Methodological Aspects of Transformational Generative Phonology 9783110872392, 9789027917614

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JANUA L I N G U A R U M STUDIA MEMORIAE N I C O L A I VAN WIJK D E D I C A T A edenda curai C. H. V A N S C H O O N E V E L D Indiana University

Series

Minor,

112

METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE PHONOLOGY by

R U D O L F P. BOTHA

E8 1971

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1971 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated, or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

Printed in Hungary

PREFACE

The present monograph contains an analysis of a number of methodological aspects of transformational generative phonology. The analysis is intended as a contribution to the field of linguistics and not to that of the philosophy of science. The scholars to whom this book is addressed are accordingly not philosophers of science and methodologists but linguists. The author is not a professional philosopher of science or methodologist, but a linguist intrigued by methodological issues in his field of inquiry. The monograph has been specially designed to be of use not only to professional linguists but also to students in linguistics. It is not, however, an introductory text-book for beginners in the field. Chapters 1 and 2 have been included especially to make it more readable and useful to students. In Chapter 1 a number of fundamental general topics are discussed, e.g., the distinction between methodology, philosophy of science, epistemology, ontology and logic, the distinction between methodological and substantive aspects of science, the notion 'analysis of a methodological principle', the basic considerations governing the analysis of a methodological principle, the reasons compelling a linguist to study the methodological aspects of his discipline, etc. In Chapter 2 a brief sketch of the aims and structure of transformational generative grammar in general and the phonological component in particular is presented. Professional philosophers of science will undoubtedly judge m y treatment of some methodological topics to be 'incorrect' or 'unsophisticated'. Let me assure them that as soon as those

6

PREFACE

professional philosophers who also have a good knowledge of linguistics in general and of transformational grammar in particular divert their attention to the analysis of methodological aspects of the latter approach in linguistics, I will confine my own research to its substantive aspects. To my knowledge, at present no such scholar takes a serious interest in the methodological aspects of this linguistic theory. Since important methodological questions in the field of transformational generative grammar cannot be left undiscussed indefinitely, monographs and papers dealing with them in a less formal manner are therefore better than none at all. It is my privilege to acknowledge my indebtedness to various people for the ways in which they assisted me in completing the present monograph. First of all, I wish to thank Professor H. Schultink of the University of Utrecht for reading the original manuscript and for making valuable comments. To Annette Theron I express my gratitude for the thoroughness with which she edited the final version of the manuscript. I wish to thank Hannaie du Toit and Walter Winckler for the large amount of their time which they gave to improving my English. To Mrs. J. Degenaar and Mrs. L. Gildenhuys I express thanks for the most able way in which they typed the various versions of the manuscript. Finally, I wish to thank my wife for her constant encouragement, without which this study could not have been completed. R.P.B. Stellenbosch, March 1970.*

* The publication of this monograph was delayed considerably by factors beyond the control of the author and the publisher. This delay is the explanation for the fact that in particular sections of the book — especially in Chapter 2 — no reference is made to recent linguistic publications.

CONTENTS

Preface

5

1. Introduction 13 1.1. Linguistics and Methodology 13 1.1.1. Methodological vs. Substantive Aspects . 13 1.1.2. The Analysis of a Methodological Principle 17 1.1.3. Premises of the Analysis of a Methodological Principle 23 1.1.4. The Necessity of Analyzing the Methodological Aspects of Linguistics : 28 1.2. The Contents and Organization of the Monograph 36 2. The Theory of Phonology 38 2.1. General Remarks 38 2.2. The Objects of Study of Transformational Generative Grammar 39 2.2.1. A Grammar 39 2.2.2. The General Theory 40 2.3. The Structure of a Transformational Generative Grammar 40 2.4. The Phonological Component 42 2.4.1. The Main Contributions 42 2.4.2. The Function of the Phonological Component 4 3 2.4.3. The Structure of the Phonological Component 44 2.4.3.1. The Original Version 45 2.4.3.1.1. Phonetic Representations . . . . 45 2.4.3.1.2. Lexical Representations 48

8

CONTENTS

2.4.3.1.3. Phonological Representations . 2.4.3.1.4. The Naturalness Condition. . . . 2.4.3.1.5. Phonological Rules 2.4.3.1.6. Phonological Redundancy Rules 2.4.3.1.7. The Theory of Exceptions . . . 2.4.3.1.8. Schematic Summary 2.4.3.2. The Markedness Version 2.4.3.2.1. Problematic Phonological Phenomena 2.4.3.2.2. Reasons for Failure of Original Version 2.4.3.2.3. The Notion of Markedness.... 2.4.4. Substantive Issues in Transformational Generative Phonology

56 58 60 65 66 67 67 69 70 72 74

3. The Notion 'Linguistically Significant Generalization' 76 3.1. General Remarks 76 3.2. The Methodological Function of the Notion 'Linguistically Significant Generalization' 76 3.2.1. A Typical Linguistic Argument 78 3.2.2. The Abstract Structure of the Linguistic Argument 81 3.3. The Content of the Notion 'Linguistically Significant Generalization' 87 3.3.1. A Generalization 87 3.3.2. The Notion 'Linguistically Significant'.... 89 3.3.2.1. 'Significant' vs. 'True' or 'Correct' 89 3.3.2.2. Linguistic Significance and Mentalism 93 3.3.2.3. Linguistically Relevant Data and Linguistically Significant Facts 95 3.3.2.4. Linguistic Significance and the Evaluation Measure 101 3.3.2.4.1. The Evaluation Measure and the Basic Pattern of Linguistic Argumentation 104

CONTENTS

3.3.2.4.2. The Scope of the Evaluation Measure 3.3.2.4.3. Conditions of Adequacy for the Evaluation Measure 3.3.2.4.4. The Notion 'Degree of Linguistically Significant Generalization' 3.4. Summary of Conclusions 4. The Validation of Transformational Generative Phonology as a Mentalistic Theory 4.1. General Remarks 4.2. The Thesis of Mentalism 4.3. The Validation of Mentalistic Hypotheses 4.3.1. Introductory Remarks 4.3.2. Norms for Validating Empirical Theories 4.3.3. Modes of Validating Mentalistic Hypotheses 4.3.3.1. General Remarks 4.3.3.2. The 'How Else' Argument 4.3.3.3. Testing the Predictions of Grammars 4.3.3.4. Psycholinguists Testing 4.3.3.5. Reference to Sustaining Evidence . 4.3.3.5.1. Historical Evidence for Rule Schemata 4.3.3.5.2. Intuitive Evidence and the Evaluation Measure 4.3.3.5.3. Psychological Evidence for Linguistic Universals 4.3.3.5.4. Metatheoretical Evidence for the Evaluation Measure 4.3.3.5.5. Neurophysiological Evidence for the Finiteness of a Grammar.. . 4.3.3.5.6. Diverse Kinds of Evidence for 'M-U' Decisions and Marking Rules. . . 4.3.3.5.6.1. Statistical Evidence 4.3.3.5.6.2. Historical and Sociological Evidence

9 107 108 110 113

116 116 117 121 121 122 124 124 125 127 131 136 137 142 144 150 154 157 158 159

10

CONTENTS

4.3.3.5.6.3. Psychological and Neurophysiological Evidence 4.3.3.5.6.4. Articulatory and Perceptual Evidence 4.3.3.5.7. Merits of Coherence Norms for Validating Mentalistic Hypotheses. . . 4.4. Summary of Conclusions 4.5. Implications of Conclusions 4.5.1. The Evaluation Measure and the Notion 'Linguistically Significant Generalization' . . 4.5.2. Mentalistic Linguistics: A Future Prospect ? 5. The Empirical Status of Transformational Generative Phonology as a Non-mentalistic Theory . 5.1. General Remarks 5.1.1. A Non-mentalistic Theory 5.1.2. The Empirical Status of a Theory 5.2. The Testability of the Theory of Phonology. . . 5.2.1. The General Issue 5.2.2. The Availability of Evidence 5.2.2.1. General Remarks 5.2.2.2. The Evaluation Measure 5.2.2.2.1. The Issues 5.2.2.2.2. Motivation for Adopting an Evaluation Measure 5.2.2.2.3. Evidence for the Form of the Evaluation Measure 5.2.2.2.4. Summarizing Remarks 5.2.2.3. Phonetic Representations 5.2.2.3.1. The Issues 5.2.2.3.2. The Reference of Phonetic Representations 5.2.2.3.3. Evidence about Physical Phenomena

159 159 160 164 166 166 167

171 171 171 174 176 176 177 177 178 178 179 181 190 191 191 193 194

CONTENTS

5.2.2.3.4. Evidence about Perceptual Phenomena 5.2.2.3.5. The Role of the Notion 'Systematic Considerations' 5.2.2.3.6. Summarizing Remarks 5.2.3. Blocking 5.2.3.1. General Remarks 5.2.3.2. Blocked Devices 5.2.3.2.1. The Principle of the Transformational Cycle 5.2.3.2.1.1. The Issues 5.2.3.2.1.2. Fineness of Stress Differentiation 5.2.3.2.1.3. Variability of Phrase-Internal Stress Relations 5.2.3.2.2. Linguistic Universals 5.2.3.2.2.1. The Non-mentalistic Notion 'Linguistic Universal' 5.2.3.2.2.2. Notions Blocking Claims about Linguistic Universals . . . . 5.2.3.2.3. The Theory of Exceptions 5.2.3.2.3.1. The Issue 5.2.3.2.3.2. First Set of Test Implications 5.2.3.2.3.3. Second Set of Test Implications 5.2.3.2.4. The Devices Accounting for Stress Phenomena 5.2.3.2.4.1. The Issue 5.2.3.2.4.2. The Strategy 5.2.3.2.4.3. The Notion 'Exception to a Rule' 5.2.3.2.4.4. The Conditions on the Abstractness of Lexical Representations

11 195 198 204 205 205 205 205 205 208 209 212 212 213 215 215 216 218 220 220 221 224

228

12

CONTENTS

5.2.3.2.4.5. The Degree of Motivation for Blocking Lexical Representations 5.2.3.2.4.6. The Degree of Motivation for Additional Rules 5.2.3.2.4.7. Merits of the Alternative Strategies 5.2.3.2.4.8. Summarizing Remarks . . 5.2.3.3. Blocking Devices 5.2.3.3.1. General Remarks 5.2.3.3.2. Methodological Status of Blocking Devices 5.3. Summary of Conclusions 5.4. Implications of the Conclusions

229 233 235 240 241 241 241 244 247

Bibliography

249

Index

258

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. LINGUISTICS AND METHODOLOGY

T h e title of this s t u d y suggests t h a t underlying t h e views t h a t will be p u t forward in it is a fundamental distinction: t h e distinction between t h e methodological and t h e nonmethodological or substantive aspects of a scientific discipline. A number of questions arises immediately with respect to this distinction: W h a t are the non-methodological aspects ? How does one distinguish between t h e methodological and non-methodological aspects, etc. ? Let us briefly consider these questions with reference to the field of transformational generative grammar. 1.1.1. Methodological vs. Substantive

Aspects

The distinction between t h e methodological and non-methodological aspects of a scientific discipline follows from a highly determinate conception of what constitutes the content of a scientific field in general. According to this conception t h e content of a field of inquiry is constituted b y two sets of 'objects': (1) (i) t h e content of the body of scientific knowledge it has already established about its object of study, as well as t h e still unsolved problems for which it endeavours t o find solutions, and (ii) the types of hypotheses, empirical generalizations, laws, theories, models, and so on in terms of which t h e content of t h e latter body of knowledge is laid

14

INTRODUCTION

down, as well as the techniques of inquiry, methods or modes of reasoning and procedures of validation b y means of which the corpus of scientific knowledge has been established, and in terms of which further investigations in this field are conducted. 1 The scientific knowledge established in a field of inquiry and the unsolved problems with which it is concerned constitute its SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT. The techniques, methods and procedures used in the discovery and validation of this knowledge and the forms of statement in terms of which the knowledge is represented collectively form its METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT. In the conduct of an inquiry these two aspects are intimately related — two sides of the same coin. From a metascientific point of view, though, a clear distinction must be drawn between them. This distinction might be misleading in that someone could interpret it as implying that bits of scientific knowledge about an object of inquiry could exist independently of the hypotheses, laws, etc. in terms of which they are codified. The latter claim is, of course, not made here. What is maintained is that from a metascientific point of view the content of a particular hypothesis, law or theory, i.e., what is asserted by it, can be distinguished from its form, i.e., the mode in which it asserts what it asserts. I n the field of transformational generative grammar, publications dealing with problematic topics of a substantive nature are produced at a prolific rate. 2 Most of these sub1 Some scientists and methodologists, e.g. De Groot (1964, p. vii), will maintain that the actions executed by a scientist in conducting a particular inquiry also constitute part of the content of his scientific field. These scholars will stress the dynamic character of empirical science, regarding it as a PROCESS which never terminates and in which definite, unassailable results are seldom obtained. Science as a process was a thesis propounded especially by pragmatists such as Peirce and Dewey (cf. Kaplan 1964, p. 7). 2 Cf. the diverse bibliographies of recent publications in the field of transformational generative grammar: Dingwall 1965, Krenn and Mullner 1968, Ruwet 1969 (pp. 134 -44), Schane 1967 (pp. 1 2 4 - 3 1 ) .

INTRODUCTION

15

stantive topics are related to four fundamental questions about the nature of natural language: (2)

(i) What are the substantial, formal and organizational constraints on the knowledge t h a t an ideal speakerhearer has of his language? (ii) What is the nature of the mechanism(s) by means of which such a speaker-hearer acquires his language ? (iii) How does this linguistic knowledge function in the production and interpretation of actual linguistic utterances ? (iv) What is the nature of linguistic change and by means of which mechanism(s) does it take place? 3

I n short, the substantive aspects of transformational generative grammar are constituted by the insights already gained in and by the still unsolved problems relating to the essential properties of natural language, its way of functioning, the way in which it is acquired and the way(s) in which it changes. Papers dealing with methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar appear only occasionally. Transformationalists such as Chomsky (e.g., 1957, pp. 52 ff.; 1964, § 4.5), Lees (1957; 1965) and Postal (1962; 1966, pp. 152 ff.) did deal in considerable detail with a number of the untenable methodological assumptions of taxonomic linguistics. Few scholars, however, have given serious and systematic consideration to the methodological aspects of 3

(2) (i — iii) are specified programmatically in m o s t o f t h e m a j o r publications dealing w i t h transformational generative g r a m m a r , e.g. in C h o m s k y 1964 (Chapter 1), 1965 (Chapter 1) and 1966 (Chapter 1). (2) (iii) is o f t e n regarded a s belonging t o t h e field of p s y c h o linguistics; cf., e.g., Osgood a n d Sebeok 1965 (p. 4). (2) (iv) is a question t h a t h a s o n l y recently b e c o m e a t o p i c of serious discussion w i t h i n t h e framework of transformational generative grammar; cf. K i p a r s k y 1968, C h o m s k y a n d H a l l e 1968 (Chap. 6, § 1.1), P o s t a l 1968 (Part I I ) . F o r a s u m m a r y of t h e m o s t general s u b s t a n t i v e topics o f inquiry in transformational generative p h o n o l o g y cf. § 2.4.4.

16

INTRODUCTION

transformational generative grammar. The only fairly systematic discussions of a number of these aspects that readily come to mind are those of Bach (1965), Bar-Hillel (1966), Chomsky (1962), Chomsky and Halle (sections of 1965; paragraphs of 1968), Hiz (1967), K a t z (1964a), Kiparsky (1968) and Botha (1968; 1970a and 1970b).4 The methodological topics treated in these publications concern questions such as: (3)

(i) What methodological role does intuition play in grammatical inquiry? (ii) What patterns of argumentation are used to establish the structural descriptions t h a t must be assigned to linguistic units? (in) How can grammars be evaluated? (iv) Under which circumstances is it permissible to introduce a new theoretical concept in the general linguistic theory and particular grammars?

The papers mentioned above deal only with a small number of the most general methodological bases of transformational generative grammar. Detailed systematic studies of methodological aspects of this linguistic theory t h a t are, with respect to their depth and scope, comparable with those in other fields, such as quantum mechanics, simply do not exist. 5 This monograph therefore has two basic aims. I n the first place, I want to demonstrate the point t h a t taking a close look at methodological aspects of a linguistic theory is not merely a most interesting pastime, b u t t h a t in order to make 4 For mostly incorrect criticisms of methodological principles of transformational grammar by non-transformationalists cf. Bolinger 1960, Dixon 1965, Garvin 1962, Hall 1965, Herdan 1967, Householder 1965, Voegelin 1959. Some of these criticisms are discussed in Botha 1968 (Chapter 3). 5 For such studies cf. journals such as Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and Synthése, as well as anthologies such as Baumrin 1963, Feigl and Brodbeck 1953, and Feigl and Maxwell 1961.

17

INTRODUCTION

progress in the investigation of substantive questions it is imperative to study these methodological aspects. I n the second place, this study is intended as a contribution to the small corpus of knowledge about methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar in general and transformational generative phonology in particular. A distinction having now been drawn between the substantive and methodological aspects of a field of inquiry, the way is clear to a discussion of the following questions: (4)

(i) What is an analysis of a methodological principle? (ii) What are the basic premises that determine the mode of execution and the outcome of such an analysis ? (iii) What reasons make it imperative that an analysis of the methodological principles of linguistic theory should be undertaken? 1.1.2. The Analysis of a Methodological

Principle

I n § 1.1.1. I have indicated what I take to be the methodological aspect of a field of inquiry [cf. (1) (ii)] and have also given examples of methodological issues in transformational generative grammar [cf. (3) (i)—(iv)]. Expressions such as 'methodology', 'philosophy of science', and 'the analysis of a methodological principle' have been used in the "Preface" and preceding paragraph, however, without being accompanied by an explicit specification of what they refer to. I t is obvious t h a t no obscurity must surround the notion 'the analysis of a methodological principle' in a monograph of this particular type. I n the attempt to clarify the content of the latter notion I depart from the assumption that although the average linguist is not well versed in present-day philosophy, he nevertheless is aware of the existence of three branches of philosophy that can be labelled 'epistemology', 'philosophy of science', and 'methodology'. Such a linguist will suspect

18

INTRODUCTION

that the analysis of a methodological principle is the task of one or more of the fields of study vaguely indicated by these labels. I t is therefore fitting to consider to which field(s) of study they refer. Although some scholars (cf., e.g., Pap 1962, pp. vii—viii; Kaplan 1964, p. 20) use these terms to refer to one and the same field of study, I find it convenient to take them as indicating three fields that are, though closely interrelated and partially overlapping, distinct. In the framework of the present monograph, METHODOLOGY will be viewed as the field of inquiry that studies methods, techniques and principles of inquiry as these are employed in the conduct of research, within particular individual scientific disciplines. These methods, techniques and principles include "such procedures as forming concepts and hypotheses, making observations and measurements, performing experiments, building models and theories, providing explanations, and making predictions" (Kaplan 1964, p. 23), as well as those figuring in the testing of hypotheses and theories. Whereas methodology — in the sense specified above — studies methods of inquiry as they are used in individual sciences, philosophy of science moves on a higher level of abstraction. P H I L O S O P H Y or S C I E N C E studies the methods, techniques and principles of inquiry as they are characteristic of science in general, as well as the nature and peculiarities of scientific knowledge in general. Five major goals of philosophy of science, as indicated by Morgenbesser (1967b, p. xiii), are: to clarify the nature and aims of science; to specify the structure of particular scientific theories; to criticize and to comment critically on scientific claims in the light of epistemological and ontological theses; to assess claims about the possible reach of science; and to buttress or test various epistemological theses on the basis of scientific results. Formulated more concisely, a basic task of philosophy of science is "to provide a clear and general account of scientific

INTRODUCTION

19

explanation, of the intelligibility of scientific principles, and of the confrontation between such principles and experience . . . " (Scheffler 1963, p. vii).6 Philosophy of science — within the framework of this monograph — is distinct from methodology in the sense that, whereas methodology is concerned with principles of inquiry as they function in the individual sciences, philosophy of science deals with them only in so far as they are characteristic of science in general. It is obvious that many of the methodological principles of the individual sciences will also be characteristic of science in general. It is for this reason that methodology and philosophy of science have been regarded as 'closely interrelated' and 'partially overlapping'. We now come to the third of the labels used above, 'epistemology'. EPISTEMOLOGY, or the theory of knowledge, will be regarded here as the discipline that attempts "to specify criteria for and types of knowledge" (Morgenbesser 1967b, p. xii). It is "that branch of philosophy which is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and the general reliability of claims to knowledge" (Hamlyn 1967, pp. 8—9).7 In these citations, "knowledge" 6 Caws (1966, pp. 5—11) distinguishes between two basic tasks of philosophy of science, an analytic one and a speculative one. The analytic task is to examine critically the theories of science, whilst the speculative one is to construct a philosophical theory about scientific theory. " T h e end in view is an understanding of science." (p. 10). F o r similar views cf. P a p 1962 (pp. v —vi). 'Woozley (1967, p. 14) regards epistemology as " t h a t branch of philosophy which has for its study the nature of cognition and its objects". H e also points out that " a theory of knowledge is not a theory only about the nature of knowing and the objects of knowledge; if it has any pretensions to completeness, it must be a theory about the range and limits of knowing, and about what happens beyond those limits" (p. 11). I n his characterization of the scope and aims of epistemology, Leinfellner (1967, p. 11) explicitly names the types of knowledge studied by epistemology: " D i e Erkenntnistheorie behandelt das Alltagserkennen, die ästhetische Welterkenntnis und Welterfahrung, die wertende Erkenntnis der Welt, bzw. die

20

INTRODUCTION

refers to both scientific and non-scientific knowledge. Epistemology thus moves on a higher level of abstraction than philosophy of science, and it is clear why some scholars regard philosophy of science as a branch of epistemology. In § 1.1.3. it will become clear that philosophy of science is related to two other disciplines, logic and ontology, in much the same way as it J»-related to epistemology. The point must be stressed that different philosophers and scientists draw the boundaries between epistemology, philosophy of science, and methodology in different ways and that some of them do not recognize these boundaries at all. The distinctions drawn above, however, facilitate the task of clarifying the content of the notion 'the analysis of a methodological principle'. It should be clear at this point that the term 'methodological principle' refers to a method, procedure, or technique of inquiry as it functions in a particular field. In analyzing a methodological principle, one is therefore not concerned with the question of whether this principle is characteristic of scientific inquiry in general. Theorie des Handelns und Entscheidens, die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis der inneren und äusseren W e l t und Logik, Mathematik und Statistik insofern, als diese der E r k e n n t n i s dienen." He proceeds t o draw the distinction between what we have called methodology, philosophy o f science and epistemology in the following way: " D i e Wissenschaftstheorie, die sich an vielen P u n k t e n mit der Erkenntnistheorie überschneidet, ist grundsätzlich eine Metawissenschaft zu den kognitiven (erkennenden) Wissenschaften; sie behandelt darüber hinaus im Gegensatz zur Erkenntnistheorie auch die Grundlagen der reinen (nicht-kognitiven) oder Formalwissenschaften, wie reine Mathem a t i k , reine Logik, reine Statistik. Die Hauptfrage sowohl der Erkenntnistheorie wie der Wissenschaftstheorie ist und bleibt die F r a g e : W i e sind E r k e n n t n i s und Wissenschaft möglich? Beide Disziplinen gehen bei ihrer Beantwortung über die Einzelwissenschaften hinaus und suchen die diesen gemeinsamen Grundlagen, Voraussetzungen und Methoden zu erfassen." Methodology is t h e field o f inquiry which restricts its attention to the various "Einzelwissens c h a f t e n " , without attempting to generalize its findings t o 'science in general'.

INTRODUCTION

21

The notion 'methodological principle' having been considered, attention can now be given to the question of what must be understood by the A N A L Y S I S of a methodological principle. In the first place, consider the aims of such an analysis. The analysis of a methodological principle is essentially a type of philosophical analysis. Its first aim is the clarification, explication or elucidation of the principles that are considered. This is to say that the first aim of such an analysis is to determine what the precise content of the given methodological principles is (cf. Morgenbesser 1967b, p. xi; Theobald 1968, pp. 12—13; Kaplan 1964, pp. 18, 19, 23). Closely connected with the first aim of this type of analysis is a second: the description or codification of the clarified methodological principle (cf. Morgenbesser 1967b, p. xii; Kaplan 1964, pp. 18, 23). It can even be argued that the codification of a methodological principle is part of its clarification, since an uncodified principle cannot be perfectly clear. The third aim of such an analysis is a normative one: the determination of the limitations and potentialities of the methodological principle under consideration (cf. Morgenbesser 1967b, p. xii; Kaplan 1964, p. 23; De Groot 1964, pp. 26—27). To evaluate a methodological principle is to determine how adequately it performs the function assigned to it. Notice incidentally that to say that the analysis of a methodological principle has a normative aspect is not tantamount to saying that it has a prescriptive aspect. This point will be raised again in § 1.1.3. Summarizing the discussion so far, we may say that in 'the analysis of a methodological principle' the following is understood: the explication, codification and evaluation of a technique, method or principle of inquiry as it functions in a particular scientific field. In concluding this section one further question about the notion 'analysis' must be briefly considered: What are the ways of going about analysis? Or: By means of which activities can the goals of an analysis be attained? Or simply:

22

INTRODUCTION

How does one perform the analysis of a methodological principle? As Caws (1966, p. 6) points out, in philosophy "there are three main ways of going about analysis, which may be called the method of redefinition, the method of explication, and the method of illustration in use". The method of redefinition consists in replacing the terms or statements to be analyzed by other terms or statements which have the same meaning and are couched in the same sort of language, but which are more carefully formulated and more clearly understood (Caws 1966, P- 6). The method of explication consists in introducing precisely specified concepts, usually taken from artificial symbolic language systems, to serve in the place of familiar but 'fuzzy' concepts of ordinary languages (Caws 1966, p. 7). The third method of analysis, that of illustration in use, takes a point of view opposite to the second one, holding that it is only by keeping close to the multiple uses of terms, and the continuous shift of meaning on passing from one use to the next, that .it is possible to get any idea of what is really going on when men communicate with one another, whether it be about science, or philosophy, or anything else (Caws 1966, p. 8). It is impossible in a monograph with the aims and scope of the present one to trace the history of these different conceptions of analysis and to enter into the dispute about their respective merits. I can do no more than point out that the method which is to be mainly used in the following chapters is the one of redefinition. This method will be especially used to attain the first goal of our analysis: the clarification of the methodological principles to be considered. The concepts that will be used in the description of these principles will be taken from the philosophy of science. To attain the third aim of our analysis, a set of norms or standards is required for judging the adequacy of the methodological principles. The nature of these norms will be discussed in § 1.1.3.

INTRODUCTION

1.1.3. Premises of the Analysis

of a Methodological

23 Principle

It is not possible to undertake an analysis of a methodological principle without proceeding from a number of premises or assumptions. These premises determine the way in which the analysis is performed as well as the validity of the outcome of the analysis. In the preceding paragraph, two such fundamental assumptions have been discussed. The first was constituted by the particular conception of the nature of a methodological principle that was outlined in § 1.1.2. The second basic premise was formed by the idea of what an analysis is. In this section, I will discuss a number of other basic premises governing the mode of execution and the validity of the outcome of the analysis that will be presented in Chapters 3—5. The first of these premises concerns the origin of the norms that are used in the evaluation of methodological principles. These norms are derived via philosophy of science from epistemology, ontology and logic. The content and aims of those fields of inquiry called 'philosophy of science' and 'epistemology' have already been specified in § 1.1.2. Ontology, or the theory of being, deals with what exists or can exist (cf. Caws 1966, p. 13; Maclntyre 1967, pp. 542—43). It examines the different modes of existence as well as the criteria for existence. Logic, or more precisely 'modern logic', studies, among other things, the different types of inference (Brody 1967, p. 67), "the way in which statements make sense" (Caws 1966, p. 13), or formulated in other terms, "the relationship between a conclusion and the evidence given to support it" (Salmon 1963, p. 1). From each of these branches of philosophy norms can be derived for the evaluation of methodological principles in particular fields of inquiry. The methodological principles of a field by means of which the truth of the scientific claims in this field are determined are evaluated by invoking EPISTEMOLOGICAL norms. The adequacy of those methodo-

24

INTRODUCTION

logical principles, on the basis of which a scientist decides to postulate the existence of 'scientific entities', is judged by using ONTOLOGICAL norms. LOGICAL norms are used for the evaluation of the methodological principles of a scientific field that determine the ways in which scientific statements are inferred from others, i.e., the ways in which conclusions are related to evidence. Finally, the philosophy of science combines ontological, epistemological and logical norms into complex ones that are used to evaluate, for example, the methodological principles of a field of inquiry which determine what counts as an explanation, prediction, etc. in this field. The question can now be raised of whether the assumption that the methodological principles of a field of inquiry are evaluated in terms of epistemological, logical and ontological norms does not clash with the thesis of the autonomy of scientific inquiry. As formulated by Kaplan (1964, p. 3), this thesis asserts that the various sciences, taken together, are not colonies subject to the governance of logic, methodology, philosophy of science, or any other discipline whatever, but are, and of right ought to be, free and independent. . . . It is the principle that the pursuit of truth is accountable to nothing and to no one not part of that pursuit itself. This principle implies, among other things, that it is not so "that the poor scientist is inherently confused and always in need of intellectual first aid, which the philosopher is uniquely competent to administer" (Morgenbesser 1967b, p. xii). The question now is whether the premise that methodological principles are evaluated in terms of norms derived from ontology, epistemology, and logic is reconcilable with the thesis of the autonomy of inquiry. It will be maintained that no clash exists between the former premise and the latter thesis. This view constitutes the second fundamental premise discussed in § 1.1.3. The reason for the absence of such a clash is that

INTRODUCTION

25

the principle of autonomy does not deny authority to norms of scientific practice but rather derives their authority from the sovereignty of science itself. Standards governing the conduct of inquiry in any of its phases emerge from inquiry and are themselves subject to further inquiry (Kaplan 1964, p. 5). The function of the principle of the autonomy of inquiry has been to defend science against attempts by social enterprises, such as theology, politics and metaphysics, to dominate it.8 The norms and standards by which the adequacy of methodological principles are judged are not forced on science. They are derived from science itself, clarified and codified by epistemology, ontology, logic and philosophy of science. The methodological principles of a field of inquiry are therefore evaluated in terms of norms that science itself dictates. For this reason it can be said that, whilst one of the aims of the analysis of a methodological principle is normative, it has no aim that is prescriptive. The nature and origin of the norms under discussion are determined by a particular conception of the relations between (a) logic, ontology, epistemology, (b) philosophy of science, (c) methodology, and (d) specific individual fields of scientific inquiry. This conception has been partly explicated in § 1.1.2. It can be summarized by the sohema (5) on the following page. The paired arrows pointing in opposite directions reflect the fact that the methodological principles of empirical science studied at various levels of abstraction by respectively methodology, philosophy of science, logic, epistemology and ontology, are turned back as norms on a particular field of inquiry. From (5) it is also clear in which way philosophy of science, functions as a 'coordination centre' that combines logical, ontological and epistemological norms 8 Marrism in linguistics is a good example of the way in which a social enterprise may attempt to dominate a scientific discipline. Marrism resulted from the Soviet scholar Marr's efforts to construct a linguistic theory that was in harmony with Marxist political and social principles (cf. Ivic 1965, pp. 102—07).

26

INTRODUCTION

(5) L E V E L S 0 F

ni

Logic

Epistemology

Ontology

Philosophy of Science

II

K H H >

A B S T R A C T 1 O N

QQ

a

M a ¡2! o a

Field of Scientific Inquiry A

Field of Scientific Inquiry B

Field of Scientific Inquiry X

03 2 a

£

into complex 'norms for scientific methodology'. The schema (5) is deficient in a number of ways. First, it wrongly suggests that methodology is more than one field of inquiry. B y labelling three different squares 'methodology', I have attempted to indicate merely that methodology is concerned with ind ividual fields of inquiry. Second, it fails to reflect the fact that logic, epistemology and ontology are also concerned with respectively non-scientific modes of inference, non-scientific types of knowledge, and non-scientific modes of existence or being. Third, (5) is incomplete in that the field of ethics is not indicated on the third level of metascientific abstraction.

INTRODUCTION

27

is the field of knowledge that makes "inquiry about ways of life and rules of conduct" (Abelson and Nielsen 1967, pp. 81—82). Generally speaking, ethics can be regarded as the intellectual field that studies values.9 Values occur in different ways in scientific inquiry, e.g., as the ethics of a field of inquiry, or "as a basis for the selection of problems, the order in which they are dealt with, and the resources expended on their solution" (Kaplan 1964, p. 381). Such values of science are also studied by ethics, and norms can be derived from this field of study for evaluating the values of a particular field of inquiry. Since I shall not deal with questions of values pertaining to transformational generative grammar in the present monograph, the nature of ethical norms will not be discussed here any further. In conclusion it must be pointed out that the preceding discussion of norms as well as that of the relations obtaining between logic, ontology, epistemology, philosophy of science and methodology are grossly oversimplified in a certain respect. These five fields of study have been mentioned as if each were a monolithic whole. This is an incorrect representation of the facts and has only been adopted in order to keep the discussion maximally simple. The point is that all of these fields have specialized branches in which various rival theories exist. For example, with respect to epistemology, Woozley (1967, p. 10) remarks that "there is no one and only theory of knowledge, but an immense variety of rival theories, alike only in that they claim to deal with the same subject matter . . . " If one examines the field called 'philosophy of science', the same thing may be observed. Philosophers of science disagree on such fundamental issues as the aims of empirical science, the nature of scientific explanations, the

ETHICS

"The or should dards for good and ments of 9

central questions of philosophical ethics are: What do we we mean by " g o o d " and " b a d " ? what are the right stanjudging things to be good or b a d ? how do judgments of bad (value judgments) differ from and depend upon judgvalue-neutral f a c t ? " (Abelson and Nielsen 1967, p. 82).

28

INTRODUCTION

function of models in scientific inquiry, the cognitive status of scientific theories, etc. (cf. Botha 1968, Chap. 3). I t is therefore a gross oversimplification to state t h a t the norms used in the evaluation of a methodological principle are derived from 'logic', 'epistemology', 'ontology', and 'philosophy of science'. I t is nearer to the t r u t h to say t h a t these norms are derived from particular theories existing within these fields. The corollary is t h a t there are as many rival norms as there are rival theories within these fields. This fact should be kept in mind when, in the following chapters, particular norms are presented for evaluating methodological principles of transformational generative phonology. The evaluation of a specific methodological principle will be incorrect if it is based on a norm derived from an inadequate metascientific theory. There is no way of eliminating this risk. A norm which is in better accord with the practice of scientific inquiry in general, rather than no norm at all, is the only alternative to an incorrect norm. No problem is solved by proclaiming — in the face of the existence of inappropriate norms — t h a t analysis of a methodological principle should not have a normative aspect. To give u p the condition that the principles and methods of scientific inquiry must meet certain norms is to open the possibility to individual scientists for going about scientific inquiry in ways which are not subject to the control of human reason. 1.1.4. The Necessity of Analyzing the Methodological Aspects of Linguistics I n § 1.1.1. it was pointed out t h a t few linguists have given serious consideration to issues concerning methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar. From this fact one may conclude t h a t linguists do not see compelling reasons for studying methodological questions in their field of inquiry. I t is therefore necessary to consider question (4) (iii), viz.: what reasons make it imperative t h a t an ana-

INTRODUCTION

29

lysis of the methodological principles of a linguistic theory in general and transformational generative grammar in particular should be undertaken? Linguists who are familiar with the writings of Weber, a one-time leading methodologist in the field of social science, may even ask whether the diversion of attention to the methodological aspects of a linguistic theory does not curb the progress of inquiry into its substantive aspects. This question would rest on Weber's (1968, p. 115) view that methodology can only bring us reflective understanding of the means which have demonstrated their value in practice by raising them to the level of explicit consciousness; it is no more the precondition of fruitful intellectual work than the knowledge of anatomy is the precondition for "correct" walking. Indeed, just as the person who attempted to govern his mode of walking continuously by anatomical knowledge would be in danger of stumbling so the professional scholar who attempted to determine the aims of his own research extrinsically on the basis of methodological reflections would be in danger of falling into the same difficulties. Linguists looking for justification for not paying attention to methodological questions might even go so far as to declare that the existence of a definite 'scientific method' and 'methodological principles' is doubtful. These linguists might quote the eminent physicist Bridgman, according to whom the scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one's damnedest with one's mind, no holds barred. What primarily distinguishes science from other intellectual enterprises in which the right answer has to be obtained is not method but the matter (cf. Bridgman 1950, p. 370). Before turning to three positive considerations which, to my mind, compel the linguist to give ample attention to methodological aspects of his intellectual field, I wish to make two general comments on the points of view cited from Weber and from Bridgman. Observe that Weber's claims are construed in terms of a metaphor which is quite

30

INTRODUCTION

misleading. By comparing the significance of anatomical knowledge about walking to t h a t of methodological knowledge about conducting a scientific inquiry, Weber compares two things which, strictly speaking, are not comparable. Whilst walking is, under normal circumstances, an instinctive activity not controlled by reason, scientific inquiry is a rational enterprise governed by rational considerations. There is nothing instinctive about the way in which a scientist, for example, tests a theory. The principles governing his testing of a theory are surely rational ones (cf. §§ 4.3.2.; 5.1.2.). 10 With respect to the point of view quoted from Bridgman, notice t h a t this view cannot exclude the possibility that there may be different ways — unequal in their merits — of doing one's damnedest with one's mind. The existence of such alternative ways cannot be affirmed or denied a priori. I t is rather an empirical question to be decided on the basis of a careful analysis of the practice of scientific inquiry. The fact t h a t a particular scientist may not be in a position to indicate and evaluate all of the methodological principles of his field of inquiry, because he has not learnt and does not know them as 'methodological principles', cannot be taken as an indication t h a t no such principles exist. 11 Now there are at least three positive considerations which, to my mind, should compel a linguist to make a serious study of the methodological aspects of his discipline. The first is the most fundamental one. I n the framework of transformational generative grammar linguists have developed, both 10 HanBon (1965, p. 71) argues that even " . . . the initial suggestion of an hypothesis is very often a reasonable affair. It is not so often affected by intuition, insight, hunches, or other imponderables as biographers or scientists suggest. . . . If establishing an hypothesis through its predictions has a logic, so has the conceiving of an hypothesis". 11 Cf. Nidditch 1968b (p. 8) for further comments on Bridgman's point of view as quoted here.

INTRODUCTION

31

on the level of linguistic analysis and on the level of grammatical analysis, typical patterns or methods of argumentation by means of which they establish solutions to linguistic and grammatical problems. For example, in grammatical analysis particular modes of reasoning are used to motivate the assignment of structural descriptions to sentences at the various levels of structure.12 Let us suppose that assignment of a particular structural description 'SDa' to a sentence 'S' is motivated by using the pattern of argumentation 'PA/. I t is then obvious that, if ' P A / should be a deficient way of making inferences, the probability that 'SDa' is the correct structural description for 'S' is small. I f 'PA X is invalid, then 'SDa' can be incidentally correct only if the grammarian says that he has used it to establish 'SDa' but has in fact established *SDa' by using a quite different pattern of argumentation 'PA 2 ' that is an acceptable one. These remarks apply not only to grammatical argumentation, but to linguistic argumentation as well. The crux of the matter is that if the methods of scientific inquiry, such as patterns of argumentation, used in linguistic and grammatical analysis were deficient, then the probability that progress could be made in the inquiry into the substantive issues in these fields would be extremely low. Insufficient understanding of the limitations of these methods of inquiry automatically leads to uncertainty about the correctness of the claims about the substantive issues that has been established through their use. To put it simply, one cannot expect to acquire many correct insights into the nature of natural claims if one seeks these insights by using questionable ways of inquiry. For thiB reason it was claimed in § 1.1.1. that, in order to make continued progress in the inquiry into substantive linguistic issues such as (2) (i—iv), it is imperative to take a close look at the methodological aspects of linguistic theory. 12

For an analysis of this pattern of argumentation cf. Botha 1970b.

32

INTRODUCTION

Constant neglect of the study of the methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar may have serious negative consequences. The most serious consequence is that transformational generative grammar might end up in a position analogous to the one in which taxonomic linguistics landed in the late fifties and early sixties. It was then that transformationalists such as Chomsky drew attention to the untenability of some of the most fundamental methodological principles governing the work of taxonomists. Chomsky pointed out, for example, that the methodological principles on which the taxonomic discovery procedures were based did not guarantee that the grammars constructed by the application of these procedures to data would contain linguistically significant and correct information (1964, pp. 56ff.). A second set of methodological principles of taxonomic linguistics whose untenability Chomsky (1964, pp. 97ff.) exposed governed the way of execution and outcome of phonological analysis. These principles were those of consistency, convertibility, simplicity and convenience. It seems to me self-evident that, to avoid landing in an analogous methodological predicament, transformationalists should study the methodological aspects of their linguistic approach with the utmost care. A second positive consideration forcing linguists to give more attention to the methodological principles of transformational generative grammar is of a more practical nature. It is amazing to see how many controversies about theoretical principles of transformational generative grammar have resulted from the fact that the critics of this linguistic approach have confused its substantive aspects with its methodological aspects and vice versa. This confusion has generated many irrelevant critical discussions of transformational generative grammar. Classic instances of debates between transformationalists and their critics caused by such confusion on the side of the critics were those in which Bolinger (1960) and Lees (1965), Garvin (1962) and Postal (1962),

INTRODUCTION

33

Householder (1965; 1966) and Chomsky and Halle (1965), and Matthews (1968) and Halle (1969) were involved. Let us consider a number of cases — in the domain of phonology — in which methodological aspects of transformational grammar were confused with substantive aspects and vice versa. Householder (1965, pp. 20ff.) mistook the substantive reasons for using distinctive features instead of phonemes in grammars for 'philosophical' ones: Can a thing be distinguished from the totality of its properties ? A phoneme is a thing, in this sense, while a feature is a property or set (class, group) in a non-technical sense of things. Is there behind the decision of Halle and Chomsky a general philosophical principle to regard all 'thing' words as illegitimate abbreviations for descriptions in terms of 'property' words? (pp. 21—22). For a rejoinder cf. Chomsky and Halle 1965 (pp. llOff.). In a similar way, Lamb (1964, pp. 114—15) incorrectly regarded the substantive issue of choosing between systems of ordered phonological rules and systems of unordered phonological rules as a 'philosophical', or methodological, one. Instead of basing this decision on empirical evidence he took it on the basis of a notion of 'absolute simplicity'. For discussion of this point cf. Chomsky and Halle 1965 (pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 ) . Matthews (1968, p. 282) considers Householder and others to be "justifiably suspicious" of transformational generative phonology, since the role of a concept which he labels "the syllable" appears to be "somewhat marginal in it". Matthews specifies the grounds for this suspicion as follows: Secondly, one must consider the role of the syllable as a phonological unit. For many languages it is customary to make generalizations on a syllabic basis: e.g., 'The word-stress falls on the first closed syllable', 'All verbal roots of such-and-such a class are disyllabic' or 'Minor syllables exhibit a three-term vowel system'. Will every statement of this kind reduce conveniently to a morpheme-structure formulation? This view of Matthews's is based on an imperfect under-

34

INTRODUCTION

standing of the conditions imposed on concept formation in empirical science. One of these conditions is that a theoretical concept must have empirical import. Applied to the question of the role of "the syllable", it implies that Matthews must provide empirical or substantive grounds for wanting to introduce such a concept into transformational generative phonology. The introduction of this concept into a particular linguistic theory cannot be motivated in terms of a poorly specified methodological consideration of 'convenience'.13 Finally, consider an example of the confusion of methodological aspects with substantive ones of a slightly different nature. Saumjan (1968, p. 5) claims to have formulated " a new phonological theory" which he labels "the two-level theory of phonology". He calls it a new theory of phonology, since it contains two main levels of abstraction: "(1) the level of phonological observation and (2) the level of phonological constructs" (p. 7). Notice that there is nothing new to this "two-level theory of phonology", for its two-levelledness does not at all represent a new approach to the study of the phonological aspect of natural language. This characteristic of Saumjan's theory is a purely methodological one that reflects nothing new about (substantive) phonological structure. Saumjan's theory is not even methodologically new because of its two-level structure. As Saumjan himself points out, "the two-level theory of phonology, as formulated by us, is in full agreement with the concept of the structure of science . . ." Transformational generative phonology is also in this sense a two-level theory. Saumjan did not appre1 8 F o r a discussion of the conditions on concept formation in empirical science cf. Hempel 1952 (pp. 39—60), 1966 (pp. 91 — 97). Uhlenbeck (1967, pp. 3 0 1 — 0 2 ) criticized transformational generative gramm a r for not incorporating a concept he labelled " t h e w o r d " . The criticisms by both Matthews and Uhlenbeck are based on the same untenable assumption about the conditions t h a t must be m e t by scientific concepts. F o r an extensive discussion of this topic cf. B o t h a 1968 (pp. 79 — 84).

INTRODUCTION

35

eiate the fact that, to provide " a new theory of phonology" he must present not a theory with new methodological characteristics, but one making new substantive claims about phonological structure. The views of Householder, Lamb, Matthews and Saumjan considered above are untenable, since all of them result from a confusion of methodological aspects of linguistic theory with substantive aspects or vice versa. The time and energy wasted on their propagation and on criticizing them can only be made good by successfully acquiring a broader and deeper understanding of the methodological aspects of linguistic theory in general and transformational generative grammar in particular. A third and final — and perhaps the most 'unscientific' — reason for giving more attention to the analysis of the methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar concerns the training of students who specialize in this field. I have the impression that 'normally', the instruction that a student receives in transformational generative grammar is limited to substantive topics. Such a student accordingly acquires a certain amount of knowledge about the content of the claims that this linguistic theory makes about natural language. The 'normal' training does not, however, equip him in a systematic way with knowledge about the methods of inquiry — such as the patterns of argumentation by means of which linguistic hypotheses are related to linguistic data — that will enable him to perform a linguistic or grammatical analysis within the framework of transformational generative grammar; The student has to gather these methods of inquiry by himself by watching his instructor and other scholars in the field go about their research activities. It can therefore not be unexpected when we find that some students do not completely succeed in mastering these methodological principles, and that those students who do are quite often unconscious of the limitations and origin of these principles.

36

INTRODUCTION

It is my contention that training in linguistics could be made much more effective if courses in the methodological aspects of linguistio theories in general and transformational generative grammar in particular are incorporated into curricula. Such courses cannot be taught, however, if the necessary teaching materials and text books are not available. And the demand for such materials cannot be met if no serious attention is given to the inquiry into the methodological aspects of linguistic theory.11

1.2. T H E CONTENTS A N D ORGANIZATION OF T H E MONOGRAPH

In addition to this introductory chapter, the present monograph includes four more chapters. The second chapter contains an exposition of the theory of transformational generative phonology as it is presented in Chomsky and Halle's The Sound Pattern of English and in Postal's Aspects of Phonological Theory. Chapter 3 examines the methodological role played by the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' in transformational generative grammar in general and phonology in particular. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the empirical status of the theory of phonology. Chapter 4 examines the question of whether it is possible to validate the claims made by the theory of phonology if this theory is regarded as a mentalistic theory. The final chapter, Chapter 5, is reserved for an examination of the testability of the claims incorporated in the theory of phonology when the latter claims are not interpreted as characterizing a mental faculty of the speaker-hearer. Whilst the topics treated in Chapter 3 are dealt with primarily in an explicatory way, 14 For a survey of a number of more general reasons why a scientist should have a basic knowledge of philosophy of science cf. Bunge 1959 (pp. 21—25).

INTRODUCTION

37

those considered in Chapters 4 and 5 are examined from a more critical point of view. Though the primary object of study of this book is constituted by methodological properties of the theory of phonology, attention is also given to some of the methodological principles of the general linguistic theory taken as a whole. More specifically, consideration is given to those methodological aspects of the general linguistic theory on the nature of which light has been thrown in recent discussions of issues in the theory of phonology.

2 THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

2.1. GENERAL REMARKS

In order to properly understand and to be able to evaluate the analysis of methodological principles of transformational generative phonology that will be presented in Chapters 4 and 5, a clear understanding of the following points is required: (1)

(i) the object of study of a transformational generative grammar, (ii) the object of study of the general linguistic theory, (iii) the structure of a transformational generative grammar, (iv) the function of the phonological component, and (v) the structure of the phonological component.

The exposition of the points (1) (i—v) will be in many respects incomplete since it will omit many details irrelevant to the methodological analyses presented in the later chapters. It should therefore not be regarded as a first introduction intended for novices in the field. Professional linguists who are well versed in the topics (1) (i—v) will learn nothing new from this exposition, and may skip it. It is intended for the large group of students who are no longer beginners in the field but who have not yet entered the ranks of the professional linguists. The exposition of (1) (i—v) is based on the major publications of Chomsky (1964, 1965, 1966, 1967a), Chomsky and Halle (1965, 1968), and Postal (1968). Bibliographical re-

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

39

ferences in Chapter 2 are limited to the most essential ones. The chapters discussing methodological aspects of transformational generative phonology will however be documented fully.

2.2. THE OBJECTS OF STUDY OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE GRAMMAR

2.2.1. A Grammar

A transformational generative grammar has as its object of study a mental entity: the LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE of an ideal speaker-hearer who knows his language perfectly.1 It is hypothesized that the linguistic competence is present in the speaker-hearer in the form of an internalized grammar, i.e., a system of rules by means of which the speaker-hearer is able to relate the sound-signals of an indefinite number of sentences to their respective semantic interpretations and vice versa. A linguistic grammar aims at describing this internalized grammar in terms of a finite set of rules that (a) enumerates all and only the grammatical sentences of the language in question, and (b) assigns to each of the enumerated sentences a structural description.2 From the structural description assigned to each sentence it must be clear how it is interpreted and pronounced. A grammar that has the two aims mentioned above is called a GENERATIVE GRAMMAR. 1 Not all scholars agree that the object of study of a transformational generative grammar should be a mental entity. Cf., e.g., BarHillel 1966, p. 399; Seuren 1969, pp. 7 - 8 ; Staal 1966, p. 197. I will return to the topic of mentalism in §§ 3.3.2.2., 4.2., and 5.1.1. 8 In addition it may be required that a grammar assign structural descriptions to certain types of deviant sentences as well, indicating the respects in which these are deviant. Cf., e.g., Katz 1964b; Seuren 1969, pp. 13£f„ 51ff.

40

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

2.2.2. The General Theory The object of study of the general linguistic theory is also a mental entity: the FACULTÉ DE LANGAGE of an ideal speakerhearer. The faculté de langage is taken to be a languageindependent mental capacity which enables a speaker-hearer to acquire his linguistic competence. The general linguistic theory is a set of hypotheses about the organization of the abstract structure of this acquisition device. These hypotheses concern the essential properties of natural language, the socalled LINGUISTIC) UNIVERSALS. A distinction is drawn between three types of linguistic universals: organizational universals, formal universals, and substantive universals. Organizational universals determine the structure of the subcomponents of a grammar and the relations among them. Formal universals are the conditions on the abstract formal structure of the rules occurring in each subcomponent of a grammar. Substantive universals constitute the theoretical vocabulary in terms of which the rules in the diverse subcomponents of a grammar are formulated. In addition to the hypotheses about these types of linguistic universals, the general linguistic theory contains an EVALUATION MEASURE. Both the child learning a language and the grammarian studying a language can construct, within the limits set by the organizational, formal and substantive universals, alternative grammars for this language. The function of the evaluation measure is to select from these competing, alternative grammars for each language the most highly valued one. 2.3. T H E S T R U C T U R E OF A T R A N S F O R M A T I O N A L GENERATIVE

GRAMMAR

It is an obvious requirement that any discussion of methodological aspects of transformational generative phonology should proceed from a clear conception of the relation be-

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

41

tween the phonological and the other components of a grammar. In terms of the version of transformational generative grammar that Chomsky and Halle present in The Sound Pattern of English (c.f., e.g., pp. 6—7), a grammar consists of three main components, viz. the syntactic, semantic and phonological component. The syntactic component comprises two major sub-components: the base component and the transformational component. The base component, in turn, includes the categorial component, the lexicon, and the lexical insertion rule. The categorial component specifies in terms of grammatical categories and relations and lexical categories the basic sentence patterns of a language. The lexicon consists of a finite number of lexical items or morphemes. Each lexical item is constituted by three sets of features: syntactic, semantic and phonological features. These features represent the idiosyncratic syntactic, semantic and phonological properties of a language. A set of lexical redundancy rules specifies the predictable syntactic, semantic and phonological characteristics of the morphemes. The function of the lexical insertion rule is to place the lexical items in the appropriate positions in the basic sentence patterns generated by the categorial subcomponent. The level of structure of a sentence that is specified by the base component constitutes its deep structure. A syntactically unambiguous sentence is assigned only one deep structure. A syntactically ambiguous or homonymous sentence is assigned as many distinct deep struct; res as there are ways in which it is syntactically ambiguous. The deep structures generated by the base component constitute the input to the semantic component of a grammar. The semantic component assigns to each sentence, via its one or more deep structures, a semantic interpretation. The major task of the transformational component is to derive the surface structure(s) of each sentence from its deep structure(s) and other underlying structures. The surface

42

THE THEORY O F PHONOLOGY

structures are the input to the phonological component. This component assigns to each surface structure a phonetic representation. Both the semantic and phonological component operate solely on impulses which they receive from the syntactic component. Accordingly, it is said that they have an interpretative function only.3 The outlines of a simplified version of the componential structure of a transformational generative grammar may be represented schematically as (2).

1. Basic sentence patterns 2. Lexical items 3. Deep structures

4. Surface structures 5. Phonetic representations 6. Semantic interpretations

2.4. T H E PHONOLOGICAL COMPONENT 2.4.1. The Main

Contributions

The first major publication that contained an exposition of a number of the theoretical principles of transformational generative phonology was Morris Halle's The Sound Pattern 3 Recently proposals have been put forward to the effect that semantics should also be generative. For example, McCawley (1968b) argues that the distinction between the base component and the semantic component as pictured by scholars such as Chomsky (1965), and K a t z and Postal (1964) is rather arbitrary in certain respects.

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

43

of Bus8ian (1959). This theory of phonology has since then been further developed, mainly by Halle himself (cf., e.g., 1964a, 1964b, 1969), by Chomsky (cf., e.g., 1964, 1966, 1967b, as well as Chomsky and Halle 1965, 1968), and by Postal (cf. 1968). A large number of other scholars have made lesser contributions.4 The most important recent contributions to phonological theory are Chomsky and Halle's monumental book The Sound Pattern of English, (1968), and Postal's monograph Aspects of Phonological Theory (1968). Chomsky and Halle's study deserves the epithet 'monumental' for more than one reason. To begin with, it is the first publication containing not only a detailed exposition of the central theoretical principles of transformational generative phonology, but also an extensive explication of a large number of less general theoretical theses of this theory. Second, The Sound Pattern of English is the first single volume in which the principles just mentioned are illustrated extensively with grammatical data drawn from a wide range of languages and dialects. Third, in this monograph a number of sweeping revisions of phonological theory are proposed. Finally, Chomsky and Halle explicate a number of methodological principles of transformational generative phonology in more detail in this work than in any of their other writings. The sketch of the function and structure of the phonological component that will follow below will naturally be based on The Sound Pattern of English. Postal's Aspects of Phonological Theory will constitute a secondary source. 2.4.2. The Function of the Phonological Component Postal (1968, p. 155) draws a distinction between "the basic" function and "other" functions of phonology as a whole. 4 C f . , e.g., Bierwisch 1966, 1967; K i p a r s k y 1965, 1966, 1968; L e e s 1961; L i g h t n e r 1965a; 1965b; McCawley 1967; 1968a; S c h a n e 1968a; S t a n l e y 1967. F o r a n e x t e n s i v e bibliography cf. S c h a n e 1967.

44

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

Its basic function is to describe how each sentence, i.e., each surface structure, is pronounced. This is done by the phonological component, which assigns to each surface structure a phonetic representation or a set of phonetic representations in cases of free variation. The phonological component thus specifies the relations between abstract syntactic surface structures and phonetic data in so far as these relations can be specified in terms of phonological rules. Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 293) characterize this role of the phonological rules in unambiguous terms: Given the surface ¡structure of a sentence, the phonological rules of the language interact with certain universal phonetic constraints to derive all grammatically determined facts about the production and perception of this sentence. Other functions of phonology are, according to Postal (1968, p. 155, note 4): (a) the specification of free variation and contrast,5 (b) the characterization of the concept 'possible morpheme',6 and (c) the specification of the notion 'phonologically possible word'. 2.4.3.

The Structure of the Phonological

Component

Alternative conceptions of the structure and functioning of the formal devices that the linguistic theory incorporates to deal with the phonological aspect of a natural language are p r e s e n t e d i n The Sound Pattern of English.

I n the brief ex-

position following below it will not be possible to outline all these different versions of phonological principles and to discuss their relative merits. The alternative conceptions of phonological structure that differ in the most fundamental way are 5 Utterance tokens that are repetitions of each other are in free variation. Utterance tokens that are not repetitions of each other contrast (cf. Postal 1968, pp. 7ff.). 6 For example, the phonological component of a grammar for English should specify that in English [krAk] is a phonologically possible morpheme, but that [tmok] is not a possible one (cf. Postal 1968, p. 156, note 4).

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

45

(a) the original and fairly well-explicated version in which the notation of markedness does not play a role, and, (b) the latest version, to which the notion of markedness is fundamental. Only the barest outlines of the markedness version of phonological theory have been sketched by Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 400—35) and Postal (1968, pp. 165—96). Many unanswered questions exist with respect to the most fundamental theses of this theory (cf. Postal 1968, pp. 182ff.). For these reasons more space will be devoted to the exposition of the original version than of the markedness version. It should however be kept in mind that the markedness version of phonological theory has come to replace the original one. The imperfect explication of its theoretical principles is the result of its newness and comprehensiveness. 2.4.3.1. The Original Version In the original conception of phonological theory three levels of representation are given special significance in the specification of the phonological properties of a sentence and its constituents: the levels of lexical, phonological and phonetic representation. The phonological representation of a sentence, i.e., of a surface structure, is derived from its lexical representation by means of phonological redundancy rules and (other) readjustment rules. A surface structure's phonetic representation is derived from its phonological representation by means of the rules of the phonological component. 2.4.3.1.1. Phonetic Representations The PHONETIC REPRESENTATION of a surface structure is a string of linearly ordered discrete phonetic segments. 7 ' This exposition of the nature of phonetic representations is based on Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 5 - 6 , 28, 1 6 4 - 6 9 , 296, 297, 298, 381, and Postal 1968, pp. 31, 33, 97, 107, 273ff„ 290ff.

46

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

A phonetic segment is not an unanalysable whole, but has an internal structure. Its internal make-up is specified in terms of distinctive features. The distinctive features occurring in phonetic representations have a phonetic function and are called 'phonetic features'. Examples of such phonetic features are 'consonantal', 'anterior', 'coronal', 'voiced', 'nasal', all of which have a positive value in the phonetic segment traditionally indicated by the symbol /n/. PHONETIC FEATURES can be regarded as physical scales with a fixed number of values. They refer to (partially) independently controllable aspects of the speech event, such as vocalicness, nasality, voicing, etc., as well as to independent elements of perceptual representation (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 298). Postal (1968, pp. 273, 290) regards phonetic representations, and therefore also the features in terms of which they are specified, as "mentalistic" in the sense that they are the mental instructions which indicate how the articulatory system is to perform. There are as many phonetic features as there are speech-producing capabilities of the vocal apparatus that are under (partially) independent control. Simultaneous and sequential restrictions limit the ways in which phonetic features can be combined in phonetic representations. The fact that no phonetic segment can be both vocalic and non-continuous is an example of a simultaneous restriction on the combinatory possibilities of phonetic features. Sequential constraints restrict the linear combinatory possibilities of phonetic segments. There are, for example, restrictions on the length of a sequence of consonantal segments that can occur in natural language. Some of these simultaneous and sequential restrictions are universal and are specified by the general phonetic theory. Others are language-dependent and must be specified in the individual grammars for particular languages (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 5). The phonetic representation of a surface structure is given in the form of a string of two-dimensional matrices,

47

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

the PHONETIC MATRICES. Whilst the rows in a phonetic matrix stand for particular phonetic features, the columns represent the consecutive phonetic segments. The entries in a phonetic matrix determine the status of the given phonetic segments with respect to the phonetic features. A phonetic segment is specified either positively or negatively with respect to a particular phonetic feature. Positive specification with respect to certain features, e.g. 'stress' and 'nasality', is a matter of degree. The feature specification of a phonetic segment is given in terms of (a) '-)-' (=positive) and ' —' {=negative), and (b) integers if the positive specification of a segment with respect to a feature is a question of degree (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 5). As examples of phonetic matrices, consider the ones that Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 165) provide for the formatives inn and algebra. (3) consonantal vocalic nasal tense stress voice continuant

(a) inn i n

+ + -

—

2

+

1

—

+ + +—

(b) ce

algebra l g e

b

r

œ

+ + —+ + + + —+ + +

—

—

—

1

4

—

—

4

+ + + + + + + + + —+ — + +

In the first column of the phonetic matrix for inn, (3a), it is specified that the initial phonetic segment is (a) non-consonantal, (b) vocalic, (c) non-tense, (d) voiced, (e) continuant, and that it has (f) nasality "of the second degree", and (g) stress of the first degree.8 The entries in the other columns of (3) must be interpreted in the same way. (f) implies t h a t its degree of nasalization is partial, and (g) t h a t it has a main stress. 8

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THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

Phonetic representations do not stand in any direct relation to physical or acoustic reality. Suppose that in a phonetic matrix the following degrees of stress were to be assigned to the vowels of compensatory: (a) stress of the fourth degree to the first vowel, (b) stress of the first degree to the second vowel, (c) stress of the fifth degree to the third vowel, and (d) stress of the third degree to the penultimate, i.e., the fourth, vowel (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 42). The final vowel can be left out of consideration here. The stress contours of compensatory can be presented as (4). (4)

4 com

1 5 3 p e n s a t or

y

By means of phonetic experiments it can be shown that in the concrete physical realization of compensatory there are no physical parameters that stand in a one-to-one relationship to the diverse degrees of stress specified in the phonetic matrix of this formative. Chomsky and Halle (pp. 24—26) attempt to account for this fact, and for numerous similar ones, by declaring that phonetic matrices do not refer directly to a physical reality. Rather, phonetic matrices refer in the first instance to a perceptual reality. What is perceptually real to a speaker-hearer is only determined in part by physical cues. Complex syntactic and phonological processes play an equally important role in determining this perceptual reality. 2.4.3.1.2. Lexical

Representations

It waa pointed out in § 2.3. in somewhat vague terms that the surface structures, generated by the transformational component, are the input to the phonological component.9 •This section on lexical representations is based on Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 9, l l f f . , 1 4 5 - 4 6 , 167, 196, 298, 388.

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T H E T H E O R Y OF PHONOLOGY

The original contention was that these surface structures, as specified by the transformational component, constitute in an unmodified form the direct input to the phonological component. In The Sound Pattern of English, (e.g., p. 9), evidence is adduced to show that the latter hypothesis is not correct in its full generality. This evidence indicates that the surface structures assigned to certain sentences by the transformational component cannot function in an unmodified form as the input to the phonological component. To account for this fact a distinction is drawn between 'syntactic' surface structures and 'phonological' surface structures. The syntactic surface structures are the direct, unmodified output of the transformational component. The phonological surface structures, constituting the input to the phonological component, are derived by means of readjustment rules from the syntactic surface structures. Thus the present hypothesis is that the output of the transformational component is in a number of respects unfit to constitute the direct input to the phonological component. S Y N T A C T I C S U R F A C E S T R U C T U R E S are strings consisting of lexical and grammatical formatives. By means of labelled bracketing it is specified which substrings are the constituents of these surface structures and to what grammatical and lexical categories these substrings belong. The brackets '[ ]' indicate the syntactic boundaries of these substrings, and subscripts or labels, such a s ' S ' , 'NP', 'VP', 'N' and 'V', specify the categories of which the substrings are members. As an example of a syntactic surface structure consider (6), which Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 8) assign to the string (5). (5) We established telegraphic

communication

(6) [ S [NP [N + we + ]N ] W [ V [ V + establish +] v + past -f ]v [„J [a [n + tele + [9TEM + graph + + ic + ] [ N tv + communicate + ion +]„ ]w ]yp ]8

JSTEM ] >

A

+]v

50

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

(In (6) S - Sentence, N P = Noun Phrase, V P = Verb Phrase, N = Noun, V = Verb, A = Adjective; ' - + - . . . + ' = formative boundaries as specified in the lexicon; 'past' is a grammatical formative, and establish is an example of a lexical formative.) The lexical formatives, e.g., we, establish, tele, graph in (6), are specified in LEXICAL REPRESENTATION in the lexicon, and appear in this form in the syntactic surface structures as well. The lexical representation of a formative includes its syntactic, semantic and phonological characteristics. In discussions of phonological topics, however, the term 'lexical representation' is often reserved to indicate only the specification of the phonological properties of a formative. Grammatical formatives such as 'past' appear in syntactic surface structures as abstract syntactic units which are unspecified as to their phonological characteristics. The lexical phonological properties of a formative are represented in the form of LEXICAL MATRICES in the lexicon. In a lexical matrix the rows represent distinctive features and the columns the phonological segments of a formative. The distinctive features which occur in lexical matrices are the same ones which occur in phonetic matrices. Only the function of the distinctive features differ between these two types of matrices. In lexical matrices the distinctive features are not physical scales, but serve to classify each lexical item in such a way that it is distinct from every other lexical item. Because of this classificatory function which distinctive features have in lexical matrices, these matrices are also called CLASSIFICATORY MATRICES. Distinctive features serving in a classificatory function are also referred to as PHONOLOGICAL FEATURES.

The classification that is imposed on formatives in lexical matrices takes place in terms of three alternatives. In a lexical matrix a phonological segment can be (a) positively specified, in terms of ' + ' , or (b) negatively speci-

51

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

fied, in terms of ' — o r (c) unspecified, in terms of '0', with respect to a given feature. A phonological segment is left unspecified with respect to a given feature in the classificatory matrix if the value of this feature for this segment can be predicted by general rule. The distinctive features in lexical matrices, unlike those in phonetic matrices, cannot be viewed as physical scales on which values can be indicated by means of integers. The relationship between lexical matrices and perceptual reality is obviously quite indirect. Examples of lexical or classificatory matrices are the ones that Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 166) provide for respectively inn and algebra.

(7)

(a) inn i

consonantal vocalic nasal tense stress voice continuant

—

0 0 —

0 0 0

n

+ 0 + 0 0 0 0

algebra

(b) ce —

0 0 —

0 0 0

I

g

+ + + —

0 0 0 0 0

—

0 0

+ —

e —

0 0 —

0 0 0

b

r

++ — —

0 0

+ —

+ 0 0 0 0 0

ce —

0 0 —

0 0 0

I t has been suggested in the preceding discussion of the nature of lexical matrices that only phonological features, i.e., distinctive features in their phonological or classificatory function, occur in these matrices. This is an oversimplification. In addition to phonological features, features of a different type also appear in lexical matrices, namely, DIACRITIC FEATURES (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 373ff.; Postal 1968, pp. 119ff.). It has become clear that phonological features, on the one hand, are binary projections of phonetic features such as consonantality, nasality, etc. Phonological

52

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

features are accordingly specified by t h e language-independent phonetic theory and are regarded as substantive linguistic universals. Diacritic features, on the other hand, are not projections of phonetic features at all. No fixed phonetic correlates correspond to them. They are also not independently motivated in terms of syntactic considerations. Diacritic features are introduced into t h e phonological theory for two fundamental reasons. First, every language has particular lexical items t h a t are exceptional in t h e sense either t h a t they alone fail to undergo a given phonological rule or t h a t t h e y alone are subject to the application of a given phonological rule. Sometimes only one particular lexical item is exceptional in this way. Examples of lexical items t h a t are exceptional in t h e specified sense are t h e English morphemes pint, count, hoist and toast. Though English vowels are generally laxed before consonant clusters, these lexical items are exceptional in t h a t they do not contain t h e expected laxed vowels before their respective consonantal clusters (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 172). Diacritic features are used in the lexical matrices of such exceptional lexical items to classify t h e m in such a way t h a t they are either excluded from or included in the domain of application of t h e rules to which they are exceptions. The diacritic features having this function are the E X C E P T I O N F E A T U R E S (cf. also § 2.4.3.1.7.). Consider now the second reason for introducing diacritic features into the phonological theory. Many languages contain lexical items which belong to idiosyncratic categories t h a t are subject to t h e application of language-particular morphological processes. These processes determine, among other things, t h e gender, case and declension forms of t h e given formatives. To divide t h e lexicon into those idiosyncratic categories t o which morphological processes apply, diacritic features are associated with t h e lexical matrices of t h e lexical items concerned. Diacritic features having this function are called MORPHOLOGICAL F E A T U R E S . Such morphological features

T H E T H E O R Y OF

PHONOLOGY

53

could, for example, be used in a grammar of Russian to draw in the lexicon a distinction between the class of stems belonging to 'the third declension' and the class of stems belonging to 'the second declension'10 (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 373). Morphological features will often be used to divide the lexical forms of a language into categories such as 'Native', 'Foreign', 'Romance', and 'Germanic' that partly correspond to the historical origin of these forms. There are important differences between phonological and diacritic features. The difference in the ways in which these two types of features are related to phonetic features has already been mentioned. A second difference is that whereas phonological features are properties of individual segments of lexical items and not of lexical items as wholes, diacritic features are associated with lexical items as wholes. That is, if a diacritic feature is assigned to a lexical item, it is hypothesized that the diacritic feature constitutes part of the feature composition of every phonological segment of this item. Though morphological and exception features are collectively referred to as diacritic features, they differ in a number of fundamental respects (cf. Postal 1968, pp. 129ff.). One important difference is that the lexical categories defined by morphological features are less arbitrary, i.e., less ad hoc, than those established in terms of exception features. That is, whereas the lexical categories delimited by morphological features are relevant to several rules in a grammar, those defined by exception features are relevant to a single rule only. Postal (1968, p. 130) illustrates this point with certain of the stress rules of French. In French the assignment of the morphological features [ + Native, — French] to lexical items predicts not only the non-application of the final10 Whilst the stem /dal,/, 'distance', belongs to the 'third declension', the one ¡dol,/, 'portion', belongs to the 'second declension' (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 373).

54

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

stress rule to these items, but also the application of the penultimate-stress rule to them. In contrast the class of lexical items in English defined by an exception feature as not undergoing the laxing rule, i.e., the class including the forms pint, count, hoist and toast, has no relevance for the application or non-application of any other rule in English phonology (cf. § 2.4.3.1.7.). The features occurring in lexical matrices can be arranged into a hierarchy with respect to the degree of arbitrariness of the divisions in the lexicon which they represent. Phonological features are the least arbitrary, morphological features more arbitrary, and exception features the most arbitrary. 11 Let us now briefly consider two other types of linguistic units which — in addition to lexical formatives — have special significance as constituents of syntactic surface structures. The first type comprises the PHONOLOGICAL WORDS of a language. Some phonological processes, e.g., the processes determining stress patterns, apply to syntactic surface structure constituents of any size, from simple lexical formatives up to the surface structures that simple sentences have as wholes (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 12, 163). Other phonological processes, e.g. the processes determining vowel alternations in English, apply only to syntactic surface structure constituents of a particular size, i.e., to phonological words. In the syntactic surface structures the phonological words of a language are determined by a universal convention (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 13, 366ff.). Word boundaries, represented by ' # # . . . . # # ' , are also complexes of features. The symbols indicating word boundaries are inserted by a general convention into syntactic surface structures to the left and right of each formative or string of formatives that is dominated by a 'major category'. Examples of major categories are the lexical categories 11 For a detailed discussion of the differences between phonological, morphological and exception features cf. Postal 1968, pp. 129ff,

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

55

'Noun', 'Verb', 'Adjective', and the grammatical categories 'Noun Phrase' and 'Verb Phrase'. The boundaries of phonological words are marked by the three fundamental configurations of symbols (8) (i), (ii) and (iii) that consist of occurrences of ' * # ' , '[' and ']' and subscripts such as 's' (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 367). (8) (i) [ S # X [ # (ii) # ] X # [ 9 (iii) # ] X [ # After the application of the general convention governing the insertion of word boundaries, the syntactic surface structure of the sentence (9) has the form (10) (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 368). (9) the book was in an unlikely place (10) U + LNP+tDtteM^+ftoo^ + ^ + W [ vp #y;a«[pp*[p m] P [ N P #[ D a»] D [A # un[A # likely # ]A # ]A[N # place # ]N ^ W * ]pp ^ ]VP ^ ]» The phonological words in (10) are, according to Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 368), the three strings (11) (i) # the # book (ii) # was # in # an # un # likely # (iii) #placed The second type of syntactic surface structure constituents with special significance are PHONOLOGICAL PHRASES. Phonological phrases are the surface structure constituents that constitute the maximal domain for the phonological processes of a language (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 9). In the case of syntactic surface structures that are not too

56

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

complex, a whole surface structure constitutes a single phonological phrase. Under these circumstances the boundaries of a phonological phrase are determined by the phrase structure boundaries of the surface structure (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 10, 372). The nature of phonological phrases is further discussed in § 2.4.3.1.3. 2.4.3.1.3. Phonological

Representations

In § 2.4.3.1.2. the point was made that there existed certain discrepancies between the output of the syntactic component and the input to the phonological component. Whereas the output of the syntactic component is constituted by the syntactic surface structures, the input to the phonological component is constituted by the PHONOLOGICAL SURFACE STRUCTURES. Where such discrepancies exist, the readjustment rules convert syntactic surface structures into phonological surface structures. The level of representation coupled with phonological surface structure is that of PHONOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION .

The content of phonological surface structures is determined by (a) the syntactic surface structures, and (b) the modifications brought about by the operation of the readjustment rules. Phonological surface structures are also represented in terms of labelled bracketing. Phonological representations of sentences, like lexical representations, are strings of concatenated classificatory matrices. The phonological representation of a sentence is also referred to as its "systematic phonemic representation" (cf. Chomsky 1964, pp. 68, 70, 95—96). The phonological segments occurring in phonological representations constitute the SYSTEMATIC PHONEMES of a language. READJUSTMENT RULES modify syntactic surface structures in diverse ways. Only some of the most important changes effected by their operation can be considered here. Firstly, they reanalyze complex syntactic surface structures into less

THE THEOKY OF PHONOLOGY

57

complex strings consisting of phonological phrases. I t was pointed out in § 2.4.3.1.2. t h a t t h e boundaries of syntactic surface structures t h a t are not too complex coincide with those of phonological phrases. I n such cases the boundaries of phonological phrases are determined solely by syntactic considerations. When syntactic surface structures become too complex, however, non-syntactic considerations also play a p a r t in determining the boundaries of phonological phrases. Especially performance phenomena, such as speed of utterance and other physiological conditions, make it necessary t h a t readjustment rules reanalyze complex syntactic surface structures into phonological phrases whose boundaries are not syntactically motivated (cf. Chomsky a n d Halle 1968, pp. 10, 372). To p u t it differently, reanalysis of complex syntactic surface structures into phonological phrases is necessary, since physiological limitations, such as t h e volume of breath available, restrict t h e length of t h e sentences t h a t can be produced by speakers. Secondly, readjustment rules modify the syntactic segmentation and categorization of particular syntactic surface structures. F o r example, in English, quite general phonological rules would assign the appropriate stress contour, i.e., final-stress, to Fifth Avenue if it were represented in t h e surface structure as a noun phrase. F o r syntactic reasons Fifth Avenue is, however, characterized in the syntactic surface structure — in t h e same way as Fifth Street — not as a noun phrase b u t as a noun. Because of this fact t h e phonological rules of English wrongly assign fore-stress t o it. To ensure t h a t the correct stress p a t t e r n will be assigned to Fifth Avenue, readjustment rules change its syntactic categorization f r o m 'noun' t o 'noun phrase'. This change also affects the occurrence of word boundaries with respect t o Fifth Avenue (cf. Chomsky a n d Halle 1968, pp. 369, 371—372). Thirdly, readjustment rules operate on abstract grammatical formatives — e.g., inflexional suffixes relating t o tense, number and gender categories — t h a t occur in syntactic

58

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

surface structures, replacing them by classificatory matrices. For example, readjustment rules replace the abstract grammatical formative 'past' in some contexts in English, e.g. mend 'past', by a feature column that can be indicated by d (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 10—11). In a similar fashion abstract boundary symbols are replaced by classificatory matrices by the operation of readjustment rules.12 2.4.3.1.4. The Naturalness Condition A distinction having been drawn between the levels of lexical and phonological representation on the one hand, and the level of phonetic representation on the other hand, the precise nature of and motivation for this distinction can now be considered. It can be asked why this distinction must be made at all. One possible alternative conception is that each lexical item should appear in the lexicon — and in the syntactic and phonological surface structures — in its phonetic representation. In this conception no provision is made at all for a distinct level of lexical representation (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 296). For several reasons, however, the latter conception of the organization of the phonological component and lexicon is inadequate. Firstly, a lexical item frequently has diverse alternative phonetic shapes depending on the context in which it occurs. Typical examples are the English forms characterized by vowel alternations, e.g., divine X divinity, derive X derivative, algebra X algebraic, funeral X funereal, profane X profanity. If,'on the one hand, such lexical items were to be represented in the lexicon by the full set of their alternative phonetic representations, all phonetic variations would wrongly be treated as exceptions. Under these circumstances it would not be possible to express in a grammar 12 For a discussion of the functions of readjustment rules cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 10 — 11, 2 3 8 - 3 9 . 3 6 9 - 7 0 , 371 — 72.

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

59

the fact that certain phonetic variations are general as well as regular in as far as they are governed b y phonological rules. If, on the other hand, one of the alternative phonetic shapes of a lexical item were t o be chosen as basic, and t h e others were t o be derived from it, a reason would have t o be given for selecting this particular one from among the alternatives. A second reason why Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 296) reject the given conception of phonological structure is that if phonological rules had to apply directly to phonetic representations, it would not be possible to formulate m a n y 'deep-seated' phonological processes as rules at all. It is for these two reasons that abstract lexical representations are set up for lexical items as a level of representation distinct from phonetic representations. Phonological rules are formulated that derive the latter representations in general ways from the former ones. The relation existing between the lexical representation of a formative and its phonetic representation is called a "natural" one (cf. Postal 1968, p. 56). Alternatively formulated, it is said that the NATURALNESS CONDITION governs the relation between lexical and phonological representations on the one hand, and phonetic representations on the other hand. The naturalness condition incorporates the claim t h a t the categorization of lexical items given by phonological structure, i.e. required to represent morphemes in the dictionary, required to state morphophonemic and phonological rules, needed to state constraints on sequences of phonological elements, needed to state phonological universale, etc., is not, from the point of view of phonetic structure, an arbitrary code. Rather, this representation is closely related to the representations needed to state the phonetic properties of the various sequences which represent individual lexical items. If "this claim is true, much, although by no means all, of the mapping between phonological and phonetic structures can be given universally. That is, much of the differences between these two levels in all languages is statable within the general theory of language and need not be specified again and again in each linguistic description (Postal 1968, p. 56).

60

THE THEORY OP PHONOLOGY

The closeness of the relation between lexical and phonological representations, on the one hand, and phonetic representations, on the other hand, is reflected by the fact t h a t these levels of representation are formulated in terms of the same distinctive features. 13 "Hence, except in the irreducible cases of completely special language-limited facts, systematic structures automatically pass into phonetic structures without the need of setting up ad hoc rules" (Postal 1968, p. 77). The language-particular rules occurring in the phonological component of a grammar represent the instances in which the naturalness condition is violated. I n constructing a grammar, the aim will always be to violate this condition as little as possible. Thus, one always wishes to represent forms phonologically in ways which will yield the derivation of their phonetic forms by way of the maximal utilization of the universal interpretive principles. This will reduce to a minimum the number of special languageparticular rules which must be set up. Thus one can represent a phonetic vowel as a phonological glide, a phonetic velar consonant as a phonological labial one, a phonetic high vowel as a phonological mid one, etc., but always at the cost - of adding special language-particular rules. Therefore one only posits such 'non-natural' representations when these have simplifying effects on the overall grammar which outweigh the required special rules (Postal 1968, p. 62). 2.4.3.1.5. Phonological

Rules

The rules of the phonological component of a grammar constitute the formalized representations of the phonological processes of a language. These rules apply to phonological surface structures, deriving from them those aspects of phonetic representations of a language which are not determined by the universal interpretive convention mentioned in § 2.4.3.1.4. 13 In addition diacritic features are also used in the formulation of lexical and phonological representations; cf. § 2.4.3.1.2.

T H E T H E O R Y OF

PHONOLOGY

61

A phonological rule has the abstract form (12) (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 332). (12) A — B / X — Y In (12), 'A' and 'B' symbolize columns of distinctive features or the null element. The a r r o w h a s the value 'is actualized as' or 'rewrite as', and the diagonal '/' the value 'in the environment'. ' X ' and 'Y' symbolize feature columns constituting respectively the left- and right-hand environments in which 'A' is actualized as 'B'. ' X ' and 'Y' may be null also. The dash '—' indicates the precise position in which 'A' occurs in the environment. Phonological rules modify phonological representations in diverse ways of which only a few will be indicated below (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 169, 359—61). 1. Phonological rules convert the binary phonological features into n-ary phonetic features. From a comparison of the phonetic matrix (3) (a) with the lexical one (7) (a) it is clear that the feature 'nasal' is affected in this way. 2. Phonological rules change the feature specification of columns in classificatory matrices to agree or disagree with that of adjacent segments. Whilst the rules effecting such agreement formalize processes of assimilation, those bringing disagreement about are representations of processes of dissimilation. 3. Entire phonetic segments, absent from classificatory matrices because of their predictability, are inserted by phonological rules into the appropriate positions in phonetic representations. Epenthetic vowels in English provide a case in point. 4. Phonological rules delete entire phonological segments from classificatory matrices. These rules represent processes of elision.

62

T H E T H E O R Y OF PHONOLOGY

5. The ordering of phonological segments relative to each other can be altered by phonological rules representing processes of metathesis. The rules of the phonological component can be classified on the basis of their mode of operation into two types: transformational phonological rules and non-transformational rules. TRANSFORMATIONAL PHONOLOGICAL R U L E S take into account the syntactic structure of the phonological surface structures to which they apply. The rules specifying the stress contours of English surface structures are typical examples of transformational phonological rules (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 15ff., 59ff.). Consider for example the transformational phonological rule (13). (13) V - [1 stress] / X - C0]NAV (13) specifies that a lexical formative, in English for example, has a stress of the first degree, i.e., primary stress, on the final vowel, if the formative is labelled in the surface structure as a Noun (N), Adjective (A), or Verb (V). 'C0' stands in (13) for a string of null or more consonants, and the 'V' to the left of the arrow symbolizes a (final) vowel. Transformational phonological rules apply to phonological surface structures that vary in size from single formatives to phonological phrases. They are ordered linearly and apply in a cyclical way. These rules apply first to the maximal surface structure strings containing no internal brackets, i.e., they apply first to the minimal constituents in surface structures. After all relevant rules have applied to the smallest surface structure strings, the innermost brackets enclosing them are erased. The rules then apply to those resulting larger strings which contain no internal brackets. After this application, the innermost brackets enclosing the strings just mentioned are erased. In this way transformational phonological rules keep applying until the limits of

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

63

their maximum domain, i.e. the boundaries of phonological phrases, are reached. The general principles governing the application of transformational phonological rules are collectively referred to as the TRANSFORMATIONAL CYCLE. 14 The transformational cycle expresses two assumptions, viz.: [(a)] that in general the phonetic shape of a complex unit (a phrase) will be determined by the inherent properties of its parts and the manner in which these parts are combined, [and] [(b)] that similar rules will apply to units of different levels of complexity (cf., e.g. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 15). Consider now the second type of phonological rule, viz. t h e NON-TRANSFORMATIONAL PHONOLOGICAL R U L E S . T h e

sur-

face structures entering the phonological component are exhaustively analyzed into phonological words. Some phonological rules are restricted, in their application, to phonological words. That is, they apply only to strings of the form ' # # . . . # # ' , where ' . . . . ' does not in turn contain internal occurrences of ' # # ' . Rules restricted to phonological words, i.e., the non-transformational phonological rules, constitute what is traditionally called the 'word phonology' of a language. Non-transformational phonological rules apply to strings without taking into account their syntactic categorization. Whilst they are also linearly ordered, they do not apply cyclically. (14) is a typical example of a non-transformational phonological rule of English (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 232). (14) z —>- [-voice] I

j- ive

14 F o r a detailed discussion of the role of t h e transformational cycle in English phonology cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, C h a p t e r 1 — § 1., and Chapter 3. F o r a m o r e formal characterization of this principle and a n illustration o f t h e w a y in which it works cf. § 5 . 2 . 3 . 2 . 1 . 1 . of t h e present monograph.

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THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

This rule specifies t h a t the column of phonological features symbolized by 'z' becomes unvoiced before the suffix -ive, e.g. in English words such as abusive and evasive. One mode of RULE ORDERING has been mentioned so far, viz. linear ordering. Whereas both transformational and non-transformational phonological rules are ordered linearly, transformational ones apply cyclically and non-transformational ones non-cyclically. The ordering of phonological rules is in addition governed by two other general principles, viz. the principle of disjunctive ordering and the principle of simultaneous ordering. 15 Two rules, 'A' and 'B', are disjunctively ordered with respect to each other if the application of 'A' excludes t h a t of 'B', and vice versa. Two rules, 'C' and 'D', are simultaneously ordered if they apply together to one string, their application yielding only one resulting level of representation in the derivation. I n conclusion of this section on the characteristics of phonological rules one of the types of notational conventions used to abbreviate partially identical rules must be considered. The abbreviated version of a set of partially identical rules constitutes a RULE SCHEMA (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 333—34). For example, the rule schema (16) is the abbreviation for the partially identical rules (15 (i)—(iii). (15)

(i) A B/C— (ii) A ^ B / D — (iii) A - B I E —

(16) A — B /

D {C E

(16) is construed by placing the non-identical parts of (15) (i—iii) in the braces '{ }'. Rule schemata such as (16) 16 The different principles governing t h e ordering of phonological rules are explicated in detail b y C h o m s k y a n d H a l l e (1968, pp. 18, 340ff„ 357, 366, 385), and P o s t a l (1968, Chapter 7).

T H E T H E O R Y OF PHONOLOGY

65

have empirical consequences for the ordering of the rules which they abbreviate. For example, (16) implies that the subrules of (15) are adjacent, and furthermore that these subrules are conjunctively ordered. 2.4.3.1.6. Phonological Redundancy Rules In addition to the two types of rules occurring in the phonological component and the readjustment rules, considered in § 2.4.3.1.3., there is a third kind of rule that plays a part in the representation of the phonological facts of a language. These rules are the PHONOLOGICAL R E D U N D A N C Y or MORPHEME S T R U C T U R E R U L E S (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 17Iff, 380ff.). The phonological redundancy rules apply strictly within a angle lexical item, filling in unspecified squares of lexical matrices. That is, these rules specify the redundant phonological properties of individual lexical items. Examples of such redundant properties are the fact that all English vowels are voiced, and the fact that the first segment of an initial consonant cluster in English must be /s/. The latter fact is represented by the phonological redundancy rule (17) (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 171). (17) [+consonantal]

— vocalic +anterior +coronal +strident -(-continuant —voice

consonantal] [—vocalic J

Phonological redundancy rules are held to be readjustment rules by Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 171, 382). B y specifying the morpheme-internal conditions on the simultaneous and consequential combination of phonological features, phonological redundancy rules define all the phonologically possible morphemes of a language.

66

T H E THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

2.4.3.1.7. The Theory of Exceptions In discuBBing the function of diacritic features (§ 2.4.3.1.2.) it was pointed out that some individual lexical items of a language are exceptions to general phonological rules in a way which is wholly arbitrary from the point of view of synchronic language study. The English lexical items pint, count, hoist, toast and field are examples of arbitrary exceptions to the general rule (18) by which vowels are laxed before consonant clusters (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 172). (18) V — [ - tense]/— C2 (C2 = a cluster of two or more consonants) It was also pointed out in § 2.4.3.1.2. that the procedure of excluding exceptions to a rule, such as pint, etc., from the domain of the rule is to associate an exception feature with them. The principles governing this treatment of exceptions are specified by the theory of exceptions, which is a component of the general linguistic theory. An incomplete and much simplified account of this theory of exceptions — as outlined by Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 172—77, 373—80) and Lakoff (1965) — is given below. The central concept in the theory of exceptions is the notion of R U L E F E A T U R E S . The theory of exceptions makes provision for a set of rule features for each language. The rule features constitute the exception features of a language. Each rule feature refers to a particular rule in the grammar. This is made possible by associating with each phonological rule an identifying number. For example, the laxing rule given above can be identified by assigning to it the number '18'. Each rule feature has the form [ocrule n], where'«'is a variable ranging over the values ' + ' and '—', and V is the number identifying a particular rule. Each lexical item is

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

07

now categorized in terms of the rule features of the grammar. Those lexical items that are arbitrary exceptions to a given rule X will be categorized as [— Rule X ] , Those lexical items which, equally arbitrarily, do fall in the domain of a given rule T will be categorized as [ + Rule F]. In this way the exceptional behaviour of individual lexical items can be accounted for in the grammar. The lexical items that, constitute arbitrary exceptions to the laxing rule (18) — i.e., the items paint, toast, count, etc. — can be excluded from the domain of this rule by attaching the rule feature [ — Rule 18} to them. The theory of exceptions also makes provision for cases in which an otherwise general rule does not apply in a given context, and for cases in which a rule applies not generally but only in isolated instances. These aspects of the theory of exceptions must, however, be left undiscussed here. 2-4.3.1.8. Schematic

Summary

The original version of phonological theory can be summarized by representing schematically the major devices that a transformational generative grammar incorporated to deal with the phonological aspect of a natural language. (See Diagram (19) on page 68.) 2.4.3.2. The Markedness

Version

The new version of transformational generative phonology, i.e., the one having 'markedness' as its central concept, has been proposed because the original one was found incapable of dealing adequately with a certain range of phonological phenomena. In this section attention will be given to (i) the nature of the phonological phenomena for which the original version of phonological theory is unable to account satisfactorily,

68

T H E T H E O R Y OF PHONOLOGY

(.19)

SYNTACTIC COMPONENT LEXICON Lexical Representations of lexical items

I Via Lexical Insertion Rule and Transformational Component

(ii) the reasons for the failure of this original version to deal adequately with the latter phenomena, and {iii) the content of the notion of markedness, and the way in which the markedness version of the theory of phonology deals with the phenomena mentioned under (i) above.

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

69

2.4.3.2.1. Problematic Phonological Phenomena Observations about the phonological phenomena defying adequate treatment within the framework of the original version of transformational generative phonology are usually formulated in terms such as 'natural', 'unnatural', 'normal', 'non-normal', 'expected' and 'not expected'. Let us consider a number of these observations, which have been presented by Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 400—02), Lakoff (1965, CI—C2), and Postal (1968, pp. 165—166). 1. It is more natural for all the vowels of a language to be voiced rather than for all to be unvoiced. Although a language of which all the vowels are voiced is valued more highly than one of which all the vowels are unvoiced, the original version of the theory of phonology is incapable of making this distinction in relative value (Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 402). 2. Though it is common for languages to have only two nasal consonants as systematic phonemes, /m/ and /n/ almost always turn up, whilst /g/ and /n/, /m/ and /g/, /n/ and /n/, etc. rarely do (cf. Lakoff 1965, CI—C2). The original version of transformational generative phonology is unable to account for the fact that one of the logically possible pairs of nasal consonants would be more likely to occur than would the others. Similarly, it failB to account for the fact that of the vowel systems (20), (21) and (22), (20) is more natural than (21) and (22). (20)

u o

%

e a (21)

(22)

i e ce •u

u o

X

a

%

A

70

T H K T H E O R Y OF PHONOLOGY

It incorrectly assigns the same value to all three these vowel systems (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 401—02). 3. Whilst, according to Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 400— 01), the class of voiced obstruents is intuitively more natural than the class of voiced segments, it is to the latter that the original version of transformational generative phonology gives the simpler definition. Thus it incorrectly assigns to the latter class the higher value of the two values involved. 4. According to Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 401), rule (23) is more expected in a grammar than rule (24), and a phonological theory should accordingly assign a higher value to it than it does to (24). (23) i -> u (24) i

i

Within the framework of the original theory (23) and (24) are regarded as equally simple; this theory therefore fails to make the appropriate distinction in value.16 5. In Tswana, voiced stops become ejectives after nasals, non-obstruent continuants become voiceless aspirated plosives, and obstruent continuants become voiceless aspirated affricates (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 401). Although these changes can all be subsumed under the heading of 'strengthening', the original theory contains no device for expressing the fact that the processes involved are related. 2.4.3.2.2. Reasons for Failure of Original

Version

There are two basic reasons why the original version of transformational generative phonology is incapable of acFor more phonological data, similar to those listed under (1) — (4), which the original version of the theory cannot treat properly of. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 400—02; Postal 1968, pp. 165—66; Lakofif 1965, C 1 - C 2 . w

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

71

counting for observations about phonological phenomena such as those listed above. In the first place, it incorporates the incorrect assumption that feature values are symmetrical in the sense that, with respect to a given feature, plusses do not complicate a grammar more than minusses, and vice versa. That is, the original version does not make provision for the fact that while for some features plus values are more highly valued than minus values, for other features minus values are more highly valued than plus ones (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 402). For this reason it fails, for example, to value more highly a language of which all the vowels are voiced than it does one of which all the vowels are voiceless. In the second place, the original version of the theory of phonology contains the incorrect hypothesis that all features are equally highly valued in all contexts. It treats all features on a par in all contexts and fails to take account of the fact that in some contexts certain features have higher values than others. The consequence of this deficiency is that, in the original version of transformational generative phonology, no provision is made for a hierarchic ordering of features with respect to each other (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 401—02; Postal 1968, pp. 165—66). For this reason it is incapable of accounting for the fact that, of the diverse logically possible pairs of nasal consonants, one would more likely occur than the others (cf. also the observations (3) and (4) in § 2.4.3.2.1.). The two above mentioned deficiencies in the original version of transformational generative phonology can be reduced to one fundamental one. This basic deficiency is that its conception of features, rules and evaluation has been "overly formal" in the sense that it has not taken into account the fact that features have "intrinsic content" (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 400).

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THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

2.4.3.2.3. The Notion

of

Marlcedness

To remedy the deficiencies in the original version of transformational generative phonology, Chomsky and Halle have introduced a modified conception of the Praguian thesis of markedness in it. In the markedness version of transformational generative phonology, the single level of lexical representation — formulated in terms of equally costly plusses and minusses, and costless O's — is replaced by two distinct levels of representation. At the deeper, i.e., more abstract level of representation, lexical items are no longer represented in terms of features having the three values ' + ' , '—', and '0'. They are instead represented in terms of features that have only two possible values, the values 'M(arked)' and 'U(nmarked)'. The unmarked value of a feature represents its 'normal' or 'expected' state with respect to a phonological segment (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 402—03; Lakoff 1965, C2; Postal 1968, pp. 166—67). Whilst 'U'-markings do not contribute to the complexity of a grammar and are without cost 'M'-markings do contribute to its complexity and have a coBt. For example, since vowels are voiced in most languages, they will be unmarked for voicing, whereas voiceless vowels will have to be marked for voicing. This will make them more complex and costly in terms of the evaluation measure specified by the general theory. At the second and more superficial level of lexical representation, lexical items are represented in terms of features having only the two values ' + ' and '—'. This level of lexical representation is derived from the deeper one by means of universal rules, the "interpretive" or "marking conventions" (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 400—04; Postal 1968, p. 167). These conventions — not constituting part of particular grammars — operate on the 'M-U' representations, deriving the ' + ' and '—' markings from them. In this conception of transformational generative phonology, '0'-specifications

73

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

do not occur at all. Predictability of markings — previously specified in terms of 'O'-values — is also accounted for in terms of 'U'-markings. Many redundancy rules "that were necessary in the earlier version of the theory are now replaced by universal conventions and can therefore be dispensed with in grammars of individual languages" (Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 415—16). As a typical example of a marking convention, consider the one that specifies that a vowel which is unmarked for voicing is voiced (cf. Lakoff 1965, C2).

+ vocalic — consonantal (25) is actually a pair of rules. It also specifies that a vowel marked for voicing will be unvoiced. Explicitly formulated, this statement can be represented by the counterpart of (25). 17

(26) [M voice] —• [— voice] / '

+ vocalic — consonantal

Introduction of the deeper level of 'M-U' lexical representation into the theory now makes it possible to distinguish in a grammar between "more natural" and "less natural", "expected" and "unexpected" aspects of phonological structure. This version of the theory clearly does not treat feature values as being symmetrical. Furthermore, this version contains additional general principles which establish a hierarchy among distinctive features. For example, a general condition will make "the availability for marking of the features 'high' and 'low' depend on the prior marking of the feature 17

T h e m a r k i n g c o n v e n t i o n s (25) and (26) are actually f o r m u l a t e d differently b y C h o m s k y a n d H a l l e (1968, p . 406), b u t for t h e purpose of t h i s e x p o s i t o r y discussion, Lakoff's formulation is adequate-.

74

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

'back' (Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 410). From this condition, and others, the feature hierarchy (27) results. (27)

back

round The establishment of a feature hierarchy such as (27) is necessary if it is required that a phonological theory should select the vowel system (20) as the optimal one from among the various logically possible five-vowel systems. The nature of the conditions establishing feature hierarchies such as (27) cannot be considered any further in this monograph (cf. however Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 409ff.). 2.4.4. Substantive Issues in Transformational Oenerative Phonology In the preceding sections the general outlines of the original and of the markedness versions of transformational generative phonology have been given. At this point it is therefore possible to summarize the main substantive issues in transformational generative phonology. Such a summary is provided by Postal (1968, pp. 313—14) in an admirably concise way, and it can be repeated here, unmodified. [(28)] [(i)] What is the proper form of representation for the inherent phonological properties of dictionary entries ? [(ii)] What is the right universal phonetic system? That is, what are the right set of phonetic features, what are their possible values, what are their possible combinations into phonetic segments, what are their possible sequential combinations?

THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

75

[(ni)] What are the possible types of phonological rules? What kinds of grammatical information may such rules appeal to and how? How are phonological rules interrelated, i.e. are they ordered, if so what kinds of ordering exist, etc. [(iv)] How may phonological properties like FREE VARIATION/CONTRAST, POSSIBLE MORPHEME, etc. be characterized by grammars? [(v)] What is the empirically correct evaluation procedure for phonological segments of grammars, that is, what technique does the prelinguistic infant use to pick the right phonological description for the language on the basis of an arbitrary and limited sample? [(vi)] How may the phonological parts of grammars change over time and differ in space? Within the framework of §§ 2.4.1.—2.4.4. it is now possible to pursue in a coherent way the main objective of the present investigation, viz. the analysis of a number of methodological aspects of transformational generative phonology.

3 THE NOTION LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

3.1. GENERAL REMARKS

No analysis of methodological aspects of transformational generative grammar in general and transformational generative phonology in particular can be regarded as systematic if it does not meet a specific condition. This condition is that the methodological role which the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' plays in transformational generative grammar should be clearly understood. The decision to insist on this particular condition of adequacy is by no means arbitrary. It can be motivated by referring to Chomsky and Halle's view that the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' is "a notion which underlies all descriptive practice but has, so far, resisted clear and general formulation" (Chomsky and Halle 1965, p. 98). A major task of any systematic analysis of the methodological bases of transformational generative phonology should therefore be to determine (i) the general methodological function, and (ii) the content, that the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' has in the theory of phonology. 3.2. THE METHODOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF THE NOTION 'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION*

Let us depart from the counter-to-fact assumption that the content of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' does not affect the nature of the methodological function

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

77

of this notion in transformational generative phonology, and focus all attention on the nature of this function. Before Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 330) begin with a survey of the formal devices t h a t they propose for phonological description, they briefly state the metatheoretical or methodological conditions of adequacy that these devices must meet and the functions t h a t they must fulfill. 1 The following conditions of adequacy are explicitly mentioned by Chomsky and Halle (1968): [(1)] [(i)] They must,. . ., make it possible to present the data precisely and clearly,

[(ii)] They must,. . ., permit us to formulate general statements about the language which are true and significant, and must provide a basis for distinguishing these from other generalizations which are false, or which are true but not significant (p. 330). Point (1) (ii) indicates in a general way what methodological function the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' fulfills in transformational generative phonology. I t is the key concept in a condition of adequacy t h a t must be met b y the theoretical concepts, by the theoretical principles, and b y the notational devices incorporated in the theory of phonology. The notion 'methodologically significant generalization' has this status not only in the theory of phonology, but also in the theories of syntax and semantics of transformational generative grammar (cf. Chomsky 1965, Chapter 1, § 7). The general methodological function of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' and the nature and implications of the condition (1) (ii) are more problematic than they appear at first sight. That they have been widely misunderstood is clear from the fact t h a t many eminent linguists have experienced difficulties in seeing the justification for incorporating various formal devices in the theory ir The term 'formal devices' is used to refer collectively to the theoretical concepts, theoretical principles and notational conventions constituting the general linguistic theory.

78

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION*

of phonology. It is therefore justified to take a closer look at the methodological function of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization'. The obvious way to do this is to examine in some detail (i) a typical example of a linguistic argument in which this notion has the function stated above; and (ii) the abstract structure of this argument. Once these points have been considered, the methodological function of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' should be clearer. The explication of this function will then still be only partial, since the way in which the content of this notion affects the nature of its function has been left unconsidered. 3.2.1. A Typical Linguistic

Argument

In The Sound Pattern of English the condition of adequacy embodying the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' features explicitly in several arguments that are produced for or against the adoption of new formal devices. These arguments concern, for example, (2) (i) the use of variables as feature coefficients (p. 351), (ii) the use of the slash dash notational convention (pp. 32—32), (iii) the modification of the set of universal phonetic features by replacing the feature "vocalic" by the feature "syllabic" (p. 354), (iv) the ordering of phonological redundancy rules (p. 386), and (v) the incorporation of the notion of markedness in the theory of phonology (pp. 400—02). Let us consider the argument concerning (2) (i), i.e., the argument for using variables as feature coefficients. Assimilation is, in the framework of transformational generative phonology, the phonological process "in which

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

79

two segments are made to agree in the value assigned to one or more features . . ." (Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 350).2 For example, in Southern Paiute the final consonant of a morpheme assimilates the "point of articulation" features of the following consonant, i.e., the "point of articulation" features of the first consonant of the following morpheme in a string. Southern Paiute has labial, dental and velar oonsonants that are involved in this process of assimilation. The facts concerning this assimilation process can be represented by the rule (3) (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p.350). (3)

[+oons]

~+ant —cor —high —back

"-f-ant —cor —high —back

~-fant + cor —high —back

~+ant +cor —high —back

~—ant —cor +high +back

"—ant —cor +high -fback

Rule (3) is found, however, to be an unsatisfactory formulation of the facts about the process of assimilation under discussion. Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 350—51) point out that in (3), the difference between a case of assimilation such as the one in Southern Paiute and a "totally implausible process" such as (4), on page 80, is not brought out. In the case of the assimilation process (3), Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 351) regard the relation between the change 1 " . . . whereas dissimilation is a process in which two segments are made t o disagree in the value assigned t o one or more features" (Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 360).

80

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT

(4)

[ + cons]

GENERALIZATION'

+ant —cor —high —back

"—ant +cor —high -(-back

"+ant -fcor —high —back

~+ant —cor +high +back

~—ant —cor +high +back

"—ant +cor +high —back

effected and the context determining this change as linguistically significant. This relation is one of agreement. On the other hand, they view the relation in (4) between the change effected and the determining context, as "entirely fortuitous" (p. 351). According to them, the theory of phonology needs a formal device to express the linguistically significant facts about the assimilation process in Southern Paiute, and to distinguish them from the totally implausible state of affairs presented in (4). This formal device must permit the facts presented in (3) to be formulated in such a way that the resulting rule(s) would be "more highly valued" than (4). In order to make the theory of phonology sufficiently powerful to permit the formulation of linguistically significant generalizations of the type mentioned above, Chomsky and Halle propose that a new notational convention be incorporated in the theory of phonology. This notational convention allows for the use of variables that range over the values of the feature coefficients '—', '1', '2', etc. In practice small Greek letters are used as such variables. In terms of variables used as feature coefficients the rule expressing the linguistically significant facts about the

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION*

81

Southern Paiute assimilation process can be formulated as (5) (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 346). (5) [ + cons]

aant jlcor yhigh Shack

+

-f-cons aant ßcor yhigh Shack

Whereas (5), by virtue of the notational convention governing the use of variables as feature coefficients, is an abbreviation of (3), there is no similar abbreviation for (4). This convention thus makes possible the expression of the linguistically significant generalization about the relation in (3) between the changes effected and the determining context. 3 Since (4) cannot be abbreviated in terms of this notational convention, this convention also distinguishes the linguistically significant process of assimilation from the implausible process (4). 3.2.2. The Abstract Structure of the Linguistic Argument In order to reveal the abstract structure of the argument adduced for the adoption of the notational convention governing the use of variables as feature coefficients, it is necessary first to briefly consider the layout of a well-formed argument. According to Toulmin (1964b) a well-formed argument contains the following components: (i) a CLAIM or CONCLUSION whose merits must be established, (ii) the DATA or 'facts' referred to as the basis for the claim or conclusion, 3 Other linguistically significant generalizations t h a t can be expressed in terms of variables ranging over feature coefficients concern processes of dissimilation, truncation, liaison and elision. Cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 351ff.

82

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

(iii) a WARRANT or 'inference-licence' that shows why the data can be regarded as supporting or contradicting the claim or conclusion, (iv) a QUALIFIER that indicates the degree of force which the data confer on the claim or conclusion by virtue of the warrant, (v) the CONDITIONS OF REBUTTAL specifying the particular circumstances under which the authority of the warrant must be set aside, and (vi) a BACKING providing the grounds from which the warrant derives its general validity.4 It is not contended that Toulmin's conception of the layout of a well-formed argument is the only one currently worth entertaining. It does however constitute a useful framework within which a linguistic argument such as the one outlined in § 3.2.1. can be analyzed. The claim of this argument is that the notational convention governing the use of variables as feature coefficients must be incorporated as a formal device in the theory of phonology. The data advanced in support of this claim are the following: (a) whilst the relation in (3) between the change effected and the determining context is linguistically significant, its counterpart in (4) is entirely fortuitous, i.e., linguistically non-significant; (b) the notational convention governing the use of variables as feature coefficients permits the expression of the linguistically significant facts in (3) in terms of a linguistically significant generalization, but disallows the expression of the implausible "facts" in (4) in terms of such a generalization. The warrant in the present argument, i.e., its component authorizing the inference of the claim from the data, is the 4 For a detailed discussion of the functioning of these components of an argument cf. Toulmin 1964b, pp. 97ff. In Botha 1970b, § 3, it is shown how this conception of the layout of an argument can be used to shed light on the structure of certain types of arguments used in grammatical inquiry.

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

83

bridge-like statement: if a given formal device allows the expression of linguistically significant facts in terms of linguistically significant generalizations, and provides a basis for distinguishing these generalizations from linguistically non-significant generalizations, then this formal device should be incorporated in the theory of phonology. This warrant derives its general validity from the transformationalist conception of the goal of a linguistic theory, viz: a linguistic theory must permit the construction of grammars for natural languages in which all and only the linguistically significant generalizations about these languages are expressed. Though neither the former warrant nor the latter backing are presented explicitly as such by Chomsky and Halle in the given argument, without appealing to them there can be no argument at all. The fact that no qualifier and conditions of rebuttal are mentioned in this argument can be taken as indicating that Chomsky and Halle regard the claim to be true in an unqualified sense. Schematically this argument may be represented as (6). For (6) see page 84. The argument (6) contains the 'skeleton' typical of arguments that are used within the framework of transformational generative grammar to motivate the extension or revision of the general theory. This basic pattern for linguistic arguments can be represented schematically as (7) on page 85. The reason for incorporating the expression " . . . and provides a basis for distinguishing these generalizations from linguistically non-significant generalizations..." in the warrant of (7) will become clear in § 3.3.2.4., and its content will be specified in § 3.3.2.4.1. The pattern of argumentation (7) is fundamental to all linguistic analyses that have the extension or revision of the theory of phonology as their objective. The notion 'linguistically significant generalization' is a key concept in the backings and warrants of all linguistic arguments constructed on the pattern (7). For this reason it can be

84

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT

GENERALIZATION'

(6) DATA (a) Whilst the relation in (3) between the change effected and the determining context is linguistically significant, its counterpart in (4) is entirely fortuitous, i.e., linguistically non-significant. (b) The notational convention governing the use of variables a« feature coefficients permits the expression of the linguistically significant facts in (3) in terms of a linguistically significant generalization, but disallows the expression of the linguistically non-significant facts in (4) in terms of such a generalization.

CLAIM The notational devices governing the use of variables as feature coefficients should be incorporated in the theory of phonology.

WARRANT Since

If a given formal device permits the expression of linguistically significant facts in terms of linguistically significant generalizations and provides a basis for distinguishing these generalizations from linguistically non-significant generalizations, then this formal device should be incorporated in the theory of phonology.

T BACKING On account

of the fact

that

A linguistic theory must permit the construction of grammars for natural languages in which all and only the linguistically significant generalizations about these languages are expressed.

' L I N G U I S T I C A L L Y SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

85

(7) DATA (a) The facts 'X', 'Y' and 'Z' are linguistically significant. (b) The formal device 'W' permits the expression of the facts 'X', 'Y' and 'Z' in terms of a linguistically significant generalization, and disallows the expression of linguistically insignificant facts in terms of such a generalization,

CLAIM The formal device 'W' should be incorporated in the theory of phonology.

• WARRANT Since

If a given formal device permits the expression of linguistically significant facts in terms of linguistically significant generalizations and provides a basis for distinguishing these generalizations from linguistically non-significant generalizations, then this formal device should be incorporated in the theory of phonology.

•I

BACKING On account

of the fact that

A linguistic theory must permit the construction of grammars for natural languages in which all and only the linguistically significant generalizations about these languages are expressed.

said that this notion underlies all linguistic and grammatical inquiry conducted within the framework of transformational generative grammar (cf. § 3.1.). Several fundamental theoretical principles of transformational generative grammar were imperfectly understood and criticized erroneously by scholars who either failed to identify the pattern of argumentation in (7) or did not grasp

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all its implications. Examples of the theoretical principles misunderstood for these reasons come readily to mind, e.g.: (8)

(i) the principle that phonological rules not be stated in terms of unanalyzed phonemes,5 (ii) the principle that also lexical representations be stated in terms of distinctive features, rather than in terms of phonemes,6 (iii) the principle that phonological rules be ordered linearly,7 and (iv) the principle that the general linguistic theory incorporate an evaluation measure.8

It is highly plausible that one of the reasons that make the pattern of argumentation (7) difficult to understand lies in the rather obscure nature of the content of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization'. So far, all the attention has been concentrated on the methodological function of this notion, without taking into consideration its content eind the; way its function is related to its content. Let us now turn to consider these two points. 5 Householder (1966, pp. 2 1 — 2 2 ) had difficulties in seeing the motivation for this principle — cf. also § 1.1.4. o f the present monograph. F o r remarks t h a t haVe a bearing on Householder's confusion cf. Chomsky and Halle 19(35, p. 119; 1968, pp. 1 7 8 - 8 0 ) . •Matthews (1968, p. 279) does not see the reason for incorporating this principle in the theory o f phonology. Comments on this s u b j e c t which can be regarded as a reply t o Matthews appear in Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 2 9 6 — 9 7 . A direct reply to Matthews is found in Halle 1969, pp. 3 0 5 - 0 7 . 7 L a m b (1966, pp. 3 9 — 4 0 ) incorrectly asserts t h a t rule ordering ill a transformational generative grammar, or mutation g r a m m a r , is " a r t i f i c i a l " and "without structural significance" since it follows from the nature o f rewrite rules. F o r a reply to this type o f o b j e c t i o n cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 340ff. " T h e motivation for incorporating an evaluation measure in a linguistic theory is not seen b y Householder (1965, pp. 16 —17, p. 33, note 17). F o r a rejoinder cf. Chomsky and Halle 1965, pp. 106fF.; 1968, pp. 3 3 0 ^ 3 1 . i

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87

3.3. T H E C O N T E N T OF T H E NOTION 'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

An analysis of the content of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' is directed at finding a.n answer to the question: what is a linguistically significant generalization within the framework of transformational generative grammar ? This question breaks down into two major subquestions: (i) what is a generalization within this linguistic theory? (ii) what conditions must a generalization meet to be 'linguistically significant'? It will become clear in the discussion of these questions that not all aspects of the content of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization' are equally transparent. Yet, no linguist and no grammarian can conduct his inquiry within the framework of transformational generative grammar in a rational way if he is unable to answer these questions satisfactorily. 3.3.1. A Generalization In empirical science various distinct types of generalizations, differing in function, form and content, are encountered.9 The distinction between simple generalizations and theoretical generalizations is a major one. A SIMPLE GENERALIZATION is "the product of a simple induction from some to all of an appropriately specified kind. A number of instances are known, and we generalize from them to all the instances of what we are prepared to call 'the same kind' " (Kaplan 1964, p. 105).10 A THEORETICAL GENERALIZATION is not the 9 For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of the diverse types of generalizations that are found in empirical science cf. K a p l a n 1964, Chapter I I I . 10 A simple generalization has the form " 'For all x and y, if x is of the kind A (has the property A) and stands in the relation R to y, then y is of the kind B (has the property B)'. For example, we may wish to consider, on the basis of a number of clinical cases, the gene-

88

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

product of a simple, inductive abstraction from the data. As indicated by the attribute 'theoretical', such a generalization is formulated in terms of theoretical concepts that cannot be regarded as mere abstractions from the data (cf. Kaplan 1964, p.

108).11

Now what are the characteristics of the generalizations encountered in transformational generative grammar? These generalizations (9)

(i) are "general statements" (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 330) that express "regularities" (p. 296); (ii) are "compatible" or "consistent" with the observed data (pp. 330, 331); (iii) go beyond the data in scope in so far as they deal with "potential data" (p. 330); (iv) go beyond the data in depth in so far as they express "the facts that underlie the data" (p. 330); (v) are expressed in terms of formal devices, i.e., in terms of theoretical concepts, theoretical principles and notational conventions (p. 330).

From (9) (ii—v) it is clear that the generalizations encountered in transformational generative grammar are not simple inductive generalizations. They are formulated in terms of theoretical concepts and, though being consistent with the observed data, go beyond these data in expressing facts that underlie them.12 Observe that, in characterizing the ralization t h a t all mothers of autistic children are overprotective" (Kaplan 1964, p. 105). Simple generalizations are sometimes also referred t o as 'empirical generalizations' (cf. Caws 1966, p. 76). 11 Theoretical generalizations are also called 'hypotheses' by some philosophers of science, e.g., by Caws (1966, p. 97). A hypothesis is formulated in terms of theoretical concepts, and is tested by inferring simple or 'empirical' generalizations from it whose correctness is checked against observational data. 12 I t is therefore not completely accurate t o assert t h a t formal devices m u s t ' 'make it possible t o present the d a t a precisely and clearly"

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89

nature of a linguistic generalization, the distinction drawn by Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 330) between 'data' and 'facts' is crucial. 3.3.2. The Notion 'Linguistically

Significant'

To explicate the content of the notion 'linguistically significant' and to determine the criterion for linguistic significance, it is necessary to consider in some detail (i) the distinction drawn between the significance and the truth or correctness of a generalization, (ii) the relation between the condition that a linguistic theory should make possible the expression of linguistically significant generalizations and the goal that it should characterize a particular mental faculty, (iii) the nature of linguistically relevant data and of linguistically significant facts, and (iv) the motivation for and function of the evaluation measure that is a component of the general linguistic theory. 3.3.2.1. 'Significant' vs. 'True' or 'Correct' In discussing the conditions of adequacy for the formal devices of the theory of phonology, Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 330) operate with a distinction between correct/true and incorrect/false generalizations on the one hand and significant/non-significant ones on the other. Though they do not discuss the nature of this distinction explicitly, it is clear that they distinguish between the truth and the significance of a generalization [cf. (1) (ii)]. The most illuminating way of considering this distinction of Chomsky and Halle's is to relate it to the distinction drawn by contemporary philosophers of science between the signi(Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 330; cf. (1) (i) in § 3.2. of t h e present monograph).

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'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION*

ficance and the truth of a statement or generalization in empirical science. Philosophers of science, such as Hempel (1965b, pp. 101—02), Scheffler (1963, pp. 127—28), and Caws (1966, pp. 183—84), regard a statement or generalization as "cognitively significant" if it is (empirically) meaningful. It is meaningful if it is either true or false.13 If it can be shown that a statement is true or false, i.e., if it is testable, then it is an empirical statement (cf. Hempel 1965c, p. 3). Statements that are neither true nor false are meaningless, i.e., cognitively non-significant. Thus, the criterion for cognitive significance is that of meaningfulness, and the one for meaningfulness is that of truth.14 A statement is regarded as "empirically true" if the state of affairs in reality which is described by this statement corresponds to what this statement asserts about this state of affairs (cf. Caws 1966, pp. 15—16).15 The distinction between the significance and the truth of a generalization or statement as made by Hempel, etc. implies that at the same time a generalization 13

Scheffler (1963, p. 1—28) draws a distinction between cognitive and empirical significance. The truth or falsity of empirically significant statements cannot be determined by taking into account their form and meaning alone; in addition, reference to observable phenomena is required. The set of cognitively significant statements includes the set of empirically significant statements as well as the set of those statements which are analytically true or false. 14 I t is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the problems relating to the formulation and justification of the criteria for significance and meaningfulness. Cf. however Hempel 1965b and Scheffler 1963, Part II. 16 There are various different epistemological theories about what constitutes a true statement, and about the criteria for truth and falsehood. The criterion specified here is derived from the correspondence theory of truth. For a discussion of the content and merits of the diverse theories of truth, including the correspondence theory, cf. Woozley 1967, Chapters 5, 6 and 7; Caws 1966, pp. 1 6 - 1 6 . The three most important theories of truth are outlined in § 4.3.2. of the present monograph.

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

(10)

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

can be can be cannot cannot

91

both significant and true, both significant and false, be both true and non-significant, be both false and non-significant.

Though it is easy to find evidence that Chomsky and Halle draw a distinction between the truth, or correctness, and the significance of generalizations, it is not a simple task to determine accurately how their distinction must be understood. In a crucial passage in the Sound Pattern of English they mention linguistic generalizations that (11)

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

can be "true and significant" (p. 330), can be "false" (p. 330), can be "true but not significant" (p. 330), can be "consistent with the data" but "not linguistically significant" (p. 330).

From (11) (iii) follows that Chomsky and Halle regard truth and significance as distinct attributes of generalizations. Not all aspects of the classification of linguistic generalizations presented in (11) (i—iv) are clear. A first question that arises is whether Chomsky and Halle intentionally drawn a distinction between the truth of a generalization (cf. (11) (i) and (iii)] and its consistency with the data [cf. (11) (iv)]. 18 Let us assume for the moment that this is the case, i.e., that we are confronted with a well-grounded distinction and not with one resulting from terminological confusion. This distinction can then be interpreted in relation to the distinction that Chomsky and Halle make between "linguistic data" and "the facts underlying the data" (cf. § 3.3.1.). The correctness or truth of a generalization can be regarded as relating to the accuracy with which it represents "the facts that underlie the data". The consistency or compati18 As well as 'consistent with the data' a generalization is sometimes called 'compatible with the data' (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 331).

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' LINGUISTIC ALL Y SIGNIFICANT

GENERALIZATION'

bility of a generalization with the data can be taken as concerning the agreement between its consequences and the data. In any case, if a distinction of this sort must be made between the correctness of a generalization and its consistency with the data, generalizations must be classified with respect to three, instead of only two, attributes within the framework of transformational generative grammar. These attributes are (a) significance/non-significance, (b) truth/falsity, and (c) consistency/inconsistency with the data. In order to determine the content of the notion 'linguistically significant', the ways in which these three attributes are related must be revealed. On the nature of these relations Chomsky and Halle offer no explicatory metatheoretical comments at all. The only available type of information is that contained in (11) (i—iv). Consider (11) (iii), in which Chomsky and Halle make provision for generalizations that can be true yet non-significant. In the light of (10) (iii) — which states that generalizations cannot be true but non-significant — it becomes clear that the distinction between the truth and the significance of a generalization as construed by Chomsky and Halle must have a basis differing from the one that underlies the distinction drawn by philosophers of science — such as Hempel — between truth and significance. The basis for their particular distinction between the truth and the significance of a generalization is not presented explicitly by Chomsky and Halle. It is therefore not clear whether they envisage — the logically possible — category of those generalizations which would be "false but nevertheless linguistically significant". If we also take into consideration the consistency of generalizations with the data, it is equally unclear whether Chomsky and Halle would allow for generalizations which could be (12)

(i) consistent with the data, true, but non-significant, (ii) inconsistent with the data, true, and significant, (iii) inconsistent with the data, false, but significant,

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

93

(iv) consistent with the data, false, and significant, etc. The point I wish to make is this: although it is clear that, within the framework of transformational generative grammar a distinction is drawn between the truth and the significance of a generalization, the basis for this distinction has not been sufficiently explicated.17 An analysis of this distinction consequently does not yield much information about the content of the notion 'linguistically significant'.

3.3.2.2. Linguistic Significance and Mentalism So far, the notion 'linguistically significant' has been considered exclusively from the point of view of its "logical syntax", i.e., from the point of view of the logical relations existing between it and other notions such as 'truth' and 'consistency with the data'. The obvious thing to do now is to turn to the "semantics" of the notion 'linguistically significant'. That is, let us examine the relation between the condition that the linguistic theory must permit the construction of grammars expressing linguistically significant generalizations about a language and the fact that the object of study of this grammar is a mental faculty. In § 2.2.1., it was pointed out that the object of study of a transformational generative grammar is the linguistic competence of an ideal speaker-hearer who knows his language perfectly. This fact suggests an answer to the question as to what constitutes a LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT generalization. It is highly plausible that a generalization, to be linguistically significant, should refer to characteristics of the linguistic competence of an ideal speaker-hearer. This is in fact the criterion for linguistic significance with which Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 296, 330), Kiparsky (1968, 17 The distinction between the truth of a generalization and its consistency with the data will be mentioned again in (13) below.

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'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION*

pp. 171 — 172), and Postal (1968, p. 42) operate. Rules "represent true and significant generalizations" in so far as "they characterize the native speaker's competence, his idealized ability to produce and understand an unlimited number of sentences" (Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 330).18 Thus the "facts that underlie the d a t a " (p. 330) which a generalization expresses are "mentalistic" facts. Notice however that in the citation given above, Chomsky and Halle are concerned with the relation between generalizations that are simultaneously significant AND true on the one hand and the linguistic competence of an ideal speaker-hearer on the other hand. It is therefore still unclear what the relation is between the attributes 'truth' and 'significance', when taken separately, and this mental faculty. That is, this citation does not provide explicit answers to the questions 'what condition must a generalization meet to qualify as significant?', 'under what circumstances can a generalization be regarded as true?', and 'what are the characteristics of a generalization that is true but not significant?' It seems to me that much of the obscurity of the transformationalist notions 'linguistically significant', 'true', and 'consistent with the data' can be dispelled by characterizing them with reference to the distinction between significance and truth as drawn by philosophers of science such as Hempel. Against the background of this distinction a generalization can be regarded as (13) (i) consistent with the data if none of its consequences are contradicted by the data, (ii) inconsistent with the data if some or all of its consequences are contradicted by the data, (iii) true if the actual state of affairs concerning the linWhat is meant by saying that a linguistically significant generalization 'refers to' or 'characterizes' the linguistic competence will be made clear in § 4.2. 18

'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

95

guistic competence of an ideal speaker-hearer does correspond to what it asserts about this mental faculty, (iv) false if the actual state of affairs concerning the linguistic competence of an ideal speaker-hearer does not correspond to what it asserts about this mental faculty, (v) linguistically significant if it is either true or false, (vi) linguistically non-significant if it is neither true nor false. Within the framework of (13) (i—vi), it would be possible for a generalization to be consistent with the data but not significant, but not to be true and non-significant. It might be that the transformationalist notions of 'significance', 'truth' and 'consistency with the data' were intended to be interpreted in the way explicated in (13) (i—vi). If this is the case, these intentions have, to my knowledge been nowhere explicitly set forth. 3.3.2.3. Linguistically Relevant Data and Linguistically ficant Facts

Signi-

The facts relating to the linguistic competence of a speakerhearer that must be expressed by a grammar in terms of generalizations can be called 'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT FACTS'. The data which these linguistically significant facts underlie can be referred to as 'LINGUISTICALLY RELEVANT DATA'. Normally both the linguist and the grammarian proceed in their analytical activities from a certain corpus of linguistic data. From (11) (iv), i.e., from Chomsky and Halle's statement that some generalizations can be consistent with the data, but not linguistically significant, it follows that not all data contained in such a corpus are linguistically relevant. The question, now, is whether a grammarian and a linguist have an a priori measure at their disposal which they can use to decide which data are lin-

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'LINGUISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT GENERALIZATION'

guistically relevant and which are not. An a priori measure is one that is used in the analytical phase of linguistic inquiry, i.e., in the pretheoretical phase of linguistic inquiry.19 I t is obvious that such a measure will make the task of both the grammarian and the linguist much easier in the sense that it will enable them to concentrate exclusively on the analysis of linguistically relevant data. The problem of specifying and justifying an a priori measure for drawing a distinction between linguistically relevant and non-relevant data is not considered seriously by Chomsky and Halle in The Sound Pattern of English. They dismiss this problem by making "the simplifying and counter-to-fact assumption that all the primary linguistic data must be accounted for by the grammar and that all must be accepted as 'correct' . . ." (p. 331). In many instances they "justify", in an implicit way, their selection of particular data as linguistically relevant by simply stating categorically that, underlying these data, there are linguistically significant facts which must be expressed in the form of generalizations. Such a priori assertions to the effect that linguistically significant facts underlie particular linguistic data give rise to another question, viz: is there an a priori measure that a LINGUIST can use to determine whether a particular fact is linguistically significant or non-significant? One is led to: expect that there is such a measure by the way in which Chomsky and Halle stamp certain facts as linguistically significant. Consider, for example, the following assertions by Chomsky and Halle, which one encounters in The Sound Pattern of English. [(14)] [(i)] Clearly, some formal means is required to express the fact that in the Southern Paiute case the agreement of the consonants in terms of the features 19

For a n explication of t h e c o n t e n t of t h e distinction 'theoreticalpretheoretical' w i t h respect t o linguistic inquiry cf. B o t h a 1968. 6 6 - 6 7 , 153-^54.

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97

"anterior," "coronal," "high," and "back" is linguistically significant, whereas in the case exemplified by (57) the relation between the change effected and the determining context is entirely fortuitous (p. 351).20 [(ii)] Given the phenomena described in (25) and (26), any linguist would understand (25) but not (26) to express a linguistically significant generalization . . . (p. 341).21 [(iii)] For it [i.e., a grammar — R.P.B.] to contain both of these rules is quite intolerable, not only because of the doubling of complexity, but, more importantly, because it is clear that such a grammar is missing a significant generalization. Thus the fact that (17) simply reverses (14) does not contribute to the simplicity of this grammar, i.e., the generalization that similar processes are involved is unexpressed (p. 180).22 In this citation, (57) refers to the rule stated as (4) in § 3.2.1. In this citation (25) and (26) refer to respectively (A) (i)—(iii) and (B)(i) —(iii) below. (A) (i) "The plosives /p t k/ are actualized as their (nonstrident) voiceless continuant congeners [-[—long]/—CC (B) V - * [ - l o n g ] / - C C . . . V . . .V 21

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VALIDATION AS MENTALISTIC THEORY

formulated as the generalization of the rule schema (17) to the rule schema (18) by the deletion of one of the consonants t h a t must follow the vowel which is to be laxed (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 334). (17)

y _

f

(18)

y -

[ - tense] j

CC

_ tense] j

{?cov}

c{yCov}

I t is pointed out by Kiparsky, and by Chomsky and Halle, t h a t the linguistic changes under discussion can only be regarded as resulting from the operation of a single process, if it is assumed t h a t rule schemata are entities to which phonological processes of change can apply. The fact t h a t rule schemata are necessary for the formulation of processes of linguistic change is taken by Kiparsky (1968, p. 181) and Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 334) as proof of the psychological reality of the notational convention (13) and the rule schemata governed by it. The abstract form of the argument in which historical evidence is furnished in support of mentalistic linguistic hypotheses can be represented as follows: 23 (19) DATA

CLAIM/CONCLUSION

1 -—•iSo J | •

A and B correctly represent aspects of t]j e abstract structure of the faculté de langage.

WARRANT Since If a formal device is needed for the formulation of a process of linguistic change, then pyschological reality must be assigned to it. 23

For a more detailed analysis of the diverse forms of argument within whose framework Kiparsky uses historical data in support of mentalistic claims cf. Botha, to appear.

VALIDATION AS MENTALISTIC THEORY

141

Unfortunately neither Kiparsky nor Chomsky and Halle provide an acceptable backing for the warrant of (19). It can be seriously doubted whether such a backing can be provided at all. To provide an acceptable backing for (19) is to show in a non-arbitrary way on the basis of a defensible general methodological measure for relevance that evidence about linguistic change is relevant to the justification of linguistic claims about the form of the mental mechanism(s) under consideration.24 This is required on account of the material dissimilarity between the content of the historical data and that of the mentalistic claims. Consider the following remarks of Chomsky's and Halle's (1968, p. 373) on the topic of the relevance of historical data to synchronic grammatical considerations relating to the idiosyncratic classification imposed on the lexicon by the selective application of phonological rules: In the phonology proper, we also find quite commonly that rules apply in a selective fashion and thus impose an idiosyncratic classification on the lexicon. Often there is a historical explanation for this idiosyncratic behavior, but this is obviously irrelevant as far as the linguistic competence of the native speaker is concerned (1968, p. 373). They proceed to point out that a classification of lexical items in English in terms of the idiosyncratic features [ ± Germanic], [¿Greek], [¿Romance] is functional in the language and must be presumed to be represented in the internalized grammar. It is justified not by the historical development of the language but by the applicability of phonological and morphological rules (p. 373).

24 The general problem of providing such a demonstration of the relevance of a linguistic evidential variable is discussed in Botha, to appear.

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VAIJDATION AS MENTALISTIC THEOBY

Taking into account these remarks by Chomsky and Halle, one would expect them to provide a justification of the use of historical evidence about linguistic change for the validation of mentalistic linguistic claims. No such justification has been provided by them. I will return to the methodological role which diachronic evidence plays in the theory of phonology in § 5.2.3.2.4.3. 4.3.3.5.2. Intuitive

Evidence and the Evaluation

Measure

The conclusion was drawn in § 3.3.2.4.3. that the evaluation measure must meet the condition of adequacy that it should represent an aspect of the structure of the faculté de langage. It was also pointed out that Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 168, 251) and Postal (1968, p. 314) in fact depicted the evaluation measure as representing an aspect of the child's faculté de langage. One therefore expects that the principal reason for finding fault with the evaluation measure should be that it incorrectly characterizes this aspect of the faculté de langage. Furthermore, it seems quite reasonable to require that the criterion used ultimately for judging the adequacy of the evaluation measure should be based on an acceptable norm for psychological reality. If these two requirements were to be dropped, there would be no point in insisting that the evaluation measure should characterize an aspect of the child's faculté de langage. When Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 400) express their dissatisfaction with the present formulation of the evaluation measure, one would consequently expect them to specify whether the reason(s) for their dissatisfaction meet(s) the requirements stated above. However, they merely state that up to a point this measure gives the desired results, but in many cases it fails completely. For example, the class of voiced obstruents is, intuitively, more natural than the class of voiced segments (consonant or vowel), but the latter has the simpler definition (p. 400).

VALIDATION AS MENTALISTIC

THEORY

143

The latter statement is not elaborated on: it is presented as a self-contained assertion expressing a reason for dissatisfaction with the evaluation measure. This reason is that the judgments made in terms of the evaluation measure fail to correspond to the I N T U I T I O N S which the linguist has about the naturalness of phonological categories. Phonological categories as linguistic universals are formal devices contained by the general linguistic theory. That is, these phonological categories are also supposed to represent aspects of the faculté de langage of the child and accordingly of the linguistic competence of native speakers. Thus, the reason why the evaluation measure is considered to be incorrect is that the judgments made in terms of it are counter to the linguist's intuitions about aspects of the mental mechanism underlying human communication. The latter argument may be represented schematically as (20). (20) DATA

CLAIM/CONCLUSION

The results given by the evaluation measure clash with the intuitions which the linguist has about the structure of the mental mechanism underlying human communication.

' The evaluation measure incorrectly represents an aspect o f the faculté de langage.

WARRANT

Since I f a formal device gives results which clash with the linguist's intuitions about the structure of the mental mechanism underlying human communication, then this formal device incorrectly represents an aspect of the faculté de langage.

The argument (20) must be rejected on account of the doubts about the relevance of the type of evidence referred to in its

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VALIDATION AS MENTALISTIC THEORY

warrant. It is not obvious on whatgrounds one is obliged to accept the point of view that a linguist can have intuitions about the structure of a mental mechanism and that these intuitions constitute relevant and reliable evidence by virtue of the fact that they are intuitions. This observation is also made by Kiparsky (1968, p. 172): There are no conscious a priori ideas of generality that we can appeal to here in the way that we can appeal to intuitions that reflect features of structural descriptions, such as ambiguity and synonymy. The processes of normal language learning being unconscious, we have absolutely no ideas about the form of grammars, though we have clear ideas about the form of sentences which grammars account for. It is true that the practicing linguist soon acquires ideas about the form of grammars and such concepts as generality. But these ideas are somehow the result of his work on languages, and we would like to know what the ideas are based on. If the evidence referred to in the warrant of (20) must be rejected as irrelevant to judging the correctness of mentalistic hypotheses, then there is no reason for agreeing with Chomsky and Halle that the evaluation measure leads to an incorrect decision about the relative simplicity of the definition of voiced obstruents and voiced segments. Moreover, if this intuitive evidence cannot be accepted as the basis of a norm for psychological reality, then the argument (20) cannot be used at all for validating mentalistic hypotheses.26 4 . 3 . 3 . 5 . 3 . Psychological

Evidence

for Linguistic

Universale

Katz (1964a, pp. 133—34) regards a mentalistic linguistic theory as "more easily testable" than a non-mentalistic one, since psychological facts can be used in the validation of the former but not of the latter one: Such a theory enters into the explanation of many of those psychological theories with which it harmonizes. Theories of per26 The methodological status of (linguistic) intuitions in transformational generative grammar is discussed in Botha 1968, § 3.3.

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ception, theories of memory, of thinking, of learning, and other psychological theories leave open various questions about the effect of language on these processes and the effect of these processes on language ; only a mentalistic theory of linguistic structure can hope to answer them. Further, by subjecting a linguistic theory to this requirement we make it more easily testable. For the requirement enables us to refute a linguistic theory if we can find psychological theories or facts that are inconsistent with i t . . . In this paragraph I intend to examine the form and the merits of the pattern of argumentation by means of which psychological evidence is used to validate claims about which linguistic hypotheses should be regarded as linguistic universals. It is however necessary first to determine precisely what a linguistic universal is within the framework of transformational generative grammar. In The Sound Pattern of English, Chomsky and Halle characterize the notion 'linguistic universal' in various ways, the following of which is consistent with the thesis of mentalism: "The significant linguistic universals are those that must be assumed to be available to the child learning a language as an a priori, innate endowment" (p. 4).26 Linguistic universals are accordingly not simply common features of the linguistic description of every language, but have psychological reality as aspects of the structure of the faculté de langage?1 Therefore a linguist who draws a distinction be24 Alternative ways in which the notion 'linguistic universal' is characterized by Chomsky and Halle (1968) will be considered in §. 5.2.3.2.2.1 27 Katz (1964a, p. 134) also gives a mentalistic interpretation to the notion 'linguistic universal': " . . . a mentalistic theory also can provide a psychological reality for linguistic universals. Instead of linguistic universals being treated simply as common features of the linguistic description of every language, as they are in the taxonomic view, the fact that such common features are universal, i.e. are necessary features of natural languages, is explained in terms of the psychology of human language learners, the one constant feature among all the individual differences between speakers of different natural languages, and all the differences between the situationsin which they learn to speak . . . Linguistic universals

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tween linguistic tiniversals and language-particular linguistic facts is actually drawing a distinction between different aspects of the structure of the mentalistic mechanism that underlies human communication. I t is thus reasonable to require that the criterion which he uses to draw this distinction should be an adapted version of a general norm for psychological reality. N o such adapted criterion has been explicitly proposed and justified by Chomsky and Halle. Implicitly they do, however, use one in the following arguments, which they advance in support of the claim that the principle of the transformational cycle in phonology is a linguistic universal. [(21)] [(i)] I t is reasonable to suppose that the principle of the transformational cycle and the principles of organization of grammar that we have formulated in terms of certain notational conventions are, if correct, a part of universal grammar rather than of the particular grammar of English. Specifically, it is difficult to imagine how such principles could be "learned" or "invented" in some way by each speaker of the language, on the basis of the data available to him. It therefore seems necessary to assume that these principles constitute a part of the schema that serves as a precondition for language acquisition and that determines the general character of what is acquired (1968, p. 43). [(ii)] Among the internalized rules are some that are particular to the language in question and thus must have been learned; there are others that simply play a role in setting the conditions on the content of linguistic experience. In the present case, it would be reasonable to suggest that the Compound and Nuclear Stress Rules are learned, while the principle of the transformational cycle, being well beyond the bounds of any conceivable method of "learning", is one of the conditions, intrinsic to the language-

thus have psychological reality as part of the internal structure of the innate mechanism responsible for a child's acquisition of a language."

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acquisition system, that determines the form of the language acquired. If this assumption is correct, we would expect the principle of the transformational cycle to be a linguistic universal, that is, to be consistent with empirical facts for all human languages; the Compound and Nuclear Stress Rules, on the other hand, might be in part language-specific (1968, pp. 24-25). The basis of the criterion for linguistic universale which is used implicitly in (21) (i) and (ii) is constituted by psychological evidence about the learning process. The abstract form of the argument incorporating this criterion as its warrant may be represented as (22).

(22) DATA

CLAIM/CONCLUSION

The formal device ' Y ' incorporated in the linguistic theory 'Z' is beyond the bounds of any conceivable method of learning. •

' Y ' is a linguistic universal. T h a t is, *Y' represents an aspect of the structure of the faculté de langage.

WARRANT

Since If a formal device which is incorporated by a linguistic theory is beyond the bounds of any conceivable method of learning, then this formal device is a linguistic universal representing an aspect of the structure of the innately endowed faculté de langage.

The question is whether the pattern of argumentation (22) is one the use of which necessarily leads to true claims. I submit that this is not the case, for the criterion for linguistic universals incorporated in the warrant is of questionable

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THEORY

validity. The crux of this criterion is the distinction "what can be learnt by means of any conceivable method of learning vs. what cannot be learnt by means of any conceivable method of learning." When Chomsky and Halle speak about conceivable methods of learning, they refer implicitly to those methods of learning which are conceivable within the framework of a behaviorist psychological theory.28 Now it is interesting to note that Chomsky (1967b, pp. 127; 1968, pp. 63—64) rejects a behaviorist theory of learning as "seriously defective" as a theory limiting itself to " a surely inadequate concept of what is learned". He thus regards a behaviorist theory of learning as a fairly primitive theory of learning. If it is true that behaviorist theories of learning are so "seriously defective" and primitive, it is dangerous to take their conception of learning as a criterion for drawing a distinction in general between what can be learnt and what cannot be learnt, and in particular between linguistic principles that can be learnt and ones that cannot be learnt. This distinction is purely accidental, since there is no consideration ruling out the possibility that within the framework of a more sophisticated theory of learning which incorporates a more advanced conception of learning, a totally different distinction would be drawn between what can be learnt and what cannot be learnt. That is, linguistic principles that cannot be learnt within the framework of the primitive behaviorist theories of learning might well turn out to be learnable within the framework of more sophisticated theories 88 Consider the following remarks by Chomsky (1968, p. 63): "The theory of learning has limited itself to a narrow and surely inadequate concept of what is learned — namely a system of stimulus-response connections, a network of associations, a repertoire of behavioral items, a habit hierarchy, or a system of dispositions to respond in a particular way under specifiable stimulus conditions." Cf. also Chomsky 1967b, pp. 127 — 28 for similar indications that when he speaks of THE theory of learning, he actually refers to the behaviorist theory(ies) of learning.

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of learning. It is solely because of practical considerations involving the inventiveness and general scholarly orientation of psychologists that such more sophisticated theories have not been developed. In short, the criterion for linguistic universals, presented as the warrant of (22), must be rejected since it is based on considerations which are accidental. Notice that so far it has been assumed that the criterion for linguistic universals under discussion is derived from a more general and fundamental norm for psychological reality. This norm should provide a generally valid basis for validating any mentalistic hypothesis, whether it be linguistic or grammatical. The derived criterion should be a valid basis for judging which aspect of the mental mechanism underlying human communication — the language-independent aspect or the language-particular aspect — is referred to by a particular mentalistic hypothesis. If the criterion for linguistic universals is formulated in terms of particular considerations, e.g., the distinction between what can and what cannot be learned, it will be a relevant criterion only if it has been shown with respect to the more general and fundamental norm for psychological reality that these considerations can form a basis for judging the correctness of mentalistic hypotheses. That is, if considerations pertaining to language learning are taken as the basis for a criterion for linguistic universals, it is reasonable to ask what the general norm for psychological reality is with respect to which these considerations have been justified as being such as to throw light on the correctness of mentalistic hypotheses in general. In other words, it is reasonable to ask why considerations pertaining to language learning should be accepted as the basis for a norm for psychological reality at all. No explicit answer to these questions can be found in recent transformationalist writings dealing with the topic of linguistic universals. One last general point must be touched on to conclude this section on the use of psychological evidence in devising

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norms for psychological reality. It was made clear' that the primitive state of development of present-day behaviorist theories of learning is a major reason for disallowing evidence from language learning to be used in a norm for linguistic universals. This point should be kept in mind by a linguist who uses other types of psychological evidence, i.e., evidence derived from theories of perception, memory, thinking, etc., as the basis for norms for psychological reality. If these theories were to be as primitive as the theory of learning, evidence derived from them would constitute a basis as shaky as the distinction between what can and what cannot be lear ned for norms of psychological reality. A case in point is the evidence derivable from the behaviorist theory of perception. Diverse transformationalists — e.g., Chomsky (1964, pp. 17ff.) — have expressed their dissatisfaction with the behaviorist theory of perception. Evidence from such unsatisfactory psychological theories cannot be used as the basis for norms of psychological reality.29 4.3.3.5.4. Metatheoretical Evidence for the Evaluation Measure Phonological rules which are partially identical can be collapsed into rule schemata by the application of notational conventions involving the use of parentheses, braces and the slash dash notation (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 36). In § 4.3.3.5.1. it was illustrated how braces for example are used to abbreviate partially identical rules to rule schemata. Examples of other aspects of the general linguistic theory in the justification of which Chomsky and Halle (1968) cite some sort of psychological evidence are: (i) the functioning of the readjustment component (p. 10), (ii) conditions of well-formedness on grammars (p. 384), and (iii) the convention that, where possible, phonological rules should be disjunctively ordered (p. 63). The latter case will be discussed briefly at the end of § 4.3.3.5.4.

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From the way in which the notational conventions mentioned above determine the application of the sub-rules of expanded rule schemata, Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 36) derive evidence for the "empirical reality" of the evaluation measure. Consider the following argument in which they present this evidence: The conventions associated with disjunctive ordering make use of the notations for stating grammatical schemata in a way that is rather novel within the theory of generative grammar. In earlier work these notations have been regarded solely as part of the system for evaluating grammars. They have been proposed as an explication of the notion 'linguistically significant generalization'; the degree of linguistically significant generalization attained by a grammar — its 'simplicity', in a technical sense of the term — is measured by the number of symbols appearing in the underlying schema that expands to this grammar by the use of the notations (See Chomsky (1965) and many earlier references for discussion.) But now we are also making use of the notations to determine how the rules apply, in particular, to determine disjunctive ordering. That is to say, we are proposing that certain formal relations among rules, statable in terms of the notations that are used for the evaluation of grammars, are significant in determining how the grammar generates derivations. If the empirical hypothesis embodied in the definition of 'disjunctive ordering' is correct, then this fact offers a powerful argument in support of the empirical reality of the evaluation procedures that have been developed within the theory of generative grammar, as it has evolved in recent years (p. 36). These remarks of Chomsky and Halle's contain a crucial expression which is rather obscure, the expression "empirical reality". In a methodological context it is an ambiguous contamination. On the one hand it may refer to the empirical status of the evaluation measure, i.e., to the testability of the claims made about the evaluation measure. On the other hand it may refer to the cognitive or ontological status of the evaluation measure, i.e., to the question of whether the evaluation measure is a mere computational device or whether

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it refers to something existing in reality, psychological reality in this case. Not much knowledge about philosophy of science is necessary to see that the empirical status and the cognitive or ontological status of a theory are two distinct properties.30 If the expression 'empirical reality' is taken as referring to the cognitive or ontological status of the evaluation measure, then the remarks by Chomsky and Halle quoted above contain the skeleton of yet another argument in justification of the psychological reality of formal devices.31 This argument may be represented schematically as follows: (23) CLAIM/CONCLUSION

DATA (a) The convention of disjunctive ordering and the evaluation measure involve the use of the same notations. (b) The convention of disjunctive ordering is correct.

go

IT

The evaluation meaI sure correctly represents an aspect of the faculté de langage.

WARRANT Since I f two formal devices 'A' and 'B' involve the use of the same notations and 'A' is correct, then 'B' also correctly represents an aspect of the faculté de langage, i.e., then 'B' is an 'empirical reality'.

The data used in (23) refer to the content and methodological status of the general linguistic theory. These data, consequently, can be labelled METATHEORETICAL DATA. 80 For a discussion of these two properties of a theory or a hypothesis cf. Hempel 1966, §§ 3.6. and 6.4. 11 In § 5.2.2.3. the implications of the possibility that the expression 'empirical reality' refers to the empirical status of the evaluation measure will be considered.

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If (23) should indeed be taken as an argument in justification of the psychological reality of linguistic theories, then two problems arise with respect to it. In the first place it is unclear why one should accept the norm for psychological reality embodied in the warrant of (23). In other words, the warrant of (23) lacks an acceptable backing, a backing in the form of an ontological principle which forces one to accept the assertion (24). (24) If formal devices involve the same notations, they have the same ontological status. Even if, for the sake of the argument, one is willing to accept (24) as valid, a second problem arises in connection with the argument (23). The correctness of the assertion presented as the datum (b) is debatable. That is to say, it is not clear whether the principle of disjunctive ordering is correct. Let us consider the way in which Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 63) defend their decision to accept the general principle that abbreviatory notations should be selected in such a way as to maximize disjunctive ordering: The principle seems to us a natural one in that maximization of disjunctive ordering will, in general, minimize the length of derivations in the grammar. The question of how an internalized grammar is used in performance (speech production or perception) is of course quite open. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that the grammar should be selected in such a way as to minimize the amount of 'computation' that is necessary, and that 'length of derivation' is one factor in determining 'complexity of computation'. Naturally, this principle must be regarded as quite tentative. We will adhere to it where a choice arises, but we have very little evidence for or against it. From these remarks by Chomsky and Halle it is clear how scant the grounds are for accepting the principle of disjunctive ordering. The soundness of the claim of (23) depends directly on the degree of confirmation of the principle of disjunctive ordering.

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4.3.3.5.5. Neurophysiological

Evidence

for the Finiteness

of

a Grammar In discussing the merits of mentalistic linguistic theories, Katz (1964a, p. 134) points out that it is possible to "refute" such a theory if we can find . . . neurophysiological accounts which describe brain structure in a way that precludes the linguistic theory from being isomorphic to any of the structures in the human brain. In this section some of the problems pertaining to the use of neurophysiological evidence in justification of mentalistic linguistic theories will be considered. Chomsky and Halle's (1968, p. 6) argument in support of the hypothesis that a grammar is a finite system makes implicit reference to neurophysiological evidence; No human language has a limit on the number of sentences that are properly formed and that receive a semantic interpretation in accordance with the rules of this language. However, the grammar of each language must obviously be a finite object realized physically in a finite human brain. Therefore, one component of the grammar must have a recursive property.. . Along similar lines Katz (1967) argues against the construction of a dictionary in which provision is made for infinite polysemy of lexical items or in which infinitely many lexical items occur. Consider the following remarks by him: . . . there is the best empirical reason for ruling out all of these possibilities. Namely, no language with such a dictionary structure could be acquired or possessed by creatures, such as ourselves, with finite brains that function in real time (p. 135); [and] . . . the possibility of such infinite polysemy must be dismissed in the construction of a dictionary; the dictionary is a reconstruction of one aspect of the speaker's semantic competence and since speakers are only equipped with finite brains, the mechanism reconstructed by a dictionary can, in principle, store only finitely many bits of information about the lexical characterization of a particular item (p. 174).

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The abstract form of the argument in which neurophysiological evidence is used to validate mentalistic hypotheses put forward in linguistic theories may be represented schematically as (25).

(25) CLAIM/CONCLUSION

DATA (a) B y postulating the formal device ' A ' t h e linguist makes t h e assertion ' B ' about the structure o f the m e n t a l mechanism M. (b) T h e neurophysiological facts about t h e structure o f M are

-¡-•So

T . . • • • F„\ (c) There is no clash between the assertion B about M and the facts ' F p . . . F „ ' about 'M'.

T h e formal device ' A ' correctly represents an aspect o f the structure o f the m e n t a l mechanism 'M'.

WARRANT Since I f the assertions made about the structure o f the faculté de langage b y formal devices postulated b y linguists do not clash with neurophysiological facts about the structure o f the faculté de langage, then these formal devices correctly represent an aspect o f the structure o f the faculté de langage.

(In (25) "the mental mechanism 'M'" and "the faculté de langage" are synonymous expressions). The pattern of argumentation (25) would lead to acceptable conclusions if three conditions could be met. The first is that the expression "do not clash with" incorporated in its warrant must be satisfactorily explicated and justified within a methodological framework. To this condition I will return in § 4.3.3.5.7.

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The second condition that must be met by a linguist using neurophysiological evidence to support mentalistic hypotheses concerns the nature of the neurophysiological evidence or facts referred to in (25). From the way in which Katz (1964a, pp. 129, 133, 134) draws the distinction between the fields of study of mentalistic linguistics and neurophysiology it follows that, whereas some neurophysiological facts are relevant to mentalistic linguistics, others are not. According to Katz, a mentalistic linguistic theory attempts to give a formal characterization of only the (functional) structure of the neural mechanism underlying human communication. It is not concerned with the way in which these mechanisms are realized physically in terms of nerve fibres, synapses, and so on (cf. Katz 1964a, p. 129). Neurophysiology, on the other hand, though apparently also concerned with the structure of these neural mechanisms (p. 134), aims especially at "discovering what kind of a physical system in the human brain instantiates the representation of structure given by a linguistic theory . . ." (Katz 1964a, p. 129). The latter way of delimiting the field of neurophysiology implies that a linguist wishing to use a given neurophysiological fact 'F' in support of a mentalistic linguistic assertion must first determine in a non-arbitrary way whether 'F' relates to the structure or to the physical realization of the neural mechanisms under discussion. Because of the indirect relation between the abstract structure of the given neural mechanisms and their physical realization, evidence about the physical realization of these mechanisms would have no direct bearing on their abstract structure. In (25) only neurophysiological evidence about the structure of these mechanisms can be used, and then only when presented in terms which make sense to linguists, who are usually laymen in the field of neurophysiology. Thus the second condition that must be met by a linguist using (25) is that he must be able to draw a motivated distinction between two kinds of neurophysiological evidence: that about the struc-

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ture, and that about the physical realization, of the mental mechanisms underlying human communication. The third condition that this linguist must meet relates to the fact that neurophysiology deals not only with the neural mechanisms involved in human communication, but also with those underlying the functioning of non-linguistic mental processes. This implies that a linguist using (25) must be able to judge, on a well-principled basis, whether a given neurophysiological fact does in fact concern the structure of the neural mechanisms underlying human communication or whether it is about mechanisms not involved in human communication. It stands to reason that, if a linguist is not capable of making this decision in a motivated way, there is no point in his using neurophysiological evidence in support of the psychological reality of a mentalistic linguistic theory such as transformational generative grammar. 4.3.3.5.6. Diverse Kinds of Evidence for 'M-U' Decisions and Marking Rules. As noted in the outline given in § 2.4.3.2.3., the markedness version of the theory of phonology makes provision for two levels of lexical representation: (i) the level of 'M' and 'U' representation, where features have two possible values: 'Marked' and 'Unmarked', and (ii) a less abstract level of matrix representation, where features have ' + ' and '—' values. According to Postal (1968, p. 167) the crucial and fundamental assumption is that this level is entirely the function of UNIVERSAL rules which operate on the level of M-U representation to successively derive + and — markings. In § 2.4.3.2.3., the following example was given of such a marking rule or convention:

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(26) [U voice]

[ +voice]

4- vocalic —consonantal

(26) expresses the view that it is "natural" for segments that are [ +vocalic, —consonantal] to be voiced. Postal (1968, p. 168) is very much aware of the fact that accepting such a theory commits one to determining for each feature value in each context grounds for a nonarbitrary choice of M or U representation. That is, accepting such a theory involves the responsibility for discovering the right class of universal rules interpreting M and U representations as + and —. Though labelling the latter task a "vast undertaking", Postal (1968, p. 168) points out that "there is already a great deal of knowledge, and many M-U decisions can be made with some confidence." These 'M-U' decisions, being decisions about linguistic universals within the framework of a mentalistic linguistic theory, ultimately embody claims about the faculté de langage of the native speaker. It is, therefore, interesting to examine the types of evidence produced in support of such M-U decisions. In this connection Postal (1968) refers, among other things, to statistical evidence, psychological and neurophysiological evidence, historical and sociological evidence, and articulaiory and perceptual evidence. 4.3.3.5.6.1. Statistical Evidence. — In the first place, facts about the relative generality in distribution or 'naturalness' of features among the entire class of languages are used in justification of 'M-U' decisions. Postal (1968, p. 81) asserts, for example, that there are no languages with only nasal vowels, though languages with only oral vowels are not uncommon. This fact is taken to support the decision that vowels may be unmarked for oralness — the 'natural' value — and marked for nasality, the 'unnatural' value. In the second place, statistical evidence concerning the relative frequency and differential predictability of features within

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particular languages is also used in support of 'M-U' decisions: For example, among the facts showing that non-Stressed rather than Stressed vowels are normal, and hence unmarked, is that in all languages the more strongly stressed vowels are in the minority (Postal 1968, p. 169).32 4.3.3.5.6.2. Historical and Sociological Evidence. — Postal (1968, p. 170) derives evidence from phonological change and dialectical variation for justifying 'M-U' decisions. He argues that one would expect, for example, that given two series of related segments, one of which is of the Unmarked type, that sound change will frequently merge the Marked with the Unmarked, or change the Marked in some other way. Hence one would expect to find dialects differing in that, for example, one had two series of consonants, one Glottalized and the other not, while the other had only non-Glottalized consonants which were cognate with both these series in the former, etc. But opposite situations in which there is loss or merger of 'normal' to 'nonnormal' types should be extremely rare or nonexistent. 4.3.3.5.6.3. Psychological and Neurophysiological Evidence. — Following Jakobson, Postal finds "important evidence" for making 'M-U' decisions in the expectation "that Marked phonological elements will be acquired later in the process of language learning and lost first in certain pathologies" (1968, p. 172). 4.3.3.5.6.4. Articulatory and Perceptual Evidence. — The "strongest evidence" for making 'M-U' decisions will come, according to Postal (1968, pp. 170—71), from physiological and perceptual investigations. Generally speaking it is expected that features requiring in particular environments the execution of special articulatory movements would be marked in these environments. On account of this consideration apicality will be unmarked in a dental position but 32 Schane (1968b, pp. 714 — 15) also refers to statistical considerations as supporting marking conventions.

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marked in labial, palatal and velar positions (cf. Postal 1968, p. 171). Because of perceptual considerations, [-f nasal] segments will be marked, for, as pointed out by Postal (1968, p. 171, note 15), "the Markedness of nasalization must then be due to the perceptual consequences of nasal resonances, quite likely their strong tendency to obscure other aspects of the signal". Within the framework of a mentalistic linguistic theory, 'M-TJ' decisions and marking conventions constitute hypotheses about those mental mechanisms of the native speaker which underlie human communication. Accordingly, evidence supporting the postulation of 'M-U' markings and marking conventions should meet a particular condition, viz. that it have a bearing on the structure of the mental mechanisms under discussion. It is therefore strange that Postal, being an advocate of mentalism in linguistics,33 does not treat a fundamental methodological question, viz.: on account of what considerations is one obliged to accept historical, sociological, statistical, psychological, neurophysiological, articulatory and perceptual evidence of the types discussed above as being relevant to decisions about the structure of mental mechanisms? I do not suggest that this question cannot be answered satisfactorily, but to me this answer is neither obvious nor so trivial that it does not warrant mentioning. 4.3.3.5.7. Merits of Coherence Norms for talistic Hypotheses

Validating

Men-

In the preceding sections variolis types of evidence provided in support of mentalistic assertions have been surveyed. Typical arguments containing these types of evidence have been analyzed and deficiencies in individual arguments have That Postal is a mentalist is clear from his view of phonetic representations (1968, pp. 31, 331T., 97, 107, 273f., 290ff.) and sound change (196», pp. 269ff.). 33

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been pointed out and commented on. It is now possible to turn to a more general and more fundamental question: under what circumstances would the procedure of validating mentalistic linguistic theories by referring to supporting or sustaining evidence be acceptable from a methodological point of view? Before discussing the latter question let us, for the sake of clarity, consider the basic form of the argument in which the evidence under discussion is used. (27) DATA

CLAIM/CONCLUSION

(a) The linguistic theory 'T' makes C ' about the the claims 'C. structure of the faculté de langage. —•«So (b) The claims 'Cx C„' are supported by the evidence 'E'.

T correctly represents the formal structure of the faculté de langage.

WARRANT Since I f the mentalistic claims of a linguistic theory are supported by the evidence 'E', then this theory correctly represents the structure of the faculté de langage.

(where 'E' refers to the diverse types of evidence surveyed in the preceding paragraphs). The procedure of validating mentalistic hypotheses by adducing evidence within the framework of (27) can be accepted only if three fundamental conditions of adequacy have been met: (28)

(i) The logical and epistemological basis of the key notion referred to by expressions such as 'is supported by', 'is sustained by' and 'coheres with' must be explicated and justified.

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(ii) The R E L E V A N C E of the supporting evidence must be demonstrated. (iii) The R E L I A B I L I T Y , i.e., the correctness, of the supporting evidence must be established. Condition (28) (i) has two aspects. In the first place, it requires that the linguist who uses the form of argument (27) must be able to characterize in precise terms the nature of the logical relation referred to by rather vague expressions such as 'is supported by' and so on. That is, if the linguist asserts that 'the evidence 'E' supports the claim 'C', he must be able to specify accurately what is the relation existing between 'E' and 'C\ If this requirement cannot be met, it will be impossible for the linguist to make a rational decision in an arbitrary case as to whether a given piece of evidence does or does not stand to a given claim in the relation referred to by terms such as 'support', 'coherence' and 'sustenance'. The second aspect of condition (28) (i) concerns the epistemological grounds for at all accepting a norm of coherence as a norm for judging the truth of ontological claims. The linguist using the pattern of argumentation (27) must be able to provide such grounds in justification of his using a coherence norm. This implies that he must be acquainted with the basic aspects of the controversy concerning the general validity of norms of coherence as norms for truth. To my knowledge neither of the two aspects of condition (28) (i) has been given any explicit consideration by irientalist linguists who have used the pattern of argumentation (27). Condition (28) (ii) — the one concerning the relevance of supporting evidence — was mentioned in the discussion of the use of, for example, historical, intuitive, metatheoretical and neurophysiological evidence in the framework of (27). The general point of (28) (ii) is that it is rather senseless to produce evidence in support of the psychological correctness of mentalistic hypotheses if it cannot be demonstrated that this evidence does in fact constitute relevant information

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about the aspect(s) of the mental mechanism(s) about which these hypotheses assert something. Consider, for example, the norm for psychological reality (29) used as the warrant of (19). (29) If a formal device is required for the statement of a process of linguistic change, then it should be assigned psychological reality. There is no a priori reason why this norm should be correct, i.e., why historical evidence should constitute relevant information about the structure of the faculté de langage. A linguist who uses (29) is therefore under the obligation to provide a backing for it — to show why historical evidence should have a bearing on the structure of the faculté de langage at all. This requirement does not hold true only for historical evidence, but for every other conceivable type of evidence used in support of mentalistic hypotheses. It is a rather disconcerting fact that, generally speaking, mentalist linguists show little interest in meeting condition (28) (ii).24 The third condition stated above, i.e., condition (28) (iii), is a rather obvious one. Before a piece of evidence can be used in support of a mentalistic hypothesis, it must be determined whether this piece of evidence is correct. This requirement constitutes the distinctly unattractive consequence of using a coherence norm for psychological reality. That is, it forces the linguist to make judgments about the correctness of scientific results established in fields of inquiry — such as neurophysiology, psychology, and so on — in which he is not a specialist. The specialized nature of modern science makes the possibility of such judgments being well motivated rather remote. In conclusion, attention must again be drawn to the reluctance of mentalist linguists to take note of conditions (28) The problem of the relevance of "external" linguistic evidence of the types mentioned above is discussed within a more sophisticated methodological framework in Botha, to appear. 84

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(i—iii) when using the pattern of argumentation (27). Thus, not much value can be attached to the proposed coherence norms for the psychological reality of linguistic theories. 4.4. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Within the framework of transformational generative grammar, the general linguistic theory and a particular grammar are mentalistic in the sense that the former is a semantic model of the structure of the faculté de langage, and the latter of the form of the native speaker's linguistic competence. 2. At present mentalist linguists do not have at their disposal such norms for the validation of mentalistic hypotheses as are acceptable from the point of view of epistemologica!, logical and ontological considerations. 3. There are no epistemological grounds for assuming that, since a given linguistic theory is the only one which 'works', its characterization of the structure of the faculté de langage is correct. 4. Since alternative, conflicting grammars for the same language can yield correct predictions about grammatical properties of the sentences of this language, the correctness of the predictions of a grammar does not necessarily indicate that it correctly represents the form of the linguistic competence of the native speaker of this language. 5. Furthermore, thè fact that a grammar yields such correct predictions is not a sure sign that the general linguistic theory in terms of which this grammar is constructed is a correct representation of the structure of the faculté de langage.

6. Psycholinguistic testing is unsatisfactory as a procedure for demonstrating the correctness of mentalistic hypotheses, since its logical basis is unsound, incorporating, as it does, the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.

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7. The procedure of validating mentalistic hypotheses by producing supporting or sustaining evidence would be valid only if the following conditions of adequacy could be met: (i) The logical and epistemological basis of the notion of support /sustenance/ coherence must be explicated and justified. (ii) The relevance of the supporting evidence must be demonstrated. (iii) The reliability of the supporting evidence must be determined. 8. Condititions (7) (i—iii) have not been given the necessary consideration by mentalist linguists using this coherence norm for psychological reality. 9. I t has not been shown why facts about linguistic change must be accepted as relevant evidence about the structure of the faculté de langage. 10. I t has not been made clear why the fact that some of the results of the application of the evaluation procedure clash with the intuitions of the linguist about the naturalness of phonological categories should be taken as an indication of the failure of this procedure as a component of the faculté de langage. 11 Psychological considerations derived from primitive and unsatisfactory psychological theories — such as the behaviorist theory of learning — constitute an unacceptable basis for a criterion for linguistic uni versals. 12. I f two formal devices involve the use of the same notations and if the one is known to be a correct hypothesis about the faculté de langage, it still does not necessarily follow that the other one is also a correct representation of some aspect of the structure of the faculté de langage. 13. A linguist adducing neurophysiological evidence in support of a mentalistic linguistic theory must be able to discriminate between (i) neurophysiological evidence about the neural mechanisms underlying human communication and neuro-

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physiological evidence about neural mechanisms not underlying human communication, and (ii) neurophysiological evidence about the structure of and neurophysiological evidence about the physical realization of the former of these two kinds of neural mechanisms. 14. It has not been shown why, within the framework of a mentalistic theory of phonology, historical, statistical and sociological evidence must be accepted as validating particular 'M—U' decisions and marking conventions.

4.5. IMPLICATIONS OF CONCLUSIONS

4.5.1. The Evaluation Measure and the Notion 'Linguistically Significant Generalization' It is now possible to return to the question which iniated the foregoing discussion of the procedures for validating transformational generative grammar as a mentalistic linguistic theory. This question was whether the evaluation measure could be used in a motivated way for determining the degree of linguistically significant generalization achieved by a grammar. It was pointed out in § 3.3.2.4.3. that two conditions must be satisfied before the evaluation measure could be used in this function: (i) The formal devices used for expressing the generalizations presented in grammars must correctly characterize the faculté de langage. (ii) The evaluation measure itself must correctly represent an aspect of the faculté de langage. At present it is impossible to judge whether these conditions can be met, for no methodologically valid procedure for evaluating mentalistic hypotheses is available. Consequently, determination of the degree of linguistically singificant generalization achieved by a mentalistic grammar by

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means of the evaluation measure under discussion is impossible. 4.5.2. Mentalistic Linguistics:

A Future Prospect?

There are two reasons why one must seriously doubt whether transformational generative grammar AS A MENTALISTIC LINGUISTIC THEORY could have established any significant results. The first and most important reason concerns the general content of the conclusions summarized in § 4.4.: mentalist linguists have failed to develop the necessary methodologically valid procedures for validating the mentalistic hypotheses of the general linguistic theory and of particular grammars. All of the pragmatic, correspondence, and coherence norms for psychological reality surveyed in the preceding paragraphs are vitiated by serious deficiencies. Even if it is assumed, for the sake of argument, that the coherence and correspondence norms for psychological reality are valid, the results obtained by using them are unimpressive. As already pointed out by Kiparsky (1968) and by Fodor and Garrett (1966), the results from psycholinguistic testing, as a procedure of validating claims about the structure of the faculté de langage and of the linguistic competence of the native speaker, are not only scant but indeed mutually contradictory. It must be pointed out that no attempt has so far been made to use the coherence norms for psychological reality in a systematic, non-incidental way for validating the mentalistic assertions of the general linguistic theory. The second reason for casting doubts on the significance of the results obtained by transformational generative grammar as a mentalistic linguistic theory concerns the form of the mentalistic hypotheses put forward by the general theory and particular grammars. Regarding the general theory Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 331) point out that there is a 'crucial' idealization implicit in the transformationalist conception of the study of language.

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We have been describing acquisition of language as if it were an instantaneous process. Obviously, this is not true. A more realistic model of language acquisition would consider the order in which primary linguistic data are used by the child and the effects of preliminary 'hypotheses' developed in the earlier stages of learning on the interpretation of new, often more complex, data. To us it appears that this more realistic study is much too complex to be undertaken in any meaningful way today and that it will be far more fruitful to investigate in detail, as a first approximation, the idealized model outlined earlier, leaving refinements to a time when this idealization is better understood . . . In the meantime, this idealization must be kept in mind when we think about the problem of the 'psychological reality' of the postulated mental structures. The incorporation of this idealization in the linguistic theory implies that mentalistic hypotheses do not have the form of simple categorical statements such as (30), but that of conditional statements such as (31). (30) The formal devices 'FD X ,. . .,FD n ' characterize the structure of the faculté de langage. (31) I f it was assumed that language acquisition is an instantaneous process, then the formal devices ' I D ^ . . .,FD n ' would characterize the structure of the faculté de langage.35 As pointed out by Chomsky and Halle (1968,p. 332) themselves, a conditional statement such as (31) "will, naturally, be more difficult to verify, will require more indirect and subtle means of verification, than a simple categorical assertion" such as (30). In the whole of thiB chapter we have assumed that mentalistic hypotheses were Bimple categorical assertions such as (30). I t was found that mentalist linguists do not have at their disposal adequate procedures of validating such simple categorical assertions. Appreciation of the fact that even 3 * As an example of such a conditional statement Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 331) provide the following: "if it were the case that language acquisition were instantaneous, then the underlying lexical forms with pre-Vowel-Shift representations would be psychologically real".

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"more indirect and subtle means of verification" are needed for the validation of conditional statements of the type of (31) leaves one still less convinced that transformational generative grammar, AS A MENTALISTIC LINGUISTIC THEORY, is testable at present.36 Whether the mentalistic claims made by transformational generative grammar will become testable in the (near) future depends primarily on one factor, viz. whether mentalist linguists will become more willing to face the methodological problems connected with the thesis of mentalism. It is hard to shake off the impression that professed mentalists are more concerned with the abstract structure of mental mechanisms when formulating the goals of linguistic theories than when actually conducting linguistic and grammatical inquiry. If they are really so concerned with revealing the structure of these mechanisms, the fact that so little attention is given to the methodological problem of validating mentalistic hypotheses is inexplicable. It seems to me that transformational generative linguists — whether they be mentalists or not — are at present quite satisfied when they attain one specific goal. This goal is the development of formal devices in terms of which grammars can be constructed that generate all and only the grammatical sentences of natural languages, assigning to each sentence an appropriate structural description. Whether these formal devices, and the grammars resulting from their application to the linguistic data, really repre36 Since an idealization is also used in the formulation of the object of study of a mentalistic grammar, its mentalistic assertions must also be formulated as conditional statements. This idealization is clearly identifiable in the remarks by Chomsky (1965, p. 3) to the effect that "linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance."

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sent the structure of mental mechanisms correctly is a question to which little attention is given in the process of linguistic inquiry. Transformationalists who have given the latter question some consideration have so far failed to identify, let alone solve, the methodological questions arising in connection with the thesis of mentalism. Kiparsky's (1968) discussion of linguistic change as a "window on the form of linguistic competence" typically fails to deal with what is one of the fundamental methodological problems connected with the validation of mentalistic linguistic theories. In concluding this paragraph, two points must be stressed. In the first place, my negative appraisal of the procedures used for validating mentalistic hypotheses by no means implies that I reject the thesis of mentalism as explicated in § 4.2. My reasons, however, for accepting this thesis are not relevant to the present discussion. In the second place, by commenting negatively on the success of transformational generative grammar AS A MENTALISTIC LINGUISTIC THEORY, I naturally do not belittle the impressive results obtained by it as a linguistic theory which makes the necessary formal devices available for constructing non-mentalistic grammars.

5

THE EMPIRICAL STATUS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE PHONOLOGY AS A NON-MENTALISTIC THEORY

5.1. GENERAL REMARKS

In the preceding chapter a number of the problems arising in connection with the validation of the theory of phonology viewed as a mentalistic approach have been examined. The present chapter is reserved for a discussion of difficulties relating to the empirical status of transformational generative phonology as a non-mentalistic theory. To ensure that this discussion takes place in a coherent fashion, the following questions must first be considered: (i) In what sense can transformational generative phonology be viewed as a non-mentalistic theory? (ii) What methodological property of a theory is referred to by the expression 'empirical status' ? 5.1.1. A Non-mentalistic

Theory

It was made clear in § 4.2. that transformational generative grammar as a mentalistic linguistic theory — both the general theory and the grammars constructed within its framework — 'deals with' two kinds of phenomena in the linguistic reality: (i) linguistic data or observations about linguistic units, and (ii) a mental mechanism or faculty. A mentalistic grammar, for example, attempts to E X P L A I N the linguistic data by presenting the rules or 'laws' to which the statements describing these data are reductively related. 1 Furthermore, it is postulated that these rules characterize 1

For the logical notion 'reduction' cf. Bochenski 1962, pp. 126-127.

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or DESCRIBE the structure of the brain mechanism which underlies the encoding and decoding of the sentences whose linguistic properties are reflected in the data. 2 The way in which a mentalistic grammar is linked to linguistic reality may be presented schematically as (1). EXPLANATION R A M M A R

DESCRIPTION

The fundamental difference between a mentalistic and a non-mentalistic linguistic theory is that, whereas the former deals with two kinds of phenomena in reality, the linguistic reality with which the latter is concerned comprises one type of phenomenon only, viz. linguistic data or observations. Viewed as a non-mentalistic theory, a transformational generative grammar, for example, would attempt no more than presenting the rules or 'laws' from which the statements describing the linguistic data can be derived reductively. A nonmentalist transformationalist would be one who does not defend the thesis that these rules should also describe the structure of a mental mechanism.3 Whether the reductive 2 The explanation of linguistic data which is given by a mentalistic theory resembles the type of explanation which Harre (1967, p. 100) calls "interacientific explanation". In interscientific explanation, an explanation of the facts of one science is given in terms of a description of the facts of another science (cf. Harre 1967, p. 101). * For a discussion of the diverse ontological interpretations that can be given to a theory in general and a linguistic theory in particular cf. Botha 1968, § 3.5.

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relation existing between a non-mentalistic grammar and the statements presenting the linguistic data could be regarded as an explanatory relationship is a debatable point which cannot be considered here.4 To eliminate the need to deal with this issue, the relation between a non-mentalistic grammar and the data will be referred to in neutral terms as a relationship of 'accounting for'. (2) schematically represents the relation between a non-mentalistic grammar and the linguistic reality it 'accounts for'. (2)

G R A M M

ACCOUNTING F O R

LINGUISTIC DATA

A R

From the point of view of validating a linguistic theory, a non-mentalistic linguistic theory — whether it be the general theory or a particular grammar — incorporates fewer claims than a mentalistic one, the correctness of which is to be determined. In the case of a mentalistic theory, it must be ascertained whether the formal devices constituting it (a) correctly describe the structure of the underlying mental mechanism, and (b) correctly explain the linguistic data. In validating a non-mentalistic linguistic theory, one is concerned with the correctness of these formal devices only insofar as they do or do not 'account for' the data constituting its linguistic reality in a satisfactory way. In this chapter, the empirical status of transformational generative phonology will be considered from the latter point of view. 1 I t is also impossible here to examine the various other methodological difficulties existing with respect to a non-mentalistic linguistic theory.

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5.1.2. The Empirical Status of a Theory Without elaborating on the point, it was suggested in § 3.3.2.1. that the empirical status of a statement is determined by its testability. To place the discussion of questions relating to the empirical status of transformational generative phonology in an explicit methodological framework, questions (3) (i—ii) must now be briefly considered.5 (3) (i) What is understood by the expression 'the testability of a hypothesis or theory' ? (ii) What are the factors harmful to the testability of a hypothesis or theory? Concerning (3) (i), Hempel (1965c, p. 3) points out that the defining characteristic of an empirical statement is its capability of being tested by a confrontation with experiential findings, i.e. with the results of suitable experiments or focussed observations. Hempel makes provision for the fact that for practical reasons a large number of empirical statements cannot be tested. He consequently introduces the notion 'the testability in principle of a statement'. In terms of this notion a statement is testable if it is possible to state just what experiential findings, if they were actually obtained, would constitute favorable evidence for it, and what findings or 'data' . . . would constitute unfavorable evidence . . (Hempel 1965c, pp. 3—4). To determine what data would constitute favourable or unfavourable evidence for a hypothesis, TEST IMPLICATIONS must be derived from it. Such test implications have the form "if test conditions C are realized, then outcome E will occur" (cf. Hempel 1966, p. 30). It is clear that Hempel's notion of 6 It is impossible to deal here with complexities and problems relating to the theory of confirmation. For a discussion of some of these questions of., e.g., Hempel 1965c and Hesse 1969.

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testability — involving the confrontation of test implications derived from a hypothesis with experiential findings — is based on a correspondence norm of truth (cf. also Popper 1969c, pp. 223 ff.). Thus, to consider the empirical status or testability of a theory, hypothesis or statement is to inquire into its susceptibility to validation on the basis of a correspondence norm for truth (cf. § 4.3.2.). Philosophers of science, such as Hempel (1966, pp. 31— 32) and Popper (1969b, pp. 256—57) point out that it is not always possible to distinguish sharply between hypotheses or theories which are testable in principle and those which are not. They consequently adopt the notion ' D E G R E E OP T E S T A B I L I T Y ' on the basis of which distinctions can be drawn among hypotheses or theories which differ as to the number and type of their test implications. Turning to question (3) (ii), three factors which adversely affect the testability of a hypothesis or theory can be noted. In the first place, the theory or hypothesis may be formulated so inexplicitly that it is impossible to derive precise test implications from it. In the second place, it may be impossible to specify just what evidence — evidence both relevant and reliable — would confirm or disconfirm a theory or hypothesis. Finally, a theory or hypothesis may be constructed in such a way that it can be upheld even in the face of evidence which actually contradicts it. In the latter case special hypotheses, principles or concepts are incorporated into a theory solely for the purpose of protecting it against adverse evidence. These devices, blocking the process of disconfirming a theory, are called 'AD HOC H Y P O T H E S E S ' by Hempel (1966, pp. 29—30). Karl Popper (1969b, p. 256) equates the testability of a theory with its "refutability". Theories which cannot be refuted he regards as "unscientific". In examining the testability of a theory or hypothesis, one should thus always attempt to determine (i) whether the theory or hypothesis yields test implications which are precise and explicit enough,

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(ii) whether it is possible to specify just what evidence would disconfirm it by contradicting these test implications, and (iii) whether the theory or hypothesis contains devices which allow one to uphold it in the face of adverse evidence. A theory formulated in such a way that it can be confirmed only, and not disconfirmed also, does not belong to the field of empirical science. When assessing the empirical status of a theory it is therefore natural to concentrate on its susceptibility to disconfirmation.

5.2. THE TESTABILITY OF THE THEORY OF PHONOLOGY

5.2.1. The Oeneral Issue

The general topic that will be dealt with in the remaining part of this chapter is the testability of a number of the devices in terms of which transformational generative phonology attempts to account for observations about the phonological and phonetic properties of natural language. These devices will be examined from two points of view: (i) that of the availability of relevant and reliable evidence which would confirm or disconfirm their test implications, and (ii) that of the existence of ad hoc hypotheses which block attempts to disconfirm them. The question might be raised as to whether or not too much attention is given to the empirical status of transformational generative phonology by reserving such a large section of a monograph for its discussion. It could be asked whether the proponents of this theory insist on its being an empirical theory. There would be no point in discussing 'difficulties' relating to the empirical status of a theory, if its proponents do not present it as empirical.

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That a detailed discussion of the empirical status of transformational generative phonology is in fact warranted is clear from the following remarks by Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. ix): One of the best reasons for presenting a theory of a particular language in the precise form of a generative grammar, or for presenting a hypothesis concerning general linguistic theory in very explicit terms, is that only such precise and explicit formulation can lead to the discovery of serious inadequacies and to an understanding of how they can be remedied. In contrast, a system of transcription or terminology, a list of examples, or a rearrangement of the data in a corpus is not 'refutable' by evidence (apart from inadvertence — errors that are on the level of proofreading mistakes). It is for just this reason that such exercises are of very limited interest for linguistics as a field of rational inquiry. From these remarks it is abundantly clear how greatly Chomsky and Halle value the methodological requirement for a linguistic theory to be empirical. This requirement has been a basic stimulus for their attempts to develop the system of generative grammar. 5.2.2. The Availability of Evidence 5.2.2.1. General Remarks The testability of two aspects of the theory of phonology will be discussed from the point of view of the availability of relevant and reliable evidence for validating them: (i) the hypotheses about the functioning and form of the evaluation measure, and (ii) the phonetic representations constituting the output of the phonological component of a grammar. These aspects of the theory of phonology will be dealt with primarily in the form in which they are presented in The Sound Pattern of English.

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THEORY

5.2.2.2. The Evaluation Measure 5.2.2.2.1. the Issues For the sake of clarity, the function and the nature of the evaluation measure are briefly outlined once more. The function of the evaluation measure is to select the most highly valued grammar for a language from the alternatives which have been constructed by the application of the general linguistic theory to the linguistic data (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp. 168, 251, 331). The evaluation measure is based on a "technical" notion of simplicity: the "simpler" a grammar is, the higher the degree of linguistically significant generalization achieved by it and the higher, consequently, the value assigned to it by the evaluation measure. The value of a grammar or a sequence of rules is the reciprocal of the number of symbols in its minimal representation (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 334). With great deliberation Chomsky and Halle (1965, pp. 107, 108, 109; 1968, pp. 36, 296—97, 334—35) declare that the selection of the evaluation measure is an "empirical" matter. They point out that a specific proposal about the form of the evaluation measure, and the notion of value on which it is based, can be proved incorrect. In their paper "Some Controversial Questions in Phonological Theory" (1965, p. 108) they compare the selection of an evaluation measure to the evaluation of a physical constant: We are given a certain pairing of empirical facts: primary linguistic data 'Dj' leads to descriptively adequate grammar 'G1', 'D 2 ' leads to 'G2', etc. One can no more give an A PRIORI argument for a particular evaluation measure than one can for a particular value of a gravitational constant. If it is true that the discovery of the evaluation measure is an empirical matter, the hypotheses (4) (i— ii) should be testable. (4) (i) The general linguistic theory must incorporate an evaluation measure.

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(ii) This evaluation measure must be based on the notion of simplicity in terms of which the value of a sequence of rules is the reciprocal of the number of symbols in its minimal representation . With respect to (4) (i) it will be determined in what way the empirical status of the evaluation measure is affected by the type of relationship in which it stands to the other formal devices in the general theory. Concerning (4) (ii), I intend to consider the question of just what data would controvert it. Having considered the testability of the hypotheses (4) (i) and (ii), it will be possible to make a general assessment of the empirical status of the evaluation measure as a device incorporated in a non-mentalistic linguistic theory. 5.2.2.2.2. Motivation for Adopting an Evalttation

Measure

To my knowledge the test implications of the hypothesis that the linguistic theory should incorporate an evaluation measure have never been stated explicitly. Neither has it been specified just what evidence would either confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis. An argument, however, for the justification of the adoption of an evaluation measure has been produced by Chomsky and Halle. Though an argument produced in favour of the adoption of a new scientific principle does not indicate that this principle is testable, it can limit the arbitrariness of this principle. Let us therefore examine this argument by Chomsky and Halle. Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 330) point out that . . . . a proper choice of formal devices does not guarantee selection of the correct grammar. It is to be expected that there will be many grammars which are statable in term6 of the given formal devices and which are all compatible with whatever data are available from a certain language; thus selection among the alternatives will require a procedure of evaluation of some sort. Certainly this is true of any proposal that can now be envisioned with regard to the formalism for the statement of grammars.

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From these remarks it is clear that an evaluation measure is required as a component of the general linguistic theory because of a particular methodological property exhibited by this theory. This property has been labelled THEORETICAL SLACK by Rosenbaum and Blair (1966, p. 9). They assert that theoretical slack means simply that the linguistic theory in terms of which a grammar is constructed is insufficiently specific to allow a choice among competing descriptions of the same phenomenon. For example, a linguistic theory which allows number on nouns to be viewed either as a constituent under the domination of 'NP', as specified in a rewriting rule, or as a syntactic feature positively or negatively specified, exhibits this property of theoretical slack. Rosenbaum and Blair (1966, p. 9) assert that selection of one of these alternatives above the other is arbitrary from the point of view of the general linguistic theory. To limit the arbitrariness of the general linguistic theory oauBed by the property of theoretical slack, an evaluation measure is adopted as an additional component of this theory. I t is clear from the quoted remarks by Chomsky and Halle that the evaluation measure SUPPLEMENTS the other formal devices in the theory in selecting the highest valued grammar for a language. This relationship of supplementation holding between the evaluation measure and the other formal devices gives rise to fundamental methodological difficulties. In the first place, the relationship of supplementation has an impermanent, incidental nature. It allows for the theoretical possibility that the need for incorporating an evaluation measure in the general theory could disappear completely. This is possible since the motivation for the adoption of an evaluation measure is found in the inability of the other formal devices in the theory to determine the most highly valued grammar for a language. As the formulation of existing formal devices is improved on and new ones are developed,

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the theoretical slack of the general theory is likely to be lessened. Consequently the motivation for adopting an evaluation measure will grow weaker and weaker. The grounds for adopting an evaluation measure and the relationship of supplementation existing between the evaluation measure and the other formal devices allow for the theoretical possibility that the evaluation measure may be eliminated completely from the general linguistic theory. The grounds for adopting an evaluation measure — the inadequacy of the other formal devices of the general linguistic theory — are of such an incidental nature that the argument with which Chomsky and Halle motivate this step is very weak indeed. This argument certainly does not illustrate the point that the selection of an evaluation measure is an empirical matter. Note, in the second place, that the incorporation of an evaluation measure into the general theory as a supplementary device, on the grounds expounded above, can have an adverse effect upon the empirical status of the other formal devices of this theory. The mere fact that a linguistic theory incorporates such an evaluation measure partially removes the motivation for rejecting or modifying the other formal devices the inadequacy of which has led to the adoption of this evaluation measure. That is, adopting an evaluation measure as a device to supplement inadequate formal devices allows for the possibility of retaining these formal devices in epite of their unsatisfactoriness. In this way the empirical status of these formal devices is all but neutralized. A concrete case in which the adoption of the evaluation measure has precisely this effect will be considered in § 5.2.3.2.3.2. 5.2.2.2.3. Evidence for the Form of the Evaluation Measure Turning to the question of the testability of the hypothesis (4) (ii), the notion of value underlying the evaluation measure can be repeated for convenience as (5). (5) The 'value' of a sequence of rules is the reciprocal of the

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THEORY

number of symbols in its minimal representation (Chomsky and Halle 1968, p. 334). Though they have insisted on the empirical nature of (5), Chomsky and Halle have not, to my knowledge, anywhere stated explicitly by just what evidence (5) could be confirmed or disconfirmed. When they do mention this evidence, they are quite vague about its precise nature and availability. Comments such as (6) (i—iii) are typical of the ones they offer on this topic. [(6)] [(i)] It may be difficult to obtain crucial empirical evidence bearing on proposed definitions of "simplicity", but this cannot obscure the fact that it is an empirical concept that is involved... (1968, p. 296). [(ii)] However difficult it may be to find relevant evidence for or against a proposed theory, there can be no doubt whatsoever about the empirical nature of the problem. We stress this fact because the problem has so often been misconstrued as one of "taste" or "elegance" (1968, p. 331). [(iii)] In other words, definition (9), together with a specific choice of an alphabet from which the symbols are selected . . . and a specific set of notations for formulating rules and schemata, provides a precise explication for the notion "linguistically significant generalization" . . . Like all empirical claims, this can be tested for correctness and accuracy and can readily be controverted by evidence showing that it fails to hold true in certain clear cases (1968, p. 335).® The remarks (6) (i—iii), and other similar ones, contain no indication at all of the precise nature of the evidence on the basis of the availability of which the notion of value (5) could be regarded as being empirical. Comments such as (6) (i—iii) tempt one to conclude that in the context of transformational generative phonology the notion 'empirical' has a rather special meaning. Instead of the usual meaning 9 (9) in this quotation refers to the notion of value specified as (5) above.

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'what is testable in principle', it has the special content 'what ought to be testable in principle'. I t is hardly necessary to point out that, taken in the latter sense, the requirement t h a t a scientific principle be empirical is completely vacuous. I n attempting to determine whether the claim t h a t the evaluation measure be based on the notion of value (5) is empirical, one could, of course, ignore metatheoretical assertions such as (6) (i—iii). I t could be argued t h a t such remarks were not intended to stand up to methodological analysis and, consequently, t h a t from a methodological viewpoint they constitute misleading evidence about the empirical status of (5). This argument could continue by saying that, in order to assess the testability of the notion of simplicity (5), one should rather examine concrete cases in which its proponents have attempted to confirm or disconfirm it. I n the examination of such cases, one would be especially concerned with the relevance and the reliability of the evidence adduced to confirm or disconfirm (5). Let us accordingly examine three cases in which Chomsky and Halle (1968) express their dissatisfaction with (5) and one case in which they offer evidence intended to confirm it. The first case in which Chomsky and Halle (1968, pp. 360—61) voice their dissatisfaction with the results of an evaluation measure based on (5) concerns the 'cost' that it assigns to the Metathesis Rule (7). ( 7 ) S D : f + V O C l ,L[ - c o nJs ] , [ + V ° C l [— cons J [— cons J 1

2

3

S C : 1 2 3 —>- 2 1 3 except when 2 = 3 = [a] This rule expresses the relation between stems such as the underlying form [pia] plural stem [pai + i]. I t is assumed t h a t place in the plural stem [pai -f- i] and not in [pia + a] (cf. Chomsky and Halle 1968, pp.

Kasem nominal 'sheep', and the metathesis takes the singular stem 360—61).

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ChomBky and Halle (1968, p. 361) assert t h a t the rule (7) raises a problem for the evaluation measure. If metathesis is formulated in this way and (7) is evaluated by counting nothing but the features occurring in it, it costs less t h a n a rule with the same structural description which has a minimal structural change of one feature. This change could be in the vowel, for example. They find it unacceptable, therefore, that in terms of the proposed notion of value, the Metathesis Rule is valued more highly than the rule involving only a minimal structural change. Unfortunately Chomsky and Halle do not present the data which controvert this result of applying the evaluation measure. I t is thus impossible to determine whether these data, if available, are relevant and reliable. Chomsky and Halle's dissatisfaction with the formulation of the evaluation measure — not being motivated — consequently does not show t h a t it is an empirical principle. I t would not do to simply label the case of the Metathesis Rule a 'clear case' in which the evaluation measure gives an unsatisfactory result. What is required is the specification of just what sort of evidence controverts its implications as well as a demonstration of the relevance and reliability of this evidence. The second case to be considered here, in which the evaluation measure fails to give a correct estimate of the value of a segment of a grammar, concerns the 'naturalness' of particular phonological segments (cf. also § 4.3.3.5.2.). I t is necessary to repeat the authors' remarks on this verbatim: Up to a point this measure gives the desired results, but in many cases it fails completely. For example, the class of voiced obstruents is, intuitively, more natural than the class of voiced segments (consonant or vowel), but the latter has the simpler definition (1968, p. 400). The key expression in these remarks is "intuitively", since it indicates the nature of the evidence which controverts the given test implication of (5). The evidence is constituted by the intuitions which the linguist has about the naturalness of

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the phonological categories mentioned. There is every methodological reason to suspect the relevance and reliability of this intuitive evidence about the properties of phonological categories (cf. also § 4.3.3.5.2.). To call a piece of evidence "intuitive" in this context is only to remain silent about its origin and not to demonstrate its relevance and reliability. 7 As pointed out by Kiparsky (1968, p. 172) linguists do acquire ideas about the form of grammars. However, these ideas result from the linguists' work on language and their basis is all but clear. Since the nature of the evidence that is supposed to controvert the given test implication of (5) is obscure, the empirical status of (5) is not demonstrated by referring to this 'disconfirming' evidence. The third case in which Chomsky and Halle (1968, p. 401) show their disapproval of results obtained by the use of the evaluation measure concerns the value it assigns to rules such as (8) (i—ii) and (9) (i— ii). (8)

(i) i u (ii) i -»• i

(9)