connects it to both the ‘duty of fighting’ (qit¯ al ) against the enemy and to a special commitment of the believer to his/her community in terms of contribution to its well-being and safety. Quoting the Qur’an:

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“And those who believed, and emigrated and strove hard in the Cause of Allah as well as those who gave them asylum and aid – these are the believers in truth, for them is forgiveness and a generous provision” (8:74) […]“He who migrates (from his home) in the cause of Allah, will find on earth many dwelling places and plenty to live by […]” (4:100).5

These are just two verses that exemplify how the Holy Book of Islam deals with migration in its ‘positive meaning’. The ‘dwelling places’ in the history of the great Arab conquests are well represented by the garrison towns (ams¯ ar), where hijra was extensively used to increase the Muslim population in the seventh and eighth centuries, but it did not last for long. While the religious majority abandoned it, hijra was on the contrary embraced by some minority opposition groups in Islamic history, such as the Kharijites, in order to oppose central authorities and pursue jih¯ ad. In Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), only the Maliki school placed special emphasis on hijra as an obligation when Muslims were not free to practice Islam in their homeland, and such an emphasis was quite evident in the Maghreb, under pressure of Christian neighbours, during and after the Reconquista, when hijra to leave the d¯ ar al-harb, the abode of war, was defined as an obligation (Verskin, 2015). At the same time, travelling for Muslims was generally seen in its enriching dimension, which spurred in particular those involved in trade to reach faraway countries and regions, even outside the d¯ ar al-Isl¯ am, the abode of Islam, given the famous Prophet’s saying (had¯ıth) “Seek knowledge even as far as China”. Trade networks connecting Gulf Arabs with India and the Far East, for instance, contributed to the peaceful spread of Islam by the Arab merchants in those far away regions. The most noble journey was certainly always the one to Mecca, the pilgrimage (hajj ), a fundamental religious duty, that often led some pilgrims to travel for years across regions far from their home, while trading. When reaching their destination, they sometimes even ended up settling in either Mecca or Medina, which explains the cosmopolitan Muslim society in the two holy cities until present times (Maestri, 2019).6 “There is no sin on you if you seek the Bounty of your Lord (during pilgrimage by trading)” the Qur’an states (Qur’an 2:198). Mobility is seen as a value, and Prophet Muhammad’s migration (hijra) from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina) in 622 AD represents a pivotal event in the history of Islam, giving its name also to the Muslim lunar calendar, 622 being year 1 of the so called ‘Hijra Calendar’. Hajj is the sacred representation

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of this value shared by believers: their sense of belonging to a religious community is enhanced by this experience, while their cultural differences may be perceived as disappearing when confronted with the myth of the universality of the umma (Islamic nation) (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1990). Hajj still has crucial political, economic and cultural consequences far beyond the religious dimension stricto sensu, but the imposition of a series of restrictions, started in the 19th century by colonial powers on movement and permanence of pilgrims in the Hejaz, ‘nationalised’ pilgrims for the first time. This ‘sacred’ mobility was affected and transformed as it had never occurred before (Zaccaria, 2011, 185).Great Britain and France, followed by Italy in the early 20th century, developed their strategies to regulate the Islamic annual pilgrimage and to adapt it to their own political colonial interests. They tried and prevented pilgrims both from consolidating transnational pan-Islamic networks through the hajj, and from resettling in the Hejaz as a sort of modern hijra, an emigration from countries oppressed by colonial powers: the goal they pursued was “to reproduce the ideal Muslim colonial subject”, abiding by Westernimposed rules and borders (Brower, 2013, 113). The emergence of the modern territorial nation-states in this world eroded even further the myth of universality and transnationality of the umma, traditionally founded on Muslims’ mobility without borders. Within this mobility hajj, hijra and travel merge, while becoming a search both for God’s favour and for knowledge and trade opportunities, which is rooted in the traditional Muslim frame of thought, despite the great cultural differences between the various Muslim countries and regions. If, on the one hand, traditional approaches to mobility and migration from one Muslim country to another have been completely transformed by nation-states and borders during the last century, on the other, a renewed discourse on mobility, intertwining with the concept of hijra, has been developed and strengthened by contemporary transnational Islamist ideologies—from the Muslim Brotherhood to the various revolutionary Salafi movements and organisations. The ‘obligation’ to spread and strengthen ‘their Islam’ against ‘the other’ is embraced through hijra, within a propaganda spurring the ‘good Muslims’ to migrate from their own countries, ruled by ‘bad Muslims’, whom they accuse of takf¯ır (being unbelievers). Within the vision of some minority radical groups, hijra can actually lead to a project of violent jih¯ ad, but that is not always the case when Islamic fundamentalist groups are involved in migration projects: peaceful adaptations to support their goal are more often encouraged.

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Within these perspectives, the role of Muslim migrants (muh¯ ajir¯ un) in host societies is clearly different from that of the l¯ aji’¯ un (refugees); the muh¯ ajir¯ un do not generally plan to go back to their countries of origin and they do not pursue assimilation in host communities, but rather preservation of their Muslim identity and consolidation of a transnational Islamic identity, their ‘global Islam’ (Choueiri, 2009). This is an aspect directly linked with the spread of transnational Islam in the West in the last decades. Within the doctrines of most Islamist thinkers and leaders, the refusal of a ‘territorialized Islam’ has been intertwined with opposition to the official religious establishment of their origin countries. A paradigm connecting the religious institutions of origin states and the destination state is contested by the Islamists, whose ideologies have spread between the 1980s and the beginning of the 21st century. Although tracing back mainly to the ideas of Mawdudi and Qutb, these new Islamist thinkers have been looking most recently for peaceful penetration into European/Western environments. And yet, there is no doubt that even within these transnational Islamist groups transplanted in Europe, the idea of opposing Western-inspired political solutions is still strong, and their vision of the ‘Islamic State’ to be restored is plain. Thus, gradual pacific penetration in Europe has become a pre-requisite to achieve that goal: the concept of ‘centrism’ (wasatiyya), developed within the Muslim Brotherhood, and promoted by scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Tariq Ramadan, has also been intertwined with the concept of support to the Islamic jurisprudence of Muslim migrants within European contexts, accepting some compromises with European societies, within a “double framework of shar¯ı‘a and secular law […] until such time as the whole of Europe becomes Islamic” (Kepel, 2008, 211–212). The Muslim communities’ minority condition in the West is dealt with by fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), which is increasingly influenced by this kind of transnational Islam in Europe: the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), founded in 1997 and headquartered in Dublin, opposes both assimilation and segregation, while supporting a kind of integration that allows the establishment of a ‘European Islam’. And yet, a question arises: is this merely conceived as a first step towards a ‘global Islam’? Given the heterogeneity of the Muslim communities of migrants, this is not an easy process, but no doubt an unprecedented Islamist project has been strengthening in Europe among Muslim migrants over the last decades, while ending up by weakening the links between them and the

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‘official Islam’ of their countries of origin: host countries’ institutions have rarely provided the appropriate regulatory framework to improve relations between migrants’ cultural-religious associations and the ‘official Islam’ of their origin countries. Moreover, in these countries of origin, political instability often led to political decentralisation and fragmentation, which affected the religious domain as well. Rising sectarianism and exposure to foreign funding in religious education were among the most dangerous consequences, as well exemplified by Iraq and Yemen at the beginning of this new century (Al-Salimi, 2014). When the ‘official Islam’ of origin countries exists and has some strength, it can certainly have a constructive role to play in coordination with the host state institutions, as happened within the Sunni Turkish community in Germany in the past, but major changes have been occurring since the 1980s, and political Islam has been spreading among Turkish labour migrants too. All of this has led to an ‘unofficial’ Turkish Islam, whose role, for instance, is well represented by Milli Görü¸sin Germany.7 Within host countries, migration and missionary activities can easily merge as well: the project of the tabl¯ıgh¯ı, whose movement emerged in the Indian subcontinent in 1926, exemplifies this phenomenon: these migrant preachers privatise a political re-Islamisation project through missionary movements that do not recognise borders, while constructing a universal hijra doctrine that prescribes migration to the non-Muslim world as well. Salafi symbols and values are often adopted by them within an adaptation to movements organised as Sufis, discovering new mobility at a global level through their networks. The case of the Tabl¯ıgh¯ı jam¯ a‘at (literally from Urdu, ‘Society for spreading faith’) well depicts da‘wa (proselytisation) going hand in hand with hijra. Tabl¯ıgh¯ı networks have been growing, reaching out to Europe, where they started to expand in the 1960s and became particularly active in the UK, targeting South Asian immigrants in particular. The impact of the Tabl¯ıgh¯ı jam¯ a‘at is wellknown in France as well, where North African youths have become a target, within networks spreading from France to North Africa and back to Europe. Here their activism has been developing further towards new directions (Gugler, 2010, 123). Increasing migratory flows from some Muslim countries created ‘Islamic islets’ in Europe, spaces where we can observe the emergence of new Muslim organisations and characteristics losing certain meanings connected with the original identity and acquiring unprecedented meanings, values and identities in host countries (Ben Achour, 2008): this is

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a variegated ‘European Islam’, in which hijra re-emerges within renewed religious dimensions, migration projects are more and more affected by political Islam ‘in its variety’, and both official Islam of origin countries and European secularism are opposed. The concept of secularism has generally been quite controversial within the Muslim world: secular Arab nationalism promoted by the Ba‘th party never excluded religion as a crucial determinant in identity formation in either Syria or Iraq during the last century, and a process of secularisation seemed to peak in the 1970s in various Arab countries in the MENA, which affected Muslim women’s clothing as well as their use of the veil (hij¯ ab). After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 a re-Islamization process involved Arab women too, while including both Shi‘a and Sunni believers, and leading to “the return and re-appropriation of the veil, with diversified social, political and institutional responses” (De Poli, 2007, 30). A power struggle also began involving women’s bodies, and an enhanced symbolic political value of the veil came to the fore throughout a Muslim world which was increasingly involved in a renewed debate on the role of Islam in the state and in society, on Islamism versus liberalism/secularism. Turkey had already shaped its secularism between 1918 and 1938 by removing Islam from the legal, political and public cultural spheres, but the peculiar Turkish secularism that had emerged from the Kemalist regime had actually promoted a national Sunni Islam controlled by the state. Secularism here had been introduced in continuity with the Ottoman tradition, which integrated Islam and subordinated it to the needs of the state (Azak, 2008). Secularism, as a concept, is still widely opposed in Islam and often equated with atheism. The translation of the word in Arabic is ‘alm¯ aniyya, deriving from the word ‘alam (world), and it evokes worldliness and materialism, without any consideration for religion (Hatina, 2007). At the turn of the new century, growing Islamist movements contributed to shape the debate on the place of Islam in the political and social order, while the dawla madaniyya (civil state) started to be seen as a concept able to bridge the gap between Islamists and liberals/Muslim liberals in the Arab world, in particular after the events of 2011. Not surprisingly, the founder and first head of the already mentioned European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), the Egyptian shaykh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who has always been very close to the MB ideology, writes in his book Al-Isl¯ am wa al-‘alm¯ aniyya, wajhan li-wajhin (Islam and secularism face

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to face) that “Muslim identity is doctrine and faith at the same time […] The faith is the pillar, the Law is the method […] upon which society is founded[…Islam] is a civilization project”: within this fundamentalist vision, all the Sunni immigrants in Europe should become part of this project by adhering to a well-defined European Islamic juridical space, where a novel process of ift¯ a ’ (pronouncement of fatw¯ a, legal opinion, by ‘ulam¯ a’ ) is aimed both at European Muslims and at a transnational Muslim umma (De Crussol, 2010, 129). As a matter of fact, one of the first fatw¯ a by ECFR authorised Muslims to settle in Europe, provided they keep strict adherence to Islam and raise the new generations according to its values (Dliouh, 2010, 87). Within a variegated and complex ideological and legal framework, the symbolism of clothing, in its social and political dimension, is reconfirmed stronger than ever in destination countries. And yet, the Muslim woman’s veil can assume the most different meanings, while being confronted both with regulations and prejudice in host societies: willingness to adhere to the traditional way of dressing, pressures from a very religious family or community, personal religious convictions and/or willingness to express an Islamist thought are among the reasons leading women to wear the veil. Thus, women’s modesty, as a value expressed in the Qur’an, is interpreted in the light of a well-defined cultural and/or ideological background, as exemplified by the variety of traditional clothing among Muslim women: from the headscarf or hij¯ ab, to the niq¯ ab, which covers the whole body, except the eyes, to the different kinds of burqa‘ , concealing most of the face and the body. No doubt, the veil can also be a strong religious-political symbol distinguishing the ‘true female believer’ from other Muslim women, within an Islamist approach. Against this backdrop, equating the veil with any other religious symbol in a European debate can be both misleading and confusing.8 Undoubtedly, Muslim communities in Europe have to deal more and more with the ‘double framework of shar¯ı‘a and secular law’. This framework is affecting European legal systems also on issues pertaining to Muslim migrants. Unprecedented emerging confrontation with Islamic legal institutions is a fact in some European countries, with specific regard to family-reunification, for instance, Kaf¯ ala is an important aspect to be considered in this direction.

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¯ : An Institution of the Islamic Kafala Fiqh Rooted in Arab Tradition Kaf¯ ala was first conceived in the Arab-Muslim world as an institution aimed at safeguarding the right to protection of those who need it under certain circumstances; as such it can be applied to protect the weakest ones in society and various categories can be included in this definition, from minors to travellers and migrants. When focusing on minors, kaf¯ ala can be defined as an adult person’s commitment to protect and maintain a child or minor, when he/she does not have parents or other family members taking care of him/her; it is a form of custody, given that adoption is not recognized by Islamic law (shar¯ı‘a). No doubt, this institution has remained largely unknown in European legal systems until very recently, and immigration laws of countries like Britain, France and Italy have ignored it. In the last few years, on the contrary, some judgements have recognised it as a de facto adoption for the achievement of family reunification, in the light of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. As regards minors deprived of their parents, this Convention actually recommends in Art. 20 “family custody, kaf¯ ala of Islamic law, adoption or, in case of need, the placement in apposite institutions for children […]” (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). Nonetheless, strong ambiguities persist in Europe on the regulation of this institution, and the absence of a common European directive is another relevant issue (Duca, 2011). ‘Kaf¯ ala judgements’ granting a ‘protected (makf¯ ul ) minor’ his/her right to stay in the host country with his/her kaf¯ıl (tutor) are an emerging phenomenon in different European countries. Italy is no exception, as attested by the first judgement of this kind passed by T.A.R (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) Piemonte in 2016 (T.A.R. Piemonte, 3 March 2016, judgement n. 281).9 And yet, ensuring Muslim immigrant children’s rights in international kaf¯ ala is not so obvious without very clear and precise regulation in host countries: since the institution does not establish a legal child-parent relationship like adoption, the risk is that it can be used to conceal human trafficking and to create a ‘residency permits market’ within some migrant communities. These risks cannot be excluded in Europe, which has seen the first efforts to include legally this institution, and they are evident in Muslim countries as well, where international kaf¯ ala is not always allowed. Egypt, Mauritania and Iran, for instance, prohibit it, while others, like Algeria, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan, decide on a case-by-case basis. Only two

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states, namely Tunisia and Indonesia, allow both adoption and kaf¯ ala, when it comes to minors (International Social Service ISS, 2008). Kaf¯ ala, as an institution pertaining both to fiqh and to Arabian customary codes (‘urf ), has created a peculiar framework of mechanisms and regulations to govern migration in some Arab-Muslim countries. Labour migration to Muslim destinations witnessed some regulation as well as the first efforts to introduce reforms. The south-south migrants within the Muslim world are generally the most disadvantaged, not only because access to social protection and services in host countries is rare, but also because these flows remain largely undocumented (Hujo &Piper, 2010, 6). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions, as already mentioned, can be both origin and destination of migrant and refugee flows, while the Gulf Arab countries remain the most important south destination of these flows and the only south destination where skilled legal immigrants can find a better quality of life than in their country of origin. The specific approach to immigration management in Gulf Arab countries is conceived within the peculiar characteristics of the local societies, marked both by economic modernisation and persistent traditional politico-legal and cultural dimensions. The kaf¯ ala or ‘sponsorship system’ is at the core of this approach and a series of strategies of coping and modes of accommodation have been developed by Asian and African immigrants in the Gulf since the 1970s (Fargues & De Bel-Air, 2015); among these strategies we can mention the use of debt, for instance, to obtain a visa through the labour-exporting agencies of the origin countries and the use of kinship and friendship ties to settle in the host country (Khalaf & Alkobaisi, 1999, 286). Kaf¯ ala, while ensuring visitors the ‘protection’ of a local kaf¯ıl (sponsor), who is accountable for the visitor’s actions and behaviour within the host community, has ended up by being adapted by some Gulf Arab nationals to allow abuses of the most vulnerable low-skilled migrants. The need to reform this system has been expressed in the last few years as a result of international pressure. In 2017 the Bahrain Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), for instance, introduced the Flexi-Permit, allowing irregular migrants to regularize their status by sponsoring themselves, and to work legally in the country either on their own or for multiple employers. When assessing expectations versus results, we must admit that this initiative in Bahrain is in the right direction: it provides a pathway towards the development of a new pattern in the whole region, but it needs to be improved and implemented with other

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reforms allowing a more effective form of legal protection for immigrant workers in the Gulf (Migrants-Right.org, 2018). No doubt, despite the more or less significant efforts to address the issue of the kaf¯ ala reform in the whole of the Gulf, it is a fact that in the eyes of most GCC nationals the system has been able to minimise security and cultural threats and to safeguard the traditional values of their societies, thus they do have no interest in reforming it (Diop et al., 2018, 35). Moreover, exploitation of unskilled labourers in the Gulf is not only connected with the kaf¯ ala system; it certainly has to do also with attitudes influenced by the fact that slavery was only abolished officially in Arabia during the last century.10 Besides slavery then, patterns and regulations of the so-called ‘indentured labour system’ affected the management of labour migration to the Gulf as well. Despite having been officially abolished in 1916, the ‘indentured labour system’ was, in fact, adopted by the British in the Arab sheikhdoms at the beginning of the oil-era, in order to channel Indian workers towards the British-owned oil companies in the Gulf: the contract-binding labour relationship, temporary residence of these labour-intensive workers and their treatment was to have an effect on the ‘sponsorship system’ of the Gulf States until recently (Thiollet, 2016, 8). Changing attitudes and mentality is not an easy process: even if the Gulf Arab States, often under western pressure, are now becoming aware of the need to protect the rights of low-skilled workers, who are more exposed to abuses in private companies and in domestic work, the state is still largely unable to enforce the law in the private sphere. So, when the newly adopted state regulations fail, the hope is that cultural initiatives to promote civil society growth and awareness can have an impact. It seems to be a paradox, but in Qatar, one of the countries most criticised by human rights organisations and associations for abuses against low skilled workers, mainly employed in the building sector, the first museum on slavery has been established in 2015. On the website (www.msheirebm useums.com.), one reads: The Overarching Ambition of Bin Jelmood House is to Raise Awareness and Play a Pivotal Role in the Global Abolition of Human Exploitation.

Against this backdrop, however, one cannot ignore the fact that migration to the Gulf Arab States is a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to exploitation. On the contrary, many migrants look at the Gulf

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as a destination in order to improve their life and their family’s financial condition. Remittances play a crucial role in this sense. They have assumed a dynamic role in modern migration involving both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Gulf. Remittance payments in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries (see Fig. 2.3) are recognised in their potential to enhance the economic contribution of the diaspora to the countries of origin, but any positive effects depend on how remittances are spent and invested. Diaspora bonds and diaspora sukuk in Islamic finance, for instance, are attracting some interest, but financial literacy in the Muslim world is generally low and the educational level of immigrants is a crucial variable in raising their awareness of potential benefits in investing their money in their home country. Pursuing coordination between origin and destination states in this domain is a challenge. Diaspora bonds and sukuk can effectively represent a source of funding for development and infrastructure projects in origin countries: they could be cheaper than the traditional instruments of external funding and assistance while, at the 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Fig. 2.3 Remittances received (% of GDP) in 2019—Top 20 OIC countries (Source Elaborated by the Author on World Bank data)

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same time, representing a concrete effort to help future generations there. However, they cannot be decoupled from the need to gather and share quality data on diaspora communities by the governments involved. A coordinated communication strategy addressing the issue of transparency on planned projects is another essential aspect to be considered (Diaw, 2017).

Non-Muslim Labour Migrants to the Gulf Within the Muslim world, the region of the GCC, as already mentioned, is the third most attractive destination of labour migration in the world, after North America and Europe. Within migration flows towards the Gulf, there are both Muslim and non-Muslim people, of course, and the main Asian origin countries seem to confirm that religion is not a discriminating factor (Table 2.1). In the last few years Saudi Arabia, being the largest and more populous country of the GCC and home to the two holy cities of Islam, has been confirmed as the most prominent destination of flows from Asian and African countries, despite the labour nationalisation policies implemented over the last decade in order to reduce foreigners in its labour market. Flows towards Saudi Arabia include both legal labour migrants and irregular migrants, as is the case almost everywhere, but here irregularity is often connected with the Islamic pilgrimage, since pilgrims often use the tourist visa to perform hajj (pilgrimage) or ‘umra (visit to the holy cities) to enter the country and then stay there irregularly to try and earn a better living than in their home nation. The phenomenon is Table 2.1 Estimated number of immigrant workers in the GCC region from Asian countries that are main remittances destination

Country India Pakistan Bangladesh Indonesia Philippines Nepal Sri Lanka

Number 6,560,848 3,043,689 2,745,517 1,692,889 1,602,645 1,256.208 1,077,665

Source Elaborated by the Author on estimates in Shah, Nasra M. (2018). Emigration Policies of Major Asian Countries. Sending Temporary Labour Migrants to the Gulf,132

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not recent and in Mecca and Medina there are already second and third generations of undocumented migrants who have been ignored for years by Saudi authorities. One of the most numerous communities of undocumented migrants, the Burmese, whose number in Mecca reached around 250,000 people over roughly 50 years, were given a residency permit only in 2015,11 but most recently other communities of irregular migrants, like the Bangladeshis, have been facing the new measures introduced against undocumented migrants, who seem to amount to over 5 million in the whole country: regular deportations to their origin countries started in 2017 and about 38 per cent of these have been recorded in the Mecca region. These undocumented migrants are all Muslim of course, often proud to be able to live in Mecca both for economic reasons and for the sanctity of the place, and they try not to be caught, but they also admit that “Mecca may be God’s city” but “Saudi Arabia is their country”, as clearly expressed by a Bangladeshi woman living there (Jaffery, 2018). These words are quite significant in order to understand that, the ‘Islamic nation’ (umma) is just a religious construct that most Muslim migrants accept even in Mecca, the core of Islam, where the modern nation-state with its rules on citizenship prevails. Muslim migrants de jure and de facto are treated quite similarly to migrants of other religious communities in the Arab Gulf States, where immigration has been growing as a structural element of the rentier state system since the oil boom in the 1970s. The non-Muslim immigrants, within the kaf¯ ala (tutelage/sponsorship) system share with the Muslim immigrants a similar legal status, since their stay in the host country is on a temporary residency-permit (iq¯ ama) basis: the ‘Islam factor’ does not make any substantial difference, in contrast to the millet system of Turkish-Ottoman tradition, in which religious minorities were organized in communities that were legally separated from the Muslim majority. The millet system was founded on religion. Dualism in Gulf societies emphasises, on the contrary, the difference in terms of rights and privileges between nationals, on the one hand, and immigrants/expatriates, on the other, rather than between Muslims and non-Muslims. As a matter of fact, the Gulf is the only region of the Muslim world that continues to attract high numbers of Christian immigrants as well. Both the teachings of Islam and the Arabian tribal culture with its customary codes (‘urf ) contribute to this unique system of managing multireligious and multicultural immigration. Kaf¯ ala intertwines with the institution of dhimma, the ‘protection’ granted to non-Muslim believers of revealed

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religions, as established by Prophet Muhammad in the Constitution of Medina in 623 AD, when he accorded religious freedom to the three Jewish tribes living in that town. In the light of dhimma non-Muslim immigrants in all the GCC countries, except Saudi Arabia, enjoy the right to religious freedom, the right to practice their religion in their places of worship, the right to build their places of worship in public areas and the right to religious education in private schools, which they are allowed to build and manage in the host country. In Saudi Arabia non-Muslim immigrants enjoy the right to religious freedom and to practice their religion only in private areas, a restriction that has been more severely implemented in the last decades, to the detriment of Christian migrants of Asian origin in particular. It is a restriction still motivated by the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, being home to the two holy cities, is ‘the geographic core of the Islamic faith’, where building places of worship for other religious groups in public areas is prohibited, according to the shar¯ı‘a, and more specifically according to the Sunna (Tradition) of the Prophet, as reported by his wife ‘A’isha and the second Caliph ‘Umar ibn Al-Khattab (Al-Aayed, 2004, 91; Borrmans, 2015, 73). All of this, however, does not seem to have a major impact on the decision of many Asian Christians to go to Saudi Arabia: they still think of the kingdom as a good destination for labour, in consideration also of the salaries, that can be higher than in other neighbouring countries. Apart from the Saudi exception, in the Gulf Arab region, since the establishment of the first Catholic Church in 1940 in Manama, the number of churches and highly appreciated Catholic private schools grew throughout the twentieth century: these schools are attended by both Christians and Muslims, like the Sacred Heart School of Bahrain, the Carmel School of Kuwait and the St. Mary Catholic School of Dubai. Some Vatican sources, at the beginning of the new century, confirm that in a total GCC region population of 42,250,000 inhabitants both the number of Catholic immigrants (Table 2.2), mainly from Asia (in particular from India and the Philippines), and their religious spaces are quite significant (Borrmans, 2007, 77). Within Gulf Arab societies, dualism is expressed by separation de jure and de facto between nationals (Gulf Arabs) and immigrants, all the others, rather than by religion. It is often the national dress that ‘signals to every expatriate that the wearer is one of the privileged few of the population’ (Heard-Bey, 2008, 168), but most government-provided facilities, like water, electricity, telecommunications and various municipal services,

2

Table 2.2 Estimated number of Catholic immigrants in the GCC countries (2001)

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Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Total GCC

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Number 30,000 151,000 70,000 70,000 1,200,00 350,000 1,871,00

Source Elaborated by the Author on estimates of the Annuario Pontificio in Borrmans Maurice (2015). Chrétiens et Musulmans. Proche et lointains, 73

are shared by nationals and a large number of immigrants alike, which makes many expatriates consider the host country ‘their home’. The most disadvantaged and exposed to abuses, besides the domestic workers, are the unskilled labourers, as already said: living in camps on the outskirts of the cities, they are exploited both by recruiting agents in their origin countries and by their sponsor (kaf¯ıl ) in the host country (Heard-Bey, 2008). Efforts to reform the kaf¯ ala system, bilateral and multilateral agreements between GCC state actors and between states and non-state business actors, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue established in 2008 between twelve Asian origin countries, on the one hand, and GCC and Malaysia, on the other, represent some interesting steps forward taken in the region to address the issue of regulating the presence of foreign workers. None of this, however, necessarily leads to significant improvements in the migrants’ condition, as the main goal of origin and destination states is to extend coordinated control over the phenomenon, with still little attention paid to migrants’ rights. When it comes to rights protection within these contexts another group is worth mentioning, as it often overlaps with the phenomenon of migration: these are the stateless people. Most of them are workers with families and children, but they are treated neither as immigrants nor as citizens.

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Statelessness and Instability in the MENA: Which Cooperation with Europe? The concept of unity (tawahhud) of the umma (Muslim community) and integration (indim¯ aj ) between Muslims from different cultural backgrounds is a basic principle in Islam, while being particularly emphasised in Islamist discourses: the Moroccan scholar Allal al-Fasi (1910–1974) in his analysis of the religious and cultural bonds between the Maghrib and the Mashriq, for instance, well depicts the Sahara desert as the natural corridor of migratory flows between the two regions, and Libya as the crossing point (al-ma‘bar) joining the East with the West (Pellitteri, 2008, 40), but none of this has any significant impact on the status of Muslim migrants, as well exemplified by the Gulf, nor on the solution of stateless people, a widespread phenomenon in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) intertwining with migratory flows. No doubt, after the events of 2011, an order in the MENA region has been challenged, while all the internal contradictions and inconsistencies within this order nowadays come to the fore and relate to thorny unresolved issues. The post-First World War settlement had introduced the concept of sovereign territoriality in the Muslim world, leading to a redefinition of who belonged to the state, the fatherland, al-watan to the Arab peoples. In the Arab Gulf countries, for instance, the notions of nationality (muw¯ atana) and citizenship (jinsiya) are strictly intertwined with the Islamic-tribal state paradigm. All of that led to the emergence of the phenomenon of statelessness, as occurred in other countries in un jinsiyya, a similar way.12 The category of the so-called bidoon (bid¯ meaning without citizenship) can be found in the whole MENA region: they are mainly descendants of nomadic groups (badu), Bedouins who moved towards the new developing urban areas for economic reasons from the 1950s on. In Kuwait, for instance, oil urbanisation contributed to the flows of badu, who settled without registering according to the 1959 Nationality Law; despite recent efforts of the leadership to extend citizenship to some of them, the number of stateless people in the country is still high (92,000 in 2010). Their social exclusion in a rich country like Kuwait relates to a persistent inherent dichotomy between sedentary peoples and Bedouins (Al-Nakib, 2014), in contexts where the concept of border can still be unclear. Such a dichotomy is evident in other Arab countries as well, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, and in the MENA region overall.

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Religion, in this case, never made any concrete difference to solving the problem, since most bidoon are Muslim, within Muslim-majority countries. No doubt, non-attribution of nationality in origin territories is a thorny issue. Besides, in origin countries the retention of nationality might depend on the loyalty to the state, which means in this case loyalty to the social contract (bay‘a), legitimising the existing political order, when the perception of threats to the status quo grows stronger. Legislative reform as far as the issue of statelessness is concerned is important, but it is still too limited: Kuwait has taken steps to promote the right to work for stateless people, some Lebanese mayors have issued ‘special papers’ to stateless children to allow them to register at school; Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Iraq have promoted some reforms as well in this direction, but further efforts are needed (Van Wass, 2010). We must admit that addressing statelessness in the MENA has been increasingly hindered by sensitive security and political issues related to the evolving situation in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Libya after 2011, which has made the number of migrants and refugees higher and higher. Discrepancies exist between the number of registered and unregistered refugees, as well depicted for instance by the case of a small country like Lebanon, where unofficial data indicate more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees against the official number of 952,562 of registered ones. Host countries both in the MENA and in Europe increasingly regard immigrants and refugees as a threat, even if migration has often been instrumental in national economic growth processes, as occurred, for instance, in the past in Germany with the Turkish community, in France with the Maghrebi communities and, when looking at a southsouth pattern, in the Gulf Arab countries, with communities coming from other parts of Asia and Africa. The Syrian refugee crisis that started in 2011 is certainly the most tragic one since the Palestinian refugee crisis began in 1948. It is an event that is marking the Middle East profoundly at the beginning of the new century. Gulf Arab countries offered financing to Arab states hosting Syrian refugees, and Saudi Arabia seems to have received more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees since the beginning of the war, but the Gulf Arab countries have not yet ratified the UN Convention on Refugees. Despite the economic and labour opportunities in the region, the lack of adequate reforms in immigration policy and in the kaf¯ ala (sponsorship) system, no inclusion and/or assimilation of refugees seem to be possible. A shift in the immigration pattern of a region like the Gulf confirmed as the

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most attractive pole to migrant flows after Europe and the US, is still to come, and the unrecognized refugee status here is another relevant issue (Al-Jabri, 2016). As for Maghrebi States (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), a major priority for them is to rethink their policies as regards the management of migrant flows from sub-Saharan Africa. This represents a great challenge for countries unable to fully control their southern borders, and to put an end to the smuggling mainly concentrated in their southern cities, where African migrants pay to make their journey to Europe. The instability of Libya after the fall of Qaddafi worsened the situation. Furthermore, North Africa’s young unemployed population, from Tunisia and Morocco, have been contributing to irregular immigration towards Europe. While Qaddafi had accepted to play a de facto proxy role for European policies to contain migratory flows, in clear violation of the migrants’ human rights, as depicted in European rhetoric, all the other Maghrebi States have refused such a role (Dris, 2013, 19). Cooperation with European countries on the issue has largely remained extremely limited and ineffective, since European border policy has been more and more dominated by the issue of irregular migration and Europe’s engagement with these countries has been increasingly seen as an engagement determined only by self-interest in ensuring barriers to migration. We may wonder: what is the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 almost thirty years on? The transformation of Europe from a normative to a realist power in its external relations with this part of the Muslim world is a fact, and the dramatic growth in migration flows has made North Africa both an origin and transient area. The creation of a zone of shared peace, stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean basin seems to be a shattered dream (Joffe, 2016, 324). Against this backdrop, and despite all the past failures and the challenges ahead, new initiatives should be developed within a rethought multilateral approach. Enhanced coordination between Europe and Islamic economic and financial institutions is still non-existent or too weak. Islamic finance is still underdeveloped in North Africa. The role played by the IsDB in the Sahel, for instance, is worth mentioning, but it is still a ‘drop in the ocean’. The role of schools and education in bridging the gap between origin and destination cultures is also essential and certainly needs to be strengthened, in order to promote coordination and joint projects between Europe on the one hand, and Muslim destination and transient countries, on the other.

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Institutions should pave the way, while people’s education should help to tackle cultural differences, in order to seek a shared model of coexistence, where unity is pursued in diversity.

Notes 1. See Chapter 8 by Annemarie Profanter. 2. My research work on history and social issues of the Gulf Arab region since the 1990s has led me to gain an insight into the phenomenon of migration in the Gulf, its evolution and specificities in the last thirty years: in Bahrain, in particular, I had the opportunity to meet and interview some members of Christian communities of migrants /expatriates, who helped me to know and understand their views on education and coexistence with Gulf Arab nationals. I am particularly grateful to Sister Idangela Meroni (1925–2018), director of the Sacred Heart School in Manama since the 1950s, for introducing me to these communities. My field work in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) carried out in 2012 was also important to contextualise some thorny issues related to urban sustainability and irregular migration in the Hejaz. 3. See Chapter 4 by Altea Pericoli. 4. See the case of Pakistanis in the Gulf in Chapter 3 by Gennaro Errichiello. 5. Translation by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an, Medina. 6. We do not know the exact numbers of Saudi citizens of the Hijaz, whose families are originally from many different regions of the Muslim world, from Asia to Africa, contributing to the cosmopolitan environment of the Hejaz, but their family names often attest to their origin, particularly when this is non-Arab, from Central Asia, India and China, for instance. They may be referred to as bag¯ aya hujj¯ aj (remnants of pilgrims) in Saudi Arabia, but officially they have Saudi nationality, according to the rules of the Saudi Arabian Nationality Statute (Niz¯ am al-jinsiyya al- ‘arabiyya al-sa ‘¯ udiyya, 1384 AH, Art. 3–4), dating back to the 1960s. 7. See Chapter 7 by Menna Taher. 8. See Chapter 6 by Colleen Bolland. 9. Thanks to Prof. Marinella Fumagalli for detailed information on this first judgement. 10. Saudi Arabia and Oman were the last two countries of the Arabian Peninsula to abolish it formally, respectively in 1962 and in 1970. 11. The fact that Burma Muslims, most of whom claim to belong to the Rohingya ethnic group, suffered increasing persecution in their country, which led them to a massive exodus by boat started in 2015, probably

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had an impact on this decision the same year, despite the fact that Saudi public opinion had often been quite critical of the illicit traffics ascribed to some members of the Burmese community living in the outskirts of Mecca, as declared by a local source in Jeddah in 2012. 12. The case of statelessness in Ceuta and Melilla is another interesting example, although it emerged in Spain. See Chapter 5 by Sergio Castaño Riaño.

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De Crussol, Y. (2010). ‘L’islam et la laïcité face à face’, selon l’imam Youssef al-Qaradawi, Christianisme et Islam (Foi et Loi), sous la direction de MarieThérèse Urvoy. Editions de Paris. De Poli, B. (2007). Arab television channels: The image of women between local and global trends. In E. Maestri & A. Profanter (Eds.), Arab women and the media in changing landscapes. Palgrave Macmillan. Diaw, A. (2017). Exploring the potential of diaspora Sukuk for OIC member countries. Islamic Economic Studies, 25, No. Special Issue April 2017. Diop, A., Johnston, T., & Le, K. T. (2018). Challenges in reforming the Kafala. In P. Fargues & N. M. Shah (Eds.), Migration to the Gulf: Policies in sending and receiving countries. GRC-EUI, Jeddah- Firenze. Dliouh, A. (2010). Perception par les Imams des travaux du Conseil Européen del Fatwa et des Recherches. In M. Younés (Ed.), Fatwa en Europe. Droit de minorité et enjeux d’intégration. PROFAC-CECR. Dresch, P. (2006). The place of strangers in gulf society. In J. Fox, N. MourtadaSabbah & M. al-Mutawa (Eds.), Globalisation and the gulf . Routledge. Dris, C. (2013). Historical and current overview of the security issue in the Maghreb. In Y. H. Zoubir & L. Dris-Ait-Hamadouche (Eds.), Praeger security international 2013. Santa Barbara. Duca, R. (2011). Family reunification: The case of the Muslim migrant children in Europe. Athens Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2), 111–120. Eickelman, D., & Piscatori, J. (Eds.) (1990). Muslim travellers. Pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination. Routledge. Fargues, P., & De Bel-Air, F. (2015). Migration to the gulf states: The political economy of exceptionalism. In D. Acosta Arcarao & A. Wiesbrock (Eds.), A global migration: Old assumptions, new dynamics,, Vol. 3, ABC-CLIO. Santa Barbara. Ghanem, Y. D. (Ed.). (2018). The Sahel: Europe’s African borders. European Institute of the Mediterranean. Gugler, T. (2010, January). The new religiosity of Tablighi Jama‘at and Da‘wate-Islami and the transformation of Islam in Europe.Anthropos: International Review of Anthropology and Linguistics Journal, 105(1), 121–136. Hatina, M. (2007). Identity politics in the Middle East. Bloomsbury Publishing. Heard-Bey. (2008). From tribe to state. The transformation of political structure in five states of the GCC. EDUCatt. Hampashire, K. (2002). Fulani on the move: Seasonal economic migration in the Sahel as a social process. The Journal of Development Studies, 38(5), 15–36. Hujo, K., & Piper, N. (Eds.). (2010). South-South migration. Palgrave Macmillan. IOM. (2018). UN migration agency. World migration report, 2010. International Social Service (ISS). (2008). Safeguarding children’s rights in national and international Kafala.

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Van Wass, L. (2010, October ). Stateless persons in the Middle East and North Africa. UNHCR Report. Verskin, A. (2015). Islamic law and the crisis of the reconquista: The debate on the status of Muslim communities in Christendom. Brill. Zaccaria, M. (2011). Lo spazio dei credenti e i confini della colonia. In U. C. Dirar, S. Palma, A. Triulzi, & A, Volterra, (Eds.), Colonia e postcolonia come spazi diasporici. Carocci.

CHAPTER 3

Migration, Integration and Belonging: Pakistani Migrants in Britain and in the United Arab Emirates Gennaro Errichiello

Introduction In Pakistan (and in South Asia), migration is a ‘family affair’ and is considered as part of people’s everyday life (Osella & Osella, 2000). Family represents the social unit that fosters migration of its members by using its networks and knowledge. It embodies a kind of intermediate institution that links together the sending and the receiving country (Harriss & Shaw, 2009). This chapter focuses on migration, integration and belonging among Pakistanis in Britain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In the chapter, I use Pakistanis to include those who were born in Pakistan and then have migrated to Britain; however, those who were born and brought up in Britain but have not obtained the British citizenship, and British citizens with a Pakistani background are identified as British Pakistanis. In

G. Errichiello (B) Fareham, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_3

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the UAE, Pakistanis (and all other migrant groups) are always considered as temporary migrants,1 even if they were born in the country. The difference between the Pakistani migration in Britain and the UAE relies, among others, on their diverse migration systems. The first pioneer Pakistani migrants in Britain are now an ethnic minority because they have settled down permanently, have obtained citizenship and their links with the Pakistani background are renegotiated in light of their status as British Pakistanis. On the contrary, in the UAE, and in the other Gulf countries, migrants are considered as temporary workers and their status cannot change, unless they are in a privileged position to obtain the Emirati citizenship that is, however, very unlikely to be granted (Lori, 2019). In the chapter, I introduce the notion of ‘migration project’ as an analytical framework in order to integrate social theory and migration studies. This concept moves beyond the idea of migrants as ‘victims solely of their circumstances’ (Mahdavi, 2011, 14) in order to recognise the prominent role and the practical and projective capacity of migrants able to make choices. In Britain, integration is under scrutiny by politicians, policy-makers (Saggar & Somerville, 2012) and academics (Mason, 2018). Multiculturalism seems to be questioned (Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018), and a sort of civic integration has been proposed, which is ‘aimed at creating a sense of identity and belonging among new immigrants and [is] marked by a process of distancing from the ethnicisation of social relationships that framed special treatment of targeted groups’ (Mattei & Broeks, 2018, 24–25). In the UAE, migration is characterised by temporariness, and integration is not in the political agenda. However, migrants’ temporary status has not prevented them from feeling a sense of belonging to the country, their status of permanent impermanence (Ali, 2010) has not inhibited the idea of considering the Emirati society as a ‘home’. A comparison between the two countries, which rely on different migration policies, state structures and societal organisation, is not possible and it is likely to lead to misunderstandings. As such, this chapter aims at discussing forms of governance of Pakistani migration in different contexts. It sheds light on integration and belonging as contextual and dynamic concepts, and it would be misleading to think of them as strictly interrelated or use them interchangeably. The former, which is invoked as a socio-political tool in most European countries, requires a top-down approach insofar as efforts of politicians, policy-makers and civil society

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are considered as necessary in order to implement policies, laws and adjustments to encourage and pursue integration of migrants. The latter, which is constructed and experienced by migrants in their everyday life, requires a bottom-up approach, and as such it does not involve any intervention from the top in order to be pursued, but migrants experience a sense of belonging regardless of any policy aimed at integrating them in the social fabric. However, such a demarcation is not clear-cut, as I will discuss, because Pakistani migrants can feel ‘integrated’ and develop a sense of belonging in light of an exclusionary policy, as it happens in the UAE, whereas they struggle to feel integrated in context where multiculturalism and integration are publicly debated, politically pursued and developed through measures aimed at overcoming a perceived sense of exclusion and discrimination, as it happens in Britain (Aston et al., 2007). The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss the role of structure and agency in migration studies on which the concept of migration project relies Then, I focus on research methods and some of the characteristics of Pakistani participants interviewed in Dubai. Before analysing the results of my field research, I discuss the Pakistani migration to Britain, which is encouraged and supported by the family unit. I thus focus on the historical evolution of Pakistani migration to the UAE. Then, I discuss the case study of Pakistani middle-class migrants in Dubai in order to highlight that, even though migration is a family affair, the Pakistani professionals also articulated and organised their migration experience in light of social capital created and acquired in migration context (to a certain extent this is evident among Pakistani migrants in Britain too). Then, I focus on integration and belonging as two important aspects of migration. Integration, which is a policy pursued by the British authorities, seems to have failed in encouraging the equal and full participation of migrants/ethnic groups in the mainstream society. In the UAE, where integration is not pursued by the authorities, the Pakistani middleclass migrants seem to have developed a sense of belonging in spite of their temporary status and the hierarchical social structure existing in the country. Lastly, I draw a conclusion by summarising the main points of the chapter.

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International Migration and Social Theory: The ‘Migration Project’ In this section, I introduce the notion of “migration project” as a theoretical framework in order to integrate the understanding of international migration with sociological theorising of structure and agency (Morawska, 2009). For Giddens (1984, 17), social theory “has the task of providing conceptions of the nature of human social activity and of the human agent which can be placed in the service of empirical work”. Social theory helps us understand how agents articulate their everyday life in specific time and place (O’Reilly, 2012a). General theories have been proposed in order to understand international migration (Massey et al., 2005). Such theories have focused on providing an explanation of migration in terms of a binary combination, e. g. functionalist/structuralist approaches. The functionalist approach emphasises the causes that push people to migrate in which such a decision is made by individuals on the basis of economic reasons (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). The structuralist approach focuses on the difference between societies meaning that “migration movements are in large part the result of unequal ‘structural’ relationships” (Addleton, 1992, 16). The distinction between these two different approaches is not clear-cut (Afsar, 2016), and they neglect the interaction between macro-structural forces and micro-lives of migrants (Bakewell, 2010; Morawska, 2009). Based upon the analytical framework proposed by Stones (2005)‚ Morawska (2007) and O’Reilly (2012a), I introduce the notion of ‘migration project’ which allows linking social theory and migration studies. It focuses on migrants’ agency but at the same time, it also considers how structures affect and shape human agency. This entails acknowledging that “society shapes individuals and, simultaneously, the individuals shape society in the ongoing process of mutual (re)constitution” (Morawska, 2007, 12). The migration project represents the set of choices, decisions, mechanisms, procedures and institutions through which migrants plan, shape and modify their migration experience, it is created and recreated every day. It values the agency of individuals, groups and households to mobilise resources in order to migrate and their knowledge of structures that can enable and constrain their agential capacity. Agents are “not only […] always rooted in a structural context, but [they …] inevitably [draw] upon their knowledge of that structural context when they engage in any sort of purposeful action” (Stones, 2005, 17). The idea of migration as

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a project seems to endorse the perception of a deterministic approach; however, the migration project is not immutable because migrants evaluate the situation and project their actions accordingly, they act in relation to the structural context, new circumstances and events taking place before undertaking the migration, during the journey, and upon their arrival (Mainwaring, 2016). The migration project relies on duality meaning that structure and agency are interrelated and conceived of as two reciprocally-inclusive components; it means that they are independent and that they have a certain autonomy granted. Giddens’s (1984) notion of duality relies on the idea that structures are part of agents as knowledgeability or memory traces (Stones, 2005). There is the mutual involvement of agents and structures and neither agents nor structures are given primacy; the connection between structure and agent “is complex because structure is part and parcel of the agent and the agent is part and parcel of the structure” (O’Reilly, 2012a, 17). The notion of duality appears to be the most useful framework to explain the historical-sociological evolution of migration. It conceives of structure and agency “as processes of continuous becoming (rather than as entities fixed in time) and their forms and contents as always changeable and never fully determined” (Morawska, 2013, 223). Structures are conceived of as “more or less enduring organisations of social (including economic and political) relations and cultural formations, [which] are created and recreated through the everyday practice of social actors” (Morawska, 2009, 3). They are constituted by a multiplicity of elements and characteristics, such as different organisations (e.g. migrant associations) and informal networks that make them endowed with different capacities to enable or constrain human agency (Morawska, 2009). The interrelatedness of structures and their link with human agency makes them mutable and dynamic (Sewell, 1992). This definition of structures resembles the idea of external structures as it has been proposed by Stones (2005) and O’Reilly (2012a). External structures are conditions of action; they “are, conceptually, the context that exists before the ‘agent in focus’ acts” (O’Reilly, 2012a, 23). In other words, external structures represent the structural context of action within which the agent in focus acts. There are also internal structures that drive human agency, such as habitus (Bourdieu, 1977; Stones, 2005), which is “the set of dispositions inculcated in each of us by conditioning that follows from our social environment” (Elder-Vass, 2010, 99). As O’Reilly (2012a, 26)

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acknowledges, the “habitus is both formed (a structural force) and continuing to be formed (an action), and is an attribute of individuals and of groups”. The habitus is produced by social conditioning and pushes us to behave in ways that reproduce the existing practices; it might be viewed as virtual at least in the sense that it represents a repertoire of knowledge that individuals have acquired through their social life and unconsciously transmitted from practice to practice (Sewell, 1992); however, it does not mean that the role of reflexivity is underestimated. For Elder-Vass (2010), individuals have choices to make every day and this pushes them to ‘act in situ’, to reflexively act in relation to the context especially in times of crisis. Agency is an attribute of all humans (Sewell, 1992), and for Giddens (1984), structures enable and constrain human agency. For Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 970, original emphasis), human agency means. the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the temporal-relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.

In their definition, they identify three different but analytically intertwined dimensions: the iterational, projective and practical-evaluative. The iterational dimension means that agents recall, select and apply the takenfor-granted schemas of action developed through the past interactions. In migration studies, this dimension of human agency relates to what Massey et al. (2005) defined as the ‘culture of migration’ meaning that migration has become part and parcel of individuals’ everyday life, especially in specific socio-economic and cultural contexts. The projective dimension means that human actors are also inventors of new possibilities for thought and action; agents tend to act reflexively in order to reconfigure their actions to their hopes and desires for the future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The projective dimension relies on actors’ capacity to move from past orientations towards future possibilities. The practical-evaluative dimension means that actors have the capacity to identify and respond to the emergent circumstances in the present situation by looking at the past and future (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Actors exercise their agency in order to pursue their aims and projects thus challenging and transforming the context of action itself.

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These three dimensions do not correspond to a temporal sequence (past, present and future), but they explain that social action is constructed through “a sequentiality of discrete acts or stages of one act” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, 972). As these three dimensions of agency illustrate, there is interrelatedness between human agency and structural context. A certain degree of autonomy and reflexivity on the part of agents is, however, recognised. The agency of individuals is not always predetermined and taken-for-granted, and individuals can exert their reflexive capacity. As Giddens (1984) points out, agents are always able to act otherwise; or as O’Reilly (2012a, 19) has put it, it “is always possible to say no, or to refuse to comply”. In conclusion, the migration project relies on the duality of structure. Social actors bend their habitual responses and future-oriented projects to their evaluation of the practical circumstances of the moment. As Morawska (2009) points out, this evaluation relies on the capacity of actors to appropriate, reproduce, and potentially project in relation to their interests, circumstances and events. This capacity, which is a common feature of socially embedded actors, is based upon cultural orientations and resources available in a specific time and place. Thus conceptualised, the migration project relies on duality in which the capacity of migrants to move into or between different environments and challenge new circumstances becomes evident, and their agency is enabled and constrained by structures. The notion of migration project allows recognising that “(im)migrants’ activities are neither simply the products of structures nor their agentic volitions but of the time- and place-specific contexts of the interactions between the two” (Morawska, 2009, 6). I will discuss this notion in the following sections in relation to the Pakistani migration in Britain and the UAE.

Research Methods The chapter relies on a desk-based approach of the extant literature on migration from Pakistan to Britain and the UAE, and a qualitative research method. The qualitative approach is based upon unstructured interviews and informal conversations with twenty Pakistani middle-class migrants in Dubai, and such a status was part of their background; a group that has hitherto not been studied. My sample was formed of fifteen men and five women, who were interviewed in Dubai in October

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and November 2014, and in October and November 2015. The interviewees were recruited via snowball sampling, where the first contacts were used to recruit other participants from their acquaintances, friends and family members. The occupations of my participants are varied (managers, executives, doctor, teacher) and this exemplifies how the category of middle-class professionals is varied and stratified; the average or typical length of an interview is between one hour and a half and six hours, the tape-recorded interviews were then transcribed and analysed by adopting thematic analysis in order to let themes, patterns and issues emerge from the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006); the majority of my participants are first-generation migrants but some of my participants are members of the second and third generation of Pakistanis who were born and brought up in the UAE or in other Gulf countries; their ages ranged from their 20s to their 70s; they are all born Muslim, with most of them being Sunni Muslims, while one participant was an Ism¯ a ¯ılï 2 Muslim and one was an atheist with an Islamic background (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021). This sample is limited in terms of gender; the majority of my interviewees were men, and I only had conversations with five Pakistani women. There are several reasons for the relatively small presence of (Muslim) Pakistani women in my sample. First, as a white Western and non-Muslim researcher, it is very difficult to approach Muslim women because of the traditional division of male and female space. In the Emirati society (and in the other Arab and Islamic countries but with different perspectives), gender segregation is seen as a way to safeguard family honour, and women “represent the public face of the family and it is women who pass honor [sic] to their male descendants” (Bristol-Rhys, 2010, 96). In this kind of society, as Bristol-Rhys (2010) argues, honour and modesty, which are both associated with the public behaviour of women, have to be protected and safeguarded. Any meetings between a male researcher and a woman participant would have to be chaperoned, thus creating an additional barrier to the recruitment. Second, in relation to Pakistani professionals, the small sample of professional women also relates to the difficulties I had with gaining potential access to Pakistani professional women via my key informant, Hamza, who was able to provide the contacts of some Pakistani women, but only a few of them accepted to be involved and to participate in my research. Third, most Pakistani men in Dubai are the main breadwinners in their family units, they undertake the initial migration and they travel on their own. Some of my male interviewees told me that they moved to Dubai on their own and that their

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wives (and children) only joined them after a few years. On all of these grounds, it is easier to facilitate research with professional Pakistani men than with professional Pakistani women. As O’Reilly (2012b, 45) acknowledges, sampling is ongoing thus meaning that deciding “who to spend time with, where to be, what to watch and so on in not one-off decision, but is part of the practice of ethnography”. In other words, during my field research I also decided to spend time and interview other individuals who were likely to enable a wider perspective on migration in Dubai. It happened that during my field research I met other people that I thought could provide a more insightful and/or a different perspective. I also interviewed Emiratis, an Indian, and a Jordanian. Further to the more formal interviews, my research relied upon informal conversations in the Pakistan Association Dubai, field notes, observations, and on many spontaneous conversations I also had with taxi drivers (especially Indians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Ethiopians) and with waiters/waitresses (mostly Filipinos) in restaurants where I had meals, and with some Westerners I met. The participants have been anonymised, and their names changed.

The Pakistani Migration to Britain The evolution of Pakistani migration to Britain is embedded in the colonial links, in the Indians, who eventually become Pakistanis, migrated during the First and Second World Wars, and then in the shortages in the British labour market during the post-war period in the 1950s and 1960s where the British Nationality Act (1948) granted UK citizenship, among others, to Pakistanis (Chaudhary, 2018). In this section, I discuss the evolution of Pakistani migration to Britain, and it emerges the role played by pioneer Pakistani migrants in encouraging and creating a ‘bridge’ between Britain and Pakistan in order to facilitate migration of their family members. In the 1970s, when British authorities, and the other Western European countries, changed their migration policies, migrants started to think of Britain as their country of settlement in such a way to become an ethnic minority. According to the last census in 2011, Pakistanis living in Britain are more than 1.7 million, they are the second largest ethnic group in Britain,

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after Indians (Office for National Statistics, 2011). The Pakistani community in Britain is mostly characterised by its internal diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, gender, generation, social and economic status. Migration from Pakistan to Britain has been studied by several scholars who have emphasised the prominent role of household in the decisionmaking process and the role and formation of transnational families in Britain (Akhtar, 2013; Anwar, 1979; Shaw, 1988). In Pakistan, family relationships are strictly determined by age and gender gender (Shaw, 1988) in particular, the eldest man represents and embodies the head of the family, and as such he “decides where a son or a younger brother will live and work. When a man is sent abroad or to the city in Pakistan, he is expected to send money to the family at home and feel himself bound by this obligation” (Shaw, 1988, 73). In this socio-cultural context, migration is driven by a decision-making process in which is the family or at least the eldest member of the family decides who has to migrate and uses his knowledge, power and networks to facilitate the migration of his kin members (Werbner, 1990). Harriss and Shaw (2009) identify four different phases of Pakistani migration to Britain, which overlap but conventionally distinct because of their different dynamics (Ballard, 1994; Charsley, 2013; Harriss & Shaw, 2006; Werbner, 1990). The first phase occurred between the 1950s and early 1970s. This was followed by other three phases, the second is the family reunion that occurred from the mid 1960s through to the 1980s […] a third phase, that of migration marriage, beginning in the 1980s and continuing throughout the 1990s to the present […] an additional fourth phase, migration for family care, entailing long or short term migrations for the care of elderly kin. (Harriss & Shaw, 2009, 107)

During the first phase, from the 1950s, households and families encouraged men of their group to migrate. Migration was mostly characterised by single men who were sent abroad with the hope that, because of obligations towards their kin group or family, they could remit money to improve their homes, establish a business and pay a dowry. The migration project focuses on the agency of individuals, groups and households and their knowledge of structures that can enable and constrain their agential capacity. It is shaped by the ability of individuals (potential migrants, heads of the family) to mobilise their knowledge and use their power to encourage and drive migration. Through chain

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employment developed among kin networks, potential migrants are aware of recruitment opportunities in some industrial sectors in Britain (Kalra, 2000). They, embedded in kin or social networks, use their social capital to migrate. In this regard, the following quote is interesting. Bashir‚ one of the first migrants in Britain, said: I had a friend from my next village. He was working in Barking and he was living in Barking. So that’s why I came to Barking […]. It depends where is your friend. (Harriss & Shaw, 2009, 112)

The above quotation demonstrates an individual’s agency to make a decision (presumably encouraged and supported by his family) to migrate and his ability to use social capital and project his life abroad. The primary importance of mobilising social capital, which is possessed by his group of kinship or fictive kinship (Werbner, 1990), is converted in economic capital that allows Bashir to earn and remit money to family left behind (Bourdieu, 1997). At the core of the notion of migration project there is the concept of duality, which implies to treat structure and agency as independent variables but mutually interdependent. It means that structures can affect human agency and their externality has somehow to be recognised to them because they are conditions of action (O’Reilly, 2012a). Immigration laws represent external structures that can enable and constrain human agency. Pakistani migrants arriving under the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, which ensured vouchers to some categories of migrants, especially those who were in need to supply the shortage of the local workforce (Spencer, 2010), were aware of which rules and laws had been implemented in Britain, they were knowledgeable agents who mobilised their social capital to migrate. Saeed, one former student who arrived in Britain in 1963‚ applied for a visa. He said: I applied for a visa to go to England in 1962 and got it in 1963. I had started an advanced science course (FSC) at school, but it was getting difficult and my friends had started going to England as an alternative. They said, ‘Why don’t you come too? After two years there you will be rich’. I was young then, about nineteen, I didn’t know any better, and I went. (Quotation from Shaw, 1988, 26)

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The above quotation is relevant because it shows the use of social capital and knowledge of structures that can enable or constrain migrants’ agency. When Saeed was invited by his friends to join them, they used their new knowledge and networks created in migration context to encourage and help him to move to Britain. Saeed made a conscious decision to migrate by adopting social capital possessed both by his family and his friend already settled down in Britain. Social capital is thus reconstituted by individuals in migration. In the mid-1970s, when immigration policies became more restrictive, family reunification was the main tool through which migrants, especially women, could arrive in Britain (Spencer, 2010). Family reunion could be perceived as a way to fulfil economic obligations towards families and kinship groups in Pakistan especially when migration of sons and nephews was encouraged (Harriss & Shaw, 2009). In this regard, wives were viewed as passive agents, who had left back in Pakistan and look after the home and rearing children while men were abroad. This perspective tends to underestimate women’s agency and their involvement in the decision-making process. However, the adoption of women-centred networks to get access and facilitate migration can subvert and obscure their husbands and senior male kin power (Harriss & Shaw, 2009). Khadija’s husband had an affair with a Russian woman in Bradford, and his wife with their daughter, Nasreen, who recounts what her mum did to go to Britain, decided to mobilise her social capital to migrate. She went through different channels […]. So she found out there was a family coming to England […]. So my mum asked relatives if they would help my mum come to England because my father wouldn’t send us a visa or the ticket money or anything. (Harriss & Shaw, 2009, 117)

The above quotation is a clear example of women’s agency and their ability to mobilise resources in order to migrate, their migration experience is thus embodied and perceived as empowering women and their agency. Khadija’s knowledge of rules and adoption of resources made her a breadwinner in her migration experience, she consciously decided in accordance and with the help of her family members to project migration. Marriage migration is another way through which migration from Pakistan has developed. It has been very popular from the mid-1980s until the present. Transnational marriage enhances kin networks ad increases ‘in-group’ solidarity (Charsley, 2013). It also reinforces the role

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of women and their agency especially in relation to the obligations and authority exerted by mothers-in-law. In the case of British Pakistanis, “women express the hope that marrying a young man from ‘back home’ will carry the weighty advantage of escaping the experience of having to live with their in-laws after marriage” (Harriss & Shaw, 2009, 121). Transnational marriage still represents a way to encourage and facilitate migration. However, it is not accepted as such by the new generation of British Pakistanis, who are renegotiating their role within the family (Errichiello, 2009). In this regard, “marriages between families or cousins within the UK were becoming increasingly important, reflecting young peoples’ changed expectations and enabling participants to play an active role in the decision making” (Dwyer, 2000, 479). For young Pakistanis, who were born and brought up in Britain, transnational marriage is viewed as difficult to pursue in light of the differences existing between them and those who were born and brought up in Pakistan (Errichiello, 2009). Although it is not rejected, it is viewed with suspicion because they “believe that linguistic and cultural issues would be major obstacles if a partner came from South Asia” (Samad & Eade, 2003, 90). Transnational family care represents a new way in which migration is developed. Migration and the lifecycle are strictly interrelated (Harriss & Shaw, 2006). Member of Pakistani families are getting older and be in Pakistan or in Britain, elders “are felt to have entitlements and claims to care from their family members, even those who are separated and living on other continents” (Harriss & Shaw, 2009, 125). This new form of migration relies on responsibility and obligations from young family members towards elders and entails moving back and forth between Pakistan and Britain. British Pakistanis evaluate the current situation and project a long-term and temporary resettlement in Pakistan or the movement of elderly members of the family to Britain. There are two important aspects in this form of migration. First, it is a sort of circular migration, which does not rely on economic reasons, but on the need felt and perceived by some members among British Pakistanis to look after their elderly members. This entails investing and using their social capital to help members who need help and support. Second, social capital acquired and developed in migration is used and mobilised to help the elders. In other words, British Pakistanis are fully aware of the rules and laws concerning family reunion and try to adopt all strategies and mobilise their social capital developed and reconstituted in Britain in order to allow the older family members to migrate.

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In conclusion, Pakistani migration is developed within the family or kin group. Social capital is used and mobilised in order to allow their family members to migrate. In a patriarchal society, pater familias exerts his role as head of the family and his power and authority is respected by family members. Social networks can be conceived of as institutions that operate by virtue of their social capital, they mobilise it in order to perpetuate migration and allow their group members to move, earn and remit money back home. Through the stories of Pakistani migrants, it emerges their enterprising capacity to make choices for themselves and their family, and their knowledge of the structural context, which will be evident, in the next sections, in relation to the Pakistani migration to the UAE.

Migration from Pakistan to the UAE Migration both within and outside the Gulf countries has historical roots and the modern migration patterns developed especially at the beginning of the twentieth century when oil was discovered in the region (Errichiello, 2012). In the UAE, the historical presence of Pakistanis relates to the presence of Baluchis, who are now naturalised Emiratis and mostly employed in the UAE police forces (Jahani, 2014). In the 1960s, “over 100 Pakistani families […] had come to work as shopkeepers, tailors, and barbers” in the UAE (Davidson, 2008, 90). Most of the initial Pakistani migrants went to the Gulf region and especially to the UAE to work in the trading and fishery industries, the emerging oil industry and in the construction sector (Davidson, 2005). In 1971, when the UAE federation was created (Davidson, 2005), Pakistan was the first country that recognised the new polity in the region by establishing its embassy (Ahmed, 1984). The links became stronger in the 1980s when the airline company of Dubai, the Emirates Airline, was established with the support of the Pakistan International Airlines (Davidson, 2008). In the 1970s, the economic boom pushed the UAE authorities to recruit foreign workers to implement its construction and development plans. South and East Asian countries became the first providers of unskilled and semi-skilled foreign workers to the Gulf countries (Arnold & Shah, 1984). At the end of the 1960s, in Pakistan, many infrastructural projects carried out by foreign construction companies and financed by international organizations were coming to an end (Nichols, 2008). These construction firms also moved to the Gulf region to implement

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infrastructural projects as a consequence of the mid-1970s oil boom, and they recruited experienced Pakistani workers. Migrants from Pakistan to the Gulf countries brought a wide range of skills from unskilled to highly skilled (Addleton, 1992). Pakistanis worked in every economic sector, from construction to street cleaning to shop-keeping and from banking to the university sector. They were mostly men who migrated alone, leaving their wives and families at home and sending back remittances. The current presence of Pakistanis in the UAE is estimated at 1, 200 million (Gulf Labour Market and Migration, 2015). While most Pakistani migrants are men who work in the maledominated construction sector, the presence of Pakistani women in the Emirati labour market is largely unknown. Since the 1970s, the Pakistani government has intentionally restricted the migration of female domestic workers to the Gulf due to women’s experiences of abuse and harassment in this specific niche of the Gulf labour market (Breeding, 2012). These restrictions have been partially removed, but there is a requirement that Pakistani women to work abroad in the domestic sector have to be aged 35 years or more (1979 Emigration Rules).3 The majority of Pakistani female migrants in the UAE migrate as dependants (and in some cases with their children); while some work as professionals, others are employed in the domestic sector or work as housewives. Migration from Pakistan is a ‘family affair’, where the households are involved in the decision-making process. In the UAE, Pakistanis are employed in different sectors, it is a male-oriented migration; Pakistani women migrate as dependants and just a few of them are employed in jobs outside of the domestic sphere. This will become evident in the following section, where I will focus on personal stories of some Pakistani middle-class professionals in Dubai and their channels of migration. Pakistani Middle-Class Migrants in Dubai Migration from the Global South is viewed as a way to alleviate the poor economic conditions and trigger development (Castles & De Haas, 2010; Miller, 2009). The migration-development nexus is, however, controversial. Ballard (2003) illustrates the role played by remittances in fostering development in Pakistan. According to him, the debate on migration and development should be framed within the local and global context where the remittances are a useful tool to start development. But it

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has to be supported by the state or government because a remittancesdriven development is not substantially a proper development especially when the government does not put in place actions to foster it. One of my participants, Jamal, an Indian professional who has spent more than fifteen years in Dubai, described the migration-development nexus as a win–win situation. He said: I think it is a win-win situation on both sides. The market benefits, the country grows, the expatriates benefit through the money that they make out here, their home country grows in terms of remittances, most importantly families of the workers here benefit greatly because they are always economically upwardly mobile. So, I think the number of cases where people who has suffered and not benefited because of the system here is very few compare to the number of people who have benefited. So overall, I think it is a win-win situation on both sides. (Interview with Jamal, Dubai, 03/11/2014)

Jamal has a very well-paid job in the Emirati government. During my research, I met him several times and he always contended that the migration experience is positive for many migrants because it serves, to a certain extent, to alleviate their poor economic conditions, and he also argued that would-be migrants are aware of the working and living conditions before migrating to Dubai. His reasoning relies on the idea that it is better to have a job, with all the constraints and difficulties attached to this job, rather than being unemployed in the home country. However, in the above quotation, Jamal underestimates the uncertainties that derive from being a migrant, which demands the need to move to a new country and the separation from the family. He tends to emphasise the economic advantages of migration, but he underestimates its social and emotional impacts on migrants’ lives (e.g. separation, dislocation). Ahmed (1984) argued that migration from Pakistan to Dubai has also psychological consequences that led some migrants to suffer the so-called ‘Dubai syndrome’ derived from the harsh working and living conditions, isolation, separation and loneliness experienced by some of them. In Pakistan, and throughout the South Asian region, remittances and social prestige, which derive from being a migrant in the Gulf countries, drive migration. Gardner (2010) underscored the importance of being perceived by fellow townsmen and family as a successful migrant even though this might not be ‘true’ because the family back home has

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invested money in migration, and they expect that their family member is successful and could remit as much money as possible back home. Naseer, one of my participants, is a Pakistani man that migrated to the Gulf region in 1979. Now he is retired, and he still lives in Dubai where he has established his own company. He described migration to Dubai as a valued experience but with many problems and constraints. He said: […] in our Asian countries if somebody says that I want to take you to Dubai for him is the end of the world. Some people I know in Pakistan they sell their land, they sell their animals, which is their only means of earning to come to Dubai and if they are not in the right place, they have to go back, and they struggle actually. It is true that the life here is unmatchable, it is one of the finest places to live but cost of living in Dubai is very high. (Interview with Naseer, Dubai, 24/10/2015)

Naseer grasped the impact of the ‘migration fever’ (Ballard, 2003) on the households and the uncertainties of the migration experience that in some cases push people to change their migration project upon their arrival in Dubai. In the above quotation, the projective dimension of human agency emerges clearly. Migrants situated in a specific time and place adopt strategies and mobilise their resources in order to cope with new events and circumstances (Stones, 2005). Migration, at least in the South Asian context, is mostly a ‘family affair’. Family is thus involved in the migration project, which sometimes entails mortgaging “themselves to the hilt to raise the necessary cash” (Ballard, 2003, 29). As Naseer acknowledges, it is important to be perceived by family as a successful migrant and project a positive image of the migration experience in Dubai. In Pakistan and in other South Asian countries, migration is perceived as a ‘rite of passage’ (Osella & Osella, 2000). Hakim, one of my participants, arrived in Dubai in 2008, when he was nineteen years old. When his father died, he had to find a job to support his family. He decided to move to Dubai where he has been able to get a good job in a private company. He defined exactly the condition in which the poor young Pakistanis are embedded when they decide to migrate to Dubai, and anxiety and expectations that their families ‘put on their shoulders’. He said: […] you leave your family and the impression in such class [blue-collar workers] is that once you move over there [Dubai] your life is set. I have

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met some people; they ask “what do you do?” And their answer is “I am in Dubai”, the next answer nobody is going to ask: “what do you do in Dubai?” They are just get satisfied: “Oh!!! you are in Dubai so you are settled” […] When they move back obviously they are there for one month or 20 days or 30 days, they spend more than normal, because they spend for their families and to provide them with some comforts to give them a better life and enjoy as most as we are together. Other people perceive “oh wow, he is rich, he is making much”. They want to come to Dubai as well. They are looking like people that have made money. Even though the actual thing is that you are not making money, you are not making much into that but this sort of things actually makes them believe that they are making much, and they even take loans to come over here. (Interview with Hakim, Dubai, 15/10/2015)

Hakim emphasised that migration, at least in Dubai, is perceived by other fellow townsmen and families as an experience that can change positively people’s life. This perception is reinforced and perpetuated by migrants upon their visits in the home villages because they buy things that most of them cannot afford, and they tend to project the image of migration as a fruitful experience that can lead some benefits and advantages to the whole family (Osella & Osella, 2000). Currently, the recruitment process of Pakistani migrants overseas is regulated and controlled by Pakistan’s Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE). In the private sector, the recruitment occurs through the Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs). However, overseas employment can also occur through social networks, friends and relatives already residing in the destination country. All the interviewees in this study migrated to Dubai by using their networks. Hamza, who worked in a bank in Pakistan, in the 1970s, was moved to a local branch in Qatar. He said: I was working in Pakistan in a bank, and I was moved to Doha in Qatar, at the end 1973 […] I worked there for two years, and then I worked in a […] bank in Qatar, and I moved to the UAE in [the 1990s]. (Interview with Hamza, Dubai, 06/11/2014)

Hamza, in other conversations, underscored that he was keen to enjoy the expereince to live and work in the Gulf region. His migration was defined through the contacts and his networks created in the workplace

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that helped him to migrate; he mobilised social capital acquired as an executive in a bank to project his life in a new country. Pakistani middle-class migrants used different channels to migrate, some of my participants arrived through marriage, whereas others easily found a job through a friend already settled in the Gulf countries; nonetheless others migrated when they were teenagers, so they were brought up in Dubai and thus consider it as their ‘home’. Ibrahim, one of my Pakistani participants, arrived in Dubai at the beginning of the 1970s and he started working as a chartered accountant. In the course of few years, he had good job positions in several Emirati and international companies. He migrated because a friend of his, who lived in Dubai, needed his help. He said: […] was invited by a friend of mine in Dubai, and at that time, he was the editor of one company where he needed some help because I have been a senior mentor to him. It was in 1973. (Interview with Ibrahim, Dubai, 18/10/2015)

Ibrahim’s story shows how capital is renegotiated in migration. He mobilised his social capital acquired in Dubai in order to find new jobs and settle down in the UAE. Whereas, Muhammad moved to Dubai in 1975, when he was very young because his father was working in a local company. He studied in the UK and after graduation he returned to Dubai where he established his own company. He said: I came here in 1975, as a young boy, I went to school in Dubai […]. I was born in Pakistan and I came here when I was ten years old. (Interview with Muhammad, Dubai, 25/10/2015)

Muhammad’s story (as that of Naseer) is significant because he created his own company in Dubai by mobilising social capital acquired as a migrant. Ibrahim and Muhammad migrated to Dubai by adopting and using different channels and had different migration stories. Some of my participants migrated for economic reasons, such as better jobs and better economic conditions, while others were born in the Gulf region (Oman and Kuwait), and others migrated when they were very young and were brought up in the UAE.

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The stories presented above resonate with how their migration project relied on a combination of taking advantage of the socio-economic conditions in Dubai, their knowledge of the local rules and laws, their capacity to mobilise and use their contacts in order to migrate (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021). Migration was part of their background, but they reflexively made decision to migrate in light of practical and projective dimensions (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).

Integration and Belonging The migration of Pakistanis in Britain and the UAE is fostered by postcolonial links to the former, and driven by socio-cultural, religious and economic factors to the latter. However, the way they interact with the host societies is different and determined by the structural context in which they are settled down. The second and third generation of British Pakistanis have to deal with the issue of integration, which is more important than it was for the first generation who arrived between the 1950s and 1960s and whose migration project relied mostly on the myth of return (Anwar, 1979). These new generations of British Pakistanis “feel frustrated by what they [perceive] to be a higher barrier to citizenship than they could overcome because of their visible identity as ‘Pakistani’” (Akhtar, 2013, 110–111). Unlike British Pakistanis, Pakistani migrants in the UAE, who are unlikely to obtain citizenship, do not perceive integration as a political issue, and they tend to construct their sense of belonging in their everyday life and practices, and by sharing spaces and places with other fellow nationals and nationalities; it seems that Dubai is a ‘privileged area’ where they share their everyday life with other fellow nationals and nationalities and where they interact without worrying and questioning the local authorities about their permanent settlement in the country. In this section, I discuss how integration and belonging are experienced in these two different contexts. Integration is a multidimensional concept that has never been clearly defined in Britain (Akhtar, 2013), it seems to bring with it a negative connotation because it appears to overlook the responsibility of the institutions of the receiving society in breaking down barriers like discrimination (Spencer, 2010). Spencer (2010, 203) conceives of integration as “processes of interaction between migrants the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate economic, social, cultural, and civic participation and an inclusive sense of belonging”. Collyer et al.

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(2020, 2) define integration “a set of normative assumptions, practices, policies and discourses that are always embedded in specific contexts and directed to particular groups or categories of people”. In Britain, integration has mostly been devoted to protecting ethnic minorities rather than migrants from their unfair treatment in the public and private spheres (Saggar & Somerville, 2012), and, in fact, migrants put in place processes of integration against the state policy (Schweitzer, 2017). Thus, politicians and policy-makers have focused on multiculturalism meaning that the different ethno-cultural and religious communities would have their ‘diversity’ recognised by the authorities. This aspect is discussed by Modood (2013, 36), who argues that multiculturalism “refers to the struggle, political mobilisation but also the policy and institutional outcomes, to the forms of accommodation in which ‘differences’ are not eliminated, are not washed away but to some extent recognized”. In British multiculturalism, ‘diversity’ is viewed as a common and collective value to be enhanced and preserved in order to encourage the integration of ethnic minorities. For Modood (2013), multiculturalism advocates the recognition of the ‘difference’ rather than ‘culture’ or cultural identities, but, at the same time, it seems to encourage minority groups to feel separated and not integrated (Mattei & Broeks, 2018). In this regard, I am taking on board the perspective proposed by Mason (2018, 28) who views integration as combined “with a commitment to the recognition or accommodation of cultural minorities in the formulation and interpretation of laws and policies, and in the design of rules for public institutions”. For Mason (2018, 39), integration has not to be necessarily based upon the promotion of values and traditions of a shared national identity, rather it should rely on the process of identification where different religious and cultural communities “might be encouraged to attend to the reasons for valuing British institutions and practices that are available within their own particular moral outlooks”. Integration is not necessarily a final and just outcome of the process of mutual adjustment and adaptation (Modood, 2013) in which values, customs and traditions of minority and majority groups are adjusted in order to fit in with each other. Multiculturalism seems to have neglected integration because of its emphasis on accommodating cultural diversity with the implementation of specific procedures, policies and laws (Mason, 2018). Modood (2013, 44), considers multiculturalism as similar to integration insofar as “multiculturalism assumes a two-way process of integration”, which means that “members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic

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minorities are required to do something”, but multiculturalism “work differently for different groups. This is because […] each group is distinctive and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the ‘multi’)”. However, for Modood (2013, 45), multicultural “accommodation of minorities is different from integration because it recognizes the social reality of groups (not just of individuals and organizations)”. The studies on integration among Pakistanis in Britain have mostly highlighted two important points. First, integration becomes a heated topic only in terms of public crisis, it is viewed “as purely a cosmetic and the current flavour of the month” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, 47). Integration is perceived as an unattainable social policy, in the sense that some Pakistanis have emphasised how challenging is social mobility for them, so “it is difficult for Pakistanis to move into white neighbourhoods, and […] due to isolation, had subsequently returned to areas with high concentrations of Pakistanis” (DCLG, 2009, 42). This is further supported by research conducted by Shah et al. (2010, 1123) on educational attainment and career aspirations among British Pakistanis. In their study‚ they argue that education is viewed and pursued because it can guarantee a sort of social mobility but, especially among working-class British Pakistanis, such an aspiration seems to be constrained by “experiences and perceptions of racialised gendered labour markets” in Britain. Qualifications are seen as a route to obtain a good job, however, as Dale et al. (2002, 949) argued, most Pakistani (and Bangladeshi) boys and girls are “very aware of the difficulty in competing with white young people in the labour market”; discrimination in the British labour market is perceived by British Pakistanis as a constraint that conspires against integration. Second, the difficulty of integration among British Pakistanis is evident in some cities, such as Birmingham, where studies conducted by Abbas (2009, 288) have emphasised that they “continue to live excluded lives, existing near or at the bottom of local area economic and social contexts”. This implies that integration is rather impossible from a weak socio-economic position, which is commonly evident among Pakistanis in Britain (Abbas, 2009). Thus, some members of the Pakistani community feel that barriers to integration still persist in the British society. The sense of discomfort deriving from a racialised labour market and cultural dislocation lead British Pakistanis to feel that they belong neither to their country of origin nor the country of settlement, and this seems to create barriers to integration (Dar, 2019).

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As Mason (2018, 33) argues, a “fully integrated society in which groups, though they retain their particular identities, participate as equals and interact meaningfully in all the major spheres of society” does not necessarily means that is a just society. The different religious and cultural communities should interact and participate in the British society and institutions by retaining their own outlook; however, a sort of civic integration, especially in the education sector where citizenship education has become of primary importance, seems to prevail, which entails adopting the main national rules and models (Mattei & Broeks, 2018). As such, this model is contested by Mason (2018) for whom discrimination, hostility and poor social mobility experienced by minority groups could inhibit the development of a sense of belonging and adherence to the values of British national identity. The study conducted by Hussain and Bagguley (2005, 421) on riots in Britain in 2001, sheds light on the discrepancy and difficulty in defining British national identity, especially for the second generation of British Pakistanis, who “feel themselves to be part of the national community at the level of their identities as citizens, but they do not feel themselves to be British in the conventional sense of national identity”. They express the existence of multiple identities which make it complicated the development of shared British national identity and values in light of discrimination and marginalisation that they experience as Muslim British Pakistanis. The formation and the awareness of Muslim identity are of primary importance for young Muslims (Elshayyal, 2018). In particular, Jacobson (1997, 239) argues that young Muslim British Pakistanis consider Islam more than ethnicity, which is viewed as marginal, as a source of identity formation, and “they affirm their belief in its teachings and regard it as something in relation to which they should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life and which therefore demands of them a self-conscious and explicit commitment”. Therefore, Muslim identity represents a prominent marker of British Pakistani identity, but this clashes with “the cultural dislocation of young Muslims from mainstream [British] society and the need for integration”, which is, however, perceived as fragile even among those who feel integrated (Akhtar, 2013, 120). In the UAE, integration is not part of the political agenda because of the ‘demographic imbalance’ meaning that migrants (88.5%) outnumber nationals (11.5%) (De Bel-Air, 2018). If we conceive of integration as a process of mutual adjustment and adaptation, it is evident that it cannot be pursued in the Emirati context. In this regard, Pakistani

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middle-class migrants have developed a sense of belonging to the host society, which is constructed by sharing everyday life and experiences with people of different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. I am taking on board the definition of belonging provided by Anthias (2013). Belonging is emotional and affective ties; it is boundary-making and boundarybreaking. People belong ‘to’ a group, but people belong ‘with’ ‘others’ in everyday life to different locales and situations. For my participants to be a Pakistani in Dubai means sharing experiences and everyday life with other fellow nationals and individuals of different ethno-national, cultural and religious backgrounds, and it also means adopting a specific lifestyle resulting from the context, and social location (e.g. class). To be a Pakistani in Pakistan means affirming a different lifestyle, (re-)adapting to a different context (especially for those participants who were brought up in Dubai and return home for short visits), and as such, belonging is experienced and embodied in a different way according to the specific context. For Pakistani middle-class migrants interviewed in Dubai, in Pakistan, ethnicity and regionalism seem to be ‘re-activated’, thus a sense of belonging is built by ‘recovering’ family background, heritage, past and customs, whereas, in the UAE, regionalism and ethnic identity seem to be subsumed under the label ‘Pakistani-ness’ (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021). In the UAE, migrants are considered as temporary and their status and permanence are regulated by the sponsorship system (kaf¯ ala), through ul ) can enter and work legally (Dito, which a migrant worker4 (makf¯ 2014). A migrant worker who wishes to obtain a temporary work permit to be employed needs a kaf¯ıl (sponsor). The kaf¯ıl, who must be a national or a local company, takes financial and legal responsibility for the migrant. This means that every migrant is tied to a local employer creating an income for nationals. Such a system also determines social interaction because it is a structure of dominance in which the employer is primarily involved in the management of migration (Longva, 1997). The UAE is characterised by a hierarchical social structure. Hierarchies are evident in local and transnational companies, where payment scales are based on nationality rather than skills. Consequently, South Asian employees are paid less than Westerners, who are sometimes less qualified and experienced. Ethno-racial hierarchies go hand in hand with gender hierarchies: “occupations in the UAE are often divided along the lines of gender and nationality as well, with companies actively recruiting employees from certain parts of the world for gendered occupations”

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(Vora, 2013, 78). Despite discrimination, Pakistani middle-class migrants feel that they belong to this place where they have spent many years, where some of them were brought up, where their children were born and where they also established companies. They felt ‘included’ in Dubai in light of their personal stories, emotional ties and the presence of family members in the city. At the same time, they felt ‘excluded’ because of the discrimination that some of them experienced but this did not challenge their belonging to the local context (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021). Some participants described their life in Dubai as being completely assimilated because they spent more than thirty years in the UAE and “you cannot live anywhere else”.5 Another participant also said: “[…] I have been here for forty years and I am part of this society […]. I mean everywhere you have been for forty years, it is your home”.6 Belonging is constructed in relation to locations; it is not only a formal membership such as citizenship and/or a specific political project such as integration or assimilation that determines belonging. Aminah, one of my participants, said: I think because I grow up in Dubai, I struggled with this [Pakistani] identity […]. I wanted to go to pubs, bars with my friends, but my parents said “no, we do not do that, it is not in our culture, your sisters do not go out”, and I could not wear certain clothes. And I would not fight against it. So, identity is something I really struggled, but now this is my Asian life, I am a very comfortably Pakistani and I am very proud of my Pakistani identity now, and I would do anything for my country. (Interview with Aminah, Dubai, 27/10/2015)

Aminah’s story encapsulates how belonging is contextual, situational and flexible. She was a young Pakistani who moved to Dubai when she was five years old. She was exposed to diverse cultures and values and she struggled to define her ‘Pakistani-ness’. Belonging was addressed in terms of experiences, everyday practices and emotions. She constructed belonging by comparing her life with that of ‘others’ and she struggled to escape from the attributions ‘chosen’ and applied to her by her family: a Muslim Pakistani woman. As Anthias (2013, 8) argues, belonging is also “about attributions designated by others formally or informally, some of which might not tally with your lived experiences”. To be a Pakistani in the UAE is different from being a Pakistani in Britain. Ismail, who is a British-Pakistani, underlined how his ‘Pakistaniness’ is determined by the religious dimension and he constructed his

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sense of belonging to the Emirati context by sharing everyday life, rhythms and moments with other Muslims regardless of their nationality.7 He also underscored how belonging swings between his Pakistani heritage and English background. But he also emphasised that Dubai is the place where his religious identity along with his ‘Pakistani-ness’ are currently fuelled. He said: [… in Dubai] I also feel comfortable because as a Muslim. For example, wherever I go, for us even a smile or to greet somebody with as-sal¯am, which is peace, is an act of worship […] so it feeds my soul a little bit[…] I have a couple of friends who work in the same school they are Pakistanis they were brought up in the North-West of England. I am quite close to them simply because we are all, not just the fact that we are all Pakistanis, but also the fact that we were born and raised in the North-West, so we have a similar kind of sense of humour, an outlook of life […], we grown up in a similar environment […]. I am Pakistani by blood, but born and raised in England, it is going to be diluted anyway; it is going to be a mix of the two. So, my own identity, I am a Pakistani in terms of the fact that my family is Pakistani, you know follow certain customs or dress, in terms of everyday life when I speak to my friends we converse in English, you know we try to hold on certain values, which English people have as well, but of course you have more in common with people who have more in common with you. (Interview with Ismail, Dubai, 07/11/2014)

The above quotation encapsulates how the discourse on ‘Pakistani-ness’ is articulated in different ways, such as the role played by religion in forging Ismail’s ‘way of life’. Ismail identified himself and categorised Pakistanis with ‘Pakistani blood’. In his words, the biological (‘Pakistani blood’) and cultural dimensions are blended together. However, as Maleševic (2004, 5) has put it, categorisation risks essentialising and reducing collectivity to a group of people that “do not necessarily have anything in common. Such an attitude essentialises and reduces cultural, political and value diversity of an individual to a single clear-cut label such as ‘Asian’”. Ismail felt a sense of discomfort because his sense of belonging was negotiated in light of the British context; the tension between his ‘Pakistani-ness’ and the place where he raised underscores the situational and contextual nature of belonging. The overlapping of different elements, blood, heritage, dress, customs and religion that are mixed and blend with a Western lifestyle is evident. In Dubai, he re-discovered his Islamic identity as well as his ‘Pakistani-ness’ that in England were weakened because

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of the contacts and interactions with a context and a lifestyle that did not fit entirely with him. However, Ismail tends to mix together biological and cultural dimensions; it seems that he tends to essentialise the sense of belonging; this perspective does not unpack the complexities and diversity existing within a group and/or a community in which different categories intersect (e. g. ethnicity, gender and class). Lifestyle determines the way in which professionals tend to articulate their belonging and social relations with the local context. Rahman, one of my Pakistani participants, underlined how his lifestyle is expressed through contacts, social gatherings and events that, as emerged in the literature, one cannot find among low-wage migrants. He was thirty-eight years old and works in Abu Dhabi for a Western company, but he lives in Dubai. Because of his job, Rahman has a high standard of life and he lives in a middle-class enclave. I asked him to describe his lifestyle and he said: It is an interesting lifestyle, there is a lot to do. You know my residence itself has a spa and clubs around, you have also most opportunities […] to explore the desert, you know there is a great beach, there is also outside the city where you can go and stay in a resort in the desert. There is also a lot of interesting people now increasingly in Dubai. So, in Abu Dhabi and Dubai I am connected with some filmmakers who will be experimenting with films. (Interview with Rahman, Dubai, 02/11/2015)

Leisure activities and social events, described by Rahman and which require economic capital, are mostly a prerogative of professionals. However, different tastes, behaviours and lifestyles seem to not inhibit the contacts between the low-wage Pakistani migrants and professionals. For example, Hamza said: […] they [Pakistani low-wage migrants] are from different mind-set; they do not have education at all. So, they are accepted, we coexist, that’s not the problem. The gardener in my house is Pakistani, and we treat him well, no discrimination against him […] we treat him well. (Interview with Hamza, Dubai, 06/11/2014)

Hamza emphasised how different tastes, dispositions and habits determine the difference between classes. But he also underscored that such differences did not hamper social relations. However, it is evident that the relation is limited to employer-employee. In other words, even though

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their good relationship is based on their common ethno-national origins, the power relationships cannot be erased, and this is mostly evident especially in social gatherings and events where class differentiation relies on creating a fracture between the public sphere, in which Pakistani domestic workers or gardeners are relegated in a subordinated position, and the private sphere where the relation employer-employee seems to be attenuated. Integration is questioned in Britain because it seems to rely on the process of adaptation and adjustment of different religious and cultural communities to shared British values and customs. For young Muslim British Pakistanis, their sense of cultural dislocation and non-integration represent “a legitimate basis for political mobilisation and lobbying” (Modood, 2013, 45). As mentioned above, in Britain, integration is very often discussed in relation to ethnic minorities rather than migrants.8 As such, a clear comparison between the two countries and migration systems is misleading. In fact, integration is not applicable to the UAE, where the existence of ethno-racial hierarchies, temporariness, and the ‘demographic imbalance’, make it clear that integration cannot be pursued by the authorities. Pakistani migrants do not have the right to settle down permanently in the UAE and it is very unlikely that they can obtain the Emirati citizenship. Belonging seems to prevail among Pakistani middleclass migrants. Despite temporariness and uncertainties of the migration experience, some of the participants consider Dubai as a ‘home’ because they were brought up in the emirate and even if they go to study to the USA or Britain they prefer to return to Dubai as they feel that they belong to the Emirati context. There is a sort of constructive9 co-existence due to the Emirati social structure where migrants and nationals are both parts of the segmented local labour market; however, the former is not part of the social fabric, and the latter, through the sponsorship system, manage and control migration. Such a co-existence relies on power relationships, hierarchies, and financial and economic interests. The outlook of a constructive co-existence is only understandable in relation to the specific Gulf context. The experience of Pakistani middle-class migrants in Dubai is of primary importance because it teaches us that juridical and formal membership (e.g. citizenship) do not necessarily guarantee a sense of belonging insofar as it relies more on people’s everyday life and experiences rather than on laws and rules established in the political agenda (e.g. integration).

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Conclusion Migration from Pakistan is conceived as a ‘rite of passage’, and it serves to help families left behind. Both in Britain and in the UAE, Pakistani migrants retain their strong links and connections with their home country and families (Harriss & Shaw, 2009). This chapter has focused on migrants’ agency and their knowledge of the external structures; conceiving of migration as a project means that migrants make conscious decision to migrate and settle down in a new country. Pakistani migration is developed and driven by family, different strategies and channels are adopted by would-be migrants. Pakistani migration to Britain is driven by links with the colonial past which have contributed to developing a chain migration between the two countries (Harriss & Shaw, 2006; Charsley, 2013). Whereas Pakistani migration to the UAE is non-colonial and driven, among others, by economic environment and specific lifestyle they can enjoy. Pakistani middle-class migrants have arrived and settled down by mobilising and renegotiating their social capital developed in Dubai. The chapter has also focused on integration and belonging that cannot be used interchangeably, and the demarcation between the two concepts is not clear-cut. For Spencer (2010), integration is a multidimensional concept based upon the relation between migrants, individuals and institutions aimed at facilitating the full participation of minority groups and their construction of a sense of belonging in the receiving society. Mason (2018, 39), however, conceives of integration as based on “a form of shared identification [where] institutions and practices that allow cultural minorities to separate to some degree if they so choose may have positive benefits in enabling their members to acquire a more confident sense of their own identity, and to sustain some of the social bases of their self-respect”. The development of a sense of belonging is not necessarily linked to integration insofar as the former is constructed and developed in people’s everyday life and experiences in different places and locations (Anthias, 2013). Integration, which is pursued by the British authorities, is under scrutiny because the different religious and ethno-cultural communities as bearers of different values, customs and traditions should be valued as such by the authorities. As Mason (2018) has pointed out, integration should be viewed and pursued with caution because of its reference to shared national values risk homogenising all different communities, and their identity is threatened. Among British Pakistanis,

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exclusion and discrimination still persist; however, several scholars have emphasised their participation in the urban environment and social fabric (Shaw, 1988; Werbner, 1990). Whereas, in the UAE, where integration is not part of the political agenda, Pakistani middle-class migrants have developed a sense of belonging determined by their lifestyle and their personal stories. For the Muslim Pakistani participants, Dubai has the facilities and entertainments of a global city (Sassen, 2005), and, at the same time, it allows Muslims to go to restaurants without worrying whether the food is licit, they can enjoy their life in Dubai without breaking the rules, and customs of their own religion. Integration and belonging are not necessarily linked, and migrants can feel a sense of belonging even considering an exclusionary and a hierarchical social structure like that existing in the UAE (Errichiello & Nyhagen, 2021).

Notes 1. In the Gulf countries, which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council also known as GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), the authorities prefer to use the term ‘temporary contractual labourers’ because “they work on a temporary basis and according to fixed-term employment contracts. Upon expiration of these contracts, they return to their home countries. Therefore, the immigration laws applicable in Western countries cannot be applied to these workers” (letter from the Ambassador Al-Shamsi permanent representative of the UAE at the United Nations in 2006, reported in Human Rights Watch, 2006, 70). 2. The transliteration of Arabic terms relies on the system used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. The only exceptions are those terms that are commonly used in English (e.g. participants’ names and geographical names). 3. An exception to this pattern is that, between the 1970s and 1980s, female nurses and teachers from the minority Christian community in Pakistan “were actively recruited for employment overseas” (Addleton, 1992, 86). 4. I use ‘migrant worker’ as it has been defined in article 2 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), in which the term is used to identify a person “who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national”. 5. Interview with Naseer, Dubai, 24/10/2015. 6. Interview with Muhammad, Dubai, 25/10/2015. 7. This also happens in Western countries where Muslims of different nationalities perform their religious duties together.

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8. In her research, Samuk (2020) advocates the need to think of integration process also in relation to temporary migrant workers. 9. I use the word constructive to emphasise that both migrants and nationals contribute towards shaping the Emirati labour market, and each category from a different perspective. However, the contribution provided by both categories is vitiated by the power relationships and the structure of dominance represented by the sponsorship system.

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org/sites/default/files/reports/uae1106webwcover.pdf Accessed 22 January 2020. Hussain, Y., & Bagguley, P. (2005). Citizenship, ethnicity and identity: British Pakistanis after the 2001 ‘Riots.’ Sociology, 39(3), 407–425. Jahani, C. (2014). The Baloch as an ethnic group in the Persian Gulf region. In L. G. Potter (Ed.), The Persian Gulf in modern times. People, ports, and history (pp. 267–297). Palgrave Macmillan. Jacobson, J. (1997). Religion and ethnicity: Dual and alternative sources of identity among young British Pakistanis. Ethnic and Racial Studies‚ 20(2)‚ 238–256. Kalra, V. (2000). From textiles mills to taxi ranks: Experiences of migration, labour and social change. Ashgate. Longva, A. N. (1997). Walls built on Sand. Migration, exclusion and society in Kuwait. Westview Press. Lori, N. (2019). Offshore citizens: Permanent temporary status in the Gulf . Cambridge University Press. Mahdavi, P. (2011). Gridlock. Labor, migration, and human trafficking in Dubai. Stanford University Press. Mainwaring, C. (2016). Migrant agency: Negotiating borders and migration controls. Migration Studies, 4(3), 289–308. Maleševic, S. (2004). The sociology of ethnicity. Sage. Mason, A. (2018). The critique of multiculturalism in Britain: Integration, separation and shared identification. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 21(1), 22–45. Massey, D. S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pelelgrino, A., & Edward Taylor, J. (2005). Worlds in motion: Understanding international migration at the end of the millennium. Clarendon Press. Mattei, P., & Broeks, M. (2018). From multiculturalism to civic integration: Citizenship education and integration policies in the Netherlands and England since the 2000s. Ethnicities, 18(1), 23–42. Modood, T. (2013). Multiculturalism (2nd ed.). Polity Press. Morawska, E. (2007). International migration: Its various mechanisms and different theories that try to explain it. Malmö University, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 1/07. Morawska, E. (2009). A sociology of immigration. (Re)making multifaceted America. Palgrave Macmillan. Morawska, E. (2013). Toward a reconciliation of the structuration and morphogenesis theories ‘tested’ in the eventful historical analysis. In H. F. Dahms (Ed.), Social theories of history and histories of social theory (pp. 221–224). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. Nichols, R. (2008). A history of pashtun migration, 1775–2006. Oxford University Press.

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O’Reilly, K. (2012a). International migration & social theory. Palgrave Macmillan. O’Reilly, K. (2012b). Ethnographic methods (2nd ed.). Routledge. Office for National Statistics. 2011 Census. Ethnic Group, local authorities in the United Kingdom, 2013. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationan dcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/keysta tisticsandquickstatisticsforlocalauthoritiesintheunitedkingdom/2013-10-11 Accessed 02 September 2020. Osella, C., & Osella, F. (2000). Migration, money and masculinity in Kerala. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 1(6), 117–133. Saggar, S., & Somerville, W. (2012). Building a British model of integration in an era of immigration: Policy lesson for government. Migration Policy Institute. Samad, Y., & Eade, J. (2003). Community perceptions of forced marriage. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report. The Stationary Office, London. Samuk, S. (2020). Can integration be temporary? The (Dis)integration of temporary migrant workers in Canada and the UK. In S. Hinger & R. Schweitzer (Eds.), Politics of (Dis)integration (pp. 61–79). IMISCOE Springer Open. Sassen, S. (2005). The global city: Introducing a concept. Brown Journal of World Affairs, XI, 2, 27–43. Schweitzer, R. (2017). Integration against the state: Irregular migrants’ agency between deportation and regularisation in the United Kingdom. Politics, 37 (3), 317–331. Sewell, W. H., Jr. (1992). A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation. American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 1–29. Shah, B., Dwyer, C., & Modood, T. (2010). Explaining educational achievement and career aspirations among young British Pakistanis: Mobilizing ‘ethnic capital’? Sociology, 44(6), 1109–1127. Shaw, A. (1988). A Pakistani community in Britain. Basil Blackwell. Spencer, S. (2010). The migration debate. The Polity Press. Stones, R. (2005). Structuration theory. Palgrave Macmillan. Vora, N. (2013). Impossible citizens. Duke University Press. Werbner, P. (1990). The migration process: Capital, gifts and offerings among British Pakistanis. Berg.

CHAPTER 4

Migration Changes and Integration Challenges in the Moroccan Case Altea Pericoli

Introduction Regarding the origins and destinations of migration flows which come from the Middle East and North Africa and arrive in Europe, it is interesting to observe the case of Morocco. The scope of this chapter is to describe the evolution of the migration phenomenon in this country, in order to understand how it is dealing with this challenge in terms of improving the migration–development paradigm and enhancing social and economic inclusion of sub-Saharan migrants. But, at the same time, it aims to understand how the migration changes have influenced over time the relationship between Morocco and Europe, in terms of policy and approaches to this phenomenon. This idea is based on the perspective that migration alters the social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions both in sending and receiving countries which constitute the entire developmental space within which the migration process occurs (de Haas, 2014b).

A. Pericoli (B) Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_4

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Starting from a historical overview, based on studies carried out by de Haas since 2003, this research underlines that Morocco is one of the main sending countries in the North African region but, at the same time, it has witnessed an important shift into a transit and destination land for subSaharan migrants and refugees. Migration flow, which is still in progress, is driven by a complex range of pull and push factors linked to the sending regions, but also to the economic and political stability in Morocco. Analysing data from 2000 to 2017 about the migration flow from, to and through Morocco, it is possible to observe a decrease in the number of Moroccan people who move to Europe and an increase of sub-Saharan migrants who arrive in Morocco. Probably this trend will continue in the near future, but it will affect emigration patterns differently across Moroccan regions. More marginalised areas may still have considerable emigration flux and the Rif region could be an example. This is one of the most marginalised and rural areas and one of the main migrant-sending regions, where it is interesting to observe the evidence of the impact of remittances on development. There is a long debate on the relationship between migration and development and the question is how it is possible to enhance the potential of remittances on an underdevelopment area such as the Rif. Studies conducted in this field by Bouoiyour, Miftah and Zhang, show that remittances can affect positively poverty reduction of the migrants’ households and their living conditions but, despite this, the Rif case demonstrates that notwithstanding the flow of remittances, development needs state support and intervention. In this direction, the co-development schemes could represent a way to enhance social and monetary remittances and a new way to rethink the relationship between Europe and Morocco on the migration issue. Considering migration as a ‘circular’ phenomenon with benefits from destination and origin countries can contribute to fostering a better integration of the diaspora in Europe and, at the same time, make migrants able to operate as agents of development in their home country. Moreover, in line with the perspective of a growing number of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Morocco, this analysis investigate show Morocco is managing this phenomenon in terms of migration policy and integration. According to Lahlou, the evolution of this policy is certainly the result of an interconnection between Morocco and Europe in a double sense: on the one hand, there is the will of Morocco to maintain a strong partnership with Europe; and on the other hand, it is clear that Europe promotes its policy of externalisation of borders, financing

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projects to promote integration of sub-Saharan African migrants. The political strategy behind this aid is to encourage them to stay for a long-term in Morocco rather than to continue their journey to Europe. Particular attention is given to the programme Mediterranean City-toCity Migration, financed by the European Trust Fund for Africa, due to its bottom-up approach and the involvement of local authorities and civil society organisations in migration management and the inclusion of subSaharan migrants in urban contexts. It could represent a successful and replicable model thanks to the ownership by the host communities of the migration issue and the strengthening of migrants’ resilience.

The Historical Trends of Migration from, Through and to Morocco The Moroccan emigration patterns are deeply rooted in colonialism: the Moroccan colonial era (1912–1956) marked the beginning of migration within the country and then to France and Spain. The French and Spanish ‘protectorate’ created an imbalance in development: while France controlled the heartland of Morocco and invested in infrastructure, the Spanish protectorate was limited to the south–western Sahara and the northern Rif mountain zone,1 which remained isolated and underdeveloped. Road construction, other infrastructure projects, and the rapid growth of cities along the Atlantic coast supported rural-to-urban migration within Morocco (de Haas, 2014b). During World Wars I and II, France recruited tens of thousands of Moroccan people into its army (40,000 for the French army during the First World War and 126,000 during the Second World War) and the same phenomenon occurred for 40,000 Moroccans from the Rif area employed in the Spanish army of Francisco Franco. The migration flow from Morocco to Europe started to increase during the decade 1962–1972, when strong economic growth in Western Europe resulted in a high demand for low-skilled labour. In this period the number of Moroccans living in the main European destination countries increased tenfold, from 30,000 to 300,000, further increasing to 700,000 in 1982, 1.6 million in 1998 and 3.1 million in 2012 (de Haas, 2014b). From 1973 to 1989 a growing number of Moroccan immigrants started to settle in a permanent way in Europe. The 1973 oil crisis led European governments to stop recruitment and put in place restrictions

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on migration that had an unintended consequence of interrupting circulation and stimulating the permanent settlement of Moroccan workers. In the same period the political situation in Morocco became unstable, and this encouraged people to emigrate and settle in Europe (Berriane et al., 2015).2 Settlement was followed by large-scale family reunification and Moroccan migration shifted during 1970s and 1980s from a circular form based on labour to one which was family based. Family reunification took two forms: ‘primary’ family reunification consisted of Moroccan women and children joining the predominantly male migrant workers. ‘Secondary’ family reunification happened when the children of Moroccan migrants in Europe married people living in regions of origin. While primary family reunification was largely completed by the end of the 1980s, during the 1990s secondary family reunification became an important channel for continued migration from Morocco. By 1998, the number of people of Moroccan descent in the main European destination countries had risen to 1.6 million (de Haas, 2014b). While traditional countries like France, Belgium and the Netherlands remained the main destinations for Moroccans, starting from the mid80s, Spain and Italy emerged as new destinations for Moroccan workers, mainly because of the high demand for employment in agriculture, construction, care and other lower skilled services. In 1991 Spain and Italy introduced visa requirements, in compliance with the Schengen Area, causing a high rate of irregular migration (Berriane et al., 2015) but borders controls and visa requirements did not reduce the flows to these two countries. A huge decrease in migration flow occurred in 2008. The 2008 Global Economic Crisis caused high unemployment among migrants living in Europe, especially in Spain (Khaldi, 2014), slowing down Moroccan migration and leading to fewer departures and temporary return.

Morocco as a Transit and Destination Country This historical overview gives a picture of Moroccan people who decided to migrate from Morocco to Europe, for reasons that can be identified in the social and economic context of these two places. At the same time, however, Morocco has also witnessed an important shift: since the mid1990s, Morocco has evolved into a destination and transit country for Sub-Saharan migrants and refugees. This migration flow, which is still in

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progress, is mainly irregular and driven by a complex range of push and pull factors linked to the sending regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and the better economic and political conditions of Morocco. Some African migrants cross Morocco before attempting to enter Europe. They enter Morocco from Algeria, at the border east of Oujda and, once in the country, they often attempt to enter Europe through the two Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The situation in these two Spanish enclaves will be described further in the next chapter of this book but it is important to keep in mind for the purpose of this analysis how difficult the process of integration and coexistence of migrants is in these two cases. In particular, two strong identities meet, and sometimes collide: a Muslim majority encounters the Christian Spanish tradition. Although most migrants consider Morocco a country of transit, an increasing number of them, who fail to enter Europe, prefer to settle in Morocco on a more long-term basis, rather than return to their more unstable and poorer origin countries. Tens of thousands have settled in cities like Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier and Fès on a semi-permanent basis, where they find jobs in the informal service sector, domestic service (de Haas, 2014a). To have a clear framework, according to the UNHCR, the number of asylum seekers and refugees to arrive in 2017 was 7,059, coming mainly from Syria, Yemen, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire and Cameroon. The number of regular immigrants (students and workers) was 55,000 coming from France, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Senegal (UNHCR, 2017). According to UN data from 2017, fewer than 100,000 international migrants (96,000) were living in Morocco, representing 0.3% of the total population (UNDESA, 2017). In February 2019, in Morocco there were 8,112 refugees and asylum-seekers, including 6,199 refugees and 1,913 asylum-seekers. This phenomenon represents a challenge for the Moroccan Government in terms of politics, human rights and integration. Morocco is the only country in the MENA region that has attempted to enact significant migration and asylum reform. Notwithstanding the efforts to improve legislation regarding the migration issue, the realisation of real integration is far from being achieved. The institutional transformation is a gradual process which has to also consider the adaptation of Moroccan society to this phenomenon. A bottom-up approach, with the involvement of civil society organisations and local authorities in migration management, together with this

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gradual institutional transformation, could achieve a sense of belonging and a respect of migrants’ basic rights. It could be the first step towards a peaceful and positive coexistence, where the engagement of the host communities in the migration phenomenon may foster a sense of migrants’ inclusion. The role of Europe is crucial to influencing institutions and politics but, at the same time, destination countries could learn best practices from their African neighbours in this sense. The increasing presence of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa has influenced Moroccan cultural, social and economic life. For instance, this phenomenon has modified religious diversity and has revitalised Christian life in some cities of a predominantly Muslim country (de Haas, 2014a).The most important aspect concerns the inclusion and integration of migrants in Moroccan society. Irregular migrants are not able to enter the formal labour market or participate in regular education and have difficulty accessing health care. Despite the efforts made in this field and the new Migration Policy in 2013 and the National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum, there are still many aspects which need to be further improved to ensure that both sides can benefit from each other’s presence (Suijkerbuijk, 2015). Community-based participatory research, conducted in 2014 in Morocco, has shown that among the 154 (60 female, 94 male) SubSaharan migrants interviewed, 90% reported cases of multiple victimisation, 45% of which was sexual, predominantly gang rape. Severe long-lasting ill-health consequences were reported while Sub-Saharan victims are not granted access to the official health care system. The perpetrators were mostly Moroccan or Algerian officials and Sub-Saharan gang leaders who seem to proceed with impunity. The migrants interviewed link risk factors mainly to their undocumented and unprotected status and suggest that, despite political efforts to adopt a human rightsbased approach, legal protection and humane treatment of migrants are politically underestimated (Keygnaert et al., 2014). Europe has a strong interest in transforming Morocco into a key player able to manage migration in the Euro-Mediterranean context and for this reason it is promoting Morocco’s role and financing programmes in order to allow it to retain many migrants, who may settle permanently and work in a situation of legality (Lahlou, 2018).

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Recent Trends and Future Perspectives Analysing the data of the Western Mediterranean route (FRONTEX, 2019; UNHCR, 2019) it is possible to understand the recent trends of migration from Morocco to Europe. In 2017, the number of migrants detected reaching Spain via this route was 23,063. The unstable situation in the Rif region, in the north of the country, created an opportunity for more departures in the second half of the year. Two out of every five migrants were nationals of Algeria and Morocco, most of the remaining people on this route coming from Western Africa. In 2018, the Western Mediterranean became the most frequently used route into Europe and 57,034 people crossed via this route. Morocco was the main departure point to Europe for irregular migrants. Most of the migratory pressure registered on this route was linked to migrants originating from Sub-Saharan countries. However, towards the end of 2018, the number of Moroccan migrants began to increase. In 2019, the number of irregular border crossings (January–February) was 4,906. The top five migrant countries of origin are: unknown 3,355, Morocco 719, Guinea 181, Mali 150 and Cote d’Ivoire 130.The main exit point from Morocco to Spain (except for Ceuta and Melilla) is Nador, a city located in the eastern Rif. The protests, which started in 2016, have made the area unstable and an easier way out for emigration. Regarding only the inflow of Moroccan migrants to Europe, data until 2017 show a decrease of this migration flow. From OECD data (see Fig. 4.1a, b), it is possible to understand recent trends and the variation of the inflow of Moroccan people in European countries. Notwithstanding a small increase between 2015 and 2017, probably due to the outbreak of recent protests in the Rif in 2016, comparing data of 2004 and 2017, it is possible to observe that the number of migrants has decreased in all of the countries evaluated (France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands), except for Germany. In the particular case of Germany, the number has almost doubled, but this represents an exception (OECD.STAT, 2019). Based on this analysis it is possible to understand recent trends, but it remains difficult to predict the future migrant movements from, through and to Morocco, also for the links between economic growth, political stability and increasing freedom. According to a study carried out by de Haas in 2014, in the medium term, the Moroccan flow to Europe will depend on the increase in civil liberties and real democratisation (de Haas, 2014b). The European continent may still represent an attractive

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a

b

Fig. 4.1 a Inflow of Moroccan migrants in European countries. Compared data among 2000, 2004, 2015 and 2017. b Inflow of Moroccan migrants in European countries (qualitative trend) (Source elaborated by the Author on OECD.STAT, 2019)

destination but, if the current trends persist and the Moroccan economy continues to grow, it could be possible that emigration of Moroccan people to Europe will further decrease, and immigration of Sub-Saharan migrants to Morocco will further increase (UNDESA, 2017). However, future development and economic trends may affect emigration patterns differently across Moroccan regions. More marginalised areas may still have considerable emigration flux and the Rif region could be an example. This is the reason why, starting from 2016, the number of Moroccans who have tried to enter Europe has begun to increase again. Regarding the migration flow from Sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Africa to Morocco, analysing data from 2000 (see Fig. 4.2a, b), the number has been constantly growing.

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a 2000

2005

2015

2017

Number of migrants from SubSaharan Africa to Morocco

4.343

4.709

6.813

6.958

Number of migrants from Northern Africa to Morocco

10.939

11.211

11.885

11.908

b

Fig. 4.2 a Inflow of Sub-Saharan and Northern Africa in Morocco. Compared data among 2000, 2005, 2015 and 2017. b Inflow of Sub-Saharan Africa in Morocco (qualitative trend) (Source Elaborated by the Author on UNDESA International Migrant Stock, 2019)

Therefore, in line with this perspective, it could be useful to understand how Morocco manages the migration phenomenon within its borders and which projects have been financed by the European Union to promote integration models for Sub-Saharan migrants, whose number in the country is destined to increase.

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Migration and Development: A Focus on the Migrant-Sending Region of the Rif Characteristics of the Rif Region Analysing the migration flow coming from Morocco and the migrants’ origin over the years, it is possible to distinguish three historical ‘migration belts’: the eastern part of the Rif mountain area, the southwestern Souss region near Agadir and the river oases located southeast of the High Atlas (de Haas, 2007). In 2017, the highest emigration registered in the country and directed towards Europe, according to the OECD, was from two main areas: the eastern Rif (23%) and Tadla Azilal (19%) (Fig. 4.3). So, the Rif region is, from a quantitative point of view, the most important area for migration to Europe (Bilgili & Weyel, 2009). For historical and ethnic reasons and due to the protests which started in 2016, it is a key case to analyse, in order to better understand the Moroccan migration trends to Europe and the link between migration and development. The emigration flow from the Rif concerns its geographical and historical characteristics and the fact that it has been neglected by the central government for many years. It is a rural and mountainous area, mainly Berber, characterised by a lack of public services, investment and infrastructure and with a high rate of unemployment (16.3% unemployment rate compared to 10.4% in the rest of the country). Since the end of Regions Souss Massa Draa Gharb Charda Beni Hssen Gchaoula Ouardiga Marrakech Tensift-Al Haouz Easter Rif Grand Casablanca Rabat Salé Doukkala Abda Tadla Azilal Meknès Tafilalet Fès Boulemane Taza Al Hoceima Taounate Tanger Tétouan

Urban 5.1 13 15.6 8.3 26.1 12.7 11 9.2 17.6 14.1 8.3 16.6 14.1

Rural 5.7 2.8 8.6 4.9 18.6 4.4 6.9 1.3 20.6 8.3 3.6 7.8 6.4

Total 5.4 8.7 12 6.4 23.1 11.7 10.3 4.7 19.4 11.5 7.3 10.2 11.3

Fig. 4.3 Percentage of households with emigrants by region and urban/rural situation (Source Elaborated by the Author on OECD, 2017a, b)

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Spanish colonisation, the region has fought for independence and was left marginalised by the state. The eastern Rif is among the most densely populated regions of Morocco. The environment, with mountains and scarce and irregular rainfall, is not favourable to agricultural production. Starting from the 1960s this region has become a traditional region of origin of workers migrating to Western Europe, and this phenomenon has functioned as a security valve and has helped to prevent demographic pressure over time (Refass, 1992). In October 2016, the death of the fish-seller Mouhcine Fikri,3 in the northern town of Al-Hoceima, sparked a wave of protests in Morocco and, in particular, in the Rif region. The anti-government protests were called by activists of the February 20 Movement, who organised demonstrations during the Arab Spring in 2011. Social tension increased in 2017 and Riffians called for better access to health services, jobs and greater public investment. In response, the government applied harsh repression, jailing the major exponents of the protests but, at the same time, it took steps to accelerate local social programs and investment projects. Moreover, in October 2017, several high-level officials were dismissed, signalling that accountability in public service delivery will be enforced going forward. Protests have decreased recently, but addressing the sources of social discontent is likely to take time (International Monetary Fund, 2018). The persistence of this popular movement in the Rif represents the failure of development and economic programmes launched by Mohammed VI in 2011. In fact, constitutional reform foresees the ‘advanced regionalisation’ in order to promote regions’ autonomy and make local authorities capable of managing investment in their territories. In this way, the process of decentralisation should have supported local growth and created a ‘Morocco with only one speed’ also in those underdeveloped areas with a weak and unstable economy, unable to manage public investment alone. Despite the governmental repression against protests, they have shown the need to rethink reforms and economic approaches for development. Some regions such as the Rif are not yet able to face regionalisation and they still need state intervention and support.

The Cultural Influence of the Riffian Diaspora This socio-economic situation has, over time, influenced the migration flows and has increased the number of Riffian migrants in European countries. At the same time, the Riffian diaspora plays a crucial role in shaping

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the identities of compatriots at home and, consequently, giving input to fighting for their rights. The Riffian diaspora is characterised not only by a sense of belonging to Morocco but especially to its ethnic origin: the Berber identity. The Amazigh diaspora communities, among which there is also that originating in the Rif, have created, in name of this identity, numerous organisations and movements in order to promote their rights both in their homeland and in destination countries. The Berber identity movement is an amorphous and many-headed phenomenon with a clear core demand: the recognition by state authorities of the existence of Amazigh people and their historical and cultural ‘Berberity’. France has been a central location for the strengthening of the Amazigh identity, because of the high concentration of Berber communities there. The first examples are the Académie Berbère established in 1967 and the Groupe d’études Berbères in 1973. Both these initiatives influenced the cultural context in France but also in the home countries. The Berber Spring in 1980 in Algeria was an example of the interconnection between the activities conducted by the diaspora in Europe and the local Amazigh movements. At a global level, the result of these interlinks is represented by the Congrès Mondial Amazighe, established in 1997 and made up of one hundred different associations from North Africa and the diaspora. It is a non-governmental organisation that advocates for the Berber cause in the countries of origin and destination. In Morocco this internal and external pressure, coming from the diaspora and local associations, has led to a legitimisation of Amazigh identity with the adoption in 2011 of the constitution which explicitly recognises the Amazigh language as an official state language and included the Amazigh in the definition of Moroccan identity (Bengio & Maddy-Weitzman, 2013).

The Link Between Migration and Development The Riffian diaspora has not only a cultural and social influence but also an economic impact on this underdeveloped and rural area. There is a lengthy debate on the relationship between migration and development and the question is whether migration promotes development in sending countries or restrains it. On the one hand, migration pessimists have argued that migration can lead to a withdrawal of human capital and provoke the development of

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passive, non-productive communities, which become increasingly dependent on remittances. On the other hand, up to the 1960s, migration optimists argued that the flow of remittances, as well as the experience, skills and knowledge of returning migrants would help sending regions in developing countries in their economic take-off (de Haas, 2005). This relationship could be observed in Morocco, where the remittances received as per cent of GDP corresponded to 6.2% in 2017, $ 7,375 million (World Bank, 2019). The relationship between remittances and development in migrant sending-countries can be explained on three different levels: the nature of remittances themselves (monetary or social remittances), their impact on the economic development and their different influence on economic sectors (Zhang, 2013). Studies in this field have demonstrated that migrants’ remittances can improve living standards among Moroccan households and negatively affect the incidence of poverty. A Moroccan Living Standard Measurement Survey conducted in 2007 showed a statistically significant and positive impact of remittances on recipient households’ expenditures. This survey considers households according to their area of living, and it diversifies rural and urban areas. In fact, the impact of remittances on the decline in the probability of being in poverty for households depends on their area of residence. This decreases by 11.3 percentage points in rural areas and by 3 points in the urban area (Bouoiyour & Miftah, 2014). Moreover, according to research carried out by Hein de Haas (2005) on migration, remittances and regional development in southern Morocco, it is possible to clearly observe the impact of migration on the migrant-sending regions in terms of development. This research is based on a survey conducted on migrants’ (international and internal) households located in the Todgha Valley, a rural area in the south of the country. He outlines that the main investment of remittances by migrants’ households are in agriculture, housing and in private enterprises, and that these activities have actively contributed to local employment and development in the area (de Haas, 2005). Regarding the use of remittances in Morocco, data collected in this field have demonstrated that in most cases migrants put their investments into real estate (Zhang, 2013), in particular 71.1% of remittances go into real estate, 11.3% to agriculture and 17.5% to non-agricultural sectors (de Haas, 2003).

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This tendency depends on the migrants’ will to show their social success after they receive money through migration. In the migrantsending regions, such as the Rif, this type of investment has transformed villages into towns and several professions related to construction have benefited from this trend (European Investment Bank, 2006). But some researchers have criticised the choice of investing in real estate and have attributed this phenomenon to the lack of entrepreneurial mentality among migrants, but also to government irresponsibility. Governments of migrant-sending countries should have policies capable of diverting remittances into productive sectors of the economy and should also guide migrants to make more rational and productive investments which would not only improve their living conditions, but also have a positive impact on the development of their home countries (Zhang, 2013). So, remittances and their investment require state support and intervention to create economic and long-term growth. In the first phase of the diaspora policy approach, the Moroccan Government tried to encourage remittances and their use in investments through incentive schemes. The aim was to increase the total flow of remittances, lowering the transfer costs and offering attractive investment alternatives. Moreover, the government established two public foundations involved in the migration management issues, the Hassan II Foundation and the Mohammed V Foundation. The former supports residents abroad interested in investing in their home country, while the second supports Moroccan migrants wishing to return for the summer holidays (European Investment Bank, 2006). The Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains residant a l’étranger (FHII) was established by royal decree in July 1990 and it is a ‘non-profit institution with a social vocation, endowed with a moral personality and financial autonomy’. In partnership with IOM, the Foundation created the ‘Observatory on the Moroccan Community Leaving Abroad’ (Brand, 2002, pp. 84–86), with the aim of strengthening Morocco’s ability to document migration trends and collect data on Moroccans abroad (Nyberg Sorensen, 2004). Monetary and social remittances have the power to influence positively the political, cultural and economic life of Moroccan society and such developments should be encouraged by the government and international agencies, which have to support the diaspora as a key actor in development. According to the International Organisation for Migration, in order to enable monetary remittances it is necessary that the Moroccan State

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encourage co-development schemes with partnerships between European and Moroccan migrant entrepreneurs; it should facilitate the transfer of skills between all the stakeholders as well as rural–urban mobility. To ensure the continuation of monetary remittances, the government should also support social remittances, which consist of the circulation of ideas, practices and skills between sending and destination communities (Lacroix et al., 2016). To do so, it would have to increase interactions at the political level and facilitate consultation between Moroccan civil society and diaspora groups in order to encourage a dialogue for development with a bottom-up approach and transform remittances into investments. Regarding efforts made by the Moroccan government in this field in the last decade, research carried out by Zapata-Barrero and Hellengren outlines that the Moroccan policy has changed from a remittances-based approach to a skills-mobilisation based approach. This means that policies have changed from controlling the diaspora and its remittances to including it. The Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l’Étranger has the aim of managing nationals living abroad and their expertise, in order to match them with national or local needs in public or private sectors or in development programmes. With this mobilisation strategy, Morocco tries to attract high-skilled Moroccan migrants, who have acquired social and technical capital abroad, in order to ‘invite’ them to contribute to the national and local development of their origin country (Zapata-Berrero & Hellengren, 2019). Despite the flow of remittances and the weak efforts made to support them, the Rif crisis reveals a failure of development in this region due to a lack of public investment. From the end of 2016, the results have been the increase of migration flux from this area, the discouragement of returns and support for permanent settlement in the destination countries. This phenomenon highlights the need for state intervention with structural investment in all sectors such as infrastructure, education and sanitation, in order to guarantee long-term economic growth which can not only be based on migrants’ remittances. The link between migration and development is not a natural consequence of monetary or social remittances, but needs the support of politics and interventions by the country of origin. The co-development schemes may represent the right way to enhance the social and monetary remittances. The relationship between Europe

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and Morocco, in line with the development–migration paradigm, could be rethought starting from strengthening the diaspora’s associations in destination countries and contributing to a deep integration of migrants. The development of associative forms is useful to harness the potential of immigrants as development actors and enabling members of diasporas to contribute to their country of origin. In this phase civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations in both countries (origin and destination) play a crucial role in building a bridge between immigrants and their homeland. Indeed, programmes of co-development have also to support association forms in origin countries, made up of exponents of migrants’ families or returned migrants. In order to build up successful models, the synergic action of Morocco and Europe should involve the private sector, which invests in activities carried out by the Moroccan diaspora in its country. Promoting co-development schemes means considering the migration phenomenon as a flexible process of movement and an exchange between territories and people in a ‘circular’ perspective where migrants should be integrated in the political, social and economic context of origin and destination countries, in order to make them able to contribute to growth and development. According to the thesis of Faist and Fauser, the migration–development nexus should be approached from a transnational perspective that recognises the emergence of ‘development agents’ such as the diaspora or the transnational community. In this perspective, the role of these actors should be supported by local, national and global institutions, including international organisations such as the World Bank, national states and organisations concerned with development cooperation. Governments and inter- and supranational organisations seek to co-opt and establish ties with these agents, who are engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border relationships on a personal, collective and organisational level (Faist & Fauser, 2011).

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The Migration Policy and Integration Models in Morocco: The Moroccan Migration Policy from 2003 Until Today The phenomenon of migration and the shift from a sending country to a transit and permanent one has inevitably influenced the Moroccan political approach and has led to a progressive evolution of its migration policy. Moreover, the political interest of Mohammed VI to transform Morocco into a key actor in the dialogue with Europe, has conditioned the way in which the policy has been shaped. The first step in this evolution was in 2003, when Morocco adopted a national strategy for fighting irregular migration with the creation of the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance, with seven regional delegations responsible for supervising the main territories of irregular migration such as Tangiers, Tetouan, alHoceima, Nador, Oujda, Larache and Layoune. Regarding the legislative procedures, in January 2003 the government proposed a law on emigration and irregular immigration in Morocco. It was adopted in May of the same year and marked a turning point in Morocco’s management of migration, especially the irregular form and the inflow from Sub-Saharan Africa. The so-called Law 02–03 was described as an ‘emergency law’ and highlighted the ‘fight against the networks of trafficking of human beings’. Moreover, article 50 provided for fines of DH 3,000 to 10,000, imprisonment terms of one month to six months or one of these two sanctions against any person who illegally leaves via Moroccan land, sea or air borders. The effort to reduce the migration flow from Morocco to Europe saw results in 2006, when the number of irregular migrants (Moroccans and Sub-Saharans) decreased from 29,808 in 2005 to 16,560 in 2006, also due to the entry into force of the SIVE (Integrated System of External Surveillance), the system of control established by Spain along its borders. The problem was, however, far from being solved. While the number of migrants from Morocco to Spain decreased, a growing number of people tried to reach Europe via new routes. It was clear that the migration phenomenon could not be managed only by strict border controls or bilateral cooperation between Morocco and Spain (Lahlou, 2015). In 2006, the Euro-African intergovernmental meeting on migration outlined the importance of a regional coordinated approach to manage migration issues. The Rabat Process provides a framework for consultation and coordination, contributes to facing the challenges posed by migration and encourages opportunities for exchange and development.

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In 2013 the Médicins sans Frontières’ report ‘Violences, Vulnérabilité et Migration: bloqués aux portes de l’Europe’ and a BBC documentary accused Morocco of ‘human rights breaches over migrants’. These accusations marked a new turning point in the migration policy and led to a shift from a security approach to a new human rights-based approach. On September 2013, Mohammed VI held a meeting with his Minister of Foreign Affairs and several human rights representatives (among them the National Council of Human rights, CNDH) to draw up a new ‘Migration and Asylum Policy’ for foreign residents in the Kingdom, especially Sub-Saharan irregular migrants and refugees from Libya and Syria. The new migration policy is based on three main elements: an exceptional regularisation process for immigrants, extended power for the UNHCR to grant the right of asylum to a greater number of asylum seekers in Morocco, new laws allowing for better integration of migrants and asylum-seekers into Moroccan society, as well as increased emphasis on the fight against human trafficking and traffickers. Moreover, in December 2014, the National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum was adopted by the Moroccan Government with the aim of ensuring the social and economic integration of immigrants and better managing the irregular migration flow. This strategy wants to facilitate the integration of the new legal immigrants, to establish a regulation framework and to manage migration flow with a human rights-based approach (Lahlou, 2018). The result was that by the end of 2014, the number of the validated requests for regularisation reached 17,916 out of a total of 27,332, just over a third of the 45,000 regularisations announced as a target of the operation (Lahlou, 2015). In 2018, the UNHCR in Morocco registered 3,835 new asylum applications. In January 2019, 155 new asylum applications were submitted (UNHCR, 2019). Another important challenge for the internal legislation is represented by the issue of stateless persons who arrive in this country. Morocco ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees in 1956 and its 1967 Protocol in 1968 but it has not ratified the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The amendments to the Moroccan Nationality code in 2007 addressed important legislative gaps concerning statelessness in Morocco, allowing Moroccan women to transfer nationality to their children, irrespective of the nationality of the father. This not only regulates a gender inequality in the law, but it also provides a measure to prevent statelessness and ensures that children enjoy the right to acquire a

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nationality at birth, as enshrined in Article 1 of the 1961 Convention. But problems remain for children of stateless refugees, who maintain the statelessness condition even if they are born in Morocco. Moreover, difficulties also arise for children born in Syria to a Syrian father and a Moroccan mother, who had not been registered at the Moroccan Consulate due to the closure of its services following the outbreak of the Syrian conflict. The challenge in these cases is to prove filiation with the mother or to request an easing of the procedural requirements to ensure full and effective implementation of Morocco’s important 2007 reforms recognising the right of women to confer nationality to their children automatically at birth. The UNHCR has been working with a legal partner in an effort to resolve such cases (UNHCR).

European Influence on the Moroccan Migration Policy Mobility between Morocco and Europe has been a constant in their shared history and the evolution of Moroccan migration policy is the result of this interconnection. Agreements signed between Morocco and the EU have influenced Moroccan political practices, also due to the will of the country to maintain a strong partnership with Europe. The historic background enables us to understand why the European–Moroccan political agenda is based on readmission, border controls and the reception of asylum-seekers (Carrera et al., 2016). In 2008, within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Morocco became a privileged partner and the EU decided to grant it advanced status. The ENP provides five-year programmes with the aim of establishing common objectives of cooperation in different fields. Regarding the programming for 2013–2017, the section on migration border management, citizen mobility, migration policy, international protection and asylum has the following key points: better organise legal migration; maximise the positive impact of migration on development; fight against irregular migration and human trafficking, also cooperate on readmission and effective border control; promote international protection and strengthen asylum policy; promote and protect the rights of migrants, whether they be resident Moroccan citizens in the EU or thirdcountry nationals residing in Morocco; promote integration initiatives for Moroccan migrants who enter the EU and the social and professional integration of Moroccans returning home.

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In 2013, the two parts signed the ‘Mobility Partnership’ with the following objectives: to strengthen cooperation on migration and development in order to exploit the potential of migration and its positive effects on the development of Morocco and European countries; to combat irregular immigration, networks involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings and to promote an effective return and readmission policy while respecting fundamental rights; to comply with duly ratified international instruments concerning the protection of refugees. The main point of debate in the negotiations was the clause on third country nationals (TCN clause) having transited through Moroccan territory. The EU insisted that Morocco also readmit those third country nationals, as well as its own citizens. Morocco hampered this part and the Commission’s evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements reduced the application of this clause (Carrera et al., 2016). With this agreement, in line with the European intention to externalise borders, Morocco was committed to combatting irregular migration and to including Sub-Saharans migrants and Syrian refugees in its social and economic system. In compliance with these agreements and in line with the European migration approach, the Kingdom elaborated and adopted the National Migration Strategy in 2014, focusing on management of migration flows with a human rights perspective in order to assume the responsibility that Europe had entrusted to it. The link between Morocco and Europe, regarding the migration issue, could be identified also in European politics of aid in the Sub-Saharan countries. One of the push factors of the increasing number of migrants coming from Africa and directed towards Europe through Morocco could be identified in the economic support given by Europe to third countries. The political strategy behind the aid has, over the years, had the aim of bridging the economic and social gap between Europe and African countries in order to reduce the migration flow coming from the latter. But studies concerning the relation between GNI and migration rate have demonstrated that poorest countries are the ones with the lowest rate of emigration, due to the costs of the migration project. Therefore, the external economic support and better infrastructure given by European countries create, in the short-term, the perfect conditions for increasing emigration (Bonucci, 2016). The migration flow will continue as long as this difference in opportunities between the origin and destination countries exists. This tendency was identified for the first time by Zelinsky, who

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called it ‘mobility transition’ and outlined that the propensity to migrate is more evident in advanced and accessible areas (Zelinsky, 1971, p. 220). Applying this theory to our case it is clear that the number of migrants coming from Sub-Saharan Africa in search of better living conditions is currently destined to increase. According to this evidence, Morocco will continue to be a country of transit but also a destination. In order to face this challenge, it is necessary to improve policies but also render the social context capable of integrating migrants. The capacity for reception and protection needs time to be applied because it concerns a transformation not only of the policy system but especially of the social and cultural vision of migration. On the international level, in December 2018 Morocco hosted the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, known also as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), under the sponsorship of the UN General Assembly. GCM was perceived by the international organisation as ‘a milestone in the history of the global dialogue and international cooperation on migration’ (UNGA, 2018). The location of the meeting in Marrakech is not a coincidence. It represents the recognised role of Morocco in improving its path towards migration reform as a place of destination for refugees and migrants. During the meeting, Moroccan foreign minister Nasser Bourita emphasised that his country ‘is fighting smuggling and human trafficking networks that are using the territory to endanger the lives of these migrants. We have dismantled the trafficking cells and worked to save the lives of a large number of migrants’ (Ghani, 2018). He also reminded his world audience of his government’s decision to grant 50,000 residency permits to migrants while easing access to the job market, health and education. So far, Morocco is the only country in MENA that has sought to enact significant migration and asylum reform. However, the domestic efforts in this sense remain short-term, centralised and do not have a multidimensional approach. Criticisms against this reform were that it aims to mitigate the problem in the short term, with the risk of not creating a true evolution in the Morocco migration approach. The lack of follow-up legislations for four years has left the migrant and refugee community economically, socially and legally still very vulnerable. Morocco seems to be on the right track with its regularisation programs but needs a pragmatic mechanism of introducing and overseeing the implementation

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of a comprehensive socio-economic and legal migration policy (Jacobs, 2019b).

Sub-Saharan Migrant Conditions Under the New Moroccan Migration Policy As mentioned above, the new Moroccan migration policy has the aim of ensuring equal opportunities for migrants, improving their access to economic, cultural and political rights and changing the perception of migration in society. The government encouraged different institutions—both private and public—to pursue programmes facilitating this integration. In the study carried out by Imane Bendra and based on interviews with Sub-Saharan migrants in four cities of Morocco (Oujda, Nador, Rabat and Meknes), she argues that ‘despite the improvements affected by the new immigration policies and the regularisation campaign, they continue to live in an exceptional state of illegality and exclusion’ (Bendra, 2017, p. 9). The reasons are the scarce access to the job market, the employment in informal sectors, such as construction or low-skilled jobs with inadequate salary, the impossibility of finding accommodation, minimal access to health services and limited access to education for migrants (Bendra, 2017). The conclusion is that the new migration policy has a contradictory approach: on the one hand, Morocco offers the residency card for Sub-Saharans migrants, maintaining the security approach to migration in line with the European policy of border externalisation but, on the other hand, the political approach is not associated with a structural change in the management of integration and inclusion. The political framework is, thus, revealed as limited and lacking due to its top-down approach and insufficient efforts to work on real integration. The social inclusion of migrants relies on the local NGOs and international organisations, while the state ensures only the possibility of remaining in a legal manner. Important steps have been taken also by civil society to improve the legal status in Moroccan legislation, such as the two regularisation campaigns that took place in 2014 and 2017 and helped 50,000 irregular migrants gain access to residency permits. Further, Moroccan civil society still includes independent, vocal advocacy groups like GADEM and AMDH that have continued to advocate for reforms in this area. Morocco’s ambitious regularisation program gave residency permits to a large majority of undocumented migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan

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Africa. The initial program took place in 2014, with a limited appeal process in 2015. A further regularisation process took place in 2017. According to the World Bank, more than 25,000 individuals from 116 different countries received one-year residency permits in the 2014 regularisation process. The program accepted the applications of all women and children who applied, and the overall acceptance rate was over 65%. This population came mostly from Senegal (25%), Syria (20%) and Nigeria (9%). The second round of regularisation was announced in 2017 around the time that Morocco started making overtures to join the ECOWAS economic bloc. The second campaign legalised roughly 28,000 individuals. This program helped open the door to conversations about reintegration into the African Union, economic cooperation and the free movement of people between Morocco and Western African countries. Yet, these positive steps were overshadowed by continued police raids, the poor treatment of sub-Saharan migrants across the country and poor living conditions experienced by many migrants and refugees (Jacobs, 2019a). Regarding irregular migration, according to Lahlou, policy measures and border controls cannot solve this immense problem. Instead, a comprehensive approach and partnership between origin countries, the European countries of destination and, of course, the countries of transit must be implemented. At the same time, it is necessary to facilitate the voluntary returns and combat human trafficking. To deal with these issues it is necessary to enhance a multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation between the European Union, the Maghreb countries, and the main countries of departure of irregular migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (Lahlou, 2018).

The European Trust Fund for Africa and Models of Integration in Morocco4 In line with its strategy of externalising borders and strengthening capacities of third countries to integrate and protect migrants, the European Union finances programmes to support them in this sense. Morocco benefits from funding under the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa which aims to foster stability and address the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa. On the national level, the Trust Fund has financed three projects for supporting the integration of Sub-Saharan migrants in different fields and

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promoting good governance at a regional level in terms of migration management. Live Together Without Discrimination: A Human Rights-Based Approach and Gender Equality This programme, started in 2016 and financed by the EUTF, is in line with the Kingdom’s National Strategy of Immigration and Asylum and with goal 3 of the Trust Fund: ‘to improve migration governance in origin, transit and destination countries’. Objectives of the programme are also related to goals 2 and 4: to enhance community resilience in particular among most vulnerable migrants and refugees; to enhance governance of migration, conflict prevention and to reduce irregular migration. Two main areas on which the programme focuses are: humanitarian issues, one of the specific objectives of which is to fight against discrimination; governance and communication issues in order to promote information and awareness regarding Sub-Saharan migrants and asylum-seekers. The specific objectives of the programme are: 1. To support the Kingdom in the comparative study of norms and regulations concerning racial and ethnic discrimination against the immigrant population, as well as in the development of proposals for strengthening public bodies involved, both at national and regional level, from a human rights perspective, with a focus on gender issues. 2. To support the improvement of mechanisms for identifying and collecting data concerning the protection of human rights and for reporting racist and xenophobic incidents in the migrant population. The protection of victims will always be guaranteed, with special measures for women and children. 3. To enhance the power of public administrations: social assistance, educational community, justice, law enforcement agencies (police officers and the Royal Gendarmerie) and health, in prevention of racism and xenophobia. 4. To strengthen skills of civil society organisations in protecting the human rights of migrants and in preventing racist and / or xenophobic incidents.

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5. To support measures and awareness-raising actions aimed at preventing racism and xenophobia, working with Moroccan media and society for the promotion and protection of human rights. Juridical Empowerment of Migrants This programme, begun in 2017, has the aim of improving the governance of migration with a human rights approach in the south–south cooperation between Morocco and Mali, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. The overall objective is in keeping with the EUTF goal number 3, which is the priority action in North Africa: ‘to improve migration governance in origin, transit and destination countries’. The agreements signed between Morocco and these African countries are linked to the diasporas living in the Kingdom. The Senegalese diaspora consists of 2,525 people, the Malian of 1,071 and the Ivorian of 1,152. The specific objectives of the programme are: 1. To strengthen the south–south cooperation on migration, particularly in terms of policies and practices for the mobility of diasporas at the regional, national and local levels. 2. To strengthen south–south cooperation in terms of integration and reintegration. 3. To improve south–south mobility in a triple winning approach (origin and destination country and migrants), including the mobility of students, trainees and volunteers. The approach of the programme is focused on the needs and interests of the partners and it is essential for the success and the sustainability of the action. For this reason, the programme aims to enhance dialogue among parties and create a space for exchanging ideas and highlighting priorities; it provides operational support and technical expertise to governments, including administrative and financial aspects related to the implementation of the project; it assists the programming and the implementation of pilot actions. Actions undertaken by governments are in line with the mandates and competences of the EUTF strategic framework and the Moroccan migration policy. Final beneficiaries are migrants and diaspora communities, which become key actors in local development in origin and destination countries.

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Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants This programme, which was started in 2018, has the aim of improving the conditions of vulnerable migrants in Morocco and their access to basic services. The overall objective is in line with goal 2 of the Emergency Trust Fund in Morocco, mentioned above, concerning the community resilience of migrants and refugees. The activities are implemented in partnership with public institutions and in coordination with other initiatives underway in Morocco and carried out by national or international organisations. The specific objectives of the programme are: 1. To ensure greater accessibility and better care for the most vulnerable migrants, including access to health, maternal and child health, psychosocial support and pre-school education. 2. To strengthen the capacity of public associations and organisations in delivering services to migrants. Regarding this last point, civil society organisations play an important role in identifying vulnerable beneficiaries and their needs. They can intervene at the local level and enter migrants’ networks, collecting data and information. For this reason, the programme wants to fit into the structure of existing organisations and strengthen their capacity to enable a growing number of migrants to have access to basic services. Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project At the regional level the EUTF has financed, since 2015, the Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project in major cities of North Africa, the Middle East and Europe, where the challenges of social inclusion have the potential to succeed. The overall objective is to contribute to improving rights-based migration governance at the local level in cities in the north of Africa, through partnership with cities in Europe, with a specific focus on integration and inclusion. The specific objectives are5 : 1. Dialogue: To improve mechanisms for multi-level governance on migration and migrant integration and inclusion in 9 cities and

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enhance horizontal and vertical inter-institutional cooperation and coordination, facilitating holistic approaches to migrant inclusion. 2. Knowledge: To generate and disseminate knowledge about the local dimension of migrant integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region and within the Southern Neighbourhood, notably North African Countries and Lebanon and Jordan. 3. Action: To reinforce the capacity of the targeted local authorities to address migrant integration and inclusion, including socio-economic opportunities for the wider population. 4. Cross-cutting communications and dissemination: To counter the negative perception of migration at the local level and promote a human-rights approach through targeted communications actions. The Action is implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), an inter-governmental organisation with expertise on migration, in partnership with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the global organisation that represents local governments. MC2CM has established a network of 9 cities: Amman, Beirut, Lisbon, Lyon, Madrid, Tangier, Tunis, Turin and Vienna and has targeted their local authorities as key actors in the management of migration, integration and inclusion. The project aims also to promote dialogue among them and an exchange of information through the City Migration Profile elaborated by each city. This document highlights relevant entities for action such as local communities, civil society organisations, migrant organisations and a series of priorities for improving migration management. In this way the Action provides a platform for cities to share experiences, tools and methods with which to address common identified challenges and also establishes collaboration within this network. The Case of Tangier6 From the Tangier Migration Profile, it is possible to outline data related to migration in this city. Data from the 2014 Population and Housing census (RGPH) on emigrants and immigrants reported that there were 5,145 foreigners in Tangier, 0.5% of the city’s total population. The current number of foreigners is much higher. According to the African Union of development associations, there are close to 3,000 immigrants

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from Sub-Saharan Africa. Within the framework of the MC2CM project, stakeholders from Tangier (including elements from the municipality, the voluntary sector and devolved state services) have identified the following priorities: 1. The mobilisation of the institutions involved in the inclusion of migrants 2. The fight against xenophobia and racism 3. The development of community actions in relation to immigration 4. Gaining awareness of migratory movements in the city 5. The hosting and support of migrants 6. Migrant health 7. Housing and accommodation for migrants 8. Access to employment 9. The schooling of migrants’ children. Regarding the implementation of the Action and the situation regarding migration management before the MC2CM, at the municipal level, procedures for dealing with migrants’ arrivals and inclusion in Tangier were not standardised and multi-level governance on this issue was completely absent. In a lack of a comprehensive municipal and multi-level framework or approach to migration, civil society organisations have filled gaps in this field. In the case of Tangier, civil society groups provide services to increase social cohesion and increase access to basic services and human rights for migrants. In line with the new decentralisation framework, promoted by the constitutional reform of 2011, the city of Tangier encourages CSOs to cooperate with local government and provides funds for such organisations to operate. In 2016, five civil society organisations received financial support from the city of Tangier for their operations in the field of migration. The city set up a committee, which overviewed the tendering process and evaluated the organisations’ applications. So, this municipality shows interest in expanding its knowledge on migration and in developing tools and mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon. Tangier’s involvement in the Mediterranean City-to-City Migration provides a further opportunity to raise awareness of this issue and to enhance social cohesion through economic, social and cultural integration of migrants with a series of training opportunities for the local authorities to build up local expertise.

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Regarding the role of the CSOs and the local authorities in migration management, the Moroccan case is an example of a Local Economic Development-inspired model and its institutional discontinuities. Despite its efforts to decentralise power and the project of regionalisation implemented by the constitutional reform in 2011, the Moroccan system remains a centralised system. However, the inclusion of local organisations and authorities in the development process happens outside of the institutional framework. According to a study conducted by Lorena Gazzotti in 2018 on the role of LAs and CSOs in supporting local development in Morocco, this process has caused unequal access to funds and resources among different local communities. The Moroccan government and international organisations are aware of the importance of these actors and donors and, with the implementation of the new Migration Policy in 2014, they have improved their engagement in enabling Moroccan local authorities to play a more direct role in the so-called migration management (Gazzotti, 2018). The Mediterranean City-to-City migration is an example of how the European Union fosters local actors to enhance their role in managing migration and development in a parallel framework and with a bottom-up approach. The project is in its second phase from 2018 to 2021, with new and expanded objectives: – Expand dialogue: more cities and stakeholders involved in exchanges such as Algiers and Oran (Algeria), Tripoli and Sabha (Libya), Sousse (Tunisia) and Fès (Morocco). – Devise more actions supporting targeted city actions to address identified needs and priorities on the ground. – Increase knowledge collecting and disseminating of migrationrelated knowledge and data. – Raise awareness promoting a realistic and fair narrative on migration and intercultural dialogue. The success of the project and its progress to a second phase can be identified in the efforts of the Moroccan Government to elaborate and implement a more decentralised system in the country. The constitutional reform of 2011 promoted the advanced regionalisation which meets two main objectives: on the one hand, a more democratic and

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efficient distribution of powers and the regional responsibility to coordinate policies for socio-economic development, in order to overcome disparities and imbalances in the country; on the other hand, the transformation of formal citizenship to an active one. The competences are divided among different territorial levels on the basis of the subsidiary principle (Art.140): local communities and authorities have their own competences, together with competences that the state can transfer, and concurring ones (Bouachik, 2012). This political approach can lead, in a medium and long-term perspective, to enhancing the autonomy of local institutions, allowing them to manage social-economic issues, including the migration phenomenon.

Integration: The Essential Path to Follow From the analysis of the migration phenomenon in Morocco it is possible to understand that integration is the essential path to follow in rethinking the relationship between destination and origin countries. On the one hand, this study underlines that the Moroccan diaspora in Europe could play a crucial role in promoting development in Morocco, especially in rural areas. In this sense, co-development schemes could be an example of how the integration and inclusion of the diaspora in the destination country could improve its role as a protagonist of development. Through the involvement of local and international organisations, both destination and origin countries should promote integration and a productive use of remittances, in order to manage migration as a resource and a circular phenomenon that brings benefits for all. On the other hand, this research shows that sending counties in the MENA region, such as Morocco, are now dealing with the migration phenomenon in a different way, becoming points of both transit and destination for migrants and refugees. In this perspective, the European Union plays a crucial role in supporting these countries in the elaboration of political and economic tools with which to face migration from a transnational point of view. Through the analysis of these programmes financed by the European Trust Fund for Africa, the research wants to underline how the EU makes efforts to support third countries to manage the migration issue within its strategy of externalising borders and reducing the migration flow towards European countries. If, on the one hand, this support could be interpreted as a handing over of responsibility and an attempt

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to transform the Mediterranean from being a space of exchange into a wall (Harrami & Mouna, 2018), on the other hand, the way in which funds and programmes are invested and implemented is a crucial point to observe. In the case of Morocco, which is a traditional sending country and is now dealing with the immigration flow, European intervention has influenced its policy and has promoted migrants’ integration in the respect of human rights. The Mediterranean City-to-City Project seems to be a successful and replicable model to foster integration and social inclusion. Unlike the other programmes analysed, it is based on a bottom-up approach and on the ownership by local authorities of migration management. In this way, the Action allows local communities and authorities, civil society organisations and migrants’ organisations to contribute directly to the process of integration. Through needs assessments, municipalities implement pilot projects on the identified priorities with the involvement of all stakeholders related to the migration issue. Integration and inclusion are not only the result of a top-down approach and migration policy with a human rights approach. They need a social and cultural change in the host community that could be reached through a long-term process, support for to top-down and bottom-up approaches and an inclusion of both the parties involved (host communities and migrants). The Project assists participating cities in increasing their knowledge base regarding migration and in developing standards that help to create an inclusive environment which provides migrants with equal access to relevant services. Sharing best practices and lesson learned concerning the same challenges within this network could represent a new way of working among cities in the MENA region and Europe that have to constantly face problems and challenges linked to migration. MC2CM has been presented in Habitat III and the World Urban Forum 9 as a best practice to implement the New Urban Agenda. It establishes a cities network with the participation of all stakeholders in assessing the needs and setting out priorities. It is a replicable model in all cities which have to deal with inclusion and integration, and it could also be sustainable if the government invests in this field and finances municipalities when the project ends in 2020. However, this approach should take a step further in order to be exported in sub-Saharan African cities. It is necessary to develop a

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common strategy to deal with the migration phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, where migration plays an important role in shaping urbanisation. According to the 2017 Drivers of Migration and Urbanisation in Africa report by the United Nations, more than half of the global population now lives in urban areas. Sub-Saharan Africa is often regarded as the world’s fastest urbanising region. Urban areas currently contain 472 million people and will double over the next 25 years (Saghir & Santoro, 2018). Transforming this programme into a replicable and sustainable model, with the aim of promoting integration of migrants in urban areas, means elaborating common action between transit and destination countries with those of origin. This common strategy should be based firstly on the reinforcement of the capacity of sub-Saharan countries to address the forces underlying both irregular and regular migration and allowing individuals to live and work in a healthy, safe and secure environment at home, or to choose to migrate safely. Moreover, a common strategy should be based also on managing the rural–urban migration in the south, with the aim of controlling the enlargement of megacities and promoting rural development. In line with this perspective, the EU-Africa Alliance for Sustainable Investments and Jobs goes beyond the donor–recipient approach and through the Task Force for Rural Africa,7 created in 2018, has the aim of contributing to sustainable development and job creation in Africa’s agri-food sector and rural economy. This joint partnership could generate, in a long-term perspective, a positive structural change in rural environment and, consequently, it may have an impact on migration. However, considering all the programmes financed, the European intervention has a double effect: on the one hand it supports public institutions and bodies involved in migration issues in order to make them capable of ensuring protection and preventing racism. This first approach improves migration governance and regional cooperation in terms of diaspora mobility. On the other hand, it strengthens skills of civil society organisations that work alongside public institutions in protecting human rights and promoting the inclusion of migrants. With a top-down and bottom-up approach at the same time, the expected results and the impact of all these programmes combined should be a more structured public system and a society ready to integrate migrants and take advantage from all the benefits that the migration phenomenon could offer. From this perspective, it is probably important to develop a sense of belonging and a respect of migrants’ basic rights

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through the involvement of civil society organisations and local authorities in migration management. This is the first step towards a positive and peaceful coexistence between sub-Saharan migrants in Moroccan society, and is the reason why the Mediterranean City-to-City migration could be a successful and replicable model. Moreover, all these programmes aim to enhance resilience in migrant communities. In this way the interventions promote the so-called nexus between migration and development. Adaptation and inclusion in the host communities enable migrants to contribute to the economic and social growth of the destination country. Sub-Saharan migrants could be a resource for Morocco as well as the Moroccan diaspora in Europe that can contribute to Moroccan development. The Moroccan Government and Europe together should continue to encourage both these processes in order to transform immigration and emigration into a potential resource.

Notes 1. The Western Sahara is a disputed territory on the northwest coast and in the Maghreb region of North and West Africa, partially controlled by the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and partially occupied by neighbouring Morocco. In 2019, according to the UNHCR, an estimated number of 170,000 Western Saharan refugees lived in camps located around Tindouf, in the western Algerian desert. They are confined to camps and dependent on humanitarian aid, and the situation has remained unchanged since 1975. 2. During the ‘Years of Lead’, 1971–1972, Hassan II launched a violence repression against dissidents. 3. Mouhcine Fikri was crushed to death in a garbage compactor while attempting to retrieve fish that the police had confiscated and thrown away. He became the symbol of the discrimination and neglect by the state in the Rif. 4. European Trust Fund for Africa. Information on programmes of the EUTF in Morocco are available at this link: (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafr ica/region/north-africa/morocco_en). 5. Details on this programme are available here: https://ec.europa.eu/trustf undforafrica/region/north-africa/regional/mediterranean-city-city-migrat ion-mc2cm-phase-ii_en. 6. Details on the Tangier case study are available on the International Centre for Migration Policy Development website: https://www.icmpd.org/fil eadmin/1_2018/MC2CM/MC2M_case_studies/EN/CaseStudies_Tan gier_Print.pdf.

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7. Details on the Task force for Rural Africa are available here: https://ec.eur opa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/farming/international-cooperation/ africa/eu-africa-partnership_en.

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CHAPTER 5

Ceuta and Melilla: Integration or Coexistence in a Plural Society Sergio Castaño Riaño

Introduction Immigration has become one of the main subjects of study in recent years. Each region has its peculiarities. Furthermore, the effects caused by this phenomenon are not homogeneous in all territories, even when the analysis is only focused on Western European countries. The contexts and, therefore, the consequences are entirely different depending on the social, economic, and political circumstances. This chapter will study Ceuta and Melilla’s singular case, two Spanish cities located on the north coast of Africa whose location and singularities have conditioned Muslim integration since the 1980s. For many migrants, Ceuta and Melilla constitute the first contact with Europe. Moreover, the two cities have a particular social reality with two predominant groups. On the one hand, people of Spanish background inhabiting the towns since the fifteenth century, and on the other hand, people of Moroccan origin. Moroccans lived excluded in Ceuta and Melilla until the 1980s. However, this decade’s migrant process allowed

S. C. Riaño (B) University of Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_5

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them to assume more relevance and, nowadays, people of Moroccan background represent almost half of the total population. The chapter will refer to the two communities as ‘Christians’ for the group of Spanish cultural tradition and ‘Muslims’ for the group linked to Morocco. The terms are probably not the most appropriate to describe the two groups because religion is not the only element that defines either community. However, this is the terminology used by locals to refer to themselves. The vagueness of the terms clarifies some of the concepts essential to understanding the unusual nature of the two cities. Christian or Muslim refers to religion, but these terms also define two identities (Rontomé Romero, 2014). Hence, along with faith, ethnicity, language, and traditions all conform to the respective identities but not to nationality in this case. Nowadays, most Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla have Spanish nationality (Rontomé Romero, 2015). On the one hand, religion, the Spanish language, and links to the European culture define Christian identity. However, despite widespread secularism among ‘Christians’, Catholicism is still used as a differentiating feature. This is one reason why, at present, Christianity dominates the public sphere because religion is used as an active element to highlight identity and a sense of belonging to one of the groups. Nevertheless, religion is not the main factor in creating identity, and cultural heritage is the key element to defining the Christian community. Muslims also take religion, language, and citizenship to define their identity. Although most of the Muslims were born in Ceuta and Melilla, they conserve a Moroccan family background. They are legally Spanish and identify themselves as Ceuta or Melilla citizens even though they keep essential ties with their culture of origin, where Islam represents a determinant identity feature. Even though the percentage of Muslims is growing also in other European cities, Ceuta and Melilla have the highest rates. This fact has led to the two Spanish cities being taken as a model for understanding future scenarios in Europe. Today the two communities live together and share the same public space to celebrate their own religious and cultural ceremonies. Different reasons have led people from Morocco to live in Ceuta and Melilla, especially since 1986 when Spain joined the European Community. New policies favoured family reunification and transit between Ceuta and Melilla with their neighbouring cities on the other side of the border.

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Along with this, the two Spanish cities in North Africa became two gateways to Europe, and migrants of different origins set Ceuta and Melilla as their first goal on their route to Europe. The massive arrival of migrants has overwhelmed the capacity of cities to receive them. Hundreds of people wait on the other side of the fence to cross irregularly. Those who manage to enter Spain initiate a legal limbo process before starting a new life in Europe. Most of them aim to live in other cities in Spain and Europe. So, time in Ceuta and Melilla is transitory until they regularize their situation. In this regard, refugees from Syria encounter more favourable conditions than other migrants from Algeria or Sub Saharan countries. The Center for the Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI) is the first institution that manages irregular migrants’ arrival (Sahraoui, 2019). The CETI has created an integration program that is considered an introduction and the first approach for migrants to initiate a new life in Europe. However, the conditions of people living in the CETI in Ceuta and Melilla impede real integration. The irregular situation of migrants prohibits them from working and, moreover, their presence in Ceuta or Melilla is temporary until officials decide upon the status of each migrant. In some cases, one month may pass, in other more than a year before they can be transferred to other cities in Spain, where the Spanish authorities decide whether to grant a residence permit or proceed with deportation. However, only a few of these migrants remain in Ceuta and Melilla and participate in society. Even when they live in the CETI, they do not have real contact with life in the cities. Since the CETI facilities are not in the city centre. Usually, the migrants do not have the economic resources to perform many activities outside the Center for the Temporary Stay of Immigrants. In this regard, other chapters of this book study the evolution of these migrant flows and how people arrive in Europe from different countries in Africa and the Middle East. However, the present chapter analyses the specific characteristics of these two cities, with particular attention to the integration of Muslim who decide to live in Ceuta and Melilla. First, it is necessary to explain why Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish cities in North Africa. Melilla joined Spain during the Catholic Monarchs period in 1497, and Ceuta was a Portuguese territory until 1640 when the city decided to pay allegiance to the king of Spain, Philip IV who, until that year, was also king of Portugal. Only the Spanish inhabited the two towns until the nineteenth century. People of Moroccan origin

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began to live in Ceuta and Melilla that century; however, they represented a minority without legal recognition in Spain for decades. The legal status of people of Moroccan background changed after the new immigration law issued in 1985 was adopted. Thanks to this new legal framework, most Muslims living in Ceuta and Melilla acquired Spanish nationality. These circumstances drove many people from Morocco to cross the border, looking for better living conditions on Spanish territory. As a result, the Muslim presence in Ceuta and Melilla increased rapidly (Datos Macro, 1985), given rise to the present social context where local society is divided between two large communities: one following European Christian roots and the other based on the Islamic culture. Different authors have analysed the particularities and the issues related to Ceuta and Melilla. However, the general approach focused on military and diplomatic aspects until the 1980s. Ceuta and Melilla were two crucial military and strategic Spanish enclaves on the south Mediterranean coast, and immigration did not exist in these two cities for centuries. Hence, social aspects were not relevant in two cities where most people were Spanish civil servants rooted in traditional Spanish culture. Consequently, surveys published until the 1980s emphasized these aspects, and here it is interesting to highlight the work by Torrecillas (2006), the analysis carried out by Sebastian Balfour (2002), and the book written by Ángel Ballesteros (2004) where the author analyses Moroccan sovereignty claims on Ceuta and Melilla. Literature turned towards social issues in the 1990s. Ana Planet (1998) published a complete study on demographic evolution and nationality in Ceuta and Melilla. Mariano Aguilar (1996) followed a similar approach in his work ‘Double Nationality’. On the other hand, many experts have concentrated on the importance of education in consolidating integration processes and raising awareness among the young about cultural plurality in both cities. On this point, Tomás Calvo (2010) and Alicia Fernandez (2016) have published two relevant works analysing critical aspects of education and school situations. Other authors such as Mar Leal (2008) and Carlos Rontomé Romero (2014) have emphasized religious factors, while Gregory White has treated immigration from the labour perspective. Moreover, recent concerns about extremism and terrorism have moved some experts to analyse the Islamist groups’ impact on Ceuta and Melilla. In this sense, Luis de la Corte (2015), in his article ‘Jihadist enclaves’? provides a current picture of the real presence of radical groups in both cities.

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Thus, this chapter analyses demographic and social evolution in Ceuta and Melilla, focusing on the transition of the two cities from an historical Christian European heritage to multicultural cities where Muslim and Christian traditions live together, unlike other European cities, where people from North Africa and the Middle East began to arrive in the 1960s and the process of adaptation evolved progressively. In Ceuta and Melilla’s case, the transformation occurred abruptly and very quickly. As a result, policymakers and institutions were not sufficiently prepared for the need to implement policies required to facilitate integration by adapting traditional structures to the new social context. This fact leads to questions for research: is there a model of integration for Ceuta and Melilla? Or have the policies adopted to handle the situation been improvised, responding to individual events? As José Luis Loureiro Souto (2015) asserts, Ceuta and Melilla represented two impregnable bastions of Western values in Muslim territory. They will become two Muslim cities under Spanish rule in the future. Thus, Loudeiro’s statement helps us establish one hypothesis: Muslims will be the dominant social group in 2040, and Islam will gain a public presence. In the 1980s, no-one considered this demographic and social transformation and, consequently, politicians did not draw up plans to respond to the specific issues caused by new social contexts. Starting from these premises, the relevance of this research observes the present social composition of Ceuta and Melilla as two cities that, in the future, will have a Muslim majority. This scenario will also affect other European cities where Muslims today represent a large part of society but are still a minority. For Ceuta and Melilla, it is impossible to refer to Muslims as a minority because they represent 43% of the people in Ceuta and more than 51% in Melilla. Thus, the evolution observed in Ceuta and Melilla could influence policies in other Spanish or European cities so as to avoid future integration problems. It could be a mistake to analyse the cases of Ceuta and Melilla as processes of integration. Considering current circumstances, Muslims do not constitute a minority and the challenge facing authorities is, therefore, to create a model of integration and a framework for coexistence that accepts the presence of two primary cultures. Simultaneously, policymakers must be aware of the future evolution since, in twenty years’ time, Christians will represent a minority in Ceuta and Melilla. Therefore, considering this general approach, and after raising the first hypothesis: Muslims will be the dominant social group in 2040 and Islam

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will gain a public presence; the second hypothesis is, the model of integration is in permanent evolution, and it advances following demographic and social changes. The following questions will be answered to confirm the two hypotheses; Can Ceuta and Melilla become a model of integration for other cities in Spain and Europe? What is the role of institutions and political parties? Is there a real integration based on realistic objectives? The chapter has four sections. In the first, the historical evolution and the present context in Ceuta and Melilla will be studied. The second section focuses on institutions’ efforts to contribute to integration, fostering coexistence in an intercultural environment. The third part of the chapter analyses the impact of Islam in both cities. The fourth section studies the presence of extremist tendencies and the policies promoted to reduce their influence.

The Singularity of Two European Cities Located in North Africa The historical evolution of Ceuta and Melilla helps us to understand their present particularities and characteristics. The integration of these two cities into Spain had nothing to do with the colonial process initiated in the nineteenth century (Bravo Nieto & Fernández Uriel, 2005). Both cities belonged to Spain before the Alawi dynasty managed to take significant control over the territory of Morocco. They were two military-strategic locations for Spain; for this reason, the Spanish rulers forbade the presence of Moroccan presence in these two areas until 1868 (Pennell, 2002). Nevertheless, a significant political change caused legislative reforms in Spain that affected the status of the two cities. As a result, foreigners were allowed to arrive in Ceuta and Melilla, giving rise to the first flows of migrants from Morocco. Furthermore, the subsequent protectorate of Spain in the north of Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century was another episode in the history of Spain in North Africa that resulted in altering the social composition of both Ceuta and Melilla (Rodríguez & Felipe, 2002). At present, Melilla is a city with 85,000 inhabitants. Thanks to agreements between Spain and Morocco, Melilla has become the main economic and commercial centre of the area. The trade flows between the Rif, a Berber region of Morocco, and Melilla have increased over recent decades and, as a result, Melilla’s border sees heavy traffic in good but is

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(Presly, 2013), at the same time, one of the points used to enter the EU from Morocco (Acosta Sánchez, 2016). Ceuta is a city located on the Straits of Gibraltar in a strategic position (see Fig. 5.1) that controls traffic in this important commercial and military area (Alarcón Caballero, 2009). The number of people living in Ceuta is similar to that in Melilla. In economic terms, Ceuta’s port has a critical value for trade between the EU, Morocco, and other African countries. Like Melilla, the border crossing of Ceuta has become another point of entry for immigrants directed towards Europe(Planet, 2011). Despite this, legislative amendments approved the presence of people from Morocco in both territories. The new law did not, however, make provision for legal status. In many cases, people who arrived from Morocco did not return to their country of origin. They lost their documentation as Moroccan citizens, but Spain’s government did not recognize them as Spanish (López Bueno, 2010). The legal vacuum caused most non-Spanish people living in Ceuta and Melilla to have no documentation, social protection, or rights as citizens. They could not initiate the procedures to obtain Spanish residence or nationality because they could not identify themselves and demonstrate that they had lived in Spain for decades. The problem extended to the descendants of these pioneer Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla, who were born in Spain but not recognized as Spanish citizens. At present, Melilla is a city with 85.000 inhabitants. Thanks to Spain and Morocco’s agreements, Melilla

Fig. 5.1 Ceuta, Melilla and the Straits of Gibraltar (Source Google Maps 2021)

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has become the main economic and commercial centre of the area. The trade flows between the Rif, a Berber region of Morocco, and Melilla increased in the last decades. As a result, Melilla’s border holds heavy traffic of goods but, at the same time, is one of the points used to enter the EU from Morocco (Acosta Sánchez, 2016). The historical military context of the two cities and the broad legal restrictions for foreigners consolidated Spanish civil servants as the leading social group. Moreover, apart from the current intense commercial activities between the two cities and their neighbouring areas in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla do not enjoy notable economic activity. The Spanish government has economic activities, but it should be noted that most of those employed in Ceuta and Melilla work for the public administration. Thus, private economic activities based on services have always been in the hands of people of Spanish background. On the other hand industry does not exist in these two cities. Therefore, this economic, legal, and social context has relegated Moroccan origin people to playing a secondary role in society (Toharia, 2018). They have been excluded from the regular life of the cities. Without legal recognition, they could not get jobs in the public administration or legal jobs protected by contracts and their only way to earn a salary was by working under unpredictable conditions. The situation changed in the 1980s when the arrival of increasing numbers of Moroccans began to grant more relevance to this community which had been excluded for decades. Moroccans represented less than 10% of inhabitants in Ceuta and Melilla until the 1980s. Different factors in the first years of this decade prompted many Moroccan people to move to Ceuta and Melilla to initiate a new life. The elements that helped change the traditional contexts in the two cities were the consolidation of democracy in Spain (Salinas Ramos, 1983), economic growth, the advance towards a more tolerant society, and mainly, the incorporation of Spain into the European Community. As a result, hundreds of people decided to cross the border, and in a short time, the number of people of Moroccan origin increased significantly. The permanent arrival of those of Muslim background drove local rulers to plan policies to foster the integration of the new inhabitants (Serna, 2006). Although the arrival of Moroccans was progressive in Ceuta and Melilla, immigration was not a relevant issue in Spain during Franco’s dictatorial period. Spain was a developing country, and its authoritarian regime was not attractive for people looking for new opportunities.

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The atmosphere created after the death of Francisco Franco encouraged people from other latitudes to come to Spain. However, immigration figures were still too low to justify establishing programs that addressed the issue in most Spain regions (Gonzálvez Pérez, 2012). The population of Spain in 1985 was 38 million and, of these, only 150,000 were not Spanish. In global figures, less than 0.5% of people in Spain did not have a Spanish passport. In contrast, the situation was different in Ceuta and Melilla, where foreign people represented 20% of the populations in the same year. The increased presence of foreigners in some cities in Spain drove the Spanish government to issue an Immigration Law. The new legislation conferred legal status and official recognition to people who had been living in Spain without any rights for decades. However, the Immigration Law had unfair consequences for people of Moroccan origin in Ceuta and Melilla (Sagarra, 2002). Families living in these two cities without being officially registered needed to meet the new requirements to obtain residence or Spanish nationality. If not fulfilling the required conditions, they could be considered irregular migrants and expelled from Spain. Many of them were born in Spain, but they did not have any documents to prove it, and there was no official register confirming their Spanish origin. In Melilla’s case, the absence of rights began in 1860, after the end of the First War of Morocco, when the agreements between Spain and Morocco forced the Berber people to abandon the territory of Melilla. Some of these sought a place to establish their homes and, after some years, they occupied the slopes of Cerro de Reina Regente (Regent Queen), which today corresponds to the ‘La Cañada de Hidum’ quarter (Delgado, 1985). This territory belonged to Spain, but people living there were not considered Spanish. Over the years, this legal limbo gave rise to undefined legal status for people born in La Cañada. One clear example of this is the situation experienced by Abdelmalik el Barkani, one of the children who grew up in this undefined zone. He was born in what is now the quarter of La Cañada in 1960. As a result, he did not have Spanish or Moroccan nationality for many years; the only documentation was his birth certificate and school records. This situation led him to enter into political activity, resulting in him becoming the governor of Melilla in 2012 (Cembreno, 2005). The Immigration Law granted a period in which people could regularize their situation in Spain (Belmonte, 2010). Despite the particularities in Ceuta and Melilla, the central government did not consider any special

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clauses for the two cities (Cordero, 2005), which caused severe social problems because more than 20,000 Muslims in Melilla and another 20,000 in Ceuta, born in Spain in most cases, could be deported to Morocco. They had always resided in Spain and did not have Moroccan documentation either. The Muslim community had suffered marginalization for decades, but this political decision constituted the first occasion on which they were obliged to abandon their respective cities. People of Moroccan background had suffered social, legal, labour, and economic discrimination. Nevertheless, they belonged to those divided and singular societies of Ceuta and Melilla. The critical situation and the risk of being expelled moved people of Moroccan background to claim their historical rights to obtain Spanish nationality. Local reactions among Muslims living in Ceuta and Melilla against the Immigration Law provisions resulted in two years of social tension. Frequent demonstrations, where Muslims claimed their rights as citizens, confirmed the rejection of the law. Protests succeeded in putting pressure on the government, which addressed Ceuta and Melilla’s particularities, especially the grievance of people who conserved Moroccan culture but who had strong roots in Spain (Delgado, 1985). Consequently, the Spanish government acknowledged the particularities of thousands of people in Ceuta and Melilla. After lengthy negotiations, at the beginning of the new century the Spanish Ministry of the Interior initiated the process of granting Spanish nationality to more than 6,000 people. Meanwhile, official recognition of people of Moroccan background as Spanish people represented an effort of integration of Muslims, who were ignored as part of the local society for a long time. From this moment on, the Muslims of Ceuta and Melilla began to establish the first organizations to defend their rights and identity as Spanish Muslims. Two of these organizations were the Muslim Community of Ceuta and the Muslim Community of Melilla. The new legal framework drove many Moroccan people to cross the border, searching for a new life in Europe (Lara, 2014). Ceuta and Melilla represented two ideal places to obtain the benefits of living in Europe without leaving their roots (White, 2003), and the Moroccan community began to be more relevant to different aspects of local life. However, integration was not easy. Although Ceuta and Melilla have higher economic prosperity than the neighbouring Moroccan cities, they do not have an intense industrial activity.1 Unemployment rates there have always been

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the highest in Spain; the economy is based upon commerce and services whose productivity is not wealthy enough to welcome new workers. As a result, new arrivals found few opportunities to initiate a prosperous life in either of the two cities. Moreover, in many cases, they were unskilled workers, and had difficulty in speaking Spanish. These two elements led many of them to face problems when attempting to integrate into Ceuta and Melilla’s new multicultural society. Many of these people lived in marginal areas in the peripheries, quarters such as El Principe (García, 2007) in Ceuta, or La Canada in Melilla (Gallego-Díaz, 2002). Although Spanish legislation does not enable reports to be elaborated providing information on people’s religious affiliation, recent surveys developed by the UCIDE and Observatorio Andalusí (2017) have analysed the present social reality in Ceuta and Melilla. The element used to determine the probable religious affiliation is the origin of the surnames. This is not an accurate method but provides relevant information about the family background while allowing a differentiation to be made between surnames of Spanish origin and those with their roots in Morocco. Religion does not always coincide with ethnicity, even though most of those from Moroccan backgrounds living in Ceuta and Melilla are also Muslim. As was highlighted before, according to unofficial data and only considering people registered by the authorities, more than 43% of the people in Ceuta and more 51% in Melilla are from Muslim backgrounds. In the majority of the cases, people included in these percentages are Muslims. Many of them obtained Spanish nationality, while the younger generations born in Spain are entirely Spanish. The new social balance which emerged following the en masse nationalization of Spanish Muslims presented a challenge for the authorities, who took various measures aimed at reducing inequality and creating a climate of coexistence within a multicultural context. On the other hand, the birth rate among Muslims is higher than among non-Muslims; the averages indicate that Muslim women have 5 five children while non-Muslims only one. Therefore, evolution shows that Muslims will be the dominant social group in Ceuta and Melilla (Amirah Fernández, 2015), and Islam will influence the development of different cultural, social, political, and even economic aspects.

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Integration in Ceuta and Melilla: Policies to Reduce the Gap Despite their location in a region where the predominant religion is Islam, Ceuta and Melilla represented an impregnable stronghold of Christianity in North Africa for centuries. Until the 1980s, Christianity and the Spanish cultural values were a source of pride among citizens and highlighted this uniqueness in North Africa (Cámara Gorge, 1997). Religious and cultural values differentiated those who lived inside and outside the borders of Ceuta and Melilla. In this context, Muslims who lived within the two Spanish cities remained excluded without any public presence. Even before recognizing Muslims’ rights, there was already an atmosphere of hostility or rejection against those who did not share the traditional ways of life predominant in Ceuta and Melilla (Cembreno, 2016). In both cities, there was a dominant social group that, for many years, ordered the different aspects of life. The two communities had been living next to one another, and now had to face the challenge of living together, sharing the same public space. This circumstance contrasts with the evolution of Muslim immigration Europe. In the beginning, when people from MENA countries arrived to work in central European countries in the 1960s (Laurence, 2012), Islamic culture was observed as something exotic. Moreover, many understood immigration as a temporary phenomenon and, for this reason, there was no policy for integrating these communities. On the contrary, when the Muslim presence began to grow in Ceuta and Melilla, ‘Christians’ were familiar with Islamic culture. Moreover, many Muslims had Spanish nationality, and their idea was to remain in Spain for the future. The recognition of Muslims born in Ceuta and Melilla as Spanish in 1985 and the progressive arrival of Moroccan people since the 1980s caused a critical social transformation (Solanes, 2010). Moroccans and Spanish of Moroccan origin began to participate in local social life. As a consequence, Islam began to assume more relevance in public life. Muslims initiated social movements aimed at obtaining public acknowledgement of their singularity. In this regard, the presence of symbols that represented Islamic culture increased in the two cities. Muslim community began to be involved in local life and claimed their principal religious days (Suárez & Escudero, 2018). People of Moroccan origin and other people who arrived in Ceuta and Melilla from different African countries celebrate their holy days

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and the two cities began to celebrate Muslim festivities in the 1980s. Initially, authorities allowed the celebrations, but all these days were not part of the local official calendar of holy days. However, the pressure from various Muslim associations and the progressive increase in the number of Muslims led local rulers to include some of these festivities within the calendar. Nevertheless, the recognition was not easy, and some tension arose among politicians over the question of accepting certain Muslim celebrations as official. In this regard, the Popular Party accused the Unión Democráta Ceutí (Ceuta Democratic Union), a party led by Muslims, of initiating a process to increase the presence of Moroccan elements in Ceuta (Jiménez Gámez, 2010). As a result of all these social movements, the authorities modified the traditional calendar based on Catholic holy days and included some significant Muslim celebrations. Although people of Christian culture are predominantly secular, and many do not participate in most Catholic celebrations, the Spanish calendar of festivities is still based on Catholic holy days. Even though this does not respond to social reality in both cities, Ceuta and Melilla conserve many Catholic days in their official schedules. On the contrary, most Muslims are more conservative in Ceuta and Melilla; they follow and respect all the religious periods of celebration. Local politicians have initiated the first steps towards including Muslim holidays in public life in the two cities, responding to Muslim demands. Consequently, the Festival of Sacrifice (Aid El Kebir) was incorporated as an official holy day in Melilla in 2009 (Figueras, 2010), making Melilla the first European city to include Aid el Kebir as one of the local official festivities. For that purpose, it was necessary to modify local rules that do not allow animal sacrifice outside the standard slaughterhouses and establish special temporary slaughterhouses for the sacrifice of lambs on this day (González & Pérez, 2008b). The only celebration in which Muslims and Christians participate together is the Magi’s Cavalcade on January 6th. For the rest of the year, the two communities remain divided and celebrate their festivities independently. In this regard, some authors have described the reality in Ceuta and Melilla as a model of coexistence. However, this situation responds to a multicultural society where different cultures coexist; they respect each other, but there is no real integration. Despite this, rulers are working to reduce the differences. However, present circumstances make it reaching integration in Ceuta and Melilla a challenge. The model of coexistence will remain at least for the next ten years, during which time

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conditions might be changed by demographic and social developments, and new scenarios could evolve. The growing presence of people from different backgrounds altered the traditional social, political, and economic environments. As related above, many of these people had difficulty adapting themselves to the European context (Garrido, 2012). This situation prompted the government to promote policies aimed at reducing the cultural impact and barriers to integration. Spain did not have a protocol for developing integration programs. Although Ceuta and Melilla possessed a significant segment of people rooted in Muslim culture, immigration was a new phenomenon for the central government. Local authorities, together with the central government began to implement the first initiatives focused on young people. New generations had always lived together in the same territory, and they did not have many prejudices. The government found it more difficult to approach people who had lived in different environments, when society remained divided into two realities. Many of the old generations of Spanish background people were reluctant to accept the integration of those of Moroccan origin, or to recognize their rights once they obtained Spanish nationality (Zamarro, 1985). For this purpose, the leading programs wanted to focus on education. Even though teaching was not the only area of action, it represents a pivotal factor in advancing towards a new intercultural and tolerant society. Along with education, central and local governments gave significant relevance to other areas such as social programs to help less advantaged families, labour insertion, campaigns, or the recognition of Muslim festivities and traditions in daily life. In this regard, the Social Services of the local government of Melilla have created ‘Integration Income’. In contrast, the High Commissioner for Child Poverty of the Government confirmed the program to combat child poverty in Spain. Since Ceuta and Melilla included Eid al-Adha as a local festivity, the two cities have made progressive advantages in this matter. Nevertheless, those policies have not always produced the expected results; in some cases, authorities found obstacles that hampered their initial goals. Since the 1980s, Ceuta and Melilla have received hundreds of children every year. The majority of them arrive at the Spanish territories in North Africa without any educational background. In many cases, they have trouble speaking the Spanish language, which represented

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the first challenge for government. Public schools channelled integration into incorporating children from different countries into the Spanish educational system (López Belmonte, 2013). On the other hand, the Spanish general educational system does not have specific elements to face Ceuta and Melilla’s singular situation. More than 50% of students do not speak Spanish as their mother tongue when Spanish is the official language. The Spanish-Muslim community’s primary language in Ceuta is the Darija dialect of Arabic (Moscoso García, 2014), while in Melilla it is the Berber language Tamazight. Although politicians have tried to promote different programs to help students of diverse backgrounds to learn Spanish and to allow them to follow the regular curriculum, educational deficiencies in Ceuta and Melilla have hampered this purpose (López Ruperez, 2013). The number of students is very limited. Furthermore, the number of teachers capable of speaking Darija and Tamazight is still too low to support the increasing number of students with troubles understanding and communicating in Spanish. The first program to be carried out focused on a bilingual project. This involves an introductory phase where a supporting teacher who speaks both languages helps the students reach the skills needed to follow the normal Spanish educational program. In this regard, it was necessary to create the figure of a bilingual teacher able to speak Spanish and Darija or Tamazight. Individual groups were established to encourage students to integrate into the Spanish educational system using Spanish as the only language for school study. Simultaneously, these teachers acted as links between the students included in the bilingual program and the rest of the teachers and students (López Bueno, 2010). The bilingual program caused division between the language that Moroccan students used at home and that used at school. Today, many of these students speak both languages but are only able to write in Spanish. Different Moroccan associations in Ceuta and Melilla demand the recognition of Darija and Tamazight as official languages in the two towns and the teaching of the two languages in public schools. However, these demands have been ignored so far. The second language in schools is English, while Darija and Tamazight are only used to integrate new students when they arrive from Morocco. In this respect, it is worth noting the analysis made by Alicia Fernandez. She remarks on the preponderance of the Spanish language, and some politicians’ reluctance to include the teaching

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of Darija and Tamazight in schools. According to Fernandez, the noninclusion of these two languages could reflect Spanish nationalism among the current authorities. After more than two decades, the policies launched have helped eliminate some of the obstacles that hinder the integration of the younger generations. However, school failure figures are still higher than in any of the other regions of Spain (Alemany Arbeloa, 2013). Even though the program has had difficulties achieving its aims in Ceuta and Melilla, it was used as a model to develop integration programs in other territories in Spain when migration began to increase in the 1990s. However, the results in different regions of Spain have not been satisfactory either. Children in schools overcome the language barrier, but this remains a problem for adults. Education is mandatory for children under sixteen, but the rest have more trouble learning Spanish and, consequently, integrating themselves into local society. There are only a few programs aimed at helping adults to reduce barriers to integration, and these are not sufficient to support the growing number of people that arrive in Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco and other Sub-Saharan countries without knowledge of Spanish. There are some educational centres for adults and literacy programs in the Spanish language, but not many people are enrolled in these (Informe, 2017). Along with education, the local governments had to handle other issues related to an increasing Muslim presence in the two cities. Social policies in less advantaged quarters sought to help people of Moroccan background. Moreover, as stated above, Ceuta and Melilla have the highest unemployment rates in Spain. Many people who arrived from other nations do not find opportunities, and, in many cases, they have to live in marginal quarters. An example of this is the quarter of El Príncipe in Ceuta (Jordán & Trujillo, 2006). El Principe is considered a conflicted peripheral area where the police have difficulties entering to do their job. Frequently, experts refer to El Principe as an area of the city outside the law. Authorities are not able to control what happens inside the neighbourhood and, simultaneously, it is difficult to provide social services in a quarter where many people are not regular migrants, and houses are built without legal permission. At present, 82% of foreigners in Ceuta live in El Príncipe. Juan Jesús Vivas (El Pueblo de Ceuta, 2018), the president of the City of Ceuta, asserts that there are disparities between the neighbourhoods in Ceuta; figures show significant oscillations in the unemployment rate,

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school abandonment, social exclusion, or the level of delinquency. Moreover, significant migratory pressure in quarters such as El Príncipe causes ethnic minorities, urban congestion, and environmental degradation. One of the consequences of the lack of opportunities and marginalization in these areas is the growing presence of criminal organizations growing presence. Ceuta and Melilla’s strategic position on the Mediterranean Sea favours the development of illegal activities such as smuggling, drug traffic, or human trafficking. Criminal organizations attract people of El Principe and La Cañada to become involved in such illicit activities, and the presence of international crime in the less-advantaged quarters further exacerbates marginalization in these areas in both cities. Politicians have launched several programs to respond to the imbalance in these marginal areas. The initiatives aim to reduce poverty and to help people improve their respective situations. The EU program for Ceuta and Melilla focuses on re-qualifying quarters impacted by marginalization and a lack of infrastructure. The program concentrates on El Príncipe and Benzú in Ceuta and La Cañada de Hidum in Melilla. In Ceuta’s case, the two neighbourhoods are severely affected by the consequences of migrant pressure on the border. There have been different public initiatives to improve the situation of these marginal quarters, the most representative case being that of El Principe. In 2007 the Government of Ceuta, with FEDER funds, invested almost e 4 million in improving the infrastructures. In 2013 the Cruz Blanca Foundation established a Social Center to help people in different social aspects. In 2018 the local government promoted the construction of a Civil Center to foster integration of people in the neighbourhood (Vivancos, 2018). Nevertheless, the measures adopted to improve the situation in these marginal quarters have mainly been ineffective. The less advantaged quarters are overpopulated; many people living in these neighbourhoods are irregular immigrants in Spain. El Principe in Ceuta and La Canada in Melilla are two suburbs excluded from social life, and most of their inhabitants live without integrating into local society. Their isolation causes people who live in other areas of the two cities to look away and ignore what is happening inside these peripheral zones.

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The Growing Presence of Islam in Ceuta and Melilla Present circumstances in both cities favour the increasing presence of people of Muslim background. Many Spanish civil servants who live in these two territories have their roots in other Spanish regions. Moreover, their sons and daughters go to study at universities in Spain or abroad, and in most cases, they do not return. This fact has led stagnation and decrease of the ‘Christian’ population. On the contrary, the Muslim community increases its number every year. The percentages nowadays show a relative balance, but Muslims will be predominant in coming years according to the evolution observed over the last decades. As a result, Islam will be the main religion of the two Spanish cities that, for centuries, represented the presence of Christianity in North Africa (Salguero, 2018). Along with the increased presence of Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla, different organizations began to organize Islam’s practice by establishing mosques and centres to practice Islamic rituals. In this regard, a decisive role has been played by Morocco’s government (Otazu, 2018), which made a significant effort to maintain most mosques and provide imams to lead religious ceremonies and guide the faithful. The Moroccan government has 34 mosques in Ceuta and 17 in Melilla. Currently, 95 Moroccan civil servants attend religious services in Ceuta and 58 in Melilla. The minister of Morocco’s Islamic Affairs justifies Moroccan involvement in religious activities, arguing that the government responds to a religious demand not satisfied by the Spanish authorities. Neither the Spanish government nor local rulers in Ceuta and Melilla contribute to the increasing presence of Islamic institution. Spain is a secular country and, although the government assigns funds for the different religious organizations, it is not involved in religious affairs. However, the Muslim community in Ceuta and Melilla demand more support for Islam from the Spanish government. According to Abdelkrim Alal, the former president of the Islamic Commission of Melilla, there are no Spanish imams because local Muslim associations do not have the funds to train people for this purpose. At the same time, Alal says that the Spanish government does not help people practice Islam (Otazu, 2018). The Moroccan government’s influence goes beyond Ceuta and Melilla, and nowadays, Moroccan authorities control many mosques in other cities in Spain. Maliki’s approach to Islam promoted by Morocco is accepted in

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Spain better than other tendencies. Spanish rulers consider Morocco Official Islam a moderate interpretation that could help prevent other radical trends. However, as Elena Ariguita (2006) asserts, ‘A large majority of Muslims rejects an official Moroccan influence on Spanish Islam’. The acceptance of official Moroccan Islam is higher in Ceuta and Melilla since physical proximity favours keeping cultural and religious ties with Morocco. One of the handicaps encountered by the Moroccan government in reinforcing its presence in Ceuta and Melilla is the problem faced by Imams in speaking the local languages, Darija and Tamazight. On many occasions, the pure Arabic language spoken by Imams hampers their ability to convey the discourses to people who speak other languages (Otazu, 2019). In this regard, Tamazight, the language spoken in Melilla, comprises structures which have nothing in common with Arabic and are difficult to comprehend. Moreover, in most cases, imams working in Ceuta and Melilla live in neighbouring cities and only go to Ceuta and Melilla to perform their religious activities. Some associations demand that the Spanish government extend the teaching of Islam in elementary public schools to high schools. Teaching Islam has been possible in open educational centres in Spain since 1992. The problem of guaranteeing this right to students has been the lack of teachers in this subject, but the situation is different in Ceuta and Melilla, where the Muslim percentage of the population is higher than in other regions in Spain (Téllez, 2014). In this regard, associations wanting Islam to be a subject taught in high schools argue the importance of teaching a correct approach to Islam to young people between the ages of 12 and 16 since, otherwise, students could learn extremist interpretations of Islam promoted by radical organizations operating far from the schools and institutes (Melillahoy, 2018). The increasing influence of Morocco on religious affairs finds strong support in agreements signed by Spain and Morocco aimed at reducing border restrictions in Ceuta and Melilla (Soddu, 2006). These agreements allow people who live in Nador near Melilla, Castillejos, and Alcazarseguir near Ceuta to cross the border without a visa. As a result, many people who officially live in Morocco spend more of their time in Ceuta and Melilla and reinforce Moroccan influence in all aspects of life but with the emphasis on promoting Islam. In some cases, Moroccans remain in Spain for long periods as irregular immigrants. Contacts between people living on both sides of the borders favour weddings between Spanish Muslims

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and Moroccan citizens. Consequently, those of Moroccan origin automatically obtain Spanish nationality (González & Pérez, 2008a). Moreover, once Moroccan migrants have Spanish nationality, they initiate family reunification, increasing the Muslim presence in both cities. The preponderance achieved by the Islamic community has altered cultural, social, and even political environments in Ceuta and Melilla. While there is no substantial evidence confirming episodes of Islamophobia; political parties led by Muslims insist on creating commissions to act against Islamophobia. According to Emilio Carreira, the Popular Party spokesman: ‘Ceuta is an example of integration and coexistence’ (Lasa, 2018). On the contrary, the representatives of parties identified with the Muslim community condemn sporadic situations which, although they do not represent an attitude extended to a whole social group, could represent the first step towards the generalization of this behaviour. In this sense, v, leader of Caballas political party, stated: ‘We have to assume that it is a problem of the whole society, not only of the Muslim population. It can generate a fracture in our community by stigmatizing an increasingly important part of it’. Here it is interesting to highlight the approach to this issue made by Carlos Rontomé (2012). He considers that ‘the coexistence between a social majority of European origin and an Islamic minority has been possible thanks to the fragile balance and strong socio-economic deficiencies’. Nowadays, it is not possible to refer to the Muslim community as a minority in Ceuta and Melilla, thus in the current context, the economic and political dominance of ‘Christians’ plays a crucial role in maintaining the present form of coexistence. According to Rontomé, the Spanish of European background in both territories rejects everything related to Islam. However, circumstances make them accept the current social and religious reality in Ceuta and Melilla, meaning that they will accept the situation as long as the ‘Christian’ community conserves its dominant socio-economic status (Ortiz, 2010). Rontomé asserts that religion maintains its prevalence in social relationships and becomes the central element of division and social confrontation. As stated above, each group identifies with a religion, even those who do not follow religious precepts but use religion as an element of cohesion, cultural identity, and sense of belonging to a community. However, Rontomé’s conclusions open a new discussion; he speaks about the importance of ‘Christian’ socio-economic hegemony. What is the

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fundamental element of division between the two communities, socioeconomic status, cultural diversity, or religion? In most cases, economic differences are crucial between Spanish of European background and Spanish Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla. Many Muslims live in marginal peripheral quarters and have few opportunities to improve their precarious conditions. They and their descendants will probably continue to live in similar circumstances in the future. In this respect, neither religion nor cultural aspect plays a significant role; their integration problem is related to socio-economic issues such as precarious conditions, difficulties accessing education, or poverty. However, many use religion as an element of identity. As a result, many of the so-called ‘Christian community’ reject people living in these less advantaged quarters not only because of their religion but such rejection could constitute an act of Islamophobia. The Muslim community is heterogeneous in both cities (Lacomba, 2005). Along with these marginalized social groups, other people whose living standards are higher identify themselves as members of the Muslim community since they want to conserve their identity as Muslims and reject the secular lifestyles promoted by the ‘Christians’. In this second case, Islam equates with identity and an intention to change the traditional Spanish concept of life to a new model of progressive Islamization. Frequently, the permanent interference carried out by the Moroccan government in religious affairs has been understood as a process of assimilation aimed at identifying Ceuta and Melilla with Morocco. Muslim people in both cities consider themselves first as citizens of Ceuta or Melilla, and then Spanish. However, they do identify with traditional Spanish values. Therefore, Spanish Muslims defend their identity and singularity as a community within Spain. Thus, Ceuta and Melilla’s evolution is not towards a Moroccan identity but a progressive advance of Islam as an element representing this social group’s cultural identity that will be predominant in the years to come. Although in the 1980s, most politicians thought that the Muslim minority would assimilate Spanish lifestyles, the opposite occurred. After four decades, assimilation processes do not affect people of Moroccan origin. Moreover, Morocco’s intervention tries to consolidate religious and cultural values among people who maintain cultural ties with the neighbouring country. Consequently, assimilation has not been possible, and nowadays, two different communities live in the same territory.

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Despite the leading national parties’ relevance, local political groups have also assumed a presence in political life since the 1990s. The granting of Spanish nationality in 1986 to Muslims born in Ceuta and Melilla allowed Muslim communities to emerge in both cities. New associations began to claim to recognize their rights as Spanish while conserving their individuality culture, and Islamic practices in public spaces. Associations advanced towards active political involvement and gave rise to the emergence of political parties, which based their activity on defending Muslim interests in Ceuta and Melilla. One of the first parties that tried to attract the Muslim vote was the ‘Partido Democrático y Social de Ceuta’ (Democratic and Social Party of Ceuta) founded in 1994. The party was established by a vast majority of people of Moroccan background. Although Muslims were not traditionally involved in local political life, the party managed to have one Assembly member elected in 1995 (Rontomé 2014). Four years later, the party increased its presence in the Ceuta Assembly to three representatives (Prades, 2001). The Party leader, Mustafá Mizzian, was the first Muslim to occupy a seat in the Ceuta local Parliament in 1995 (Campoamor, 2010). Four years later, due to a motion of censure, Mizzian became a member of Ceuta’s government as Public Works councillor. The trend initiated by the PDSC led to the emergence of another political party inspired by similar ideological principles, the ‘Unión Democrata Ceutí’ (Democratic Union of Ceuta) which was founded in September 2002. Only a few months after its constitution, the UDCE won three seats in the local Assembly, and Fatima Hamed became the first woman to attend the local Assembly with her head covered by the Islamic veil (Nachawati, 2015). At present, the main political party representing Muslim interests in Ceuta is ‘Caballas’. Among the proposals of Caballas, their position is significant regarding the acknowledgement of Darija as one of the official languages in Ceuta. In 2012, the MPs of Caballas tried to create the Academy of Arab-Ceuta Language but did not find support from the representatives of other political parties (Abad, 2012). Internal problems and divisions within the party did not impede the Caballas coalition from retaining its four seats in 2015. The context was not easy for Caballas because only a few months before the elections, a group of dissidents led by Fatima Hamed had founded the ‘Movement for Dignity and Citizenship’, which won three representatives in 2015.

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Therefore, in the last legislature, Muslim parties have had seven representatives in the Assembly out of a total of twenty-five. This result shows the social change that has taken place in recent years and the growing presence of Muslims in Ceuta. Although Melilla’s political evolution has been similar to that of Ceuta, it shows more stability in Muslim political activity, which has always been led by the ‘Coalición Por Melilla’ (Melilla Coalition). The coalition created in 1995 aimed to represent Muslim interests in local elections. The origin of the CPM was the Hispano-Berber Party and the movement against the immigration law. Since its inception, the leader of the coalition has been Mustafa Aberchan and, in 1999, political circumstances placed Aberchan as president of Melilla. However, other political groups’ reluctance led to his demission only one year after becoming the president (Ramos, 2000). Aberchan considered the motion of censure as an example of institutional racism mobilization aimed at expelling him from the government. He literally said ‘to expel “the Moor” from the government’ (Cifuentes, 2000). This episode gave more preponderance to the CPM, which increased its number of representatives to seven in 2003, confirming its position as the second political party in Melilla. Nowadays, CPM has seven seats in the Assembly and has consolidated its role as the leading representative of Melill’s Muslim interests. Even though Muslims represent many people in both cities, the Muslim community’s social relevance did not have a major impact on electoral results and the traditional national parties still dominate the political arena. Since the 1990s, the Popular Party has won elections in Ceuta and Melilla. One of the reasons for the preponderance of the conservative Popular Party is the lack of interest by most Muslims in political affairs (El País, 2007). Moreover, many of them support the Popular Party because the governments led by the PP have established social programs that grant economic aid to families (Prado, 2012). Some people fear that a political change and a new party’s possible arrival in government could change present contexts. Thus, contrary to the usual tendency in other European cities where most Muslims support left-wing partie (Castaño, 2014), a significant percentage of Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla usually vote for the conservative Popular Party.

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In the present circumstances, it is interesting to note that only one of the government members in Ceuta and one in Melilla are of Muslim background. Furthermore, secondary political posts and civil servant positions have a minority presence of people of Muslim origin.

Responses to Radicalism in Ceuta and Melilla Like other European cities where multiculturalism has changed traditional societies and given Muslims a relevance that it had not had previously, Ceuta and Melilla have experienced a general social evolution that has also affected the Muslim community’s composition. Starting from the fact that the Muslim community in Ceuta is heterogeneous, it is possible to find people of different political tendencies, cultural level, particular preferences, and various religious approaches. Observing evolution of the Muslim communities in Ceuta and Melilla, it is possible to see a full return to the more traditional and conservative interpretation of Islam (Gámez, 2016). Contrary to Muslim attitudes until the 1980s, when mosttried to imitate the Spanish lifestyle, a large segment of Muslims have modified their behaviour. They have returned to conservative positions as a means of highlighting their singularity as Muslims. While Christians tend to adopt secular practices and do not become involved in religious matters, Muslims give more relevance to religion in daily life. Many Muslims have returned to wearing traditional clothes to emphasize their Islamic identity by adopting conservative customs. In this regard, it is quite common to see men with long beards wearing the djellaba in Ceuta and Melilla, and women wearing by the Islamic veil. One of the strategies used to prevent the increased presence of extremist tendencies is cooperation with Morocco. As stated above, the principles of Moroccan Official Islam are considered a proper interpretation of Islam to foster integration into Spain. According to the Moroccan state, Official Moroccan Islam is tolerant, a peacemaker, and a model for other countries (Mesa, 2018). However, as Reinares and García Calvo (2015) assert, the collaboration of Morocco in initiatives aimed at inhibiting radicalization processes in Moroccan origin communities could help consolidate the Moroccan government’s interests in Spain. There are no official initiatives to introduce Moroccan Official Islam in Spain. However, Spanish authorities do not apply any restrictions to

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the government of Morocco and sometimes even favour the establishment and consolidation of mosques and associations promoted by the Moroccan government. In the evolution towards more rigorous positions, the activity developed by Islam’s extremist movements in both cities has been notable. Islamic trends such as Jama’a at-Tabligh, Salafist organizations, or Sufi confraternities have consolidated their presence in Ceuta and Melilla (Carbajosa, 2014). In this regard, cooperation between Spain and Morocco is fundamental in order to prevent radicalism. Collaboration has been intense since the 1980s and was reinforced after the terrorist attacks in Casablanca 2003 and Madrid 2004. Jama’a at-Tabligh began to operate in Ceuta in 1988, while other Islamic trends started to gain footholds in the two cities in the 1990s. Masjid An- Noor (Glow Mosque) represents Jama’a at Tabligh in Ceuta. The leader, Laarbi Maateis (Abad, 2015), is also the president of the ‘Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de Ceuta’ (Union of Islamic Communities of Ceuta). Masjid An-Noor initiated its activities in 1986. It was officially registered as a religious association in Spain in 1988. The movement has its roots in the Indian subcontinent. The Tabligh bases its activities on preaching. Groups inspired by the Tabligh ideology promote a conservative approach to Islam that takes the sacred texts as the only source of inspiration in life. The Tabligh’s aim is to reform Islamic society and return to the pure concept of Islam by following a literal interpretation of these texts. The Tabligh movement is observed with skepticism in Spain. It is considered a fundamentalist and conservative movement contrary to European values of freedom and equality. Although the Tabligh is not included among the violent Islamist movements operating in Spain, the Spanish secret services monitor its activities and possible links with radical groups. Despite permanent suspicions about the activities of the Tabligh, Masjid An-Noor is a legal organization that receives funding from the Spanish government. Moreover, the leader of Masjid An-Noor managed to give high relevance to the organization. Masjid An-Noor has acted in many cases as one of the Muslim community’s representative entities in Ceuta, which also explains why Laarby Maateis is the president of the Union of Islamic Communities of Ceuta. Initially, the activity of Masjid An-Noor in Ceuta focused on the prison ‘Los Rosales’. Laarby Maateis asserted that the organization tried to

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keep criminals away from illicit activities and modify their behaviour by adopting Islamic values. The action was extended to help young people in marginal quarters (Abad, 2006). Masjid An-Noor is today one of the essential Islamic organizations in Ceuta, and it participates in all public events and Islamic celebrations. However, this organization has been accused by Muslims and Christians due to its extremist positions. On the other hand, Sufi groups have been developing their activities in both cities since 1997. Sufis have a less public presence, and their postulates are far from Islam’s most extremist tendencies (De Andrés, 2017). Sufism operates in small brotherhoods and teaches a mystical approach to Islam. Although Sufism refuses radicalism, its growing presence in Ceuta and Melilla contributes to driving its followers to adopt a lifestyle far from secular western traditions. Moreover, its particular way of understanding the world helps to consolidate the idea of social division between ‘Muslims’ and ‘Christians’. On two occasions the Sufi brotherhood ‘Islamic Community Al-Ihsan’ organized a seminar to promote Sufism and to convey the particular conception of religion based on the purity of Islam, entitled ‘The Sufi way: recovering Islam’. Two thousand people from different countries participated in this event used by Sufism in Melilla as a platform to attract new members. The activities developed by the Sufi community are focused on religion and education. Even though Tabligh and Sufism have increased their presence in Ceuta and Melilla and have contributed to consolidating the presence of fundamentalist movements, revolutionary Salafism has been the movement that has caused most reactions among both Muslims and Christians. The repercussions of terrorist attacks carried out by violent Salafist groups worldwide have given rise to a general rejection of the Salafist trend in Ceuta and Melilla, even if revolutionary Salafism has become quite attractive for the youngest who live in marginalized neighbourhoods such as La Cañada in Melilla or El Príncipe in Ceuta (Corte, 2015). Belonging to one of the Salafist groups is considered the first step in radicalization for many young people. The permanent transit of radicals from Morocco to Ceuta and Melilla, along with the easy integration into the international jihadist networks, has placed Ceuta and Melilla as an important jihadist focus in Spain (Ortega Dolz, 2015). The numbers involved in jihadist groups is still limited, but a number of young people decide to support radical groups (Irujo, 2015).

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According to official reports, Ceuta, Melilla, and Catalonia are the Spanish territories with the highest concentration of people close to the positions defended by terrorist organizations such as ISIS or al-Qaeda. Although marginal quarters help develop small groups supporting the use of violence, most people, even those who live Islam based on conservative positions, refuse the use of force. Muslims in Ceuta and Melilla want to recognize Islam as part of the present reality in both cities but, in most cases, condemn the actions carried out by the radicals. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the government has increased policies to control radicalism’s focus (Barrenechea & Alonso, 2015). The results have been satisfactory. Despite the general tendency to adopt conservative and rigorist interpretations of Islam, the percentage of people who opt for radicalism and violence is not relevant in Ceuta and Melilla.

Conclusion Ceuta and Melilla have undergone an extraordinary transformation that has turned the two cities into multicultural urban areas where two primary cultures identified by religion coexist (Loudeiro, 2015). Although the number of Christians and Muslims is similar in the two cities, demographic reports forecast a significant increase of Muslims in the following years. Despite this, ‘Christians’, or better, those of Spanish background, are still prominent in different areas. However, the progressive growth in the number of Muslims will change the current situation, and vital activism will replace Muslims’ traditional secondary role in all the spheres. Focusing on the present context, the dominant position held by ‘Christians’, and Muslims’ difficulties in participating in public life, keep society divided. Politicians have prompted various policies to bridge this gap so as to advance towards a truly plural society. However, in many cases, these have failed, and the particular social, economic, demographic, and urban characteristics of Ceuta and Melilla have made it difficult to achieve the desired goals. Nevertheless, developments in coming years will place the Muslim community as the leading social group. As a result, they will be predominant and current problems will give rise to new circumstances and new integration conflicts. The ‘Christian’ community will have to accept this new social reality and adapt to the new conditions. Since the 1980s, social evolution and forecasts for the future confirm that Ceuta and Melilla’s cases are not models for social integration

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(Rontomé Romero, 2012). Authorities have not established a plan, but have had to improvise to respond to Muslims’ permanent demands once they started to gain a significant presence in both cities. The solutions adopted tried to solve specific situations and did not follow a plan to foster integration. Politicians have sought to create a climate of tolerance and mutual acceptance to favour coexistence, but it is not possible to describe the case of Ceuta and Melilla as providing a real model of integration since local society is still divided. One of the questions posed at the beginning of the chapter was about implementing the model used for Ceuta and Melilla in other European cities. It would be more accurate to refer to Ceuta and Melilla as a model of coexistence where the two main social groups recognize the other and respect their singularities. Ceuta and Melilla became multicultural cities where, initially, Muslims were considered a minority. Today instead they represent nearly 50% of the local populations and most of them are legally Spanish, though their culture is based upon Islamic roots. The second question concerned the role of institutions and political parties. In this regard, institutions, associations, and the positions of political parties will be decisive in creating a space for coexistence of the two majority communities. Efforts must be addressed to reducing social and economic differences so as to create an equal society where opportunities are the same for everyone independently of their respective cultural backgrounds. Finally, and answering the third question, in the case of Ceuta and Melilla, integration is not a realistic objective because the two communities are embedded in their roots and are not open to moving towards real integration. Nonetheless, Ceuta and Melilla’s present social context may be understood as a model from which to learn how to act in other European realities in the future.

Notes 1. The border that separates Melilla and Nador represents the point in the world where it is possible to find the highest economic differences and shows the variation of standards between Europe and Africa. Average income in Spain is e25,100, while in Morocco it is e2,703.

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Presly, L. (2013, October 30). The heavy-lifting “mulewomen” of Melilla. BBC World Service. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-247 06863. Accessed August 4, 2019. Ramos, T. (2000, July 8). Moción de censura contra Aberchan en Melilla por clientelismo y falta de transparencia. El País. Rescatado un niño que iba a cruzar la frontera de Ceuta oculto en una maleta. (2015, May 8). El Periódico. Rodríguez, F., & De Felipe, H. (2002). El protectorado español en, Marruecos: gestión colonial e identidades. LDM Ediciones. Rontomé Romero, C. (2012). Ceuta, convivencia y conflicto en una sociedad multiétnica. UNED. Rontomé Romero, C. (2014). Populismo durante la era Aznar: el GIL en Ceuta. In C. Navajas Zubeldia & D. Iturriaga Barco (Eds.), España en democracia: (Actas del IV Congreso de Historia de Nuestro Tiempo) (pp. 315–320). Rontomé Romero, C. (2015). Radicalización y Yihadismo en Ceuta. Anuari Del Conflicte Social,, 5. Sagarra, E. (2002). La legislación sobre extranjería e inmigración: una lectura: los derechos fundamentales y las libertades públicas de los extranjeros en España. UB. Sahraoui, N. (2019). Integration into liminality: Women’s lives in an open centre for migrants at Europe’s Southern Antechamber. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 1369183X.2019.1597690. Accessed November 18, 2019. Salguero, O. (2018). A diachronic view of the spaces of Islam in Melilla. In A. Planet (Ed.), Observing Islam in Spain: Contemporary politics and social dynamics (pp. 62–84). Brill. Salinas Ramos, F. (1983). Los Anos 80: Cambio Y Participacion. Documentación Social, 50. Serna, A. (2006). Al sur de Tarifa Marruecos-España: un malentendido histórico. Marcial Pons. Soddu, P. (2006). Ceuta y Melilla: gestión fronteriza, derechos humanos y seguridad. Iemed balance 2006. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/ profile/Pietro_Soddu/publication/242540117_Ceuta_y_Melilla_gestion_f ronteriza_derechos_humanos_y_seguridad/links/56de9c9908aedf2bf0c9b c73/Ceuta-y-Melilla-gestion-fronteriza-derechos-humanos-y-seguridad.pdf. Accessed June 9, 2019. Solanes, A. (2010). Un balance tras 25 años de leyes de extranjería en España: 1985–2010. Revista del Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, 90. Suárez, C. Escudero, J. (2018, August 21). El Islam sigue creciendo entre los españoles: la población musulmana, en seis gráficos. El Confidencial. Available at: https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2018-08-21/seis-graficos-islamespana_1606301/. Accessed June 14, 2019.

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Téllez, V. (2014). Somos “ciudadanos musulmanes españoles”: posibilidades de conciliar la ciudadanía española y la religiosidad islámica. In Á. Ramírez (Ed.), La Alteridad Imaginada. Bellaterra. Toharia, M. (2018, November 26). Melilla, una ciudad frontera bajo la mirada de los jóvenes inmigrantes. El País. Torrecillas, A. (2006). Dos civilizaciones en conflicto España en el África musulmana. Historia de una guerra de 400 años: (1497–1927). Quirón Ediciones. UCIDE & Observatorio Andalusi. (2017, December 31). Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Available at: http://observatorio.hispanomuslim. es/estademograf.pdf. Accessed September 9, 2019. Un Centro Cívico para converger al Príncipe con el resto de Ceuta en calidad de vida (2018, December 11). Ceuta al Día. Un principio de Acuerdo para Ceuta y Melilla (1986, February 11). El País. Vivancos, S. (2018, June). El Príncipe tendrá un centro cívico para el fomento de las actividades vecinales. El Faro de Ceuta, 24. White, G. (2003). La migración laboral marroquí y los territorios españoles de Ceuta y Melilla. Revista Internacional de Sociología, 61–36. Zamarro, J. M. (1985, December). La manifestación en Melilla a favor de la ley de Extranjería fue un acto de afirmación española. ABC, 7.

CHAPTER 6

The Veil as Perceived and Real Boundary for Spanish Muslim Youth: Case by Case Regulation in Light of Discrimination and Individual Rights Claims Colleen Boland

Introduction Modern immigration to Europe has created real and imagined boundaries between so-called autochthonous populations and minorities of migrant background, despite academic and policy attempts to pursue societies of inclusion. Muslim minorities often encounter a very particular marginalization, as they may not only face the disadvantages inherent to either drawing from or being associated with a migrant background, but also confront a compounded ‘othering’ due to their ascription to Islam; in many discursive contexts, Islam or the practices attributed to it are cast as either contravening the principles of liberal democratic societies, or

C. Boland (B) Law Faculty, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_6

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as in opposition to historically Christian tradition and modern secularist models. The debate surrounding the Islamic headscarf has served as a particularly visible example of these controversial perceived or real divides, whether in the form of societal and political discourses, or more tangibly found in differing policies and regulations. The social opposition to the veil can translate into a form of ostracization that endangers a minority already at risk of marginalization, thus threatening the greater community with social fragmentation. Moreover, hijab cases that reach adjudication raise ideological questions regarding a supposed balance between European commitments to public neutrality, versus protecting individual rights of European citizens within plural societies. It remains an ongoing controversy in Europe reflective of evolving social relations, with differing local, national and European supranational socio-institutional configurations. A very timely and salient example of fluctuating social dynamics in this debate includes the discussions surrounding recent COVID-19 crisis mandatory mask measures: face coverings in some European states have become obligatory, when only years before they had been restricted in policy targeting the Islamic veil (Ricca, 2020). Muslim youth present a significant population at risk with regards to this reoccurring and often polemically charged issue. As they face intersectional discrimination or rejection due to the veil, particularly in the educational environment or labor market, it can influence identity and attachment to their communities, stunt socioeconomic trajectories and generate the structural exclusion of a diverse and growing youth demographic. In addressing practical approaches to this group’s inclusion, Spain provides an added and revelatory perspective, given its unique characteristics that frame the ongoing veil debate. It boasts relatively recent migration flows in comparison to other European states, with urgent issues surfacing due to dynamic, emerging demographics in a diverse society with linguistic, regional and national pluralism, in combination with multilevel governance. This work proposes to analyze how both case by case regulation and experiences of discrimination reflect the intersectionality of the debate surrounding the Islamic headscarf in Spain, and to compare it with the wider European context. In doing so, it reveals fluid and myriad ways in which the veil can represent a perceived or real boundary to Spanish Muslim youth’s inclusion in Spain. It notes that despite advances in diversity management, Spain has been scrutinized for insufficiency or lack of an intersectional approach to diversity and discrimination, perhaps precisely

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due to the fact that given more recent migration flows, diversity has been conceived in terms of foreign immigration, rather than relating to citizenship models (Astor & Griera, 2016; Bustelo, 2009). Ultimately, it seeks to offer insight as to ameliorating this layered exclusion, via analyzing institutional diversity management, and outlining the imperative, constant self-critique that addressing societal and institutional inequalities requires. Further supporting this population in the protection, awareness and exercise of their individual rights, via local governance, can bolster a more equitable and presumably more cohesive society. Firstly, this chapter provides a brief overview of the broader European context regarding the headscarf debate, including how and why European level regulation to date has approached the issue, and why it still remains contested. It will then proceed to a more in-depth analysis of the Spanish example; this entails tracing the modern history of Muslim immigration to Spain and how this minority community has engaged with the state. It highlights a shift in demographics, both in terms of countries of origin and an increased Spanish Muslim population. The work then outlines how the headscarf in Spain is regulated on a case by case basis at the regional and national level, drawing primarily on examples of contestations arising from the educational system and the workplace, and indicating which legislation or institutional norms are cited in these disputes. Both the European and Spanish analyses offer insight as to the intersectional nature of subjects and identities surrounding the veil, and how discrimination in this context can be understood as depriving the wearer of individual rights. To better demonstrate this, the work provides an overview of available literature on such experiences of discrimination, alongside a case study of Muslim youth in Madrid that illustrates the veil’s multiple and varied significance, and participants’ encounters with hijab discrimination. The discrimination experiences and rights grievances linked to the veil by study participants, alongside lack of awareness of or access to institutional recourse, combined with the overall theme of multidimensional discrimination and factors underlying veil debates in Europe, point to the possibility of a new avenue to diversity management: reorienting policy and research to approach rights as interdependent rather than hierarchical, including rights to non-discrimination and religious freedom. Thus, conclusions are drawn as to how pluralism can be accommodated both via reinforcing national-level institutional mechanisms for individual rights protections, as well as via improving the support, knowledge and

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access of such rights at the local community level, tailoring it to inherently unique intersectional discrimination and rights transgressions. This is offered within the overall context of European societies continuously reformulating values and norms while aiming to improve societal cohesion and manage diversity, particularly among youth populations representing the next generation of European citizens.

Pluralism in European Societies: From Integration Models to Diversity Management A discussion of the multidimensionality of the veil debate, in both its regulation and in the discrimination Muslim youth face, finds its departure point in how narratives and policy regarding European pluralism have evolved. The processes of globalization and European migration flows in recent decades have given rise to new configurations and understandings of citizenship in both academic literature and public discourse. As such, the geographical phenomenon of migration patterns between the Muslim World and Europe is not self-contained to a demographic shift; beyond that, it exercises a highly significant impact on political institutions and societal processes. Whether shaping societal interaction, educational practices or the development of institutional policies, the discussion surrounding Muslims in Europe is marked by controversy and perceived boundaries surrounding a minority religious group that is also often associated with migrant origins. Throughout this discussion, on the one hand, there are contestations, deriving from a colonialist narrative, that Islam is incompatible with European society, its Christian tradition and current secular paradigm. However, this is juxtaposed with the European Union and its states attempting to eliminate discrimination, encourage cross-cultural pluralism and ensure a common interpretation of human rights on the other. Various national models for such cross-cultural pluralism have been proposed, and several states were perceived to have undergone failed attempts to implement a multicultural integration model from the 1990s onward (Vertovec, 2010). Moreover, as the policy-research nexus works toward providing inclusion in increasingly diverse societies, it is difficult to cast this topic as simply a matter of integration models, driven by immigration policies. Of course, Muslims in Europe can be aligned with a migrant background, either by society or by the individuals themselves, and draw from a range of countries of origin. However, some

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may not relate to a migrant background at all, and models of citizenship must account for this. The author in Chapter 7 further elaborates on the elusive, sometimes controversial and even politically charged nature of the term and concept ‘integration’. In order to sidestep the integration debate at present, in treating of the Muslim World and Europe, this chapter frames its following discussion in terms of models for diversity management. This approach also presents various challenges, but at least acknowledges the complexity and diversity of Islam and the intersectional discrimination European Muslims face, addressing any potential migratory facet of the debate without restricting it to that sole aspect. Moreover, it delves into the roots of a key, unresolved dispute in the European arena: namely, the perception that increasingly plural societies are balancing commitments to a supposedly neutral public sphere, while simultaneously ensuring individual liberties of non-discrimination and religious freedom derived from a communally agreed upon human rights scheme.

The Veil’s Symbolism in European Diversity Management: Recognizing Its Intersectionality The Islamic headscarf has served as a very visible vehicle for diversity management disputes, with prominent debate as to its regulation in the public sphere dating back to the early 1990s. It has been the subject of both public polemic and judicial and legislative proceedings throughout European states for some time since. France is often cited as a prominent case study in light of two policy debates: the controversy leading up to a 2004 ban on ostentatious religious symbols in public primary and secondary schools, which was seen as targeting the veil specifically, as well as political discourse that resulted in a ban on full face-coverings in public spaces coming into force in 2011 (Malik, 2014; Nielsen et al., 2014).1 The United Kingdom,2 by contrast, is perceived as less stringent and more protective of cultural diversity and religious freedom, as demonstrated in both public and institutional skepticism regarding a 2017 European Court ruling allowing an employer to ban headscarves (Equality and Human Rights Commission of Britain [EHRCB], 2017). In The Netherlands, where both the headscarf and niqab have been continuously debated for over a decade, a 2004 policy report by the government (reaffirmed in 2008) proclaimed the right to wear the headscarf in public spaces, including in public school, although explained an

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exception was to be made for the police force and judiciary, in order to avoid appearance of partiality (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014). Germany, in turn, adopts varying stances according to individual states, with some of its states banning religious symbols in given public contexts according to the neutrality principle (i.e., Berlin’s law restricts teachers and civil servants, but not public school students), others espousing this same principle but with a ‘Christian-Occidental’ exception, and still others dealing with regulation on a case by case basis (ibid.).3 As will be further discussed, Spain does not have specific national regulation for the veil, but rather deals with the matter via case law. The traditional head covering of the veil has been used throughout history, and is not exclusive to Islam; depending upon culture, social class, ethnicity, and so forth, various coverings and manifestations are exhibited, and the meaning behind its usage may vary according to the society and community, or even at the individual level (Heath, 2008). Moreover, the Islamic dress can include a gown in addition to a face veil or headscarf (Shadid & Koningsveld, 2005). The Arabic term hijab essentially refers to the veil or headscarf, and means ‘cover’. Although it can denote both head and body covering, in the Muslim World and in the Western sense today, it is primarily referring to head covering (ibid.). In this work, the referencing of ‘hijab’, ‘veil’ or ‘headscarf’ will denote the covering of the head and neck, but not the face, to provide a reasonable scope within which to examine the topic in Europe, with the understanding that referring to solely head covering with the term ‘hijab’ is common in the Western context. There is a debate as to whether the headscarf derives from cultural practices of Byzantine, Greek and Persian empires, or if it can be more directly attributed to the principles or laws of Islam (Esposito, 2018; Pascual Llanos, 2015). The Koran, for example, refers to ‘modest’ dress, and for this reason it can be understood as a symbol of modesty or morality (Harkness, 2019). However, for the wearer or in any given social context, it does not only necessarily bear a religious or moral connotation, but can also or alternatively hold an ethnic, cultural or identificational meaning, at both the individual and collective level (Ajrouch, 2007; El Guindi, 1999). While there is a gap in the literature regarding its psychological value, the veil and its meaning to the individual wearer can extend to correlations with life satisfaction, optimism and health (Swami et al., 2014). The meaning and symbolism of the veil are not only constructed by those who wear it. A great deal of European rhetoric has framed the veil in

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terms of the subjugation of women, and as in opposition to or impeding gender equality (Diehl et al., 2009; Scott, 2009). Moreover, societal and political factions advocating for veil removal in the public sphere have underlined it as a security issue or as detrimental to social cohesion (in this case, social cohesion is defined as taking the form of homogeneity) (Moruzzi, 1994). In reply to assertions regarding gender equality, there is a counterargument that this is a rhetorical fallacy, working within a limited hegemonic Western and colonialist epistemology (Mahmood, 2001; Ramírez, 2014). In fact, when examining the meaning of the veil for its wearer in Europe, the very symbolism that the surrounding society attributes to it may influence the ways in which a wearer identifies. The concept of intersectionality is significant when exploring discrimination and the headscarf debate: proponents of intersectional theories would point to how Muslim women are experiencing mistreatment drawing from multiple, interconnected systems of inequality, precisely given the varied and compounded meanings behind the veil (Harnois, 2015). Especially in light of contestations surrounding the veil, the wearer may be communicating resistance, agency or identity affirmation (El Guindi, 1999). Throughout these debates, European Muslim women do indeed perceive and claim discrimination due to wearing the headscarf, and this discrimination can be compounded, including but not limited to combinations of racial, religious and gendered discrimination (Halrynjo & Jonker, 2016; Schiek & Chege, 2008). Discrimination on the basis of race, religious preference and gender transgresses the equal treatment supposedly guaranteed by European norms and the principles of liberal democracies. This has led to discussions and claims regarding discrimination and infringement of individual rights (including but not limited to rights to religious freedom and non-discrimination), with questions as to the commitment of individual European states to these rights, as well as regarding the jurisdiction and role of European institutions. Various supranational legal mechanisms meant to arbitrate beyond state sovereignty have been put in place, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to clarify the human rights queries surrounding these types of challenges (Koenig, 2014). Religious freedom is protected within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but tensions remain between the prioritization of this right versus others, and the relationship between state autonomy versus international norms.4 With European states ascribing to these international human rights norms, a rise in collective rights claims, including those asserted by

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Muslim minority associations, has led to litigating for religious freedom (Soysal, 1997). The ECtHR has communicated clear decisions regarding the protection of minority rights, including: the right to a legal personality of religious groups, enabling them to carry out legal proceedings (Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, no. 25528/94, 1997); the right to own property and a bank account (Krupko and Others v. Russia, no. 26587/07, 2014); the right to build and conserve a place of worship, and so on (Fokas & Richardson, 2017). On the whole, however, ECtHR litigation has tended to either defer to the autonomy of national governments, weigh protection of the public interest over individual rights or constrain religious pluralism in the public space (Edmunds, 2012; Fokas & Richardson, 2017).5 Again, the history of church-state relations and secularism in Europe no doubt shapes these judgments. They could also be understood as promulgated within the framework of prevailing Islamophobia in Europe, where there is a presumed relationship between Islam and terrorism; there is a notion that the public interest supersedes religious freedoms, due to presumed links between fundamentalism and Islam. As previously noted, a reoccurring argument in public discourse, as well as in case law of some European member states, is that Islam is a paternalistic religion, the veil symbolic of women’s oppression, and that a veil ban ensures gender equality. In this sense, paradoxically, Muslim women continually face a dual discourse of either fundamentalist aggressor, or oppressed victim of gender inequality (Howard, 2012). While granting other religious rights, the ECtHR does tend to restrict religious visibility in the public sphere, especially when it comes to the headscarf or Muslim dress. Some of the judgments are based on the argument that gender equality justified bans on this way of dress, and neglect deference to a woman’s right to an individual identity, protected in Article 8 of the ECHR (Edmunds, 2012). Another controversial ruling by the European Courts, that of the European Court of Justice in 2017, ADDH v Micropole Univers, argued that an employer was allowed to ban the headscarf in that they forbid a visible sign of political, philosophical or religious belief and therefore upheld a ‘neutrality’ that prevented a difference of treatment, or indirect discrimination (ECLI:EU:C:2017:204). This decision draws on Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), but seems to infringe on Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and Article 9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the ECHR (Council of Europe, 1950).6

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Article 9 of the ECHR guarantees the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, but qualifies the right to manifest one’s religion: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of Europe, 1950). As demonstrated in ECtHR judgments and according to European legal experts, restricting the right to manifest religious affiliation must meet a three-part justification test of legality, necessity and proportionality. In achieving such a justification, of course, in addition to ensuring it corresponds to different national laws, discretion is left up to states to decide what in fact is necessary and proportional (Howard, 2017). European principles and instruments to date are not strictly binding, and jurisdiction and autonomy is often delegated to individual European member states. The principle of proportionality in particular, involving a balance of interests, is very open to interpretation. It is important to note the different interests at play and in contention with this case by case modus operandi of legally managing veil contestations; these can include political and state interests, or interests in the business, civic and industrial spheres (Rea & Rea, 2017). In fact, the questions raised by obligatory masking during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in Europe demonstrate the fluid nature of the principle of proportionality in relation to face coverings (Ricca, 2020). There are multiple regimes of justification and competing jurisdictions involved in attempts to uphold human and individual rights reflected in European principles. Rather than an intersectional approach that acknowledges the interdependence of such rights, rights protections and implementation often results in a ranking of conventional hierarchies: for example, prioritizing political and civil rights like public order, over socioeconomic and cultural rights (Truong et al., 2014). International human rights framework provides for the indivisibility and universality of fundamental rights, and UN bodies call for protecting and advancing all human rights equally and simultaneously, yet there are many challenges and a lack of uniform standards, clear guidelines and implementation for states (Quintavalla & Heine, 2019). Ultimately, states are left with a substantial margin in deciding on the balance of interests and what is necessary in a democratic society, determining how necessity and proportionality apply in cases of anti-discrimination and the veil (Howard, 2017).

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An intersectional approach to anti-discrimination law and consequently to legislation and judicial processes surrounding the veil has been increasingly offered as a manner in which to rectify the conflicting jurisdictions and justifications, as well as to achieve adequate rights protections (Morondo Taramundi, 2015). In this work, ‘intersectional discrimination’ often refers to overlapping or compounded discrimination, as in combined discrimination due to both gender and religious preference, for example. However, an intersectional approach, originally adopted in gender studies and subject to evolution and critique for several decades, should be understood distinctly (Chia & De Graeve, 2014). In the case of the veil, it is important to consider the power systems that structure and reproduce diversity discourse. For this reason, Morondo Taramundi advises that an effective intersectional analysis or critique should note that the pretense of neutrality or separation between law and society underlying current anti-discrimination policies and legal arguments is indeed, pretense: there are preexisting or inevitable structural and societal conditions and relations of oppression and discrimination that need to be considered when approaching antidiscrimination and human rights (2015). While European and national level policies have adopted a language of intersectionality of late, it may simply focus on positions that result from multiple inequalities. An example includes focusing on the ‘intersectional subject’ of a Muslim woman discriminated against for both religion and gender, rather than addressing systemic dimensions of privilege and oppression that have and continue to produce these positions (Morondo Taramundi, 2015; Verloo, 2016). An intersectional approach to problematization of the veil that remains cognizant of power relations, applied in both academic analysis and in policy design, may allow for proceeding forward in a continued societal dialogue on equal rights. In sum, as European Muslims of migrant origin (or otherwise) contend with various obstacles in their European societies of residence, not the least of which include the disadvantages of being a religious minority or drawing from a migrant population, the veil has emerged time and time again as a particularly concrete manifestation of the various debates surrounding the accommodation (or lack thereof) of this population. Because of the visibility of this manner of dress, women especially face challenges and intersectional discrimination as they negotiate their place in European society. While international norms (including the ECHR) ensure individual rights like religious freedom, and non-discrimination,

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religious or cultural plurality is not necessarily encouraged. Furthermore, it may be unclear as to what degree individual rights are prioritized within the set of European principles to which European member states ascribe. And while respect and acknowledgment of religious pluralism may be written in the letter of the law, its implementation at the institutional level can be elusive, especially for the members of society to which it is meant to offer inclusion. Within this context, Spain’s unique historical and structural pluralism (linguistically, regionally and nationally), as well as its decentralized governance in matters of integration, provides a novel space within which to explore diversity management, its ambiguities and its challenges.

Islam in Spain: From Countries of Origin to Diverse Spanish Communities Spain is a particularly illustrative example of how the management of religious and cultural pluralism, alongside a complex and evolving relationship with Islam at both the institutional and societal level, remains a pressing issue and begs future policy considerations. In tracing the relationship between the Spanish state and Islam, it is notable that it has transformed from more of a diplomatic or foreign policy interaction, including direct negotiation with the governments of origin countries, to a diversity management matter, where increasing religious plurality among a diverse Spanish citizenry has become an important reality for the state and at the societal level. By way of brief introduction, Spain boasts singular historic roots in its relationship with Islam. Some argue that as a result of the historical Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula from roughly 711 to 1492, and the Umayyad Caliphate’s Golden Age, an ‘otherness’ has been attributed to Islam in Spain (Kennedy, 1996). They argue it can be traced back to this medieval historic conflict, and accompanying religious and ideological boundaries, as rule under the caliphate declined in 1492, and religions other than Catholicism were abolished until the Constitution of 1869. In more recent history, under the dictatorship following the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), religious liberty was enshrined in law, but the government was strongly preferential toward Catholicism. The uniformity pursued under the dictatorship not only extended to religion, but also to attempts at national and linguistic homogeneity (Zapata Barrero, 2006). As a result, in recent years, the ‘othering’ of Islam in Spain can be

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attributed to modern-day reactions to immigration and cultural or ethnic diversity and differences in a post-authoritarian society. As noted, this may or may not also draw on narratives of centuries past conflicts, before the nation-state was formed (Corpas Aguirre, 2010). Indeed, the post-dictatorship period saw Spain developing its Concordatarian church-state structure, whereby the state engages with organized religion by way of agreements. For instance, an official agreement was brokered between the Spanish government and the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) in April 1992 (Medina & Peña-Ramos, 2012). Another example includes how the Jewish community, via official interlocuter the Federation of Israelite Communities in Spain, also formalized an agreement, particularly regarding provisions in the education system, military and correctional facilities (López García et al., 2007). This move toward agreements with religious entities outside of the Catholic Church marked a shift in how diversity management evolved from a diplomatic issue (making concessions in order to maintain foreign ties) to more of a migration issue (addressing pluralism as a domestic reality) as a result of modern postcolonial and labor immigration flows (Astor & Griera, 2016; Cebolla & Requena, 2010). It is of note that despite this shift, denominations other than Catholicism are still positioned outside out of the dominant social paradigm or ‘mainstream’ society, continuing the historical stigma associated with Islam and its adherents in particular (Rodríguez-García et al., 2019). The CIE is composed of representatives from the group the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, founded in 1989), largely drawing from naturalized Spanish Muslims or converts, and the Spanish Union of Islamic Communities (UCIDE, founded in 1991). The former’s members initially hailed from Syria and Palestine, and the latter was formed by originally Spanish Muslim converts; these two groups sometimes found themselves in opposition, but both drew from a largely educated elite (Mijares & Ramirez, 2008). The goal of establishing the CIE was to create a single interlocuter for Islam in official government relations, as part of the 1992 agreement (Arigita, 2006). When the CIE was formed, the Muslim demographic in Spain largely drew from Middle Eastern migrants from the Mediterranean region (including Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria); in the 60s and 70s both refugees and middle-class students arrived due to the Spanish cost of living and the access to legal residence at the time (López García et al.,

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2007). However, Morocco’s inequalities triggered a much more significant wave of migration to Spain, and labor immigration beginning in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s meant that the migrant background of the majority of Spain’s growing Muslim population now traces back to Morocco and North Africa (Gavira, 2008; López García, 2009). These more recently arrived migrants and their descendants represent a different demographic makeup than those that had formed the CIE a decade earlier, and continue to lead it (Gest, 2010; Mijares & Ramírez, 2008). In terms of the current Muslim population in Spain, it is difficult to provide precise statistics as officially, the government only offers information on the nationality of foreigners, and of course, a portion of mixed migration flows cannot be recorded (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2010). Moreover, Spanish census data does not include information about the religious affiliation of households, although estimates by various entities indicate that the self-identifying Muslim population ranges from a little more than a million to a little less than two million; it seems reasonable to venture that there are slightly over a million adherents throughout Spain, or about 2.6% of the total population as of 2016 (FRA, 2017; Observatorio Andalusí, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2017). Within this, it is estimated that about 70% of the Muslim population in Spain could be characterized as having some degree of Moroccan background, while other heritages include Algerian, Pakistani, Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian and Tunisian (FRA, 2010). Public opinion in Spain demonstrates a greater rejection of immigrants from Morocco, as compared to those from other countries or regions like Latin America (Pérez-Díaz et al., 2001). This can often be based in the assumption that the Moroccan culture is distinct from the Spanish, including beliefs that women are treated differently than in Spanish culture, and that the Moroccan form of dress differs as well (ibid.). Other North African and Arab migrants can sometimes be equated with Moroccans or those of Moroccan origin. In Spain, the term ‘moro’ can be commonly used to refer to this group, often in a derogatory sense, with accompanying stereotypes of delinquency and laziness (Bravo López, 2004). In terms of the cultural interpretation of Islamic dress, Moroccans and consequently those Moroccans who have immigrated to Spain and their progeny may or may not wear the Islamic headscarf; however, in Morocco only a small minority wear the full burqa, which as of 2017 was banned in that country (Masbah, 2017). The niqab is rarely adopted

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or a subject of debate in Spain, which is perhaps linked to the particular Islamic practices in Morocco from where, as previously indicated, more substantial and recent migration flows originated. Currently a sizeable population of second-generation youth, primarily with a Moroccan migrant background, are completing their Spanish education and entering the workforce. As such, Spain’s Muslim immigration, similarly to Italy’s, is a decade or two behind other comparative postcolonial countries with incoming migration flows like France and the United Kingdom, already with third and fourth-generation populations. The demographic shift from the smaller numbers of Muslim immigrants in the pre-dictatorship era to the modern migration labor wave from North Africa bears implications for the formal Spanish state relationship with Islam. While as of 2015 there were up to 1,427 Muslim religious communities, 44 federations and 20 associations registered in the Ministry of Justice, hundreds remain unaffiliated with UCIDE or FEERI (Gest, 2010; Observatorio Andalusí, 2016). There have been attempts to challenge CIE leadership; for example, in 2004, the Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers in Spain (Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España or ATIME) also sought official recognition under the formalized state agreement, as until then, it had more resembled a labor association (Mijares & Ramírez, 2008). However, FEERI and UCIDE were unsupportive of ATIME’s efforts to regulate religious matters, including imams and religious instruction (Arigita, 2006). Over the past two decades, there is an increasing sentiment, especially among more grassroots or neighborhood-based Muslim communities throughout the various Spanish religions, that the leadership of the CIE is unrepresentative of the wider Spanish Muslim community (Gest, 2010). The CIE composition and leadership may not reflect the priorities of Muslims from a more recent migrant background (including Moroccan communities) or their progeny; as such, there have been calls for more authentic representation, a critique that has also emerged in Muslim communities in Germany as discussed in Chapter 7 (Moreras, 2007). Other federations of Muslim organizations representative of the respective Spanish autonomous communities, with some of the first including Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Madrid and Ceuta, have joined CIE as members (Planet Contreras & Moreras, 2008). Many of these community organizations officially register as sociocultural organizations and provide more political, social or cultural channels of participation (López García et al., 2007). However, the official representatives of Islam,

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by a statute of the CIE, remain UCIDE and FEERI. This highlights some potential weaknesses of the current official Spanish state relationship with Islam. A first shortcoming includes that the relationship operates via more antiquated origin country ties, rather than reflecting current Spanish community compositions or more recent migrant flows; a second drawback includes that the official representatives of Islam serve as an interlocutor with the state and perhaps a tool of the state more than true representation of its community; and a final disadvantage includes how, because of historically close Catholic ties, while Islam is a recognized body in Spain, it still does not carry the cultural weight of the Catholic Church, or share the Catholic Church’s privileges in the Spanish educational system (Zapata Barrero, 2010). Of course, Spain is not the only state actor attempting to accommodate pluralism in engaging with Muslim communities. In fact, in the wider European context, Muslim communities within individual states can often be more varied, either drawing from a greater number of origin countries as immigrant communities, or engaging in a more extensive variety of sociocultural practices as part of the citizenry. At the same time, there are Spanish institutional efforts to accommodate religious and cultural pluralism. For example, there are attempts to divorce such efforts from a migration and integration policy framework or language, and rather orient them toward equal rights and recognition of diversity among Spanish citizens. In 2004, the Council of Ministries established the Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (‘La Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia’) per a recommendation of Spain’s Ministry of Justice. The Foundation purportedly aims to promote religious freedom through cooperation with religious minorities, and to provide a forum for research, debate and the generation of public policies that encourages religious freedom and peaceful coexistence (La Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia, 2016). As a result, the activities it supports or conducts are often geared toward social cohesion, and can include aiding recently arrived migrants with Spanish instruction or labor market entry, assisting youth in accessing the school system, celebrating religious events and publishing relevant materials. Of course, given it is a state entity, the Foundation reinforces the structure of the CIE via its funding scheme (Álvarez-Miranda, 2009). While practical implementation of state policies aimed at managing religious diversity is still a work in progress, the Foundation is a step forward in addressing the gap between policy and social

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reality (Astor & Griera, 2016). Moreover, this decentralized approach can perhaps aid in balancing the role and influence of the CIE. The Foundation is also key in accommodating local level initiatives, as it has collaborated with the Spanish Federation of Cities and Provinces (la Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias), to create an Observatory for Religious Pluralism (El Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso). This combined state and local effort allows for accommodation of and monitoring religious diversity in Spain, especially in shaping local level policies and recommending good practices. This is an important mechanism because of the competing state, regional and local jurisdictions in Spain, and the questions that arise as a result. For example, in Catalonia, the regional government challenged a provision in a 2013 federal law that made stipulations for religious spaces, arguing that it left a great deal of decision-making to the local authorities, rather than the autonomous regions (Astor & Griera, 2016). In light of competing interests, the Observatory provides good practice manuals to local authorities in order to elucidate the varying levels of diversity management within the framework of Spanish multilevel governance (ibid.). The Observatory also offers information about legislation or judicial decisions relating to religious pluralism, organized by topic, in order to provide clarity to all societal members. Spain’s delegation of pluralism management, and its advantages, will surface later in considering the case of Muslim youth, specifically. Given the multidimensional nature of the veil debate identified in this work, while not related to religious minorities per se, there are other Spanish ministries that have made some promising strides in terms of institutional steps toward identifying and combatting discrimination that could play a role in rights protections for Muslim youth of migrant origin. These include OBERAXE, the Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia, under the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, and the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination, under the Ministry of the Presidency, Relationship with Legislature and Equality (Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia; Consejo para la Eliminación de la Discriminación Racial o Étnica). With the veil, these bodies are relevant in that there is confusion between what constitutes religious discrimination versus ethnic discrimination, xenophobia, and so on. However, none of these bodies are autonomous, and a 2018 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (under the Council of Europe) report criticized this reality. The Commission also pointed to

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a lack of institutional protections in Spain. It lamented the 2011 failure to legislate a stronger body, and argued that Constitutional provisions and definitions of discrimination were not strict enough. In addition, it insisted that anti-discrimination provisions were so obscure that discrimination cases are almost never brought to court (Council of Europe, 2018). In this way, veil contestations in Spain are not only relevant in terms of analyzing the previous context shaping the debate; they become particularly significant in the current situation, where rising numbers of citizens descending from diverse backgrounds present new questions and social transformations potentially triggering unprecedented institutional change.

Regulation of the Veil in Spain There are several reasons as to why legislative and judicial safeguards are ambiguous when it comes to adjudication surrounding the veil. To begin, Spain has various provisions for religious freedom. This makes sense within an international context, because at the level of international human rights, freedom of religion, as well as to manifest personal belief in public and private, is enshrined in Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly).7 Moreover, Article 10 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights guarantees religious freedom, and Article 22 protects religious diversity (as well as cultural and linguistic diversity), prohibiting discrimination based on religion (European Union, 2012).8 As such, Spain also protects religious freedom in its legislation, with both the 1980 Law of Religious Liberty and the Spanish Constitution’s Article 16 right to religious liberty (Constitución Española, 1978 [CE 1978]; Ley Orgánica 7/1980).9 The Spanish Constitution’s Article 14 furthermore prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or any other personal or social attributes (CE, 1978).10 However, despite several different bodies and mechanisms in place directed at anti-discrimination, and these laws safeguarding religious liberty, there is still a great deal of inconclusiveness when it comes to litigation surrounding the veil. There is no national legislation in force regulating it or prohibiting it. Instead, there is a series of case law that looks at the context of the situation and weighs varying legislation and constitutional guarantees before determining in favor of or against veil usage. Moreover, Spain has a relatively decentralized governmental framework, with regions that are diverse socially, economically, politically and

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culturally. Regulation can differ from region to region as the central government delegates autonomy in the areas of education, health and culture, employment, housing, social services and so forth (Godenau et al., 2015). Within these varying levels of governance, arguments against the veil’s usage find their basis in several legal grounds. Those highlighted here will include: security and public order, the neutrality of the state and laicism, laws protecting school councils and laws protecting employers. And again, throughout these arguments, the jurisdiction of the locality, region or state comes into play. Firstly, and paradoxically from the same Constitutional Article protecting religious liberty, opponents of the veil can also draw on Article 16, as it speaks of public order: “Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law” (CE, 1978). In regard to issues of security and public order, a recent 2017 case provides a salient example. A National Audience ruling (a high court in Spain issuing decisions that can only be appealed in the Spanish Supreme Court) determined that an inmate was not allowed to wear the hijab because it covered part of the face and violated security and public order, and thus was not a matter of religious freedom, especially as the individual was incarcerated and exercised limited rights (Audiencia Nacional, 2017). Moreover, the 1992 Law for the Protection of Citizen Security has been invoked in cases against wearing the veil in school (Ley Orgánica 1/1992; Pascual Llanos, 2015).

Spanish Regulation Regarding the Veil in Educational Settings Cases of the veil in the educational setting are especially visible examples of veil contestations, and important when specifically considering the Muslim youth population. Arguments against the veil’s usage again draw on security, as well as the neutrality of the state and laws protecting school council autonomy. Constitutional Article 16, protecting freedom of religion with the caveat of public order, also enjoins that there is a need to maintain a laical, neutral public space: “there shall be no state religion” (CE, 1978). Essentially, the government must maintain a neutrality and balance between all religions, which simultaneously allows for religious freedoms (Vidal Gallardo, 2016). This is sometimes interpreted as removing religious manifestation from the public sphere in order to

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preserve such neutrality. One of the first high-profile veil cases took place in 2002, with a student in a public school in San Lorenzo de El Escorial. Initially banned from a private school, after a meeting of the public Education Ministry of the Community of Madrid, she was admitted to a public school (Mijares & Ramírez, 2008). In fact, the majority of girls wearing headscarves in Spain are permitted to do so without expulsion (ibid.). However, in a court of first instance ruling in 2012, parents took legal action after their daughter had been banned from school for wearing the veil. The defendants argued that laicism represented a constitutional value, and for that reason demonstrating religious affiliations can be restricted (ibid.). When taken to the Supreme Tribunal of Madrid, the court ruled in favor of the institution on two grounds. It first established the school had the right to enforce its internal regulation against head coverings, as this type of autonomy is granted in a 2002 Law for Education Quality, with Article 83.1 stating that each school council may “control and manage its educational centers in all aspects relating to the educational community” (Ley Orgánica 10/2002; Llorent Bedmar, 2013). This demonstrates the way in which Spain delegating authority to regions or localities plays a role when examining veil litigation in the education system. Secondly, the court ruled in favor of the school because it argued that based on a technicality, rulings cannot be appealed in a dispute involving less than 30,000 euros (Álvarez, 2013). Meanwhile, the Education Boards of the Basque Community in 2016, and the Valencian Community in 2017, instructed their public schools (i.e. education centers) via circulars that they must allow the veil in all centers.11 These school examples particularly demonstrate how varying cases present differing outcomes, and how there are opposing notions as to which level of governance exercises jurisdiction. While in practice, expulsion or banning from school for wearing the headscarf is not the norm, some cases may invoke the principle of laicism or the aforementioned Law of Education in order to uphold rulings against the veil. Finally, in addition to relying on varying interpretations of which law exercises priority, and which jurisdiction prevails, if a girl’s right to wear the veil in school reaches adjudication, decision criteria may depend on whether the school is public or private, what type of veil it is, and the age and maturity of the student (Pascual Llanos, 2015).

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Spanish Regulation Regarding the Veil in the Workplace As explained earlier, Spain’s population of Muslim youth of migrant origin is in its nascence, beginning to join the labor force or have recently joined part. Contestations regarding the veil in the labor market have perhaps garnered less visibility for this reason, as to date the new generation educated in Spain are only recently entering the professional sphere. Another potential reason yet again points to the multiple ways in which the question of the veil is approached: litigation in opposition to the veil in the workplace will sometimes invoke the employer´s right to enforce its internal norms for reasons inherent to the profession. In several cases, employers have argued that the work contract contains stipulations about a certain type of dress or hygiene, or security norms. They base them on one of two legal grounds: the Spanish Constitution’s Article 38, recognizing the rights of businesses and ensuring their protection by public powers, and Article 20.3 of the 1980 Worker’s Law, which allows the company to enforce internal requirements insofar as they meet standards of human dignity (Pascual Llanos, 2015; Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015). In 2017 in Palma de Mallorca, a labor court of the first instance ruled in favor of an employee who contested suspension by her employer for wearing the hijab. While the company argued it was part of their dress code to prohibit the veil, the court ruled that the individual’s right to religious expression prevailed, because no other law was in conflict with it in this case (Juzgado de lo Social, Palma de Mallorca, 2017). However, in a case decided by the highest court in the Community of La Rioja, Spain, it was determined that the appellant had to cover her veil with a sanitary cap because she worked in a mushroom factory. It was reasoned compulsory given the sanitary norms of the workplace, and it was decided she was not being sanctioned with any intentional discrimination (Tribunal Superior de Justicia de La Rioja, 2017). In sum, in Spain, the veil is treated on a case by case basis, with varying outcomes depending on the context of the claim, the laws cited in court arguments and the autonomy of individual regions and institutions (De Lemus Diego, 2016; Pascual Llanos, 2015). Comprehensive research on discrimination directly linked to the veil is lacking, and again, the concept

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of intersectionality in addressing this would prove useful, as unequal treatment (both perceived and actual) can be traced to multiple factors, and very often a combination.

Previous Studies Recording Veil Discrimination in Spain As to what research is available, some substantial data at the wider European level exists that links the veil and unequal treatment, as recorded in a 2017 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA] survey. It collected data from 10,527 first- and second-generation self-identifying Muslim respondents across 15 EU member states over the years 2015– 2016, and found that visible religious symbols like the headscarf resulted in higher levels of discrimination experience: about one in every three Muslims. For example, in the workplace, “Muslim women feel particularly discriminated against because of their clothing: 35 per cent of Muslim women who looked for work, compared with 4 per cent of Muslim men, mention clothing as a reason for discrimination; 22 per cent of Muslim women, compared with 7 per cent of Muslim men, mention it when at work” (FRA, 2017). Regarding research in Spain, again, the relatively recent and growing demographic of Spanish Muslim youth accounts for the gaps in research regarding both the perceptions and practices of this population, and in this case more specifically, data regarding their encounters with unequal treatment. A few studies provide various insights that add to this analysis. For instance, a 2001 study found that of all immigrants, Spanish society was particularly resistant to Moroccans, citing reasons including but not limited to the veil (Pérez-Díaz et al., 2001). In a 2003 study of Moroccans in Spain, the authors found that Moroccans faced cultural and religious stereotyping, and some women explained that they had to take off their veil in order to obtain work (Martín Muñoz et al., 2003). Furthermore, in a 2015 qualitative study of six focus groups, women again expressed their frustration due to different treatment as a result of their use of the veil (Mijares & Lems, 2018). There is academic consensus that Islamophobia is a problem in Spain, and identifying as a Muslim or drawing from a Muslim-majority country is viewed as negative, with varying interpretations as to whether this stigmatization is less exacerbated in comparison with other European countries (Cea D’Ancona, 2016; Rodríguez-García et al., 2019). As such, it must be reiterated that the

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literature would benefit from further investigation as to veil discrimination and Spanish Muslim youth’s perceptions and practices, specifically.

A Madrid Qualitative Case Study: Muslim Youth of Migrant Origin and the Veil As explained, further inquiry as to Spanish Muslim youth’s selfidentification and corresponding practices, especially given that the population is in their nascence and transitioning to contributing as adult citizens to society, is necessary. As a result, the author conducted a qualitative investigation of Muslim youth of migrant origin in Madrid over the course of 2016–2018, inquiring as to their self-identification, and as to perceptions of Spanish societal and institutional reception, with special attention as to how the latter influenced self-identification (Boland, 2019). Within the results of the study, there was room to extrapolate information as to experiences surrounding the hijab. For the purposes of this work, and within the larger research question, the author’s study provided insights into both the veil’s significance among the participants, as well as to how this population’s experiences and perceptions spoke to the wider societal and institutional issues related to the veil. Via snowball and volunteer sampling, the author contacted participants through colleagues, social networks and community associations. The interviewees were from various neighborhoods in Madrid city, as well as municipalities throughout the Madrid region. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 29 self-identifying Muslim youth; a few had migrated to Spain themselves, while the majority were Spanish citizens born in Spain, with parents who had migrated to Spain. Of the 29 interviewed, 52% were female and 48% male. As noted in the description of the wider European veil discourse, controversy surrounding the veil is often framed in a gendered way, with claims that Islam is inimical to gender equality. Within the overall study, in concentrating on the perceptions regarding the veil in the analysis to follow, the almost equal split between genders among the participant sample was sought, given the stigmatization of both European Muslim women and men in gendered rhetoric. As for migrant origin, 16 participants were born in Spain, eight migrated to Spain before the age of 12, and five were first-generation migrants. Most participants had parents that originated from Morocco,

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while a few had Palestinian, Egyptian or Syrian origins. The firstgeneration group included one participant originally from Tunisia, one who had recently arrived from Senegal, and three who had migrated from Morocco. Especially among the second generation, not everyone identified with migrant origin. For this reason, it is useful to accentuate how the term ‘Muslim’ can signify a wide range of meanings in the European context. As indicated in the previous discussion, depending on who is using the term, it can signify not only a religious, but a national, regional, socioeconomic, or migrant category, to name a few. More importantly, how Muslim individuals identify or define themselves can vary from individual to individual or community to community. As such, the Madrid study used Muslim identity as a category of practice (how ‘Muslim’ is identified by the self or identified as the other) rather than as a category of analysis (for example, degree of religiosity), as Brubaker suggests (Brubaker, 2012). Again, the veil in turn can carry varying significance for the wearer, and extend beyond merely religious symbolism or a Muslim self-identification. Finally, within the Spanish context, there is a rationale for why Madrid was chosen for the study. Firstly, it had to be limited to this one region due to the size and resources of the investigation. Secondly, it sought to emphasize the significance of local governance described earlier; in Spain, integration or diversity management can take place at the local government or civil society level (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011). The Community of Madrid hosts a substantial percentage of Spain’s immigrant population; as of 2018, with 13.4% foreign residents, it has the second largest number of immigrants in Spain after Barcelona (Comunidad de Madrid, 2018). As of 2015, Madrid as a region was estimated to have the third largest population of Muslims, and it provides a unique setting in which to examine contestation of the veil and diversity management in general (Observatorio Andalusí, 2016). Madrid’s Muslim youth associations include youth of migrant origin, as well as children of native parents from a range of backgrounds (López García et al., 2007).

Perceptions of the Veil’s Varied Significance Within this context, the study offered observations as to how the veil was perceived by the participants, often alongside what they felt their surrounding community or society believed it to signify. The majority of the youth elaborated it was an important part of their identity. It is

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of note that also, among second-generation participants, instead of or alongside identifying with their parents’ origin country, a majority identified with Spain or Madrid. The investigation highlighted the complexity of treating the veil as solely religious symbolism. Nessrin, a 32-year-old lawyer who arrived from Morocco with her parents at the age of 5, did not wear the veil but identified as both a practicing and religious Muslim, as well as both Moroccan and Spanish. She believed that it was a misconception that the veil constituted a religious requirement, and rather held that it was a cultural tradition. At the same time, she felt it was certainly related to personal identity, and of course there was an individual right to manifest the identity as such, as many other participants also agreed. In fact, only five of the participants felt that the veil was a purely religious obligation, and two of these five were from the smaller sample of first-generation migrants, as compared to 21 of the 25 of those were first or second generation and did not identify the veil as exclusively religious. This might point to how origin country context versus a society of residence may influence how the veil’s symbolism and religious identity is interpreted. Moreover, many of the youth felt that rather than simply linked to religious identification, society might often attribute the veil to migrant origin or understood the veil as foreign and ‘the other’. Rajae, age 30 and a first generation, Moroccan language teacher, explained that she had many friends, born in Spain, who were treated as foreign because they wore a headscarf. Ibrahim, an age 22 student and second generation of Moroccan origin, argued that it was especially difficult for Muslim youth who were native-born, Spanish citizens: I know many girls that have a lot of friends that have been attacked or molested physically and have been insulted and couldn’t find work, at the European level, it’s difficult. It’s complicated for girls who were born here. Our mothers came and were used to it. It’s a problem. (Ibrahim, personal communication, November 4, 2017)

In these cases, participants felt that beyond a religious marker, the veil was understood as foreign and a result of xenophobia, even if its wearer emphatically did not perceive it as a foreign practice, or incompatible with being Spanish. In this sense, a distinction is made between first-generation migrants and origin country practices, versus youth of migrant origin who identify with their country of residence. At the same time, many in the

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latter group find that due to the veil, they are identified by others with their parents’ origin country. As before, in the larger body of literature, the intersectional dimension of this issue arises.

Experiences of Intersectional Discrimination Linked to the Veil In fact, when the majority of participants related experiences of discrimination, many experiences were linked to the veil. Interviewees explained that sometimes it was discouraged or frowned upon in school. For example, Chaima, an age 16 student and second generation with Moroccan origins, said that though she did not face discrimination frequently, the times she did occur in school or on public transport, and she attributed this to the fact she wore the veil. Ihsan, 20 and second generation with Syrian origins, reported that in public school they discouraged wearing the hijab. Significantly, many of the participants related personal stories or recounted those of family and friends regarding how the veil presented a problem in accessing the labor market. Ayeh, 20 and a student, and second generation of Moroccan origin, believed she would have to work in another country because of her experience at an interview. She recounted: I was interviewed with the veil and they asked, ‘Why can’t you take that cloth off?’ And I replied, ‘It’s called a headscarf, a veil. And I can’t.’ And they asked, ‘not even at work?’ And I answered, ‘No, because for me, it is like telling me to take off my shirt, it’s part of what I wear.’ And [they said] ‘Oh, I’m sorry, it’s an image problem’. (Ayeh, personal communication, February 1, 2018)

Hanaa, a second generation, 20-year-old student also of Moroccan origin, similarly felt it was difficult to obtain a job where you could cover your head or perform daily prayers. Malek, a first generation, 25-year-old who migrated from Tunisia, theorized she did not encounter discrimination precisely because she did not wear a veil, and explained how a friend of hers was specifically told she would not be hired because she wore one. Moreover, Malek noted that when she was discussing the subject with her employer, she was informed that if she had applied while wearing the hijab, they would not have offered her a position.

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Warda, 19 years old and in university, second generation and of Moroccan origin, had not yet attempted to access the labor market herself, but had three female friends that encountered resistance in either the interview or hiring process due to wearing a veil. Needless to say, the participants in this study are not alone in their perceptions of discrimination: as noted earlier, facing discrimination due to or difficulties in accessing the labor market due to the veil has been recorded in many other studies of Muslims in Spain and Madrid.

Supporting and Facilitating Spanish Muslim Youth Individual Rights Claims The study offered several new findings in examining Spanish Muslim youth’s perceptions and experiences with the veil. Firstly, it demonstrated how the veil can serve as both an imagined and real boundary. Some participants indicated that they felt stigmatized by society and suffered discrimination because of it, or that this had happened to family and friends. Various reasons were cited for why there seemed to be resistance to the veil, and again the intersectional nature of what it symbolizes from one individual or community to the next surfaced, as had been previously identified in the literature. Moreover, they noted resistance to the veil that resulted in real, structural impediments, including denial of employment due to its usage. Again, this points to the multiple forms of exclusion linked to the veil. Finally, it is significant that this exclusion, symbolic or not, demonstrated the intersectional nature of the veil debate. The veil held varying significance for the participants beyond the religious, and moreover, they perceived discrimination due to the veil also drew from a range of factors. A second pattern that emerged, in that while these many of the youth communicated they had encountered discrimination due to veil usage, only one of the participant’s friends had ever filed a complaint due to discrimination against, or rejection of, the veil. The interviewees often did express some degree of knowledgeability and awareness of rights. When doing so, it is notable that they framed their understanding of rights from the position of Spanish or European residents and citizens entitled to comprehensive rights, rather than referring to veil usage as a practice they sought to preserve as part of origin country or migrant background identification. At the same time, there appeared to be a lack of clarity as to the possibility of denouncing their experiences of discrimination, especially

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in the workplace. Moreover, regardless of rights awareness, experiences of discrimination surrounding the veil present a difficult situation for an oftentimes vulnerable and socioeconomically disadvantaged population to face. In addition to the ambiguity as to whether the law in fact supports their case, victims of unequal treatment may not have the resources to litigate in the case of perceived discrimination or rights deprivation. This raises the challenge of ensuring that this youth minority is both aware of anti-discrimination mechanisms and protections, as well as has access to them.

Stricter Institutional Anti-discrimination Definitions, Accompanied by Support from Municipal Governments and Sociocultural Organizations As previously noted, efforts are being made to manage diversity in Spain at both the national and local levels. The Observatory for Religious Pluralism attempts to provide national and local level authorities and organizations with best practices guides and information on how the regulation applies to religious entities or the right to manifest and practice belief. Moreover, it was outlined earlier how the Spanish institutional framework provides for non-discrimination and individual freedoms. However, there is no consistent or blanket approach to veil contestations; rather, a value judgment is made as to whether the veil’s usage, or the conduct of this minority population, is excessive or reasonable within legislative and legal international and national frameworks. Again, there is a hierarchy of rights, and interpretations of what constitutes public neutrality or individual freedom are issued on a case by case basis. It seems that at this point of time, given the social and political context and the extent to which Spain affords autonomy to its regional governments, the case by case veil adjudication is inevitable in the Spanish model. Despite ebbs and flows, public debate surrounding the veil has not escalated to the same degree as it has in the other European countries discussed, perhaps accounting for why nationwide regulation has not yet been legislated. At the same time, comparative examples demonstrate how social relations are fluid and the debate can arise, particularly in times of social fracture. The benefit of the case by case approach to the veil lies in how it allows for the intersectionality of the veil debate, in that many factors can influence

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why a case involving the veil is negotiated within the justice system in the first place, with nuances that may remain unaddressed by a blanket federal law. One of the drawbacks of a case by case approach to the veil is that unreasonable responsibility can fall upon the individual to confront complex societal and institutional relations surrounding individual rights. Stemming from these observations, and from the findings in the Madrid case study, it seems that there are two possibilities for providing Spanish Muslim youth further protection, clarification and support as they navigate veil contestations. Firstly, while there is clear decentralization and local level governance in diversity management, what national institutional framework is in place could be further enhanced. For example, Spain may in fact benefit from a stricter constitutional definition of discrimination, as the FRA suggests. This could help rectify the gaps in rights protections or recourse, and allow for further consistency in veil case judgments, even as they are considered on a case by case approach. Moreover, strengthening Spain’s equality body could also provide oversight of the case by case basis. While the Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination currently serves as Spain’s equality body, making it autonomous and independent of government ministries (in this case, it falls under the Ministry of the Presidency), may afford it more legitimacy. Further resources and powers could be allotted to the equality body so that it would serve in a regulatory capacity, i.e., with the means and jurisdiction to provide legal assistance to victims, or intervene and initiate legal proceedings if necessary. As politics and populist discourse continue to surround the veil debate, a strengthened equality body with regulatory functions could help to separate discourse from legislative and legal dictates. In addition to central government institutions and frameworks providing strengthened protection, support and regulatory oversight for Spanish Muslim youth who find themselves victims of multiple forms of veil discrimination, it would be useful if youth were made aware of these mechanisms and resources via support at the local level. As noted in the case study, the vast majority of the youth did not make claims after what they perceived was a rights violation due to the veil. The Observatory for Religious Pluralism, for example, could design programming or allot resources specifically promoting rights awareness among Spanish Muslim youth, tailored to the complexity of experiences of discrimination surrounding the veil. As with the Observatory’s current work, such recommendations and resources could be provided to governance and

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organizations at the local level. This would be useful not only because the youth in this study explained that they were involved in local sociocultural associations, but also, as noted earlier, the diversity management system in Spain is developing into a decentralized network. The individualized nature of the veil speaks to such a decentralized diversity management model, which operates within a local space of individual agency. The funding that Spain allocates to its regions and cities for matters of cultural diversity management would be useful in the case of Muslim youth of migrant origin and their experiences of the veil given its unique, intersectional and varying significance. For example, the city of Madrid has an area of its government dedicated to Families, Equality and Social Welfare (Junta de Gobierno de la Ciudad de Madrid, 2019). It provides resources and services for victims of racism, or gender violence, but could also benefit from a specific set of resources or offices directed toward Muslim youth specifically. It could assist in connecting them with relevant civil society organizations, including sociocultural organizations, throughout the city. It is important to pursue this as a supplement to national-level institutional policies, as again, approaches to equality and discrimination burden the individual with negotiating these issues, rather than understanding it as a structural problem. At least with the Madrid case, national-level agreements with countries of origin like Morocco do not seem to particularly assist Muslim youth of migrant origin in their day-to-day lives, if at all. Thus, the Observatory and national government could pivot from providing substantial funding or resources to official state interlocuters like the CIE; as previously noted, it is purportedly not as effective at representing the current Muslim demographic in Spain, i.e., Spanish Muslim youth of migrant background no longer identifying with origin countries. Instead, reallocating such (or more) support directly to equality initiatives pursued by municipalities, as well as local sociocultural organizations, could be more beneficial for this population and their corresponding city or community. Again, Muslim youth of migrant origin stand to become an increasingly significant component of Spain’s social fabric, and informing them of their rights and how to defend them in situations of veil discrimination can help prevent, avoid or ameliorate the accompanying disadvantages of such discrimination. Doing so via local governance or civil society efforts is important because of the intersectional nature of the veil and need to tailor to a nuanced situation. Moreover, these youth participate in their

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local communities, and in identifying with Madrid or Spain, may not relate to Islam’s official state interlocutors with tie to origin countries.

Conclusion Throughout Europe, there is conflicting societal rhetoric, policy and judicial sentences regarding use of the veil, and whether Muslim youth of migrant origin wearing it are conducting themselves as ‘proper’ citizens, or citizens-to-be in their communities. Whether or not ample evidence indicates that Muslim youth are indeed citizens with equal rights is not enough to resolve the debate, if they are still perceived as foreign and thus face corresponding inequalities. Policymakers and jurists still operate as if they must weigh European commitments to the secular state or public neutrality on the one hand, versus the rights to individual expression and religious liberty on the other. These principles and rights are the most frequently cited in discussions or legal disputes regarding the persistent discrimination linked to the veil. The intersectional nature of the veil is also met with intersectional discrimination, making it a complex field of contestation. Analyzing the veil within the context of the Spanish case underlines how historical, political and social factors contribute to determining which principles or rights are prioritized in a given state or society. In the Madrid case study, the youth interviewed perceived they were met with discrimination in relation to the veil for reasons beyond religious symbolism, including due to an oftentimes misplaced xenophobia. Most participants were Spanish citizens and understood their rights were being infringed upon; for example, when receiving unequal treatment in the educational system or the workplace. They expressed frustration and recounted stories of unequal access to opportunity, yet did not seem clear on how to rectify such injustices. Of course, these experiences of discrimination and how they impacted identity, societal inclusion or community participation require much more profound description and analyzation, and more extensive investigation among the wider Spanish Muslim youth population. Meanwhile, however, the case study demonstrates at least a two-fold difficulty with veil usage among Muslim youth in Spain. Firstly, the perceptions and polemic surrounding its use seem to translate to the marginalization of those who wear it. Secondly, those who do use the veil are seemingly unaware of or unequipped to defend their rights to inclusion and individual expression guaranteed by Spanish institutions,

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as well as European and transnational instruments. This presents a challenge, as such discrimination begets marginalization, with both symbolic and structural boundaries. Spain’s diversity management model incorporates a local level governance and civil society support for justifiable reasons. In the case of Spanish Muslim youth of migrant origin, it seems appropriate to continue developing a two-pronged, local and national effort in addressing veil contestations. European and Spanish societal pluralism, and the crises and controversies surrounding it, can often be framed in cultural or religious terms, although steps are being taken to reorient the discussion toward a diversity management model that seeks equal treatment and non-discrimination. This could help to provide more consistency and thus diminish conflict, as well as mitigate some of the burden placed on the individual. Both the policy measures informing this model, as well as the justice system reinforcing it, must recognize the interdependence of rights, and how the current configuration of state and society is not perfectly neutral. These concerted efforts to remain conscious of the power dynamics that create multiple forms of discrimination, alongside continued review of systemic inequality and normative assumptions, could aid in progressing toward improved protections and a just society. Bearing this in mind, it would be practically beneficial to strengthen Spanish national institutional mechanisms in order to better protect and support individual rights to veil usage. This would entail clarifying the definition of non-discrimination, and providing an equality body with more autonomy and regulatory powers. Additionally, it would be useful to further develop the local approach to managing pluralism, as when discrimination concretely manifests at the micro level, it affects diverse communities in varying ways. With regards to the latter, the local level initiatives can reach out to Muslim youth specifically, promoting awareness of their rights and how to defend them when they perceive they are victims of discrimination due to the veil. The local approach means engaging with Muslim communities in a truly representative way, moving beyond migration or integration policies linked to origin countries. It is important to recognize a growing, native, second-generation population that articulates their rights and citizenship demands as members of plural Spanish communities that vary according to region and even city. As has been stated in this work, developing a sense of belonging may contribute to a ‘constructive coexistence’ and is a part of European

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countries’ attempts at diversity management. Diversity and equality policies grounded in an understanding of how power relations and layers of exclusion or marginalization have consistently permeated European society could serve as the way forward, including in the Spanish case. This entails rejecting assumptions of neutral governance systems and instead analyzing and taking into account how and why Muslim youth face consistent disadvantages when developing and implementing such policies. Acknowledging this burden and addressing it in local and national policy efforts reflective of Spain’s multilevel governance model, and in doing so crucially focusing on the interdependence of rights, would not only offer recourse to those youth of migrant origin marginalized for adopting the veil; it may ultimately facilitate and strengthen equality for the entirety of Spain’s progressively heterogenic citizenry.

Notes 1. There are other Islamic coverings or forms of dress that have provoked controversy in Europe, including the full face covering of the niqab and its ban; in 2014, the ECtHR upheld the 2010 French ban on face coverings in public (which came into force in 2011), including the niqab and burqa (Fokas & Richardson, 2017). They are accompanied by further factors and considerations, too numerous to address in this work. 2. As of the June 23, 2016 referendum, the people of the United Kingdom voted via a majority to begin the process of exiting the European Union (Menon, 2018). The United Kingdom is still provided as a point of comparison, given that it is a particularly salient comparative example, and has yet to complete the process of ‘Brexit’ upon the writing of this work. 3. See Chapter 7 of this work for further detail regarding the German case. 4. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is an international human rights treaty adopted in 1953, to which all member states of the Council of Europe must adhere, and if joining as a new member, must ratify (Council of Europe). Article 9 stipulates: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the

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protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Council of Europe, 1950). Regarding the national governments, as briefly referenced earlier, public debate and legislation or regulation regarding the headscarf varies among European states. At the national level, France has banned religious symbols in public spaces since 2004, including the headscarf in public school, and political and public debate has been consistent (Howard, 2017; Sauer, 2009). The United Kingdom has no such headscarf ban, with public employers accommodating adaptation of uniforms, and media attention and public debate is infrequent or brief in duration (Howard, 2017). In The Netherlands, it is permitted in public school but restricted within the police force and judiciary, and debate has remained relatively constant in relation to the niqab (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014). In Germany, regulation of the veil is left to its federal states, where some legislate a ban and others deal with the issue on a case by case basis (ibid.). There are more restrictive policies in several of these states regarding the niqab; again, there is limited room to go into further detail regarding the face veil within the scope of this work. Article 14 states: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (Council of Europe, 1950). Article 8 reads: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (ibid.). See previous note for the text of Article 9. Article 18 reads: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance” (UN General Assembly, 1948). Article 10 stipulates: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of

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this right” (European Union, 2012). Article 22 reads: “The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (ibid.). 9. Article 16 details the right to religious liberty: “Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law. 2. No one may be compelled to make statements regarding his religion, beliefs or ideologies. 3. There shall be no State religion. The public authorities shall take the religious beliefs of Spanish society into account and shall consequently maintain appropriate cooperation with the Catholic Church and the other confessions” (1978). Organic Law 7/1980 makes similar guarantees and further expands on the right of religious liberty, as well as puts forth the guidelines for agreements between the state and diverse confessions, with the understanding that the state remains non-denominational. 10. Spanish Constitution Article 14 stipulates: “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance” (CE, 1978). 11. Since these took the form of school circulars, there is no academic material or judicial publication to cite. However, these circulars were reported in the media, including from the following sources: Ortega, L. (2017, July 21). El Gobierno valenciano obligará a permitir el velo en los colegios públicos. El Español. https://www.elespanol.com/espana/201 70720/232727602_0.html. EFE. (2016, July 4). El debate sobre el velo islámico llega a las aulas vascas. El Mundo. https://www.elmundo.es/paisvasco/2016/06/04/5752db8222601d403f8b4664.html.

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CHAPTER 7

Resource Mobilization and the Institutional Frameword of Islam: The Integration of Muslim Turks in Germany Menna Taher

Introduction In his book ‘The Politics’, Aristotle introduced his vision of an ideal ruler, and in that context, he explained that the definition of a citizen is not static yet dynamic since it is subject to change from one type of government to another, for example, a citizen in an oligarchic system is different from that of a democratic one (Jowett, 1999). The State and its population held different definitions of the concept of citizenship, as citizenship to the people indicated that individuals came together to form a nation, either based on decent ‘ethnos’ or contract ‘demos’. While for the state, the concept was legal as it identified those who belonged to the state, and those who did not—in other terms it defined its own line of inclusion and exclusion (Halfmann, 1997). This entails that the state decides who is a wanted and who is an unwanted migrant, and who needs to be integrated and who does not. This brings

M. Taher (B) Cairo University, Giza City, Egypt © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_7

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up another debate concerning the issue of disintegration vs. integration, and how disintegration has become legitimized within a broader integration framework, i.e. disintegration in itself is part of the state’s integration policy (Hinger, 2020). Thus, citizenship is a legal relationship between the state and a person or a group of persons, which is as a rule, is exclusive, permanent, and immediate. Yet, it should not only be confined to the state, as citizenship could also be the result of the struggles of its members to be active participants and be recognized as citizens. This emphasizes the idea that citizenship is a dynamic reciprocal process that reflects the state’s manifestation of its sovereignty, and that the people strive to be included and integrated (Brubaker, 1992). Nationhood was thus the main driving force behind the politics of citizenship and the way it was articulated in addition to the pragmatic interests of the state (Brubaker, 1990). This could somehow explain the vagueness of the concept of citizenship and integration in German politics, which meant that the concept of citizenship with regards to immigrants in Germany would always be contested, as long as it was perceived from an ethno-cultural perspective—a rhetoric that is always raised in times of economic or political crises (Halfmann, 1997). Integration usually took one of two paths either to assimilate immigrants into the host state, or to let them be part of the host society while celebrating their diversity and their own identity (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). It seems that there are two trends that fall at the two ends of the continuum; yet, in reality application is different. When assessing any integration process, it would be a limited explanation that only considered the variables that concern the host state in integrating immigrants, such as the state’s definition of citizenship, secularism, or the political opportunity structure, which identifies the space offered by the host state to immigrants to integrate and accommodate their demands. Integration is a dynamic process and is only completed with the contribution of immigrants through their organization and resource mobilization capabilities. This opens the door for assessing the story from another perspective, where immigrants play the main role, actively contribute to how the integration process proceeds, and determine its results and the probability of its success. This requires us to take a closer look at the mechanisms that the Sunni Muslim Turkish minorities used to integrate into German society, being the largest Muslim minority group. They constitute 76% of the Muslim community in Germany, and are often

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the most visible because of the headscarf. It also reflects that dealing with the problems of integration should not be through a top-down approach, where the state enforces its own integration policies, but rather a bottomup, where the target minority group also contributes to the integration process (Yurdakul, 2009). To understand the contribution of the Sunni Muslim Turks in Germany to the integration process, two important variables will be explained: the institutional framework of Islam, and their resource mobilization capabilities manifested in the role of organizations in pushing the German state to accommodate the needs of Sunni Muslim Turks, especially with regards to the problem of the headscarf debate. To support the research, interviews were conducted with eleven Turkish students living in Berlin, which incorporates the largest concentration of Turkish immigrants in Germany. The target group was a variety of second and third generation immigrants, most of them have German nationality. Their educational backgrounds ranged from high school, to under-graduate, and post-graduate studies. Through their answers they expressed their understanding of ideas, such as citizenship, identity, Islam, Turkish organizations, secularism, the German constitution, education, and social integration. Interviews ranged from individual to group interviews, and their personal ideas and experiences were quite insightful, and provided an added value to this research. Their answers and ideas will be demonstrated to provide a better understanding of the variables studied, and to grasp their applicability to the German society. This chapter will cover the following points: the development of citizenship and integration in Germany, Sunni Muslim Turks in Germany and the institutionalization of Islam, the role of religious organizations in the integration process, the headscarf debate, the relations of this group with state authorities, and a conclusion.

The Development of Citizenship and Integration in Germany Germany possesses a unique history as the ‘German state’ and the ‘German nation’ developed in a parallel manner, where the state constituted the institutional and legal framework that controlled the territory and the people, while the ‘nation’ constituted the community of citizens ‘the people’ or the ‘Volk’. Understanding how these two concepts grew separately will help explain the current dilemma of citizenship in Germany, including the strategies of inclusion into the nation-state and

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into the welfare-system. This can only be understood through exploring the history of emigration from Germany until the formation of the nation state, and then, its shift into a country of immigration in a later phase (Leoussi, 2001). Germany had a history of insecurity concerning its borders and rules of inclusion into the state and social system. This insecurity goes back to the building of the nation state in 1871, and the state’s need to decide on the legal and political status of Germans living outside Germany or the Aussiedler (Germans from East and South–East Europe). The Bismarckian state excluded Germans from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, while it was decided to include Ethnic Poles from the Eastern Province of Prussia. So, what Germany called the ‘kleindeutsche Loesung’ (Lesser German Solution) aimed at only unifying the northern German states, excluding Austria. Thus, the whole idea of defining the nation was built on an ethno-cultural basis (Taher, 2017). On a parallel level, the founding of Imperial Germany in 1871 was accompanied with a shift in the economy from an agrarian to an industrial one which, in turn, changed it from a country of emigration to one of immigration. By 1914, there were about 1.2 million foreign workers in Germany. This major shift had cast its shadow over the concept of citizenship, which was quite vague during that period, and this was reflected in the state’s different treatment of Italian and Polish workers. Polish workers were discriminated against because their Prussian (German) loyalty was in doubt, and because of their strong sense of nationality. Thus, they were subject to forced assimilation: through abolishing their associations, and prohibiting the teaching of the Polish language in schools. Italians, instead, were exempted from such measures because they were thought of as temporary workers. This situation was no different from what Germany did in the beginning with its Turkish Guest workers. The treatment of Polish workers reflected the state’s concern about providing a clear and astute description of what the ‘German nation’ is (Halfmann, 1997). Nazi Germany had also reflected the same struggle between the ‘state’ and ‘nation’; however, citizenship was based on ethno-racial rather than on ethno-cultural grounds. Thus, those who were not descended from German blood ‘jus sanguinis’ were denied citizenship rights and were subject to discrimination, like the Jews (Schrimer, 2004). The same principle was used when the German Government felt that its identity was being challenged by the presence of guest-workers. For that reason, it was

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officially declared that ‘it is not a country of immigration’ (‘Deutschland ist Kein Einwanderungsland’), and citizenship was to be based on (jus sanguinis), and not on place of birth (jus soli) (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). The problem of social and political inclusion continued with the Federal Republic of Germany, especially with the great need for labor in the 1970s. Workers managed to achieve social inclusion, yet were still struggling to obtain political inclusion, which was not even put on the political agenda until the 1980s. This also persisted after the ‘Anwerbestopp’ (recruitment stop), which offered a fertile ground for the re-emergence of ethno-cultural citizenship—the basis for German nationhood in the 1990s (Halfmann, 1997). The history of Turkish immigration to Germany has passed through four main phases that have also cast their shadow over the process of integration of Turkish immigrants in Germany. The first phase started with the guest-worker agreement in 1961, and Family reunification Law (1973–1980). The bilateral guest-worker agreement specified that workers were to stay in Germany as long as it needed them. Thus, they were always thought of as temporary workers and were expected to return to their country of origin, when their help was no longer needed (Hinze, 2013). When the first guest workers arrived in Germany in the early 1960s, the Government completely isolated them from the rest of the German population, even spatially, housing them in temporary barracks. This restriction then started to fall away with their growing numbers. Being recognized as temporary, the German Government was not keen on accommodating their religious, cultural, or religious needs. So, under such conditions, only a few non-European foreigners managed to obtain German citizenship, and many Turks were unwilling to give up their citizenship, especially as they felt unwelcome in Germany and were reluctant to lose their right to inheritance of property in Turkey (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). The economic decline that hit Europe with the oil embargo of 1973 led to a drastic decline in employment rates, followed by a state suspension to the recruitment of foreign workers (Anwerbestopp) (Oezcan, 2003, 2004), and Turkish immigration to Germany after 1973 was mainly granted for family reunification, rather than asylum seeking (the 1971 Turkish Military Coup), or work permits. The second phase started on January 1, 1981, when the conservative Kohl Government passed the return-promoting law (Ruckkehrfoerderungsgesetz). The German Government provided Turks who were

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willing to go back home with a severance package of about 7,500 $ (10,500 Deutsche marks), tax cut/breaks, and the required counseling to re-enter the Turkish job market. Public opinion at that time supported the Kohl Government’s decision and its assumption that Turkish guest workers would not be able to integrate into a Western society that was mainly guided by Christian values. This policy was quite successful during the first half of the decade, leading to the return of almost 250,000 immigrants to Turkey. The third phase started in the 1990s and witnessed the formation of permanent immigrant minorities. This placed the issue of the integration of Turkish minorities at the top of the state’s political agenda. In this context, the concept of assimilation was used to describe the incorporation of Turkish minorities, who were expected to meet a number of very severe and astutely described requirements, which were meant to make them indistinguishable from Germans on all levels (Hinze, 2013). Despite many years of residence, few Turks had managed to acquire German nationality: up to the year 1988, over 60% of Turks had been resident for at least 10 years. Despite this, the rate of naturalization was noticeably low, reaching only about 0.08%, and for the entire foreign population not more than 0.03%, revealing nothing but the reluctance of the German state to integrate foreigners into its mainstream culture (Green, 2003). As windows opened for the naturalization of Turks, the number of those willing to naturalize had doubled over the years 1995–2006 (Hinze, 2013). To be more specific, in the period from 1998 to 2001, about 322,000 Turks had been naturalized, compared to only 14,600 in the period 1972–1990. Despite this, the requirements for naturalization remained quite harsh, as the concept of ‘jus soli’ was totally absent until the 2000 revision of citizenship law. Being naturalized was associated with the rejection of dual citizenship, which constituted an emotional problem to Turks, who had to break their ties with their country of origin. Moreover, the decision to break away required difficult administrative procedures that could last up to three years. So, one could say that the Turkish Government had somehow contributed to the hindrance of the naturalization process (Green, 2003). The properties of German identity were in flux, as the inclusion into the national community was no longer limited to those of German citizenship, and the question was no longer a legal one. Citizenship law was now replaced with integration policy, which became the new gatekeeper

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of the German community. This has been clearly reflected in the development of the German citizenship laws over the years, including legal revisions in 2000, which emphasized the development and changes in the ‘German National Identity’ (Hinze, 2013). Another revision started following the 2015 refugee crisis, and then with the official re-framing of the integration policy in 2016 through the integration Bill, which was drafted to deal with the increased number of refugees that were pouring into German municipalities. This pushed city representatives to call for accelerated integration procedures and an early selection process, especially for asylum seekers. This bill introduced a two-class asylum, which categorized asylum seekers as ‘likely to stay’ and ‘unlikely to stay’. Through this bill, the state has applied a systemic disintegration process based on residential segregation and material exclusion—for those who were ‘unlikely to stay’ due to low protection rates and their ‘undeservingness’ to integration. The new bill reflected developments in the state’s standards in defining and categorizing migrants; and thus, re-defining the state’s elements of inclusion and exclusion into the German nation (Hinger, 2020).

Defining Integration Integration has become an intransitive concept, where immigrants are perceived as active subjects who contribute to the integration process. This requires a closer look at how the concept is defined in the German case. This entails that integration should not be forced from above (the state), and citizenship should also be acquired by immigrants through a series of individual actions and choices in certain social, political, economic, and cultural contexts (Brubaker, 1992). Integration should be perceived as a ‘particular’ issue not a general or global trend that deals with immigrants as a single block (Brubaker, 1992). The peculiarity of the German case lies in its dealings with its Turkish Immigrants, and this was the whole essence of this research. So, how does the German state define integration? There is no straightforward answer to this question; yet, one could discern what integration meant from the 2000 Report on the situation of Foreigners in Germany, issued by the Federal Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. In this report it was stated: There is no German monolithic culture or ‘Leitkultur’ that immigrants were required to share, as German society was made up of a ‘complexity of coexisting lifestyles’.

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This was not the first time that reference was made to the complexity of German society. In October 1996, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (KMK) had released a policy paper on the ‘Cross-cultural Education in School’, that pointed out the pluralistic nature of modern societies. Back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, policies were implemented in Germany with the aim of promoting foreign involvement in the economic, social, and cultural life, but not the political one. This included the acceptance of fundamental rights under the German constitution, such as women’s rights and religious tolerance through relying on education as a tool of integration at the national level. Despite this, one could not deny that the selective school system constituted a barrier to equal opportunity. All of this prevented the possibility of defining integration in its old context of assimilation. Since the two main criteria that had been specifically mentioned in the report were: acceptance of the values of the constitution, and knowledge of the German language, or commitment to the liberal values of democracy independently from any territorial embodiment. Even the naturalization of immigrants according to the new citizenship Law of 1999 also focused on the two previously mentioned criteria, which emphasized the state departure from cultural assimilation as a prerequisite for citizenship acquisition (Difato, 2013). With the continuous flow of immigrants, great tension and resistance arose when it came to identifying the ‘citizen’, or the mainstream culture within a given society. In the German case, the mainstream culture held a special identity, as it was double layered, because it had the features both of the German society, and of a supranational European identity. The EU called for the integration and acceptance of European immigrants although they did not belong to the mainstream German culture, as they still fit within the European mainstream culture, which meant they were not targets of integration. The Turkish community did not fit into either context, and this explains why they were still struggling to integrate into the German society (Hinze, 2013). The EU had also referred to the problem of discrepancy between the local and national levels in dealing with immigrants with an insecure residence status, where the local governments have reflected more flexible and more accommodating procedures for integration, compared to the federal state. This problem was also evident in some EU citizens, especially those from Eastern Europe (Hinger, 2020).

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Those who defended the idea of ‘national identity’ and ‘national mainstream’ were the ones who defined the ‘other’, or those who did not belong to the mainstream culture (Hinze, 2013). The concept of the ‘other’ and excluding those who did not belong to the mainstream ‘elements of exclusion’, was reflected in Thilo Sarrazin’s controversial book ‘Germany Does Itself in: How We Put our Country at Risk Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen’. Sarrazin was a member of the executive board of the German Federal Bank and a long-term member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). In his book, Thilo Sarrazin claimed that Muslim immigrants were conquering Germany, and pointed to the damage that was inflicted on the German culture and the social welfare society by the headscarf society and welfare queens as he described them (Spiegel Staff, 2010). Though his ideas were extreme, still there was some support for them. Because of their low labor force participation and high utilization of social welfare benefits, Muslim immigrants cost each country more than they contribute in economic value. They were also perceived as a threat to the secular ideas of society and its moral concepts. Moreover, the high fertility rates of Muslim immigrants pose a long-term threat to culture and civilization, in an ageing Europe (Scherr, 2013). One could claim that Sarrazin’s viewpoint regarding the low impact of the Muslim community of Turks on the German economy could be contested. Starting with the first wave of immigrants, the Turkish workforce had assisted in the building of the postwar German economy and had eventually occupied those jobs which, today, the German workforce is unwilling to. The German worker is highly paid, and thus, the service sector had not been thriving in Germany, and Turks had been filling the gap in certain areas that had been abandoned by the German workforce. On September 10, 2010, Sarrazin’s comments and ideas stirred public debate and eventually; he was forced to resign from the executive board of the German Federal Bank, and the SPD also started the process of expelling Sarrazin as a result of the content of his book (Spiegel Staff, 2010). Although 70% of the public rejected his ideas, still there were 30% who supported Sarrazin (Hinze, 2013). The book created a huge public debate and had such an impact that even the German President Christian Wulff brought up the issue of integration. In his speech on the twentieth anniversary of German reunification, he stated: ‘Without a doubt, Christianity is a part of Germany. Without a doubt, Judaism is

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part of Germany as well […] but now Islam is also part of Germany’ (Matussek, 2011). The statement of Islam being part of Germany was met with heavy criticism from both sides of the political spectrum, and the public too. Although his statements outraged the conservative wing of Wulff’s Christian Democratic Union Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU), Volker Bouffier, acting Chairman of the party stated: ‘Shariah law cannot be the basis for successful integration in Germany’ (Hinze, 2013). It was obvious that Islam was framed in the context of Islamic fundamentalism, and it was hard for either politicians or the public to accept Islamic preaching or law as part of the German legal code. On another occasion, Bouffier also stated: ‘We have immigrants, but Germany is not an immigration country”’ (Scherr, 2013). Angela Merkel stood halfway between Wulff’s and Bouffier’s stances and stated in her speech in the Potsdam, Berlin October 17, 2010: ‘multiculturalism has failed’. Merkel and Wulff adopted two different approaches in dealing with integration: Merkel was pushing towards the need of immigrants to work harder to integrate because multiculturalism has failed, despite the fact that Germany did not openly announce an official policy of multiculturalism. On the other hand, Wulff adopted the idea of religious co-existence and a more inclusive German culture. So, while he was calling for a change in German culture, she was calling for Turks to adapt to the German culture. It appeared that there was inconsistency in the political rhetoric, and it also reflected confusion in policy making. And though practices of exclusion could not be justified within the framework of liberal democracy, the practical realization of liberal democracy depended on these practices of exclusion because the creation of a liberal polity that was made up of free and equal citizens rested upon the ‘exclusion’ of others, who had a particular identity different from the rest. This again reflects how exclusion and disintegration have become part of the integration process ‘integration through disintegration’ (Hinze, 2013, p. 16). Categorization now lies at the very heart of integration, where immigrants and asylum seekers could be further categorized based on certain factors, such as economic performance, cultural deservingness, and protection rate (legal status). Also, this process of categorization is socially constructed by multiple actors that interact at both the local and the national level, as each Lander reflects a level of autonomy in applying

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its integration policy and could also contribute to shaping it (Hinger, 2020). This complexity in categorization and diversity, in applying integration policies, has made the immigrants’ access—to learning the German language, to the social service system, and citizenship policy—a later stage in the integration process (Brubaker, 1992). Until recently, refugees with insecure status were not considered part of the integration process. Thus, they were excluded from all accommodation measures, such as learning the German language or taking integration courses. They were also denied employability and access to private flats. These procedures had been imposed by the Government in the 1980s, with the aim of making their likelihood of staying most unlikely. On the other hand, local and municipal authorities adopted a more pragmatic way for integrating refugees, although the national government had explicitly rejected them. An obvious case is the 2013 Plan of the Osnabruck municipality, which promoted the integration of refugees or asylum seekers, who had been excluded from integration measures at the national level due to their insecure legal status. The plan identified refugees as persons who are in need of special guidance and care. This step at the municipal/local level allowed these refugees access to additional expenditure on social workers. It legitimized accommodation of refugees with an insecure status in centers, where social workers could more easily intervene. Civil society has also supported the process of integration at the local level, as the City’s Migrants Advisory Board harshly criticized the decision of linking private housing to the length of stay, which could extend to more than two years, and demanded access to decentralized housing for all refugees. As a result, in 2015, the city administration decided that all refugees, regardless of their legal status and length of stay, could move into private flats. This demonstrates the role of local governments (Laender) in contributing to and shaping the integration policies, more able to accommodate migrants regardless of status than policies at the state level (Hinger, 2020). On the other hand, sending countries also influence the integration process, as they can either impede or contribute to it (Hinze, 2013). One clear example of this was in 2008, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed Germany’s Turkish immigrants in the city of Cologne. In his speech, he pointed to how Turks were able to preserve their language and culture for forty-seven years, and added that he did not expect them to tolerate assimilation because he believed that ‘it is a crime

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against humanity’ (Pidd, 2011). Thus, he was explicitly encouraging the Turkish immigrant community to influence German politics in the interest of Turkey, which posed an identity question: was it they, the Turks, who were resisting assimilation, or were they the poorly integrated German citizens? Similarly, the leading Turkish minority politician Cem Ozdemir, Head of the German Green Party, introduced the term ‘hyphenated identity’, where one could be a German citizen, a committed democrat, and still maintained a close connection with one’s country of origin or that of one’s parents. With his statement, he tried to draw public attention to the inflexibility of the German integration policy (Hinze, 2013). The continuous flow of such ideas from the sending country had a major impact on the Turkish community in Germany. In the last referendum on the expansion of powers to the office of the Turkish President in 2017, less than half a million or 63% of the total Turkish population in Germany had voted ‘yes’. Both Germans and Turks who voted ‘no’ were shocked by the results, and many newspapers stated: Turks living in freedom in Germany but who desire an autocracy for Turks living in Turkey. The results reflected nothing but the great impact that Erdogan has had on the Turkish community in Germany, and the way he has used them to gain votes in the referendum. CDU Politician Wolfgang Bosbach stated that, Turks were loyal to Germany on an economic and social level, but on a political and ideological level, they were loyal to Erdogan (Breitnbach, 2017). This distorted loyalty pushed Turkish immigrants to unconsciously adopt this hyphenated identity. This could be seen as an attempt by Turks to preserve their own culture and roots. Yet, the German state has also contributed to the creation of this identity, by isolating and excluding some of these immigrants from the social fabric. One clear example was the appearance of Turkish ghetto communities in Germany, such as Kreuzberg (a little Istanbul in Berlin). The urban scholars Gaffikin, Perry, and Kundu said that the state implicitly created urban territories of sociocultural exclusion to exclude those who did not belong to the sociocultural mainstream. The state had repeatedly declared that Turks were not part of the mainstream culture or the ‘collective identity’, which led to the creation of a cultural and ethnic enclave that minorities resort to in order to flee from the national mainstream (Hinze, 2013). Based on what the above, one cannot provide a clear definition of integration in Germany. It is a dynamic concept that has been subject to continuous change and influenced by a number of different factors,

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related to both the state and its immigrant community. The integration process was a contribution of both the receiving and sending countries. If Germany was to blame for excluding its Muslim Turkish community by pointing to its difference from the mainstream, the Turkish state was also held responsible. The Turkish state has insisted on conveying a message to its Turkish community in Germany that they have to hold on to their culture and identity, in a way that has encouraged them to stay isolated in their parallel community. This is proof that both sides hold a different definition and perception of identity and integration. When addressing the issue of identity and citizenship with the 11 Turkish interviewees, 72% of them revealed that they have German citizenship. When asked about their identity as Muslims, 81% of them identified themselves as ‘Muslims’, and when asked about practicing their religion, only 36% of them said they were practicing Muslims. They identified themselves as ‘Muslims’ because of their relation to their parents and family in Turkey, but they did not seem to manifest a real understanding of Islam or being a Muslim. It seemed to be merely a way of manifesting their distinct identity. So, immigrants either identified themselves as Muslims simply because of their cultural heritage and familial ties, or as atheists or agnostic because to them religion was a source of discrimination, and they wanted to assimilate. When asked about their Turkish cultural traditions, 81% of the interviewees revealed that they still hold on to their cultural traditions despite belonging to the second and third generation of immigrants and were all born in Germany. They explained that they hold on to some of the traditions that were passed on through their parents, such as celebrating Bayram, wearing the hijab, listening to Turkish music, visiting their family in Turkey every summer, and some have also talked about marriage rituals, and living with their parents. The comments and answers from interview revealed the close connection that the second and third generations of Turkish Muslim immigrants still have with their cultural traditions, despite acquisition of German citizenship. The Turkish state has somehow succeeded in maintaining a link between the sending state, and the early and later generations of Turkish immigrants. Whether this connection is superficial or strong, they still maintain a level of connection, which was reflected with regard to the problem of integration, and their suffering from an identity crisis, due to their distorted loyalty.

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The Institutional Framework of Islam and Religious Organizations in Germany With the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), Francis Fukuyama declared the ‘end of history’, leaving the world with few alternatives, of which Islam as one. Fukuyama explained that Islam would not survive as it was appealing to neither non-Muslims nor non-fundamentalist Muslims. This only placed greater emphasis on capital liberal democracy as the last and only destination for nations. Within the same line of thought, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington introduced their own perspective on Islam. In explaining the clash of civilizations, Huntington stated that Islam would replace communism, and be the new ‘other’, and Lewis emphasized the idea by pointing to the incompatibility of Islam with Western culture with all its norms of democracy, freedom, and even peace. Lewis added that the inner structure of Islam would not change over time and was not adaptive, be it to Western societies, or even to Islamic societies (Yukleyen, 2012). Based on these explanations, Islam was understood within a fundamentalist context: the one that was referred to when speaking of 9/11, the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, or the shootings at Charlie Hebdo. All these ideas simply reiterated one thing: that Islam was incompatible with the West, and its acceptance into Western societies would be difficult if not impossible. Using a more recent rhetoric, some European scholars called for what was known as ‘Euro-Islam’, the kind that was related to the secular European Public Sphere; this was a monolithic project in which Islam would be practiced privately in a way that assured Muslim participation in European Multiculturalism. This explains the European projects that call for the development of a ‘German Islam’ or a ‘French Islam’. These ideas have been supported by a new Islamic discourse introduced by thinkers such as Rached Gannouchi, Mohamed Arkoun, and Nasr Abu Zayd. These thinkers laid the foundation for the reinterpretation of Islam in the light of Western ideas of democracy, liberalism, and secularism; however, these ideas did not reach the majority of the Muslim community. Thus, Islam in Europe was moving in a vicious cycle with voices of multiculturalists asking for the respect of ethnic and religious diversity and another conservative trend that saw no hope of its adaptation to Western values (Yukleyen, 2012). The case of Islam in Germany is worth exploring to examine to the extent to which Turkish

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organizations contribute to the integration of Turks, and how the institutional framework of Islam could explain relations between the German state and its Sunni Muslim Turkish minority.

The Institutionalization of Islam in Germany Unlike the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church, there is not central authority that defines or represents Sunni Islam. At a certain time in Islamic history, the Caliphate was the only institution that claimed to represent Sunni Islam (Carolyn et al., 2006). Today there is no such unified authority to represent or define Sunni Muslims in Turkey; different actors claim to be the ones rightfully practicing and interpreting Islam. This has made it quite difficult on the one hand to represent the Muslim community and, on the other hand, for the German state to reach out and connect with the Sunni Muslim community, to understand their problems and help them integrate. One of the Islamic thinkers who has talked about the problem of interpretation of Islam is Abdolkarim Soroush, the Iranian thinker who is known by his supporters as the Luther of Islam. He has stated: ‘there is only interpretation as opposed to an essence that all Muslims understand and practice in the same way’ (Yukleyen, 2012). In this context, Soroush draws a distinction between ‘religious knowledge’ and ‘religious truth’ and explains that because no one has direct access to the ‘divine’, one can only develop knowledge of the divinity. Thus, such knowledge is subject to expansion and contraction based on interpretation and implementation. This also means that the boundaries of knowledge are subject to expansion, when people are more engaged in actively interpreting the Islamic texts. According to Soroush, ‘Muslims should expand their religious knowledge because Islam is the sum of all interpretations’ (Vakil, 1997, pp. 4–5). This idea is quite useful in general for the application of Islam in Europe, which requires an interpretation that fits a secular society that has adopted different social and political values. The different trends of the interpretation of Islam in Europe in general, and Germany in particular, have mainly been presented by Islamic organizations.

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Religious Organizations in Germany The emergence of the Turkish community in the 1970s created the demand for the institutionalization of Islam through building and establishing mosques. Starting in the late 1980s, Turkish Islamic institutions and organizations began transplanting different forms of Islam such as Sufism and political Islam from their country of origin. Therefore, what they did was reproduce the religious goals, projects, and methods of their mother organizations in Europe. A shift then occurred in the 1990s, when the religiosity of the Turkish Muslim communities shifted from their country of origin to their host European state. This shift took place when the leadership of religious organizations and institutions passed from members of the first generation to those of the second generation, as Muslims have reoriented themselves from Turkey to Europe (Azzaoui, 2016). Oliver Roy argued that ethno-cultural differences would disappear when Muslims detach religion from culture. Yet, Muslim Turks have reaffirmed and strengthened the relation between religion and their ethno-national identity. Thus, the period that followed the issuing of the family reunification law, witnessed the building of mosques, the practice of Islamic rituals (Friday prayers), and the emergence of transnational Islamic organizations, such as the Milli Görü¸s, the Diyanet, and later the Forum of the German Islam Conference (DIK). The appearance of these organizations has contextualized the relationship between the state and the Turkish minorities in Germany, and the need for these organizations to be acknowledged and recognized became a prominent issue. This was necessary for them to become eligible for state subsidies in the context of what is known as ‘public corporation status’; however, this financial support was not available to them, given their lack of recognition (Christine & Barker, 2000). Despite not being legally recognized in Germany, this did not stop the Turkish Muslim community from organizing itself and fulfilling requirements which the German state did not satisfy (Oner, 2014). Religious centers played an important role in this regard as they fulfilled ritual obligations and also worked as fundraisers to collect money for their headquarters in Turkey. In the 1980s, they supported the ‘myth of return’ to Turkey and worked on addressing the needs of their communities throughout the 90s (Yukleyen, 2012).

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At the initial stage of migration, migrant Islamic organizations represented what was known as ‘transplanted Islam’, where they actually transferred their organizational skills, religious, and political programs, imams and political leaders from their country of origin i.e. Turkey. Later there started a period of ‘Islamic re-evaluation’ in order to face a number of different challenges, starting with the different social and religious needs of Muslims in Germany, besides the different legal, social, and political contexts. The following section will examine the development of Islamic organizations in Germany and will provide examples of Turkish religious organizations in Germany, mainly the Diyanet and the Milli Görü¸s, which have transferred different agendas from Turkey, and the DIK, which has represented a forum of discussion between the local, Federal German Government on the one hand, and the Muslim community on the other hand (Yukleyen, 2012).

¨ u ¨ S¸ The Diyanet vs. Milli Gor In the aftermath of September 11, German politicians and the mass media started paying more attention to Islam in general, and Muslim associations in particular. The German media discourse shifted completely during this period, when mosques and gathering places for Muslims were now considered as ‘shelters for terrorists’. The characteristics of the Turkish immigrant associations, in terms of their political mobilization and representation, became a popular and hot topic in the German media that drew the attention of both politicians and society. The reaction of Muslim associations in Germany took two opposite directions. One group has reacted positively to the waves of suspicion, and adopted an open-door policy, to prove that their activities were not extreme or harmful to society. Other groups minimized their activities and interactions, after receiving threats from police raids, and journalistic hype (Yurdakul, 2009). After September 11, Islam was categorized into two main groups: state-supported Islam, and Islam as a threat to the state, or as Mahmoud Mamdani identified them, ‘good Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’. His categorization was based on President George Bush Junior’s reference to pursuing a crusade and stating that the bad Muslims were the ones mainly responsible for terrorism (Mamdani, 2002). Mamdani pointed out that the discourse employed suggested that every Muslim is bad until proven good (2002). If we translate the good Muslim vs. bad Muslim discourse to the level of immigrant associations, we will have two main

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associations. The first is the association of the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri/DITIB), which was supported by the Turkish state and the German State institutions; the German Islam conference (DIK) also falls within the same category. The second association is the Islamische Gemeinschaft (Milli Görü¸s), which means ‘national vision’ in Turkish and which was not supported by either states but considered a threat to both (Yurdakul, 2009).

The Diyanet (DITIB) The Diyanet started organizing in Europe after the Turkish military coup in 1980, and its primary goal was counterbalancing non-governmental Islamic and political movements and promoting national solidarity and loyalty to the Turkish state. This happened after a number of leftists and nationalists, who were considered a threat to the Turkish state, fled to Europe. So, the main mission of the DITIB in Europe was to prevent the opposition from using the Turkish migrants’ religious demands, and to mobilize them against the secular Turkish state (Yukleyen, 2012). The Diyanet was established in Cologne, Germany, July 5, 1984, and has about 230 member associations. It also operates in a number of countries in Europe, including the Netherlands, as well as in Australia, and Canada. Its main role in European states was to ensure and reaffirm immigrants’ loyalty to the Turkish state and to ensure that they continued having cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to Turkey in a way that would not impede the process of integration in Europe. The Diyanet’s interpretation of Islam was known as ‘official Islam’ because of its close connection with the Turkish state. Accordingly, Islam here was a private matter in which a person’s moral code dictated his personal life and behavior, and this was in accordance with the state’s policy of secularism. For this purpose, the Government in Turkey sent religious attaches and counsellors to Turkish embassies and consulates, so the presidents of the DITIB were officials in the Turkish embassies. The association had an appointed religious attaché who served a fouryear term, and imams who were funded by the Turkish state. These imams were usually not fluent in the German language and had little knowledge of German culture. So, the religious teachings of different ethnic groups were mainly transferred from the country of origin. For these reasons, they failed to find a link, or common values that could bring both cultures together to facilitate the process of integration. Thus, the role of imams

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turned into a symbolic rather than an active one. Despite this, they still had a stabilizing effect on the Diyanet by being representatives of the Turkish state; yet, its connection with the Turkish state disqualified it as a religious community and presented it as a political one. Similarly, the appointed cadres were less informed, and by the time they became familiar with the problems, their term ended. And while they communicated better with the first generation of Turks, they had quite a linguistic gap with the younger generations, mainly the second and third generation of Turks (Yukleyen, 2012). Its political affiliation was easily detected from its careful statements, whether in its internal or external affairs, that could offend or negatively affect Turkish–German relations. Despite its official and unofficial attempts to cooperate with other Muslim representative organizations in Europe, it still faced problems connecting with members of the Turkish community in Germany, and other Muslim representative organizations in Europe because of the differences in institutional interests, which prevented unitary action and full cooperation. The Diyanet perceived Islam as a culture that was parallel to the German mainstream culture, which meant that Islam held a quite different entity. That was why it adopted a structured approach to integration that supported the Turkish state control over religion and was based on an intercultural dialogue that was by no means a threat to German society. Therefore, it avoided any clash with the German authorities and supported the cooperative approach that was adopted by the Turkish state towards the German state authorities (Yurdakul, 2009).

¨ u ¨ S¸ : National Vision Milli Gor Today, the Milli Görü¸s is one the most influential Islamic organizations in Germany, and one of the most important Islamist movements operating within the Turkish diaspora in Europe. It operates about 514 mosques and cultural centers in Europe, 323 of which are operating in Germany, and it has about 300,000 members in Germany alone (Vielhaber, 2012). The ideology of the Milli Görü¸swas driven by the ideas of Necmetin Erbakan, the former Prime Minister of Turkey (Yurdakul, 2009), and an Islamist intellectual who was considered one of the most interesting intellectual politicians in the second half of the 20th Century. It was part of an informal network in Europe which started in the early 1970s and emerged in Germany as a diasporic association of the members of

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the Turkish National Salvation Party, the banned party of Necmettin Erbakan, who became the spiritual leader of the ideology of Milli Görü¸s. Erbakan adopted a radical, anti-western, and anti-secular ideology, and instead called for a gradual bottom-up approach to Islamist revival and reform. Accordingly, he created the Milli Görü¸s or ‘National Vision’ to carry out his vision of transforming Turkey into an Islamic state. The movement faced obstacles in both Germany and Turkey, as the role of the Milli Görü¸s in Germany was mainly to undermine the secular Kemalist institutions and principles of the Diyanet and to promote the rise of political Islam as a counter movement to Kemalism. Over more than four decades, the Milli Görü¸s, especially with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, and other ideologically driven Islamic movements, gained increasing influence over Turkey’s religious and political life. This fact had made the Turkish state’s secular structure quite hostile and unwelcoming to the growth of such Islamic institutions and organizations. Similarly, in Germany, the Milli Görü¸s was also not welcomed, as the security services closely monitored the organization and its activities, out of fear that it could contribute to and foster ideological radicalization and terrorism (Vielhaber, 2012). The German state has even taken some serious measures against the Milli Görü¸s. In 2009, the police started searching its facilities, as a move to disrupt its operations and to investigate charges of it operating as a criminal organization. Six of its officials were charged with fraud, money laundering, and supporting terrorist organizations, though later all charges were dropped (Bolsover, 2010). Moreover, the German Intelligence Agency records named the Milli Görü¸s as a ‘threat to German democracy’, considering it as part of political Islam and a hindering power to the integration process, and the German state also accused it of being anti-Semitic and of making anti-German statements (Milli Görü¸s Gazette). In addition, the public framing of the Milli Görü¸sas a threat to the community made the Diyanet (DITIB) more appealing to immigrants, especially the second generation, who sought to pray in a more secured atmosphere, especially after the xenophobic attitude that swept Europe after September 11. Despite the fact that both the Diyanet and Milli Görü¸s provided similar services, they did not collaborate in real life because of the major differences in their political views (Yurdakul, 2009).

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German Islam Conference (DIK) On September 27, 2006, the German Islam Conference created the first forum for dialogue between federal state, local authorities, and Muslims in Germany. The aim of this dialogue was to improve the religious and social participation of the Muslim community in Germany, with the aim of finding practical solutions for the integration and accommodation of their religious needs, within the context of German religious law. The conference also supported efforts and projects of Muslim organizations, which aim at providing support for refugees. In the context of the cooperation between the local and national state to shape and articulate the integration policy, the Federal Ministry of the Interior sought, in its first phase from 2006 to 2009, to invite public officials and Muslim representatives to participate in a novel national discussion forum. The conference incorporated ministers, civil servants representing various levels within the federal state, five representatives of the five largest Muslim associations in Germany, and ten public intellectuals who were to present the majority of non-organized Muslims. The aim behind this was to push for granting ‘public corporation status’ to the Muslim community, as is the case for the Christian and Jewish communities. Conference participants met four times each year to discuss issues of security and Islamism (Islamic fundamentalism), building bridges within the economy and the media, and religion in the German constitution. In its last conference in 2018, the DIK on its agenda discussed a number of important issues that promoted integration and the training of imams in Germany. It also discussed the role of Islamic theology in German universities and mosques, and whether these religious institutions should receive funding from abroad (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building, and Community, 2020). According to Schauble, the Minister of the Interior, the German conference does not simply aim to initiate a non-binding dialogue between all the stakeholders of the integration process, it also aims to set goals for where Germany should stand in the next five to 30 years on the issue of integration, in the context of liberal democracy (Schauble, 2006). Despite the role of the DIK, the high hopes and expectations about the role and positive results of the conference were mostly unrealistic. It will only be possible to claim that the conference has achieved its goal when Germans associate Islam with the positive contribution Muslims are making to the German society, and when diversity is no longer seen as a

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threat to society, but an enriching factor for both society and culture. It is important to point out the limited impact of the conference, as it is not legally binding, and its legal stance and jurisdiction concerning many issues has to be, in the end, decided by the local governments, and not on the national level. The Interior Minister in 2006, Schauble, stated that the conference is a high-profile initiative by the Federal Government to regain mutual trust between the Muslim and Germany community. This top-down approach to dealing with integration issues also takes us back to the problem of all the other organizations and initiatives aimed at dealing with problems of integration (Aslan, 2011). Despite this, the incorporation and the level of autonomy that local governments have with regards to integration, has been quite helpful in providing more pragmatic solutions to problems of integration. The stances which the Diyanet, the DIK, and Milli Görü¸s hold are quite different, and this has been apparent in their position towards a number of important issues, such as the headscarf debate as well as their relations with the German authorities.

The Headscarf Debate The early years of Turkish immigration to Germany brought the issue of the headscarf to the state’s political agenda, and this has gained more importance in recent years. The veil has grown to symbolize the ‘otherness’ of Muslim women, their oppression, their cultural difference, and the fear of the impact of Islam on Germany, or in other words the contestation of ‘Germaneness’ (Weber, 2004). While the issue of the headscarf stirred public debate in France, which ended with forbidding any Islamic symbols to be displayed publicly, Germany could be seen as more accommodating in this regard. A case that best described the German position regarding the headscarf was the well-known case of the teacher Fereshta Ludin, an Afghan-born naturalized German Muslim, who was stopped or barred from wearing her hijab while teaching by the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1998 on the grounds that civil servants must be neutral on religious matters (Oezcan, 2003). Though teachers were allowed in other states or lander, such as Hamburg and Brandenburg to wear the veil, other federal states such as Baden-Wurttemberg and Lower Saxony have forbidden such practice, based on the principle of state neutrality towards all religions. There was also a political reason behind this, which was the fear of policy makers

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that allowing the headscarf meant that they endorsed Islam, which is still unofficially recognized by the German state. Ludin filed a suit against state authorities demanding her right to wear the headscarf. She claimed that the state’s neutrality claim was hollow, and her ban from wearing the veil contradicted with the crucifixes that were placed on the walls of many public-school classrooms, and the practicing of Christian activities that were allowed by the state. She publicly stated: ‘What does neutral mean? When you have two standards, then you can openly say, for us Christians it’s okay, but for everyone else, it’s not […] the Christian communities (in Baden-Wuerttemberg) have great freedom of expression, but all other religious groups don’t’ (Fetzer & Soper, 2005, pp. 115–116). She lost the case in subsequent appeals until she took her case to the constitutional Court in 2002, which declared after a year: that the state rule was wrong, and was without sufficient legal basis in Baden-Wuerttemberg’s law (Oezcan, 2003). What was important about the verdict besides allowing teachers to wear the headscarf and stating that it did not violate the law on freedom of religion and religious neutrality of educators, was that the court signified that ‘there might be compelling reasons to allow Muslim teachers to wear headscarves so as to make a contribution to integration efforts’. Moreover, the court added that because religious plurality could also be connected with conflicts, it might also be legitimate for legislators to ‘attach stricter importance to the neutrality requirement in schools’ (Fetzer & Soper, 2005, p. 115). The problem is that the debate is still unsettled due to the fact that the law acknowledged the discretion of each state to deal with the issue of the veil and, following the court’s ruling, on October 9, 2003, education ministers of the 16 states of Germany failed to reach a unified agreement on the issue of the headscarf (Oezcan, 2003). The autonomy of each German Lander has led to the rise of what are known as ‘Germany’s Patchwork Laws’ on the headscarf. This could be seen with the police being called when a head teacher at a primary school at the state of Hesse wrote to students’ parents notifying them that the headscarf was not allowed in the classroom. Whereas in Bremen, in the north-west of the country, teachers are allowed to wear the headscarf, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the issue is decided on a case-by-case basis. Yet, it is still banned for girls under the age of 14 to wear the headscarf in school (Berlin Court bars Muslim teachers from wearing the headscarf,

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2018). It is worth mentioning that Berlin is the only state to pass a consistently secular law that bans all religious symbols in the classroom (Weber, 2004). This comes again in defiance of Article (4) of the German Constitutional Law that guarantees freedom of faith and conscience, and the undisturbed practice of religion, which becomes problematic, especially for public sector employees (Anderson, 2018). It is also worth explaining that the German state has identified and distinguished a line between the headscarf and full faced hijab (burka). This was evident with Angela Merkel’s statement on December 6, 2016, that full faced hijab should be banned and prohibited in Germany ‘wherever it is legally possible’. This decision was based on a proposal made earlier in August of the same year by Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere, and this was the first law ever in Germany to restrict the wearing of the headscarf. The more conservative southern State of Bavaria went on to prohibit the burka in schools, universities, polling stations, and government offices in 2017 (The Islamic Veil across Europe, 2018). The debate has also extended to the courthouse and legal trainees, as the constitutional court has won a case against a Muslim Trainee Lawyer, who filed a case against the state of Hesse’s neutrality law that bans public sector workers from wearing religious garments. The court ruled more in favor of neutrality law rather than women’s religious freedom and decided that legal trainees are perceived as public entities and, therefore, should carefully observe neutrality (Anderson, 2018). This touches upon another important debate concerning the issue of visible and invisible neutrality, as Article (33) of the German Basic Law specifies ‘the eligibility for public office shall not be dependent on religious affiliation’. Moreover, Article (97) provides for ‘judicial independence, and a particular dress code that requires wearing a robe, symbolizing commitment to fairness and neutrality’. Here a question arises whether the ‘appearance of neutrality’ is more important than the’invisibly’ held political and religious convictions that are not necessarily held by Muslims, be they Christians, Jews, atheists […] etc. Will the religious conviction of judges overshadow their alignment with the law, given that there are still states like Bavaria, where crucifixes are hanging on the walls of all courtrooms, and shall that be perceived as a legal impediment, or does this defy religious neutrality? A question worth exploring (Ibold, 2018). The positions of the Milli Görü¸s and the Diyanet had been completely different concerning the issue of the headscarf during the first decade

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of this century. The Milli Görü¸s had been quite supportive of women’s issues, especially wearing the headscarf in public. It had also clearly stated that religious and cultural differences should be regarded as constitutional rights. Thus, Muslim women were to be granted the right to freely wear the veil in public. On the other hand, in those years, the Diyanet had not made any statements regarding the headscarf, its concerns being directed towards issues such as providing Muslim Turks in Germany with Quran reciting courses, German language courses, and literacy courses (Yurdakul, 2009). The Diyanet position regarding the headscarf also reflected its political position, and its reluctance to hold any opposing views to those of the German state. On the other hand, the Milli Görü¸s represented the position of a religious organization that defied the secularist trend in Turkey and Germany. Again, the different stance of the two organizations was reflected in the case of Leyla Sahin. In 1998, Leyla Sahin, a medical student, challenged the Turkish law that did not allow students to wear the veil or grow any beards at universities or other state educational institutions (The Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey). Despite the competition between both organizations, still their ability to accommodate the needs and demands of Muslim Turks was also determined by the extent the German Government was willing to provide them with a legitimate political space within the Turkish communities in Germany (Yurdakul, 2009). As for the German Islam Conference, its stance on the issue of the headscarf was not clear, as it only represented an official platform of discussion between the German state and the Muslim community. Thus, it again presented a top-down approach, reflecting little influence on the problems of integration. For instance, the DIK website has provided a platform for women to engage in debates concerning the headscarf, with one of the prominent figures, and the first woman chair of the DITIB, Ayten Kilicarslan, presenting her own point of view on the website. She explained that German politicians in general, and feminists in particular, misunderstood the real meaning behind the headscarf. She explained that the headscarf theologically is a religious symbol, and it is wrong for it to be politically perceived as symbolizing a violation of human rights. In her opinion, women who ‘freely’ wear the veil should not be perceived as oppressed. The issue has been perceived politically through the several bans that have been imposed on the headscarf, which differ from one political situation to another. Thus, she recommended seeing

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veiled women from a secular perspective, rather than excluding them from society due to religious reasons. Similarly, the project leader at the Intercultural Council, Hasibe Ozaslan, stated that it was unjust to reduce women to a piece of cloth, rather than evaluating their performance, and what they deliver. The platform has allowed the greater diversity of Muslim women’s perspectives to be presented in the context of interpreting and understanding German society. It has become a hybrid that represents the perspective of the German state and the Muslim community, which is an attempt to stand against the mainstream interpretation of the headscarf, introducing the different meanings and interpretation of belonging to the German national identity. Naika Foroutan, a political scientist in Berlin, born to German and Iranian parents, has also reflected on the issue of belongingness from the perspective of ‘hybrid identities’. She points to the idea of ‘code switching’, which reflects switching from one language to another, or belonging to more than one culture, which is the case for members of the Muslim community in general. She has rejected the idea of integration through creating a homogenous identity that, for example, imposes compulsory language classes for immigrants, and emphasizes that the German state places little emphasis on the issue of hybrid identity. Her stance is clear in her attack on and critique of the ideas of Thilo Sarrazin, who attempted to create a model of germaneness that excluded Muslims and considered them a threat to the German culture and identity (Anna et al., 2014). In the case of both the DITIB and the DIK, before the further consolidation of political Islam in Turkey in the last few years, the issue of the headscarf represented the official position of both the German and Turkish states, which again reflected a top-down approach in dealing with the debate of religious freedom vs. religious neutrality. It also emphasized the unwillingness of the federal state to recognize Islam as an official religion, and allowing the constitutional court to clearly decide on the issue of the headscarf. Again, the role of the local government, and the autonomy of each lander becomes the decisive factor, as was explained earlier, thus also emphasizing the issue of integration through disintegration. A fear of the impact of organizations, such as the Milli Görü¸s, and the infiltration of the Muslim religious convictions and symbols into German society, on German culture and identity, has pushed the state to draw a clear line between those who should and should not be integrated,

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even if this is not clearly imposed by the Federal Government, and only apparently at the local level.

¨ u ¨ S¸ and Diyanet’s Relations with German Milli Gor Authorities and Approaches to Integration The Milli Görü¸s and the Diyanet have adopted different perceptions of Islamic culture and approaches towards integration until the most recent years. The Diyanet perceived Islam as a culture parallel to the German mainstream culture. This is why it has adopted a ‘structured approach’ to integration, one that supported Turkish state control over religion and is based on an intercultural dialogue that is by no means a threat to the German society. Therefore, it avoided any clash with the German authorities, yet supported the cooperative approach adopted by the Turkish state towards the German state authorities; the same applied for the DIK. On the other hand, the Milli Görü¸s took a ‘holistic approach’ to integration, which mainly attempted to incorporate some elements and specificities of Islam into the German culture, such as Islamic education, ritual slaughtering of animals, Muslim-only cemeteries, etc. The Milli Görü¸s claimed to be creating a multicultural society that succeeded at incorporating Muslims of different backgrounds into the German society and pushed for Islam to be officially recognized by German state authorities (Yurdakul, 2009). Mostafa Yoldas of the Milli Görü¸s drew attention to the German state and society’s reluctance to integrate Muslim Turks into the community by stating: I have been in Germany for 24 years and I am a German citizen for 11 years. I speak better German than Edmund Stoiber (a famous German politician). I have been residing in Germany much longer than Angela Merkel. I have an academic career here. I donate blood every eight weeks […] I don’t think you can find anybody who voluntarily works as much as I do for the promotion of inter-religious dialogue in North Germany. If this is integration, then I am integrated. But if what you want is to dye our hair blonde, wear blue contact lenses, then drink Hopfenbier, eat Bratwurst and sing Deutsche Volkslieder, then you have to wait for a couple of centuries. I don’t think this is going to happen. (Yukleyen & Yurdakul, 2011, p. 74)

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What Yoldas was trying to point out here, was that regardless of the fact that many Muslim Turks had managed to fulfill all the requirements for naturalization and citizenship and had made serious attempts at integration; still ethnic markers were a serious impediment to fitting in and integrating into German society. And this was clearly seen in the answers of the 11 interviewees as explained before. The stance of the Milli Görü¸s was not supported by the German Government, which has pushed the Government to list it as a ‘Bundesverfassungschutz’ or an ‘Anti-integrative association’. Yoldas responded to this move by saying that it was simply a political game by the German Government against Islamic politics. The Milli Görü¸s received no support from the Government and has no credibility that was why it used alternative channels, associations and representatives, such as the Islamische Foderation Berlin (IFB) that taught Islamic courses in German secondary education in the German language. It struggled for 14 years to be officially recognized by the German legal system; once recognized it managed to push for a number of causes, such as gaining the right to teach Islam as a religion course in public schools. The result of this was that in 2002– 2003, 1,607 students in Berlin, 852 of whom were girls and 805 boys, took Islam as a religious course, 74% were of Turkish nationality and 21% were Arabs. This number tripled in five years to reach 4,600 students in 2007–2008 (Yurdakul, 2009). The Milli Görü¸s also struggled to push for a number of other legal cases, such as the right to ritual slaughter (positively decided in 2002), Muslim teachers’ right to wear religious attire in school (negatively decided in 2003), and the right to religious education (positively decided in 1984) (Salvatore et al., 2013). There have been a number of other cases that are still under discussion, such as the availability of Muslim services in social and medical institutions and the right to burial according to Muslim rituals. Other issues have not yet been taken to court, such as the right to the call to Islamic prayers (ezan), the right to have permission from an employer for daily prayer times, and for religious holidays (Yurdakul, 2009). Still one cannot blame the German authorities alone for this, since a number of these Muslim institutions are not fully capable of implementing these procedures due to their lack of institutionalization, or due to restrictions in their organizational structure. One example of this is the leaders of the Islamische Foderation being unable to find appropriate teachers. This is because those who applied for the job held a different perspective than that of the Federation. Burhan Kesici, a leader

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in the Foderation, stated ‘Islam that is lived in Turkey, or the Islam that is lived in Saudi Arabia, is different from the Islam that is lived in Berlin’. There was also the problem of finding imams who were well acquainted with German culture and language, and at the same time who did not give anti-German hate speeches (Yurdakul, 2009). There was the case of the imam Yakup Taschi, the imam of the Melvana Mosque in Kreuzberg (Berlin), whom the Berlin Constitutional Court ruled was to be deported for a hate speech he had given which constituted a threat to public safety. It was stated that, in his speech, he glorified martyrs in Iraq and Jerusalem in a form of a poem suggesting that suicide attacks should be carried out in Germany (Fekete, 2005). These kinds of imams will never help or support the process of integration and will only emphasize the state fear of the Milli Görü¸s. Party politics in Turkey have also cast their shadow over the status and performance of the Milli Görü¸s in Germany, and a trend of thought pointed out that Germany possessed a different political environment than that of Turkey. The Milli Görü¸s has continuously tried to peel off the ‘bad Muslim’ label and claimed to be an ‘anti-integration association’; however, still the Diyanet (DITIB), despite its most recent transformation, and the DIK enjoy a better position even for Turks in Germany, who are simply looking for a safe atmosphere to pray. One could also conclude that the Turkish organizations that operate in Germany have constituted an impediment towards integration, given that they hold different stances towards Islam and represent different actors. Moreover, their different positions explain the lack of a unified leadership that could truly represent the Muslim Turkish community and convey their needs to the German state. When asked about the role of Turkish organizations in representing the Muslim Turkish community and helping them integrate, the responses from interviewees were as follows: most of the answers were positive as 36.3% agreed, 9% strongly agreed, 18.1% were neutral, and 27.2% disagreed. Almost all of them mentioned the DITIB as an example of such organizations. One interviewee described it as an organization that did social work and refugee work. It also adopted an open-door policy, where it involved people of different backgrounds, such as Kurds and Christians and worked on creating awareness to bridge the gap between Islam and Christianity. Others mentioned other organizations, such as the Turkischer Bund, Zentralrat der Muslems, Turkische Gemeinde,

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Turkischer Elternverein, providing some social services to Turks and the Youth Union of Turkey (TGB). The comments of the interviewees about the performance and role of these organizations were quite interesting. One stated ‘the head of these clubs and organizations appear in the media and speak of Turks, but Turks do not know them. They know nothing about those who support them or give them money’, and explained that there were some good organizations, yet these were small, had no power, and were financially supported by the Government, thus were far from being independent. Some of the interviewees expressed their lack of trust in some of these organizations and stated that they did not truly represent them. Moreover, they explained that the leaders of these organizations or those who reached power like Cem Ozdemir (Milli Görü¸s), who is a member of the Bundestag, were already assimilated, and did not relate to the Turkish community. A number of interviewees have expressed the lack of interest in politics among the younger generations, of both Turkish and German origins. In addition, they explained that there were not enough organizations for Turkish youth in Germany, and it is worth mentioning that none of the interviewees were members of the aforementioned organizations.

Conclusion Theoretically, there is no operationalized definition with specific indicators that one could generally use for integration. It is more of an ongoing process that is subject to continuous change and usually passes through different phases, depending on the particular context in which it is being applied. This has made every phase unique, and every state different in dealing with a specific immigrant population. Applying this to the German case, one could explain that the integration process has been a contribution of both the receiving and sending countries. If Germany has been to blame for excluding its Turkish community and always pointing out its difference from the mainstream culture, the Muslim Turkish community and the Turkish state are also to be held responsible. The integration process has been handled through a top-down approach by both the receiving and sending states. It is obvious in the case of the German state that it has only allowed a certain space to the DITIB and the DIK that were also supported by the Turkish Government, in the context of protecting its own secularist trend, and its ‘Euro-version of Islam’. These state-supported organizations have sometimes been distant

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from the target community, which has rendered their efforts largely ineffective, as was clearly reflected in the answers of most of the interviewees, which sometimes indicated their lack or interest or trust in these organizations. These organizations are not grass-rooted, and what has impeded their role in accommodating the needs of the Turkish Muslim minority group has been their obvious political agendas, and goals behind both the state-supported and the non-state-supported organizations. Though both the Turkish and German approach to integration has been top-down, they were heading in different directions. The Germans state was hoping for the creation of a community that resembled the German identity and preserved its culture; the Turkish state was asking its community to integrate, while preserving its own ethnic identity. This caused nothing but an identity crisis to the Turkish community in Germany, leaving them either totally assimilated, having no trace of their ethnic identity, or living in a parallel community that was alienated from German society. The approach should be bottom-up to be real, and to push the Turkish community to be woven into German society without losing its identity. This is quite obvious in the way the Turkish organizations have operated in Germany, which constitutes an impediment towards integration, since there are different organizations, each holding a certain stance towards Islam and representing different actors. Moreover, their different positions explain the lack of a unified leadership that could truly represent the Muslim Turkish community and could convey their needs to the German state. Moreover, imams of the Muslim organizations have been appointed through an agreement between the receiving and sending states, and are characterized by their limited command of the native language, and their disconnection from the society of the host state. This renders them simple followers of the sending state, with no real influence on the integration process; thus, they simply turn into state officials, rather than real representatives of the Muslim community. This gives the German state the chance to accuse the Turkish community of being unable to agree on a leader to represent their demands. The Turkish state has also played a role in impeding the process of integration because it has chosen to either fully adopt a supportive attitude to the German policy, or to move in the opposite direction. Thus, the Turkish state has not always succeeded in showing the support that was needed to accommodate its people in Germany. This has left Turkish Muslims with doubts about the real support of their government.

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Religion is not static, and is subject to re-interpretation to cope with changes in context and any possible developments in society. Islam calls for reinterpretation or ‘Ijtihad’ because development and change are inevitable. Europe represents a different context and holds different values; thus, accommodation to these values without violating the main pillars of the Islamic religion is something acceptable, and possible to achieve. Yet, what seems to be a problem is the presence of a unified and reliable platform that could set a clear basis for the target Muslim community, which could help overcome the problem of the lack of a unified leadership, and at the same time would withhold the claim of European states that there was no official representative of the Muslim community. When evaluating the two variables of the role of religious organizations and the institutional framework of Islam, the following conclusion was reached: there is a general problem of a lack of leadership and real representatives of Muslims in Europe, which could justify the several failed attempts to create a common space for debate between the Muslim communities and the receiving European states. The German state worked on supporting Muslim organizations that were representative of its own vision of Islam ‘Euro Islam’, like the DITIB and the DIK, which provided an image of a state that was trying to reach out to its growing Muslim population, but taking a closer look at these religious entities and the way they operated, one could see that they have little influence of the integration process. The problem of Islam in Europe is not only confined to the issue of leadership, it is also related to the compatibility of Islam to the Western values of liberal democracy. Many of the immigrants who moved from their country of origin to the host state, especially the first generation which carried their culture to their new home, resorted to Islam to emphasize their identity. Later generations have also resorted to Islam due to their inability to integrate on many levels in the host society. Thus, Islam was the only way to develop an identity of their own, and this was how they became isolated in their ghettos and social enclaves. The western perception of the values of Islam was linked to ideas about radicalism, and terrorism. Moreover, European states embraced the principle of secularism, which sometimes clashed with the values and practices of Islam because Islam is not a private religion in all its aspects, it is a way of life. This opened an important door to the interpretation of Islam, especially in the European context and called for flexibility when implementing the values of Islam to cope with the secularist European context.

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Such reformist ideas were faced with the obstacles of implementation, especially the fact that there were several dispersed institutions, which were not legitimate, and which have presented such interpretation and practice. The particularity of each European community is something that requires consideration, the one-size fits all solution is one of the main impediments in dealing with the problem of integration of Muslim minorities in Europe. Each European state has its own features, and each Muslim community could be different from that of other European states. Thus, dealing with Muslims as a bulk in Europe is one of the main problems in approaching the problem of integration. The issue of the headscarf continues to be a hot topic in secular European states, and the German case is no different. Though basic German law ensures freedom of faith and conscience, the issue being left to the discretion of each lander has made the state appear indecisive. It has also allowed what has been described as a patchwork of laws, where the more conservative lander has forbidden it, while the less conservative or more cosmopolitan states, like Berlin, have allowed it. No state dares to acknowledge Islam as an official religion in Germany, and this is what has allowed this grey area to exist. The issue of the headscarf has highlighted the discrepancy between the local and federal state in assessing and carrying out the process of integration, placing emphasis on disintegration as an integral part of the integration process. The issue appears to be a fight for secularism, but one could also claim that it is a fight for identity on both sides. Turks believe that the headscarf is an assertion of their identity given that integration is still a problem to them. At the same time, Germany is trying to preserve its identity that seems to be changing in a community where the Turkish community is growing rapidly, especially since Europe is ageing and there is speculation that one-day the youth community of Turks will outnumber the German one. Standing on different grounds and pushing for a solution from above has proven to be unsuccessful. The only way to deal with the problem of integration in Germany, is to address the givens of that society. Adaptation and flexibility are a must when living in different communities, and Islam gives way for this in a manner that does not violate the main principles of Islam, but how far does the Turkish community really adapt? The German state should also demonstrate the same level of flexibility, given that it has allowed and approved the presence of different communities on

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its own land. Rigidity from both sides will impede the whole integration process and will result in an irresolvable deadlock.

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Yurdakul, G. (2009). From guest workers into Muslims: The transformation of Turkish immigrant associations in Germany. UK: Cambridge Scholar Publishing.

CHAPTER 8

Immigration in Europe and Italy: Different Perspectives, Shared Challenges? Annemarie Profanter

Introduction Thousands of people continue to try to reach Europe by sea, legally or illegally, in search of international protection, family reunification, for economic reasons or to pursue educational opportunities. The media daily reports troublesome images of overloaded vessels drifting in the Mediterranean. At the end of the 1990s, the stock of irregular migrants in Mediterranean Europe was estimated at about 1.1 million, distributed as follows: 150,000 in Spain, 175,000 in France, 250,000 in Italy and 525,000 in Greece (Reyneri, 2001). In total, there are 21.8 million citizens of non-EU countries living within the European Union. Germany reported the largest number of immigrants in 2018, followed by Spain, France and Italy (Eurostat data from May 2020). According to statistics of the UN High Commission for Refugees in 2019 Europe received 3.5 million refugees; among the main host countries were Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Greece and the UK.

A. Profanter (B) Faculty of Education, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Brixen, Bolzano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_8

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The attraction of Europe combined with the transformation of Greece, Spain and Portugal into countries of immigration due to the fall of the dictatorships in the 70’s and their subsequent entry into the EU in the 80’s, increased migratory pressure in the Maghreb. For example, the increased activity in the agricultural sector in Spain displaced imports from Morocco and acted at the same time as a pull factor for Spain and push factor for Morocco due to an increased need for labour (cf. Fargues, 2004, p. 1357). The existence of established transMediterranean networks form the basis of Arab immigration, originating mainly in the Maghreb. Fargues (2004, p. 1349) already 15 years ago portrayed a scenario with growing Arab migration to Europe: “migration from the Arab east, the Masherq, has been recently growing and might gain momentum in the coming years as a result of declining demand for migrant labour in the Gulf, a region that for more than three decades has been a major destination for eastern Arab migrants”. A massive immigration push occurred for the first time as a consequence of the economic crisis following the Arab–Israeli war in 1973 when European countries denounced bilateral agreements regulating labour migration and placed restrictions on the immigration of migrant workers (Fargues, 2004, p. 1356). Along the same lines, 15 years later Salameh (2019) referred to the increasing numbers of immigrants especially from the Arab spring countries which create disastrous situations for migrants, both in sending and receiving countries alike. Thus, migration is referred to as a shared challenge for countries of emigration and countries of immigration. Throughout the EU irregular entries have been increasing and a system of clandestine immigration and irregular stays has emerged ever since restrictive policies of European countries took effect: At the end of 2019, the stock of irregular migrants and refugees came to 120,000 (Bierbach, 2019). At the same time restrictive policies on immigration, measures targeting irregular migration and the support of Libyan and other authorities off the shores of Europe to seal off their borders have been on the political agenda in Europe. Starting by providing a framework on European migration policy, this chapter is centred around the case study of Italy which, together with Greece, Spain and France, is considered a key player in the Mediterranean region, having traditionally held a role as bridge or transit country as a result of the central geographic position of its southern shores in the Mediterranean with migrants arriving from African and Asian countries.

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EU Migration Policies The relatively recent establishment of the European Union as a grouping of nation states with differing legal system regulating the migration phenomenon has, until now, represented a challenge to the development of a common policy system. Particularly since the late 1980s when south–north migration phenomena increased, the issue has been at the forefront of the European agenda (Pietsch, 2015). Within this institution immigration has always been a sensitive issue and several member states were hesitant to cede their political authority over the management of human flows to a supranational level, due to different traditions based on historical developments and national sovereignty (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015). “The EU’s development was a crucial factor in building a new European migration space, both as an institutional regime within the EU’s legal and regulatory system and as migration patterns to and within the EU. It must be noted that what can be regarded as the European migration regime is something absolutely unique and distinct, with no comparison in the contemporary world in terms of scale or legal and institutional framework” (Kaczmarczyk et al., p. 25). The EU itself provides only a common legal framework that regulates mobility and the portability of rights and entitlements and has no authority over national integration policies but makes recommendations that the member states should follow. Although a detailed discussion of the complex legal framework which regulates immigration is not possible here, the following paragraph makes reference to key policy acts in order to outline some central features of the EU migration and integration policies: Schengen (1995), which regulates the free exchange of goods and people among the member states has, on the other hand, permitted reinforced control of the external borders of the European Union. The treaty of Amsterdam (1997), a common policy for asylum and immigration, was passed although national policies remain in place. The Oslo process (1993) initiated agreements of countries of the Mediterranean, in both the Maghreb and Europe, to jointly set up security, peace, economic and financial partnerships and establish prosperity through free trade by 2010. With the Barcelona Declaration (1995) the control of illegal immigration and the development of local economies to reduce the necessity for emigration were announced, the broader aim being to create an area of shared prosperity among Arab countries that border the Mediterranean

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and the European Union through the progressive establishment of free trade across the Mediterranean. Arab partners of the European Union in the Barcelona Process are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Among the countries of the south-Mediterranean only Libya has not joined the process. Interestingly, all partner states are countries of emigration while Europe clearly is characterized by immigration. In recent decades this issue of illegal immigration, however, has become of crucial importance for those countries of emigration, with migrants from sub-Saharan Africa transiting the Maghreb in an attempt to reach Europe. While many EU measures are purely economically orientated, in 2004, the “Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU” were launched: the socioeconomic approach to integration as regards education, work, housing and health, considered areas key to successful integration, was privileged in this and marks the most significant adoption of such an approach. Following the Lisbon Treaty signed in December of 2009, the European Parliament was given legislative power and since then has gained more legal authority in migration affairs (Pietsch, 2015). Although within the European Union there have been attempts to homogenize policies one cannot speak about a common strategy to manage and regularize migration. When it comes to external border protection, visa policies, the asylum regime and the response to irregular forms of migration, agreements have been signed but, in effect, the history and situation of the individual member states varies so substantially that it is almost impossible to come up with one single model of integration. For example, countries like Germany and France have a long history of immigration whereas for new member states such as Hungary and Poland this has imperceptible effects. Thus, the inheritance of a diverse immigrant population in the funding member states of the EU has developed over three phases since World War II. This has been accompanied by changing demographic, structural and policy needs and, at the same time, migration flows have changed in their geographical origin and thus also the socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants themselves have been diverse. “These transformations have met a variety of national policy responses that have fluctuated from laissez faire policy in the early post-war years to a complete halt and even deportation by the late 1970s, to zero-immigration appeals by the 1990s” (Lahav, 2009, p. 29).

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By the 1990s, traditional “sending” countries such as Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, had turned into countries of immigration, and added immigration to the political agenda. “Now more dominated by socio-political and law-and-order considerations, immigration intake was significantly curbed, and the debate became dominated by questions of social integration and immigrant rights, as well as more long-term considerations of the ‘push–pull’ dynamic” (Lahav, 2004, p. 31). A noticeable increase of the immigrant population in Spain and Italy was perceived at the start of the twenty-first century (Pietsch, 2015). At the turn of the century the main concerns with immigration were “security issues”: ethnic conflict, terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, etc. (Huysmans, 2000). “European immigration policy turned to the future status of ‘third-country nationals’, or those immigrant groups with privileged status and the right of residence in one member-country” (Lahav, 2009, p. 41). Thus, the different EU nation states have adopted various strategies to manage diversity, ranging from assimilation policies, segregation and integration. These different approaches have been inspired by various concepts of national unity and social stability. “Most European countries developed their own ‘philosophies of integration’ based on differing traditions, concepts of community, citizenship and nationhood. As a result, a variety of integration policy models directed at migrants emerged” (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015, p. 38). From 2014 to 2020 the European Union provided 7.06 billion Euros for the Asylum, Migration and Integration fund (AMIF). The objectives are to strengthen and develop the common European asylum system, to support legal migration to the EU member states in line with labour market needs and to promote the effective integration of nonEU nationals. It enhances fair and effective return strategies, combating irregular migration, with the emphasis on sustainability and success of the return process, and lends further solidarity to those EU states which are most affected by migration and asylum flows (European Commission AMIF). The problem with these measures is their implementation, and support for the implementation process which is a greater necessity for certain EU states such as Italy and Spain. The Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals, elaborated in June 2016, provides a comprehensive framework supporting member states’ efforts in developing and strengthening their integration policies. It includes actions

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across all policy areas crucial for integration and mutual learning between member states (European Commission Action Plan). However, there does not seem to be a common agreement as to the role of the EU in migration affairs. The institutions of the EU framework tend to have limited support from the public and an overall weak legitimacy, but greater trust and importance is placed in national institutions and frameworks (Pietsch, 2015). Results from the European Election Study (EES) in 2009 show that around 50 per cent of EU residents thought that measures towards immigration adopted by the EU had a negative effect on their country and that the EU was to be held responsible for the numbers of immigrants coming into the nation. The study revealed further that, among others, Spain and Italy stated that immigration needs to be decreased significantly (Pietsch, 2015). The public debate on immigration policy has often been used to project economic and social problems. As has been outlined above, the political tone of the integration debate has changed over the last decades, linking the security issue to Muslim communities in Europe. “Strong religious identity, a lower level of integration, the role of the traditional sharia law (as being above state law), a common fear of radicalization, alienation and violence among Muslims, especially young Muslims, have meant that the debate around immigration and integration has become focused on the security-terrorism-Islam triad” (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015, p. 42). The idea of a collision of Western European and Muslim values has formed the basis of this rhetoric. Cultural diversity in an anti-immigrant logic is seen as a challenge and a threat to a concept of the modern nation state that is non-existent and unrealistic in the multicultural and globalized Europe of the twenty-first century, but which is promoted by right wing parties. Parallel to these measures taken in Europe, the countries of the Maghreb such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, have themselves developed emigration policies, mainly in order to optimize the economic benefits to be drawn from emigration but also to maintain ties with their emigrants and preserve their cultural identity (Fargues, 2004). This strategy has been described as being a hindrance to the establishment of social cohesion in Europe as immigrants neglect the values and culture of their host country. Once again Muslims are under scrutiny. The presence of Islam in Europe has been on the public agenda. This also is associated to the religious visibility of Islam itself (Allievi, 2003). The increasing support for right-wing parties in Western Europe reflects the concerns of people also in terms of their security and cultural identity

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parallel to economic concerns (Pietsch, 2015). The case study that follows takes Italy as an example through which to analyse these religious and political currents in light of the question: what kind of integration model can be applied granting immigrants of all ethnicity and faith a rightful place in society?

Italy---the Fortress of Europe The “rapid increase of Italy’s immigrant population is the result of regular and, more often, regularized entries. Between 2000 and 2010, some 300,000 persons registered in the country each year” (Zincone, 2011, p. 249). In 2001, the top three nationalities were Moroccans, Albanians and Romanians. Together they made up 26.7 per cent of total immigration. By 2010, the same top three nationalities comprised already 43.4 per cent of the total immigrant population (Zincone, 2011). Depending upon the prevalent political spirit in the country different standpoints towards immigration and the cultivation of the relationship with neighbouring Arab countries in the Mediterranean have been adopted. However, from a European perspective “the Mediterranean has become a kind of Berlin Wall, a frontier” that represents Europe’s desire to control immigration (Chater, 1996, p. 65). Castronovo (1988, p. XXXVII) metaphorically refers to Italy as “a sort of centaur, with its head well stuck into Europe and hooves reaching down into the Mediterranean”. This ambiguity has been expressed in terms of Italy’s geopolitical identity being referred to, on the one hand as “maritime” due to the fact that it is more an island than a peninsula and, on the other hand, as “continental” and rooted in the powerful European Union (Santoro, 1991, pp. 50–51). In fact, historically there has been a strong connection which goes back to pre-colonial times and in the south of the country (cultural) connections with the Arab world are evident in every corner as Sicily was a Muslim stronghold for about 200 years between the 9th and the eleventh century. However, today Gulf oil seems to be a strong and decisive argument for maintaining good relations. Thus, during the oil crisis in the 70’s, the post-war period and the Gulf War at the beginning of the 1990s, a mediating approach between Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East was applied, while post-9/11 a shift of Italian policy towards subordinacy in relation to the major allies and to American commands emerged with reference to security concerns.

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However, Italy’s traditional Mediterranean policy1 in general terms can be described as being “reasonably pro-Arab even if under cover of the ‘equidistant’ (equidistanza) formula (or as D’Alema puts it now ‘equiclose’ (equivicinanza), which has translated into a practice of constant referral to the United Nations (UN) post-9/11 motivated by national security concerns, and into a search for dialogue with all the countries in the region, independently of their political and ideological alignment or any involvement in actions directly against Italian or Western interests” (Coralluzzo, 2008, p. 118). The transformation of Italian society into a multicultural and multiethnic diverse society in relation to the number of residents, participation in the labour market, transition to self-employment, marriages of mixed ethnicity and the multicultural composition of schools is now a fact. However, in their cultural representations Italian citizens are not ready to acknowledge this reality but are rather closed towards a multi-ethnic change of their cities (Ambrosini, 2013). Thus, “the definition of immigration as a problem of safety and public order, the tightening of rules that aim to fight irregular immigration, backlash against cultural and religious differences became central aspects of the prevailing political discourse” (Ambrosini, 2013, p. 192). In order to understand the logic of a nation’s integration policy the history, traditions and ideas of community, nationhood and citizenship must be interpreted within the specific national context in which immigration emerged (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015, p. 38). Therefore, the following section is structured around a brief overview of the historical events that characterized the immigration phenomenon in Italy and the politics that, over recent decades, have tried to come up with an integration policy model. Against the background of the politics of migration and integration at a supranational level, thus the contemporary European framework, an analysis of the Italian philosophy or rather model of integration is presented, taking into consideration immigration policies, Italian—Arab relationships and European standpoints.

The Migration Phenomenon: A Historical Overview Transatlantic and trans-Mediterranean migration flows are characteristic of Italian migration history. One peak of this movement was reached between 1876 and 1976 when 26 million citizens left the country

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(Choate, 2008, p. 244, note 1), a phenomenon that started just after Unification. Around the same time Italy occupied coastal regions on the Red Sea that were known as the first Italian formal colony of Eritrea (1890), and others followed. Italian migrations to Africa have been divided by Labanca (2002, pp. 372–375) into three groups: a) colonial emigration, e.g. in 1920 there were 17,500 Italians in Libya; b) migration to Tunisia (the numbers amounted to roughly 80,000 Italians around 1900), Egypt, French Algeria and other former Roman colonies with which a precolonial relationship was maintained; and c) migration to sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, the missionary tradition rooted in the supremacy of the Catholic church in Italy played a major role: There was an increased interest in the Mediterranean “under the umbrella of Christian universalism within the Catholic world, or human solidarity within the secular parties, or the international link with the Third World liberation movement marshalling the left” (Garruccio, 1982, p. 10). Colonial emigration can, however, be considered imperceptible in terms of numbers compared to the great emigration to the United States (Lombardi-Diop & Romeo, 2012, p. 4). These two phenomena, emigration and colonialization, conditioned “a circulation of individuals and families, but also of capital, traditions and ideas” (Choate, 2008, p. 1). The huge number of emigrants destabilized national belonging while linguistic and cultural features were disseminated that are “inherent to the concept of ‘italianità’,2 a concept that is now crucial to a definition and an understanding of the postcolonial condition in contemporary Italy” (Lombardi-Diop & Romeo, 2012, p. 3). While issues such as transnational trading, spatial articulation and issues of cultural hegemony, to mention a few, are discussed in postcolonial studies, these historical phenomena must also be considered in any debate on contemporary Italy. Nor can Italy’s internal colonialism be neglected: at the time of unification, Italy’s south, known as the “mezzogiorno”, was described as a colonial extension of the North. Italy’s history is quite unique within the European context: while post-war Italy was still a country of emigration with citizens leaving for Germany, Switzerland, Austria, other European nations like Britain and France had to deal with large numbers of immigrants from their previously colonized territories. Especially blue-collar guest workers from Italy’s south moved abroad or to the industrial areas in the north of the country, the so-called internal colonial migration phenomenon (cf. Castles et al., 2013),with a revival of internal migration flows between 1995 and

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2008 (cf. Celi & Viti, 2018). The first immigrants from the ex-colonies to Italy, however, were young Ethiopian intellectuals and Somali university students followed by Eritrean domestic workers in the 1960s. Only in the 1980s, while the emigration flows continued, did Italy start to become a destination country for immigrants due to its strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea. The enlargement of the European Union with the fall of the dictatorships and consequent incorporation of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 70s, functioned as a push factor for emigration in the Maghreb as the economic construction of the European Union took over, for example, agricultural sectors formerly dominated by countries of the Maghreb (Fargues, 2004, p. 1357). Similarly to these neighbouring countries where the process started 10–15 years later, Italy had, since the mid-seventies, turned from being a country of emigration into one of immigration (Allievi, 2003). Although the majority of migrants in Italy today are not from former colonies,3 this postcolonial condition as well as the unique influence of the church in Italy influenced the cultural production and thus discourses regarding immigrants in Italy. In the following decades Italy served as a passageway for southern and eastern migratory flows with the result that “by the end of the 1990s, Italy had one of the most diverse immigration populations in Europe, with migrants from Europe, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, China and Southeast Asia, a heterogeneity that creates possibilities and challenges for a diverse type of multiculturalism4 (Lombardi-Diop & Romeo, 2012, p. 9). Because of its geopolitical position, Italy plays an important role regarding the migratory routes from Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea (Castelli, 2016, p. 54). Castelli, 2016 describes the historical immigration to Italy as “unplanned”, because the reasons for immigration to Italy can be found in neighbouring countries and economic causes, more than the recruiting of immigrants by the Italian government.5 In the 1950’s and 1960’s the demand for labour in specific sectors of production increased, also in the informal sector because of the so-called “miracolo economico” (economic miracle) (Castelli, 2016, p. 55; see also Massey, quoted in Castelli). In the 1980’s, immigration emerged as a “relevant political issue” because of the “increased inflow of migrants” and it also received greater attention from the media (Castelli, 2016, pp. 55–61). According to statistics released in 2019, there are approximately 3,700,000 non-EU citizens in Italy; newer data are not available yet (Istat,

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2019). The most highly represented countries of origin are Morocco, Albania, China, the Ukraine and the Philippines. The greatest numbers of foreign immigrants who have acquired citizenship are from Albania and Morocco. In the last five years immigration from African countries, in particular Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Ghana to Italy has increased significantly. In 2017, 16 per cent more than in 2016 received asylum permits and humanitarian protection, the main countries of origin concerned being Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In comparison with the European Union average, the negative decision rate for asylum in Italy is lower (Istat, 2017–2018; Country factsheet: Italy 2016 European Migration Network). An analysis of labour market development shows a decline in the young working-age group: While in 1991 this represented 70 per cent, in 2007 it was only 62 per cent.6 This stands in contrast to Greece, Portugal and Spain where the percentage of this working-age group is constantly increasing. The majority (55 per cent) of immigrants are females in the age group 45–59, compared to Spain and Portugal where the majority is male and in Greece where females make up 51 per cent of the share. Italian immigrants tend to be very young (19 per cent are 0–14 years old) in contrast to Spain with only 14 per cent. The increase in second-generation immigrants and formation of families shows that Italy is at an advanced stage of the immigration process (Baldwin-Edwards, 2012, p. 150). To sum up, there are “three significant features of immigration in Italy: rapid inflow, substantial volume and a high proportion of undocumented immigrants” (Zancone, 2011, p. 247).

Political Climate (Change) and Immigration Policies In the early days of the formulation of immigration policy, there was a consensus “among political actors” regarding immigration and their “point of view of labour relations” (Castelli, 2016, p. 62). The first immigration law in 1986 implied a control system and focused on the “employment of foreign workers to Italy” (Castelli, 2016, p. 63). “The first immigration law approved in Italy, as a parliamentary initiative, and which ended an embarrassing legislative silence unparalleled in the receiving countries of Europe, was Law 943 (officially published on 30 December 1986), entitled ‘Legislation concerning the employment and treatment of extra-communitarian immigrants and against clandestine

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immigration’”, (Allievi, 2014, p. 726). The hidden agenda was twofold: (a) all immigrants from outside Europe were referred to as “extracommunitarian”; (b) legal measures were stipulated only in relation to their aspects concerning the labour market: immigrants were perceived as work force and all other human needs were either neglected or not specified under this legislative initiative (Allievi, 2010). “In a nutshell, immigrants were seen merely as labour force but enjoyed equal rights to Italians in terms of welfare provisions, language learning was promoted and the preservation of first culture and language for second generations was enforced” (Zincone, 2011, pp. 262–263). Parallel to this national scenario, Italy launched its cooperation with the Arab region: In terms of international relations, Italy’s reaction to the Arab sanctions in the oil crisis of the 70’s was characterized by mediation while at the same time being driven by national interests. The Italian government established direct contacts with oil-producing countries and gained agreements, for example with Saudi Arabia7 and Libya, to increase oil imports in exchange for Italian technical, scientific and industrial investments and presence. “In the stipulation of the bilateral agreements, ENI should have a decisive role strictly linked to the increase and maintenance of a suitable national energy supply” (Labbate, 2013, p. 74). Returning to domestic policy, however, in the 1980’s, after a period of mobilization and agency work by charity organizations, the Catholic church and trade unions, a public spirit of solidarity gained ground. This occurred as a result of dramatic episodes of violence against immigrants (Allievi, 2014). Thus, the second legislative initiatives on immigration in the late 1980s were the consequence of a quite different situation and were passed under an emergency logic (Allievi, 2014). The socalled Martelli Decree (Decreto Legge 416, 30 December 1989 which became Law 39, on 28 February 1990) put the debate about the presence of immigrants in Italy on a different footing. This ex-post legal initiative called “sanatoria” (amnesty or regularization), which is typical in Italy for grey areas, allowed illegal immigrants to attain legal status without sanctions and thus lead to a total of 217,700 regularizations. Another “sanatoria” was passed 5 years later and resulted in 246,000 regularizing their position, and again 3 years later in 217,000 with “regularizations”.8 “It should be noted that Italy, with its annual quota system for the admission of foreigners for reasons related to work, and not only seasonal or highly skilled work, is more open to immigration than most

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European Union countries. But the labour market (firms and families), with its workforce demand, has exceeded the conservative forecasts for the recruitment of foreign workers each year, forcing lawmakers to realign legislation retrospectively to match actual market dynamics” (Ambrosini, 2013, p. 177). In the late 1990s there was a change in immigration policy, which was regulated by the “Turco-Napolitano law” (1998) and transposed by the first government of Prodi, in power after the elections of 1996. The government “[…] started the first serious attempt to build a non-emergency legislative framework concerning immigration in Italy” (Allievi, 2014). The “Turco-Napolitano law” provided general principles of immigration policies (Art. 1.1), rights and obligations for foreigners (Art. 1.2), legal provisions of entry, stay and repatriation (Art. 2, 1–9), border control and government action against illegal immigration (Art. 2, 10–17). It contained further provisions on humanitarian aid (Art. 2, 18–20), regulations of employment (Art. 2, 21–22), family reunion (Art. 2, 28–33), health promotion, social integration, intercultural education and the creation of reception centres (Friese, 2014, p. 54). This law is, to date, the main piece of legislation for the regularization of immigrants. The law addressed legal immigrants as persons and potential citizens and thus moved away from the former orientation towards human work force. Immigrants were made almost equal to nationals in terms of social rights (Art. 41). Finances were committed to this political approach with the establishment of the National Fund for Migration Policies (Fondo Nazionale per le Politiche Migratorie, Art. 45). Moreover, access to public education was ensured (Art. 38, Para. 1) and a large share of public health care to undocumented immigrants (Art. 35, Para. 3) (Zincone, 2011, p. 266). At the same time, repressive measures had to be introduced in order to comply with the Schengen agreement and to reinforce border controls against illegal immigration. “The most significant repressive measures consisted of the possibility of holding undocumented immigrants in special ‘temporary detention centres’ for up to 30 days (Art. 14) in order to identify and possibly repatriate them” (Zincone, 2011, p. 267). On an international agenda under this centre-left government Italy became characterized by an increasing propensity to hold dialogues Libya, Iran, Iraq. Italy’s initiatives “appear to be anchored in a more organic and coherent vision of national interests in the Mediterranean, and an independent pursuit of those interests, without conflicting with western allies”

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(Guazzone, 2000, p. 433). For example, Italy assumed the role as key mediator between Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East in the Gulf war at the beginning of the 1990s. This stance, however, was changed radically as a consequence of the change of government. The centre-left coalition was challenged by opposition parties on the subject of illegal migration. The Italian centre-right called for stricter controls and supported the criminalization of illegal immigration. It becomes evident that the centre-right used this issue felt by the public as a strategic sleight of hand. The population’s general views on immigration were characterized by a tenor of refusal which politically lead to the success of the “Lega Nord” of Umberto Bossi and the “Alleanza Nazionale”, the traditional right-wing party of Gianfranco Fini, as well as the new right-wing party named “Forza Italia”, created by Silvio Berlusconi. Foreign media referred to the Italian right as typical in its religious intolerance and xenophobic aggression, and its massive use of anti-immigrant language (Bolaffi, 2001). After the right-wing coalition in 2001 under Prime Minister Berlusconi came to power again, after a short period of governance in 1994–1995, a stronger discourse on security was employed, assigning to immigrants the role of scapegoats. Immigration was to be regulated through “professional qualifications and the knowledge of the Italian culture” (Castelli, 2016, p. 63). The so-called “Bossi-Fini law” (Law 189, of 30 July 2002) brought further tightening of regulations regarding language learning, social inclusion and the cultural exchange with the Italian population through surveillance and control (Friese, 2014, p. 165). Immigrants were again treated as guest workers and the most significant measures of the law consisted of “an increase to a three-year legal residence requirement before being entitled to family reunification and preservation of the ten-year period of residence before non-EU citizens could apply for naturalization” (Zincone, 2011, p. 270). Moreover, the law was intended to eliminate irregular immigration. Residence permits were linked directly and exclusively to a regular job. This, however, meant that all immigrants without a fixed job lost the right to obtain legal residence status. Thus, the Bossi-Fini law increased the number of irregular immigrants in the country with the paradox of producing irregularity via the legislation itself. This has been defined as the Italian immigration schizophrenia, paired with an “invasion paranoia” (Pastore, 2009). As a consequence, the number of imprisonments of clandestine immigrants rose dramatically, it being estimated that more than 10,000 people were involved. The

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intention of this legal initiative was primarily ideological as there were no considerations of emerging social and cultural issues or reflections on a multicultural Italy in a state of change. The media (many private channels are in the hand of far-right-xenophobic parties) and xenophobic parties have openly promoted an anti-Islamic discourse so that within the Europe Union Italy clearly stands out. “Faced with the widespread use of a workforce of regular and irregular immigrants, in families and enterprises of the urban economy, the prevailing opinion rejects the idea of giving a place to immigration in the nation’s social organization, and this position is strengthened by political forces and media that reflect and exacerbate the reaction” (Ambrosini, 2013, p. 175). On an international level, the good relations which had been established with the countries of the Maghreb and the Arab Islamic world in general were spoilt due to the anti-Muslim policy of Berlusconi’s alliance and the alignment to hardline politics by the Bush-administration following post-9/11 scenarios (Coraluzzo, 2008, pp. 117–118). The claim of the Premier Berlusconi who “praised Western civilization today as superior to that of the Islamic world” (New York Times, 2001, para. 1) certainly was not very helpful. From his point of view the West “is bound to occidentalize and conquer new people […]. It has done it with the Communist world and part of the Islamic world, but unfortunately, a part of the Islamic world is 1,400 years behind”. In 2006 elections, the centre-left majority returned to power for a brief period with a small and very weak majority. The Prodi government (2006–2008) tried to re-establish Italy’s position in the Mediterranean, building on its historical vocation, and to establish Europe as a natural terrain redefining the links with the United States as equal but loyal (Caffarena, 2007, p. 192). The aim was to tie in the historical good relations with the Arab world in the light of the imbalanced international situation. Under Prodi’s government another sanatoria was passed and 350,000 migrants regularized (Zincone, 2011, p. 248). The short-lived comeback of Berlusconi 2008–2011 ended due to an economic crisis, the consequent depression and the far-reaching international discrediting of the government coalition, and Silvio Berlusconi was forced to resign in 2011. Between 2011 and 2013 Mario Monti served as Prime Minister of Italy, having been appointed by Italian President Giorgio Napolitano to lead a government of technocrats in this critical period. Mario Monti followed a political agenda of change: immigration laws were reformed granting more rights to immigrants combined

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with wider access to Italian citizenship, particularly for the second generations. Following the government of Mario Monti, a coalition government of Enrico Letta (April 2013), that included both centre-right (“Popolo della Libertà”, Berlusconi’s party) and the Democratic Party as well as “Scelta Civica”, the former prime minister Monti’s new party, did not take any new initiatives, although it did take the highly symbolic decision— not without opposition—to appoint Cécile Kyenge, a doctor born in Congo, as the Minister for Integration (cf. Hawthorne, 2017). Interestingly, under the government of Silvio Berlusconi nobody was appointed as minister for integration which was, in itself, a strong message. Berlusconi refused the idea of Italy becoming a multi-ethnic country and his political partner Bossi affirmed: “In my mind, immigrants represent only a negative resource” (Zincone, 2011, p. 277). Monti and Letta both, instead, represented a symbolic will to change integration policies compared to the previous governments of Berlusconi (Allievi, 2014, pp. 726–729). There then followed, however, a change towards hardline policies with regard to immigrant issues. The immigration laws under the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini, a hardline Eurosceptic politician from the Lega Nord party and the coalition party “Movimento 5 Stelle”(June 2018–September 2019), which was been declared as a “Security and Immigration Law”, Legislative Decree n. 113, adopted in October 2018, proposed the restriction of humanitarian aid and protection, the limitation of asylum rights, the reduction of contributions for SPRAR-projects (the national asylum program) and fewer rights for migrants to name just a few elements (SPRAR, Ministero dell’ Interno). This “take-no-prisoners approach” makes the anti-immigrant rhetoric evident and represents in itself a simple repetition of the right-wing agenda proclaimed by Berlusconi in 2001. The pro-European government in charge from September 2019 until January 2021 constituted a coalition between the Five Star Movement (M5S) and centre-left Democratic Party (PD) along with the leftist parliamentary group Free and Equal(LeU). It adopted a more moderate approach: the immigration issue was far less evident on the news agenda than it had been under the previous government where it had served the populist agenda. What emerged is a pattern of policy making which involved negotiating permanently between centre-right and centre-left. And it was this struggle among other issues that brought the political area of the cabinet Conte II to an end. As of March 2021, a new technocratled government took over: the former president of the European Central

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Bank, Draghi is the new prime minister at the head of a unity government called on to confront the coronavirus crisis and economic slump. The cabinet is composed of tecnocrats and politicians and supported by all parties in the parliament except for the right-wing Brothers of Italy (FdI) group. It is expected that issues around the pandemic such as health care and economic crisis will be on the forefront of the political agenda while immigration will not be the main concern. In general terms, however, issues of employment and immigration are interconnected and thus politicians will have to consider it as well. “Decision-makers in Italy have had to find a middle ground, striking a balance between the public demand for control over illegal immigration and reduced inflows, on the one hand, and employers’ pressure to regularize undocumented immigrants and open the borders to immigrant labour, on the other hand. Different inputs produce these contradictory outputs. Insufficiently controlled or hyper-regulated inflows encourage further irregular inflows. Repeated amnesties aimed to remedy the large strata of irregular, albeit employed, immigrants are a magnet for further irregular inflows” (Zincone, 2011, p. 249). The huge sector of the informal economy triggered illegal immigration with people entering clandestinely or on a tourist visa and then hiding in the shadow economy until they found a way to legalize their position.9

The Muslim (Immigrant) Population in Italy Although the presence of Islam is not exactly a new phenomenon in Italy and it would be more precise to speak about a return—although obviously under other circumstances—it is nowadays linked to immigration and, from a sociological, point of view can therefore be considered “new”. In contrast to other European countries there was no military conquest of territories linked to the Muslim faith such as in the Austrian Empire and Germany which receive many immigrants from Turkey. Also, historically there has only ever been a small percentage of immigrants from Asian countries. As outlined earlier, unlike other European countries such as France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal, Italy does not have much immigration from former colonies, there being only some Somalis and a very low number of Libyans. In the 1970s Islam was firstly promoted by the Union of Muslim Students in Italy (USMI) for a small number of elite students from the Middle East (Syria, Jordan and, in many cases, Palestinians). This is quite

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unique in Europe as the massive influx of immigrant workers of Muslim faith followed later (Mantovan, 2013). According to statistical data from 2012, Muslims represent 26.3 per cent of religious affiliation in Italy, and is the second most important religion in the country after Christianity. In 2019, 1.6 million Muslims lived in Italy (Statista, 2020). Castelli Gattinara (2016, p. 7) in an analysis of the migrant communities in the cities of Milan, Rome and Prato, 3 major immigrant destinations in the centre-north of the country, revealed that “Muslim immigrants represent about 40 per cent of the total number of foreign residents in the city of Milan and the presence of Muslims in the streets during Friday prayers has been one of the main sources of conflict between neighbourhood organizations and migrant communities in Europe”. There are many Muslim communities in Italy, with various countries of origin. The last wave of immigration, both legal and illegal, comprised people from the Maghreb nations and some other Muslim countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Albania, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The main Muslim countries represented are Morocco with 34.8 per cent, followed by Albania (15.3 per cent) and Tunisia (8.3 per cent). Other origin countries of Muslim immigrants in Italy are Senegal, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Algeria, Bosnia, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iran, Nigeria, Turkey and others. This shows the variety and plurality of Islam in Italy. Although in the public debate unity of the diaspora is often assumed,10 Muslims in Italy cannot be reduced to a single universal condition (Ajala, 2014, 131)11 : it goes without saying that the Muslim faith in Italy is extremely multi-faceted and diverse as the Muslim community in Italy is composed of people from various origins and thus follows different legal schools. It is difficult to obtain data about organized and private worship, but it is obvious that the needs of immigrants are diverse. Muslim migration to Italy raises questions on religious visibility and cultural and political reactions (Allievi, 2003). Correspondingly, the institutionalization of Islam in Italy unfolds relatively quickly; political movements, intellectual production, establishment of transnational power lines etc. are being developed. “Everything exists but everything is still at a relatively fragile state of organization. Different actors are fighting for the leadership, but it is still unclear what will be the final result of this match” (Allievi, 2003, pp. 143–145).

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Since the events of 2001 and the terrorist attacks in Europe the identity construction of Muslim immigrants has been at the centre of the attention of public debate concerning immigration issues. The difficulties in defining Muslim identity in relation to “Western” identity in a society where Islam is a minority religion is a complex process of selfdefinition and external constructions of otherness, determined by the perception and performance of Islam in public and private (Allievi, 2003; Pepicelli, 2017, p. 62f). The question, however, reaches beyond national border and also concerns the governments of Arab sending countries. While remittances are a fundamental pillar of local economies, the aim of optimizing the economic benefits drawn from emigrants often implies identification with the culture of origin. It goes without saying that the idea of sharing prosperity but not identity with host societies runs counter for efforts aimed at integration. The Orientalist discourse dominates current representations of Islam in Italy and in Europe in general (Topolski, 2018a, b). The racist discourse, which has been linked to the political climate, posits Muslims and immigrants in general as scapegoats for economic and social problems and is used to promote strategies of exclusion and discrimination. Among the numerous victims of racist violence in Italy, only a few that have gained public attention shall be mentioned here. In 2016, Emmanuel Chidi Nnamdi, a 36-year-old Nigerian asylum seeker who had fled Boko Haram and crossed the Mediterranean via Libya, was beaten to death in a small town in southern Italy by Amedeo Mancini, an Italian soccer player; likewise in 2008 Abdul Guibre a 19-year-old Burkinabe in Milan and, in 2011, Samb Modou and Diop Mor, two Senegalese migrants in Florence (Hawthorne, 2017). “Alongside this denial of racism in Italy (which functions by way of bounded geographical comparisons and a methodological nationalism that presumes nations to be hermetically sealed units) are equally common assertions about Italy’s status as a ‘meticcia’ or hybrid/mixed, Mediterranean nation—particularly among white leftists” (Hawthorne, 2017, p. 165). This so-called hype of hybridity in Italy is “a subtle form of nationalism and colonial nostalgia”. However, these “territorial lines, both cultural and physical, hardened into true borders to be crossed in the re-defining of us or culturally ‘othered’ individuals” (Bassam Tibi in an interview with Meyer and Schmidt, 2006) have to be challenged and considered in the integration model currently in place.

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The Integration Model(s) in Italy The “absence of traditions of immigration management” (BaldwinEdwards, 2012, p. 151) led to the fact that until today “policies for the integration of migrants are poorly developed in Southern Europe” (Baldwin-Edwards, 2012, p. 152). As noted earlier, in Italy there have been several instances of post hoc regularization, periods of innovative measures and openness during centre-left governments and an inclination towards restrictionism under the rule of centre-right governments. “Since 1986, Italy had adopted a policy of planned inflows meant, in principle, to manage immigration” which in the following decades has been pulled between the objectives of centre-right and centre-left governments in power (Zincone, 2011, p. 248). Migratory policies follow two directions: first, the immigration policies, regulating entry, stay, expulsion, policing and border control; and second, policies with a focus on the integration of immigrants. The Italian migration policy distinguishes between refugees, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. The acquisition of Italian citizenship depends on legal residence, which differs from 10 years for non-EU citizens, 5 years for political refugees, 4 years for EU-citizens and 3 years for descendants of Italian citizens by birth (Ministero dell’Interno, 2016). The prevailing mode of acquiring citizenship is jus sanguinis enforced in Italy and already introduced in the first Italian Civil code of 1865 (Zincone, 2011, p. 252). While the European Union’s citizenship ensures free mobility, the mobility of non-European citizens is limited. Friese (2014, p. 118) refers to this fact as a “postcolonial European border regime”. Some strategies of the regulation and control of mobility are, according to Friese (2014, p. 119): a) the shift and externalization of borders; and b) at the same time their extensive and total control. Due to the enlargement of the EU an increase in the scale of immigration from the new-member states led to major changes in immigration flows also in Italy. “In contrast to the past, new migrant flows from the region tend to be male and strongly work-oriented, with labour migrants the vast majority of the total flow. They are also young and relatively well-educated” (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015, p. 35). “Hundreds of thousands of ‘new Europeans’ departed on their migration journeys looking for better jobs and living conditions. The structure of the process shows that recent intra-European migration is mostly demand-driven. Migrants are filling gaps in highly segmented labour markets, and overall the receiving countries benefit more than

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the sending countries” (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2015, pp. 36–37). Relations with former European colonial countries are strengthened while pressure is growing on these countries. The undocumented emigration in the Maghreb states is criminalized and has been punishable by criminal law since 2003 in Morocco, 2008 in Algeria and since 2004 in Tunisia, with Italy and Tunisia also having a repatriation agreement (Friese, 2014, p. 126). Many laws have dealt with immigration, but they have all failed to tackle the cultural and religious impact of the presence of immigrant populations. The needs of immigrants in Italy are diverse and spring from their different areas of origin, religions, levels of education, knowledge of the Italian language, age and stages in the stabilization process. Italy is characterized by an extreme multi-ethnicity, with a mosaic of languages, cultures, religions and ethnic group as has been outlined in Sect. 4 “The migration phenomenon: A historical overview”. Key influencers for the implementation of bottom-up initiatives at the regional level and the consequent social legitimation of immigrants especially in the 1980s were the Catholic Church, Caritas and other NGOs (Caponio, 2013). As outlined in Sect. 3, “Political climate (change) and immigration policies”, in Italy policies for immigrant welfare and social integration have been promoted, although they seem to vary from region to region and are somewhat uncoordinated. The “phenomenon shows marked regional and occupational concentrations. Whereas in most developed economies it is highly concentrated in cities, in Italy it is widespread in the center-north provinces” (Ambrosini, 2013, p. 190). Thus, the integration of immigrants depends also on the status of each region and also on the percentage of immigrants in each region as their distribution is rather uneven with a concentration in northern regions, e.g. in Lombardy nearly 25 per cent of all immigrants are registered. “Friuli, Val d’Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige are, under Constitutional Law, regions which are granted a special statute; that means also that most of taxation remains there” (Celi & Viti, 2018, p. 35). With the self-ruling powers of these regions an adaptation of immigration policies can be observed: The Province of Bolzano, on the border with Austria, offers a wide range of services to immigrants such as language courses mainly in Italian constituting one of the three official languages of the province. Likewise, the region Friuli-Venezia Giulia, on the border with Austria and Slovenia, is known for the successful implementation of its model of integration. In contrast to other special statute regions, Sicily and Sardinia, whose rural

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areas in the central regions are among the poorest in the country, lack proper implementation of integration policies. A comparison of Bologna, Naples and Milan has revealed that in the first two cities the implementation of cultural mediation in municipal immigration has facilitated a public discourse towards cultural recognition (Caponio, 2013). This socalled “reasonable integration” model is based on bottom-up approaches aimed at soft recognition and practical accommodation (De Zwart, 2005) whereas public recognition in general is often neglected. Thus, these two contrasting approaches determine Italian migration politics. Caponio (2013, p. 230) refers to this as “Multiculturalism Italian style” or “multiculturalism of convenience”, where the recognition of cultural difference is subject to the condition of usefulness. Cultural recognition is limited: “First, they do not imply any inclusion or participation of immigrant associations in policymaking or, at a local level, in service delivery. Second, they do not explicitly allow for the expression of cultural difference in the public space” (Caponio, 2013, p. 231). The opposing trends in Italian immigrant integration policy have led to an “Italian model” that includes a number of problems and contradictions (cf. King & DeBono, 2013). First, a tightly controlled entry system is impossible to implement due to the difficulty of controlling national borders. Second, Italy’s conceptualization of multiculturalism is based on shifting notions of culture and ethnicity. Third, immigrants are not granted rapid access to citizenship and other formal rights. Fourth, entry policy: certain immigrant groups are more welcome pointing to a common value system or economic reasons (south–north immigration is seen as a challenge or rather a problem). Fifth, cultural, educational and social needs of immigrants are yet to be addressed parallel to economic needs. Sixth, the development of multicultural and multi-ethnic societies in an anti-discriminatory sense needs to form the basis of policy measures. According to an analysis by Ambrosini (2013) the migration models proposed in earlier research such as the Mediterranean migration model or the Southern European model put forward by Baldwin-Edwards and Arango (1999), King and Black (1997) and King and RibasMateos (2002) have to be reconceptualized. The process of immigration throughout southern Europe or even within Italy cannot be described as homogeneous. This is related to regional concentrations of immigrants in center-north provinces where high employment rates prevail and to provincial differences in dealing with the phenomenon. Ambrosini (2013, p. 190), therefore, suggests that “one can find several types of

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migration and, if one will, several models of integration, linked to the industrial districts, to the metropolitan areas and to the agricultural and tourist industry areas which in turn are differentiated by varying levels of institutional regulation”.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that Italy is a relatively new immigration destination and the phenomenon is a hotly contested issue. Throughout Italy, measures and public attitudes towards different types of migration policies are divided. A political climate of radicalization can be observed in Italy and throughout Europe, which clearly hinders the implementation of a “reasonable integration model” that would enable the full inclusion of new citizens. The Italian state faces a number of challenges with huge pressure from the European Economic and Monetary Union (Tsareva, 2014). The definition of the framework of national immigration policy by the EU encounters opposition from right-wing movements which oppose the idea of external involvement in “national affairs” (Garcés-Mascarenas & Penninx, 2016). “A profound sense of gloom permeates Italy today— from the withering welfare state to the explosion of virulent far-right racisms, from unemployment and the increasing flexibilization of labour to the horror of unrelenting migrant deaths at sea. There is a palpable sense of being in the midst of Gramsci’s ‘time of monsters’, when an old world is crumbling but a new one has yet to be realized” (Hawthorne, 2017, p. 167). The question of how immigrants can be successfully integrated into society has been addressed differently depending on the prevalent political spirit. Different local initiatives have adopted innovative approaches and the diverse provinces have responded to the question according to their potential. To what extent these local practices can be developed into alternative models and replace the prevailing radicalized discourse on immigrant groups’ difference has yet to be determined. It is a fact that “Italian society, as a result of tensions between markets, politics and culture on the issue of immigration, is facing a dilemma: how to reconcile interests and feelings, head and heart, individuals and communities: how to rebuild sufficient social cohesion in a society that is increasingly differentiated and heterogeneous” (Ambrosini, 2011, p. 175).

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Notes 1. Significant supporters of this policy were: Enrico Mattei, Amintore Fanfani, Aldo Moro, Giulio Andreotti, Bettino Craxi and Massimo D’Alema (cf. Coralluzzo, 2008). 2. Being Italian; the Italian way of life. 3. Immigrants from Eritrea with 13.3 per cent occupy the thirty-ninth position, with 8.5 per cent Ethiopian immigrants are in forty-ninth position and Somalians with 8.1 per cent, fiftieth, and Libya with1.5 per cent ninety-fourth (Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2019, Caritas-Migrantes). 4. See King & DeBono (2013) 5. The Italian case contrasts with the situation in Germany where recruitment for labour was part of the immigration policy (See Chapter 7: The Integration of Muslim Turks in Germany: Resource Mobilization and the Institutional Framework of Islam, by Menna Taher). 6. There is a huge gap between central and northern regions and the south: only 29 per cent of the labour force reside in the south (See IGIER Bocconi, 2017). 7. Through a personal visit of the principal capitals of the Middle East in 1974, the Christian Democratic Minister Moro established new forms of economic co-operation with the Saudi Oil Minister and the Algerian Energy Minister while assuring a favourable Italian attitude in support of Arab appeals on the controversial issue of the return of the Arab territories (cf. Labbate, 2013, 74). 8. Minor regularizations were adopted in 1977, 1982 and 1986. In 2009 mass regularizations of over 300,000 caregivers and domestic workers followed (Zincone, 2011). 9. For example, more than 700,000 applications for regularization were received from undocumented aliens following the enactment of the Bossi-Fini law of September 2002. 10. As Bassam Tibi, the influential Syrian-German political scientist, argues: “The West, for example, is uniquely Western on the one hand, but culturally multi-faceted on the other” (Tibi, 2000, 6). 11. According to Said (1978), this homogenization and reduction of the other is the basis of antisemitism, Orientalism and Islamophobia that can be found in Europe and in the media.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion Annemarie Profanter and Elena Maestri

The economic success of many European states in the twentieth century is closely linked to immigration. The recent history of immigration is characterised by labour immigrants from neighbouring countries, mainly young males who migrated temporarily in search of work and higher wages, primarily to support their families back home through remittances. While their migration project, e.g. temporariness of stay, and visibility in public places, e.g. due to family reunification, has changed dramatically since the 70s, the challenges of social and cultural integration became virulent and, alongside these, questions of integration of Muslim immigrants into secular Europe emerged. The representations of “Islam in Europe became a cause of anxiety: the mushrooming of mosques, women’s veils and new religious fervour” (Khader, 2015). Although there are several categories of European Muslims such as indigenous Muslims

A. Profanter (B) Faculty of Education, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Brixen, Bolzano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] E. Maestri Dipartimento Di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0_9

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who have lived in Europe for centuries or members of the Commonwealth in the UK, citizens of ex-colonies such as Algerians in France, second generations, asylum seekers and refugees, the central theme of concern has been focussed on that one category alongside attempts to adopt defensive and protective policies in the Mediterranean. As the migratory crisis in Europe has become more virulent there has been an ongoing debate on which model(s) of integration would have the greatest success in terms of integration of Muslim immigrants. Social and political movements of the right successfully linked the rise of immigration flows with issues on the international agenda such as terrorism and the rise in Islamic fundamentalism, stirring up Islamophobia. Thus, the ideal goal in relation to Muslim immigrants and children with a migration background in Europe is to make most of them part of knowledgebased societies. Theory and practice should intertwine to define networks involving multifarious skills and energies. In the light of these developments, which affected relationships with the countries of the Maghreb, the question arose as to which patterns can be found in Europe and beyond in order to rise to the challenges of ongoing migration flows. The patterns to be found in the individual countries of the management of cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic and other diversity are not straightforward and there is a danger of jumping to simplified representations (Choquet, 2017). Thus, the approach adopted for this book was an in-depth analysis of selected case studies: At the end of this collective and interdisciplinary study, it is quite clear that religious differences tend to become more problematic when they are associated with social marginalisation. The ‘Islam factor’ must be understood in its complexity, in order to define better policies related to the ethics of hosting migrants from Muslim countries. Islam can certainly be lived as an intimate religious faith by a migrant, but it often continues to affect migrants’ way of life and their children in host countries as a comprehensive system, depending on the Muslim migrants’ heterogeneous cultural background and giving them various motivations to leave their country of origin. Enhancing awareness of the geography of Islam and of its different ideological and juridical dimensions is identified as a necessary step in order to help European civil societies and institutions develop the constructive potential of the religious factor as opposed to its disruptive one. Therefore, the European fantasy of one Muslim community needs to be dissolved.

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The role of education comes to the fore in teaching respect for religious pluralism among both the European hosts and the Muslim ‘hosted people’. Religious pluralism per se is not something new to Europe. The problem is rather the image that most Europeans receive of Islam through some Muslim immigrants, clergy and scholars, who propose their view and ‘way of life’ as the essence of Islam to the eyes of ‘the other’. False notions often nourish misunderstanding and conflicts: Eastern history and cultures are generally neglected in courses on world history in European schools and universities, where only specialised courses are dedicated to the study of non-Western civilisations. Arab and non-Arab Muslim cultures are no exception within this framework. On the other hand, some intellectuals in Muslim countries replicate a similar approach when contributing to defining curricula, which means that prejudice has affected the way history has been taught for several decades in the regions of origin. Non-verified information both on Western and other Muslim cultures has slowly lead to the creation of a series of rifts with the West and within the Muslim world itself. A revision of history and cultural textbooks should be an objective of importance in joint efforts to bridge the existing gaps. A conceptual framework of new strategies aimed at enhancing a sense of belonging in the countries and areas under investigation is outlined in this work, trying to invent a new model of inclusion, which cannot ignore, as a pre-requisite, the need to build solid cooperation in education and culture with and within the Muslim world. Without such a pre-requisite, any integration effort could end up being perceived by the same Muslim immigrants as a threat to their identity. The British integration pattern and its multiculturalism have not prevented many Pakistanis from feeling a sense of exclusion and discrimination in the UK. There is a growing awareness in the UK of the need to strengthen social cohesion through the development of a common shared identity, language and values. The UAE case, on the contrary, shows that the ‘sense of home’ can exist in a host Muslim country, despite the fact that it is marked by rigorous rules of circular migration, excluding migrants from any integration pattern. Such a ‘sense of home’ has, no doubt, been nourished by programmes and courses in schools attended by the children of immigrants in the UAE, which once again relates back to the crucial role of education in host countries.

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Our surveys indicate that a re-thought multilateral approach is needed in order to bridge the gap between Muslim identities and European citizenship schemes. The necessary coordination between Europe and the educational, economic and financial institutions of neighbouring Muslim countries is to be developed further, with a specific focus on generational dynamics. Co-development schemes, such as the ones promoted with Morocco, seem to be quite promising initiatives in this sense, and have been emerging to include the diaspora in the destination countries and productive use of remittances in the origin country in order to manage migration as a beneficial ‘circular phenomenon’. However, despite some initiatives of civil society activism and indicators of a policy shift, as well as regularisation efforts, integration actions are generally very slow and migrants continue to live in marginalisation and exclusion, mainly in terms of legislative regularisation, employment, education and healthcare. And yet, when we look at the gated territories of Ceuta and Melilla, we realise how difficult it is to conceive solid plans to address the huge challenges of European cities marked by rising Muslim populations. These two Spanish urban contexts are still very far from the implementation of strategies aimed at constructive co-existence capable of involving the growing Spanish Muslim population, on the one hand, and the Spanish inhabitants with a Christian cultural background, on the other. ‘Perceived and real boundaries’ make integration a mere chimera. The issue of the veil in Spain is a clear example of these boundaries: it is often associated with ‘intersectional discrimination’, as it becomes a field of contestation. Historical, political and social factors affect the meanings of symbols, like the woman’s veil, which may be related either to Muslim cultural identity and tradition, or a specific ideological Islamist position. The same symbols can easily intertwine here, as in other European contexts, with the debates on prioritised rights, on the preservation of secularism and on original identity values. The case of the Turks in Germany well exemplifies the highly symbolic dimension assumed by the veil: citizens having a Turkish cultural background often look at the headscarf as a way to assert both an Islamic Turkish identity and an effort to oppose integration as it is conceived by Germany, namely without any change in the ‘secular cultural identity’. The great numbers of Turkish immigrants, whose children now have German passports, while looking back at their origin country, have been facing a changing political environment since the beginning of the new century, which no doubt has given unprecedented emphasis to the

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‘Islamic identity’, alongside the ‘ethnic Turkish identity’. The ensuing ‘identity crisis’ has been affected by a top-down approach assumed both by Turkey and Germany when dealing with Turkish communities in this part of Europe. All of this has led either to assimilation of some or to alienation of a rising majority. Considering the assimilationist tradition in Germany, the pragmatic recognition of diversity in the territory has been a recent principle of the integration strategy adopted. Against this backdrop, we can argue that most integration strategies have simply failed because the institutionalised dialogue with Muslim representatives, like that promoted within the German Islam Conference, did not actually contribute to addressing either the issues of human development within most Muslim immigrant communities or those of social justice with regard to these same communities. Institutional integration of Islam remains quite a vague goal, for example through involving universities in the training of Imams, given all the differences among Muslims, which raises again the question we asked ourselves at the beginning of this work: which Islam? Thus, we believe that a more comprehensive process should be re-started by refusing the rhetoric of ‘integration as regulation’ and by going beyond the concept of ethnocultural national identity. Although in Germany the concept of assimilation has been replaced by the term integration, a certain degree of acculturation is implied as it relates to the acquisition of the official language and of cultural values. However, integration in its original sense is a mutual movement that concerns the so-called host society as much as the immigrants. Further cooperation and dialogue between origin and destination countries and cultures are needed, of course, but this does not simply mean top-down initiatives at the political, economic and cultural levels. Bottom-up initiatives become crucial when they can contribute to assisting communities with different cultural and religious backgrounds to be woven into the fabric of European societies. Destination countries will be enriched by positive values of the migrants’ cultural background, if a ‘sense of belonging’ emerges among them, and above all among their children, through educational programmes founded both on quality and accessibility. Identity in Italy is portrayed as being predominantly linked to the Catholic church and religion being deeply embedded in the society. The society is based on a “Catholic model of secularism where religion forms the cultural basis of the nation’s identity” (Frisina, 2011, p. 272). This exclusionary, ethnic idea of Italianness itself creates exclusion and marginalisation and is being called into question (Frisina, 2010). In Islam

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the separation of religion and politics has often been questioned and, thus, Muslim citizens and Muslim immigrants have to negotiate their (hybrid) identities “by articulating discourses that resist the political use of secularism” (Evolvi, 2017, p. 222) challenging the idea that Islam in Italy is monolithic and homogeneous. The recognition of the right to be different and of the right/duty to learn about the original cultural values of the host countries demands an unprecedented ability to adapt in a flexible way, if we want to see a new pattern of co-existence with Muslim communities emerge in Europe, given the limited results of the integration and assimilation processes in most European contexts to date. The essential value of complementarity between institutions and organisations, between states and civil societies, public and private sectors sheds light on the possible emergence of a new pattern founded on an intercultural approach, in which the role of the state is crucial, but cannot be the only one. “Research on the integration of immigrants in Europe has turned into discussions about the success or failure of traditional integration policies on one hand, and on the legitimacy of claims made by ethnic minorities on the other, particularly when these claims are made by Muslims” (Bertossi, 2011, p. 3). These discussions have at the same time questioned, “the relevance of a category (‘Muslims’) that is used in and is the subject of political debates” (Bertossi, 2011, p. 4). Although criticism has arisen over the explanatory value of national integration models (Bertossi, 2011) they can be useful in comparing the construction of comprehensive national analytical frameworks and how they themselves contribute to the framing of concepts such as inclusion, identity and equality. Managing interculturalism is a huge challenge but it cannot be separated from the concept of a new pattern of constructive co-existence in our European societies, a pattern able to prevent those crises that have been emerging when efforts to either manage or manipulate Islam have involved host countries and hosted communities. Different energies and cultures can merge to ‘create unity in diversity’, but there is still a long way to go. Our hope is that this volume has provided some ideas to help take a few steps towards new synergies and more inclusive societies.

Bibliography Bertossi, C. (2011). National models of integration in Europe: A comparative and critical analysis. American Behavioral Scientist, 55(12), 1561–1580.

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Choquet, S. (2017). Models of integration in Europe. Fondation Robert Schuman. European Issues. Evolvi, G. (2017). Hybrid Muslim identities in digital space: The Italian blog Yalla. Social Compass, 64(2), 220–232. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ pdf/10.1177/0037768617697911. Accessed 29 November 2020. Frisina, A. (2010). Young Muslims’ everyday tactics and strategies: resisting islamophobia, negotiating Italianness, becoming citizens. Journal of intercultural studies, 31(5), 557–572. Frisina, A. (2011). The making of religious pluralism in Italy: Discussing religious education from a new generational perspective. Social Compass, 58(2), 271– 284. Khader, B. (2015). Muslims in Europe: The construction of a “problem”. In The search for Europe. Contrasting approaches. BBVA. https://www.bbv aopenmind.com/en/articles/muslims-in-europe-the-construction-of-a-pro blem/. Accessed 20 December 2020.

Index

A Aberchan, Mustafa, 151 Afghanistan, 27 Africa, 2, 3, 13, 17, 24, 30, 47, 49, 93, 97–99, 110, 113, 116, 120, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 156, 251, 253, 254, 258 Agadir, 100 Alal, Abdelkrim, 146 Albania, 255, 262 Alcazarseguir, 147 Algeria, 10, 38, 47, 48, 95, 97, 102, 119, 131, 248, 250, 253, 262, 265 Algiers, 119 Al-Hoceima, 101, 107 Al-Husri, Sati‘, 12 Ali, Mohamed, 148 Al-Qaeda, 155 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 34, 36 Al-Shamsi, 84 Amman, 29, 117 Arabian Peninsula, 11, 12, 29, 31, 49 Asia, 2, 3, 13, 15, 24, 44, 47, 49

Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers in Spain (ATIME), 178 Atlas, 100 Australia, 224 Austria, 5, 210, 253, 265 Austrian-Hungarian Empire, 210 B Baden-Württemberg, 228, 229 Bahrain, 30, 39, 44, 45, 49, 84 Balearic Islands, 178 Bangladesh, 27, 28, 42, 255, 262 Barcelona, 48, 187, 247, 248 Barking, 65 Basque Community, 183 Bavaria, 230 Beirut, 117 Belgium, 94, 97 Berlin, 170, 209, 216, 218, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235, 239, 251 Berlusconi, Silvio, 258–260 Birmingham, 76 Boko Haram, 263 Bologna, 266

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 A. Profanter and E. Maestri (eds.), Migration and Integration Challenges of Muslim Immigrants in Europe, Politics of Citizenship and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75626-0

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284

INDEX

Bosbach, Wolfgang, 218 Bossi, Umberto, 258, 260 Bouffier, Volker, 216 Bourita, Nasser, 111 Bradford, 66 Bremen, 229 Britain, 38, 55–57, 61, 63–67, 74–77, 79, 82, 83, 169, 253 Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), 72 Bush Jr., George, 223, 259 Byzantine empire, 170

C Caballas, 148, 150 Cameroon, 95 Canada, 139, 145, 224 Carreira, Emilio, 148 Casablanca, 95, 153 Castillejos, 147 Catalonia, 155, 178, 180 Cerro de Reina Regente, 137 Ceuta, 2, 17, 50, 95, 97, 129–156, 178, 278 Charlie Hebdo, 220 China, 32, 49, 254, 255 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 216, 218 City Migrants Advisory Board (Osnabruk/Germany), 217 Coalición Por Melilla, 151 Cologne, 217, 224 Community of La Rioja, 184 Community of Madrid, 187 Congo, 260 The constitutional court, 229, 230, 232 Cote d’Ivoire, 95, 97, 115 Council for the Elimination of Racial or Ethnic Discrimination (Spain), 180, 192

Council of Ministries (Spain), 179 D De Maiziere, Thomas, 230 Denmark, 5 Department for Communities and Local Government, 76 Dhabi, Abu, 45, 81 Dubai, 14, 15, 44, 57, 61–63, 68–74, 78–84 E East Asian countries, 68 Eastern Europe, 214, 262 Education Ministry of the Community of Madrid, 183 Egypt, 3, 5, 12, 27, 29, 30, 38, 47, 176, 248, 250, 253, 262 El Barkani, Abdelmalik, 137 El Principe, 139, 144, 145 England, 65, 66, 80 Erbakan, Necmettin, 225, 226 Eritrea, 253, 268 EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, 181 Europe, 1–5, 8–11, 13–18, 23, 24, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 42, 47, 48, 91–98, 100–102, 105–107, 109, 110, 116, 120, 121, 123, 129–131, 134, 135, 138, 140, 156, 165–173, 180, 181, 194, 196, 197, 210, 211, 215, 220–222, 224–226, 230, 238, 239, 245–248, 250, 251, 254–256, 258, 259, 262, 263, 267, 268, 275–280 European Commission, 180, 249, 250 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 171–174, 196 European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), 34, 36, 37

INDEX

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 171–173, 196 European Court of Justice, 172 European Economic and Monetary Union, 267 European Union (EU), 3, 6–8, 13, 14, 17, 18, 99, 109, 110, 113, 119, 120, 122, 135, 136, 145, 168, 172, 181, 185, 196, 198, 214, 245–251, 254, 255, 257, 264, 267 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 177, 185, 192 F Federation of Israelite Communities in Spain (CIE) Fereshta Ludin, 176 Fès, 95, 119 Fikri, Mouhcine, 101, 123 Fini, Gianfranco, 258 Florence, 263 Foroutan, Naika, 232 Forum of German Islam Conference (DIK), 222–224, 227, 228, 231–233, 235, 236, 238 Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (Spain), 179 France, 3–5, 8, 24, 33, 35, 38, 47, 93–95, 97, 102, 169, 178, 197, 228, 245, 246, 248, 253, 261, 276 Franco, Francisco, 93, 136, 137 Friuli, 265 G Gaza, 27 German Federal Bank, 215 German Green Party, 218 Germany, 3–5, 8, 14, 18, 24, 35, 47, 97, 170, 178, 197, 208–211,

285

213–231, 235–237, 239, 245, 248, 253, 261, 268, 278, 279 Ghana, 255 Great Britain (UK), 5, 8, 14, 15, 33, 261 Greece, 3, 172, 245, 246, 249, 254, 255 Greek empire, 170 Guibre, Abdul, 263 Guinea, 95, 97, 255 Gulf, 2–4, 14, 15, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 39–44, 46, 47, 49, 68, 69, 71–73, 82, 84, 246, 251, 258 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 30, 40, 42, 44, 45, 84 Gulf countries, 15, 24, 46, 56, 62, 68–70, 73, 84 H Hasibe Ozaslan, 232 Hassan II, 104, 123 Hesse, 229, 230 Human Rights Watch, 84 Hungary, 248 I Iberian Peninsula, 10, 175 Indonesia, 27, 28, 39, 42 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 84 Iran, 28, 36, 38, 257, 262 Iraq, 35, 36, 47, 235, 257 Ireland, 5 ISIS, 155 Islamic Commission of Spain, 176 Islamic Community Al-Ihsan, 154 Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 48 The Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB), 234

286

INDEX

Italy, 3, 5, 14, 18, 24, 33, 38, 94, 97, 178, 245, 246, 249–267, 279, 280 Ivory Coast, 255

J Jama’a at-Tabligh, 153 Jordan, 27, 29, 30, 38, 117, 176, 248, 261 The Justice and Development Party (AKP), 226

K Kazakhstan, 27 Kesici, Burhan, 234 Kilicarslan, Ayten, 231 Kreuzberg, 218, 235 Kuwait, 27, 30, 44–47, 73, 84 Kyenge, Cécile, 260

L La Cañada de Hidum, 137, 145 Larache, 107 Latin America, 177, 254 Layoune, 107 Lebanon, 27, 29, 47, 117, 176, 248 Letta, Enrico, 260 Leyla Sahin, 231 Libya, 3, 5, 30, 46–48, 108, 119, 248, 253, 256, 257, 263, 268 Lisbon, 117, 248 Lombardy, 265 Los Rosales, 153 Lower Saxony, 228 Luxembourg, 5 Lyon, 117

M Maateis, Laarbi, 153

Madrid, 117, 153, 167, 178, 186–188, 190, 192–194 Malaysia, 28, 45 Mali, 30, 97, 115 Mancini, Amedeo, 263 Marrakech, 111 Masherq, 246 Masjid An-Noor, 153, 154 Mauritania, 38, 95 Mediterranean Europe, 245 Mediterranean Sea, 145, 254 Meknes, 112 Melilla, 2, 17, 50, 95, 97, 129–156, 278 Merkel, Angela, 216, 230 Middle East, 11, 13, 24, 26, 47, 116, 131, 133, 251, 258, 261, 262, 268 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 5, 6, 13, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 36, 39, 46, 47, 91, 95, 111, 120, 121, 140 Milan, 262, 263, 266 Milli Görü¸s, 222–226, 228, 230–236 Ministry of the Presidency, Relationship with Legislature and Equality (Spain), 180, 192 Mohammed V, 104 Mohammed VI, 101, 107, 108 Monti, Mario, 259, 260 Morocco, 5, 11, 14, 16, 17, 30, 38, 47, 48, 91–113, 115, 116, 119–121, 123, 130, 132, 134–139, 143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 152–154, 156, 177, 178, 186–188, 193, 246, 248, 250, 255, 262, 265, 278 Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 33, 34, 36 Myanmar, 28

INDEX

N Nador, 97, 107, 112, 147, 156 Naples, 266 Napolitano, Giorgio, 257, 259 The National Salvation Party, 226 Netherlands, 5, 94, 97, 169, 197, 224, 261 Niger, 30 Nigeria, 113, 255, 262 North Africa/Maghreb, 2, 3, 10, 13, 24, 30, 32, 35, 48, 102, 113, 115, 116, 123, 131, 133, 134, 140, 142, 146, 177, 178, 246–248, 250, 254, 259, 262, 265, 276 North Rhine-Westphalia, 229 Norway, 5 O Observatory for Religious Pluralism (Spain), 180, 191, 192 Oman, 30, 45, 46, 49, 73, 84 Oran, 119 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 41 Oslo, 247 Oujda, 95, 107, 112 Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs), 72 P Pakistan, 14, 27, 28, 38, 42, 55, 61, 63, 64, 66–72, 78, 83, 84, 255, 262 Palestine, 27, 176 Palma de Mallorca, 184 Persian empire, 170 Philippines, 42, 44, 255 Poland, 248 Portugal, 131, 246, 249, 254, 255, 261

287

Prodi, Romano, 257, 259 Province of Bolzano, 265 Prussia, 210

Q Qaddafi/Gaddafi, Mu‘ammar, 30, 48 Qatar, 30, 40, 45, 46, 72, 84

R Rabat, 95, 107, 112 Ramadan, Tariq, 34 Red Sea, 253 Rif, 16, 92, 93, 97, 98, 100–102, 104, 105, 123, 134, 136 Rontomé, Carlos, 130, 132, 148, 150, 156 Russia, 172

S Sabha, 119 Sahel, 30, 48 Salvini, Matteo, 18, 260 San Lorenzo de El Escorial, 183 Sardinia, 265 Sarrazin, Thilo, 215, 232 Saudi Arabia, 27, 30, 42–47, 49, 84, 235, 256 Schauble, Wolfgang, 227, 228 Senegal, 95, 113, 115, 187, 262 Sicily, 251, 265 Slovenia, 265 Social Democratic Party (SPD) Somalia, 215 Sousse, 119 South Asia, 55, 67 Southeast Asia, 13, 24, 254 Southern Europe, 14, 264, 266 Soviet Union (USSR), 220 Spain, 5, 10, 14, 17, 24, 50, 93, 94, 97, 107, 130–132, 134–140,

288

INDEX

142, 144–147, 149, 152–154, 156, 166, 167, 170, 175–188, 190–196, 245, 246, 249, 250, 254, 255, 278 Spanish Constitution, 181, 184, 198 Spanish Federation of Cities and Provinces, 180 Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI), 176, 178, 179 Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 180 Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia, 180 Spanish Union of Islamic Communities (UCIDE), 139, 176, 178, 179 The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (KMK), 214 Strait of Gibraltar, 135 Sub-Saharan Africa, 2, 3, 23, 48, 92, 95, 96, 98, 107, 111, 113, 118, 122, 248, 253, 254, 262 Supreme Tribunal of Madrid, 183 Sweden, 3, 5, 245 Switzerland, 253 Syria, 3, 24, 27–30, 36, 47, 95, 108, 109, 113, 131, 176, 248, 261 T Tabl¯ıgh¯ı jam¯ a‘at , 35 Tadla Azilal, 100 Tangier, 95, 107, 117, 118, 123 Tetouan, 107 Todgha Valley, 103 Trentino Alto Adige, 265 Tripoli, 119 Tunis, 117 Tunisia, 5, 30, 39, 48, 95, 119, 187, 189, 248, 250, 253, 262, 265 Turin, 117

Turkey, 2, 14, 27, 29, 36, 211, 212, 218, 219, 221–226, 231, 232, 235, 261, 262, 279 Turkey Youth Union (TGB), 236 Türkische Gemeinde (Turkish community), 35, 47, 214, 218, 219, 222, 225, 235–237, 239 Türkischer Bund (Turkish Federation), 235 Türkischer Elternverein (Social Services to Turks), 236 Turkish embassies and consulates, 224 Turkish Islamic Conference for Relgious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri/DITIB), 224, 226, 231, 232, 235, 236, 238

U Ukraine, 255 Umayyad Caliphate, 175 UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 3, 27, 28, 95, 97, 108, 109, 123, 245 Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de Ceuta, 153 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 15, 27, 30, 45, 46, 55–57, 61, 62, 68, 69, 73, 74, 77–79, 82–84, 277 United Kingdom (UK), 3, 4, 8, 24, 35, 63, 67, 73, 169, 178, 196, 197, 245, 276, 277 United Nations (UN), 27, 38, 47, 84, 95, 111, 117, 122, 173, 181, 197, 252 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 27, 28 United States (USA), 82, 253, 259 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 181

INDEX

V Val d’Aosta, 265 Valencia, 178 Valencian Community, 183 Van Gogh, Theo, 220 Vienna, 117 Vivas, Juan Jesús, 144 W Wulff, Christian, 215, 216

289

Y Yemen, 3, 24, 35, 47, 95 Yoldas, Mostafa, 233, 234 Yugoslavia, 262

Z Zentralrat der Muslems in Deutschland (Central Council of Muslims in Germany), 235