Metonymy in Frames: The Role of Functional Relations in Contiguity-Based Semantic Shifts of Nouns 9783110755459, 9783110755282

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Anselm L. Terhalle Metonymy in Frames

Dissertations in Language and Cognition

Edited by Hana Filip, Peter Indefrey, Laura Kallmeyer, Sebastian Löbner, Gerhard Schurz and Robert D. Van Valin, Jr.

Volume 11

Anselm L. Terhalle

Metonymy in Frames The Role of Functional Relations in Contiguity-Based Semantic Shifts of Nouns

D 61 Düsseldorf Original title of the thesis: Metonymy in Frames. Studies on the role of functional relations in contiguity-based semantic shifts of nouns.

ISBN 978-3-11-075528-2 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-075545-9 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-075556-5 Library of Congress Control Number: 2022944185 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston d|u|p düsseldorf university press is an imprint of Walter de Gruyter GmbH Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck dup.degruyter.com

Preface The research presented in the present work was carried out in the context of the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 991 The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science (2011–2020; speaker: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Löbner) at Düsseldorf University, within project C04 Conceptual shifts: their role in historical semantics (2011–2015; principal investigator: Prof. Dr. Hans Geisler). The CRC 991 was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and centred around frames, a model of knowledge representation that relies essentially on functions as building blocks of and links between conceptual components. The present work constitutes an attempt to apply the frames being researched by the CRC 991 to the linguistic/cognitive phenomenon of metonymy, with a view to testing their capability to generate results that go beyond received knowledge about metonymy. Thus, it contributes to unraveling the possibilities that frames offer for the description and understanding of linguistic phenomena from a cognitive perspective and, at the same time, argues in favour of models of knowledge representation that are able to take account of the flexibility and dynamics of linguistic meaning construction.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-202

Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without an appropriate context and the support and contributions of certain people. I would like to thank all of them for their help, support and guidance. I am especially indebted to Hans Geisler for introducing me to the study of language change and the cognitive perspective on it, for integrating me into his working group and for casting a critical eye onto my work not without a certain generosity of vision. I am also grateful to Sebastian Löbner, who introduced me to function-based frames as a model of knowledge and semantic representation and has thus shaped my way of thinking about semantics considerably. Moreover, I thank Elmar Schafroth, whose agreement to supervise this work I appreciate very much, and Peter Indefrey, who was always open to discussing my ideas of metonymic distance. Some of the ideas developed in this work were evaluated in intense and inspiring discussions with Brigitte Schwarze, Daniel Schulzek and Mattis List, whose feedback has helped this work to come to fruition. I am also grateful to Nick Quaintmere and his competence as a native speaker and linguist for doing the English revision of the text. I thank the editors of the series Dissertations in Language and Cognition for incorporating this text. Its conversion into a publishable book has profited a lot from the help and support by the responsable De Gruyter staff members, to whom I am very grateful. Last but by no means least I thank my family for their invaluable support in so many ways.

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Contents Preface | V Acknowledgements | VII List of Figures | XV List of Tables | XVII List of Abbreviations | XIX 1 1.1 1.2

Introduction | 1 Subject | 1 Structure and Main Insights | 3

2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.4 2.5

Mentally Representing the World | 7 Concepts | 8 Constructed Mental Representations | 9 Types of Mental Representations | 10 MR Types and Noun Types | 11 Linguistic Symptoms of MR Types | 13 Combinations of Mental Representations | 14 Conclusion | 16

3 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.3 3.4 3.5

Frames: A Recursive Format for Mental Knowledge Representation | 17 Capturing Flexible Knowledge Structures | 17 Frames as Attribute-Value Structures | 17 Properties as Attribute-Value Pairs | 18 Frames Represented as Directed Graphs | 19 Attributes and Values | 19 MR Types in Frames | 21 MR Combination and Modification in Frames | 22 Conclusion | 23

4 4.1 4.2 4.2.1

Meaning: Stability and Flexibility | 25 Concepts, Lexical, and Intralingual Meanings | 25 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction | 27 Meaning Construction | 28

X | Contents

4.2.2 4.2.3 4.3 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Levels of Meaning Construction | 30 Mechanisms of Meaning Construction | 32 Conclusion | 34

5.5 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12

Metonymy | 35 Rhetorical Tradition and Cognitive Turn | 35 Metonymy as Substitution or Ellipsis | 36 Metonymy and Synecdoche | 37 Metonymy as a Conceptual Shift or Domain-Internal Highlighting | 38 The Conceptual Relation Underlying Metonymy | 40 Contiguity | 40 Salience | 41 Contingency | 41 Metonymy and Conceptual Distance | 42 Metonymy and Reference | 43 Metonymic Relations | 44 Metonymy and Discourse | 46 Metonymy and Grammar | 46 Metonymy and Language Change | 47 Conclusion | 48

6 6.1 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.3 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.4

A Way of Analysing Metonymy in Frames | 49 Metonymic Shifts and Metonymic Change | 49 The Data | 51 Sources | 51 Differences in Internal Complexity of the Examples | 52 The Method | 53 Relevant Invariants of Lexicalization | 53 Reconstruction | 54 Example Reconstruction | 55 Conclusion | 58

7 7.1 7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.3

Integrating Received Knowledge of Metonymy into Frames | 59 Definition | 59 Metonymy and Reference in Frames | 61 The Conceptual Base of Referential Shifts | 61 Referent-Sensitive Metonymies in Frames | 62 Non-Referent-Sensitive Metonymies in Frames | 65 Availability of Attributes in Frames | 67

Contents

7.4 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.5

| XI

Traditional Types of Metonymy in Frames | 70 Metonymic Classes and Reversibility | 70 Metonymic Classes and Attribute Labelling | 72 Conclusion | 74

8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.5.1 8.5.2 8.5.3 8.5.4 8.5.5 8.5.6 8.6

Source Focus versus Target Focus | 75 Metonymy: Ubiquitous and Hard to Narrow Down | 75 Metonymic Continuum: the Word Formation Pole | 77 Metonymic Continuum: the (Quasi-)Literal Pole | 81 A (Tentative) Scale of Metonymic Phenomena | 95 A Model of Metonymic Focus Placement | 100 The Basic Conceptual Distinction | 101 Linguistic Reflexes of the Distinction | 103 Arguments for MFP | 105 Why Source Metonymy is Metonymy | 106 Why Source Metonymy is Referent-Sensitive Metonymy | 107 Benefit and Function of Referent-Sensitive Metonymy | 108 Conclusion | 109

9 9.1 9.1.1 9.1.2 9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 9.2.5 9.3 9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.4 9.4.1 9.4.2 9.5 9.6 9.7

Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames | 111 The Directionality of the Metonymic Link | 111 The Uneven Dependency between Source and Target | 111 Potential Constellations in Terms of Attribute Links | 112 Bidirectionality | 113 Examples of Bidirectional Metonymies | 114 Potential Objections | 115 Arguments in Favour of Necessary Bidirectionality | 117 Bidirectionality with Source and Target Focus | 119 Identical (Non-)Uniqueness of Source and Target | 119 Counter-Directionality | 120 Why Bidirectionality Is not (Always) Necessary | 121 Examples of Counter-Directional Target Metonymy | 122 Examples of Counter-Directional Source Metonymy | 130 Necessity of the Counter-Directional Attribute | 136 Why the Counter-Directional Attribute is Inevitable | 137 Discussing Some ‘Impossible Examples’ | 138 What about Non-Referent-Sensitive Metonymy? | 141 Non-Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview | 141 Conclusion | 144

XII | Contents 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames | 145 10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy | 145 10.1.1 Metonymy in Frames with No Open Arguments | 145 10.1.2 Metonymy in Frames with Additional Open Arguments | 146 10.1.3 Metonymy that Shifts an Open Argument | 146 10.1.4 Shift to the Possessor? | 148 10.1.5 Shift from Possessor to Attribute? | 152 10.1.6 Conclusion | 153 10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy | 154 10.2.1 Argument-Directed Metonymy | 154 10.2.2 Argument-Averted Metonymy | 159 10.3 Cross-Argument Metonymy | 162 10.3.1 Conditions of Cross-Argument Metonymy | 162 10.4 What about Non-Referent-Sensitive Relational Metonymy? | 167 10.5 Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview | 170 10.6 Conclusion | 172 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy | 173 11.1 The Notion of Metonymic Distance | 173 11.2 Views on Metonymic Distance | 174 11.3 Chained Metonymies versus Metonymic Distance | 176 11.4 The Peculiarity of the Frame Perspective | 177 11.4.1 Starting Point | 177 11.4.2 Value (De)Composition | 179 11.4.3 Attribute (De)Contraction | 180 11.4.4 Attribute Reduction | 182 11.5 Metonymies across Different Distances | 184 11.6 Conclusion | 192 12 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8

Summary and Discussion | 195 The Frame Perspective on Metonymy | 195 The Metonymic Continuum | 196 Functional Relations in Metonymy | 197 The Source Is a Function of the Target | 198 The Target Can Be a Function of the Source | 199 Contentious Cases | 202 Metonymy and Choice of Expression | 203 Specifying Metonymic Contiguity | 204

Contents

13

Conclusion | 205

References | 207 Index | 217

|

XIII

List of Figures Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3

Examples of frame representations (bright red bird) | 20 [−R] frames (bright red bird) | 22 [+R] frames (component, top) | 22

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2

Potential frames of the source and the target (plume) | 56 Integrated frame at the moment of the shift (plume) | 58

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. 7.8

Situationally connected MRs (bicycle) | 63 Referent-sensitive metonymy (Grieche) | 64 Non-referent-sensitive metonymy (boor) | 66 Attribute orientation (tray, book) | 68 Default concepts (tray, book) | 68 Situational integration (tray, book) | 69 Situational integration and default knowledge (tray, book) | 69 Reversible metonymy (bottle, milk) | 71

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2

Target metonymy (ham sandwich) | 101 Source metonymy (Fahrrad) | 102

Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5 Fig. 9.6 Fig. 9.7 Fig. 9.8 Fig. 9.9 Fig. 9.10

Unidirectional attribute link (Moscow) | 115 Contextually bijective frame (Moscow) | 116 Metonymy that fulfills BiDi (Düsseldorf University) | 118 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (galerie) | 123 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (Picasso) | 124 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (bordeaux) | 125 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (bordeaux) | 126 Target metonymy (1985) | 127 Target metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (Berühmtheit) | 128 Target metonymy with contextually uniquely attributed target (Berühmtheit) | 129 Metonymy with (non-)uniquely attributed target (Delacroix) | 132 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (bordeaux) | 133 Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target (peintres) | 135 Target metonymy (Grieche) | 139 No reverse link (Grieche) | 139

Fig. 9.11 Fig. 9.12 Fig. 9.13 Fig. 9.14 Fig. 9.15 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 10.2 Fig. 10.3 Fig. 10.4 Fig. 10.5

[+R] metonymy next to an open argument shared by source and target (entreprise) | 147 [−R] metonymy on the basis of a situationally saturated FC (structure) | 151 [−R] and [+R] metonymy on the basis of a situationally saturated FC (production) | 151 (Non-)Relationality preservation in metonymy | 153 Pre-argument and cross-argument metonymies | 155

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XVI | List of Figures

Fig. 10.6 Fig. 10.7 Fig. 10.8 Fig. 10.9 Fig. 10.10 Fig. 10.11 Fig. 10.12

Argument-directed pre-argument metonymy (bicycle) | 156 Argument-directed pre-argument metonymy (épée) | 157 Argument-averted pre-argument metonymy (galerie) | 160 Cross-argument metonymies | 163 Cross-argument metonymy (plume) | 164 Cross-argument metonymy (construction) | 165 Non-referent-sensitive [+R] metonymy (kilométrage) | 169

Fig. 11.1 Fig. 11.2 Fig. 11.3 Fig. 11.4 Fig. 11.5

Modelling options (red apple) | 178 Modelling options (blond man) | 178 2-attr frame | 179 Value decomposition (teacher) | 180 Two models of the same MR, or two (slightly) different cognitive realities? (mileage) | 181 Attribute contraction (laitance) | 182 Metonymies across different distances | 185 1-attr metonymy from process to component (abordage) | 186 2-attr metonymy between a whole and a non-unique part (Picasso) | 188 2-attr metonymy between components of a process (Picasso) | 188 3-attr metonymy (Picasso) | 189 4-attr metonymy (Plato) | 190 4-attr metonymy (bordeaux) | 191 2-attr metonymy from a process to the property of a component of the process (fabrique) | 191 2-attr metonymy from a property of a component of a process to the process (idiotie) | 192 [+R] 3-attr metonymy (sadisme) | 192

Fig. 11.6 Fig. 11.7 Fig. 11.8 Fig. 11.9 Fig. 11.10 Fig. 11.11 Fig. 11.12 Fig. 11.13 Fig. 11.14 Fig. 11.15 Fig. 11.16

List of Tables Tab. 9.1

Types of non-relational, referent-sensitive metonymy in terms of functional relations between source and target | 143

Tab. 10.1

Types of relational, referent-sensitive metonymy in terms of functional relations between source, target and possessor | 171

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List of Abbreviations ((x)) ((s)) (t) [p] [+R] [−R] [+U] [−U] a→b a←b a 󴀗󴀰 b a1v a1v (p) avv BiDi Eng. (O/M∼) FC FMR Fr. (O/M∼) Ger. Hait. IC IMR It. Lat. MR n-attr Pt. RC RMR SC SMR Sp.

frame centre frame centre serving as source in a metonymic shift frame node serving as target in a metonymic shift open/possessor argument in a frame relational non-relational unique non-unique frame attribute taking a as argument and b as value frame attribute taking b as argument and a as value frame attributes in both directions between a and b attribute a1 which takes the value v attribute a1 assigns the value v to the possessor p and vice versa bidirectionality hypothesis English (Old/Middle ∼) functional concept functional mental representation French (Old/Middle ∼) German Haitian individual concept individual mental representation Italian Latin mental representation (frame/metonymy) consisting of/bridging n stringed attributevalue pairs Portuguese (proper) relational concept (proper) relational mental representation sortal concept sortal mental representation Spanish

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1 Introduction The phenomenon referred to as metonymy has been subject to intensive work during the last forty years and considerable research during the last century – not to mention the description of its fundamentals by the ancient Greeks, who coined the etymon of the term metonymy more than 2000 years ago. While there are many mutually alternative or complementary models that try to account for metonymy, few can lay claim to being clearly superior to others. Rather, new facets of metonymy are discovered from time to time, sometimes because the search for symptoms of invariants leads to extensions of the notion of metonymy to phenomena that share some fundamental properties with more prototypical cases. Thus, work on metonymy consists of feeling one’s way towards something that oscillates between some kind of stable core knowledge and a heterogeneous collection of more or less interrelated observations. The analyses presented here are an attempt to make a contribution to this description of phenomena treated under the label of metonymy. It aims at adding aspects to the discussion that have not been treated in that form thus far. In this way, it hopefully contributes to understanding a phenomenon which, despite making analytic access quite demanding, also provides enriching insights into how meaning can be constructed with the help of linguistic items.

1.1 Subject The present work deals specifically with the role of functional relations in metonymic shifts. It sheds light on how a function-based frame model can be used to reveal structural invariants underlying metonymy, such as the nature of the contiguity between source and target. Metonymy is primarily investigated in the form of nominal metonymy, i.e. metonymic shifts¹ between concepts that are verbalized by nouns or noun phrases. Example 1 displays a metonymy in which the shifted noun-adjective combination culottes bleues does not refer to its literal referent ‘blue trousers’, but serves as the identifying property of what is really meant and referred to, namely the ‘players with the blue trousers’. The shift is assumed to be possible because

1 When I speak of shifts (semantic, metonymic etc.) in the remainder of this work, I will typically be referring to primary pragmatic, inference-based construction processes that occur during language use and affect the semantics of what is said, i.e. the “literal” meaning of an utterance in a given context (see Chapter 4). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-001

2 | 1 Introduction

the blue trousers constitute an identifying property of the players of one team in the game, so that they are an ideal means of referring to the players. (1)

Les culottes bleues ont gagné par 3 à 0. (Kleiber, 1995, p. 107)² ‘The (players wearing)³ blue trousers won 3 goals to 0.’ ‘pair of blue trousers’source 󴀗󴀰 ‘player’target

I concentrate on the role of functional relations in the link between the metonymic source (here: ‘blue trousers’) and the metonymic target (here: ‘player that wears blue trousers’). This perspective relies on the standard view of metonymy as a shift that depends on the contiguity between the source and the target, i.e. on their simultaneous presence and mutual relevance in the context. A look at the descriptions of this contiguity relation in literature shows that many of the possible metonymy-producing relationships (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 29) involve functional relations inasmuch as the source is a function of the target and the target is a function of the source. Source and target are bijectively linked in these cases, but is this mandatory for metonymy? (2)

slow road (effect for cause; Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 38) ‘slow (traffic resulting from the poor state of the)⁴ road’ ‘road, in its poor state’source 󴀗󴀰 ‘traffic, depending on the state of the road’target

(3) The bottle is sour (container for contents; Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 41) ‘The (milk in the) bottle is sour’ ‘bottle, which contains (only) the milk’source 󴀗󴀰 ‘(the) milk that is in the bottle’target 2 As is common practice, I use this kind of enumeration and indentation mainly for language examples (sentences, expressions, words); but not exclusively. It also serves to highlight and number descriptions of linguistic patterns, such as metonymic relations (see example 101 on page 114) or frame constellations (see example 100 on page 114). 3 I attempt to provide relatively explicit paraphrases of the metonymically used expressions throughout this work by distinguishing between explicitly coded content (outside parentheses) and metonymically inferred content (inside parentheses), although a neat distinction between the two can be impossible at times, for example due to grammatical constraints. I am, of course, aware that there is most probably no way of linguistically expressing a proposition in a totally explicit way: “In order to reach a complete proposition through saturation, we must appeal to speaker’s meaning” (Recanati, 2003, p. 14). Still, despite their context dependence, I believe the paraphrases add sufficient explicitness to fulfill their purpose. 4 While the distinction between explicit and implicit components by means of parentheses has been introduced by myself, the paraphrase as a whole originates from Radden & Kövecses (1999).

1.2 Structure and Main Insights | 3

Frames are used here to model the representations that are involved in metonymic shifts. These frames have two central properties: the direction of the attribute links between the nodes, and the distance between the nodes in terms of attribute-value pairs. Based on these properties, metonymies are being analysed here with respect to the role functional relations actually play for the metonymy to be possible, and with respect to the conceptual distance between source and target. Since attributes as the key components of frames are modelled as functional relations and functions can be chained or decomposed into chained functions, frames constitute a tool that is particularly suited for investigating these issues. Therefore, the three main research questions in this work are the following: – Functional relations in metonymy: In terms of the constitutive properties of metonymy, what is the role of functional relations between source and target? – Metonymic distance in frames: Does the distance between source and target provide useful insights into the functioning of metonymy in terms of functional attribute-value pairs? – Metonymy and frames: Does the analysis of metonymy using frames yield interesting inferences about how metonymy functions? In summary, this work aims at providing a refined view of metonymy that sheds more light on what conceptual contiguity means in metonymic meaning construction processes.

1.2 Structure and Main Insights These are the subjects and main insights of the different chapters: Chapter 2 delineates how reality can be described as being mentally represented as an interplay of stably stored concepts and flexible, context-dependent representations constructed on the basis of these concepts (loosely based on Machery, 2009). I introduce Löbner’s (2011) concept type distinction and illustrate how the different concept types allow for an accounting of conceptual modification by means of conceptual combination. Chapter 3 introduces frames, a model of knowledge representation based on recursive attribute-value structures (cf. Barsalou, 1992; Petersen, 2007). Frames rely on functional concepts as links between non-relational concepts and reflect the type of the concept they model. They are used here as a means of modelling the flexibility of conceptualization, which is required for the analysis of metonymy.

4 | 1 Introduction Chapter 4 situates the notion of lexical meaning within the conceptual framework delineated in Chapters 2 and 3. Meaning is equated with conceptualization (cf. Langacker, 1986) inasmuch as lexical meanings are seen as stable concepts, and meaning in language use is seen as a matter of construction (cf. Carston, 1997, 2013; Recanati, 1989, 2004) on the basis of stable conceptual input and pragmatic inferences. Parts of lexical meanings and the representations based on these meanings in language use can be modelled in frames. Chapter 5 contains a brief summary of the most important aspects discussed in the research on metonymy thus far. Metonymy is a ubiquitous mechanism involved in the construction of meaning, propositional or illucutionary. It relies on information provided by language material and the relevant context and exploits the contiguity between concepts and/or referents at the moment of the metonymic shift. Chapter 6 introduces basic procedural aspects of how metonymy can be analysed with the help of frames. Modelling a given metonymic shift involves the reconstruction of the source reading, the target reading and a plausible connection between the two at the moment of the shift. Therefore, the analyses of both innovative and lexical metonymies rely on the sentences and utterances in which the shifts are embedded. Chapter 7 aims at integrating received knowledge of metonymy, i.e. the accepted canon regarding metonymy, into frames. I provide a working definition of metonymy in terms of frames, which is sufficiently general to accommodate the differences – on a common conceptual basis – between different kinds of noun-based metonymy treated in this work. Referential metonymy is treated as a symptom of metonymic shifts at the conceptual level, which justifies the analysis of any metonymy in frames; nevertheless, reference is accorded a crucial role in the selection of the appropriate frame model. This is particularly true for modelling the distinction between referent-sensitive and non-referent-sensitive metonymy (cf. Koch, 2004). Since frame models require the involved attributes to be explicitly specified, some remarks are made about criteria for assuming the presence of a given attribute. This issue is closely related to traditional accounts of metonymic shifts, which typically name or classify the relationship between source and target. Chapter 8 discusses the fact that the focus (a notion used following Warren, 2002) in referent-sensitive metonymies can be either more on the metonymic target or more on the metonymic source (cf. Kleiber, 1995; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003; Warren, 2002; Paradis, 2004; Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011). Based on reflections about this issue in the literature, I set up a scale of metonymic focus placement ranging from target-focus at one end to source-focus at the other. Different phenomena that involve metonymic shifts – from quasi-literal use to contiguity-based word

1.2 Structure and Main Insights | 5

formation – are located on that scale: while metonymy-based word formation must be situated on the target-focused end, and literal use is clearly an instance of the source-focused pole, there are metonymic shifts that are closer to the source-pole, intermediate shifts that provide access to both source and target, and metonymic shifts that are closer to the target-pole in that they behave like certain word formation processes (cf. Warren, 2002). A model of metonymic focus placement emphasizes the role of the metonymic shifts that are involved and the different purposes for which these shifts are used. I show in the subsequent chapters that the patterns of functional relations in metonymy hold for target metonymies and source metonymies. Chapter 9 is explicitly dedicated to exploring the role of functional relations between source and target in referent-sensitive metonymies without open arguments. While many metonymies discussed in the literature do rely on bijections between source and target, I discuss different kinds of evidence for the claim that the metonymic source is necessarily a function of the target: the counter-directional attribute, i.e. the attribute in the opposite direction of the metonymic shift, constitutes a key element of metonymy. On the other hand, metonymic shifts to targets that are non-unique with respect to the source are possible. The attribute link in the direction of the shift can be shown to be necessarily present only in cases where the target is a contextually unique MR. Thus, the metonymic source and target can differ in (contextual) uniqueness since the target can be a non-unique concept in the relevant context even if the source is unique. Non-unique sources, however, imply non-unique targets. All claims are illustrated both for target metonymies and source metonymies. For target metonymies with an individual concept as source, frames reflect the conceptual difference between what is marked by definite and what is marked by indefinite determination on the linguistic surface. A short digression is dedicated to non-referent-sensitive metonymies. An overview of the possible constellations can be found in Chapter 9.6. Chapter 10 broadens the perspective adopted in Chapter 9 by exploring the functional relations between source, target and an open argument, i.e. the patterns to be found in referent-sensitive metonymy with open arguments. Metonymies are shown to conserve the (contextual) relationality of the source. In contrast, (non-)uniqueness of source and target (with respect to the open argument) can differ, just like in non-relational metonymy. Examples of different kinds of relational metonymy – distinguished by the position of source, target, and possessor with respect to one another – show that relational metonymy exhibits a behaviour similar to non-relational metonymy, even if the presence of an explicit possessor has a certain impact on the links between source and target. In particular, the claim that the source has to be a function of the target while the target is not necessarily

6 | 1 Introduction

a function of the source, which is illustrated for non-relational referent-sensitive metonymy in Chapter 9, seems to be true for relational referent-sensitive metonymy as well. An overview of the possible constellations can be found in Chapter 10.5. Chapter 11 examines the distance between source and target in terms of attributevalue pairs in a frame. Based on the views on metonymic distance that are described in the literature, I enlarge on issues of conceptual distance that are quite conspicuous in frame models of metonymic shifts. There are few (but some) good criteria for assuming a certain number of attribute-value pairs between source and target. However, a more explicit decomposition of the link between source and target can profit more from the explicitness that frame models are able to exhibit. Nevertheless, metonymic distance in frames remains an open question, with the exception of certain specific cases in which there are rather good arguments for intermediate nodes. Chapter 12 summarizes and discusses the findings of the previous chapters, asking from a broad perspective whether the analysis of metonymy benefits from the use of function-based frames. The answer is affirmative because, on the one hand, the explicit nature of frames draws attention to details in the conceptual constellations that pass unnoticed otherwise, and, on the other hand, the emphasis of frames on functional relations uncovers the fact that the functionality of the source constitutes a necessary condition of metonymy. Thus, frames contribute to a refinement of the notion of contiguity with respect to metonymy. Furthermore, frames nicely reflect the conceptual basis of some symptoms at the linguistic surface, such as the difference between definite and indefinite metonymic items when the metonymic source is an individual or functional concept. At the same time, despite of having a promising future, frame analyses are still in their embryonic state and require a lot of development in order to become strong and reliable tools for research in semantics.

2 Mentally Representing the World Cognitive semantics does not distinguish neatly between linguistic meaning and non-linguistic cognitive structures.¹ Meaning is seen as consisting of the same content as conceptualization in general, since it is assumed to rely on the same evolutionary structures as does any kind of conceptualization (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This has been formulated by Langacker (1986, p. 4) as one of the most influential contributions to the development of a cognitive semantics: Meaning is equated with conceptualization. Linguistic semantics must therefore attempt the structural analysis and explicit description of abstract entities like thoughts and concepts. The term conceptualization is interpreted quite broadly: it encompasses novel conceptions as well as fixed concepts; sensory, kinesthetic, and emotive experience; recognition of the immediate context (social, physical, and linguistic); and so on.

This chapter is dedicated to delineating some basic assumptions about the conceptual structures that underly lexical meaning and meaning as flexibly construed content in actual language use. The description of basic cognitive invariants here is followed in Chapter 3 by the outline of a model of knowledge representation, frames, that will be used to model the content associated to linguistic code in speech. The relation between conceptual structures in general and conceptual structures associated with lexical items is treated in Chapter 4.

1 I am aware of the fact that this view is not shared by all linguists or philosophers of language. For example, Keller (1995, Chap. 8) maintains that there are relations between meanings by virtue of their being meanings of signs while these relationships do not hold between the concepts associated with them. In a similar way, Blank (1997, Chap. II.4.2) – modifying a model by Raible (1983) – proposes a sign model that comprises both the Designat (extralingual knowledge about the entity/-ies designated by the sign) and the Signifiant (intralingual meaning) with the aim of being able to distinguish associations between extralingual concepts from associations between intralingual meanings. This makes it possible to account for a possible difference in intralingual meaning in pairs of expressions that use different semantic material to designate the same extralingual concept/category (cf. the Fregeian Morgenstern-Abendstern pair). For others, the general underdeterminacy of language (see Chapter 4.2) implies that meaning is conceptual. I restrict myself to saying that I do not have such strong reservations with regard to considering meanings as concepts. Moreover, acknowledging the difference between intralingual and extralingual meaning does not automatically contradict the view that meanings are concepts (see Chapters 2.1 and 4.1). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-002

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2.1 Concepts Using a theory of knowledge representation presupposes that a supposedly existing extracognitive and extralingual reality is being represented in human cognition one way or the other in order for interaction with that world to be possible. Since the access to that world depends on the sensory-motor means humans have at their disposal, the representations are necessarily subjective (cf. M. Wilson, 2002). One consequence of sensory-motor interaction with the extracognitive world seems to be the development of relatively stable mental entities that represent a certain kind of knowledge about an aspect of the world in human cognition. These entities are called concepts. According to Definition 1 based on Machery (2009, p. 12),² concepts are stable and cognition regularly falls back upon them, for example in categorization. In this view, a concept of x contains all the knowledge about x that comes immediately and inevitably to a person’s mind every time his/her cognition concentrates on x, even if it is immediately refuted or modified due to contextual factors. Definition 1 (Concept). A concept of x is the knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in judgments about x. This notion of concept has the advantage of constituting a stable basis for the analysis of meaning in language use, which is generally assumed to rely ostensibly on stably stored lexical meanings. These meanings can be conceived of as concepts in the above sense. Arguments for this view are the following (cf. Machery, 2009, pp. 14–17 and Chapter 6): First, a linguistic argument: A sentence like 4 (cited by Machery from Ziff 1972, p. 128; my meaning paraphrase) would typically be considered to be true, but, to be precise, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. It can be argued that this ‘prototypical’ content might be part of the concept ‘cheetah’, with no contextual influence.

2 Machery’s original definition is the following: “A concept of x is a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgments about x.” (Machery, 2009, p. 12). I slightly modified it in order to adapt it to the terminology and to the conceptual framework in this work. I choose knowledge instead of body of knowledge, which Machery defines as a “contentful state that can be used in cognitive processes.” I understand judgments about x to mean any kind of conscious or unconscious cognitive activity that concerns entities belonging to x.

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A cheetah can outrun a man. ‘A cheetah can outrun a man (if there are no factors in which the cheetah differs from the image of a fully grown, healthy cheetah in good condition)’

Second, Barsalou provides experimental evidence for the distinction between context-independent and context-dependent information (cf. Barsalou, 1982), and claims (in Barsalou, 1987, p. 122; Barsalou’s emphasis) that the latter . . . comes to mind on every occasion in which a concept³ is construed for a particular category. [. . . ] For example, whenever people construct a concept for skunk, the activation of smells is obligatory; whenever people construct a concept for diamond, the activation of valuable is obligatory.

What he calls context-independent information related to x can be seen as what is part of a concept of x according to Definition 1. Third, a thought experiment: assuming the non-existence of concepts (in the above sense) would force us to retrieve all our knowledge about a category while reasoning about it, or at least to select systematically from the totality of this information. Given that our working memory has a limited capacity, the ability to activate only default knowledge – which has become default because it has proven to be useful in a great variety of tasks – fits in better with the standpoint of efficiency (cf. Machery, 2009, p. 15).

2.2 Constructed Mental Representations When activated during reflections about or involving x, the concept of x has to undergo minor or major modifications that adapt the evoked information to the reality that is supposed to be represented. This modification of the conceptual content⁴ leads to the creation of a contextually more specific and thus ephemeral mental representation of x which is based on the concept (cf. Barsalou, 1992, p. 31, footnote 3). The modification can consist of integrating concept-related content – i.e. information associated with x that is stored in long-term memory, but which is not part of the concept of x itself since it is not activated by default (cf. Machery, 2009,

3 Obviously, Barsalou does not use the term concept in the way Machery does. By concept, he refers to what can be constructed on the basis of stable default knowledge (= our notion of concept). 4 The emerging contextually specific mental representation could be seen as a kind of modified working copy of the stable concept. Thus, the contextual mental representation can be created without ‘damaging’ the concept itself.

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p. 13, Fig. 1.2) – and situation-specific content into the representation, or of overwriting some of the default information if it contradicts the represented instance in any way. For example, observing a yellow dog with three legs might trigger the activation of the concept ‘dog’, according to what Definition 1 predicts, and lead to the creation of some kind of specific mental representation that is based on the concept ‘dog’, but which specifies an atypical colour, number of legs and all relevant inferences depending on it to the actual occurrence. Furthermore, the observation might activate additional information, such as relevant memories. Since such context-triggered mental representations are based on concepts and concept-related stable knowledge without being concepts or just stable themselves, a more general definition of mental representations, as proposed in Definition 2, is appropriate. Definition 2 (Mental representation). A mental representation (MR) of x is any kind of cognitive representation of x that is identical to the concept of x or results from modification, combination, or contextualization of conceptual knowledge of x.⁵ This definition will be of particular use to the analysis of metonymy in Chapters 6 to 11: Metonymy is a process of meaning construction, based on what is provided by the linguistic material or the context of utterance. It occurs in language use and therefore relies on more or less contextualized versions of the concepts that constitute the meanings of the shifted items.

2.3 Types of Mental Representations In this section, I introduce a classification of types of mental representations by Löbner (2011) that draws on two criteria: (non-)uniqueness and (non-)relationality of the mental representation. The classification is shown by Löbner (1985, 2011) to constitute a useful tool in the analysis of a variety of language phenomena, in particular nominal determination, NP construction and interpretation. Löbner assumes further that “the basic concept types are not only types of noun and CNP (common noun phrase; AT) meanings, but more generally the basic types of concepts that our cognition works with anyway” (2011, p. 313).

5 I will use the term whenever I refer to context-dependent representations in my analyses, which is true for the majority of the cases.

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2.3.1 MR Types and Noun Types The types of mental representations distinguished in this work correspond to Löbner’s noun types and the types of concepts they stand for:⁶ sortal, individual, relational, and functional MRs⁷ (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 280–282). It is assumed that they structure part of what the human mind construes as reality, in particular conceptual content that is linked to nouns or noun phrases. Hence, they are involved in nominal metonymy. Sortal MRs can be modelled as unary predicates. They describe the entities they represent in terms of properties and classify them as belonging to a certain category. A sortal noun has no, one, or more referents in a given context of utterance. Typical sortal nouns, i.e. nouns whose meanings⁸ are sortal concepts (SCs), are nouns for natural kinds or artefacts. In example 5, Fr. femme ‘female (adult) human being’ as a sortal noun evokes a sortal concept that classifies its referent as being an element of the category of women. (5)

. . . un violoneux jouait un air que chantait une femme brune, de type gitan [. . . ] (Aragon, Louis, Les Beaux Quartiers, 1936, p. 106; cited from TLFi, “femme”, I.A.1) ‘. . . a fiddler was playing a tune sung by a brunette woman who looked like a gypsy [. . . ]’

Individual MRs can be modelled as individual constants: they have a unique⁹ instantiation in a given context of utterance, if they have one at all. The referential argument of an individual noun, i.e. a noun whose meaning is an individual concept (IC), is uniquely related to the context of utterance. Typical individual nouns are Fr. Président (de la République française) ‘(the) President of the French Republic’, soleil ‘(the) sun of our solar system’ (in the common use of the word), or proper names such as Clémence ‘(the) person called Clémence who is relevant in the context’. An individual MR might differ from a corresponding sortal MR only with

6 Löbner (2011) does not introduce his classification directly for mental representations, but for nouns that are distinguished by having certain types of concepts as meanings. I take the conceptual side as a starting point, introduce the distinction of types of mental representations, and relate them to nouns that have a concept of the respective type as meaning. 7 I will regularly be using the abbreviations SMR/SC, IMR/IC, RMR/RC, and FMR/FC for sortal, individual, relational, and functional mental representation/concept in the following. 8 The type specification of a noun applies, of course, to a noun in one of its meanings, i.e. to a nominal lexical unit as a form-meaning pair, not to a polysemous noun as whole. 9 Löbner marks the uniqueness of a concept as [+U] and the non-uniqueness as [−U]. I adopt this convention together with the corresponding convention for (non-)relationality (existence or not of open arguments). Thus, SMRs are [−U] (and [−R]) and IMRs are [+U] (and [−R]).

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respect to its type, not with respect to descriptive content, which can be identical (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 283). In example 6, the referent of femme is categorized in the same way as in example 5, but as contextually unique. (6) . . . un violoneux jouait un air que chantait la femme brune, de type gitan [. . . ] (modification by AT of example 5) ‘. . . a fiddler was playing a tune sung by the brunette woman who looked like a gypsy [. . . ]’ In contrast to SMRs and IMRs, which are both non-relational,¹⁰ (proper) relational MRs are [+R] since they can be modelled as binary predicates: they classify their instantiation in terms of its property of standing in relation to another entity. Typical relational nouns, i.e. nouns whose meanings are relational concepts (RCs), are Fr. morceau (de) ‘piece/fragment (of)’, habitant (de) ‘inhabitant (of)’ or enfant (de) ‘child (of)’. Since a relational noun may have more than one referent inasmuch as there can be more than one entity that stands in the given relation to a possessor, RMRs are [+R] MRs that are [−U] (with respect to the possessor and thus in any context). In example 7, the relationality of Fr. morceau is reflected by the possessor construction and its non-uniqueness with respect to the possessor by the use of the indefinite determiner. (7) La propriété du paysan est un morceau de sa vie [. . . ]. (Jaurès, Jean, Études socialistes, 1901, p. 258; cited from TLFi, “morceau”, III. – au fig.) ‘The property of a peasant is a piece of his life [. . . ]’ Functional MRs are [+R] like proper relational MRs. Since they can be modelled as unary functions, they are [+U] inasmuch as they uniquely relate their instantiation to a possessor, just like a mathematical function does. The referent of a functional noun, i.e. of a noun whose meaning is a functional concept (FC), is a value that is unique with respect to the argument in a given context of utterance inasmuch as it is the only element that plays the role specified by the noun with respect to the possessor. Typical functional nouns are Fr. mère (de) ‘(the) mother (of)’, poids (de) ‘(the) weight (of)’, or prix (de) ‘(the) price (of)’. In example 8, the relationality of Fr. longueur is marked by the possessive construction and its uniqueness with respect to the possessor by the use of the definite determiner.

10 Löbner marks the relationality of a concept as [+R] and the non-relationality as [−R]. I adopt this convention together with the corresponding convention for (non-)uniqueness.

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Je suis honteux de la longueur de cette lettre. (Tocqueville, Alexis de, Correspondances [avec H. Reeve], 1858, p. 255; cited from TLFi, “longueur”, C.2). ‘I am ashamed of the length of this letter.’

To sum up, part of reality is assumed to be structured in cognition by means of representations that are of one of the four MR types. Stable MRs, which can be of any one of the four types, are stored as concepts, of which some figure as meanings of nouns. Since a nominal metonymy is a shift of/within the MR associated to a noun, the resulting MR might differ from the original MR in type. The type of the MR a noun stands for is reflected by linguistic characteristics of its use, as described in the following.

2.3.2 Linguistic Symptoms of MR Types The distinction of MR types and corresponding noun types is accompanied by a theory of linguistic determination. According to Löbner (2011, p. 287), nouns or NPs that stand for an MR of a certain type occur with a determination that reflects this type. A metonymic shift to another MR can be reflected by the determination of the shifted item; therefore, the relation between MR type and linguistic determination is relevant to the study of metonymy. [+U] MRs are marked by definite determination (see examples 6 and 8), while [−U] MRs can be concomitant with several kinds of determination, such as simple indefinite determination (e.g. Fr. un/une Nsing , or des Nplur ; see examples 5 and 7), plural, quantitative determination (e.g. Fr. plusieurs/quelques Nplur ), or quantificational determination (e.g. Fr. chaque Nsing ) (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 288). What the [−U] scenarios have in common is that the number of concerned single cases does not or may not equal 1. On the basis of the non-unique input, determination can still select a given referent out of several possible cases unambiguously, like in the case of contrastive demonstratives, where one specific entity is singled out from several potential referents that are present in the context. [+R] MRs are marked by relational determination, such as possessive constructions, which specifies the filler of the open argument of the relational MR, thus linking the referent of the [+R] noun or NP to its possessor (see examples 7 and 8). [−R] MRs carry absolute determination inasmuch as there is no external possessor specification because there is no open argument to be filled (see examples 5 and 6). Since open arguments inhibit the determination of a referent, referring NPs that are not part of another NP are naturally [−R] and marked as such (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 299, 300).

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In possessive chains (a possessum head with at least one possessor specification and possible further embedded possessor specifications), all but the final possessor specification are [+R] because they have further possessor specifications. The last possessor must be [−R] in order for the chain as a whole to be [−R] and be able to refer. The (non-)uniqueness of the MR represented by such a chain can be inferred from the determinations of the involved heads and the final [−R] possessor: the determination of one head only reflects its (non-)uniqueness with respect to its possessor, but an entire possessive chain is necessarily [−U] iff at least one of its elements is [−U], which can be seen from its determination (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 301–306). For example, the NP in 9 stands for a [−U] MR, and the NP in 10 stands for a [+U] MR – although both start with a definite determiner – because the relational noun ami (de) ‘friend (of)’ stands for a MR that is non-unique with respect to its unique possessor Paul. (9)

la mère d’un ami de Paul ‘the mother of a friend of Paul’s’

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la mère de Paul ‘Paul’s mother’

To sum up, determination corresponding to a certain MR type follows directly from a cross-classification that is based on determinations that are specific to (non-)uniqueness and to (non-)relationality (cf. Löbner, 2011, Tab. 1 on p. 307). Sortally used nouns/NPs (see example 5) are not integrated into any relational construction, carry indefinite or quantificational determination, are used in plural or are accopanied by a demonstrative pronoun. Individually used nouns/NPs (see example 6) are not part of any relational construction either and exhibit singular definite determination. Relationally used nouns/NPs (see example 7) are part of a relational construction, which specifies their possessor explicitly, have indefinite or quantificational determination, are used in plural or are accompanied by a demonstrative pronoun. Functionally used nouns/NPs (see example 8) are equally accompanied by a relational construction and carry singular definite determination.

2.4 Combinations of Mental Representations The concept type distinction by Löbner (1985, 2011) provides key constituents for modelling conceptual modification and combination: the [+R] property of relational and functional MRs is the means that allows MRs to be combined with other MRs. Thus, MR modification can be explained as consisting in MR combination.

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Since metonymy is a prominent process of meaning construction in language use (see Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.3) and relies on contextually specific MRs (see Chapter 7.1), accounting of MR combination and modification is a prerequisite to the study of metonymy. Language provides a number of clues for the importance of conceptual combination in cognition. Since language use involves recursively combining entities from a limited set of elements that are either more lexical or more grammatical in nature,¹¹ the concepts that are stored as stable meanings of these items must be combined in a given linguistic utterance, in order to produce a complex whole that is emergent inasmuch as it represents more than just the set of the meanings of its parts. This emergence of the constructed MRs relies heavily on the [+R] property of relational and functional concepts. The modification of a concept or MR can be explained by processes of combination of that concept with other concepts or MRs. The meaning of Fr. oiseau bleu ‘blue bird’ is likely to be a MR that is constructed on the basis of the lexical meanings of oiseau and bleu.¹² The construction process consists of selecting the relevant attribute(s) ‘colour of feathers of [x]’ in the concept ‘bird’ and of saturating that attribute by means of specifying its value as ‘blue’. In this way, we obtain a modified, namely more specific, ‘copy’ of the stable concept ‘bird’. The combination of the two is possible because the SC ‘bird’ is composed of a number of attributes, which take ‘bird’ as possessor and assign a value to it. The selection of the relevant (chain of) attribute(s) ‘colour of the feathers of [x]’¹³ depends on sortal characteristics of the concept ‘red’, which is known to be a colour and therefore constitutes an ideal filler of the attribute ‘colour of [x]’ in the frame of a given concept or MR. Since metonymies rely on the compositionality of contextually specific MRs based on concepts as meanings, the analysis of metonymy requires a model of

11 Lexicon and grammar are not regarded as two entirely distinct components of language, but rather as two poles of a continuum of phenomena that can be located somewhere between the poles (cf. Lehmann, 1990, 2002; Goldberg, 1995; Croft, 2001; Brinton & Traugott, 2005). 12 This view is reflected, for example, by the fact that there is no entry for this expression in relatively comprehensive dictionaries such as the TLFi. Furthermore, the Modified Occam’s Razor proposed by Grice suggests preferring a construction account to a multiplication of senses. However, this does not impede the expression from acquiring a lexical meaning one day, which would certainly be a more specific concept than just the application of the colour predication to the bird’s feathers. 13 Whether this is actually the relevant attribute is, of course, dependent on the context. While in many typical contexts, this is most probably the element to which the colour predication applies, it is possible to imagine contexts in which a different aspect of the bird is predicated upon (see Chapter 4.2.1 on meaning construction in context).

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mental knowledge representation that is capable of accounting for the flexibility of conceptual structures. Such a model is introduced in Chapter 3 in the form of a recursive attribute-value structure whose attributes are conceived of as functional concepts.¹⁴

2.5 Conclusion The experienced world is mentally generalized in the form of relatively stable knowledge that is stored in long-term memory, among others in the form of concepts. Together with situation-specific information, this stored knowledge constitutes a basis for the flexible construction of situation-specific mental representations. The creation of ephemeral mental representations can be analysed as the combination of concepts and/or non-conceptual content to new MRs. In other words, conceptual modification can also be conceived of as a kind of conceptual combination. Among the four types of mental representations that are distinguished in this work (sortal, individual, relational, functional), relational and functional MRs constitute the means to assure the integration of different conceptual components into a complex whole during meaning composition and contextual meaning construction. Since meaning in language use is equally a matter of activation of such construction processes, the analysis of semantico-conceptual operations like metonymy requires a theoretical background that accounts for stable lexical content and ephemeral, constructed representations.

14 Evidence for MR combination is ubiquitous in language, but will not be reviewed here. Widely investigated linguistic phenomena that reflect MR combination particularly well include word formation, especially compounding (cf. Gentner & Markman, 1994; Wisniewski, 1996, 1997, 1998; Wisniewski & Love, 1998; Rathert & Alexiadou, 2010; Bauer, Lieber, & Plag, 2013; Schulzek, 2014, 2019) and the semantics of larger units such as clauses (cf. Mel’cuk, Clas, & Polguère, 1995; Van Valin, 2005).

3 Frames: A Recursive Format for Mental Knowledge Representation This chapter is about frames, a model of mental knowledge representation that is used to capture the semantic dynamics at work in metonymic shifts. It is based on research by Barsalou (1992) and Barsalou & Hale (1993), and has been further developed by Petersen (2007), Petersen & Werning (2007), Petersen & Osswald (2012) and Löbner (2013, Chap. 12).

3.1 Capturing Flexible Knowledge Structures It is largely accepted in cognitive linguistics that meaning in language use has to be constructed by semantic and pragmatic means, on the basis of stably stored meanings, world knowledge, and specific contextual input (cf. Recanati, 2004, and many others, see my Chapter 4.2.1). Models of flexible knowledge structures have been gaining ground since the cognitive turn in the 1970s; the described structures (and the resulting models) have been called frames (cf. Minsky, 1975, 1988; Fillmore, 1977b, 1985), domains (cf. Langacker, 1987; Croft, 1993), scripts (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977), schemas (cf. Johnson, 1987), or idealized cognitive models (cf. Lakoff, 1987). They often put particular emphasis on the generalized, stereotypical character of such structures (cf. Minsky, 1988, p. 244), and highlight the fact that frames are representations of complex conceptual interactions or co-occurrences based on our perception of what we call the real world. Such a comprehensive description is provided by Geeraerts (2006, p. 16), whose view forms the basis for the following general working definition: Definition 3 (Frame as a complex structure of representations). A (semantic) frame is a coherent structure of related mental representations in which the relations are based on the way the components co-occur in real world situations. Based on this general definition, the more concrete frame model in the following sections tries to further operationalize such structures for semantic analysis.

3.2 Frames as Attribute-Value Structures Complex knowledge structures as defined in Definition 3 are not directly observable, they must be inferred from what is considered to be an observable symptom. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-003

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However, everyday experiences and the way language breaks knowledge into more or less discrete entities give us some insights into possible invariants of how knowledge is structured.

3.2.1 Properties as Attribute-Value Pairs Barsalou (1992, pp. 24–29) claims that frames are recursive attribute-value structures (rather than, for example, feature lists). First, according to experimental evidence, a red object is different from a yellow object, but not in the same way that it is different from a round object (p. 25, 26). Second, experiments show that correlated entities are not stored as a set of unrelated components but are linked by relations; otherwise, a complex whole would be no different to the set of its parts (p. 26, 27). In the frame model proposed by Petersen (2007), Petersen & Osswald (2012), and Löbner (2013), the attributes are assumed to be FMRs¹ inasmuch as they uniquely assign one single value to their bearer (= the possessor of the FMR) in a given context (cf. Petersen, 2007, p. 154), which is in line with the examples given by Barsalou; as such, the model is particularly suited to analysing the role of functional relations in metonymy (see Chapters 6 to 11). Frames as an analytic model – as opposed to frames as complex cognitive representations according to Definition 3 – can be defined as in Definition 4, which is based on the definition provided by Löbner (2013, p. 307). Definition 4 (Frame as a model). A frame (as a model of knowledge structures) is a network of mental representations that consists of attribute-value assignments and fulfills the following uniqueness conditions: 1. It has a unique frame centre, which stands for the entity that is represented by the frame and which is connected to any other element of the frame by attributes. 2. An attribute of an element in the frame is unique in that it is assigned no more than once to its bearer. 3. An attribute of an element in the frame is a function in that it assigns a unique value to its bearer.

1 Petersen (2007), Petersen & Osswald (2012) and Löbner (2013) adopt the concept type distinction and the related terminology developed by Löbner (1985, 2011). Since they do not introduce a terminological distinction between stably stored concepts and contextual representations based on these concepts, they do not distinguish between FCs and FMRs, SCs and SMRs. Based on the terminological distinction between stable and ephemeral representations that I introduced in Chapter 2, I use FMR/SMR etc. every time I do not restrict my observations to stably stored conceptual content.

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Since frames are supposed to represent MRs of the four types distinguished in Chapter 2.3, they can contain open arguments (cf. Petersen & Osswald, 2012), which are integrated into the structure like any other frame element. The terms frame, frames, frame representation, and frame model will be used in the sense of ‘frame as a model’ – or in the sense of ‘frame graph’ (see Chapter 3.2.2) – for the most part in Chapters 6 to 11.²

3.2.2 Frames Represented as Directed Graphs Frame representations in agreement with the model delineated in Definition 4 can be depicted as directed graphs (cf. Petersen, 2007; Petersen & Osswald, 2012), such as the graph in Figure 3.1. The frame centre is a node marked by a double border. The attribute of a frame element is an arc from the node representing that element to another node, which represents the value assigned by the attribute to its bearer. The attribute carries a label that paraphrases the functional MR it represents. The assigned values are also specified in the form of labels that identify or categorize the value. Empty nodes represent value assignments that are unspecific, i.e. they are only constrained by the attribute and the possessor they belong to (see Chapter 3.2.3). The open arguments in frames of relational or functional MRs are depicted as rectangular nodes in the frame representations (see Chapter 3.3).

3.2.3 Attributes and Values The attributes and values in our frame model have a certain number of restrictions because the frame model needs to reflect the coherence of the represented conceptual structure according to Definition 3 in Chapter 3.1: A given attribute applies only to appropriate possessors (cf. Barsalou 1992, p. 31; Löbner 2013, p. 308). For example, the attribute ‘physical weight of [x]’ applies only to physical objects. A given attribute can only take appropriate values (cf. Wisniewski 1997, p. 173; Petersen 2007, p. 162, 163; Löbner 2013, p. 308) inasmuch as any potential value must be a “subordinate concept” (cf. Barsalou, 1992, p. 31) of the attribute. For example, the attribute ‘physical weight of [x]’ can only take weight specifications as values. These weight specifications are subordinate concepts of the attribute

2 Note: The three introduced readings of the term frame are clearly linked by metonymy: ‘complex structures of mental representations’ are modelled by ‘frames as a model of knowledge structures’, which, in turn, are graphically represented by ‘frame graphs’.

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ur

ati on > sat ur

r>

col o

lou

bright red bird

co

e < siz

e < siz

bright red bird

high

node

>

node

pl um a < b ge > ird

bright red

node

bright red

hue >

red

Fig. 3.1: Examples of frame representations: rudimentary frame representations of the MR ‘bright red bird’. They are rudimentary inasmuch as many other parts and properties of a bird could be explicitly included in the form of attributes with more or less specific values. The representation on the right decomposes the ‘colour of [x]’ attribute of the left frame, which is obviously understood as the ‘colour of the plumage of [x] ’. In the same way, the colour value ‘bright red’ can be further decomposed into its properties.

inasmuch as they represent information that is more specific than the (unspecified) attribute itself.³ A given possessor can induce a constraint on the values that a given attribute of the possessor might take (cf. Barsalou 1992, pp. 37–40; Löbner 2013, p. 10). For example, applying the attribute ‘physical weight of [x]’ to a human being as its possessor will reduce the set of possible values to a spectrum between barely positive values and, at most, several hundred kilos.⁴ A given possessor can result in a correlation between the values of two of its attributes (cf. Barsalou 1992, pp.37–40; Löbner 2013, p. 310). For example, the values of the attributes ‘age of [x]’ and ‘marital status of [x]’ correlate when the attributes are both applied to human possessors, inasmuch as the value of the latter attribute depends to a certain degree on the value of the first.⁵

3 Guarino (1992) captures this relation by distinguishing between relational and denotational interpretations of [+R] MRs, of which the latter categorize the potential values of an FMR as belonging to a certain class. 4 Bearing in mind the context-dependence of language use and meaning construction, such a constraint is, of course, also context-dependent. Therefore, while the described constraint is valid for many typical contexts, it is possible to imagine ficticious contexts in which such a constraint dictates a totally different value range or does not exist at all. 5 A similar kind of correlation based on experience has been attested by Medin & Shoben (1988): spoons made of wood are typically believed to be big spoons, i.e. the values of the attributes ‘material of [x]’ and ‘size of [x]’ correlate for spoons as possessors.

3.3 MR Types in Frames |

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3.3 MR Types in Frames Given the properties of the frame model defined in Chapter 3.2.1 and of its representation as graphs defined in Chapter 3.2.2, one basic method of modelling MRs of different types (see Chapter 2.3) in frames quickly becomes apparent (cf. Table 2 and the comments in Petersen & Osswald, 2012). “Basic” is to be understood here in the sense that I only make assumptions that are necessary to distinguish the four MR types from one another; any further assumptions are avoided in order to impose as few theoretical presuppositions on the models as possible. Frames of [+R] MRs like RMRs or FMRs have an open argument, while frames without open arguments represent SMRs or IMRs. In the frames of [+U] MRs, the frame centre is a function of an open argument (in the case of FMRs), or it is either a function of another unique frame element or contextually or prototypically unique itself (in the case of IMRs). From these premises, frames for MRs of the four types follow: A sortal frame has no open argument. The frame centre is not a function of a [+U] frame element, but it can be a function of a [−U] frame element, or a [+U] frame element can be a function of the frame centre. The left frame in Figure 3.2 depicts one way a sortal frame can look. An individual frame has no open argument. The frame centre is a function of another [+U] frame element (see Figure 3.2, right frame), or it represents a contextually or prototypically unique element itself (see Figure 3.2, left frame, interpreted as the red bird in a certain context).⁶ A relational frame has (at least) one open argument; in a wide sense, it is relational in a narrow sense or functional (see below). If it is relational in a narrow sense, the frame centre is not a function of the open argument, but the open argument is a function of the frame centre, and the frame centre is not a function of a [+U] node. The left frame in Figure 3.3 illustrates one example of a relational frame. A functional frame has (at least) one open argument. The frame centre is a function of the open argument. One example of a functional frame is depicted in Figure 3.3, right frame. 6 Since “the difference between individual and sortal concepts is not a matter of descriptive content but a matter of concept type as such” (Löbner, 2011, p. 283), I do not explicitly mark the difference between a contextually sortal frame (Figure 3.2, left frame as representing ‘a red bird’), and a contextually individual frame (Figure 3.2, left frame as representing ‘the red bird’). In the analysis of metonymies in Chapters 6 to 11, the difference between SMRs and contextually individualized SMRs is either clear from the discussion or not relevant for the analysis of the respective metonymic shift.

22 | 3 Frames: A Recursive Format for Mental Knowledge Representation

bright red

bright red

e < siz

e < siz

red bird

co lo ur >

node

co lo ur >

node

owner >

red bird

SMR or IMR

< pet

IMR

J.-P. Sartre

Fig. 3.2: [−R] frames: Two frame representations of non-relational MRs. While the left frame can represent a SMR or IMR, depending on the context, the right frame clearly represents an IMR because the frame centre is a function of the IC ‘J.-P. Sartre’.

tower

component

RMR




e>

tower

ol

whole >

component

top part

FMR

Fig. 3.3: [+R] frames: Two frame representations of relational MRs. While the left frame satisfies the conditions of a RMR because the frame centre is not unique as a filler of the relational ‘component’ role with respect to the argument, the right frame satisfies the conditions of a FMR because the frame centre is a function of the open argument.

3.4 MR Combination and Modification in Frames On the basis of these criteria for frames of different MR types (see Chapter 3.3), frames also reflect the properties of MR combination as described by Löbner (2011, summarized in my Chapter 2.3). Saturating the open argument of a FMR frame by an IMR yields the frame of an IMR because the frame centre is a function of a [+U] frame element. Saturating it by a SMR yields a SMR because the frame centre is a function of a [−U] frame element. Saturating the open argument of a RMR by an IMR yields a SMR, and saturating it by a SMR equally yields a SMR, because the frame centre is not unique with respect to a [+U] MR in either case. Converting a non-relational frame into a relational frame can be achieved by desaturating one of the frame elements, i.e. by replacing it with an open argument, or by replacing a frame element with a [+R] frame. The resulting frame is always

3.5 Conclusion |

23

[+R]: it represents a proper RMR if there is no chain of attributes directed from the open argument to the frame centre, and it represents a FMR if there is a chain of attributes directed from the open argument to the frame centre. Unspecified values of attributes in a frame can be specified by the insertion of a more specific MR of the same kind as the unspecific value, i.e. of a subtype of the denotational interpretation of the attribute in question. Thus, the frame ‘bird’ can be modified in view of modelling a more specific MR ‘bright red bird’ by replacing the unspecific ‘colour of [x]’ value by the more specific MR ‘bright red’, modelled either as a single node (like in Figure 3.1, left frame, on page 20) or as a slightly more decomposed frame (like in Figure 3.1, right frame).

3.5 Conclusion Frames, as described above (cf. Barsalou, 1992; Petersen, 2007; Petersen & Osswald, 2012; Löbner, 2013), constitute a structurally rather specific tool for modelling mental knowledge representation as a flexible way of construing reality, with particular emphasis on the role functional relations play in knowledge representation. The compatibility of frames with sortal, individual, relational and functional MRs, which constitute four basic types of meaning in language according to Löbner (1985, 2011), makes frames an inspiring instrument for the analysis of meaning and construction in language use. Since functional relations play a key role in metonymy in that the metonymic source must be a function of the metonymic target (see Chapters 9, 10), and since metonymic shifts are restricted to certain combinations of MR types due to the mandatory functionality of the source (see Chapters 9, 10), the distinction of MRs of different types in frames constitutes an important factor in the analysis of metonymy. Moreover, the outstanding position of the frame centre on the one hand and of open arguments on the other makes it possible to distinguish different types of metonymic shifts – such as referent-sensitive versus non-referent-sensitive shifts (see Chapter 7.2.2), as well as structurally different shifts in [+R] frames (see Chapter 10) – by means of their frame models.

4 Meaning: Stability and Flexibility A metonymy, when reflected in language,¹ is a meaning construction process based on the contextually integrated meaning of the shifted item. Hence, the investigation of metonymic shifts requires a model of meaning in language use. Received knowledge about stable and contextualized linguistic meanings, about their relation to more general knowledge structures (such as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3), and about meaning construction processes is briefly delineated in this chapter as a theoretical basis for the analyses carried out in Chapters 6 to 11. Metonymy itself is introduced with more detail in Chapter 5.

4.1 Concepts, Lexical, and Intralingual Meanings Cognitive linguists assume meaning to be inseparable from non-linguistic knowledge, as the following description by Fauconnier (1999, p. 96, found in Radden, Köpcke, Berg, & Siemund 2007) expressively states: Language is only the tip of a spectacular cognitive iceberg, and when we engage in any language activity, be it mundane or artistically creative, we draw unconsciously on vast cognitive resources, call up innumerable models and frames, set up multiple connections, coordinate large arrays of information, and engage in creative mappings, transfers and elaborations. This is what language is about and what language is for.

Based on this view, meaning in language use can be seen as a kind of conceptualization, i.e. as a way of constructing a cognitive reality. And, at the same time, lexical meaning can be equated with concepts: Since purely contextual theories of meaning can be refuted on the basis of the view that the elements of a set cannot all be defined exclusively by their relations to the respective other elements, a linguistic item has to possess some kind of meaning of its own with which it contributes to the construction process. For a lexical item like a noun, its lexical meaning can be defined in the context of this work as follows:

1 This (typical and, in terms of linguists’ interest, rather traditional) ‘form’ of metonymy can be differentiated from a view of metonymy as a cognitively even more basic phenomenon of association that can but need not be reflected in language use (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2004). Since all the analyses in the present work depend on language data, I can restrict myself to the language-related view of metonymy. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-004

26 | 4 Meaning: Stability and Flexibility

Definition 5 (Lexical meaning). The lexical meaning of a lexical item is a concept (in the sense of Definition 1 on page 8) inasmuch as it is a relatively stable mental representation – stored in long-term memory – of the abstract or concrete things the item can stand for, and whose content is evoked by default every time the item is used.² According to this definition, the lexical meaning of an item does not comprise all the knowledge the language user has about the potentially designated entities, but only the default knowledge that is activated automatically, and can be refuted or modified due to contextual needs. Nevertheless, it is mentally connected to the nonconceptual knowledge about the relevant entities (see Chapter 2.1). Since concepts can be modelled as frames (see Chapter 3), lexical meanings can be modelled as frames. And since contextually specific, ephemeral mental representations constructed on the basis of concepts and other kinds of knowledge can be modelled as frames, meaning in language use (see Chapter 4.2.1) can be modelled in frames. Despite the equation of stably stored meaning with conceptual knowledge, distinguishing between concepts and intralingual meanings (in the sense of meaning as part of a specific language system, similar to what structuralist approaches call the signifié, significatum, or signatum; cf. Blank 1997, Fig. 4 on p. 99) is possible: In many cases, the concept as meaning – called Dingvorstellung ‘idea of the thing’ in Gauger (1976), designatum in Raible (1983), and Designat in Blank (1997) – does not seem to be very different from the intralingual meaning. For example, the meaning ‘cat (felid)’ of Fr. chat is the concept of the category of cats and thus consists of some kind of basic knowledge (about this category), whose activation is appropriate in most of the reasoning about cats and in most of the uses of the French noun chat. It might therefore comprise some kind of prototypical, most probably still rather schematic knowledge about the category members. The difference between a (more or less) extralingual concept and the intralingual meaning of an item can become more obvious in cases where partly compositional items have lexical meanings. Sp. gato montés and gato salvaje are synonymous inasmuch as they share the same concept ‘wildcat (felis silvestris)’ as their meaning.³ They can nevertheless be distinguished by their respective intralingual meanings.

2 This is compatible with the received view in cognitive linguistics, even if there are linguists and philosophers who challenge the view that meanings are concepts (see the footnote on page 7). 3 The one-piece form of the English word wildcat nicely reflects the fact that this a lexical noun whose lexical meaning is not equivalent to that of the N-A combination wild cat, which is much more compositional in nature than the lexicalized version.

4.2 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction |

27

These intralingual meanings can be seen as either emphasizing certain aspects of the concept – some kind of underspecified relation to mountains or rugged terrain in the case of gato montés, and some kind of wildness in the case of gato salvaje (DRAE, “montés”, 1., and “salvaje”, 2., 3.)⁴ – or as adding these aspects to the concept. In both cases, these intralingually emphasized aspects might be activated when the words are used. Thus, the lexical items gato montés and gato salvaje would be partly compositional in that they share the same concept as meaning, but emphasize or additionally evoke aspects by means of their compositional structure. Alternatively, the intralingual meaning might be hidden completely by the associated concept in some cases and only be activated in situations in which attention is explicitly drawn to the original compositionality of the item.

4.2 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction On peut dire que, historiquement, le littéralisme l’a emporté sur la position défendue par les philosophes du langage ordinaire. La sémantique contemporaine [. . . ] est fondée sur un présupposé littéraliste. Récemment, toutefois, les pragmaticiens et certains philosophes du langage ont mis l’accent sur la sous-détermination sémantique et abandonné le minimalisme, en faisant une place à des effets du contexte sur le contenu qui ne sont pas contrôlés par la signification linguistique et qui néanmoins affectent les conditions de vérité. (Recanati, 2005)

Identifying lexical meanings with concepts within a conceptual framework that sees concepts as stable components of the mental representation of things – albeit with a certain degree of abstractness or underspecification – and, as such, as the building blocks of which situation-specific representations are constructed, implicates that meaning in language use is a matter of construal. It is constructed from the concepts that the (grammatical and lexical) linguistic material provides and in consideration of the context of utterance, specifically, as I delineate below, the (alleged) intentions of the speaker. The view that meaning in language use is a matter of inferential construction, not just semantic composition, has been discussed in great detail during the last few decades by language philosophers and linguists such as Paul Grice, Deirdre Wilson, Dan Sperber, Kent Bach, Stephen Levinson, François Recanati, Robyn Carston and many others. In the following sections, I try to give a brief summary

4 DRAE, “montés”, 1., paraphrases the meaning of the adjective montés as follows: “Que anda, está o se cría en el monte.”

28 | 4 Meaning: Stability and Flexibility

of what can be regarded as the common denominator of the different theories that have been developed in this field.⁵

4.2.1 Meaning Construction The central idea of meaning construction is that a major part of meaning conveyed in language use relies on pragmatic inferences based on the context of utterance and on the intentions of the speaker, not only on the linguistic material as such. When Grice (1975) proposed the distinction between “what is said” and “what is implicated”, his primary intention was to highlight the fact that linguistic utterances, i.e. linguistic expressions uttered in a context of utterance with a communicative aim, often convey meaning that relies strongly on contextual inferences beyond a compositional, bottom-up semantics. Even though Grice concentrates on conversational implicatures and does not explicitly address any non-compositional, inferential aspects of what is said (the “literal” interpretation), his vague formulation that what is said is “closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence)” (Grice, 1975, p. 44) might suggest that he is not entirely unaware of the pragmatic aspects of the so-called literal meaning, but he does not enlarge on this question. Subsequent research has shown, however, that it is not only implicated meaning that is of strongly pragmatic nature, but also literal utterance meaning: [W]hat is said turns out to be, in a large measure, pragmatically determined. Besides the conversational implicatures, which are external to (and combine with) what is said, there are other non-conventional, pragmatic aspects of utterance meaning, which are constitutive of what is said. (Recanati, 1989, p. 296)

A key aspect of this observation is that the contextual dependence of utterance meaning is not at all restricted to simple reference attribution based on strongly indexical items such as first person personal pronouns. Traditional literalism is typically fine with accepting that the meaning of an utterance like 11 is contextual in 5 As a consequence of the brevity of my overview, differences between (neo-)Gricean, relevancetheoretic, contextualist and related views are not being spelled out here systematically, but my explanations might be a little closer to the contextualist view since I am particularly convinced of Recanati’s arguments for a basic semantics that prompts pragmatically constructed ‘literal’ utterance meanings. Ways of giving an overview (with different focuses) of the differences and resemblances between some existing theories on pragmatic meaning construction can be found in Davis (2019) and in the first sections of many of the papers published on that matter, especially the papers by François Recanati and his book (Recanati, 2004), whose descriptions are particularly neat, perspicacious and well structured, in my view.

4.2 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction |

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that the meaning of the first person pronoun depends on the context by definition. However, this could be explained by assuming the contextless meaning of je to be a rule that determines which element to select as the meaning of je in a given context, in a simple bottom-up process. (11)

J’ai déja vu le livre de Paul quelque part. ‘I have already seen Paul’s book somewhere.’

In contrast, proponents of a strongly inferential utterance meaning convincingly emphasize that the meanings conventionally associated with words generally do not provide enough information to be considered as rules that have to be simply obeyed to unambiguously understand what is said. Rather, the conventional lexical and grammatical meanings contained in an expression serve as prompts that help to construct a propositional mental representation (cf. Radden et al., 2007, p. 1).⁶ For example, while the identification of the referent of je might be quite straightforward in a large number of imaginable contexts, understanding the utterance meaning of third person pronoun il ‘he’ cannot be entirely based on information provided by the word itself because it provides no criterion for the identification of the referent; hence, its meaning cannot be described as a rule as simply as in the case of the first person pronoun (cf. Recanati, 1989, p. 297).⁷ In a similar way, the hearer of the utterance in example 11 also needs to ascertain the meanings of déjà, of le livre, of de and of quelque part in that context by assumption-based inference. This can be illustrated by trying to formulate something that resembles the contextless expression meaning of the sentence: ‘[The speaker] [has seen] [at some point of time before the time of utterance] [and somewhere] [a contextually unique] [book or book-like thing] [that stands in a certain relation to] [a contextually unique thing or person named Paul].’ Even if we deliberately forget about potential ambiguities related to the use of Paul and book and take standard, prototypical interpretations for granted, the expression meaning of the sentence falls short of a potential utterance meaning of that sentence in many ways. While the use of the passé composé only indicates anteriority in spoken French, it would mean something much more specific in a context where someone is looking for Paul’s book and gets sentence 11 as answer: the interpretation of the chosen

6 As to criteria for the distinction between semantic ambiguity (polysemy) and pragmatic ambiguity (underdetermination), Grice proposes the Modified Occam’s Razor, according to which a “pragmatic account is to be preferred [so that s]enses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Recanati, 1989, p. 296). 7 In the same way, interpreting the first person plural pronoun nous is much less straightforward than in the case of je because it requires contextually identifying who could be meant apart from the speaker themself.

30 | 4 Meaning: Stability and Flexibility

tense would be restricted to some kind of relevant time frame, for example the day of the utterance. The same applies to the spatial adverb quelque part, which must have a much narrower interpretation in the utterance meaning because its most general interpretation would be redundant in any context of utterance. Similarly, the noun phrase le livre de Paul only expresses that there is some kind of relation between Paul and the book and that the book is unique in some way, but it is still up to the hearer to contextually infer which book is actually meant and what kind of relation (property, spatial closeness, authorship etc.) is actually designated by the possessive construction. Hence, proponents of a pragmatically constructed what is said claim that linguistic form does not sufficiently determine what is said in most or all contexts of utterance, that this context-dependence extends beyond reference assignment, and that the construction of the utterance meaning is free in the sense that it cannot be described as a rule or bottom-up process in most cases, but consists of top-down inferences which are based on the context and on speaker intentions and are constrained by the conventional meaning of the involved linguistic material (cf. Recanati, 1989).

4.2.2 Levels of Meaning Construction It follows from the observations delineated in the above section that a distinction between three levels makes sense in the study of linguistic meaning. A level of sentence meaning or expression meaning, which is the (non-propositional) meaning conveyed by a sentence or expression without context,⁸ a level of utterance meaning or what is said or speaker’s primary meaning, which is what speakers intend to say literally when uttering a sentence or expression,⁹ and a level of (conversationally) implicated meaning or communicated message, which is a message that is conveyed by an utterance in addition to what is said by that utterance. The exact distinction between these levels has been a matter of debate. Linguists who are considered closer to Grice’s views adapt a so-called minimalist

8 Recanati (2003, p. 13, 14) rejects the notion of a purely semantic minimal proposition. An argument supporting this view is that there are a number of cases in which the minimal proposition is not even entailed by the actual, intuitive meaning of the sentence. As a consequence, assuming a minimal, purely semantic proposition would be tantamount to assuming a level of meaning interpretation that does not have any impact on the actual utterance meaning. 9 The relevance-theoretic account calls the intermediate level explicature (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 182). This notion is slightly different from the contextualists’ view of how what is said is constructed, but both views have a lot in common (cf. Carston, 2013, p. 3).

4.2 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction | 31

view, according to which what is said differs from the conventional or sentence meaning “only when this is necessary to ‘complete’ the meaning of the sentence and make it propositional” (Recanati, 2004, p. 7). This meaning might be the result of implicatures, according to neo-Griceans such as Levinson (1983), Bach (2001), or Horn (2006). In contrast, relevance theorists such as Sperber & Wilson (1986), D. Wilson & Sperber (2012), or Carston (1997, 2002, 2013) and contextualists such as Recanati (1989, 2003, 2004) assume that what is said needs some inferential effort because “[i]n order to reach a complete proposition through saturation, we must appeal to speaker’s meaning” (Recanati, 2003, p. 14), as I delineated in Chapter 4.2.1, since the coding linguistic expression is always underdetermined.¹⁰ This underdeterminacy can be reduced by adding more words and thus being more explicit, but “full explicitness (full encoding of content) is quite generally not achievable” (Carston, 2013, p. 24). The distinction between pragmatic inferences that contribute to the construction of what is said and pragmatic inferences that contribute to conversational implicatures can be justified by the following argument: The construction of conversational implicatures relies on and thus presupposes the truth of what is said. Since the pragmatic construction of what is said cannot presuppose the result it is supposed to yield, the construction processes that yield what is said are necessarily not the same as those yielding any kind of conversational implicature (cf. Recanati, 2004).¹¹ In the present work, I concentrate on metonymic shifts as mechanisms that contribute to the construction of what is said, i.e. which affect the utterance meaning as an intuitively literal, propositional level of interpretation. Contiguity-based inferences are also present on the third level, i.e. on the level of conversational implicatures that arise in addition to what is said (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2003c,b), but these are not subject of the present work.

10 As a criterion for determining what is the literal meaning of an utterance, Recanati suggests the availability principle or availability-based approach (cf. Recanati, 1989, 2004), according to which what is said by a sentence is intuitively available to the ordinary language user in a given context of utterance. 11 For example, a sentence like He found himself a job and bought a sports car could have, in an appropriate context, the conversational implicature that the job is remunerative. The underlying utterance meaning would need to be ‘he found himself a job and then/afterwards bought a sports car’, based on pragmatic inferences on the part of the hearer who must interpret the underdetermined conjunction and in a specific chronological sense. Since interpreting the conjunction in a purely logical way would not allow the assumed conversational implicature, the implicature presupposes the truth conditions of the pragmatically enriched utterance meaning (the one that interprets the conjunction in a chronological way).

32 | 4 Meaning: Stability and Flexibility 4.2.3 Mechanisms of Meaning Construction Part of the discussion on meaning construction in general and on the construction of what is said in particular centres around the construction mechanisms. In the following, I provide a brief overview of the most generally assumed mechanisms in the construction of what is said, among which there is metonymy. In Recanati (2003, p. 8) and Recanati (2004, chap. 2) these processes are described as primary pragmatic processes, as opposed to so-called secondary pragmatic processes which are at work in the creation of implicatures when the propositional meaning has already been inferred.¹² The generally accepted processes on the way from sentence meaning to what is said are the processes of disambiguation, reference assignment and saturation. They are mostly dependent on the communicative intention of the speaker, so that “it is only through the employment of some pragmatic principle or other that the addressee is able to find the right value” since a simple rule falls short of explaining successful reference (Carston, 2006, p. 638). A hypothesis about speaker intentions in the given context is needed to infer the intended conventional meaning (in the case of conventionally polysemous items), the intended referent of an item that has been disambiguated (in the case of reference assignment), or the intended value of an open argument (in the case of saturation processes).¹³ They must occur simultaneously and affect one another mutually, the reason being that reference assignment can depend on the selected conventional meaning of a polysemous item, and, inversely, the selection of one out of several available conventional meanings might depend on assumptions about which of these meanings has a relevant referent in the context of utterance. Other kinds of pragmatic processes that contribute to building what is said are cases of what Recanati (2004, chap. 2) calls modulation. Modulation is not linguistically mandated (hence free) but is entirely context-driven or top-down. Recanati subsumes under this notion processes referred to as free enrichment, loosening or extension (comprising metaphor) and semantic transfer (metonymy).

12 I do not go into details of different classifications of these processes and of different views on the exact distinction between primary pragmatic processes and processes of implicature derivation. For detailed discussions on that matter, see Recanati 2004, chap. 2 and 3. 13 These are the reasons why Recanati rejects the idea of a minimal proposition as a complete proposition constructed entirely by the allegedly semantic processes of disambiguation, saturation and reference assignment (see Recanati 2003, p. 14, and Chapter 4.2.2 above).

4.2 Meaning, Underspecification and Construction | 33

Free enrichment (or strengthening)¹⁴ is a process through which items take contextual meanings that are more specific than their conventional meanings.¹⁵ In contrast to such interpretations, which entail the original proposition, the speaker’s meaning is wider than the conventional meaning in cases of loosening. Carston (2006, p. 642) gives examples of hyperbole or metaphor,¹⁶ in which the conventional meaning is applied to cases that are similar in some way, and Recanati (2005) also considers certain metaphors to be cases of loosening.¹⁷ Finally, metonymy or transfer of meaning, the kind of shift the present work centres around, is considered to be a kind of modulation process that contributes to the pragmatic construction of what is said (cf. Recanati, 2003, 2005). For instance, in the famous ham sandwich example,¹⁸ discussed in slightly different versions by a wealth of authors and cited here as example 12, Recanati assumes a metonymic meaning transfer to occur locally, based on the inference triggered by the interpretation of the predicate left without paying and by contextual information (cf. Recanati, 2004, p. 32, 33). This analysis of metonymy as a local process differs from a global interpretation in that the global interpretation would require the whole non-shifted proposition to be computed first, while Recanati’s view of metonymy as a local process emphasizes the increased accessibility of the shifted meaning ‘ham sandwich orderer’ due to the predicate. Thus, the local range of the pragmatic transfer process impedes the computation of the minimal proposition. (12)

The ham sandwich left without paying.

14 See Recanati (2004, chap. 2.1) for a discussion of possible overlaps and distinctions between enrichment, strengthening and specifization [sic], which can sometimes be used as alternative analyses of the same cases. 15 Examples are the possible interpretation of open in a sentence like Mary took out her key and opened the door, which is enriched into ‘open with the aforementioned key’ (cf. Recanati, 2004, p. 23, 24), or the enrichment of the temporal predication in It will take us some time to get there into a more specific temporal predication (Recanati, 1989, p. 303, 304). Recanati (2005) gives the example of Fr. lapin in typical uses of the expression porter du lapin on the one hand and manger du lapin on the other. The modulated meanings ‘rabbit fur’ and ‘rabbit meat’ are apparently seen as more specific because they are parts of rabbits, but since there is no taxonomic relation between conventional meaning and shifted meaning, such processes would be classified as metonymic (from whole to a part of the whole) in this work. 16 Examples of these mechanisms are the use of raw and rectangle in This stake is raw and There is a rectangle of lawn on the back. 17 As an example of a metaphor that can be analysed as a case of loosening, Recanati mentions the use of swallow in Le distributeur de billets a avalé ma carte de crédit ‘The cash dispenser has swallowed my credit card’. 18 It seems to have been introduced into the discussion on metonymy by Nunberg (1979, p. 149) in the following version: The ham sandwich is sitting at table 20.

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In just the same way that the other mentioned primary pragmatic processes must occur in parallel to a certain degree, metonymy cannot be considered as a process that occurs separately. It follows from Recanati’s view on metonymy as a local pragmatic process that reference assignment can depend on a previous metonymic shift. Inversely, a metonymic shift might just as well be triggered entirely by nonlinguistic, contextual factors such as the absence of a relevant referent of the nonshifted meaning and the presence of a relevant referent of some metonymically transferred meaning (see example 13). Hence, metonymy as a pragmatic process of meaning construction interacts closely with the other construction processes. (13)

Ich stehe am Hintereingang. non-shifted: ‘I am at the rear entrance.’ metonymically: ‘My car is parked at the rear entrance.’ (in a context in which the car owner wants to provide the hearer with information about the position of his car)

I enlarge on metonymy in greater detail in Chapter 5.

4.3 Conclusion Meaning can be equated with conceptualization from a cognitive point of view, in that lexical meanings are concepts (according to the definition of the term in Chapter 2.1) and meaning construction in language use can be conceived of as a process by means of which a situationally specific, ephemeral MR is constructed on the basis of stable word meaning, grammatical meaning, world knowledge and contextual information. Meaning construction can be shown to be at work on different levels of language use, not only at a pragmatic level, which reflects the view that meaning crucially depends on world knowledge. Furthermore, meaning construction seems to follow a number of recurrent mechanisms, among which metonymy and metaphor play key roles. The next chapter delineates what research on metonymy as a particular and highly influential mechanism of meaning construction has discussed and revealed hitherto.

5 Metonymy Metonymy occupies a key role in the construction of mental representations based on meanings evoked by linguistic code. This section is intended to provide an overview of the most widely acknowledged properties of the phenomenon also referred to as meaning transfer.¹ The aim is to lay the foundations for the framebased account of metonymy in Chapters 6 to 11.

5.1 Rhetorical Tradition and Cognitive Turn Metonymy as a fundamental linguistic and cognitive phenomenon, as it has been considered for more than a century now – with increased priority over recent decades – is probably one of the oldest components of cognitive models of language, since its discovery dates back to the rhetorical tradition of antiquity. One of the earliest descriptions is provided by an anonymous author in the Rhetorica ad Herennium from about 100 BCE under the Latin name of denominatio: Denominatio est, quae ab rebus propinquis et finitimis trahit orationem, qua possit intellegi res, quae non suo vocabulo sit appellata. ‘Denominatio is what takes its expression from near and close things and by which we can understand a thing that is not denominated by its proper word.’ (Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, 32, 43;² translation slightly adapted by AT from Koch 1999, p. 141).

This definition already contains what is today considered unanimously as the necessary condition for metonymy – thus differentiating it from other mechanisms such as metaphor: the contiguity between the involved elements.³ For example, for Classical Latin focus ‘fireplace’ to develop the meaning ‘fire’ in Vulgar Latin – which was retained in the Romance languages by Fr. feu, Sp. fuego, and It. fuoco – the

1 Overviews of the notion of metonymy and its development in linguistic thought are provided for example by Geeraerts (1994), Eggs (2000), Panther & Radden (2003), Panther & Thornburg (2010), Barcelona (2011), and Koch (2012), with slight differences in perspective and main emphases. 2 Listed as Nüsslein ([ca. 100 BCE] 1994) in the References of the present work. 3 More recent formulations of the same idea can be found in early modern definitions such as “[. . . ] désignation d’un objet par le nom d’un autre objet qui fait comme lui un tout absolument à part, mais qui lui doit ou à qui il doit lui-même plus ou moins, ou pour son existence, ou pour sa manière d’être.” (Fontanier, [1821,1827] 1977, p. 79), as well as in cognitive approaches such as “[Metonymy is] a semantic link between two senses of a lexical item that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of the senses” (Geeraerts, 1994, p. 2477). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-005

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copresence of a fire in a culturally typical fireplace in every home is seen as crucial because this copresence and the purpose-driven relation lead to a contextually strong association of the two concepts (and their referents). Since antiquity, the phenomenon has been the subject of discussion as a figure of speech in the domain of rhetorics (cf. Dumarsais, 1818; Fontanier, [1821,1827] 1977, but also Lausberg, 1960) and has undergone a reconceptualization in modern linguistics as a fundamental semantic and/or pragmatic and/or conceptual process with considerable importance for utterance production and interpretation at the lexical and grammatical level. There are already signs of this development in Fontanier ([1821,1827] 1977), who describes them as being “employés par nécessité” (‘used by necessity’, p. 109) because they can be conventionalized means of expression.⁴

5.2 Metonymy as Substitution or Ellipsis Like metaphor (cf. Black, 1983), metonymy has been analysed as a substitution mechanism by means of which the metonymic expression replaces some kind of literal expression or verbum proprium (cf. Ruwet, 1983). While Ruwet (1983, p. 260) himself observes that such a replacement is not always possible, his analysis is criticized more fundamentally by Blank (1997, p. 232) and Radden & Kövecses (1999, p. 18), who emphasize that different linguistic ways of referring to the same thing are not conceptually equivalent.⁵

4 Similarities between modern cognitive approaches on the one hand and certain psychological aspects of the philological tradition on the other are mentioned by Geeraerts (1988) and Blank (1997, Chap. I.2), and are also insinuated by the idea behind a collection such as Blank & Koch (1999). An overview of how metonymy has been treated in the course of its history is also provided by Bonhomme (1987, Chap. Introduction). 5 Radden & Kövecses (1999, p. 18) discuss the expression She’s just a pretty face, in which the shifted NP a pretty face is not conceptually equivalent to a potential non-metonymic substitute a pretty person. To this argument can be objected however that the substituted expression is probably not a pretty person but a person with a pretty face, which would be very similar to the metonymic expression. Nevertheless, referential identity obviously does not imply conceptual equivalence; in this case, one might argue that even the more specific paraphrase is not conceptually equivalent to the metonymic expression since it lays less emphasis on the effect that the prettiness of the face has on the prettiness of the person as a whole. Blank (1997, p. 232) follows a similar line of argument in his analysis of being in command of 130 (soldiers with) canons. Accepting the idea that metonymy is a kind of substitution might depend on whether one accepts the more literalist idea that every metonymy can be paraphrased explicitly in some way.

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Metonymy has also been regarded as an elliptical construction by Le Guern (1973) and Warren (1999, 2002). According to this view, the metonymy in Fr. boire un verre ‘to drink a glass’ is an elliptical version of le contenu d’un verre ‘the contents of a glass’. Since this analysis assumes that for every metonymy there is an explicit non-metonymic paraphrase (rendering the implicit possessum, metonymically made inferable by the possessor), it should be in line with the substitution view: the metonymic expression substitutes its explicit formulation. One of the major problems of this view is probably that source-focused metonymies like The shoes were neatly tied (treated also by Warren) cannot be modelled coherently as metonymic ellipses ([the laces of] the shoes, Warren 1999, p. 120) because metonymic and explicit formulation exhibit differences in terms of anaphoric accessibility of the referents and morphosyntactic behaviour.⁶

5.3 Metonymy and Synecdoche Metonymy is regarded as distinct from synecdoche in ancient and classical rhetoric (cf. Nerlich & Clark, 1999; Panther & Thornburg, 2010), but even though Fontanier ([1821,1827] 1977, p. 87, 88) considers synecdoche as a category of its own (comprising taxonomic and meronomic relations) early modern analyses also start to see similarities.⁷ For Dumarsais (1818, p. 115) “[l]a Synecdoque est donc une espèce de métonymie” (‘so, synecdoche is a kind of metonymy’), and subsequent elaboration and examples show that his notion of synecdoche comprises both taxonomic and meronomic relations in equal measures. While some modern cognitive linguists also propagate that taxonomy-based shifts such as specialization (pill for ‘birth-control pill’) or generalization (aspirin for ‘any pain-relieving tablet’, cf. Kövecses & Radden, 1998, p. 53, but also Jakobson, [1956] 2002, and Lakoff, 1987) are metonymic, early twentieth century authors like Nyrop (1913) and Esnault (1925) reduced synecdoche to meronomic cases (cf. Nerlich & Clark, 1999, p. 200), integrating part-whole cases into metonymy, a view shared by Blank (1997) and Nerlich & Clark (1999). One aspect of the controversy regarding the relation between metonymy and taxonomic shifts is certainly that the use of mother for the more specific concept ‘housewife mother’ (from Lakoff, 1987) (a case of specialization) can be analysed more easily as metonymic than the reverse case if we accept the contingency

6 See Chapter 8, especially Chapters 8.3 and 8.4 for a detailed discussion of the way in which such cases are metonymic. 7 I am not retracing the history of the notion of synecdoche here, but an informative overview can be found in Nerlich & Clark (1999, Sec. 1).

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criterion often applied to metonymy (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2003a, p. 3, and Chapter 5.5 here below): While generalization is based on logical implication, i.e. on necessity, specialization is not. Every housewife mother is a mother, but inferring housewife mother from mother is based on some kind of contextual cooccurrence. I suggest that, just as metonymy cannot be neatly distinguished from implication (see Chapter 5.5 below), a neat distinction from taxonomy-based shifts might be unjustified in actual analysis because there are cases in which a perceived correlation can be seen as consisting of a taxonomic or even an implication relation. For example, using aspirin in a generalizing way for ‘any pain-relieving tablet’ is based on the perceived correlation between the concepts (not referents) of ‘pain relieving medication’ and ‘aspirin pill’. This analysis is supported by the fact that the concept ‘aspirin pill’ does of course logically imply a large number of other superordinate concepts (among which are ‘potentially toxic substance’, ‘small object’ etc.) which are not meant in the relevant situations because they are not perceived as contiguous at that moment. Thus, perceiving and linguistically exploiting the correlation between a concept and a superordinate concept can be seen as metonymic because it is a kind of conceptual contiguity, even though there is no referential contiguity but referential identity.⁸

5.4 Metonymy as a Conceptual Shift or Domain-Internal Highlighting Metonymy is often defined as some kind of reference-based shift (see, for example, the definition by Geeraerts, 1994, cited at the beginning of Chapter 5.1 above) – even though the existence of predicational and illocutionary metonymy has been acknowledged. This is probably due to the fact that certain metonymic readings of referentially used nominal items were the first to attract analytic attention and that referential definitions can often be adapted to non-referential cases (like the face example in Chapter 5.2) in which the metonymically predicated entities are assumed to stand in the same kind of contiguity relation as if they were the referents of a referentially used metonymic expression. In the cognitive view, it is important, however, that the metonymic shift, whether referential or not, is anchored at the conceptual level (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Croft, 1993; Langacker,

8 Insistence on referential non-identity might be a consequence of the fact that the analysis of metonymy has begun with a strong focus on referentially used metonymic expressions. But referential shifts and metonymic shifts are not as closely connected as one might intuitively think (see Chapter 5.7).

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1999; Radden & Kövecses, 1999, and many others), and that the conceptual shift can be reflected by a metonymic reference shift in language use.⁹ Lakoff & Turner (1989) proposed a definition of metonymy as a mapping within a single domain, thus distinguishing it from metaphor as a mapping between different domains. Croft (1993) modified this view by putting forward a proposal of metonymy as the highlighting of a previously less highlighted domain (inspired by Langacker, 1987), an idea which can also be found in Koch (1999). The involved domains are assumed to be part of one bigger, unifying domain (or domain matrix, set up by the sentence in which the metonymy occurs) according to the hypothesis of conceptual unity of domain (Croft, 1993, p. 336).¹⁰ As a development of the domain approach to metonymy, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) propose two kinds of metonymic shifts. In source-in-target metonymies like the ham sandwich shift in example 12 (page 33) the source is a subdomain of the target. In targetin-source metonymies like the rear entrance example 13 (page 34) the target is a subdomain of the source. This dichotomy is supposed to replace tripartite distinctions that assume the existence of part-for-part metonymies – next to part-for-whole or whole-for-part metonymies – (cf. Taylor, 2003, p. 125), which are subsumed under Ruiz de Mendoza’s source-in-target metonymies.¹¹ In contrast to Ruiz de Mendoza and Croft, Radden & Kövecses (1999, p. 21) provide a definition of metonymy that relies on Lakoff’s idealized cognitive models. Metonymy is seen as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the

9 Despite the existence of predicational or illocutionary metonymies, metonymy is seen as primarily suited for referential use by some authors (cf. e.g. Lakoff & Turner, 1989, p. 103). Sometimes, the fact that nominal predicational metonymy is much less productive than predicational metaphor (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2001, p. 323) is considered as a symptom justifying this claim. This phenomenon is explained in turn by the observation that metonymies are one-correspondence mappings: i.e. there is exactly one link (or connector, cf. Warren, 2002, p. 117) between metonymic source and target, whereas metaphors often rely on a set of correspondences between source and target (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2001, p. 325). 10 Distinguishing between different subdomains within a matrix domain or between different domains without a matrix domain can be controversial. The distinction between metaphor and metonymy, interactions and dependencies of metonymy and metaphor are discussed in Goossens (2002), Geeraerts (2002), Dirven & Pörings (2002), Radden (2002), Turner & Fauconnier (2002) and Yurchenko, Lopukhina, & Dragoy (2020), among others. 11 Ruiz de Mendoza’s distinction is a helpful tool for discriminating between metonymies whose behaviour is close to literal word use and metonymies that function more or less like ellipses. A detailed discussion of his and other related views can be found in Chapter 8 of this work, where I propose a scale of metonymic focus placement ranging from literal use to contiguity-based word formation.

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same cognitive model”. Since cognitive models comprise all kinds of representations, including representations of linguistic elements such as form, they consider the conventional link between the two sides of a linguistic sign to be metonymic, which is contentious (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2010).

5.5 The Conceptual Relation Underlying Metonymy The relation that is assumed to hold between the mental representations involved in a metonymic shift is often characterized by means of three properties: contiguity, saliency, and contingency.

5.5.1 Contiguity From a referential perspective, the conventional referent and metonymic referent of the metonymically used item are contiguous (cf. Jakobson, [1956] 2002), which can already be found in the antique definition (cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, 32, 43).¹² Contiguity at the referential level corresponds (at the conceptual level) to the association of two concepts that play a role/correlate in the same context or situation (cf. Dirven, 2002).¹³ While the first authors to use the term contiguity in this context (cf. Roudet, 1921; Jakobson, [1956] 2002; Ullmann, 1972) rely on the intuitive intelligibility of the term,¹⁴ a number of influential cognitive tentatives ground the notion on models of complex knowledge representation within which metonymy is assumed to take place. These models are called mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985), domains (Langacker, 1987, 2008; Croft, 1993), or Idealized Cognitive Models (Lakoff, 1987) and endeavour to model relations between mental representations that are based on experience and can be flexibly adapted to particular situations. The frame notions used by Blank (1999) and Koch (1999, 2004), which are influenced by Minsky (1975) and Fillmore (1977b), pursue a similar goal. Other cognitive studies of metonymy refer to one or more of the aforementioned theories (e.g. Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Radden & Kövecses, 1999) or to other frame-based accounts (e.g.

12 Listed as Nüsslein ([ca. 100 BCE] 1994) in the References of the present work. 13 Conceptual metonymy seems to be understood as a regular contiguity between certain concepts that can be linguistically coded, but need not. 14 Koch (1999, p. 141) mentions that the notion goes back to English associationist psychology and sensualism as supported by Hume, Locke, and others and is not directly related to the view of close things in antiquity despite some parallels.

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Deane, 1988; Löbner, 2013, 2014), or assume some kind of relation or function to hold between the elements in metonymy (cf. Kleiber, 1995; Nunberg, 1995). Mental representations can be contiguous on a purely accidental basis and might allow metonymic exploitation of their accidental, situation-specific contiguity by linguistic means. However, it is generally assumed that there are a certain number of rather abstract, high-level types of contiguity to which most cases of metonymic shifts go back (see Chapter 5.8).

5.5.2 Salience Salience is also assumed to be a necessary condition of metonymy (cf. Deane, 1988; Kleiber, 1995; Nunberg, 1995; Koch, 1999; Radden & Kövecses, 1999). In a way, the notion of salience makes explicit what is implicit in most uses of the term contiguity: the situational relevance of the contiguity relation. The idea is that a contiguity-based associative link between things or mental representations only allows a metonymic shift if it matters in the relevant context. The salience depends on general cognitive principles (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999, who refer to Cooper & Ross 1975) and on contextual relevance (cf. Deane, 1988, who resorts to Sperber & Wilson 1986). According to Deane (1988), salience is the result of an activation spread from one concept to another, which follows the general rule that activation of the part activates the whole, but activation of the whole only triggers a minor activation of the part. Metonymy relies on an activation spread from the lexical meaning (e.g. ‘t-shirt’) to a concept that is saliently connected to it (e.g. ‘wearer of [the t-shirt]’, p. 336) in the context of utterance. In Nunberg’s words (1995, p. 114), in order to allow a predicate transfer, the function that connects two predicates has to be salient in that the target property provides “a useful way of classifying its bearer”. Radden & Kövecses (1999, Sec. 4.1) enumerate empirically grounded pairs of concepts that exhibit a salience hierarchy. For example, ‘human’ is more salient than ‘non-human’, ‘functional’ more than ‘non-functional’, or ‘good gestalt’ more than ‘poor gestalt’.

5.5.3 Contingency Panther & Thornburg (2003a, p. 3) differentiate metonymy from shifts based on necessary, non-defeasible relations like logical implication by propagating that the contiguity relation underlying metonymy must be contingent. According to

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them, the noun loss in The loss of her diamond ring chagrined Mary cannot be analysed as metonymic even if we assume that what chagrins the referent of her is the non-possession of the ring, i.e. the consequence of the concept expressed by loss. In Chapter 5.3, I insinuate that a strict separation of metonymy from logical implication is not convincing to me because among all the content logically implied by an expression the relevance of the implication actually meant must be explained in some way.¹⁵

5.6 Metonymy and Conceptual Distance Since the contiguity of metonymic source and target is a constitutive property of metonymy, the question arises whether this contiguity is a discrete phenomenon or rather a matter of degree. Panther & Thornburg (1998) endorse the latter view but apply it to a mixed notion of contiguity and salience when they state that the term toenail is a less appropriate means to designate a person than the term redhead because the latter is more salient and allegedly conceptually closer. Furthermore, Panther & Thornburg (2010, p. 257) formulate the hypothesis that stable, regular or intrinsic contiguity relations are more likely to be exploited linguistically than accidental, ephemeral contiguity relations. I see two potential objections to this analysis: It has to be clarified in which way we want to mingle contiguity and salience since the above analysis would mean that spatial contiguity between ‘face’ and ‘person’ could be weak in cases in which the face is not particularly relevant for the person, despite the strong meronomic relation between the two. Secondly, the analysis neglects the view that context influences the relevant contiguity relations. Hence, a toenail might be as relevant a body part in an appropriate context as the face is in many other situations.¹⁶ Since frames in general and the function-based frame model introduced in Chapter 3 in particular imply that there is some kind of distance between their

15 Hence, I tend towards considering the loss example as metonymic: First, the concept ‘loss’ has other implications not meant here. Second, a situation can easily be imagined in which what chagrins the owner of the ring is primarily the way it got lost, for example due to negligence. Another example: The sentence x is a rose logically implies in appropriate contexts that ‘x can wilt’. In a decoration context, this implication becomes relevant and can thus be the intended (metonymic) message. In the context of human courtship rituals however, this implication might be irrelevant because the priority is given to the symbolic value of roses, independently of the fact that ‘x can wilt’. 16 For example in a specific medical context, comparable to the ulcer metonymy referring to a specific patient (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2010, p. 241).

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components, I discuss issues like the distance between frame components and the impact of this on the analysis of metonymy in Chapter 11.¹⁷

5.7 Metonymy and Reference Reference, one of several communicative functions of metonymy, is mentioned in Chapter 5.4 above as a typical property of metonymy even though it does not cover all the ways in which metonymy operates. The use of the term referential metonymy does not automatically imply that there is a locally permanent reference shift, but only that the item that triggers some kind of metonymic shift on the conceptual level is used referentially. A typical case of referential metonymy is when a referentially used item undergoes a metonymic interpretation so that the metonymic referent is not the same as the conventional referent would be (see the ham sandwich case in example 12 on page 33). However, the term referential metonymy is also used for source-focused cases in which a referentially used item undergoes some kind of metonymic shift at the conceptual level even though this shift does not result in an anaphorically traceable reference shift (cf. Warren, 1999, 2002), as in example 13 on page 34.¹⁸ Furthermore, Koch (2004) describes what he calls non-referent-sensitive metonymy, by means of which the referent of the shifted item is conceptualized in a new way – one property metonymically activates another property – but remains the referent of the metonymic item. Koch provides the example of Eng. boor ‘peasant’ > ‘coarse person’, which seems to be similar to Lakoff’s (1987) example of mother ‘biol. mother’ > ‘housewife mother’.¹⁹ Nunberg (1995) adds a facet to the discussion by claiming that even in typical referential cases, in which the referent of the metonymically used item is not identical with a conventional referent of the item, the metonymic shift is a shift of the predicating content provided by the item and occurs before reference assignment.²⁰

17 In Chapter 11.2, I present some more views of the matter, which can be found sporadically in the literature. 18 I enlarge on differences between target-focused and source-focused metonymy in Chapter 8. 19 These examples differ from source-focused metonymies like 13 (page 34) in that there are not two distinguishable referents, one conventional and one metonymic (not even locally), but only one referent that has two properties, one conventionally primary and one (e.g. a connotated property) that is metonymically highlighted. The difference is reflected by different frame models (see Chapters 7.2.2 and 8.5.5). 20 This is in line with Recanati’s (2004, p. 32, 33) view of metonymy as a primary pragmatic process contributing to the construction of the actually meant proposition without the need to compute a minimal, non-shifted proposition first.

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Nunberg’s analysis of source-focused metonymies like 13 (page 34) as shifts of the predicate expressions, not of the referring subject phrase, has been criticized (cf. Kleiber, 1995) as being counterintuitive. Ruiz de Mendoza’s and Pérez’ proposal of a domain availability principle is an attempt to remedy this (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2001, see also Chapter 5.4 here above and Chapter 8.3) because it allows the assumption of a referential shift of the referring item despite the fact that anaphoric back reference resumes the lexical or non-shifted referent in the case of source-focused metonymy. Consequently, it is obvious that a cognitive model of metonymy as a conceptual shift interacts with reference but that the referential use of a metonymically shifted item is not automatically indicative of a metonymic reference shift. Furthermore, even in cases in which the metonymic referent can be neatly distinguished from the conventional referent, theories differ with respect to whether reference assignment occurs before the metonymy (metonymy triggers an actual reference shift) or after (metonymy is a purely conceptual shift). Apart from the different types of referential metonymy, metonymy is also possible in non-referring predicates (cf. Langacker, 1987; Nunberg, 1995; Panther & Thornburg, 1998; Barcelona, 2011). Moreover, as stated above, Nunberg (1995) also sees referential cases like the ham sandwich as shifting the predicate before reference assignment, thus skipping a potential original referent. Beyond the propositional level, metonymy is seen as operating at the illocutionary level (cf. Gibbs, 1994; Panther & Thornburg, 1998, 2003b) in indirect speech acts by means of implicatures, i.e. on a level of pragmatic meaning that presupposes the previous construction of what is said as a kind of “literal” proposition.

5.8 Metonymic Relations It is quite common among linguists to assume that most instances of metonymy in language use rely on “a relatively restricted set of metonymic inference schemas that are exploited again and again” (Panther & Thornburg, 2010, p. 249). However, which metonymic relations should be considered as high-level (each comprising a hierarchy of more specific subtypes and their subtypes) because they might qualify as elements of a reasonable taxonomy of metonymic shifts seems to be rather controversial (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2010, p. 257, 258). Two rather different examples of such classifications are provided by Norrick (1981) and Radden & Kövecses (1999). In fact, empirically grounded classes of metonymy constitute the basic way of describing the phenomenon in antiquity and are still predominant in the early

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modern age. Dumarsais (1818) lists nine classes with several linguistic examples for each.²¹ Fontanier ([1821,1827] 1977) also enumerates nine classes, of which the metonymy of the cause is the largest; it is subdivided into six subclasses. Partly similar classes are distinguished by Lausberg (1960, from the perspective of rhetoric), by Lakoff & Johnson (1980, with seven “representative” classes), by Norrick (1981, with 18 metonymic principles), by Deane (1988, with seven illustrative classes), or – as a kind of detailed, empirical supplement to the strongly qualitative analysis – by Kövecses & Radden (1998) and Radden & Kövecses (1999, with about 40 relations).²² Apart from the observation that certain abstract relations seem to explain the similarities between certain instantiations of metonymy quite well,²³ one reason for the ubiquity of empirically grounded classifications of metonymic shifts in ancient, traditional and modern literature is certainly the difficulty of properly defining metonymy in a qualitative way, that is, to name all necessary and sufficient conditions that determine a metonymic shift. This results in a variety of different approaches, which can be located on a scale with the two poles extensional definition and intensional definition. In the attempts to outline metonymy, there is a trend from pseudo-extensional to more intensional definitions. Ancient and many traditional sources rely heavily on pseudo-extensional definitions.²⁴ They provide no intensional definition or a minimal one that is sometimes too general from today’s perspective (see, for example, Institutio oratoria, VIII, 6, 23).²⁵ Dumarsais (1818) and Fontanier ([1821,1827] 1977) adopt a similar approach by combining a short intensional definition with a list of classes of metonymy, each of which is illustrated by a pseudo-extensional list of examples.

21 For example: container for content like in bouteille ‘bottle’ for ‘wine’, or sign/symbol for signified thing like in épée ‘sword’ for ‘military profession’. In addition, he lists synecdoche as part-whole shifts and metalepsis as shifts between consecutive things. 22 The classifications differ with respect to some of the classes and to the number of distinguished categories, but also regarding the reversibility of metonymic shifts. While Dumarsais, Fontanier, and Lakoff seem to consider most of them as unidirectional, Radden and Kövecses provide linguistic examples of both directions for more than half of the underlying relations. This corresponds to Fauconnier’s and Turner’s observation that metonymy is in principle reversible (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 1999). 23 For example, the high-level metonymy effect for cause can be assumed to be structured in at least three taxonomic levels, according to Panther & Thornburg (2010, p. 258 and Fig. 10.1). 24 A pseudo-extensional definition is understood here as enumerating some elements of the set as examples, insinuating an intensional rule that can be inferred from the example elements. 25 Listed as Quintilianus ([ca. 100 BCE] 1988) in the References of the present work.

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The change of perspective from rhetoric to linguistic semantics, especially after the cognitive turn in the 1970s, leads to more elaborate intensional descriptions in the form of constitutive or contingent properties (cf. Langacker, 1987, 2008; Croft, 1993; Panther & Thornburg, 1998; Fauconnier & Turner, 1999; Koch, 1999).²⁶ Correspondingly, typologies of metonymies result more directly from the qualitative assumptions on metonymy, are not necessarily based on ontological distinctions such as classes of contiguity relations, and focus on functional aspects of the metonymy (cf. Fauconnier, 1985; Deane, 1988; Nunberg, 1995; Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Blank, 1999; Radden & Kövecses, 1999; Koch, 2004; Löbner, 2013). However, more traditional metonymic classes (i.e. contiguity relations that are regularly exploited metonymically) continue to be relevant in today’s resarch (cf. Norrick, 1981; Lakoff, 1987; Kövecses & Radden, 1998; Radden & Kövecses, 1999).

5.9 Metonymy and Discourse The role of metonymy for the structuring of discourse as large language-based units with a certain conceptual coherence has been investigated by Bonhomme (2005) and Kern (2010). Metonymy can be seen as helping to construct discourse continuity, with topic-focus structures in texts being responsible for whether metonymies make their source or target readings anaphorically accessible. Thus, Kern provides an explanation of functionally different kinds of metonymy in terms of discourse theory while approaches such as Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) or Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Diez Velasco (2004) concentrate more on the cognitive functioning.

5.10 Metonymy and Grammar Metonymy is known to play a role in grammar and grammaticalization in different ways (cf. Langacker, 1987, 1999; Geisler, 1991, 1994; Waltereit, 1998; Panther, Thornburg, & Barcelona, 2009), even though the distinction between lexicon and grammar is not clear-cut (cf. Croft, 2001; Lehmann, 2002). One way of formulating this as a kind of working definition could be: when a change in grammatical behaviour, marked in some way on the surface, indicates an interpretation on

26 Roudet (1921) was one of the first to ground metonymy – and other factors of semantic change – on a psychological basis by introducing the notion of contiguity (between ideas), which was taken up by Jakobson ([1956] 2002), Ullmann (1972), or Blank (1997).

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the basis of conceptual contiguity, this is grammatical metonymy or metonymy in grammar. Mass-count conversions like in a water can be seen as metonymic (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999; Ziegeler, 2007), the separated part of a unique whole being singled out metonymically for example by an indefinite determinator. Since the metonymic shift is concomitant with some morphological marking and the respective change in grammatical behaviour in many languages (cf. Koch, 2014, p. 73), these shifts can be considered as related to grammar. In the same way, the semantic effect of certain word formation processes (to play ‘playing process by [x]’ > player ‘x’, see e.g. Norrick 1981; Schulzek 2014) corresponds to a contiguity-based shift within a frame, so that these processes can be seen as metonymic.²⁷ Some grammatical coercion processes can be analysed as metonymic (cf. Ziegeler, 2007), when the often rather abstract meaning of grammatical constructions (cf. Goldberg, 1995) is modulated (or coerced, in Pustejovsky’s, 1995, terminology) during meaning construction, for example, due to a conflict between conventional and actually instantiated argument structure.²⁸

5.11 Metonymy and Language Change When, over time, grammatical categories emerge either from lexical or from other grammatical material, grammaticalization can be based on metonymy. One example of the former phenomenon is the development of Fr. aller or Eng. to be going to into a marker of temporal posteriority in analytic future tense (je vais chanter ‘I am going to sing’).²⁹ The latter phenomenon has been illustrated, for example, by cases of auto-converses such as Lat. inodiare ‘[x] hate [y]’ > late Lat. ‘[y] be hated by [x]’ > Fr. enuyer ‘[y] bore [x]’ or Sp. gustar de ‘[x] like [y]’ > gustar ‘[y] be liked by [x]’ (cf. Blank, 1997, Sec. V.5 and p. 523, or Waltereit, 1998, pp. 79–83). A historical corpus-based study including statistical analyses of the development of argument alternations in French over time is provided by Law (2022).

27 Other contiguity-based interpretations of word formation can be found for example in Nikiforidou (1999) and Koch (2014). See also my discussion of certain morphologically marked processes as metonymy in Chapters 8.2 and 8.4. 28 In the famous example He sneezed the napkin off the table by Goldberg (1995, p. 9), the change of grammatical behaviour in the originally intransitive verb invites inferences on the basis of a plausible contiguity between the sneezing event and the movement of the NP referent. 29 It relies on a figure-ground shift between the change of place, to which the conventionally interpreted finite verb refers, and the contiguous posteriority of the action that is designated by the non-finite verb (cf. Hopper, 1993, pp. 80–86).

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The role of metonymy in lexical change has been studied quite extensively by Ullmann (1972), Blank (1997, 1999) and Koch (1999, 2012), who not only aim at explaining patterns of lexical meaning change but, at the same time, target linguistic and cognitive mechanisms whose traces have often been conserved in some way by (historical) lexical data. For example, polysemy as a possible consequence and symptom of semantic change (cf. Traugott, 1986; François, 2008) emerges from initially novel, i.e. pragmatic, meanings or uses becoming more and more frequent and stable. Metonymies as pragmatic processes that help to construct an intended meaning can highlight aspects that are more or less close to what is typically considered as the conventional meaning of a word (cf. Kleiber, 1995; Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011; Paradis, 2011) and shine through in originally metonymic lexical meanings as results of semantic change.³⁰

5.12 Conclusion Metonymy is a construction mechanism used to generate meaning, propositional or illocutionary, based on the semantic clues provided by (underspecified or propositional) language material in a given context of utterance. Within cognitive semantics, it is seen as operating at the conceptual level but can have a direct impact on the referents of the metonymically shifted items. Since stable concepts and contextually specific MRs can be modelled in frames, meaning construction, in particular metonymic meaning construction, can be modelled in frames. How this can be done is discussed in the following chapters.

30 Furthermore, many of the works in this domain highlight the development of abstract meaning on the basis of sensory-motor concepts by means of metaphor and metonymy (cf. Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Sweetser, 1990; Gibbs, 2003; Geisler, 2011).

6 A Way of Analysing Metonymy in Frames This chapter is dedicated to briefly delineating the most important methodological aspects of the study of metonymy in frames. In other words, it lays the groundwork for exploring structural invariants of metonymic shifts within our function-based frame model in the remainder of this work. Chapter 7 discusses the frame perspective on certain received views on metonymy and the subsequent chapters show that frames constitute an appropriate tool for discovering differences between superficially similar metonymic shifts that go beyond received knowledge regarding what is metonymic contiguity.

6.1 Metonymic Shifts and Metonymic Change The following citation from Koch (1999, p. 140) describes the relation between metonymic shifts as a meaning construction mechanism in the dynamic lexicon and stable lexical entities that originate in such shifts: [M]etonymy constitutes an ad hoc innovation that can potentially induce a ‘metonymic change’ in the meaning of the lexeme concerned, which thereby becomes (metonymically) polysemous.

A stable meaning in the mental lexicon that can be traced back to metonymic shifts will be referred to as lexical metonymy from now on (following Koch, 2004). In lexical metonymies, the “literal” (in the sense of ‘not requiring substantial reinterpretation’) use no longer requires the effort of a metonymic shift because the originally metonymic reading is already stored in the mental lexicon and can therefore be retrieved like any other stably stored meaning. Nevertheless, the metonymic shift can remain visible from an analytical perspective. Lexical metonymies are thus symptoms of underlying metonymic shifts and can be used in order to extract information about them. As such, they have been analysed by (cognitive) historical semanticists such as Ullmann (1972), Blank (1999), or Koch (1999, 2004) with the aim of obtaining information on the subjacent associations and construction mechanisms, as criteria for discriminating between different types of semantic change, and also in the search for information on metonymy as a cognitive process. Moreover, from an analytical perspective, the difference between lexical metonymies (as symptoms of metonymic shifts) and non-lexicalized metonymic shifts is reconcilable, as can be seen from the fact that both types of data are used side by side in papers on metonymy like Radden & Kövecses (1999) and Koch https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-006

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(2004). In practice, the biggest difference is probably that innovative metonymic shifts are typically discussed with the help of an example sentence that contains the metonymic shift, whereas shifts at the origin of lexical metonymies are often – but not always (see below) – discussed on the basis of paraphrases of the original and of the derived meaning.¹ However, an idea of a real or potential context is imperative in order to understand the metonymic construction process,² independently of whether the analysed data is an ad hoc shift or a lexical metonymy whose origin we want to ‘extract’. In principle, reconstructing a shift between ‘speed’ and ‘gear’ – underlying the by now lexical meanings of Fr. vitesse – requires as much knowledge or context as does the analysis of the shift based on the association between ‘ham sandwich’ and ‘customer who ordered the ham sandwich’, which is not lexicalized, whence it is illustrated in many sources by means of a whole sentence. This is why Koch (1999, 2004) provides example sentences – as a means to construe an example context – in order to discuss and illustrate the associations and figure-ground shifts at the origin of certain lexical metonymies (see example 14). (14)

Incendamus focum. ‘Let us light the (fire in the) fireplace’

Example sentences that mirror the context of the original ad hoc shift also help to carry out the analysis of lexical metonymy with a certain amount of caution and conscience of factors that can have an impact on how an originally innovative reading is being lexicalized. Abstraction processes, which help to make the stably memorized meaning compatible with a wider range of contexts, have to be taken into account (cf. Brinton & Traugott, 2005, on lexicalization mechanisms). The

1 For example, Radden & Kövecses (1999), who discuss metonymies of different kinds, provide example sentences and (sometimes partial) paraphrases of the metonymic interpretation for some metonymies (for example for container for content metonymies: The bottle is sour for ‘milk’, p. 41). Other metonymies, however, are illustrated by an example sentence without paraphrasing (sound for event causing it: The car screeched to a halt, p. 39). A third group, such as the place for product made there metonymies, is illustrated by the enumeration of several lexical metonymies of that class, even without a meaning paraphrase (china, mocha, camembert, p. 40). And a fourth group consists of lexical items with a paraphrase of the metonymic meaning/reading (wood for ‘forest’, p. 32). In a similar way, Koch (2004), as a historical linguist, provides many examples of lexical metonymies by paraphrasing original and metonymically derived meaning (e.g. Fr. vitesse 1. ‘speed’ 2. ‘gear’, p. 8), but discusses whole sentences when it comes to what he calls referent-oriented metonymies like in Ger. Sind im Griechen ‘(We) Are in the Greek (restaurant)’. 2 This follows from the view of propositional meaning as requiring necessarily some inferential construction work – and contiguity-based construction work in the case of metonymic language (see Chapter 4).

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analyses in Chapters 9 and 10 deal, among other things, with the (non-)uniqueness of source and target (in context and with respect to each other), a factor which can vary between several innovative ad hoc shifts that can still result in a single lexical metonymy because lexicalization abstracts from certain contextual aspects.

6.2 The Data 6.2.1 Sources The metonymies chosen for analysis in this and the following chapters were mainly found in the cognitive and historical literature on metonymy and in the TLFi.³ Some examples and example sentences were constructed or found by myself. The discussion of examples that have already been discussed in literature constitutes an indispensable means of relating my analysis to the received or alternative views. Given that the set of factors that can influence a given metonymic meaning construction process seems to be rather varied, comparing different analyses and models of metonymy is incumbent upon discussing the same examples. Since most of the discussions that concern current questions about constitutive and contingent properties of metonymy are based on English examples, these examples make up a large part of the analysed data.⁴ My primary dictionary source is the Trésor de la langue française informatisé (TLFi), the digital version of the Trésor de la langue française (cf. Dendien & Pierrel, 2003). Over 8500 entries in the TLFi contain at least one meaning with the metalinguistic mark p. méton. ‘by means of metonymy’, signifying that the marked

3 The emphasis is put on testing frame-based hypotheses about structural invariants of metonymy and identifying some prominent patterns by means of meaningful examples. A follow-up corpusbased study in view of quantifying these patterns would be an interesting endeavour for future research. Corpus-based analyses are provided for example by Barcelona (2007), Kern (2010), Law (2022) and Khishigsuren et al. (2022). Automated metonymy processing in texts, which would help to increase corpus size and statistical power, does not seem to be trivial (cf. Markert & Nissim, 2009), however, especially if a comprehensive approach to metonymy is to be adopted. 4 These examples mainly stem from sources including Fauconnier (1985), Deane (1988), Croft (1993, 2002), Langacker (1991, 1999), Nunberg (1995), Kövecses & Radden (1998), Radden & Kövecses (1999), Barcelona (2002, 2003b, 2011), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003), Paradis (2004, 2011), Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011), Löbner (2013, 2014), Schulzek (2014). Some French synchronic examples were taken from Kleiber (1995). Lexical metonymies that are treated in literature on meaning change or on metonymy as a shifting mechanism were taken from Blank (1997, 1999), Koch (1999, 2004, 2012), and Gévaudan (2007).

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meaning is assumed to have been derived metonymically from a meaning that is mentioned before in the same entry. The TLFi is based on a text corpus with texts mainly from the 19th and 20th century and follows a philological approach (cf. Schafroth, 2012, p. 371, 372).⁵ Therefore, among the readings marked as metonymically derived there are lexical metonymies as well as more innovative metonymic shifts, similar to the nonlexicalized metonymies discussed in the literature.

6.2.2 Differences in Internal Complexity of the Examples Representing developments and changes over time in frames is still a challenge for frame theory because functional relations that are concomitant with timebased changes in the attribute-value structure are less obvious and more complex than functional relations between ‘static’ MRs.⁶ The analysis of cases that involve any kind of comparison between MRs, over time or at a given moment, is just as challenging because this involves different values of identical attributes.⁷ Also, metonymies of dynamic concepts can require a high degree of decomposition of the process into temporally and logically ordered phases.⁸

5 This means that the meaning variants or readings listed in the articles – which have an extensive structure (cf. Schafroth, 2014, p. 185) – closely reflect, for a given lexical item, all the different readings that occur in the corpus, apart from hapax legomena. 6 Lat. prehensio ‘act of seizing/apprehending’ > ‘captivity’ (> ‘prison’, ‘prison sentence’) (Blank, 1997, p. 246, 520) is presumably based on a bijection between the process/act and the result state, which, in a given situation, share a common theme. While being quite intuitive, modelling the fact that the metonymic target is a state that is true for the theme argument of the metonymic source in terms of our explicit attribute-value chains raises quite a lot of questions. 7 The change of Fr. déjeuner ‘to have the first meal (of two meals) of the day’ > ‘to have lunch’ (Blank, 1997, p. 260, 261, 381, 515) is assumed to have occurred because of the socio-cultural change in the eating habits from originally two to then three meals per day, triggered by a postponement of the first meal towards noon (cf. Blank, 1997, p. 381). Thus, metonymic source and target were contiguous because the first meal was a meal taken towards noon, which is intuitively convincing. Modelling these relations in frames is challenging because the temporal ordering, required for modelling ‘first meal of the day’, is hard to render explicitly. 8 For example, the metonymy that underlies Fr. descendre ‘to go down’ (intr.) > ‘to take down [sth.]’ (tr.) (Koch, 1999, p. 155) or the analogous Fr. monter ‘to go up’ (intr.) > ‘to take up [sth.]’ (tr.) (Blank, 1997, p. 518) most likely relies on a bijection between the taking down/up of an object and the going down/up of the person that takes the object down/up because the going down/up is a key component without which the taking down/up cannot occur and, at the same time, the process of going down/up is part of exactly one transportation process. Specifying the functions between these intertwined processes, their agents and themes is a task prone to objections.

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The analyses presented in the following chapters are dominated by cases for which I feel able to provide a frame model on which some agreement can be reached without too much controversy. When I venture into the verbal or deverbal domain, the involved MRs are decomposed into case-frame-like structures – loosely based on the decompositions by Fillmore (1968, 1977b,a) – that allow some judgements about functional relations; I avoid deep decomposition of the semantic core of the verb (cf. Koch, 1991) at this point.

6.3 The Method The procedure that underlies the analysis in the present work is intended to produce a frame representation of the association between metonymic source and target for every analysed metonymy at the moment of the metonymic shift. Thus, it reveals which are the functional relations at stake.

6.3.1 Relevant Invariants of Lexicalization Metonymic semantic change proceeds from the target of a metonymic shift to a new lexical meaning via lexicalization. The focus of attention in this work is on the underlying innovative meaning construction process, both for non-lexicalized and historical, lexicalized shifts (see Chapters 6.1 and 6.2). Since the analysis of lexical metonymy with this aim involves all the steps of analysis that an innovative metonymic example undergoes, it can be described here as representative for the analyses of both kinds of data. Extracting information about metonymic shifts from lexical metonymies requires awareness of two aspects: 1. The new lexical meaning is not identical to the metonymic target. The lexical metonymy must be compatible with a wide range of situations. Therefore, some of the situation-specific components of the metonymic targets lose relevance during lexicalization. This, of course, has a bearing on reference and contextual uniqueness, which is not necessarily relevant for the metonymic shift as such either. It can also regard relational aspects – and the relative (non-)uniqueness that results from it – such as situation-specific links between MRs. As a consequence, the link of the resulting lexical metonymy to the configurations of MRs present in the situations of the metonymic innovation can be loose.⁹ 9 For example, the lexical metonymy Lat. focus ‘fire’ originates in the original meaning ‘fireplace’. Since the concept ‘fire’, such as preserved as meaning of Fr. feu, does not contain the notion of

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2.

The metonymic target at the moment of the shift might contain contextual clues not present in the original lexical meaning of the shifted item. Since lexical metonymy is the result of a lexicalization process that acts upon the metonymic target, and since the metonymic source might equally be a contextual modification of the lexical meaning of the shifted item, the two lexical meanings of a metonymically polysemous lexical item do not necessarily contain all the information that was relevant for the original metonymic shift.¹⁰ Instead, it is the target MR that is linked to the source MR in the situation of the innovation. These links can be highly context-specific or very prototypical.

6.3.2 Reconstruction It follows from the above observations that, for an appropriate reconstruction of the metonymic shift, the reconstructed scenario convincingly associates the involved MRs and fulfills the following conditions: 1. The reconstructed situation fits in with the context of the original shift, which might be historical.¹¹ 2. The metonymic source is based on one/the original lexical meaning. 3. Metonymic source and metonymic target are linked in some way. 4. In case of lexicalization, the metonymic target must be a potential base for the lexical metonymy, since the latter must have been further abstracted from a number of similar target MRs in the cource of lexicalization.¹²

‘fireplace’ anymore, lexicalization must have abstracted from that aspect over time. Nonetheless, the original meaning ‘fireplace’ suggests that the metonymic target, i.e. the MR evoked by the metonymic shift, was not fire but the more specific ‘fire on the/a fireplace’. Koch’s (1999, Table 4) construction of a putative context and utterance (here as example 14 on page 50) illustrates the difference between original metonymic target and later lexical metonymy. 10 Propositional meaning requires some construction work in all cases, as delineated in Chapter 4.2.1 (following Levinson, 1983; Recanati, 1989, 2004; Carston, 1997, 2013, and many others). 11 For example, reconstructing the shift that underlies Lat. comes stabuli ‘equerry (in charge of horses)’ > Fr. connétable ‘commander-in-chief of the armee’ (Blank, 1997, p. 514) depends on the role of horses in warfare and of the social advancement of cavalry in the Middle Ages (cf. Blank, 1997, p. 338). 12 For example, the metonymic shift from ‘wine-growing region’ to ‘wines from that region’ in the case of Fr. Bordeaux has occurred often enough to be considered a case of lexicalization. However, the target reading might have occurred as a [−U] MR (Fr. un bordeaux ‘one of the wines from the Bordeaux wine region’) in some contexts or as a [+U] MR (Fr. le bordeaux ‘the wine from Bordeaux that is relevant here’ in others – apart from other situation-specific differences.

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Given these requirements, modelling a metonymy in frames consists of the following steps: 1. Model the lexical meaning on which the selected metonymic shift is (most likely) based (according to the literature) in frames. 2. Model the innovative meaning or, in case of lexicalization, the lexical metonymy in frames. 3. Try to integrate both MRs within the same integrated frame by considering possible associations and modifications of the two in a potential context. Thus, the integrated frame does not represent the original lexical meaning nor a lexical metonymy. It comprises the source – a version of the original lexical meaning adapted to a possible context – and the target – a MR which could have developed into what is the attested lexical metonymy. Definition 6 (Integrated frame). The integrated frame of a metonymic shift is a frame representation of how the metonymic source and target are potentially associated at the moment of the metonymic shift. It is based on the relevant lexical meaning of the shifted item but can contain a certain amount of contextually motivated information, which is not part of the lexical meaning but can be responsible for the contiguity between source and target.

6.3.3 Example Reconstruction Determining the nature of the MRs that are involved in a metonymy and identifying the functional relations at stake can require a number of considerations, even with a metonymy like the following, which looks quite straightforward at first sight:¹³ The French noun plume ‘pen’ (< ‘feather (used for writing)’, cf. Blank, 1997, p. 231, 519) has been used metonymically in the sense of ‘writer’ (TLFi, “plume”, II.B.5.a) and ‘writing style of [writer]’ (TLFi, “plume”, II.B.3.). I model the shift to the target ‘writer’ here. The source meaning is ‘pen’ or ‘feather used for writing’, i.e. the sortal concept of an object that is used for writing. The metonymic meaning is paraphrased in the TLFi by Fr. ‘écrivain’, which is defined in the respective entry as [c]elui, celle dont

13 We are all used to the relatively straightforward treatment in literature even of metonymies that rely on highly complex conceptual constellations. This is due to the fact that analyses of metonymy mostly rely on the observation that there is a contiguity relation and sometimes on the additional determination of the kind of this relation. Decomposing into functional attribute-value pairs the components of the link between source and target can exceed this effort.

56 | 6 A Way of Analysing Metonymy in Frames < theme

< theme

writing


pen

writing en ag

os e>

text

writer

Fig. 6.1: Potential frames of the source and the target: MRs involved in the metonymic shift of Fr. plume ‘pen’ > ‘writer’. The ‘writing’ nodes do not seem to represent exactly the same MRs, despite their identical labels here, which demands for modifications in the analysis.

le métier est d’écrire pour autrui ‘someone whose job consists in writing for others’ (TLFi, “écrivain”, A.), also a sortal concept. Out of the variety of attribute-value specifications that one might explicitly add to the central node in order to describe the content of these concepts, I emphasize those properties that would typically figure in contextless paraphrases. For the concept ‘pen’, this is its purpose, according to the following meaning paraphrase: Instrument dont la pointe, enduite d’encre, permet d’écrire, de dessiner ‘instrument with an ink-coated tip used for writing or drawing’ (TLFi, “plume”, II.A.). Writing necessarily incorporates a [theme] argument, at least implicitly. Furthermore, the paraphrase has an implicit [agent] argument.¹⁴ For the concept ‘writer’, the property that figures in a contextless paraphrase is its typical occupation, i.e. writing activities, as can be seen from the paraphrase provided by the TLFi, cited above. Again, writing implies at least a [theme] argument. Therefore, the two concepts can be represented as in the two frames depicted in Figure 6.1. At this point, unifying the two lexical frames in order to create the integrated frame underlying the metonymic shift seems quite straightforward: The frames for ‘pen’ and ‘writer’ have several elements in common, namely the ‘writing’ node and two of its properties which only have to be identified with their respective counterparts. However, this analysis glosses over differences between the frames in Figure 6.1 which are due to the ambiguity of the label writing. It is certainly part of the concept ‘pen’ that a pen is destined for writing, even if it has never been used for it. Therefore, we can say that, in the ‘pen’-frame, ‘writing’ is an IMR that represents writing activity as such, independently of individual writing acts, or an SMR that stands for an activity classified as writing. If it was

14 It can be rephrased as . . . permet à qqn d’écrire, de dessiner qqc ‘. . . can be used by someone to write or draw something’.

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an IMR, all sortal representations of pens would share this ‘writing’ concept as the value of their attribute ‘purpose of [x]’. Analogously, it seems reasonable to assume that ‘writing’ in the ‘writer’ frame is the same IMR (shared by all sortal representations of writers as the value of their attribute ‘occupation of [x])’ or an SMR. However, this would lead to a contradiction in the analysis if ‘writing’ was an IMR: in the integrated frame, the presence of the attribute ‘agent of [x]’ from the ‘pen’ frame would lead to a bijection between [+U] ‘writing’ and sortal ‘writer’, a contradiction. In the alternative interpretation of the ‘writing’ node as sortal, identifying the two ‘writing’ nodes as identical is not justified because they do not represent identical entities (only entities of the same sort). In addition, the decisive thing about writers is that they create a certain content. The physical writing activity involving the pen is only one element of the process. This means that the identification of the two ‘writing’ nodes in Figure 6.1 with each other could be an error based on the polysemy of the chosen node labels. As delineated in Chapter 6.1, an analysis based on a specific situation, modelled at least partly by means of an example sentence, is more appropriate and probably the only possible procedure: The TLFi illustrates the metonymic shift by the sentence in my example 15. The concept ‘pen’ serves as a means to characterize and thus refer to instances of ‘writer’. The paraphrase of the metonymic reading is slightly less straightforward than in other cases: a blueprint paraphrase like ‘(writer using the) quill/pen’ is hardly appropriate; instead, a slightly more complex and specific paraphrase such as the one proposed in the English translation of the example renders better the role that the pen plays for the writer and her/his work and thus makes the sense of the metonymy intelligible. (15) [i]l a suffi d’une poignée d’écrivains courageux pour mettre en fuite des milliers de plumes vénales (Camille Desmoulins in Le Vieux Cordelier, 1793/94, cited from TLFi, “plume”, II.B.5.a) ‘it took a handful of courageous writers to put thousands of venal (persons who produce content with their) pens to flight.’ The paraphrase in example 15 reflects a bijection between pen and writer, in that each writer is referred to by means of the pen she/he uses (see Figure 6.2): The writing activity is writer-specific here, a function of the concept ‘writer’, just as the ‘writer’ as the agent of the writing activities is a function of her/his writing activity. In order to distinguish such writer-specific writing activities from the rather abstract IMR ‘writing’ in Figure 6.1, I chose the label to write. In the same way, the concept ‘pen’ is bijectively linked to the writing activity, since it serves as the instrument for the writing activity and is exclusively destined for and involved in

58 | 6 A Way of Analysing Metonymy in Frames < theme origin >

to write


. en p ag ccu o
m.

text

writer

Fig. 6.2: Association between source and target at the moment of the shift: integrated frame on the basis of the use of Fr. plume in example 15. The integrated frame represents the conceptual constellation that underlies the shift from the source to the target in the context of utterance of the example sentence.

this activity. The concreteness of ‘to write’ in contrast to ‘writing’ is also reflected by the attribute link from ‘pen’ to ‘to write’, which has been changed from ‘purpose of [x]’ to ‘activity of [x]’ and thus underlines the fact that ‘to write’ represents a set of actual writing events, not just a rather abstract aim or purpose. As a consequence, the node ‘text’ also represents all the content produced by a given writer, so that it is linked by a bijection to the writing activity. The analysis shows that the reconstruction of an integrated frame involves a number of considerations concerning the nature of the involved MRs and their relations to one another, and that example sentences can provide the necessary context in order to convincingly identify the relations between the involved MRs.

6.4 Conclusion The investigation of metonymy in this work relies on innovative, non-lexicalized metonymic data, as well as on words with at least one stably stored meaning that is assumed to originate from a metonymic shift. Many aspects of metonymic shifts can only be found in specific linguistic and situational environments, whence the analysis of innovative as well as lexical metonymy depends on sentences and utterances in which the shifts are embedded. Many of the English and some of the French metonymies analysed in the following chapters stem from cognitive and historical literature on metonymy. Most of the French metonymies, both lexical and innovative, were found in the Trésor de la langue française informatisé (TLFi, 2002). Modelling a given metonymic shift is a reconstruction process that involves several steps, notably the reconstruction of the source and target readings, modelling them in frames, and reconstructing a conceptual link that constitutes a plausible conceptual connection between the two at the moment of the shift.

7 Integrating Received Knowledge of Metonymy into Frames Semantics, especially cognitive semantics, has been analyzing metonymy extensively and intensively for several decades now.¹ Frames based on functional attribute-value pairs (cf. Barsalou, 1992), see Chapter 3, however, have only recently been described in an explicit way (cf. Petersen, 2007), and, in that form, have been used in the discussion of metonymy even more recently (cf. Löbner, 2013, 2014; Schulzek, 2014). This chapter is dedicated to integrating received knowledge about metonymy from research in (cognitive) linguistics into this model as far as possible.

7.1 Definition The notion of metonymy is still rather hard to grasp in clear scientific terms.² Research on metonymy still relies to a large extent on what is commonly called a working definition that aims at narrowing down the envisaged phenomena so that the members of the scientific community concerned have a sufficient idea of what the elements are that are being investigated. In this work, metonymy is regarded as a certain kind of meaning construction mechanism dependent upon language use.³ The analysis is based on linguistic evidence, so that I am only able to consider the conceptual side as linked more or less directly to some linguistic form. Therefore, I refrain from adopting a more strongly conceptual view of metonymy although its basic claim – namely, that metonymy is a cognitive constant that is broader than its linguistic appearances (cf. Lakoff 1987 or Radden & Kövecses 1999) – has some convincing aspects. Reference is an important criterion in the analysis of metonymy (see Chapters 7.2.2, 8 and 10), but it is not central for its functioning, which is why I do not consider it in the definition.⁴

1 See Chapter 5 and the literature cited there for an overview of the most prominent facets of metonymy as a linguistic and cognitive phenomenon. 2 The heterogeneity of the phenomena that are now treated as metonymic has been increasing during recent decades in the endeavour of identifying cognitive constants in linguistic behaviour. 3 See the overview of meaning construction mechanisms in Chapter 4.2.3. 4 Metonymy has also been shown to operate on non-referring items and even a metonymic shift of a referentially used item can be predicational in nature when it triggers a reconceptualization of the referent instead of a change of the referent (see Chapter 7.2). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-007

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Definition 7 (Metonymy, working definition). Metonymy, as a meaning construction mechanism, is a shift of attention from one node (the source) to another node (the target) within the frame of a linguistically encoded mental representation in context, in which the source provides access to the target. This definition contains elements of the definitions provided by Radden & Kövecses (1999) and Koch (2004) and of contextualist approaches to the construction of literal meaning as delineated by Recanati (2004). It combines the need for contextual enrichment/modulation of underspecified linguistic code, the idea of activation of the target via the source, the conceptual unity guaranteed by the common frame, and the involvement of an (invariant) linguistic form as bearer of the MRs. The traditional notion of contiguity between source and target as a necessary condition of metonymy is rendered here by the assumption of an underlying common frame. It can therefore be paraphrased as ‘the presence of the source and target in a frame that is situationally specific to some extent but may well bear a certain number of prototypical associations’. The emphasis on linguistic encoding does not restrict metonymy to operations on stably stored meanings. It reflects the view that metonymy arises in language use and operates on contextualized versions of stably stored meanings in order to generate propositional content.⁵ Based on what I show in the following chapters of this work, we will be able to propose a refined, more restricted definition of metonymy which includes what seems to be a necessary condition of metonymy, in addition to the general contiguity condition that is reflected by the underlying frame: Definition 8 (Metonymy, refined definition). Metonymy, as a meaning construction mechanism, is a shift of attention from one node (the source) to another node (the target) within the frame of a linguistically encoded mental representation in context, in which the source is a function of and provides access to the target. Like the working definition, the refined definition⁶ is general enough to cover all the different subtypes of metonymy that are treated in this work. This is important,

5 As mentioned in Chapter 4.2.3, meaning construction cannot be assumed to occur sequentially level by level, as if an utterance was first interpreted on a contextless basis, then modified/enriched by contextual or primary pragmatic input in view of becoming propositional (a.o. by means of metonymic shifts), and then supplemented with implicatures. Sperber & Wilson (2007, p. 482) highlight that these subtasks of meaning construction must occur alongside one another and interact in order to generate the intended contextually relevant content. Hence, metonymy cannot be assumed to work exclusively on one of the levels either. 6 Obviously, the refined definition is still a working definition, but it is slightly closer to an appropriate definition in that it contains an additional necessary condition of metonymy.

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because the shift of attention leads to a locally permanent shift of the referential node in target metonymies and to a shift of attention in source metonymies, to changes in property salience in [−R] non-referent-sensitive metonymies, and to a shift of the open argument in [+R] non-referent-sensitive metonymies. The refined definition has the added advantage of including what is identified as a necessary condition of metonymy in terms of the direction of the involved attributes in Chapters 9 and 10, namely the functionality of the source with respect to the target.

7.2 Metonymy and Reference in Frames Referentiality has regularly been the focus of traditional and recent approaches to metonymy, which highlight the stand for relation with respect to close things (Rhetorica ad Herennium, commented by Koch 1999, p. 140, 141), or the contiguity between the referents of the metonymic expression (cf. Geeraerts, 1994, p. 2477). Croft (1993, 2002, p. 179) considers a referential shift as a necessary condition for prototypical metonymies, and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003, p. 114), who acknowledges the existence of predicational metonymies, assumes that metonymy is better suited for referential use.⁷ This section argues that metonymy can be analysed as a construction process within frames independently of whether this is accompanied by a reference shift, even though referential behaviour can provide important clues on how to model a metonymic shift at the conceptual level.

7.2.1 The Conceptual Base of Referential Shifts Despite the ubiquity of referential aspects of metonymy, any metonymy-triggered change of the referent with respect to a standard referent⁸ can be seen as being mediated by a modulation process at the level of mental representations. Therefore, both metonymies that result in a change of the referent as well as non- or less referential metonymies can be modelled in frames. In order to illustrate the justification of the view that metonymy at a referential level is ‘merely’ a potential consequence of a metonymic shift on the conceptual

7 In contrast to metaphor, which is assumed to be better suited to predicational use (see my overview of views on metonymy in Chapter 5, especially Section 5.4). 8 The term standard referent refers to the “literal” (or lexical or conventional, or whatever you might call it) referent here, i.e. to a referent that is part of the denotation of the non-modulated item.

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level it makes sense to a imagine a situation in which referential aspects are prominent inasmuch as 1) the linguistic cotext alone does not contain a cue that indicates the necessity of a shift⁹ and 2) a standard referent of the lexical item is available in the context. In the card play described by Löbner (2013, Sec. 1.1.2) one of the players rejects a proposed card change with the words: (16)

I don’t need your bicycle. ‘I do not need your (card with a) bicycle (picture on it).’

There is no indication of a necessary shift at the lexical or grammatical level and, theoretically, the item bicycle could refer to the real vehicle of the addressed player; hence, the sentence could be propositional and true based on its nonmetonymic meaning. What triggers the metonymic meaning construction process is the contextual lack of relevance of the player’s real bicycle and that there is, in turn, a card that depicts a bicycle. The change in reference¹⁰ from a potential literal referent to the metonymically designated playing card has to be constructed on the basis of reflections about the link between the lexical meaning of bicycle and any relevant component of the context of utterance.¹¹ This inferential construction process is a process on the level of mental representations – and hence an object of analysis with frames – independent of referential aspects to a certain degree. A possible frame model of the shift is represented in Figure 7.1.

7.2.2 Referent-Sensitive Metonymies in Frames The fact that metonymic shifts can be analysed as construction processes on the level of mental representations (independently of whether the shifted item refers

9 There is no grammatically or lexically induced coercion process like in sentences such as He sneezed the napkin off the table (Goldberg, 1995, p. 9), where violating the original intransitivity of the verb forces the language user into a search for additional information in order to make the untypical direct argument compatible with the lexical meaning of the verb (see also Chapter 5.10). 10 I adhere to Nunberg’s (1995) and Recanati’s (2004) views that the metonymic construction process (as a primary pragmatic process, in Recanati’s terms) typically precedes referent assignment, so that what looks like a referential shift is more properly described as a predicate transfer (in Nunberg’s terms): while the metonymic referent is indeed different from a literal referent of the item, a literal referent is not necessarily assigned prior to the intended reference if the context provides sufficient clues for what could be actually meant (see Chapter 5.7). 11 From the point of view of the speaker, the construction process consists in anticipating the interpretation process that the hearer will most probably be able to go through. From the point of the view the hearer, these reflections are assumptions about what link the speaker might see between the lexical meaning and one of the relevant elements of the context of utterance.

7.2 Metonymy and Reference in Frames |

ev en th t > em e
n en ag ctio a
or re pp u su ict p


picture

playing card

63

Titus

Maggie

Fig. 7.1: Situationally connected MRs: possible frame representation of the shift in example 16 between two MRs of a [+R] attribute chain. The MRs are made available by the – underspecified, but contextually enriched – possessive construction that marks the presence of a (contextually relevant) link between the metonymic source and the argument ‘Maggie’.

or not) must not be misinterpreted as implying that it is not necessary to take reference into account in the study of metonymy. Reference can provide important clues on how to model a metonymic shift at the conceptual level. Koch (2004, 2012) distinguishes between referent-sensitive metonymies and non-referent-sensitive metonymies. The former are those metonymies that lead to a change of the referent if the shifted item is used referentially. The latter do not lead to a change of the referent, despite referential use of the shifted item (see Chapter 7.2.3). Since metonymies can also occur with non-referring items, a more strongly conceptual formulation of the phenomenon in terms of frames would be the following: Observation 1 (Referent-sensitive metonymy in frames). A referent-sensitive metonymy is a metonymic shift from the MR that is represented by the frame to an MR that constitutes a component of the frame. As such, it is best modelled as a shift from the central node to a non-central node of the frame. Examples of referent-sensitive metonymy are the metonymic shifts in sentences 16 (from Löbner, 2013), 17 (from Koch, 2004) and 18 (from Paradis, 2004). The lexical meaning of Ger. Grieche ‘Greek man’ in example 17 is shifted to (a representation of) the restaurant whose boss is the Greek person, and, in the same way, the compositional meaning of red shirt is shifted to (a representation of) the player who wears the shirt (see Figure 7.2). (17)

Wir sind im Griechen. ‘We are in the (restaurant run by the) Greek man.’

(18)

The red shirts won the match. ‘The (players wearing the) red shirts won the match.’

64 | 7 Integrating Received Knowledge of Metonymy into Frames

Greek man

restaurant > < boss

Greek restaurant

Fig. 7.2: Referent-sensitive metonymy: possible frame representation of the shift in example 17 from the central node to a non-central node of the frame, which leads to a change of the referent if the corresponding lexical item is referentially used.

Broadening the scope of metonymy has lead to the inclusion of cases that do not yield a locally permanent change of the referent even though the metonymically used item refers. This is the case in examples like 19, where the predication applies to one aspect of the lexically designated object while saying something about the object as a whole. The reference does not change permanently, as the (im)possibility of anaphoric resumption of either the source or the target shows. Such sourcefocused metonymies are a subclass of referent-sensitive metonymies and are hence modelled as such.¹² (19)

Er pumpte sein Fahrrad auf (und stellte es in die Garage/*und stellte sie in die Garage). ‘He inflated (the tyres of) his bike (and put itbike into the garage/*and put themtyres into the garage).’

It is part of the received view that metonymy can occur with non-referring items (cf. Barcelona, 2011, p. 10). Example 20a would be a case of referent-sensitive metonymy if the item was used referentially, unlike the purely metaphorical use of lion in example 20b (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003, p. 114). Hence, such a predicational use does not change the frame model. At the same time, the notion of metonymy has been applied to an increasingly heterogeneous set of phenomena – which was possible notably due to the emphasis on cognitive more than referential factors –, including conversational implicatures of utterances like in example 21. Such illocutionary metonymies are not the focus of this work and would probably require different models depending on its subtypes.¹³

12 The distinction between (more) source-focused metonymies and (more) target-focused metonymies and why both are referent-sensitive needs some more room and is therefore discussed in Chapter 8. Both classes are included in the discussion of non-relational referent-sensitive metonymy in Chapter 9, because they differ with respect to their behaviour on the linguistic surface. 13 Example 21, originally from Halliday, it seems, is discussed by Warren (1999, p. 129). Authors like Panther & Thornburg (2003a) would not consider it as metonymic because the relation is not

7.2 Metonymy and Reference in Frames |

(20)

65

a. She is a brain. ‘She is a (person with a powerful) brain.’ b. Achille is a lion. ‘Achille has certain traits that can be described by comparison to a lion.’

(21)

It won’t happen while I still breathe. Conversational implicature: ‘It won’t happen while I am still alive.’

7.2.3 Non-Referent-Sensitive Metonymies in Frames In contrast to referent-sensitive-metonymies, non-referent-sensitive metonymies, as described by Koch (2004, 2012), do not result in a change of the referent even if the metonymically shifted lexical item is used referentially. Such a metonymy underlies the meaning change of MEng. boor ‘peasant’ > Eng. ‘coarse or badmannered person’ or of Eng. child ‘descendant of [x]’ > ‘very young person’ (from Koch, 2004). The paraphrases of the original meanings and of the metonymy-based meanings are problematic to the extent that they allow two different interpretations in terms of reference in a given context of utterance. The first interpretation sees the metonymically related concepts as representing distinct persons: a descendant and a child in the case of child, and a peasant and an unpleasant person in the case of boor. Such shifts would be modelled in frames like referent-sensitive-shifts, namely as shifts from the central node, which represents the person corresponding to the metonymic source, to a non-central node, which represents the other person. The second interpretation – which turns out to be the interpretation intended by Koch – shows that the above analysis is wrong because the metonymic shift at the level of representations does not produce a change on the referential level, according to Koch. Instead, both the target and the source MR constitute conceptualizations of the same referent. This aspect of the analysis is of crucial importance because it is the common referent that provides the frame within which source and target are contiguous: the referent is the common whole of metonymic source and target. The phenomenon can be formulated as follows: Observation 2 (Non-referent-sensitive metonymy in frames). A metonymy that is non-referent-sensitive is a metonymic shift between two MRs that are part of a frame contingent (the source reading implies the metonymic reading). Cases of defeasible implicatures as connectors between direct and indirect illocutionary acts like in I am willing to lend you my car ‘Take my car, if you like’ (Panther & Thornburg, 2003a, p. 6), however, are metonymic to them.

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peasantry

> v. h a er be ear b


person

coarse, unpleasant

Fig. 7.3: Non-referent-sensitive metonymy: A shift between non-central nodes results in different conceptualizations of the same thing, like in the shift of Eng. boor.

that represents another MR. As such, it is best modelled as a shift from one noncentral node to another non-central node of the frame. Such a non-referent-sensitive shift cannot be modelled as a shift from the central node to a non-central node because this would imply that the referent (in the case of referential use of the shifted item) stands in a metonymic relation to a different target referent, which is not true here. The frame analysis of a non-referentsensitive metonymy is depicted in Figure 7.3. The metonymic shift from one property to another changes the conceptualization of a potential referent but it does not change the referent. In this way, the frame analysis makes it possible to discriminate between shifts from (the MR of) one entity to (the MR of) another entity, and shifts from one conceptualization of an entity to another conceptualization of the same entity. Although the word meaning shifts from ‘peasant’ to ‘coarse person’ in the case of boor, this shift is only concomitant with the actual metonymic shift. While original and resulting meaning should be considered as similar, either metaphorically or taxonomically,¹⁴ the actual metonymic shift occurs between properties of the referent, namely between the ‘property of being a peasant’ and the ‘property of being coarse’, because these properties are contiguous in the (contextual) frame of their common bearer. In other words, the original and shifted meaning of the lexical item are not identical to the source and target of the shift, but result from the fact that they incorporate source and target.¹⁵ This shows that a careful analysis of metonymy has to discriminate between the metonymic source and target on the

14 See Blank (1999) and his view of metaphorical and taxonomic change as based on similarity. 15 The same holds for the mentioned shift of child. While the original and resulting meaning are similar (their frames are strongly congruent), the metonymic shift occurs between two properties that are contiguous inasmuch as they occur with the same bearer.

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67

one hand and the original and resulting word reading on the other, because they can constitute distinct pairs. Like referent-sensitive metonymies, non-referent-sensitive metonymies can occur in predicational use. For example, the meaning change of boor might have been triggered by utterances like He is a real boor ‘He is a really coarse person’, where the item is used as a predication on the referring pronoun. This might even have worked without the characterized person being a peasant, just because being a peasant and being coarse were properties typically associated with each other (cf. Koch, 2004).¹⁶ The frame model of the predicational variant would be the same as for the referential variant.

7.3 Availability of Attributes in Frames Frame representations rely on links that assign a unique role to one entity with respect to another entity (cf. Chapter 3). Therefore, they require adequate attribute identification in order to be reasonably applicable to linguistic data. Provided that language data and its context suggest a metonymic link between given entities, what orientation does this link have? Context-dependence and contextual flexibility are a key feature of MRs as represented in the frame model outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. This flexibility makes the model compatible with findings such as the metonymic activation spread along certain patterns, from a part to its whole, for example, depending on situational relevance (cf. Deane, 1988, p. 332–334),¹⁷ or within a salience hierarchy that facilitates shifts from ‘human’ to ‘non-human’, from ‘functional’ to ‘non-functional’, or from ‘concrete’ to ‘abstract’ (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999, Sec. 4).¹⁸ They highlight certain regularities in terms of the links along which a shift occurs without neglecting strong situational influences. The supposed ubiquity or generality of patterns of salience spread, identified as patterns of the descriptive content of the involved concepts by Deane or Radden and Kövecses, raises the question whether a fundamental structural property of frames, namely the orientation of the attributes that link two MRs in a metonymy,

16 In this case, metonymy and metaphor interact quite strongly, as has been observed for a number of phenomena by different authors (cf. Goossens, 2002; Barcelona, 2003a; Dirven & Pörings, 2002; Fauconnier & Turner, 2003). 17 Deane combines assumptions about the structure of cognition by Anderson (1983) with the relevance theory views of Sperber & Wilson (1986). 18 For example, good ear ‘good (hearing due to that) ear’. Radden & Kövecses (1999) refer back to Cooper & Ross (1975).

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for >

tray

food

< support

< support

book

food

Fig. 7.4: Attribute orientation: approximate frame translation of Deane’s (1988, p. 341) view of the (im)possible activation spread in two only slightly different situations (see examples 22b and 22c).

> rp os e pu

rp os e pu

>

book

nt

e>

food

e ag

em

tray

reading th

>

supporting

node

Fig. 7.5: Default concepts: rudimentary frame representations of the concepts evoked by default by the lexical items tray and book.

might display similar invariants.¹⁹ Attribute presence and orientation as a matter of analysis can be illustrated by means of the utterances in example 22 (introduced and discussed by Deane, 1988, p. 340, 341). (22)

a. The nurse is holding dinner. b. Eat your whole tray, dear. c.

? Eat

your whole book, dear.

In a situation in which a nurse carries a patient’s dinner on a support, utterance 22a would be possible, independently of whether the carried support is an actual tray or a book (possibly because the kitchen has run out of trays). Apparently, the situation with a tray as support and the situation with a book as support are conceptualized in a similar way here. However, when it comes to a metonymic use in the opposite direction, namely with the word that originally designates the supporting object (tray or book) as source for the supported thing as target, the situations behave differently. While the prototypical situation allows a shift from ‘tray’ to ‘dinner on that tray’ (example 22b), the analogous shift from ‘book’ to ‘dinner on that book’ (example 22c) is contentious at least.

19 This aspect of metonymy in frames has been treated by Löbner (2013, 2014) and Schulzek (2014) and is discussed in detail in Chapters 9 and 10 of the present work.

7.3 Availability of Attributes in Frames |

to support

e> em n t e ev


st ru m.

69

tray

food

book

food

Fig. 7.6: Situational integration: ‘tray’ and ‘book’ fulfilling the same function in a specific supporting act described in example 22. Despite the similarity, the tray variant allows the metonymic shift (see example 22b), while the book variant does probably not (see example 22c).

to support

book

e> em t th n ve driver (cf. Norrick, 1981, and many others). In contrast to metonymy, such derivation processes are explicitly marked on the morphological level. 3 Literal use resembles metonymy when a literal referent is subject to a predication that concerns only one of its aspects (cf. Langacker, 1991, Chap. 7, for his notion of active zone). For example, in Le pantalon est sale (from Kleiber, 1995) the predication most probably highlights an unspecific part only. 4 My analysis builds on previous work by proponents of a more comprehensive account of metonymy, notably George Kleiber, Antonio Barcelona, Dirk Geeraerts, Yves Peirsman, and Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez – next to pioneers of cognition-focused approaches such as Ronald W. Langacker. 5 See my working definition 7 on page 60 or functionally comparable domain-based definitions by Langacker (1987) or Croft (1993). https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-008

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criteria. Therefore, research on metonymy needs some kind of statement about which cases are assumed to be comprised by the object of investigation. As a starting point, let us take a brief look at examples of the phenomena that I have just described as standing out above. There are . . . 1. cases in which a contiguity-based shift between the components of a frame takes place, but whose occurrence is morphologically marked by, for example, a derivational suffix: heater ‘something that heats’, morphologically and semantically derived from to heat and the frame it evokes. These cases have been recognized as relying on the same mechanism as metonymy (cf. Norrick, 1981) but are often ignored in literature on metonymy. 2. cases that are variants of literal, non-shifted word use and are not systematically treated in literature on metonymy, despite including a contiguity-based shift of attention: das Fahrrad aufpumpen ‘to inflate the bicycle (tyres)’. There is an attention shift within the frame evoked by the meaning of the item inasmuch as a specific part of the designated object is immediately concerned by the predication.⁶ At the same time, there is no explicit shift marker and the reference of the item is not altered.⁷ In between these extremes, there are intermediate cases that comprise, among other things, most uncontentious metonymies, like example 25, where there is a locally permanent shift of omelet ‘omelette’ > ‘customer who ordered the omelette’ (cf. Fauconnier, 1985).⁸ (25)

The mushroom omelet left without paying the bill. ‘The (customer who ordered the) mushroom omelette left without paying the bill.’

The variation within the set of potentially metonymic phenomena suggests that it is appropriate to describe (the construct) metonymy as a gradual phenomenon that occurs between two poles on a scale of contiguity-based shifts, one being the pole of morphological marking, which corresponds to the cases under a) above, and the other being literal use, which corresponds to b) above. The following two general principles shall guide the selection:

6 Among the first to describe this phenomenon was Langacker (1991, Chap. 7) with his notion of active zone. 7 Such cases open up quite a heterogeneous field whose unified treatment by means of clear criteria is discussed by proponents (cf. Barcelona, 2003b, 2011) and opponents (cf. Paradis, 2004, 2011) of an analysis as metonymy. 8 Fauconnier uses the North American spelling variant omelet.

8.2 Metonymic Continuum: the Word Formation Pole | 77

1. 2.

The object of investigation should not be restricted in a way that the described part of reality could be enlarged with no or little modification of the model. The object of investigation should not be so heterogeneous as to impede interesting conclusions.

In Chapters 8.2 and 8.3, I briefly discuss existing views on the relation between metonymy and the two classes of marginal phenomena. Chapters 8.4 and 8.5 summarize my view of the metonymic continuum.

8.2 Metonymic Continuum: the Word Formation Pole Several sources in literature observe that the semantic side of processes of word formation can be based on, function like, or consist of conceptual processes that occur in metonymic shifts. Gauger’s (1971, p. 136) term ausgreifendes Suffixwort (≈ ‘scopious, expansive word derived by suffixation’) describes those derivatives by suffixation whose original and derived meanings are related to each other because the designated objects are related in reality. This is a reference-centred formulation of the principle of contiguity, which is recognized in word formation by Gauger. On the basis of Charles S. Peirce’s work, Norrick (1981) develops a set of indexical principles that mirror patterns of associations between contiguous elements so that one element points towards the other. For example, a general principle relates causes with their effects – and vice versa – so that there is an indexical principle that relates a sign expression x to y if x and y are a cause and its effect (Norrick, 1981, p. 42). The eighteen indexical principles have eighteen metonymic principles at the level of semantic relations as counterparts.⁹ In the illustration and description of these principles, Norrick makes no difference between metonymy in the traditional sense and other phenomena that involve similar contiguity-based meaning shifts, such as word formation processes of the type heat-heater. Ronald Langacker, who is well known for his fruitful attempts to identify common cognitive invariants in different linguistic phenomena, underlines the common ground of metonymies and several other phenomena, for example possessive constructions (the boy’s watch) and topic or presentational constructions (On the table sat a nervous calico cat) by treating them as elements of a broad category

9 For example, metonymic principle 1 is formulated in the following way: “x is in regular metonymic relation with y, if x and y are conceptualized as identifying an effect and its cause respectively. (reversible)” (p. 86).

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of reference point phenomena (cf. Langacker, 1993, 1999). What they have in common is that they “invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with another” (Langacker, 1999, p. 173), the entity that is used as a vehicle being the reference point of the conceptualization.¹⁰ From this perspective, metonymy is also to be regarded as a reference point phenomenon inasmuch as “the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target” (cf. Langacker, 1999, p. 199). For the analysis of word formation (in Italian), Blank (1998b) adapts the approach he developed in Blank (1997). Basic principles of association (Assoziationsprinzipien, also termed Gestalt laws) like contiguity, similarity, contrast, good gestalt, strong emergence¹¹ and figure-ground are assumed to constitute the cognitive basis of meaning change (1997, chap. IV.1.2). Applied to word formation, this means that forming one word on the basis of another semantically functions like meaning change because the derivation of the new meaning on the basis of the original meaning constitutes the same process, the only difference being that this process is accompanied by changes of the linguistic form in the case of word formation.¹² Koch (1999, p. 158) follows this line of thought: contiguity based-shifts “represent a fundamental cognitive principle underlying several lexical processes which considerably differ from each other.” On the one hand, he shows by means of a frame representation of the complex concept ‘deprivation of liberty’ that the invariable French form la prison successively adopted several of the components of a common frame as meanings: OFr. la prison (subst., f.) ‘the act of seizing’ > ‘captivity’ > ‘prison’ > MFr. ‘penalty of imprisonment’ (p. 143). On the other hand, the same kind of contiguity-based shift within the frame can be accompanied by morphological change (of gender: OFr. li prisons (subst., m) ‘the prisoner’) or actual

10 In a possessive construction like the boy’s watch, the boy is used as a reference point for the identification/characterization of the watch (cf. Langacker, 1999, p. 175, 176). In a quasi-possessive construction like Fr. Il lève la main ‘He raises his hand’, the subject typically refers to the body to which the hand belongs and thus is the reference point by means of which the hand can be identified (1999, p. 190). In a presentational construction like On the table sat a nervous calico cat, the table is the reference point that affords access to the cat (1999, p. 196). 11 The German term Blank uses is Übersummativität. 12 This analysis can also be found in Blank (1998a and 2001, p. 123–135), where the development of Lat. caput ‘head’ > capitium ‘hood (cap)’ is described as a combination of a formal operation, i.e. suffixation, with a certain kind of associative relation, namely contiguity.

8.2 Metonymic Continuum: the Word Formation Pole | 79

word formation by suffixation (OFr. li prisoniers > MFr. le prisonier ‘the prisoner’) (p. 158).¹³ A list of examples illustrating that “there is no clear cut, but rather a continuum of lexical processes between derivation and MCh [= meaning change; AT]" (p. 74) – on a scale from none to obvious morphological marking over different degrees of change on the linguistic surface – is provided by Koch (2014). There can be changes in syntactic behaviour due to a change in word class (cf. also Bauer, 2018) or change in gender or number, based on/accompanied by contiguity-based semantic shifts (Koch, 2014, p. 73): (26)

OEng. cild ‘young person below the age of puberty’ > MEng. child ‘offspring’ (where he refers to the relational meaning, which I would paraphrase as ‘offspring of [x]’)

(27)

OFr. voirre/verre ‘glass (transparent substance)’ > verre ‘glass (vessel)’

(28)

Hait. Creole chita ‘to sit down’ > chita ‘the sitting’ and chita ‘stagnant’

(29) OFr. lunete ‘polished glass or metal plate of a circular mirror’ > OFr. ‘lunetes’ > (Modern) Fr. lunettes ‘spectacles’ (30)

It. gobbo ‘hunchback (person)’ > gobba ‘hunchback’

(31)

Eng. bank ‘establishment for custody of money’ > banker ‘keeper of a bank’¹⁴

Within the same ‘school’ of diachronic lexical analysis as Koch and Blank, Gévaudan (2007) presents an integrated model of lexical filiation, which sees lexical innovation as change or a combination of changes in the three fields semantics, morphology, and stratum (i.e. affiliation to a certain linguistic community or language variety). This view results in a three-dimensional space within which the ‘life’ of any lexical unit within a certain time period can be described in terms of continuity or discontinuity in each single dimension (Gévaudan, 2007, p. 63, Fig. 27).¹⁵ This space also allows for contiguity-based shifts which are or are not accompanied by a change at the morphological level.

13 In a similar way, the contiguous concepts ‘lemon’ and ‘lemon tree’ are verbalized metonymically in Italian by limone and by pairs of morphologically modified nouns in Spanish (limón ‘lemon’ > limonero ‘lemon tree’, by suffixation) and English (lemon > lemon tree, by composition). 14 See also Panther & Thornburg (2002) on metonymy and metaphor in English er nominals. 15 The change of Frank *werra ‘turmoil’ > Sp. guerra ‘war’ for example can be described as a combination of discontinuity in terms of a contiguity-based transfer on the semantic side, continuity (also termed identity) on the morphological side (only sound change has occurred), and discontinuity in terms of borrowing on the level of the stratum (from Frank into the precursors of the Spanish dialects). In contrast to this, Lat. sol ‘sun’ > It. sole ‘sun’ exhibits continuity on all three dimensions (Gévaudan, 2007, p. 63).

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Löbner (2013, Chap. 12) and Schulzek (2014) use the Barsalou-inspired frame model that I adopt in the present work and conceive of conceptual contiguity as the presence of an attribute that links the relevant concepts within a given frame. They model both metonymic shifts and processes of derivation as shifts of the central node of a frame to the value of an adjacent attribute and consider a bidirectional link between the two nodes as a necessary condition of the shift. I adopt a relatively open perspective with respect to the inclusion of cases that border on overtly marked word formation, the main reason being that even uncontentious cases of word formation function very much like some cases of referential metonymy: a metonymy like in example 25 on page 76 so much focuses on the target that it probably behaves more or less exactly like a potential compound omelet man or a hypothetical derivative omeleter. Both the unmarked and the marked meaning shifts make use of the meaning of the original item in order to characterize the target meaning, which is in the focus of interest: after the shift, the source meaning is not available in either the metonymic or in the derivation case.¹⁶ From the point of view of a lexical item as a mental lexical entry that comprises information about a number of aspects, among others about the different inflectional forms of the item or about open arguments and selectional restrictions, a word class changing shift can hardly be considered as a case of continuity on the level of the linguistic form, even if there are no overt derivational markers in the item itself. Nonetheless, such shifts appear from time to time in the analysis of metonymy in literature, just like overtly marked derivation: to porch the newspaper ‘to distribute the newspaper by placing/throwing it onto the porch’ < porch ‘porch (of a house)’ (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 37). Cases of mass-count conversion represent a similar phenomenon since they also result in different morphosyntactic properties and therefore must be considered as cases with a certain amount of discontinuity on the level of the form. Hence, morphologically less marked cases clearly fall within the ambit of my research. In particular, cases that entrain a change in argument structure while preserving the word class (like in example 32) or shifts that are accompanied by a change in uniqueness (like in example 33) are included in the analyses in the following chapters.¹⁷

16 I would not even be surprised if studying the parallels between mentally processing this targetcentred kind of metonymy (a subset of the phenomena that I treat as metonymies in Chapters 8.5 and 9) and certain cases of word formation resulted in the insight that they are conceptually closer than certain contiguity-based unmarked shifts. 17 Such cases do not figure in the list of contiguity-based shifts with different degrees of morphological marking by Koch (2014). Nonetheless, my relatively open approach to metonymy is

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(32) (une) structure ‘(a) thing that exhibits a certain structure’ (SC) < structure de [x] ‘structure of [x]’ (FC) (from TLFi, “structure”) (33)

(une) académie ‘(a) nude painting made in a/the relevant drawing academy for practice’ (SC) < académie ‘academy (teaching institution)’ (SC) (from TLFi, “académie”)

Observation 4 (Continuum from unmarked to marked metonymic shifts). Since there seems to be a continuum from morphologically unmarked to overtly marked contiguity-based shifts, limiting the semantic analysis of such shifts to a subset can only be justified for pragmatic reasons.

8.3 Metonymic Continuum: the (Quasi-)Literal Pole Several sources in the literature discuss the observation that metonymy-like processes take place in intuitively literal word use.¹⁸ An analytic approach to this phenomenon is complicated by the fact that many of the criteria suggested in view of distinguishing such cases from one another generate heterogeneous results and therefore have to be interpreted with caution. Fauconnier (1985, pp. 4–10) tries to account for the fact that examples like 34 behave like metonymy on the one hand and are similar to non-shifted uses on the other. They must contain some kind of contiguity-based shift, without which the predication would not make sense, but the original, non-shifted meaning of the lexical item can be accessed anaphorically, like in sentence 34b. He assumes that the open connector authors → books (p. 9) serves as a pragmatic function between source and target that allows the identification of the target by means of a description of the source. In contrast, the closed connector food → customers is supposed to be responsible for the behaviour in examples 35, where the target in a way replaces the original meaning.¹⁹ supported by Koch who states that some of the intermediate cases do not appear to be distinct from typical metonymy in languages with generally little morphological marking, for example languages with word class indeterminacy that allow the use of a given lexical item in slots for verbs, nouns, and adjectives (Koch, 2014, p. 74). 18 The expression intuitively literal word use is meant to refer to word use that is felt to be nonshifted or much closer to non-shifted use than uncontentious metonymies. Literal does not refer here to Recanati’s more general notion of what is said or speaker’s primary meaning, also referred to as literal meaning by himself, for any meaning resulting from primary pragmatic processes in meaning construction in context, which can involve modulation by metonymy (see Chapter 4.2.2). 19 Deane (1988) uses the analogous terms open and closed polysemy.

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(34)

a. Plato is on the top shelf. It is bound in leather.²⁰ b. Plato is on the top shelf. You’ll find that he is a very interesting author. c. Plato is on the top shelf. It is bound in leather. You’ll find that he is a very interesting author. d. *Plato is on the top shelf. It is a very interesting author. e. Plato, who is on the top shelf, was a great man. f. Plato, who was a great man, is on the top shelf.

(35)

a. The mushroom omelet left without paying the bill.²¹ b. The mushroom omelet left without paying his bill. He jumped into a taxi. c. *The mushroom omelet was eating itself/himself with chopsticks. d. *The mushroom omelet was too spicy. It left without paying. e. *The omelet, which left in a hurry, was too spicy. f. *The omelet, which was too spicy, left in a hurry.

Langacker is known for his comprehensive, integrated approaches, reflected by his quite general notion of reference point construction (see Chapter 8.2) and by his notion of the active zone (cf. Langacker 1991, Chap. 7, and 1999, Chap. 2.4), which aims at cases in which a given concept is evoked by a linguistic expression although the concept as a whole is not necessarily directly concerned by the relevant predication. The directly affected portion of the concept is referred to as the active zone. While the active zone is assumed to be identical with the concept as a whole in examples like 36 (Langacker, 1991, p. 190), Langacker considers it to be a portion of the concepts ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘David’ and ‘speaker’ in examples 37 (p. 189, 190): the dog’s teeth or biting apparatus, an unspecific part of the cat, David’s eyes, and the speaker’s name and phone number. (36)

The spacecraft is now approaching Uranus.

(37)

a. Your dog bit my cat.

20 All examples by Fauconnier (1985). I was told that definiteness marking (the Plato . . . ) is imperative if one is talking about one specific book, whereas the article can be dropped if one is referring to various works or a body of work by Plato. According to this, examples 34a and 34c, provided without an article by Fauconnier, would require explicit definiteness marking by the use of the Plato because the follow-up sentences make clear that one single work is meant. As a consequence, the distinction between the person and the work(s) would be marked more explicitly here than in cases such as examples 34b or 34e. 21 All examples by Fauconnier (1985) who uses the North American spelling variant omelet.

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b. David blinked. c. I’m in the phone book. While the observation that there are differences between the involvement of the different parts in examples 37 is certainly correct, the three sentences differ with respect to linguistic behaviour, which suggests that the involved shifts to the relevant parts are not exactly the same. While examples 37a and 37b do not allow an immediate paraphrase of the active zone like in examples 38a to 38e – which is observed and taken into account by Langacker – this is possible in example 38f. Moreover, stating that example 36 represents a case of identity of the active zone and trajector²² is more contentious than it seems at first sight. Since active zones are not necessarily concrete physical entities, but can also be more abstract things that are associated with a concept (cf. Langacker, 1991, p. 192) – such as the sound of a piano in example 39 (Langacker, 1991, p. 189) –, abstract information like weight, age, or place of construction might also be regarded as parts of the frame of ‘spacecraft’. But do they approach Uranus just like all the physical parts do? A more detailed account of the nature and prominence of all kinds of knowledge associated with a spacecraft is probably necessary in order to reasonably treat this phenomenon. (38)

a. *The teeth of your dog bit my cat. b. *Your dog bit a part of my cat. c. *Your dog bit my cat with its teeth. d. *David’s eye blinked. e. *David blinked with his eyes. f. My name/phone number is in the phone book.

(39)

a. She heard the piano. b. She heard the sound of the piano.

Based on examples like 40a, which are metonymic inasmuch as there must be some kind of shift that links the speaker to his/her car, and which are at the same time close to literal use inasmuch as only the literal referent can be accessed anaphorically (example 40b), but not the metonymic referent (example 40c), Nunberg (1995) proposes his predicate transfer analysis in which the predicate expression is assumed to shift instead of the referring personal pronoun. Thus, the transferred reading of parked out back would describe “a property of persons, the property they possess in [sic] virtue of the locations of their cars” (p. 111). The same is supposed

22 The term trajector designates the highlighted entity in Langacker’s model and terminology.

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to occur before referent assignment in referential uses of a shifted ham sandwich like in example 41. (40)

a. I am parked out back. b. I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes. c. *I am parked out back and may not start.

(41)

The ham sandwich is at table 7.

Nunberg also adapts this analysis to referentially used NPs like in example 41 – which do exhibit a referent different from the normal referent of the common noun – by arguing that the shift occurs at the level of the meaning of the noun sandwich before referent assignment rather than on the level of the referent of the NP the sandwich. Kleiber (1995) proposes an account that does not rely on predicate transfer for different reasons.²³ Instead, he decides to make use of a principle of integrated metonymy.²⁴ According to this principle, some characteristics of certain parts can characterize the whole (cf. Kleiber, 1995, p. 123). In examples 42 to 45, this means that the predications can be true for the wholes designated by the NPs even if not all parts or aspects of these wholes satisfy the predications (p. 125). (42)

Le pantalon est sale. ‘(Certain parts of) The trousers are dirty.’

(43)

Paul est vouté. literally: ‘Paul(’s back) is vaulted’ = ‘Paul is hunchbacked’

(44)

Paul est bronzé. ‘Paul(’s skin) is tanned.’

(45)

Le stylo est rouge. ‘The (ink contained/mark drawn by the) pen is red.’ or ‘(All or a large part of the exterior of) The pen is red.’

Kleiber’s principle of integrated metonymy is not to be misunderstood as stating that the predications in the above examples are just vague predications applied fuzzily to the whole. Instead, the concerned part is often quite specific and the satisfaction of the predication by parts other than the targeted one would contradict

23 He observes that there is no real argument for why the predicate should shift instead of the referring NP or noun, and that the shifted meaning of the predicate is much more vague than the meaning of the shifted NP or noun would be (cf. Kleiber, 1995, Sec. 4). 24 Principe de métonymie intégrée, proposed and applied in Kleiber (1987, 1994) and others.

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what is actually meant in many cases. For example, stating that an apple is red is by default interpreted as the apple having a red skin.²⁵ I like Kleiber’s explicit observation that a part characterizes the whole because, in the case of the metonymies like those in examples 42 to 45, it emphasizes the fact that there is a metonymic shift from the whole to its part, and that this shift does not aim at characterizing the part by means of the whole, but rather the whole by its relevant part.²⁶ Among the first to explicitly propagate a continuum between literal use and referential metonymy are Croft (1993, 2002) and Barcelona (2002), although with different opinions on the nature or limits of this continuum. Croft (1993) – here reported based on the revised version as Croft (2002) – highlights certain parallels between what he considers as a typical metonymy (such as example 46) and what is “not an example of metonymy in the usual sense” (p. 180) (such as example 47). The shift to the target ‘work of Proust’ in example 46 is analysed as metonymic, the shifts in examples 47 are not, however, because the profiled elements, i.e. the physical body of the book and the subject or content of the book are considered as “highly intrinsic” to the concerned concept.²⁷ Despite the difference between examples 46 and 47, Croft assumes the existence of a “continuum between the clear cases of metonymy and the highlighting of highly intrinsic facets of a concepts” (p. 180). (46)

Proust is tough to read.²⁸

(47)

a. This book is heavy. b. This book is a history of Iraq.

To Barcelona (2002, p. 227) and Ruiz de Mendoza (2003, p. 127), however, example 47b is metonymic: the semantic content of the book, which is the element of the

25 This integrated metonymic shift is so stable that a more explicit description like the apple is (really) entirely red (even on the inside) would be required to highlight the fact that an apple is entirely red on the outside and inside. On the level of the targeted skin of the apple, however, the predication is indeed fuzzy inasmuch as this skin can have brown spots without the predication becoming false. I briefly come back to this aspect in the discussion of metonymic distance in frames, in Chapter 11, especially Chapter 11.4.4. 26 These opposed metonymy-based strategies are at the core of my distinction between sourcefocused metonymies and target-focused metonymies as poles of a metonymic continuum that I develop in Chapter 8.5. 27 The notion of intrinsicness has been borrowed from Langacker (1987, Chap. 4.2.2) who uses it as one of four criteria to assess the degree to which a certain kind of knowledge is central to a given concept. 28 In fact, earlier literature such as Fauconnier (1985) already contains the observation that such metonymies are not typically referential since the source ‘Proust (person)’ remains accessible.

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concept ‘book’ that is highlighted in the example, can be shown to be non-central.²⁹ Indeed, the target can be distinguished from the source by a paraphrase such as the content of the book . . . , whereas an analogous paraphrase of example 47a is less obvious: ? The physical support/body of the book is heavy. To Barcelona, example 47a is “peripherally metonymic” (Barcelona, 2011, p. 18), due to his way of structuring the continuum between uncontentious metonymies and facet highlighting into at least three degrees of metonymicity (cf. Barcelona, 2002, 2011). Schematic metonymies, the superordinate category that includes typical and prototypical metonymies, consist of a mapping within the same overall domain with the source providing mental access to the target (see example 47a).³⁰ Typical metonymies are “schematic metonymies whose target is clearly distinct from the source” (Barcelona, 2002, p. 228). They correspond to whole-for-part metonymies or to part-for-whole or to part-for-part metonymies (cf. Barcelona, 2011, p. 20). Typical metonymies include prototypical metonymies, but also cases such as example 47b, which is not prototypical. A prototypical metonymy is a “highly typical referential metonymy [. . . ] whose target and referent is an individual entity, or a collection of individual entities. [. . . T]he referential function of these metonymies is readily perceived by language users” (Barcelona, 2011, p. 21). It constitutes the most restricted group; one example is the omelette shift in example 25 on page 76. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) do not speak of a continuum or scale of metonymicity, but instead distinguish two groups, based on a domain approach to metonymy inspired by Langacker and Croft. The two-fold distinction has the advantage of providing an explanation for differences in anaphoric reference which exist precisely between

29 I disagree with or totally misunderstand Ruiz de Mendoza’s application of the three criteria genericity, characteristicness, and conventionality to the example: He argues that books are not generally histories (genericity violated), are not conventionally considered to be histories (conventionality violated), and are not the only items that are/can be histories (characteristicness violated). While what he sais is of course true, it does not prove the violation of the three criteria because he should have tested whether books have a ‘subject’ or ‘content’ since these are the aspects/attributes of ‘book’ that are highlighted by means of the value specification ‘history of Iraq’. Thus, the test would reflect a violation of characteristicness only, because books generically have contents and this is conventionally known. 30 In order to be able to express himself clearly despite the relation of inclusion between the classes, Barcelona uses purely schematic to designate metonymies that are schematic but not typical or prototypical (cf. Barcelona, 2011, p. 26), such as example 47a, where source and target are hard to separate. This view “entails that most uses of a linguistic expression (especially a word) in context will be metonymic in the purely schematic sense” (Barcelona, 2011, p. 26).

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typical referential metonymies like 48a and the more contentious cases, closer to literary use, that are under discussion in this section, like example 49a. (48)

a. The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. b.

(49)

? The

ham sandwich is waiting for his check and it looks rather stale.

a. Nixon bombed Hanoi and he knew what he was doing. b.

? Nixon

bombed Hanoi, but theysoldiers were under orders.

While ham sandwich refers to the customer and the reference shift is locally permanent inasmuch as only the metonymic referent can be accessed anaphorically (see also Fauconnier’s (1985) and Nunberg’s (1995) similar examples and observations), in 49a, there is no locally permanent shift to the target MR ‘(some of) Nixon’s soldiers’ because only the metonymic source ‘Nixon (himself)’ can be evoked anaphorically (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003, p. 117). Ruiz de Mendoza’s explanation for this phenomenon is the following: The ham sandwich case is a source-in-target metonymy inasmuch as the target constitutes the matrix domain with the source as one of its subdomains; the Nixon case is a targetin-source metonymy inasmuch as the source constitutes the matrix domain and the target is one of its subdomains. Since for anaphoric reference “it is preferable to have a clear, unambiguous domain, and matrix domains usually qualify better in this respect than subdomains” according to Ruiz de Mendoza (p. 116), the matrix domain is, in both cases, selected for reference, which is the target in the source-intarget metonymy (ham sandwich) and the source in the target-in-source metonymy (Nixon). Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011, pp. 90–96) make use of Ruiz de Mendoza’s distinction in order to account for different cases of the metonymic scale like examples 50 to 54, of which they classify all but example 54 as metonymies, although of different natures, namely source-in-target and target-in-source. (50)

a. The red shirts won the match. b.

? The

red shirts won the match and had to be cleaned thoroughly.

(51)

The kettle is boiling.

(52)

This book is utterly boring.

(53)

The book is thick as well as boring.

(54)

Your dog bit my cat.

I agree with Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011) that Ruiz de Mendoza’s distinction captures crucial differences in conceptualization and therefore provides a helpful insight into the semantic/conceptual differences between the discussed phenomena, with the following reservations, because of which I argue for a modified

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model influenced by their distinction and by Kleiber’s (1995) notion of integrated metonymy. The first objection is that the distinction between source-in-target or targetin-source is too static, for which Ruiz de Mendoza’s analysis of the Sean Connery shifts (examples 55 and 56) seems to be symptomatic. Since Ruiz de Mendoza sees ‘Sean Connery’ necessarily as the matrix domain and ‘James Bond’ as a subdomain of the matrix domain, sentence 55a is assumed to be an example of a target-insource metonymy, while sentence 56a constitutes an example of a source-in-target metonymy (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003, p. 116). (55)

a. In Goldfinger, Sean Connery (= James Bond) saves the world from a nuclear disaster, but he had trouble achieving it. b.

(56)

? In

Goldfinger, Sean Connery (= James Bond) saves the world from a nuclear disaster, but I don’t understand why he (= Sean Connery) sometimes tends to overact.

a. James Bond (= Sean Connery) was fairly convincing in Goldfinger, but he sometimes tends to overact. b.

? James Bond (= Sean Connery) was fairly convincing in Goldfinger, but I

don’t understand why he (= James Bond) took so long to save the world. Ruiz de Mendoza shows that combining the source and the target reading by means of anaphora is impossible (examples 55b and 56b). He argues that it is always the matrix domain that is used for reference, which means that in example 55, ‘Sean Connery’ would be always the referent. This, however, contradicts example 55b, in which reference is only possible to ‘James Bond’, the metonymic target. Hence, Ruiz de Mendoza’s error lies in classifying example 55a as a case of target-in-source metonymy, I suppose: only the metonymic targets are available in both examples 55a and 56a. Therefore, both metonymies are of the same type: there is a shift from the source to the target, after which only the target remains accessible.³¹ This shows that Ruiz de Mendoza’s basic assumption that the matrix-subdomain relation between ‘Sean Connery’ and ‘James Bond’ is fixed (in that the first is

31 The underlying problem is, I surmise, that Ruiz de Mendoza assumes the concepts ‘Sean Connery’ and ‘James Bond’ to be always in the same relation with each other, so that ‘Sean Connery’ must constitute the matrix in both examples. The linguistic data, however, according to which the respective target (‘James Bond’ in 55a and ‘Sean Connery’ in 56a) is in focus in both examples (55a and 56a), strongly suggests that one time ‘Sean Connery’ is used to conceptualize ‘James Bond’ and one time vice versa. Thus, the examples are not similar in that they both use ‘Sean Connery’ as matrix domain and ‘James Bond’ as subdomain, but in that they are both cases of target-focused metonymies. And the examples are different in that they rely on a respectively inversed matrix-subdomain relation while being both source-in-target metonymies.

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always the matrix domain) is probably too static. Therefore, I suggest that matrixsubdomain constellations are flexible and may not be presupposed before the semantic analysis.³² Another argument for a flexible view of the matrix-subdomain constellation is that, in some cases, exactly the same source-target pair can be used in the form of a source-focused metonymy or in the form of a target-focused metonymy, depending on whether the speaker wants to emphasize characteristics of the source by means of the target or characterize/identify the target by means of the source. The sentences in examples 57 represent such a case. Both involve the individual concept ‘Lufthansa company’ as their metonymic source, verbalized habitually by the item Lufthansa, and the sortal MR ‘(an) aircraft belonging to Lufthansa’ as metonymic target. The only difference lies in the fact that 57a is a target-focused metonymy inasmuch as the source is a means to identify/characterize the metonymic target, which is at the centre of attention, while 57b is a source-focused metonymy inasmuch as the metonymic target (the aeroplane that actually made the flight) is used as a crucial element in the predication and thus serves as a means to provide information about the source (the company as a whole), which is at the centre of attention. Thus, exactly the same conceptual constellation can be construed and verbalized in the form of a source-focused or a target-focused metonymy, depending on the communicative intention. (57)

a. Eine Lufthansa hat einen Streckenrekord aufgestellt. ‘A Lufthansa (aircraft) set a record for non-stop flight.’ b. Lufthansa hat einen Streckenrekord aufgestellt. ‘Lufthansa set a record for non-stop flight.’

The second objection to the dichotomy is that its binary nature could be too restrictive. There are extreme cases of both kinds of metonymy, source-in-target and target-in-source, but there are also intermediate cases which the notion of inclusion, a metaphor that is obviously committed to a dichotomy, cannot really capture. In example 58, the source can be resumed anaphorically (a property of metonymy with focus on the source), but the anaphora only works in a separate sentence, not by means of such a direct link as a conjunction. (58)

a. Plato is on the top shelf. He is an interesting author. ‘(An exemplar of)Plato(’s work) is on the top shelf.’

32 It seems to me that the matrix-subdomain constellation (if you want to stick to this model) can be deduced directly from the anaphoric availability of source or target and does not need to be presupposed.

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b.

? Plato

is on the top shelf and (he is) an interesting author.

In contrast to the more comprehensive approaches by Barcelona, Ruiz de Mendoza, and Geeraerts and Peirsman, Paradis (2004, 2011) restricts her notion of metonymy to metonymies that exhibit what I have been calling locally permanent referential shifts, which Barcelona calls prototypical metonymies, and classifies other phenomena either as facetization or as zone activation. The three categories are represented by examples 59, 60, and 61 (Paradis, 2004, p. 246). (59)

The red shirts won the match. (metonymization)

(60) The court had to assume that the statement of claim was true. (facetization) (61)

I have a really slow car. (zone activation)

Paradis (2004, p. 246) argues for distinguishing them neatly as different phenomena and bases her argumentation on the distinction between lexical meanings and shifted readings: “I maintain that they are all similar in being construals of salience based on a part-whole configuration. However, I also argue that none of these examples are on a par with one another with respect to the relation between their profiled readings and the conventional pairings of senses and lexical items, respectively.” While zone activation like in example 61 is assumed to be a ubiquitous phenomenon at the level of qualia structure³³ and within different qualia (cf. Paradis, 2004, p. 249),³⁴ metonymization like in example 59 occurs between different senses (p. 252)³⁵ and as such is not conventional but has to be contextually motivated (p. 255). According to Paradis, this is reflected by the fact that the coordination of metonymies results in zeugma (p. 250), while the coordination of different activated zones does not (p. 249, 250). Facetization like in example 60 is a phenomenon based on Cruse’s (2000) notion of facets and is presented by Paradis as a “squish category that concerns form-meaning pairings occupying the middle range of the continuum between metonymization and zone activation” (Paradis, 2011, p. 68).³⁶

33 The theoretical base of Paradis’ analysis is a modified version of Pustejovky’s (1995) notion of qualia structure. Like Cruse (2000), she assumes that qualia constitute elements of conceptual nature that structure the content of nominals in that they “encode information about constituent parts, taxonomic relations, functions, and modes of creation” (Paradis, 2004, p. 249). 34 This means: within inherent components of a conceptual structure linked conventionally to an item. 35 This means: between concepts that are distinct inasmuch as none is part of the conceptual structure of the other. 36 Paradis (2011) places much less emphasis on the distinction of facetization from the two extremes than does Paradis (2004).

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It is assumed to be distinct from zone activation inasmuch as facets are “readings within senses [and] conventionally activated by one and the same item” (2004, p. 252), while zone activation can occur within one of these readings since each facet or reading can call up its own set of qualia roles, as Paradis reports. Like in zone activation, the coordination of different facets does not yield zeugma, according to Paradis. However, differences in ubiquity or frequency do not entail Paradis’ view of two distinct phenomena, as also Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011, p. 94) state. While Paradis uses zeugma to distinguish between facetization and metonymization,³⁷ Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011, p. 97) observe that zeugma is of limited use as a criterion. They state that shifts categorized as facetization by Paradis do not all exhibit the same behaviour. While example 62 allows the combination of two different readings of department, example 63 results in zeugma. As a consequence, based on zeugma, it is not clear whether shifts of the complex concept ‘department’ with its different parts/properties/facets should be considered as facetization or metonymy: “This shows that instances of facetization do not behave homogeneously with respect to syntactic phenomena like zeugma.”³⁸ (62)

Linguistics is the biggest and most sympathetic department of the faculty.

(63)

*The whole department was made redundant and then torn down.

In other words, the border between metonymy and cases that are closer to literal word use is not that neat in Paradis’ model either.³⁹ Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011, p. 91) adopt a comprehensive view on the continuum of contiguity-based shifts by arguing that Paradis’ facetization and metonymization are metonymic but zone activation is not. Therefore, examples such as 64 to 66 are not metonymic to them whereas examples 67 to 71 are considered as “most easily identifiable as real metonymies” (p. 93). (64)

Your dog bit my cat. (Langacker, 1984)

(65)

Roger heard a noise. (Langacker, 1984)

37 The conjunction of the metonymic and the literal meaning results in zeugma while the conjunction of different facets does not, according to Paradis. 38 The same inconsistent behaviour with respect to zeugma can be found with examples such as 57 (on page 89), where the source is the company and the target is a single aircraft in both cases, but only example 57a would yield zeugma if conjoined with a reading other than ‘Lufthansa airplane’. 39 This is observed by Paradis herself: “When the ontological basis for [. . . ] lexical items [like court and department; AT] is ‘people’, they border on being metonymies, but they are similar to ‘book’ in that they are highly intrinsic for the whole conceptual envelope, and instead of being jointly activated by different lexical items, they are highlighted separately by the same lexical items” (Paradis, 2004, 260).

92 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus

(66)

Susan has a cigarette in her mouth. (Langacker, 1984)

(67)

The kettle is boiling. (Langacker, 1999)

(68)

Washington is insensitive to the needs of the people. (Barcelona, 2002)

(69)

The author finished a new book. (Langacker, 1984)

(70)

He picked up the telephone. (Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011)

(71)

He filled up the car. (Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011)

Their argument against considering 64 and 65 as metonymic is that the biting apparatus and the hearing apparatus (the metonymic targets) are not able to perform the respective actions alone and that paraphrases like your dog’s teeth bit my cat or Roger’s ear heard a noise would violate the selectional restrictions of the respective verbs bite and hear (p. 92).⁴⁰ Contrary to this, examples 67 to 71 are classified as clearly metonymic because “our knowledge about the real-world situations causes us to impose a sense shift on the noun phrases involved”, from the whole to one of its parts: “These shifts of references set apart these examples from those of the type the dog bit my cat” (Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011, p. 93). Geeraerts and Peirsman further argue that the conventionality of examples 67 to 71 is no reason for not seeing them as metonymic (p. 94).⁴¹ Apparently, the fact that something is intuitively recognized as metonymic because, from a conceptual point of view, the predication cannot apply directly to the source, or, from a semantico-grammatical point of view, there is a violation of selectional restrictions, does not imply that this is a typical referential metonymy. Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011) seem to consider – like Warren (1999, 2002) – cases like example 67 are located at the target-focused pole of the scale, but this is very unlikely. These examples are much closer to literal use than typical metonymies

40 Although I do not think that being able to perform an action alone is a good criterion for metonymy, I agree with their conclusion for the simple reason that one can paraphrase the lexical meaning of bite as ‘to use teeth to cut into or through something’ (based on Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary) and of hear as ‘to be aware of sounds with your ears’ (ibidem). Hence, the concepts ‘teeth’ and ‘ear’ cannot constitute metonymic targets since they are already part of the proposition – as parts of the verb meanings – without a shift of the respective nouns. By the way, it is probably too restrictive to assume that concepts like ‘teeth’ or ‘ear’ would constitute the targets of alleged metonymies in this case, as do Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011). It is more likely that concepts like ‘biting apparatus’ and ‘hearing apparatus’ constitute the targets or, since we do not see these cases as metonymies, the active zones of the predication (Langacker, 1991, Chap. 7). 41 I agree with their view: Metonymic shifts can be more or less common without the shifted word acquiring the target as a new meaning. Despite the ubiquity of uses like in 67, the item kettle is likely not to have the lexical meaning ‘content of the kettle’, and certainly not ‘content of [x]’ in general.

8.3 Metonymic Continuum: the (Quasi-)Literal Pole | 93

like the red shirts shift, because the metonymic source remains in focus. Again, this is an argument in favour of a view that sees source-focused and target-focused metonymies as poles of a scale of metonymic phenomena rather than as the only options of a dichotomy. My view is close to the comprehensive approaches by Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011) or Kleiber (1995). In my analyses I include cases of shifts that are treated as facetizations by Paradis (2004, 2011) or as target-in-source metonymies by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) and Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011), and some of the cases that Barcelona (2002, 2011) categorizes as purely schematic metonymies. Since I agree with Barcelona and Paradis that “there is a continuum from metonymy to zone activation” (Barcelona, 2011, p. 32), I refrain from determining where or whether there is a clear dividing line between the two. Reducing the study of metonymy to referential cases would lead to a more or less arbitrary exclusion of cases that share key properties with referential metonymies, such as kettle-like examples, which are unanimously considered as metonymic in literature, and even as uncontentious cases that are “clearly metonymic” (Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011, p. 93), despite the fact that they behave very much like literal word use. However, I explicitly exclude cases such as 64 or 65 on page 91 – where zone activation occurs but all involved concepts are lexically coded so that no (reference) shift has to take place – from my study of metonymy. This is in line with Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011). The cases included in this study all show clear symptoms of a shift that takes place from some kind of lexically coded information to content that is not explicitly verbalized. This is obviously true for typical, referential, target-focused metonymies like 59 (red shirts, on page 90) or 48a (ham sandwich, on page 87), which do not run the risk of being seen as instances of literal use and are located at the other end of the metonymic scale. But it is also the case for metonymies that place more emphasis on the source, shifting momentarily to the target as a means of providing or getting information that is relevant for the source as a whole or for other subparts of the source. Metonymies that are probably closest to a potential dividing line between metonymy and literal use while still showing enough symptoms of an actual shift to be unambiguously classified as metonymic in comprehensive approaches include cases like 71 (on page 92), 72 (below) and 45 (on page 84). They do not yield locally permanent reference shifts as they clearly focus on the metonymic source and they are not felt to include a shift by linguistic amateurs or even by linguists at first sight. Nevertheless, they do involve shifts because they all include predications that apply . . .

94 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus

1. 2. 3.

unambiguously (in standard contexts) . . . ⁴² to specific parts or aspects associated with the concepts that are designated by the lexical items, . . . although these aspects are not coded explicitly by any part of the argument or the predication.

These aspects, the metonymic targets, are the ‘gasoline container of the car’ in 71, something like the ‘exterior of the apple’ or ‘skin of the apple’ in 72, and either the ‘exterior of the pen’ or the ‘colour mark produced by the pen’ in 45. (72)

The apple is red.

A comprehensive position with respect to the continuum between metonymy and literal use serves as a guiding principle in the following. Since I refrain from determining a clear borderline beyond which everything is definitely non-metonymic, based on universally applicable criteria, any close-to-literal example might require a justification of its own if I consider it as metonymic. Observation 5 (Target-centred metonymy and source-centred metonymy). Typical referential metonymies, which focus strongly on the target, share key properties with some word uses that do not yield referential shifts and are therefore closer to literal word use. Modern cognitive approaches place emphasis on the aspects these phenomena have in common and therefore go beyond studies of metonymy based entirely on reference. Observation 6 (Continuum from source-centred metonymy to literal use). Since there seems to be a continuum from metonymies that focus strongly on the source to literal word use, the semantic analysis of such close-to-literal cases involves a blurred zone within which the occurrence of a shift is contentious from an analytical point of view and depends a lot on individual properties of the respective cases.

42 In this context, unambiguously does not mean that the metonymic target must be identified with 100% specificity – which is not the case in metonymies like 60, where the metonymic target is vague to a certain extent. It means that the target is by no means identical with the metonymic source, that a non-shifted reading is not possible or would represent an unusual interpretation that would normally be verbalized by more explicit formulations: “This [. . . ] ultimately means that the target part must be neatly distinguishable from the source whole” (Barcelona, 2011, p. 18). In the same way, specific means that the target can be narrowed down with a certain degree of precision, even if some vagueness, sometimes more, sometimes less, remains.

8.4 A (Tentative) Scale of Metonymic Phenomena | 95

8.4 A (Tentative) Scale of Metonymic Phenomena The discussions delineated above show that there are arguments for restricting the analysis of metonymy to traditional, referential cases (metonymy is when reference shifts in a locally permanent way, on the basis of contiguous MRs) and arguments for more or less comprehensive approaches (metonymy is when attention shifts between contiguous MRs), the latter corresponding better to the cognitive focus of current research. This liberty of construal in the analysis of metonymic phenomena, as we might call it, is restricted by the semantic and conceptual model on which the analysis relies.⁴³ The comprehensive view on metonymic phenomena yields a scale from the pole of literal word use to the pole of contiguity-based word formation, which is briefly, and tentatively,⁴⁴ described and illustrated in this section. All the phenomena on that scale, while exhibiting differences from one another, are assumed to rely on the same basic principle: a shift between contiguous MRs. Literal pole This pole is most probably not metonymic, since the examples do not fulfill the above-mentioned criterion of a target that is neatly distinguishable from the source whole. There is certainly some kind of zone activation (cf. Langacker, 1991), but all relevant elements are verbally coded in some way in examples 73 and 74. (73)

Your dog bit my cat. ‘Your dog bit my cat (on a certain part of its body, obviously with its teeth).’

(74)

Roger hears a noise. ‘Roger hears a noise (obviously by means of his ears).’

Contiguity-based shift, despite focus on the source Cases on this position of the scale involve a shift based on the criteria identified above: the predications

43 This is the reason why Paradis (2004, 2011), despite starting from the flexible notion of meaning as construal, describes quite a static view of metonymy in comparison to facetization and zone activation. Since she presupposes neat distinctions between stored meanings, content that is part of these meanings, and content that is associated with these meanings, the continuum of contiguity-based shifts automatically falls into distinct categories. Approaches that are less explicit with respect to what constitutes lexical meaning, such as domain-based views by Langacker (1987, 1991, 1999), Croft (1993, 2002), or Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003), or the frame model adopted in this work yield comprehensive views on metonymy with more ease. 44 Given the controversies concerning the treatment of different kinds of metonymic phenomena, the positions of some of the examples can certainly be discussed, but the scale illustrates the advantages of an account that emphasizes the continuum while not hiding the differences. It accounts for referent-sensitive metonymies only (see Chapters 5.7 and 7.2.2 on Koch’s distinction).

96 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus

apply unambiguously to specific, non-verbalized aspects of the verbalized sources. The shift is not referential in that it does not lead to a locally permanent change of the referent: the metonymic source can be anaphorically accessed, even in direct conjunction with the shifted item. The metonymic target cannot be accessed anaphorically. (75) Mon ami est garé derrière l’Opéra depuis dix minutes (et y retournera à pied dans un quart d’heure./*Elle est tout au bout du parking.) ‘My friend(’s car) is parked behind the opera house (and [hefriend ] will be back there in a quarter of an hour./*Itcar is right at the end of the car park.)’ (76)

He filled up the car (and got into it). ‘He filled up (the fuel tank of) the car (and got into itcar /*ittank ).’

(77)

Er pumpte sein Fahrrad auf (und stellte es/*sie in die Garage). ‘He pumped up (the tyres of) his bike (and put itbike /*themtyres into the garage).’

(78)

Der Kessel kocht schon (aber er ist zu klein./*so dass er herausspritzt. ‘(The contents of) The kettle is already boiling (but itkettle is too small./*so itcontent spills out.)’

(79)

Die Lufthansa ist gestern zum ersten Mal über mein Haus geflogen (und ist damit wohl die einzige Gesellschaft, die ihre Flugzeuge über die Südroute schickt./*und es flog ziemlich tief.) ‘Yesterday, (an aircraft belonging to) Lufthansa flew over my house for the first time(, so itairline seems to be the only airline that sends its aircraft via the south route./*and itaircraft flew quite low.)’

(80)

The apple is red. ‘(The skin of) The apple is red.’

Contiguity-based shift, focus not entirely on the source This slightly heterogeneous group contains elements which combine properties of shifts that focus on the source with properties of shifts that focus on the target. Some allow the anaphoric resumption of the source and of the target, alternatively or even both in succession (example 81). Some inhibit the explicit resumption of the target while not allowing the direct conjunction of the source reading either (example 83). Some allow resumption of the source in a separate sentence – while inhibiting explicit access to the target – but not in direct conjunction with the shifted item (example 82).

8.4 A (Tentative) Scale of Metonymic Phenomena | 97

(81) Plato is on the top shelf. (It is bound in leather. OR/AND You’ll find that he is an interesting author.) ‘(An exemplar of) Plato(’s writings) is on the top shelf. (Itexemplar is bound in leather. OR/AND You’ll find that hePlato is an interesting author.)’ (82)

Plato is on the top shelf (? and he is an interesting author). ‘(An exemplar of) Plato(’s writings) is on the top shelf (? and hePlato is an interesting author.)

(83) Die Universität streikt (*weil sie ein zu kleines Fächerangebot hat./*Sie verlangen ein breiter gefächertes Lehrangebot.) ‘(The students of) The university is(/are) on strike (*because itsuni course offer is not varied enough./*Theystudents demand a more varied range of courses.)’ Contiguity-based shift, focus on the target Cases on this position of the scale involve a shift that is easily observable since, in referential use, the referent changes in a locally permanent manner. The source cannot be anaphorically resumed, even in a separate sentence. The target is accessible, also in direct conjunction with the shifted item. (84)

Wir sind im Griechen (einem der schönsten Restaurants in der Gegend./? Er hat uns eingeladen.) ‘We are in (the restaurant run by) the Greek (man) (one of nicest restaurants around here/? Heman invited us.)’

(85) The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill (and he is getting restless./*It looks rather stale.) ‘(The customer who ordered) The ham sandwich is waiting for hiscustomer check (and hecustomer is getting restless/*Itsandwich looks rather stale.)’ (86)

The red shirts won the match (and are now ready for an interview./*They will have to be cleaned now.) ‘The (players with the) red shirts won the match (and [theyplayers ] are now ready for an interview./*Theyshirts will have to be cleaned now.)’

(87) We need more good brains for our project (and try to lure them with extraordinary payment./? They should come in the skulls of their bearers.)⁴⁵ ‘We need more (people with) good brains for our project (and try to lure thempersons with extraordinary payment./? Theybrains should come in the skulls of their bearers.)’ 45 This works as a joking remark, deliberately pretending that there is no target metonymy.

98 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus Contiguity-based shift, focus on the target, change in uniqueness explicitly marked Cases on this position of the scale semantically function like the targetfocused shifts in the previous paragraph. They only provide anaphoric access to the metonymic target. The difference is that – unlike the previous target-focused shifts which rely on one-to-one relations between source and target – the target is not a function of the source while the source is still a function of the target. This non-uniqueness of the target with respect to the source is marked by the indefinite article. Example 90 is the target-focused version of example 79; the indefinite article unambiguously marks the shift as focused on the target. (88) Elle [. . . ] a pris au bureau une deuxième galerie; j’ai été obligé de la suivre en donnant au contrôleur ma première galerie pour une deuxième. (Nerval, Gérard de, Voyage en Orient, vol. 1, 1851, p. 41, cited from TLFi, “galerie”, I.B.2.b.–P. méton.) ‘She [. . . ] bought a (ticket for a place on the) second balcony; I had to follow her by giving my (ticket for a place on the) first balcony to the controller in exchange for a (ticket for a place on the) second balcony.’ (89)

Un Picasso rarissime mis aux enchères à un prix record. (Ulgu-Servant, 2022) ‘A extremely rare (painting/piece by) Picasso [will be] put up for auction for a record price.’

(90)

Eine Lufthansa ist gestern über mein Haus geflogen. ‘A(n aircraft belonging to) Lufthansa flew over my house yesterday.’

In contrast to shifts with some morphological change (see the next paragraph), contextual influence can easily convert these shifted items to definites – like in example 88, where première galerie designates ‘the (contextually unique) seat on the first balcony’ –, so that the non-uniqueness of the target with respect to the source does not appear at the linguistic surface any more. Thus, these cases differ less from morphologically unmarked metonymies than the examples in the next paragraph. Contiguity-based shift, focus on the target, some morphological marking The target-focused shifts on this position of the scale entrain a change in one of the categories that are reflected by morphology in the respective languages. Of course, shifts whose source and target are MRs that are typically associated with the same sex/gender would not exhibit any explicit marking in these cases and thus look like ‘pure’ metonymy. All these cases would be typical target-focused metonymies in languages that have less explicit morphological marking (cf. Koch, 2014, p. 74).

8.4 A (Tentative) Scale of Metonymic Phenomena | 99

(91) Fr. marteler ‘to beat (like) with a hammer’ < AFr. martel ‘hammer’ (cf. TLFi, “marteler”) (word class conversion) (92) Fr. (un/le) trompette (masc.) ‘soldier charged with giving the signals’ < (une/la) trompette (fem.) ‘trumpet’ (cf. TLFi, “trompette”, II.A) (change in gender) (93)

MFr. lunettes (plural) ‘spectacles’ < OFr. lunete (singular) ‘polished glass or metal plate of a circular mirror’ (cf. TLFi, “lunette”, C, and Koch, 2014, who provides the English translation of the meaning paraphrase given in the TLFi) (change in number)

Word formation pole On the word formation pole of the scale, contiguity-based shifts with a clear focus on the target are marked quite explicitly by means of word formation instruments. The difference with respect to any other target-focused shifts on the scale is that the shift markers (affixes in derivatives or head components in endocentric compounds) narrow down potential interpretations in a way that the target of the shift cannot be considered as entirely implicit any more. As a consequence, some of these cases are more metonymic than others. The derivation of the meaning ‘lemon tree’ from Sp. limón by means of the affix -ero is less explicit than the English compound variant lemon tree, because the modifying noun tree has more content than the affix -ero. (94)

OFr. (li) prisoniers ‘(the) prisoner’ < (la) prison ‘(the) prison’

(95) (a/the) drawing ‘(a/the) drawn representation of sth.’ < to draw [sth.] ‘to draw [sth.]’ (96)

Lat. capitium ‘hood (cap)’ < caput ‘head’

(97)

Sp. limonero ‘lemon tree’ < limón ‘lemon’

(98)

Eng. lemon tree ‘lemon tree’ < lemon ‘lemon’

It might seem strange to list lemon tree as coming from lemon, since the compound is of course a modified and taxonomically more explicit version of tree as its head. From the perspective of metonymy, however, ‘lemon’ serves as source from which the shift starts with the aim of identifying/describing the target, the tree – just like in the referentially analogous Spanish derivation limonero.⁴⁶ Still, this example

46 For a joint treatment of N-N compounds and metonymy, see Warren (1999, 2002). She sees referential metonymies as modifier-head constructions with implicit heads, since many referential metonymies allow non-metonymic paraphrases with a modifier-head structure. The problem with her view is that she includes source-focused metonymies like The shoe(lace)s are neatly tied, for which the modifier-head view does not work, however: modifier-head constructions place the

100 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus

is certainly a borderline case because the target MR is explicitly mentioned by the head of the compound. However, the implicitness or explicitness of the target seems to be a gradual phenomenon rather than reflecting a natural, discrete cut. On the basis of this scale of metonymic phenomena, a model of metonymy is outlined in Chapter 8.5. This model emphasizes the common ground of the phenomena on the scale, the contiguity-based shifts and, at the same time, accounts for the different roles this same kind of shift plays according to the positions on the scale.

8.5 A Model of Metonymic Focus Placement The model of metonymic mocus placement (MFP) is based on the distinctions between referential metonymy and word formation (Chapter 8.2) and between metonymy and literal word use (Chapter 8.3) as well as on the scale of contiguitybased phenomena between word formation and literal use (Chapter 8.4). It sees metonymy as a shift of attention between contiguous MRs, compatible with the general working definition of metonymy provided in Chapter 7.1. Since the metonymic shift can have different purposes in the construction of meaning on the basis of complex conceptual constellations, different kinds of metonymic phenomena are accounted for in the model. These can be distinguished by means of the conceptual element on which the meaning construction focuses. The focus, that is the relevance in terms of information transmission or information acquisition for upcoming interaction, can be on the metonymic source, on the metonymic target, or on both of them to a certain degree, which yields metonymies on either pole of the scale of focus placement and somewhere between these poles.⁴⁷ Thus, MFP emphasizes different perspectives on elements of conceptual content that are related by contiguity.⁴⁸

focus entirely on the target. This does not become obvious in the above example due to its syntactic structure. The inadequacy of the modifier-head model for such source-focused metonymies can be illustrated, however, by the variant He wore neatly tied shoes, which cannot be paraphrased in terms of a modifier-head construction like *‘He wore neatly tied shoelaces’ because this would take away the focus from the shoes and put it on the laces, as if this were a target-focused metonymy. 47 This notion of focus follows Warren’s use of the term with respect to the same kind of metonymic phenomena (see Warren, 1999, 2002). 48 The model has been inspired by observations and analyses by Kleiber (1995) (integrated metonymy), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) (source-in-target and target-in-source metonymy), and Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011) (application of Ruiz de Mendoza’s dichotomy), and it addresses potential issues, weaknesses, or additional observations that I discussed in Chapters 8.2 and 8.3.

8.5 A Model of Metonymic Focus Placement |

101

client r> te ea der r

ag en

s> es o c eme th
cy cl e

node

inflate

Fig. 8.2: Source metonymy: rudimentary frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 77 on page 96. The focus is on the source, the target emphasizes a relevant feature of the source.

allows conclusions about the source as a whole. Since the target is ‘merely’ an instrument that serves the conceptualization of the source (with the corresonding referent), it remains less prominent than the source as a whole. In example 77 (on page 96), the source ‘bicycle’ provides access to the target ‘tyre(s) of the bicycle’. The shift is triggered by the verbal predicate which typically applies to inflatable objects such as tyres. The metonymic target is highlighted but the predication is relevant for the bicycle as a whole, since it allows a number of inferences that might be useful for possible interactions with the source (referent), notably riding the bike. In other words, the metonymic source is clearly in focus here and remains exclusively accessible anaphorically afterwards. The shift to the target serves the emphasis of those aspects of the source whole that are relevant in the context (see Figure 8.2). Obviously, the direction of the shift is the same in target and source metonymies, namely from the source to target; this is their common ground. But since the shift has different functions, the directions of the information flow are somewhat opposed: the source provides access to the target and characterizes the target in target metonymies. The source provides access to the target and is characterized by the target in source metonymies. The same strategy, namely the shift, is used for opposite aims in source and target metonymy. Intermediate cases between source and target metonymies, such as the Plato or university examples on the scale in Chapter 8.4, have to be located somewhere between source and target metonymies,⁴⁹ either because both source and target remain in focus to a certain degree after the shift or because the metonymies have

49 See my comments on Ruiz de Mendoza’s (2003) view in Chapter 8.3 and the description of cases of contiguity-based shifts, focus not entirely on the source in Chapter 8.4.

8.5 A Model of Metonymic Focus Placement |

103

certain linguistic characteristics of target metonymies although the source is in focus.⁵⁰

8.5.2 Linguistic Reflexes of the Distinction Target and source metonymy differ with respect to the possibilities of anaphoric reference to target and/or source, and with respect to the conjunction of the shifted reading with either source or target.⁵¹ At the level of linguistic determination, the focus on the target in target metonymies and on the source in source metonymies is reflected by the morphosyntactic integration of the lexical item into the linguistic expression. While the morphosyntactic integration of target metonymies is in line with the target MR, lexical items in source metonymies are integrated in line with the metonymic source. Concretely, target and source metonymies differ with respect to the congruence between the linguistic determination of the metonymically used item and the (non-)uniqueness of the metonymic source and target in the languages and examples that I analysed. While in target metonymies, the MR type of the target has to be compatible with the determination of the NP, in source metonymies, the determination of the NP reflects the MR type of the metonymic source. In the examples in 99, the same situation is conceptualized and verbalized in the form of a target metonymy and in the form of a source metonymy. (99)

a. Eine Lufthansa hat einen Streckenrekord aufgestellt. (target metonymy) ‘A Lufthansa (aircraft) set a record for non-stop flight.’ b. (Die) Lufthansa hat einen Streckenrekord aufgestellt. (source metonymy) ‘(A) Lufthansa (aircraft) set a record for non-stop flight.’

These examples nicely illustrate how the same kind of metonymic shift can be used in two different ways, focusing on the source or on the target, in order to put more weight on and convey information about the desired element. In 99a, the item Lufthansa is subject to a target metonymy from the complex company concept (an

50 Since they all maintain the accessibility of the source, they are often discussed as the representatives of the source-focused part in more dichotomic views such as Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) or Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011). This is justified since there is certain focus on the source, but it glosses over certain properties that resemble those of target metonymies. 51 This has been observed by authors like Fauconnier (1985), Nunberg (1995), and Kleiber (1995), and set off the discussion about the borderline between metonymy and literal speech in Croft (1993), Barcelona (2002, 2011), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003), Paradis (2004, 2011), Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011), and others (see my observations and comments in Chapters 8.3 and 8.4).

104 | 8 Source Focus versus Target Focus

IC) to one unspecific aircraft belonging to that company (an IC-saturated RC, which results in an SC). Since in target metonymies, the focus is on the target and the target here is the [−U] MR ‘(an) aircraft belonging to Lufthansa’, the shifted item reflects this concept type by means of its indefinite determination.⁵² The metonymy in 99b has exactly the same metonymic source and target and constitutes a description of the same situation, but since the shift is a source metonymy, the shifted item carries IC-compatible definite determination (or no explicit determiner at all because Lufthansa is a proper name and as such is definite and non-relational by default and can thus be used without explicit definiteness marking). With a bijectively linked metonymic source and target, like in the target metonymy in the sandwich example 85 (depicted in Figure 8.1 on page 101) or in the source metonymy in the bicycle example 77 (depicted in Figure 8.2 on page 102), the difference in concept type marking between source and target metonymies is not reflected because the uniqueness of source and target are identical. As to other parameters expressed through determination in some languages, such as gender, for example, there might be some relation between determination and source or target properties, depending on the type of metonymy. For example, in Spanish El batería de este grupo es muy bueno ‘The (player of the) percussion in this group is very good’ (from Cuenca & Hilferty, 1999, p. 114), the target focus is reflected by the masculine determiner, which contrasts with the gender of the underlying noun batería (fem.) ‘drums, percussion’. However, there are also counter-examples, so the relation might be less systematic than in the case of uniqueness marking: a German translation of the Spanish sentence above would be Das Schlagzeug dieser Gruppe ist sehr gut, where the determiner das (neuter) is in congruence with the metonymic source, not with the either male or female person playing it. It could be interpreted literally in the sense of ‘The drums equipement they have is very good’ or metonymically in the sense of ‘Their drummer is very good.’ The metonymic interpretation is strongly target-focused. In the same way, the German version of the sandwich examples would not adapt the gender of the shifted item to the metonymic target, despite being a target metonymy. So it seems that gender marking need not necessarily be congruent with the focus of the metonymy. In this work, I concentrate on concept type marking, especially uniqueness marking, in source and target metonymies.⁵³

52 See the observations on the correlation between concept type and determination in Löbner 2011 and in my Chapter 2.3.2. 53 The issue of a correlation between the coded grammatical or semantic categories and properties of the metonymic focus (referent) is very interesting, however, and probably constitutes a promising field of future research, especially across languages (see the overall conclusion in Chapter 13).

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8.5.3 Arguments for MFP Some strengths of MFP in comparison to similar comprehensive models of metonymy – such as the dichotomic distinction between source-in-target and target-in-source metonymies by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) or the notion of métonymie intégrée by Kleiber (1995) – are briefly summarized in the following. MFP concentrates on linguistic symptoms while Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) and Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011) seem to presuppose the conceptual constellation that underlies a shift to a certain degree. It thus recognizes differences on the linguistic surface and therefore probably has the potential of being more objective with respect to the data. As a consequence, MFP is less static than its predecessors. Since it does not presuppose the inclusion relation between source and target, it adapts to changing conceptualizations of the same set of entities, notably to whether one and the same source-target pair is conceptualized and verbalized as a source-focused metonymy or as a target-focused metonymy. MFP is also less restricted than its predecessors because it does not require opting for one of two complementary choices. Instead, the linguistic differences between the intermediate cases and the clearly source-focused cases can be taken into account.⁵⁴ MFP accounts for conceptual and strategic differences. The twofold distinction proposed by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003) “does not only explain their pragmatic characteristics and their syntactic behaviour with respect to zeugma; it also takes away all reasons to claim any deeper conceptual differences than just the direction of the sense shift” (Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011, p. 100, 101), which is unlikely to be true. They reduce the fact that target-in-source metonymies focus on the source to the explanation that they are more concrete and often less vague than the target: “for anaphoric reference to be more workable, it is preferable to have a clear, unambiguous domain, and matrix domains usually qualify better in this respect than target domains” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003, p. 116). While the easiness of reference assignment

54 Intermediate metonymies, which have many properties of source metonymies while exhibiting some characteristics of target metonymies (see Chapters 8.3 and 8.4), are not to be confused with the traditional category of part for part metonymies. The latter notion was used for cases like the ham sandwich shifts, where there did not seem to be a clear inclusion relation between source and target, but which is a typical target-focused metonymy in Ruiz de Mendoza’s dichotomic view and in MFP.

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certainly does have an impact in many cases, this does not explain why a source metonymy is chosen in cases in which a target metonymy is also possible.⁵⁵ Therefore, MFP claims that the shift, which is common to all kinds of metonymy, is either a means to identify the target as the element in focus or a means to identify the target as a crucial property of the source, thus predicating about the source by means of the target, or something in between. In other words, depending on the communicative purpose, the shift relocates reference in a locally permanent way or does not affect reference.

8.5.4 Why Source Metonymy is Metonymy Several of the examples that are discussed in literature as metonymies are source metonymies – even though this is not always pointed out. But since there are some source metonymies that are so close to literal use that analytic attention has to be drawn explicitly to their metonymic character first, this section is dedicated to briefly summarizing the reasons for considering source metonymy as metonymy.⁵⁶ Some uncontentious metonymies are source metonymies. Excluding source metonymy as non-metonymical would entrain that shifts like examples 75 (on page 96), 77 (on page 96), 78 (on page 96), or 97 (on page 97) could not be considered as metonymic any more. Non-metonymic paraphrases of the shifted readings are most often possible in source metonymy. This kind of more explicit representation of the content of the expression in question is a strong indicator of a shift.⁵⁷ Reference shifts should not constitute the chief criterion in primarily cognitive approaches. Although referential behaviour constitutes an important kind 55 There are indeed cases, in which the target is clearly distinct from the source but nevertheless so vague that it is hard to verbalize. However, this cannot be the reason for why kettle functions like a source metonymy in example 78 (on page 96), because the content of the kettle could well be verbalized itself. So, why is the kettle in focus? MFP proposes an explanation: Kessel or kettle are used in the form of a source metonymy when the container is relevant for future interaction (taking the kettle off the heat, for example), even if what boils is obviously the content itself. 56 The arguments in this section do not concern the MFP-specific view but generally support metonymies with some source-focus, that is metonymies of the kind covered by the target-in-source type by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003). 57 On the other hand, the absence of such as paraphrase does not imply that there is no shift. Adjectives in predicative use can trigger a metonymic shift of the modfied noun that can be paraphrased non-metonymically ([The skin of] The apple is red), while the attributive use of the adjective prevents a paraphrase of the same form (the red apple ≠ the red skin of the apple). This difference is due to the referential or syntactic behaviour and does not constitute evidence against a shift.

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of content in linguistics and cognitive linguistics, its scope is limited. Restricting metonymy to typical cases of contiguity-based referent change would gloss over the fact that source and target metonymies have many things in common. Moreover, metonymy can be used predicatively anyway (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 1998; Barcelona, 2011), and Koch’s (2004) distinction between referent-sensitive and non-referent-sensitive metonymies (see my Chapters 7.2.2 and 10.4) shows that there is even a class of shifts that are classified as metonymic despite the fact that source and target concern the same referent so that they cannot entrain a referent change by definition. The notion of source metonymy best accommodates the speaker’s knowledge that a predication can concern one specific aspect of a whole while at the same time saying something about the functioning whole (example 77 on page 96). Source metonymies clearly do not rely on fuzzy predication. As I mention in the footnotes on page 85, source metonymies have targets that are clearly distinguishable from the source and can be neatly distinguished from cases of fuzzy predication, even if the predication itself can be fuzzy at the level of the metonymic target. Source metonymies are potential candidates for lexicalization. Barcelona (2011, p. 51) states: “some purely schematic metonymies [which would be source-focused metonymies on my scale and in my model; AT] can also become conventional and even give rise to established polysemy.”⁵⁸ The same source-target pair can undergo both source and target metonymy, at least in some cases. Excluding source metonymy as non-metonymic would lead to a situation, in which example 99a (on page 103) is categorized as metonymic while example 99b is not. Assigning different categories to these cases despite their many parallels would hide the fact that the same phenomenon is applied to the same conceptual entities and the same association between them, but from different perspectives.

8.5.5 Why Source Metonymy is Referent-Sensitive Metonymy Koch’s distinction between referent-sensitive and non-referent-sensitive metonymies and how it can be translated into frames has been treated in Chapters 7.2.2 and 7.2.3. Target metonymies, as defined above, are obviously typical referent-sensitive

58 I suppose that Lat. focus ‘fireplace’ > ‘fire’ (example 14 on page 50) is such a case because it seems to function conceptually like the source-focused kettle examples in 78 on page 96. The fireplace is in focus as relevant object of interaction and source-focused metonymies like 14 shift to the fire without changing the referent of the item.

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metonymies and can therefore be modelled in frames as described in Observation 1 on page 63. On the other hand, source metonymies, in which the referent of the shifted expression does not change in a locally permanent manner according to the definition, have a certain resemblance to non-referent-sensitive metonymies: there is no permanent referent change. However, this resemblance is merely superficial. Source metonymies are clearly referent-sensitive, for the following reasons: 1. The referent of the shifted item in source metonymy is involved in the shift – it is the source MR that represents this referent – like in typical referent-sensitive metonymies. This is not the case in non-referent-sensitive metonymy, where the referent of the shifted item is reconceptualized by the shift, since the shift itself operates on MRs that only represent properties of the referent. 2. The source MR and target MR in source metonymy stand in a metonymic relation – the shift starts from the MR that represents the literal referent and aims at the MR that represents the highlighted property of the literal referent – like in typical referent-sensitive metonymies. This is not the case in nonreferent-sensitive metonymy, where the MRs that represent the shifted and the non-shifted referent stand in a relation of similarity to each other (see Chapter 7.2.3). The shifted items in non-referent-sensitive metonymy are therefore similar to metaphor or subordination, while source metonymy is clearly non-metaphoric and non-taxonomic. Therefore, source metonymy can be modelled in frames like referent-sensitive metonymy as described in Observation 1. Hence, its frame model is similar to how target metonymies are modelled – despite the differences in focus. This can be summarized as follows: Observation 7 (Subtypes of referent-sensitive metonymy). Source metonymies and target metonymies are both referent-sensitive metonymies because they both involve the non-metonymic reading as a central component of the shift. As such, they are both modelled as shifts from the central node to a non-central node of the frame.

8.5.6 Benefit and Function of Referent-Sensitive Metonymy Langacker discusses the function of metonymy as a reference point phenomenon, which means that his observations are supposed to describe first of all metonymies that are target-focused. A slight modification of his analysis of their benefits for communication in comparison to literal language adapts his insight to the notion

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of source metonymy as well, so that the whole range of metonymic phenomena on the scale delineated in Chapter 8.4 is covered. Langacker (1999, p. 199) provides the following analysis: Metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us.

It is true that the addressee’s attention is directed towards the intended target in target metonymies, which is less the case in source metonymies, where the attention is on the source, despite the shift to the target. And it is true for source and target metonymies that the source is cognitively salient, but due to different reasons: while the cognitive salience of the source in target metonymies is used to make the target salient, the source is cognitively salient in source metonymies because this is what the speaker actually wants to talk about. Therefore, a description of the function or benefit of referent-sensitive metonymy across all referent-sensitive metonymies from the source pole to the target pole of the scale outlined in Chapter 8.4 could be carried out roughly in the following way: Referent-sensitive metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of three conflicting factors: 1. the need to be accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the intended element, which is most important for us – and which is the target in target metonymies and the source in source metonymies 2. our intention to characterize the intended element by means of a property that is associated with that element – the source in target metonymies and the target in source metonymies 3. our inclination to be short, so that the speaker wants to use one element and evoke both, the intended element and the relevant property – which leads to the verbalization of the source because the source can provide access to the target.

8.6 Conclusion The main insights of this chapter can be summarized as follows: Observation 8 (Target metonymy). In target metonymies, a kind of referentsensitive metonymy, the target is in focus and is conceptualized and/or identified by means of the source as a contextually relevant property of the target. Therefore,

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in referential use, target metonymies constitute cases of locally permanent referent shifts. Observation 9 (Source metonymy). In source metonymies, a kind of referentsensitive metonymy, the source is at the centre of interest and is conceptualized (but not identified) by means of the target, which is contextually relevant for the source. Since the target must nevertheless be accessed and identified via the source, source metonymies rely on the same shift as target metonymies, but with a different aim. In referential use, source metonymies do not entrain a locally permanent referent shift because the focus remains on the metonymic source. Observation 10 (Metonymies between the source and the target pole). Certain metonymies exhibit properties of both source and target metonymies inasmuch as they maintain the anaphoric accessibility of the metonymic source while also providing access to the target, which cannot be linked directly to the source reading by a conjunction, however. Observation 11 (Metonymy: flexible strategy). Metonymy constitutes a flexible strategy in order to profit from contextually contiguous concepts. The direction of the shift is the same from source to target in both target and source metonymies. This constitutes the common ground of both extremes, but since the shift has different functions, the directions of the characterization are opposed: The source provides access to and characterizes the target in target metonymy, but the source provides access to the target and is characterized by the target in source metonymies. In Chapter 9, I illustrate and defend my claims and arguments by means of examples of source metonymies and target metonymies. This shows that the characteristics apply to referent-sensitive metonymic phenomena in general. As examples of source metonymies, pure source metonymies as well as intermediate cases, in which the source remains accessible despite certain characteristics of target metonymies, will be provided.

9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames This work focuses primarily on the manner in which metonymic source and target are connected. In particular, the analyses aim at providing insights into what constitutes the link between source and target in terms of functional relations, i.e. with a focus that is slightly different from traditional classifications in terms of more or less detailed ontological categories (see Fontanier, [1821,1827] 1977). Frames, as conceived in this work (see Chapter 3), impose a direction on the relations between their components. Since metonymies are shifts between MRs within the same frame, investigating the impact of attribute directionality on metonymy is one of the most central aspects in the analysis of metonymy from the perspective of frames.¹ Hence, the way in which the direction of a link between two MRs is related to the direction and nature of a potential metonymic shift between these MRs is discussed here. In this chapter, I concentrate on metonymic patterns that can be found in frames with no open arguments; these constitute a kind of ‘default case’, mainly because it is this kind of metonymy that is typically treated in literature. Metonymy with open arguments, which I discuss in Chapter 10, has not yet been explicitly addressed to my knowledge.² Chapter 11 is then dedicated to a further decomposition of the links between metonymic source and target in view of insights into metonymic distance.

9.1 The Directionality of the Metonymic Link 9.1.1 The Uneven Dependency between Source and Target This work presents metonymy as a shift of attention between two MRs that are part of the same frame (see the beginning of Chapter 7, especially Definition 7 on page 60). The source MR provides access to the target MR, which is then conceptualized and/or identified by means of the source (in target metonymy) or which in turn provides information about the source (in source metonymy) (see Chapter 8, for example the conclusion on page 109).

1 For analyses of metonymy within a formally less constrained frame model, see, for example, Koch (1999). 2 It turns out that the regularities identified for non-relational metonymy in the present chapter are also found in the many different patterns of relational metonymy. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-009

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The fact that the target is necessarily accessed via the source results in an uneven dependency between the two. While the source has a certain degree of independence, the target being ‘just’ near or related to it in some way, the target is clearly dependent on the source because the source presents/evokes it on the basis of its relation to the source. As a consequence, every time we determine the (non-)uniqueness of source and target MRs in the following, we will have to determine the (non-)uniqueness and (non-)relationality of the target viewed from the perspective of the source. This means that the target is equivalent to an originally [+R] MR whose argument has been saturated by the source MR. Thus, (non-)uniqueness and (non-)relationality of the target follow from the corresponding values of the source by means of the rules underlying the semantics of possessive chains (see Chapter 2.3.2 or Löbner, 2011, p. 301–306). It follows from this uneven dependency that a non-relational metonymy with a [+U] target always has a [+U] source, and, as the contrapositive, that a nonrelational metonymy with a [−U] source always has a [−U] target.

9.1.2 Potential Constellations in Terms of Attribute Links Löbner (2013, 2014) advances a strong hypothesis concerning metonymy in frames, which I label the bidirectionality hypothesis (BiDi). It is one of four possible constellations that could be necessary frame-structural conditions of metonymy: 1. A bijection between source and target is necessary for metonymy (= BiDi). 2. Only a function from source to target is necessary for metonymy. 3. Any link between target and source suffices for metonymy. 4. Only a function from target to source is necessary for metonymy.³ Löbner’s BiDi is undoubtedly capable of accounting for a great many metonymies. In this chapter, I would like to supplement/modify it with the claim that metonymy does not have to fulfill BiDi – even though it does in most cases. Instead, I argue that the necessary condition of metonymy (restricted here to cases without open arguments, but expanded to relational metonymy in the next chapter) in terms of frames is an attribute link from the target to the source, i.e. in the opposite

3 These constellations have been formulated for direct, one-attribute links between source and target, but can easily be expanded to any indirectly linked source-target pair: bijections subsume unidirectional links, but not vice versa, so that chains of bijective links fulfill all conditions, but any unidirectional link within a chain of attribute-value links makes the relation between source and target unidirectional. This expansion seems to be in accordance with Löbner’s view (2014, Slide 5, and his analysis of the ham sandwich example).

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direction of the shift. In addition, an extra link from the source to the target is required under certain circumstances – namely with [+U] metonymic targets, which is often the case – so that Löbner’s BiDi holds for these cases and for cases with a bidirectionally linked [−U] source and target. I discuss arguments for and against BiDi and the necessity of the attribute in the direction of the shift in Section 9.2 and enlarge on my own claim in Chapters 9.3 and 9.4. The analysis considers the (non-)uniqueness of source and target MRs – as features of the MR type that are relevant for the link between source and target MR – and comprises both source-focused and target-focused metonymies with the aim of showing that the observed regularities are true for both areas of the spectrum delineated in Chapter 8. Independently of the discussion of the different constellations in the next sections, the insights gained hitherto can be summarized as follows: Observation 12 (Source-target dependency). Since the metonymic source provides access to the target on the basis of the relation that the target has to the source, the target must be analysed like a relational or functional MR (depending on whether it is unique or not with respect to the source) whose argument is saturated by the source MR. This must be true for metonymies in frames with or without open arguments. Observation 13 (Target uniqueness). As a consequence of Observation 12, a [+U] metonymic target implies a [+U] source and a directional attribute from the source to the target. Moreover, a [−U] source implies a [−U] target, independently of the attribute links between the two.

9.2 Bidirectionality Let us have a closer look at the bidirectionality hypothesis first. BiDi, as proposed by Löbner (2013, 2014) and Schulzek (2014), reads roughly as follows: There has to be a bijection in terms of attributes, i.e. functional relations, between metonymic source and metonymic target.

Of course, this bijection must be the case at the moment of the metonymic shift; that is, it can be specific to the situation in which the shift occurs and does not have to

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hold in general. The common frame pattern underlying bidirectional metonymies is illustrated by the scheme depicted in 100:⁴ (100)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t)

The scheme models cases such as a bidirectionally linked [+U] source and target (see example 101a) or a bidirectionally linked [−U] source and target (see example 101e).

9.2.1 Examples of Bidirectional Metonymies Löbner’s BiDi originates, on the one hand, in empirical lists of metonymic shifts that are based on bijections and, on the other hand, on the observation that the source can be seen as standing for the target and vice versa. Löbner lists examples of classes of metonymy in order to illustrate that traditional types of metonymy rely on bijections:⁵ (101)

a. location 󴀘󴀯 institution (Moscow menaces Ukraine), b. author 󴀘󴀯 oeuvre (I like to read Sartre), c. container 󴀘󴀯 content (Drink up your cup), d. ordered meal 󴀘󴀯 ordering customer (The French fries just left), e. unique equipment 󴀘󴀯 wearer (A Blue Beret is a peacekeeper for the UN), f. property instance 󴀘󴀯 possessor (Celebrities are victims of a new photo hacking trend).

He assumes that all metonymic source-target pairs in example 101 exhibit a bijective link. As a contrast, he argues that the reason why a shift from ‘university’ to such properties as ‘year of foundation of the university’ or to ‘size of the university’ is not possible is that such attributes as ‘year of foundation of [x]’ or ‘size of [x]’ do not have an invertible counterpart that links their values back to the possessor (cf. Löbner, 2013, Chap. 12.3.1).⁶ 4 I make use of such schematic representations of source-target(-possessor) constellations in the following chapters. They obey the following formal conventions: Single round brackets represent frame nodes, double round brackets mark the central node, and square brackets represent arguments. The letters s, t, and p stand for source, target, and possessor. Each arrow from a to b represents an attribute that takes a as possessor and b as value. 5 The examples stem from a plenary talk at CTF’14, Düsseldorf, Germany (see Löbner, 2014); Löbner’s classes of relations, my example sentences. 6 The reason for assuming such unidirectional links is, obviously, that a given year is host for a great many events and that a given size can be the case of a great many objects so that the

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Russ. Gov.

Fig. 9.2: Contextually bijective frame: possible context- or discourse-specific frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 101a.

attribute based on the reduced frame (see Chapter 11.4.4 on attribute reduction) as depicted in Figure 9.1, right frame. In either case, BiDi does not seem to be fulfilled at first sight. With this in mind, how do we accommodate this case in view of BiDi, given that the link does not seem to be bidirectional in a logical sense (see the left frame, attribute link on the left, in Figure 9.1 again). One possible way to make out a case for a bijection between ‘Moscow’ and ‘Russian Government’ is to assume⁷ that for the shift to work the focus must be restricted to a limited context, such as international or Russian politics (and the forces that have predominant roles in there), which triggers a contextual bijection between the two because other institutions or locations in Moscow might matter less in the relevant context (see Figure 9.2). In this case, the example does indeed fulfill BiDi. For abstract objects, however, BiDi might be less intuitive than for cases that rely on the spatio-physical 1-to-1 correspondence between physical objects. Therefore, an argumentation that holds for physically related objects can be contentious or more speculative for other classes. Consider the property instance 󴀘󴀯 possessor relation in example 101f: The possessor, a person, is assumed to have the property of being famous, so that there must be some attribute that takes ‘person’ as possessor and ‘famous’ as value. But what about the existence of an attribute in the direction of the shift? There are arguments for a view according to which there is no such link from source to target here.⁸

7 As I did for some of the shifts described by Radden & Kövecses (1999), discussed in Chapter 7.4. 8 Contrary to physical categories, which have distinguishable instances, instances of ‘fame’ are quite hard to distinguish – except via their bearers. This is comparable to colours: While different colours and colour nuances can be discriminated by sensory-motor means, the colour instances of two identically coloured objects (e.g. two externally identical ambulances, which have both the same reddish colour) cannot be discriminated by human vision. Therefore, they might be perceived and conceptualized not as two instances of the same category – despite the fact that the colour substances sprayed on each of the cars are distinct – but as the same abstract thing, just like the value of ‘year of the end of World War 2’ is exactly the same as the value of ‘year of the Yalta Conference’.

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Possible doubts about BiDi as a necessary condition of metonymy turn out to be justified; as I show in Chapter 9.3, metonymy is indeed possible without the attribute in the direction of the shift. However, the possibility and ubiquity of metonymies on the basis of a bidirectional link between source and target is uncontroversial.

9.2.3 Arguments in Favour of Necessary Bidirectionality Löbner argues for BiDi by, one the one hand, treating as somewhat self-evident that any metonymic shift from a to b requires an attribute in the direction of the shift (that is, which takes a as possessor and b as value), and, on the other hand, providing arguments for the necessity of an attribute in the opposite diretion of the shift. 9.2.3.1 Arguments for the Directional Link Löbner (2013, 2014) and Kimm, Schulzek, & Terhalle (2012)⁹ formulate the following hypothesis about the directional attribute: Metonymic source and metonymic target must be connected by an attribute from the source to the target.

Indeed, this view seems quite intuitive at first sight, especially if it is based on examples that exhibit bidirectional links between source and target. Since the metonymic source is seen as a means to identify the target, the target must be a function of the source, otherwise it would be impossible to identify it unambiguously.¹⁰ However, as it turns out, there is a problem with this argument: it presupposes that an unambiguous identification is always necessary or wanted in metonymy. As I show below, this presupposition can be refuted.

9 Kimm et al. (2012) was co-authered by me, but I have significantly changed and sharpened my view of the matter since then, so that I no longer consider the paper as representative of my view. 10 The same idea is more or less explicitly included in observations by Geeraerts & Peirsman (2011, p. 96), who proclaim the pragmatic rule that “[i]n order to identify a certain referent, mak[ing] use of a feature that economically allows for the unique identification of that referent in the given context” makes sense, and by Fauconnier (1985), whose connectors between source and target seem to be functions from the former to the latter. Moreover, this view is compatible with the view enlarged on in Deane (1988, p. 340, 341), which can be interpreted as if activation spread followed the direction of the attributes in frames (see my discussion in Chapter 7.3).

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ca m




HHU

on ti ca lo

pu in s > st .

node

Wersten

Fig. 9.3: Metonymy that fulfills BiDi: rudimentary frame representation of the shift in example 102.

9.2.3.2 Arguments for the Counter-Directional Link In his argumentation for BiDi, Löbner (2013, p. 314) also explains the necessity of the attribute in the opposite direction of the shift. He states that, while in a metonymy the source – activated as lexical meaning of the shifted item – stands for the target, the reverse is also true at the same time: the source provides access to the target because the target stands for the source as its most relevant component in the given context. This observation is indeed applicable to source metonymies (see Chapter 8.5). The described mutual stand-for relation figures in the sentence in example 102. (102)

Düsseldorf University lies in Wersten. ‘(The campus of) The institution Düsseldorf University lies in Wersten.’

The NP Düsseldorf University activates a complex meaning and is shifted to one of its components, the ‘campus of Düsseldorf University’ by the co(n)text (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Radden & Kövecses, 1999): the possessor stands for its contextually relevant part, upon which the predication actually operates. At the same time, the location predication lies in can be seen as providing information that characterizes not only the campus, but the university as such because it is, in many contexts, one of the most relevant pieces of information for anyone who wants to work or study there, i.e. anyone who wants to interact with other components of the university than its campus. From this perspective, the campus stands for the whole university. This is a key feature of source metonymy: a property of the campus can equally well be conceptualized as property of the university as a whole because it is of vital importance for many kinds of interaction with the university (see Figure 9.3). Löbner’s argument for the necessity of a bidirectional link is strong. However, its forte is not the fact that it substantiates BiDi¹¹ but that it explains the importance

11 Which it most probably does not, at least not in the general way it is supposed to.

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of the attribute link in the opposite direction of the metonymic shift. I show in Chapter 9.3 that the aforementioned counter-directional attribute can enable metonymy without the presence of an attribute link in the direction of the shift. And in Chapter 9.4, I argue that the counter-directional attribute must even be considered the crucial link for metonymy since metonymy is not possible without it.

9.2.4 Bidirectionality with Source and Target Focus As illustrated by the examples in 101 on page 114, bidirectional metonymy can occur both in source and target metonymies (as defined in Chapter 8, for example in the conclusion on page 109). Example 101b is a source metonymy, in which the metonymic source, the IR ‘Sartre’, is used to draw attention to the bidirectionally linked target MR ‘oeuvre produced by/attributed to Sartre’, while still remaining in focus, so that the person itself could be anaphorically referred to without any difficulty. Example 101d represents a typical target metonymy – just like the very similar example 85 discussed on page 97 – which shifts attention and reference to the target, making it impossible to anaphorically resume the source afterwards.

9.2.5 Identical (Non-)Uniqueness of Source and Target Metonymic shifts based on a bidirectional link between source and target can occur with [+U] sources and [−U] sources. The bidirectional link between the two, which is equivalent to each of them being unique with respect to the other, results in the source and target having identical (non-)uniqueness values. If the source is [+U] the target is [+U]: Since any metonymic target is evoked by the source and hence has to be viewed in its relation to the source, it is equivalent to an originally [+R] MR whose argument has been saturated by the source MR as possessor (see Chapter 9.1.1). In this case, the attribute link from the source to the target makes the target a function of the unique source; as delineated in Chapter 2.3.2, saturating a functional MR by a [+U] possessor results in a [+U] MR (see examples 101b or 101d). If the source is [−U] the target is [−U], since the attribute link from the source to the target makes the target a function of the non-unique source, which results in a non-unique target MR. As delineated in Chapter 2.3.2, saturating a functional MR by a [−U] possessor results in a [−U] MR (see examples 101e or 101f). In sum, the above observations show that metonymy along a bidirectional link between source and target is possible and that the bijection has a certain impact on possible combinations of source and target (non-)uniqueness:

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Observation 14 (Bidirectional non-relational metonymy). Referent-sensitive, non-relational metonymies, i.e. source and target metonymies in frames with no open arguments, are possible between a source and a target MR that are bidirectionally linked. The (non-)uniqueness of the source is preserved during the shift inasmuch as source and target are either both [+U] or both [−U]. At the same time, the ubiquity and typicality of metonymies along a bidirectional link cannot gloss over the fact that bidirectionality is not a necessary condition of metonymy, which I show in the following.

9.3 Counter-Directionality This section is dedicated to showing that an attribute in the direction of the shift (or directional attribute), i.e. from the source to the target, is not necessary for referentsensitive non-relational metonymies.¹² Instead, metonymies with a [−U] target can rely exclusively on a link in the opposite direction of the shift, the counterdirectional attribute, in certain cases. The directional attribute is only necessary with metonymies that have [+U] targets. Since the concept type of the metonymic target is reflected by the determination of the shifted lexical item (see section 8.5) in target metonymies, a directional attribute must be present in definite target metonymies. Since source metonymies mark the concept type of the source on the shifted item, definite determination does not imply the necessity of a directional attribute in source metonymies. The patterns 103 and 104 illustrate my claim schematically. The bidirectional pattern in 103 represents a possible basis of a metonymic shift, as I showed in Chapter 9.2, but so does the uni-directional pattern in 104. (103)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t)

(104)

((s)) ← (t)

I provide arguments for the conditionality of the directional attribute and refute its necessity for metonymy by discussing several examples of metonymic shifts along exclusively counter-directional links. The necessity of the directional attribute for metonymies with [+U] targets cannot be proven empirically, but I illustrate that target metonymies of items with definite determination, which reflect [+U] targets, correspond to bijections between source and target.

12 In Chapter 10, I show that this is also true for metonymies in frames with open arguments.

9.3 Counter-Directionality |

121

9.3.1 Why Bidirectionality Is not (Always) Necessary When a metonymic target is contextually [+U], it must also be unique with respect to the source because of the contrapositive that a target that is not unique with respect to the source is not unique in the whole context, since the target is always viewed in its relation to the source as its “activator” (see Chapter 9.1.1). Therefore, metonymies with [+U] targets require a directional attribute. In target-focused metonymies, the MR that constitutes the metonymic target has to be compatible with the determination of the NP (see Chapter 8.5). Therefore, a target metonymy in a definite NP has a [+U] target and thus needs to lead to the unambiguous identification of the target (referent). Hence, there must be a directional attribute. But this does not mean that this is an intrinsic characteristic of metonymic shifts. And indeed, it is not. In target metonymies, the source, as a relevant property of the target in the respective context, characterizes and thus helps to identify the target. This principle is not violated if the target is not a function of the source. In the same way, in source metonymies, the source has to serve as the identifier of the target as one of its components and the content that applies to the target has to apply indirectly to the source as a whole. This is not violated by non-unique targets either. Sometimes, it is simply enough to highlight the source as a typical property of the target without the target being unambiguously identifiable. For example, it is perfectly fine to identify members of a sort by means of a property that is shared by all members of that sort, like in example 105. (105)

J’ai lu quelques Sartre. ‘I have read several (of) Sartre(’s novels).’

This is a metonymy from the IC ‘J.-P. Sartre’ to some unspecified novels that have the common property of having ‘Sartre’ as their author, so that ‘Sartre’ is unique with respect to each of the novels, while each novel is not uniquely attributed to him on this level of categorization, i.e. as sortal ‘novel written by Sartre’.¹³ In the following, I provide additional empirical support for the possibility of purely counter-directional metonymies in the form of examples of both target and source metonymies without an attribute from the source to the target.

13 It is of course possible to create a bijection between Sartre and each of his novels and papers by identifying each of them properly, but on the level of abstraction that underlies the expression in example 105 there is no distinction between the novels, which are categorized as equal members of a set of novels/works in relation to their creator.

122 | 9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames 9.3.2 Examples of Counter-Directional Target Metonymy In the (non-relational, referent-sensitive) target metonymies that are analysed in the following, the existence of a directional attribute either cannot be argued for reasonably or is highly controversial, so that the counter-directional attribute from target to source is most likely the only link.¹⁴ 9.3.2.1 [+U] Source and [−U] Target A typical case of a counter-directional metonymy is the shift from a (contextually) [+U] source to a [−U] target (= a [+U]-saturated relational MR). The French noun galerie ‘balcony (of a theatre or opera house)’ allows a shift to entities that are non-uniquely related to its lexical meaning. In example 106, the metonymic construction process proceedes from a unique whole (the second balcony in a given theatre) to one of many entities that are of the same sortal kind and have exactly the same relation to the whole (one of many seats on the balcony, see Figure 9.4). (106) Elle [. . . ] a pris au bureau une deuxième galerie; j’ai été obligé de la suivre en donnant au contrôleur ma première galerie pour une deuxième. (Nerval, Gérard de, Voyage en Orient, vol. 1, 1851, p. 41, cited from TLFi, “galerie”, I.B.2.b–P. méton.)¹⁵ ‘At the booking office, she [. . . ] bought a (ticket for a seat on the) second balcony; I had to follow her by giving my (ticket for a seat on the) first balcony to the controller in exchange for a (ticket for a seat on the) second balcony.’ The non-uniqueness of the target with respect to the unique source is marked by the use of indefinite determination. The source serves as an identifying entity for what is really meant, namely entities in close, non-unique relation it, which are designated by means of their common property of being associated in a relevant way to the unique source. Counter-directional metonymies can occur on the basis of the producer for product relation, which Radden & Kövecses (1999, p. 38) illustrate by means of the utterance that I recite here as example 107a. Next to the bijection between an

14 In combination with what is shown in Chapter 9.4, namely that there is no evidence for metonymy based exclusively on an attribute from source to target, this supports the claim that the counter-directional attribute is the only necessary condition of metonymy in terms of attribute functionality in frames. 15 In the same context, the item is also attested as an expression for the whole audience on the seats in the back.

9.3 Counter-Directionality |

ny

seat

o lc

ticket > < seat

123

ticket

a

balcony

< seat

ticket

Fig. 9.4: Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target: rudimentary frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 106. The two ‘seat’ nodes indicate that there is a whole set of seats. The item galerie shifts from ‘balcony’ via ‘seat on that balcony’ to ‘ticket for a seat on that balcony’. The first step of the shift is a target metonymy because it shifts the focus to the target. The second step of the shift is a source metonymy, because the focus stays on the source, i.e. on the target of the first step. Independently of whether ‘balcony’ – and thus the whole frame – is an IC or an SC, the ‘seat’ nodes are non-unique since they represent the sortal MRs ‘(a) seat on the balcony in question’.

author and his whole oeuvre (see my example 101b, according to Löbner 2014), metonymic shifts are also possible between an artist and one or more unspecified work(s) from his oeuvre, like in examples 105 (commented on above) and 107b, where the metonymic source is a function of the target, but not vice versa. (107)

a. I’ve got a Ford. ‘I’ve got a (car from the) Ford company.’ b. J’aimerais acheter un Picasso. ‘I would love to buy a (painting by) Picasso.’

In the examples in 107, the indefinite determination¹⁶ of the shifted items indicates [−U] targets. Together with the [+U] sources, this reflects the fact that the referents are classified as belonging to the category of objects with the property that is encoded by the metonymic source and the counter-directional attribute (see Figure 9.5). The definite variant of such shifts would be interpreted as referring to one contextually unique referent. Since the referent is conceptualized as belonging to

16 By indefinite determination, I refer to Löbner’s broad notion of indefiniteness here, which stands for “a variety of determinations including simple indefinite” (Löbner, 2011, p. 279) and incorporates markers of non-uniqueness, such as simple indefinite determiners like a, unspecific modifiers like some [singular noun], certain quantifiers, such as several, every, all, plural, etc. (Löbner, 2011, p. 288).

124 | 9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames

FOCUS

FOCUS

e cr >




painting at or

painting

Picasso

Fig. 9.5: Metonymy with non-uniquely attributed target: frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 107b (left frame) and its definite counterpart in situations that include a contextually unique painting by Picasso (right frame).

the category of objects that have the property encoded by the metonymic source, this would entail that there is an unambiguously identifiable referent with this property, which is tantamount to a directional attribute from the source to the target. Once more, the indefinite examples refute the general necessity of a directional link for metonymy, and the definite counterparts support the necessity of the directional link with [+U] targets. Another pervasive case of metonymic shifts in the opposite direction of the linking attribute is the designation of products by means of their regions of origin (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999, p. 40, relation: place for product made there), or the year in which they have been produced. This holds for the designation of types of wines as well as for certain portions of a certain type of wine. Consider the sentence in 108a. This is a shift from the wine-growing area to one of the wines produced in that particular wine region. While the metonymic source is an IC, the metonymic target is an SC that represents one element out of a category of mass concepts, namely the different types of wine that are all classified as Bordeaux wines. The attribute is unidirectional from the target to the source, since there are several types of wine which are produced in the Bordeaux wine region and which are all referred to as Bordeaux wines (see Figure 9.6). The shift is a target metonymy, and accordingly, the determination of the item reflects the properties of the target concept. (108)

a. C’est un bordeaux léger, peu tannique. ‘This is a light, not very tannic (wine from the wine regions in Gironde department whose prefecture is) Bordeaux.’

9.3 Counter-Directionality |

125

FOCUS B. wine

B. wine

>

re


gi on


r tau res

Greek man

???

p ou

r

ro up Greek man

FOCUS node

???

Fig. 9.15: No reverse link: possible frame representations of a constellation in which the restaurant has two more or less equally prominent owners of which one cannot be picked out in an unspecific way to serve as a source. Hence, this representation does not reflect the frame on which a shift like in example 125 could rely because the selection of the IMR ‘(the) Greek man’ as source by the speaker creates a bidirectional link to the restaurant which fades out the ‘Italian woman’ as momentarily less relevant.

A plausible situation could be some kind of higher relevance of the Greek owner with respect to the Italian owner – for example, if the Greek shows up in his restaurant every day while the Italian owner has never been seen by anybody, or if the dishes and style of the restaurant are explicitly Greek, despite the second owner. This would easily lead to a conceptual bijection between the Greek man and the place. But also simple ‘laziness’ (not in a negative sense, but more in the sense of ‘natural striving for some kind of efficiency’) could certainly result in choosing one of two options as the source. The point to make here is the following: If we try to trigger a shift on the basis of a frame in which there is really no contextually specific link from the target to the source (but only a link in the direction of the shift, like in Figure 9.15) we cannot make use of the IMR ‘(the) Greek man’ since this would create a bijection restricted to the context of utterance. Instead, we have to conceptualize the Greek or the Italian owner in view of their identical roles with respect to the restaurant, i.e. as the sortal MR ‘one of the owners of the restaurant’ (= IMR-saturated relational MR). In a metonymy, this can only be achieved by verbalizing the source more or less as

140 | 9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames

follows: one of the owners (of the restaurant), and this would not be a metonymy because we would have to either explicitly name or consider as presupposed the intended target. This way, the reason why a version of the metonymy in example 125 with no counter-directional link is impossible is the same as the one briefly illustrated in the Romulus case above. In his argument for the necessity of the counter-directional link (in the context of his bidirectionality hypothesis), Löbner (2013, p. 314) discusses the shift from ‘university institution’ to the ‘year of foundation of the university institution’ (in my example 126) as not possible without further contextual support. I tend to believe, however, that this is not due to the lack of a counter-directional link but to the fact that, without context, it is simply very hard to see what the target of the metonymy is supposed to be. Even with the help of the ‘hint’ that we have to look for a year, the frame of ‘university’ simply does not provide enough information as to what kind of year that is relevant for the university could be meant here. Thus, without further contextual support, the problem is not the lacking counter-directional attribute (as there are many events related to 1839, not only the foundation of Boston University) but the lack of an attribute in the direction of the shift as well: the attribute ‘year of foundation of [x]’ simply cannot be inferred. As a consequence, there is no visible link at all. (126)

Boston University was a year of considerable unrest. ? ‘(The

year of the foundation of) Boston University was a year of considerable unrest.’ If the context was a little more specific, for example because the utterance is part of a conversation about ‘years in which American universities were founded’, the metonymy might be possible, even if other universities had been founded in the same year, because mentioning the source IMR would create the bijection.²⁶ Finding a metonymic formulation, however, that conceptualizes the university as one of many entities of the sort ‘(an) institution founded in 1839’ – thus creating a frame in which there is indeed no counter-directional attribute – is impossible. The observations and examples in this Chapter illustrate that the necessity of the counter-directional attribute in metonymy can be justified, and that there are cases in which metonymic shifts are not possible with a unidirectional link in the the direction of the shift, but become possible as soon as a counter-directional

26 Moreover, given that the metonymy in the example would most probably be a target metonymy, whose determination is congruent with the target, the definiteness of the item Boston University suggests that the target should be [+U].

9.5 What about Non-Referent-Sensitive Metonymy? |

141

attribute is present. Therefore, the results of this section can be summarized in the following way: Observation 16 (Counter-directional attribute in non-relational metonymy). Nonrelational, referent-sensitive metonymies, i.e. source and target metonymies with no open arguments, require a counter-directional attribute in order to be possible, i.e. they depend on the existence of an attribute from the metonymic target to the metonymic source.

9.5 What about Non-Referent-Sensitive Metonymy? Non-referent-sensitive metonymies in frames with no open arguments are shifts between properties of the same referent, which are therefore best modelled as shifts between two non-central nodes within a frame (see Chapter 7.2.3 from page 65 on). The shifts of boor ‘peasant’ > ‘coarse or unpleasant person’ and child (‘descendant of [x]’ >)²⁷ ‘descendant (of someone)’ > ‘very young person’ provided by Koch (2004) exhibit the pattern depicted in 127. (127)

(s) 󴀗󴀰 ((x)) 󴀗󴀰 (t)

The pattern illustrates that source and target are non-central nodes in a frame with no open arguments and that the central node remains untouched. Although I tend towards the view that such a bidirectional link between the components is the pattern necessary for this kind of metonymy, I lack sufficient examples to discuss non-referent-sensitive metonymy more thoroughly.²⁸ Non-referent-sensitive metonymy can at least be shown to also exist in frames with open arguments in Chapter 10.4.

9.6 Non-Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview This section provides an overview of the different kinds of non-relational, referentsensitive metonymy discussed in this chapter. Patterns of [+R] metonymies are treated in Chapter 10 and summarized in Chapter 10.5. The present overview is sup-

27 This additional step from the relational use of child to a non-relational use must be included here for the sake of completeness because it is the non-relational MR that serves as basis of the non-referent-sensitive metonymy (otherwise the metonymy would include an open argument). 28 For this reason, I do not include them in the overview in Table 9.1 on page 143.

142 | 9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames

posed to make 1) the identified patterns in terms of attribute links between source and target, 2) the combinations of contextual source and target (non-)uniqueness, and 3) the linguistic determination that accompanies these factors for 4) both source metonymies and target metonymies easily accessible. Every combination is illustrated by means of an example (see Table 9.1 on page 143, to which the following explanations refer). In row one of Table 9.1, a [+U] source combines in a bijection with a [+U] target. The target is [+U] because, as an MR that is dependant on the source (see Chapter 9.1.1), it is a function of the unique source, i.e. a [+U]-saturated FMR, which is automatically [+U] (see Löbner, 2011, and my Chapter 8.5.2). This is reflected by the paraphrases of the metonymic readings: ‘the tyres of the bike’ and ‘the player of the alto saxophone’. At the same time, the functionality of the source with respect to the target is a necessary condition of metonymy (Chapter 9.4) and therefore has to be encoded in the (contextualized) frame of the metonymic source. For the examples in line one of Table 9.1, the sources might be paraphrased by ‘the bike, with its tyres’ and ‘the alto sax, which is played by its player’. In row two of Table 9.1, a [−U] source combines in a bijection with a [−U] target. The target is [−U] because it is a function of the non-unique source, i.e. a [−U]saturated FMR, which is automatically [−U]. This is reflected by the paraphrases of the metonymic readings: ‘the campuses of which’ and ‘persons who produce content with their quills/pens’, which represent unspecific elements of a certain category. Like above, the fact that the source MRs must include the target MRs in their (contextualized) frames can be paraphrased by ‘universities, each having its own campus/building’ and ‘quills of which each is used by its own writer’. In row three of Table 9.1, a [+U] source combines with a [−U] target, the source being a function the target. The target is [−U] because it is not functionally but non-uniquely attributed to the source, i.e. it is a [+U]-saturated RMR, which is automatically [−U]. This is reflected by the paraphrase of the metonymic readings: ‘a work/some works by Picasso’. Since the determination of the metonymic items depends on the type of the MR the focus is on, the target metonymy exhibits indefinite determination while the source metonymy carries the definite determination congruent with the unique source. The source might be paraphrased as ‘Picasso, who creates pieces of art’. In row four of Table 9.1, a [−U] source combines with a [−U] target, the source being a function of the target. The target is [−U] because it is relationally attributed to the source, i.e. it is a [−U]-saturated RMR, which is automatically [−U]. This is reflected by the paraphrases of the metonymic readings: ‘some paintings created by living painters’ and ‘a/the ticket for a seat on a balcony’. Paraphrases of the sources can be ‘painters, of which each one creates one or more paintings’ and ‘a balcony, on which there are seats which one can rent each by buying a ticket’.

9.6 Non-Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview |

143

Tab. 9.1: Types of non-relational, referent-sensitive metonymy in terms of functional relations between source and target: Since this is only about non-relational metonymy, source and target are always [−R], so that only the (non-)uniqueness of the MR is specified in the columns. pattern

source

target

source metonymy

target metonymy

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t)

[+U]

[+U] =[+U(+U)]

DEF Les valves Schrader permettent de gonfler le vélo à une station-service. ‘Schrader valves make it possible to inflate (the tyres of) the bike at a petrol station.’ INDEF Les études supérieures [...] se faisaient [...] dans les universités se trouvant dans les villes. ‘Higher education took place at the universities (the campuses of which were) located in towns.’

DEF Le saxophone alto s’en alla boitant sur son pied bandé. ‘The (player of the) alto saxophone left, limping on his bandaged foot.’

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t)

[−U]

[−U] =[+U(−U)]

((s)) ← (t)

[+U]

[−U] =[−U(+U)]

DEF Picasso est au Louvre ‘(Some of) Picasso(’s art work) is in the Louvre’

((s)) ← (t)

[−U]

[−U] =[−U(−U)]

INDEF Il faut permettre aux particuliers d’acheter des peintres vivants plus facilement. ‘We have to make it easier for private individuals to buy (some paintings created by) living painters.’

INDEF Il a suffi d’une poignée d’écrivains courageux pour mettre en fuite des milliers de plumes vénales. ‘It took a handful of courageous writers to put thousands of venal (persons who produce content with their) pens to flight.’ INDEF Un Picasso rarissime mis aux enchères à un prix record. ‘A extremely rare (painting/piece by) Picasso [will be] put up for auction for a record price.’ INDEF Elle a pris au bureau une galerie. ‘At the booking office, she bought a (ticket for a seat on a) balcony.’

144 | 9 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Non-Relational Frames

In accordance with what I outlined in Chapters 8.5, 9.3 and 9.4, the determination of the shifted lexical item reflects the concept type of the source in the case of source metonymy and of the target in the case of target metonymy. Also, across target and source metonymies, the counter-directional attribute link from the target to the source is mandatory, while the directional attribute link from the source to the target is only required by metonymies with [+U] targets. Since targets that are attributed functionally to a [−U] source are also [−U], the directional link can also occur with [−U] targets if the source is [−U].

9.7 Conclusion Metonymy crucially depends on the functionality of the links between source and target. The counter-directional link in the form of an attribute from the target to the source constitutes a necessary condition of non-relational referent-sensitive metonymy. The directional link in the form of an attribute from the source to the target is constitutive of metonymies with [+U] targets, but it can figure in metonymies with [−U] targets if the source is also [−U]. It follows from this that metonymies with [+U] targets always have [+U] sources. As a consequence, the hypothesis put forward by Löbner (2013) that metonymy relies necessarily on a bijection between source and target is valid for a subset of all metonymies (even if this is most probably quite a large subset), but can be supplemented with cases that do not need the directional attribute. The described conditions hold for all metonymies on the scale of focus placement (see Chapter 8.4) by which referent-sensitive metonymies can be described: they are valid for target metonymies, i.e. metonymies that focus primarily on the target, and for source metonymies, i.e. metonymies that focus primarily on the source, as outlined in Chapter 8.5. In Chapter 10 (see especially the summary in Chapter 10.5 and in the conclusion), I show that relational metonymy, i.e. metonymy within a frame with an open argument, behaves like non-relational metonymy in terms of the (non-)uniqueness of source and target. Therefore, these conditions can probably be considered as necessary conditions of metonymy in general.

10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of relational metonymy.¹ It supplements Chapter 9 (on non-relational metonymy) by analysing the constellations that can be found in metonymic uses of expressions with open arguments, i.e. based on frames with open arguments. Metonymies are shifts from one MR to another MR via some linking attribute(s) within a given frame. MRs have a certain MR type, which can be described by means of the dimensions uniqueness [±U] and relationality [±R] (see Chapters 2.3 and 3.3 and Löbner, 2011). While in Chapter 9, the (non-)uniqueness of source and/or target and the way source and target are linked was discussed for metoymies in [−R] frames, in this chapter I discuss their (non-)uniqueness and the way they are linked in [+R] frames, i.e. in relation to an open argument. Since the open argument constitutes a third component to be taken into account, more different metonymic patterns can be distinguished than for non-relational metonymy. Still, the regularities identified for non-relational metonymy are also found in relational metonymy.

10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy Patterns and subtypes of relational metonymy in terms of the functional links between source, target and arguments will be discussed in Chapters 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. The present section is dedicated to some general observations about metonymy in frames with open arguments. It turns out that metonymy preserves (non-)relationality inasmuch as the target is [+R] if the source is [+R] and the target is [−R] if the source is [−R].

10.1.1 Metonymy in Frames with No Open Arguments If the metonymy is a shift between two nodes of a frame that does not have any open argument (see the cases discussed in Chapter 9), source MR and target MR are both [−R]. This constellation is trivial from the point of view of (non-)relationality preservation in metonymy: no open argument is involved in the shift, the frame 1 To my knowledge, metonymy with open arguments has not been addressed explicitly in the literature yet. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-010

146 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

has no open argument, both source and target are necessarily [−R]. The target metonymy in example 128a and the source metonymy in example 128b are such cases. (128)

a. Le Picasso que j’ai vu au Louvre m’a fasciné. ‘I was fascinated by the (art work by) Picasso that I saw in the Louvre.’ b. Picasso est au Louvre.² ‘(Some/one or more art works by) Picasso can be found in the Louvre.’

10.1.2 Metonymy in Frames with Additional Open Arguments If the metonymy is a shift between two nodes of a frame that additionally has one or more open arguments, and the metonymic shift is a transfer of attention from one node to another node and does not affect the open argument(s) directly, these arguments simply remain open during the shift. Thus, source MR and target MR are both [+R], sharing the same open argument(s). The target metonymy in example 134b on page 150 represents such a case. The ‘producer’ constitutes the open argument of the ‘production process’ (metonymic source) and of the ‘result of the production process’ (metonymic target). In the same way, the source metonymy in example 129 constitutes a shift from a [+R] source with ‘Hermès family’ as possessor to a [+R] target with the same possessor (see Figure 10.1). (129)

L’entreprise de la famille Hermès se trouve à Paris. ‘(The company seat of) The business of the Hermès family is in Paris.’

Such referent-sensitive [+R] metonymies will be described in more detail in Chapters 10.2 and 10.3.

10.1.3 Metonymy that Shifts an Open Argument There are metonymies that shift an open argument while leaving the central node untouched.³ Since the open argument shifts to another place within the integrated frame while the frame centre remains untouched, both metonymic source and

2 As far as I know, no work by Picasso is part of the permanent collection of the Louvre. 3 Thus, they are a particular [+R] version of the [−R] non-referent-sensitive metonymies discussed in Chapter 7.2.3.

10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy |

Hermès family ow n bu er sin > es s
it. st t in sea
(un) poids ‘(a) physical object that applies pressure to something by means of downward force’ (adapted from TLFi, “poids”, I.A.–1. and I.B.–1.a)⁷

The existence of lexical metonymies whose original lexical meaning is [+R] while the metonymic meaning is [−R], like in Fr. structure, does not imply that the

5 This is equivalent to the more common formulation distance in kilometres. 6 Or vice versa, see Chapter 10.1.5, page 152. 7 The meaning paraphrases are not all close translations of the French paraphrases provided by the TLFi. Instead, the French meaning paraphrases have been adapted to my purposes in order to highlight the presence or absence of an open argument in the different meanings, since this information is more visible in the examples provided by the TLFi than in the meaning paraphrases themselves.

10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy |

149

metonymy is a shift from a [+U] MR to a [−U] MR because the source of a metonymic shift is not necessarily identical to the lexical frame of the shifted item. Instead, the source is rather an MR which is based on the lexical frame of the shifted item after this frame has been modified by relevant information from the context⁸ (see Chapter 7.1). An argument for the relationality-preservation claim is what one might call the descriptiveness of relationality, in contrast to the non-descriptiveness of (absolute) uniqueness: non-relational (non-)uniqueness – i.e. the (non-)uniqueness of the MR represented by the frame as a whole – reflects the contextual (un)ambiguity of an MR, independent of the descriptive content of that MR (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 283). (Non-)relationality, in contrast, is a property that does affect the descriptive content.⁹ Since metonymy is conceived in the present work as a shift within a given frame, the links between the components of the frame are not touched by the shift itself. As a consequence, a shift within a frame with open arguments has a [+R] source and a [+R] target, while a shift within a frame without open arguments has a [−R] source and a [−R] target. In this view, metonymic shifts not only preserve relationality in that the target is [+R] each time the source is [+R], but they also preserve the open argument(s) as such, so that the target has exactly the same open argument(s) as the source.¹⁰ With this in mind, cases of metonymies that exhibit a difference in (non-)relationality between the metonymic target and the (presumed) original meaning must be analysed as a combination of concept type shift and metonymic shift. This combination between a concept type shift and a subsequent metonymic shift can be illustrated with the help of examples 133 and 134. (133) [I]l apperçoit au loin une haute structure [. . . ]. (Chateaubriand, RenéFrançois, Génie du christianisme, vol. 1, 1803, p. 515, cited from TLFi, “structure”, A.1.a–P. méton.) ‘[H]e perceives a high (building because of its typical/visible) structure in the distance [. . . ].’

8 For example, in the case of the metonymic shift of ham sandwich for ‘customer who ordered the ham sandwich’, the contextually triggered modification consists of the integration of the fact that ham sandwiches (and any other dish) have the purpose of/are typically being ordered by customers in the relevant restaurant context. The metonymic target is only present – and thus accessible at all – in the frame due to this contextual modification of the frame associated with the item, and thus the relevant metonymy becomes possible. 9 As a consequence, this is also true for relational (non-)uniqueness, i.e. for the uniqueness or non-uniqueness of an MR with respect to another MR. 10 The only condition for which this is not true is non-referent-sensitive [+R] metonymy, where the open argument itself shifts metonymically (see Chapter 10.4).

150 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

(134)

a. Hier soir au cinéma, j’ai regardé une production qui date de 1979. (from TLFi, “production”, I.C.2) ‘Last night at the movies, I watched (the result of) a production from 1979.’ b. Hier soir au cinéma, j’ai regardé une production de Truffaut. ‘Last night at the movies, I watched (the result of) a production by Truffaut.’

The meaning paraphrase and the example phrases provided by the TLFi in order to illustrate the putative original meaning of the shift in example 133 indicate: the meaning that underlies the shift is the functional concept ‘structure of [x]’ and takes as possessor all kinds of buildings and other constructions: Fr. [s]tructure d’un édifice, d’un pont, d’un toit, d’un village ‘structure of a building, of a bridge, of a roof, of a village’. Analogous uses are reported in the dictionary entry for possessors that are artefacts or art works. In contrast to this [+R] concept, the metonymic target is a sortal, i.e. [−R], MR that represents the possessor of the original FC. This is reflected by the [−R] (and [−U]) use in example 133. The original meaning of the shifted item structure, an FC, is contextually coerced into a [−U] MR by means of a Guarino shift (cf. Löbner, 2011, p. 309, 310, and the footnote on page 20 of the present work). The resulting sortal MR represents one unspecific possible value of the FC and corresponds to the FC with existential possessor saturation, namely ‘the structure of a/some building’ (=[+U(−U)]=[−U]). In this way, the possessor of the original [+R] concept is part of the now [−R] frame of the metonymic source. The source is then metonymically mapped onto the former possessor MR via the attribute ‘structure of [x]’. The metonymic source represents the visually perceptible property of the object (‘the structure of a building’), so that it can be used to characterize the metonymic target, i.e. the object itself: ‘a building that can be recognized by its structure’. The frame representations of the steps are depicted in Figure 10.2. By the way, the alternative view that the metonymic shift in some way comprises the change in the open argument is clearly impossible: in this case, the metonymic source would be a [+R] MR with an argument realized somewhere on the linguistic surface (for example, as part of a prepositional phrase accompanying the item to be shifted). The metonymic source would then have to shift to a target MR which is already present in the form of the explicitly realized possessor. Thus, a shift to the externally realized argument of the [+R] meaning of structure would lead to a second, metonymic verbalization of something that is already present on the linguistic surface, which obviously makes no sense. The metonymy in example 133 is similar to the shift from a process to its result in example 134 (depicted in Figure 10.3). The shift of Fr. production ‘action of realizing

10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy |

node




st ru ct

1

< st r ob uct je ct ure >

ur e

building

151

node

Fig. 10.2: [−R] metonymy on the basis of a situationally saturated FC: rudimentary frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 133. The focus is (probably) on the target, the source serves as emphasis of the key feature of the target, its visible structure. 1) original lexical meaning, 2) MR after possessor saturation = metonymic source, 3) metonymic shift.

FOCUS

FOCUS > er uc od

> er uc od

> sis t l su

re

pr


sis t l su

ne


‘movie, radio/television programme’ relies on the [−U] source MR ‘production of a film by someone’, the existentially saturated version of the FC ‘production of a [film] by [person/company]’.¹¹

11 The concept type shift need not concern both arguments of production, since the saturation of the ‘result of [x]’ argument already incorporates the future metonymic target into the frame. This becomes obvious from the fact that the metonymy can be converted into [+R] by adding the director of the film, like in example 134b. This shift is a referent-sensitive [+R] metonymy, whose open argument remains untouched by the metonymic shift (see Chapters 10.2 and 10.3).

152 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames 10.1.5 Shift from Possessor to Attribute? In Chapter 10.1.4, I discuss arguments in favour of the claim that a shift from an attribute to its possessor is not possible. The only other constellation in which metonymy could be the factor that changes the argument structure of the frame in a way that the relationality of the shifted item is affected would be a shift in the opposite direction, i.e. from a [−R] source to a [+R] attribute that takes the source as possessor. However, this kind of shift does not seem to exist. To my knowledge, there is no unquestionable example of a metonymic shift from an SC, for example the representation of an object, to a property of that object, in which the metonymic target would be a FC that takes the sortal metonymic source as possessor. Moreover, from a pragmatic perspective, it would be senseless to use a word that stands for an object in order to designate an attribute of the object if successful reference requires adding an expression referring to the object itself as possessor again, since the attribute requires argument saturation. Instead, a shift from the possessor to the value of its attribute might be useful, but this would be an ordinary shift that does not lead to differences in relationality between source and target. Meaning pairs in which a [+R] meaning seems to result metonymically from a [−R] reading can be better explained by an open argument shared by the two meanings in question than by a shift from the [−R] possessor to its [+R] attribute. Consider example 135. Such nouns typically also exhibit or exhibited a process meaning. Processes can be modelled as n-place functional concepts whose n open arguments are the key components of the process. This is reflected for example in the verbal (‘[x] composes [y]’: Matissex composes a paintingy ) or nominal constructions (‘composition of [y] (by [x])’: the composition of the paintingy (by Matissex )). Such [+R] process concepts have the same open argument [y] as the [+R] property meaning ‘structure of [y]’. On the other hand, there is a strong dependence not only between the possessor concept (the result object) and its property, but also between the underlying process and the property of the result object: the value of the property concept depends on how the process proceeds. Therefore, assuming a shift from the [+R] process MR to the [+R] property MR is much more convincing than assuming a shift from a [−R] object MR to a [+R] MR that takes the object as possessor. (135) Fr. composition ‘result (object) of assembling or combining things’ > composition de [x] ‘structure of [physical or abstract object]’ (adapted from TLFi, “composition”, I.A and I.A.1)

10.1 (Non-)Relationality in Metonymy |

1

×

2

4

5

✓

× ✓

3

6

153

✓ ✓

Fig. 10.4: (Non-)Relationality preservation in metonymy: 1) shift from an attribute ([+R]) to its [−R] possessor: not possible, 2) shift from a [−R] possessor to its [+R] attribute: not possible (the rectangular node reflects the fact that this would be the open argument of the metonymic target), 3) shift between components of a [−R] frame: possible (also as shifts between noncentral nodes in non-referent-sensitive metonymy), 4) shift between components of a [+R] frame that are linked via the open argument: possible, 5) shift between components of a [+R] frame: possible, 6) shift of the open argument of a [+R] frame: possible. The bijections between the nodes represent sufficient conditions of metonymy in terms of attribute directionality, but they do not mean that a bijection is mandatory in all cases.

10.1.6 Conclusion We have seen that metonymies in frames whose open argument becomes the metonymic target or whose source becomes the open argument are hardly plausible. Possible metonymic constellations seem to be the following: – [−R] (non-)referent-sensitive metonymy: Source and target of the metonymy are both [−R]. – [+R] referent-sensitive metonymy: Metonymic source and target are both [+R] and share the open argument. – [+R] non-referent-sensitive metonymy: Metonymic source and target have the same central node while the open argument itself shifts. All of the constellations discussed in this section are depicted in Figure 10.4. The main observations in this section can be summarized as follows: Observation 17 (Concept type in metonymy). Metonymic source and target can (but need not) differ in (non-)uniqueness, in that the target can be contextually/relationally (i.e. with respect to a possessor) non-unique even if the source is contextually/relationally unique. Metonymic source and target do not differ in

154 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

(non-)relationality, i.e. either both are [−R], or both are [+R]. If the open argument itself does not shift, metonymic source and target share the open argument.

10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy Like with [−R] metonymies, which can be divided into referent-sensitive (see Chapter 7.2.2, enlarged on in Chapters 8 and 9), and non-referent-sensitive metonymies (see Chapters 7.2.3 and 9.5), it is possible to discriminate between [+R] metonymies that are referent-sensitive since the central node of the integrated frame shifts and metonymies that are non-referent-sensitive since it is not the central node but the open argument itself that shifts. As with non-relational metonymy, I focus on (the much more frequent) referent-sensitive cases (this Section and Chapter 10.3) and only deal briefly with non-referent-sensitive ones in Chapter 10.4. In referent-sensitive metonymies, the metonymy shifts the frame centre within the integrated frame.¹² If the integrated frame has one or more open arguments, the metonymic source and target share the open argument (see Chapter 10.1). The possessor of an FMR, as filler of the open argument, must be verbalized separately and therefore appears in the vicinity of the shifted lexical item. Hence, the link between the metonymic source and the possessor is revealed explicitly¹³ and corresponds to either a single or a chain of attribute-value pair(s). In this constellation, metonymic shifts occur in two ways: pre-argument metonymies (see Figure 10.5, left frame), as I label them, are shifts of a [+R] MR within a chain of attributes of a given possessor (this section). They differ from cross-argument metonymies (see Chapter 10.3) in that the open argument is not part of the link between the metonymic source and the target.

10.2.1 Argument-Directed Metonymy There seem to be two subtypes of pre-argument metonymy, depending on the direction of the shift with respect to the open argument. Pre-argument metonymy can be argument-directed (see this section) if the shift proceeds from an MR that is

12 For the notion of integrated frame, see Definition 6 on page 55. 13 Since possessive constructions constitute typical examples of conceptually highly underspecified constructions that need a certain amount of contextual input in order to be interpreted correctly in pragmatic terms, the explicitness of the link between the metonymic source and possessor obviously depends on the contextual enrichment of the possessive construction.

10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy |

155

Fig. 10.5: Pre-argument and cross-argument metonymies: schematic illustrations of two classes of [+R] metonymies (with some potential shifts per class). Pre-argument metonymies (left frame) shift towards the argument within a chain of attributes (argument-directed metonymy), or away from the argument (argument-averted metonymy). Cross-argument metonymies (right frame) shift the source to other attributes of the same argument. The open arguments are depicted as rectangular nodes. The bijections between the nodes represent sufficient conditions of metonymy in terms of attribute directionality without a bijection being necessary in all cases.

less close to the argument to a MR that is closer to the argument within the chain of attributes, or argument-averted (see the following section) if the shift proceeds from an MR that is close to the open argument to a MR that is less close to the open argument. Pre-argument metonymies of both subtypes are schematically illustrated in Figure 10.5, left frame. In the study of [+R] metonymy from the perspective of frames, one of the most relevant questions is whether the explicit coding of the possessor and the resulting activation of an attribute-value chain between source and possessor has an impact on the conditions of metonymy in terms of the direction of the involved attributes. In Chapter 9, I showed for [−R] referent-sensitive metonymy that the counter-directional attribute¹⁴ constitutes a necessary condition of metonymy (see Chapter 9.4), and that the directional attribute – an attribute in the direction of the shift – constitutes an additional necessary condition of metonymies only with [+U] targets (see Chapter 9.3). In the following, I go through potential conceptual constellations of argument-directed metonymy. 10.2.1.1 Source Unique with Respect to [±U] Possessor This is a case like the bicycle shift in example 16 (on page 62, also depicted in Figure 10.6). The lexical item is integrated into a definite possessor construction (your . . . ), which indicates that the represented MR is [+R] and uniquely attributed to

14 In other words, an attribute that links metonymic source and target in a way that the source is a function of the target, so that the attribute direction is opposed to the direction of the metonymic shift.

156 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

to propose

picture

addr

ev en th t > em e
n en ag ctio a
or . t pp su pic


esse

Titus

Maggie

FOCUS Fig. 10.6: Argument-directed pre-argument metonymy: frame of the shift in example 16 on page 62 between two MRs of a [+R] attribute chain. The MRs are made available by the possessive construction that explicitly links the metonymic source to the possessor ‘Maggie’ and touches the metonymic target ‘playing card that displays the bicycle of [x]’.

the possessor in the relevant context. The possessive construction your bicycle (= ‘bicycle belonging to Maggie’) underdetermines a contextually quite specific relation between possessor and referent that can be paraphrased as ‘bicycle that is the motif of the picture that appeares on the playing card that the possessor/addressee proposed to the speaker’. The paraphrase shows that the metonymic target ‘playing card belonging to [x]’ is part of the information conveyed by the possessive construction that links the metonymic source ‘bicycle belonging to [x]’ to its possessor. Source and target are bidirectionally linked and also exhibit a bidirectional relation to their common IC possessor. Hence, this is a metonymy between two FMRs (see Figure 10.6). In argument-directed metonymies that rely on this constellation, there is necessarily a bijection between source and possessor (see the schematic representation in 136). Naming only one possessor of the metonymic source is tantamount to contextually reducing the potential possessors to the mentioned one; as a consequence, the possessor is also a function of the source. Since the target is part of the chain between source and possessor, there is also a bijection between the source and target, and between the target and possessor. That is to say, these metonymies behave in the same way as [−R] referent-sensitive metonymy. The shift with a [+U] target relies on a bijection between source and target. (136)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t) 󴀗󴀰 [p]¹⁵

The same pattern holds for analogous cases with a [−U] possessor. If the source is unique with respect to a [−U] possessor in an argument-directed metonymy, a 15 As in Chapter 9, I make use of schematic representations of abstract frame structures, in which s stands for source, t for target, and p for possessor. The round brackets represent nodes, the square brackets open arguments.

10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy |

sword

speaker

ma

ma

st

st

er >

er >

speaker

t> en ag tion c

fighter

FOCUS

Fig. 10.7: Argument-directed pre-argument metonymy: two possible frame representations of the metonymy in example 137. The metonymic source and target are bidirectionally linked, but are non-uniquely related to their argument in the relevant context. The metonymic target ‘sword fighter’ is part of the attribute-value chain that links the metonymic source to its possessor. Thus, it is made available by means of the possessive construction.

bijection between source and possessor – and thus also between source and target, and between target and possessor – is necessarily established, the reason being again that evoking a certain possessor – even by means of a sortal concept as one unspecific element of its class – contextually reduces the (set of theoretically) relevant possessors to the mentioned one, so that the possessor also becomes a function of the source. As a consequence, the target, which is located between source and possessor, is also a function of the source and the possessor is a function of the target. This results in a shift between a source and a target, which are both [+U] with respect to the possessor but [−U] (=[+U(−U)]) MRs in the context, along a bijective link. 10.2.1.2 Source Non-Unique with Respect to [±U] Possessor If the source in an argument-directed metonymy is non-unique with respect to a [±U] possessor this can be due to three possible constellations: the non-uniqueness of the source with respect to the target, and/or the non-uniqueness of the target with respect to the possessor. (137) Comminges est une de nos meilleures épées (Mérimée, Prosper, Chronique du règne de Charles IX, 1829, p. 92, cited from TLFi, “épée”, B.2.–P. méton.). ‘Comminges is one of our best (men that fight with) swords.’ The shift of épée in example 137 (depicted in Figure 10.7) represents a case of a bijectively linked source and target, and a non-unique relation of both to the common possessor (see the schematic illustration in 138). The metonymic source and target are linked by a bijection due to the prototypical constellation of a fighter and his own sword, but they are non-uniquely related to their possessor, the master

158 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

of several sword fighters, which is reflected by the indefinite determination (plural) in the example sentence. The target is made available as part of the attribute-value chain between metonymic source and possessor, which is evoked by the possessive construction nos meilleures épées ‘our best swords’. Hence, this is a shift between two bijectively linked relational MRs. It satisfies the same conditions as those formulated for [−R] referent-sensitive metonymies in Chapters 9.4 and 9.3. (138)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t) → [p]

The constellation of a source that is non-uniquely related to a target, which in contrast is bijectively linked to the possessor (see the schematic illustration in 139), does not seem to allow a metonymic shift, however, probably for the same reason as in non-relational metonymy (see Chapter 9.4): There does not seem to be any means to verbalize the source as non-uniquely attributed to the target (and thus to the possessor) without mentioning the target. The source needs to function as a label of the target in order to be able to pick it out; one of several elements with the same relation to the target, however, can only be verbalized in their relative nonuniqueness by mentioning the target as possessor (which would, in turn, make the metonymy senseless since the target has already been verbalized). Furthermore, in a target-focused metonymy¹⁶ the relative uniqueness of the target (an FMR) would be marked on the linguistic surface by definite determination, which would be incompatible with the relative non-uniqueness of the source (an RMR) with respect to the target and thus to the possessor. How would a non-unique MR identify an MR which is unique? (139)

*((s)) → (t) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

For the same reason, the constellation of a source that is non-uniquely related to the target, which, in turn, is non-uniquely related to the possessor (see the schematic illustration in 140), does not allow a metonymic shift. (140)

*((s)) → (t) → [p]

Hence, argument-directed metonymy must rely on a bijection between the source and target. Any potentially unidirectional link from the target to the source (in the opposite direction of the shift) becomes bijective due to the possessor specification, and unidirectional links in the direction of the shift do not qualify for target identification.

16 It is reasonable to assume that differences in focus placement comparable to what I described in Chapter 8.5 also occur with [+R] metonymies, since the existence of an argument does not exclude source or target focus in principle and entirely bijective constellations, in particular – such as depicted in example 136 – are likely to function quite like [−R] referent-sensitive metonymies.

10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy |

159

As a consequence, argument-directed metonymy relies on the same basic principle as [−R] referent-sensitive metonymy, notably the necessity of the counterdirectional link. But since the need for possessor specification in [+R] items automatically triggers an attribute link in the direction of the shift, it makes sense to assume that argument-directed metonymies always rely on bijections. Observation 18 (Argument-directed pre-argument metonymy). Source and target in argument-directed pre-argument metonymies are linked by a bijection. Therefore, they always stand in the same relation to their possessor, so that they are either both FMRs or both RMRs.

10.2.2 Argument-Averted Metonymy As we have seen in the last section, pre-argument metonymy is argument-directed if the shift proceeds from an MR that is less close to the argument to an MR that is closer to the argument within the chain of attributes. The present section is about argument-averted pre-argument metonymy, where the shift proceeds from an MR close to the open argument to a MR that is less close to the open argument. In argument-averted metonymy, the target is not part of the attribute-value chain between source and possessor,¹⁷ whence it behaves much like [−R] referent-sensitive metonymy in terms of the links between the source and target. 10.2.2.1 Source Unique with Respect to [±U] Possessor If the source is a function of the possessor in argument-averted metonymy, a bijection between source and possessor is implied because the explicit mention of the possessor makes it the only contextually relevant possessor, which is tantamount to establishing the possessor as a function of the source. In this kind of constellation, the target is either bijectively linked to the source (see the schematic illustration in 141) or non-uniquely related to the source (see the illustration in 142).¹⁸ (141)

(t) 󴀗󴀰 ((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

(142)

(t) → ((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

17 See the observations at the beginning of Chapter 10.2 and Figure 10.5, left frame, on page 155. 18 If the target is a function of the source, a bijection between the two is implied so that this case corresponds to the scheme in 141.

160 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

ny

seat

o lc

ticket > < seat

ticket

a

balcony

< seat

ticket

Fig. 10.8: Argument-averted pre-argument metonymy: frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 144. The mechanism of the shift is nearly identical to its [−R] version (with a contextually saturated possessor argument) from example 106 (page 122, depicted in Figure 9.4).

The scheme in 141 can be illustrated by example 143, where there is a contextually triggered bijection between the possessor ‘Truffaut’ and one of his films. Target, source, and possessor are bijectively linked to each other. (143) Je n’ai pas encore regardé la production de Truffaut, mais celle de Chabrol. ‘I haven’t seen the (film resulting from the contextually unique) production process carried out by Truffaut yet, but the one by Chabrol.’ The scheme in 142 reflects the constellation that underlies the galerie shift in example 144. The target is non-uniquely related to the source ‘first balcony of [x]’ and thus also non-unique with respect to the possessor ‘theatre/opera’, despite the bijection between the source and possessor.¹⁹ In other words, the target is an RMR and the source is an FMR (see Figure 10.8). (144)

J’ai pu acheter une première galerie à l’opéra pour moins de dix euros. ‘I had the chance to buy (a/the ticket for) a first balcony (seat) at the opera for less than ten euros.’

10.2.2.2 Source Non-Unique with Respect to [±U] Possessor If the source is non-uniquely related to the possessor (as an RMR) in argumentaverted metonymy, the target is necessarily an RMR. It is either bijectively linked

19 The source ‘first balcony of [x]’ is uniquely related to the possessor because the restrictive adjective première ‘first’ unambiguously selects this balcony from the different balconies available at the theatre.

10.2 Pre-Argument Metonymy |

161

to the source (see the schematic illustration in 145), or it is non-uniquely related to the source (see the schematic illustration in 146). The scheme in 145 corresponds to the shift in example 134b (on page 150, depicted in Figure 10.3, right frame, on page 151). The metonymic source and its possessor are evoked together in the possessive construction une production de Truffaut ‘a production carried out by Truffaut’. The target is bijectively linked to the source outside of the link between source and possessor and can be paraphrased as ‘the film resulting from a production process carried out by [x]’. Thus, the metonymic source and target are bijectively linked but are both non-unique with respect to their common possessor in the relevant context, which makes them RMRs. (145)

(t) 󴀗󴀰 ((s)) → [p]

(146)

(t) → ((s)) → [p]

We can find the scheme in 146 in (a possible interpretation of) example 147, a slightly modified version of example 144. If the opera has several balconies, the metonymic target is ‘the ticket for a seat on a balcony of [opera]’, so that the possessor is a function of the source node and the source node is a function of the target node, but neither of these links is bijective – except for the last link from the respective seat to the ticket for this seat. (147)

J’ai pu acheter une galerie à l’opéra pour moins de dix euros. ‘I had the chance to buy (a/the ticket for) a (seat on a) balcony at the opera for less than ten euros.’

Argument-averted metonymy allows more source-target-possessor constellations than argument-directed metonymy. This is due to the fact that the metonymic target is not part of the link between the source and possessor: in contrast to argument-directed metonymies, where a bijection between source and possessor leads to a bijection between target and possessor because the target is part of the linking elements (see above), a bijection between source and possessor in argument-averted metonymies does not affect the relation between target and possessor. It can clearly be seen that, if we juxtapose the absolute (non-)uniqueness of [−R] metonymies with the relative (non-)uniqueness of [+R] metonymies, argumentaverted pre-argument metonymy behaves much like non-relational metonymy because the concept type of the target depends less on the concept type of the source. The results of this section can be summarized as follows:

162 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

Observation 19 (Argument-averted pre-argument metonymy). Argument-averted metonymies behave like non-relational metonymies. [+U] targets²⁰ require a bijection between source and target. Shifts along a unidirectional attribute in the direction of the shift do not seem to be possible. Shifts to a target that is [−U] with respect to the source are possible (which implies non-uniqueness with respect to the possessor).

10.3 Cross-Argument Metonymy Referent-sensitive metonymic shifts within frames with open arguments occur in two ways. Pre-argument metonymies are shifts of a [+R] MR within a chain of attributes of a given possessor (see Chapter 10.2). They differ from cross-argument metonymies (this section) where the open argument is part of the link between the metonymic source and the target, so that they occur from one property to another property of the same open argument. They are schematically illustrated in Figure 10.9 (and also in Figure 10.5, right frame, on page 155). In cross-argument metonymies, two constellations are possible: either the open argument is one of the nodes of the attribute-value chain that links source and target (see Figure 10.9, left frame) or one of the nodes in the attribute-value chain between source and target carries the open argument (see Figure 10.9, right frame). In both cases, source and target are conceptualized as two properties of their common possessor.²¹

10.3.1 Conditions of Cross-Argument Metonymy Cross-argument metonymy seems to be quite restricted with respect to the sourcetarget-possessor constellations that it requires. In contrast to pre-argument metonymies (see Chapter 10.2), the relation between source and possessor does not depend on the relation between target and possessor (as in argument-directed pre-

20 In the case of [+R] metonymy, this means [+U] with respect to the possessor, whereas [+U] in the case of [−R] metonymies stands for contextually absolute uniqueness. 21 The two types of pre-argument metonymies, which I distinguished in Chapter 10.2, are different from each other inasmuch as the presence or absence of the metonymic target in the attribute-value chain between source and possessor has an impact on the conditions of metonymy in terms of the directionality of the involved links. In contrast, the two types of cross-argument metonymy function essentially in the same way.

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Fig. 10.9: Cross-argument metonymies: schematic illustrations of [+R] metonymies in which the open argument constitutes a key component of the link between source and target. The open arguments are depicted as rectangular nodes. The bijections between the nodes represent sufficient conditions of metonymy in terms of attribute directionality without a bijection being necessary in all cases.

argument metonymies, which are similarly restricted); neither does the relation between target and possessor depend on the relation between source and possessor (as in argument-averted pre-argument metonymies). Like in pre-argument metonymies (argument-directed as well as argument-averted ones), the uniqueness of the source with respect to the possessor automatically triggers a bijection between the two.²² The same holds for the functionality of the target with respect to the possessor. In the following, the conceptual constellations that allow cross-argument metonymy are briefly addressed. 10.3.1.1 Source Unique with Respect to [±U] Possessor If the source is a function of the possessor, a bijection between source and possessor is implicit. In such a constellation, the target can be a function of the possessor and would thus be bijectively linked to the possessor automatically (see the schematic illustration in 148), or it can be non-uniquely related to the possessor (see the schematic illustration in 149). (148)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p] 󴀗󴀰 (t)

(149)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p] ← (t)

22 Again, this is due to the fact that the explicit possessor specification makes the possessor the only relevant possessor in the respective context, which is tantamount to the creation of a functional link from the source to possessor.

164 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

to write/tell iv i in ty > st r.
r yl st are be
r yl st are be
in st r.

writer

node

FOCUS

Fig. 10.10: Cross-argument metonymy: rudimentary frame representations of the [+R] shift in example 150. The right frame makes two facts explicit: 1) The writer’s pen can only be seen as indexical of the writer’s style if it is used in the writing process. 2) The writer’s style is the style of the writer’s writing/telling. The double label to write/tell in the right frame furthermore alludes to the complexity of the process that is metonymically designated by the verb to write, namely the process of mentally developing some content, putting it into language structures and actually writing it down at the end.

The scheme in 148 is exemplified by examples 150 and 151, where the source and target are both bijectively linked to their common possessors. The shift of Fr. plume de [x] ‘writing pen of [x]’ > ‘writing/telling style of [x]’ in example 150 depends on the fact that both the writing pen and the telling style are conceptualized as key properties of their possessor in the writing/telling process. (150) Malgré quelques écarts répréhensibles, qu’on peut et qu’on doit reprocher à ses écrits, (. . . ) sa plume est prude, et son génie collet-monté (Joubert, Joseph, Pensées, essais et maximes, vol. 2, 1824, p. 220, cited from TLFi, “plume”, II.B.3). ‘Despite some reprehensible gaffes, for which he can and has to be reproached, (. . . ) his (writing style, which takes shape by his use of his) pen is wise and he is of a strait-laced nature.’ Since the writer only develops a writing style due to the fact that she/he produces language content by means of writing, for which he/she needs a writing instrument, the pen becomes a crucial and pleasantly concrete, physical object that constitutes a good metonymic source that is able to designate an abstract target like ‘telling style of [x]’ that is much less tangible.²³ The two frame representations of the shift

23 Tangibility must be understood here on the basis of the general metonymic patterns outlined by Radden & Kövecses (1999, p. 45), where concrete entities are preferred over abstract entities. In the case of the writer, her/his style and the pen used, both the writing style and the pen constitute properties or aspects that closely belong to the writer and the writing activity, but they strongly differ in their degree of abstractness.

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165

object


io

t ac

constr. process

e> ur c t r er ru st bea


th e pr m e > oc es s
i ig

or

< l be eng t ar er h >


‘to be on a sinking ship [person]’ in example 158. The frame centre of ‘to sink [x]’ is not touched, while there is a metonymic shift from its argument, the ship, to a component of the ship, namely the people on it.²⁸

27 The analysis of the shift that underlies the polysemy of Fr. panser is not trivial. Apart from the analysis as non-referent-sensitive [+R] shift, which is compatible with Koch’s view of the metonymy operating exclusively on the level of selectional restrictions, not on the level of the semantic core (leerstellenunabhängiger Bereich, Koch, 1991, p. 285) of the verb, there are at least two alternative analyses: One might assume that the basis of the shift is the contiguity between different actions, namely the treatment of an injured person as a complex action that comprises the treatment of the wound, and the treatment of the wound itself. Another possible explanation is based on the notion of source metonymy (see Chapter 8.5). From this view, the original reading of panser would be a source metonymy that shifts to the wound as metonymic target while letting the focus on the source as the relevant whole that is crucially affected by what happens to the wound. As a consequence, the development of the more recent reading ‘to take care of/to treat [sb,wound]’ would not be a metonymy, but a kind of inverse process, a de-metonymization, since it makes explicit the originally implicit metonymic target. 28 The reconceptualization of the sinking event can be described as a shift of attention from the actually sinking element, the ship, to those elements that are directly affected by the sinking of

170 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

(158)

Des gens qui naufragent ont peu le temps de délibérer et encore moins le temps de s’attendrir. (Hugo, Victor, Les Travailleurs de la mer, 1866, p. 208, cited from TLFi, “naufrager”, A.2) ‘People who (are on ships that) sink have little time to deliberate and even less to feel sorry for themselves.’

It is obvious that non-referent-sensitive [+R] metonymy is quite similar to its [−R] counterpart (see Chapter 7.2.3). The shift of non-central components or non-central arguments in a frame leads to an alternative conceptualization of the referent. Examples 157 and 158 analysed above exhibit the properties illustrated in the schematic representation in 159. (159)

((x)) 󴀗󴀰 [s] 󴀗󴀰 (t)

The results of this section can be summarized as follows: NonObservation 21 (Relational non-referent-sensitive metonymy in frames). referent-sensitive [+R] metonymy conserves the frame centre and instead shifts the argument within the integrated frame. Original and metonymic argument are contiguous and constitute metonymic source and target. Original and metonymic reading stand in a relation of similarity to each other and constitute different conceptualizations of a shared referent.

10.5 Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview By means of Table 10.1 on page 171, this section provides an overview of the different kinds of [+R] referent-sensitive metonymy discussed in this chapter. Aspects of relative (non-)uniqueness, i.e. of (non-)uniqueness of one MR with respect to the possessor, which play a role in relational metonymy, can be inferred from the attribute relations between sources, targets, and possessors. The overview is supposed to make 1) the concept types of the metonymic source and target, 2) the positions of source and target with respect to their possessor, and 3) the different attribute links between source, target, and possessor easily accessible. The first two columns contain the labels of the subtypes of [+R] metonymy that are distinguished in the present work. Column three displays the position of source,

the ship. Like in the kilométrage example above, the metonymic frame is more complex than the frame of the original meaning inasmuch as the link between frame centre and argument contains additional information, since the original argument has been incorporated into the link.

10.5 Relational Metonymy in Frames: Overview |

171

Tab. 10.1: Types of relational, referent-sensitive metonymy in terms of functional relations between source, target and possessor arg pos

direction

links

metonymy

pre-arg

arg-directed

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

I don’t need your bicycle ‘I don’t need your (card with the representation of a) bicycle’ Comminges est une de nos meilleures épées ‘Comminges is one of our best (men that fight with) swords’ Je n’ai pas encore regardé la production de Truffaut, mais celle de Chabrol ‘I haven’t seen the (film resulting from the contextually unique) production process carried out by Truffaut yet, but the one by Chabrol’ J’ai pu acheter une première galerie à l’opéra pour moins de dix euros ‘I had the opportunity to buy (a/the ticket for) a (seat on the) first balcony at the opera for less than ten euros’ J’ai regardé une production de Truffaut ‘I watched (the result of) a production process carried out by Truffaut’ J’ai pu acheter une galerie à l’opéra pour moins de dix euros ‘I had the opportunity to buy (a/the ticket for) a (seat on a) balcony at the opera for less than ten euros’ Sa plume est prude, et son génie colletmonté ‘His (writing style, which takes shape by his use of his) pen is wise, and he is of a strait-laced nature’ Cela nous change des idioties de Sartre ‘That will make a change from Sartre’s (statements triggered by his) madness’

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 (t) → [p]

arg-averted

(t) 󴀗󴀰 ((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

(t) → ((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p]

(t) 󴀗󴀰 ((s)) → [p]

(t) → ((s)) → [p]

cross-arg

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p] 󴀗󴀰 (t)

((s)) 󴀗󴀰 [p] ← (t)

172 | 10 Metonymy and Directionality: Patterns in Relational Frames

target and possessor with respect to each other, and the attribute links that allow a metonymic shift. Column five contains one example sentence per constellation.²⁹ As with [−R] metonymy (see Chapter 9, especially the summary in Chapter 9.6), metonymies in frames with an open argument also seem to require at least an argument link in the opposite direction of the shift, that is from the target to the source. Furthermore, the target can be non-unique with respect to the possessor, independently of whether the source is also non-unique with respect to the possessor or bijectively linked to the possessor; this is in part constrained by the position of source, target and possessor to one another. If the source and/or target are a function of the possessor, they are automatically bijectively linked to the possessor because the explicit possessor specification makes the possessor the only relevant possessor in the context. This means that either both source and target are [+U] (with respect to p), or both source and target are [−U] (with respect to p), or the source is [+U] (with respect to p) while the target is [−U] (with respect to p), but a combination of a [−U] source with a [+U] target (with respect to p) does not seem to be possible. Juxtaposing the relative (non-)uniqueness of the source/target in [+R] metonymy to the absolute (non-)uniqueness of the source/target in [−R] metonymy shows that relational and non-relational metonymy exhibit similar patterns.

10.6 Conclusion Relational metonymy depends on the functionality of the links between the source and target. The counter-directional link (an attribute link from the target to the source) seems to constitute a necessary condition of relational referent-sensitive metonymy, just like the functionality of the possessor with respect to the source and target. An additional directional link in the form of an attribute from the source to the target, and an additional link from the possessor to the source and/or target are also possible. Thus, relational and non-relational metonymy exhibit similar patterns in terms of (non-)uniqueness of the source and/or target. While in [−R] metonymy, a combination of a [−U] source with a [+U] target is not possible, in [+R] metonymy, a combination of a [−U] source with a [+U] target (with respect to the possessor) is not possible, and independently of the possessor, the source is necessarily a function of the target, while the inverse is not true.

29 In accordance with the conventions of this work, single round brackets represent frame nodes, double round brackets represent the frame centre, square brackets arguments, and the labels s, t and p stand for source, target and possessor.

11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy Defining metonymy as a meaning construction process based on MRs that are components of the same frame (see Definition 8 in Chapter 7.1) emphasizes the observation that the metonymic source and target are closely associated to each other as relevant elements of a given situation, prototypically or in a specific context. The ways in which two central elements of a situation can be related to each other are multiple, however. Some of this variation has been discussed in the previous chapters of the present work. One aspect, the conceptual distance between the source and target, is discussed from the perspective of frames in the present chapter.

11.1 The Notion of Metonymic Distance The kinds of associations between the source and target are manifold. First, this variety is accounted for by means of ontological classifications of the associations between source and target.¹ Equally, second, broader, more functional distinctions² constitute ways of systematizing the heterogeneity of the link between metonymic source and target. Among the more functional approaches of accounting for the variety of associations between source and target is the investigation of the length of the metonymic link. Disregarding the kind of material that constitutes the link, this approach asks how much of this material there is between the source and target. This property of the source-target relation is sometimes labelled the conceptual distance between the source and target in literature (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 1998; Geeraerts & Peirsman, 2011).³ It is evoked from time to time in literature as a factor that might be of importance in the analysis of metonymy, but there are, to my knowledge,

1 These classifications are prominent in antique and traditional literature on metonymy (cf. Fontanier, [1821,1827] 1977; Lausberg, 1960), but the assumed types of association are also assigned quite some weight as universal invariants by more recent, cognitive approaches (cf. Radden & Kövecses, 1999; Warren, 1999, and many others, see Chapter 5.8 of the present work). 2 For example the distinction between referent-sensitive and non-referent-sensitive metonymy (cf. Koch, 2004), or between more source-focused and more target-focused metonymy (cf. Kleiber, 1995; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández, 2001; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez, 2003, etc. and the corresponding observations in the present work, see Chapter 8), or the distinctions in terms of frame structural properties discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 3 I also use the term metonymic distance. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110755459-011

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currently very few analyses that try to cover the phenomenon systematically. In this chapter, metonymic distance is discussed from the perspective of frames.⁴ The notion of metonymic distance is closely connected to the metonymydefining notion of contiguity; both expressions rely on the same spatial metaphor. If, on the one hand, metonymy relies upon the contiguity of source and target, and, on the other, metonymy can be seen as occurring within one and the same frame, the question arises as to whether there is still some room for variation of the degree of contiguity between the source and target. Thus, if the notion of contiguity describes the phenomenon that two MRs are sufficiently close, in that they are part of the same frame (which might be a binary phenomenon of yes or no) the notion of conceptual distance between the source and target (or of metonymic distance) takes into account the possibility that the link between the source and target within their common frame might be longer or shorter, depending on the amount of content of which the link consists. Views on distance variation within metonymy are summarized in Chapters 11.2 and 11.3. In Chapters 11.4 and 11.5, I enlarge on the notion of metonymic distance from the perspective of frames, provide examples of metonymies with different distances, and discuss several alternative analyses.

11.2 Views on Metonymic Distance The idea that the metonymic source and target might be more or less closely associated⁵ has been posited in the literature from time to time, mostly in a rather cursory manner. Blank (1997, p. 241) alludes to the phenomenon from the perspective of diachronic semantics and meaning change. He does not directly mention the possibility of shifts across larger distances, but he highlights the fact that successively occurring metonymies can bridge larger conceptual distances step by step. Sp. víspera and Pt. véspera have both undergone two metonymic shifts, first from ‘evening’ to ‘evening mass before a holiday’, then to ‘day before a holiday’. The conceptual closeness between the source ‘evening’ of the first shift and the target ‘evening mass before a holiday’ of the second shift raises the question as to whether a direct shift would have been possible.

4 Since modelling metonymies with the help of frames requires explicit labels for the involved attributes, it is impossible to avoid the notion of distance in the course of the analysis. Every decision for or against the inclusion of a certain attribute in the frame model is a decision for a frame representation that reflects a distance between the source and target in terms of the number of attribute-value pairs. 5 Despite the fact that they are anyhow sufficiently close to allow a metonymic shift . . .

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175

Conceptual distance as a factor that might have an impact on the metonymic shift is treated by Panther & Thornburg (1998, 2010). They observe that a shift from a part to the whole it belongs to seems to be more likely in the case of redhead ‘head of red hair’ > ‘person with a head of red hair’ than in the case of toenail ‘toenail’ > ‘person with toenail’ because they assume the former to be conceptually closer to the whole than the latter in terms of the meronymic organization of the body (cf. Panther & Thornburg, 2010, p. 242).⁶ Metonymic distance is most often and most extensively discussed in the context of double metonymies or chained metonymies.⁷ These are assumed to consist of a series of successive conceptual shifts, so that source and target of the chained metonymy are linked by one or more elements that also constitute potential targets of metonymies from the same source (cf. Hilpert, 2007, p. 80). According to Barcelona (2008, p. 328), each intermediate metonymic step “pave[s] the way” for the subsequent step. Since the chained metonymy consists of several shifts, the overall conceptual distance that it bridges is larger than in single metonymies. For example, the metonymy in 160 is analysed as a sequence of two shifts from the source ‘Plato’ over the MR ‘Plato’s work’ to ‘a book containing (part of) Plato’s work’ by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001, p.353). In the same way, Hilpert (2007, p. 80) analyses the shift in example 161 (my meaning paraphrase) as a shift from ‘material’ over ‘writing’ to ‘ideas’. (160)

Plato is on the top shelf. ‘(A book containing (part of)) Plato(’s work) is on the top shelf.’

(161)

Bob gave an interesting paper. ‘Bob gave a (lecture presenting ideas that were) interesting (and written on a piece of) paper.’⁸

6 According to the necessary conditions of metonymy in terms of the direction of the linking attributes between source and target (see Chapter 9, especially Chapter 9.4), a shift of toenail would require a closer look due to the non-uniqueness of toenails with respect to their bearers. However, as remarked briefly in Chapter 5.6, context has a key role in turning existing contiguity relations into relevant contiguity relations. A toenail might be an appropriate source for identifying the human to which it belongs as target in more specific contexts, such as certain medical contexts, for example. 7 Among the papers that discuss this phenomenon are Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001), Warren (2002), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2003), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Díez Velasco (2002), Barcelona (2002, 2008), Hilpert (2007). 8 This is one of the cases in which the non-metonymic paraphrase cannot really be formulated in a way that presents the metonymy as some kind of ellipsis on the linguistic surface.

176 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

11.3 Chained Metonymies versus Metonymic Distance The notion of chained metonymies indeed constitutes a reasonable description of shifts that can be decomposed into metonymic steps that can have an existence of their own. From this perspective, it is equally reasonable to assume that the conceptual distance between the source and target in chained metonymies is the sum of the metonymic distances of all single metonymic steps it involves. A convincing example of such a chained metonymy is the metonymy in 106 (on page 122, depicted in Figure 9.4). As evidence that there are two separate metonymic steps can be considered the fact that the focus of the metonymy passes from the source ‘2nd balcony’ to the intermediate target ‘(a) seat on the balcony of the theatre’ in the first step and stays there, while the predication applies to the second (and final) target ‘ticket for a seat on the balcony of the theatre’. Thus, the first step is a target metonymy (shifting the focus to the target of the first step) and the second step is a source metonymy (leaving the focus on the source of the second step).⁹ Since chained metonymies are seen as a series of single metonymies, the constraint has been formulated that every intermediate step must be proven to be the target of an existing single metonymy: “To justify intermediate links between vehicle and target, [. . . ] all intermediate links should represent attested, authentic expressions” (Hilpert, 2007, p. 80). If all metonymies across larger distances are chained metonymies, this constraint in the analysis of large distance metonymies certainly constitutes a useful empirical clue. Indeed, for most of the metonymic shifts that are analysed as bridging more than one single attribute in the last chapters of the present work, it seems plausible that the intermediate nodes constitute potential targets themselves. However, there are some reasons why relying on attestations of these nodes as independent targets should not be mandatory for considering the nodes as potential parts of the links assumed to underly the metonymies. First, interpreting any metonymy requires reconstructing/inferring the link between the explicit source and the implicit target in order to identify the target itself. Components that are necessary in order to get access to the target must be considered as part of the link independently of whether their target status can be attested separately.¹⁰

9 Such cases have been discussed as combinations of source-in-target and target-in-source metonymy by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Pérez Hernández (2001, p. 342) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Díez Velasco (2002, p. 517). 10 However, I recognize that the decomposition of the link into its components is not a straightforward procedure that necessarily yields one single result, as I show in Chapter 11.4.

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177

Second, if several frame models of the same shift, but with different degrees of decomposition of the link, seem possible, we need to ask ourselves what the status of these differences is supposed to be. Does a long source-target link in the frame model of a shift necessarily imply a difference with respect to a short link for the language user? Does an intermediate target that could constitute a perfectly fine target of its own have to be ‘headed for’ as if it was a final target? Third, there are cases in which an intermediate node cannot be the target of a separate shifting step, even if there is evidence that it can be a target of its own in other circumstances. In a metonymy like the shift of Fr. construction de [x] ‘construction process of [x]’ > ‘make/structure of [x]’ (see example 151 and Figure 10.11 on pages 165 and 165), which is a cross-argument metonymy (see Chapter 10.3), the possessor cannot play the role of a metonymic target since it is already verbalized separately, but it can in other contexts (cf. TLFi, “construction”, A.3.a). In other words, metonymic chains in the sense of successively occurring metonymic shifts that bridge large conceptual distances can constitute evidence of metonymic distance, and the shifts might be understood as consecutive oneattribute shifts. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to treat the question of the conceptual distance between the source and target with caution, even in cases in which the intermediate nodes are attested as potential targets of their own.

11.4 The Peculiarity of the Frame Perspective The distance between the MRs in a frame is an important aspect of the analysis of metonymy with frames, since in the recursive structure of frames the distances are measurable inasmuch as one can count, in a given frame model of a given metonymic shift, the steps from the metonymic source to the metonymic target in terms of the number of attributes that have to be passed. In this section, I present some issues that arise when trying to model the links between MRs by means of a chain of attribute-value pairs, and which are relevant for examination regarding the measurement of conceptual or metonymic distances.

11.4.1 Starting Point Sentences like those in example 162 evoke the concept ‘apple’ with particular attention to its colour. Modelling this concept in frames offers at least two options. Either the colour is seen as an attribute of the possessor ‘apple’ (this leads to a frame model that can look like the left frame in Figure 11.1) or the colour is seen as

178 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

node sk in ap > pl e

colour >

> ur lo co

red







ur lo co

man

ha i pe r > rs on

node

man

blond

Fig. 11.2: Modelling options: rudimentary frame representations of a ‘blond man’, as evoked in examples 163.

an attribute of the possessor ‘skin of the apple’ (this leads to a frame representation like the right frame in Figure 11.1). (162)

a. Der Apfel ist rot. ‘The apple is red.’ b. Der rote Apfel war süßer als die anderen. ‘The red apple was sweeter than the others.’

(163)

a. Der Mann war blond. ‘The man was blond.’ b. Der blonde Mann hat das Bier bestellt. ‘The blond man ordered the beer.’

In contrast to that, the concept ‘man’, with particular attention to the hair colour, as evoked in examples 163, does not offer the same modelling options. Although, analogously to the apple case, the colour can be seen as an attribute of the possessor ‘hair’, which is attributed to ‘man’ (see Figure 11.2, right frame), linking the attribute ‘colour of [x]’ directly to the concept ‘man’ as its possessor is not an option here.

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179

p

a2

a1

v

w

Fig. 11.3: 2-attr frame: schematic representation of a 2-attr frame.

Instead, a direct link can only be assumed in the form of an amalgamated attribute ‘colour of the hair of [x]’ = ‘hair colour of [x]’ (see Figure 11.2, left frame). This observation shows that frame models that are identical at the surface, like the right frames in Figures 11.1 and 11.2, represent distinct conceptual relations or, alternatively, reveal differences in semantic or pragmatic (under-)specification of the analysed linguistic items which might need consideration in the models. These differences can be observed between frame models that allow reduction and frame models that do not, in that they only allow contraction. The question arises, which criteria can be used in order to justify the presence or absence of an intermediate attribute-node pair (like the ‘skin of [x]’ attribute in the ‘apple’ frame) and thus justify or refute the assumption of larger or smaller distances between the MRs in a frame? In the following, I argue that frames that can be reduced, like the ‘apple’ frame in Figure 11.1, represent instances of metonymic use of the modelled item. They are cases of source metonymy inasmuch as they shift to the target while maintaining the focus on the source.¹¹ For the purpose of illustration, we take an abstract frame with two stringed attribute-value pairs, which is a frame with an attribute-value pair a1v (p) that takes the frame centre p as possessor and an additional attribute-value pair a2w (a1v (p)) that takes the value of the other attribute as possessor. I refer to a frame of this structure as a 2-attr frame in the following (see Figure 11.3). The following observations also hold for n-step frames when they allow consecutive reduction or contraction of their 2-attr subframes.

11.4.2 Value (De)Composition A brief remark should be made on value (de)composition in frame models, only to avoid its confusion with contraction and reduction, whose properties and implications I discuss in Chapters 11.4.3 and 11.4.4 below. Being more or less explicit 11 See Chapter 8, especially Chapter 8.5 for the notion of source metonymy.

180 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

pr of es sio n>

er >

mo th

mo th man

> er

teacher

th fa

> er

man

teaching prof.

node

th fa

er >

node

node

Fig. 11.4: Value decomposition: alternative frame representations of a man whose mother’s father is a teacher. The ‘teacher’ node is decomposed by explicitly determining the ‘profession of [x]’ attribute.

with respect to the recursive decomposition of a node into (some of) its attributes and their values, and so on, has an impact on the frame model of an MR, but it has no impact on the distance between the involved MRs in the model. In the abstract 2-attr frame in Figure 11.3, node w could be decomposed by adding one or more attributes and their values that describe explicitly the content for which w stands. This would not change the distance between p and v, p and w, or v and w. The left frame in Figure 11.4, for example, allows a further decomposition of the ‘teacher’ node into a more explicit frame based on moving the attribute ‘profession of [x]’ and its value ‘teaching (profession)’ to outside of the ‘teacher’ node without affecting the distance between the nodes (see Figure 11.4, right frame). In contrast to that, contraction and reduction have an impact on the distances between the nodes in the model.

11.4.3 Attribute (De)Contraction Attribute (de)contraction describes the possibility of contracting a chain of attributevalue pairs to one attribute-value pair, like in Figure 11.2. It is thus the attributelevel counterpart of what value (de)composition is on the level of values. A 2-attr frame like in Figure 11.3 can be contracted iff the attribute-value pair a1v and the attribute-value pair a2w can be amalgamated with each other, so that the chain of attribute-value pairs is replaced by one single attribute-value pair that takes the same value as the original attribute a2, but is not identical with either of the two uncontracted attributes. Thus, (de)contraction has an impact on the distance between the involved MRs in that v is present/absent from the model and w is indirectly or directly related to p. At the level of functionality, the contraction of an uncontracted attribute chain between two MRs p and w conserves the properties of the uncontracted chain. If

11.4 The Peculiarity of the Frame Perspective |

to drive

≈

< m be ilea ar g er e >

th e pr m e > oc es s
i ig

or

< l be eng t ar er h >


‘mileage (actually in kilometres . . . ) of [car]’ (see example 157 on page 168 and Figure 10.12 on page 169).¹²

12 In the same way, the concept ‘milt (seminal fluid of fish)’ might be directly associated to a fish in many contexts (see Figure 11.6, left frame). The meaning change of Fr. laitance ‘milt’ > ‘gland that produces the milt’ (cf. TLFi, “laitance” A.–P. méton.), however, requires the decontraction of the frame representation (see Figure 11.6, right frame) in order to make the producing gland available for analysis. Hence, working with the uncontracted frame model can be useful or even necessary in order to understand certain phenomena.

182 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

to produce

milt

fis h > gl an d
m. ru ess st c in ro p


fish

gland

Fig. 11.6: Attribute contraction: frames of milt and its origin. The 1-attr frame might represent a sufficient degree of explicitness in many situations, but it cannot account for the role of both the milt and the milt-producing gland in restaurant contexts or for the meaning change of Fr. laitance ‘milt’ > ‘milt-producing gland’.

Given these observations, from the point of view of the methodology it makes sense in many cases not to assume such an abbreviation but rather work with the uncontracted frames.

11.4.4 Attribute Reduction In the attempt to model a concept or MR, attribute reduction describes the possibility to include or exclude a chain of attribute-value pairs between the frame centre and a more eccentric attribute-value pair, like in Figure 11.1 (on page 178). This seems to be an option when the reduced attribute is the primary means to characterize p in many typical situations. A 2-attr frame like in Figure 11.3 on page 179 can be reduced iff the intermediate attribute-value pair a1v can be removed so that a2w takes p as possessor, which results in a 1-attr frame model that is intuitively interpreted as standing for the same thing as the non-reduced 2-attr frame. Thus, reduction has an impact on the distance between the involved MRs in that v is present/absent from the model and w is indirectly or directly related to p.¹³ In cases like example 162 (on page 178), the reduced variant seems to be an appropriate frame model at first sight, because it reflects our intuition that apples have a colour and because it directly mirrors the linguistic surface that is used to code this information; moreover, it is common to linguistically make a direct link

13 In contrast to (de)contraction, where the label of the resulting attribute reflects the complexity of the underlying decontracted attribute-value chain to a certain degree, all information about the non-reduced attributes is entirely implicit since it is not implied by the label of the reduced attribute: colour in the left frame of Figure 11.1 does not indicate that it is supposed to specify the colour of the exterior skin of the apple (and not the colour of the pulp or the stalk of the apple).

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183

between the FC ‘colour of [x]’ and the possessor ‘apple’ by speaking about the colour of an apple. At the same time, the non-reduced frame model adequately mirrors the way one would interpret the sentences in examples 162 in most contexts. The reason to prefer the non-reduced model as more adequate is that the linguistic expressions in example 162 as well as the reduced frame would – in most contexts – be interpreted by default in the same way as the non-reduced frame. Although the linguistic surface is not sensitive to this specificity, it is clearly present at the level of conceptualization, which marks the reduced model either as underspecified with respect to the non-reduced frame¹⁴ or as false because it lacks a restriction that is part of the conceptual representation. The existence of a typical, restricted interpretation of sentences like in example 162 is corroborated by example 164, which does not produce a contradiction. Therefore, ‘skin of the apple’ is the possessor of the attribute ‘colour of [x]’ in the default interpretation of sentences like in examples 162. (164)

Diese grünen Äpfel haben weißes Fruchtfleisch. ‘These green apples (= apples that are green on the outside) have white pulp.’

One might object to this argument that the colour predication is simply a fuzzily applied attribute-value specification in that it need not be true for the whole object in order to be valid. This would mean that ‘apple’ can still be the possessor of the attribute ‘colour of [x]’, so that the reduced frame would at least constitute a second valid modelling option. This objection can be easily refuted, however. The existence of fuzzy predication is certainly true. For example, the skin of an apple can be described as red even if there are some brown spots here and there. The crucial point is that these spots could also be red, i.e. a perfectly red apple skin would be catorized just as well or even better as being red. While this is characteristic for fuzzy predication, it is not for cases like the ‘red apple’, where applying the expression red apple to an apple with red pulp or a red stalk in addition to its red skin would result in astonishment on the part of the interlocutor. Therefore, although linguistically underspecified, the attribute takes a specific part of the apple as its possessor and excludes, at first, the other parts. The predication is fuzzy only at the level of the affected part, namely the skin, because it tolerates a certain deviation from an untainted coloration. Such cases are common examples of a strongly source-focused metonymic shift (see Chapter 8.5) from the source

14 This would be inconsistent with respect to our attempt to decompose the evoked conceptual content.

184 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

whole to the momentarily relevant part without taking away the overall focus from the source. Preferring the non-reduced frame model to the reduced variant, which I advocate above, entails that frame models that allow reduction (and thus also contraction) and frame models that do not allow reduction (but contraction) are not different with respect to the distance between the involved MRs, but rather with respect to the impact/importance that the intermediate attribute has on the conceptualization of the whole concept represented by the frame centre. The colour of the skin of an apple is very prominent and allows more interesting inferences about the apple than the hair colour or the nose shape does about its bearer in typical situations; this is reflected by the impression that the colour of the skin of the apple is the colour of the apple (and by the habitual metonymy that verbalizes this view), while the colour of the hair is not perceived as the colour of the person and the shape of the nose is not perceived as the shape of the person.¹⁵ To put it in a nutshell: the possibility of reduction and/or contraction reflects conceptual differences that are not visible as frame-structural properties. Therefore, these subjacent differences between structurally similar frames have to be taken into account in the analysis of metonymy from the perspective of frames and the distances between MRs within a frame have to be interpreted with caution. This has an impact on the analysis of conceptual distance and, as a consequence, on the analysis of metonymy.

11.5 Metonymies across Different Distances The most prominent necessary condition of metonymy is the contiguity between source and target. On the one hand, frames are particularly suited to measuring metonymic distance since the decomposition of the contiguity relation into recursive structures of attribute-value pairs enables us to quantify the distance between two MRs to a certain degree. On the other hand, criteria for an adequate degree of decomposition of conceptual content into attribute chains are sparse. Decomposing conceptual links into chains of attribute-value pairs is preferable to less explicit decomposition if the decomposition is required for analysing a given metonymic shift (see Chapters 11.4.3 and 11.4.4), and in some cases, hints such as

15 Since the typicality or the weight of an attribute is not yet an integral part of the frame model in its current form, as I mentioned above, it would be counterproductive to translate these aspects as distances in a frame because this would, on the one hand, result in incoherences when directly linked attributes become situationally irrelevant and, on the other hand, deprive us of the decompositional power of frames.

11.5 Metonymies across Different Distances |

185

Fig. 11.7: Metonymies across different distances: Schematic representation of metonymies from a source that is directly or indirectly linked to the target.

focus placement or the position of an open argument indicate that there must be intermediate MRs between the source and target (see Chapter 11.3). The following analyses provide an insight into possible views of metonymic distance (as schematically represented in Figure 11.7) and illustrate the variety of decompositions for which it is possible to argue in some cases.¹⁶ Hence, they do not exemplify a classification, but reflect the fact that the analysis allows for different deconstructions, so that the benefit of frames for the analysis of the particular phenomenon of metonymic distance is still limited. Certain analyses of metonymic shifts suggest themselves inasmuch as the components bridging source and target seem obvious. Shifts between processes and their components or between components of a common process sometimes belong to this category. In a shift like fr. abordage ‘event of docking somewhere’ > ‘place where docking is possible’ in example 165 (modelled in Figure 11.8),¹⁷ the location constitutes a key element of the process and would be a role in case-frame-like structures as suggested by Fillmore (1968, 1977a,b, for example). Hence, modelling it as a 1-attr shift between the central process node and the value of the location attribute seems quite natural.¹⁸

16 Again, metonymies with a single attribute link between source and target will be termed 1-attr metonymies/shifts, metonymies with one intermediate node 2-attr metonymies/shifts, and so on. 17 Since the metonymic source is a process while the metonymic target is a place or object that is included in the process but is not modified by it, there are few predications that can apply indirectly to the source. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this shift constitutes a target metonymy: the docking place is in the focus of interest and is conceptualized by means of the action that is (supposed to be) performed at this place. 18 The source is probably a saturated version of the underlying functional concept ‘(the) docking of [x]’, the implicit filler of the argument being a sortal MR like ‘(a) ship that docks here’, which turns the whole frame into the representation of a sortal MR (= sortally saturated functional concept).

186 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

FOCUS berth

e em th n > o ti ac


‘heap resulting from a landslide’ (example 166), fabrique ‘process of production (of object)’ > ‘object that has been produced’ (example 167), halte ‘interruption of a journey’ > ‘place destined for journey interruptions’ (example 168), or production ‘process of production (of movie)’ > ‘produced movie’ (example 134 on page 150). (166) [. . . ] un éboulement qui bouchait une voie. (Zola, Émile, Germinal, 1885, p. 1535; cited from TLFi, “éboulement", B.–P. méton.) ‘[. . . ] (the heap resulting from) a landslide that blocked a path.’ (167)

Les fabriques les plus splendides ne se vendent qu’à grande perte. (Michelet, Jules, Le Peuple, 1846, p. 115; cited from TLFi, “fabrique”, B.1.a–P. méton.) ‘The most splendid (objects resulting from their) fabrication processes are sold with losses.’

(168) Rien de plus rudimentaire que ces haltes établies dans la montagne par les soins du Club Alpin Suisse. (Daudet, Alphonse, Tartarin sur les Alpes, 1885, p. 184; cited from TLFi, “halte”, I.B.2.) ‘Nothing could be more rudimentary than these (places for) rest stops that have been set up in the mountains by the Swiss Alpine Club.’ However, since my case-frame-like representations have quite a high level of abstraction and deliberately avoid the difficulty of decomposing the complex process

11.5 Metonymies across Different Distances |

187

node into something more explicit, they probably fall short of representing adequately the conceptual structure behind the shift. As a consequence, while such a superficial decomposition might suffice to explain the metonymic shift it might just as well fail to render the distance between source and target. Shifts between components of a common process show that the assumption of case-frame-like constellations is not necessarily the most convincing. In the shift of Fr. plume ‘pen’ > ‘writer’ (discussed on the basis of example 15 in Chapter 6.3.3, and depicted in Figure 6.2 on page 58), the element linking the source and target was supposed to be the ‘writing process’, which can be justified by the fact that the relation between a writer and its pen is established by means of the fact that the pen is actually used for writing. However, a pen might just as well be considered as a conventional symbol or constitutive element of the person who was considered as a writer at the time, abstracting from the writing process. In this view, a case could be made out for linking the source and target directly. The shift of Fr. épée for ‘sword fighter’ (see example 137 on page 157) is similar inasmuch as a ‘fighting’ component linking the source and target can be assumed. However, the sword is equally a typical component of a sword fighter or knight (his sword, not just the sword he fights with), which might be better reflected by a direct attribute link in the model. The metonymic uses of Plato (see example 160 on page 175) and Picasso (see example 128b on page 146) illustrate well the variety of more or less fine-grained decompositions, which can each be argued for reasonably and which all render the basic properties of the metonymic shift. The most simple representation attributes any specific or unspecific (exemplar of a) work directly to the creator, which results in a 1-attr model (see for example Figure 9.5 on page 124). In the case of the Plato shift, however, such a simple representation falls short of rendering the fact that the focus probably shifts to an intermediate node (in the specific example sentence 160), which is not present in the model (see below and Figure 11.12). In addition, a shift to the set of all works, like in example 169, is possible. If we followed the claim in Hilpert (2007) that potential intermediate nodes have to be potential targets of their own, it would make sense to include an additional node into the frame models of all metonymies to non-uniquely related targets. As a consequence, a frame representation of the Picasso shift in example 128b could look like the model in figure 11.9. (169)

Plato is tough to read. ‘Plato(’s entire oeuvre) is tough to read.’

At the same time, the relation between a creator and (each of) her or his work(s) is obviously established through a creation process which gives rise to the works

188 | 11 Conceptual Distance in Metonymy

o wh


o

Louvre


oeuvre

FOCUS Picasso

creation

Fig. 11.9: 2-attr metonymy between a whole and a non-unique part: possible 2-attr frame representation of the metonymic shift in example 128b on page 146. The model takes into account the fact that the non-uniquely related target is part of the uniquely related whole oeuvre. Analogous models are possible with the shifts of Lufthansa in examples 99 on page 103, or of Plato in example 160 on page 175.

ca t Pi ion ca ss > o

lo