Messianism in Medieval Jewish Thought 9781618115706

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Messianism in Medieval Jewish Thought

Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah Series Editor Dov Schwartz (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan) Editorial Board Ada Rapoport Albert (University College, London) Gad Freudenthal (CNRS, Paris) Gideon Freudenthal (Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv) Moshe Idel (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) Raphael Jospe (Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan) Ephraim Kanarfogel (Yeshiva University, New York) Menachem Kellner (Haifa University, Haifa) Daniel Lasker (Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva)

Messianism in Medieval Jewish Thought Dov Schwartz Translated by Batya Stein

Boston 2017

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names:  Schwartz, Dov, author. | Stein, Batya, translator. Title:  Messianism in medieval Jewish thought / Dov Schwartz; translated by Batya Stein. Other titles:  ha-Ra-ayon ha-meshihi ba-hagut ha-Yehudit bi-Yeme ha-Beinayim. English Description:  Academic Studies | Press: Brighton, MA, [2017] Series: Emunot: Jewish philosophy and Kabbalah | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers:  LCCN 2016052710 | ISBN 9781618115690 (hardback) Subjects: LCSH: Messianic era (Judaism)—History of doctrines. Redemption— Judaism—­History of doctrines. | Jewish philosophy. | Philosophy, Medieval. Classification:LCC BM625 .S3413 1997 | DDC 296.3/3609—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016052710 Copyright © 2017 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved. ISBN 978-1-618115-69-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-618115-70-6 (electronic) Cover design by Jen Stacey Book design by Kryon Publishing www.kryonpublishing.com Published by Academic Studies Press in 2017 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com

Contents

Preface vi Chapter 1:  Methodological Introduction

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Chapter 2:  Apocalyptic Messianism in a Rationalist Garb

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Chapter 3:  Individual Redemption and Naturalism

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Chapter 4:  The Resurgence of Apocalyptic Messianism

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Chapter 5:   The Decline of Collective Naturalism

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Chapter 6:  Between Naturalism and Apocalyptic Messianism

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Chapter 7:  Clarifying Positions: The Last Stage

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Chapter 8:  Conclusions: Redemption, Models, and Decisions

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Appendix  History, Ideas, and the History of Ideas

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Bibliography

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Index 272

Preface

Messianism has played a significant role in Jewish thought and culture. This yearning for redemption in a people in exile is understandable, given that the announcement of its exile was tied to that of its birth at the “covenant between the parts” (Genesis 15:1-15). Jewish thought was first systematically formulated in the Middle Ages, and it was then that messianic approaches also found fitting expression. Knowledge about these messianic views in medieval thought is thus also important as a conceptual and cultural foundation of modern and contemporary messianic approaches. The present work is an attempt to outline the basic characteristics of rationalist messianic approaches in the Middle Ages, and particularly the conceptual tensions between them. Specifically, it focuses on various manifestations of two messianic approaches that address the nature of the messianic process as well as the outlines of future redemption in general. The first approach will, for the current purposes, be referred to as apocalyptic.1 Terms such as “miraculous” or “supernatural” do not encompass the full span of this view. In its context, redemption means an essential and profound change in the cosmos, up to its destruction and rebuilding, and its attainment is tied to a glorious messianic tableau, with a plot and a distinctly mythical order. The second approach, to be referred to as naturalistic, challenges the assumption of the end of the world as a condition of redemption. It holds that we should not despair of the present world and its amendment and, therefore, should not ask for a new world to emerge on the ruins of the present one. This approach significantly lessens direct divine involvement in the redemptive process and almost excludes it altogether. This view characterized classic rationalists who recoiled from changes in the natural order and from the imaginary, and to some extent dangerous, character of the apocalyptic legacy. This book traces the emergence of these two positions in Jewish philosophy and their various manifestations until   1 In this work, apocalyptic is used to denote content rather than form. Content-wise, the apocalyptic chapters in Isaiah, Daniel, and other biblical texts deal with the end of the world, with a wondrous war with mythical and demonic creatures, and so forth. In other words, apocalypse is tied to the supernatural and the mythical. Formwise, apocalypse is formulated as visions, with their usual literary characteristics. By contrast, visionary writing is not widespread in the philosophical literature of the Middle Ages, and its character is also alien to the genre. See Malcolm Bull, ed., Apocalypse Theory and the Ends of the World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

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the end of the Middle Ages, including the tension between them following their confrontation. A book of this kind could hardly have been written in its present form during the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth. I will not enter here into the recurring conflict between the present and previous generation of scholars with the Wissenschaft des Judentums school and the extent of its biases. Clearly, however, misgivings still prevail about delving too deeply into the issue of messianism and its implications. Three brief examples of how messianism was handled will serve to illustrate this determination: 1) In an article devoted to this topic in his Jüdische Schriften, Hermann Cohen described the messianic idea relying solely on naturalistic motifs. He did not consider that apocalyptic messianism had any right to exist or exerted any influence. 2) David Neumark, among the more sober scholars of Wissenschaft des Judentums, devised an ambitious plan for writing, in ten volumes, the “history of Jewish philosophy” up to the end of the Middle Ages. He succeeded in writing four—an introductory volume, matter and form, the attributes in antiquity, and dogma. The messianic idea never featured in this plan, even though other theological issues, such as prophecy, do appear. 3) When Benzion Netanyahu dealt with the messianic issue in his important book on Abravanel (published in 1953), he rushed to explain and justify the motif of vengeance from Gentiles. The vengeance motif is widespread in apocalyptic messianic trends, be they philosophical or mythical, and one of their integral components. Apologizing and downplaying messianic positions is currently unnecessary. Gershom Scholem’s merit is that he dared to present a direct analysis of the messianic idea’s elements without restricting himself to specific issues, such as the dates of redemption or historical messianic movements. Scholem’s disciples presented detailed and exhaustive analyses of messianic manifestations in Kabbalah and Jewish mysticism. The messianic component in rationalist Jewish philosophy, however, seems to require further attention. Scholars have not found the juncture of rationality and messianism appealing and this topic, except for a few important studies, has not been sufficiently discussed. Note that the present work does deal at length with the approach ­conveying apprehensions about any concern with messianism. These apprehensions,

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however, are not a modern phenomenon and had already existed in the Middle Ages. At that time, a trend emerged seeking to make messianic descriptions enlightened and universal, confronting the sources on the one hand and the zeitgeist on the other. The visions in the biblical, talmudic, and midrashic sources prophesied vengeance and retribution as well as a wonderful world for the god-fearing, mostly only for the Jews among them. The popular mood longed for the great and terrible day of the Lord, when God would take revenge on the Gentiles and on the “members of religions” (Moslems and Christians) for the suffering they had inflicted on God’s chosen people. Rationality, as noted, attempted to contend with this sweeping approach and, supported by several prestigious figures (Maimonides, Rashba, and others), presented a fair and balanced confrontation with the apocalyptic view. Among rationalists, this confrontation persisted until the end of the Middle Ages and was only settled with the appearance of R. Yitzhak Abravanel. The importance of this historical and philosophical chapter in the study of the history of ideas seems quite obvious, but an inquiry into this question will also provide some perspective on the conceptual forces active in Jewish thought. A deeper analysis of these philosophical and theological sources indeed reveals that contemporary positions have their roots in the Jewish world of ideas. Describing how the messianic idea came into being within Jewish thought is crucial because, contrary to Islam and Christianity, which required only a few decades to formulate a systematic theology, Judaism took many centuries to present a methodical philosophy. Hence, the study of medieval philosophy is not an archaic concern with dusty and crumbling books and manuscripts of interest to a tiny group of academics, but an inquiry into the cradle of systematic thought in Judaism. This probe into the messianic idea, then, is doubly significant: it points to fundamental trends that Jewish culture draws upon to this day, and affords a glimpse into the relationship of Judaism with its surroundings in the past and possibly in the present. The research method adopted in this study focuses on a wide ­spectrum of thinkers. The present book’s essential innovation is that it does not, unlike the studies on messianic thought so far, focus on key figures. Both ­historically and philosophically, describing the conceptual aspects of a ­culture according to the doctrine of one or two thinkers as a suitable ­representation of a century or more seems mistaken. This is the approach that was applied in Joseph Saracheck’s book, published in 1932, which attempts to describe a period by studying the teachings of a few isolated figures. Attention has also focused on printed works, while neglecting

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­ anuscripts. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, printed m works are only a fraction of the active thought of the period. The merit of the present work is that it describes currents of thought developing and resonating in the teachings of dozens of thinkers, seeking to present the leading philosophical doctrines against the backdrop of the period and its spirit. Many conceptual phenomena that seem startling and unusual in isolation thereby become understandable. The research method focusing on conceptual circles rather than on the thought of individual figures is applied in this work to one issue in the general context of the messianic idea—messianic tension—which bears implications for other dimensions of the encounter between philosophy and theology. This book does not pretend to encompass the philosophical dynamic of the Middle Ages as a whole. It concentrates on the “Sephardic” rationalism that arose in the Iberian Peninsula, Provence, and Italy, and its impact on Jewish thought in Byzantium.2 Lacunas will most probably be revealed regarding personalities or cultural areas, given that research on the philosophy and theology of rationality in Byzantium and Ashkenaz is only beginning. It does describe, however, the central developments in the messianic idea from West to East and suitably reflects the philosophical endeavor within the circles of Jewish rationality.

*** Many colleagues have read this manuscript, wholly or partly, and most of them also made important comments. Some of them inspired the ideas mentioned in it—Moshe Hallamish, Moshe Idel, Menachem Kellner, Daniel Lasker, Lawrence Schiffman, and Eliezer Schlossberg. I am grateful to all. I wish to express once more my deep thanks and appreciation to Batya Stein. Batya is not only my translator but a genuine partner to my writing, whose insights and contributions make her an author. I am honored and grateful for this privilege.   2 In Ashkenaz, the rationalistic trend was marginal. For the differences between “Ashkenazi” and “Sephardic” ­messianism in general and spe­cifically on Ashkenazi messianism, see, for example, Gershon D. Cohen, “Messianic Postures of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” Leo Baeck Memorial Lecture 9 (1967): 117–158; Elisheva Carlebach, Between History and Hope: Jewish Messianism in Ashkenaz and Sepharad (New York: Touro College, 1998); Israel Yuval, Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, trans. Barbara Harshav and Jonathan Chipman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Sarit Shalev-Eyni, “Between Carnality and Spirituality: A Cosmological Vision of the End at the Turn of the Fifth Jewish Millennium,” Speculum 90 (2015): 458-482.

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Methodological Introduction

Research deals mostly with historical and conceptual events and ­analyzes them with a priori tools by placing them and framing them within given structural patterns. The scholarly consensus is that the actual ­phenomenon—the historical reality or the ideas—does not precisely fit the construct into which it is poured. Reality is complex and more blurry than the pattern or model representing it. Almost p ­ aradoxically, however, the event and its implications are hard to understand unless they are located within a p ­ attern, a construct, a model. After scholars understand the ­structural trend and the place of the event within it, they are qualified to understand the event’s authentic character. Models, then, are necessary research tools, even though they cannot fully reflect the complexity of reality. An appropriate example of this use of models is the clear division into Neoplatonic and neo-Aristotelian trends, which is pervasive in the study of medieval Jewish philosophy. These two models will help in the initial description and mapping of how philosophical thought developed in the Jewish world at the time. An analysis of the concrete teachings, however, shows that the actual event is not a pure reflection of any model, and reality is far more complex than the strong and simplistic division into models. Neoplatonic patterns recur in philosophies considered ­distinctly “Aristotelian” and vice-versa—thinkers who are definitely viewed as Neoplatonic consistently display Aristotelian thinking.1 Yet, the study of the concrete teachings cannot begin without setting up the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian models or, in another formulation, without setting up the models in order to dismantle them. Relying on these assumptions, I will present several models and ­criteria for the development of the messianic idea in medieval Jewish philosophy, from the geonic era and up to the expulsion from Spain. These models and ­criteria   1 For the reflection of this determination in another matter, see Dov Schwartz, “The Study of Models and the Teachings of a Forgotten Thinker,” Daat 34 (1995): 153-156 [Heb].

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are mutually related. Moreover, they even derive from one another. Their isolation and presentation follows the analysis of the complex p ­ hilosophical and theological reality and its deconstruction into conceptual elements. Messianic models and criteria can be viewed from several angles. The richness of the messianic idea and the broad scope of the discussions about it enable its ­presentation from various directions, approaches, and perspectives. Ever since Gershom Scholem’s attempt to promote inclusive messianic formats, scholars have e­ ffectively widened and developed ­several specific models.2 Nevertheless, examining the ­question of models and criteria, and even reformulating it in light of the many sources and studies available since Scholem’s original ­proposal, would seem a useful endeavor. My examination focuses on medieval ­philosophical thought, which is at the center of this study.

THE CRITERIA In the discussion that follows, I suggest six analytical criteria for m ­ apping and locating messianic teachings, which are also relevant to medieval ­philosophical literature: (1) the character of the messianic era; (2) the messiah’s personality; (3) the standing of the law; (4) the programmatic dimension; (5) the existence of a messianic orientation; (6) the sources of the messianic motifs. A detailed consideration of these criteria follows.

1. The Redemptive Era: Apocalyptic Messianism vs. Messianic Naturalism What will be the typical characteristics of the future world? According to the apocalyptic approach, the messianic era means the end of the present   2 See Gershom Scholem, “Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism,” in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 1-36. For examples of the study of models, see Shalom Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise: The Idea of Restorative Redemption,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 43, 78-86 [Heb]; Moshe Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity in the Middle Ages,” in Messianism and Eschatology: A Collection of Essays, ed. Zvi Baras (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), 253-279 [Heb]; idem, “Introduction,” Messianic Movements in Israel, by Aharon Zeev Aescoly (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1987), 9-28 [Heb]; idem, Messianism and Mysticism (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992) [Heb]; Menachem Kellner, “Jews and their Messiahs,” The Jewish Quarterly 155 (1994): 7-13. Other works dealing with the history of the messianic idea in the Middle Ages are Julius H. Greenstone, The Messiah Idea in Jewish History (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1906); Joseph Saracheck, The Doctrine of the Messiah in Medieval Jewish Literature (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1932). Works devoted to the history of Jewish philosophy in the Middle Ages (such as those by Julius Guttmann, Isaac Husik, and Colette Sirat) have also made a significant contribution. Philosophical essays, however, even by important historians (such as “Galut” by Yitzhak Baer as well as others), do not significantly add to our understanding of the conceptual reality. These works, though essential for the understanding of the texts’ philosophical foundations and for the development of current Jewish thought, have hardly promoted further concrete research.

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world and the collapse of history. Accompanying the dramatic end will be a series of catastrophic events involving the extinction of one or another part of humanity and the destruction of the cosmos. A new world, with an entirely different order, will replace the present natural world. In this new world, pain, suffering, death, and d ­ estruction will be no longer. Humans will live forever, entirely free from evil, instinctual drives, and inner qualms. The apocalyptic approach, then, despairs from the realization of redemption in this world and replaces it with a new and imaginary world, when a new reality will emerge on the ruins of the present one. The apocalyptic approach has its origins in a series of midrashim on redemption that began to take shape in the Hasmonean period, and then became part of many theological sources. This widespread approach clung to the literal meaning of the texts and interpreted apocalyptic prophecies verbatim—“new heavens and a new earth” (Isaiah 65:17; 66:22). Supporters of the apocalyptic view accept the aggadic terms literally and view paradise, hell, the resurrection of the dead, the day of the Lord, and so forth as actual places or events. Apocalyptic messianism too is an independent, self-sustaining goal rather than an instrumental element serving other ends. Note, ­moreover, that apocalyptic redemption is collective and its momentous changes relate to the public realm. It does not emphasize individual ­intimate redemption and does not discuss it as a key autonomous element, a­ ssimilating the individual personality into the cosmic and national events. Apocalyptic messianism in the Middle Ages therefore demands that we disregard individual attachment (to cosmic entities such as the general soul, the active intellect, and so forth), intimate c­ ommunion, and other individual goals. Finally, apocalyptic ­messianism is not ­specific to people living at a particular time. All the righteous or all who deserve it, whether alive now or in the past, will share in it. This characterization again attests to the inclusiveness of redemption in its apocalyptic version. By contrast, the naturalistic approach holds that the messianic era will occur within history and not in its collapse. The world will continue on its course and natural laws will remain in place. Since messianism will be realized in the present material-earthly world, how will we r­ecognize it? Messianic events will be manifest mainly in two areas. The first is the ­socio-­political realm, involving the e­stablishment of a just society and a ­fitting and ­productive regime. The second is related to the motif of ­humanity’s p ­ rogress. The future society will direct its resources to cultural development as well as to spiritual and i­ntellectual ­enrichment instead of turning to war efforts on the one hand, and to material ­consumption and hedonism on the other. The naturalistic v­ ersion of redemption is valid solely

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for the generation of redemption and does not involve ­participation by the righteous or the deserving from previous ones. The sources of the naturalistic approach are ­distinctly r­ ationalistic and its advocates are part of the ­rationalist trend that developed in the Middle Ages. This approach fostered a suitable ­ technique for i­nterpreting ­ apocalyptic ­ prophecies—allegory. Naturalists, then, extracted the texts from their literal sense and granted them an inner meaning in the spirit of their thought. Naturalism relies on approaches tending toward ­personal, natural, and spiritual redemption. These views hold that the greatest form of human p ­ erfection is manifest in the ­individual, and ­messianic teachings are a tool for its attainment. Furthermore, ­individual perfection is spiritual or mental and definitely internal, so that its ­interest in external reality is limited. In the ­naturalists’ ­teachings, therefore, general messianic events become at most instrumental and thereby lose their crucial significance.

2.  The Personality and Character of the Messiah Messianic approaches, at least in Western religions, tend toward the personification of the messianic idea. The abstract, intangible messianic idea is poured into a concrete figure (“messiah”) that is a realistic and feasible representation of it. The analysis of the messiah’s figure and its characteristics, then, will optimally reflect the general meaning of the messianic position. A review of the messiah’s typical traits according to the different ­conceptions indeed reveals a broad variety of characteristics. How can we describe the character and personality of the messiah? The answers to this question can be classified into four groups: (1) Many sources present the messiah as a charismatic commander and ideal hero, who is also an acclaimed ­politician. According to the King David paradigm, the messiah heroically wages the wars of the Lord and, through the force of his personality, gathers behind him the people of Israel and all its exiles to renew the sovereignty of the realm and religious worship in the Holy Land. (2) Other sources present the ­messiah as a pained figure, “humble and riding upon an ass” (Zechariah 9:9), a s­ ufferer among sufferers and a leper among lepers. Christian sources ­contributed to the development of this figure in Jewish medieval p ­ hilosophy. (3) Some ­present the messiah as an intellectual, a spiritual Torah leader, a kind of ­traditional Jewish scholar. This messianic figure epitomizes ­erudition and knowledge. (4) Some present the messiah as a magician, who effects the changes of the m ­ essianic era by resorting to his wondrous, supernatural powers.

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The messiah’s personality can obviously be built from more than one feature. Alternatively, one or another characteristic may be ­conveyed through two messianic figures—the son of Joseph and the son of David as, respectively, the suffering messiah and the triumphant warrior m ­ essiah. Evidently, then, choosing one of the messiah’s specific ­characteristics or even integrating several of them conveys the messianic approach of the thinker who presents it. The messiah is thus an expression of the ­general idea. Another question that emerges in this context is the relationship between the messiah’s personality and the messianic era. In some approaches, the messiah is an indication or a symptom of the era and messianic events take place deterministically, independently of a special person or of a nation’s collective activity. These approaches thus view the appearance of the ­messiah as expressing the beginning or the end of an era. By contrast, some hold that the messiah is the one who brings about the messianic era and actively fulfills the messianic promises. The essential or contingent ­dependence of redemption on the figure of the redeemer is thus a matter for the discussions that are part of the various approaches.

3. Religious Law (Halakhah) in the Messianic Era: Conservatism vs. Antinomianism The foundation of Jewish religion is a comprehensive and r­ igorous code of law pertaining to the most intimate aspects of life. By its very nature, the commandments of Halakhah limit and confine the Jew’s freedom. One question, then, needs clarification here: will this r­ igorous law still be binding in the messianic era? To trace the roots of this ­question requires addressing another complex issue first—the ­reasons for the commandments. One conclusive determination is ­possible in this regard: whatever the rationalist view of the c­ ommandments in the Middle Ages, it invariably perceives them as founded partly or wholly on restraint and education. As such, the purpose of the ­commandments is to impart virtues and moral qualities to ­believers. The basic question, whose answer will also be dealing with the question of Halakhah’s survival, is now in place: what will the future ­anthropological model look like? What will humans be like in the messianic era? If one ­envisages them as lacking any evil wants and desires, no educational restraining law will be necessary. In other words, according to the approach that assumes a new human type in the future—perfect, without any evil drives and cleansed of all sins and transgressions—Halakhah

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has no room. This approach presents a classic antinomian position: “the commandments will be abolished in the world to come” (TB Niddah 61b). By contrast, should we assume that the future anthropological model will be ­identical to the current one and that future humans will have passions, desires, and inner doubts, religious law will be preserved as is. This conservative ­position therefore supports the view that “the commandments will not be abolished in the world to come.” Perceptions of the future human being obviously depend on the assumptions about messianic events in general. Whereas a new human type without evil drives is the fundamental premise of the apocalyptic approach, the naturalistic approach vigorously denies any changes in the human model. The modern period, however, offers mixed approaches, which preserve the human model and, at the same time, uphold ­antinomianism. These views prevailed at the time of the Haskalah (Enlightenment) and are already evident in Moses Mendelssohn’s work. A separate issue is the nature of messianic antinomianism in ­kabbalistic teachings such as the “doctrine of sabbaticals” (shemitot) and in Sabbatean theology. In the Middle Ages, however, the range of views generally varies according to the ­anthropological model and the general perception of messianic events.

4. The Program of the Messianic Process: Determinism vs. Voluntarism The motifs, signs, and stages of the messianic process are seemingly determined a priori. The structure of the process is detailed in the messianic chapters of the books of the prophets, in the tannaitic and talmudic sources, and in various midrashim dealing with ­redemption. The descriptions in the various sources are not all consistent and coherent, and they are subject to different and extreme interpretations in both directions. They do include, however, several programmatic presentations of the signs of redemptions and its various stages. The messianic process, as it were, has a time sequence as well as some kind of distinct order. Are the various stages and elements of the messianic process, then, ­deterministic or voluntarist? Can the course and the rhythm of the ­messianic process be affected and, if so, to what extent? The deterministic approach can offer two theses: (1) The messianic process has a set ­program. Once the process has begun, nothing can stop it and it will necessarily reach its end, so that even events that seemingly delay it and contradict it are essential to it and promote the process even against their will. (2) The messianic process has a stable and set date, determined according to calculations in prophetic

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verses or according to charts created by expert astrologists. When the date arrives, the messianic process necessarily takes place. In the Middle Ages, many approaches combined textual exegeses and astrological calculations to determine the time of redemption. The voluntarist approach offers two contrary theses: (1) The nature of the messianic process is not programmatically determined. Even after the messianic process has begun, therefore, it can be stopped and made to retreat to an earlier stage or to its beginning. (2) The m ­ essianic process has no set date and depends on the spiritual level of a people or of the world. Some openly and consistently attested to their d ­ isinterest in such a set date and the matter then became entirely redundant. Disinterest could be a result of the prohibition to engage in ­calculations of the end (TB Sanhedrin 97b) or of the emphasis on individual redemption as a supreme end that, by comparison, makes other ends less worthy. The dominant approaches are obviously the synthetic ones that claim, for example, a set date that could be cancelled if the conditions for the arrival of redemption were to occur before it—“hasten it in its time” (Isaiah 60:22). Messianic approaches, then, can be classified according to their attitude to the messianic program.

5.  The Existence of a Messianic Orientation Messianic approaches, as noted, rely on various sources of authority. Specific thinkers may be convinced that they have interpreted the texts authentically, aiming, as it were, at the writer’s intention, but ultimately, it is the view and personal taste of the philosophical interpreter that explain the text. The interpreter too, however, is committed to ­various ­parallel texts (biblical, talmudic, aggadic, and so forth), presenting a series of motifs that cannot be ignored. The observer of messianic sources will find in them diverse motifs that partly or fully convey the messianic era—the end of days, the day of the Lord, the footsteps of the messiah, the messianic era, the resurrection of the dead, the world to come, paradise, and hell—all of which need to be addressed ­hermeneutically and philosophically. Philosophers, then, must consider the question—is there a ­messianic ­orien­tation? In other words—is there any connection (causal or ­chronological) between the various motifs building up the messianic idea that can ensure proper acquaintance with them? The answers of medieval Jewish ­thinkers to this question can be split into three: (1) Some endorse a m ­ essianic ­orientation and hold that the first motif leads to the second, the second to the third, and so forth. All these motifs intertwine in a ­splendid ­messianic weave, wherein each motif and each event represents a stage in the ­complete messianic

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­ rocess. (2) Some absolutely negate such an o p ­ rientation and hold that each messianic motif is meant to be realized at a different time. In their view, no essential link binds one messianic event to another. (3) Some see messianic motifs as different expressions of the same event, so that their meaning is to be determined according to this event’s p ­ erception. For example, whoever holds that messianism will be concretized only at the individual level (the soul’s return to its source in Neoplatonic approaches, communion with the active intellect, and so forth) will explain the ­messianic motifs as different expressions of that level. The messianic orientation thus also serves as a suitable criterion for mapping the various messianic approaches.

6. The Motifs Underlying the Messianic Process: New Contents vs. Restoration Messianic thought, as noted, is woven based on a given pool of motifs that relies on the authoritative sources. The interpretation of these motifs, which is determined according to each philosopher’s personal doctrine, is what shapes the type of messianism and its image. The interpretation of the pool of motifs relates to different points along the time axis: a wondrous past versus a dreamed up future. Two options are thus available: (1) The philosophical interpretation of the messianic idea may rely on contents that are entirely new, unknown in the ­biblical and general history familiar to us. The new contents may be ­apocalyptic or naturalistic. According to apocalyptic conceptions, the ­novelty of the future world is manifest in a utopian order, supernatural and ­superhuman, entirely unlike anything in the historical past. According to naturalistic ­conceptions, the novelty is manifest in the union of ­humanity as a whole in order to realize either social or intellectual aims or all of them together. (2) The philosophical interpretation may present the ­messianic idea as restorative, that is, as a return to a distant and ­wondrous past. According to this option, the messianic motifs are not new but rather an expression of longing for the distant past—the beginning of history or of the process (paradise, the general soul, and so forth). The longing could also focus on a relatively nearer past, such as the yearning for a renewal of religious worship in the Temple or the i­nspiration of prophecy. The m ­ essianic view will ­therefore be defined according to the ­orientation of the interpretation— toward a distant or nearer past or toward an ­imaginary future. Gershom Scholem pointed to this criterion as a significant key to the understanding of the messianic idea’s development. Studies on this

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­ uestion, however, have shown that the conceptual messianic reality is far q more complex and this principle does not always fit the reality.3

Implications and Ramifications Up to this point, the focus has been on an initial description of several key criteria whose elaboration led to the development of the messianic idea in the Middle Ages. These criteria obviously bear essential implications for other and more specific aspects of the messianic idea, aspects that are branches or items derived from the general roots that made up the above list. Following are several examples of such aspects: 1) The balance between natural individual redemption and social, national, or universal redemption. I consider this issue at length below since it follows directly from the tension between the ­apocalyptic and the naturalistic messianic approaches. 2) The various patterns of activity meant to influence the m ­ essianic process directly or indirectly, and the value ascribed to each of these activities. This activity may come forth in collective r­ epentance, in messianic emigration to the Land of Israel, in calculations of redemption’s timing, and in magic and theurgic activities.4 3) The value of the intellectual and scholarly concern with messianic issues in the present. Some reject this concern and view it as a negative sinking into delusions and fantasy, and some affirm it as a form of legitimate Torah study. 4) The attitude of thinkers toward current messianic events, such as the appearance of a false messiah. These attitudes afford a glimpse into the conceptual approach itself and into its application to pragmatic events. 5) Hermeneutical problems related to the messianic issue, such as refraining from mention of certain messianic goals in the Torah and in other sources. One may also add here the issue of esoteric interpretation, which developed in the Middle Ages in relation to the messianic idea. 6) The controversy with Christianity as a factor that shapes the messianic philosophical endeavor. This is a significant issue ­   3 See Scholem, “Toward an Understanding”; Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise.” See also the chapters that follow.   4 On this issue see, at length, Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity.”

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because many philosophers were directly or indirectly involved in disputes with Church representatives and Christianity had a well-developed messianic view. 7) The dogmatic status of messianism and its place in Jewish faith. Setting up messianism as a principle of faith was extremely ­problematic, and the attitude toward this issue at times reflected the thinker’s solid messianic stance. These seven issues and many others like them are determined, developed, and formulated according to decisions by religious thinkers concerning different messianic models. In the current discussion, therefore, I address the implications and ramifications described here. The study of the c­ oncrete conceptual-messianic reality, then, abides by a series of criteria and models, to which I also resort to some extent in this work.

WHAT IS RATIONALISM? My present concern is the analysis of rationalist thinkers’ messianic ­discussions and, since the meaning of the term rationalism changes over time, a general description of medieval rationalism seems appropriate here. Medieval Jewish philosophy is subject to two mutually contradictory ­jurisdictions. On the one hand is theology, which rests on set a­ ssumptions serving to justify religion that, according to the medieval approach, ­originate in revelation. On the other hand is philosophy, which assumes freedom of thought, curiosity, and paths to knowledge. Philosophy is ­self-­sustaining and has no need for heteronomous assumptions, just as it is not subject to any other authority beside thought. Reason and revelation are mutually contradictory and religious philosophy thus attempts to do the impossible—­combine philosophy and theology. The various approaches shift between three focal positions: 1)  The Supremacy of Philosophy. This approach views the ­achieve­­­ments of reason and its rules as the only truth criterion and, therefore, explains the holy texts solely according to these rational inferences and rules. Thinkers such as R. Yitzhak Albalag and R. Yosef Ibn Caspi endorsed this stance. 2)  The Equivalence of Philosophy and Theology. This view holds that “healthy” and proper free thought is coextensive with the

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rules of theology. R. Saadia Gaon and other geonim endorsed this view. 3)  The Supremacy of Theology. This view sees revelation and the texts that followed it as the sole truth criterion. The basic rules of this approach derive from a literal reading of the text or from an interpretation that does not rest on reason and logic. This was the view adopted by R. Shlomo ben Abraham of Montpellier (min ha-Har), R. Moshe Taku, and other thinkers who devoted their endeavors and literary concerns to Kabbalah. The various approaches, as noted, shift between these focal positions. For example, Judah Halevi’s stance is located between positions (2) and (3), but may not merge with (3). Maimonides’ view has been the subject of a strong controversy involving exegetes and scholars and is located between ­positions (1) and (2). The present work defines the term r­ ationalism in its broad d ­ enotation, that is, all the views that do not merge with position (3). I call the first position extreme ­rationalism, and the views between ­positions (2) and (3) ­moderate rationalism. All the views that assign some authority to the achievements of free thought—­regardless of whether the thought is ­identical to theology or inferior to it but of value—are included in the rationalist categories. Hence, I do not consider kabbalists here. The study of extreme rationalism began in depth around the 1980s, but moderate rationalism has hardly been studied, except for its manifestations in the tenth to twelfth ­centuries. The present study addresses one expression of Jewish ­rationalism—­the ­attitude toward the tension between a­ pocalyptic and n ­aturalistic ­ messianism. Following is a brief presentation of the ­chronological and ­systematic ­progression of this tension’s development in the Middle Ages.

THE TENSION BETWEEN THE MESSIANIC APPROACHES Every criterion in the list presented above may, as noted, serve as a tool and an initial benchmark for the classification of medieval philosophy’s ­messianic approaches. In this work, I examine the first basic criterion ­(apocalyptic vs. naturalistic messianism) and present it as a yardstick for classifying and mapping various messianic outlooks that emerged in Jewish r­ ationalism. The tension between apocalyptic messianic thought and ­naturalistic thought suitably reflects the general development of

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the messianic idea in the Middle Ages. In the analysis of this criterion, I will occasionally address other c­ riteria suggested above, but the general character of the messianic era and the ­tension between apocalyptic messianism and messianic naturalism will be the main factor guiding the discussion. Following are several schemes that will reflect the development of the tension on the messianic issue from a chronological historical perspective and from an inner conceptual one.

Chronological Development The chronological course of the tension between apocalyptic messianism and naturalism may be described as follows: Period I: From the tenth until the end of the twelfth century, purely apocalyptic and naturalistic views tend to emerge in Jewish philosophy. Period II: The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries are characterized by mixed approaches, which include both naturalistic and apocalyptic elements. Period III: From the mid-fifteenth century until the expulsion from Spain, both the apocalyptic and the naturalistic approaches return to their pure versions, in a context of conceptual diversity. The inner conceptual progression matches the chronological one. The development along the time axis fits the struggle between two ­conceptual considerations that had prevailed in the Middle Ages: the ­rationalist ­philosophical consideration inclines toward ­individual redemption (the soul’s return to its source or rational communion), which ­essentially leaves no room for public, social, or cosmic r­ edemption. By contrast, the c­ onsideration that arises from a majority of the r­ evelational sources (­ biblical, talmudic, and midrashic) literally compels ­recognition of public and collective ­messianic goals. Chapter Three shows that advocates of individual r­ edemption need the n ­ aturalistic approach, whereas ­supporters of the apocalyptic approach are not overly ­interested in the individual per se. For the apocalyptic approach, the individual is a component in the messianic collective. The ­confrontation between the various messianic approaches on the character of future events, then, does not hinge only on the issue of miracle vs. nature, as many had held. Instead, it touches directly on the essence of human perfection. Rationalists viewed perfection as a ­distinctly individual i­ ntimate issue (conjunctio or union with a supreme intellect), which fully dictates

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the terms of the theological doctrine. Opponents of ­rationalism rejected the exclusive primacy of individual perfection and held that ­theology draws literally on the sources. The tension in messianic thought is thus perhaps a further expression of the ancient confrontation between reason and ­revelation.

The Developmental Stages The systematic development of the tension between apocalyptic ­messianism and messianic naturalism went through four stages: Stage I: The apocalyptic messianic model, which had so far been ­conveyed in scattered midrashim, was consolidated, justified in seemingly rationalist terms, and integrated into Jewish philosophy as a necessary and unquestionable demand of reason. This stage unfolded at the end of the geonic period and was mainly evident in R. Saadia Gaon’s philosophical project. This stage is the topic of Chapter Two. Stage II: The naturalistic messianic model emerged as exclusive due to a lack of alternatives: the rise of individual and eternal redemption at the expense of public, social, and cosmic redemption required the ­creation of a non-apocalyptic model. Individual redemption came about in the wake of a Neoplatonic group of thinkers on the one hand, and an Aristotelian one on the other. The philosophical consideration overrode all others, and m ­ essianic naturalism appeared. This stage, which is conveyed in the w ­ ritings of various twelfth-century thinkers and culminated in the ­teachings of Maimonides, is the subject of Chapter Three. Stage III: Two symmetrical conceptual phenomena led to the gradual collapse of the naturalistic and individual model and to the renewed ascent of apocalyptic messianism. On the one hand, revelational sources regained authority in the course of the controversy around Maimonides’ writings and the rise of thinkers who combine Halakhah and philosophy, challenging the exclusive standing of individual redemption. Chapter Four is devoted to this phenomenon. On the other hand, extreme rationalists turned the notion of public messianism into a vague symbol—a riddle and a ­parable of individual redemption. They thereby led to the collapse of public, ­concrete redemption as a real option, even in its natural garb. Chapter Five is devoted to this issue. Gradually and persistently, these two developments cast doubt on the validity of the naturalistic model. But the naturalistic

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approach did not give up center stage without a struggle and kept a hold on the teachings of various thinkers through the motif of Halakhah’s eternity, which is not usually present in the apocalyptic approach. This issue is discussed in Chapter Six. Many thinkers offered unsystematic formulations of their messianic views, combining mixed motifs. Stage III, then, was ­characterized by hints and by messianic motifs operating below the surface. This stage unfolded mainly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Stage IV: Contrary to the random hermeneutical framing and to the mixing of motifs in the messianic approaches of thirteenth- and fourteenth-­ ­ century philosophy, from the mid-fifteenth century until the expulsion from Spain, philosophical thought was characterized by sharp ­formulations and by the systematic, distinct, and extensive presentation of positions beside one another. Note, however, that except for clear and s­ystematic d ­elivery, ­ fifteenth century messianic thought is hardly inspiring or original. Many thinkers set the apocalyptic view beside the individual ­naturalistic one, defined them in detail, and resolutely chose one or another. Clear ­ formulations replaced the blurring and layering of the fourteenth c­entury and the two messianic views, the apocalyptic and the naturalistic, came into open confrontation. The clarification of positions that had unfolded in the course of the controversy surrounding Maimonides’ writings at the beginning of the thirteenth century recurred, this time in depth and at length, while several significant monographs written in the course of the fifteenth ­century also contributed to this trend. By contrast, fourteenth-century thinkers had conveyed their views mostly through their interpretation of ­authoritative sources. Stage IV attests that medieval philosophy did not offer a s­ olution, a compromise, or a decision on the confrontation between apocalyptic ­messianism and naturalism. This stage ended with the t­ eachings of Yitzhak Abravanel, which tilted the balance in favor of the apocalyptic view. Chapter Seven is devoted to this stage. In the sixteenth century, after the expulsion from Spain, ­positions changed and new criteria emerged.5 The confrontation between the ­apocalyptic and the naturalistic models, which had been so ­significant in the Middle Ages, no longer appeared to dominate the shaping of v­ arious messianic conceptions. The apocalyptic model, in its theoretical or ­kabbalistic garb, became central, as is already evident in R. Yitzhak Abravanel’s messianic teachings.  5 Cf. Hayim Hillel Ben-Sasson, “Exile and Redemption through the Eyes of the Spanish Exiles,” in Yitzhak Baer Jubilee Volume, ed. Shmuel Ettinger et al. (Jerusalem: The Historical Society of Israel, 1960): 216-227 [Heb].

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I turn now to a systematic discussion of the various stages, t­ racing the various manifestations of the apocalyptic model, the naturalistic model, and the tension between them in medieval Jewish philosophy. In the course of discussing these models’ various manifestations, I deal with ­specific ­messianic events (the messianic era, the resurrection of the dead, and so forth) and, through them, analyze the fluctuations between apocalyptic messianism and messianic naturalism in philosophical approaches that create a defined conceptual structure.

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Apocalyptic Messianism in a Rationalist Garb

Apocalyptic messianism emerges in Jewish philosophy during the geonic era. For historical, polemical, and systematic reasons, some geonim developed conceptual approaches containing rationalist motifs, manifest in their critical view of aggadot and midrashim contradicting logic and reason. R. Saadia Gaon, Rav Shrira, and Rav Hai Gaon, for example, frequently and unhesitatingly pointed to the critical principle that states, “one is not to rely on aggadic statements” and “one does not challenge on the basis of Aggadah.”1 Several geonim consistently rejected the anthropomorphization of the divine and, relying on rationalist arguments, supported the rabbinic view of the Oral Law. Behind this rationalist approach were inner motivations, beside elements of the polemic with Karaism and Islam. On the messianic issue, however, many geonim adopted the conservative position adhering to a literal reading of the sources, that is, the apocalyptic model of messianism. Among them was also one who relied on clearly rationalist arguments to support the conservative model—Saadia. This issue is at the focus of the present chapter.

THE RATIONALIST JUSTIFICATION OF APOCALYPTIC MESSIANISM Apocalyptic messianism draws on the imagination and, as such, is incom­ ­ patible with pure rationalism. By Saadia’s time, Alfarabi had ­determined that rationalism relies on knowledge of the natural and the cosmic order. Given that knowledge of the rules of physics and m ­ etaphysics is necessary and even compelling for a medieval philosopher in order to attain perfection, the greatest refutation of philosophical rationalism is the complete and eternal collapse of both the natural and human order. For  1 Teshuvot ha-Geonim, ed. Yaakov Mussafia (Lyck: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1864), 31a [Heb]; Toratan shel Rishonim (Frankfurt am Mein: Slobotsky, 1882), 45; Zikaron la-Rishonim, ed. Abraham E. Harkabi (St. Petersburg, 1879), 4. Cf. Otsar ha-Geonim le-Masekhet Hagigah, ed. B. M. Levin (Jerusalem, 1931), 59-60 [Heb]; Avraham Ovadiah (Gottesdiner), “The Story of Rav Hai Gaon,” Sinai 2 (1931), 562-564 [Heb]; José Faur, Studies in the Mishneh Torah: Book of Knowledge (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1978) [Heb].

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Saadia, however, rationalism is the justification of Scripture through reason. In his wake, rationalist thinkers endorsed apocalyptic approaches, and even granted them ostensibly rational justifications in their ­messianic teachings. The rational justification of apocalyptic messianism began during the geonic period, which is also the time when systematic Jewish philosophy appears.

Double Faith and Eccentricity R. Saadia Gaon’s messianic outlook is a classic instance of the merger of ­apocalyptic views into a rationalist doctrine. He is considered the first ­systematic philosopher in Judaism (if we disregard the philosophy of Daud ibn Marwan al-Muqammis as an integral link in Jewish thought). A ­cornerstone in the study of Saadia’s theoretical work is the definition of “double faith” adopted by Harry Austryn Wolfson, stating that Saadia is unequivocally committed to a view of Jewish belief in revelation as ­amenable to rational verification. Regardless of whether we approach r­evelation from a rational direction or accept it unquestionably, we will reach the same truth.2 Saadia’s conviction in this regard was so strong that, in the preface to The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, he proceeded to clarify why the Sinai epiphany and the giving of the Torah were at all necessary if we can fully grasp the principles of ­revelation through reason. The answers he suggested to his question do not affect his basic underlying assumption—we can reach truth relying solely on reason. At the beginning of Treatise III, Saadia even offers a prescription for formulating the principles and the commandments of the Torah based solely on logical thinking, without recourse to revelation. This view can therefore be defined as naïve rationalism, granting extensive authority to reason. Prudent readers expecting the first philosophical and rationalist ­systematic treatise in Judaism to be balanced and judicious confront a rather strange development. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions indeed deals with a series of key issues in the building of Jewish faith, with each treatise addressing one of them. Treatise I, for example, is devoted to a discussion of creation, Treatise II, to God and the divine attributes, Treatise VI to the soul, and so forth. These prudent readers, familiar with authoritative and philosophical sources, would expect a discussion of the messianic issue to cover at most one treatise. Saadia, however, devoted to the messianic idea and to related questions no less than three full treatises: Treatise VII   2 Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics,” Jewish Quarterly Review, n. s. 33 (1942): 213-264.

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deals with the resurrection of the dead, Treatise VIII with redemption, and Treatise IX with the world to come. For Saadia, then, the messianic idea is tantamount to about one-third of Jewish faith as a whole. The issue of the essence of God and the explanation of God’s existence—to which only one treatise is devoted—takes up about one-third of the scope devoted to the messianic idea, even though the author was well-aware that his book launched the era of systematic philosophy in Judaism, since he apologized for writing a book on Jewish philosophy in its preface: “I saw, furthermore, men who were sunk, as it were, in seas of doubt and overwhelmed by waves of confusion and there was no diver to bring them up from the depths nor a swimmer who might take hold of their hands and carry them ashore.”3 This formal fact amply attests to the character of Saadia’s messianic philosophy and to the essential importance he ascribed to it.

Interpretation, Knowledge, and Messianism Saadia, as noted, legitimized the apocalyptic approach within a rationalist context and presented it as an integral part of a rationalist worldview, as evident in the hermeneutical method he formulated in Treatise VII of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions. He issued a clear statement on the Tāwīl— the allegorical interpretation of the canonic text—a matter of significant ­concern for Moslem theology in general and for the Mu’tazila in ­particular. Serious questions were raised in the discussion, such as: are humans allowed to interpret God’s words in contradiction to their literal m ­ eaning? Can ­ matters delivered through revelation be interpreted a­llegorically? According to Saadia, the exegete is committed to the literal meaning of texts but is given license to transcend it in four cases: 1) When the literal meaning contradicts sensorial perception, that is, when a literal understanding is “rejected by the observation of the senses.” For example, the text calls Eve “the mother of all living” (Genesis 3:20), whereas the senses attest that humans give birth only to humans. The literal meaning, then, must be t­ ranscended to determine that the reference is only to human descendants—“the mother of all speaking living [creatures].”4   3 Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 7 (henceforth Beliefs and Opinions).   4 This is Saadia’s interpretation in the Tafsir Genesis ad locum. See R. Yosef Kafih, Peirushei Rabeinu Saadia Gaon al ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1976), 16 [Heb].

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2) When the literal sense is “negated by reason.” For example, the text determines that the Holy One, blessed be He, is “a devouring fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24), whereas rational thought shows this to be impossible, since fire is ignited and then burns out, whereas the Holy One, blessed be He, precedes all and is eternal. God’s revenge when punishing sinners is thus to be interpreted as fire, because it appears at the proper time and then disappears: “because the punishment of the Lord your God is a devouring fire.”5 3) When the literal meaning of one statement contradicts the literal meaning of another. The literal meaning of one of them should then be rejected and adapted to the other. For example, one verse forbids trying God (Deuteronomy 6:16) and another supports doing so (Malachi 3:10). The solution is to interpret one verse ­literally and the other not. In this example, God should indeed not be tried. Humans, however, must test their standing before God and find out whether they are worthy of God’s miraculous intervention in their favor. 4) When rabbinic tradition (athār) offers an interpretation opposed to the literal one. For example, Scripture determines that the wicked are punished with forty stripes (Deuteronomy 25:3), whereas tradition lowered the punishment to thirty-nine.6 According to Saadia, as shown below, messianic texts are not included in these four instances of license because of God’s omnipotence, and ­transcending their literal meaning is therefore not allowed. These four allegorical cases, however, show surprising parallels with the four sources of knowledge premised by Saadia. In the preface to The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Saadia addressed the epistemological question: whence do humans draw the correct and accurate knowledge they are endowed with? In his view, the four roots of true knowledge are: 1) The senses, meaning knowledge based on the apprehension of the five senses (h  . awāss). 2)  The intuition of the intellect (’aql), meaning knowledge that does not require external experience, such as first principles and ­elementary moral statements.   5 Ibid., 136.   6 M. Makkot 3:10. Beliefs and Opinions, 265-266. See M. Zucker, ed., Peirushei Rav Saadia Gaon li-Breshith (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1984), 191-192 [Heb]; Saadia Gaon, introduction to The Book of Theodicy: Translation and Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. L. E. Goodman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 130-131.

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3) Logical necessity (ald  . arūrah), which is fundamentally ­comparative and discursive. Saadia defined it as assuming the existence of an invisible object, such as the soul, in order to avoid contradicting the senses or the intuition of the intellect. 4) Authentic tradition (alkhabar al s  . ādiq). Saadia defined this source as knowledge that relies on public human testimony, referring to miracles described in Scripture.7 Scientific epistemological truth as well as revelational truth, then, ­corroborate Saadia’s hermeneutical method—allegorical interpretation in all the four noted instances is both an intellectual and a theological demand. Since Saadia does not include messianic texts in any of these four options, departing from their literal meaning is forbidden. When Saadia later applied this hermeneutical method to the messianic idea, he reached the following conclusion: There exists, then, only these four possible reasons for a non-literal interpretation of the verses of Sacred Writ, there being no fifth. So far as the resurrection of the dead is concerned, however, we have seen it [take place], and there is no eyewitness to contradict it, for we do not allege that they will come to life of their own accord but merely that their Creator will bring them to life. Furthermore, there is no rational objection to the doctrine [of resurrection] because the restoration of something that has once existed and disintegrated is more plausible logically than creatio ex nihilo. Moreover, there is no other ­pronouncement of Scripture to contradict the belief in resurrection, but, on the contrary, the text of Sacred Writ confirms it by expressly citing the resurrection in this world of the son of the Zarephite (I Kings 17: 22) and that of the Shunammite (II Kings 4: 35) woman. Finally, there exists no rabbinic tradition necessitating the non-literal i­nterpretation of this concept, but, on the contrary, all traditions corroborate it. Hence, we must let this belief stand as it is according to the explicit statement of the text of Scripture that God will bring the dead of His nation to life again at the time of the redemption, and it is not to be interpreted otherwise.8  7 Beliefs and Opinions, 16-17. The roots of knowledge (mawādd) are translated by R. Kafih as movilim and by Moses Ibn Tibbon as meshakhim.   8 Ibid., 267. Saadia’s rationalist argumentation was far removed from the demonstration methods of ancient ­apocalyptic thinkers. Cf. Amos Funkenstein, Perceptions of Jewish History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 74-78.

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The resurrection of the dead at the time of the final redemption (yeshu‘ah— this is how the term appears in the Arabic original as well) will indeed take place as Scripture promises, both because the hermeneutical method requires it and because it is a necessary consequence of the cognitive, ­epistemological truth. Saadia thereby presented a classic apocalyptic approach, ­manifest in two elements: (1) the miraculous resurrection of the dead; (2) the m ­ essianic orientation—that is, the connection of physical resurrection to redemption. Saadia later showed how the miraculous and the s­ upernatural are essential features of the messianic era. Both are directly justified by reason, since rational thinking is what precludes the interpretation of the apocalyptic messianic idea in allegorical terms. Adopting a non-literal meaning of messianic texts is therefore forbidden. Readers, then, confront a remarkable situation: Saadia constructs a rationalist hermeneutical theory to justify apocalyptic tradition, which thereby acquires legitimate rationalist standing. Moreover, this hermeneutical theory also supports the ­interpretation of future redemption (yeshu‘ah), as is evident between the lines. The ­redemption chapters in the prophets—“the great and the terrible day of the Lord” (Joel 3:4), “new heavens and a new earth” (Isaiah 65:17)—are required by reason and should all be understood literally. The justification of apocalyptic tradition through rationalist categories is also apparent in the application of the general method of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions (“the double faith”) to the messianic issue. I will cite only one example out of several. In Treatise VIII, Saadia discusses the guarantee of redemption (furkān): How do we know that redemption is imperative and will indeed come? In other words, what is the guarantee that exile will not be eternal and that redemption will indeed occur? Saadia provides four answers to this question. The guarantees of redemption are, in his view: 1) The truth of the prophetic promises. This truth relies on the ­verification of Scripture. Since the books of revelation describe the miracles of the prophets (Moses, Isaiah) as unassailable facts, the truth of their messianic promises is also unquestionable. On this matter, Saadia relies on his determination in the preface to the book that tradition is as true a source of knowledge as all others. Hence, the testimony of Scripture is self-evident and, by virtue of it, so are the promises of redemption. 2) The divine attribute of justice (’adl). Like the Mu’tazila, Saadia too held that God is compelled to act according to the principles

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of absolute and objective justice. The Jewish people’s suffering in exile could either be punishment for their sins or a way of testing them. But the sins of the people, however grave, were limited, and the test, however long, yields both positive and negative results. Hence, divine justice requires both the punishment and the test to be limited in time. Redemption from exile is thus imperative. 3) Scripture attests that God fulfills his promises. 4) Analogy (qiyās) based on historical events. A well-known historical model of exile and redemption is the slavery and exodus from Egypt, from which we should learn that the current exile will also end in redemption. Saadia, however, was not satisfied with the evidence about the actual occurrence of redemption and inferred, a fortiori, additional data from the comparison with the events in Egypt: He had then [in Egypt] promised us only two things; namely, that He would execute judgment upon our oppressor and that he would give us great wealth. That is the import of His statement: And also that nation, whom they shall serve, will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance (Gen. 15:14). Yet our eyes have seen what He has done for us besides that; namely, the cleaving of the sea, and the Manna, and the quail, and the assembly at Mount Sinai, and the arresting of the sun and other such things. All the more certain, therefore [must the ultimate redemption be]. For God has made us great and liberal promises of the well-being and bliss and greatness and might and glory that He will grant us twofold [in return] for the humiliation and the misery that have been our lot. . . . If, then, what has happened to us in the past can be used as a proof and an example, God will assuredly do for us in the future doubly double above what He has promised us, so that we will be unable quickly and entirely to compute it.9

 9 Beliefs and Opinions, 291-292. On the miracles in the revenge from enemies in the messianic era, see also Tafsir Yeshayahu le-Rav Saadia (Saadia’s Translation and Commentary on Isaiah), ed. Yehuda Ratzaby (Kiriyat Ono: Machon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1993), 290 [Heb]. As noted, Saadia used the term furkān here to denote redemption and to compare the redemption models in Egypt and in the future. See Yehuda Ratzaby, A Dictionary of Judaeo-Arabic in R. Saadia’s Tafsir (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1985) [Heb].

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If signs and wonders accompanied redemption in Egypt, the results of future redemption will, a fortiori, be even more amazing and supernatural. The following diagram clarifies this argument of Saadia: Redemption in Egypt Final Redemption 1.  Promises about it were moderate 1. Promises about it transcend and restrained. imagination in their wonder and supernaturalism. 2.  Exile and suffering were limited, and 2.  Exile and suffering go on for continued for a relatively short time centuries. (210 years according to the tradition). 3. Redemption took place through 3. Redemption will take place signs and wonders. through much greater signs and wonders. The fourth guarantee, then, is not limited to the actual coming of r­ edemption but extends to its contents as well, that is, to its distinct ­apocalyptic ­description. The miracles detailed in the cited passage leave no room for doubt concerning the supernatural character of redemption. Yet again, then, Saadia exploited an opportunity to bring in the apocalyptic legacy in the course of a discussion relying on a rationalist argument. Saadia’s discussion here leads to two conclusions. The first is the salience of the “double faith” principle in the four guarantees he suggested concerning the coming of redemption. The first and the third g­ uarantees rely on the truth and certainty of the revelational texts (the prophets’ m ­ iracles) and the two others rely directly on reason (the concept of divine justice and a comparative analogy from historical events). The first and the third guarantees on the one hand, and the second and fourth on the other, lead to the same truth. Methodologically, then, the messianic discussion does not differ from other rationalist discussions in the book. The second conclusion is that the last guarantee confers full rationalist legitimation on the apocalyptic approach. Formal rationalist arguments and reliance on the “double faith” doctrine affirm and corroborate this approach. The ­apocalyptic character of redemption, then, follows directly from clearly rationalist arguments.10 10 Cf. Dov Schwartz, “A Note on the Relation between Miracles and Prophecy in Saadia’s Teachings,” Daat 28 (1992): 120-121 [Heb].

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The Apocalyptic Foundation Based on the ostensibly rationalist thinking presented above, Saadia ­proposed a firm messianic orientation in Treatises VIII and IX. Following is the assumed progression of apocalyptic events: 1) The messianic era, with two messiahs—the messiah son of Joseph and the messiah son of David. According to the spiritual situation of the Jewish people, it is possible to skip the traumatic event of the first messiah’s death and go straight to the victories of the messiah son of David (the war of Gog and Magog). 2) The resurrection of the dead, which is specific to the Jewish people. The messiah son of Joseph will be the first to be resurrected. The revelation of the Shekhinah and the renewal of prophecy will follow the resurrection. 3) The world to come (where all the dead will be resurrected) is also known as paradise. The resurrected dead will move to the world to come, which is a new world, and will henceforth live eternally in their own body and soul.11 This glorious apocalyptic picture, which offers an unbroken description of mythical events, appears in Treatise VIII of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions.12 This chapter, as noted, pretends to present a purely rationalist discussion on the nature of redemption, yet describes all three events in terms of ­miracles and wonders. In Treatise IX, Saadia goes even further and presents the world to come as an entirely new creation. The absolute change in the natural order is evident in Saadia’s two different interpretations of the new earth and new heavens motifs mentioned in Scripture (Isaiah 65:17; 66:22). In the first, Saadia claimed the motif referred to the resurrection of the dead, and in the second, to the world to come. Following are the two interpretations: [About the resurrection of the dead]: We are also informed by Scripture that all pestilence, diseases, and infirmity will disappear, and similarly 11 Note that Saadia accepted the view of the eternal body above all due to the authority of apocalyptic literature. He certainly relied on Kalaam literature, which sought rational justification for the eternity of the body. For example, Al-Baghdadi attested about Al-Ash‘ari, who had discussed the creation and eternity of the body (Kitāb ’us .  ūl aldīn [Beirut: 1981], 230). On the “world to come” as the universal locus of the ultimate reward and punishment, see also Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saadia Gaon li-Breshith, 173, and 275, note 44; Ratzaby, Tafsir Yeshayahu le-Rav Saadia, 342. 12 Beliefs and Opinions, 310-311.

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sadness and sorrow. Their world will be one that is replete with joy and gladness, so that it will seem to them as though their heaven and their earth have been renewed for them.13 [About the world to come]: As for God’s statement: For as the new heavens (Isaiah 66:22), since it applies to the world to come, it must literally refer to the place and the environment that God is destined to create for His servants upon the annihilation of our present center and surroundings.14

In the first interpretation, Saadia transcended the literal meaning of the text. Since the order of nature will change and suffering and loss will ­disappear, a world without evil will appear as a new world. In the context of the ­resurrection of the dead, Saadia was forced to endorse an ­allegorical explanation of “new heavens” and “new earth,” since he assumed that the literal meaning of the text referred to the world to come. For him, as noted, the world to come is an entirely new creation, a kind of different cosmos (“place”) founded on the ruins of the present one. The promise of new heavens and a new earth should thus be interpreted almost literally. Saadia’s further contribution to apocalyptic messianism is his ­systematic description of the purified human body in the future world. This ­purified body that God will create in the future is comparable to the condition of Moses, who survived forty days and forty nights without food: He must, therefore, have been sustained solely by the light which God had [specially] created and with which He covered his face. . . . God’s purpose herein was to present us an indication and a rationally comprehensible means of deducing that the righteous will subsist in the hereafter on light and not on ordinary nourishment.15

Saadia views Moses’ physical condition as a miracle created for its time, according to the text he cites there: “Before all thy people I will do ­marvels, such as have not been done in all the earth, nor in any nation” (Exodus 34:10). The arguments and the discussion thus unfolded within an ostensibly ­rationalist 13 Ibid., 311. 14 Ibid., 342. 15 Ibid., 339. Cf. ibid., 333-334. The basis of the discussion is obviously the rabbinic saying about the world to come as lacking any material functions (eating, drinking, procreation, and so forth—TB Berakhot 17a). Saadia explained this saying by resorting to a comparison with Moses. Cf. Yosef Heinemann, Aggadah and Its Development (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), 109-114 [Heb]; John G. Gager, Moses in Greco-Roman Paganism (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1972); Rella Kushelevsky, Moses and the Angel of Death, trans. Ruth Bar-Ilan (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 48-49.

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context, both in methodical and hermeneutical terms. This ­rationalist line probably granted Saadia legitimation to engage in the detailed computation of the messianic era according to its apocalyptic version.16 On one specific matter, Saadia refrained from exhausting the a­ pocalyptic implications in full and he thereby set the rule for future g­enerations. I am referring to the preservation of the law in the world to come. Saadia had ­supported the approach assuming a new human in the future. This perception compels an antinomian conclusion given that Halakhah is ­ meant for flesh and blood individuals, with all their w ­ eaknesses and flaws, and not for perfect beings. Saadia, however, u ­ ncompromisingly supported the ­validity of the Torah and the commandments in the world to come. A ­plausible assumption is that the controversy with Islam and Christianity, both of which upheld the idea of abrogating the Torah (naskh), most ­probably compelled Saadia to support the preservation of the Torah in the world to come.17 Despite the incoherence of this position, medieval c­ onservatives followed on Saadia’s path until the work of Yitzhak Abravanel.18 Finally, note that the use of rationalist arguments as proofs of ­apocalyptic messianism characterized the thought of the Church Fathers and, in the late Middle Ages, played a crucial role in Christian ­scholastics.19 The t­endency to found miraculous motifs on rationalist arguments, ­however, is not ­ prevalent in Jewish apocalyptic thought in the Middle Ages, except for trends influenced by Saadia and his claims. Indeed, many supporters of the apocalyptic approach presented it as a revelational truth ­incompatible with logic, and even exposed its limitations and weaknesses. This ­distinction between Christian and Jewish thought certainly follows from the ­character of Christian dogma and its contrast with Jewish faith, which lacks this ­absoluteness and finality. In this sense, Saadia presented

16 See Henry Malter, “Saadia Gaon’s Messianic Computation,” Journal of Jewish Lore and Philosophy 1 (1919): 45-60; M. G. Tsovel, “Computing the End and the Description of Redemption in The Book of Beliefs and Opinions,” in Kovets Rav Saadia Gaon, ed. R. Moshe Fischman Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1942), 172-190 [Heb]; Israel Efros, Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Issues and Methods (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1964), 166-174 [Heb]; Eliezer Schlossberg, Concepts and Methods in the Commentary of R. Saadia Gaon on the Book of Daniel (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 1989), 145-197 [Heb]. 17 See Daniel J. Lasker, “Against Whom Did Saadia Polemicize Concerning the Abrogation of the Torah?” Daat 32-33 (1994): 5-11 [Heb]; Eliezer Schlossberg, “A Response to Prof. Lasker’s Paper,” in ibid., 13-17. 18 Despite Abravanel’s rich apocalyptic legacy, he devoted an entire section of his book to the preservation of the commandments. See Yitzhak Abravanel, Yeshu‘ot Meshiho, Treatise Four (Bnei Brak: Machon Me’orei Sefarad, 1993), 193ff. See also the end of chapter 7 below. 19 See, for example, Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Resurrection of the Body According to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham,” Philosophical Topics 20, no. 2 (1992): 1-33.

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a unique m ­ ethodological position, extremely rare among apocalyptic ­thinkers after the geonic era.

THE INFLUENCE OF APOCALYPTIC MESSIANISM Saadia, as noted, is the one figure among the geonim who p ­ ainstakingly tried to develop a broad rationalist justification for the apocalyptic ­messianic approach. His solid authority led to his significant influence on other thinkers in the geonic period and later as well, in the many areas where systematic Jewish thought was then embarking on its course. Some remarks on this influence follow.

The Geonim An apocalyptic approach to messianism, though lacking Saadia’s rigorous and consistent rationalist foundation, characterized several other geonim as well as other thinkers active in their surroundings whose writings showed conceptual and philosophical connections with the messianic idea. The first I will consider is Rav Hai Gaon, who was influenced by Saadia.20 A long responsum about “yeshu‘ah,” ascribed to Rav Hai, paints a glorious picture of the events of redemption in a colorful style, openly and even b ­ latantly suggesting personal and miraculous divine involvement.21 He also offers two interpretations of the “new heavens” motif—the first views it as referring to messianic events in this world and thus transcends the literal level, whereas the second is closer to the literal meaning of the world to come. He writes: [About the messianic era and the resurrection]: And in those times, when the Temple and Jerusalem are revealed . . . in that hour heaven and earth are seen as if renewed, as if the heaven and earth of enslavement had gone by and a new heaven and a new earth had replaced them . . . and they will rule until the end of days.22 20 See, for example, Simha Assaf, The Geonic Era and Its Literature (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1977), 199 [Heb]. 21 See Yehuda Even-Shmuel, Midreshei Ge‘ulah (Jerusalem: Bialik, Institute, 1954), 133-142 [Heb]. One item to be added to Even-Shmuel’s bibliography is Otsar ha-Geonim le-Masekhet Sanhedrin, ed. Hayyim Zvi Toibush (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1966), 493-497 [Heb]. On other messianic statements with apocalyptic associations either made by or ascribed to Rav Hai, see, for example, Louis Ginzberg, Genizah Studies in Memory of Doctor Solomon Schechter, vol. 2, Geonic and Early Karaitic Halakhah (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1929), 165 [Heb]; Otsar ha-Geonim le-Masekhet Sukkah, ed. B. M. Levin (Jerusalem, 1934), 75-76 [Heb]; Alexander Marx, “On the Year of Redemption,” Ha-Tsofeh le-Hokhmat Israel 5 (1921): 198 [Heb]; R. Abraham b. R. Azriel, Sefer Arugat Habosem vol. 1, ed. Ephraim E. Urbach (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1963), 256 [Heb]. 22 Even-Shmuel, Midreshei Ge‘ulah, 140.

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[About the world to come]: And the dead who lived and saw the redemption, will come out by themselves to the world to come . . . and at that time, the Holy One, blessed be He, will create another heaven and another earth beside these, and the righteous will dwell in them forever and ever.23

The question addressed in this responsum, ascribed to Rav Hai, dealt also with the reference to the “new heaven.” His view is unequivocal: this text will definitely be interpreted literally in the world to come, which will emerge at the end of the current one. In another responsum, Rav Hai indeed writes, “What this means is that, at the end of four thousand [years], a messiah will come and live for two thousand years, and after that, this world will pass and the world to come will be created.”24 The apocalyptic approach, then, guided Rav Hai in his messianic thought and in the extensive interpretation that accompanies it. The view of R. Shmuel b. Hofni Gaon is somewhat similar. R. Shmuel’s discussions on many theoretical issues, as is well known, fit Saadia’s method exactly. Examples are the epistemology based on four sources of k­ nowledge and the hermeneutical method of the Tāwīl. And indeed, R. Shmuel b. Hofni also hints that he has accepted the world to come concept as ­referring to supreme and eternal physical existence.25 Remnants of writings by R. Nissim b. Yaakov Gaon show that he too preserved Saadia’s messianic principles. First, he described the world to come as “a place where no evil will befall the righteous,” “that is endlessly pleasant,”26 and where all is “light.”27 In the sources mentioned, he also hinted at a link between the world to come and the resurrection of the 23 Ibid., 141. 24 Wolf Warenheim, Kevutsat Hakhamim (Wien: A. Della Torre, 1861), 106 [Heb]. Reprinted in Otsar ha-Geonim le-Masekhet Sanhedrin, 499. Cf. Joel Miller, Mafteah li-Tshuvot ha-Geonim (Berlin: 1891), 255, #728 [Heb]. Miller, as noted, cast doubt on the ascription of the responsum on yeshu‘ah cited above to Rav Hai. In addition to the evidence cited against these doubts, the views of Rav Hai in various sources, including the one cited here, clearly support the strong apocalyptic emphasis of the responsum. 25 Aharon Greenbaum, The Biblical Commentary of Rabbi Shmuel b. Hofni Gaon (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1979), 286 [Heb]. R. Shmuel compared the years of life in this world, which are “few and evil” (Genesis 47:9), to the years in the world to come, which are “many and good.” It is a plausible assumption that, should other remnants of the gaon’s commentaries be found, his messianic view will emerge clearly rather than in hints. 26 R. Nissim b. Yaakov, Hibbur Yafeh me-ha-Yeshu‘ah, ed. Hayyim Zeev Hirschberg (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1970), 8-9 [Heb]. The original appeared in Shraga Abramson, ed. Rav Nissim Gaon: Hamishah Sefarim (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1965), 437, note 64 [Heb]. “Gaon” was an honorary title for R. Nissim. He was not the head of the Gaon Yaakov yeshiva, but he was active in the surroundings of the geonim and in their culture. 27 A. Poznanski, “Selections from Megillat Sefarim by Rabbenu Nissim b. R. Yaakov of Kiruan,” Ha-Tsofeh le-Hokhmat Israel 5 (1921): 189 [Heb].

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dead. The world to come is therefore an actual place. At the same time, the wicked are to be punished by burning. To reinforce this literal view of punishment, R. Nissim Gaon relied on Saadia’s hermeneutical claim stating that a text should not be extracted from its literal meaning unless this meaning contradicts human understanding. “The literal reading is that they [the wicked] should be ashes, and there is no e­ vidence [dalīl] for departing from the literal reading. And since there is no other evidence—we know [it is so] and we will not depart from it.”28 Second, Nissim Gaon emphasized observance of the commandments in the future due to the controversy with Christianity.29 Saadia’s spirit, then, lingers in the systematic development of Nissim Gaon’s apocalyptic formulations, although, unfortunately, only isolated fragments of his discussions remain. Saadia, Rav Hai, R. Shmuel b. Hofni, and R. Nissim b. Yaakov are instances of geonim and of sages active in their surroundings who were often concerned with conceptual and philosophical matters in their responsa and in their interpretations of Scripture and of Aggadah, and did so mostly by resorting to primary analytical and logical tools.30 All these four geonim are rationalist thinkers and their messianic doctrine rests, overtly or covertly, on distinctly apocalyptic motifs. After Saadia’s extensive discussions and his systematic arguments, justifying apocalyptic traditions in rationalist terms was apparently no longer necessary. Until the twelfth century, these ­traditions were therefore integrated into many philosophical texts.

Influence in East and West Saadia developed a set of rationalist arguments into a specific apocalyptic ­tradition that eventually became accepted and even prevalent among the geonim or, alternatively, helped other geonim to endorse the apocalyptic approach. Saadia’s broad influence extends beyond the time and place of 28 Abramson, Rav Nissim Gaon, 543. The original is on page 540. 29 “Because after we are gathered from exile and return to our homeland in the days of the redeemer—by it [by the Torah] we will be commanded [we will observe the commandments; natas . arra‘u]” (ibid., 352-353). 30 The conceptual and philosophical interests of the geonim (except, of course, Saadia), have only occasionally interested scholars, mainly in the context of other topics (the study of mysticism and of religious polemics). This matter still awaits serious research. R. Nissim Gaon’s intention to write “laws on faith,” for instance, stresses the conceptual association of the geonim. Conceptual analyses of geonic teachings appear, for example, in David Kaufmann, “Ein Responsum des Gaons Hai über Gottes Vorherwissen,” ZDMG 49 (1895): 73; Y. Twersky, “Hamishah Sefarim le-Rav Nissim Gaon,” review of the eponymous book by Shraga Abramson, Tarbiz 37 (1968): 318-328 [Heb]; Dov Schwartz, “Giosuè fermo veramente il sole? Aspetti della concezione del miracolo nella filosofia ebraica medievale,” La rassegna mensile di Israel 63, no. 3 (2002): 1-24.

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the geonim and reaches as far as Spain, Provence, and Ashkenaz in the late Middle Ages. The writings of R. Abraham bar Hiyya ha-Nasi, for example, who ­discussed various miraculous motifs in the messianic period, contain traces of Saadia’s messianic and apocalyptic doctrine. Bar Hiyya opens his discussion about the resurrection of the dead with the following conclusive statement: I would have done better not talking about this issue and relying on the writings of R. Saadia Gaon, of blessed memory, who wrote The Book of Beliefs . . . and his words are accurate and accepted by all believers and I should not have added to them. However, I saw and heard about fellow Jews in this generation, some of them in Spain and some of them in France saying that these words of R. Saadia Gaon, of blessed memory, are not enough for them. . . .31

Thinkers active in Spain and Provence in the twelfth century adopted Saadia’s messianic doctrine in its entirety, citing him verbatim, in ­ periphrastic ­translations, or summarizing him. R. Berachya b. Natronai ha-­Nakdan cites at length the three messianic treatises of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions in a periphrastic translation.32 R. Yaakov b. Reuven cited from this t­ ranslation (in the name of “the great sage” and “the gaon”) and summed up the course of the messianic events according to Saadia in Treatise XII of his book Milhamot ha-Shem. Among the aims of this section, he notes, are “to show the power of the prophecies about the coming of our messiah/because our days are near/and our end has not come,” and “to tell them that, at the time of the resurrection, the body will be alive with the soul/and those sleeping under the ground—will arise.”33 Finally, R. Yosef b. Nathan Official also quotes at length from Treatise VIII of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions and, inter alia, mentions the change in the nature of feral beasts at the time of redemption.34 Saadia’s ideas and claims thus fitted his polemical, anti-Christian ­disposition and the refutation of various false messiahs, such as Abu ‘Issa 31 R. Abraham bar Hiyya, Sefer Megillat ha-Megalleh, ed. A. Poznanski and J. Guttmann (Berlin: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1924), 48 [Heb]. The third section of this book deals with resurrection and bar Hiyya addresses in it other interfacing issues, such as the commentaries on Adam’s stories in Genesis. Bar Hiyya alludes frequently to Saadia, challenging his exegeses. Cf. Shalom Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise: The Idea of Restorative Redemption,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 43-45 [Heb]. 32 Herman Gollancz, ed., The Ethical Treatises of Berachya Son of Rabbi Natronai ha-Nakdan, Hebrew Section (London: D. Nutt, 1902), 52-83. 33 R. Yaakov b. Reuven, Milhamot ha-Shem, ed. Yehuda Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1963), 157 [Heb]. R. Yitzhak Abravanel also adopted this course, pointing to apocalyptic goals to prove that the Christian interpretation is mistaken. See chapter 7 below. 34 R. Yosef b. Nathan Official, Sefer Yosef Hamekanne, ed. Yehuda Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1970), 5 [Heb].

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from Isfahan. Saadia’s apocalyptic outlook was indeed extremely helpful to anti-Christian polemicists such as R. Yaakov b. Reuven, R. Yosef Official, and R. Moshe ha-Kohen of Tordesillas,35 in their common effort to prove that the messiah had not yet arrived. Their approach, as noted, supports the notion of a miraculous world that will come into being following the arrival of the messiah while, as is well known, no such miracles have occurred so far and nature remains unchanged. Contrary to the Christians’ claim, the world was not redeemed with the arrival of Jesus. In time, debaters who supported a naturalistic approach tried to refine this claim. In the heat of the discussion, many claimed that neither political nor social changes had taken place after Jesus, and he is therefore not a messiah. Typical examples of such polemical arguments could be the ones ascribed to R. David Kimhi (Radak),36 R. Shlomo b. Moshe from Rome,37 R. Yehuda Halawa,38 and R. Hasdai Crescas.39 Yet, rationalist polemicists targeted Saadia directly in their criticism.40 The apocalyptic outlook, however, is obviously the most effective argument against the claim that Jesus had already appeared as a messiah, since no one could be deluded into thinking that we are living in an apocalyptic miraculous world.

35 Yehuda Shamir, Rabbi Moses ha-Kohen of Tordesillas and his Book Ezer ha-Emunah: A Chapter in the History of the Judeo-Christian Controversy (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 104-105. 36 A disputant assumed to be Kimhi mentions five characteristics (re’aiyot) of the messianic era, which failed to appear despite Jesus’ arrival. As will be shown in chapter 3, the following characteristics go into the building of the naturalistic approach. They are: 1) “the messiah will gather the dispersed of Israel and the scattered of Judah and the twelve tribes of Israel”; 2) “the messiah will build the Temple and Jerusalem and the city of David—Zion”; 3) “the messiah will bring everlasting peace”; 4) “the messiah will rule over all the kings on earth”; 5) “the whole world will beat their swords and their spears” (R. David Kimhi, The Book of the Covenant and Other Writings, ed. Frank Talmage [Jerusalem: The Bialik Institute, 1974], 85-86 [Heb]). These arguments reflect their author’s complex polemical interests. Cf. idem, “A Hebrew Polemical Treatise: Anti-Cathar and Anti-Orthodox,” Harvard Theological Review 60 (1967): 323-348. 37 Such claims appear frequently in Edut Adonai Ne’emanah by Shlomo b. Moshe. See Yehuda Rosenthal, Studies and Sources, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1967), 373-430 [Heb]. 38 R. Yehuda b. Maharam Halawa mentioned the promise of kingship (“the staff shall not depart from Judah” [Genesis 49:10]) to prove that the messiah had not yet arrived. R. Judah’s statement appears in his commentary on Genesis, Sefer Imrei Shefer, ed. Hayyim Ben-Zion Herschler (Jerusalem: Harav Herschler Institute, 1993), 439 [Heb]. 39 Crescas summed up briefly, pointing to the Jewish religious renaissance and to universal peace: “When, however, we go over the prophecies, we shall see that they hoped for things with the coming of the messiah which did not come and which were not seen when [Jesus] came: about the substance of the messiah, his family, the stature of his glory; about Jerusalem, Israel, the Temple, and universal peace for all nations; about life and the divine emanation, wisdom, prophecy, and the inclination to do good” (Hasdai Crescas, The Refutation of the Christian Principles, trans. Daniel J. Lasker [Albany, NY: SUNY, 1992]), 66. On R. Meir b. Shim’on of Narbonne, see ch. 6 below. 40 See Norman Frimer and Dov Schwartz, The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1992), 33 [Heb].

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As will be shown below, Saadia’s influence is also evident in the first controversies about Maimonides’ writings at the end of the twelfth c­ entury and in the 1230s and 1240s, among them the messianic doctrines of extreme and moderate thinkers such as R. Meir Abulafia and Nahmanides. The influence of Saadia’s doctrine of redemption is evident in the apocalyptic content of the messianic events and in Nahmanides’ messianic orientation, which established the following chronological order: (1) the temporary world of the souls; (2) the messianic era; (3) the resurrection of the dead; (4) the world to come.41 Traces of Saadia’s messianic doctrine are evident not only among ­individuals but also in various currents of thought and in several ­ideological circles, as evident in two examples. One is Karaite messianic thought: ­several Karaite thinkers preserved Saadia’s model, including its a­ pocalyptic ­features.42 The second example points to messianic trends that ­developed in Yemenite Judaism, which were significantly influenced by Saadia’s ­messianic teachings, as discussed below.43 Saadia’s influence on the m ­ essianic idea in medieval Jewish philosophy, then, can hardly be exaggerated.

SUMMARY This brief and preliminary discussion of several geonim, and above all Saadia, shows that systematic Jewish philosophy was, from the start, deeply ­committed to the apocalyptic messianic model and strongly attempted to ensure its rational corroboration. This determination applies both to the evidence about the actual existence of the apocalyptic model and to its ­presentation in a clearly philosophical context. In fact, Saadia took a ­midrashic tradition (Sefer Zeruvavel) and offered biblical support for many of its details (the messiah son of Joseph, Armilus, and so forth), thus ­incorporating it into the biblical tradition. Saadia dismissed the more ­exaggerated descriptions in the book, such as Armilus being the son of Satan born of an image made of

41 See, for example, Nahmanides, Torat ha-Adam, in Kitvei ha-Ramban, vol. 2, ed. Baruch Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1965), 311 [Heb]. For further discussion of R. Meir Abulafia and Nahmanides, see ch. 4 below. 42 See Daniel Lasker, “The Destiny of Man in Karaite Philosophy,” Daat 12 (1984): 7-13 [Heb]. Cf. George Vajda, “The Opinions of the Karaite R. Yafeth b. Ali on the Destruction of the World in the End of Days,” in American Academy for Jewish Research Jubilee Volume, ed. Salo Baron and Isaac E. Barzilay (Jerusalem: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1980): 85-95; Zvi Ankori, “Studies in the Messianic Doctrine of Yehuda Hadassi the Karaite,” Tarbiz 30 (1961): 186-208 [Heb]. 43 On Nathanael Ibn al-Fayyumi and Hoter b. Shlomo, see chs. 3 and 7 below.

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stone. In other words, he fully adopted the apocalyptic motif while justifying its use in systematic and rational discussions.44 Jewish philosophy in its first steps, then, as the first rationalist v­ ersion of Judaism, did not seek detachment from the apocalyptic tradition. Not only that—it actually endeavored to place this tradition within a r­ ationalist frame. The very use of the term rationalism concerning a messianic ­doctrine with mythical overtones is indeed quite puzzling. Nevertheless, the use of ­analogical and theological arguments on the one hand, and the anchoring of the m ­ essianic interpretation in an epistemic structure on the other, place this discussion within the realm of rationality, notwithstanding its mythical object. By the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries, the gradual detachment from apocalyptic messianism had already begun. R. Abraham bar Hiyya’s claims about the critics of Saadia’s messianism in Spain and Provence (“words of R. Saadia Gaon . . . are not enough for them”) hint at the beginning of the disengagement from him. Toward the end of the twelfth century, the apocalyptic approach had lost its center of power within Jewish thought almost entirely and, ever since, waited for its return to prominence. The rejection of apocalyptic messianism will be the topic of the next chapter.

44 Note that, in this regard, Saadia’s conceptual messianic endeavor resembles R. Akiva’s—both toned down apocalyptic approaches to adapt them to redemption in the present. See Heinemann, Aggadah and Its Development, 108; David Berger, “Three Typological Themes in Early Jewish Messianism: Messiah Son of Joseph, Rabbinic Calculations, and the Figure of Armilus,” AJS Review 10 (1985): 141-164.

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Individual Redemption and Naturalism

THE RETREAT OF APOCALYPTIC MESSIANISM In the course of the twelfth century, rationalists increasingly came to think of the apocalyptic view as one not resting on solid foundations. This ­conceptual process began among Spanish thinkers and reached as far as the East, culminating in the naturalistic messianic doctrine of Maimonides that cleansed rationalist views from any apocalyptic remnants. Maimonides’ messianic doctrine has been studied seriously and in depth, but mainly as an isolated, independent chapter rather than as a link in the history of ideas. Specifically, scholars have dealt mainly with Maimonides’ influence on his actual and spiritual disciples in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, while the fact that Maimonides’ teachings were part of a conceptual process has not received significant attention. In this context, then, I will describe the development of the messianic idea in the twelfth century and present Maimonides’ teachings as the final, immanent stage of this development. The accepted, and certainly justified, assumption is that Maimonides was the first to present a systematic naturalistic messianic model. I will argue, however, that the foundations for the eclipse of the apocalyptic tradition, which in Maimonides’ work disappears almost entirely, were already in place in the eleventh century and the first half of the twelfth. Maimonides, then, did not conceive his messianic doctrine ex nihilo but radicalized trends that, to some extent, had already been present in Jewish philosophy in the transition from Moslem to Christian Spain. The thrust of these trends is a shift of focus to the supreme importance of individual and natural redemption, which is identified with the eternal and abstract immortality of the individual soul and intellect.1 Individual   1 See Shalom Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise: The Idea of Restorative Redemption,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 78-86 [Heb]; Moshe Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity in the Middle Ages,” in Messianism and Eschatology, ed. Zvi Baras (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), 254-263 [Heb]; idem, introduction to Messianic Movements in Israel, by Aharon Zeev Aescoly

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realization becomes the final and absolute goal, and any collective messianic goal, political or cosmic, pales by comparison. Apocalyptic messianism had not emphasized the i­ ndividual dimension of redemption and its sources state that miraculous, created beings bring about individual redemption ­(including a wondrous paradise and a menacing, burning hell). Individual redemption, therefore, lacked any personal intimacy given that ­paradise, hell, and ­similar ­constructs had been meant for large groups (the ­righteous, the wrongdoers, and so forth). By contrast, at the end of the eleventh ­century and the beginning of the twelfth, the foundation was set for a n ­ atural ­intimate redemption, in whose course the soul unites with a ­rational and spiritual supreme element or returns to it as its source. This communion is the result of an entirely n ­ atural psychological process, without any divine personal involvement and without any miraculous sign or disruption in the laws of nature. Indeed, quite the contrary—the return to the source marks the height of the natural process. Various Neoplatonic influences, traceable in the writings of many contemporary thinkers, contributed to this focus on the individual at the expense of the splendid, collective messianic process. A tension, and even a contradiction, emerged between the apocalyptic legacy and the ­individualistic conception, focusing on two issues: 1) The apocalyptic approach is unequivocally committed to ­eternal physical life, but the abstract immortality of the soul and the ­intellect as the ultimate end are also viewed as eternal. These two conceptions are therefore incompatible. 2) The individual goal is viewed as a natural state, according to the definitions of the soul and of the intellect. This determination is valid for the two philosophical approaches widespread in the twelfth century: a) Neoplatonism viewed the return of the soul to its eternal source (mostly the universal soul) as a natural p ­ rocess, which only the foulness of matter could harm and disrupt; b) NeoAristotelians viewed eternal communion with the active intellect as a direct continuation of the process of intellection (or achieving knowledge) in the material world.

(Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1987), 12-13 [Heb]. On the tension between personal redemption and apocalyptic messianism in the rabbinic period, see Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987), 652-654.

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The result was a detour from apocalyptic tradition, which is miraculous and all-encompassing, toward the individual end, which is distinctly n ­ aturalistic, since one cannot simultaneously support the motif of ­eternal material life and the abstract and eternal immortality of the soul. Naturalism, then, began at the personal level and, in Maimonidean ­doctrine, spread to the social and cosmic realms. This tension between apocalyptic tradition and the importance of individual redemption as the natural immortality of the soul recurs in the writings of at least four twelfth-century thinkers: R. Abraham bar Hiyya, R. Judah Halevi, R. Yosef Ibn Saddiq, and R. Abraham Ibn Ezra. First note that, during the eleventh century and at the beginning of the twelfth, other Neoplatonic and Neo-Aristotelian views appear, rooted in natural i­ ndividual redemption and entirely unconnected to collective messianism, such as those of R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol and R. Moshe Ibn Ezra,2 the author of Kitab Ma‘ānī al-nafs,3 R. Abraham b. Daud,4 and more. Other thinkers, such as R. Maimun b. Yosef,5 went on upholding redemption as based on a­ pocalyptic motifs. These parallel trends seemingly led to a hidden ­tension between the apocalyptic messianic legacy and natural individual r­edemption. In Spain, this tension erupted openly in the writings of Bar Hiyya, Judah Halevi, Ibn Saddiq, and Abraham Ibn Ezra, who, aside from apocalyptic views, ­supported Neoplatonic variations of individual ­natural approaches. In Yemen, this conceptual tension appears in the thought of Nathanael Ibn al-Fayyumi. The current discussion thus focuses on the conceptual ­processes   2 Jacques Schlanger, La Philosophie de Salomon Ibn Gabirol: Étude d’un Néoplatonisme (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 305307. Note that motifs with messianic associations can indeed be rescued from Ibn Gabirol’s poetry, but they cannot be viewed as expressions of systematic messianic thought. Cf. Raphael Loewe, “Ibn Gabirol’s Treatment of Sources in the Kether Malkhuth,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmann on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed. Siegfried Stein and Raphael Loewe (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1979), 191.   3 See Abraham Halkin, “Studies in Kitab Ma‘ānī al-nafs,” in Arabic and Islamic Studies, ed. Yaakov Mansour ­(Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1973), 92-93 [Heb].   4 In a sense, Abraham Ibn Daud presented a periphrastic version of Avicenna’s psychological teachings, including individual and intellectual immortality. See Amira Eran, “Avicennna’s Influence on Abraham Ibn Daud’s Proof of the Immortality of the Soul,” Daat 31 (1993): 5-25 [Heb]; Dov Schwartz, “The Criticism of the Reincarnation of Souls in the Middle Ages,” Mahanayim 6 (1994): 107 [Heb]. See also note 57 below. Some scholars have argued that the notion of individual redemption, meaning the immortality of the soul, can already be found in Saadia’s time. I am not persuaded that concepts such as eternal life, the world to come, and others resembling them convey the notion of abstract immortality, rather than that of eternal corporeal life according to the apocalyptic approach. See Ezra Fleischer, The Proverbs of Sa’id ben Bābshād (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1990), 124-125 [Heb].  5 See The Letter of Consolation of Maimun ben Joseph, trans. L. M. Simmons (London: Wertheimer, 1890), 29-31. Cf. ch. 4 below, note 30.

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that led to the rise of messianic naturalism until it came to dominate ­messianic thought in Jewish philosophy at the end of the twelfth century.

INDIVIDUAL REDEMPTION BEFORE MAIMONIDES The dichotomous rift between the apocalyptic messianic legacy and the individual naturalistic goal is particularly prominent in the work of Ibn Saddiq and Nathanael Ibn al Fayyumi. By contrast, in the writings of Bar Hiyya and Halevi, messianic tension remains latent. Bar Hiyya concealed the messianic tension by conveying these approaches in two separate books—Megillat Hamegalleh and Hegyon ha-Nefesh ha-´Atsuvah. Halevi succeeded in playing down this conflict in a single work (The Kuzari) by relying on his literary brilliance. After the discussion of these thinkers’ philosophical connection to messianism, I consider at length the messianic tension in Halevi’s teachings.

Messianic Tension in Spain As noted at the end of the previous chapter, Bar Hiyya endorsed an ­apocalyptic messianic approach. In Megillat Hamegalleh, Bar Hiyya ­supports apocalyptic ideas such as the eternal life of the body (“those who go to the Garden of Eden live and do not taste death”), the expansion of the Land of Israel over the entire world (“and either all the nations of the world will be called the Land of Israel or the Land of Israel will greatly expand until it fills the entire world”) and a messianic orientation of the Saadian variety, formulating these ideas clearly and precisely.6 By contrast, in his other work, Bar Hiyya addresses the individual and natural conception of the immortality of the soul. Quoting the philosophers, he writes: (I) The wise and pious: When he leaves the world, his soul, as a result of his wisdom, will be separated from the material world and will resume its former form; on account of his piety, which rejected worldly ways, it will ascend from the lower to the upper world and be freed

  6 A lucid formulation of these apocalyptic motifs, from which the following passages are cited, is found in Sefer Megillat ha-Megalleh, ed. A. Poznanski and J. Guttmann (Berlin: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1924), 110 [Heb]. See also ch. 2 above, note 31. Cf. Sarah Klein-Braslavy, “Abraham bar Hiyya’s Interpretation of the Story of the Creation of Man and the Story of the Garden of Eden,”in Maimonides as Biblical Interpreter (Boston, MA: Academic Studies Press, 2011), 221; Moshe Idel, “On the Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Mysticism,” in The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed. Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1991), 200-201 [Heb].

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from all inferior matter. It will come into contact with the high, pure, pristine Form and enter it inseparably.7

The passage clearly echoes the classic Neoplatonic approach stating that the soul fully emanates from the supernal world (“pure Form”),8 and returns to it at the end of the life cycle to stay there forever. According to this ­representative determination, Bar Hiyya acknowledged the Neoplatonic version of individual eternal redemption. Later in this work, Bar Hiyya described the new type of human to emerge at the time of redemption, whose nature is adapted to the preservation of the Torah and “will have neither the possibility nor the ability to transgress.”9 The idea of the soul’s return to its source on the one hand and the notion of corporeal eternity and the emergence of a superhuman future model on the other are, as noted, incompatible. Bar Hiyya thus presented the idea of personal redemption but without rejecting the apocalyptic legacy. The analysis of Ibn Saddiq’s work leads to similar conclusions. Like Bar Hiyya, he too suggested two messianic alternatives simultaneously— apocalyptic-collective and natural-individual—seemingly entirely unaware of the essential contradiction between them. In the closing chapter of Olam Katan [The Microcosm], in the section entitled “A Treatise Concerning the True Meaning of Reward and Punishment,” he writes: The rational soul . . . when it has separated from its body its existence is perpetuated forever in the celestial world. That is to say, its bliss, its paradise, and its reward consist in its attachment to the world to which it really belongs, and its return to its element, to shine with that true light that emanates from its Creator, may He be blessed, w ­ ithout

  7 Abraham bar Hiyya, The Meditation of the Sad Soul, trans. Geoffrey Wigoder (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 46-47. In this work, however, Bar Hiyya did not unequivocally equate the world to come with this i­mmortality. Scholars have discussed the difference between the two works. See, for example, Julius Guttman, The Philosophy of Judaism: The History of Jewish Philosophy from Biblical Times to Franz Rosenzweig, trans. David W. Silverman (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988), 113-114. See also Meir Waxman, “The Philosophical and Religious Thought of Abraham bar Hiyya ha-Nasi,” in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, Hebrew Section, ed. Saul Lieberman et al. (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 162.   8 The “high, pure, pristine Form” (The Meditation of the Sad Soul, 47) seems to be identical to the “closed” form (ibid., 39), and the reference is then to the “world soul or general soul” of Neoplatonism. The world soul is the source of the forms and the souls. See, for example, Isaac Husik, A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1918), 117; Israel Efros, Studies in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), 216-218.   9 Bar Hiyya, The Meditation of the Sad Soul, 143. See also ibid., 145: God “will make good man’s inclination which was ab initio bad [according to Genesis 2:21].”

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any intermediary.10 Such is the destiny of the human soul, and its ­recompense for its good work.11

The soul’s final goal, then, is the return to its abstract spiritual source (“its element”). This return, argued Ibn Saddiq, is “the world to come.” The immortality of the soul is thus contingent on “its separation from the body.” Ibn Saddiq knew that abstract eternal immortality is unintelligible to the multitude and he therefore shortened his argument: “But this is not the place to reveal more of this, because of the intensity with which lust, folly, i­gnorance, and blindness prevails among our contemporaries.”12 By ­contrast, Ibn Saddiq later allotted to the Jewish people at least material immortality. His claims show that he had internalized apocalyptic ­tradition. Consider the following: As for my own theory concerning the resurrection of the dead, it is as follows: Because the help afforded by the Creator, may He be ­magnified, to us, the people of Israel, has been so great and so firm, it must follow that He would resurrect the righteous, the pious, the Patriarchs and the prophets. Whosoever dies in exile suffering m ­ artyrdom for ­asserting the unity of God, may He be blessed, will proceed forward to the reward of the World to Come and will later, in the Messianic Age, be resurrected, never to die again; as our Rabbis, of blessed memory, have said: “The dead whom the Holy One, blessed be He, will r­ esurrect, will never again revert to dust” (Sanhedrin 92a).13

This passage shows that the resurrected will be eternal (“never to die again”). Moreover, Ibn Saddiq noted that material life in messianic times would be devoid of material pleasures of the kind known to us, shifting to a new type of material life in a cleansed and purified body. Eternal ­physical life, as noted, is a recurrent motif in apocalyptic midrashic literature, and Saadia had already systematically formulated the notion of a purified body.14 Ibn Saddiq, then, preserved the apocalyptic orientation, including all its events and characteristics, and formulated an approach supporting 10 The presentation of the immortality of the soul as existing in the light of the Creator seems to be based on the epistles of Alkindī. See Rasā‘il al-Kindī al-Falsafiyya, vol. 1 (Cairo, 1950), 275. 11 The Microcosm of Joseph Ibn Saddiq, trans. Jacob Haberman (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2003), 147. See also ibid., 97-99. 12 Ibid., 148. 13 Ibid., 150. TB Sanhedrin 92a; Tana de-Bei Eliyahu Rabba, 31. 14 See ch. 2 above. This approach later became a central characteristic of the apocalyptic trend in the teachings of Nahmanides, R. Meir Abulafia, and others.

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­individual ­naturalistic redemption.15 Finally, this characterization is also true of Abraham Ibn Ezra’s messianic interpretations. In his exegesis of the chapters on messianic events, Ibn Ezra included classic apocalyptic motifs,16 but he clearly and broadly upheld the substantial concept of the soul and its individual abstract immortality.17 The tension in the discussions of Ibn Saddiq and Bar Hiyya between an emphatic apocalyptic view of redemption and an individual n ­ aturalistic one closely reflect the tensions in the writings of Judah Halevi as well, even though in Halevi’s writings they are scattered and ­formulated ­esoterically. This tension also reflects the beginning of a gradual retreat from the ­apocalyptic legacy toward naturalism and the progressive ­erosion of apocalyptic messianism’s exclusivity. Before presenting the ­ tension between the apocalyptic element and individual natural r­edemption in Judah Halevi’s teachings, I will comment on the reflection of this tension in the contemporary Jewish thought in Yemen.

Messianic Wavering in Yemen Another thinker who, like many other medieval scholars in Yemen, was ­perhaps directly influenced by Saadia’s messianic philosophy is Nathanael Ibn al-Fayyumi. Rather than resorting to Saadia’s course of presenting rational arguments and evidence, Nathanael apparently relied on Saadia’s claims, as did the later geonim. However, he derived his messianic and apocalyptic approach directly from Saadia’s metaphysical ­individualistic 15 At the end, after describing the suffering of the wicked in messianic times, Ibn Saddiq writes: “But the life of the ­righteous will be one in which they behold and acknowledge their Creator. . . . But those who have not died [at the advent of the Messianic Age] will die, and go forward to their reward which awaits them, and to perpetual bliss” (The Microcosm, 151). It is hard to decide whether the words “but those who have not died will die” relate to the wicked (while the righteous see revenge taken on them) or to the righteous—the subject is the same in the two sentences. The statement can be interpreted to mean that Ibn Saddiq supported Saadia’s version of the world to come, which is reached after resurrection, but it is also possible to assume that he is speaking of abstract immortality and Ibn Saddiq then created a compromise between the apocalyptic tradition and the individual approach. According to this compromise, apocalyptic events will be followed by general death and the souls of the righteous will remain. Whatever the case, the tension between apocalyptic messianism and individual naturalism remains. The lack of the Arab source does not ease the choice between these two alternatives, and scholars dealing with this question do not seem to have contributed much to its clarification. See Zvi Blomberg, “Ethical Doctrines in the Religious Philosophies of Abraham Bar Hiyya, Yosef ibn Saddiq, and Abraham Ibn Daud,” Tarbiz 46 (1977): 239-240 [Heb]. 16 See, for example, his exegesis of Daniel 12:2, and cf. M. Friedländer, The Commentary of Ibn Ezra on Isaiah, vol. 4, Essays on the Writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra (London: Society of Hebrew Literature, 1877), 99-101. 17 See the sources and the discussion in Hermann Greive, Studien zum Jüdischen Neuplatonismus: Die Religions philosophie des Abraham Ibn Ezra (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 60-73.

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doctrine, as shown below. Together with Saadia’s influence, therefore, Nathanael also endorsed individual natural redemption, and the tension remained unresolved. Chapter Six of Bustān Al-‘Ukūl [The Garden of Wisdom] is entirely devoted to the messiah’s virtues and to future redemption. Nathanael opens his description of the messiah with a brief formulation of his view of ­prophecy. In Nathanael’s doctrine, prophecy is adapted to the Neoplatonic terms he probably found in Ismailite sources. These sources exerted decisive influence on pre-Maimonidean thought, and Nathanael is no exception in this regard.18 Accordingly, Nathanael holds that prophecy is an emanation bestowed on the prophet. The emanation radiates from the universal soul and originates in the Intellect. The messiah is a future prophet, who will bring not only intellectual, political, and social order to the world but also a distinct change in the laws of nature. “God enables the Messiah to p ­ erform such great miracles that no 19 prophet before him has ever achieved.” Like Saadia, Nathanael interpreted the prophecies as change in the laws of nature, reading literally the ideal of peace between beasts of prey and those which are gentle (according to Isaiah 11:6). Nathanael, then, categorically rejected allegorical views of messianism. On two central issues, however, his apocalyptic doctrine was neither consistent nor coherent—the eternity of the Torah and the Neoplatonic conception of the soul’s return to its supreme source. A genuine supporter of apocalyptic views cannot accept the Torah’s eternity literally, since the Torah is adapted to the present material world rather than to a miraculous future one. Nathanael dealt at length with the argument that the Torah is eternal and will not change even in messianic times. This approach, which had previously appeared in Saadia’s work, is part of the polemic with Islam that was widespread in Jewish thought in Yemen.20 Possibly, then, the interreligious polemic became a distinct ­conceptual motive that ultimately promoted the naturalistic approach. 18 On the Ismailite sources of Nathanael Ibn al-Fayyumi, see Shlomo Pines, “Nathanael ben al-Fayyumi et la théologie ismaelienne,” Revue de l’histoire juive en Egypte 1 (1947): 5-22; R. C. Keiner, “Jewish Ismailism in Twelfth Century Yemen: R. Nathanael ben Al-Fayyumi,” Jewish Quarterly Review 74 (1984): 249-266. On Nathanael’s messianic approach, see Shaul Regev, “Messianic Conceptions in the Philosophical Literature of Yemenite Jews in the Middle Ages,” Tema: Journal of Judeo-Yemenite Studies 4 (1994): 26 [Heb]. 19 Nathanael ibn al-Fayyumi, The Bustān Al-Ukūl, trans. David Levine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1907), 96. Nathanael returned to describe the philosophical and Neoplatonic context where he located the prophet and the messiah in ibid., 104. 20 Ibid., 103-115. See also Reuben Aharoni, “From Bustan Al-Uqul to Qisat Al-Batul: Some Aspects of Jewish-Muslim Religious Polemics in Yemen,” Hebrew Union College Annual 52 (1981): 311-360. Cf. also Eliezer Schlossberg, “The Polemic against Islam in the Midrash Nur-al Zalam,” Tema 3 (1993): 57-66 [Heb].

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As for the second principle—the return of the soul to its supernal source—the term “the world to come” in the seventh chapter of Bustān Al-‘Ukūl refers to the soul’s communion with the spiritual hypostasis from which it emanated. This principle is not part of the anti-Moslem polemic and Nathanael explicitly intends here the individual and abstract i­mmortality of the soul. In his view, after attaining both practical and rational qualities, the soul “will inhale holy forms and be attached to the universal soul, so that light will shine upon her . . . [as will] the essence of the Merciful One for ­immortality and perfect happiness to all eternity.”21 Clearly, then, Nathanael meant eternal individual redemption with a distinct naturalistic bent. Like his contemporaries, Nathanael Ibn al-Fayyumi was not consistent on this question. On the one hand, he blindly supported Saadia’s version of miraculous collective redemption and, on the other, he loyally promoted the Neoplatonic ideal of individual natural redemption and the eternity of the law. Resonating in messianic Jewish thought in Yemen, then, are ­hesitations and conceptual tensions present in twelfth-century philosophy in the West as well.

PROPHECY AND REDEMPTION In this discussion, the focus will be on the messianic outlook of The Kuzari.22 A central feature of this book turns Judah Halevi into a link in the messianic chain assumed by the geonim. I am referring to his unequivocal statement on the essential, particular, and eternal uniqueness of the 21 Bustān Al-‘Ukūl, 135. See also ibid., 137: “Every soul that masters the whole of theory and practice, acquires the ways of the prophets and the pious, and treads in their paths, will surely achieve uninterrupted happiness unto all eternity.” 22 Scholars have differed on whether sacred poetry can be considered an authentic expression of philosophical views. See Ezra Fleischer, “A Study of R. Judah Halevi’s Sacred Poems,” in R. Judah Halevi’s Philosophical Thought, ed. Haya Schwartz (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1978), 175-178 [Heb]. By contrast, see Yosef Heinemann, “R. Judah Halevi: The Man and the Thinker,” Knesset 7 (1942): 261-279 [Heb]; Yeshayahu Leibowitz, “The Selihot and Piyutim of R. Judah Halevi,” in R. Judah Halevi’s Philosophical Thought, 185-186 [Heb]; Ephraim Hazan, “I Asked Thee Concerning a Pious Man, Not a Prince,” Mayim mi-Dalav 1 (1990): 236-242 [Heb]; idem, “Israel and the Nations in the Poetry of Judah Halevi and in Sefer Ha-Kuzari,” Piyyut in Tradition 1 (1996): 83-91 [Heb]. Joseph Saracheck discusses Halevi’s poetry in a messianic context and, possibly on these grounds, his concern with The Kuzari is less than exhaustive. See his The Doctrine of the Messiah in Medieval Jewish Literature (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1932), 98-101. I will not address the historical question of whether Halevi’s decision to go to the Land of Israel conveys messianic fervor or his pious individual desire to to be buried there. See Benzion Dinur, “Judah Halevi in the Land of Israel and the Contemporary Messianic Fervor” in Historical Writings, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1975), 202-231 [Heb]. The Kuzari, however, definitely conveys Halevi’s exoteric and esoteric views, and I will therefore analyze his messianic doctrine as stated in this work.

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Jewish people and of the Land of Israel, the very elements that apocalyptic ­literature had so excelled at emphasizing. Rather than on the universal ­elevation of ­humanity, apocalyptic literature focuses on particularistic elements, national and ethnic. According to this view, only the people of Israel will raise in the future to the highest rank and the rest of the world will be ­subject to them. The apocalyptic vision does not contemplate the restoration of all lands, stating instead that “in the future the Land of Israel will expand on all sides.”23 Given his support for this clear-cut particularism that, at least partly, continued in the messianic era, Halevi showed a strong ­attachment to the apocalyptic approach. At the same time, Halevi can validly be viewed as anticipating Maimonides on individual redemption and on the abstract and natural immortality of the soul. On these issues, Halevi’s teachings emerge as a way of preparing the ground for Maimonidean naturalism. The unique role that prophecy plays in The Kuzari allows for both these views.24 The discussion will therefore deal with both the book’s apocalyptic legacy and its connection to the natural individual immortality of the soul. I begin with a description of several apocalyptic motifs in Halevi’s messianic doctrine. Halevi places the prophet in an independent degree of reality, above human existence, as evident in the fact that the laws of nature do not apply to the prophet in certain circumstances.25 The conditions that, according to Halevi, prophecy needs to meet to reach perfection expose their obvious messianic connection: uniqueness of ancestry, uniqueness of place, and uniqueness of ritual. I consider them below, tracing their ­messianic meaning.

Uniqueness of Ancestry Halevi holds that only Jews are granted the gift of prophecy. He clarifies the special status of the Jewish people vis-à-vis humanity in general with the help of a metaphor that points to this contrast in several versions—kernel 23 Reuven Hammer, trans., Sifrei: A Tannaitic Commentary on the Book of Deuteronomy, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 1:1, 27. 24 On Halevi’s conception of prophecy, see, for example, Harry A. Wolfson, “Halevi and Maimonides on Prophecy,” Jewish Quarterly Review 33 (1942-1943): 58-70. Since the writing of this pioneering study, many scholars—far too many to mention here—have considered this question. For one example, see Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 94-147. 25 The Kuzari I: 41, 48. References and citations are from the following edition: Judah Halevi, The Kuzari: An Argument for the Faith of Israel, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York: Schocken, 1964). References to the Arabic original are to Kitāb al-Radd Wa-‘L Dalīl Fī ‘L Dīn Al-Dhalīl, ed. David H. Baneth and Haggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem: Magnes Press and The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1977).

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(the chosen) and shell, heart and limbs, brain and barks, seed and earth.26 An analysis of these metaphors attests to interdependence between the Jewish people and other nations as well as to a system of mutual relationships between the different components. The seed—the Jewish people—grows from its amalgamation with the earth that nourishes it, which symbolizes the nations of the world; the heart is connected to the peripheral limbs in mutual interaction and Halevi, as a physician, certainly recognized this according to the Hippocratic corpus; kernel and husk also attest to mutual interaction and to the impossibility of each one existing on its own. Halevi, then, viewed perfection and proper functioning as dependent on a whole, on a situation where all the parts function harmoniously even though some are more important than others. The first metaphor proposes the image of kernel and shell.27 Exposing the two sources of this image will reveal the new meaning that Halevi assigned to it. The first source points to Moslem influences, be it through the polemic with the “Arabiyya” or through mutual inspiration.28 Against the notion of uniqueness in the “Arabiyya,” which emphasized the ­distinctiveness of the Moslem community and its prophet, Halevi ­postulated the uniqueness of the Jewish community. A second source is neither polemical nor ­environmental but intra-Jewish. Chronologically, Bar Hiyya’s notion of the “pure soul” ­transmigrating from Adam to the entire Jewish people influenced Halevi.29 The metaphor of kernel versus shell is the source of a religious-anthropological conception that is clearly dualistic, though with some caveats I c­ onsider below. This conception divides the human race into two defined groups: the chosen, who symbolize the good, and the sinners, who symbolize evil, or, in another formulation, the chosen ­community versus the evil community. In the West, this approach is assumed to begin with various Zoroastrian 26 For an analysis of these metaphors and their influence, see Shalom Rosenberg, “The Chosenness Idea in R. Judah Halevi’s Thought and in Modern Jewish Philosophy,” in R. Judah Halevi’s Philosophical Thought, 109-118 [Heb]. 27 This image recurs in The Kuzari I in several places: 47, p. 49; 95, p. 64; 103, p. 73. The other images also convey this idea. 28 See Nehemya Aloni, “The Kuzari: An Anti-Arabiyyeh Polemic,” Eshel Beer Sheva: Studies in Jewish Thought 2 (1980): 119-144 [Heb]; Jan D. Katzwe, “Moses Ibn Ezra and Judah Halevi: Their Philosophies in Response to Exile,” Hebrew Union College Annual 55 (1984): 189-195. For terminological sources of the concept of segullah, see Shlomo Pines, “Shi’ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi’s Kuzari,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2 (1980): 167-172. See also Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language of Religious Experience in Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). 29 See Guttmann’s introduction to Sefer Megillat ha-Megalleh, XXI-XXII, and the article by Bernhard Ziemlich, “Abraham ben Chija und Jehuda Halewi,” Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 29 (1880): 366-374, cited there. Moshe Idel also compares their attitude to the Land of Israel in “Some Conceptions of the Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought,” in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture—Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 125-129.

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religions. It was then endorsed by the Judean desert sects,30 and reached more advanced formulation in the writings of Augustine. According to Augustine, history reflects the distinction between two classes—one guided by ­ ephemeral values and the other by eternal ones.31 The ­ symbolism ­expressing these groups speaks of people in “the earthly city” as opposed to those in “the heavenly city.”32 The similarity between the anthropological conceptions of the Judean desert sects, for example, and that of Halevi, is in the a­ rbitrariness of the choice. Jews are not chosen because they will it, just as the sons of light and the sons of darkness are predestined. The ­difference between Halevi and these sources, however, is considerable: he does not claim that these ­communities were involved in a struggle. Nor do we find a ­historical ­explanation, such as a confrontation between those who are chosen and those who are not, as Augustine to some extent argues. Rather, the p ­ erfection of humanity is tied to the harmonization of kernel and shell and, as noted, to the mutual functioning of the various elements. These are the grounds for the ­considerable difference between the messianic ­conceptions of Augustine and Halevi. Further evidence of this difference emerges in the last metaphor—the seed and the earth. This metaphor leads to the messianic connections of the metaphors conveying the relationship between Israel and other nations: Besides this, God has a secret and wise design concerning us, which should be compared to the wisdom hidden in the seed which falls into the ground . . . In the same manner the law of Moses transforms each one who honestly follows it, though it may externally repel him. The nations merely serve to introduce and pave the way for the expected Messiah, who is the fruition, and they will all become His fruit. Then, if they acknowledge Him, they will become one tree. Then they will 33 revere the origin ['as  . al] which they formerly despised.

30 See, for example, David Flusser, “The Dead Sea Sect and Pre-Pauline Christianity,” Scrypta Hierosolimytana 4 (1958): 222-227. The motif of the chosen community in Pauline Christianity has been the subject of extensive research and I will not address it here. 31 See Saint Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. Philip Levine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), Book XIV, 407. 32 Ibid., 405. According to The Kuzari, the highest degree of perfection—which is attained when prophecy is ­fulfilled—is characterized by admission to “the realm of angels” (III: 1, 135). According to Yohanan Silman, this characteristic reflects only the early thought of Halevi. See Yohanan Silman, Philosopher and Prophet: Judah Halevi, The Kuzari, and the Evolution of His Thought, trans. Lenn J. Schramm (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), 134-135. Silman therefore determined that, on this point, Halevi identifies himself as a philosopher. See ibid., 31-58. 33 The Kuzari IV: 23, 226-227 (Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition, 172-173).

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The role of the people of Israel, then, is to lead the world to its perfection, and that is the purpose of their exile. Final perfection is thus tied to the ­perfection of all parts of humanity and a clearly messianic motif emerges here, which presents the people of Israel as working to amend the world and lead it to its ultimate aim. This passage intimates that, in an ideal s­ ituation, all human reality will be a “fruition,” but clearly without blurring the d ­ ifferences between Israel and the nations of the world. First, because the uniqueness of the Jewish people is assumed to be inherited and the system seems to offer no reason to change this perception. Second, according to the cited ­passage, the circumstances whereby the nations of the world praise and acclaim the people of Israel remain unchanged (“they will revere the origin”). The ­standing of the Jewish people is perpetuated as the “origin” of human ­existence as a whole, and the Jew’s inherited ­character is preserved, as is the ­distinction between branch and root. The people of Israel are not necessarily distinguished by virtue of acquired advantages or achievements but by being the root of the messianic fruit. Furthermore, the special, preferred status granted to the people of Israel seems to be a c­ ompensation for the humiliation they had ­suffered in exile (“which they formerly despised”). In sum, Halevi does not abandon the apocalyptic legacy that preserves the uniqueness and ­superiority of the Jewish people in the messianic period, neither concerning their s­ tanding nor concerning the attitude of other nations toward them.

Uniqueness of Place The uniqueness of the Land of Israel stands out against the backdrop of the “theory of climates” endorsed by Halevi and scholars have discussed this issue at length, beyond the context of the polemic with the “ Arabiyya.”34 According to Halevi, the Land of Israel, as the land of prophecy, is a ­necessary component of the Jew’s personal and religious perfection. As for the practical and messianic implications that follow from this approach, we find two types of sources. Evident in one is a call to take action in order to end the exile or, alternatively, to go to the Land of Israel. The other calls 34 See Alexander Altmann, “Judah Halevi’s Theory of Climates,” Aleph 5 (2005): 215-246. On the place of the Land of Israel in The Kuzari, see Saracheck, The Doctrine of the Messiah, 86-87; Eliezer Schweid, “Judah Halevi: A Land Both Spiritual and Physical,” in The Land of Israel: National Home or Land of Destiny, trans. Deborah Greniman (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), 47-60; Yohanan Silman, “The Earthliness of the Land of Israel in The Kuzari,” in The Land of Israel in Medieval Jewish Thought, ed. Moshe Hallamish and Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1991), 79-89 [Heb]. In the same volume, see Abraham Melamed, “The Land of Israel and Climatology in Jewish Thought,” 55-57 [Heb].

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Jews to acquiesce in their exile and bear the pain “for the sake of heaven.” Scholars have considered both types of sources at length.35 Either one of these options preserves the uniqueness of the Land of Israel in the ­messianic period, as evident from the aggadic exegesis: “Seven things were created prior to the world: Paradise, the Torah, the just, Israel, the throne of glory, Jerusalem, and the Messiah, the son of David”:36 It was the object of divine wisdom in the creation of the world to create the Torah, which was the essence of wisdom, and whose bearers are the just, among whom stands the throne of glory and the truly righteous, who are the most select, viz. Israel, and the proper place for them was Jerusalem, and only the best of men, viz. the Messiah, son of David, could be associated with them, and they all entered37 Paradise. Figuratively speaking, one must assume that they were created prior to the world.

Both the people of Israel and the Land of Israel, whose center is Jerusalem, preserve their uniqueness and their standing in the messianic period. The motif of entering paradise mentioned in this passage alludes also to the apocalyptic notion of a finite eternal world of the Saadia variety, to emerge after the days of the messiah (“yemot ha-mashiach”). After the ­redemption of Jerusalem in the days of the messiah, the end of days will be in the Garden of Eden. In all these circumstances, the Land of Israel remains unique in the future as well, and in this sense Halevi’s view is no different from the ­apocalyptic approach that emphasizes the uniqueness of the Land. This view clearly leads to messianic tension concerning the activism required to realize the unique ancestry in the unique place. The difference between the two sources on the ending of exile or its acceptance “for the sake of heaven” (see, for example, The Kuzari I:109) reflects the two trends underlying Halevi’s messianic doctrine. On the one hand is an a­ pocalyptic view that explains current historical events as expressing the arrival of redemption, hence the turn to messianic activism, and on the other is the trend of individual redemption, which entails a dimension of acquiescence in exile.

35 A detailed discussion based on an extensive bibliography on the subject appears in Silman, Philosopher and Prophet, 153-156. The wavering between the two positions is explained according to the development of Halevi’s doctrine: in his youth, as evident in his early thought, he supported acquiescence in exile, whereas his later thought endorsed action by moving to the Land of Israel. 36 The Kuzari III: 73, 196 (citing Genesis Rabbah 1); TB Pesahim 54a; TB Nedarim 39b. 37 In the Arabic original, “their going.” It is unclear whether the reference is to actual physical entry or to a general direction. See also below, in the discussion of the world to come concept.

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Uniqueness of Ritual The third condition for the attainment of prophecy is life in a ­community that rigorously observes the commandments, though the u ­ nderstanding of their conceptual content is essentially irrelevant. This approach is already evident in the framing story, where Al Khazari is told, “Thy way of ­thinking38 is indeed pleasing to the Creator, but not thy way of acting.” This statement means that a suitable intention could also be found in a pagan cult, such as the Khazars’ religion, and, therefore, intention is irrelevant to a person’s actual course in the path of truth. Religious action is the only test for distinguishing the way of truth from the way of deceit, “the root of faith” from “the root of revolt.” Halevi emphasized that religious observance must be perfect in its entire scope and in all its details. The rank of prophecy will only be reached when all those bound by the commandments observe all of them ­simultaneously, as the following passage makes clear: These conditions which render man fit to receive this divine i­nfluence do not lie within him … neither their time, place, and connexion, nor suitability could be discovered. For this, inspired and detailed ­instruction is necessary. He who has been thus inspired, and obeys the teaching in every respect with a pure mind, is a believer. . . .39 We have, however, said, that one cannot approach God except by His commands. For he knows their comprehensiveness, division, times, and places, and consequences in the fulfillment [tama - m] of which the pleasure of God and the connexion with the Divine Influence are to be gained.40

But full observance of all the commandments by one individual is ­impossible because the commandments are incumbent on different groups (priests, Levites, Israelites, and so forth), apply to different events (levirate marriage, weddings, and so forth), and to many situations. Halevi, then, refers above all to a situation where the full range of commandments can 38 Halevi (The Kuzari I:1, 35) used the term niyyah (Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition, 3), one of whose contexts (which appears in several hadiths) is the heart’s intention in the observance of the commandment. Cf. Dov Schwartz, “R. Judah Halevi on Christianity and Empirical Science,” AJS Review 19 (1994): 6 [Heb]. See also idem, Contradiction and Concealment in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2001), ch. 2 [Heb]. 39 The Kuzari I:79, 56 (Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition, 20). Even Shmuel’s translation lays more emphasis on the maximalist demand: “He who attains this knowledge and, accordingly and wholeheartedly, observes God’s commandment in all its details and conditions is the believer.” 40 The Kuzari III:23, 162 (Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition, 113).

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be observed, meaning a time when the Temple will be in place and halakhic authorities will issue rulings on sacrifices, sabbatical years, jubilees, and so forth. Attaining prophecy thus requires proper observance by the people of Israel in the Land of Israel and a full basis for the perfect observance of the Torah’s commandments and laws. This condition also leads to special messianic implications. For a Jew, attaining perfection is contingent on normal halakhic existence in the Land of Israel. For the purpose of this existence, the third Temple will be built according to the design in Ezekiel (The Kuzari I:99). Given that the desired aim is the perfection of the ritual, it creates messianic tension. This ­tension might encourage messianic activism in the search for the attainment of prophecy, implying emphasis on individual uniqueness in the messianic era as well. The analysis of the first two conditions of prophecy exposes Halevi as, at the very least, continuing Saadia’s apocalyptic legacy, a legacy that underscores the individual uniqueness of the nation, the land, and the ritual. These conditions expose an explicit particularism that, ­purportedly, will be preserved in the messianic era as well. Halevi emphasized the ­universality of messianic existence, but he also stated admiration for “the origin”—meaning the Jewish people—and the advantage of the special land—the Land of Israel. In this sense, Halevi systematized trends that had emerged in the apocalyptic messianism that had already acquired philosophical formulation in the work of Saadia and other geonim.

The Individual Messianic Aspect My next concern is the notion of individual immortality in The Kuzari. The apocalyptic views that emerge in Halevi’s teachings do not exhaust his ­messianic thought. On one specific issue, Halevi suggests a different approach, supporting the ideal of individual redemption. I am referring to the discussion of the world to come in The Kuzari I:104-117. After a detailed analysis of this issue, I will consider its messianic implications. The discussion devoted to the concept of immortality (the world to come) in The Kuzari reflects the special literary structure of this work and its most prevalent literary devices.41 When considering individual redemp41 Concern with The Kuzari’s dialogical style and its literary devices began with the articles by Leo Strauss, “The Law of Reason in The Kuzari,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), 98-112; Shlomo Pines, “Note sur la doctrine de la prophétie et la rehabilitation de la matière dans le Kuzari,” Mélanges de philosophie et de littérature juives 1-2 (1956-1957): 253-260. See also Eliezer Schweid, “The Literary Structure of the First Book of the Kuzari,” Tarbiz 30 (1961): 257-272 [Heb]; idem, Faith and Speculation (Ramat-Gan: Massada, 1979), 73-97 [Heb]; idem, “The Rabbi as

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tion, therefore, I will point to the rhetorical and substantive web of the discussion. At the end of I:103, Halevi equates the world to come with the immortality of the soul after the extinction of the body. The soul reaches this state after it is “detached from material senses” and after “the demise of the body,”42 thus fulfilling the Torah’s promises and rewards.43 At this point, Al Khazari asks a question that sets the topic of the d ­ iscussion: “The anticipations of other churches are grosser and more sensuous than yours.”44 Two claims, or one two-sided claim, emerge from this question. One is a substantive claim that is the basis for the question in general: the sources of Judaism, meaning the Bible and tannaitic-talmudic literature, do not contain explicit descriptions and detailed promises about rewards for the deserving after death and the punishments threatening sinners. The non-mention of the world to come in these sources thus requires an explanation. The second is a polemical claim: the Scriptures of other religions do offer detailed and exuberant descriptions of the rewards awaiting after death, a fact o ­ stensibly pointing to their advantage over the sources of Judaism. Even if the first claim can be answered—meaning that we can account for the non-mention of the “world to come” in Jewish sources—hiding or ignoring this claim on ­polemical grounds still needs to be explained. Halevi answers these claims in detail in I:109. Before answering, ­however, the Rabbi misleads Al Khazari into a dichotomous perception of the after-death promises in the believer’s lifetime. Consider the dialogical move in Sections 105-108: The Rabbi: They [the promises] are none of them realized till after death, whilst during this life nothing points to them. Al Khazari: May be; I have never seen anyone who believed in these promises desire their speedy fulfillment The Rabbi: What is thy opinion concerning him who witnessed those grand and divine scenes? Al Khazari: That he, no doubt, longs for the perpetual separation of his soul from his material senses, in order to enjoy that light. It is such a person who would desire death.45 an Educator in The Kuzari,” in R. Judah Halevi’s Philosophical Thought, 33-40 [Heb]; Arieh L. Motzkin, “On Yehuda Halevi’s Kuzari as a Platonic Dialogue,” Iyyun 28 (1978): 209-219 [Heb]; Yohanan Silman, “The Literary Aspect of The Kuzari,” Daat 32-33 (1994): 53-65 [Heb]. The analysis below relies on the conclusions of these scholars. 42 The Kuzari, I:103, 74. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., I:104, 74. 45 Ibid, 74-75.

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The Rabbi’s claim is decidedly apologetic: the religions’ promises concerning an after-death reward are entirely undermined because ­ believers do not wish for their fulfillment. Were this claim reformulated in modern terms, it would focus on the utilitarian motive of the religion’s founder when making promises based on mass psychology. The Rabbi, however, p ­ resents the yearning for the world to come as a criterion of its truth. Jews, who have been persuaded by the e­ vidence of their Torah’s truth (hence the mention of the “grand and divine scenes” that, according to The Kuzari, corroborate the truth of Judaism), and who do not doubt the existence of the world to come as the purpose of o ­ bserving the commandments, must yearn for death. That is the trap that the Rabbi laid for Al Khazari: prima facie, the way of deceit is related to the attachment to this world and its a­ ffirmation, whereas the way of truth requires a desire for death. Al Khazari’s ­dichotomous ­fallacy is presented in the following diagram: Other Religions

Jews

Did not take part in a public divine revelation

Took part in a public revelation

↓ Lack certainty in their faith, and hence doubt the immortality of their soul

↓ Their religion is self-evident, hence they are sure of the immortality of their soul

↓ Do not desire to die

↓ ???

Al Khazari obviously filled the missing cell with the determination that Jews are meant to desire death, since they can be sure of their souls’ fate after the collapse of their material body. In the substantive explanation in the next section (I:109), Al Khazari will find that this dichotomy is ­neither i­mperative nor typical of Judaism. Indeed, for Judaism, faith in the i­mmortality of the soul coexists with an affirmation of earthly life and a positive approach to it. Al Khazari’s pagan background prevented his understanding of this subtlety at the beginning of the discussion. I turn now to the substantive explanation. This is a dual explanation where Halevi proceeds step by step. One side of the problem focuses on the non-mention of the world to come in the Torah and in other Jewish

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sources. Halevi’s claim is unequivocal: setting up prophecy as an ideal makes the ­reference to the world to come redundant and worthless: Now all that our promises imply is that we shall become connected with the divine influence by means of prophecy, or something nearly approaching it, and also through our relation to the divine influence, as displayed to us in grand and awe-inspiring miracles. . . .46 But how can they [the members of other religions] boast of e­ xpectations after death to those who enjoy the fulfilment already in life? Is not the nature of prophets and godly men nearer to immortality [albaqa  - 47 ­alabadi  ] than the nature of him who never reached that degree?48

For Halevi, the immortality of the soul means its coexistence with the s­ piritual beings or, in other words, with the angels. And that is precisely the m ­ eaning of prophecy—the connection with the spiritual world or with the angels. The claim thus becomes an a fortiori one: if when bound by ­material ­shackles humans can rise to a spiritual existence through the process of prophecy,49 when they are free of these shackles and the delaying material obstacle is removed, they will certainly reach the spiritual degree of being. Setting up prophecy as the supreme ideal makes a Torah discussion on the immortality of the soul r­ edundant and the Torah, as is well known, refrains from s­ uperfluous repetitions. That, then, is the reason for not mentioning the world to come in the Torah. Incidentally, a further characteristic of the concept of prophecy in Halevi’s doctrine is the life of the world to come in this world. This substantive claim in The Kuzari is strengthened in the king of India parable. The central point of this parable—which appears at the opening of the Rabbi’s statement (Section 19) and at the end of Part 46 47 48 49

Ibid., 75. In other words, the future immortality (Baneth and Ben-Shammai edition, 83). Ibid., 77. Halevi’s closeness to Neoplatonic philosophy was noted by Guttmann, The Philosophy of Judaism, 120ff. According to Guttmann, however, Halevi differs from this school on the matter of asceticism (ibid., 129). Contrary to Guttmann, however, note that the world to come is clearly pervaded by ascetic notes, which are also evident at the beginning of Part III:1. Scholars have noted that extreme abstinence and strong reservations about material aspects ­characterizes Halevi’s dialectical attitude toward philosophy in general. On this issue, see Schwartz, Contradiction and Concealment, and Silman, Philosopher and Prophet, 97-100. See also Barry S. Kogan, “Who Has Implanted within Us Eternal Life: Judah Halevi on Immortality and the Afterlife,” in Judaism and Modernity: The Religious Philosophy of David Hartman, ed. Jonathan W Malino (Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute 2001), 473-495; Dov Schwartz, “Ethics and Asceticism in the Neoplatonic School of the Fourteenth Century,” in Between Religion and Ethics, ed. Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1993), 190-192 [Heb]. The description of prophecy as coexistence with the angels and the spirituals appears in I:103.

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I (Section 109)—is the stay of the company of friends (the prophets in the parable) close to the Indian king, and particularly the emphasis on their repeated return to earthly reality. The parable clarifies that the c­ onnection with the spiritual world is already possible in actual ­material reality.50 I turn now to the polemical aspect of the question that opens the ­discussion on the immortality of the soul. The answer is formulated in this passage: You shall remain in the country . . . viz. the Holy Land. Its fertility or barrenness, its happiness or misfortune, depend upon the divine ­influence which your conduct will merit, whilst the rest of the world would continue its natural course. For if the divine presence is among you, you will perceive . . . that your affairs are not managed by simple laws of nature, but by the divine Will.51

This claim differs from the previous one, and is explicitly apologetic. Scripture does not mention the immortal promises due to an additional ­criterion pointing to the truth of the Torah—its focus on the concrete realm. The Torah makes commitments that can be verified—rain vs. drought, war and exile vs. peace and remaining in the land—rather than on matters that cannot. The promises and threats of the Torah relate to the economic-­political domain, which can be subject to review, rather than to an after death reward that cannot. In sum, the Torah submits itself to this examination whereas the Scriptures of other religions make a commitment to an after death reward because such a reward is irrefutable.52 At the next stage, the discussion shifts to the problem of exile and the meaning of suffering. The digression is part of a brilliant ironic move of the Khazar king, who relates to the first, substantive, claim that had been raised 50 The parable is completed in III:21. Its role there is to clarify why the world to come is not mentioned in the prayers, and the claim is formulated explicitly: he who has been close to the king throughout his life, does not fear the “final journey” after death. 51 The Kuzari, I:109, 75. 52 A literary device that is prevalent in The Kuzari recurs in these claims—a reframing process that turns weaknesses into advantages. The failure to mention promises in the Torah, which was noted as a weakness at the start of the discussion, itself becomes a criterion for the verification of the Torah, that is, a distinct advantage. Consider another example. The description of the biblical people of Israel in the desert is unquestionably harsh: a skeptical, critical, and stubborn nation. Halevi turned this weakness into a significant advantage: the Torah could only be given to a critical people because they would indeed check that the revelation was divine and that proof was offered of the event at which the Torah was given.

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previously: “Apply this also in the other direction, and judge their degree in the next world according to their station in this world.”53 The claim stating that prophecy is evidence of the immortality of the soul rests on an a fortiori inference from present life to life after death: if in turbid material life humans attain contact with the spirituals, in abstract spiritual life this degree will be attained for sure. Al Khazari too draws a ­sarcastic inference from the present to the future: if in the present—in exile—the Jew is humiliated and trampled upon by Gentiles, all the more so in the future, after death. . . . This inference is obviously formal. Al Khazari retained the pattern of the a fortiori argument to refer to exile as a ­theological problem. Exile is known to play a crucial role in The Kuzari, and Halevi found an additional opportunity to raise it. In any event, the claim about the centrality of prophecy is perceived as the most substantive and important claim in this regard. The entire discussion ends in a dual answer to the dual question raised at its start. Section 115 offers a detailed and well-argued response meant to establish two points: 1)  A substantive claim: The world to come, meaning the ­immortality of the soul, is indeed explicitly mentioned in the sources of Judaism, from the Torah (Balaam’s request ­concerning his end [Numbers 23:10]) through the Prophets (the story about the medium [I Samuel 28]), through the Hagiographa (the verse “and the spirit returns to God who gave it” [Ecclesiastes 12:7]), through the members of the Great Synagogue, who constituted the prayers (Elohai, neshamah she-natata bi), up to rabbinic homilies. 2) A polemical claim: the broad, colorful descriptions we find in the Scriptures of other religions are taken from Jewish sources, either literally or allegorically. An analysis of this discussion reveals it as seemingly inconsistent, as presented in the following scheme describing its structure and stages: Question: 1)  The world to come is not mentioned in the sources; 2) The promises of the religions are rich and detailed.

53 The Kuzari, I:112, 78.

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Initial response—according to the assumptions of the question: 1) The ideal of prophecy relieves us from the need for explicit ­reference to the question of the world to come and even makes it redundant (the parable of the caravan in the desert); 2) The concrete commitments of the Torah vs. the religions. The discussion branches out into problems of suffering, exile, conversion, and the reason for the commandment of circumcision. Final response— refutation of the question’s basic assumptions: 1) Jewish sources explicitly relate to the world to come; 2) The descriptions of the religions’ promises are taken from the sources of Judaism. We confront a hidden contradiction here: in the initial reaction, Halevi accepts the basic assumption that the after death reward does not appear in the sources of Judaism and, in line with it, he raises his two arguments. According to these arguments, mentioning the world to come would be a flaw of Scripture and of the Midrash. In the final response he rejects this question’s basic assumption and presents it as groundless—the after death reward is detailed in biblical, talmudic, and midrashic literature. Possibly, the expansion of the discussion to problems that are not directly related to the redemption of the soul (suffering, exile, conversion, and the reason for the commandment of circumcision) is designed to blur the open contradiction between these two responses and is therefore a significant component of the esoteric writing in The Kuzari. Seemingly, the c­ ontradiction can be understood in light of The Kuzari’s character as a polemical text aiming to protect “the humiliated religion.”54 A book defending the religion raises all the claims needed to meet its polemical promise. In this sense, The Kuzari is a book of sources and arguments serving the interests of participants in the polemic. Halevi therefore misses no chance to raise arguments in defense of Judaism and does not hesitate to present claims based on contradictory assumptions. Learned polemicists will choose from the two alternatives the tactics they wish to adopt in defense of “the humiliated religion.” 54 This interpretation of The Kuzari was suggested by Yaakov S. Levinger, From Routine to Renewal: Pointers in Contemporary Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Deot, 1973), 138-151 [Heb].

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The analysis of the issue thus reveals two implications that are important for predating the Maimonidean naturalism found in Halevi’s version of the messianic idea. The first implication is the basic assumption of the entire discussion, stating that the reward after death that is embodied in the world to come concept is identical to the individual immortality of the soul. The second implication is the setting up of prophecy as the ideal of natural individual redemption, detached from the collective. This determination states that, in their material life, individuals can rise to the world-to-come state. Individual redemption is thus also possible in an unredeemed world and, as we know, most prophets actually lived at times of moral and religious decline. The definition of prophecy as a paradox of detachment from the material in a material world blunts active ­messianic tension. Amending the world is therefore unnecessary for attaining ­personal redemption. The prophets are archetypes of redeemed figures in an unredeemed world. This discussion shows that Halevi—like Bar Hiyya, Ibn Saddiq, and others—anticipates Maimonidean messianism, which is the topic of the discussion that follows.

A KEY TO MAIMONIDEAN MESSIANISM A momentous event was recorded in the philosophical and theological realm: Maimonides’ messianic teachings absolutely tilted the scale to the naturalistic side in both the collective and the individual realms. Maimonides’ ­messianic approach became a key research topic, and scholars have set up a series of models in search for the “mainstay” of Maimonidean messianism.55 Most scholars, however, have focused on the Code and on the implications of The Guide of the Perplexed, and have disregarded almost entirely 55 Various models have been suggested in, for example, the following studies: Amos Funkenstein, “Maimonides: Political Theory and Realistic Messianism,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 11 (1970): 81-103; David Hartman, “Maimonides’ Approach to Messianism and Its Contemporary Implications,” Daat 2-3 (1978-1979): 5-33; Gerald J. Blidstein, Political Concepts in Maimonidean Halakhah (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1983), 243-245 [Heb]; Joel L. Kraemer, “On Maimonides’ Messianic Posture,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 109-142; Aviezer Ravitzky, “’To the Utmost of Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah,” in Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 221-256; Yehuda Liebes, “De Natura Dei: On the Development of the Jewish Myth,” in Studies in Jewish Myth and Jewish Messianism, trans. Batya Stein (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 61-64; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, Maimonides, The Yemenite Messiah and Apostasy, (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2002) [Heb]; Kenneth Seeskin, Jewish Messianic Thought in an Age of Despair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 27-50. An excellent anthology of sources and literary discussions of Maimonidean messianism appears in Jacob I. Dienstag, Eschatology in Maimonidean Thought: Messianism, Resurrection, and the World to Come (New York: Ktav, 1983).

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Maimonides’ introduction to Perek Helek (Chapter Ten or sometimes Eleven of Tractate Sanhedrin) of his Commentary on the Mishnah, a work he wrote in his youth. In a history-of-ideas perspective, this introduction is also a direct ­continuation of an early twelfth-century trend focusing on individual and spiritual redemption.56 The discussion in Maimonides’ introduction to Perek Helek thus appears to be the “mainstay” of his messianic doctrine, offering a suitable perspective for understanding Maimonides’ direction and providing a context for understanding the naturalistic model.

The Marginalization of Messianism The introduction to Perek Helek, as I have discussed elsewhere, reveals Avicenna’s influence, even though Maimonides showed great ­independence in the interpretation of his sources.57 Maimonides opens his systematic analyses of the messianic idea with a critique of its apocalyptic version and considers the question of final reward and punishment—what should the believer await more than anything and what should the rebel fear more than anything? The discussion on reward in the introduction to Perek Helek opens with a critique of the five accepted ideas on ultimate reward and p ­ unishment. These ideas were suggested by “the theologians” (‘ahl al-sharī‘a),58 and they are: (1) reward and punish56 The fact that Maimonides did not explicitly cite the Jewish thinkers who had preceded him or that he had expressed reservations about some of them in his famous epistle does not necessarily attest to his “marked disinterest in this literature,” as Shlomo Pines concludes (“Introduction: The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed,” in Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed [Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963], cxxxii). See also Sarah Stroumsa, “Note on Maimonides’ Attitude to Yosef Ibn Saddiq,” in Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, vol. 2, ed. Moshe Idel, Zev Harvey, and Eliezer Schweid (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1990) [Heb]. It appears questionable that texts that, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced Maimonides’ close surroundings left no mark whatsoever on his theological thought, even if he did not view them as works of independent philosophical value. This question is still in need of extensive study. See, for example, Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 95-121; Dov Schwartz, “The Figure of Judah Halevi in Light of Maimonides’ Guide I:71,” Daat 61 (2007): 23-40 [Heb]. 57 See Dov Schwartz, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Immortality,” in Medieval and Modern Perspectives on Muslim-Jewish Relations, ed. Ronald L. Nettler (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995), 185-197. Cf. Amira Eran, “Al-Ghazali and Maimonides on the World to Come and Spiritual Pleasures,”Jewish Studies Quarterly 8, no. 2 (2001): 137-166. 58 J. Abelson, “Maimonides on the Jewish Creed,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 19 (1906) (a translation of Maimonides’ introduction to Perek Helek in his Commentary on the Mishnah): 29 (henceforth “On the Jewish Creed”). Note that in this Commentary and in Milot ha-Higayion, Maimonides used the term Sharī‘ah to denote both the Torah and religious law in general. Most probably, the generalized reference is appropriate here, since it is questionable that five such views were found among Jews. Cf. Joel Kraemer, “Nomos and Sharī‘ah in Maimonides’ Teachings,” Te‘udah 4 (1986): 185-202 [Heb]; Abraham Nuriel, “On the Meaning of Sharī‘ah in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” in Studies in Halakhah and Jewish Thought Presented to Prof. Emanuel Rackman, ed. Moshe Beer (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994), 287, 290-291 [Heb].

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ment in the Garden of Eden and in Gehenna, respectively; (2) the days of the messiah; (3) the resurrection of the dead; (4) reward and punishment in this world; (5) the combination of the previous views, which creates a messianic orientation: the resurrection of the dead that follows the days of the messiah, and the Garden of Eden that follows the resurrection. All the views cited by Maimonides, except perhaps for the fourth, are described in distinctly apocalyptic terms. The first describes the Garden of Eden as “a place where people eat and drink without bodily toil or faintness. Houses of costly stones are there, couches of silk and rivers flowing with wine and perfumed oils and many other things of this kind.”59 The second view presents messianic times as an era when “all men will be kings forever. Their bodily frames will be mighty and they will inhabit the whole earth unto eternity . . . and the earth will bring forth garments ready woven and bread ready baked and many other impossible (mumtaniāt) things like these.” The third view also defines the resurrection of the dead by saying that a resurrected person will “never more die.”60 And finally, the fifth view presents a distinctly messianic o ­ rientation with “the coming of the Messiah, the resurrection of the dead, their entry into the Garden of Eden, their eating and drinking and living in health there so long as heaven and earth endure.” A close examination of this view will find that Maimonides used here a further opportunity to, as he usually did, criticize Saadia, but without explicitly mentioning his name. It was Saadia, as noted, who had suggested a messianic approach that opens with the days of the messiah, during which the dead will be resurrected and henceforth live forever in what he entitled “the world to come,” which was equated with the Garden of Eden. Maimonides, however, does not mention the world to come because he held that Saadia had distorted the term and detracted from its authentic meaning, as shown below. Maimonides, then, presented a conceptual-messianic reality made up mostly of clearly apocalyptic ideas. Maimonides’ criticism of the ­apocalyptic model will thus probably lead us to an understanding of the naturalistic model that he proposed. His critique covers two areas: (1) the ­methodological axiological domain, which is the most important. When discussing it, Maimonides clarifies the mistake entailed by the accepted views; (2) the substantive content domain, wherein Maimonides ­reinterprets the messianic motifs in natural terms. 59 “On the Jewish Creed,” 29. 60 Ibid., 30.

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The first critique is discussed at length in the discussion that f­ollows. Maimonides held that the five views had focused on marginal and ­peripheral dimensions of the reward doctrine, ignoring the core. What is the ­fundamental core? For Maimonides, the core of the reward is found in the world to come concept, obviously according to his own personal ­interpretation of it. The five views had entirely disregarded the existence of the world to come, which Maimonides defines as follows: The world to come, where our souls will attain to a knowledge of the Creator as do the higher bodies.61 In the world to come . . . [there will be only] the righteous sitting with crowns on their heads enjoying the splendour of the Shechinah [TB Berakhot 17a]. By their remark, “their crowns on their heads,” is meant the preservation of the soul in the intellectual sphere and the merging of the two into one as has been described by the illustrious philosophers in ways whose exposition would take too long here.62 . . . a man whom no obstacle hinders from making the intellectual element in his soul live on after death. This is “the world to come” . . .63

As evident from these citations, Maimonides used the world to come concept rather sparingly. The long discussion in the introduction to Perek Helek focuses instead on arguments and claims for the existence of a pleasure element (ladhdha) attached to the immortality of the intellect on the one hand, and to the loss of the evil ignoramus’ soul on the other. Maimonides also disregarded the theological problems deriving from the immortality of the intellect, such as the fate of the just and righteous who had failed to acquire intelligibles, or the lack of gradation in the punishment of the 61 Ibid., 39. 62 Ibid., 39. Maimonides repeated this view in Laws of Repentance 8:2: “The phrase ‘their crowns on their heads’ refers to the knowledge they have acquired, and for the sake of which they have attained life in the world to come” (Laws of Repentance, Mishneh Torah: The Book of Knowledge, ed. Moses Hyamson [Jerusalem: Boys Town, 1962]). All ­further references to the Laws of Repentance are to this source. 63 “On the Jewish Creed,” 45. Cf. the clarification in Laws of Repentance 8:3: “The soul, whenever mentioned in this connection, is not the vital element requisite for bodily existence, but that form of soul which is identical with the intelligence which apprehends the Creator, as far as it is able, and apprehends other abstract concepts and other things.” Cf. also the definition in “The Essay on Resurrection, ” in Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham Halkin, discussion by David Hartman (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1985), 215: “The members of the world-to-come are separated souls, namely, intellects.” Finally, note the definition of Maimonides’ disciple, whereby “the world to come” is equated with “true pleasure and eternal life” (in Mordechai A. Friedman, “Notes by a Disciple in Maimonides’ Academy Pertaining to Beliefs and Concepts of Halakhah,” Tarbiz 62 [1993]: 533 [Heb]).

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wicked. The context of the Commentary on the Mishnah as a work intended for the broad public seemingly precluded profound discussions on the nature of immortality. Concerning the existence of the material disposition needed for the pleasure of intellection, Maimonides may have assumed the immortality of imagination after death, as had Avicenna, and he may have rejected even that. Clearly, however, the world to come for Maimonides was identical to the immortality of the soul or the intellect, which meant the immortality of the acquired intelligibles and the accompanying pleasure. In other words, every single scientific cognition that humans acquire leads them to ontic immortality after death. The intellect is not a “vessel” wherein humans place intelligibles. The intellect is the intelligibles. Thus, with each acquired intelligible, humans take a step forward toward immortality, and the standard of immortality is measured by the “quantity” of intelligibles. By contrast, the souls of those who had not acquired intelligibles are entirely lost and are reduced to nothing after death. The world to come, therefore, is not a heteronomous reward given by an external agent (God or the Active Intellect) but a state that people bring upon themselves. Maimonides was aware that intellectual immortality is an ideal intended for elitist individuals who devote themselves to knowledge. The ignorant multitude would not understand such an ideal, just as a blind person would not understand the beauty of a work of art nor a eunuch carnal passion.64 How does their disregard of the world to come lead the different views to a methodological fallacy? To answer this question, Maimonides resorts to the metaphor of prizes and achievements in the educational process. The child, the young man, and the adult expect different prizes for their studies (nuts, a coat, and so forth), and thereby “aims at getting something other than what ought to be its real aim [ghāya].”65 The true aim, then, is study itself, and the reward offered by the teacher is worthless vis-à-vis this aim. At precisely this point—if we shift to the moral of the ­parable—lies the fundamental methodological mistake of the ­supporters of ­apocalyptic ­messianism. The true aim is to acquire cognitions and ­intelligibles, ­including the appropriate moral standing enabling people to devote ­themselves to study. The messianic goals 64 “On the Jewish Creed,” 38. This argument, taken from Avicenna, recurs among rationalists who discussed this issue, such as the commentary of R. Israel Israeli cited in the R. Yitzhak b. Shlomo of Toledo, Commentary on Avot, ed. Moshe Shlomo Kasher and Yaakov Yehoshua Blekherowitz (Jerusalem: Mechon Torah Shlemah, 1983), 155 [Heb]. 65 “On the Jewish Creed,” 32. See Eliezer Schweid, “Maimonides’ Pedagogical Teaching in the Literary Construction of the Introduction to Perek Helek,” in Joseph Baruch Sermoneta Memorial Volume, ed. Aviezer Ravitzky, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 14 (1998): 1-23 [Heb]; Adam Afterman, Devequt: Mystical Intimacy in Medieval Jewish Thought (Los Angeles: Cherub Press 2011), 149-154 [Heb].

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(the Garden of Eden, the messianic era, and so forth) are the prizes offered to the multitude, such as the nuts or the coat, to make the pursuit of the true aim appealing. Observance of the ­commandments and the acquisition of knowledge are aims to be pursued for their own sake, without seeking f­ urther reward. Maimonides, as noted, did not consider reward and punishment autonomous. Empowering and substantiating the intellect is the true reward, and is automatically accompanied by immortality. Abstract intellection as an ideal cannot be acceptable to the multitude. In sum: if the multitude will not believe in and expect a material reward (to be alive in the messianic era, ­resurrection after death, and so forth), they will refuse to pursue the true aim, which is alien to them. The five views, then, had dealt with the trivial and the marginal and neglected what is most important. Here, then, is a proper perspective on the value of messianic aims and on their standing according to Maimonides. Whoever observes the ­commandments or studies “not for its own sake” but for the sake of ­messianic promises, disregarding the true purpose, is an “imbecile boor who has fallen a prey to the whisperings of inane thoughts and defective imaginings.”66 More precisely: Maimonides used the term al-takhayyalāt in this passage because imagination is for him the antithesis of reason.67 Those who let themselves be dragged by their imagination are the ones who require messianic aims. These aims, then, are a priori and directly meant for the multitude. Maimonides thus diverted the messianic idea in general from the center to the margins. This idea becomes an educational ­incentive that, in truth, is deceitful and “blameworthy.”68 The messianic idea ­resembles the promises of nuts and figs to the child or of a new coat to the young man, both still immature. For the wise, who know how to identify the most important aim of all, the messianic idea becomes entirely redundant. Having turned the messianic idea into an educational incentive, Maimonides is compelled to clarify how the various aims relate to the intellectual ideal, and it is here that we encounter his substantive critique of apocalyptic messianism. If the messianic idea is indeed entirely d ­ ependent 66 Ibid., 33. 67 On Maimonides’ view of the imagination, see, for example, Zev Harvey, “Maimonides and Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” Iyyun 28 (1978-1979): 177-179 [Heb]; idem, “A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981): 155-161; José Faur, “Imagination and Religious Pluralism: Maimonides, Ibn Verga and Vico,” New Vico Studies 10 (1992): 39-43. 68 “On the Jewish Creed,” 32. Maimonides thereby drew a distinction between genuine perfection and perfection according to the multitude. At a later time, he wrote in “The Essay on Resurrection”: “They [scholars] will no longer cast the knowledge of God behind their backs, but will exert themselves to the limit of their power to attain what will perfect them and bring them nearer to their Creator, not to what the general public imagines to be perfection” (213).

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on the ideal of acquiring intelligibles and expanding knowledge, it cannot be explained in apocalyptic terms entirely alien to the spirit of rationalism. In several places, Maimonides detailed the areas of knowledge that lead to perfection. For example: There is, moreover, no way to apprehend Him except it be through the things He has made . . . It is therefore indispensable to consider all beings as they really are so that we may obtain for all the kinds of beings true and certain premises that would be useful to us in our researches pertaining to the divine science. How very many are the premises thus taken from the nature of numbers and the properties of geometrical figures from which we draw inferences concerning things that we should deny with respect to God, may He be exalted! And this denial is indicative to us of many notions. As for the matters ­pertaining to the astronomy of the spheres and to natural science, I do not ­consider that you should have any difficulty in grasping that those are matters necessary for the apprehension of the relation of the world to God’s governance as this relation is in truth and not according to imaginings. . . . Accordingly it is certainly necessary for whoever wishes to achieve human perfection to train himself at first in the art of logic, then in the mathematical sciences according to the proper order, then in the natural sciences, and after that in the divine science.69

The way to ultimate human perfection is entwined with the life sciences (zoology, botany, and so forth), astronomy, physics, and the preparatory ­sciences such as logic and mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, and so forth). If order in the material world is what brings rational perfection, and if the messianic world is meant to help humans reach that perfection, all we need to do is adopt a naturalistic model reflecting the order of the material world familiar to us. A fantastic world emerging in the wake of a ­catastrophe that shatters the natural order contradicts the contents of knowledge and, m ­ oreover, is impossible.70 These are contents based on 69 The Guide of the Perplexed I:34, 74-75. Arabic—dalālat al-hā’ irīn (Jerusalem: Sifriyya Philosophit, 1929) 50. See also Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, ed. Yosef Kafih, Tractate Zera’im (Jerusalem, 1963), 42; The Guide of the Perplexed III:27, and others. 70 Cf.: “. . . the passing-away of this world, a change of the state in which it is, or a thing’s changing its nature and with that the permanence of this change, are not affirmed in any prophetic text or in any statement of the Sages either . . . nothing new will be produced in any respect or from any cause whatever” (The Guide of the Perplexed II:29). The argument that reality does not change was also raised by Maimonides in the introduction to Avot, ch. 8. See also Ravitzky, “‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity,’” 250-254. The eternity of the material world is compelled by the determination that God’s actions are perfect and, therefore, God has created the best of all possible worlds.

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Aristotelian ­ physics and Ptolemaic astronomy. Intellectual cognitions cannot be acquired in a world whose miraculous existence is, as such, a contradiction to the ­scientific knowledge being sought. Maimonides insists in many sources that the perfect acquisition of knowledge is contingent on moral, social, and political perfection, and this perfection is best attained through ­observance of the Torah and the commandments.71 Clearly, then, religious law must remain unchanged in the future, as the Laws on the Messiah in the Code strongly emphasize. In sum, the only future possibility is messianic naturalism, for three reasons: 1)  The demand of the individual redemption approach, in its ­intellectual garb, leaves no room for physical immortality, whereas the apocalyptic tradition is based on the motif of eternal life. 2) The assumption of a fantastic future world is philosophically impossible and, indeed, contradicts the very aim of messianism— the pursuit of knowledge about the natural order. 3) The preservation of Halakhah, meaning the principle of the Torah’s eternity, can only be upheld in a naturalistic world. I expand on this point below. Maimonides, then, must offer a completely different explanation for the apocalyptic aims, which he does by claiming that, in the days of the ­messiah, the people of Israel will attain independence and the whole world will adhere to the intellectual ideal. Prophecy will therefore return, a phenomenon that Maimonides explained in natural and rational terms. Should the future world indeed devote all its resources to wisdom and knowledge, the study of the material world will plausibly reveal new ­territories, including the actual location of the “Garden of Eden” that now (in the twelfth century) is lost.72 And finally, the resurrection of the dead is a one-time miracle, at whose conclusion the dead will return to 71 See, for instance, “The Epistle to Yemen,” in Crisis and Leadership, 99-100; The Guide of the Perplexed III:27. 72 As shown in ch. 5 below, Maimonides’ spiritual disciples interpreted the Garden of Eden as an absolute symbol. For example: “The degree of prophecy is the true Garden of Eden” (Shmuel Ibn Zarza, Mikhlol Yofi, Paris Ms. 729-730, I: 129a). Maimonides, as we know, supported the notion that the Garden of Eden was an actual place. On the return of prophecy in messianic times according to Maimonides, see “The Epistle to Yemen,”123; Code, Laws of Kings and Wars 12:3; Guide of the Perplexed II:37. The messiah’s standing concerning prophecy is unclear. In “The Epistle to Yemen,” Maimonides determined that “the Messiah is a very eminent prophet, more illustrious than all the prophets after Moses” (123) and in Laws of Kings and Wars he only claimed that the “Holy Spirit” rests upon him (see Guide of the Perplexed II:45). Clearly, however, the defining characteristic of the messianic period is the return of prophecy in one way or another, because of the serenity and the interest in knowledge that will prevail at such a time.

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ashes. The reason for resurrection is apparently the renewed potential for knowledge. Potentiality can only be found in matter and, therefore, there is no acquisition of knowledge after death since the intellect is static. Resurrection reconnects the intellect to matter, enabling it a new ­potential to reach its highest level.73 Beside this new and naturalistic ­interpretation of messianic promises, Maimonides was not interested in messianic o ­ rientations and actually negated them.74 Each messianic event will take place in a ­specific historical period, and these events should not be tied to one another either causally or chronologically. The reason for denying this o ­ rientation—besides his opposition to the g­ lorious ­messianic ­scenario that apocalyptic literature had woven—is clear: if resurrection is expected to take place in the days of the ­messiah, for example, a d ­ efinitely ­miraculous dimension will be added to these times. Maimonides ­obviously wanted to remove any such dimension from this period and, therefore, isolated the miracle of resurrection, thereby a­dapting the n ­ aturalistic model to the general framework of his philosophy.

Messianism as a Principle The inclusion of messianism in the list of principles detailed at the ­introduction to Perek Helek (principles 12-13) points to the nature of the list and the public it is meant for—the broad multitude. The reason adduced for this inclusion is that messianic hope strengthens in the ­multitude the authority of the Oral Law and faith in miracles. Therefore, “he that has any doubt about him or holds his authority in light esteem imputes ­falsehood to the Torah, which clearly promises his coming in . . . ‘the chapter of Balaam’ [Numbers 13-14] and in ‘Ye stand this day’ [Deuteronomy 30:1-10].”75 But there is a further reason for presenting messianism as essential. For the m ­ ultitude, as noted, the messianic impulse is a necessary c­ ondition for minimal cooperation with the ideal of acquiring knowledge. The ­messianic events as a prize and an incentive are the multitude’s chance of attaining moral virtues and basic knowledge, and thus of being 73 See “On the Jewish Creed,” 38-41. 74 In “The Essay on Resurrection,” Maimonides assigned no significance whatsoever to its timing: “it will happen in the lifetime of the Messiah, or before him, or after he dies” (222). By contrast, immediately following (223) and elsewhere in his writings, Maimonides denied the possibility of any miraculous dimension in the days of the messiah, thereby clarifying that he opposed the idea of resurrection in the messianic era. 75 “On the Jewish Creed,” 56.

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included in the world to come and becoming eternal. The people of Israel, then, the chosen people, have a share in the world to come because they have become acquainted with Maimonides’ principles. These principles (particularly the first five) inspire the collective to attain the world to come and also grant it minimal knowledge for the purpose of immortality.76 Essentially, however, not much can be inferred from these principles about the value and standing of messianism in Maimonides’ doctrine. A clash of trends should be noted here. In Laws of Kings and Wars 11:1, Maimonides stresses that the messianic idea is part of the dogma by claiming that to deny it is to deny the Torah: He who does not believe in a restoration or does not look forward to the coming of the Messiah denies not only the teachings of the Prophets but also those of the law and Moses, our teacher, for Scripture affirms the rehabilitation of Israel . . . These words stated in Scripture include all that the prophets said (on the subject).77

This law endows the dogmas in the introduction to Perek Helek with legal validity. Faith in the coming of the messiah is thus a “principle” and failure to acknowledge it is a denial of the Torah. By contrast, in Laws of Kings and Wars 12: 2, Maimonides determines that concern with the contents of the messianic idea is not to be equated with dogmatic acceptance of the p ­ rinciple. Maimonides was patently uninterested in messianic details, as discussed below, and determined that messianic contents are not “religious dogmas”: But no one is in a position to know the details of this and similar things until they have come to pass. They are not explicitly stated by the Prophets. Nor have the Rabbis any tradition with regard to these matters. They are guided solely by what the scriptural texts seem to imply. Hence there is a divergence of opinion on the subject. But be that as it may, neither the exact sequence of those events nor the details thereof constitute religious dogmas. 76 Cf. Arthur Hyman, “Maimonides’ ‘Thirteen Principles,’” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 127. 77 Cf. Maimonides’ view in Laws of Repentance 3:6: “The following have no portion in the world to come, but are cut off and perish and for their great wickedness and sinfulness are condemned for ever and ever. . . . those who deny . . . the resurrection of the dead or the coming of the Redeemer.” Maimonides apparently noted a natural and logical process regarding the multitude—whoever does not acknowledge the messianic incentive has already lost the motivation to acquire knowledge and wisdom and will inevitably be lost forever. See Ravitzky, “’To the Utmost of Human Capacity,’” 237n37.

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The dogmatic status of messianism was required, as noted, to encourage the multitude to participate—even if minimally—in the learning process, in the knowledge of intellectual truths, and in the immortality of the intellect. Maimonides’ dogmatic system is self-sustaining. Heading the list are truths leading to immortality (the divine attributes of unity, eternity, and so forth), and at its end is the messianic spur to acquire the truths.78 A clearly dogmatic dimension, therefore, characterizes the general belief in ­messianism. By ­contrast, the value of the messianic idea as such, in all its details and ­complexities, is not only not a dogma but is actually marginal and ­lacking any essential meaning. Methodologically, the messianic principle rests on faith in the Oral Law and in miracles and, therefore, merits inclusion as a p ­ rinciple, evident from the first law of Chapter Eleven. The concealed ­principle, ­however, is to pour messianism into the list of dogmas in order to stabilize and strengthen the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom among the multitude so as to enable them to survive after death and gain “a share in the world to come.”79

The Immortality of the Intellect and the Messianic Era For Maimonides, then, messianic aims in general—if they have any ­political and religious importance—draw their character and purpose from the ­concept of the world to come. Individual intellectual perfection and the ontic state of immortality that accompanies it shape the contours of

78 For a similar interpretation of the dogmatic status of messianism, see Daniel Lasker, “Maimonides’ Influence on the Philosophy of Elijah Bashyazi the Karaite,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 3 (1984): 421 [Heb]. Isadore Twersky discussed Ibn Ezra’s potential influence on Maimonides in this regard. See his “Did R. Abraham Ibn Ezra Influence Maimonides?” in Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 21-48. 79 See David Neumark, The History of the Principles of Judaism, vol. 2 (Odessa: Moriah, 1913), 132-133 [Heb]. See also ibid., 157-158: “We have already hinted that, according to Maimonides, the resurrection of the dead is an e­ phemeral miracle, and the days of the messiah are merely the return of a Jewish government . . . but what is essential is the spiritual world-to-come.” According to this approach, Neumark unhesitatingly determined that the “world-to-come” is an actual principle and related to it as such in his discussion. Cf. the thorough analysis of Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 41, 52-53; idem, “On Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles and the Status of Non-Jews in Messianic Times,” Tura: Studies in Jewish Thought 1 (1989): 253-256 [Heb]. Note also that, after it was presented as a Maimonidean ­principle, m ­ essianism entered the realm of dogmatism in general and even assumed an apocalyptic garb. Apocalyptic m ­ essianism is also presented as a principle in Karaite doctrines. See, for example, A. S. Halkin, “A Karaite Creed,” in Studies in Judaica, Karaitica and Islamica Presented to Leon Nemoy on His Eightieth Birthday, ed. Sheldon R. Brunswick (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1982), 153.

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­ essianism in general. In different writings, Maimonides explicitly refers m to the messianic era: Great perfection will appertain to him that lives in those days [the days of the messiah], and he will be elevated through it to the life of the world to come.80 Hence, all Israelites, their prophets and sages, longed for the advent of Messianic times, that they might have relief from the wicked tyranny that does not permit them properly to occupy themselves with the study of Torah and the observance of the commandments; that they might have ease, devote themselves to getting wisdom, and thus attain to life in the World to Come . . . The ultimate and perfect reward, the final bliss which will suffer neither interruption nor diminution is the life in the world to come.81 The Sages and Prophets did not long for the days of the Messiah … Their aspiration was that Israel be free to devote itself to the Law and its wisdom, with no one to oppress or disturb it, and thus be worthy of life in the world to come.82

“Life in the world to come” thus endows the days of the messiah with a purpose, and even with its character and meaning. Maimonides’ messianic doctrine is thus constituted entirely on individual redemption, defined as intellectual immortality. Furthermore, when Maimonides described the functioning of the messianic king, he presented the success of the political events that he will be part of as a criterion for the transition from “assumed Messiah” (hezkat mashiach) to “Messiah beyond all doubt” (mashiach vada’i): If there arise a king from the House of David who meditates on the Torah, occupies himself with the commandments, as did his ancestor David, observes the precepts prescribed in the Written and the Oral law, prevails upon Israel to walk in the way of the Torah and to repair its breaches, and fights the battles of the Lord, it may be assumed that he is the Messiah. If he does these things and succeeds, rebuilds the sanctuary on its site, and gathers the dispersed of Israel, he is beyond all doubt the Messiah. He will prepare the whole world to serve the

80 “On the Jewish Creed,” 43 (my emphasis). 81 Code, Laws of Repentance 9:2 (my emphasis). 82 Laws of Kings and Wars 12:4 (my emphasis).

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Lord with one accord, as it is written: “For then will I turn to the ­peoples a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord to serve Him with one consent” (Zephaniah 3:9).83

The political qualifications of the charismatic messiah are revealed in his attainment of unity in the Jewish people, in victorious wars, and in his successful realization of religious aims. But his ultimate aim is a­ ctually achieved after the political success, and that is the amendment of the entire world: “He will prepare the whole world to serve the Lord with one accord.” Maimonides defines the essence of this amendment of the world with the words: “The one preoccupation of the whole world will be to know the Lord.”84 In other words, the messiah’s very existence was meant for the attainment of intellectual perfection and immortality, that is, the world to come. Individual intellectual redemption is thus the foundation of ­naturalism and its very purpose. Messianism, according to Maimonides, is thus a direct continuation of the individual redemption trend that had flourished in Jewish p ­ hilosophy during the twelfth century. True redemption turned into knowledge, “which they had not attained while they were in the murky and lowly body.”85 The naturalistic model, as systematically detailed at the end of the Code, is placed entirely at the service of final individual redemption. Individual redemption is also what led to the complete collapse of the apocalyptic approach in Maimonides’ teachings. Note that the marginalization of the messianic idea is also evident in an additional fact. In his philosophical work, The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides showed that it is possible to engage in a thorough philosophical and theological discussion without addressing the messianic issue in depth, except for random mentions. All three parts of The Guide almost entirely disregard the messianic era and the resurrection of the dead. Furthermore, in “The Essay on Resurrection,” a later work, Maimonides reiterated that the world to come is the key to a true u ­ nderstanding of the messianic idea. He added to this claim a renewed reference to his ­earlier ­discussion in his Commentary on the Mishnah (introduction to Perek Helek).86 Maimonides, then, viewed the messianic doctrine he 83 84 85 86

Ibid., 11:4. Ibid., 12:5. Laws of Repentance 8:2. “But the world-to-come is entirely overlooked. I thereupon announced very clearly [in the introduction to Perek Helek] that the Resurrection is a fundamental of the Torah of Moses our master, but that it was not the ultimate goal, and that the ultimate goal is the life in the world-to-come . . . I quoted verses from the Torah, as explained to us by t­radition, to demonstrate that it contemplated the world-to-come as the ultimate goal of recompense . . .” (“The Essay on

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detailed in various writings and contexts as one whole and coherent ­conceptual sequence. The importance of individual redemption leads to the two ­central and fundamental characteristics of the messianic idea in his ­doctrine: ­turning the collective idea into a marginal notion that functions as an ­educational incentive and, consequently, accepting it under duress due to the power of the authoritative Judaic sources, but within ­naturalistic ­constraints. Endorsement of the idea was justified by referring to the ­political interest in the education of the multitude.

Maimonidean Naturalism In previous sections, I argued that the basic assumptions of Maimonides’ doctrine, and especially his intellectual version of individual redemption, compelled him to endorse the naturalistic messianic model. The last two chapters of the Laws of Kings and Wars (11-12), which close the Code, contain the essence of the natural conception of messianism. In these chapters, Maimonides stated his naturalistic outlook in unequivocal ­ ­halakhic terms, without any concession to the apocalyptic legacy. Following is a brief review of Maimonides’ discussion of natural redemption. It seems unquestionable that Maimonides built the two chapters of the “Laws of the Messiah” in a deliberately hierarchical fashion.87 The ­relationship between the chapters’ topics can be presented in various Resurrection,” 214). In “‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity,’” Ravitzky interpreted Maimonides’ messianic ­doctrine as a result of two clashing trends in the political and the intellectual models. Ravitzky’s i­nterpretation exposes hidden trends in Maimonides’ teachings, but without undermining the decisive role that the world to come played in Maimonides’ messianic doctrine as a whole. Note also the serious controversy evoked by Pines’ interpretation, which sought to deny Maimonides’ doctrine on the immortality of the soul. See Shlomo Pines, “The Limitation of Human Knowledge According to Alfarabi, Ibn Bajja and Maimonides,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 1, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 82-102; Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” in Von der Mittelalterlichen zur Modernen Aufklärung: Studien zur Jüdischen Geistesgeschichte (Tubingen: Mohr, 1987), 60-129; Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Human Perfection (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990); Herbert Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,”Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992-1993): 49-103. Pines ignored the broader Maimonidean corpus and focused on the Guide of the Perplexed. By contrast, I deal with the place of Maimonides’ messianic teachings in the history of ideas as a philosophical continuity, and the issue of casuistry in the esotericism of the Guide of the Perplexed is irrelevant to it. Maimonides, as noted, argued in “The Essay on Resurrection” that, despite his frequent reliance on the Guide of the Perplexed, he had not retreated from the views he had presented in the introduction to Perek Helek. He thereby attested to continuity between the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Guide, at least on the matter of immortality. He also took special trouble to note that both discussions—in “The Essay on Resurrection” and in The Guide—were meant for perfect individuals (see “The Essay on Resurrection,” 221). Supporters of esotericism will most certainly point out that the essay is public, and the discussion could go on endlessly. 87 An excellent interpretation of these two chapters is found in Isadore Twersky, Law and Philosophy: Perspectives on Maimonides’ Teaching, vol. 2, (Ramat-Aviv: The Open University of Israel, 1992), 11-23 [Heb].

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ways, and their common denominator is that Chapter Eleven deals with the ­particular elements of the redemptive process and Chapter Twelve addresses the collective level. Following are the details of the various options: 1) Chapter Eleven discusses the perfection of individual religious law in the future and Chapter Twelve the imposition of the wisdom ideal.88 2) Chapter Eleven discusses in detail the existence of the people of Israel in the messianic era, and Chapter Twelve presents the ­universal characteristics of the messianic world and the function of the Jewish people in its context. 3) Chapter Eleven deals with the functions of future humans in ­general and of the messiah as an anthropological representative in particular, whereas Chapter Twelve presents the characteristics of the messianic period in general. The latter possibility is apparently the one that leads to a proper ­understanding of the messianic era’s naturalistic features. Chapter Eleven, as noted, presents the future anthropological doctrine that is c­ haracterized, above all, by its concern with the personality and the functions of the ­messiah: the messiah will return Halakhah to its proper place, “sacrifices . . . the Sabbatical and Jubilee years” (Law 1); the messiah does not perform miracles (Law 3); the messiah will be a religious commander and leader (Law 4). Two elements, then, ensure human naturalism in the future: 1) The stability of Halakhah and the natural character of future humans. The need for law in the messianic era shows that the evil impulse will not disappear, and that humans will need r­ estraining and limiting tools in the future as well. It is thus clear why Maimonides chose to emphasize a specific commandment from the many that we will be compelled to observe in the future—cities of refuge: So too, with reference to the cities of refuge, the Bible says: “And if the Lord thy God enlarge thy borders . . . then thou shalt add three cities more for thee” (Deuteronomy 19:8, 9)—a precept which has never 88 Law XII:3, which discusses the role of ancestry in the future as intended to highlight the messiah’s “holy spirit,” should be interpreted accordingly. In other words, Maimonides found that this way was appropriate for presenting the return of prophecy, as an expression of intellectual perfection in the future. On other possibilities of dividing these topics, see Shimon Gershon Rosenberg, “History and Messianism According to Maimonides,” in Yeshuot Uzo: Memorial Volume for Rabbi Uzi Kalcheim, ed. Itamar Warhaftig (Jerusalem: Ariel, 1996), 282-286 [Heb].

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been carried out. Yet, not in vain did the Holy One, blessed be He, give us this commandment” (Law 2).

    Cities of refuge, as we know, were meant for unintentional slayers. The h ­ alakhic boundaries of “unintentionality” (shegagah) point to an ­intermediate state covering the possibilities between coercion and ­deliberate intention. In other words, ­unintentionality is negligence. In the future, then, negligence will still be w ­ idespread, except in apocalyptic approaches that uphold a superman exempt from flaws and mistakes. Future humans, then, will not be perfect, just like present ones are not. 2) The characteristics of the messiah. The messiah, as noted, has always been perceived in Jewish tradition as a representation of the ­messianic era as a whole. The shattering of the miraculous remnants in the messiah’s figure in Maimonides’ “Laws of the Messiah” is thus an indication of his view of the messianic era in general. This p ­ rinciple is extremely important to Maimonides, to the point that he is prepared to deny the need for any evidence of the messiah, thereby exposing himself to critiques such as that of R. Abraham b. David of Posquières in his gloss ad locum (11:3). In sum: no ­evidence is required of the messiah’s mission. He is judged only post factum, like “Ben Kozba the king.” If he succeeded in his role and in his mission and if he led the Jewish people to ­independence, he will no longer be an “assumed Messiah” and will become one “beyond all doubt.” Maimonides, therefore, actually granted legitimation to failed and flawed messiahs: “But if he fails in these matters or is killed, it will be known that he is not the one the Torah has promised and he is as all the superb and capable kings of the House of David who have died”(11:4).89 The messiah’s characteristics are also evidence of the natural anthropology assumed for the messianic period. 89 This sentence does not appear in the Yale edition of the Code. Denying the need for absolute evidence about the messiah led to historical consequences different from those Maimonides had expected. See David Berger, “Some Ironic Consequences of Maimonides’ Rationalistic Messianism,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991): 1-8 [Heb]. Other problems, which I have not addressed here, are: (1) the descriptions of the messiah in various Maimonidean ­writings, particularly in the introduction to Perek Helek, at the end of Tractate Eduyiot in his Commentary of the Mishnah, in the Laws of Repentance, and in the Laws of Kings and Wars; (2) the possibility of several messiahs. As noted in ch. 1 above, a discussion on messianism conducted according to the personality and characteristics of the messiah should pay specific attention to these issues.

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He then proceeds to the description of the period as a whole, and Chapter Twelve presents the universal characteristics of the messianic era. At the opening of this chapter, Maimonides presents the naturalistic approach and considers its sources, covering all the hermeneutical implications ­compelled by it, that is, the allegorical character of the apocalyptic sources: Let no one think that in the days of the Messiah any of the laws of nature will be set aside, or any innovation be introduced into creation. The world will follow its normal course. The words of Isaiah: “And the wolf shall lie down with the kid” (Isaiah 11: 6) are to be ­understood figuratively, meaning that Israel will live securely among the wicked of the heathens who are likened to wolves and leopards, as it is ­written: “A wolf of the deserts doth spoil them, a leopard watcheth over their cities” (Jeremiah 5:6). They will all accept the true religion, and will neither plunder nor destroy, and will peacefully eat what is ­permitted . . .90 (Law 1).

Maimonides carefully selected his terms according to his theoretical and hermeneutical approach, and these terms point to the natural c­ haracteristics of the messianic era. In his view, nothing will change in ­“creation” [ma´aseh bereshith]. In his various writings, Maimonides states that the term ma´aseh bereshith denotes physics (al-‘ilm al-‘bī‘ī—the wisdom of nature), that is, the understanding of the natural sub-lunar order, which is eternal and unchanging.91 The use of the term ma´aseh bereshith points to the stable order of the natural world in the messianic era. Maimonides further ­clarified that in the future, “what is permitted” will be eaten a­ ccording to the “true religion.” What is the connection between “what is permitted” and the topic of the chapter—the natural world? Maimonides probably deplored the traditions on the leviathan banquets in the messianic era. Midrashic sources present this future monster (a kind of crocodile?) as ­ritually unfit, as a symbol of the prohibitions to be revoked in the future.92 90 Law 12:1 (the last sentence is my translation of the Hebrew original). 91 See his Commentary on the Mishnah, Hagigah 2:1; Laws on the Foundations of the Torah 4:10; Preface to The Guide of the Perplexed. Cf. Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), 364-366; idem, “Halakhah and Science: Perspectives on the Epistemology of Maimonides,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri: Annual of the Institute for Research in Jewish Law 14-15 (1988-1989): 140-141 [Heb]. On the sources of the mentioned law, see Benjamin Z. Benedict, The Torah Center in Provence: An Anthology (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1994), 156-161 [Heb]. 92 See, for example, Leviticus Rabbah Margaliot ed., 13:3, 278-280 [Heb]. On the rabbinic background of this motif, see George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of the Tannaim, vol. 2 (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 363-364; Yosef Heinemman, Aggadah and Its Development (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), 166

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Maimonides therefore emphasized that the future will generally continue on its normal course, and there is no room for a natural reality different from the ­current physical world. More precisely, Maimonides may have used the term “normal course” (hanhagah) in the denotation of the Arabic term tadbīr. Maimonides later assigned to this term the meaning of natural and normative order,93 and in the messianic era, therefore, the natural and social order of the world will not change. Law 12:2 persists in the expression of strong reservations about ­apocalyptic traditions. Maimonides shifts here from an explicit discussion of Scripture to Aggadah. Since he was aware that these traditions were quite prevalent in talmudic and midrashic literature, he assumed ­responsibility for performing a bold and daunting task—to lower the standing of ­aggadic rabbinic midrashim and their special value: “Nor have the Rabbis any ­tradition with regard to these matters. They are guided solely by what the scriptural texts seem to imply.” Homilists, then, make their own d ­ ecisions concerning their messianic doctrines. Since this is a matter of personal taste and individual discretion, “no one should ever occupy himself with the legendary themes or spend much time on midrashic statements.” Maimonides thereby continued the view of the geonim regarding the standing of Aggadah, and took it to further extremes. After opening the second law by deciding in favor of Shmuel, “The sole difference between the present and the Messianic days is delivery from servitude to foreign powers [TB Berakhot 34b; Sanhedrin 91b]),” he went on to note a series of entirely natural messianic events: . . . it appears that the inauguration of the Messianic era will be marked by the war of Gog and Magog; that prior to that war, a prophet will arise to guide Israel and set their hearts aright, as it is written: “Behold, I will send you Elijah . . . (Malachi 3:23). He will come . . . to bring peace in the world, as it is said: “And he shall turn the hearts of the fathers to the children” (Malachi 3:24). [Heb]; Jacob Neusner, The Foundations of Judaism: Method, Teleology, Doctrine, vol. 2, Messiah in Context: Israel’s History and Destiny in Formative Judaism, 2nd printing (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988). Cf. Benjamin Ish-Shalom, “Tannin, Leviathan, Nahash: On the Meaning of a Legendary Motif,” Daat 19 (1987): 79-101 [Heb]; Lois Drewer, “Leviathan, Behemoth, and Ziz: A Christian Adaptation,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 44 (1981): 148-156. The tension between the stability of the law and its future infringement is a topic discussed in rabbinic literature, and the leviathan issue is an expression of it. Other sources held that the leviathan is ritually fit (TB Hullin 67a, and more). “What is permitted” can also be interpreted as the opposite of plunder. 93 See Abraham Nuriel, “Providence and Governance in Moreh ha-­Nevukhim,” Tarbiz 49 (1980): 348-353 [Heb]. Cf. also Laws of Repentance 9:2.

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According to Maimonides, this chain of events is derived from “the words of the prophets in their literal sense.” We thus find that he entirely disregarded most of the prophets’ statements about the future day of God and filtered the political and strategic events that would occur. Later, when writing The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides interpreted the prophecies in distinctly allegorical terms (II:29). Moreover, even though he openly declared that he was reading the “words of the prophets in their literal sense,” he did not abide by his statement, since the verse explicitly notes the return of the historical Elijah, whereas Maimonides averred that a “prophet,” generally, would arise to guide Israel. His daring statement on the lack of interest evoked by ­rabbinic statements opens by noting: “Some of our Sages say that the coming of Elijah will precede the advent of the Messiah” (12:2). Maimonides turned the tables here: the sources actually state that Elijah is the one who will appear in the future, and Maimonides would be among “some of our Sages” who have other interpretations. By contrast, he states that a literal reading notes that “a prophet” will appear, not Elijah, while the Sages, who have jumbled up different understandings of the verses, side with the historical Elijah.94 These Maimonidean twists and turns strengthen his uncompromising view stating that the world will not change its course in the future. The last three laws are the last nail in the coffin of apocalyptic ­messianism. Law 3 notes the return of revelation in its Maimonidean v­ ersion. The messiah is endowed with a charismatic “Holy Spirit” and prophecy, according to Maimonides, is a natural, intellectual, and universal process that may at times involve distinct political implications.95 Law 4 dissolves the overt and concealed apocalyptic hopes one after another. The parallels in this regard between the introduction to Perek Helek and the Code are presented below: The days of the Messiah are not ardently longed for on account of the plentiful vegetation, and the riches which they will bring in their train, 94 On the standing and functions of Elijah in the messianic period, see ch. 5 below, note 69. See also Zalman N. Goldberg, “The Messiah’s Determination of Pedigree by the Holy Spirit: Maimonides’ Explanation,” in Yeshuot Uzo, 74-75 [Heb]. 95 See the Laws on the Foundations of the Torah 7:1; Guide of the Perplexed II:36. See also Kreisel, Prophecy, 148-315. As Maimonides noted in the Guide II:45, the “Holy Spirit” is a lower rank of prophecy (“second degree” out of eleven), which is not “pure prophecy,” and further inquiry is thus required into the messiah’s prophetic standing. Moreover, in Laws of Repentance 9:2, Maimonides determined that the messiah’s rank is close to that of Moses. It is in the Laws of Kings and Wars that he seems to have conveyed his authentic view. The prophet (“Elijah”[?]) who will appear in the future attests to the preservation of the tension between prophecy and kingship. Maimonides, furthermore, does not view prophecy as meant specifically for the people of Israel but as shared by all the nations of the world. Its return in the future is thus a sign of the universalism typical of the messianic era. Cf. Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Judaism and the Jewish People (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 33-47. See also note 72 above.

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nor in order that we may ride on horses, nor that we may drink to the accompaniment of various kinds of musical instruments, as is thought by those people who are confused in their ideas on such things.96 The Sages and the Prophets did not long for the days of the Messiah that Israel might exercise dominion over the world, or rule over the heathens, or be exalted by the nations, or that it might eat and drink and rejoice (12:4).

Maimonides, then, strengthened his stance through both positive and negative arguments. On the one hand, he formulated a solid naturalistic position, which rejects the conclusions of the apocalyptic legacy. On the other, he painstakingly demolished the apocalyptic motivation, given that supporters of apocalyptic messianism could only be satisfied when their personal and material aspirations are fulfilled in their vision. Specifically, they hoped to see the nations of the world as their servile subjects, bowing before them as compensation and perhaps even revenge for the sufferings of exile—for example, “And then come all the nations and kneel before each one of Israel and lick the dust on their feet . . . and Israel eat and are joyful.”97 The messianic period, then, is characterized by measured ­political balance and universal peace, in line with its purpose. Maimonides ­ ­enumerates the advantages of future peace in the law that concludes Chapter Twelve and the Code as a whole: “In that era there will be n ­ either famine nor war, neither jealousy nor strife. Blessings will be abundant, comforts within the reach of all” (12:5). He presents here a relationship of dependence. Given that, in the messianic era, the nations will not be involved in strategic c­ ompetition and all resources will be allocated to the search for wisdom and to the expansion of the frontiers of knowledge, the problem of hunger will be resolved. Already in the introduction to Perek Helek, Maimonides commented on an apocalyptic saying—“The Land of Israel will one day produce cakes ready baked, and garments of fine silk” (TB Shabbat 30b; Ketuboth 111b)—as pointing to the abundance of the messianic era: “But verily in those days the gaining of their livelihood will be so very easy . . . For when one finds a thing easily and without labour, people are in the habit of saying, ‘So and So found bread ready baked, and

96 “On the Jewish Creed,” 44. 97 Sefer Eliyahu, in Yehuda Even-Shmuel, ed., Midreshei Geulah: Chapters in Jewish Apocalypse from the Closure of the Talmud until the Early Sixth Century, 2nd edition (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute, 1952), 45-46 [Heb].

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a meal ready cooked.’”98 The blessings in the messianic era, noted in Law 5, are merely an expression of moderate comfort, contrasted with famine. Maimonides, then, presented in his Laws on the Messiah a ­well-­designed naturalistic model and, in its context, suggested most of the limitations ­preventing a dangerous slide toward apocalyptic motifs. The distinctly n ­ atural description of the future is compelled by the purpose of the m ­ essianic era: “The one preoccupation of the whole world will be to know the Lord.” The ideal of knowledge and wisdom, and the immortality of the soul attached to them as the ultimate goal, shapes the description of the messianic era. This ideal determines the manifestation of Maimonidean messianism as a whole.

SUMMARY The study of the second stage in the messianic development of Jewish ­philosophy shows that the firm stance of the geonim was rejected, and retreated until it finally vanished. In the writings of twelfth-­century r­ ationalists, n ­ atural individual redemption pushed collective social ­redemption to the margins and general apocalyptic redemption d ­ isappeared almost without remnant. This conceptual process was evolutionary. It began in the writings of such thinkers as Abraham bar Hiyya, Judah Halevi, Yosef Ibn Saddiq, Abraham Ibn Ezra, and others, and culminated in Maimonides’ exegetical and halakhic doctrine. Maimonides systematically proposed messianic naturalism as the only approach compatible with individual eternal redemption. Individual redemption, then, became the alternative model to apocalyptic redemption. This model required a different attitude toward the relevant sources, and ­naturalistic messianism emerged as the answer. But why did not thinkers who had preceded Maimonides present the thesis of messianic naturalism? Why did they not infer from their theory the required messianic conclusions about individual ­redemption? They evidently preferred to avoid confrontation with the prevalent rich apocalyptic traditions. Instead, they chose to incorporate these t­ raditions in non-­systematic contexts of interpretation, in monographs, and in the ongoing exegesis of the sources. Maimonides’ writings, by contrast, are premised on the challenge posed by his broad codification endeavor. Once Maimonides chose to present an inclusive and consistent ­interpretation of an authoritative text (the Commentary on the Mishnah) and offer a wide-ranging legal interpretation of Judaism (the Code), he could no 98 “On the Jewish Creed,” 42-43.

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longer avoid the necessary messianic conclusions. Therefore, he diligently and systematically presented the limitations of messianic naturalism. Christian influences on the shaping of the soul’s salvation idea at the individual, intimate level cannot be dismissed altogether. Clearly, however, natural, individual redemption developed among the thinkers of Moslem Spain, both Neoplatonic and Aristotelian, out of immanent, intra-­systemic philosophical motivations. The various sources that affected these ­thinkers dictated the idea of spiritual salvation through the soul’s return to its supreme source as the ultimate and longed-for individual redemption. Finally, the need of these thinkers for a realistic naturalistic messianic outlook emerged due to the solid authority of the revelational sources in the Talmud and the Midrash, which left them no alternative but to develop a social and universal messianic model. The messianic idea could not be ignored altogether. The rationalists, however, adapted this model to the ­intimate salvation of the individual in an Aristotelian or Neoplatonic ­version. Messianic naturalism was therefore inevitable, since it was the only model that could serve individual redemption, spiritual and eternal.

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The Resurgence of Apocalyptic Messianism

The emergence of individual redemption dealt a crushing blow to apocalyptic messianism. The overpowering authority of Maimonides, ­ who placed all his halakhic and philosophical weight behind messianic ­naturalism, inflicted the greatest damage. In the thirteenth and ­fourteenth centuries, however, circumstances changed. Apocalyptic messianism ­gradually regained l­ egitimacy, challenging rationalist thought and g­ radually leading to the decline of naturalism. The resurgent apocalyptic approach was, to some extent, a reaction to a philosophical naturalism formulated in theoretical, and perhaps even logical, terms. The apocalyptic view, therefore, could not return to its ­classic articulation in geonic writings and now endorsed a more theoretical garb and more systematic formulations. The mythical description of the ­messianic chain of events that had appeared in the responsum ascribed to R. Hai and in other sources was thus replaced by a consistent and quasi-­ logical presentation of apocalyptic arguments. Following the renaissance of apocalyptic messianism, an open and covert struggle unfolded and, in its course, rationalist attitudes became more extreme. These conceptual phenomena will be the topic of this and the next two chapters, beginning with a schematic presentation of the developments that led to the rise of apocalyptic messianism on the one hand and the retreat of messianic naturalism on the other, to be followed by a focus on apocalyptic messianic positions advanced by traditionalists.

NEW DEVELOPMENTS The previous—second—stage was characterized by a linear development from thinkers in the early twelfth century up to Maimonides. By contrast, the typical feature of the present stage is a split into a set of complex and intricate views. Jewish philosophy absorbed new approaches, such as that of Averroes on the one hand and scholastic ideas on the other. At the same time,

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it was affected by changes and upheavals in the wake of stormy controversies about the legitimacy of philosophy and its contents, which had already erupted at the end of Maimonides’ life. Rationalists became more radical, and t­raditionalists warned against this radicalization. The ­confrontation with the Christian world exposed Jewish philosophers to new interests and, at their center—the messianic idea. In this discussion, I trace the changes affecting the two messianic models, the apocalyptic and the naturalistic, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Maimonides’ approach, which marginalized the messianic idea and made it entirely redundant for the elitist intellectual, evoked three types of responses. Two characterize radical positions—from both ­traditionalists and rationalists—and the third represents a type of thought that ­mediates conservatism and rationalism by mixing apocalyptic and naturalistic motifs. All these three positions pushed messianic naturalism aside and ­significantly lessened its value, its standing, and its power, each from its own unique background. Following is a description of these three responses: 1) The conservative view of the traditionalists in the Maimonidean controversy. Early on in the controversy (end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century), unyielding t­raditionalists such as R. Meir Halevi Abulafia (Ramah) and R. Shmuel b. Ali faulted Maimonides for not believing at all in collective ­messianic goals and for distorting what they held to be the true ­meaning of the sources. In their view, the Maimonidean version of ­individual redemption does not enable fulfillment of collective public goals. Traditionalists also rejected the naturalistic model in p ­ rinciple because negating individual spiritual redemption entails the ­collapse of naturalism, which loses its right to exist, and also because the simplistic literal interpretation of t­ almudic and ­midrashic sources became increasingly dominant. In the wake of this rejection, the apocalyptic model emerged even more ­prominently as the only messianic option, according to the ­exegeses cleaving to these sources’ literal meaning. Maimonides’ solid authority, however, led traditionalists to reconsider the nature of apocalyptic miracles and to tone down, to some extent, the miraculous component. Apocalyptic messianism in its pure form, then, as it appears in the l­iterature of ­redemption ­midrashim, can no longer be found. By the mid-thirteenth

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century, this move had largely ended. This position is discussed in the present chapter. 2) The extreme rationalist position. During the thirteenth and ­fourteenth centuries, extreme rationalists developed the trends found in Maimonidean texts and made individual redemption the sole eternal and authentic goal. Beginning with R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, they offered a consistent symbolic interpretation of the messianic idea that took it far beyond its literal meaning. Terms such as messiah, days of the messiah, and the resurrection of the dead became a metaphor and a symbol of the conjunction of the individual and the active intellect. The world to come—meaning individual intellectual redemption—remained the only concrete future ideal worth pursuing. Conjunction with the active ­intellect replaced collective redemption and became “true” redemption. Concrete expressions of the messianic idea, among them also naturalism, disappeared altogether. Naturalistic messianism emerges—if anyone resorts to it—only when reference to the sources compels it, but not out of a systematic need. This topic is the subject of Chapter Five below. 3) The conservative rationalist position. Many thinkers formulated a messianic approach involving both apocalyptic and ­naturalistic motifs. Without explicitly saying so, these thinkers apparently wanted to strike a balance between naturalism and the literal meaning of the texts, “holding the stick on both ends” as it were. Some of them devoted most of their time, energy, and literary ­productivity to their extensive halakhic pursuits, but they were aware of the rationalist tradition and incorporated some of its assumptions and its writings in their thought. This approach, which appeared in the work of some individuals during the ­thirteenth century, was adopted in the fourteenth century by a defined circle claiming to be descended from two of the greatest Spanish halakhists—R. Shlomo b. Aderet (Rashba) and R. Asher b. Yehiel (Rosh). Chapter Six below discusses this position. The current chapter, as noted, deals with the first position’s affinity with the character of messianic events, whereas the next two chapters deal, respectively, with the two other positions. Discussion of the traditionalists’ views is split into two. The first part clarifies that the traditionalists in the philosophy controversy indeed interpreted Maimonides’ messianic doctrine

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through a cautious reading between the lines, exhausting its radical implications. The second part presents the development and the changes in the apocalyptic approach following the encounter with Maimonides’ unwavering rationalist naturalism.

THE TESTIMONY OF MAIMONIDES’ CONTEMPORARY EXEGETES The discussion in the previous chapter sought to substantiate the claim that Maimonidean messianism in general is constituted on the immortality of the soul or the intellect and, therefore, compels the naturalistic messianic model. The best way of examining the meaning of a claim in the history of philosophy may be to examine its perception and interpretation by its ­contemporaries, who shared the cultural climate in whose context the claim was raised and understood the precise meanings of its terms. So, was this the perception of Maimonidean messianism when Maimonides was alive? The “core” of Maimonides’ messianic doctrine was well-­understood even by his fiercest contemporary adversaries. These traditionalists should not be viewed as zealous opponents, whose fury had blinded their c­autious eyes. Quite the contrary. The thinkers who lived in Maimonides’ times or soon after knew the key for decoding his secrets. They ­carefully ­formulated their claims and were versed in the ­halakhic and ­philosophical Maimonidean corpus. Like the contemporary ­rationalists and i­ntellectuals, traditionalists were acquainted with the rationalists’ e­ soteric style, the very style that many modern researchers have toiled—and still toil—to decode in order to retrieve its m ­ ysteries.1 This ­acquaintance helped them in their persistent attacks against the rationalists. One example is Ramah, who painstakingly traced the roots of Maimonidean messianism because the thrust of his own attack was that the dead will be resurrected in the world to come. What is the meaning of this assertion? Consider Ramah’s claims:   1 In this sense, Aviezer Ravitzky was right when drawing a parallel between the views of rationalists such as Shmuel Ibn Tibbon and those of the traditionalists. Both sides exposed the secrets of The Guide of the Perplexed out of their own interests. See Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Secrets of The Guide of the Perplexed between the Thirteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” in Studies in Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 165-168; Dov Schwartz, “The Debate over the Maimonidean Theory of Providence in Thirteenth-Century Jewish Philosophy,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 2 (1995): 185-196. On the debate and the interpretation in the East, see Sarah Stroumsa, The Beginnings of the Maimonidean Controversy in the East: Yosef Ibn Shim’on’s Silencing Epistle Concerning the Resurrection of the Dead (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1999) [Arabic and Hebrew]; Zvi Langerman, “The Epistle of R. Shmuel b. Ali on the Resurrection of the Dead,” Kovets Al Yad 15 (2001): 39-94 [Heb].

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The Talmud is teeming with evidence showing that the world to come at the end is the final reward of the righteous and the retribution to the wicked, and it is one where there is a body and a corpse, and heaven forfend that any god-fearing person should doubt this.2 But how can we not present whatever proves the resurrection of the dead in the world to come as it is, after we have failed to find any clear evidence, big or small, to contradict its literal and concrete interpretation?3 We learn that the dead resurrected in the days of the messiah do not go back to be dust, and that the world to come after the days of the messiah is the judgment of both souls and bodies, and that there is no death to the righteous after life in the world to come.4 After the Mishneh Torah reached this land/I studied the Sefer ha-Mad´a that, in the Laws of Repentance, says that in the world to come/there is neither body nor corpse/and I was zealous for the God of Israel, for his holiness/and for justice and its source/when I saw that the ancient belief in the resurrection of the dead had been lost among the people of this land.5

In these claims, Ramah articulates a clear messianic orientation, tying both the world to come and the days of the messiah to the ­resurrection of the dead. Ramah, however, warned not only against the ­connection assumed between these messianic events. Mainly, he called for the ­recognition of a material dimension in the world to come by insisting on p ­ hysical resurrection in it. He understood that, should he be able to d ­ ­ismiss Maimonides’ idea that “the world to come” meant individual redemption, spiritual and intellectual, he would thereby do away with messianic ­naturalism altogether. Ramah mocked the Provençal rationalists who con  2 R. Meir Abulafia, Kitāb al Rasā‘il, ed. Yehiel Brill (Paris, 1871), 56 (henceforth Kitāb). Cf. Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 109-135; Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies of Ramah (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 39-60.  3 Kitāb, 57.   4 Ibid., 66.   5 Letter from Ramah to Nahmanides, Kovets Teshuvot ha-Rambam ve-Iggrotav, vol. 3 (Lipsia, 1859), 6a [Heb]. A close reading reveals that Ramah pinned the denial of the resurrection of the dead on the term the world to come. On Ramah’s claims about the world to come, see also Abraham Bar Azriel, Sefer Arugat ha-Bosem, vol. 2, ed. Ephraim E. Urbach (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1946) [Heb]; idem, “The Participation of German and French Scholars in the Controversy about Maimonides and His Works,” Zion 12 (1947): 150 [Heb].

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tinued Maimonides’ ­rationalist heritage and claimed that “the tree of knowledge is suited for learning, explaining, and inquiring/ which is the path that will bring light.”6 In his view, then, the authentic key for ­understanding the messianic idea lies in the “tree of knowledge” symbol. Note that the “tree of ­knowledge,” more than any other motif, conveys the ­vulnerability of rationalism. Rationalists explained it as symbolizing norms opposed to scholarship (Maimonides), the material dimension, or, even explicitly, sexual ­intercourse (R. Shlomo Ibn Gabirol and R. Abraham Ibn Ezra).7 Both the social and political m ­ anifestations of this motif and its material dimension preclude full ­devotion to the acquisition of k­ nowledge. Against them, Ramah claims that the material dimension symbolized by the “tree of knowledge” is the true foundation of the messianic world. Therefore, it is worthy of “learning, explaining, and inquiring” so as to grasp the full depth of the messianic idea because messianic goals, contrary to Maimonides’ abstract version of the “world to come,” do have a material dimension. Ramah, then, interpreted Maimonides’ doctrine authentically and, on this basis, resolutely opposed it. These claims of Ramah, which make the perception of the world to come the basis of a general critique of Maimonides, were supported by other ­traditionalists. One of the more zealous among them was R. Moshe b. Hasdai Taku, an Ashkenazi scholar who mobilized his own sworn opponents to attack Maimonides’ messianic doctrine and focused mainly on the definition of “the world to come.” After citing R. Hai Gaon’s responsum on ­redemption processes, Taku wrote as follows: “The Book of Beliefs [Saadia’s Beliefs and Opinions] also contests R. Moshe b. Maimon, who said that there are no bodies in the world to come. He [Saadia] wrote that there will be bodies and souls, but they will not eat, as our teachers have said. . . .”8 R. Abraham b. Azriel sums up Taku’s view as follows: “Relying on the same personal opinion, [Taku] ­disputes R. [Moshe] b. Maimon who wrote in his book that, in the world to

 6 Kitāb, 59.   7 See, for example, David Kaufmann, “Salomon Ibn Gabirol Philosophische Allegorese,” in Studien über Salomon Ibn Gabirol (Budapest: A. Alkalay, 1898-1899); Sarah Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis: A Study of Maimonides’ Anthropology (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1986), 239-250 [Heb]. Cf. Dov Schwartz, The Philosophy of a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Neoplatonic Circle (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1996), 233-239 [Heb].   8 R. Moshe Taku, Ketav Tamim—Ms. Paris H711: Thirteenth Century Controversy over Saadian Theology (Jerusalem: Merkaz Dinur, 1984), 95. On Taku’s strong hostility toward Saadia, whom he counted among the “apostates,” and on his critique on the question of messianism, see Urbach, “The Participation of German and French Scholars,” 154; Joseph Dan, The Esoteric Theology of Ashkenazi Hasidism (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1968) [Heb]; idem, ­introduction to Ketav Tamim, 12, 25. On Rav Hai Gaon, see ch. 2 above.

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come, there is neither body nor corpse.”9 Finally, note that Nahmanides too focused his critique of Maimonides’ messianism on the immortality of the intellect, though he also extended it to naturalism in the collective sphere.10 The traditionalists, then, understood the roots of Maimonides’ messianic conception and targeted it in their critique. After they shattered Maimonides’ view of individual spiritual redemption, the naturalistic model collapsed and was replaced by the apocalyptic one. Rationalists did acknowledge the centrality and even the ­exclusivity of individual redemption in Maimonidean doctrine. R. Abraham, Maimonides’ son, edited his answers to the traditionalists in their order of importance. He first addresses “the world to come,” which has “only wisdom and ­knowledge,”11 and only afterward does he consider other m ­ essianic goals. Only in light of this principle can we understand Maimonides’ close disciple, R. Yosef b. Yehuda Ibn Shimon, who apparently held that his rabbi had never acknowledged the resurrection of the dead as a concrete event.12 R. Yosef,  9 Urbach, Sefer Arugat ha-Bosem, vol. 2, 254. On apocalyptic motives in Ashkenazi thought, see, for example, Israel Jacob Yuval, ”Vengeance and Damnation, Blood and Defamation: From Jewish Martyrdom to Blood Libel Accusations,” Zion 58 (1993): 33-90 [Heb]. 10 This critique is discussed in the next section. See, for example, “The Gate of Reward,” in Ramban (Nachmanides), Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1978), 473-474, 497-499, 525-531; “Letter to Provence,” in Ginzei Nistarot, vol. 4, ed. Yosef Kobak (Bamberg, 1868), 19 [Heb]. On apocalyptic motifs in Nahmanides’ messianic conception, see Dov Rappel, “Nahmanides on Exile and Redemption,” in Redemption and State (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1979), 98-109 [Heb]. For a critique of naturalism, see ibid., 106-107. 11 Abraham Maimonides, Milhamot ha-Shem, ed. Reuven Margaliot (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1953), 61 [Heb]. On the positions presented in this letter and on the positions of Maimonides’ family in general, see below. 12 This view is clearly discernible in Maimonides’ letter to his disciple: “And it is surprising . . . that Your Honor [R. Yosef] notes that non-literal interpretations of biblical verses on the resurrection of the dead are inappropriate” (Moses Maimonides, Epistles, ed. David Zvi Baneth [Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1985], 67 [Heb]). See also the note in R. Yosef Kafih, Maimonides’ Letters (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1987), 133n97 [Heb]. The expression “dimiyon shav [delusion]” that appears in it is a mistake. I wish to comment briefly here on a comparison between Maimonides’ messianism in general and the issue of resurrection in particular in “old” rationalist texts, as opposed to modern and postmodern interpretations of this doctrine. Medieval rationalists—as evident from the figure of R. Yosef b. Yehuda and as shown in ch. 5 below—drew categorical conclusions and held that there is no room for material reward. The modern responses of Leo Strauss and Shlomo Pines (in his early work, when he had held that Maimonides does acknowledge the immortality of the intellect) had a strong esoteric bent and identified with the medieval stance. By contrast, the new interpretation seeks a middle course with new and broader perspectives regarding both the coherence of Maimonides’ halakhic and philosophical doctrine and his reflection in it as a religious leader. See, for example, the interesting comments of Isadore Twersky on the one hand and David Hartman on the other, who reopened the discussion of this topic: “[Maimonides alerts] us to the fact that the opposition in this case is not an eccentric or isolated matter but symptomatic of divergent and irreconcilable religious conceptions. The issue is not resurrection but religious phenomenology and axiology” (Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides [Mishneh Torah] [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980], 503. “Rather than claim that Maimonides did not believe in rewards and punishments in general and in resurrection in particular, it is more correct to claim that he was embarrassed to talk at length about doctrines used to motivate observance of commandments by appeals

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for whom Maimonides wrote The Guide of the Perplexed after r­ecognizing his student’s “excellence of mind and quickness of grasp,” was certainly able to understand the view of his rabbi, even if far fetched, as well as its ­implications. Individual redemption and the immortality of the intellect henceforth became the sole concern of rationalists. Some, such as Sa´d Ibn Kammuna,13 Moshe Narboni,14 and others, wrote special ­treatises to discuss individual ­redemption, while others discussed this issue at length throughout their writings. The naturalistic model, then, patently drew its vitality and its legitimacy from the intellectual version of individual redemption.

RIFTS IN THE MAIMONIDEAN BASTION R. Abraham Maimonides, as noted, resolutely defended his father’s ­messianic stance. Indeed, most of the family persisted in its adherence to Moses Maimonides’ views and to the spirit of his teachings. But apocalyptic cracks appeared even within the family circle, which had been a bastion of support for his followers, clearly attesting to the resurgence of apocalyptic messianism. I open with R. Abraham’s apologetic arguments, which were ­presented in the course of the stormy controversy surrounding his father’s ­writings. First, R. Abraham cited from biblical and talmudic sources the few ­statements that, ostensibly, appear to support the rationalist ­interpretation of the term world to come. This interpretation defines the world to come as a state where there is no “eating or drinking but only wisdom and knowledge, which is the high degree that true Torah scholars reach in this world.”15 According to R. Abraham, this Maimonidean definition relies on three sources: 1) the statement in the Babylonian Talmud, “May you see your world in your lifetime and your latter end in the future world” (TB Berakhot 17a); 2) the verse, “I will give thee access among those who stand by” (Zechariah 3:7); 3) concerning the loss of the evildoer’s soul—“and their hope shall turn to despair” (Job 11:20). Second, R. Abraham attacked the simplistic interpretation of apocalyptic motifs such as the leviathan to self interest” (Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham Halkin, discussions by David Hartman [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1985], 247). This is an issue in need of serious discussion, and I am merely drawing attention to it. 13 See Leon Nemoy, “Ibn Kammuna and His Essay on the Immortality of the Soul,” Ha-Rofeh ha-Ivri 2, no. 35 (1962): 131-136 [Heb]. 14 See also Moses Narboni, The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni, ed. Kalman P. Bland (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1982). 15 Abraham Maimonides, Milhamot ha-Shem, 61.

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banquet and the aged wine. He attested that his father had “shouted and complained with worry and sighs” about this phenomenon, and hinted at the parable on the educational process that his father had offered. This ­parable, as noted, had presented messianic events as a deceitful and trifling (“nuts and figs”), even if legitimate, educational prize. Finally, R. Abraham applied his t­ heoretical determinations to several interpretations that adapt the authoritative sources to the foundations of Maimonidean messianism.16 R. Abraham saw no need for hermeneutical discussions, holding that healthy common sense points to the abstract immortality of the soul as an eternal autonomous reward. Against the Provençal traditionalists, however, he resorted to the methodological weapon that they themselves had wielded—applying to aggadic material the argumentative techniques characteristic of the study of Halakhah: “We will explain this to him [to R. Shlomo of Montpellier, the traditionalists’ leader] and to his sort through the talmudic methods of discussion, questioning, and analysis that they know and are used to, rather than through discretion, intellect, and ­principles, which they are not used to.”17 Abraham applied principles of halakhic study and halakhic rulings to the realm of Aggadah, and these are the rules he formulated: Everyone who studies Talmud knows that every amora who makes a statement that a tannaitic mishnah or beraita objects to, [must] either reconcile his theory with the words of the tanna or his statement will be dismissed in the tanna’s favor. If the dispute is between two ­tannaim, such as a beraita and a mishnah or two mishnayot in dispute, ­talmudic sages will juxtapose them and discuss them until they can either r­ econcile them or dismiss one in favor of the other.18

Abraham presented two mutually contradictory sources. On the one hand, the source from TB Berakhot 17a that negates material functions (eating, drinking, procreation, and so forth) in the world to come, and on the other, the sources on aged wine and others of that kind (TB Berakhot 34a, TB Sanhedrin 99a, and so forth) that attest to a material dimension in the world to come. How should we decide between them? The rules noted should be applied. The view negating material functions in the world to come is that of Rab. Although Rab is from the generation of the amoraim, the rule is that 16 Ibid., 62-68. 17 Ibid., 67. On the Provençal method of study, see Benjamin Z. Benedict, The Torah Center in Provence: An Anthology (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1994), 8-12 [Heb]; Israel Ta-Shma, R. Zerahiah Ba´al ha-Ma’or and His Circle: On the History of Rabbinic Literature in Provence (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1992) [Heb]. 18 Abraham Maimonides, Milhamot ha-Shem, 67.

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“Rab is a tanna and is privileged to differ” (TB Eruvin 50b), that is, Rab’s view is no less important than that of a tanna. Therefore, stated Abraham, we rule according to his view, and he defied the Provence traditionalists by claiming “I am no less than you.”19 We thus find Abraham vigorously defending his father’s messianic stance. Moreover, in the surviving remnants of his writings, Abraham proudly supports the individual redemption of the soul, whereby the soul yearns for return to its divine source. He adapted ­individual redemption to the classic Neoplatonic style, stating, for instance, that “the longing of the soul for its world is (developed) by means of ­speculation and reflection.”20 Virtuous ascetics and hermits yearn in all their ways for “the life of the world to come.”21 R. Abraham thereby carved a path for the Maimonides family for the following generations. The ideal of an individual redemption equated with the soul’s return to its supreme source became a significant feature in the philosophy of the Maimonidean dynasty. Examples of it are the approaches of R. Ovadia, son of Abraham and grandson of Moses Maimonides on the one hand,22 and that of R. David, son of Yehoshua ha-Naggid, sixth generation after Maimonides on the other.23 Cracks in the naturalistic fence protecting individual redemption, however, were already evident in the third generation after Maimonides. The trends in the treatise ascribed to R. David b. Abraham ha-Naggid, Maimonides’ grandson and R. Ovadia’s brother, are no longer faithful to the Maimonidean legacy. According to this treatise, made up of Torah homilies that were delivered and formulated in the circle of negidim belonging to the Maimonidean dynasty, redemption is unequivocally characterized by miracles and wonders. Consider the following: In the future, in the days of our Lord the messiah, may he soon be revealed, God has promised that He will perform miracles and ­wonders in heaven and earth and do so in His glorious self, may He be exalted,

19 Ibid., 68. 20 Samuel Rosenblatt, ed., The High Ways to Perfection of Abraham Maimonides, vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), 313. See also R. Abraham’s Commentary on the Torah, Genesis 48:1 (Jerusalem, 1984). R. Abraham apparently devoted a special chapter to the immortality of the soul, which has not survived. See Paul Fenton, “En Marge du Kitāb Kifayat al-Ābidīn,” Revue des etudes juives 150 (1991): 395. 21 Abraham b. Moshe b. Maimon, Sefer ha-Maspik le-Ovdey ha-Shem (Part Two, vol. 2), ed. Nissim Dana (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 1989), 112 [Arabic original and Hebrew translation]. 22 See, for example, Paul Fenton, ed., The Treatise of the Pool (London: Octagon Press, 1981), 113, and cf. below, 115. 23 See, for example, R. David b. Yehoshua Maimoni, Sefer Moreh ha-­Prishut u-Madrikh ha-Peshitut, ed. Yosef Yinon (Fenton) (Jerusalem: Tuv, 1987), 95 [Heb].

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as He says: “And I will exhibit wonders in the heavens and on the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke”(Joel 3:3).24 The prophet then told us about the many wars and commotions and tumult and struggles that will occur at the end of days . . . and the king messiah will soon appear in our times and perform miracles, wonders, and marvels as those performed in Egypt by Moses the first redeemer, of blessed memory.25

Similar statements recur in the commentary on Avot (3:26) ascribed to R. David. In this work, he added another, anthropological characteristic— the creation of a new type of redeemed human: “[In the future, God] will take away from us the evil inclination so that we all may obey him and be worthy of him.”26 The future human, then, will basically be a good ­creature. The Torah homilist unhesitatingly detailed a series of future events that, according to longstanding apocalyptic prescriptions, would include ­miracles and wonders related to an awesome revenge on Gentiles. The study of works by Maimonides’ descendants shows that they were actually not i­ nterested in messianic concerns. Explicit messianic references in them are few, scattered, and lack any conceptual significance. By contrast, the ­homilist purported to be R. David b. Abraham often resorted to messianic discussions and considered them at length in his homilies. The conceptual transformation evident in Spain, Provence, and Italy left a mark in North Africa as well and may have led to the renewed ­influence of Saadia’s messianic doctrine. To some extent, the stance of the work ascribed to R. David b. Abraham conveys the resurgence of the a­ pocalyptic approach among rationalists. In the following discussion, therefore, I describe the re-emergence of apocalyptic messianism in t­ hirteenth-­century thought, including its imprint on rationalist literature.

A MODERATE APOCALYPTIC APPROACH Traditionalists, as noted, refused to adopt Maimonides’ naturalistic ­inter­pretation of messianic terms, rejected the principle that “the world 24 Midrash R. David ha-Naggid on Exodus, trans. Abraham Yitzhak Katz (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1968), 37 [Heb]. See Ella Almagor, ‘The Damascus Redaction of the Homilies on the Pentateuch Attributed to David b. Abraham Maimuni,” in Hebrew and Arabic Studies in Honour of Joshua Blau (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University, 1993), 67-75 [Heb]. 25 Midrash R. David ha-Naggid on Exodus, 49. 26 David b. Abraham ha-Naggid, Commentary on Avot, ed. Zion Krinpeas (Jerusalem: 1986), 76 [Heb].

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will follow its normal course” in the days of the messiah, and negated the notion of resurrection as a one-time miracle by founding it on ­eternal life. Traditionalists, then, called for a return to the pure version of the apocalyptic legacy. Their writings include quotes and paraphrases of ­ ­biblical and ­midrashic sources that do not depart from the verbatim meaning and seek to understand the apocalyptic denotations literally. If Daniel ­determined that “many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting ­contempt” (12:2), then nothing, for better or worse, should be added to or detracted from material resurrection. This approach, according to the traditionalists, is also ­appropriate for aggadic sources and is the one that prevails, for ­example, in the philosophical writings of R. Yonah Gerondi’s commentaries on Proverbs and Avot. Note, however, that the radical, fanciful apocalyptic overtones that c­haracterize redemption midrashim are no longer found. When ­moderating the messianic apocalyptic connotation of these midrashim, ­thirteenth-­century traditionalists continue the endeavor of Saadia, who had sought to make this a legitimate trend from a tenth-century rationalist ­perspective. It is also safe to assume that Maimonides’ authority drove these ­traditionalists to express slight reservations about the absolutely miraculous character of the messianic era, which are evident in two issues: 1) the nature of ­messianic miracles and their relationship with biblical sources; 2) the ­different s­ tructure of matter in future humans and its new function in the messianic era. These issues are considered below.

Moderating the Novelty Talmudic and midrashic apocalyptic sources had described a miraculous world ruled by a completely new order. By contrast, medieval t­ raditionalists expressed reservations and stated that nature’s miraculous change in the messianic era would not go beyond the miracles already described in the sources. Ramah discusses the statement by Shmuel—“there is no d ­ ifference between this world and the days of the messiah except for the bondage of foreign powers” (TB Berakhot 34b; Sanhedrin 91b)—that Maimonides had relied on to formulate his naturalism—and notes: Shmuel did not say this to dismiss the miracles that will occur in future days and times according to the need of the time and the place, but to say that the ways of the world will not be completely different, as in

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the saying, “the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold” (Isaiah 30:26), as we find in Perek Helek.27

Future miracles, then, will not be entirely new phenomena, a new heaven and a new earth, but will resemble biblical miracles that have already occurred in the past. Note that, although Ramah vigorously objected to uncritical allegorical approaches, he transcended the simple literal ­meaning of Shmuel’s saying. The “bondage of foreign powers,” rather than merely a political transformation, will involve a qualified miracle. We find, then, that although no absolute change in the normal course of the world is to be expected, the apocalyptic overtones of redemption remain in place: the miracles of Egypt (the destruction of “the tongue of the sea of Egypt,” according to Isaiah 11:15), the increased light of the sun and the moon, the resurrection of the dead, and so forth, are certainly to be expected in the days of the messiah. The reality of the miracle thus remained, but Ramah was forced to dispel the radical novelty of the messianic world. A certain moderation of the novelty element is also evident in Nahmanides’ well-known reference to the change in the character of beasts in the future world. The Sifra (Behukotai 2:1) deals with a controversy on the meaning of the verse “and I will cause evil beasts to cease out of the land” (Leviticus 26:6). Views were divided as to whether no evil beasts would be on the land at all or God would perhaps change their nature. Nahmanides clearly states that the Holy One, blessed be He, will change the aggressive nature of beasts of prey, “like the world was at its beginning, before the sin of the first man.”28 God, then, will not eliminate beasts of prey to create an entirely new reality but will correct the current one by changing the natural order. Resonating in Nahmanides’ approach are certainly echoes of a key characteristic of the messianic idea in early Kabbalah—returning to the state that had prevailed prior to Adam’s sin and reuniting the split in the 27 Kitāb, 63. See also Judah Goldin, “On Midrash and the Messianic Theme,” in Studies in Midrash and Related Literature, ed. Barry L. Eichler and Jeffrey H. Tigay (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1988), 372-373. Cf. the view of Yafeth b. Ali as cited in Georges Vajda, “The Opinions of the Karaite R. Yafeth b. Ali on the Destruction of the World in the End of Days, in Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research Jubilee Volume, ed. Salo W. Baron and Isaac E. Barzilay (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1980), 89, 91 [Heb]. 28 Nahmanides, Ramban (Nahmanides) Commentary on the Torah, Leviticus, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1974), 456. Cf. Rappel, “Nahmanides on Exile and Redemption,” 105-107; Benedict, The Torah Center in Provence, 154. In his gloss, Rabad used this text to attack Maimonides’ allegorical interpretation of Isaiah 11:6, “the wolf shall dwell with the lamb,” but he downplayed the moderating kabbalistic and apocalyptic foundation at the basis of the critique. See Benedict, The Torah Center in Provence, 151.

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world of the sefirot. Nahmanides’ terms nevertheless point to a re-­examination of the apocalyptic foundation and its relative moderation in the shadow of the controversy.

Restricting the Material Functions The traditionalists, only because they had no other choice, did agree that no “crude” material activities—eating, drinking, and procreation—would take place in the future. Pushed by the authoritative sources stating that “in the future world there is no eating nor drinking nor intercourse nor business nor jealousy nor hatred nor competition” (TB Berakhot 17a), traditionalists admitted that “the eating and drinking noted here should be interpreted metaphorically.”29 In other words, future humans will exist without any need for sustenance or procreation. But Ramah’s restriction in no way dims the reality of eternal resurrection. The dead will remain forever, though their bodies will not require food and sex. The conception of the future physical body according to Saadia’s school was reformulated in the course of these hermeneutical discussions. Many thinkers claimed that a new type of body would emerge, a refined and ­purified organic being without any inferior layers such as digestion and procreation. Nahmanides claimed that the awakening of the dead in the Garden of Eden takes place “in an actual physical sense,” though this should not be interpreted in an inferior, material sense. In his view, the people of that [Coming] World will attain the eminence of Moses our teacher, whose soul was [spiritually] so far above that his bodily powers were voided and he was at all times arrayed with Ruach Hakodesh [the holy spirit]. It was as if his sight and hearing were [functions] only of the essence of the soul alone and were not accomplished through the medium of the physical eye. This [the physical means] was how the other prophets perceived when [the powers of] the body were voided and those of the soul expanded so that Ruach Hakodesh emanated upon it, enabling it to see with its own sight how [the angels] Michael and Gabriel appear. This is the true vision and the correct hearing.30 29 Kitāb, 56. 30 Nahmanides, Ramban (Nachmanides), Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, trans. Charles b. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1978), 517-518. Nahmanides relied here on a philosophical tradition that Saadia began formulating ­systematically, which viewed Moses’ body as possessing unique physical qualities. Cf., for example, Nahmanides’ description of

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The comparison of future beings to Moses shows that, by then, the body will be entirely purified of its material activity and serve solely as a s­ uitable substrate for the soul. Furthermore, Nahmanides devised a ­psychological approach that perfectly corresponds to this refined, purified body by ­stating that the material functions can be transferred to the soul. The soul, then, can be described in material terms such as sight and hearing, just as the ­physical term place can be applied to the soul. Nahmanides did not recoil from expressions such as “the soul is limited/defined by place.”31 He was well aware that his own psychological theory did not fit those ­considered ­acceptable by medieval rationalism; indeed, it ­contradicted the ­“philosophers”—the “Greek philosophers and the sophistry of the Chaldeans and the Arabs.” For Nahmanides, however, the messianic ­apocalyptic need that demands strict adherence to the literal meaning of texts and aggadot imposes this psychological approach. He writes: We, on the other hand, who follow the true tradition from the holy ancestors who did not “please themselves in the brood of aliens”32 exalt [the soul] and describe its subtle essence far more than these philosophers . . . the etherealness of the soul is not found to a greater degree among the philosophers of the nations and those who are drawn along with them than it is present among our Rabbis. Nor is there any comparison among them; although the Rabbis have not ­frightened the students with words expressed tersely and gravely on the ­subject, Nevertheless, our Rabbis do believe that the fire of Gehenna and destruction has mastery over the soul by the Will of Him Who made everything, blessed and praised be He.33 Moses’ body to that of Maimun b. Yosef: “Moses was a prophet whose body was purified till it became as the body of Michael and Gabriel, but stronger, for those were of light, not of flesh or of blood, or of sinew or matter; but this mortal man entered among thousands and tens of thousands of angels of fire” (The Letter of Consolation of Maimun ben Joseph, trans. L. M. Simmons [London: Wertheimer, 1890], 16). See also Eliezer Schlossberg, “The Commentary of R. Maimon on Psalm 90,” Sinai 96 (1985): 139 [Heb]; Menahem Ben-Sasson, “The Prayer of the Conversos,” in Sanctity of Life and Martyrdom: Studies in Memory of Amir Yakutiel, ed. Isaiah M. Gafni and Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, 1993), 160-161 [Heb]. The source of the “the eye of the soul” c­ oncept is apparently in Judah Halevi, The Kuzari 4:3. 31 Writings and Discourses, 483, 516. Nahmanides explained in this way the souls’ stay in the “Garden of Eden” or in “Gehenna,” until they face judgment, that is, until the resurrection in messianic times. See Gershom Scholem, “An Inquiry in the Kabbalah of R. Yitzhak b. Yaakov Ha-Cohen,” Tarbiz 2 (1930): 434 [Heb]. Note that this approach strongly influenced R. Nissim Girondi (Ran) and R. Hasdai Crescas, who ascribed the existence of the soul in the Garden of Eden to the impressions it had absorbed during its stay in the material body. On the messianic views of Ran and Crescas, see ch. 6 below. Cf. also note 43 below. 32 According to Isaiah 2:6. 33 Nachmanides, Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, 485-486. Cf. Moshe Idel, “Nachmanides: Kabbalah, Halakhah, and

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In this critique of the philosophers, Nahmanides supported the view ­claiming that the immortality of the soul in the Garden of Eden and in Gehenna is irrational. This view had already been conveyed by Maimonides’ greatest opponent, R. Abraham b. David of Posquières (Rabad), in his polemic with R. Zerahiah Halevi Baal ha-Ma’or.34 According to both Rabad and Nahmanides, the story of the soul after death cannot be used as ­logical proof. Both adopted a decidedly anti-philosophical attitude on specific questions, and the late-thirteenth-century rationalist R. Zerahiah Hen was critical of Nahmanides for departing from philosophical truth, specifically targeting Nahmanides’ literal interpretation of Job’s words: One should not wonder that this happened to the man Moses [according to Exodus 11:3], because he had no natural views on ­ which to pin his own when contemplating the natural matters and the sealed secrets found in the prophets’ words. He departed very far from the view of Rav [Moses] b. Maimon, Or ha-Golah, concerning the meaning of the Book of Job but one should not blame him for it, because Moshe bar Nachman knew the wisdom of the Talmud but knew nothing about philosophy. He was therefore very critical of Rav b. Maimon’s i­nterpretation of the Torah and of his view of p ­ rophetic ­perceptions, but he should have chosen to be silent on all the m ­ atters that he criticized because one should not decide which to favor between two things until one knows what should be known about both, and one need say no more.35

This passage seems crucial for the understanding of the rationalist p ­ osition at a time of fiery controversies over philosophy. Indeed, Zerahiah Hen openly supported the Maimonidean stance on individual redemption—“the immortality of the soul as explained by the Rav [Maimonides]”—and his critique of Nahmanides also relied on this approach.36 In the later half of the fourteenth Spiritual Leadership,” Tarbiz 64 (1995): 560-561 [Heb]. 34 See Ta-Shma, R. Zerahiah Ba´al ha-Ma’or, 141-143. On Rabad and Nahmanides as critics of R. Zerahiah Ha-Levi, see also Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières: A Twelfth Century Talmudist (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1980), 120-125. 35 Zerahiah’s Commentary on Job 3:1, printed in Human Hope: Commentaries on the Book of Job, vol. 1, ed. Israel Schwartz (Berlin: Gerschel, 1868), 190 [Heb]. See also Aviezer Ravitzky, The Thought of Zerahiah ben Yitzhak ben She’altiel Hen and Maimonidean-Tibbonian Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979), 104 [Heb]. Ravitzky cites here another critique, from the letter to Hillel b. Shmuel, where Zerahiah also stated that Nahmanides “does not know the nature of reality at all.” Zerahiah was indeed extremely critical of Nahmanides in his commentary on Job. 36 Zerahiah’s Commentary on Job 1:6, 182. On the evildoer’s soul’s reduction to nothingness after death, see ibid., 239-240.

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century, R. Eleazar Ashkenazi argued that ascribing a material dimension to the soul in the Garden of Eden results from being swept by imagination and delusion.37 These two sages faithfully represented a clear rationalist position. Nahmanides, however, chose to present a view that ­blatantly contradicts the rationalists’ accepted psychological foundation. The determination that the soul is connected to the material dimension of space, sensorial perceptions, and animative feelings (pain and pleasure) enabled Nahmanides to create a hierarchy of the soul’s fate after death in light of real, concrete criteria, such as its temporal or eternal grinding in the wheel of fire or, alternatively, its existence in a real and material Garden of Eden until it reaches its final fate. Clearly, then, the material activities expected to take place after the resurrection will refer to the soul, and the body will lose its material functions almost entirely. Nahmanides, then, built his messianic orientation according to his psychological approach, based on these stages: the world of the souls (the Garden of Eden and Gehenna), the messianic era in this world, the resurrection of the dead, and eternal judgment in the world to come.38 This period can, moreover, be viewed as another manifestation of a mid-term position, which presents the resurrection of the purified body by contrast with the current material body. This stance appears in the approach of R. Yehuda b. Shlomo ha-Cohen, who writes in his commentary on Genesis (2:8): Apparently, it [the state of Adam in the Garden of Eden] resembles the resurrection of the dead that will occur in the future, when the body will be purified with the soul. It is neither the purification that occurs in this life nor the purification of the soul that separates from the body in the spiritual world. Rather, it is a purification that only Adam knew when he was in the Garden, and one we will know with the ­resurrection of the dead.39 37 R. Elazar Ashkenazi, Zafenath Paneach, ed. Solomon Rappaport (Johannesburg: Kayor, 1965), 73. Elazar demanded that rabbinic homilies be interpreted in light of common sense. See ibid., 76. Cf. Abraham Epstein, Of Jews in Ancient Times, ed. Abraham Meir Haberman (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1957), 123 [Heb]; Eric Lawee, “Audacious Epigone: R. Eleazar Ashkenazi b. R. Nathan Ha-Bavli and His Torah Commentary Safenat Pa‘neah,” in Studies in Jewish History Presented to Joseph Hacker, ed. Yaron Ben-Naeh et al. (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2013), 170-186 [Heb]. 38 Nahmanides, Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, 537-539. I have already considered the source of this approach in Saadia’s discussions in ch. 2 above. For a concise description of this approach, see David Novak, The Theology of Nahmanides Systematically Presented (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992), 125-134, and particularly 129. 39 Cited in David Goldstein, “The Commentary of Judah ben Solomon Hakohen ibn Matqah to Genesis, Psalms, and Proverbs,” Hebrew Union College Annual 52 (1981): 213, lns. 276-280. This approach was also endorsed by R. Abraham Bibago, Derekh Emunah (Constantinople, 1522), 93c. See also Colette Sirat, “La Qabbale d’apres Judah b. Salomon Ha-Cohen,” in Hommage a Georges Vajda: Ėtudes d’histoire et de pensée juives, ed. Gérard Nahon and

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Yehuda b. Shlomo draws a distinction between abstract immortality—a kind of “refinement” and pleasure—and an existence to occur with the ­resurrection of the dead, where pleasure will relate to both the body and the soul. Adam’s existence in the Garden of Eden, which entailed an o ­ bviously physical dimension, reflects a special bodily state ranked even higher than the p ­ leasure of immortality. In the world of resurrection, a sublime, ­purified material state will emerge. Note that this approach appears in the ­commentary of a respected professional scientist and astrologer who wrote a comprehensive encyclopedia of the sciences (Midrash ha-Hokhmah). Yehuda b. Shlomo was viewed as an authority and his work was cited by Byzantine scholar Abraham Kirimi in his mid-fourteenth-century Torah commentary Sefat Ha-Emet. Yehuda b. Shlomo was from Toledo and ­apparently a disciple of Ramah. And if this is indeed the case, the ­conception of a refined body at the time of resurrection was also formulated in Ramah’s circle. Finally, note that the Christian view of resurrection as a return of the soul to a purified and refined material body may have influenced the ­integration of this systematic view into Judaism.40 The teachings of Ramah, Nahmanides, and others thus show that, although traditionalists did to some extent retreat from fully and blatantly endorsing the apocalyptic view, this was decidedly the dominant element in their messianic approach and in their controversy with the rationalists.

THE RATIONALISTS’ DEFENSE Traditionalists, as noted, did convey some reservations about the scope of the apocalyptic model, which they softened and moderated. Nevertheless, they still failed to leave room for the naturalistic model. The messianic world was ­presented as a wondrous, miraculous era hardly sharing a­ nything in common with the current natural order. Furthermore, the strong r­eaction of Ramah and other traditionalists led several rationalists directly to a new apologetic ­interpretation of Maimonides. According to this interpretation, Maimonides had purportedly acknowledged an apocalyptic dimension in redemption, despite his open, clear statement on the matter. Consider, for example, letters written by well-known rationalists during the first Maimonidean controversy:

Charles Touati (Louvain: Peeters, 1980), 197-198. 40 See Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Resurrection of the Body According to Three Medieval Aristotelians: Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William Ockham,” Philosophical Topics 20, no. 2 (1992): 1-33.

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You [Ramah] did not really understand our teacher Moses, who said that the world to come has no body and no corpse. What world to come was he referring to? To the resurrection of the dead, or to the world that will be renewed after the resurrection of the dead, after lying destroyed for many days, as our blessed rabbis said, “The world is to last six thousand years, and one thousand it will be desolate” (TB Rosh Hashanah 31a; Avodah Zarah 9a).41 And our great rabbi, of blessed memory, never denied the future ­banquet with the aged wine, and leviathan, and the wild ox, nor did he contradict their words.42

These statements are worth comparing with Nahmanides’ i­nterpretation of Maimonides’ view, stating that the latter believed in good faith in Gehenna and in the gradual punishment of the soul according to the gravity of sins: . . . perhaps the opinion of the Rabbi of blessed memory tends to state that there is no punishment and suffering for the sinning soul . . . God forbid! Rather, the words of the Rabbi of blessed memory refer to the ultimate destruction and utter ruin beyond which there is no ­punishment and retribution. This is the excision which is the ­destruction of the soul. Included in this [concept of excision] is that besides [the fact] that [the soul] was at first chastised with ­punishments of the Gehenna, and its sufferings, this severe [i. e. final] destruction [of the soul] is the great punishment inasmuch as [the soul] has lost the great bliss which was its rightful charge. . . .43 41 R. Aharon b. Meshulam of Lunel, Kitāb, 36. 42 R. Shmuel b. Abraham Saporta (?), Ginzei Nistarot 4 (1868): 54 [Heb]. Cf. the traditionalists’ claim: “How could their foolish heart lead them to doubt the reward of the Garden of Eden and the halakhot and aggadot that he himself tells. And whoever comes to doubt this, heaven forfend, because of what R. Moses said, he is as an apostate who questions the words of tannaim and amoraim as well as the rest of the aggadot—the opening of the ass’ mouth and the leviathan banquet. Our rabbis interpreted these literally, and ‘he who makes a change bears the loss’” (printed in Joseph Shatzmiller, “Towards a Picture of the First Maimonidean Controversy,” Zion 34 [1969]: 139 [Heb]). 43 Nahmanides, Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, 495-496. Nahmanides’ interpretation of Maimonides’ notion of karet [excision] is in conflict with the idea of the soul’s negation and elimination, contrary to the meaning assumed in the Maimonidean oeuvre. Nahmanides explains karet as “in truth the destruction of the soul. . . . This ‘destruction,’ though, is only a form of afflictive punishment; it is not that the wicked man dies and his soul is destroyed and becomes like the eradicable soul of an animal” (ibid., 486). In his letter to the French rabbis, Nahmanides ascribes to Maimonides a stay (though not necessarily twelve months in Gehenna) for the purpose of purifying the soul. He does acknowledge: “It is true that, in all of the Rabbi’s words,/ I saw no reference to ‘the twelve months’ [period]/ mentioned by the Sages/ in Tractate Rosh Hashanah and other

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Maimonides’ systematic doctrine never recognized the cyclical nature of the universe (the destruction expected after the resurrection of the dead) and would not have accepted the leviathan banquet in its literal meaning or the active existence of Gehenna and its graded punishments. When the ­apocalyptic approach proudly awakened from its latency, it pushed both ­typical rationalists and moderate traditionalists to retreat from Maimonides’ pure and unequivocal naturalism. The result was an e­ xegesis of Maimonides involving a strange mix of some apocalyptic motifs ­(miracles and a ­messianic orientation) into a semi-naturalistic c­onception. The a­pologetic stance that several rationalists adopted toward the apocalyptic legacy leads to its strengthening, to the point that they saw a need for ­bringing Maimonides’ teachings in line with it. This exegesis of Maimonides is also a sign of the naturalistic model’s retreat among some rationalist thinkers as well as among those who did not find radical extremism appealing. The retreat of the naturalistic model was also due to the effects of another, seemingly unexpected force. The hermeneutical activity of ­radical rationalists, who might justifiably be viewed as Maimonides’ ­spiritual disciples and as yearning for his teachings, made messianic collective naturalism redundant and meaningless. These philosophical interpreters diligently and consistently abandoned all literal readings of messianic sources, turning them into symbols of the individual, i­ ntimate process of attaining knowledge and intellection. Collective salvation became an allegorical cover for the communion of the individual intellect with the active intellect. The messianic view of radical rationalists is at the focus of the next chapter.

places,/ [but] it appears to me/ that [the Rabbi] of blessed memory believes/ that this figure [of twelve months] is not meant to be taken verbatim. . . . That the Rabbi did not mention/ the ways of Gehenna [and its punishment]/is because he considers them/ among the miraculous phenomena,/ which [characteristically] obscures their nature./ The Rabbi, though, follows the paths of the Torah/ in explaining things which are made clear/ by absolute and complete proof” (ibid., vol. 2, 394-395).

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The Decline of Collective Naturalism

Following is a detailed description of the approach of radical rationalists, whose insistence on allegorical and symbolic interpretations led to the ­collapse of cosmic collective messianism as a real option. I will review here their ­comprehensive interpretive endeavor according to topics: messianic activism, the figure of the messiah, salvation and the end of days, and the ­resurrection of the dead. This interpretation essentially left no room for a real collective m ­ essianic event, not even in its naturalistic m ­ anifestation. Allegorical and s­ymbolic ­interpretations resulted in collective ­messianism losing any c­ oncreteness and coming to s­ ymbolize various stages of i­ndividual intellectualism (the ­ ­ epistemological ­ process of acquiring knowledge, ­intellectual immortality as communion with the active intellect, and so forth). In the following sections, I discuss this ­conceptual development in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and point to its echoes in the fifteenth century.

MESSIANIC ACTIVITY The philosophical-hermeneutical discussion of the messianic q ­ uestion does not ignore actions that, in one way or another, seek to i­nfluence the ­messianic process and hasten its coming. Actions trying to bring ­redemption f­orward that were discussed in the opening chapter spread over many areas—­repentance, migrating to the Land of Israel for m ­ essianic ­reasons (contrary to the separate migration of individual d ­ evotees and followers), magic, and theurgy. Through an appropriate a­llegorical interpretation, ­ ­ medieval Jewish rationalists shifted various forms of ­messianic activism from r­ eality to the sphere of intellectual p ­ erfection. Dramatic attempts to hasten r­ edemption and bring forward the messiah’s coming were ­accordingly d ­ isplaced to the rationalist individual realm. R. Levi b. Abraham interpreted in this spirit the prohibition to hasten the end, and he was strongly critical of his c­ ontemporaries’ s­ piritual ­situation. In the first (abridged) version of his encyclopedic rationalist treatise, Livyat Hen, Levi writes:

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A person should not break through [Exodus 19:21] and seek to attain the final causes of wisdom at the start of his scholarly endeavor, and should not begin with metaphysics [elohiyyot]. This was their i­ ntention when they said, “He adjured them not to hasten the end.”1 In our times, not only do they not hasten the end but not even one in a t­housand awakens to pursue the ends, as he forewarned us when he said “the wisdom of their wise men shall perish” (Isaiah 29:14). And since the discovery of truths and the knowledge of final goals is hard for the multitudes, who do not reach this degree and do not understand its great power, God did not wish to reveal the end [of time] in detail.2

Hastening the end, then, is synonymous with the desire to reach the height of knowledge—meaning metaphysics (elohiyyot)—without prior study of the preparatory sciences.3 The passage cited offers two interpretations: 1) an interpretation of the ban on hastening the end, addressed to the student and the scholar and dealing with the proper order of study; 2) an i­ nterpretation of why the Holy One, blessed be He, is prevented from revealing the end,4 which deals with the concealment of the intellectual perfection ideal from  1 Song of Songs Rabbah 2:18, ed. Shimshon Dunsky (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1980), 64 (“pushed for the end”) [Heb]; TB Ketuboth 111a (“shall not make known the end”).   2 Levi b. Abraham, Livyat Hen, Munich Ms. 58, 37b (printed in Levi b. Avraham, Livyat Hen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel [Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2007], 845 [Heb]). This view was widespread in the philosophical interpretation of Song of Songs. See, for example, R. Moses b. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, Commentary on Song of Songs, ed. Shlomo Zalman Hayyim Halberstam (Lyck: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1874), 11b; R. Immanuel b. Shlomo (Immanuel the Roman), Commentary on Song of Songs, London Ms. 238, 88a, 93b (the philosophical section of the commentary was published in full in Israel Ravitzky, Immanuel the Roman: A Commentary on the Song of Songs (MA thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970) [Heb].   3 R. Levi details these sciences elsewhere: “And it is known that, as knowledge of grammar is necessary before the art of writing, so should logic be considered the first step of knowledge, then mathematics, then physics, and then metaphysics” (ibid., 60a, Kreisel ed. 887). While interpreting the wells dug by the patriarchs allegorically, R. Levi enumerates the mentioned sciences and explains them as follows (ibid., 59b, Kreisel ed. 886):   1. The science of mathematics (including arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music);   2. The science of nature;   3. General science (metaphysics);   4. Politics. Note that logic is not considered a separate science, and politics is not included in the list of sciences required for metaphysics. Further­more, note that R. Levi’s list of sciences generally resembles that of R. Abraham Ibn Ezra. The main difference is that the latter’s list does count logic as a science and omits politics. See Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Classification of Sciences in Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy,” in Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 508-509.   4 As in the story of Jacob’s death. See, for example, Genesis Rabbah 98:2 (on Genesis 49:1), ed. Theodor-Albeck (Berlin: Itzkovsky, 1912) [Heb].

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the masses, who are incapable of understanding its depth. In this passage, Levi equates “the end” with rational perfection. Finally, note that Levi’s ­critical view of the masses may have contributed to the polemic about the sciences that broke out at the end of the thirteenth century and is associated with his name.5 Following up Levi’s interpretation of the ban on revealing the end was another rationalist—R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza. Ibn Zarza wrote two e­ xtensive treatises: Mekor Hayyim—a commentary on the Torah focusing on Ibn Ezra’s commentary, and Mikhlol Yofi—an interpretation of rabbinic aggadot. In the latter, Ibn Zarza writes: All things that come before their time are not truly strong and proper, and when the messiah comes, he will quickly discover that the earth is full of the knowledge of God, may He be blessed. Should he come too soon, however, this knowledge will be poor and limited, as [it ­happened to] the nobles of the children of Israel [Exodus 24:11] who saw the gods at the wrong time.6

Hastening the end will lead to non-gradual learning, in an improper order, resulting in the loss of the distinct intellectual advantage attached to the days of the messiah. In another interpretation dealing with bringing forth redemption, Ibn Zarza diverted the discussion from actual redemption to individual intellectual perfection. This interpretation addresses another kind of messianic activity—repentance. Contrary to the hastening of the   5 See Abraham S. Halkin, “The Ban on the Study of Philosophy,”Perakim 1 (1967-1968): 35-55 [Heb]; idem, “Why Was Levi b. Avraham Hounded?” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 34 (1966): 65-76; idem, “Yedaiah Bedershi’s Apology,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 165-184. In his meticulous studies, Halkin tried to show, both explicitly and implicitly, that Levi had unwillingly stumbled into the struggle between traditionalists and rationalists and that his doctrine per se does not justify the grave claims raised against him. In the context of rationalist thought, however, Levi’s views definitely seem extreme, and his homiletic and conceptual endeavor was certainly an inspiration to radical rationalists. Cf. the discussion of his views below in this chapter.  6 Mikhlol Yofi, Paris Ms. 729-730 Héb, Section I, 183a. Note that Ibn Zarza relates to the hastening of the end in another source as well, but from an astrological perspective. From this perspective, hastening the end is negative and damaging because the astral constellation does not allow for it, but the end can be hastened by “defeating the [decrees of the astral] system through the general [rules of science]” (ibid., Section II, 13a). In other words, if the people of Israel apply themselves to the study of the intelligibles, which involve general rules rather than individual attainments, they will not be affected by the astral system and redemption may come before its time. This interpretation is based on Shlomo Al-Constantini’s approach in Megalleh Amukot, Vatican Ms. 59, 49b-50a. According to Al-Constantini and Ibn Zarza, then, astrological considerations are also subject to the apprehension of the intelligibles. Hence, we find that “those whose intellections are perfect . . . bring redemption forward” (Mikhlol Yofi, Section II, 30a).

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end through magical means, repentance was usually evaluated positively. Following is Ibn Zarza’s formulation: It has also been said that repentance draws redemption closer, as they said in Yoma,7 “Great is repentance because it brings about ­redemption,” as we are told, “But to Zion a redeemer shall come, and to them that turn from transgression” (Isaiah 59:20). And repentance truly draws the intellect closer to redemption from matter.8

Repentance thus leads to detachment from the material dimension and, as shown below, intellectual conjunction depends on this ­detachment. The ­passage above again highlights how the drama of hastening r­ edemption and the active hastening of the end is displaced to the ­individual ­intellectual sphere. The stance of Levi and Ibn Zarza appears even more extreme when compared with early allegorical interpretation of Song of Songs. R. Yosef Ibn Aknin offered several interpretations of “I charge you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, that you stir not up, nor awake my love, till it please” (Song of Songs 2:7). Beside the well known rabbinic ­exegesis that opposes hastening the end, which is per se ­presented as an ­interpretation, he cites an allegorical interpretation: “The active ­intellect (al-‘aql al-fi‘āl) adjured the powers [of the soul] not to assist the ­rational (al-nātiqah) unless they see that her love has already ­awakened.”9 This ­interpretation ­suggests that intellectual perfection needs to enlist the ­faculties of the soul. The allegorical rationalist interpretation and the r­abbinic one are juxtaposed as two legitimate alternatives. As Ibn Aknin’s ­interpretation shows, the rationalist allegory does not exclude the ­meaning that the rabbis had ascribed to the verse. Levi and Ibn Zarza, ­however, ­interpret the rabbinic exegesis itself allegorically, shifting messianic activism from the c­oncrete national and universal realm to the individual attainment of knowledge. According to the rationalists, then, hastening the end reflects an attempt to deal with metaphysics without the preparatory sciences. The ­philosophical interpretation of Song of Songs made a significant ­contribution to the ­rationalists’ endorsement of individual redemption.   7 TB Yoma 86b; Rosh Hashanah 17b.  8 Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 198a.   9 Yosef Ibn Aknin, Hitgalut ha-Sodot ve-Hofa´at ha-Me’orot: Commentary on the Song of Songs, ed. Abraham S. Halkin (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1964), 80, lns. 26-27 [Heb]. The rabbinic interpretation is cited second (78, lns. 18 ff.). The “daughters of Jerusalem” motif as the powers of the body versus the intellect recurs in other interpretations of Song of Songs. See, for example, the commentary of R. Moshe b. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, 11b.

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An entire biblical book was interpreted by many philosophers through the prism of the desire for intellectual conjunction with the active intellect, and to the thinkers already noted we could add Gersonides, R. Shemarya Ikriti, R. Zechariah ha-Rofeh, and many many more.10 This consistent interpretation must have prompted many rationalists to replace collective redemption with intimate individual redemption.

THE FIGURE OF THE MESSIAH The figure of the messiah captivated aggadic commentators from the very start. Judah Halevi in The Kuzari (III:73) presented the messiah as the embodiment of human perfection. In the thirteenth century, this ­perfection was directly related to the intellectualist trend. It seems that the first ­systematic formulations tying the messiah to the ideal of wisdom and knowledge appear in the writings of the aggadic exegete R. Yitzhak b. Yeda‘ya.11 From the end of the thirteenth century, however, ­philosophical interpretations of the relevant messianic sayings were not limited to the ­presentation of the messiah as wise and as having attained the highest form of intellectual perfection a human being could ever reach. In these r­ ationalist ­interpretations, the messiah appeared as an unreal, abstract figure and had turned into the symbol of knowledge. For example, the widespread a­ llegory on the verse “humble, and riding upon an ass” (Zechariah 9:9), which relies on the linguistic closeness between hamor (ass) and homer (matter), became an important component of messianism’s intellectual ­version.12 Rationalist thinkers found in the verse “humble, and riding upon an ass” the idea that intellectual perfection depends upon extreme asceticism, meaning the complete defeat of the material dimension (hamor) or even 10 On this interpretation, see Abraham S. Halkin, “Ibn Aknin’s Commentary on the Song of Songs,” in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume, ed. Saul Lieberman (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1950), 389-420; Israel Ravitzky, Immanuel the Roman: A Commentary on the Song of Songs, 36-93; Menachem Kellner, “Gersonides’ Introduction to his Commentary on Song of Songs,” Daat 23 (1989): 15-26 [Heb]; Shalom Rosenberg, “Philosophical Hermeneutics on the Song of Songs: Introductory Remarks,” Tarbiz 59 (1990): 133-151 [Heb]; Menachem Kellner, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Song of Songs: For Whom Was It Written and Why?” in Gersonide en son temps: Science et philosophie médiévales, ed. Gilbert Dahan (Louvain: E. Peeters, 1991), 81-107; idem, “Gersonides on the Song of Songs and the Nature of Science,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 4 (1994): 1-21; Shaul Regev, “Messianic Conceptions in the Philosophical Literature of Yemenite Jews in the Middle Ages,” Tema 4 (1994): 29-33 [Heb]. 11 On this issue, see the extensive discussion in Marc Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis: A Thirteenth-Century Commentary on the Aggadah (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 102-120. Cf. idem, “R. Isaac b. Yeda‘ya: A Forgotten Commentator on the Aggada,” Revue des études juives 138 (1979): 39-40. 12 See Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 113; Moshe Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity in the Middle Ages,” in Messianism and Eschatology: A Collection of Essays, ed. Zvi Baras (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984), 255, note 14 [Heb].

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absolute detachment from matter. These thinkers poured the hamor-homer motif into their radical allegorical interpretation of the story about Moses’ return to Egypt. As an example, consider Levi’s view on this matter: “And Moses took his wife and his sons, and set them upon an ass” (Exodus 4:20). He made his wife, who is the wise [rational] important soul, and his sons, who are his intellectual powers, rule over the ass . . . which is the special ass that Abraham saddled for the sacrifice of Isaac, and the same one on which the king messiah will appear, as it is said, “humble, and riding upon an ass,” and he is the pure matter proper for the form.13

In this interpretation, the messiah is ostensibly a concrete figure who, because he is made of the purest matter, will not delay the development of the human form, which is the intellect. The messiah finds the matter that is proper for his form, as does the “woman of virtue” according to The Guide of the Perplexed III:8. Other sources, however, show that Levi views the messiah too as a symbol of the intellect that is actualized after death. He writes, for example, “the name of the messiah is the human intellect.”14 Messiah, then, in R. Levi’s interpretation, means the form of the perfect human intellectual. Ibn Zarza supports this view in a passage that recurs almost verbatim in both his works: And the truth is that Moses, of blessed memory, saddled and restrained his matter [homro] and his physical powers, as did Abraham, who saddled his matter. And the king messiah too will be revealed riding this old ass [hamor], as it is said, “humble and riding upon an ass.”15

This passage ties the figure of the messiah to the defeat of material forces. The essential transformation in the interpretation of Moses’ situation merits note. The apocalyptic messianic conceptions of Saadia, Nahmanides, and others had located, as noted, a miraculous dimension in Moses’ unique material state, which they used in order to clarify the notion of a purified body in the future human. Rationalists, by contrast, shifted the discussion 13 Livyat Hen, abridged version, 64a, Kreisel ed., 897-898. 14 Livyat Hen, Vatican Ms. 192, 57b, according to Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity,” 262n42. 15 Mekor Hayyim (Mantua, 1559), 32d; Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 156a-b (with some modifications). This motif recurs in the account about R. Yohanan b. Zakkai, who rode an ass (TB Hagigah 14b), and Ibn Zarza comments, “because his intellect ruled his matter” (Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 180b). Cf. Dov Schwartz, The Religious Philosophy of R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza, vol. 1 (PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 1989), 225-226 [Heb]; idem, “Theology and Learning in Medieval Jewish Philosophy: A Chapter in Maimonidean Influence,” Daat 37 (1996): 161-166 [Heb].

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to the normal situation of every philosopher who, aspiring to perfection, restrains his own matter. The miraculous dimension is thus replaced by the ordinary dimension of the rationalist. The ascetic element required in order to attain rationalist perfection recurs in Ibn Zarza’s interpretation of another statement with messianic associations: “The son of David will not come before all the souls in the body have been disposed of.”16 According to his interpretation, the messiah arrives “when the physical powers are destroyed.”17 Again, according to these passages, the messiah can be viewed as a concrete figure emblematic of intellectual perfection. According to another exegesis of this rabbinic saying, the messiah himself becomes a symbol: Know and understand that the human intellect was in actu called the son of David, the king messiah who is anointed under the influence of the active intellect, and the other material powers were called “the souls in the body.” The son of David, then, does not come, meaning that the intellect cannot reach conjunction with the active intellect, until all the souls of the body, which are the material powers, have been disposed of.18

Ibn Zarza’s view here is that conjunction with the separate intellect is impossible in material life. Even after actualizing their intellectual ­potential, humans cannot reach conjunction with the separate intellect, and this conjunction only becomes possible when the perfect human is absolutely detached from the material dimension, that is, after death.19 The messiah is thus the symbol of an actual intellect ready for conjunction. The ­“anointment” is the intellectual emanation of the active intellect through which we acquire knowledge and reach communion, a state seemingly parallel to that of the “acquired intellect,” (‘aql al-mustafād) or, in another translation—“emanated intellect.” In this state, the active intellect assists the actualized intellect to reach communion with the separate intellect.20 16 17 18 19

TB Yevamoth 62a. See also Genesis Rabbah 24, Theodor-Albeck ed., 233. Mekor Hayyim, 40c. Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 156a. Following are two version of this approach: “When [man] takes off the filthy material clothing—he will attain communion” (Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 124a). “Know that this is the longed-for apprehension [intellectual ­perfection], which cannot possibly be attained as long as the soul is attached to matter” (ibid., Section II, 56a). See also Schwartz, The Religious Philosophy of R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza, 90-94. This approach is also found among thinkers in Ibn Zarza’s circle—R. Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut and R. Shem Tov Ibn Mayor. I have dealt with this issue at length in The Philosophy of a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Neoplatonic Circle (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1996), 203-210 [Heb]. 20 See Dov Schwartz, “The Quadripartite Division of the Intellect in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Jewish Quarterly Review 84 (1993-1994): 227-236.

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The anointment is discussed more extensively in the next section, and I return now to the motif of the messiah’s figure that recurs in other sources with similar meaning: “. . . no human can grasp and see the king messiah, who is the active intellect in his time, unless he has studied the ­sciences in their proper order.”21 “The coming of the messiah son of David—that is the active intellect.”22 In these sources, the messiah symbolizes the active intellect that has reached the longed-for state of communion. Ibn Zarza’s broader hermeneutical endeavor clearly suggests that messianism in ­general implies conjunction with the active intellect, and the messiah is one of the motifs (actual intellect, active intellect) that reflect its realization. Let us return to Levi and his circle. Active in Provence in the ­mid-­fourteenth century was R. Shlomo b. Menachem, known as Prat Maimon. Prat may never have met Levi, but refers to him as “my teacher” as a sign of his unqualified admiration. Prat wrote a commentary on Levi’s rhymed prose poem Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Lehashim. On the following lines in Levi’s poem, “He is a seed that will rise from another place/ and will not bestow the honor of majesty on strangers,” Prat comments: R. Tanhuma says: “For God has appointed me [shat li] another seed” (Genesis 4:25) hints at the seed that comes from another place, and this is the king messiah,23 meaning that it is spiritual and does not come from the body and its nature, resembling the king messiah, who is of highly exalted rank and also comes from another place. And the kingdom and the power will be given in name and in practice to the intellect, because it alone is free and not subject to others. Rather, all are indeed subject to it.24 21 Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 161a. 22 Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 93a. 23 Genesis Rabbah 23, Theodor-Albeck ed., 226. In the passage that precedes this one, Prat Maimon clarifies the ­connection to the beginning of the cited verse (“And Adam knew his wife again; and she bore him a son, and called his name Seth”) and states that Seth symbolizes the theoretical intellect: “[Adam’s dynasty) will not prevail except for Seth, who is the theoretical intellect.” 24 Paris Ms. 891 Héb, 18a. On Prat and his circle, see my articles: “Contacts between Jewish Philosophy and Mysticism in the Early Fifteenth Century,” Daat 29 (1992): 41-67 [Heb]; “Asceticism and Self-Mortification: Attitudes in a Provençal Circle of Commentators of the Kuzari,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 11 (1993): 79-99 [Heb]; “The Messianic Idea in the Thought of R. Judah Halevi and Its Interpretation by Provençal Commentators of the Kuzari,” Sefunot 21 (1993): 11-39 [Heb]; “R. Judah Halevi on Christianity and Experimental Science,” AJS Review 19 (1994): 1-24 [Heb]; “The Writings of R. Shlomo b. Menachem (Prat Maimon): On the History of Rationality in Provence,” Assufot 9 (1995): 291-331 [Heb]; “The Theology of the Provençal Circle of Kuzari Commentators,” Tarbiz 64 (1995): 401-421 [Heb]; “The Kuzari Renaissance in Jewish Philosophy: The Thought of the School of Kuzari Commentators in Early Fifteenth-Century Provence,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 3, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1-40 [Heb].

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According to this passage, the external source refers to a spiritual or ­intellectual source separate from material reality. Intellectual emanation is analogous to the king messiah, both in its exalted value and in its ­external origin (“from another place”). The messiah, then, is perceived as a real figure that ­symbolizes the intellect in its independence from matter, just like the king, who is also free and rules over others. In another source, Prat also explains the saying, “The son of David will not come before all the souls in the body have been disposed of.” He, however, does so in terms that are entirely allegorical and without resorting to the messiah’s actual figure: “The reason is that the human intellect is not actualized until the souls of the body and the physical powers that yearn to join the multitude are disposed of.”25 The rationalists’ analysis of the messiah’s figure follows a clear ­process. In the first stage, the messiah is a figure reflecting the idea of rational ­perfection—an intellectual and a scholar. In the second stage, the messiah is a symbol of the attainment of wisdom, be it as an actualized or active ­intellect that “redeems” the human intellect. These two stages obviously appear ­simultaneously in the thinkers’ writings, and an analysis of the relevant texts reveals the transformation of the messiah into a symbol and an abstract idea.

REDEMPTION AND THE END OF DAYS The rationalist shaping of the messiah’s figure prepares the ground for the presentation of the messianic era in general. Philosophic allegorical interpretation in the Middle Ages diverted the discussion from the era of redemption in general to the individual intellectual sphere. I will first ­consider this determination in the interpretation of the terms salvation and anointment, which in many biblical sources convey the era of the end of days and its characteristics.26 I then deal with other hermeneutical ­phenomena that dismiss collective redemption as a concrete option and shift it to the sphere of individual intellectual perfection.

Salvation and Anointment Philosophers interpreted the term salvation as reflecting “true” salvation, meaning attaining knowledge and, in its wake, the immortality of the intellect through conjunction with the active intellect. Salvation is directly 25 Paris Ms. 891 Héb, 18b. The reference here is both to vegetative and animative souls. 26 See Jacob Licht, “Salvation,” Encyclopaedia Biblica, vol. 3, cls. 897-898.

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related to rescue from loss given that, according to Maimonides, the souls of individuals who have not developed their intellect do not survive after death and disappear with the body’s extinction. “True salvation” is thus equivalent to “knowledge and learning” (The Guide of the Perplexed I:30) and salvation is consequently individual, devoid of any universal or national collective meaning. The idea of identifying salvation with intellectual perfection and the immortality of the intellect began to take shape as early as the first Maimonidean controversy, and appears in the writings of the Tibbon family and their philosophical circle. R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon commented on the verse “With long life I will satisfy him, and show him my salvation” (Psalms 91:16): After reaching this degree [attaining truth], he will be blessed with long life in a long-lasting world, hinting at the immortality of the rational soul, that is, to the power of the intellect among human powers. He will see God’s salvation, meaning that God will save him from the corruption and the extinction deserved by the wicked, who will all be lost.27

Ibn Tibbon’s views influenced the circle of his close disciples in Provence and Italy. R. Yaakov Anatoli presented the salvation of the soul as a “true s­ alvation” limited to a select few, whereas “the salvation of this world”—which is not part of “true salvation”— stands for the days of the messiah. Anatoli clarified that the anointment with oil symbolizes the virtue of m ­ odesty because oil is liquid, “smoothening and softening anything that sticks to it,” and yet it is a steadying factor, “forever stable.”28 Modesty works similarly: per se it attests to softness, but it stabilizes the individual’s p ­ ersonality and qualities. In Anatoli’s words: 27 Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yikawu ha-Mayim, ed. Mordechai Bisliches (Pressburg, 1837), 98. See also Ibn Tibbon, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Parma Ms. 272, 6b-7a. Note that R. David Kimchi suggested this interpretation as an alternative to the commentary dealing with the end of days: “May his soul be saved before me, or may all of him [his body and soul] be saved in the world to come, or ‘my salvation’ refers to the salvation that will come with the king messiah” (The Complete Commentary on the Psalms [Jerusalem: Darom, 1979], 205 [Heb]). R. Kimchi was indeed influenced by Ibn Tibbon’s interpretation. See Frank Talmage, “David Kimchi and the Rationalist Tradition,” in Studies in Jewish Bibliography, History, and Literature in Honor of I. Edward Kiev, ed. Charles Berlin (New York: Ktav, 1971), 473-474. Cf. R. Abraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary ad locum. See also the Epistle of R. Asher b. R. Gershom in the context of the Maimonidean controversy (printed in Kerem Hemed shel Shadal 5 [1841]: 12 [Heb]). Finally, note that, by contrast with the natural view of individual redemption, R. Yonah Girondi connected individual salvation to the miracles that the Holy One, blessed be He, performs for the god-fearing (She’arei Teshuvah, vol. 1 [Jerusalem, 1967], 27). This connection indeed shows how far rationalists had departed from the traditionalist view. 28 Yaakov Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim (Lyck: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1866), 35a [Heb].

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And it is known that the prophet had not been anointed with oil, only with the oil of modesty, and on that we are told “the anointed of the God of Jacob” (Samuel II 23:1), meaning that God had anointed him with the good oil that his prophets had attributed to Him . . . and God thereby ensured that the messiah would be perfect in all his virtues. And after David finished describing the salvation of this world, which is the coming of the messiah, he spoke of the true salvation, which is meant for individuals, and said, “Now these are the last words of David. David the son of Yishay said, and the man who was raised up on high, the anointed of the God of Jacob and the sweet singer of Israel” (ibid.).29 29 Ibid., 35b. Anatoli also emphasized, here and elsewhere (for example, 64b), that the world is eternal and will never collapse. Individual redemption is well suited to Anatoli’s general approach. Cf. Azriel Shohat, “On the First Maimonidean Controversy,” in Studies, vol. 1 (Haifa: Haifa University, 1982), 111-113 (first published in Zion 36 [1971]: 58-60) [Heb]. A comment is warranted in this context, touching on the very essence of Jewish medieval rationalism and beyond any fastidious scholarly controversy. Shohat ends his analysis of Anatoli’s notion of redemption as follows: In Malmad ha-Talmidim, R. Yaakov Anatoli afforded us a glimpse into the world of the moderate “scholar” who, despite rationalism and allegory, remained loyal to ancestral tradition. The plausible assumption is that this was the dominant type among Provençal scholars, and that some of them were also found in Spain. Some details of Anatoli’s thoughts and opinions on exile and redemption might be his own but, essentially, they were certainly shared by many. They struggled against “kabbalists” and “Kabbalah” because they thought that Jewish redemption would be hastened through “pure faith.” Their expectation from “metaphysics” is basically life in the world of souls, and the main purpose of Jewish redemption is only “to expand knowledge” (ibid., 113). Relying on the religious-moral tone of Malmad ha-Talmidim, Shohat stated that Anatoli was “moderate” because he preached a definite religious ideal beside intellectualism. In his view, Anatoli had called for adding a spiritual dimension to religious life and for filling observance of the commandments with a conceptual, rational content. Shohat consequently determined that he had remained loyal to “ancestral tradition.” This analysis, however, appears to ignore the conceptual continuity of Jewish rationalism and makes Anatoli an individual instance of a broad trend, although he is detached from the collective and its spirit. In truth, the analysis of medieval Jewish rationalism shows that the attitude toward the commandments and the religious ideal is not a criterion of moderation or radicalism. The most extreme rationalist ideas grew among individuals who appreciated religion as a way of life, and generally recognized the political value of religious society. R. Yosef Ibn Caspi, who is discussed further below, is an example of a consistently radical rationalist. His biblical exegesis at times leans toward antinomianism and extreme radical metaphysical ideas. And yet, in his will to his son he writes as follows: There are, my son! two dispositions among contemporary Jews which must be firmly avoided by thee. The first class consists of sciolists, whose studies have not gone far enough. They are ­destroyers and rebels; scoff at the words of the Rabbis of blessed memory, treat the p­ ractical precepts as of little account, and accept unseemly interpretations of biblical narratives. These men are false, through and though. They testify unmistakably against themselves that they are ill-acquainted with the philosophical writings of Aristotle and his disciples. This is obvious to those who are really familiar with those writings. I call heaven and earth to witness that I may claim some not inconsiderable scientific ­attainments. That being so, I swear by Him who

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The anointment thus reflects the moral perfection that brings the person to “true” salvation, meaning the immortality of the intellect or the soul. Anatoli emphasized that modesty is the expression of the virtues in general, which are a condition of knowledge because immoral individuals cannot devote themselves to the attainment of intelligibles. True salvation, then, is individual redemption. The oil motif mentioned by Anatoli continues to relate to knowledge and messianism in the hermeneutical doctrine of R. Judah Romano and R. Immanuel b. Shlomo (Immanuel the Roman). Romano viewed oil as the symbol of all existing objects and of the knowledge about them, and described at length the “days of the messiah” as the conjunction of the ­individual intellect and the active intellect.30 Immanuel, following Romano, also interpreted the oil motif as reflecting the existing world that emanates from God, and the days of the messiah as knowledge of reality leading to individual redemption.31 Finally, note that R. Moshe b. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon lives eternally that Aristotle, his fellows, and his disciples, advocate all that is contained in the Torah and the Prophets, and particularly the performance of the practical precepts. Israel Abrahams, ed., Hebrew Ethical Wills (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1926), 146-147. Cf. Isadore Twersky “Joseph Ibn Caspi: Portrait of a Medieval Jewish Intellectual,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, 231-257. Caspi seems to be referring to Averroists, whose existence and endeavors in medieval Spain and in Provence in the Middle Ages have been a frequent topic of historical research. This is one illustration of the principle that the attitude to practical-religious conduct does not attest to moderation or extremism in the philosophical method. The reason is that many rationalists acknowledged the political value of religious commandments and carefully protected their membership in the religious establishment. Anatoli, then, is not exceptional in his attitude to religious conduct. But his attitude to the messianic idea—further considered below—shows that he is a link in a chain of thinkers who diverted the messianic idea from the universal context in the real world to the individual and the individual’s intellectual world. Anatoli thereby supported the collapse of the traditional dimension in the messianic idea, and he should be viewed as a radical thinker. These remarks touch on the very character of medieval rationalists, whose attitude to practical religious conduct does not affect their philosophical radicalism. I consider the need for re-evaluating the figure of the medieval Jewish rationalist from an additional direction in my article, “On the Philosophical Circles in Spain and Provence Before the Expulsion,” Pe‘amim 49 (1992): 7 [Heb]. Cf. Israel Ta-Shma, “History, Kabbalah and Philosophy in Christian Spain: Review of History of the Jews in Christian Spain,” Jewish Law Annual 18-19 (1992-1994): 479-495 [Heb]. 30 Joseph Sermoneta, “Yehuda and Immanuel Haromi: Rationalism Culminating in Mystic Faith,” in Revelation, Faith, Reason: A Collection of Papers, ed. Moshe Hallamish and Moshe Schwarcz (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1976), 64 [Heb]; idem, “‘Thine Ointments Have a Goodly Fragrance’: Rabbi Judah Romano and the Open Text Method,” Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, vol. 2, ed. Moshe Idel, Zev Harvey, and Eliezer Schweid (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1990), 77-113 [Heb]; C. Rigo, “Mosheh Romano traduttore di Alberto Magno (commento al De Anima III, II, 16),” Henoch 15 (1993): 65-91. On Romano’s meticulous allegorical interpretation see Joseph Sermoneta, “R. Yehuda Romano on Prophecy,” Daat 8 (1982): 53-86 [Heb]. 31 In his commentary on Song of Songs, Immanuel wrote about those who believe because of tradition rather than inquiry: “And they said ‘thy ointments’ (Song of Songs 1:2), hinting in the oil at God creating all the objects that exist and supporting them by bestowing his goodness upon them . . . And they said ‘therefore do the virgins love thee’ (ibid., 1:3), meaning that the virgins (‘alamot), who do not know (ne‘elam) the truth, are the souls that did not reach the days of the messiah and were not anointed with his sacred oil and did not reach the kingdom. They will love the Holy One,

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explained the rabbinic saying about the cyclical nature of the world as ­dealing with periods in the individual’s intellectual development, which culminate in the “days of the messiah”: “[After] three periods have passed, the days of the messiah have ended, and it [the world] is destroyed, he will reach conjunction with the separate intellect and will know what is ­concealed as well as the future.”32 Let us return to the rationalist interpretation of the term salvation. The shift in the use of this term and in the conception of redemption in ­general to describe internal rather than external reality was evident not only in Provence, Spain, and Italy. In northern Yemen, an anonymous writer ­determined in the first half of the thirteenth century: Know that true salvation is the coming of the redeemer who is the king messiah, may he soon arrive, and salvation also relates to the ­perfection of the human soul. Human perfection is the intellect, which is the form of the soul and what remains after death, and particularly at the end of days.33

Although this writer had not yet imposed the individual i­ ntellectual ­meaning as the sole interpretation, he was clearly familiar with the r­ ationalist ­tradition that identifies the end of days with individual ­redemption. In Ashkenaz, R. Shlomo b. Yehuda ha-Nasi also adopted the term true ­salvation to denote intellectual immortality. In his view, “the attainment of intellectual wisdom . . . is the true salvation, meaning it is the acquisition of the soul and what remains after death, known in the Torah as the Garden of Eden and the tree blessed be He, for the fragrance and for what they have heard, thereby hinting at the believers who love and fear God through tradition and through what they have heard” (London Ms. 238, 79b-80a). The motif of intellectual immortality—“the pleasure of the spiritual Eden” (Commentary on Proverbs, [Naples, 1887; Jerusalem, 1981], 17)—recurs in the philosophical interpretation of Immanuel the Roman that, as noted, was influenced by Shmuel Ibn Tibbon and Romano. Cf. the parallel passages cited in the article of Aviezer Ravitzky, “Immanuel of Rome’s Commentary on the Book of Proverbs: Its Sources,” Kiriyat Sefer 56 (1981): 733 [Heb]. 32 Sefer Peah, Oxford-Bodleian Ms. 939/1, 15b (printed in The Writing of R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. Howard Kreisel, Colette Sirat, and Avraham Israel [Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2010], 99 [Heb]). The reference is to the saying, “the world is to last six thousand years, and one thousand it will be desolate” (TB Rosh Hashanah 31a; Avodah Zarah 9a). Each of the three “periods” that Ibn Tibbon refers to lasts two thousand years. See also the Commentary on Song of Songs, Halberstam ed., 20a-b. Note that the messiah reflects the active intellect in Ibn Zarza’s explanation of the aggadah on the cyclical nature of the world: “The world is to exist six thousand years—two thousand years of desolation, two thousand of Torah, and two thousand of the days of the messiah” (TB Sanhedrin 96a). The messiah symbolizes the last stage of intellectual development, which is communion. Here too, the messiah son of David is interpreted as the active intellect (Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 93a). 33 According to Daniel 12:13. The quote is from a remnant of Sefer Tevunat Be‘alei ha-Tevunah, which appears in Yosef Kafih, “Philosophical Texts of a Yemenite Author,” in Collected Papers, vol. 1, ed. Yosef Tobi (Jerusalem: E’eleh Bethamar, 1989), 223-224 [Heb].

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of life.”34 In other words, redemption and the days of the messiah became a symbol of the last stage of individual development before the acceptance of prophecy’s philosophical meaning, that is, before conjunction with the active intellect. The idea of “salvation” as the attainment of intelligibles and knowledge was indeed a prevalent notion among rationalists until R. Moshe b. Yehuda Nagari presented it as a separate entry in his index to The Guide of the Perplexed. The entry is defined as “on true spiritual salvation,” and Nagari refers to Guide I:30 and III:11.35 These two chapters present knowledge as the central component of future redemption. Spiritual salvation is thus the true salvation and the material dimension is marginal. This is also the approach of R. Yeda‘ya Hapenini. In this view, the troubles and the p ­ ersecutions of exile resulted in “ignorance about truths and perfections” and “salvation” is therefore redemption from “the huge ignorance that has preceded us.”36 An extreme expression of this approach appears in the commentary of R. Shlomo b. Menachem (Prat Maimon) on Levi b. Abraham’s lines: “a man is asked whether he has fixed times for learning/and whether he has engaged in the dialectics of wisdom.”37 Prat writes as follows: The proper order is for knowledge to be accessible, first through tradition and then supported by demonstration, followed by precise actions that improve the ways of men. In their words: when a man is led in for judgment, he is asked—did you fix times for learning, did you engage 34 Commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed, Cambridge Ms. 83, 2b. Cited in Michael Zvi Nehorai, “Rabbi Shlomo b. R. Yehuda ha-Nasi and His Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed” (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978), 29 [Heb]. Polemics on allegorical interpretations were also common in Ashkenaz, as noted, and Shlomo ha-Nasi formulated his rationalist approaches in these circumstances. See, for example, Israel Ta-Shma, “Sefer ha-Maskil: An Unknown Hebrew Book from the Thirteenth Century,” Jerusalem Studies on Jewish Thought 2 (1983): 419-423 [Heb]; Sarah Kamin, “The Polemic against Allegory in the Commentary of Rabbi Yoseph Bekhor Shor,” in Jews and Christians Interpret the Bible (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991), 75-98 [Heb]. 35 R. Moses b. Yehuda Nagari, Ma’amar ba-Ma´arekhet (printed in Questions to R. Shaul Hacohen [from R. Yitzhak Abravanel], Part 2 [Venice, 1574], 2d). Note that Guide III:11 does not deal with the redemption of the soul but with the days of the messiah. Nagari nevertheless described the discussion there as dealing with “spiritual redemption.” 36 R. Yeda‘ya Hapenini, Erläuterungen der Psalmen Haggada von R. Jedaja Penini (Bedarschi), ed. Salomon Buber (Krakau: Yosef Fischer, 1891), 19. Yeda‘ya presented the political side as well: “The revelation of the light will then be strengthened in us, and the signs of success and the kingdom that cannot be returned without returning all the perfections will be returned, all with the help of the strong God who will not fall and will never again let go of our hand” (ibid.). His commentary, however, shows that true revelation and redemption relate to wisdom and knowledge. 37 The chapter containing this passage was printed in Israel Davidson, “The First Chapter of Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-­ Lehashim,” Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of Hebrew Poetry 5 (1939): 33 [Heb]. Davidson printed in this edition an anonymous commentary found in Paris Ms. 978, which also directs to the source cited by Prat Maimon.

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in the dialectics of wisdom, did you deal faithfully.38 This is the order in which things should be remembered, the final one being knowledge, which is the purpose. And the possible interpretation is: did you deal faithfully—did you learn ways of syllogism and did you inquire into the roots of faith and understand them properly. Did you hope for salvation, meaning the salvation of the soul, “but my salvation shall be forever” (Isaiah 51:6) and, as they said, he is rewarded and sees salvation by the Holy One, blessed be He.39

In this passage, the hope for salvation is fully directed to intellectual ­pursuits. Prat determined that studying in the right order while preserving virtues and moral practice ultimately leads to true salvation, which is “the salvation of the soul.” When rationalists addressed intellectual perfection, then, they ­abandoned the concrete collective dimension of redemption and showed no interest at all in it, as evident in the consistent interpretation they offered for such terms as salvation and anointment as well as other motifs and styles. This is the topic of the following discussion.

The Return to Zion and Redemption The most significant messianic yearning throughout the ages is the desire to return to the Land of Israel and rebuild it. Many rationalists, however, unhesitatingly equated the return to Zion motif with that of communion with the active intellect. Prat Maimon’s philosophical interpretation left its mark on his close circle. Prat had three Provençal disciples, and all of them wrote commentaries on The Kuzari during the 1420s: R. Nethanel Caspi, R. Yaakov Farissol, and R. Shlomo b. Yehuda of Lunel. Paradoxically, all these three commentaries turn The Kuzari into a rationalist book. Consider, for instance, their explanation of the parable on the king and his devotee in The Kuzari III:21. According to this parable, the king’s devotee had long been used to the king’s company and, relying on their intimate closeness, had been sure that the king would accompany him on his long and perilous voyage. The lesson, according to Halevi’s original intention, had dealt with the principle that prophecy and piety in this world are a guarantee of life in the world to come. These three commentators, by contrast, suggested a d ­ ifferent 38 According to TB Shabbat 31a. 39 See, for example, TB Moed Katan 5a; TB Sotah 5b. The passage is from the commentary on Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Lehashim, 10b.

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principle for the lesson to be drawn from the parable: the ­conjunction of the material intellect and the active intellect in the process of achieving ­perfection is the guarantee of the intellect’s immortality. They therefore apply themselves to the interpretation of the parable in all its details, in light of the intellectual conjunction principle. The devotee s­ ymbolizes the human intellect, the king—the active intellect. One detail in the p ­ arable describes the closeness between the devotee and the king—when the devotee transgresses, the king sends him away, and when he corrects his behavior, the king brings him back. R. Shlomo b. Yehuda interpreted the distancing as the severing of intellectual communion due to the human material dimension. In the course of his interpretation, he clearly intimated that the return to Zion is actually a return to the state of communion. The passage below quotes R. Shlomo b. Yehuda in full: The sage is cut off from communion due to his despicable matter and to the attraction of the corrupting reality, which is the cause of all errors and transgressions. This is the cause for the severance of ­communion—as the prophet says, since your iniquities have made a separation between you and your God (according to Isaiah 59:2). The perfect man, therefore, will pray, to his utmost, only for the return to the days of yore and for communion with it [the active intellect], and this is the purpose intended in our prayers when we say, “may you soon dwell in Zion,” and so forth.40 These are also the worlds of the perfect devotee, as was written: I unite with myself and remove my body and become, as it were, a simple immaterial substance, and I see within myself the beauty and the splendor that I will ­contemplate in wonder and ­amazement, and I know that I am part of the supernal perfect world and so forth. And when I am in the world of thought [mahshavah],41 thought will hide from me the light and the radiance and I will be amazed as to how I descended from the supernal divine place and so forth. Animal souls, he said, will only dwell in dust bodies, and will therefore think that detachment is hard, but pure souls are their opposite.42 40 From an ancient version of the “Temple Service” that was recited prior to the sacrifices (Leviticus Rabbah 7:2 [Margaliot ed., 151] and parallel versions). See Ismar Elbogen, Jewish Liturgy: A Comprehensive History, translated by Raymond P. Scheindlin (Philadelphia, PA and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1993), 49-51. Cf. also idem, “Die messianiche Idee in den alten jüdischen Gebeten,” Judaica Festschrift zu Hermann Cohens Siebzigstem Geburtstage (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912), 669-679. 41 Should perhaps be darkness [hashekhah]. 42 Heshek Shlomo (on The Kuzari) Oxford-Bodleian Ms. 2383, 77a. The source of this passage, which recurs in many medieval Jewish sources, is Aristotelian theology. See Idel, “Patterns of Redemptive Activity,” 256-257; Paul B.

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According to Shlomo b. Yehuda’s commentary, exile means the ­severance of intellectual communion, and the prayer to bring back the days of yore seeks to return the intellect to a state of communion. The concept of Zion ­apparently reflects the active intellect, and the request to dwell in Zion ­conveys the conjunction of the individual intellect and the active ­intellect. More precisely: “the purpose intended in our prayers” is the desire to unite with the active intellect. The yearning for Zion is thus translated into ­individual intellectual terms. On this question, Shlomo b. Yehuda ­continued in the path carved by his teacher, Prat Maimon. Active in southern France in Prat’s time was also R. Moshe Narboni, whose hermeneutical approach was similar. Narboni wrote a full c­ ommentary on the Book of Lamentations as part of a larger plan that was also meant to include a commentary on Song of Songs. The c­onnection between Narboni’s various commentaries is the true understanding of “apprehension during communion” [hasagah be-´et ha-dibbuk].43 For Narboni, the deep meaning of the Book of Lamentations, which touches on the essence of exile and destruction, is a process of knowledge and ­intellectual conjunction. Readers, then, confront a consistent ­interpretive tradition that replaced redemption from exile and physical suffering with the intellect’s salvation from the material dimension that limits it and confines it. In this tradition, the people, or even the world in general, are replaced by the individual and by the individual’s intellectual perfection, expressed and reflected in the end of days. The circle of Prat and Moshe Narboni fittingly represents the general rationalist trend. Similar approaches in the interpretation of sources, in a different context, were implemented in North Africa and in Yemen. I open with the works of R. Ovadiah Maimoni, which attest to the influence of this trend. Like other thinkers in the Maimonidean dynasty, Ovadiah too described the road to perfection meticulously and at great length, ­resorting to a variety of techniques merging Jewish and Sufi sources. The final ­process of individual perfection is described relying on texts that are distinctly messianic: “though it tarry, wait for it; because it will surely come, it will not delay” (Habakkuk 2:3); “whose name is Tsemah, and Fenton (Yinnon), “Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera and the Theology of Aristotle,” Daat 29 (1992): 31 [Heb]. Note that an ascetic Neoplatonic approach of this kind is widespread in the ‘adab literature, and many sayings that draw a sharp distinction between body and soul are ascribed to Socrates and Aristotle. See, for example, Ilai Alon, Socrates in Mediaeval Arabic Literature (Leiden and Jerusalem: Brill and Magnes Press, 1991), 167-168. 43 Maurice-Ruben Hayoun, “Moses Narboni’s Commentary on Megillat Kinot,” Kovets Al-Yad 11, no. 2 (1989): 241 [Heb].

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who shall grow [itsmah] out of his place” (Zechariah 6:12); “Happy is he who waits and reaches” (Daniel 12:12); “neither has an eye seen, that a god, beside thee, should do such a thing for him that waits for him” (Isaiah 64:3).44 Biblical messianism according to Ovadiah thus refers to individual redemption. Finally, collective redemption shifts to clearly individual terms in the exegesis and homiletics of R. Yihiyah Altabib, who is known as Zechariah ha-Rofeh (Razah). On the rabbinic midrash, “As long as my children are enslaved, my right hand is enslaved, when I redeem my children, I redeem my right hand,”45 Zechariah writes as follows: Know that these words of the sages should not be read literally but as hinting to the exalted and spiritual human soul that, in its tie to matter, is enslaved. When it awoke and was freed from the shackles of nature, it used matter for worship and attained redemption, which is its purpose. This is what the homilist intended by the belief in the redemption of Israel that we are considering.46

Similarly, Zechariah interprets the rise from Gehenna as a spiritual elevation above matter and as communion with “the spiritual forms.”47 These exegeses fit Zechariah’s commentary on Song of Songs, which deals with the desire of the individual intellect “to reach conjunction with the active [intellect] (‘ittis .āl bi-al-fi‘āl)”48 and attain the “pleasure of apprehending eternal immortality.”49 At the opening of his commentary, Razah also set its guidelines: “Know that the purpose of this book reflects the desire of the intellectual soul to reach its spiritual world.”50 The tendency to establish

44 See Paul Fenton, ed., The Treatise of the Pool (London: Octagon Press, 1981), 116. In the Arabic source, the verses appear in Hebrew, on page 27b. Fenton notes (129n180) that the homilies in these texts relate to the messianic era (TB Berakhot 34b). 45 Yalkut Shimoni on Isaiah, #471. The midrash refers to the verse “I will be with him in trouble” (Psalms 91:15). 46 Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets, Exodus, ed. Meir Havatselet (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1991), 319 [Heb]. On Zechariah’s openness to various sources see Saul Lieberman, Shkiin—Yemenite Midrashim: A Lecture on the Yemenite Midrashim, Their Character and Value (Jerusalem: Wahrmann Books, 1970), 22-32 [Heb]. See also Meir Havatselet, “On the Allegorical Philosophical Commentary of Rabbi Zechariah ha-Rofeh on Midrash ha-Hefets,” Tema: Journal of Judeo-Yemenite Studies 3 (1993): 45-56 [Heb]. 47 Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets, Leviticus, 31. 48 His exegesis on the verse “when I found him whom my soul loves” (Song of Songs 3:4). Razah’s exegesis is cited in Five Scrolls: With Commentaries, ed. R. Yosef Kafih (Jerusalem: Agudah le-Hatsalat Ginzei Teiman, 1962), 62 [Heb]. 49 Ibid., 75, exegesis on “on the day of the gladness of his heart” (Song of Songs 3:11). 50 Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets on Leviticus, 26.

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messianic writings on ­rationalist individual redemption is thus common to East and West.

Other Aspects Backing away from a view of the end of days as an actual time is paralleled by a similar retreat in its description as a unique era, a one-time event with characteristics solely its own. An extreme instance of it is the b ­ iblical ­commentary of R. Yosef Ibn Caspi, who, in many sources, interpreted future prophecies as dealing with past historical eras. For example, he ­challenged those who set aside the last days concept exclusively for the future: “‘But in the last days’ (Micah 4:1)—[refers to] the reason for building the Second Temple, and so did Isaiah refer to Hezekiah’s time (Isaiah 2:2), and so it will be in the building of the Third Temple, and so it was in the days of the Hasmonean and his sons.”51 Caspi, then, was not an exception and reflects a distinct interpretive trend.52 As shown below, then, rationalists suggested random formulations that focused mainly on the description of the messianic era in Maimonidean terms, that is, as a period where the ideal of acquiring knowledge becomes dominant. In their extensive interpretive endeavor, however, the future messianic drama was shifted to the individual sphere and lost ­concreteness as a collective event. Salvation, the days of the messiah, and the end of days were displaced to the individual sphere in a brilliant hermeneutical move. Other rationalists endeavored to interpret the concepts that a­ ccompany the collective messianic drama and shift them to the individual realm. R. Eleazar Ashkenazi b. Nathan, for example, developed a consistent ­interpretation of the “garden of Eden” concept as a symbol of an individual attaining ­intelligibles, a process culminating in conjunction with the active ­intellect.53 51 Exegesis on Micah 4:1, in Yosef Ibn Caspi, Adnei Kessef, vol. 2, ed. Isaac Last (London: Groditsky, 1911), 105 [Heb]. 52 A similar series of commentaries was also collected in Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim: Book of Principles, vol. 4, trans. Isaac Husik (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1946), part 2, ch. 42. Albo attested there about Hayyim Galipapa, who interpreted the messianic prophecies about the Second Temple in the Book of Daniel (418). Yitzhak Abravanel, in the opening of his introduction to Mashmi‘a Yeshu‘ah, strongly opposed this stance. See ch. 8 below. On Caspi’s messianic stance, see also Shlomo Pines, “The Probability of Restoring a Jewish State According to Yosef Ibn Caspi and Spinoza,” in Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy: The Transmission of Texts and Ideas (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1977), 285-286 [Heb]; Aviezer Ravitzky, “‘To the Utmost of Human Capacity’: Maimonides on the Days of the Messiah,” in Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 225n7. 53 Eleazar Ashkenazi, Zafenath Paneach, ed. Solomon Rappaport (Johannesburg: Kayor, 1965), 79. See Eric Lawee, “Audacious Epigone: R. Eleazar Ashkenazi b. R. Nathan Ha-Bavli and His Torah Commentary Safenat Pa‘neah,” in Studies in Jewish History Presented to Joseph Hacker, ed. Yaron Ben-Naeh et al. (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2013), 170-186 [Heb].

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Jewish thought thus came a long way from Maimonides’ e­ xplanation of the “Garden of Eden” to reach fourteenth-century ­rationalism, when Eleazar Ashkenazi renounced the literal meaning altogether and thereby conveyed the prevalent rationalist interest. Moreover, R. Yehuda b. Shmuel Ibn Abbas interpreted the term “the world to come” itself as conveying the process of acquiring knowledge in this world.54 Extreme rationalists, then, remained faithful to their hermeneutical endeavor, which removed any concrete grounds for collective redemption.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD Belief in the resurrection of the dead was the Achilles’ heel of medieval rationalism. The days of the messiah could be explained realistically, as an era of social and political change. The Garden of Eden too could be explained through Avicenna’s cosmographic theory as a fertile location south of the Equator. For the resurrection of the dead, however, they could find no acceptable explanation without undermining the natural order and assuming its destruction through God’s active intervention. Even the more moderate philosophers active in the fourteenth and fifteenth ­centuries admitted to the “strangeness” of this belief, as R. Yitzhak Abravanel attested: “From the point of view of reason it is known that it is not a philosophical concept [Iyyun] for rational demonstration disavows it according to the natural roots. Thus, it is not possible for a man to say that one can believe in resurrection on the basis of speculation [Iyyun].”55 Several thinkers adopted a distinctly apologetic stance. R. Joseph Albo, for example, tried to bring the belief in the resurrection of the dead closer to rational understanding by conferring on it the status of experiential ­science, that is, the field dealing with phenomena that can only be proven experientially but cannot be explained causally, relying on the structure of the object. Albo used the classic example of the magnet to clarify that the 54 See Dov Schwartz, “Meharsim, Talmudiyyim and Anshei ha-Hokhmah: Yehuda b. Shmuel Ibn ‘Abbas’ Views and Preaching,” Tarbiz 62 (1993): 598 [Heb]. 55 Yitzhak Abravanel, Principles of Faith (Rosh Amanah), trans. Menachem Marc Kellner (London: Associated University Presses, 1982), 188. Cf. Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 187-188. A special chapter devoted to the notion that resurrection cannot be explained logically appears in R. Yitzhak Abuhav, Menorat ha-Ma’or, ed. Judah Paris-Horev and Moshe Hayyim Katzenelenbogen (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1970). Abuhav lived in the early fourteenth century. See Israel Ta-Shma, “The Problem of the Book Menorat ha-Ma’or and Its Solution,” Tarbiz 64 (1995): 395-400 [Heb].

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stories of the prophets (Elijah, Elisha) about the resurrection of the dead place resurrection in the area of experiential science: And a thing to which experience testifies must be believed, even if it is not required by logic. For example, it is absolutely true that there is a stone which attracts iron, because experience shows it, though logic does not require it. We must therefore believe that God will revive the dead, even after they turn to dust, because it is something the mind can conceive.56

A true rationalist would not provide such an explanation, but not because of any doubt about the standing of experiential science. Maimonides ­integrated experiential science in his medical writings, particularly in the area of pharmacology. This explanation is inadequate because the validity of experiential science derives from the fact that every time an event takes place under the same conditions the same result obtains, as is true of the magnet’s attraction to an iron alloy or the effect of a particular remedy on a particular sickness. The resurrection of the dead, however, is definitely not in this category. Radical rationalists therefore chose a different explanation of ­resurrection, as they did concerning other messianic issues. Substantively, they denied the possibility of resurrecting the dead as described in the Elijah and Elisha stories, and R. Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona had already warned about this matter in his letter to R. Zerahiah Hen.57 Hermeneutically, ­rationalists preferred an allegorical interpretation of resurrection. In their usual fashion, they based resurrection on the ideal of intellectual perfection 56 Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, ch. 35, 340. This claim recurs in ch. 41. Albo also suggested a further explanation, stating that an “impression” of the life spirit that had been there remains in the body of the righteous, and this impression enables resurrection. See also Daniel J. Lasker, Jewish Philosophical Polemics against Christianity in the Middle Ages (New York: Ktav, 1977), 35; idem, “Joseph Albo’s Theory of Verification,” Daat 5 (1980): 7-9 [Heb]; Dror Ehrlich, The Thought of R. Joseph Albo: Esoteric Writing in the Late Middle Ages (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2009), 267 [Heb]. Experiential science appears also in an immortality of the soul context in the letter that, apparently mistakenly, was ascribed to R. Yitzhak Ibn Latif. The writer of the letter considered the connection between the purification of the soul and the acquisition of the sciences on the one hand, and immortality on the other: “And a stone attracts iron though they are in no way related and the proof is that the stone attracts no other metals, and he who realizes this to be true will also know that the soul is immortal” (“The Response Letter,” Kovets Al-Yad 1 [1885]: 58 [Heb]) Note, moreover, that Moslem thinkers also proposed apologetic approaches anchored in physical theories in order to explain the resurrection of the dead. See, for example, Barry S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1985), 148-149. 57 See below, 137-138. Cf. Aviezer Ravitzky, The Thought of Zerahiah b. Yitzhak b. She’altiel Hen and MaimonideanTibbonian Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979), 269-292 [Heb]; Talmage, “David Kimchi and the Rationalistic Tradition,” 200.

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and thereby led to its inevitable collapse as an actual event. This d ­ evelopment was already evident by the end of the twelfth century. Maimonides attested that his contemporaries negated the reality of resurrection, apparently on rationalist grounds: “word reached me that a student in Damascus asserted there would be no resurrection, and the soul would not return to the body after they separated.”58 As already noted, Maimonides’ close ­disciple, R. Yosef b. Yehuda Ibn Shimon, held that his admired teacher did not ­acknowledge actual resurrection.59 The following discussion reviews the collapse of the belief in ­resurrection as an actual event at two levels: (1) the allegorical ­interpretive level; (2) the main objection to the idea of resurrection, which implies coercing the soul to return to the turbid and despicable material body, according to those who expressed these reservations. As shown below, these qualifications appeared even among thinkers who were ready to accept the belief in resurrection as an actual event.

The Interpretive Allegorical Level During the first Maimonidean controversy, at the beginning of the t­ hirteenth century, the interpretation in the epistle of R. Sheshet b. R. Yitzhak ha-Nasi transcends the literal meaning of the resurrection idea and affirms that “all the words of the prophets are only meant as allegories and r­ iddles.”60 R. Sheshet includes in this statement messianic prophecies such as Ezekiel’s vision of the dry bones, which only a “fool” cites as evidence of resurrection in a literal sense.61 Why, then, do some sages apparently uphold a literal notion of resurrection? R. Sheshet answers this query as follows: Should you find among the smart or among the wise, including among the true talmudic sages, anyone saying that the resurrection of the dead is the return of the soul to the body and that there is a Garden of Eden where the bodies sit and a Gehenna where the wicked burn, 58 Maimonides, “The Essay on Resurrection,” in Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham Halkin, discussion by David Hartman (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1985), 216. 59 See 84-85 above. See also Sarah Stroumsa, The Beginnings of the Maimonidean Controversy in the East: Yosef Ibn Shim’on’s Silencing Epistle Concerning the Resurrection of the Dead (Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1999). 60 The epistle was published in Alexander Marx, “Texts by and about Maimonides,” Jewish Quarterly Review 25 (19341935): 426, ln. 341. For an analysis of Sheshet’s response, see Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 128-132. 61 Marx, “Texts,” 426, lns. 343-346. The hint is to Saadia and his followers. See Saadia Gaon, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), VII:2, 265.

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you should know that, in truth, they only said so to assure fools (who would otherwise not grasp or understand or believe that it [the soul] could stand without a body) of something they desire and know, so they might trust that their soul will return to their body and that, if they do not sin, they will delight in the splendor of the Shekhinah in the Garden of Eden and enjoy its pleasures.62

Belief in resurrection, then, is a political necessity, furthered so as not to crush the hopes and yearnings of ordinary people who do not rise above the satisfaction of concrete pleasures. In truth, however, resurrection is solely spiritual-intellectual and synonymous with the immortality of the soul or the intellect. According to Maimonides’ understanding of messianic concepts (in the introduction to Perek Helek and in the Mishneh Torah), the resurrection of the dead according to R. Sheshet is identical to the world to come, which is only meant for the fully developed (actual) intellect. The extremists who supported the rationalist position in the Maimonidean controversy viewed resurrection as a symbol and a parable of the immortality of the soul. Fourteenth century rationalists, by contrast, viewed resurrection as a symbol of knowledge itself, as well as of the ­process of acquiring it. The Talmud teaches on the giving of the Torah: With every word that went forth from the mouth of the Holy One, blessed be He, the souls of Israel departed. . . . But since their souls departed with the first word, how could they receive the second? He brought down the dew that will resurrect the dead and revived them.63

Rationalists explained the dew of resurrection motif as an expression of the individual psychological and epistemological process of knowledge. In the rationalists’ interpretations, death conveys the potential intellect that was not actualized—that is, the intellect of an individual who has not ­studied or acquired knowledge—and resurrection is its actualization through the acquisition of knowledge. Consider two fourteenth-century variations of this explanation written in two geographically distant places—one in Yemen and the other in Castile, Spain. Clearly allegorical, both were ­written at a time when allegory was the subject of a sharp polemic—one in 62 Marx, “Texts,” 425, lns. 315-322. 63 TB Shabbat 88b. See also TB Hagigah 12b.

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Yemen between sages from San’a and Sa’dah, and the other between those of Provence and Spain. The two thinkers wrote as follows: R. Nethanel b. Isaiah: The secret in this matter is that, when ­perfect souls actualize their potential, they separate themselves from the bodies and they become perfect through the intellect they have acquired from their source [the active intellect], with which they have reached ­communion.64 [They call it], “the soul departs.” And the dew through which the Holy One, blessed be He, resurrects the dead is the divine emanation through which souls live and [also] remain [after death] through the immortality of their intelligibles.65 And were it not for the divine assistance accompanying the perfect ones when their intellect reaches communion with the separate intellects, those human intellects would be lost due to their flaws compared to their source and to those separate ones, for whom they are as dead.66 R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza: When Israel apprehended what they had heard from the Holy One, blessed be He—“I am the Lord your God” (Exodus 20:2)—their soul departed, but God dropped dew on them and resurrected them. This means their intellect could not bear the apprehension of God, may He be blessed, since they lacked the grasp for it, and they therefore died as if their soul had departed. So were the prophets afraid when God, may He be blessed, spoke to them. And the dew that he dropped on them revived them, meaning that he added understanding to them so that they might apprehend this, and that is the dew with which the Holy One, blessed be He, will resurrect the dead.67

R. Nethanel made the resurrection motif the basis for the survival of the individual intellect after death. Despite the conjunction of the individual intellect and the active intellect that occurs through knowledge, the individual intellect is not absorbed within the separate intellect, either when 64 The idea cited here is the classic view suggested by Al-Farābi, whereby the active intellect assists in the process of acquiring knowledge, culminating in the material intellect reaching communion with the active intellect. 65 In the original, ma‘lūmihā. 66 R. Nethanel b. Ishaya, Sefer Ma’or ha-Afelah, trans. Yosef Kafih (Jerusalem, 1957), 108 [Heb]. On the immortality of the intellect, see ibid., 221, 251, 418, 469, 576. Nethanel was among the opponents of allegorical interpretation. This commentary shows that the polemic in Yemen, as that in Provence and Spain, was complex and positions were not clear-cut. Cf. Yosef Kafih, “An Apology from Yemen on the Use of Allegory in Biblical Exegesis,” in Collected Papers, vol. 1, 341-363 [Heb]; Yosef Tobi, “Hoter Ben Shelomo: His Life and Times,” appendix to The Philosophic Questions and Answers of Hoter ben Shelomo, ed. David R. Blumenthal (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1981), 392-395. 67 Mekor Hayyim, 43b. On the dew motif as symbolizing knowledge, see also Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 75.

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alive or after death, due to the divine emanation (faid   .). For Ibn Zarza, the basis of the dew of resurrection motif is the emanation of knowledge on the children of Israel and on the prophets, who are enriched through its acquisition. In several sources, Ibn Zarza referred to the motif of the dew of resurrection as reflecting the intellectual grasp that revives its possessors.68 The figure of Elijah appears in these sources, following the story about the son of the wise woman from Zarephat who was resurrected (I Kings, ch. 17). Elijah is presented as purifying the intellect and teaching wisdom and understanding to all who seek it, particularly in an eschatological context. In the Maimonidean controversy that erupted in the early ­thirteenth ­century, Elijah’s figure was at the center of the dispute on ­material ­resurrection.69 According to Ibn Zarza, however, what Elijah reflects is intellection and attaining intelligibles, rather than material resurrection. An extreme ­version of this approach is Ibn Zarza’s commentary on the passage dealing with the revelation of Elijah: Know that Elijah is the one who prepares for the resurrection, ­meaning that they [R. Hiyya and his sons] had studied metaphysics, which is the vitality (hayut) of the intellect, and this is the true resurrection, when it [the intellect] actualizes its potential, because he whose i­ntellect remains potential is dead . . . and when it is actualized, then he is alive.70 68 See Mikhlol Yofi, Section II, 20b, 22a. 69 See J. L. Teicher, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Resurrection: A Thirteenth Century Forgery,” Melilah: A Volume of Studies 1 (1944): 81-83 [Heb]; Isaiah Sonne, “A Scrutiny of the Charges of Forgery against Maimonides’‘Letter on Resurrection,’” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 21 (1952): 103-110. On Elijah’s role in the redemption process according to rabbinic literature, see also Meir Waxman, Exile and Redemption in Jewish Literature (New York: Ogen, 1952), 247-254 [Heb]; Chaim Milikowsky, “Elijah and the Messiah,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 2 (1983): 491496 [Heb]; Benjamin Z. Benedict, The Torah Center in Provence: An Anthology (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1994), 35-46 [Heb], and cf. 74 above. 70 Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 183b (the passage appears in TB Bava Metsiah 85b). On Elijah’s mission imparting intelligibles, Ibn Zarza writes: “As water purifies the hands, so does Elijah cleanse ideas from their dross and their distortion” (183a). See also Section I, 160b and Section II, 20b, 22 a-b, and Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim, 149b-150a. In the following quote, Ibn Zarza adopts a formulation that recognizes resurrection: “And if God, may he be blessed, created man from one drop, God will also be able to revive man after he dies and to change nature as he changed it in the Red Sea and in the Jordan, closing the mouth of the earth, returning the rod to be a serpent, and [making Aharon’s rod] bring forth buds, blossom, and yield almonds, as well as all the other wonders. And if the prophets, of blessed memory, could change nature as did Moses, Elijah, Elisha, and others, all the more so the King of Kings, may He be blessed” (Mekor Hayyim 128a). But the sincerity of this declaration should be questioned, relying on the following two arguments: (1) In many sources, Ibn Zarza explains the miracles themselves in natural terms, and his frequent recourse to the anthropology of miracles that ascribes wonders to human power should also be understood in these terms. (2) Ibn Zarza declares in the introduction to Mikhlol Yofi that he writes esoterically and that wise scholars will know how to resolve his deliberate contradictions. I have shown that, whereas Mekor Hayyim tends toward exotericism, Mikhol Yofi tends toward esotericism, as this example shows. See Schwartz, The Religious Philosophy

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Ibn Zarza openly avows that the true meaning of resurrection is the ­realization of the intellect’s potential—death reflects the potential and life reflects actual intellectual perfection. He thereby follows on the footsteps of R. Moshe Narboni, who in his commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed wrote, “because the true views that remain [after life] are called life, and those that are lost—death.”71 The presentation of Elijah as a model teacher and the interpretation of resurrection as the acquisition of knowledge became a rationalist tradition, which appears recurrently in R. Abraham Bibago’s texts. According to talmudic tradition, in the future “Tishbi [Elijah] will solve questions and problems” [Tishbi iytarets kushiyot u-beaiyot–­ TeIKU] and will dismiss all doubts. Bibago explained how these solutions will be found: “The intellect that actualizes our own potential intellect and is s­ eparate from the flaws, is called Elijah. It will complete all, and the soul will neither retain follies of acquisition (sikhlut kinyani), ­meaning ­misconceptions that mix one thing with another, nor follies of absence (sikhlut he‘ederi), meaning failures to grasp or understand things.”72 Elijah, then, symbolizes the active intellect that inspires the human intellect. In the following remarks, I touch on the use of the dew of resurrection motif in R. Levi b. Abraham’s circle. In his rhymed poem, Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Lehashim, Levi writes: “And you gave it with the dew, with the light of the rains/ where revealed and concealed are engraved.” R. Shlomo b. Menachem (Prat Maimon) interprets these lines as follows: The Torah was given in dew and in rain to point out that revealed and concealed (which they called the Torah’s mysteries) are in it. The revealed was compared to the rain, and the concealed, as intended here, was compared to the dew because of its subtlety. And on this they said, “My doctrine shall drop as the rain, my speech shall distil as the dew” (Deuteronomy 32:2). The divine emanation will be called dew, as if to say—the dew with which the Holy One, blessed be He, will in the future resurrect the dead, meaning humans who are living rational [lit. speaking] dead.73 of R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza, vol. 1, 18-20; idem, “The Fourteenth-Century Neoplatonic Trend in the Jewish Doctrine of Creation,” Tarbiz 60 (1991): 600-606 [Heb]. 71 Moshe Narboni, Commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed I:42; Maurice-Ruben Hayoun, Moshé Narboni (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1986), 142, lns. 21-22. Cf. Gitit Holzman, “R. Moses of Narbonne’s Theory of Prophecy,” in Proceedings of the Eleventh World Congress of Jewish Studies, Division C, Volume 2 (1994): 64 [Heb]. Ibn Zarza often quotes Narboni’s writings. See Schwartz, The Religious Philosophy of R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza, vol. 1, 31. 72 Abraham Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 92a. 73 Commentary on Batei ha-Nefesh, 39b. For other critiques of the apocalyptic approach, see the end of ch. 6 below.

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For Prat, who had trained in the rationalist tradition, the “mysteries of the Torah” reflect knowledge of physics and metaphysics—the work of c­ reation (ma‘aseh bereshit) and the work of the chariot (ma‘aseh ­merkavah). At the end of the passage, Prat uses the expression “living rational dead,” that is, dead in their intellectual apprehension. A person who has not acquired i­ntelligibles is as a living dead and resurrection is synonymous with i­ntellectual emanation. Prat’s interpretation thus returns to the ideas of Narboni and Ibn Zarza and, according to all three, true r­esurrection is attaining knowledge, while the worst possible death is a potential ­immortality that was not actualized due to lack of intellectual attainment. Prat’s interpretation is well-suited to the statement of his admired rabbi. R. Levi cites the definition of an anonymous “Ashkenazi rabbi” on the fate meant for the wicked in the future resurrection of the dead, when “the soul and body will unite ‘to shame and everlasting contempt’” (Daniel 12:2). Levi boldly attacked this approach: This explains the extinction and the loss, because the body, which has already returned to the hyle [in order to] acquire another form, is called a corpse and is inappropriate to the soul’s form. The soul, moreover, is not a body—it neither moves nor shifts and has already lost vitality, feeling, and imagination . . . but the sorrow of the wicked’s soul is that, having attained little [knowledge], it is hungry and thirsty to know its principle and what in it, according to its nature, will be its pleasure.74

Levi, then, argued that sources presenting the sorrow of the wicked should not be explained as dealing with resurrection because the immortality of the soul has no vital, animated dimension connecting the soul to matter. Levi’s ­explanation of the sorrow he describes as the soul’s lot after death returns to the approach of Avicenna, who tried to find some eternal ­yearning that remains unsatisfied. The soul that has acquired little knowledge and grasps the value of intellectual apprehension seeks to attain it after death, but is ­incapable of doing so.75 Levi unwittingly contradicts himself in the passage cited. On the one hand, he claims that the immortal soul lacks a ­dimension of vitality or imagination, and on the other, speaks of eternal sorrow. In any event, Levi argues that the immortality of the soul rather than the ­resurrection of the dead is the proper object of a­llegorical ­interpretation, given that, ­philosophically and scientifically, actual ­resurrection is ­impossible. In his commentaries, Prat Maimon indeed implemented Levi’s claim. 74 Livyat Hen, Vatican Ms. 192, 131b (printed in Livyat Hen: The Secrets of Faith, The Gate of the Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel [Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2014], 279-280). 75 See Avicenna, Kitāb al-najāt, ed. Alkurdī (Cairo, 1938), 295. Cf. Kitāb al-shīfa (al-’ilahiyyāt) ed. G. C. Anawati and S. Zayed (Cairo, 1960), 425-429; Herbert Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,” Viator 3 (1972): 173-174.

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Finally, note that R. Yitzhak Arama, whose extreme conservatism does not fit the conceptual approaches of the groups discussed in this ­chapter, also interpreted the resurrection of the dead as identical to the world to the come, that is, to the immortality of the soul. In his radical take on ­messianism, Arama saw the terms world to come, end of days, and ­resurrection of the dead as synonymous, all referring only to the abstract immortality of the soul.76 He did not expand on the resurrection of the dead and he may not have accepted it literally. Arama’s messianic approach, discussed in Chapter Seven below, reflects the influence of these extreme groups on fifteenth-century conservative thought as well.

Reservations about Resurrection Rationalists who did acknowledge the resurrection of the dead in literal terms had reservations, as noted, about the very idea of return to a ­material body, and only accepted it because they bowed to the authority of the sources that presented it in dogmatic terms. Objections to the belief in resurrection were also voiced in the letter of R. Sheshet, who, as noted, was among the l­eading supporters of the rationalist view during the first Maimonidean ­controversy. In an aggressive response to the attack of R. Meir Abulafia (Ramah) against Maimonides’ view of resurrection, R. Sheshet writes: And he [Ramah] wishes to bring down our holy forefathers from their supreme degree, which is that of angels who enjoy the splendor of the Shekhinah and live forever, to the degree of humans, returning them to the impure body that can only exist by eating and drinking and whose end is maggots and worms. . . . By the living wisdom that prevails over folly as does light over darkness, these notions are to me as those of one who has lost his mind and his wisdom, and whose heart is not with him because of his melancholy sickness. And they are also laughable.77

At the end of this letter, R. Sheshet admits (evidently under duress) to a belief in resurrection: “And the only ruse is to agree to the idea of the r­ esurrection of the dead by making it one of a series of wonders that were performed

76 On the “question of the soul,” Arama explicitly wrote: “Because the end of days is the time allotted to every person to see the light in the face of the living king . . . and we learn that no believer can ignore the end of the soul’s success” (Yitzhak, vol. 1, ed. Hayyim Yosef Polack [Pressburg: Von Schmidt, 1849], Part 33, 289a [Heb]). See also Sarah Heller Wilensky, The Philosophy of Isaac Arama in the Framework of Philonic Philosophy (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute and Dvir, 1956), 145 and index, under “resurrection of the dead” [Heb]. 77 Marx, “Texts,” 418, lns. 106-117.

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already in the past through miracles against nature.”78 But the tone of the letter clearly attests that his belief is not only incompatible with wisdom but, indeed, in sharp contradiction with philosophical principles. This approach makes the belief in resurrection superfluous, and ­admitting to it does not conceal serious criticism of its very existence. R. Yaakov Anatoli, a contemporary of R. Sheshet, also admits to the reality of ­resurrection, and justifies on its grounds the commandment of burying the dead. Burying the dead in a shroud as part of a dignified religious ritual leads to a recognition of the body’s purpose in the future—serving as a renewed dwelling for the soul. Anatoli, however, added a further reason for the prohibition to touch the dead on grounds of impurity: No one should imagine that the Torah intends the person when it says that whoever touches the dead shall be unclean seven days (according to Numbers 19:14). We must understand the intention and know that . . . what is meant above all is not the body but the immortal soul, whose transgressions God forgives at the end. His [God’s] anger does not awaken to extinguish the soul because the cause of the ­transgressions was the body, which bears the transgressions to the netherworld since they are the true impurity. . . .79

Anatoli concludes: “Finally, the main principle is that ‘a person’ does not mean only the person’s soul, and one must therefore seek to perfect one’s soul with knowledge. . . .” In this discussion, impurity symbolizes loss and extinction, and the body will therefore ultimately break apart. Between the lines, the reader learns that full attention should be devoted to ­knowledge because resurrection actually means the soul’s return to “the ­netherworld.” Later in this discussion, Anatoli made a d ­ etermination that would become a cornerstone of medieval rationalist thought, stating that faith in ­resurrection is a “necessary belief.”80 Maimonides defines such 78 Ibid., 426, lns. 359-361. 79 Anatoli, Malmad ha-Talmidim, 89a. On impurity as causing delays in intellectual development according to rationalist interpretations, see Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 138; Dov Schwartz, “The Spiritual-Religious Decline of the Jewish Community in Spain at the End of the Fourteenth Century,” Pe‘amim 46-47 (1992): 109 [Heb]. 80 “And in order for this necessary belief to prevail, what is said about the patriarchs’ burial was written in the Torah . . .” (Malmad ha-­Talmidim 89a). R. Nissim of Marseilles too defined the belief in resurrection as a “necessary cornerstone” meant solely for the masses. In his view, the Torah does not mention resurrection because it can be denied by reason, and the Torah does not discuss matters that contradict reason. See Abraham S. Halkin, “Nissim of Marseilles: A Fourteenth-Century Philosopher,” Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 1946), 64 [Heb]; Colette Sirat, “The Political Ideas of Nissim b. Moses of Marseilles,” in Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, vol. 2, ed. Moshe Idel, Warren Zev Harvey and Eliezer Schweid (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1990), 66-67 [Heb].

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beliefs as “necessary for the sake of political welfare. Such, for instance, is our belief that He, may He be exalted, is violently angry with those who disobey Him and that it is therefore necessary to fear Him and dread Him and take care not to disobey.”81 Anatoli, then, returns to R. Sheshet’s view, stating that resurrection is clearly a political belief meant only for the multitude and is not within the spectrum of “true beliefs”; for the wise, the desirable aim is the i­ mmortality of the soul. Anatoli e­ mphasized that the body and the stay within it delay intellectual development. The perfect individual should therefore focus on fostering the intellectual dimension and avoid d ­ ealing with “necessary beliefs” such as ­resurrection. Many rationalists later repeated this s­ tatement. Among them is Elia del Medigo, who presented resurrection and the coming of the messiah within a ­dogmatic and political context.82 Like his predecessors, Shlomo Al-Constantini is also ostensibly ready to recognize resurrection in its concrete sense while also displaying a ­negative and rejecting attitude toward it. Al-Constantini wrote a commentary on the Torah that is split into two parts: the first and shortest is a defense of astrology, and the second is a rationalist interpretation of rabbinic ­aggadic homilies according to the order of the Torah’s weekly portions. In this ­interpretation, he offers three explanations of resurrection (representing three distinct “groups”): 1) The physical process of a material object’s creation from its two components—potential matter and active form: “The ­containment of matter, which is dead, into form, which is alive.” 2) The process of attaining intellectual perfection as the realization of the potential: “Let the soul learn the intelligibles because, by knowing them, it will actualize its potential since, while still only potential, the soul is as dead.” 3) The traditional interpretation, which recognizes resurrection as an actual concrete event: “Resurrection is the return of the soul to the body after it has separated from it. This is a miraculous ­occurrence, like other miracles cited in our holy Torah.”83 81 The Guide of the Perplexed III: 28. Many scholars have dealt with the term “necessary belief” and its meaning in Maimonides’ teachings. See, for example, Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 311-312. 82 R. Elia del Medigo, Sefer Behinat ha-Dat, ed. Joshua Ross (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1984) [Heb]. Cf. Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, 197. Kellner refers to an English translation of Sefer Behinat ha-Dat in David Geffen, “Faith and Reason in Elia del Medigo’s Behinat ha-Dat and the Philosophic Background of the Work” (Columbia University, 1970) (Xerox University Microfilms no. 71- 0675). 83 Megalleh Amukot, Vatican Ms. 59, 113a-b.

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According to Al-Constantini, the resurrection of the dead as an actual event should not be rejected outright because “prophecy is beyond ­syllogism.” By contrast, the wise person yearns for intellectual communion and views ­resurrection as sorrow and suffering: He who has attained communion wears the royal crown and delights in the splendor of the Shekhinah, enjoying the greatest pleasure the heart is capable of. And the scholar’s desire is to study metaphysics (elohiyyim) in order to reach this degree, not in order to return to the dark body and to the initial sorrow, and this is enough to the wise.84

The hint “to the wise” at the end of the passage attests that bodily resurrection is a promise that the masses await. The perfect individual, however, yearns for the immortality of the soul, and bodily resurrection implies a return to an inferior, lacking, and flawed state. The negative attitude toward the idea of resurrection is clear in Al-Constantini’s discussion, who obviously prefers the first two interpretations to the third. Moreover, the first two interpretations point to the existence of a hermeneutical and rationalist tradition in Jewish philosophy that transcended the literal meaning of resurrection and founded it on natural or psychological processes. Al-Constantini cites these views in the name of defined circles: “Many views have prevailed on the resurrection of the dead, held by various philosophers and theologians.” Al-Constantini thus formulates an approach predominant among scholars, and his view is one link in a chain of approaches that viewed resurrection as transcending its concrete-material meaning. In the early fifteenth century, the radical ­polemicist R. Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov formulated the negative rationalist view of resurrection as follows: “And all [hold that], after the separation of the soul from the body, a human body has no advantage over that of an impure beast, and the resurrection of the dead is impossible.”85 The positions of Sheshet b. R. Yitzhak, Yaakov Anatoli, Shlomo Al-Constantini, and their rationalist colleagues definitely helped to strengthen the extremists’ critique, and Shem Tov’s reaction is a good example of this radical view. 84 Ibid., 113b. I amended according to Breslau Ms. 101. The full version appears in the appendix to my book, The Philosophy of a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Neoplatonic Circle, 288. 85 Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, Sefer ha-Emunot (Ferrara, 1556), 11a. See also Schwartz, “The Spiritual-Religious Decline of the Jewish Community in Spain,” 98.

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THE FATE OF MESSIANIC NATURALISM Rationalist sources show that, although messianic collective naturalism in both its social and political versions had in fact become redundant, in theory it still appears as an official rationalist position. Scattered collective natural motifs persistently appear in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century rationalist thought. But if naturalistic messianism had indeed become redundant, why did these motifs survive? This is the question discussed below.

Revealed and Concealed Due to the continued allegorical interpretation of messianic texts, i­ nterest in the natural description of the future era lessened. But although the ­naturalist model had become entirely superfluous for the more radical ­philosophers and commentators, some rationalists at times relied on it, apparently in order to preclude doubts about their belief in concrete ­messianism. In other words, these rationalists adopted two ways of writing—exoteric and e­ soteric. On the one hand, they created an overt naturalistic layer, made up of ­isolated, scattered motifs. Rationalists usually omitted the specific political motif of Jewish independence and emphasized mainly the ideal of the n ­ atural world’s future intellectualism. On the other hand, rationalists remained loyal to individual intellectual redemption as the “true” messianism. The i­ndividual layer is the deep, hidden meaning behind the overt natural and collective description. Several examples of the naturalist and collective messianic cover in fourteenth-century philosophical thought follow: R. Yitzhak Pulgar: And we must believe that, with his [the messiah’s] coming, nothing will change in the ways of the world, because the sages have already taught that the sole difference between the present and messianic days is delivery from bondage to foreign powers.86 R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza: . . . in the days of the messiah, may he soon arrive, the people of Israel will be perfect in their moral and intellectual ­qualities, as has been taught, the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord and so forth, and they will reach the degree of prophecy, as has been taught, your sons and your daughters shall prophesy . . . may

86 R. Yitzhak Pulgar, Ezer ha-Dat, ed. Yaakov Levinger (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1984), 57 [Heb].

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they see true joy, which is God’s emanation upon their head, meaning upon their intellect, because the intellect is called “head.”87 R. Shlomo b. Yehuda of Lunel: If he [the messiah] tarries, wait for him, because he will surely come and will not delay. And know that the Creator has transmitted through his loyal prophets the aim of the redeemer’s coming in order to save our souls, and that is the arrival of perfection and the removal of all obstacles—no more Satan and no more evil. We will be quiet and serene, knowledge and providence will grow among us and we will gain the perfection of the world to come.88

R. Levi b. Abraham devoted an entire chapter of Livyat Hen to r­ edemption, where he presented a systematic naturalistic approach.89 If ­rationalists did indeed covertly and furtively subvert the concrete foundations of the ­messianic idea through a long and consistent hermeneutical p ­ rocess, overtly they p ­ resented a version of the “days of the messiah” marked by pure Maimonidean characteristics. Rationalists consistently reiterated Maimonides’ position, whereby the main change in the days of the messiah will be manifest in the general acceptance of the peace and well-being ideal on the one hand, and the ideal of intellectualism and the revelation of philosophical mysteries on the other.90 This is an understandable development since rationalists could never choose apocalyptic messianism, which is so far removed from their world view, as the exoteric layer of their work. The 87 Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 188a. See also 153b. Ibn Zarza, as noted, split his works into two in regard to style: Mekor Hayyim (a commentary on the Torah that places special emphasis on Ibn Ezra’s commentary) is an exoteric work, and Mikhlol Yofi (a commentary on aggadot) is an esoteric treatise (see note 70 above). In Mekor Hayyim, therefore, he did not avoid statements with messianic apocalyptic overtones, but in Mikhlol Yofi, he engaged in a consistent hermeneutical effort to exclude the option of messianism as a concrete possibility. On a similar statement by R. Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut, of Ibn Zarza’s circle, see Norman E. Frimer and Dov Schwartz, The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1992), 141 [Heb]. 88 R. Shlomo b. Yehuda of Lunel, Heshkek Shlomoh 74a (printed in The Commentary of R. Shlomo b. Yehuda on The Kuzari, ed. Dov Schwartz [Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2007], 265 [Heb]). R. Shlomo stressed in regard to both resurrection and the days of the messiah that “for philosophers, this is an impossible and inconsequential occurrence” (ibid., 159b; Schwartz ed., 486). 89 In this chapter, Levi supports messianic naturalism, despite the allegorical interpretation of various messianic statements that he adopted elsewhere. Cf. below, 150-151. 90 Concerning the revelation of philosophical mysteries in the future, note Prat Maimon’s comment on Levi b. Abraham’s words: “In exile, most mysteries are hidden/ sealed until the priest stands before the Urim.” Prat explained as follows: “One loses sight of many mysteries and hints and comments in the Torah, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa. The exile and the imperfections of our heart hinder our understanding of them because we are enslaved by a villainous people, until the day a just teacher arrives who will not rest until he shows the land his precious notions, which will then grow and engender more true ideas and mysteries and comments” (Commentary on Batei ha-Nefesh, 12b; the source of Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Lehashim in Davidson’s ed. 37).

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apocalyptic challenge posed by biblical and midrashic sources, however, forced them to present remnants of messianic naturalism as the overt layer of their thought. Naturalistic characteristics are thus a cover for their deep inner interest—­ the presentation of messianism as a parable and an allegory of ­individual intellectual perfection. Individual intellectual perfection, eternal and ­natural, is the rationalist’s true messianic goal. The evidence from the ­rationalists’ writings unquestionably shows that they viewed intellectual perfection as the center of Maimonidean messianism. The world to come is therefore the heart of messianic doctrine as a whole.

The Retreat of Naturalism This discussion suggests that the naturalistic model had declined in ­significant ways and was no longer a meaningful topic for rationalists, even if it appeared in some sources as an exoteric cover. Thinkers used this model insofar as they were required to do so by the authoritative sources that they interpreted (in the above examples, Levi and Ibn Zarza—the ­interpretation of Aggadah, and Shlomo b. Yehuda—the commentary on The Kuzari). The analysis of messianic naturalism and its standing points to a m ­ omentous event in Jewish thought: a conceptual symmetry was created between r­ adical rationalists and apocalyptic extremists, when rationalist i­nterpretations led to the decline of naturalistic redemption and actually eradicated it. What is the true messianic aspiration according to these radical ­rationalists? The definitive answer is: the immortality of the soul or of the individual intellect and their communion with the active intellect. The yearning for the soul’s eternal conjunction with the supernal world united rationalists from different places and various cultures, as attested by the following random but representative selection of quotations: A) “The divine supernal [rational soul] will then be immortal, as is the intellect it united with” (R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon).91 B) “Intellectual souls are eternal and prevail forever and ever.”92 C) “The sought-for perfection is the immortality of the species in the world to come” (R. Shlomo Franco).93  91 R. Shmuel Ibn Tibbon, Ma’amar Yikawu ha-Mayim, 91.  92 See Dov Schwartz, “‘Magen David’ by R. David Ibn Biliah,” Kovets Al Yad 12 (1994): 201 [Heb].  93 R. Shlomo Franco, supercommentary on R. Abraham Ibn Ezra’s Commentary on the Torah, Oxford-Bodleian Ms. 1258, 64a.

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D) The actualization of the human intellect, “the ­actualization of its potential, which is the world to come” (R. Shlomo Al-Constantini).94 E) “The immortal soul prevails forever and ever and that is the true salvation” (R. Shmuel Ibn Zarza).95 F) “The intellectual part in man is what remains after death” (R. Shemarya Ikriti).96 G) The meaning of the world to come vis-à-vis the soul is a state wherein “the branch unites with the root” (R. Moshe Narboni).97 H) “Intellectual power, through which one gains understanding of God and his endeavors as well as of his conduct of the entire world—only that remains after death” (R. Menachem Egler).98 I) “True knowledge revives the soul in this world and in the world to come” (R. Shlomo b. Yehuda).99 J) “The immortality of the soul” is “the immortality of its ­intelligibles” (ma‘lūmihā) (R. Zechariah ha-Rofeh).100 As all these quotes attest, the individual intellectual aim ­marginalized collective messianic naturalism, and attention focused fully on the ­ individual and intimate redemption of the scholar. Rationalists also ­ ­blatantly ­criticized the neglect of individual intellectual redemption as, for instance, in the strong condemnation by the anonymous author of ´Alilot Devarim.101 This focus on the individual is also behind the absence of any systematic ­discussion of collective messianism in many of the ­rationalist writings mentioned above. Some of these writings address this issue with banal ­generalizations and others never consider it at all. Collective ­naturalistic messianism was no longer interesting to radical rationalists.  94 R. Shlomo Al-Constantini, Megalleh Amukot, Vatican Ms. 59, 50b.  95 Ibn Zarza, Mikhlol Yofi, Section I, 220a.  96 Commentary of R. Shemarya Ikriti on Song of Songs, in Kafih, Five Scrolls: With Commentaries, 95. See also Colette Sirat, “A Letter on Creation by R. Shemarya b. Elijah Ikriti,” Eshel Beer Sheva 2 (1980): 205-209 [Heb].  97 Hayoun, “Moses Narboni’s Commentary on Megillat Kinot,” 255.   98 A letter preserved in Parma Ms. 755 and printed in Ephraim Kupfer, “Concerning the Cultural Image of German Jewry and Its Rabbis in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” Tarbiz 42 (1973): 144 [Heb].  99 R. Shlomo b. Yehuda ha-Nasi, Commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed, Cambridge Ms. 83, 20b, cited in Nehorai, “Rabbi Shlomo b. Juda ha-Nasi and His Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed,” 27. 100 R. Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets, vol. 2, Havatselet ed., 155, 425. 101 In his view, the messiah son of David is delayed due to “ignorance.” See ‘Alilot Devarim (printed in Otsar Nehmad 4 [1864]: 193 [Heb]). Cf. Reuven Bonfil, “Sefer ´Alilot Devarim: A Chapter in Fourteenth-Century Ashkenazi Thought,” Eshel Beer Sheva 2 (1980): 240-241 [Heb]. Some hold that this work was written in the fifteenth century, at the time it was copied. See Israel Ta-Shma, “Where Was Sefer ´Alilot Devarim Written,” ´Alei Sefer 3 (1977): 44-53 [Heb].

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SUMMARY The sources discussed above show that the philosophical-messianic endeavor of classic rationalists can be summed up in two elements, which are: (1) the shift of the messianic drama to the individual sphere; (2) the presentation of the intellectual motif as the sole or, at least, as the central and dominant component of the messianic idea. Rationalist ­interpretations, which reached new heights, found the collective messianic idea to be marginal and negligible. Allegorical interpretation gathered momentum among rationalists despite the fierce struggles against it in Spain, Provence, Ashkenaz, Yemen, and elsewhere.102 Messianism underwent an essential transformation in medieval ­rationalism by becoming far more prominent than it had been in ­previous eras. Louis Finkelstein, for example, argues that the resurrection of the dead in the tannaitic era had basically been concerned with the merging of body and soul in the personal sphere. In the course of time, this idea ­developed into a notion of general resurrection.103 In the Middle Ages, by contrast, developments followed the opposite course and resurrection began as a general notion, as evident in the messianic doctrine of Saadia and other geonim. As it was developed by radical rationalist circles in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, however, it became ­individual and turned into a parable of intellectual communion. The discussion above identifies three main stages in the radical ­rationalist development of messianism: 1) Maimonides’ doctrine presented the messianic idea in general as an educational tool that is secondary to the aim itself—the ­attainment of scientific knowledge. 2) The polemic about Maimonides’ writings sharpened the stance of extreme rationalists, and some of them claimed spiritual ­meanings for the messianic motifs.104 102 The scholarly literature has not paid sufficient attention to the significant development of allegorical interpretation in the wake of the messianic idea. One instance is the important article by Frank Talmage, “Apples of Gold: The Inner Meaning of Sacred Texts in Medieval Judaism,” in Jewish Spirituality, ed. Arthur Green (New York: Crossroad, 1986-1987), vol. 1, 313-355. 103 See Louis Finkelstein, The Pharisees: The Sociological Background of Their Faith, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1946), 149-151. Cf. Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987), 652-654; Jacob Neusner, Messiah in Context: Israel’s History and Destiny in Formative Judaism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984). 104 The radicals’ stance is further emphasized in light of the hesitance that characterized the more moderate views. See the discussion in ch. 6 below.

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3) The allegorical interpretation that developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries anchored the spiritualization of messianism in the holy texts. Rationalist interpreters endorsed a clear-cut principle: We will gladly accept the demonstrated existence or impossibility of a thing, since we will be unable to deny it. Should a literal reading of the Torah deny it, we will transcend the literal meaning until it fits the truth, because our Torah is truth and does not question truth.105

The predictable result of this conceptual process was the devaluation of messianic faith up to its complete dismissal. Making messianic belief part of the “necessary beliefs”106 category excluded it from the truths category. The following statement by R. Nissim of Marseilles excels at conveying the radical rationalist’s typical view on the messianic issue: The main principle is always first to try, if possible, to lead them [the aims, meaning the promises about the future] toward rational affirmation, even through a far-fetched interpretation if required. If you cannot do so, place them in the group of necessary goals that no religion can escape from, because religion is a general law given to intellectuals as well as to the multitude of fools and to women and children—one ordinance shall be for them and for all that accompany them.107

At times, the rationalist meaning precedes the historical meaning in the rationalists’ attitude toward ancient models of exile and redemption. This principle can be illustrated in the attitude toward the redemption from Egyptian slavery in R. Shlomo Al-Constantini’s interpretation of the midrash on the verse “This month shall be to you” (Exodus 12:2): “The redemption will be mine and yours, as if to say, ‘I will be redeemed with you 105 Ashkenazi, Zafenath Paneach, 76, and the editor’s introduction, iii. See also Abraham Epstein, Of Jews in Ancient Times, ed. Abraham Meir Haberman (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1957), 123-124 [Heb]; Lawee,“Audacious Epigone.”This passage is cited to support the idea of the soul’s abstract immortality, contrary to the masses’ belief in physical immortality. 106 See above, 126-127. 107 According to Numbers 9:14; 15:15. The passage is from R. Nissim of Marseilles, Ma‘aseh Nissim, ch. 10 (printed in Rabbi Nissim Massilitani, Liber Ma‘ase Nissim, ed. Howard Kreisel (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 2000), 148. The aims that fit “rational affirmation” can be summed up as the immortality of the soul, that is, the world to come according to Maimonides (see ibid., 125-126). Cf. Sirat, “The Political Ideas of Nissim b. Moses of Marseilles,” 59-60.

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. . . Therefore, set this month for me and for you, because I will see the blood of Passover and will make atonement for you.’”108 Al-Constantini writes: They thereby said that, as this month points to the movement of the sphere, and as the movement of the sphere points to the existence of God, may He be blessed, and as there is redemption for Israel in the achievement of true knowledge, so will there be redemption for Him, may He be blessed, meaning that God’s existence and his divinity will be known in the world, and all will know of his Providence, and his exalted virtue will be acknowledged as it had not been before, as Pharaoh had said.109

The passage draws a parallel between the redemption of Israel and the redemption of God. As the true redemption of the people of Israel is found in knowledge, so is God’s redemption purportedly tied to ­knowledge, which is the world’s acknowledgement of his divinity. Clearly, then, Al-Constantini finds in the concept of redemption, both past and future, above all ­intellectual meaning and only then historical meaning. Gershom Scholem characterized the rationalist messianic approach according to a series of messianic models that he had postulated. The ­utopian apocalyptic model focuses on the ending of the current reality and the restoration of a new imaginary world without death and extinction. The traditionalist restorative model implies a return to the religious life of antiquity. Scholem commented on medieval rationalism: . . . the rational tendencies in Judaism pushed the restorative factor in Messianism decidedly into the foreground. With the influential ­formulation of this tendency by Maimonides restoration becomes the focus of Messianism. By contrast, the utopian element quite peculiarly recedes and is only maintained at a minimum.110

Scholem’s analysis seems well suited to the approach of Maimonides, who insisted on clarifying that the days of the messiah entail no innovation 108 Exodus Rabbah 15:12. Cf. Mekhilta de Rabbi Ishmael, Masekhta de-Pisha 14. 109 Megalleh Amukot, 65b. 110 Gershom Scholem, “Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism,” in The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 24-25. Scholem’s main innovation in this regard was to direct attention to the wide diffusion of the apocalyptic model, which Wissenschaft des Judentums had tried to blur. His excessive concern with this issue apparently led to an incomplete analysis of the emergence of the messianic idea among rationalists. Cf. David Biale, Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 153-154.

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beyond the religious life of the Temple era and the intellectual elevation of the world, as noted in Chapter Three above. But Scholem ignores the potential for the neutralization and even the actual elimination of the ­messianic idea that is latent in Maimonides’ approach, a potential that ­several of his disciples actualized for about two-hundred and fifty years, until the fifteenth century. Scholem failed to note that Jewish rationality set up a new messianic model with its own laws and rules rather than merely a reaction to apocalyptic messianism,111 which Scholem considered the ­central and most crucial factor in the Middle Ages. Confrontations between rationalism and apocalyptic messianism had indeed already occurred in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but the rationalist model offered a spiritual messianic alternative with its own hermeneutical and methodological expressions. The introduction to Perek Helek in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah, as shown, is the text that most clearly presents the notion that messianic contents are absolutely redundant for the perfect individual. Maimonides’ spiritual disciples went beyond his rigorous, cautious, and moderate formulations in the last two chapters of Laws of Kings. They drew comparisons between various chapters of The Guide of the Perplexed, read all of Maimonides’ references to the messianic topic, and were also attentive to hidden trends in his statements. Step by step, they arrived at the latent neutralization of the idea until it was transformed into an individual and spiritual messianic model that reflected the “true” meaning of these texts. No individual or general messianic restoration of a distant past is assumed here, as the twelfth-century Neoplatonic doctrine had been a return of the soul to its source. More and more, rationalists lean toward an intellectual utopia that unfolds in the individual, intimate sphere—the communion of the ­individual intellect with the active intellect. In practice, this trend led to the ­neutralization of the messianic idea until its eradication as a concrete option.

111 Moshe Idel discussed the personal model in his book Messianism and Mysticism (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1992). On the reaction of R. Hayyim Ibn Bivas to apocalyptic messianism, see Y. Tzvi Langerman, “A New Codex of Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Kiriyat Sefer 64 (1992-1993): 1431-1432 [Heb].

Ch a p te r 6

Between Naturalism and Apocalyptic Messianism

In this chapter, I review attitudes toward messianic events among t­ hinkers we might call “moderate rationalists.” Contrary to extreme rationalists, these thinkers did not resort to allegorical interpretations of redemption. But unlike traditionalists in the early Maimonidean controversy, they did not categorically reject individual spiritual immortality and the natural realization of messianism in the historical world. This review will show that these thinkers sought to endorse the Maimonidean version of individual redemption and some of its naturalistic implications. They were unwilling, however, to renounce the apocalyptic legacy that seemed better suited to the literal meaning of the sources on revelation and to their spirit. Moderate rationalists did not attempt to formulate an integrated ­messianic doctrine offering a true synthesis of messianic naturalism and the apocalyptic view. Instead, they conveyed both these approaches beside one another and without making binding declarations, as if ­fearing to make a dangerous decision on provocative questions that were then dividing extreme rationalists from sworn traditionalists. They therefore ­discussed the immortality of the soul as part of individual redemption as if ­apocalyptic messianism had never existed, and the apocalyptic approach as if ­individual immortality had never existed. Messianic tension was built up through casual hints and statements lacking systematic formulation. Nevertheless, the frequent references to apocalyptic traditions did erode the centrality of Maimonidean naturalism. These moderate thinkers appeared mainly in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and their teachings are my concern in this chapter.

NATURALISM AND APOCALYPTIC HINTS The apocalyptic approach and messianic naturalism were adopted as ­parallel legitimate models in the course of a gradual process. Maimonides, as noted, had unequivocally supported a natural perception of messianic events and its conceptual source—natural individual redemption. The retreat from this

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unbending stance began with the teachings of moderate thinkers, who remained loyal to the naturalistic model but allowed scattered a­ pocalyptic motifs to creep into their discussions. Among these thinkers were R. Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona and R. Shlomo b. Aderet (Rashba). By the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries, a­ pocalyptic motifs had begun to trickle into the work of moderate ­rationalists until, by the mid-fourteenth century, they acquired legitimate status beside the naturalistic ones. I open, then, with the initial stages in the rise of the ­apocalyptic approach, and then present the outlooks that advocated ­coexistence between naturalism and apocalyptic messianism.

Paradise as a Parable Traces of the tension between naturalistic messianism and individual redemption when confronted with apocalyptic traditions are already ­evident in the work of R. Hillel b. Shmuel. As is well-known, Hillel ­abandoned extreme rationalism and even attacked R. Zerahiah Hen for his use of radical allegorization.1 Hillel’s moderate view comes forth clearly in his messianic approach. He unequivocally supported the ­spiritual immortality of the intellect. Describing his Sefer Tagmulé ha-Nefesh (Book of the Rewards of the Soul), Hillel writes in the first note of Part II that his goal is to prove that “it is entirely impossible for them [the rewards of the soul] to be at all material.”2 And indeed, his clear-cut conclusion concerning eternal reward is: Reward and paradise for the righteous is neither corporeal nor ­material, only formal: the soul of the righteous will climb eternal rungs to see the face of the Master, Lord of Hosts, may He be blessed, and there it will stand on its own, sated with everlasting glory and splendor.3

Like Maimonides, Hillel adopted the principle of the soul’s pleasure after death. Unlike Maimonides’ vagueness, however, Hillel distinctly upheld the   1 As he is cited by Zerahiah in Otsar Nehmad 2 (1857): 126-143. See also Joseph B. Sermoneta, Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona and his Philosophical Doctrine (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1962), 83-84 ff. [Heb]; idem, “The Defeat of the Angels,” in Yaakov Friedman: In Memoriam, ed. Shlomo Pines (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1974), 161-162 [Heb]; Aviezer Ravitzky, The Thought of Zerahiah ben Yitzhak ben She’altiel Hen and Maimonidean-Tibbonian Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979), 269-292 [Heb].   2 “Letter to Maestro Gaio,” in Hemdah Genuzah, ed. Zvi Hirsch Edelman (Koenigsberg, 1856), 22 [Heb].   3 Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona, Sefer Tagmulé ha-Nefesh [Book of the Rewards of the Soul], ed. Joseph Sermoneta (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1981), 149-150 [Heb].

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immortality of imagination after death, in Avicenna’s manner.4 Again unlike Maimonides, Hillel did not disregard the theological problems evoked by making immortality contingent on the attainment of knowledge, such as: 1) The status of the righteous but uneducated, who never acquired ­scientific knowledge and will seemingly be lost forever after their death; 2) the ­gradation assumed in the sources concerning the punishment of the wicked even though, according to the principle of the loss after death, no d ­ istinction is drawn between evildoers. Hillel confronted these problems relying on Avicenna’s view on the immortality of the faculty of ­imagination, which ensures peace and serenity to the righteous and suffering to the wicked.5 Hillel accordingly equated paradise with the immortality of the soul (“eternal happiness”) and wandering souls (literally, kaf ha-kel‘a) with the perpetual suffering of the wicked due to their gushing imagination, which will never be satisfied in the absence of material organs.6 Several years after Hillel formulated his view, R. Hayyim Israeli presented a synthetic approach, drawing a split between a lower material paradise and a supreme spiritual one, synonymous with the separate intellect.7 Hillel clearly stated, however, that any reference presenting the “rewards of the soul as m ­ aterial reward and punishment” must be interpreted allegorically, “and under no circumstances should it be understood literally.”8 Hillel even drew the ­conclusion warranted by his immortality theory—the naturalistic model of the messianic era: “The days of the messiah will not be a time of judgment for the wicked any more than the present given that, as [the rabbis] said, the   4 On the principle of pleasure, see ibid., 150. On the immortality of the imagination, see ibid., 168-169.   5 Ibid., 155-156, 175-179.   6 Ibid., 157, 168, 176. Incidentally, note that Hillel held that the soul ranks far higher after death than during life. This view implies that Hillel rejects the a fortiori element in Judah Halevi’s statement and channels it in another direction: “Far greater value is added to the soul after its separation . . . definitely far greater than the one it had while in the body” (168); “even while it is intellect within matter, which is a thick screen and a blurry partition separating it from the eternal light, it [the soul] is in a kind of communion with the active intellect. After the separation from the body and from matter, then, its value is so much greater that it hardly has anything in common with what it was at first” (174). Hillel also tied the value of those considered worthy of immortality to their ability to perform a miracle in this world. Cf. Aviezer Ravitzky, Crescas Sermon on the Passover and Studies in His Philosophy (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1988), 86n59 [Heb].   7 This approach appears in “The Treatise on the Garden of Eden,” published by Pietro Perreau in the Jubelshrift zum neunzigsten Geburtstag des Dr. L. Zunz, ed. Curatorium der Zunz-Stiftung, 20-42. (Berlin: Louis Gerschel, 1884). On the “Upper Eden” [le-ma´ala], see ibid., Hebrew section, 23. Cf. also Dov Schwartz, “The Quadripartite Division of the Intellect in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Jewish Quarterly Review 84 (1993/1994): 232-235.  8 Sefer Tagmulé ha-Nefesh, 191. It is the masses, emphasized Hillel, who need the literal interpretation (ibid., 193, 197 ff.). Hillel thus endorsed an educational goal, despite his decidedly elitist approach that is illustrated, for example, in his reference to the masses in the course of his messianic discussion as “goats appearing as people” (ibid., 194), and in other examples.

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sole difference between this world and the days of the messiah is delivery from bondage to foreign powers.”9 When Hillel entered into a serious discussion of specific messianic terms, however, he changed his categorical view and cast doubts on his seemingly absolute determinations. Three examples follow: 1) Hillel’s first and quite emphatic statement, as noted, had been that “Eden” is entirely abstract and spiritual. At a later stage, however, he retreated and was willing to agree to a Nahmanidean view whereby “the Eden that the soul of the righteous will enter after death is a pleasant place on earth, located under the Equator.” On this view, Hillel wrote in precise terms: “Upon my word, these agreeable assertions are worthier than any I have heard by any author in our times. And they are also acceptable to R. Moses [Maimonides].”10 Despite his claims concerning abstract rewards, then, Hillel did not utterly reject a material dimension in the reward to the soul, so long as the person did not equate it with true, supreme h ­ appiness. Hillel acquiesced in Nahmanides’ view, even though it bluntly c­ ontradicts Aristotle’s psychological p ­ rinciples. Indeed, d ­ etermining a m ­ aterial paradise for souls—even if only as an intermediate stage—­challenges the absoluteness of messianic naturalism. 2) Hillel endeavored to take the sources mentioning the fire of Gehenna beyond their literal meaning, given that souls do not actually burn. He therefore explained texts describing the future burning of the other nations in apocalyptic terms rather than ­verbatim. These texts refer to the days of the messiah, “who will come to redeem the people of Israel and lead the other nations to ­extinction.”11 Hillel, then, did not endorse the apocalyptic approach but did not adopt true ­naturalism either, since an actual natural model does not assume the possibility of other nations’ total obliteration. Quite the contrary: true messianic naturalism upholds the idea of humanity’s progress “to the utmost human capacity.” Maimonides, for ­example, seems to have been aware of the contradiction entailed by the assumption of humanity’s destruction. 3) In a Tagmulé ha-Nefesh passage, Hillel explicitly revealed that he assumes a mutual tie between messianic events. In his view,   9 Ibid., 202. 10 Ibid., 195-196. 11 Ibid., 206.

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“the world to come” cannot be separated from the “­ resurrection of the dead”: For me, the world to come and the resurrection of the dead are one simultaneous matter, since the resurrection of all the dead will only occur in the world to come. In the days of the messiah, the only ones alive will be the especially righteous, such as seven shepherds and eight princes. But in the world to come, all the dead will come to life—the righteous and the wicked. The wicked will be judged and will return to she’ol to be eliminated without any further plea, and will only be resurrected in order to show the wonders of God, may He be blessed.12

     This passage indicates that Hillel continued to adhere to the literal meaning of the messianic texts in the description of the future era. In some sense, these texts also convey surrender to the traditionalists, who insisted on an actual material dimension in the world to come in the style of Saadia or Nahmanides, and the careful reader will find in them an endorsement of the messianic orientation. The days of the messiah, then, will be an era of remnants only, and resurrection will take place in the world to come, “to show the wonders of God, may He be blessed.” Finally, Hillel did not agree with Maimonides’ view on the study of messianic midrashim as a waste of time: “No one should ever occupy himself with the legendary themes or spend much time on midrashic statements bearing on this and like s­ ubjects” (Laws of Kings 12:2). Instead, Hillel claimed that “on such matters it is said, study it and receive reward.”13 Although Hillel did not support extensive concern with messianic sources, he did assign supreme ­importance to their exegesis. To some extent, then, Hillel retreated from the naturalistic model and its characteristic features. The second half of the book is devoted to a long and systematic justification of the immortality of the soul as a ­special ­eternal reward, the only one suitable for it. Hillel extensively demonstrated the immortality of the soul through the knowledge it has acquired and through the imagination that accompanies it. When dealing with the m ­ essianic 12 Ibid., 206-207. See also Sermoneta’s comment on lines 254-262, where he pointed out the incoherence of these statements. Cf. the note by the (probably fifteenth-century) copyist of the München Ms., Yakar b. Hezekiyah, ibid., line 257. 13 Ibid., 208.

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question, however, he delayed taking the conclusions of his intellectual and psychological theory to the end. The hesitant change in his ­attitude is prominently evident in his use of the term paradise, which began as a symbol of immortality and ended as a material place for the soul’s delight, in line with Nahmanides’ version. The apocalyptic legacy hindered the freedom of Hillel’s ideas and narrowed his options, forcing him to admit ­apocalyptic motifs. Hillel’s discussion of this issue indeed p ­ ortends future developments. Henceforth, systematic messianic d ­ ­iscussions in many scholars’ writings would be marked by hesitations, enabling a­ pocalyptic messianism to regain its place in the philosophical and theoretical l­ iterature.

The Traditionalists’ Agreement The first Maimonidean controversy began, as noted, with acrimonious ­conflicts on the issue of messianism. But when the dispute erupted at the end of the thirteenth century at the initiative of Abba Mari Yarhi and Rashba, the messianic question did not play an essential role. The ­epistles that Abba Mari preserved in his treatise Minhat Kena’ot do not focus on this ­question. Several pressing issues—consistent recourse to radical ­allegorization in philosophical sermons delivered in synagogues and houses of study, the status of sciences versus revelation, the study of the sciences among the young, heretic notions such as the eternity of the world and the negation of individual providence, the legitimacy of astral magic—all pushed messianism to the margins and actually excluded it from the controversy almost entirely. The exchange of letters between Shimon b. Yosef, Abba Mari’s disciple, and Menachem Meiri attests that the immortality of the soul was a marginal question; references to it were rare and not at the heart of the dispute. Why was messianism sidelined? The more plausible reason is that both Abba Mari and Rashba tended to preserve Maimonidean ­messianic naturalism. The position that rationalists had endorsed in the first ­controversy became the one that the traditionalists adopted in the later dispute, at the end of the thirteenth century. Although both Abba Mari and Rashba raged against rationalists for restricting the role of miracles and dismissing their supernatural features, they did not expand their attack to the future. So what drove them to preserve naturalism? Basically, their concern for religious law. Afraid of undermining the authority of Halakhah due to messianic stirrings or to the anti-Christian polemic, they bolstered the eternal validity of Jewish law. To claim that Halakhah was eternal was only possible

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through a resolute determination that, in the future, the world would continue on its course. Abba Mari preceded Minhat Kena’ot with a series of chapters where he outlined his ideas. The second chapter was devoted to the eternity of ­religious law, “because the Torah will not change and will not be renewed.”14 Abba Mari even sought to elucidate and reconcile midrashic formulations that seemed to contradict the eternity of the Torah. In the course of his discussion, he outlined the transformation expected in the messianic era: Given that the king messiah is a just king, as attested in the text, “the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord” (Isaiah 11:2), he will not burden us with rates and taxes, as it is said, “with righteousness shall he judge the poor” (11:4), and we will not be troubled by wars, as it is said, “he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth“ (ibid.), and it is said “his resting place shall be glorious” (11:10). Then we will be free to serve God, “for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord” (11:9).15

Abba Mari thus presented the messianic era in definitely naturalistic terms. He also absorbed traces of this description’s philosophical ­justifications, including the assumption of individual intellectual redemption: “the ­apprehension of God, may He be blessed, is true happiness, salvation, and eternal life, and is the aim of the Torah’s intention.”16 This view was also shared by Rashba, whom Abba Mari urged to become involved in the controversy. Although Rashba was extremely ­productive on matters of Halakhah, philosophy, and Kabbalah, he ­delivered most of his teachings orally to his circle of disciples and followers. He ­formulated his halakhic ideas at length in his novellae and in his extensive responsa, but wrote very little on philosophical and kabbalistic thought. All he left behind are several paragraphs interpreting talmudic aggadot, a few scattered responsa with conceptual implications, and isolated passages whose ascription to Rashba is not always certain. In his ­interpretation of aggadot, Rashba wrote a long allegorical explanation of concrete and miraculous motifs that appear in aggadic sources and refer to the world to come. These motifs are “parables and hints to subtle inner 14 Sefer Minhat Kena’ot, in Rashba, Responsa, ed. Hayyim Zalman Dimitrovsky, vol. 1, part 1 (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1990), 232 [Heb]. 15 Ibid., 231. 16 Ibid., ch. 9, 247.

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matters”17 in the world of the souls. Furthermore, if these aggadic references cannot be explained in this manner, the principle that applies is that “we do not draw answers from aggadic references.”18 As for the days of the messiah, Rashba resolutely stated that “nothing will be different then from what happens now, and as they said in Shabbat, the sole difference between this world and the days of the messiah is the delivery from bondage to ­foreign powers.”19 Why, then, refrain from the literal interpretation of future miracles? Would it not be preferable for Rashba to endorse the apocalyptic t­ raditions that follow directly from the literal meaning of the texts? His answer is unequivocal: I have dwelt at length on these issues because those who oppose us rely on them indirectly when they say that the Torah’s commandments are not eternally binding. They hold that the rabbis’ acknowledgement that they [the commandments] are limited in time enables a litigant to claim that, at some point in time, they will be abrogated in this world. And we have now strengthened the true view by showing that the views of our rabbis, of blessed memory, are not as they had been misunderstood and distorted.20

Evident between the lines is Rashba’s suspicion that supporting the ­apocalyptic approach would be harmful to the eternity of the Torah, as the Christian stance had been. In support of this view, Rashba offered allegorical interpretations of other motifs that aggadists had perceived in concrete terms. One impressive example of this approach is his broad allegorical exegesis of the leviathan banquet (TB Bava Bathra 74b), which 17 Hiddushei ha-Rashba: Perushei ha-Haggadot, ed. Hayyim Moshe Feldman (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1991), 35 [Heb]. Cf. ibid., 52-53. 18 Ibid., 33. 19 Ibid., 34. 20 Ibid., 35. Rashba referred to the text in TB Avodah Zarah 3b: “In the future world, there is no Gehenna but the Holy One, blessed be He, brings the sun out of its sheath . . . the wicked are punished by it and the righteous are healed by it.” Furthermore, Rashba equated the term “future world” with the time after death in order to take the statement “the commandments will be abrogated in the future world” (TB Niddah 61b) beyond its literal meaning; according to this meaning, the Talmud had meant that there is no room for the commandments after a person’s death (Hiddushei ha-Rashba, 31-32). See also Rashba, Responsa, Dimitrovsky ed., vol. 1, part 1, #22, 66-67. Abravanel also adopted Rashba’s responsum. See Yitzhak Abravanel, Yeshu‘ot Meshiho (Bnei Brak: Machon Me’orei Sefarad, 1993), 211. On the anti-­Christian polemic on this matter, see, for example, Jeremy Cohen, The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 209-210. On Rashba’s involvement in the polemic, see ibid., 156-163; idem, “The Polemical Adversary of Shlomo Ibn Aderet,” Jewish Quarterly Review 71 (1980): 48-55.

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relies on Neoplatonic psychological foundations that influenced other fourteenth-century thinkers. In this interpretation, Rashba wrote that the phrase “and he salted it [the female leviathan] for the righteous in the world to come” means that “the soul of the righteous is immortal, and will exist at the time of the resurrection and in the world to come.”21 Rashba indeed endorsed the principle of immortality and viewed the world to come notion as conveying it.22 In this context, note that the author of Sefer ha-Hinukh (Pinhas ha-Levi, brother of Aharon ha-Levi?), also unambiguously states that the entire purpose of our religious and intellectual endeavor is “to raise our intellect to communion with the supreme intellect.”23 Notwithstanding these clear determinations, Rashba dared not reject the apocalyptic legacy entirely and, at the core of the allegorical ­discussions on “the world to come” and the leviathan banquet, he slipped in the ­apocalyptic alternative. He addresses the reader directly: “Do not make ­far-fetched assumptions about the righteous holding banquets in the world to come in a literal sense, as is found in some aggadot in the Talmud and the midrashim.”24 He does not, however, negate a material dimension in the world to come: Perhaps the meat and fish at the banquets for the righteous were, from the six days of Creation, created for this very purpose and for the ­pleasure that can only be attained in the world to come, not in this world, and those who are invited to that meal represent the perfection that is sought in humanity.25

21 Hiddushei ha-Rashba, 98. Rashba’s commentary inspired Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut, who repeated his paraphrase twice. See Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut, Pardes Rimonim, ed. Eliezer Zweifel (Zitomir, 1866), 20; idem, Sha´ar ha-Aggadah, at the end of the Zafenath Paneach treatise (Ms. Oxford Bodli. 2350 [Opp. Add. 4° 107]) on Ibn Ezra’s commentary on the Torah). For Ibn Shaprut’s formulation, see Norman E. Frimer and Dov Schwartz, The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1992), 82-84 [Heb]. Cf. Georges Vajda, “Pour le dossier de Metatron,” in Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History Presented to Alexander Altmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Siegfried Stein and Raphael Loewe (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1979), 347-348; Dov Schwartz, “Rationalism and Conservatism in the Thought of Rashba’s Circle,” Daat 32-33 (1994): 163-164 [Heb]. 22 Schwartz, “Rationalism and Conservatism,” 170-172. The principle that the future reward is spiritual is also dominant among thinkers close in spirit to the course set by Rashba’s circle. See, for example, the comments of Yitzhak Ibn Wakar, who refrained from resorting to the prevalent term of “intellectual” communion after death, but steadfastly supported the notion of abstract “spiritual reward.” See Ephraim Kupfer, ”Chapters from Matok la-Nefesh by Moshe b. R. Yitzhak Ibn Wakar,” Kovets al-Yad 12 (1994): 266-267 [Heb]. 23 Sefer ha-Hinukh, ed. Hayyim Dov Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1974), commandment 95, p. 152 [Heb]. Impurity has the opposite effect: “It weakens the strength of the intellectual soul, confuses it, separates it from the perfect Supreme Intellect, and remains separate until it is purified” (ibid., commandment 362, p. 457). 24 Hiddushei ha-Rashba, 91-92. 25 Ibid., 93.

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Indeed, Rashba did not intend ordinary nourishment but “very pure ­natural food” that “by nature enlarges the intellect.” But the very statement that the world to come has a material dimension attests to a retreat from the ­firmness of the previous statements. Rashba also proudly upheld two views with kabbalistic associations that are the source for non-natural ­perceptions of redemption: 1)  The worlds are cyclical. The shemitot doctrine that is ­well-­formulated in Sefer ha-Temunah determines that the world is built of cycles, each seven thousand years long, whose character is determined according to seven sefirot (hesed, din, tif ’eret, netsah, hod, yesod, and malkhut). At the end of seven such cycles, in the year fifty thousand (yovel), the world returns to its source (sefirat binah). According to some approaches, new cycles begin at the end of this cosmic ­jubilee. The cyclic worlds doctrine compels a re-­examination of the date and character of messianic events, given that the ­messianic event becomes a deterministic occurrence at the end of specific cycles. The cycles theory also precludes acceptance of redemption as an ordinary historical event because their unfolding assumes a ­ specific “ending,” whereby redemption is tied to the end of a cycle and the creation of a new one. Rashba indeed pointed to the mystery and meaning of the cosmic “jubilee,” which is viewed as the true and final redemption. The cycles theory thus attests to a retreat from messianism in its rationalist version and Rashba proudly proclaimed its contrast with the philosophical course. 2)  Transmigration of Souls [Gilgul Neshamot]. The theory of ­trans­migration percolated down to kabbalistic thought as soon as it appeared at end of the twelfth century, and became ­increasingly ­complex and intricate during the thirteenth and fourteenth c­ enturies. This development is evident in the widening scope of the kind of souls that transmigrate, in the number of transmigrations, in the function of the soul’s various layers in the process, and so forth. Wide-ranging controversies also erupted on the connection of transmigration to the future world, such as the resurrection of the dead and the soul of the messiah. The transmigration doctrine assumes that redemption will come with the release of the last soul (the soul of the messiah) from the trove of souls. This soul will be released when all the others have concluded their transmigration cycles.

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Rashba himself did not exhaust the messianic implications of these two doctrines and left this task to his kabbalist disciples. The very endorsement of these doctrines in his teachings, however, precludes acceptance of a pure naturalistic approach.26 This model of messianic thought, ­endorsing ­transmigration and a cyclical view of the world, greatly influenced r­ ationalist thought in the fifteenth century, as shown in Chapter Seven below. The discussion so far thus suggests that both Rashba and Abba Mari backed a clearly naturalistic conception. Rashba, however, was not entirely consistent. Discernible in Rashba’s approach, as was pointed out ­regarding Hillel b. Shmuel, are traces of a return to the apocalyptic view. It bears ­emphasis that, while the traditionalists’ view leans mainly toward ­messianic naturalism, there is certainly no room for attacking ­rationalists on the ­messianic question. The traditionalist view, then, underwent a ­radical ­transformation from the beginning to the end of the thirteenth c­ entury. At first, it was the traditionalists who supported an apocalyptic world and rejected Maimonides’ natural description altogether, except for certain ­reservations. For example, Ramah holds that keeping the law in a world where life is eternal and the evil instinct has been abolished is ­unnecessary. By the end of the century, however, traditionalists actually upheld the idea of a natural messianic world, due to serious fears that the apocalyptic approach would lead to the erosion of Halakhah. Ramah and Nahmanides, but also Abba Mari and Rashba—all perceived their halakhic and their ­conceptual world as one. But whereas the former found the source of the messianic approach in imagination, the latter drew on a natural r­ ationalist vision out of a pure halakhic interest, even if leaving room for apocalyptic hints.

The Moderate Rationalists in Provence Historians and scholars of ideas have emphasized Provençal radicalism. Provence was home to controversial traditionalists such as Abba Mari and 26 For sources on this question, see Schwartz, “Rationalism and Conservatism,” 155-156, 164-165. An unusual approach in rationalist thought merged an astrological naturalistic view with the destruction of the world at the end of the cycle. Shlomo b. Abraham Peniel determined that, in the seventh millennium, “the world will be destroyed according to the decrees of the astrological system, and the Jewish people will then be safely settled in their land” (Or Einayim, new ed. [Jerusalem, 1983], 83 [Heb]). Peniel’s messianic approach is addressed below. Cf. Sarah Heller-Wilensky, “Messianism, Eschatology, and Utopia in the Thirteenth Century Philosophical-Mystical School of Kabbalah,” in Messianism and Eschatology: A Collection of Essays, ed. Zvi Baras (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Centre, 1984), 221-237 [Heb]. Note that the controversy also extended to the issue of transmigration. Yeda‘ya ha-­ Penini rejected transmigration and its messianic implications in the apology sent to Rashba. See Rashba, Responsa (Bologna, 1539), 81b [Heb].

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also a bastion of Maimonides’ rationalist supporters, such as Aharon b. Meshulam. Only few scholars, however, have devoted deep discussions to the mediating position that blended rationalist moderation with halakhic conservatism.27 In its attitude toward messianism, this stance revealed a duality: while it advocated continuing Maimonides’ messianic naturalism, it also preserved apocalyptic motifs, seemingly aimed at the literal meaning of Scripture and Aggadah. One example is the polemical argument of Meir b. Shimon of Narbonne, who is known for his critique of the early kabbalists.28 In his work Milhemet Mitsvah, he engaged in long disputes with Christianity, where he claimed that the present world is unredeemed. His verification of this claim shows that he preserved both messianic approaches. The messiah has not come because, when he does, “peace will prevail throughout the world, “faith and the service of God will join together,” “the Land of Israel will be settled with great honor.”29 Together with these Maimonidean ­features, Meir b. Shimon presented others, such as “the miracles that will occur at the time of salvation,” and the apocalyptic description in Ezekiel 47 of “a great river as far as the sea” flowing out from the Temple.30 Meir b. Shimon did not wish to choose between these alternatives and pointed to the a­ llegorical i­nterpretation—“faith and greatness are meant metaphorically.” Meir b. Shimon’s approach was indeed typical of the ways adopted by the moderate rationalist school of Provence in later times as well. This school was active in Provence from the mid-thirteenth c­ entury until the beginning of the fourteenth. Its members were c­ommitted halakhists who, in their theories, endorsed Maimonides’ approach ­ ­verbatim without attempting to present esoteric interpretations as did, for example, Shmuel Ibn Tibbon. This Provençal circle also included Reuven b. Hayyim, his disciple Menachem Meiri, and David b. Shmuel ha-Kokhavi. Like Abba Mari and Rashba, this ideological circle preserved Maimonides’ ­naturalistic approach but did not refrain from scattered (though overt and clear) ­apocalyptic leanings. 27 The classic study by Isadore Twersky, “Aspects of the Social and Cultural History of Provençal Jewry,” Journal of World History 11 (1968): 185-207, is the exception in this regard. See also Israel Ta-Shma, “History, Kabbalah and Philosophy in Christian Spain: Review of History of the Jews in Christian Spain,” Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri: Annual of the Institute for Research in Jewish Law 18-19 (1992-1994): 479-495 [Heb]. 28 See, for example, Gershom Scholem, “A New Document on the Early History of Kabbalah,” in Studies in Kabbalah (I) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1998), 16-20 [Heb]; idem, Origins of the Kabbalah (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1987), 39-44; Moshe Idel, Kabbalah: New Perspectives (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 250-251. 29 Sefer Milhemet Mitsvah, printed in Shitat ha-Kadmonim on Nezir, Zevahim, Arakhin, and Temurah (New York: Blau, 1974), 328 [Heb]. 30 Ibid., 329, 331.

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Except for Sefer ha-Tamid, and that too only in part, none of Reuven’s writings have survived. From these fragments, however, we can retrieve traces of principles that would be formulated in detail and at length in the writings of his disciple, Meiri. Most of Reuven’s pronouncements on the messianic question focus on the interpretation of several psalms ­embedded in the Sabbath prayers. In his scattered references to ­immortality, for ­example, his clearly worded statements expose their philosophical origin. In his exegesis of the verse “He saves such as are of a contrite spirit” (Psalms 34:19), Reuven writes: Meaning salvation in the world to come . . . and the contrite of spirit are those who separate from matter and whose intellect remains ­forever in communion with the active intellect because no hindrance separates them. He [the contrite] truly walks among the angels and his eternity is like theirs, and he is therefore saved forever in this world and in the world to come.31

Reuven then, formulated immortality as the individual intellect’s ­communion with the active intellect and its ascent to the level of beings that are distinct from matter. Concrete general redemption, then, will also be explained in this intellectual light. Reuven further claimed that, at “the end of days,” God would punish the wicked and only the righteous would remain. As can be learned from the next three passages, the righteous in the world to come are the learned and the wise, whose presence in the ­messianic era is ensured through their intellectual attainments: All will apprehend the Creator, young and old, as it is said, “And the Lord shall be king over all the earth” (Zechariah 14:9) and all will crown him, and it is known that the righteous spread peace.32 None of the nations that worship God serves the true God or ­apprehends any part of him . . . and at the time of the messiah, all will apprehend the truth of his existence and submit to him.33 And all three [the world to come, the days of the messiah, and the resurrection] are very honorable times and free from all material ­ ­concerns, and all are involved in intellectual matters and ready to apprehend their Creator without hindrance.34 31 32 33 34

Reuven b. Hayyim, Sefer ha-Tamid, ed. Jacob Moshe Toledano, printed in Otsar ha-Hayyim 7-8 (1931-1932): 13 [Heb]. Ibid., 8. On the relationship between apprehension of the intellections and the peace motif, see 192-194 below. Ibid., 28. Ibid., 31.

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The spread of learning and the future peace motifs are distinctly Maimonidean, and Reuven indeed imparted this rationalist framework to his disciples. But he also bequeathed to them the apocalyptic trend intimated in the survival of the righteous and, thereby, perpetuated messianic tension among his ­disciples, who are the moderate rationalists of Provence. In his exegesis of Psalm 136, which describes the wonders in Egypt, Reuven noted that these marvels “will prevail at the time of redemption,” relying on the verse “As in the days of thy coming out of the land of Egypt I will show him marvelous things” (Micah 7:15).35 Nor did he refrain from stating that resurrection will occur in the days of the messiah, thereby adding a miraculous element to the messianic era.36 All these statements of Reuven parallel his endorsement of the rationalist naturalistic approach. Like his teacher, Meiri also addressed the messianic issue at length in his many exegeses of Psalms. Meiri fully endorsed the Maimonidean ­version of abstract intellectual immortality, clearly distinguishing it from earthly redemption. This distinction appears in his exegesis of the verse “With long life I will satisfy him, and show him my salvation” (Psalms 91:16), where Meiri determines that the psalmist is referring to “the time of redemption or ­hinting at the eternal salvation [of the soul].”37 What, then, are the c­ haracteristics of earthly redemption? In his description of these features, Meiri followed Maimonides. For example, Meiri held that the purpose of renewing the ­settlement of the Land of Israel and building the Temple is clearly intellectual and intended for the apprehension of God. He explicitly states: The intent of this Psalm [Psalms 84] is to prophesy our exile and our yearning to build the Temple. He is announcing in it that the yearning for the land and for the Temple is essentially the perfection of wisdom,

35 Ibid., 18. Although Reuven b. Hayyim was resolute in his determination that redemption involved wonders, he later qualified this statement. On the verse in Micah, he stated: “As in the days of thy coming out of the land of Egypt I will show him marvelous things and the marvel of that redemption is that no sorrow will follow it” (ibid., 28). In his exegesis of the Nishmat prayer, Reuven did not interpret the resurrection in literal terms and noted instead that it referred to life and death processes (ibid., 29). 36 “The resurrection that will occur in messianic times” (ibid., 31). 37 Menachem Meiri, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, ed. Yosef Cohn (Jerusalem: Mekizei Nirdamim, 1936), 182 [Heb]. On Meiri’s conception of immortality, see also Dov Schwartz, “The Messianic Idea in the Thought of R. Judah Halevi and Its Interpretation by Provençal Commentators of the Kuzari,” Sefunot 21 (1993): 24-25 [Heb]; Moshe Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdom: Rabbi Menachem Meiri and the Maimonidean Halakhists in Provence (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000) [Heb]; Gregg Stern, Philosophy and Rabbinic Culture: Jewish Interpretation and Controversy in Medieval Languedoc (New York: Routledge, 2009).

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until man comes to know from the greatness of the Creator whatever can be apprehended through the human intellect.38

In this sense, the return to Zion glorifies the name of God, because “that is where the wisdom that spreads knowledge of his greatness and his power will be found.”39 Furthermore, Meiri established Psalm 113 on future redemption and defined there the servants of God as “the surviving sages called by God.”40 In sum, at the time of redemption, “the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea.”41 Meiri, then, persisted in his view that the final purpose of serving God is “the world to come,” that is, the immortality of the soul, and thereby fully endorsed the leitmotif of Maimonides’ thought.42 And yet, Meiri also suggested apocalyptic messianic descriptions. He held that, at the time of redemption, the people of Israel would need a “new song” (Psalms 96:1) because “the songs and the psalms and the praises that we have will not suffice and several new ones will be added on the many miracles and wonders that God will do for you.”43 Meiri thus took the cosmic description (let the heavens rejoice, and let the earth be glad; let the sea roar [Psalms 96:11] and so forth) beyond the literal interpretation and determined that “it is a metaphor for the great joy of immense peace.”44 He did not, however, deny a clearly miraculous dimension in the era of redemption. Psalms 135-136, as noted, describe the wonders in Egypt that, unquestionably, are a collapse of natural structures. Psalm 135:13 is not directly relevant to the central theme, and Meiri interpreted it as a t­ estimony to future redemption, as follows: Once the prophecy made known to him [to David] the matter of exile, he repeatedly said, “Thy name, O Lord, endures forever; and thy renown, O Lord, throughout all generations, to do a miracle for us as at first, for the Lord will judge the cause of his people,” meaning that he will judge, do justice, and take revenge from the nations.45 38 Meiri, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 163-164. 39 Ibid., 191. Meiri noted elsewhere that the importance of Jerusalem is in its very fact of its being “a place ready for knowledge” (ibid., 169). 40 Ibid., 227; cf. ibid., 229 (on Psalms 115:11). Note that, in his commentary on the end of Psalm 117 (ibid., 232), Meiri states that the supreme stage of the messianic days is communion. 41 According to Isaiah 11:9. Meiri, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 293. 42 Ibid., 100. 43 Ibid., 188. 44 Ibid., 189. 45 Ibid., 268.

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The miracle, then, connects past and future redemptions. Meiri thus supported the apocalyptic notion of miraculous redemption—the ­ ­redemption of Israel occurs in the course of a miraculous revenge on the nations of the world that God will punish “by his pouring fire and ­brimstone and crystal stones upon them.”46 In the future world, then, the ­philosophical God will be replaced by the personal God who j­ealously guards the people of Israel and pours his wrath on the nations by ­changing the nature that emerged in the six days of Creation. True, Meiri was not swept into blunt apocalyptic formulations and alluded only to open public miracles that would occur in the present concrete world.47 In this p ­ erception of ­messianic times, however, he did not follow Maimonides and did not recoil from acknowledging natural changes. Furthermore, according to Meiri, nature will crumble not only in the earthly but also in the heavenly world. Although the astrological system is not meant to synchronize the coming of redemption, God will change the functioning of the heavenly elements accordingly.48 Is there an antinomian dimension in Meiri’s version of apocalyptic redemption? Did he truly dare to hint that the law would be abrogated in the future? What emerges is that Meiri did not flinch from unequivocally stating, when commenting on a midrash, that prayers of petition and some of the sacrifices might be rescinded in the future. Consider his explicit statement: And the homily says that all prayers will be annulled in the future but thanks offerings will not be annulled (Midrash Shoher Tov on Psalm 100). Prayers, then, will not be needed for anything that people might request because the good will prevail forever and all will only wish to thank and praise, nor will there be sinners needing to bring offerings of sin and atonement.49

46 Ibid., 190, according to Ezekiel 38:22. See also ibid., 98. 47 Cf. his statement “may you renew your marvels upon us after the despair in the way of the new heavens” (ibid., 284, according to Isaiah 66:22). In other words, the marvels should not be understood as an absolute change of the world’s order but as deviations from this order. See also ibid., 103. 48 Ibid., 288. Meiri fully acknowledged the truth of astrological forecasts, though without dwelling on astrology’s magic implications. See Dov Schwartz, Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, trans. David Louvish and Batya Stein (Leiden and Boston, MA: Brill, 2005), 129-133. 49 Meiri, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 192. Incidentally, Meiri hinted here that redemption will be eternal, meaning that the days of the messiah will go on forever. He also repeated this statement elsewhere. See, for example, ibid., 55, 98.

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In the future, then, a new type of human being will appear, without an evil instinct. Future humans will not be sinners and will not need to bring atonement offerings—thanks offerings will suffice. Finally, note that Meiri was aware that rabbinic homilies tend to present resurrection as an eternal era and he noted this idea without expressing any opposition to it.50 Quite the contrary. Meiri argued in his talmudic commentary that resurrection is the last stage in a defined messianic orientation, and that “the world to come” does not conclude the messianic process. In his view, “resurrection is the last stage . . . and the order is: this world and the world to come and the days of the messiah and the resurrection of the dead.”51 Though adopting a Maimonidean philosophical version of i­ mmortality, then, Meiri saw no problem in coloring redemption with strong ­apocalyptic hues. His description was sometimes open and explicit and sometimes subtly allusive, clearly showing that Meiri had indeed absorbed ­apocalyptic ­traditions and had tried to incorporate them into his rationalist world. In other words, he did not retreat from the intellectual overtones of ­redemption, yet characterized it as pervaded by overt m ­ iracles, thus ­agreeing with and contesting Maimonides at the same time. The tension between the ­messianic models in Meiri’s writings might have been partly or entirely dispelled had his lost treatise Ketav ha-Dat, purportedly dealing with the messianic issue, been available.52 In his wavering between the two models, however, Meiri can definitely be said to have joined the conceptual messianic framework of his time and place. I turn now to another thinker active at the time, David b. Shmuel ha-Kokhavi, whose work and thought is close to that of Meiri. Unlike him, however, Kokhavi remained almost entirely faithful to Maimonides’ messianic views. Kokhavi wrote Sefer ha-Batim, a comprehensive ­halakhic treatise that opens with Sefer ha-Emunah, which deals with the philosophical foundations of Judaism. This formal structure itself seemingly attests to the influence of Maimonides, who also opened his halakhic treatise with philosophical scientific discussions. Sefer ha-Emunah is divided into seven sections, three of which are directly and indirectly devoted to the messianic idea. The fifth section deals with the “the belief in reward and punishment” and focuses mostly on the immortality of the soul. The sixth and seventh sections deal, 50 “And in the homilies (derash) they hinted that resurrection means that one will be resurrected forever and enjoy eternal pleasure” (ibid., 33). See also ibid., 50. 51 Menachem Meiri, Beth ha-Behirah le-Masekhet Sanhedrin, ed. Abraham Sofer (Jerusalem, 1965), 334 [Heb]. 52 He noted his intention to write this in his Commentary on the Book of Psalms, 103.

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r­espectively, with the coming of the redeemer and with resurrection. Kokhavi’s Maimonidean connection is evident, inter alia, in his choice to conclude the seventh section with a reproduction of the “Essay on Resurrection,” where Maimonides presents his messianic ideas. Precisely this opening, however, points to the complexity of Kokhavi’s sources. The first chapter of the fifth section notes that the Torah does not refer to spiritual aims after death. Kokhavi’s first answer to this question relies directly on Judah Halevi without mentioning his name.53 According to this answer, the Torah submits itself to the test of reality and its future ­commitments are ­therefore limited to the concrete realm. Since the immortality of the soul cannot be tested in this fashion, the Torah does not refer to it. Kokhavi then mentions the answer of Maimonides, who notes that the Torah offers the ­material conditions for the enlightening process that ensures the i­ mmortality of the soul. The Maimonidean context, then, did not preclude Kokhavi’s ­reliance on other sources, as will be shown in the discussion that follows. Kokhavi conclusively supported the rationalist ideal. Communion is attained through apprehension of the “true opinions,” namely, when the ­intellect “that had been a potential intellect returns to be active . . . because man was created for the purpose of intellectual apprehension and ­communion with God, may He be blessed.”54 Accordingly, the immortality of the intellect is abstract, eternal, and accompanied by “the pleasure of the soul.”55 Kokhavi nevertheless noted that the people of Israel enjoy a clear advantage because of the rational commandments granted to them that, after death, bring them to the level of the separate intellect.56 Kokhavi thus e­ mphasized the ideal of intellectual immortality and even anchored this ideal in the sources in two chapters of the fifth section: the third chapter submits a justification of abstract immortality by citing biblical and rabbinic sources, and the fifth chapter offers elaborate allegorical interpretations that take apocalyptic sources (the leviathan banquet, the illumination of the righteous’ faces, and so forth) beyond their literal sense, ascribing to them rationalist meanings. In the sixth section, Kokhavi systematically wove in a Maimonidean approach, citing explicit and implicit passages from the Laws of the Messiah that conclude the Mishneh Torah. His treatise is indeed unique 53 See 42-56 above. The discussion is based on David b. Shmuel ha-Kokhavi, Migdal David, Sefer ha-Batim, ed. Moshe Hershler (Jerusalem: Shalem Institute, 1982), 161-162 [Heb]. 54 Ibid., 161. 55 Ibid., 167. Avicenna’s approach on the pleasure (ladhdha) that accompanies the immortality of the virtuous soul resonates here as well. 56 Ibid., 162-163.

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in its ­comprehensive and systematic concern with the messianic question, almost unparalleled in the contemporaneous literature. But just as the ­traditionalists were forced into a formal retreat when accepting the ­conception of the “refined body” or when determining that future m ­ iracles would follow the pattern of past ones, so did Kokhavi retreat from the exclusivity of the Maimonidean approach to hint at some changes ­deviating from the natural context. Thus, for example, he pointed to the search for knowledge and learning in the messianic era and took it beyond ­“natural changes.” He then took a further step, which Maimonides had recoiled from, and stated: In the days of the messiah, the air will be renewed and purified, and people will be healthy and live a pleasant life. This was the prophet Isaiah’s intention when he said “For, behold, I create new heavens and a new earth: and the former things shall not be remembered” (Isaiah 65:17). Ibn Ezra interpreted it to mean that the heavens are the atmosphere (raki‘a), and God will renew a good air so that people might be healthy in their bodies and live many years, and he will add to the power of the earth and, behold, it is new.57

The purity of the air, according to one view cited by Kokhavi, leads to a long life, as had been the case in the early generations mentioned in Genesis. Kokhavi certainly followed The Guide of the Perplexed II:47 on these matters, though Maimonides had ascribed the ancestors’ longevity to “nutrition and regime” rather than to a change in the character of the air, a determination that appears close to a moderate miracle. Avoiding miracles had been the main reason for Maimonides ascribing long life only to a few ­isolated figures ­ ­ mentioned in the biblical narrative rather than to all, whereas Kokhavi saw longevity as a shared attribute of the messianic generation in general. Moreover, Kokhavi did uphold the eternity of the Torah and the ­commandments, but he also held that no prohibitions would be necessary in the future era, since humans would then not be tempted by their passions. On forbidden foods and forbidden intercourse with menstruating women, which would be abrogated (Midrash Shoher Tov on Psalms 146:4 and more), Kokhavi wrote: And this sage said that, in the days to come, when the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, these warnings will be unnecessary

57 Ibid., 182.

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when all will be like angels without an evil instinct, and it is their intellect that will guide their body rather than their body their intellect . . . and in the future all will be as angels on whom no innocence or guilt is incumbent.58

Whereas Maimonides had tried to emphasize the ordinariness of future humans (evident, for example, in the persistence of negligence attested by the commandment to establish cities of refuge), Kokhavi emphasized their new dimensions. Finally, when discussing resurrection, Kokhavi contrasted two views: 1)  Eternal life after the resurrection. This view is presented in two variations— eternal life in the current body or in a refined one. This latter view, however, is not cited in the name of Saadia, Nahmanides, and their followers, but defined as a foreign view, probably Christian: The sages of other nations who support the former view, however, say that their matter will be pure as one of the everlasting ones, meaning the matter of the spheres, and it is this view that our rabbis might have been hinting at when they said that the righteous will be as the stars and the spheres.59

2)  Resurrection to one cycle of life. This is of course Maimonides’ view, and Kokhavi notes that it is “suited to and in harmony with philosophy.” And yet, although supporting this position, Kokhavi did not entirely reject the other one that, as he noted, also enjoyed reliable backing. Kokhavi, then, held that resurrection is a further opportunity for the wise person to increase “his virtue and his apprehension to delight in the world of souls.”60 Nevertheless, he did not entirely disregard the other traditions that favor apocalyptic messianism, and viewed them as a conceptual challenge. Note, moreover, that he also refused to take a stand on the question of “when would resurrection occur—whether at the time of the messiah’s coming, or before him, or after that.” Maimonides, as noted, had already expressed disinterest in this question.

58 Ibid., 184. This motif had already appeared in Edut Adonai Ne’emanah by Shlomo b. Moses b. Yekutiel of Rome, which was printed in Judah Rosenthal, Studies and Sources, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1967), 390 [Heb]. 59 Migdal David, Sefer ha-Emunah, 196. See also TB Sanhedrin 92b. 60 Migdal David, Sefer ha-Emunah, 197.

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In the absence of details about Reuven b. Hayyim, Kokhavi unquestionably emerges as the most consistent Maimonidean rationalist in the Provençal circles of halakhists who address philosophical questions, as attested by his detailed and systematic messianic doctrine. He did not, however, refrain from hints at non-rationalistic messianic traditions. Summing up, then, Maimonides’ authority left a mark most particularly on thinkers who were widely versed in both Halakhah and philosophy. These thinkers, however, were not impervious to apocalyptic forms of messianism. Here and there they embedded hints and fragments that point to knowledge of midrashic and apocalyptic traditions as well as some consideration for these sources. This view began to be challenged in other circles, where the apocalyptic approach is not merely a hint but another legitimate alternative, beside naturalism. This is the topic of the next section.

GROWING TENSION In the course of the thirteenth century, as noted, traces of apocalyptic t­ raditions were evident in the teachings of such thinkers as Hillel b. Shmuel, Rashba, Meiri, and others. In these doctrines, however, the naturalistic approach remained dominant on grounds such as moderate rationalism (Hillel) and the preservation of Halakhah (Rashba). Henceforth, ­apocalyptic ­messianism slowly emerged as a legitimate stance beside the naturalistic trend, at times even overriding it, a development evident in two ­philosophical circles: (1) thinkers who merged Torah and science. These thinkers ­followed Abba Mari and Rashba by combining abstract thought with extensive h ­ alakhic ­pursuits but, unlike them, emphasized the apocalyptic dimension; (2) ­classic ­philosophers, who saw the writing of philosophical works as their main endeavor and whose messianic discussions granted legitimation to both models. Both these groups are discussed below.

Torah, Wisdom, and Messianism Abba Mari and Rashba, as noted, had tended to support messianic ­naturalism. In the generation after them, the picture changed. In the w ­ ritings of Rashba’s and Rosh’s disciples (and their disciples), the ­naturalistic and apocalyptic legacies appear beside one another and, gradually, the scales began tilting in favor of the latter. The writings of these disciples combine halakhic and conceptual dimensions, when philosophical and theological concerns are only one aspect of their oeuvre.

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The naturalistic legacy is preserved in two areas: (1) the d ­ etermination of the “world to come” as an abstract spiritual goal, that is, as ­individual ­redemption; (2) a naturalistic description of the days of the messiah. Concerning the former, the disciples of Rashba and Rosh endorsed a ­specific meaning of the “world to come” as the abstract immortality of the intellect. Consider a number of examples. When Meir Aldabi discussed the ­quality of intellectual perfection, he chose to express his view in the words of Alfarabi in Kitāb al-Siyāsa al-Maddaniyya (Political Regime). Alfarabi presented the ­epistemological perspective on the unity of ­knowledge ­(intellect, ­intellectually cognizing subject, and intellectually cognized object), and concluded: “When the intellectual faculty becomes intellect, his intellect in actu resembles the separate entities . . . it is in the realm of the active intellect, and when man reaches this . . . his happiness is perfect, and he is in actu and in perfection by apprehending his activity.”61 Through this communion, emphasizes Aldabi, the human intellect becomes ­immortal. Menachem b. Zerah also followed Alfarabi on this question, though ­without explicitly mentioning him. He adopted the quadripartite division of the intellect or of reason into intellect in potentiality, intellect in actuality, acquired intellect, and active intellect. When humans actualize their intellect, they receive the acquired intellect and are then capable of communion with the active intellect. Intellectual c­ ommunion is thus the ultimate human goal. Menachem writes: And when it becomes intellect in actuality, it is as matter to the acquired intellect, and the acquired intellect is a form to it, and the intellect in actu is as matter to the active separate intellect, and the active intellect is a form to it, and that is the soul’s ultimate aim—communion with the active intellect, when both become one.62

He describes the perfect beings as follows: They strive ceaselessly for nobility and for immortality, as compelled by their noble form. They do not think only in terms of conceptions 61 Cited in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 32 ff. 62 Menachem b. Zerah, Tsedah la-Derekh (Warsaw: Hayyim Kelter, 1680), section 1, principle 1, ch. 18, 15a [Heb] (henceforth Tsedah la-Derekh). Menachem claimed in several sources that the spiritual reward is eternal and true, and concerns only the soul. See, for example, Tsedah la-Derekh ch. 33, 22a. On the quadripartite division of the intellect (which Menachem uses) as it appears in Muslim sources, and on its influence on Jewish philosophers, see Schwartz, “The Quadripartite Division.”

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and attaining the right opinions, but wish for communion with the divine intellect emanating on them and is the source of this form.63

Menachem thus went so far as equating immortality with absolute communion of the individual intellect with the active intellect. More precisely, rather than the usual perception of communion, this is a union that blurs ­individuality. Although the question of whether he intended the actual communion of the individual intellect and the active intellect remains open, this formulation is extremely daring in its degree of rationality. For Menachem, “the ultimate aim,” which leads to communion once attained, is “to understand and learn the n ­ atural objects and the spheres and the [separate] intellects and their causes and the causes of their causes.”64 Generally, “in knowledge and in practice, the soul will reach communion with the supreme world.”65 Finally, note the statement of Shmuel b. Meshulam, which weaves together motifs of individual redemption with public and natural redemption. Shmuel again addresses the omission of any mention of individual redemption in the Torah: But the Torah does note in many places the goal of reward and success in this world, all so that we may ready ourselves to apprehend it properly and perform the commandments without any hindrances or contradictions . . . And that is why we long for the coming of the redeemer, because nothing will then hinder observance of the Torah and the commandments, “for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea” (Isaiah 11:9).66

Shmuel actually emphasizes observance (“apprehend it [the Torah] properly and perform the commandments”) rather than intellectual achievement as the purpose of the days of the Messiah. His conclusion indeed leads to the second area—preserving a consistently naturalistic description of the days of the messiah. Menachem devoted an entire chapter to the natural messianic idea, when he summed up Maimonides’ 63 Tsedah la-Derekh, section 5, principle 1, ch. 2, 138c. 64 Ibid., section 1, principle 1, ch. 19. Menachem described this goal as a preparation for prophecy. 65 Ibid., ch. 20, 15d. And similarly, in section 5, principle 1, ch. 1, 138a. For the source of the section, see Shlomo Ibn Gabirol, “The Source of Life,” in Medieval Jewish Philosophical Writings, ed. Charles Manekin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 24; David Kaufmann, Studien über Salomon Ibn Gabirol (Budapest: A. Alkalay,1899), 73. 66 Yaakov S. Spiegel, “On Sha´ar Reshit Hokhmah and Sha´ar ha-Refu’ah (long versions) by R. Shmuel b. R. Meshulam,” in Studies in Memory of the Rishon le-Zion R. Yitzhak Nissim, ed. Meir Benayahu, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Nissim, 1988), 286-290 [Heb].

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Laws of the Messiah by copying and paraphrasing them.67 As shown below, Menachem changed emphases by adapting Maimonides’ view to his own, but the messianic conception did remain naturalistic. Consider Maimonides 4. The Sages and the Prophets did not long for the days of the Messiah that Israel might exercise dominion over the world, or rule over the heathens, or be exalted by the nations, or that it might eat and drink and rejoice. Their aspiration was that Israel be free to devote itself to the law and its wisdom, with no one to oppress or disturb it, and thus be worthy of life in the world to come. 5. In that era there will be neither famine nor war, neither jealousy nor strife. Blessings will be abundant, comforts within the reach of all. The one preoccupation of the whole world will be to know the Lord. Hence Israelites will be very wise, they will know the things that are now concealed and will attain an understanding of their Creator to the utmost capacity of the human mind, as it is written: “For the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea” (Isaiah 11:9).

67 Tsedah la-Derekh, principle 3, ch. 4, 149b-d.

Menachem b. Zerah And the purpose of waiting for the messiah is not so as to exercise dominion over the world and humiliate other nations, nor is it to eat and drink and rejoice, but to be free to study the Torah and the commandments to perfection, so that we might know how to serve the Lord. In that era there will be neither famine nor war nor jealousy. Blessings will be abundant, comforts within reach, and the one preoccupation of everyone will be to know the Lord as meant by the prophets, of blessed memory, and we will thereby attain the proper aim which is the world to come with great love and the good laid up for the righteous who are inscribed in the book of the living where the foundations and the mystery of the souls are to be found, as David said: “How great is thy goodness, which thou hast laid up for those who fear thee; which thou hast performed for those who trust in thee in the sight of the sons of men” [Psalms 31:20]

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Menachem’s periphrastic course, as shown in the table on the previous page. The topic is the purpose of the days of the messiah, and they are contrasted with Maimonides’ Laws of Kings 12:4–5. One conceptual change is immediately evident: whereas Maimonides defined the purpose of the days of the messiah as time to deal “with the law and its wisdom,” Menachem defined it as the study of “the Torah and the ­commandments,” as Shmuel had done. Menachem, then, does not detract “serving the Lord” from “knowledge of the Lord” Human ­perfection—which is the aim of the days of the messiah—is evident not only in greater knowledge but also, and perhaps mainly, in s­ erving God. Finally, note that a brief summary of the Laws of the Messiah in the Mishneh Torah appears also in the messianic discussion of Aldabi.68 Like Rashba, then, Shmuel b. Meshulam, Menachem b. Zerah, and Meir Aldabi adopt the ­naturalistic messianic model for the sake of the perfect preservation of Halakhah. The very element that moved Abba Mari and Rashba to support a ­naturalistic approach, then, also led their disciples and their disciples’ disciples to do so. Parallel to the naturalistic view supported by these thinkers, ­however, the apocalyptic approach emerges as a legitimate m ­ essianic doctrine. The decline of naturalism and the rise of apocalyptic m ­ essianism are evident in two areas: the recognition of approaches opposed to pure rationalism, and the emergence of distinctly apocalyptic messianic features. As for the former, these thinkers endorsed the two departures from rationalism that Rashba had already adopted—the theory of cyclical worlds and the theory of transmigration.69 As for the latter, most thinkers offer a systematic and well-organized apocalyptic approach in their writings. Consider, for ­example, the messianic orientation suggested by Shmuel that, in general lines, fits the future program presented by Saadia and Nahmanides: This is the order of the rewards: first the world of the souls, which is between the time of death and the resurrection, and then the time of the resurrection of the dead, who stand in their failings and are healed. And the dead who come to life in the days of the messiah do not return to dust, and in the world to come after the days of the messiah both 68 Meir Aldabi, Shvilei Emunah (Warsaw, 1887), Section 10, 96b [Heb]. Aldabi also emphasized (ibid., 96a) Maimonides’ determination (in Laws of Kings 11:3) that the messiah would not be required to perform miracles and wonders to demonstrate that he is the messiah. 69 See Schwartz, “Rationalism and Conservatism,” 156-158, 165, 167.

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the souls and the dead are judged, and the righteous do not die after coming to life in the world to come.70

In the light of this passage, the naturalistic description suggested by Shmuel simply collapses—how can any naturalistic feature be preserved when human life in the days of the messiah is characterized as eternal?! And even after the addition of the cyclical worlds theory, the claim that the ­resurrected dead “do not return to dust” still stands. Moreover, the world to come is equated in this passage with a time when “both the souls and the dead” are judged. Previously, however, Shmuel had written that “the intended true reward is spiritual, and the good awaiting the righteous in the world to come, which is the world of the souls, is the absolute good and a genuine reward that never ceases.”71 Was Shmuel unaware of what he had written only a few lines before? All that can be said is that Shmuel cited ­contradictory ­traditions intending to present a spectrum covering both ­naturalistic and apocalyptic elements. So had Aldabi when he ­contrasted the distinct naturalistic description based on the Laws of Kings with a ­magnificent and extremely detailed apocalyptic view based on the Book of Zerubavel and on Saadia’s colorful descriptions in The Book of Beliefs and Opinions.72 While both Shmuel b. Meshulam and Aldabi presented these contradictory ­traditions quite resolutely and without attempting to reconcile them, Nissim Gerondi and Menachem b. Zerah did so hesitantly and, eventually, favored the apocalyptic view. In his homilies, Nissim drew a distinction between transient and eternal punishments. Regarding eternal punishment, Nissim accepted the Maimonidean principle stating that reward and punishment are autonomous, “a natural matter, when [punishment] is inflicted on the soul from itself when it had sinned greatly in this world.”73 By contrast, Nissim defined the transient punishment with the help of the rabbinic statement in TB Rosh Hashanah 16b-17a, “they go down to Gehenna and squeal 70 Shmuel b. Meshulam, Sha’ar Reshit Hokhmah, Spiegel ed., 292. According to Shmuel, resurrection precedes the days of the messiah. 71 Ibid., 289. Shmuel accepted Nahmanides’ notion about the gradual enforcement of the karet punishment, seemingly without violating the perception of karet as complete extinction (ibid., 286-287). 72 Shvilei Emunah, Section 10, 93d ff. See also note 68 above. On Aldabi’s sources in general, and regarding the messianic idea in particular, see Saul H. Kook, Studies and Reflections, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1963), 91 [Heb]; Dov Schwartz, “On the Sources of Shvilei Emunah by R. Meir Aldabi,” Sinai 114 (1994): 72-77 [Heb]. 73 Nissim b. Reuven Gerondi (Ran), Derashot, ed. Leon A. Feldman (Jerusalem: Shalem Institute, 1973), 164 [Heb]. Cf. Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Vérité prophétique et vérité philosophique chez Nissim de Gérone: Une interprétation du Récit de la Création et du Récit du Char,” Revue des études Juives 134 (1975): 75-99.

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and rise again, or go down to Gehenna and are punished there for twelve months.” These punishments are also natural to the soul, but the logic of their cathartic process is not necessarily clear nor does it meet the strict philosophical criterion, as Nissim indeed admitted: “But how will the cleansing and the purification take place when something is hidden even from us, and should we try to engage in speculation or follow on the path of the rabbis, of blessed memory, we will be as dreamers, so it is best to be silent on this.”74 Nissim thus recognized that the cleansing and purification approach, unlike the autonomous intellectual immortality approach, cannot be explained philosophically; nevertheless, he still adopted the rabbinic view literally and without any qualms. He therefore stated, for example, that “a Jew who will see the days of our messiah will never die.”75 The m ­ essianic era, then, will bring Jews eternal life. Nissim may have intended that the ­miraculous dimension will apply to everyone alive in the messianic era since he had already stated that, in the future, all the nations of the world would accept the commandments of Jewish religion and, in fact, all the world’s inhabitants would be included in the national and religious definition of the people of Israel.76 Eternal life is thus a key apocalyptic characteristic of the messianic era according to Nissim, who imparted this apocalyptic foundation to his close circle. From remnants of Yosef of Zaragoza’s c­ ommentary on the Torah, we learn that he endowed the world to come with a certain material dimension. Yosef explained the essence of the heavenly manna as an emanation of “light, splendor, and glory” that is expressed in two ways: in the spiritual world it is an abstract emanation that nourishes the angels, and in the material world it is concretized as the s­ ustenance of the desert generation. This explanation was framed in the terms of the Mekhilta ­statement—“This day you will not find it . . . but you will find it in the world to come”: One might understand from this that it [manna] will be found in the world to come, meaning that those in the world to come who do not merit eternal enjoyment of the splendor of the Shekhinah will enjoy the material manifestation of that splendor, as did the desert g­ eneration; or [one might understand from this that] may it be God’s will that you 74 Ran, Derashot, 164. Moreover, Nissim accepted Nahmanides’ view stating that, although the soul is a spiritual entity, it is spatially confined due to the material traces: “Obviously, all agree that the soul is neither a body nor a force in the body but, nevertheless, because it has dwelt in the body, it is construed by material ideas. Consequently, after the separation [from the body], it must dwell in a material place and the conclusion that was drawn [from this] was that Eden is in the nether world” (Ran, Derashot, 113). 75 Ibid., 94. 76 Ibid., 121.

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find it in the world to come, meaning that in the world to come one only enjoys the splendor, as the rabbis, of blessed memory, literally stated—in the world to come there is neither eating nor drinking, and the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads and enjoy the splendor of the Shekhinah.77

According to the former interpretation, two levels of emanation will be found in the world to come, adapted to the hierarchy of its inhabitants—the higher rank will enjoy the spiritual aspect of the emanation and the lower one the material aspect. According to the latter interpretation, only the spiritual manifestation of manna will be found in the world to come. The distinction between these two interpretations is essential to the definition: according to the former one, the world to come has a distinctive material dimension, whereas according to the latter, it will be characterized solely by spiritual enjoyment. The rest of this commentary has not reached us so we do not know Yosef of Zaragoza’s decision, but, like his teacher—Nissim—he wavered between the two approaches. Finally, Menachem b. Zerah devoted a special chapter—the sixth ­chapter from the third principle of the fifth section—to the confrontation between ­individual naturalistic redemption and apocalyptic redemption. Throughout the chapter, his formulations remain hesitant and u ­ ncommitted. He would obviously prefer to avoid choosing, but a book encompassing the halakhic as well as the philosophical foundations of Judaism cannot avoid dealing with this subtle issue. Menachem therefore opted for quoting both views, although his preference can be glimpsed through his hesitations. In the chapter mentioned, he writes as follows: I am not wise enough to choose between these two inspiring notions [literal: mountains—abarot], and I think it is impossible to apprehend this matter to the end because it is the Holy One, may He be blessed, who knows the mystery of these matters. In many places, however, the rabbis side with the second [apocalyptic] view in their literal ­understanding and, on these matters, we should not follow reason without relying on the teachings of the prophets to ensure we have understood them correctly.78 77 Yosef of Zaragoza, Commentary on the Bible attributed to [R. Joseph b. David] a disciple of R. Nissim b. Reuben Gerondi (Ran), ed. Leon A. Feldman (Jerusalem: Institute Shalem, 1970), 153-154 [Heb]. The citation is from Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, trans. Jacob Z. Lauterbach, Tractate Vayassa, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 2004), 244, on Exodus 16:25. 78 Tsedah la-Derekh, 150c. The call to return to a literal reading of Scripture and homilies appears also in ibid., 150b,

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Menachem, then, ultimately leaned in a messianic apocalyptic direction. He describes the apocalyptic view as upholding a clear messianic orientation made up of several stages—a concrete paradise and a concrete Gehenna, the days of the messiah, the day of judgment and the resurrection, the world to come. In the last stage “the body will return like the soul . . . and all will exist forever and for all eternity.” In the course of the discussion he also notes the source of this approach—Nahmanides’ Gate of Reward.79 Maimonides, as noted, chose naturalism for a number of reasons, ­including the demand of individual intellectual redemption and the ­preservation of Halakhah. The circle around Rashba was forced to ­preserve the naturalistic model mainly to preserve Halakhah but also due to the importance of the intellectual ideal. Thinkers in this circle, h ­ owever, were almost unreservedly committed to the literal meaning of ­homiletic ­statements, which they viewed as a direct expression of revelation, and thus could not avoid repeated reference to the apocalyptic m ­ essianic heritage. The legacy of fantasy slowly gained legitimacy, and finally seems to have tilted the balance. Ultimately, the positions of Saadia and Nahmanides are the ones that set the messianic foundation of Rashba’s circle. Phenomenologically, however, a dialectic tension prevails between the apocalyptic and the n ­ aturalistic approaches that is far deeper than the thirteenth-century ­polarization found, for example, in the book of Hillel b. Shmuel.

Again: Revealed and Concealed The sharp messianic tension between apocalypse and naturalism was absorbed into systematic philosophical doctrines. Thinkers such as Gersonides and Hasdai Crescas, who were mainly concerned with p ­ rofound p ­ hilosophical questions, preserved the tension between apocalypse and ­naturalism that reached culmination in the circle combining Halakhah, ­ exegesis, and ­philosophy founded by Rashba. The tension is uniquely reflected in Gersonides’ thought, which is almost unparalleled in medieval philosophy. In his extensive ­ biblical commentaries, Gersonides unreservedly supports an apocalyptic ­ approach.80 One out of many examples of this apocalyptic style is the where he compares supporting the philosophical view of the world to “keeping company with heretics.” 79 Ibid., 150d. See also end of ch. 2 above. 80 On this issue see, at length, Menachem Kellner, “Gersonides on Miracles, the Messiah, and Resurrection,” Daat 4

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­ resentation of the messiah’s future miracles as surpassing those of Moses. p Gersonides writes: And indeed, the truth compelled by this verse is that there was no other prophet like Moses, who was a prophet only to Israel. But there will be a prophet to the nations of the world as well, and he is the king messiah, as it is said in the midrash, “Behold, my servant shall prosper,”81 who will be greater than Moses. And his miracles will also be found to be greater than those of Moses because, whereas Moses through his miracles drew only Israel to the service of the Lord, he will draw all the nations to the service of the Lord, may He be blessed, as it says, “For then I will convert the peoples to a purer language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve Him with one consent” (Zephaniah 3:9). This will indeed happen through a wondrous miracle that will be seen by all nations to the ends of the earth, and that is the resurrection.82

Three clear-cut and unequivocal apocalyptic motifs emerge from this ­exegesis by Gersonides: (1) The messiah as a miraculous figure. (2) Messianic miracles as far greater than biblical ones. (3) The connection between the days of the messiah and the resurrection, that is, the m ­ essianic o ­ rientation. Apocalyptic utterances such as these ones are frequent in Gersonides’ b ­ iblical commentaries. By contrast, in his profound philosophical treatise Milhamot ha-Shem [The Wars of the Lord], Gersonides does not address the ­messianic ­question in any essential way. Like Maimonides, Gersonides drew d ­istinctions between various types of works, separating biblical commentaries from texts that are distinctly philosophical and theological. This similarity between them, however, is also accompanied by a fundamental d ­ ifference: when Maimonides separated his halakhic texts (the introduction to Perek Helek and the Mishneh Torah) from The Guide of the Perplexed (which hardly ever considers the standing of messianism), he did so deliberately, transparently, and without any esoteric intention. He openly and ­daringly (1980): 5-34. See also Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et theólogique de Gersonide (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973), 528-537; Gad Freudenthal, “Levi ben Gershom as a Scientist: Physics, Astrology, and Eschatology,” Proceedings of the Tenth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Division C, Vol. 1 (1990): 65-72. 81 See Isaiah 52:13. Gersonides was apparently referring to Midrash Tanhuma (S. Buber Recension), trans. John T. Townsend (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1989), vol. 1, Genesis 6:20, Toldot: “This is the Messianic King . . . more than Abraham, . . . more than Moses, . . . more than the ministering angels” (166-167). Cf. also ibid., Genesis 6:14. 82 Gersonides, Commentary on the Bible (Venice, 1547), 198 [Heb].

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argued that messianic theories are merely an unessential incentive to study and ­learning. Scholars know their purpose without any recourse to ­promises about the future, which they find redundant. The Guide of the Perplexed is a treatise intended for such scholars and, therefore, messianism has no place in it. By contrast, Gersonides downplayed his true intention in a mist of contradictions and inconsistencies given that his systematic philosophy—on the intellect, on conjunctio, or on providence—leaves no room for serious apocalyptic messianism, in total contrast with his biblical exegesis and his casual references to it in Milhamot ha-Shem.83 I turn now to Crescas, who also refrained from categorical distinctions between apocalyptic and naturalistic messianism, though he did favor the latter.84 Crescas’ messianic discussions include mixed motifs in an attempt to cover all options. He completely ignores the material dimension of ­messianic events in his discussion on the immortality of the soul, which he views as eternal. By contrast, in his messianic discussions, he does not reject outright all apocalyptic ideas, such as eternal material life. I begin with a brief review of the immortality of the soul question in Or Adonai [The Light of the Lord]. In order to substantiate the i­ mmortality of the soul, Crescas endorsed Avicenna’s well-known argument, as follows: the soul is in the category of an autonomous spiritual substance; the ­connection between soul and body is accidental rather than essential; therefore, since the soul is an eternal substance, we need not assume its extinction at any given time. When the body perishes, then, it does not take the soul with it. Crescas’ argument is cited below in two versions. In the second one, Crescas also presents his view of communion, in his own unique style: And I say that the soul, which survives after death, will survive ­eternally in nature, by itself, unchanging either in the species or in the i­ ndividual, following the Torah’s decree and in accord with ­philosophical study. . . . And we said “will survive eternally in nature” because it does not, in itself, contain the causes of its corruption. Therefore, unless it is pun83 On Milhamot ha-Shem as an esoteric text, see Shlomo Pines, “Some Views Put Forward by the Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher Yitzhak Pulgar and Some Parallel Views Expressed by Spinoza,” in Studies of Jewish Mysticism, Philosophy, and Ethical Literature Presented to Isaiah Tishby on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday, ed. Joseph Dan and Joseph Hacker (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986), 447-457 [Heb]. Cf. Dov Schwartz, “On Gersonides as a Scientist,” Pe´amim 54 (1993): 136 [Heb]. Note that another thinker who was also deeply influenced by Gersonides, Shem-Tov Ibn Shaprut, formulated a natural messianic doctrine based on Gersonides’ astrological terms. See Frimer and Schwartz, The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut, 141. 84 On this question, see Simha B. Urbach, Pillars of Jewish Thought, vol. 4 (Jerusalem: WZO, 1982), 1156-1193 [Heb]; Warren Z. Harvey, Rabbi Hasdai Crescas (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 2010), 151-161 [Heb].

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ished as required by the tradition or by divine decree, it will survive eternally in nature.85 Therefore, what we need to say to affirm the survival of the soul is that, once the soul has been defined as an intellectual substance that does not contain the causes of its corruption, when the soul becomes perfected in conjunction and in love through what it apprehends of the Torah and of the wonders of God, may He be blessed, it befits it to remain in its perfection and in a strong conjunction. . . . What is fitting and required is for that spiritual part not to be corrupted, as the material part clearly will when it returns to its simple elements. Immortality is thus demonstrated and necessary per se, in accord with true philosophical study.86

Crescas, then, distinguished between eternal reward and punishment. The soul’s eternal reward is to be understood according to Avicenna’s ­philosophical approach, that is, as immortal pleasure and happiness. Crescas added love and communion (“strong conjunction”), which play a central role in his teachings. This addition, rooted in Crescas’ c­ onceptual and Torah world, is built on the philosophical notion of immortality. Crescas was highly critical of i­ntellectual immortality in its philosophical version, but he did accept the abstract survival of the soul after death. By contrast, the soul’s punishment should be understood only according to the ­“tradition” [kabbalah]. Punishment, then, has no solid philosophical foundation and rests solely on rabbinic tradition. In the discussion on the soul’s fate after death, then, Crescas unreservedly supported the idea of immortality, both after the death of the individual and after the r­ esurrection of the dead in general. In both cases, the soul will return to its eternal abstract existence, without any material dimension.87 Crescas imparted this approach to his close disciples, Zerahiah Halevi and Abraham b. Judah Leon, and they too

85 Or Adonai, book 3, part 2, ch. 1. Cf. book 3, part 3, end of ch. 1. Passages are translations of first printing (Ferrara, 1555—offset, 1984), introduction by Eliezer Schweid, 1984 [Heb]. On Crescas’ psychology and on his criticism of intellectual communion, see the following exhaustive studies by Warren Zev Harvey: Crescas’ Critique of the Theory of the Acquired Intellect (PhD diss., Columbia University, New York, 1973—University of Michigan, No. 74-1488); “Crescas versus Maimonides on Knowledge and Pleasure,” in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture-Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Ruth Link-Salinger (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 119; “Hasdai Crescas and Bernat Metge on the Soul,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 5 (1986): 141-154 [Heb]. 86 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 3, part 2, ch. 2. In his polemical treatise, Crescas emphasized the loss of the sinful soul. See Hasdai Crescas, The Refutation of the Christian Principles, trans. Daniel Lasker (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 76. See also ibid., introduction, 12-14. 87 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 3, part 4, chs. 3-4.

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held that the reward is “spiritual,” and occurs “when [man] removes his soiled clothes.”88 Crescas, however, was not entirely consistent on the matter of the soul’s abstract immortality. His hesitancy and indecisiveness on immortality are evident in four separate discussions: 1) Crescas recognized the eternal punishment of the soul according to the hierarchy determined by the rabbis. He pondered a problem similar to that of Avicenna—the basis for eternal punishment— and inclined toward Maimonides’ solution—an ontological attack on the existence of evil. He articulated his view on the elimination of evil as follows: Given that this matter cannot be grasped by reason, one imagines that the final corruption after the sorrow seemingly suffered in Gehenna is the corruption in the very nature of the substance’s disposition, as if the spirit had been left naked and lacking any disposition at all, resembling the ashes that remain after something is burnt.89

 rescas seems to have stopped short of endorsing complete anniC hilation, though he is clearly not entirely at peace with his decision in favor of the tradition (kabbalah). 2) Crescas did not entirely reject the transmigration of souls either as did, for example, Avicenna.90 As noted, the transmigration theory entails essential messianic implications. 3) In Crescas’ brief presentation of the dispute between Ramah and Nahmanides on the one hand and the rationalists on the other, he described the former’s position as supporting the eternity of both body and soul (“the resurrected will not die”). On this view, 88 See, for example, Zerahia’s homily on Genesis 22:14, Houghton Ms. 61, 156b-157a. For a critical edition of the homily, see Ari Ackerman, “Zerahia Halevi’s Sermon on Genesis 22:14” (MA thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993); idem, The Sermons of R. Zerahya Halevi Saladin (Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 2012) [Heb]. See also Shalom Rosenberg, “The Arba´ah Turim of Rabbi Abraham bar Judah, Disciple of Don Hasdai Crescas,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 3 (1984): 591 [Heb]. Crescas bequeathed his critique of the intellectual view of immortality to his successors, such as Shabtai Bilbo. See Aviezer Ravitzky, “A Kabbalistic Confutation of Philosophy: The Fifteenth-Century Debate in Candia,” Tarbiz 58 (1989): 475-480 [Heb]. 89 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 3, part 3, ch. 3. 90 Warren Zev Harvey, “Kabbalistic Elements in Crescas’ Light of the Lord,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 2 (1983): 101-103 [Heb]. Cf. Dov Schwartz, “The Criticism on the Doctrine of Transmigration of Souls in the Middle Ages,” Mahanayim 6 (1994): 104-113 [Heb].

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he explicitly stated: “And a literal understanding of our rabbis’ ­sayings will support this view.”91 4) He agreed with Nahmanides and Nissim, his own teacher, that the soul is confined to a place and that paradise and Gehenna are actual, real places.92 Indeed, supporting the immortality of the soul did not prevent Crescas from presenting apocalyptic views in his discussion on redemption and resurrection, as shown below. Following is an analysis of Crescas’ discussions directly concerned with messianism. Crescas was aware of the contest between the ­apocalyptic and naturalistic models, but he refused to take a stand, and even presented ­contradictory views in his discussions in Parts Four and Eight in Book Three of Or Adonai. His initial statements on the messiah and his times present the confrontation in clear terms, but without resolving it: “And the dispute hinges on whether or not anything will happen in the days of the messiah beyond the natural design, as found in some of the aims stated in the ­prophets.”93 From what follows, Crescas appears to lean in a ­naturalistic direction. He cites Shmuel’s statement, “the sole difference between this world and the days of the messiah is delivery from bondage to foreign powers,” and adds, “And the sages of that time appear to have supported it.” According to this naturalistic tendency, the key feature of the “days of the messiah” is the ­universal repair of the world, dominated by the worship of God.94 Concerning resurrection, however, Crescas actually inclined toward the view of its occurrence in the days of the messiah. This era, then, is no longer part of a distinctly natural context. Crescas held that the sources support the combination of resurrection and the building of the Temple. He therefore faced a problem: Shmuel’s statement, which Crescas viewed as an unquestionably authoritative source, points merely to political change (“bondage to foreign powers”). In the wake of this discrepancy, Crescas’ ­attitude toward Shmuel’s statement changed: “And indeed, Shmuel’s saying is not agreed in the Gemarah, because some of the sages dispute it.”95 Crescas sought a way 91 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 3, part 4, ch. 1. For the rest of Crescas’ discussion there, see below. 92 Ibid., book 4, Derush 9. Cf. Sara Klein-Braslavy, “Gan Eden et Gehinom dans le système de Hasdai Crescas,” in Hommage à Georges Vajda: Études d’histoire et de pensée juives, ed. Gérard Nahon and Charles Touati (Louvain: Peeters, 1980), 263-278. 93 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 4, part 8, ch. 1. 94 Ibid., book 4, part 8, ch. 2. This principle, too, left its impression on Crescas’ disciples and Zerahia Halevi writes in his homily: “And when the messiah arrives, the Lord will repair hearts and thoughts, and they will pray to him for a straight path” (he-Halutz 7 [1865]: 101). 95 Crescas, Or Adonai, book 4, part 4, ch. 1. This contradictory determination might explain the fact that Crescas split

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out from this entanglement and stated that the Temple would not be built immediately upon the messiah’s arrival. Clearly, however, it would be built in the messianic era, though perhaps not “­ immediately upon the messiah’s coming.” Moreover, Crescas did not refrain from apocalyptic overtones when presenting the resurrection as the day of the Lord. Note the following: Already in a literal reading, the prophecies show that the great and dreadful day will begin at the time of the resurrection. . . . And this miracle will be performed by Elijah, may he soon be revealed, as it is said, “Behold, I will send you Elijah, the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord” (Malachi 3:23). And it should have happened already, since all that is found in Scripture about the miracles of the Lord happened through the prophet and not through someone else . . . and this great miracle should have happened through the prophet after he turned into an angel in body and soul, as was true of Elijah, of blessed memory.96

Maimonides, as noted, avoided recognizing the historical Elijah as the prophet who would come at the time of the redemption. To Maimonides’ rationalist disciples in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Elijah’s future appearance seemed even less real, and he turned into a symbol of wisdom and knowledge. Crescas, however, hinted at similarities in the ­personalities and miracles of Elijah and the future prophet, and he ­presented a ­messianic doctrine suffused with non-natural motifs. He did not ­confine himself to a Maimonidean variety of the naturalistic approach and veered in a ­naturalistic direction, probably because the Torah’s ­eternity was ­crucial for him. He even devoted to this issue Part Five in Book Three of Or Adonai and Chapter Nine in The Refutation of the Christian Principles. The a­pocalyptic tradition, however, did not allow Crescas to present a coherent and ­consistent view, and he wavered between the naturalistic and ­apocalyptic poles without reaching a final decision. In sum: the power of the messianic idea, evident in the growing ­tension between apocalyptic and naturalistic messianism, is also evident in the work of systematic philosophers such as Gersonides and Crescas, who represent the deepest, most insightful, and most innovative philosophical endeavor in post-Maimonidean Jewish philosophy. And yet, when coming off the discussion of resurrection from that of messianic days and placed between them a series of topics that are not directly related to either (Moses’ prophecy, urim ve-tumim, and so forth). This split blurs the contradictions for someone reading the chapters in order. 96 Ibid. See also ibid., ch. 2. The text may be playing here on the double meaning of the term malakh in Hebrew, as both emissary and angel.

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to deal with the messianic idea, both these thinkers recoiled from p ­ resenting deep and penetrating analytical arguments and retreated at times to an apocalyptic approach, while somehow combining it with n ­ atural trends. Systemically, Gersonides and Crescas clearly favored messianic naturalism, each for his own reasons, but both avoided saying so clearly and openly. An incisive thinker like Gersonides and a critical thinker like Crescas refused to clarify their authentic messianic views, and thereby contributed to the ­preservation of the tension between the models. Furthermore, the messianic doctrines of both these thinkers point to the erosive effects of apocalyptic thought during the fourteenth ­century. Maimonidean naturalism was no longer the single prevalent view for ­rationalists, and apocalyptic motifs paved their way toward legitimacy. Beside radical rationalists such as Shlomo Al-Constantini and Shmuel Ibn Zarza, who threatened to dismantle concrete messianism altogether, a ­parallel trend developed within rationalist thought that began conferring legitimacy on the apocalyptic version of messianism.

Incisive Criticism Not all rationalists were indifferent to the gradual but sure rise of ­apocalyptic messianism. Some thinkers decried the decline of rationalism and the ­marginalization of its intellectual ideals, and even pointed to the dangers they thought to be latent in apocalyptic messianism. These ­rationalist ­critics include radicals and moderates. I present below several fourteenth-century critiques targeting apocalyptic messianism from different directions and reflecting the responses of rationalist circles to its re-emergence. I open with Yitzhak Pulgar, who bitingly mocked supporters of ­apocalyptic messianism. Note that Pulgar had reservations about the central role that various thinkers assigned to messianism in general. Although he purportedly acknowledged that the days of the messiah would indeed come and even cited many sources in this regard,97 he unequivocally opens with a dogmatic statement: “It is unworthy for any scholar to believe that our faith depends on the coming of the messiah, and doubts about his coming should not weaken anyone’s faith in any part of our 97 This is the topic of Section 6 in Part 1 of Ezer ha-Dat. See Yitzhak Pulgar, Ezer ha-Dat, ed. Yaakov Levinger (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1984), 57-60 [Heb]. Pulgar’s interest was obviously mainly polemical, directed against the Christian belief that the messiah had already arrived. Yitzhak Baer discussed Pulgar’s involvement in the polemic with Avner of Burgos. See Yitzhak Baer, “Sefer Minhat Kena’ot by Avner of Burgos and Its Influence on Hasdai Crescas,” Tarbiz 11 (1940): 188-206 [Heb].

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Torah.”98 Pulgar equates the world to come with the individual immortality of the soul, and he devotes lengthy discussions to this topic in two places in Ezer ha-Dat—Book Four of Part One and the whole of Part Five. His anger against the supporters of apocalyptic messianism was conveyed, as noted, in mocking statements, where he takes their conclusions ad absurdum. Consider Pulgar’s view against the material interpretation of the world to come concept: Some of us think that, in the world to come, we will eat tasty food and drink strong wines and delight in many sweet and dear and noble ­pleasures, greater than any attainable in this world. They also believe that they will remain and survive there in their bodies as they are here and will never die, to the point that if you ask a person some of whose children have died, how many children do you have, he may answer, for example, four, two in paradise and two in this world. They will think that death is merely a trip from one place to another, and they will fail to understand this even when seeing that the organs that enable these pleasures are lost, spoilt, and hidden in deep darkness when death comes.99

The blatant scorn in Pulgar’s words attests to the deep harm to the very core of classic rationalism. Pulgar is among the most radical rationalists in medieval Jewish philosophy. The most yearned-for and secret ideal of the rationalist, the immortality of the soul as embodied in the concept of the world to come, turned into a product of the whims and immature dreams of apocalyptic traditions. The material aspect of eternal redemption according to the ­apocalyptic version was a provocative issue to other rationalists as well. Levi b. Abraham implicitly criticized the source apparently assuming eternal life in a refined body, described in Moses’ survival without eating and drinking. He writes: And there are no bodies there [in the world to come] because, should there be, the placing of material organs would have been acting in vain, and God would never act in vain. Thus, we should not imagine Moses  98 Pulgar, Ezer ha-Dat, 57.  99 Ibid., 47. Pulgar relied on the figure of Moses, who retreated from material life, to highlight the eternal intellectual ideal that is completely detached from the material dimension (ibid., 51). Moses’ retreat apparently contributes to his stature and to that of prophecy in general in Pulgar’s teachings. See Pines, “Yitzhak Pulgar and Some Parallel Views Expressed by Spinoza,” 420-429; Dov Schwartz, “Yitzhak Pulgar, Shlomo Al-Constantin, and Spinoza: Views of Prophecy,” Assufot 4 (1990): 60-61 [Heb].

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and Elijah spending forty days without eating, since they later returned to use the organs in their body as at the beginning and went back to eat as at the start.100

Levi relied on the critique of Maimonides, who enlisted a classic ­philosophical argument against the apocalyptic motif of eternal life. Maimonides had argued that an eternal body without digestive and reproductive functions is in the category of an “action in vain.” The Holy One, blessed be He, would not engage in a vain action of this kind and, therefore, immortality entails no material dimension at all.101 Eleazar Ashkenazi b. Nathan ha-Bavli and Zechariah ha-Rofeh leveled a s­ imilar critique based on a pure rationalist interest, that is, against replacing true perfection—intellectual eternity—with apparent perfection. Eleazar Ashkenazi attacked the Saadian tradition that equates paradise with the world to come in order to ascribe a ­material dimension to it: “All these are worthless matters, far far away from any truth.”102 Zechariah stated that “happiness is life in the world to come, and the immortality of the soul means the immortality of its intelligibles and not the delight of the bodies, as the ignorant think.”103 Yitzhak b. Moses ha-Levi, known as Profiat Duran (Efodi), presented a different critical perspective on apocalyptic messianism. Duran played a significant role in the philosophical controversy with Christianity, and his starting point on this issue was also distinctly polemical. He was extremely critical of Christian theology for its failure to rise above the material ­conception of reward and for ignoring, in his view, abstract immortality. In his discussion of salvation following the original sin, Duran writes: Unlike the followers of the true Torah, they [Christians] did not see immortality as reflecting the truth and the essence of the soul and as one of the separate substances. Because they did not rise to the rung of grasping the intellectual world and thought of everything as ­material, 100 Levi b. Abraham, Livyat Hen, München Ms. 58, 111b (Livyat Hen: The Secrets of the Faith, The Gate of the Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel [Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University Press, 2014], 137). 101 “As the sages have all made clear, that there is no eating in it [the world to come], nor drinking, nor intercourse— it is obvious there is no body. God creates absolutely nothing in vain, makes things only for things” (“The Essay on Resurrection,” in Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham Halkin, discussions by David Hartman [Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1985], 220). See also The Guide of the Perplexed III:25. 102 Eleazar Ashkenazi, Zafenath Paneach, ed. Solomon Rappaport (Johannesburg: Kayor, 1965), 78. Eleazar holds it to be unquestionable that the world to come refers to the abstract immortality of the soul, and paradise is a symbol of the enlightening process that ensures immortality. See 116-117 above. 103 Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets on Leviticus, ed. Meir Havatselet (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1990), 35 [Heb].

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and of the soul too as material, though of a gentle matter. . . . And everything is indeed material and it would be heresy to turn this into a parable and a metaphor.104

Duran was also critical of another Christian idea, and stated: Believers in him [Jesus] will return after death and live forever in body and soul as angels of God whereas others will go in body and soul to Gehenna . . . and they call this life eternal life and also the kingdom of heaven, because in that resurrection will be the day of judgment when they will be granted that life, and he [Jesus] is the first of the resurrected.105

Duran, then, ascribed to Christianity the material view of the soul and, in its wake, the material dimension of eschatology. Clearly, then, he viewed apocalyptic messianism as a Christian phenomenon. One can hardly doubt Duran’s awareness of the pervasiveness of apocalyptic traces in messianic thought as, for example, in Nahmanides’ teachings. Nevertheless, he was strongly critical of it and equated it with the most dangerous religious enemy of Spanish Jewry at the time of the 1391 persecutions—Christianity. In his view, Judaism is characterized by the attainment of “the spiritual world through study and practice”106 whereas Christianity focuses on an eternal life that is distinctly material.

104 Profiat Duran “The Reproach of the Gentiles,” in The Polemical Writings of Profiat Durant, ed. Frank Talmage (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center and Dinur Center, 1981), 20, [Heb]. 105 Ibid., xxiii, xxvi. 106 “Be Not Like Unto Thy Fathers,” in ibid., 79. A few years after the writing of the letter, Yosef Ibn Shem Tov wrote a commentary on it and ad locum, he notes: “And this Torah should not be changed because, by studying it, the soul will be brought to the spiritual world, meaning to the secrets of reality, and to the act of Creation [ma’aseh bereshit] and the mystery of the chariot [ma’aseh merkavah]; and from the action, on to the rectitude of the p­ olitical commandments found within it, be it in the conduct of the state or in the conduct of the house and the individual virtues . . . because the Torah takes the soul back to the holy place from which it was carved” (“Be Not Like Unto Thy Fathers,” letter by Profiat Duran with the commentary of Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, ed. Zeev Poznansky, Jerusalem National University Library offset 8o 757, [1970], 12-134) [Heb]. See also Crescas, The Refutation of the Christian Principles, 41. Duran’s critique should be contrasted with the opposite traditionalist critique, which pinned all troubles—including the forced disputations with Christianity—on individual redemption in its philosophical version. Following are, for example, Shlomo Bonfed’s comments on “the helplessness of faith”: “Many of those living in exile are left hopeless and cite strangers’ counsel to uproot the sources of religion, and the pious of the generation come to believe that study is of the essence and action is secondary. Their folly thus leads them to believe that the Torah was only necessary for the masses of the people who have grown used to faith and tradition, and that knowledge and apprehension of the Lord is unrelated to human success, which requires study of Aristotle’s books of nature and metaphysics . . .” (Aharon Kaminka, “Poems by R. Shlomo Bonfed,” Ha-Tsofeh le-Hokhmat Israel 12 [1928]: 40 [Heb]). See also Abraham Gross, “The Poet Solomon Bonfed and the Events of His Time,” in The Frank Talmage Memorial Volume, ed. Barry Walfish, vol. 1, Hebrew section (Haifa: Haifa University Press, 1993), 36 [Heb].

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I conclude with another polemical argument, this time targeting apocalyptic messianism in its Muslim garb. Perahiyya b. Meshulam wrote responsa on philosophical questions, many of them focusing on the ­elucidation of various messianic terms. Perahiyya unequivocally c­ larified that, after death, the body collapses into its elements and therefore lacks any personal ascription. He followed Maimonides to the letter and stated that, after death, the learned retain their form and the wicked lose it. Relying on this conceptual background, he criticizes the material conception of ­paradise as material life after death: But believers in paradise say that, after the soul separates from the body, it will return to it and will be carried from the grave and brought to paradise, where it will be pampered and delight in many material pleasures such as eating and drinking and sexual intercourse. This will be so if his deeds in this world were good. And if his deeds were bad, the opposite of this delight will befall him, meaning he will be tormented and pained by being deprived of these pleasures that they invented, and will suffer and burn in Gehenna.107

Perahiyya apparently presented here the idea of paradise and Gehenna as articulated in the texts of his Muslim surroundings in Yemen, stating that the righteous will enjoy material delights after death and the wicked will be subject to physical torments.108 He rejected this approach with the simple argument that one can actually see that the body does not abandon the grave. Perahiyya was aware that Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) doubted the absolute evidence of the senses, but he never took this approach into account. This is thus yet another example of the Maimonidean r­ ationalist approach that uncompromisingly rejects apocalyptic manifestations of messianism. Apocalyptic messianism was thus a target of serious critiques whose common leitmotif is a polemical interest. Most of the critiques did not deal with it seriously, and fourteenth-century rationalists generally adopted a sarcastic stance toward it, lacking any depth. But Pulgar, Duran, Perahiyya, 107 Yosef Kafih, “Forty Questions and Answers on Philosophy to R. Perahiyya b. R. Meshulam,” in Collected Papers, ed. Yosef Tobi (Jerusalem: E’eleh Bethamar, 1989), 149-150 [Heb]. The Maimonidean conception of immortality is formulated in pp. 155, 179ff. Perahiyya clearly stated: “What is left is the simple intellect, without any complexity or multiplicity—all it is is its knowledge, and its knowledge is it” (ibid., 182). 108 See, for example, William C. Chittick, “Eschatology,” in Islamic Spirituality, vol. 2, Manifestations, ed. Seyeed Hossein Nasr (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 380. Perahiyya was obviously disregarding here the many Muslim philosophical interpretations in Neoplatonic and Aristotelian versions, which shifted the eschatological aims to the pure spiritual level. He therefore entered into a polemic with the theological and popular interpretation of the messianic elements in the Quran.

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and their rationalist colleagues could no longer stop the spread of the ­prevalent apocalyptic traditions. Together with the noted decline in the exclusivity of messianic naturalism, the apocalyptic approach according to Saadia, Ramah, and Nahmanides moved toward legitimate recognition, a process that unfolded in the course of the fourteenth century, mainly in moderate philosophical circles.

Toward a Solution In light of the intensifying undercurrents of messianic tension, the beginning of attempts seeking a clear formulation of the various ­alternatives, and even a resolution of the tensions, is worth noting. No ­information is available on Shlomo b. Abraham Peniel, who wrote a book on ­astrological and rationalist elements, Or Einayim. A plausible a­ ssumption is that this unknown writer was active in the middle or the end of the ­fourteenth century. According to Peniel, the world’s existence unfolds in cycles of seven-­ ­ thousand years each. The character of the cycle is exclusively ­determined by the heavenly bodies. Redemption will occur in the sixth and seventh millennia, though Peniel drew a sharp distinction between these two eras. The days of the messiah will occur in the sixth millennium, and ­resurrection in the seventh. Peniel described the days of the messiah in entirely natural terms: “The world follows its course . . . and the land must be tilled and kept [according to Genesis 2:15].”109 Although living long lives, as hinted in the verse “for the youngest shall die a hundred years old” (Isaiah 61:21), at the end of their lives people will die. The sixth ­millennium, then, is marked by events following an entirely natural course except for ­“delivery from bondage.” The apocalyptic descriptions, by c­ ontrast, will be fully ­realized in the seventh millennium, including the reframing of the ­astrological system and the abrogation of decrees affecting the planets. Consider the following description: Because I hold that the arrival of the seventh millennium will bring ­general renaissance to the people of Israel, and the dwellers in the dust will awake (Isaiah 26:19), contrary to the rules of the astrological system, and all Israel will be together for a thousand years [the seventh ­millennium] in their land forever and ever. And He will destroy death forever (Isaiah 109 Peniel, Or Einayim, 83.

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25:8) and the land shall yield its fruit,110 and bread will come from it without sowing and planting, and everything will be free in the field and they will eat its fruit . . . and the beasts in the field will also have a covenant of peace, as it is said, the wolf shall dwell with the lamb (Isaiah 11:6).111

Peniel did not give up on the motif of revenge from the nations either.112 He thus tried to solve the problem posed by messianic tension by drawing a clear split between the days of the messiah in their naturalistic version and resurrection in the apocalyptic view. This split is intimated in the writings of many thinkers who preceded Peniel, but he formulated it systematically in the context of a general cosmological conception. By presenting the models beside one another, Peniel anticipated the conceptual trends of mid-fifteenth-century philosophy. This ­simplistic ­reconciliation of messianic tension, however, is incompatible with the mainstream trends dominant in each approach. The rationalist interest, as it consolidated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, does not allow for this apocalyptic manifestation, even if the sixth millennium is ­construed in natural terms. In any event, Peniel’s doctrine is a landmark in messianic Jewish thought, marking the transition from hints to clarity and from undercurrents to open and transparent formulations.

SUMMARY Moderate Jewish rationalism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was characterized by a concealed struggle between apocalyptic ­messianism and messianic naturalism, a struggle that was waged below the surface. Apocalyptic and naturalistic motifs clashed with one another and spread through the texts of various moderate rationalists. The a­voidance of ­clear-cut decisions preserved the messianic tension, but also precluded clear definitions and the development of an unambiguous method. Note that 110 According to Leviticus 25:18. See also Nehemiah 9:36. 111 Peniel, Or Einayim, 84. The emphasis on the reversal of the astrological rules relates to Saturn’s rule in the seventh cycle, which compels “the destruction of the world” (ibid., 87). Cf. the text cited in the name of Moses b. Yehuda in Israel in the Diaspora: A Documentary History of the Jewish People from Its Beginning to the Present, ed. Benzion Dinur, vol. 2, book 3 (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968), 374 [Heb]. Furthermore, Saturn’s connection to the destiny of the Jewish people was at the center of a controversy that erupted in the mid-fourteenth century between Shlomo Franco and Abraham Altabib. See Dov Schwartz, “R. Abraham Al Tabib: The Man and His Endeavor,” Kiriyat Sefer 64 (19921993): 1389-1401 [Heb]; Schwartz, Studies on Astral Magic, 167-178. 112 Peniel, Or Einayim, 85. Note, however, that Peniel did not settle the question of individual redemption and he hints at the immortality of the soul. Though striving for a solution, he did not exhaust the issue.

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even the most radical thinkers downplayed their message and i­ ncorporated it into painstaking exegetical endeavors rather than conveying it in extreme and ostentatious declarations. Messianic tension thus came forth in a ­similar style among both radical and moderate rationalists. The results of this struggle were thus mutually complementary: (1) naturalism lost its exclusivity; (2) the apocalyptic approach carved a path toward recognition. These processes were accompanied by confrontations within each method that, as noted, took place below the surface. In the next stage of the tension between the two messianic approaches, these conceptual circumstances changed. The vagueness, the blurring, the hesitations—all were replaced by transparency and decisiveness. First, the mythical apocalyptic traditions emerged from their latency and proudly came up on stage. They came to play a central, legitimate, and systematic role in the philosophers’ thought, beside the messianic and naturalistic t­raditions. At the same time, radical rationalism and messianic ­allegorization declined, and quite a few of the thinkers who had upheld rationalism returned to Maimonides’ original teachings, but without rejecting a­ pocalyptic ­messianism, and even taking it into account. This stage, which unfolded mainly in the course of the fifteenth century, is the topic of the next chapter.

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Clarifying Positions: The Last Stage

From the mid-fifteenth century up to the expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula, Jewish rationalism underwent conceptual transformations that directly affected messianism and its inner tensions. Fundamentally, Jewish rationalism assumed a new garb. First, signs of the radical rationalism that had prevailed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were hardly ­evident after the murderous attacks of 1391 that, at least in Spain, shook the ­foundations of Jewish communal existence. I am not claiming that radical rationalists were not to be found at this time, and figures such as Elia del Medigo, Aaron Abulrabi, and others do attest to extremist p ­ ositions.1 But the influence of radical rationalists seemed to be ebbing and, as far as we know today, they were no longer historically or conceptually ­dominant at this time. Moderate rationalism developed in light of ­historical ­developments that left their imprint on the Jewish community in Spain and elsewhere.2 Second, Hasdai Crescas’ strong critique of Aristotelian ­philosophy e­ ssentially lacked any influence and, basically, mid-fifteenth-century ­rationalism ­continued to adhere to the Maimonidean approach. Historically, inklings of a deep messianic ferment became evident following the 1391 attacks, which ­persisted with ups and downs until the expulsion. This ferment certainly left a mark on the world of ideas as well. Many rationalists busied themselves with Kabbalah in the fifteenth century, and this is one of the crucial conceptual transformations of the time.3 The image of ordinary rationalists changed and they opened up to non-rationalist traditions, developments that directly influenced messianic  1 Cf. Dov Schwartz, “Divine Immanence in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 3 (1994): 275-277.   2 See, for example, Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, Continuity and Change, ed. Joseph R. Hacker (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1984), 275-277 [Heb]. See also Eric Lawee, “‘Israel has No Messiah’ in Late Medieval Spain,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 5 (1995): 245-279.   3 Shaul Regev, “Rationalism and Mysticism in Fifteenth-Century Jewish Thought,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 5 (1986): 155-189 [Heb]; Moshe Idel, “Jewish Thought in Medieval Spain,” in Moreshet Sepharad: The Sephardi Legacy, ed. Haim Beinart (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1992), 269-271 [Heb].

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approaches. Distinctly kabbalistic doctrines decisively affected the ­messianic conception at the time. Fifteenth-century rationalists did not engage in an independent messianic discourse, detached from its sources. Rather, they presented Maimonides’ model beside that of Saadia and Nahmanides as parallel alternatives. The former model emphasizes individual redemption in the immortality of the soul, which leads to messianic naturalism, while the latter supports apocalyptic redemption. Some proudly adopted the apocalyptic model, particularly those who had been influenced by ­kabbalistic thought. Other rationalists fundamentally rejected it but could no longer ignore it, and they formulated apocalyptic motifs beside the Maimonidean dominance. In the fourteenth century, ­messianic tension had been evident mostly in the casual and mixed appearance of hints and fragmented motifs, whereas in the mid-fifteenth century, the models leading to messianic, apocalyptic, and naturalistic tension appear beside one another. Hints and fragmented ideas thus became structured systems and actual alternatives in the second half of the ­fifteenth century, when the clarification of these positions and their ­separation accompanied rationalist philosophy. Both models ­underwent a process of differentiation and were juxtaposed almost every time a thinker faced a choice between them. Finally, note that even rationalists who had drawn away from Saadia, Abulafia (Ramah), and Nahmanides no longer preserved the original Maimonidean rationalism. Many of them assumed that, in addition to knowledge and wisdom, the practical service of God is equally ­important for human perfection and directly affects the ultimate human purpose. I turn, then, to a description of the conceptual transformations in the attitude toward messianic tension in the fifteenth century. I open with Maimonidean rationalist views, then review the intermediate positions, and close with the manifestations of apocalyptic messianism.

THE ADVANTAGE OF THE NATURALISTIC MODEL Extreme rationalism in the style of Averroes was not widespread in the fifteenth century, as noted. Even thinkers who clung as far as possible to the Maimonidean tradition no longer accepted it in its pure version, as evident in the view claiming that the Torah and its commandments are equivalent, or in some ways even preferable, to the intellectual ideal. One group of thinkers, however, did remain loyal to the general lines of natural

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Maimonidean messianism, and includes Joseph Albo, Yitzhak Arama, and Abraham Shalom.

The Polemic with the Apocalyptic Approach Of these three thinkers, Joseph Albo was the one who engaged in the ­deepest and most comprehensive discussions of the messianic view. Like Crescas, Albo contrasted the natural Maimonidean model with the apocalyptic Saadian model, siding with the former and defending its validity. Contrary to Crescas, however, who addressed the tension between these two models briefly and randomly in the course of an intricate discussion, Albo conducted a systematic analysis in the light of these models and grappled with them continuously, going beyond hermeneutical aspects of the messianic issue and addressing philosophical and substantive questions as well. Arama adopted a similar approach, but related only casually to the messianic issue. In Chapters 30-34 of Sefer ha-Ikkarim, Section 4, Albo presents two parallel approaches. One is that of Maimonides, stating that the ultimate reward is eternal intellectual communion. This view relies to some extent on Avicenna’s notion of the balanced customs and inclinations that people acquire in the course of their lives, which enable them to devote themselves to learning, knowledge, and the acquisition of intellectual immortality.4 The other messianic aims will be attained in the material world.   4 “When the soul parts from the body after death, she longs eagerly for her natural activity, which is connected with her understanding, namely, to serve God, and at the same time she still has an inclination for the things to which she was accustomed while in the body” (Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, ed. Isaac Husik, vol. 4, [Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1946], Part 2, ch. 33, 324 [henceforth Sefer ha-Ikkarim]). On the term “accustomed,”see Avicenna, Kitāb al-najāt (Cairo, 1938), 296. Cf. A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sīnā (Avicenne) (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), 384-385. Note, however, that Albo changed the Maimonidean approach on two main counts: 1) In the determination (in the mentioned ch. 33) that observance and simple faith lead to the abstract ­immortality of the soul. Albo relied on the approach that action is an integral part of understanding and observance is therefore an element of intellectual perfection. See ibid., Section 3, ch. 5; Section 4, chs. 29, 40. Incidentally, the parable of the king that he seeks to rely upon in ch. 33 (327-328) resembles in general lines the parables of the king in The Kuzari (I:109, and mainly III:21). Cf. Julius Guttmann, Religion and Knowledge, ed. Samuel Hugo Bergman and Nathan Rotenstreich (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979) [Heb]. 2) On the punishment after death, Albo followed Avicenna rather than Maimonides. Maimonides, as noted, sided with the disappearance of the soul, whereas Albo held that the soul is in an eternal sorrow that is never ­dispelled, except for extreme evildoers who disappear after the twelve months in Gehenna (ibid., vol. 4, ch. 34). The reason for this difference is that Albo adopted the substantialist concept of the soul, as shown below. Other deviations from Maimonidean doctrine on the immortality of the soul are discussed below.

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Albo upheld Maimonides’ view stating that the world is indeed created but is eternal and will never decline, and messianic events will therefore take place within the real world of life and death.5 Beside this approach, Albo described briefly but in detail the approaches of Nahmanides, Ramah, Aharon ha-Levi, and “their school.” Into his description of this approach, Albo inserted the a­ pocalyptic signs that appear in Saadia’s doctrine and had been fully articulated during the controversies surrounding Maimonides’ writings, including the messianic orientation (Eden and Gehenna, the days of the messiah, the resurrection of the dead, and the world to come), the refined body, and eternal material life in the future. Consider the general description of the apocalyptic approach as it appears in Sefer ha-Ikkarim: Those who say that the main reward in the next world is conferred upon body and soul together, argue as follows: Since, as they believe, the soul lives and exists only in the body, and the body is an instrument of the soul, giving it existence so that it may perform the will of the Creator, it follows from the justice of God that He should compensate the body for the toil and trouble which it had in the service of God together with the soul. This reward consists in the entire person—body and soul—continuing to exist forever after the resurrection. This, they say, will happen when God will purify the matter of the body so that it becomes like the matter of the spheres or the stars. The body together with the soul will then exist forever as the stars exist, who are living and intelligent beings, having body and soul. . . .6 Rabbi Meir Halevi [Ramah, and in another version Aharon ha-Levi] and Nahmanides are of the opinion that after resurrection, the persons in question will live as long as their natural capacity permits them, and then their bodies will be transmuted by purification and will become like the body of Elijah. And thenceforth they will continue to exist as body and soul, but will no longer use any sense functions, will not eat or drink or die and will remain forever without eating and drinking. It seems too that this latter is the opinion of some of the Rabbis of the   5 “For the heavens and the earth are new, that is have come into being, according to the opinion of those who adhere to the Torah and believe in the creation of the world in time, and yet they exist before the Lord continually, i.e. they are eternal” (Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 41, 425).   6 Ibid., ch. 33, 322-323. See also Simcha Bunim Urbach, Pillars of Jewish Thought, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: WZO, 1972), 645646 [Heb].

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Talmud, for they say that the righteous whom God will resurrect will not return to dust [TB Sanhedrin 92a].7

These passages patently show that Albo ascribed to the supporters of ­apo­calyptic messianism a psychosomatic view, which assumes the soul’s essential dependence on either an ordinary or a refined body in the future. In his view, supporters of apocalyptic messianism are close to the view ­upholding the union of body and soul, even though the body is still defined as a means (“instrument”). This approach helped Albo reject apocalyptic messianism, as shown below. One feature characterizing Albo’s description of the ­apocalyptic stance is the determination that in the messianic era (“the world to come after the resurrection”), only the righteous will be present.8 Albo thus offered a systematic description of apocalyptic messianism, which can be addressed at the theoretical level. He therefore enlisted a series of q ­ uasi-philosophical claims (Section 4, end of chapter 30) to contradict the conceptual foundation of eternal life in the messianic era. The claims are:



1) An assumption of eternal bodily life implies that the human soul is not a substance existing independently of the body. Supporters of the apocalyptic stance are therefore compelled to admit that the intellect is a material disposition in the soul, as Alexander of Aphrodisias had argued. Albo, however, like many of his ­contemporaries who followed Neoplatonic psychology, held that the soul is a separate spiritual substance. 2) If body and soul are indeed one homogeneous eternal unit, it is impossible to explain the existence of the soul in the ­intermediate stage between death and resurrection, at a time when the soul exists on its own while the body has collapsed into its elements. Both these claims together focus on the weakness of the assumption about the dependence between body and soul. This is indeed a weak claim for those who support a substantialist concept of the

 7 Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 35, 347-348. See also ibid., 412-413.   8 “The second opinion is that though the perfectly righteous get material reward in this world, yet since their number is small, and the great majority of righteous men do not get corporeal reward in this world, there should be in the next world corporeal as well as spiritual reward. This comes, they say, after the resurrection when the soul and the body will exist in conjunction, but without food and drink” (ibid., ch. 30, 297). This could have been a truism, however, and Maimonides had already noted in his introduction to Perek Helek that resurrection is only for the righteous. See J. Abelson, “Maimonides on the Jewish Creed,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 19 (1906): 42 (this is a translation of Maimonides’ introduction to Perek Helek in his Commentary on the Mishnah).

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soul, and Albo is ­convinced that the rabbis had indeed unequivocally supported such a view. 3) The transition from a material body, which is made up of the four basic elements, to an eternal body that never perishes, is ­unintelligible. Moreover, the assumption of such a metamorphosis in the structure of the body ostensibly enables a similar change in the nature of the soul as well. Assuming the miraculous existence of a different kind of body is therefore unnecessary, and stating that the soul will change and will possess a new and eternal nature suffices. Another implicit problem is that, should such changes indeed occur in the future, the intermediate and the wicked will also have a share in the resurrection. These claims illustrate the character of Albo’s messianic discussions. All three claims together reveal that Albo used his philosophical knowledge to reject the conceptual aspects of the apocalyptic view. Nahmanides had already anticipated this argumentation when he stated that philosophical claims are inappropriate for understanding the soul’s fate and essence after death, and that Kabbalah and mysticism will replace rationalism.9 These claims, however, offer a good illustration of Albo’s philosophical course: preserving the rationalist legacy and strictly adhering to its framework insofar as the intellectual calling of the soul is concerned on the one hand, while continuously grappling with Nahmanides’ kabbalistic traditions on the other. Albo did not stop at abstract theoretical discussion. Quite the opposite. The hermeneutical interest is dominant in Albo’s messianic doctrine, and he devoted long chapters to proving that Scripture indeed conveys both the abstract immortality of the soul and the messianic goals compelled by such an approach. At the same time, he rejected the hermeneutical evidence that supporters of the apocalyptic view rely upon. In this realm, Albo chose to attack Ramah’s view in Kitāb Alrasāil. Here too, I will consider Albo’s course in rejecting the hermeneutical foundations of apocalyptic messianism, as conveyed in Sefer ha-Ikkarim (section 4, chapter 31). I present first Ramah’s view and then Albo’s claim: As we learned, these are the ones who have no share in the world to come: he who denies the resurrection of the dead, and some say, he who says there is no resurrection of the dead in the Torah. And the Gemarah says: Why so? And we learn that the Holy One, blessed

  9 See ch. 4 above.

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be He, returns measure for measure—since he denied the resurrection of the dead, he will have no share in the resurrection (TB Sanhedrin 90a). You learn, then, that the world to come considered here is the ­resurrection of the dead.10 But this inference is invalid, for we may say that the expression, ­“resurrection,” in this place denotes the reward of the soul and its life in the world of souls, which comes right after death. They call it ­resurrection of the dead in opposition to the Sadducees and the Samaritans who denied the immortality of the soul and said that the soul dies with the body. . . . I say, therefore, that the expression in the Mishnah: “All Israel have a share in the world to come,” refers to the reward of the soul after death, both that degree which man has after the resurrection and that which he has immediately after death.11

Ramah’s equation of the world to come with the resurrection of the dead relies on the explanation in the Gemarah of the Mishnah terms world to come and resurrection of the dead. By contrast, Albo claims that the phrase world to come is a generic term, pointing to any kind of ­specific reward after death.12 Albo’s view here is that there are two options of immortality for the soul—one applies after the current death, and the other after the death that follows resurrection. This resurrection is meant only for the righteous who did not attain full realization in their current life, such as Moses and Aaron, who did not enter the Promised Land and could not f­ ulfill the commandments depending on it.13 The second level of ­immortality thus ranks infinitely higher than the first, and not all merit it. So far, then, the approach presented by Albo is fundamentally Maimonidean. Note, however, that on matters of immortality and resurrection, Albo went much further than Maimonides. He refused to accept Maimonides’ consistent use of allegorization in regard to messianic sources. True, Albo stayed within the personal and naturalistic messianic framework that he had set for himself, but he also related seriously to the talmudic and ­midrashic sources on messianism and tried to understand them ­literally, using ­ ostensibly rationalist arguments for this purpose. For example, Albo discussed the midrashim that set a defined period of time—twelve months—separating death from the eternal reward. This period is mostly 10 Ramah, Kitāb Alrasail, 63-64. 11 Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 31, 307-308. 12 Ibid., 312. On the different meanings of the world to come, see below, 00. 13 Ibid., ch. 35.

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described as a “descent” and as Gehenna. Albo emphasized that ­breaking a habit and shifting to a new state causes suffering, as the transition from ­prolonged darkness to sudden exposure to light is painful to the eyes. Similarly, the soul’s exit from the corporeal state to a state of i­mmortality causes it to suffer, given that the soul has become accustomed to use the material powers and the concrete tools that had accompanied it in the ­process of learning, and learning is imperative for the immortality of the soul: “because she was accustomed to them at first when she needed the sensations and the ­corporeal powers in order by means of them to acquire the sensible images, from which the soul removed the elements of ­particularity, which is p ­ erishable, and retained the element of universality, which is permanent.”14 Although the soul moves from darkness to light, breaking the habit is ­difficult, and this difficulty lasts no less than twelve full months. Whether Albo interpreted the assigned time literally or saw it as a cathartic description of the soul after death cannot be ­determined for sure, but he clearly tried his utmost to adapt the sages’ utterance to the rationalist thought underlying the naturalistic model. This adaptation, however, is obviously not complete because immortality does not depend on any assigned time. Albo tried, as far as possible, to preserve the ­rationalist framework. The same determination applies to the midrash on the dew that the Holy One, blessed be He, will bring down to resurrect the dead.15 Albo clarified that the action of the dew is equivalent to that of semen, from which life grows. In other words, Albo genuinely tried to establish the process of immortality and resurrection, as it appears in the Midrash and the Talmud, on rationalist terms. One could also add here the ­arguments in Chapter 35 on the character of resurrection, which are also alien to the Maimonidean i­nterest in repressing and marginalizing the ­messianic idea. Finally, Albo also veered away from Maimonides in his view of the i­ mmortality of the soul as divine grace rather than as an entirely natural autonomous reward.16 14 Ibid., ch. 32, 318-319. See also ibid., ch. 31, 309-311. 15 See ch. 5 above. This issue is discussed in Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 35. 16 Ibid., chs. 36, 38. According to Albo, eternal life for the wicked, which follows cleansing and purification during twelve months in Gehenna, should be ascribed to divine grace: “Just as reward is made eternal by divine grace, though according to strict justice it should be temporary, so punishment is made temporary by divine grace, though according to strict justice it should be eternal” (ibid., ch. 38, 374; and see at length, ibid., ch. 50). Cf. Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2, From the Fourteenth Century to the Expulsion (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society, 1966), 232-234. In this context, note that the notion of salvation as based on divine grace is widespread in medieval Christian theology. See, for example, Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300) (Chicago: University of

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Albo definitely opted for the naturalistic model, citing corroborating evidence and supporting interpretations, even while deviating from it on many details. His approach, however, no longer fits solid Maimonidean naturalism, and mixed within it are non-Maimonidean elements such as the conception of immortality as a special sign of divine grace. Albo thereby reflects the times and the cultural background of the fifteenth c­entury. When dealing with messianism, however, he does present a new ­perspective on the messianic discourse in his painstaking attempts to p ­ resent the a­ pocalyptic approach as an actual alternative. Although he rejects ­apocalyptic ­messianism in principle, he does not question its ­legitimacy and admits the possibility of adapting it to Scripture and to other sources: Although this opinion [eternal life after the resurrection] seems strange, nevertheless it may be believed, since the mind can conceive it and [Moses’] experience testifies in its favor. . . . The best solution in this and similar cases is the answer R. Joshua b. Hananiah gave to the Alexandrians—“when they come to life again, we will consult about the matter” [according to TB Niddah 70b].17

The rationalist context, then, does not discriminate against the apocalyptic alternative that, throughout Albo’s discussions, is consistently present as a religious, philosophical, and hermeneutical challenge.

Displaying Indifference Yitzhak Arama and Abraham Shalom followed Maimonides’ affirmations as well as his negations. They did not engage in a systematic discussion of messianism nor did they consider it a topic worthy of independent and ­comprehensive treatment. In this sense, one could claim that they s­ upported the rationalist Maimonidean stance perhaps even more ­loyally than Albo. I open with Arama’s messianic statements. The topic of ­messianism is quite exceptional in the thought of Arama, who strongly opposed ­rationalist philosophy and showed deep respect for kabbalists and their theories. ­ Despite the broad scope of his Akedat Yitzhak treatise, Arama hardly refers to messianism. Except for casual laconic mentions, he does not ­systematically address issues such as resurrection or the days of the m ­ essiah. Arama’s ­reaction to the contemporary events, then, was not refracted through the Chicago Press, 1978), 25-26. Note also that Albo saw immortality as a direct effect of divine providence, and he even hinted that it does not fit “the regular course of nature”(Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 41, 404). 17 Ibid., 348. According to TB Niddah 70b.

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messianic prism. He thereby differed from the series of thinkers close to his conservative ­philosophy in his abstention from contrasting the two ­messianic alternatives presented by Maimonides and Nahmanides. Arama upheld the categorical statement that the ultimate future reward is the abstract immortality of the soul. In his view, “the most perfect ­happiness is the happiness of the soul and its immortality, enjoying eternal pleasure in the world of souls.”18 Individual immortality is attained when the human soul, which is essentially only a disposition, becomes a substance in the ­process of reaching perfection. Attaining perfection is a process involving ­knowledge and action, meaning both intellection and the worship of God.19 The ontic turn from disposition to substance ensures the soul’s eternal survival. Indeed, the determination of abstract and natural immortality in Arama’s doctrine was not dimmed by apocalyptic overtones. He also supported this a­ ssumption in his interpretation of other messianic terms—the days of the messiah and the resurrection of the dead. Arama described the days of the messiah relying on typical Maimonidean characteristics, as follows: 1) Directing humanity’s attention to the true human purpose—“when hearts will be circumcised to reach the human end.”20 2) The eternity of religious law: “The final and binding absolute ­obligation is that God’s Torah is perfect and nothing should be added to it nor detracted from it at any time.”21 3) Presenting the messiah as both a political and intellectual figure, who redeems the Jewish people from their exile and reveals the mysteries of the Torah.22 18 Yitzhak Arama, Akedat Yitzhak, vol. 3 (Pressburg, 1849), Section 70, 155a [Heb] (henceforth Akedat Yitzhak). The entire section is devoted to the question of immortality, an issue that is also reflected in further discussions, such as Section 55. 19 The change in the status of the soul from form to substance at the height of the intellection process appears already in Alfarabi’s writings, and Arama added to it the concept of the soul as a disposition in its early stages. Arama omitted the traditional rationalist context by dismissing the concept of the active intellect from the process of attaining excellence. For an extensive discussion of Arama’s theory of the soul and of immortality, see Sarah Heller-Wilensky, The Philosophy of Isaac Arama in the Framework of Philonic Philosophy (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute and Dvir, 1956), 137-148 [Heb]. See also the summary of Chaim Pearl, The Medieval Jewish Mind (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1971), 63, 66, 99. 20 Akedat Yitzhak, vol. 1, Section 33, 286b. Arama, as noted, defined the goal as the perfection of deeds as well. Cf. Heller-Wilensky, The Philosophy of Isaac Arama, 188. 21 Akedat Yitzhak, vol. 5, Section 105, 161a. Arama mentions there the kabbalistic perception of the Torah as combinations of God’s names, and hints at its connection with the theory of cycles. Nevertheless, he absolutely rejects the antinomian element in the shemitot theory, which states that for every cycle there will be a different Torah. See Moshe Idel, Absorbing Perfections: Kabbalah and Interpretation (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2002). 22 Heller-Wilensky, The Philosophy of Isaac Arama, 86-87.

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Arama, then, ascribed to naturalistic messianism an absolute advantage. True, he dimmed rationalist exclusivity by making religious action part of the individual perfection process. Similarly, he changed the character of messianic naturalism by emphasizing that, in the future messianic world, the purpose of humanity would be the worship of God and not necessarily only intellectual attainments. Moreover, he did not refrain from displaying awareness of apocalyptic traditions. Contextually, however, he remained on naturalistic ground and presented a natural messianic approach. Together with the determination that Arama did not acknowledge resurrection as a concrete independent event and probably equated it with the immortality of the soul, one may assert that he preserved the Maimonidean spirit while successfully adapting it to the emphases of fifteenth-century thought.23 Another thinker who leaned toward the Maimonidean approach was Abraham Shalom. Although Shalom devoted an extensive monograph— Neveh Shalom—to various conceptual and theological issues, he addressed the messianic issue only randomly and unsystematically. As is true of Arama, Shalom’s loyalty to Maimonides’ doctrine is evident in the three issues with messianic associations that he considered: 1)  The resurrection of the dead: Shalom discerned a distinctly ­miraculous dimension in resurrection, which Maimonides had already admitted. Shalom repeatedly argued that the d ­ etermination about resurrection is not easily reconcilable with scientific truth and cannot be demonstrated, but the notion of creation ex nihilo enables its acceptance.24 2) The immortality of the soul: On this issue as well, which Shalom addressed quite frequently, he decisively supported the idea that the soul survives eternally after death and “will ­neither be ­extinguished nor lost.”25 In one source, he indeed cites Nahmanides’ view that 23 See 124 above. One example of Arama’s adaptation to the fifteenth-century context is his determination that, in the future, predatory beasts will change their aggressive nature. He relies for this claim on the purportedly philosophical assumption that each level of existence (inanimate, vegetative, and so forth) draws on those below it. On the problem of predatory beasts killing others, Arama answered, “that will happen if the evil temper and corrupt nature remain in them from the days of the flood, and that is why the wolf will live with the lamb and so forth and they shall not hurt nor destroy and so forth is meant for the days of the messiah” (Akedat Yitzhak, vol. 2, Section 41, 79a). 24 Neveh Shalom, book 1, ch. 15, 22b. See also book 5, ch. 8, 79a. Cf. Herbert Alan Davidson, The Philosophy of Abraham Shalom: A Fifteenth-Century Exposition and Defense of Maimonides (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964), 99. As the subtitle indicates, Shalom indeed defended Maimonides’ position, including his messianic stance. 25 Neveh Shalom, book 11, ch. 5, 193b. See also book 7, part 1, ch. 6, 104b, and many other similar ones. Cf. Davidson, The

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the soul exists temporarily in paradise until, with ­resurrection, it returns to the body. Shalom ­clarifies, however, that the ­resurrection of the body is a temporary ­disposition and a preparation for the abstract immortality of the soul.26 3) The days of the messiah. The description of the days of the ­messiah in Neveh Shalom presents a series of classic naturalistic motifs. The permanence and stability of Halakhah—“which is eternal and unchanging”—is unquestionable for Shalom and, when ­validating this principle, he notes his source—the Laws of the Messiah in the Mishneh Torah.27 Furthermore, Shalom preserved the key ­characteristics of the days of the messiah—the renaissance of the people of Israel together with the defeat of the other nations (“our rulers will triumphantly return”),28 and the recognition of the value of knowledge (“spread wisdom among the people”).29 Arama and Shalom are thus keen supporters of Maimonides’ approach on the messianic question, including in their abstention from any serious discussion or independent analysis of it in their wide-ranging treatises. Their teachings, then, implement the Maimonidean demand of naturalistic ­messianism on the one hand, and marginalization of the topic on the other. In this sense, we might add to Arama and Shalom thinkers such as Joseph Hayyun of Portugal,30 David

Philosophy of Abraham Shalom, 85-89. Note that Abraham Shalom presented the eternal existence of the soul as a “peculiar property” (segulah) and also as a consequence of observing the commandments. See Neveh Shalom, book 8, ch. 6, 133a, 140b. This approach of presenting the commandments through a segulah was widespread in the fifteenth century. See, for example, Dov Rappel, “Preface to Ma’aseh Efod of Profiat Duran,” Sinai 100 (1987): 764-765 [Heb]; Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, Derashot (Venice, 1547), 64a, 64c (his messianic thought is discussed below). Cf. Dov Schwartz, Amulets, Properties and Rationalism in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2004), 116-135 [Heb]. 26 See Neveh Shalom, book 9, ch. 1, 151a. Resurrection is symbolized in the redemption blessing of the morning prayer, which parallels youth, whereas immortality is symbolized in the redemption of the evening prayer, which is the separation “of the soul from the body and will be perfect in actu.” 27 Neveh Shalom, book 1, ch. 3, 3b. Cf. ibid., book 10, ch. 4, 179a. 28 Ibid., book 2, ch. 9, 39b; book 4, ch. 1, 53a; book 7, part 1, ch. 8. 105a. On the significant role of politics in Shalom’s teachings, see Hava Tirosh-Rothschild, “The Political Philosophy of Rabbi Abraham Shalom: The Platonic Tradition,” in Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Eightieth Birthday, vol. 2, ed. Moshe Idel, Warren Zev Harvey, and Eliezer Schweid (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1990), 409-440, and particularly 438 [Heb]. 29 Neveh Shalom, book 1, ch. 16, 26b; book 5, ch. 11, 82a. 30 Hayyun clearly emphasized the Maimonidean—rationalist and individual—meaning of the world to come concept. See, for example, Milei de-Avot, which appeared in Peirushei Rishonim le-Masekhet Avot, ed. Moshe Kasher and Jacob Blekherowitz (Jerusalem: Machon Torah Shlemah, 1973), 86-87, 103, 217 [Heb]. On resurrection as a limited life cycle, see the hint in ibid., 224. Hayyun, however, did not devote independent and profound discussions to messianic events. See Abraham Gross, Rabbi Yosef ben Abraham Hayyun: Leader of the Lisbon Jewish Community and His Literary Work (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1993) 64 [Heb]. See also ibid., 88.

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Messer Leon of Italy,31 and Nethanel b. Yeshayahu of Yemen.32 Although the views of Albo, Arama, and Shalom are essentially ­different in their character and their aims, all cohere around the naturalistic idea. Maimonides would probably disagree with their account of some of his ideas, and particularly with the presentation of immortality in the wake of the commandments as a segulah. Nevertheless, the spirit of the messianic teachings in The Guide of the Perplexed and the interests that prompted the articulation of these teachings were generally preserved. Arama and Shalom located their messianic doctrine precisely, as did, for example, Shimon b. Tsemah Duran and Yitzhak Abravanel on the opposite side, as shown below.

World Peace I conclude with a brief description of a motif that was widespread in fourteenth and fifteenth century thought and deserves independent ­discussion—the concern with world peace. This broad issue attracted the attention of both radical and moderate rationalists. Even thinkers who did not assign a special place to peace and its merits within the context of the messianic discussion (such as Arama, Shalom, and Shem-Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem-Tov) dwelt at length on the value of peace as such. The ­philosophical and non-philosophical Musar literature written in Spain dealt with the great merit of pursuing peace.33 The anti-Christian polemical literature strove to demonstrate that this longed-for peace had not been attained and the messiah, therefore, had not yet arrived.34 Peace, as noted, is a crucial characteristic of the days of the messiah ­according to Maimonides. A utopian state of world peace will be attained after the ideal of wisdom is recognized and resources are devoted to the ­expansion of knowledge.35 Many medieval rationalists diligently and s­ ystematically ­presented the idea of peace in the political realm as 31 On the messianism of Messer Leon, see Hava Tirosh-Rothschild, Between Worlds: The Life and Thought of Rabbi David ben Judah Messer Leon (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1991), 157-159. 32 Nethanel, who, like many other thinkers in Yemen, admired Maimonides, ignored the messianic issue altogether. In his comprehensive treatise Me’or ha-Afelah, he devoted no attention whatsoever to the days of the messiah or to resurrection, except for isolated mentions from midrashim. 33 See, for example, Yitzhak Abuhav, Menorat ha-Ma’or, ed. Judah Paris and Moses Katzenelenbogen (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1970), 736-740 [Heb]; Israel Elnekaveh, Menorat ha-Ma’or, Enlau ed., vol. 4 (New York, 1932), 544-560 [Heb]. 34 See, for example, Yehuda Shamir, Rabbi Moses Ha-Kohen of Tordesillas and His Book Ezer Ha-Emunah: A Chapter in the History of the Judeo-Christian Controversy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 105-106. Cf. ch. 2 above. 35 See Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Term Shalom in Jewish Thought,” Daat 17 (1986): 13-14 ff. [Heb].

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a result of the spread of knowledge, anchoring it hermeneutically and ­conceptually. Two ­thirteenth-century e­ xamples are the statement of an anonymous Yemenite sage in the East and that of Levi b. Abraham of Provence in the West, who wrote: Because knowledge of the truth will remove enmity and hatred, and the harm that people inflict on one another will be quashed, as has already been promised: “The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb . . . They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord (Isaiah 11:6-9).”36 Where the southern wind is, that is where peace is, because heat is mostly in the south and that is where wisdom will be found, as they said, “he who desires to become wise should turn to the south,”37 and wisdom will bring with it peace, as the sage said, wisdom leads to peace and serenity, and also because the south is sparsely settled.38

The rationalist connection between the value of peace and messianism was significantly influential in fifteenth-century thought. All rationalists agreed that peace would only be attained “with the perfection of the sciences and of learning.”39 Note that Albo defined peace as a state without antitheses and contradictions (“opposites”). For him, therefore, peace reflects the state of affairs in the world to come, that is, the abstract immortality of the soul. Peace “denotes both the spiritual delight in the celestial world which is far from opposition, viz. the world to come, the essential reward of the soul”;40 hence, “the spiritual reward of the soul . . . is called peace.”41 Peace 36 Yosef Kafih, “Philosophical Texts of a Yemenite Author,” in Collected Papers, vol. 1, ed. Yosef Tobi (Jerusalem: E’eleh Bethamar, 1989), 251 [Heb]. 37 According to TB Bava Bathra 25b. 38 Levi b. Abraham, Livyat Hen, Munich Ms. 58, 54b. (Livyat Hen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel [Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University, 2007], 876-877 [Heb]). Cf. some of the commentaries on the aggadot in Livyat Hen, Vatican Ms. 192, 130a (Livyat Hen: The Secrets of Faith, The Gate of the Haggadah, ed. Howard Kreisel [Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University, 2014], 272-273 [Heb]). In the controversy on the issue of settlement in the southern part of the globe, Levi b. Abraham favored the conservative view, stating that the harsh living conditions in the south generally preclude habitation. Cf. Shalom Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise: On the Idea of Restorative Redemption in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 66-73. 39 Zechariah ha-Rofeh, Midrash ha-Hefets, Exodus, ed. Meir Havatselet (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook, 1991), 320 [Heb]. 40 Sefer ha-Ikkarim, vol. 4, ch. 51, 496. Albo views the immortality of the soul as an intellectual state accompanied by pleasure. In this sense, Albo’s view of immortality fits that of Avicenna and Maimonides, for whom eternal ­happiness (sa‘ādah) entails pleasure (ladhdha). See ch. 3 above. 41 Ibid., 498.

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in the human condition in this world, meaning the correct and harmonious balance between body and soul, is what leads to the absolute peace of the immortality of the soul. Albo again ties intellectual perfection to peace in his interpretation of the world to come concept. Finally, note that Abraham Bibago equated redemption with “the apprehension of the truths, and the sciences, and knowledge,” and he ­therefore claimed that “evil, wars, and conflicts are indeed a result of ignorance and folly because, if the whole world knew the Lord, may He be blessed, people would not harm one another given that love indeed reflects agreement between all true views.”42 Should everybody in the world seek to know God in his perfection and imitate him, this common purpose would lead to true peace. For many medieval rationalists, then, the ideal of peace is also tied to intellectualism. Peace was presented as based on the value of wisdom or as the foundation of the immortality of the soul. Fifteenth-century rationalists deepened the Maimonidean description of the days of the messiah as an era of universal peace meant to strengthen concern with knowledge. The view of world peace as a direct expression of public messianic naturalism thus accompanied apocalyptic approaches, and again reflects the philosophical messianic interest during the fifteenth century. Hence, we can again conclude that the clear differentiation between apocalyptic and naturalistic messianism is the true and all-encompassing feature of ­fifteenth-century philosophy. This section reviewed various well-formulated positions that remained loyal to the spirit of Maimonides’ messianic doctrine. Intermediate positions were still evident at this time, however, which held on to naturalistic motifs without abandoning apocalyptic messianism. I deal with them below.

INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS Albo, Duran, and others compared the two messianic alternatives and opted for one of them. Some, however, did not wish to make a c­ onclusive choice between apocalyptic messianism and n ­ aturalism. Among them, some ­developed a synthetic messianic approach and some leaned in one ­direction but left room for the opposite one. Maimonidean ­messianism appealed to these thinkers, but they were uncomfortable with the ­conception of the refined body and eternal life in the future, which were emphasized in 42 Abraham Bibago, Derekh Emunah (Constantinople, 1522), 91b [Heb].

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the messianic doctrines of Saadia, Ramah, and Nahmanides. The present ­discussion is devoted to these intermediate views.

Again—The Apocalyptic Approach in a Rationalist Guise Bibago also contrasted the two models of Maimonides and Nahmanides but, rather than finally opting for one of them, he preferred to create a synthetic approach including both of them. The Maimonidean view of ­immortality without a body is extensively discussed in his treatise Derekh Emunah. Bibago, however, also cited evidence from talmudic and m ­ idrashic sources supporting Nahmanides, stating that the world to come has a ­distinct ­material dimension, such as “every leader who leads the community with mildness will also be privileged to lead them in the world to come.”43 Like Albo, Bibago too grappled seriously with these sayings, applying them to the days of the messiah and interpreting them in natural terms because he sided with the abstract survival of the soul after death. I show below that the soul’s survival is not eternal and continues only until resurrection. The conflict with Nahmanides, then, hinges on what happens after death. Nahmanides ascribed to this state a material dimension (the soul is in a material paradise), and Bibago held that this is an entirely spiritual state, as Maimonides argues. So how did Bibago grapple with the evidence he cited in Nahmanides’ name? Albo, as noted, expanded the meaning of the world to come ­concept in order to contend with the hermeneutical difficulties raised by the ­supporters of the apocalyptic view, a course that was also adopted by Bibago, who, however, read far broader meanings in it. He set a rule: “And I think that the world to come appears in rabbinic sayings in many forms. It is not a u ­ nivocal term that we refer to through one name only, but a ­homonym that covers many aspects.”44 Bibago relied in this determination on the ­ambiguity of the world to come concept, an ambiguity already evident in talmudic literature and also noted by other thinkers such as Abraham b. Azriel and Yitzhak

43 Ibid., 91a-b, according to TB Sanhedrin 92a. Nahmanides relies on this saying in “The Gate of Reward,” in Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1978), 521-526. The aggadic statement that Bibago cites from this source and also from Exodus Rabbah 15:21 describes actual changes (public leadership, expanded light, and so forth) to occur in the world to come. The conception of immortality is detailed according to its Maimonidean sources in ibid., 90b. 44 Ibid., 93b.

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Abuhav.45 Bibago expanded this hermeneutical ­principle and counted no less than five different meanings of this concept:46 1) “The world to come refers to the world of the souls, which contains neither bodies nor corpses.” This meaning touches on the continued blissful existence of the soul and its communion with the intellectual world. This reality, stressed Bibago, is not in the future; this is a world that has “already come.” The intellectual world, in the sense of the soul’s state after death, exists and has been in existence since creation. 2) “The world to come refers to the coming of the messiah and the ingathering of exiles.” The characteristics of the messianic era are delivery from bondage and widespread joy. At this time, holds Bibago, redemption will be “for the soul and for the intellect,” meaning that material well-being will lead to intellectual excellence. Bibago called attention to the “true” spiritual dimension of the days of the messiah: “We learn, then, that true exile is caused by the loss of apprehension and contemplation, and knowledge of the first active will bring redemption with the coming of our messiah.”47 3) “The world to come refers to the time of the resurrection.” For Bibago, the resurrection of the dead is compelled by the evidence of the sources and by the argument that God is served with both body and soul, and the reward should thus be granted to the body as well. 4) “The world to come refers to the life that continues after resurrection.” This resurrection will occur in a paradise that Bibago, in the spirit of Maimonides, presents as a real place offering perfect living conditions. 45 See also Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987), 651-652; Abraham b. Azriel, Sefer Arugat Habosem, vol. 2, ed. Ephraim E. Urbach (Jerusalem: Mekitsei Nirdamim, 1963), 255-256; Abuhav, Menorat ha-Ma’or, 541. 46 Four meanings appear in Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 93b-94b. This and other passages also appear in part in Chava Fraenkel Goldshmidt, ed., Abraham Bibago: Derekh Emunah (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1978), 278-287 [Heb]. Note that Abraham Shalom also noted that “the world to come” includes both the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the dead, but without drawing Bibago’s conclusions. See Neveh Shalom, book 2, ch. 1, 28b. 47 Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 93c. Knowledge of “the first active”obviously refers to the apprehension of God. Bibago described at length the apprehensions and the mysteries revealed in the days of the messiah, which lead to the immortality of the soul (ibid., 92b-93). Cf. Abraham Nuriel, “Israel and the Nations in the Teachings of R. Abraham Bibago,” in Between Israel and the Nations (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1980), 39-40 [Heb] (reprinted in Avraham Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy [Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2000], 256-262 [Heb]).

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5) “The world to come refers to the world that continues after the person’s death, which is the world that comes into reality after his being.” According to this definition, the world to come means continued material existence in the world after the death of a specific person. The rabbis held that people who died alone without children had no share in the world to come, meaning they left nothing behind. Bibago interprets the saying “all Israel have a share in the world to come” (M. Sanhedrin 10:1) as referring to the first meaning of the term, pouring into it Maimonides’ view about the immortality of the soul. This approach includes both the intellectual immortality of the soul and the pleasure that accompanies it. The first meaning of the world to come is agreed on by all rationalists and all believers in the true faith,48 and in that sense, they are the “Israel” who have a share in it. Since the world to come is a homonym, Nahmanides’ evidence is not relevant and nothing precludes assuming that immortality is distinctly spiritual. The rabbis’ material descriptions of the world to come, then, do not relate to the immortality of the soul. The clarification of the term the world to come in Bibago’s treatise fully exposes his messianic leanings. So how did Bibago relate to apocalyptic messianism? The third and fourth meanings of the term the world to come show that, on an essential messianic issue, Bibago supported the a­ pocalyptic approach— eternal life after resurrection. Bibago was well aware of Maimonides’ view, stating that “they will live a long life after r­ esurrection and then will die, because everything made up of elements must ­collapse into the elements.” In Bibago’s view, however, the revelatory sources c­ ontradict Maimonides. He rejected Maimonides’ stance and u ­ nequivocally ­supported eternal life in a material body. Consider his detailed ­hermeneutical argument: Indeed, the tradition received from the sages of truth does not agree with the view of the rabbi [Maimonides]. But they—I mean the rabbis, of blessed memory—believe that after resurrection they will not die, 48 Bibago shares the tendency of Albo and other fifteenth-century sages to view the religious activity of faith and observance as equivalent to, or even as surpassing, knowledge. Cf. Abraham Nuriel, “Faith and Intellect in the Doctrine of R. Abraham Bibago,” in Revelation, Faith, Reason, ed. Moshe Hallamish and Moshe Schwarcz (RamatGan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1976), 35-43 [Heb] (reprinted in Nuriel, Concealed and Revealed in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 263-270).

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as it is said, “And they who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament” (Daniel 12:3), which is indestructible after coming into being, as it is said, “And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life” (Daniel 12:2), indicating that they will arise to everlasting life and live to apprehend their Creator from the splendor of the Shekhinah. Three times, as we know, Moses spent forty days and forty nights—which are one hundred and twenty days—­ without eating and drinking, as he noted when saying “I neither did eat bread nor drink water . . .” (Deuteronomy 9:9, 18), and this was for his pleasure, to ennoble his life in the divine ­emanation. Individuals who have not sinned and have not been blamed, but whose corporeality and body will be as pure and clean as a heavenly s­ubstance, will thus live after the resurrection a life as eternal as the life of the heavens.49

To this hermeneutical evidence, Bibago added ostensibly rationalist grounds for the plausibility of eternal life. His claim is that a pure and refined body, such as the body of the future human, is not composed at all of matter and, therefore, there is no reason for its collapse and ­disappearance.50 Bibago, then, internalized the apocalyptic motif of eternal life in a refined ­material body and founded it on a logical basis, and he too used Moses’ biblical figure to elucidate the nature of material life in a refined body. In this sense, then, Bibago returned to the ostensibly rationalist justification of ­apocalyptic messianism in the pattern of Saadia’s arguments. Bibago formulated a mixed messianic approach, juxtaposing ­apocalyptic and naturalistic arguments. On the one hand, he adopted the conception of eternal life in a refined body after resurrection and, on the other, he continued to support the natural view of the days of the ­messiah, with their Maimonidean characteristics and their abstract immortality. Bibago, then, did not renounce the eternity of the world in its current ­material version. Life will go on eternally in a concrete material paradise found in an equatorial location on the globe rather than in a new and ­imaginary world.51 Eternal life will be a kind of vita contemplativa or, in 49 Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 93c. 50 Cf. Bibago’s rationalist explanation of the ancients’ longevity, as mentioned in Genesis: “And after them [Cain and Abel] many others were born and lived a long time . . . and the reason for their long years is the cleansing of the surrounding matter, which led to a lessening of the bad vapors. People also behaved according to reason and did not pursue cravings that lead to an early death” (Ets ha-Hayyim, Paris Ms. 995, 44a). In the future, then, material hindrances and obstacles to eternal life will be removed. 51 Bibago tended to support Averroes’ view in Section 2 of Meteorologica, stating that no human life is possible in the equatorial zone. In the future, however, the body will be pure and will therefore be able to survive there. See Bibago,

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Bibago’s precise formulation—“the bliss of the perfect ones, who will rise and live in eternal contemplation after the resurrection.”52 Nahmanides, as noted, assigned paradise a defined role—preserving the souls until the new world of the resurrection. Bibago, however, did not accept this view of the new world and held that people would live eternally in the paradise of the present world. An intermediate approach between apocalyptic messianism and naturalism thus developed in the course of the fifteenth century through the ceaseless grappling with both alternatives. This approach leaned in Maimonides’ direction, but preserved a distinct motif from Saadia’s tradition. I turn now to describe other examples of this integration of contradictory motifs.

The Power of Miracles The beginning of the fifteenth century witnessed the emergence of an ­outspoken critic of Jewish rationalism and a prominent kabbalist—R. Shem Tov b. Shem Tov. In his commentary on the sefirot and in the ­opening pages of Sefer ha-Emunot, he raged against the philosophers and used every ­possible issue to expose the rationalists’ mistakes and heresies. Unfortunately [for him], however, the descendants of this bold zealot were prolific authors and wrote several rationalist treatises dealing with the authoritative ­philosophical literature of the Middle Ages. These include commentaries on The Guide of the Perplexed and supercommentaries on Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle written by Shem Tov’s sons, Yitzhak and Yosef, and by his grandson, Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem Tov. The question of the intellect’s essence and its abstract immortality seems to have occupied the Shem Tov family more than any other,53 a ­determination particularly valid for Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, who, at times, also addressed the messianic issue. Shem Tov missed no chance to stress that the human purpose is to attain individual, abstract, and eternal immortality through apprehension of the intelligibles. Like his father and his uncle, Shem Tov interpreted Aristotle’s De Anima for his circle of Derekh Emunah, 93d-94a. Cf. Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise,” 69-70. 52 Bibago, Derekh Emunah, 93d. 53 On the intellect in the writings of Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, see Shaul Regev, “Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov’s Commentary on Averroes’‘Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction,’” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 2 (1982): 38-93 [Heb]; idem, Theology and Rational Mysticism in the Writings of R. Yosef Ben Shem Tov (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1983), 74-138 [Heb]. On Yitzhak Ibn Shem Tov, see Julia Schwartzman, “Yitzhak Ibn Shem Tov’s Commentary on The Guide of the Perplexed,” Daat 26 (1991): 50-55 [Heb].

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students,54 but surpassed them in his educational concern. Preaching and moralistic connotations are notable in his homilies and his commentary on Avot, which focus on the ideal of intellectual communion as immortality.55 In line with his support for individual and intellectual redemption as an ideal, Shem Tov built a messianic approach marked by naturalistic motifs. But when coming to exhaust the implications of this approach, he retreated and avoided a decision. Shem Tov, like the rationalists, described the days of the messiah in naturalist terms. He ascribed the relative disappearance of evil in this future era to individuals “following their reason [sekhel], so that most evil will disappear.”56 He also noted the independence of the Jewish people, who will emerge from “slavery to eternal freedom”57 and will be perfect in both “opinions and virtues.”58 The political conception of the days of the messiah is also manifest in the figure of the messiah. Shem Tov suggested several reasons for the obvious political advantage of an autocracy (monarchy and monocracy) assisted by intellectual counselors. Since the establishment of a worthy regime is one of the goals of the days of the messiah, the messiah will be an autocratic ruler of this kind. “True redemption, then, will be for us to have one king and one shepherd.”59 Although in one source Shem Tov played down the universal character of redemption and claimed that “in this redemption, our enemies will be annihilated,”60 this statement is only a further variation on the motif of the wars accompanying the Jewish people’s independence. Generally, then, Shem Tov’s descriptions point to a natural rationalist view of the days of the messiah. 54 The commentary on De Anima has been preserved in Paris Ms. 967. 55 The notes of Shem Tov’s disciple from his commentary on De Anima are preserved in Paris Ms. 967. On the commentary on Avot, see Michael A. Shmidman, R. Yosef Ibn Shoshan and Medieval Commentaries on Avot, Including an Edition of the Avot Commentary of R. Shem Tov ben Yosef Ibn Shem Tov (PhD diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1980). 56 Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, Commentary on “The Guide of the Perplexed” (III: 11) (Jerusalem, 1980), 14a-b [Heb]. According to this determination, the future era will be marked by universal peace. See Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, Homilies on the Torah (Venice, 1547), 38 a-b. 57 Ibid., 24d. 58 Ibid., 30a. Shem Tov added that this perfection would be eternal, so he may have held that the days of the messiah would go on forever. See ibid., 69b-c. 59 Ibid., 58a. For a discussion of similar political views, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “On Kings and Statutes in Jewish Thought in the Middle Ages,” in Culture and Society in Medieval Jewry: Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Haim Hillel BenSasson, ed. Menahem Ben-Sasson, Robert Bonfil, and Joseph R. Hacker (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1989) [Heb]. 60 Shem Tov, Homilies on the Torah, 58a. Shem Tov also stated that the Holy One, blessed be He, would himself redeem the people of Israel. He did not, however, go into details as to the meaning of this determination or whether it has any positive implications.

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On two messianic issues, both directly related to Nahmanides’ ­messianic thought, Shem Tov avoided a decision. He was strongly i­nfluenced by Nahmanides’ commentary on the Torah, and it was probably Nahmanides’ authority that led him to retreat from an exclusively naturalistic approach. On both these issues, Shem Tov endorsed the naturalistic approach together with the apocalyptic one, without choosing between them: 1)  T  he souls’ existence in paradise until the resurrection. Shem Tov presented the view of Nahmanides (without mentioning his name), contrasted it with the rationalist one, and presented a third one between them. These views hinged on the essence of paradise and Gehenna: Some have said that the soul is rewarded after its separation from the material body in a place called the Garden of Eden, and souls will delight in that garden. And also that the place of punishment is corporeal—­a thin fire, the thinnest possible, and the wicked are sentenced to be there for a year or two, each one according to his wickedness, or to stay there for an indeterminate time. Others think that the place of judgment and the place of justice is communion with God, may He be blessed, and the place of Gehenna is that the soul will not be in communion with the place from which it was carved, and that is the essence of the punishment. And yet others think that the reward is spiritual and the punishment is material. And we see that there are many views on all these matters.61

 Although Shem Tov’s philosophical texts clearly show that he opted for the second view, meaning the equation of the Garden of Eden and Gehenna with a state of communion versus the absence of it, he made no decision here and merely noted that the three views are important for attaining fear of God. 2)  Eternal life after resurrection. Shem Tov repeated the ­determination that the resurrection of the dead is a definite miracle because, in the natural course of things, “the spirit returns to God who gave it” (Ecclesiastes 12:7). Resurrection is meant only for the r­ ighteous, since they are the ones worthy of such a miracle. Shem Tov briefly presented his understanding of the technique of resurrecting the dead found in Ezekiel, chapter 37. According to his i­ nterpretation, the resurrection will take place in two stages: the first is the 61 Ibid., 60a.

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c­ reation of the limbs, and the second is joining them together so that they might perform their physiological function. In the course of this description of resurrection, Shem Tov addressed the issue of eternal life after it: When the God of spirits showed Ezekiel the dry bones, He asked, “Can these bones live?” Ezekiel replied, “O Lord God, only You know” (Ezekiel 37:32). God then showed Ezekiel, whether as an optical ­illusion or a prophetic vision, how the dead will come to life. First He said that He will make similar parts of the body piece by piece, namely, the sinews and the flesh. Second, that He will bring them near each other, and make from them a corporeal receptacle. . . . It [the complete body] will be able to do important things that it did not accomplish while in this world, and afterward it will receive a great reward, while the soul is still joined to the body. This is in accordance with the view of the rabbi who said, “The dead that the Holy One will resurrect will not return to the dust again.”62 Or they will live in order to receive a great reward after the body separates from the soul for a second time, a reward they did not receive in this world.63

Here too, Shem Tov cites the two views beside one another—eternal life in the style of Saadia, Ramah, and Nahmanides, as opposed to one cycle of life after resurrection in the style of Maimonides—and chooses not to decide. The distinctly miraculous dimension of the resurrection of the dead that Shem Tov had clearly emphasized in the discussion from which this p ­ assage is taken (“perform . . . which it had not p ­ erformed when . . . in this world”) drove him to doubt the exclusivity of the Maimonidean approach. If the miracle is so special and exceptional, it might continue eternally. Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn Shem Tov, then, was generally inclined toward the Maimonidean view. Nevertheless, according to the tendency typical of fifteenth-century thinkers, he presented both alternatives—apocalyptic messianism versus naturalism. When he noted the confrontation between these approaches he avoided a decision, leaving the issue open for the readers to decide. Shem Tov’s approach thus offers a suitable summary of mid-fifteenth-century conceptions, which clarified and juxtaposed the 62 According to TB Sanhedrin 92a (stating “righteous” rather than “dead”). 63 Shem Tov, Homilies on the Torah, 19d, in Mark Saperstein, Jewish Preaching 1200-1800 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 197-198. The printed version is faulty.

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v­ arious messianic alternatives. We should not, therefore, seek ­originality here, or even elucidation and analysis of the existing material. What fifteenth-­century thought does offer are distinctions and clarification, as shown by the discussions so far. The confrontation between the apocalyptic approach and messianic naturalism was not resolved, and future events did not remove their vagueness. The struggle, despite ups and downs, remained balanced, at least until the end of the fifteenth century.

Contradictory Influences As I have shown in the previous chapters, Jewish thought in Yemen was not detached from the conceptual transformations taking place in the West. The dynamic in Yemen, however, was at times special and different. Whereas ­fifteenth-century thought in Spain had differentiated ­apocalyptic ­messianism from naturalism and juxtaposed them, in Yemen the two were mixed. In this sense, then, philosophy preserved the messianic tension that had emerged in Spain, Provence, and Italy during the thirteenth and fourteenth ­centuries, though the grounds for this preservation differ from those in the West. Saadia and Maimonides were the two respected figures in medieval thought in Yemen. Their messianic approaches are among the factors affecting the messianic tension between the apocalyptic and n ­ aturalistic positions, a tension that left its mark in the writings of Yemenite thinkers. This conceptual process is evident in the messianic doctrine of Hoter b. Shlomo. Hoter remained within the Maimonidean conceptual framework, and even relied on the interpretation of the Guide endorsed by radical ­rationalists. On the Garden of Eden, for example, he resolutely states: Know that the meaning of “the Garden of Eden” is the realm of the ­spiritual forms which emanate from the separated Intelligences which are the originating-principles of the existents and the universals of things. . . . Now, insofar as the beginning of man is from [this] soul, his return is to it, for it is necessary that everything return to its originating-principle.64

Hoter’s statements resemble the allegorization of public messianism ­supported by rationalists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the shift to individual eternal redemption. Hoter’s description of the days of the messiah also presented a typical Maimonidean approach. For example, 64 David R. Blumenthal, ed., The Philosophic Questions and Answers of Hoter ben Shelōmō (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1981), 97th question, 264.

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in his commentary on Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles, Hoter writes as follows on the Twelfth Principle (the days of the messiah): The world shall follow its custom, the only difference being that the Jews will be a sovereign state. . . .65 This means that God, may He be exalted, has promised us that, in the time of the Messiah, He will open our hearts to the knowledge of Him, may He be exalted, and to the knowledge of His creatures—a true knowledge.66

By contrast, Hoter’s commentary on the thirteenth principle—the ­resurrection of the dead—clearly deviates from the Maimonidean legacy and veers toward Saadia’s approach. The essential difference is already e­ vident at the formal level. Maimonides deliberately refrained from d ­ iscussions on the resurrection of the dead, and such discussions do not appear either in the introduction that he is commenting upon or in the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides does acknowledge actual resurrection in the “Essay on Resurrection,” but in his teachings he conveys the view that ­resurrection is a one-time miracle that does not require special d ­ iscussion. By contrast, Hoter devotes to it a long discussion, where he ponders ­questions that Maimonides had not considered and that Saadia invested great efforts in answering. Saadia’s spirit hovers above the questions and answers, both in the very concern with them and in the arguments. For example, ­regarding the technical possibility of reviving the dead, Saadia presented the ­following elementary argument: if the Holy One, blessed be He, displayed the power of creatio ex nihilo at the time of creation, he will certainly be capable of creatio ex materia at the time of the resurrection. Hoter returns to this argument.67 Furthermore, in the very discussion on resurrection of the dead, Hoter changed his previous determination whereby, in the messianic era, the world continues on its course. In his view, the messiah himself will raise the dead and will be a miraculous figure: “But, once a miracle has happened, [all argumentation] concerning it ceases. The other miracles of the Messiah-King, may he be revealed to us, speedily, in our days must be viewed by analogy to what I have just mentioned.”68 Clear and simple. Note that, concerning the general philosophical framework, Hoter admiringly followed Maimonides’ teachings in the style endorsed 65 Taken from Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 9:2. 66 The original was printed in David R. Blumenthal, ed. The Commentary of Hoter ben Shelōmō to the Thirteen Principles of Maimonides (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1974), 315, 317. The translation quoted in the text appears in ibid., 175, 177. 67 Ibid., 190. 68 Ibid., 189.

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by ­ medieval Yemenite sages, that is, mixing Neoplatonic and Islamic approaches. Yet, despite the decisive Maimonidean influence on him, when coming to deal with the messianic question Hoter did not ignore the ­apocalyptic view and was potentially influenced by Saadia. The same ­phenomenon thus recurs: naturalistic and apocalyptic motifs presented hand in hand without reaching an absolute final decision.

THE ADVANTAGE OF THE APOCALYPTIC MODEL The traditional apocalyptic model stressing the conception of a refined body (after Saadia) and a soul with a material connection (after Nahmanides) were a critical influence on thinkers who had shown openness to ­kabbalistic views. One important sign of kabbalistic views with clearly messianic associations is the adoption of the theory of transmigration and the theory of cyclical worlds (the shemitot theory). Such a model had already appeared in Rashba’s ­messianic approach, as noted in Chapter Six above, and here serves as the hallmark of several thinkers. Adopting these theories may have affected the messianic conception and the confrontation between a­ pocalyptic ­messianism and messianic naturalism. Kabbalists also became authoritative figures, as attested by Nahmanides’ extensive influence on the very d ­ iscussion of ­apocalyptic views in the fifteenth century.69 A fitting example of ­thinkers who are almost uncompromisingly loyal to apocalyptic messianism and ­kabbalistic trends is that of Duran (Rashbaz) and Abravanel.

Against Philosophy Duran was very open to kabbalistic teachings. He adopted both the theory of transmigration and the theory of the shemitot70 and, to some extent on 69 This influence crossed geographical borders, as the discussion below shows. Consider, for example, the resolute statement of Abraham Farissol, attesting to differences on the one hand and to his personal decision on the other: “According to Maimonides’ explanation, the world to come is the one that the person goes to immediately after his death, and I have seen different views on this matter. Some say that the world to come refers to the world after the resurrection and the day of judgment, and I will assume so, according to the sages and according to Nahmanides in ‘The Gate of Reward,’ who have excelled at commenting on this matter” (Abraham Farissol, Commentary on Avot, ed. Moshe Kasher and Jacob Blekherowitz [Jerusalem: Machon Torah Shlemah, 1969], 63). 70 On transmigration, see Shimon b. Tsemah Duran, Magen Avot (Livorno, 1785), 88a. On the shemitot, Duran determined that the messianic world will begin at the end of the seventh millennium, following “the destruction of the world after the shemitah” (Magen Avot 91b-92a, and see ibid., 98a). In this latter source, Duran used a formulation seemingly more hesitant: “These matters are not harmful to faith, but if this tradition is one that kabbalists received from the prophets, we should submit to it and believe what is true. And if anyone has doubts about this and remains perplexed on this matter, it does not harm his faith but he must know that inquiry has not yielded decisions on this

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their basis, shaped messianism, its time, and its character. The ­psychological and messianic views that Nahmanides had articulated in his treatise Torat ha-Adam crucially influenced Duran, who cites him extensively in his book Magen Avot. But Duran relied on many philosophical sources, ­speculative and kabbalistic, many of them unacceptable to rationalist thinkers in the fourteenth century and before. For example, he often relies on the a­ rguments of Judah Halevi and may also follow Saadia. Duran is critical of extreme rationalism in his messianic arguments, which sum up his p ­ redecessors’ views on this count. I turn now to the immortality of the soul, an issue founded directly on Duran’s psychology. His definition of the soul is a composite of v­ arious traditions, all strongly opposed to rationalism in general and to the ­ ­perception of the soul as a disposition in particular. This view, as noted, had been suggested by Alexander of Aphrodisias and endorsed by Gersonides. According to Duran, the soul is defined mainly as an autonomous ­substance in its Neoplatonic version, but also as “the spirit of God” and as the pure material substance that makes up the spheres, according to Saadia’s ­definition in Part Six of The Book of Beliefs and Opinions.71 Nahmanides supports these definitions in “The Gate of Reward.” According to Duran, the soul can also be discussed in terms of its confinement within a material location, as Nahmanides had conclusively stated.72 Duran discusses the immortality of the soul while involved in a ­serious and protracted confrontation with Gersonides and other rationalist ­philosophers. Duran’s psychological analysis indicates that the concern with immortality touches only on the period beginning after death and ends with the resurrection of the dead in the messianic era. After the resurrection, people remain in their own body and soul for all eternity. Duran adopted Ramah’s and Nahmanides’ critiques of Maimonides’ equation of ­immortality with the world to come, given their view that eternal existence in the era of redemption involves a material dimension. Duran therefore supported the conception of an eternal refined body without crude material passions.73 As for the Maimonidean view upholding the abstract immortality of the soul matter.” Both the terminology he adopted in Magen Avot on the cycles of existence—shemitot— and his support for the kabbalistic traditions, then, show that he had accepted the theory of the cycles. 71 Ibid., 84a. See also ibid., 89b. On Duran’s psychology and on his messianic view, see Nahum Arieli, The Philosophy of Rashbaz: Shimon Ben Tsemah Duran (PhD diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976), 137-187 [Heb]. 72 Duran, Magen Avot, 84b-85a; 88b. See also Shimon b. Tsemah Duran, Ohev Mishpat (Commentary on the Book of Job) (Venice, 1590), 26b-27a [Heb]. 73 Duran, Magen Avot, 90b-92b.

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and thus denying material life after the resurrection, Duran wrote: “None of the Torah scholars who followed him [Maimonides] agreed with him on this matter, nor did our teacher Saadia, of blessed memory, say so.”74 Duran presented a detailed, systematic messianic view, and the brief summary of the convoluted messianic discussions in Magen Avot points to its nature: Ultimately, after leaving the body, all the souls will return to their foundation under the heavenly throne, the site of the first light. In the days of the messiah, after the ingathering of exiles, the dead will live and the soul will return to the body, as it had faithfully been with it in this world. Finally, the reward will be the great day of judgment, and the righteous will then be under the heavenly throne in body and soul, enjoying the splendor of the Shekhinah like the ministering angels. Happy is he who merits this attainment, whose essence was unknown even to the prophets, because they did not reach it.75

To be in body and soul “under the heavenly throne” is a new assertion, ­without any possible philosophical meaning. Throughout the various ­discussions, Duran was aware that Nahmanides’ conceptions rely on the authority and validity of kabbalistic doctrines. Duran was therefore ­consistently ­critical of classic philosophical statements on the psychological question, and ­usually relied on Halevi’s critique in The Kuzari.76 All that Duran needed to do, t­herefore, was accept the apocalyptic model of Nahmanides and his ­faction, with the known reservations about the original ­apocalyptic ­character of redemption midrashim. These reservations, as noted, had already been ­conveyed in the writings of Saadia and the geonim and attained their final ­formulation during the Maimonidean controversies. The ­polemics with radical rationalists led supporters of the apocalyptic stance—­ ­ including Duran—to reconsider their messianic doctrine and refine some of its ­determinations. 74 Ibid., 100a. 75 Ibid., 92a. 76 Judah Halevi, The Kuzari, V:14. See Duran, Magen Avot 87b, and see also 89a, on the Christians’ and Moslems’“theft” of the conception of paradise and Gehenna, in line with The Kuzari I:115-117. Evidence attesting to the renewed rise of The Kuzari in the course of the fourteenth and beginning of the fifteenth centuries is the circle of Prat Maimon’s disciples discussed in chapter 5 above, and the statements of Profiat Duran about one attracted to Greek wisdom: “I anticipate his troubles and give him fair advice—he should prepare for success by studying the honored book by the excellent Torah scholar R. Judah Halevi, of blessed memory, and his arguments to the Khazar king against the Greek philosophers when they reject the foundations of the divine Torah . . .” (appears in Rappel, “Preface to Ma´aseh Efod,” 794).

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Note that another treatise, apparently from an Ashkenazi or Byzantine source, was also extremely critical of Maimonides’ teachings on ­individual redemption. Hezekiyah b. Abraham sought to validate Nahmanides’ approach, which assumes a material dimension in the soul, by splitting it into two layers: the animative layer, immanent to the body in its lifetime (“spirit” [ruah]), and the substantial soul, which emanates from the angels’ world. The animative layer of the soul survives after death, and part of it are the impressions of the senses after death,77 which enable the descriptions of material reward and punishment in paradise and in Gehenna.78 Duran, too, strove to corroborate the apocalyptic foundation on conceptual and psychological grounds. Contrary to Hezekiyah, however, he presented his views in long formulations, in detailed discussions, and drawing broadly on rabbinic sources and medieval philosophical literature.

The Triumph of Apocalyptic Messianism From the start, it is clear that Abravanel could not fully accept the ­conclusions of rationalist Maimonidean tradition. First, just like Duran, Abravanel was extremely critical of rationalist philosophy.79 Second, although Abravanel claimed that he had not endorsed Kabbalah, he did uphold the doctrine of transmigration and also discussed the ­“jubilees [yovlot]” doctrine.80 Although Abravanel is known as a deep and l­evel-headed political thinker,81 he presented (apparently w ­ ithout 77 Hezekiyah b. Abraham, Sefer Malkiel (printed in Zehav Parvayyim, ed. Israel Dov Levin [Pieterkov, 1880], 53b ff [Heb]. 78 The Garden of Eden extends “up to the firmament” (ibid., 57d). Hezekiyah is faithful to the hermeneutical approach that he presented. He supports the literal reading of texts and the pinning of logical contradictions, when they emerge, on “lack of understanding” (ibid., 52b). This approach is reminiscent of the Orthodox Kalām in Islam, which demanded that concrete descriptions in the Qur’an be accepted without questioning, given that our apprehension is limited. 79 See, for example, Leo Strauss, “On Abravanel’s Philosophical Tendency and Political Teaching,” in Isaac Abravanel: Six Lectures, ed. J. B. Trend and H. Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 95-129; Ephraim Schmueli, Don Isaac Abravanel and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1963), 92-93 [Heb]. Strauss’ discussions deal mainly with the political foundation and Schmueli’s claims are quite general. Abravanel’s insightful critique of Aristotelianism, however, still awaits serious discussion. See also Eric Lawee, Isaac Abarbanel’s Stance Toward Tradition: Defense, Dissent, and Dialogue (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001). On doubt in the apprehension of the separate intellects, see Dov Schwartz, “On Abravanel’s Theory of Creation,” Daat 23 (1989): 137-138 [Heb]. 80 See, for example, Yitzhak Abravanel, Yeshu´ot Meshiho (Bnei Brak: Machon Me’orei Sefarad, 1993), 42, 58, 93, and more. See also ibid., Section 1, the whole of ch. 1. Cf. Moshe Idel, “Kabbalah and Ancient Philosophy for Isaac and Judah Abravanel,” in The Philosophy of Leone Ebreo: Four Lectures at the Colloquium of Haifa University, January 16, 1984, ed. Menahem Dorman and Ze’ev Levy (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), 75-79 ff. [Heb]. 81 See, for example, Yitzhak Baer, “Don Yitzhak Abravanel and His Attitude to Problems of History and Politics,” Tarbiz 8 (1937): 241-259 [Heb]; Ephraim E. Urbach, “Die Staatsauffassung des Don Isaak Abrabanel,” Monatschrift für Geschichte und

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­ atting an eyelid) a coherent and comprehensive messianic theory b including various apocalyptic features.82 Abravanel devoted three full exegetical treatises to the messianic issue: Ma´ayanei ha-Yeshu´ah is a messianic interpretation of the book of Daniel; Yeshu´ot Meshiho discusses aggadot and homilies on ­redemption, and Mashmi´a Yeshu´ah is a messianic interpretation of biblical p ­ rophecies, divided according to individual “harbingers” [mevasrim]. All three, in varying measures, have a clearly polemical anti-Christian i­nterest.83 Other works by Abravanel on the messianic idea, such as Tseddek Olamim, have not reached us. Scholars have already pointed to Abravanel’s ­tendency to present redemption in apocalyptic terms when he deals with the ­crushing revenge to be exacted from other nations and kingdoms.84 Abravanel’s unique view of the tension between apocalyptic messianism and ­naturalism will be noted here. Several aspects of apocalyptic messianism in Abravanel’s Wissenschaft des Jundentums 81 (1937): 257-270; Benzion Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel: Statesman and Philosopher (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1968), 130-194; Ravitzky, “On Kings and Statutes,” 221, note 59. 82 The view that Abravanel tried to “hold the stick at both ends” on the question of “miraculous” versus “natural” redemption by resorting to the astrological option should be reconsidered. See Shaul Regev, “Messianism and Astrology in the Thought of R. Yitzhak Abravanel,” Assufot 1 (1987): 171, 183 ff. [Heb]. Abravanel set the start of the messianic process at a defined date, which astrological rules indeed reflect but do not create. As shown below, messianic reality will unfold in a world where astrological decrees are altogether invalid. Abravanel’s version of the messianic era, then, can be defined as deterministic regarding its ending but definitely not as natural regarding its events. This astrological determinism is also less pronounced in Abravanel’s discussions. In his view, “divine providence will arrange matters according to the will rather than according to celestial decrees” (Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah [Jerusalem, 1960], 417b). One change typical of the future era will be the elimination of the astrological system. “The power of the king messiah will greatly expand until the supreme instructions are rescinded . . . because of divine providence” (Yeshu’ot Meshiho, revised ed. [Bnei Berak: Machon Me’orei Sefarad, 1993], 131. See also Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah [Jerusalem, 1960], 437a, 459a, 491a, and more. See also Regev, “Messianism and Astrology,” 187). Abravanel’s view, then, does not fit the ordinary astrological approaches prevalent in medieval rationalism, and is certainly not essential to his conception of the messianic era. One instance of a classic astrological messianic view in that period, which did waver between the natural and the miraculous, is that of Abraham Zacut (see Malachi Beith Arié and Moshe Idel, “Treatise on Eschatology and Astrology by R. Abraham Zacut,” Kiriyat Sefer 54 [1979]: 174-194 [Heb]). Finally, note that Abravanel’s astrological approach draws extensively on the general messianic influence of Saadia, even though the latter did not resort to astrology, This influence is evident, for example, in the comparison between the historical models of future redemption and the redemption in Egypt that, as shown below, was of great interest to Abravanel, and perhaps also in his endorsement of a deterministic versus a voluntary end. This view, although formulated in the Talmud, was systematically articulated in Saadia’s messianic doctrine. In sum, Abravanel presented an approach that was distinctly apocalyptic in its concern and its sources, and the position of astrology in his doctrine requires further study. The true tension revealed in his doctrine is that between individual and public redemption, as discussed below. 83 For a description of these three works, see Moses Gaster, “Abravanel’s Literary Work,” in Isaac Abravanel: Six Lectures, ed. J. B. Trend and H. Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 57-66. 84 See, for example, Netanyahu, Don Isaac Abravanel, 238ff.; Schmueli, Don Isaac Abravanel and the Expulsion of the Jews, 143.

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writings are discussed below, in the following order: (1) the turning of apocalyptic messianism into a systematic philosophical element; (2) the apocalyptic characteristics of the transition to the messianic era; (3) the development of new hermeneutic possibilities for internalizing the ­apocalyptic stance; (4) the enlistment of the anti-Christian polemic in the service of apocalyptic messianism. Abravanel seemingly endorsed a natural messianic framework: the future world will be natural and its ideal will be to strive for the ­immortality of the soul. But he made two changes to this context that actually turned it upside down: (1) an essential change—the transition to the messianic world will be distinctly apocalyptic, meaning that the wars with the nations of the world will be a glorious succession of marvels and miracles as a result of extensive divine involvement; (2) a formal and interpretive change—Abravanel devoted almost his entire work to this apocalyptic transition. The natural context is mentioned casually and in passing, in the course of an extensive discussion of the apocalyptic events. He thereby ascribed ­conceptual and hermeneutical legitimacy to the apocalyptic view, and turned it into a dominant messianic factor that marginalizes all others. I turn now to a description of the various aspects of this messianic approach. Abravanel’s messianic thought, as noted, is characterized by a series of attempts to systematize the messianic idea and place it on a broad basis. The apocalyptic connotation is crucial in all these attempts, as ­illustrated by various formats assumed by the messianic idea: A)  T he three hidden foundations. Abravanel states that “three ­enormous marvels will be revealed at the end of days”: (1) revenge on the enemies; (2) the redemption of Israel; (3) the resurrection of the dead, which is “the purpose of the marvels (nifla’ot).”85 B)  Ten steps. Abravanel argued that future redemption will involve “ten kinds of goals”: (1) the messiah; (2) the ingathering of exiles in the Land of Israel; (3) revenge and “the destruction of the nations”; (4) the material prosperity of the future Land of Israel; (5) the religious and spiritual supremacy of the future people of Israel; (6) the return of prophecy; (7) the miracles to take place “with the renewal of miraculous signs and wonders at that time”;

85 Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah, 399a. These three elements, “revenge, redemption, and resurrection,” appear also on p. 400.

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(8) the eternity of redemption; (9) universal recognition of the unity of God; (10) the resurrection of the dead.86 C)  Fourteen principles. According to the interpretation of the ­messianic prophecies in the book of Isaiah, redemption is based on fourteen principles, “independent necessary principles that will imperatively be found at the time of the redemption” and have never existed in the past.87 These “principles” are indeed ­frequently discussed in Mashmi´a Yeshu´ah.88 D)  Seventy moves. According to the interpretation of Daniel’s ­prophecies, Abravanel detailed the events of redemption and its characteristics according to seventy “future aims and wonders.”89 These events create a detailed apocalyptic structure that sums up all competing claims. To these messianic schemes, of which the four presented above are only examples, we should add a series of historical outlines where Abravanel tried to locate the messianic era at the end of history. The attempt to present the order of messianic events in precise, consistent, and continuous terms leads to a splendid messianic scheme whose consequences Maimonides and his rationalist disciples had been afraid to consider and had avoided at all costs. This is apocalyptic messianism entering the very core of ­speculative and hermeneutical thought. Abravanel dealt with the actual details of r­ edemption and its stages and carefully analyzed the ­threatening and wondrous events that would precede it (“the end of exile”).90 The seeds of a systematic apocalyptic approach that had been planted in Saadia’s writings struck root, flourished, and turned into an organized program in Abravanel’s thought—the manifest sign of exile’s apocalyptic goal. What are the characteristics of this goal? Abravanel, as noted, sharply distinguished between two redemptions: (1) individual, natural r­ edemption, abstract and eternal in a rationalist style. The immortality of the soul is the true “spiritual reward,”91 meaning that individual redemption is the final 86 87 88 89 90 91

Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 61-63. Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 391b-396a. Ibid., 506b, 507b. Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah, 418b-421a. See, for example, Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 85-86. See, for example, Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 593a. Spiritual reward is casually mentioned in Abravanel’s extensive messianic discussions, and emphasized in other writings. See, for example, Nahalat Avot (New York, 1953), 276 [Heb]. Abravanel also rejects outright the refined body conception (“thin, light, airy bodies” or “in the nature of celestial matter”) and ascribes it to Christians (ibid., 272). See also ch. 6 above, note 59.

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human reward; (2) public redemption. Abravanel’s blatant apocalyptic style touches only on the events that will lead to the era of public redemption. This period will indeed be eternal in public terms (the rule of the people of Israel over the nations of the world) but individuals as such will not enjoy eternal material life. Abravanel’s messianic interests, then, focused on public redemption and its events: the terrible wars, the arrival of the messiah, and the resurrection of the dead that will occur then. His ­magnificent messianic description thus refers to public redemption. How did he describe the new messianic reality? Clearly, Abravanel cannot equate the messianic world with the c­ urrent one. This world is “the world of exile,” and will go through fundamental changes with “God’s revenge and his judgment of Edom and Ishmael.” The motif of miraculous and wondrous revenge on the nations of the world is the basis of Abravanel’s apocalyptic approach. The apocalyptic moment is evident mainly in the destruction of the evil nations in general and of the Christian community in particular. This approach is, in his view, c­ ompatible with the rabbis’ view about the renewal of the world after a defined period (TB Sanhedrin 97b). Abravanel does not mean the ­obliteration and ­absolute disappearance of the world but the new human and environmental r­ eality that will prevail in it, “the end of days, and the end of anger, and the ­salvation of Israel.”92 This reality means a life of serenity out of true faith under the eternal rule of the people of Israel. It will be marked by economic prosperity and material comfort, which will also continue forever. The days of the messiah, then, will be days of “ease and rest in the Holy Land until the end of the world.”93 The transition to this reality will occur, as noted, at the beginning of the days of the messiah, as part of the divine wondrous revenge against the nations: “And the nations that have harmed Israel shall lick the dust like a snake and like the crawling things of the earth.”94 In this future era, even God will come out from hiding to lead an open, cruel war against the nations of the world. In this war, nothing will resemble the familiar, natural world. The miracles of the past will pale by comparison with the direct divine war against the nations and the means that will be adopted in it. By diverting the apocalypse toward the destruction of actual and demonic-satanic enemies, Abravanel became a partner to a prevalent trend in the expulsion generation, as is clearly 92 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 544a. 93 Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah, 403a. On the cyclical conception of the world’s existence, see also ibid., 402a, 405a-b. Abravanel, as noted, negated the complete destruction of the world. See Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 485b. 94 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 560b, according to Micah 7:17.

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e­ vident from remnants of a Genizah work,95 and from the sermons of Yosef Garson.96 Abravanel, ­however, anchored the boldly apocalyptic stance on a fundamental, ­systematic, and unique web of interpretation and philosophy. I turn to the other elements of the messianic era according to Abravanel. First, note the general resurrection of the dead in this era. Abravanel i­nterpreted the verse “the Lord has created a new thing in the earth” (Jeremiah 31:22) as referring to the miraculous resurrection taking place in the days of the messiah.97 Furthermore: in a renewed world of that kind, the Land of Israel will stand out due to its special status,98 and the people of Israel as a national entity will live eternally in safety and serenity. Redeemed existence will be accompanied by a number of wondrous motifs, evident mainly in the figure of the future human, as shown below. Finally, note that Abravanel did not renounce the ideal of wisdom and knowledge. This ideal, however, becomes less significant in the context of his detailed messianic discussions of miraculous wars against other religions and other wondrous elements of redemption, all bearing distinctly apocalyptic marks. Does the new world also mean a new human? According to Abravanel, as noted, the future world is a natural world and, ostensibly, the future human is also meant to be identical to the present one. Abravanel was well aware of this inference but could not renounce the apocalyptic ­connotations coloring his discussions of the processes leading to the days of the m ­ essiah—wars and revenge on other nations. Addressing the issue of free choice in the future world, he notes: And the uncircumcised heart that Moses our master mentioned is not lack of choice and its negation in those days, since possibility is i­ nherent in the actual nature of rational creatures. Rather, he means them to fear the miracles and marvels that God, may He be blessed, will perform in front of them until, due to them, they surrender their ­uncircumcised heart (Leviticus 26:41) and no longer seek the ­material cravings that represent but perfection and holiness instead. And in those days, they will be as Adam when he was born, before he sinned.99 95 See Isaiah Tishby, Messianism at the Time of the Expulsion from Spain and Portugal (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1985), 59-97 [Heb]. 96 Meir Benayahu, “The Sermons of R. Yosef b. Meir Garson as a Source for the History of the Expulsion from Spain and Sephardi Diaspora,” Michael: On the History of the Jews in the Diaspora 7 (1981): 156-157 [Heb]. 97 Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah, 406a. 98 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 465b (Abravanel relies on the view in The Kuzari about the Land of Israel as the land of prophecy). Cf. ibid., 483-484. 99 Ibid., 434b. See also ibid., 505a.

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This passage was formulated in a topical context—the problem of the Marranos (“the forced sinners of Israel . . . born among the Gentiles and learning from their deeds”). Abravanel interpreted the verse “And the Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart” (Deuteronomy 30:6) as referring to them.100 Abravanel, then, tried to preserve choice in the future but ­miraculous events will obviously preclude it. The example in the cited passage of Adam before sin indeed attests that the redeemed world will be manifest as a rebirth and humanity will have a new start. In fact, the redeemed world will begin with an essential advantage over the first steps of the current world, because Adam failed and sinned, whereas the people of the future “will only choose the good and their nature will not crave for what is unworthy.” Furthermore: “In the days of the messiah people will return to the rung where Adam had stood .  .  . wisdom and fairness and the abolition of masculine cravings.”101 That, then, is the great power of the miracle and the wonder of the future world’s birth. Abravanel indeed ­interpreted literally the motif of “a new heart and a new spirit” (Ezekiel 36:26)—“they will not wish and crave for a bad thing and the heart will always crave for the good and honest things according to the intellect”; in brief—“the dismissal of the evil spirit.”102 Three characteristics should be added to the ­description of the future human: (1) “a good and ­unchanging temperament” will be created, so that people will live long lives at the time of redemption, like the ancients who are mentioned in Genesis;103 (2) h ­ eavenly manifestations will return, the holy spirit and prophecy, “through miracles rather than through nature”;104 (3) the ideal of wisdom and k­ nowledge will be realized.105 Despite the natural context, then, a new human type will obviously emerge in the future. A further expression of the future human state comes forth in the figure of the messiah. Medieval literature offers hardly any other e­ xamples of extensive and systematic analytical and hermeneutical discussions on messianic personification on the scale of Abravanel.106 The figure of the 100 Cf. Benzion Netanyahu, The Marranos of Spain: From the Late XIth to the Early XVIth Century According to Contemporary Hebrew Sources (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1966), 177-203 101 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 156. 102 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 435a; 521a. 103 Ibid., 486b. This motif, as noted, had already been discussed by Sholom b. Moshe from Rome and by David Kokhavi (see ch. 6 above). 104 Ibid., 545b and many others. 105 Ibid., 547a. 106 The whole of Section 3 in Yeshu’ot Meshiho, for example, is devoted to the figure of the messiah. Thus, the determination that “Abravanel is more interested in the concept of messianism than in the individual messiah” (Rivka

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messiah is built in light of the general perception of the messianic era and wondrously reflects it. For example, the messiah will be a true sage. Abravanel holds that true knowledge is acquired solely through m ­ iracles, and his discussion highlights his critique of the philosophers and his disappointment with their view of intellectual perfection. Abravanel ­ finds the rationalist version of intellectual perfection lacking for three reasons: (1) the philosopher, who devotes himself to the intellect, has no political ability. This ability is part of the practical intellect, which is neglected in the development of the speculative intellect; (2) for the same reason—devotion to the intellect—the philosopher lacks physical fitness; (3) the philosopher “generally” deviates from “Torah faith.”107 By contrast, the king messiah will be wise, a statesman, and a hero “through miracles.” The king ­messiah is the true intellectual because he develops all his ­intellectual abilities, but he does so through supernatural, m ­ iraculous means. The messiah will wage ­apocalyptic wars with the entire world solely through “the rod of his mouth,” hence the “signs and wonders” that will characterize his activities.108 I turn now to the hermeneutical implementation of the ­apocalyptic moment. Abravanel was familiar with the interpretations of medieval Jewish rationalism and at times relied on rationalist allusions. For e­ xample, he interpreted Elijah’s manifestations in the sources in two ways: (1) these manifestations were merely products of the imagination (dreams or ­“solitary meditation” [hitbodedut]); (2) Jewish sages followed ancient philosophers by speaking in riddles and parables, and the figure of Elijah should also be understood as a parable and a symbol.109 Together with the similarity, ­however, is the deep difference resulting from Abravanel’s changes in the aim of the interpretation. Abravanel enlisted allegorical rationalist methods to substantiate the apocalyptic approach, and he was therefore critical of the usual rationalist interpretation of Aggadah, such as that of Shem Tov Ibn

Shatz, “Jewish Messianism After the Expulsion from Spain: Some Characteristics,” Daat 11 [1983]: 61 [Heb]) needs to be reconsidered. 107 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 441a. 108 Ibid., 442a, according to Isaiah 11:4. 109 Ibid., 50. Later in his commentary, Abravanel formulated his messianic orientation in an apocalyptic style (ibid., 53). On the medieval manifestation of Elijah, see Reuven Margaliot, ed., “Introduction,” in Responsa from Heaven by Yaakov of Marvish, revised ed. (Jerusalem: Mosad Harav Kook 1989), 3-41; Abraham Heschel, “Inspiration in the Middle Ages,” in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. Saul Lieberman (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1950), Hebrew Section, 175-208; Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1980), 291-298.

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Shaprut.110 The conclusions that emerge from Abravanel’s ­commentaries are well-anchored in anti-rationalist apocalyptic contents. For example, Abravanel interpreted in two ways the rabbinic saying: “The Son of David will not come until a small fish is sought for an invalid and cannot be procured, as it is written (Ezekiel 32:14), ‘Then will I make their waters deep’ (TB Sanhedrin 98a).” One interpretation fits the literal reading and states, “future redemption will resemble redemption in Egypt in its wonders.” In the blood plague, as is well-known, all the fish in the Nile died and, similarly “there will be such a plague in the world to come.”111 A second interpretation is allegorical. In his view, the fish symbolizes man, as based on the writing, “And dost make men like the fish of the sea” (Habakuk 1:14). According to this interpretation, the rabbis intended “many great” wars that will wipe out nations—such as Egypt—from the face of the earth. Abravanel also noted the motivation for such an allegorical interpretation: “And R. Hanina chose to speak in parables because it was dangerous to say so explicitly since they were living in the land of Egypt.”112 Abravanel, then, often took the natural changes described in Scripture beyond their literal meaning and viewed them as referring to the terrible wars to be waged in the redeemed world in the course of miracles and wonders. The m ­ iraculous war whereby God would pour crystal stones, fire, and brimstone from heaven is the true meaning behind the new heaven and the new earth. Abravanel, then, strove to create a new hermeneutical tradition, characterized by three features: apocalyptic in its content, allegorical in its interpretation, and esoteric in its style. Clearly, Abravanel poured a characteristic rationalist pattern into his messianic interpretation and, in its context, replaced the rationalist contents with apocalyptic ones. He aspired to create an alternative hermeneutical perception of the ­rationalist tradition, which would be based on the same methods but reach the opposite conclusions. Elsewhere, he even hinted that allegor110 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 92. On Ibn Shaprut’s interpretation of Aggadah, see Norman Frimer and Dov Schwartz, The Life and Thought of Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 1992), 57-87 [Heb]. 111 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 90. This interpretation appears also in Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 515b. Abravanel, as noted, frequently compared future redemption to the exodus from Egypt, in all aspects. This comparison recurs in his interpretation of the Passover Haggadah, Zevah Pesah. See also, at length, Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 513a, and more. Abravanel, however, did not moderate the apocalyptic overtones as did, for example, Ramah, who stated that future miracles will not exceed the biblical ones (see ch. 4 above). Quite the contrary. When dealing with the parting of the Red Sea, Abravanel stated that the future redemption will “be infinitely greater [than the exodus from Egypt] and, therefore, will not be ascribed to the finger, or the hand, or the arm, but definitely to me [the Holy One, blessed be He], as it was said (Isaiah 51:12), “I, even I, am he that comforts you” (Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 472b; see also ibid., 498a). 112 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 91. For further examples of such allegorical interpretations, see 120ff.; Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, 446a and more.

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ical interpretation is the more deeply rooted Sephardic approach, contrary to the literal readings typical of the “ways of Ashkenazim.”113 The allegory, however, replaces one miracle with another. In other words, the spirit of apocalyptic messianism hovers above Abravanel’s wide-ranging ­hermeneutical enterprise. Obviously, this interpretive development stands beside a massive, ­broad-scoped, and comprehensive endeavor that constitutes the ­messianic events on a literal reading of the prophets. A fitting example of such an ­interpretation of rabbinic statements is the discussion of Shmuel’s saying, “the sole difference between this world and the days of the ­messiah is ­delivery from bondage to foreign powers.” Abravanel was aware that this saying was the authoritative bastion of naturalism. He noted that Maimonides ­omitted Shmuel’s name as the author of this saying to divert attention from the fact that it could then be categorized as “an individual statement.”114 And how did Abravanel interpret Shmuel’s view? In his view, Shmuel assumed that redemption takes place in two eras: (1) the days of the messiah; (2) the r­ esurrection of the dead or the world to come, which for Abravanel are synonymous. Shmuel, then, intended his explicit statement only for the first of these two eras and thus admitted that the second marks a new chapter founded on miracle and wonder, both in the universe and in human h ­ istory. Moreover, the statement about the first era also needs a new explanation. This world means “the days that the Jewish people have spent since the exodus from Egypt until today, and nothing new will happen to the Jewish people in the days of the messiah beyond what had happened to them before, at the time of their success.”115 In other words, this world is not only the days of exile but also includes the times of Moses, David and Solomon, e­ conomic prosperity, and the wonders in the past. What, then, is the ­distinction between this world—including its periods of peace and ­privilege—and the days of the messiah? Simply: in the past, the attacking kingdoms had only been defeated by the Jewish people but had not s­ ubmitted to them. In the days of the messiah, they will be s­ ubjugated.116 The second era, however, 113 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 103. Abravanel also characterized as “ways of Ashkenazim” commentaries that rely on folk magic (“[a] soothsayer, diviner, wizard, understands birds’ tweets and the conversations of animals”). Abravanel related to the Ashkenazi exegesis as “insufficient and incorrect” (ibid.). See Gershon D. Cohen, “Messianic Postures of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” in Studies in the Variety of Rabbinic Cultures (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 271-297. 114 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 157. Shmuel’s saying is the topic of ch. 7 in Section 3 of his book. 115 Ibid., 159. 116 Ibid., 160. Cf. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, “Abravanel: Redemption and the End of Days,” in Faith, History and Values (Jerusalem: Akademon, 1982), 108 [Heb].

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will be part of a new world whose birth is founded on a miracle. The last authoritative fortress of naturalism, then, melted and collapsed. Mostly, the interpretation in Mashmi´a Yeshu´ah endorses the literal apocalyptic meaning of the prophecies about the end of days in all that ­concerns the wars of redemption. Although Abravanel, as noted, often resorted to allegorical interpretations, he recoiled from the free ­allegorization of miracles. Even for their use in the fateful and passionate dispute with the Christian interpretation, he would not consent to ­“parables or form replacing the resurrection of the dead,”117 that is, the miracle of the resurrection must be interpreted literally. In Abravanel’s writings, allegory serves the apocalyptic spirit of the messianic events. Relying on the magnificent apocalyptic scheme that he had built and substantiated through his interpretation of the sources, Abravanel directed his criticism at the Christian apocalyptic foundations. A key motif in the Christian version of the day of judgment is the demonic figure of the Antichrist. This figure—the essence of evil and the enemy of Jesus—will wage a fearsome struggle against God and, on the day of judgment, will be destroyed. Abravanel’s strategy was to show that the source of this approach is the Book of Daniel and that Christianity had distorted its meaning. Since Christians feared that the Jewish messiah would indeed arrive and that their messiah would be exposed as a deceit, they poured the features of the messiah into the Antichrist in the hope that the success of the Jewish messiah would prove only temporary. Abravanel thus thought it was crucial to demonstrate that apocalyptic messianism has its roots in Jewish sources. Among the characteristics of the messiah is the determination “and they [the Christians] said that he would perform signs and wonders, and also that he is the truth, as it is said, ‘and I will exhibit wonders in the heavens and on the earth’ (Joel 3:3).”118 Reacting to the Christian interpretation, Abravanel equated the Antichrist 117 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 178. Cf. Ram Ben-Shalom, The Image of Christian Culture in the Historical Consciousness of the Jews of Twelfth to Fifteenth Century Spain and Provence, vol. 1 (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 1996), 136-152 [Heb]. 118 Ma’ayanei ha-Yeshu’ah, 341a. Abravanel often relied on this text to illustrate the characteristics of the redeemed world. On his claim about the Antichrist, cf. “The Reproach of the Gentiles,” in The Polemical Writings of Profiat Durant, ed. Frank Talmage (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center and The Dinur Center, 1981), 22-23, [Heb]; Shimon b. Tsemah Duran, Keshet U-Magen (Berlin: Steinschneider, 1881) (the part on the polemic against the Christians). As this issue attests, as well as Abravanel’s general messianic doctrine, the messianic discussions in the writings of Jews and Christians show that they were mutually aware. Cf. David B. Ruderman, “Hope against Hope: Jewish and Christian Messianic Expectations in the Late Middle Ages,” in Exile and Diaspora: Studies on the History of the Jewish People Presented to Professor Haim Beinart, ed. Aharon Mirsky, Avraham Grossman, and Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem and Madrid: Ben Zvi Institute, Hebrew University, and Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1991), 185-202.

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that would be destroyed in the messianic process with the experiences of the messiah son of Joseph.119 Abravanel, then, built his apocalyptic version of messianism relying both on the Christian interpretation and on his bitter dispute with it in his writings on the messianic idea. Through Abravanel, apocalyptic messianism donned a systematic garb and a hermeneutical and philosophical fullness it had never received in medieval Jewish thought. No rationalist ever devoted three ­comprehensive works to the messianic idea basing it on distinctly apocalyptic f­ oundations. Indeed, Abravanel could not retreat as if nothing had happened in the course of six hundred years of thought. He could not go back to endorse Saadia’s hermeneutical determination that messianic texts must be read only l­iterally. Hence, Abravanel used mostly allegories and, in their course, ­presented apocalyptic views in moderate terms, such as negating the ­absolute destruction of the present world on the one hand, and r­ ejecting the motif of eternal life on the other. The abstract spiritual reward of the soul plays a significant role for Abravanel, and creates a certain tension between individual and public redemption. This tension, however, is blunted because of the redeemed world’s eternity, when the Jewish people will forever rule over other nations in a world that knows no heresy. Hence, the relative moderation of individual redemption did not detract from his messianic doctrine’s systematic and meticulously apocalyptic character. Abravanel focused apocalyptic messianism on the miraculous wars that lead to the redeemed world. Revenge on the Gentiles filled this outstanding leader’s being and set the course for his messianic interpretation. Abravanel’s messianic endeavor dealt a fatal blow to the n ­ aturalistic idea and marginalized it altogether. His project attained two important ­achievements. One was political—according to his calculations, Abravanel was convinced that he was at the opening of the messianic era and, as an e­ xperienced leader, he prepared his community for an i­ mminent new world. His second achievement was adding an essential and ­significant ­contribution to the defeat of medieval rationalism in the v­ ersion of Maimonides and his disciples, who had supported the ­naturalistic ­messianic idea. The m ­ essianic idea was an effective tool for defeating ­rationalist ­philosophy. The Middle Ages, then, ended with the victory of ­apocalyptic ­messianism in its ­moderate version. More than by ­theological and ­philosophical ­considerations, however, messianic naturalism was defeated by the fearsome events of the times—the persecution and the final expulsion from Spain and Portugal. 119 Mashmi’a Yeshuah, 450b.

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Conclusions: Redemption, Models, and Decisions

The description of the substantive and historical development of the ­tension between naturalism and apocalyptic messianism leads to several conclusions. These conclusions touch directly on the value of the messianic models presented in the first chapter and on their descriptive and analytical usefulness, as well as providing data for a re-evaluation of the relationship between philosophy and theology in medieval rationalist thought. This chapter is devoted to these systematic conclusions and to the connection between the messianic idea and historical reality.

THE CLARIFICATION OF THE MODELS The rationalists’ discussions of the messianic idea and their ­confrontations with the traditionalists led to the refinement of the messianic models ­themselves. Contrary to midrashic and apocalyptic literature that, by its very nature, did not strive for a conceptual, substantive, and s­ ystematic ­clarification of the characteristics of redemption, the speculative l­ iterature of the Middle Ages did set itself this goal. Although the ­clarification was at times unsystematic and resorted to topical and polemical texts, it did ­illuminate the style and character of messianic conceptions. After the detailed examination of messianic rationalist doctrines, we can return to an analysis of the first criterion in the list cited at the start of this book— on the c­ haracter and nature of messianic events—and consider several options of it. The various modes of apocalyptic messianism will henceforth be defined as follows: 1)  A new cosmos. This view assumes that the messianic world is an entirely new reality, without parallel in the past. No trace of the current order will survive and a new creation will emerge. This is the “world to come” according to Saadia and other geonim, for example, and the image of the final stage according to, say, Shimon b. Tsemah Duran.

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2)  A new order in an ordinary world. This view assumes that the messianic world is our present world, but its order is completely changed. The miracles that had occurred in the past would return and continue forever, as in eternal life, but without fundamental changes in the world order. This is the approach of traditionalists such as Ramah and Nahmanides, and also Bibago’s view of eternal life in the present world. 3)  A temporary collapse of the present order. This view assumes that the present natural order will also be preserved in the future. Redemption will occur through miracles and wonders that ­transcend nature but only at a specific time, in order to exact revenge from the nations and create the new Jewish kingdom. This was the view of Menachem Meiri (who deviated from it on one count—the abolition of evil in humans) and was also c­ onsidered at length in Yitzhak Abravanel’s discussions. The naturalistic messianic mode was also refined and clarified on at least two counts. One is the attitude toward apocalyptic messianism among ­supporters of the naturalistic model, and the other is the motivations behind its proposition. Concerning the attitude toward the apocalyptic model, three approaches emerged: 1)  Complete rejection of the apocalyptic model. This approach sees no room for any deviation from the natural order and rejects apocalyptic traditions as unacceptable. This was the view of ­ Maimonides and many other rationalists. 2)  Adoption of apocalyptic motifs within a naturalistic context. This approach strives to create a synthesis, essentially integrating ­apocalyptic motifs within a naturalistic context. This was the approach suggested by Aharon b. Meshulam of Lunel and others at the time of the first Maimonidean controversy. 3)  Juxtaposing apocalyptic motifs to the naturalistic approach. Followers of this approach did not seek to reconcile these two traditions and, while endorsing the naturalistic model, paid their dues to a­ pocalyptic messianism by showing support for various ­apocalyptically styled motifs. This approach resonates widely in medieval thought. As for the motivations behind the emergence of, and the support for, the naturalistic model, three factors are central:

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1)  I ndividual redemption. This is a key drive, leading ­rationalism in its various manifestations (Neoplatonic and neo-­Aristotelian) to adhere to a messianic version suited to the natural order. The n ­ aturalistic model wavers between loyalty to sources that compelled recognition of the messianic purpose on the one ­ hand, and on the other, the rationalist inclination to present ­individual redemption, the soul’s return to its source, or the ideal of ­intellectual communion as the only significant element. 2)   The eternity of the world. The philosophical and scientific ­conception about the eternity of natural laws led to the ­emergence of approaches on messianism as realized within history and within the natural world. 3)  The eternity of Halakhah. This element too was significant in ­driving many thinkers to adhere to the naturalistic model. Apparently, the desire to preserve Halakhah originated in the experience with false messiahs and their antinomian tendencies and in the involvement in the anti-Christian polemic. Thinkers feared for the wholeness of Halakhah and, therefore, accepted the only model that provided a reasonable basis for its eternal ­preservation. Finally, note again that other methods emerged in the course of the ­messianic discussion, striving for a synthesis of apocalyptic and n ­ aturalistic ­messianism in various attempts to cover all the options. Two ­symmetrical, though antithetical, solutions reflect this trend. One claims that ­messianic naturalism is typical of the first stage of redemption—the days of the messiah—when the transformations are only social and ­ ­ political. Apocalyptic events characterize the second stage, into which the many ­talmudic and midrashic traditions that support apocalyptic redemption (for example, in the book Or Einayim and in Bibago’s teachings) can be placed. The other solution locates the apocalyptic motifs in the days of the messiah, while the natural context returns once the messiah has concluded his strategic actions (Abravanel). Both the apocalyptic and the naturalistic models, then, were refined in the course of medieval philosophy until they developed as two discrete alternatives, mainly in the mid-fifteenth century.

MODELS AND REALITY This book opened with the question of the relationship between the research models and the concrete conceptual reality they seek to explain. I claimed

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that a diverse and complex reality cannot be exhausted by any ideal model posited by scholars, and here we touch on an essential ­methodological ­question. The course dictated by scholarship is indeed to adopt ­general principles and to locate, map out, and arrange the actual events in ­various contexts and disciplines. Once the isolated event is ­analyzed and located within a trend, a circle, or a conceptual approach, its uniqueness and exclusivity can be understood, but so can its complexity as a crossroad of influences and a confluence of ideas. A dramatic but n ­ ecessary stage then arrives: when scholars delve into the depth of the actual reality assisted by the necessary models, they find that these models collapse and vanish. Methodologically, then, research advances in a process of building and breakup: model → application at the concrete level → collapse of the model. Mostly, this ­methodological process is the work of more than one ­individual, given that the scholar who set up the model at times finds it hard to admit its collapse when confronted with the concrete reality. The preceding discussions began with the building of distinct models— apocalyptic messianism versus naturalistic messianism. The examination of the various approaches and the periodical cross-sections, however, lead to another perspective. The messianic idea plays an important educational role in Maimonides’ approach but, intrinsically, it is marginal—merely an e­ ducational incentive. The perfect individual does not need m ­ essianic ­promises. The messianic idea is politically important in Maimonides’ ­teachings, and the political question is essential to these teachings as it is to those of the Muslim thinker admired by Maimonides—Alfarabi. As such, however, Maimonides ascribed no essential importance to the ­messianic idea. His spiritual disciples—thirteenth- and fourteenth-­century rationalists—even translated it into allegorical terms and ­ ­ disregarded its concrete expressions almost entirely. Furthermore, we found that Maimonides himself thought up messianic naturalism since this is the only model that fits the abstract immortality of the soul. And again, n ­ aturalism is not intrinsically important but, rather, was required by the encounter between rationalism and revelation. Had they not been compelled by the holy texts and sources, Maimonides and his disciples would never have entered into a discussion of messianism in the first place. Messianic ­naturalism arose hand in hand with the need to repress the messianic topic and prevent its fruitless exploration. Indeed, Maimonides dwelled at length (Laws of Kings 12:2) on the uselessness of the messianic discourse and the need to avoid it. Among supporters of the apocalyptic approach, the situation was different. They viewed the messianic element as a significant, essential, and

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fateful element of their world view. Nahmanides’ obsessive tone in Torat ha-Adam, the war that Ramah declared in his letters, the ­discussions of thinkers with kabbalistic leanings—all attest to their essential i­nterest in the messianic discourse. These thinkers saw the messianic goal as the ­culmination of their mystical and spiritual aspirations. Although these apocalyptic views did affect naturalism, however, the fatal blow was inflicted by Abravanel. He absolutely rejected the approach that had ­marginalized the messianic issue and, instead, located it at the center of the conceptual map. Against the fundamental naturalistic interest— making messianism a side issue—Abravanel set the messianic discourse at the very core of Jewish thought. The actual conceptual reality, then, does not entirely fit the a­ ssumption of a continued confrontation between apocalyptic ­ messianism and ­naturalism. Though these models serve the scholarly analysis well, actual reality reveals that the motivation of the various thinkers and camps was different. The tension and the ensuing struggles resulted, firstly, from a confrontation over the very value of the messianic idea and its ­importance. The rationalist camp claimed that the idea was superfluous, tried to push it aside, and accepted it under duress, whereas the moderate camp turned the messianic idea into the guiding ideal of human life. It could be argued that, at a certain stage, only two alternatives existed— apocalyptic m ­ essianism or no messianism—or, in another formulation, to agree with the messianic idea or to negate it. Many thinkers wavered between the two approaches without the ability or the desire to choose between them, and extreme rationalists in particular lacked courage to reject the messianic idea altogether. Many traditionalists, as noted, delved into the depths of the ­rationalist interest and understood its drift. Even at the beginning of the ­polemics, ­rationalists were blamed for betraying and distorting the messianic goals. One of the philosophers’ strongest adversaries during the 1351 p ­ ersecutions, Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, explicitly accused rationalists of rejecting the ­traditional messianic notion altogether. An incisive thinker, Shem Tov understood that individual redemption indeed rejects the ­messianic idea outright. After noting in general terms the various ­rationalist ­interpretations of the intellect’s essence, Shem Tov determined: And according to these theories, it is clearly wrong and deceitful to presume that the righteous soul is rewarded according to its actions and punished according to its wickedness, and that there is paradise,

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and Gehenna, and a great day of judgment, and the resurrection of the dead, and to hope for the body of the individual after the soul separates from it. Rather, it is as a stinking carcass and the wise holds no advantage over the fool and the righteous is as the wicked. . . .1

Shem Tov longingly raised the memory of days past, at a time of “Rav Saadia Gaon, of blessed memory, and the Spanish R. Abraham b. R. Hiyya and many other noblemen like them,” who acknowledged ”miracles and the ­resurrection of the dead.”2 Abravanel too, in the introduction to his book Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah, attacked at length those who supported the ­salvation of the soul “and did not believe in the wonders [of God].”3 Abravanel tied together those who supported individual redemption and interpreted ­messianic prophesies “in spiritual ways [as referring] only to soul matters,”4 to those who attributed these prophecies to the time of the Second Temple. Elsewhere, Abravanel went even further: he described the Christian ­spiritual interpretation of the messianic chapters as a ­conclusion that emerges from Maimonides’ approach.5 For these thinkers, then, the true struggle was that between the supporters and the deniers of ­redemption as a future event. An examination of the tension between the models, then, reveals an immanent, fundamental, and profound tension between the affirmation of messianism and its dismissal from the philosophical and theological map. A series of historical, sociological, and philosophical tensions led to the various approaches. My presentation of the two main models (apocalyptic ­messianism versus naturalism) is based on a general analysis of texts at the descriptive level.

  1 Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov, Sefer ha-Emunot (Ferrara, 1555), 2b. See also Yitzhak Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2, From the Fourteenth Century to the Expulsion (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1966), 235239; Dov Schwartz, “The Spiritual-Religious Decline of the Jewish Community in Spain at the End of the Fourteenth Century,” Pe‘amim 46-47 (1992): 98 [Heb]. Shem Tov hints in this passage at another accusation he never tired of making concerning the standing of a righteous but uneducated person. According to Maimonides’ understanding of the “world to come” concept, the righteous who are uneducated are not granted immortality.   2 Shem Tov, Sefer ha-Emunot, 3b. On Shem Tov’s critique on the issue of resurrection, see also the end of ch. 5 above.  3 Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah (Jerusalem, 1960), 426b.   4 Ibid., 427a.  5 Yeshu’ot Meshiho, 163-165. Christian participants in the polemics with Jews also relied on Maimonides’ messianic approach, as evident, for example, in Nahmanides’ polemic. See Ramban (Nachmanides), Writings and Discourses, vol. 2, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1978), 680-685. See Joseph Shatzmiller, La deuxième controverse de Paris: Un chapitre dans la polémique entre chrétiens et juifs au Moyen âge (Paris: Peeters, 1994), 39, 42. Cf. also Chen Merchavia, “Pugio Fidei: An Index of Citations,” in Exile and Diaspora: Studies in the History of the Jewish People Presented to Professor Haim Beinart, ed. Aharon Mirsky, Avraham Grossman, and Yosef Kaplan (Jerusalem and Madrid: Ben-Zvi Institute and Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1988), 232-233 [Heb].

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The conclusions of the analysis expose the inner motivation of the discourse on the messianic idea—the attitude toward the messianic idea per se. Actual reality, then, cannot be reduced to a simple uniform ­framework, and is a product of historical, cultural, and hermeneutical elements.

THE CONTEXT At the opening of the book, I presented its underlying research method: the study of the conceptual and cultural trends building Jewish rationalist thought in the Middle Ages. Jewish philosophy, then, is presented in this work as a manifestation of various trends of thought confronting one another and also fusing with one another. I also noted that this method is helpful in the ­understanding of the central approaches that, so far, have been studied in isolation. More precisely, not only does this method expose the paths of mainstream philosophical positions and their roots but it also sheds new light on the mainstream philosophy itself. One significant example is Maimonides’ stance, which was presented as resulting from the trend of ­striving for ­intimate individual redemption. Another illustrative example worthy of ­ further ­examination follows. Gersonides’ messianic doctrine was described briefly in Chapter Six above. This doctrine is distinctly apocalyptic and stands out as an alien ­element in the context of his rationalist approach, since Gersonides is among the deepest and most original Aristotelian thinkers in medieval Jewish philosophy. A history of ideas focusing on the cultural climate might explain this strange phenomenon and shed light on it in two parallel ways: 1)  R  evelation and concealment. Possibly, Gersonides presented his overt thought in his biblical commentary and his concealed thought in Milhamot ha-Shem. In this view, Gersonides is p ­ resented as a link in the chain of esoteric medieval literature, preceded by Judah Halevi and Maimonides, and followed by Shmuel Ibn Zarza and Shem Tov Ibn Shaprut. This option also points to the standing of the philosopher vis-à-vis the masses in the fourteenth century, reversing the symmetry in regard to other rationalists. Extreme rationalists such as Ibn Zarza presented messianic n ­ aturalism as the open layer and the rejection of m ­ essianic reality as the ­concealed one, whereas Gersonides presented a more moderate interpretive scheme, whereby the revealed is purely apocalyptic and the concealed apparently naturalistic. Gersonides’ stance,

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then, may be an expression of a discrete literary genre that was widespread in medieval thought—esoteric literature. 2)  The rise of the apocalyptic approach. In Gersonides’ times, then, messianic apocalyptic thought re-emerged and entered the very core of rationalism. This development—prominent in the thought of Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona, the writings of Meiri, and the ­speculative thought of Rashba’s circle—may also have prompted Gersonides to examine this matter, at least as it relates directly to biblical commentary. Discernible in this approach, then, are again echoes of a conceptual trend widespread in the zeitgeist. These two alternatives, though incompatible, help in the understanding of a thinker’s conceptual activity vis-à-vis the cultural surroundings. The study of the dominant rationalist doctrines, so vigorously pursued in the ­current research, is therefore extremely important. No less, and perhaps even more important, however, is the study of the cultural processes that make up the history of ideas. This determination applies to the most abstract ­philosophical matters, and is even more valid for issues where philosophy and theology interface, such as the tension within the messianic idea.

INFLUENCE Discussions on the development of the messianic idea in Jewish thought have relied mainly on the analysis of primary sources and their mutual context. The need for taking into account a series of historical factors and interreligious processes in order to clarify the various conceptual paths has already been emphasized. In other words, the inner dynamic of the ­messianic tension is shaped also by the contact with the immediate as well as the alien social, religious, or conceptual surroundings. I will expand briefly on an example of contact with the social and ­religious environment that greatly influenced the tension between ­messianic approaches—the anti-Christian polemic. This polemic dictated different and even opposite directions that, in turn, contributed to the shaping of the apocalyptic and naturalistic approaches. On the one hand, the polemic helped to identify the apocalyptic approach as a future, as yet unrealized, world. The apocalyptic approach assumed legitimacy as a method used to contradict Christian messianism. Presuming a drastic change in the natural order and the creation of a new world as a messianic characteristic excludes the possibility that messianism

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has already been realized and the messiah has already come, as Christianity argues. The Christian interpretation thus sought the allegorization of the texts so that they might fit life in a redeemed world, whereas apocalyptic messianism demanded a literal reading and thus effectively contradicted the Christian interpretation. On the other hand, the same anti-Christian polemical consideration promoted and validated the naturalistic approach—whereas the Christian gospel claimed the commandments would be abolished with the arrival of redemption, Jewish naturalism substantiated the eternity of the Torah and of Halakhah and rejected figurative and allegorical Christian exegeses. The anti-Christian polemic, then, helped to deepen the immanent tension between naturalism and the apocalyptic stance already present in messianic Jewish thought. The Christian idea is itself multifaceted, and its various aspects exerted different and even contrasting influences. For example, many Christian theologians presented an apocalyptic messianic view of resurrection, such as the Antichrist motif. Paradoxically, however, they may thereby have contributed to the strengthening of the naturalistic model in Jewish thought. By contrast, Christianity repeatedly emphasized the salvation of the soul. This emphasis led to a Jewish traditionalist (Abravanel in the introduction to Mashmi’a Yeshu’ah) objecting to Jewish rationalists joining Christians in the interpretation of messianic prophesies as applying to the past (the Second Temple period) and in the presentation of social and cosmic goals as spiritual and individual. The contact with the surroundings and the interreligious polemic unquestionably influenced, directly or indirectly, the tension between the apocalyptic and naturalistic approaches in Jewish thought itself. Even places that had no direct contact with Christianity, such as Yemen, showed awareness of the conceptual processes in the locales of the polemic. The tension, therefore, cannot be described without addressing the course of the anti-Christian polemic within Jewish thought.

DECIDING AND AVOIDING DECISIONS In many issues in the study of Jewish thought, gradual and continuous paths of development are discernible from the beginning of the Middle Ages until the expulsions at the end of the fifteenth century. (For example, on the psychological question of the essence of mind and soul, various approaches are involved in a struggle until, in the fifteenth century, most thinkers leaned in

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favor of one or another version of the substantialist conception of the soul. The study of medieval psychology can thus present a developmental model, with ups and downs that ultimately led to the marginalization of several psychological approaches and the triumph of the substantialist view.) Not so concerning the messianic issue, which kept wavering between various positions. The historical events that shocked Spanish and French Jews in the fourteenth century, for example, could have been expected to tilt the balance in favor of the apocalyptic tradition, but the history of ideas decided otherwise. Although the historical events significantly eroded the status of the naturalistic model, it still preserved its power and, in the ­fifteenth century, was still a legitimate alternative for philosophers. Avoiding a decision may result from the essence of the messianic ­question, which relates to the future—near or far. This characteristic enables various speculations, including the confrontation between a­ pocalyptic and naturalistic messianism. Hence, despite the anger and the rancor against rationalist philosophy, the naturalistic approach was not rejected outright, as Yitzhak Arama’s doctrine attests. A prevalent argument in Christian polemical literature (for ­example, in the thirteenth-century writings of Ramon Llull, who significantly ­influenced Jewish thought, and in the 1413 Tortosa controversy6) hinged on the lack of a decision on the messianic question in Jewish theology. Llull held that this indecisiveness was due to the polarization of views, which prevented the Jewish world from lending clear support to any position. Sometimes Christians used this argument, and sometimes Jews raised it to avoid blame for contradicting the Christian dogma. At such times, the ­tendency to avoid a decision and juxtapose the apocalyptic and the ­naturalistic approaches emerged as distinctly advantageous. In addition to the polemical element, naturalistic views were ­reinforced by another, essential factor—the recoil from the nihilism and ­licentiousness of false messianism. In the fifteenth century, for ­example, Judaism became well-acquainted with various m ­ anifestations of false messianism, and was also exposed to anti-Christian and anti-­Muslim polemics, as described above. False messiahs and r­ epresentatives of the great religions—all attempted to detract from the status of Halakhah as an eternal religious law. The naturalistic model, by ­ contrast, ­strengthened confidence in the eternity of Halakhah, hence its a­ dvantage over ­apocalyptic traditions.   6 See Baer, A History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol. 2, 171-185.

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Again we reach the clear conclusion that social and religious h ­ istory directly affected the philosophical dimension. Rationalist messianism enjoyed a distinct advantage until the end of the fifteenth century, an ­advantage shaken only by a dramatic historical event, such as the ­expulsion, which tilted the balance in favor of the apocalyptic view conveyed in Abravanel’s messianic doctrine. In sum, the conclusions of this discussion attest that the messianic views in medieval Jewish philosophy should not be viewed as the product of individual figures detached from the conceptual and cultural climate. Rather, messianic thought assumed shape through processes of conceptual development, beginning with the initial appearance of the various ideas and continuing up to their mutual confrontation through clarification and ­differentiation. The analysis of ideas, like the analysis of the ­messianic idea in this book, should thus be conducted in other philosophical and ­theological fields as well.7 Only then, when other aspects of the messianic idea—proofs of the existence of God, the theory of attributes, providence, and so forth—are subject to such an analysis, will it be possible to gain true insight into medieval Jewish philosophy.

  7 Note that several monographs have been written dealing with the conceptual study of specific issues in different schools. Above all, the study by Colette Sirat mapping out various schools of thought deserves mention. See A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 24, which presents the central doctrines against the background of the conceptual surroundings. Available also is my Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, trans. David Louvish and Batya Stein (Leiden: Brill, 2004). Additional areas still await further research.

Appendix

History, Ideas, and the History of Ideas

In this appendix, I deal with various aspects of the connection between the hope for redemption and the history of the Jewish people, which can deepen our understanding of the traces of messianic tension in medieval Jewish ­history. The first feature to note is that the messianic phenomenon in the Jewish world has historical-paradigmatic characteristics that recur in almost every event involving messianic fervor. For example, traumatic events affecting world history lead to messianic expectations and, at times, even generate actual messianic movements. The messianic event is often accompanied by “heavenly” revelations, which prophets and v­ isionaries corroborate and endow with vitality. In extreme cases, antinomian ­features appear as well, since broad segments of the conservative society perceive the future as characterized by the revocation of the law, meaning the strict halakhic regime. These examples point to a certain regularity in the historic-­messianic process.1 Messianic theology is also characterized by paradigmatic features. The historian of ideas studying messianic views can identify theoretical models that recurrently set the course of messianic thought: apocalyptic ­messianism versus messianic naturalism, deterministic versus voluntarist messianism, and the dogmatism of messianic belief.2 My question here touches on the extent of the mutual relations and of the correspondence between the history of ideas and “real” history. Many classic studies dealing with the messianic idea in medieval p ­ hilosophy, such as that of Joseph Saracheck, deal with theoretical thought rather than with history, because the surviving remnants of the medieval period are the ­elitist texts of scholars, thinkers, and writers. Modern Jewish philosophy, by ­contrast, often makes use of venues such as ­journals and ­periodicals, enabling us to estimate   1 Many scholars have dealt with the interface between historical and messianic thinking. See, for example, Zvi Baras, ed., Messianism and Eschatology: A Collection of Essays (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1984) [Heb]; Shalom Rosenberg, “History in an Eschatological Perspective,” in Joseph Baruch Sermoneta Memorial Volume, ed. Aviezer Ravitzky, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 14 (1998): 313-340 [Heb]; Marjorie Reeves, The Prophetic Sense of History in Medieval and Renaissance Europe (Aldershot: Variorum, 1999).   2 See ch. 1 above.

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public moods and their mutual ­relationships with abstract conceptual thought—­ philosophical, ­kabbalistic, and so forth. Given these c­ircumstances, we can also consider whether and how deep thinkers reflect prevalent trends in the ­contemporaneous Jewish ­society. For example, when studying the ­development of the Zionist idea in the twentieth c­ entury, we can draw a d ­ istinction between journalistic ­ articles by officeholders, p ­oliticians, and a­ctivists on the one hand, and ­ theological, political, and philosophical thought on the other. The ­various literary genres (poetry, narrative, p ­hilosophical m ­ onographs, ­journalistic reports, critical articles, and so forth) offer a ­general perspective on a “­conceptual m ­ essianism” ­conveying a “real, historical ­messianism.” In the Middle Ages, however, this is not the case. Several chronicles from this period have reached us, but their number is negligible in ­comparison with the ­conceptual abstract literature (halakhic, philosophical, and k­ abbalistic) of the time. The historian of ideas has no option but to use elitist sources. To what extent does the deep thinker convey the moods of the masses, that is, of the society as a whole? Often, this question has no answer. The problem of the definition’s borders must be mentioned here again. Messianism is defined as a way of striving for amendment and, almost invariably, tension prevailed between social-cosmic-universal amendment and personal-individual amendment. Can we study social messianism in detachment from individual messianism? In Maimonides, for example, can we separate the “world to come,” reflecting the ­immortality of the soul (individual-intimate amendment), from the “days of the messiah,” denoting social-political amendment?! Maimonides did not separate these categories in the introduction to Perek Helek, and the analysis conducted throughout this book also assumes they cannot be separated. Despite the dangers lurking on the path of a discussion tying together general and individual messianism, then, the separation between them seems to miss significant aspects of medieval culture. I will attempt to show here how this artificial separation resulted in someone being presented as a messiah, contrary to historical truth. The discussion, therefore, focuses on the connection between historical writing and the abstract messianic idea.

MESSIANIC FIGURES IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MESSIANIC NATURALISM I present below two examples of the connection between historical reality and conceptual-elitist thought. In the first example, historical evidence helps

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to clarify the conceptual development, and in the second, the ­theological conception enriches the historical information. The first ­example deals with stories and messianic traditions from the twelfth ­century and, in its context, I re-examine Maimonidean messianism, ­discussed in Chapter Three. The second example is the story of R. Shemarya Ikriti’s ­“messianism,” which is presented against the background of Jewish thought in the Byzantine Empire at the end of the medieval period.

Apocalyptic and Naturalistic Interpretations In the history of Western religions, the abstract messianic idea was expressed in messianic personification. The figure of the messiah has always helped to focus and center the characteristics of the messianic era in general.3 The study of the concrete messiah also helps to understand the elements that the idea and the historical event share in common, since messianic fervor was often evoked by a messianic figure. I will now consider the claim that Maimonidean messianic naturalism was a reaction to messianic historical events. Several messiahs were active in Maimonides’ social and cultural ­surroundings in the twelfth century.4 In particular, the messianic ­movement established by David Alroy in the East was described in detail. I will point out the conceptual messianic models underlying the various descriptions, and specifically their fitness to the various interests and the literary genres where they appear. R. Benjamin of Tudela dealt at length with the figure of David Alroy and his influence. As a representative of the travelogue genre, Benjamin documented messianic traditions in a typical apocalyptic style. In these traditions, the pseudo-messiah is described as a supernatural figure and a magician. Clearly then, the messiah embodies an impossible set of features: he is a scholar (“being well-versed in the Mosaic law, in the decisions of the rabbis, and in the Talmud; understanding also the ­profane sciences”), a magician (versed in “the scriptures of the magicians and enchanters”) and a commanding military leader (“He made up his mind . . . to unite and collect the Jews who live in the mountains of Chaphton and with them to engage in war with all Gentiles, making the conquest of Jerusalem his final object”).5   3 See above, 4-5.   4 See Mordechai Akiva Friedman, Maimonides, the Yemenite Messiah, and Apostasy (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi Institute, 2002), 19-21 [Heb]. This book deals with several additional questions about the issues considered here.  5 The Travels of Benjamin of Tudela (accessed September 4, 2016) http://www.sacred-texts.com/jud/mhl/mhl20.htm, 417.

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The folk source in this description can perhaps be separated from the critical tone that Benjamin of Tudela brings to it. The folk d ­ escription merely tells the story of David Alroy walking on a shawl that he had spread upon the water. Benjamin, however, pinned Alroy’s magic gift on the magic knowledge he had acquired. His sorceries were “false miracles,” ­meaning deceptions. Benjamin, then, wanted to emphasize the human-­ natural dimension in order to expose the messiah’s deceit. According to his ­testimony, the redemption sages ultimately decided he was not a messiah and that the time had not yet arrived. Folk traditions, however, presented the messiah as an apocalyptic figure capable of miracles and wonders and also as a scholar. Furthermore, Benjamin emphasized that David Alroy had tried to be a political leader and a military commander (“he made up his mind”), but had failed. The result was that only “some of the Jews did believe in him.” In other words, this was not a massive, sweeping ­messianic movement, and the messiah’s political image and his ability as a military commander are therefore affected. Folk traditions, then, clung to the ­apocalyptic image of the messiah as formulated in texts and in historical and millenarian messianic movements,6 whereas Benjamin tended to present him as a natural figure. The apostate Samawāl [Samuel] Ibn Abbass describes the deeds of another messiah, Menachem b. Shlomo b. Ruhi. His description is d ­ istinctly naturalistic, guided by a clear interest to offend Jews (as indicated by the title of this book—The Humiliation of the Jews). This pseudo-­messiah ­gathered “a great multitude”7 and tried to start wars, and is described as someone who resorted to stratagems to establish a large militia. This description is compatible with the political, naturalistic attributes that Maimonides ­formulated in his teachings. Ibn Abbass also describes the apocalyptic expectations of the masses, who longingly climb to the roofs expecting the angels “to carry them to Jerusalem on their wings.”

Maimonides and the Messianic-Historical Reality In “The Epistle to Yemen,” Maimonides explicitly states that he relates to concrete messianic events and to actual messianic traditions. Since this

Similar descriptions are provided by Joseph Hacohen and Joseph Sambari, as cited in Aharon Zeev Aescoly, ed., Messianic Movements in Israel (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1956), 193, 198 [Heb]. By contrast, R. Gedaliah Ibn Ihyia describes Alroy as merely a magician, from his own perspective as an expert in practical Kabbalah (ibid., 197).   6 See, for example, Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957).  7 Aescoly, Messianic Movements in Israel, 189.

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epistle is meant for the broad public, however, one should be extremely cautious before assuming that these are Maimonides’ authentic views. As scholars have noted, his systematic approach should be sought mainly in his writings. In “The Epistle to Yemen,” Maimonides attests to m ­ essianic ­speculations in Andalusia and concerning the messiah in Yemen. The ­messianic speculations in Maimonides’ family are an a­ dditional ­element in his connection to the messianic-historical reality of his time. We could therefore assume that, when Maimonides developed his ­ ­ conception of m ­ essianic naturalism, his rejection of the folk traditions about the ­miraculous messiah and his acceptance of the venomous critiques of ­messianic fervor (such as that of Ibn Abbass) also played a role.8 The ­confrontation over a concrete messiah ended up presenting two clear options: whereas the folk traditions on the messianic movements are ­apocalyptic and support a supernatural messiah, the critical attitudes in the reports about these movements present the “messiah” in entirely n ­ atural terms while denying his messianic attributes. The historical reality that dictated the various views probably affected Maimonides as well. In “The Epistle to Yemen,” Maimonides clarified that a prophet is not a sorcerer and that the only signs of prophecy are the predictions of the future.9 It is indeed on these grounds that Maimonides determines that the messiah is judged only ex post factum—only if he succeeds in his worldwide political activity and in his wars will it be clear that he is the messiah.10 One possible implication of the Menachem b. Shlomo b. Ruhi (or ben Ruggi) story is the adoption of the tradition that Elijah will be the harbinger of the messiah’s arrival. In the Laws of the Messiah, Maimonides offered a brief description of future events.11 I re-examine here Maimonides’ ­important statements, this time in order to trace their historical sources: Taking the words of the Prophets in their literal sense, it appears that the inauguration of the Messianic era will be marked by the war of Gog and Magog; that prior to that war, a prophet will arise to guide Israel and set their hearts aright, as it is written: “Behold, I will   8 On Maimonides’ messianic approach, see above, 56-77.   9 “The Epistle to Yemen,” in Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham Halkin, discussions by David Hartman (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1985), 110-112. See also Maimonides’ Introduction to His Commentary on the Mishnah, trans. Fred Rosner (Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1995), 21-23; Code, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 10:1-3. Predicting the future is a direct consequence of the perception of prophecy as the emanation of the active intellect, without revoking the laws of nature. 10 Code, Laws of Kings 11:4. 11 See above, 73-74.

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send you Elijah the prophet” (Malachi 3:23). He will come neither to declare the clean unclean, nor the unclean clean; neither to disqualify those who are presumed to be of legitimate descent, nor to pronounce qualified those who are presumed to be of illegitimate descent, but to bring peace in the world, as it is said: “And he shall turn the hearts of the fathers to the children” (Malachi 3:24).12

This passage attests that the tradition about Elijah bothered Maimonides and he offers two options for interpreting it—one metaphorical, in which Elijah is a symbol of an anonymous prophet who will be alive at the time of the messiah, and the other literal, stating that the prophet Elijah ­himself will herald the coming of the messiah, as discussed above. Scholars who deal with the tradition of Elijah’s connection to messianic events d ­ isagree on the question of its origin. Some hold that it is Christian, since it appears only in the late rabbinic literature, and some see it as an expression of ancient Jewish lore.13 Be that as it may, before Maimonides there was a defined ­midrashic statement. Why, then, does he cite a further option about an anonymous prophet? His abstention from a decision on this matter ­certainly follows from conceptual-philosophical reasons as well. In a document from the Genizah, we find that the father of a contemporary messianic figure—Shlomo b. Ruhi—is identified with Elijah, and his son, Menachem b. Shlomo, with the messiah. This document spread rumors that “the time has come for God to bring his people Israel from all the lands to Jerusalem, the holy city, and Shlomo b. Ruhi is El[ijah, and his son] is the messiah.”14 The traditions that present Elijah as the harbinger of the ­messiah relied on the messianic fervor surrounding Menachem b. Shlomo, and Maimonides may have feared the repercussions of the ­ scholarly ­tradition given the ­surrounding messianic fervor. Incidentally, the Genizah document refers to the pseudo-messiah through the verse in Daniel 11:14: “the renegades of thy people shall exalt themselves to fulfil the vision; but they shall stumble.” B. Ruhi is thus counted among “the renegades of Israel.” In “The Epistle to Yemen,” Maimonides presented Jesus as “a wicked and heretical Jew.”15 His halakhic style, then, may reflect the active messianic reality of the period, whose characteristics left their mark on his doctrine. 12 Code, Laws of Kings 12:2. 13 See Chaim Milikovsky, “Elijah and the Messiah,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 2 (1983): 491-496 [Heb]. 14 Aescoly, Messianic Movements in Israel, 192. 15 “The Epistle to Yemen,” 98.

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PSEUDO-MESSIANISM AND BYZANTINE THOUGHT A remnant of late medieval Jewish-Byzantine culture is a humorous poem about R. Shemarya Ikriti, an interesting contemporary figure. In this poem, Shemarya is presented as one who proclaimed himself a messiah. The scanty cultural remnants from Byzantium in the period that preceded the Ottoman conquest (1453) actually enable a proper perspective on the ­background to these accusations.

The Days of the Messiah in a Rationalist Garb The messianic approaches that developed in Jewish-Byzantine thought in the late Middle Ages drew on various types of sources. Among them are the apocalyptic-prophetic literature that had struck root in the Byzantine Empire over the centuries,16 and an extensive rationalist and k­ abbalistic Jewish literature that resulted in systematic messianic discussions.17 From the few surviving texts by Byzantine rationalists dating to the second half of the fourteenth century, we learn that views tended toward Maimonides’ messianic approach, at least in the description of the days of the messiah. This tendency is evident, above all, in the rejection of the apocalyptic ­context. Byzantine thinkers also used a pure Maimonidean-rationalist style in their description of the days of the messiah. R. Elnathan Khalkis, a versatile Byzantine kabbalist, entirely rejected the apocalyptic ­descriptions supporting a new world in the messianic era. In his exegesis of “For, behold, I create new heavens and a new earth” (Isaiah 65:17), he writes: And we need not say that God, may He be blessed, will not create a new heaven and a new earth unless this [heaven] and this [earth] are destroyed, because rationalists could not accept this for two reasons. One, because this heaven and this earth cannot be destroyed given that God, may He be blessed, does not destroy things without cause or reason. Should it be said that they will be destroyed without cause or reason, we 16 See, for example, Paul J. Alexander, “The Diffusion of Byzantine Apocalypses in the Medieval West and the Beginnings of Joachimism,” in Prophecy and Millenarianism: Essays in Honour of Marjorie Reeves, ed. Ann Williams (Essex: Longman, 1980), 55-60; idem, The Byzantine Apocalyptic Tradition (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Jane Baun, “The Moral Apocalypse in Byzantium,” in Apocalyptic Time, ed. Albert I. Baumgarten (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 241-267. On Jewish thought in Byzantium, see the discussion and the sources in Dov Schwartz, Amulets, Properties, and Rationalism in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2004), 139-185 [Heb]. 17 On various developments in the study of Jewish messianism in the Middle Ages, see the previous chapters. See, for example, Moshe Idel, Messianic Mystics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

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will answer: if God, may He be blessed, destroys things without cause, then the laws and the Torahs should be destroyed and replaced with new laws and new Torahs, and we should believe in the words of the nations that the Torah of Moses, may his memory be blessed, has been destroyed and replaced with another. Heaven forfend we should side with those who replace, deny, and support this wicked belief. Indeed, we believe that God lives and all his deeds and all his laws are alive and binding and none of them will be destroyed without cause or reason. None will be changed unless in due time, except to show the people bound by them his glory and his greatness. There is no weariness in his laws [requiring them to] be changed, unless He, who made them, does so for a time, as in “Sun, stand still upon Giv’on; and moon, in the valley of Ayyalon” (Joshua 10:12), to exalt his prophets and to debase the views of those who deny Him and place their trust in the hosts of heaven, as did Pharaoh and his sorcerers when saying “Who is the Lord” (Exodus 5:2) in order to defeat them. And yet, all is possible and changes do sometimes occur, be it through [earthly] bodies or through heavenly [lit., simple] bodies, since they were created ex nihilo through God’s deliberate will. And after all was created from nothing through the power of God and exists due to it, may He be blessed, it is indeed in his power to annihilate it whenever He wishes and also easy to endlessly change it.18

The forthright apocalyptic approach is rejected on polemical anti-­Christian grounds, a course that Rashba had already chosen.19 The establishment of a new world brings with it an antinomian approach, since there is no room for the Torah and the commandments in a world with laws different from those of the present one. Khalkis, however, adduces two arguments for the eternity of the world: (1) the nature of heaven and earth (“cannot be destroyed”); (2) there is no cause for replacing the world, and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not act without a cause. Khalkis pursues this matter at length and notes 18 Even Sappir, Paris Ms. 727, 64b. This text was written in 1366. A previous edition, from Vatican Ms. 284, was ­published by Raphael Cohen (Jerusalem, 1998). On Khalkis’ time and place, see Ephraim Kupfer, “Identification of Manuscripts in the Institute of Microfilms of Hebrew Manuscripts,” Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies 5 (1973): 137-138 [Heb], and the introduction to Cohen’s edition, 1-2. Israel Ta-Shma and Moshe Idel d­ iscuss Khalkis in several studies. See, for example, Israel Ta-Shma, “R. Jesaiah di Trani the Elder and His Connections with Byzantium and Palestine,” Shalem 4 (1984): 411-416 [Heb]; Moshe Idel, The Mystical Experience in Abraham Abulafia, trans. Jonathan Chipman (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), 94 and index, under Khalkis. See also Paul B. Fenton, “Traces of Mōšeh Ibn ‘Ezra’s ‘Arūgāt ha-Bōsem in the Writings of the Early Qabbalists of the Spanish School,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), vol. 3, 66-68. 19 See above 143-145. See also Dov Schwartz, Contradiction and Concealment in Medieval Jewish Thought (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2001), 260 [Heb].

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that God does perform miracles on limited occasions, resting his approach on divine creation ex nihilo. God, however, does not consistently change the natural order. His first argument exposes a classic philosophical-rationalist perspective: the nature of creation is eternal and, consequently, the apocalyptic approach, at least concerning the days of the messiah, has no hold. Khalkis describes the days of the messiah in a pure Maimonidean style in other sources as well: God’s wisdom meant for the enlightened to be few and the ignorant to be many so that they may work for them and serve them, to enable them to study Torah without impediment. But on the days of the m ­ essiah, if we reach them, many will wander around and knowledge will spread.20

Khalkis, then, endorsed the elitist view that appears in the introduction to Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah, in the discussion on the ­purpose of all humans. In his view, the purpose of the masses is to create a social-economic network that frees scholars to devote themselves to study and wisdom. In the days of the messiah, by contrast, many will dedicate themselves to learning and acquiring knowledge; the elitist approach of today will, in the future, spread to all. Note that the anti-apocalyptic Maimonidean description is confined to the days of the messiah. When Khalkis deals with resurrection and with the world to come that will follow it, he endorses the views of t­ raditionalists and kabbalists, such as Ramah and Nahmanides. Khalkis adopted, for example, the notion of the “refined body.” When speaking about “the world to come with the resurrection of the dead,” he emphasizes the connection of “the soul with the body”—“and the body will enjoy the pleasures of the time without the evil instinct overcoming it.”21 His description of the days of the messiah, however, is based solely on rationalist conceptions: Khalkis clearly conveys the rationalist view of messianism.

The Immortality of the Soul or Intellect Byzantine thinkers also endorsed Maimonides’ view about the ­immortality of the soul, or more precisely the intellect, as communion with the i­ ntelligibles. In his supercommentary on Ibn Ezra’s Commentary on the Torah, R. Yehuda 20 Even Sappir, Paris Ms. 727, 18b. 21 Ibid., 9a. On the refined body, see above, 91-92. Note that Ramah also grappled with the claim that the creation of the refined body involves “vain action,” since this body has organs it does not use. His argument is theological: these organs were meant to receive reward or punishment for their actions in the previous world. See R. Meir Abulafia, Yad Ramah le-Masekhet Sanhedrin, ed. Yehezkel Zilber (Jerusalem, 2000), 335 [Heb].

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Mosconi considers at length Ibn Ezra’s exegesis of the verse “and hold fast to him” (Deuteronomy 11:22) and writes—“in the end, and this is a great secret.” Mosconi presents a series of chapter headings meant to assist in the understanding of this enigmatic formulation,22 and articulates the ideal as eternal communion of the individual intellect with the active intellect. He takes pains to explain the claim that the Torah’s intention is communion with the active intellect (the lowest in the order of the separate intellects) rather than communion with God, given that, according to the p ­ hilosophical approach, communion is only possible with the lowest separate intellect. The prophets themselves followed this course and strove for the ­immortality of the soul, and that had been their intention when writing the biblical text. Mosconi clearly means that, after death, the intellect is absorbed within the supreme cosmic element and its individuality is blurred. This conception is obviously incompatible with apocalyptic messianic aims, which uphold the eternal communion of the body and the soul in a world ruled by a new order. Mosconi views this idea as a great secret that wise readers are ­commanded “to hide and not to publish.”23 Furthermore, Mosconi argues that communion after death is a direct continuation of communion during life, since the active intellect materially enriches the perfect individual in his lifetime, allows him to be a perfect leader, and straightens his path to immortality after death (“reception of the emanation for the eternity of his soul”).24 R. Abraham b. Yehuda Leon of Candia also discusses the pleasure of intellectual immortality after death.25 This approach emerges in Byzantine philosophy in the first half of the fifteenth century. R. Mordechai Komtino, a profound Byzantine scholar who dabbled in the sciences, philosophy, and biblical exegesis, wrote a commentary on the Torah where he emphasizes that communion is “the 22 London-Montefiore Ms. 49. On R. Yehuda Mosconi, see Moritz Steinschneider, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Heinrich Malter and Alexander Marx (Berlin: M. Poppelauer, 1925), 536-570; Uriel Simon, “Interpreting the Interpreter: Supercommentaries on Ibn Ezra’s Commentaries,” in Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, edited by Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 86-128; Dov Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought ­(Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1999), 205-213 [Heb]. Fragments from his exegesis appear in the Appendix (ibid., 293-350). 23 Schwartz, Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, 366a. This is the style throughout Mosconi’s commentary. 24 Ibid., 389a. On communion during life and after death in contemporaneous Spanish-Jewish culture, see Dov Schwartz, The Philosophy of a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Neoplatonic Circle (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1996), 183210 [Heb]. 25 See Shalom Rosenberg, “The Arba’ah Turim of R. Abraham b. Yehuda, Disciple of Don Hasdai Crescas,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 3 (1984): 614 [Heb].

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secret meaning of the world to come.”26 The immortality of the soul, then, is communion with the Holy One, blessed be He (contrary to Mosconi, Komtino does not enter into its true meaning, that is, into communion with the active intellect) by attaining the intelligibles. Komtino also adopts both conceptions: communion in life, which confers material benefit,27 and communion in death, which ensures immortal life. Komtino, then, reflects a philosophical approach articulated in the course of the fourteenth century that sided with the immortality of the soul or the intellect. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, R. Ephraim b. Gershon would also to some extent support this view and include ­philosophical-allegoristic traditions in his sermons, beside kabbalistic ones. The philosophical traditions did indeed support the abstract ­immortality of the soul.28 This approach led to commitment to the Maimonidean messianic view, since it excludes from the days of the ­ ­ messiah the ­apocalyptic ­overtones originating in the prophetic chapters and in the midrashim, and diverts attention from the material messianic mission to the spiritual one. By c­ ontrast, Karaite thinkers in Byzantium supported the mutual ­immortality of body and soul, in the style of the Kalam and Saadia Gaon. Elijah Bashyazi was perhaps among the few who deviated from this approach—the notion of the immortality of the soul resonates in his ­writings, attesting to the interest in this idea in late medieval Byzantium.29

Messianism and Rationalism: R. Shemarya Ikriti R. Shemarya Ikriti also supported the rationalist idea of communion.30 According to his exegesis, Song of Songs is constituted on the yearning of 26 Commentary on the Torah, Paris Ms. 265, 160a. On Mordechai Komtino, see Jean-Christophe Attias, Le commentaire biblique: Mordekhai Komtino ou l’hermeneutique du dialogue (Paris: Cerf, 1991). 27 “Because he taught [the children of Israel] wisdom until they attained communion with God and deserved that the astrological principles should be defeated for them” (Commentary on the Torah, Paris Ms. 265, 69a). 28 See the sermons of R. Ephraim b. Gershon, London Ms., British Museum 379, 95b-96a. 29 See, for example, Daniel Lasker, “Maimonides’ Influence on the Philosophy of Elijah Bashyazi the Karaite,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 3 (1984): 421-422 [Heb]; idem, “The Destiny of Man in Karaite Philosophy,” Daat 12 (1984): 8, 13 [Heb]. 30 On Shemarya, see Colette Sirat, “A Letter on the Creation by R. Shemarya b. Elijah Ikriti,” Eshel Beer Sheva 2 (1980): 199227 [Heb]; Aaron Ahrendt, “Commentary on the Book of Esther by Shemarya b. Eliyahu Ikriti,” in Studies on Bible and Education Honoring Prof. Moshe Ahrendt, ed. Dov Rappel (Jerusalem: Touro College, 1996) [Heb]; idem, “A Philosophical Commentary on the Kaddish by Shemarya b. Elijah Ikriti,” Daat 43 (1999): 43-51 [Heb]; Dov Schwartz, “Notes on R. Shemarya Ikriti’s Commentary on Song of Songs,” in Rabbi Yosef Kafih Memorial Volume, ed. Zohar Amar and Hananel Seri (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University, 2001) [Heb]; Aaron Ahrendt, “On Byzantine Aggadic Exegesis: The Introduction and Conclusion of the Book Amaziyahu by R. Shemarya b. Elijah Ikriti,” Pe‘amim 91 (2002): 165-179 [Heb].

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the individual intellect to reach communion with the active intellect. In several interpretations, Shemarya considered the possibility of ­intellectual communion during life, and decided it is only possible after death. Trends that appeared in Byzantine-Jewish thought in the fourteenth century quickly found articulation in Shemarya’s writings. R. Moses b. Shmuel of Rocamora, a Provençal translator who lived in Spain too, claimed that Shemarya had presented himself as a messiah and a prophet. Indeed, the perception of Shemarya as a pseudo-messiah relies directly on a line in Moses b. Shmuel’s humorous poem, “You should know: I am a messiah!”31 Although this is ostensibly overt messianism in the style of the familiar medieval waves of messianic fervor, no other source links Shemarya to a self-proclamation as a messiah. The conceptual-philosophical background enables another interpretation. In the opening lines of his humorous poem, Moses b. Shmuel writes: “As did the madman, Shemarya the Greek, when boasting in a prophecy of reaching communion with the detached and separate intellects, and he is a separate fool, detached from any intelligible.”32 Moses b. Shmuel, then, attacked Shemarya for proudly declaring that he is in communion with the separate intellects. Shemarya himself, as noted, negated the possibility of communion during life, but he may have publicly praised the rationalist ideal of communion that was also widespread among Byzantine thinkers who had wandered westward, and may have claimed that he himself was close to reaching communion. Traditional conservative factions ­vigorously protested this declaration, and echoes of the controversies on the study of the sciences, which began in the thirteenth century and continued in the fourteenth, may be resonating here. According to the description in the poem, which contains many biblical allusions, Shemarya turned to the elites (“the earls of the city”) in the central cities of Seville and Castile. Moses refers to them as “­ remnants” [seridim], a term widely used by rationalists to describe the perfect i­ndividuals who devote themselves to the attainment of knowledge:33 The remnants then gathered round him because they thought they had seen great miracles and hoped to raise him above the height of the clouds to be Nasi, slowly encouraging him from a corner location. 31 Cited in Aescoly, Messianic Movements in Israel, 241. 32 Ibid., 243. 33 See, for example, The Guide of the Perplexed I:34.

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Shemarya turns to these elite groups and rebukes them for the ­deplorable state of wisdom, since their generation had failed to produce a sage like Maimonides. Had we such sages among us, added Shemarya when ­addressing these select individuals, we would be a glorious model to all nations. Shemarya, then, had obviously called for the study of sciences and philosophy. Moses b. Shmuel reacted by accusing Shemarya and his faction of grazing in foreign pastures (“children of strangers”). In several places in the poem, Shemarya is presented as a prophet, giving the impression that Moses b. Shmuel meant prophecy in the rationalist-­ Maimonidean style, which is to some extent equivalent to communion with the active intellect and to the prophet’s inspiration through its emanation.34 Shemarya, then, claims to have been inspired by the active intellect and calls intellectuals to follow in his footsteps and reach the rank of communion. Shemarya’s preaching is also disturbing because the wanderer from afar (“the Greek”), coming from distant Byzantium to the countries in the West, dares to admonish the honorable Spanish intellectuals. The ­combination of the rationalist approach and the educational-preaching pretensions present Shemarya as strange and ridiculous. Proclaiming him as a messiah is thus probably meant as a humorous description of Shemarya, and may never have happened in reality. In this context, “messiah” is one who tries to bring personal-rational redemption to the uneducated. It is actually ironic that rationalists in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries turn the messiah’s figure into a symbol of wisdom and individual-intellectual redemption. It is no wonder that his proclamation as a messiah followed Shemarya’s presentation as a prophet.35 The poem describes the townspeople’s response to Shemarya’s proclamation as a messiah as “wise in his own conceit.”36 The dispute, then, hinges on the status of the sciences. Lines in the poem stating that he was “wise in his own conceit” and “his ministers had no wisdom” are not suited to the description of a public or cosmic messianic event. Rather the opposite— the townspeople held that Shemarya’s proclamation as a messiah should be interpreted as a concrete public messianic event and therefore asked for some ­miraculous proof, whereas he had intended individual messianism (the eternal ­redemption of the soul). As soon as Shemarya heard that he 34 Ibid., II:32. 35 Maimonides too, in “The Epistle to Yemen,” described the messiah as a prophet, a reference that became common: “The Messiah indeed ranks above all prophets after Moses in eminence and distinction” (124). By contrast, in the Code, Maimonides claimed that he was endowed with “the holy spirit.” See above, 74 note 95. 36 According to Proverbs 26:5, 12.

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was expected to show some proof, he understood that he had failed in his task and that the ideas he had expressed had not been understood, and he was “saddened.” This is then another episode in the struggle for the image and the goals of the ordinary Jewish rationalist in the Middle Ages.

The Controversy on the Study of the Sciences Various scholars have held that the controversy about the study of the ­sciences ebbed after the bans of Rashba and his court at the beginning of the fourteenth century. This dispute too, as noted, erupted after the philosophical sermons of R. Levi b. Abraham, that is, the public exposure of philosophy and its teaching to broad communities. The evidence suggests that echoes of the various disputes in Spain and Provence reached distant Byzantium.37 As I have shown elsewhere, at least the dispute on astral magic persisted as late as the mid-fourteenth century and even after.38 According to my interpretation, then, the concern with Shemarya is a further stage in the controversy over the sciences, given that the poem ends by characterizing him as “ignorant.” Another interesting aspect that this book considered in detail is the encounter between general-cosmic messianism and individual ­messianism. Scholars consider the standing of individual messianism (immortality, the world to come in a rationalist sense), and whether it can indeed be included in a scholarly philosophical-analytical discussion of public ­messianism.39 The case of Shemarya and Moses b. Shmuel shows that ­individual ­messianism entailed public aspects, given the ideal of ­educating and enlightening the masses. At the time, people interpreted the call for individual amendment as messianism, and did not separate individual p ­ erfection from the public promises about the future. The conceptual-philosophical reality, then, compels the ­presentation of this event in another perspective. The philosophical background requires us to interpret the historical reality about Shemarya’s ­“messianism” as ­individual rather than public. He was not proclaimed 37 See Dov Schwartz, “The Servant of Moses by R. Kalonymos,” Kovets Al Yad 14 (1998): 343-347 [Heb]. 38 Idem, Studies on Astral Magic in Medieval Jewish Thought, trans. David Louvish and Batya Stein (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 163-165. 39 See Shalom Rosenberg, “The Return to Paradise: The Idea of Restorative Redemption,” in The Messianic Idea in Jewish Thought (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1982), 78-86 [Heb]. See also ch. 5 above, and cf. David Berger’s review of the first Hebrew edition of the present book in AJS Review 24 (1999): 344-348.

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a messiah in Seville and Castile—he preached the study of philosophy and the s­ ciences in the pursuit of individual perfection. The allegorical interpretation of a­ pocalyptic-cosmic events appeared in the third century CE in Origen’s thought. It then culminated in Augustine’s endeavor, from which it t­ransmuted into Jewish scholasticism and rationalism in the medieval era, leaving its mark on the historical and conceptual events of the late Middle Ages. Individual redemption (of an intellectual, pietistic, or ­mystical v­ ariety) is the true meaning of the public redemption and the historical event.

SUMMARY This discussion shows that there are essential connections between the ­messianic conception and the historical event. The roots of the ­tension between messianic naturalism and apocalyptic messianism are in ­concrete events. The study of the historical aspect and the examination of the p ­ hilosophical aspect are mutually enriching, not only formally and s­ tylistically but also in terms of content and substance. Similarly, the ­presentation of individual redemption as the true meaning of the texts of public redemption is well-anchored in historical reality. The ­traditionalists’ strong reservations about philosophical allegorization during the thirteenth-­century controversies hinged on their fears that the literal meaning would be entirely dismissed. The judicious historian and historian of ideas cannot disregard the possibility that traditionalists described an existing s­ ituation or one that might become real. If a thinker such as R. Yaakov Anatoli, discussed in Chapter Five, determines that the “true” redemption is the immortality of the soul, the messianic-naturalistic descriptions he cites lose their meaning;40 traditionalists understood this well and thus repeatedly warned about it. R. Shimon b. Tsemah and other conservatives accused rationalists of heresy for their views on the resurrection because, according to rationalism and its principles, resurrection is impossible.41 The i­ntegration of individual redemption (the immortality of the soul and the intellect) into public redemption is a result of the c­ onnection between thought 40 Leo Strauss determines that an author’s view actually emerges in random and isolated pronouncement and not necessarily in comprehensive descriptions. See “The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952), 63-64. 41 See, for example, Ohev Mishpat (Venice, 1588), introduction, 27a.

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and ­historical reality. No comprehensive study of these ­connections has been conducted so far, though such a study would enrich our ­perspective on medieval Jews and their ideas and a work dealing with the perception of redemption in the Middle Ages neither can nor should ignore them. The wavering between the miraculous and the natural ­perception of the ­messianic idea, then, affected historical events. Messianic fervor was intrinsic to the way the idea was absorbed by the wider public.42 The difference between the philosopher and the historian of ideas merits note here. Every intellectual event can be examined from two perspectives— the event itself and its meaning in light of the ­history of ideas—and a philosophy scholar cannot ignore the second. For e­ xample: it is a fact that Maimonides ascribed a certain miraculous ­dimension to the messiah in his Commentary on the Mishnah and in “The Epistle to Yemen,” whereas in the Code he rejected this dimension. The ­historian will simply note the conceptual facts and will perhaps ­present a ­developmental theory. The philosopher and the historian of ideas, h ­ owever, will also note how Maimonides’ messianic doctrine was perceived. Clearly, Maimonides’ rationalist disciples emphasized the negation of miracles, and most of them saw in it the gist of his teachings.43 The history of ideas finds s­ upport in the conceptual reality for the notion that Maimonides’ view was to deny miracles, and that other views he expressed can be explained as needs of the genre (a folk interpretation, a widely publicized epistle, and so forth). The history of ideas, then, goes one step beyond the ­historian’s evaluation. The discussion of the connections between the abstract t­ heological approach and the historical reality is the final note in this story about the confrontation between apocalyptic messianism and messianic ­naturalism. As I noted at the beginning of Chapter One, the conceptual reality is c­ omplex, and the apocalyptic and naturalistic poles are helpful tools for pointing to conceptual processes. Philosophical activity unfolds between these two poles, in the context of a layered and intricate ­historical ­reality. Thinkers placed themselves between these poles and created various ­syntheses, as this book shows in detail. The confrontation between ­ apocalyptic and ­ naturalistic messianism is 42 See, for example, Gerson D. Cohen, “Messianic Postures of Ashkenazim and Sephardim,” in Studies in the Variety of Rabbinic Cultures (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 271-297. 43 Not so in Ashkenaz, however. See Ephraim Kanarfogel, “Medieval Rabbinic Conceptions of the Messianic Age: The View of the Tosafists,” in Me’ah She‘arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2001), 147-169.

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another description of ­medieval Jewish thought according to one narrative—the messianic idea. I have p ­ resented in other works the history of Jewish thought in the Middle Ages according to other criteria or narratives—astral magic,44 and esoteric ­interpretation.45 Each of these criteria reveals another facet in this thought, and points to the ­exegetic and philosophical vibrancy of the cultural and theological phenomenon. The review of the messianic idea, therefore, is a fruitful addition to the hermeneutical options suggested by the study of medieval Jewish thought.

44 Schwartz, Studies on Astral Magic; idem, Amulets, Properties, and Rationalism. 45 Idem, Contradiction and Concealment.

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271

Index

A

Abba Mari of Lunel (ha-Yarhi) 142–147 messianic era, 143 Abbass, Samuel Ibn, 234 Abraham bar Hiyya ha-Nasi, 30, 33, 40, 56, 76 immortality of the soul, 37–38 Megillat Hamegalleh, 37 Neoplatonic version of individual eternal redemption, 38 notion of the “pure soul,” 44 Abraham, Hezekiyah b., 208 Abraham, R. Levi b., 98–100, 99n3, 103, 123–124, 130, 173–174, 193, 244 Abraham b. David of Posquières (Rabad), 93 Abraham of Montpellier (min ha-Har), R. Shlomo ben, 11 Abravanel, R. Yitzhak, 14, 117, 192, 205–219, 218n118 Abulafia (Ramah), R. Meir, 32, 125 Aderet (Rashba), R. Shlomo b., 80, 138, 142–147, 144n20, 145–146, 148, 157–158, 161, 165, 205, 227, 238, 244 future world, 144n20 principle of immortality, 145 Aharon b. Meshulam, 148 Albalag, R. Yitzhak, 10 Albo, R. Joseph, 117, 182–188, 182n4, 193–194 Al-Constantini, Shlomo, 127–128, 134–135 Aldabi, Meir, 158 al-Fayyumi, Nathanael Ibn, 40–42 Al Khazari, 48, 50 dichotomous fallacy, 51 allegorical interpretations, 111n34, 143, 154, 218 exegesis of the leviathan banquet, 144–145 of redemption, 137 resurrection of the dead, 119–125 al-Muqammis, Daud ibn Marwan, 17

Alroy, David, 233–234 Altabib, R. Yihiyah, 115 Anatoli, R. Yaakov, 107–108, 126–128, 245 anointment, 107–112 anti-Christian polemic, 31, 142, 144n20, 192, 210, 222, 227–229 apocalyptic legacy, 23, 35, 38, 40, 43, 46, 49, 69, 75, 89, 97, 137, 142, 145 apocalyptic literature, 43, 64, 220 apocalyptic messianic model, 2–4, 12–13, 222–226. see also Halevi’s teachings; naturalistic messianic model advantages, 205–219 attitude toward, 221 influence of, 27–32 modes, 220–221 new developments, 78–81 rationalist justification of, 16–27 retreat of, 34–37 triumph of, 208–219 Arama, R. Yitzhak, 125, 188–192, 229 Ashkenazi, R. Eleazar, 94, 117, 174

B

Baal ha-Ma’or, R. Zerahiah Halevi, 93 Batei ha-Nefesh ve-ha-Lehashim, 105, 123 Benjamin of Tudela, R., 233 Bibago, R. Abraham, 123, 194–199

C

Caspi, R. Nethanel, 112 Caspi, R. Yosef Ibn, 10, 108n29, 116 Christianity, 9–10, 26, 148, 218 Church Fathers, 26 Code, 69, 74–75 collective messianism, 98–102 figure of the messiah, 102–106 linguistic closeness between hamor (ass) and homer (matter), 102–103 naturalism, 129–132 redemption and end of days, 106–117

Index

resurrection of the dead, 117–128 communion, idea of, 3, 8, 12, 35, 42, 97–98, 104–105, 110, 112–115, 121, 128, 131, 133, 136, 139n6, 145, 149, 154, 158–159, 167–168, 182, 196, 200–201, 222, 239–243 Crescas, Hasdai, 31, 167–172

D

David b. Shmuel s. v. ha-Kokhavi, David b. Shmuel DelMedigo, Elia , 127 dogmatic status of messianism, 10 double faith principle, 17–18, 23 Duran, Shimon b. Tsemah, 192, 205–208, 220, 245

E

Eleazar b. Nathan Ashkenazi b., 116 Elijah, figure of, 122, 171 eternity, 14, 38, 42, 58, 62n70, 66, 240 of body and soul, 24n11, 165, 169 of Halakhah, 229 of the Torah, 41, 63, 143–144, 155, 171, 228 of the world, 142, 198, 206, 219, 222, 238 Ezer ha-Dat, 173 Ezra, Abraham Ibn, 40, 76

F

Farissol, R. Yaakov, 112 Fayyumi, Nathanael Ibn al, 37 Finkelstein, Louis, 133

G

Gaon, R. Nissim b. Yaakov, 28–29 apocalyptic formulations, 29 Gaon, R. Saadia, 11, 13, 16–17, 27–33, 33n44, 36n4, 37, 39–42, 47, 49, 58, 88–89, 91n30, 103, 133, 141, 156, 161–162, 165, 174, 177, 181 assumed progression of apocalyptic events, 24 The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 17–19, 21, 24, 30, 162, 206 classic apocalyptic approach, 21 guarantee of redemption (furkān), 21–23 influence in East and West, 29–32 literal meaning of texts, 18–19 and Milhamot ha-Shem, 30 principles and commandments of the Torah, 17 rationalist hermeneutical theory of apocalyptic tradition, 21

resurrection of the dead, 24–25 Sinai epiphany, 17 systematic description of purified human body, 25–26 Gaon, R. Shmuel b. Hofni, 28–29 world to come concept, 28–29 Gaon, Rav Hai, 16, 27–28 interpretations of “new heavens” motif, 27–28 Garden of Eden, 37, 47, 58, 61, 63n72, 91, 92n31, 93–95, 96n42, 110, 116–117, 119–120, 201, 203, 208n78 geonim, 27–29, 29n30 Gerondi, R. Yonah, 89 Gershon, R. Ephraim b., 241 Gersonides, 102, 165–167, 226–227 The Guide of the Perplexed, 56, 57n56, 68n86, 74, 85, 103, 107, 111, 123, 127n81, 136, 155, 166–167, 192, 199

H

Hai s. v. Gaon, Rav Hai, ha-Kohen of Tordesillas, R. Moshe, 31 ha-Kokhavi, David b. Shmuel, 153–156 Halakhah, 5–6, 142–143, 157, 165, 222 boundaries of “unintentionality” (shegagah), 71 human naturalism and, 70 Halawa, R. Yehuda, 31 Ha-Levi, Aharon, 183 Ha-Levi, Yitzhak b. Moses, 174–175 Halevi, Zerahiah, 168 Halevi Judah 42-56 Halevi’s teachings, 76 closeness to Neoplatonic philosophy, 52n49 difference between messianic conceptions of Augustine and, 45 kernel vs shell metaphor, 44–45 Maimonidean naturalism, 56 messianic tension in, 37–42 metaphors of relationship between Israel and other nations, 44–46 prophecy, role of, 42–56 setting up prophecy as an ideal, 52 status of the Jewish people, 43–46 uniqueness of ritual, 48–49 uniqueness of the Land of Israel, 46–47 Hapenini, R. Yeda’ya, 111, 111n36 ha-Rofeh, R. Zechariah, 102, 174 Hayyim, Reuven b., 148–150, 150n35, 157

273

274

Index

Hegyon ha-Nefesh ha-´Atsuvah, 37 Hen, R. Zerahiah, 93, 118, 138 Hillel b. Shmuel of Verona, 118, 138–142 147, 157 discussion of specific messianic terms, 140–141 paradise and wandering souls, 139 principle of the soul’s pleasure after death, 138–142, 139n6 Sefer Tagmulé ha-Nefesh, 138 study of messianic midrashim, 141 historical reality, 1 Hoter b. Shlomo, 203–205

I

Ibn Abbass s. v. Abbass, Samuel Ibn Ibn al-Fayyumi, s. v. al-Fayyumi, Nathanael Ibn, 40–42 Ibn Caspi, s. v. Caspi, R. Yosef Ibn Ibn Ezra s. v. Ezra, Abraham Ibn Ibn Saddiq s. v. Yosef ibn Saddiq Ibn Zarza s. v. Zarza, R. Shmuel Ibn Ikriti, R. Shemarya, 102, 237, 241–245 Immanuel b. Shlomo, 109 immortality of the soul, 35–38, 37n4, 39, 39n10, 42–43, 50–54, 56, 60, 68n86, 76, 81, 86, 93, 118n56, 120, 124–125, 127–128, 131–132, 134n107, 137, 139, 141–142, 151, 153–154, 167, 170, 173–174, 174n102, 178n112, 181, 182n4, 185–187, 189–191, 193–194, 196n46, 197, 206, 210–211, 223, 239–241, 245 s. v. world to come individual intellectual perfection, 131 individual messianic aspect, 49–56 individual redemption, 7, 9, 12–13, 35–36, 38, 40, 43, 49, 56, 63, 85, 87, 110, 115–116, 137–138, 158, 222 Anatoli’s approach, 108n29 intellectual redemption, 129 Maimonidean stance on, 37–42, 67–69, 79–80, 82, 84, 93 natural, 137–138 Neoplatonic ideal of individual natural redemption, 40–42 prophecy and, 42–56 rationalists’ endorsement of, 102–103 in Torah, 159 true salvation, 106–112 intellectual emanation, 106 Islam, 16, 26

Israeli, R. Hayyim, 139

J

Jewish-Byzantine thought on messianic ideas, 237–245 Jewish people, uniqueness of, 43–46 Jewish rationalism, 180–181

K

Kabbalah, 11, 90, 108n29, 143, 168–169, 180, 185, 208 Karaism, 16, 32 Khalkis, R. Elnathan, 237–239 Kimchi, R. David, 31, 107n27 Komtino, R. Mordechai, 240 The Kuzari, 42, 53n52, 102, 112, 207 exile in, 54 king of India parable, 52–53, 53n50 notion of individual immortality in, 49–56 as a polemical text, 55

L

Land of Israel, 9, 37, 43, 46–47, 49, 75, 98, 112, 148, 150, 210, 213 uniqueness of, 46–47 Leon, Abraham b. Judah, 168

M

ma´aseh bereshith, 72 Ma´ayanei ha-Yeshu´ah, 209, 218n118 Magen Avot, 206–207 Maimoni, R. Ovadiah, 114 Maimonidean messianism, 56–76, 68n86, 80–81, 83–84, 148, 153, 194, 225n5, 237, 246 allegorical character of the apocalyptic sources, 72 characteristics of the messiah, 71 Christian view of resurrection, 95 good faith in Gehenna, 96–97 interpretation by contemporaries, 81–85 Kokhavi’s view, 153–154 moderate apocalyptic approach, 88–95 Nahmanides’ interpretation of Maimonides’ notion of karet (excision), 96, 96n43 naturalistic messianic model, 69–77 rationalist moderation in, 147–157 rationalists’ defense, 95–97

Index

Ravitzky’s interpretation, 68n86 restriction on material activities, 91–95 rifts in views, father vs son, 85–88 stability of Halakhah, 70–71 Maimonides, 43, 76, 118–119, 135–136, 153–154, 160, 174, 232 Commentary on the Mishnah, 136 exegesis of, 97 The Guide of the Perplexed, 74 messianic-historical reality, 234–236 understanding of messianic concepts, 120 Malmad ha-Talmidim, 108n29 medieval Jewish history, 231 medieval Jewish philosophy, messianic idea in, 1–2, 10–11, 226, 230 apocalyptic messianism vs messianic naturalism, 2–4 criteria for mapping and locating messianic teachings, 2–9 developmental stages, 13–15 humanity’s progress, 3 implications and ramifications, 9–15 rationalist trend, 4 in socio-political realm, 3 medieval psychology, 228–229 Megillat Hamegalleh, 37 Meir b. Shimon, 148 Meiri, Menachem, 142, 148–153, 157 Menachem b. Zerah, 158–160, 164Menachem, R. Shlomo b., 105, 111, 123–124 Mendelssohn, Moses, 6 Messiah, personality and character of 4–5, 71, 102–106, 232–236 Ibn Zarza’s view, 103–105 King David paradigm, 4 rationalists’ analysis of, 106messianism, public 13 messianic naturalism and apocalyptic approach, 202, 228–230 Abba Mari and Rashba, views of, 142–147 Crescas’ thought, 167–172 criticism, 172–177 Gersonides’ thought, 165–167 Hillel’s moderate view, 138–142 intermediate positions, 194–205 messianic tension between apocalypse and naturalism, 157–172 moderate rationalists’ views, 147–157

paradise, 138–142 resolution of the tensions, 177–178 traditionalists’ views, 142–147 messianic orientation, 7–8, 21 messianic process, motifs, signs, and stages of, 6–9 deterministic approach, 6–7 dominant approach, 7 philosophical interpretation, 8 voluntarist approach, 7 messianic tension in Halevi’s teachings in Spain, 37–40 in Yemen, 40–42 Milhamot ha-Shem, 166 Mosconi, R. Yehuda, 239–240

N

Nagari, R. Moshe b. Yehuda, 111 Nahmanides, 32, 84, 90, 91n30, 92, 92n31, 93–95, 96n43, 103, 140–142, 147, 156, 161, 163n74, 165, 169–170, 175, 177, 181, 183, 185, 189–190, 195, 197, 199, 201–202, 205–208, 221, 224, 239 characteristic of the messianic idea in early Kabbalah, 90–91 Gate of Reward, 165 interpretation of Maimonides’ notion of karet (excision), 96, 96n43 literal interpretation of Job’s words, 93 souls’ stay in the “Garden of Eden,” 92n31, 93 Narboni, R. Moshe, 114, 123 naturalistic messianic model, 2–4, 12–13, 222–226. see also apocalyptic messianic model advantages, 181–194 assumptions of Maimonides’ doctrine, 69–77 messianic collective naturalism, 129–132 modes, 221 motivations behind, 221–222 naturalistic legacy, 158 retreat of, 131–132 naturalistic version of redemption, 2–4 Neoplatonic ideal of individual natural redemption, 40–42Nethanel b.Yeshayahu, 121, 192 revelation of Elijah, 122–123, 122n70 Neveh Shalom, 190–191

275

276

Index

Nissim b. Yaakov s. v. Gaon, R. Nissim b. Yaakov Nissim of Marseilles, R., 134, 163

O

Official, R. Yosef b. Nathan, 30–31 Or Adonai, 167, 170

P

Peace, s. v. world peace Peniel, Shlomo b. Abraham, 147n26, 177–178 Perahiyya b. Meshulam, 176–177Perek Helek, 74–75, 90, 136, 166 personal redemption, 38 Prat Maimon. see Menachem, R. Shlomo b. Profiat Duran (Efodi). see ha-Levi, Yitzhak b. Moses prophecy, 42–56 as ideal of natural individual redemption, 56 Land of Israel as the land of prophecy, 46–47 as a paradox of detachment, 56 polemical claim about, 54 substantive claim about, 54 uniqueness of ancestry, 43–46 uniqueness of ritual, 48–49 Provençal radicalism, 147–157 Pulgar, R. Yitzhak, 129, 172–173

R

Rabad s. v. Abraham b. David of Posquières Radak s. v. Kimhi , R. David Ramah, s. v. Abulafia R. Meir Rashba, s. v. Aderet (Rashba), R. Shlomo b Rashbetz s. v. Duran, Shimon b. Tsemah rationalism, medieval, 10–11, 33, 133 extreme rationalism, 11 Maimonides’ view, 11 moderate rationalism, 11 rational justification of apocalyptic messianism, 16–27 analysis of the messiah’s figure, 106 clarification, 220–222 double faith, 17–18 interpretation and knowledge of Scriptures, 18–23 stages in radical, 133–134 rational soul, 38–39

redemption, 135 Anatoli’s notion of, 108, 108n29 anointment, 107–112 apocalyptic messianic descriptions, 151–152 apocalyptic notion of miraculous, 151–152 non-natural perceptions of, 146 return to Zion motif, 112–116 salvation, 106–112 redemptive era messianism, 2–4 refined body, 155 religious law (Halakhah) in the messianic era, 5–6 resurrection, 24–25, 30, 125–128, 156 Albo’s example, 117–118, 118n56 Al-Constantini’s view, 128 allegorical interpretive level, 119–125 eternal life after, 156 to one cycle of life, 156 radical rationalists’ views, 118–119 rationalists’ interpretations, 120 reservations about, 125–128 in Spain, 120–121 in Yemen, 120–121 return to Zion, 112–116, 151 revelation, 226 Romano, R. Judah, 109 Ruhi, Menachem b. Shlomo b., 235–236

S

Saadia s. v. Gaon, R. Saadia Sabbatical s. v. shemitot salvation, 106–112, 116, 174 true 106–112 Scholem, Gershom, 2, 8, 135–136 Sefer ha-Batim, 153 Sefer ha-Emunah, 153 Sefer ha-Ikkarim, 182–183, 185 Shalom, Abraham, 188, 190–192 shemitot, 6, 205, 205n70 Sheshet b. Yitzhak ha-Nasi, 119–120 125 128Shem Tov, R. Shem Tov Ibn , 199 Shem Tov, Shem Tov b. Yosef Ibn, 128, 199–203 Shlomo b. Moshe, 31 Shlomo b. Yehuda, 113–114 Shlomo b. Yehuda of Lunel, 112, 130 Shlomo b. Yehuda ha-Nasi, 110

277

Index

Shmuel b. Hofni s. v. Gaon, R. Shmuel b. Hofni Shmuel b. Meshulam, 159 Shmuel of Rocamora, R. Moses b., 242 Shrira, Rav, 16 Soul s. v. immortality of the soul Spain, 180, 192, 203, 244 messianic tension in Halevi’s teachings, 37–40 resurrection of the dead, 110, 120–121

54–56, 58–59, 59n63, 60, 65–66, 65n77, 66n79, 67–68, 68n86, 80–84, 82n5, 85–87, 94, 96, 107n27, 112, 117, 120, 125, 130–132, 141, 143, 145–146, 149, 151, 153, 158, 161–165, 173–174, 183–186, 193–196, 205n69, 206, 216–217, 220, 239, 241, 244

Y

T

Taku, R. Moshe, 11 Tibbon, R. Shmuel Ibn, 107, 109, 148 Torat ha-Adam, 206

Yaakov b. Reuven, 31 Yehuda b. Shlomo, 94–95 Yemen, 32, 203 Yeshu´ot Meshiho, 209 Yitzhak b. Yedaya, 102 Yosef b.Yehuda Ibn Shamun,, 119 Yosef ibn Saddiq, 37–40, 40n15, 76

W

Z

Western religions, messianic idea in, 4 Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 17 world peace, 192–194 world to come 6–7, 18, 24–29, 32, 36n4, 38n7, 39, 40n15, 42, 49–52, 52n49,

Zarza, R. Shmuel Ibn, 103–105, 121–122, 124, 129–130, 226 explanation of the aggadah, 110n32 Zechariah ha-Rofeh (Razah). see Altabib, R. Yihiyah