Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity 0199467099, 9780199467099

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Title Pages

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Title Pages J.S. Grewal

(p.i) Master Tara Singh in Indian History (p.iii) Master Tara Singh in Indian History

(p.iv) Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries. Published in India by Oxford University Press

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Title Pages 2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002, India © Oxford University Press 2017 The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in 2017 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. ISBN-13: 978-0-19-946709-9 ISBN-10: 0-19-946709-9 Typeset in ScalaPro 10/13 by The Graphics Solution, New Delhi 110 092 Printed in India by Rakmo Press, New Delhi 110 020 Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holder of photographs 1, 16, 35, and 37. The publisher would be pleased to hear from the copyright owner so that proper acknowledgement can be made in future editions.

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Frontispiece

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Frontispiece J.S. Grewal

(p.ii)

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Frontispiece

Master Tara Singh, 20 September 1956 Source: FPG/Getty Images.

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Dedication

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Dedication J.S. Grewal

(p.v) To Punjabi University, Patiala, with which I have remained closely associated in several capacities for over a decade (p.vi)

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Illustrations

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.ix) Illustrations J.S. Grewal

Photographs Frontispiece image: Master Tara Singh, 20 September 1956 ii 1. Master Tara Singh as a young man 703 2. Master Tara Singh (in chair on the extreme left) as a member of the hockey team, Khalsa College, Amritsar 703 3. Master Tara Singh (fourth from the right in the row of chairs), Headmaster, Khalsa High School, Kallar, in 1917, with Sant Teja Singh on the right 703 4. Master Tara Singh (second from the left in the row of chairs) with some Akali leaders after their release from jail in September 1926. The chair in the middle has a photograph of Sardar Teja Singh Samundri who had died in jail 703 5. Master Tara Singh leading a jathā of 100 Akalis from Amritsar to Peshawar amidst a huge crowd in 1930 704 6. Master Tara Singh leading the jathā for Peshawar near Khalsa College, Amritsar 704 7. Master Tara Singh (in the middle) with Akali leaders at the time of a meeting of the Central Sikh League at Amritsar on 8 April 1931 704 8. Master Tara Singh (third from left) listening to Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942. Sitting from left to right are Sardar Ujjal Singh, Sardar Jogendra Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh 705 9. Master Tara Singh at a party after meeting Sir Stafford Cripps 705 (p.x) 10. Master Tara Singh sitting in a rickshaw amidst a crowd of people in Simla at the time of the Simla Conference in June–July 1945 705

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Illustrations 11. Master Tara Singh (third from right) in conversation with Jinnah while Lord Wavell is talking to the other Indian leaders at the time of the Simla Conference 705 12. Master Tara Singh (third from left) listening to Lady Wavell at the time of the Simla Conference 705 13. Master Tara Singh talking to Maulana Azad at the time of the Simla Conference 706 14. Master Tara Singh with Jinnah and Khizar Hayat Khan at the Simla Conference 706 15. Master Tara Singh in discussion with Sardar Mangal Singh at the time of the Simla Conference 706 16. Master Tara Singh (in chair in the middle) as Commander of the Akal Regiment, with Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke, Ishar Singh Majhail (on the left), and Darshan Singh Pheruman and General Mohan Singh (on the right) in 1947 706 17. Master Tara Singh (on the mike) addressing the annual conference of the All India Sikh Students Federation at Ludhiana on 24 April 1948 707 18. Master Tara Singh (seated fourth from the right, facing the camera) addressing a press conference at Delhi on 2 August 1948 707 19. Master Tara Singh after his release from jail in October 1949 707 20. Master Tara Singh with Jathedar Pritam Singh Khuranj on the right and Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala on his left after the election of Jathedar Khuranj as President of the SGPC in 1952 707 21. Master Tara Singh addressing a joint meeting (in connection with the general election) sponsored by the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh, and the Shiromani Akali Dal on 8 January 1952 708 22. Master Tara Singh with visitors from Pakistan in May 1955 708 23. Akali procession at Amritsar on 11 February 1956 at the time of All India Akali Conference 708 24. Master Tara Singh welcomed by his friends in his native village, Harial, in Pakistan early in 1960 709 25. On behalf of Master Tara Singh, Sardar Bakshish Singh is thanking the residents of Harial 709 26. Master Tara Singh listening to C. Rajagopalachari during the latter’s visit to the Golden Temple in March 1960 709 27. Master Tara Singh sitting by the side of Sant Fateh Singh on fast on 5 January 1961 709 28. Master Tara Singh accepting juice from Yadvindra Singh of Patiala and Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast on 1 October 1961 710 29. Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh listening to the verdict of the Panj Pyaras at the Akal Takht on 29 November 1961 710 (p.xi) 30. Master Tara Singh performing penance at the Golden Temple after the verdict by the Panj Pyaras 710

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Illustrations 31. Master Tara Singh cleaning shoes of the sangat at the Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in Delhi as part of his penance 710 32. Master Tara Singh cleaning utensils at Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in Delhi as part of his penance 711 33. Master Tara Singh with U.N. Dhebar at the Golden Temple in February 1966 711 34. Master Tara Singh having a walk in the park near the Post Graduate Institute for Medical Education and Research at Chandigarh on 13 November 1967 711 35. Giani Bhupinder Singh and Sardar Atma Singh looking at the face of Master Tara Singh before his funeral 711 36. The funeral procession of Master Tara Singh at Amritsar on 23 November 1967 711 37. Master Tara Singh busy writing in his home at Amritsar sitting on a cot, the seat of his day-long routine 712 38. Master Tara Singh with his wife, Shrimati Tej Kaur 712 39. Master Tara Singh with his family 712 40. A popular portrait of Master Tara Singh 712

Maps 14.1 The British Punjab: The Radcliffe Line 367 20.1 The Punjab in 1956 513 25.1 The Punjab in 1966 613 (p.xii)

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Foreword

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.xiii) Foreword Jaspal Singh

I have a memory of an incident that introduced me in a way to Master Tara Singh. As a young boy I saw people flocking to a railway station to have a fleeting glimpse of Master Tara Singh who was travelling in a train that was to stop there for a few minutes. My later awareness of his role in Indian politics as a Sikh leader confirmed the impression that Master Tara Singh remained the tallest leader of the Sikhs for several decades. I could think of no other leader who caught the imagination of the Sikh people in the way that Master Tara Singh did. As a student of Sikh politics, and in touch with a number of friends among scholars, including historians, I also became aware that much had been written on Master Tara Singh, especially in Punjabi, but not enough to do justice to his multifarious activities, which were underpinned by an intense desire to serve his country and his community. I shared the feeling of several Sikh scholars that a thorough study of Master Tara Singh was called for in the light of his importance and the conflicting views of his admirers and opponents in politics among the Indian leaders of his time, a crucial period in the history of modern India. After becoming Vice Chancellor of Punjabi University, Patiala, I began to think of a project on Master Tara Singh. The first step was to identify a historian of known competence to undertake a detailed study. There was a general impression that Dr J.S. Grewal was best qualified to take it up. He had already written a general history of the Sikhs (The Sikhs of the Punjab, a volume of the New Cambridge History of India series) and a short history of the Akalis. As a Visiting Professor at the Punjabi University during 2006–8, he had given public lectures on the political, social, and cultural history of the Punjab (which the University is publishing in four volumes). After a brief consultation, Dr Grewal Page 1 of 2

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Foreword was invited to be Professor of Eminence in the Department of Punjab Historical Studies and to formulate a project on Master Tara Singh with support from the Punjabi University. (p.xiv) The scope of the study expanded with the exploration of relevant sources in Punjabi and English. Master Tara Singh was fond of writing about his political, social, and cultural concerns in various forms. This evidence has been used by Dr Grewal rather thoroughly for the first time. This is a most valuable part of his study as it reflects Master Tara Singh’s response to the changing situations in his life. Equally valuable is the evidence coming from the most important leaders of the Indian subcontinent, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and M.A. Jinnah. It is not surprising that the work took six years to be completed. I was keen to ensure that a book based on such a wide range of evidence, and written by an eminent historian, should be easily accessible to the readers the world over. I feel happy that the Oxford University Press has agreed to publish this book within a year. I have no doubt that it would be received well by the general reader as well as the social scientists and researchers. I am thankful to Dr Grewal for undertaking this project on behalf of the Punjabi University. He had complete freedom to plan and pursue the project. He has placed Master Tara Singh squarely in the wider context of Indian history in a volume of over 400,000 words, touching upon all aspects of Master Tara Singh’s long political life. The subtitle of the book aptly refers to its comprehensive scope. It is a study of colonialism, nationalism, and the politics of Sikh identity. It demonstrates that Master Tara Singh was a great Indian patriot, deeply concerned with the welfare of the Sikhs as citizens of free India. Jaspal Singh Vice Chancellor Punjabi University, Patiala

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Preface

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.xv) Preface J.S. Grewal

Dr Jaspal Singh, Vice Chancellor, Punjabi University, Patiala, persuaded me in 2010 to undertake a study of Master Tara Singh who, he rightly thought, had been neglected by historians though he could be regarded as the greatest Sikh leader of the twentieth century. Since then I have worked on this study as Professor of Eminence at the Punjabi Unversity, which provided the support required for this project. Dr Jaspal Singh’s personal interest in this work has enabled me to collect a wide range of sources for a comprehensive study of the life of Master Tara Singh in the wider context of modern Indian history. This book is divided into two parts due to the fundamental difference between the era of colonial rule and the era of independence. During the first era, Master Tara Singh contended essentially with the British rulers in collaboration with the Congress. In the second era, ironically, he had to contend essentially with the Congress Party and the Congress government at the centre and in the Punjab. It needs to be underlined that he was not anti-Hindu but anti-Congress. The first two chapters of the first part outline the colonial context up to 1919, after which Master Tara Singh left the teaching profession for politics as a fulltime vocation. The first thirty-five years of his life, taken up in the third chapter, are related to the colonial context and serve as the background to the developments from 1920 to 1947, analysed later in eleven chapters. The larger context of the region and the country is kept in view for marking the important phases in his life. The second part opens with a discussion of the new context from 15 August 1947 to the adoption of the new Constitution on 26 January 1950 in two chapters. Master Tara Singh’s responses to this new situation are taken up in Page 1 of 3

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Preface the third chapter. Before the end of 1950, he was in confrontation with the Congress government and this confrontation lasted till his (p.xvi) death in 1967, except for a short period of truce in 1956–7. The fundamental demand of the Shiromani Akali Dal under the leadership of Master Tara Singh was for the creation of a unilingual state in the Punjab, which was ultimately created in 1966 under the leadership of Sant Fateh Singh. These developments are taken up in nine chapters. In the last year of his life Master Tara Singh put forth the idea of a ‘Sikh Homeland’ within India, with larger autonomy for the state. The focus in the conclusion is on the political ideas of Master Tara Singh in relation to Sikh identity, leading to his advocacy of pluralism in free India. Photographs related to the life of Master Tara Singh from about 1907 to 1967 are given together after the appendices, followed by a glossary, a bibliography, and an index. For the collection of source materials, both primary and secondary, I am indebted to Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha Library of the Punjabi University, the library of its Department of Punjab Historical Studies, and the Punjab State Archives at Patiala; Bhai Gurdas Library of Guru Nanak Dev University, the library of the Research Department of Khalsa College, and the Sikh Reference Library at Amritsar; the A.C. Joshi Library of the Panjab University, the Dwarka Das Library, and the Punjab State Archives at Chandigarh; and the National Archives of India and Nehru Memorial Museum and Library at New Delhi. Some archival material acquired from the British Library at London and the Cambridge University Library turned out to be relevant for this project. It is a matter of pleasure for me to thankfully acknowledge the courteous help received from the custodians and staff of all these institutions. I may particularly mention Dr Devinder Kaur, Dr Saroj Bala, Dr Mehar Kaur, and Dr Harinder Singh Chopra. I may add that Dr Lionel Carter and Professor C.A. Bayly were very helpful in England. The Sikh scholar Prithipal Singh Kapur and Dr Kirpal Singh, both of whom have shown interest in Master Tara Singh, generously lent a number of rare books and pamphlets from their personal libraries. Sardar Gurtej Singh, a former member of the Indian Administrative Service, who is deeply interested in Sikh history, provided some rare photographs as well as books, pamphlets, and other materials from his own collection. Sohan Singh Pooni, author of the Gadri Babe, sent me the private papers of Baldev Raj Nayar, mainly the records of his interviews with a number of political leaders of the Punjab in the early 1960s. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Professor Emeritus at the Kurukshetra University, a professional historian who has written most empathetically on Master Tara Singh, gave me one of his books based almost entirely on contemporary evidence for the year of Partition. I am extremely thankful to all these scholars.

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Preface I am grateful to Professor Indu Banga, Professor Emeritus, Panjab University, Chandigarh, for her deep interest in this study from the beginning to the end; she offered valuable suggestions on all aspects of this study. I am deeply indebted to Dr Karamjit K. Malhotra, Assistant Professor in the Department of Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University, Patiala, for her concern with the progress of this project, her useful suggestions, and active support at all stages. I am extremely thankful to Dr Sheena Pall, Professor of History, Panjab University, Chandigarh, who has helped me in the pursuit of this study over these years. (p.xvii) Personal interest taken in this work by my daughters, Professor Reeta Grewal and Dr Aneeta Minhas, and several other members of the family and personal friends was gratifying in its own way. Several drafts of this work were typed out and diligently corrected, particularly by Komal and Savitri. I am thankful to them. I greatly appreciate the interest taken by the team at the Oxford University Press in the publication of this work. Finally, I am thankful for the gracious permission received from Manohar Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, for maps 14.1, 20.1, and 25.1; from Singh Brothers, Amritsar, for photo 8; from Government of India (Photos Division) for photos 10–13; from National Institute of Panjab Studies (Bhai Vir Singh Sahit Sadan), New Delhi, for photos 15 and 21; from Sardar Manbir Singh (son of the late S. Jaswant Singh), Amritsar, for photos 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 31, 32, and 38; from Sardarni Ajit Kaur (widow of the late S. Gur Rattan Pal Singh) for photos 3, 7, 17, 18, 20, 27, 29, 30, 33, 36, and 39; and Sardar Gurtej Singh for photo 34. I am thankful to Professor Chetan Singh, Director, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, and Dr Mohinder Singh, Director, National Institute of Panjab Studies, New Delhi, for obtaining some of these photos. I feel sorry that I could not use any of the photographs sent by S. Amarjit Chandan but I am thankful to him nonetheless. J.S. Grewal Chandigarh 21 March 2017 (p.xviii)

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Introduction

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Introduction Historiographical Legacy and Our Approach J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords Master Tara Singh became a subject of study in his lifetime. A wide range of historical writing on Master Tara Singh has been produced in Punjabi and English in the past three quarters of a century, both by his admirers and his critics. However, this historiography has been based on a small part of the total evidence now available on Master Tara Singh, including archival sources and his own works. The range of evidence used in the present study is much larger. Furthermore, ample space has been given not only to Master Tara Singh but also to his opponents. Consequently, the image of Master Tara Singh that emerges from this comprehensive study is likely to be more authentic and refreshing. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, historiography, own works, range of evidence, image of Master Tara Singh

Legacy Master Tara Singh became a subject of study in his lifetime. Durlab Singh published an account of the major events of Master Tara Singh’s life in a book of about 40,000 words in 1942. He saw Master Tara Singh as a ‘remarkable man’ who fought for the people irrespective of their caste, creed, or profession. A valiant fighter, he filled the heart of his community and the people of his country ‘with boundless hope and confidence’.1 Durlab Singh emphasized that Master Tara Singh became a remarkable man despite having no privileges attached to birth. He came to occupy the most responsible position in his community as its foremost leader. ‘We can safely say Page 1 of 15

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Introduction that after the Sikh Raj no Sikh could ever capture such vast influence in the community as has come to the lot of Master Tara Singh.’2 Master Tara Singh’s decision to become a Singh through initiation of the doubleedged sword was an event of great significance in his life. The name ‘Tara Singh’ was actually given to him by Sant Attar Singh who was believed to have said: ‘Young man, you are no more Nanak Chand: you are Tara Singh henceforth, may God help you finding salvation for yourself and also for your community.’3 This, indeed, was a genuinely sought conversion and it had a profound influence on Master Tara Singh throughout his life. In 1921, he was asked by some of the Akali leaders to take part in the Akali movement as a full-time worker, and he continued to work for the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Shiromani Akali Dal for the rest of his life.4 In the Akali Leaders’ Case, Master Tara Singh stated in the court that he was the person ‘most responsible’ for the Nabha agitation and for the decision of the SGPC to take up the Nabha issue.5 The courage of Master Tara Singh was equally evident from the support he gave to the Akalis of the Patiala state against its Maharaja.6 (p.2) Durlab Singh appreciated Master Tara Singh’s stand against the Nehru Report of 1928 and his decision to work with the Congress, unlike Baba Kharak Singh who insisted on total dissociation. Master Tara Singh’s decision to take an Akali jathā to Peshawar in sympathy with the Pathans who had been brutally treated by the bureaucrats during the civil disobedience in 1930 marked the fall of Baba Kharak Singh and the rise of Master Tara Singh to the top of Sikh politics. Master Tara Singh was in jail when he was unanimously elected President of the SGPC in 1930.7 Appreciating Master Tara Singh’s stand against the Unionist premier Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Durlab Singh observed that Master Tara Singh was the one man and Shiromani Akali Dal the only organization in the province to remain unshaken in spite of the harsh treatment by the rulers of the province.8 Master Tara Singh groomed a large number of Akali leaders who played an important role in Sikh affairs.9 Master Tara Singh’s autobiographical Merī Yād (My Recollections) was published in 1945 at the instance of some friends. He had no time to search for newspapers or other records, and he wrote solely from his recollection. He tried to avoid talking about matters that were not of public interest.10 His autobiography is largely a narration of political events in which he participated or which had a close bearing on his life. Soon after Independence appeared Mahinder Singh’s Sardār-i Ā‘zam (The Great Leader) with its open admiration for Master Tara Singh. The whole of India was indebted to Master Tara Singh for his contribution to the struggle for its freedom. It was a great tragedy that he was put behind bars when he asked for Page 2 of 15

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Introduction an honourable place for the Sikhs in free India. Mahinder Singh’s narrative was meant to serve as a source of inspiration for the Sikhs to strive for a state within India in which Sikh culture could prosper without any threat or constraint. Mahinder Singh closes his book with the remark that Master Tara Singh’s position in the Sikh community was the same as that of Mahatma Gandhi in the Congress. Master Tara Singh was comparable indeed with the greatest leaders of the world.11 A few months later, in 1950, Gurcharan Singh wrote about Master Tara Singh as a self-respecting warrior (Aṇkhī Sūrmā) who had influenced Sikh history more profoundly than any other Sikh leader after Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Just as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Subhash Chandra Bose were known throughout the world as Indian leaders, Master Tara Singh was known as the leader of six million Sikhs. He was never prepared to dilute his love for the Panth for any worldly consideration. No other leader was accorded so much honour by the Panth as Master Tara Singh. He loved his country as a great patriot, and he alone could guide the Sikhs in the right direction.12 These four works carry a peculiar relevance for the life of Master Tara Singh. The three earliest biographers were highly appreciative of the Akali movement and admired Master Tara Singh as by far the most important Sikh leader. His autobiographical work has a significance of its own as a reflection of his selfimage and his understanding and assessment of the events in which he participated or which he witnessed. No such work on Master Tara Singh appeared in his lifetime after 1950. However, the editor of the Sant Sipāhī started a series of new instalments of Master Tara Singh’s recollections, starting with the Azad Punjab scheme and the Sapru Committee. The (p.3) second instalment appeared in September, followed by others in October–November 1950 and May–June 1951. In the Sant Sipāhī of March 1955 the editor mentioned that a book entitled Merī Yād was published covering the events up to 1954, and Master Tara Singh picked up the old threads in March 1955.13 All such articles of Master Tara Singh were incorporated by his elder son, Jaswant Singh, in his Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, published in 1972. Large extracts from contemporary sources and his own longish notes, or even whole chapters, were added by Jaswant Singh to the text of Merī Yād. Therefore, he refers to himself as the ‘editor’.14 Master Tara Singh’s younger brother, Niranjan Singh, had already published a biography of Master Tara Singh entitled Jīwan-Yātra Master Tara Singh, in 1968. It was based largely on his own experiences and observations and some records in his possession.15 Only three more works written exclusively on Master Tara Singh in Punjabi have appeared in the last fifty years. Prithipal Singh Kapur’s Srimān Master Tara Singh (Itihāsik Pakh Ton) was published in 1968. In less than 25,000 words, Page 3 of 15

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Introduction Kapur outlined the most important events of Master Tara Singh’s life (1885– 1967) with an appreciative appraisal of his achievement as the man-of-the-age (yugpursh).16 Bimla Anand’s Master Tara Singh, published by the Punjabi University, Patiala, in 1995 has the distinction of including Master Tara Singh’s literary and journalistic activities and the use of some archival sources, but the narrative is not free from factual errors.17 Surinder Singh Batra, in his Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Te Rachnā, goes into greater detail of his autobiography, his novels, his Safarnāma, his political articles and pamphlets, his essays on Sikh faith, and other miscellaneous writings.18 In English, only essays and articles on Master Tara Singh have appeared in recent decades.19 A biographical sketch of the whole life of Master Tara Singh in an essay of about 15,000 words by Prithipal Singh Kapur is an English version of his booklet in Punjabi published in 1968.20 The latest work on the subject, Master Tara Singh and His Reminiscences, consists mainly of an English translation of the whole of Merī Yād by Dharam Singh, with an elaborate appraisal of Master Tara Singh by Prithipal Singh Kapur.21 Master Tara Singh figures prominently in Baldev Raj Nayar’s Minority Politics in the Punjab. As a political scientist, Nayar sets out to study ‘the Indian case’ in the context of the general problem of building a ‘nation’ out of the diverse groups in the erstwhile colonies of Europe in Asia and Africa. Nayar notes that the people of the Indian subcontinent suffered a setback in nation-building when India was partitioned ‘on the basis of religion’ in 1947. The new Constitution of India embodied a delicate balance between the need for a strong central government and the recognition of regional diversity. Furthermore, the Constitution established a ‘secular state’ in India, unidentified with any particular religion. Equality of opportunity was provided for all in public employment. The most important challenge to ‘national unity’ and ‘the secular state’ came from the growth of regionalism based on linguistic and cultural ties. Another type of threat to the existing political framework in India was religion-based communalism. The examples of communal groups given by Nayar are the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, and the Muslim League. However, Nayar was concerned primarily with the demand for a new state in the (p.4) Punjab, its social and political context, and its nature: whether it was a language-based regional demand or a region-based communal one. The basis and the origin of the demand, and the motivating factors behind it, could throw light on the future development of the political conflict in the Punjab.22 In Nayar’s perspective, thus, ‘regional’ and ‘communal’ demands were obstacles in the path of nation-building.

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Introduction According to Nayar, the doctrine which provided the basic motive force for reform among the Sikhs was that of ‘a separate political entity’. It was argued that Sikhism was not a religion like other religions; it was concerned with the whole activity of man in the context of this world. ‘Religion and politics are said to be combined in Sikhism.’ Master Tara Singh maintained that the Panth was a political organization founded upon religion. ‘Without political organization and participation in politics, the Sikh religion cannot survive.’ Master Tara Singh was also reported to have said that ‘the Khalsa Panth will either be a ruler or a rebel. It has no third role to play’.23 Nayar argues that the Akali demand for a Punjabi-speaking province was a cloak for objectives that were not cultural but political or rather communal. He refers to a speech by Master Tara Singh during the elections of 1951–2 in which he said that it was wrong to allege that he wanted ‘a Sikh state’; he desired only ‘a state based on the Punjabi language’. But he also said frankly that his manifesto was ‘the Panth’ and he wanted ‘Sikh rule’. In one of his articles Master Tara Singh wrote that he wanted a Sikh majority state with internal autonomy like that of Kashmir. On yet another occasion he said that the Sikhs wanted āzādī. Nayar gives other instances where Master Tara Singh reveals more concern for the Sikh religion and the Sikh Panth than for the Punjabi language.24 Master Tara Singh made no secret of his motives even in 1961: ‘The Sikhs as a distinctive community,’ he said, ‘must be preserved and they could be preserved only in a “homeland” of their own.’ He asserted that in their present position ‘the Sikhs would be gradually “absorbed” by the majority community’. Thus, the Sikhs needed political power for the protection of the Sikh symbols of distinction.25 Nayar comes to the conclusion that the Akali demand for the Punjabi Suba was a continuum of the Akali concern for preserving Sikh identity from the very beginning of the Akali movement. The demand for Punjabi Suba represented ‘the political aspiration of a religious group to nationhood, especially in view of the historical memories of having been the sovereign rulers of the Punjab’. The ‘nationalist leadership’ opposed the demand as ‘a potential threat’ to the ‘secular regime’ and to ‘Indian national unity’. The conflict over the demand was not merely a conflict between Hindus and Sikhs, but between two groups of leaders among the Sikhs themselves: the Akali leaders, who made ‘communal demands’ in the name of the Sikh community, and the Congress-Sikh leaders who subscribed to ‘secular nationalism’.26 Nayar does recognize, however, that Master Tara Singh held a unique position among the Sikh masses till 1962 as the only consistent and long-suffering upholder of the doctrine of the Panth as a separate entity, and as ‘a selfless and dedicated leader without personal ambition’. After 1962, Master Tara Singh’s position changed, and his advancing age precluded the possibility that he could offer the vigorous and determined leadership he had provided in the past. Page 5 of 15

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Introduction However, Master Tara Singh’s political career did suggest that the Akali leadership in the future might seek to (p.5) project his image to secure popular support if it decided to persist ‘in the policy of challenging the forces of secular nationalism’.27 The image of Master Tara Singh could inspire popular support, but his ideas had no relevance for the future, according to Nayar. He was inclined on the whole to see Master Tara Singh as a protagonist of communalism and, therefore, an obstacle to nation-building in a secular state. In contrast to Nayar, Sarhadi identifies himself with the ‘minority’ and his primary concern is with the formation of a unilingual Punjab state. His interest is in minority politics within the general political framework. He views Master Tara Singh from a totally different perspective. His Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle was based mainly on a large number of documents in his possession, as well as his personal knowledge. A lawyer by profession and an Akali leader in his own right, Sarhadi places Master Tara Singh at the centre of his story. After religious resurgence and the awakening of new consciousness among the Sikhs, Sarhadi takes up their part in politics when transfer of power was to take place. The main plot of the whole story began ‘with the great holocaust and culminated with the carving out a “homeland” for these people’. Master Tara Singh is at the centre of the story from 1942 to 1962. Sarhadi’s own participation in the struggle gave him the opportunity to watch the course of events and the men on the stage. Written without fear or favour, his narrative was primarily factual. He points out that he does not agree with Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, author of The Emergence of Pakistan, who held that the Sikhs were responsible for the holocaust of 1947. Nor does Sarhadi agree with Khushwant Singh who said that language was only the sugar-coating for the Akali demand for a Sikh state.28 Significantly, no professional historian or social scientist has undertaken a detailed study of Master Tara Singh. The Akalis in power, who trace their ‘political ancestory’ to Sant Fateh Singh, maintain a studied silence about Master Tara Singh even though he has been formally honoured by them as a ‘Panth Ratan’. There are the Sikh critics of Master Tara Singh who hold the view that he betrayed the Sikhs because he refused to accept a Sikh state being offered by the British, and by Jinnah. Among them is the most respectable Sikh intellectual Sardar Kapur Singh.29 Sardar Gurtej Singh, who has great respect for Sardar Kapur Singh’s view, sent on request a number of questions to indicate what went wrong with Master Tara Singh’s politics. He should not have ‘leaned upon the Congress’ during the Gurdwara Reform Movement, and then onwards up to 1947 he should have retained an autonomous position. For instance, he himself should have represented the Sikhs at the Round Table Conference. He should not have accepted leadership of the Hindus because it diluted the idea of a distinct Sikh identity. Master Tara Singh appears not to have been aware that Mahatma Page 6 of 15

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Introduction Gandhi had accepted Pakistan much before 1946. He could have taken help from the Sikh rulers like the Maharaja of Patiala and the leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan ‘to negotiate more meaningfully with the British’.30 Soon after Independence it was clear that the Hindus wanted ‘to annihilate the Sikhs’ but Master Tara Singh does not appear to have been aware of this. When Nehru asked Master Tara Singh in September 1947 whether the Sikhs wanted Khalistan, he should have told Nehru that the Sikhs required political safeguards. Master Tara Singh should not have allowed the Akali Dal to be merged with the Congress first in 1948 and then in 1956. Finally, he did (p.6) not understand that his agitational approach was wasteful and rather counterproductive. In the present study, there is no attempt to address these views directly but answers to most of these are built into its text. The ‘nationalist’ historians have little appreciation for Master Tara Singh primarily because they see him essentially as a ‘communalist’. Bipan Chandra, one of the foremost historians of modern India, brackets the Gurdwara Reform Movement with the struggle for temple entry in Kerala. Both illustrate for him the influence of nationalism on the struggle ‘to reform Indian social and religious institutions and practices’ leading to confrontation with the colonial authorities. The struggle for reform tended to merge with the anti-imperialist struggle. The Akali movement related initially to a purely religious issue but ended up as ‘a powerful episode of India’s freedom struggle’.31 In other words, the motivating force for the Akalis was the Congress. Under the influence of the Non-cooperation Movement the Akali Dal and the SGPC accepted complete non-violence as their creed.32 The government adopted a two-pronged policy in view of the emerging integration of the Akali movement with the national movement: to win over the moderates and to suppress the extremists. Heartened by the support of the nationalist forces, the Akalis began to see their movement as a part of the national struggle. The nationalist section within the SGPC passed a resolution in favour of non-cooperation in May 1921. Master Tara Singh at this time was one of the prominent ‘militant nationalist leaders’ of the SGPC.33 The SGPC took up the cause of the Maharaja of Nabha who had been forced to abdicate in July 1923. The Jaito morchā launched by the SGPC did not get much support from the rest of the country. The government succeeded in winning over the moderate Akalis with the promise of legislation, and the Gurdwaras Act was passed in July 1925. Apart from its own achievement, the Akali movement made ‘a massive contribution’ to political awakening among the Punjab peasantry, and the people of the princely states.34 The Akali movement was commendable for Bipan Chandra in so far as it was aligned with politics of the Indian National Congress. But it encouraged ‘a certain religiosity’ that was used later by ‘communalism’. While the moderates Page 7 of 15

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Introduction went back to loyalist politics to become a part of the Unionist Party, and as the nationalist Akalis joined the mainstream nationalist movement as part of the Gandhian or the leftist Kirtī–Kisān and Communist wings, the ‘stream’ which kept the title ‘Akali’ used the prestige of the movement and became the political organ of Sikh communalism, ‘mixing religion and politics and inculcating the ideology of political separatism from Hindus and Muslims’. The politics of the Akali Dal constantly vacillated between nationalist and loyalist politics before 1947.35 In India after Independence, written jointly by Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, it is stated that the Akali leadership from the very beginning had adopted certain ‘communal themes’, which became ‘the constitutive elements of Sikh communalism’ in all its phases. This was reflected in the movement for a Punjabi-speaking state. Denying the ideal of a secular polity, the Akalis asserted that religion and politics could not be separated, and that the Sikhs were being subjected to discrimination, humiliation, and victimization. No evidence other than that of the denial of a Punjabi Suba, however, was offered in support of the (p.7) charges. A significant feature of Akali politics was the use of the institutions and symbols of Sikh religion in order to harness religious sentiments and fervour to communal ends. Hindu communalism was very active in the Punjab at the same time as a counterpoint to Sikh communalism.36 For our authors, Nehru was ‘more than aware of the fascist character of extreme communalism, including its Akali variety under Master Tara Singh’s leadership’. At the same time Nehru was sensitive to the feelings of the minorities, and he tried to conciliate the Akalis by accommodating, as far as possible, their secular demands. The examples of this accommodation are the pacts of 1948 and 1956 when the Akali Dal agreed to shed its communal character. The pact of 1948 was meant to absorb the Akali legislators into the Congress Party. It isolated Master Tara Singh from the former Akali leaders. But this strategy failed to stem the growth of communalism in the Punjab. Neither Prime Minister Nehru nor Chief Minister Kairon took steps to launch an ideological campaign against communalism, nor did they confront communalism directly at a time when it was not difficult to do so.37 Bipan Chandra and his co-authors emphasize that Master Tara Singh gave ‘a blatantly communal character’ to the demand for a Punjabi Suba. They contend that the Sikhs wanted a state of their own in which they could dominate as a religious and political community. Nehru refused to concede the demand because of its communal underpinnings. When Sant Fateh Singh ousted Master Tara Singh from the top leadership of the Akali Dal and declared that the demand for the Punjabi Suba was based entirely on language, the ground was prepared for its acceptance, and the Punjabi Suba was created in 1966. It was a correct step, but no solution to the Punjab problem. The heart of that problem Page 8 of 15

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Introduction was communalism and unless that was eradicated the problem would remain and take new forms. The authors go on to discuss ‘Akali politics and militancy’ after the creation of the Punjabi Suba on the assumption that militancy was an extension of Akali politics.38 Bipan Chandra and his co-authors represent nationalist historiography with an explicit hostility towards Master Tara Singh’s ‘communalism’. S.S. Bal wrote a booklet to discuss ‘Sikh communalism as channelised by the Shiromani Akali Dal, 1920–1947’ as a topic of great contemporary relevance. ‘Properly studied, it helps us in understanding the travails, that the State of the Indian Union bearing the name of the Punjab since 1 November 1966, had undergone in the last decade or so.’39 Sikh communalism for Bal was not related in any way to the pre-colonial Sikh past. ‘It has nothing to do even with Guru Gobind Singh creating the Khalsa on the Baisakhi of 1699 or with the new form he gave to the followers of the Great Nanak.’40 As elsewhere in India, British rule provided the basis for communalism in the Punjab. It was reinforced by the reform movements. Nevertheless, the Central Sikh League and the Akali Dal acquired the image of ‘great freedom fighters’ early in the 1920s. The demands of the Central Sikh League were addressed to the Congress and not to the British Government. But the Akali leaders seldom missed the opportunity to emphasize their separate identity from the Congress. At the end, Bal agrees with Bipan Chandra that communalism was a phenomenon of modern Indian history. It was not a religious but a secular phenomenon, catering to vested interests of the feudal and the educated classes. However, Sikh communalism in the Punjab, nurtured (p.8) and guided by the Akali Dal, was different from the Muslim communalism promoted by the Muslim League. In the first place it was addressed primarily to the Congress. The demands of Akali Dal were a counterpoise to the demands of the Muslim League, and it did not act as a brake on India’s fight for freedom.41 Despite these qualifications, Bal regards Sikh communalism as the source of the travails of the Punjab in the 1980s, and remains pretty close to Bipan Chandra’s Communalism in Modern India.42 Talking of the paradox of ethnic identities and statehood, Raghuvendra Tanwar looks upon Master Tara Singh as an upholder of ethnic identity with an implicit empathy with the movements led by him. Tanwar says that he does not subscribe to the view that ‘the Sikhs had developed from a distinctive religious and ethnic group to the level of a conscious nationality’. However, they had moved speedily towards becoming ‘a more distinct, self conscious community’ before 1947, drawing its bonding elements from symbols of heritage, shared history, culture, and religion. There was an urge to protect the exclusive interests and specific identity of which the Sikhs were increasingly becoming conscious as an ‘ethnic group’.43

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Introduction Master Tara Singh’s differences with the Congress over the Nehru Report were resolved when the Congress gave assurance to the Sikhs in 1929 ‘that in future no constitutional solution that did not give satisfaction to the Sikhs would be acceptable to the Congress’. Master Tara Singh welcomed this assurance, declaring that the Sikhs would stand at the forefront in the fight for freedom.44 Tanwar refers to Master Tara Singh’s ‘nationalist role’ in the 1930s even though his rivals talked in ‘communal terms’. Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs to join the British Indian Army for the sake of the Panth as the Sikhs in the army could be ‘a great support’ when the struggle came. About the Azad Punjab scheme, he made no secret of his purpose: to cripple the Pakistan scheme. His own scheme was meant to ensure integrity of the Indian state.45 Tanwar outlines the events that indicate how the Sikhs saw their future in India, and why Master Tara Singh insisted on the partition of the Punjab. He was not happy with the 3 June 1947 Award which provided no political safeguards for the Sikhs. Early in June he said: ‘It is not a matter of mere political power for us. Our very existence is at stake.’ A fortnight later he said that the Sikhs were facing extinction because ‘they have been thrown bound at the mercy of others’. The plan for the partition of the Punjab was understood by Master Tara Singh and the Congress leaders ‘to mean completely different things’. The Sikh perception that they had actually made a sacrifice by siding with India was of no concern to the Congress leadership. By the end of 1947, Master Tara Singh was clearly an undesirable element as far as Nehru and Gandhi were concerned.46 The Akali leaders were disappointed with the indifference of the Congress leaders to the promises made before 1947. Nehru declared at Jalandhar on 24 February 1948 that ‘in this country weightage is not to be given to anybody’. He frankly told the people that it was ‘nonsense’ to demand weightage. Master Tara Singh reacted: ‘I want the right of self determination for the Panth in matters religious, social, political and others. If to ask for the existence of the Panth is communalism, then I am a communalist and I am prepared to face repression.’ Repeatedly he spoke of a space for preserving ‘our culture and traditions’. What the Sikhs sought (p.9) was a ‘province within the federation of India’.47 Master Tara Singh’s arrest for the first time in free India on 19 February 1949 according to Tanwar was unwarranted. Master Tara Singh was to be in and out of jail in the years that followed, and the problem of the Congress in the Punjab was that it had no one to rival Master Tara Singh in popularity. Tanwar outlines the developments leading to the inauguration of the Punjabi-speaking state on 1 November 1966. But as soon as it was done, the Akalis led by Sant Fateh Singh condemned the common links like Chandigarh and the Bhakra works. Several new dimensions came to be added to the politics of the Punjab.48

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Introduction Tanwar concludes that the Sikhs as a minority with a strong sense of identity did not fall in line with a homogeneous national identity which they did not find to be sufficiently reassuring. Indeed, he makes the general observation that pride in one’s culture, ethnic identity, and participation in the political system of the region and the nation are natural processes that need to be appreciated in multiethnic states like India The ‘setting of “pan-Indian” goals was and would be even today completely out of the pace with liberal, democratic, secular and federal ethos, which are important concerns of Indian polity’.49 Tanwar is far more empathetic than Bipan Chandra and his co-authors. He has an inkling that there could be honest differences of outlook and political attitudes among leaders with different historical and cultural heritage. For him, the construct of ‘communalism’ does not clarify issues. ‘Unity’ is not to be confused with ‘uniformity’. Tanwar presents Master Tara Singh as a patriot who was seriously concerned about the interests of his community within the constitutional framework of the country.

Approach The range of evidence used in this detailed study of Master Tara Singh is far wider than in the published historical literature on Master Tara Singh, whether in Punjabi or in English. Master Tara Singh’s own writings, other than Merī Yād, are most important for our purpose. This material consists of essays on Sikh religion and Sikh ethics, historical novels, pamphlets, public addresses, and a posthumously published travelogue. These writings reveal his thoughts, values, and attitudes rooted in the Sikh tradition as he understood it. Apart from some fresh information, his writings also reveal his perspective on important historical situations and events. To these sources are added the autobiographies of some of his older and younger contemporaries, both in English and Punjabi. The second category of important materials that have been used systematically in this study comprises the collected and selected works of some of the most eminent leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and M.A. Jinnah. These works contain significant evidence on the Sikhs and the Sikh leaders in general, and Master Tara Singh in particular. A close reading of these sources reveals the assumptions of these leaders about the Sikh faith and the Sikh past. Significantly, they regarded Master Tara Singh as the most important Sikh leader even when his independent stance was not to their liking. Over 200 in all, these volumes add new dimensions to our understanding of the situations which Master Tara Singh had to face. Equally important are over two scores of volumes of published official documents. Much smaller in volume but (p.10) nonetheless significant are the documents of the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal. Thus, the use of published and unpublished primary sources in this study is comprehensive. It has a strong empirical base.

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Introduction Some scholars have reminded me that Master Tara Singh is a highly controversial figure in modern Indian history. Paradoxically, this makes him all the more important as a subject of historical study. Partly due to the supposedly controversial subject, ample space is given in this study to what Master Tara Singh has said and also to what has been said by his antagonists. This may enable the reader to appreciate the viewpoints of all the actors in the story. Inevitably, interpretation is involved in the selection of evidence. This selection has been made quite deliberately, keeping in view the whole range of available evidence. All the time Master Tara Singh is sought to be placed in the context of Indian history, with special reference to the Punjab. The image of Master Tara Singh that emerges from this voluminous and varied evidence is understandably quite different from what we see in the published historical literature on him. Master Tara Singh was undoubtedly a devout Sikh and a staunch patriot. Faith and patriotism were two sides of the same coin for him. In his own words, to be a Sikh was to be a patriot. He loved the Sikh Panth and he loved his country. Service of the Panth was service of the country, and service of the country was service of the Panth. He firmly believed that this was the legacy left by the Sikh gurus for their followers down the centuries. This basic conviction and commitment underpinned Master Tara Singh’s political activity. For about four decades he sympathized with or participated in antiBritish movements to free the country from foreign rule. His cherished wish was that the Sikhs should fight at the forefront for the freedom of the country. His basic concern—service of the Panth and service of the country—remained operative after 1947 when the Congress came into power. The Sikhs had been partners in the struggle for freedom and Master Tara Singh wanted them to be partners in power. Only this could ensure an honourable position for the Sikhs in free India. Notes:

(1.) Durlab Singh, The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh (Lahore: Hero Publications, 1942), p. 13. (2.) Durlab Singh, ‘Master Tara Singh: The Valiant Fighter’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), p. 176. (3.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, p. 9. (4.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, p. 25. (5.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, p. 32. (6.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 41–8. (7.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 48–66.

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Introduction (8.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, p. 70. (9.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 69–102. (10.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945). (11.) Mahinder Singh, Sardār-i Ā‘zam (Jīwan Master Tara Singh Ji) (Amritsar: Panthak Tract Society, 1950), pp. 6–8, 149–50, 176. (12.) Gurcharan Singh, Aṇkhī Sūramā (Jīwan Master Tara Singh Ji) (Amritsar, 1950), pp. 9–10, 13–14. (13.) Sant Sipāhī (August 1950): pp. 38–44; (September 1950): pp. 31–5; (October 1950): pp. 27–9; (November 1950): pp. 47–50; (May 1951): pp. 7–9; (June 1951): pp. 58–61; (March 1955): pp. 15–18. (14.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972). (15.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968). (16.) Prithipal Singh Kapur, Srimān Master Tara Singh (Itihāsik Pakh Ton) (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968). (17.) Bimla Anand, Master Tara Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995). (18.) Surinder Singh Batra, Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Te Rachnā (n.p.: n.d.). Besides the blessings (ashīrvād) of Giani Bhupinder Singh and Giani Gurmukh Singh, who praise Master Tara Singh as a leader, the foreword by S. Bharpur Singh, Registrar, Guru Nanak Dev University, highlights Master Tara Singh’s deep interest in the Sikh faith and Sikh history. (19.) For an anthology of essays and articles, see Master Tara Singh, edited by Verinder Grover. A number of other articles are listed in the bibliography of the present study. (20.) Prithipal Singh Kapur, ‘Master Tara Singh—A Biographical Sketch’, in Master Tara Singh, ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 116–48. (21.) Prithipal Singh Kapur, Master Tara Singh and His Reminiscences (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2015). (22.) Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 1–9. (23.) Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, pp. 68–70. Page 13 of 15

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Introduction (24.) Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, pp. 35–8. (25.) Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, pp. 107–8. (26.) Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, pp. 118–19. (27.) Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, pp. 143–4, 149. (28.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (New Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), Preface. (29.) Kapur Singh, Sikhs and Sikhism (Amritsar: SGPC, 2002), p. 20. See also his Sāchī Sākhī (Amritsar: Gurmat Pustak Bhandar, n.d.), pp. 101–23 and his ‘Panjab dā Batwārā te Sikh Netā’, in Bikh Meh Amrit (a collection of essays by Kapur Singh), ed. Baldev Singh (Kapurthala: Published by Editor, 2013, fourth edition, first published in 1972), pp. 68–74. (30.) The Chief Khalsa Diwan was an organization working generally in cooperation with the government. (31.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Ltd, 1989, reprint), p. 224. The chapter discussed here was written by Bipan Chandra. (32.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 225–7. (33.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 226–9. (34.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 227–9. (35.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 229. (36.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, fifth impression), pp. 324–5. (37.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947– 2000, pp. 325–6. (38.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947– 2000, pp. 326–8.

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Introduction (39.) S.S. Bal, Political Parties and Growth of Communalism in Punjab (1920–47) (Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1989), p. 1. (40.) Bal, Political Parties and Growth of Communalism in Punjab, p. 7. (41.) Bal, Political Parties and Growth of Communalism in Punjab, pp. 57–8. (42.) Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India (New Delhi: Vani Educational Books, 1984). (43.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood: Reassessing the Role of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Master Tara Singh (Kanwar: Indian History Congress, 2008), ‘Presidential Address’, Contemporary History of India, p. 5. (44.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, p. 9. (45.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, pp. 9–10. (46.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, pp. 16–20. (47.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, pp. 31–2. (48.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, pp. 33–40. (49.) Tanwar, The Paradox of Ethnic Identity and Statehood, pp. 40–1.

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The Colonial Context

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Colonial Context (1849–1919) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0002

Abstract and Keywords The British evolved an elaborate administrative structure to ensure peace and order for exploiting the material and human resources of the Punjab. The new means of communication and transportation based on western technology served their economic, political, and administrative purposes. A new system of education was introduced chiefly to produce personnel for the middle and lower rungs of administration. The Christian missionaries were closely aligned with the administrators in this project, primarily for gaining converts to Christianity. The socio-economic change brought about by the colonial rule led to a number of movements for socio-religious reform, followed by a new kind of political awakening in the Punjab as in the rest of British India. The political aspirations of Indians were met only partially by the Government of India Act, 1919. Keywords:   Punjab, administrative structure, communication and transportation, education, Christian missionaries, socio-religious reform, political awakening, Government of India Act, 1919

After annexation, the Punjab was increasingly integrated with the rest of British India and, consequently, with the global political economy. A new imperial ethos informed the policies and measures of the colonial administrators of the Punjab after 1858. They introduced Western education and brought about technological and economic changes to serve imperial interests, resulting in an unprecedented social change that marked the emergence of new middle classes in the province. Their responses to the colonial situation led to a widespread cultural resurgence among all the major religious communities of the Punjab. This resurgence Page 1 of 25

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The Colonial Context became the basis of political articulation, particularly by the middle-class leaders. The growing political concerns of the people of the Punjab were recognized to some extent by their new rulers, and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919.

The Punjab Administration In its hierarchy and functioning the Punjab administration tended to be centralized and autocratic. The key functionary was the Deputy Commissioner in charge of the district as the most important administrative unit. It generally consisted of four tehsils, and was placed in a division under a commissioner. The Lieutenant Governor was at the head of the three branches of the provincial government: executive, judicial, and revenue. He had a strong secretariat, controlled only by the Governor General in Council, thus giving ‘the advantage of one man government’ to the Punjab, according to James Douie, an experienced administrator of the province. The Commissioner combined revenue powers with the executive and was under the Financial Commissioner. While the Deputy Commissioner and the Tehsildar exercised (p.16) executive, revenue, and judicial (criminal only) powers, the Assistant Commissioner, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, and the Naib Tehsildar performed all the three functions. Thus, there was a tendency ‘for powers in all the three branches to be concentrated in the hands of single individuals’.1 The other departments under the Lieutenant Governor were irrigation, roads and buildings, forests, police, medical, and education. The departments of railways, post offices, telegraphs, and accounts were under the Government of India. The judicial administration functioned independently, with a chief court consisting of two subdivisions: civil and criminal. Established in 1865 with two judges, it came to have five in 1909. The number of divisional and sessions judges increased from twelve to sixteen. In both the subdivisions, there were district judges, subordinate judges, and munsifs.2 Half a century of effort, admits the British administrator Douie, had failed to make local self-government a living thing in towns and districts. In 1911–12 there were 107 municipalities and 104 ‘notified areas’. About 90 per cent of their income came from octroi. It was spent largely on public health and convenience. The effect of the British administration had been a weakening of self-government in villages. Even the district boards were treated as consultative bodies. Their income was derived mainly from a surcharge of one-twelfth of the land revenue. About 60 per cent of the income was spent on public works and education. Public spirit was lacking and, generally, the franchise for the members to be elected was regarded with indifference except when party or communitarian considerations were involved.3 In its financial relations, the Punjab province was subordinate to the Government of India. The income from railways, post offices, telegraphs, salt, Page 2 of 25

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The Colonial Context and sale of opium went entirely to the Government of India. The total revenue of the Punjab in 1911–12 was Rs 75,856,000, out of which the province got only Rs 39,933,000. Assignments of Rs 3,777,000 from the centre raised the total income of the Punjab to Rs 43,710,000. The total expenditure in 1911–12 was Rs 40,379,000. Of the gross income of the province, more than 75 per cent was derived from land, 46 per cent from land revenue, 29 from irrigation (chiefly canal water rates), and 1.75 per cent from forests. The rest came from excise, stamps, income tax, and other heads.4 Douie takes pride in the roads and railways developed by the British, resulting in 2,000 miles of metalled and more than 20,000 miles of unmetalled roads, and over 4,000 miles of open railway lines by 1912. Railways beyond the Salt Range and the Sind Sagar railway were built primarily for military considerations.5 As a historian of both the Punjab and the Indian Railway system, Ian J. Kerr has recently suggested that it would be useful to see the development of railways in the province as ‘an integral part of the colonial project to master the Punjab and Punjabis’. Along with other innovations, it helped to ensure the security of British rule in the Punjab, to integrate it with the British Indian Empire, and to develop its commercial potential. Increase in agrarian production in the region on an unprecedented scale was reflected in the huge volume and value of trade. Agrarian production was geared largely to the needs of export not only through Bombay (present-day Mumbai) or Calcutta (present-day Kolkata) but also through the new port of Karachi which was linked up with the Punjab.6 Equally important was the fact that the railways, roads, telegraphs, and post offices (p.17) were interdependent, contributing significantly to the making of the colonial ‘dominant space’. This mega structure of transportation and communications was closely tied to the needs and concerns of the British Empire. These ‘revolutionary technological changes’ accelerated the pace of change. Places which took twenty hours to cover in the 1840s took only one hour by the end of the century. This ‘space–time compression’ had effects on all aspects of the colonial situation.7 Among the greatest achievements of British rule in the Punjab, says Douie, was ‘the magnificent system of irrigation canals’. The network of canals in the province irrigated more than eight and a quarter millions of acres in 1911–12. From 1850 to 1880 the government had constructed new canals to shore up petty commodity production. Their principal function was to even out seasonal differences in rainfall to give greater security to small proprietors of the thickly populated central Punjab. These early canals came to be called ‘protective’. In the 1880s the colonial government began to make massive capital investment in agricultural production to enhance the land revenue and export trade. With British capital and indigenous labour, ‘protective’ irrigation was replaced by ‘productive’ irrigation in largely uninhabited wastelands. In 1904, the Lower Chenab Colony alone had 1,800,000 acres allotted to peasants and yeomen. The Page 3 of 25

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The Colonial Context great part of the colony was covered by the Lyallpur district which had a population of 857,511 in 1911. Before 1892, when colonization had started, it had only a few nomad owners of large herds of cattle.8 Richard G. Fox looks upon these irrigation projects as more important than the railways for bringing about a fundamental transformation of agrarian production and labour in colonial Punjab. During the first fifty years of their rule, the British harnessed the region’s agricultural production and labour to the world system without radical transformation and major capital investment. Peasants in the central districts of the Punjab began to produce wheat for export and became ‘petty commodity producers’. In this manner, a precapitalist system of family labour and domestic capital was geared to the capitalist world economy. By the 1920s, over 10 million acres of desert land were under irrigation. The canal colonies had become a new recognizable ‘region’ which specialized in the production of export crops. Apart from the export of wheat and cotton, the canal colonies produced a large amount of revenue. Not controlled or threatened by merchant capital, the canal colonies grew stronger in contrast with the worsening condition of the cultivators of central Punjab. In the first decade of the twentieth century, net outmigration from the central districts increased from 1.52 to 4.72 per cent, a percentage higher than that in the south-western and south-eastern districts.9 Outmigration was linked up with the growing indebtedness in the late nineteenth century. Merchants and moneylenders had been advancing cash to cultivators for payment of the land revenue and for purchase of the factors of production in the market. The moneylenders made such loans against jewellery, crops, land, or even against premature rights of purchase. The high interest rates made it extremely difficult for the peasant to repay the capital. The creditors took land on mortgage in payment of defaulted loans, and reduced the small proprietor to a tenant on his own land. As the petty commodity producers became increasingly debt-ridden, the merchants and moneylenders became increasingly affluent. Thus, prosperity and debt went hand in hand. Debt bondage and (p.18) the tyranny of the market made military service more attractive and also obliged the Punjab cultivators to seek opportunity of wage labour abroad.10 The colonial authorities intervened to protect the system of agrarian production, their own creation, through legislation. The Alienation of Land Act of 1900 prevented cultivators from transferring their lands or mortgaging them for extended periods to non-agriculturists. This legislation addressed at least the immediate threat of transfer of land to non-agriculturist moneylenders. Dungen goes into the details of transformation of official opinion in the Punjab from 1869 to 1909 in which the Punjab administration exercised a decisive influence on the Government of India and the India Office with regard to the revenue policy and measures. The loyalty of the peasantry to the British was taken for granted, even Page 4 of 25

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The Colonial Context though the peasant proprietors were seen as a political force. The Alienation of Land Act, which came into force in June 1901, has been called ‘a landmark in the Punjab political tradition’.11 James Douie regretfully observed the dismal progress of modern education after six decades of British rule in the Punjab. There was one boy in six and one girl in thirty-seven at school. However, the old indifference was weakening and interest in education was increasing in towns and cities. The government was directly or indirectly responsible for education. At the headquarters of each district there was a high school, controlled by the Education Department. In each district there were Anglo-vernacular and vernacular middle schools, and primary schools managed by municipalities and district boards. An institution of a special kind was the Punjab Chiefs’ College at Lahore for the sons of princes and men of high social position. For girls of the upper middle class there was the Victoria May School in Lahore, founded in 1908, which developed into the Queen Mary College. The Government Arts College, the Oriental College, the Medical College, the Law School, and the Central Training College at Lahore were in place before the Punjab University was established in 1882. Founded in 1864, the Government College, Lahore, grew to be the premier educational institution in the Punjab. The veterinary college at Lahore was the best of its kind in India, and the agricultural college at Lyallpur was expected to play a very useful role in agrarian production.12 Douie refers to the ‘honourable connection’ of the Christian missionaries with the educational history of the Punjab. Indeed, they were closely connected with the British administrators of the province. The Political Agent at Ludhiana had invited the Presbyterian missionaries from the USA in 1834 to take charge of a school started by him. Before the end of the year, John C. Lowrie arrived in Ludhiana to establish a missionary centre and a printing press. Another centre was started in 1846 at Jullundur which had been taken over by the British after the Sikh War of 1845–6. Soon after annexation in 1849 a missionary centre was opened in Lahore. New centres were established at Sialkot, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar in 1856. Thus, the missionaries characteristically followed the British flag. After 1858 the missions expanded, founding new churches, hospitals, and orphanages, as well as schools and colleges in cities and towns all over the Punjab. Education was an important area of cooperation between the missionaries and the Punjab administrators. The system of grants-in-aid for private initiative in education was introduced initially to help the mission schools. The missionaries were (p.19) pioneers in women’s education and the education of the Untouchables, later called the Depressed Classes and subsequently Dalits. The missionaries promoted English language, literature, and Western education; held compulsory classes in Christianity; and made participation in Christian worship obligatory for their students. Indeed, the primary aim of Christian institutions Page 5 of 25

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The Colonial Context was evangelistic. The missionaries subscribed to the view that God had saved the British in 1857–8 for the spread of Christianity. In the early decades of British rule there were a few conspicuous conversions to Christianity in the Punjab, but the total number of Christians till 1881 was only about 4,000. Their number shot up to 163,994 in 1911. By far the largest number of converts were Dalits, especially the Chuhras of the countryside, who wished to be free of the social and economic tyranny of the landholders. The mass conversions by the Christian missionaries gave a jolt to the social reformers of the province and goaded them into action.13 In higher education, English literature and the social sciences were combined with the natural sciences to form the core of the new, essentially Western, education. The medium of higher education was English. Urdu was introduced as the medium of instruction up to matriculation, and Urdu literature as a subject of study. The sole criterion for this measure was administrative convenience, because soon after annexation the British had adopted Urdu as the language of administration at the lower rungs. Most of the literate Punjabis came to know the Urdu language and literature, and used it as the medium for public communication, both written and oral. Though a large province, the Punjab did not have the same status as the older provinces. Instead of the Governor it only had a Lieutenant Governor, and instead of a High Court only a Chief Court. The Governor General in Council had greater control over the province than in the Governors’ provinces. A Legislative Council was formed in the Punjab rather late, in 1897, consisting of only nine members, all of whom were nominated by the Lieutenant Governor. The council was enlarged in 1909. It consisted of twenty-four members, of whom only eight were elected, one each by the Punjab University and the Chamber of Commerce, and three each by the officially controlled Municipal and Cantonment Committees and District Boards. At least six of the other sixteen nominated members were from outside the Government service.14 Direct election was introduced only in 1919, with a much larger number of members but a limited franchise. The colonial rulers felt gratified to think that they had introduced the rule of law in the Punjab, but their rule was based essentially on force. For the maintenance of law and order, police administration was developed as distinct from the army and placed under the civil authorities. The army could be called whenever the situation appeared to be critical in their eyes. The Punjab administration came to be called ‘paternal’ with reference to the authority and power exercised by the colonial administrators. They were proud of this tradition and keen to retain it as long as they could.

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The Colonial Context On the whole, colonial rule in the Punjab had a great impact on the life of its people. In the first place, the old jāgīrdārī system was replaced by a bureaucratic system. Europeans, mainly British, occupied the top positions, with a much larger number of educated Indians at the middle and lower rungs in each department, selected and promoted by and large according to rules and paid monthly (p.20) salaries in cash. The Europeans received far higher salaries than the Indians. In the early decades after annexation, the Indian personnel came mostly from the United Provinces (UP) and Bengal. In due course educated Punjabis began to compete with them to serve the new rulers. Apart from various other departments, Indians educated in the law in India or England came to be associated with the administration of justice, and a substantial number of Punjabis took to the profession of law.15 The network of transportation and communications was used by the people as well as the civil administrators and military authorities. The printing press was similarly put to use by all for various purposes. Its importance was enhanced by its use, particularly for the dissemination of information and ideas by an individual or an organization interested in influencing the public or the bureaucracy. The printing press encouraged journalism and publication of books and pamphlets. For example, in 1911, nearly 600 books were published in Urdu, over 450 in Punjabi, and 80 each in English and Hindi. These books included the new literary forms of drama and fiction. Both literature and journalism largely reflected the emerging concerns of the Punjabis, like religious and social reform, history and biography, and the sciences and arts. It is interesting to note that more than half of the total publications came out from Lahore. Next in importance was Amritsar, though it brought out only a fourth of the number of books published in Lahore.16 Commercialization of agriculture in the Punjab added two more components to the new middle classes. Both the petty commodity producers in the countryside and the merchants and moneylenders in urban centres can be seen as constituting the middle class. Though unconscious and unrecognized, the merchants and moneylenders were the most important accomplices of commercialization; they were unofficial agents of the British. Till the end of the nineteenth century they were the greatest beneficiaries of the agrarian policies of the colonial state. Thus, bureaucracy, the rule of law in principle, new forms of transportation and communication, canal irrigation, agrarian policies, commercialization of agriculture, and a new system of education led to a social transformation in which the middle classes emerged as the most important segment of the social order in the Punjab. The professional middle class consisted of two broad categories: individuals in the service of the colonial state and persons in professions outside the state service such as law and journalism, and private enterprise in education. The commercial middle class consisted of members of Page 7 of 25

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The Colonial Context the urban trading communities and the rural commodity producers. The middle classes played an increasingly important role in the social, cultural, and political life of the province.17

Socio-religious Movements in the Punjab As a region numerically dominated by Muslims but having substantial proportions of Hindus and Sikhs,18 the Punjab came to have a very large number of movements for socio-religious reform. While the Nirankaris and the Nāmdhārīs among the Sikhs had started their reformist endeavours before annexation, the Singh Sabha, Sanatana Dharma, and the Ahmadiya movements emerged during the last three decades of the nineteenth century essentially in response to the colonial situation. Indigenous to the (p.21) Punjab, these reform movements may be differentiated from the Arya Samaj originating in western India and the Muslim associations (anjumans) drawing inspiration from the Aligarh Movement located in the United Provinces. Though numerically not very important, the Brahmo Samaj was the earliest to find a foothold in Lahore, the provincial capital. A few Bengalis and Punjabis founded the Lahore Brahmo Samaj in 1863 under the leadership of Babu Navin Chandra Roy. He was a paymaster in the NorthWestern Railway office in Lahore and an advocate of socially radical Brahmoism and Hindi. From 1867 to 1874 Lahore was visited by the leading Brahmos like Keshab Chandra Sen, Debendranath Tagore, and Pratap Chandra Majumdar. They upheld Upanishadic thought and appreciated Western science and the Christian ethic. With their rational yet theistic outlook and their socially liberal attitude, the Brahmos stood for the freedom of the press and English education, and they espoused the cause of the low castes and the Hindu women. Though willing to make use of Urdu and Punjabi for the propagation of their own ideas, the leaders of the Brahmo Samaj had a decided preference for Hindi in Devanagri script. The Brahmo monthly Harī Hakīkat, launched in 1877, was one of the earliest periodicals to be published in the Punjab.19 Some of the Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab, like Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia, Lala Harkishan Lal, and Professor Ruchi Ram Sahni, came to be associated with the Brahmo Samaj and played an important public role. However, the Dev Samaj, an offshoot of the Brahmo Samaj, proved to be relatively more lasting in the Punjab. It was founded by Pandit Shiv Narayan Agnihotri who had joined the Brahmo Samaj, and who used to expound its rationalistic and eclectic doctrine, and speak in favour of marriage reform and vegetarianism. In 1880 he was ordained as a missionary of the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj established in Calcutta. In 1882, he took sanyās and changed his name to Satyanand Agnihotri. In 1886 he left the Brahmo Samaj, and founded on 16 February 1887 a new organization called Dev Samaj (Divine Society). He rejected rationalism and initiated the dual worship of God and the gurū (he himself). In 1895 the worship of God was dropped and the founder became the Page 8 of 25

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The Colonial Context sole point of attention as Dev Bhagwan Atma for members of the Dev Samaj. They were expected to abandon all caste restrictions, practise intercaste dining and intercaste marriage. Widow marriage was made acceptable. In 1899 a coeducational school was started at Moga in Ferozpore district. Much later, a Dev Samaj College for Women was opened in Firozpur city. In 1921 there were 3,597 members of the Dev Samaj, with a good proportion of graduates, magistrates, doctors, pleaders, moneylenders, landlords, and government servants. The influence of the Dev Samaj was greater than what the number of its members would suggest.20 Ruchi Ram Sahni, a contemporary who knew Agnihotri well, talks in some detail how a person who used to appeal vehemently in the name of reason and conscience came to believe in his own extraordinary powers and decided to form a new centre for his activities.21 Swami Dayanand Saraswati came to the Punjab in 1877–8. The first edition of his Satyārth Prakāsh (The Light of Truth) had been published in 1875, elaborating his concept of true Hinduism in Hindi in Devanagri script. He denounced orthodox Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism as false in comparison with Vedic (p.22) Dharma, the only true faith. For him all truth was found in the Vedas as he understood them. The Vedas, and the texts based on a proper understanding of the Vedas, provided the yardstick for judging all other scriptural texts. Swami Dayanand rejected almost all aspects of contemporary Hinduism: the Puranas, polytheism, idolatry, the role of Brahman priests, pilgrimages, nearly all rituals, and the ban on widow marriage. For the propagation of ‘purified’ Dharma, he had founded the Arya Samaj at Bombay in April 1875. The Lahore Arya Samaj, founded in June 1877, held its first meeting on 24 June at which ten simple principles were adopted as the basic creed of the Samaj. In a short time, Arya Samajes were organized in different cities of the province before Dayanand’s death at Ajmer on 30 October 1883.22 The Arya Samajes in the Punjab had agreed on founding a school as a memorial for Swami Dayanand to impart Arya Dharam. The Lahore Samaj drafted a plan in 1883 and set up a sub-committee to raise funds. Lala Hans Raj offered to serve as principal of the school without any pay. The Dayananda Anglo-Vedic Trust and Management Society held its first meeting on 27 February 1886, and the school was opened in June. On 18 May 1889, the Punjab University granted affiliation to Dayanand Anglo-Vernacular (DAV) College. However, the concrete shape being given to the Anglo-Vedic system of education became a source of internal tension. Pandit Guru Datta, who looked upon Swami Dayananda as a divinely inspired sage (rishi) and considered the Satyārth Prakāsh as a text to be taken literally without any questioning, wanted the school to focus on Arya ideology, the study of Sanskrit, and the Vedic scriptures. He was supported by Pandit Lekh Ram and Lala Munshi Ram (later Swami Shraddhananda). By 1893 the Arya Samaj was formally divided between the moderates, known as the ‘College’ party, and the militants, known as the ‘Gurukul’ party. The latter also insisted on Page 9 of 25

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The Colonial Context vegetarian diet while the former left it to the discretion of the individual to eat or not to eat meat.23 The moderates remained focused on the Managing Committee, with education as their primary concern. Slowly they were able to expand the DAV College. The Lahore school run by the Committee became the model for other Aryas in the Punjab. By 1910, the Managing Committee had a number of schools affiliated to it, and it became the formal head of a growing educational system. In 1903 was founded their own Arya Pradeshak Pratinidhi Sabha. In due course, they added other forms of service, notably orphanages and famine relief. The militants had gained control over most of the local Arya Samajes and the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of the Punjab. They laid emphasis on Ved-prachār for propagation of the new message. Pandit Guru Datta had died in March 1890, and leadership of the party was taken over by Lala Munshi Ram and Pandit Lekh Ram. They laid stress on shuddhī or reconversion of Hindus who had converted to Islam or Christianity. In view of the then current notion of ‘Hindus as a dying race’, the scope of shuddhī was extended to ‘purifying’ anyone whose ancestors had once been Hindus (Indians). Pandit Lekh Ram wrote books against Islam, portraying it as a religion of murder, theft, slavery, and perverse sexual acts. Angered Muslims appealed to the courts but failed to silence him. On 6 March 1897, Pandit Lekh Ram was assassinated by a Muslim, leading to communal tension. The programme of shuddhī included the Sikhs and a number of Rahtias (Sikh weavers from outcaste (p.23) background) who were ‘purified’ at Lahore, and their heads and beards were shaved in public.24 In addition to Ved-prachār and shuddhī, the militant Aryas turned their attention to education. A girl’s school, the Arya Kanya Pathshala, was established in Jalandhar in the early 1890s. A women’s hostel, Kanya Ashram, was also founded. In June 1896 the Kanya Mahavidyalaya was founded, which finally became a women’s college. It published literature for women’s education and founded the Hindi monthly Panchāl Panditā in 1898 to propagate the cause of female education. The purpose of this education was to produce a new ideal Hindu woman. The militants advocated widow remarriage, restricting it initially to virgin widows. In 1898 the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha voted to establish an institution where the student would lead a life of celibacy (Brahmacharya), discipline, and Vedic learning. This institution opened in March 1902 in the form of Gurukula Kangri in Hardwar, with Lala Munshi Ram as its manager and moral guide. With this, the militant Aryas completed their own system of religiously oriented education for both women and men.25 The two wings of the Arya Samaj created a wide variety of institutions, offered new forms of worship, introduced proselytism, a conversion ritual, and a simple statement of their fundamental creed. The Arya Samaj reinforced the lines

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The Colonial Context drawn between Hindus and others, with an aggressive promotion of Vedic Hinduism. A defender of Hindu orthodoxy against attacks from Christianity had appeared in the early 1860s in the person of Pandit Shardha Ram Phillauri. He started preaching Vaishnava Hinduism, denounced Christianity as ‘trivial and gross’, and organized a Hindu Sabha in 1867–8 to sustain sanātana dharma. In 1872–3 he preached at the Guru ka Bagh in Amritsar and spoke against the Namdhari programme of Anand marriage, the killing of Muslim butchers, and the rejection of Brahmans for the rites of passage. The Sikhs who heard him carried the impression that he denied the sanctity of the Sikh Gurus. For the remainder of his stay in Amritsar he required police protection to ensure his safety. He had written his Sikhān de Rāj dī Vithiā (An Account of Sikh Rule) for the British bureaucracy in 1866. In 1876 appeared his Dharma Raksha, a defence of sanātana dharma against the Brahmos, arguing that scriptural authority was above human reasoning. At the same time, Phillauri rejected the practice of Ras Lila on his own reasoning. He broke his alliance with Kanhiya Lal Alakhdhari who was a critic of traditional Hinduism. Pandit Shardha Ram was not overawed by Swami Dayananda’s knowledge of Sanskrit. He countered the Swami’s call for restructuring of Hinduism in 1878. Pandit Shardha Ram died early in 1881 after founding a few sanātana dharma institutions for worship and Sanskritic education.26 Pandit Din Dayalu Sharma of Jhajjar (in present-day Haryana) formed an association at Hardwar in 1886 and toured the Punjab to organize Sanatana Dharma Sabhas, goshalas (cow-houses), and Sanskrit schools. In April 1887 he organized a meeting at Kapurthala to plan a new organization to represent all Hindus and bring together the leaders of Hindu orthodoxy. A new society called Bharat Dharma Mahamandala met at Hardwar from 29 to 31 May 1887 and passed resolutions on the need to protect varnashrama dharma in general, and on the urgency for religious preaching, establishment of Sanatana Dharma Sabhas, and the defence of Hinduism against its critics. The office of the Mahamandala (p.24) was established in Delhi (which was then in the Punjab) under Din Dayalu’s supervision. Its conferences were held in Amritsar in 1896 and at Kapurthala in 1897. The Hindu College at Delhi was opened in 1899. In March 1901 the Nigama Mandali, founded by Swami Gyanananda in 1896, became part of the Mahamandala. In 1902 Pandit Din Dayalu resigned from the secretaryship of the Mahamandala. Under Swami Gyanananda’s leadership, its headquarters moved to Benares (present-day Varanasi) in 1903. In the next three decades the Mahamandala developed as a subcontinental organization which it was meant to be.27 The Bharat Dharma Mahamandala presents an interesting case of an organization originating in the British Punjab and becoming pan-Indian.

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The Colonial Context New Islamic influences reached the Punjab from Delhi and the United Provinces. Abdul Minan Wazirabadi brought back from Delhi the ideology of Ahl-i Hadis (laying emphasis on the practices associated with the Prophet). Another prominent supporter of Ahl-i Hadis was Maulavi Muhammad Husain of Batala near Amritsar. In Lahore, Abdullah Chakralwi founded the Ahl-i Qurān, rejecting traditional Islam and all movements based on any authority other than that of the Qur’ān. Understandably, the Ahl-i Qurān clashed with all other groups. New types of Islamic organizations began to appear in the late 1860s and became widespread in the last two decades of the century, largely under the influence of Syed Ahmed Khan. These associations were concerned with education, social reform, religion, and politics. Schools were established with Western education as an essential component of their programme; orphanages for boys and girls were founded; preachers were sponsored; pamphlets and tracts were printed and distributed; and memorials and petitions were presented to safeguard and promote Muslim interests. The influence of Syed Ahmed Khan was palpable in the Punjab in the fields of education and politics. His call to the Muslims to remain aloof from the Indian National Congress proved to be effective in the province. There was a general fear among Muslims that representation based on elections and employment based on open competition were not in their interest.28 A new movement, called Ahmadiya after the name of its founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) of Kadiyan near Batala, aimed at rejuvenating Islam as a world religion on the basis of a fresh interpretation of the Islamic tradition. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was familiar with Sunni and Shia‘ Islam, and with the position of the Ahl-i Hadis, before he came into contact with Christian missionaries. In his Burāhīn-i Ahmadiya (Proofs of Ahmadiya), published in four volumes between 1880 and 1884, he refuted the doctrines of other religious leaders both within and outside Islam, especially the Arya Samajists. He announced in March 1882 that he had received a divine command to become a mujaddid (a renovator of Islam). In 1890–1, he claimed to be the promised messiah, popularly called the Mahdi, the future saviour of both Islam and Christianity. The ‘ulamā of Batala, Amritsar, and Delhi got a decree (fatwa) issued against him. A meeting of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s adherents was held in 1891. At their second general meeting in 1892, the Ahmadiyas declared their goals: ‘To propagate Islam; to think out ways and means of promoting the welfare of new converts to Islam in Europe and America; to further the cause of righteousness, purity, piety and moral excellence throughout the world, to eradicate the evil habits and customs; to appreciate with gratitude the good (p. 25) of the British Government.’ In one of his publications Mirza Ghulam Ahmad argued that Guru Nanak was in fact a protagonist of Islam. This was refuted by the Sikh leaders, and a protracted controversy started. The contribution of Ghulam Ahmad to religious controversy was out of all proportion to the number of his followers. Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians reacted to his Page 12 of 25

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The Colonial Context publications so that the last decade of the nineteenth century became the highest watermark of religious controversy in the Punjab.29

New Political Awakening in the Punjab As in the case of socio-religious resurgence, political developments in the rest of British India quickened the pace of a new kind of political awakening in the Punjab. Ruchi Ram Sahni observed in 1885 that the only organization ‘worth mentioning’ in the Punjab was the Lahore Indian Association that provided a common platform for all sections of the society. After 1885 it began to work in tandem with the Indian National Congress. A number of political conferences were held in the Punjab for its ‘political regeneration’. One of the demands of the conferences and the Congress was met in 1897 when the Punjab Legislative Council was created. Sahni recalled that the first session of the Congress at Lahore in 1893 had ‘created a sensation’ which he found difficult to describe.30 However, it was no index of the popularity of the Congress in the province. Generally, most of the delegates from the Punjab to the annual sessions of the Indian National Congress were Hindus, mostly Brahmos and Aryas. They were interested mainly in provincial issues.31 In 1899, twenty-six delegates from the Punjab went to the Congress session at Lucknow. This relatively high number was due to the fact that the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill had been introduced in the Central Legislative Council. At the suggestion of the Punjab delegates, a resolution was passed for a suitable amendment. The Punjab delegates invited the Congress to hold its session at Lahore in 1900. Meanwhile, the Bill was passed, and the Congress did not pass any resolution against the Punjab Alienation of Land Act. The session was important for another reason. The Bradlaugh Hall had been constructed in Lahore as ‘emphatically the people’s own Hall’ for the Congress and other similar organizations to hold conferences. Furthermore, delegates from the Punjab continued to participate in the sessions of the Congress in considerable numbers. On an appeal from Lala Lajpat Rai, the leading Arya of the ‘College’ party, 104 delegates from the Punjab attended the session at Benares. Incidentally, the highest participation of the Punjab delegates in the Congress was at Surat in 1907 when there was a split between the moderates and the extremists. The Punjab Swadeshi Association was formed in October 1905, followed by the Swadeshi Vastu Pracharak Sabha to propagate the idea of using Indian goods. Lajpat Rai declared that he was ‘an out and out Swadeshist’ and equated Swadeshi with patriotism.32 However, the movement remained confined to urban centres, and it slowed down after 1907. The year 1906 was marked by agitation in the Punjab over the Punjab Colonization Bill which was meant to amend the Colonization of Land Act of 1893. Actually, it abrogated some of the terms and conditions which were in the interest of the colonists. The powerful Punjab administrators like Denzil (p.26) Ibbetson and Charles Rivaz tried to push it through with a minor modification. Page 13 of 25

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The Colonial Context On 25 October 1906 it was introduced in the Punjab Legislative Council of nine members, all nominated. In November 1906 a drastic increase in the charge on canal water in the districts of Amritsar, Lahore, and Gurdaspur was announced by the Punjab Government. A systematic protest against the Bill was initiated early in 1907 by the Bar Zamindar Association. Mass meetings were held and memorials were sent to the government. The Bill was passed nevertheless in March 1907. A mammoth meeting was called by the leaders of the agitation on 22 and 23 March at the time of the annual cattle fair in Lyallpur. About 9,000 colonists responded to a printed invitation. It was on this occasion that Prabh Dayal, editor of the Jhang Siyāl, recited the well-known poem with the refrain, ‘Pagṛī sambhāl jattā’. The main speakers on this occasion were Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh (Bhagat Singh’s uncle). Both of them were deported in May 1907. However, Lord Minto, the Governor General, abandoned Curzon’s policy of coercion and adopted conciliation. He vetoed the Act before the end of May. The agitation subsided, and before the end of the year Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were brought back to Lahore and released. Lord Minto’s policy of conciliation culminated in the grant of proprietary rights to the colonists which had been the bone of contention.33 During the agitation in 1907 the tone of Ajit Singh’s speeches was more antiBritish and his ideas more radical than those of Lajpat Rai. Hira Singh Dard, who had heard the speech of Ajit Singh at Rawalpindi on 21 April 1907 and witnessed the ‘Pindi riots’, gives the title ‘revolutionary torch’ to the chapter on this episode in his autobiography. The conference at Rawalpindi and Ajit Singh’s speech, he says, were a turning point in his own life. To his interest in matters religious was now added a lasting interest in political issues.34 Significantly, boycott and haṛtāl were employed for the first time in the Punjab in this agitation which was essentially rural and non-communal. It is important to note, however, that Ibbetson was exceptionally concerned with the Sikhs. He wrote in his Minute that the danger was especially great in the case of the Sikhs who had been ruling over the Punjab only sixty years earlier. The ‘Mutiny’ of 1857 had been put down largely with their help. They occupied the centre of the province. A religious movement among them was a source of solidarity, and it would render them more powerful. The Punjabis were more difficult to move than the Bengalis, but when they were moved they were far more dangerous. If the loyalty of the Jatt Sikhs of the Punjab was ever materially shaken, the danger was greater than any that could possibly arise in Bengal.35 After 1907 the Government at the centre, and consequently the Punjab administration, took greater interest in the activities of Ajit Singh and his associates than in what Lajpat Rai and the other Arya Samajist or Swadeshi leaders were doing. Lala Harkishan Lal, the arch-rival of Lajpat Rai, became the most important leader in the Punjab Congress and, like the Indian National Congress, the Punjab Congress remained inert for over a decade. Unnerved by the Government’s repressive measures, the Arya leaders made public Page 14 of 25

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The Colonial Context declarations that the Arya Samaj had no political agenda, and that Lajpat Rai as a political activist did not represent the Samaj. If Lajpat Rai was an extremist in favour of agitational mobilization, Ajit Singh was a revolutionary who favoured the use of violence to throw out the British. The Deputy Commissioner (p.27) of Lahore made a clear distinction between ‘Ajit Singh and his gang’ and the ‘respectable men’ like Lala Lajpat Rai and other Arya Samajist and Swadeshi leaders. Of all the publications of the revolutionaries circulated in the Punjab, three were identified as a reliable basis for prosecution: Unglī Pakṛate Pahunchā Pakṛā and Divide and Conquer for charges against Ajit Singh, and the Bāghī Masīh (Rebel Prophet) for charges against Amba Parshad. While the Government was making preparations for prosecuting them, they managed to evade the police and joined the Indian revolutionaries abroad.36 The Ghadar Movement had its greatest impact on the people of the Punjab. Among Indian migrants to Canada and the USA, all known as ‘Hindus’ (which simply meant ‘Indians’), the Sikhs represented no less than 90 per cent. The centres of their religious and social life were gurdwaras which were useful for the formation of community networks. The Indians in Canada were seen as ‘interlopers’ and an ‘unmitigated nuisance’. They were also the targets of violent attacks. The upholders of ‘White Canada for Ever’ demanded the exclusion of Indians from Canada. The Canadian Government was inclined to take adequate measures for this purpose. The Government of India was keen to ensure that the loyalty of the Sikhs was not affected by ‘seditious’ influences. The Indian revolutionaries abroad were keen to give a revolutionary direction to the new political awakening among the Sikhs in the USA and Canada. They were playing a considerable role in the ‘promotion of disaffection among the Sikhs’. Har Dayal was highly impressed with the pious Sikhs. With ‘a keen sense of patriotism’, they were prepared to do much for the good of their people and their country.37 Ghadar, a weekly in Urdu, was launched from San Francisco on 1 November 1913 for revolutionary propaganda. The Ghadar in Punjabi was started on 9 November. After Har Dayal’s departure from the USA five months later, the weekly was given a new name, Hindustan Ghadar. Its first issue appeared on 7 April 1914. Before the end of May the steamship Komagata Maru reached Vancouver with its 376 passengers, mostly Sikhs, and after a tug-of-war for two months the Komagata Maru was pushed out of the Canadian waters on 23 July by a highly provocative display of military power. By then war had broken out. The passengers of the Komagata Maru were not allowed to disembark on its voyage back to Calcutta where it reached towards the end of September 1914. At the Budge Budge harbour, the Sikh passengers refused to be transported to the Punjab. A violent confrontation took place in which the police killed nineteen passengers. Already on 4 August, the Hindustan Ghadar had sounded the ‘trumpet of war’, and its issue of 11 August called for soldiers prepared to die for the freedom of India. By the end of October 1914 eight ships carrying large groups of Ghadarites had departed from the ports of Victoria and San Francisco Page 15 of 25

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The Colonial Context on the West Coast of North America. Their destination was the Punjab, the theatre chosen for initiating the revolutionary war for the freedom of India. The Punjab was the obvious choice because the overwhelming majority of the Ghadarites were Sikhs of the Punjab.38 They were confident of getting support from the soldiers in the Army, which had a substantial number from the Punjab, most of them Sikhs. The Government of India, fully informed of the temper and designs of the Sikh Ghadarites, scrutinized over 3,000 returned Indians, detained 189 of their leaders, and (p.28) restricted 704 of them to their villages. All the prominent leaders of India and almost all the princely rulers had committed themselves to support the Government in its war effort. The Sikh organizations in the Punjab, either on their own, or under the influence of the Punjab Government, declared their opposition to the ‘American Sikhs’, who were characterized as renegades, dacoits, and thieves. Only a few individuals, like Bhai Randhir Singh of Narangwal, and a few revolutionaries in places like Lohat Baddi in the Nabha state responded to the call of the Ghadarites. Through infiltration in the Ghadarite leadership, almost all their plots became known to the authorities in time for them to take prompt action. Out of a total of 299 Ghadarites who were tried, 46 were sentenced to death, 69 to life imprisonment with deportation, and 125 to other terms of imprisonment. This was a heavy price to pay. However, the moral conviction, commitment, and sacrifices of the Ghadarites proved to be a lasting legacy.39 The literature of the Ghadar Movement provides some clues to the sources of the moral conviction and commitment of its members. The political subjugation of India to the British was seen as the cause of the discriminatory treatment they received in Canada. Their disillusionment with the Government of India appears to be relevant for their hostile attitude towards the colonial rule. The ideas and influence of the Indian revolutionaries would largely account for their passion for the freedom of India. Savarkar’s The Indian War of Independence made the ‘Ghadar of 1857’ a reference point for the new struggle for independence. Unity among all the religious communities and the peoples of the provinces of India was necessary for a war of Indian independence. The word qaum is used in the Ghadarite literature clearly to refer to the Indian nation. However, the Ghadar poets draw upon the various religious traditions of India in order to take inspiration from the cultural roots of the people. Understandably, they are selective and give their own orientation to the elements seen as relevant to their purpose. It is interesting to note in this connection that a poem of over 100 verses is addressed to the Khalsa Panth. It refers to the Ghadar of 1857 and Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi, and talks of the second Ghadar in the offing. Har Dayal is mentioned in this connection. The poet regrets that the Sikhs did not participate in the Ghadar of 1857. Had they done so, the country would have been free. The Singhs should now appropriate their true vocation of fighting for freedom and take up the sword. The Guru had created the Khalsa Panth for ensuring the Page 16 of 25

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The Colonial Context welfare of others (par-upkār). He had removed all oppression from Bharat Varsh; he had suffered for the country and had made sacrifices for the protection of India. Several martyrs and heroes of Sikh history are mentioned as the upholders of freedom. Thus, the Sikh tradition is projected as a struggle for freedom.40 Another important development of the war years was the Lucknow Pact between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, which had been founded in 1906 essentially in response to the activities of the Congress. Two Muslim Leagues were formed in the Punjab in 1906 and 1907 by two different leaders, Mian Muhammad Shafi and Mian Fazl-i Husain, but they were merged together before the end of 1907. In 1915 Tilak and his supporters were allowed to enter the Congress. Both the Congress and the Muslim League set up committees to draft common constitutional demands. Nineteen non-official (p. 29) members of the Imperial Council jointly petitioned the Viceroy in October 1916, calling for representative government and dominion status for India. Later, a common demand for elected majorities in provincial councils was made. Hindu–Muslim differences were sought to be resolved. The Congress conceded separate electorates and weightage for Muslims. Fazl-i Husain was satisfied with 50 per cent seats to be reserved for Muslims in the Punjab, but Fazlul Huq could not satisfy the Muslims of Bengal where they were in majority but only 40 per cent seats were to be reserved for them. In the United Provinces, which had a much smaller percentage of Muslims than Bengal or the Punjab, as high as 30 per cent of the seats were to be reserved for them. This was a reflection of the influence exercised by the Muslim leaders of the United Provinces.41 The Lucknow Pact became a point of reference for the Sikh leaders to put forth their demands. Some important developments took place in India and the Punjab after the Congress–League rapprochement in 1916. A declaration by E.S. Montagu as the Secretary of State for India on 20 August 1917 was followed by the ‘MontagueChelmsford Report’ of 1918 and the Government of India Act of 1919. Montagu had announced in the House of Commons that the policy of His Majesty’s Government was ‘the increasing association of Indians in every branch of administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British empire’. The joint report of the Secretary of State and the Viceroy reinforced the intention embodied in Montagu’s announcement but accepted the Congress–League decision on separate electorates and reservations for Muslims. The privileges conceded to the Muslims were not to be extended to any other community except the Sikhs who had hitherto been ‘virtually unrepresented’ though they were ‘a distinct and important people’ and everywhere in a minority.42

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The Colonial Context The Act of 1919 included the Punjab in the list of the Governors’ provinces, with seven others. In accordance with the Congress–League pact of 1916, separate electorates for Muslims were retained, with 50 per cent seats reserved for them. However, separate electorates were extended to the Sikhs with some weightage. Furthermore, seven special seats were added to the General (twenty), Muslim (thirty-two), and Sikh (twelve) categories. The total number of elected members was thus raised from sixty-four to seventy-one. There were eighteen executive councillors and nominated officials and five non-official nominated members (one each for Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Europeans, labour, and the military), thus raising the total to ninety-four and diluting the majority of the elected Muslim members. The departments crucial to the colonial state (justice, jails, police, land-revenue, and forests) were ‘reserved’ for the Governor and his Executive Council. The ‘ameliorative’ departments (education, agriculture, public health, and local government) were ‘transferred’ to the ministers working under the Governor. He was expected normally to accept their advice but had the power to veto any bill passed by the legislature. The Punjab was represented by four members in the Central Council of sixty, and by twelve members in the Central Assembly of 145 members.43 In February–March 1919, despite opposition from all non-official Indian members, the Rowlatt Bill was rushed through the Imperial Council. On 23 March Mahatma Gandhi (p.30) announced an all-India haṛtāl to be observed on 30 March (postponed later to 6 April). On both the days there were disturbances in the Punjab at Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala, and a number of smaller towns. This was a reflection of the discontent generated largely by the measures of Michael O’Dwyer, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, during the war years. The haṛtāls at Amritsar on 30 March and 6 April were massive but peaceful. The Ram Naumi processions on 9 April were a striking demonstration of Hindu– Muslim unity. The arch imperialist O’Dwyer was frightened, affected by the memories of 1857 and the recent activities of the Ghadarites in the Punjab. Saifuddin Kitchlew and Satyapal, the local leaders, were deported on the same day. Firing on a peaceful demonstration provoked attacks on banks, post offices, the railway station, and the Town Hall on 10 April. Martial Law was imposed on the following day. A peaceful and unarmed crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh on 13 April was fired at without a warning upon the orders of General Dyer. He was keen to produce ‘a moral effect’. His only regret later was that his ammunition ran out. Hundreds of people were killed. With the backing of O’Dwyer, Dyer tried to strike terror among the people through indiscriminate arrests, torture, public flogging, special tribunals, and by making Indians crawl in the lane in Amritsar where a white woman had been insulted. Disturbances in the districts of Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala, Gujrat, and Lyallpur were put down with a heavy hand. In the Punjab under the Martial Law, 1,200 persons got killed and 3,600 were wounded. Apart from the brutal treatment of people at many places in the province, the Martial Law Commissioners at Amritsar sentenced fifty-one Page 18 of 25

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The Colonial Context persons to death, forty-six to transportation for life, and over a hundred others to imprisonment, ranging from three to ten years.44 Mahatma Gandhi called off the satyāgraha on 18 April 1919. The resentment over the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and atrocities of the Martial Law was assuaged somewhat by the royal amnesty for prisoners not accused of violence, the formal assent to the Montford Reforms in 1919, and appointment of the Hunter Enquiry Committee. At the annual session of the Congress at Amritsar towards the end of 1919, a resolution thanking Montagu and promising cooperation in working the new councils was passed. It reads: ‘This Congress trusts that so far as may be possible they will work the reforms so as to secure an early establishment of full responsible government, and this Congress offers its thanks to Mister E.S. Montague for his labour in connection with Reforms.’ The resolution added that the Congress adhered to its resolution of 1918 that the Reform Act was ‘inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing’ and urged the British Parliament to take early steps to establish ‘full responsible government in India in accordance with the principle of self-determination’.45 The resolution was a compromise between Mahatma Gandhi, who stood for full cooperation, and C.R. Das, Tilak, Hasrat Mohani, and Ram Bhuj Dutt Chaudhry, who were opposed to cooperation.

In Retrospect The colonial rulers of the Punjab evolved an elaborate administrative structure to ensure peace and order with the ultimate objective of exploiting its material and human resources in their own interest but incidentally in the interest also of their conscious or unconscious collaborators. Western science and (p.31) technology enabled them to introduce new means of communication and transportation for administrative, political, and economic purposes. More than legal recognition of proprietary rights in land and periodic settlement of land revenue and its rigorous collection in cash, a new system of canal irrigation increased agrarian production and land revenue. But prosperity was not uniform, and rural indebtedness increased on an unprecedented scale. Some landholders became richer and others became poorer. Outmigration to the other parts of India, other countries of Asia, and to other continents was linked up with the poverty of the landholders due to indebtedness. Merchants and moneylenders flourished as collaborators in the new agrarian system. The system had to be protected though legislation of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900, with the political implication of strengthening loyalty of the landholders to the colonial rule. A new system of education catered to the higher classes who could provide personnel for the middle and lower rungs of bureaucracy and the judiciary, or take to the new professions of engineering, medicine, law, teaching, and journalism. The Christian missionaries were closely aligned with the rulers in their project but their ultimate object was to gain converts. Their success added Page 19 of 25

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The Colonial Context a new religious community to the three major communities of the province, and its presence was felt acutely by Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. As a result of the social change, the middle classes emerged as the most influential entities. Their response to the colonial context produced unprecedented socio-religious resurgence in the Punjab. The Punjab came to witness a large number of movements for socio-religious reform. Brahmos in government service came from Bengal to find support from some middle-class Hindus in the Punjab to propagate their ideas through the Brahmo Samaj founded at Lahore. Its offshoot, the Dev Samaj, added to the growing socio-religious diversity in the province. Swami Dayananda Saraswati, a Gujarati Brahman who had founded the Arya Samaj at Bombay, came to the Punjab to receive an enthusiastic support from educated Hindus. The Arya Samaj movement in the Punjab became important in the religious, social, and political life of the Punjabi Hindus. The traditional, orthodox Hindus began to defend their position against attacks from the Christian missionaries as well as from the Brahmos and the Aryas. The movement initiated by Pandit Shardha Ram Phillauri was reinforced by Pandit Din Dayalu of Jhajjar. The Sanatana Dharma Sabhas were founded to promote, among other things, the AngloSanatan education in their own schools and colleges. They became the standardbearers of Hindu identity and claimed that all the people of India were Hindu, except the Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Parsis. Apart from the Islamic anjumans, which were largely influenced by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, the Ahmadiyas emerged as a sectarian group among the Muslims, regarded as extremely unorthodox by the bulk of the Punjabi Muslims. Colonial Punjab was marked by unprecedented religious controversies in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Some of these controversies had a long and lingering effect on the psyche and social relations of the Punjabis. There was a new political awakening in the Punjab as in the rest of British India. The most important agency of this awakening was the Indian National Congress founded in 1885. It was much more attractive to Brahmos and Aryas than to any other section or (p.32) community of the Punjab. The Sanatanists participated only in the constitutional politics. The influence of the Swadeshi movement in Bengal was visible in the foundation of the Punjab Swadeshi Association in 1905. The year 1907 was marked by agitation over the Punjab Colonization Bill which was meant to depress the position of the colonists. The most active participants in this agitation were the Arya Samajists Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. The latter eventually proved to be a ‘revolutionary’. The Ghadarites found few supporters among Hindus and Muslims in the Punjab. The influence of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan deterred the Punjabi Muslims from joining the Congress. The Punjabi Muslims were more attracted to the Muslim League founded in 1906. Fazl-i Husain was an important participant in the efforts which led to the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Congress and the Muslim League. The two organizations worked in tandem for more than six years. The Punjabi reaction to Page 20 of 25

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The Colonial Context the Rowlatt Bills and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre added a new dimension to political awareness and activity. At the annual session of the Congress held at Amritsar in 1919 there was a serious difference of opinion on whether or not the Government of India Act of 1919 should be accepted. Notes:

(1.) For the colonial framework in the first six decades of British rule, see James Douie, The Panjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir [cited hereafter as The Panjab] (Delhi: Low Price Publications, [1916] 1994, reprint), pp. 212–13. (2.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 212–13, 215–16. (3.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 217–18. (4.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 219–20. (5.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 127–31. (6.) Ian J. Kerr, ‘British Rule, Technological Change, and the Revolution in Transportation and Communication: Punjab in the Later Nineteenth Century’, in Textures of the Sikh Past: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Tony Ballantyne (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 158. See also Kerr, Building the Railways of the Raj 1850–1900 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997). Indu Banga, ‘Karachi and Its Hinterland under Colonial Rule’, in Ports and Their Hinterlands in India (1700–1950), ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1992), pp. 337–58. (7.) Kerr, ‘British Rule, Technological Change and the Revolution in Transportation and Communication’, pp. 154, 159, 161–5, 170. (8.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 132–3, 140. (9.) Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 24–39, 52–73. (10.) Fox, Lions of the Punjab, pp. 39–51. Cf. Malcom Lyall Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London, 1928). S.S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War (Patiala: Punjab Languages Department, 1970, reprint). (11.) P.H.M. van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition: Influence and Authority in Nineteenth-Century India (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972). See also Norman G. Barrier, ‘The Formulation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill’, The Panjab Past and Present [cited hereafter as PPP] 13, part 1 (April 1979): 193–215. Ravinder Kumar, ‘Urban Society and Urban Politics: Lahore in 1919’, in Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c. 1500–

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The Colonial Context 1990 [cited hereafter as Five Punjabi Centuries], ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2000), pp. 180–220. (12.) Douie, The Panjab, pp. 122–6. See also H.L.O. Garett (ed.), A History of Government College, Lahore 1864–1914 (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1914). (13.) For the missionary work in the Punjab, see John C.B. Webster, The Christian Community and Change in Nineteenth Century North India (Delhi: Macmillan, 1976) and his A Social History of Christianity: North-west India Since 1800 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008). (14.) Douie, The Panjab, p. 216. (15.) Sukhdev Singh Sohal, ‘Emergence of the Middle Classes and Forms of Political Articulation’, in Five Punjabi Centuries, pp. 455–70. (16.) This is well brought out in David Emmett, Press and Politics in British Western Punjab (1836–1947) (Delhi: Academic Publications, 1983). See also N.G. Barrier and Paul Wallace, The Punjab Press, 1880–1905 (Michigan, 1970). (17.) In addition to the works cited above, this understanding of socio-economic change is based on Dolores Domin, India: A Study in the Role of the Sikhs in 1857–59 (Berlin: Akadmie Verlag, 1977). Himadri Banerjee, Agrarian Society of the Punjab (1849–1901) (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1982). J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. II, part 3) [cited hereafter as The Sikhs of the Punjab] (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2014, reprint of second edition). Sukhdev Singh Sohal, The Making of the Middle Classes in the Punjab (1849–1947) (Jalandhar: ABS Publications, 2008). Imran Ali, ‘Canal Colonization and Socio-Economic Change’, in Five Punjabi Centuries, pp. 341–57. Reeta Grewal, ‘Urban Revolution under Colonial Rule’, in Five Punjabi Centuries, pp. 438–54. (18.) In 1881, even when the Punjabi Muslims constituted the majority, Hindus were around 40 per cent and the Sikhs around 7.5. In the later census reports, the percentage of Hindus came down, but that of the Sikhs increased appreciably. See, for example, Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th-Century Punjab (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1976), Appendix III, Statistical Abstracts: ‘Population of Punjab by Religion 1881–1921’, p. 234. (19.) Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. III, part 1) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 30–9. Devinder Kumar Verma, ‘The Brahmo Samaj’, in The Singh Sabha and Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925,

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The Colonial Context ed. Ganda Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1997, third edition), pp. 207–12. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, p. 132. (20.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 98–101, 103–6. S.P. Kanal, ‘The Dev Samaj’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements, pp. 241–52. (21.) Ruchi Ram Sahni, Memoirs of Ruchi Ram Sahni [cited hereafter as Memoirs], eds Narender K. Sehgal and Subodh Mahanti (New Delhi: Vigyan Prasar, 1997, second edition, paperback), pp. 128–46. See also Jones, SocioReligious Reform Movements, pp. 101–3. (22.) For Swami Dayanand’s life, see J.T.F. Jorden, Dayananda Sarasvati: His Life and Ideas (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979, second impression). (23.) By far the best study of the Arya Samaj movement in the Punjab is Jones’ Arya Dharm. See also Indu Banga, ‘Lajpat Rai on the Arya Samaj: An Insider’s View’, in Lala Lajpat Rai in Retrospect: Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Concerns, eds J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga (Chandigarh: Panjab University, 2000), pp. 299–317. See also J.N. Farquhar, ‘The Arya Samaj’, in The Singh Sabha and other Socio-Religious Movements, pp. 213–40. (24.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 98–101. (25.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 101–3. (26.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 106–9. (27.) Sheena Pall, ‘The Sanatan Dharm Movement in the Colonial Punjab: Religious, Social and Political Dimensions’, PhD Thesis, Chandigarh: Panjab University, 2008. (28.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 94–5. P. Hardy, ‘Wahhabis in the Panjab, 1876’, PPP 15, part 2 (October 1981): 428–32. Edward D. Churchill Jr, ‘The Muhammadan Educational Conference and the Aligarh Movement, 1886– 1900’, PPP 8, part 2 (October 1974): 366–81, and ‘Muslim Societies of the Punjab, 1860–1890’, PPP 8, part 1 (April 1974): 69–91. Ikram Ali Malik, ‘Muslim Anjumans and Communitarian Consciousness’, in Five Punjabi Centuries, pp. 112–25. (29.) Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements, pp. 115–19. For a detailed study, see Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1974). See also Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ‘The Ahmadiya Movement’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements, pp. 258–62. Spencer Lavan, ‘Communalism in the Punjab: The

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The Colonial Context Ahmadiyah Versus the Arya Samaj During the Lifetime of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’, PPP 5, part 2 (October 1971): 320–42. (30.) Sahni, Memoirs, p. 112. (31.) For a broad outline, see Ganeshi Mahajan, Congress Politics in the Punjab (1885–1947) (Shimla: K.K. Publishers, 2002). (32.) For a comprehensive view of the struggle for independence and the role of the Indian National Congress, see Sumit Sarkar, Modern India: 1885–1947 [cited hereafter as Modern India] (Madras: Macmillan India, 1995, reprint), and Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence 1857–1947 [cited hereafter as India’s Struggle for Independence] (Penguin Books India Ltd, 1989, reprint, paperback). See also S.C. Mittal, ‘Political Consciousness and the Role of the Punjab Provincial Political Conferences (1895–1906)’, PPP 19, part 1 (April 1985): 137–45. N.G. Barrier, ‘Mass Politics and the Punjab Congress in the PreGandhian Era’, PPP 9, part 2 (October 1975): 349–59. Sukhdev Singh Sohal, ‘Politics of the Middle Classes in the Colonial Punjab’, PPP 20, part 1 (April 1986): 195–207, and ‘The Swadeshi Movement in the Punjab (1904–1907)’, PPP 26, part 1 (April 1992): 129–33. See also J.S. Dhanki, ‘The Swadeshi Movement in the Punjab and Lala Lajpat Rai, 1905–1907’, in Lala Lajpat Rai in Retrospect: Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Concerns, pp. 31–9. (33.) N. Gerald Barrier, ‘The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: The Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest’, PPP 8, part 2 (October 1974): 444–76. For further detail, see Ganda Singh (ed.), Deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1978). (34.) Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān (Jalandhar: Dhanpat Rai and Sons, 1960, second edition), pp. 40–1. (35.) Sir Denzil Ibbetson’s Minute on the political situation in the Punjab reproduced in Deportation of Laja Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh, p. 10. (36.) Ganda Singh, Devinder Kumar Verma, and Parm Bakhshish Singh (eds), Seditious Literature in the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1988). For the Indian revolutionaries outside the country, see N.N. Bhattacharya, ‘Indian Revolutionaries Abroad (1891–1919)’, PPP 8, part 2 (October 1974): 351–65. (37.) For the Ghadar Movement, see Harish K. Puri, Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organisation and Strategy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1993, revised and enlarged edition) and his Ghadar Movement: A Short History [cited hereafter as Ghadar Movement] (New Delhi: National Book Trust, India, 2011, paperback). See also J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga (eds), The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies (Patiala: Punjabi Page 24 of 25

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The Colonial Context University, 2013). For a brief but critical assessment of Har Dayal’s life and work, see Emily C. Brown, ‘The Ideology of Har Dayal’, in Political Dynamics of Punjab, eds Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981), pp. 345–69. (38.) For a brief account of these developments, see Puri, Ghadar Movement, pp. 74–101. (39.) Puri, Ghadar Movement, pp. 102–15. (40.) For the Ghadar literature, see Grewal, Puri, and Banga (eds), The Ghadar Movement, pp. 451–570. Kesar Singh Kesar (ed.), Ghadar Lehar di Kavitā, compiled by Kesar Singh Novelist (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995). Kirpal Singh Kasel (ed.), Ghadar Lehar di Vārtak, compiled by Giani Kesar Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2008). (41.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 150–1. (42.) R. Coupland, The Indian Problem 1833–1935 [cited hereafter as The Indian Problem] (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), pp. 52, 56–7. (43.) Coupland, The Indian Problem, pp. 61–5. (44.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 187–92. For the Jallianwala Bagh event, see Alfred Draper, Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj (London, 1961). See also J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga, ‘The Jallianwala Bagh Tragedy: The Official Attitude and Its Significance’, in Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, eds V.N. Datta and S. Settar (Delhi: Pragati Publications/ICHR, 2002); K.L. Tuteja, ‘Jallianwala Bagh’, in Punjab and the Freedom Struggle, eds Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998), pp. 215–28. (45.) Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47, vol. I, part 1 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957).

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (1849–1919) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0003

Abstract and Keywords Nearly all classes of the Sikh social order suffered due to the loss of power in 1849, especially the Sikh jagīrdārs, the Sikh peasantry, and the Sikh soldiery. However, much of the lost ground was recovered before World War I. A new religious awakening among the Sikhs had started before 1849 in the form of the Nirankari and the Nāmdhārī movements. Both of these were overshadowed by the Singh Sabha movement which was far more influential. The Chief Khalsa Diwan, led by Sunder Singh Majithia, generally pursued constitutional politics. But there were other more radical Singh reformers who were willing to take up causes in opposition to the government. The Central Sikh League, the first political party of the Sikhs, was founded at Amritsar in 1919 to remain closely aligned with the Indian National Congress. Keywords:   Sikh social order, World War I, Nirankari, Nāmdhārī, Singh Sabha movement, Chief Khalsa Diwan, Sunder Singh Majithia, radical Singh reformers, Central Sikh League, Indian National Congress

In the 1840s the Sikhs formed the most important component of the ruling class and the army of the state created by Ranjit Singh. Unlike the other Sikh states, it was conquered and annexed by the British in 1849 after two hard-fought wars. The Sikhs were hit hard, both politically and economically. After 1857–8 the Sikh aristocracy recovered partially from recession and came to be looked upon by the British as the ‘natural leaders’ of the people and allies of the Government. Sikhs began to be recruited increasingly in the British Indian army. The agrarian ‘reforms’ introduced by the colonial rulers were helpful to a considerable part of Page 1 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs the Sikh peasantry, particularly in the central districts and the canal colonies. Already, before the annexation of the Punjab, two religious movements had appeared in the upper Sindh Sagar Doab, to be followed by the Singh Sabha movement as the mainspring of socio-cultural resurgence among the Sikhs. By the early twentieth century a new kind of political awakening, largely under middle-class leadership, was evident among the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh grew with this religious and political resurgence.

Recession and Recovery The Sikhs had suffered the most due to the loss of power in 1849. Resumption of jāgīrs decimated the political and economic strength of the Sikh aristocracy. Only an amount of Rs 42,670 was given in annual pension to twenty-five Sikh rebels whose jāgīrs earlier had amounted to Rs 1,131,000 a year.1 The other Sikh jāgīrdārs were treated less severely but they also lost a substantial part of their jāgīrs and their descendants could succeed to only a small portion of their truncated jāgīrs. The Punjab Administration Report of 1851–2 recorded that the ‘gaudy retinues’ of the former Sardars had disappeared, their country seats stood rather neglected, and their city residences were no longer thronged by visitors. The decline of the former Sikh ruling class as pillars of the state of Ranjit (p.37) Singh appeared to be inevitable to the new rulers of the Punjab. They hoped to ‘render their decadence gradual’ by allowing them pensions or jāgīrs.2 The British also commented upon the bearing of this situation on the religious beliefs and practices of the Sikhs. Sir Richard Temple, Secretary to the Punjab Government, emphasized in 1853 that ‘the Sikh faith and ecclesiastical polity’ was rapidly going where ‘the Sikh political ascendancy’ had already gone. The initiatory ceremony for adults was now rarely performed at the Akal Takht. Attendance at the annual festivals at the Golden Temple was diminishing. The Khalsa were discarding the external form in thousands. Richard Temple saw a close connection between the loss of political power and the decline of the Sikh faith. It is clear from his statement that he was making a distinction between ‘the Sikhs of Nanak’ and ‘the Sikhs of Gobind’; while the former were likely to cling to the faith of their forefathers, the latter, who were ‘styled as Singhs or Lions and who embraced the faith as being the religion of warfare and conquest’, no longer regarded the Khalsa form as important because its prestige had departed. ‘These men joined in thousands, and they now depart in equal numbers. They rejoin the ranks of Hinduism whence they originally came.’3 Temple was not alone in thinking of the pre-Khalsa Sikh faith as pacifist and ‘Hindu’, and of the Khalsa faith as militant and distinctly Sikh. This equation of the Singhs alone with the Sikhs was based on the understanding that the Khalsa Singhs had persisted in their struggle against the Mughals, wrested a large part of the Punjab from the Afghans, and fought valiantly in two wars against the British.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs In the census of 1855 the Sikhs were not enumerated separately from the Hindus except in the Lahore Division. Therein too only were the Khalsa Singhs enumerated as Sikhs. Their total number in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Gujranwala, and Sialkot was 181,172. ‘It was very remarkable, as was pointed out, that there should be less than 200,000 Sikhs in a total population of 3,500,000 in the division which contained ‘the religious capital of Sikhism, Amritsar, and original and peculiar Territory of the Sikhs, the Majha’.4 The uprising of 1857–8 can be seen in retrospect as a benchmark in the Sikh recovery from recession in the first decade of colonial rule. The Sikh rulers of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, and Kapurthala were politically bound to lend support to the British. A number of former jāgīrdārs of the Punjab demonstrated their loyalty to the new regime to gain favour; and they were rewarded by increase in pensions, grants of land, and employment in the services. Furthermore, they began to be looked upon as the ‘natural leaders’ of the society. Nearly half of the Sikh aristocratic families survived into the twentieth century. Some of the Sikh princes and aristocrats played a considerable role in socio-religious reform and constitutional politics.5 As an official report of 1858 put it, the Khalsa were called out to ‘save the Empire’ in the critical time of the uprising and they fulfilled their mission. They began to be recruited in increasing numbers. They fought in all the major wars of the British outside India. Due to their ‘gallant and faithful services in all climes’ they became ‘the pride of the Punjab’. On the eve of World War I, the proportion of Sikhs in the Indian army was much larger than their proportion in the population of the Punjab.6 The agrarian policy of the British in the Punjab had a close bearing on the life of (p.38) the Sikh peasantry which represented more than 72 per cent of the Sikh population. With the rising tide of indebtedness in the late nineteenth century, the Sikh peasantry suffered economically, but less than the others. ‘Their love of gain and inherited shrewdness’, according to a contemporary British observer, ‘enabled them to avoid the pitfalls of the system of administration’ established by the British.7 Nevertheless, differentiation among the Sikh landholders was in evidence everywhere, more so in the central districts of the province. Service in the army provided a sustaining factor in the rural economy. Emigration promised better opportunities of employment. Sikh agriculturists represented a substantial portion of the emigrants to the other parts of the country, and to other countries of the world, including Canada and the USA.8 Much more remarkable than any other aspect, however, was the sheer increase in the number of Sikhs. In 1881 they were less than two million but their number rose to nearly four million in 1921. In 1911, when the total population of the province was actually 2 per cent less than in 1901, the Sikh population increased by more than 37 per cent. This was largely due to the fact that non-Singhs were Page 3 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs also given the option to return themselves as ‘Sikhs’. Equally remarkable was the increase in the proportion of Keshdhārī Singhs in the Sikh population. Their number rose from about 840,000 in 1891 to nearly 3,600,000 in 1931. In less than half a century, their percentage in the Sikh population rose from less than 70 to more than 90.9 Increase in the number of Sikhs has been generally explained in terms of the preference given to them in many branches of government service, and ‘conversions’ to the Sikh faith on a large scale. Equally relevant, however, was the growing consciousness of Sikh identity. In the central districts of the Punjab, the percentage of Sikhs among Jatts rose from less than 54 in 1881 to nearly 80 in 1921, while the percentage of Hindu Jatts decreased from about 40 in 1881 to less than 10. It was observed by James Douie that a ‘change of sentiment on the part of the Sikh community has led many persons recording themselves as Sikhs who were formerly content to be regarded as Hindus’. Writing in the second decade of the twentieth century, he noted that the future of Sikhism was with the Keshdhārīs.10 Aware of the importance of the gurdwaras in Sikh life, the British administrators had made the Udāsī or Nirmala Mahants of the historic gurdwaras hereditary to create vested interests. The management and control of the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht had been entrusted by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and his successors to a Sardar of their own choice. In 1846 the British Resident, Henry Lawrence, quietly assumed responsibility for the management of these premier Sikh institutions. After annexation, Sardar Jodh Singh, an Extra Assistant Commissioner in the new administration, was given the charge of the Darbar Sahib. A General Committee was constituted with a number of prominent Sikhs as its members, and Raja Tej Singh, the arch collaborator, was made its President. Sardar Jodh Singh actually functioned under the direction of the British bureaucracy. To control these institutions was to control Sikh opinion. For ten years (1849–59) the Punjab Government virtually maintained direct control over the administration of the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht through a judicial officer of its own. This arrangement was modified in 1859. John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, had circulated a general order in August (p. 39) 1858 to the effect that the officers of the Government would have nothing to do with the management of religious institutions. ‘The people must manage their own religious institutions. If such institutions suffer from internal disputes, that is their business, not ours.’ The Commissioner of the Amritsar Division, Robert Needham Cust, began to apply these orders to the arrangements for the Golden Temple. This created ‘some sensation’ among the Sikh vested interests, and John Lawrence, the Lieutenant Governor of the province, ordered that arrangements for the future management of the Darbar Sahib should be clearly regulated. Frederic Cooper, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, used tact and threat to get a Dastūr al-‘Aml (Rules of Practice) prepared and signed by a large number of Sikh representatives. The British connection with the Golden Temple was Page 4 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs transformed into ‘simple magisterial and political control’. Despite the Government of India Act XX of 1863 (Religious Endowment Act), which left no room for the kind of control established by the Dastur of 1859, the Punjab Government persisted in exercising its control over this premier institution of the Sikhs for over six more decades.11 In all important matters, the sarbrah, or the Manager, of the Golden Temple followed the orders given by the British authorities. Richard Fox aptly remarks: ‘The British believed that their Punjab Lions were a dangerous species and also that religion gave them strength. Colonial authorities attempted to lock up their loyalty to the Raj by converting their religious shrines into imperial cages and their ritual officiants into colonial attendants.’12 It may be added that they were used by the colonial authorities for their own purposes, particularly in sensitive or critical situations. Thus made subordinate and static, the most important institutions of the Sikhs began to degenerate. The reformist species of ‘Singhs’ would reclaim them in the early twentieth century.

The Nirankari Sikhs and the Nāmdhārī Sant Khalsa The Nirankari movement, as the name suggests, emphasized the concept of God as formless (Nirankar) which implied a total rejection of belief in multiple gods and goddesses, and the practice of idol worship. The founder of the movement, Baba Dayal, a Malhotra Khatri of Rawalpindi, accepted the Granth Sāhib as the only authoritative guide to right belief and practice. It gave no sanction for Brahmanical rituals, rites, or ceremonies. Therefore, he insisted that all Sikh rites and ceremonies should be performed with the recitation of the composition called Lāvān in the Granth Sahib. Local opposition to his reform obliged Baba Dayal to have his own gurdwara, and a separate place for disposal of the dead.13 Upon his death in 1855, Baba Dayal was succeeded by his eldest son, Baba Darbara Singh, who established many centres in towns and villages outside Rawalpindi, appointing his representatives (biṛedār) for the local congregations (sangats). He prepared a hukamnāmā, spelling out the essential religious beliefs and practices for his followers, including the rites for marriage, birth, and death. In this hukamnāmā, divine sanction is claimed for the mission of Baba Dayal as ‘the true gurū’.14 Upon his death in 1870, Baba Darbara Singh was succeeded by his younger brother, Sahib Ratta Ji, who consolidated the work of his predecessors by an uncompromising insistence on the Nirankari code (rahit). He (p.40) transformed the mission at Rawalpindi into an impersonal institution through a formal will in 1903. The Nirankaris consisted of Khatri, Arora, and Bhatia traders, bankers, and shopkeepers of the towns and villages of the upper Sindh Sagar Doab. True to their advocacy of a Sikh ceremony of marriage, the Nirankaris supported the Anand Marriage Bill in 1908–9. The Nirankari reform Page 5 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs highlighted the centrality of the Granth Sahib in Sikh life but ignored the initiatory rite of the Khalsa, and therefore remained a ‘sahajdhārī’ movement. It did not have a wide appeal and its followers could only be counted in thousands.15 Hira Singh Dard, a leading journalist, recalled his differences with his father, Bhai Hari Singh, a devout Nirankari. Hira Singh admired his father’s dedication and commitment to the cause of Nirankari reform. There was one aspect, however, which he could not appreciate: his father’s conviction that Sahib Ratta Ji was the thirteenth Guru in line from Guru Nanak. In fact, the Nirankaris looked upon Baba Dayal and all his successors as Gurus. Baba Gurdit Singh, who succeeded Baba Ratta Ji in 1909, was regarded as the fourteenth Guru. The names of all the Gurus were mentioned in the Nirankari ardās. Hira Singh did not take baptism of the foot (charanamrit) from Baba Ratta Ji. Instead, he received pahul of the double-edged sword from five Singhs to become a Khalsa Singh.16 The movement called Nāmdhārī was started in the Sindh Sagar Doab by Baba Balak Singh, who was a disciple of Bhagat Jawahar Mal, a Kohli Khatri of Rawalpindi.17 The best-known disciple of Baba Balak Singh was Bhai Ram Singh, generally referred to as Baba Ram Singh. He himself says in one of his letters that he received the gift of nām from ‘Guru Balak Singh Ji’. Evidently, therefore, the followers of Baba Balak Singh were known as Nāmdhārīs, and Bhai Ram Singh was one of them. However, he made pahul of the double-edged sword and Khalsa rahit obligatory for his own followers. He refers to them as ‘Sant Khalsa’, a term that began to appear in official records in the 1860s. The more enthusiastic among the Sant Khalsa, called mastāna (the intoxicated), used to shout loudly in a frenzied state during kīrtans. They were called kūkās (shriekers), and the term came to be used for all the followers of Bhai Ram Singh. It is interesting to know that the term ‘Sant Khalsa’ is used for the Khalsa Singhs of Guru Gobind Singh in the Prem Sumārag, an early eighteenth-century Rahitnāmā (a manual on the Sikh way of life), prescribed by Bhai Ram Singh to his followers as a religious text. This Rahitnāmā, emphasizing the Khalsa way of life, also contains a prophecy of Khalsa Raj after much suffering.18 The rahit prescribed by Bhai Ram Singh for the Sant Khalsa has many similarities with the rahit prescribed in the Prem Sumārag. Men and women are often bracketed in situations of religious and social concerns. Female infanticide is categorically forbidden. It is more heinous than even cow-slaughter. There is a considerable concern for the outcastes. For the rites of marriage (anand) and death (bhog), no service of a Brahman was required. Bhai Ram Singh believed that his opponents had fallen from the Khalsa norms and praxis. Some of his letters leave the impression that his Sant Khalsa represented an alternative to the Khalsa of Guru Gobind Singh, or its counterpart in the changed historical situation. Bhai Ram Singh was keen to be accepted as a Sikh at the Golden Page 6 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Temple, Amritsar, Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur, and the takhts (p.41) at Patna Sahib and Nander (Abchal Nagar). But the Singh custodians of these places were opposed to him and so were the Sikh princes and aristocrats.19 The custodians of Keshgarh Sahib objected to Bhai Ram Singh on five counts. The first was that he had set himself up a Guru. Second, he whispered a mantar in the ear of the person initiated. Third, he told his followers to mention Hazro as their birthplace and Bhaini as the place of residence. Fourth, the Kukas removed their turbans and let their hair loose in places of worship. Finally, they worked themselves up into a frenzy like Muslim faqīrs. The first objection was based on the belief of the Khalsa that personal Guruship had ended with Guru Gobind Singh, and that Guruship, henceforth, was vested in the Granth Sahib (and the collective body of the Khalsa). The second objection was based on the Khalsa practice of openly enunciating the essential rahit at the time of initiation. The third objection was based on the practice of telling the newly baptized Singh to regard Patna Sahib as his place of birth and Anandpur as the place of his residence. The fourth objection was based on the sanctity attached by the Khalsa to the kesh and the place of worship. Finally, the frenzy of the Kukas was suggestive of the dance of the Sufi darveshes during the singing of religious poetry (sama‘), with the implication that it was not a ‘Sikh’ practice.20 Bhai Ram Singh’s response to this criticism by the traditional representatives of the Khalsa indicates that these objections were not baseless. He justifies the frenzy of the Kukas on the ground that they were so absorbed in God that they forgot about everything else. His letters, written after his deportation to Burma in 1872, clearly show that Bhai Ram Singh knew that he was regarded by thousands of people as their Guru, and that his followers looked upon him as the eleventh Guru in succession from Guru Nanak. He knew that he stood bracketed with Bhai Bir Singh and Bhai Maharaj Singh, who were regarded as Gurus by many Sikhs. However, he says emphatically that Guru Gobind Singh had established the Granth Sahib as the everlasting Guru in line with the ten Gurus. In the characteristic idiom of Sikh humility he refers to himself as a kūkar (dog) sitting at the Guru’s door. He tells his followers that only a person linked with the shabad was linked with the Guru. Indeed, he quotes from the Granth Sahib: ‘Bani is Guru, and Guru is Bani; all amrits are in Bani.’ He quotes a Rahitnāmā: ‘Regard Gurū Granth Sāhib as the Guru, the body manifest of the Guru.’21 Though Bhai Ram Singh formally disclaimed to be the Guru, he did believe in the prophecies about an incarnation of Guru Gobind Singh restoring Khalsa Raj after a phase of suffering. He did not dismiss the idea that he himself might be that incarnation. With reference to a verse in the Prahladpur pothī, referring to a Tarkhan Guru as a future incarnation of Guru Gobind Singh, Bhai Ram Singh wrote that if he was really the person referred to, he would surely return to the Punjab. If he was the twelfth Guru, then his orders should be obeyed by those who believed in him. In short, the prophecy in which the Sant Khalsa were to Page 7 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs establish Sikh rule under the leadership of Bhai Ram Singh was yet to be affirmed by future events. But it gained credence among the Kukas in the early decades of the twentieth century. Their belief in the Guruship of Baba Balak Singh, Bhai Ram Singh, and his successors turned them into a sectarian group.22 They stood in direct opposition to the (p.42) Singh reformers who categorically rejected the notion of a personal Guru.

The Singh Reformers As the forerunners of the Singh Sabha movement, the Nirankari and the Nāmdhārī movements were marked by two limitations: belief in a personal Guru and lack of interest in Western education. The Nirankaris came to believe in Baba Dayal, the founder of the movement, as a successor of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh. Similarly, the Nāmdhārīs raised Bhai Ram Singh to the position of a Guru, or a successor of Guru Nanak, though they were not authorized by Baba Ram Singh to do this.23 We may add, however, that these two movements share some important concerns with the Singh Sabhas. The Nirankaris rejected idol worship as un-Sikh and they rejected the services of Brahmans for the rites of passage which made them unambiguously Sikh, even though they did not insist on a Singh identity. The Nāmdhārīs insisted on Singh identity of the Sant Khalsa. In both the reform movements there was a good deal of emphasis on daily religious practices. In case of the Sant Khalsa there was also an anti-British political dimension.24 The Singh Sabha movement got its name from the fact that a large number of voluntary associations (Sabhas) of Singhs sprang up all over the Punjab during the late nineteenth century, starting with Sri Guru Singh Sabha of Amritsar in 1873 and the Singh Sabha of Lahore in 1879. The ‘Singh’ identity was built into the name, and every Singh Sabha was a voluntary association of equals. At the end of the World War I there were Singh Sabhas in nearly all the cities of the Punjab, in most of its towns and some of its villages. Most of these associations had a formal constitution. Each Singh Sabha catered to a small area in practice but in theory regarded itself as representative of the whole Sikh community.25 The need for coordination among the Singh Sabhas brought into existence the Khalsa Diwan at Amritsar in 1893 and the Khalsa Diwan at Lahore in 1896. Khalsa dīwāns were founded in a few other cities and towns as well. The Chief Khalsa Diwan, founded at Amritsar in 1902, in place of the Amritsar and Lahore dīwāns, turned out to be the most important. About a dozen allied organizations were founded between 1890 and 1910, like the Gurmat Granth Pracharak Sabha of Amritsar, the Gurmat Granth Sudharak Sabhas of Amritsar and Lahore, the Khalsa Dharam Pracharak Sabha of Rawalpindi, the Khalsa Tract Society, the Central Khalsa Orphanage, the Sikh Education Conference, and the Punjab and Sind Bank. In this collective endeavour for socio-religious reform the ruling families were represented by the Princes of Kapurthala, Faridkot, and Nabha. Page 8 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs The aristocracy was represented by Sardars like Attar Singh of Bhadaur, Sunder Singh Majithia, and Harbans Singh Atari. The new middle class was represented by teachers like Gurmukh Singh and Bhai Jodh Singh, petty bureaucrats like Bhai Jawahar Singh and Babu Teja Singh, publicists and writers like Bhai Ditt Singh and Bhai Vir Singh, scholars like Bhai Kahn Singh, and businessmen like Trilochan Singh. The Singh Sabha reformers were anxious to defend the Sikh faith against attacks from others. Apart from the conspicuous conversion of Maharaja Dalip Singh and Kanwar Harnam Singh Ahluwalia of Kapurthala in the early decades of British rule, Christian missionaries continued to gain converts from among the Sikhs. There were stray conversions to Islam as well. There was a (p.43) prolonged controversy with the Ahmadiyas. Much more important than the threat from Christianity or Islam was the threat from the Arya Samaj. Several eminent Sikhs had joined the Arya Samaj but a decisive break came in 1888. Bhai Ditt Singh and Jawahar Singh Kapur left the Arya Samaj to join the Singh Sabha reformers. A subtle threat from the Sanatanist Hindus, who asserted that the Sikhs were ‘Hindu’, sharpened the issue of Sikh identity. The Khalsa Diwan of Lahore in its farewell address to the Governor General in 1888 categorically stated that ‘the Sikhs should not be confounded with Hindus but treated in all respects as a separate community’.26 Towards the end of the century, Bhai Kahn Singh published his Ham Hindu Nahīn which came to be regarded as a classic exposition of distinctive Sikh identity.27 Though Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha is known primarily for his Ham Hindu Nahīn and the Mahānkosh (The Encyclopaedia of Sikh Literature), he was deeply interested in the Sikh faith as well. Three of his works, written before the end of the nineteenth century, are particularly relevant in this connection: Gurū Girā Kasautī, Gurmat Prabhākar, and Gurmat Sudhākar. The first of these was not published, but this was only because Bhai Kahn Singh did not wish to start a controversy: he was strongly critical of the works like the Janamsākhī attributed to Bala and the Sūraj Parkāsh of Bhai Santokh Singh, which were held in high esteem by a large number of Sikhs. In the Gurmat Prabhākar his basic purpose was to put together all relevant verses from Guru Granth Sahib having a direct bearing on nearly 1,000 themes related to the Sikh faith, ideals, ethics, and Sikh beliefs and practices in general. In the light of the verses from Guru Granth Sahib then, the credibility of the statements made in later Sikh literature could be tested. This was precisely what Bhai Kahn Singh did in his Gurmat Sudhākar. The major works of Sikh literature from Bhai Gurdas in the early seventeenth century to Bhai Santokh Singh in the early nineteenth are examined in the Gurmat Sudhākar to establish the credibility or incredibility of the evidence presented in these works. The Parbhākar and the Sudhākar are thus complementary. The principle enunciated and applied by Bhai Kahn Singh was so firmly established that it is still popular among Sikh scholars. The Gurmat

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Mārtand, based on all the three works, was published posthumously as a kind of ‘Encyclopaedia of Sikhism’.28 The Singh reformers used print media to propagate their ideas and to promote their interests. The average number of tracts by the Sikhs and on the Sikhs increased from about 60 a year in the 1870s to about 160 a year in the late 1890s. The most important Sikh periodicals were the Khālsā Akhbār in Punjabi and the Khalsa in English, both of which were brought out from Lahore. The Nirguṇiārā and the Khālsā Samāchār in Punjabi and the Khalsa Advocate in English were published from Amritsar.29 Bhai Vir Singh, who was closely associated with the Chief Khalsa Diwan wrote novels, poetry, dramas, an epic, exegeses, biographies, tracts, periodical essays, and literature for the young to enrich Punjabi language and to create historical consciousness among the Sikhs. To resurrect and glorify the Sikh past was the main purpose of his novels. His epic, Rānā Sūrat Singh, was meant to exalt Sikh ideals and ethics. His ‘national drama’, Rājā Lakhdātā Singh, was written to underscore that mass education was the solution to moral degeneration among the Sikhs. Bhai Vir Singh’s contribution to the study of Sikh faith (p.44) and Sikh history is evident from the works he edited: Sikhān dī Bhagatmālā (1912), Prachīn Panth Parkāsh (1914), Purātan Janamsākhī (1926), Sūraj Prakāsh in fourteen volumes (1934), Sākhī Pothī, and seven volumes of Santhya Srī Gurū Granth Sāhib ji, published posthumously and covering less than half of the Guru Granth Sahib.30 The important concerns of the Singh reformers, reflected in the Khālsā Samāchār in the early decades of the twentieth century, were countering the propaganda of Christian missionaries, the Aryas, and the Ahmadiyas; insistence on separate socio-religious entity of the Sikhs; emphasis on the study of Sikh religious literature and Sikh history; increasing criticism of Udāsīs, pujārīs and mahants; argument for the good treatment of the Ramdasia and the Rehatia Sikhs; and advocacy of female education. There are pleas for the use of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script at least up to primary level in education, in courts, in post offices, and in railway carriages. There is advocacy of Anand marriage. There is criticism of the management of gurdwaras and there is the argument that they should be handed over to committees of Singhs because they belonged to the Panth.31 In a tract published in 1919, it was argued that no human being could be the Guru of the Sikhs, for Guru Gobind Singh had vested Guruship in the Ādi Granth. Furthermore, the Sikhs were ‘to view themselves as the Panth and not to recognize any single person as their sole leader’. Thus, the idea of Guru-Panth (collectivity as the Guru) was expressed as clearly as the equation of the Guru with the Adi Granth.32 A comprehensive code for Sikh ceremonies and rites had

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs been published by the Chief Khalsa Diwan in 1915 as the Gurmat Parkāsh Bhāg Sanskār, based largely on Sikh literature of the earlier centuries.33 The Singh reformers invoked the Sikh past for inspiration and guidance. Giani Gian Singh’s Panth Prakāsh (1880) was followed by his Tawārīkh-i Gurū Khālsā in 1892. He was followed by historians like Karam Singh, Sewa Ram Singh, and Bhagat Lakshman Singh. A number of books were published on the lives of the Sikh Gurus, the institution of the Khalsa, and the political struggle of the Sikhs against the Mughals and the Afghans. By far the most popular literary figure among the Singh reformers, Bhai Vir Singh recreated the heroic age of the Khalsa in his Sundarī, Bijai Singh, Satwant Kaur, and Bābā Naudh Singh, producing historical fiction which idealized the Sikh past. Martyrdom was recognized and projected as an essential feature of the Sikh tradition.34 Unlike the Nirankaris and the Nāmdhārīs, the Singh reformers welcomed English education and appreciated Western science and technology. They did not like Christian instruction in missionary schools and the total absence of religious instruction in Government institutions. They were keen to teach Sikh tenets and Sikh history to Sikh boys and girls as an important plank of education. The proposal for a Khalsa College at Lahore was made as early as 1885. There was a hot debate about its location in 1890. The foundation stone of the Khalsa College was eventually laid at Amritsar in March 1892, and the College eventually became the premier educational institution of the Sikhs.35 Equally symbolic of the Singh reform was the Kanya Maha Vidyalaya founded at Firozpur by Bhai Takht Singh in 1892, and run without any grant from the Government and without any tuition fee from the girls.36 It was followed by girls’ schools at Lahore, Amritsar, Rawalpindi, and Ropar. High schools were established not only in cities but also in small (p.45) towns like Damdama Sahib and new towns like Lyallpur. A college was established at Gujranwala before 1920 when the number of Sikh educational institutions was more than three scores. Like the Brahmos, the Aryas, and the Sanatanists, the Singh reformers were opposed to Urdu as the medium of education and administration. Unlike them, however, they supported Punjabi in Gurmukhi script rather than Hindi in Devanagri script. They argued strongly that school education should be based on ‘the language of the people’. Punjabi language and literature for the Singh Sabha reformers were inseparable from the Gurmukhi script in which their sacred scripture was written. In the opening decade of the twentieth century the issue of language became as important as the issue of religious identity. This contest proved to be long lasting.37 Bhagat Lakshman Singh (1863–1944), a zealous advocate of the Singh Sabha reform, provides valuable insights into the movement in his autobiography. He recalls how he had become a Khalsa Singh in 1895. ‘On my hearing the Benatī Chaupaī of Guru Gobind Singh,’ he says, ‘I was very much impressed by the Page 11 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs unpretentious and sublime teachings of the Great Master and I decided once for all to accept him as my Saviour’. Lakshman Singh began to study the sacred literature of the Sikhs with a granthī of Rawalpindi and expressed a desire to be admitted into the Khalsa Panth. On the commendation of Rai Bahadur Sardar Sujan Singh of Rawalpindi, Baba Khem Singh Bedi, who was one of the topmost leaders of the Amritsar Singh Sabha, agreed to initiate Lakshman Singh, and he became a full-fledged Khalsa.38 Bhagat Lakshman Singh had known Baba Khem Singh Bedi since the late 1870s when he used to stay at the dharamsala called Baradari during his visits to Rawalpindi, and hundreds of people of all ages, men, women, and children flocked to to him for a darshan. It was difficult to describe the enthusiasm he inspired. He could neither read nor write but he could recite scriptural passages from memory. He rode out daily for shikār, with a hawk perched on his left hand. ‘This position he carefully maintained even when presiding at the daily congregations.’ His idea was to look like the illustrious Guru Gobind Singh. ‘His followers believed him to be an avatar whose mere touch would save them.’ As stated by a waggish person, Baba Khem Singh Bedi was ‘the premier Sikh Guru’ and no contemporary wielded such an influence over officialdom as Baba Khem Singh Bedi. In the late 1890s, Bhagat Lakshman Singh went to see Baba Khem Singh Bedi, who by now had his residence in Rawalpindi, known as Damdama Sahib. He had carved his fortune with consummate skill and become fabulously rich. He talked of the good old days when the sangat of Rawalpindi used to go up to Rawat in hundreds with drums and cymbals, singing hymns all the way ‘to do him honour’, but all that had changed. Bhagat Lakshman Singh said to him that he had changed very much: ‘You were, then, a saint but now you are more a prince than anything else.’ Baba Sir Khem Singh Bedi agreed: ‘Truly, I am not the man I was.’39 Significantly, Bhagat Lakshman Singh did not regard Baba Khem Singh Bedi as a leader of the Singh Sabha movement. Indeed, for Lakshman Singh, the Singh Sabha movement was born at Lahore. The efforts of Kanwar Bikrama Singh of Kapurthala and the ruler of Faridkot of the same name at mustering forces ‘for an all-round Panthic uplift’ had failed to achieve much. ‘It was (p.46) really given to the son of a servant of Kanwar Bikrama Singh of Kapurthala, the late Bhai Gurmukh Singh, a teacher in the Oriental College, Lahore, to effectively organize the community and achieve great results.’ The Singh Sabha movement began to take rapid strides when Bhai Gurmukh Singh welcomed three men of dynamic personalities to the Singh Sabha: Jawahar Singh, Ditt Singh, and Maya Singh. All the three had left the Arya Samaj due to the thoughtless attack on the holy Sikh Gurus by Arya Samajist fire brands at an annual meeting of the Arya Samaj in their Mandir in Wachhowali which led to the secession from the Samaj of Bhai Jawahir Singh, its Vice President, and his friends Bhai Dit Singh Gyani, who was a forceful writer, Page 12 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs and Bhai Maya Singh, who was both an eloquent speaker and a writer of marked ability. A press was purchased with financial support from Maharaja Hira Singh of Nabha and the Khālsā Akhbār was started under the able editorship of Giani Ditt Singh. He wrote dozens of books ‘to illumine the popular mind’ and ‘infused a feeling of pride into the mass of the community for their great Gurus and their creed of love and harmony’. Baba Sir Khem Singh Bedi was ‘an extremely generous hearted man’ but he never forgave ‘the pioneers of the Singh Sabha Movement’ because a few of them had insulted him. [They removed] his gaddī cushions in the parkarmā of the Golden Temple from underneath him to show that the use of a masnad, a high seat, could not be permitted in the precincts of the holy Darbar Sahib, as the Golden Temple is called by the Sikhs, to any person, however highly placed he might be, and that they did not acknowledge him as Guru of the Sikhs.40 Immediately after his admission into the Khalsa Panth, Bhagat Lakshman Singh thought of uniting the entire Sikh community of the district of Rawalpindi through a network of Singh Sabhas and educational propaganda. There was already a Singh Sabha in Rawalpindi, but in name only. It had a building of its own and a big landed proprietor as its President, but the weekly meetings were poorly attended. Its income was barely sufficient for maintaining a granthī. Bhagat Lakshman Singh had worked as its Secretary for a couple of years and knew that he had to spend his own money for the celebration of the birthanniversaries of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh. The reason for the sad state of the Singh Sabha in Rawalpindi was not far to seek: ‘The influence of Baba Sir Khem Singh Bedi was predominant over the whole ilāqa and the leaders of the Singh Sabha had forfeited Baba Sahib’s sympathy.’ His followers fought shy of the Singh Sabha movement. In fact, people had practically boycotted it. Bhagat Lakshman Singh wanted ‘to serve as a link between Baba Sahib and the Singh Sabha people all over the province’. But he could not get Baba Khem Singh Bedi’s patronage for his educational propaganda and, ultimately, had to depend on his own resources. He founded the Khalsa Dharam Parcharak Sabha at Rawalpindi and established a sabha at Gujjar Khan. Baba Khem Singh’s followers were antagonistic to the Singh Sabha propaganda. Eventually, however, a high school was founded at Gujjar Khan with the help of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia. Bhagat Lakshman Singh succeeded in his efforts to establish Khalsa Anglo-Vernacular Middle Schools at Sukho and Kallar, the former in opposition to the Christian missionaries and the latter in opposition to the Arya Samajists. Ironically, he wrote against ‘Babadom’ too, which offended a son of Baba Khem Singh Bedi.41

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (p.47) Bhagat Lakshman Singh had been obliged to leave the Mission High School at Rawalpindi as a student in 1882 because of his critical attitude towards Christianity. He often challenged the missionary propaganda that there was nothing particularly good in Hindu and Sikh creeds. He had to leave the Gordon Mission College, Rawalpindi, as a teacher in 1898, because he had sounded an alarm in his zeal for Khalsa educational institutions and urged the need of propaganda to counter the activity of the United American Presbyterian Mission in the Rawalpindi area. He went to Lahore to serve as Secretary of the Punjab Mutual Hindu Family Relief Fund.42 Very soon Lakshman Singh got involved in a heated controversy with the Arya Samaj. Bawa Chhajju Singh was in charge of the Arya Messenger, the English organ of the College Section of the Arya Samaj. His brother Bawa Arjan Singh was in charge of the Aryā Patrikā of the Gurukul Section of the Arya Samaj, Wachhowali. Both of them were apostates from Sikhism and carried a virulent propaganda against ‘the pioneers of Sikh renaissance’. Bawa Chhajju Singh employed his ability ‘to show that the holy Sikh Gurus were only Hindu reformers’, that they believed in the Vedas, and that the Sikh scriptures were ‘only mutilated copies of the Vedas and the other books on the philosophy of the Hindu religion’. Bawa Arjan Singh sometimes played a second fiddle to his elder brother. Their misrepresentation of the mission of the Gurus filled Bhagat Lakshman Singh with indignation. He approached his friend Bhai Jawahar Singh, who was Honorary Secretary of the Council of Khalsa College, Amritsar, and, with his approval, started the weekly Khalsa on 5 January 1899.43 In the columns of the Khalsa Bhagat Lakshman Singh used to provide exposition of the Sikh scriptures to hammer in the point that Sikh dispensation was ‘an independent entity’ and not ‘a subsidiary system, based on Hindu philosophy’, as his opponents maintained. He pointed out that Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh themselves claimed that ‘what they said and wrote was revealed to them by the divine being direct’. In a series of twenty-one articles on ‘The Gurus and the Vedas’ Lakshman Singh was able to defeat his adversaries on their chosen ground, the verses of the Gurus. Bhagat Lakshman Singh propagated the same idea as Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha in his Ham Hindu Nahīn, but with a difference: ‘While I claimed that the Khalsa church was a distinct divine dispensation, enjoining wearing distinct religious symbols and following distinct social customs, I never intended to convey the idea that politically the interests of the Khalsa ran counter to those of the Hindus or, for the matter of that even to those of the Indian Musalmans or Christians’.44 In other words, Bhagat Lakshman Singh underlined the idea of a distinct Sikh identity, but he did not subscribe to the idea that Sikh political interests clashed with the interests of other religious communities.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs It is important to note that Bhagat Lakshman Singh held the Aryas responsible for the confrontation between Hindus and Sikhs. All good and noble Hindus used to express their indebtedness to the Khalsa before Swami Dayanand ridiculed Guru Nanak. His followers began to stir ‘bad blood’ between the Khalsa and the Hindus. ‘They will have nothing but the Vedas, no matter if they are unintelligible to the mass of their people. They must have Hindi as their vernacular, to the exclusion of their own mother tongue.’ Bhai Parmanand’s history of the Punjab ended with the advent of Guru Gobind Singh. What the Khalsa achieved later was regarded (p.48) as ‘something un-Hindu, if not antiHindu, something to be discarded, something to be tabooed, nick-named as separation and boycotted’. Some teachers and research scholars proclaimed that the ‘separatist’ movement (Singh Sabha) dated from the time when Arthur Macauliffe, who published five volumes of translation and commentary on Sikh religion and literature in 1909, appeared on the scene. Bhagat Lakshman Singh goes on to say that Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, even though he wanted to see in every Hindu family at least one Sikh for the defence of Bharat Mata, condemned the Moonje–Ambedkar pact according to which the Untouchables could become Sikhs if they chose to do so. Mahatma Gandhi advised the Dalits not to become Sikhs but to wait for the grant of rights till the hearts of the casteHindus underwent change. Bhagat Lakshman Singh drew the inference that a great majority of Hindus of India actually treated Sikhism as something distinct from Hinduism. In any case, the Arya Samajists extended the programme of shuddhī to the Sikhs. The leaders of the Wachhowali (Lahore) Arya Samaj shaved the heads and beards of the Rahtia (low-caste weavers) Sikhs in public. The Sikh resentment over this episode resulted in the formation of Khalsa Sudhar Sabha. Propaganda on its behalf appeared in the Khalsa, and Bhagat Lakshman Singh himself wrote an article entitled ‘Danger Ahead’, depicting the possible effect on the peace of the province if the Arya Samajist free lancers were not curbed.45 The religious, social, and cultural concerns of Singh Sabhas on the whole were quite comprehensive and there was a large degree of consensus. The declaration of Khalsa identity was built into the names ‘Singh Sabha’ and ‘Khalsa Diwan’. Both objectively and subjectively, the Singhs represented a distinct identity as a socio-religious fraternity. A unique form of initiation, a well-defined code of life, the forms of daily worship, and rites and ceremonies, cherished or advocated, reflected and reinforced this identity. However, the essential basis of this identity was the unique position of the scripture, the Adi Granth equated with the Guru. The doctrine of Guru-Panth, with its inbuilt authority and egalitarian implication, was next only to the over-arching doctrine of the Guru-Granth. The only obviously new feature of the Singh Sabha movement was a more or less enthusiastic acceptance of Western science, technology, and the English language. It was combined with Sikh religious and cultural heritage to evolve the Anglo-Sikh system of education. The Punjabi language in Gurmukhi script was of paramount importance to the Singh reformers. The comprehensive scope Page 15 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs of the Singh Sabha concerns and their pervasive influence were two sides of the same coin. The Singh Sabha movement proved to be far more influential than the Nirankari and Nāmdhārī movements. It represented the central stream of ‘modern’ Sikhism in colonial Punjab.46 Master Tara Singh, like most Sikh leaders of the time, was deeply influenced by the Singh Sabha movement.

Political Awakening among the Sikhs It is generally assumed that either the uprising of 1857–8 or the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 can serve as the starting point for a discussion of political awakening in India. But Master Tara Singh turned to the Sikh wars of 1845–6 and 1848–9 to inspire the Sikhs to struggle for freedom in his novel entitled Bābā Tegā Singh. Its hero is (p.49) Sardar Sham Singh Atari, a devout Sikh, a just administrator, a valiant fighter, and a deeply committed supporter of sovereignty, who died fighting in the battle of Sabraon in 1846.47 There is ample justification for Master Tara Singh’s view of the Sikh wars. A French officer, Captain Mouton, who had fought against the British in the first Sikh war as a commander of the regular cavalry of the army of Lahore, identified himself with the people of the Punjab and referred to the war of 1845–6 as ‘the war of independence’. Needham Cust, who was with the Governor General from December 1845 to March 1846 as a participant in the war, looked upon it as ‘the first British invasion of the independent kingdom of the Punjab’. Conversely, to resist this invasion was to preserve independence. Joseph Davey Cunningham, who also was a participant in the war, argues at some length in his classic history of the Sikhs that the Sikh soldiery thought that they were fighting a purely defensive war as representatives of ‘the Sikh people’. There is hardly any doubt that the war of 1845–6 was a war of resistance to British design over the Punjab.48 After the war of 1845–6, the state of Lahore was no longer sovereign. The treaty of Bhyrowal, which Lord Hardinge had managed to impose on the minor Maharaja Dalip Singh in December 1846, removed all ambiguity about the subordinate status of the truncated state of Lahore. It was becoming increasingly clear that the British had come to stay in the Punjab. Resistance began to increase. The initiative was taken by Maharani Jind Kaur, the Regent, even before the treaty of Bhyrowal was signed. One implication of the treaty was the end of the Maharani’s regency; it was replaced by a council. When she tried to resist the British Residents through the council or the minor Maharaja, she was removed from Lahore to Sheikhupura in 1847 and then from the Punjab to Benares in 1848. Soon afterwards, Lord Dalhousie finally decided to take over the Punjab. Large sections of the people of the Punjab took to arms to overthrow the British. A large chunk of the army, the mass of the disbanded soldiery, a few subordinate rulers and Sardars, and the people at large, not only Sikhs but also Hindus and Muslims, participated in the war of 1848–9 to make it a war of

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs liberation. Raja Sher Singh, son of Chattar Singh Atariwala, and Bhai Maharaj Singh were the two major protagonists of this war.49 The war was lost but resistance to the British ‘confiscation’ of the Punjab continued. Bhai Maharaj Singh, the acknowledged leader of the people, worked for the ouster of the British from the Punjab. He was deported to Singapore in 1850, and he died there stoically in 1856. Maharani Jind Kaur continued to work against the British as an exile in Nepal till 1857–8. She died in England in 1863, having been obliged to live away from her son so that she did not become his ‘evil genius’. But she did make him aware of his spiritual and temporal heritage, which created some trouble for the British.50 Master Tara Singh’s view has been affirmed by independent researches of the historians like Sita Ram Kohli, Ganda Singh, Bikrama Jit Hasrat, Fauja Singh, A.C. Banerjee, and Chhanda Chatterjee about the essential character of the Sikh wars of 1845–6 and 1848–9. Neither the Sikhs nor the British ever forgot these wars. The colonial construction of 1857 in relation to the Punjab appeared immediately after the uprising of 1857–8 with the publications of Frederic Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, and Rev. J. Cave Browne, a chaplain of the Moveable Column formed for (p.50) action during the uprising. The two writers projected the impression that the people of the Punjab remained generally loyal to their new masters and the Sikhs supported the British to save the empire. A deconstruction of their works shows that this projection was a mixture of fact and fiction—a myth. Cooper believed in the racial traits of the Anglo-Saxons and Cave Browne believed in the providential role of the British Empire. Both admired the role of the British administrators of the Punjab, and more than that, the ‘paternal’ system of administration peculiar to the Punjab that saved the empire. The Indian component of the army of the East India Company in the Punjab was almost entirely non-Punjabi. The task before the British officers was to keep them loyal, to disarm or disband them, and, if they rose in revolt, to decimate them. Cooper concedes, however, that a small part of the troops in the Punjab joined the rebels in Delhi. They were able to reach there because of the sympathy of the people with the rebels.51 Support for the British came from the ruling chiefs who were bound by the terms of ‘protection’ imposed on them in 1809. Among them, the Sikh chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, and Kapurthala were notably active. Some of the former jāgīrdārs of the Punjab, like Raja Tej Singh and Sardar Shamsher Singh Sandhanwalia, were already on the side of the British, and a few of the old fighters against them, who had been socially degraded, seized the opportunity to reinstate themselves by a show of loyalty to the British. From the mass of the Sikh people the British administrators chose the former ‘outcaste’ Mazhabis for induction into the army. Thus, the bulk of the Sikhs had no inclination to support Page 17 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs the British. Cooper and Cave Browne create the impression that the Punjabis in general and the Sikhs in particular were enthusiastic in supporting the British. However, their own unintentional evidence leaves the impression that there were individuals and groups in both rural and urban areas in different parts of the Punjab, in the hills as well as the plains, who sympathized with the rebels and actively worked against the British wherever possible. Among those who showed a spirit of resistance to British domination were members of Princely Houses and their officials, religious leaders, traders, tribal and village communities, and peasants and artisans. Among these rebels were Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs.52 The year 1857–8 was important in another way too. As a follower of Baba Balak Singh, ‘Bhai Ram Singh’ had become active in the central districts of the Punjab. The British administrators took notice of his activities in 1863. It was reported from Firozpur district that his followers (called Kukas) gave expression to antiBritish sentiments in a state of spiritual ‘intoxication’. A prophecy of Guru Gobind Singh was current among them that he would take birth as the carpenter ‘Ram Singh’ and defeat the firangīs (the British) to re-establish Khalsa Raj in 1865. In 1866 and 1867 it was reported that the Kukas had destroyed structures raised over graves and spots of cremation. Bhai Ram Singh resented the reintroduction of cow slaughter in the Punjab by the British. The violent activities of the Kukas were extended to the murder of butchers at places like Amritsar and Raikot in Ludhiana district. Several Kukas were sentenced to death. There was a state of unrest in the central Punjab. In view of a potential threat to peace, the Commissioner of the Ambala Division recommended Bhai Ram Singh’s arrest and deportation to Burma. The episode of Malerkotla early in 1872, in which (p. 51) a number of Malerkotla men were killed and about three scores of Kukas were blown from canons through unauthorized orders of the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana and the Commissioner of Ambala, clinched the issue. Bhai Ram Singh and all his important lieutenants (sūbās) were deported. The political potential of the movement fizzled out. The ‘martyrs’ of Malerkotla became the symbol of the anti-British spirit of the Kukas.53 What made the Kukas potentially dangerous was not so much their iconoclastic or anti-cow-killing activity as it was the institution of the Sant Khalsa to regenerate the Sikh social order with the idea that just as the rule of the Khalsa of Guru Gobind Singh had replaced the Mughal rule, so would the regenerated Sant Khalsa be the instrument of British ouster from the Punjab. The prophecies about the return of Sikh Raj in the near future added a sense of urgency. The popularity of Bhai Ram Singh among the Sikh masses gave a sense of reality to the threat. The British bureaucracy met this potential danger by removing Bhai Ram Singh from the scene and keeping him in complete isolation. According to Bhai Ram Singh the British were convinced that a letter from him to his followers could sweep them off. The Chief Commissioner of Burma wrote to the

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Government of India that Bhai Ram Singh was ‘the most dangerous man perhaps now in India’.54 The Kuka movement subsided finally after Bhai Ram Singh’s death. In the census of 1891 less than 10,000 Sikhs returned themselves as Nāmdhārīs. The year 1885, the year of Bhai Ram Singh’s death, incidentally, was the year of Master Tara Singh’s birth. It was important in another way too. It marked the foundation of the Indian National Congress which reflected a new kind of political awakening, concerned not with the affairs of any particular region but of the whole of the Indian subcontinent, not with the aspirations of any religious community but of all the peoples of India. The project of the Indian National Congress was to create an ‘Indian Nation’. A Sikh to figure prominently in the Indian National Congress before 1900 was Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia. His father, Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia, had served Maharaja Ranjit Singh with distinction. Dyal Singh belonged to the first generation of Sikhs exposed to Western systems of thought. His name came to be associated with the Brahmo variety of reform, institutions of higher education, the Indian Association, and the founding of The Tribune. He was President of the standing committee of the Congress. In 1893 he was Chairman of the Reception Committee for the annual session of the Congress at Lahore. Pattabhi Sitaramayya writes in his History of the Indian National Congress that ‘the progress of the Congress from its inception in 1885 to 1905 was one of even march based on a firm faith in constitutional agitation and in the unfailing regard for justice attributed to the Englishmen’. It was in these terms that Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia, Chairman, Reception Committee, talked of ‘the greatest glory of British Rule in this country’, and felt gratified with a constitution ‘whose watchword’ was freedom and ‘whose main pillar’ was toleration. Majithia went on to add: ‘We look back complacently on our past history, and glory in it. Can we then in the midst of this national upheaval remain quiescent and indifferent?’55 In his Nationalism, a short book published in 1895, he expresses moderate admiration for and loyalty to the order and progress brought to the Punjab by the British, but he took exception to what he regarded as the excesses and omissions of British rule.56 (p.52) Sardar Dyal Singh proved to be the only Sikh aristocrat to take interest in the Congress. His death in 1898 raised the issue whether the Sikhs were Hindus. In his will he had left his vast property in trust to The Tribune, the Dyal Singh College, and the Dyal Singh Library. This was contested on behalf of his wife and her cousin Sardar Gajindra Singh on the argument that Majithia was a Sikh and, therefore, the Hindu law of inheritance under which he had alienated his ancestral property in favour of the Dyal Singh Trust did not hold good. Bhagat Lakshman Singh wrote articles in the Khalsa against the decision of the court in favour of the trustees. He was convinced that the judgement of the court was faulty.57 But the judgement was upheld by the Chief Court.58 Page 19 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Lakshman Singh was pained all the more to think that Sardar Dyal Singh had been discarded by his community ‘as an apostate’ and ‘unworthy of being seen’. He was not a Hindu, and he was not a Sikh ‘in the accepted sense’ but he had great admiration for the Gurus and ‘the work of the illustrious veteran Khalsa chiefs’.59 What is relevant for us here is the reaction of the Singh reformers to the decision of the Chief Court in favour of the Sikh demand of legal recognition for the Sikh form of marriage called the Anand marriage. Tikka (heir apparent) Ripudaman Singh of Nabha was nominated to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1907. He was closely associated with the Singh Sabha movement. He introduced the Anand Marriage Bill in the council in October 1908. Not only Hindus but also many Sikhs were opposed to the Bill, including the granthīs of the Golden Temple. The Anand marriage was wrongly regarded by the opponents of the Bill as an innovation of the Singh reformers. Hundreds of communications were sent for and against the Bill. The Nirankaris and the Nāmdhārīs wrote to the Government in its support. The attitude of the Nirankaris, who were basically sahajdhārīs, proved to be rather crucial in a contest between the conservative Sikhs and the Singh reformers. With some modification, the Bill was eventually passed in October 1909. In place of Tikka Ripudaman Singh, whose term was not extended, the pliable Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was nominated as a member of the Imperial Legislative Council for the specific purpose of steering the Bill through.60 The prime mover of this legislation, Tikka Ripudaman Singh, remained unhappy with the shape given to the Anand Marriage Act in 1909. The difference between the new leadership and the Chief Khalsa Diwan was far more visible in the case of the Gurdwara Rakabganj agitation. When the outer wall of the Rakabganj gurdwara in Delhi was dismantled in 1913 to construct a road to the new Viceregal Lodge, the Singh reformers were very much agitated. The Sikhs sent telegrams, petitions, and memoranda to the Viceroy, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Commissioner of Delhi. The Sikh Review was launched in Delhi, with Sardul Singh Caveeshar as its editor, to inform Sikh opinion on Sikh interests. Tikka Ripudaman Singh, now the Maharaja of Nabha, was equally interested in the issue. When Sardar Sunder Singh Maijithia and the Chief Khalsa Diwan tried to accommodate the Government on this issue, protest meetings were held as much against the Chief Khalsa Diwan as against the Government. The Rakabganj agitation was beginning to gain momentum when the war broke out in September 1914. Both the project and the agitation were shelved during the war.61 (p.53) In fact, the politics of the Chief Khalsa Diwan remained confined to matters constitutional. Baba Sir Khem Singh Bedi and Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia represented the Sikhs in the council till 1909. When the Punjab Council was expanded by the Act of 1909 with the provision of eight elected members, Page 20 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs the Sikhs could find no representation through election and members like Partap Singh Ahluwalia, Daljit Singh of Kapurthala, Baba Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia, and Sardar Gajjan Singh Grewal were nominated to the council. The Sikhs felt more and more convinced that they needed separate electorates like the Muslims. Soon after the Lucknow Pact, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia wrote to the Lieutenant Governor mentioning that the Sikhs should be given a share in the councils and administration with due regard to their status before the annexation of the Punjab, their present stake in the country, and their services to the British Empire. Asking for a share in excess of the Sikh proportion in the population of the province, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia had in mind the Lucknow Pact which had given such weightage to Muslims in the provinces where they were in minority. Equally relevant to him was ‘Sikh identity’ on which the politics of the Chief Khalsa Diwan was based from the very beginning with its professed purpose to safeguard ‘the political rights’ of the Sikhs.62 A Sikh deputation met Governor General Chelmsford in November 1917 to plead for separate electorates and weightage for the Sikhs on the basis of their ‘unique position’. In the Montford Report it was noted that the Sikhs had remained unrepresented in spite of their services to the empire. ‘To the Sikhs, therefore, and to them alone, we propose to extend the system already adopted in the case of Muhammadans.’63 On the initiative of the Chief Khalsa Diwan, representatives of the entire Sikh community prepared a memorandum in September 1918 to impress upon the Government that the principle conceded in the Montford Report should be ‘carried out and fulfilled in the fullest measure and in all its consequences’. However, the proposal of 33 per cent share for the Sikhs in the provincial council was not acceptable to Hindus and Muslims. On a strong recommendation from the Punjab Government, the Franchise Committee conceded a separate electoral role and separate constituencies for the Sikhs with only a small weightage of 19 per cent of the total seats. The Sikhs, however, remained resentful.64 The World War I had left a great impact on the Indian society in general and on the people of the Punjab in particular. At the pan-Indian level, the Defence of India Act was passed in an extraordinary session of the Central Legislature on 17 March 1915, despite opposition from Indian leaders. It was meant to tighten social control for getting men, money, and materials for the war effort. The capacity for coercion was combined with a positive incentive by the decision of the Government in 1917 to grant King’s Commission to Indians. The total strength of the British Indian Army on 1 August 1914 was 155,423, but on 31 December 1918 it was 1,440,337. The total number of combatants and noncombatants enlisted from the Punjab was 446,976. The Sikhs held a prominent position among the martial races, but the ‘martial race’ idea gradually lost importance, and new classes came to be inducted in the army. During the war years, they contributed 88,925 men. In terms of their population in the Punjab, Page 21 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs their contribution was twice that of the Muslims and thrice that of the Hindus. However, the percentage of the (p.54) Sikhs in the Indian army at the end of the war was less than nineteen.65 The Sikh soldiers in the Indian army were advised to take keen interest in religious activities. Each Sikh unit was provided with a granthī who used to stay in the base area and had high respect among the Sikh soldiers. The British officers also showed high regard to him. They encouraged the soldiers to attend the religious functions and it was quite common for them to do so. However, the experience of Sikh soldiers in the war had a significant impact on them. There was a change in their attitude towards the British who appeared to have no genuine respect for the Sikhs. A British sepoy did not salute a Sikh Subedar Major. The Sikh soldiers started protesting against ‘the inequalities and disparities which the British had created between the white and the black’. The British now appeared to be cunning.66 There was surely a degree of disillusionment with the ‘paternal’ colonial rulers. This disillusionment was deepened significantly by the experience of British brutality at the Jallianwala Bagh, followed by the Martial Law. Ruchi Ram Sahni writes in his Memoirs: ‘The reader of these notes will hardly be able to realise how much the people of Punjab had been struck with terror by the memorable week which is now glorified as the national week followed by about two months of Martial Law Regime.’67 Giani Kartar Singh, later a prominent Akali leader, was at Amritsar in those days as a student. He recalled that the news of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre spread throughout the province. His grandfather came to Amritsar to take him back to his village, Chak No. 40 in Lyallpur district. Tickets could be bought only on verification of a military officer. Giani Kartar Singh’s uncle, who was in the army, got a note attested by General Dyer. When the train moved they discovered that it was going to Lahore. They found the main station in Lahore city cordoned off by British soldiers. Not allowed to enter they went to a shop on the road, took charpoys, and slept in the bāzār. ‘The British soldiers had the authority to shoot at sight. We passed the night clinging closely to our beds without ever lifting our heads.’ In the morning the only conveyance they could get was a tonga which took them to Sheikhupura in the evening. After an overnight stay in the town they followed the track which his grandfather had followed for the first time from his village Nagoke in Amritsar district to the Chenab Colony. Travelling 40 miles on foot, they reached Shahkot and resumed the journey on the day following. There were ‘very few people on the roads, but whoever we met was seething with anger against the English’. On the way, they heard that the village Wadda Khiala was attacked by the British soldiers because a zaildār had been murdered there. The Deputy Commissioner was determined to scorch the whole village but he was dissuaded; he arrested nearly a score of villagers.68

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Jathedar Kartar Singh Jhabbar, another prominent Akali, had a different story to tell. Till April 1919 his preoccupation was propagation of Sikh faith and education. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre was in the newspapers on 14 April. On 15 April the young men of village Chuharkana near Nankana Sahib took to arson and plunder of Government property. At midnight came a train from Lahore with British soldiers and they started firing indiscriminately. Some people were killed and some wounded. Arrests of all sorts of people followed. Jhabbar spent the night away from his village. Soon he came to know that warrants for his arrest had been issued and his property was confiscated. On the day (p.55) following he presented himself before Sardar Amar Singh, the magistrate of the ‘ilaqā. Thirty of the persons arrested were identified as ring leaders and sent to jail. Six of them were sentenced to death and seventeen others to life imprisonment with deportation. On 30 May 1919, Jhabbar was told that his sentence to death was commuted to deportation for life. He was sent to the Andamans. There he met some of the Ghadarites and other revolutionaries. In March 1920 came the news of amnesty and Jhabbar, along with many others, was released soon after. But he was not the same man any more. In less than a year he was transformed into a leader whose primary concern was politics.69 The first political party of the Sikhs, the Central Sikh League, was formed at Amritsar in 1919 on the initiative of some erstwhile leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. Its first general session was held at Amritsar at the time of the Congress session in December 1919. Sardar Sant Singh, Chairman of the Reception Committee, said that ‘the new Sikh League was a triumph of the principle of democracy over the principle of favouritism which was followed in the past’. In his presidential address Sardar Gajjan Singh expressed gratification over the ‘special representation’ for the Sikhs in the Act of 1919 but found it ‘inadequate’. A resolution of the Central Sikh League extended cooperation to the Government. Another resolution referred to the ‘atrocious and inhuman’ massacre at the Jallianwala Bagh and expected that the Government ‘would take immediate action to satisfy the public’. The League committed itself to the objective of self-government for India and demanded adequate representation of Sikhs in the services. Yet another resolution of the League expressed its strong conviction that the management and control of the gurdwaras should no longer be withheld from the community in the interest of these institutions and the Sikh Panth. The sore and long-standing grievance of the Sikhs was that the administration of the Golden Temple was still carried on by a nominee of the Government. The resolution emphasized that this ‘foremost seat of Sikh faith should be placed in the hands of the representative body of the Sikhs constituted on an elective basis and responsible for its actions to the Panth at large’. The League expressed its indignation over the discharge of certain Sikh soldiers for wearing kirpān and demanded that since the Government had already conceded the religious right of the Sikhs to wear kirpān, there should be no penalization. The Central Sikh League demanded a permanent settlement of land revenue in Page 23 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs place of the periodic assessments which were detrimental to the interests of the peasantry. The Government was also asked to adopt a more equitable system of water rates for irrigation.70 The Central Sikh League espoused the causes dear to the Sikh peasantry, the Singh Sabha reformers, and the Chief Khalsa Diwan, but unlike them the League stood for self-government (swarāj). Finally, we may take notice of the Sikh states which were a part of the Punjab, both geographically and politically. These states were unilaterally declared to be ‘protected’ by the British, which meant that they were under the political control of the British. They were given lenient but vague terms. With the passage of time, British control over them increased in several ways. The Political Agent, appointed by the Punjab Government first and then by the Central Government in consultation with the Punjab authorities, became increasingly influential in the states and his ‘advice’ was expected to be accepted by the ruler of the state concerned. In 1857–8, (p.56) the rulers of these states had generally supported the British and were rewarded with territories and titles. The rulers of Patiala, Nabha, and Jind were given some exceptional concessions. But before the end of the nineteenth century the paramount power had asserted itself effectively to integrate the states with British India in the spheres of defence, communications, currency, and even internal administration, particularly in the revenue and judicial departments. In the early twentieth century, while the states and their subjects were influenced by developments in the British Punjab, the rulers of the states simultaneously began to take interest in Sikh affairs of the British Punjab. Thus, a certain degree of mutuality was being established between the Sikhs of the British Punjab and the Sikhs of the princely states.71 On the whole, from the 1870s to 1919, a marked socio-political change had been experienced by almost all sections of the Sikhs, most of all by the emerging middle class to which Master Tara Singh belonged.

In Retrospect The political and economic strength of the Sikh aristocrats was radically reduced with the loss of power in 1849. Their jāgīrs were resumed or reduced and they were obliged to adjust themselves to the new situation. Most of them demonstrated their loyalty to the new rulers in 1857–8, began to serve them in various capacities, and came to be regarded as the ‘natural leaders’. The colonial rulers valued their collaboration. The Sikh soldiers lost their occupation when the army was disbanded on a large scale. But new Sikh soldiers began to be recruited cautiously before 1857 and increasingly after 1858. The colonial rulers insisted that the Sikh soldiers should preserve their Singh or Khalsa identity because the British linked it with soldierly qualities. In fact, the Khalsa were seen as the only category of true Sikhs. Only they were returned as Sikhs in the census reports till 1911. Although Sikh peasantry, which constituted the bulk of the Sikh community, suffered economically due to the rising tide of indebtedness in the late nineteenth century, their suffering was much less than Page 24 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs that of others. Emigration provided an avenue for better opportunities and employment to many a peasant. The most remarkable indicator of Sikh resurgence was the sheer increase in the number of Sikhs from less than two million in 1881 to nearly four million in 1921. Equally remarkable was increase in the proportion of the Khalsa among the Sikhs. The colonial rulers never trusted the Khalsa completely. On political considerations they strengthened their own control over the Darbar Sahib and the Akal Takht in spite of the legislation against any official association with the religious institutions of the people in British India. A new religious awakening among the Sikhs had emerged before 1849 in the form of the Nirankari and Nāmdhārī movements. The founders of both the movements regarded the Granth Sahib as the only authoritative scripture which inculcated the worship of one God in conjunction with the exclusion of idol worship, or any other non-Sikh form of worship. The Nirankaris in particular rejected all Brahmanical rites and ceremonies. Neither of the two movements needed initiation through the pahul of the double-edged sword, and both came to cherish a belief in a personal Guru. This carried the implication that the eighteenth-century doctrines of Guru-Panth and Guru-Granth did not have much significance for their followers. After the advent of colonial rule in the Punjab they did not take to new education or to any other important (p.57) institution. After 1857 Baba Ram Singh gave a new orientation to the Nāmdhārī movement. He introduced initiation through pahul of the double-edged sword, and the term Sant Khalsa for his followers. They were filled with ardent religious zeal and a strong feeling of hatred towards the British, with some political undertones. The Singh Sabha movement, which started in the 1870s, overshadowed the Nirankari and Nāmdhārī movements. What distinguished the Singh Sabha reformers from them was first of all their espousal of the eighteenth-century doctrines of Guru-Granth and Guru-Panth. Their emphasis on a distinct Sikh identity was a logical corollary to the eighteenth-century concept of the tīsar panth, the Khalsa of Guru Gobind Singh being distinct from both the Hindus and Muslims. Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha’s Ham Hindu Nahīn was meant essentially to clarify this position because some Hindu leaders had begun to assert that the Sikhs were ‘Hindu’. The Singh Sabhas, the Khalsa dīwāns, and other organizations set up by the Singh reformers were based on democratic principles. The major writers of the movement, Giani Ditt Singh, Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, and Bhai Vir Singh produced a wide range of literature. The Singh reformers made good use of the printing press to bring out newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets. They welcomed Western education, science, and technology and evolved an Anglo-Sikh system of education which included instruction in the Sikh faith. They advocated the use of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as the medium of school education and in public life. They defended the Sikh faith against attacks from the Christian missionaries, the Arya Samajists, and the Ahmadiyas, and provided their own exposition of Sikhism and Sikh Page 25 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs history. The Singh reformers wanted the affairs of the Darbar Sahib and the Akal Takht, and other historical gurdwaras, to be managed by their own representatives on behalf of the Sikh Panth. Resistance to British imperialism was a legacy of the Sikh wars of the 1840s. The millenarian hope of Baba Ram Singh and his followers about the return of Sikh Raj was a feeble reflection of this legacy. The anti-British feeling of the Sant Khalsa found expression in the attack on the cow-killing butchers for which a number of Kukas were hanged and a much larger number were blown from guns at Malerkotla in 1872. They came to be seen as martyrs to freedom. Their millenarian hopes did not survive long after the death of Baba Ram Singh in 1885, and the foundation of the Indian National Congress in the same year provided for them a forum with which they could align themselves. The Congress provided a forum for some other Sikhs too. However, their number was very small. The most eminent Sikh who figures prominently in the Congress during the late nineteenth century was Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia. He had little to do with the Singh Sabha movement. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Sardar Harbans Singh Atari took some interest in the agrarian agitation of 1907, and Tikka Ripudaman Singh showed some interest in the issue of Gurdwara Rakabganj. A large number of Sikhs took part in the Ghadar Movement, but the Sikh aristocrats associated with the Singh Sabha movement were opposed even to agitational politics. The politics of the Chief Khalsa Diwan was based on Sikh identity but confined to constitutional reform. The first political party of the Sikhs, the Central Sikh League, was formed at Amritsar on the initiative of some erstwhile leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. Significantly, its first (p.58) general session was held at Amritsar at the time of the Congress session in December 1919. The League committed itself to the objective of self-government for India and condemned the ‘atrocious and inhuman’ massacre at the Jallianwala Bagh. Even more significant was a middleclass articulation of opposition to the pro-government attitude of the Chief Khalsa Diwan with regard to the Rakabganj gurdwara, the Komagata Maru, and the harsh punishment meted out to the Ghadarites. In reaction to the Jallianwala Bagh massacre on 13 April 1919, the young men of Chuharkana near Nankana Sahib took to plunder and destruction of government property. Their leader, Kartar Singh Jhabbar, later to be valorized as an Akali, was sentenced to death. Subsequently, however, his sentence was commuted to deportation for life. He was sent to the Andamans but released on amnesty in early 1920. He was transformed into a leader whose primary concern, henceforth, was politics. The strongest collaborators of the British in the Punjab at the time were the rulers of Sikh princely states, with the most notable exception of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs Notes:

(1.) Sukhdev Singh Sohal, The Making of the Middle Classes in the Punjab (1849–1947) (Jalandhar: ABS Publications, 2008), p. 13. (2.) J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. II, part 3) [cited hereafter as The Sikhs of the Punjab] (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2014, reprint), p. 135. (3.) Quoted by Rajiv A. Kapur, Sikh Separatism: A Politics of Faith (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1987, second impression, paperback), p. 8. See also Richard G. Fox, Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 8. (4.) ‘Report on the Census’ (1855), reprinted in PPP 17, part 1 (April 1983): 179– 200 and tables. ‘Census of the Punjab, 1868 and of India, 1871–72’ (Extracts), PPP 8, part 2 (October 1974): 346–50. (5.) Lepel Griffin, Rajas of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjab Languages Department, 1970, reprint, first published in 1870). The changing fortunes of the former jāgīrdārs of the Punjab come out clearly from an analysis of Lepel Griffin’s The Panjab Chiefs, published in 1865, and its enlarged editions published in 1890, 1909, and 1940. See also J.S. Grewal and Harish C. Sharma, ‘Political Change and Social Adjustment: The Case of Sikh Aristocracy under Colonial Rule in the Punjab’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Goa (1988): 377–82. Harish C. Sharma, ‘Political Change and Social Readjustment: Case of the Sandhanwalia Family’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Dharwad (1988). (6.) A report of 1858 quoted by Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 114n.47. See also Major G.F. Macmunn, ‘The Martial Races of India’, PPP 3, part 1 (April 1970): 75–7; and Reginald Hodder, ‘The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars’, PPP 3, part 1 (April 1970): 86– 105. (7.) S.S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War (Patiala: Punjab Languages Department, 1970), p. 265. (8.) Fox, Lions of the Punjab, p. 73. (9.) Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, pp. 137–8. See also Joginder Singh, ‘The Sikh Community: Demography and Occupational Change 1881–1931’, in Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c.1500–1990, ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2000), pp. 271–95. (10.) James Douie, The Panjab, North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir (Delhi: Seema Publications, 1974, reprint), pp. 117–18.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (11.) Ian J. Kerr ‘The British and the Administration of the Golden Temple in 1859’, PPP 10, part 2 (October 1976): 306–2. (12.) Fox, Lions of the Punjab, p. 10. (13.) For the Nirankaris, John C.B. Webster, The Nirankari Sikhs (Delhi: Macmillan, 1979). Man Singh Nirankari, ‘The Nirankaris’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, ed. Ganda Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973), pp. 1–11. J.S. Grewal, ‘An Interpreter of the Early Sikh Tradition’, in Baba Dayal: Founder of the First Reform Movement Among the Sikhs, ed. J.S. Grewal (Chandigarh: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 2003). Man Singh Nirankari and Dewan Singh (eds), Baba Dayal: Crusader of True Sikhism (Amritsar: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 1997, second edition). (14.) An English version of this hukamnāmā is given by John C.B. Webster in his Nirankari Sikhs, Appendix G, pp. 83–99. (15.) For the number of Nirankaris, see Webster’s Nirankari Sikhs, pp. 15–16. (16.) Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān (Jalandhar: Dhanpat Rai and Sons, 1960, second edition), pp. 17–35. (17.) Bhagat Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, ed. Ganda Singh (Calcutta: The Sikh Cultural Centre, 1965), pp. 3–6. Ganda Singh questions the importance given to the political aspect of the movement in ‘Was the Kuka (Nāmdhārī) Movement a Rebellion against the British Government?’, PPP 8, part 2 (October 1974): 325–41. (18.) For the Prem Sumārg, see J.S. Grewal, ‘A Theory of Sikh Social Order’, in Sikh Ideology, Polity and Social Order: From Guru Nanak to Maharaja Ranjit Singh (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 2007), pp. 248–57. Also J.S. Grewal, ‘The Prem Sumarg: A Sant Khalsa Vision of the Sikh Panth’, in The Sikhs: Ideology, Institutions and Identity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 158–85. (19.) For the letters of Baba Ram Singh, see Ganda Singh (ed.), Kukian di Vithia (Patiala: Punjabi University, [1944] 2000). (20.) Nahar Singh and Kirpal Singh (eds), Rebels against the British Rule: Guru Ram Singh and the Kuka Sikhs (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1995), pp. 59–60. (21.) Ganda Singh, Kukian di Vithia, Bhai Ram Singh’s letters to his brother at Bhaini.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (22.) Nahar Singh (ed.), Gooroo Ram Singh and the Kuka Sikhs (New Delhi, 1965). For more information, see Jaswinder Singh, Kuka Movement: Freedom Struggle in Punjab (Documents, 1880–1903 AD) (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1985). Ganda Singh (ed.), Maharaja Duleep Singh’s Correspondence (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1977). (23.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Sikh Awakening (Jullundur City: Desh Sewak Book Agency, 1922), pp. 41–2. (24.) The political aspect of Baba Ram Singh’s Sant Khalsa, which has been emphasized more than the religious aspect in recent historical literature, would be taken up later. (25.) For the Singh Sabha movement, see Harbans Singh, ‘Origins of the Singh Sabha’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 21–30. Teja Singh, ‘The Singh Sabha Movement’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 31– 44. Gurdarshan Singh, ‘Origin and Development of Singh Sabha Movement: Constitutional Aspects’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 45–58. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab, pp. 144–50. (26.) Anon., ‘Bhai Jawahar Singh—Arya Samaj—Singh Sabha’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 92–5. (27.) For an analysis of Bhai Kahn Singh’s work, see J.S. Grewal, ‘An Argument for Sikh Nationality: Nabha’s Ham Hindu Nahin’, in History, Literature and Identity: Four Centuries of Sikh Tradition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012, second impression), pp. 275–97. (28.) Pritam Singh, Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha: Pichhokaṛ, Rachnā te Mulankan (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1989). (29.) N. Gerald Barrier, The Sikhs and their Literature (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1970). (30.) Harbans Singh, Bhai Vir Singh (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1984, second edition, paperback). (31.) The entries in Barrier’s The Sikhs and Their Literature contain ample evidence of the concerns, ideas, and attitudes of the Sikhs in the early decades of the twentieth century. See also Joginder Singh, ‘Resurgence in Sikh Journalism’, Journal of Regional History, vol. III (I982): 99–116. Satpal Kaur, ‘Journalism in the Punjab and the Khalsa Samachar (1899–1919)’, M.Phil. Dissertation (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1985).

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (32.) For the emergence of these doctrines, J.S. Grewal, ‘The Doctrines of Guru Panth and Guru Granth’, in Sikh Ideology, Polity and Social Order: From Guru Nanak to Maharaja Ranjit Singh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 223–38. (33.) Anon., ‘Chief Khalsa Diwan: Fifty Years of Service (1902–1951)’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 59–68. See also Ganda Singh, ‘Sikh Educational Conference’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 69– 77. (34.) Harbans Singh, Bhai Vir Singh, pp. 42–67. (35.) Ganda Singh, A History of the Khalsa College Amritsar (Amritsar, 1949). See also Teja Singh, ‘Khalsa College Amritsar’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, pp. 78–85. (36.) Sardul Singh Caveeshar, ‘The Sikh Kanya Mahavidyala’, in The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, ed. Ganda Singh, pp. 99–112. (37.) Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 277–309. (38.) Lakhshman Singh, Autobiography, p. 102. (39.) Lakhshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 15–18. (40.) Lakhshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 39, 58–9, 89–91. (41.) Lakhshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 103–9. (42.) For the Hindu Family Relief Fund, see Ruchi Ram Sahni, Memoirs of Ruchi Ram Sahni, eds Narender K. Sehgal and Subodh Mahanty (New Delhi: Vigyan Prasar, 1997, second edition, paperback), pp. 106–8. (43.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 31–4, 100–1, 130–3. (44.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 133–8. (45.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 154–68. See also Ganda Singh, ‘The Origin of the Hindu–Sikh Tension in the Panjab’, PPP 11, part 2 (October 1977): 325–9. Kenneth W. Jones, ‘Ham Hindu Nahin: The Arya–Sikh Relations 1877– 1905’, PPP 11, part 2 (October 1977): 330–55. (46.) J.S. Grewal, ‘Cultural Reorientation in India under Colonial Rule’, in Cultural Reorientation in Modern India, eds. Indu Banga and Jaidev (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996), pp. 13–23.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (47.) Master Tara Singh, Dogrā Sājish ate Angrezān te Singhān dī Jang Zubānī Bābā Tegā Singh (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999, reprint). For an analysis of this work, see Appendix A.2. (48.) For detail, J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga, ‘The War of Resistance’, in The Ghadar Movement, eds J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013), pp. 3–15. (49.) Grewal and Banga, ‘The War of Liberation’, in The Ghadar Movement, pp. 15–24. (50.) Grewal and Banga, ‘Bhai Maharaj Singh’ and ‘Maharani Jind Kaur’, in The Ghadar Movement, pp. 24–38. See also M.L. Ahluwalia, ‘Bhai Maharaj Singh and His Role in the Freedom Struggle’, in Punjab and the Freedom Struggle, eds Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998), pp. 51–62. (51.) Grewal and Banga, ‘Deconstructing Colonial Constructions of 1857 in Relation to the Punjab’, in The Ghadar Movement, pp. 40–52. (52.) S.K. Bajaj, ‘Role of the Sikhs in the Revolt of 1857 in Punjab’, Punjab and the Freedom Struggle, eds Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma, pp. 77–84. (53.) For emphasis on the political aspect of the Kuka movement, Fauja Singh, Kuka Movement: An Important Phase in Punjab’s Role in India’s Struggle for Freedom (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965). See also Grewal and Banga, ‘The Kuka Movement’, in The Ghadar Movement, pp. 55–66. (54.) Grewal, Puri, and Banga (eds), The Ghadar Movement, pp. 67–78. (55.) Pattabhi Sitaramayya, A History of the Indian National Congress, vol. I (1885–1935) (Bombay: Padma Publications, n.d.), p. 61. (56.) Jeffrey Perrill, ‘Dyal Singh Majithia’, in The Encyclopaedia of Sikhism, vol. I, ed. Harbans Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1992), pp. 606–7. (57.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 153–4. (58.) Sahni, Memoirs, p. 79. (59.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, p. 128. (60.) For the Anand Marriage Act, see Gurdev Singh Deol, Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia: Life, Work and Mission (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1992), pp. 81–97, Appendix B (pp. 171–7) and Appendix C (pp. 179–80). See also K.S. Talwar, ‘The Anand Marriage Act’, PPP 2, part 2 (October 1968): 400–10.

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs (61.) Harjot Singh, ‘From Gurdwara Rakabganj to the Viceregal Palace—A Study of Religious Protest’, PPP 14, part 1 (April 1980): 182–98. For accounts by contemporaries, Kirpal Singh Dardi, Akali Lehar dā Sanchālak Master Sundar Singh Lyallpurī (Jīwaṇī) (n.p.: Shahid Uhdam Singh Prakashan, 1991), pp. 40–7. Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Ithihāsik Yādān, pp. 138–46. (62.) For politics of the Chief Khalsa Diwan, Surjit Singh Narang, ‘Chief Khalsa Diwan: An Analytical Study of its Perceptions’, in Political Dynamics of Punjab, eds Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981), pp. 67–81. See also D. Petrie, ‘Recent Developments in Sikh Politics’, PPP 4, part 2 (October 1970): 302–79. This comprehensive report was compiled in August 1911. (63.) Ruchi Ram Sahni, Struggle for Reform in Sikh Shrines, ed. Ganda Singh (Amritsar: SGPC, n.d.), pp. 45–7. (64.) It is interesting to note that in 1911 Sardar Jogendra Singh as the Home Minister of Patiala had expressed his opposition to separate electorates for giving rise to ill feelings between Hindus and Muslims. Kirpal Singh (ed.), Hardinge Papers Relating to Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2002), pp. 67–8. (65.) S.D. Pradhan, ‘Indian Army and the First World War’, in India and World War I, eds Devitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1978), pp. 49–67. (66.) Pradhan, ‘The Sikh Soldier in the First World War’, in India and World War I, pp. 213–25. (67.) Sahni, Memoirs, p. 118. For judgment on the Lahore Conspiracy case during the Martial Law, see ‘The Judgment of Lahore Conspiracy Case, Decided by the General Summary Court Martial, Lahore on 5th July 1919’, PPP 15, part 2 (October 1981): 374–406. (68.) Harbans Singh, ‘Fragments from Giani Kartar Singh’s Memoirs’, in Giani Kartar Singh: A Commemorative Volume, ed. Jasdev Singh Sandhu (Patiala: S. Jasdev Singh Sandhu Foundation, 2001), pp. 25–6. (69.) Narain Singh, Jathedar Kartar Singh Jhabbar, [1959] 1967, pp. 34–56. (70.) Sukhmani Bal Riar, The Politics and History of the Central Sikh League 1919–1929 (Chandigarh: Unistar, 2006), pp. 15–22. (71.) A large volume of historical literature has been produced on the Indian States, including the Punjab states. We need not go into detail. A ccouple of works which are most relevant would be the following: for the growing concept of paramountcy and the changes in British attitudes towards the Indian Princely States, Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of the Empire 1917– Page 32 of 33

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Colonial Rule and the Sikhs 1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject, Barbara N. Ramusack, The Indian Princes and Their States (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. III, part 6) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (1885–1919) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0004

Abstract and Keywords In the early 1890s, Master Tara Singh (Nanak Chand) was so impressed by the stories of Singh martyrs that he thought of becoming a Keshdhārī Singh. Initiated by Sant Attar Singh in 1901, Master Tara Singh decided to dedicate his life to the service of the Sikh Panth. After the government took over the management of Khalsa College, Amritsar, he began to participate in all antigovernment agitations. As Head Master of Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, he was closely associated with the group of Sikh leaders who were more radical than the Chief Khalsa Diwan. His sympathy with the ‘Canadian’ Sikhs, and his interest in the Komagata Maru voyage and the Budge Budge firing made him all the more anti-British. His familiarity with gurbāṇī, Sikh history, and Punjabi literature was reflected in his controversy with the Arya Samaj leaders. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Keshdhārī Singh, Sant Attar Singh, Sikh Panth, Khalsa College Amritsar, Chief Khalsa Diwan, Komagata Maru voyage, gurbāṇī, Sikh history, Arya Samaj

Master Tara Singh was thirty-five years old when politics became his full-time vocation. He spent about twelve years of his early life in his native village. Subsequently, for six years he lived mostly in the city of Rawalpindi, studying in a Christian missionary high school. For graduate studies he spent four years at Khalsa College in Amritsar and a year at the Central Training College in Lahore. He became the headmaster of Khalsa High School at Lyallpur in 1908 at the age of twenty-three. For about twelve years he headed three high schools. He also responded to the misconceptions and misrepresentations of Sikh religion and Page 1 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh history in the Arya periodicals. During these thirty-five years Master Tara Singh imbibed the spirit of the Singh Sabha movement, developed an interest in journalism, and came to have an acute political awareness.

Childhood and School Education ‘Master Tara Singh’s life was shaped by the unseen forces of the times,’ says his younger brother, Niranjan Singh. Tara Singh’s birth in a poor family of an obscure village, his initiation into the Khalsa faith, and his education at Khalsa College, Amritsar, appeared to be the result of propulsion by an unknown power. Nevertheless, Niranjan Singh tries consciously to place Master Tara Singh in the changing historical situations of his life.1 Born on 24 June 1885 in Harial, a village in Tehsil Gujjar Khan, the only plain area in the Rawalpindi district, Master Tara Singh was initially named Nanak Chand. Harial was a village of ‘Harial’ Brahmans, not far from Mandra station on the North-Western Railway from Lahore to Rawalpindi. Nanak Chand’s father’s great-grandfather, a Malhotra Khatri, (p.63) had settled there, and his descendants after four generations consisted of about fifteen families who lived in separate houses in a small muhallā of the village. Though they were Sikhs of Guru Nanak, their way of life was no different from that of the Hindus. There were two dharamsāls in the village on opposite sides of a small gorge: one was that of the Brahmans and the other of the Khatris. Guru Granth Sahib was installed in both the dharamsāls, to be looked after by two granthīs called ‘Bhais’. All the residents of the village thought of themselves as ‘Hindus’, though they followed the practices of ‘Sahajdhārī Sikhs’.2 The term ‘Sikh’ was reserved for the Keshdhārī Singhs of Guru Gobind Singh. Nanak Chand’s father, Gopi Chand, was a patwari, known as Bakhshi. So respected was he for his staunch commitment to truthfulness that the people would have accepted his arbitration even in a dispute involving his own brother. Nanak Chand’s mother, Mulan Devi, was a Sehgal Khatri. She had learnt the Japujī, the Kīrtan Sohilā, and some other shabads from Bhai Arjan Singh, the dharamsāliā of the Khatris, who was the only ‘Sikh’ in the village. He used to teach Mulan Devi one line of gurbāṇī on his daily round to collect food from the village households for the dharamsāl. Apart from keeping the house clean and washing clothes when necessary, she used to work daily at the grindstone and the spinning wheel. Nanak Chand had one sister and three brothers; their names were chosen from the Granth Sāhib.3 The first thing that stood out in Master Tara Singh’s memory of his childhood was a small incident. His mother had stopped breastfeeding; she used to feel annoyed whenever he sat in her lap for suckling. One day she said, ‘Stop it you old ox.’ This taunt resulted in a strong dislike for milk that lasted throughout Master Tara Singh’s life. Another thing that he remembered was that his father’s widowed sister used to tell him stories of Hindu gods and goddesses. At the Page 2 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh same time she used to talk about God (Vāhegurū) who had no form, no colour, no eyes, no nose, no ears, no arms, no head, and no legs and yet he saw, heard, and knew everything, remaining unseen. All this was confirmed by his mother. His father’s sister told him further that one could meet God by reciting ‘Vāhegurū, Vāhegurū all the time. She told the story of Dhanna Bhagat who had met God through a weighing stone. Nanak Chand brought home a piece of stone with a white line (supposed to be the sacred thread of the deity), and also thought of eating no food (until it was eaten by the deity in the piece of stone), but he did not do so for fear of his father. The Brahman and Khatri boys of Harial used to discuss whether devī (goddess) or Guru Nanak was greater. In view of their opposing assertions, Nanak Chand asked his mother and she said that Guru Nanak was greater.4 In 1892 Nanak Chand joined the primary school at Harnal, a village of ‘Harnal’ Brahmans, about two and a half kilometres from his village. Only ten or twelve boys of his village used to go to this school, which probably was a small school. Master Tara Singh refers to only one teacher, Munshi Kanayya Lal. He was a terror for the boys because of the harsh and callous way in which he treated them. Almost the whole day was spent in the school but the time actually spent in study was no more than two hours. The midday recess was the only time of relief when the boys ate rotīs with an onion and pickle or a piece of jaggery brought from home. The only refreshing element in the situation was the cool drinking water which the boys drank at the home of the village Numbardar (headman), Piara, on (p.64) their way home. Though Nanak Chand used to stand first in his class, the school remained a frightening place for him.5 What influenced Nanak Chand the most at this stage had nothing to do with his school. In the dharamsāl of Harial, Bhai Arjan Singh, the granthī, started kathā of the Panth Prakāsh. He used to read it, and what he read was explained by Bakhshi Meghraj Singh, an elder cousin of Nanak Chand’s father, who was the only ‘Sikh’ in the Khatri brotherhood of Harial. Nanak Chand used to repeat to his mother whatever he heard in the dharamsāl. He was much impressed and inspired by the stories of Sikh martyrs and valiant Sikh warriors. The idea of becoming a ‘Sikh’, a Keshdhārī Singh of Guru Gobind Singh, was planted in his mind.6 Jaswant Singh mentions that Bakhshi Gopi Chand and his brothers used to wash the feet of Brahmans at the time of shrādhs before offering them food. All members of the family would eat only after the Brahmans had been fed. Once Nanak Chand began to eat lūchīs and kaṛāh before the arrival of the Brahmans. His father’s sister complained to Bakhshi Gopi Chand. He told her to remain quiet and asked Nanak Chand not to do so openly. Nanak Chand, however, went on eating. ‘The Brahmans are not better than myself,’ he said. Similarly, Nanak Chand showed no respect to those who claimed to be ‘Gurus’. Baba Khem Singh Bedi used to go to Harial every year to stay in the dharamsāl of the Brahmans Page 3 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh who served him well. Nanak Chand used to sit in the dharamsāl of the Khatris, located right opposite to that of the Brahmans, to recite loudly for Baba Khem Singh to hear a verse of Guru Nanak to the effect that he who called himself Guru or Pir and went to beg deserved no homage; only he who worked hard to earn his livelihood and gave something to others could recognize the true path.7 After studying till class five at Harnal, in 1897 Nanak Chand joined the Mission High School at Rawalpindi and studied there for six years. Rawalpindi had gained importance as a town after 1765 when it was occupied by Sardar Milkha Singh. It was here that the Sikh army under Sardar Chattar Singh and Raja Sher Singh had finally laid down their arms on 14 March 1849 when a Sikh soldier was overheard saying: ‘Today Maharaja Ranjit Singh has died.’ The British added a cantonment in 1851, and a Christian mission was established at Rawalpindi in 1856. In 1879 the North-Western Railway was extended to the city, which increased its commercial importance. Its population around 1900 was about 87,000. More than half of its inhabitants lived in the city which had a separate municipality. As the headquarters of a district and a division, Rawalpindi had the courts of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, the treasury, and the jail, besides a circuit house, a civil hospital, the railway station, the telegraph office, and a church. There was also a distillery. There was a municipal garden, the garden of Rai Bahadur Sujan Singh, and the library of Sardar Hardit Singh. There was also the tank of Mai Veero. The Gordon Mission College had also come into existence.8 An Arya Samaj and a Singh Sabha had been established in competition with the Christian missions. There was, thus, a great change in the immediate environment for Nanak Chand. Nanak Chand’s elder brother, his cousin, and some of their friends used to live in rented rooms in the Sheranwali Saran in Rawalpindi. They used to go to the dharamsāl of Bhagat Jawala where the bhagat and some boys led the others in singing shabads. (p.65) On Sundays they used to go to the Singh Sabha which was rather new at that time. All this increased Nanak Chand’s interest in the Sikh faith. His father and eldest brother were opposed to his idea of initiation of the double-edged sword, though they regarded themselves as Sikhs. Once his mother said in some context, ‘We are sewaks of the Guru’s house.’ His father said angrily, ‘We are not sewaks, we are Sikhs.’ Nanak Chand stood first in the ‘junior special’ and returned to the village before joining the sixth class.9 The ‘junior special’ was presumably meant for learning English which was not taught in the Harnal primary school. In 1897–8 there was a good deal of debate and discussion among the protagonists of Christianity, the Arya Samaj, and the Singh Sabha. The Hindus were turning increasingly to the Arya Samaj and the Sikhs to the Singh Sabha. The Sanatan Dharmis were the losers in this war of words and they were becoming weaker and weaker. They were temporarily helped by ‘a flood of devīs’ in Rawalpindi. Most of them came from Kunjah in the Gujrat district. Parents of Page 4 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh certain young girls, or their guardians, took them from place to place and they were called devīs. It was believed that they could restore the tongues cut off by their devotees. Nanak Chand personally knew of ‘a pujārī friend’ who had cut off his tongue. He also saw a devī on the roof of the Sheranwali Saran where a huge crowd had gathered to see her. On the day following when he went to the school he found that only a Sanatanist teacher was defending the devī whereas all the others, including Christians, Arya Samajists, and Singh Sabhaites, were denouncing her as a fraud. There were rumours in the city that a devī had restored the tongue of ‘our pujārī friend’, and another that Lala Bishambar Das, a rich magnate of the city, who was lying on his deathbed, donated Rs 500 to a devī who restored him to health. Nanak Chand was much impressed by the devīs. Later on he learnt that Lala Bishambar Das had died, and the pujārī was still without his tongue. Nanak Chand was finally disillusioned. The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar sent a devī and her two guardians into police custody and this put an end to the devī phenomenon.10 Though the school in Rawalpindi was a Christian institution, its headmaster was a Sikh, Master Bishan Singh. The teacher of the Bible appeared to Nanak Chand to be highly incompetent, and the boys used to tease him. One day he distributed the Gospel of Luke in Urdu, but the one he used to teach was the Gospel of Mathews. There were differences of detail between the two, and the boys began to say that the Bible was a false scripture. The teacher went to the headmaster to complain. Master Bishan Singh came into the class and saw papers scattered all over the floor. The boys had torn copies of the Gospel given to them, and they were all punished, except Nanak Chand: he had given his copy to a fellow student in another section of the class. Nanak Chand used to stand first in all the subjects in all the house examinations of the middle school. In 1901, in the final examination of class eight, which was conducted by the University, he stood first in the whole district and got a scholarship.11 In class nine, Nanak Chand was left alone in Rawalpindi because his elder brother, who had accepted a job, was transferred from Rawalpindi. Nanak Chand began to live in the Khalsa Boarding House. All the other boys were Sikh, and they used to go to the Singh Sabha. Nanak Chand used to go with them. The superintendent of the boarding house was Bhai Ram Rakha Singh who later became head clerk in Khalsa College, Amritsar. Jodh (p.66) Singh, who later became the principal of the College, was a resident of the boarding house, but not as a student. He was employed in some job and he was older than all the other boys. Both Ram Rakha Singh and Jodh Singh tried to persuade Nanak Chand to become a ‘Sikh’. As a result he was inclined to be initiated as a Singh.12 In Merī Yād (My Recollection) Master Tara Singh recalls that he had gone to his village (in 1901) and when he was to return to Rawalpindi he was accompanied by eight or ten other boys of the village who intended to go to Dera Khalsa Page 5 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh where Sant Attar Singh was staying at that time. When they all came to Mandra station, where Nanak Chand was to part with them, they persuaded him to go with them. Instead of boarding the train he went to Dera Khalsa. There they thought of taking amrit. All of them, except Nanak Chand, his elder brother, and their cousin, were already keshdhārī. All of them received amrit from Sant Attar Singh. Nanak Chand was given the new name Tara Singh. Ganga Ram, his eldest brother, was angry with him but he never wanted Tara Singh to discard his new form. In fact, he himself was initiated later to become Ganga Singh. Master Tara Singh says that this was the second important event in his life that changed his worldview. The first was the kathā of the Panth Parkāsh.13 Durlab Singh refers to Sant Attar Singh as ‘perhaps the greatest Sikh saint and the most selfless Sikh missionary’ of the twentieth century.14 Sant Attar Singh was a protagonist of Sikh resurgence. Born in 1866 in Cheema village of the Patiala State, he had joined an artillery unit of the Indian army in 1883 but was transferred to an infantry battalion. He took pahul and received the basic instruction in the Khalsa rahit. In 1888 his battalion was transferred from Kohat to Dera Ghazi Khan. Without taking leave, he went to Abchal Nagar (Nander) for pilgrimage. When he learnt that he was being treated as an abscondee, he returned to Abbotabad and met the Colonel of the battalion. He was detained in the quarter-guard but the Colonel soon became convinced that his spiritual quest was genuine and relieved him from service. He stayed at several places in the Sindh Sagar Doab, perfecting his religious life. People began to recognize him as a spiritual person. He started preaching in the Pothohar area, administering amrit. Bhai Jodh Singh had taken pahul from him in Kahuta. Around 1,900 the Sant visited Amritsar and performed kīrtan at the Harmandar Sahib. When he returned to the Rawalpindi area he stayed at Dera Khalsa, close to Harial, and people of Pothohar flocked to him.15 In an issue of the Akālī Patrikā on Sant Attar Singh, Master Tara Singh recalled that at the time of his initiation at Dera Khalsa the Sant was a tall handsome figure about thirty years old. He used to recite shabads in a loud melodious voice. Having seen Sant Ji, Nanak Chand decided to take amrit from him. He was given the name Tara Singh, a new star to shine in the world. ‘The great change in my life,’ says Master Tara Singh, ‘came on meeting Sant Attar Singh Ji Maharaj’. Harbouring special affection for Sant Ji, he came into close contact with him in later life and met him many a time to stay with him for days. He discovered that Sant Attar Singh was completely free from the five adversaries of man: kām, krodh, lobh, moh, and hankār. This was the only criterion for a worldly person to assess a sant. Master Tara Singh discussed political matters too with Sant Attar Singh and found that he had intense love for the Sikh faith and the Sikh Panth.16

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (p.67) A moral injunction given by Sant Attar Singh to Tara Singh at the time of his initiation was reinforced by two books which he received in prize at the Missionary School: Character by Dr Smile and The Student’s Manual by Dr Todd. The thrust of these books was against sensual pleasures. Master Tara Singh goes on to add that earlier he had a wrong impression that the English people did not uphold high morals. He still thought that the lure of Western culture could lead young people into wrong paths. He appreciated the Singh Sabha movement for putting a stop to the performance of dance by professional female dancers.17 Unlike the Singh Sabha, the Arya Samaj in Rawalpindi was very influential. Swami Dayananad had held a debate in Rawalpindi and subjected the local Sanatanist purohit to much ridicule. Pandit Lekh Ram was an active member of the Samaj, and he was ‘out and out anti-Muslim’, resorting to invectives when he lectured on Islam or its prophet. Bhagat Lakshman Singh, who knew Pandit Lekh Ram, was not surprised when he heard years later that he met a violent end at the hands of a Muslim in Lahore. Another active member of the Rawalpindi Arya Samaj was Lala Hans Raj who was a cultured man and respected even by Muslims. He was respectful towards the Granth Sahib.18 Tara Singh used to debate frequently with the young Aryas. Always active in games and sports, Tara Singh became very fond of football at the High School. In fact, he became ‘famous’ as a football player. A football match in those days was a kind of battle, and he was indifferent to injuries received or inflicted. His body was hard and he came to be called wattā (a weighing stone). Much of his time was taken up by sports. He did reasonably well in his matriculation examination but not so well as to get a scholarship.19

At Amritsar for Graduation Tara Singh was keen to attend college. His brothers wanted him to join the Medical College at Lahore. A few friends of his brother were already studying there. The principal of the college, Brown Sahib, was favourably inclined towards the Sikhs. But Tara Singh did not join the crowd of candidates who rushed into the college gallery to occupy the front seats. In fact, he was not keen to get admitted. Principal Brown selected candidates just by looking at them. He selected several Sikh boys quite deliberately, but Tara Singh was not conspicuous enough to attract his notice because of his short stature.20 Tara Singh’s father had died in 1901. His eldest brother, Ganga Singh, was working as an accountant, earning Rs 30 a month. Younger to him was Sant Singh who was keeping a small shop in Harial. The family owned a small piece of land which was given on batāī to receive some grain for home consumption. Both the elder brothers were married. Their only sister, who was elder to them, had also been married. Apart from their mother, there were two widowed aunts in the family. The two younger brothers, Tara Singh and Niranjan Singh, were studying. Ganga Singh had to shoulder almost the entire burden of the Page 7 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh household. He was nonetheless keen that Tara Singh should go to a college for further studies. In this situation Bhai Ram Rakha Singh and Bhai Jodh Singh came to Tara Singh’s help. On their recommendation to their patron, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia, Tara Singh got admission into the Khalsa College, Amritsar, and he was given a scholarship of Rs 8 a month.21 (p.68) The Khalsa College was in its early phase when Tara Singh joined it in 1903. Its foundation stone had been laid on 5 March 1892 by Sir James Broadwood Lyall, Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Its management was entrusted to a council of over a hundred members with an Executive Committee of thirty. Early in April, Dr William H. Rattigan became President of the council and Sardar Attar Singh of Bhadaur was made its Vice-President. Bhai Jawahar Singh Kapur was elected Secretary of the council. School classes were started in 1893 and college classes in 1897. A Religious Instructions Committee was appointed in 1899. There were only four buildings in the college premises in 1903: the gurdwara, the principal’s house, a college hostel, and a school hostel. The college and school classes were held in the dormitories of the college hostel. The total strength of teachers was twenty-four, and only five of them were graduates. Sir Charles Montgomery Rivaz, the Lieutenant Governor, visited the college in April 1903, expressed his wish to raise the Khalsa College to the enviable status of the Aitchison College at Lahore, and emphasized the desirability of speedy construction of its main building.22 Sir Lewis Tupper, Vice Chancellor of the Punjab University, was favourably impressed by the college during his visit in March 1904 for two reasons: games were compulsory, and all Sikh students had to attend daily service in the gurdwara. An All-India Sikh Conference was held in the college on the day of Baisakhi in 1904. The President for the morning darbār, in which more than 10,000 people were present, was Maharaja Hira Singh of Nabha. He was accompanied by the crown prince, Tikka Ripudaman Singh. A printed appeal emphasized the urgent need of money for the main building, additional teachers, introduction of classes in agriculture, engineering, and drawing, and the programme of military training. Bhai Kahn Singh, the former tutor of Tikka Ripudaman Singh and a trusted official of Nabha, addressed the audience on behalf of the Maharaja. He referred to Lord Curzon’s hope expressed at Sangrur in November 1903 that the Sikh states and principal members of the Sikh community would support the excellent institution of the Khalsa College with money to ensure ‘the future prospects of the Sikh race’. Bhai Kahn Singh said that if the Sikhs wanted their nation to become educated, civilized, and enlightened, their only option was to contribute generously towards the funds of the college. The total amount of contributions announced by the Sikh states and a few eminent Sikhs was more than 16 lakhs (1 lakh equals 100,000).23

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Sir Charles Rivaz gave away prizes in the second session and exhorted the whole community to support the institution. He also announced a grant of Rs 50,000 to the building fund. Later in the year he laid the foundation-stone of the main building, and admired the architectural design for its beauty. He congratulated Sardar Ram Singh, Vice-Principal of the Mayo School of Arts, Lahore, for his artistic skill and labour of love in producing such a marvellous design worthy of the great Sikh institution.24 The construction of the college building was supervised by Sardar Dharam Singh who had willingly responded to the request of the Managing Committee and offered to serve in an honorary capacity. In 1905 Sardar Niranjan Singh Mehta joined the college as second Professor of English. He was the person who was later initiated by Sant Attar Singh and renamed Teja Singh, and who eventually came to be known as Sant Teja Singh. Bhai Jodh Singh was appointed as the (p.69) first Professor of Divinity on 1 June 1905. The Prince of Wales visited the college towards the end of the year.25 Inspired by the ideals of the Lahore Singh Sabha and patronized by the watchful British bureaucracy, the college was developing into a good institution of the Sikhs. In 1906, however, Major John Hill, a member of the Managing Committee, ridiculed the ideal of service, with reference to the honorary services of Sardar Dharam Singh, mentioning that ‘labour of love’ was ‘nonsense’. This was resented by the Sikh members, and eventually it produced a commotion among the students. The bureaucracy viewed it as a sign of disaffection and thought of keeping the young Sikhs away from politics. In January 1907 Charles Rivaz came to the college apparently to inspect the building under construction. A meeting of the Managing Committee was held on the same day at which the President, Justice Rattigan, stated that the Lieutenant Governor wanted a thoroughly competent engineer to supervise the work. The President proposed to dispense with the services of Sardar Dharam Singh, and the resolution was seconded by Major Hill. This was resented by the teachers and students of the college. The students agitated when a European engineer replaced Sardar Dharam Singh. The Government was obliged to find a Sikh substitute.26 An inspection committee appointed by the Punjab University pointed out that the Managing Committee of the college had no legal standing in the light of the Universities Act passed by Lord Curzon. Sir Louis Dane, the new Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, appointed a committee for advice on the revision of the fundamental rules of the college. The draft rules prepared by the committee were approved by the Government in May 1908, and eventually adopted by the Executive Committee with minor modifications. According to the new Constitution, the council consisted of fifty-eight members. Five of these were to be nominated by the Government and twenty-five by the Sikh states; twenty-six were to be selected from the British districts of the Punjab, and two were to be elected by Sikh graduates of three years’ standing. The Managing Committee consisted of seventeen members, with the Commissioner of Lahore Division as Page 9 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh its President, and the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar as its Vice-President. When the college came under the control of the bureaucracy, the threat of disaffiliation disappeared. Sir Louis Dane visited the college in 1908, and Lord Minto in 1909.27 Evidently, the Punjab Government was anxious to keep under its control this growing educational institution of the Sikhs, just like what they had done with the religious institutions. Tara Singh used to stand first it the college in the quarterly tests in religious studies and got a scholarship. He also stood first in his class in the Faculty of Arts examination and got scholarship from the college but he did not get any position in the university. He used to play football and hockey. The hockey team of the college was more successful in university tournaments. Therefore, Tara Singh was better known as a hockey player. The game was rather rough in those days, and Tara Singh played aggressively. He came to be known as ‘stone’ (paththar). This was an independent confirmation of his reputation in Rawalpindi where he was known as wattā.28 In 1904 Tara Singh married the daughter of Sardar Mangat Singh of the village Dhamial near Rawalpindi. All the members of the marriage party were monās with the exception of Ganga Singh, the elder brother of Tara Singh. On the bride’s side, however, (p.70) everyone was a Keshdhārī Singh. At the time of anand kāraj, Tara Singh asked whether or not the bride had been initiated. She was not. Tara Singh now insisted that she must take amrit before the marriage ceremony. Many people tried to impress upon him that she would take amrit on the day following, but he remained adamant. At last the bride’s father sent someone to Rawalpindi to bring five ‘Singhs’ from the Singh Sabha. The panjpiārās came and administered pahul to the bride, and only then was the marriage ceremony by the Sikh rite performed.29 She was given the new name of Tej Kaur. In Rawalpindi, after his initiation into the Khalsa order, Tara Singh used to recite the five prescribed bāṇīs every day before breakfast. His enthusiasm was strengthened in a way by the presence of the Arya Samajist boys in the school with whom he used to have engaging discussions. Even outside the school he would be involved in one or another kind of religious debate. In Khalsa College at Amritsar he continued his daily routine (nitnem) of the recitation of five bāṇīs for several months. Most of the students, however, did not recite any bāṇī. Participation in the Rahirās in the evening was compulsory for all students, and they used to recite ‘the ten savvayyās’ together. Tara Singh was foremost in the sports and, therefore, came to be regarded as the leader of other students. In the beginning he used to go to the gurdwara every day and would persuade others to do the same. Gradually, however, he was affected by the situation around him. The players in particular used to miss attendance at the gurdwara without being marked absent. The main reason for Tara Singh’s indifference to

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh daily religious routine was his love of sports. This did not mean, however, that his faith in Sikhism had weakened.30 In those days, recalls Master Tara Singh, the Arya Samaj and the Singh Sabha were suspect in the eyes of the Government. The Aryas were supposed to be more firm in their opposition to the Government, but now they tried to project themselves as loyalists. In the meetings of the Singh Sabhas too, loyalty used to be expressed in explicit terms. In his early life Nanak Chand had heard from his father such praises of ‘General Nicholson’ (who had created the ‘Moving Column’ during the 1857 Rebellion, famous for its marches and reaching the right spot at the right time ) that he had come to see the English in a favourable light. Till 1906 the students generally used to be in favour of the British rulers, but events took such a turn in 1906–7 that the attitude of a large number of people towards the British changed radically from admiration to denunciation, and even opposition. Master Tara Singh goes on to say that towards the end of 1906 and at the beginning of 1907 began a great agitation against the partition of Bengal. There was a great emphasis on boycott of foreign goods and on swadeshī. He remembered that many students of Government College, Lahore, had broken their electric lamps and had begun to study in the light of earthen lamps.31 Master Tara Singh refers to two important events in connection with the agitation of 1907. He mentions the new laws proposed for the lower Rachna Doab, imposing several kinds of restrictions on the zamīndārs. The leaders of the agitation over the Bill were Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai. They were both Arya Samajists but the agitation was started by Sikh and Muslim landholders. The Sikhs were generally supposed to be more aggressive and their participation in agitations was deemed to be important for success. During this agitation they were specially incited to (p.71) action. The Chief Khalsa Diwan leader Sardar Harbans Singh Atari joined the agitation. The Government deported Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai. While the Arya Samaj passed a resolution declaring that Lajpat Rai was not an Arya Samajist, the Zamindara Committee of Lyallpur approached the Deputy Commissioner to express its loyalty to the Government. The agitation soon fizzled out.32 The other event of 1907 mentioned by Master Tara Singh was related to the growing bureaucratic interference in the affairs of Khalsa College, Amritsar. As mentioned before, the college engineer, Sardar Dharam Singh, was removed at the instance of a British member of the Managing Committee. The Chief Khalsa Diwan encouraged the students to protest. They started agitating and formed a committee for this purpose. Tara Singh was its president. This agitation got connected with both the Bar agitation and swadeshī. When Gopal Krishan Gokhale came to Amritsar in 1907 the boys of Khalsa College pulled his carriage in a huge procession.33

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh According to Bhagat Lakshman Singh, a few months after Gokhale’s visit, a special meeting of the Managing Committee was held to approve a revised constitution. In this draft, old glaring defects were retained, like the appointment of members for life without them having to pay any subscription. The names of men like Bhagat Lakshman Singh, who had opposed the Amritsar group, were actually omitted altogether. He was not over-anxious to continue as a member of the Management Committee because he had come to regard the Khalsa College ‘as a Government College minus Government discipline’. No member had a free hand and it was idle to think of doing any constructive work without the prior sanction of the Government. Bhagat Lakshman Singh was not happy with the virtual transfer of management from the Lahore leaders to the loyalist Chief Khalsa Diwan. He pointed out that there was no quorum and a meeting could not be held. But this proved to be a cry in the wilderness. In fact, he came to be seen as an opponent of the Government.34 Master Sunder Singh Lyallpuri says that he was provoked by Major Hill’s remark on Sardar Dharam Singh’s honorary service to write a pamphlet: Kī Khalsa College Sikhān dā Hai? (Does Khalsa College Belong to the Sikhs?) This pamphlet was distributed at the time of the Sikh Educational Conference at Lahore. The organizers of the conference complained to Khazan Singh Suri, ‘manager’ of the Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, who was present in the conference. Khazan Singh told Master Sunder Singh to stop the distribution. On returning to Lyallpur, Master Sunder Singh resigned from his position as a teacher in the school. In this pamphlet Master Sunder Singh refers to Ajit Singh’s Amānat Mein Khiānat (Betrayal of Trust) to suggest that the British had taken over the Khalsa College in trust but they would never return it, just as they had done with Maharaja Dalip Singh’s kingdom. Sunder Singh’s pamphlet was banned and a copy was sent by the Punjab Government to the Secretary of State for India.35 Master Tara Singh says that he left the college after the BA examination in April 1907, and there was no other influential leader among the students. The Government blamed the Chief Khalsa Diwan. The members from the Sikh states were under the influence of the Government. With their support, the whole constitution of the college was changed. Bhai Jodh Singh and another teacher were removed from service. In Master Tara Singh’s view, Bhai Jodh Singh did (p.72) encourage the students to agitate but not Master Narain Singh. He was merely a sympathizer. The Khalsa College came under full control of the Government which filled Tara Singh’s mind with anger: ‘From that day,’ he says, ‘I became an opponent of the Government and ever since I have participated with enthusiasm in all the anti-Government agitations.’36 Tara Singh’s stay at Khalsa College, Amritsar, had a lasting effect on his life.

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh An Educationist with Interest in Public Affairs As a form of reaction to the taking over of Khalsa College by the British administrators, Tara Singh joined the Training College at Lahore to qualify for teaching. Before the examination of the Senior Anglo-Vernacular Course for teachers, Tara Singh discussed with his class fellows Bishan Singh and Sunder Singh the idea of opening a Khalsa school. At that time there was a Khalsa school only in Gujranwala, apart from the one in Amritsar. The Arya Samajists had provided leadership to the Sikhs in the agitation of 1907 in the Lyallpur district, and they were thinking of opening a high school at Lyallpur. Tara Singh and his friends offered their teaching services for a year to the Bar Khalsa Diwan at Rs 15 a month if a high school was opened at Lyallpur. Their offer was accepted and Khalsa High School was started at Lyallpur in 1908. At that time, trained Sikh graduates were so few that Tara Singh was made its headmaster at the age of twenty-three.37 There were financial difficulties in running the school. Master Tara Singh used to collect funds from the villages of Lyallpur district during the vacations. Sardar Khazan Singh (Suri), Bar at Law, was Secretary of the management committee and he used to donate a fourth of his annual income to the school. When he left the school, the responsibility of collecting funds devolved upon three members of the school committee: Sardar Teja Singh Samundri, Sardar Bishan Singh of Singhpura, and Sardar Sunder Singh of Chak No. 213. Apart from these three, Jamadar Sadhu Singh, Babu Tripat Singh, Sardar Hari Singh, all hailing from Chak No. 41, and Sardar Harchand Singh of Chak No. 220 also took interest in collecting funds.38 Initially the school was started in a rented house. Sunder Singh says that he met Dev Dutt, who was running a boarding house with a large number of Sikh boys and persuaded him to hand over the building to him. The Khalsa High School was started in this building in 1908.39 Then Sardar Jawand Singh donated land for the school on the road from Lyallpur to Jaranwala, close to the Rakh Branch of the Lower Chenab canal. In a couple of years buildings were constructed. Every one worked in a spirit of service. In a few years Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, became one of the foremost schools in the Punjab. The school had good playing grounds. The gurdwara of the school was well attended and there was a good deal of interest in Sikh maryādā.40 This educational movement brought a small group of dedicated individuals together, with Master Tara Singh as an inspiring member if not actually the leader. His increasing influence made him suspect in the eyes of the local administrators. His role as a student leader in Khalsa College, Amritsar, and his attitude of independence were not appreciated by the officials. As Headmaster of the Khalsa High School, he never went to meet the Deputy Commissioner of

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Lyallpur of his own accord. Consequently, no grant was given to the school by the Government.41 (p.73) During these years Master Tara Singh came to associate himself with Ajit Singh who had been released by the Government. The basis of their friendship was their common opposition to British rule. Ajit Singh’s hostility towards the British was well known. In his lecture at Rawalpindi in April 1907, which left a vivid impression on Hira Singh Dard (later to become a well-known journalist) and proved to be a turning point in his life, Ajit Singh had told the people present in a loud and clear voice to face the British imperial oppression with courage. ‘Today the peasants of the Bar are sought to be strangled by black legislation,’ he said, ‘and tomorrow it would be your turn to suffer a similar blow. If you want to put an end to your woes, you must unite as brothers, all Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs, against the slavery of the British and come forward to free the country.’42 According to his colleague Sunder Singh, Master Tara Singh was associated with two other important ventures. One was the publication of Sachā Dhandorā in 1909–10 and then in 1914, a weekly which was anti-Government in its tone and content. It was edited for some time by a friend of Master Tara Singh. It is very probable that Master Tara Singh himself contributed articles to this weekly. The other was the ceremony of anand kāraj as a distinctly Sikh form of marriage. Lala Harkishan Lal Gauba approached Master Tara Singh and Sunder Singh with the request that he might be married according to the Sikh practice. They prepared a manual for the performance of marriage among the Sahajdhārī Sikhs. Hakishan Lal’s marriage was performed in accordance with this manual. Another interesting thing mentioned by Sunder Singh is that they used to go to the canal for picnics on Sundays and Master Tara Singh used to cook excellent mutton for the whole party.43 The activity that made Master Tara Singh a confirmed suspect in the eyes of the officials was his connection with the Canadian Sikhs: Bhai Balwant Singh, Bhai Narain Singh, and Bhai Nand Singh. They had gone to England to seek relief from the new restrictions on immigration to Canada. No one listened to this delegation in England. They came to the Punjab. A meeting was held in Amritsar under the chairmanship of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. When Bhai Balwant Singh gave expression to the grievances of the Sikhs in Canada, Majithia stopped him in his speech. Another meeting held in Lahore by the Congress had no effect either. No other meeting was held for a month. On Master Tara Singh’s suggestion, his friends brought the three deputationists to Lyallpur. Bhai Nand Singh was an old friend of Master Tara Singh from the Khalsa College days. But this was not the only or the primary reason for Master Tara Singh’s interest in the deputation. He knew that the Sikhs of Canada had been sending money to support Panthic institutions, and they had now appealed to the Sikhs of the Punjab for support. From Lyallpur, Master Tara Singh took Page 14 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh the deputationists to Rawalpindi, Gujjar Khan, and other places. With his support, meetings were held at several places and resolutions passed in support of the Canadian Sikhs.44 The treatment of Sikhs in Canada by its Government was the second factor after the episode of Khalsa College and the Bar agitation which, according to Master Tara Singh, alienated the Sikhs from the British. He goes into some detail. The years 1913 and 1914 were marked by important developments. In Canada, Bhai Parmanand and Lala Har Dayal were inciting the Sikhs to agitate against the British. Meanwhile, Baba Gurdit Singh (p.74) hired a Japanese ship called the Komagata Maru to carry the Sikhs directly from India to Canada for meeting the condition imposed by a new law of immigration. But the passengers were not allowed to disembark. The Sikhs in Canada protested. The Canadian Government worked out a settlement with Baba Gurdit Singh. The passengers of the Komagata Maru were given the expense of their travel and returned to Calcutta. On the voyage, the Sikhs protested wherever the ship stopped. It finally reached Budge Budge. The intention of the Government was to send all the Sikh passengers to the Punjab and not to allow them to stay in Calcutta. They were full of anger, and they had also been incited. They marched from Budge Budge towards the city of Calcutta. The police obliged them to return to the station. There was a clash and one police officer was killed. About thirty-five to forty Sikhs were also killed due to heavy firing by the police.45 Hira Singh Dard, who used to meet Master Tara Singh in these years, refers to the attitude of the Punjab Government towards the sympathizers of the Sikhs who suffered in the Komagata Maru affair. After having passed the Giani examination at Rawalpindi, Dard was teaching in the District Board School at Chak No. 73 (Jhabal-Bhakna). When he read about what had happened to the passengers of the Komagata Maru at Budge Budge he, as Secretary of Gurmat Parcharak Jatha, arranged an Akhand Pāṭh in Chak No. 41 to pray for eternal peace for the martyrs of Budge Budge. An ardās was performed at the end of this continuous recitation of Guru Granth Sahib. A few days later, the local thānedār came to the village and called Hira Singh to ask him why he had arranged an Akhand Pāṭh for ‘traitors’. Hira Singh Dard said that no crime had been proved against the people who had been shot dead, and he saw nothing wrong in what he had done. He was taken to Lyallpur and presented before the English Superintendent of Police who told Hira Singh that he was spreading sedition and, therefore, he was a rebel. Hira Singh maintained that he saw nothing wrong in praying for peace for the dead. He listened quietly to whatever the English officer had to say. Upon escorting him out of the office, the thānedār said that unless he apologized he would lose his job. Hira Singh refused to apologize because there was no crime in sympathizing with his Sikh brethren. He was allowed to go home. He resigned from the District Board School and went to the Khalsa High School at Kallar.46 Page 15 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Master Tara Singh talks also about another ship, the Tosha Maru, which reached India with a large number of Sikhs from Canada. They tried to incite the Sikhs of the Punjab and the Sikh soldiers in the British Indian army to rise in revolt against the British. The Government came to know of their design. Many of the Sikhs were arrested. Some of the soldiers of the Meerut Cantonment were also arrested. They were all tried, and awarded capital punishment or deported. All this led to tension between the Sikhs and the British.47 The differences of the leaders of the Bar Khalsa Diwan with the Chief Khalsa Diwan became clear during the Rakabganj agitation. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia, as the leader of the Sikhs, had given his consent to this project of dismantling the outer wall of the gurdwara to construct a road to the new Viceregal Lodge. The Government did not think it was necessary to consult any other Sikh or Sikh organization. Sardar Harchand Singh of Lyallpur and Bhai Randhir Singh started a movement against the demolition of the wall. The Khalsa weekly was started, and protest meetings were held. The Chief Khalsa Diwan (p.75) tried to dissuade Sardar Harchand Singh, but in vain. Master Sunder Singh refers to the ishtihār issued by Sardar Harchand Singh and gives an account of the meeting held opposite the Jullundur Railway Station, and also of the meeting held by the Chief Khalsa Diwan at Amritsar on 3 May 1914 in which Master Tara Singh was present.48 Soon, however, the World War started, and the Government declared that no further step would be taken with regard to the Rakabganj gurdwara during the war. The Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur called Sardar Harchand Singh to apprise him of the official decision, and the issue was shelved. The Government rightly surmised that Harchand Singh was not alone; he was supported by Master Tara Singh and the whole Bar group. The official attitude towards Khalsa High School became more hostile. Master Tara Singh only mentions that he left Khalsa High School with the idea of going to England as a granthī of the gurdwara, but he could not go because the war had started. However, Niranjan Singh explains that Master Tara Singh had thought of going to London because the official hostility towards Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, was essentially due to his presence, and that was why he had decided to resign in July 1914.49 Before the end of 1914 Master Tara Singh became Headmaster of Khalsa High School at Kallar and stayed there for three years. Bhagat Lakshman Singh, a senior Singh Sabha reformer, had opened a Khalsa Anglo-Vernacular Middle School at Kallar in the late 1890s on the request of its Khatri residents. He had openly allied himself with the ‘enemies’ of Baba Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi, the eldest son of Baba Khem Singh Bedi. With his ‘unbounded influence and authority’ Baba Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi remained opposed to the Khatri Sikhs of Kallar.50 In the second decade of the twentieth century the Khalsa school at Kallar was a high school, but in difficulties. On request of the sangat of Kallar, Page 16 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Sant Teja Singh had taken up its management to place it on a firm footing. He persuaded Baba Gurbakhsh Singh Bedi to join him for this purpose, and he agreed to become President of the Management Committee. But this was not acceptable to the other party. Located in an ordinary type of building taken on rent, the Khalsa High School was receiving no grant from the Government. The salaries of the teachers remained in arrears for months. In spite of all these difficulties, Master Tara Singh served the school as its headmaster with love and patience to become a source of inspiration for all other teachers.51 The Khalsa High School at Kallar had several teachers who became eminent later, like Giani Gurmukh Sikh Musafir, Master Sujan Singh Sarhali, Lal Singh Kamla Akali, and Hira Singh Dard, all inspired by the ideal of service, like Master Tara Singh. Hira Singh says that sometimes they would go out for picnic and Master Tara Singh would generally cook meat on such occasions. Hira Singh deliberately avoided picnics because he had stopped eating meat. Master Tara Singh knew that Hira Singh used to eat meat whenever he visited him at Lyallpur. Pressed by him, Hira Singh had to tell him that Bhai Randhir Singh had administered pahul to Hira Singh in 1914 and, in the name of the panj-piāras, ordered him not to eat meat. Master Tara Singh went to the gurdwara with all the teachers, opened the Granth Sahib for recitation, and after the ardās he said: ‘Listen Giani Hira Singh, we the panj-piārās, the veritable form of the Guru, order you in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib to eat meat because a Sikh who does not eat jhatkā meat is not a true Sikh.’ (p.76) Hira Singh Dard saw the logic of the situation and agreed to eat meat.52 The Bar group was keen that Master Tara Singh should be closer to them. They thought of setting him up as a commission agent (āṛhatiā). It was called ‘Bar Dukan’, a cooperative project with a number of share holders. In less than a year, however, it became clear that Master Tara Singh was not the man for such an enterprise. He was appointed headmaster of Khalsa High School at Chak No. 41. Giani Kartar Singh was a student in the school at this time. In 1920 Master Tara Singh came back to Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, after a gap of about six years.53 Master Tara Singh recalls that the Lucknow Pact of 1916 between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League became an indirect cause of tension between the Sikhs and the Government. No Sikh representative had been invited to participate in the deliberations and no Sikh was present. The understanding reached between the Congress and League leaders was that 50 per cent seats in the Punjab Legislature would be reserved for Muslims. There was no mention of Sikhs in the remaining 50 per cent. The Sikhs expected the Government to modify the formula in favour of the Sikhs because till that time the claims of the Sikhs had never been ignored. In fact, they expected to get a one-third share. Their expectation was heightened due to their support for the British in World War I. But they were ignored by the Government as well as the Page 17 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Congress. A Sikh deputation to the Lieutenant Governor met the Home Member and one of them said that if the Government did not care for the Sikhs they would join the Congress. The Home Member said in reaction that they were free to join the Congress. A Sikh deputation to England proved to be ineffective. On the initiative of the Lieutenant Governor, however, 19 per cent seats were reserved for the Sikhs out of the half meant for Hindus and others. Moreover, additional seats were created for representatives of the university, commerce, and agriculture. Thus, the Muslim share was reduced to less than 50 per cent. The Sikhs, nevertheless, remained resentful.54 Master Tara Singh goes on to add that there was increasing discontent among the Sikhs before the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy and the imposition of Martial Law. The Sikhs suffered more than others in these events. Towards the end of 1919 the Sikh League was formed for the protection of Sikh rights by those Sikh leaders who were regarded as pro-Government earlier. The Sikhs were now turning to the Congress. The Congress session held at Amritsar towards the end of 1919 created great enthusiasm in the Punjab against the Government.55 It may be noted that the slant of Master Tara Singh’s narrative is to explain how the Sikhs gradually came into direct confrontation with the British. The Akali movement, which changed the whole pattern of Master Tara Singh’s life, was the culmination of this process.

Debate with the Arya Samajists In three articles written before 1920 Master Tara Singh reveals his deep concern for Sikh ideology and the Punjabi language, two of the major concerns of the Singh Sabha reformers. The first of these articles refers to the harsh words used about the Sikhs by Swami Dayanand and his followers in the Punjab. The Arya Samajists were now befriending the Hindus and speaking on their behalf. They were trying to create a cleavage between Hindus and Sikhs. In this context Bhagat Ishar Das’s efforts to promote (p.77) goodwill between the Sikhs and the Aryas did not convince the Sikhs of the genuineness of his efforts. The Hindu and the Arya press was blaming the Sikhs all the time as ‘separatists’.56 Bhagat Ishar Das was the eldest son of Bhagat Jawahar Mal, the acknowledged mentor of Baba Balak Singh, who was the founder of the Nāmdhārī movement. A cousin of Bhagat Lakhshman Singh, Bhagat Ishar Das was one of the distinguished leaders of the Arya Samaj, and the success of Dayanand Anglo-Vedic College, Lahore, was principally due to his lifelong labour.57 The Hindu press was trying hard in more ways than one to unite the Hindus as a single entity but the ways in which it was trying to bring the Sikhs into the Hindu fold were counterproductive. Master Tara Singh quotes three extracts from an article published in the Aryā Musāfir to show how its author was trying to make the Ganga flow from the sea towards the mountains, that is, trying to do the impossible. It was asserted by the writer that Guru Hargobind had done Page 18 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh nothing for the welfare of the Hindus. In fact, he became the cause of their suffering. It was contended that he paid no price for Kazi Rustam Khan’s horse; he misappropriated a royal hawk; and he sent Bidhi Chand to steal a horse from the royal stables. Above all, he took away the Kazi’s daughter from Lahore to Amritsar. It was also contended that Guru Gobind Singh fought bloody battles, abolished the varnashrama system of the Hindus, instructing his followers to discard the sacred thread. Moreover, his followers indulged in slaughter and plunder and, thereby, destroyed the country’s prosperity. ‘Was all this done for the sake of the Hindus and for the protection of Hindu dharma?’ The Aryā Musāfir was ‘prepared to prove that the Khalsa ji did not come into being for any religious or political welfare of the Hindus but only because of the feeling of revenge for his father’s death, and his own aspiration for political power’. Guru Gobind Singh would not have created the Khalsa, but for the execution of his father, Guru Tegh Bahadur, who had been executed for creating disorders in a Muslim state. Guru Hargobind, Guru Tegh Bahadur, and Guru Gobind Singh, thus, had nothing to do with the protection of Hindus or their dharma. Indeed, all such claims were false and fraudulent.58 Master Tara Singh points out that the Aryā Musāfir did not know Gurmukhi and relied on hearsay. He advises the Sikhs not to be upset by its arrogance and to continue to give support to the Hindus whenever needed, because selfless service was the ideal upheld by the Gurus. He advises the Hindus to read the book written by Daulat Ram on the life of Guru Gobind Singh. Passages are quoted from this work to show how wrong the Aryā Musāfir was. Daulat Ram had gone to the extent of saying that the Hindus were proud of Guru Gobind Singh and placed him before Ram, Krishan, and Shankar. Master Tara Singh points out further that the Arya Samaj leaders used to invoke the martyrdom of the Sikh Gurus and the sacrifice of the Sahibzadas to move the people emotionally to garner Sikh support.59 Elaborating on this basic argument, Master Tara Singh brings out the factual inaccuracies of the Aryā Musāfir, and challenges the Aryas by saying that if they were the true progeny of their forefathers who had suffered because of the Sikhs, they should not use donations received from the Sikhs for their colleges, schools, orphanages, Gurukuls, and Kanya Vidyalyas. Master Tara Singh underlines that the Aryā Musāfir had given a tilt to historical truth by changing mahram (a confidant) to mujrim (an accused). His attack on Guru (p.78) Hargobind was misplaced: the episode of the hawk was not the real cause of the battle but merely an excuse for it. The real reason for the confrontation of Guru Hargobind with the Mughal state was the view taken by the Mughal rulers of his activities: foundation of a takht in the vicinity of the provincial capital at Lahore, wearing of two swords (symbolizing spiritual and temporal authority), construction of a fort, manufacture of guns, soldierly training, the hunting expeditions of the Guru, the title ‘true king’ (sachā pātshāh) used for him by his devoted followers, their presence in several provinces of the Mughal empire, and Page 19 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh the daily offerings of thousands of rupees. No ruler could ignore the rise of such an autonomous power within his territories. The Mughal rulers were hostile to Guru Hargobind precisely because of his success in mobilizing people in a direction that appeared to be potentially dangerous for the Mughal state.60 About not paying the price of the horse taken from the Kazi, Master Tara Singh says that the horse did not belong to the emperor. It had been brought by a Sikh for the Guru but was forcibly taken from him and given to the Kazi to take care of its ailment. Guru Hargobind fulfilled the purpose for which it had been brought by his Sikh. The Sikhs of the Guru were prepared to face the consequences. No Hindu had to suffer for it. In short, the horse taken away by Bidhi Chand from the royal stables belonged to the Guru.61 About the Kazi’s daughter, Kaulan, who was said to have been taken by Guru Hargobind from Lahore to Amritsar, Master Tara Singh goes into greater detail which reveals his familiarity with Sikh literature and Sikh history. In the first place, the name of the Kazi’s daughter comes from the Sanskrit word ‘Kamla’ and a Kazi was hardly likely to have given a Hindu name to his daughter, and that too the name of a goddess. Kamla was Vishnu’s wife, popularly known as Lakshmi. Brahma had kept wandering for ages in Vishnu’s lotus-like navel, while Kaulan (generally, Kaula in Sikh literature) was massaging his feet while he was asleep on the body of Sheshnag (with its hood providing shadow for his head). Present in the Vedic times, Kamla was known as māyā during the time of the Upanishads; she became Lakshmi in the Puranas; she was called Kamla in the time of the (Vaishnava) bhagats, and Kaulan in the time of Kabir. Master Tara Singh goes on to point out that there are references to Kaulan in Sri Guru Granth Sahib which was compiled before Hargobind was installed as the Guru. Kamla figures in Namdev’s well-known hymn addressed to God: ‘The human frame is the mosque and the mind (man) is maulāna who performs namāz. You are married to Kamla who makes the formless manifest.’62 The reference here is clearly to matter as māyā. In the verse of Guru Arjan quoted by Master Tara Singh that Kaula follows the person whose mind (man) runs away from māyā.63 The reference, thus, is clearly to detachment-in-life as the Sikh ideal. Master Tara Singh infers that ‘Kaulan’ was a familiar figure or concept, before the time of Guru Hargobind.64 In the verse of Namdev, māyā is called ‘Bibi Kaula’ and the term used for marriage is nikāh, a term used for the Muslim rite of marriage. Master Tara Singh poses the question whether this Kaula was the same entity as Lachhmi (Lakshmi) of the Sikh lore who remained at a distance of 12 kos from Guru Nanak and 4 kos from Guru Angad, who stood outside the gate of the house of Guru Amar Das, and swept the floor inside the house of Guru Ram Das. Guru Arjan allowed her to (p.79) serve him, and Guru Hargobind married her. Master Tara Singh further questions whether in the classic work of Bhai Santokh Singh the figure is a metaphor. Could the Kazi’s daughter Kaulan be a metaphor Page 20 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh for māyā (material resources and power) which the Muslim rulers had acquired in India at the cost of the Hindu rulers? When Guru Hargobind combined miri (temporal authority) with pīrī (spiritual authority), māyā appeared in all its splendour at his service. Master Tara Singh quotes a verse of Guru Amar Das to the effect that māyā is a nāgin (female cobra) and he who serves her is eaten up by her but he who has turned to the Guru (Gurmukh) knows the antidote to poison, and tramples her under his feet.65 Guru Hargobind used māyā for the protection of the country, remaining personally detached. This position was depicted by the poet through a sustained metaphor in such a manner that people began to treat it as history. Even when taken literally, the episode presents Kaulan as a devotee of God who is given protection by Guru Hargobind against the harsh treatment meted out to her by her own father, the Kazi. She lives as a recluse, following her own inclinations. The whole episode depicts the principle of the freedom of conscience and the duty of the Sikhs to support this principle in practice.66 Regarding Aryā Musāfir’s accusation that Guru Hargobind and Guru Gobind Singh were motivated by a feeling of revenge for the execution of Guru Arjan and Guru Tegh Bahadur, Master Tara Singh refers to the popular prophecies about Guru Hargobind and Guru Gobind Singh. Their mission is presented in terms of the protection and propagation of dharma and not in political terms. A personal motive does not appear anywhere in these prophecies. There were many well-known events or incidents in which the followers of Guru Gobind Singh offered protection to defenceless people who did not follow the Sikh faith. A contemporary writing in Persian says that no Sikh uttered falsehood and no Sikh was immoral. The Singhs were indeed brave lions. We know that this was written by Qazi Nur Muhammad. The author of the Khulāsa ut-Tawārīkh writes that the Sikhs were a community of people whose prayers were answered by God. For the author, the Sikhs were pious people devoted primarily to God. Their ethical values were such that they could never fight simply for selfaggrandizement. The assertions of Aryā Musāfir were nothing more than slander-mongering. All sensible Hindus acknowledged the role of the Khalsa in their protection. The Muslim writers, too, agreed on this point.67 In his third article Master Tara Singh refers to Lala Lajpat Rai’s views on the Punjabi language to argue that he knew very little about the Punjabi language and literature, and he wrote primarily in advocacy of Hindi as the only suitable language for the Punjab. According to Lajpat Rai, Punjabi had two kinds of advocates. The Khalsa Sahiban insisted that Punjabi was the language of their religion and it must be written in Gurmukhi script. Master Tara Singh says that this was an ironical reversal. If there was any party which had given religious complexion to language that was Lala Lajpat Rai’s own party which loudly proclaimed that Hindu culture could not survive without Hindi. On the other hand, the Sikhs in general and the Singh advocates of the Punjabi language in particular were openly denouncing the efforts to give a religious colouring to the Page 21 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh language question. The Khalsa Advocate had frequently clarified that the language of instruction should be Punjabi, and the question of script may be left (p.80) to the parents. Lala Durga Das, who too was an Arya Samajist, had written in The Tribune that the Sikhs did not insist on the Gurmukhi script for writing in Punjabi. Lala Lajpat Rai himself had contended that the bāṇī of the Gurus was not in the Punjabi language. It was illogical on his part to maintain that the Sikhs regarded Punjabi as their religious language.68 The second category of people who, according to Lajpat Rai, insisted on the use of Punjabi in any script did not realize that the Punjabi language had no future. There was no good literature in Punjabi. All that was there was the bāṇī of the Sikh Gurus. But to say that the language of the compositions of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh was Punjabi was as meaningless as to say that the Hindi of Tulsi Das was Punjabi. Master Tara Singh points out that Lala Lajpat Rai was repeating what he had heard from other people. It was factually incorrect. According to Lala Lajpat Rai, the ‘Khalsa party’ was trying to create Punjabi literature now, borrowing words from English, Arabic, or Sanskrit, and producing a mixture (khichṛī) that was neither tasteful nor useful. Master Tara Singh asks that if Hindi could borrow words from other languages, why could not Punjabi do the same. The ‘mother’ of the Punjabi language was a prakrit which had given a regional colour to thousands of words from Sanskrit. Master Tara Singh asserted that Lala Lajpat Rai’s real purpose was merely to banish Punjabi from the land of its birth.69 If asked about old literature in Hindi, Lala Lajpat Rai was likely to mention the Ramayan of Tulsi Das. But its language, strictly speaking, was not Hindi. Till the end of the seventeenth century there was no literature in Hindi. The advocates of Hindi went back to the work of Chand Bardai in the twelfth century. This was baseless. In the history of Punjabi literature, however, one could legitimately refer to the compositions of Baba Farid who wrote in the thirteenth century. Thus, Punjabi was in the process of becoming a literary language much prior to the birth of Hindi. Highly philosophical discussions in the sixteenth century, as in the compositions of Guru Nanak and the Vārs of Bhai Gurdas, present an excellent example of the ways in which the Punjabi language could be used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A pure pearl of Punjabi literature was the work of Waris Shah produced in the eighteenth century. The ‘modern’ works of Punjabi literature produced by the ‘Khalsa party’ gave ample indication of its great future. There was a time when the English language was regarded as rustic, and so were the Indian regional languages in their infancy. Tulsi Das was aware that his language was regarded as inferior to Sanskrit. Thus, even the socalled mother of Hindi was regarded as rustic. If Tulsi Das had listened to the people like Lala Lajpat Rai there would have been no Hindi literature.70

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Master Tara Singh points out that the people of the Punjab had remained in contact with Muslims for 900 years and the language of the people of this region had absorbed many words of Persian and Arabic. Lala Lajpat Rai wanted the people to replace such words with words from Sanskrit and to use the Devanagri script. He wanted to impose a kind of embargo on the Punjabi language ‘to make Punjabi and Hindi one’. He was thus complicating the issue of language. Master Tara Singh contended that Lala Lajpat Rai’s arguments were based on propriety (ma‘qūliat) but actually he exposed his narrow-minded partisanship and fanatical prejudice. Hindi bhākhā was derived from Brij Bhasha which was derived from Saraseni (p.81) (Saurseni) which was derived from Prakrit, and this process of development went further back in time. The history of Hindi was similar to the history of the other regional languages of India, and it had no special claim. Master Tara Singh advised Lala Lajpat Rai not to rely on hearsay but to pay more attention to scholarly research before pronouncing judgements. If he was a real patriot (desh bhagat) he should study the Sikh tradition closely, especially the publications of the Khalsa Tract Society in the Punjabi language.71 Master Tara Singh makes a general observation that Sanskrit was the ‘grandmother’ of Indian languages, and its life had expired over 2,000 years ago. Its place was taken by five major languages, like Prakrit and Pali. From these five were derived Punjabi, Hindi, Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi, Bengali, and Oriya— the major regional languages of north India. The Arya Samajists presented Hindi as the eldest daughter of Sanskrit, but they could not give any proof based on credible evidence. Some of them referred to Hindi as the ‘kind mother’ of Punjabi. This was either a mistake or sheer obstinacy. If a relationship between Hindi and Punjabi had to be postulated, then Punjabi could be seen as Hindi’s mother’s sister (māsī). Punjabi’s mother and Hindi’s grandmother had a sisterly relation. This subject needed further research with an open mind.72 Master Tara Singh gives illustrations from the poetry of Baba Farid, Guru Nanak, and Bhai Gurdas to suggest that Punjabi could express subtle ideas as a literary language. This development would have taken at least a few centuries. Therefore, the emergence of Punjabi could be traced possibly to the ninth or the tenth century. The shaloks of Guru Nanak quoted by Master Tara Singh were meant to show how the Punjabi language could capture the highest flight of thought. The excellence of Punjabi language was reflected in the stanzas (pauṛīs) quoted from the Vārs of Bhai Gurdas. The poetry of Shah Husain, Bullhe Shah, and Waris Shah revealed the beauties of the Punjabi language. Their works were so well known. The rapid development of modern Punjabi as a language of learning was evident from the publications of the Khalsa Tract Society. The distinctive character of Punjabi was reflected in the works like Rānā Sūrat Singh and Rānī Rāj Kaur. From the very beginning Punjabi developed as an independent language, with its own peculiar structure and character, and not in imitation of any other language.73 Page 23 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Finally, Master Tara Singh tells his ‘Punjabi brothers’ that their mother tongue was an integral part of their being, a part that could not be separated. They should not be afraid of the hostile efforts of men like Lala Lajpat Rai. He goes on to add that Swami Ram Tirath, who was regarded as a true rishi, used to write in Urdu or Hindi but involuntarily his pen would turn out Punjabi like pure water flowing from a spring in the hills. Even a few quotations would suffice to show how beautifully Swami Ram Tirath could convey ideas and feelings in Punjabi, using minimum possible words to make them sound as sweet as sugar. No more proof was needed to suggest that Punjabi was to the Punjabis like water to the fish and worship to the devotee of God. ‘Let us not be bothered about what is being said by the opponents of the language of our ancestors and keep it close to our hearts, a language that has been called “divine bāṇī” by our sages.’74 Master Tara Singh and the Arya Samajists held opposing views on Sikhism and Sikh history. Their attitudes towards the Punjabi language were also different. Even in the late (p.82) 1890s Tara Singh used to have hot debates with the Arya Samajist students in Rawalpindi. The increasing influence of the Arya Samaj in the canal colony of Lyallpur was not relished by Master Tara Singh because of his concern that the Sikhs should not come under its influence in political or cultural matters. The undercurrent of animosity between the Aryas and the Singh reformers came to the surface from time to time before 1947. If anything, it would become stronger after Independence.

In Retrospect Master Tara Singh’s native place Harial, like some other neighbouring villages in the Rawalpindi district, was a village of Brahman landholders. His family was one of the fifteen Khatri families of the village and they were all Sahajdhārī Sikhs. Only one member of the Khatri brotherhood was a Keshdhārī Singh. The Khatris had a dharamsāl of their own in which the Granth Sahib was installed. It was looked after by a granthī (dharamsālia), the only other Keshdhārī Singh in the village. They organized a kathā of the Panth Prakāsh in the early 1890s. Master Tara Singh, as the boy Nanak Chand, was deeply impressed and inspired by the stories of the Singh martyrs and valiant warriors of the eighteenth century. He thought of becoming a Keshdhārī Singh, The influence of the Singh Sabha movement was quietly growing. Nanak Chand got initiated as Keshdhārī Singh in 1901 by Sant Attar Singh and he was re-named Tara Singh. He vowed to dedicate his life to the service of the Sikh Panth. At the time of his marriage in 1904 at the age of 19, he insisted that his marriage ceremony should be performed strictly in accordance with the Sikh rite advocated by the leaders of the Singh Sabha movement. This was a measure of his commitment to socioreligious reform among the Sikhs. The Khalsa College at Amritsar was developing fast under the fostering care of colonial bureaucrats who were keen to keep it under their direct or indirect control. With the agitation against the partition of Bengal and rise of the Page 24 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh Swadeshi movement, the British bureaucracy became all the more anxious to keep the College immune from political influences. The removal of Sardar Dharam Singh as the honorary engineer of the College and the appointment of a salaried Englishman in his place led to agitation by the students. Tara Singh was elected president of the agitation committee. The English engineer was replaced by an Indian. Tara Singh left the College after his BA examination in April 1907. The British administrators established a tighter control over the College. In reaction Tara Singh began to participate in all anti-government agitations. Tara Singh’s decision to join the Central Training College at Lahore in 1907 and to take up teaching at the Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, in 1908 was not unconnected with the new political developments. He thought of education as the best means of reform among the Sikhs and he did not want the Arya Samaj to increase its cultural or political influence over the Sikhs in the Chenab colony. The Arya Samaj of Lyallpur was thinking of opening a high school in the city. Tara Singh and two of his friends offered their services to the Bar Khalsa Diwan at Rs 15 a month. As Head Master of Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, from 1908 to 1914, Master Tara Singh was closely associated with the Lyallpur Group in Sikh politics who were much more radical than the Chief Khalsa Diwan led by Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia. Master Tara Singh took keen interest in the legal recognition of the Sikh (p.83) form of marriage (anand kāraj). He was associated with the publication of Sachā Dhandorā as an anti-government weekly and with the three-member delegation of the Canadian Sikhs. The Komagata Maru episode and the Budge Budge firing made him all the more anti-British. He took interest in the Rakabganj agitation. Master Tara Singh resigned from the Khalsa High School on being selected as a granthī for the newly founded gurdwara in London on the initiative of Sant Teja Singh, the foremost follower of Sant Attar Singh. But Master Tara Singh could not go due to the outbreak of 1914. He was becoming aware of the wider world. After serving Khalsa High School at Kallar (district Rawalpindi) and another high school in Lyallpur district, Master Tara Singh returned to Khalsa High School, Lyallpur. A significant activity of Master Tara Singh during these years was his controversy with the ‘Arya Musafar’ and Lala Lajpat Rai on the issues of Sikh ideology and Punjabi language, revealing Master Tara Singh’s familiarity with gurbāṇī, Sikh history, and Punjabi literature. According to him, the treatment of the Sikh Ghadarites, the Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, and imposition of Martial Law were the reasons due to which the Sikhs were alienated from the British. The Sikhs were inclined to turn towards the Congress in 1919. Master Tara Singh’s serious interest in all these developments is an index of his political awakening. Notes:

(1.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 6. Page 25 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (2.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 9–11. (3.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 11–12. (4.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, [1945] 1999), pp. 20–1. (5.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 22–4. (6.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 24–5. (7.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 34–5. (8.) Gazetteer Rawalpindi District 1907 (Part A), reprinted in District and State Gazetteers of the Undivided Punjab (Delhi: D.K. Publishers, 1993), pp. 245–8. (9.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 25. (10.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 26–9. (11.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 29–30. (12.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 30. (13.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 30–1. (14.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), p. 7. (15.) Sant Teja Singh, Jīwan Kathā Gurmukh Piāre Sant Attar Singh ji Maharaj, part I (Baru Sahib: Kalgidhar Trust, 2008), pp. 28, 34–41, 63–6, 72–6, 107–32, 140–1, 146–7. (16.) Teja Singh, Jīwan Kathā Gurmukh Piāre Sant Attar Singh ji Maharaj, pp. 147–8. (17.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 31–3. (18.) Bhagat Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, ed. Ganda Singh (Calcutta: The Sikh Cultural Centre, 1965), pp. 23–8. (19.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 33, 35. (20.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 34–5. (21.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 34. (22.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1947), pp. 22–3, 28, 32, 39, 44, 48. Page 26 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (23.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar, pp. 50, 55–7. (24.) Bhai Ram Singh of Mayo School of Art was the architect who designed the Khalsa College building. Ruchi Ram Sahni regarded it as his best-designed building from the artistic viewpoint. Ruchi Ram Sahni, Memoirs of Ruchi Ram Sahni, eds Narender K. Sehgal and Subodh Mahanti (New Delhi: Vigyan Prasar, [1994] 1997), p. 31. (25.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar, pp. 58–65. (26.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar, pp. 66–7; Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 202–5. (27.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar, pp. 67–70. (28.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 35–6. (29.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 43–4. (30.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 38–9. (31.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 36. (32.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 36–7. (33.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 37. (34.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 202–6. (35.) Kirpal Singh Dardi, Akali Lehar dā Sanchālak Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī (Jīwaṇī) (n.p.: Shahid Udham Singh Prakashan, 1991), pp. 36–8. See also Mohinder Singh, Baba Kharak Singh and India’s Struggle for Freedom (New Delhi: National Book Trust India, 2005), pp. 5 and 11n.3. (36.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 37–8. (37.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 39. Significantly, this offer was made by them at the first Sikh Educational Conference at Gujranwala in 1908. Dardi, Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī, p. 25. (38.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 39–40. (39.) Dardi, Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī, p. 25. (40.) Niranjan Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 28–32. (41.) Niranjan Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 35–7.

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (42.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 40. Hira Singh Dard, Merian Kujh Itihāsik Yādān (Jullundur: Dhanpat Rai and Sons, 1960, second edition), pp. 40–3, 50. (43.) Dardi, Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī, pp. 20–2, 125, 170. (44.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 40–1. See also Harish K. Puri, Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organisation and Strategy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1993, second edition), pp. 55–7. (45.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 41–2. (46.) Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 71–81. (47.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 42. (48.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 37–8, 61. For some interesting detail, Dardi, Master Sunder Singh Lyallpuri, pp. 42–4. (49.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 38–9. Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 41. (50.) Lakhshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 147–9. (51.) Sant Teja Singh, Jīwan Kathā Gurmukh Piāre Sant Attar Singh ji Maharaj de Annan Sewak Sant Teja Singh ji (Gurdwara Baru Sahib: Kalgidhar Trust, 2000, tenth reprint), pp. 123–4, 128. (52.) Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 63–70. (53.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 59–60. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 42–3. (55.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 43. (56.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Prem dī Ganga Samundron Kailash nūn tur pāi’, in Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh (1910–1924), vol. 1, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), p. 21. The editor does not give the dates of these articles, nor does he mention where these articles were published. However, the anthology covers the years from 1910 to 1924, and Master Tara Singh refers to ‘the paper’ (parcha) in which two of these articles were published. He was associated with the weekly Sachā Dhandhorā, brought out first in 1909–10 and then in 1914. (57.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, p. 6. (58.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 22–33. (59.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 24–7. Page 28 of 29

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Early Life and Career of Master Tara Singh (60.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 28–30. (61.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 30–1. (62.) Shabdārath Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee [standard pagination]), p. 1167. (63.) Shabdārath Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji, p. 235. (64.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 31–2. (65.) Shabdārath Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji, p. 510. (66.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 32–4. (67.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 34–5. (68.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 36–7. (69.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 37–9. (70.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 39–43. (71.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 43–5. (72.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, p. 45. (73.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 45–8. (74.) Master Tara Singh, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, pp. 48–9.

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (1920–3) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0005

Abstract and Keywords The newspaper Akali, started by the radical Sikh leaders in June 1920, articulated their concern for the liberation of Khalsa College, Amritsar, the historic gurdwaras, and eventually the whole country. On the announcement of direct action by the Akali volunteers to reconstruct the demolished wall of Gurdwara Rakabganj, it was quickly rebuilt by the government. The Punjab bureaucracy relinquished its control over the Khalsa College in favour of the moderate leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. For the control of Darbar Sahib at Amritsar and other gurdwaras, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) was formed in November 1920 and the Shiromani Akali Dal was formed in December. The non-violent morchās launched by the SGPC in 1922–3 were eminently successful. Master Tara Singh emerged as one of the prominent Akali leaders and the best ideologue of the Akali Movement. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, The Akali, Khalsa College Amritsar, Gurdwara Rakabganj, Chief Khalsa Diwan, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Shiromani Akali Dal, non-violent morchās, Akali Movement

The year 1920 was remarkable for a political upsurge in the Punjab as well as in the country as a whole. The Non-cooperation Movement in India and the Akali movement in the Punjab began in 1920. The former was to end in 1922 but the latter ended in 1925. This was the phase of a close cooperation between the Congress and the Akalis. The role of Mahatma Gandhi in the Akali movement is,

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement therefore, an important theme for study. Master Tara Singh’s role as an ideologue of the Akali movement was as important as his political activity.

Political Developments Major developments in Indian politics from 1920 to 1923 were connected with the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements and the emergence of the Swaraj Party within the Indian National Congress. After the failure of the Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements, communal tension surfaced at several places in the country. The Punjab came to have a partly representative government. The Congress and Khilafat leaders had decided at Amritsar in December 1919 to organize the Khilafat work under Mahatma Gandhi’s leadership. A Muslim deputation waited upon the Governor General on 19 January 1920 and emphasized that the existence of the Khilafat as a temporal and spiritual institution was ‘the very essence of their faith’. The Governor General’s response was rather disappointing. The Khilafat question became more important in February and March. Mahatma Gandhi announced that if the terms of peace with Turkey did not meet the sentiments of Muslims in India, he would launch non-cooperation. On 10 March (p.87) 1920, for the first time he indicated a plan of non-cooperation. The Khilafat Committee met at Bombay on 28 May and decided to start non-cooperation. It was inaugurated formally on 1 August. The non-violent non-cooperation inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi was adopted in a special session of the Congress held in Calcutta from 4 to 9 September. This was confirmed at the Nagpur session of the Congress. By the end of 1920, the moderates had cut themselves off from the Congress once and for all.1 ‘Swaraj inside a year’ was the predominant sentiment in 1921. On the arrival of the Prince of Wales in Bombay on 17 November, there was rioting and bloodshed in which fifty-three persons died and about 400 were wounded. Mahatma Gandhi fasted for five days to restore order. In January 1922 an All-Parties Conference was held at Bombay on the initiative of Congress sympathizers to bring about an understanding between the Congress and the Government of India. Three weeks later, on 5 February 1922, a Sub-Inspector of police and twenty-one constables perished in flames when a Congress procession was provoked by the police at Chauri Chaura near Gorakhpur. On 12 February the Congress Working Committee suspended mass civil disobedience. Pandit Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai criticized Mahatma Gandhi ‘for punishing the whole country for the sins of a place’. Mahatma Gandhi was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on the charge of sedition.2 At the All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting in Calcutta in November 1922, Motilal Nehru and C.R. Das supported the programme of entry into councils under the Reform Act of 1919 but the issue was postponed for the annual session at Gaya. It was pressed harder at Gaya but many Congressmen still felt strongly that the scheme of non-cooperation would be upset if entry into Page 2 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement councils was permitted. C.R. Das, Motilal Nehru, and Vitthalbhai Patel formed a party of their own. Before the end of 1922, the Khilafat issue ended in a way totally unexpected. The Sultan of Turkey was deposed but a new Khalifa was elected. The Khilafat was, thus, ‘vaticanized’. At the special session of the Congress in Delhi in the third week of September 1923, a permissive resolution declared that the Congressmen who had ‘no religious or other conscientious objection’ against entering the legislatures were at liberty to stand as candidates and to exercise their right of voting at the forthcoming elections. The fate of the council-boycott was sealed at the annual session in Cocanada.3 Communal tension surfaced at places in the form of riots at the time of religious festivals, resulting in loss of life and property and escalating tension. Hindu– Muslim riots took place at Multan in September 1922. Serious disturbances broke out in Amritsar in April 1923 in which the Akalis played an active positive role as a neutral party between the Arya Samajists and Muslims. Panipat witnessed a riot in July 1923 due to a dispute between Hindu and Muslim zamīndārs. Such riots were to continue for several years more.4 For the elections to the Punjab Legislative Council in 1920, sixty-four of the elected seats were meant for Hindus (General), Muslims, and Sikhs. Seven of the twenty seats for Hindus were meant for urban constituencies. Five of the thirtytwo Muslim seats were urban, and so was one of the eleven Sikh seats. Thus, the number of seats for Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian legislators in the Punjab Council in 1920, respectively, was thirty-four, twenty-three, thirteen, and one.5 With the franchise restricted to a little over (p.88) 3 per cent of the total population of the province, the large landholders were dominant in the council, and the majority of them were Muslims. The elections of 1920 were held under the shadow of the Non-cooperation Movement. Only about 50 per cent of the enrolled voters turned up to cast their votes. Fazl-i Husain, a leading Congressman before the Non-cooperation Movement and now elected from the special constituency of landholders, was the most influential member of the newly formed council. He was appointed a minister, and on his suggestion, Lala Harkishan Lal became the second minister. Fazl-i Husain’s political position enabled him to bring together the Muslim members to form the ‘Rural Block’. Most of its members were big landlords. Under the guidance of Fazl-i Husain the Rural Block began to align with the Hindu and Sikh rural leaders in the council on the issues involving the peasantry and the rural Punjab.6

Beginning of the Akali Movement Hira Singh Dard, who was active in the politics of the Punjab at the time, looked back at 1920 as the year in which political movements flooded the Punjab in the wake of the atrocities committed under the Martial Law of 1919.7 The first Sikh political newspaper, the daily Akālī in Urdu, was launched from Lahore on 21 Page 3 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement May 1920, the day of Guru Arjan’s martyrdom. Hira Singh Dard left his job to join the Managing Committee and the Editorial Board of the Akālī before it was launched. Mangal Singh Gill resigned from Tehsildarship to join the Akālī as an editor. Sardul Singh Caveeshar’s ‘people’s press’ was used for printing the newspaper. The name ‘Akālī’ was chosen in honour of Akali Phula Singh who appeared to symbolize sacrifice, fearlessness, and bravery. Hira Singh contributed a poem called ‘Āa giā pher Akālī je’ (the Akali has come again) in which he regretted that the Sikh nation (kaum) was being openly sold by Sikhs hankering after jāgīrs and service under the government. With the coming of the Akālī none would dare to take over a college or a gurdwara of the Sikhs. The Akālī would project the message of universal brotherhood, reject the differences of ‘colour’ (caste), the difference between the rich and the poor, and eradicate selfishness from national life. Every child would sing, ‘We belong to India, and India belongs to us.’8 The objectives of the Akālī were clearly stated: (a) to put an end to the management of gurdwaras by mahants and to bring them under the control of Sikh representative bodies; (b) to wrest the Khalsa College at Amritsar from official control and to place it under a representative Sikh management; (c) to get the demolished wall of Gurdwara Rakabganj reconstructed; (d) to create political and national awakening among the Sikhs and to encourage them to participate in the common struggle for freedom; and (e) to establish a democratic organization of the Sikhs as an alternative to the Chief Khalsa Diwan with which the Sikh masses were dissatisfied.9 It may be noted that the Central Sikh League was not regarded as radical enough at this time. The issues of Gurdwara Rakabganj and Khalsa College, Amritsar, were the earliest to be resolved. The question of the wall of Gurdwara Rakabganj, which had been shelved during World War I was not taken up by the government for about two and a half years after the war. Sardul Singh Caveeshar published a letter in the Akālī in June or July 1920 to the effect that the assurance given by the government to rebuild the wall in (p.89) consultation with the representatives of the Sikhs had not been honoured. ‘Now we have to perform this task on our own’, reiterating Guru Arjan’s words: ‘We should perform all our tasks with our own hands.’ The Sikhs should be prepared, if necessary, to offer their heads to build the wall of the sacred gurdwara associated with the king of martyrs, Guru Tegh Bahadur. For this ‘holy task’ 100 brave Sikhs were needed. These volunteers should take the vow in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib before sending their names. When the number reached 100, a meeting would be held and the government would be asked to restore the wall within a stipulated time. Otherwise the band of (potential) martyrs (shahīdī jathā) would go to Delhi to rebuild the wall even if they had to face bullets.10

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement As stated by Hira Singh Dard, within a month or so, more than 1,000 names were received by the Akālī. This tremendous response was the guarantee that the government would not be able to stand in their way. It was announced in the Akālī that a meeting of the shahīdī jathā would be held in October 1920 at the time of the second annual conference of the Central Sikh League and a notice would be given to the government. Despite opposition from the government and its Sikh supporters, the resolution in favour of non-cooperation was passed under the Presidentship of Sardar Kharak Singh. The meeting of the shahīdī jathā was held afterwards and it was resolved to send a notice to the government to restore the wall in its original form within a few weeks. The eyes of the government had now opened to the probability of bloodshed close to the Viceregal Lodge and in front of the Secretariat in the imperial capital. What all the requests, deputations, telegrams, and resolutions had not been able to achieve in six years was achieved in a few days by the organized strength of the Sikh people and their will to make sacrifice. The news came from Delhi within a week that the government had restored the demolished wall. Hira Singh Dard regarded it as the forerunner of the Akali movement.11 The teachers of Khalsa College gave an ultimatum to the government that they would resign if official control over the college was not withdrawn before 5 November 1920. The college remained closed for a month. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia prevailed upon the government to withdraw its control. A special meeting of the Managing Committee was held on 13 November under the Presidentship of C.M. King, Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, and it was resolved to form a sub-committee to draft amendments in order ‘to effect a complete withdrawal of Government control from the institution’. The subcommittee met during 14–16 November and then on 3 December under the chairmanship of Majithia to finalize its recommendations. On 4 December the Managing Committee accepted the recommended constitution with two minor changes. An ad-interim Managing Committee took over the college management. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was elected its Chairman, as also of the College Council. He invited Sardar Harbans Singh Atariwala (who had been eliminated from the old Managing Committee) and Professor Bhai Jodh Singh (who had been asked to leave the college in 1912) to become its members. A new council and a new Managing Committee were finally constituted in 1921, with Sardar Harbans Singh Atariwala as the elected Secretary of both the council and the Committee.12 Thus, the control of the college passed from the bureaucracy to the party of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia. (p.90) Professor Teja Singh, who was among the teachers who had resigned after 5 November 1920, says that they were in favour of the moderate Sikh leaders. He refers to Mahatma Gandhi’s visit to the college earlier when he had failed to enlist the teachers or the students in support of non-cooperation. Mahatma Gandhi was invited to the college on the suggestion of its Principal, G.A. Wathen, who asked him if his purpose was ‘to break’ the college, and Page 5 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement Gandhi replied, ‘Yes, I have come to break the College.’ Wathen took him to the main building of the college and said that every brick of the institution had been produced by the sweat of a small community of the Sikhs. They who had no share in its construction had no right to talk of its destruction. The Khalsa College was bound to remain ‘alive’. The teachers and the students present shouted: ‘Long live Khalsa College!’ Thus, Mahatma Gandhi’s arrow missed its mark. But now the country was on fire. It was bound to affect the college. To save it from the wave of non-cooperation, it was decided to give an ultimatum to the government. Thirteen Professors of the College resigned after 5 November. C.M. King took Bawa Harkishan Singh, Professor Niranjan Singh, and Professor Teja Singh to the Lieutenant Governor, Edward Maclagan, at Lahore and there an offer was made to upgrade the college to a Sikh University. But the professors insisted that the Sikhs wanted to have the college in their own hands for the present. It was decided to hold special meetings of the Managing Committee to change the constitution. All its eleven official members were replaced by Sikh members. ‘We saw to it’, says Teja Singh, ‘that none of the extremist Sikhs was included in the list of new names.’ This was done to reassure the government that ‘we were not playing in the hands of its opponents’.13 Evidently, the ‘moderate’ Sikh leadership was far more acceptable to the Punjab beaurcracy than the ‘extremists’. Meanwhile, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and the Shiromani Akali Dal had been formed to introduce reform in all the historic gurdwaras under the management of the representatives of the Sikh Panth in place of the agents of the government. A potential confrontation between the colonial bureaucracy and the new leadership of the Sikhs was built into the situation. Teja Singh elaborates the background specifically to the Gurdwara Reform Movement. He says that three ways were open to the Sikhs to carry out reform in gurdwaras: boycott, litigation, and public pressure. Boycott could never be effective because the custodians of gurdwaras had enormous resources other than offerings. Litigation could be of no avail without the conscientious support of the government. Therefore, the Sikhs relied chiefly on the pressure of public opinion. Teja Singh cites the example of Nankana Sahib. For about ten years a jathā of the Sikhs of Lahore had been going to Nankana Sahib every year on foot to hold a dīwān. Public subscriptions enabled them to add several new features to the gurdwaras in Nankana Sahib. After some time it was proposed to appoint a representative committee to control all those gurdwaras. A document was signed to this effect. But the mahants changed their mind on the advice of a Hindu Tehsildar. Nevertheless, the Sikhs continued their efforts till 1905 and succeeded in getting the lands entered in the name of the gurdwaras instead of the mahants.14

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement For the advocacy of reform it was necessary to inform the people about the practices prevailing in the gurdwaras. Their misuse was thoroughly exposed, especially the loose (p.91) lifestyle of the mahants and their misappropriation of gurdwara property. The Punjab of Amritsar, for example, pointed out on 15 October 1906 that gurdwaras in Majha and Malwa were being converted into private houses by Udāsīs and other sādhūs. The Khalsa Advocate, the Khālsā Samāchār, and the Khalsa Sewak also remained active in support of Gurdwara Reform. The Chief Khalsa Diwan remained interested in the reform of gurdwaras and formed a sub-committee for this purpose. In 1915 a pamphlet in English had been printed and circulated among prominent Sikhs, advocating the freedom of gurdwaras as the basis of all reform, and asking for opinions and suggestions. Only a few persons responded and their views were not encouraging. The matter was dropped.15 However, local Singh Sabhas continued their efforts to influence the custodians of gurdwaras in favour of reform. Mahant Harnam Singh of Sialkot died on 26 September 1918. No mahant was elected through due process after his death. The Singh Sabha of Sialkot petitioned to the Deputy Commissioner to appoint a committee for management of the Gurdwara Babe-di-Ber, associated with Guru Nanak. The mahant’s widow appointed Ganda Singh, an apostate from Sikhism, as the Manager of the Gurdwara. When the law failed them the local Sikhs began to hold daily services in the gurdwara. Ganda Singh hired ruffians (gundās) to disrupt the services. Meanwhile, Sardar Amar Singh Jhabal and Sardar Jaswant Singh Jhabal came to Sialkot. Their speeches won public sympathy, and the local Hindus and Muslims began to support the reform party. Ganda Singh sought help from the local administration but Sikhs began to arrive at Sialkot from all sides. The gurdwara was temporarily taken over in the name of the Panth. On 5 October 1919, the Khalsa held a dīwān and elected a Committee of thirteen members for the control and management of the gurdwara. C.M. King, the Divisional Commissioner, came to Sialkot and told the Sikhs that the government would not interfere in the religious matters but they would hold the gurdwara lands in trust and the two parties had to come to a settlement.16 This was the first historic gurdwara to come under the control of the reformers. In the case of the Golden Temple, the demand had been expressed over three decades earlier. ‘We appeal before the Khalsa community and the Government’, wrote the Khālsā Akhbār of 1 January 1887, ‘that the present committee for the management of the Golden Temple is neither based on the principles of the Khalsa Panth nor on Government legislation.’ On the principles of the Khalsa, only Sikhs could be members of the Managing Committee, and not a Hindu, like Raja Harbans Singh who, contrary to the faith of the Khalsa, professed belief in idol worship. Indeed, it was rather ironic that the gurdwara belonged to the Sikh community but its management was presided over by a British Deputy Commissioner (who was a Christian). Furthermore, the Committee had been set up in contravention of government legislation: ‘The administration is not Page 7 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement supposed to interfere in religious matters.’ There was every reason, thus, for reconstituting the Committee.17 In the summer of 1906 the Khalsa Advocate and the Punjab of Amritsar strongly urged that it was necessary to change the administration of the Darbar Sahib and other gurdwaras to remove patent evils. The Manager (sarbrah) of the Golden Temple should be elected by the Panth and not selected by the government. In May 1907, the Punjab (p.92) urged the formation of a Gurdwara Sambhāl Committee.18 The management of the Harmandar had degenerated visibly. Hira Singh Dard talks of the sad state of affairs in 1910 when he visited Amritsar on the Diwali. He had read in the gurbāṇī that there was no other place like ‘amritsar’. Its praise had no limits in Sikh works of history and in Bhai Vir Singh’s Sundrī and Bijai Singh. A collection of episodes (sākhīs) on the life (janam) of Guru Nanak talked of crows becoming swans by taking a dip in the pool of nector (amritsarovar) and lepers being cured by bathing in it. He was happy to have a holy bath. However, he was sad to see a lot of litter in the circumambulatory path (parkarmā). Brahmans and beggars crowded the banks of the sarovar. A ten- or twelve-year-old boy was in attendance on Guru Granth Sahib in the Darbar Sahib. He was actually Bhai Fateh Singh, the Head Granthi, who had been installed by the government in this position on hereditary basis. The pujārīs of the Harmandar were no less crafty than the proverbial thugs of Benares. The granthīs and pujārīs cared nothing for the sangat. Mai Ram Kaur addressed the sangat in the Malwai Bunga in a dīwān organized by the Chief Khalsa Diwan. Two Sikhs brought a Hindu from the parkarmā with five or six seers of the kaṛāh parsād in a bundle. Mai Ram Kaur pointed out that the pujārīs had sold it for one or two annas a seer instead of distributing it among the sangat. ‘Our newspapers are crying aloud’, she said, ‘about the sad state of affairs in our Gurdwaras but the government pays no heed.’ She exhorted the Khalsa to wake up.19 Sadder still, Mai Ram Kaur led a jathā, reciting shabads to have darshan of the Darbar Sahib and the jathā was beaten with lāṭhīs in front of the Harmandar; Mai Ram Kaur was seriously hurt. This was done deliberately because tension between the pujārīs and the reformers had been rising since long. The government was backing the pujārīs who always kept the local officials satisfied. Having done the grievous misdeed, the pujārīs went to the police station to lodge a complaint that Mai Ram Kaur had tried to plunder the Guru’s golak with the support of a jathā of Singh Sabhaites. She was taken to the police station along with some Sikhs. On hearing all this, Hira Singh went to the police station. A pious-looking granthī said to the thānedār that Hira Singh was a supporter of Ram Kaur and he had incited the jathā to ‘catch hold of the granthīs and plunder the golak’. Hira Singh was kept in the Kotwali along with twenty or twenty-five Singhs. More than half of them had not even gone to the parkarmā. Hira Singh was asked to tender a written apology but he refused to do so. He was released Page 8 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement after an hour or so. He had gone to Amritsar for light but he returned with a fire in his heart.20 According to Teja Singh, the Khalsa Advocate of 9 June 1917 complained of corruption and mismanagement in the Darbar Sahib Gurdwaras which belonged to the Panth. Bhai Partap Singh, granthī of the Darbar Sahib, went to the extent of claiming that the gurdwaras were the property of granthīs and not of the Sikh Panth. In the days of the Martial Law, General Dyer was given a robe of honour at the Golden Temple. Sardar Arur Singh, the sarbrah, was later obliged by the Sikhs to resign. The government knighted him and he became Sir Arur Singh of the Golden Temple. As we noticed earlier, the Central Sikh League at its annual session at Amritsar in December 1919 referred to ‘the sore and long-standing grievance of the Sikh community’—the administration of the Golden Temple was still in the hands of a (p.93) government nominee. The League demanded that it should be placed in the hands of a representative body of Sikhs, constituted on an elective basis and responsible to the Panth. Finding the government indifferent, the Sikhs began to hold meetings in the Gurdwaras to exercise their right of gurmatā granted to them by Guru Gobind Singh. ‘By this constitution the Sikh community assumed the position and authority of the Guru.’21 The doctrine of Guru Panth was invoked for Panthic control over the Panthic gurdwaras. In Amritsar, there was a religious body called Khalsa Brotherhood to preach equality and to admit people of all castes and outcastes into the fold of Sikhism. On 12 October 1920, a few low-caste men were initiated and brought in a procession to the Golden Temple. The priests refused to receive their offering or to perform prayer for them. The Granth Sahib was opened for guidance (vāk). It said that God ‘sends grace even to those who have no merit, and takes from them the true Guru’s service, which is most noble, as it turns our hearts to the love of God’. These words of Guru Amar Das had a wonderful effect. The priests agreed to offer prayers and to accept the sacred food from the hands of the newly converted Sikhs. The party then moved towards the Akal Takht. Its priests fled from their posts. They did not come even when the sarbrah, Sardar Sunder Singh Ramgarhia, called them. On 23 October, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar formed a provisional committee of nine Sikhs, including the sarbrah, to manage the affairs of the Golden Temple till a permanent committee was formed.22 A hukamnāmā was issued from the Akal Takht for a general assembly of the Sikhs on 15 November 1920 in order to elect a representative committee of the Panth to control the Golden Temple and other gurdwaras. The government did not want to have a committee entirely independent of its influence. With the help of the Maharaja of Patiala, a Managing Committee of thirty-six members was appointed two days before the scheduled meeting of the Sikh Panth. The general meeting during 15–16 November resolved to form a committee of 175 members, including the thirty-six members of the committee appointed by the government. Page 9 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement Sardar Harbans Singh, as President of the thirty-six-member committee, and Sardar Sunder Singh Ramgarhia, as its Manager, carried on the administration till 12 December 1920 when the inaugural meeting of the new body, called the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, was held. The names of the elected members were announced by Bawa Harkishan Singh as Assistant Secretary. In the case of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia it was added that certain members of the Panth were displeased with him and he was asked to state in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib whether or not he was prompted by ulterior motives in what he had been doing as Secretary of the Chief Khalsa Diwan or as a representative of the Panth. Sardar Sunder Singh solemnly affirmed that he was not actuated at all by any selfish or unworthy motives in serving the interests of the community to the best of his ability and understanding. Yet he sought forgiveness from the Panth for possible lapses. He quoted a verse of Kirat the Bhatt, which ends with: ‘May Guru Ram Das be my refuge.’ The whole audience was moved to tears. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was elected President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), with Sardar Harbans Singh as Vice-President. Sardar Sunder Singh Ramgarhia was elected Secretary.23 None of them was an ‘Akali’. The (p.94) SGPC was, on the whole, a moderate body and acceptable to the governement. The Shiromani Akali Dal was founded at Amritsar on 14 December 1920. Three jathās were initially affiliated to it: the Central Khalsa Diwan, the Bar Akali Jatha, and the Malwa Khalsa Diwan of Dhuri. Other jathās were to be affiliated later. Teja Singh clarifies that the word ‘Akali’ had appeared on the title page of the newspaper Akālī of Lahore, but the Panch Khalsa Diwan and the Central Majha Diwan, which had rendered valuable services in connection with the release of Gurdwara Babe-di-Ber at Sialkot, the Akal Takht at Amritsar, and Panja Sahib at Hasan Abdal, had not yet adopted the title ‘Akali’. The members of the Central Majha Diwan came to be called Akalis after taking charge of the Akal Takht, especially when the old Nihangs had lost confidence of the people due to their assault on the Akal Takht soon after its occupation by the reformers.24 The Akali Jatha Khara Sauda Bar was formed at Sheikhupura in December 1920.25 In due course, all the Sikhs who were in favour of Gurdwara Reform and prepared to suffer for it came to be called Akalis.

The Akalis in Confrontation with the Government (1921–3) Before turning to the role of Mahatma Gandhi and Master Tara Singh in the Akali movement from 1921 to early 1923, we may outline its main developments. The year 1921 was marked by several new developments in the Akali movement: control of the SGPC over the Darbar Sahib at Tarn Taran, the Nankana Sahib tragedy resulting in the control of the SGPC over the gurdwaras at Nankana Sahib, rejection of the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill by the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislature, and the Keys morchā which obliged the government to hand over the keys of the treasury of the Golden Temple to the President of the SGPC. The year 1922 saw the famous Guru-ka-Bagh Morcha which put a stop to Page 10 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement interference by the government in the affairs of the Gurdwara Guru-ka-Bagh under the management of the SGPC. A large number of historic gurdwaras came under the control of the SGPC, and the Punjab Government on its own passed an Act which was not acceptable to the Akalis. It became a dead letter. The Akali prisoners were released unconditionally early in 1923. The colonial government was not yet prepared for legislation acceptable to the Akalis. The immoral practices and arrogant attitude of the priests of the Darbar Sahib at Tarn Taran were well known. On 25 January 1921, Teja Singh Bhuchar reached Tarn Taran with forty Akalis. The priests agreed to form a joint committee for resolving their dispute with the local reformers. At nightfall, however, they attacked the Akalis, who were seriously wounded and two of them died. The District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police reached Tarn Taran. A provisional committee was formed for management, leaving it to the SGPC to appoint a regular committee.26 The suspicion that the bureaucracy was giving tacit support to the old custodians of gurdwaras was confirmed by the tragedy at Nankana Sahib on 20 February 1921. Narain Das, the mahant of Gurdwara Janam Asthan at Nankana Sahib, called a meeting of over sixty mahants at Nankana Sahib in consultation with Baba Kartar Singh Bedi and resolved not to recognize the authority of the SGPC. In fact, a parallel committee was formed, with Mahant Narain Das as its President. He had begun to make preparations on a large scale for what he called ‘self-defence’, fortifying the place and collecting about 400 mercenaries. This was known to the (p.95) Divisional Commissioner, C.M. King, who had actually encouraged the mahant to resist the reformers. The SGPC decided to hold a general meeting at Nankana Sahib during 4–6 March 1921. However, Bhai Lachhman Singh reached Nankana Sahib on 20 February with a jathā of over 100 Akalis. They were allowed to enter the Gurdwara through the main gate which was shut after their entry. Then they were attacked and about twenty-five Akalis were shot inside the gurdwara; about sixty-five others, who had shut themselves in another sanctuary, were killed; and twenty-five Akalis found in the side rooms were also put to death. Most of the dead and the wounded were burnt, using the kerosene oil which had been stored for this purpose. The Deputy Commissioner, Currie, arrived at about 12:30 p.m. and saw the dead and wounded being burnt. C.M. King and the DIG of Police arrived in the late evening with 100 troops. Mahant Narain Das was arrested with two of his henchmen and twenty-six hired Pathans. The Gurdwara Janam Asthan was placed under military guard. On 21 February, Jathedar Kartar Singh Jhabbar arrived with over 2,000 Akalis, determined to enter the gurdwara. After consultation with C.M. King, the Deputy Commissioner agreed to form a committee of management, and the gurdwara was handed over to a committee of seven, with Sardar Harbans Singh Atariwala as its President. The mahants of over half a dozen other gurdwaras in Nankana Sahib surrendered their charge

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement voluntarily to the SGPC. A shahīdī dīwān was held at Nankana Sahib on 3 March 1921. Mahatma Gandhi came to express his solidarity with the Sikhs.27 The colonial government had no genuine sympathy with the reform movement. In order to protect the vested interests, the Punjab Government adopted a policy of repression. The Rawalpindi Singh Sabha appreciated the services of Sikh prisoners, including Kartar Singh Jhabbar and Teja Singh Bhuchar, and made a representation for justice to these innocent people. The Chief Secretary Craik gave the noting on 17 August 1921 that no reply be given because the Khatri and Arora Akalis of Rawalpindi were in no way representatives of the Sikh community as a whole. The Magistrate had recorded that this case was similar to the series of cases which followed the Nankana Tragedy, marked by ‘forcible seizure of Gurdwaras by an advanced section of the Sikhs who have suddenly sprung up into prominence and rejoice in the title of Akalis and would have us believe that on them devolves the duty of reforming Sikhism’. A jathā of twelve persons led by Teja Singh had forcibly seized three Sikh religious places. Teja Singh was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and to two years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 452.28 The SGPC decided to adopt non-violent non-cooperation as a part of Mahatma Gandhi’s Non-cooperation Movement. The Punjab Government prepared a draft of the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill in April 1921 and referred it to the Select Committee. After its approval it was presented to the Punjab Legislative Council in September. There was no provision of a Sikh central body in this Bill. The Sikh members of the council did not support the Bill. It was dropped finally on 10 November 1921.29 The government could use the legislature for its own purposes but not for any discussion of its policy or measures with regard to the movement for Gurdwara Reform. On 6 September 1921, Sardar Man Singh, Member, Legislative Assembly, had written to the Home Member, Sir William Vincent, about the serious grievances of the Sikh community (p.96) and proposed a resolution in the assembly regarding (a) the conduct of officials in the Nankana tragedy and the treatment of the Sikhs over the Gurdwaras and (b) the release of persons convicted for offences alleged to be connected with the reform movement. He was informed that the subject matter of his resolution concerned the province. Therefore, no special facilities could be given for its discussion on a date set aside for official business. Actually, the Punjab Governor had not approved of giving any facility for the resolution. The second resolution was not moved in the first place. Later, it was not debated. In practically all the cases, the prisoners had already been released.30 The sarbrah appointed by the government, Sardar Sunder Singh Ramgarhia, had continued to function as the Manager of the Golden Temple on behalf of the SGPC under its President, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia. The new President of Page 12 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement the SGPC, Sardar Kharak Singh, was keen to make it clear that Sunder Singh was under the control of the SGPC. On 29 October 1921 the Executive Committee of the SGPC decided to ask the Ramgarhia Sardar to hand over the keys of the treasury (toshakhāna) of the Golden Temple to the President of the SGPC. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar sent Lala Amar Nath, an Extra Assistant Commissioner, to collect the keys from Sunder Singh Ramgarhia who surrendered a bunch of fifty-three keys. In his place Captain Bahadur Singh was made the new Manager. But all this was regarded by the Akalis as official interference in the affairs of gurdwaras, and they decided not to allow Captain Bahadur Singh to interfere in the affairs of the Golden Temple. Protest meetings began to be held. The SGPC resolved to hold dīwāns ‘everywhere to explain the facts about the Keys affair’. The Akali leaders were arrested, tried, and convicted. The SGPC passed a resolution on 6 December 1921 that no Sikh should agree to any arrangement about the restoration of the keys until the Sikhs who had been arrested were released unconditionally. Caught in a dilemma, the government negotiated with the Sikh leaders, and issued a communiqué on 12 January 1922, announcing the decision to finally withdraw its connection with the management of the Golden Temple, to leave it in the hands of the SGPC, and to allow the keys to be given over to it.31 In The Tribune of 21 April 1922, fifty-one well-known Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs stated that they could not shut their eyes to numerous reports of excesses and irregularities by the government officials appearing in the press. Irregular and illegal arrests were followed by hasty and questionable convictions. The Punjab Government defended its action. The Governor General was in favour of contradicting any such report. On 6 May 1922 a general communiqué was issued that the object of the government in dealing with the Sikh question had been to treat ‘as sympathetically as possible’ all demands which were of a religious or semi-religious character. The general sympathy of the government was with ‘the movement for religious reform among the Sikhs’. However, continued the communiqué, the extreme section of the Sikhs had combined politics with religion. Their agitation was ‘revolutionary in character’. The Akalis had avowed hostility towards the government. At the end of February 1922, no less than 25,000 Akalis were moving about in armed bodies, and the government had to enforce the law. The Akalis were arrested and their cases were entrusted to a judge of the High Court. This action improved the situation.32 (p.97) The Guru-ka-Bagh morchā was initiated by the government to suppress the Akalis. Mahant Sunder Das of the Guru-ka-Bagh Gurdwara had signed an agreement with the SGPC early in 1921 to work under a committee of eleven members. Five or six months later, when the attitude of the bureaucracy towards the SGPC had hardened, the Mahant’s attitude also changed. On 23 August 1921, the SGPC took over the management of the gurdwara but allowed the land attached to it, known as the Guru-ka-Bagh, to remain in possession of the Mahant. He raised no objection to the dry wood being cut from this land for the Page 13 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement langar (community kitchen) of the gurdwara. A year later, on 9 August 1922, however, five Akalis were arrested on the charge of ‘theft’ for felling a dry kikar tree as fuel for the gurdwara kitchen. A complaint from Mahant Sundar Das was obtained after the arrests. This was actually an official challenge to the Akalis. They started sending jathās of five volunteers to assert their right to cut wood from the Guru-ka-Bagh for the gurdwara kitchen. By 25 August, 210 Akalis had been arrested. Fearing that an enormous number of Akali volunteers would come for arrests, the bureaucracy devised a new method of dealing with them.33 On 31 August 1922, Sardar Bahadur Gajjan Singh gave notice of questions for the Legislative Assembly. A number of these questions were regarded as related to matters which did not primarily concern the Governor General in Council. Therefore, they were disallowed. On 12 September, Sardar Man Singh gave notice of questions related mostly to the Guru-ka-Bagh. These too were disallowed, and on the same grounds as in the case of Sardar Gajjan Singh earlier.34 The Sikh situation was discussed by the Governor General in September 1922. Bhagwan Das, Deputy Superintendent of the CID, had reported on 7 September that police action at the Guru-ka-Bagh had proved ineffective. It was decided to stop it and to devise some other means of dealing with the situation. Allegations of looting by policemen were also reported. According to Sardar Jogendra Singh, he was told by Pandit Malaviya to say to His Excellency that ‘every lathi blow given to the Akalis was a blow at the root of British rule in India’. The Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India that there was no change in the situation. Arrests had gone up to eighty. The SGPC appeared to be inclined to settle the issue but on its own terms which might not be acceptable to the government.35 The Akali gatherings at Guru-ka-Bagh were declared to be unlawful. Jathās were stopped on the way, ordered to disperse, and, when they did not obey the order, they were beaten with lāṭhīs. The use of excessive brutal force presented a glaring contrast to the totally passive suffering of the Akalis. Some of the eminent leaders and prominent persons of the country witnessed the Guru-kaBagh morchā as a sad and unprecedented spectacle. It was reported in national newspapers. On 13 September 1922 the Punjab Governor visited Amritsar and the Guru-ka-Bagh. The use of brutal force was replaced by arrests. The stories and the sight of what was happening had excited sympathy for the Akalis even on the part of those who did not sympathize with the movement. The Akalis survived the worst kind of brute repression without showing any signs of weakness or wavering. A fairly large number of ex-soldiers had joined the morchā. The government began to look for a face-saving device. Sir Ganga Ram came to its help, or he was persuaded to do so. He took the Guru-ka-Bagh on lease and raised no objection to the wood being cut.36

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (p.98) In the Viceroy’s conference on 3 October 1922, the Gurdwara Bill drafted by Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was briefly discussed. It appeared to be reasonable to the Viceroy who observed that the Punjab Government was bound to give protection to the mahants who were legally entitled to police protection. The Home Member, Malcolm Hailey, suggested that a compromise between the Akalis and the mahants was preferable to arbitration. The written statement of Subedar Amar Singh was seen as important. He referred to the services rendered by the Sikh soldiers all over the world under hard conditions and the medals they were given in recognition of their sacrifice. But they were disillusioned by the attitude of the government towards the Sikh civilians. At Guru-ka-Bagh the Akalis were treated as criminals and humiliated. ‘We shall now be pleased to see handcuffs fastened on own wrists by those whom we have been considering our friends for long and in whose service we have been so little calculating of our own interests.’ The Sikh soldiers were fortunate now that they were put in jail ‘for the liberation of our religious shrines and Gurdwara reform’.37 The Home Secretary wrote to the Home Member on 7 November 1922 that Ogilvie, a Punjab civilian, was being sent on a tour with officers of the 47th Sikhs to explain to the regiments the government policy in order to reassure the Sikh soldiers. Rushbrook William was to organize propaganda in the press on the basis of the matter supplied by the Punjab Government. Two leaflets were prepared by the government for circulation among the Sikhs. One was entitled ‘The Sarkar in Difficulties’ and the other ‘Zalim Sarkar’. The import of these two leaflets was that the cry of government tyranny was ridiculous: it had to uphold the law. The Director of the CID was organizing propaganda in the press to refute charges against the government, and to expose the tactics of the SGPC. He was paying particular attention to the merits of Gurdwara Bill, introduced on 7 November, from the Sikh point of view. In another pamphlet Ogilvie dwelt on the concern of the paternal government with the welfare of the people like their children. The title was suggestive of its thrust: ‘Sons are bad sometimes; parents never.’38 The new Bill was not supported by the Sikh members when it was taken up for discussion. It was passed, nevertheless, with the support of the official and Muslim members of the council in November 1922. From the Sikh point of view, it was an improvement upon the Bill of 1921. But the Sikh members refused to cooperate in the implementation of the Act, and it became a dead letter. The government had passed this Act in the hope that the release of Akali prisoners would be made conditional upon working the Act but the SGPC refused to accept this piece of legislation. Therefore, the government was looking for some other plausible excuse for releasing 5,600 Akali prisoners. The Akali leaders played an active and constructive role in the Hindu–Muslim riots in Amritsar on 13 March

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement 1923. In appreciation, the government ordered unconditional release of the Akali volunteers arrested in the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā.39 For a British bureaucrat who wrote under the pen name ‘Komma’, the SGPC was hostile to the government from the very beginning. The religious movement was ‘speedily overshadowed by the political motive’. The Sikh League was a purely political body and it resolved to support the general movement for Indian independence. The political objective was propagated under the ‘cloak (p.99) of religion’. The SGPC could invoke the sacrifice of the martyrs of Nankana Sahib in their struggle against the government. ‘Every Akali henceforward was to wear a black turban in token of his mourning and they must demand that all Sikh shrines should be handed over to them.’ The leaders of the movement were not prepared to come to a peaceful settlement. ‘What they now wanted was the recovery, not of the shrines only, but also of the lordship of the Punjab and Swaraj for India.’ With reference to the handing over of the keys of the toshakhāna to the SGPC ‘Komma’ says: ‘Never was there a more shameful defeat.’ The Punjab Government had ‘humbled itself to the dust’ but the Akali leaders rejected all attempts at a compromise. The Guru-ka-Bagh morchā was not ‘a religious agitation’ but ‘a plain and naked attempt at revolt’. However, the situation was not desperate from the British point of view. The Sikh states and their rulers were faithful in their allegiance to the King-Emperor. The mass of the rural civil population had not yet been infected. The Sikh leaders disloyal to the government had misled the virile followers of the Sikh faith by giving their agitation a religious complexion. ‘Komma’ gave three suggestions for dealing with the situation. First, the political movement must be dissociated from the religious movement. Second, the agitators who were urging the Sikhs to revolt must be silenced. Third, the law which had prevented the reform of Sikh shrines must be changed ‘to accommodate the growing desire of the Sikhs to purify their religion’. In other words, ‘Komma’ favoured suitable legislation to appease the moderate reformers but recommended strong action against the agitators from outside the province and the politically radical Akalis.40 This appears to be a reflection of the thinking of the colonial government at this juncture.

Master Tara Singh’s Political Role Master Tara Singh was the Headmaster of Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, in 1920 when he was made a member of the SGPC, like several other Sikh leaders of the Lyallpur colony. He became personally involved in the events at Nankana Sahib. He says in Merī Yād that Nankana Sahib had attracted the attention of Singhs for four reasons: it was the birthplace of Guru Nanak; a large property was attached to the gurdwara; its resources were used against the Singh Sabha reformers; and its mahant had a disreputable character. As the leader of mahants, Narain Das decided to hold a conference in Lahore under the presidentship of Baba Kartar Singh Bedi. This irked the Akalis because a meeting of the SGPC was scheduled to be held on this day. Bhai Kartar Singh

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement Jhabbar and Bhai Lachhman Singh Dharowalia planned on their own to take possession of Nankana Sahib on the day of the conference.41 Master Tara Singh recalls that a day before the meeting of the SGPC (on 20 February 1921), he was met by Sardar Teja Singh Samundri who expressed great anxiety about the plan to take over Gurdwara Janam Asthan at Nankana Sahib. He wanted the action to be postponed. Before boarding the night train from Lyallpur to reach Amritsar in time for the SGPC meeting, they sent a telegram to Bhai Kartar Singh Jhabbar to meet them at the Chuharkana railway station. He sent Bhai Sucha Singh to meet them on his behalf. Bhai Sucha Singh agreed to convey their message to Bhai Kartar Singh to postpone the proposed action, but added that it would not be postponed.42 (p.100) At the Lahore railway station Sardar Teja Singh Samundri and Master Tara Singh met Bhai Dalip Singh of Sahowal, Jathedar of the Sheikhupura District Akali Dal, who knew nothing of the plan. He was given all the information and asked to go to Sacha Sauda and stop the jathās. Bhai Dalip Singh was able to persuade Kartar Singh Jhabbar to postpone action. Then he sent someone to Lachhman Singh for the same purpose. He himself went to Nankana Sahib to stop any jathā going towards the gurdwara. Along with Bhai Buta Singh, he waited on the way to the gurdwara but no jathā came till early in the morning, and they thought of going to sleep in the factory (kārkhāna) of Bhai Uttam Singh. Soon they heard the sound of firing and ran towards the Gurdwara Janam Asthan. Buta Singh was stopped on the way but Lachhman Singh reached the gurdwara. He implored the mahant to stop the carnage but the mahant ordered his men to kill him. He was cut to pieces and his limbs were thrown into a kiln to be burnt. It transpired later that some Singhs had met Lachhman Singh and tried to stop him but he said that ardās had been performed and they had to proceed irrespective of what might happen.43 On reaching Amritsar, Sardar Teja Singh Samundri and Master Tara Singh informed other members of the SGPC about the critical situation. Such was their anxiety that no matter was taken up in the meeting. The two returned from Amritsar on the same day and learnt at the Malhian Junction that hundreds of Singhs had been shot down at Nankana Sahib. They left the train at Sangla and walked to Chandarkot during the night. Bhai Kartar Singh Jhabbar was already there with his jathā. A huge crowd had gathered by the evening. Jathās from Jaranwala, Tandalianwala, and other places had also arrived. A single jathā was formed under the command of Bhai Kartar Singh. When it reached Nankana Sahib, many of the mahant’s men had already been arrested and the Commissioner gave the keys of the gurdwara to the Singhs in order to placate them. The gurdwara was occupied peacefully. Sometime later, however, the Singhs who had reached Nankana Sahib in large numbers went out of control and they ill-treated some of the local people.44

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement Master Tara Singh was now invited to work as Secretary of the SGPC. He took leave from the school for six months and reached Amritsar to establish his office as Secretary. The existence of the SGPC became tangible in the form of this office. A Gurdwaras Bill was prepared by the government but there was a fundamental difference between the viewpoint of the Akalis and the government. From the government’s point of view it was not politic to create a central body for all the gurdwaras of the province. The Bill was passed but it remained a dead letter because the Sikhs were opposed to the Act. The government started arresting the Akalis in order to suppress the movement. The mahants were encouraged to resist the Akalis. Master Tara Singh had to bear the main burden of pressure from the government.45 Master Tara Singh was staying with his brother, Professor Niranjan Singh, who was teaching at Khalsa College, Amritsar. Because of his residence in the College, Master Tara Singh developed friendly relations with Bawa Harkishan Singh and Professor Teja Singh, who were both teaching in the College. Both of them were well versed in Sikh religion and took serious interest in the affairs of the Sikh Panth. Gradually, all the three professors became co-workers of Master Tara Singh who would consult them on all important matters. They started going to the office of the SGPC (p.101) and to participate in discussions. Later they were entrusted with the task of publicizing the proclamations of the SGPC and drafting all kinds of declarations.46 The repressive policy of the government obliged the SGPC to pass a resolution in May in favour of non-cooperation with the government. The moderate leaders, Sardar Harbans Singh Atari and Bhai Jodh Singh, who were not in favour of confrontation with the government, left the SGPC. In July 1921 a new SGPC was constituted, and Sardar Kharak Singh was elected President.47 The movement entered a new phase. In direct confrontation with the government, the SGPC now demanded that the keys of the toshakhāna of the Darbar Sahib should be handed over to its President. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar had by then appointed Captain Bahadur Singh as the sarbrah. In the beginning of November, he came to the Darbar Sahib with the keys so that arrangement for display (jallau) at the time of Gurpurab might be made, but the Sikh sangat did not allow him to go near the toshakhāna. He handed over the keys to the Deputy Commissioner and resigned.48 The new SGPC organized a large number of dīwāns and lectures. The government imposed a ban on meetings in the districts of Lahore, Amritsar, and Sheikhupura. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar began to hold his own meetings. The one at Ajnala was attended by Sardar Teja Singh Samundri, Sardar Jaswant Singh Jhabal, Sardar Dan Singh Wachhoa, and some others. After the Deputy Commissioner’s speech the Akali leaders asked for time to speak but were refused. They decided to hold a separate meeting. The police arrested the Akalis. The SGPC was in session when this news reached Amritsar. Page 18 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement It was decided to hold a dīwān in Ajnala. Master Tara Singh was present in this dīwān but he did not make any speech. He was not among the leaders arrested on this occasion. It was decided to start a morchā at Amritsar. There, Master Tara Singh made a speech in front of the Akal Takht, and he was arrested (and sent to the Mianwali jail).49 After the arrest of Sardar Kharak Singh, Sardar Harchand Singh of Lyallpur was made President of the SGPC. Giani Sher Singh left Rawalpindi and settled permanently in Amritsar. Many others came to work for the SGPC. The new Working Committee of the SGPC passed the resolution that no Sikh should accept the keys of the toshakhāna from the Deputy Commissioner until all the Akali prisoners were released. None of the staunch loyalist Sikhs was prepared to take the keys on behalf of the government. The Deputy Commissioner wanted to negotiate terms with the new Akali leaders but they were not prepared to go to him. Sardar Beant Singh, a Tehsildar, brought the message of the Deputy Commissioner that he wanted to meet the Akali leaders in the office of the SGPC. ‘This was for the first time during the British rule that its administrator came to the office of an organization to meet its office-bearers.’50 In his negotiations with the Akali leaders the Deputy Commissioner said that the government was prepared to release the Akalis on the condition that they would not agitate against the government so that the whole matter of gurdwaras could be settled in a peaceful manner. Professor Niranjan Singh and Giani Sher Singh met Master Tara Singh and Sardar Teja Singh Samundri, who were in the Mianwali jail with some other Akali leaders. All of them thought that the proposal was reasonable. If the objective of the Akalis (p.102) was achieved through peaceful means there was no need for agitation. Then Professor Niranjan Singh and Giani Sher Singh went to Dera Ghazi Khan where Sardar Kharak Singh and Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh were detained with some other leaders. Sardar Kharak Singh alone insisted that the government must offer an apology. The others tried to persuade him but he did not change his stand. When Niranjan Singh and Sher Singh returned to Amritsar, the Akali leaders were being released. Sardar Kharak Singh came out and started giving inflammatory speeches to incite the Sikhs against the government. This attitude of the top leader convinced the government that it would have to use harsh measures to deal with the Akalis.51 Master Tara Singh writes that this victory and the stance of their President elated the Akali workers so much that they began to travel in trains without tickets and to occupy all classes of compartments. At several places they insulted English officers. The Akali leaders were partly responsible for this. In a procession in Lahore they shouted provocative slogans against the government. In Amritsar, all limits were crossed. Master Tara Singh drew the attention of the Akali leaders towards this, and separated himself from them as a token of

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement protest. He was not yet in a position, he says, to be effective.52 This is the earliest indication of Master Tara Singh’s differences with Sardar Kharak Singh. Giani Sher Singh was appreciative of Master Tara Singh. He wrote on 16 April 1922 that the frank and courageous approach of Master Tara Singh had been well recognized by the Panth. By going to jail for the second time, he had entered the political arena openly. His first offence in the eyes of the government was to have read out the resolution of SGPC on the keys affair to a religious dīwān. This time he was arrested for his lecture at village Ghasitpura (district Lyallpur) which was regarded by the people as rather mild in tone and content. But Article 107 could be interpreted by the authorities in any way they liked. The real reason for his arrest was that he had gone to Benares to ask Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya for support to the Akalis. He was arrested by the police on his return when he was rather unwell. He was among the handful of leaders who had dedicated themselves wholly to the SGPC.53 It was hoped that the government would pass a Gurdwaras Act but the Akalis were agitating all over the Punjab. The government prepared lists of all Akalis in each district and in the Sikh states to arrest them all at the same time. About 1,700 Akalis were arrested. This brought peace to the Punjab but it strengthened the SGPC. Had the government not taken action against the Akalis, they would have put an end to the authority of the SGPC. An eloquent example of their high-handedness was that they had once kept the members of the committee of Darbar Sahib confined in a room in their office for three hours for not getting what they regarded as good food in the langar. Bawa Harkishan Singh was among those who had been confined. The members of the Working Committee of the SGPC, among whom was Master Tara Singh, felt afraid that the Akali victory over the possession of the keys of the Darbar Sahib might finish off the SGPC. Master Tara Singh was also arrested but he was released after a week.54 Thinking that the Akalis had been weakened, the government began to dilly-dally about the Gurdwara legislation. It was a great failing on the part of the government to yield to the pressure of agitation and to feel strong enough to resist when that (p.103) agitation stopped as if there would be none again. This happened several times during the Akali movement. The SGPC was earnest about legislation, but there was no statesman among the British administrators of the Punjab. At one or two places the mahants were encouraged by the local officials to take back the gurdwaras in the possession of the Akalis. The SGPC decided to launch a morchā. It was due to the foolishness of the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar that the morchā at Guru-ka-Bagh had started.55 Master Tara Singh recalls that every morning 100 Singhs used to take the vow at the Akal Takht to remain peaceful against all provocation, and start towards the Guru-ka-Bagh. The police used to meet them on the way. They would sit down and the police would start beating them till every Singh lay prostrate on the Page 20 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement ground. This continued for twelve days. No Akali abandoned the ground, and no Akali resisted. The Congress had failed in its satyāgraha and there was a great feeling of despondency in the entire country. The challenge of the Akalis kindled a new spirit.56 The aggressive attitude of the government was the cause of the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā. All the top leaders with the exception of Sardar Teja Singh Samundri were arrested. The SGPC was virtually placed under siege: no postal communication, no money, and no help was allowed to come in. The Akalis were not allowed to board any train. But the Sikhs did not submit to repression. The Akali jathās bore all kinds of hardship and deprivation. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya came to Amritsar to help the Sikhs. He invited C.F. Andrews too to see for himself what was going on. Andrews wrote articles in English for newspapers in India and England. The Punjab Government stood exposed. National leaders began to come to Amritsar. A special session of the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress was held at Amritsar under the Presidentship of Srinivas Ayangar. A committee was appointed to investigate official excesses. Never before or after were the Sikhs in such a high spirit as now. It was the second victory of the Sikhs when the government saved its face through Sir Ganga Ram’s mediacy.57 All the important gurdwaras had come under the control of the Akalis. But this was not a constitutional position. Therefore, the Akalis expected the government to legislate a suitable measure for the control and management of gurdwaras. In the new elections of the SGPC, Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh was elected President and Sardar Teja Singh Samundri Vice-President. An executive committee was constituted with Master Tara Singh as a member. He was also the editor of the Akālī, which was now published from Amritsar. Bawa Harkishan Singh was very close to him. These two were the most influential individuals among the Akalis. Sardar Teja Singh and Sardar Mehtab Singh generally tended to agree with them. The entire Akali leadership was now absolutely keen that its position should be constitutionalized.58 The government wanted to isolate the Akalis from the Babbar Akalis, who had started their programme of political murders. The threat from the Babbars appeared to be more imminent and more serious. The government felt obliged to come to a sort of truce with the SGPC. All the Akalis arrested during the Guruka-Bagh Morcha were released ostensibly for their help in stopping the riots between Hindus and Muslims at Amritsar. However, the government did not initiate any legislation on the gurdwaras. Master Tara Singh had also been arrested. But he was released after about a month and a half. The (p.104) reason was that whereas other Akali leaders used to give lectures, he did not make any speech. Master Tara Singh emphasized that both Hindus and Muslims supported the Akalis at the time of Guru-ka-Bagh morchā. On no other occasion were they together in supporting the Akalis. This was also the time when the Page 21 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement orders of the SGPC were obeyed by the Sikhs like the Guru’s order. All political shades were represented on the SGPC and this was the source of its strength.59 The Akali movement was at its height when the SGPC resolved to start the cleansing of the tank (kār-sevā) at the Darbar Sahib. There was unprecedented enthusiasm among the Sikhs, and an unusually large number of Sikhs turned up for the kār-sevā. Master Tara Singh says that he had not witnessed such a scene in his whole life nor read in Sikh history. He regrets that this was spoilt by the spirit of rowdyism (burchhā-gardī) which surfaced among the Sikhs rather frequently. A few headstrong individuals started the work of kār-sevā even before ardās was performed and kār-sevā initiated by panj-piārās. Master Tara Singh does not name anyone, but we know that these headstrong individuals were led by Teja Singh Bhuchar. Master Tara Singh calls it burchhe-gardī; it was the chief source of weakness of the Panth. Some leaders always acted without a sense of responsibility.60 At the time of the kār-sevā, the local army officers without the knowledge of the Deputy Commissioner and the higher authorities sent troops to Amritsar on the assumption that they might be required in view of a large gathering. It was then decided that in future the movement of troops in aid of civil power should be ordered only at the request or acquiescence of the civil authorities. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar reported on 17 June 1923 that if the procession had followed the SGPC programme, ‘it would have covered at least 18 miles, and would have taken all day to reach the Darbar Sahib’. He also noticed ‘a magnificent piece of insolence’. An Akali jathā started the work of kār-sevā early in the morning, more than two hours before the arrival of Sardar Mehtab Singh and Captain Ram Singh. The Maharaja of Patiala arrived 15 minutes later, at 8:15, and sat before the Akal Takht. Teja Singh Bhuchar at the head of the jathā marched out defiantly. Only then, at 11:00, did the panj-piāras begin the clearance and the people were allowed to perform sevā. The Deputy Commissioner remarked that its after-effects might be political, but the spirit of the kār-sevā was not political.61 Master Tara Singh did not take the bureaucracy seriously when it was announced that prisoners of the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā were being released in appreciation of the peaceful role played by the Akalis during the Hindu–Muslim clashes in Amritsar. Had this been the real reason, all the Akali prisoners should have been released. But the prisoners other than those of the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā were not released. It was generally believed by the people that the government wanted to show mildness towards the passive Akalis so that they did not join the militant Babbars. Furthermore, the object of the bureaucracy was to suppress the Babbar Akalis by isolating them from rest of the Panth. These measures could then be adopted in other areas, one after the other. The Akalis

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement did not approve of violence but they would not tolerate their suppression on the false plea of violence.62 Master Tara Singh remained interested in the Babbar Akalis till the end. When the Babbars were sentenced to death, they refused to make any appeal. ‘Whatever we have done’, they said, ‘is precisely what Guru Hargobind and the Tenth Master had done.’ To destroy (p.105) the wicked was no sin or crime. To utter such words in the face of death, says Master Tara Singh, was not possible for a thief, a dacoit, or a murderer. ‘We cannot help sympathizing with Sardar Kishan Singh and his companions who are called Babbar Akalis and ordered to be hanged.’ Their courage, dedication to the cause, and their sacrifice were being praised by all. Even when the Babbars were mistaken in their method, ‘we want to say it loudly and clearly that the responsibility for their attitude lies with the bureaucracy’. The manner in which the officials of the State treated the peaceful Akalis at Guru-ka-Bagh and desecrated the symbols of their faith was bound to create a spirit of retaliation among some of the Akalis. It went to the credit of the SGPC that the entire Panth did not join the Babbar Akali movement. At its very beginning, the SGPC had declared that it could not appreciate the viewpoint of the Babbars, but in the heart of their hearts, the Akalis were convinced that they were doing nothing wrong. The Babbar Akali movement was a product of the atrocities of the bureaucracy in dealing with the peaceful Akalis. It was for the bureaucracy to realize its mistake.63

Mahatma Gandhi’s Attitude towards the Akalis Ruchi Ram Sahni, who came to be closely associated with the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā on behalf of the Congress, was convinced that the Akali movement was deeply influenced by Mahatma Gandhi. He writes: ‘In my view, the Akali movement provides the best and the most inspiring instance of Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings of non-violence through word and deed.’64 Mohinder Singh observes, however, that the Congress found in the Akali movement an opportunity to further its own programme of non-cooperation launched by Mahatma Gandhi to strengthen its own position in the Punjab.65 There is no doubt that the Congress leadership in general and Mahatma Gandhi in particular took keen interest in the Akalis. It is important, therefore, to look at the nature of this interest. Addressing a meeting at Amritsar on 18 October 1920, Mahatma Gandhi had said that there were only two ways to attain swarāj: the sword and noncooperation. It was his firm conviction that ‘swaraj could be achieved in one year’ with complete unity and spirit of sacrifice for non-cooperation. On the same day, Mahatma Gandhi talked to the students of Khalsa College, Amritsar, and asked them whether they wished to be loyal to the Empire or to Guru Nanak. They could make the College ‘truly Khalsa’ if it received no grants, and they could themselves become ‘truly Khalsa’ if they left the College. Clearly, he wanted the Sikhs to join the Non-cooperation Movement. At Lahore, on the Page 23 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement following day, he made it very explicit: ‘Let the Hindus, Musalmans and the Sikhs weld themselves together in one whole and through progressive nonviolent non-cooperation wrest justice from Government’s unwilling hands.’66 Speaking at Gujranwala on 19 February 1921, Mahatma Gandhi referred to the Sikh League having joined the non-cooperation for obtaining swarāj, and he reiterated that swarāj could be attained within one year through non-violent noncooperation. On 25 February he made his first known comment on Nankana Sahib. The mahants would surrender immediately, he said, if no one visited a gurdwara and if no money was put into the impure hands of the impure mahants. There was some humiliation involved in the way in which the control of the gurdwara at Nankana Sahib had been given to the Akalis (p.106) by the government’s army. ‘We do not have any right to acquire control of a gurdwara by intimidation.’ The Sikhs had waited for years. ‘Would it have been wrong to wait a year more.’ On 3 March Mahatma Gandhi visited Nankana Sahib to tender his sympathy as ‘a pilgrim’. After speaking about ‘the tragedy’ he said that the Gurdwara movement required ‘overhauling’. Even if no violence was intended, a large party going to take possession of a gurdwara constituted ‘a show of force’. There were two ways open to the Akalis: arbitration or suspension. Mahatma Gandhi was in favour of suspension of the movement.67 Clearly, he wanted the Akalis to suspend their movement in order to give support to his Non-cooperation Movement. In the Navjivan on 13 March 1921, Mahatma Gandhi wrote a longish piece on ‘awakening among the Sikhs’. This awakening, he said significantly, would either deliver India from bondage within eight months ‘or it will obstruct that deliverance’. The Sikhs had strength of both body and mind, they were brave with the sword, and they were strong of will too. The biggest gurdwaras had fallen into the hands of the Akali jathās. Narrating briefly how Mahant Narain Das had ‘out-Dyered Dyer’, Mahatma Gandhi wrote: I asked one of their leaders what, according to him, was the value of this sacrifice from the point of view of the country. He said it had added to the strength not only of the Sikhs but of the whole of India. We should not be surprised if many more such sacrifices have to be made before we win swaraj. This sacrifice, he said, had shown the world what brave men the country had. He was right. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had uttered one profound sentence at Nankana Sahib: ‘The blood of a hundred and fifty has purified one gurudwara. Should it be any wonder if all of us have to be martyrs to purify the gurudwara that is India?’ Everyone of the Sikhs to whom Mahatma Gandhi talked on this subject believed that the Akalis had gone to the gurdwara for darshan and, though they could have drawn their swords, they refrained from doing so and perished, since they had taken a pledge to act peacefully. ‘If so, this is a perfect example of nonPage 24 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement violent non-cooperation, and I firmly believe that its impact on the freedom movement will be tremendous.’68 Genuinely appreciative of the Akalis, Mahatma Gandhi was absolutely keen to see that the Akalis did not deviate from the path of non-violence. They had a crucial importance for the project of swarāj. Mahatma Gandhi took notice of the Akali agitation about the keys of the treasury of the Golden Temple. The Punjab Government had goaded the Sikhs to civil disobedience by prohibiting a Sikh dīwān to be held at Amritsar. But the Sikhs held the dīwān and eleven leading Sikhs were arrested, including the SGPC President, Sardar Kharak Singh, and Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh who had resigned the Deputy Presidentship of the Punjab Council and government pleadership on the gurdwara question. ‘If the Sikhs continued to remain calm and yet firm, then the incarceration of the Sikh leaders must bring about the desired solution of the Gurdwara question.’ In the congratulatory telegram sent by Mahatma Gandhi to Sardar Kharak Singh, the success of the Akalis in the Keys morchā was stated to be a victory in the first battle of freedom. It was a measure of the kind of importance he attached to the Akali movement. In December 1921, he wrote that ‘the Sikh countrymen’ were solving their own and India’s problem. All their best men were offering themselves as sacrifice for the sake of their faith. In soldierly fashion, one after another, they were (p.107) seeking imprisonment without fuss and flutter and without the slightest violence. If the same calm courage continues, they would without a shadow of doubt solve their own and with it also materially assist in solving India’s problem. All of India was watching with eager expectation this religious manifestation among the Sikhs.69 Mahatma Gandhi praised the Akalis as non-violent fighters against the government. They had behaved with wonderful courage and restraint. ‘When born fighters become non-violent they exhibit courage of the highest order.’ Mahatma Gandhi hoped and prayed that they would remain non-violent to the end. He fully endorsed Lajpat Rai’s tribute to the Sikhs that they had set a noble example. They deserved all praise as brave and noble sufferers in the cause of truth. Their resolute behaviour, their religious fervour, and their calm determination commanded his highest admiration. Mahatma Gandhi earnestly hoped that no hasty action, no outbreak of violence would impede ‘our unmistakable progress towards our destined goal’. The message sent by Sardar Kharak Singh from prison to the Khalsa was: ‘Non-violence is the key to success.’ Eventually the Commissioner offered to return the keys of the Golden Temple on certain conditions. Mahatma Gandhi remarked: ‘Sikh courage reaches greater heights every day and along with their courage grow their endurance and their spirit of non-violence.’ The government was now in a dilemma. ‘If it releases the Sikhs, it will be ridiculed and the strength of the Sikhs will increase two fold. If it does not release them, their strength will increase tenfold.’70 The government proved to be wise enough to choose to be laughed at. The Congress Committee paid a compliment to the Sikhs for their bravery, sacrifice, and Page 25 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement patriotism by selecting Sardar Kharak Singh as President of Provincial Congress Committee. Mahatma Gandhi congratulated Sardar Kharak Singh on his courage to take up the office ‘at this stormy period of the nation’s career’.71 Sikh nonviolence in the struggle for freedom had a peculiar importance for Mahatma Gandhi because of his assumption that the Sikhs believed in the use of force. A ‘Punjab Nationalist’ wrote to Mahatma Gandhi about ‘some of the terrible facts’ which should oblige him to revise his opinion about the non-violent character of the Sikh awakening. This letter startled Mahatma Gandhi. The report seemed to be ‘unbelievable’ but its author claimed accuracy for his report. It was published by Mahatma Gandhi without any comment. He wanted to hear what his Sikh friends had to say about this matter.72 The ‘Punjab Nationalist’ had confused the Babbars, who subscribed to the idea and practice of armed struggle against the British, with the Akalis. Mahatma Gandhi’s anxiety is understandable. He carried the impression that the Sikhs believed in the use of force but they had taken to non-violent noncooperation in an exemplary manner. Their loyalty to the cause was exceptionally important for Mahatma Gandhi. He was arrested in 1922 and remained in jail till early 1924. But he did not forget the Sikhs. It was in the jail for the first time that he read some books on Sikh history in order to understand them better in the light of their background. He would take serious interest in the Akali movement again during 1924–5 under changed circumstances.

Master Tara Singh as an Ideologue of the Akali Movement Master Tara Singh’s literary activity was as important as if not more than his political (p.108) activity in the early 1920s. Through his articles he communicated his ideas to inform the political and religious attitudes of the Sikhs. He used a language that was easy to understand, and in an idiom that had a peculiar appeal for people familiar with the Sikh faith and Sikh history. The bearing of Sikh ideology, as understood by Master Tara Singh, comes out clearly in these articles. It is important to note in this connection that even though he supported non-violent non-cooperation, Master Tara Singh sought the real roots of the Akali movement in the Sikh tradition and not in Mahatma Gandhi’s principle of non-violence.73 Master Tara Singh pointed out that the Sikhs had never accepted the authority of any government in their religious affairs. Even under Sikh rule, all religious disputes were settled by the Akalis of that time. But the British were trying to impose their own ideas in religious matters concerning the Sikhs. That was the reason why the SGPC had resorted to non-cooperation. The only way out now was that, in consonance with the religious convictions of the Sikhs and their religious rights, the management of gurdwaras should be legally entrusted to the elected representatives of the Panth in accordance with the wishes of the SGPC. The martyrs’ blood at Nankana Sahib had demonstrated to the world how Page 26 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement dearly religious freedom was cherished by the Sikhs. The Sikhs had realized that freedom lay in their conscience, and the key to the freedom of gurdwaras was with the SGPC. Service of the Panth was the foremost duty of the Sikhs.74 The source of inspiration for the Sikhs was their history as much as their faith. On the eve of the Hola Muhalla at Anandpur, Master Tara Singh recalled the siege of Anandpur by the combined forces of the Hill Rajas and the Mughals. Just as Guru Gobind Singh was surrounded at that time by hardship on all sides, so was the Panth besieged by difficulties now. Like the Hill Rajas then, the mahants now were the real enemies. They wanted to sacrifice the nation for their selfish interests. ‘Anandpur’ was a legacy left for the Sikhs by the Tenth Master and they were proud of this heritage. The spirit which enabled the Khalsa to overcome all the difficulties in their struggle for freedom would rescue them from their present predicament. They must remain true to their heritage.75 As in the time of the Mughal emperors, when it was a crime to be a Singh, so was it now a crime to be an Akali. The Sikhs had only two options: to become renegades (patits) or to be treated as rebels. Since they could not betray their faith, they had to be prepared for facing all kinds of hardship as ‘rebels’. ‘In the present times a Sikh who is not ready to go to jail is either not really a Sikh or he does not understand the Sikh faith.’ The path of sikhī, as laid down in gurbāṇī, was narrower than the breadth of a hair and sharper than the edge of a sword. Now was the testing time. A Sikh who takes pahul commits himself to dedicate his body, mind, and wealth to the Guru. The proof of faith was not in words but in actions.76 Master Tara Singh invoked the Sikh tradition of martyrdom in the cause of faith. To die for the faith was a source of honour. The people (kaum) who fail to preserve their honour cease to be alive. The Sikhs were small in number; they were not so learned as some other peoples were; they did not possess much wealth; but they possessed a strong sense of honour. They knew how to die for their faith. ‘So long as the Sikhs remember the basic principle (mūlmantar) that their life lies in the honour of their faith, they (p.109) shall remain a nation of the brave.’ A brave Singh warrior, Bhai Alam Singh, asked Guru Gobind Singh how a handful of the Khalsa would remain on its feet against a crowd of powerful opponents. The Tenth Master told him, ‘The Immortal Being (Akal Purkh) will be their protector if the Khalsa know how to die for their faith.’77 Master Tara Singh invoked the Sikh tradition in support of non-violent noncooperation. Non-violent suffering for a cause was an integral part of the Sikh tradition. Non-violence for Master Tara Singh was not to retaliate even when one had the capacity to do so. Guru Tegh Bahadur had demonstrated the principle that non-violence involved deliberate suffering. To remain peaceful out of fear was not bravery but cowardice. He who was afraid of the sword could not wield the sword. He who was prepared to die could challenge thousands of people just Page 27 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement by himself. All kinds of bravery were subsumed in non-violence. Passive suffering strengthened the soul, and it was a source of bravery for others too. Therefore, what was needed was to strengthen the soul through non-violence.78 Master Tara Singh appreciated Mahatma Gandhi’s recipe of non-violent noncooperation. Atrocities on peaceful agitators would expose the imperial power and its cloak of legality and touch the conscience of its agents. It would be impossible for the government machinery to run without the support of the Indian people. They could foil the imperial policy of ‘the-carrot-and-the-stick’ only by non-violent non-cooperation. The ‘carrot’ would have no attraction and the ‘stick’ would unmask the true character of imperial power. The people who criticized non-cooperation out of selfish concerns were mistaken. There was no middle path. Swarāj and non-cooperation were two sides of the same coin. Nonviolent non-cooperation was the one and only road to victory.79 The bureaucracy was adopting harsh measures to re-establish its reputation and authority. But it would be a mistake to retaliate and to resort to violence. The lesson of Chauri Chaura should never be forgotten. Non-violent non-cooperation was the necessary answer to atrocities and oppression. The Sikhs should rejoice over the chance to make sacrifices. To save the honour of the Panth was in the hands of the Khalsa. Guru Arjan and Guru Tegh Bahadur, the martyr Gurus, were watching them. Bhai Mani Singh and Bhai Taru Singh, the great Sikh martyrs, were waiting for them with garlands in their hands. The Khalsa should sink their differences and become a strong entity. Freedom was not easy to attain, and even more difficult was to remain steadfast in faith. Only they who were indifferent to suffering could remain steadfast. The Khalsa should remember the legacy of Guru Tegh Bahadur who sacrificed his life to uphold his principle.80 Master Tara Singh was sure that there was no option for the Akalis but to fight. The colonial government had its own inherent weaknesses. It was opposed to the idea of handing over the management of the gurdwaras to the representatives of the Panth because it entertained suspicion out of its own weakness. First, it was a foreign government and, second, it was maintained by force. Because of this essential weakness, the government did not trust anybody and interfered with everything. ‘Weakness creates mistrust which leads to interference, and interference breeds opposition.’ This had been the weakness of Aurangzeb. The British bureaucracy mistrusted the Muslims after 1857 and when the Hindus began to ask for their rights they were suspected of treason. The bureaucracy (p.110) began to mistrust the Sikhs after 1907. Its anxiety to keep the Sikh institutions like the Darbar Sahib and the Khalsa College under its control was a reflection of this mistrust. The Sikhs could not keep quiet any longer, and they made their position clear over the issue of Gurdwara Rakabganj. But the British reluctance to relinquish control increased all the more. There was no point in waiting for the government to change its mind. The SGPC was left with no

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement option but to continue the agitation with greater vigour. This would have to be done sooner or later.81 True faith was the basis of power. Guru Gobind Singh made it very clear that he would ensure power for the Khalsa so long as they remained faithful to their distinctive way of life; they would lose his trust if they deviated from the way of life prescribed for the Khalsa. Through the grace of the Tenth Master the Khalsa made their way to power. When they adopted Brahmanical rites and rituals, so much so that there remained no distinction between a Sikh and a Hindu, they lost their power. At the first birth of the Khalsa only five Sikhs were asked to offer their heads. For the ‘re-birth’ of the Khalsa, the blood of 125 Sikhs was spilt at Nankana Sahib. The British bureaucracy tried to weaken the Akalis and took the keys of the toshakhāna to put an end to the SGPC, but it failed to suppress the Akalis. The Guru-ka-Bagh was another battleground where the bureaucracy was defeated. Master Tara Singh hoped that the Khalsa would take the vow on the Baisakhi of 1923 to fight to the finish.82

In Retrospect The year 1920 appears in retrospect to be a watershed in the history of the Sikhs and in the life of Master Tara Singh. The newspaper Akālī was started as the mouthpiece of the radical Sikh leaders as rivals of the Chief Khalsa Diwan, articulating their concern for the liberation of Khalsa College, Amritsar, the historical gurdwaras in the Punjab, and eventually the country. Never before had the Singh Sabha leaders expressed their concern for the freedom of the country so openly and so strongly as now. The radical leaders captured the Central Sikh League and announced direct action to reconstruct the wall of Gurdwara Rakabganj. It was rebuilt by the colonial government as a politic measure. To obviate the radicals taking over management of Khalsa College at Amritsar, the British bureaucracy relinquished its control in favour of the moderate leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. For the management of the Darbar Sahib at Amritsar and other gurdwaras, a new representative body called the SGPC was formed in November, of which Master Tara Singh was a member. This was followed by the formation of Shiromani Akali Dal in December 1920. The Akali movement for liberation of the gurdwaras and liberation of the country had begun. The radical Sikh leaders of the Lyallpur canal colony played a considerable role in the developments of 1920. Master Tara Singh was conspicuous among them. A founder member of the SGPC like several other Sikh leaders of the Lyallpur colony, Master Tara Singh became personally involved in the events at Nankana Sahib in February 1921. Soon after, he was invited to become Secretary of the SGPC and he established his office at Amritsar. In this process he adopted Amritsar as his home, with politics as his full-time vocation. It located Master Tara Singh at the centre of Sikh politics for the rest of his life. In May 1921 the SGPC passed a resolution in favour of non-cooperation with the (p.111) government. When a new SGPC was constituted in July, Sardar Kharak Singh Page 29 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement was elected its President, to replace the moderate leaders of the Chief Khalsa Diwan. Thus, Master Tara Singh’s tenure as Secretary of the SGPC was marked by an important change, and Akali politics entered a new phase. The ‘Keys Morcha’ (29 October 1921–12 January 1922) was the first direct confrontation of the Akalis with the government. Master Tara Singh was arrested for the first time and sent to Mianwali Jail. By the beginning of 1922, the government was prepared to release all the Akali prisoners in order to settle the gurdwara issue in a peaceful manner on the understanding that the Akalis would stop the agitation. Master Tara Singh favoured peaceful means for resolving political issues. The agitational mode was the last resort for him. His approach was appreciated by the Panth. He was looked upon as one of the few Sikh leaders who had dedicated themselves wholly to the SGPC. The Guru-ka-Bagh morchā (August 1922–March 1923) was the highest watermark of the Akali movement; it demonstrated the capacity of the Akali volunteers to bear utmost suffering with patience. It received sympathy and support from the leaders of the Congress and other organizations, and it got wide publicity as the most important movement at that time in India. The Akalis were never so strong as at the time of the kār-sevā at Amritsar during the early summer of 1923. By then, Master Tara Singh had emerged as one of most prominent Akali leaders. He had been influencing the Sikhs in general and the Akalis in particular through his articles in Punjabi. For Mahatma Gandhi, the Akali movement was important primarily for its potential integration with the struggle for the freedom of India. For Master Tara Singh, it was important also for ensuring freedom for the Sikh Panth in consonance with the basic character of the Sikh movement. Service of the Panth was the foremost duty of the Sikhs. The source of inspiration for the Sikhs was their history as much as their faith. They must remain true to their heritage. The proof of faith was not in words but in actions. He invoked the Sikh tradition of martyrdom in the cause of faith. To die for the faith was a source of honour. Master Tara Singh was sure that there was no option for the Akalis but to fight and continue the agitation with greater vigour. True faith was the basis of power. He hoped that the Khalsa would take the vow on the Baisakhi of 1923 to fight to the finish. Notes:

(1.) B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, vol. I (1885–1935) (Bombay: Padma Publications, n.d.), pp. 181–91, 196, 199–200, 206, 210. (2.) Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, pp. 219, 223, 230, 235–7, 241.

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (3.) Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, pp. 249, 251–2, 254, 260–1. (4.) Prem Raman Uprety, Religion and Politics in Punjab in the 1920s (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980), pp. 150–3. (5.) Kirpal C. Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), pp. 41–52. See also Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Panjab 1897–1947 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research [ICHR], 1984), pp. 100–1, 106–8, 110. (6.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), pp. 40–6. (7.) Hira Singh Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, 2nd ed. (Jalandhar: Dhanpat Rai & Sons, 1957), pp. 115–21. (8.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 122–35. (9.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 130–1. (10.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 147–8. (11.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 148–9. According to Durlab Singh, Master Tara Singh had offered his name for the shahīdī jathā for rebuilding the wall of Gurdwara Rakabganj. ‘The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh’ in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), p. 20. (12.) Ganda Singh, A History of Khalsa College Amritsar (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1949), pp. 93–4. (13.) Teja Singh, Ārsī (Amritsar: Lok Sahit Prakashan, 1958), pp. 56–9. (14.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform and the Sikh Awakening (Jullundur City: Desh Sewak Book Agency, 1922), pp. 87–8. (15.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 92–5. (16.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 121–36. (17.) Khālsā Akhbār, 1 January 1987, pp. 3–5. Quoted by Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 326–7 and n. 40. (18.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 90–2, 143–5. (19.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 56–60.

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (20.) Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, pp. 60–2. (21.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 106, 115, 148–9. (22.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 151–4. (23.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 161–8. (24.) Teja Singh, The Gurdwara Reform, pp. 446–7. (25.) Kulwinder Singh Bajwa (ed.), Akālī Dal Sachā Saudā Bār (Amritsar: SGPC, 2000), p. 61. (26.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978), pp. 24–5. (27.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 28–35. (28.) F. No. 383 & K.W., Home Political 1921, National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi. (29.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Struggle: A Retrospect (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1988), p. 135. (30.) F. No. 262, Home Political 1921, NAI. (31.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 42–7. (32.) ‘Policy of the Punjab Government in Regard to the Akali Movement’, F. No. 861, Home Political 1922, NAI. (33.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 49–51. (34.) F. No. 914/II, Home Political 1922, NAI. (35.) F. No. 914, Home Political 1922, NAI. (36.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 52–61. (37.) F. No. 914, Home Political 1922, NAI. (38.) F. No. 914, Home Political 1922, NAI. (39.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Struggle, pp. 136–7. (40.) Komma, ‘The Sikh Situation in the Punjab (1907–1922)’, PPP 12, part 2 (October 1978): 432–8. John Maynard, who was directly concerned with the Akali movement and who wrote in justification of the official policy and measures with regard to the movement, does not talk of even legislation and ends his article with the statement that ‘on the whole the outlook before the Page 32 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement Punjab is less troubled than it has been for some years past’. John Maynard, ‘The Sikh Problem in the Punjab, 1920–23’, PPP 11, part 1 (April 1977): 129–41. This article was published in the Contemporary Review in September 1923. (41.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 46. (42.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 46–7. (43.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 47–8. (44.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 48. (45.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), pp. 77–8. (46.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 78–9. (47.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 48–9. (48.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 49. Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 79–80. (49.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 49–50. (50.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 80–2. (51.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 82–3. (52.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 50. (53.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Master Tara Singh Ji’, in Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 19–20. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 50–1. (55.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 52. (56.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 52–3. (57.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 83–6. (58.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 86–7. (59.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 53. (60.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 54–6. (61.) F. No. 191, Home Political 1923, NAI.

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (62.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Gurū ke Bāgh de Kaidī Singh Kion Chhade gai han’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, pp. 93–4. (63.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Babbar Akalian de Mukaddme da Faisla’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 107–12. (64.) Ruchi Ram Sahni, Introduction in Struggle for Reform in Sikh Shrines, ed. Ganda Singh (Amritsar: SGPC, n.d.), p. ii. (65.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Struggle, pp. 146–7. (66.) Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. XVIII (New Delhi: Government of India, 1965), pp. 354–8. (67.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XIX (1966), pp. 370, 386, 396–7. (68.) Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXI (1966), pp. 421–5. (69.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXI, pp. 505–6, 531–2. (70.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXII (1966), pp. 7, 25, 83, 170–1, 208–9. (71.) Mahatma Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII (1967), pp. 44–5. (72.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, pp. 200, 210–12. (73.) As mentioned earlier, two volumes of Master Tara Singh’s essays have been published as Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, edited by Harjinder Singh Dilgir. He indicates that these essays were written by Master Tara Singh from 1910 to 1924. Only three essays appear to have been written before 1920. Most of the essays appear to fall in 1920–4. In any case, we have taken up here only those essays which have a direct bearing on the developments from 1920 to 1923. It may be added that in 1922 the Akālī was merged with the Pardesī Khālsā and it was brought out from Amritsar as Akālī te Pardesī under the guidance of Master Tara Singh and it became virtually a newspaper of the Akali movement. Dard, Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān, p. 137. (74.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Gurdwara Sudhār te Asādā Dharmic Hakk’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 50–7. (75.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Anandpur Sāhib dā Samā Āgiā’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 53–4. (76.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Akāliān nūn Kuchlan dā Yatan’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 66–8. (77.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Ikdūn ik kar Devo: Shiromani Gurdwara Kametī de Vichār Yog’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 69–73. Page 34 of 35

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Master Tara Singh in the Akali Movement (78.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Kaumī Izzat Nūn Kāim Rakhkhan da Vela’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, p. 74. (79.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Khalsa ji da Khūnī Janam dūjī Ver’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 91–2. (80.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Shāntmai Bahādarī Kih Buzdilī’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 89–90. (81.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Swarāj te Nā-milvartan’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 55–8. (82.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Imtihān dī Ghaṛhī’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 63–5.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (1923–5) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0006

Abstract and Keywords The removal of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh from Nabha in July 1923 was seen by the SGPC as an indirect attack on its movement for Gurdwara Reform. On the issue of his restoration, protest meetings began to be held. An Akhand Pāṭh in Gurdwara Gangsar in Jaito was disrupted by the Nabha police. Jathās began to be sent from the Akal Takht to perform AkhandPāṭh in Gurdwara Gangsar. In October, the Punjab Government declared the SGPC to be an unlawful association, and all the members of its executive committee were arrested and charged with ‘treason against the King-Emperor’. The Jaito morchā continued for nearly two years. Eventually, with the help of the moderate leaders of the SGPC, the Punjab Government passed the Sikh Gurdwaras Act in 1925 without any reference to restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha. Keywords:   Maharaja Ripudaman Singh, Akalis, Akhand Pāṭh, Akal Takht, Gurdwara Gangsar, SGPC, Gurdwara Reform, Akali jathās, Jaito morchā, and Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925

The second phase of the Akali movement was different from the first in an important way. The initial resolution of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) was not related to gurdwaras but to the removal of a Sikh ruler from his gaddī. Soon, however, a religious issue was added: the interruption of Akhand Pāṭh in Gurdwara Gangsar at Jaito. The scene of agitation was in the Nabha state and not in British territory. The Akalis were placed at a disadvantage. Nevertheless, the Jaito morchā was sustained long enough to Page 1 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation oblige the British authorities to negotiate. The negotiations failed on the issue of the release of all the Akali prisoners. Sir Malcom Hailey became the Punjab Governor at the end of May 1924 primarily to deal with the Akalis. He combined harsh measures against them with encouragement to moderate and pro-British Sikh leaders. He wanted to negotiate on his own terms, but the eventual agreement was a compromise. It was embodied in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925. The Congress leaders remained associated with the Akalis because Mahatma Gandhi was interested in the developments related to the Akali agitation. They were in favour of isolating the religious from the political issue. In this context, Master Tara Singh played an important role both before and during his detention from October 1923 to September 1926.

Political Developments The year 1924 was marked by the triumph of the Swaraj Party in the Legislatures and Mahatma Gandhi’s serious illness, operation, and unconditional release on 5 February, four years before it was due. A compact and welldisciplined party had emerged (p.115) after the elections, consisting of fortyfive Swarajists who could command a working majority with the support of the Nationalist Party, consisting of patriots who had not accepted non-cooperation. Motilal Nehru offered cooperation on his own terms: ‘If the Government would receive this co-operation, they would find that the Swarajists were their men. If not, the Swarajists would stand on their rights and continue to be Non-cooperators.’ Mahatma Gandhi recognized the fundamental difference between non-cooperation and entry into the council but he failed to convince the Swarajists and he announced that ‘so long as they think otherwise, their place is undoubtedly in the Councils’. Before the end of 1924, however, Mahatma Gandhi surrendered to C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru. The Mahatma presided over the Belgaum session of the Congress to save it from a split, pacifying both the sides but agreeing with neither.1 He kept the balance between the two sections. The politics of 1925 centred round council work, in which the Swarajists were not harassed by the No-changers. However, the Party was performing merely the role of a constitutional Opposition. There was no question of ‘constant, continuous, uniform obstruction’ as originally projected. There was a revolt within the Party, led by M.R. Jayakar and N.C. Kelkar, who raised the slogan of Responsive Cooperation. They were more concerned with what they regarded as ‘Hindu’ interests. Along with B.S. Moonje (a prominent leader and ideologue of the Hindu Mahasabha), they resigned their membership of Legislature to which they had been elected on the Swarajist ticket. On 4 December 1925 it was agreed that ‘all public controversy on the question of the Swarajist Party’s policy should cease untill the Congress meets’.2 The Swaraj Party had only a limited capacity to lead the struggle for freedom. Communal troubles were far more widespread in 1924, with serious outbreaks at Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad, Jubbulpore, and Kohat. ‘The Kohat riots really Page 2 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation broke the backbone of India.’ Throughout 1925, Hindu–Muslim riots occurred from time to time. Mahatma Gandhi admitted his inability to bring about Hindu– Muslim unity. He made one of those rare statements in which he would entertain the idea of bloodshed in despair: ‘If it is to be our lot that, before we can come together, we must shed one another’s blood, then I say, the sooner we do so, the better it is for us.’3 The general elections to the Punjab Council were held in the second half of November 1923. The ‘Rural Block’ formed after the elections of December 1920 was renamed ‘Punjab National Unionist Party’ after the elections of 1923. For its programme and ideology it was simply stated that ‘the new party would improve the condition of the peasantry, backward classes and backward communities living in rural Punjab’. The party was to work ‘against the exploitation of moneylenders’ and to open cooperative societies, rural dispensaries, veterinary dispensaries, primary schools, high schools, intermediate colleges, and panchāyatī system. The emphasis on rural development was justified by the fact that nearly 90 per cent of the people of the Punjab lived in the countryside. The party leaders underscored the need of communal harmony in the midst of growing social tensions reflected in the riots of Multan and Amritsar. They swore by constitutional methods in politics, and their most important demand was for provincial autonomy. Power was shared by Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, but Muslim domination was evident from the fact that thirty-two of (p.116) its initial members were Muslims and only seven of them were Hindus and Sikhs. The party leader, Fazl-i Husain, was nevertheless supported strongly by Chhotu Ram, and he had the consistent support of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia. The bulk of the party members were large landholders and elites. They were in open or covert collaboration with the British bureaucracy. The Act of 1919 did not give much power to the ministers even in theory, and the British Governors of the Punjab were keen to ensure that the Unionist Ministers did not exercise unrestrained power in practice. Sir Malcolm Hailey, who took office as Governor on 31 May 1924, remarked with reference to Sir Fazl-i Husain that a minister who should behave as ‘an obedient driver’ of the state vehicle was behaving ‘as if he owned it’.4 Seven members belonged to the Swaraj Party, with its programme of opposing the government in the council. The leaders of the party in the Punjab were Lala Duni Chand, Raizada Hans Raj, and Professor Ruchi Ram Sahni. Lala Lajpat Rai began to support them very strongly after the special session of the Congress at Delhi in September 1923. He had campaigned actively for the party candidates in the Punjab. All the seven members elected were Hindus. However, the party had close association with the SGPC which had won two seats. Another party in the fray was the Hindu Nationalist Party formed by (Raja) Narendra Nath to make efforts for gaining swarāj through constitutional means. Despite the

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation boycott of elections by the Congress, the number of votes polled rose to 250,000 as against 130,000 in 1920.5

The Jaito Morchā Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha was removed to Dehra Dun on 9 July 1923 after his forced abdication. He had supported national, regional, and Sikh causes, starting with his letter as a prince to the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar in 1905 to get the idols of Hindu deities removed from the precincts of the Golden Temple. As a nominated member of the Imperial Legislative Council in 1907–8, he aligned himself with the nationalist leaders. He also introduced the Anand Marriage Bill to make the Sikh form of marriage as the only valid form. It was not taken up during his term, and Sunder Singh Majithia was made a member of the Council to steer the Bill in a modified form making the Sikh form of marriage as legally valid. In 1912, he insisted that his succession was a matter of right and not of discretion on the part of the paramount power. He was never enthusiastic in his support of the British during World War I and he was suspected of harbouring Ghadarites in his state. He was genuinely sympathetic towards the Akali reformers. As ‘a rebel prince’ he presented a contrast to Maharaja Bhupinder Singh of Patiala who was an arch-collaborator. It was on Bhupinder Singh’s verbal and informal complaint to the Secretary of State for India that two enquiries were initiated against Maharaja Ripudaman Singh, one secret and the other political. The purpose of both these enquiries turned out to be intimidation. He was forced to abdicate on 7 July 1923 in favour of his minor son not on the basis of any formal enquiry but by threats of what could be done against him on the basis of the two enquiries. The Agent to the Governor General (AGG), Colonel A.B. Minchin, had already made arrangements to remove the Maharaja from Nabha. Minchin arrived in Nabha on the morning of 8 July with troops and armoured cars to take control of the Nabha state and to send the Maharaja to Dehra Dun under a military escort.6 (p.117) The Akali leaders were in contact with the Maharaja and they knew that he was being pressurized to sign a letter of abdication. They took up the question of his restoration in a communiqué of 9 July 1923. They fixed 29 July as the day of prayer for his restoration and 9 September as the day of barefoot marches in protest. Meanwhile, on 10 July a communiqué of the SGPC stated that there were good reasons to believe that the abdication of the Maharaja was not voluntary but extorted by official pressure.7 At the instance of the Punjab Government, the Viceroy held a conference on 25 July in view of the information that the new SGPC which was being elected ‘will almost certainly be far more extremist in character’ and it was ‘almost certain to identify itself with the agitation now in progress among the Akalis in favour of restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha to his gaddi’. It was decided that the Maharaja should be persuaded to state that agitation was not in his interest. If the SGPC sent jathās, or tried to persuade the people not to pay revenue, it Page 4 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation should be declared ‘an unlawful association’. Action against Akali jathās should be taken in the Nabha territory and not in the Punjab. This decision could enable the government to use troops of the Sikh states and to shut out the press and other possible observers from outside. Furthermore, a state matter could not be taken up in any legislature. On 26 July the army officers concerned were ordered to move some troops to Nabha and also keep troops in readiness for being sent to Amritsar.8 In the election of office bearers of the SGPC on 5 August, Sardar Kharak Singh was elected President of the SGPC, but Sardar Mehtab Singh was to act in his place, as the former was in jail. Sardar Bhag Singh of Gurdaspur was elected Secretary. Both Mehtab Singh and Bhag Singh were reluctant to take office and they took leave for three months. Sardar Teja Singh Samundri and Bawa Harkishan Singh agreed to officiate in their place.9 The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar reported that the new SGPC was unanimous in condemning the action of the Government of India to force the Maharaja of Nabha to abdicate. However, there was no unanimity on the issue of his restoration. The extremists were strongly in favour of action but Bhai Jodh Singh and Raja Singh (a vakīl of Peshawar) were opposed to it. Finally, it was argued that the rulers of the Sikh states acknowledged the authority of Akal Takht and, therefore, the SGPC could legitimately intervene in their affairs. The Executive Committee of thirty-four members elected on 6 August included Master Tara Singh. He was also among the seven members elected to the Working Committee. The statement he prepared on the abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha was approved by the Working Committee.10 On Malcolm Hailey’s suggestion the troops sent to Nabha were to remain there for some time more for moral effect. It was not the situation in Nabha itself that justified their presence so much as ‘the chilling effect on the activities of the Akalis and their Committee’. He went on to add that the SGPC would not be able to keep the matter alive much longer. However, he was not sure because it was not safe ‘to prophesy where such perverse people are concerned’.11 The Nabha administration under a British officer issued an ordinance prohibiting political meetings within the state. However, the Akalis of the Nabha state continued to hold dīwāns. On 25 August a procession was taken out at Jaito in the Nabha territory and a dīwān was organized. On the third day, (p.118) resolutions were passed in sympathy with the Maharaja, condemning the police, the state officials, and the Maharaja of Patiala. The organizers were arrested on charge of making political speeches. The dīwān was indefinitely extended by the state Akalis, and an Akhand Pāṭh (unbroken reading) was started at Gurdwara Gangsar in Jaito. It was disrupted by the Nabha police and its organizers were arrested. The police action added to the resentment of the Akalis.12

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation The situation by the end of August was reviewed by the Viceroy. There were two movements among the Sikhs: (a) the Babbar Akali campaign of terrorism in the Hoshiarpur and Jullundur districts and (b) the Akali agitation against the abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha. The former was suppressed for the present. The latter was fostered by the enthusiasm, unity, and jathā organization created by the kār-sevā, the new members of the SGPC, and the resources controlled by it. It was difficult to avoid an open rupture, realized the Viceroy.13 According to a CID report, the Nabha issue had been discussed by the Working Committee of the SGPC on 13 August at which members of the Central Sikh League were also present. An Akali who had accompanied Master Tara Singh to this meeting gave the information that efforts were being made to come to terms with the Nāmdhārīs. The Nāmdhārī Guru, Maharaj Pratap Singh, and all his sūbās were in Amritsar. Sant Singh of the CID reported that the SGPC had acquired ‘a hold upon a good many Sikhs, including those now serving in the army’. It was rumoured that the Maharaja of Patiala had bribed Mehtab Singh and Giani Sher Singh. The people of Patiala state did not like the partiality of the British for their Maharaja.14 The thrust of an article in the Bombay Chronicle was on ‘the insulting and high handed conduct’ of the Political Agent, A.B. Minchin, with regard to the royal ladies of Nabha, including the senior Maharani, when they were taken to Dehra Dun under a military escort. At a meeting of the SGPC towards the end of August, Master Tara Singh moved a resolution that the government had done great injustice to the Maharaja of Nabha, breaking terms of the understanding given to the protected states that British troops would never be allowed to enter the Nabha state.15 On 9 September the Viceroy held a conference to consider the situation in the Punjab and in the Nabha state. The discussion led to three points: action against the SGPC, against the Maharaja, and against the Akali jathās. The Viceroy expressed his view that the members of the SGPC should be arrested if the jathās broke the cordon at Jaito, and the Maharaja should be told to surrender securities and other documents within a stipulated period and then ‘the Government of India would consider themselves absolved from the conditions of his abdication and would be at liberty to take such action as they considered necessary’. Publicity should be given to the ban on political dīwāns in the Nabha state. G.D. Ogilvie, Assistant Administrator, Nabha, wrote in a ‘Note on military action at Jaito’ that in his opinion attempts ‘to break through the cordon at Jaito should be resisted, up to the point of firing’. For this purpose, he had twenty men armed with guns and buckshot; they were all Sikhs. A public statement was issued accordingly.16

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation The SGPC protested to the Viceroy that on 14 September the military under the Assistant Administrator, Gurdial Singh, forced its way into the gurdwara and dragged away everyone, including the person who was reading the (p.119) Granth for an Akhand Pāṭh. The holy Granth remained opened but unattended. This was an unprecedented sacrilege of Guru Granth Sahib. ‘The Sikh community hold your Government responsible for all this.’ The Viceroy endorsed Hailey’s noting that so long as the Akalis offered only passive resistance no firing should be resorted to. Wilson Johnston, the Administrator of Nabha, said that arrests were uncalled for; Gurdial Singh should not have acted in this way against direct orders of Johnston. Nevertheless, he went on to justify his deputy’s action. In Johnston’s opinion, it did not injure religious sentiments of the Sikhs.17 Gurdial Singh himself claimed later that the Akhand Pāṭh was not disrupted. ‘The Akali reader was asked to leave the place and our man replaced him.’18 The evidence collected by the CID against the SGPC was regarded as plentiful and conclusive to justify action against it. At the top of the list of over a score of charges was Master Tara Singh’s taking up of the agitation as virtual editor of the Akālī Pardesī and pressurising the old SGPC to issue the communiqué of 10 July referred to earlier. Some of the other charges were also interesting or important, like the publication of The Truth About Nabha which showed clearly that the Maharaja had abdicated under pressure, and the declaration made by Teja Singh, Jathedar of the Akal Takht, that the government would soon be destroyed for having begun to suppress the Akalis at Jaito. The Akālī te Pardesī under the control of Master Tara Singh and the Akālī edited by Giani Sher Singh had been writing against the government and in favour of the Maharaja of Nabha.19 Akali jathās of twenty-five each began to be sent from the Akal Takht to Jaito for performing Akhand Pāṭh and to suffer all hardships and tortures for establishing the right of free worship in all gurdwaras. On 12 October 1923, the Punjab Government declared the SGPC and all Akali jathās to be ‘unlawful associations’ as they constituted ‘a danger to public peace’. All the sixty members of the Executive Committee of the SGPC were arrested and charged with ‘treason against the King-Emperor’.20 On 25 October the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India that even at the outset the Akali movement had a political aspect and this had become increasingly apparent. It was a grave danger to permit an association that had formidable financial resources at its command, and excited the people emotionally by appeal to their religious sentiments. The agitation for the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha was a challenge to the Government of India in exercising its secular power. Therefore, it could not be ignored. It was necessary to ensure that there was no alliance between the Akalis and the Congress extremists. Full support was to be given to the Punjab Government in Page 7 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation this situation. The majority of the important Akalis had been arrested without causing disorder or popular excitement over the notification of the Akali bodies as unlawful associations.21 The Viceroy did not want A.B. Minchin to be dragged into the Sikh leaders’ case. Minchin was the man most directly involved in forcing the Maharaja of Nabha to abdicate. The personal Secretary to the Viceroy wrote to Sir Malcolm Hailey on 9 November that His Excellency could not understand how Minchin’s evidence could be relevant, and he wanted the Punjab Government to oppose any such application of the defence. He agreed with Hailey that the examination of Minchin was ‘most undesirable and should be avoided if possible’.22 (p.120) On 26 November 1923, J. Crerar, Secretary to Government of India, Home Department, wrote to H.D. Craik, Chief Secretary, Punjab, that the Akali leaders might possibly attempt to prove that compulsion was used in the matter of the abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha. The defence counsel might ask for confidential documents or the political officers as witnesses. ‘In order that we may decide as expeditiously as possible and in consultation with the Political Department what action could be taken in any such contingency I am to request you that you will let me know without delay if there is any indication of the defence taking the line above suggested.’ Craik consulted Bevin Pitman, the leading government counsel in the Akali leaders’ case, and he replied that this was certainly expected. But he would object. It was immaterial whether or not pressure was exerted. ‘The question is whether in any circumstances the actions of the accused are illegal.’23 On 18 December, a CID officer of the Punjab reported that Sardar Mehtab Singh claimed that the Akalis had some documents in their possession which would make ‘startling revelations in the Court, particularly about the abdication of Nabha’. These documents would also expose the government’s opposition to the Gurdwara Reform Movement from the very beginning.24 The members of the SGPC in position at Amritsar were arrested on 7 January 1924. The Akali attitude in the past fortnight had been aggressive. With total disregard to the notification which declared the SGPC to be an unlawful body, its meeting was announced in the newspapers. The Punjab Government thought that the arrest of the SGPC members would produce a good effect. The police was ordered to arrest the members holding a meeting at the Akal Takht. The police forced their way through the Akali ‘sewādārs’ but on Bhai Jodh Singh’s intervention, they returned to the entrance and waited for voluntary surrender of the members of the SGPC. After a long delay, a dīwān was held in the open space and inflammatory speeches were made and sixty-two persons were garlanded; they walked in procession in parkarmā before they surrendered; they were taken to the Kotwali at 6:00 p.m. ‘It was somewhat unfortunate’, wrote Craik to Crerar, ‘that the local officers should have underestimated the Page 8 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation opposition likely to be encountered, but it must be remembered that the Akalis have an extraordinarily good system of intelligence.’ The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar believed that this unprecedented entry of the police into the Akal Takht was resented by the Akalis as an outrage though this action heartened the supporters of the government.25 On 15 January the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, which said: ‘The first public meeting of the SGPC after it was proclaimed to be as unlawful association. The police were roughly handled by Akali sewadars. Forcible entry would have resulted in bloodshed. Members were called upon to surrender and 62 arrests were made. City was reported quiet.’26 On 15 January 1924, Crerar wrote to Craik that some of the evidence for the prosecution of Akali leaders was of a very general character and, prima facie, it did not appear to be directly relevant for the personal complicity of the accused. Craik explained the position to Crerar on 25 January. He added that the counsel for the Crown would try to prove not only the involvement of the persons accused but also that there was a ‘conspiracy’ among them.27 On 1 February 1924, Sardar Kartar Singh gave notice of questions in the Central (p.121) Legislative Assembly. Three of these were admitted but not the one on the abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha, which it was said was not under the purview of the assembly as it related to a princely state. In reply to the other questions it was stated that expense on prosecution of the Akalis was incurred by the Punjab Government, and the Punjab Government had the approval of the Government of India for its measures with regard to the Akalis.28 All the questions were meant to underline the anomaly of the system which prevented the representatives of the Indian people from intervening in the affairs of the princely states but empowered the representatives of the British Government to handle them. Sardar Gulab Singh had moved a resolution in the Legislative Assembly early in January 1924 to the effect that a committee consisting of two-thirds of the nonofficial and one-third of the official members of both the Legislatures be appointed to enquire into the grievances of the Sikh community and the report on the Akali movement. The President of the Legislative Assembly admitted this resolution on 1 February. The Home Secretary Crerar gave the noting that the resolution should be opposed on the ground that the great majority of the Sikhs were residents of the Punjab and their interests were primarily the concern of the Punjab Government. The Home Member, Malcolm Hailey, endorsed this view on 22 February and the Viceroy gave his approval on the same day. On 27 February, the Viceroy sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for India that a full discussion was held on the Sikh situation and the Jaito affair. The majority of non-official members were in favour of an enquiry. Echoing the Sikh members, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya too held the government wholly responsible for Page 9 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation the Sikh situation. Hailey maintained that the Sikh trouble was between two sections of the Sikh community. He opposed the resolution and suggested that in consultation with the Punjab Government a method could be evolved to enable the Sikhs to put forward their case and possibly to find a solution. The assembly recommended to the Governor General to appoint a committee of official and non-official members of the House ‘to inquire into the causes of discontent prevailing among the Sikh community and to report on what measures should be adopted to remove the same’.29 Akali jathās had continued to reach Jaito, to be beaten, arrested, kept in custody for a few days, taken to the farthest territories of the Nabha state, and left there without any means for returning. This went on for weeks and months. The SGPC decided to send a shahīdī jathā of 500 Akalis to reach Jaito on 21 February 1924, the third anniversary of the tragic but successful action at Nankana Sahib. This jathā was to perform Akhand Pāṭh, or to die in the attempt, observing complete non-violence in thought, word, and deed. The evidence of eyewitnesses and contemporary enquiries leaves no doubt that the Akalis were perfectly nonviolent but the jathā was fired at. The SGPC communiqué reported 300 causalities, including 70 to 150 dead. The Nabha authorities contended that the firing was first started by someone in the jathā. An official enquiry confirmed this version.30 The government remained stuck to this view, tried the so-called ring leaders of the jathā, and sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment. The Government of India thought somehow that the arrest of the shahīdī jathā would be resisted by violence. If such a situation arose the ringleaders should be arrested and (p.122) ‘in the last resort force should be used, gun fire being employed if necessary to restore order’. Detailed instruction as to the methods to be adopted if fire had to be opened, already issued by the Government of India, had to be strictly adhered to. A small body of the Patiala troops could also be present at Jaito. There was positive advantage in bringing home to the Sikh extremists that all the Sikh states were united in their opposition to the Akali menace. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, who watched the whole procedure at Amritsar during 9–10 February, ended his report with the sentence: ‘I should be surprised if the jatha breaks the vow of non-violence under any provocation.’ But the Administrator of Nabha ordered firing at the jathā, and the government communiqué of 22 February justified his action.31 On 24 February 1924, A.B. Minchin wrote to the Political Secretary to Government of India that the Sikh situation had reached a critical stage, and it was ‘absolutely essential to show to the Sikhs that they could not have their own way’. It was alleged that there was evidence to show that the Sikh jathā had brought firearms for distribution to the Durli Jatha (the Akalis who were not a part of the shahīdī jathā) just before arriving at Jaito. The Firozpur Akalis who attacked the troops were well provided with firearms. Minchin suggested that the Maharaja of Patiala could be asked to add to the body of 150 infantry already Page 10 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation at the disposal of the Administrator. The Maharaja was prepared to supply troops, or 20,000 villagers. On 25 February the Governor General in Council decided that the same policy be pursued in regard to the second shahīdī jathā as was followed in regard to the first, and that the decision as to the number of persons to be prosecuted be deferred till the report of the Magistrate was received.32 Before the third shahīdī jathā was sent, Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh’s wife asked his cousin, Sardar Sobha Singh, on 13 March 1924 to see Mehtab Singh in the Lahore Fort. He was anxious to come to some sort of arrangement with the government. Sobha Singh saw Mehtab Singh and certain other Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort. They stated that they wanted a Gurdwara Bill and they demanded only a Regency Council on the Nabha issue. The other points for discussion were minor. Sobha Singh carried the impression that the leaders whom he had met were in a penitent and reasonable mood. Craik suggested certain conditions. Sobha Singh met Mehtab Singh again. He was willing, but not the other leaders.33 This was a significant indication of division among the Akali leaders. On 29 March 1924, Hardial Singh, the Magistrate, gave judgment in the criminal case against Karan Singh and sixty other members of the SGPC, sentencing fiftyseven of them to various terms of imprisonment ranging from one year of simple imprisonment to two years of rigorous imprisonment, on account of their participation in the meeting of the SGPC on 7 January 1924.34 However, the case of the Akalis in the Lahore Fort, where Master Tara Singh was imprisoned along with senior Akali leaders, lingered on. The Chief Secretary, Punjab, wrote to the Home Secretary in Delhi on 17 May 1924 that the CID report indicated that efforts would be made to drag in ‘the question of the Maharaja of Nabha’ though it was irrelevant to the case of the Akalis on trial. There would be a lengthy and stubborn defence, and the trial would linger on.35 The Akali leadership was divided on whether or not another shahīdī jathā should be sent but eventually they sent the shahīdī jathā as scheduled. (p.123) Sir Malcolm Hailey suggested in the Governor General’s Council that General Sir William Birdwood might negotiate terms of settlement with the Akali leaders, both outside and inside the jail. The Akali leadership was willing to separate the issue of legislation from the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha but insisted on unconditional completion of 101 Akhand Pāṭhs at Gurdwara Gangsar, and unconditional release of all the Akali prisoners. General Birdwood wrote later in his autobiography that the Akali stipulation of unconditional release of all Sikhs undergoing imprisonment or awaiting trial, ‘even for murder or manslaughter resulting from the seizure of Gurdwaras’, was quite impossible

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation to accept. This was an indirect reference to the alleged violence of the first shahīdī jāthā. General Birdwood abandoned his efforts finally on 2 June 1924.36 After becoming the Punjab Governor in May 1924, Malcolm Hailey had adopted a policy of repression, separating the religious issue from the political, encouraging Hindus, Muslims, and the moderate Sikhs to abandon the Akali cause, dividing the Akali leadership, and organizing rival Sikh associations called Sudhar Committees. He was convinced that real peace would be possible only if the government was able to dictate terms to the Akalis. He opened new fronts for Akali agitation by appointing a Receiver for Nankana Sahib and by refusing to renew the lease of the Guru-ka-Bagh. To deprive the Akalis of the main objective of their agitation, he encouraged the officially sponsored Sudhar Committees to unite in promoting Gurdwara legislation. At this juncture Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya came to the help of the Akali leaders. He persuaded the Hindu members of the Punjab Council to support the Sikh members in moving a Bill. He prepared another Bill for the Central Legislature if a Gurdwara Bill was not taken up in the Punjab Council. Malaviya had Jinnah’s support for these moves. Hailey felt obliged to go ahead with legislation. A Bill evolved in consultation with the moderate section of the Akalis was introduced in the Punjab Council on 7 May 1925. The report of the Select Committee was received on 25 June and the Bill was passed on 7 July, incidentally, exactly two years after the forced abdication of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh. The Governor General gave his assent on 28 July, and the Act came into force on 1 November 1925.37

Mahatma Gandhi on Akali Politics and Sikh Identity Mahatma Gandhi was released on 5 February 1924. He was still under the surgeon’s care, unfit for active work. On 25 February he received a telegram from Zira in the name of ‘Akali Jatha’: ‘Come unminding health condition soon.’ He could not go but he wrote an open letter to the Akalis. He expressed his sympathy with them. Without full facts, he said, he was unable to say whether or not they were justified in sending the shahīdī jathā of 500 to Jaito, but he would ask the Akali Sikhs not to send any more jathās without further deliberation and consultation with the ‘leaders outside the Sikh community’ who had hitherto been giving them ‘advice’. Since the Akalis had always claimed that their movement was perfectly non-violent and religious, Mahatma Gandhi underlined that non-violence was impossible without deep humility and the strictest regard for truth. A word of caution was more necessary in the case of the Sikhs because they had been incessantly active in the pursuit of their goal.38 The Bombay Chronicle of 28 February 1924 gave the impression that Mahatma Gandhi’s (p.124) open letter to the Akali Sikhs was based on wrong information and people suspected Lala Lajpat Rai as its source. Mahatma Gandhi stated that he had received all the information on the Jaito tragedy and drafted his letter before Lajpat Rai met him. Lajpat Rai did see the letter and, on his insistence, Mahatma Gandhi struck out a large number of passages which Page 12 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation were more strongly worded than the final letter. Lajpat Rai pressed him also to advise the Akalis not to send another shahīdī jathā before deliberation with their non-Sikh ‘advisers’; the general reference to the implications of non-violence was Mahatma Gandhi’s own, and he had retained it despite Lajpat Rai’s advice against it.39 On 4 March 1924, Mahatma Gandhi stated that he wanted to be satisfied on five points before he threw himself heart and soul in the movement. One was simply to know the ‘strength of the Akalis’. Another was a ‘clear manifesto publicly stating the minimum’. As he understood it, the minimum was the performance of Akhand Pāṭh at Gurdwara Gangsar in Jaito. This part had nothing to do with the issue of the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha. For control over the gurdwaras, all the gurdwaras that could be proved to be historical must remain under the control of the SGPC but for all other gurdwaras, all the facts in dispute would be subject to arbitration. If the party in possession of a gurdwara declined to refer the matter to arbitration, or refused to surrender control, the Akalis would be free to take direct but non-violent action. The third point on which Mahatma Gandhi wanted satisfaction was full assurance by the Akali leaders on behalf of the SGPC in the form of a document intended for publication, that the Akalis would be non-violent in thought, word, and deed ‘in connection with all persons’, whether government officials or public persons belonging to denominations regarded as opponents of the Akali movement. The fourth point was to state explicitly that the Akali movement was not anti-Hindu nor against any other race or creed. Finally, the Mahatma needed satisfaction on the point that the SGPC had ‘no desire for the establishment of Sikh Raj’, and that it was ‘purely a religious body’ and had ‘no secular object or intention’.40 Referring to the Nabha issue, Mahatma Gandhi said that the Maharaja had made it practically impossible for his well-wishers to carry on an effective agitation for his restoration because of what he had given in writing to the government. If, however, he made a public statement that all these writings were extorted from him, and that he was willing to face all the consequence of agitation, and if all allegations regarding duress could be proved, it was possible to carry on an effective and even successful agitation. If undertaken, it should be an all-India agitation. On the same day, Mahatma Gandhi wrote to his ‘Sikh friends’ who had met him earlier that according to Pandit Motilal Nehru, the accused in the Akali trials were being defended by the SGPC. He had also learnt that a Hindu temple within the precincts of the Golden Temple had been destroyed by the Akalis. Mahatma Gandhi asked his friends ‘to deal with all these questions’ in the letter which they had promised to write.41 Subsequently, the Mahatma clarified his views further. In connection with nonviolence, he spelt out that a large body of men could not be deputed to assert the right of the SGPC but one or at the most two men of undoubted integrity, spiritual force, and humility could be deputed to assert the right. On the Nabha Page 13 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation issue, the SGPC was expected to accept the findings of an open and impartial (p.125) enquiry conducted by a competent authority on the question whether or not the Maharaja was forced to abdicate under duress. If the Maharaja gave in writing a fresh document that he abdicated voluntarily ‘in consideration for the Government suppressing certain charges which they hold are of an extremely damnatory character’, the SGPC would have nothing further to say. The second shahīdī jathā was already on its way to Jaito, and Mahatma Gandhi would not advise its recall. However, instead of presenting a solid living wall to the State soldiery, the jathā should obey the order of deportation. After the present jathā, the whole situation should be reviewed. Mahatma Gandhi reiterated that the SGPC should keep the religious issue of Akhand Pāṭh separate from the political issue of the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha, and make a declaration to this effect. A third party would then be in a position to negotiate with the authorities with a view to removing the deadlock.42 On 9 March 1924, Mahatma Gandhi made a statement to the representatives of the Associated Press after his week-long discussions with an Akali deputation. His long conversations with the Akali friends, he said, were cordial and he tendered his opinion on several matters. His letter had been given all the consideration under the given circumstances. There was no foundation for misapprehension that his letter was intended to renew the opinion he had given after the Nankana Sahib to postpone the movement till after the attainment of swarāj. He had never expressed this opinion, and his recent letter also was merely an advice to suspend the sending of the shahīdī jathā till after deliberations with non-Sikh friends and full introspection.43 Mahatma Gandhi congratulated Sardar Mangal Singh of the Sikh League two days later for the splendid behaviour of the second shahīdī jathā.44 On 20 April 1924, the Secretary of the SGPC clarified its position in some detail to Mahatma Gandhi with reference to his letter and note of 4 April which could be considered also a reaction against his assumptions and tone. All historic gurdwaras now under the control of the SGPC should remain under its control. With reference to all other gurdwaras, the facts in dispute should be a matter of arbitration. The movement for Gurdwara Reform was not against Hindus or any other race or creed. It was purely religious and had no secular intention or object. It had no desire to establish Sikh Raj. Nor did any other Sikh body or individual entertain the dream of Sikh Raj. Exactly because it was a religious movement, the Sikhs had been ‘very jealous of keeping the control and guidance of the Gurdwara movement in purely Sikh hands’. A number of ‘Hindu and Mahammadan friends’ had taken sympathetic interest in the movement and given support to it.45 With regard to the significance and implications of the Jaito struggle, the Secretary stated that the ‘invasion’ of Sikh religious rights, and not the deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha, was the cause of jathās going to Jaito. The Page 14 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation Nabha administration had denied the right of free congregation and free worship to the Sikhs of the state, and the SGPC was sending jathās ‘to reestablish the rights assailed’. The intention was to fulfil ‘our vow of completing 101 Akhand Pāṭhs’ after the Gangsar Gurdwara was thrown open to the Sikhs, and to depart within a few days after establishing the right and making necessary arrangements. ‘No body has any right to impose any restriction on us as to the number of pilgrims, period of stay, and mode of worship in our Gurdwaras.’ The SGPC had no (p.126) intention of making the Gangsar Gurdwara its base of operations to carry on propaganda against the deposition of the Maharaja. At the same time, the SGPC wants to make it very clear that its resolution to get righted the wrong done to the Maharaja stood ‘in full force and the SGPC will leave no stone unturned to carry out that resolution in consonance with its wording’. However, there was no immediate need of a decision on ‘making Nabha deposition an all-India question’, or securing certain announcements from the Maharaja for that purpose.46 The Secretary admitted that Motilal Nehru was right. Many of the Akali leaders were defending themselves in the conspiracy case against them. They were doing so in this case because the charge was extraordinary, that the Sikhs wanted to seize the Punjab. That even Mahatma Gandhi found it necessary to ask for repudiation of the charge of desiring Sikh Raj showed how the government had succeeded in clouding the issue, and how necessary it was to fight this campaign of misrepresentation. The SGPC had never adopted any resolution to boycott courts, and it had gone to courts many a time. Its policy on every occasion was to take into account the nature and circumstances of the case. The second batch of fifty-eight members of the SGPC did not defend themselves, nor did thousands of others Akalis who had been flung into jails. With regard to ‘the demolition of a Hindu temple within the precincts of the Golden Temple, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Swami Shankaracharya had agreed to an amicable removal of the Shiva-lingam in a corner of the Parikarma of the Golden Temple which had been introduced ‘in recent times’. Some irresponsible and misguided men, most probably Sikhs, demolished it during the night without the knowledge of the SGPC or any person connected with it. In the morning, the SGPC hastened to express its deep regret in public.47 Regarding its minimum demands the SGPC wanted a law that should provide for ‘a central, representative and elective body of the Sikhs’ as trustees of all historical gurdwaras, that is, all gurdwaras connected with the memory of a Sikh Guru, a Sikh martyr, a saint, or a historical personage. Second, the SGPC wanted freedom for the Sikh religious symbol, the kirpān: there should be no restriction on possessing, wearing, carrying, manufacturing, or selling a kirpān in any form or size. The law in existence gave this freedom but the government interpreted it differently according to its attitude towards the Sikhs on various occasions. These two were the minimum demands of the SGPC. With regard to nonviolence, the Akalis had demonstrated it perfectly in the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā. Page 15 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation ‘The position of the Sikhs from the beginning has been the same and based on the same principle.’ Mahatma Gandhi had not kept this principle in view when he suggested that ‘one or at the most two’ satyāgrahis should go to the Gurdwara Gangsar. The institution of sangat in Sikhism meant worship in congregation. Therefore, no restriction could be placed on the number of Sikhs for performing an Akhand Pāṭh.48 Finally, whereas Mahatma Gandhi favoured no resistance in a non-violent satyāgraha, the SGPC favoured passive resistance. The Sikhs had been compelled to adopt the way of suffering taught by their Gurus. Their idea was to disobey certain official orders pertaining to the gurdwaras and, thus, to invite suffering on themselves, remaining perfectly non-violent. The government tried the policy of wholesale arrests in 1921 and the first half of 1922. In the Guru-kaBagh morchā (p.127) in August 1922, the government resorted to inhuman beating until the pressure of public opinion obliged it to revert to arrests. The first shahīdī jathā at Jaito on 21 February 1924 was ordered to disperse and, on its refusal to obey, the jathā was fired upon. ‘It was perfectly justified in refusing to disperse for a Sikh cannot surrender his religious right of freely visiting the Gurdwara.’ The Sikhs believed that they had the right to disobey a mere order of arrest. It was ‘compatible with their oath of non-violence’. Passive resistance for them was a legitimate form of non-violence in the given situation. There was no ‘show of force’ when the whole jathā was to act in perfect coordination like one man and went only to suffer and not to inflict suffering.49 This correspondence clarifies the position of the Akalis on the issues of legislation and restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha, and also brings out Mahatma Gandhi’s view of Sikhism which explains his attitude towards the Akali movement as well. In 1905, Sikhism for him was a direct result of the influence of Islam on Hinduism. It brought out one of the chief characteristics of Religion: toleration in its true light and fullness.50 Guru Gobind Singh wanted to save Hinduism from Islam, if necessary, with the sword. ‘This gave rise to Sikhism.’51 In other words, ‘Sikhism’ for Mahatma Gandhi was a militant form of Hinduism. It seems, therefore, that Mahatma Gandhi looked upon the Khalsa as a militant wing of the Hindus. Writing about fifteen years later, on 13 March 1921, Mahatma Gandhi says that he had always thought of the Sikhs as ‘a sect of Hinduism’. But their leaders thought that the Sikhs had ‘a distinct religion of their own’. Guru Nanak, ‘of course’, was a Hindu but according to the Sikh leaders, ‘he founded a new religion’. Its external symbols were the five Ks (kesha, kangī, kaṛa, kachhā, and kirpān). However, little emphasis was laid on these symbols ‘till some years ago’. Now, the younger Sikhs attached great importance to them. One of their elders told Mahatma Gandhi that the Sikhs did not believe in caste distinctions (varnashrama); there were no high or low among them and there was no untouchability; and they looked upon idol worship as a sin. Though reverence Page 16 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation was shown to Hindu deities, they did not have the same place in Sikhism as in Hinduism. The Sikhs did not eat beef, but they did not believe in cow protection. They believed in rebirth and muktī, but they paid no special regard to the Vedas and other Hindu scriptures. Their sacred book was the word of their Gurus and, apart from that book, they accepted no other scriptures as holy. Tobacco and liquor were forbidden among them.52 Mahatma Gandhi brackets Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh with Chaitanya, Kabir, Shivaji, and Pratap as greater men than Ram Mohan Roy or Tilak because they had to surmount greater obstacles, and had greater effect on the masses.53 He affirmed that kirpān was as essential for the Sikhs as the sacred thread for the Brahmans. Rather than surrender their sacred weapon, the Sikhs should court imprisonment.54 On 19 June 1924, Mahatma Gandhi said at a meeting in the Punjab that the Sikhs were a part of the Hindu community. Millions of Hindus believed in Guru Nanak, and the Granth Sahib was filled with the Hindu spirit and Hindu legends. But a Sikh friend who was present at the meeting took him aside and told him gravely that he had offended the Sikhs by including them in the Hindu community. Mahatma Gandhi now began to notice that many Sikhs regarded themselves as belonging to a religion (p.128) different from Hinduism. He promised the Sikh friend never to refer to the Sikhs as Hindus. He was, nonetheless, pleased to find that ‘the separatist tendency’ was confined to a very few Sikhs and the general body regarded themselves as Hindus. Significantly, Mahatma Gandhi argued that the Sikhs were similar to the Arya Samajists and the Jains. He looked upon Buddhism and Jainism too as ‘mighty reforms in Hinduism’. If and when he included the Sikhs among non-Hindus it was due to a delicate regard for their feelings and ‘against my own inclinations’.55 Thus, Mahatma Gandhi stuck to his earliest known position that he regarded Sikhism as a sect of Hinduism. Mahatma Gandhi talked about three books on Sikh history he had read in jail: the works of J.D. Cunningham, M.A. Macauliffe, and Gokul Chand Narang. ‘It is impossible’, he says, ‘to appreciate the present Sikh struggle without understanding their previous history and the life of the Gurus.’ Cunningham’s book was a sympathetic record of events up to the Sikh wars. Macauliffe’s book gave life-stories of the Gurus and copious extracts from their compositions. In the Mahatma’s view, it lost its value for two reasons: its fulsome praise of the English rule, and its emphasis on Sikhism as a separate religion, having nothing in common with Hinduism. Gokul Chand Narang’s monograph supplied information not available in the other two.56 It may, however, be added that all the three historians were seriously concerned with Sikh identity. Cunningham looked upon Guru Nanak’s dispensation as the culmination of the earlier religious movements of medieval India, but different and distinct from them. Macauliffe reinforced this view by emphasizing both the distinctiveness and Page 17 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation originality of the Sikh faith. For Narang, Guru Nanak was a sort of forerunner of the Arya reformers but Sikhism was ‘transformed’ later into a new faith.57 Sardar Mangal Singh brought to Mahatma Gandhi’s notice that his article in Young India of April 1925 which referred to Guru Gobind Singh as ‘a misguided patriot’ had given great offence to many Sikhs. Mahatma Gandhi wrote in reply that his language was ‘most guarded’ and that he made ‘no positive assertion’. His own belief about the Sikh Gurus was that ‘they were all deeply religious teachers and reformers, that they were all Hindus and that Guru Gobind Singh was the greatest defender of Hinduism’. He had drawn his sword in defence of Hinduism. But Guru Gobind Singh could not be his model. Nor did he regard Sikhism as ‘a religion distinct from Hinduism’; it was ‘a part of Hinduism’. At the same time he did not quarrel with the Sikhs for considering, if they wished, Sikhism as totally distinct from Hinduism. But he had to express his honest view when he was asked to express his opinion about Sikhism.58 Thus, Mahatma Gandhi could not recognize an independent identity of the Sikhs, nor could he approve of any violence on the part of the Akalis. With a fundamental difference in the ideological positions of Mahatma Gandhi and the Akali leaders, especially Master Tara Singh, differences were likely to crop up on issues of their common concern. In this context, the issue of the ‘national’ flag is quite significant. It was brought to the notice of Mahatma Gandhi that the Central Sikh League passed a resolution that the Sikh colour (black) be included in the national flag. The Mahatma explained that Hindu and Islamic colours were specially represented, not so much for their numbers as for the fact that they had remained apart for long and their mutual distrust had been (p.129) an effectual bar against the realization of national aspirations. All other communities were represented on the white strip. If the Sikh colour was represented separately, why not the Parsi, the Christian, or the Jewish? He hoped that the Sikh League leaders would see the unpractical nature of their suggestion. The central point was to have ‘a clear and rallying object’, not any religious symbol but ‘the spinning wheel’.59 The implication of the argument was that the charkhā alone should appear on the flag. Otherwise, the Hindu and Muslim colours should be retained to symbolize Hindu–Muslim unity. Mahatma Gandhi tried to clarify sometime later that ‘Sikh friends’ were ‘needlessly agitated’ over the colours in the proposed national flag’. In order to convince them of their ‘unreasonableness’, he reiterated that white included all other colours. He went on to add a startling statement: ‘To ask for special prominence is tantamount to a refusal to merge in the two numerically great communities.’ It was dangerous to emphasize ‘our differences or distinctions’. ‘The two colours red and green should be there to perpetuate the growing unity.’ Mahatma Gandhi went on to say that government agents were making all kinds of mischievous suggestions to breed dissensions among the Sikhs. The Sikh Page 18 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation ‘nationalists should not worry. They should know their own mind and stand unmoved by anything said by their detractors’.60 In other words, they should forget all about Sikh identity to become ‘nationalists’. Indian nationalism and Sikh nationalism were mutually exclusive. That Hindu identity was very dear to Mahatma Gandhi is reflected in his attitude towards the Dalit movement in Kerala. He wrote in Young India of 1 May 1924 that Vykom (or Vaikom) had suddenly leapt to fame because it had become the seat of the satyāgraha on behalf of the Untouchables of Travancore. Vaikom satyāgraha (to make the main road accessible to Untouchables) attracted widespread public attention. The Hindu opinion was actively hostile to the movement. Mahatma Gandhi wrote to George Joseph, a Congressman, that the Hindus had to purify themselves because untouchability was ‘the sin of the Hindus’. They ‘must suffer’ to purify themselves and repay the debt they owed to their suppressed brothers and sisters. In short, the whole issue should be exclusively a concern of the Hindus. All outside help was interference. Indeed, he viewed the Sikh free kitchen (langar) of the SGPC ‘as a menace to the frightened Hindus of Vaikom’.61 When a ‘friend’ from the Punjab wrote to Mahatma Gandhi that the Akalis were enraged at his note about Vaikom in which the Sikhs were classed, with Muslims and Christians, as non-Hindus, Gandhi was glad to know that his Sikh friends resented being classed with non-Hindus. He himself regarded the Sikhs as Hindus. But so far as the Sikh kitchen was concerned, it was a menace whether the Sikhs may be regarded as Hindus or non-Hindus. ‘All this outside intrusion— for I cannot call it anything else—takes no note of the orthodox sensitiveness or the difficulty of the Darbar [of Travancore].’ Gandhi added that he had learnt more about the Sikh kitchen and he could not help saying that it compromised ‘the self-respect of the Kerala people’. He makes a strange statement again: ‘If I was a volunteer, I would rather starve than be fed by outside charity, whether Hindu or non-Hindu. Surely the Kerala people must be trusted to see to the feeding of their volunteers.’62 On this argument, the Sikhs had to be kept out because they were not Keralites.

(p.130) Indian National Congress and the Akali Movement Like Mahatma Gandhi, and largely because of him, the Indian National Congress was closely linked with the Akali movement. Significantly, the earliest historian of the Indian National Congress, Pattabhi Sitaramayya, gives a broad outline of the Akali movement as a whole with sympathy and appreciation. He refers to the Nankana tragedy which, during a motion before the Council of State, was explained by the government as ‘a fight between two sections of the Sikhs’. When a Sikh member, Man Singh, hinted that the local officials were probably aware of the possibility of ‘the projected crime of such magnitude’, Malcolm Hailey got up to condemn the speaker for the implied suggestion that the officials were somehow involved in the ghastly affair. The Working Committee of Page 19 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation the Congress, which met at Bezwada on 31 March 1921, expressed its sense of horror over the Nankana massacre: ‘The Nankana tragedy was an unprecedented event in which the pilgrims were shot down and, while yet life was lingering, thrown into the burning pit.’ The Congress assured the Sikhs of its sympathy with them in the heavy loss suffered by them.63 According to Sitaramayya, one of the two most important events of the year 1922 was the Guru-ka-Bagh affair: ‘It was an object lesson in non-violence displayed by a martial race of India who had fought the Germans and won victories for the British in Europe.’ The self-control exhibited by the Akalis was extolled in various sections of the Indian press as ‘a triumph of Gandhism’. At the Gaya session of the Congress, the unexampled bravery of the ‘Akali Martyrs’ and the noble example of non-violence set by them were admired. At the special session of the Congress in Delhi in September 1923, the ‘forced abdication of Nabha’ was one of the subjects for suitable resolutions of sympathy. The Akalis were once again congratulated on their courageous and non-violent stand against repression, culminating in the arrest of the Enquiry Committee sent to Jaito by the SGPC. At its annual session at Cocanada, the Congress took up the government’s challenge to the right of free association of Indians for non-violent activities ‘in attacking the Akali Dal of the S.G.P. Committee and resolved to stand by the Sikhs in their “present” struggle and render all possible assistance, including assistance with men and money’. By this time, the Akali Sikhs with their black turbans, their cries of ‘Sat Sri Akali’, and their langar had become a familiar feature of Congress sessions.64 ‘An Interlude at Nabha’ is a fascinating chapter in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Autobiography. Immediately after the special session of the Congress at Delhi in September 1923, at which a notice had been taken of the Nabha issue, he had ‘a strange and unexpected adventure’. In his view, the Gurdwara movement had come up partly due to the general awakening caused by non-cooperation, and the methods of the Akalis were modelled on non-violent satyāgraha. India was startled by the ‘amazing display of tenacity and courage’ shown by the Akalis in the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā. The Congress was naturally sympathetic to the Akali movement. Nehru had been reading accounts of the way in which the British Administrator of Nabha was treating the Akali jathās at Jaito. Immediately after the Delhi session of the Congress, he was invited to see what would happen to an Akali jathā that was now going to Jaito. He was accompanied by two of his Congress (p.131) colleagues, A.T. Gidwani and K.Santannum. On entering the Nabha territory they were arrested and taken to Nabha Jail to be kept in ‘a most unwholesome and insanitary cell’. On 24 September the Political Secretary to Government of India sent a telegram to the Administrator of Nabha that the government would like to know the arrangement for the trial of Jawaharlal and his companions. ‘Provisional view of the Government of India was that on conclusion of proceedings case would be Page 20 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation adequately met by order of expulsion from the state.’ On the following day the Administrator received the telegram that the Government of India considered that the proper course would be for the court to pass judgment but to announce at the same time that the state government had suspended execution of the sentence. ‘Jawaharlal and his companions should then be expelled from State and excluded therefrom by executive order.’65 Nehru goes on to describe the ludicrous way in which they were tried and sentenced for a concocted unlawful entry and alleged conspiracy. ‘The whole procedure was farcical.’66 ‘My father knew something of Indian states’, says Nehru, ‘and so he was greatly upset at my unexpected arrest in Nabha’. Motilal Nehru telegraphed the Viceroy, and he was allowed at last to interview Jawaharlal in prison. He left Kapil Dev Malaviya, ‘a young lawyer colleague of ours’, in Nabha to watch the proceedings. The trial was over after a fortnight, and the solid fact of a long sentence of over two years had a sobering effect. However, there was a greater but happy surprise in store for them. The jail superintendent showed them an order suspending their sentences. There was another order, asking them to leave Nabha and not to return to the state without special permission. They were escorted to the railway station and released there. They were not given copies of any of the orders or the judgment. Jawaharlal had a hunch that the sentences were still hanging over them, and could take effect ‘whenever the Nabha authorities or the British Government so choose’.67 Indeed, A.T. Gidwani, who was acting as the Congress representative in Amritsar to remain in touch with the SGPC, was arrested when he entered the Nabha territory in February 1924 to help the wounded in the firing on the first shahīdī jathā. ‘He was simply kept in prison for the best part of a year when, utterly broken in health, he was discharged.’ Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Nabha Administrator to know why Gidwani had been treated in this way and he replied that Gidwani had been imprisoned because ‘he had broken the order not to enter Nabha territory without permission’. Jawaharlal challenged the legality and the propriety of arresting Gidwani. He felt inclined to go to Nabha and allow the Administrator to treat him as he had treated Gidwani. But he was dissuaded by many friends. The chapter ends on a note of confession. I took shelter behind the advice of friends, and made of it a pretext to cover my own weakness. For, after all, it was my weakness and disinclination to go to Nabha Gaol again that kept me away, and I have always felt a little ashamed of thus deserting a colleague. As often with us all , discretion was preferred to valour.68 Whether or not Jawaharlal knew it, the order of the suspension of sentences on him and his colleagues had been conveyed to them due to a telegraphic instruction received from the Viceroy who did not want the Congress to take up Page 21 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation the Nabha issue. Essentially, therefore, Pandit Motilal Nehru’s approach to the Viceroy was the cause of his intervention.69 (p.132) In return for this personal favour, Motilal did not want his son to get involved in the Nabha affair. Jawaharlal Nehru continued to take interest in the Akali movement. In his presidential address to the Varanasi Conference, read in his absence on 13 October 1923, he referred to ‘the gallant Akalis’ challenging ‘the might of the Government’. They had taken up ‘the proud position of the vanguard of our army of freedom’. In full sympathy and admiration for them, ‘we will not be lacking in our support’ to them. On 27 October 1923, Jawaharlal wrote from the Nainital Jail to the students of the Allahabad University that the government was trying its utmost to crush ‘the brave and gallant’ Sikh people who were fighting for their very existence with their backs to the wall. Jawaharlal wanted them to encourage the Akalis by a public expression of their sympathy with them. In the Congress session at Cocanada before the end of 1923, Jawaharlal underscored that the whole Sikh community was opposed to the government and determined to fight. The Sikhs were well organized and had got the necessary training for suffering as satyāgrahis. Their heroic example should be emulated by Hindus and Muslims of India.70 In order ‘to discuss the role of the All India Congress Committee in the Akali movement’, thirty members of the AICC and three representatives of the Akalis met at Amritsar on 14 November 1923. It was agreed that the Akalis needed help in terms of funds and propaganda. A special committee, consisting of Akalis and two Congressmen (Joseph and Kitchlew) was appointed to ‘help and guide’ the Akali agitation. In the evening, Maulana Azad announced at the Jallianwala Bagh that in view of the fact that the Sikh situation and the Nabha question were really all-India affairs concerning all communities, the ‘leaders conference’ had decided to give all help which the SGPC and the Akali Dal required. A.T. Gidwani was selected for organizing the propaganda work.71 Gidwani wrote to Jawaharlal on 23 January 1924 that he had established a sort of Congress Embassy in Amritsar to keep in touch with details of the Akali movement and to offer, whenever possible, the Congress point of view and programme. He urged: ‘You will be strengthening the hold of the Congress on the Sikh community if you do not defer action on our Akali resolutions indefinitely. A definite sum should be fixed and announced even if it has to be collected.’ Jawaharlal wrote to Gidwani on 25 January 1924 that the Congress did not lack earnestness in regard to the Akalis. But in his view, the greatest help that the Congress could give the Akalis was ‘to perfect our own organization and throw in its whole weight at the moment of crisis’. Meanwhile, Gidwani could continue to give full publicity to the Akali agitation. He was given charge of the Publicity Bureau. Only a day earlier the Akali Sahayak Bureau had given detail of the news related to the Akali movement which were based on the information provided by the Bureau. These news had appeared in several dailies, Page 22 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation including The Tribune, the Civil and Military Gazette, the Amrit Bazār Patrikā, and the Zamīndār. At the meeting of the AICC in Bombay on 31 January 1924, it was decided to contribute a total amount of Rs 25,000 to be spent in consultation with the SGPC. On 13 February 1924, Gidwani wrote to Jawaharlal about his long talk with Mahatma Gandhi at Poona (present-day Pune), explaining the Akali situation accurately. Two or three days later he moved with the first shahīdhī jathā and described the response of the villagers on the (p. 133) way. As mentioned before, he was arrested at Jaito a week later on 21 February 1924.72 K.M. Panikkar wrote to Jawaharlal on 23 March 1924 that he was preparing a report on the Jaito firing independently of the SGPC. He had consulted Dr Kitchlew and he was taking evidence of all the Muslim volunteers who had accompanied the shahīdī jathā. Dr Kitchlew gave an account of what he had seen of the first shahīdī jathā on 21 February 1924 when he himself was arrested but released and told not to enter Nabha territory again.73 On 30 March 1924, K.M. Panikkar sent his report on Jaito to Jawaharlal. He was trying to get as many editorials as possible into the papers, some written by himself and others based on his suggestions. He was also trying to study the cause of strained relations between the Punjabi Hindus and the Sikhs. He was convinced that the trouble was mainly due to the fact that the Hindus wanted to use the opportunity to get the better of the Sikhs when they were engaged in a struggle against the government. In his view, the local Hindus were ‘extremely narrow minded and bigoted’. The SGPC was careful about preserving cordial relations with all communities. Panikkar tried to bring the two communities together but the Hindu leaders were intractable, and ‘mostly men of straw’. He was keen to keep Jawaharlal in touch with developments. He had been sending too many and too detailed reports to Mahatma Gandhi. Therefore, he sent a summary now to Jawaharlal which could prove handy for discussing the Akali situation in the Congress Working Committee meeting at Bombay.74 Panikkar conveyed to Nehru his well-considered assessment of the SGPC and the Akali Dal. The Gurdwara Reform Movement had the sympathy of a very large section of the Sikh community. The ‘Sanatani Sikhs’, who stood in opposition to reform were not considered to be the true followers of Sikhism by the Akalis. Panikkar brackets the Sanatanist and the Sahajdhārī Sikhs who appeared to him to be indistinguishable from the vast mass of the Hindu community. The SGPC was an institution of ‘the Singhs’. Its object was the reform of historical gurdwaras and their management under Panthic control. The real trouble was with non-historical gurdwaras in which the Sahajdhārī Sikhs had their rights. This was ‘at the root of the so-called Hindu–Sikh trouble in the Punjab’. The Nabha question was in the background now and the restoration of the Maharaja was not much mentioned. The issue of Jaito had been made definitely a religious one through the intervention of Mahatma Gandhi. The more moderate among the leaders of the SGPC wanted only the control and management of the Page 23 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation historical gurdwaras. But such a proposal would not be accepted ‘either by the Akali Dal or by the majority of the Akali Sikhs’.75 Panikkar wrote further that every village now had its own jathā, federated into the Zail and the Tehsil jathā. The district jathās were directly under the Akali Dal. About 80,000 volunteers could be called up through this organization. Sikh shahīdī jathās of 500 each had been sent to Jaito, but the government showed no sign of yielding, and the Akalis were determined not to yield. The situation might become easier when the SGPC issued its promised statement that the Jaito morchā had nothing to do with the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha. Panikkar was pressing for such a statement. It was difficult for the Congress to interfere directly in a matter claimed to be essentially religious. Panikkar’s report on the firing at Jaito showed that the evidence available to him contradicted the (p.134) official assertion that the shahīdī jathā had resorted to violence.76 The press release of the Akali Sahayak Bureau on 8 April 1924 approvingly gave Sardar Mangal Singh’s statement as President of the Central Sikh League. He said emphatically that the idea of establishing Sikh Raj had never been entertained by any Sikh. The Akali movement was a ‘powerful auxiliary’ to the national cause. The Jaito morchā as such was quite apart from the agitation about the deposition of the Maharaja of Nabha. The Sikhs would stand shoulder to shoulder with their Hindu and Muslim brothers in the fight for their country’s freedom.77

The Role of Master Tara Singh Master Tara Singh had his own perspective on the Nabha issue which, in the light of later research, turns out to be illuminating. Tikka Ripudaman Singh of Nabha was seen by the Chief Khalsa Diwan as a staunch Sikh before the Anand Marriage Bill was introduced in the Legislature by him in 1908. As we noticed earlier, the Bill was not taken up during the Tikka’s term and Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was nominated as a member to steer the Bill in accordance with the official view. Tikka Ripudaman Singh did not like Sardar Sunder Singh for his compromising role in the legislation. When the conflict between Nabha and Patiala came out into the open, the sympathies of the Chief Khalsa Diwan were with the Maharaja of Patiala and those of the opponents of the Chief Khalsa Diwan with the Maharaja of Nabha. The Akali leaders sympathized with Maharaja Ripudaman Singh because of his goodwill for the Akalis. Whereas the Maharaja of Patiala had tried to weaken the Akali movement in collaboration with the British bureaucracy, Maharaja Ripudaman Singh had supported the movement in his own way. He wore black turban and slept on the floor on the Nankana Martyrs’ Day in accordance with the resolution of the SGPC on 21 February 1922, and he did not suppress the Akalis in the Nabha state even

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation though his inaction offended the paramount power. For these reasons the Akalis were wholeheartedly in sympathy with the Maharaja.78 Sant Didar Singh, who had met the Maharaja of Nabha, came to Amritsar and informed the SGPC that the Maharaja was going to leave the gaddī under pressure from the government. Accompanied by Sant Didar Singh, Master Tara Singh went to Nabha to dissuade the Maharaja from abdication. They discovered that the Maharaja was vacillating: to abdicate or not to abdicate was the question. This went on till the fall of night when the Maharaja agreed that he would not abdicate. In the morning, however, when Master Tara Singh and Sant Didar Singh reached the Hira Mahal, they came to know that an English employee of the Maharaja had already left Nabha with his letter of abdication. The Maharaja agreed to send his ahlkārs in a fast car to bring back the letter. Master Tara Singh and Sant Didar Singh felt happy over this action and went to the gurdwara. When they came to the palace again they were told by an ahlkār that the Englishman had refused to part with the letter. After this, they were not allowed to see the Maharaja.79 On his return to Amritsar, Master Tara Singh gave the whole story in the Akālī te Pardesī. There was a strong reaction among the Sikhs. The other Sikh newspapers also took up the issue. Dīwāns began to be held and there was a popular demand for starting a morchā. The Akalis became so enthusiastic that it became difficult to contain them. (p.135) Now the leaders were in two minds. Many members of the Working Committee of the SGPC were hesitant to launch a morchā but the leaders of the Shiromani Akal Dal were adamant. The President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Sardar Sarmukh Singh Jhabal, left Amritsar for his village, expressing his resentment with the remark that he would come back only when the morchā was started. The Working Committee of the SGPC held meetings every day but could not come to a decision. Finally, it was argued by Master Tara Singh that, if the Akali Dal alone launched a morchā and failed, the SGPC would be held equally responsible for the failure.80 Master Tara Singh recalls that about forty volunteers were killed and many others wounded when the first shahīdī jathā of 500 Singhs was fired upon. The government contended that the jathā had fired first. In order to prove the point, a large number of men and women were tried in Nabha and sentenced to long imprisonment of up to seven years. The morchā continued till 1925 when the Gurdwaras Act was passed. In order to humiliate the Akalis the government laid the condition that only a leader who signed the commitment to work out the Gurdwaras Act would be released from jail. This condition was superfluous because the Act had been passed after an agreement between the government and the Akali leaders in jail. About fifteen Akali leaders in the Lahore jail, including Master Tara Singh, refused to sign, and in other jails too most of the Akalis refused to accept the condition. Nor did the Akalis who were in Nabha jail sign any such paper. Master Tara Singh goes on to add that he could never get Page 25 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation rid of the resentment against the government over its treatment of the Akalis in the Jaito morchā. In the first place, there was no cause for firing at the shahīdī jathā. Second, the Akalis were falsely implicated and sentenced. Third, they were kept in jail even after the Gurdwaras Act. The government could never be absolved of this deliberate and gross injustice.81 Master Tara Singh refers to the mistakes made by the Akali leaders. Sardar Sarmukh Singh Jhabal was keen to launch the Nabha morchā and he was angry with other leaders because of their hesitation. He was at that time Jathedar of the Shiromani Akali Dal and a member of the Working Committee of the SGPC. He was so influential that he could not be resisted. Although Master Tara Singh was the first to think of the Nabha agitation, for he had great respect for the Maharaja of Nabha, yet he was initially reluctant to start the morchā. But Sardar Sarmukh Singh had shown no hesitation at any time. However, when the Akali leaders were being tried in the Lahore Fort Sardar Gopal Singh Kaumi told Master Tara Singh that he and Sardar Sarmukh Singh were no longer in favour of the Nabha morchā. They wanted to make their view known to others. Master Tara Singh dissuaded them from this act of grave irresponsibility.82 Another mistake was made during the negotiations with General Birdwood who was assigned the task of working out an understanding with the Sikhs towards the end of 1924. An understanding was evolved but it did not fructify because of a misunderstanding. ‘We insisted that the shahīdī jathā must first be released, but the Government regarded this as dishonourable, and the negotiations broke down.’ Had the two sides made General Birdwood an arbitrator in the matter, the conflict would have been resolved. But this did not occur to either the Akalis or the government and negotiations broke down for want of wisdom.83 (p.136) Master Tara Singh appreciated Sir Malcolm Hailey, the new Governor of the Punjab, for his decision in favour of Gurdwara legislation. Hailey adopted an aggressive policy first and then negotiated with the Akali leaders to enact Gurdwara legislation. However, he failed to reconcile the Sikhs. Had the government released the Akali prisoners, none would have ascribed it to the government’s weakness, as was the case during the Keys and the Guru-ka-Bagh morchā. Master Tara Singh looked upon the British attitude in their handling of the Jaito morchā as a reflection of ‘meanness’ (kamīngī).84 Niranjan Singh states that Master Tara Singh and Bawa Harkishan Singh together had convinced the Akalis that the removal of the Maharaja of Nabha was an indirect attack on the Akali movement. Sardar Teja Singh Samundri and Sardar Mehtab Singh now began to support their view, and the SGPC unanimously resolved to take up the issue of Nabha.85 Master Tara Singh never denied that he was the person ‘most responsible’ for the Nabha agitation. His statement about the Maharaja of Nabha shows that he Page 26 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation knew the real reason of official resentment against him. He said: ‘The Maharaja of Nabha had much respect and influence in the Panth, as the Sikhs looked upon him as the only Sikh Maharaja who understood the Sikh faith properly and took an interest in preaching the Sikh faith, and was in sympathy with the Sikh Reform Movement.’ Furthermore, the Panth knew that many government officials were annoyed with him. Among them were the then Political Agent and Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Louis Dane. ‘My writing all the facts in Akālī te Pardesī caused a great sensation at once in the Panth and meetings commenced to be held at various places.’86 During Master Tara Singh’s detention from October 1923 to September 1926, the Akali leaders were not exactly ineffective. Professor Teja Singh, an ‘insider’, tells us how the Akali leaders inside the jail remained in contact with the leaders managing the affairs of the SGPC. The whole publicity work was done in the jail by Bawa Harkishan Singh in consultation with others. Whatever they wrote was sent out through Mangal Singh, a servant of Sardar Mehtab Singh. Before the second round of arrests of the Akali leaders, a message was sent to the ‘outsiders’ in time for eight leaders to leave the meeting of the SGPC to avoid arrest. Similarly, when Sardul Singh Caveeshar and Mangal Singh, presumably on the advice of Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress leaders of the Punjab, were not in favour of sending the second shahīdī jathā, the ‘insiders’ sent a categorical advice that it must be sent, and this was done. This, in fact, was the reason why the government transferred the leaders on trial from Amritsar to Lahore in March 1924.87 In the Lahore Fort, the Akali leaders used to discuss matters concerning the Sikh Panth, ranging from the Gurdwara Bill to the conduct of Teja Singh Bhuchar who had been declared tankhāhiyā because he started kār-sevā at Amritsar before the ardās was performed by the panj-piāras. Giani Sher Singh was of the view that if he repented and sought forgiveness, his fault should be ignored. Master Tara Singh held the view that he could be forgiven only at the Akal Takht and not by a decision of the Akali leaders in the jail. There was a hot discussion between the two. Master Tara Singh left the room in anger and climbed the pīpal tree in the jail premises. Professor Teja Singh states: ‘Whenever Master Tara Singh wanted to think deeply about an important (p. 137) issue he used to climb the pīpal tree to sit and think.’88 The evidence of the ‘confidential papers’ related to the Akali movement shows that a few issues remained unresolved even though the Sikh Gurdwaras Act was passed and implemented. One of these issues was the restoration of the Maharaja of Nabha. It was the first among the twelve points proposed by General Birdwood on 7 April 1924 as the basis of a settlement. The Akali leaders present in the initial discussion were Narain Singh, Bawa Harkishan Singh, Mehtab Singh, and Teja Singh. In the notes they handed over to General Birdwood on 16 April, it was stated that the SGPC would drop the Nabha issue if Page 27 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation a letter from the Maharaja of Nabha was obtained, saying: ‘I deeply appreciate the sympathy expressed with me in the Panth but I have reasons to believe that the interests of myself, my house and my state would be best served, if the Nabha agitation is now dropped. I, therefore, request the SGPC to exert its influence in the Panth for this purpose.’ In the discussion of General Birdwood and Craik with Narain Singh and Jodh Singh on 17 April, it was affirmed that, ‘on receiving an assurance from the Maharaja that he abdicated voluntarily and desired the agitation to be stopped’, the SGPC would withdraw from the Nabha agitation.89 The draft declaration to be made by the SGPC, dated 24 April 1924, refers to an old letter of the Maharaja, dated 31 July 1923 (it had been extorted from him by the Political Agent, Colonel A.B. Minchin), and it read: ‘I am not responsible for the present agitation about Nabha affairs.’ The post-script to this added, ‘and have no sympathy with it’. This letter was already in the possession of the SGPC. The three Akali leaders with whom the terms were being negotiated did not regard this old letter as adequate. A way out was suggested later. The Working Committee of the SGPC approved of a new basis proposed by Bhai Jodh Singh in consultation with General Birdwood, Colonel Minchin, and Craik on 28 April. A sub-committee was constituted to work out the details in consultation with ‘the Working Committee in the Fort Jail’. This sub-committee consisted of Mangal Singh, Daulat Singh, and Raja Singh. In the draft communiqué the SGPC had to declare that it had no wish ‘to carry on propaganda against Nabha deposition under the cloak of performance of pilgrimage and Akhand Path’. But the following sentence was to be added to the draft communiqué: ‘It should be understood that this communiqué does in no way imply the abandonment of the Nabha question by the SGPC.’90 Apprehending that ‘the negotiations were coming to a standstill, Bhai Jodh Singh recapitulated the whole proceedings. General Birdwood had handed over a draft communiqué on 24 April which the SGPC might issue about Nabha. That proposal did not mature and the possibility of a compromise was discussed on the 25th, leaving the Nabha question alone. On 30 April, Craik handed over a draft resolution of the Punjab Government to be published with the approval of the Government of India. On Bhai Jodh Singh’s suggestion, certain changes were made in the draft and he took it to the three Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort Jail, referred to by him as the inner Working Committee. They asked Bhai Jodh Singh to convey to Craik that their experience of the last few days had convinced them that negotiations would advance further only if something in ‘its final shape’ was given to them, and not a proposal subject to approval by the Government of India.91 Bhai Jodh Singh wrote to Craik again to point out (p.138) a change in the new draft: it contained the word ‘abandon’ whereas the SGPC had agreed to leave the Nabha question open.92

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation Daulat Singh, Secretary, Negotiations Sub-Committee, wrote to Sardar Narain Singh and Bhai Jodh Singh on 18 May 1924 that the proposed resolution by the Punjab Government had made a serious departure from the line of discussion followed earlier and made many changes in the earlier proposals. The earliest understanding on the Nabha issue was that the SGPC would advise the Sikh community to drop the issue if the Maharaja himself requested that it might be dropped. But the document given to them on the 24 April was a copy of the statement signed by the Maharaja on 31 July 1923 which was already in the possession of the SGPC. When the government failed to get a fresh document, the SGPC agreed to leave the Nabha issue open. A confidential agreement was to be made on this point. But on 1 May the sub-committee was told that the government did not want to make a confidential agreement and a new draft was brought up. The revised draft resolution of 28 April wanted the Akalis to ‘abandon’ the Nabha issue. This was one of the reasons for not accepting the draft resolution of 17 May which had the approval of the Government of India.93 In its communiqué of 3 June 1924, the government announced that ‘the idea of the Birdwood Committee’ was abandoned because negotiations with the Sikhs about preliminaries had resulted in no agreement. The Secretary of the SGPC made a brief authoritative statement about the position of the Sikhs. In the beginning the government contemplated settlement of the Nabha issue, but it was not able to carry out its own proposal about Nabha. Both the parties to negotiations agreed to proceed with the other questions, ‘leaving the Nabha question open’. Already on 22 May, Bhai Jodh Singh had been called to Simla and shown a draft announcement about the breakdown of negotiations and the abandonment of the Birdwood Committee as no agreement could be reached.94 This evidence leaves no doubt that the government wanted the Akalis to abandon the Nabha issue altogether. The compromise offered by the Akalis was not enough. None of the Akali leaders in jail was prepared to go beyond the compromise. They could not go back on the solemn commitment made to the Maharaja of Nabha on behalf of the SGPC. This surely was the position of Master Tara Singh on the issue. On 26 June 1924, Mahatma Gandhi supported the Akalis morally. He wrote that the government did not promise even to release the prisoners who had taken part in the Gurdwara agitation. The Akali struggle in all probability would be prosecuted with greater vigour. The government would also probably adopt more repressive measures. The demands of the Akalis seemed to be absolutely simple: (a) possession of all historical gurdwaras by a central body elected by the Sikhs; (b) right of every Sikh to possess a kirpān of any size; and (c) right of performing Akhand Pāṭh at Jaito. Mahatma Gandhi appealed to the Hindus, Muslims, and other communities to help the reformers with their moral support.95 On 5 December 1924 Mahatma Gandhi warned the Akalis at the Akal Takht against being duped by the speeches of Sir Malcolm Hailey; he professed Page 29 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation that he did not want to undermine the Sikhs and favoured Gurdwara Reform, but actually he was keen to crush them by uniting their opponents in the Punjab. Mahatma Gandhi impressed upon the Akalis that they should adhere to truth and carry on their struggle armed with the ‘force of truth’.96 (p.139) On 2 April 1925, Mahatma Gandhi noted that the Akali position still seemed to be uncertain. Their losses according to Sardar Mangal Singh, who was President of the Central Sikh League at this time, amounted to 400 dead or killed, 2,000 wounded, and 30,000 arrested. Fines and forfeiture of pensions of retired soldiers amounted to Rs 1,500,000. This record reflected ‘the highest credit on Sikh courage and sacrifice’, and it meant equal discredit to the government.97 Reports of merciless beating and humiliating treatment of the Akali prisoners in Nabha were reaching Mahatma Gandhi in the month of April. The Government of India could not plead neutrality, he said, because their own officer was administering the state.98 On 11 July 1925, Mahatma Gandhi congratulated both the Punjab Government and the Sikhs over ‘the happy ending of the Akali movement’. He noted, however, that the conditions imposed by the government with regard to the release of prisoners and the performance of Akhand Pāṭhs had caused some dissatisfaction. If, however, the conditions imposed were merely precautionary, or designed to save the prestige of the government, the Akalis would be well advised in not being strict in their interpretation of the conditions imposed.99 The second issue on which the Akalis and the government were not prepared to compromise was the release of Akali prisoners. The issue had been included in the bases proposed on 7 April 1924: ‘Release of all the Sikh prisoners convicted or under trial in connection with Kirpan, Jaito affair, Bhai Pheru, C.L.A.A., Black pagri (Military) and the case against S.B. Mehtab Singh and others.’ In case of any difference of opinion between the SGPC and the government about any prisoner the Birdwood Committee was to decide. The revised draft of 30 April, however, mentioned only ‘the intention of the Government of the Punjab to release as many as possible of the persons now imprisoned in connection with the Akali movement’. Bhai Jodh Singh wrote to the Chief Secretary, Craik, on 26 May, and reiterated on 27 May that the Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort Jail wanted ‘unconditional release of prisoners’. But the government’s position remained ‘unaltered’, and the Secretary of the SGPC in his press statement on the breakdown of negotiations made the observation in June 1924 that the negotiations broke where they had begun, ‘that is, on the question of the release of prisoners’. He went on to add that any Gurdwara legislation was bound to fail ‘if thousands of those who had suffered to secure it, did not come out to work it’. He went on to address all: ‘The present rupture of negotiation has confirmed the fear of the average Sikh that the Government does not want to release the leaders and workers of the Sikh community and that a Government which would

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation not do that would never consent to give them a satisfactory Gurdwara legislation.’100 The third issue which eventually divided the Sikh leadership and the Akalis was that of release on the condition of a written undertaking to cooperate in implementing the Act. The notes of 16 and 17 April mention the proposed basis: ‘SGPC undertake to carry out the actual spirit as well as the letter of the law passed.’ But the draft resolution of the Punjab Government stated that the leading members of the SGPC would give a written assurance to give all facilities in their power to the proceedings of the Birdwood Committee and carry out in letter and spirit any Act passed with the consent of the Sikh members in the Legislative Assembly. This was to apply also to the members of the SGPC in jail. A note (p.140) by Bhai Jodh Singh dated 25 April states that the three leaders to whom the basis of the proposed settlement was shown were of the view that the SGPC should give ‘nothing as a confidential undertaking’. But the condition was included in the terms suggested by Bhai Jodh Singh on 28 April. The condition was included in the revised draft resolution of the Punjab Government.101 Thus, between 25 and 28 April, the three leaders in the Lahore Fort Jail changed their position with regard to the condition of release.

The Akalis on the Verge of a Split Malcolm Hailey kept the idea of Gurdwara legislation open to tell the Sikhs that he was their well-wisher. He encouraged the Sikh vested interests to form the provincial Sudhar Committee to promote the idea of rapprochement between the government and the Sikhs. Sardar Jogendra Singh, a member of the Legislative Council and a Minister, was taking interest in the legislation. Returning the draft Gurdwara Bill to Sardar Arjan Singh, Secretary, SGPC, on 4 October 1924, he advised peace with the government, a bill to amend the Gurdwaras Act of 1922 which had been rejected by the Akalis, dropping the Nabha issue, pressing for the release of prisoners, and sending a jathā of only fifty to Jaito. His advice was pretty close to what Hailey wanted. The Sikh members of the Punjab Council were exploring with H.W. Emerson, the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, the possibilities of evolving a legislation acceptable to both the government and the Sikhs in November 1924. In December, twenty-four of the Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort Jail wrote jointly to the Secretary, SGPC, that the Akali leaders in the Fort could not come to a unanimous decision on any issue. Therefore, the Akali leaders outside were authorized to take their own decisions, keeping in view the interests of the Panth. Master Tara Singh was not a signatory to this letter. It was stated, however, that he was also in agreement with them but he had not signed the letter for ‘private reasons’.102 Six leaders (Sohan Singh Chetanpuri, Rai Singh, Sant Singh Sultanwind, Teja Singh, Sewa Singh, and Gurcharan Singh) wrote separately that they would oppose any Act compromising the dignity and honour of the Panth. The name ‘Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’ should never be changed. The Page 31 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation principle of ‘centralization’ should be emphasized and ‘decentralization’ should be minimized as much as possible. Teja Singh Chuharkana wrote to the Secretary, SGPC, that the Nabha issue should never be abandoned and all Sikh prisoners of the Akali movement should be released unconditionally.103 This was the initial position of the Akalis. The Akalis were seriously concerned with the name of the central body, which they thought should be strong or centralized. Bhai Jodh Singh, a member of the Punjab Legislative Council with whom Emerson was negotiating the Bill, wrote to him on 20 December 1924 that the Sikhs wanted the name ‘Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’ to be retained. But the government was not prepared to accept this. Bhai Jodh Singh’s letter of 1 January 1925 contained no assurance that the name ‘Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’ for the proposed Central Board was dropped. This omission was pointed out by Emerson on the day following. A week later, Bhai Jodh Singh wrote to him that ‘if the new Central Board was allowed to choose its own name we were prepared to drop the idea of calling it SGPC in a bill’.104 This was finally agreed to. (p.141) What remained to be settled finally was the conditioned release. Sardar Mehtab Singh noted in his diary on 12 July 1925 that fifteen Akali leaders had a conference in the Lahore Fort and there was a consensus of opinion in favour of working the Bill after it was passed. After his meetings with the Divisional Commissioner of Lahore, Rai Bahadur Jawala Parshad, Prosecution Council, and the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, on 14 and 18 July 1925, Sardar Mehtab Singh noted: ‘I have been offered a release on signing an understanding to support the Bill or, in other words, to reform the Gurdwaras in accordance with the provisions of the new Reform law known as the Sikh Gurdwaras Act.’ He had been a staunch advocate, he says, ‘of the passage of a reform law and a rapprochement between the Government and the Sikhs’. However, he would not give the undertaking, at least for the present, and would remain in jail for as long as the Court chose to keep him there. But if the SGPC considered that ‘such a sacrifice of human dignity and self-respect’ was required for the welfare of the community, ‘I shall submit once more and carry out its desires’.105 The views expressed by individual leaders for or against conditional release began to be projected in public speeches and newspapers. Sardar Bhag Singh wrote from the Fort that the government was determined to detain those persons in jail who happened not to support the Bill. On 25 July 1925, nineteen persons in the Fort wrote under the signature of Sardar Teja Singh Samundri that a resolution might be passed immediately to appeal to the Panth to work the Bill wholeheartedly even though it had certain shortcomings and irrespective of the release of prisoners. But if no understanding was reached with the

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation government, it should be made perfectly clear that they were not prepared to give any undertaking as a condition of release.106 The leaders of the SGPC at Amritsar were guided mainly by Sardar Mehtab Singh (presumed to be the President of the SGPC) in 1924–5. Much of his correspondence with the Secretary, SGPC, is available in print.107 He talks about matters connected with the Akali movement: the Maharaja of Nabha, the Gurdwara Bill, the Akali leaders’ case, the question of the release of Akali prisoners, the Sikh Sudhar Committee, the Chief Khalsa Diwan and the moderate leaders, and many other passing events or concerns. Sardar Mehtab Singh was never enthusiastic about the restoration of the Maharaja. However, in view of the feelings of other Akali leaders like Master Tara Singh, he wanted to keep the issue open. In this connection, a ‘most confidential’ note on ‘Nabha affair’ is significant. A Council of Regency was proposed for Nabha and later it was modified to a Council of Administration so that the Maharaja did not have to formally abdicate in favour of the minor Tikka Partap Singh. The minimum that he proposed for the Maharaja, apart from the Council of Administration, was removal of restrictions on his movement in India and outside, freedom to seek constitutional redress, and right to his private property. The chance of his restoration in the future was kept open.108 For the Gurdwaras Bill, Sardar Mehtab Singh, like the moderate Sikh leaders, was keen about rapprochement between the Sikhs and the government and, therefore, be as accommodative as possible.109 Sardar Mehtab Singh was not happy that the Executive Committee had failed to pass the resolution about the imposition of condition of release. Had this resolution been passed, the position of the SGPC would have been strengthened by convincing the world (p.142) that its aim was ‘constructive’ and that it was anxious for a settlement. ‘It would have made our agitation for removal of condition on release more effective and at the same time definitely and clearly prepared the community for constructive work.’ Mehtab Singh maintained that the real import of the statement of Sardar Teja Singh was that the Bill was defective ‘but not so much that we may reject or wreck it’. He was prepared to work it and try to get it improved. This could be verified from him. Mehtab Singh wrote again that a serious tactical mistake had been made in ‘not making a definite declaration of our constructive policy’. It would have been considered by all ‘a splendid stroke of statesmanship’.110 Sardar Mehtab Singh was in favour of immediately declaring a clear and decisive policy which might impress the government, the public, and the community with their ‘peace-loving intention’. Furthermore, the issue of release should be isolated from other entanglements: ‘Now we must be ready for compromises concerning matters left unsolved.’ Pressure on the government was to be kept up but not overdone, because they were dealing with Malcolm Hailey who was ‘an exceptionally clever and firm man’.111 Sardar Bahadur Page 33 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation Mehtab Singh was, thus, mentally prepared to take up ‘constructive work’ as President of the SGPC, in spite of the fact that there was no unanimity among the Akali leaders on the issue of release. The Akalis were on the verge of a split.

Master Tara Singh’s Views on the Situation The articles published by Master Tara Singh during this phase are relevant for his responses to the situation. He wanted the Sikhs to work shoulder to shoulder with Hindus and Muslims. Boycott of Legislative Councils was a part of Mahatma Gandhi’s Non-cooperation Movement. But now the Congress (Swarajists) had decided to join the councils. Master Tara Singh was convinced that councils would have to be left again, and non-cooperation would gain greater support. Meanwhile, however, if Hindus and Muslims joined the councils and the Sikhs did not, it would not serve any purpose. The Sikhs could be effective in union with Hindus and Muslims. Therefore, the Sikhs should not separate themselves from others. To boycott the councils and to sit at home instead of agitating against the taxes imposed by the councils would be to commit political suicide.112 Master Tara Singh justified the decision taken by the Akalis and stuck to it because religion and politics in his view were inseparable at least in the Sikh tradition. Indeed, he firmly believed that religion and politics could not be separated. However, there were Sikhs who made a distinction between what was religious and what was political. But, all that this distinction amounted to was that whatever offended the government was ‘political’, and whatever was safe was ‘religious’. The ‘purely religious’ persons were actually those who wished to avoid service and sacrifice. Guru Tegh Bahadur gave his head to save the Hindus. Guru Gobind Singh created the Khalsa to fight against injustice. The measure of true faith was what one could do for others. ‘Pure faith’ was total deception. ‘We request the purely religious to keep quiet if they are not prepared to serve and sacrifice, and not try to look great by mere talk.’113 Master Tara Singh’s conception of freedom was equally clear. He stood for partnership in power and not assimilation in one common identity. Freedom for India meant freedom (p.143) for all individuals and all people alike. A letter addressed to Mahatma Gandhi and published in Young India was the same as the one published earlier in the Civil and Military Gazette. The charge against the Akalis in both these letters was the same as in an official statement: it was underscored that the Akalis wanted Sikh Raj and not swarāj. Mahatma Gandhi had remarked that he did not believe this to be true but, if it was true, it was a very dangerous thing. Master Tara Singh had not heard of any such statement by a Sikh leader but be did not rule out the possibility that some Sikhs entertained the wish for their Raj, like some Hindus and Muslims. All such people were obstacles in the path of swarāj. They wanted the British to leave but they themselves wanted to rule over others. There was no justification for oppression by Indians in place of the British. They should all work for a swarāj in Page 34 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation which there was no oppression: every individual and all peoples should be free. To fight for the freedom of the whole country was ‘our religious duty’.114 Disunity among the Sikhs was inevitably harmful to all sections of the community. Master Tara Singh took special notice of the Nāmdhārīs, popularly called Kukas. They had a leader named Mangal Singh who, instead of feeling ashamed of his moral lapses, mentioned them openly with great pride. The good qualities which the Nāmdhārīs possessed in the beginning had now become a sham. They were heading towards their demise. Master Tara Singh tried to explain how the Kukas were going down. They had made a mistake early in their history. They began to look upon themselves as separate from the Panth. It was not clear whether they became separate because they came to believe in the Guruship of Baba Ram Singh or because they adopted him as their Guru. The fact was that the Kukas began to place Baba Ram Singh at par with the ten Gurus from Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh, and became a sect. Had they treated Baba Ram Singh simply as a teacher (guru) who interpreted the Guru Granth for them, they could have remained a part of the Sikh Panth. More recently, they had repeated their mistake. Some Kukas did not stand up when the Guru Granth Sahib was brought out at Tarn Taran. Step by step they were moving away from the Panth. If this trend continued, the Panth would suffer, but the Kukas would suffer more.115 Not external force but internal weakness was the cause of decline in the history of any organization. An organization could survive efficiently only if the number of unsuitable members was not allowed to increase. Master Tara Singh uses the terms ‘dogs’, ‘crows’, and khaṛpanchas for such people. The first category was useless in a crisis. The second category had a strong vocal chord but weak understanding. The third category sought underserved honour. All of them should be made aware that their true character was not hidden from the people. The Chief Khalsa Diwan suffered as an organization when the difference between a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ member was ignored for nomination. The SGPC and the Sikh League had to be created to give more importance to election than to nomination. But corrupt practices could be introduced in the process of election too. This was, in fact, happening in the elections to the councils, and it could happen in the SGPC as well. The only way to avoid such an eventuality was to make people aware of the importance of honesty in public affairs.116 Thus, Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs to be politically committed. They should fight shoulder to shoulder with other Indians for (p.144) the freedom of the country. He thought of swarāj as a partnership of the various communities of India in political power among whom the Sikhs were a distinct entity. He wanted the Sikhs to follow ethical principles in the pursuit of power. For him, religion, ethics, and politics were inseparable.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation In Retrospect The colonial government was not prepared to give legal recognition to a central body like the SGPC for the control and management of gurdwaras associated with the Sikh Gurus and Sikh martyrs. Rather, it wanted to weaken the Akalis. The bureaucrats were not prepared to create any central body. This was the crux of the problem. Master Tara Singh rightly perceived that a showdown was inevitable. The colonial authorities, on their part, were bent upon bringing the Akalis to their knees. At the instance of the Governor General, two enquiries had been conducted against Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha to bring about charges of disloyalty and maladministration. On the basis of their ‘findings’, the Political Agent for the Punjab states, A.B. Minchin, threatened the Maharaja of dire consequences if he did not abdicate. Actually, the Maharaja was a consistent opponent of the British and he had shown strong sympathies with the Akali movement. He was removed from Nabha on 8 July 1923. In a communiqué of 9 July, the Akali leaders declared that they would take up the issue of his restoration. The decision was taken after a protracted discussion among the leaders of the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal. The Akalis knew that the removal of the Maharaja from his state was meant indirectly to weaken them but they were divided on the issue of a morchā for his restoration. Master Tara Singh tilted the balance in favour of morchā. He took up the cause of Nabha in the Akālī te Pardesī and created a strong reaction against the government. On 5 August 1923, the SGPC authorized its Executive Committee to use all peaceful and legitimate means for the Maharaja’s restoration. This was clearly a political issue on which the government could not compromise. To its advantage, the affairs of the princely states were outside the perview of the Legislature. The British Administrator of Nabha was given dictatorial powers, and he had the support of the other Sikh states, especially Patiala. The Congress leadership at this time was divided and weak. In the early days of protest, an Akhand Pāṭh in the Gurdwara Gangsar was disrupted by the Nabha police. A religious dimension was added to a political issue. On 29 September 1923, the SGPC resolved to assert the Sikh right to free worship. Akali jathās began to be sent to Jaito from the Akal Takht to resume Akhand Pāṭh. On 12 October 1923, the Punjab Government declared the SGPC and the Akali jathās to be ‘unlawful associations’. All the members of the Executive Committee of the SGPC were arrested and charged with ‘treason against the King-Emperor’. During the trials, Master Tara Singh admitted that he was the person ‘most responsible’ for the Nabha agitation. The Maharaja of Nabha commanded ‘much respect and influence in the Panth’ because of his ‘sympathy with the Sikh Reform Movement’. But many British officials were annoyed with him due to his independent stance. The publicity given to all these facts in the Akālī te Pardesī caused ‘a great sensation’ in the Panth.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation During his detention for three years (October 1923–September 1926) Master Tara Singh and the other Akali leaders inside the jail remained in contact with the leaders outside and all important decisions were taken in (p.145) consultation, especially on the Nabha issue and the Gurdwara legislation. Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress leaders, like the British authorities, were in favour of separating the Nabha issue from the question of legislation. The Sikh leadership was divided on both these issues. The moderates were prepared to abandon the issue of restoration and to accept legislation finally evolved by the government in consultation with the Akali leaders. Master Tara Singh and many other Akalis were not prepared to abandon the cause of Nabha altogether, nor to accept legislation without a central Sikh body for the control of the gurdwaras. The difference between them was essentially ideological. Master Tara Singh, and others of his view, did not wish to compromise the idea of the collective authority of the Panth as the Guru, and its independent identity. This was also the basis of a fundamental difference between Mahatma Gandhi and Master Tara Singh. Throughout his life Mahatma Gandhi never really discarded his notion that Sikhism was a part of Hinduism and the Sikhs were a part of the Hindu social order. Master Tara Singh, on his part, never quite discarded the idea of a distinctive identity of the Sikhs as a political community. Notes:

(1.) B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, vol. I (1885–1935) (Bombay: Padma Publications, n.d.), pp. 267–8, 276–7. (2.) Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, pp. 280–1, 292–3. (3.) Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, pp. 250, 254, 275, 298. (4.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), pp. 46–65. (5.) Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Punjab 1897– 1947 (New Delhi: ICHR, 1984), pp. 125–43. (6.) This statement is based on documentary evidence collected from the British Library by J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga for ‘A Political Biography of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh’. See also Diwan Singh ‘Maftun’, Nāqābil-i Farāmosh (Delhi: 1957), pp. 65–8. (7.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978), pp. 67–8. (8.) ‘Sikh Situation’, F.No. 1 & K.W., Home Political 1924, National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (9.) Telegram from Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, to Punjab Government, dated 6 August 1923, F.No. 1 & K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (10.) Report of Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, 6–8, August 1923, F.No. 1 & K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (11.) Note dated 15 August 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (12.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 69–70. (13.) ‘The Present Situation in the Punjab’, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (14.) CID Report of 14 August 1923 and Sant Singh’s Report of 18 August 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (15.) Cutting from Bombay Chronicle of 21 August 1923 and CID Report of 30 August 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (16.) Proceedings of the Conference on 9 September 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (17.) SGPC to the Viceroy, 15 September 1923 and Wilson Johnston’s Note, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (18.) The Pioneer, 6 October 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (19.) ‘Notes on Case Against the Prabandhak Committee in Connection with the Nabha Agitation’, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (20.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, p. 71. (21.) Viceroy’s Telegram to Secretary of State, 15 October 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (22.) Personal Secretary, Viceroy (PSV) to Sir Malcolm Hailey, 9 November 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (23.) ‘Abdication of the Maharaja of Nabha and the Sikh Leaders’ Case, Amritsar’, F.No. 148/IV, Home Political 1923, NAI. (24.) CID Report of 24 December 1923, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (25.) ‘Arrest at the “Akal Takht” under the Criminial Law Amendment Act, 1908 of Members of Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’, F.No. 1/I, Home Political 1924, NAI. (26.) Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 January 1924, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. Page 38 of 43

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (27.) J. Crerar to H.D. Craik, 15 January 1924, and Craik’s reply, 25 January 1924, F.No. 95, Home Political 1924, NAI. (28.) ‘Questions in the Legislative Assembly Regarding Prosecution of Members of the Shironmani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and Policy of Government in Regard to the Sikhs’, F.No. 1/III, Home Political 1924, NAI. (29.) ‘Sardar Gulab Singh’s Resolution in the Legislative Assembly Recommending the Appointment of a Committee to Enquire into the Sikh Situation’, F.No. 235, Home Political 1924, NAI. (30.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 70–5. (31.) ‘The Akali Movement’, F.No. 1/II, Home Political 1924, NAI. (32.) Minchin to Thompson, 24 February 1924, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (33.) H.D. Craik to J. Crerar, 13 March 1924, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (34.) H.D. Craik to Home Secretary, 2 May 1924, F.No. 1/II, Home Political 1924, NAI. (35.) Chief Secretary, Punjab, to J. Crerar, 17 May 1924, F.No. 1/IV, Home Political 1924, NAI. (36.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 75–6, 131–2. (37.) Mohinder Singh, The Akali Movement, pp. 75–6, 132–5. (38.) M.K. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. XXIII (New Delhi: Government of India, 1967), pp. 200, 210–12. (39.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, p. 213. (40.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, pp. 218–20. (41.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, p. 220. (42.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, pp. 229–35. (43.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, p. 235. (44.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, p. 281. (45.) Ganda Singh (ed.), Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1965), pp. 56–8.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (46.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 58–60. (47.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 60–2. (48.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 62–6. (49.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 66–9. (50.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. IX (1963), p. 377. (51.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. IX, p. 407. (52.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XIX (1966), pp. 421–2. (53.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XX (1966), p. 43. (54.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XX, p. 406. (55.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIV (1967), pp. 104–6. (56.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXV (1967), pp. 84, 155. (57.) For the works of J.D. Cunningham, M.A. Macauliffe, and Gokul Chand Narang see J.S. Grewal, Historical Writings on the Sikhs (1784–2011): Western Enterprise and Indian Response (New Delhi: Manohar, 2012), pp. 110–56, 211– 26, 351–66. (58.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXVII (1968), pp. 263–4. (59.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XX, p. 107. (60.) Gandhi believed that the Sikh fear was not about identity so much as the issue of their representation. In his view the Sikhs were entitled to a treatment similar to the one given to the Muslims. But it was a question to be settled largely by the three communities in the Punjab. Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XX, pp. 462–3. (61.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIII, pp. 457, 515–16. (62.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIV, pp. 104–6. (63.) Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, vol. I, pp. 212– 13. (64.) Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, pp. 245, 260, 262.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (65.) ‘Meeting at Viceregal Lodge, Simla, on 19 September 1922 to consider the Sikh Agitation’, and correspondence between the Political Department and the Nabha Administrator, F.No. 1 K.W., Home Political 1924, NAI. (66.) Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982, reprint, paperback), pp. 109–13. (67.) Nehru, An Autobiography, pp. 113–15. (68.) Nehru, An Autobiography, pp. 115–16. (69.) Several files in the Punjab State Archives, Patiala, relate to this trial and provide much detail, including the Governor General’s intervention. (70.) M.L. Ahluwalia, Select Documents Gurdwara Reform Movement 1919– 1925: An Era of Congress-Akali Collaboration (New Delhi: Ashoka International Publishers, 1985), pp. 415–16. (71.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 373–6. (72.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 377–87. (73.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 389–90, 392–5. (74.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 395–6. (75.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 397–9. (76.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, pp. 399–412. (77.) Ahluwalia, Select Documents, p. 413. (78.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999, reprint), pp. 58–9. (79.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 59–60. (80.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 60–2. (81.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 62–3. (82.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 63–6. (83.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 66. (84.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 66–9. (85.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 89.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (86.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), p. 32. (87.) Teja Singh, Ārsī (Amritsar: Lok Sahit Prakashan, n.d.), pp. 73–7. (88.) Teja Singh, Ārsī, pp. 81–2. (89.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 69–71. (90.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 74–83. (91.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 84–7. (92.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 87–8. (93.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 91–4. (94.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 100–5. (95.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXIV, pp. 293–5. (96.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXV, pp. 399–400. (97.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXVI (1967), pp. 439–40. (98.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXVI, pp. 197, 536. (99.) Gandhi, The Collected Works, vol. XXVII, pp. 361–2. (100.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 69–70, 76, 85, 93, 96, 99, 103–4. (101.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 69, 71, 73, 76, 78, 85. (102.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 134–9. (103.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 139– 44. (104.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 144–5, 148–9. (105.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 159– 64. (106.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 163–9.

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From the Jaito Morchā to the Gurdwara Legislation (107.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 237– 363. Teja Singh refers to Sardar Mehtab Singh as ‘the most responsible personality’ in the jail: Ārsī, p. 82. (108.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, p. 299. (109.) Document 160 in Some Confidential Papers was ‘strictly confidential’. It appears to have been written from the Lahore Jail by Sardar Mehtab Singh to a trusted and influential person in the SGPC at Amritsar, pp. 243–5. (110.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 288– 90. (111.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 291–2. (112.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Ki Sada Ros koi asar pa sakda hai?’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 98–9. (113.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Nirol Dhārmak kauṇ hai’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 86–8. (114.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Swarāj ke Sikh Rāj’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 59–62. (115.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Kūke kis tarān gir rahe haṇ’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 101–3. (116.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Maut Bahron nahīn aundī andron jamdī hai’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 75–80.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence (1926–9) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0007

Abstract and Keywords In the first elections to the SGPC (Central Board) Kharak Singh and Master Tara Singh were elected President and Vice-President. Most of the meetings of the SGPC from 1926 to 1929 were presided over by Master Tara Singh, and a number of important resolutions were passed. He played a leading role in the Akali agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala, and in mobilizing Sikh opinion against the recommendations of the Motilal Nehru Committee which were unjust to the Sikhs. Eventually, the Congress passed a resolution at its annual session at Lahore in 1929 that no constitution for India would be finalized without the consent of the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh decided to work with the Congress, but Kharak Singh decided to boycott it. Elected President of the SGPC in 1930, Master Tara Singh replaced Kharak Singh as the topmost leader of the Akalis. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, SGPC, Kharak Singh, Akali agitation against Patiala, Motilal Nehru Committee, Congress assurance in 1929, President SGPC

In recognition of his services to the Sikh community and his role in the Akali movement from 1920 to 1925, Master Tara Singh was elected Vice-President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) in absentia in 1926. Sardar Kharak Singh, elected President in absentia at the same time, presided over the meetings of the SGPC rather rarely, leaving the field open to Master Tara Singh to guide the Sikhs in their religious, cultural, and political affairs from 1926 to 1929. He spearheaded an agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala to force him to release Sewa Singh Thikriwala, the most important Akali leader Page 1 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence of the Sikh states, with forty other Akalis towards the end of August 1929. He had already influenced the Sikh opinion to reject the Nehru Committee Report which, in his well-considered view, was unfair to the Sikhs. But he was not in favour of boycotting the Congress. This was the basic difference between him and Sardar Kharak Singh, who favoured boycott. At the annual session of the Congress at Lahore in December 1929, a resolution was formally passed not to accept any constitution for India without the consent of the Sikhs.

The Political Context Jawaharlal Nehru looked upon 1926 as the year of ‘controversies in India’. The Nationalist Party under the leadership of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, working in close cooperation with the Hindu Mahasabha, met with a great measure of success in the elections to the Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Councils at the cost of the Swarajists, leaving behind a trail of bitter memories. Communal passion resulted in the assassination of Swami Shradhanand.1 (p.150) Motilal Nehru was in deep despondence and wrote on 30 March 1927 that ‘conditions in India have never been worse’.2 In November 1927, the Conservative Government of Britain announced the allwhite Simon Commission to recommend further constitutional reforms for India. There was an adverse reaction to the deliberate exclusion of Indians from the Commission even among the leaders of the Liberal Federation and the Hindu Mahasabha. The Simon Commission landed at Bombay on 3 February 1928. In protest, haṛtāl was observed in all major cities and towns of India. Everywhere the Commission was greeted with black flags. Its boycott was almost complete till it was concluded on 14 April 1929. The Indian National Congress took the initiative to hold an All-Parties Conference at Delhi in February and March and at Bombay in May, and to finalize a report at Lucknow during 28–30 August 1928, known as the ‘Nehru Report’. It recommended joint electorates everywhere and seats to be reserved for Muslims at the Centre and in the provinces with Muslim minorities. Sind was to be made a separate province (with a Muslim majority). However, the Mahasabha leaders did not go all the way with the Congress to meet the demands put forward by Jinnah. At the end of 1928 at Calcutta it became clear that the All-Parties Conference had failed to evolve a national constitution for India.3 The younger leaders of the Indian National Congress were not happy with the goal of Dominion Status in the Nehru Report. At the Congress session at Calcutta itself in December 1928, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose pressed for Pūran Swarāj or complete independence as the goal of the Congress. It was decided to launch a civil disobedience movement for the attainment of complete independence if the government did not accept a constitution based on Dominion Status within a year. A Labour Government headed by Ramsay Page 2 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Macdonald called Lord Irwin to London for consultations in May 1929. He made the announcement in October that Dominion Status was considered to be the goal for India, and a Round Table Conference would be held after the submission of the Simon Commission’s report. However, in December 1929, Lord Irwin told Mahatma Gandhi that he was not in a position to say when a scheme for Dominion Status would be implemented. At the Lahore session of the Congress, under the presidentship of Jawaharlal Nehru, the main resolution declared that complete independence was the goal of the Congress.4 Though opposed to the Swarajists in the elections of 1926, Lajpat Rai participated in the agitation against the Simon Commission, received lāṭhī blows on 30 October 1928, and died a few weeks later. The young revolutionaries of northern India had met in Delhi in September 1928 and created a new leadership which adopted socialism as their goal and changed the Hindustan Republican Association of 1924 into the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army. On 17 December 1928, Bhagat Singh, Chandrashekhar Azad, and Rajguru assassinated Saunders, the English police officer who was believed to be responsible for the death of Lala Lajpat Rai. On 8 April 1929, Bhagat Singh and B.K. Dutt threw a bomb in the Central Legislative Assembly ‘to make the deaf hear’. A large number of revolutionaries were tried in the Lahore Conspiracy and Assembly Bomb Cases.5 Communism had come early to the Punjab, and three groups were attracted to communism before 1929: the Mahajirs, (p.151) the Naujawan Bharat Sabha, and the Kirtī Kisan Party. All the three groups appeared to converge, and a distinct Ghadar-Kirtī communism was evolving. The Punjabi monthly Kirti (The Workers) was started in February 1926. On 12 April 1928, the Kirtī group was reconstituted as the Kirtī Kisan Party (Workers and Peasants’ Party). The Comintern’s patronage gave Ghadar-Kirtī communism a certain degree of organizational recognition.6 Meanwhile, the elections to the Punjab Legislative Council were held in November 1926. The Congress failed miserably, due mainly to internal bickering and dissensions, and its influence got almost totally restricted to the urban middle class. It won only two seats. However, the Central Sikh League, in alliance with the Congress, won ten seats. The Khilafat Committee put up six candidates and won three seats. The Hindu Mahasabha, with the support of Lajpat Rai, won twelve seats. The election results clearly showed that the elitist electorate had rejected the Congress, with the Hindus going largely to the Hindu Mahasabha. The Unionist Party won the largest number of seats, over thirty, due partly to the influence of Chhotu Ram in south-eastern Punjab. Ten of the Sikh members resigned on 19 May 1927 but they were re-elected early in July.7

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence A split in Sikh leadership over the issue of conditional release had resulted in the dominance of the Akali Dal in the SGPC, with Sardar Kharak Singh and Master Tara Singh as its President and Vice-President respectively. The Akalis came into confrontation with the Maharaja of Patiala over the imprisonment of Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala. Disagreement of the Akalis with the Congress on the Nehru Report induced the Congress leaders to assure the Akali leaders formally through a resolution that no constitution would be adopted for India without the consent of the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh’s response to the Nehru Report can be appreciated only in the larger context in which the Nehru Committee was appointed and how it functioned. The Congress had passed a resolution at Gauhati (present-day Guwahati) in December 1926 that the Congress Working Committee, in consultation with Hindu and Muslim leaders, should devise measures for the removal of differences prevailing between the two communities. On 20 March 1927, prominent Muslim leaders met in Delhi and prepared ‘Muslim proposals’ for acceptance by the Hindus. The Congress Working Committee appointed a sub-committee to confer with Hindu and Muslim leaders, and passed a lengthy resolution on the Hindu–Muslim question at Bombay during 15–18 May 1927. The AICC accepted this resolution with minor modifications. After the announcement of the Simon Commission, a resolution was passed at the Madras Congress in December 1927 to hold a convention in Delhi in March 1928 to draft a Swaraj Constitution for India. The Working Committee invited about thirty organizations to an All-Parties Conference at Delhi on 12 February 1928. Included in these organizations were the All-India Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Central Sikh League. The Conference continued to meet till 28 February when a committee was appointed to report on some of the important subjects discussed in the Conference. On 8 March 1928, the Conference met again at Delhi. There was no agreement between the All-India Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha on separation of Sind from Bombay and on reservation of seats for majorities. The Sikhs were strongly opposed to the latter.8

(p.152) Master Tara Singh as Vice-President of the SGPC Master Tara Singh recalls in his Merī Yād that the original members of the Akali Party within the SGPC were in a minority. In the elections of the Central Board, however, the Akali Party became dominant even though the members from the Sikh states as well as the pro-government members voted against the Akali candidates. In the second meeting of the Central Board, Sardar Kharak Singh was elected President and Master Tara Singh as Vice-President. Sardar Kharak Singh was still in jail.9 They were the two most acceptable leaders of the Akalis in 1926. The former was already the acknowledged leader, but the recognition given to Master Tara Singh was a new thing. It was a result of his important role in the Akali movement from 1921 to 1926.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Two of the Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort, Risaldar Sunder Singh and Risaldar Ranjodh Singh, accepted in writing on 21 January 1926 the conditions of release laid down by Malcolm Hailey. They were released. Risaldar Sunder Singh was mentioned in the official report as a former President of the SGPC and a nephew of Sardar Kharak Singh, the ‘uncrowned king’ of the Akalis. On 25 January, Bawa Harkishan Singh read a statement in Court giving his arguments for working the Act with reference to Hailey’s speech of 9 July 1925. After this, nineteen other Akalis made the same statement and were released from the Lahore Fort jail. Among these twenty Akalis were Sardar Mehtab Singh and Giani Sher Singh. On 8 February, Teja Singh Chuharkana also came out from ‘the same back-door’, as he said. Left behind in the Fort were fifteen Akali leaders who were not prepared to accept any condition for their release. Sardar Teja Singh Samundri, Master Tara Singh, and Sardar Bhag Singh continued to take interest in the trial that was still going on.10 On 31 January 1926, the office bearers of the SGPC were all elected afresh. Sardar Mehtab Singh was elected President with seventy-seven votes against forty-four for Sardar Bhag Singh Canadian. The candidates of Sardar Mehtab Singh’s choice were elected Vice-President and General Secretary. Sardar Mangal Singh and Sardar Amar Singh Jhabal walked out with their supporters. In the evening they held a meeting in the Guru-ka-Bagh (adjoining the Golden Temple) and denounced the way in which the elections had been conducted. According to the official report for February 1926, fifty to sixty Akalis formed their own committee with Bhag Singh Canadian as its President and Mangal Singh as its Secretary.11 On 26 February, Sardar Mangal Singh wrote in the Akālī and the Akālī te Pardesī that these two papers were dedicated to the service of the Sikh Panth, with its welfare as their foremost objective. He suggested that the SGPC in the present predicament should hold its general elections before the elections of the Central Board (provided for in the Act). Already, a subcommittee had been appointed for this purpose.12 Purportedly on behalf of the sub-committee, Sardar Mangal Singh announced that elections to the SGPC would be held on 11 April. But this announcement was rejected as unauthorized by the sub-committee and he resigned from it. Mohinder Singh Sidhwan, General Secretary of the SGPC, wrote to Sardar Mangal Singh on 19 April that the general elections would be held during 29–30 May. He went on to add that if the issue of prisoners got postponed (p.153) due to this announcement the responsibility would be entirely that of the Akali Party, and if a morchā was launched for any reason the Akali Party alone would be responsible for its conduct and consequences. Mohinder Singh was emphatic that the Akali Party was solely responsible for the present predicament.13 Sardar Mangal Singh wrote to the General Secretary on 28 April 1926 that the Akali leaders were keen to see the prisoners released but with honour. The way in which the Sardar Bahadur (Mehtab Singh) and his companions had degraded Page 5 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence themselves by accepting the conditions imposed by the government was not liked by the Akali leaders. Had they cared for their fellow prisoners, Mehtab Singh and his party would not have left them behind in the Fort. Their way was not only dishonourable but also harmful. The responsibility for the continued detention of the Akali leaders in the Fort was squarely on them. Had they not accepted the condition of their release, all the prisoners would have been released sooner than later. Their act was an everlasting blot on the Sikh tradition. Their crime was as heinous as that of Lal Singh and Tej Singh, the arch-traitors of the first Sikh war (1845–6).14 The Executive Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal decided on 21 April 1926 to hold ‘Sarbat Khalsa Conference’ during 21–22 May to think about the present predicament of the Panth. The SGPC proclaimed that it would not participate in the Conference, nor regard it as representative of the Panth. An attempt was made to resolve the differences through the arbitration of Professor Teja Singh and Sardar Narain Singh of Gujranwala.15 Sardar Mangal Singh and Giani Sher Singh issued a joint statement that the ‘Sarbat Khalsa Conference’ was postponed till the decision of arbitrators. Sardar Amar Singh Jhabal resigned from the Presidentship of the Akali Dal, and Baba Gurdit Singh, known for the Komagata Maru enterprise, was elected in his place. It was decided that if the two parties failed to come to a mutual understanding, the ‘Sarbat Khalsa Conference’ would be held on 10–11 June. The leaders of the SGPC went ahead with the elections to establish their hold over it.16 The Sarbat Khalsa Conference was held at the Jallianwala Bagh in the second week of June. A resolution was passed against the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, and a committee was formed to take over the SGPC. The Gargaj Akalis, who were dominant in the Conference, tried to take over the SGPC but their bid was foiled by the police called in by Bhai Jodh Singh and Giani Sher Singh. Elections to the Central Board were held in the third week of June. Candidates of the Shiromani Akali Dal won eighty-five seats, and those of the Sardar Bahadur faction got only twenty-six seats. Five elected members belonged to the Panthic Sudhar Committee sponsored by the government, and the remaining four were independent candidates. Sardar Mehtab Singh resigned from the Presidentship of the SGPC. The first meeting of the Board was called by the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar on 4 September 1926 in the Town Hall. Sardar Mangal Singh was elected Chairman for this meeting. Fourteen members were nominated to the Board, including Sardar Kharak Singh and Sardar Hazara Singh of Jamarai. The first meeting of the Central Board was held on 2 October 1926 under the Presidentship of Sardar Mangal Singh. The meeting expressed its deep sorrow over the untimely death of ‘the real founder of the Gurdwara reform movement’, Sardar Teja Singh Samundri (who had died in the Lahore Fort on 17 July). Sardar Hazara Singh Jamarai resigned and in his place, Master

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Tara Singh was nominated as a member. Present among (p.154) the visitors, Master Tara Singh was invited by the President to take his seat as a member.17 In the elections of office-bearers, Sardar Kharak Singh was unanimously elected President, and Master Tara Singh Vice-President. Sardar Mehtab Singh suggested that since Sardar Kharak Singh was still in jail and Master Tara Singh was present in the meeting, he might be requested to take the chair. The meeting broke for half an hour and met again under the Chairmanship of Master Tara Singh. Eight members were elected to the Executive Committee. The first resolution passed by the Central Board with Master Tara Singh in the chair was to call it ‘Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’. The second resolution underlined that the Sikhs would never be at peace until all the prisoners connected with the Gurdwara Reform Movement since 1913, including the prisoners of the states, were released and compensated for the losses they had suffered. The third resolution congratulated the brave Sikhs who had preserved the honour of the Panth by refusing to accept any condition for their release and were still in jail. It was also resolved to record the proceedings of the Board in Punjabi. On 3 October, it was decided to use dates of the Khalsa Sammat though there was no objection to the use of the British calendar at the same time. Local committees were formed for the management of the Darbar Sahib at Amritsar, the Darbar Sahib at Tarn Taran, Sri Muktsar Sahib, the gurdwaras of the city of Lahore, Nankana Sahib, Sri Anandpur Sahib, and Panja Sahib.18 The main concern of the SGPC, says Master Tara Singh, was to fight court cases connected with gurdwaras or to work out negotiated settlements with the nonAkali custodians of gurdwaras. The political concern of the Akalis was to agitate all over the province for the release of Sardar Kharak Singh and other Akalis prisoners. Sardar Kharak Singh was released in the spring of 1927. He was received with great honour wherever he went. As the President of the SGPC, he tried to modify the Sikh Gurdwaras Act because the SGPC did not possess effective power over the local committees to ensure their good functioning. This defect in the constitution could be rectified only by an amendment. Meanwhile, most of the local committees surrendered all their rights and powers to the SGPC under Article 85. The problem was not solved but only shelved.19 Presiding over the SGPC on 13 March 1927, Master Tara Singh suggested that a special meeting of the SGPC should be held on 3 April to discuss the issue of the release of Akali prisoners and compensation for the losses they had suffered. On 14 March, a resolution was passed against discrimination on the basis of caste. The resolution underlined that no one should be regarded as high or low, and no distinction should be made between one Sikh and another in the langar. Not to allow a Sikh to draw water from a well was to insult the Sikh faith. It was resolved to form a committee for determining rahit-maryādā (desirable conduct) for the Sikhs. It included the names of Professor Teja Singh, Bhai Jodh Singh,

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Giani Sher Singh, Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, Bhai Vir Singh, Giani Hira Singh Dard, and Bawa Harkishan Singh.20 In a special meeting held on 3 April, Master Tara Singh stated that a decision had been taken at the Akal Takht for reconciliation between the Akalis and the Sardar Bahadur party. They shared the view that the foremost concern of the Sikhs was the release of the Akali prisoners. On behalf of his party Giani Sher Singh said that whatever they did was in good faith and he sought forgiveness from (p.155) those who were still critical of their actions. Master Tara Singh appealed to the members to forget about the past differences and get their fellow Akalis released unconditionally. The Sikh members of the Punjab Council were asked to resign on this issue. All those members were present and, on their behalf, Sardar Narain Singh of Gujranwala accepted this decision. The other members present were Sardar Buta Singh, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Sardar Partap Singh, Sardar Hira Singh, Sardar Santa Singh, and Sardar Kundan Singh. It was decided to request the Central Sikh League to ask all the Sikh members elected on the League ticket to resign on the issue of Akali prisoners.21 In the fresh election of office-bearers on 8 October 1927, Master Tara Singh proposed the name of Sardar Kharak Singh as President. Master Tara Singh himself was elected Vice-President. In the absence of Sardar Kharak Singh he presided over the meeting. It was decided to bring out the Gurdwara Gazettee to disseminate accurate information on the matters connected with the gurdwaras. Regarding the distinctions of caste observed among the Sikhs, it was decided to mobilize local Sikh opinion and to issue a general hukamnāmā from the Akal Takht. A resolution of condolence over the death of Sant Attar Singh was passed by the SGPC under the chairmanship of Master Tara Singh.22 Master Tara Singh continued to preside over the general body meetings of the SGPC in 1928 and 1929 in the absence of Sardar Kharak Singh. On 10 March 1928, the SGPC denounced the vindictive attitude of the government in keeping the Akali prisoners in jails, both in the province and the states for two and half years after the Sikh Gurdwaras Act. The SGPC congratulated the brave warriors of the Panth for maintaining its honour. Another resolution of 10 March recorded deep sympathies of the SGPC with the Maharaja of Nabha and his family over his removal to Kodai Kanal as a political prisoner, and his allowance being much reduced and his titles taken away. On 15 July 1928 the SGPC authorized its Executive Committee to organize a ‘Shahidi Day’ at Gurdwara Gangsar in honour of the martyrs of February 1923. The case of pension for Mai Kishan Kaur, who had done commendable services to the Panth during the Guru-kaBagh and the Jaito morchā, was entrusted to the Executive Committee. On 28 October 1928, the SGPC recorded its appreciation of the services of the Akali prisoners who remained faithful to their vow for the sake of the Panth’s honour.23

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Several resolutions related to the SGPC and its functioning. The local gurdwara committees were expected to pay a tenth of their income (daswandh) to the SGPC in January during the current financial year, which created difficulties of several kinds. On 10 March 1928, it was resolved that the daswandh due for the past year should be entered in the accounts of the current year. It was also resolved that gurdwara committees should give preference to competent Singhs of the backward classes in their service. Teja Singh Bhuchar (who had been declared tankhāhiā for starting kār-sevā in 1923 before it was initiated formally by the panj-piārās) was forgiven in view of his services to the Panth during the Akali movement. On 15 July 1928, it was resolved to forge a reasonable agreement with the other party in a dispute related to gurdwaras other than the historic gurdwaras in order to reduce the number of court cases. Since there was no such provision in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, efforts should be made for its amendment. It was also resolved that since the management of the Darbar Sahib (p.156) was linked up with that of the Akal Takht, the local committee for the Darbar Sahib may act as a sub-committee for general supervision of the Akal Takht. Through another resolution, separate oaths were approved for Keshdhārī and Sahajdhārī candidates for membership of the SGPC. A resolution of 28 October 1928 expressed great resentment of the SGPC against those newspapers which were creating tension between the Sikhs and the Hindus.24 By far the most important religious concern of the SGPC in 1928 was the way in which Babu Teja Singh of the Panch Khalsa Diwan of Bhasaur and his wife, Bibi Niranjan Kaur, had treated the Sikh scripture. The convenor of a committee appointed by the SGPC to investigate into this matter, Jathedar Teja Singh, reported that Bibi Niranjan Kaur, Principal of the Khalsa Girls College at Bhasaur, had published in 1922 the bāṇī of Guru Granth Sahib in five parts and the last part contained bāṇī from the Dasam Granth, without the ‘Rag Mala’. One opinion in the meeting of the SGPC was that the attitude of the Panch Khalsa Diwan indicated indifference to any proposal of talks and it was necessary, therefore, that action in this matter should not be delayed. It was resolved that a special meeting of the SGPC be held on 30 March, to which the President may invite some learned members of the Panth.25 Seven responsible members of the Panch Khalsa Diwan, along with Giani Nahar Singh (of Gujranwala), editor of the Aslī Kaumī Dard, were invited for the special meeting of the SGPC held on 31 March 1928. Apart from sixty-six members of the SGPC and Giani Nahar Singh, eleven members of the Gurmat Rahu-Riti Committee came for the meeting. However, only three members of the Panch Khalsa Diwan chose to come, all connected with the press. The four others who did not come were actually more important for the occasion: Babu Teja Singh, Bibi Niranjan Kaur Giani, Subedar Gurdit Singh (Jathedar, Panch Khalsa Diwan), and Bhai Harchand Singh (granthī, Gurdwara Sahib Panch Khand, Bhasaur). The grave faults established against the Panch Khalsa Diwan were: (a) breaking up the bāṇī and Guru Granth Sahib into parts, (b) replacing ‘Bhagauti’ by ‘Satnam’ Page 9 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence in the daily ardās, (c) writing ‘Vahuguru’ instead of ‘Vaheguru’, and (d) using no sugar in the water for preparing amrit. There was a general opinion that Babu Teja Singh should be excommunicated. One member reminded them, however, that the people of the Panch Khalsa Diwan were ‘our brothers’. They should be given another opportunity to explain their position. A sub-committee was formed to go into this matter and report within three months. It was also resolved that after receiving the report a special meeting of the SGPC may be held before the end of July.26 The final decision in this matter was taken in the general body meeting of the SGPC on 15 July 1928. Master Tara Singh was in the chair when Sardar Kharak Singh appeared ‘suddenly’ and presided over the rest of the proceedings. Master Tara Singh himself presented the proposals of the sub-committee for approval by the SGPC. The changes made by the Panch Khalsa Diwan in the bāṇī and the Guru Granth Sahib were viewed as a grievous injury to the Sikh faith and a dangerous threat to the distinctive character of gurbāṇī. The SGPC came to the conclusion that the Panch Khalsa Diwan had infringed the norms of Gurmat, Sikh ardās, and amrit maryādā. Babu Teja Singh and Bibi Niranjan Kaur were excommunicated, and ardās on behalf of the other members at any Takht or gurdwara was (p.157) forbidden. Sardar Bahadur Sardar Mehtab Singh got it recorded that this punishment was too harsh.27 In the meeting of the SGPC on 28 October 1928, Sardar Kharak Singh and Master Tara Singh were elected President and Vice-President, respectively, for the year 1929. On 1 November 1929, they were elected for the year 1930.

Agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala In August 1925, Daya Kishan Kaul, Prime Minister of the Patiala state, wrote to Colonel St. John, Agent to the Governor General, that one chapter of Akali history could be taken as closed with the passing of the Gurdwaras Bill. This, he thought, was an appropriate occasion for bringing to the notice of the Government of India the services rendered by the Patiala state in combating ‘the Akali menace’. Therefore, he sent a note for due recognition of the services rendered by Patiala. After giving the detail of services, Kaul summed up that His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala and his government had fully maintained their established tradition of their wholehearted co-operation with and loyal assistance to the British Government during the last troublesome decade of Punjab’s history, especially in connection with the anarchist and extremist movements among the Sikhs. The role of the Maharaja of Patiala was presented as a contrast with the role of the Maharaja of Nabha, who supported all these movements morally and financially: the Ghadar conspiracy of 1914, the political agitation of 1917, the seditious activities of 1919, the attacks on Khalsa College in 1920 and 1923, the Akali movement as a whole, and the Babbar Akalis. It was

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence added that the Maharaja of Patiala was unpopular among the extremists in the Punjab and within the Patiala state due to his services to the British Empire.28 In consonance with his collaborative attitude, the Maharaja of Patiala took action against Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala immediately on his release from the Lahore jail in September 1926. According to his biographer, his village, Thikriwala, was in the Patiala state. But he had come under the influence of the Singh Sabha movement and become active in its programmes. In sympathy with the Jallianwala Bagh martyrs in 1919, Sardar Sewa Singh had arranged five Akhand Pāṭhs. In 1921 he took a jathā of twenty volunteers to Nankana Sahib after the tragedy earlier in 1921. He took another jathā to Amritsar for the Guruka-Bagh morchā in 1922. With a jathā of 100 Singhs he took over the gurdwara at Muktsar Sahib on behalf of the SGPC. Even more offensive to the Maharaja of Patiala was Sardar Sewa Singh’s sympathy for the Maharaja of Nabha. In October 1923, Sardar Sewa Singh was arrested by the Punjab police from Muktsar and brought to Patiala where Maharaja Bhupinder Singh tried unsuccessfully to dissuade him from having any connection with the Akalis. Sardar Sewa Singh was sent to the Punjab to join other Akali prisoners. After his unconditional release from Lahore he was arrested by the Patiala police and imprisoned in Patiala on false and flimsy charges.29 Master Tara Singh recalls in his Merī Yād that he and Sardar Mangal Singh had met the Maharaja of Patiala before the end of 1926 to request him that Sardar Sewa Singh be released, but he refused. Master Tara Singh asked him the reason for the refusal and he said that Sardar Sewa Singh had not tendered an apology. Master Tara Singh wanted to know his fault. The Maharaja said that (p. 158) he did not apologize when he was ordered to do so. The point at issue for him was the disobedience of his order, whether right or wrong. Master Tara Singh got the impression that the Maharaja wanted to demonstrate that he could oblige Sardar Sewa Singh to apologize whereas the British Government had failed to do so. The only alternative left for the Akalis was to arouse public opinion against the Maharaja.30 Master Tara Singh goes on to say that the Shiromani Akali Dal resolved to hold dīwāns to be addressed by Sardar Kharak Singh and other Akali leaders. A conference at the village Thikriwala was attended by a large number of people. Maharaja Bhupinder Singh had gone abroad and the state officials did not feel strong enough to check the agitation. Sardar Sewa Singh was elected President of the Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal. The Patiala police began to arrest people coming for meetings; everyone wearing a black turban was arrested and his property was confiscated. Many discarded the black turban and others left the state. Sardar Kharak Singh went to many places for meetings but no dīwān could actually be held. The agents of Patiala launched a propaganda through newspapers and pamphlets against the Akalis. An important Akali leader defected and went over to Patiala, though he himself had been a party to the Page 11 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence resolution, and had attended the early dīwāns. He gave a statement against the morchā, and the morchā ended in a complete failure.31 Master Tara Singh’s account is substantiated by the historian of the Praja Mandal movement. The Akalis had started the campaign with a tour by Sardar Kharak Singh who was at the height of his popularity in early 1928. He addressed a number of dīwāns (conferences). The one held at village Thikriwala on 24–26 June 1928 was addressed by Jaswant Singh Danewalia. The Maharaja of Patiala was abroad and the Patiala administration did not take any decisive action. Sardar Kharak Singh addressed a gathering in the heart of the Patiala city. Formation of the Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal was announced at a big rally at Mansa on 17 July 1928, and Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala was elected its President, with Bhagwan Singh Longowalia as its General Secretary, both in absentia. Sardar Kharak Singh denounced the misdeeds of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh of Patiala. The Mansa conference provided the guidelines for the new movement, with its objectives close to the aims of the All India States’ People’s Conference.32 On 29 July 1928, Maharaja Bhupinder Singh wrote a letter from London for his Ministers to deal with the Akalis and ‘extremist agitators with a firm grip’. The Akali newspapers had become active in support of the release of Sardar Sewa Singh. Some of the political workers, who had supported Maharaja Ripudaman Singh earlier, became articulate against Patiala. Paid journalists, and a few Akali leaders, entered the fray on behalf of Patiala. In addition to the police, the state forces were used by the Patiala authorities to suppress the agitation. Properties of all persons associated with the tours of Sardar Kharak Singh were confiscated. Nobody was allowed to bring provisions for the Akalis. The entry of Akali newspapers was banned and press correspondents were turned out of the state. In Patiala this time, Kharak Singh passed through deserted streets. No one came to hear him. Master Tara Singh did not actively associate himself with this tour but continued to support the movement against Patiala.33 Interestingly, Sardar Mehtab Singh was advising the Patiala authorities on how (p.159) to deal with the Akalis. Kartar Singh Diwana and Kartar Singh Jhabbar were active in support of Patiala. At this juncture, according of Master Tara Singh, the Akali leaders decided to silence the press propaganda against them. A meeting of the Panth was held at the Akal Takht. A statement was read out on behalf of Sardar Kharak Singh as President in which an appeal was made to the Maharaja to release the Akalis and restore their properties. The intention of the Akali leaders was simply to read out this appeal and not to discuss it in the meeting. But there was a strong reaction from the people and Sardar Kharak Singh allowed the proposition to be discussed. Every speaker rejected the idea of an appeal to the Maharaja of Patiala who, it was feared, would become all the more arrogant. Master Tara Singh shared this view but his idea was to expose the Maharaja. He appealed to Page 12 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence the critics of the proposal to give him a month and, if nothing came out of the attempt, he alone would be held responsible for the failure. In the absence of any alternative line of action, his proposition was accepted.34 For a month and a half, there was no response from the Maharaja to the appeal made by the Panth. The Akalis turned against the Maharaja, and his supporters became indifferent. Master Tara Singh was anxious that the Akalis of the Patiala state should not mistrust him. Sardar Sewa Singh, the only Akali of the state who had full trust in Master Tara Singh, was in jail, but he sent a message to all the Akalis of the state to have confidence in Master Tara Singh. Their trust in Master Tara Singh and the attitude of the Maharaja of Patiala put an end to the propaganda against the Akalis. As the editor of the Akālī and the Akālī te Pardesī, Master Tara Singh now used his pen against Maharaja Bhupinder Singh. At the risk of imprisonment, Master Tara Singh began to expose the ‘dark deeds’ and grinding oppression of the Maharaja. Till then, journalists had been afraid of Indian princes. It was far easier to write against the British Government than against an Indian prince. The princes could devise devious ways of harming their critics. Master Tara Singh’s fearless and open challenge to the Maharaja to sue him in court created a great stir to embolden the state’s people.35 The Akali leaders now demanded release of not only Sewa Singh but also the Akali workers. Sardar Sewa Singh went on hunger strike on 25 May 1929. In August, some Akali leaders approached Pandit Motilal Nehru to raise the issue in the Central Assembly. Maharaja Bhupinder Singh now looked for a face-saving device. A statement drafted by Patiala officials was signed by Sardar Mehtab Singh, Giani Sher Singh, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia, Kartar Singh Diwana, and others, appealing for the Maharaja’s mercy for the release of Akali prisoners. The Maharaja ‘graciously’ issued a farmān on 23 August 1929. On the following day, Sewa Singh and over forty other Akalis were released.36 Master Tara Singh says that Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji was not released by the Maharaja of Patiala with the other prisoners, nor was his property restored. Master Tara Singh’s articles had changed the atmosphere and he continued to write. The All India States’ People’s Conference examined the charges levelled against the Maharaja by Master Tara Singh and published a report. On its basis the Government of India felt obliged to hold an enquiry. This kind of enquiry had never been instituted against any Indian ruler on the basis of a public agitation. But Master Tara Singh went to jail in connection with civil disobedience and the enquiry was boycotted (p.160) in his absence. According to Master Tara Singh, the Maharaja of Patiala had identified and used one of the Akali leaders as his agent for this purpose. None of the charges brought against him was proved even though he was guilty of those crimes.37

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Charges of ‘unmitigated oppression under the tyrannical and immoral regime of the Maharaja of Patiala’ were the subject of a memorandum submitted by a group of ten Patiala state subjects to the Viceroy, seeking the Maharaja’s removal in justice to the 1,500,000 people of the state. Among the specific charges of a personal nature were the Maharaja’s involvement in the murder of Sardar Lal Singh, the forcible detention of Sardar Amar Singh’s wife in the Maharaja’s palace, and the illegal arrest of Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji and confiscation of his property. A copy of the memorandum was submitted to the All India States’ People’s Conference. It became the principal subject of discussion at the Bombay session of the Conference in May 1929. An Enquiry Committee was constituted. It visited the Punjab in December. Its report was finalized at Poona in February 1930, holding the Maharaja guilty of most of the charges. The Maharaja was frightened. Invoking his past services to the empire, he managed to get J.A.O. Fitzpatrick, the AGG, appointed for the enquiry. He was known to be one of the most venal British officers. The All India States’ People’s Conference boycotted the enquiry conducted at Dalhousie in the summer of 1930. Some of the topmost lawyers, headed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, were employed by the Maharaja to give the impression that he took the allegations very seriously. However, the result of the enquiry was a foregone conclusion: complete exoneration of the Maharaja. Ironically, Fitzpatrick recommended stringent action against the Maharaja of Nabha for orchestrating the demand for enquiry. Its only positive achievement was the release of Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji from the Patiala jail. Maharaja Bhupinder Singh had managed with some difficulty to persuade the Sardar to accept a face-saving device for the Maharaja.38

Master Tara Singh Rejects the Nehru Report The Nehru Report makes no mention of Master Tara Singh. His contemporary biographer, Durlab Singh, states, however, that Srinivas Iyengar, President of the Gauhati Congress, was keen to evolve a formula for Hindu–Muslim unity. Master Tara Singh and Sardar Mangal Singh welcomed him when he came to the Punjab. Master Tara Singh assured him that the Sikhs were unlikely to demand separate electorates in the Punjab if joint electorates were introduced throughout India with reservation of seats for minorities. Master Tara Singh was present at the Madras Congress in 1927 as a member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), and he pointed out that the communal formula evolved by its Working Committee and the AICC included ‘reciprocal concessions’ in addition to joint electorates and reservation of seats on the basis of population. But the Sikhs were not in majority even in the Punjab. Therefore, they needed ‘one-sided concessions’ as a minority. According to Sardar Mangal Singh, Master Tara Singh succeeded in getting a new clause added to the resolution: ‘When the question of reservation of seats in the Punjab will be taken up the case of the Sikhs will be considered as that of an important minority.’39

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Sardar Mangal Singh, General Secretary of the Central Sikh League, was elected as a member of the Committee formed at the (p.161) All-Parties Conference in Bombay on 19 May 1928 ‘to consider and determine the principles of the Constitution for India’. The report prepared by this Committee, generally called the Nehru Committee because Pandit Motilal Nehru was its Chairman, enunciated that ‘the communal problem of India is primarily the Hindu–Muslim problem’. However, the Sikhs in the Punjab were ‘an important and wellknit minority which cannot be ignored’. But, essentially, the problem was ‘how to adjust the differences between the Hindus and Muslims’. In its political aspect, the communal problem resolved itself into the question of electorates, reservation of seats, separation of Sind, and the form of government in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan) and Baluchistan. Actually, the Committee remarked that neither Hindus nor Muslims needed ‘communal protection’; rather it was necessary for ‘the small communities which together form 10 per cent of the total’. The communal problem could be solved, therefore, by giving ‘the fullest religious liberty’ and ‘cultural autonomy’ to all religious communities.40 Whereas Muslims were insistent on reservation of seats for the Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League were equally strongly opposed to it. The Committee had no doubt that ‘proportional representation will in future be the solution of our problem’. In an informal meeting on 7 July 1928, it was resolved by the Committee: ‘We are unanimously opposed to the reservation of seats in the legislatures either for majorities or minorities and we recommend that no such reservation should be provided for in the constitution.’ Sardar Mangal Singh agreed to this proposition. However, the resolution went on to add: But if this recommendation is not accepted and an agreement can be arrived at only on a reservation of seats on the population basis we recommend that such reservation be made for majorities or minorities without any weightage and with a clear provision that it shall automatically cease at the expiry of ten years or earlier by the consent of the parties concerned. This was not acceptable to Sardar Mangal Singh. He wrote in his note that he was very strongly opposed to the creation of statutory communal majorities on population basis. Therefore, he recommended that the Sikhs as an important minority should be given representation far in excess of their numbers.41 Finally, the Nehru Committee recommended reservation of seats, when demanded, for Muslim minorities in strict proportion to their population with the right to contest additional seats for a fixed period of ten years. The Committee recommended the same concession for the non-Muslim minorities in the NWFP and Baluchistan. These recommendations left the Sikhs high and dry. The Page 15 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Committee provided an explanation. The Sikhs deserved special consideration as a distinct and important minority and the Committee gave its best consideration to the views expressed by Sardar Mangal Singh on behalf of the Sikhs. He had shown ‘an admirable spirit of self-sacrifice’ to give up ‘communal advantages in the general interest of the country’. The Sikhs stood for joint electorates with no reservation for any community, even though they were subject to all the disadvantages of a minority in a joint mixed electorate based on wide adult suffrage recommended by the Committee. Though they had a strong case for reservations, there was another ‘very potent factor to be taken into account’: the presence of a strong Hindu minority in the Punjab. Thus, the Punjab (p.162) problem assumed an all-India importance. The only way to avoid complications and to give full play to the forces of nationalism was ‘to eradicate the virus of communalism from the body politic of the Punjab’. Sardar Mangal Singh fully realized the difficulty of the Committee, and ‘voluntarily’ gave up all claims with the sole object of preventing an impasse. The Committee appreciated this spirit and congratulated the Sikhs for their patriotic resolve.42 In this specious argument Sardar Mangal Singh’s acquiescence is presented as the patriotic resolve of the Sikhs to sacrifice their own interests in national interest. Apart from the fact that Sardar Mangal Singh had no authority to decide on behalf of the Sikhs, it is not clear how national interest could be served by sacrificing the interest of a minority. In any case, there was no justification for asking the Sikhs alone to sacrifice their interests. With the Sikhs out of the way, it was easy to dismiss the claims of other minorities to reinforce the argument that the communal question was ‘essentially a Hindu–Muslim question’ and it had to be settled on that basis. Therefore, the Nehru Committee recommended that there would be joint mixed electorates throughout India and there would be no reservation of seats at the Centre except for Muslims of those provinces where they were in a minority and for non-Muslims in the NWFP, strictly according to their population, with the right to contest additional seats. There would be no reservation of seats for any community in the Punjab and Bengal Legislatures. In other provincial legislatures, there would be reservation for Muslim minorities on population basis with the right to contest additional seats, and in the NWFP there would be similar concessions for non-Muslims. All reservations were to end after ten years.43 Injustice to the Sikhs was built into this recommendation made in ‘national’ interests. Master Tara Singh reacted sharply to the report of the Nehru Committee published on 10 August 1928. He was the first Sikh, he says, to send a telegram of protest to Pandit Motilal Nehru. His telegram of 17 August 1928 simply said: ‘Regret Sikh rights have been overlooked by Nehru Committee Report.’44

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence In his editorial to the Akālī te Pardesī of 15 September 1928, Master Tara Singh wrote that faith was the dearest thing to the Sikhs because it was the basis of their nationality (kaum). Sikh dharam was created for the welfare of the peoples of the world and it could survive only through the Sikhs. To sacrifice the Sikh nation (kaum) for the sake of the country in the interest of those who were keen to destroy it was not only a mistake but also a great foolishness. The Muslims leaders were virtually demanding rāj of the Punjab. Their demand was unjust. ‘We are prepared to make sacrifice for the progress of the country but not to support injustice.’ To obviate injustice it was ‘either necessary to abolish communal electorates altogether or to give adequate weightage to the Sikhs as well’.45 Master Tara Singh reinforced the editorial soon afterwards by underscoring that it would be no sacrifice to accept the Nehru Report. A sacrifice could be justified only if it was made in the cause of justice, truth or faith, or for the sake of the oppressed, and not for injustice, falsehood, bad faith, or oppression. The Nehru Report was unjust to the Sikhs. Minorities were given some kind of protection in other provinces but in the Punjab the rule of the majority was sought to be perpetuated. This was patently unjust. Master Tara Singh was emphatic that Muslim leaders were bent upon injustice and, therefore, to (p.163) concede their demand was not sacrifice but cowardice.46 Master Tara Singh pointed out that it was wrong to say that there was no communal representation for the Punjab in the Nehru Report. The Muslims had accepted joint electorates on the condition of universal suffrage. The implication was very clear: Muslim domination in the Punjab. In the other provinces, communal representation was intact. In the Punjab, Muslim majority was ensured through the provision of universal suffrage. Some self-interested persons were claiming that the majority of the Sikhs were in favour of the Nehru Report. But actually the large majority of the Sikhs were opposed to the Nehru Report. The Chief Khalsa Diwan and the moderate Sikh parties had already expressed their opposition to the Report. The Central Sikh League, which was in the hands of the ‘nationalist’ Sikhs, was going to meet at Gujranwala for its annual session on 21–23 October 1928. Master Tara Singh declared that the Central Sikh League was going to protest against the Nehru Report in a forceful manner. He closed his article with the warning that if the Congress paid no heed to the Sikh concerns, some sections of the Sikhs would be alienated from the Congress.47 Finally, Master Tara Singh wrote an editorial in the Akālī te Pardesī of 19 December 1928 for the benefit of the Sikh representatives to the national convention to be held at Calcutta for considering the Nehru Report. He pointed out first of all that the loyalty of a couple of Sikh representatives, selected by the executive committee of the Central Sikh League, to the Panth was suspect. In any case, a great responsibility had been entrusted to the Sikh representatives Page 17 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence and it was incumbent upon them to safeguard Panthic interests. If these interests were not safeguarded, it should not be because of them but in spite of them. First, their arguments should be rational and convincing. Second, if communal representation was abolished altogether all over the country, they should support it. Third, in no case the domination of a majority in the Punjab was to be accepted. Fourth, if there was disagreement with the Congress, it should not be allowed to take a form that could be exploited by the bureaucracy. They could suggest postponement of the final decision on the points of disagreement. They should take their stand on the welfare of the country and the Panth.48 In order to appreciate Sikh opposition to the Nehru Report, it is necessary to keep in view the existing position in the Punjab. The voting strength of the three communities was not the same as their proportion in the total population. With a little over 55 per cent population, the Muslims had 44 per cent votes. With a little more than 11 per cent population, the Sikhs had 24 per cent votes. The Hindus had a voting strength nearly equal to their proportion in population; it was 32 per cent. The Nehru Committee’s recommendation of representation according to population reduced the Sikh voting strength to 11 per cent instead of 24, which in turn reduced the number of Sikh seats.49 Two opposing views had developed within the Akali Party in the Central Sikh League, one with Sardar Mangal Singh in favour of the Nehru Report and the other with Master Tara Singh against it. Giani Sher Singh, who was otherwise opposed to Master Tara Singh, also protested against the Nehru Report. A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Sikh League was held at the Sikh Missionary College, Amritsar. The two sides were balanced and Sardar Kharak Singh was neutral. After the speeches were made for and against the Nehru Report, Sardar Kharak (p.164) Singh turned against the Report, and Master Tara Singh’s side became stronger.50 Giani Sher Singh gives Punjabi translation of both the statements. The one, on behalf of the Punjabi Muslims, accepted the recommendations of the Nehru Report on the condition that all adult men and women should have the right to vote and each community should have the right to review the communal representation after ten years. The statement signed by Master Tara Singh and Giani Sher Singh accepted the recommendations of the Nehru Report on the condition that in the Punjab there should be proportional representation, proportional to the number of voters and not population. On 27 September 1928, Giani Sher Singh wrote again to clarify the Sikh position. He underlined that an unqualified acceptance of the recommendations of the Nehru Report would result in minimizing the number of Sikh members in the council, and that in no case would the Sikhs accept the principle of representation on the basis of population in the Punjab (which would mean statutory majority of Muslims in the

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Punjab Council).51 Giani Sher Singh pointed out the flaws in Professor Gurmukh Nihal Singh’s article in support of the Nehru Report.52 The Tribune of 7 October 1928 reported that Master Tara Singh was preparing for a showdown at the annual session of the Central Sikh League. He reiterated what he had said several times before that the Nehru Report had ignored Sikh interests. He was sure that the Sikhs were going to reject the Report at the Sikh League session scheduled to be held at Gujranwala on 22 October, even though the Central Sikh League was in the hands of the so-called nationalist Sikhs. Those who were claiming that ‘a considerable section of the Sikhs were in favour of the Nehru Report’ were bound to be disillusioned. The official resolution moved by Giani Sher Singh at the annual session was in favour of rejection of the Nehru Report which was ‘unjust and highly prejudicial to the interests of the community’. The Sikhs must have ‘at least 30 per cent of seats in the local legislature and the same proportion of representatives from the Punjab to the Central Legislatures of the country on the system of the joint electorate and plural constituencies so that one community may not be in a position to dominate over the others combined’.53 Sardar Amar Singh Jhabal suggested modifications in the Nehru Report: complete independence instead of dominion status as the goal, abolition of all communal representation, and joint electorates with no statutory reservation of seats. This did not change the basic position in the Punjab where virtual domination of Muslims was kept up. Speeches were made in favour of the amendment, but the amendment was defeated and the original resolution was passed. Sardar Kharak Singh lent his weight to the resolution by the threat that he would ‘cease to be a member of the Sikh League if Nehru Report was not rejected’. Master Tara Singh had his way. The Tribune commented that the position now adopted by the Central Sikh League was ‘fundamentally different from its past position’.54 The Central Sikh League was no longer under Sardar Mangal Singh when it was invited to the National Convention in Calcutta at the time of the Congress session in December 1928. However, Mangal Singh and Sardul Singh Caveeshar, being closest to the Congress leadership, were also invited. What was more surprising, the Nāmdhārīs, who were opposed to the Akalis, were also asked to send their representatives. Master (p.165) Tara Singh, Sardar Harnam Singh, and Giani Sher Singh reached Calcutta on 22 December to represent the Central Sikh League at the National Convention. They met Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Pandit Motilal Nehru. During the talks, Malaviya said that the Muslim leaders could be persuaded to accept reservations for the Sikhs in the Punjab on the basis of their population, but not 30 per cent seats. The Sikh representatives argued that in 1916 such concessions were given to the Muslims in the provinces, like Bihar and Madras. Now the Muslims were willing to relinquish the earlier concessions only because they had got much more. But the Page 19 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Sikhs were being asked to accept even less than what they actually had. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya had no answer.55 On 23 December, Sardar Mehtab Singh also reached Calcutta and all the four Sikh leaders met Mahatma Gandhi. He asked if a special representation was given to the Sikhs then why not to Christians and Parsis. They said that they had no objection to a special representation given to them in the Punjab (they were less than 2 per cent). The rest of the seats could then be divided among the Sikhs, the Hindus, and the Muslims in the ratio of 30, 30, and 40 per cent respectively. The Sikh leaders added that only they were being asked to discard the principle of communal representation and not the Muslims. Mahatma Gandhi said that Hindus and Muslims regarded each other as enemies. Did the Sikhs perceive such enmity? They replied that in the given situation there was a threat to them from both Hindus and Muslims. Whether an arbitrator was acceptable to the Sikhs was the next question. The Sikh leaders said they had not been authorized to accept or to reject such a proposition. The talks with Mahatma Gandhi ended there. On 27 December 1928, Master Tara Singh, Sardar Mehtab Singh, Giani Sher Singh, and Sardar Harnam Singh participated in the meeting of the subcommittee. The demands of the Muslim leaders were taken up first. Jinnah left the meeting before the Sikh demands were taken up as if he had no concern with the Sikh demands. The Sikh leaders presented all the arguments in support of their demand for 30 per cent seats. Mahatma Gandhi asked the Muslim leaders present to give the same rights to the Sikhs in the Punjab as had been given to other minorities. The Muslim leaders said that they were not prepared to consider such a demand even though they were ‘nationalists’. They were keen that Muslim majority in the Punjab Council should not be affected in any way. The Sikh leaders were not prepared to have less than 30 per cent representation. On 28 December, Jinnah came up with some new demands and one of his demands was accepted. It was meant to ensure that no constitutional change could be made subsequently without the consent of Muslim members. When the demand of the Punjab Muslims for 55 per cent representation, or adult suffrage, was taken up, Jinnah made a speech, underlining the importance of the satisfaction of a minority. His arguments were equally applicable to the Sikhs. But he ended his speech with the advice to his Sikh friends to remember that the question in India was how to work out an understanding between Hindus and Muslims. The Sikh question, therefore, called for no special consideration. Sardar Mehtab Singh made a strong speech that either communal representation should be abolished altogether or the Sikh demand should be conceded. On 30 December 1928, Sardar Mehtab Singh proposed an amendment that communal representation should be discarded (p.166) and the Nehru Committee should modify its recommendations accordingly. The President ruled Page 20 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence that this amendment was out of order. Sardar Harnam Singh read a statement in which all the arguments for 30 per cent representation for the Sikhs were given. With no hope of justice, he said, the Sikhs rejected the Nehru Report and would not take part in the Convention anymore and they would walk out in protest. In the absence of the Sikh leaders, Ralia Ram, a Christian representative from the Punjab, proposed the amendment that the Sikhs should be given separate representation like the other minorities. Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya said that injustice had been done to the Sikhs but they should not have made an issue of it. Pandit Motilal Nehru opposed the proposal vehemently. Even so, it was defeated by only six votes. Pandit Motilal Nehru’s speech at the Convention on 30 December was published in the Amrit Bazār Patrikā of 31 December 1928. The reason for the rejection of the Sikh demand given in the reported speech was disagreement among the Sikhs on the question of Sikh rights. Giani Sher Singh wrote to Motilal Nehru that he should go to any part of the Punjab to see how many Sikhs supported the Nehru Report and whether or not they accepted the decision of the Central Sikh League. He added that the Nehru Report itself contained the statement that the Sikhs would suffer a loss due to the constitution proposed by the Nehru Committee. He referred also to the Congress resorting to ‘divide and rule’. Pandit Motilal wrote to Giani Sher Singh on 8 January 1929 that his speech was either misrepresented or misunderstood: he had never said that the Sikhs were not united in their demand. What he had said was that, whereas there were only Hindus and Muslims in the other provinces, there were Sikhs in the Punjab as the third party. Therefore, the principle evolved for the other provinces could not be applied to the Punjab. He went on to add that weightage given to the Muslim minorities in the other provinces did not reduce the Hindu majority into a minority but weightage conceded to the Sikhs now in the Punjab would reduce the Muslim majority into a minority. Motilal Nehru denied that there was any admission in the Report about the Sikhs suffering a loss. The Sikhs had to suffer a loss not because there was anything wrong with the recommendations of the Nehru Committee but due to ‘natural’ causes, their peculiar position. He could not see any reason for Giani Sher Singh’s reference to the Congress following the policy of ‘divide and rule’ in relation to the Sikhs. He warned the Sikh League in all seriousness that its attitude would not help the Sikhs in any way, and said that he would be very happy to help the Sikhs if they were prepared to accept reservations on the basis of population.56 Giani Sher Singh wrote to Pandit Motilal that his letter clarified that his speech was inaccurately reported in the newspaper. His statement about a majority not being reduced to minority was factually correct but it was not clear why it was necessary to maintain a marginal Muslim majority in the Punjab. Furthermore, why was it not enough for the Muslims in the Punjab to have a majority in comparison with each of the other two communities? Even with a weightage to the Sikhs and proportional representation to the Hindus, the Muslims would Page 21 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence remain the majority community. Had the Nehru Committee recommended 30 per cent seats for the Sikhs, 30 per cent for the Hindus, and 40 per cent for the Muslims, would the Sikhs have suffered due to ‘natural causes’? (The causes were historical and not natural.) (p.167) Giani Sher Singh added that the Central Sikh League would be happy to discuss matters with Nehru and other respectable leaders of the country, but would not participate in any formal committee or conference so long as it was not recognized that the Sikhs needed a special representation as a respectable community in India. About the policy of ‘divide and rule’, Giani Sher Singh mentioned the congratulatory telegrams sent to those Sikhs who had supported the Report and the invitation sent to the Nāmdhārīs, a small sect of the Sikhs which had stood in opposition to the Sikh leaders for the past ten years. Not the attitude of the Central Sikh League but the solution of the communal problem recommended by the Nehru Committee would strengthen the hands of the government and lay the foundation of ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ rule. The Central Sikh League simply demanded justice. The National Convention had been adjourned sine die, without coming to any conclusion. The Congress leadership was divided sharply over the issue of Dominion Status versus ‘Complete Independence’. Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose stood for ‘Complete Independence’. The Congress came to a compromise. It resolved to adopt the Nehru Constitution if it was accepted ‘in its entirety by the British Parliament on or before the 31st December 1929’, but if it was not accepted by that date or rejected earlier, the Congress would organize a campaign of ‘non-violent non-cooperation’. While approving of the Report, Mahatma Gandhi recognized the injustice done to the Sikhs, but in his own way, remarking: ‘Personally I think we have not done full justice to the Sikhs.’57 The use of ‘full justice’ for ‘no justice’ is very remarkable. On their return from Calcutta the Sikh leaders organized a number of meetings against the Nehru Report as the ‘destroyer of Sikh rights’. Durlab Singh says that a group of reactionaries among the Sikhs exploited the Sikh resentment against the Nehru Report for detaching the Sikhs from the Congress. They gathered round Sardar Kharak Singh to din into his ears that the Congress leaders were not sympathetic to the Sikh minority. On the issue of the Nehru Report, he decided to boycott the Congress session scheduled to be held at Lahore in December 1929. Master Tara Singh, on the other hand, advocated no boycott of the Congress session but only rejection of the Nehru Report. Thus, there were now three camps among the Sikhs: an insignificant minority which approved of the Nehru Report; a group of Sikh aristocracy who stood for boycott of the Congress; and a large number of Akalis who disapproved of the Report but stood with the Congress in all other matters. This third group was led by Master Tara Singh.58 Indeed, Master Tara Singh was firm on the point that the Sikhs should fight for their rights remaining within the Congress and fighting for the freedom of the country.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence At the annual session of the Central Sikh League in October 1929 under the Presidentship of Master Tara Singh, the supporters of Baba Kharak Singh, who was adamant on boycott with the Congress, were in a minority, but they were more noisy and were supported by the ‘agents’ of the Maharaja of Patiala. The session ended in a disorderly scene without a clear decision on whether or not the Akalis should participate in the annual session of the Congress at Lahore in December 1929. Master Tara Singh says that he did not want to see the Akalis divided into two parties on the issue. (p.168) He met Sardar Kharak Singh at Sialkot and came to an understanding with him that, whatever the attitude of the Central Sikh League, he would be free to participate in the Congress session.59 The Congress leaders, especially Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Motilal Nehru, were keen that the Akalis should not boycott the Congress session at Lahore. The main resolution of the Congress was to be the goal of ‘complete independence’ and the Nehru Report was to lapse automatically. Mahatma Gandhi appealed to the Sikhs not to decide in favour of boycotting the Congress session. Before the session Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Motilal Nehru, and M.A. Ansari met Master Tara Singh, Sardar Kharak Singh, and other Sikh leaders to listen to their views. They assured the Sikh leaders that in future no solution would be acceptable to the Congress if it did not satisfy the Sikh and Muslim minorities. At the Congress session, then, a formal resolution was passed. According to a professional historian, this was a ‘tactical move’ to ensure Akali support for the civil disobedience movement.60 Indeed, it would be totally ignored by the Congress.

In Retrospect The issue over which the SGPC split at last was of the conditional release of Akali prisoners. Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh, who was President of the SGPC in October 1923 when the Akali leaders were arrested, was persuaded by the bureaucracy to accept the conditional release stipulated by the Punjab Governor, Malcolm Hailey, to cooperate with the government to implement the Gurdwaras Act. Towards the end of January 1926, over a score of Akali leaders in the Lahore Fort came out after accepting the condition of cooperation. Among them were Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh and Giani Sher Singh. Fifteen leaders refused to accept conditional release. Among them were Sardar Teja Singh Samundri and Master Tara Singh. They were not released. On 31 January 1926, Mehtab Singh was elected President of the SGPC with seventy-seven votes against forty-four for Bhag Singh Canadian who was supported by Sardar Mangal Singh. In view of the elections to the Central Board created by the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925, both the groups began to canvass support from public platforms and resolutions of local sangats. The Sardar Bahadur faction won only twenty-six seats and the Akali faction won eighty-five. In the first meeting of the new Central Board, held on 2 October 1926 under the Page 23 of 29

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence Presidentship of Mangal Singh, Sardar Kharak Singh was elected President and Master Tara Singh was elected Vice-President. The former was still in jail but Master Tara Singh was present in the meeting, having been released in September when the ban on the SGPC and the Akali Dals was lifted. The election of Master Tara Singh as Vice-President was a recognition of his services to the Sikh Panth from 1921 to 1925 and the stand he had taken on the issues of restoration of the Nabha ruler and conditional release of the Akali prisoners. The first resolution passed by the Central Board under his Chairmanship was to call itself by its initial name as Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, legitimizing its formation in 1920. As Vice-President of the SGPC from 1926 to 1929, Master Tara Singh remained far more active than its President, and presided over most of its meetings, and some important resolutions were passed during these years. One of these was for the release of the Akali (p.169) prisoners who were still in jail because of their refusal to accept the condition of release. The other resolutions dealt with reconciliation between the leaders of the two main groups, negotiated settlement with the non-Akali custodians of the Sikh Gurdwaras, informal understanding with the local committees of the gurdwaras under the decentralized SGPC, need of amendment in the Gurdwaras Act for an efficient and effective functioning of the SGPC, use of the Khalsa Sammat for recording the minutes of the meetings of the SGPC, removal of discrimination among the Sikhs on the basis of caste, formulation of a uniform rahit maryādā for all the Keshdhārī and Sahajdhārī Sikhs, publication of the Gurdwara Gazette, protesting against the unjust detention of Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha at Kodai Kanal, observation of the Shahidi Day at Gurdwara Gangsar for the martyrs of 1923, for providing pension to Mai Kishan Kaur in recognition of her commendable services to the Panth during the Guru-ka-Bagh and the Jaito morchā, and the excommunication of Babu Teja Singh Bhasaur and his wife, Bibi Niranjan Kaur. Elected as President of the SGPC in absentia in 1930, Master Tara Singh emerged as the foremost leader of the Sikhs. In the confrontation of the Akalis with Maharaja Bhupinder Singh of Patiala over the illegal and vindictive imprisonment of Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala in 1928–29, Master Tara Singh exposed the ‘dark deeds’ of the Maharaja to oblige him by August 1929 to issue a farmān for the release of Sewa Singh and over two scores of other Akali prisoners. Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji and some other prisoners were not released and Master Tara Singh continued to write till the All India States’ People’s Conference prepared a strongly worded ‘indictment’ against Patiala and demanded an official enquiry. In an enquiry conducted by the Agent to the Governor General stationed at Patiala, the Maharaja’s exoneration was a foregone conclusion. But Harchand Singh Jeji was released in the process and his confiscated property was restored. Master Tara Singh felt gratified that for the first time the government was obliged by public opinion to conduct an

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence enquiry against a Maharaja, and that too the Maharaja of Patiala, who was known to be the staunchest collaborator of the British. In 1928–29, Master Tara Singh took a bold stand against the Nehru Report. The primary concern of the Motilal Nehru Committee was to reconcile Hindu and Muslim interests for framing a ‘national constitution’. With this preoccupation, the Committee was prepared to sacrifice the interests of the other minorities, most notably the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh firmly believed that to ask one minority to make sacrifice in the interest of another was fundamentally unjust, and to invoke the larger interests of the country in its justification was ethically wrong. ‘We are prepared to make sacrifice for the progress of the country’, he declared, ‘but not to support injustice.’ He pointed out that the Muslims had accepted joint electorates on the condition of universal suffrage, which ensured statutory majority of Muslims in the Punjab Legislature. He made it clear that if communal representation was abolished altogether all over the country, the Sikhs would support it. The Nehru Report was rejected by the Central Sikh League even though it was regarded as an organization of ‘nationalist’ Sikhs. Sardar Kharak Singh favoured rejection of the Nehru Report and boycott of the Congress session to be held at Lahore in 1929. Master Tara Singh, however, advocated cooperation with the Congress. He was firm on the point (p.170) that the Sikhs should fight for their rights but remain aligned with the Congress in the fight for the freedom of the country. There was no contradiction between his concern for the community and his concern for the country. At the Congress session at Lahore in December 1929, a formal resolution was passed to the effect that in future no solution would be acceptable to the Congress if it did not satisfy the Sikh and Muslim minorities. Satisfied with this resolution, Master Tara Singh was prepared to support the civil disobedience movement to be launched by Mahatma Gandhi, in accordance with a resolution of the Congress Working Committee. Notes:

(1.) Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, [1936] 1982), pp. 156–60. (2.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), p. 237. (3.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 261–4. On the boycott of the Simon Commission, Jinnah too was ‘as firm as a rock’: Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, [1984] 1988), p. 92. (4.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1989, reprint), pp. 264–6.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence (5.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 267–8. (6.) Gurharpal Singh, Communism in Punjab (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1994), pp. 40–52. (7.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Unionist Party 1923– 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), pp.65–7. K.C Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920– 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), pp. 61–7. See also Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Punjab 1897–1947 (New Delhi: ICHR, 1984), pp. 143–5. (8.) ‘All Parties Conference, 1928 (Nehru Committee Report)’, in Master Tara Singh, ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 198–204. (9.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999, reprint), p. 70. (10.) Sohan Singh Josh, Akālī Morchiān dā Itihās (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1972), pp. 430–3. (11.) Josh, Akālī Morchiān dā Itihās, pp. 433–6. (12.) Ganda Singh (ed.), Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement (Amritsar: SGPC, 1965), pp. 195–6. (13.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 199– 200. (14.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 200–3. (15.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 207–8. (16.) Josh, Akālī Morchiān dā Itihās, pp. 207–8. (17.) Shamsher Singh Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (1926–1976) (Amritsar: SGPC, 2003, reprint), pp. 47–53. (18.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 54–9. (19.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 70–1. (20.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 59–66. (21.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 66–70.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence (22.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 70–2. (23.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 73, 78, 84 (24.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 74–5, 78–9, 81–5. (25.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 72–3. (26.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 75–8. (27.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 79–81, 83, 85–6. (28.) Ganda Singh, Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement, pp. 174–89. (29.) Gurcharan Singh, Jīwan Sardar Sewā Singh Thikrīwāla (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1970), pp. 18–33. (30.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 71. (31.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 71–2. (32.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), pp. 53–9. (33.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 61–6. (34.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 72. (35.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 72–4. (36.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 67–74. (37.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 74. (38.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 88–95. A few sentences are based on archival evidence seen in the British Library, London. (39.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 48–9. (40.) ‘All Parties Conference, 1928’, pp. 204–5, 208–14.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence (41.) ‘All Parties Conference, 1928’, pp. 214–30. (42.) ‘All Parties Conference, 1928’, pp. 234–9. In fact, as S.S. Iyengar wrote to Dr M.A. Ansari, President of All-Parties Conference, even Sardar Mangal Singh was in favour of proportional representation. Mangal Singh was under constant pressure from the Congress leaders like Motilal Nehru and Dr Ansari to submit a unanimous report in view of the wider interests of the country. Motilal Nehru had written to all members of the Committee on this point. Therefore, Mangal Singh, as he wrote to Motilal Nehru on 9 September 1928, did not force the method of proportional representation to the ‘extent of wrecking the new constitution’. K.L. Tuteja, ‘The Sikhs and the Nehru Report’, PPP 15, part 1 (April 1981): 134–5 and nn. 41–6. (43.) ‘All Parties Conference, 1928’, p. 297. (44.) Tuteja, ‘The Sikhs and the Nehru Report’, 135 n. 49. (45.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Sikh kī Kurbānī kar sakde han’, in Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 61–2. (46.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Kurbānī keh Kairtā’, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 64–5. (47.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Nehru Report’, in Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 66–7. (48.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Central Sikh League de Kalkatte jāṇ wāliān Pratīnidhān pratī’, in Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 92–4. (49.) Tuteja, ‘The Sikhs and the Nehru Report’, 134–5 and nn. 41–6. (50.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 76. Giani Sher Singh had participated in the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow during 29–31 August 1928. As reported by Giani Sher Singh, the delegates from the Punjab met in a separate committee in which Congressmen like Lala Lajpat Rai and Dr Kitchlew opposed the Sikh demands on the plea that the Punjabi Hindus would also make such a demand. They were told that this was never done before and the argument was concocted now merely to oppose the Sikhs. Tej Bahadur Sapru, Sarojini Naidu, and Maulana Azad were participating in the Punjab committee meetings. The Punjabi Muslims were adamant that seats should be reserved for them on the basis of their population. At last in the forenoon of 31 August two statements were regarded as a compromise, one signed by non-Sikh Punjabis, with the exception of Sardul Singh Caveesher, and the other signed by Master Tara Singh and Giani Sher Singh. ‘Sarb Hind Sarb Party [Lucknow] Vich Conference: Sikh Swal Sanbandhi ki hoiya’, in Gurcharan Singh Giani, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988), pp. 43–4.

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Master Tara Singh’s Rise into Pre-eminence (51.) ‘Sarb Hind Sarb Party [Lucknow] Vich Conference: Sikh Sawāl Sanbandhi kī hoiyā’, pp. 45–6. ‘Nehru Report te Mein: Galat Fahimī dūr kar lao’, in Giani Sher Singh, pp. 46–9. (52.) ‘S. Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Professor, Hindu University dī Chitthī te us par vichār: Maujudā Hālāt anusār Kaunsalān vich Firkedār Pratīnidhtā dī Loṛ’, in Giani Sher Singh, pp. 49–58. (53.) The Tribune of 7, 24, and 26 October 1928, quoted in Sukhmani Bal Riar, The Politics and History of the Central Sikh League 1919–1929 (Chandigarh: Unistar, 2006), pp. 118–19. (54.) Bal-Rīar, The Politics and History of the Central Sikh League, pp. 119–22. (55.) For this and the following three paragraphs: Giani Sher Singh, ‘Kalkatte vich Sikh League de Pratīnidhān ne kī kītā? Hindu Leaderān da Watīrā kī sī?’, in Giani Sher Singh, pp. 59–63. (56.) For this and the following paragraphs: ‘Pandit Motilal Ji Nehru te Central Sikh League’, in Giani Sher Singh, pp. 63–8. (57.) K.L. Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40) (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984), pp. 146–7. (58.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 58–9. (59.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics, p. 147–8. (60.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics, pp. 147.

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (1930–6) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0008

Abstract and Keywords The Akalis joined the civil disobedience movement, and Master Tara Singh was arrested while leading an Akali jathā to Peshawar and sent to jail. The Communal Award of August 1932 recommended statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The leaders of Sikh parties formed the Khalsa Darbar to resist implementation of the Award. But the Akali leadership was soon divided. Master Tara Singh’s agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala in 1935 led to a compromise. Master Tara Singh took a firm stand against the Muslim leaders of the Shahidganj agitation. In 1936, he took serious interest in the Dalits of the south. Though unhappy with the neutrality of the Congress towards the Communal Award, he was willing to align with the Congress for the forthcoming elections of 1937. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, civil disobedience movement, Akali jathā to Peshawar, Communal Award, Khalsa Darbar, agitation against Patiala, Shahidganj agitation, Dalits of the south, Congress, elections of 1937

Master Tara Singh was deeply involved in the non-cooperation agitation and he was actually in jail when he was elected President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) unopposed in 1930. With great trust in Mahatma Gandhi he led a Sikh deputation to him in 1931 and presented a charter of seventeen demands with the request to represent the Sikhs at the Second Round Table Conference. On the announcement of the Communal Award in 1932, Page 1 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Master Tara Singh decided to oppose it and he tried to work out unity among the Sikhs. After initial success Master Tara Singh and Sardar Kharak Singh found it difficult to work together and the latter formed a separate Akali Dal of his own. The Congress was neutral towards the Communal Award and Master Tara Singh felt let down. On a request from the Gursewak Sabha he went into voluntary exile in the second half of 1934. On hearing of the death of Sewa Singh Thikriwala, he returned to the Punjab before the end of the year and started an agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala early in 1935. On the release of Akali prisoners he was reconciled with the Maharaja. But this was not appreciated by most of the leaders of the Akalis of the Sikh states. In 1936, Master Tara Singh took a firm stand in defence of the Shahidganj in Lahore against the Muslim agitators demanding its possession. He showed a serious concern for Dalits in close association with B.R. Ambedkar.

The Context Authorized to launch a programme of civil disobedience, the Working Committee of the Congress gave full powers to Mahatma (p.174) Gandhi in February 1930 to launch the movement at a time and place of his choice. On 12 March, Mahatma Gandhi started his twenty-four-day march through the villages of Gujarat to collect salt from the Dandi Beach in order to disobey the law. Civil disobedience was formally launched on 6 April 1930. Mahatma Gandhi was arrested, and the movement became a mass affair. The Simon Commission submitted its report in 1930. In July, the Viceroy reiterated the goal of Dominion Status and suggested a Round Table Conference. Held in London in November 1930, it was boycotted by the Congress. There was a general feeling that the Conference had little meaning without participation of the Congress. In January 1931, Mahatma Gandhi and all the members of the Congress Working Committee were released unconditionally. According to the Gandhi–Irwin Pact, signed on 5 March 1931, all political prisoners were to be immediately released and it was understood that the Congress would participate in the next Round Table Conference.1 Before he sailed from Bombay on 29 August 1931, Mahatma Gandhi had the premonition that he would return ‘empty handed’. This was exactly what happened. The British Government refused to concede independence and Mahatma Gandhi returned to India before the end of 1931. Soon afterwards the Labourite Ramsay Macdonald was heading the Cabinet dominated by the Conservatives, with the reactionary Samuel Hoare as the Secretary of State for India. The Congress Working Committee met on 29 December 1931, the day following Gandhi’s arrival, and decided to resume civil disobedience. On 4 January 1932, Mahatma Gandhi was arrested and a programme of repression was launched. The watchwords of the new official policy were no pact, no truce, and ‘no quarter for the enemy’. More than 80,000 satyāgrahis were arrested in the early months of 1932. After August, however, the movement began to decline Page 2 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader and it lingered on till it was suspended by Mahatma Gandhi on 20 May 1933 and formally withdrawn in April 1934.2 In the ‘Communal Award’ of 16 August 1932, separate electorates were retained and the Depressed Classes were declared to be a minority community, entitled to separate electorates. Mahatma Gandhi saw the Award as harmful to both Hinduism and the Depressed Classes. He went on a fast unto death on 20 September to enforce the demand that the representatives of the Depressed Classes should be elected by the general electorate. The political leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.C. Rajah, and B.R. Ambedkar hammered out an agreement, known as the Poona Pact, discarding the idea of separate electorates but increasing the number of seats reserved for the Depressed Classes from 71 to 147 in the Provincial Councils, with 18 per cent seats in the Central Legislature. For Mahatma Gandhi, the Depressed Classes and Hinduism were inseparable. He declared that Hinduism would die if untouchability lived and untouchability had to die if Hinduism was to live.3 A White Paper outlining the Constitution Act for India was issued in 1933 on the basis of the Communal Award and presented to the Legislative Councils for discussion. The Government of India Act of 1935 embodied reservations and separate electorates, Muslim majority in the Punjab, a considerable autonomy for the Provinces, and a system of Federation. Jinnah objected to the Federation part. The Act of 1935 was condemned by nearly all sections of Indian opinion. However, the (p.175) Congress, having won forty-five of the seventy-five seats for Indians in the elections to the Central Legislative Assembly in November 1934, eventually decided in favour of fighting elections to the Provincial Assemblies on the basis of the Act of 1935.4 In the Punjab, the activities of the Kirtī Kisan Party enabled the Congress to make some inroads into the political life of the rural areas of central Punjab, articulating the demands of the peasantry. The Kirtīs were regarded by the government as potentially more dangerous than the Naujawan Bharat Sabha with which they were closely linked. Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, and Rajguru were sentenced to be hanged, and the sentence was carried out on 23 March 1931. For a time, Bhagat Singh appeared to have become ‘the foremost political figure’ of India.5 The Naujawan Bharat Sabha and the Kirtī Kisan Party were proscribed. The Congress Socialist Party, founded in 1930, became the centre of activity for the Left leaders of the Punjab after 1934.6 The elections of 1930 were boycotted by the Congress and the Akalis. The elections were lacklustre: candidates for thirty-eight seats were returned unopposed. Only two parties were important: the Unionist Party, which won thirty-seven seats, and the Nationalist Progressive Party, which won twenty seats. The remaining fourteen seats were won by independent and other candidates. The Governor formed a non-party Ministry, with Firoz Khan Noon Page 3 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader and Sikander Hayat Khan from the Unionist Party, Gokul Chand Narang of the Nationalist Progressive Party, and Sardar Jogendra Singh, who did not belong to any party. The other important Sikh legislators were Ujjal Singh, Sampuran Singh, Buta Singh of Sheikhupura, and Narain Singh of Gujranwala. The influence of Sikander Hayat began to grow in the 1930s, weakening in proportion the hold of Fazl-i Husain.7 Response to civil disobedience in the Punjab during its first phase from 12 March 1930 to 5 March 1931 was quite enthusiastic. Out of 60,000 to 70,000 satyāgrahis arrested in India, the Punjab accounted for 7,000. In the second phase from 4 January 1932 to 8 May 1933, there was much less enthusiasm for taking out processions or observing haṛtāls to court arrest. The number of arrests was less than 4,200. In the third phase, from 1 August 1933 to the middle of May 1934, the movement was fizzling out. The Punjab Congress approved of suspension of the movement on 14 May. The number of arrests was less than 3,700. Muslim participation in the movement was less than 10 per cent.8

Master Tara Singh in Cooperation with the Congress Like the Congress, the Akalis celebrated 26 January 1930 as the Independence Day. The Tribune reported that a large number of Sikhs participated in the celebration in spite of the grievance of a section of the Akalis against the Congress. Sikh institutions in Amritsar hoisted the national flag. A number of Sikhs were arrested in the states of Patiala and Nabha for participating in the celebration.9 Master Tara Singh represented the Sikhs on a ‘war council’ formed in a conference of various political parties of the Punjab. On 9 March 1930, he persuaded the Shiromani Akal Dal to support the civil disobedience movement and 5,000 Akali volunteers were placed at his disposal. According to Master Tara Singh, out of 7,000 satyāgrahis convicted in the Punjab, 3,000 were Sikhs.10 Master Tara Singh led a jathā of 100 Akalis to Peshawar. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (p.176) had been arrested on 23 April 1930 for civil disobedience and taken to the police station in Peshawar. People flocked to the place. An accident led to firing from armoured cars in which, according to the official report, thirty persons were killed and thirty-three wounded, but the popular estimate was far higher. The people all over the country were indignant. Master Tara Singh made a declaration before a huge crowd in the Jallianwala Bagh on 9 May that the Sikhs would shed their blood in sympathy with the Pathans who had been killed. One hundred Akalis offered themselves to march to Peshawar to lay down their lives. As leader of the jathā, Master Tara Singh was arrested before it reached Lahore, and sent to the Gujrat Jail.11 At the time of the first Round Table Conference, from 12 November 1930 to 19 January 1931, Master Tara Singh was in jail. The Sikh organizations had boycotted the conference because there was no assurance on the objective of Page 4 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader self-government for India. On the insistence of the Sikh organizations, Ujjal Singh, who had been nominated by the government as a Sikh representative along with Sampuran Singh to the Round Table Conference, stood for 30 per cent representation for the Sikhs.12 Soon after the release of Master Tara Singh in March 1931, a meeting of the Central Sikh League had been held and it was decided to participate in the Round Table Conference, scheduled to be held from 17 September to 1 December 1931. A Sikh deputation under the leadership of Master Tara Singh met Mahatma Gandhi and presented a charter of seventeen demands. The most significant demand was that a communal balance should be created by reorganizing the Punjab province. The foremost concern of the Sikhs was to get rid of statutory Muslim majority. However, the Congress Working Committee evolved a different formula: reservation of seats on the basis of population, with the right to contest additional seats, for the Hindus in Sind, Muslims in Assam, Sikhs in the Punjab and the NWFP, and for the Hindus and Muslims in any other province where they were less than 25 per cent of the population. The All-Parties Sikh Conference rejected the proposal and reiterated the seventeen demands. Again, Ujjal Singh and Sampuran Singh were nominated by the government to represent the Sikhs at the second Round Table Conference.13 As the sole representative of the Congress, Mahatma Gandhi presented the Congress Working Committee formula to the Minorities Committee at the second Round Table Conference. But he did not press for it when he found that both Muslims and Sikhs were opposed to it. He wished that Dr Ansari and Master Tara Singh had been with him. He was prepared to endorse any reasonable scheme acceptable to the parties concerned. He was inclined to discuss the scheme put forth by Sir Geoffrey Corbett, Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, to attach the plain areas of the Ambala Division to the United Provinces. It was rejected by both Sikhs and Hindus, obviously because it would worsen their position. Ujjal Singh suggested that Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions, without Lyallpur and Montgomery districts, should be attached to the NWFP. The rest of the Punjab province then would have 43.3 per cent Muslims, 42 per cent Hindus, and 14.4 per cent Sikhs. There would be no need for reservation for any community. As it may be expected a priori, the Muslim representatives were strongly opposed to this suggestion. The Sikh representatives reverted to their old demand for 30 per cent reservations.14 Evidently, the Muslim leaders were keen to (p.177) ensure their political domination in the Punjab, and the Sikh leaders were equally keen to obviate such domination. After the second Round Table Conference, Mahatma Gandhi resumed civil disobedience in January 1932. Master Tara Singh was in jail. In its meeting held at Amritsar on 24 February, the Shiromani Akali Dal allowed its members to join the civil disobedience. The Akali press urged the Sikhs to take part in the Page 5 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader movement, and Sikh volunteers began to appear in the campaign. During the National week in April, a procession was taken out in Amritsar and a dīwān was held at Jallianwala Bagh to remind the people of the atrocities committed there by the British. Master Tara Singh was directly associated with this programme. His success in settling the Daska dispute enabled the Akalis to turn to civil disobedience.15 The Akalis boycotted the third Round Table Conference held in December 1932. The government sponsored Sardar Tara Singh of Moga as the Sikh representative. He was disowned by the Khalsa Darbar.

Master Tara Singh in Sikh Politics A resolution against Master Tara Singh had been proposed by Kartar Singh Diwana in a meeting of the SGPC in 1930, alleging that Master Tara Singh had supported Mahant Tirath Singh, a well-known opponent of Gurdwara Reform, in the election for the Nankana Sahib Gurdwara Committee. Master Tara Singh was presiding over the meeting and allowed the proposed resolution to be taken up because it related to him personally, even though it had been received late. The members who supported the resolution included Giani Sher Singh, and among its opponents was Sardar Amar Singh, editor of the Sher-i Punjab. Sardar Ujjal Singh was in favour of its withdrawal. It was defeated by forty-five votes against thirteen. On the other hand, the resolution against Sardar Mehtab Singh was passed by forty-one votes against eighteen, stating that (a) he had raised the question of caste interest in the elections of Gurdwara Committees, (b) started the Shiromani Gurdwara Akali Dal in opposition to the Shiromani Akali Dal in accordance with the wishes of the government, (c) harmed the Sikh Panth by joining hands with the Sudhar Party, the Patiala Party, and the newspapers which were defaming the selfless sevaks of the Panth, and (d) continued to support Kartar Singh Vakil’s candidature even though he was a known supporter of mahants. This was done despite Sardar Kharak Singh’s announcement that he would resign if Kartar Singh was elected to any Gurdwara Committee.16 In the general meeting on 9 June 1930, Sardar Kharak Singh was elected President of the SGPC and the matter of firing at Gurdwara Sisganj in Delhi was taken up. The report of the Enquiry Committee made it quite clear that the Delhi police had indulged in firing in a vindictive spirit on 6 May 1930 and infringed the sanctity of the sacred place by entering it with their shoes on. The SGPC expressed its resentment and anger over desecration of the gurdwara and its sympathy with those who had suffered due to the police action in any way. The new SGPC recorded its ‘appreciation’ for the last Executive Committee, especially the services of Master Tara Singh, for selfless services during the past three and a half years.17 On 31 August, Sardar Kharak Singh was in the chair when the SGPC approved of the programme chalked out by the Executive Committee on 9 July in connection with the Sisganj firing. He clarified that this programme had nothing to do with the civil (p.178) disobedience of the Congress, and made it absolutely clear Page 6 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader that he would not support the civil disobedience movement unless the Shiromani Akali Dal passed a resolution to the effect that the Sikhs would work under the Khalsa flag in service of the country so long as the Khalsa colour was not included in the national flag. On this condition, Sardar Kharak Singh withdrew his resignation.18 The Punjab Provincial Congress Committee had no objection to the Sikh colour being included in the national flag. K. Santanam wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President, on 15 October 1930 that the Sikh colour might be included in the national flag. Nehru replied promptly that the Congress had adopted the national flag by a resolution and the party flag had become the national flag. He denied that the colours of the flag represented different communities. He characterized the decision of the Punjab Congress as hasty and untimely. The Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim leaders in Gujrat Jail were also in favour of including the Sikh colour in the national flag but both Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru were opposed to it. Giani Sher Singh wrote on 1 November 1930: ‘We appreciate the dedication of the Nehrus, the father and the son, to the country and the sacrifices made by them, but we cannot help saying that they are making a grave mistake.’ He pointed out that Jawaharlal was factually wrong in saying that Mahatma Gandhi had given no promise to the Sikhs that he would replace the red colour by basanti, which the Sikhs now regarded as their symbolic colour. Giani Sher Singh added that Mahatma Gandhi’s earlier objection had been to the black colour suggested by the Sikhs because ‘black’ was associated with mourning. He had agreed to the inclusion of the Sikh colour in the national flag unfurled on 26 January 1930 by Sardar Kharak Singh at Sialkot on the invitation of the local Congress Committee. Jawaharlal Nehru’s contention that the colours in the national flag did not represent Hindu and Muslim communities was also wrong. His attitude indicated that he would never include the Sikh colour in the national flag. Giani Sher Singh feared that many Sikhs would leave the Congress on this account.19 In the meeting of the SGPC on 12 October 1930, presided over by Sardar Bhag Singh, Bhai Randhir Singh was congratulated on his release from jail after a long imprisonment for his support to the Ghadar Movement. The SGPC expressed its sympathy with the family of the eminent historian Sardar Karam Singh over his sad demise. By another resolution a sub-committee was formed to go into the beneficial and harmful results of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925, and to report within one month. On its receipt, a special meeting of the SGPC was to be held within twenty-five days. Master Tara Singh was elected President of the SGPC unopposed for no other name was proposed.20 The news of this honour was conveyed to Master Tara Singh in the jail at Gujrat. He was congratulated by the other leaders in jail, like M.A. Ansari, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Mufti Kifayatullah, and Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar.21 After 1930,

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Sardar Kharak Singh had little to do with the SGPC. It was to remain the foremost concern of Master Tara Singh for the rest of his life. After his release from jail in March 1931, Master Tara Singh got involved in the Daska morchā against his inclination. The dispute at Daska was between Hindus and Sikhs over the possession of shops which belonged to the gurdwara. The Sikhs had filed a suit but the court decided in favour of the Hindu occupants. The Sikhs regarded this decision as unfair. Without consulting the SGPC or (p. 179) the Akali Dal, Sardar Kharak Singh launched a morchā in August 1931. Some Sikh leaders expected Master Tara Singh to support him. Master Tara Singh clarified that he was never consulted and he had never spoken in favour of the morchā. Whatever his personal opinion, he would follow the decision taken by the Shiromani Akali Dal.22 He persuaded the Working Committee of the Akali Dal to take up the morchā and himself led a jathā in September. He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and sent again to the jail in Gujrat. Sardar Kharak Singh was also there. They both went on strike over the issue of jhatkā and were transferred to the Central Jail, Lahore. They had a frank talk and it was decided that each one would get confirmation from the other of the truth of a statement or an action attributed to one of them. Master Tara Singh was released earlier and he worked out an agreement with the Hindus about the Daska Gurdwara. Without speaking to Master Tara Singh, Sardar Kharak Singh began to denounce him and, on coming out of the jail, began to speak openly against Master Tara Singh in public meetings. ‘From that day’, says Master Tara Singh, ‘I have not consulted Baba Kharak Singh Ji on any issue.’ He had never consulted Master Tara Singh even earlier. Master Tara Singh goes on to add that democratic principles could not be sacrificed to appease a person aspiring to leadership without adequate support. Evidently, Sardar Kharak Singh had lost the majority support among the Akalis.23

Master Tara Singh in Opposition to the Communal Award In the report of the Simon Commission, submitted on 7 June 1930, it was stated that Sikh representation could not be reduced, but ‘it would be impossible to concede so large a percentage as 30 without doing injustice to the other communities in the province’. The report was not acceptable to the Sikhs. More serious was the probability of Muslims being given statutory majority. The SGPC passed a resolution on 6 March 1932 that the Sikhs would never accept statutory majority of a single community.24 About a month earlier than the announcement of the Communal Award on 16 August 1932, the news leaked out that Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald had decided to create majority for Muslims in the Punjab. A general meeting of the Sikhs was held on 24 July 1932 at the samādh of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at Lahore. Sir Jogendra Singh and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia were among the Sikh leaders who took a solemn vow in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib not to Page 8 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader accept any such award. Master Tara Singh had been ordered not to enter the municipal limits of Lahore but he could guide the move from Shahdara. Indeed, he was at the centre of this agitation.25 On 5 August, the dailies flashed the news that an understanding was being worked out at Simla between the Muslim and Sikh leaders. Giani Sher Singh received a telegram from Sir Sunder Singh to reach Simla on the coming Sunday. In the Civil and Military Gazette of 6 August appeared the news that Sir Jogendra Singh had sent a scheme to Sir Muhammad Iqbal in which 51 per cent of the total seats were to go to the Muslims. Giani Sher Singh wrote on 8 August: ‘No Sardar and no leader had the right to suggest going back on the vow taken by the Panth.’ The Sikhs could not accept a scheme of Muslim majority in the province.26 Master Tara Singh refers to a strong statement issued to the press by the Sikh (p.180) aristocrats who had joined the Sikh Parties Conference at the samādh of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and taken the vow along with the other Sikh leaders to oppose any award unduly favourable to Muslims. Then the Sikh aristocrats sent a message from Simla that an amicable agreement could be worked out with the Muslim leaders. When Master Tara Singh arrived in Simla he found that the aristocrats were actually backing out of the pledge. The newspapers in England carried the news that the Sikhs had accepted the Communal Award. Mounting opposition of the Sikhs was weakened by the talks of agreement and, subsequently, only constitutional opposition could be offered to the Communal Award.27 Macdonald’s Award confirmed the worst fears of the Sikhs. It created a statutory Muslim majority with eighty-six seats for them against seventy-five seats for both Hindus and Sikhs.28 On 25 September, the Sikhs assembled at the Akal Takht and decided to set up a new organization called Khalsa Darbar to thwart implementation of the Communal Award.29 Master Tara Singh participated in the Unity Conference organized by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and Maulana Shaukat Ali at Allahabad on 3 November 1932. The Sikh representatives agreed to accept statutory majority of Muslims in the Punjab with joint electorates and adequate safeguards for the Sikhs. In Master Tara Singh’s view, the proposed settlement was not satisfactory from the Sikh or the national perspective but it was better than the Communal Award because the statutory majority of Muslims in the proposed scheme had little scope for tyranny and oppression. The Unity Conference was close to success when Sir Samuel Hoare declared in the House of Commons that 33.5 per cent seats would be given to the Muslims in the Central Legislature, and Sind would be made a separate province. The Muslim leaders withdrew their support to the Unity Conference, and it failed in its objective.30

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader On 27 November 1932, the SGPC passed a resolution against the Communal Award given by the British Government. It was not only an embodiment of injustice and a strong obstacle to the freedom of the country but also dangerous for the religious minorities because it could establish the dominance of the majority community. The Sikhs and the Sikh faith would not be safe under Muslim political domination. Therefore, the SGPC as the supreme religious body of the Sikhs had come to the conclusion that it regarded the Award as extremely harmful for the Panth and appealed to every Sikh to make all possible effort to nullify the Award.31 In March 1933, the White Paper confirmed the Communal Award. Giani Sher Singh called it ‘a bundle of unjust provisions’. His analysis was meant to show that the pro-government members would dominate the Central Legislature.32 Presiding over the SGPC meeting on 8 April 1933, Sardar Mangal Singh stated that the Sikh Panth had shown its trust in the Akali Dal by ensuring its majority in the SGPC for the third time.33 On 17 June 1933, the SGPC, under the presidentship of Jamadar Partap Singh, resolved to place on record its considered opinion that ‘any constitution based on the Communal Award will be entirely unacceptable to the Sikh community and reiterates the determination of the Panth not to submit to any such constitution’.34 According to Master Tara Singh, the Sikh situation went on deteriorating. The Khalsa Darbar could not function as a unit. The Akalis and the Sardar Bahadur party began to hold separate meetings.35 Sardar Kharak Singh left the (p.181) Khalsa Darbar with his supporters. In September 1933, Giani Sher Singh, Sardar Amar Singh, and Harbans Singh Seistani walked out of a meeting of the Khalsa Darbar. Soon afterwards, the Central Akali Dal was formed as an organization parallel to the Shiromani Akali Dal, with Sardar Kharak Singh as its President. On 16 October 1933, the Khalsa Darbar and the Central Sikh League passed a joint resolution pressing for revocation of the Communal Award.36 On 10 March 1934, the SGPC expressed its complete confidence in the Shiromani Akali Dal which had served the Sikh Panth in accordance with the Sikh tradition and made great sacrifices since the very beginning of the Gurdwara Reform Movement. To set up another organization parallel to the Shiromani Akali Dal was to hit Panthic interests and organization. In another resolution the SGPC expressed the view that to regard any person as ‘the dictator’ of the Sikh Panth was to infringe the principles of Gurmat and democracy. Those who declared Sardar Kharak Singh as ‘dictator’ of the Panth had tarnished the glory of Sikh faith.37 On 28 March 1934, Giani Sher Singh denounced what he called the ‘communal reward’. Characterizing the unilateral decision of the British Prime Minister as the greatest ‘constitutional injustice’ in history, Giani Sher Singh said that the Muslims in the Punjab and the Europeans in Bengal were ‘rewarded’ to prolong British rule in India. The Sikhs were divided among themselves, but Giani Sher Singh hoped that ‘our Jathedar’ (Sardar Kharak Singh) would get this unjust decision undone. The Page 10 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Central Akali Dal would lead the Sikhs in their struggle against this unprincipled dispensation.38 The Sikh legislators tried to work out a compromise with the Muslim leaders. It was reported in The Tribune in April–May 1933 that Sardar Jogendra Singh and Sir Fazl-i Husain had agreed to have joint electorate with reservation of seats for the various committees on the basis of the Communal Award. Some of the Sikh leaders and Gokul Chand Narang and Narendra Nath welcomed the agreement. Sardar Harbans Singh, a Sikh legislator, made the statement that the majority community could not be denied their legitimate right, and the introduction of joint electorates would ensure that the persons elected were ‘broad-minded and progressive in their outlook’. Master Tara Singh reacted sharply against this statement. He denied that joint electorates was a basic demand of the Sikhs. The Executive Committee of the Khalsa Darbar also rejected the settlement.39 The letters of Sir Fazl-i Husain provide more detail of the efforts of Sardar Jogendra Singh. Fazl-i Husain had told Chaudhari Shahabuddin that Sardar Jogendra Singh should first have a talk with ‘his own moderate friends’ and then with the SGPC people who claimed to represent the Sikhs. It was necessary to have the Sikh community behind this idea. ‘If the extremist Sikhs find that Jogendra Singh and I have evolved this plan, they are bound to condemn it at the very start; but if they feel that they have evolved it, they may not later on feel safe to disown it.’40 In January 1933, Raja Narendra Nath and some leading Hindus and Sikhs were holding public lectures against the Muslim majority in the reformed council. Fazl-i Husain wanted to know whether the peace proposals had been dropped. Chaudhari Shahabuddin informed him that Sikander Hayat Khan had met Jogendra Singh and Gokul Chand, and they had agreed to a draft proposal for Fazl-i Husain’s consideration. Fazl-i Husain saw the proposal and suggested some modifications. (p.182) Sikander Hayat Khan and Gokul Chand revised the proposal which Jogendra Singh sent to Fazl-i Husain on 27 February. The main thing in Jogendra Singh’s view was to ensure that representation of each community was fairly distributed all over the province.41 Jogendra Singh informed Fazl-i Husain on 3 April 1933 that he had obtained signatures of almost all the Sikh legislators. Fazl-i Husain wrote to Shahabuddin to clarify the position of the Hindu leaders with regard to joint electorates. On the same day, Fazl-i Husain received a letter from Syed Habib, editor of the daily Siyāsat. Giani Kartar Singh had told him that Jogendra Singh was waiting for the verdict of the Khalsa Darbar, and the Khalsa Darbar had totally rejected the proposed agreement. Giani Kartar Singh put forth his own conditions for a Sikh– Muslim pact in the Punjab. The Sikhs would agree to separate electorates till

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Muslims themselves gave up that method. They would wave their objections to the statutory majority of the Muslims on eight conditions, which he spelt out.42 Shahabuddin sent to Fazl-i Husain an agreement signed by ten Sikh legislators for his approval. Jogendra Singh would then get the signatures of about 300 more Sardars. However, he was still doubtful whether Sardar Ujjal Singh or Sardar Sampuran Singh would sign. The Sikh legislators agreed to have representation in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in proportion to the voting strength of each community, joint electorates, and constituencies proposed by the reform commissioners of the Punjab. It was also agreed that safeguards devised for minority communities in other provinces would apply to minority communities of the Punjab. Fazl-i Husain pointed out that this draft was quite different from the one which had been agreed to. He felt that they were merely ‘churning water’.43 Fazl-i Husain wrote to Sir Muhammad Iqbal on 29 April 1933 that he was against joint electorates but he was willing to consider Jogendra Singh’s proposal. He claimed that a large majority of Hindus and Sikhs were prepared to support his draft. Fazl-i Husain enclosed his comments with his letter, adding that this was not the final scheme. ‘As soon as it is ready, it should be discussed by the Muslim conference, the Muslim Press, just the same way as it should be discussed by Hindu and Sikh organizations.’ Firoz Khan, who had received a copy of Sir Jogendra Singh’s draft from Chaudhari Sir Shahabuddin, sent his comment to Fazl-i Husain on 30 April that the Sikhs would never accept the formula, and if they did, it would be the biggest mistake of their lives. Fazl-i Husain sent to Iqbal a copy of the last draft by Jogendra Singh on 1 May, suggesting that as a member of the All India Muslim Conference he could say that the Muslim community of the Punjab would give this proposal the most serious consideration. Iqbal wrote back immediately that the Sikh leader Tara Singh had declared the formula to be ‘a kind of suicide for Sikhs if they accept it’.44 On 5 May 1933, Sardar Jogendra Singh wrote to Fazl-i Husain that Hindus were solidly behind him and all the Sikhs would be with him, except the Akalis. Sir Muhammad Iqbal was going to oppose it. He suggested an alternative formula since Sir Shahbuddin had said that the formula would have to be modified. Fazl-i Husain wrote to him on the 8th that the proposal had come from Jogendra Singh though he also had helped in its formulation. ‘The Punjab Muslims are quite satisfied with the existent position (p.183) and, therefore, proposals for change must emanate from Hindus and Sikhs.’ Two days later, Agha Khan wrote to Fazl-i Husain that though he, Shafa’at, Ghaznavi, and Zafarulla were not opposed to a compromise between the three communities of the Punjab, they felt that it would be highly risky to raise any point dealing with the communal problem which formed part of the Award embodied in the White Paper. It would break up the solidarity of Muslims in India and create a cleavage between the Muslims of East and West Punjab. ‘The Punjab question does not and cannot stand alone.’ The Page 12 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Muslims of modern India had got their rights recognized after years of strenuous work, and this unparalleled achievement would be thrown away. In Fazl-i Husain’s view, the proposed agreement was more beneficial to Muslims than to Hindus and ‘most hurtful to Sikhs’. Fazl-i Husain wrote to Sir Shafa’at on 19 June that there was a very strong opposition amongst the Sikhs and for obvious reasons. It was not likely to get united support from Hindus either. ‘Personally, I doubt very much that it will materialize now.’45 On 5 February 1935, Sardar Jogendra Singh wrote to Fazl-i Husain that the India Bill seemed to have awakened some interest ‘in our old formula of communal settlement’. The Sikh and Hindu objections to franchise and constituencies could possibly be met. Before beginning discussions, he wanted to just mention it to Fazl-i Husain. The response from Fazl-i Husain was rather curt. The points mentioned by Jogendra Singh had been discussed threadbare over and over again and Fazl-i Husain had no wish after his experience at Simla to reopen the matter. It was ‘finally settled and closed’.46 Without support from the Akalis, the Muslim League and the Congress, the Unionists alone could not go far with any proposal of communal settlement in the Punjab. Master Tara Singh had the feeling that the British were anxious to ensure Muslim dominance in the Punjab. It had become necessary for the colonial government to retain Muslim support in view of the changing political situation in India. Moreover, the government wanted to weaken the Akalis because of its unhappy experience of the Akali movement. The Punjab Governor had tried to thrust a Gurdwaras Act on the Sikhs with the support of the Muslim legislators. Sir Fazl-i Husain had told the Muslim members to support the Bill to get rewarded. Probably, Sir John Maynard had made some such promise to Sir Fazl-i Husain. In any case, from that time onwards the government had begun to show greater regard for Muslims in the Punjab. Till the outbreak of World War II, the consistent policy of the colonial government had been to weaken the Sikhs in all those spheres which had made them important for the British.47

Master Tara Singh in Voluntary Exile Professor Teja Singh states in his Ārsī that disputes among the Sikh leaders after their release from jail in 1926 were responsible for creating disunity in the Sikh Panth. The differences between Master Tara Singh and Giani Sher Singh were printed in newspapers and voiced from public platforms. There was no end to their mutual antagonism and they were joined by others. Therefore, Bawa Harkishan Singh, Professor Niranjan Singh, Sardar Bhag Singh, Master Mehtab Singh, and others, who were not affiliated to any party, formed a new association called the ‘Gursewak Sabha’ with the primary objective of self-improvement for selfless service of the Panth. Professor Teja Singh was an (p.184) active member of the Gursewak Sabha, and its only office-bearer was its ‘convener’, Bawa Harkishan Singh.48

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Seriously concerned with patching up differences among the Sikh leaders, the members of the Gursewak Sabha began to feel that there was no possibility of resolving the internal differences so long as Master Tara Singh and Giani Sher Singh were on the scene of Sikh politics. The Sabha requested both of them very respectfully to retire from public life. Giani Sher Singh ignored their request but Master Tara Singh left the Punjab. The Gursewak Sabha called him back when Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala died of hunger strike in the Patiala jail early in 1935.49 At the outset of his voluntary exile, Master Tara Singh began to reflect on the past for possible ‘mistakes’, especially his decision to reject conditional release when many other leaders had accepted it. Those who had accepted conditional release went on justifying their decision, while Master Tara Singh and his supporters remained equally insistent on proving them wrong. This became the cause of a rift in the Panth. But could it be avoided? Would the Sikh leadership now handle the situation in which Muslim domination was sought to be perpetuated? Master Tara Singh found no answer.50 Master Tara Singh’s journal of the days of exile was posthumously published by his daughter, Dr Rajinder Kaur, as his Safarnāmā. It reveals some aspects of Master Tara Singh’s personality, especially the pleasure he derived from the sight of hills, rivers, springs, and forests, and the attention he gave to Sikh gurdwaras and their problems.51 The first entry was made at Saharanpur on 12 July 1934 and the last at Amritsar on 13 February 1935, though he had returned to Amritsar before the end of January. The published version contains some additional matter: a letter sent to Baba Partap Singh (Nāmdhārī) of Bhaini Sahib on 24 October 1934, a letter written for Giani Sher Singh on 23 November 1934, speeches made by several leaders on the need for Panthic unity at a party held in honour of Master Tara Singh, his own statement on Panthic unity, and his statement on Sardar Sewa Singh’s martyrdom. There is a statement on the deteriorating situation of the Panth, the view expressed by Sardar Ishar Singh Majhail on the need for Master Tara Singh’s return to the Punjab, the appeal of eminent nationalist leaders for Master Tara Singh’s return, a letter of the convener of the Gursewak Sabha for Master Tara Singh, a resolution of the Shiromani Akali Dal in favour of Master Tara Singh’s return, the need expressed by the Riasati Praja Mandal of Patiala to contact Master Tara Singh in view of Sardar Sewa Singh’s hunger strike, and the news of Sardar Sewa Singh’s death. This additional matter was not a part of the journal but it makes the Safarnāmā more important for the political life of Master Tara Singh than his personal life. Master Tara Singh’s interest in gurdwaras was not merely personal. Much of the revenue-free land given by the state of Nahan to the gurdwara of Bhangani had been resumed. The grant of Gurdwara Toka Sahib had been totally resumed on Page 14 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader the plea that its mahant did not have a good moral character. On a piece of land attached to the gurdwara at Nahan, some servants of the state had constructed a building, but no compensation was given to the gurdwara. A prince of Nahan had given 400 bighas of land to the Paonta Sahib Gurdwara. Later on, however, 150 bighas of this land were used for the office of the Tehsildar, a hospital, a temple, and a bazaar, without any compensation. Master Tara Singh believed that some high-placed fanatical (p.185) Hindu officials were responsible for all this and not the Raja of Nahan. Master Tara Singh wished that injustice of all kinds done to the gurdwaras was undone.52 The gurdwara at Biharigarh, halfway between Saharanpur and Dehra Dun, was built by the Sikhs of the two cities. In the villages around, there were many Banjaras. The Banjaras’ ancestors appeared to have been initiated into the Khalsa order, and some of those Khalsa Singhs were still alive in the area. Most of these people now smoked tobacco but they greeted one another with Vāhegurūjī kī fateh’. In some of the villages, Guru Granth Sahib was installed. Even where there was no Granth Sahib, they prepared kaṛāh parsād on the first day of the month and distributed it after ardās. The Shiromani Gurdwara Committee had appointed Bhai Gurbachan Singh for religious parchār. He had initiated a few of the Banjaras.53 The gurdwara at Biharigarh, thus, held a peculiar kind of significance for Master Tara Singh. In October 1934, Master Tara Singh went to Huzur Sahib (Nander) for ‘darshan of Gurdwaras’. He visited all the gurdwaras associated with Guru Gobind Singh (Nagina Ghat, Banda Ghat, Hira Ghat, and Shikar Ghat), and the Gurdwara of Mata Ji which was managed by Nihangs. He noticed a certain degree of tussle between the Dakhni Sikhs associated with Gurdwara Sachkhand and the Punjabi Sikhs associated with the Gurdwara of Baba Nidhan Singh. Master Tara Singh’s sympathies were with the Dakhni Sikhs who had taken good care of the Sachkhand despite hostility from local Muslims. The state of Hyderabad had no prejudices against the Sikhs, and it looked after the management of the gurdwara. However, if a suitable proposal was put forward by the Sikhs, the state might entrust the management to a Sikh body. Unlike the British Government, the Nizam did not want the Sikhs to prove their loyalty; all that he wanted was peace. The Sikhs had the reputation of being quarrelsome, and this gave the impression that they would not be able to manage the affairs of the gurdwaras efficiently. Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikh and Muslim leaders to develop good mutual relations.54 After some correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi, Master Tara Singh visited Wardha in Gujarat in November 1934. He stayed in the house of Seth Jamna Lal, virtually a hotel for the guests of Mahatma Gandhi. Contrary to the practice in the Sikh langar, no one was bothered about the food served being left uneaten. Mahatma Gandhi used cushions during the prayer meetings, which was not the practice among the Sikhs any more. Master Tara Singh observed that in the Page 15 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader prayer meeting the presence of all the girls of the Ashrama was marked in a register. This, in his view, did not harmonize with the ideal of satyāgraha because, in his view, it involved a kind of compulsion. Master Tara Singh does not refer to any personal conversation with Mahatma Gandhi.55 The purpose of his visit is not clear. It is interesting to note, however, that Master Tara Singh wrote a letter to Giani Sher Singh from Wardha. The purpose of Master Tara Singh’s visit to Bhaini Sahib is somewhat clearer. He came to the dīwān held at Bhaini Sahib on 15 October 1934 as an observer. He was full of praise for the recitation of gurbāṇī and sevā (service), but he did not like separate langars for the Kukas, the Nihangs, the Bhasaurias, and the common Sikh sangat. The very purpose of the langar was defeated. Nevertheless, Master Tara Singh appreciated the sagacity of ‘Baba Partap Singh Ji’ who tackled all the delicate situations in an appropriate manner. In his (p. 186) letter to Baba Partap Singh on 24 October 1934, Master Tara Singh says that he was prepared ‘to fall at the feet of anyone’ and to meet any demand in order to change the declining state of the Panth. But he could not place his trust in a person whom he really distrusted. The reference could possibly be to Giani Sher Singh. Master Tara Singh appreciated the efforts made by Baba Partap Singh to bring the Akalis, the Nāmdhārīs, the Udāsīs, and the Nirmalas together. He could possibly serve as a mediator also between the warring factions among the Akalis. But there was no response to his letter.56 Master Tara Singh then addressed a letter to Giani Sher Singh on 23 November 1934. It was sent to Sardar Bhag Singh so that he could read it out to Giani Sher Singh (who was blind). But Sardar Bhag Singh did not take it to Giani Sher Singh and Master Tara Singh got it back from him after a couple of months. In this letter Master Tara Singh had made an appeal to Giani Sher Singh in the name of the Panth. Despite what had happened and what was happening, Master Tara Singh believed that Giani Sher Singh genuinely cared for the Panth and its welfare. He was frank enough to confess that his own mind was not clear with regard to Giani Sher Singh. But he had decided to write this letter in the interest of the Panth which was in the doldrums. The country and the Panth were passing through a critical phase. There was hardly any articulate opposition to the Communal Award. Resolutions were passed but no one was prepared to implement them. In so far as the Sikhs were responsible for it, their leaders were to be blamed more than anyone else.57 Master Tara Singh wanted to know what he could do to satisfy Giani Sher Singh to enable him to concentrate all his energies on forging unity in the Panth. If this letter could be helpful in improving the state of the Panth, Master Tara Singh was prepared to publish it. Giani Sher Singh could even make some changes in its text. He asked Giani Sher Singh not to consult anyone else for taking his decision on whether or not the letter should be published. If it was not possible for Giani Sher Singh to reply without consulting someone else, there was no Page 16 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader need to respond. Master Tara Singh did not wish to start another controversy. He makes it absolutely clear that he would not associate himself formally with the SGPC or with the management of any gurdwara. His sole wish was to see the Panth united. It was impossible for him to remain at peace with himself in the present state of the Panth.58 During the second half of 1934, the affairs of the Sikh Panth had become worse than before. Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala, who was put in jail for the third time by Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, had to go on hunger strike. The Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal was feeling helpless. Its President, Sardar Hari Singh, was keen to know the whereabouts of Master Tara Singh to request him personally to come back to guide them. Therefore, he made an appeal that anyone who knew where Master Tara Singh happened to be should inform Sardar Hari Singh through a letter or through a newspaper.59 Sardar Ishar Singh Majhail underscored that Master Tara Singh had accepted the suggestion of the Gursewak Sabha despite his own view that it would not produce the expected result. He referred to the baseless propaganda against Master Tara Singh which had gone on for years, and he asserted that no thoughtful person would ever believe in the false charges levelled against him. The charge that Master Tara Singh hankered after leadership could neither be proved nor disproved. But they who (p.187) were close to Master Tara Singh knew that it had no basis. The person (Giani Sher Singh) who was foremost in levelling this charge had not renounced politics on the plea that his supporters did not allow him to do so. Master Tara Singh’s position was comparable with that of Yusaf who had been thrown into a well by his brothers. Ishar Singh wished for a famine in ‘Egypt’ so that Yusaf’s brothers were obliged to come to him for grain. Most of the Sikhs were waiting for Master Tara Singh to return and to guide the Panth.60 Several eminent non-Sikh leaders of the Punjab suggested to the Gursewak Sabha that it should call Master Tara Singh back to serve the country and the nation (kaum). Bawa Harkishan Singh wrote to Master Tara Singh that the Sabha had made an appeal to him in May 1934 to dissociate himself from the affairs of the Panth, and not to leave his family or the Punjab. Nearly seven months had passed since then, but his opponents were still dragging his name in matters of dispute. He should seriously think of returning to his family as early as possible. Bawa Harkishan Singh went on to add that Master Tara Singh should continue to keep himself aloof from the politics of the Panth.61 On 21 January there appeared a news to the effect that Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala, who was on hunger strike in the Patiala Jail for about six months, had passed away. Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji had got this news confirmed from

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader the jail authorities. On hearing the news Master Tara Singh returned to Amritsar.62

Reconciliation with Maharaja Bhupinder Singh after Agitation After his release from jail in August 1929, Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala had continued his political activities as a leader of the Praja Mandal. As Chairman of the Reception Committee at the second Conference of the Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal held at Ludhiana in October 1930, he denounced the Maharaja of Patiala in strong terms: ‘The Patiala state in the reign of its present ruler, Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, has degenerated materially, spiritually, and morally so much that it seems as if the Devil is ruling over the state.’ The resolution on Patiala characterized the Fitzpatrick enquiry as a farce, and demanded the Maharaja’s deposition. Sardar Sewa Singh was arrested on 3 November from his house in Thikriwala and sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment by Pritam Singh Sidhu, the Magistrate of Barnala, on 28 November 1930. On an appeal to the High Court, his sentence was reduced to five years. However, Sewa Singh was released on 12 March 1931. According to Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji, in return the Praja Mandal had secretly agreed not to demonstrate against the Maharaja at Bombay on his return from England.63 Efforts were made again to win over Sardar Sewa Singh but he insisted that the Maharaja should introduce reforms. Negotiations failed and agitation was resumed. Sewa Singh led a morchā in the Jind state in November 1931. On 14 January 1932, the Patiala state issued a royal order (farmān-i shāhī) announcing the promulgation of ‘Hidayat 88’ which banned all unauthorized political activity in the three states of Nabha, Jind, and Patiala. No organization could be formed without a certificate of recognition from the state government. Sewa Singh was arrested under Hidayat 88 on 24 August 1933 for his participation in the Punjab Praja Mandal Conference at Delhi in April 1933. In January 1934 he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000 by Pritam Singh Sidhu, and sent to (p.188) the Central Jail, Patiala. Throughout 1934 he remained on partial or total hunger strike. Forced feeding was started in July 1934. On 18 January 1935, he started vomiting blood. He died in the Rajindra Hospital on the 20th. His body was cremated in suspicious circumstances, and even his last remains were not handed over to his family.64 Master Tara Singh sent to the press a statement on the death of Sardar Sewa Singh who was the Vice-President of the Shiromani Akal Dal, President of the Shiromani Malwa Pratindhi Diwan, and President of the Riasati Parja Mandal. Master Tara Singh was still not inclined to take part in the affairs of the Panth but he was willing to participate in the movement in Patiala to save the political prisoners of the state and to do his best for its oppressed people. When Sardar Sewa Singh was on hunger strike in the jail, no representative of the SGPC or the Akali Dal was allowed to see him. No one was allowed to persuade Sardar Sewa Singh not to continue with his fast, and no one was informed of his critical Page 18 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader condition. Thus, Sardar Sewa Singh was deliberately allowed to die. The Maharaja of Patiala was clearly responsible for this. The Patiala state was constitutionally bound to ensure justice to its subjects. Therefore, an inquiry should have been conducted by the Government of India in public interest even earlier, but now it was absolutely necessary.65 On 30 January 1935, a tea party was held at the residence of Sardar Harnam Singh in honour of Master Tara Singh. A number of leaders expressed their views on the general political situation in the country, the state of the Panth, or the martyrdom of Sardar Sewa Singh. Among them were Dr Kitchlew, Sardar Sewa Ram Singh, Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar, Sardar Mangal Singh, Professor Ganga Singh, Sardar Gopal Singh Kaumi, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and Sardar Mehtab Singh. They emphasized that Master Tara Singh had done well to return to the Punjab and that his guidance was indispensable. Caveeshar said that Master Tara Singh should not have adopted an attitude of abnegation. Gopal Singh said that those who were right should be supported. Giani Gurmukh Singh said that the opponents of Master Tara Singh stood exposed and the evil which Master Tara Singh had tried to eradicate had become rampant. Sardar Mehtab Singh, President of Nankana Sahib Committee, assured the leaders present that the management at Nankana Sahib was as good as it could possibly be, and he was prepared to remove any defect brought to his notice. At the end, Sewa Ram Singh was entrusted with the responsibility of working out a unity programme.66 Master Tara Singh stated that he had returned to Amritsar on hearing the news of the saintly Sewa Singh’s martyrdom. During his absence from the Punjab, he had reflected on the state of the Panth. He read out the letter he had sent to Baba Partap Singh and the one written for Giani Sher Singh. He was still prepared to do anything that the Panth wanted him to do. Otherwise, ‘I will tell you what to do, and you give your support’. In order to take someone out of the mud, it was necessary to get into the mud. Neutrality in his view was useless: ‘Be men and not Gursewak Sabha.’67 The Akalis and the Praja Mandal were demanding an enquiry into Sewa Singh’s death, but the Government of India was taking no action. The All India States’ People’s Conference appointed an Enquiry Committee. Agitation for the release of prisoners went on. In August 1935, Colonel Raghbir Singh, the Inspector General of Police of the Patiala state, wrote to the Prime Minister of Patiala (p. 189) that putting more people in jail was likely to result in agitation in the jail itself. On 1 January 1936, twenty-five Praja Mandal workers were released. Among them was a leader, Bhagwan Singh Longowalia. On 7 April 1936, the Maharaja of Patiala issued a special clemency order that all cases pending in the court under Hidayat 88 should be withdrawn. Realization of the fines imposed on

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Sardar Sewa Singh was stopped. All this was the result of Master Tara Singh’s understanding with Maharaja Bhupinder Singh.68 The Akali leaders of the Patiala state did not like Master Tara Singh’s ‘compromise’. Even Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji denounced it. In an address presented to Ujagar Singh Bhaura in his honour, Master Tara Singh was referred to as ‘the new devotee of Patiala and a traitor of the Panth’. He had ‘sold the martyr’s blood and cast a slur on Panthic dignity’. Bhaura himself said that the states’ subjects in general and the subjects of Patiala in particular were grieved when certain dishonest leaders of the Shiromani Akali Dal ‘dragged the fair name of the organization and its glorious traditions, through the mire’. A pamphlet contained the allegation that Master Tara Singh had drawn material benefit from the compromise.69 Master Tara Singh says that the Maharaja of Patiala tried to come to terms with the Akalis because Giani Sher Singh, who supported the Maharaja, had become politically weak. An understanding (samjhautā) was worked out with him in consultation with the leaders of the Praja Mandal. By that time, only a few Akalis were in jail and they too were released, and the property of the remaining few Akalis was restored to them. Sardar Kharak Singh had separated himself from the SGPC and the Akali Dal, and his son and two of his nephews had been taken into service of the Patiala state. Even after the death of Sardar Sewa Singh, Sardar Kharak Singh had refused to make a statement against the tyranny of the Maharaja of Patiala. But his son and nephews were removed from the service of the state.70 Elsewhere in his autobiographical Merī Yād, Master Tara Singh talks of his rapprochement with the Maharaja of Patiala. When the agitation against Patiala had begun in 1935, the Maharaja had tried to come to an understanding with the party of Giani Sher Singh. However, Giani Sher Singh’s position had changed because his candidates had been defeated in the 1934 elections to the Central Legislature despite the total support of the Maharaja of Patiala. Both the Sikh seats were won by the Akali candidates. Indeed, the party of Giani Sher Singh had become very weak. The Maharaja was now inclined to have an understanding with the Akalis. He took the initiative to come to an agreement. Master Tara Singh formed an agreement with him in consultation with the Akali leaders of the Patiala state. But Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji began to say that this agreement should have been made with him rather than Master Tara Singh. Many of the Akalis of the Patiala state remained opposed to Master Tara Singh for quite some time. Eventually, however, they began to trust him due to their experience of Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji’s leadership.71

In Defence of the Shahidganj Gurdwara Shahidganj in Lahore was included in the schedule of Sikh Gurdwaras in the Act of 1925 as one of the most important places for the Sikhs. Its Page 20 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader management was entrusted to the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee of Lahore. There was a background of protracted litigation between the mahants of the gurdwara on the one hand, and Nur Ahmad (with (p.190) his personal claims) and Imam Mehar Shah (on behalf of the Muslim community) on the other. The claims of the latter two had been dismissed. After the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925, Bhai Harnam Singh, the mahant, was not willing to transfer the property attached to Gurdwara Shahidganj and went to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal on this issue. The Anjuman-i Islamia now raked up the old issue and filed a petition in the Gurdwara Tribunal on behalf of the Muslim community. The petitions of both these parties were dismissed by the Tribunal. Bhai Harnam Singh appealed to the High Court. His appeal was dismissed on 19 October 1934. In March 1935, all the property attached to Gurdwara Shahῑdganj passed into the possession of the local Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, with Jathedar Tara Singh of Thethar as its President.72 The Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee of Lahore started clearing the precincts of the gurdwara before the end of May 1935. Demolition of the building called Dharamsala, which was claimed by the Muslim litigants to be a mosque, began on 8 June. On 28 June, a Sikh mason died, buried under the debris of the old building. The death of the mason was regarded by some Muslims as an indication of God’s wrath. On 29 June, a large crowd of local Muslims collected near the gurdwara. An attempt was made to enter the precincts forcibly but the place was defended by the Sikhs inside. The Sikh Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, S. Partap, asked the Sikhs to stop demolition till the relevant records were examined. On 2 July, about 200 Muslims carrying spades were marching in military formation near the gurdwara, accompanied by a crowd of nearly 3,000 Muslims. On 3 July, nearly 3,000 Akalis arrived from outside Lahore for the purpose of defence. On 5 July, there was a clash between an armed Muslim crowd marching towards the Shahidganj Gurdwara and the police. On the following day, the Punjab Governor, Emerson, came down from Simla. He explained to Muslim deputationists that the government was bound by the decisions of the court. All the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners were also informed of the legal position.73 On 14 July 1935, a government communiqué was published in the papers that the Punjab Government had decided to hand over to the Muslim community (through the Anjuman-i Islamia) the commodious building called the Shah Chiragh Mosque which was being used as a Sessions Court. It was meant to placate the Muslims, but it had the opposite effect. In the evening a meeting of about 10,000 Muslims thanked the government for its decision but some speakers said that it ‘could not deflect Muslims from their demand for the site of the demolished Shahidganj mosque’. Four of the Muslim leaders were deported from Lahore and an official order banned discussion of the Shahidganj dispute at public meetings in Lahore. On 16 July, unlawful processions of Muslims were dispersed with lāṭhī charge. On 21 July, the police had to open fire on Muslim Page 21 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader rioters. Despite an appeal from the Governor and from the non-official members of the council, violence went on increasing. As a result of retaliation by the violent Muslim crowds on 20 and 21 July, 124 of the military and police officers and other ranks were wounded. This was followed by civil disobedience for two or three days.74 Firoz Khan Noon, who was working for an amicable settlement between the Muslims and the Sikhs over the Shahidganj issue, wrote to Fazl-i Husain on 26 July 1935 that twelve leaders had made a joint statement and the situation in the city was very much (p.191) easier now. He was hopeful that civil disobedience would be called off at the Friday prayer. Chaudhari Shahabuddin wrote to Fazl-i Husain on 28 July that in his opinion ‘the drama had been finished’. He did not think that the site of the ‘mosque’ was worth the price the Muslims had paid by sacrificing their lives. The masses were misled by the ‘ulamā, the lawyers, and ‘the ignoramuses’, resulting in a deplorable situation that they had probably not foreseen. Firoz Khan had been writing to Fazl-i Husain about the critical situation in Lahore, giving the impression that the Sikh leaders were not prepared to accept the compromise suggested by the Muslim leaders, and that the Hindu leaders were trying to spoil a settlement. Chhotu Ram wrote that the ill-conceived move to attempt a march on the Shahidganj Gurdwara was bound to antagonize the Sikhs who were ‘mere puppets’ in the hands of the Hindus. The attempt of the Muslims to nullify a civil court’s decree by direct action was ‘most unreasonable’.75 On 8 August 1935, Firoz Khan informed Fazl-i Husain that the Sikhs had adopted a defying attitude throughout the province. In another letter he says that he saw no hope of the Sikhs giving up even an inch of the land of the Shahidganj Gurdwara. There were two rival parties in the SGPC, each afraid of the other, and none of the two was willing to make any concession to the Muslim sentiment.76 On 27 August 1935, Khalid Latif Gauba (Harkishan Lal’s son who had accepted Islam), suggested in the Civil and Military Gazette an economic boycott of Hindus and Sikhs. Ten days later, Fazl-i Husain wrote to Syed Habib that he was definitely and categorically opposed to civil disobedience.77 On 11 September, the Secretary of the Shiromani Akali Dal issued a statement that certain Muslim newspapers were trying to incite communal animosity but the Sikhs should show self-restraint and self-control. Under no circumstances would the Akali Dal tolerate any infringement of their inviolable rights; it would ‘defend by all possible means every inch of the sacred premises of Gurdwara Shahidganj’. The SGPC appealed to the Sikhs to do nothing that could disturb public peace on 20 September 1935, the day to be observed by Muslims as the ‘Shahidganj Day’.78 Maulana Shaukat Ali wrote to Master Tara Singh for negotiations. Master Tara Singh warned the Maulana that any question relating to the site of the so-called mosque must be regarded as closed. For a Sikh leader, to forget this fact was to Page 22 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader be a traitor to his faith and his community. He added that the agitation was inspired by the crude political ambitions of some Punjabi Muslims, ‘based on communal vanity generated by the Anglo-Muslim alliance which has developed a dangerous type of superiority complex’. The Sikhs, therefore, would not countenance tactics employed against them. If Maulana Shaukat Ali still thought that their meeting could serve some useful purpose, he would be most welcome on any of the first three days of October.79 Maulana Shaukat Ali and some Punjabi Muslim leaders met Master Tara Singh and seven other Sikh leaders at Amritsar on 3 October 1935. Their conversation held behind closed doors lasted for over five hours. After much discussion they agreed upon a statement to be issued by the Sikh leaders. It was a genuine pleasure for the them, said the Sikh leaders, to meet Maulana Shaukat Ali and other Muslim friends, and to understand and appreciate each other’s point of view. For this, the Sikh leaders were grateful to him. ‘Though the Sikh community is not prepared to part with the site, this does not preclude (p.192) the possibility of further negotiations. This can only be possible if our Muslim brethren create a calm atmosphere.’ The prospects at the time were discouraging yet ‘representatives of Sikh community would welcome a talk with representatives of Muslim community in changed circumstances’. But Pir Jami‘at Ali Shah of Sialkot became all the more active now in pursuit of his programme. He talked of a million volunteers for his campaign.80 The SGPC was most directly concerned with the Gurdwara Shahidganj issue. This issue was taken up first of all in its meeting of 20 October 1935. On behalf of its Executive Committee, Sardar Mangal Singh highlighted the importance of the Shahidganj Gurdwara for the Sikhs, which explained why the Executive Committee had handled this matter since June 1935. The Sikh sangats were instructed never to do anything that could create ill-feeling among others. Sardar Mangal Singh read out the resolution of the Executive Committee passed on 8 July. He referred to all the efforts made by the Muslims to take over the Shahidganj Gurdwara: letters and resolutions, civil disobedience, civil suits, deputations to the government, economic boycott, and the implied threats of Pir Jami‘at Ali Shah. The Sikhs respected the religious places of others, and during the Akali movement they had built mosques for Muslims in several villages. Had any reasonable solution been possible with the Muslims over the Shahidganj issue, the SGPC would have accepted it. ‘We could give only this assurance that we would not misuse the place because it was our Shahidganj and therefore a holy place. The executive committee did what it thought was the best, and now it was for the general body of the SGPC to decide for the future.’81 Giani Sher Singh said that the Shahidganj issue was a matter of honour for the Sikh Panth and the Sikhs should deal with it as one entity. He wanted to know the result of the talk between Maulana Shaukat Ali and Master Tara Singh. The attitude of the government, he said, might change in the future. Therefore, there Page 23 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader should be a well thought out plan of action. Sardar Harnam Singh pointed out that after the talk between Maulana Shaukat Ali and Master Tara Singh, the Sikh leaders had published a statement in the newspapers. Giani Kartar Singh said that it was decided to create a calm atmosphere first, and then the representatives of both sides could discuss the issue. Giani Sher Singh wanted to know how far the Executive Committee was prepared to go in meeting the Muslim demand and what action it proposed to take to resist the demand. Master Tara Singh said that the Sikh view at that time was that if a peaceful atmosphere was created, the Muslims would see no point in talks, and if it was not, they would be exposed. There was no improvement in the situation, nor was there any solution in sight. It was an open question. Something would be done but it was not advisable to reveal the detail.82 Sardar Bhag Singh said that what had been discussed already would have been better avoided. Sardar Kartar Singh Jhabbar emphasized the immediate need for rebuilding the Shahidganj Gurdwara. Sardar Amar Singh of the Sher-i Punjab suggested that the Sikh view of the matter could be clearly enunciated: the Shahidganj was a sacred place of the Sikhs and it could not be put to any unholy use but the Sikhs would not yield to any pressure from the Muslims to come to a dishonourable compromise. Sardar Kartar Singh of Campbellpur said that the Shahidganj issue was of crucial importance (p.193) to the Sikhs, and the Executive Committee had handled it in a way in which it should have been handled. The House recorded its appreciation of the Executive Committee and the Lahore Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee for the courage, wisdom, and earnestness with which they had handled the situation arising out of the Gurdwara Shahidganj agitation. Another resolution unanimously passed by the SGPC thanked the Shiromani Akali Dal for its extraordinary service in connection with the Gurdwara Shahidganj agitation.83 On 4 November 1935, Master Tara Singh issued a statement to the press to declare the position of the Sikhs. It would be cowardly, he said, to have talks with the Muslims in the given circumstances. ‘I, therefore, wish to declare that I, at least, shall not participate in any such talk.’ To agree to the Muslim demand that the Gurdwara Shahidganj should be handed over to them was beyond the power of any Sikh leader or Sikh organization, or all the Sikh organizations combined. In view of the Muslim threats, it would be an insult to the Panth and the martyrs to yield even an inch. On 11 November 1935, the Finance Member to the Punjab Government stated on the floor of the council that the Sikhs were in legal possession of Shahidganj and it was impossible for the government to prevent them from doing whatever they liked with it. He concluded his speech with the words: ‘By asking the Government to deprive the Sikhs of rights, which they have established in a court of law, Muslims are asking the Government to commit an illegal act.’84

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader ‘Strange things are happening,’ wrote Bhagat Lakshman Singh at the close of 1935. The Lahore Gurdwara Committee, in charge of Shahidganj, dismantled ‘an old mosque-shaped edifice’ on its premises, and huge crowds of Muslims marched towards the place to throw out the Sikh custodians of the building. The situation was brought under control by special police and the military after a small number of casualties. The Muslim feelings against the Sikhs ran high and cold-blooded murder of innocent Sikhs became the order of the day. The Governor, Sir Herbert Emerson, had to deal with a difficult situation. He recognized the Sikh right to do whatever they liked with the property in their possession, but they could have avoided injuring the susceptibilities of their Muslim countrymen. Pir Jami‘at Ali Shah made inflammatory speeches in the Badshahi Mosque. The government tried to appease the Muslims and ordered the transfer of a magnificent domed building to them as a reward for their supposed patience and forbearance. Furthermore, the government removed the ban on the carrying of swords throughout the province. A procession of several thousand Muslims, headed by Maulana Shaukat Ali and other Muslim members of Legislative Assembly, passed through the bazaars of Lahore, brandishing their weapons and shouting ‘yā ‘Alī, yā ‘Alī’. Their idea was to overawe the Hindus and the Sikhs.85 The Sikhs organized a counter-demonstration towards the end of November 1935. They marched out in procession from the Shahidganj Gurdwara and passed through the bazaars of Lahore. Some Hindus also joined the procession. The various Sikh jathās were under the control of their leaders but the Hindu processionists, who owed them no allegiance, were shouting provocative slogans. Bhagat Lakshman Singh was with the procession from the Lahori Gate to the Dera Sahib Gurdwara near the fort. He met Master Tara Singh and invited his attention to this undesirable feature of the (p.194) procession. Master Tara Singh agreed with him that it was a mistake to have allowed these irresponsible young men to participate in the procession. On the following day, a big crowd of armed Muslims from the Bhati Gate area assaulted stray Sikhs and Hindus with fatal consequences. A curfew order was issued and a ban on carrying the kirpān was reimposed, which was regarded by the Sikhs as an interference in their religion. The SGPC decided to protest, and the jathās were awarded a day’s punishment till the rising of the court. This ‘whole comic affair’ ended when the prescribed period of the ban was over. The Muslims took a cue from the Sikhs and resorted to ‘civil disobedience’, marching towards Shahidganj to offer prayers there. No solution was in sight.86 Master Tara Singh recalled that the Gurdwara Committee, Lahore, had begun to demolish the mosque-like building without consulting the SGPC. He learnt that the Muslims were demanding that the ‘mosque’ should not be demolished, and he thought that this demand could easily be conceded. However, on coming to Lahore personally he found that the Muslim procession was meant to intimidate the Sikhs. He changed his mind. To concede the demand in the face of Page 25 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader intimidation was to encourage the Muslims to ask for more and more. Thousands of Sikhs gathered in the Gurdwara Shahidganj and the Dera Sahib Gurdwara. The Muslim crowds marching towards Shahidganj were stopped by the police. There was no clash but the feelings ran high in entire Punjab, and even in the rest of the country. The Governor came down from Simla and spoke to the Sikh and Muslim leaders. He agreed with the Sikh leaders that the place belonged to them but asked them not to demolish the ‘mosque’ for three days more.87 At this juncture, Sardar Kharak Singh and some other opponents of the Akalis began to make speeches to incite the Sikhs to demolish the building. Before the third day of the understanding with the Governor, an Akali leader started demolishing the ‘mosque’ without consulting others. The Governor was no longer sympathetic to the Sikhs and they had to face a lot of difficulties.88 Writing to the Governor General on 8 May 1937, the Punjab Governor recalled that Sardar Kharak Singh was ‘largely responsible for the Shahidganj trouble, since the excitement he caused at a critical moment among the Sikhs gathered at Lahore made it impossible for the so-called Sikh leaders to keep their followers under control’.89 Governor Emerson had given Masjid Shah Chiragh and the property attached to it to the Muslims, and allowed Muslims and Hindus to carry swords. Master Tara Singh refers to the talks with the Ahrar leaders who demanded that the ‘mosque’ should not be demolished and the grave within its precincts should be made accessible to worshippers by a separate path. The Sikh leaders said that this demand could be seriously considered if all the Muslim leaders agreed. The Ahrar leaders talked to Maulana Zafar Ali, and he said that he had come to know that the government was going to give Shahidganj to Muslims; there was no need for coming to any compromise with the Sikhs.90 Emerson advised Sardar Jogendra Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh to come to some agreement with the Muslim leaders. The Muslim demand now was that a wall be built on four sides of the place of the ‘mosque’ and the enclosed area should not be put to any use. Sardar Jogendra Singh was keen that this demand should be conceded. But the Akali leaders were not prepared to bow before any (p.195) threat from the Muslim leaders. The Muslims who had gathered between the Delhi Gate and the Shahidganj Gurdwara came to know that no agreement was reached. They held a meeting outside the Mochi Gate and dispersed after the meeting. In Master Tara Singh’s view, the whole agitation was orchestrated by Muslim leaders to put pressure on the government and the Sikhs.91 He took a firm stand on the issue of Shahidganj.

Master Tara Singh’s Concern for Dalits Removal of untouchability had become an important concern of various reform movements and organizations by the early twentieth century. Entry of Untouchables (initially called the Depressed Classes and then Dalits) into Hindu Page 26 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader temples was a crucial element in this movement. A notable satyāgraha was organized at Vaikom in Travencore state in 1924–5. It was led by T.K. Madhavan, a Congress leader from the state with a low-caste background. Its objective was to assert the right of the Untouchables as well as the low castes to use roads near a temple. Mahatma Gandhi visited Vaikom in March 1925, and eventually the government constructed new roads for use by the Untouchables. Another landmark in the history of the Untouchables followed the Communal Award of August 1932, creating separate electorates for them. Mahatma Gandhi’s fast unto death on this issue enabled him to secure an agreement, known as the Poona Pact, between the caste Hindus and Untouchable leaders. As a result, the Communal Award was modified: the Hindu joint electorate was retained with reserved seats for the Untouchables and an increase in their representation. Mahatma Gandhi began to pay increasing attention to the issue of the Dalits (called Harijans by him), virtually in opposition to B.R. Ambedkar, their foremost leader by then.92 Master Tara Singh was invited to preside over a conference of Dalits held at Cochin towards the end of May 1936. In his presidential address he justified their resentment against the high-caste Hindus who were responsible for their wretched plight. Master Tara Singh said that a true and honest leader of the Dalits had told him that they wanted to leave the Hindu fold out of vengeance. This psychological state was understandable, said Master Singh, but the feeling of hatred could do no good to any people. Hate and vengeance had no place in religion. Another Dalit leader had said to Master Tara Singh that the Dalits needed a leader like Guru Gobind Singh. Master Tara Singh assured him that they would find a good leader if only five of them were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the sake of others. Nothing could be done without selfless sacrifice. He had come to offer them his faith ‘but not out of any selfish motive’. It was the duty of a Sikh to help the needy and the oppressed. If they accepted the Sikh faith, the Sikhs would feel gratified that the standards of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh were furled in distant parts of India. ‘There was no other gain.’93 ‘If you adopt the Sikh faith,’ continued Master Tara Singh, ‘we shall try our best to help you to get rid of your slavery. We shall perform this service for you even if you do not accept the Sikh faith.’ Master Tara Singh referred to the jathā of twelve Akalis sent by the SGPC in March 1924 for helping the Dalits, and to provide langar to the satyāgrahis for several months. This was a tangible token of Akali sympathy with the cause of the Depressed (p.196) Classes in India. Master Tara Singh went on to say that no distinction was made between high and low, rich and the poor, young and the old in the Sikh gurdwara: they were all served alike. ‘We have come to you in that spirit.’ If they wanted to know what they would gain by becoming Sikhs, the answer had been given by the Guru: ‘If you wish to play the game of love, enter my lane with your head placed on your palm.’ The Guru did not offer rulership or a promise of paradise. He says, ‘I have Page 27 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader no desire for Raj, nor for Mukti; I long for the feet of the Lord as the object of my love.’ The Guru had taught how to die in life. ‘This is what the Sikh faith offers to you, and to the world.’ Conscience was not a commodity to be sold for a personal gain of any kind.94 Master Tara Singh went on to say that no nation could progress without the spirit of sacrifice. The Sikh faith offered teachings and traditions and a history that served as a source of inspiration for cultivating the spirit of sacrifice. The Sikhs would give nothing to Dalits but they would be prepared to make selfless sacrifice for their sake. The peasants and carpenters among the Sikhs were deemed to be as high as the highest in the traditional order. The Maharaja of Kapurthala belonged to a family of kalāls (vintners). Carpenters (tarkhāns) and Jats were the leaders of the principalities established at the beginning of Sikh rule. None of them came from a high caste. Bhai Ditt Singh, the founder of the contemporary reform movement among the Sikhs, was a chamār, an outcaste. The person referred to as the ‘uncrowned king’ of the Sikhs (Sardar Kharak Singh) was a vintner. The Akali movement started to improve the status of the outcastes (chuhṛās and chamārs) who had been initiated into the Sikh faith. The Dalits should not regard themselves as inferior. They were equal to the highest as human beings. ‘The Sikhs regarded it as their duty to help them in their struggle for emancipation.’ ‘We wish to serve you and not to increase the number of Sikhs.’95
After the Dalit Conference, Ambedkar reached Bombay on 18 June accompanied by Munje and discussed the matter of the Dalits with Seth Jugal Kishore Birla and others. In view of Ambedkar’s revolt against Hinduism, they came up with a proposal. Ambedkar would declare that he and his supporters will not accept Islam or Christianity but the Sikh faith and they will cooperate with Hindus and Sikhs in their efforts to counter the increasing influence of Islam. The Hindu Mahasabha would then declare that the Dalits should accept the Sikh faith, that those among the Dalits who accepted the Sikh faith would be counted as ‘Scheduled Castes’, entitled to the rights conceded to Dalits by the Poona Pact.96 On his return to Nagpur on 30 June 1936, Munje wrote to Rao Bahadur N.C. Raja about the meeting in Bombay and enclosed a copy of the draft declaration by Ambedkar for his response, adding that he was trying to meet Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and the Maharaja of Patiala to have their response to this proposal of a very delicate nature. N.C. Raja on his own gave a statement to the press that he made a clear distinction between genuine conversion and change of faith from social, economic, or political motivation. He was opposed to the proposition of Munje. He held correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi, Malaviya, and Rajagopalachari. All the three leaders were in agreement with Raja in opposition to the proposition.97

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Ambedkar made a statement on 10 August that N.C. Raja had gone to the press without Munje’s permission or consent. He pointed out that Raja had no recognized position among the Dalits since he had declared (p.197) that he was born a Hindu and he would die a Hindu. Ambedkar added that Mahatma Gandhi had failed miserably in the promise made at the time of the Poona Pact about improving the condition of Dalits. Mahatma Gandhi’s assertion that the issue of Dalit welfare was not connected with any other issue was too mystical to make sense to Ambedkar who was interested in human problems on this earth. The Dalits were asking for the basic human rights and the Mahatma was offering spiritual solace. The import of Mahatma Gandhi’s argument was that the Dalits should only pray to the high castes to redress their wrongs. Ambedkar condemned the use of the word ‘mischievous’ for what was a life-and-death issue for the Dalits.98 Master Tara Singh was the President of the SGPC at this time and Ambedkar used to come to Amritsar to meet the Akali leaders because of his interest in joining the Sikh fold along with his fellow Dalits. He presented an impressive and thoughtful address at a religious conference in which some professors of the Khalsa College were also present. Professor Ganga Singh rose in response to Ambedkar and spoke well, but he spoke in Punjabi which Ambedkar and his companions could not understand. On Master Tara Singh’s suggestion, Bawa Harkishan Singh was persuaded to speak. He was a good match for Ambedkar, and his speech saved the honour of the Akalis.99 Sometime later, the Akalis thought of establishing a college in Bombay as a centre for the propagation of Sikh culture. The Khalsa College at Bombay owed its foundation and its progressive development essentially to Master Tara Singh.100 In the early 1930s, Master Tara Singh emerged as the most important Sikh leader. The year 1930 was important in this context. For the first time Master Tara Singh became President of the SGPC in place of Sardar Kharak Singh who, henceforth, had little to do with the SGPC. Initially against Sardar Mehtab Singh and Giani Sher Singh, the Kharak Singh–Tara Singh camp was now split. Sardar Kharak Singh eventually joined Giani Sher Singh in opposition to Master Tara Singh. But the dominant influence of Master Tara Singh in the SGPC as well as the Shiromani Akali Dal was well established. After the Communal Award, the formation of the Khalsa Darbar as a joint organization failed to serve its purpose. The Central Akali Board was formed as a rival to the Shiromani Akali Dal but all the efforts of Giani Sher Singh and Sardar Kharak Singh failed to make it a real rival. They even aligned with the Maharaja of Patiala despite his repressive measures against the Akalis. Master Tara Singh’s voluntary exile in 1934 added to his prestige, while Giani Sher Singh’s candidates for the Central Legislature in 1934 were defeated by the Akali candidates despite the support of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh. After the agitation against Patiala in 1935, the Maharaja was inclined to come to terms with Master Tara Singh as the undisputed leader of the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh welcomed the compromise in order to eliminate Page 29 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader the influence of Sardar Kharak Singh and Giani Sher Singh with the Maharaja of Patiala. Master Tara Singh’s firm stand on the Shahidganj issue added to his popularity as a Sikh leader.101

In Retrospect The Akalis joined the civil disobedience movement with enthusiasm. Master Tara Singh was arrested while leading an Akali jathā to Peshawar. He was in Gujrat Jail when he was elected President of the SGPC early in 1930. Significantly, the services of (p.198) Master Tara Singh in the past three and a half years, since 1927, were appreciated in a formal resolution of the SGPC. Master Tara Singh had to take up the Daska morchā which had been launched by Kharak Singh in August 1931 without consulting the SGPC or the Akali Dal. Master Tara Singh led a jathā in September, and he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. After his release from jail in March 1931, Master Tara Singh met Mahatma Gandhi with a Sikh deputation to represent the Sikhs at the Round Table Conference. The foremost concern of the Sikhs was to get rid of statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab by reorganizing the province to ensure communal balance in its population so that no single community was in a position to dominate others. At the Round Table Conference the Sikh concern was a low priority for Mahatma Gandhi. Master Tara Singh supported the civil disobedience resumed by Mahatma Gandhi in January 1932, and he was debarred from entering Lahore. About a month before the actual announcement of the Communal Award, the Sikhs held a general meeting at Lahore at which Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and Sir Jogendra Singh were present. A solemn vow was taken to oppose the probable award of statutory Muslim majority. Two weeks later appeared the news that Sir Jogendra Singh, in his communication to Sir Muhammad Iqbal, had agreed to a Muslim majority of 51 per cent. Master Tara Singh received a message to reach Simla where an amicable agreement was to be worked out with the Muslim leaders. He reached Simla but only to discover that the Sikh aristocrats were backing out, giving the impression that the Sikhs would accept the Award. Announced on 16 August 1932, the Communal Award confirmed the worst fears of the Akalis. Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislative Assembly was made statutory. The Congress adopted a neutral position, which was not appreciated by Master Tara Singh. Sikh leaders of various parties assembled at the Akal Takht on 25 September 1932 and formed a new organization, the Khalsa Darbar, to resist implementation of the Award. In March 1933, the White Paper issued by the government came as a confirmation of the Communal Award. In June 1933, the SGPC recorded that the Award was entirely unacceptable to the Sikhs, and the Panth would not submit to such a Constitution. However, the Sikh leaders became divided as supporters of Master Tara Singh or of Sardar Kharak Singh. As seen by Master Tara Singh, the situation went on deteriorating. The Khalsa Darbar could not function as a single unit. Eventually, Kharak Singh formed his Page 30 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader Central Akali Dal, with the support of Giani Sher Singh, as an organization parallel to the Shiromani Akali Dal. The Gursewak Sabha requested Master Tara Singh and Giani Sher Singh to retire from public life so that unity among the Sikhs might be restored. Master Tara Singh went into voluntary exile in the latter half of 1934, but not Giani Sher Singh. There was no sign of rapprochement among the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh returned to the Punjab on hearing about the death of Sewa Singh Thikriwala in jail and started an agitation against the Maharaja of Patiala. It ended in a compromise and the release of the Akali prisoners. The year 1935 was marked by the sensitive issue of Shahidganj to which the Sikhs attached a great deal of sanctity and importance as the place where a large number of Sikhs had died as martyrs. The Shahidganj Gurdwara was under the jurisdiction of the (p.199) SGPC and, consequently, a direct concern of Master Tara Singh. He was in favour of a reasonable concession but not to yield to the demand for Muslim control over the gurdwara. He was supported by the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal. On 4 November 1935, Master Tara Singh declared that to hand over Shahidganj to Muslims was beyond the power of any Sikh leader or Sikh organization or all the Sikh organizations combined. Throughout the agitation Master Tara Singh took a firm stand, which added to his popularity as a Sikh leader. The Congress showed no interest in the issue of Shahidganj. In 1936, Master Tara Singh showed serious interest in the conversion of Dalits to the Sikh faith. It brought B.R. Ambedkar closer to Master Tara Singh. The Khalsa College at Bombay is the lasting memorial of Sikh interest in the Dalits. However, Mahatma Gandhi was opposed to both Ambedkar and Master Tara Singh. It may be added, the Muslim League was prepared to utilize the Provincial Scheme of the Constitution in spite of its most objectionable features. The Congress rejected ‘the new Constitution in its entirety’ and demanded a Constituent Assembly to frame a new constitution for India. With more than half of the total 175 seats for Muslims in the Punjab Legislature, a Muslim domination in the Punjab was ensured. The Act of 1935 was in no way acceptable to the Akalis. Notes:

(1.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1989, reprint), pp. 270–83. (2.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), pp. 308–14; Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 284–5. Page 31 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (3.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 293. (4.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 316–22. (5.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 267–9. (6.) Gurharpal Singh, Communism in Punjab (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1994), pp. 40–52. See also Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Punjab 1897–1947 (New Delhi: ICHR, 1984), pp. 163–6, 171–3. (7.) Gurharpal Singh, Communism in Punjab, p. 170. Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party (1923–1947) (New Delhi: Manohar, 1999), pp. 71–2. Kirpal C. Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), pp. 67–71. (8.) S.L. Malhotra, From Civil Disobedience to Quit India (Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1979), pp. 1–23. (9.) K.L. Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40) (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984), pp. 149–50. (10.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics, pp. 149–50. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), pp. 54–5. (11.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 62–5. (12.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40), pp. 151–2. (13.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40), pp. 153–4. (14.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40), pp. 155–6. (15.) Malhotra, From Civil Disobedience to Quit India, pp. 9–11. (16.) Shamsher Singh Ashok (ed.), Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (Amritsar: SGPC, 2003, reprint), pp. 87–8. (17.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 94–8. Report of the Gurdwara Sisganj Enquiry Committee (Amritsar: SGPC, 1928). (18.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 97–8. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, pp. 55–6.

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (19.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Kaumī Jhande vich Sikhān dā Rang Pauṇ ton Inkār: Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru dī Chitthī par Vichār’, in Gurcharan Singh Giani, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988), pp. 68–71. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, p. 56. (20.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 98–9. (21.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, p. 66. (22.) For the resolutions of the Shiromani Akali Dal on the affairs of Daska, see Kirpal Singh (ed.), Panthic Mate (Chandigarh: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 2000), pp. 50–60. (23.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999, reprint), pp. 88–9. (24.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 108. (25.) Durlab Singh, The Valiant Fighter, p. 68. See also Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994, second edition), pp. 263–4. (26.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Sikh Pahāṛ dī Tarā Atal Rehaṇ’, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 80–2. (27.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 80. (28.) Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics (1920–1947)’, Ph.D. Thesis, Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 2005, p. 92 n. 71. (29.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, p. 265. (30.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40), pp. 158–9. (31.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 92. (32.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Karmān diā Baliā Ridhī Khīr te ho giā Daliā’ and ‘Sikhān Hinduān nāl be-insāfī dā namūnā’, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 82–4. (33.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 119–20. (34.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 123–4. (35.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 82. Page 33 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (36.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, p. 265. (37.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 134. (38.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Wazīr ‘Āzam de Firkādārī Faisle Virudh Panth dā Zabardāst Faislā—Sikh Hakkān dī Rākhī laī Kamarkase’, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 86–8. (39.) Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle, pp. 183–4. (40.) Waheed Ahmad (ed.), Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1976), pp. 229–30. (41.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 232–3, 246–7, 250–2. (42.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 255–7. (43.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 258–61. (44.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 265–8. (45.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 281–6, 295–6, 303–5. (46.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 394, 398. (47.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 80–2. (48.) Teja Singh, Ārsī (Amritsar: Lok Sahit Prakashan, n.d.), pp. 99–100. (49.) Teja Singh, Ārsī, pp. 100–1. (50.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, ed. Rajinder Kaur (Amritsar: Master Tara Singh Publications, 1969), pp. 1–2. (51.) Bimla Anand, Master Tara Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995), p. 93. (52.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 29–31. (53.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 51–3. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 70–7. (55.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 88–94. (56.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 47–8, 64–5, 111–13. (57.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 114–16. (58.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 118–21. Page 34 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (59.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 78–9. (60.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 80–3. (61.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 83–5. (62.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 87, 101. (63.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), pp. 103–15. (64.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 115–20. (65.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 102–5. (66.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 106–10. (67.) Master Tara Singh, Merā Safarnāmā, pp. 110–11. (68.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 123–6. (69.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 126–8. (70.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 77–8. (71.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 85–6. (72.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore (Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1935), pp. 43–65. (73.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore, pp. 66–75. (74.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore, pp. 79–89. (75.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 409–21. Sayed Habib blamed Fazl-i Husain personally in a letter but he refused to be intimidated. Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 421–2 (Fazl-i Husain’ letter in Urdu). (76.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 423–5. (77.) Ahmad, Letters of Mian Fazl-i Husain, pp. 448–9. (78.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidgang Lahore, pp. 89–93. (79.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidgang Lahore, pp. 93–4. (80.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidgang Lahore, pp. 94–101. (81.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 147–9. Page 35 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader (82.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 149–50. (83.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 150–1. (84.) Ganda Singh, History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore, pp. 102, 104–7, 112–15. (85.) Bhagat Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, ed. Ganda Singh (Calcutta: The Sikh Cultural Centre, 1965), pp. 279–81. (86.) Lakshman Singh, Autobiography, pp. 281–4. (87.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 90. (88.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 90–1. (89.) Lionel Carter (ed.), Punjab Politics 1936–1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy (Governor’s Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents) (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), p. 90. (90.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 91–2. (91.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 91. (92.) Sarkar, Modern India, p. 229. Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, Mahajan, and Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, pp. 291–5. (93.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jiwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 174–5. Punjabi translation published in the Akālī te Pardesī from 4 to 11 June 1936. (94.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 173–6. (95.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 176–7. (96.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 177–8. (97.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 182, 184. (98.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 184–6. (99.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 106. (100.) For an account of Khalsa College, Bombay, see Teja Singh, Ārsī, pp. 121–9. Teja Singh refers to Master Tara Singh in this account. At the time of his appeal for the collection of Rs 500,000 the Khalsa College collected Rs 30,000. This Page 36 of 37

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Master Tara Singh Emerges as the Foremost Sikh Leader amount was presented to him in the presence of hundreds of thousands of people gathered in his honour. Master Tara Singh’s pen was auctioned among other articles for Rs 1,100 and thousands of blankets were distributed among the refugees. Teja Singh, Ārsī, pp. 127–8. Sant Singh Sekhon, however, makes Master Tara Singh rather lukewarm about a Khalsa College at Bombay. Sant Singh Sekhon, Swai Jiwani, ed. Tejwant Singh Gill (Chandigarh: Lokgeet Prakashan, 2011), p. 178. (101.) Surjit Singh Gandhi gives some detail of the factional struggle among the Akali leaders: Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation (New Delhi: APD Computer Graphics, 1993), pp. 174–85.

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Facing New Challenges

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Facing New Challenges (1937–40) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0009

Abstract and Keywords The elections of 1936–7 under the new constitution made the Unionists more powerful. The Sikander–Jinnah Pact strengthened the position of the Muslim League in Indian politics. Sunder Singh Majithia tried to settle his scores with Master Tara Singh but the charge of embezzlement of funds against him was set aside by the court. Professor Niranjan Singh, Master Tara Singh’s younger brother, and some other professors of Khalsa College, Amritsar, were expelled from the College. They founded Sikh National College at Lahore. The issue of Shahidganj was raised again in April 1937, but the Sikh claim was upheld by the highest judicial authorities. The Lahore Resolution, popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, was passed by the Muslim League in March 1940. Seeing no future for the Sikhs in Pakistan, Master Tara Singh declared that the Sikhs wanted freedom and ‘not a change of masters’. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, elections of 1936–7, Unionists, Sikander–Jinnah Pact, Muslim League, Sunder Singh Majithia, Professor Niranjan Singh, Sikh National College, Shahidganj, Pakistan Resolution

The Act of 1935 confirmed the Communal Award with some modifications but retaining the statutory Muslim majority in the Punjab Legislature. The attitude of the Congress towards the Communal Award also changed and Master Tara Singh decided to form an alliance with the Congress for fighting the elections of 1936–7. Giani Sher Singh joined the Khalsa National Party led by Sir Sunder Singh Majithia who had an informal understanding with the Unionists. In the

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Facing New Challenges election of 1937 in the Punjab the Congress won eighteen seats, with five Sikhs among the winning candidates. The Khalsa National Party won fourteen seats and the Akali Dal ten. The Unionists formed a ministry with the support of 120 members out of 175. Sunder Singh Majithia was made a Minister and the Khalsa National Party supported the Ministry. The Akalis sat with the Congress in opposition. Sunder Singh Majithia tried to harass Master Tara Singh through litigation about matters related to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the elections and by dismissing Master Tara Singh’s brother, Professor Niranjan Singh, with four other Professors from Khalsa College, Amritsar. Professor Niranjan Singh established Sikh National College at Lahore as a rival to the Khalsa College. Master Tara Singh openly took a firm stand against what he regarded as the anti-Sikh policies and measures of Sikander Hayat Khan. Jinnah persuaded Sikander Hayat Khan to form a pact with the Muslim League, which compromised Sikander Hayat Khan’s position as the leader of the Unionist Party. The search for a decentralized federation led eventually to the Muslim League Resolution of March 1940, popularly called the Pakistan Resolution.

The Context The proposed Federal structure in the Act of 1935 was to become operative after half of the Indian princes had acceded. This part (p.204) of the Act was never implemented because the princes had become indifferent to the idea of a Federation for various reasons. The deadlock over this issue allowed the system of 1919 to continue unchanged indefinitely with total official control at the centre. The only significant step forward was taken in the provinces. Dyarchy was replaced by responsible government in all the departments, with substantial autonomy for the provinces. The electorate was increased from less than seven million to about thirty million. This change was most welcome to the All-India Muslim League and the Muslim Unionists in the Punjab. However, they were unhappy about the proposed Federal structure which was too unitary in their eyes to eliminate the danger of Hindu domination.1 The Congress did extremely well in the elections held early in 1937, winning 711 out of 1,585 provincial assembly seats, with absolute majorities in the United Provinces (UP), Bihar, Orissa, the Central Provinces (CP), and Madras, and a near-majority in Bombay. For seats reserved for Muslims, however, the Congress candidates won only twenty-six of the fifty-eight seats contested. The Congress won most of the Scheduled Caste seats, but in Bombay the Independent Labour Party of B.R. Ambedkar captured thirteen out of fifteen of the reserved seats. Electoral success strengthened the pressures for ministry formation. Congress ministries took office in six provinces, including Bombay. Subsequently, a Congress ministry was formed in the NWFP in 1937 and in Assam in September 1938.2

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Facing New Challenges During the election campaign, Jawaharlal Nehru had declared that there were only two forces in the country: the Congress and the government. To vote against the Congress was to perpetuate British domination. Jinnah refused to line up with the Congress. ‘There is a third party in this country’, he said, ‘and that is the Muslims.’ Jinnah knew that there could be no independence without Hindu–Muslim unity and he was determined that there should be no Hindu– Muslim unity without safeguards for Muslims. He was convinced that the Muslims could not be ignored in the struggle for independence.3 But the results of the elections of 1937 showed that the Muslim League was not the sole representative of Muslims. In the NWFP, where almost the entire population was Muslim, a Congress ministry was formed. In Bengal, the Muslim League had to accept a coalition. In the Punjab, the Unionists swept the polls. Rejected in the Muslim majority provinces, the League had nothing to offer at the Centre where the Act of 1935 was not likely to be implemented. In the provinces where the Congress had won comfortable majorities it saw no reason to dilute its control by giving the League any share.4 The Congress flag flew over public buildings when the new assemblies met to the strains of ‘Vande Mātram’. Congress membership shot up from half a million in 1936 to 4.5 million in 1938. The sudden access to power and patronage bred factional squabbles and position-hunting. The most serious problem was the balancing of diverse interests of communities and classes.5 ‘Many Congressmen began to give way to casteism in their search for power.’6 At the All-India Muslim League session at Lucknow in October 1937, Jinnah said: The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last 10 years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; and since they have formed Governments in the six provinces where they are in a majority, they have by their words, deeds and programmes (p.205) shown, more and more, that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. He went on to assure an audience of 5,000 Muslims who had arrived from all over India that eighty million Muslims in India had nothing to fear. They had a ‘magic power’ in their own hands.7 From its Lucknow session onwards, the All-India Muslim League tried to create a wider base, accepting complete independence with effective minority safeguards as its creed. The Congress was denounced for creating ‘class bitterness and communal war’. Jinnah was able to obtain informal adherence of the Unionist Premier, Sikander Hayat Khan (who had succeeded Fazl-i Husain), in the Punjab and the Krishak Praja leader Fazlul Huq in Bengal. Throughout the Congress rule of over two years the League kept up propaganda against the Congress on the charges that it failed to prevent communal riots, imposed ban Page 3 of 29

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Facing New Challenges on cow-slaughter at the time of Bakr-Id, encouraged the singing of ‘Vande Mātram’ on public occasions, and used Hindi in Devanagri script at the cost of Urdu. Nehru observed in October 1939 that the Congress leaders had been unable to check the growth of ‘anti-Congress feeling among the Muslim masses’.8 The Congress ministries resigned towards the end of October 1939 because the Governor General had associated India with Britain’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September 1939 without consulting the provincial ministries or any Indian leader. The Muslim League celebrated it as a ‘day of deliverance’. The Congress was prepared to give full cooperation in the war effort on the promise of a post-war Constituent Assembly to determine the political structure of a free India and the immediate formation of a responsible government at the Centre. The Governor General offered Dominion Status in an indefinite future and a promise merely to modify the Act of 1935. His attitude was part of the general British policy to regain the ground lost to the Congress, taking advantage of the presence of British and allied troops in India and the sweeping powers of new ordinances. Winston Churchill, who became the head of a national coalition in May 1940, could more than counterbalance Labour intentions of Attlee and Cripps. Linlithgow’s ‘August Offer’ of 1940 was little more than Dominion Status in an unspecified future, a post-war body to devise a new constitution, and immediate expansion of the Governor General’s Executive to include some more Indians. This was not acceptable to the Congress.9 Already in March 1940 the All-India Muslim League in its annual session at Lahore had passed the resolution which came to be popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution. This was not a sudden development. Muhammad Iqbal had referred to the need for a ‘North West Indian Muslim state’ in his presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930. A group of Punjabi Muslim students at Cambridge, led by Chaudhari Rehmat Ali, had coined the name ‘Pakistan’ for a state consisting of the Punjab, the Afghan province, Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. No notice was taken of these demands even by the Muslim League. After 1937, however, when the Federal clauses of the Act of 1935 were increasingly becoming difficult to be implemented, a number of alternative proposals were put forward in 1938–9. The Muslim League set up a subcommittee in March 1939 to examine the various schemes, including the one by the Punjab Premier Sikander Hayat Khan. The British authorities encouraged these alternative proposals. Linlithgow (p.206) told Jinnah on 6 February 1940 that British sympathy should not be expected ‘for a party whose policy was one of sheer negation’. With this hint apparently at the Congress, the Governor General suggested to Jinnah that if the Muslims wanted their case to be considered, ‘they should formulate their plan in the near future’.10

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Facing New Challenges The ‘near future’ turned out to be 23 March 1940. A resolution moved by Sikander Hayat and seconded by Khaliquzzaman demanded ‘that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and northeastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute “Independent States”, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign’. The wording was remarkably clumsy, probably deliberately so. There was no explicit mention of Pakistan or partition. But the term ‘Pakistan’ immediately came to be used for the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 by the non-Muslim press before it was taken up by the Muslim press and the people.11 In retrospect, it is possible to see that this resolution marked the beginning of a new phase in the political history of modern India. Sir Fazl-i Husain, a member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy since 1930, had returned to Punjab politics in April 1935. After some rest and study of the situation he decided to strengthen the Unionist Party for elections. The central office of the Party at Lahore was inaugurated on 1 April 1936. The All-India Muslim League’s resolution at its Bombay session on 12 April 1936 had authorized Jinnah to nominate a Parliamentary Board to contest elections in the provinces under the new Constitution for ‘strengthening the solidarity of the Muslim community’, and ‘securing for Muslims their proper and effective share in the provincial Governments’. Jinnah accordingly tried to persuade Fazl-i Husain to accept a programme of Muslim League ticket for all Muslim candidates. But Fazl-i-Husain was convinced that his own strategy was better for the Punjab. Nevertheless, he offered a compromise to Jinnah that for election to the Central Assembly, a common effort could be made in all the provinces to return all Muslim candidates on the Muslim League ticket. This was not acceptable to Jinnah. A few weeks later, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, General Secretary of the Unionist Party, made the same suggestion to ‘Allama Iqbal, President of the Punjab Provincial Parliamentary Board, and the latter wrote to Jinnah on 25 June 1936 that Muslim members of the Unionist Party were prepared for a compromise: their formula would make them Muslim Leaguers in all-India politics but they would remain Unionists in Punjab politics. Jinnah did not respond to this letter.12 There were two major factions among the Muslim Unionists: the Wah-Daultana and the Noon-Tiwana. A potential candidate to succeed Fazl-i Husain was Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, who represented the former faction and was Governor of the Reserve Bank of India at this time. Another potential candidate was Sir Firoz Khan Noon, who represented the other faction and was High Commissioner of India in London. Sikander Hayat Khan professed his loyalty to Fazl-i Husain, and he was keen to return to the Punjab with the idea of eventually replacing him as the leader. On 15 May 1936, Fazl-i Husain wrote to Sikander in annoyance that he should return to the Punjab and assume leadership (p.207) in his place. Page 5 of 29

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Facing New Challenges Khan Bahadur Chaudhari Sir Shahabuddin pleaded for unity and worked for reconciliation between them. A Memorandum of Reconciliation was signed by Sikander Hayat Khan, Chhotu Ram, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, Zafarullah Khan, and Shahabuddin himself. Before the end of May, Fazl-i Husain was appointed Education Minister in place of Firoz Khan Noon, who had been appointed High Commissioner for India in London.13 Fazl-i Husain died on 9 August 1936. Sikander Hayat Khan returned to the Punjab and became Minister of Revenue and leader of the Unionist Party. The Unionist Party fought the elections of 1936–7 under the leadership of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan and won the majority of seats. In accordance with his electoral understanding, the Hindu Election Board and the Khalsa National Party supported the Unionists, and Sikander Hayat Khan as the Prime Minister had a majority of 120 in an assembly of 175 members. The Unionist Ministry pursued the familiar policy of promoting the interests of the agriculturalists and the backward classes. Though professedly a non-communal Party, following a secular policy, the Ministry worked largely in favour of Muslims. The provincial autonomy of the new Constitution made it all the more powerful. The Muslim majority in the assembly, with Sir Sikander Hayat Khan as Prime Minister and Sir Shahabuddin as Speaker, became the visible symbols of Muslim political domination in the Punjab. Subordination of the Ministry to the colonial government was symbolized by the Governor presiding over the assembly meetings.14 The Unionists were able to have their way in the assembly but not without much criticism by the opposition. Some of the subjects for debate were: (a) the composition of the Public Services Commission, (b) the salaries of the Ministers, (c) the language to be spoken in the assembly, (d) government intervention in the work of the Ministers, (e) release of political prisoners like the Babbar Akalis, and (f) freedom of the press. The most important pro-agriculturist Bills passed by the assembly in 1938 related to: (a) registration of moneylenders, (b) third amendment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, and (c) marketing of agricultural produce.15 On the outbreak of communal riots in the Punjab in March 1937, Sikander Hayat assured the House that he would eradicate communal bitterness. In June 1937, he convened an All-Parties Conference at which the communal incidents were strongly condemned and an appeal was made to the people, the press, and the administration to avert the propagation of such deplorable happenings and not to do anything likely to disturb communal peace and goodwill in the province. A sub-committee was formed to explore all avenues for promoting relations between the various communities and to go into the causes of communal friction. All the members expressed their concern over the growth of

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Facing New Challenges communalism but there was no agreement on its causes or the means of its eradication. How to minimize the differences was the crux of the problem.16 According to Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana, Sikander was keen that the AllIndia Muslim League should be an effective mouthpiece of the all-India Muslim community. To withstand the Congress demands, the Government of India wanted to strengthen the League. Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan had talks at Lucknow on the eve of the annual session of the All-India Muslim League in October 1937 which led to an acceptable compromise. The Sikander–Jinnah Pact (p.208) provided for reconstitution of the Provincial Parliamentary Board of the League, and the constitution of Muslim League was amended at its Lucknow session to enable the Provincial League Councils to function also as Parliamentary Boards in future. The Pact was interpreted differently by the leaders of the Punjab Muslim League and the Unionists. In August 1939, Jinnah supported the position taken up by Sikander Hayat Khan.17 However, Sikander Hayat Khan suffered a loss of credibility as the professed champion of unity among the Punjabis. The sub-committee formed after the Unity Conference stood discredited. The Working Committee of the Punjab Provincial Congress passed a resolution on 19 October 1937 that no useful purpose could be served by the participation of Congressmen in the Unity Conference ‘now that Sikander Hayat Khan had joined the Muslim League’. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia called upon the Unionist Party in November to issue an authoritative statement on the Pact. Chaudhari Chhotu Ram warned Sikander Hayat Khan of the possible implications of the Pact for the future. Gokul Chand Narang left the treasury benches to join the Opposition.18 The inherent contradiction between the regional stance of the Muslim Unionists and their pledged support for Muslim League in Indian politics could not be explained away easily. The Communists in the Punjab were gaining strength. A confidential official report of August 1938 noted ‘intense rural activity on communist lines’ in the central districts and the canal colonies. The Punjab Kisan Committee, formed in 1937 by the Kirtī Kisan Party and the Congress Socialist Party, had given a new turn to peasant organization. A series of morchās were launched to mobilize the peasantry. The Amritsar morchā of July–August 1938 led to violent clashes in which several hundred peasants were arrested. They were protesting against the enhancement of land revenue and reduction in the supply of canal water. In the Lahore morchā of February–August 1939, nearly 1,700 people were arrested. Jathās from the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Firozpur, and Ambala marched to Lahore on foot and courted arrest. Polictical awakening was spreading among the peasants when the struggle was withdrawn following the outbreak of World War II. The Kirtī Kisan Party and the Congress Socialist Party worked at infiltrating the army. Soldiers on leave were influenced by Communist propaganda. The Kirtī Kisan Party moved its headquarters to Meerut Page 7 of 29

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Facing New Challenges and established contacts with the serving Indian soldiers. Revolutionary literature was smuggled into the regimental lines and soldiers were instructed to form their own cells.19 The Communist-led Kisan committees began to appear in the princely states of the Punjab in 1937. An armed clash between tenants and landlords at a village near Dhuri in November 1937, in which two tenants were killed and nine wounded, heralded a new phase of militant peasant movement in the Patiala state. The Enquiry Committee appointed by the Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal, with Master Hari Singh, a Punjab MLA, as one of the three members, held that the firing was unnecessary, unjustifiable, excessive, and uncontrolled. The committee demanded suspension of the guilty officials, arrest of the landlords, and compensation for the victims. Maharaja Bhupindar Singh announced in January 1938 the setting up of a Constitutional Reform Committee. He died soon after and Maharaja Yadvindra Singh succeeded him in February 1938. Sardar Harchand Singh (p.209) Jeji, whose daughter was married to the new Maharaja on 9 August 1938, withdrew from the Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal, leaving the organization in the hands of Bhagwan Singh Longowalia and Jagir Singh Joga who had come under the influence of Marxist ideology. Well-known Communist leaders from the Punjab were invited to speak at public meetings organized by the Praja Mandal. Among them were Sohan Singh Josh, B.P.L. Bedi, Arjan Singh Gargaj, Karam Singh Mann, and Baba Rur Singh. A new political awakening was visible in all the Punjab states under the influence of the Indian National Congress as well as the Communist leadership. In February 1939, Jawaharlal Nehru presided over the All India States’ People’s Conference at Ludhiana. Two resolutions passed at the conference were on ‘responsible government’ and ‘restoration of civil liberty’.20 On the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Unionist Government proclaimed complete support to it. The defence of India ordinance, promulgated on 3 September 1939, was applicable to the provinces. Sikander Hayat Khan warned the people that those who spoke against recruitment would be arrested. On behalf of the ruling party, a Sikh Unionist moved the resolution on 3 November that the assembly approved of the policy of the Punjab Government in condemning Fascist and Nazi aggression, and declared its determination to resist this aggression and to protect the security and honour of the Punjab and India. The resolution was passed by 103 votes to 39. This unconditional and total support to the war effort was not acceptable to the Congress, nor was it to the Akali Dal.21 The Congress changed its attitude towards the Communal Award which was seen as anti-national and anti-democratic. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to Master Tara Singh in November 1936 expressing sympathy with the Sikh stand. This had paved the way for an electoral pact between the Akalis and the

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Facing New Challenges Congress. The Khalsa Nationalist Party, on the other hand, had the support of Giani Sher Singh and an understanding with the Muslim Unionists.22

Conflict with Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia Sir Herbert Emerson, the Punjab Governor, wrote to the Governor General, Lord Linlithgow, in October 1936 that the Akalis had exercised a dominating influence in Sikh politics for some years, and the Sikhs of moderate views had neither the courage nor the energy to oppose them. Akali politics had been controlled to a large extent by non-agriculturist leaders, especially Khatris and Aroras. They controlled the SGPC and, therefore, the gurdwara funds. Master Tara Singh was a man of ‘considerable force of character, uncompromising in his views and generally anti-Government’; he had not been able to control the Communist and revolutionary elements among the Sikhs. Giani Sher Singh’s party at any rate was now very weak. However, the Akalis were not yet allied with the Congress because they were ‘bitterly opposed to the Communal Award’, even though they professed to follow ‘the Congress creed of non-cooperation and wrecking of the Constitution’. They were expected to gain a fair number of Sikh seats. Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, who was ‘very loyal and generally trusted’, was the leader of the Chief Khalsa Diwan party. His chief lieutenant was Sir Jogendra Singh. They were optimistic regarding their chances in the elections.23 The Act of 1935 had created four kinds of constituencies: Muslim, General, Sikh, and (p.210) others. In the last category were Europeans, Anglo-Indians, and Indian Christians, and those of the functional groups such as commerce, labour, and university graduates. The other three categories were further divided into urban, rural and other. The ‘other’ consisted of women and landowners. Out of the 175 seats, ninety-five were won by the Unionists. Among them were seventyfour Muslims, thirteen general, and eight others. The Indian National Congress won eighteen seats, out of which two were Muslim, eleven general, and five Sikh. The Khalsa National Party won fourteen seats and the Shiromani Akali Dal ten. The Hindu Electoral Board, with its two factions led by Raja Narendra Nath and Gokul Chand Narang, won eleven seats. There were nineteen independent members besides two each from the Majlis-i Ahrar and the Itihad-i Millat and one each from the Muslim League, Congress Nationalists, Socialists, and Labour. Supported by the Khalsa National Party and the Hindu Electoral Board, the Unionists formed absolute majority with 120 members. All others sat in opposition. The Congress and the Akali Dal, together, represented the most organized part of the opposition.24 According to Master Tara Singh, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia had faced a tough opposition from the Akalis during his election from Batala. After the elections he was made a Minister and, with the backing of Sikander Hayat Khan, he began to work against Master Tara Singh.25 Emerson alleged in May 1937 that the Akalis had used ‘religious funds for the purpose of bribing the electorate’. A complaint to this effect was lodged before the District Magistrate Page 9 of 29

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Facing New Challenges of Amritsar, and the case was taken up by the police. Cases of embezzlement were under investigation and ‘there will certainly be enough evidence to produce them in court’. Emerson underlined that Master Tara Singh, ‘the outstanding figure in Akali circles for some years, is apparently involved in the embezzlements’. Whatever the outcome of the criminal cases, Emerson felt gratified that ‘the credit of the Akalis will be severely shaken’.26 Master Tara Singh says that cases against the Akalis were fabricated. The offices of the SGPC, Shiromani Akali Dal, All India Sikh Mission, Sri Darbar Sahib Committee, and Sri Nankana Sahib Committee were searched several times but no evidence was found to incriminate the Akali leaders. The suits which were filed by Sardar Khazan Singh were dismissed by the High Court. One of these suits was that the SGPC had spent money on parchār in excess of its authority. It was found, however, that every single penny was accounted for. The Judge dismissed the charge with the remark that the white sheet of the SGPC had no stain on it.27 Principal Niranjan Singh clarifies the financial position. The Akali candidate from Batala in the elections was Jathedar Teja Singh Akarpuri and his contest with Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia was regarded by the Akalis to be of crucial importance. Against official backing for him, the Akalis mobilized all their resources. Master Sujan Singh was in charge of the Akali campaign. His main task was to collect funds. Demand for cash increased with the day of election coming closer. Sardar Bhag Singh, the Akali candidate for Gurdaspur, took some money from the SGPC funds with the intention of putting it back when more funds were collected. His example encouraged others and Rs 25,000 to Rs 30,000 were taken out of the SGPC funds for the elections. Legally, this amounted to misappropriation. Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia came to know of this through Lal Singh, Secretary of the SGPC (later Secretary (p.211) of the Khalsa College Council of which Sardar Sunder Singh was the President). The Akali leaders thought of a way out. In the account books of the SGPC the amount taken out of its funds was shown as a loan to the Khalsa College, Bombay. Sardar Indar Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh’s father, provided the amount needed and it was credited to the Khalsa College, Bombay, on behalf of the SGPC.28 Before the end of May 1937, Emerson wrote to Linlithgow that there was trouble in the Khalsa College, Amritsar. The Principal had issued a statement which indicated that the students had been incited by some teachers to go on strike, and six students were rusticated for one year. The student leaders invited people (Akalis) from outside for their support and the crowd asked the Principal to take back the orders of rustication. When the crowd refused to disperse, the police resorted to lāṭhī charge under the orders of a Magistrate. Emerson went on to add that the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the Khalsa College was Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, ‘the Revenue Minister’. His ‘enemies’ had tried to create

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Facing New Challenges trouble in the College previously and this probably was the case in the present instance.29 The Governor’s support was with the College authorities. The ‘enemies’ of Majithia were soon identified: ‘Sikh extremists hostile to Sir Sunder Singh’. The root causes of the trouble were two Professors of extremist views. One of them was a brother of Master Tara Singh. The Committee had got rid of him, and the student leaders who had gone on strike against this decision had been rusticated. Police intervention might accentuate the trouble for the time being, but it was very ‘desirable on general grounds that indiscipline among students should be checked’.30 In short, the students of the College had gone on strike because the College Committee under the Chairmanship of Majithia had dispensed with the services of Professor Niranjan Singh, the younger brother of the Akali leader Master Tara Singh, and the government was behind Sir Sunder Singh. According to Professor Niranjan Singh, Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia told him that the British Government and the Sikh states were the chief financial supporters of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, and their representatives dominated the Managing Committee of the College. Therefore, the only option for Sardar Sunder Singh was to support the government. ‘But I was also helpless,’ says Professor Niranjan Singh. ‘Mahatma Gandhi loomed large in my imagination and to walk on the way shown by him appeared to me as the only right path.’ The Principal told Professor Niranjan Singh that Sardar Sunder Singh expected him to support him in the elections. But Niranjan Singh began to oppose Majithia with the support of some enthusiastic students. Four other Professors of the College joined him in this campaign. But Sardar Sunder Singh won the seat. His victory was celebrated in the College. Professor Niranjan Singh was the only teacher of the College not to join the celebration. He was advised by all his wellwishers to change his attitude but he felt ‘helpless’. The Managing Committee removed him and four other Professors from service.31 Emerson had no doubt that the persons dismissed were ‘a very unhealthy influence in the College’.32 Master Sunder Singh Lyallpuri is stated to have written a pamphlet entitled ‘Professor Niranjan Singh Guru Gorakh of the Masand Party’. It was distributed among the students of Khalsa College, and many of them turned against Professor Niranjan Singh. He was obliged to leave the College with four other (p.212) Professors who were aligned with him.33 Sant Singh Sekhon, the wellknown Marxist writer, reveals in his autobiography that this pamphlet was written by him. The expense on its printing was borne by Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji and it was distributed among the students by Ujagar Singh Bhaura. The targets of Sekhon’s criticism were Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, Master Tara Singh, Professor Niranjan Singh, and Bawa Harkishan Singh. Sekhon was opposed to the understanding between the Maharaja and Master Tara Singh. Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji, Master Sunder Singh, and Ujagar Singh Bhaura, as well as Sekhon were aligned with the Praja Mandal against the Maharaja and Page 11 of 29

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Facing New Challenges Master Tara Singh. Primarily, however, Sekhon was annoyed with Niranjan Singh.34 Maharaja Bhupinder Singh was no longer hostile towards the Akalis. Emerson noted in September 1937 that the Maharaja of Patiala appeared to be ‘going back on his agreement’ with regard to the dismissal of the Professors of Khalsa College.35 If he was not actually giving a lukewarm support to the agitators, he had certainly withdrawn his support to the Managing Committee.36 Indeed, in October 1937, the Maharaja of Patiala sent a telegram to Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia just before the strike, saying that he would not allow his representatives to attend the Managing Committee and that action should be taken against some other members of the staff ‘hostile to the Akalis in the College’. The Maharaja appeared to intervene on behalf of the Akalis. Emerson hoped that Sir Sunder Singh would ‘remain firm, not only because of the immediate issue, but because Patiala has a way of intervening in Sikh affairs whenever he has a chance’.37 Emerson was evidently keen to keep the ‘extremist’ Akalis out of the Khalsa College. A new college established at Lahore called the Sikh National College, with the support of Master Tara Singh and Sadar Baldev Singh, was ‘nothing short of a miracle’ for Professor Niranjan Singh.38 But it was an eyesore for not only Sardar Sunder Singh but also Sir Henry Craik, the new Governor of the Punjab. He wrote to the Governor General in February 1939 that ‘an institution recently started in Lahore’ had secured affiliation to the Punjab University. It was entirely controlled by ‘the Akali Sikhs of extremist views’ who had founded it with the express intention of making it ‘a rival of the Khalsa College at Amritsar’. Some of the Professors dismissed from Khalsa College, Amritsar, ‘for grave acts of insubordination’ were appointed as Professors in the Sikh National College. The Khalsa College was an institution of old standing and the leading Sikh College in the province. It was the favoured ‘child’ of the Revenue Minister, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, who had nurtured it for more than thirty years and was Chairman of the Managing Body. He was likely to be ‘deeply pained’ at the announcement of donation of Rs 200,000 by the Maharaja of Patiala to the Sikh National College at Lahore, ‘the rival’ of the Khalsa College at Amritsar.39 The Punjab Governor did not like that the new Maharaja of Patiala should have announced a donation for the Sikh National College. Presumably, the Viceroy was expected to ensure that the Maharaja did not pay the donation. In any case, it is clear that Craik looked at the two institutions strictly from the political angle. He identified himself with the Khalsa College at Amritsar under the management of a moderate Sikh leader and he was essentially hostile to the Sikh National College at Lahore under the control of the extremist Sikh leaders.

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Facing New Challenges (p.213) Conflict with Sir Sikander Hayat Khan Emerson observed in September 1937 that a succession of communal troubles had somewhat shaken the confidence of some senior officers in the ability of the Unionist Government to deal firmly with serious trouble.40 In October 1939, Craik wrote that communal differences had been greatly aggravated by the working of the provincial autonomy since April 1937. ‘Even a man so sane and moderate in his outlook has repeatedly expressed to me in private conversation his conviction that the Congress Governments have gravely oppressed the Muslim minorities in their charge.’41 This sane and moderate person was Sikander Hayat Khan. Ironically, however, Master Tara Singh charged Sikander Hayat Khan himself of anti-Sikh bias in what Emerson calls ‘a truculent letter addressed to the Premier’.42 Master Tara Singh took credit for being the first to expose the communal outlook and attitude of Sikander Hayat Khan.43 A contemporary biographer of Master Tara Singh believed that his widely publicized letter was ‘a precious document’.44 Master Tara Singh wrote to Sir Sikander Hayat Khan that all his efforts were meant ‘to establish Muslim domination in the province’. The British Government desired to continue to exploit India and they had begun to favour and cajole the Muslims. Consequently, the Muslim attitude in the Punjab became ‘arrogant and aggressive’. The condition had worsened after Sikander Hayat’s taking charge of the government. The Sikhs were not prepared to submit to ‘communal inequalities’ or ‘to recognize the social and political supremacy of the Muslims in the province’. The Akalis would foil Sikander Hayat Khan’s efforts ‘to win over some Sikhs and coerce others into submission’. In support of his allegation, Master Tara Singh refers to Sikander Hayat Khan’s attitude towards (a) Gurdwara Kot Bhai Than Singh, (b) Muslim aggression against the Sikhs in Gujrat villages, (c) the affair of Jandiala Sher Khan, (d) the removal of five Professors from Khalsa College, Amritsar, and (e) the Shrimoni Akali Dal and the SGPC. Master Tara Singh appealed to Sikander Hayat Khan to give up his ‘communal policy’ and to work for ‘the freedom of the country and the amelioration of the economic and social condition of the starving millions living in the province’. If he took to ‘the noble work of liberating the country and serving the masses’ to promote ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’, the services of Master Tara Singh and those whom he represented would be at the disposal of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan.45 There were a number of ‘communal incidents’ in the province. In Rawalpindi in the past year or two, several serious clashes between Muslims and Sikhs had been avoided with difficulty. The cause of tension was processions. The Sikh processions used to pass in front of the main mosque in the city and Muslim processions used to pass through the main Hindu and Sikh bazaars. Efforts were made to work out an agreement to change the routes. Emerson was of the view that an ‘established practice has sometimes to give way to the clear requirements of law and order’.46 A new agreement between the Sikh and Page 13 of 29

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Facing New Challenges Muslim communities of the city was reached early in January 1937 and Emerson was satisfied that ‘Government will now be able to stand on the new agreement’ without incurring the blame that an established practice was not adhered to. In Amritsar there was ‘a stupid communal murder’. A Sikh was murdered by a fanatical (p.214) Muslim for no reason whatever, and there was great excitement in the city for several days.47 In Kot Fateh Khan, damage was done to the gurdwara and a granthī reading the Granth Sahib was murdered. The Sikhs were talking of taking large Sikh jathās to Kot Fateh Khan on the day of Baisakhi. Emerson hoped that the dispute would be settled.48 Early in June 1937, a Nihang Sikh was murdered in the village of Ala in Gujrat district. The Sikhs announced a dīwān to be held in the village and published provocative posters. On 13 June, Sikhs began to arrive at the neighbouring railway station. They were attacked by Muslim mobs. Two or three Sikhs were killed and about sixteen injured. The police had to open fire three times. Five Muslims were killed. About forty villages of the area were involved in this matter. There was great indignation among the Sikhs. The funeral procession of a Sikh whose corpse had been sent from Gujrat was taken out at Amritsar by about 10,000 Sikhs who attacked Muslims indiscriminately; about sixty Muslims were reported to have been injured and one of them had died. The events in Gujrat and Amritsar indicated the existence of tense feeling between Sikhs and Muslims. The Punjab Governor made a self-justificatory comment: the enmity between the two sides was a ‘matter of history’; it was always there, and it was ‘certain to remain’.49 The government ordered a general enquiry into the causes of the trouble. The lawlessness witnessed in about thirty villages ‘could hardly have happened had there not been organized efforts to stir up the religious prejudices and hatred of the population’. Indeed, a few agitators could stir up serious trouble ‘at very short notice’. The press on both sides was extremely bitter about occurrences in Gujrat and Amritsar. Sikander Hayat Khan held a conference to consider the situation. Apart from the Ministers, the conference was attended by nonofficials, members of the Legislature, and other prominent men of the province. A number of resolutions were passed. It was decided to set up two small committees of non-officials to consider (a) religious causes and (b) political causes. This conference was not expected to have a lasting effect. Emerson himself was unenthusiastic about ‘bringing into general prominence subjects of a highly controversial character in regard to which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any measure of agreement in a committee consisting of representatives of different communities’.50 In August 1937, trouble arose again in Kot Fateh Khan when the District Magistrate forbade the Sikhs from drawing water for use in the gurdwara from the nearby stream where Muslim women used to draw water and bathe. The Sikhs decided to start a morchā and two volunteers were arrested every day for about a week for disobeying the official order. Master Tara Singh was ‘hesitant Page 14 of 29

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Facing New Challenges to take up the matter on a big scale’. Kot Fateh Khan was in a predominantly Muslim area and its Muslim landlord was supporting the government as a member of the Legislative Assembly. Soon afterwards, the High Court modified the order of the District Magistrate and fixed hours during which Sikhs could draw water from the disputed stream. The Magistrate prohibited the Muslims from drawing water during those hours. The Sikhs abandoned the idea of civil disobedience.51 In the month of September 1937 there was Sikh–Muslim trouble in the Sheikhupura district which resulted in the death of six persons. Fortunately, however, it was not followed by a general fight between the Sikhs and the Muslims who numbered 6,000 and 3,000 respectively. But the pattern of (p. 215) the trouble was becoming common: a local incident of trivial importance, followed by a Sikh religious gathering, resentment of Muslims, and a situation of armed confrontation. It is interesting to note that in this pattern the incident of trivial importance involves something happening to a Sikh, but the Governor takes a supposedly neutral position, implying that the Sikhs reacted to the incident to embarrass the government and that their reaction justified the further action by Muslims. On this assumption, the government issued a letter to all district officers to make it clear that ‘considerations of law and order were paramount, and where one party deliberately gives provocation to others under the guise of religion, the District Magistrate must consider the danger to the public peace, and, if necessary, forbid the observances, after a reference to Government if time permits’. This policy was discussed in the Council of Ministers. How this could improve the situation is not clear because this order left a large degree of discretion with the local administrator. In any case, Emerson himself records: ‘The communal situation generally gives considerable cause of anxiety.’52 These official reports appear to confirm Master Tara Singh’s contention that Sikh–Muslim tension was increasing during Sikander Hayat Khan’s term as the Premier, often due to an aggressive stance of Muslims.

Shahidganj Again The issue that spanned the whole phase as the symbol of tension between Sikhs and Muslims was the old issue of Shahidganj. During the elections of 1937, the Itihad-i Millat tried to revive the Shahidganj agitation in order to improve its election chances. In Emerson’s view, this illustrated the danger of ‘unscrupulous exploitation of religious feeling for party or individual ends’.53 In April, a gang of irresponsible Muslims were inclined to revive the Shahidganj agitation purely for political purposes.54 As a direct or indirect consequence of the Shahidganj issue, there were a number of isolated murders of Sikhs by fanatical Muslims in June. The Sikhs had not tried to take reprisals but the situation was changing. Both communities now were ‘itching for a fight’.55

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Facing New Challenges On 22 October 1937, the Friday congregation in the Badshahi Mosque was unusually large, and a meeting held after the prayers was attended by about 5,000 persons. Resolutions were passed, asking for the return of the site of Shahidganj to Muslims. However, there was no follow-up. Presumably, the leaders of the meeting had been allowed to pass resolutions on the understanding that the Ministry would not be embarrassed further. But the Muslim League had also passed a resolution that could embarrass Sikander Hayat Khan. Legally, the courts had consistently recognized the right of the Sikhs who had been in possession of the site for 175 years. An appeal against the judgment of the District Judge was pending in the High Court, which would take it up when the executive authorities indicated that the time was convenient. In the normal course, a further appeal could be made to the Privy Council by the unsuccessful party. Litigation was, therefore, likely to continue for ‘several years’.56 Before the end of 1937, the appeal had been heard by the High Court but the judgment was reserved. It was to be announced on ‘a date convenient to the executive’.57 The Ahrars now became somewhat active in connection with the Shahidganj issue. Maulavi Mazhar Ali Azhar, the Ahrar member of the Legislative Assembly, offered (p.216) himself for arrest with nine others. They were arrested on their way from the Badshahi Mosque to the Shahidganj Gurdwara. Their action appeared to have been inspired entirely by political motives and they failed to evoke much sympathy among Muslims.58 The Ahrar campaign of civil disobedience continued. It was a direct outcome of the Lucknow Conference at which a resolution was passed by the Muslim League demanding that the place should be restored to Muslims.59 Five persons were arrested daily for more than a month. On 26 January 1938, a full bench of the High Court delivered its appellate judgment, with the majority decision confirming the previous findings of the civil court and a long dissenting judgment by Justice Din Muhammad. The immediate effect of this judgment was a haṛtāl in some Muslim quarters; Muslim newspapers came out with headlines. The Ahrar volunteers began to offer themselves for arrest every day. The issue had become very live again.60 Meetings were held by Muslims in the Badshahi Mosque on 27 and 28 January 1938 but there was no mob action and no clash with the police. Maulana Zafar Ali, a Member of the Central Legislature, discouraged any precipitate action. Non-violent agitation was not likely to cause much trouble. In early February, the number of those offering themselves for arrest increased and Emerson anticipated that if 18 February, fixed as the Shahidganj Day, passed quietly, the civil disobedience movement in Lahore would become a matter of routine and fade away in a few months. The Muslim League had passed a resolution, reaffirming the pledge to secure the restoration of the Shahidganj site. But this could be achieved only ‘in face of the fierce opposition of the Sikh community as a whole, who, it may be observed, attach more genuine sanctity to the place than

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Facing New Challenges do the Muslims’. Meanwhile, efforts were being made to delay the issue by an appeal to the Privy Council.61 Before the end of February, Khalid Latif Gauba and Malik Barkat Ali proposed to introduce two Bills in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The Punjab Governor thought that the Bills could not be allowed to pass into law for various reasons. The Bills were introduced partly to make a popular appeal to Muslim sentiment, but mainly to embarrass the Ministry, especially the Muslim Ministers. There were signs of Muslim feeling about the Shahidganj issue increasing rather than abating. The Muslim members of the assembly were beginning to feel the tension between their religious sentiments and their political loyalty. The Governor was not inclined to allow the Bills to be introduced.62 The submission of private Bills was a troublesome feature of the Shahidganj agitation. In all, twenty-four Muslim members of the assembly put in motions for leave to introduce the Bill in the terms sponsored by Malik Barkat Ali. Several of them were likely to withdraw their motions if asked by the party to do so, but there were others who could refuse to withdraw. Meanwhile, both Muslims and Sikhs were expressing their views and feelings regarding the Bills in the press and on the platform. Muslim members of the assembly were subjected to great pressure to sign the Bill or to be considered unbelievers. Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders on the Sikh side were making strong statements and speeches with demands that the Governor should refuse sanction to the Bills. Both Emerson and Sikander Hayat Khan were in favour of a settlement between Sikhs and Muslims. A very important obstacle in their way was Master Tara Singh. Sir Sundar Singh (p.217) Majithia was not prepared to approach Master Tara Singh directly but he could explore the chances of settlement indirectly. Emerson got the impression that Sikander Hyat Khan was trying to put pressure on the Sikhs ‘to come to an amicable settlement’.63 There was pressure on the Governor too. It was clear that the Bills could not be introduced in the Legislative Assembly without the Governor’s sanction under Section 299(3) of the Act of 1935. But the Ministry could resign, and if it resigned in connection with the Shahidganj issue, the Governor saw no alternative Ministry able to carry on, except possibly a purely Muslim Ministry pledged to the restoration of Shahidganj to the Muslims. But in that case the Ministry would come into direct conflict with the Governor’s special responsibilities. The only desirable course was to evolve an amicable settlement between Sikhs and Muslims. Otherwise ‘the peace and tranquility of the Province was likely to be gravely disturbed’. Therefore, the issue before the Governor was not merely constitutional but also political.64 As Emerson informed Linlithgow on 9 March 1938, the Ministers would advise him formally on the 14th to withhold his consent and this would become known on the 15th of March. On the advice of the Ministers the then Governor withheld consent to Malik Barkat Ali’s Bill. The Premier made a statement in the assembly. There Page 17 of 29

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Facing New Challenges was an attempt to move a vote of no confidence against the government but only two members supported the move.65 The Executive Committee of the SGPC declared that there could be no talk whatever of any compromise. The Governor had a long and serious talk with Sir Sunder Singh and he gave the impression that the Sikhs were content to let matters drift. The Governor tried to impress upon him the need for a settlement, because the Muslim leaders would not be able to stall the issue for long. Sir Sunder Singh promised to do something but the Governor was not hopeful. Sikander Hayat Khan met Master Tara Singh secretly on 3 April 1938. The meeting did not lead to any positive result. Sikander Hayat Khan thought that Master Tara Singh was not opposed to a settlement but the political situation among the Sikhs did not leave much room for him to think of a settlement. The Governor thought it was good that Sikander Hayat Khan and Master Tara Singh had got into personal touch.66 Sikander Hayat Khan went to Calcutta for the annual session of the Muslim League. He was able to handle the resolution on Shahidganj to his satisfaction. Simultaneously with its report in the press appeared a strong statement from Master Tara Singh against any settlement. The Milāp had attributed a false statement to Sikander Hyat Khan at Calcutta that the Sikhs had agreed to a settlement. Master Tara Singh’s denial was based on that false report. Sikander Hayat Khan gathered from a leading supporter of Master Tara Singh that both the Khalsa National Party and the Akali Dal were afraid that a statement made by one in favour of settlement would be used against it by the other in Sikh politics. Sikander Hayat Khan was gratified that the local Sikhs of the Khalsa National Party at Lyallpur presented an address to him in which he was compared with Maharaja Ranjit Singh who enjoyed the confidence of the Sikhs and the Muslims alike. Giani Sher Singh made a speech in similar terms. He was critical of Master Tara Singh. Sikander Hayat Khan’s own speech was very well received.67 Presumably, he hoped that there was a possibility of settlement with the Sikhs. In May 1938, the new Governor, Sir Henry Craik, reported that the Ahrars had (p.218) announced their decision to abandon civil disobedience. However, Maulana Zafar Ali of the Itihad-i Millat decided to continue the protest because of ‘the irreconcilable attitude adopted by the Akalis and Master Tara Singh and the wayward policy of the Majlis-i Ahrar’.68 Before the end of May, the High Court granted the Muslims leave to appeal to the Privy Council, with an injunction against any building being erected on the disputed site pending the decision of the appeal. The Itihad-i Millat now reversed their decision to persist in civil disobedience.69

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Facing New Challenges The Secretary of State for India, Lord Zetland, sent a telegram to the Governor General and the Punjab Governor on 5 October 1939, asking them to consider the possibility of inducing the parties concerned in the Shahidganj appeal to the Privy Council to sink their differences at least temporarily in view of the war.70 Lord Linlithgow sent a copy of this telegram to Craik for his response. Craik wrote that the Akali leaders were in ‘a somewhat truculent mood and bitter in their opposition to Muslims generally and to the Unionist Ministry in particular’. If the Privy Council decision was in favour of the Sikhs they would not refrain from erecting some building on the site. It might be possible, however, to persuade some moderate Sikhs to put forward quietly a suggestion that the Sikhs should make a generous gesture and agree to leave the site as it was but railed off and open to access by the public. This was broadly the proposal of Sikander Hayat Khan in the spring of 1938. Craik was not hopeful that this suggestion would be acceptable now. Therefore, he suggested that the only way to avoid a revival of bitter communal tension was to ‘secure a postponement of the hearing of the appeal’ if this could be done in some way by the Secretary of State. On the following day, Craik suggested that the Muslims could probably be advised quietly to put in an application to this effect.71 On 24 October, Craik informed Linlithgow that a Muslim Advocate in Lahore, who was in charge of the case, had written to the Solicitors concerned in London to apply for postponement on the plea that it had become impossible for the local counsel to secure a passage to England. Craik added that ‘a postponement of hearing of the appeal is much to be desired’.72 In January 1940, Craik’s information on the appeal to the Privy Council was that the Sikh respondents were opposed to postponement and their Solicitors had informed them that the Court was unlikely to grant an adjournment.73 Sikander observed in April 1940 that the Privy Council judgment in the Shahidganj case was likely to be published in a few days. The Khaksars might find an opportunity for making a bid for Muslim sympathy by leading attacks on the Sikhs if the Shahidganj controversy got revived.74 Early in May, Craik observed that the announcement of the Privy Council decision in the Shahidganj case had caused less excitement than he had anticipated. The Sikhs were anxious not to increase Muslim ill-feeling towards themselves. They were not in a hurry to build on the old site but if and when they do, the real trouble would recommence.75 Shahidganj, however, does not figure in the subsequent reports of the Punjab Governor. His worry on this score, and the worry of the Unionists as well as the Sikhs, was virtually over.

From the Sikander–Jinnah Pact to the Muslim League’s Resolution of 1940 In October 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru attended a political conference in district Hoshiarpur (p.219) and addressed a large public meeting at Lahore. He made a ‘wholesale attack’ on the Unionist Ministry which caused great resentment among the supporters of the government. He emphasized that Sikander Hayat Khan and his colleagues were doing nothing for the people and there could be Page 19 of 29

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Facing New Challenges no real freedom or advance until these instruments of a reactionary government were replaced by Congress Ministers. He said a great deal about repression in the Punjab. He dwelt on the Congress objective of wrecking the Act of 1935 and promoting mass movement. He asserted that the Congress would be so irresistible in a few years that it would sweep everybody and everything before it. A big European war was a certainty and the British Empire would come to an end within years. No help should be given to the British in case of war. The Congress would have nothing to do with Federation. The Punjab Governor got the impression that Jawaharlal represented the Congress stance of ‘dominance and arrogance’. Due to this domineering and arrogant spirit of the Congress, Sikander Hayat Khan leaned towards the Muslim League.76 Jinnah was anxious to have Sikander Hayat Khan’s help in all-India politics. The Muslims saw the non-inclusion of representative Muslims in Congress Cabinets, flaunting of the Congress flag, prominence given to ‘Vande Mātaram’, and making Hindi the universal language as the visible signs of the Congress intention to create Hindu Raj. Concrete examples of ‘oppression of Muslims’ were given by some of the delegates to the Lucknow Conference. Speech after speech was couched in the most bitter invective against the Congress. It was generally felt that the bulwarks against Congress domination could be the Punjab and, to a less extent, Bengal. The defeatist mood of the conference changed into a determined attitude to fight the Congress to the last.77 This was the situation in which the Sikander–Jinnah Pact was forged on 15 October 1937. According to this Pact, Sikander Hayat Khan agreed to convene a meeting of his party and advise all its Muslim members who were not members of the Muslim League to join the League by signing its creed on the understanding that ‘they will be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central and Provincial Boards of the All India Muslim League’. Their continuance in the coalition and the Unionist Party was not to be affected. In future elections and by-elections for the Legislature after the adoption of this arrangement, the groups constituting the Unionist Party at that time ‘will jointly support candidates put up by their respective groups’. The Muslim members elected on the League ticket ‘will constitute the Muslim League Party within the Legislature’ with the option to enter into coalition or alliance with any other party, before or after the elections. In view of the arrangement agreed upon, the Provincial League Parliamentary Board was to be reconstituted.78 The ‘Sikander–Jinnah Pact’ was open to different interpretations. According to Sikander Hayat Khan, all that he agreed to do was to support Jinnah in all-India politics and to advise the Muslim supporters in the Provincial Legislature to join the Muslim League, making it clear that the position of the Unionist Party would remain unchanged in provincial concerns. But Ghulam Rasul Khan, Secretary of the Muslim League, interpreted the agreement as merging of the Muslim members of the Unionist Party in the Muslim League. In any case, Sikander Page 20 of 29

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Facing New Challenges Hayat Khan in this document appeared to have become a Muslim leader. Furthermore, he was deluding (p.220) himself if he thought that provincial politics could be divorced from all-India Muslim interests. The Muslim League resolution for the restoration of the Shahidganj site to Muslims, passed at the Lucknow session, was a case in point.79 The Khalsa National Party of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia passed a resolution in November 1937, asking the Muslim Unionists to make their position clear. Among the Hindus too there was a reaction against the Pact.80 Early in December, Sikander Hayat Khan declared that his adherence to the Muslim League did not affect the policy or position of the Unionist Party in any way.81 Jinnah was biding his time. The question of Federation was debated in the Punjab Assembly on 8 April 1938, when a member of the Congress Party attacked the method of indirect election to the Lower House, the nomination of the representatives of the states by the princes, and the limitations on the financial powers of the Central Legislature and on its power of control over the Railways and the Reserve Bank. Sikander Hayat Khan moved an amendment to the resolution tabled by the Congress member after a speech in which he suggested modification of the Federal scheme in accordance with the aspirations of the people but insisting that some sort of Federal Government at the Centre was necessary. He emphasized that the present power and autonomy of the units should not be impaired, and he opposed the view that the Indian states could be omitted from a Federal system. He poured scorn on the suggestion for a Constituent Assembly based on universal adult franchise. Judging by what had happened in the case of the Congress provinces, he apprehended that a Ministry at the Centre would be predominantly a Congress Ministry, rigidly controlled by the Congress High Command. He mentioned five subjects with which the Centre should deal: Defence, Customs, External Affairs, Relations with the states, and Communications. His basic idea was that each Federal unit should have an equal share of representation both in the Legislature and in the Ministry. For this purpose, the whole of India could be divided into seven zones. Every zone, except Bengal, was a combination of more than one administrative unit in existence. The North-Western zone was to consist of the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind, Kashmir, the Punjab states, and one or two of the Rajputana states.82 A year later, in June 1939, Sir Henry Craik was talking about the ‘Pakistan project’. He thought that the original Pakistan project was conceived, or at least sponsored, by Sir Muhammad Iqbal who visualized an Islamic state uniting the Punjab, Sind, the NWFP, possibly also the Kashmir and Bahawalpur states, with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. A modified form of the Pakistan-idea involved the splitting up of India into two separate entities, both of which were to remain within the British Empire. Muslim India was to include the Punjab, Page 21 of 29

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Facing New Challenges Sind, the NWFP, and perhaps also Kashmir and Bahawalpur. None of these two schemes was taken up seriously by any politically respectable group of people. Then there was the third scheme for dividing India into the Hindu and Muhammadan ‘cultural zones’ which had a good deal of publicity in the past few months. It was quite impracticable because it involved shifting of vast mass of people from one area to another. All these schemes were visionary and illdefined. Craik thought, nevertheless, that it would be ‘a mistake to assume that the Pakistan idea was dead in the sense that we shall hear no more about it’. Indeed, it (p.221) would continue to figure prominently in the columns of ‘the more irresponsible Muslim newspapers and to be ventilated on the platform’. In his view, it did not merit serious consideration as ‘a possible solution of our present difficulties’.83 Muslim opposition to the scheme of Federation contained in the Act of 1935 was founded on the apprehension that the Central Government under the scheme would be predominantly a Congress Government, and that the Central Executive would be disposed to meddle unduly in purely provincial matters. This hostility was not there in 1935 because no one expected the Congress to come to power after the elections in the provinces. The hostility towards Federation had considerably intensified after the Patna session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1937. At this session, great prominence was given to allegations of oppression of Muslims in the Congress provinces. These allegations were repeated at length and in detail in a pamphlet circulated later by Jinnah. A strong deputation of the All-India Muslim League had toured the Punjab and the NWFP, repeating these stories at crowded meetings. This had a considerable effect in ‘intensifying communal feelings generally and Muslim determination not to tolerate Hindu domination in particular’.84 Sikander Hayat Khan gave copies of his scheme to both Jinnah and Gandhi. He had explained the scheme in general terms to his colleagues who received it favourably. He had an interesting discussion with the League Executive too. This was initiated with a definite suggestion that, if war was declared, the League should at once make an announcement in terms of its Sholapur resolution (which was to the effect that in its own interests Muslim India should support Great Britain in the event of a world conflict). The majority of the League Executive expressed agreement with Sikander Hayat Khan’s proposal. Jinnah differed at first but eventually agreed with deference to the wishes of the majority. However, he was not in favour of the idea that the League should make a definite statement now but Sikander Hayat Khan was at liberty to announce his support to the British if war broke out. Sikander Hayat Khan’s announcement would make it clear that the British Government ‘could rely on the support of Muslim India’ and that the League ‘would not use the outbreak of war in a bargaining spirit’.85

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Facing New Challenges The declaration of war had a dramatic effect. The Muslim League Working Committee passed a lengthy resolution on war at its New Delhi meeting on 18 September 1939, calling for complete abandonment of the Federal scheme and urged the British Government to ‘review and revise the entire problem of India’s future constitution de novo’. The resolution also asked for an assurance from the British Government that ‘no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advance for India should be made without the League’s consent and approval’.86 With reference to this resolution, Sikander Hayat Khan told Craik that Jinnah would be prepared to accept ‘consultation’ instead of ‘approval and consent’ if the League could be given the assurance that in any future scheme of Federation Muslim interests would be amply protected. Sikander Hayat Khan asked Craik to put it to the Governor General that if the Muslim League cooperated fully in the prosecution of the war, his Majesty’s Government would not overlook their attitude. Furthermore, Sikander Hayat Khan was sure that if the Governor General asked Jinnah whether the Muslims would cooperate with the government even if the Congress adopted an obstructive attitude, (p.222) his answer would be the same as that of Sikander Hayat Khan.87 The League was prepared to support the government. The main political resolution of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on 24 March 1940 came to be known as the Pakistan Resolution.88 According to Craik, the importance of the League as the representative Muslim organization was now immensely enhanced; Jinnah’s position as ‘the one All-India Muslim leader’ was now unchallenged; and at least outwardly, Muslim opinion was in favour of partition. The partition resolution completely torpedoed the Congress claim to speak for India as a whole. The scheme had a great potential appeal to Muslim masses.89 Master Tara Singh looked upon the idea of Pakistan as the greatest challenge for the Sikhs. As President of the Shiromani Akali Dal he declared that the Muslims would have to cross an ocean of Sikh blood before they could establish their rule.90

In Retrospect The elections of 1936–7 made the Unionists more powerful under the new Constitution. Most of the Muslim Unionists persisted in their Muslim bias. Sikander Hayat Khan signed a pact with Jinnah to strengthen the position of the All-India Muslim League in Indian politics. Sunder Singh Majithia, as a Unionist Minister, tried to settle his score with Master Tara Singh. Cases of embezzlement of funds were brought against the Akali Dal, the SGPC, and Master Tara Singh. But he was exonerated by the court. There was trouble in the Khalsa College, Amritsar, essentially due to the fact that Niranjan Singh, the younger brother of Master Tara Singh, had campaigned against Majithia in the elections. The British bureaucrats and the Unionists supported Sunder Singh Majithia while the Akalis supported Niranjan Singh and those of his colleagues who were being victimized as ‘extremists’. Eventually, five Professors were removed from the service of the College. Master Tara Singh helped them in Page 23 of 29

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Facing New Challenges founding the Sikh National College at Lahore which developed into a remarkable institution in a short time. The issue of Shahidganj was raised again in April 1937 for purely political purposes. Master Tara Singh wrote a letter to the Punjab Premier, Sikander Hayat Khan, on 10 September 1937, that whatever his personal views, all his efforts resulted in the consolidation of Muslim position and establishment of Muslim domination in the Punjab. The policy of the British Government was to favour the Muslims, which made them arrogant and aggressive. This tendency had increased under Sikander Hayat Khan’s Premiership. This letter was widely publicized. Master Tara Singh believed that he was the first person to expose Sikander Hayat Khan’s anti-Sikh bias that was concealed under his cloak of catholicity, geniality, and appeal to Punjabi sentiment. There were official reports of Muslim violence against Sikh gurdwaras and Sikhs in many parts of the province. The case of the Shahidganj site was only the most glaring and the most important one. Master Tara Singh refused to make any compromise on this issue. The Sikh claim was upheld by the highest judicial authorities. Throughout the 1930s, Muslim intellectuals and politicians remained occupied with the formulation of a Constitution that could provide the best political safeguards for Muslims in India. At least two of these involved partition. As a culmination of such formulations came the Muslim League’s resolution of March 1940. Master Tara Singh’s (p.223) immediate reaction was to resist the formation of Pakistan even if it involved a civil war. The two-nation theory did not recognize any other nationality in the country, and Jinnah was not prepared to share power with the other political entities in the Punjab. Master Tara Singh did not see any future for the Sikhs in Pakistan. On 17 September 1940, he underscored that the Akalis would never accept Pakistan. He visualized the possibility of the British Government and the Congress conceding something like Pakistan for their own reasons. But the Sikhs wanted freedom and ‘not a change of masters’. He impressed upon the Sikhs to build their own political strength to be counted in the future. Notes:

(1.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), pp. 336–8. (2.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 349–50. (3.) Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984, paperback), pp. 136, 147. (4.) Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 35. (5.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 350–1. Page 24 of 29

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Facing New Challenges (6.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Ltd, 1989, reprint), p. 339. (7.) Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, p. 153. (8.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 354–7. (9.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 375–7. (10.) Sarkar, Modern India, p. 377–9. (11.) Sarkar, Modern India, p. 379. (12.) Craig Baxter (ed.), ‘The 1937 Elections and the Sikander–Jinnah Pact’, PPP 10, part 1 (October 1976): 360–6. (13.) Waheed Ahmad (ed.), Letters of Mian Faz-i-Husain (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1996), pp. 533–6, 544–5, 547–9. (14.) The Congress won only eighteen seats, including six seats of the Congress Socialists (Congress Socialist Party, Kirtī Kisan Party, and Official Group). Teja Singh Swantantar was the seventh to be added to this group having been returned unopposed in May 1937. The Akalis won ten seats and sat with the Congress in opposition to the Unionist Ministry. They were supported by nineteen Independents and six other members of the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Itihad-iMillat, the Congress Nationalists, Labour, and the Muslim League. K.C. Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), pp. 84–106. Baxter, ‘The 1937 Elections and the Sikander–Jinnah Pact’, 359–60. Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Panjab 1897–1947 (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1984), pp. 218–25. (15.) Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle, pp. 225–37, 248–55. (16.) Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle, pp. 237–9. (17.) Baxter, ‘The 1937 Elections and the Sikander–Jinnah Pact’, pp. 369–78. (18.) Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle, pp. 240–3. (19.) Gurharpal Singh, Communism in Punjab (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1984), pp. 54–8. (20.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), pp. 129–52. (21.) Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle, pp. 258–62.

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Facing New Challenges (22.) Fauja Singh, ‘Akalis and the Indian National Congress’, PPP 15, part 2 (October 1981): 463–4. Y.P. Bajaj, ‘Sikhs and the First General Elections (1936– 37) to the Punjab Legislative Assembly: An Analysis’, PPP 11, part 1 (April 1987): 103–8. (23.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 19 October 1936, in Punjab Politics 1936–1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy (Governor’s Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents), ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), pp. 54–5. (24.) Kirpal C. Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947, pp. 74–106. (25.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999, reprint), pp. 92–3. (26.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 8 May 1937, Panjab Politics (2004), pp. 89–90. (27.) Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 92–3. (28.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 108–10. (29.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 22 May 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 93–4. (30.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 5 June 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 103. (31.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 111–13. (32.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 28 August 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 123. (33.) Kirpal Singh Dardi, Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī (n.p.: Shahid Udham Singh Prakashan, 1991), p. 156. (34.) Sant Singh Sekhon, Swai Jīwaṇī, ed. Tejwant Singh Gill (Chandigarh: Lokgeet Prakashan, 2011), pp. 189–90. Later on Sekhon was removed from the College due to pressure from Maharaja Bhupinder Singh: Swai Jīwaṇī, p. 194. (35.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 14 September 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 125–6. (36.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 28 September 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 136. (37.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 8 October 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 137. (38.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, p. 113. (39.) Craik to Linlithgow (private and personal), 9 February 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 312. For Sekhon’s comment on the Sikh National College, his Swai Jīwaṇī, pp. 224–5. (40.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 28 September 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 134. Page 26 of 29

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Facing New Challenges (41.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 29 October 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 396. (42.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 28 September 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 136. (43.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 93. (44.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh’, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 74–5. (45.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 100–2. (46.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 19 December 1936, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 62– 3. (47.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 January 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 67–8. (48.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 24 April 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 86. (49.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 19 June 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 105–6. (50.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 3 July 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 111–12. Master Tara Singh was present in this ‘Unity Conference’. (51.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 14 and 28 August 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 121–2, 123. (52.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 14 September 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 124–5. (53.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 16 November 1936, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 58– 9. (54.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 24 April 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 87. (55.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 19 June 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 106–7. (56.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 12 November 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 147– 8. (57.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 3 December 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 151. (58.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 18 December 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 154. (59.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 11 January 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 162. (60.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 27 January 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 164–6. (61.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 30 January and 12 February 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 169–72. Page 27 of 29

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Facing New Challenges (62.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 27 February 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 178– 81. (63.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 4 March 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 183–5. (64.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 4 March 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 183–8. (65.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 9 and 17 March 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 194–7. (66.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 31 March and 5 April 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 199–200. (67.) Craik to Linlithgow, 18/19 and 25 April 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 206–9. (68.) Craik to Linlithgow, 10 May 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 212. (69.) Craik to Linlithgow, 26 May 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 217. (70.) Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 418 n. 87. (71.) Craik to Linlithgow, 10, 11, and 12 October 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 385–7. (72.) Craik to Linlithgow, 24 October 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 392. (73.) Craik to Linlithgow, 14 January 1940, Punjab Politics 1940–1943, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), pp. 68–9. (74.) Craik to Linlithgow, 22 April 1940, in Punjab Politics: Strains of War, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p. 129. (75.) Craik to Linlithgow, 5 May 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 137. (76.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 October 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 140–2. (77.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 October 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 143–4. (78.) Sikander–Jinnah Pact, Lucknow, October 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), Appendix I, pp. 421–2. (79.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 21 October 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 144–6. (80.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 12 November 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 149. (81.) Emerson to Linlithgow, 3 December 1937, Punjab Politics (2004), p. 151. (82.) Craik to Linlithgow, 5 June 1938, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 218–26.

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Facing New Challenges (83.) Craik to Linlithgow, 19 June 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 351–2. For more detail on the background to the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India’s Parition 1928–40 (New Delhi: Manohar, 1977), pp. 136–62. (84.) Craik to Linlithgow, 19 June 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 352–3. (85.) Craik to Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 362–3. (86.) Punjab Politics (2004), p. 417 n. 83. (87.) Craik to Linlithgow, 25 September 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 380–1. (88.) For the text of the Resolution, see Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power (1942–1947) (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2006), pp. 3–4. (89.) Craik to Linlithgow, 1 April 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 108–9. (90.) Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40) (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984), p. 193.

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In Search of Political Autonomy

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

In Search of Political Autonomy (1940–2) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0010

Abstract and Keywords In August 1940, Master Tara Singh started negotiations with the Congress leaders about whether or not to support the government in its war efforts. Mahatma Gandhi’s response obliged him eventually to resign from the Congress Working Committee. Master Tara Singh supported the programme of the Khalsa Defence of India League formed early in 1941 under the leadership of Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala. In March 1942, Stafford Cripps brought a proposal that appeared to concede Pakistan. His mission failed but Master Tara Singh remained seriously perturbed over the possibility of the Sikhs being placed under perpetual Muslim domination. The Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact enabled Baldev Singh, a non-Akali legislator, to replace Dasaundha Singh as the Sikh minister in the Unionist ministry. Thus, Master Tara Singh’s idea was to strengthen the Sikh position without infringing his formal understanding with the Congress. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Mahatma Gandhi, war efforts, Congress Working Committee, Khalsa Defence of India League, Stafford Cripps, Pakistan, Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact, Unionist ministry, Congress

World War II began to make an impact on Indian politics, including, of course, the Punjab. The League Resolution of 1940 was indirectly and partly a result of the war. Master Tara Singh reacted strongly to this resolution and visualized the possibility of its being accepted by the British and the Congress. Keen to improve the position of the Sikhs, he came to favour the idea of support for the

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In Search of Political Autonomy war in opposition to the Congress policy of conditional cooperation. This led to his estrangement from the Congress but the Akali Dal was to remain aligned with it. To strengthen the Sikh position further, Master Tara Singh agreed to a pact between Sikander Hayat Khan and Baldev Singh as a non-Akali Minister in the Unionist Cabinet. A direct result of the war was the Cripps Mission of March 1942. The idea of Pakistan was conceded in the Cripps proposals and Master Tara Singh presented reorganization of the Punjab province as a counter to Pakistan. The failure of the Cripps Mission removed the immediate danger but Master Tara Singh became increasingly serious about territorial reorganization.

The Political Context Immediately after becoming Prime Minister, Winston Churchill declared on 13 May 1940 that the policy of the new government was to wage war and to win at all costs. Without victory, he said, there would be ‘no survival for the British Empire’ and ‘no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for’. He had not become the King’s First Minister ‘to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’. His stern attitude towards India could offset the sympathetic attitude of two of his Labour colleagues in the Cabinet, L.S. Amery and Sir Stafford Cripps. The Governor General, Lord Linlithgow, was Conservative, like Churchill. On 8 August 1940, he offered Dominion Status in an unspecified future but immediate expansion of the Viceroy’s (p.227) Executive. The Viceroy’s Executive was enlarged in July 1941, and an advisory National Defence Council was established.1 After the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the Indian Communists began to support what they now called the ‘people’s war’. Before the end of the year, Japan attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbour. Singapore fell to the Japanese on 15 February 1942, Rangoon on 8 March, and the Andaman Islands on 23 March. Already, in December 1941, Franklin Roosevelt had raised with Churchill the question of gaining the Congress’ support for war through some sort of political reform. The Labour members of the War Cabinet, especially Cripps, now persuaded the Cabinet to agree to a draft declaration of post-war Dominion Status with right to secession and the right of the Indian states to appoint their representatives. In addition, there would be a ‘constitution-making body’ elected by provincial legislatures.2 Linlithgow was opposed to the idea of Cripps coming to India. Churchill explained to him that the Mission was meant to prove British honesty of purpose and, if it was rejected by the Indian political parties, the sincerity of the British would, nonetheless, be proved to the world. The Congress was critical of nomination of the Indian states’ representatives by their rulers and the option given to the provinces to join or not to join the Indian Union, which was a public admission of the possibility of Pakistan. In his discussions with Nehru and Azad on 9 April 1942, Cripps went beyond his brief in suggesting that the new Executive Council would approximate to a cabinet. He was sharply pulled up by Page 2 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy the War Cabinet and he began to sing a different tune on the same day. The talks broke down suddenly, but proved to be an important event to be taken up later at some length.3 In the early phase of the war, Mahatma Gandhi and the right-wing Congress had tried repeatedly for some kind of agreement with the British. The Working Committee of the Congress was prepared to back the war effort if the British gave concessions on the two key demands: a post-war independence pledge and an immediate national government at the Centre. After Linlithgow’s ‘August offer’ Mahatma Gandhi sanctioned civil disobedience to court arrest by making anti-war speeches. About 20,000 volunteers went to jail but the movement petered out before the end of 1941.4 The Congress leaders in the Punjab were not unanimous in supporting the individual satyāgraha. The allies of the Congress in the Punjab were also divided on this issue.5 Rajagopalachari’s statement of 23 August 1940 that if the British Government agreed to form a provisional national government, he would persuade his colleagues to agree to the Muslim League being invited to nominate the Prime Minister, who could form a government as he liked, disturbed the Akali Dal. Master Tara Singh began to fear the possibility of Pakistan being created. The British bureaucracy was working on the Akalis, especially through Major Short and Penderel Moon, to support the war effort. Master Tara Singh’s conflict with Mahatma Gandhi led to the former’s resignation from the Congress and divided the Akalis over the issue of recruitment. Master Tara Singh encouraged Sardar Baldev Singh to sign a pact with Sikander Hayat Khan.

Master Tara Singh’s Response to the Idea of Pakistan Master Tara Singh was not alone in condemning the idea of Pakistan. Sardar Kharak Singh (p.228) looked at the scheme as ‘absurd’ and declared that the Sikhs would not allow India’s vivisection. The Khalsa National Party resolved that the Sikhs would not tolerate the rule of the Muslim community in the Punjab, which was the holy land and homeland of the Sikhs. Some newspapers, like the Khalsa Sewak, suggested that the Sikhs should have a separate state.6 Master Tara Singh did not appreciate the idea of ‘Khalistan’ put forth by V.S. Bhatti of Ludhiana as a buffer state between Pakistan and Hindustan. As a counterbalance to the idea of Pakistan, it appealed to Baba Gurdit Singh of the Komagata Maru fame who was aligned with the Congress. In the elections of 1937, he had been defeated as a Congress Sikh candidate by Partap Singh Kairon as an Akali candidate. On 19 May 1940, a convention was called by Baba Gurdit Singh in association with one Ranjodh Singh Tarsika and Jagjit Singh who had replaced Giani Sher Singh as the Editor of the Khalsa Sewak. The scheme was further elaborated at another convention organized by Gurdit Singh and Jagjit Singh, and a new Sikh organization, called the Guru Raj Darbar Khalsa Board, was formed to campaign for Khalistan. Master Tara Singh remarked that Page 3 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy ‘some Sikhs have lost their head and they are preaching the establishment of Sikh Rule. This will simply result in adding to the confusion already created by the Muslim League’. The Working Committee of the Punjab Provincial Congress, however, wrote misleadingly to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, President of the Congress, that some Akalis were misusing the Congress platform to propagate Sikh Raj for scuttling the idea of Pakistan. Opposition from Master Tara Singh and the Congress at any rate put an end to all activity in connection with the idea of Khalistan by August 1940.7 Tension between Sikhs and Muslims was increasing. At Sargodha, where both the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police were Muslims, there was a good deal of uneasiness among the Hindus and Sikhs.8 A procession that used to be taken out on the birth anniversary of Guru Gobind Singh was unnecessarily interfered with on 7 July and thirty-one Sikhs were arrested. The Akalis demanded release of these prisoners. A date was fixed for a morchā. Sikander Hayat Khan announced the release of prisoners on the floor of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.9 A more serious incident took place at Gujranwala on 13 July when ‘a prominent local Sikh’ was killed.10 As Giani Lal Singh mentions in his autobiography, this prominent Sikh was Avtar Singh, a barrister of Gujranwala, who had dominated the public life of Gujranwala for two decades (1920–40) as President of the local Singh Sabha and a member of the Municipal Committee. He was all-important in the management of the Khalsa High School and the Guru Nanak Khalsa College. He had served the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) and the Gurdwara Committee Nankana Sahib as a member, and he was close to the Akali High Command. He was closely associated with the Congress as President of the District Committee and a member of the Working Committee of the Provincial Congress. He was Chairman of the reception committee for the annual session of the Provincial Congress at Gujranwala in 1938. He was popular among all the religious communities of the city, especially the poor sections.11 Giani Lal Singh goes on to add that Avtar Singh was entrusted with the task of organizing a unit of the ‘Akal Regiment’ in Gujranwala. He took a jathā of 700 volunteers to the first conference of the ‘Akal Regiment’ held (p.229) at Atari. In 1940, when the Muslim League raised the issue of Pakistan, Avtar Singh organized the Ghallughara Day in Gujranwala. His activities were disliked by the pro-Pakistan Muslims of the city. At their behest, a man named Sheru attacked Avtar Singh with a poisoned dagger and wounded him. Then he went to the shop of the Sikh butcher Dhian Singh with the intention of attacking him but a Nihang Singh killed Sheru. Avtar Singh died in hospital on 15 July. In his funeral procession many eminent leaders of the Akali Dal and the Punjab Congress were present. After the cremation, a dīwān was held in the premises of the local Singh Sabha. Later on, several Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim leaders of the city were

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In Search of Political Autonomy arrested. Among them was Giani Lal Singh who had become a sort of deputy (nā’ib) of Sardar Avtar Singh.12 In honour of ‘the martyr’ Avtar Singh, an Akali Conference was held at Kila Didar Singh in the Gujranwala district on 17 September 1940. Master Tara Singh in his presidential address referred to the late Sardar Avtar Singh as a close friend who had devoted his life to the service of the community and the country. Master Tara Singh underscored that the Akalis would never accept Pakistan. But the British Government might be inclined to accept it to please the Muslim League. The Congress might placate the Muslim League for its support in the struggle for freedom. If all these three forces came together, it would not be easy for the Sikhs to oppose them. But not to oppose the creation of Pakistan would be to commit suicide. Therefore, the only alternative open to the Sikhs was to build their own strength on the basis of unity, with the determination to make sacrifices. Master Tara Singh referred to the past when a handful of Sikhs had destroyed the Mughal Raj. Now four million Sikhs could surely stop the creation of Pakistan. The struggle was great but the Sikhs could repeat history if a few thousand Sikhs were willing to die for the cause. Master Tara Singh went on to say that independence was bound to come to India sooner or later, whether through a peaceful process or in chaos. What was vital to know was who would succeed the British in power and authority. The Muslim League had revolted against the Congress and demanded partition of the country with the support of the government. The Congress appeared to be keen to have the cooperation of the League at any cost, despite the promises given to the Sikhs in 1929. In August 1940, Rajagopalachari had made an offer of Prime Ministership to Jinnah to form a ministry of his choice. This showed that the Congress could give all sorts of concessions to the League to have its cooperation. The Congress leaders had, in fact, indicated that they would not oppose the League if it persisted in its demand. By conceding Pakistan the Congress would push the Sikhs into slavery. But the Sikhs, said Master Tara Singh, wanted freedom and not ‘a change of masters’. The Sikh alignment with the Congress did not mean that they had authorized the Congress to decide on their behalf. The Sikhs were with the Congress in its fight for freedom but they were not with the Congress for the creation of Pakistan. He declared: ‘we shall fight against Pakistan’. Master Tara Singh asserted that the Shiromani Akali Dal was the only representative organization of the Sikh Panth. He refers to the leaders of the Khalsa National Party as ‘Sikanderi Sikhs’. The Sikh Socialists did not subscribe to the Sikh faith or ethics. Sikhism was meant for the uplift of the poor, and the Sikhs could appreciate the objectives of the socialists and work for reducing or eliminating economic disparities. But they could not (p.230) make any compromise with atheism. The Sikh objectives were universal service and goodwill (upkār) but the socialists tended to go on the assumption that man lived Page 5 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy by bread alone. Master Tara Singh did not wish to go into detail of the doctrines of religion, but he felt impelled to underline that a person who regarded the five senses as the sole source of knowledge was a veritable fool. In any case, there was no place for atheism in the Sikh faith. Whenever some Sikhs asked Master Tara Singh whether they should remain in the Congress or leave it, he would tell them to be true Sikhs and to make all possible sacrifices for the Sikh faith. ‘I am a patriot’, he said, ‘because I am a Sikh’. Patriotism was built into the Sikh faith. He advised the Sikhs to join others in the service of the country (desh). In the fight for freedom they should be in the front. But if freedom comes through Pakistan they should be in the front to fight against it. ‘Freedom means freedom for all nationalities and freedom of conscience for all persons.’ Master Tara Singh underlined that the Sikhs could rely only on themselves and not on the Congress, the League, or the government. It was imperative for them to create power and to retain it in their own hands to be politically counted in the days to come. Thus, the issue of Pakistan made Master Tara Singh hostile to the idea of Pakistan and lukewarm towards the Congress due to its attitude towards the Pakistan issue. To build their own political strength was the only alternative for the Sikhs.

Master Tara Singh’s Estrangement from the Congress The Akali–Congress collaboration worked well for a few years before World War II. The Congress policy of no support for the war, in Master Tara Singh’s view, did not suit the interests of the Sikh community. His anxiety to safeguard Sikh interests during the war by supporting recruitment to the British Indian army eventually led to his resignation from the Punjab Congress Committee and the Congress Working Committee. However, he did not wish the Akali Dal to formally part company with the Congress. In his Merī Yād Master Tara Singh recalls that the Sikhs were opposed to the idea of recruitment in the beginning. At one or two places Sikh troops disobeyed orders and the British had begun to suspect the loyalty of the Sikhs of certain areas and villages. The Sikhs in general did not like the Sikh soldiers creating any kind of disturbance. When Master Tara Singh came to know that some Sikhs of the Central Indian Horse regiment had refused to embark a ship, he made an open declaration against this attitude. The senior army officers appointed a commission to enquire into the issue of loyalty among the Sikhs. It consisted of officers who were sympathetic to the Sikhs, and the commission reported in their favour. The doubts of the British authorities were removed. However, relations of the Akalis with the Premier, Sikander Hayat Khan, were not good and he was not in favour of encouraging the Sikhs to join the army, and if they did, they should do it through him so that the credit went to him (and not to Sikh or Akali leaders). Master Tara Singh did not wish to support Sikander in his war effort. But the government was keen to get Sikh support for recruitment. Having an inkling of Sikander Hayat Khan’s intentions, some Sikh leaders thought of

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In Search of Political Autonomy forming an organization called the Khalsa Defence of India League for changing the Sikh attitude against recruitment.13 On 10 July, Sikander Hayat Khan told the Punjab Governor that the Muslim League (p.231) Executive was inclined to support the government in the event of a world conflict not only in the interest of Great Britain but also in the interest of ‘Muslim India’. There was a general feeling among members of the League that an announcement by Sikander Hayat Khan, who was present in the meeting, would by itself make it clear to the British Government that they could rely on the support of the Muslims, and the Muslim League would not use the outbreak of war in a bargaining spirit.14 On 25 August Sikander Hayat Khan stated with reference to the coming war that there was ‘no room for vacillation or doubt’. He insisted that ‘we must unequivocally throw in our lot with the nations which stand for justice, righteousness and self-determination for all’. If unfortunately a war could not be avoided, ‘the Punjab will rise as one man to fight the enemies of peace and freedom’.15 Sikander Hayat Khan was pleased with the cordial response given by the Muslim press of the Punjab to his statement. He issued another statement on 13 September explaining the justice of ‘our cause’ and calling on the Punjab to demonstrate its sympathy for Great Britain to maintain the splendid traditions of the province as ‘the sword arm of India’.16 The Punjab Assembly approved of the policy of the Punjab Government in condemning the Fascist and Nazi aggression with all available resources of the province. The assembly desired that it should be made absolutely clear that the Constitution of India shall be examined all afresh at the end of the war ‘with a view to immediate attainment of the objective of Dominion Status with effective protection for the due rights of the minorities and other sections and in consultation with and agreement of all the parties concerned’.17 On 1 October, the Akali Dal passed a resolution, repudiating ‘the audacious claim’ of Sikander Hayat Khan to represent all the martial classes of the Punjab and declared that ‘the Sikhs had no faith in him’. Master Tara Singh sent to Craik a copy of his correspondence with Sikander Hayat Khan in September in which he had refused to meet Sikander Hayat Khan in connection with the war situation, writing bitterly of the ‘repression and oppression of the Sikhs’ by the Muslims under the Unionist Party’s regime.18 Master Tara Singh approached the Punjab Governor through Sir Jogendra Singh, who handed over to Craik a copy of the note which Master Tara Singh had left with the Governor General on 15 October, and told Craik that Master Tara Singh was very perturbed about the rumours regarding the possible curtailment of Sikh recruitment, but he was afraid to come into the open as an advocate of recruitment because his influence among the Akalis depended on his opposing the government consistently. Master Tara Singh wanted to see the Governor. Page 7 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy Craik was prepared to see Master Tara Singh. ‘If he does come to see me’, wrote Craik, ‘I will try to convince him that the communists, whom he detests, are doing infinite damage to Sikh interests and that it was his duty to oppose them openly.’19 Early in 1940, the Akalis were clearly in favour of recruitment. In a conversation with the Punjab Governor, Sardar Sant Singh (Member Central Legislature) talked about the general attitude of the Akalis about the recruitment of Sikhs to the army. With the exception of a few extremists, the Akalis were solid in favour of strengthening the Sikh connection with the army. The importance of the Sikh minority in their view depended largely on this connection. Sardar Sant Singh had the impression that if the Congress High (p.232) Command decided that it would be improper for the Akalis as supporters of the Congress to help in the prosecution of the war in any way, the Akalis would break with the Congress, with the exception of a small minority.20 With regard to disaffection amongst the Sikh troops, Craik observed in August 1940 that the Sikh community as a whole was ‘more politically minded’ than any other in the Punjab. A large number of Sikhs had gone abroad and they were well acquainted with political, social, and economic conditions of other countries. There was a regular intercourse between the Sikhs abroad and their relatives in the Punjab. There were two constant factors in the recent desertions. One of these was faulty recruitment due to faulty verification of the character of the person selected. The ring leader of the Central India Horse mutiny was the nephew of a well-known political agitator. The second factor was failure to eject subversive elements even after they were detected. A notorious example of this was that of Sadhu Singh, a Naik Reservist at Meerut; his name figured prominently in the investigations made into the Central India Horse mutiny and he was largely responsible later for the trouble in Egypt. Craik attributed disaffection amongst the Sikh troops to the propaganda carried on by the Communists, especially the Kirtī-Ghadarites and their centre at Meerut.21 As Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar, Penderel Moon thought that it was his duty to establish ‘friendly relations with Sikh political leaders and particularly with Master Tara Singh and other prominent Akalis’. The district of Amritsar was in the heart of the Sikh country and the city of Amritsar was the main religious and political centre of the Sikhs. It had the headquarters of the Akalis, ‘the most powerful Sikh political party, representing an extreme form of Sikh nationalism with a strongly anti-British bias’. They controlled the Golden Temple and ‘buzzed about the place like angry wasps’.22 Moon had come to the Punjab in the summer of 1940 because of a series of disquieting incidents among Sikh elements of the armed forces, culminating in April 1940 in the refusal of the Sikh squadron of the Central India Horse to embark at Bombay for the Middle East. ‘A considerable flutter had been caused Page 8 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy in Army Headquarters. There was some wild talk of disbanding all Sikh units; and, more seriously, a proposal was put forward to stop all further recruitment of Sikhs.’ The Punjab Government was strongly opposed to this drastic step. At Major Short’s own suggestion, he was appointed to probe and report on Sikh unrest in certain army units and in the principal Sikh districts. Later, a few officers were posted in the main areas of Sikh recruitment to try, in cooperation with the civil authorities, to allay Sikh unrest and to induce them to join the armed forces. Short was one of these civil liaison officers, with his base at Lahore.23 Moon underlines that the Sikhs held a favoured position in the army. But they could lose this position due to ‘misconduct’ of Sikh troops or ‘disaffection’ of the Sikh population. ‘This was a danger which no Sikh could overlook; and it was not lost upon the Akalis.’ However, it was not easy for them to perform a complete volte-face in view of their anti-British struggle and alignment with the Congress. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard Sikh position in the army, some of the Akali leaders were inclined to modify their attitude of opposition. Therefore, the circumstances were not unfavourable for a revival of Anglo-Sikh amity as a prelude to Sikh support for the war.24 Short’s immediate concern was (p.233) to restore Anglo-Sikh amity and to promote the largest possible measure of Sikh–Muslim rapprochement for rallying the maximum Sikh support for the war effort. On 9 August 1940, Master Tara Singh wrote a letter to Maulana Azad, the Congress President, with copies to Mahatma Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, and Rajagopalachari. Master Tara Singh emphasized the importance of a strong and well-organized army for a nation. India, in his view, should not depend on British forces for its defence. Therefore, not only should the Indian component of the army be increased, but war materials and weapons should also be manufactured in India. This was the time to make India self-reliant. In the case of British defeat, India would have to face other enemies. It was necessary to prepare for such an eventuality. Master Tara Singh believed that the Sikhs should join the army in the largest possible numbers in the interests of the country as well as their own. Since the Congress was in favour of ‘conditional support’, Master Tara Singh wanted to know if he could make his views public. He wanted the advice of Mahatma Gandhi on this point as his views on non-violence were well known, and ‘his valuable advice’ was necessary in this critical situation.25 Mahatma Gandhi wrote to Master Tara Singh on 15 August 1940 that he had received a copy of his letter addressed to Maulana Sahib. The Mahatma’s anger is reflected in his ‘advice’ to Master Tara Singh that he had nothing in common with the Congress, nor the Congress with him. He went on to add:

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In Search of Political Autonomy You believe in the rule of the sword but this is not the conviction of the Congress. You think all the time of ‘my people’ but the Congress thinks there are no other people than the Nation. Your civil disobedience is a form of violence. My candid advice is that you are weakening your people by remaining in the Congress. And you weaken the Congress too by your mentality. Mahatma Gandhi said further that Master Tara Singh could offer his support for war without any condition and look to the British for the protection of the rights of his people. But he should not think for a moment that the British would welcome the offer of recruitment on his own terms. Finally, Mahatma Gandhi advised Master Tara Singh to be either completely a nationalist or a communalist, and if the latter, he would have to depend completely on the British. His letter ended with a rhetorical claim. This was, he said, ‘the frank view of a person who loves you and the Sikhs as much as he loves himself, in fact, more, because I have stopped loving myself’.26 Master Tara Singh responded to Mahatma Gandhi’s letter on 12 September 1940. To his surprise, the letter said nothing on the issue raised by Master Tara Singh. It gave suggestions altogether extraneous to the issue. Perhaps the fundamental differences between him and the Sikhs restrained him from offering a detailed answer. Therefore, Master Tara Singh would not like to persist on the matter. However, two things mentioned by Mahatma Gandhi called for comment. The Mahatma had said that Master Tara Singh had nothing in common with the Congress because he talked about his own people and did not think of the Indian Nation. Master Tara Singh was well aware of the ideal of Indian Nationalism but the Congress recognized the presence of religious communities, including the Sikhs, as political entities. Master Tara Singh pointed out that the Congress members of the Bengal Legislative Assembly had voted in favour of a resolution doing away with the distinction between martial and non-martial races, and recruitment was now being done on the (p.234) basis of that resolution. Therefore, the issue raised by Master Tara Singh did not imply any opposition to the Congress. Indeed, the Congress was there before the Mahatma’s policy of non-violence, and the Congress would be there when the policy of non-violence would not be there any more. The objective of the Congress was ‘complete independence’ and non-violence was the means adopted for attaining that objective. Master Tara Singh had met no Congressman in the Punjab who had the same conception of non-violence as the Mahatma. No one believed that an independent state could be maintained without an army and police. The Congress view of the use of violence or non-violence was the same as that of the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh was proud of being a Sikh of Guru Gobind Singh who had proclaimed that it was legitimate to take to the sword when all other means fail. ‘No use of violence in any situation whatever’ was not the creed of the Congress. Master Tara Singh wished to be forgiven for saying that

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In Search of Political Autonomy the Mahatma was not ‘a good Congressman’. As for his advice to be wholly a nationalist or wholly a communalist, Master Tara Singh wrote: You may use any word you like for me. I do not care. I am clearly the same person as I was in 1929 when you had recognized the existence of Sikhs as a distinct community and given them the assurance that the Congress would not accept any arrangement unsatisfactory to the Sikhs. If you have changed your mind, I am not obliged to conceal the truth. I am as much a communalist and a Congressman today as I was in 1929. Master Tara Singh was personally there when the resolution of 1929 was drafted in the presence of Mahatma Gandhi.27 The Punjab Governor was looking forward to a rupture between the Congress and the Akalis. He wrote to the Governor General on 27 August 1940 that Gandhi had given a ‘very outspoken reply’ to Master Tara Singh and it was difficult to see ‘how the Akalis, whose declared policy is now to maintain and strengthen the Sikh connection with the Army, can remain within the Congress fold’.28 Within a fortnight, the Punjab Governor received a letter from an Amritsar journalist, G.R. Sethi, that Master Tara Singh had resigned from the All India and Provincial Congress Committees. Sethi had enclosed copies of the letters exchanged between Master Tara Singh and Mahatma Gandhi.29 Master Tara Singh had written to the President of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee on 10 September 1940 that he was resigning in protest. He had written a letter to Maulana Azad with copies to Mahatma Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, and Rajagopalachari. As Master Tara Singh thought that his attitude might not be quite consistent with the policy of the Congress, he did not want to make his views public against the advice of the Congress High Command. He received a reply only from Mahatma Gandhi who said nothing on the advice which had been sought but gave an ‘astounding advice’ of his own. The purport of the letter leaked out and got publicity in the press in a form far worse than it really was. Therefore, Master Tara Singh wrote to Mahatma Gandhi to publish his letter. With his permission, Master Tara Singh released the correspondence between them.30 In his letter to the President of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee, Master Tara Singh refers to an incorrect news published in the press which he immediately contradicted. But on the basis of the incorrect news, Maulana Azad wrote to the President of the Punjab Congress to make enquiries from Master Tara Singh. The President was (p.235) satisfied that the news was false but Maulana Azad gave a statement to the press on the basis of the false news that he had asked for Master Tara Singh’s explanation. He reacted strongly: ‘It is hard for me to put up with such a statement. I am not accustomed to it. I, therefore, resign from all positions where Maulana Sahib can have any control.’ Page 11 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy Master Tara Singh did not wish to remain in a position in which Maulana Azad could insult him again. His resignation from the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee and the All India Congress Committee was based ‘purely upon personal grounds’. He advised his friends to carry on with their duties in the Congress.31 The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal held a special meeting at Amritsar on 28 September 1940 and discussed the correspondence between Master Tara Singh and Mahatma Gandhi for six hours. It was resolved that the Working Committee fully supported the views of Master Tara Singh regarding the defence of the country and expressed its unhappiness and anger over the inappropriate (nā-munāsib) remarks of Mahatma Gandhi about the Sikhs. Present in the meeting from amongst its regular members were Jathedar Teja Singh Akarpuri (President), Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Ishar Singh Majhail, and Sohan Singh Jalal-Usman. Among the special invitees were Partap Singh Kairon (MLA and General Secretary, Punjab Congress), Baldev Singh (MLA), Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and Darshan Singh Pheruman.32 In a note published in the Harijan, Mahatma Gandhi stated that the remarks in his letter to Master Tara Singh were applicable to him personally and to those whom he represented. With reference to this note, Master Tara Singh pointed out on the 1st of October 1940 that there was nothing in Mahatma Gandhi’s letter in support of his clarification. Even in the clarification given now he included those whom Master Tara Singh represented. This virtually meant all the Sikhs. With reference to Mahatma Gandhi’s statement that ‘civil disobedience’ for the Sikhs was a branch of their creed of violence, Master Tara Singh said that he looked upon peaceful agitation as a matter of policy and not as a principle. This was the faith of all the Sikhs. ‘Anyone who does not hold this conviction cannot remain a Sikh of Guru Gobind Singh.’ With reference to Mahatma Gandhi’s statement that the Congress had taken the pledge to remain peaceful, Master Tara Singh had ‘no problem with this policy’, provided it remained confined to the fight against the British for our rights and it was not extended to the other walks of life.33 In this correspondence, Master Tara Singh makes his position very clear. He was no longer personally bound by the Congress policy of conditional cooperation with the British in the war. It was virtually a declaration that the Akali alignment with the Congress did not mean subordination to the Congress. The Shiromani Akali Dal was a political party in its own right, with the right to adopt and follow an independent policy. But this was not a new position adopted by Master Tara Singh. It was a consistent practice of the Shiromani Akali Dal since 1920. After Master Tara Singh’s resignation from the AICC and the PPC on 10 September 1940, Craik observed that there was considerable division among the Akalis on whether or not to follow the example of their leader, but they all Page 12 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy tended to agree that everything possible must be done to maintain and encourage Sikh recruitment. In these circumstances it was not easy to see how a final rupture with the Congress could be long delayed.34 To his (p.236) regret, Craik’s hope of rupture of the Akalis with the Congress was never realized. The Akalis managed to ‘sail in two boats’. They promoted Sikh recruitment but they did not formally break with the Congress. The Khalsa Defence of India League was formed on 19 January 1941. It was generally known that Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh had encouraged its formation. However, the President of the Akali Dal made a statement that the Akali Dal was not participating in the newly formed League. Craik drew the inference that Master Tara Singh and his party ‘will not have the courage openly to support the league’. It was clear that so long as the Akalis refused to associate themselves with the League, it was unlikely to have any great measure of success.35 However, at the end of the month he remarked that the League was really beginning to have some effect on Jatt–Sikh recruitment. Six or seven paid propagandists (parchāraks) had been supplied by Master Tara Singh and his friends to preach recruitment in villages and their speeches were having a good effect.36 On 17 March 1941, Sardar Ujjal Singh, a Parliamentary Secretary, told the Punjab Governor that the Khalsa Defence of India League was distrusted by the Khalsa National Party of Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia because they believed that it was too much in the hands of the Akalis who supplied the parchāraks and controlled the disbursement of funds supplied by the Maharaja of Patiala.37 Towards the end of April, Sir Bertrand Glancy observed that though Patiala was the central figure in the Khalsa Defence of India League, it was doubtful whether he would succeed in taming the Akalis.38 After the middle of June, Glancy wrote that the Khalsa Defence League was genuinely interested in promoting recruitment. Akali influences were a little too strong in the League but the Akalis realized that a decline in the Sikh military quota would result in a serious setback to the community.39 In October 1941, Glancy expressed his satisfaction with recruitment and remarked that the Akalis were careful to avoid coming into the open in helping to promote war activities but they were nonetheless keen to maintain the Sikh proportion in the army.40

The Cripps Mission Master Tara Singh makes a very short statement on the Cripps Mission, highlighting its most salient features from his viewpoint. Cripps came to India on behalf of the British Government with the message of freedom. His proposal, in a nutshell, was that India would be set free after the war and the provinces with Muslim majority would have the right to separate from India if they so desired. Thus, the whole of the Punjab was to become a part of Pakistan. ‘We were greatly perturbed when Cripps revealed the plan. We discussed the matter with all the Sikh leaders present in Delhi and came to the conclusion that we should Page 13 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy ask for separation of those areas in which non-Muslims were in majority. We rejected the proposal of Sir Cripps.’41 Lord Linlithgow had drawn the attention of the Punjab Governor, Sir Bertrand Glancy, on 3 March 1942 to two key points in the first draft of ‘Cripps Offer’: (a) that India will be promised the right to secede after the drafting of the new Constitution, and (b) that the provinces will have the option to accede or not to accede. Glancy expressed his concern that the ‘Cripps Offer’ would intensify bitterness between Muslims and Sikhs, and that the Muslim League was likely to gain great strength in the Punjab. The (p.237) Muslims of the province were not likely to be in favour of accession to India and, given its religious composition, internal trouble in the Punjab would be unavoidable. Only a day later he observed that the relations between Muslims and Sikhs were becoming more and more strained and their mutual mistrust was growing. With reference to a telegram of the Governor General dated 16 March, Glancy suggested the names of Master Tara Singh, Sir Jogendra Singh, and Sardar Kirpal Singh Majithia to meet Cripps.42 Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in Delhi on 23 March 1942 and began his talks with the Viceroy, the members of the Executive Council, high officials, and political leaders of all the main parties and communities. The draft declaration for discussion with Indian leaders was published on 30 March. It stated: ‘Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.’ This Constitution-making body was to include representatives of the Indian states. His Majesty’s Government undertook ‘to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed’ but subject to the right of any province of British India to retain its present constitutional position with the provision for its subsequent accession if it so decided. The non-acceding provinces could have an agreed-upon new Constitution, giving them the same status as for the Indian Union. Furthermore, a treaty was to be negotiated between His Majesty’s Government and the Constitution-making body to cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands including ‘the protection of racial and religious minorities’. So far as it might be required in the new Constitution, an Indian state would have to revise its treaty arrangements. The Constitution-making body was to be elected by an electoral college consisting of members elected to the lower houses of the Provincial Legislatures after the war. The Indian states were to be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole. Until the new Constitution was framed, His Majesty’s Government was to bear the responsibility for control and direction of the defence of India through the Government of India with the

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In Search of Political Autonomy cooperation of the peoples of India.43 Creation of more than one independent state was acceptable to the British Government. On 24 March 1942, Cripps had an interview with the Punjab Governor, who was anxious about Sikh–Muslim relations in the province. In his view, ‘the Sikh was troublesome anyway’. On a hint of secession the Sikhs would concentrate on getting ready to fight the Muslims and ‘this would diminish their contribution to the war effort’. But if the Sikhs and the Muslims agreed on the scheme, hardly any trouble was likely to arise.44 Cripps met Master Tara Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir Jogendra Singh, and Sardar Ujjal Singh on 27 March 1942 and explained the ‘offer’. They raised the question of protection for the Sikh minority and the possibility of carving out a province in which the Sikhs would have a decisive voice ‘as a balancing party between Hindus and Muslims’. Cripps went through the document again to explain the successive stages at which the Sikhs could exert pressure ‘either to remain part of the single Indian Union or to get some provincial autonomy within the second Union if such was formed’. The explanation given by Cripps had many ifs and buts. The Sikh (p.238) leaders were anxious to avoid the setting up of a second dominion but, if it were to be set up, to cut out an autonomous area for themselves. Cripps assured them that the matter of protection to the Sikhs had been particularly discussed in the War Cabinet ‘because of our very great appreciation of the contribution that the Sikhs had made in the past and were making now to the defence of India’. Cripps thought that the Sikh delegates were fully convinced of the British goodwill.45 Actually, Master Tara Singh was ‘extremely upset’ over the scheme propounded by Cripps. The whole question of the treatment of minorities was ‘much too vague’. The only thing that could satisfy the Sikhs was to divide the Punjab to create a separate province. The Sikhs would never tolerate ‘Muhammadan rule’ in any form.46 On 31 March 1942, Cripps had an interview with Sardar Dasaundha Singh and Sardar Naunihal Singh Mann as representatives of the Khalsa Defence of India League. They were not satisfied with the possible safeguards suggested by Cripps, and they were anxious ‘to have carved out a special Sikh area where there could be a plebiscite to decide as to whether they should join the first or the second union in the event of there being two unions’.47 On the same day, Cripps had an interview with the ‘Akali Sikhs’. They stated that they did not approve of the scheme; it did not give them sufficient protection. They expressed the view that they would like a special area in which vote could be taken to decide whether they should join the first or the second Union. Cripps promised to bear this matter in mind and mention it to Jinnah at some stage.48

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In Search of Political Autonomy The Sikh All-Parties Committee’s letter for Cripps (handed over by the ‘Akali Sikhs’ on 31 March) was signed by Baldev Singh (as President), Master Tara Singh, Jogendra Singh, Ujjal Singh, and Mohan Singh (ex-Advisor to the Secretary of State for India), with a note on the position of the Sikhs in the Punjab. The Sikh leaders pointed out that the proposals put forth by Cripps provided for separation of provinces instead of maintaining India’s integrity and betrayed the cause of the Sikh community. As an alternative, the Punjab province could be reorganized to reduce the proportion of Muslims in the total population. In other words, instead of tagging more than 40 per cent of Sikhs and Hindus to the Punjab as a part of Pakistan, the Muslim proportion in its population could be reduced in a reorganized Punjab as a part of united India. The territories to be excluded were the trans-Jhelum area and the districts of Multan and Jhang, which, it was stated, did not belong to the Punjab proper before the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It was added that the Sikhs had lost all hopes of receiving any consideration and that separation of the Punjab from all India Union shall be resisted by all possible means: India could not be left ‘at the mercy of those who disown it’.49 The note appended to the letter underlined the importance of the Sikhs as a distinct community. They had played a vital role in the economic and civic life of the country and its defence but had been progressively deprived of its due share since the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms. The only way of protecting their interests was to keep India united and the Punjab province divided into two with the River Ravi forming roughly the boundary between the two. The province to the west of the Ravi would have more than 77 per cent Muslims and to the east it would have 37 per cent Muslims. The Sikhs would certainly not submit to the domination of a community which was bent upon breaking the unity (p.239) of India. Furthermore, ten safeguards were listed in addition to the formation of a new province, relating to weightage, Provincial Cabinet, representation in the Central Legislature and the Central Cabinet, a Defence Advisory Committee, the Defence Forces of India, Provincial and All-India Services, religious laws of the Sikhs, their religious rights, and the Gurmukhi script.50 Glancy wrote to Linlithgow that the Sikhs were still restive, though ‘undoubtedly relieved’ by the rejection of the offer brought by Cripps. Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders were talking of the danger of the Sikhs being subjected to ‘Muhammadan rule’ in the Punjab. Glancy felt that they would derive comfort from ‘the sympathetic references made to Sikhs’ in the recent debates in Parliament. He hoped, however, that these expressions of sympathy would not lead the Sikhs to believe that ‘Khalistan’ was a practical proposition. Glancy was aware of ‘the practical objections’ to Khalistan even more than to Pakistan. There was not a single district in the Punjab in which the Sikhs were in majority. The obvious course for them to pursue was to seek a satisfactory basis for combining with the majority community in the province.51 Page 16 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy On 1 May, Master Tara Singh thanked Sir Stafford Cripps for his ‘sweet words’ in the House of Commons on 28 April in which he had appreciated the services of the Sikhs and admitted that promises given to minorities had not been kept, except in case of the Muslims. Master Tara Singh asked: ‘Why should premium be put upon secession from India?’ The Hindus and Sikhs of the Punjab did not want to go out of India. Why should they ‘be forced to go out’? It was unreasonable to allow the majority in one part of the province to take with them the majority of the other part. The right to secede from India was not the way to protect the Sikhs. A big province could certainly be carved out in which the Sikhs were not dominated by any single community.52 Master Tara Singh was not asking for a Sikh state. Three days later, Master Tara Singh wrote to Cripps again that if the British Government was prepared to accept the Sikh proposal, there was a likelihood of reaching the final solution to the communal problem. Master Tara Singh could persuade the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha to agree to the solution proposed. The only party to object to the division of the Punjab as proposed would be the Muslim League. Master Tara Singh hoped that Cripps and the Secretary of State, Amery, would stand by the Sikhs to save the major portion of the community from the domination of any single community.53 Cripps responded to this appeal on 10 July, but only to reiterate that the British Government and the British people had ‘the most kindly and grateful feelings’ towards the Sikhs.54

Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact Master Tara Singh says in his Merī Yād that the Akali Dal expressed its views for Sikander Hayat Khan’s consideration. The differences between the two sides were both political and communal. The political differences could not be resolved but something could be done about communal differences. The Akalis were bitterly opposed to his anti-Sikh measures. The Sikhs could be appeased by putting an end to such communal policies and measures. After the discussions, the following decisions were taken: (a) the Akali members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly would continue to sit with the Congress in opposition to the Unionists and would be perfectly (p.240) free to oppose Sikander Hayat Khan and his party, (b) there would be no restriction whatever on the use of jhatkā meat in government places and institutions, (c) no new legislation would be enacted without the consent of the Sikh Minister, (d) adequate arrangements would be made for the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script in government schools, and (e) preference would be given to the views of the Sikh Minister in all matters connected with the Sikhs. After the agreement on these terms it was decided that no Akali MLA would become a Minister because the Akalis were aligned with the Congress. Sardar Baldev Singh, who had not been elected on the Congress ticket, or with the help of the Congress, was acceptable to the Akalis. Therefore, he could take the place of Sardar Dasaundha Singh as the Sikh Minister. This was agreed to.55 This agreement, called the Sikander–Baldev Page 17 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy Singh Pact, was entered into in June 1942. Its background can be traced to January 1941. The Executive Committee of the Shiromani Akai Dal had passed a resolution on 26 January 1941 to invite proposals for resolutions by 7 February for an All-India Akali Conference to be held at Rurka Kalan in the Jullundur district. A subcommittee was appointed on 9 February to look into the proposed gurmatās. The SGPC was requested to provide guidance in certain matters which were the cause of great restlessness among the Sikhs. These matters related to the policy of the government with regard to the use of Punjabi language and Gurmukhi script, free use of meat prepared in Muslim fashion in government institutions, ban on the use of jhatkā meat, undue restrictions on the Sikh religious procession in Sargodha, unjust action against those who had taken out a procession as a matter of right, the threat of Pakistan being created, and decline of Sikh spirit in the rulers of the Sikh states.56 After the All-India Akali Conference at Rurka during 15–16 February 1941, a General Meeting of the SGPC was held on 22 February. Master Tara Singh, President of the SGPC, sent copies of the resolutions passed at the Conference and the General Meeting to the Punjab Governor, underlining that the Punjab Government had persistently followed a narrow-minded policy in the past four years, and expecting that the government would desist from taking steps ‘to weaken the position of the Sikhs and specially from attacking their religion, culture and honour’. The Governor was empowered by the Government of India Act of 1935 to protect the minority communities, especially their religion and culture. Therefore, Master Tara Singh appealed to the Governor on behalf of the Sikh community to see that the perfectly reasonable and moderate demands of the Sikhs were met by the 1st of April 1941. The first demand in the resolution of the SGPC, which supported the demands of the All-India Akali Conference, was unconditional withdrawal of cases against the Sikhs at Sargodha. The second demand was to establish a convention that legislation affecting the religious matters of any community would be enacted by an absolute majority of that community alone; and concurrence of the SGPC should be deemed essential for any legislation affecting the management of gurdwaras. The third demand related to special facilities, including budget provision, to be afforded for popularizing and teaching the Punjabi language. Amendment of the compulsory Primary Education Bill was the fourth demand, so that teaching of Gurmukhi (Punjabi) and Hindi could be provided in all public schools where at least seven students desired it. The fifth demand was the removal (p.241) of restrictions on the use of jhatkā meat within the precincts of public institutions with the same facilities as were given for the halāl meat. The last demand was to exempt from taxation property belonging to all religious, educational, and charitable institutions. On 3 March 1941, Craik wrote to Linlithgow that he proposed to

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In Search of Political Autonomy discuss the situation with Master Tara Singh, possibly in the presence of Sikander Hayat Khan.57 Craik met Sikander Hayat Khan on 4 March 1941 and discussed the ‘ultimatum’ received from the SGPC. Sikander Hayat Khan agreed to a meeting with Master Tara Singh.58 On 16 March, the Punjab Governor and the Punjab Premier held a long conversation with Master Tara Singh and went through all the demands one by one. Sikander Hayat Khan was firm on the first point: the cases against the offenders could be withdrawn only if they apologized. The local Sikhs were prepared to do so. Craik got the impression that Master Tara Singh was not really keen to start any campaign of direct action; he seemed rather anxious to prolong the negotiations. After the discussion of all the demands Craik advised Master Tara Singh in the interest of the Sikhs themselves that they should concentrate all their efforts ‘at the present moment on maintaining and strengthening their connection with the Army’. Master Tara Singh was inclined to agree with the Governor that ‘both the economic and political importance of the Sikhs as a minority community depended almost entirely on their connection with the Army’.59 Master Tara Singh’s view of what happened in Sargodha was quite different. He says that the Deputy Commissioner of Sargodha encouraged the Muslims to obstruct the procession on the occasion of the Gurpurb in order to demoralize the Sikhs. The Muslims were at fault but the Sikhs were arrested. The Panth was agitated all the more, and the Shiromani Akali Dal decided to launch a morchā. Master Tara Singh was to lead a jathā to Sargodha. The British authorities intervened. They had become convinced of the undue interference by the Deputy Commissioner. He was transferred from Sargodha, and the Sikh prisoners were released. Master Tara Singh could not say that the Muslims were incited by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan but he was ‘convinced that Muslim officers were affected by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan’s habit of referring to his government as “Muslim government” in ordinary conversations’.60 The Deputy Commissioner of Sargodha was one such officer. Master Tara Singh was not satisfied with the response of Sikander Hayat Khan to the Sikh demands. Indeed, on 24 March 1941 the Akali leaders met at Amritsar and decided to resort to direct action unless the Punjab Government (a) unconditionally released the Sikhs arrested in Sargodha in connection with the incident of 4 January 1941, and (b) established a convention that legislation affecting the religious affairs of a community was left to the members of the Legislative Assembly representing that particular community. On 27 March, Sikander Hayat Khan made a statement in the assembly expressing his readiness to promote the establishment of a convention regarding ‘religious’ legislation on the lines demanded by the Sikhs. With regard to the arrests in Sargodha, he reiterated the stand he had taken on 16 March. Meanwhile, a deputation of the local Sikhs had waited on the District Magistrate of Sargodha to express their Page 19 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy regret and give the required assurance. The orders of prosecution were withdrawn and the accused persons were released. Master Tara Singh regarded this as a victory of the Akalis.61 (p.242) The statement made by Sikander Hayat Khan in the assembly was drafted ‘in part’ by Craik. He felt happy over the management of this business by Sikander Hayat Khan with considerable skill, avoiding the appearance of giving in to threats of direct action. The District Magistrate who happened to be Muslim had passed ‘a somewhat hasty and indiscreet order’ which was the source of trouble. But Craik would have preferred to insist on an expression of regret by the Sikhs concerned and not by the local Sikh leaders. However, he did not want to leave the situation unresolved on the eve of his departure from the Punjab on 7 April 1941.62 Craik’s close alignment with the Premier and his support to the Unionist Ministry come out clearly from his reports, even though he was aware of its Muslim bias. Sir Sunder Singh Majithia died early in April 1941. According to the new Governor, Sir Bertrand Glancy, Sikander Hayat Khan wanted to have a loyalist Sikh in his place. There was no candidate of outstanding merit, and the choice fell on Sardar Dasaundha Singh, who was a Jatt Sikh ‘loyal to the Punjab Government’. His appointment was reasonably well received but there was little enthusiasm.63 According to Master Tara Singh, Sardar Dasaundha Singh was expected to dance to the tune of Sikander Hayat Khan who could thereby promote Muslim rule (musalmānī rāj) and enhance his prestige. For this purpose he could not have a more suitable person than Dasaundha Singh who had no Sikh legislator or Sikh public figure in his support. Dasaundha Singh soon earned an unenviable name for himself and became the butt of jokes in social gatherings. The Unionist Party, in turn, suffered in terms of reputation. Whereas Sardar Sunder Singh Majithia had the Chief Khalsa Diwan and a number of public figures behind him, Dasaundha Singh had only Sikander Hayat Khan. The Akali Dal gained strength in this situation. Sikander Hayat Khan was now inclined to get rid of Dasaundha Singh. The British authorities were not happy with a Sikh Minister who had no influence over the Sikhs. The army authorities were in favour of rapprochement between the Akalis and Sikander Hayat Khan. In this situation, Sikander Hayat Khan thought of coming to some kind of an agreement with the Akalis.64 For the appointment of a Sikh representative on the National Defence Council in July 1941, the Governor considered four possible persons: Sir Jogendra Singh, Sardar Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, and Sardar Naunihal Singh Mann. Sikander Hayat Khan was not in favour of Sir Jogendra Singh who was a ‘superficial idealist’. He was definitely opposed to Master Tara Singh who was disliked by the Sikh gentry, which was almost exclusively Jatt. As ‘an Arora Sikh’ he was not likely to promote recruitment among the Jatt Sikhs. He commanded Page 20 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy considerable influence among the Sikh masses, but his appointment would be open to serious objection from ‘the political point of view’. Sikander Hayat Khan considered Sardar Naunihal Singh Mann to be the best choice as a Jatt Sikh who was the head of a well-known family of Shiekhupura with considerable influence in his district. Sikander Hayat Khan’s second choice was Sardar Baldev Singh, who was a ‘big’ contractor. His father had earned ‘very large profits as a result of the war’. He was closely associated with the Akalis, who depended on him for considerable financial support. However, his appointment to the Defence Council would not be appropriate because he happened to be a fairly large contractor.65 Sardar Naunihal (p.243) Singh Mann was eventually appointed to the National Defence Council. Under pressure from Jinnah, Sikander Hayat Khan decided to sever his connection with the National Defence Council. His ‘unexpected surrender to the dictation of Jinnah’ created the impression that the Unionist Party was not likely to remain ascendant if it became tied to the wheels of the Muslim League chariot. The Unionists were keen that the seat left vacant by Sir Sunder Singh in the Sikh constituency of Batala in the Gurdaspur district should be filled by his son, Sardar Kirpal Singh. The Akalis looked upon the Batala seat as the most prestigious one, and they strained every nerve to win the contest. They mobilized their forces on a large scale and there was ‘a good deal of hooliganism and intimidation’. The Akali candidate won by a margin of about 1,000 votes. The Akalis regarded this triumph as an ‘indication of their ascendancy among the Sikh community’. They set up a committee now to get their grievances redressed.66 The Akalis were loud in denouncing the Unionist Government which appeared to be determined on abusing the Sikhs at every opportunity. Besides the problem of jhatkā, there was the denial of their fair share in the public services, noninclusion of a Sikh member in the enlarged Executive Council of the Viceroy, and the appointment of a weak leader like Dasaundha Singh as a member of the Punjab Cabinet. On the last point, Glancy himself sincerely wished that ‘a more effective successor to the late Sir Sunder Singh Majithia had been put forward’. There was a talk of liquidating his Khalsa National Party. More significantly, there was a feeling among the Sikhs that they had made a mistake in aligning with the Congress and opposing Sikh recruitment to the army. They should not allow their ‘political identity’ to be submerged. They should be good friends with the British as ‘an impartial umpire’. They suggested that ‘if Sikander would openly abandon the Pakistan theory, and if a Sikh Minister who is truly representative of the Khalsa could be appointed to the Cabinet, then all distrust would happily disappear’. Glancy got the impression that the Sikhs were growing more and more uneasy and wished to move in some direction or other to ensure their survival.67

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In Search of Political Autonomy Glancy wrote to Linlithgow on 1 May 1942 that the obvious course for the Sikhs to pursue was to seek a satisfactory basis for aligning with the Muslim majority in the province. Already the name of Sardar Baldev Singh had met the approval of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, and it was persistently mentioned for inclusion in the Punjab Cabinet. Master Tara Singh was in favour of a compromise and would like to take credit for services rendered to the community. Glancy thought it was better to strengthen the position of a new Sikh Minister as a unifying factor ‘rather than to let him dance to the tune of an outside party directorate’. Baldev Singh could be a fairly good representative of the Sikhs, without the tag of the Khalsa National Party. Before the end of May, Baldev Singh was in Tatanagar to ask for his father’s consent for joining the Cabinet on the basis of the compromise being worked out with the blessings of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh.68 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan announced at a press conference on 15 June 1942 the terms of his pact with Sardar Baldev Singh as leader of the United Punjab Party. On the issue of jhatkā, it was announced that every community should be free to cook and use meat slaughtered according to their own rites in all government institutions where separate (p.244) kitchens existed or could be provided for Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs. Teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as the second language was to be introduced as soon as possible in accordance with a formula that shall apply to all communities alike. In matters concerned exclusively with a particular community, that community alone shall have the right to decide whether or not to proceed with it when it came before the House; it would be left to the members of the community to take a decision at all stages of such legislation. For recruitment to the Services, there was already a proportion fixed for each Minister to ensure that there was no departure from this formula. The Premier assured Baldev Singh that he would support the Sikh claim for due share in the Central Services.69 Sardar Dasaundha Singh resigned gracefully to make room for Sardar Baldev Singh, who took his seat in the cabinet as Development Minister before the end of June 1942. On 26 July, Glancy wrote to Linlithgow that the Sikhs generally were better disposed towards the government now as a result of the Sikander– Baldev Singh Pact and the appointment of Sir Jogendra Singh to the expanded council. Several Sikh leaders had made speeches that were favourable to the government. There were gratifying signs that the Congress proposals had been criticized in Sikh newspapers of the Punjab. Indeed, ‘the bond between the Akalis and the Congress is not as strong as it was, and Gandhi can certainly not rely on any general Sikh support in the early stages of a mass movement’.70 Linlithgow wrote to Glancy in November that he was glad to know that Baldev Singh was settling down, and added: ‘I have always attached very great importance to the Sikander–Baldev Singh pact, and hope sincerely that it will continue to pay a good dividend.’71 Page 22 of 28

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In Search of Political Autonomy In Retrospect On 9 August 1940, Master Tara Singh had already asked the Congress President, Maulana Azad, whether or not he could make his view public that he was in favour of making India self-reliant in terms of men, war materials, and weapons in the larger interests of the country and the Sikhs. The more the army was ‘Indianized’, the more would it be helpful in case India was invaded by a foreign power and in a situation of political chaos. Copies of this letter were sent to Mahatma Gandhi, Rajendra Prasad, and Rajagopalachari. Mahatma Gandhi accused Master Tara Singh that he believed in the rule of the sword and thought of ‘my people’ but not of the nation. His mentality weakened the Congress and he weakened his own people by remaining in the Congress. He should be either completely a ‘nationalist’ or a ‘communalist’. Master Tara Singh said in response that he had no doubt that the Congress subscribed to the ideal of Indian Nationalism, but it did recognize the presence of religious communities and minorities as well. Mahatma Gandhi himself had recognized the existence of the Sikhs as a distinct community. In 1929, he had reassured the Sikhs and the Muslims that no constitution would be adopted without their consent. Mahatma Gandhi’s advice that Master Tara Singh should be either completely a nationalist or a communalist reflected a change in the political outlook of the Congress in which ‘communalism’ had come to mean the opposite of nationalism, making the two mutually exclusive. On the question of non-violence, Master Tara Singh said that non-violence for the Congress was the means for attaining complete independence. No one believed that an independent (p.245) state could exist without an army and a police. Not only Master Tara Singh but every Sikh of Guru Gobind Singh believed that it was legitimate to take up the sword when all peaceful means failed. The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal fully supported the views of Master Tara Singh regarding the defence of the country. Mahatma Gandhi clarified in the Harijan that his remarks were applicable to Master Tara Singh personally and to those whom he represented. Master Tara Singh gave a public statement on the 1st of October that there was nothing in the Mahatma’s letter to support his clarification, and his note reinforced the impression that he was talking of all the Akalis. Master Tara Singh maintained that his resignation from the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee and the All India Congress Committee was based ‘purely upon personal grounds’, and he advised ‘his friends’ to carry on with their duties in the Congress. Within four months of the estrangement between Master Tara Singh and Mahatma Gandhi the Khalsa Defence of India League was formed under the leadership of the Maharaja of Patiala in January 1941. It was supported quietly by Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. In October 1941, the Punjab Governor expressed his satisfaction with the recruitment of the Sikhs from the province.

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In Search of Political Autonomy In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps met Master Tara Singh with some other Sikh leaders and told them that the War Cabinet had ‘very great appreciation of the contribution that the Sikhs had made in the past and were making now to the defence of India’. But Master Tara Singh was ‘extremely upset’ over the scheme propounded by Cripps in which partition of India was accepted in principle. In that case, Master Tara Singh wanted the Punjab to be divided so that the Sikhs could become free from ‘Muhammadan rule’. The Cripps Mission failed but the Sikhs remained seriously perturbed over the possibility that they could be placed under perpetual Muslim domination. The Akalis had a number of grievances against the Unionist Government headed by Sikander Hayat Khan. However, the Punjab Governor was keen to work out some sort of rapprochement between the Akalis and the Unionists. On the initiative of the Punjab Governor, the Akalis put forward their views and Sikander Hayat Khan agreed on a number of points. The agreement was given a tangible shape in the Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact of 1942. Baldev Singh replaced Dasaundha Singh as the Sikh Minister in the Unionist Ministry. He did not join the Cabinet as an Akali but as the leader of the United Punjab Party in the Legislature. Penderel Moon saw in the pact a potential for communal rapprochement in the Punjab and even in India. However, Sikander Hayat Khan was only half hearted and Master Tara Singh was clear that this pact could not resolve the political differences between the Akalis and the Unionists. The Akalis did not sever their connection with the Congress but tried to follow an independent policy to acquire a sort of political autonomy. Notes:

(1.) Peter Clarke, The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 5–6. (2.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), pp. 385–6. (3.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 386–8. (4.) Sarkar, Modern India, p. 381. (5.) Satya M. Rai, Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Panjab 1897– 1947 (New Delhi: ICHR, 1984), pp. 266–7. (6.) K.L. Tuteja, Sikh Politics (1920–40) (Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984), pp. 192–3, 206 n. 157. (7.) Sukhmani Bal Riar, The Politics of the Sikhs 1940–47 (Chandigarh: Unistar, 2006), pp. 53–7.

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In Search of Political Autonomy (8.) Craik to Linlithgow, 16 July 1940, in Punjab Politics, 1940–1943: Strains of War, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p. 161. (9.) Durlab Singh, ‘The Valiant Fighter’, pp. 75–8. (10.) Craik to Linlithgow, 16 July 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 161. (11.) Giani Lal Singh, Nīlī Dastār dī Dāstān (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1994), pp. 32–3. (12.) For this and the following three paragraphs, Master Tara Singh, Pardhāngī Address (given at Kila Didar Singh on 17 September 1940), published and freely distributed by Mota Singh Kalowali, General Secretary, Reception Committee. Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, PhD thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, Appendix 3. (13.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), p. 95. (14.) Craik to Linlithgow, 10 July 1939, in Punjab Politics: The Start of Provincial Autonomy (Governor’s Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents), ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), pp. 362–3. (15.) Punjab Politics (2004), p. 416 n. 70. (16.) Craik to Linlithgow, 28 August and 13 September 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 375, 376. (17.) Punjab Politics (2004), p. 394. (18.) Craik to Linlithgow, 12 October 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 387–8. (19.) Craik to Linlithgow, 15 November 1939, Punjab Politics (2004), pp. 398–9. (20.) Craik to Linlithgow, 28 January 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 73. (21.) Craik to Linlithgow, 22 August 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 175–7. (22.) Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), p. 31. (23.) Moon, Divide and Quit, p. 32. (24.) Moon, Divide and Quit, pp. 32–4. (25.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh Te Udesh, pp. 164–7. (26.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 167–8.

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In Search of Political Autonomy (27.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 168–71. (28.) Craik to Linlithgow, 27 August 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 179–80. (29.) Sethi to Craik, 10 September 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 183. (30.) Master Tara Singh to President, Punjab Provincial Congress Committee, 10 September 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 184. (31.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 184–5. (32.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 171. (33.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 172. (34.) Craik to Linlithgow, 24 September 1940, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 186. (35.) Craik to Linlithgow, 10 February 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 223. (36.) Craik to Linlithgow, 28 February 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 227. (37.) Craik to Linlithgow, 17 March 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 240. (38.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 28 April 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 247. (39.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 23 June 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 252. (40.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 21 October 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 279. (41.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 105. (42.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 4 and 16 March 1942, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 294– 5, 301, 343 n. 3. (43.) Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–1947, 2 volumes (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. II, pp. 520–1. Nicholas Mansergh and E.W. Lumby (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1970), vol. I, pp. 565–6. (44.) The Transfer of Power, vol. I, pp. 464–5. (45.) Note by Sir S. Cripps, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, pp. 496–8. (46.) Ogilvie to Pinnell, 30 March 1942, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, p. 564. (47.) Note by Sir S. Cripps, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, p. 580. (48.) Note by Sir S. Cripps, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, p. 581.

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In Search of Political Autonomy (49.) The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps, 31 March 1942, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, pp. 582–3. (50.) Enclosure to No. 967, The Transfer of Power, vol. I, pp. 583–8. (51.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 1 May 1942, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 304. (52.) Master Tara Singh to Sir S. Cripps, 1 May 1942, in Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 435–6. (53.) Master Tara Singh to Sir S. Cripps, 4 May 1942, in Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh, p. 437. Mansergh and Lumby, The Transfer of Power (1971), vol. II, pp. 26–7. (54.) Sir S. Cripps to Master Tara Singh, 10 July 1942, Mahatma Gandhi’s talks with Jinnah later, The Transfer of Power, vol. II, p. 362. (55.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī Dā Punjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 208. Kirpal Singh (ed.) Panthic Mate (Chandigarh: Dr. Man Singh Nirankari, 2002), pp. 93–5. Craik to Linlithgow, 3 March 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 229–31. (56.) Craik to Linlithgow, 3 March 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 229–33. (57.) Craik to Linlithgow, 4 March 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 234–6. (58.) Craik to Linlithgow, 17 March 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 239–40. (59.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 95–6. (60.) Craik to Linlithgow, 2 April 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 241–2. (61.) Craik to Linlithgow, 2 April 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 243–4. (62.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 11 April 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 244. (63.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 96. (64.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 1 July 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 258–9. (65.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 21 October 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 279. (66.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 22 November 1941, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 280–2. (67.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 96–7. (68.) Glancy to Linlighgow, 1 May 1942, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 304–5. (69.) Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact, Punjab Politics (2005), Appendix, pp. 417–18.

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In Search of Political Autonomy (70.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 26 July 1942, Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 321–2. (71.) Linlithgow to Glancy, 24 November 1942, The Transfer of Power (1971), vol. III, p. 297.

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New Political Orientations

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

New Political Orientations (1942–5) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0011

Abstract and Keywords In 1942–3, the ‘Azad Punjab’ scheme was promoted by Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders. However, it had no attraction for the bureaucracy, the Muslim League, and the Congress. Even Kharak Singh and Sant Singh were opposed to it. The talks of Rajagopalachari with Jinnah impelled Master Tara Singh to put forth the idea of a Sikh state in view of the impression left by the talks that Rajagopalachari and Mahatma Gandhi were willing to concede Pakistan in accordance with a modified procedure for demarcating the boundaries. In case Pakistan was conceded, the Sikh memorandum to the Sapru Committee asked for creation of a separate Sikh state with a substantial proportion of the Sikh population, their historic gurdwaras, and provision of transfer of population and property. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, ‘Azad Punjab’, Congress, Kharak Singh, Rajagopalachari, Jinnah, Pakistan, Sikh memorandum, Sapru Committee, Sikh state

The failure of the Cripps Mission was followed by the ‘Quit India’ movement, which too ended in failure. The Muslim League was opposed to the movement. In fact, Jinnah’s ‘Divide and Quit’ was a retort to ‘Quit India’. Rajagopalachari and Mahatma Gandhi were inclined to come to a compromise with Jinnah to form a joint front for the demand of freedom. With Mahatma Gandhi’s approval, Rajaji had talks with Jinnah, who, as it turned out, was not prepared to accept a truncated Pakistan. Mahatma Gandhi’s talks with Jinnah later also failed because the Mahatma was not prepared to accept the ‘two-nation theory’ of Jinnah, who Page 1 of 33

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New Political Orientations was unwilling to abandon the Resolution of 1940. Master Tara Singh advocated the idea of ‘Azad Punjab’ before the Rajaji–Jinnah and Gandhi–Jinnah talks and the idea of a ‘Sikh State’ after the talks. This was the demand put forth by the Sikh leaders before the Sapru Committee. Nothing came out of this demand because nothing came out of the Sapru Committee Report.

The ‘Quit India’ Movement The ‘Quit India’ resolution was passed by the CWC at Wardha on 14 July 1942 and endorsed by the AICC at Bombay on 8 August 1942. The Congress leaders were arrested in the early morning of 9 August. This crackdown resulted in a spontaneous outburst. It was massive and violent, predominantly urban, and it was quickly suppressed. After the middle of August, the movement spread to the countryside. Communications were destroyed on a massive scale; there were peasant rebellions against the authorities and short-lived local ‘national governments’. The use of fifty-seven army battalions enabled the government to weaken the movement by brutal repression. After September 1942, the movement was marked by terrorist activities of educated youth directed against police and army installations as well as communications. By the end of 1943, 208 police outposts, 332 railway stations, and 945 post offices had been (p.249) destroyed or severely damaged; there had been 664 bomb explosions; and nearly 92,000 persons had been arrested. The movement eventually failed but the British were convinced that negotiated settlement would be the only option open to them after the war.1 The official attitude during the war years towards the All-India Muslim League enabled Jinnah to consolidate his position and power. The ‘August offer’ of Linlithgow had conceded in effect one of the major demands of Jinnah since the outbreak of the war: the League was the sole spokesman for India’s Muslims, and it had a kind of veto on future constitutional changes. The Cripps Mission formally admitted the possibility of Pakistan being created. The Muslim League took full advantage of the suppression of the Congress. League ministry was installed in Assam in August 1942, in Sind in October 1942, and in Bengal in March 1943.2 Mahatma Gandhi was in favour of coming to some kind of understanding with the Muslim League. In the summer of 1944 Rajagopalachari put forth a formula for Jinnah’s consideration. It proposed a ‘plebiscite’ for the Muslim majority ‘contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India’ on the issue of separation from Hindustan. It sounded like ‘Pakistan’ and aroused considerable speculation about Mahatma Gandhi’s new position because Rajagopalachari had insisted that the Mahatma was prepared to accept the formula if Jinnah agreed to it. However, Jinnah awaited direct word from Mahatma Gandhi. This led to talks between Gandhi and Jinnah in September 1944. Jinnah was not prepared to concede anything. As Mahatma Gandhi put it, Jinnah wanted Pakistan ‘now, not after independence’. They met again but nothing was resolved through their Page 2 of 33

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New Political Orientations talks and correspondence. Wavell wrote in his journal: ‘The two great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous mouse has emerged.’3 Before the end of 1944, a few leaders who did not belong to any political party formed a committee, headed by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, to explore the ground for national consensus on constitutional issues. The questionnaire issued by the Conciliation Committee, popularly called the ‘Sapru Committee’, was quite comprehensive, eliciting views on fundamental rights, representation to be given to communities, the issue of Pakistan, and of alternative territorial reorganization. The Committee submitted its report in March 1945, rejecting the idea of Pakistan.

Akali Response to ‘Quit India’ On 14 July 1942, the CWC passed the ‘Quit India’ resolution at Wardha, calling for the immediate ending of British rule in India. In response to a telegram from Linlithgow, Glancy said that the effect of this move by the Congress might be less embarrassing in the Punjab than in other provinces but the situation as a whole appeared to become increasingly dangerous, and positive action would soon become unavoidable.4 On 16 July, Linlithgow wrote to Glancy that there was general solidarity in the council that if the AICC ratified the ‘Quit India’ resolution there should be immediate action. The members underscored the importance of propaganda at home and abroad, and suggested that the parties who did not agree with the Congress or Gandhi should be mobilized. Linlithgow asked Glancy to do what he could with Jogendra Singh to try to get the Sikhs to come out in opposition to the Congress.5 With reference to Linlithgow’s telegram, asking him to keep in close touch with (p.250) reactions to the CWC resolution, Glancy wrote to Linlithgow on 26 July that the Muslim press in Lahore used the terms ‘blackmail’, ‘hypocrisy’, and ‘ludicrous’ for the CWC demand. Sikander Hayat Khan said at a meeting at Lyallpur: ‘If the British quit India, chaos will follow and no ordered Government would be possible.’ The Punjab Congress was divided into the camps of Bhargava and Satyapal, and the latter would hesitate to do anything that might increase Bhargava’s prestige. The Lahore Hindu press had shown no great enthusiasm for the resolution. The Akalis would be in an awkward position in view of the recent rapprochement with the Unionists (the Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact). Individual Akalis might join a civil disobedience movement but there would be no unanimity in their response to the resolution.6 The Sikhs generally were better disposed to the government as the result of the Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact and the appointment of Sir Jogendra Singh to the expanded council.7 Sir Jogendra Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh made satisfactory speeches at a tea party. Baldev Singh’s speech was reported in the press. It was the duty of every true Punjabi, he said, to be ready to make any sacrifice to meet ‘internal disorder’ and to defeat the forces of ‘external Page 3 of 33

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New Political Orientations aggression’. It was the time for mustering in thousands ‘to repel the evil forces’ threatening the democracies of the world. In The Tribune of 25 July appeared a statement by Sardar Naunihal Singh, Sardar Jogindar Singh Mann, Sardar Bahadur Gurbachan Singh, and Sardar Raghbir Singh Sandhanwalia criticizing the Congress proposals.8 However, Sir Jogendra Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh hesitated to come out into the open against the resolution of the CWC.9 On 8 August 1942, the AICC gave its ‘most careful consideration’ to the resolution of the CWC, the development of the war situation, the statements of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments made in India and abroad, and approved of the resolution and endorsed it. If anything, there was further justification for the immediate end of British rule in India. On this vital issue depended the future of the war and success of freedom and democracy. Therefore, the AICC repeated with ‘all emphasis’ the demand for withdrawal of the British power from India. A provisional government could be formed with the cooperation of ‘the principal parties and groups’ to defend India against external aggression. The provisional government would evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly to prepare a Constitution acceptable to all sections of the people. This Constitution should be a federal one, with ‘the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with residuary powers vesting in these units’. The AICC resolved to sanction ‘the starting of a mass struggle on nonviolent lines on the widest possible scale’ under the leadership of Gandhiji. By embarking on a mass struggle, the AICC had no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it came, would belong to ‘all the people of India’.10 Amery wrote to Linlithgow on 26 August that he had sent a number of telegrams about Gandhi. He was keen that ‘by hook or by crook we mustn’t let him defeat us, even if it involved somehow enclosing and picketing Sevagram, the difficulties of which I fully appreciate’. Amery talked about the Sikhs too in this letter. He referred to Linlithgow’s letter of 25 May 1942 in which he had talked about the encouragement which the Sikhs might have derived from the Cripps Mission and (p.251) Amery’s own speeches. Amery asserted that there was nothing like a pledge given to the Sikhs but they would try to give that complexion. With the threat of Pakistan they would press for ‘a degree of autonomy sufficient to protect them from Muslim domination’. However, advocacy of an independent ‘Sikhdom’ was bound sooner or later to create trouble. It would be useful, therefore, to explore various possibilities they suggest in advance of any further constitutional discussions. ‘I should judge that a separate Sikhdom is really unworkable without extensive transfers of population in order to mitigate the fresh minority problems that it would raise.’ Amery suggested that perhaps the Reforms Department in consultation with the Punjab Government could go into the schemes adumbrated at the Round Table Conference, observing complete secrecy.11 Page 4 of 33

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New Political Orientations On 20 August 1942 the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League met at Bombay to deplore the decision of the AICC on 8 August to launch an ‘open rebellion’ in the name of mass civil disobedience in pursuance of their objective of establishing ‘Congress Hindu domination in India’. This movement was meant not only to coerce the British Government into handing over power to ‘a Hindu oligarchy’ but also ‘to force the Musalmans to submit and surrender to Congress terms and dictation’. The slogan of ‘Quit India’ was mere camouflage. The real aim of the Congress was to have ‘supreme control of the government of the country’. The Muslims were firmly convinced that the ‘Quit India’ movement was meant to deal a death blow to the Muslim goal of Pakistan. The Muslim League, therefore, called upon the British Government to come forward with ‘an unequivocal declaration guaranteeing to the Muslims the right of selfdetermination’, and to give effect to the Pakistan scheme. The Working Committee was fully convinced that Pakistan was ‘the only solution of India’s constitutional problem’. The Muslim League was always willing to negotiate with any party ‘on the footing of equality’. In these circumstances the Working Committee of All-India Muslim League called upon the Muslims ‘to abstain from any participation in the movement initiated by the Congress’.12 On 21 August 1942, Glancy wrote to Linlithgow that, normally, the Akalis as the champions of Congress were expected to provide the more unruly and determined element in the provincial disorders. Now, however, there was a general impression that they were less liable to be led into anti-government demonstrations. The inclusion of Jogendra Singh in the Governor General’s Council and the appointment of Baldev Singh as a Minister were gratifying to the Sikhs in general, and the Akalis would now be content to rest on their laurels. But Master Tara Singh had come out with a statement that ‘he will not oppose any adventures on which the Congress may embark’. Glancy had to point out to him and his friends that any continuance of this form of response to the favours which the Sikhs had lately received from the government would ‘make it increasingly difficult for those who sympathise with the community to espouse their cause’. Amritsar, the stronghold of the Akali Dal, still remained ‘the danger centre’. A goods train had just been derailed in its neighbourhood.13 In a telegram to the Punjab Governor on 18 August 1942, the Governor General had mentioned the importance of collecting evidence to prove the responsibility of the Congress, and of Gandhi in particular, for the campaign of violence. Glancy wrote to Linlithgow on the 1st of September that a (p.252) CID agent from the Punjab had gathered information in Bombay, claiming that he received it ‘direct from members of the Working Committee’. Gandhi was still a strong believer in non-violence but he had realized, he said, the impossibility of conducting the campaign on non-violent lines, and he gave it as his opinion that ‘the destruction of railway lines, telegraph, and telephone wires and other Government property was not an act of violence’. He visualized that some lives could be lost in struggle with the government. A form of guerrilla warfare aimed Page 5 of 33

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New Political Orientations at crippling the government was also favoured. In other words, only deliberate killing was violence. Among other items of information Glancy mentioned that the Punjab legislator Mangal Singh on his return from Wardha in July had said in Delhi that the Congress High Command was not afraid of general chaos, terrorism, communal riots, and other such phenomenon that involved violence.14 Master Tara Singh’s chapter on ‘Congress–Akali Conspiracy’ in his Merī Yād refers to a comical incident in connection with the ‘Quit India’ movement. When the Congress leaders were arrested on account of the ‘Quit India’ resolution in August 1942, people rose spontaneously at many places to destroy railway lines and disrupt activities related to the war. However, this reaction was rather weak in the Punjab. Only two categories of Punjabis could have responded to the situation, the students and the Akalis. The students were on vacation and the Akalis were unenthusiastic. Those who attended the Congress meeting at Bombay claimed that they had received secret instruction to pursue violent activities short of murder. Master Tara Singh did not believe that violence was suggested by the Congress leaders. Since Master Tara Singh himself was opposed to violence, some Akalis of Amritsar who were thinking of destroying railway lines kept it secret from him. When a goods train was derailed at the Mananwala station, he suspected the Amritsar Akalis. He persuaded Jathedar Sohan Singh (Josh) to discard the programme of violence and to court arrest under civil disobedience. All the Akalis connected with the incident at Mananwala, and also at Butari, got arrested. But they were kept only under detention. There was a lot of enthusiasm in the beginning and a Giani tried to persuade Master Tara Singh to allow violent activity. Amar Singh, a known Akali leader, was equally opposed to violence but his hot discussion with the Giani ended in their decision to disrupt traffic on the railway together. When they reached the railway line they realized that they had forgotten to bring any implements. They tried to burn the wooden logs of the railway line but failed. Meanwhile the train came and they threw stones at it. On the following day everyone in the Missionary College laughed at them and mocked their ‘bravery’ in throwing stones at a goods train, but they contended that it was a passenger train.15 On 7 September 1942, Linlithgow wrote to Amery with reference to his letter of 20 August that in his judgement the Sikhs were a nuisance worth placating but a relatively small nuisance. Under no circumstances could he think that ‘it would be practical politics to consider any sort of “Sikhistan”; and I would not think it wise even to mention it to Glancy’. Sikhistan was ‘a far more preposterous claim’ than Pakistan. The slightest sign of taking Sikhistan seriously in the least degree would aggravate communal tension gravely in the Punjab. The Communal Award discussions in 1931 had shown that the Sikhs found themselves ‘occasionally in a position to wreck a scheme which would have gone down well with the major communities’.16 Page 6 of 33

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New Political Orientations (p.253) On 10 September 1942, a statement was signed by Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh, along with ten other leaders, six Hindus, and four Muslims. A copy of the statement was sent by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, and at the same time a copy was sent to the Prime Minister by cable. The thrust of the statement was on the urgency of setting up a ‘National Government’ in India to implement ‘the professions of equality and freedom’ often made by Great Britain. ‘A National Government pledged to the support of the War against the aggressors consisting of representatives of major political interests with complete autonomy in the internal administration during the period of the War and unfettered freedom thereafter, will satisfy the demands for Independence put forth by all the political parties of the country’. His Majesty’s Government should proclaim India’s independence here and now. The signatories urged upon the British Prime Minister to settle this problem in the interest of Britain and India.17 On 14 September Linlithgow wrote to Amery that Jinnah’s statement in the press on the issue of Pakistan was quite uncompromising. The individuals mentioned by Mookerjee as supporting the stand of the Hindu Mahasabha were all respectable or important but they did not really matter. So far as the Muslims were concerned, Jinnah was the only person that mattered.18 At the end of September 1942, Glancy wrote to Linlithgow that there was some trouble after the reopening of colleges. A few colleges in Lahore and Amritsar were on strike. A small number of student leaders had been arrested and heads of colleges had been warned. ‘We are trying to use the opportunity to tighten up educational control, but it is not altogether easy to find an effective solution.’ As regards the Sikh community, Master Tara Singh continued to maintain his balance between pro-Congress and anti-Congress Akalis. His own proclivities and those of Giani Kartar Singh were towards peace at home and support for the Army but he was reluctant, as always, to show his hand. Therefore, his speeches reflected ‘the Gandhian model’ and the audience ‘could take their choice according to their inclinations’. A few Congress Akalis had been courting arrest by shouting slogans. It seemed that the situation would not change for the worse. Recruitment had not suffered any material setback from the Congress campaigns. It was going on ‘most admirably’.19 Glancy’s comment on the Sikhs sent to Linlithgow on the 1st of October was conveyed by him to Amery on the 4th. The Sikhs were a potential source of trouble. Therefore, it was suggested by Glancy that the Secretary of State for India should avoid any such presentation of the Pakistan issue that might arouse Sikh feeling and embarrass the Punjab Government. He should also avoid specific reference to the Sikhs.20 Glancy reported on 13 November that active support of the Congress appeared to be on the decline, and the Sikh community as a whole had continued to abstain from any participation in the Congress crusade. Some of the Sikh leaders had been trying to negotiate with Jinnah apparently to see if they could get more out of Jinnah or Sikander Hayat Khan. Page 7 of 33

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New Political Orientations Glancy had taken steps to point out to some of them that they were not likely to secure any practical benefit from dealing with Jinnah. Glancy was inclined to think that responsible Sikhs had no serious desire to dismember the province ‘as long as they were likely to be given a fair deal’.21 (p.254) Jinnah’s visit to the Punjab in November 1942 induced Sikander Hayat Khan to proclaim that he saw eye to eye with the champion of Pakistan. This weakened the Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact to a considerable extent. The Sikhs were feeling hurt and bewildered. Master Tara Singh freely criticized both Jinnah and Sikander Hayat Khan. Giani Kartar Singh was still groping for some means ‘to satisfy the separatist ambitions of his community’. In a speech at Nankana Sahib he said that the Sikhs should work for the unity of India as a whole, but they should aim at an appropriate partition of the Punjab. This partition should be based not on population but on landed interests. At a communal reunion party hosted by Baldev Singh on 27 November, the usual speeches were made and everyone appeared to be friendly, ‘but there was a certain air of unreality about the proceedings’.22 Finally, Penderel Moon, known to be ‘a friend’ of the Sikhs, felt obliged to resign in a situation connected in a way with the ‘Quit India’ movement. On 13 November, Moon wrote a confidential letter to Punjab Home Secretary about the treatment of civil disobedience prisoners who, he alleged, were bracketed with C-class convicts. This, in his view, was harsh and ‘in sorry contrast to the principles of freedom for which we are supposed to be fighting this War’. The Chief Secretary explained and justified the position on 9 December. Moon sent a copy of this letter to Colonel Shamsher Singh, a brother of Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, who herself was secretary to Mahatma Gandhi, with the remark that it was ‘a shameful story’. The real serious mistake of Moon was ‘to send a copy of a confidential official letter to a private individual’. The Punjab Governor and the Governor General were convinced that Moon could not be allowed to continue in service. But he was ‘an excellent officer’, both in the Secretariat and in the Executive line. Eventually, Glancy persuaded him to resign from the Indian Civil Service. Moon did resign but ‘resolutely refused to apply for a proportionate pension’.23

Akali Demand for ‘Azad Punjab’ Master Tara Singh traced the scheme called the ‘Azad Punjab’ to the Cripps Mission. He says that Jinnah’s reputation was in the ascendancy and the idea of Pakistan got official recognition. Under pressure from the Akali leaders the Congress passed a resolution that made the demand for Pakistan rather lame but did not help the Akalis in any way. This scheme was that ‘the Punjab should be reorganized in such a way that the bulk of the Sikh population was included in it, and that no single community in it was in majority’. It was called ‘Azad Punjab’ due to its conception of freedom from the dominance of any one community. It was a good scheme for the protection of both Hindus and Sikhs of Page 8 of 33

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New Political Orientations the Punjab but some of the Hindu newspapers opposed it. They did not like the Sikhs to improve their position.24 According to Master Tara Singh, Raja Maheshwar Dayal met Jinnah through Liaqat Ali on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha in April 1942 and told the Hindu and Sikh leaders gathered in Delhi that Jinnah was prepared to confine his scheme to those districts which had more than 65 per cent Muslim population. Master Tara Singh hoped that Jinnah could be persuaded to make some further amendment in the Punjab for the sake of the Sikhs. But the Hindu leaders did not accept Jinnah’s offer. Now that Rajagopalachari had offered simple (p.255) Muslim majority as the criterion for the districts to be included in Pakistan, Jinnah would not agree to the earlier proposal. Master Tara Singh explained that he had been in favour of accepting Jinnah’s offer because it excluded the larger proportion of Sikh population from Pakistan and the ‘balance’ remained in the hands of the Sikhs.25 The negotiations had not fructified because Goswami Ganesh Datt, who had been invited to the talks on the suggestion of Gokul Chand Narang, made the statement that transfer of any area to Pakistan would be unacceptable to the Hindus of the Punjab.26 ‘Azad Punjab’ soon became associated with Master Tara Singh. On 10 May 1942, Ajit Singh Sarhadi saw a motley crowd of Hindus with a sprinkling of Sikhs in the streets of Campbellpur shouting the slogans, ‘Azad Punjab Murdabad’, ‘Master Tara Singh Murdabad’. Evidently, the Sikhs and Hindus of Campbellpur were resentful because it was not included in the proposed ‘Azad Punjab’. Significantly, Sarhadi goes on to emphasize that the Sikhs and the Shiromani Akali Dal had adopted an independent line because the Congress had given ‘step motherly treatment’ to the Sikhs in the 1920s and the 1930s despite the support given by the Akalis to the Congress. Sarhadi saw greater relevance of the Congress attitude towards the Pakistan scheme than the recent visit of Sir Stafford Cripps for the Azad Punjab scheme.27 In his presidential address to a conference at Kot Moman in Sargodha district on 2 October 1942, Giani Sher Singh referred to the Sikhs being in grave danger because of the probability of Pakistan being created. The entire Panth was opposed to Pakistan but unable to affect a decision arrived at by the Congress, Muslim League, and the British Government. The only option was to put forth a reasonable demand. The Congress had conceded Pakistan in principle and the majority of the Hindus were with the Congress. The Sikhs must think of themselves as one entity and the Sikhs likely to remain outside a reorganized Punjab should support a reasonable proposal in the interest of the Sikhs as a community. A province with a majority of Hindus and Sikhs, and with adequate power for the Sikhs, would enable them to ensure that the Sikhs and Hindus in the Muslim areas were protected. Giani Sher Singh said that he and his companions had joined the Akali Dal in view of the common danger to the Sikhs. He ended his speech with the note that the Sikhs should be prepared to (a) Page 9 of 33

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New Political Orientations protect their honour and self-respect, (b) serve their Hindu and Muslim brethren, and (c) make the greatest possible sacrifice for peace and unity in the country.28 On 21 October 1942, Rajagopalachari’s plan for provisional government was conveyed to London by Reuters. He was convinced that both the Congress and the Muslim League would accept it. He suggested that the Viceroy should ask Jinnah to join the provisional government ‘with as many men of his choice’ as he liked. The new executive was to consist of (a) five Congress leaders selected by the Viceroy, (b) all the leaders of the Muslim League nominated by Jinnah, and (c) three persons selected either by (a) and (b) or by the Viceroy to represent other important factors or persons of importance as a cementing factor. This executive was to be responsible to a newly constituted Indian Legislature. In an official note on this plan it was said that ‘Rajagopalachari’s scheme is really only another device for securing to Congress, or at any rate to the Hindu elements, the immediate control of India’. It was far too apparent to deceive Jinnah. He had roundly (p.256) condemned it. In fact it found no support from any party.29 In a speech at Nankana Sahib in November 1942, Giani Kartar Singh said that the Sikhs should work for the unity of India as a whole but aim at partition of the Punjab based on landed interests and not population. This criterion was more favourable to the Sikhs.30 It would remain important for the Akalis in their proposals about reorganization of the Punjab. Sikander Hayat Khan died on the night of 26 December 1942, and his death overshadowed all other events. Malik Khizar Hayat became the leader of the Unionist Party. Mahatma Gandhi began his fast on 10 February and concluded it on 3 March 1943. Master Tara Singh was a signatory to the resolution for immediate and unconditional release of Mahatma Gandhi passed by a conference representing different creeds, communities, and interests of India.31 Master Tara Singh presided over the fourth All-India Akali Conference at Bhawanigarh in the Patiala state in March 1943.32 In his address to the conference he touched upon a number of issues. The basic requisite to meet the situation was propagation of the Sikh ideals, selfless service, and initiation of the double-edged sword. Sikh history could be popularized with special reference to the Sikh martyrs. To read about them was to associate with them, and this association was the source of inspiration for sacrifice for the Panth. With reference to the political situation in India, Master Tara Singh said that there was a spurt of violence in 1942 when the Congress leaders were arrested. To resort to violence was a great error but he did not blame the Congress for it. The only right means to independence in the given situation was non-violence. The modern states were so powerfully organized that armed revolts had no chance of success. Master Tara Singh advised the British Government to release the Sikh leaders who were in jail. Among them were Jathedar Udham Singh (Nagoke), Ishar Singh Majhail, Partap Singh (Kairon), Jathedar Mohan Singh (Nagoke), Page 10 of 33

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New Political Orientations Basant Singh, Jathedar Channan Singh, Darshan Singh (Pheruman), Giani Gurmukh Singh (Musafir), and Gopal Singh (Kaumi). Master Tara Singh emphasized that the British Government would not be able now ‘to keep India under their control’. It was in the common interest of both the British and the Indians to work out a plan for swarāj. With these preliminary observations, Master Tara Singh turned to the demand of the Panth for reorganization of the Punjab province. Its primary purpose was to ensure that no religious community was dominated by another. The idea of reorganization was not new. In 1931, the leaders of various parties of the Sikhs had formulated seventeen demands before they met Mahatma Gandhi. The fourth demand on the list related to reorganization of the Punjab province. These demands were placed before Lord Willingdon by a Sikh deputation and included in the appeal sent by the Chief Khalsa Diwan for the Round Table Conference. The Central Sikh League had already passed a resolution on seventeen demands at Amritsar in 1931 when Master Tara Singh was its President. At the time of the ‘Cripps Mission’, about forty Sikh leaders had signed the memorandum in which reorganization of the Punjab province was demanded. On the whole, it was a demand of the Sikh Panth and not only of the Akalis. However, objections were now being raised to the Azad Punjab scheme and it was necessary to clarify the position of the Akali Dal. First of all the term azad gave the wrong impression that the new province (p.257) was meant to be independent of the Indian union. The Azad Punjab was meant to be a province of India. The term azad signified that each religious community of the province would be free from the political domination of another. No community would have an absolute majority in the province. This solution to the communal problem would strengthen the sentiment of Indian nationalism and serve as a positive factor for attaining independence. Master Tara Singh had no objection to the name ‘Azad Punjab’ being changed. What really mattered was the substance of the scheme. Master Tara Singh stated further that an impartial commission could do the demarcation on the basis of population, immovable property, and historical and religious considerations. The principle of provincial reorganization had already been accepted and implemented by creating Sind as a new province. This had been agreed to in the Nehru Report in 1928. Master Tara Singh added that the Azad Punjab scheme could not be bracketed with Pakistan which demanded vivisection of the country. However, the reason for both the demands was the same: distrust of the majority by a minority. The Sikh distrust of the Muslim majority in the Punjab was due to the policies and measures of the Unionist Ministry during the past five or six years. Apart from the Unionist reluctance to introduce jhatkā on the plea of maintaining the status quo and interference in the gurdwara elections, Master Tara Singh made a specific reference to the village Raja Jang in the Lahore district. It belonged Page 11 of 33

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New Political Orientations entirely to Sikh proprietors. The Muslims in the village belonged to the category of kamīns. The Unionist Government established a police post there to ensure that the call to prayer was not stopped. A Sikh was killed. Master Tara Singh was not in favour of any bar on call to prayer, but the essence of the Unionist Muslim policy was to destroy the feeling of self-respect among the Sikhs. The Azad Punjab scheme appeared to be the most feasible way of preserving the Sikh sense of self-respect. With reference to protection of the Sikhs outside the Azad Punjab, Master Tara Singh said that all the Sikhs must rise above personal and local interests and think of the welfare of the Panth as a whole. The issue of Azad Punjab and the protection of the Sikhs elsewhere should be given equal consideration by the Sikh leaders. If the position of the Sikhs in Azad Punjab was strengthened, it would be helpful for securing protection for the Sikhs outside Azad Punjab. There was no justification for keeping the whole community at a disadvantage simply because the position of a part could not be improved. Master Tara Singh argued, in fact, in some detail how the Sikhs outside Azad Punjab would acquire greater representation, like the Muslims in the other provinces of India. Master Tara Singh assured the Hindus of the Punjab that the Azad Punjab scheme was equally in their interest. Veer Savarkar was not opposed to the movement for Azad Punjab, nor was K.M. Munshi. Seth Jugal Kishore Birla was strongly in its favour. Master Tara Singh himself was strongly opposed to the separation of any part of the Punjab from India. All the Hindu leaders he talked to were also opposed to the idea of partition but no one objected to the formation of two provinces of the Punjab. Master Tara Singh talked about the Sikh states as well. Like the other princely states, the Sikh states were protected by the British. Left to themselves, their rulers were not in a position to withstand the people. The administration of these states was oppressive, (p.258) particularly for the Sikhs. The rulers of the Sikh states could not be allowed to infringe Sikh principles and practices. Master Tara Singh expected the Sikhs of the Patiala state, who had put up a brave struggle against the former ruler of Patiala, to support the Sikhs of Kapurthala, who were struggling against the oppressive and discriminatory measures of the Maharaja of Kapurthala. Master Tara Singh added that if the critics of Azad Punjab were to say that they wanted Sikh Raj and not simply Azad Punjab they would at least sound sincere. ‘We are not asking for Sikh Raj’, he said, but ‘it is true that the Sikhs can find better protection in Sikh Raj than in the Azad Punjab.’ Next to Sikh Raj, however, the solution to the communal problem was the Azad Punjab scheme. In order to see the merit of the scheme it had to be compared with the present situation and not with Sikh Raj. If there is Sikh Raj ‘it would not taste sour to me’. But that would be based on a different principle. Even then, the Sikh sense Page 12 of 33

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New Political Orientations of self-respect and honour would be essential to cultivate. In order to preserve the sense of self-respect and honour, it would be necessary to get rid of the present dominance of Muslim majority. This was the basic purpose. Master Tara Singh elaborated the ‘Azad Punjab’ scheme on 5 June 1943 in a meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal. The Working Committee of the Akali Dal met on 7 June and, in view of enquiries frequently received about the boundaries of the proposed Azad Punjab, declared that Azad Punjab would include the Ambala, Jullundur, and Lahore Divisions, the districts of Lyallpur and Montgomery, and a part of the Multan district. The Shiromani Akali Dal would put forth this demand and work for it. The criteria for demarcating this area were freedom of all communities, property, revenue paid, and historical traditions. An independent commission would demarcate the boundaries.33 All the parties and leaders opposed to the Akali Dal held about a dozen conferences or meetings in 1943. But the Akalis organized fifty-two conferences from 31 January to 31 December 1943 in about forty cities, towns, and villages. In order to explain the Azad Punjab scheme and to meet the objections raised by its opponents a collection of essays under the title Azad Punjab by ten prominent Sikh leaders was published early in 1944. Master Tara Singh’s essay, ‘Azad Punjab’, heads the collection. He gives the background of the demand, clarifies what it really meant, argues in favour of its advantages, and visualizes the possible position of the non-Muslims in the areas left out of the Azad Punjab.34 Sardar Kartar Singh, an advocate of Patiala, wrote about the advantages of Azad Punjab for the Sikhs of the Malwa region, and pointed out that Sardar Kharak Singh’s talk of akhandtā being infringed by provincial reorganization was a hoax.35 Sardar Santokh Singh, a legislator of Amritsar, argued that the Azad Punjab was sound in principle and a good solution to the communal tangle.36 Sardar Inder Singh, a mill owner of Kanpur, asserted that the Indian situation could be changed for the better by the solution proposed for the Punjab. It would take the wind out of the sails of Pakistan.37 Sardar Harnam Singh, an advocate from Lahore, refuted the arguments of Sardar Sant Singh against the Azad Punjab scheme, which was dubbed as antinational by the opponents of Master Tara Singh. The scheme was in no way similar to that of Pakistan.38 Giani Kartar Singh provided answers to all the objections raised against the Azad Punjab scheme. He referred to the resolutions of the All-India Akali Conference held at Vahila in (p.259) Lyallpur district in 1942 and at Bhawanigarh in the Patiala state in 1943 in favour of Azad Punjab. Some Sikhs, he said, had gone astray due to the misleading propaganda of one or two Hindu newspapers and he hoped that soon there would be complete unity in the Panth on this issue. Of the Sikh newspapers, the Akālī, the Khalsa Sewak, and the Ajīt were in favour of the scheme. The Sher-i Punjab had written strongly in favour of Page 13 of 33

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New Political Orientations the scheme in 1942, but now it was opposed to it. The other newspaper in opposition was the Fateh. Giani Kartar Singh gives the history of the demand since 1930 when Master Tara Singh and he were together in the Gujrat Jail.39 Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh, an advocate from Lyallpur, found no sound argument in the loud speeches of Sardar Sant Singh and Sardar Kharak Singh. The term ‘Azad Punjab’ was perhaps the source of their confusion. They maintained that it gave recognition to the creation of Pakistan, but actually it was meant to eradicate communal considerations of all kinds. They contended that some gurdwaras, like Panja Sahib, would be left out of Azad Punjab. But two of the four Sikh takhts were already outside the Punjab: Patna Sahib and Huzur Sahib (Nander).40 Giani Sher Singh asserted that to preserve their distinct identity was a historical necessity for the Sikhs; they needed adequate power. They could not have a province with Sikh majority because of their small number but they could demand reorganization to be free from the domination of another community. This was in the interest of all, according well with the Sikh ideal of sarbat dā bhalā (welfare of all human beings). The new province was to be an integral part of India, without the majority of any single community.41 Another essay dwelt on the possibilities of propagation of the Sikh faith in the new province.42 The last essay provided facts and figures on the numbers and distribution of the Sikh population.43 Meanwhile, the management of the Ajīt had published two books in Urdu under the pen-name of ‘Sikh Siyāsatdān’—Taksīm-i Punjab and Āzād Punjab—to elaborate and popularize the demand for ‘Azad Punjab’.44 The ‘Sikh Siyāsatdān’ was Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Editor of the Ajīt weekly in Urdu. Hamdard says that the principle of the demand for Azad Punjab had not been put across in a clear or comprehensive manner and he felt that it was necessary to do so. He used the Ajīt weekly to write articles on ‘Taqsim-i Punjab’, followed by a series on ‘Tashrīh-i Taqsīm’. Without consulting Master Tara Singh or Giani Kartar Singh he wrote a foreword (dībāchah) for the series of his articles and published this material in the form of a booklet. It was severely criticized by the Muslim and Hindu press, with the exception of the Prabhāt, edited by Lala Nanak Chand Naz. All the 1,000 copies of the booklet were sold. In fact, 10,000 more copies were soon sold out and another set of 10,000 copies was printed. This inspired Hamdard to elaborate the scheme and to publish his Āzād Punjab.45 Glancy wrote to Linlithgow on 12 October 1943 that Giani Kartar Singh was trying again to contact Jinnah in order to work out better terms for the Sikhs in a possible coalition between the Muslim League and the Akali Dal and to ascertain the full implications of Pakistan.46 The approach of the Akali leaders to Jinnah had not led to any important result till 8 December 1943, and the Sikh leaders were still quarrelling with one another.47 The quarrel spilt over into the new year, and Glancy reported on 4 March 1944 that Master Tara Singh’s Azad Punjab had been giving rise to growing criticism.48 The Sikhs were divided over Page 14 of 33

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New Political Orientations the issue; the Congress did not (p.260) see any reason to support it while the Muslim League was strongly opposed to it. On 4 March 1944, Master Tara Singh wrote an open letter to his well-wishers that he was needed more for religious preaching to eradicate atheism (of the Sikh Communists and Socialists). He declared: ‘I am completely cutting off myself from all public activities in order to get rid of all past commitments and intricacies.’ He went on to add that he had made up his mind and he was sure that the Panth would gain by this.49 On 5 March, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) recorded its appreciation of ‘the unique and selfless services’ of Master Tara Singh for the cause of the Panth and the SGPC during the past three decades, and expressed its confidence that his work would stand out as a beacon to future generations. Sardar Harnam Singh, who proposed the resolution, referred to the statement of the Maharaja of Patiala that he had purchased many a great man but he found Master Tara Singh incorruptible. The SGPC presented a kirpān and a saropā to Master Tara Singh.50 Master Tara Singh’s withdrawal from politics was seen in government circles as an astute move to force the rival parties among the Sikhs to close their ranks and to resist the growing threat of the Communists to the Sikh gurdwaras. It was also a move to prevent Giani Kartar Singh from exploiting Master Tara Singh’s position and influence among the Sikhs to build up his own political position. The propagation of the Azad Punjab scheme and negotiations with the Muslim League were largely the work of Giani Kartar Singh.51 On 9 April 1944, Giani Kartar Singh proposed the resolution that the election of the SGPC President should be postponed and Master Tara Singh should be requested to reconsider his decision of 4 March and resume the responsibility of Presidentship. The resolution was passed by a large majority.52 Glancy wrote to Wavell on 8 May that Giani Kartar Singh was being pressed hard by the Nagoke faction. There was nothing to indicate that Master Tara Singh would emerge from his retirement and reappear in public life.53 Master Tara Singh wrote a year later that he had resigned from the Presidentship of the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal because there was disunity among the Akalis. Both the factions had faith in Master Tara Singh and he was acceptable to both sides as President. But his opponents were always on the lookout for a pretext to quarrel with him, and this could give the impression that some leaders preferred Presidentship over interests of the Sikh Panth. In Master Tara Singh’s absence, both the sides were keen to elect their own candidate as President of the SGPC. Giani Kartar Singh and Jathedar Mohan Singh tackled the situation wisely, and the elections were postponed. Master Tara Singh was asked to become President again but he declined. Then both the sides assured him that a person nominated by him would be unanimously elected

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New Political Orientations President and he would act in accordance with his advice. After this assurance, Master Tara Singh returned to politics.54

From ‘Azad Punjab’ to ‘Sikh State’ Master Tara Singh says that when he returned to public life the Raja–Gandhi Formula was the subject of debate. Rajagopalachari and Mahatma Gandhi had conceded Pakistan to the extent that contiguous districts or tehsils with Muslim majority would have the right to form a separate government. According to this scheme the Sikhs of the Punjab would have been divided into two parts, half of them (p.261) going permanently under Muslim-majority Pakistan and the other half under the Hindu majority. In this way the political position of the Sikhs would have become very weak. Master Tara Singh organized a conference in which three to four hundred representatives of the Sikhs participated. This conference resolved to oppose the Raja–Gandhi Formula tooth and nail. It was also decided that Master Tara Singh should become active in this campaign. It created a lot of enthusiasm among the Sikhs against the Raja–Gandhi Formula.55 Giani Sher Singh had written on 6 June 1944 that the Muslim League was bent upon creating Pakistan and the Congress had accepted the idea of Pakistan in principle. The nationalist Muslims were in favour of the right of the Muslimmajority areas to separate. If Mahatma Gandhi also accepted Pakistan it would certainly be established. The idea that if right to separate was conceded for the Muslims they would not exercise this right was merely a wishful thought. Anyway, if Pakistan was to be created, the Sikh demand should not be Azad Punjab but a separate area in the Punjab in which Sikh majority should be ensured by transfer of population and landed property, a sort of ‘Sikh State’ or ‘Khalistan’. This area would necessarily be that in which the Sikhs were already in considerable numbers and included the most important Sikh religious places. The Sikhs of outlying areas should opt for residence in Khalistan. Possibly, the existing Sikh states would join Khalistan. Giani Sher Singh warned the Sikhs that the Hindus could sacrifice the Punjab for the sake of Hindu domination in Hindustan. He referred to Gokul Chand Narang’s welcome address to the Hindu Mahasabha in its annual session at Amritsar in December 1943 in which he had said that the Hindus would accept Pakistan rather than Muslim parity with the Hindus at the Centre. At the end, Giani Sher Singh made it clear that the Sikhs were against the creation of Pakistan, but if Pakistan was to be created then the Sikhs should have Khalistan.56 Muhammad Ashraf, a Communist leader, was said to have stated in Srinagar that the Muslims had the right to self-determination as a large minority, but not the Sikhs who were small in number.57 This was illogical. Writing about the Sikh All-Parties Conference held on 20 August 1944, Giani Sher Singh said that it was for the first time after the fall of the Sikh Raj that so many representatives of the Sikhs had come together. Apart from the most eminent leaders of the Shiromani Akali Dal there were representatives of the Page 16 of 33

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New Political Orientations Chief Khalsa Diwan, the Singh Sabhas, and Sikh religious institutions. The Central Akali Dal was invited to bring as many representatives as it liked but Sardar Kharak Singh did not accept the invitation simply because it was issued by Master Tara Singh. Speaking at the Conference Master Tara Singh said that he knew that in the Conference of the Central Akali Dal at Rawalpindi a large majority was in favour of participating in the Conference organized by Master Tara Singh. Anyway, more than 90 per cent of the Sikhs were of the same voice as the Shiromani Akali Dal. In a real sense, the Shiromani Akali Dal was the Panth. The Sikhs loved their country and they loved freedom, a freedom in which the Sikhs were partners and not subordinate to Muslims or Hindus. The interests of the Panth were foremost for the Sikhs. They were afraid that after the proposed Gandhi–Jinnah pact the Sikhs would be under pressure from both Hindus and Muslims to accept it. But the Sikhs were not prepared to commit a political suicide.58 In his telegram to Jinnah on 30 June 1944, Rajagopalachari had said that his formula (p.262) had Mahatma Gandhi’s support. His talks with Jinnah were over and he wanted to publish the formula and its rejection by Jinnah. This telegram too had Gandhi’s approval and at this juncture Rajagopalachari wanted Jinnah to reconsider his rejection.59 Jinnah responded on 2 July, expressing his surprise over the wrong version of the talk. His position even now was that he could not personally take the responsibility of accepting or rejecting the formula and he was willing to place it before the Muslim League Working Committee.60 Rajagopalachari reiterated on 4 July that his proposal was definitely approved by Mahatma Gandhi and he had authorized Rajagopalachari to approach Jinnah on that basis. No purpose would be served, he added, if the formula did not have Jinnah’s support.61 Jinnah said that he was unable to go beyond what he had stated on 2 July.62 On 8 July, Rajagopalachari informed Jinnah that he would now release the entire correspondence between them.63 Mahatma Gandhi’s approval of Rajagopalachari’s formula was well known before the end of July 1944, and some Sikh leaders had begun to write to Jinnah on that basis. Teja Singh Swatantar and Sohan Singh Josh wrote to him on 24 July that the formula proposed by Rajagopalachari and accepted by Mahatma Gandhi had caused a stir among the Sikhs of the Punjab on the ground that it conceded Pakistan. All patriotic Sikhs, whether in the Congress, the Akali Dal, or the Communist Party, they said, would welcome more than anything else a settlement between Gandhi and Jinnah because Gandhi had accepted the right of self-determination for all nationalities, especially for the Muslim and Sikh nationalities. The Sikhs wanted to have this right emanating from the Congress and the Muslim League, and not from the British. The two Communist leaders urged Jinnah to start negotiations immediately with Mahatma Gandhi.64 They wrote again on 29 July that the Communist Sikhs of the Punjab would like to discuss with him ‘the question of Pakistan and the Sikh right to selfdetermination’. They wanted to meet him as soon as possible before the meeting Page 17 of 33

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New Political Orientations of the Muslim League Working Committee. The interview was fixed for 1 August 1944.65 Jagdish Singh, President of the Modern Sikh Federation of Peshawar, wrote to Jinnah on 3 September 1944 that the Federation had passed a resolution condemning the Raja–Gandhi Formula. The Federation had complete faith in the leadership of the Shiromani Akali Dal, the only representative body of the Sikhs in India. ‘We fully authorize Master Tara Singh to negotiate with other parties to safeguard the interests of the Sikhs.’ The Akali Dal alone had the right to represent the Sikhs in negotiations with Gandhi or Jinnah.66 Gurdit Singh, President of the Gurdwara Committee of Bhai Joga Singh Gurdwara in Peshawar, wrote to Jinnah on the same day that the Committee had declared to make all possible sacrifice to oppose the anti-national formula of Rajagopalachari, endorsed by Mahatma Gandhi. The Sikh community had always stood against ‘a communal Raj’, whether Hindu or Mulsim.67 Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daultana had reported to Jinnah on 28 July that five Sikh Communist members of the Punjab Legislature were ready to support the League Party. They accepted Pakistan but demanded the right of the Sikhs to self-determination. Furthermore, Giani Kartar Singh was prepared for unity with the League for Pakistan, but on the basis of ‘most exaggerated and quite fabulous Sikh claims’.68 Wavell wrote to Amery on 15 August 1944 that Jinnah had reverted to his proposal for (p.263) some kind of autonomy for the Sikhs within Pakistan. But they had not liked it before and there was no reason to suppose that they would like it now.69 Glancy wrote to Wavell on 23 August that political interest was focused on ‘the coming conversations’ between Gandhi and Jinnah. Master Tara Singh had come back into the political arena as ‘the most prominent leader amongst the Sikhs’. The entire Sikh community had condemned the approaching negotiations. Gandhi’s moves solidified the great bulk of Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs against Pakistan. There was a general feeling that Gandhi was using the minority communities of the Punjab as a pawn in his game without consulting them.70 Thus, by the time of the Sikh All-Parties Conference, there was resentment against the Rajagopalachari–Jinnah talks with Gandhi’s approval, and anxiety about the forthcoming Gandhi–Jinnah talks. Giani Sher Singh’s assumption that Mahatma Gandhi would concede Pakistan, as Rajagopalachari had done with his approval, induced him to write strongly against Pakistan, and in favour of ‘Khalsa State’ if Pakistan was to be created despite Sikh opposition. The Sikhs were relatively small in number but not so small that they could not form a state. It would have Hindus and Muslims as well as Sikhs between five and six million. That the Sikhs were not in majority in any district was no valid argument when a state was being created for Jews, who Page 18 of 33

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New Political Orientations were scattered all over the world. The real purpose of Azad Punjab and the Sikh State was to be free from domination by others. Instead of an agreement between Gandhi and Jinnah, there should be an agreement between Master Tara Singh, Gandhi, and Jinnah. Giani Sher Singh went on to write that the Rajagopalachari formula was intended to serve as the basis for settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. The Muslim League was to endorse the demand for independence and cooperate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government until the attainment of independence. After the termination of the war, a commission was to be appointed for demarcating ‘contiguous districts’ in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population was in ‘absolute majority’. A plebiscite of ‘all the inhabitants’ of the areas thus demarcated was to be held on the basis of ‘adult suffrage’, or some other practicable franchise, to decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. Mutual agreements were to be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce, communications, and other essential purposes. Transfer of population was to be voluntary. All these terms were to be binding only in case of transfer of full power and responsibility by Britain for the governance of India.71 While the Akalis denounced the formula for conceding Pakistan, Jinnah in his speech to the Muslim League Working Committee on 30 July 1944 said that it was a ‘shadow and a husk, a maimed[,] mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan’.72 Louis Fischer, Mahatma Gandhi’s biographer, has devoted a separate chapter to ‘Jinnah and Gandhi’ in which he outlines their relations with a frank appreciation for Mahatma Gandhi. After his release from jail due to ill-health in June 1944, Mahatma Gandhi wrote to Lord Wavell for a meeting. Wavell declined and Gandhi then focused his attention on Jinnah. Gandhi had always acted on the assumption that if the Congress and the Muslim League came together the British would grant independence to India. They met at Jinnah’s house in Bombay for a number (p.264) of times from 9 to 26 September when the talks broke down. The entire correspondence was published.73 According to Fischer, the wall between Gandhi and Jinnah was the two-nation theory. Jinnah maintained that Indian Muslims were a nation by ‘all the canons of international Law’. They had ‘a distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions’. But Gandhi found no parallel in history for ‘a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock’. In other words, the basis for nationhood was essentially religious for Jinnah and racial for Gandhi. This cleavage was known in advance. But Gandhi hoped that they could agree to differ on the question of ‘two nations’ and try to solve the problem ‘on the basis of self-determination’. Gandhi put forth the Page 19 of 33

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New Political Orientations formula in clear terms. The Muslim-majority areas would form a separate state ‘as soon as India is free’, and the two states could set up one unified administration for foreign affairs, defence, internal communications, customs, commerce, and the like. Jinnah said ‘No’ three times. He wanted partition and complete separation before the British left India and only the Muslims to vote in the plebiscite. Fischer points out that a majority of two or three million Muslim votes in the Punjab would have placed its entire population of over twenty-eight millions in Pakistan. But Jinnah was in a strong position. Whereas Gandhi thought that this was the best time to get independence, Jinnah was prepared to wait for a year or two to ensure that he got what he wanted.74 Mahatma Gandhi gave an interview to the press on 28 September 1944, saying that there was no cause for disappointment. The so-called breakdown was only an adjournment sine die. He claimed that the formulae gave as much as could reasonably be expected with due regard to the interests of the whole of India. He wanted certain things to be common between sovereign states. His nationalism had taught him that he would be guilty of disloyalty if he sacrificed the interests of a single Indian. Jinnah’s loyalty was to the Muslims alone. Mahatma Gandhi told the News Chronicle representative on 29 September that he could not accept the ‘two nation basis’.75 Jinnah had written to Mahatma Gandhi on 26 September 1944 that if a break came, it would be due to Gandhi’s failure to satisfy Jinnah in regard to the essence of the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution. It would be most unfortunate. If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and the other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my judgement and conscience.76 According to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Gandhi’s real concern was to prove from Jinnah’s own words that ‘the whole of the Pakistan proposition was absurd’. Gandhi maintained that India was one nation and he saw in the Pakistan Resolution ‘nothing but ruin for the whole of India’. Jinnah was dead earnest about Muslims being a distinct ‘nation’.77 According to Hodson, Gandhi’s proposition denied the fundamental theme of the Lahore Resolution since it refused to acknowledge that the Muslims were a nation with the right to selfdetermination. The proposal that the inhabitants even of the (p.265) admittedly Muslim-majority areas should vote for or against separation was unacceptable to Jinnah. Whereas Gandhi’s proposal envisaged separation after India was free, Jinnah wanted the issue to be settled before the Muslim League worked jointly with the Congress for attaining independence. Furthermore, foreign affairs, defence, customs, communications, and other matters in Jinnah’s view were the Page 20 of 33

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New Political Orientations lifeblood of a state and, therefore, could not be delegated to any common central body. Hodson goes on to add that Gandhi–Jinnah talks enhanced Jinnah’s prestige, while the opponents of partition were incensed by Gandhi’s offer. V.D. Savarkar protested that the Indian provinces were not ‘the private property of Gandhiji or Rajaji so that they could make a gift of them to anyone they liked’.78 Glancy observed in September 1944 that the Sikhs were still ‘rabidly’ against any idea of Pakistan. Master Tara Singh had been declaring that an agreement would be reached between Jinnah and Gandhi. Various proposals were being made for the establishment of ‘some kind of a Sikh State’ in which the community should be in a commanding position by holding a balance between equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims, if not actually in a majority. The Hindus had been less vocal. They appeared to leave the Sikhs to fight the battle against Pakistan. This attitude did not improve Hindu–Sikh relations.79 The breakdown of Gandhi–Jinnah talks was a relief to the Sikhs because the immediate danger had passed.80 The Akalis led by Master Tara Singh continued to denounce the Pakistan theory and to complain that Gandhi had betrayed their interests. The pro-Congress Sikhs released from jail were not likely to have much influence with the Akali Sikhs. However, the Communists were still inclined to side with the Muslim League.81 The fifth All-India Akali Conference was held at Lahore. On 14 October 1944, Master Tara Singh unfurled the Sikh flag and stated that the Sikhs were facing two great dangers: the Communists on the one hand, and Gandhi and Jinnah on the other. The Sikhs were not prepared to suffer the ‘tyrants’ like Gandhi or Jinnah who wanted to impose Hindu or Muslim majorities on the Sikhs by dividing India. Jathedar Pritam Singh declared that ‘if India is to be divided and cut into pieces the Sikhs must have a State and they must be given a homeland on the basis of the land now in their possession and their political importance’. Giani Kartar Singh denounced Mahatma Gandhi for going back on his word and treating the Sikhs with unprecedented disrespect and discourtesy. Among the Akali leaders recently released from jail were Ishar Singh Majhail, Udham Singh Nagoke, Darshan Singh Pheruman, and Sohan Singh Jalal-Usman.82 On the second day of the Conference Master Tara Singh declared that the demand for an independent Sikh state was held back to keep the door open for negotiations. He stated that the Sikhs had suffered in economic, political, religious, and cultural spheres due to the way in which the provincial autonomy had worked. Even the reserved powers of the Governor had failed to protect them. What the British gave to the Muslims was at the cost of the Sikhs, who figured nowhere in the ‘Rajagopalachari Formula’ and in Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence and talks, even though they were the most vitally affected by the proposal to divide their homeland. Mahatma Gandhi had ‘followed the policy of Muslim appeasement at the expense of the Sikh community’. The Sikhs were prepared to support any scheme of communal settlement which provided ample Page 21 of 33

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New Political Orientations (p.266) scope for their political, cultural, and religious development to their satisfaction. They were prepared to live as a free community in a free united India but they ‘shall not submit to the domination of any other community’. The proposals put forth by Rajagopalachari and Mahatma Gandhi were ‘greatly detrimental to the interests of the Sikhs in particular and the country in general’. Therefore, he moved the resolution that the Conference rejected the proposals and called upon the Sikhs ‘to carry on ceaseless agitation unless the scheme is finally dropped and the Sikhs are assured that no similar proposal will be put forward’. Giani Kartar Singh supported Master Tara Singh’s resolution and it was passed unanimously. The Conference declared further that no communal settlement would be acceptable to the Sikhs unless it was approved by the Shiromani Akali Dal.83 In mid-November 1944, a Non-Party Conference under the leadership of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru constituted a Conciliation Committee ‘to examine the whole communal and minorities question from the constitutional and political point of view, putting itself in touch with different parties and their leaders including minorities interested in the question, and to present a solution within two months’. Sapru wrote to Jinnah on 10 December 1944 that the Standing Committee of the Non-Party Conference at Delhi during 18–19 November had appointed a committee to explore the views of the main political parties on the future constitution of India. The Committee would study carefully the full implications of the proposals of the Muslim League in regard to Pakistan as well as the full import of the proposals made by Mahatma Gandhi and C. Rajagopalachari during the recent Gandhi–Jinnah talks. Similarly, it would study the demands of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, and the Scheduled Castes. Sapru wanted to meet Jinnah in this connection. Jinnah replied that he could not recognize the Non-Party Conference, the Standing Committee, or the Committee appointed by the Standing Committee. But Sapru was welcome to meet him personally.84 Sapru wrote a similar letter to Master Tara Singh to know his views on the practical aspects of the problem. Master Tara Singh replied that he was very anxious for a communal settlement. However, he would not put a definite demand but he would present the Sikh point of view in the light of the demands put forth by the other communities.85 The Conciliation Committee prepared a ‘questionnaire’ in its meeting at Delhi during 30–31 December 1944 for the various parties and organizations. As a member of the Sapru Conciliation Committee, Harnam Singh wrote his ‘Notes’ on the Punjab and sent them to K. Santhanam, Joint Secretary of the Committee, on 27 February 1945 for circulation amongst its members. On 6 March, Santhanam wrote to Harnam Singh to get the ‘Notes’ printed before the meeting of the Committee on 29 March 1945. Harnam Singh prepared a book under the title ‘Punjab, the Homeland of the Sikhs’ for the use of the Committee.

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New Political Orientations This book contains the ‘Memorandum’ submitted by the Sikh leaders and an Appendix providing the questionnaire circulated by the Committee, in addition to Harnam Singh’s own ‘Notes’. The Sikh leaders responded to these issues in their Memorandum to the Conciliation Committee. The name of Master Tara Singh was at the top of the signatories to the Memorandum. Apart from eighteen MLAs from Lahore, Lyallpur, Ludhiana, Amritsar, Sheikhupura, Firozpur, Sialkot, Jullundur, Montgomery, Multan, Gujrat, Gurdaspur, and Hissar, eleven Sikh leaders signed (p.267) the Memorandum. Among them were Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, Sardar Basakha Singh, Bhai Jodh Singh, Kartar Singh Campbellpuri, Mohinder Singh Sidhwan, Buta Singh of Sheikhupura, Harcharan Singh Bajwa, Sujan Singh Sarhali, Ishar Singh Majhail, and Dr Randhir Singh of Lahore. Thus, the Memorandum was signed by the Sikh legislators and leaders of the SGPC, the Shiromani Akali Dal, and the Chief Khalsa Diwan. As Baldev Singh wrote in his foreword, never before was there such unanimity of opinion amongst Sikhs belonging to every school of thought in public, social, and religious life. Harnam Singh provided factual information in his ‘Notes’ with an eye on the political issues seen by his contemporaries as important: the geographical position of the Punjab, its area, and population; the Punjab princely states; the language of the people; the peasantry; Sikhs in the Indian army; education, industry, and commerce; the Punjab as the holy land of the Sikhs; the demand of the All-India Muslim League, the Muslim population in the census reports, and the distribution of population in general; the Pakistan Resolution and its criticism; the two-nation theory and its invalidity; and the Punjab as the homeland of the Sikhs. The ‘Notes’ contained a lot of factual information relevant for the issues involved but Harnam Singh was not neutral in his presentation of facts. He had his own views on Sikh politics. Therefore, he clarifies in his Preface that he was not responsible for the proposals contained in the Memorandum. The first nine paras of the Memorandum are ‘introductory’ in which it is emphasized that the Sikhs constituted the third largest community after the Hindus and the Muslims, and that their political, historical, and economic importance was out of all proportion to their numbers. The Punjab was, and it must remain inalienably, the homeland and the holy land of the Sikhs. They had more than 700 gurdwaras in the province associated with their Gurus and Sikh martyrs. The Sikhs contributed more than 40 per cent of the total revenues of the province. They owned the best and most fertile lands of the province as the result of the sustained labour of the Sikh cultivators. The contribution of the Sikhs to the defence of the country was even more remarkable.86 Six paras of the Memorandum dwell on how the fortunes of the Sikhs were adversely affected by the constitutional changes introduced by the British. Sikh representation provided in the Act of 1935 was much smaller in the Provincial Page 23 of 33

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New Political Orientations Legislature, the Council of State, and the Federal Assembly than the representation given to the Muslim minority in other provinces. Furthermore, the Communal Award transferred all power into the hands of a Muslim majority which ruled in the name of the Unionist Party. Till 1926, there was one Sikh Minister in three, but by now there was one in six. The differences between the Muslim League and the Unionist Muslims resulted in the addition of a seventh Minister. No decision could be taken without consultation and consent of the Muslim Premier who had the last word on every case. The provincial autonomy, thus, reduced the Sikhs and the Hindus to a state of political subjection. The Sikhs were deliberately excluded from effective participation in the administrative machinery. With only seven out of eighty-five Fellows on the Senate, they had no voice in the Punjab University. The Punjabi language was disowned and, therefore, neglected by the protagonists of Urdu and Hindi. The preparation of jhatkā meat had been stopped by executive orders. The whole government machinery was (p.268) biased in favour of Muslims. The statutory safeguards had failed to provide any protection to the non-Muslim officers. In two separate paras, then, the Sikh grievances in relation to other provinces and in relation to the Centre are mentioned in the Memorandum.87 More interesting and far more important are the responses to the questionnaire of the Conciliation Committee. Fifteen fundamental rights are listed for being incorporated in the new Constitution for affording protection to and preservation of certain inalienable rights of the Sikh community. These rights relate to the free profession of religious faith and practice, use of jhatkā meat, wearing of kirpān, control and management of gurdwaras, protection of endowments attached to Sikh institutions, employment of Punjabi for social and cultural intercourse and for the conduct of administrative business, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, liberty to reside in any part of India, freedom to choose occupation and to take economic initiative in all parts of India, the right to establish and maintain educational, charitable, religious, and other institutions, adequate representation of Sikhs in all educational institutions, Punjabi to be the official language of the Punjab, and no Bill to be introduced or passed without the consent of 75 per cent members of the community to which it relates.88 The Memorandum asked for an independent Minorities Commission. The Mazhabi and Ramdasia Sikhs and those who join the Sikh faith from amongst the Scheduled Castes and Tribes should have the same facilities and concessions as the other Scheduled Castes and Tribes. With regard to Pakistan, the Sikhs were irrevocably opposed to any partition of India on a communal basis. To accept Pakistan was to sign ‘the death-warrant of the future of the Sikh community as a whole’. The ‘Rajagopalacharia Formula’ was even worse as it divided the Sikhs into two almost equal parts, each dominated by another community. The Indian states should be included in the Indian Union which should have a strong Centre. The Sikhs were opposed to the Cripps proposals. Non-accession may be Page 24 of 33

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New Political Orientations allowed to a province if 65 per cent of the people vote for it, but no cessation after the all-India Union had been formed. The Sikhs favoured realignment of the provincial boundaries. They needed higher weightage and larger representation in services and government institutions.89 Nothing came out of the Sikh Memorandum because nothing came out of the Conciliation Committee. Nevertheless, the Memorandum is an important document. It reflects the most important concerns of the Sikhs in general and of Master Tara Singh in particular in early 1945. In this connection, two responses were the most important. With regard to the steps which were necessary to secure an adequate share and equal opportunities in the legislatures, executive governments and the services, and so on, the demands of the Sikhs, in so far as the Punjab was concerned, were: (a) that no single community should enjoy an absolute majority in the Legislature, (b) that the allocation of seats should be 40 per cent for Muslims, 30 per cent for Sikhs, and 30 per cent for other non-Muslims, and (c) that this proportion must also be reflected in the composition of the executive government and the services, guaranteed by statute. The minister for Law and Order should always belong to a minority community.90 With regard to the Pakistan scheme: We have been asked as to whether we have any views to express in case the Pakistan scheme is (p.269) imposed on us by an authority whose power we cannot hope to challenge successfully, the British Government or the agreed will of the Hindus and Muslims of India. In that case, we would insist on the creation of a separate Sikh State which should include the substantial majority of the Sikh population and their important sacred shrines and historic Gurdwaras and places with provision for the transfer and exchange of population and property.91 Glancy wrote to Wavell on 20 February 1945 that the Sikhs had been using the Sapru Committee as an arena for the ventilation of their grievances, presenting fantastic demands in the event of the Pakistan principle being accepted.92 On 26 February 1945, Sapru told Wavell: ‘The one people he had met who really knew their own mind were the Sikhs, who were quite determined that they would not be subjected to the domination of any party at the Centre, either Hindu or Muslim.’ He added that the Sikhs favoured the Swiss type of constitution.93 Addressing an Akali Conference at Mandi Bahauddin in Gujrat district on 24 March 1945, Master Tara Singh said that Jinnah was insisting that the British should establish Pakistan before leaving India. The Muslims refused to remain subordinate to the Hindus, and the Sikhs would refuse to remain subordinate to the Muslims. The only solution of this problem was to do away with Hindu domination at the Centre and Muslim domination in the Punjab. Something on Page 25 of 33

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New Political Orientations the model of the constitution of Switzerland could be devised for this purpose. To aspire to dominate others was to seek power for oppression. There was no logic in the Muslim demand to be free of Hindu domination and at the same time to keep the Sikhs under Muslim domination. Master Tara Singh advised the Sikhs never to aspire for domination and never to accept the domination of another community. It was a religious duty of the Sikhs to work with Hindus and Muslims for the freedom of the country, and it was also their duty to resist Hindu and Muslim domination. To make sacrifices for this ideal would be a service to the Panth and the country as a whole.94 Master Tara Singh read the recommendations of the Sapru Committee in the newspapers. On one or two points he thought he should express his views immediately. On 17 April 1945 appeared his statement that the peculiar position of the Sikhs in the Punjab had been ignored by the Sapru Committee: ‘The Punjab was their homeland, their sacred land, their body, their soul, and their life.’ The Sikh position could not be equated with that of any other minority in the province. The other minorities in the Punjab formed only a small part of their communities in India but for the Sikhs the Punjab was everything. It was beyond comprehension why the Sapru Committee had not felt the need of stating it clearly that Muslim majority in the Punjab, which was at the root of their aspiration for domination, should be neutralized through territorial reorganization. Furthermore, the Sapru Committee had recommended a commission for minorities but its decisions were subject to approval by the Legislature. What was given by one hand was taken back by the other. Legislature actually meant the majority community. Therefore, the commission for minorities could not be an independent commission but an arm of the majority community. Master Tara Singh asked: ‘What was the need of this subterfuge[?]’95 Rejection of the idea of Pakistan by the Sapru Committee was no consolation for Master Tara Singh.

(p.270) In Retrospect During 1942–3, the idea of territorial reorganization of the Punjab was developed further as ‘Azad Punjab’ and advocated by Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders. Master Tara Singh clarified the position of the Akali Dal on Azad Punjab and emphasized its importance for strengthening the sentiment of Indian Nationalism, besides protection from the domination of any single community. He assured the Sikhs that the scheme would be helpful in securing protection for the Sikhs outside the Azad Punjab. He assured the Hindus of the Punjab that the scheme was in their interest as well. During 1943, the Akalis held more than fifty conferences at about forty places in the Punjab in order to explain the Azad Punjab scheme and to counter the objections raised against it. Early in 1944, a collection of ten essays, entitled Azad Punjab, was published as the last important publication on the subject. Apart from Master Tara Singh’s essay, the anthology contained essays by Giani Kartar Singh, Giani Sher Singh, Advocate Harnam Singh, two other well-known advocates and a legislator. The Page 26 of 33

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New Political Orientations chief Sikh opponents of the scheme were Kharak Singh and Sant Singh. In March 1944, Master Tara Singh resigned from the Presidentship of the SGPC and the Akali Dal because of disunity among the Akalis (due to the rivalry between the supporters of Giani Kartar Singh and Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke). When Master Tara Singh came back into the political arena in August 1944, political interest in the Punjab was focussed on ‘the coming conversations’ between Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah. Rajagopalachari in his talks with Jinnah before the end of June had conceded a truncated Pakistan with the approval of Mahatma Gandhi. Jinnah characterized it as a ‘shadow and a husk, a maimed mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan’. After the all Sikh parties’ meeting on 20 August 1944, Giani Sher Singh said: ‘The Sikhs loved the country and they loved freedom but a freedom in which the Sikhs were also partners and not subordinated to Muslims or Hindus.’ This principle was common to the Azad Punjab scheme and the idea of a Sikh state. The idea of Azad Punjab, which had crystallized as a result of the Cripps Proposals, was transformed into the idea of a Sikh state after the Raja–Gandhi formula. At the fifth All-India Akali Conference on 14 October 1944, Master Tara Singh stated that Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah wanted to impose Hindu and Muslim majorities on the Sikhs in a divided India. Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran underlined that ‘the Sikhs must be given a homeland on the basis of the land now in their possession and their political importance’. However, Master Tara Singh declared on the following day that formal demand for an independent state was not pressed to keep the door open for an amicable settlement through negotiations. The Sikhs were prepared to support any scheme of communal settlement which provided ample scope for their political, cultural, and religious development. The Sikh Memorandum submitted to the Conciliation Committee reflected the concern of the Sikhs in general and of Master Tara Singh in particular. It was emphatically stated that if Pakistan was imposed on the Sikhs, whether by the British Government or the agreed will of the Hindus and Muslims of India, the Sikhs would insist on the creation of a separate Sikh state with a substantial proportion of the Sikh population, their historic gurdwaras, and provision for the transfer of population and property. (p.271) After the report of the Sapru Committee was published, Master Tara Singh said that it was beyond his comprehension why this Conciliation Committee had felt no need for stating that Muslim majority in the Punjab should be neutralized through territorial reorganization. Rejection of the Pakistan scheme was no consolation for the Sikhs who wanted to get rid of

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New Political Orientations Muslim domination. Master Tara Singh could see that the Congress and League leaders were indifferent to the interests of the Sikhs. Notes:

(1.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), pp. 388–99. (2.) Sarkar, Modern India, pp. 408–9. (3.) Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988, paperback), pp. 230–6. (4.) Lionel Carter (ed.), Punjab Politics, 1940–43: Strains of War (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p. 318. (5.) Punjab Politics (2005), p. 345 n. 26. (6.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 320–1. (7.) Linlithgow had written to Amery in May 1942 that Baldev Singh was the strongest Sikh candidate for the council but he might act as ‘a quisling in certain circumstances’. By far the best compromise was Jogendra Singh. ‘I hold therefore to Jogendra Singh for the Sikh vacancy.’ Linlithgow to Amery, 30 May 1942, in The Transfer of Power, eds Nicholas Mansergh and E.W. Lumby (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1971), vol. II, p. 109. Sir Jogendra Singh joined the council two months later, on 29 July 1942. (8.) For their statement in the Tribune of 25 July 1942, see The Transfer of Power, vol. II, p. 465. (9.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 321–2. (10.) The ‘Quit India’ Resolution in The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 621–4. (11.) Amery to Linlithgow, 20 August 1942, The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 769–70. (12.) Resolution of the Muslim League Working Committee, The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 771–4. (13.) Punjab Politics (2005), p. 325. (14.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 327–8. (15.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 107–9.

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New Political Orientations (16.) Linlithgow to Amery, 5 and 7 September 1942, The Transfer of Power, vol. II, p. 913. (17.) The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 936–8. (18.) Linlithgow to Amery, 14 September 1942, The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 960–1. (19.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 329–30. (20.) Punjab Politics (2005), p. 330. Linlithgow to Amery, 4 October 1942, The Transfer of Power, (1971), vol. III, p. 88. (21.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 331–2. (22.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 333–4. (23.) Punjab Politics (2005), pp. 334–7, 339–43, 346–7 nn. 47–50 and 53–4. (24.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp.105–6. (25.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, in Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, PhD Thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 2005, Appendix 8, pp. 1–16. (26.) Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, pp. 147–8. (27.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 68–79. (28.) Gurcharan Singh Giani, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān (Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988), pp. 106–9. (29.) Memorandum by Secretary of State for India, The Transfer of Power, vol. III, pp. 212–18. (30.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 28 November 1942, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 333. (31.) Sir T.B. Sapru to Sir G. Laithwaite, 20 February 1943, The Transfer of Power, vol. III (1972), pp. 705–6. The government did not release Mahatma Gandhi. The Transfer of Power, vol. II, pp. 706, 711–13. (32.) Master Tara Singh, Pradhāngī Address, Fourth All-India Akali Conference, Bhawanigarh (Patiala), 14 March 1943, in Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendicx 4, pp. 1–16. (33.) Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, pp. 151–2.

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New Political Orientations (34.) Giani Trilok Singh (ed.), Āzād Punjab (Amritsar: Ajit Book Agency, 1944), pp. 17–28. (35.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 29–35. (36.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 36–41. (37.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 42–5. (38.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 46–50. (39.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 51–8. (40.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 59–62. (41.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 63–7. (42.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 68–73. (43.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, pp. 74–87. (44.) Giani Trilok Singh, Āzād Punjab, p. 6. (45.) Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās (Jalandhar: Ajit Prakashan, 2004), pp. 176–86. (46.) Glancy to Linlithgow, 12 October 1943, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 404. (47.) Glancy to Wavell, 30 October 1943, Punjab Politics (2005), p. 406. (48.) Glancy to Wavell, 4 March 1944, Punjab Politics, 1 January 1944–3 March 1947: Last Years of the Ministries, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 59. (49.) Letter by Master Tara Singh quoted in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, pp. 152–3. (50.) Shamsher Singh Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (1926–1976) (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 2003, reprint), pp. 221–2. (51.) S.L. Malhotra, Gandhi, Punjab and the Partition (Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1983), pp. 85–6. (52.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 222. (53.) Glancy to Wavell, 8 May 1944, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 79. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 110–11. Page 30 of 33

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New Political Orientations (55.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 111–12. (56.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Āzād Punjab te Khālistān’, Punjab, 6 June 1944, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 121–2. (57.) Giani Sher Singh, ‘Dr. Ashraf te Pakistan’, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 122–3). (58.) Giani Sher Singh, Ímtihān dī Ghaṛī’, in Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān, pp. 123–5. (59.) C. Rajagopalachari to Jinnah, 30 June 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (Second Series), ed. Z.H. Zaidi (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, n.y.), vol. X, p. 511. (60.) M.A. Jinnah to C. Rajagopalachari, 2 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, p. 518. (61.) C. Rajagopalachari to M.A. Jinnah, 4 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, p. 528. (62.) M.A. Jinnah to C. Rajagopalachari, 5 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, p. 530. (63.) C. Rajagopalachari to M.A. Jinnah, 8 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, p. 546. (64.) Teja Singh Swatantra and Sohan Singh Josh to M.A. Jinnah, 24 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, pp. 591–2. (65.) Teja Singh Swatantra and Sohan Singh Josh to M.A. Jinnah, 29 July 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. X, pp. 615–16. (66.) Jagdish Singh to M.A. Jinnah, 3 September 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. XI, p. 117. (67.) Gurdit Singh to M.A. Jinnah and others, 3 September 1944, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, vol. XI, p. 118. (68.) Quaid-i Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (Second Series), ed. Z.H. Zaidi, vol. X, p. 614. (69.) Wavell to Amery, 15 August 1944, The Transfer of Power, vol. IV (1973), p. 1199. (70.) Glancy to Wavell, 23 August 1944, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 95–6.

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New Political Orientations (71.) Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. II, pp. 548–9 and n. 1. (72.) H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969), p. 113. (73.) Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951), pp. 425–31. (74.) Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi, pp. 432–3. (75.) The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. LXXVIII (1979), pp. 136–43. (76.) Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (Second Series), vol. XI, pp. 192–3. (77.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: University of the Punjab, 2009, reprint), p. 46. (78.) Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 114–15. (79.) Glancy to Wavell, 20 September 1944, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 98. (80.) Glancy to Wavell, 3 October 1944, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 101. (81.) Glancy to Wavell, 25–6 October 1944, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 103. (82.) Grover, Master Tara Singh, pp. 447–9. (83.) Grover, Master Tara Singh, pp. 450–3. (84.) Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (second series), vol. XI, pp. 345–53. (85.) Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, pp. 155–6. (86.) Harnam Singh, Punjab The Homeland of the Sikhs (Lahore), 1945, pp. 63–5. (87.) Harnam Singh, Punjab, pp. 65–73. (88.) Harnam Singh, Punjab, pp. 73–6. (89.) Harnam Singh, Punjab, pp. 76–83. (90.) Harnam Singh, Punjab, p. 76. (91.) Harnam Singh, Punjab, p. 78. (92.) Glancy to Wavell, 20 February 1945, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 122. Page 32 of 33

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New Political Orientations (93.) Note on conversation with Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, in The Transfer of Power, eds Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1974), vol. V, pp. 630–1. (94.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh Te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 154–6; see also pp. 157–8. (95.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Sapru Kameti de Dhakwanj di ki Lor Hai’ (What is the need of Sapru Committee’s Subterfuge?), Rozānā Akāli, 17 April 1945, in Joginder Singh, Punjab Journalism: Issues and Concerns (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2014), Appendix D, pp. 168–9.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (1945–6) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0012

Abstract and Keywords On Lord Wavell’s initiative, the Simla Conference was held to discuss the proposal of a new executive council and a new constitution for India after the war. Master Tara Singh represented the Sikh community at the Simla Conference. The Conference failed due to Jinnah’s insistence that the Muslim League alone had the right to nominate Muslim representatives on the Executive Council. The failure of the Conference made the general elections of 1945–6 all the more important. The general elections resulted in a large degree of polarization between the Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. The Muslim League got Muslim mandate in favour of Pakistan. The Congress got a mandate of Hindus and a considerable proportion of the Sikhs for independence without partition. The Akalis got support of the large majority of the Sikhs for an independent political entity of the Sikhs. This polarization was of crucial importance for the future. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Lord Wavell, Simla Conference, constitution for India, Jinnah, Muslim League, Pakistan, Congress, partition, general elections of 1945–6

The year after the failure of the Sapru Committee was marked by the Simla Conference of June–July 1945 and the general elections of 1945–6. The importance of these two events is evident from the attention given to them by the Governor General, the Punjab Governor, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, and Master Tara Singh. The Simla Conference clarified the issues Page 1 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections for the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Akali Dal. The elections were fought on the issues of mutually clashing objectives of independence for India, creation of Pakistan, and an autonomous area for the Sikhs. The results of the elections demonstrated that the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Akali Dal were the political parties which counted, and this made the situation more difficult to deal with.

Wavell’s Initiative On 24 October 1944, Governor General Wavell wrote to Prime Minister Churchill that he wanted to express his views on the present and future of India. The vital problems of India had been treated by His Majesty’s Government ‘with neglect, even sometime with hostility and contempt’. He was convinced that the situation warranted proposals for ‘political advance’ in India ‘to rally all classes to support the war effort’. The failure of Gandhi–Jinnah talks, he added, had created a favourable moment for a move by His Majesty’s Government.1 Within a month, two other proposals came to the notice of the Governor General: Bhulabhai Desai’s proposal for a ‘National Government’ and Tej Bahadur Sapru Committee’s (p.275) pending recommendations. Wavell asked the Secretary of State for India to consider his proposals even if action was taken after the submission of the report of the Sapru Committee. It was extremely important for Wavell ‘to persuade Whitehall of the paramount importance of British prestige, British security and British prosperity to secure a satisfactory but generous settlement of the Indian problem’.2 Wavell was keen to visit England in March for meeting the Prime Minister to discuss and finalize the proposal to be announced. When the Secretary of State suggested a visit in June, Wavell made ‘an indignant protest’, and he got back the message that he had ‘better come home at once’.3 From 24 March to 31 May 1945, Wavell discussed matters, formally and informally, with Linlithgow, the Cabinet Committee on India, the India Committee, and the Prime Minister. Eventually, the Cabinet met on 30 May to decide about India but Wavell was not invited. On 31 May he presented to the Cabinet a draft statement he had prepared. The Prime Minister made a long statement against the proposal. But at a later meeting the Prime Minster made just as forcible an address in favour of the proposals as he had made in their condemnation in the morning. Wavell’s draft for broadcast was approved with one or two minor suggestions. What accounted for the Prime Minister’s dramatic reversal was the logic of facts. With the elections coming up in Great Britain, he could not possibly see India becoming a party issue and he decided ‘to give way with good grace’.4 Back in India, Wavell met the council in Delhi on 6 June to disclose the proposals, with no good response from the members. However, the broadcast on 14 June evening came through quite well. The press was not unfriendly in their response to the proposals. Wavell noted that it was something of an achievement Page 2 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections to have got so far, but difficult times were ahead.5 In his broadcast on 14 June, Wavell announced that he proposed to invite Indian leaders with a view to forming a new Executive Council representing the main communities with equal proportions of caste Hindus and Muslims. It would be entirely an Indian council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief as the War Member. The main tasks of the new council would be (a) to prosecute the war, (b) to carry on the Government of British India, and to think of the long-term solution. As the means of forming such a council, Wavell had decided to invite, among others, the two main recognized leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, that is, Gandhi and Jinnah, for a conference. Master Tara Singh was to represent the Sikhs.6 The official organ of the Muslim League, the Dawn, stated on 15 June that ‘the Musalmans will tolerate no infiltration of non-League stooges to humour any party’. Jinnah said that only after the discussions on 24 June he would decide whether or not the members of the League should participate in the Conference on 25 June.7 Wavell had separate interviews with Azad, Gandhi, and Jinnah on 24 June. Azad appeared to accept the general principles of the proposals. He made it clear, however, that the Congress must have a say in the representation of non-Hindu communities, and would not agree to only one communal organization putting forth all Muslim names. Mahatma Gandhi blessed the proposals but objected to the term ‘Caste Hindus’ for the non-Scheduled Caste Hindus and their parity with the Muslim League. Jinnah claimed that the Muslim League represented (p.276) the whole of Muslim India and had the right, therefore, to nominate all Muslim members. He hinted that he would consult the League Working Committee. The way was cleared for holding the Conference but there were two issues of possible contention: parity between Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled Castes and the demand of the Muslim League to nominate all Muslim members to the Executive Council.8 The first day of the Conference went ‘pretty well’ for Wavell. Only Jinnah was a little difficult. On 26 June, Wavell put up to the conference that the composition of the Executive Council should be taken up first and then the names. This was approved, and the meeting was adjourned for 27 June. No progress was made on 27 June. Jinnah met Wavell in the evening and reiterated that all Muslim members should be nominated by the Muslim League. It was obvious on 29 June that the Congress and the League had failed entirely to agree. Wavell suggested the alternative that the party leaders should send panels of names to him, and he should try to form an acceptable council out of those named. Wavell decided to adjourn the Conference till 14 July.9 On 30 June, Wavell informed the Governors that discussion in the Conference had broken down on the strength and composition of the new council. Wavell had the feeling that a council consisting largely of non-League Muslims and Congressmen would not work, and on this point, he wanted to have the advice of Page 3 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections the Governors with regard to the course he should follow if the League refused to cooperate.10 Glancy responded on 3 July. Jinnah’s claim to nominate all Muslim members appeared to him to be outrageously unreasonable in the light of the meagre hold of the League on Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces. Glancy agreed that if Jinnah maintained his present attitude, it would be inadvisable to form a council without the League’s representatives. Glancy sent another telegram on 6 July that it would be better to suspend the Conference, expressing the hope that Jinnah would adopt a reasonable attitude.11 On behalf of the Congress, Maulana Azad sent a list of fifteen names of members of the entire council consisting of both Congressmen and non-Congressmen to make the list as inclusive as possible. The name of Master Tara Singh as the Sikh nominee was sent on 9 July.12 Wavell wrote to Amery on the same day that Azad offered to Master Tara Singh full support for the Sikhs in the Executive Council if an agreed Sikh name were sent through the Congress. The Sikhs did not accept the Congress offer and Master Tara Singh sent a separate list of his own. It included the names of Master Tara Singh, another prominent Sikh, and an exMinister of Patiala.13 Wavell informed the Governors on 10 July that Jinnah finally refused to send a list of names for the new council. Wavell had made provisional selection, including four Muslim League members and one non-League Muslim from the Punjab. If the selections were approved by the British Government, he would discuss them with Jinnah and the other leaders. But the chances of a settlement in his assessment were small. The non-League Muslim selected by Wavell was not Khizar Hayat Khan but Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan.14 The ‘shadow’ council selected by Wavell was approved by the Cabinet on 11 July but Jinnah refused even to discuss names unless he could be given the absolute right to select all Muslim members.15 In the Conference on 25 June, Master Tara Singh had said that everything would depend (p.277) on the spirit in which the proposals were worked. He feared that the parties in the end might drift further apart. He made it clear that the Sikhs did not identify themselves with the Congress but they were in sympathy with it insofar as it favoured India’s freedom. The future of the Indian army, in his view, called for careful consideration; new ideas about its composition might injure people who had served the country well.16 Master Tara Singh informed Wavell on 6 July that he had placed his own name at the head of Sikh nominees for the council at the insistence of the Akali Dal Working Committee. The other two names in Wavell’s opinion were ‘complete duds’. ‘This may be awkward’, he added, ‘since Master Tara Singh would be a poor member of Council’.17 Wavell owned full responsibility for its failure in the Conference on 14 July. But Azad said that it failed because the Muslim League had refused to abandon their claim to nominate all Muslim members of the council. The communal problem Page 4 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections could now be solved only by a just decision which must be firmly enforced. Rajagopalachari suggested that an Interim Government might be formed on territorial or administrative basis rather than on communal lines. Jinnah made a long statement. The Muslim League and the Congress viewed affairs from entirely different angles, he said, and in the proposed new council there would have been constant clash between the idea of Pakistan and plans for united India. Nomination of all Muslim members by the League was a fundamental point for Jinnah. Master Tara Singh said that ‘Sikhs could accept Pakistan only if Muslims agreed to separate Sikh State’.18 Amery congratulated Wavell on the generosity and wisdom of his statement: ‘If anything can bring about a change of heart in the Party Leaders it will be your magnanimity in placing the failure of the Conference on your own shoulders.’19 Jawaharlal Nehru met Wavell and talked to him for an hour and a quarter. ‘His main theme was that the Congress represented a modern nationalist tendency— the League a medieval and separatist one.’ He admitted that there was ‘a section of Hindus out for complete Hindu domination’ and there was a psychological fear of Hindu domination but it was ‘unreal and unwarranted’. Wavell remarked that Nehru ‘is more of a theorist than a practical politician but earnest and I am sure honest’.20 In his note of 15 July 1945 on the Simla Conference, Wavell clearly stated that the immediate cause of the failure of the Conference was Jinnah’s intransigence about Muslim representation and safeguards for Muslims. ‘Their fear that the Congress, by parading its national character and using the Muslim dummies will permeate the entire administration of any united India is real, and cannot be dismissed as an obsession of Jinnah and his immediate entourage.’ It was not clear now what Jinnah would be prepared to accept short of Pakistan. Mahatma Gandhi told Wavell that His Majesty’s Government would have to decide sooner or later ‘whether to come down on the side of Hindu or Muslim, of Congress or League, since they could never reconcile them’.21 This equation of Hindus with the Congress is significant. Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Editor of the Ajīt, who was in Simla, refers to Master Tara Singh’s warm response to the press after the sessions as the sole representative of the Sikhs. He used to speak the language of the Hindu Mahasabha, asserting that under no circumstances would the Sikhs allow the creation of Pakistan. He held Jinnah responsible for the failure of the Conference, and (p.278) he believed that the British Government was no longer keen to create Pakistan. He thought that there was a great probability of a ‘National’ government being set up. On being asked as to who would represent the Sikhs in the government, Master Tara Singh remained silent. Mangal Singh said, ‘Of course, Master Tara Singh.’ Durga Das mentioned Baldev Singh’s name as a possibility. Master Tara Singh said that only the leaders of first rank would join the government. In regard to the effect of the failure of the Conference on Page 5 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections the Sikhs, Master Tara Singh said that the Sikhs would be happy to see the end of talk about the creation of Pakistan.22

Moving towards the Elections ‘So ends 1945’, wrote Wavell in his journal on 30 December, ‘a busy and eventful year for me.’ His long struggle for permission to make an attempt to end the Indian deadlock was followed by his failure at Simla to do so. Then came two rather unexpected developments, the Labour success in the elections and the sudden end of the war with Japan. Both had considerable effect on the ‘problem in India’. The end of the war brought the difficult period sooner than he had expected; but a Labour Government had, on the whole, made things easier. More attention was paid to India and the outlook was rather more ‘sympathetic’.23 Two weeks after the end of the Simla Conference, all the Governors, except Glancy, favoured general elections to the Central Assembly as soon as possible, and all, except Glancy, wanted provincial elections in the coming winter.24 Glancy explained that the main issue in the Punjab was Pakistan. It was necessary to clear up the Pakistan issue and to steer the Muslim League away from ‘the crude version of Pakistan’. Otherwise, there would be civil war in the Punjab. The elections might consolidate the Muslim League position because the Punjab Muslims would vote simply on what appeared to be a religious issue for them.25 Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence a few days later that the Sikhs, who formed a solid block in the middle of the Punjab, would never acquiesce in their inclusion in a Muslim Sovereign State.26 On 21 August 1945, the Secretary of State for India indicated to Wavell that a reversion to the Draft Declaration of 1942 was contemplated by His Majesty’s Government and asked Wavell to suggest a procedure to be followed along with composition of an electoral college and a Constitution-making body. The total number of members of the Constitution-making body proposed by Wavell was 209, of whom 106 were Hindus and 64 were Muslims. The total number of the Sikhs was 6. In Wavell’s view, the Draft Declaration of 1942 was unacceptable to the parties in India and it should not be revived. He also added that if British India was partitioned, there would be no incentive for the states to cooperate with the British Indian provinces, and they would wish to stand out permanently as independent sovereign units.27 Wavell left Delhi for London on 24 August to discuss the issue. He told the India Cabinet Committee that the Cripps offer would not be acceptable to the parties concerned. Eventually, a new draft put forward by him was finalized. After his return to Delhi, Wavell made the announcement on 19 September that the British Government would do their utmost to promote early realization of ‘full Self-Government in India’. Elections to the Central and Provincial Assemblies to be held during the coming cold weather had already been announced. Thereafter, the intention of the government was to convene (p.279) a Page 6 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Constitution-making body as soon as possible. Wavell was authorized to constitute an Executive Council with the support of the main Indian parties.28 Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 22 October 1945 that the Muslim League’s propaganda about Pakistan was having a disturbing effect. The League’s speakers were saying that the elections would decide whether or not there would be Pakistan. It was necessary to clarify the position more or less formally.29 Master Tara Singh wrote to Prime Minister Atlee on 23 October that communal feeling was steadily deteriorating in the Punjab. The cry of Pakistan was being raised more and more loudly by the Muslim Leaguers. They openly asserted that the whole of the province would be separated from the Indian Union if there was a bare majority in favour of separation. Master Tara Singh requested on behalf of the Sikhs that the Cripps offer should be clarified by announcing that the term ‘province’ did not mean the province as it existed. He referred to the speech of the Secretary of the State delivered on 28 April 1942 suggesting an alternative. He had said: The particular method which we suggest for arriving at a constitutional settlement, more particularly on the present Provincial basis, both for setting up a constitution-making assembly and for non-accession is not meeting with sufficient support for us to press it further. It may be that alternative methods might arise which form a better basis for the definition of boundaries and might give representation for smaller elements such as Sikhs whose natural aspirations we appreciate. Master Tara Singh suggested that an announcement of this nature would help to make the position clear to the average voter and prevent his being misled by false propaganda. An early action was necessary to minimize the danger of widespread bloodshed.30 Nehru and Patel were threatening in their ‘wild speeches’ to launch a mass movement after the elections in continuation with ‘Quit India’. Wavell told Nehru on 3 November that no government could indefinitely tolerate ‘incitement to violence or threats to its officials’. Nehru said that the Congress could make ‘no terms whatever’ with the Muslim League under its present leadership and policy. He was preaching violence because he did not see how violence could be avoided to attain ‘legitimate aims’. Wavell got the impression that Nehru was quite incapable of considering any views which did not coincide with his own. The government, thought Wavell, would have to face before long another violent suppression of the Congress, with weaker and perhaps rather demoralized forces. He sent a note to His Majesty’s Government on 5 November on the gravity of the Indian situation and wanted the British Government to make it clear that they would not permit any political party to resort to violence.31

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections The Cabinet responded to Wavell’s note with the proposal to send a Parliamentary Delegation to India and to form a Constitution-making body after the elections. Wavell saw Mahatma Gandhi on 15 December. On the issue of violent speeches by the Congress leaders, Mahatma Gandhi said that he was trying to get the pitch lowered. On the need of agreement between Hindus and Muslims he said that he was frustrated in his efforts by the British policy of divide and rule. He defended the Congress Ministries which were seen by the Muslim League as responsible for Muslim alienation.32 Glancy had noted at the beginning of 1945 that some unrestrained speeches were (p.280) made by Congress leaders at Ludhiana. They accused the Communists of treachery in an attempt to increase Congress influence among the rural population. Their idea was to rebuild its strength on a fairly wide scale. Early in April, Glancy suggested that if revival of the Congress was to be checked, all meetings and conferences organized by the Punjab Workers Assembly should be prohibited.33 The Congress was building up its organization in the Punjab. Nehru had not been very successful in reconciling the factions in the Punjab Congress during his visit, and this task was entrusted to Maulana Azad. The Indian National Army (INA) trials at Delhi in November gave rise to an alarming agitation encouraged by almost all political parties. The Congress being the first in the field in the campaign had already strengthened its position greatly. There was no general compromise yet between the Congress and the Akalis with regard to elections.34 After the breakdown of the Simla Conference, the Muslim Leaguers had begun to make the most extravagant statements to blame their opponents. Before the middle of August they were indulging in wholesale vilification of the Congress and the Unionist Government in the Punjab. They were loudly clamouring for elections. Jinnah’s reputation among the Muslims had risen very high after the Simla Conference and he was hailed as the champion of Islam. He had openly given out that the elections would show an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan.35 The Muslim Leaguers were conducting their propaganda on fanatical lines. In mid-September, religious leaders and religious buildings were being used freely by the League for advocating Pakistan. The Ahrars and the Khaksars were included among the opponents of the Muslim League for abuse and vilification. In October the supporters of the Muslim League in the Ambala Division declared that Pakistan would soon be a reality and the laws of Islam would prevail in Pakistan. By the middle of November the Muslim League had succeeded in undermining the loyalty of some trusted supporters of the Unionists. Towards the end of December, Pirs and Maulavis were enlisted in large numbers to tour the province and announce all who opposed the League as infidels. Copies of the Qur’ān were carried around as an emblem peculiar to the Muslim League. Their tactics were not easy for the Unionists to counter.36

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections The Unionists were losing ground. They had supported the war effort consistently and unconditionally and they expected to be represented on the Executive Council. The rank and file of the Unionist Party were bewildered by the turn of events at the Simla Conference. Only towards the end of September did they set to work, selecting their candidates for the elections. No Unionist was thinking of an alternative to Pakistan for solving the Punjab problem. On the eve of the elections, the Unionists were weaker than what they were ten months earlier, in relation to the League as well as the Congress. The Hindu Mahasabha had practically vanished from the scene. The Ahrars and Khaksars were only marginal parties.37 The Akalis were coming up as the most important party among the Sikhs. They were strongly opposed not only to Pakistan and the Muslim League but also to the Communists who were mostly Sikh and catered to the needs of the Sikh peasants and workers. Rather distanced from the Congress, the Akalis were linked with it through the pro-Congress Nagoke group. Baldev Singh was another conduit. Before the Simla Conference Master Tara Singh’s important (p.281) concern was to keep the two Akalis groups together and to eliminate the Sikh Communists who were taking interest in the affairs of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), apart from making a dent in the rural following of the Akalis. Early in March 1945, Master Tara Singh had a long talk with the Punjab Governor. Much disturbed about the Communist influence, he pleaded that all Communists were atheists and, therefore, no Communist should be allowed to pose as a Sikh or vote in gurdwara elections. On 7 April, Glancy remarked that the Communists were denounced by the Akalis as atheists and projected by the Congress as traitors. In June, Sikh politics were in ‘the usual welter’ because of the rival factions among the Akalis. Master Tara Singh was veering towards Giani Kartar Singh’s group at the cost of the Nagoke group who was feeling increasingly dissatisfied with Master Tara Singh’s leadership and threatened at times to break away from him.38 The Simla Conference boosted the image of Master Tara Singh as the sole representative of the Sikhs. In September 1945, the Sikhs in general and the Akalis in particular were growing distinctly nervous at the possibility of Pakistan being created. Glancy had no doubt that they would forcibly resist any attempt to include them in Pakistan. One result of their apprehensions was a greater measure of concord between the Giani and the Nagoke groups. Inclined towards the Congress, the latter had become more influential than before. The Akali leaders appeared to have decided that they would contest the elections on their own and not with the Congress. The prospects of the Communists in the Sikh constituencies appeared to be growing more remote.39 The All-India Akali Conference, held at Gujranwala at the end of September 1945, rejected the plan announced by Wavell on 19 September. It appeared to be based on the Cripps offer which had been rejected by the Akalis. They attached Page 9 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections great importance to the provincial elections because the composition of a Constituent Assembly and the integrity of India depended on the results of these elections. They were determined to oppose Pakistan through ‘concerted Panthic action’. In the presence of 100,000 people, Ishar Singh Majhail unfurled the Sikh flag (nishān sāhib) and declared: ‘The Sikh Panth would resist Pakistan to the last man.’40 Most of the Congress Sikhs participated in the Conference despite Daud Ghaznavi’s direction against it. On 31 September, the Conference decided to fight the elections on a common Panthic ticket with the demand for an independent Sikh state.41 Before the end of October it seemed that the Nagoke group was finding it difficult to continue their pro-Congress policy.42 The SGPC passed two resolutions on 26 October 1945. The insistence of the Muslim League on Pakistan posed a threat to the Sikh Panth. The resolution of the CWC at Poona had diluted Congress opposition to Pakistan. The Communists were openly supporting the demand for Pakistan. But the SGPC made it absolutely clear on behalf of the entire Panth that in no circumstances would the Sikhs accept Pakistan. Since the new Constitution was to be framed by the representatives of the assembly members, the SGPC appealed to all the citizens of India to elect only those candidates who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan so that the country and the Sikh Panth remained safe. The SGPC appealed to all the Sikhs to prepare for sacrifice to save the country and the Panth in this critical situation. The resolution was passed by a large majority.43 The second resolution was drafted by Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke. The SGPC (p.282) appreciated the recommendation of the Executive Committee to contribute Rs 5,000 to the fund for fighting the legal battle for the Azad Hind Fauj (the INA), and increased the amount to Rs 7,000. The SGPC also impressed upon the Government of India to withdraw the cases against its men and release them immediately. The SGPC demanded the release of army prisoners in the Indore and other jails, and that all the soldiers of the Azad Hind Fauj released outside India be brought back. The resolution was passed unanimously.44 It may be added that the Nagoke group was dominant in the SGPC at this time, with Jathedar Mohan Singh Nagoke as its President. Sadhu Singh Hamdard dwells on the attitudes of Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Udham Singh Nagoke. Even though he appreciated Giani Kartar Singh more than Master Tara Singh, he kept up a neutral stance quite often. Giani Kartar Singh was keen about the Sikh state. Udham Singh Nagoke was opposed to Pakistan but he did not approve of any talk of a Sikh state. Master Tara Singh was sympathetic to the idea of a Sikh state but he was reluctant to make it a political issue for various reasons. Hamdard wrote a booklet of 250 pages in Urdu on the theme of ‘Panth Āzād’. It was widely appreciated (presumably by the Sikhs). The first edition of 1,000 copies was immediately sold out and he printed 10,000 copies more which too were sold in a short time. He elaborated the argument that the Congress had its slogan of Page 10 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections ‘Complete Independence’ or ‘Desh Āzād’. The Muslim League had the slogan of Pakistan, a sovereign Muslim state. The Akalis must adopt the slogan ‘Panth Azad’, an independent Sikh state. Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs to have an independent identity and an independent policy, but he was not in favour of the slogan ‘Panth Āzād’. Eventually, the Akalis adopted the slogan of ‘Panth Āzād, Desh Āzād’.45 For Master Tara Singh, freedom of the country and freedom of the Panth were the two sides of the coin of independence.

The General Elections Elections to the Central Legislature were held in November 1945 and to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in the first half of February 1946. Sardar Patel was most closely connected with the elections as Chairman of the Central Election Board. His correspondence from the 1st of October 1945 to the end of February 1946 clearly suggests that in theory he gave greater importance to both Bengal and the Punjab than to any other province but in practice he gave far greater importance to the Punjab than to Bengal. Four of the ten chapters of the second volume of his correspondence relate very largely to the Punjab. Sardar Patel remained in close touch not only with Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad or with Gopi Chand Bhargava and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi but also with Sardar Baldev Singh directly, or through his private secretary, B.S. Gilani. All the three Congress stalwarts looked upon the Punjab as the key province to the future of India, just as Jinnah looked upon the province as the key to Pakistan. Sardar Patel wrote to Nehru on the 1st of October 1945 that programme of the Central Assembly elections had been announced by the Government of India and suggested that Nehru should send to him a small draft of the election manifesto for the Central Assembly elections, basing it on the main issue of independence or Quit India.46 The Congress manifesto prepared by Nehru, corrected by Mahatma Gandhi and approved by (p.283) the Congress President, opened with the role of the Indian National Congress in raising a powerful movement of resistance to foreign rule in the past sixty years as the living and vibrant symbol of India’s will to freedom and independence. It stood for independence and for equal rights and opportunities to every citizen of India, the unity of all communities and religious groups, and the freedom of each territorial area to develop its own life and culture within the larger framework. The special concerns of the Congress were to enable women to take full part in national activities as equal citizens, to raise the depressed sections of the society from their backward state. To raise the standards of the masses, it was necessary to plan in advance in all fields with a certain degree of central control over the methods of production and distribution. A cooperative commonwealth in free India and establishment of a world federation of free nations were the national and international objectives of the Congress. The manifesto laid emphasis on the urgency of Indian independence.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Nehru went on to write that the All India Congress Committee had passed a resolution which gave the battle cry ‘Quit India’. The Congress stood by that demand and challenge, and it reaffirmed the national and international objectives of that August resolution. On the basis of this resolution and with this battle cry would the Congress face the elections for the Central and Provincial Assemblies.47 Thus, the Congress stood for immediate independence of united India for a fully democratic and somewhat socialistic federation in India to take its place in a comity of free states in the world. Maulana Azad wrote to Sardar Patel on 16 October 1945: ‘Considering the present condition, the reorientation of the Congress Committee in Lahore is quite satisfactory, and it is hoped that work will go on smoothly till the formation of the new committees.’48 Maulana Azad wrote again on 21 October that the Punjab and Bengal held the key position in the present election. Both the provinces needed funds. A cheque of Rs 20,000 had been presented to him in Lahore for the Punjab election. Azad had kept it back to be used for urgent work if no other arrangement was made. On 26 October, Gopi Chand Bhargava was in Poona to secure financial assistance for the Punjab.49 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel on 31 October that he was dissatisfied with recent developments in the Punjab, specifically at some of the choices made, or proposed to be made.50 Patel acknowledged that there was a complaint about the selection of Gopi Chand Bhargava’s brother.51 Actually, Patel himself had written to Maulana Azad on 20 October that Thakur Das Bhargava (Gopi Chand’s brother) would be the best candidate.52 Azad pointed out that the sitting member, Sham Lal, had always stood with the Congress and suffered for it, while Thakur Das had always opposed Congress candidates and kept away from imprisonment. People had begun to say that Gopi Chand Bhargava was using his influence unduly for his brother. If the Punjab Board had made such a recommendation, the Central Board would have to interevene.53 Azad sent a telegraphic message to Sardar Patel, reiterating the merit of Sham Lal and the demerit of Thakur Das, and asking him to announce the name of Sham Lal. Sardar Patel sent back a telegraphic message that the name of Thakur Das had already been announced and he had no authority to upset it. Nor was it desirable.54 Sardar Patel managed to have his way. Thakur Das Bhargava was elected to the Central Assembly. (p.284) The Congress in the Punjab had to contend with the Unionists, the Muslim League, the Ahrars, the Communists, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Akalis. Azad wrote to Patel on 16 October that the Ahrars might get two or three seats on the Congress ticket. They were in great need of help.55 On 26 November, Nehru conveyed his impression to Patel that there was a very good response among Muslims to the Congress appeal, and foundations were laid of a favourable drive for the provincial elections. He hoped that the Congress would contest every Muslim seat.56 In Patel’s view, the Congress did not have to think Page 12 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections of any settlement with the Hindu Mahasabha. There was absolutely no need as the Congress would easily win all the non-Muslim seats in the Central Assembly.57 On 7 November, Patel wrote to Nehru that the Hindu Mahasabha ‘will be finally finished this time’.58 In the Punjab there were two Sikh seats, wrote Patel to Azad on 23 October, and one of these would be contested by Sardar Kapur Singh. ‘He is a strong candidate and will win.’ But the other seat for which Sardul Singh Caveeshar was proposed, the Congress was sure to lose against Sampuran Singh, the Akali candidate. It was now proposed that Sant Singh should be set up for that constituency. He was sure to win. The decision was to be taken on the day following after consulting Maulana Daud Ghaznavi.59 Sardar Patel wrote to Maulana Azad on 26 October that the Akalis were ‘on the warpath’. They had started violence in public meetings because the Congress Sikh candidates for the two seats were ‘fairly strong’.60 The Akali Dal was putting a stiff fight against the Congress Sikh candidates for the Central Assembly. All the important forces had gathered behind Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh to defeat the Congress. ‘A defeat in the Centre will have a very bad repercussion in the province.’ B.S. Gilani had gone to Maulana Azad on behalf of Baldev Singh with a proposal to settle the Sikh question so as to avoid a fight. Master Tara Singh, it appeared, was not averse to the idea.61 Nehru’s letter of the same day mentions that the deputation sent to him by Master Tara Singh consisted of ‘so-called Congress Akalis’. Nehru noted that Master Tara Singh himself had kept away.62 On 8 November, Master Tara Singh’s man came with a proposal for settlement, both for the Centre and the province. Patel told him that no settlement was possible now for the Centre but the question could be considered for the provincial elections if there was goodwill on both sides. However, any proposal for settlement would be considered by the Congress President and the Central Election Board only if it was supported by the local Parliamentary Board and a large majority of the Sikhs in the Congress.63 The results of elections to the Central Assembly in the Punjab showed that the influence of the Congress was confined to the Hindus. All the three ‘General’ seats were won by the Congress candidates: Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Raizada Hans Raj, and Diwan Chaman Lal. But the Congress won no Muslim seat. The Muslim League candidates won five seats out of six. For the Sikh seats, both the Congress Sikh candidates were defeated by the Akali candidates: Sardar Kapur Singh by Sardar Mangal Singh, and Sardar Sant Singh by Sardar Sampuran Singh.64 These results were not good from the viewpoint of the Congress, diluting its ‘national’ credentials.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Maulana Daud Ghaznavi sent a telegraphic message to Sardar Patel on 30 December 1945 that the Unionists, the Akalis, the Muslim (p.285) Leaguers, and the Communists were strongly opposing the Congress candidates (on Muslim and Sikh seats). He requested Patel to ask Nehru for a tour in the Punjab in the second or third week of January.65 Sardar Patel wrote to Maulana Azad that Nehru’s tours created a lot of enthusiasm and pulled huge crowds, but this had no value for the purpose of elections. It influenced ‘no voters in the Muslim constituencies’, and the Hindu voters needed ‘no encouragement’.66 Patel had written to Azad on 21 December that he sent a cheque of Rs 50,000 but he was afraid that this was a wastage of good money for nothing, and Congress reputation would suffer badly in the end. The Ahrars whom the Congress had supported joined the Muslim League.67 Maulana Azad fully appreciated Patel’s view and added that he would not do anything in connection with the Ahrars unless he was fully satisfied. Patel remarked on the 1st of January 1946 that the two parties in the Punjab Congress were still quarrelling with increasing vigour. This had a very demoralizing effect on the general situation.68 Patel wrote to a Congress leader of Rupar that Congressmen in the Punjab, the key province which held ‘the future of India in the balance’, should have no quarrels or parties or factions. ‘We must all unite and fight the forces of reaction and disintegration.’69 These forces were certainly the Unionists and the Muslim League. On 8 January, Patel wrote to Sachar that it would a misfortune if he, Bhargava, and Ghaznavi failed to act with one mind and one voice at this critical period in the history of the country. ‘The Punjab holds the key to the future’ and the Punjab Congress leaders had to play a most important role at this hour.70 On 15 November 1945, Gopi Chand Bhargava sent to Sardar Patel an estimate of Rs 550,000 needed for the Muslim, Sikh, and the Scheduled Caste seats. Maulana Daud proposed to keep a few Muslim preachers for three months.71 Patel wrote a few days later that Bhargava seemed to throw the whole responsibility on the Centre. A substantial sum should be raised from the Punjab.72 He wrote also to Sachar that the Punjab was prosperous and it should not be difficult for the Congress to raise any amount of money for the allimportant issue of elections.73 Sachar underlined that financial aid could make a difference of five or six seats more.74 Sarat Chandra Bose sought Sardar Patel’s intervention on behalf of Sardul Singh Caveeshar, who was not nominated by the Congress as its candidate for the Punjab Assembly. The candidate preferred over Caveeshar was Inder Singh, a mill owner of Kanpur, with no record of public work. Ramrup Sharma, who had written to Sarat Bose about Caveeshar, had also said that when mill owners and millionaires were allowed to put on the Congress label, Sikhs naturally felt that the Congress was putting up a fight to create friction among the Sikhs and not Page 14 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections because the Congress Sikh candidates were better.75 The Congress leaders were no doubt keen to win as many Sikh seats as possible. The pro-Congress Akalis of the Nagoke group were in favour of a settlement between the Akalis and the Congress. However, no settlement was made for the Central elections. For the provincial elections, negotiations began on the 1st of November 1945. B.S. Gilani, personal secretary of Sardar Baldev Singh, had talks with Maulana Azad and Sardar Patel and gave several arguments in favour of a settlement. The chances of Congress candidates without a settlement with the Sikhs were meagre. A fight between the Sikhs and the Congress would give advantage (p.286) to the Communists in more than half a dozen constituencies. The rift between the Sikhs and the Congress was having its repercussion in wider fields. The Congress organization in the Punjab was weak. Friendly alliances with the Sikhs and others were imperative.76 On 9 November, Sardar Patel wrote in response to Gilani’s letter that Sardar Basant Singh did not come with Master Tara Singh’s letter, but talked to him on the phone. Patel told him that difficulty was created by the resolution passed by the Akali Conference (in favour of a Sikh state). He would still try his best to persuade Maulana Azad to come to an understanding. But, as yet, he had received no encouragement from the Sikhs.77 Sardar Patel wrote to Bhargava that there should be no bitterness between the Akalis and the Congressmen as both stood for the independence of India and there was much common ground between them. Patel advised Bhargava to discuss the matter of arrangements for provincial elections with Daud Ghaznavi and the Congress Sikhs. If they were of one mind, it would be possible for Patel to get in touch with Maulana Azad for this purpose.78 On 14 November 1945, Maulana Azad sent a telegram to Sardar Patel that if the Akalis approached him he should refer them to Azad.79 Talks with the Akalis began on 15 November. It was proposed to issue a statement which, in Bhargava’s opinion, would induce the ‘nationalist Sikhs’ in the Akali Dal to join the Congress. Bhargava sent a copy of the statement to Sardar Patel for approval.80 Patel wrote to Bhargava that he did not know how a promise of 50 per cent seats could be made to any party or group. He wondered if Maulana Azad had done it during his last visit to the Punjab. Nehru would not be a party to any such understanding or assurance, nor would he encourage such a thing.81 In other words, Patel was not in favour of leaving half of the Sikh seats to Master Tara Singh. ‘I am afraid we have mishandled the whole Punjab situation,’ wrote Sardar Patel to Maulana Azad on 21 December 1945. The Congress would have to fight the Akalis and ‘we will not get more than 5 or 6 seats after a good deal of expense which could be easily avoided’.82 Daud Ghaznavi wrote to Sardar Patel on 4 January 1946 that Baldev Singh eventually gave a proposal which fell short of 50 Page 15 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections per cent seats for the Congress. It was accepted in the interest of unity. According to this proposal the Akalis would not oppose the Congress in ten constituencies and the Congress would not oppose the Akalis in ten others. On five seats, the Congress and Akalis would have a contest. On seven seats the Congress would not oppose the Akalis because in their view the Congress had no strong candidates to put up on those seats. But when negotiations were nearing completion, Sohan Singh Jalal-Usman opposed the proposition and Baldev Singh was unable to carry it through. Daud Ghaznavi goes on to add that sixteen or seventeen Communists were contesting Sikh seats. But only a few of them were serious candidates. It was agreed by Baldev Singh that on two of these only the Congress candidates would contest, and on the other two, only the Akali candidates. This arrangement was accepted by the Akalis and brought into action.83 Gilani wrote to Sardar Patel on 10 February 1946 that the aftermath of no settlement with the Sikhs was disconcerting. Bitterness was running deep, and it was widening.84 Sardar Patel agreed that the Sikh question was giving trouble. He held Master Tara Singh primarily responsible for this. So long as Master Tara Singh was the leader of the Akali Dal, he (p.287) said, there was hardly a chance of easing the situation.85 This may be taken as a left-handed compliment to Master Tara Singh’s success in mobilizing the Sikhs in support of the Akali Dal as an independent party. The Akali–Congress relations in the elections of 1945–6 were not the same as in the elections of 1936–7. They were fighting the elections now not in collaboration but in opposition to each other. Nehru’s election speeches in the Punjab, which were addressed largely to the Sikhs in November 1945, leave no doubt that he was strongly opposed to the Akalis in general and to Master Tara Singh in particular. He presented them as ‘communal’ and appealed to the other Sikhs to support the Congress. His rhetoric was meant to appeal to the patriotic spirit of the Sikhs and their sense of honour.

Nehru’s Campaign in the Punjab In view of the importance of the elections of 1945–6, almost all the top political leaders of India got involved. On the whole, Jinnah, Nehru, and Master Tara Singh represented the ideas, rationale, and concerns of their respective parties more authoritatively than others. Jinnah was acutely aware of the Congress objective of ‘immediate independence’ of India as a single state. In his first public pronouncement after the Simla Conference, he declared in Bombay that there were only two major parties in the country, the Muslims represented by the Muslim League and the Hindus represented by the Congress. He spoke again in August 1945 in his home city, accusing the Congress of trying ‘by hook or by crook’ to lure Muslims into an ‘all-India union’. But the Muslims could not agree to any arrangement that means ‘freedom for Hindus and establishment of “Hindu Raj” and slavery for the Muslims’. His audience donated Rs 300,000, Page 16 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections called ‘silver bullets’. His message was simple wherever he spoke. The Muslim League was ‘the only authoritative’ party of Muslims throughout India, and the sole demand of the League was Pakistan.86 ‘Pakistan is the question of life and death for us’, said Jinnah at Ahmedabad in October 1945. He collected a cheque of Rs 200,000 from Gujarati Muslims. All Muslims, he said, were ‘one nation’. They wanted Pakistan and they would attain it. On the 1st of November Jinnah predicted a Muslim League ‘sweep’ at the polls. At a Muslim League Conference on 24 November he said that they had no friends: ‘Neither the British, nor the Hindus.’ Nevertheless, the Muslims would fight with their united might and win in the end. To win Pakistan, all they had to do was to ‘vote for the League candidates’. In December, he said to the students in the Punjab that the first round was over and the day was not far off when they would see Pakistan as a sovereign state.87 Thus, Jinnah staked everything on the sole objective of Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru articulated the Congress ideology more elaborately than any other Congress leader. He was opposed to the division of India not because he had some sentimental attachment to united India. It was his progressive and modern mind that made him believe that united India could make a powerful state. Secondly, partition would not solve ‘the communal problem’. Instead, it could be intensified. Jinnah’s fear of the Hindu majority in ‘a centralized national government’ was based on his ‘medieval trend of thought’. In any case, the Punjab’s problem would remain unsolved. The Hindus and Sikhs of the eastern districts would never go over to Pakistan. Indeed, separation was (p.288) not in the interest of anyone, certainly not of the Muslims.88 In Nehru’s view, all the communal troubles in India were due to separate electorates. Given the historical background, however, safeguard would have to be provided for the protection of minority interests. There should be semiindependent autonomous provinces with all possible protection to the minorities: cultural, linguistic, and religious. Nehru defined ‘medievalism’ as ‘a religious group functioning as a political party’. An obvious example was the Muslim League which was confined to Muslims. The Congress had a national foundation and its political programme was to fight for the complete independence of all, irrespective of caste or creed. The Hindu–Muslim question was an obstruction to freedom but to say that freedom could not come unless there was Hindu–Muslim unity was incorrect. Political freedom could come even before that unity was achieved.89 Nehru compared the ‘Quit India’ movement of 1942 with the historic Indian rising of 1857. He made it plain that he could not condemn those who took part in the 1942 movement. ‘It was a mighty and staggering phenomenon to see a helpless people spontaneously rise in despair without any leader or organization or preparation or arms.’90

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections When elections were announced on 21 August 1945, Nehru asserted: ‘No power on earth can now stand in the way to freedom.’ While the Muslim League was raising the issue of Pakistan, the Congress was thinking of ‘the economic, political, social and cultural problems’ of India and the world. The Indians who joined the Indian National Army and fought against the British were misguided, but they had been actuated by the love of their country. It would be ‘a supreme tragedy’ if these officers and other men were liquidated by the British by way of punishment.91 The Congress had already acknowledged the right of self-determination and the right of secession to the provinces. But the Pakistan scheme was still vague. Besides its economic consequences for the body politic of India, it was bound to create complications in India and Pakistan for all times. In the Punjab it was not possible to concede the right of self-determination to one community in defiance of the other.92 Nehru emphasized the crucial importance of the elections which might lead to ‘a constituent assembly’ for framing ‘a constitution for the country’. The elections were being contested by the Congress for deciding the issue ‘as to who should be the rulers in Delhi: the people’s own elected representatives or friends of the British bureaucracy’? The elections would decide ‘the fate of the Red Fort and the Viceregal Lodge’.93 These were the symbols of a single sovereign state in India. To vote for the Congress was to vote for the freedom that was coming soon. The people of the Punjab could declare by their vote whether they stood for ‘freedom or slavery’. The communal organizations were trying to sidetrack the main issue, serving the purpose of British imperialism. Nehru warned the opponents of the Congress: ‘Those who try to go against the great gushing torrent of Indian nationalism will be swept ashore, lifeless as a log of wood.’94 There were other parties in the Punjab. The Communists had created a gulf between themselves and the people by opposing the August Resolution of 1942. In the ‘war between India and England’, they were on the side of England. The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had made no sacrifices (p.289) for the freedom of India. A communal organization could never think of ‘the good of the country as a whole’. Therefore, no communal organization was entitled to speak for India. In the free India of the future there would be no Hindu Raj, nor a Muslim Raj, nor a Sikh Raj. ‘It will be a people’s raj—a raj of all, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others with power resting in the hands of the people as a whole.’95 The ‘people’s raj’ of Nehru was not a ‘partnership’ among the religious communities of India. The talk about Pakistan sounded empty and meaningless to Nehru. The question of its acceptance or rejection did not arise because nobody had yet defined Page 18 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Pakistan. Moreover, if Pakistan was created then the parts of the Punjab with Hindu majority would join Hindustan, and the Punjab would have to be divided. No sensible Punjabi would like the province to be divided into two parts. Nehru advised the Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs of the Punjab to think twice before embarking upon a division of their province into two. Though their religions were different, their culture, civilization, and language were the same. In any case, the problem of Pakistan could be solved only by ‘a compromise’.96 Nehru’s slogan of composite culture had no appeal for the Muslim League. More crucial than the Communists, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, and the Unionists in the Punjab were the Sikhs, ‘a great people, a most patriotic people’. But the Akalis could not rise against the British. They were all the time going ‘from one door to another, not sticking to any party, for negotiations’. When the Congressmen were in jail after the August Resolution of 1942, the Akalis were ‘opposing the Congress movement and abusing Gandhiji’. They blamed the Congress that it had sanctioned Pakistan but they themselves had negotiated with the Muslim League ‘through the back door so many times’. Many Akalis had fought ‘shoulder to shoulder with the Congress in the fight for liberty’. It was against ‘the dignity and honour of the brave Sikhs’ to oppose the Congress. As ‘a brave freedom-loving people’ the Sikhs should strengthen the hands of all progressive forces and work with the Congress for freedom.97

Master Tara Singh’s Campaign Master Tara Singh propagated his own ideas among the Sikhs in view of the elections. His pamphlet on ‘Pakistan’ was widely distributed by the Shiromani Akali Dal. ‘Pakistan’ meant ‘Muslim Raj’, but the use of the term ‘Pakistan’ had made the Muslims more fanatical about it. Consequently, fear among nonMuslims had increased. The Congress objected to Pakistan but not to Muslim Raj. Whereas Cripps had said that a ‘province’ had the option to separate, the Congress said that only an area (‘ilāqa) had the option to separate. Rajaji and Mahatma Gandhi proposed that districts and tehsils with Muslim majority could separate from Hindustan to form Pakistan. Had this formula been implemented, half of the Sikhs would have come under Pakistan and the other left in eastern Punjab.98 The Communists favoured the idea of Pakistan. They talked of Sikh right to selfdetermination but opposed all specific proposals for the protection of Sikh rights. Then there were some ‘angry’ friends (the Sikhs annoyed with the Akalis) who had full faith in the Congress and in Nehru to protect them even if Pakistan was established. Master Tara Singh was ‘shocked and surprised’ that there were (p.290) Sikhs who placed greater faith in ‘a non-Sikh mortal than in constitutional safeguards’. It was absolutely clear that the Sikhs who were not under the influence of the Congress, the Communists, or the ‘angry’ Sikhs had to oppose Pakistan.99

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Master Tara Singh found it strange that Muslims did not trust the Congress because it was dominated by Hindus but they expected the Sikhs to trust the League which was entirely Muslim. It was more difficult for a non-Muslim to trust the Muslim League than for a Muslim to trust the Congress. None should expect the Sikhs to willingly accept any kind of Muslim Raj. There were three ways in which Muslim Raj could be thrust on unwilling Sikhs: (a) by force, (b) with the support of the British, and (c) by dividing the Sikhs. He felt certain that whatever the way, Muslim Raj over the Sikhs would put an end to the Sikh faith, the Sikh tradition, and the Sikhs.100 Muslims could establish their rule over the Sikhs by force only after the British had left. In such an eventuality, actions would be needed rather than words. Verbal arguments could help in establishing their Raj only with the support of the British. That was why the Muslims were demanding that the British should leave only after the transfer of power into Muslim hands. This amounted to use of force by proxy. But no nation (kaum) willingly accepted the Raj of another nation. It would be a grave injustice on the part of the British to thrust Muslim yoke on the Sikhs for any reason whatever. Furthermore, the British had taken rulership from the Sikhs on trust and it would be a betrayal of the Sikhs to entrust it to Muslims.101 The possibility of Muslim Raj over the Sikhs due to their disunity would be created only if the Sikhs voted for those candidates who were in favour of Pakistan. Thus, to vote for a Congress or a Communist candidate was to vote for Pakistan. The Congress was no longer a common party of all communities; it had become virtually a ‘Hindu’ party. For the Sikhs to remain subordinate to the Congress was to remain in favour of Pakistan. The Sikhs must remember all the time that the successful candidates in the coming elections would participate in the framing of the final Constitution. Master Tara Singh declared: ‘I shall fight all alone, if need be, to preserve the independent identity of the Panth.’102 After the elections were announced, Master Tara Singh circulated a pamphlet called ‘Congress te Sikh’ (the Congress and the Sikhs), underlining the message that the Sikhs should not vote for a candidate fielded by any non-Sikh party. There were two such parties: the Communists, who were openly supporting the idea of Pakistan, and the Congress, which wanted to ensure that the Sikhs should not remain in a position to oppose Pakistan or to think of some other strategy independently of the Congress. Master Tara Singh refers to the background of Sikh–Congress relations to remind the Sikhs that the Congress had set aside its promise to the Sikhs, and the Sikhs had to put forth their own scheme of Azad Punjab. In 1944, Mahatma Gandhi blessed the Rajagopalachari Formula which visualized the River Beas to be the boundary with Pakistan, dividing the Sikhs into two equal halves, both under political slavery. Mahatma

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Gandhi affirmed his adherence to the Congress resolution of 1929 as well to the Rajagopalachari Formula, but no one knew how he would do this.103 Maulana Azad had stated that Muslims in the Muslim-majority areas should have the right to separate from Hindustan, and he appealed to Sikhs and Hindus to agree. His (p.291) argument was that if they did so, the Muslims would think calmly and abandon the idea. This logic was beyond comprehension. In any case, if the Muslims did not abandon the idea, Hindus and Sikhs would be committed to accepting Pakistan. The Hindus might find consolation in the idea that they would be free in Hindustan but what kind of consolation would the Sikhs have? If the Punjab was lost, everything was lost for them.104 Nehru wisely coated the poisonous pill with sugar. He agreed with Maulana Azad but added that if Muslims had the right to self-determination, so had the Sikhs. However, the Sikhs were not in majority in any district or tehsil. Therefore, their right to self-determination remained a theoretical proposition. Master Tara Singh said that the first step should be to ask the Sikhs how their interests could be safeguarded. Sardar Patel had stated for the first time that the promise given to the Sikhs should be honoured. However, much hope could not be placed on this statement because it was made during campaigning for the elections. The more important leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad, and Pandit Nehru were vocal in favour only of the Muslim right to selfdetermination.105 In the light of his experience, Master Tara Singh came to the conclusion that the only right path for the Sikhs was to work for the freedom of the country ‘by standing on their own two feet’. He was in favour of establishing independent identity of the Panth and maintaining it. He did not wish the Congress to speak on their behalf in taking all decisions. The Congress would honour its assurance to the Sikhs only if they were politically alive. If their political identity was destroyed, ‘which Sikhs would the Congress care for?’ If the Sikhs were with the Congress, to consult the Sikhs would be to consult itself. The Muslims had separated themselves and there was ‘no question any longer of forming one nation’. The real issue now was to maintain ‘the independent identity of the Sikhs and to increase their strength’.106 The Sikhs were told again and again that they should make sacrifices for the country. It was surely a good thing. ‘But the country is not so much its land as its people and the Sikhs too are included among its people.’ If the suggestion was that the Sikhs should make sacrifices for the sake of Hindus and Muslims alone, such a sacrifice would be worse than suicide. Every Sikh should be prepared to make sacrifice for a just cause (dharam), for the oppressed, and the indigent. The Guru had defined the martyr for the guidance of the Sikhs: the true warrior laid down his life for the good. To sacrifice one’s life in the service of the Panth and for the protection of the Panth was true sacrifice. To die for the sake of Page 21 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections those who tried to put an end to the freedom of the Panth was no sacrifice. By far the most important thing for the Sikhs was their faith (dharam); for its preservation, it was necessary to preserve the Panth, and for that it was necessary to preserve its independence.107 Some people were saying that the British rulers were pulling the strings to keep Indians disunited. But the British were neither gods nor devils; they were selfish people ‘like ourselves’. What had obliged them to concede independence for India was the international situation. They would neither wish to impose unity on the Indian people, nor would such a forced unity be a guarantee of peace. The only way out of the impasse was to work on the principle that no nationality (kaum) should try to rule over another. To save one nationality from the domination of another did not infringe the ideal of Nationalism. (p.292) Both Hindus and Muslims had demonstrated their preference for communal considerations (firkādārī) by devising plans to rule over others. The Sikhs could think only of plans to save themselves from the domination of others. If bifurcation of the country was inevitable, the Sikhs should have a separate state for themselves on the basis of the total lands they owned.108 The Congress was keen to weaken the Panthic organization for its own purposes. All those Sikhs who joined the Congress out of ignorance, self-interest, sheer obstinacy, or out of spite were helpful to the Congress. It was necessary for the Sikhs to keep their authority in their own hands and not to entrust it to others. Therefore, no Sikh should vote for a candidate fielded by a non-Sikh party. To elect such a candidate was to support the party opposed to Sikh interests. No personal consideration should be shown to any such candidate, whether put up by the Congress or the Communists. Master Tara Singh declared that a friend of the Panth was his friend and an enemy of the Panth was his enemy. ‘I have no kinship or friendship with a person who stabs the Panth in the back.’109 ‘The Cat Is Out of the Bag’ is the title of a pamphlet written by Master Tara Singh after the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal had nominated their candidates for the Sikh seats in the Punjab. The candidates nominated by the Shiromani Akali Dal were staunch Sikhs as well as patriots who would fight for the freedom of the country. The best candidates nominated by the Congress were those who were committed only to fight for freedom. The Akali slogan was ‘Panth Āzād, Desh Āzād’; the slogan of the Congress was ‘Desh Āzād’. The Congress wanted to put an end to the independent identity of the Sikh Panth. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress would never think of Sikh interests. Master Tara Singh told the pro-Congress Sikhs that they were needed only so long as the independent identity of the Panth was intact. Their relevance lay in their opposition to the Akalis. ‘The demise of the Panth would be their death.’110

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Master Tara Singh made a prophecy in his address to the Akali Conference at Bannu on 23 January 1946 that Hindus and Muslims would come to an agreement after the elections ‘on the basis of Pakistan’. His address reiterated some of the statements already made during the election campaign and raised the basic issue: whether or not independence of the ‘third Panth’ (tīsar panth) of Guru Gobind Singh would survive. The Hindu newspapers were hoarse that there was no threat to the Panth; only the leadership of Master Tara Singh was in danger. Master Tara Singh replied that not his leadership but his life was in danger. He would not wish to live if the Panth died.111 The Congress was no longer a party fighting for freedom. It had become a Hindu party with a large number of loyalist Hindus. Every Hindu was a Congressman just as every Muslim was a Muslim Leaguer. Now the struggle was between Hindus and Muslims for grabbing power. The Hindus were dividing the Sikhs with their money power in the name of the Congress. Their objective was to put an end to the independent identity of the Panth. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress made it quite clear that its intention was to atomize the Panth. The Akalis were trying to keep the Panth together. In this situation, could the Sikhs save the Khalsa Panth by entrusting its leadership to others? This was the crucial question.112 Sikh nationality was based on a distinctive faith (dharam). ‘If there is no Sikh (p.293) dharam there can be no Sikh kaum, and if there is no Sikh kaum there can be no Sikh dharam.’ That was why politics and religion could not be separated. The argument to separate religion from politics was meant actually to destroy Sikh nationality. For the first time the British had declared that no Constitution would be framed without the consent of the ‘main elements’ in the country, and the Sikhs were among these ‘main elements’. At the time of the Simla Conference, Maulana Azad had tried very hard to persuade Master Tara Singh to accept the Congress as representing the Sikhs too, but Master Tara Singh did not relinquish the right to independence. The Congressmen in general and the Congressite Muslims in particular were unhappy about the view of the government to regard the Sikhs as one of the ‘main elements’, which made their consent necessary for an agreement. If the Sikhs entrusted their right to the Congress, there would be no need of their consent because their consent would be included in that of the Congress.113 The Congress at its Poona session had denounced the idea of Pakistan but passed the resolution that an area in which the majority was in favour of separation could not be forced to remain in Hindustan. The only difference between the Muslim League and the Congress on this issue was that the former wanted Pakistan up to Delhi and the latter wanted its boundary to be the River Beas. In both the cases, the Sikhs would be subject to slavery. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress were already a party to the idea of accepting Pakistan. If the Sikhs were united, it would not be possible for the Muslim Page 23 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections League, the Congress, and the British, even in combination, to force Pakistan on the Sikhs. Therefore, Master Tara Singh appealed to the non-Akali Sikhs: ‘Save us, if you wish to save yourselves.’ They who did not subscribe to the idea that the Sikhs as a nationality had some rights had no right to get Sikh votes.114

Results of the Elections The general elections of 1945–6 for the Central and Punjab Legislatures showed a high degree of polarization. The Muslims voted overwhelmingly in support of the Muslim League; the Hindus voted mostly for the Congress candidates; and the Sikhs voted largely for the Akalis. Out of the eighty-four Muslim seats in the Punjab Assembly, the Muslim League won sixty-nine and the Unionists won twelve. Only one seat went to the Congress, while two independent candidates were elected. Out of the thirty-four general seats, the Congress won thirty-two. The Unionists got only two seats. Out of the thirty-one Sikh seats, the Akalis won nineteen and the Congressite Sikhs got nine. Independent candidates were elected for the remaining three seats. The Akalis were able to oust the moderate Sikh leadership of the Chief Khalsa Diwan and the Communists. The Congress Sikhs retained about one-third of the Sikh seats now as in 1937. The Sikh presence in the Congress was certainly important but the larger majority of the Sikhs had turned towards the Akalis. Two of the three Sikh seats for the Central Legislature were also won by the Akalis.115 This, at least partly, may be taken as a measure of the influence of Master Tara Singh’s campaign and propagation of the idea of independent political entity of the Sikhs. Sadhu Singh Hamdard, who was deeply involved with the elections of 1945–6, made some observations on the results. First, that (p.294) the Akalis emerged as representatives of the Sikhs as a third party, like the Congress and the Muslim League. Second, that by and large the Hindus were with the Congress, the Muslims with the Muslim League, and the Sikhs with the Akali Dal. The Muslims were seeking a solution to the Hindu–Muslim problem in Pakistan, and it was necessary to find a solution for the Sikh problem as the third ‘nationality’ (kaum) in India. A solution could be found only with the consent of the Sikhs. Third, whereas Nehru was the spokesman of the Congress and Jinnah of the Muslim League, the spokesman of the Sikhs should be of their own choice, whether Master Tara Singh or Sardar Baldev Singh. Incidentally, Hamdard was partial to Baldev Singh, who was never a leader of the Sikh masses. Fourth, the Sikhs were neither with Jinnah nor with Nehru on the issue of Pakistan. It was for the Sikhs to decide what kind of safeguards they wanted. This issue could be taken up with the British more appropriately than with the Congress or the Muslim League, each of whom had their own objectives to pursue. In other words, the logic of the situation called for an independent course for the Akalis.116

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections In Hamdard’s own view, if Pakistan was to be conceded to Jinnah (whose position had been very much strengthened by the elections results), it would be incumbent upon the Sikhs to ask for a Sikh state in which all the Sikhs were concentrated. It should have the right to accede to Hindustan or Pakistan. The elections had proved that the Sikhs had a distinct ‘nationality’ and their problem should be taken up simultaneously with the Hindu–Muslim problem. The elections had made it absolutely clear that the Sikhs should be treated not as a part of the Congress but a separate entity.117

In Retrospect On Wavell’s initiative the Simla Conference was held in June–July 1945 to discuss the proposal of a new Executive Council representing ‘the main communities’, including equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims. All the members of the council were to be Indian except the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. A new constitution for India was to be evolved after the war. Master Tara Singh, who represented one of the three main elements in Indian politics, found the proposals acceptable but feared that the parties might drift further apart in the end. He made it clear that the Sikhs did not identify themselves with the Congress though they favoured India’s freedom like the Congress. Asked to give three names for the Sikh members of the Executive Committee, Master Tara Singh placed his own name at the head. In Wavell’s opinion, the two other Sikhs listed were ‘dummies’. Significantly, he remarked that Master Tara Singh ‘would be a poor member of the Council’. The Congress leaders were inclined to accept the proposal. Jinnah claimed to be the sole representative of the Muslims of India and asserted that he alone had the right to send the names of Muslims to be nominated as members of the Executive Council. This was unacceptable to the Congress, claiming to be the representative of the Indian Nation. But Wavell did not ignore Jinnah’s claim. The Conference failed. By mid-August 1945, Jinnah was clamouring for general elections, confident of success of the Muslim League at the polls. The League fought the elections on the sole issue of Pakistan, ‘the question of life and death’ for the Muslims. Elections in the Punjab were a ‘critical test’ for the Muslim League. Its leaders mobilized Muslim religious (p.295) elements and students. Jinnah predicted a Muslim League sweep at the polls. Nehru started his campaign immediately after the announcement of elections. ‘No power on earth can now stand in the way to freedom,’ he declared. The scheme of Pakistan was bound to create complications in India and Pakistan for all times, and the right to self-determination could not be conceded to one community in defiance of the other in the Punjab. The elections were to decide who would frame a new Constitution for free India. He asserted that the Congress alone was relevant for resolving these vital issues. No other organization could speak for India as a whole. The first and foremost objective Page 25 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections before the Congress was ‘India’s freedom’. Nehru took keen interest in the Punjab, especially for the Sikh seats. He was in favour of putting up ‘straightforward Sikhs’ as candidates rather than those who had some affiliation with the Akalis. If Master Tara Singh stood for elections, he should be opposed by a strong Sikh candidate. Evidently, Nehru did not want Master Tara Singh or any other Akali leader to be elected. He wanted the Congressite Sikhs to win the elections so that there was no opposition from the Sikhs to the decisions of the Congress. He came again to the Punjab for three days in the third week of November 1945, especially for the election to the Sikh seats. To vote for the Congress was to vote for freedom, he said, and to vote for a communal organization was to sidetrack the basic issue and, thus, to serve the purpose of British imperialism. In free India, there would be no Hindu Raj, nor a Muslim or Sikh Raj, but a Raj of all the people—Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. The Sikhs, for Nehru, were ‘a great people, a most patriotic people’, but the Akalis were not sticking to any party for negotiations. It was against ‘the dignity and honour of the brave Sikhs’ to oppose the Congress in its fight for freedom. The line between the so-called nationalist and the so-called ‘communalist’ Sikhs was clearly drawn. Master Tara Singh’s perspective on the situation was fundamentally different. He wrote a number of pamphlets before and during the elections for circulation among the Sikhs and he addressed conferences. For him, ‘Pakistan’ essentially meant ‘Muslim Raj’. The Congress accepted the idea of ‘Muslim Raj’ and conceded ‘Pakistan’ upto the River Beas. This proposal was worse than that of Pakistan because it divided the Sikhs into two halves, each under the domination of another community. If the Muslims were a nation, the Sikhs too were a distinct nation, and the Muslims had no right to rule over them. To vote for a Congress candidate was to vote for Pakistan. For the Sikhs to remain subordinate to the Congress was to subordinate themselves to a ‘Hindu’ party which was in favour of Pakistan. The Congress wanted its Sikh candidates to win so that the Sikhs did not remain in a position to oppose Pakistan or to think of another strategy independently of the Congress. The real issue for the Sikhs was to maintain ‘independent identity of the Sikhs and to increase their strength’. To recognize the principle that no nationality should try to rule over another was the only way to resolve the problem of unity, asserted Master Tara Singh. He told the pro-Congress Sikhs that they were needed only so long as the Sikh identity was not destroyed. Their relevance lay in their opposition to the Akalis. ‘The demise of the Panth would be their death.’ Master Tara Singh observed that the Hindus wanted to have a democratic system on the basis of adult suffrage to establish a permanent ‘Hindu Raj’. Understandably, all (p.296) the Hindus were in its favour. The Congress was prepared to make some modifications in order to satisfy the Muslim and Sikh minorities. But the Hindu Mahasabha subscribed to an undiluted ideal of democracy based on adult suffrage. Its leader, Veer Savarkar, regarded the Page 26 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections Hindus alone as the true nationalists. Their true patriotism, according to Master Tara Singh, was meant to cover up their aspiration to establish ‘Hindu Raj’ on a firm footing. The Muslim League was not prepared to accept the safeguards offered by the Congress and demanded the creation of Pakistan. Injustice to the Sikhs was built into this demand. Logically, the Muslim League should concede the Sikh aspiration to be free of Muslim domination, which was as legitimate as the Muslim aspiration to be free of Hindu domination. But the Muslim League did not concede this. The only solution to the communal problem in India was to evolve a constitution in which no community was under the domination of another. What India needed, therefore, was a constitution similar to that of Switzerland. The basic issue for Master Tara Singh was to ensure independence of the Third Panth (tīsar panth, a phrase used in eighteenth-century Sikh literature for the Sikh Panth to underline its distinction from Hindu and Muslim identities). Those who did not recognize that the Sikhs had some rights as a nationality had no right to get Sikh votes. Master Tara Singh wanted partnership of the Sikhs in political power as much as in the struggle for freedom. The general elections of 1945–6 resulted in a large degree of polarization. An overwhelming majority of Muslim seats were won by the League at the cost of the Muslim Unionists. Similarly the large majority of general seats were won by the Congress at the cost of the ‘Hindu’ parties and the Hindu Unionists. The larger majority of Sikh seats were won by the Akalis at the cost of both the moderate Sikhs and the Communists. But the Congress got ten out of thirtythree Sikh seats. The Muslim League got a sort of Muslim mandate in favour of Pakistan and, consequently, the partition of India. The Congress got a mandate of Hindus and a considerable proportion of Sikhs for independence. The Akalis got support of a large majority of the Sikhs for an independent political entity of the Sikhs. Thus, the elections of 1945–6 proved to be of crucial importance for the future. Notes:

(1.) Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 94–9. (2.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 101, 107–8. (3.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 114, 116–17. (4.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 118–36. (5.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 138–42. (6.) Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973), vol. V, pp. 1122–4.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (7.) V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957), pp. 182–9. Moon, Wavell, pp. 147–8 n. 2. (8.) Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, pp. 189–91. (9.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 147–51. (10.) Lionel Carter (ed.), Punjab Politics, 1 January 1944–3 March 1947: Last Years of the Ministries (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 162 n. 17. (11.) Glancy to Wavell, 3 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 135–6. (12.) Azad to Wavell, 7 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, pp. 1202–5 and n. 1. (13.) Azad to Wavell, 7 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, pp. 1210–11. (14.) Glancy to Wavell, 11 July 1945, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 139; also p. 163 n. 23. (15.) Moon, Wavell, p. 154. (16.) Moon, Wavell, p. 155. (17.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 152–3. Some historians have wrongly stated that Master Tara Singh gave his own name thrice. (18.) Wavell to Amery, 14 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, pp. 1247–8. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, pp. 208–15. See also Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1988, complete version), pp. 107–25. According to K.K. Aziz, the clash at the Simla Conference was essentially between the irreconcilable claims of ‘two nationalisms’: The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 67. (19.) Amery to Wavell, 14 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, p. 1249. (20.) Note on Wavell’s interview with Nehru on 14 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, p. 1249. (21.) Wavell to Amery, 15 July 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. V, pp. 1258–63. (22.) Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās (Jalandhar: Ajit Prakashan, 2004), pp. 355–6. (23.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 200–1. (24.) Moon, Wavell, p. 160.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (25.) Mansergh and Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1974), vol. VI, pp. 6–24. (26.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 August 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. VI, p. 29. (27.) Memorandum, 22–23 August 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. VI, pp. 120– 5. (28.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 163–71. (29.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 October 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. VI, pp. 374–8. (30.) Master Tara Singh to Attlee, 23 October 1945, The Transfer of Power, vol. VI, pp. 424–5. (31.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 179–84. (32.) Moon, Wavell, pp. 186, 192–3. (33.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 116, 118, 121, 125. (34.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 104–10, 145, 147, 155–9. (35.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 116, 121, 129, 135, 141–2. (36.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 145, 151–2, 156, 160. (37.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 128, 137, 148, 160. (38.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 124–5, 129, 131, 135. (39.) Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 141, 145, 148. (40.) Indu Banga, ‘The Crisis of Sikh Politics (1940–47)’, in Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century, eds Joseph O’ Connell, Milton Israel, and Willard Oxtoby with W.H. McLeod and J.S. Grewal as visiting editors (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988), pp. 233–55. (41.) Sukhmani Bal Riar, The Politics of the Sikhs 1940–47 (Chandigarh: Unistar Books, 2006), pp. 79–81. (42.) Glancy to Wavell, 27 October 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 152. (43.) Shamsher Singh Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (Amritsar: SGPC, 2003, reprint), pp. 232–4.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (44.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 226–7. (45.) Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās, pp. 400–2. (46.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50 (Ahemdabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1972), vol. II, p.1. (47.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 7–10 (48.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 26–7. (49.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 24–5, 33. (50.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 66. (51.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 68. (52.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 102. (53.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 31 (54.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 35–6. (55.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 27. (56.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 77–8. (57.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 11–12. (58.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 71. (59.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 28–9. (60.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 33 (61.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 70–1. (62.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 71–2. (63.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 72–3. (64.) K.C. Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947 (New Delhi: Manohar. 1987), pp. 34–5. (65.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 289. (66.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 49. (67.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 47.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (68.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 49. (69.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 290. (70.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 283–4. (71.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 147–8. (72.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 150. (73.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 281–2. (74.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 282–3. (75.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 284–9. (76.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 135. (77.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 136. (78.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 140. (79.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 146. (80.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 148. (81.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 150. (82.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 47. (83.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 290–2. (84.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, pp. 301–2. (85.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, vol. II, p. 303. (86.) Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984, paperback), pp. 247–8. (87.) Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, pp. 251–4. (88.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, General Editor, S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund), vol. XIV (1981), pp. 49–50. (89.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 50–2. (90.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, p. 54. (91.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 155–7. (92.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 157–8. Page 31 of 33

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (93.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 159–61, 163, 165, 175. (94.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp.173–5. (95.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 159–60, 169–70, 177. (96.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 162, 164–65, 178. (97.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIV, pp. 174, 176–8. (98.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, in Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, PhD thesis, Guru Nanak University, Amritsar, 2005, Appendix 8, pp. 1–16. (99.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, pp. 6–7. (100.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, pp. 7–8. (101.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, pp. 9–11. (102.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Pakistan’, pp. 11–16. (103.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix 5, pp. 1–16. (104.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 4–5. (105.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 5–8. (106.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 8–10. (107.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 10–12. (108.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 12–15. (109.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, pp. 15–16. (110.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Billee Thelion Nikkal Aaī’ (The Cat Is Out of the Bag) in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix 6, pp. 1–4. (111.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Address to the Akali Conference’, Bannu, 23 January 1946, pp. 1–4. (112.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Address to the Akali Conference’, Bannu, pp. 4–7. (113.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Address to the Akali Conference’, Bannu, pp. 9–10. (114.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Address to the Akali Conference’, Bannu, pp. 10–13.

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At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections (115.) Yadav, Elections in Panjab 1920–1947, pp. 106–29. Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 172–3. (116.) Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās, pp. 400–2. (117.) Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās, pp. 412–13.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (1946–7) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0013

Abstract and Keywords In a formal announcement on 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission proposed the formation of a Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution for the Indian Union. It was to have 216 Hindu, 78 Muslim, and 4 Sikh members. All decisions were to be taken by majority vote. Safeguards were to be provided for Muslims but not for the Sikhs. On 16 June 1946, the Cabinet Mission made its announcement on the formation of Interim Government. It was to consist of fourteen individuals, including Baldev Singh (who was not a formal representative of the Sikhs). Master Tara Singh looked upon the Cabinet Mission proposals as a ‘betrayal of the Sikhs’. The Sikh leaders decided to boycott the Interim Government and the Constituent Assembly. The Congress Working Committee recognized that injustice had been done to Sikhs. The Akalis decided to join the Constituent Assembly and the Interim Government. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Cabinet Mission proposals, safeguards, Constituent Assembly, Interim Government, Baldev Singh, Congress Working Committee, ‘betrayal of the Sikhs’, Akalis

The great event of 1946 was the Cabinet Mission. Its Statement of May 1946 did not meet any of the major aspirations of the Akalis. They felt betrayed and reacted strongly to its recommendations but eventually came to prefer negotiations over direct action. They failed to persuade the British to make any changes in the statement, getting merely verbal assurances of goodwill. The Muslim League made promises which inspired no confidence. The CWC passed a resolution to safeguard Sikh interests, and the Akalis joined the Constituent Page 1 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Assembly. With the consent of the Congress and the Muslim League, Baldev Singh was made War Member in the Interim Government. The events of the year resulted in increasing communal tension in the Punjab.

Political Developments On 13 February 1946, the Secretary of State for India circulated a note on the ‘viability of Pakistan’ for discussion. For the economic aspect of Pakistan, it was stated that a large part of the prosperity of the Punjab was dependent on its predominance in the army and the amount of military expenditure in the Punjab apart from the pay and pensions of personnel of the Indian army. Before World War II broke out the Punjabis formed considerably more than 50 per cent of the Indian army. Together with other aspects, it appeared that the splitting up of India would result in ‘two ramshackle States’.1 Wavell’s telegram of 7 February to the Secretary of State had also been circulated and discussed. Wavell’s proposal was related to the demarcation of the genuinely Muslim areas. The sketch map sent by him showed all the districts of the Bari Doab as Muslim-majority districts, except Amritsar. This plan left in Pakistan one and a half million Sikhs: ‘A troublesome minority.’ This would not be acceptable to Jinnah. The comments on this plan were mostly adverse.2 Finally, it (p.301) was decided to send a strong team of Ministers to India not with a plan but ‘to negotiate’ with the Indian leaders for devising a plan. A Cabinet delegation came to India in March 1946. They had a series of over 400 interviews from 26 March to 19 April, and came out with a statement on 16 May, giving the option of a ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan, or a loose, three-tier confederal structure. The existing Provincial Assemblies were to be grouped into three sections for electing the Constituent Assembly: Section A for the Hindu-majority provinces and Sections B and C for the Muslim-majority provinces of the northwest and the north-east. Each Section was to have the power to set up intermediate level executives and legislatures of its own.3 The Cabinet Mission left India on 29 June 1946. By this time, the Muslim League had accepted without qualifications the Statement of 16 May, the main plan. The Congress had accepted the plan with an interpretation that could nullify the provision of grouping of provinces to form a three tier system. The League had accepted the Mission’s Statement of 16 June on the Interim Government as well but the Congress and certain minority groups had rejected it. The Viceroy was unable, therefore, to form an Interim Government on the basis of the 16 June Statement. He set up a caretaker government of officials.4 On the 1st of July 1946, Wavell wrote a summary of the Cabinet Mission’s work during March–June 1946. The Statement of 16 May was good, he wrote, but ‘we might have done something more to satisfy the Sikhs’.5

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Early in July, Jawaharlal Nehru replaced Maulana Azad as Congress President. At a press conference in Bombay on 10 July he said that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly ‘completely unfettered by agreements and free to meet all situations as they arise’. Jinnah told the Muslim League Council that Nehru had made it quite clear that ‘the Congress was committed to nothing’ and there was ‘no effective check’ on the Congress, which happened to have ‘a brute majority in the Constituent Assembly’. On 29 July, the League Council resolved to withdraw its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Proposal. Another resolution said that the time had come ‘for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan to get rid of the present slavery under the British and contemplated future Caste Hindu domination’.6 The day fixed for direct action was 16 August 1946. Calcutta was the scene of an unprecedented Hindu–Muslim riot that came to be known as the Great Calcutta Killing. According to official estimates 5,000 people were killed and 15,000 injured.7 On 24 August, the Viceroy announced the names of the members of the Interim Government, leaving two vacancies. Jawaharlal Nehru and the rest of the Cabinet were sworn in on 2 September. He stressed the need for bringing in the Muslim League. An agreement was worked out later, and Jinnah nominated five members for the Cabinet on behalf of the Muslim League, including Jogendra Nath Mandal, a Scheduled Caste representative. It was an uneasy partnership. The Congress wanted Nehru to be accepted as the leader of the entire Cabinet but the League refused to accept.8 In November 1946 there were riots in Bihar, followed by riots in Garhmukteshwar in the United Provinces, resulting in the massacre of Muslims on an unprecedented scale. Tension was mounting all over India. With the approval of the British Government, the Viceroy decided to summon the Constituent Assembly on 9 December. It was a ‘blunder (p.302) of very grave and serious character’ according to Jinnah. He declared that no representative of the Muslim League would participate in the Constituent Assembly. The Congress demanded that the League join the Constituent Assembly or quit the Interim Government. The British Government invited the Viceroy, two representatives each of the Congress and the League, and one representative of the Sikh community to London to bring about an agreement on the basis of the Statement of 16 May. Lord Wavell, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, and Baldev Singh arrived in England on 2 December and held discussions with the British Government for four days. On 6 December, the Statement of His Majesty’s Government urged the Congress to accept the view of the Cabinet Mission (that grouping of provinces was an essential part of the Statement of 16 May) so that a way might be opened for the Muslim League to reconsider its attitude. But if the Constituent Assembly did not accept this view, this fundamental point should be referred to the Federal Court for a decision. And if the Constitution was framed by the Constituent Assembly in the absence of a large section of the

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Indian population, it should not be forced upon any unwilling parts of the country.9 The basic differences between the Congress and the Muslim League related to the powers of the Constituent Assembly as well as the grouping of provinces. Jinnah had maintained all along that the Constituent Assembly had no authority to change the structure of the plan and that grouping was its essential part. The provinces had to join the group, with the option to opt out after the first election under the new Constitution. The Muslim League had accepted the plan on the basis of the distribution of powers between the Central government, the groups, and the provinces. This was how the Statement of 16 May was interpreted by the Cabinet Mission. Nehru was not prepared to accept this interpretation. Thus, the deadlock was complete. Nehru and Baldev Singh returned to India. Jinnah stated in London on 14 December that he would call the Muslim League Council to reconsider the matter if the Congress accepted the British Government’s interpretation. On 15 December, Nehru said in his speech at Benares (presentday Varanasi) that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly would become ‘the Constitution of free India—whether Britain accepts it or not’. He added: ‘We cannot and will not tolerate any outside interference.’10 The Muslim League members did not attend the opening session of the Constituent Assembly on 9 December 1946. The Objectives Resolution moved by Nehru was passed on 20 January 1947. He made it clear that no work would be held up in future because of the absence of any member of the assembly. On 22 December, the Congress Working Committee passed an ambiguous resolution in regard to the acceptance of the Statement of 16 May. The Working Committee of the League criticized this resolution and finally called upon the British Government ‘to decide that the constitutional plan formulated by the Cabinet Mission, as announced on May 16, has failed’, and to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. The Congress bloc in the Interim Government demanded that the Viceroy dismiss the Muslim League Ministers. Sardar Patel said that if the Muslim League Ministers remained in the Interim Government, the Congress would withdraw from it. The British Government was unable to reconcile the two antagonistic interests. On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons that the intention (p.303) of the British Government was to transfer power to responsible Indian hands no later than June 1948, and to replace Lord Wavell by Lord Mountbatten.11 The foremost issue after the elections in the Punjab was the formation of a more or less stable Ministry. No single party commanded a majority in the assembly and the only alternative was a coalition. The Muslim League and the Congress were most unlikely to work together. A section of the Panthic Sikhs was ‘flirting’ with the Muslim League. But the general impression was that this was designed to raise the price of Panthic support to the Congress. The most likely combination that could work appeared to be the Congress under the leadership Page 4 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ of Bhim Sen Sachar, the Unionists under the leadership of Khizar Hayat Khan, and the Panthic Sikhs under the leadership of Sardar Baldev Singh.12 The Coalition Ministry with Khizar Hayat Khan as the Prime Minister took up office on 11 March 1946 to the chagrin of the Muslim League. The resentment of the Muslim League increased in proportion to its anxiety to form its own ministry or to topple the Coalition Ministry of Khizar Hayat Khan.

The Cabinet Mission Lord Wavell was keen that initiative for political action should remain in British hands to forestall Congress demands. He had written to the Secretary of State for India on 22 December 1945 about his immediate objectives for 1946. One of these was to secure a reasonably efficient Executive Council with Indian representatives and another was to form a Constitution-making body.13 On 19 February 1946, the Secretary of State, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, made a statement in the House of Lords that the British Government had decided to send out to India a special mission of Cabinet Ministers to act in association with the Viceroy to have discussions with leaders of Indian opinion for the positive steps to be taken after the general elections for early realization of ‘full selfgovernment in India’.14 ‘The three Magi have arrived,’ wrote Wavell in his journal on 24 March, referring to the three members of the Cabinet Mission: Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps, and A.V. Alexander. He was doubtful whether they had got any definite plan in their heads.15 The Cabinet Delegation and Wavell met the Nawab of Mamdot on 2 April. He said that the Muslim League leaders were prepared to meet the Sikhs on reasonable terms. But the Sikhs did not know what they wanted; they had not defined the boundaries of Sikhistan. They were demanding a state of eight districts but such a state with non-Muslim majority would still have a larger number of Muslims than the Sikhs. Another Muslim leader said that a separate Sikh state was impracticable unless there was extensive transfer of population; the Sikhs were not in majority in any district.16 The Cabinet Delegation and Wavell had a meeting with the Sikh leaders on 5 April. Wavell records in a light vein: Tara Singh brought two others, who did most of the talking. It was not very illuminating, calculations of figures to show that there were more Sikhs than generally supposed and that any way they ought to count double because they were such fine fellows. Pakistan was absurd of course, but if India was to be divided, the Sikhs would want a large share of the Punjab. Wavell continues:

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Baldev Singh said much the same in a more polished manner and with greater assurance. The division of the Punjab was quite simple: the Sikhs (p.304) should have it, except the Rawalpindi and Multan divisions and some adjustment elsewhere. The Sikhs were entitled to a large share of the Army, Civil Service, and everything else, whatever form of India was set up. All this did not get us much further except to emphasize the difficulty of the Sikh problem in any form of Pakistan.17 The formal record of the meeting of the Cabinet Delegation and Lord Wavell with the representatives of the Sikh community names all the three Sikh leaders: Master Tara Singh, Gaini Kartar Singh, and Sardar Harnam Singh. PethickLawrence said that the transfer of power would alter the position of the Sikhs very considerably. The mission had to consider whether power should be transferred to one or two bodies, or even to more than two. It had also to consider the position of the Indian states. The Sikh delegation was asked (a) whether the Sikh community would prefer the transfer of power to a single body or to more than one body; (b) if the power were transferred to two bodies which of the two the Sikhs would wish to be a part; and (c) ‘íf it were found to be practicable and could be arranged, as to which the Secretary of State had formed no opinion, would the Sikhs wish to have a separate autonomous state of their own?’ Master Tara Singh stood for united India and for some sort of coalition government of all communities. In case of division, the Sikhs could not remain either in Hindustan or in Pakistan. They should have a separate independent state ‘with the right to federate either with Hindustan or Pakistan’.18 Thus, Master Tara Singh made his options very clear: a united India or an independent Sikh state with the option to join India or Pakistan. Pethick-Lawrence now asked which districts in the Punjab could presumably be made into a Sikh state. The Sikhs were not in the majority in any district. Master Tara Singh said that ‘though the Sikhs were not in the majority they had a right to exist’ (as a nationality). He went on to explain how the Sikhs had been badly treated after the Act of 1935 which gave provincial autonomy. It would be difficult for the Sikhs to continue in the existing situation. Therefore, the only safeguard in his view was ‘some form of autonomous Sikh state’.19 Sardar Harnam Singh said that the areas to be given to the Sikh state should not be considered only on the basis of population. With 60 per cent of the population, the Muslims held only 30 per cent of the land in the Lahore district. The Sikhs owned 60 per cent of the land. Somewhat similar was the position in the Amritsar district where the Sikhs paid nearly 12 lakhs of rupees as land revenue and the Muslims paid only 3 lakhs. The Sikh leaders suggested that there should be transfer of property as well as population. If partition was imposed upon the Sikhs by the British Government, the only safeguard for the Sikhs would be ‘a Sikh state with the right to federate’. If the Muslims were not

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ to be subjected to majority rule in India, there was no reason why the Sikhs should be in the Punjab.20 Cripps asked about the proposed area for the Sikh state. Gaini Kartar Singh said that the Lahore and Jullundur Divisions should be included, together with the districts of Hissar, Karnal, Ambala, and Simla from the Ambala Division, and the districts of Montgomery and Lyallpur. Wavell asked whether transfer of population was really practicable. The Sikh delegates said that the major part of the Sikh population could be concentrated in the proposed Sikh state within five to ten years with government assistance. Gaini Kartar Singh said that if there was to be an independent state for the Sikhs, their position in the army (p.305) had to be strong. Pethick-Lawrence suggested that their position in the army would give them influence in any all-India Constitution. The Sikh delegates said that the rest of India was very suspicious of the Sikhs and looked upon them as a ‘creation of the British’. Giani Kartar Singh said that no community should be put in a dominating position in a Constitution-making body. Sardar Harnam Singh said that in the Constitution-making body proposed in the Cripps offer the Sikhs had only four seats compared to eighty seats for the Hindus in a body that decided by majority vote. The Sikhs had special claims because, unlike Hindus and Muslims, they were concentrated in the Punjab.21 On the whole, the three Sikh leaders were rather clear and unanimous in their statements. Sardar Baldev Singh, who met the delegation an hour later, outlined the experience of the Sikhs in the Punjab. He referred to their satisfactory position before 1914. They began to lose this position after the war, and especially after the Gurdwara Reform Movement. After the elections of 1937 they came to have one Minister in a cabinet of six. Wavell pointed out that one in six ministers was proportionate to the Sikh population, and inquired what would happen to the Sikhs if Jinnah’s idea of division of India was carried out. Baldev Singh replied that ‘the Sikhs would then not be able to live’. On a question from Cripps, he said that the ‘best solution’ was a united India with safeguards for minorities in the form of weighted communal representation in the Legislatures and adjustment of provincial boundaries. In response to another question by Cripps, he said that if a solution were to be found by dividing the province, transfer of population to increase the Sikh proportion would be feasible. He pointed out that in the proposed Sikh state, the Sikh population would be only 20 per cent. He repeated that ‘a single India with safeguards for the minorities was the solution’.22 Baldev Singh was more in favour of united India with a reorganized Punjab rather than a Sikh state. With regard to safeguards, Baldev Singh said that the Sikh interests could be protected if the Muslims were content to have 45 per cent of the seats, and the rest were divided between the Hindus and the Sikhs. In reply to a question by Wavell, he agreed that a number of unfortunate incidents had occurred but the attempt to discredit the Khalsa Defence of India League had been designed to Page 7 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ reduce the Sikh influence in the province. Pethick-Lawrence asked what the British could do before they left India to help the Sikhs to retain a position of independence and standing. Baldev Singh said that the parties must agree to adequate safeguards for the minorities; he was convinced that they would get nothing after power had been transferred. In order to get Pakistan, Jinnah was prepared to promise anything, but previous experience in the Punjab made it doubtful whether, once in power, he would fulfil his promises. Pethick-Lawrence remarked that the need for Sikh cooperation would be adequate safeguards in any state. Baldev Singh reiterated that the Sikhs could not maintain their position without constitutional safeguards.23 Master Tara Singh’s position was further clarified in a Memorandum submitted later to the Cabinet Mission. It was necessary for the Sikhs to safeguard their political status in the Constitution itself. The Sikhs were opposed to any partition of India. As a ‘cultural nationality’ they demanded that the statutory Muslim majority in the Legislature of the Punjab must go and Sikh representation must be increased. The provincial boundaries could (p.306) be re-demarcated to include all the important Sikh gurdwaras and a substantial majority of the Sikhs. However, rumours were current that Pakistan would be created. The Sikhs had as good a claim for the establishment of a sovereign Sikh state as the Muslims for Pakistan. If it was proposed to have two Constitution-making bodies, the Sikhs demanded that there should be one more for the Sikh state.24 A Memorandum by Cripps dated 18 April 1946 states: We cannot see any justification for including within Pakistan large areas of the Punjab and of Bengal and Assam, in which the population is predominantly non-Muslim. Every argument that can be used in favour of Pakistan can equally, in our view, be used in favour of the exclusion of these non-Muslim areas from Pakistan. This argument of exclusion from Pakistan is particularly pressed upon by the Sikhs. The Cabinet Delegation came to the conclusion that there was no practicable scheme whereby the Muslim-majority areas could be brought together to form an independent sovereign state wholly separated from the rest of India. The setting up of a separate sovereign state of Pakistan would not solve the communal difficulties.25 V.P. Menon clarified in an undated note that the Sikhs would have a determining voice to influence transfer of territory. The voting strength required for going out of Pakistan was 75 per cent. In the Muslimminority districts in the Punjab there were thirty general seats and nineteen Sikh seats. These districts could go into Hindustan only with Sikh support.26 In the first revised Draft Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and Wavell, it was emphasized that the voluminous evidence submitted to the Mission had shown an almost universal desire, outside the supporters of the Muslim League, for the Page 8 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ unity of India.27 After a number of discussions with the leaders of the Muslim League and the Congress, a copy of the second revised statement proposed to be made was sent by Wavell to the Punjab Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, on 5 May 1946. Jenkins expressed the view that the Panthic Sikhs would be greatly dissatisfied with the solution and educated Sikh opinion would agree with them. Their case against the Punjabi Muslims was virtually the same as Jinnah’s case against the all-India Hindus. They would say that the Muslims had got what amounted to Pakistan and the Sikhs were embedded for all time in a Muslim state. The Sikh position had no counterpart in the rest of India. The solution must, if possible, include safeguard for the Sikhs.28 At the meeting of the Mission with the Muslim League and the Congress representatives on 11 May 1946, Nehru said that the minimum that the Congress could agree to was a Union Centre with the subjects of Defence, Foreign Relations, Communications, and the right to raise its own revenue by taxation. Currency and planning should also be Central, the latter in a large sense advisory. The Muslim League representatives said that they would require parity of representation in the Union Constitution. According to Wavell: ‘This is where the Conference should have ended.’29 In other words, the differences between the Congress and the Muslim League were so fundamental that they could not be resolved. On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy issued their final statement in Delhi, admitting that no agreement had been reached. Nevertheless, it was their duty to put forward what they considered to be the best possible arrangements for a speedy setting up of a new Constitution. They decided (p.307) to make immediate arrangements for the future Constitution of India and an Interim Government to carry on the administration. The voluminous evidence submitted to the Mission showed a general desire for the unity of India. But they were greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims about a perpetual Hindu majority rule; they examined the possibility of partition closely and impartially. Demographic figures showed that a separate sovereign state of Pakistan set up on the lines claimed by the Muslim League would not solve the problem of non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab, and of Bengal and Assam, especially the Sikhs. Therefore, ‘a smaller sovereign Pakistan confined to the Muslim majority areas alone might be a possible basis of compromise’.30 However, ‘any division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs leaving substantial bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary’. Therefore, the Delegation came to the conclusion that ‘neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign state of Pakistan would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem’. Moreover, there were weighty administrative, economic, and military considerations, like transportation, communications, and defence, and the great difficulty which the Indian states would find in associating themselves with a Page 9 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ divided British India. For all these reasons the Delegation were unable to advise the British government that the power which was in British hands should be handed over to two entirely separate sovereign states.31 In order to meet as far as possible the demands or claims of different parties, particularly the Muslim League, the Congress, and the Indian states, the Delegation thought of a stable and practicable form of Constitution for India as a whole. They recommended that a union of India, embracing British India and the states, should deal with foreign affairs, defence, and communication, and it should have the power necessary to raise the finances required for these subjects. The Union should have an executive and a legislature with representatives both from British India and the states. ‘Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.’ All subjects other than the Union subjects, and all residuary powers, should vest in the provinces. The states would retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union. The provinces would be free to form groups with executives and legislatures, and each group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common. Finally, the constitutions of the Union and the groups would contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.32 These recommendations leave no doubt that almost exclusive concern of the Delegation was with the Congress and the Muslim League. The Sikhs were virtually left out. The Delegation had recommended the broad basis of the future Constitution in order to set in motion the machinery for settling a Constitution of India by Indians. They indicated that the Constitution-making body shall obtain as broad based and accurate a representation of the whole population as was possible. The most satisfactory matter would have been election on adult franchise but this could lead to a long delay. The only (p.308) alternative was to utilize the recently elected provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies. The existing inequalities in representation could be corrected. The fairest and the most practicable plan, the Delegation thought, would be (a) to allot to each province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, (b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each province in proportion to their population, and (c) to get the representatives allotted to each community by the members of that community in its Legislative Assembly. The Sikhs would have four members, the

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Muslims would have seventy-eight, and the Hindus (including the Scheduled Castes) would have 216 members.33 Provincial Constitutions and Group Constitutions were to be settled by the members of each of the Sections A, B, and C. A province could opt out of the group by a decision of its new Legislature after the first general election under the new Constitution. In the Union Constituent Assembly, ‘a majority of the representatives present and voting’ and a majority of ‘each of the two major communities’ was required for matters related to communal issues. The third main community, the Sikhs, were excluded from this privilege. A treaty was to be negotiated between the Union Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power. The immediate concern of the Delegation was the setting up of an Interim Government having the support of the major political parties. The Delegation hoped that the new independent India ‘may choose to be a member of the British Common Wealth’.34 At a press conference on 16 May 1946, Cripps said that the Cabinet Mission had decided among other things to deal with the minorities in a double way by: (a) proportional representation in the main Constitution-making body and (b) provision for setting up an influential Advisory Commission to prepare the list of Fundamental Rights, the Minority Protection clauses, and the proposals for the administration of Tribal and Excluded Areas’. This Commission would make its recommendations to the Constituent-making body and would also suggest the stage at which these provisions should be inserted in the Constitution, whether in the Union, Group, or Provincial Constitutions, or in any two or more of them.35 In his broadcast on 17 May, Wavell said the proposals offered a reasonable and workable basis for India’s future Constitution, preserving the essential unity of India which was threatened by the dispute between the two major communities and keeping the Indian army intact to ensure unity and security for the future, and at the same time offering to the Muslim community the right to direct their own essential interests, their religion, education, culture, economic and other concerns in their own way and their own best advantage. Wavell went on to add that for ‘another great community’, the Sikhs, the proposals preserved the unity of their homeland, the Punjab, in which they had played and could play an important and influential part. But no specific provision was made for the Sikhs. All the smaller minorities could make their needs known to and secure protection for their interests through the Special Committee of the Constitutionmaking body.36 There was nothing of the safeguards sought by the Akali leaders. Evidently, the primary concern of the Cabinet Mission was to conciliate the Congress and the Muslim League as the most powerful parties.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (p.309) On 13 June 1946, Master Tara Singh wrote a foreword for the book Betrayal of the Sikhs in which the author had presented ‘an ordinary un-official Britisher’s viewpoint’ with regard to the ‘neglect on the part of the Cabinet Mission to make satisfactory provision for the Sikh Community in the future Constitution of India’. Only ‘bloodshed and misery’ could result from ‘such stepmotherly treatment’ of a community known for its courage and spirit of sacrifice.37 Master Tara Singh wrote that the Sikh position had been ‘finally liquidated in the proposed constitution’. He had no doubt that the Sikhs ‘shall perish under the Government to be established in accordance with the Scheme of the British Cabinet Mission’. Master Tara Singh had no illusion about the British politicians who knew how to use other nations and communities as it suited their ‘imperialistic policy’. No nation willingly submitted to the rule of an alien nation. ‘We must live and we cannot live under Muslim majority rule.’38

Akali Response to the Cabinet Delegation On 28 April 1946, Giani Kartar Singh wrote to the Cabinet Mission that the Sikhs had misgivings with regard to the negotiation proposed in the communiqué of the Mission which stated that the Presidents of the Congress and the Muslim League were to nominate representatives to meet the Mission at a Joint Conference. The issues to be taken up at the Conference were most likely to be the Interim Government, self-determination and Pakistan, and the method, manner, and principles for the realignment of the boundaries of provinces, including the Punjab, the homeland of the Sikhs. The only party, other than the Congress and the League, vitally concerned with and directly affected by these issues were the Sikhs. ‘Therefore, any settlement, in a manner not acceptable to us, on matters referred to above, will affect our future status and demands.’ Giani Kartar Singh urged upon the Mission to see that representative of the Sikhs was present at the Conference for discussion. Otherwise, there might be complications, making complete agreement impossible.39 On 16 May 1946, Wavell and Alexander had a meeting with Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh. Wavell said that the Mission had borne the position of the Sikhs constantly in mind. Their interests were a factor in the attitude of the Mission on the subject of Pakistan. The Mission decided what seemed likely to be the best option for the Sikh community. The Sikhs were the only community, after the Hindus and the Muslims, to be given special representation. The number allotted to them might seem inadequate but it was done on the same basis as for the others. The Advisory Committee on Minorities, on which the Sikhs would surely be represented, would be of value to them. The unity of India and of the army was to be maintained, which would be in the interest of the Sikhs. Baldev Singh pointed out that Sikh representation was smaller now than what it would have been under the 1942 plan. A few more votes, he was told, would not make any material difference. Moreover, the Advisory Committee was a valuable safeguard. Master Tara Singh gave reasons for thinking that the representation given to the Sikhs was inadequate. Their position in the all-India Page 12 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Constituent Assembly would be of little avail to them when they had already been ignored in the Constitution-making for Group B. ‘It would help the Sikhs if some provision could be made whereby decisions could not be (p.310) taken against their interest if, say, half their representatives were opposed.’ This question, he was informed, would have to be raised in the course of the constitutional discussions. ‘The Viceroy said that he found it impossible to imagine a Constitution being made for the Punjab which ignored so powerful and influential an interest as that of the Sikhs.’40 Thus, the Sikh leaders got merely words for being almost totally ignored. The only tangible element was Sikh representation in the Constituent Assemblies and the Advisory Committee, which was as good as useless in the bodies where all decisions were to be taken by a majority vote. Jenkins wrote to Wavell on 21 May 1946 that the Sikhs were ‘intensely bitter’. Master Tara Singh did not go to see A.A. Macdonald (the Home Secretary who had been on good terms with the Sikhs as the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar). Giani Kartar Singh, Sardar Swaran Singh, and Sardar Sujan Singh of Sarhali, who had come straight from Master Tara Singh, told Macdonald that the Sikhs had been ‘badly let down’. They intended to hold a meeting on 9 June to decide what form their offensive against the authorities was to take. Macdonald argued that being in an excellent bargaining position, they could probably secure a very adequate position for themselves in the Punjab. They were not impressed. They could have made satisfactory terms with Jinnah some time earlier but not now. They had now been handed over to him in perpetuity and there was no hope whatever of Jinnah or the Muslim League being ready to do a reasonable deal.41 According to Wavell, the Sikhs objected to the scheme because it did ‘in effect grant Pakistan’.42 Master Tara Singh wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 25 May 1946 that a wave of dejection, resentment, and indignation had run throughout the Sikh community since the publication of the Cabinet Mission’s recommendations for the future Constitution of India. The Sikhs were thrown entirely at the mercy of the Muslims. Could anyone expect any consideration or justice for the Sikhs from an assembly of twenty-three Muslims, nine Hindus, and four Sikhs? The Cabinet Mission had recognized ‘the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule’. But was there no ‘genuine and acute anxiety’ among the Sikhs lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Muslim majority rule? If the British Government was not aware of the Sikh feelings, the Sikhs would have to resort to some measures to convince everybody concerned of the Sikh anxiety in case they were subjected to perpetual Muslim domination. Protection was given to the Muslims but denied to the Sikhs. It appeared that the Sikhs had been studiously debarred from having any effective influence in the province, a group, or the Central Union. The Sikhs were not treated in the same way as the Hindus and the Muslims. The Sikhs had advised Master Tara Singh to seek clarification Page 13 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ from Pethick-Lawrence and to find out if there was ‘any hope of such amendments as may save the Sikhs from perpetual domination. He posed three questions at the end: (a) What was the significance of recognizing the Sikhs as one of ‘the main communities’? (b) If the Sikh members in Group B did not agree, would it mean ‘deadlock’, or ‘simply dissociation’? (c) Was there any hope of obtaining the same right for the Sikhs as was given to the Muslims and the Hindus?43 Baldev Singh wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 26 May that all shades of opinion in the Sikh (p.311) community were agreed that Sikh interests had been ignored. The Delegation had no desire to help the Sikhs as they had helped the Hindus and the Muslims. Baldev Singh referred to the request of the Sikhs for a place being given to them in the Conference to which only the Congress and Muslim League were invited. ‘We cannot understand why, having once been put at par with Hindus and Mussalmans, we have been discriminated against so glaringly.’ The provision made for Hindus and Muslims in the Union Constituent Assembly was not made for the Sikhs in the Constituent Assembly of Group B in which the Sikh homeland had been placed. Baldev Singh proposed that an amendment should be made in the statement to ensure that no decision regarding the Sikh community would be taken without the support of a majority of Sikh representatives present and voting in Group B. Baldev Singh sought clarification on five points to be helpful to him in his ‘efforts to set Sikh fears at rest’. Among other things he wanted to know whether the Constitution of all the three provinces in Group B be framed by the other representatives if the Sikh representatives refused to take part in the proceedings by way of protest. Finally, Baldev Singh said that the Sikh members on the Constituent Assembly were ‘far too few to be able to influence decisions; our exclusion at the proper time from joint deliberations has already deprived us of any possibility of an agreement with others’. Only the British Delegation could help the Sikhs at this stage. The representatives of the Sikh community were going to meet on 9 June to consider the situation finally. Therefore, he requested for an early reply to his letter.44 On 27 May 1946, Sardar Baldev Singh showed Jenkins a copy of his letter of 26 May and had a long talk on the attitude of the Sikhs. During the recent discussions among the Sikh leaders he found himself in a minority of one. If his supporters in the assembly resigned, he would be unable to remain in office. The Sikhs would take the final decision on 9 June and he was not sure how things would turn up. Jenkins said that the Sikhs could not expect more than a very limited influence in all-India affairs but in the Punjab they had nothing whatever to fear if they were given adequate political leadership. ‘Sikh influence in the Punjab was likely to increase rather than diminish.’ As ‘an old friend’ of the Sikhs, Jenkins appreciated their disappointment with the Cabinet Mission’s Statement. The Sikhs were confined to Group B but had no communal safeguards, direct or indirect. There was something to be said in favour of the Page 14 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ idea that the Sikhs should have the same kind of safeguards in Group B as the Muslim minority had in Group A. The Sikh sense of grievance was real and they believed themselves to be justified in taking an extreme step. Two days later Jenkins wrote to the Governor General: ‘On full consideration I recommend immediate and serious attempt to conciliate the Sikhs.’ Such conciliation presumably required the consent of the League and the Congress. The Sikhs would be satisfied with ‘communal safeguard within Group B of Constituent Assembly similar to that granted to Hindus and Muslims within the Union Assembly’, and a statement that weightage in services was not ruled out.45 A copy of Jenkin’s letter of 29 May 1946 was sent to V.P. Menon by Abell, the Viceroy’s private secretary, for his views before the Secretary of State could reply to the letters of Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh. ‘It seems to me’, wrote Abell, ‘that it would be very risky to modify the statement in regard to the Sikhs. There would be an (p.312) immediate clamour to modify it in other directions also’. On the whole it seemed to Abell that all that could be done was to tell the Sikhs that the Delegation were prepared to approach the Congress and the League for an assurance which could relieve the anxieties of the Sikhs. Menon promptly replied that the Punjab Governor had not ‘weighed sufficiently the all-India implications of a concession to the Sikh demand on the lines he has indicated’. Both the Congress and the League had demands enough to put forward. Therefore, Menon entirely agreed with Abell. He suggested a line that could possibly go some way to pacify the Sikhs. The Cabinet Delegation in their next discussion with Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh should impress upon them their peculiar position of advantage in the Punjab and the difficulty of any community to get on without their willing cooperation. The Sikhs should join the Constituent Assembly and if their rights were not protected in the new Constitution, ‘it will be for His Majesty’s Government, in pursuance of their responsibilities to the minorities in India, to use their good offices’. They should also be told that there would be a Sikh member on the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights and protection of minorities.46 On 31 May 1946, the letters from Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh, ‘which set out the strong objection of the Sikhs to the Delegation’s Statement of the 16th May’, were considered by the Delegation and Wavell. It was noted that the Governor of the Punjab was in favour of meeting the Sikh demand that the Sikh community should be given the same safeguards in Group B of the Constituent Assembly as the Muslims had in the Union Constituent Assembly. However, ‘it was not practicable to alter the Delegation’s Statement though the matter might be discussed by the Delegation with the two main parties to see whether they would agree to it’. Draft replies to the letters from Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh were approved.47

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Pethick-Lawrence sent his reply to Baldev Singh on the 1st of June, welcoming the positive attitude of the Sikhs, especially Baldev Singh, to contribute their share in reaching a solution to India’s political problems. But he was disappointed with the reception of the Statement of 16 May by the Sikhs. He had hoped that there would be satisfaction that neither India nor the Punjab was to be partitioned, and the Sikhs would realize how great a political influence they were likely to enjoy in the Punjab of the future. The Mission certainly expected that the Advisory Committee would have a Sikh. The recommendations of the Committee would not be mandatory unless the Constituent Assembly decided in advance to make them mandatory. In answer to the first four questions in Baldev Singh’s letter, Pethick-Lawrence simply said that he would leave the Statement to speak for itself. He was sure that Baldev Singh, and many others, would use their influence to ensure that the Sikhs did not misunderstand the Statement and ‘misjudged the great opportunity which our scheme gives them for playing a worthy and conspicuous part in the free India of the future’. The reply to Master Tara Singh’s letter was enclosed with the reply to Baldev Singh, with the remark that the Mission did not propose to make any addition to, or interpretation of, its Statement, though they felt sure that the main parties would inevitably recognize the special importance of the Sikh community and the Viceroy was ready to discuss the matter with them when the Constituent Assembly had been formed. (p.313) This point is elaborated in the reply of Pethick-Lawrence to Master Tara Singh, in which he claimed to have done the best possible for the Sikhs in the given situation and invited him and Baldev Singh to meet the Cabinet Mission in the first week of June.48 Baldev Singh wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 4 June that the Statement of 16 May put the Sikhs at par with Hindus and Muslims in one place but discriminated against them in another; the contrast was glaring. Furthermore, though the Statement, as officially interpreted, did not envisage the possibility of the division of India, it contained the seeds of Pakistan in the form of the Group system with separate Constitution-making bodies for each group. Nor had the partitioning of the Punjab been abandoned. Partition of the Punjab was not in Sikh interest but it was preferable to their perpetual subjection in Group B. Sardar Baldev Singh expressed the wish that he and Master Tara Singh be given another opportunity of a personal discussion on 6 June.49 On 5 June 1946, Major Short wrote a note about the Sikhs, underlining that it was imperative to check the present mood of the Sikhs with ‘conciliation, but also with a finishing touch of sharp firmness’. It should be made clear to them that what had been done was deemed to be ‘our best for the Sikhs’. If they continued to trust the British authorities and took their advice, the British would continue to do their best for the Sikhs. Otherwise, the Sikhs were ‘at perfect liberty to go to blazes’. In elaboration of this line, they could be told that more singular favours would antagonize both the major political parties and all and sundry, that they had been put in a commanding political position, not in Page 16 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ quantity but in quality, on negotiation rather than weightage and voting. Short emphasized that the Sikhs should be made to realize that their future lay in trust. If they sat still and did not irritate Jinnah, he would realize that he could consolidate his power only with Sikh support. But if he got irritated, the British would not be able to help the Sikhs.50 This ‘Note’ reveals the nature of Short’s role in Anglo-Sikh affairs: he was to work for the British as a ‘friend’ of the Sikhs. In their interview with the members of the Cabinet Mission and the Governor General on 6 June 1946, Master Tara Singh referred to the alarm among the Sikhs over the statement of 16 May, and pointed out that they were in hopeless minority with four out of thirty-six seats in Group B. The Governor General said that this was on the basis of their population and that it would not help the Sikhs if they had two or three more seats. He added that Jinnah was sympathetic and he had no intention whatever of doing an injury. Master Tara Singh said that it might happen nonetheless. He emphasized that under the proposal of 16 May there were no safeguards for the Sikhs. Wavell assured him that he and the Delegation would use all their influence to see that the Sikhs had a square deal. Master Tara Singh favoured the idea of the same rights for the Sikhs as the Muslims had been given in the Union Constituent Assembly: ‘No important communal issue affecting the Sikhs should be decided without a majority of Sikhs voting in its favour.’ Cripps said that the Sikhs could not be treated as an exception and it would have been necessary then to give the same right to the Hindus, Depressed Classes, and others. The Sikhs were in a strong position and both Muslims and Hindus would be anxious to get their support. Master Tara Singh said that the Sikhs were not in the position of a ‘balancing party’. Baldev Singh wanted to know what would happen if the Sikh members walked out of the Group Constituent Assembly. Wavell (p.314) told him that the Group would have to proceed without the Sikhs. It was pointed out, however, that the Delegation’s Statement of 25 May had made it clear that the British Parliament had to be satisfied that ‘due provision had been made for minority protection’ in the Constitution. The Sikh leaders were advised to get the safeguards they needed in the process of Constitution-making, depending upon British goodwill for them.51 The political situation changed drastically for Master Tara Singh. He had approached the Cabinet Mission in April with two basic demands: (a) reorganization of the Punjab Province to put an end to Muslim domination over the Sikhs, and (b) the creation of a Sikh state if Pakistan was to be created. In May he was told that India was proposed to be kept as a single state and that the Sikhs would be kept together in a single province. These proposals put an end to the idea of a Sikh state or even a reorganized province within India, without removing the possibility of Muslim domination over the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh was told finally in June 1946 that no modification could be made in the Cabinet Mission Statement of 16 May but efforts could be made to ensure that Page 17 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ constitutional safeguards were provided for the Sikhs. It was for Master Tara Singh and the Sikhs now to decide whether or not to work with the British and the two Indian political parties to get constitutional safeguards.

Negotiations Rather than Direct Action Master Tara Singh and the other Sikh leaders found themselves in a grave political uncertainty, groping their way out of the impasse created by the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission. The Jathedar of the Akal Takht called a meeting of the leaders of all the Sikh parties on 9 and 10 June 1946. These meetings were well attended though some of the nationalist Sikh leaders did not turn up. The Cabinet Mission’s Statement of 16 May was unanimously condemned and there was a talk of direct action against the British. Sardar Baldev Singh and Principal Jodh Singh of Khalsa College exercised a moderating influence. It was agreed to appoint an Advisory Committee for settlement by negotiations with the Cabinet Mission, the Muslim League, and the Congress. A Council of Action too was formed to plan an offensive against the British. Niranjan Singh Gill, an INA officer who had worked for Mahatma Gandhi on Sardar Patel’s recommendation, was made President of this council.52 On 11 June 1946, Major Woodrow Wyatt met Jinnah to ascertain his views, among other things, with regard to the Sikhs. ‘I will give you an assurance’, said Jinnah, ‘that as soon as the Interim Government is constituted I will go down and see Master Tara Singh and will give him anything that he asks for within reason.’ He added that he was going to stand as a candidate for the Group B Constituent Assembly and then he would say publicly to the Sikhs that, on any matter which affects their community, the Muslim League would be guided by the majority of the Sikh votes as far as possible.53 In the meeting of the Cabinet Delegation and Lord Wavell on 17 June 1946, a note recording an interview of Major Short with Gaini Kartar Singh was circulated. The latter had told Short that the Sikhs did not attach much hope to the possibility of an assurance coming from the two major communities that in Group B the Sikhs could have a right of communal voting on matters which affected the community. However, they would be (p.315) satisfied if Lord Wavell could obtain assurances from the two parties. Giani Kartar Singh added that the Sikhs wished to have the right of communal voting in the Union Constituent Assembly in respect of (a) their position in the armed forces; (b) their position in the Civil Services; and (c) their right to representation in the Central Legislature, and to at least one representative in the Union Executive.54 Contrary to Baldev Singh’s hope, the Sikhs decided not to join the Interim Government, but not to boycott the Constituent Assembly. The Sikhs were unwilling to approach Jinnah and would still like modification of the Statement of 16 May. Jenkins thought that sting would be taken out of the present agitation if the League and the Congress could be prevailed upon to agree to safeguards Page 18 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ for the Sikhs in Group B of the Constituent Assembly and, if possible, in the main assembly as well. Master Tara Singh was thinking of a Congress-type agitation with mass arrests and hunger strikes in jails.55 On 3 July 1946, Baldev Singh thanked Jenkins for the sympathy he had shown for the Sikh community for the plight in which they had been put by the Cabinet Mission’s proposals. But the matters remained where they were. When Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh met the Cabinet Mission on 6 June they were told that it was impossible to alter the Statement of 16 May for fear of fresh complications. They said that the Muslims seemed to have been given concessions far in excess of the implications of the Statement. For instance, the two major parties had obtained the right of having their say in the selection of Executive Councillors from the minorities. This clearly was an encroachment on Sikh rights and reduced them to an inferior status. Moreover, the League appeared to claim a veto in communal matters even in the Executive Council. This would contravene the status of equality given to the Sikhs in the Statement of 16 May. There was no justification for relegating the Sikhs to a subordinate role in their own homeland. They should be accorded the same rights as had been conceded to the two other communities.56 Giani Kartar Singh met the Punjab Governor on 4 July 1946 and told him that the Sikhs were worried about their future and not their past. The Muslims had demanded safeguards on an all-India scale and got them. The Sikhs could not understand why the Cabinet Delegation had refused similar rights to the Sikhs. Giani Kartar Singh suggested that the British Government may state in the Parliament that ‘the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly would not be recommended for approval by Parliament unless it gave adequate protection for the “political, economic and military rights” of the Sikhs’. Immediately after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Governor General might confer with the leaders of Indian opinion to secure their consent to safeguards for the Sikhs in Group B. Giani Kartar Singh referred to the explanatory statement issued by the Cabinet Delegation and the Governor General on 25 May which contained an assurance about ‘adequate provision for the protection of the minorities’. He also explained that the Sikh case should not stand or fall on Jinnah’s view, which was tainted by Muslim ambitions. Jenkins suggested to Wavell that, possibly, a question in general terms about the Sikh grievance could be raised in Parliament and the Secretary of State could reply that the Governor General had been asked to go into the matter with the Sikh and other leaders of Indian opinion. Jenkins went on to add that if the Governor General decided to do (p.316) something for the Sikhs, it would be wise to tell them. ‘I am in favour of helping them, if possible, because their position in the Punjab makes them temporarily of some all-India importance.’57

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Wavell wrote to Jenkins on 8 July 1946 that he was prepared to speak to both parties and try to persuade them to satisfy the Sikhs in regard to their position in the Punjab. Meanwhile, Jenkins could tell Baldev Singh or Giani Kartar Singh that Wavell had Sikh apprehensions very much in mind, and would have further discussions about them with the party leaders when he reopened negotiations for an Interim Government.58 Baldev Singh had written to the Prime Minister on 7 July, enclosing a copy of the resolution of the conference of all Sikh parties on 10 June to indicate the depth of the Sikh feeling and seeking personal intervention of the Prime Minister to rectify the wrong that had been done to the Sikh community. The basic point he made was that there was no provision in the Statement of 16 May ‘whereby Sikh areas can opt out or protect Sikh cultural, social and even religious rights on the basis assured to both Hindus and Muslims’. This should be made applicable to the Sikh community as well.59 Jenkins wrote to Wavell on 18 July 1946 that the Akalis had favoured total boycott when the Panthic Board met on 9 July. The Congress High Command had ordered the Congress Sikhs to support nominations acceptable to the Panth as a whole or, if that failed, to make their own nominations. There was a heated discussion and the Panthic Board decided on the 10th to boycott nominations. According to Baldev Singh, all the eight Sikh candidates withdrew their nominations, including the Congress Sikh candidates. Baldev Singh attributed this fiasco to Sachar’s ineptitude. But Abell noted that Nehru’s statement was a muddle that would do his personal reputation no good. Nehru insisted now that four Congress Sikhs be nominated, urging application for by-election. Baldev Singh said that if by-election was held and Congress Sikhs were nominated, the Akalis would again follow suit. Jenkins told Baldev Singh that he knew nothing about by-elections though he presumed that there would be a machinery for filling casual vacancies. He wanted to know from Wavell whether by-elections could be held for the Sikhs and if so, where and by what procedure.60 Wavell sent a telegram to Pethick-Lawrence on 19 July 1946 that there was no provision for by-election in the Cabinet Mission Statement of 16 May, leaving this matter to the Constituent Assembly. He did not think that the statement of 16 May should be modified. It could be made clear in a public statement that the Constituent Assembly would have to prescribe procedure for by-election. As soon as that was done, there would be nothing to prevent by-election for the Sikh seats.61 In his private and secret letter to Pethick-Lawrence on the same day, Wavell wrote that a struggle was going on between Niranjan Singh Gill of the INA, who was essentially a political leader, and the old brigade of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. The Congress could hardly maintain its ‘national character’ if it allowed the Congress Sikhs to reject the Congress policy and adopt a purely communal policy in a matter of this importance. There was now a movement for the Sikhs to change their minds again, make nominations, and ask for by-elections.62 Page 20 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ On 20 July 1946, Wavell received a telephonic message from the Punjab Governor that the Muslim League was strongly in favour of offering the Sikhs by-elections to (p.317) get them off the boil, provided it did not involve another assembly session. He was not in favour of being too legalist about the Sikhs in this matter. Mamdot had told him that a League–Sikh rapprochement was the only solution and he was in favour of safeguards for the Sikhs in Group B. Wavell recommended that the Punjab Governor should be authorized to invite the Sikh members of the Punjab Assembly to elect four representatives as early as possible. He proposed that instructions to the Governor should be expressed as instructions from Members of the Cabinet Delegation and Wavell since this was in effect an amendment of their Statement of 16 May.63 Pethick-Lawrence responded immediately to say that it might perhaps be possible for the Governor to issue instructions modifying electoral rules for the Constituent Assembly to enable the Sikh election to be held after the fixed dates. He would have to satisfy himself that the Sikhs as a whole now wished to participate in the election and that no opposition would be forthcoming from leaders of other parties in the Punjab Legislature. It would also be desirable for Wavell to tell Nehru and Jinnah in advance and secure their agreement to the course proposed. It was very important to get the Sikhs in. It did not involve modification of the Statement of 16 May, and might be regarded as a modification of electoral rules. On the following day Pethick-Lawrence confirmed that the necessary step could be taken as an ‘administrative action’ on the part of the Governor General and the Governor.64 The Prime Minister referred Baldev Singh’s letter to Pethick-Lawrence, who wrote about it to Wavell, with a draft reply. Wavell sent a copy of this letter to Jenkins for comment. Jenkins had no objection to the proposed reply but suggested alternative wording at the beginning of the last paragraph: I have given close personal consideration to this matter and I am sure you will appreciate that amendment of Statement of May 16th would now be quite inappropriate. This Statement was issued by Cabinet Mission during negotiations with Congress and Muslim League and had full approval of H.M.G. at the time; and it has been the basis of all further discussion. So far as the proceedings of the Mission are concerned it cannot now be changed. But there would be no repeat no objection to a separate Statement defining the position of Sikhs in Constituent Assembly provided Presidents of Congress and Muslim League agreed to it, and Viceroy is very ready to discuss the matter with them.65 This alternative wording was more polite and a little more reassuring, but it did not modify the substance.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ On 3 August 1946, Jenkins wrote to Wavell that Nehru attached great importance to the four Sikh seats in the Constituent Assembly being filled, and the Nationalist Sikhs and some of the moderate Akalis, including Baldev Singh, were of the same view. According to Baldev Singh even the extremists admitted that the situation had changed but they were not yet clear what to do. A deputation consisting of Giani Kartar Singh, Niranjan Singh Gill, Udham Singh Nagoke, and others was going to Wardha to discuss the situation with the Congress High Command and to obtain assurances regarding the Congress attitude to the Sikhs. Baldev Singh hoped to keep in touch with the Sikh deputation. The future was uncertain but the Congress would presumably press for the summoning of the Constituent Assembly and for the formation of an Interim Government without the League. The chances were that the Sikhs would in the end align themselves with the (p.318) Congress, if only to strengthen their immediate position in the Punjab. Jenkins informed Wavell that the idea of a big Sikh morchā held the field and a big Sikh meeting had been called for 22 September.66 On 9 August 1946, the CWC passed a resolution that it was aware of the injustice done to the Sikhs and assured them that the Congress would give all possible support in addressing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards. A meeting of the Panthic Pratinidhi Board was held at Amritsar from 11 to 14 August 1946 to consider the situation created by the developments since 5 July. The Secretary of State for India had made an appeal to the Sikhs on 18 July to reconsider their boycott decision and the Viceroy also had replied to communications from certain Sikh leaders, expressing his willingness to accommodate the Sikh viewpoint. The main factor, however, was the resolution of the CWC on 9 August in which the Congress had recognized that injustice was done to the Sikhs by the Cabinet Mission proposals and had declared that it would give all possible support to the Sikhs in redressing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards for the Sikhs to protect their interests. Though the grave apprehensions of the Sikh community concerning their future under the Cabinet Mission scheme continued to exist, the appeal and the assurances of the Indian National Congress carried weight with the Panthic Board. The situation called for an earnest effort by the Sikhs to give the Constituent Assembly a fair trial to secure for the Sikhs similar safeguards in the Union and the Provincial spheres as were provided for the two major communities in the long-term proposals. It was added that if the new approach failed, the Panth would be doubly justified in going back to its resolve of boycotting and direct action. Therefore, the Board advised the Sikh Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) to return their representatives to the Constituent Assembly to raise the question of the safeguards for the Sikhs in its preliminary meeting. The Panthic Board expected all the parties in the assembly to support the Sikh demand.67

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ On 16 August 1946, Baldev Singh asked Jenkins that in view of the Panthic Board’s new resolution, immediate arrangements should be made for a byelection of Sikh representatives to the Constituent Assembly. He explained that there was only one dissent in the Panthic Board, by a follower of Kharak Singh. The Board members were at first doubtful but were influenced by (a) the belief that the Viceroy and the Congress desire to help the Sikhs and (b) the attitude of the Muslim League.68 As Abell wrote to Menon on 16 August 1946, Wavell felt that if a Sikh was taken into the Interim Government without formal acceptance of the Statement of 16 May by the Sikhs, a propaganda point of some value would be given to Jinnah. He did not wish to take any chance.69 Menon suggested immediately that the resolution passed by the Panthic Board could be taken as a clear indication of the willingness of the Sikhs to accept the Cabinet Mission Statement of 16 May for the purposes of the relevant paragraph of the Statement of 16 June. If a copy of a resolution by the Panthic Board was forwarded to the Viceroy, the Sikhs would qualify for inclusion in the Interim Government. Abell wrote to the Secretary of the Panthic Board to ask if Lord Wavell could be informed officially that the Sikh Community had accepted the Statement of 16 May. The Secretary of the Panthic Board confirmed on 22 August that the Board had accepted the Statement in order to give (p.319) the Constituent Assembly a fair trial for the purpose of ‘getting necessary modifications made in the Cabinet Mission’s Scheme to ensure justice to the Sikh community in the future Constitution of India’.70 Wavell received a telephone call from the Panthic Board asking for early elections to the Sikh seats in the Constituent Assembly. He sent a telegram to Jenkins on 9 September 1946 that he would have negotiations with Jinnah and the Congress in the next ten days or so. He would much prefer not to give Jinnah any possible cause for complaint. Therefore, he would prefer to wait for some time. The Constituent Assembly was unlikely to meet before the middle of October. Jenkins agreed to the deferment of the Sikh by-election.71 During 16–18 October, Wavell told Jenkins that now there was no objection to his holding the by-election of the Sikhs to the Constituent Assembly. The Congress had for some time been in favour of the election and the Muslim League would raise no technical objections. Jinnah was keen to be quoted as in favour of the election.72 During 26–9 November 1946, there was hectic correspondence between Wavell and the Indian leaders, and between Wavell and the Secretary of State about a conference to be held in London.73 In this context, Baldev Singh wrote to Wavell on 27 November that he had carefully considered the invitation of His Majesty’s Government to a Delegation consisting of two representatives of the Congress, two of the League, and one Sikh to visit London to discuss the present political situation. In view of the Congress not having found it possible to go to this conference, Baldev Singh thought that his acceptance of the invitation would Page 23 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ serve no useful purpose. He went on to add that the Sikhs were considerably perturbed over the aggressive attitude of the Muslim League. Jinnah’s demands on the minorities in what he termed Pakistan areas were reaching dangerous proportions. The Sikhs had begun to fear that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to come to any settlement with the Muslim League. A stage might as well be reached where ‘the Sikhs may have to refuse to sit with the Muslim League for political discussion’.74 On 29 November 1946, Baldev Singh wrote to Wavell that the two major parties having decided to participate in the London Conference he too had decided to join. ‘This conference will provide a very good opportunity to decide the question of safeguards demanded by Sikh community in the Constituent Assembly and in Group B.’ He hoped that Wavell would kindly use his influence to see that the assurance given by the Secretary of State (in his letter of the 1st of June to Baldev Singh and his speech in the House of Lords on 18 July) was given practical shape by persuading the Congress and the League leaders to remove the Sikh grievances.75 In his note for discussion in London, Wavell writes that the Sikhs had been negotiating with both the Congress and the League but, as the result of recent events, had come down to the side of the Congress because they felt the Congress was the stronger party and His Majesty’s Government dared not oppose it. There were internal stresses among Sikhs due to a struggle for power between various sections but as a whole they would back the party which they thought was the strongest party, and this party they believed was the Congress.76 In Sardar Baldev Singh’s discussion with the Cabinet Delegation and Wavell, he said that the Sikh community did not have the same safeguards in the Constituent Assembly as the other two communities. Wavell said that he would speak to their (p.320) leaders. Baldev Singh did not expect Jinnah to agree. Baldev Singh added a little later that the Sikhs had come into the Constituent Assembly in the hope that they would receive in Group B the same safeguards in communal matters as the other communities had at the Centre. Otherwise, they would have to look to the Congress for support at the Centre and to the League in Group B.77 Giani Kartar Singh had a long interview with Jenkins on 5 December 1946 and expressed some concern about the London Conference. Jenkins knew that Giani Kartar Singh thought that Baldev Singh was now much too close to the Congress and decided to go to London without consulting Master Tara Singh. Nor had Baldev Singh consulted Giani Kartar Singh. Giani Kartar Singh asked Jenkins what he thought would happen in London, and Jenkins told him that a complete reconciliation between Jinnah and Nehru seemed unlikely. Giani Kartar Singh reminded Jenkins of the Sikh demand for safeguards. ‘The Sikhs felt that they were as much entitled to safeguards as the Muslims and pressed that both in the full assembly and in Group B any major communal decision should require their Page 24 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ consent.’ Giani Kartar Singh hoped that the Viceroy would prevail upon the party leaders to agree to the safeguards wanted by the Sikhs.78 On 6 December 1946, the draft statement to be made by His Majesty’s Government was discussed by Attlee, Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps, Alexander, Wavell, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, and Baldev Singh. Baldev Singh said that the new Statement would worsen the position of the Sikhs. If there was majority voting in Group B and not voting by provinces, the four Sikh representatives would be in less influential position. ‘This would have a bad reaction on the Sikhs who had only been persuaded to join the Interim Government and accept the Cabinet Mission’s Statement with great difficulty.’ He feared that the Federal Court was now likely to take the same view as His Majesty’s Government and the Sikhs might take steps ‘very embarrassing for him personally’ and for his other colleagues. ‘He would, however, try his best to persuade his people to give the Constituent Assembly a trial.’79 Baldev Singh had begun to talk as a collaborator with the government and not as a representative of the Sikhs.

Baldev Singh Becomes the Defence Member On the possibilities of forming a coalition government, the Statement of the Cabinet Delegation and Wavell issued from Delhi on 16 June 1946 refers to discussions with the two major parties. It seemed that no useful purpose could be served by further prolonging these discussions. It was urgently necessary to set up a strong and representative Interim Government. It was decided to invite fourteen specific individuals. Wavell was to distribute portfolios in consultation with the leaders of the two major parties. It was his intention ‘to proceed with the formation of an interim government’ even if the two major parties, or either of them, proved unwilling to join a coalition. He added that the Governors were directed to proceed with the elections necessary for the setting up of the Constitution-making machinery in accordance with the Statement of 16 May. In a meeting of the Cabinet Delegation and the Governor General on 3 May 1946, Wavell had said that it would be best to give the War Portfolio to a Sikh and Baldev Singh might be suitable. It had been agreed in (p.321) London that the War Member should be an Indian but not one belonging to any of the two major communities. However, the Delegation thought that it might not be possible to insist on this. In that event the portfolio would go to a Hindu or a Muslim, and the Home Membership to the other community.80 Wavell wrote to Jenkins on 23 May that he would definitely want to offer a portfolio to Baldev Singh, and he wanted Jenkins to tell Khizar of his intentions and secure his agreement.81 Baldev Singh was willing to accept the invitation to serve in the Interim Government and wanted to know if in that case he would be debarred from election to the Constituent Assembly. Major Short advised him to get in touch with Jenkins as to the character of his reply.82

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Jenkins discussed the Statement with Sardar Baldev Singh on 16 June. Baldev Singh said that during a private meeting on 9 and 10 June, the Sikhs had decided to participate in the Interim Government and not to boycott elections to the Constituent Assembly. However, he would have to await party reactions before deciding to accept the invitation.83 Baldev Singh thanked Wavell on 20 June 1946 for the letter of 16 June inviting him to join the Interim Government. The present unsatisfactory position, said Baldev Singh, would be materially improved by participating in the new scheme but discussions were going on among the Sikhs who held that the Cabinet Mission’s Statement of 16 May did not safeguard Sikh interests. He hoped to write to Wavell in the next few days.84 On 26 June 1946, Wavell wrote to Baldev Singh that one of the major parties had rejected the proposals in the Statement of 16 June. Therefore, he regretfully withdrew the invitation to Baldev Singh to be a Member of his council. Wavell went on to add that an announcement would be made shortly that a purely official Caretaker Government would be set up to hold office for a short time. He proposed to have fresh negotiation with the principal parties.85 On 28 June, Sardar Baldev Singh had an interview with Wavell and spoke of the excited state of the Sikhs. They would not boycott the elections to the Constituent Assembly but they were not prepared to accept the Statement of 16 May which gave them nothing. Baldev Singh had been carrying on negotiations with the Congress and received a promise of certain guarantees in Group B. Jinnah’s price was too high; he wanted Sikh support for weakening the Centre. Wavell pointed out that if the Sikhs did not accept the Statement of 16 May, they would not be eligible for participation in the formation of a new government. He suggested that the Sikhs could accept the Statement after stating all their objections to it, like the Muslim League and the Congress. Wavell got the impression that the Sikhs would not take immediate action, but would elect their representatives and line up with the Congress to oppose the Muslim League.86 On 9 July, Jenkins wrote to Baldev Singh that the Governor General had asked Jenkins to tell him that ‘he has the Sikh apprehensions very much in mind, and will have further discussions about them with the party leaders when he reopens negotiations for an Interim Government’.87 Jenkins informed Wavell on 26 August that Baldev Singh was most anxious to be allotted War Portfolio and that the Sikhs would be gratified by his selection as War Member.88 On 18 August 1946, Nehru gave six names of Congress representatives for the Interim Government and proposed three names for Minority representatives, including the name (p.322) of Baldev Singh.89 On 1 September he sent a list of fourteen Members of the Provisional Government with their portfolios. Baldev Singh was included as the Defence (War) Member. Nehru made it clear that the Page 26 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Muslim League could nominate five Members. Then, the portfolios would be reshuffled. He preferred to call it the Provisional National Government but he would have no objection if Wavell regarded Interim Government as more suitable. In any case, it would be undesirable to refer to it as the Governor General’s Executive Council. ‘This Government will function as a Cabinet and will be jointly responsible for its decisions.’90 Having persuaded Jinnah to join the Interim Government, Wavell told Nehru on 14 October that the Muslim League had decided to join the Interim Government. Nehru asked Wavell about the long-term issue. Wavell said that he had told Jinnah that his entry into the Interim Government must be considered as constitutional on his acceptance of the long-term plan.91 Master Tara Singh wrote to Wavell on 30 October 1946 that the Congress and the Muslim League were free to nominate their own representatives, but this right was not given to the Shiromani Akali Dal, which had fought the last general elections on this issue alone and won. Wavell had agreed to consult the Congress and the Muslim League both while filling a Sikh vacancy if it occurred. This was highly unfair to the Sikhs. Unlike the other minorities, the Sikhs had been recognized as a separate entity and they had got their own representative organization. They had always fought elections on the ticket of their own organization. ‘If a Sikh Executive member is to be appointed with the consultation of the Congress and the Muslim League, the gentleman may be a good Sikh, but he will not be a Sikh representative.’ The Sikh aspirant to be elected as an Executive Member would have to flatter the Muslim League and the Congress. Master Tara Singh requested Wavell to modify his decision and assure the Sikhs that the Sikh Executive Member would really be a Sikh representative and not a nominee of a non-Sikh organization.92 Master Tara Singh sent a copy of this letter to Sardar Baldev Singh and he wrote to Wavell on 7 November 1946 that he himself had felt perturbed over Wavell’s acceptance of Jinnah’s proposition to consult the majority parties for the appointment of the Sikh Member of the Central Government. The Sikh community had proved its own identity and, in the present inter-communal conflicts, would in no case be willing to be exploited by a community with whose political programme it could not agree. Baldev Singh wrote again to Wavell on 13 November that the reply given was disappointing and derogatory to the Sikh community. No self-respecting Sikh representative would be prepared to subject his selection to the choice of the Muslim League. At least Baldev Singh could not accept such a situation. He requested Wavell to give this matter a serious consideration. Abell minuted that this letter was written ‘with an eye to its effect on Tara Singh and the Sikhs, to whom no doubt it will be shown’. In an interview with Wavell on 2 January 1947, Baldev Singh did not raise this matter.93

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ The Hindustan Times reported on 21 November 1946 that all was not well with the Interim Government. While moving the resolution directing the Congress representatives in the Constituent Assembly to prepare a Constitution for ‘an independent sovereign republic’, Nehru had said that the situation was delicate. He warned the Viceroy that ‘our patience is fast reaching the limit’. The manner in which Nehru’s statement was (p.323) received by the delegates showed that the entire Congress stood behind the Interim Government.94 It was also reported that Jinnah regarded the decision to summon the Constituent Assembly on 9 December 1946 as a serious blunder. The Viceroy was playing into the hands of the Congress in total disregard to the Muslim League. Jinnah made it clear that ‘no representative of the Muslim League should attend the Constituent Assembly summoned to meet on December 9th, 1946’.95

Communal Tensions At the end of August 1946, the Muslims were frightened and angry. They regarded the formation of the Interim Government as an unconditional surrender of power to the Hindus and were convinced that the Governor General would be unable to prevent the Hindus from using their newly acquired power for a systematic repression of the Muslims all over India. They suspected a deeplaid plot between the British and the Congress. The British had not been prepared to put the Muslim League in power when the Congress was not cooperating but they were now willing to put the Congress in power when the Muslim League was not cooperating. The Hindus were jubilant and the Congress leaders in the Punjab were talking loosely about their ability to suppress Muslims once and for all with British aid. The Congress pact with the Sikhs was welcome to the Punjabi Hindus but the Sikh attitude was still uncertain. The tone of the Sikh press and the Sikh speakers was anti-British and anti-Muslim, and in a serious disturbance, the Sikhs were most likely to side with the Hindus.96 Jenkins wrote to Wavell on 14 September 1946 that the Muslim League leaders of the Punjab were waiting for guidance about direct action. Their own idea appeared to be a movement for non-cooperation primarily against the Punjab Government and not against the Hindus and Sikhs.97 On 14 October, Jenkins wrote that the League preparations for direct action continued and wellattended meetings had been addressed in most of the districts by the leaders.98 During 13–14 November, Jenkins wrote that communal tension was worse than ever. The Congress press was as poisonous as it could possibly be. The Muslim League was no less vicious but it was less effective. There was little to choose between the Hindu and Muslim newspapers published in Indian languages. The slightest incident could touch off very serious disorders.99 Jenkins wrote to the Governor General on 30 November that the speeches of Kriplani, Patel, and Nehru, and Jinnah’s statement that the Muslim League would not enter the

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ Constituent Assembly, had caused very grave concern and there could be serious trouble in large cities any time.100 Jenkins wrote on 14 December 1946 that Patel’s recent speeches, the failure of the London Conference, and the intention of the Constituent Assembly to force a new constitution upon a united India had worsened the communal situation. The Muslim League leaders regarded the London statement as a triumph for Jinnah and trusted that the British Government would not let the Congress have a free hand. The average man, whether Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh, was deeply concerned about the future. It appeared to Jenkins that there would be no settlement without widespread disorders which would cause no loss to the leaders but it would be disastrous for the mass of the population.101 ‘Private armies’ were a source of anxiety for the Punjab Government. The Governor (p.324) had discussed this matter with Khizar Hayat in the summer of 1946. Late in November he informed the Governor that he had decided to take action by declaring the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Muslim League National Guards to be unlawful associations under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. Both Khizar and Jenkins thought that such an action would not cause any serious disturbance. The declarations were duly made on 24 January 1947. Routine searches were conducted all over the Punjab without any difficulty. In Lahore, however, the Muslim League leaders, particularly Iftikhar-ud-Din, a former Congressman, persisted in obstructing the police in searching the head office of the National Guards. They were removed to the Civil Lines Police Station, where they declined to seek bail. Their arrests provoked a rowdy demonstration outside the head office of the National Guards. An aggressive crowd assembled outside the Civil Lines Police Station was dispersed by a severe lāṭhī charge. There were processions and demonstrations on the following day; one was headed by seven Muslim League MLAs. They were arrested. There were two demonstrations by women and a few women were also arrested. Tear gas was freely used. Khizar Hayat was in a difficult position, both administratively and politically. Jenkins made it clear to Wavell and the Secretary of State that he took ‘full responsibility’ for what had happened because the suggestion originally was made by him even though he had put no pressure on Khizar.102 Demonstrations continued for a few days. On 28 January, Khizar Hayat announced withdrawal of the bans. It made no difference to the leaders of the Muslim League. Their objective was to overthrow the Coalition Ministry.103 Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Wavell on 31 January 1947 that he had been watching developments in the Punjab with much anxiety. Khizar’s decision to impose ban on the two organizations would destroy any possibility there might have been of the Muslim League coming into the Constituent Assembly. The withdrawal of the ban did not seem to have eased the situation. Possibly, Khizar’s coalition could break up under the strain, and some of his supporters might conceivably support a Muslim League Government. It was not impossible Page 29 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ that the Sikhs might see an opportunity of offering support to the Muslim League in return for assurances about constitutional matters. Pethick-Lawrence asked Wavell to give his assessment of the situation.104 On 3 February, Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and two other Sikh leaders asked the Governor to be allowed to raise a private army. The Muslim League, if it succeeded, would mean Muslim Raj and the Sikhs must set about protecting themselves. Jenkins tried to dissuade them but he was not sure that they were dissuaded.105 Baldev Singh wrote to Wavell on 6 February that the Punjab Government was perfectly justified in imposing the ban. There was little doubt that the continued defiance on the part of the League was aimed at disrupting the coalition. The Sikhs were greatly agitated over what was happening. Their interests would be disregarded by the League if it captured power.106 On 8 February 1947, Jenkins informed Pethick-Lawrence that Muslim agitation had taken ‘normal course of all Indian passive resistance movements’ through haṛtāls, processions, and meetings in contravention of law, and dissemination of false stories of police excesses and heroism of the demonstrators. The sympathies of all official and non-official Muslims were with the agitators (p. 325) who shouted slogans against Khizar and his Ministry and in favour of Pakistan. Jenkins thought that it was quite impossible for one community to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long-term alternative, therefore, was either reversion to Unionist principles with Muslim domination or partition. If the agitation continued, it would oblige the non-Muslims to think of the second alternative. The Muslim League, in his view, was ‘wantonly throwing certainty of Muslim leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which Sikhs will gradually now demand’.107 Before the middle of February, Master Tara Singh issued the statement that the Sikhs were in grave danger and must revive their ‘Army’ immediately under his control.108 On 15 February, Jenkins gave population figures of 1941 to reiterate that no single community could rule the Punjab with its present boundaries, ‘except by conquest’. The peaceful alternative was either a united Punjab under a government representing Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, or a partition into two or possibly three separate states. The uncompromising communal outlook of the Muslim League was the cause of their failure to take office after the general elections, but its leaders were sore against others. They were looking for an opportunity to agitate against Khizar. Jenkins told Khizar and Swaran Singh that if Master Tara Singh’s threat of direct action was carried out, ‘I do not see how the Ministry could remain in office’.109 Already on 12 February 1947, Attlee had sent a telegram to Wavell that he proposed to make a statement of policy on India. A part of the proposed announcement was given in the telegram. It referred to the wartime Page 30 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ appointment of Field Marshal the Right Honourable Viscount Wavell as the Viceroy of India, a high office that he discharged during a very difficult period with devotion and high sense of duty. The time was appropriate to terminate this wartime appointment now that a new and final phase was opening in India. His successor had been approved by His Majesty and he would be entrusted with the task of transferring to Indian hands the responsibility for the government of British India. His Majesty had been pleased to approve conferment of an Earldom on Viscount Wavell.110 On 14 February, Pethick-Lawrence informed Wavell that it was decided to make the statement on 20 February 1947.111

In Retrospect The Cabinet Mission arrived in India on 24 March and left on 29 June 1946. They made two formal announcements during these three months, one on 16 May with regard to the Constitution for India and the other on 16 June on the formation of Interim Government. According to the former, a Union of India was to cover British India and the princely states to deal with foreign affairs, defence, and communications. All other subjects and residual powers were to vest in the provinces which were free to form groups to determine the provincial subjects to be taken together. Thus, there were three tiers: the Union, the group, and the province. The Constituent Assembly of the Union included representatives of the three main communities of India: Hindus (including Scheduled Castes), 216; Muslims, 78; and Sikhs, 4. All decisions were to be taken by majority vote. However, it was necessary to ensure for the Muslims control in all matters vital to their culture, religion, and economic and other interests. No such safeguards were provided for the Sikhs. Therefore, their recognition (p.326) as one of the three main communities was no consolation for the Sikhs. An Advisory Committee was to make recommendations for protection of the fundamental rights for final decision by a majority vote. The Constituent Assembly had to negotiate a treaty with the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of the transfer of power. For the Interim Government, it was decided eventually to invite fourteen specific individuals. One of them was Baldev Singh. Since neither Master Tara Singh nor Giani Kartar Singh had been consulted in the matter, Baldev Singh was not a formal representative of the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh pointed out later that Baldev Singh might be a good Sikh but he did not represent the Sikhs. Giani Kartar Singh said bluntly that Baldev Singh was a rubber-stamp. Indeed, he had been recommended by the Punjab Governor and he was acceptable to the Governor General (who was unwilling to have Master Tara Singh at any rate). To the Congress too Baldev Singh was more acceptable than any other Sikh leader. The Akalis were ‘intensely bitter’ and felt strongly that they had been ‘badly let down’. Their basic demands had been turned down: recognition of their distinct political identity and an adequate role in the constitutional arrangements for the protection of their political and cultural interests. They wanted a united India Page 31 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ without the political domination of any single community in the Punjab, or a divided India with a state in which the Sikhs held the balance, if not a majority. At the end, the Sikhs got none of their fundamental demands conceded. The British ‘might have done something more to satisfy the Sikhs’, recorded Wavell, after the deed had been done. From Master Tara Singh’s viewpoint, at any rate, the British had done nothing for the Sikhs. It was a ‘betrayal of the Sikhs’. At the All-Parties Sikh Conference at Amritsar during 9–10 June 1946, the 16 May Statement was unanimously condemned, and direct action against the government was proposed. The moderate Sikh leaders, however, were in favour of negotiations with the government, the Congress and the League. An Advisory Committee was formed for settlement through negotiations, and a Council of Action was also formed with Niranjan Singh Gill of the Indian National Army as president. He was aligned with the Congress. He announced a big gathering of the Sikhs to be held on 22 September 1946 to decide ‘the nature and scope of the morchā’. Meanwhile, the Akali leaders were negotiating with the British authorities, the Congress, and the League. After a resolution of the CWC on 14 August 1946, which recognized that injustice had been done to the Sikhs, the Akalis decided to join the Constituent Assembly and to participate in the Interim Government. Baldev Singh, who was anxious to become War Member in the Interim Government, was gratified by his selection. Even in future the Sikh member was to be selected in consultation with the Congress and the Muslim League. The recognition given to the Sikhs as the ‘third element’ in the political life of India stood practically withdrawn. Notes:

(1.) Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1976), vol. VI, pp. 951–5. (2.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VI, pp. 964–6. (3.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan, 1995, reprint), pp. 428–30. (4.) H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (Lahore: University of Punjab, 1969), p. 161. (5.) Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 313. The summary (pp. 309–17) ended with a parody with reference to ‘Alice Through the Looking Glass’ which Wavell had picked up to read one evening. The parody was hard to understand. Therefore, HobsonJobson explained: the Congressites were ‘very slippery’ and they could ‘wriggle out of anything’ they did not like; the Leaguers were rather ‘fierce and noisy’ and they could not bear the Congressites; and the Akalis were ‘puffed up’ and they went round ‘shouting out that they weren’t being fairly treated and would

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ take direct action about it’. Gandhi seemed to have been ‘swoozled’ but it was discovered afterwards that ‘he had swoozled everyone else’. (6.) Chaudhri Mahammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: University of Punjab, 1967, reprint), pp. 67–70. (7.) Moon, Wavell, p. 334. (8.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp. 76–85. (9.) Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. II, pp. 660–1. (10.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp. 90–4. (11.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp. 94–8. (12.) Glancy to Wavell, 28 February 1946, in Punjab Politics: 1 January 1944–3 March 1947, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 173. (13.) Moon, Wavell, p. 196. (14.) Gwyer and Appadurai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47, vol. II, p. 571. (15.) Moon, Wavell, p. 229. (16.) Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942– 7 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1977), vol. VII, pp. 90–1. (17.) Moon, Wavell, p. 237. (18.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, p. 138. (19.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 138–9. (20.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, p. 139. (21.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 140–1. (22.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 141–2. (23.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 142–3. (24.) Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995), pp. 456–7. (25.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 303–5.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (26.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 318–20. (27.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 361–2. (28.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 484–5. (29.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 508–11. (30.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 582–91. (31.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, p. 585. (32.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 586–7. (33.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 587–9. (34.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 589–91. (35.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 595–9. (36.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 611–12. (37.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 358–9. (38.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, p. 576. (39.) Jenkins to Wavell, 21 May 1946, in Punjab Politics: 1 January 1944–3 March 1947, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), pp. 202–3. (40.) Wavell to Henderson, 21 May 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, p. 653. (41.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 696–7. (42.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 700–3. (43.) Jenkins to Wavell, 21, 27, and 29 May 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 203– 10. (44.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 739–40. (45.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 745–6. (46.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 760–1. (47.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 797–8. (48.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 821–2. (49.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 827–9.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (50.) Jenkins to Wavell, 15 June 1946, Punjab Politics 1 January 1944–3 March 1947, pp. 216–17, 224–5. (51.) Note by Major Wyatt, 11 June 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, pp. 866–7. (52.) The Transfer of Power 1942–7, vol. VII, pp. 957–8. (53.) Jenkins to Wavell, 26 June 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 224–5. (54.) Baldev Singh to Jenkins, 3 July 1946, Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII (1979), pp. 10–11. (55.) Jenkins to Wavell, 4 July 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 237–40. (56.) Wavell to Jenkins, 8 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 17. (57.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 24 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 116. (58.) Jenkins to Wavell, 18 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 80–1. Also, Menon to Turnbull, 16 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 65. (59.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 19 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 84–5. (60.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 19 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 89. (61.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 20 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 93. (62.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 20 July 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 94 and n. 3. (63.) Jenkins to Wavell, 30 July 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 254. (64.) Jenkins to Wavell, 3 August 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 179– 80. (65.) Baldev Singh to Abell, 17 August 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 242–4. (66.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 240–1. (67.) Abell to Menon, 16 August 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 241. (68.) Menon to Abell, 16 August 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 242.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (69.) Wavell to Jenkins, 9 September 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 470. (70.) Wavell to Jenkins, 16–18 October 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 744–5. (71.) Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX (1980), pp. 186–228. (72.) Baldev Singh to Wavell, 27 November 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 188–9. (73.) Baldev Singh to Wavell, 29 November 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 217–18. (74.) Note by Wavell, 2 December 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 241– 2. (75.) The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 266–8. (76.) The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 285–7. (77.) The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 295–6, 299–300. (78.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, pp. 403–4. (79.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, pp. 674–5. (80.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, pp. 968–9. (81.) Jenkins to Wavell, 16 June 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 222–3. (82.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, p. 989. (83.) Jenkins to Wavell, 26 June 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 224–5. (84.) Jenkins to Wavell, 29 June 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 226–7. (85.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, p. 1066. (86.) The Transfer of Power, vol. VII, p. 1075. (87.) Jenkins to Wavell, 9 July 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 243–4. (88.) Jenkins to Wavell, 26 August 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 268. (89.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 19 August 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, p. 256. (90.) Nehru to Wavell, 1 September 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 380–2. Page 36 of 38

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’ (91.) Note by Wavell, 14 October 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 720– 1. (92.) Master Tara Singh to Wavell, 30 October 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. VIII, pp. 838–9 (93.) Baldev Singh to Wavell, 9 November 1946, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 20. (94.) The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 131–4. (95.) The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 135 (96.) Jenkins to Wavell, 31 August 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 272–9. (97.) Jenkins to Wavell, 14 September 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 280. (98.) Jenkins to Wavell, 14 October 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 289. (99.) Jenkins to Wavell, 13–14 November 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 296–7. (100.) Jenkins to Wavell, 30 November 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 302. (101.) Jenkins to Sir Colville, 14 December 1946, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 307. (102.) Jenkins to Wavell, 26 January 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 326–31. (103.) Jenkins to Wavell, 29 January 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 331–5. (104.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 31 January 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 584. (105.) Jenkins to Wavell, 3 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), p. 341. (106.) Baldev Singh to Wavell, 6 February 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 626–7. (107.) Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, 8 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 342–3. (108.) Jenkins to Wavell, 12 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 343–4. (109.) Jenkins to Wavell, 15 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 344–50. (110.) Attlee to Wavell, 12 February 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 678–9. (111.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 14 February 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 712.

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‘Betrayal of the Sikhs’

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‘Divide and Quit’

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

‘Divide and Quit’ (February–May 1947) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0014

Abstract and Keywords The British Prime Minister’s statement of 20 February 1947 carried the implication of partition with independence by June 1948. Nehru welcomed the statement as ‘wise and courageous’ and the Congress Working Committee welcomed the declaration, adding that Sikh interests would be safeguarded. Master Tara Singh declared that there could be no settlement if the Muslims wanted to rule over the Punjab. Lord Mountbatten was prepared to work out a settlement on the basis of partition. In his meeting with the Governor General and the representatives of the Congress and the Muslim League on 2 June, Baldev Singh accepted partition in principle, suggesting exchange of population and property as the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. Mountbatten made it clear at a press conference later that the Labour Government would never subscribe to partition on the basis of landed property. Thus, population became virtually the sole criterion for partition. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Nehru, Congress Working Committee, Mountbatten, partition, Muslim League, Baldev Singh, terms of reference, Boundary Commission, Labour Government

Prime Minister Atlee’s statement on 20 February 1947 declared the intention of His Majesty’s Government to transfer power to responsible Indians by a date ‘not later than June 1948’. The British were in a haste to leave India. The statement of 20 February obliged the Unionist Premier, Sir Khizar Hayat Khan, to resign. Attempts to find alternatives to the Governor’s rule met with no success. Communal violence became a serious problem. In view of the clashing Page 1 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ concerns of the Muslim League and the Akalis, partition of the Punjab appeared to be inevitable. ‘Divide and Quit’ was Jinnah’s retort to ‘Quit India’. Now Master Tara Singh was equally insistent on division of the Punjab before Independence.

The British Plan Even before Attlee’s statement of 20 February 1947, the Punjab Governor, Sir Evan Jenkins, had commented on the draft of the proposed statement, shown to him by Sir George Abell, that the only definite point in the statement was that the British were to relinquish all power in India by 30 June 1948. The document was presumably intended to bring the Congress and the Muslims League up against reality and to force them to cooperate with one another. In his judgement, however, it would have ‘the diametrically opposite effect’. Jenkins’ particular concern was with the Punjab. ‘Here, the struggle for power has already begun,’ he said. The avowed aim of the Muslim League was undiluted Muslim rule; the Panthic Sikhs were determined to resist Muslim rule; and the Congress would side with them in provincial politics. In Jenkins’ well-considered view, no single community could rule the Punjab with its present boundaries except by conquest. The statement as it stood could lead to an explosion of great violence, a prelude to the final communal showdown. The only peaceful alternatives were (a) a government formed by a coalition (p.331) of all parties or by a non-communal party and (b) a partition.1 On 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in the House of Commons that it was the intention of His Majesty’s Government to transfer power to responsible Indian hands before the end of June 1948. It was essential, therefore, that all parties should sink their differences in order that they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibilities. If it appeared that a fully representative Constituent Assembly would not work out a Constitution before that time, His Majesty’s Government will have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government in British India should be handed over on the due date, whether as a whole to some form of Central Government for British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments in the best interests of the people.2 In other words, if the Muslim League persisted in boycotting the Constituent Assembly the door to partition of British India would be opened. Termination of the ‘war time appointment’ of Viscount Wavell was also announced at the same time. In his place, Viscount Mountbatten was appointed to take charge in March 1947, to mark the opening of ‘a new and final phase’ in the history of British rule in India.3 Jawaharlal Nehru’s reaction to the statement was released to the press on 22 February. The decision of the British Government, he said, was ‘wise and courageous’. In a letter to Krishna Menon on 23 February, Nehru wrote that it might ‘inevitably mean a division of Punjab and Bengal’.4 Clearly, Nehru thought

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‘Divide and Quit’ that the Prime Minister’s statement could lead to division of India and, inevitably, of the Punjab. Yet he welcomed the decision as ‘wise’. On Nehru’s initiative the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress resolved on 8 March 1947 to ‘welcome the declaration made on behalf of the British Government’. The Congress had made it clear already that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly, which was at work, would apply ‘only to those areas which accept it’. It had also been clarified that any province or part of a province which desired to join the Union could not be prevented from doing so. The Working Committee invited the All-India Muslim League to nominate representatives to meet representatives of the Congress in order to consider the situation that had arisen and to devise means to meet it. The Committee was to remain in close touch with the representatives of the Sikhs and other groups ‘for safeguarding their interests’.5 The Hindu Outlook made a telling comment on the resolution of the Congress Working Committee: ‘By its resolution on Clement Attlee’s statement the Congress has given a final blow to the integrity and unity of this ancient land and has surrendered Pakistan to the Muslims.’6 Nehru wrote to Wavell on 9 March 1947 that certain members of the Interim Government had actively participated in the Punjab agitation and encouraged the attempts to oust the coalition government. This was patently against constitutional procedure and wholly lacking in propriety. Any attempt now to set up a League Ministry in the Punjab would lead to conflict due to the fact that the Muslim League wanted ‘to make the whole of the Punjab a Pakistan area’ and wished ‘to use a League Ministry to that end’. Thus, the real issue was not the Ministry so much as territory. In Nehru’s view, a proper and fair solution appeared to be the division of the Punjab into a predominantly Muslim area and a predominantly non-Muslim area.7 According to Sumit Sarkar, the hint of partition ‘and possibly even Balkanization (p.332) into numerous states’ was clear in Atlee’s statement, but for the Congress leaders ‘the bait of complete transfer of power by a definite and a fairly early date proved to be too tempting to be refused’.8 However, Sarkar makes no comment on the early, almost immediate, concern of Jawaharlal Nehru with the partition of the Punjab. Combined with the partition of Bengal, it would result in a ‘moth-eaten’ Pakistan, but nonetheless a second sovereign state in the Indian subcontinent. Nehru’s initiative forestalled the Akali demand for some sort of a Sikh state. Sworn in on 24 March, Lord Mountbatten had informal talks with Nehru and Jinnah and with other political leaders. He held 133 interviews in two weeks. After a week in office he could see ‘little common ground on which to build any agreed solution for the future of India’. The only conclusion he could draw was that ‘unless I act quickly I may well find the real beginnings of a civil war on my Page 3 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ hands’. In the Governors’ Conference on 16 April even the quieter provinces felt that they were ‘sitting on the edge of a volcano’. The main craters were the Punjab, the NWFP, and Bengal. On 17 April, Mountbatten thought that if civil war was not averted there was a risk of complete breakdown of the administration. Therefore, ‘our decision must be announced before the end of May’. Second, if any attempt was made to impose the Cabinet Mission Plan on the Muslim League ‘they will resort to arms to resist it’. Third, the scheme of partition ‘should be such as will not debar the two sides from getting together, even before we transfer prower’.9 Mountbatten set up a special committee consisting of himself, Lord Ismay (Chief of the Viceroy’s Staff), Sir Eric Mieville (Principal Secretary of the Viceroy), and Sir George Abell (Private Secretary to the Governor General) to work on a draft plan to transfer power by June 1948. On the 1st of May 1947 Mountbatten wrote to the Secretary of State for India, the Earl of Listowel, that Ismay and Abell were coming to England to give a firsthand information on the situation. They were carrying with them the draft plan for the transfer of power.10 In his ‘Personal Report’ Mountbatten says that he had concentrated chiefly on meetings with Nehru, Patel, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, and Baldev Singh to get their suggestions, which were now embodied in the plan. Mieville had a satisfactory interview with Nehru, except on the subject of NWFP. Jinnah, however, protested strongly against the partition of the provinces and demanded that the Viceroy should immediately dissolve the Constituent Assembly. But he was not in a position to stop the plan moving forward. Therefore, Mountbatten was sending Ismay off on 2 May to be available to explain the Report to the Cabinet. ‘The essence of the plan is to make it apparent to the people of India and to the world in general that we are allowing, so far as possible, Indians themselves to choose how they wish us to transfer power.’ The provinces themselves were to decide if they wanted partition. Mountbatten thought it was essential to explain in his broadcast how Indian leaders had refused to agree on anything other than partition. He expected the Cabinet to give him the necessary authority to go ahead because every day now counted ‘if we are to prevent the communal conflict from spreading to unmanageable proportions’.11 During his two-day tour of the NWFP, Mountbatten had a long talk with Jenkins about the partitioning of the Punjab. The bone of contention was going to be the area between the Ravi and the Sutlej. It would be very difficult to produce a demarcation which (p.333) would be acceptable to both the parties, the Sikhs and the Muslim League (to Master Tara Singh and Jinnah). The Sikhs in their endeavours to have a real ‘Sikhistan’ (Sikh homeland) were very anxious to take a large part of the area where most of the land was owned by them but where the Muslim population predominated. ‘To this I am absolutely opposed,’ emphasized Mountbatten. The Sikhs wanted their holy places preserved for them, as well as Lahore, ‘the capital designate of Pakistan’. It was significant Page 4 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ that ‘when the Sikh delegation saw me they particularly asked that I should not decide whether the Sikhs would join Pakistan or Hindustan’. Jinnah told Mountbatten that an emissary had come to Giani Kartar Singh with a view to discuss about the future of ‘Sikhistan’. Liaqat Ali Khan hinted to Mieville that there was a chance of ‘Sikhistan’ joining up with Pakistan on very generous terms from the Muslim League. This could have the effect of avoiding partition.12 Nehru was staying at Mashobra near Simla as a private guest of the Viceroy. In strict confidence Mountbatten showed the ‘London Plan’ to him. Nehru wrote to Mountbatten on 11 May 1947 that he was good enough to speak to Nehru frankly and in a very friendly manner ‘last night’ and to give him the opportunity to see the tentative proposals (the plan worked out in London). Nehru said the proposals had produced ‘a devastating effect’ upon him and he reacted to them very strongly. An entirely new and frightening picture was presented in the proposals, ‘a picture of fragmentation and conflict and disorder, and, unhappily also, of a worsening relations between India and Britain’. Nehru was convinced that the proposals would be ‘bitterly disliked all over the country’. He indicated that he would send a brief note later.13 In his note Nehru pointed out that the whole approach had been changed completely: ‘The proposals start with rejection of an Indian Union as the successor to power and invite the claims of large number of succession states who are permitted to unite if they so wish in two or more States.’ All earlier British proposals had started with a United India, and the inroads into such unity were confined to (a) weakening the Centre and giving some sort of Group autonomy or (b) giving the freedom to certain areas, which were demonstrably against joining the Union, to create themselves into separate states. The present proposals virtually scrapped the Constituent Assembly which included all elements except the Muslim League. The obvious consequences of the proposals would be to (a) invite the Balkanization of India, (b) add to violence and disorder, (c) lead to breakdown of the central authority, and (d) demoralize the army, the police, and the Central Services.14 In view of Nehru’s strong reaction Mountbatten thought it was necessary to revise the draft plan. Rao Bahadur V.P. Menon was also in Simla as one of the Viceroy’s official advisers. He told Sir Eric Mieville that Patel might accept an offer of Dominion Status for the time being and that Nehru might not be unfavourable. Mountbatten flew to London on 14 May, taking V.P. Menon with him.15 In London, the Cabinet endorsed the plan after a brief discussion. Mountbatten returned to Delhi on 30 May with a revised plan to be placed before the Indian leaders, providing for two sovereign states in the Indian subcontinent and partition of the Punjab and Bengal.

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‘Divide and Quit’ Governor’s Rule in the Punjab In an interview with Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din on 18 February 1947, Jenkins underlined that (p.334) the Muslim League agitation might dislodge the Unionist Ministry, but the League would have no support from the Hindus or the Sikhs in forming a government. Nazim-ud-Din believed that the Muslim League would be glad to enter the government if the other parties, particularly the Sikhs, would cooperate. Jenkins explained that the nationalist or Congress Sikhs and the Communists were perhaps the least important. The Akalis were by far the most important Sikh party, and dominant among them now was Giani Kartar Singh (as President of the Akali Dal). He had been in favour of some rapprochement with the League in the recent past but in view of the League agitation he was now advocating a separate Sikh state. Nazim-ud-Din said that the League leaders were aggrieved at the conduct of the Coalition Ministry ever since it took office in 1946. Jenkins emphasized that if the Muslim League really wanted a settlement, they had to be reasonable. The Muslims in the Punjab were entitled to leadership due to their numerical majority but they had to treat the non-Muslim minorities as partners and not as inferiors or subordinates.16 Jenkins had a further talk with Nazim-ud-Din on 19 February, and found him much less amiable than he was the day before. Finally, a settlement was announced on 26 February and the agitation was called off. The ban on public meetings was removed but not on processions. All prisoners detained under trial or convicted in connection with the agitation were released, but not those accused or convicted for more serious offences. Legislation was to be introduced to replace the ordinances.17 Giani Kartar Singh saw the Home Secretary, Macdonald, on 26 February and said that the Sikhs were prepared for an alliance with the Muslims only on suitable terms. In a cabinet with a Muslim Premier the Sikhs must have parity with Muslims, guaranteed by the British Government. For a more accurate assessment of the Sikh position, Jenkins spoke to Swaran Singh on the day following. He said that the announcement of 20 February had ‘destroyed the foundations of everything and had removed the possibility of any effective sanctions to a settlement’. The Sikhs would not allow the Muslims to seize the Punjab for themselves. The agitation had exposed the Muslim League for the kind of treatment that the Sikhs as a minority might expect from the Muslim extremists. He admitted that civil war would lead to widespread misery but he did not see how the Sikhs could be partners with the Muslims on any terms in the absence of some effective sanctions. He felt that partition with all its disadvantages might prove to be the only remedy. Jenkins advised him to persuade the Sikhs not to commit themselves, and told him that the Governor was always ready to see Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh if they wanted to discuss the Sikh position with him.18

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‘Divide and Quit’ On 2 March, Malik Khizar Hayat Khan called on the Governor at 10:15 p.m. and resigned. He stated that he had accepted the Governor’s invitation to head a coalition government as the leader of a non-communal party. But in view of the announcement of 20 February it was only fair that ‘all political parties in the province should have a chance of evolving between them an administration which should be ready to receive sovereign power from H.M.G. as soon as the process of transfer commences’. Indeed, involvement of the Muslim League in this process as the Muslim-majority party had become necessary. Jenkins asked the Premier to remain in office and to persuade his colleagues to do (p.335) so until efforts to form a new Ministry had been made. On 3 March the assembly was adjourned sine die.19 Jenkins saw Bhim Sen Sachar who said that the Congress could not cooperate with the Muslim League unless it was clear that the minorities would be treated as equals and not as inferiors. Swaran Singh saw Jenkins and said that the Sikhs must have a clear idea of the Muslim League’s plan for the future of the Punjab and the Sikh position in that plan. ‘The Sikhs had no intention of being treated as serfs under Muslim masters.’ Jenkins asked Mamdot to form a Ministry in time to pass the budget before the end of March. Meanwhile, Jenkins sought guidance from Wavell on whether or not to allow Mamdot to form a Ministry with a majority of legislators but without support from the Congress or the Panthic Sikhs.20 Master Tara Singh says in his Merī Yād that the Sikhs and Hindus were much worried after the resignation of Sir Khizar Hayat. The Panthic members of the assembly met at Sardar Swaran Singh’s residence. The Muslim League sent messages, suggesting that there would be four Muslim Ministers, three Sikh Ministers, and one Hindu Minister and that too a Jatt. But the Sikhs were not prepared to accept the rule of Muslim majority. Master Tara Singh was totally opposed to any compromise with the Muslim League. It had become clear by then that Pakistan was going to be created and the whole of the Punjab would go to Pakistan, Therefore, it was decided to oppose the formation of a Muslim League government. Master Tara Singh went to the Punjab Assembly with the legislators where a unanimous decision was taken to oppose the formation of a League government. Master Tara Singh suggested that opposition to the League should start immediately as the only way to allay Sikh–Hindu fears and despair. All came out shouting ‘Pakistan Murdabad’. The Muslim crowd moved towards them. Mian Iftikharuddin intervened and the crowd moved away. Master Tara Singh was holding a kirpān at that time and the rumour spread in the city that he had torn the Muslim League flag. In fact, there was no such flag and the question of it being torn did not arise. There was no occasion for unsheathing the sword. The incident created a lot of enthusiasm and a huge meeting of Sikhs and Hindus was held at Kapurthala House on the night of 3 March. Master Tara Singh addressed this gathering of about a lakh of people. On the following day, he contradicted the rumour about the Muslim League flag having been torn by Page 7 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ him but it had no effect.21 Sadhu Singh Hamdard, who was an eyewitness, supports his statement in all its essentials and appreciates the courage of Master Tara Singh.22 However, there are still some people who believe that Master Tara Singh had torn the Muslim League flag on 3 March 1947. On 3 March, Muslims in Lahore were jubilant and noisy. Non-Muslims, especially Sikhs, were exasperated. At night, a very large meeting was held at which violent speeches were made by Congress and Sikh leaders. This was the meeting mentioned by Master Tara Singh in his Merī Yād. Jenkins could see that the Congress and the Akalis were determined to resist Muslim rule. Mamdot had made no progress in forming a coalition, and wanted a Muslim League Ministry supported by a handful of Scheduled Caste and Indian Christian legislators. In Jenkins’ view, Section 93 (Governor’s rule) was an alternative. It would not be satisfactory but ‘might possibly be preferred by Punjabis generally’.23 On 5 March, Jenkins informed Wavell that Coalition Ministers had resigned a day earlier and (p.336) he was left without a Ministry.24 He was not inclined to risk the kind of Ministry suggested by Mamdot without support from the Akalis or the Congress. With Wavell’s concurrence, Jenkins prorogued the assembly and made Proclamation under Section 93.25 Wavell sent a telegram to Pethick-Lawrence on 5 March that the Punjab Governor had asked Mamdot to form a Ministry and report progress by 8 March. Jenkins had suggested that His Majesty’s Government should give serious consideration to their policy and decide whether or not to have Governor’s rule in preference to an unstable Ministry under Mamdot. Wavell proposed to send Abell to Lahore on 6 March to instruct the Governor that Mamdot should be allowed to take office if he produced parliamentary majority even though it might be unsatisfactory. If the Governor did go into Section 93 in consultation with Wavell, he should make it clear that order would be maintained strictly. The Governor should give a fair run to the Ministry by giving support to the Ministry in the event of serious disorders.26 Pethick-Lawrence agreed with Wavell and Attlee ‘approved it the same day’.27 On 6 March, Wavell was more inclined towards Section 93. ‘The worst of Section 93 is that it may be difficult to get out of it.’ But he was not prepared to recommend inviting Mamdot to form a Ministry ‘until he can produce an assured majority’.28 Increasing incidents of violence in the Punjab influenced Wavell to prefer Section 93. On 7 March, Pethick-Lawrence agreed with Wavell that there was no alternative to Section 93. However, a genuine Muslim–Sikh Coalition could ease the situation. But no such Ministry could be formed immediately and the situation was changing rapidly. Wavell could use his discretion as the occasion demanded.29 On 8 March, Wavell sent a telegram to Jenkins telling him that the Secretary of State had agreed that the Governor may stay in Section 93 ‘for a few days at any rate’ and that it was desirable to negotiate for a coalition. Wavell advised Jenkins not to give a written memorandum to anyone unless the League Page 8 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ was prepared to negotiate on ‘the big issues’.30 Wavell entirely agreed with Jenkins about the contents of his ‘note’ written a day earlier and sent to Wavell. On a suggestion from Sardar Ujjal Singh, Jenkins had prepared a paper about the terms of a possible settlement. He argued that only two peaceful solutions were possible: (a) a united Punjab under a Constitution and a government that all communities would accept, and (b) an agreed partition of the Punjab between Muslims and non-Muslims. Partition would solve no problem, he said, and it made really no sense. Suggesting the basic principles of a coalition and the ground for negotiations, Jenkins concluded that, given goodwill and common sense, the Punjab could be kept united and governed by a Ministry acceptable to Punjabis.31 However, when Jenkins asked Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh on 8 March about the prospects of settlement, they said that the Sikhs could have nothing to do with the League because they were suffering heavy causalities at the hands of Muslims. On 9 March, Jenkins wrote to Wavell that the Sikhs regarded the Muslim League agitation and the present communal disturbances as an attack particularly on them. The CWC resolution of 8 March, which demanded partition of the Punjab, was accompanied by a joint statement of the Congress and Sikh leaders that in no circumstances would they be willing to give the slightest assurance or support to the Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry. In the light of these developments a ‘coalition (p.337) now seemed most improbable’. Mamdot, Daultana, and Firoz saw the Governor on 10 March and said that their overtures had been rebuffed.32 In his letter of 12 March, Wavell mentioned to Pethick-Lawrence that Nehru had suggested on 10 March that two Ministries could be set up in the Punjab on regional basis. He had no idea of the administrative difficulties of such a proposal.33 On 14 March, Jenkins wrote that there was no immediate prospect of a new Ministry. At the end of the month, the Muslim League seemed to be divided into two schools. Ghazanfar Ali, and others like him, thought of a purely Muslim Ministry as the result of fresh elections. Mamdot and Daultana recognized that the non-Muslims, particularly the Sikhs, could make it quite impossible for a Muslim government to carry on. They were likely to approach the Sikhs again but it was most improbable that the Sikhs would cooperate with them in any way.34 Mamdot wrote to Jenkins on 24 April 1947 that the situation had returned to almost normal and there was no longer any justification for not forming a Ministry. He claimed to have majority support and a keen desire to secure the cooperation of Sikh and Hindu representatives in the formation of a fully representative Ministry. Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that the formation of a Ministry proposed by Mamdot would unquestionably precipitate non-Muslim rebellion of extreme violence. The situation had changed radically since 5 March Page 9 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ and all communities were preparing for the final struggle. Therefore, though he doubted that Mamdot had majority in the assembly, he proposed to tell Mamdot that a communal Ministry could not carry on in the Punjab until the Viceroy’s discussions with the leaders were concluded. On 26 March, Mountbatten informed Jenkins of Jinnah’s interview with him in which Jinnah had asked that Mamdot should not see Jenkins before seeing the Viceroy. In Jenkins’ view, Jinnah’s move was intended to increase the importance of the Muslim League and to transfer direct control of the Punjab from the Governor to the Viceroy. Jenkins suggested that the Viceroy might meet Mamdot alone. Mamdot saw Jenkins on 28 March and produced figures for his alleged majority: eighty-four Muslims, four scheduled castes, and three Christians. Jenkins told him that a Ministry without the Congress and the Sikhs could not be stable and he was not willing to accept a communal Ministry. Mamdot finally observed that the Muslims were not going to accept partition of the Punjab and a civil war was inevitable. He saw no reason why Jenkins should prevent the Muslims from fighting for ‘what they regarded as their rights’.35 On 28 March, Mamdot wrote to the Governor, asking for a final answer to the questions raised in his letter of the 24th. He talked of his constitutional right to prove his majority on the floor of the House. He was willing to cooperate with the Congress on the same basis as the Hindu majority would cooperate with the Muslim League in other provinces. He could make further efforts to reach a settlement with the Sikhs but he could not accept ‘their unreasoning veto on the functioning of democracy in the Punjab’. Jenkins sent to the Viceroy copies of Mamdot’s letters with a draft of his reply to him. His draft reply was carefully worded, restating the essential points raised by Mamdot and responding to them one by one. Referring to the ‘direct action’ in the League agitation of January and February 1947, Jenkins did not see how the Muslim League could expect the Sikhs and Hindus to respect the principles which the (p.338) Muslims had themselves discarded. A fresh starting point in the Punjab was possible only if the Congress, the Sikhs, and the Muslim League could arrive at some agreement about the future of India. The reply ends with the conclusion that ‘no Ministry should be formed immediately’ but the situation should be reviewed ‘as soon as the all-India position was clear’.36 Mountbatten saw Jinnah on 26 April 1947 to discuss Mamdot’s offer to form a Ministry. He told Jinnah that after his talk with Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh he was convinced that any attempt to impose a mainly onecommunity government on the Sikhs would produce immediate retaliation which might end in civil war. He went on to say that there was the great probability that Pakistan would emerge with a partition of the Punjab. There was no point in having a brief period of Muslim League Government in the Punjab which could result only in bloodshed. He added that nothing would induce him to change his mind and he proposed to instruct the Governor accordingly. Jinnah told him that Giani Kartar Singh had sent a private emissary to Jinnah to suggest that they Page 10 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ should hold discussions about the Sikh state joining Pakistan after partition. Jinnah had accepted Giani Kartar Singh’s message to see him in Delhi. He was gratified that the Sikhs liked him personally and had always trusted him. He had publicly stated, he said, that he would support the Sikhs against the Muslims any time they took unfair action against the Sikhs.37 Jenkins had sent his reply to Mamdot on 7 May 1947. He consulted Jinnah at Delhi and wrote to Jenkins on 14 May that he did not agree with some of the conclusions drawn by Jenkins. He was surprised that Jenkins should have any doubt as to the substance of his invitation of 3 March. He questioned the grounds on which any doubt could be entertained about his having an absolute majority. After Malik Khizar Hayat’s statement of 11 May, Mamdot claimed to have the support of ninety-eight members. Khizar had stated that the Muslim League party had his support and that of his Muslim colleagues for the formation of a Ministry. Mamdot charged Jenkins with partiality towards Hindus and Sikhs in postponing the formation of a Ministry. He asserted that Section 93 was being used to coerce, oppress, and intimidate the Muslims. He could not accept Jenkins’ conclusion that no Ministry could be formed immediately. He concluded his letter with a request to be formally invited to form a Ministry. Jenkins’ draft reply, a copy of which he sent to Mountbatten, was brief. He reiterated that ‘we should do nothing here to prejudice all-India agreement’ but to review the situation as soon as the all-India position was clear.38 The case of a Muslim League Ministry was finally closed. Jawaharlal Nehru had a different plan. He had visited the Punjab during 14–16 March 1947. According to Jenkins, he conferred with the Hindus and never seemed to hear more than one side of any question. Jenkins believed, in fact, that Nehru, ‘like most Congressmen’, was at heart ‘intensely communal’. He talked to Jenkins on 14 and 16 March. Concerning the immediate situation, he advocated martial law in disturbed areas, like Rawalpindi, but he was unaware of the conditions under which it could be imposed. For long-term problems and purposes he said that some sort of partition was inevitable but it must be made within the framework of the present Constitution and by methods which could be established by convention and not by legislation. He thought that a Muslim Area, a Central Area, and a Non-Muslim Area (p.339) should be recognized, and each area with its own Ministers should be autonomous for certain purposes. For common concerns, the Ministers of the three Areas should sit jointly. Nehru also said that he had talked to Master Tara Singh and he too felt that a ‘notional partition’ might work.39 Jawaharlal Nehru seems to have asked Sir B.N. Rau to prepare a plan for the consideration of Lord Mountbatten. On 25 March, Rau gave Lord Ismay a copy of the note he had recently prepared for the Viceroy to see. Rau’s plan was to extend the Cabinet Mission’s plan for the Centre to the provincial sphere. Its purpose was to maintain ‘a single Centre for dealing with a few subjects of AllPage 11 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ India importance and leaving other subjects to be dealt with on a regional basis’. In a province with distinct regions, whether racial, linguistic, or religious, most of the provincial subjects could be dealt within a region and a minimum number of essential subjects on a joint basis. The plan suggested by Rau did not require any new legislation.40 A copy of Rau’s scheme for regional administration was sent by Abell to Abbot for Jenkins’ comment. Abbot sent to Abell on 31 March a note prepared by the Governor. It related to three aspects of the plan: (a) its political acceptability, (b) its administrative working, and (c) the timing of its introduction. An examination of the plan led Jenkins to some important conclusions: (a) the plan would not be acceptable to all parties and politicians, (b) it was administratively bad, and (c) there could be ‘no satisfactory solution, short-term or long-term, except by consent or acquiescence’.41 Sardar Swaran Singh and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar issued a statement on 21 April 1947 which was handed over to Jenkins by the Viceroy at Rawalpindi for his comment. It was essentially a demand that ‘as an interim and transitional arrangement’ the Governor General should install immediately two or three regional administrations with separate Ministers under the Governor for the two or three zones of the existing Province of the Punjab. Jenkins pointed out that this was much the same idea as the one put forward by Sir B.N. Rau. Jawaharlal Nehru, very well aware of the implications of the demand, had agreed with Jenkins in March that the main use of the plan might be to serve as ‘a bridge between Section 93 and some entirely new system of Government’. The difficulties involved in the plan were the same as pointed out by Jenkins in the case of Rau’s scheme. If the intention was to amend the Government of India Act of 1935 to create a new province or provinces, it would amount simply to a demand for partition.42

Communal Violence As we noticed earlier, Jenkins wrote to Pethick-Lawrence that the Muslims in Lahore were jubilant and noisy on 3 March 1947. The non-Muslims, especially the Sikhs, were correspondingly exasperated and a very large meeting was held by them at night in which violent speeches were made by the Congress and Sikh leaders. On 4 March, a procession of students, mostly Hindus, clashed with the police and raided the police station later. The police opened fire and three demonstrators were wounded. Non-Muslim crowds were moving about, tearing down Muslim League flags and badges of Muslim Leaguers. Rioting broke out in the city. Six men were reported dead and twenty seriously injured. Coalition Ministers called on the Governor and told him that their resignations must take effect forthwith. There was no Ministry now. On 5 March, riots broke out in Multan and (p.340) Amritsar. The situation in Lahore worsened, with many dead and widespread arsons. ‘We shall be lucky’, wrote Jenkins to Wavell, ‘if we escape communal rioting throughout Punjab on unprecedented scale’.43

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‘Divide and Quit’ Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Wavell on 7 March 1947 that the belated and interminable enquiries into communal disturbances served little useful purpose and were only likely to prolong the communal feeling aroused by the disturbances. The Muslim League’s report on the disturbances in Bihar and the United Provinces between October and November 1946 had been circulated widely in England by the Muslim India Information Centre and quoted during the debate in the House of Lords.44 These reports were current in the Punjab as well. On 10 March, Master Tara Singh was reported to have said at Amritsar that ‘civil war’ had begun. The murder of Labh Singh, a former President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), in Jullundur was probably the main cause of his resentment. The 11th of March was observed as AntiPakistan Day and the Sikhs were intensely excited. Master Tara Singh, who was in Lahore on 11 March, was again talking in terms of ‘civil war’.45 Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 12 March that the Punjab had a bad week, with disturbances in Lahore and Multan, riots and arson in Amritsar, and considerable trouble elsewhere. The Rawalpindi area was specially marked by Muslim attacks on Hindus and Sikhs. There was a political dimension to this situation. The central Punjab was really ‘the battle ground for Pakistan’. Wavell was anxious about the possible effects on the Indian army if the trouble continued and spread widely.46 Nehru wrote to Wavell on 13 March that in the Frontier Province the agitation led by the Muslim League had definitely taken a communal turn. Its demand was to refund the fines realized from the Nandihar tribes in the Hazara area and the return of a Sikh woman who had been raped and forcibly converted to Islam. ‘No government can agree to such demands, whatever the consequences.’47 In the first two weeks of March 1947, the number of casualties officially reported in the Punjab was 2,156 (1,506 of these in cities and towns and 650 in the rural areas). The number of the dead was 1,046 (524 in urban areas and 522 in the rural). The number of seriously injured was 1,110 (982 in the urban centres and 128 in rural areas). The number and proportion of Muslims in both categories was rather small: 110 dead and 135 seriously injured, mostly in towns and cities. The news from the Rawalpindi and Attock districts was really bad. In the Taxila-Murree-Gujar Khan triangle there was ‘a regular butchery of nonMuslims, particularly Sikhs’.48 Lieutenant-General F.W. Messervy, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, in his note on the disturbances in the northern Punjab remarked that the first cause was politico-religious: the Muslim League propaganda on religious lines for some time. Muslim feelings were roused to a pitch of fanaticism when the intensive Muslim League campaign forced the resignation of the Unionist Government, and Master Tara Singh and other Sikh Page 13 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ leaders gave anti-Pakistan statements. Two minor causes were (a) scarcity of cloth and some items of food due to black marketeering by the Hindu–Sikh bania community and (b) the ‘goonda’ element which was always ready to take advantage of disturbances to practise arson, loot, and dacoity. Attacks in the cities were fiercer, more sudden, and more savage. In the rural areas attacks were launched by large (p.341) mobs of Muslim peasants to destroy and loot Sikh and Hindu shops in their area. In some cases savagery was carried to extreme: men, women, and children were hacked or beaten to death or burned in their houses. There were a number of cases of forcible conversion of males and abduction of females. There was a widespread desire to rid many areas of all Sikhs and Hindus, entirely forever. The police in rural areas had shown partiality, about 90 per cent of the police personnel being Muslim. Junior officials too were generally partial. Pensioners and ex-soldiers were heavily involved in disturbances. About 40,000 persons were made homeless and destitute.49 Firoz Khan Noon saw Jenkins on 24 March and tried complacently to develop the theory that Hindus and Sikhs, particularly the latter, were aggressors everywhere but he could not account for the number of non-Muslim corpses.50 At the end of March the situation came under control in all those districts and cities where rioting had taken place. But there were rumblings below the surface. The Muslims were infatuously complacent. They blamed Master Tara Singh for his violent statements which set things off and the Sikhs for making a great parade of their kirpāns. Some bad speeches were being made in mosques, and some members of the Muslim League liked to see further trouble. The Hindus and Sikhs were acting together. They saw no justification for the general massacre in the Rawalpindi Division. There were about 40,000 refugees from the Division.51 It was clear before the middle of April 1947 that some of the Sikh leaders were preparing for violent action. Both Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh had advocated retaliation against the Muslims and both had been in touch with the rulers of the Sikh states. A Gurmukhi pamphlet, distributed by Giani Kartar Singh to Akali Jathedars and Secretaries from all over the Punjab and the Sikh states, gave details of what the Sikhs had faced in the districts of Attock, Rawalpindi, and Jhelum: murders, suicide by Sikh women, forcible conversions to Islam, arson, plunder, and destruction of property. There were thousands of Sikhs in relief camps, including women, young girls, and children. The Sikhs were asked to read all this and think: ‘What have you to do under the circumstance? In your veins there is yet the blood of your beloved Guru Gobind Singh ji. Do your duty.’ In another pamphlet printed in the Urdu Ajīt of 5 April (which was not distributed), the Sikhs were exhorted to do their duty to the Guru’s Panth. The bloody carnage (ghallūghāra) which had occurred in the Pothohar and the Frontier was too painful to be described. For action, money Page 14 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ was needed to the tune of 50 lakhs by the day of Baisakhi. Contributions could be sent to Sardar Baldev Singh or Sardar Bhag Singh of Gurdaspur. The list of signatories was headed by Master Tara Singh and it included the names of seventeen other Sikh leaders.52 A note sent by Jenkins to Mountbatten on 16 April 1947 states that the total number of dead was not known but the latest figure was just under 3,000 and the final figure might be 3,500. The communal proportions were not accurately reported but he believed that among the dead there were six non-Muslims for every Muslim. In many villages of the Rawalpindi Division the Sikhs had been ‘herded into houses and burnt alive’. Many Sikhs had their hair and beards cut and there were cases of forcible circumcision. Many Sikh women who escaped slaughter were abducted. The Muslim League made no efforts to maintain peace.53 (p.342) On 20 April, Maharaja Yadvindra Singh told Mountbatten that about 20,000 Sikh refugees from ‘the massacre areas’ of the Punjab were a problem for him to settle. He added that he was trying to keep Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh in order but they were apt to be inflammatory. They and the Raja of Faridkot were foolishly planning to grab territory on the departure of the British.54 On 24 April, Mountbatten wrote in his ‘Personal Report’ that he had an interview with Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh. On 20 April, the Raja of Faridkot had handed him a letter received from Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh in which they exhorted the Raja to ‘take over the entire policy, organisation and safety of life and property regarding the districts of Ludhiana, Firozpur and portions of Lahore and its administration’. It appeared that preparation for civil war were going on.55 On 6 May, Mountbatten warned Baldev Singh that if the Sikhs made trouble or tried to start a communal war, he would crush them with all the power at his command, and he would instruct Baldev Singh as Defence Member to turn out the Army and the Air Force to fight them.56 On 12 May 1947, Master Tara Singh issued a statement that the Sikhs had been special targets of the League terrorists and hired assassins. There was no end to their acts of barbarity and bestiality under the garb of ‘civil disobedience’. In the interest of peace and welfare of the country, it had become imperative for Master Tara Singh to tell the authorities that no amount of reasoning could convince the Hindus and the Sikhs that the forces of disorder could not be suppressed by the authorities. The Sikhs expected the higher officials to deal properly with delinquent local officials and law breakers but those expectations had been belied, and confidence of the Hindu and Sikh minorities had not been restored. Their despair had found unmistakable expression in ‘the wholesale exodus’ from several districts of the NWFP and the Punjab. Master Tara Singh assured the authorities that the Sikhs could ensure peace within a few days if the police and the army allowed them to act freely and did not subject them to Page 15 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ the ‘double tyranny of hooliganism and police’. He appreciated the remarkable restraint shown by the Sikhs. Urged by sheer sense of duty to his country and his community, Master Tara Singh made his last appeal to the government and the Muslim League to save the situation which had grown explosive in the highest degree.57 The Punjab Governor responded to Master Tara Singh’s statement by inviting him to a meeting of party leaders to take a more definite line in purely law and order matters, particularly in Amritsar. The Governor proposed to hold meetings on 14 May 1947 separately with the Sikh and Muslim League leaders before a joint discussion with other leaders was arranged. Master Tara Singh expressed his regret over missing an opportunity to place his viewpoint before the Governor at the stipulated time because his movements were being watched by the Muslim League for some ‘mischievous object’. But, after his return from Delhi, he would meet the Governor without intimating him of the day and the time. He added that he would not be a party to ‘any hypocritical statement’ like the one issued recently by Mahatma Gandhi and Jinnah ‘with the bitter result known to the world’. The joint peace appeal by Gandhi and Jinnah had appeared on 15 April 1947, denouncing for all time the use of force for political ends by any community. But none of the Muslim League leaders had condemned (p.343) the unprecedented atrocities, barbarities, and murders committed by their followers in the western Punjab. Master Tara Singh would ‘not lick the hand besmeared with the blood of my innocent children, sisters and brothers’. He had no faith in the sincerity of the Muslim League leaders. Therefore, there was no point in meeting them in a conference even for peace.58 In the second week of May 1947 violent activity had reappeared in Amritsar and tension had increased in Lahore due to the events in Amritsar. There was tension ‘almost everywhere’ outside Amritsar and Lahore. Jenkins reported to Mountbatten on 15 May: ‘The hope of a settlement is very faint indeed, since the Muslim League leaders have no sense at all, and Tara Singh is almost hysterical.’ In Jenkins’ opinion, the Sikh organization would become the most formidable of the important ‘private armies’ in the Punjab: the RSS, the Muslim League National Guards, the Khaksars, and the Akal Sena.59 On 17 May, Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins that he had spoken very strongly to Baldev Singh about the way in which Master Tara Singh had refused to cooperate with Jenkins and Muslim leaders in trying to control disturbances. Baldev Singh explained that Master Tara Singh had been threatened by the Muslims and he could not agree to meet them. Mountbatten added that Baldev Singh, the Maharaja of Patiala, and the Raja of Faridkot had promised to do all they could to keep the Sikhs peaceful.60

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‘Divide and Quit’ Master Tara Singh saw Jenkins on 19 May 1947 after his return from Delhi and said that there could be no solution because neither the Muslims nor the Sikhs in the Punjab would submit to communal domination. He turned to the probable consequences of the Viceroy’s talks with the leaders, and asked Jenkins to help the Sikhs over the partition of the Punjab. Jenkins said that he could not see how the non-Muslims could possibly get more than the Ambala and Jullundur Divisions, the Amritsar district, and perhaps parts of Gurdaspur and Lahore districts. Master Tara Singh felt that the Punjab might drift into chaos. He had earlier said that the Muslims in Pakistan would massacre all Sikhs and Hindus, and in other parts of the Punjab the Sikhs and Hindus would massacre all the Muslims. Jenkins said that it was a hopeless idea.61 Liaqat Ali Khan saw Jenkins on 25 May and asserted that the Muslims were not the aggressors. However, the official figures of deaths due to disturbances since March were about 3,600 and no more than 600 of the dead were Muslims, and the loss of Muslim property in the total loss of Rs 100 to 150 millions was less than 5 per cent. The Muslim League had not even apologized for the Rawalpindi massacres. Liaqat AIi Khan believed that there would be ‘civil war’.62 Jenkins reported to Mountbatten on 31 May 1947 that serious communal disturbances had continued in Lahore and Amritsar during the second half of May. Nearly all districts reported acute uneasiness. The general impression that the Punjab would be partitioned had intensified the communal split.63 Given the aspirations, concerns, and attitudes of the Muslim League and the Akalis there was little hope of any amicable settlement. A vicious circle was created in which communal tensions led to the demand for partition and the increasing possibility of partition intensified the communal rift.

The Akalis Insist on Partition Jenkins briefed the new Viceroy that the most important party among the Sikhs was the (p.344) Akali Dal and its more powerful wing was headed by Master Tara Singh, ‘probably the Sikh leader with the greatest personal following’. Giani Kartar Singh was a typical party ‘boss’. He had secured an absolute majority in the recent elections to the Shiromani Akali Dal. In any negotiations with the Sikh community the persons to get hold of were Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh.64 On 3 April 1947, Pethick-Lawrence wrote to Mountbatten that he had seen a statement by Master Tara Singh in which he supported partition. Jenkin’s argument in favour of a coalition of all the three communities was important but it was bound to break down ‘if we failed to get an all-India settlement’. Therefore, in spite of its grave practical difficulties and dangers, partition of the Punjab ‘to such degree and such a form as will satisfy the rival nationalism in the Province’ was really unavoidable from the political point of view of the transfer of authority in June 1948. This was merely an indication of the way in Page 17 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ which Pethick-Lawrence’s own mind was working and he was open to conviction. For consideration with his colleagues he would be glad, he said, to have Mountbatten’s views in the light of a discussion with the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal, the latter because partition of the Punjab would implicate partition of Bengal for similar reasons.65 On 10 April 1947, the Punjab Governor wrote a note for the Viceroy that the Sikhs were extraordinarily important in the Punjab. They were a compact militant community with landed and other economic interests in the heart of the province. Their total population, including the Sikhs of the Punjab states, was over five million. They would apparently acquiesce in any agreement between the British Government, the Congress, and the Muslim League only on two conditions. First, that they should have a right of communal veto in any Constituent Assembly; second, they demanded immediate partition of the Punjab. The first condition was entirely reasonable, but partition, in Jenkins’ view, would not be beneficial in the long run. In his interview with Jenkins, Giani Kartar Singh had indicated in a general way that he wanted a non-Muslim state with nearly the whole of the Sikh country included in it. The districts of Rohtak and Gurgaon and about half each of Karnal and Hissar districts could be kept out, like the Lahore city. Nankana Sahib with its neighbouring villages should be a ‘free city’. Transfer of population could take place, especially between the Sikh population of Lyallpur district and the Muslim population of Montgomery district. He made it absolutely clear that the Sikhs would not accept an arrangement that placed them under the domination of another community.66 In a note of the same date Jenkins visualized the inevitability of partition and suggested steps to be taken if partition of the Punjab became unavoidable.67 Mountbatten met Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh on 18 April and told them that they had a warm place in his heart ‘since the Sikh units had bought with such magnificent gallantry in S.E. Asia’. When he asked them about the Punjab situation they began with a long tale of woe of how the Sikhs had been treated by the Muslims. They would accept nothing that would put them under Muslim domination. To begin with, they complained that 73 per cent of the police personnel were Muslims; 6,000 men were proposed to be added to 32,000 policemen; the Sikh leaders felt that all the 6,000 should be non-Muslims. Mountbatten undertook to write to the Governor (p.345) about this. For measures of general safety and protection, Mountbatten invited the Defence Member to explore the situation. Baldev Singh stated that Jinnah had accepted the principle of the transfer of populations in the Punjab. About 20,000 Sikhs had fled from Muslim-dominated areas and taken refuge in Patiala. Mountbatten said that he would go into this but pointed out the appalling difficulties involved in such a form of partition. They pointed out that Pakistan would be even more difficult to effect. Mountbatten replied that if he was reluctantly driven to accept Pakistan, he would certainly agree to the partition of the Punjab. But he would resist this if the Cabinet Mission Plan or any Page 18 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ comparable plan were accepted. The Sikh leaders discussed the matter of safeguards and finally said that they would give up their insistence on partition only if they were given adequate safeguards against being dominated by the Muslims. If it was decided on Pakistan and partition, Mountbatten agreed to give them the choice of joining either Pakistan or Hindustan.68 On 24 April, Mountbatten referred to his interview with the Sikh leaders and remarked: ‘Any hopes that I still had of being able to avoid the partition of the Punjab if Pakistan is forced on us were shattered at this meeting; all the three Sikhs made it quite clear that they would fight to the last man if put under Muslim domination.’ They considered that the Cabinet Mission had let them down badly and, on this subject, they presented a book titled Betrayal of the Sikhs, written by Landen Sarsfield. ‘They have encyclopaedic knowledge of every letter that passed with the Secretary of State and all the statements made on the subject in the House of Commons and brought with them copies of Hansard and all the correspondence.’ They were particularly bitter about the provision made for Muslims and Hindus with regard to any major communal issue which was denied to the Sikhs, even though they had been given the status of the only other major community. They wanted the same right of communal veto on questions affecting their interests.69 Baldev Singh wrote a detailed letter to Mountbatten on 27 April 1947. Outlining the background since the Cabinet Mission, Baldev Singh underscored the assurance given to Master Tara Singh by the Cabinet Mission and Lord Wavell that Sikh interests would in no circumstances be ignored. He hoped now that Lord Mountbatten could keep those assurances in view when making his final proposals in regard to the division of the Punjab. He put forth two basic considerations for demarcation: (a) landed property held respectively by nonMuslims and Muslims in the Punjab as a whole and (b) the population strength of non-Muslims and Muslims in the Punjab as a whole. The population of nonMuslims in the Punjab was at least 44 per cent. The non-Muslims paid Rs 21,844,913 out of the total revenues of Rs 43,813,977. The non-Muslims owned 80 per cent of the urban property. Their total share was thus over 50 per cent. Half of the total area of the Punjab was 49,544 out of 99,089 square miles. The claim of the non-Muslims on the three Divisions of Ambala, Jullundur, and Lahore was incontrovertible.70 Mountbatten discussed the letter with Jenkins who minuted as follows: This shows why the partition of the Punjab would mean civil war. The Sikhs haven’t a majority in any district. They want—on the religious grounds like the Muslims—to take over and dominate areas in which they are a minority. The Bari Doab—the area between the Ravi and the Beas comprising Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore and Montgomery—would become

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‘Divide and Quit’ a battle-ground, and Baldev Singh (p.346) evidently wants to go well west of the Ravi. This won’t work.71 Giani Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh, and Ujjal Singh met Lord Ismay on 30 April in a high state of excitement about the partition of the Punjab. They said that this should not be done merely on the basis of counting of heads. Landed property and ancient shrines were factors to be borne in mind. Interim arrangements in their view were of vital importance. The solution they suggested was that Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions could go to the Muslims, Ambala and Jullundur Divisions could go to non-Muslims, and the Lahore Division could be kept under a joint council until such time as a Boundary Commission had been able to report on frontiers and transfer of populations. Ismay suggested that the position of the Sikhs called for renewed consideration and he was inclined to raise this point at the Staff Meeting on 1 May.72 At the end of April, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that the Sikhs had committed themselves to the partition of the Punjab so deeply that it would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for them to take a different line. But an agreed partition appeared to Jenkins to be virtually impossible. The opposing claims of the Sikhs and the Muslim League were impossible to reconcile.73 Jenkins reiterated on the following day, when he was discussing security arrangements with the army commander for the partition, that a peaceful partition of the Punjab was most improbable. The Muslims wanted virtually the whole of the Punjab; the Sikhs wanted all districts from the Jamuna to the Ravi and possibly to the Chenab; the Hindus were likely to side with the Sikhs.74 Swaran Singh, Harnam Singh, and Bhim Sen Sachar called on Jenkins on 3 May 1947 and said that the statement of 16 May 1946 was a dead letter, that Pakistan was coming, and that the partition of the Punjab was inevitable. As Jenkins learnt the next day, a Hindu–Sikh convention in Delhi had demanded partition of the Punjab with the Chenab as the western boundary between the two states. After a good deal of discussion the three leaders said that any attempt to divide the Lahore Division would lead to an immediate explosion. When Jenkins pointed out that the discussion kept underlining the folly of partition, Swaran Singh said that since Jinnah insisted on a sovereign state, the Sikhs had no alternative but to demand a homeland of their own, and they could get it only by partition. ‘For the Sikhs it was a matter of life and death.’ Jenkins ended his note with the observation: ‘Unless there is a considerable change in the Muslim view, fighting is inevitable and the only question is when it will break out’.75 Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Ujjal Singh saw the Governor on 7 May 1947. They were certainly not going to be included in a separate Pakistan, they said. Giani Kartar Singh said that there was no solution except a partition based on population, with some consideration for ownership of land and urban immovable Page 20 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ property. His idea was to make the two states really Muslim and non-Muslim through exchange of population. The Muslim country in the west and the nonMuslim country in the east presented no problem. The Lahore Division and the districts of Lyallpur and Montgomery could be regarded as a joint area and a Boundary Commission could be instructed to lay down a boundary through this area in such a way as to give the Muslim and non-Muslim populations a reasonable start on the exchange of populations being effected. Jenkins pointed out that this would (p.347) involve migration of two and a half million nonMuslims and three million Muslims. Giani Kartar Singh then said that the Sikhs would accept an independent Punjab in which they could be given adequate safeguards but they could not possibly agree to absorption in Pakistan. The interview indicated that the Sikhs felt committed to partition. They did not want any provisional boundary defined by the British Government. Jenkins made it clear that it was not the intention of the government to impose a solution on the Punjab. Its limited aim immediately was ‘to find an authority or authorities to which power could be transferred’.76 Baldev Singh wrote to Mountbatten on 7 May that he was upset at the tentative proposals about ‘notional division’. ‘It will stiffen the attitude of the Muslim League and make it almost impossible to realign the areas differently at a later stage’. It was bound to influence the Boundary Commission as well. There was no justification for including Gurdaspur in the Western Zone at any stage. Baldev Singh suggested that the members of the Punjab Legislature of the districts of Gurdaspur and Lahore, and the representatives they elect to decide partition, could be divided equally among the Eastern and Western Zones. He added that the necessity for partition of the Punjab had arisen on account of the Sikh demand in particular. Therefore, in any scheme of partition special regard should be paid to the interests of the Sikhs. This could be done (a) by making sure that the plan of ‘notional division’ did not prejudice the final partition and (b) by including in the terms of reference to the Boundary Commission that the two areas were to be so demarcated as to leave as small a number of the Sikhs as possible in Pakistan. Jinnah appeared to be keen to settle with the Sikhs but he did not mean business. He was not prepared to come to terms with the Sikhs ‘unless he can first rope the Sikhs in his Pakistan under Muslim domination’. The Sikhs would never agree to any discussion with Jinnah on the basis of being included in Pakistan.77 Master Tara Singh, Baldev Singh, and Swaran Singh sent a telegram to the Secretary of State on 7 May, underlining that ‘division of Punjab alone can provide safety and homeland for the Sikhs’. The proposal to make only twelve districts as homeland for Sikhs and Hindus was causing consternation among them. These districts had only 35 per cent area of the Punjab as against 50 per cent property and 43 per cent of population of Sikhs and Hindus of the Punjab. This proposal was the ‘heaviest blow to Sikhs as it carves [an] already small community into two halves’ and deprives them of the canal colony areas Page 21 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ developed mainly through their efforts. ‘We demand division of Punjab along river Chenab with provision for exchange of population and property.’ Any interim arrangement inconsistent with this demand would be extremely prejudicial and it would be resisted. Now was the time for the British to redeem their repeated pledges to the Sikhs.78 Major Short was in correspondence with Baldev Singh and Sant Singh, the Prime Minister of Nabha. The latter had written a letter to Major Short on 26 April 1947, pointing out that religious majorities and minorities in India were regarded as political majorities and minorities. It was for this reason that he had accepted the idea of Pakistan and Khalistan in 1946. He suggested that division and partition ‘be accepted in principle’. The Muslims and non-Muslims, including or excluding the Sikhs, could sit in their own Constituent Assemblies. The Sikhs could (p.348) have their own Constituent Assembly, if they chose. ‘Let these bodies prepare paper Constitutions.’ A negotiation body could resolve the points of difference. Amended Constitutions could then be put to referendum to the different communities both in the majority and minority provinces. If 25 per cent of the majority community voted against and 66 per cent of the minority community did not accept the draft Constitution, it should be considered lost. Baldev Singh wrote to Major Short on the 1st of May that he agreed with what Sant Singh wrote. Short wrote to Sir Stafford Cripps on 8 May 1947, enclosing the letters from Sant Singh and Baldev Singh as useful for Cripps to know their views. This letter and its enclosures appeared to have been sent to Attlee.79 On 9 May, the Secretary of State wrote to the Viceroy that the Sikhs had ‘an exaggerated idea of their proper status in the future set-up’. This was due partly to their historical position as the rulers of the Punjab, partly to the rather flattering treatment they had received from the British as one of the great martial races of India, and partly the contribution they had made to the economic wealth of the Punjab out of proportion to their numbers. They numbered only some 6 million out of nearly 400 million in India, and only 4 million out of 28 million in the Punjab. On any ‘democratic basis’ they formed only a minority and not even a ‘major’ minority. ‘Owing to fact that in no single district of the Punjab do they constitute a majority of the population it is out of the question to meet their claims by setting up a separate Sikh State.’80 Mountbatten gave a copy of the draft of his plan to Baldev Singh on 15 May to be brought back and discussed on the following day. On 16 May, Baldev Singh was very anxious that there should be a paragraph saying that the British Government had taken the Sikh community into account; Mountbatten invited him to draft a paragraph to be considered for inclusion in the draft, and explained to him very carefully:

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‘Divide and Quit’ Great consideration had been given by myself and my staff, together with the Governor of the Punjab, and Pandit Nehru, as to what could be done about the Sikhs. I explained to him exactly why we could not depart from the simple formula put up by the Congress; viz that no non-Muslim majority areas should be included in Pakistan. For his own reasons, Mountbatten accepted the Congress formula in spite of the Sikh demands. Baldev Singh assured him that he was fully in sympathy with Mountbatten’s view that ‘any attempt at communal warfare should be immediately put down with the utmost rigour’.81 As Defence Member, Baldev Singh was prepared to put down any violent agitation started by the Sikh leaders. Baldev Singh wrote to Mountbatten on 17 May that the amended draft of the plan was, if anything, worse than the earlier draft from the Sikh point of view. Changes had been made to meet the wishes of the Muslim League, ignoring all that he had represented on behalf of his community. For example, the amended draft in paragraph 9 reads that the Boundary Commission ‘will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, down to Girdawari Circles’. The ‘other factors’ in the next sentence are left undefined. The phrase ‘down to Girdawari Circles’ should be omitted altogether, and the next sentence should read: ‘It will also be instructed to take into account other factors such as the property holdings of and land revenue paid by non-Muslims.’ The statement (p.349) under the sub-heading ‘The Sikhs’ served no useful purpose as it stood. It should read as follows: H.M.G. have given long and careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs. The partition of the Punjab if it takes place as a result of the decision of the Legislative Assembly members will have the effect of dividing the Sikhs between Muslim and non-Muslim areas but as the necessity of partition has arisen mainly on account of Sikh demand and as it is impossible to devise a scheme under which the entire Sikh community can be brought into one province, care should be taken by the Boundary Commission to ensure that as large a percentage as possible of the Sikh population in the Province is left in the Eastern Punjab. Baldev Singh ended his letter with a reiteration of the basic demand in his letter of 7 May.82

In Retrospect In his declaration of 20 February 1947, the British Prime Minister no longer insisted on a united India and declared instead that power would have to be divided in order to be demitted. Jinnah’s demand, crisply put as ‘divide and quit’, was thus accepted. This brought the issue of partition to the centre stage. On 23 February 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru appreciated the Prime Minister’s statement as Page 23 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ ‘wise and courageous’ and thought immediately of ‘a division of Punjab and Bengal’. On his initiative as the Congress President, the Working Committee resolved on 8 March 1947 to welcome the declaration. The Committee was also to remain in close touch with the representatives of the Sikhs ‘for safeguarding their interests’. The Muslim League, on the other hand, was not prepared to accept partition of the Punjab. Sir Evan Jenkins, the Punjab Governor, was convinced that the declaration would lead to an explosion of great violence as a prelude to the final communal showdown. On 28 February 1947, Master Tara Singh declared that there could be no settlement if the Muslims wanted to rule the Punjab, and civil war could not be avoided. He was totally opposed to any compromise with the Muslim League, not even the formation of a Muslim League Government after the resignation of Malik Khizar Hayat Khan on 2 March 1947. However, Mamdot continued his efforts to form a Muslim League or a Coalition Ministry in the Punjab but this option was finally closed early in May 1947. The Muslim League’s anxiety to form its Ministry was linked with its hope of keeping the whole of the Punjab in Pakistan. Jenkins informed the new Governor General that the most important party among the Sikhs was the Akali Dal, and the Akali leader with the greatest personal following was Master Tara Singh. Two other persons important for negotiations were Giani Kartar Singh and Baldev Singh. The former was far more sympathetic to the idea of a Sikh state than any other Akali leader. Baldev Singh was known to be the most flexible and, therefore, the most acceptable to the Congress and the government. The Secretary of State for India made it clear to Mountbatten in May that it was ‘out of the question’ to meet Sikh claims for ‘a separate Sikhs State’. Jenkins had already written to Mountbatten at the end of April that the Sikhs were committed to the partition of the Punjab so deeply that it would be almost impossible for them to take up a different line. Master Tara Singh met Jenkins on 19 May 1947 and asked him to help the Sikhs in the matter of the partition of the Punjab, the only alternative. Exchange of property and population was of crucial importance for Master Tara Singh. (p.350) Mountbatten held a meeting with the representatives of the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikhs on 2 June. Baldev Singh, assumed to be the Sikh representative, accepted the principle of partition, asking, however, that Sikh demands should be taken into account for framing the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission to be set up. Mountbatten addressed the peoples of India in his broadcast on 3 June. His speech was followed by the speeches of Nehru, Jinnah, and Baldev Singh. At a press conference on 4 June, Mountbatten made it absolutely clear that the Labour Government would never subscribe to a partition on the basis of landed property. Thus, population became virtually the sole criterion for partition. The talk of ‘other factors’ was a mere formality.

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‘Divide and Quit’ Notes:

(1.) Lionel Carter (ed.), Punjab Politics: 1 January 1944–3 March 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), pp. 352–4. (2.) Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (eds), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47 (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957), vol. II, pp. 667–8. (3.) Gwyer and Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47, vol. II, pp. 668–9. (4.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and Other Opinions (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 111. (5.) Gwyer and Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–47, vol. II, pp. 669–70. (6.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947, p. 113. (7.) Nehru to Wavell, 9 March 1947, in The Transfer of Power 1942–7, eds Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1980), vol. IX, pp. 906–7. (8.) Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (Madras: Macmillan India, 1995, reprint), pp. 446–7. (9.) H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 289–91. (10.) Mountbatten to the Earl of Listowel, 1 May 1947, The Transfer of Power (1981), vol. X, p. 530. (11.) Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 5, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 533–4. (12.) Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 537–8. (13.) Nehru to Mountbatten, 11 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 756–7. (14.) Note by Pandit Nehru, 11 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 766–71. (15.) Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 299–309. (16.) Abbott to Abell, 19 February 1947; Note and Draft by Jenkins, 18 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 355–61. (17.) Abbott to Abell, 19 February 1947, Note by Jenkins, 18 February 1947, and Draft by Jenkins, 18 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 360–5, 375 n. 37. Page 25 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ (18.) Jenkins to Wavell, 28 February 1947, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 369–70. (19.) Statement by Sir Khizar Hyat Khan, Punjab Politics (2006), pp. 381–2 (Appendix II). Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, in Punjab Politics: 3 March–31 May 1947, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 50–1. (20.) Jenkins to Wavell, 3 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 51–4. (21.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, in Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh Ate Udesh, ed. Jaswant Singh (Amritsar, 1972), part I, pp. 198–201. (22.) Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Yād Baṇī Itihās (Jalandhar: Ajit Prakashan Samuh, 2001), pp. 625–9. (23.) Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, 4 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 55. (24.) Jenkins to Wavell, 5 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 56. (25.) Jenkins to Wavell, 6 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 57–8. (26.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 853–4. (27.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 5 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 872–3. (28.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 875. (29.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 7 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 889–90. (30.) Wavell to Jenkins, 8 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 893–4. (31.) Jenkins to Wavell, 7 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 60–7. (32.) Jenkins to Wavell, 8, 9, and 10 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 69– 75. (33.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 12 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 927. (34.) Jenkins to Wavell, 14 and 31 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 80, 103–4. (35.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 24 and 28 April 1947, and Mamdot to Jenkins, 24 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 139–42, 145–6, 157 n. 31.

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‘Divide and Quit’ (36.) Mamdot to Jenkins, 27 March 1947, and Jenkins’ draft reply to Mamdot, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 143–9. (37.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 451–2. (38.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 14 May 1947, Mamdot to Jenkins, 14 May 1947, and Jenkins’ draft letter for Mamdot, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 184–92. (39.) Jenkins to Wavell, 13, 14, and 16 March 1947, and interviews with Nehru, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 78–84, 245–8 (Appendices 11–12). (40.) Kirpal Singh (ed.), Select Documents on Partition of Punjab–1947 (Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006, revised and enlarged), pp. 28–31. (41.) Abbott to Abell, 31 March 1947 and Note by Jenkins, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 98–101. (42.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 149–50. (43.) Jenkins to Pethick-Lawrence, 4 and 5 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 54–8. (44.) Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell, 7 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 890. (45.) Jenkins to Wavell, 10 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 75–6. (46.) Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 12 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, p. 926. (47.) Nehru to Wavell, 13 March 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 928–9. (48.) Jenkins to Wavell, 17 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 85–90. (49.) Note by General Messervy, The Transfer of Power, vol. IX, pp. 1005–8. (50.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 24 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 95. (51.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 March 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 102. (52.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 9 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 117–23. (53.) Note by Jenkins for Mountbatten, 16 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 135–8. (54.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 376–7. (55.) Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 4, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 405–6. (56.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, p. 672. Page 27 of 29

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‘Divide and Quit’ (57.) Abbott to Brockman, 13 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 180–4. (58.) Abbott to Brockman, 15 May 1947; Abbott to Master Tara Singh, 13 May 1947; Master Tara Singh to Abbott, 13 May 1947; Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 193–5. (59.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 195–9. (60.) Mountbatten to Jenkins, 17 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, p. 863. (61.) Note by Jenkins sent to Abell, 19 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 202– 3. (62.) Abbott to Brockman, 26 May 1947 and Note by Jenkins, 25 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 213–15. (63.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 221–5. (64.) Note by Jenkins for Mountbatten, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 111–12. (65.) Pethick-Lawrence to Mountbatten, 3 April 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 103–7. (66.) Abbott to Abell, 10 April 1947; Baldev Singh to Jenkins, 7 April 1947; Jenkins to Baldev Singh, 10 April 1947; Abbott to Abell, 11 April 1947; Note by Jenkins, 10 April 1947; another Note by Jenkins, 10 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 124–32. (67.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 127–9. (68.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 320–4. (69.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 405–6. (70.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 652–6. (71.) Baldev Singh to Mountbatten, 27 April 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 966–70. (72.) Ismay to Mountbatten, 13 April 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, p. 490. (73.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30 April 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 151–6. (74.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 1 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 159–61. (75.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 3 May 1947, and Note by Jenkins, 2 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 161–7.

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‘Divide and Quit’ (76.) Note by Jenkins to Mountbatten, 7 May 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 672–4. (77.) Baldev Singh to Mountbatten, 7 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 644–6. A similar letter addressed by Baldev Singh probably to Major Short was circulated in the India and Burma Committee. The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 652–6. (78.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, p. 660. (79.) Short to Cripps, 8 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 693–6. (80.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 693–6. (81.) The Transfer of Power, vol. X, pp. 693–6. (82.) Baldev Singh to Mountbatten, 17 May 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. X, p. 864.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Seventy-Five Days to Partition (1 June–15 August 1947) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0015

Abstract and Keywords Master Tara Singh issued a statement on 4 June that the 3 June Plan did not give ‘any power or status’ to the Sikhs or anything ‘safeguarding their position or interests’. The ultimate acceptance of the plan, he said, would depend on the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. A cycle of retaliation and reprisal started before 15 August 1947 as a prelude to an unprecedented exodus in world history. Giani Kartar Singh was thinking of reorganization of the East Punjab to form ‘a Sikh majority province’, including the princely states of the plains. But Nehru was opposed to any kind of political safeguards. His vision of India after Independence had little room for the long-cherished hopes and aspirations of the Akalis. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, 3 June Plan, terms of reference, Boundary Commission, Giani Kartar Singh, East Punjab, Nehru, political safeguards, Akalis

Partition of the Punjab was embodied in the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947, and the Akalis reacted to it rather strongly. The Radcliffe Award was made public on 16 August and became a subject of controversy later. The last phase of colonial rule in India was marked by the beginning of communal violence which eventually led to large-scale migration of Hindus and Sikhs to East Punjab and of Muslims to West Punjab. Master Tara Singh was allegedly involved in schemes of violence. The problems of implementation of the Mountbatten Plan were

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition accentuated by the retreat of colonial rulers in an uncanny haste which amounted to a scuttle.

The Mountbatten Plan ‘We have given careful consideration to the position of the Sikhs,’ said Lord Mountbatten in his broadcast from the All-India Radio on the evening of 3 June 1947. This valiant community forms about an eighth of the population of the Punjab, but they are so distributed that any partition of this Province will inevitably divide them. All of us who have the good of the Sikh community at heart are very sorry to think that the partition of the Punjab, which they themselves desire, cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The exact degree of the split will be left to the Boundary Commission on which they will of course be represented.1 According to the statement of 3 June, a new and separate Constituent Assembly was to be created in addition to the existing Constituent Assembly, consisting of the representatives of those areas which decided not to participate in the existing Constituent Assembly. It would then be possible to determine the authority or authorities to whom power was to be transferred. The Legislative Assembly of the Punjab was to meet in two parts, one representing the Muslimmajority districts and the other, the remaining districts. The members of the two parts were to vote separately on whether or not the province should be partitioned. If the decision involved partition, a Boundary Commission was to be (p.354) set up by the Governor General, and its terms of reference were to be settled in consultation with the parties concerned. The Boundary Commission was to be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It was to be instructed also to take ‘other factors’ into account. This consideration was added on demand from the Akali leadership. The provisional boundary was indicated in the appendix by listing seventeen Muslim-majority districts of the Punjab according to the census of 1941. For representation in the new Constituent Assembly, there were to be twenty-nine members in all from the Punjab, sixteen Muslim, four Sikh, and nine ‘General’ (Hindu). His Majesty’s Government proposed to introduce legislation ‘during the current session for the transfer of power this year on the Dominion Status basis to one or two successor authorities’.2 On 2 June, Mountbatten had held a meeting with ‘the Indian leaders’ to explain the main features of the Plan, and copies of the Statement to be made on 3 June were handed round to the Indian leaders. He felt grateful that five of the leaders present at the meeting had been associated with him in the drafting of the statement and expected their support to continue. At this juncture, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, and Baldev Singh signified Page 2 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition their assent. Mountbatten asked the leaders to take copies of the Statement to their Working Committees and discuss it with them on that very day and let him know what they thought of it.3 Baldev Singh wrote to Mountbatten on the morning of 3 June that he had discussed the Statement with the Sikh leaders and they appreciated that the principle of the partition of the Punjab had been accepted, and that the Viceroy had expressed his anxiety to help the Sikh community. However, partition by itself did not provide the safeguards needed by the Sikhs. They could hope for no security whatever under Muslim domination. This was the essential reason why they demanded partition. Baldev Singh pointed out that the notional division as proposed would prejudice the final partition of the Punjab. The clarification given by the Viceroy that it was purely a temporary arrangement was somewhat reassuring, but the term ‘other factors’ was far too vague. It should be clarified that the ‘other factors’ included exchange of population with property, and special notice should be taken of the sacred places of the Sikhs. As the partition of the province had been decided upon to meet the Sikh demands, clear instructions should be given to the Boundary Commission to ensure that as large a percentage of the Sikh population as possible was included in East Punjab. Furthermore, nothing tangible had been done with regard to assurances given that safeguards in communal matters for the Sikh community would be the same as for the other two major communities. To make the plan fully acceptable to the Sikhs, their views should be met when the terms of reference were framed for the Boundary Commission.4 On 3 June, Mountbatten sent a telegram to Attlee, mentioning among other things that he had asked the Indian leaders to agree to extend their acceptance to the printed plan as it stood subject to ratification by the All India Congress Committee and the All-India Muslim League.5 Evidently, formal ratification by the Akali Dal was thought to be unnecessary, though Baldev Singh consulted the Akali leaders present in Delhi. The Raja of Faridkot told J.H. Thompson, Resident on special duty, (p.355) on 2 June that if Giani Kartar Singh, who was staying at Faridkot House, was invited by the Viceroy he could join the talks with the other political leaders and do his utmost to come to an amicable agreement with Jinnah in regard to the inclusion of ‘Khalistan’ within Pakistan. He argued that it would be logical to invite Giani Kartar Singh to a meeting to which Presidents of the Congress and the Muslim League were invited. Mountbatten saw Giani Kartar Singh but on 3 June.6 Nehru and Jinnah were to speak on the Radio immediately after his announcement of the plan. They might give their personal assurances of support for the plan and say that they would try their best to ensure a peaceful acceptance of it by their respective parties. Nehru agreed to do so and said that he would be definite in his broadcast. Jinnah also agreed but said that it would be difficult for him to give any assurance. Nehru suggested that Baldev Singh Page 3 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition should also speak. Baldev Singh at first demurred and felt that he would have nothing to say. Eventually, he agreed to make an appeal for bloodshed to cease. It was finally agreed that Nehru, Jinnah, and Baldev Singh should bring their scripts to the meeting on 3 June and read them out.7 In his broadcast on 3 June, Mountbatten referred to the Congress concern for the country to remain a single entity and the Muslim League demand for partition. The same arguments were used for the partition of certain provinces. He felt ‘it was essential that the people of India themselves should decide the question of partition’. The procedure for this was set out in the statement to be read out. Mountbatten reiterated the careful consideration given to the position of the Sikhs but there was no way to avoid splitting them up to a greater or lesser extent. The Boundary Commission, on which they would be represented, would decide the exact degree of split. The real dilemma for His Majesty’s Government was that there was no new constitutional set-up in India, especially in the case of partition. Therefore, the only way out was to transfer power now to one or two governments, each having Dominion Status as soon as necessary arrangements could be made. Thus, the way was now open to an arrangement by which power could be transferred many months earlier than that the most optimistic person could think of.8 Mountbatten does not say so but as it turned out this date was 15 August 1947, ten months earlier than June 1948. Nehru in his broadcast referred to the great destiny of India to achieve full independence. However, there was no joy in his heart because certain parts of the country were allowed to secede. But he had no doubt that this was the right decision from the larger viewpoint. Nehru went on to say: ‘We are little men serving great causes, but because the cause is great, something of that greatness falls upon us also.’ There had been shameful, degrading, and revolting violence in various parts of the country. ‘This must end. We are determined to end it.’ Standing on a watershed of the past and the future, the people of India should forget all bitterness and adhere to the ideals they cherished. The good of the 400,000,000 Indians must be ‘our supreme objective’.9 Jinnah earnestly appealed to every community and particularly to Muslims to maintain peace and order. It was clear that the plan did not meet the Muslim point of view in some important respects and the Muslims did not agree with some of the matters dealt with by the plan. ‘It is for us to consider whether the plan as presented to us by His Majesty’s (p.356) Government should be accepted by us as a compromise or a settlement. On this point I do not wish to prejudge.’ The council of the All-India Muslim League summoned to meet on 9 June would take the final decisions according to its constitution, precedents, and practice. Jinnah went on to say that Mountbatten was actuated by the highest sense of fairness and impartiality and it was up to Muslims to make his task less difficult in his mission of transferring power to the peoples of India in a peaceful and orderly manner. Appreciating the sufferings of and sacrifices made by all Page 4 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition classes of Muslims, Jinnah once more made an earnest appeal to all to maintain peace and order. He ended with ‘Pakistan Zindabad’.10 Sardar Baldev Singh said in his broadcast that the people of India had found the heritage of freedom as their birthright. It would be idle to pretend that the day was bright and joyous. Seldom perhaps had such a settlement been tarnished with so much fear and sorrow. ‘Thousands of innocent lives have been lost. Men, women and children roam from one place to another, homeless and without shelter.’ The plan that had been announced now steered a course obviously above the conflicting claims. ‘It is not a compromise: I prefer to call it a settlement.’ It did not please everybody, ‘not the Sikh community, anyway. But it is certainly worth-while. Let us take it’. Baldev Singh went on to warn: ‘We have taken the strongest measures to enforce law and order and to apprehend the mischief-makers wherever we can lay our hands on them.’ He appealed to patriotism for ‘our motherland’ and told the people not to forget that India’s honour was their honour.11 Baldev Singh spoke like a great Indian nationalist and not as an Akali or a Sikh. After the broadcasts on 3 June, Mountbatten sent a telegram to the Secretary of State that Baldev Singh wanted the instructions to the Boundary Commission included in the printed plan and wished them to take Sikh interests more fully into consideration. ‘I rejected this at the meeting and he accepted my ruling.’12 On 7 June, Baldev Singh said in the Viceroy’s Seventeenth Miscellaneous Meeting that the broadcast which he had made had been translated entirely wrongly. Master Tara Singh had heard this incorrect translation and made his statement to the press on this basis. On hearing the correct version in English later, he apologized.13 But Master Tara Singh never said a good word for the Mountbatten Plan which was accepted by Baldev Singh as a settlement even when he knew that it did not at all please the Sikh community. In a press conference on 4 June, Mountbatten referred to the predicament of the Sikhs, which was presented by him as if they themselves had asked for it. All that he could do was to leave it to the leaders of the respective communities to appoint a committee to draw up the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. All the leaders wanted speed in the actual transfer of power. They were anxious to assume their full responsibility at the earliest possible moment and Mountbatten was anxious to let them do so. The date of independence with partition was advanced by almost a year. His Majesty’s Government rushed the Bill through in record time of two months ‘because of the measure of extreme goodwill that exists among all parties in England’.14 Mountbatten talks as if the Indian leaders had asked for a scuttle and the British leaders were ready to help them.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition However, a press representative embarrassed Mountbatten by asking him whether (p.357) he had received from the leaders of the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikhs a satisfactory measure of support, and whether he was feeling more satisfied in the case of one and less in the case of the other. The question was prompted by the fact that Master Tara Singh had stated that the Statement of 3 June was ‘not very satisfactory’. Mountbatten replied: ‘I am the person who is carrying the responsibility of going ahead with this business. If I have gone ahead it is because I feel that was the right thing to do.’ He was not prepared to reveal ‘what was given to me in confidence’. It could be said that by going ahead he had taken a risk ‘but I have spent the last five years in taking what you might call calculated risks’.15 Mountbatten could take the so-called risk because he knew that the Congress and Muslim League leaders had accepted the plan and the objections raised by Baldev Singh on behalf of the Akali leaders had been rejected in a formal meeting. The British, the Congress, and the Muslim League were ranged against any concession to the Sikhs on vital matters. Another question was about any provision made in the plan ‘to keep the integrity of the Sikh people intact’. ‘I must point out’, said Mountbatten, ‘that the people who asked for the partition were the Sikhs. The Congress took up their request and framed the Resolution in the form they wanted. They wanted the Punjab to be divided into predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim areas. I have done exactly what the Sikhs requested me to do through the Congress’. Mountbatten went on to reiterate that he was fond of the Sikhs and wished them well. But he was not ‘a magician’. The Indians had to find out a solution. A Chairman could not impose a decision on anyone. In any case, he was not responsible for asking for partition.16 Mountbatten was studiously silent about the concerns expressed by the Sikh leaders only a day before. A Sikh correspondent asked him whether any property qualification would be a factor in the demarcation of the boundary line. Mountbatten replied, ‘His Majesty’s Government could hardly be expected to subscribe to a Partition on the basis of landed property least of all the present Government’. Yet another question related to exchange of population. A reporter asked Mountbatten, ‘Do you foresee any mass transfer of population?’ ‘Personally I do not’, said the Viceroy, ‘because of the physical difficulties involved.’ Nevertheless, he thought that ‘a measure of transfer of population will come about in a natural way, that is to say people will just cross the boundary’.17 The ‘other factors’ were clearly an eyewash.

Akali Response to the Plan Jawaharlal Nehru was in Mussourie when Mountbatten was returning from London, carrying approval for the partition plan. Nehru learnt that Master Tara Singh was unhappy with the emerging political scene and he was likely to oppose the plan openly. Nehru rushed to Amritsar on 28 May 1947 to go straight Page 6 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition into a late-night meeting with Master Tara Singh. Nothing was known of what transpired in this meeting but Master Tara Singh appeared to have become quite mellowed. It would not be wrong to assume that Nehru gave some assurances to the Akali leader. When he found that Mountbatten made no reference to an organized exchange of population, Master Tara Singh felt betrayed and cheated.18 On 4 June, Master Tara Singh said that there was a ‘total lack’ of provision in the Mountbatten Plan to give the Sikhs ‘any power or status anywhere’ or even ‘for (p.358) safeguarding their position or interests’. The ultimate acceptance or rejection of the Plan by the Sikhs would depend a good deal on the terms of reference given to the Boundary Commission. The ‘very existence’ of the Sikhs was now at stake. They would not be satisfied ‘unless the dividing line is the River Chenab’. Jenkins commented that the Sikhs were angry and bellicose and Master Tara Singh’s statement did not improve the general situation.19 Mountbatten wrote in his Personal Report of 12 June that the Governors of the Punjab and Bengal were expecting difficulty over the Boundary Commission. Unless the terms of reference were drawn widely the Sikhs would not be satisfied. But the Muslim League wanted narrow terms of reference in the Punjab to resist the claims of the Sikhs on the basis of property and historical associations rather than population.20 Giani Kartar Singh met the Viceroy on 13 June. In his interview with Mountbatten on the 1st of June it had been indicated that he should send written suggestions concerning safeguards for the protection of Sikh interests in the two parts of the Punjab. Since the exact degree of the split of the Sikh community was yet to be determined by the Boundary Commission, Giani Kartar Singh expected the Commission to devise ways and means under the Viceroy’s direction to maintain the integrity and solidarity of the Sikh community in East Punjab. Due to the terrible happenings in the Rawalpindi and Multan Divisions since March 1947, over a lakh of people had come over from those areas and nobody could say how much of the Sikh population would remain in West Punjab. Therefore, Giani Kartar Singh ventured to make a few suggestions on safeguards for the Sikhs in East Punjab alone.21 A joint meeting of the Panthic Assembly Party, the Working Committee of Shiromani Akali Dal, and the Panthic Pratinidhi Board passed a resolution on 14 June with reference to the 3rd June Plan: ‘In the opinion of this conference, the Boundary Commission should be given express directive to make recommendations for the transfer of Hindu and Sikh population and property from the western part of the Punjab to the eastern part after the partition has been effected on an equitable basis.’ Without provision of transfer of population and property, ‘the very purpose of partition would be defeated’.22

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Campbell-Johnson was not happy with the attitude of Master Tara Singh or Giani Kartar Singh. He recorded on 14 June that Baldev Singh had become ‘a voice in the wilderness’ and the Maharaja of Patiala had no ‘decisive influence’. Camphall-Johnson observed regretfully that power was passing to ‘the wilder men’ like Master Tara Singh. The outlook was ‘stormy and unsettled’. He went on to add that the Sikh leaders were hopelessly out-manoeuvred in the political struggle and no juggling of a Boundary Commission could prevent bisection of the Sikhs.23 Giani Kartar Singh pointed out that the Sikhs had a separate representation and weightage in the Legislature and there was a special responsibility of the Governor General and the Governor about the protection of the minorities. He expected the Viceroy to use his good offices with the Congress to give adequate weightage to the Sikhs in the new Constitution in East Punjab. Second, the Sikhs wanted a provision that any question raising a major communal issue in the provincial legislature should require separate majority of votes of the members of the major communities. Third, the representation of the Sikh community in the legislatures of (p.359) provinces other than the Punjab should be adequately weighted. Similarly, the Sikhs should have weighted representation at the Centre. They trusted that in all these matters the Viceroy’s sympathy would be with them. Giani Kartar Singh was informed on 24 June that Lord Mountbatten would discuss the points raised by him, and he was asked whether he would like Baldev Singh to be present at the interview.24 In his Personal Report of 27 June, the Viceroy recorded that in a joint session of the two Assemblies in the Punjab on 23 June, ninety-one members voted for joining a new Constituent Assembly and seventy-seven for the present Constituent Assembly if there was no partition. In the East Punjab Assembly meeting separately, fifty members voted in favour of partition of the province and for joining the present Constituent Assembly. Very simple terms of reference for the Punjab Boundary Commission were agreed upon.25 There was no specific reference to property or sacred places. Mountbatten wrote to Jinnah on 29 June that Baldev Singh had signified in the Partition Committee meeting on the 27th that he had accepted the terms of reference, though not the content.26 Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh met Lord Mountbatten on 30 June and he spoke about the four points raised by Giani Kartar Singh in his letter of 13 June. The Governor General promised to bear the Sikh point of view in mind and use his influence with the major parties in regard to weightage and safeguards. Baldev Singh said that neither of the major parties would give safeguards or weightage. Giani Kartar Singh emphasized that the Governor General should act now while he had his powers. Mountbatten said that he had talked to both sides and they had given assurances about the minorities. He also referred to the statement of Maulana Azad made a day earlier about the apprehensions of minorities in the Union of India and the seceding areas in Page 8 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition which he had suggested a joint meeting of the representatives of the two Constituent Assemblies to draw up a common charter of rights of minorities in both states. Giani Kartar Singh and Baldev Singh hoped that the transfer of population would be taken up. Mountbatten said that this might be examined. Giani Kartar Singh said that the main points which the Sikhs wished to press were two: (a) weightage in the East Punjab Legislature or separation of the Hindi-speaking parts of the East Punjab to make ‘a province comprising of the Punjabi-speaking areas’, and (b) more than two Sikh representatives in the existing Constituent Assembly. Among other points, Giani Kartar Singh suggested that a copy of Mountbatten’s broadcast of 3 June should be given to the Boundary Commission as a part of the Plan. Mountbatten said that he had authorized Baldev Singh to put in a copy.27 Giani Kartar Singh gave a note to Mountbatten in which he referred to demarcation of the line between East and West Punjab as the main problem before the Sikhs. Their cultural, linguistic, spiritual affinities, economic wellbeing, and solidarity and integrity had been jeopardized by the notional division of the Punjab. The Sikhs would not be satisfied unless at least 80 per cent of their population was brought into East Punjab. After the wholesale massacre of the Sikhs in the Rawalpindi Division they did not like to cast their lot with Pakistan. Next to the demarcation of the boundary line the Sikhs insisted on the transfer of the Sikh population from Pakistan and of the Muslim population from East Punjab. In Giani Kartar Singh’s view (p.360) the transfer of a million of Sikhs with the similar number of Muslims would solve the Sikh problem to a great extent. As a distinct entity in political affairs, the Sikhs needed the following safeguards: (a) In the federation of Hindustan, (a.1) one Minister in the Federal Cabinet, (a.2) 6 per cent representation in both Houses of the Federal Legislature, (a.3) the traditional strength of Sikhs in the Armed Forces, and (a.4) protection of Sikh interests in case of major communal issues; (b) in the provinces, (b.1) one-third share of the Sikhs in the Legislature of East Punjab, (b.2) either its Governor or Premier to be a Sikh by convention, and (b.3) adequate representation of Sikhs in the Legislatures of Delhi and UP, and one seat in the Legislature of West Bengal; (c) in the Dominion Act, (c.1) about ten Sikh representatives on each of the Constituent Assemblies, and (c.2) representation of Sikhs in both the Dominion Governments.28 On 4 July, Master Tara Singh said, ‘We should accept 3 June Plan only if the Government accepts the river Chenab as boundary, thereby maintaining solidarity of the Sikhs.’ On the call of the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Sikhs observed a strike on 8 July. It was a resounding success. It received strong support from the Hindus as well. Markets remained closed in many cities and towns of the Punjab. Resolutions were passed, demanding solidarity of the Sikhs, adequate share in canal waters, and protection of Sikh gurdwaras. At a huge dīwān in the Golden Temple complex Master Tara Singh said that he anticipated a big struggle for their rights and asked the Sikhs to be prepared to vindicate Page 9 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition their honour and make sacrifices if the award went against them. He had refused to sign a peace pledge, he said further, because it was designed to deceive the Sikhs.29 Reuters’ Indian Service reported that India’s 5,700,000 Sikhs wore black armbands as they prayed in their gurdwaras to protest against the threat to split their community under the British Plan for India. The day of prayer passed quietly. Gurdwara congregations approved the resolution that ‘any partition that did not secure the integrity and solidarity of the Sikhs would be unacceptable and create a difficult situation’. Addressing a meeting, Sardar Baldev Singh said that the Sikhs would be prepared to make all sacrifices if the verdict of the Boundary Commission went against them. Acceptance of the Statement of 3 June did not mean that they should acquiesce in decisions which threatened their very existence.30 In a meeting on 9 July, Mountbatten taxed Sardar Baldev Singh on the statement he had made on 8 July. He was reported to have said that he hoped that the Boundary Commission would be fair to the Sikhs, ‘but if its decision is against us, we will resist it, and will not consider any sacrifice too great to vindicate the honour of the Punjab’. Baldev Singh denied it indignantly. He had been misreported, he said, and intended to ask for a correction to be issued. Mountbatten believed that he might not have been correctly reported but there was little doubt that he had talked along the lines reported. Mountbatten added that he had seen the Maharaja of Patiala a day before and impressed on him again that if the Sikhs showed any sign of fight they would be crushed by the armed forces of India.31 Mountbatten was keen to keep up the appearance of peace during his Viceroyalty. In a meeting of the Partition Committee on 10 July, Jinnah said that the Sikhs were carrying on agitation in order to influence the decisions of the Boundary Commission whereas the Muslim League leaders were (p.361) telling Muslims to honour the undertaking that the findings of the Boundary Commissions would be accepted. Mountbatten said that he had made it very clear to the Maharaja of Patiala, Sardar Baldev Singh, Master Tara Singh, and all the other Sikh leaders in his interviews that no government would tolerate active resistance. It would be met by the armed forces of India with aeroplanes, tanks, and artillery. He reaffirmed the hope that the Sikh leaders would restrain their followers.32 Giani Kartar Singh met the Punjab Governor, Jenkins, on 10 July and said that the Sikhs would not accept the ‘notional’ boundary even provisionally, and if an attempt was made to set up two new Governments on the basis of this boundary on 15 August, the Sikhs would refuse to join the government of East Punjab and they would refuse to have anything to do with the government of the Indian Union. There must be ‘an exchange of population on a large scale,’ he insisted. Jenkins said that the Sikhs had themselves to blame for their present position Page 10 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition because Giani Kartar Singh himself had insisted on partition and Sardar Baldev Singh had accepted the Plan. Giani Kartar Singh countered that Baldev Singh in his letter to the Viceroy had merely accepted the principle of the Plan and made it clear that there could be no partition based on population alone. ‘The Sikhs were entitled to a homeland just as much as the Muslims and the Hindus.’ He said that the Sikhs must have at least one canal system and Nankana Sahib. The arrangements made should bring three-quarters or at least two-thirds of Sikh population into East Punjab. Property as well as population should be taken into account in the exchange. To avoid trouble, the British Government, the Viceroy, and the Party leaders must recognize that ‘the fate of the Sikhs was a vital issue in the proceedings for the transfer of power’.33 Asked to explain in more concrete terms, Giani Kartar Singh said that the Sikhs would be content with the whole of the Montgomery district and Nankana Sahib, and if this was effected, the exchange of population would be more or less automatic. He gave a long, rather involved, account of the communal distribution in parts of the Lyallpur and Sheikhupura districts to assure Jenkins that the transfer of Nankana Sahib to East Punjab was practicable. Giving further explanations, Giani Kartar Singh said that ‘the Sikhs would be obliged to fight’. He believed that the Sikh Judge as one of the four members of the Boundary Commission could do little for the Sikh community, and the Sikhs expected no justice from the Commission. The Muslims would go on hoping to secure territory as far east as Ambala, and any discussion of settlement with them would be useless. Finally, Giani Kartar Singh appealed to the Governor to help the Sikhs in a period of great trial. All in all it came nearest to an ultimatum, noted Jenkins.34 Jenkins thought that there was quite a lot in the claim of the Sikhs for a share in the canal colonies, and Giani Kartar Singh’s idea that Montgomery district should be allotted to the east was by no means ridiculous. The district could be ‘recolonised’ to concentrate non-Muslims in it and to transfer Muslims to Lyallpur district. But the Sikhs were demanding that the western boundary should be the Chenab and the Muslims were hoping to stretch their tentacles as far east as Ambala. Each party thought of the other as the enemy in a war. Jenkins had little hope of any solution.35 On the following day, Jathedar Mohan Singh, President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), met the (p.362) Governor with Sardar Harnam Singh. They raised certain points about some Sikh gurdwaras in West Punjab and the refugee camp at Wah. Jathedar Mohan Singh then made a long statement on Sikh claims and said that the Governor was solely responsible for seeing that the Sikhs got justice. Jenkins pointed out that the Governor General could not give orders to the Boundary Commission and its Chairman would not seek the Governor’s advice. Jathedar Mohan Singh said that there was no hope of a unanimous report and the Governor General might have to decide Page 11 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition what to do. Jenkins said that the Governor General might not ask for his opinion and might not follow the opinion given. Jathedar Mohan Singh talked a lot about the difficulties of the Sikhs and said that the only solution was a very substantial exchange of population. If this did not occur the Sikhs could get rid of Muslims in East Punjab in the same way as the Muslims had done in the Rawalpindi Division. He did not put it so crudely but this was his general idea. Jenkins got the impression that the Sikhs would act in a big way immediately after the transfer of power.36 Master Tara Singh wrote to Attlee that the Shiromani Akali Dal, the only Sikh political organization, was sending a Sikh deputation to London, with Principal Ganga Singh as its leader, to place the urgent case of the Sikh community before the Prime Minister. The Sikhs feared that the notional division of the Punjab would cut the Sikh community into two and thus threaten their existence. They wanted to avoid the ‘grave consequences’ of this decision. Therefore, he sincerely hoped that Attlee would give the Sikh deputation some time to explain the Sikh case and help them in every possible way. Master Tara Singh wrote a similar letter to the Secretary of State. These letters were presented to Attlee and Lord Listowel, with request to each one of them to find time for the deputation before the Boundary Commission gave its award. Attlee declined to see the delegation. Listowel offered to meet them but made it clear that he would not be able to say anything about the Boundary Commission.37 The reply dispatched to Principal Ganga Singh on these lines on 9 August was received by him on 13 August when he was in Scotland. He telephoned to say that he did not wish to trouble Lord Listowel since the Boundary Commission was to give their award on that very day.38 On 26 July, Giani Kartar Singh had sent to Lord Mountbatten a copy of the brochure entitled ‘Sikh Case for Nankana Sahib’, containing the proposition that a contiguous tract of about 2,800 square miles around Nankana Sahib in the districts of Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, and Gujranwala could remain a part of India. The majority of the people of this area were Sikhs and Hindus; they owned 76 per cent of the land and paid 71 per cent of the revenue. The majority of the Sikhs in this area were colonists, mainly Sikh peasant proprietors from the districts of Amritsar, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Firozpur, Ludhiana, and Ambala. Then there were the native Virks, holding 120 villages. There were 800 Sikh villages and 1,000 gurdwaras, apart from Nankana Sahib, the place of birth of Guru Nanak, the founder of the Sikh faith. ‘Today when charters of radiant liberty are going out to other communities this predominantly Sikh tract also demands the right of self-determination.’39 A Sikh political conference was announced to be held at Nankana Sahib on 27 July in order to press boundary claims. The poster on behalf of twenty-two members of the Punjab Assembly was meant to encourage resistance to unfavourable award. The actual organizer of the conference was Giani Kartar Page 12 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Singh. (p.363) His idea was that large jathās from Lyallpur and Sheikhupura districts should converge on Nankana Sahib. If repressive action was taken by the government, a morchā could be started at Nankana Sahib. Jenkins informed Sardar Swaran Singh that the meeting was illegal, and Sardar Swaran Singh promised to do what he could to stop it. Special forces were sent to Nankana Sahib and measures were taken to discourage and minimize attendance. The gathering at Nankana Sahib on 27 July was about 12,000, including residents of the town and Sikhs staying in the gurdwara. As stated in Jenkins’ telegram to Mountbatten on 28 July, complete stoppage was imposed ‘on news from Nankana and speeches made in Gurdwara’.40 On 28 July, Master Tara Singh declared that the object of holding the conference at Nankana Sahib had been achieved. The Boundary Commission was yet to give its decision and ‘we must await the decision and not complicate the situation’. Therefore, his advice was that the conference should not be prolonged merely because the government had interfered.41 Jenkins, however, wrote on 29 July that the Nankana Sahib conference had fizzled out. He felt satisfied that he achieved his objective. By preventing a gigantic rural gathering, he wanted ‘to make it clear to the Sikhs that mass demonstrations about the boundary are not considered a good thing’.42 Giani Kartar Singh saw Jenkins on 30 July 1947 to say that he had not intended any threats and apologized for any wrong impression that he might have caused. He handed over a copy of the Sikh Memorandum to the Boundary Commission, a copy of another document entitled ‘The Hindu–Sikh case for Nankana Sahib Tract’, and a map. He covered the same ground as in the earlier meeting and Jenkins made the same kind of observations. Giani Kartar Singh said that what the Sikhs had originally agreed to was a report by a Boundary Commission, which would be considered by the Governor General. The report had suddenly been turned into an award which would be final. This was not what the Sikhs had accepted. Giani Kartar Singh pointed out that Sardar Baldev Singh had no authority to make any statement and that he had not consulted the party before doing so. The Viceroy had simply sent for him ‘to get his thumb impression’. The Sikhs were certainly not going to accept an award which they thought unjust. Jenkins said that there was no point in not accepting the award when both the Dominions would accept it and enforce it. Jenkins added that he was convinced that population was to be the most important criterion, and that ‘other factors’ would not count very greatly. There could be little change in the ‘notional’ boundary. Giani Kartar Singh said that then there was no need of a Commission at all. He was right. When Jenkins suggested that creation of two Dominions would not affect titles in property and Nankana Sahib would function exactly as it functioned now, Giani Kartar Singh said that he had seen a good deal of Jinnah and had no confidence in him. In any case, Jinnah was not going to be there for all times.43

Page 13 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Penderel Moon, who was in favour of Sikh–Muslim rapprochement in the Punjab, had written to Master Sujan Singh Sarhali on 8 June that partition was most likely to divide the Sikhs into two parts, and the Muslims would treat the Sikh minority left in West Punjab ‘little better than sweepers’. Moreover, strife in the Punjab would be aggravated and indefinitely prolonged. Therefore, the Sikh community as a whole should throw in their lot with Pakistan. In that case the Muslims (p.364) would be prepared to make considerable concessions so that the Sikhs would feel secure in Pakistan. Moon mentioned three specific concessions: (a) a separate Sikh unit with rights in respect of the Pakistan Central Government equal to any other unit, like West Punjab or Sind, (b) special privileges for the Sikh Minority in West Punjab, and (c) special privileges for the Sikhs in Pakistan as a whole. Moon added that he would like very much to discuss this proposition with the Sikh leaders, Master Tara Singh, and others. He had failed to contact Giani Kartar Singh but he could come to Lahore or Amritsar to meet him on 12, 13, or 23 June, or some other date convenient to Giani Kartar Singh.44 In his letter to Lord Ismay on 27 June, Moon referred to their conversation a few weeks earlier with regard to the Sikhs and informed Ismay that Firoz Khan Noon had approached the Sikh leaders directly about special concessions if they threw in their lot with Pakistan, but he met with a rebuff. This was to be expected, he said, in view of the injuries inflicted on the Sikhs by the Muslims in the Rawalpindi Division. But Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh knew that the only way to avoid disaster in the Punjab was to come to a settlement with the Muslims. Moon spelt out the steps which could be taken to bring about Sikh– Muslim rapprochement. Certain Sikhs, who were in touch with Baldev Singh and Master Tara Singh, would informally formulate the Sikh conditions for joining Pakistan. Certain Muslim League leaders would then be informally approached to consider the conditions formulated. ‘The Sikhs are anxious’, said Moon, ‘that it should not leak out that any such negotiations are about or contemplated.’ The Sikh demand for excluding Gurgaon, Rohtak, Hissar, and Karnal should be encouraged and conceded to ensure the strongest possible Sikh complexion of the new East Punjab. The next step would be to indicate that it was optional for East Punjab to join either Hindustan or Pakistan, and that there was no presumption that it must join one rather than the other. If the Sikhs asked for some pronouncement to this effect, it would be advisable to accede to their request. At the end, Moon asked Ismay to forgive him for this unasked for opinion. The reason for his effusion was that ‘without a Sikh–Muslim pact there will be chaos in northern India’.45 The Muslim League was vehemently opposed to division of the Punjab. Its leaders were keen to come to some understanding with the Akali leaders to keep the whole, or nearly the whole, of the Punjab in Pakistan. Soon after Mountbatten’s press conference on 4 June 1947 the Dawn commented that the Viceroy had made it very clear that the Sikhs themselves were responsible for Page 14 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition their predicament. They had begged for partition and asked the Congress also to pass a resolution. Now they had got the bed and they had to lie on it. ‘If they find it a bed of thorns, the thorns are all their own implanting.’ The editorial advised the Sikhs to stick on with the Muslims. With reference to the Muslim attacks on the Sikhs in March, the editorial of 7 June said that there is ‘nothing but sadness in Muslim hearts’. Those memories could be forgotten and wounds healed and friendship could emerge out of the welter of enmity. ‘Muslims and Sikhs can together add to the glory of Pakistan.’ Iftikhar Husain Mamdot, President of the Punjab Muslim League, said that the Sikhs ‘would have got a home land within Pakistan if they had desired an amicable settlement with the Muslim League’. Firoz Khan Noon appealed to the Sikhs to join hands with the Muslim League to solve the (p.365) Sikh problem which was indeed ‘a Muslim Sikh problem’.46 Lord Ismay responded to Moon’s letter on 3 July 1947, saying that the Viceroy had an interview with Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Katar Singh on 20 June. Baldev Singh said that there was no sign at all of either of the major parties making any concessions to the Sikhs, and he doubted very much whether there would be any settlement between the Sikhs and the Muslims. Significantly, all the emphasis during the interview was on concessions to be obtained from the Union of India and not from Pakistan. Both the Sikh leaders seemed fairly content with Mountbatten’s promise to write to the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League to draw their attention to the requests made by the Sikh leaders. Ismay agreed with Moon that Sikh–Muslim rapprochement was commendable, but ‘things have now gone much too far for [us] to be able to take a hand’. If the provincial boundaries were to be redrawn again, ‘it would have to be done by the successor authorities’.47 By early July, Moon had realized that his attempt to bring about a Sikh–Muslim rapprochement was bound to fail. ‘If the Sikhs were lukewarm about a settlement, the Muslims were icy cold.’ Jinnah was resigned to a ‘truncated’ Pakistan. The Sikhs could go to the devil in their own way. ‘It was they who had demanded the partition of the Punjab. They could now take the consequences.’48

Sir Cyril Radcliffe’s Award On 27 June 1947, a formal proposal made by the Viceroy in the first meeting of the Partition Council two days earlier that Sir Cyril Radcliffe may be appointed Chairman of the Boundary Commission was accepted unanimously by the Congress and the League. On 30 June, Lord Mountbatten announced the names of the other four members: Justice Din Mohammad, Justice Muhammad Munir, Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan, and Justice Teja Singh. For its terms of reference, the Boundary Commission was instructed ‘to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of the Muslims and the non-Muslims’. In doing so, it was also to take into account ‘other factors’. The ‘notional’ division of the Punjab was based on the district boundaries, placing seventeen districts in West Punjab and the Page 15 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition remaining twelve in East Punjab. However, the central districts formed a sort of disputed territory, consisting of the whole or some parts of the districts of Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, and Lyallpur in the Rachna Doab; Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, and Montgomery in the Bari Doab; Jullundur and Hoshiarpur in the Bist Jalandhar Doab; and Firozpur on the east of the Sutlej. A note handed over by Sir Cyril Radcliffe to Mountbatten was circulated in a meeting of the Partition Committee on 10 July to clarify the meaning of the word ‘award’ in clauses 3 and 4 of the Indian Independence Bill. After some discussion it was agreed that the members of the Boundary Commissions were to act as assessors and the Chairman would act in the role of Umpire and give his awards. It was agreed to add the following amendment: For this purpose the award of a Boundary Commission shall mean the decisions of Chairman.49 The Commission followed a judicial procedure. In the first meeting on 14 July, it was decided to announce that interested parties should submit their memoranda to the Commission by 18 July. The Punjab Boundary Commission held its public sittings from 21 (p.366) to 31 July under the Chairmanship of Justice Muhammad Munir. Eminent lawyers like Seetalvad, Zafarullah Khan, and Harnam Singh pleaded respectively the case of the Congress, the League, and the Shiromani Akali Dal. O.H.K. Spate, a Geographer, pleaded the case of the Ahmadiya community. The case for West Punjab was made almost entirely on population. There could be no dispute about the districts of Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, Lahore, Montgomery, and Multan. Gurdaspur district as a whole had Muslim majority, and so had the tehsils of Ajnala, Nakodar, Jullundur, Firozpur, and Zira. Justice Mehar Chand Mahajan recommended that the boundary should be near the Ravi and Lahore should be included in East Punjab. Justice Teja Singh advocated that the boundary line should be near the Chenab and parts of the districts of Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Lyallpur, and Montgomery should be included in East Punjab. Their emphasis was on factors like economic enterprise and development in agriculture, industry, and commerce, especially colonization; the landed property as reflected in the land revenue; the location of the most sacred places; and the occupational and migratory character of a large part of the Muslim population. The words and phrases of the terms of reference like ‘demarcate’, ‘contiguity’, ‘in doing so’, ‘areas’, and ‘other factors’ were interpreted differently by the members of the Commission. Sir Cyril Radcliffe presided over the meetings of the Punjab Commission at Simla after 31 July 1947. All the four members of the Commission submitted separate reports: Justice Mahajan on 3 August, Justice Teja Singh on 4 August, Justice Din Muhammad on 5 August, and Justice Muhammad Munir on the 6th. Their recommendations differed widely due to the differences of opinion on the significance of ‘other factors’. At their last meeting Sir Cyril Radcliffe said: Page 16 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition ‘Gentlemen you have disagreed and, therefore, the duty falls on me to give the award which I will do later on.’ He signed his award on 12 August.50 On 16 August, Mountbatten handed over the Radcliffe Award to the leaders. Campbell-Johnson was present. He wrote later that ‘the rejoicings of the morning were all too soon tempered by the depression of the leaders this afternoon’. Liaqat Ali, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, was present ‘at this sombre and sullen gathering, where the only unanimity was in denunciation of this or that communal “injustice”’. Liaqat’s ‘dismay’ was offset by Patel’s ‘anger’, and the ‘resentment’ of both was blanketed by Baldev Singh’s ‘dumb depression’ (see Map 14.1).51 In the award given by Radcliffe the boundary line was described in detail and a map was attached only for illustration. If there was any divergence between the two, Radcliffe’s description was to prevail. In his judgement the truly debatable ground in the end lay in and around the areas between the Beas and the Sutlej on the one hand and the Ravi on the other. The fixing of the boundary in this area was further complicated by the existence of canal systems and a system of road and rail communications. The geographical location of the cities of Lahore and Amritsar, over each or both of which claims and counterclaims were made, was another factor in the situation. Radcliffe gave his award keeping in view the fundamental basis of contiguous majority areas and other factors. The Muslimmajority areas east of the Sutlej and in the angle of the Beas and the Sutlej were not included in West Punjab. He did not find it possible to keep the irrigation system of the Upper Bari Doab Canal undivided. To (p.367) mitigate some of the consequences of this severance, he made small adjustments of the Lahore– Amritsar district boundary. Similarly, the Mandi Hydroelectric Scheme could not be preserved under one territorial jurisdiction. Radcliffe underscores at the end that he was not concerned with political aspirations. His sole concern was with the terms of reference given to the Commission.52 Other factors were given only a marginal consideration.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (p.368) ‘I was deadly against this method of demarcation of boundary,’ said Lord Patrick Spens (Chief Justice of the Federal Court and Chairman of Arbitral Tribunal), with reference to the Boundary Commission for Bengal and the Punjab. ‘What do judges know about the demarcation of the boundary?’ he asked, and himself added, ‘It was wrong to associate judges with the demarcation of the boundary.’ Furthermore, the man appointed as the Chairman of this Commission knew neither ‘the language nor the territory nor the inhabitants of the

Map 14. 1: The British Punjab: The

areas’. Lord Spens went on to add that nowhere else ‘in the

Source: A.S. Narang, ‘Movement for the Punjabi Speaking State’, in Five Punjabi

whole of British Empire boundaries have been

Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c.1500–1990, ed. Indu Banga

demarcated in this way’.53

(New Delhi: Manohar, 2000, reprint), p. 247.

Indeed, why was an exception made in this case? Lord

Radcliffe Line

Mountbatten had stated in the Partition Council on 25 June that all parties had agreed that the Boundary Commissions should finish their work by 15 August and, therefore, it had become necessary to modify the earlier decision that the Commissions should elect their own Chairmen. To expedite the work, the Partition Council could think of two eminent men, each ‘to serve as Chairman and having a casting vote’. On request from the Governor General, the Secretary of State had recommended the name of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, ‘a man of high integrity, legal reputation, and wide experience’. Moreover, if it proved difficult to find any other person, Radcliffe could be considered for the Chairmanship of both the Commissions. The advantage of such a course was that ‘Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be enabled to adjust any slight loss one State might have to suffer in particular area by compensating it in another’. On 27 June, both the Congress and the League agreed to the proposal.54 Thus, the need to expedite the process and the high reputation of Radcliffe could be seen as the criteria for the choice. It had the further implication that demarcation of boundary became a judicial rather than a political matter and that the Chairman’s recommendation

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition would become the final award. No controversy was expected to arise. Indeed, there was no immediate controversy. However, in a meeting of Mountbatten with the representatives of India and Pakistan on 16 August 1947, Nehru said that the award of the Boundary Commission in the Punjab was likely to have a bad effect among the Sikhs who presented a particularly difficult problem. Baldev Singh also thought that the reaction to the award would be very unfavourable on the Sikh mind. Patel’s view was that the only solution to the Punjab award was transfer of population on a large scale.55 Master Tara Singh was reported to have said a few days after 15 August 1947: ‘I am today a most miserable man.’56 In a broadcast speech at the end of August, Jinnah said that the ‘division of India’ was now final and irrevocable. No doubt the carving out of this great independent Muslim State had suffered injustices. The Award of the Boundary Commission was the latest blow that Muslims had received. It was an unjust and incomprehensible award. It may be wrong, unjust, and perverse, and it may not be a judicial but a political award, ‘but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honourable people we must abide by it’. It was a misfortune that had to be borne with fortitude, courage, and hope.57 Four months later, the Radcliffe Award became the subject of a controversy. Zaferullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, raised in the Security Council at Lake Success the question of the change made by Radcliffe in the award he had made on 6 August 1947. (p.369) The award was taken up later by historians as a controversial subject.

Controversy over the Radcliffe Award Major J.M. Short is believed to have played some role in helping the Sikhs in the matter of the award. Baldev Singh had sent a cable to ‘Billi’ (Major J.M. Short) on 5 July to act as ‘an eminent King’s Counsel to represent our case before the Boundary Commission’.58 On 10 July, Ismay wrote to the Viceroy that he had kept in touch with Short who had great knowledge of the Sikhs and influence with them. He had a strong hunch that Short could be helpful ‘in keeping Sikhs quiet’. He could be attached to Ismay’s staff for two months as a temporary measure.59 Mountbatten suggested that Short could come out as Baldev Singh’s guest, and Ismay agreed.60 In response to Baldev Singh’s request, Short arrived on 22 July. According to Moon, he was expected to play some role in bringing about Sikh–Muslim rapprochement but he realized at once that the time had passed for such a role. All he could do now for the Sikhs was to plead for drawing the dividing line in the Punjab sufficiently far to the west to bring some of canal colony lands within India. Moon adds that Short eventually realized that the line could not be drawn much to the west. He was disconsolate that there was really nothing he could do for the Sikhs.61 Major Short wrote to Stafford Page 19 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Cripps on 3 August that there was ‘a truly popular belief’ in India that Radcliffe would give his award as dictated by Mountbatten. However, on or before 12 August, he made the point to Lord Ismay that His Excellency had succeeded in convincing at least the Sikh leadership that he was not touching the Boundary Commission award. He added that this was the source of Baldev Singh’s deep gloom and the prevailing mood of the Sikhs.62 Short recalled later that his impression on getting to Delhi was that the Sikhs did not like the 3 June Plan; they had agreed to it ‘to meet us more than half-way and to make it easier for us to go out of our way to meet their wish for some sort of Sikhistan’. He reported on these lines to the British authorities in Delhi, and they felt as he did that they could not alter the course now, ‘but in so far as they could trim a trifle to meet the Sikhs, they would’.63 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali took up the issue to establish the fact that Radcliffe altered the award between 8 and 12 August 1947. He emphasized that Mountbatten and the British officials in the Punjab were anxious to save the Sikhs from the consequences of their demand for the partition of the Punjab. He refers to the statement made by Mountbatten on 4 June to the effect that he liked the Sikhs, he was fond of them, and he wished them well. Jenkins was in sympathy with Sikh demands and had written to the Viceroy that there was ‘quite a lot in the claims of the Sikhs’. Radcliffe worked consistently in favour of India and against Pakistan.64 For H.V. Hodson, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali is an example of the Pakistani controversialists who alleged that ‘publication of the reports was delayed while Lord Mountbatten brought pressure to bear on Sir Cyril Radcliffe to alter the awards, especially to the disadvantage of Pakistan in the northern part of the Punjab’. Hodson argued that this was not the final award. When Radcliffe decided finally about the award, the message for correction was sent to Jenkins by the words ‘Eliminate Salient’. The innuendo of the Pakistani allegation was sharpened by the claim that Gurdaspur district was deliberately given to (p. 370) India to provide a route into Kashmir. There was ‘a high degree of myth’ in this claim. No evidence of the influence or pressure which Lord Mountbatten was alleged to have brought on the Chairman of the Commission in those last days had been produced. There was ‘no contemporary record’ of the meeting that took place in Lord Ismay’s house over an evening drink on or about 9 August 1947. The recollections of the three participants differed. According to Ismay and Radcliffe no such statement was made by Mountbatten during this meeting. A general principle of ‘balance’ between concessions made to the Sikhs in the Punjab and to the Muslims in Bengal could have been stated earlier.65 Lionel Carter, however, says that he had a talk on this subject with Sir Penderel Moon a short time before his death in 1987 and Moon said that he had come to the view that the Firozpur boundary was altered at Mountbatten’s ‘request’. Page 20 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Carter believed that Moon had reached this conclusion after receiving ‘authoritative information’. Carter refers to the evidence of Kanwar Sain, Chief Irrigation Engineer of Bikaner, who had met Mountbatten on 11 August 1947 with K.M. Panikkar, Prime Minister of Bikaner. Sain picked up the courage to say that His Highness of Bikaner would opt for Pakistan in the interest of his subjects if the Firozepur Headworks went to Pakistan. Sain perceived ‘a change in the colour of the face of Mountbatten’. In the evening they heard on the radio the announcement of delay in the Radcliffe Award. Coincidentally, ‘about 10th or 11th August’ the Punjab authorities received the message ‘Eliminate Salient’ (with reference to the sketch map sent earlier).66 In The Partition of the Punjab, Kirpal Singh had argued that there was no credible evidence of the Viceroy’s interference in the working of the Boundary Commission. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh had told Kirpal Singh that Major Short’s pleading for the Sikhs had brought favourable award to India. Short himself in an interview with Kirpal Singh had said that the authorities in Delhi could ‘trim a trifle’ to help the Sikhs, but he had himself admitted that he was not high-ranking enough to influence the course of events. Kirpal Singh underlined that a close scrutiny of the Partition Proceedings would convince any impartial observer that the Punjab Boundary Award was in accordance with the decisions of the Partition Council.67 Kirpal Singh’s Punjab da Batwara te Sikh Neta (Partition of the Punjab and the Sikh Leaders) contains a chapter on the contribution of the Sikhs for the inclusion of the Firozpur and Zira tehsils in India. In January 1960, Justice Harnam Singh had claimed that these two tehsils came to India due to the efforts of the Sikhs. Justice Harnam Singh and Giani Kartar Singh came to know in Simla that Radcliffe had given these tehsils to Pakistan, and immediately they went to Delhi. On the way they prepared a memorandum in which it was underscored that the Sikhs had already suffered a great injustice and no more injustice should be done now. The problem was how to ensure that this memorandum reached Mountbatten. No person, particularly a Sikh, could meet Mountbatten in connection with the Punjab boundary as the matter was regarded as sub-judice. Major Short was now thought of as the person suitable for taking the memorandum to Mountbatten. This came as a confirmation of what Kirpal Singh had already heard from Master Tara Singh. This evidence became more credible when the sketch map actually became known (it was published in 1983). Kirpal Singh reproduces it in his book.68 Kirpal Singh does (p.371) not say so but he leaves the impression that Mountbatten had suggested to Radcliffe to alter the award in favour of the Sikhs due to the efforts of the Sikh leaders. In The Sikhs and the Transfer of Power (1942–1947), Kirpal Singh says explicitly that the two tehsils in question were first allocated to West Punjab but finally to India. He refers to the statements of Justice Harnam Singh and Major Short. Page 21 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition This was confirmed by Christopher Beaumont, personal secretary of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who had disclosed in 1997 that the Punjab Boundary Award was altered. About the compelling circumstances which led to the modification of the award, Kirpal Singh refers to the personal and private letters of Mountbatten to Ismay in which he talks of the ‘Sikh Problem’. Master Tara Singh also held the view that Mountbatten wanted to pacify the Sikhs. ‘Therefore it appears almost certain that the Sikh problem was a major factor leading to the alteration in the Punjab Boundary Award.’69 The whole controversy has to be seen in relation to the Governor General’s note of 25 June 1947, stating that the advantage of having Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of both the Boundary Commissions was that he ‘would be enabled to adjust any slight loss one State might have to suffer in a particular area by compensating it in another’.70 Not the fact of alteration so much as the motive for alteration appeared to be all important to the parties in this debate. The Pakistan leaders were keen to establish that the change in the award was made under the influence of Lord Mountbatten who wanted to placate the Sikhs. Mountbatten was equally anxious to make it clear that he was not responsible for any specific change in the award. The closest he came to stating any possible role in the matter of influencing Radcliffe was in his letter of 2 April 1948 to Lord Ismay. Mountbatten recalled that during the drink party at Ismay’s house on or about 9 August he had stated: So far as I remember I said to him that the Sikh attitude had become rather worse than we had anticipated, and that when he was balancing up the boundaries of East and West Pakistan I sincerely hoped that he would bear the Sikh problem in mind. I think I went so far as to say that provided he were really satisfied that the overall decision, both, East and West, was absolutely fair to both communities, then I trusted that any generosity to Pakistan should be given more in Bengal than the Punjab since there was no Sikh problem in Bengal.71 The conversation then turned to the irrigation canals and headworks; Radcliffe had failed to obtain agreement for joint inter-dominion working of the headworks. He remarked that the boundary was particularly difficult to adjust round about Firozpur. Mountbatten remarked that ‘he could make any adjustments necessary for balancing out the boundaries in Bengal and the Punjab’. Mountbatten also remarked that this adjustment could be made if Radcliffe thought that the overall East–West boundaries were scrupulously fair between the two dominions. The implication of Mountbatten’s suggestion was clear. Radcliffe could make any change he thought fit. This could not be regarded as ‘pressure’.

Page 22 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Evidence of the Select Documents can be appreciated in this context. On 31 January 1948, Ismay wrote to Mountbatten that Zafarullah Khan at Lake Success had talked about a communication from George Abell having been found from Jenkins’ papers, showing that Radcliffe made his award on ‘the 6th August’ and that thereafter the award was tampered with to the great disadvantage of Pakistan and its publication was delayed by ten days. Mountbatten wrote to Ismay on 12 (p.372) February that he should tell Abell about Zafarullah’s remarks and explain the situation to Jenkins, Radcliffe, Abbot, and Beaumont.72 On 19 March, Mountbatten himself wrote to Jenkins about the remarks of Zafarullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and its representative to the Security Council. Moreover, on 19 March at the meeting of the Joint Defence Council, Liaqat Ali Khan brought up the question of documents showing that Firozpur and Zira tehsils had been allotted to Pakistan before the award was altered.73 Jenkins responded to Mountbatten’s letter on 7 April 1948. He had approached the Viceroy’s House, and not the Boundary Commission, for advance information as ‘one of the routine security precautions recognised as prudent under the British regime’. On 8 August, Abell enclosed a schedule in typescript and a printed map with a line drawn to show a boundary that included in Pakistan a sharp salient in district Firozpur. ‘This salient enclosed the whole of the Firozpur and Zira Tehsils.’ Jenkins took appropriate precautions on the basis of this information. About the 10th or 11th August, he received a message from the Viceroy’s House containing the words ‘Eliminate Salient’. On 12 or 13 August he was informed that the award would be announced after the transfer of power. Jenkins shared all this information, and the arrangements he had made, with Sir Francis Mudie, Governor-designate of West Punjab, who was staying with him. Abell’s letter of 8 August and its enclosures were left in the Secretary’s safe at Government House in Lahore, to which only Mudie (or his Military Secretary) could have access. Jenkins knew nothing more about the documents, nor could he say how they got into ‘political’ hands.74 Sir Francis Mudie himself said on 27 August 1964 that he had shown the map to Liaqat Ali Khan and Jinnah. This map was given to him by Jenkins’ Secretary.75 As Ismay wrote to Mountbatten on 9 April 1948, the sequence of events was quite clear: (a) Jenkins asked for advance information in order to dispose of his forces; (b) Abell obtained information from Radcliffe’s office and passed it on to Jenkins; (c) subsequently, on further consideration, Radcliffe changed his mind with regard to the Firozpur salient and notified Abell of this change; and (d) Abell communicated it to Jenkins.76 Mudie was emphatic that Radcliffe changed the award.77 Radcliffe did not exactly deny the possibility of his having made the change. He might have two or three maps prepared, he said, before he submitted the final one. He underlined: ‘The final award is mine, entirely mine.’78 Page 23 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition Overall Deterioration in the Socio-political Situation The last seventy-five days of colonial rule were marked by a radical deterioration in the Punjab situation. On the 1st of June 1947, Jenkins accompanied the Viceroy to Gurgaon where an area of about 800 square miles was still affected by raids and counter-raids by Meos and Hindus on the border of Mewat. Reception of the partition plan on 4 June was mixed. The Sikhs were angry and bellicose, and the Muslims threatened to destroy Amritsar completely.79 In his fortnightly report to Mountbatten on 15 June, Jenkins gave his impressions of reactions to the announcement of 3 June. There was no enthusiasm for the partition plan. Nobody seemed to be pleased or to get on with the job. There was no improvement in communal relations. Lahore and Amritsar remained (p.373) seriously disturbed with stabbings, cases of arson, and bomb explosions. Gurgaon had been largely out of hand. The old administrative machine was rapidly falling to pieces.80 In the third week of June, the Hindus and Sikhs were making effective use of bombs in Lahore and Amritsar, and the Muslims were retaliating with incendiarism. Jenkins had no doubt whatever that the Muslim League approved and, in some degree, directed the burning. This was true of other political parties too. However, not the top leaders but individuals somewhere connected with party organizations controlled the campaigns and were given the money to do so.81 In the beginning of July 1947, Mamdot resigned from the Security Committee, alleging that the administration was strongly anti-Muslim. Jenkins commented that since Mamdot claimed to have stopped the last series of outrage, it was legitimate to suppose that he could prevent any recrudescence. In any case, the Security Committee ceased to exist on 3 July owing to his resignation.82 On 14 July 1947, Jenkins reported that the Amritsar rural area was a source of anxiety. It was one of the toughest parts of the Punjab. There had been many communal murders and one or two organized raids on villages. In most of these incidents the Sikhs had been the aggressors. The boundary problem was uppermost in the mind of everybody. Apart from the more militant Sikhs, whose views were known to Mountbatten, the non-Muslims in general were extremely nervous about residing in West Punjab or serving in it. Similarly, the Muslims were far from happy about their position in East Punjab. In the Indian Civil Services not a single Hindu or Sikh had agreed to serve in the west and only one Muslim had agreed to serve in the east, and that too because he thought that the Muslim League would victimize him. The position of other services appeared to be the same.83 Towards the end of July, Jenkins reported a bomb explosion outside the Session’s Court in Amritsar in which forty-six Muslims were injured and two of them had died later. The situation in the Amritsar and Gurdaspur villages, along the Jullundur–Hoshiarpur border, and along the Ferozpore-Lahore border gave cause for considerable anxiety.84

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition On 31 July, the whole of the Punjab was declared to be a disturbed area under the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act 1947. The explanation came in a sense on the following day. Raids on Muslim villages had begun in Amritsar and Lahore districts and the Jullundur–Hoshiarpur border. Muslim causalities in Amritsar rural area since the night of 30–31 July were three killed and thirty wounded. There were attacks on trains in the past two or three days. The Governor did not know when and how bad, but there was going to be trouble from the Sikhs.85 On 4 August 1947, Jenkins sent to Mountbatten a memorandum he had prepared on the main lines of criticism against the Punjab Government for its handling of the disturbances of 1947. Whereas the Muslim League had brought allegations of partiality against Jenkins, the Congress, and in particular Nehru and Patel, dwelt on the failure of the British to deal with the disturbances; the British officials had been callous and incompetent, it was alleged; they presented a contrast to Indian officials who had managed to maintain order; the worst province was the Punjab which was still ‘under British rule’; the fire services in the cities had been inefficient and useless; the Magistrates and the Police had connived at and actually participated in murder, arson, and looting; and the British authorities failed to impose (p.374) Martial Law in Lahore and elsewhere. Jenkins explained, in the first place: ‘We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political or communal violence, but with a struggle for the power we are shortly to abandon.’ Normal standards could not be applied to this ‘communal war of succession’. Second, the critics were themselves participants in the events which they professed to deplore.86 Jenkins compared the present situation with the situation from 1921 to 1942 when the Unionists were in power as a non-communal party. The Unionists began to disintegrate after the death of Sikander Hayat Khan at the end of 1942. The general elections of 1945–6 were fought on ‘the most bitter communal lines’. Only eight or nine Muslim Unionists survived; Hindu Unionists were mostly defeated or absorbed by the Congress; and the Sikh Unionists joined the Panthic Party. The situation might have been saved by a coalition of the League, the Congress, and the Panthic Sikhs but communal feelings were too strong, and both the League and the Congress were under orders from outside the Punjab. Sucked into the vortex of all-India politics, ‘Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs’.87 Jenkins outlines the events leading to the Governor’s rule and three phases of disturbances in the Punjab; he gives figures of causalities and the loss of property, and replies to the set of specific charges against him or the British officials. The dominant impression left by his memorandum is the multiplicity of factors for the situation developing from March to August 1947. Jenkins reported to Mountbatten on 13 August 1947 that communal disturbances had overshadowed everything else during the first half of August. After providing details, he adds that it was impossible to say anything definite Page 25 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition about the future. The Sikhs appeared to have two objectives in mind: to take revenge for the Rawalpindi massacres and to assert themselves on the boundary question. Their conduct was impossible to defend but the Muslims had failed to understand the horror caused by the Rawalpindi riots. In fact, they seemed to think even now that reprisals would bring the Sikhs to a less violent frame of mind. But Jenkins believed that reprisals in Lahore would lead only to further outrages by the Sikhs and the process would go on. The Muslim movement from the east was balanced by a similar movement of Hindus from the west. They were ‘more concerned to get out of Lahore safely than anything else’.88 The situation worsened further with growing migration of Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab. The police in Lahore and Amritsar had become unreliable. The troops were insufficient and their neutrality was affected by the tension around. The Punjab Partition Committee agreed about very little and most important questions were referred to arbitration or for the two new governments to settle later. A queer sort of political and administrative vacuum was created, leaving much scope for destructive activities of individuals and local groups. A cycle of retaliation and reprisals had started before the middle of August 1947. Jenkins wished that he could have made ‘a cleaner job of the partition’.89 But the situation was beyond his control.

The ‘Sikh Plan’ Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins that Zafarullah Khan had attacked him openly also on account of ‘the Sikh Plan’ which he said was known to the Viceroy and yet he did not take any effective action against ‘the (p.375) trouble-makers’ despite his assurance that he would.90 Master Tara Singh was said to have been involved in the Sikh Plan. Jenkins had written a secret letter to Abell on 4 August 1947, saying that he was sending Captain G.R. Savage, a member of the CID Central Staff, down with some papers to be brought to the notice of the Viceroy. The ‘principal character’ involved seemed to be ‘cracked’. The question was whether to put him in the bag now or chance it. Though it was bad either way, on the whole, Jenkins was inclined to chance it. In other words, Jenkins wanted to know whether or not to arrest Master Tara Singh immediately. The information provided by Savage was to the effect that Master Tara Singh had stated that four or five young Sikhs were planning to blow up a special train meant to carry government officials from Lahore to Karachi. He had also said that Jinnah would be killed during the independence ceremonies at Karachi. Furthermore, it was alleged that he was collecting arms through Sikh army officers and dumping them in the princely states.91 As Abell informed Jenkins on the following day, Savage told his story in the presence of Mountbatten, Jinnah, Liaqat Ali, and Patel. It made a considerable impression and, after some discussion, it was agreed that Master Tara Singh and the more hot-headed of the Sikhs should be arrested. Mountbatten suggested Page 26 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition that it would be best to do it at the same time as the announcement of the Boundary Commission’s award. He pointed out that if it was done before, the trouble would probably spread and the announcement would make things even worse. It was also agreed that there should be a common policy in the matter. Mountbatten said that he would discuss the matter with Sir Chandulal Trivedi and Sir Francis Mudie, the Premiers-designate of East and West Punjab. He was definitely of the view that arrests should be made but only after a week or so.92 On 6 August, Abell had half an hour with Jinnah, who thought that it would be unwise to wait and was personally in favour of arrests at once. He had agreed to simultaneous action on the announcement of the award only to accommodate Sardar Patel who was opposed to arrest. Jinnah suspected that Patel would welcome trouble from the Sikhs in central Punjab and wanted, therefore, to delay action. Abell thought that the matter was important enough to be discussed with the Punjab Governor.93 Mountbatten sent a telegram to Jenkins on 8 August 1947 about the ‘subversive’ activities of Master Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders. Jenkins discussed this matter with Sir Chandulal Trivedi and Sir Francis Mudie and they all agreed that the arrests, now or later, could not improve the situation. In fact, the immediate situation could worsen. Therefore, it was far better to leave the matter to ‘the new Governments’ of West Punjab and East Punjab to decide. The village raids in Amritsar district were not specifically directed by Master Tara and his associates, though it was ‘undoubtedly the result of their general propaganda’. Jenkins believed that the reports on Master Tara Singh’s personal activities were substantially true but he had doubts that their alleged plans would come to anything. He added: ‘We have as yet no evidence to support a criminal prosecution’, and it was impossible to say what the attitude of the new governments would be. Jenkins felt that this decision would be unwelcome to Jinnah, but it was the right one. ‘The whole object of our policy has been to get as smooth a change-over as we can, even at considerable risk.’ The two new governments might have to fight the (p.376) Sikhs but it would not be fair to them to start the fight and leave it for them to inherit. On the 10th of August, Mountbatten telegraphed his acceptance of Sir Evan Jenkins’ view.94 The issue of the ‘Sikh Plan’ was mentioned by Zaffarullah Khan in the Security Council on 16 January 1948. He stated that ‘apparently the Viceroy himself’ was ‘aware of what the Sikh Plan was’. On 24 January, a note stated that ‘beyond any doubt’ the plan was known to the authorities. It was alleged that Lord Mountbatten had changed his ground after the decision taken to arrest Master Tara Singh and other prominent Sikh leaders.95 Lord Mountbatten refuted on 2 March 1948 the charges against the Governor General of India in connection with the Sikhs. These charges consisted of two parts: (a) that, as Viceroy, Mountbatten knew the Sikh plan, and (b) that, knowing it, he failed to take effective action against the Sikh leaders and Page 27 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition troublemakers despite previous assurance that he would. In response to the first charge it was stated that the ‘Sikh problem’ was frequently discussed in the Cabinet meetings, and it was discussed also with the members of the Partition Council and the Joint Defence Council. In the higher spheres of government, including the Muslim representatives, the Sikh problem was no secret. On 26 April 1947, Mountbatten had told Jinnah that he was convinced that any attempt to impose a mainly one-community government on the Sikhs would produce immediate armed retaliation which might end in civil war, and Jinnah thought that the Viceroy’s talk with the Sikh leaders would have a good effect. Jinnah revealed that an emissary of Giani Kartar Singh had come to him with the suggestion that they should hold discussions about ‘a Sikh State’ joining Pakistan after partition. He had accepted Giani Kartar Singh’s offer to see him in Delhi. Jinnah went on to claim that the Sikhs liked him personally and they had always trusted him. He stated publicly that he would support the Sikhs any time against the Muslims if they took unfair action against the Sikhs.96 The Viceroy discussed the Punjab problem again with Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan on 2 May 1947. They wanted to know why a Muslim League Government should not be formed in the Punjab. The Viceroy pointed out that the Sikhs might fight them if Section 93 was withdrawn. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan accepted this view. On 5 August 1947, the evidence presented by Captain Savage was ‘the only detailed and factual evidence’ that was ever procured. The intelligence departments were working under great handicaps due to the rapid decrease in the number of experienced British officers, the temporary lack of experienced Indian officers to take their place, and the general disarrangement due to partition. For the first time, Captain Savage had intelligence reports about two specific plots.97 The first plot that Captain Savage claimed to have unearthed was that some young Sikhs were planning to blow up a special train carrying Pakistan Government personnel from Delhi to Karachi. In the discussion on this subject, Liaqat Ali Khan stated that he had given direction for all the Pakistan trains to take every possible precaution, and for this particular train to Karachi he had strengthened its military escort and arranged for the Inspector-General of Police to be informed. The second plot was assassination of Jinnah during the ceremonies at Karachi on 14 August 1947 related to the transfer of power. A bomb was to be thrown at him during the State Drive through the streets. The Viceroy did not feel that, on the strength of the information produced by Savage, the danger was (p.377) sufficient for cancelling the Karachi ceremonies. In fact, he had arranged to accompany Jinnah in an open car in the State Drive through Karachi on 14 August. In the meeting of 5 August, Liaqat Ali Khan had given his opinion that the Sikhs were likely to react on the announcement of the award. It was unanimously recommended that Master Tara Singh and other suspected Sikh ‘ringleaders’ should be arrested at about the time of the award, and a letter to this effect should be sent to the Punjab Governor. A letter was Page 28 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition sent to Sir Evan Jenkins on 5 August to make it clear that the matter was to be left to the new Governments of West Punjab and East Punjab to deal with.98 On the charge of failure to use force to crush disturbances, it was pointed out first that the Viceroy had made it clear that he would use all means at his disposal to achieve immediate objective so long as it was his responsibility. After 15 August 1947, as Constitutional Governor General, he had no longer the authority or power he exercised as the British Governor General and Viceroy. He had no personal responsibility for carrying out any action against disturbances. His policy as the Viceroy was known to Sardar Baldev Singh as Defence Minister of the Indian Interim Government. By mid-August, 55,000 officers and men with tanks and armoured cars had been concentrated in the Punjab. The Viceroy was acutely aware of the general situation but he was not aware of any plan and no details were known to the intelligence departments. A large force was provided for internal security duties which were carried out with ability and firmness under conditions of great stress.99 Understandably, Mountbatten was not prepared to own any responsibility for the situation which developed before 15 August 1947. On 17 September 1947, Lord Ismay wrote about the causes of disturbances and bloodshed. The principal reason for the massacres in the Punjab and Delhi, as he saw in retrospect, was not that the number of troops was inadequate, but that they failed to do their duty. They were unwilling to take action against their co-religionists. On the question of whether power was transferred in too great a hurry, Ismay thought that there were three reasons which made any other course highly dangerous, if not impossible. One was the extreme communal tension throughout the country. Another was that the power to check disturbances was no longer there. The most important reason was that Nehru specifically said that unless the Muslim members were dismissed from the Interim Government, he would resign.100 Ismay too assumed that the colonial rulers were not responsible for the explosive situation which had developed before 15 August 1947. Master Tara Singh’s demand for partition of the Punjab was no secret. It was indeed public and emphatic. He said frequently in public that if this demand was not conceded and implemented, bloodshed was inevitable. The prospect of the ‘other factors’ for division being ignored made him all the more desperate. But the Muslim League was equally adamant about population as the only admissible criterion for division. In his entire political career Master Tara Singh was not associated with any conspiracy or plot other than the one allegedly unearthed by Captain Savage. The information he collected and recorded did not pinpoint Master Tara Singh. In any case, it was not sufficient for ‘criminal prosecution’.

Akali Expectations The promises made and assurances given to Master Tara Singh by Jawaharlal Nehru (p.378) on 28 May 1947 are not known, but there is no doubt about the Page 29 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition disconsolation of Master Tara Singh over the announcement of the Mountbatten Plan. In the process of pressing the demand for exchange of population and property in order to ensure concentration of Sikhs in a large contiguous area between the Jamuna and the Chenab, the Akali leaders discovered that the political forces against their demand were too strong for them to overcome. Their best chances, therefore, were to get concessions from the Congress leadership for an honourable position in the Indian Union. The views occasionally expressed by Giani Kartar Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, between 3 June and 15 August 1947 provide an inkling of Akali expectations. Giani Kartar Singh submitted to Mountbatten a note on 20 June 1947 which, apart from exchange of population and property, suggested that the Sikh problem could be solved by separating the Hindi-speaking population of East Punjab as a new province in Hindustan in which the Sikhs should have one-third share in the legislature.101 The charter of eight demands in a secret circular letter of the Akali High Command included, among other things, ‘the creation of a Sikh homeland in Hindustan for Punjabi-speaking Hindus and Sikhs, and the strengthening of the Sikh political position in Hindustan by giving them special weightage’.102 Presumably the Sikh homeland in Hindustan was to have Hindu majority and a large weightage for the Sikhs. In his interview with Jenkins on 10 July 1947, Giani Kartar Singh asserted that the Sikhs were ‘entitled to a homeland just as much as the Muslims or the Hindus’. Furthermore, he said that Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Patel had been sympathetic to the establishment of a Sikh homeland with the Jatt districts separated and joined to the United Province. ‘He saw the final Sikh state as a kind of buffer state between Pakistan and the union of India.’103 On 30 July again, Giani Kartar Singh spoke of the Sikh future. The Sikhs favoured, he said, the amalgamation of the non-Punjabi speaking districts with the United Provinces, or with another new province. ‘They would then try to organize what remained of East Punjab as a Sikh majority Province.’ The Sikh states of the Punjab region were expected to become a part of the new East Punjab. Significantly, Giani Kartar Singh added that as yet no idea of their intentions was given to the Hindus.104 Thus, the operative idea of Sikh future in the Union of India was a sort of Punjabi-speaking state with a Sikh majority. Mountbatten had written to Nehru on 4 July that the Sikh leaders presented their point of view to him in his discussions with them. They were worried that the Sikh community would be divided into two halves unless major alterations were made by the Boundary Commission. They hoped that the Commission would make such major alterations. Apart from this, they asked for assurance that they would receive weightage in the legislature of East Punjab and hoped for weightage in the Central Houses of the Union of India and a seat in the Union Government. They had suggested that they should have special representation in the existing Constituent Assembly, and also that transfer of Page 30 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition population should be seriously considered in the Punjab. The letter ended with almost an appeal. ‘I expect all these points have been put to you but I should like to tell you how much I sympathise with the Sikhs and how much I hope you will be able to help them.’ On the same day, Mountbatten wrote a similar letter to Jinnah.105 (p.379) Nehru responded to Mountbatten’s letter on 7 July. ‘We appreciate thoroughly’, he said, ‘the anxiety of the Sikhs.’ They had been hit hard by the division. However, weightage raised complicated issues. ‘All our troubles, or nearly all, have been due to separate electorates and the system of weightage, originally introduced for the Muslims.’ It created separatist tendencies. It led to far-reaching consequences and ill-will. It was ‘a fundamentally wrong principle’. It was possible, however, to give some kind of reservation, with freedom also to contest the general seats, but without weightage and separate electorate. The question of transfer of population did not arise immediately. ‘If the people desire it, it must be seriously considered.’106 Chaudhri Lahri Singh had written to Sardar Patel on 9 July 1947 that a movement for the creation of a Punjabi-speaking province, with the whole of Jullundur Division, Amritsar, and parts of Ambala Division, was gaining ground. This would result in isolating the ‘Haryana Prant’, that is, the districts of Rohtak, Karnal, Gurgaon, and parts of Hissar. ‘To propose further division of the truncated Punjab is definitely actuated by the sole desire of establishing Sikh hegemony in the Central Punjab.’ This move of the Sikh leaders was not justified. Lahri Singh, along with a few other persons, wanted to explain the case to Sardar Patel personally.107 However, Patel replied that he could not meet a deputation due to his preoccupation with the partition question, but he assured Lahri Singh that there was ‘no question of any division of the Eastern Punjab’.108 Given the views of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel on the issues of political safeguards for the Sikhs and the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state, the Akalis were most unlikely to have a smooth sailing after 15 August 1947. Despite their aspirations and hopes, their position in the new political order in free India was uncertain. It is important, nevertheless, to note that they were talking in terms of Sikh homeland as a Punjabi-speaking province within the Indian Union.

In Retrospect Master Tara Singh stated on 4 June that there was total lack of provision in the Plan of 3 June 1947 to give the Sikhs ‘any power or status anywhere’, or even ‘for safeguarding their position or interests’. The ultimate acceptance or rejection of the Plan, he said, would depend a good deal on the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. The Punjab Governor reported on 24 June that the Akali High Command had sent in a secret circular to Sikh organizations a charter of demands which included the exchange of property and population. On 10 July, Giani Kartar Singh asserted that the Sikhs were Page 31 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition entitled to a homeland ‘as much as the Muslims and Hindus’. Their homeland must have at least one canal system, Nankana Sahib, and two-thirds of the Sikhs through a large-scale exchange of population. The British and Indian Governments and the Congress must recognize that in the proceedings for the transfer of power ‘the fate of the Sikhs was a vital issue’. In June, July, and early August, the political and administrative situation was worsening in the Punjab. There were several reasons for this deterioration. The old administrative machine was rapidly falling to pieces. In the Indian Civil Services no Hindu or Sikh opted for service in Pakistan; only one Muslim opted for the Indian Union, and he too for fear of victimization by the Muslim League in Pakistan. By the end of July, the whole of the (p.380) Punjab was declared to be a disturbed area under the Punjab Disturbed Area Act of 1947. There was a ‘communal war of succession’ in which some political leaders were participating even directly. The Security Committee ceased to exist after 3 July when Mamdot resigned from it. The police became unreliable. The troops were insufficient and their neutrality was affected by the tension around. The Punjab Partition Committee agreed about very little and the most important questions were referred to arbitration or left for the two new governments to settle later. A strange kind of political and administrative vacuum was created, leaving much scope for local initiative for violence and aggrandizement. A cycle of retaliation and reprisals started before 15 August 1947 as a prelude to an unprecedented exodus in world history. Despite all uncertainties, the Akali leaders did not despair. In July 1947, Giani Kartar Singh was thinking of reorganization of East Punjab as ‘a Sikh majority province’, including the princely states of the plains. However, Jawaharlal Nehru was vehemently opposed to separate electorates and weightage. The only political safeguard he was prepared to concede, and that too against his grain, was reservation of seats in proportion to population. His vision of India after Independence had little room for the long-cherished hopes and aspirations of the Akalis.

Notes:

(1.) Kirpal Singh (ed.), Select Documents on Partition of Punjab–1947 (Delhi: National Book Shop, [1991] 2006), pp. 91–2. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–47 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1982), vol. XI, p. 41. (2.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 93–8. (3.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 39–47.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (4.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 89–91. Also, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 69–70. (5.) Mountbatten to Attlee, 3 June 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 78. (6.) Thompson to Carfield, 2 June 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 38. (7.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 47. (8.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 91–3. (9.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 94–7. (10.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 97–8. (11.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 99–101. (12.) Mountbatten to the Earl of Listowel, 3 June 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 105. (13.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 189. (14.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 189. (15.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 110–15. (16.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 117. (17.) Gopal Singh, A History of the Sikh People (1469–1988) (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, [1979] 1993), pp. 706–7n. (18.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, ‘Master Tara Singh and Punjab’s Partition’, The Tribune, 6 August 2014, p. 9. Based on Civil and Military Gazette, 31 May 1947. (19.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 4 June 1947, in Punjab Politics: 1 June–14 August 1947, ed. Lionel Carter (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), pp. 53, 117 n. 7. (20.) Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 9, 12 June 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 307. (21.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 331. (22.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 108. (23.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 136–8. (24.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 331–2. (25.) Viceroy’s Personal Report No. 10, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 687–2.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (26.) Mountbatten to Jinnah, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, p. 735. (27.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 260–1. (28.) Note by Giani Kartar Singh, The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 762–3. (29.) Raghuvendra Tanwar (ed.), Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), pp. 252–7. (30.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII (1983), pp. 17–18. (31.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 93–4. (32.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 65–6. (33.) Note by Jenkins, 10 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 144–5. (34.) Note by Jenkins, 10 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 145–7. (35.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 10 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 143–4. (36.) Note by Jenkins of interview with Jathedar Mohan Singh and Harnam Singh, 11 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), Appendix 14, pp. 249–50. (37.) Master Tara Singh to Attlee, 25 July 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 340–1. (38.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 621. (39.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 292–9. (40.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 23, 27 and 28 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 169–70, 174–7. (41.) Ismay to Mountbatten, 31 July 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 439. (42.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 29 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 176. (43.) Note by Jenkins, 30 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 181–3. (44.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 103–4. (45.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 122–3. (46.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947, pp. 210–12. (47.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 138–9. The Transfer of Power, vol. XI, pp. 846–7.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (48.) Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 86–7. (49.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 63–4. (50.) Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1989, second edition), pp. 77–92. (51.) Allan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London: Robert Hale, 1951), p. 167. (52.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 473–5. (53.) Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power (1942–1947) (Patiala: Punjabi University, 2006), p. 146 (personal interview on 22 May 1963). (54.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 118–19. (55.) The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 739. (56.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947, p. 322. (57.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: University of the Punjab, [1967] 2009), pp. 220–1. (58.) Baldev Singh to Major J.M. Short, 5 July 1947, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 143. (59.) Ismay to Mountbatten, 10 July 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 156. The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 78–9. (60.) Ismay to Mountbatten, 14 July 1947, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 167. The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 79 n. 1. (61.) Moon, Divide and Quit, p. 96. (62.) Short to Cripps, 3 August 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 492 n. 1. (63.) Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, pp. 51–2. (64.) Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp. 210–20. (65.) H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain—India—Pakistan (London: Hutchinson, 1969, second impression), pp. 352–5. (66.) Lionel Carter (ed.), Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty, 22 March–15 August 1947 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2003), pp. 11–12 and 14 n. 21. (67.) Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, pp. 99–103. Page 35 of 38

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (68.) Kirpal Singh, Punjab da Batwārā te Sikh Neta (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1997), pp. 54–60. (69.) Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power, pp. 73–8. (70.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 118. (71.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 705. (72.) Mountbatten to Ismay, 12 February 1948, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 700. (73.) Mountbatten to Ismay, 19 March 1948, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 701–3. (74.) Ismay to Mountbatten, 7 April 1948, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, pp. 706–8. (75.) Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power, p. 134. (76.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 709. (77.) Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power, p. 133. (78.) Kirpal Singh, The Sikhs and Transfer of Power, p. 144. (79.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 1 and 4 June 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 50, 53. (80.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 15 June 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 74–8. (81.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 20, 25, and 26 June 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 81, 93, 99–101, 106. (82.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 3 and 14 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 126–7, 129, 159. (83.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 14 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 158–61. (84.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 July and 1 August 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 185, 190–1. (85.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 31 July and 1 August, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 184, 190. (86.) Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 August 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), p. 195. (87.) Memorandum by Jenkins, 4 August 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 196–7.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (88.) Jenkins to Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 228– 31. (89.) Jenkins to Abell, 4 August 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 211, 235 nn. 13, 14, 236 n. 32. For the story of Savage, see Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, pp. 537–9. (90.) Abell to Sir Evan Jenkins, 5 August 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 373. Mountbatten to the Earl of Listowel, 8 August 1947, The Transfer of Power, vol. XII, p. 589. (91.) Abell to Mountbatten, 6 August 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 407. (92.) Kirpal Singh, Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, p. 373. (93.) Abell to Mountbatten, 6 August 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 407. (94.) ‘Lord Mountbatten to Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948’ (enclosure to 242), in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 712–13. (95.) ‘Lord Mountbatten to Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948’ (enclosure to 242), in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 713–14. (96.) ‘Lord Mountbatten to Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948’ (enclosure to 242), in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 714–15. (97.) ‘Lord Mountbatten to Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker, 2 March 1948’ (enclosure to 242), in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 715–16. (98.) ‘Lord Ismay Col. Erskine-Crum, 17 September 1948’, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 716–17. (99.) A note by Giani Kartar Singh given to His Excellency at Interview on 26 June 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, p. 137. (100.) Punjab Politics (2007), p. 121 n. 67. (101.) ‘Jenkins to Mountbatten 10 July 1947’ (enclosure to no. 71), Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 144–7. (102.) ‘Jenkins to Mountbatten 30 July 1947’ (enclosure to 102), Punjab Politics (2007), p. 183. (103.) Note by Jenkins, 10 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 145–7. (104.) Note by Jenkins, 30 July 1947, Punjab Politics (2007), pp. 181–3.

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Seventy-Five Days to Partition (105.) Mountbatten to Nehru, 4 July 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 139–40. (106.) Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Lord Mountbatten, 7 July 1947, in Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, ed. Kirpal Singh, pp. 148–9. (107.) Chaudhry Lahri Singh to Patel, 9 July 1947, in Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50, ed. Durga Das (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. V, pp. 301–3. (108.) Patel to Lahri Singh, 11 July 1947, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. V, p. 303.

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The New Context

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The New Context (1947–50) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0016

Abstract and Keywords In the new context after Independence, the most urgent problems before the governments of India and Punjab were rehabilitation, the language issue, and integration of the princely states. Rehabilitation created Hindu majority in the province, with Sikh majority in six districts. The Sachar Formula to solve the language issue enabled the Arya Samaj leaders of the Punjabi region to exercise their preference for Hindi over Punjabi as the medium of education. Sardar Patel considered various possibilities and decided to form the Patiala and the East Punjab States Union (Pepsu). The caretaker government formed under Gian Singh Rarewala kept the Akalis out. Article 371 of the Constitution of India enabled Sardar Patel to intervene in the affairs of the Pepsu more effectively than in the affairs of the Punjab. Keywords:   The new context, rehabilitation, the language issue, princely states, Sikh majority, Sachar Formula, Sardar Patel, Patiala and the East Punjab States Union, Pepsu, Gian Singh Rarewala, Article 371

In the wake of India’s independence on 15 August 1947, there was increased problem of violence and exodus, followed by the problem of rehabilitation of ‘refugees’ from Pakistan. A new administrative apparatus had to be set up in East Punjab with an evolving relationship with the Centre. The process of integration of princely states with the Indian Union had begun before Independence. A new state, known as the Patiala and the East Punjab States Union (Pepsu), was formed in the Punjab region. Thus, the major developments

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The New Context of the period relate to (a) problems of violence, exodus, and rehabilitation; (b) governance in East Punjab; and (c) the formation of the Pepsu. The Constituent Assembly which had met for the first time in December 1946 completed its task before the end of 1949, and the new Constitution was adopted on 26 January 1950 as a framework for the future political system in India. We propose to take up the making of the Constitution in the next chapter. It may be added that despite all continuities the net result was virtually ‘a revolution’. In retrospect, 15 August 1947 appears to be a kind of watershed between an old and a new world.

The Problems of Violence, Exodus, and Rehabilitation The Government of India set up a Fact Finding Organization early in 1948, with Gopal Das Khosla as its Chairman, to examine the recorded statements of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan. Khosla’s Stern Reckoning was based largely on a critical examination of the statements made by the refugees from the districts of Lahore, Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Shahpur, Jhang, Multan, Muzaffargarh, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Attock, Mianwali, Dera Ghazi Khan, and the Bahawalpur State.1 According to Khosla, non-Muslims all over West Punjab came to feel in the months of (p.388) August and September 1947 the urgency of leaving Pakistan where conditions of life were becoming impossible for them. ‘From hamlets and villages the people ran like hunted animals to seek shelter in towns where they hoped to find safety, in large numbers.’ Large concentrations of refugees grew up in towns and cities. These camps were subjected to attacks. Caravans of refugees began to move in the direction of India. ‘Day after day, week after week, non-Muslims from West Punjab continued to pour across the border in trains, lorries, aeroplanes, bullock-carts and on foot, till by the end of December 1947, four millions of them had come to India.’2 Retaliation in East Punjab had begun before 15 August 1947. By the end of August the atmosphere throughout East Punjab had become very tense and violence continued to occur in the month of September. According to one report, almost all Muslim men, women, and children, whether urban or rural, had been either killed or turned out of their homes in East Punjab. What had happened in West Punjab was re-enacted in East Punjab on an equally large scale and with equal ferocity. The drive became so relentless that East Punjab was denuded of almost its entire Muslim population.3 A meeting was held at Ambala on 17 August 1947 in which the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan were present. On the following day a joint statement by Nehru and Liaqat Ali was released to the press from Lahore that ‘arrangements have been made to put down firmly all elements of disorder’. A joint statement by Mamdot, Bhargava, Karamat Ali, and Swaran Singh was publicized on 19–20 Page 2 of 33

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The New Context August, saying: ‘We are determined to put down disorder and to this end we shall adopt every step open to us’. Order would be restored at all costs. No government could tolerate lawlessness. On 21 August, the East Punjab Governor, Trivedi, told a news reporter in Simla that he was shifting to Jullundur and would not return until normal conditions were restored.4 Sardar Patel urged upon the rulers of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla to take prompt and effective action against depredations of the bands (jathās) formed in the states, and to take all possible security measures for the trains passing through their territories. At the end of August, Jawaharlal Nehru showed Liaqat Ali Khan a telegram from Sardar Patel in which he had underlined that it would be extremely difficult to restrain people in East Punjab in face of the refugees from Pakistan telling harrowing tales of atrocities and brutalities. If the situation in West Punjab did not improve, the situation in East Punjab would go out of control and its repercussions could be very widespread and disastrous.5 On 28 August 1947, Nehru asserted: ‘We have not a shadow of doubt that what we are having today is the result of the past years activity.’ Violence in the Punjab could be traced to the March disturbances in Rawalpindi and Multan. There was a sharp reaction in the Pakistan Times to this statement. Nehru expressed concern over the manner in which the foreign correspondents were mixing facts with fiction.6 Sardar Patel held a conference at Jullundur on 31 August with the Governor, Chandulal Trivedi; the Premier, Gopi Chand Bhargava; the Refugee Commissioner for East Punjab, P.N. Thapar; and the Chief Secretary, Sachdeva. They went through the problems of relief and evacuation, and came to an agreement about the respective spheres of the Central and provincial governments and the army. Patel observed that the Pakistan (p.389) Minister for Information was trying in his ‘mischievous and dishonest’ statements to create a wedge between the Sikhs and the Hindus. The crowds of refugees whom Sardar Patel met at Jullundur were complaining bitterly about the attitude of Muslim officials, both military and police. There were reports of atrocities on Hindus and Sikhs stranded in the state of Bahawalpur.7 Jawaharlal Nehru, who was in Lahore at this time, sent a telegram to Sardar Patel that situation in West and East Punjab required reciprocal and cooperative handling by the Central and provincial governments on both sides. His tour with the Prime Minister of Pakistan had revealed horrible sights wherever they went. The problem of refugees was assuming terrific proportions. With cooperation from the West Punjab Government and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, steps were being taken for relief and evacuation on a large scale. Lawlessness still existed in several areas but effort was being made to deal effectively with the situation and to help the refugees. Francis Mudie, the Governor of West Punjab, Page 3 of 33

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The New Context did not like the visit of ‘Nehru, Patel and company’. He refers to Nehru’s ‘hectoring manner’. He hoped that ‘it will be possible to prevent further visits to Lahore’.8 Sardar Patel wrote to John Mathai, Minister for Transport and Railways, that all the available trains be placed at the disposal of a senior railway official attached to the Brigadier in charge of evacuation of refugees. But John Mathai explained his difficulties and cited one example to illustrate the problem of insecurity. On the 1st of September, the train from Kalka to Delhi had been stopped near Sonepat and a large crowd attacked the train, showing ‘the greatest brutality imaginable’. No discrimination was made towards age or sex of the victims. Women and small children were attacked in a particularly brutal manner. The police escort was totally inactive and ineffective. The attack appeared to have been planned out with great detail and efficiency. The aide-de-camp (ADC) to the Governor General, who was an eyewitness, was keen to stress one point: ‘Sikhs numbered not more than three of the total crowd attacking the train.’9 Sardar Patel wrote to Nehru on 2 September 1947 that the tales of atrocities narrated by Hindu and Sikh refugees in Delhi affected the people so much that they were openly clamouring for action with regard to Muslims.10 Nehru and Liaqat Ali were on peace tour at this time. They encountered the largest foot convoy of refugees recorded in history, stretching over 60 miles and comprising almost 300,000 people, mostly Sikhs. Between Okara and Montgomery, Nehru’s party stopped on the road to watch the people who had survived the Sheikhupura massacre. Nehru was deeply moved by their plight. To show his concern he asked a family from where they were. An old women asked the counter question: ‘If you wanted to partition Punjab why did you not arrange for exchange of population earlier?’11 The people were left to arrange it for themselves. The refugee problem was assuming gigantic proportions in the first week of September 1947. Francis Mudie wrote to Jinnah on 5 September that movement across the border ran into a lakh or so a day. At Chuharkana he had seen 100,000 to 150,000 people collected in the town and around it. They would need forty-five trains to be sent over to India and 50 tons of flour every day while in the town. ‘I am telling every one’, he wrote, ‘that I don’t care how the Sikhs get across the border; the great thing is to get rid of them as soon as possible’. There was no sign of 300,000 Sikhs (p.390) in Lyallpur moving, but in the end they too would have to go.12 On 13 September 1947, Nehru addressed a major press conference in New Delhi, giving his assessment of the situation. He admitted that the government had underestimated the crisis in mid-August: ‘we were taken unaware’, and the government ‘must suffer for it’. He blamed the foreign press for holding the Sikhs responsible for it. The others too had ‘misbehaved’. Nehru referred to the Page 4 of 33

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The New Context Calcutta killings of 16 August 1946, the massacres of March 1947, and the subsequent disturbances. Things happened to ‘upset the mental machinery’. The migration that followed the March killings disturbed the balance of the population between communities which had enjoyed peace for ages. ‘Once the balance was upset, the one-sided killings became easier.’13 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel at the end of September about another dimension of the situation. The Hindus were being deliberately attacked and pushed out of Patiala, more especially those who had been connected with the Praja Mandal and its activities. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the Health Minister in Nehru’s Cabinet, sent a more sensational report. About 100,000 Muslims were murdered in the Patiala state, and about 12,000 of them in the Patiala city itself. ‘They died like goats and sheep.’ Rape, abduction, processions of naked women, and other atrocities had taken place. The police and military had a large share in wholesale looting. Conversion of Muslims was permitted to Sikhism alone. There were threats and some actual instances of looting and murder of Hindus; they were being ousted from business, and facilities were given to local and refugee Sikhs. The Hindus were panic-stricken and ready to quit. The idea was to make Patiala ‘a purely Sikh state’.14 On 10 October 1947, Trivedi issued an order that was sent to all the District Magistrates of East Punjab under the signatures of the Home Secretary, asking them to take strict action against the Sikhs who indulged in violence. It was stated that ‘the Sikhs, as a community, were a lawless people and were thus, a menace to the law-abiding Hindus in the province’. It was suggested that the motive for the lawlessness of Sikhs was their ‘desire for women and loot’. The Deputy Commissioners of East Punjab were instructed to adopt ‘special measures’ against the Sikhs.15 Jawaharlal Nehru remarked that the Home Department and police in East Punjab were dominated by the Sikh element. ‘Unless something about this is done, the Hindus of the East Punjab will suffer very greatly as they are suffering now.’ Nehru himself seems to have been affected by the tensions around. Sardar Patel agreed with Nehru that the administration of East Punjab required tightening up. But the Services were deeply affected by recent events and it was difficult to secure efficient and impartial administration. ‘The outlook of the general public, be it Hindu or Sikh, finds a responsive echo among the Services.’16 Sardar Patel addressed over 200,000 people in Amritsar on 30 September 1947. Retaliation, he said, was a ‘mad man’s dream’. He called for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Sikhs were dear to him. He appealed to them to raise a volunteer force for protecting the Muslim refugees against attack. To fight

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The New Context against Muslim refugees, he said, was no fight at all. No laws of humanity or war permitted slaughtering of people who had sought shelter and protection.17 On 7 October 1947, Brigadier S.B.S. Chimni, head of the Military Evacuation (p. 391) Organisation (MEO), with his headquarters at Amritsar, gave the official figures for evacuation and exchange of population during the month ending on 4 October. About 150,000 Muslims were awaiting evacuation in East Punjab and about 871,000 had been moved to Pakistan: (310,000 by train, 106,000 by motor transport, and about 455,000 in foot convoys). In Pakistan 2,000,000 nonMuslims were awaiting evacuation and about 600,000 of them were in scattered and isolated pockets. The number of the non-Muslims evacuated was 757,037 by train, on foot, by motor transport, and by air.18 On 8 October 1947, the largest foot convoy crossed the border into India: ‘small shopkeepers, landlords, artisans, doctors, labourers, even dogs, and starved cattle’; so vast was the size that it took eight days for it to cross a given point. It had left Lyallpur on 11 September to trudge 150 kilometre route into India. ‘These Sikhs’ marching out of Lyallpur were ‘an amazing sight’. Many of them had been robbed on the way, and they reached the ‘Promised Land’ penniless and in rags.19 On 23 October, Patel addressed a massive gathering in Patiala and thanked the Sikhs for their response to his appeal for peace. Muslim convoys had been allowed to pass peacefully. Once again he appealed to the Sikhs to be dispassionate and calm and ‘not to besmirch the honour of their swords by spilling innocent blood’.20 Trivedi was back in Simla on 14 November and asserted with confidence that law and order had been restored.21 On 29 November, K.C. Neogi, Refugee and Rehabilitation Minister, Government of India, informed the Constituent Assembly that about 500,000 non-Muslims were still in the western districts of the Punjab, including abducted women, forcibly converted persons, and Dalits.22 In the last week of February 1948, Bhargava made the statement that about one and a half million refugees had been settled on about two million acres of land in the Punjab.23 On the 1st of December, the West Punjab Government virtually withdrew the rights of original owners on the assumption that practically there was no chance of their return. In January 1948, the East Punjab Government also issued an ordinance to match the provisions of the West Punjab ordinance. It became possible now to devise a permanent system of allocation of the evacuee land in East Punjab among the erstwhile Hindu and Sikh landowners of West Punjab. The exchange of landed property, demanded by the Akalis much before 15 August 1947, had become a ground reality early in 1948. Raghuvendra Tanwar has underscored the strength of the opposition to the idea of exchange of population. It was reflected in the resolution of the Congress Working Committee on 23 September 1947. It said that exchange of population needed to be discouraged because neither of the two countries could bear the Page 6 of 33

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The New Context financial burden entailed. The leading Congressmen were talking along these lines mainly because Gandhi believed that an exchange of population was undesirable. Indeed, Gandhi did not waver in his belief despite all the exodus. As late as mid-November 1947, he promised to do whatever was in his power to enable the ‘refugees’ from both sides to go back to their homes.24 It may be added that the Muslim League leaders had been opposed to partition of the Punjab and they did not subscribe to the principle of exchange of population for partition. The persistent demand of the Akalis for exchange of population and property as the basis of partition was opposed by the (p.392) Muslim League and the Congress, and it was set aside by the colonial rulers who wanted to leave in a hurry. An alternative to exchange of population was to maintain peace and order through administrative action or persuasion. But the magnitude of violence and the scale of migration were totally unanticipated and no adequate preparation had been made to meet the emerging challenge to peace and order. In fact, there was a sort of politico-administrative vacuum, leaving a large scope for unrestrained local action by individuals and groups. Furthermore, after 15 August 1947 the problem was no more ‘internal’ but ‘international’. The story of rehabilitation is recorded by M.S. Randhawa in his Out of the Ashes, dedicated to the refugee farmers of the Punjab who displayed unparalleled courage, endurance, and fortitude in an unprecedented calamity. It is a comprehensive account of the rehabilitation of refugees in the rural areas of East Punjab. The first Director General of Rural Rehabilitation, Tarlok Singh, evolved a system of allotment of land based on standardization of lands on both sides of the border, and graded cuts on the area for allocation. The procedure, rules, instructions, and the formulae evolved for implementing this novel scheme were contained in his Land Resettlement Manual. Randhawa succeeded him in 1949 and completed the work of rehabilitation. It was handled on an emergency basis. In fact, an Emergency Committee was formed which included all Cabinet Ministers, besides the Minister of Rehabilitation. By the time Randhawa wrote his book, the rural refugees were striking roots into the soil of East Punjab. The title of the book was meant to suggest that the Punjab had risen again from the ashes like the mythical phoenix.25 Randhawa refers to the camps set up by the Government of India and the East Punjab Government for the refugees with essential amenities of life. By the end of November 1947, there were 720,000 persons in the refugee camps. The largest camp at Kurukshetra alone had 275,000 persons. By the end of 1947, there were more than 1,250,000 refugees in 160 camps all over India. Many of the refugees found work and new occupations. The rural migrants moved into

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The New Context villages and the urban refugees tried to rehabilitate themselves in diverse ways in towns and cities.26 The non-Muslim rural population in West Punjab in 1941 was close to three million. The rural migrants to East Punjab were settled in the villages on a temporary basis. Each family was given about 10 acres of land, regardless of its holding in West Punjab. No distinction was made between a landholder and a tenant. A plan for even distribution of the displaced peasantry in the districts of East Punjab was drawn. Once the farmers were settled on the land, financial assistance was given to them in the form of loan for various purposes. The temporary allotment was essentially a measure of relief. However, it remained somewhat relevant for quasi-permanent allotment of evacuee lands.27 When it became clear that migration from Pakistan was permanent, the system of temporary allotment was rather irksome for the landholders due to its inequity and uncertainty. But the government had no record of areas abandoned in West Punjab by the displaced proprietors. In March–April 1948, their claims were registered at the tehsil and sub-tehsil offices; the total number of claims was 517,401. The stage was set for making quasi-permanent allotments in terms of standard acres to enable the allottees to start afresh. Each claim was verified in the (p.393) panchāyats to obtain accurate data. This process was over by the end of October 1948. The governments on both sides agreed to exchange copies of revenue records. The work of linking claims with the areas abandoned was completed in June 1949.28 A unit called standard acre was evolved as a common measure. An acre of land which could yield 10 to 11 maunds of wheat was given the full value of ‘16 annas’ and termed a standard acre. All lands were evaluated in terms of productivity and measured in terms of the standard acre. If the value of an acre of bārānī land was 4 annas, then 4 acres of this land were equal to one standard acre. In the canal-irrigated areas, an acre of land was treated as equal to the standard acre. By November 1949, 250,000 allotment orders had been issued. But then it became necessary to take up the review applications, and only 50,000 allotment orders were issued in the months of November and December 1949 and January 1950. Allotment orders continued to be issued till the end of June 1951.29 The landed property left by Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab was much more than the landed property left by Muslims in East Punjab: 3,935,131 against 2,448,830 standard acres. A loss of 1,486,301 standard acres had to be distributed among the allottees even though they expected full compensation. The scheme of graded cuts became an important feature of the land resettlement policy. It was a compromise that could not satisfy all classes of landholders. Of the total of 483,611 landowners, 388,387 owned less 10 standard acres each; 79,181 landholders owned 10–40 standard acres each; Page 8 of 33

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The New Context 12,610 landholders owned 40–100 standard acres each; 2,719 landholders owned 100–250 standard acres each; 714 landholders owned 250–1,000 standard acres each; and 87 landholders owned more than 1,000 standard acres each. All these categories of land owners suffered loss but not in proportion to their holdings. The first two categories lost less than 30 per cent of their land but the last two categories lost more than 80 per cent. The loss of the two middle categories fell between 40 and 60 per cent. The gap between the area abandoned and evacuee area available for allotment obliged 350,000 families of refugee landholders to make what Randhawa calls an unparalleled sacrifice at the altar of freedom.30 Urban resettlement involved housing, employment, commercial and industrial activity, and the issue of compensation. The number of houses left by the Muslim migrants from East Punjab was much smaller than the number of houses in West Punjab abandoned by Hindus and Sikhs. The size and quality of houses in East Punjab was much poorer. In October 1947, the East Punjab Government allotted available space at the rate of 50 square feet for an adult and 30 square feet for a child. In October 1948, a census of displaced persons was conducted and 8,792 families were found to be living in dharamsālās and 15,278 in the open. The East Punjab Government decided to build model towns in the suburbs of seventeen urban centres.31 The bulk of the urban Muslims who left East Punjab consisted of artisans, craftsmen, and mechanics but the bulk of the urban Hindu and Sikh refugees belonged to the trading classes. There was a huge gap in terms of occupations and professions. Six vocational centres were started in East Punjab, and the Departments of Industries maintained twenty-three industrial schools and twenty demonstration parties. There was a marked disparity between the number of industrial and commercial concerns left by the migrants on both sides of the border. (p.394) Indeed, there was only one Muslim concern in East Punjab for every thirteen non-Muslim concerns in West Punjab. A large number of displaced industrialists migrated to Delhi and other cities of India and some of the industrialists in the border towns of East Punjab also migrated to other places. Restrictive legislation on the shifting of industry was resented by the industrialists of Amritsar. Industry in general suffered heavily. The government encouraged the growth of industries across the River Sutlej, especially in the Haryana region. The government of India spent Rs 112,300,000 on relief and rehabilitation by 1950–1, and the Government of East Punjab, Rs 29,700,000.32 Compensation for the urban immovable property left in West Punjab was long delayed because of the rigid attitude of the Government of Pakistan. There was a constant pressure from the displaced urbanites and political leaders, and the Government of India decided in May 1954 to acquire the rights, titles, and interests of evacuee owners to their properties in India, and to utilize these for giving part compensation to displaced persons. An Act was passed for this Page 9 of 33

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The New Context purpose in October. The final compensation scheme was approved by the Parliament in September 1955. A pool was created by the evacuee property valued at Rs 1,000,000,000 and the government built property for the displaced persons valued at Rs 850,000,000. A system of ‘graded cuts’ was introduced by which the smaller claimants received larger percentage of compensation. For example, the persons with claims up to Rs 5,000 received 50 per cent or more of their claims. The percentage for claims up to Rs 20,000 was 33 and for claims exceeding Rs 100,000, it was a little more than 11. A ceiling was also fixed: no claimant could receive more than Rs 200,000. Thus, the urban refugees too were obliged to sacrifice a large part of the property they owned in West Punjab.33 Finally, exodus and rehabilitation brought about a great change in the demographic pattern of East Punjab. The size of the cities increased due to the net addition of urban population. The religious composition of the population changed even more. The Hindus became a majority, with over 60 per cent. For the first time in their history, the Sikhs were concentrated in half a dozen districts, being more than half of the total population of each, and became territorially a compact community. The demographic change had important implications for politics.34

Governance in East Punjab Jawaharlal Nehru became the first Prime Minister of India on 15 August 1947 as the acknowledged leader of the Indian National Congress. His personality, attitudes, and style of leadership influenced all aspects of the political system. His ideology involved a strong commitment to secularism, economic development, and a liberal form of socialism. For all these purposes, he was determined to make the Congress politically dominant and supreme in the Indian Union. Consequently, he could resort to political manipulation and use the power of the Central government to undermine opposition to the Congress and dissidence among the Congress factions.35 Sardar Patel was the main leader of the Congress right wing. His relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru was quite complex. They had ideological and temperamental differences, and several times their differences on matters of policy led to near breach. A certain degree of tension was always present between the two, though they managed to (p.395) stick together to complement each other’s work. As Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Home Affairs, Patel was nearly as powerful and influential as Nehru.36 The Indian National Congress was the most important political organization in India before Independence and it remained the ruling party for over a score of years afterwards. As a ruling party, it had to face the problem of relationship of the party organization with the government. J.B. Kriplani favoured supremacy of the party and on this issue he resigned from the Presidentship of the Congress in November 1947. Nehru and Patel were of the view that the party should lay Page 10 of 33

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The New Context down general policies and long-term goals, but it should not interfere with governance. This view was acceptable to Dr Rajendra Prasad and B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, who succeeded Kriplani. None of them asserted the principle of organizational supremacy.37 The party’s role was mainly to formulate policies and select candidates for the elections. The Pradesh Congress parties remained under the discipline of the Congress organization at the centre. The ideals invoked by the Congress leadership, with some differences of emphasis and degree, were sovereignty, unity, parliamentarian democracy, and economic independence. Another value widely shared by the nationalist leaders was secularism. In their minds there was overwhelming justification for a strong, centralized state. Economic development with a certain degree of social control over production and distribution was seen as the primary agency of national integration. However, the political practice never corresponded to the rhetoric of public discourse.38 In East Punjab, Chandulal Trivedi took office as Governor on 15 August 1947, with the idea of playing an important role as a strong and competent administrator chosen by Jawaharlal Nehru. Gopi Chand Bhargava was sworn in as Prime Minister of East Punjab. The Minister to figure prominently in the early months of Independence was the Home Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, who had been elected to the Punjab Assembly as an Akali candidate in 1946. The Punjab Legislative Assembly met for the first time on the 1st of November 1947. The flag-hoisting ceremony was followed by the swearing in of the Speaker and the Ministers. Among the first items to be taken up by the House was the Salary Bill. Some of the Congress members reacted to it like opposition members. Sri Ram Sharma drew the attention of the House to the plight of refugees in Rohtak and Hissar. Bhargava said in defence that he was helpless sometimes because the Government of India did not accept his suggestions. Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke told the House that some officers had not hesitated ‘to kill Hindus and Sikhs for personal loot’. Jathedar Ishar Singh Majhail defended the government against a long list of complaints with regard to evacuation and resettlement. Sardar Swaran Singh explained why law and order had broken down in East Punjab. He shared the concern of the members with regard to the widespread involvement of the bureaucracy in corruption and nepotism. Gopi Chand Bhargava pointed out that some of the members who were loudest in talking against communalism were themselves objecting to the settling of refugees of one community in some districts. He told the House that he had lodged strong protests with Nehru and G.B. Pant on the issue of the banning of the movement of refugees into UP and other provinces. An editorial in The Tribune underscored that it was a ‘noisy House’ and (p.396) ‘some of the Congress members impaired its dignity, throwing all decorum to the wind’. On many occasions, the assembly gave the appearance of ‘a fish market’.39

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The New Context The policy of the leaders of the Centre was to have no reservation in Services except for the Scheduled Castes. K.C. Neogy wrote to Sardar Patel in January 1948 that he would like to discuss with him a confidential circular said to have been issued by the Home Minister of East Punjab. This circular tentatively laid down the proportion of representation in the Services at 40 per cent for the Sikhs and 60 per cent for the Hindus. Sardar Patel wrote to Sardar Swaran Singh to know how he felt justified in issuing the circular if he really issued it. N. Gopalaswami wrote to Sardar Patel at the end of February 1948 that the orders issued by the East Punjab Government had produced discontent among the nonSikh personnel. Gopalaswamy suggested that this expression of communalism in administration should be nipped in the bud. In response to Nehru’s letter of 1 March 1948, Bhargava explained that it was wrong to say that such orders had been issued. This proposal was before the government but no decision had yet been taken. The ratio of 40:60 between Sikhs and Hindus was followed before Independence. In some departments, instructions were issued that this ratio may be followed until otherwise decided. When Bhargava came to know of this he decided to place the matter before the Cabinet.40 C.M. Trivedi’s assumption about his role in the Cabinet came to be questioned. The Statesman of 16 December 1948 pointed out that the Punjab Governor was still presiding over the Cabinet meetings. A few days later, C.M. Trivedi wrote to Gopi Chand Bhargava that he had been presiding over the Cabinet meetings because East Punjab had not framed any new rules. Though there was nothing unconstitutional about his presiding over the Cabinet meetings, he would not like to do so against the wishes of the Premier and his colleagues in the Cabinet. Trivedi referred to the special situation in the Punjab and roundly suggested that Prime Minister Nehru wanted to build up the new province with the help of an experienced and firm administrator like Trivedi. The Indian News Chronicle of 18 December was even more critical of Trivedi. He did not like the prospect of becoming the subject of a controversy and said that he would preside over Cabinet meetings only if he was invited by Bhargava to do so.41 Trivedi sent a copy of his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru who, in turn, sent it to Sardar Patel with the remark that as a general principle, Governors should not preside over Cabinet meetings but in East Punjab the Governor’s presence had been helpful and it would continue to be helpful. Therefore, Nehru suggested that Bhargava and his colleagues could invite the Governor to preside.42 Sardar Patel’s response was quick. The practice in East Punjab was opposed to the constitutional provisions and the general practice in other provinces. Even under the colonial regime the Congress had tried to fight against this practice. ‘We can hardly do otherwise under a free India.’ Patel added that opposition within the East Punjab Assembly and within the Party was making capital out of the situation and was stirring up discontent.43

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The New Context On 11 March 1949, Sardar Patel sent his ‘heartiest congratulations’ to Bhargava on his unanimous election as leader of the Congress Legislative Party. It was ‘a happy augury for unity and cohesion in future’. East Punjab was to be rebuilt with its foundations well and truly laid on the basis of cooperation and a spirit of sacrifice. Sardar Patel assured (p.397) Bhargava of ‘our best wishes for success in justifying confidence reposed in you’.44 On 30 March 1949, Bhargava informed Sardar Patel that the Congress Legislative Party expected all groups to be represented on the Cabinet. Therefore, reshuffling was necessary. He proposed to do so in a day or two, selecting members from all groups who could work as a team. He hoped that the Parliamentary Board would have no objection.45 Only a few days later, however, the Sachar group and the Giani group gave notice of no-confidence motion, and a meeting had to be called within forty-eight hours. Bhargava removed Giani Kartar Singh from the Cabinet on 5 April 1949. When the meeting of the Party was held on the following day, Bhim Sen Sachar was elected leader of the Congress Assembly Party.46 On 11 April 1949, Sardar Patel sent to Bhim Sen Sachar a copy of his letter to Bhargava with regard to the speeches delivered by Giani Kartar Singh. His denial of having said anything of the kind alleged was not acceptable. On Sardar Patel’s visit to Ambala, Giani Kartar Singh did not meet him when the whole Ministry was there. Apart from any other consideration, these lapses made Giani Kartar Singh entirely unsuitable for inclusion in the Ministry. Sardar Patel was strongly of the opinion that he should be excluded.47 Trivedi was unhappy about the swearing in of Deputy Ministers. He wrote a letter to the Governor General, C. Rajagopalachari, on 14 April 1949 and sent a copy to Nehru with a covering letter, saying that a few of the Deputy Ministers appointed by Bhim Sen Sachar as the new Premier did not enjoy good public reputation. The appointment of so many Ministers was likely to retard disposal of business and to prejudice secrecy.48 Sachar appears to have been influenced by Sardar Baldev Singh. Nehru wrote to Patel on 14 April, informing him that he had told Baldev Singh that it was not desirable on his part to influence the decisions of a Minister in a state. In the confused state of affairs existing in East Punjab, such interference added to the confusion. Even in the developments leading to Bhargava’s resignation, Baldev Singh appeared to have taken active part in East Punjab politics. It was constitutionally improper and practically unwise. The Central Ministers should keep away from provincial politics and keep their interest confined to their official work.49 In response to a secret and personal letter from Sardar Patel, Trivedi wrote back in his own hand on 29 May 1949 about the issue of enquiry into the happenings Page 13 of 33

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The New Context at Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, that the matter had been settled and no enquiry would now be held. (This enquiry had been demanded by the supporters of Master Tara Singh.) Much of his letter dwelt on the new Premier, Bhim Sen Sachar. He was presented as ‘hasty, impulsive, tactless, obstinate and vain’. In spite of the Governor’s advice, Sachar had appointed Basant Krishna Khanna as Advocate General. Most of the Secretaries to Government were ‘very nearly sick of him’. He had thoroughly alienated Gopi Chand Bhargava by ‘his tactlessness amounting almost to rudeness and discourtesy’. With reference to what Sardar Patel had said about Giani Kartar Singh, Trivedi promised ‘to keep him on the right track’, though he was ‘a slippery customer’. Sardar Patel thanked Trivedi for his ‘secret and personal letter’. ‘So long as we are on the alert’, he said, it may be possible to save East Punjab against itself.50 Patel was convinced that intervention in the affairs of East Punjab was not only justified but also necessary. (p.398) On 23 June 1949, Bhim Sen Sachar wrote to Sardar Patel about the drive he had started against bogus iron and steel quota holders. A special inquiry agency had taken up the matter already before he formed the Ministry. Therefore, it could not be said that he was trying to malign his predecessor in office. But Gopi Chand Bhargava was trying to shield the guilty and saying that Sachar was actuated by personal motives against his political opponents.51 Sardar Patel advised Sachar: ‘If you wish to enlist the help and cooperation of Dr. Gopichand and your other colleagues in the obviously desirable undertaking of exposing corruption and other scandals, I feel the best course would be to take them all into your confidence, to pool your talents and experience.’ Sachar assured Sardar Patel that he was not actuated by factional motives. Sardar Patel was glad to know that Sachar would secure cooperation of his colleagues.52 Corruption did not appear to be a crucial issue. C. Rajagopalachari, the Governor General, wrote to Sardar Patel early in July 1949 that he was impressed by Sachar who could be given ‘a fair chance’. He had advised Sachar to be most considerate and never to ignore the advice of Governor Trivedi.53 Early in September 1949, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir and Lehna Singh Sethi, respectively President and General Secretary of the Punjab Congress, informed Sardar Patel of the success of the Congress candidate with an overwhelming majority of 2,191 votes against 447in the by-election for the only seat in the ‘Trade Union Labour’ constituency of the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Sardar Patel expressed his delight over the result, congratulated and thanked Musafir and all Congress workers who made the success possible. Significantly, Sardar Patel thanked Sardar Baldev Singh most sincerely: ‘I know how much you laboured for it and how much our success is due to your untiring efforts.’54

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The New Context Sardar Patel had no objection to the Defence Minister of India taking interest in the by-election of a Congress candidate in his home state. An editorial in The Tribune referred to a common talk that ‘if Pandit Nehru had not gone to the United States in 1949, the Sachar Ministry may have had a longer life than six months’.55 Nehru learnt about the change in the East Punjab Ministry after his return from the USA early in November. He wrote to Sardar Patel on 19 November that he was rather depressed at the state of affairs in East Punjab. Since the Central partAuthorities and the Congress Parliamentary Board were involved in the recent changes, they would be dragged into mire and would suffer discredit. A number of the Punjab legislators were prepared to change their allegiance at the slightest provocation to the highest bidder. This was not conducive to any kind of stability or public confidence. In his tour of the Punjab during the Ministry of Sachar, Nehru had noticed a healthier tone in some respects and he was strongly of the opinion then that any change in the immediate future would upset ‘the delicate equilibrium’. Therefore, he laid stress on stability and continuity of administration. The Services in East Punjab were bound to be demoralized by quick changes and the Congress would simply fade away. Schemes like the Bhakra Dam and the new capital were bound to suffer in a fierce conflict between rival elements who would think only of personal rivalries and forget every important issue. ‘As for those gentlemen whose profession seems to be to shift about from side to side, the less said the better.’56 Sardar Patel expressed his well-considered view that the only course in the interest both of the province and the country (p.399) was ‘Governor’s rule until fresh elections can be held’. The only way in which the Parliamentary Board could have secured a willing majority for Sachar was as the head of a composite Ministry. Even at the time he had taken office in April 1949, he had a precarious majority. Defections had begun to appear within a week. The Parliamentary Board had to resort to the expedient of a composite Ministry. The experiment could succeed only if there was mutual accommodation and mutual confidence. Unfortunately, Sachar showed qualities which were the very opposite of those required in a Premier in the given situation. He himself had written to the Parliamentary Board in August that the experiment had failed and he was finding it difficult to carry on with his colleagues. After Sachar’s resignation, Bhargava got an overwhelming majority of votes. The shifting of party loyalties was a chronic disease from which the Punjab Congress had been suffering both before and after Partition. The Partition made the situation worse: a substantial number of the members had no constituency in East Punjab. Sachar climbed the ladder of leadership by suborning the loyalty of members to their leader ‘unanimously expressed only a few days before’. Possibly, he had come down by the same ladder.57

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The New Context The impression that we get of governance in East Punjab is that the leaders at the Centre, both in the government and in the Congress, tried to guide and control matters for various reasons. The Governor tended to be, and he was used as, an instrument of the Centre. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel gave unsought advice to the Premiers and Ministers of the East Punjab. They took interest in matters of policy, administration, elections, and formation of Ministries. Divided into factions, the East Punjab Congressmen were guided by factional and personal interests and looked for support from one or another of the Central leaders. The considerations which influenced the attitude of the Punjab Congress leaders towards the Sikh leaders in general and the Akali leaders in particular were also factional and personal. East Punjab had a special importance for the Central leaders also due to its location on the border with Pakistan, the problems of rehabilitation arising out of the exodus, and the concentration of Sikh population in East Punjab. For all these reasons their interest was deep and the scope of their intervention was rather wide. ‘To save the East Punjab against itself’ appears to sum up their basic attitude. The Ministry of Bhim Sen Sachar is known for the language formula generally called the Sachar Formula. The beginning of the issue of language for East Punjab goes back to November 1947 when Gopi Chand Bhargava, who held the Education portfolio, made a policy statement on education in the East Punjab Legislative Assembly. He planned to take over all buildings (left by Muslims) suitable for schools and to assist all organizations willing to restart schools, provided that they were not sectarian or communal. Lists of refugee teachers were being prepared for filling up vacancies in the schools. The primary and middle schools were to be opened on 17 November 1947, the day on which the East Punjab University Camp College was to be started in Delhi.58 The issue of the medium of education in schools was becoming somewhat urgent. The language issue in the Punjab was partly a legacy of the colonial period, but it became acute after Independence due to the competitive claims of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script and Hindi in Devanagri script. A large (p.400) majority of the people in East Punjab spoke Punjabi, but most of the Hindus preferred Hindi in Devanagri as the medium of education and most of the Sikhs preferred Punjabi in Gurmukhi script. In the Punjabi-speaking districts there were many Hindus who had imbibed the influence of the Arya Samaj and therefore, even though their mother tongue was Punjabi, their preference was for Hindi (Arya Bhasha). Some of the important leaders of the province, and of the Congress, belonged to this category. They were influential individuals, with the power of the press at their command. Their geographical location, coupled with their political and cultural aspirations, complicated the language issue. In February 1948, the Jullundur Municipality decided to introduce Hindi in all its schools at the primary stage. In June 1948, the East Punjab Government issued a circular to the effect that the medium of instruction in the schools shall be the Page 16 of 33

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The New Context mother tongue of the pupils and the script to be used could be Gurmukhi or Devanagri in the first and second classes, and the script not used in these two classes would have to be introduced with class three. The ambiguity of the circular concealed the implication that Hindi in Devanagri script was regarded as ‘mother tongue’. But only a few days earlier in Jullundur city itself Gopi Chand Bhargava had admitted that the mother tongue of the people of the Punjab was Punjabi. A year later, in June 1949, the Panjab University Senate rejected Punjabi as the medium of instruction in the schools. The Sikh members of the Senate were prepared to accept Punjabi in Gurmukhi or Devanagri script but their proposal was rejected and they walked out to mark their protest.59 The East Punjab Government failed to evolve any compromise formula for the place of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as the medium of instruction. Bhim Sen Sachar wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on 13 May 1949 that the Central government could hear the parties concerned and give its decision. He was immediately informed that the Punjab Government should at least send their recommendations. Sachar wrote to Nehru on 9 July 1949 that he had informal discussions with his colleagues and the Governor and also with leaders of public opinion. The unanimous demand of the Sikhs was that Punjabi in Gurmukhi script should be adopted all over the province, not only as the medium of instruction in schools and colleges but also as the official and court language. This would not be acceptable to Hindus in general and the Hindustani-speaking region of the Ambala Division and Kangra district of the Jullundur Division in particular, and it would be unfair to force it on them. The best solution to the impasse would be to recognize the province as consisting of two distinct linguistic regions, Punjabi and non-Punjabi. The Punjab Government would therefore agree that (a) Punjabi should mean Punjabi in Gurmukhi script; (b) East Punjab should be divided into two distinct regions on linguistic basis; (c) Punjabi should be the medium of instruction in the Punjabi-speaking region of the province and Hindi in the other, up to and including the fifth class; (d) in the Punjabi-speaking region Hindi should be compulsorily taught as a second language from the fourth class, with the reversal of the same arrangement in the non-Punjabi region. English and Urdu could continue for the present as the official and court language. Whereas the Sikhs were not in favour of making any distinction between schools for boys and girls for this purpose, the Hindus were. The Sikhs would include the whole of Jullundur Division and the whole of Ambala (p.401) district in the Punjabi-speaking region, but the Hindus would exclude the Kangra district and the Ambala, Naraingarh, and Jagadhari tehsils of Ambala district. A specific Sikh demand was to include the entire region north of the Ghaggar plus the portion of Ambala district on its south in the Punjabi-speaking region. This would include the districts of Ambala and Simla. The Hindus would not accept it.60

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The New Context Jawaharlal Nehru informed Bhim Sen Sachar that his letter of 9 July would be considered in due course. Meanwhile, Sachar could reflect upon the rule Nehru had laid down in his previous letter ‘that every child is entitled to primary education in his or her mother tongue, wherever he or she may be, provided there are a sufficient number of children of that type to make arrangements feasible’. Nehru goes on to explain: ‘Even if you make some kind of a linguistic division of the province, facilities for carrying on primary education in the script and language of the parents’ choice must be available in either area.’61 It is important to note that in the proposal acceptable to the Punjab Government, no concession or relaxation was given, directly or by implication, to the Hindi zealots of the Punjabi-speaking region, but the rule laid down by Nehru carried the implication that primary education could be imparted to boys and girls in Hindi in Devanagari script in the Punjabi-speaking zone as well. Thus, the most crucial clause in the language formula was sought to be introduced by Nehru. However, he wanted to give the impression that there was no imposition from the Centre. Sardar Patel had his own views on the language issue in the Punjab. First of all, it should be taken up not by itself but along with the question of Services. Second, the assurance given by the Premier and the Governor was not enough; the Sikh leaders should give an undertaking that they would accept the decisions of the Central government. Third, the matter should be placed before the Cabinet after some tentative conclusions were evolved on the basis of expert advice. Furthermore, some fundamental questions had also to be taken into consideration: (a) Was Punjabi a language or a dialect? Did it have a grammar and a literature? And were the people willing to continue or adopt it? (b) What was the percentage of the population of East Punjab which used Gurmukhi or ‘Hindi’ as script, and whether it was possible to divide the population into any geographical or administrative divisions? (c) In the matter of language, was it better to use compulsion or to give option? If it was compulsion, whether the whole province should be made bilingual or divided into linguistic regions? Finally, Sardar Patel suggested that Sachar should be asked to expedite his recommendations on the question of Services.62 Some of the questions posed by Patel appear to be heavily loaded. Jawaharlal Nehru suggested that the safest way to deal with the language problem was to think of some principles which could be applied to India as a whole. In Bengal there was a rule to the effect that every child had a right to receive education in his or her mother tongue, provided there was a sufficient number of such children. This seemed to be a correct approach and in line with what the Congress had often said. It would be for parents to say what the ‘mother tongue’ was. In the Punjab, there could be two more or less definitely marked areas of Hindi and Punjabi, with each of these as the primary language for its own area. Applying the principle stated earlier, it would be open to (p. Page 18 of 33

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The New Context 402) those who considered Hindi their language to ask for primary education in Hindi in the Punjabi area and vice versa. Both Punjabi and Hindi should be equally recognized as official languages for the courts. Compulsion or coercion, he asserted, would be against all the principles and totally unreasonable.63 Nehru’s principle bypassed the issue of ‘mother tongue’ which was peculiar to East Punjab. In fact, Nehru conceded by implication that Hindi was the mother tongue of Punjabi Hindus of the Punjabi region if they claimed it to be. Jawaharlal Nehru had already written to Bhim Sen Sachar that the Central government could not consider a one-sided reference. ‘This will simply involve us in trouble later, when some people might repudiate what we decide.’ The phrase ‘some people’ actually meant the Akalis. Nehru asked Sachar to expedite his recommendations in regard to the Services. ‘We should like to deal with both controversial issues together and not piecemeal.’64 Sardar Patel was in general agreement with Nehru, particularly in his emphasis that there should be no compulsion. However, he wanted to ensure that options were ‘real options’ and that no compulsion was allowed for the primary language. Both Nehru and Patel were doubtful about the suitability of Punjabi at the levels for higher studies. Patel was doubtful about Punjabi being suitable even at the secondary stage. He wanted to have an expert opinion on the question of at least the possibility of Punjabi, both present and potential, as a medium of instruction’.65 In retrospect, it seems that these doubts arose from ignorance and prejudice rather than any understanding or knowledge of the Punjabi language and literature. Giani Kartar Singh met Jawaharlal Nehru on 22 July 1949 and said that both the government and the Assembly Party, including the Sikhs, were not of one opinion on the question of Services. He suggested that the language issue might be resolved first. After a long discussion an agreement had been arrived at on the language issue between the Hindu and the Sikh Ministers; the Governor too had agreed. There was a difference of opinion about the delimitation of linguistic areas and about the option. Whereas the Hindus wanted option, the Sikhs did not. These two points of difference were referred to the Central government. Nehru made it clear that ‘our general policy was against compulsion’, which meant that option was given ‘in regard to the choice of mother-tongue’. He believed that Punjabi would have ‘a much better chance of growing if there was no compulsion’. Giani Kartar Singh said that the Sikh demand was unanimous, and asked for an early decision. The Central leaders could not agree to do away with the option of the parents to decide the mother tongue.66 The Punjab Government announced its decision to adopt a language formula for education in schools that came to be known as Sachar Formula or Sachar–Giani Formula. Both Sachar and Giani Kartar Singh undoubtedly had taken keen interest in the issue. But it was equally the concern of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. In fact, they had made a crucial contribution to the formula and had given their final approval for all its important features. Indeed, its Page 19 of 33

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The New Context attribution to Bhim Sen Sachar or to both Sachar and Giani Kartar Singh conceals the role of its master architects. The option for parents to decide about the choice of ‘mother-tongue’ was incorporated in the formula on Nehru’s insistence. The Simla district and the Ambala tehsil were made bilingual and the Kangra district and the tehsils of Jagadhari and Naraingarh were (p.403) included in the Hindi zone. The formula, on the whole, was a compromise tilted in favour of Hindi. Nevertheless, the Arya Samaj started the propaganda that the Hindu institutions should not implement the policy laid down by the government.67 The formula was never fully implemented due to their attitude.

The New State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union The Punjab princely states had acceded to the Indian Union before 15 August 1947. On 15 July 1948, the Patiala and East Punjab States Union was inaugurated by Sardar Patel. In 1948–9, the most important problem of this union of states was how to ensure a stable ministry. Sardar Patel was the kingpin in the situation. At the annual session of the Chamber of Princes on 17 January 1946, Lord Wavell had assured the rulers of the Indian states that no change in their relationship with the Crown would be initiated without their consent, and he expected the states to take full part in the proposed Constitution-making body. The Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes declared that its policy was to follow the principles of sound administration and every state should introduce popular institutions with elected majorities to ensure close and effective association of its people with governance.68 In the general conference of rulers and states’ ministers on 2 April 1947, the Maharaja of Patiala, who was Pro-Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, and the Maharaja of Bikaner took a stand in favour of sending representatives to the Constituent Assembly. In the course of the discussions the Maharaja of Patiala told the Chancellor (the Nawab of Bhopal) that he was sending his representatives to the Constituent Assembly because he felt that the stage had definitely come for participation of the states in the process of Constitutionmaking. Any delay in doing so would be prejudicial not only to his own interests but also to the wider interests of the country. The Maharaja of Patiala was supported by the Maharaja of Bikaner and some other rulers. On 28 April, the representatives of Baroda, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Patiala, and Rewa took their seats in the Constituent Assembly.69 The ‘Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy’, handed over to the Chamber on 22 May 1946, carried the implication that the rights of the states which flowed from their relationship with the Crown would cease to exist and all the rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power would return to them. The lapse of paramountcy involved the closing down of the Political Department. Jawaharlal Nehru argued that the lapse of paramountcy did not Page 20 of 33

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The New Context lead to independence of the states. ‘Only certain functions would cease to be exercised; other would remain.’ It was essential, therefore, to have a department to deal with the states. Lord Mountbatten recognized the right of the two new governments to set up a new department called the ‘States Department’, to deal with matters of common concerns, divided into two sections ready for the partition of the country. V.P. Menon proposed a single organization with two ministers, one from the Congress and the other from the Muslim League. This was accepted by Lord Mountbatten. Sardar Patel and Abdur Rab Nishtar were the Ministers nominated by Nehru and Jinnah on behalf of the Congress and the Muslim League. Sardar Patel invited Menon to be the Secretary of the States Department. A press communiqué (p.404) announced the appointment of Sardar Patel on 27 June 1947, with Menon as Secretary.70 On 5 July 1947, Sardar Patel appealed to those Indian states which had not yet joined the Constituent Assembly to do so before 15 August 1947. The safety and preservation of the states, as well as of India, demanded ‘unity and mutual cooperation between its different parts’. The states had already accepted the basic principle that they would come into the Indian Union ‘for defence, foreign affairs and communications’. In other matters, the Government of India would ‘scrupulously respect their autonomous existence’. It was better for all concerned to make laws as friends rather than treaties as aliens. Therefore, he invited ‘the Rulers of States and their people to the councils of the Constituent Assembly in this spirit of friendliness and cooperation in a joint endeavour, inspired by common allegiance to our motherland for the common good of us all’. Apart from this appeal to patriotism and good sense of the rulers, Sardar Patel referred to the unpleasant alternative: ‘anarchy and chaos which will overwhelm great and small in a common ruin if we are unable to get together in the minimum of common tasks’.71 The moving appeal and the veiled threat had the desired effect. The majority of the states acceded to the Indian Union before 15 August 1947, with the exception of Junagarh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad. The princely rulers were aware of the political consciousness of the people of their states. The parties most active in internal politics of the Punjab states were the Akali Dal and the Praja Mandal. The latter was supported by the Communists. Maharaja Yadvindra Singh of Patiala had lifted the ban on political associations in March 1946. The Praja Mandal asked for full responsible government. Giani Kartar Singh demanded responsible government with 60 per cent representation for the Sikhs in the legislature and the dismissal of ‘outsiders’ from the service of the state. The Akalis looked upon Patiala as the only Sikh state where Sikh culture and character could be maintained. There was ‘no separate homeland for the Sikhs’.72 In the Jind State the Akalis put pressure on the Maharaja of Jind in November 1946 to dismiss his Special Adviser, Ganga Kaula. More than 2,000 Akalis offered themselves for arrest. In December 1946, the Maharaja dismissed Kaula Page 21 of 33

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The New Context and promised weightage for the Sikhs, besides a responsible government. On 1 January 1947, the Maharaja selected two representatives of the Praja Mandal, two of the Akali Dal, and one Muslim as members of the Council of Ministers. His personal nominee was made the Diwan, or the Prime Minister, who was also a Muslim. The Maharaja had the power to override any decision of the Council of Ministers. The Diwan and the Muslim Minister left for Pakistan in August 1947.73 In the Nabha State the Praja Mandal launched a satyāgraha in January 1947 over the arrest of some Congress Socialist deputationists who had sought interview with the Maharaja. Section 144 was imposed in the town. A big procession entering the Hira Bagh Palace was lāthī charged. The Praja Mandal demanded an enquiry into the matter and launched a satyāgraha in support of the demand. But the agitation was withdrawn on 18 February 1947. Sixteen persons lodged in Nabha Jail had signed a statement that was tantamount to public disavowal of the agitation. All those who had courted arrest were released. Brish Bhan sought clarification from the Chief Minister who said that the signed statement was voluntary and unconditional; no promise, express or implied, had been (p.405) made. The Praja Mandal failed to revive the agitation.74 In the Faridkot State the Punjab Regional Council of the All India States’ Peoples Conference, with Brish Bhan as its Chairman, sponsored in April 1946 a satyāgraha against the removal of the Congress flag hoisted in the grain market in Faridkot. Reports of brutal lāṭhī charges on the satyāgrahis induced Jawaharlal Nehru to come to the state on 1 May 1946, defying the order forbidding his entry. The Maharaja chose to negotiate and agreed to withdraw all restrictions on the hoisting of the Congress flag, forming of associations, and indulging in political propaganda. The Registration of Societies Act was repealed in June 1946 to legalize all political activity. The Maharaja announced that a legislative council would be established in the state. However, nothing came out of the announcement.75 According to V.P. Menon, when the Akali leaders saw that the states could be merged with the neighbouring provinces they sponsored the formation of a new unit covering Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla. The Raja of Faridkot was toying with the idea of a union of Faridkot, Jind, Kapurthala, and Nabha in the hope that he would be enabled to play a decisive part in Sikh politics. The Maharaja of Patiala was keen to retain the political identity of the Patiala state. All such possibilities along with the possibility of merging the states with East Punjab were considered by Sardar Patel. Eventually, he decided to form the East Punjab States into a separate administrative unit.76

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The New Context Meanwhile, Menon had been trying to convince the Maharaja of Patiala that his interest lay in the formation of a union of all the states. The Maharaja suggested a union of the Patiala state with the other states on a federal basis for certain essential purposes. But this seemed to be impracticable. The Maharaja emphasized ‘the desirability of properly canalizing Sikh politics’. Menon suggested that a separate union of the Punjab states would satisfy ‘the legitimate aspirations of reasonable elements in the Sikh community’. The Maharaja finally accepted the principle of union of the Punjab states. His advisers were anxious that he and his successors should remain the Rajpramukh of the new state. Menon told them that it was not possible to have hereditary Rajpramukhs of the house of Patiala. With regard to the privy purse and a couple of other prerogatives, the Maharaja was anxious to be treated at par with the rulers of Indore and Gwalior and the Rajpramukh of Madhya Bharat. Menon had a meeting with the other rulers on 2 May 1948. It was agreed that the union might tentatively be called the Patiala and East Punjab States Union, with the Maharaja of Patiala as its Rajpramukh for life and the Maharaja of Kapurthala as its Uprajpramukh for life. The states of Kalsia and Nalagarh were also to join the Union. The rulers signed the covenant on 5 May. Subsequently, the privy purse of the Maharaja of Patiala was fixed at 17 lakhs.77 Sardar Patel reached Patiala on 14 May 1948 to explore the possibility of forming a ministry. The Akalis claimed to represent the majority of the Sikh community and cherished the desire that Pepsu should have a Sikh premier. But the Praja Mandal was opposed to the Akalis. The Praja Mandal leaders believed that only the head of their organization could be called upon to form the Cabinet. By now, there was a third organization called the Lok Sewa Sabha formed by Colonel Raghbir Singh who had the support of the Maharaja of Patiala and the blessings of Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke. The proposals put forward by Menon were not (p.406) acceptable to all the parties. The negotiations broke down. Only the Rajpramukh was sworn in on 15 July 1948. Sardar Patel inaugurated the union of eight states. It had an area of over 10,000 square miles, a population of over 3,424,000, and annual revenue of little over Rs 5 crores (1 crore equals 10 million).78 From 15 August 1947 to 15 July 1948, pressure for introducing representative government in the states had been increasing. The Maharaja of Patiala announced constitutional reforms at his birthday Darbar in January 1948. The basic features of the reform announced were joint electorates, adult suffrage, no reservations, and a Legislative Assembly with at least 75 per cent of elected seats. The Council of Ministers was to be responsible to the assembly. At least half of the Ministers were to be from amongst the elected members. However, the assembly was to be elected indirectly by the members of Panchayats and Municipal Committees, and there was a long list of reserved subjects on which the elected members could not legislate. Brish Bhan commented that the announcement should serve as an eye-opener to the outside world ‘deluded by Page 23 of 33

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The New Context the so-called progressive ideas of the Ruler of Patiala’. A joint press statement was issue by Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran, President, Riasati Akali Dal; Jathedar Sampuran Singh Raman, President, Patiala State Akali Dal; and Sunder Lal, President, Patiala State Praja Mandal. It referred to the inevitable clash now between the people of the state and the Maharaja, and the leaders called upon everybody in the state to be prepared ‘to make the utmost sacrifice for the establishment of full responsible government’.79 In February 1948, the Praja Mandal Ministers of Jind resigned over the demand for a fully responsible government in which the leader of the majority party in an elected legislature was to be invited to form the ministry. Jind was the only state to have provided a functioning representative assembly and some sort of a responsible government.80 The Praja Mandal organized a political conference at Patiala during 28–29 February 1948 under the presidentship of Pattabhi Sitaramayya. This was the first state-level Praja Mandal conference held inside the state territory. Sunder Lal attacked the Maharaja for having entered the arena of ‘party politics’ by assuming leadership of the ‘Panthic Darbar’. Sitaramayya and other speakers talked of the merger of Patiala with East Punjab. Reaction against the Praja Mandal was marked by violent demonstrations. On 2 March 1948, a demonstration was staged by 30,000 persons. The official handout presented the demonstrations as a spontaneous expression of the feeling of the Sikhs over the provocative speeches of the Praja Mandal Conference.81 The Akali leaders of the state believed that the Lok Sewak Sabha was responsible for the lawless activities. The leader of Lok Sewak Sabha, Colonel Raghbir Singh, was a former Minister of Patiala. He was opposed to both the Praja Mandal and the Akalis, and he stood for a fair trial of the new constitutional proposals. It stood for the Patiala state as a separate entity. The leaders of the Patiala State Praja Mandal protested to the Punjab Congress leaders against Jathedar Nagoke and his group who were openly campaigning for the Lok Sewak Sabha. Nagoke’s alliance with the Maharaja’s ‘Panthic Darbar’ was an open secret.82 The Maharaja of Patiala wrote to Sardar Patel on 29 February 1948 that the Praja Mandal was trying to create trouble in the state. He underlined that the so-called Praja Mandal organization was a small group of (p.407) people, with hardly any following. There was a very strong opposition to the Praja Mandal. The Maharaja wanted to ensure that there was no ‘counter-demonstration and unfortunate incidents’ at the proposed meeting of the Praja Mandal. At the meeting they took ‘an inadvisable step’, asking for ‘the merger of Paiala into East Punjab’. Furthermore, they shouted the slogan that ‘Sikh Raj’ should be terminated. Any attempt to attack ‘the Sikhs’ was likely to release forces which might be impossible to control. The intention of the Praja Mandal appeared to be Page 24 of 33

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The New Context the eventual effacement of Patiala as an entity. This was creating great tension and was bound to create complications of several kinds. ‘All that I would say is that it would be wise to leave Patiala to Patialvies and the people of Patiala alone.’83 Evidently, the Maharaja of Patiala was unhappy with the idea of Patiala losing its political identity through merger, or even a union of states. Maharaja Yadvindra Singh wrote to Sardar Patel on 6 March 1948 that the Praja Mandal workers had met the Secretary of the States Department in Delhi who advised them not to launch any frontal movement against the Maharaja because the government did not want to ‘alienate Patiala just now’ but they could embarrass Patiala by an indirect move. Sardar Patel did not respond personally but his Private Secretary, V. Shankar, replied on 16 March that Sardar Patel was distressed over the turn of events in Patiala. He had been receiving information about ‘the increasing rift between Hindus and Sikhs’ to the point of ‘forcing the Hindus to leave the State’. This was an unhappy development and the Maharaja should ensure a speedy return of normal conditions in this regard.84 Sardar Patel did not share the Maharaja’s view with regard to the Praja Mandal and its aspirations. The Maharaja of Kapurthala wrote to Sardar Patel on 3 March 1948 that rapid political developments were taking place in the states and, therefore, he wanted to have a Constitutional Adviser to suggest the most suitable type of constitutional set-up for his state in consonance with the wishes of the majority of his people. His preference was for Kanwar Sir Dalip Singh, who was related to the House of Kapurthala. At the same time the Maharaja made the announcement that ‘full responsibility will be given to my people in which the executive will be responsible to the duly elected Legislature in all matters’.85 This belated expression of goodwill for his people and a responsible government in his state suggests that Maharaja Jagatjit Singh of Kapurthala was not in favour of a union of states. According to Menon, a great achievement of the new Constitution was ‘the assimilation of the position of the former Indian States and Unions with that of the former Governor’s provinces’. The Part A States were not ‘essentially different’ from the Part B States, whether in their relationship with the Central Government or in their internal structure and power. However, a few further adjustments and modifications were found necessary for completing the process of integration.86 The most important of these was a ‘special provision’ in the Constitution with regard to the Unions of states. Notwithstanding anything in the Constitution, during a period of ten years from the commencement there of, or during such longer and shorter period as Parliament may by law provide in respect of any State, the Government Page 25 of 33

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The New Context of every State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall be under the general control of and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by the President. (p.408) Sardar Patel explained that it was necessary to exercise general supervision over governments of the states for the growth of democratic institutions in these states and the requirements of administrative efficiency. Article 371 was essentially in the nature of a safety valve to obviate recourse to drastic remedies ‘such as the provisions for the breakdown of the constitutional machinery’.87 In theory, thus, the Central Government had special powers to intervene in the affairs of the unions of states. Maharaja Yadvindra Singh wrote to Sardar Patel on 9 May that he had great personal regard for him. He would always be ready to participate ‘in anything and everything concerning the welfare of our country’. He assured Sardar Patel of his cooperation in the future, as in the past. He was happy to work under Sardar Patel’s guidance and advice. Sardar Patel wrote in response that he felt ‘overwhelmed’ by the kind words of Maharaja Yadvindra Singh and appreciated his spirit of cordiality, cooperation, and brotherliness.88 The Maharaja was keen now to indicate that he would follow the line chosen by Sardar Patel. On 5 August 1948, Yadvindra Singh wrote to Sardar Patel that appointment of the Prime Minister was ‘a matter which concerns us solely and one with which those outside could appropriately have nothing to do’. Brish Bhan, President of the Pepsu Congress, wrote to Sardar Patel that formation of government in the union was very much a concern of his party. According to him the negotiations for the formation of an interim Ministry broke down because the Rajpramukh made it plain that none but his own nominee was acceptable to him as the Prime Minister. If the Rajpramukh was to have the last word there was no point in negotiations. Brish Bhan added that the Rajpramukh was not at all serious about the proper constitution of a popular Ministry. The Pepsu Congress had no illusions about his liberalism and ‘democratic instincts’. To appoint his nominee as the Prime Minister was to make Yadvindra Singh ‘the Maharaja of eight States rather than of Patiala alone’. If the proposal to establish an interim government of the Akalis and the Lok Sewak Sabha was accepted, it would lead to widespread dissatisfaction, demonstrations, and clashes. The only way to save the situation was to take immediate steps to democratize the administration.89 Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Patiala, criticized the interim arrangements in a pamphlet as an ‘eye-opener’ for the Sikhs. The Premier in the caretaker government was a Sikh, but the Advisor and the Chief Secretary were Hindus brought from outside. Gojran refused to accept that a competent Chief Secretary or Adviser was not available in the state. Out of the five Deputy Secretaries, only two were Sikhs, and out of nine UnderSecretaries only four were Sikhs. In the Finance and Education Departments Page 26 of 33

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The New Context there was no Sikh even at the level Assistant Secretary. This was ‘the foretaste of Congress democracy in our Sikh States Union’. He added sarcastically that the Sikhs of East Punjab were ‘already having their share of the lesson in democracy’.90 Jathedar Gojran went on to say that after the formation of Pepsu, which was demanded by the Akalis and opposed by the Praja Mandal, every possible effort was being made to sidetrack and circumscribe the Sikh majority. In East Punjab, weightage could not be given at the cost of the Hindus and in Pepsu the due share of the Sikh majority could not be given because such questions were not raised in a secular state. For the Congress leadership ‘the worst type of reactionary communalism of the overwhelming (p.409) Hindu majority is “Nationalism”’.91 The Akali argument all along was precisely this that due consideration was not given to the Sikh majority in Pepsu. The foremost issue in Pepsu was the formation of a Ministry. There were three claimants to power: the Akali Dal, the Praja Mandal, and the Lok Sewak Sabha of Colonel Raghbir Singh. They could not come to an agreement. Therefore, a caretaker government was formed under Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala who had been a government servant for twenty-five years. Rarewala was not acceptable to the Praja Mandal or the Akalis. In view of their opposition, Sardar Patel encouraged the rebels in the Praja Mandal to join the Ministry of Lok Sewak Sabha, consisting of Colonel Raghbir Singh, Giani Zail Singh, Seth Ram Nath, Nihal Singh, Harcharan Singh, L.D. Kaushal, and Sardar Bahadur Ranjit Singh, a close relative of Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala who was heading the Ministry. The Ministers sworn in on 13 January 1949 were aligned either with the Rajpramukh Yadvindra Singh or Sardar Patel. The Akalis were kept out.92 In July 1949, Sardar Patel wrote to Chandulal Trivedi that they had to consider the matter concerning Pepsu very carefully and to tread warily. ‘It would be wise not to disturb the veritable powder magazine.’ Patel suggested that a Punjab officer could be ‘our representative’ in Patiala. He had in mind M.R. Bhide, a member of the Indian Civil Services, who could ensure uniformity between East Punjab and Pepsu. Bhide was ‘a Punjab Officer’ but ‘not a Punjabi’. He could be expected to implement the policy of the Centre effectively.93

In Retrospect In free India, change was far more remarkable than continuity. It was also relevant for the political activity and attitude of the Akalis under the leadership of Master Tara Singh. Jawaharlal Nehru became the most powerful individual in the country and influenced all aspects of political system. Nearly as influential was Sardar Patel. The Congress in the Punjab was divided on factional lines between groups, needing support from the Akali legislators for forming a ministry. Bhargava was replaced by Bhim Sen Sachar in April 1949 as the Chief Minister. Page 27 of 33

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The New Context The most urgent problem before the new Government of India and that of East Punjab was the breakdown of law and order on both sides of the new international border, resulting in migration of millions of people to and from East Punjab. Both Nehru and Patel paid their utmost attention to the problem but all their efforts could not stop the exodus, and within two months the overwhelming majority of Hindus and Sikhs of West Punjab migrated to India and nearly the whole Muslim population of East Punjab moved to Pakistan. The forced exchange of population created the problem of rehabilitation. Furthermore, migration of population created a new demographic pattern with Hindu majority in the province and Sikh majority in the Sikh districts. A sad aspect of the situation was that tension began to grow between Hindus and Sikhs. Sadder still was the way in which the persons in high places were influenced by this situation. East Punjab became exceptionally important in the eyes of the leaders at the Centre because of an unfriendly or hostile border, special needs of reconstruction, administrative instability, growing tension between its major communities, and their own concern for introducing the policies they evolved. Thus, their intervention in the affairs of East Punjab was wide in scope. Given this general attitude, they were all the more anxious about matters involving Sikh politics in general and the Akali politics in particular. (p.410) The language issue in East Punjab arose essentially from the conflicting claims for Punjabi in Gurmukhi script and Hindi in Devanagri script. It was complicated further by the question of the mother tongue. The Punjabi Arya Samajists decided to return Hindi as their mother tongue, which was factually incorrect but their commitment to Hindi was almost a religious matter for them. The Arya Samajist leaders, settled mostly in the region between the Ravi and the Ghaggar, were opposed to Punjabi as the medium of school education and its official use even in the region which was factually Punjabispeaking. ‘Sachar Formula’ was a compromise. The crucial clause in the formula was added by Jawaharlal Nehru and it was supported by Sardar Patel. This provision was meant to enable the Arya Samajists of the Punjabi region to exercise their preference for Hindi over Punjabi. Ironically, the formula was acceptable to the Congress Government of East Punjab but not to the Arya Samajists. It was never implemented in their schools. With regard to the princely states of East Punjab Sardar Patel considered various possibilities and decided to form the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (Pepsu). It was inaugurated on 15 July 1948, but only the Rajpramukh was sworn in because there was no agreement among the political parties about forming a ministry. Sardar Patel’s sympathies were with the Praja Mandal, which was closely aligned with the Congress, and the sympathies of Master Tara Singh were with the Akalis of Pepsu, who had had close ties with the Shiromani Akali Dal since its very inception. The Rajpramukh of Patiala was interested in Page 28 of 33

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The New Context promoting a new party called the Lok Sewak Sabha. For want of agreement among these three parties, a caretaker government was formed under Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala, who was acceptable to Sardar Patel as well as the Rajpramukh. Patel succeeded in devising a ministry under Rarewala with the support of the Lok Sewak Sabha and some Praja Mandal rebels led by Giani Zail Singh. The Akalis were kept out all the time. Furthermore, Article 371 of the Constitution enabled Sardar Patel to intervene in the affairs of Pepsu even more effectively than in the Punjab affairs. Notes:

(1.) Gopal Das Khosla, Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events Leading Up to and Following the Partition of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, paperback), pp. 120–216 and Appendix II, pp. 320–49. (2.) Khosla, Stern Reckoning, pp. 223, 234. (3.) Khosla, Stern Reckoning, pp. 290–1. (4.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and Other Opinions (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 339. (5.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. IV, pp. 252, 310–11. (6.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 349–52. (7.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, pp. 314–17. (8.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, pp. 320–4. (9.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, pp. 320–4. (10.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, pp. 318–19. (11.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, p. 361. (12.) Khosla, Stern Reckoning, Appendix I (iii), pp. 314–16. (13.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 197–8. (14.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1971), vol. I, pp. 50–1. (15.) Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī (Amritsar: Gurmat Pustak Bhandar, n.d.), pp. 4–5. (16.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, pp. 356–8. (17.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, p. 435.

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The New Context (18.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 456–7. (19.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, p. 415. (20.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 435–6. (21.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, p. 485. (22.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, p. 499. (23.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, p. 517. (24.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 415–17. (25.) M.S. Randhawa, Out of the Ashes (An account of the rehabilitation of refugees from West Pakistan in rural areas of East Punjab), n.d. (26.) Randhawa, Out of the Ashes, pp. 30–2. (27.) Randhawa, Out of the Ashes, pp. 67–73. (28.) Randhawa, Out of the Ashes, pp. 74–9. (29.) Randhawa, Out of the Ashes, pp. 80–92. (30.) Randhawa, Out of the Ashes, pp. 93–108. (31.) Satya M. Rai, Punjab Since Partition (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986), pp. 169–72. (32.) Rai, Punjab Since Partition, pp. 173–84. (33.) Rai, Punjab Since Partition, pp. 189–92. (34.) Census of India, 1951, vol. VIII, part 1–Report (Simla, 1953), pp. ii, iv, 3, 10. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), tables on pp. 152–3. (35.) Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (The New Cambridge History of India, vol IV, part 1) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, second edition, published in India by Foundation Books, New Delhi, 1994), pp. 36–37. (36.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Ltd, 2003, fifth impression), pp. 189–90. (37.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence, p. 188. Page 30 of 33

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The New Context (38.) Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, pp. 10–14. (39.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 465–8. (40.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. v, pp. 212–15. (41.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VI, pp. 225–9. (42.) Durga Das (ed.) Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1974), vol. IX, p. 225. (43.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 229–30. (44.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 123. (45.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 124. (46.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 124. (47.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 167–8. (48.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 125–6. (49.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 125–7. (50.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 351–2. (51.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 138. (52.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 139–41. (53.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 141. (54.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 163–5. (55.) Rai, Punjab Since Partition, p. 259. (56.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 168–70. (57.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 170–3. (58.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab, pp. 170–1. (59.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 163, 172, 179. (60.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 143–4. (61.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 145. (62.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 145–7. Page 31 of 33

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The New Context (63.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 148–50. (64.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 150. (65.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 151. (66.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 153–4. (67.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 187–9. (68.) V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1961), pp. 57–8. (69.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 74–6. (70.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 64, 85–92. (71.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. V, Appendix IV (1973), pp. 536–8. (72.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), pp. 168–9. (73.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 172–3. (74.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 176–8. (75.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 173–5. (76.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 229–32. (77.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 234–8. (78.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 236–7. (79.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 130–1. (80.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, p. 173. (81.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 182–3. (82.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 183–4. (83.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. VII, pp. 607–8. (84.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VII, pp. 609–10. (85.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VII, pp. 603–4. (86.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, p. 450.

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The New Context (87.) Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States, pp. 451–2. (88.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VII, pp. 610–11. (89.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VII, pp. 612–14. (90.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 176–7. (91.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 177–8. (92.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 191–2. (93.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 157–8.

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Making of the New Constitution

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Making of the New Constitution (1946–50) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0017

Abstract and Keywords Of special interest to the Sikhs in the making of a new constitution were political safeguards, the issues of language, and linguistic states. In 1947 it was decided to have proportionate reservations for minorities. However, the question of safeguards for the Sikhs was postponed. A sub-committee formed in February 1948 saw no reason to make an exception in their case. In May 1949, Sardar Patel reopened the question of reservations but decided to have no reservations for any religious minority. On the issue of the official language for India, the final decision was in favour of Hindi in Devnagri script. On the issue of linguistic states, the Constituent Assembly reluctantly formed a commission which recommended that there was no need of creating linguistic states. The Constitution adopted in 1950, thus, did not satisfy any of the political aspirations of the Sikhs as a community. Keywords:   Indian Constitution, political safeguards, issue of language, linguistic states, proportionate reservations for minorities, Sardar Patel, Hindi in Devnagri script, Constituent Assembly, political aspirations of the Sikhs

The Congress Assembly Party was ‘the unofficial, private forum that debated every provision of the Constitution, and in most cases decided its fate before it reached the floor of the house’.1 Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel were Chairmen of a large number of Committees formed by the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution embodied the ideology of the Congress and its changing perspective.

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Making of the New Constitution The announcement of the Mountbatten Plan of Partition on 3 June 1947 made a great impact on the Congress leadership. The perspective of the Constituent Assembly was completely altered by this announcement.2 In the midst of the deliberations on a federation that would be flexible enough to accommodate the Muslim-majority provinces, discussions in the assembly took an immediate about-turn: speaker after speaker emphasized the imperative necessity for India to have a strong Centre and a strong state.3 The Sikh members of the Constituent Assembly were interested particularly in the position of minorities. On 17 December 1946, Sardar Ujjal Singh supported the ‘Directives Resolution’ which had been moved by Jawaharlal Nehru. It consisted of three parts: (a) declaration of an independent sovereign Republic, (b) autonomous units having residuary powers, and (c) adequate safeguards for the minorities, backward classes, and tribal areas. The third part was of the greatest interest to Sardar Ujjal Singh. He emphasized that safeguards should not only be adequate but also satisfactory to the Sikhs and the other minorities concerned. He referred to the solemn assurances given to the Sikhs by the Congress in 1929. The Sikhs had made common cause and fought the country’s battle for freedom side by side with the Congress.4 Sardar Ujjal Singh went on to say that the Cabinet Mission had admitted the Sikhs to (p.414) be one of the three main communities in India but failed to provide any protection or safeguards for the Sikhs. The Sikhs decided to boycott the Constituent Assembly. The Secretary of State said in the House of Lords on 18 July 1946 that fullest consideration should be given to the claims of the Sikhs as ‘a distinct and important community’. The Congress and the Muslim League were receptive to the idea of giving the Sikhs a strong position in the affairs of the Punjab. This assurance was satisfactory but not sufficient to change the Sikh attitude. On 9 August 1946, the Congress Working Committee passed the resolution that the Committee was aware of the injustice done to the Sikhs and assured them that the Congress ‘will give them all possible support in redressing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards’. The Sikhs reviewed the whole position on 14 August in the light of the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, and the Panthic Board decided to lift the ban on participation in the work of the Constituent Assembly. ‘I have great faith in the Congress leaders’, said Ujjal Singh, ‘and sincerely hope that the assurances given to the Sikhs will be implemented without delay as the time has come for the translation of those solemn words into action.’5 On 24 January 1947, Sardar Harnam Singh referred to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s insistence in his letter to Lord Pethick-Lawrence that there must be consent of all the affected parties for a proper solution of the communal problem. He stated that some communities had laid stress on the weightage to be provided to them. Others had insisted on the retention of separate electorates. Some of these provisions might have done mischief in the years Page 2 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution past, but he hoped that the Advisory Committee ‘will consider the question of the protection of minorities from all these various points of view and, whatever is good in the larger interest of the country and also in the interests of the minorities, would find a place in the report of the Advisory Committee’.6

The Issue of Political Safeguards The Advisory Committee, constituted on 24 January 1947, held its first meeting on 27 February. Its Chairman, Sardar Patel, moved on 29 April that the time fixed for the presentation of the report of the Advisory Committee be extended until such date as the President of the Constituent Assembly may choose in his discretion.7 Sardar Patel sent his report to the President on 8 August 1947. It covered the following points as ‘political’ safeguards for minorities: (a) representation in legislatures, (b) reservation of seats in cabinets, (c) reservation in the public services, and (d) administrative machinery to ensure protection of minority rights. Sardar Patel stated that recommendations made on the basis of exhaustive discussions in the Sub-Committee on Minorities as well as the main Advisory Body were either unanimous or taken by very large majorities of members belonging to minority communities. An overwhelming majority came to the conclusion that the system of separate electorates in the past had sharpened communal differences to a dangerous extent and proved to be one of the main stumbling blocks to the development of a healthy national life. Therefore, it was recommended that all elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures should be held on the basis of joint electorates, and seats should be reserved in the various legislatures on the basis of the population of the recognized minorities, initially for a period of ten years. As a matter of general principle, (p.415) the members of the Advisory Committee were opposed to weightage for any minority community. The Committee somehow decided that ‘the whole question of safeguards for the Sikh Community should be held over for the present’ due to the uncertainty of the position of the Sikhs.8 In the Constituent Assembly, some Muslim League members raised various objections to the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. Sardar Patel responded to them with the remark that if he had known that the changed conditions would make no difference to the attitude of the leaders of the Muslim League he ‘would certainly not have agreed to any reservation at all’. He talked of ‘a full dose of poison’ in their approach. It had resulted in the division of the country. If they persisted, Sardar Patel would have to tell them that their place was in Pakistan and not in India. There was applause in the assembly. Sardar Patel went on to add: ‘We are laying the foundations of One Nation, and those who choose to divide again and sow the seeds of disruption will have no place, no quarter.’ Patel told the Muslim members bluntly that it was difficult to protect the Muslims ‘under the present condition and in the present atmosphere’. The minorities had to depend on the ‘generosity’ of the majority and win its

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Making of the New Constitution confidence.9 After this, the Sikhs had little chance of getting any political safeguards. Giani Kartar Singh led a Sikh deputation to Dr Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, on 21 January 1948 to place before him matters related to Sikh gurdwaras left in Pakistan and their properties, abduction of women, and the political position of the Sikhs. The last issue was the most important and it could be taken up by the Advisory Committee on Minorities. Dr Rajendra Prasad wrote to Sardar Patel, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, that this matter should be taken up by the Committee and its views put up for consideration by the Constituent Assembly.10 The Advisory Committee appointed a SubCommittee on 24 February 1948 to report on ‘certain minority problems affecting East Punjab and West Bengal’. It consisted of Jawaharlal Nehru, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Dr Ambedkar, and K.M. Munshi, with Sardar Patel as Chairman. The most important matter referred to the Sub-Committee was ‘the problem of the Sikhs’. The main demands of the Akali Dal were for separate electorates, 5 per cent seats at the Centre, reservation of seats in Delhi and UP, the same privileges for the Sikh Scheduled Castes as for others, and statutory reservation of a certain proportion of places in the army. Sardar Patel made the statement that these demands were ‘a fundamental departure’ from the decisions taken by the assembly in respect of every other community. The members of the SubCommittee professed to be acutely aware of the tragic suffering of the Sikhs both before and after the Partition but the question remitted to them had to be settled on different grounds. The Sikhs did not suffer from any of the handicaps faced by the other minorities dealt with by the Advisory Committee. The Sikhs were a highly educated and virile community gifted with a most remarkable spirit of enterprise. They formed no less than 30 per cent of the population of East Punjab, which gave them a position of considerable authority. Therefore, the Sub-Committee came to the conclusion that no separate electorate or weightage could be recommended for the Sikhs. Under a system of joint electorates with reserved seats and with the right to contest additional seats, the Sikhs were likely to get greater (p.416) representation than their proportion in the population. In any case, to give weightage to one community was to deprive another of its due share. Above all, communal electorates and weightage were ‘definitely retrograde from the point of view of the general interests of the country’. The demands of the Akali Dal were precisely those which the Muslim League had made for Muslims, and which led to the tragic consequences.11 The implication of the argument was that separate electorates for the Sikhs would lead to further division of India. However, the decision to give no political recognition to a religious community had already been taken. Sardar Patel referred to a resolution of the Constituent Assembly which had laid down the basic principle that Page 4 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution no communal organization which by its constitution or by the exercise of discretionary power vested in any of its officers or organs, admits to or excludes from its membership persons on ground of religion, race or caste, or any of them, should be permitted to engage in any activities other than those essential for the bona fide religious, cultural, social and educational needs of the community, and that all steps, legislative and administrative, necessary to prevent such activities should be taken. In other words, no recognition could be given to a political party confined to the members of a religious community. The demands of the Akali Dal were ‘thus wholly at variance with the considered judgement of the Assembly’. Furthermore, if the Constitution guarantees special safeguards, such as communal electorates and weightage to the Sikhs, ‘it would be impossible to justify denying the same privileges to certain other communities’. Therefore, the Sub-Committee recommended that no special provision should be made for the Sikhs other than the general provisions already approved by the assembly for certain communities.12 It is not clear why the Sikh case was isolated from the others in the first place. The report of the special Sub-Committee was considered by the Advisory Committee on 30 December 1948. Some of the members felt that it was no longer appropriate in free India to have reservation of seats for any religious minority. Reservation of seats was ‘contrary to the conception of secular democratic State’. Indeed, some members gave notices of resolutions to recommend that there should be no reservation of seats in the legislatures for any community in India. The meeting was adjourned after Sardar Patel’s suggestion that if the members of a particular community were not in favour of reservation for them the matter could be reopened. The Advisory Committee met again on 11 May 1949. H.C. Mookherjee’s resolution in its amended form abolished ‘the system of reservation for minorities other than Scheduled Castes in Legislatures’. The Committee also accepted the proposal made by the Sikh representatives that the Mazhabis, Ramdasis, Kabirpanthis, and Sikligars of East Punjab should be included in the list of Scheduled Castes. Sardar Patel was keen that the change should appear to have been ‘sought voluntarily by the minorities themselves and not imposed on them by the majority community’. He emphasized that conditions had changed vastly since August 1947 and the minorities themselves felt in their own interest as well as the interests of the country as a whole that statutory reservation of seats for religious minorities should be abolished.13 Sardar Patel appeared to have orchestrated and managed the whole show. The report of the Advisory Committee was presented to the Constituent Assembly (p.417) by Sardar Patel on 25 May 1949. He stated that ‘a group of people of highly nationalistic tendencies’ were opposed to reservations even in August 1947. He mentioned H.C. Mookherjee (Vice-Chairman of the Constituent Page 5 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution Assembly and a Christian) in this connection. Sardar Patel claimed that these proposals had been accepted by the House ‘practically unanimously’ and the minorities had expressed a general sense of appreciation. Considering the whole situation, the Advisory Committee had come to the conclusion that the vast majority of the minority communities themselves were in favour of dropping the reservations because of their evil effects in the past on the minorities themselves. According to Patel, there was only one solitary vote against the proposal in a house of about forty members of the Advisory Committee.14 In regard to the Sikh position, Sardar Patel looked upon the Sikhs as a ‘reformed community of the Hindus’. There were Scheduled Castes among the Sikhs who suffered from the disabilities like the Scheduled Caste Hindus even though ‘the high-level Sikh religion’ did not recognize any class distinctions. It was up to ‘the majority community to create by its generosity a sense of confidence in the minorities’ and it was ‘the duty of the minority communities’ to take up responsibility of laying down the foundations of free India in which, eventually, there would be no minority or majority but ‘only one community’. After this rhetorical statement, Sardar Patel appealed to the House, and particularly the Scheduled Castes, not to resent or grudge ‘the concession’ given to the Sikhs to include the four categories of Sikhs in the list of Scheduled Castes. It was not a good thing in the interest of the Sikhs themselves but it was for them to realize that it was wrong. Sardar Patel advised the minorities ‘to trust the good sense and sense of fairness of the majority, and to place confidence in them’.15 Sardar Patel’s statements were remarkable for underscoring the great power of the Hindu majority in free India. There was a long and heated discussion in the Constituent Assembly for two days on the issue of the withdrawal of reservation of seats in legislatures. The Muslim members were ranged on both sides. Mohamed Ismail Sahib, a Muslim League member from Madras, moved an amendment to the effect that the principle of reservation of seats should be confirmed and retained, and that the reserved seats should be filled by members of the respective communities by voters belonging to the respective minorities. He wanted the whole question of minorities and the political safeguards for them to be placed before the House once again so that in the final stages of passing the Constitution it may give mature reconsideration to the subject. He agreed with Sardar Patel that the situation had changed since August 1947, but the change called for better and real safeguards for the Muslims and other minorities. Mohamed Ismail Sahib alleged that canvassing had gone on for some time before the report was presented. If the majority community or the party in power wanted to do away with any of the safeguards, it was not fair to place the responsibility on the shoulders of the minorities for doing away with such safeguards. The religious basis of the minorities could not be denied because religious communities did exist in reality. Separate electorates recognized the differences between one group of people and another and served as a device to bring people together; ‘to Page 6 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution insist that one group should give up certain differences was dictation’. The contentment which the people got through respect shown for their views and feelings (p.418) produced goodwill. On behalf of his community Mohamed Ismail Sahib asked that they may be given ‘this fundamental right of representing their views before the legislatures and the Government so that they may be in a position to contribute their utmost and their best for the happiness, strength and honour of the country which is their motherland as much as it is of anybody else’.16 Syed Muhammad Saadulla, a Muslim member from Assam, stated that he had consulted all the Muslim members of his party in the Assam Legislature and their unanimous mandate was in favour of reservation. He pointed out that on 11 May 1949, one of the four Muslim members present had supported the resolution moved by H.C. Mookherjee by speech, another had opposed it by vote, and the other two (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Hifzur Rahman) had remained neutral. Sardar Patel should have left this matter to the Muslim members. Mookherjee had ‘no right whatsoever’ to move the resolution on behalf of the minorities other than the Christians. In any case, he had ‘the solitary support’ of Begam Aizaz Rasul. Actually, reservations were admitted not only for the Scheduled Castes but also for the Christians in two provinces, and for the AngloIndian community. However, some other Muslim members supported the recommendations of the Advisory Committee: Naziruddin Ahmad from West Bengal, Tajammul Husain from Bihar, Muhammad Ismail Khan and Maulana Hasrat Mohani from the United Provinces, and Colonel B.H. Zaidi from Rampur.17 Z.H. Lari, a Muslim member from UP, supported the view of the Sub-Committee that a minority must aspire to be an integral part of the nation, but moved an amendment to the effect that there should be multi-member constituencies, allowing the minorities to group their votes. The legislature ceased to be the mirror of the nation if only 51 per cent of the people were represented on the basis of the majority vote. All elections should be direct, secret, and based on adult suffrage under a system of joint electorates. Lari emphasized that in a true democracy there should be no ‘disenfranchisement’ of a minority, be it political, religious, or social. Logically, if proportional representation was accepted there was no scope for any reservation for any minority, not even for the Scheduled Castes. Lari pointed out that the kind of care and solicitude shown for the Scheduled Castes was not shown for the other minorities. In any case, the views of the minority concerned should be taken into account for deciding whether to retain or to take away reservation.18 This view rejected weightage and separate electorates but retained political recognition of the minorities. Sardar Hukam Singh spoke for the Sikhs. While extending his wholehearted support to the Resolution before the House, he made a few observations. It was agreed, he said, that it was a birthright of every section of the population, Page 7 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution numerical or political minority, to have proper representation and a proper voice in the administration of the country. The dispute was only about the method of securing such representation. The method of separate electorates and fixed proportions was given a sufficiently long trial. Whether or not this method was solely the cause of all the catastrophe was open to question, but separate electorates did create a cleavage among the various communities. It was desirable to look for some other method now that ‘we want to live as one Nation’ and ‘a harmonious whole’. The method of ‘cumulative votes’ (proposed by Lari) was wholesome. It could give representation to religious minorities and various other interests. However, it would (p.419) not be a practical possibility in the given situation. The provision of reservation was an ‘intermediate step’. There was no harm in trying a new experiment of no reservation for ten years. If the minorities felt satisfied, there would be no further demand for any safeguards. If not, they would raise a louder voice for some other substitute. The Sikhs wanted to contribute as best as they could towards the development of a compact nation. Therefore, they were giving full support to this Resolution.19 Hukam Singh emphasized that the responsibility of the majority increased in the absence of political safeguards. To ensure that the minorities felt secure was a heavy responsibility. The only safety for the minorities lay in a secular state. It paid them to be nationalists in the true sense of the term and to work against any dilution of nationalism. ‘But what we require is a pure nationalism and not any counterfeit.’ The majority community had a privileged position. Its ‘national outlook’ was not a matter of choice so much as a reflection of the consciousness of being the majority (which needed no political safeguards). The fears of the minorities could be appreciated only by placing oneself in their position. All demands for safeguards were the product of those fears. The Sikhs had fears as regards their language, script, and position in the Services. The government should see that the fears of the minorities were removed and that there was a chance for the culture of every community to develop. Certain matters could be left to conventions. If wholesome conventions were evolved to make the minorities feel secure, there would be no need for having a whole chapter on safeguards for the minorities.20 The tone and tenor of Sardar Hukam Singh’s speech suggests that he was highly doubtful about the secular credentials of the bulk of the majority community. Hukam Singh had something to say about the inclusion of four castes of the Sikhs in the list of Scheduled Castes. Sardar Patel had appealed to the House not to resent or to grudge this concession to the Sikhs. The Sikh community was grateful to the Sardar, the Advisory Committee, and to the House for all the concessions. But he had a different viewpoint on this particular issue. ‘We were told that the Sikh religion does not acknowledge any discrimination on account of caste and that for securing certain political rights for the section, the Sikhs

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Making of the New Constitution are sacrificing certain principles of their religion.’ Sardar Patel was frank in saying that ‘religion was being used as a cloak for political purposes’. However, If we give concession and certain privileges, certain rights to the Scheduled Castes simply because they are backward socially, economically and politically and not because they are a religious minority, then other classes, whatever their religion, whatever the professions of their religion, who are equally backward socially, economically and politically must also be included in the list. So my submission is that it ought to have been done long ago, that these classes also, because they are backward, were included in the list along with their other brethren of the Scheduled Castes, and it should not have been considered as a concession. Nevertheless, even if the Sikhs were entitled to it, they were grateful. ‘They feel that one demand of theirs on which they were very serious has been met. They hope that other small things also would be considered favourably so that they could feel satisfied and could walk shoulder to shoulder with other progressive forces to the cherished goal that we have set before us.’21 The sarcasm reflected in this speech arose no doubt from Hukam (p.420) Singh’s awareness that the whole concern for Scheduled Castes was based primarily on communal considerations. They were to be counted as ‘Hindus’. Jawaharlal Nehru said that there was abundance of goodwill for the motion that turned its back upon a great evil (separate electorates and reservations) to pursue a path that was fundamentally good for every part of the nation. At the same time he pointed out that few even of the professed nationalists were free from communal tendencies; they used nationalism as a cloak. He knew that the will of the majority ultimately prevailed in a democracy. But the majority could not afford to ride roughshod over the wishes of a minority. Injustice done to minorities rankled like a running sore. Nevertheless, Nehru was in favour of putting an end to all reservations, except for the Scheduled Castes. To help them was to help ‘backward groups’ in the country. It may be noted that there were ‘backward groups’ among all religious communities. Why did Nehru talk of ‘Hindu’ Scheduled Castes alone? Nehru went on to say that the common goal for all Indians was ‘secular democracy’. But he added that no Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, or Christian could say that he had no taint of communalism in his mind or heart. In order to proceed towards the goal of secular democracy ‘each one of us whether we belong to the majority or to a minority’ have ‘to gain the goodwill of the other group or individual’. This was an act of faith for all, and above all for the majority community because they would have to behave to others in a generous, fair, and just way.22 In other words, the issue of political safeguards, which could not be resolved by constitutional provisions, had to be left to the good sense of the minorities and the goodwill of the majority. Despite his

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Making of the New Constitution scepticism about the nationalist and secular credentials of the religious majority as a whole, Nehru was inclined to depend on their trusteeship as an act of faith. Sardar Patel said that separate representation, originally, was a ‘command performance’, but now it should be a ‘consent performance’. No mandate from the Muslim League could be allowed to be acted upon. A minority community must see that its interests were not different from that of the country. Otherwise, no minority community could find a place in a Ministry or a share in the government. To exclude itself was to remain perpetually in a minority. Sardar Patel visualized that a member of any community could become the Prime Minister in free India. A Muslim could aspire to the highest position, but not as a Muslim Leaguer.23 With no political safeguards, Muslim future was in the hands of the Congress (or any other party in power). Sardar Patel professed that he had always viewed the Sikh community ‘with considerable respect, regard and admiration’. He had advised the Sikhs as their friend that it was not in their interest to get any concession for the Scheduled Castes among the Sikhs, but he did not grudge this concession. He could ask the Sikhs ‘to take control of the country and rule’. They had the capacity and they had the courage. They had proved their mettle in agriculture, in engineering, and in the army. They should not think low of themselves.24 Sardar Patel offered praise to his Sikh friends and a share in power in subordination to the Congress in lieu of political safeguards. Sardar Patel ended his speech with the hope that the House would feel proud that ‘we are able to bring about unanimity in removing the past blots in our Constitution’. He was loudly cheered by the House.25 The new Constitution was expected to serve as (p.421) the basis of a secular state with majoritarian democracy in which the minorities could hope to flourish with the goodwill of the majority.

The Issues of Language and Linguistic States As controversial as the safeguards for minorities was the language issue. The speeches of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Jawaharlal Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad, and Rajendra Prasad reflect the importance as well as the problematic character of the language issue. Maulana Azad outlined the debate to clarify his own position on the issue of language. The first question was to remove English from its official position in the government and administration and in the sphere of education. Azad’s view was to develop a national language for five years to replace English. The members from the south, and even from Bengal, were in favour of a longer period, and the period of at least fifteen years appeared to be very reasonable. However, there was no ‘national language’ in currency to replace English. There was no common language either, particularly between the north and the south.

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Making of the New Constitution According to Bimal Prasad, it was generally agreed that the language spoken in northern India could be made the lingua franca. But there were three names for it: Urdu, Hindi, and Hindustani. These three names implied differences about the form or style. A style resplendent with Persian was called Urdu, and a style leaning towards Sanskrit was known as Hindi. The term ‘Hindustani’ had developed a wider connotation to embrace all forms of language spoken in northern India, not only Hindi and Urdu but some others as well. Maulana Azad had suggested to the All India Congress Committee about a quarter of a century earlier that the name Hindustani should be adopted to do away with the differences that separated Urdu and Hindi, particularly in view of the Urdu– Hindi controversy. Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress worked and acted on this principle. Indeed, Mahatma Gandhi had started ‘Hindustani Pracharni Sabha’ and severed his connection from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. Maulana Azad had hoped that at least the older Congressmen would not forsake their stand but he was greatly disappointed. With few exceptions, all retraced their steps.26 In the party meetings one of the resolutions was to retain the word ‘Hindi’ with the interpretation that it included the style known as Urdu. The question was left to the Drafting Committee. Several new members were added to the Committee, and Maulana Azad was one of them. He attended the first meeting and found that the members refused to accept Hindustani or the wider inclusive interpretation of ‘Hindi’. He resigned from the Committee. The question was raised in the Committee again, and it was agreed that ‘Hindi’ included ‘Hindustani’ to emphasize that it embodied ‘composite culture’. At the same time, Urdu was recognized as one of the languages of India. The decision of the Congress to adopt both Devanagri and Urdu scripts was not accepted by the Committee. Hindi in Devanagri script alone was to be the lingua franca of India. Maulana Azad was unhappy to see that ‘from one end to the other, narrowmindedness reigned supreme’. The one great argument used was that if Hindustani was accepted then Urdu would have to be accommodated. He hoped, nonetheless, that a new environment would be created in which the people would see the problem of language in its real and true perspective.27 (p.422) In the Constituent Assembly, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated at the outset that the Committee reached a fairly unanimous decision to select one of the languages of India as the common language for the whole country. The final decision on this question was to adopt Hindi as the language for all official purposes of the Union under the new Constitution. English was to continue for a period of about fifteen years. In the states of the Union, the language spoken in a state was to be recognized as the language for official purposes. A state language could be used for debates in the state legislatures first, as Hindi could be used for this purpose in the Central legislatures. For the Supreme Court and the High Court the language to be used was English. Punjabi was included in the Schedule of fourteen Indian languages.28 Page 11 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution Many of the members of the Constituent Assembly articulated their concerns about the common language. Hifzur Rahman from the United Provinces, for example, said that ‘till yesterday’ the whole Congress was unanimous regarding the solution of the language problem. ‘All said with one voice “Hindustani shall be the national language of our country, which shall be written in both the scripts, namely, Hindi and Urdu”. But today they want to change it.’ Mahatma Gandhi was absolutely clear that ‘Hindustani alone was suitable for India’. Hindustani was being replaced by Hindi against the Gandhian view now. This was not the right path. Hifzur Rahman concluded with the appeal to consider the matter with a clean heart so that the members could realize ‘that the language of this country ought to be Hindustani, Hindustani and nothing but Hindustani’.29 R.V. Dulekar, a Congressman from the United Provinces said that he had entered the Congress thirty-eight years earlier at the age of eighteen, and had the notion that one day his country would have its own language and its own culture. Hindi was already ‘the national language of this country’ when Swami Dayanand began to write in Hindi (instead of Sanskrit). Others might look upon Hindi as the ‘official language’ but for Dhulekar it was ‘the national language’. The ‘Hindustani Business’ was actually a part of the ‘appeasement policy’. The Congress made honest efforts to forge a common Indian front for the struggle for freedom, and followed a ‘friendly policy’ towards Muslims. Eventually, however, the Congress had to fight the battle alone. Dhulekar asserted that ‘Hindi will be the language of this land’ with ‘Devanagri script and numerals’. His honest advice to Maulana Hifzur Rahman was to drop his advocacy of Hindustani because he would be misrepresented and misunderstood. Today, ‘the nation which has undergone so many sufferings is not in a mood to hear him’.30 In other words, to support Hindi was to be a nationalist and to talk of Hindustani was to be communal. This was a remarkable reversal. Frank Anthony remarked that the fanatical attitude of the protagonists of Hindi had done greater harm to the cause of Hindi than anyone else. By their intolerance, they had created an attitude of resistance. Due to their fanatical zeal a process of purge had become current to make Hindi unintelligible even to the Hindi-speaking Hindu in the street. Anthony did not claim that English could be the national language, but there was no justification for a vindictive attitude towards English; it should have been given a place in the languages of India. In the larger interests of the country, the Roman script should be substituted in place of Devanagri.31 (p.423) Qazi Syed Karimuddin from the Central Provinces and Berar remarked that the change from Hindustani in both Urdu and Devanagri scripts to Hindi in Devanagri script was due to the fact that Pakistan had declared Urdu to be its

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Making of the New Constitution national language. He believed that Urdu was being deliberately suppressed by the Hindu majority in a reaction.32 T.A. Ramalingam Chettiar from Madras remarked that the language problem was a matter of ‘life and death for the South’. The protagonists of Hindi should realize that the people of the south too had love for their language and literature. Acceptance of the claims of the north would put the people of the south in a ‘false position’. Acceptance of Hindi in Nagari script was a necessary compromise, but Hindi was ‘no more national’ than English. The people of the south had their own ‘national languages’. Naturally, therefore, the south was feeling frustrated. Tamil was not derived from Sanskrit, nor was it based on Sanskrit. The people speaking Tamil would be permanently handicapped. Chettiar shuddered to think ‘what may be the future for us’.33 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee from West Bengal emphasized that ‘coercion’ was not possible. Unity in diversity was India’s key-note, and it could be achieved only through ‘consent’. Personally, he was in favour of Sanskrit, but he accepted Hindi, not because it was the best but mainly because it was understood by the largest single majority in the country. The proposition before the House was not in the interest of the people of the south but it was in the interest of the people of India as a whole.34 Jawaharlal Nehru rose to support Ayyangar not because his amendment was perfect in every way but because it displayed ‘the largest measure of agreement’ and it was ‘a thought-out approach’ to a difficult problem. Language, he said, was ‘a most intimate thing’. The question had to be considered in the larger context in which the ultimate objective was to promote ‘the integrity of India’. Mahatma Gandhi, ‘the Father of our Nation’, had given thought to this question. The first thing he taught was that English could never become the language of the people, and the language of India should be the language of the people and not of the learned coterie. It should also represent ‘the composite culture of India’. Therefore, he used the word Hindustani in the broad sense of a composite language to be evolved. ‘Men shape a language, but then that language itself shapes those men and society.’ If a language was exclusive the people also became exclusive in thought, mind, and action. The fundamental question in approaching the problem was: ‘which way are you looking, backward or forward’. The language for India should be an inclusive language and not an exclusive one. Nehru felt sure that Hindi would grow as Hindustani and become a very great language.35 Nehru was clinging to hope for ‘Hindustani’ in helplessness. ‘I am one of those’, said Sardar Hukam Singh, ‘who have withdrawn their support from Hindi in Devanagri script simply because of the fanaticism and intolerance of those who support it.’ Their speeches made it very clear that they had no intention of enriching Hindi from other languages and let it grow as ‘our Page 13 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution common language’. There had been a keen contest before Partition between Urdu and Hindi to become the ‘Rashtra Bhasha’ (national language). There were two fanaticisms, and there was antagonism. On that account a common language was sought to be evolved and it was named Hindustani. Hukam Singh supported ‘Hindustani’. The (p.424) script for Hindustani should be the Roman script which was equally convenient to learn in the north and the south: ‘This will remove the antagonism that is apparent in this House and will enable our Southern friends as well to learn the language more easily’.36 For the regional languages, Sardar Hukam Singh proposed that the language of the majority according to the last census figures should be adopted as the language to be used for all official purposes of that state. He referred to the Punjab as a peculiar province in which the language had become ‘a communal question’. This was a legacy of pre-Partition days. As reported by the Census Commissioners in 1931 and 1941, very respectable persons gave wrong answers to choose one language or the other. They gave their ‘mother tongue’ as Urdu or Hindi while they spoke Punjabi. Whereas Hindi as the lingua franca would be read and written by all in the Punjab, Punjabi would not have its own status if it was left to the state legislature. Hukam Singh went on to add: ‘Communalism has not been correctly defined anywhere, but a convenient definition may be that whatever is said and done by the majority in a democratic country or at least in India is pure nationalism and whatever is said by a minority community is communalism.’37 Thus, the term ‘communalism’ as an antonym of both ‘nationalism’ and ‘secularism’ had become a political abuse. The majority community in the Punjab denied that Punjabi was their mother tongue. The Sikhs had no choice but to take up the cause of Punjabi. Their demand had been dubbed as ‘a communal demand’. The press carried on a vigorous propaganda. They said that the Sikhs were out to have a separate state. With the fear that Punjabi was going to be ousted, the minority community wanted the adjustment of boundaries to be taken up, and wanted that linguistic province might be demarcated. That too was decried as a communal demand. ‘It was not communal in other parts of the country, but it is communal so far as the cry of the minority community in the Punjab is concerned’. Even the Commission ruled out any change. About the Punjabi language they said that it was ‘only a dialect of the Hindi language.’38 Another technique had been adopted by the majority community in the Punjab. Nobody should be compelled, it was said. Everybody should be free to choose the medium of instruction. In other words, there should be freedom to choose the mother tongue. Sardar Hukam Singh made it clear that no minority in India could now be communal. There was no ‘third party’ and every minority had to look to the majority for everything, whether favours, rights, or concessions. The minorities were not afraid of the majority but its communalism. The Punjab was

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Making of the New Constitution suffering and Hukam Singh appealed to the House to save it ‘from the communalism of the majority’.39 The Commission to which Sardar Hukam Singh made a reference was the one appointed by the Constituent Assembly reluctantly in 1948 with Justice S.K. Dhar as it Chairman to enquire into the desirability of linguistic provinces. The Congress had espoused the cause of linguistic provinces virtually since 1920. However, Jawaharlal Nehru had come to think and argue that reorganization of the provinces on the basis of language was not very desirable. It was certainly not an urgent matter for him. With no priority given to linguistic provinces by Nehru, the Constituent Assembly was not enthusiastic about reorganization. But there was a demand for it in several provinces, and the Commission was (p. 425) appointed to consider the matter for adopting a systematic approach. Its report came out in December 1948. The Commission saw no urgency in the matter. To take up reorganization would certainly involve administrative inconvenience. It might threaten national unity. Linguistic states appeared to represent regionalism as opposed to Nationalism. The Constituent Assembly decided not to incorporate the principle of linguistic reorganization in the Constitution.

A Dissenting Voice Sardar Hukam Singh made a startling declaration in the Constituent Assembly. He said that the Sikhs feel that they have been discriminated against. Let it not be misunderstood that the Sikh community has agreed to this constitution. I wish to record an emphatic protest here. My community cannot subscribe its assent to this historic document.40 Hukam Singh made some general remarks on the Constitution during its third reading on 21 November 1949. In the preamble, ‘we have overdone ourselves in certain respects’. Fraternity was impossible to enforce; liberty of thought meant nothing if there was no freedom of expression; equality of status was an empty boast. In the Fundamental Rights, the rights to freedom in Article 19 were hedged round with exceptions and reservations which made them ineffective. The various rights were subject to the existing restrictive laws, and to laws made hereafter. Much greater trust was placed in the Legislature than in the Judiciary. This was a wrong foundation for the structure raised. ‘The Judiciary can be more safely entrusted with the holding of balance between the individual and the State.’ Prohibitions were imposed on the Legislature, but the Legislature itself was permitted to restrict the liberty. ‘The feared robber is made the judge and the possible trespasser the sole arbiter.’ This was a clear deception. Then there were Emergency provisions. On the report of a Governor or a Rajpramukh, all liberties worth the name could come to an end. The proclamation of Emergency could abrogate civil liberties. Hukam Singh believed that ‘civil liberty should Page 15 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution come to an end only when civil authority comes to an end’. Personal freedoms were worth nothing unless material insecurity was eliminated. Rights were no rights unless enforceable. India was to be a socialist state but there was nothing else in the Constitution in support of this pious platitude. With reference to the special provisions related to the minorities, Hukam Singh said that the Sikhs could feel proud of their contribution in terms of sacrifices made for freedom. They had received assurances from the Congress from 1929 to 1947 about safeguarding their interests. The Muslims, who were not satisfied with the assurances given by the Congress, got Pakistan. The Sikhs, who consistently cried for safeguards, were denied any consideration. ‘They fail to understand why they have met this treatment.’ Separate electorates had gone. Reservation on population basis was abolished. It was said that it was a blot to acknowledge any ‘religious minority’ but the Anglo-Indians were given safeguards. The Sikhs were told that the entry about consideration of their claims to Services would have disfigured the Constitution, but a similar entry about the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the Anglo-Indians did not impair its beauty. The Sikhs wanted a Punjabi-speaking province. That was denied even though it was not a communal but a territorial demand. Thus, not a single safeguard (p.426) or concession was given to the Sikhs in the Constitution for free India.

In Retrospect The Congress leadership was most keen on fashioning the Constitution in accordance with their ideology and interests. Of special importance to the Sikhs were political safeguards for the minorities, the issue of national and regional languages, and the issue of linguistic states. The Advisory Committee on Minorities decided to hold all elections on the basis of joint electorates, with reservation of seats for minorities. The question of safeguards for the Sikhs was postponed. A five-member Sub-Committee was formed in February 1948 to consider ‘the problem of the Sikhs’. The demands of the Akali Dal were now seen as a fundamental departure from the decisions already taken by the Constituent Assembly with regard to Muslims and other minorities. The Sub-Committee could see no reason for an exception to be made in the case of the Sikhs. Over ten months later, on 30 December 1948, some members of the Advisory Committee orchestrated the opinion that the reservation of seats for Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs was ‘contrary to the conception of secular democratic state’. On 11 May 1949, the Advisory Committee met again and Sardar Patel tried to give the impression that the majority of the members of the minorities themselves were in favour of having no reservations, except for the Scheduled Castes. He also stated that the Committee agreed to include the Mazahabi, Ramdasi, Kabirpanthi, and Sikligar Sikhs in the list of Scheduled Castes

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Making of the New Constitution confined earlier to the ‘Hindus’. This ‘concession’ was given to the Sikhs for the consent to dispense with reservation of seats. On 25 May 1949, Sardar Patel presented the report of the Advisory Committee to the Constituent Assembly, outlining the background and explaining the Sikh position. There was a heated discussion on the issue of the withdrawal of reservation of seats in legislatures. The Resolution was passed and Sardar Patel felt gratified that the House was ‘able to bring about unanimity in removing the past blots in our constitution’. Many leaders of the minorities had no doubt that this ‘unanimity’ was brought about by Sardar Patel through cajolery and intimidation. Another crucial issue was the choice between ‘Hindustani’ and ‘Hindi’ as the official language for use in government and administration and as the lingua franca for India. The final decision was virtually in favour of Hindi in Devanagri script. Antagonism to Urdu (associated with Muslims and adopted as the national language in Pakistan) was built into the espousal of Hindi. The decision about Hindi by a very thin majority was rightly seen by many members as an exhibition of ‘Hindu’ fanaticism. The ‘secular’ nationalists were defeated by the ‘communal’ Congressmen. Sardar Hukam Singh talked about the language problem in the Punjab where language had become a communal question before 1947. The majority community in East Punjab denied that Punjabi was their mother tongue. Therefore, the Sikhs alone had to take up the cause of Punjabi. But this was dubbed as ‘a communal demand’. Hukam Singh came up with a definition of communalism in contemporary India: whatever was said and done by the majority was ‘pure nationalism’ and whatever was demanded by a minority community was ‘communalism’. He asserted that no minority in India could now be communal as the British were no longer there as the ‘third party’. Every minority had to look to the majority for rights or concessions. The minorities were not afraid of Hindu majority but of its communalism. (p.427) Closely connected with the language issue was the creation of linguistic states which had been advocated by the Congress virtually since 1920. In reaction to Partition, however, Nehru was opposed to the idea. Regional articulation on cultural basis appeared to be in conflict with the ideal of strong centralized state as the instrument of rapid economic development which was expected to strengthen national integration. The Commission reluctantly appointed by the Constituent Assembly to enquire into the desirability of linguistic states echoed the fears of Nehru: an immediate administrative inconvenience and a long-term threat to national unity. Significantly, the Commission went out of its way to reject the possibility of a Punjabi-speaking state. The Constituent Assembly decided not to incorporate the principle of linguistic reorganization in the Constitution. Whereas Nehru looked upon the Page 17 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution Indian Constitution as a great achievement of the Congress, Hukam Singh saw many serious flaws in it. It did not satisfy any of the aspirations of the Sikhs as a political community. Notes:

(1.) Granville Austen, quoted by Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, fifth impression), p. 41. (2.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence, p. 40. (3.) Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, part 1) (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1994, second edition), pp. 12–13. (4.) The Constituent Assembly Debates (New Delhi: Government of India), Book I, pp. 104–5. (5.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book I, pp. 105–7. (6.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book I, pp. 333–4. (7.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book I, p. 399. (8.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book I, p. 243. (9.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book I, pp. 270–3. (10.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. VI, pp. 307–10. (11.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 313–15. (12.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, p. 315. (13.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 310–12. (14.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 269–71. (15.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 271–2. (16.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 274–7. (17.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 282–9. (18.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 303–5. (19.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 321–2. (20.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, p. 322. Page 18 of 19

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Making of the New Constitution (21.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 322–3. (22.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 329–32. (23.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, pp. 349–52. (24.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 353–4. (25.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book III, p. 354. (26.) Bimal Prasad (ed.), The Ideas and Men Behind the Indian Constitution: Selections from the Constituent Assembly Debates (1946–49) (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2001), pp. 129–31. (27.) Bimal Prasad (ed.), The Ideas and Men Behind the Indian Constitution, pp. 133–42. (28.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1319–25. (29.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1326–31, 1341–8. (30.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1332–6, 1351–4. (31.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1337–40, 1362–7. (32.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, p. 1369. (33.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1373–7. (34.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1391–5. (35.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1411–18. (36.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1438–9. (37.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, p. 1440. (38.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, pp. 1440–1. (39.) The Constituent Assembly Debates, Book IV, p. 1441. (40.) This section is based on Sardar Hukam Singh’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on 21 November 1949. It is reproduced in Appendix 9.

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab (1947–50) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0018

Abstract and Keywords Master Tara Singh’s differences with the Congress Government in political matters began to emerge in 1948. In March 1948, the Akali legislators joined the Congress party in the legislature. Master Tara Singh underscored, nevertheless, that it was essential to preserve Sikh identity in religious, social, and political matters. The Akali Dal made it clear in October 1948 that the most effective safeguard for a minority was the right to choose its own representatives through separate electorates. In February 1949, Master Tara Singh emphasized that the root of all demands and all principles for the Sikhs was to have political power. Sardar Patel kept Master Tara Singh under detention for about eight months as a political prisoner under the Bengal Regulation III of 1818, which did not allow any legal intervention. His purpose was to settle all major Sikh issues without Master Tara Singh. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Congress Government, Akali legislators, Congress party, Sikh identity, Akali Dal, safeguard for a minority, Sardar Patel, Bengal Regulation III of 1818, Sikh issues

Master Tara Singh took interest in all the important developments after 15 August 1947 up to the adoption of the new Constitution on 26 January 1950: evacuation of refugees and their rehabilitation, proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, formation of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union, and the

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab question of linguistic states. Formation of a Punjabi-speaking state emerged as by far the most important issue in these early years.

Master Tara Singh’s Concern with Evacuation and Resettlement Master Tara Singh recalls in his Merī Yād that Sardar Patel came to Amritsar at the end of August and met the Sikh leaders to seek their help for putting a stop to massacres in the Punjab. ‘All of us made a united effort and succeeded in getting the massacres stopped.’ The Muslims in Pakistan also became moderate and bloodshed gradually ended.1 Jaswant Singh says that government officials and other responsible persons used to come several times every day to the Missionary College, Amritsar, to get instructions from Master Tara Singh about the Hindu and Sikh refugees who had started crossing the border from Pakistan after the Partition. In the early weeks after Partition the Akalis alone used to look after these unfortunate and miserable people. The government offices had moved to Jalandhar but the responsibility of making arrangements for food and lodging for the refugees was that of the Shiromani (p.430) Akali Dal. There was no newspaper in the Punjab at that time; only an official bulletin used to be issued for all information on the refugees.2 Niranjan Singh states that Gopi Chand Bhargava used to consult Master Tara Singh at every step. Till the end of 1947, no Minister returned from Amritsar without meeting Master Tara Singh at his house.3 Within a week after 15 August 1947, General Rees requested Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh to tour the region and appeal for peace. Both of them did this earnestly. Soon afterwards, an appeal for peace was signed by eleven leading Akalis.4 Sardar Patel refers to a conference held at Amritsar on 1 September 1947 to which Master Tara Singh was invited besides Trivedi and Bhargava.5 In a speech at Simla on 15 November 1947, Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke referred to a meeting with Sardar Patel in Amritsar, at which Patel had said that no army was needed when the Sikhs were there in East Punjab. Nagoke said that what they needed was only arms and ammunition to invade West Punjab. Nagoke added that the Sikhs were ‘mainly responsible for saving the East Punjab from the Muslims’. He had encouraged the non-Muslims of his area to take possession of the land of the Muslims in the nearby villages so that, on the arrival of the refugees from Pakistan, these lands were given to them.6 Trivedi believed that law and order could be restored only by putting a stop to the activities of the Sikhs. He wrote to Sardar Swaran Singh on 4 September 1947 that the Sikh leaders like Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh had been doing quite a lot for the restoration of peace but their propaganda did not seem to have gone home to the local leaders in tehsils or villages. Sikh jathās were getting bigger and more organized, and the only alternative now was a vigorous police and military action. If no such action was taken, the situation would become worse. It was the duty of the government to take stern and Page 2 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab immediate action. ‘If the Sikhs themselves cry a halt, it would the best solution. Otherwise there will be no other alternative but to set the whole of the police and military machinery in motion.’7 Jawaharlal Nehru had addressed a gathering at Lyallpur on 2 September to underline that the Punjab was engaged in an act of suicide. On the same day Jinnah spoke on the Pakistan Radio in support of peace. Appeals for peace came from all sides, and Master Tara Singh made an earnest appeal for peace on 5 September.8 However, leaders like Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar appeared to have lost control over the jathās. In any case, they were unable to disband them. The organizational part of the Sikh jathās was looked after by the ex-INA Sikh officers, mainly by Colonel Niranjan Singh Gill.9 Also, the Akalis could not get printing paper for the dissemination of their views. Master Tara Singh asked Major Short to request the Deputy Commissioner but printing paper could not be arranged.10 In the last week of September 1947, Master Tara Singh and Udham Singh Nagoke jointly invoked the Sikh tradition to appeal to the Sikhs to stop violence. They knew, they said, that Sikhs stooped to low depths only in retaliation but this remained an infringement of the Sikh tradition. The Sikhs should be prepared to fight a clean battle with the Muslims of Pakistan as their enemies but they must stop at once the killing of women and children and those who seek asylum with them. The other Akali leaders like Ishar Singh Majhail, Jathedar Mohan Singh Nagoke, and Sohan Singh Jalal-Usman also appealed for (p.431) peace. Early in October the Akali leaders made a special appeal to the Sikhs to let Muslim convoys pass peacefully.11 Master Tara Singh’s primary concern in the early months of Independence was evacuation of Sikhs and Hindus from Pakistan and their settlement in India. On 28 September 1947, he sent a telegram to Sardar Patel that the Sikh and Hindu population of West Punjab was being wiped out. The military and the police were working havoc. Children, women, and men were crying for help from India. They must be rescued in time.12 There was also the problem of settling the refugees coming from Pakistan. At a press interview early in October, Master Tara Singh said that Muslims in Delhi and northern UP were being made to leave. According to Liaqat Ali Khan’s statement, it appeared that the Ministers of the Government of India who had gone to Lahore for a conference wanted to include Muslims of Delhi and the western districts of UP in the evacuation programme. But Jawaharlal Nehru clarified that this was not the policy of the Government of India.13 Master Tara Singh held the view that the Government of India should come to an understanding with the Government of Pakistan about evacuation so that the Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan could be settled in India and given adequate compensation for the lands they had left in Pakistan. This carried

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab the implication that the Muslims in India who wanted to migrate to Pakistan should be encouraged to do so. Master Tara Singh believed that both Nehru and Gandhi were wrong in asking the Muslims to stay on in Delhi. The question of the acres in excess, estimated at 2.5 million, which the Hindus and Sikhs had left or would leave in Pakistan, was of great importance. He urged Mahatma Gandhi and other leaders to pay serious attention to this side of the problem. All along he had been ‘asking for an exchange of population along with property’. He added that the Sikhs would perish if Muslims did not vacate lands in UP and Delhi.14 Early in December, again, Master Tara Singh voiced his opposition to the Congress attitude towards Muslim emigration. ‘Let Mahatma Gandhi pay more attention to the property of Hindus and Sikhs,’ he said. The leaders who were appealing to Hindus and Sikhs to return to Pakistan had no sense of the realities: ‘no Hindu and Sikh can be loyal to Pakistan’. Master Tara Singh was unhappy over Mahatma Gandhi’s reaction to the ban on kirpān longer than 9 inches. Responding to Sardar Sant Singh’s request to use his influence to remove the ban, Gandhi had said on 26 November 1947 that the Sikhs should not be carried by the prevailing current. They should help in ‘ridding the great and brave community of madness, drunkenness and all vices that flow from it. Let them sheath the sword which they have flourished loudly and badly’. He went on to add that a kirpān ceased to be sacred ‘when it goes into the hands of an unprincipled drunkard’. At a press conference in Bombay before the end of November, Master Tara Singh reacted angrily to the manner in which the issue of the kirpān had been handled in Delhi.15 Early in December, Master Tara Singh expressed the view that war with Pakistan was the only way to solve the problem of displacement of Hindus and Sikhs. He added that if Nehru was convinced that Pakistan was responsible for the trouble in Kashmir, and had proof in support of his allegation, he should open a front near Lahore. On 11 January 1948, at a public gathering in Amritsar, Master Tara Singh warned of a war with Pakistan in the near future. The people in the Punjab, and even the Congress Ministers, (p.432) began to talk of war. This impression was reinforced by the news that the gurdwara near Ratan Talao in Karachi was surrounded by a mob of 8,000 Muslims who burnt it down and killed a number of Sikhs who had arrived there on 6 January. On 12 January, nearly 1,700 non-Muslim refugees from Bannu were killed at Gujrat railway station. This fresh spurt of violence in Pakistan was seen as a reflection of its aggressive designs.16 On 13 January 1948, Mahatma Gandhi undertook the last of his historic fasts unto death in an attempt to restore the confidence of Muslims who had been traumatized. The Government of India ordered the Reserve Bank of India to credit Rs 350,000,000 to Pakistan though this was not one of the seven main conditions for ending the fast. Gandhi ended his fast on 18 January, ‘an Page 4 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab auspicious’ day for him, and ‘also the birthday of Guru Gobind Singh’. But this did not endear him to the people of East Punjab. An editorial in The Tribune remarked that this quick change of face on the part of the Government of India did not add to its prestige, and Mahatma Gandhi was expected now to secure ‘justice for the Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab’.17 On 24 January, Master Tara Singh issued the statement that the country and the nation should be grateful to Mahatmaji for his great service to both. But changes in time needed changes in policy, which Mahatma Gandhi did not seem capable of making. The only practical course for him was to retire. He did not have a realistic view of the situation and he should not interfere in the affairs of the government: ‘Let Mahatmaji cease to be a super Prime Minister as he is now.’ Even his prayers were dominated by his politics.18 Nehru was upset by Master Tara Singh’s statement. He was in Amritsar on 29 January 1948. In all the speeches he made on that day, a common theme was his warning to communal bodies not to oppose the government covertly. They ‘must come out in the open’ if they wished to do so. He warned the people of the danger of fascist forces.19 Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated on 30 January. The Congress Legislative Party met on 4 February and resolved to ban the RSS. It is important to add that the Congress was thinking of banning the communal bodies even before the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi: in an editorial of The Tribune of 26 November 1947, it was stated that Nehru wanted the RSS and the Akali Dal to be banned. He was believed to have issued a directive to the East Punjab Government for this purpose. The editorial appreciated the role of ‘these national organisations’ in protecting thousands of Hindu and Sikh women during the holocaust. Some of the members of these organizations might have been involved in the disturbances but the RSS and the Akali Dal were ‘protectors of people and enshrined in the hearts of the people’. They could be absorbed in a powerful defence force.20

Unsuccessful Attempts to Isolate Master Tara Singh In his Merī Yād, Master Tara Singh mentions that he received the news of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination of 30 January 1948 at Dharamsala where he had gone for recovery after his illness.21 He returned to Amritsar on 1 February. The Government of India made a lot of propaganda over the death of Mahatma Gandhi to strengthen its position. A great immediate gain from Mahatma Gandhi’s death was that the hands of the Congress were strengthened. The Congress campaign against ‘communalism’ and the banning of the RSS affected the thinking of (p.433) the Akali leaders. Sardar Baldev Singh started persuading them to join the Congress. He spoke to Master Tara Singh also but in vain. Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke, President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, also began to persuade the Sikh leaders to join the Congress. He spoke to Master Tara Singh. The only argument he gave was that in joint electorates no candidate could enter the legislature without the Congress ticket. Master Tara Singh said that the matter was not urgent and it Page 5 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab required serious thought. But a few days later Jathedar Udham Singh declared in the newspapers that the political leadership of the Congress alone should now be accepted. Without any reference to this declaration, Master Tara Singh wrote a pamphlet opposing the idea of joining the Congress.22 Master Tara Singh’s pamphlet failed to change the mind of the Panthic leaders. He came to know, in fact, that Sardar Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, and several other Akali legislators were ready to join the Congress. At last a meeting of the Panthic members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly was held at Simla. It was an eye-opener for Master Tara Singh. He found himself alone in resisting the move. The position was clear enough but another meeting was fixed to take the final decision. Before going to this meeting at Delhi, Master Tara Singh came to know that Giani Kartar Singh was no longer in favour of joining the Congress. There was, thus, a clear possibility of contention between the Giani group and the Nagoke group. In consultation with Bawa Harkishan Singh and Sardar Bhag Singh, who were travelling with him to Delhi, Master Tara Singh decided to remain neutral. When Master Tara Singh met Giani Kartar Singh and mentioned his intention of remaining neutral, Giani Kartar Singh said that in that case, he too would join the Congress. Master Tara Singh decided to oppose the proposition in the meeting of the Working Committee of the Akali Dal on the following day. Only Jathedar Pritam Singh said that he was with Master Tara Singh. In this situation, Master Tara Singh agreed that they could try the experiment on some conditions. It was agreed that the Akali Dal would remain a separate political party. This was confirmed in a meeting of the Working Committee at Master Tara Singh’s house in Amritsar. Jathedar Mohan Singh and Jathedar Sohan Singh (of Nagoke group) were also present. But the basic difference between Master Tara Singh and the Panthic legislators became public. Master Tara Singh insisted that the Sikhs must have a distinct political party of their own. But the Akali leaders who were allowed by the Working Committee of the Akali Dal on 17 March 1948 to join the Congress Party began to assert that the Sikhs did not need a separate party. Master Tara Singh stood isolated from the Akali leaders.23 On 24 April 1948, Master Tara Singh addressed the annual conference of the All India Sikh Students Federation and clarified his understanding of the situation. The Sikhs, in his view, were passing through a grave crisis in their history, like the one in the time of Guru Gobind Singh when their very existence was at stake. Never before in human history had so much misery been witnessed as now, so much cruelty, slaughter, and abduction, exodus on such a large scale, and so much humiliation. The plight had not yet ended. There was little hope for the future. Master Tara Singh exhorted the young men to be prepared to make sacrifices for the protection of the Sikh faith. There was a grave threat to dharam, kaum, desh, and the Panth. (p.434) They should make the Panth aware

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab of this danger. It was necessary to revive the high moral spirit of the Khalsa and to overpower the enemies of the Panth.24 Master Tara Singh went on to underscore that moral strength came from religious faith. The Satnami movement in the time of Aurangzeb went down when suppressed by the state. By contrast, the Sikh movement emerged supreme despite aggression by the state. This was because the spiritual and temporal forces joined hands in the case of the Sikhs. When Ahmad Shah Abdali offered the rulership of Lahore to the Khalsa, they rejected the offer and said that they would get rulership with the power of the Panth and not as a gift from someone else. Only an office held on the basis of the strength of the Panth strengthened its position. Artificial props from outside destroyed the real source of power.25 Master Tara Singh explained that the Panthic legislators had joined the Congress Party in the interest of the Panth. But if there was no Panth, the question of serving its interest would not arise. The independent or autonomous entity of the Panth, therefore, was essential. All religious, social, and political decisions affecting the Panth should be taken by the Panth. Master Tara Singh made a clear distinction between personal and collective gain. The former should not harm the latter. To join the Congress was one thing; to dissolve the Panthic party was quite another. If there was no Panthic entity, there could be no gain.26 It was a matter of faith for Master Tara Singh that the Tenth Master had bestowed both mīrī and pīrī on the Panth. Mīrī meant power of the Panth, and not an office or a position received from another power. The Akali Dal had decided to join the Congress but not to dissolve itself. If there was any ambiguity, it had been removed by the declaration of the Akali Dal that it would continue to be a political party. Even now an Akali could join the Congress but with the permission of the Akali Dal. The independent status (azād hastī) of the Panth and an autonomous existence of the Akali Dal as a political party went together.27 Master Tara Singh was opposed to irresponsible criticism of the government. But this did not mean that everything done, or not done, by the government was justified. On the issue of rehabilitation, for instance, inadequate compensation was unjust. The landholders should have been given as much land as they had left in Pakistan. But the government had obliged them to suffer a great loss in order to retain goodwill of Muslims. There was discrimination against the Sikhs in the services due to the high-handed attitude of those Hindu officers who were ‘communal’ in their outlook. The government did not allow the Sikhs to go to Pakistan. They were not allowed to purchase arms because they were not trusted.28

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Master Tara Singh argued that mistakes made by him, or attributed to him, did not mean that the institution or the body he represented was at fault. He refers to his role during World War II and justifies it. In any case, he had done nothing for his personal gain. In other words, his motive could not be questioned. It was now alleged that there was no threat to the Panth and that Master Tara Singh was worried about his own leadership. But there was a threat to his leadership precisely because he was a leader of the Panth. If there was no Panth, there would be no leader and no threat to Panthic leadership. Thus, the threat to Master Tara Singh’s leadership in the given situation was (p.435) actually a threat to an independent existence of the Panth.29 Master Tara Singh appealed to Hindus in the name of the Indian Nation that they should not try to weaken the Sikh sense of self-respect which was the source of their courage and valour. The Sikhs were the strength of the Nation as a ‘national army’. To fight for the country and to fight for justice was a religious duty of the Khalsa Panth.30 The Congress looked upon the Shiromani Akali Dal as a ‘communal organization’ and there was a talk of banning all organizations regarded as communal. Instead of taking steps to curb ‘communalism’ of the majority to inspire confidence in the minorities, the government was bent upon suppressing the minorities under the garb of ‘nationalism’. Master Tara Singh was determined to oppose a statutory ban on the Akali Dal.31 Addressing himself to his ‘Sikh brothers’ finally, Master Tara Singh said that they should allow the Panthic legislators who had joined the Congress Party to try the experiment but no one should entertain the idea that the Panth need not be an autonomous entity. There should be no objection to a Panthic member joining the Congress Party on the understanding that he would leave the Congress when he was asked to do so. But they who joined the Congress on their own had no right to come back at will. The only solution to the Sikh problem was to strengthen the Akali Dal and make it the real representative of the Panth. The panacea for all ills was the strength of the Panth, and the strength of the Panth depended upon organization. The Sikhs needed total dedication and the Guru’s grace.32 Master Tara Singh raised his lone voice in support of the autonomy of the Akali Dal and sought to strengthen the Akali Dal. Addressing the Akali Political Conference at Patiala on 26 June 1948, Master Tara Singh underlined the responsibility of the Sikhs to the coming generations. The Congress had decided that a member of the Congress could not remain or become a member of any other political party, like the Akali Dal. The Panthic legislators, who were under the discipline of the Congress, could not raise any issue related to the Sikhs. No Sikh member could raise the issue of discrimination against the Sikhs in the Services or against the Punjabi language. To join the Congress now was to deny the existence of the Sikhs as a collectivity. There was a ludicrous situation: the Sikhs recited the ‘Rāj Karegā Khalsa’ anthem every day and the Akali leaders maintained that ‘all political decisions Page 8 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab would be taken by the Congress’. This was a cruel joke. ‘Rāj Karegā Khalsa’ was not to be taken literally as ‘the rule of the Khalsa’, but it did imply at least a separate and distinct political entity. The term ‘Panth’ was used for the collective entity of the Sikhs which made them distinct. They who said that the Sikhs needed no political entity of their own wanted the Sikhs to remain scattered like single bricks and not to build a wall. To accept the authority of the Akali Dal was to accept the authority of the Panth in so far as the Akali Dal was a true representative of the Panth. In certain situations the Akali Dal could, and did, call meetings of the entire body of the Sikhs and their organizations for deliberating on issues concerning the entire Panth. The decision of an individual could never be a decision of the Panth.33 Master Tara Singh underlined that the Sikhs were not opposed to the Hindus. Guru Tegh Bahadur had given his head for (p.436) the protection of the Hindu symbols (the sacred mark and the sacred thread). Guru Gobind Singh had created the Khalsa for the protection of dharam, which included the Hindu dharam. But some of the Hindu leaders wanted to absorb the Sikhs. They had the support of the Congress in their efforts to put an end to the independent identity of the Sikhs under the cloak of nationalism. Master Tara Singh proclaimed that they who were opposed to the Sikh Panth were his opponents, and they who were friendly towards the Sikh Panth were his friends. He was opposed to the Congress precisely because the Congress was bent upon atomizing the Sikh Panth to make it helpless in relation to the majority.34 Before Independence, there was a common bond between the Akali Dal and the Congress: the struggle for freedom. Now that the British had been pushed out, there was no common bond. The sycophants of the colonial days had joined the Congress for self-aggrandizement. Only those Sikhs could now remain in the Congress, or join the Congress, who had a personal axe to grind or who were in some kind of trouble. Master Tara Singh was not one of those Sikhs. He looked upon the contemporary Sikh and Hindu faiths as two different dispensations, sharing the same civilizational background. The same basic culture was at the root of these two different religious systems. The Sikhs and the Hindus needed each other’s help. They were to live and die together. It was not in the interest of the Hindus to weaken the Sikhs or to humiliate them.35 Master Tara Singh expected the Hindus not to support the Congress in its anti-Sikh policies and measures. Separate electorates for Master Tara Singh symbolized recognition of the Sikh Panth as a distinct religious community. That was why he had never agreed to dispense with separate electorates. He was unhappy when the Constituent Assembly decided in August 1947 to have only joint electorates. He met Maulana Azad in this connection and came to know that Sardar Patel had persuaded Giani Kartar Singh, who was President of the Shiromani Akali Dal at that time, to drop the demand for separate electorates. Giani Kartar Singh’s consent was used as Page 9 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab an argument with Maulana Azad to persuade him not to insist on separate electorates for Muslims.36 That the decision of the Constituent Assembly was not acceptable to Master Tara Singh is evident from the resolution of the Akali Dal on 25 October 1948 before the Draft Constitution was taken up by the Constituent Assembly: It has become a fashion in the day to condemn the separate electorate system. But in the composite State that India undoubtedly is, the right to choose one’s own representative is the most effective and prized safeguard for a minority. Separate electorates are only the age-old democratic maxim. What touches us most must be approved by us in practice. The apprehensions felt about them are chimerical. On the other hand, they are sine quo non of the Sikh satisfaction, and would promote confidence and concord between the communities by eliminating causes and chances of friction.37 The Sikhs were insistent on separate Sikh seats ‘because the aggressive communal mentality, brought into play particularly during the last 10 months by the majority community, has created an apprehension in their minds that the joint electorate system may be exploited to kill their entity’. Therefore, the Sikhs demanded that separate electorates should be retained for the Sikhs at least for ten years. The Akalis were far more keen about separate electorate than about weightage. Reservation of seats without separate electorates was practically useless. It is of interest to note that Master Tara Singh took serious notice of tension between (p.437) Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab in November 1948. ‘It is a very ominous campaign started against the Sikhs’, he said, ‘by the leaders of the East Punjab and fanned by the Hindu Press.’ Some newspapers were ‘distinctly hostile’. Their assertion that the Hindus could never accept Sikh domination in the province provided a strong argument for Master Tara Singh to insist that he would never accept Hindu domination. He wished to retain the entity of the Khalsa Panth and he would certainly resist every effort ‘to absorb the Sikhs into the Hindu community’. The remedy for this situation was ‘a sort of an equal partnership’ in which no community dominated the other.38 Master Tara Singh did not want Sikh domination but only safeguards for ‘an honorable status’ for the Sikhs. Master Tara Singh was not happy with the working of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). The General Body of the SGPC had met on 28 May 1948 and elected Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke as President. Master Tara Singh was not elected to any office. On 10 June, the Executive Committee passed the resolution that in future the gurdwaras would be made the sources of Gursikhi (Sikh faith) and no partisan (political) issues would be discussed in gurdwaras.39 This accorded well with the considered policy of the Congressite Page 10 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Sikhs that no political issues should be taken up in gurdwaras. At the time of Diwali in November 1948, a ‘message’ from the Akal Takht was addressed to the Sikh sangats coming from far and near: ‘Our Bharat has become free from foreign domination after many sacrifices made by the Sikhs in the cause of freedom. In free India, we have to see that the Panth remains in high spirits and the country reaches the pinnacle of progress.’ A programme of religious and social nature was recommended for 1949.40 Thus, the SGPC under the control of the Congressite Sikhs tried to eliminate politics from religion. Master Tara Singh says that the majority of the members of the SGPC sided with his opponents. Since the government was opposed to him, both the Sikh and Hindu officials exerted their influence on the members. The members nominated from Pepsu were under the influence of the former Maharaja of Patiala. Some refugee members had also settled in Pepsu and they looked towards Yadvindra Singh for guidance. Two members were nominated by the government to fill vacancies arising due to death. Some of the members were actually officials of the government. In short, the party and the government which claimed to be secular had brought the SGPC completely under their ‘political influence’. According to Master Tara Singh, the Rajpramukh of Pepsu was directly interfering in the affairs of the SGPC. He did this, perhaps, on Sardar Patel’s suggestion. The Hindu Ministers of the Punjab also took keen interest in the elections of the SGPC. There was open interference of the ‘secular’ government in the ‘religious’ institutions of the Sikhs.41 Writing to Sardar Patel about the report of the Sub-Committee of the Minorities Advisory Committee on 15 December 1948, Sardar Baldev Singh was anxious to restate that it had never been his view that the Sikhs should have separate electorates or weightage. He did ‘not agree with the demands put forward by the Akali Dal’. He was not in favour of ‘anything which conflicts with the basic principles that have been laid down’. He assured Sardar Patel that, with the exception of one or two, all the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislature fully believed that the Sikh problem could be solved ‘without violating the agreed principles to the satisfaction of (p.438) the vast majority of Sikhs’.42 On 29 December, Baldev Singh was more vehement in his denial that he supported Master Tara Singh in his present attitude. He asserted that ever since he had been pushed into politics he had tried his best ‘to bring the Sikhs around to the Congress point of view’. He had persuaded all the Panthic legislators to join the Congress. This he did in the interests of the Sikhs, East Punjab, and the country as a whole. He did not agree with Master Tara Singh ‘in his present policy’.43 Baldev Singh’s disclaimer is a measure of Sardar Patel’s annoyance with Master Tara Singh as much as his own keenness to create distance between himself and Master Tara Singh.

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Sardar Patel’s letter of 30 December 1948 refers to the general impression given by some of the Sikh friends themselves that the attitude of Sardar Baldev Singh was the same as that of Master Tara Singh. Baldev Singh’s differences with the former Maharaja of Patiala, who was generally taken to represent the party opposed to Master Tara Singh, had been seen to lend further support to the proposition. Patel drew the line very clearly: ‘No one has deplored more than myself these manifestations of disunity among the Sikhs, and it is this disunity which has resulted in the inability of Sikh political leaders to face with confidence the rank communalism of Master Tara Singh.’44 Sardar Patel wanted all the Sikh leaders to unite in opposition to the Master. It may be noted that the most important English newspaper in the Punjab, The Tribune, supported the official policy. ‘The whole conception of Sikh political interest’, it said, ‘is fundamentally at variance with the secular nature of the State.’ In the new political set-up, political parties would have to cut themselves completely on ‘economic lines’. Communal weightage and reservations in the past had distorted the growth of ‘a healthy and natural political development’.45 It was stated that ‘communal poison’ was now affecting rehabilitation. Displaced persons (Hindus) were not settling down for fear of being displaced again. Communal feelings were intensified by a competitive spirit between the two communities. The proposal of further division of the Punjab, ‘ostensibly on linguistic grounds but actually in perpetuation of the pernicious doctrine of religious exclusiveness’, was bound to lead to a disaster greater than the one it had already experienced.46

Master Tara Singh’s Detention (February–October 1949) The Delhi Provincial Congress Committee organized a public meeting at the Gandhi Grounds on 6 February 1949 in connection with Mahatma Gandhi’s martyrdom (balīdān) and invited the Congressite Sikh leaders to speak about ‘the dangers of communalism and provincialism’. Among these leaders were Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, Giani Zail Singh, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and Jathedar Ishar Singh Majhail. The meeting was widely advertised and 15,000 to 20,000 people turned up. A large number of them were Akalis. They objected to the speeches of Ishar Singh Majhail and Giani Zail Singh. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon tried to pacify them but he too was not allowed to continue with his speech. However, the situation was brought under control, or so the President of the Provincial Congress Committee, Radha Raman, claimed.47 Jawaharlal Nehru had been greatly concerned about the Akali situation developing in Delhi. ‘Open challenges are being made,’ he (p.439) said. Master Tara Singh’s speeches in Delhi had ‘gingered up his followers’, and ‘a major crisis’ was ahead. Nehru was anxious that official policy ‘should be clearly laid down and every preparation made for carrying it through’.48 Sardar Patel reassured Nehru that ‘he would not allow an Akali conference to be held in Delhi in any shape or form’. After his visit to Delhi, Master Tara Singh had ‘delivered a Page 12 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab violent speech’ at Dehra Dun, but the Akalis were no longer vociferous in Delhi. Their main organ, the Ranjīt Nagārā, had been closed down by the Chief Commissioner. Patel was sure that the Akalis in Pepsu would not be able to make much headway. The real problem was to deal with the Akali situation in East Punjab. Sardar Patel had no objection if Nehru would like to place the whole matter before the Cabinet for formulating an official policy.49 In a talk with Jawaharlal Nehru on 11 February 1949, the Rajpramukh of Pepsu expressed his distress at the state of affairs in East Punjab. Master Tara Singh had regained a good deal of influence, he said. According to Yadvindra Singh, Master Tara Singh did not hesitate to say that if Patel and Jawaharlal continued to come in the way, they should be disposed of. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh (who functioned more or less in the same way but who was more cautious in speech) were supported financially by Sardar Baldev Singh. Master Tara Singh had fallen out with Yadvindra Singh because Master Tara Singh could not tolerate anyone else having influence. ‘He wanted to be the sole dictator of the Sikhs.’ Yadvindra Singh felt as a Sikh that Master Tara Singh’s policy was ‘very harmful’ and he felt distressed at the way he had been ‘allowed to continue spreading poison’. Nehru gathered the impression that Yadvindra Singh would like action to be taken against Master Tara Singh before the proposed Sikh conference in Delhi.50 Master Tara Singh says that he used to respond strongly to the threats of suppression by the government. The Akali conference at Delhi was meant to give expression to Sikh resentment over the official attitude. On the government’s refusal to allow any conference, it was decided to hold a dīwān in Gurdwara Rakabganj. Sardar Baldev Singh tried to persuade the Akali leaders not to hold the proposed conference. In a week’s time he sent forty to fifty Akalis to Master Tara Singh. Everyone of them tried to dissuade Master Tara Singh. But he was convinced that though confrontation was dangerous, running away from it was sure death. The programme could be modified but his presidential address would not be changed. When he was told that he was going against the majority and disobeying the Panth, he said that the Akali leaders no longer represented the Panth. Ajit Singh Sarhadi suggested a way out, which was interpreted by some leaders as a decision to hold no conference. The President of the Reception Committee declared that no conference was to be held. Master Tara Singh sent telegrams to many persons to confirm that the conference was going to be held. The government did not stop the jathās coming from outside, giving the impression that it had no objection to a conference being held in the gurdwara. Master Tara Singh boarded the train at Ambala, but he was arrested at Narela and sent to Meerut.51 Ajit Singh Sarhadi, who participated in the conference, states that the Akali conference at Delhi on 20 February 1949 was going to be held to voice the grievances and put forth the demands of the Sikhs at a time when the Page 13 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Constitution was in the making, and most of the important clauses pertaining to the (p.440) minorities had already been decided upon. The Sikhs were justifiably perturbed over the rejection of their main demands. It seemed, however, that Sardar Patel was bent upon coming down on the Sikhs. Baldev Singh wanted to avoid the crisis. The Working Committee reconsidered the matter on 10 February 1949 in the light of the messages sent by Sardar Baldev Singh. Despite the intercession of Giani Kartar Singh, who was then a Minister in the Punjab Cabinet and who was equally keen to avoid a crisis, the Working Committee confirmed its decision to hold the conference, not as ‘a Political Conference’ but as a Shahidi dīwān in Gurdwara Rakabganj. Master Tara Singh was arrested but the dīwān was held as scheduled. Ajit Singh Sarhadi was one of the leaders who addressed the dīwān. He gave reasons for holding it despite the ban on public meetings, and emphasized that the arrest of Master Tara Singh was totally unjustified and unwarranted.52 After the conference, Ajit Singh Sarhadi met Sardar Baldev Singh, who advised him to leave Delhi to avoid arrest. He seemed to have ‘no say’ in the decisions of the Centre. All those who had addressed the dīwān were tried for breach of Section 144, and after a prolonged trial they were sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. The detention of a leader of the stature of Master Tara Singh in free India for voicing the views of a minority which felt aggrieved at its calculated ill-treatment was ‘a tragic irony’. But ‘a more bitter irony’ was that Baldev Singh, who was a nominee of the Akali Dal in the Central Cabinet, ‘let down Master Tara Singh to please his Congress masters’. He set an example ‘to play the quisling to the Congress’ in self-interest. On 23 February 1949, he denounced the holding of the conference by the Akali Dal and thereby justifying the action taken against Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders. Baldev Singh underlined his efforts to impress upon Master Tara Singh the need for patience and the danger of ‘inflaming the mass mind in the prevailing circumstances’. Unfortunately, however, he did not succeed with Master Tara Singh who was sincere but ‘failed to realize his responsibilities towards the country and the community at this grave juncture’. Sarhadi adds that this statement came as a shock to the Sikh intelligentsia.53 Master Tara Singh refers to the Delhi conference as ‘a turning point’ that tilted the balance of Sikh opinion eventually in his favour. According to Sarhadi, it obliged the Sikh leadership to rethink about their position in the future. It is important to note that Master Tara Singh in his printed address, which was distributed in the dīwān at Delhi on 20 February 1949, exhorts the Singhs to have faith in the grace of Guru Gobind Singh and to struggle for his sake. Political power came from the Sikh faith, and faith could weaken due to lack of political power. The intention of the self-styled secular leaders was clear from the speech of Sri Purshottamdas Tandon at the Jaipur session of the Congress. He had said that propaganda for ‘Hinduttava’ was a parchār of ‘nationalism’ as its success would create ‘one nation’. Therefore, it was absolutely necessary, Page 14 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab said Master Tara Singh, to preserve the political identity of the Sikhs in the interests of the Sikh Panth and the Sikh faith. The Sikhs were able to preserve their honour and self-respect under colonial rule because there was no discrimination against them, but now there was. It was evident from the treatment of Sikhs in the Services. The Sikh backward classes were not included among the Scheduled Castes because, as a responsible Congress leader put it, the Sikh backward classes would surely (p.441) get absorbed now in the Hindu backward classes. Master Tara Singh’s first demand was that ‘the independent political identity of the Sikhs and their sense of honour should remain untouched’. Indeed, to retain political power was the root of all demands and all principles. All other demands could be modified or changed according to change in circumstances but this fundamental principle could never be set aside.54 The Akalis were opposed to the Congress because the Congress had attacked their ‘political independence and identity’. If the Congress abandoned this policy, there would be no reason for the Akalis to stand in opposition. Master Tara Singh declared: ‘The enemy of the Panth is my enemy, and the friend of the Panth is my friend.’ ‘He who is a servant of the Panth, I am his servant.’ Perhaps with the leaders like Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Kartar Singh in mind, Master Tara Singh writes that he could tolerate a person who used the Congress in the interest of the Panth, even though it was not a good thing to do. But he who used the Panth in the interest of the Congress was his enemy, and he who used both the Congress and the Panth for his own purposes was a contemptible wretch.55 Master Tara Singh was equally critical of Sardar Patel’s policy: ‘What kind of independence was this that the Maharaja of Patiala counted for everything in the Sikh states? Sardar Patel and he had nominated the entire Cabinet.’ This was a ministry of Patel and not of Patiala, nor of the Sikhs. It did not matter who did or did not become a minister. They were all merely the tools of Patel. They did not represent the Panth because they had not been made ministers by the Panth, nor could the Panth remove them. The new ministers who looked like Sikhs in appearance but actually they were ‘Patels with turbans and beards’ (kesān wāle Patel). Maser Tara Singh tells the Sikhs: ‘Your strongest fort has been captured by the enemies of the Panth with the help of the traitors to the Panth.’56 Master Tara Singh urged the ‘Congressite Hindus’ to abandon the idea of finishing the Khalsa Panth, and not to play in the hands of the Arya Samaj. The Khalsa Panth would never fall down. The Mughals had failed to destroy the Sikhs and the Congress would never be able to do so. ‘Do not bring about pointless confrontation, Patel Sahib.’ Where was Nauranga Turkara (Aurangzeb) who was proud of his armies? Where was Lakhu Patakhu (Diwan Lakhpat Rai) who had vowed to destroy the Sikhs root and branch? And where was Kabuli Kutta (Ahmad Shah Abdali) who threatened to ruin the Khalsa? They had all gone to hell, leaving no trace behind. This was a warning to those who talked of Page 15 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab destroying the Panth. Master Tara Singh expressed his profound faith in the ultimate triumph of the Khalsa.57 The Shiromani Akali Dal decided to observe a Protest Day throughout the Punjab and Delhi on 2 March 1949 against the arrest and detention of Master Tara Singh. Everywhere the day was observed with enthusiasm. But the SGPC under the control of the Congressite Sikhs did not allow any demonstration of protest within the premises of the Darbar Sahib at Amritsar. This led to confrontation, and the SGPC men called the police. The policemen entered the place with their shoes on, and resorted to firing in the circumambulatory pavement (parikarmā). Encouraged by the government, the local officials adopted a high-handed attitude. The supporters of Master Tara Singh appointed Bawa Harkishan Singh and Sardar Bhag Singh as a committee to enquire into the whole matter. They reported on 8 March (p.442) that the functionaries of the SGPC and the police were responsible for desecration of the Darbar Sahib.58 The SGPC had held its general meeting already on 6 March 1949 with Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke in the chair. It was reported by the Executive Committee that, in accordance the decision taken on 28 May 1948, no political lectures were allowed within the precincts of the gurdwaras of Amritsar, and that a series of religious lectures had been started. Sardar Ishar Singh Majhail’s written resolution was to the effect that the party of Master Tara Singh had shown grave disrespect to the Darbar Sahib and the Akal Takht, setting aside the sanctity of these places of the Gurus. Giani Dhanwant Singh and Sardar Jagjit Singh of the newspaper Khalsa Sewak were held responsible for instigating this activity. Jathedar Mohan Singh was praised for his patience even when he was subjected to violence.59 Evidently, the SGPC presented a very different picture of the unhappy incident. Very significant in their version was the plea for elimination of politics from religion. In April 1949, a large convention of Sikhs was called at Amritsar to which teachers, doctors, lawyers, and businessmen as well as politicians were invited. The arrest and detention of Master Tara Singh and other Akali leaders was condemned at this convention. At the same time, demand for the creation of a purely linguistic state in the Punjab was adopted. No boundaries were defined because the demand related essentially to get the principle accepted.60 On 4 April 1949, Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar pleaded with Sardar Patel for the release of Master Tara Singh. The words of those Akalis who were attached to the Congress, that is the Nagoke and Patiala groups, or those who had deserted Master Tara Singh, could not be relied upon, he wrote, when they spoke of his ideas and intentions. The Akali Dal leaders had officially declared that they had no intention of defying the law. There was peace in Delhi and in East Punjab. Master Tara Singh ‘should not be allowed to remain in custody without trial’. There was no strong case against Ajit Singh Sarhadi and other Page 16 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Akali leaders. It could be withdrawn and they could be released. Caveeshar added that the Nagoke group, associated with the Maharaja of Patiala, had ousted Master Tara Singh from the SGPC. The government had completely ignored Master Tara Singh’s party in the formation of the Pepsu Ministry. Master Tara Singh’s speeches and actions could be better understood in the light of this context. In any case, Caveeshar concluded that ‘the Delhi case and Masterji’s detention were doing more harm than good’.61 Sardar Patel’s response was prompt. He had explained his position regarding Master Tara Singh, he said, in a speech at Ambala and on the floor of the House. Master Tara Singh’s speeches were pretty bad as reported in the press; actually, they were much worse. They constituted a direct incitement to violence and to defiance of authority. Master Tara Singh’s attitude in regard to the holding of the Akali conference in Delhi was the climax of a studied attempt to defy the dictates of prudence and discretion. With regard to the formation of a Ministry in Patiala, Sardar Patel said that several chances were given to form a stable Ministry. ‘Even to the end, we were trying to persuade the Akalis to come in, but they would not, except on their own terms. We cannot place the power of veto in the hands of a minority.’ In the light of this letter, Sardar Patel hoped that Caveeshar would understand ‘our action better’ and (p.443) appreciate the reasons for it.62 The matter was closed for Sardar Patel. On 29 June 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru reminded Sardar Patel of their talk at Dehra Dun in which they had agreed that there was no particular point in keeping Golwalkar and Tara Singh in detention. They had also agreed that the ban on the RSS could be removed.63 The Statesman of 3 July 1949 wrote: ‘Many must recurrently in recent weeks have wondered how much longer Master Tara Singh will remain in jail.’ He was detained under the Bengal Regulation III of 1818 in February. Most of those arrested with him had now been set free. The importance of Master Tara Singh for the Sikhs was unquestionable and yet there was no violence that was anticipated by officialdom; this emphasized the capacity of the Sikhs for discipline and their inherent loyalty to the new India.64 C. Rajagopalachari, Governor General of India, enclosed this cutting from The Statesman with his letter to Sardar Patel on 3 July. He felt that Master Tara Singh should have been released much earlier. It should be done now. But it was left for Sardar Patel to decide’.65 Sardar Patel wrote back to Rajaji on 4 July: Nobody is more keen on his release than myself. Indeed it was most distasteful to me to place him behind the bars, but he asked for it and from what we know he is unrepentant and unchanged. I had hoped that after the principal Sikh demand was met he would be more sober. Giani Kartar Singh and two of Master Tara Singh’s lieutenants saw him shortly after this decision was taken. They found him adamant and unmoved. Recently two other Sikh leaders went and saw him and I enclose a gist of their interview Page 17 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab with him. The Sikh leaders themselves are apprehensive lest after his release matters might get worse. He is a fanatic and seems to suffer from some hallucination about the coming of Sikh Raj and you will notice that he even goes to the extent of saying that those who cannot reconcile themselves to the demands of the Sikhs in East Punjab, should clear out. At the same time, I realize that his detention cannot be permanent. I am watching this situation and you can rest assured that as soon as I am able to do so, I shall release him.66 Rajaji said that he had no doubt in his mind that Sardar Patel was as anxious to release Master Tara Singh as anybody else. The ‘general welfare’ was indeed more important than anything else. Therefore, Patel could do what he thought was the best.67 On 17 July 1949, Sardar Patel disclosed his real design to Jawaharlal Nehru. On the basis of a report received from the UP Government, Patel maintained that Master Tara Singh was insistent on his demands, particularly on the language question. He wanted the Punjab for the Sikhs and was prepared to use compulsion on the question of language. Even, otherwise, he was unrepentant. Our difficulty in regard to Master Tara Singh is that he is a fanatic and will not change. There is no doubt that he commands some influence among the Sikhs. We have been able to solve the Sikh problem in so far as their political demands are concerned. This, I think, was possible only because Master Tara Singh was not there to influence the Sikhs otherwise. I feel it would be a mistake and probably lead to trouble if we released him before the Sikh problem was settled. It is only when all these matters have been finally settled and we have taken an undertaking from the Sikh leaders that they have no other demands to make that it would be proper to release Master Tara Singh. We can then and only then take whatever risk is involved. Furthermore, both the outstanding questions of the language and Sikh representation in the services should be taken up together.68 (p.444) According to the report received from the UP Government, Sardar Ishar Singh Majhail and Colonel Raghbir Singh had an interview with Master Tara Singh in Almora Jail on 27 June 1949. Raghbir Singh asked Master Tara Singh to advise them what the Sikhs should do in the grave situation of the growing tension between Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab. Master Tara Singh mentioned three things: enforcement of Punjabi in the Punjab, seats reserved for the Sikhs as a minority community, and a certain percentage of seats for the Sikhs in government service. If the government created trouble over Sikh demands, the Sikhs would ‘like to be finished rather than surrender’. Master Tara Singh added that Nehru might yield to their request as he was a sensible Page 18 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab man but Sardar Patel would not agree as he was under the impression that ‘being in power he can crush anything’. Sardar Ishar Singh Majhail suggested that a sincere understanding between the government and Master Tara Singh could result in a suitable solution. Master Tara Singh replied that no settlement was possible until the government viewed the situation with ‘a liberal mind’. To Majhail’s observation that ‘many districts’ in the Punjab were not in favour of enforcing ‘the Punjabi language’, Master Tara Singh responded that those who did not like it could ‘go away to other places’.69 Master Tara Singh’s impression of his interview with Raghbir Singh and Ishar Singh Majhail in Almora Jail was very different. He refers to the interview in the context of growing disillusionment among the Sikhs about the bona fides of ‘Indian’ nationalism. The most important thing that they said to him was that every Hindu had become communal. Master Tara Singh felt gratified that the false posture of ‘nationalism’ was there no more.70 On 19 July 1949, Sardar Patel sent to Jawaharlal Nehru a copy of the report of an interview of Master Tara Singh’s son Jaswant Singh and Gurbakhsh Singh with Master Tara Singh in Almora Jail on 3 July 1949. It showed how Master Tara Singh’s mind was working.71 With reference to the earlier visit of Majhail and Raghbir Singh, Master Tara Singh had a message for the latter. Sardar Patel should have an open interview with him without any restrictions, or a limit of time, which should last for two days. Among several other things, Master Tara Singh expressed the view that there would be disorders in all the provinces of India due to the worsening situation under the Congress Government.72 On 28 August 1949, Sardar Patel wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru that the outstanding issues of language and the Services should be settled before Nehru’s scheduled visit to the UK, the USA, and Canada. To release Master Tara Singh before these issues were settled ‘would be too great a risk’. His case was much different from that of Golwalkar, who had ‘come round to our view in several particulars’ and who accepted ‘certain limitations’ for himself and the Sangh. But Master Tara Singh was not prepared to accept any limitations. ‘Once he is out of jail, he will be a thorn in the side not only of the government but of the Sikh leaders themselves. You know the ideas which Master Tara Singh is even now harbouring.’ Referring to a letter of Master Tara Singh to Colonel Raghbir Singh, which Sardar Patel had seen, Patel said that Master Tara Singh firmly believed that war with Pakistan was inevitable, that the Sikhs would return to West Punjab by force, that East Punjab was virtually a Sikh state, and that Punjabi was its only language. Above all, he believed in ‘the invincibility and integrity of the Panth’. He was most unlikely to recant. Therefore, the (p.445) only way to deal with his silly notions was to present him with ‘an accomplished fact’.73

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab In August there were press reports about a secret meeting of the Akali Dal in which it was decided to support Captain Dhillon in the by-election to a Labour seat. This was a surprise for Sardar Patel. He asked Sachar on 19 August to send for Giani Kartar Singh to ensure that the Akalis behaved in a straight manner and did not indulge in double-dealing. Patel asked Sachar to handle the situation ‘firmly and decisively’ in this matter.74 Sachar informed Patel on 24 August that Giani Kartar Singh had expressed his helplessness in influencing the Akali Dal. The Sikhs were aggrieved about the detention of Master Tara Singh and the language question.75 Sardar Patel had already written to Sardar Baldev Singh that if the Akali Dal was really inclined in favour of Captain Dhillon ‘our whole attitude to that organisation’ would have to be reconsidered. ‘If they want to suffer more, they can indulge in these harmful tactics.’ Patel expected Baldev Singh to ensure that the Akalis were guided by a straight policy and they adopted straightforward methods.76 Baldev Singh reported that he had tried to persuade the Akali leaders to support the Congress candidate in the by-election. They were feeling strongly that to support the Congress was to stab their leader in the back. Baldev Singh himself was no longer popular with the Akalis, but he proposed to handle them sympathetically. ‘The Sikhs as a whole are sentimental people’, he said, ‘and with a bit of sympathetic handling they can be persuaded to follow the right course.’77 Sardar Patel wrote to Sardar Baldev Singh on 25 August that the Sikhs could not ‘reasonably complain of lack of sympathy and consideration from us, particularly from myself’. But the whole point was that their minds were still concentrated on the extreme demands of men like Master Tara Singh. This extremism was ‘a challenge to constitutionalism and nationalism’. Patel talked of ‘constitutional inability’ of the Akalis ‘to see their path clearly’. They must cast their lot either with the Congress or with its opponents. The by-election was a test of their faith and their policy. If they were against the Congress, Patel saw ‘no reason why we should waste any more time in trying to win them over. We shall then have to alter our course accordingly’. Patel added that due to this reason more than anything else he would not take ‘any definite decision in regard to any of the outstanding matters with which the Akalis are concerned, unless, of course, they clarified their position’.78 Patel apparently wanted to intimidate the Akalis in the absence of Master Tara Singh. On 14 September 1949, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir sent a telegram to Sardar Patel: ‘Hearty Congratulations. Our candidate succeeds with overwhelming majority votes.’ The Congress candidate had got 2,191 votes against 447. Sardar Patel was ‘delighted’ and congratulated all the Congress workers. He sent his ‘sincerest thanks’ to Sardar Baldev Singh for his ‘untiring efforts’.79 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel that the stock of the Akali Dal was now rather low. It was desirable to release Master Tara Singh. The Sikh members of the Page 20 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Constituent Assembly had also pressed for Master Tara Singh’s release. His brother (presumably Niranjan Singh) had written to Nehru and also probably to Patel about his release.80 Sardar Patel wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on 17 September that there was no indication of the stock of the Akali Dal becoming low. Only the moderate Akalis had supported the Congress candidate. If Master Tara Singh (p.446) was released, the extremist Akalis would gain ground and the moderates would either surrender or become quiescent. There was ‘no change whatsoever’ in Master Tara Singh’s attitude. He was ‘as militant and fanatical as before’. There was always a tendency in the ‘Sikh mentality’ to listen to ‘extreme communalism’. If Master Tara Singh was released, the process of settlement of the Sikh issue by peaceful negotiations would be very seriously jeopardized. He would once again ‘inflame Sikh opinion’ and there would be a serious problem with the supporters of Master Tara Singh.81 Sardar Patel appears to have realized that Master Tara Singh was the most influential leader of the Sikhs.

Demand for a Punjabi-Speaking State In his letter to the Premiers as the Acting Prime Minister of India during Jawaharlal Nehru’s trip abroad, Sardar Patel wrote among many other things that they might be feeling somewhat concerned over the latest utterances of Master Tara Singh, ‘but I should like you to appraise those speeches in the light of some healthy developments in the Sikh situation’. The political question of safeguards for the Sikhs had met satisfactory disposal and the language controversy had been settled. Consequently, the sting had been taken out of ‘fanatics whom Master Tara Singh might be taken to lead’. The Sikhs had realized now that they had ‘everything to lose and practically nothing to gain by persisting in their extreme demands’. This realization had been prompted partly by the firm action ‘which we took last February when Master Tara Singh indulged in open defiance of law and authority’ and partly by ‘the spirit of accommodation’. Master Tara Singh himself appeared to have realized ‘the need for gradually returning to sanity and sobriety’. His activities required some vigilance, but there was no occasion for any serious misgivings.82 For evidence of change in Master Tara Singh’s attitude, Sardar Patel referred to his ‘somewhat apologetic stand’ at Agra which contrasted with his ‘fire-eating performance’ at Amritsar. Master Tara Singh had addressed a conference of the UP Sikhs at Agra. Even there, he had warned Sardar Patel that he would smilingly face all hardships but never allow the standard of the Panth to be lowered. ‘My head can be cut off’, he said, ‘but it cannot bow.’83 He made another statement to the effect that every minority, except the Sikhs, had been given justice. The Muslims demanded Pakistan and they got it. The Scheduled Castes wanted representation on population basis with the right to contest

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab additional seats and they got it. But when the Sikhs demanded that they should not be dominated by another community, they were kicked.84 In reaction to the insistence of the Hindu leaders of the Punjabi zone that their mother tongue was Hindi, Master Tara Singh stated that the Sikhs had a culture very different from that of the Hindus. Their traditions and history were different. Their heroes were different, and their social orders were different. There was no reason why the Sikhs should not claim ‘the right of selfdetermination for themselves’.85 Thus, there were no signs of Master Tara Singh having changed his basic position. Already in September 1949, Master Tara Singh had directed Sardar Hukam Singh from the jail to send a memorial to Dr Rajendra Prasad, President of the Constituent Assembly, asking for a commission to be appointed for demarcation of a linguistic (p.447) state on the basis of Punjabi.86 By this time it was clear that no political safeguards for the Sikhs were incorporated in the Constitution. The only option before Master Tara Singh was a linguistic state. The idea of a Punjabi-speaking state was not new. In 1948, Bawa Harkishan Singh had published a pamphlet called A Plea for a Punjabi-Speaking Province for the public in general and the members of the Constituent Assembly in particular. He pointed out that six of the fifteen districts of East Punjab were overwhelmingly Punjabi-speaking: Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, and Firozpur. On the authority of George Grierson, the Kangra district (in which Western Pahari was spoken as a dialect of Punjabi) was clearly Punjabi-speaking. After the influx of Hindus and Sikhs from the western districts to East Punjab, only Gurgaon and Rohtak remained Hindi-speaking districts.87 Bawa Harkishan Singh refers to the constitution adopted by the Indian National Congress at Nagpur in 1920 which provided for twenty-five provinces in British India mainly based on language. The report of the Nehru Committee submitted to the All-Parties Conference on 10 August 1928 recognized the desirability of reorganizing provinces on the basis of language which corresponded with ‘a special variety of culture, of tradition and literature’. The election manifesto of the Congress in 1945–6 assured the people that linguistic areas in India shall be constituted, as far as possible, on linguistic and cultural basis. The Constituent Assembly of India set up a Commission to report on the reconstitution of provinces on linguistic basis. Subsequently, however, some persons in authority suggested that the matter might well be postponed for a decade. In their view, the formation of provinces on linguistic basis could give ‘a fillip to provincialism as opposed to nationalism’. Bawa Harkishan Singh did not agree with this view. Immediate redistribution of provinces on linguistic basis was an imperative necessity in fact ‘to check provincialism as opposed to nationalism’.88

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Bawa Harkishan Singh stated that Punjabi was one of the main languages of India. It was the oldest of the Indo-Aryan group of languages. He quotes to this effect the report of the Punjab University Enquiry Committee of 1932 in which it was claimed that there were more literary works in Punjabi than in any other Indo-Aryan language. It had its own grammar, its own idiom, its own peculiarities of a phonetic system and its own literature. Punjabi had a cluster of dialects. Two of its dialects were important for Grierson: Western Pahari and Lehnda. The language controversy in the Punjab had been created by the insistence of Hindus and Muslims to return Hindi or Urdu as their mother tongue. Bawa Harkishan Singh goes on to meet all the superficial objections raised against the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. It was clear that the demand was ‘perfectly legitimate and national’. In fact, it was being opposed on ‘communal’ considerations’.89 In the end, Bawa Harkishan Singh underscored that if reconstitution of provinces on linguistic basis had any justification in any part of India, it had ‘that justification in the case of the East Punjab’. This alone could produce ‘harmony and goodwill among the people’. In his view the demand for the reconstitution of East Punjab on a linguistic basis was sound, feasible, and urgent.90 It may be noted that Bawa Harkishan Singh does not think in terms of percentages of population. The reorganized Punjab visualized by him would still have a clear Hindu majority. His (p.448) criterion was solely the Punjabi language, shorn of all political considerations. In the tense communal situation in the Punjab, the East Punjab Ministry appointed a Minority Committee early in November 1948. All the Sikh members of the assembly except Kairon drew up a charter of thirteen demands on 15 November. These demands included representation of the Sikhs in the province on the basis of the 1941 census, 5 per cent representation in the Central Cabinet, with one Minister and one Deputy Minister, the Governor and the Premier of the province to be alternately a Hindu and a Sikh, 50 per cent representation for the Sikhs in the Provincial Cabinet, 40 per cent of the services to be reserved for the Sikhs, and separation of the Gurgaon district and the Loharu State from East Punjab. Finally, if all their demands were rejected, ‘the Sikhs should be allowed to form a new Province of 7 districts’: Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Firozpur, Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Ambala. Sarhadi mentions elsewhere that this last demand was added to the charter ‘at the instance of Master Tara Singh’.91 In the Ajīt of 27 November 1949, Master Tara Singh referred to the letter he had written to Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel from jail for the creation of a Punjabi linguistic state and said that this state would consist of seven to nine districts of the East Punjab. ‘This will be a province based on language alone.’ It could be called ‘Punjabi Suba’. It would also have joint electorate, supposed to be the hallmark of nationalism. With reference to the argument that if such a Page 23 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Punjabi province was created the Sikhs would have to get out of the rest of the country, Master Tara Singh said that whereas Muslims were still living in India even though Pakistan had been created as an independent state, the Sikhs were threatened with eviction from the rest of the country for demanding a state within the country.92 Master Tara Singh clarified his position further in the Sant Sipāhī of December 1949. A Punjabi-speaking province, he said, was the best way of ensuring independent existence of the Sikhs. When this demand began to gain popularity, some Hindu leaders and newspapers started saying that Punjabi was spoken even in Meerut and Saharanpur. The Shiromani Akali Dal clarified that their objective was to have a province with a large concentration of the Sikhs to reduce Hindu domination in the provincial assembly. On this clarification, the Hindus press began to allege that the Akalis were demanding a ‘Sikh Suba’. Master Tara Singh wanted this province to have internal autonomy, because in the Indian Constitution the provinces were little more than ‘large district boards’. Autonomy was desirable for other provinces as well. Whether Punjabi Suba was ‘communal’ or ‘national’, its essential purpose was to free the Sikhs from Hindu domination in the assembly. He added: ‘I have not met a single Hindu in the Punjab who is not communal but who does not claim to be a nationalist.’ Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs to be saved from this rank Hindu communalism.93 To meet the lame argument of those who said that dominance at the Centre would remain even if Punjabi Suba was created, Master Tara Singh said that the burden of one bundle over one’s head was always less than that of two bundles. Moreover, he favoured the idea of reduction in the Central ‘burden’. The Sikhs had decided to live in freedom for the sake of dharam, culture, Panth, and keeping the standard of their Guru aloft. Threats, taunts, and chicanery would be of no use.94 (p.449) All other minorities of the Indian subcontinent had either got what they wanted or they were given what they wanted: Muslims, Scheduled Castes, and Anglo-Indians. The Sikhs were an exception. Their demand for an autonomous province within India was not being conceded. The Hindus and the Congress had supported this demand before Independence but now they were opposed to it. Master Tara Singh was not opposed to ‘nationalism’ but he was not prepared to agree that the Hindus were truly nationalist. Since the majority could impose its domination, communalism of the majority was far more dangerous than any other. Since the majority possessed the sword, the minority must have a shield. The hollowness of the secular state was evident from the fact that the minorities were asked to win the confidence of the majority.95

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab Finally, Master Tara Singh emphasized that his basic objective was internal autonomy of the Sikhs irrespective of the specificities to ensure this. If not Punjabi Suba, then there could be some other way. Surely there was no infringement of nationalism in this demand. The Soviet Union had given internal autonomy to its constituent units, and also the right to secede. ‘But who would like to weaken the unit by secession if there was internal autonomy?’96 At a press conference in Bombay on 1 January 1950, Sardar Hukam Singh, President of the Akali Dal said: ‘The demand for the reconstitution of the Punjab on a linguistic basis, through an impartial agency sponsored by the Shiromani Akali Dal, is the only means for the preservation of the Punjabi culture and language.’ It was perfectly democratic, he said, and there was nothing communal about this demand. It would give ‘the sense of freedom’ promised by Jawaharlal Nehru in August 1945. An aggressive communal consciousness had led the Hindus of the Punjab to disown their mother tongue and to denounce a democratic demand. The policy of deliberate discrimination against the Sikhs was the outcome of an ‘irrational outlook’. The stand of the Akali Dal was ‘purely national’ ‘We do not want a separate state, much less an independent one.’ Readjustment of boundaries on linguistic and cultural basis should not be decried as communal. It was a dishonesty to misrepresent the Sikhs.97 Thus, before the formal adoption of the Constitution on 26 January 1950, the Akalis had taken up the idea of ‘Punjabi Suba’ as a unilingual Punjabi state.

In Retrospect Master Tara Singh’s primary concern in the early months of Independence was evacuation of Sikhs and Hindus from Pakistan and their resettlement in India. He subscribed to the idea of exchange of population and regarded the ‘refugees’ as citizens of India. They were entitled to full compensation for the loss of their property. He wanted the Government of the Indian Union to come to an understanding with the Government of Pakistan about the exchange of population and property. Since this was not done, Master Tara Singh began to criticize the Government of India. Differences with the Congress Government in political matters began to emerge in 1948. In September 1947, Master Tara Singh had to clarify that he did not subscribe to the idea of a Sikh state. In March 1948, the Akali legislators were allowed by the Akali Dal Working Committee to join the Congress Party in the legislatures. However, Master Tara Singh underscored that it was (p.450) absolutely essential for the Sikhs to preserve their autonomous identity in religious, social, and political matters. He also underlined that to join the Congress now was to deny the existence of the Sikhs as a collective entity. He was opposed to the Congress because it was atomizing the Panth to make it politically irrelevant.

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab In October 1948, the Shiromani Akali Dal made it clear that the most effective and prized safeguard for a minority was the right to choose its own representatives. ‘What touches us most must be approved by us.’ Given the attitude of the majority community towards the Sikhs, joint electorates could be exploited ‘to kill their identity’. Therefore, they demanded that separate electorates should be retained at least for ten years. In November, Master Tara Singh emphasized that the remedy for the mutual distrust of Hindus and Sikhs was ‘a sort of an equal partnership’ in which there was no domination of any community. The Minority Committee appointed by the East Punjab Government suggested as a last resort that a new ‘province’ of seven districts should be formed. Master Tara Singh was unhappy about the control of the pro-Congress Akalis over the SGPC. Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke was elected its President on 28 May 1948 with the support of the members under the influence of the East Punjab Government and the Maharaja of Patiala who was working in tandem with Sardar Patel. Under their ‘political influence’ the SGPC was making a clear distinction between politics and religion and pursuing only religious and social programme. No political issue was to be discussed in gurdwaras. Master Tara Singh pointed out that a government which claimed to be ‘secular’ was directly interfering in the ‘religious’ institutions of the Sikhs. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel took serious view of the ‘open challenges’ of Master Tara Singh. In his presidential address read at the Delhi dīwān on 20 February 1949, Master Tara Singh emphasized that the root of all demands and all principles for the Sikhs was to have political power. This fundamental principle could not be compromised. The Akalis were opposed to the Congress because it had attacked the ‘political independence and identity’ of the Sikhs. The ministry in Pepsu, for Master Tara Singh, was virtually a ministry of Sardar Patel. Master Tara Singh expressed his profound faith in the ultimate success of the Khalsa Panth. He invoked the Sikh past: no Mughal or Afghan ruler had been able to suppress the Panth in the past and no enemy of the Panth would be able to suppress it in the future. Sardar Patel was determined to have his own way. He kept Master Tara Singh in jail for about eight months as a political prisoner under the Bengal Regulation III of 1818, which did not allow any legal intervention. Protest meetings, conventions, and editorials against his detention were ignored. Despite appeals made by persons like Sardul Singh Caveeshar and Niranjan Singh, and suggestions from Governor General Rajagopalachari and Prime Minister Nehru, Sardar Patel refused to relent. In July 1949, he disclosed his design to Nehru that Master Tara Singh was kept in detention to settle all the major issues related to the Sikhs. He was not to be allowed to exercise his tremendous influence on the Sikhs in matters of serious concern for them: the issues of language and Services. Patel wanted to present Master Tara Singh with ‘an Page 26 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab accomplished fact’. Master Tara Singh looked upon the Delhi dīwān as ‘a turning point’ in his popularity as a Sikh leader. Notes:

(1.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, in Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, ed. Jaswant Singh (Amritsar, 1972), p. 203. (2.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, p. 210. (3.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 144. (4.) Raghuvendra Tanwar, Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and Other Opinion (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p. 339. (5.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1972), vol. IV, p. 314. (6.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1973), vol. VI, pp. 215–17. (7.) Verinder Grover (ed.), Master Tara Singh (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), Appendix XL, pp. 510–11. A few months later this speech was regarded as undesirable but ignored. The apparently anti-Muslim and antiPakistan stance of some of the Sikh leaders was actually linked intimately with their concern for rehabilitation. (8.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 362. (9.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 367. (10.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 381. (11.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 435. (12.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, p. 347. (13.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IV, p. 291. (14.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, pp. 419–20. (15.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, pp. 507–8. (16.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, pp. 505–6, 552–4. (17.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, pp. 569–73. (18.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 575.

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab (19.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, p. 578. (20.) Tanwar, Reporting the Partition, pp. 584–5. (21.) Master Tara Singh, Sant Sipāhī (Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, ed. Jaswant Singh), p. 219. (22.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 219–20. (23.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 220–2. (24.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī (Amritsar: Manjit Singh, n.d.), pp. 33–5. (25.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 35–7. (26.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 38–9. (27.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 39–42. (28.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 42–4. (29.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 44–8. (30.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 48–9. (31.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 49–51. (32.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 52–4. (33.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 57–63. (34.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, p. 67. (35.) Master Tara Singh, Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 67–70. (36.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 211. (37.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur & Sons, 1970), pp. 164–5. (38.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 170–1. (39.) Shamsher Singh Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (1920–1976) (Amritsar: SGPC, 1982), p. 244. (40.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, p. 248. (41.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 222–3. Page 28 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab (42.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VI, pp. 349–50. (43.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VI, pp. 351–3. (44.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VI, pp. 353–4. (45.) Quoted, Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 170. (46.) Quoted, Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 169. (47.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX (1974), pp. 120–1. (48.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 116. (49.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 117–19. (50.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 121–3. (51.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 223–4. (52.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 172–3. (53.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 173–5. (54.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 236–7. (55.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 237. (56.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 237–8. (57.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 238–9. (58.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 175. Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 226. Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 158–9. (59.) Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās, pp. 255–6. (60.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 179. (61.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 127–30. (62.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 130–1. (63.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 247. (64.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 142. (65.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 141. (66.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, pp. 279–80. Page 29 of 31

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab (67.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 280. (68.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 145–7. (69.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 147–8. (70.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 241–2. (71.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 151–3. (72.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 147–8. (73.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 337. (74.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 158. (75.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 159. (76.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 160. (77.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 160–1. (78.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 162–4. (79.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 164–6. (80.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 166–7. (81.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 166–70. (82.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, p. 402. (83.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 165–6. (84.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 190. (85.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 193–4. (86.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 198. (87.) Bawa Harkishan Singh, A Plea for a Punjabi-Speaking Province (Qadian, 1948), pp. 1–4. (88.) Bawa Harkishan Singh, A Plea, pp. 20–4. (89.) Bawa Harkishan Singh, A Plea, pp. 25–42. (90.) Bawa Harkishan Singh, A Plea, pp. 43–7. (91.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 198.

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Emergence of the Demand for Territorial Reorganization of East Punjab (92.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 199–200. (93.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 229–31. (94.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 231–3. (95.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 233–4. (96.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 234–5. (97.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 203–4.

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ (1950–2) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0019

Abstract and Keywords With no political safeguards in the Indian Constitution, Master Tara Singh was convinced that ‘Punjabi Suba’ was the only alternative left for the Sikhs. In March 1950, he asked the Akali legislators to resign from the Congress legislative party. On Sardar Patel’s bidding, Baldev Singh managed to persuade the Akali legislators not to resign. In September 1951, Nehru declared an all-out war on what he termed ‘communalism’. In January 1952, he declared that he would use the might of the Indian state to suppress the demand for a Punjabispeaking state. He felt gratified that the Congress had ‘curbed Sikh and Hindu Communalism’ in the general elections of 1952. Sardar Hukam Singh, President of the Akali Dal, attributed its defeat to the division between the Sikhs and the Hindus ‘engineered’ by the Congress. Formation of the Punjabi-speaking province, he said, was ‘the most fundamental demand of the Sikhs’. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Indian Constitution, ‘Punjabi Suba’, Congress legislative party, Sardar Patel, Baldev Singh, Nehru, communalism, general elections of 1952, Sardar Hukam Singh

Between the adoption of the new Constitution in January 1950 and the first general elections in February 1952, Nehru became the unchallenged leader of the Congress and the Congress Government at the Centre. Central intervention in the legislative, ministerial, and administrative matters in the Punjab continued as before. Imposition of Governor’s rule in June 1951 to ensure Congress’ victory in the general elections and the unceremonious dismissal of Page 1 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Sardar Kapur Singh of the Indian Civil Service were the two most glaring examples of intervention. The period was marked by discord between Hindus and Sikhs, and among the Akalis. If anything, antagonism between Master Tara Singh as the leader of the Akalis and Nehru as the Congress Prime Minister was intensified with ‘Punjabi Suba’ emerging as the basic demand of the Akalis. The results of the elections of 1952 were seen by Nehru as an affirmation of his policies, and by Master Tara Singh as a support for the demand for Punjabi Suba by the majority of the Sikhs. The years 1950–1 provide the background for a long drawn out struggle for Punjabi Suba.

Government and Administration in East Punjab The struggle between Jawaharlal Nehru and the right wing of the Congress Party came to a head in August 1950 over the election of the Party President. It involved matters of policy as well as ideology. It was important also because the new office-bearers of the Party were expected to play a decisive role in the nomination of the Party candidates in the general elections. There were two main contenders for Presidentship: J.B. Kriplani, (p.454) supported by Nehru, and Purshottamdas Tandon, supported by Patel. In the election on 29 August 1950, Tandon got 1,306 votes and Kriplani 1,092. As expected, Tandon packed the Working Committee and the Central Election Committee with his own men. Sardar Patel died on 15 December 1950. On 6 August 1951, Nehru resigned from the Working Committee, asking Congressmen to choose his viewpoint and outlook or that of Tandon. Instead of accepting Nehru’s resignation, Tandon himself resigned and the AICC accepted his resignation on 8 September, electing Nehru himself as President. He emerged as the unchallenged leader of the Congress Party and the government.1 On the advice of the Chief Minister, Gopi Chand Bhargava, the Punjab Governor, C.M. Trivedi, appointed Giani Kartar Singh as a Minister in place of Sardar Narotam Singh. Bhargava had assured Trivedi that he had got Sardar Patel’s approval for including Giani Kartar Singh in the Cabinet, and that Giani Kartar Singh was acceptable to the other Sikh groups in the assembly: the Nagoke group and the Congressite Sikhs. It was not quite clear to Sardar Patel whether or not Bhargava had taken into confidence the two groups of Sikh members of the Assembly. He asked Bhargava to explain exactly how he came to include Giani Kartar Singh in the Council of Ministers.2 In June 1950, Sardar Patel wrote to Bhargava that C.D. Deshmukh should be nominated to the Parliament from the Punjab in place of Jairamdas. Bhargava called a meeting of the Congress Assembly Party in which the general consensus was in favour of a Punjabi for nominations. Among the persons suggested as possible candidates was Lala Jagat Narain. Though General Secretary of the Punjab State Congress Committee, he used to write against the Congress Government in ‘a very rabid language’. Bhargava was in favour of Lala Avtar Narain Gujral, an advocate from Jhelum. Sardar Patel explained why they had Page 2 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ thought of the Punjab getting Deshmukh nominated. Jairamdas’s nomination had created a precedent in the Punjab which was not there in any other states. Therefore, it was easier to get Deshmukh nominated from the Punjab. Patel said to Bhargava: ‘I do not see why your friends in the Punjab have suddenly shown so much anxiety to secure representation of Punjabis in Parliament.’ He told Bhargava to secure Deshmukh’s nomination. On 1 July 1950, Sardar Patel received a telegram from Bhargava: ‘Working Committee of State Congress Committee and Executive Committee Congress Legislative Party unanimously nominate Shri Deshmukh for membership of Parliament.’3 The leaders of the Punjab Congress virtually obeyed the orders of the Deputy Prime Minister. Sardar Patel wrote to Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon on 7 September 1950 that he was happy over the satisfactory arrangements formed after his discussions with Bhargava and Kairon with regard to the Congress set-up in the Punjab. For these arrangements to function smoothly, it was essential now for Kairon to have close consultation and accord with Gopi Chand, particularly in the matter of nominations to the Working Committee. In case there was any difficulty, the ‘services’ of Patel would be at the disposal of both Kairon and Bhargava.4 Kairon wrote to Sardar Patel on 15 October 1950 that he had announced twenty-one names of the members of the Working Committee but not of the remaining four because Jagat Narain wanted to discuss with Sardar Patel whether or not Giani Kartar Singh was to be included. Bhargava wrote to Sardar Patel a few days later that the names (p.455) announced by Kairon included all those names to which Bhargava had objected. He was doubtful ‘whether it would be advisable for me to try this experiment’.5 Seth Sudarshan, who had met Sardar Patel, told Bhargava that he could go ahead with announcing the names of Parliamentary Secretaries. But Sardar Patel told Bhargava not to announce the names. In such matters, opinions were not taken through intermediaries but by personal discussion. Sardar Patel was sorry that some difficulties had cropped up between Bhargava and Kairon. The best course now was to discuss the whole question and decide matters finally and once and for all by a meeting of Bhargava, Karion, and Jagat Narain with Sardar Patel.6 The role of a mediator or an arbitrator was assumed by Sardar Patel as a matter of course. On 13 October 1950, five out of the eight Dalit legislators of the Punjab made a representation to the President, Congress Central Parliamentary Board, that they might be allowed to elect their representative on the Cabinet in place of Prithvi Singh Azad, who had been included in the Cabinet in the reshuffle of April 1949 because of the ‘order’ of the Central Advisory Board that one of the Ministers should be a Dalit who enjoyed the confidence of the majority of Dalit legislators. Sardar Patel sent a copy of this letter to Bhargava with the remark that he could very well imagine the intrigues behind it. He should prevent any division in his ranks, or in the ranks of the Dalits, ‘in the interests of Hindu Page 3 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ community of the province’. Such divisions, particularly near the time of elections, would be fully exploited by ‘interested parties’. Therefore, he should send for the signatories ‘to scotch the intrigue’ and to tell them that such divisions would be bad for the Dalit cause. All Dalits should unite and ‘face the electorate with one voice’.7 It is interesting to note that Sardar Patel, as President of the Central Parliamentary Board, poses to be a champion of Hindu community, including the Dalits. In November 1950, Sardar Sant Parkash Singh, Inspector General of Police, had applied for six months’ leave and his successor was to be appointed. The seniormost Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police was Halliday, a European. Next to him was Lal, who was sent back to Delhi due to his doubtful activities. Next to Lal was Gurdial Singh, DIG, CID, whom Bhargava wanted to promote. He wrote to Patel: ‘You know there is a Sikh problem in our State. The elections are to be held soon. I want that such a person be in this post who understands my mind and would work as I want him to do.’ Sardar Patel referred to the letter of the Governor Trivedi in support of Halliday and told Bhargava that ‘the best course, in keeping with the practice and normal expectation of service in these matters, would be to appoint Halliday as IGP during the absence of Sardar Sant Parkash Singh’.8 The gulf between the Ministry and the Punjab Congress went on increasing in 1951. In a note of 11 April 1951 in the AICC Papers in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, it is noted that there had been deterioration in the situation of the Punjab. There was a good deal of communal friction. The law and order situation was not good and the Provincial Congress was opposed to the Ministry. To continue the Ministry was undesirable. The other extreme was to have no Ministry and to have Governor’s rule. That extreme too had to be avoided. The only feasible way was to reconstitute the Bhargava Ministry so as to lessen the gap between the Congress organization and the Ministry, to keep the two Sikh (p.456) groups, the Giani and the Nagoke, associated with the Ministry, and to bring about harmony between the Sikhs and the Hindus in the province.9 An editorial in The Tribune of 5 May 1951 referred to the conflicts between the Pradesh Congress and the Legislative Party in the Punjab taking the most unpredictable turn. The group led by Partap Singh Kairon and Bhim Sen Sachar charged the government of maladministration, condemned the prevalence of bribery and corruption in the state, and alleged that 90 per cent of officers were corrupt. The Bhargava Ministry had mishandled the census operations. On 13 May 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke that the state of affairs in the Punjab was deteriorating and there was no sense of discipline or cooperative effort. ‘Some rather radical steps will have to be taken to meet this situation.’10

Page 4 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ On 11 June 1951, the Parliamentary Board decided that Bhargava should resign and in order to prevent internal conflicts in the Congress before the forthcoming general elections, no Congress Government should function in the East Punjab until the elections were over. On 13 June, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Congress President, Purushottamdas Tandon, that Gopi Chand was again being led astray by some of his colleagues and advisers. He was delaying matters by asking for reconsideration. Nehru suggested that Tandon could tell Gopi Chand not to delay in carrying out his directive.11 On 15 June, Nehru explained to Rajendra Prasad the situation in which the Parliamentary Board had communicated its directive to Bhargava, and how it would become necessary for the President to issue a proclamation under Article 356.12 Bhargava resigned on 16 June 1951. On 18 June, Rajendra Prasad approved of a proclamation for the Punjab though he ‘intensely disliked’ suspending of the normal working of the Constitution. Such a situation was bad enough in all circumstances but the way the Emergency had been brought about made it much worse. Bhargava still enjoyed the support of the majority in the assembly when he was directed to resign in the interest apparently of the Congress, particularly in view of the elections. Governor’s rule was imposed on the Punjab on 20 June 1951. On 21 June, Jawaharlal Nehru explained to Rajendra Prasad that the Parliamentary Board had explored all possibilities short of Governor’s rule. The Chief Minister had become merely a nominal leader of the Party which he could neither control nor influence much. The choice before the Parliamentary Board was to allow the situation to deteriorate till it became uncontrollable or to ask the Chief Minister to resign.13 On 20 June 1951, C.M. Trivedi took charge of East Punjab under Article 356. On 24 June, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Trivedi with reference to his letters of 16, 17, and 20 June. It was certainly possible to criticize the action taken in the Punjab from the democratic point of view, he said, but this action was necessary in order to stop the progressive deterioration. There would a marked improvement now in the administration, greater discipline, and less communalism. Nehru was keen that all the important Bills for the Punjab should be passed in Delhi. In another letter of the same date Nehru wrote that he was quite sure that there would be rapid improvement in the Punjab. Its politics needed to be taken out of the old ruts. He added: ‘I think we need not appoint any advisers, official or non-official, for the present.’14 Governor Trivedi was expected to do what Chief Minister Bhargava had not been able to do during his two terms. (p.457) However, a resentful Bhargava alleged that the High Command had taken a partisan view of the whole affair because Bhargava did not belong to the majority faction in the High Command. ‘After the sad demise of Sardar Patel, it was found easier to drive away all those out of the Congress who were taken to Page 5 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ be of Sardar Patel’s group.’15 Thakur Das Bhargava, Gopi Chand’s brother and a Member of Parliament (MP) from the Punjab, remarked with reference to the mediating role of Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad among the Punjab Ministers that this system was responsible for all factionalism and bickering. ‘All the people of the Punjab, Hindus and Sikhs, feel that there is no responsible government in the Punjab.’16 Finally, we may refer briefly to the sad episode of Sardar Kapur Singh. Ajit Singh Sarhadi refers to a confidential letter circulated by the Punjab Government among all Magistrates, dubbing the Sikhs as criminals. Before the end of 1949, it created a stir among the Sikhs. It was supposed to have been endorsed by Sardar Swaran Singh as the Home Minister.17 Sardar Kapur Singh gives more specific information about this letter. Like all other Deputy Commissioners of the Punjab, he received a ‘confidential communication’ in the form of a policy letter, dated 10 October 1947, informing them that the Sikhs, as a community, were a lawless people and a menace to the law-abiding Hindus in the province; it called upon the Deputy Commissioners to take special measures against the Sikhs. It was gratuitously suggested that the motive for lawlessness was their desire for women and loot. It was rumoured that this policy letter had been issued by the Home Secretary under direct orders from the Governor, over the head of the Home Minister who happened to be a Sikh, and without even discussing this policy at the Cabinet level.18 In response to the letter of 10 October 1947, Sardar Kapur Singh wrote that lawlessness was not confined to a single community, not in the Kangra district in any case. In fact, it was necessary to take action against certain Hindu leaders and officers. Kapur Singh was transferred from Kangra to Hoshiarpur in February 1948. The tussle between him and the Congress leaders and Ministers continued over certain cases of law and order. In February 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Punjab Government against Kapur Singh. Sardar Patel had already indicated that an example should be made of Kapur Singh ‘for offering Master Tara Singh a cup of tea at Hoshiarpur in 1948’. On 12 April 1949, Kapur Singh took leave for four months. This was the day on which no-confidence vote was passed against the Ministry of Gopi Chand Bhargava. On the night of 13–14 April, orders of Bhargava under the signatures of the Chief Secretary were delivered to Kapur Singh at his residence after midnight, suspending him from the Indian Civil Service.19 On 5 May 1950, Sardar Kapur Singh made a representation to the President of India. With reference to this representation, Sardar Patel wrote to Bhargava on 4 June 1950 that Kapur Singh was suspended without ‘any charges being framed more than a year ago and even by this time it appears that no regular enquiry has been started’. This was ‘unsatisfactory’. Patel underlined ‘the importance of completing investigations and enquiry quickly’.20 It is important to note that

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Sardar Patel ignored the fact that no ‘preliminary enquiry’ had been held and no prima facie case for departmental enquiry had been made out. Bhargava responded to Patel’s letter on 21 June. He confirmed that Kapur Singh was (p.458) suspended in April 1949 after Bhargava ‘had resigned but had not handed over the charge’. Kapur Singh was suspended ‘after consultation with the Governor’ and he was supplied with ‘a copy of the charge sheet’. The case had been sent to the Chief Justice for holding an enquiry under the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850. Bhargava ended his letter with the assurance that ‘the hearing probably begins from 22 June’.21 The Chief Justice who conducted the enquiry in the case of Sardar Kapur Singh was no ordinary judge. He was an Englishman and the Constitution of India had been amended to appoint him as a Judge of the Supreme Court in accordance with the notification of the Ministry of Law, dated 2 September 1950.22 The Judge appointed on the basis of this amendment was Eric Weston. It is interesting to note that C.N. Chatterji, an eminent lawyer of India, who was defending Master Tara Singh in the conspiracy case brought against him by the government, looked upon the Hon’ble Chief Justice Eric Weston as a stooge of Sardar Patel, appointed specifically to take care of Kapur Singh’s case.23 Justice Weston submitted his report within six months. He held Kapur Singh guilty of dishonesty because he did not obtain receipts for the amount of Rs 10,000 which he had received from some sabhās and societies and disbursed among refugees. Actually, this discretion had been given to all Deputy Commissioners, but the Government of India accepted this report and dismissed Sardar Kapur Singh without pension or any other benefit after fourteen years of service. Weston was needed no more. The ordinance issued by the President of India to make Eric Weston’s exceptional appointment possible was not presented to the Parliament within six months. In compensation as it were, the Government of India wrote to the British Government that this English Judge had performed great service in public interest. He was recommended for knighthood. Eric Weston became ‘Sir Eric Weston’. His public service consisted almost exclusively of the enquiry he had conducted. He knew that Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru simply did not want to keep Kapur Singh in the ICS and he was willing to help them.24 Sardar Kapur Singh had no doubt about the hostility of Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru towards him. There is a possibility that they were misinformed by all sorts of people. There is a certainty that lawyers, judges, and political leaders were hesitant to help Kapur Singh when they came to know that Nehru and Patel were hostile towards him. Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India, once met the President of India and talked to him about Kapur Singh. ‘We also wanted to set him right’, he said, ‘but he gave no chance because he was honest and always worked within the legal bounds.’ The Page 7 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ President said, ‘Yes, we also know that he is innocent but he is haughty in his general attitude.’ The word used by the President for ‘but’ was ‘prantū’, and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan wanted to know from Kapur Singh what it meant? He said, ‘Raja Sahib, in our country these days the person who incurs the wrath of Pandit Nehru or Sardar Patel is called prantū’. Sardar Kapur Singh’s strong sense of self-respect made him the object of their wrath. Another reason is suggested by Sardar Kapur Singh himself: false and exaggerated reports of a conspiracy hatched by Master Tara Singh and Sardar Kapur Singh to launch an armed revolution to establish Sikh Raj.25 In short, Sardar Kapur Singh was highly suspect in the eyes of Nehru and Patel, (p.459) like Master Tara Singh, with whom he had a long association.

The Growing Discords A Panthic Conference was held at Ludhiana on 26 March 1950. In his presidential address, Sardar Hukam Singh traced the history of Sikh relations with the Congress and the support given by the Sikhs to the Congress in a critical period. The promises and assurances given by the Congress to the Sikh leaders were now being ignored on the plea that conditions in the country had changed. But the Sikhs were a minority in the Punjab where the communal mentality of the majority had taken up ‘the garb of nationalism’. The position of the Sikhs was actually worse now. They were supported earlier by the Hindus against Muslim domination but now they had to protect themselves against Hindu domination. ‘The Hindus are refusing a rightful place to Punjabi, even in the Punjab.’ Hukam Singh urged that since the Congress had accepted the principle of linguistic states, it should act upon it.26 The former Akali leaders who were now in the Congress, like Giani Kartar Singh and Ishar Singh Majhail, had begun to make public statements against the demand for a linguistic state. Master Tara Singh had no other issue to pursue. The by-election for the Zira constituency, where an election petition against the Akali candidate, Sardar Ratan Singh of Lohgarh, had been accepted, determined Master Tara Singh’s programme. The Working Committee of the Akali Dal resolved that if the Congress contested the by-election the Akali legislators who had been allowed to join the Congress Party in March 1948 should be asked to come out of the Congress and support the Akali candidate. If the Congress did not contest, the matter of withdrawal from the Congress was to be reconsidered for a final decision. The Congress did not put up its own candidate but openly opposed Sardar Ratan Singh. After the by-election, which was won by the Akali candidate, a meeting of the Working Committee of the Akali Dal was announced. Giani Kartar Singh, who had worked for the Akali candidate, tried to persuade the members not to confirm the earlier resolution. Sardar Baldev Singh also tried to persuade them. But the Working Committee reaffirmed its resolution.27 Early in July 1950, the Shiromani Akali Dal decided to send a notice to the Panthic legislators to leave the Congress. The legislators met at Ambala and set up a committee of five, with Sardar Baldev Singh as its president, to persuade Page 8 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ the Akali Dal not to issue the directive. But the directive was issued. Only one legislator, Jaswant Singh Duggal, resigned from the Congress Legislative Party.28 Gopi Chand had written to Sardar Patel on 14 March 1950 that the activities of Master Tara Singh were still far from desirable, and that he would have to chalk out a programme to give him a fight.29 On 6 July 1950, he informed Sardar Patel that Master Tara Singh had written to the members of the old Panthic party to let him know why they should not withdraw from the Congress Party. Some members refused to see him. One of them met Bhargava and expressed his opinion that the whole exercise was election propaganda to oust Giani Kartar Singh and to create a rift between him and his supporters.30 Sardar Patel advised Bhargava to meet the tactics of Master Tara Singh to create a rift between the Congress Party in the assembly with a stern hand. Whoever obeyed Master Tara Singh’s fiat would make himself liable to disciplinary action and expulsion from the Congress Party.31 (p.460) Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel on 10 July 1950 that Master Tara Singh was on a tour of the Punjab and Pepsu to demand ‘a separate homeland’ for the Sikhs. It was desirable that the Punjab Ministers and prominent Sikhs in Delhi should say something about this demand.32 Sardar Patel informed Nehru that Master Tara Singh was in Delhi, making speeches in his usual tone. It was not merely his demand for ‘a separate homeland’ but his entire policy which was to be opposed. Patel had asked Bhargava to ask Giani (Gurmukh Singh Musafir) to make a statement to this effect. He did say something, but after some hesitation. The Nagoke group made no secret of opposing Master Tara Singh. Some nationalist Sikhs had also spoken against the demand. Patel pointed out: ‘Our main difficulty in regard to the Sikhs is that those who are with us do not take a definite hostile line to Masterji’s politics.’ If Baldev Singh was persuaded to do so, the others would follow suit. Nehru himself could write to Baldev Singh, and then Patel could speak to him.33 Nehru wrote to Baldev Singh immediately that he was worried about the fresh campaign started by Master Tara Singh. He could neither learn nor forget. ‘The world may change, but he goes on in his old way.’ He was talking about a separate homeland and many other things in opposition to the Congress policy. It was the duty of Sikh leaders to dissociate themselves clearly from this campaign. Baldev Singh should give a lead, ‘we should not allow a mischievous turn of events to grow and assume importance’.34 Sardar Baldev Singh agreed with Jawaharlal Nehru. Master Tara Singh had become absolutely desperate and he did not know what he was talking about. His utterances were not in the interest of the country and rather detrimental to his own community. Baldev Singh went on to add that many things had happened in the Punjab which gave a handle to persons like Master Tara Singh. The Punjab Government and the state Congress did little towards the solution of the difficult problem of communal amity. Baldev Singh took credit for winning Page 9 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ the Amritsar Labour seat for the Congress. In the Zira by-election too he had advised the Congress to contest. But, after a lot of propaganda, the decision was taken not to contest. For the majority of non-official members mistake. The success of the Akali Dal candidate gave a boost to Master Tara Singh and his associates. Baldev Singh professed to have no liking for Master Tara Singh’s programme, and he had no hesitation in repudiating it. He informed Nehru that he had called a meeting of the Panthic legislators on 23 July 1950 in order to take an organized stand against Master Tara Singh’s activities.35 Sardar Baldev Singh was able to persuade the Panthic legislators not to resign from the Congress Party. There was only one exception. Jawaharlal Nehru received a letter from Sardar Santokh Singh Vidyarthi, a ‘nationalist’ Sikh supporter of Baba Kharak Singh, stating the reasons why the ‘nationalist’ Sikhs were opposed to the creation of ‘the so-called Punjabispeaking province or the Sikh state’. The ‘nationalist’ Sikhs were placed at a great disadvantage when a person like Giani Kartar Singh was made a Minister. The appointment of Sardar Baldev Singh also was not favoured much by them. No ‘nationalist’ Sikh had any position in the government. Nehru remarked that there was much weight in this letter.36 But Sardar Patel was not impressed. In his assessment Baba Kharak Singh and ‘his nationalist Sikhs’ had no following and they could not deliver the goods. ‘The answer to Master Tara Singh’s activities cannot come from such a party, but must come from those (p.461) who are better organised and more active and can command better following.’ Patel had talked to the leading Panthic Sikhs who were now members of the Congress Party. They were going to take a definite stand against Master Tara Singh. It was much better to create this opposition than to alienate it.37 Sardar Patel proposed to use the old Akalis against Master Tara Singh. Master Tara Singh says that Giani Kartar Singh professed to be Panthic in his presence and a staunch Congressman in the presence of Sardar Patel before the directive was issued to him to resign from the Congress Party. Henceforth, he began to criticize and oppose the Akali Dal. He had the backing of Sardar Patel and enjoyed full confidence of the Punjab Premier, Gopi Chand Bhargava. The Punjab Government started a policy of repression. The Akali workers who acknowledged their affiliation to Master Tara Singh, and not to Giani Kartar Singh, began to be arrested under the Public Safety Act. They were detained but Master Tara Singh was tried for spreading hatred against the government. He was sent to Karnal Jail on 7 September 1950. The Punjab High Court set aside Article 124 as inapplicable and ordered Master Tara Singh’s release. He was set free on 28 November 1950. This was Master Tara Singh’s second detention after Independence.38 Partap Singh Kairon called a convention of all Congress and ‘nationalist’ Sikhs at Amritsar on 15 December 1950 to combat the growing ‘communalism’ among the Sikhs. He declared that the Congress and the ‘nationalist’ Sikhs would take a Page 10 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ united stand against the creation of a linguistic state or the grant of a concession to the Sikh backward classes. Henceforth, the Congress started openly opposing the Punjabi Suba.39 This was the day of Sardar Patel’s death. On the following day, a Panthic convention was held at Amritsar. It was addressed by Master Tara Singh. Of six grievances of the Sikhs, the first and foremost was the refusal of the government to create Punjabi Suba. The convention adopted the resolution that provincial boundaries be changed on linguistic and cultural basis to promote the natural development of different parties. Sardar Hukam Singh emphasized that the Sikhs would have a more effective voice in the Punjabi Suba to secure protection from the tyranny of the communal majority, to which they were entitled as law-abiding citizens of the country. They were asking for no favour and no concession. They did not desire a separate state, nor even necessarily a Sikh-majority area.40 The growing cleavage between Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjabi-speaking zone was clearly reflected in the census operations of 1951. With the background of the language controversy and in view of the Akali demand for Punjabi Suba, the Hindu leaders were anxious that all Hindus, including the Scheduled Castes in the countryside, should return Hindi as their mother tongue. This led to a tense situation in which some incidents of violence took place. On 2 March 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Gopi Chand Bhargava that he was much concerned with the situation in the Punjab. There was a report of acute tension between Hindus and Sikhs in some of the rural areas of Jullundur over the census enumeration. The victims were Dalits. ‘Apparently a great pressure was brought to bear upon them by the Sikhs to describe their mother-tongue as Punjabi.’ The Dalits who were ‘daring enough’ to describe their mother tongue as Hindi were socially boycotted by the Sikhs. This was a very serious state of affairs, which no government should tolerate. Nehru had no doubt that it was the duty of (p.462) the government to take stern and immediate action against the Sikh leaders like Sardar Amar Singh Dosanjh who were preaching social boycott. Nehru did not want ‘public feeling’ to become anti-government, ‘more especially when elections are coming’. That Nehru was much concerned about the elections is evident from his letter. C.M. Trivedi, was telling him that, if the existing conditions continued, there was likely to be ‘large-scale bloodshed during the elections’. Giani Kartar Singh’s presence as a Minister was likely to be an additional factor in creating trouble. With the elections in view, he was a grave liability.41 Sardar Udham Singh Nagoke wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on 6 March 1951 that pressure was being exercised on people to declare their mother tongue as Hindi. Nehru informed him that he had received reports of great pressure being exercised on people to declare Punjabi as their mother tongue even when they did not want to do so. Social boycott was proclaimed to bring such pressure to bear, more especially on the Dalits. Lawlessness was increasing. Nehru referred to the statement of the Home Minister in the Lok Sabha on 8 March. Page 11 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Rajagopalachari had stated that ‘a section of the Hindus asked people to return Hindi instead of Punjabi as their mother-tongue and this had caused resentment among the Sikhs. Consequently some disturbance took place in a village in Jullundur and one person was murdered’. It is clear from this statement that, in the first place, Punjabi-speaking Dalits were being pressurized to declare Hindi as their mother tongue. Nehru was not inclined to go into ‘the merits of this question’. He asserted, nevertheless, that both the parties were in error and acting wrongly. He made perfectly clear ‘that any census given in the Punjab and in Pepsu on the language and script questions will not be considered to have any value’.42 The census of 1951 does not give any figures for language or religion. Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated at a press conference in Delhi that ‘so far as the census is concerned, it does not matter what people put down in regard to language because it is not going to count at all’. People were not declaring their language freely. There should be no question of forcing anyone on this issue.43 On 18 March, Nehru wrote to Nagoke that the language controversy and the census should not lead to ‘political consequences’ and ‘so far as we are concerned, we are not going to accept as valid the result of this census in the Punjab, so far as language is concerned’. Nehru was prepared to take action to stop pressure tactics and to stop criminal behaviour, in specific and obvious cases, ‘to remove the bitterness that has grown’.44 Within a month of this letter, Nehru was entertaining the possibility of ‘Governor’s rule in a state of emergency’.45 He wrote to Nagoke on 13 May that some radical steps would have to be taken to meet the deteriorating situation in the Punjab.46 The radical step turned out to be the Governor’s rule. Master Tara Singh writes that the Congress Government in the Punjab was weakened because of the role that Congress leaders, the officials of the government, and the Ministers played during the census. Its consequence was lawlessness and disorder.47 On 22 April 1951, he wrote in the Spokesman that the demand for Punjabi Suba was being refused ‘simply on account of the narrow mentality of those of the Hindu politicians, who suspect the Sikhs and wish to keep them under their heels’.48 A staff correspondent of The Times of India wrote on 15 August 1951 that most of the Sikhs were sore with the Congress. The so-called Congressmen in the Punjab had (p.463) been hostile to all that the Sikhs stood for. The anti-Punjabi attitude of the Congress leaders was the last straw. ‘No leading Congressman, no top most national leader thought it worthwhile to understand the viewpoint of the Sikhs, or to hold aloft the olive branch of peace.’ The Sikhs would welcome any alliance to strengthen the cause of the Punjabi province. ‘They cannot brook the idea of their culture, or themselves, being swallowed up. But they seek the preservation of their cultural and linguistic entity, and to this end they demand a Punjabi-speaking province.’ The correspondent concluded that this was ‘the cure of the Sikh problem’. The

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Congress leadership, however, thought that the solution of the demand was its denunciation.49 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers in May 1951 that a ‘new popular ministry’ had been formed in Pepsu. This Ministry, he added, would have to face very grave problems. One of the gravest problems was the ‘organised hostility’ of the Akalis. After a relatively quieter period, Master Tara Singh was ‘again coming out as a preacher of trouble and conflict’.50 The Ministry formed on 13 January 1949 had come under attack from the Akalis. They dubbed it as the Ministry of ‘the maternal uncle and the nephew’ (Mama– Bhanaja wazārat, with reference Gian Singh Rarewala and Yadvindra Singh). Ministers were shown black flags wherever they went. To protect them from the demonstrators, Section 144 was imposed. Political meetings were prohibited. Brish Bhan and his supporters in the Praja Mandal succeeded in getting Jagir Singh Joga elected President of the Patiala State Praja Mandal. Under his leadership was started a tenant movement in March 1949 that lasted till legislation on land reforms was enacted in 1952. In the face of the Akali–Praja Mandal opposition, the Mama–Bhanaja wazārat was replaced on 23 May 1951. Nehru’s ‘popular ministry’ was actually a Congress Ministry under Colonel Raghbir Singh, who had dissolved the Lok Sewak Dal to join the Congress. Brish Bhan was the Deputy Chief Minister, with three of his nominees as Ministers and two of his Dalit supporters as Deputy Ministers. But he had to share power with Giani Zail Singh and Nihal Singh Takshak who had earlier defected from the Praja Mandal (Pepsu Congress). In fact, Raghbir Singh with his group was brought into the State Congress by the central leadership to broaden the base of the Pepsu Congress, and this policy was to continue later.51 In the general elections of 1952, Congress tickets were given to General Shivdev Singh, a former Chief Minister; Mahadev Nagar, a former Minister of the Nabha state; Balwant Singh, a former Chief Minister of the Malerkotla state; and Sardar Kirpal Singh and Sardar Fateh Singh, two of the feudal lords of the Patiala state. But the Congress had only a limited appeal. It could win only twenty-six seats out of sixty. The Akalis won nineteen and the Communists three. The rest of the seats were won by independent candidates. In the Punjabi zone the Akalis were more popular than the Congress. For the Lok Sabha too, the Akalis captured two of the four seats and the Congress only one. The total votes polled by the Akalis was more than that polled by the Congress: 477,638 against 378,367. The Sikhs ‘as a community were with Master Tara Singh’.52 Nevertheless, the Congress formed a government with the help of independents. It fell on the very first day when its nominee for speakership was defeated by the defection of one of its Deputy Ministers who was adopted (p.464) as a candidate by the United Front of the Akalis and independents led by Gian Singh Rarewala. On 21 April 1952, a four-member United Front Ministry took office, to Page 13 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ be expanded later. A sort of coalition of the Jats of Hindi and Punjabi zones, it continued to function for about a year, despite the inner tensions between the legislators of the Punjabi and Hindi zones and between the Akalis led by Pritam Singh Gojran, with Gian Singh Rarewala as their parliamentary leader, and the Akalis led by Sampuran Singh Raman. President’s rule was imposed on Pepsu in March 1953, with P.S. Rau as the Advisor to the Rajpramukh.53

Emergence of Punjabi Suba as the Basic Demand of the Akalis In June 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel were in favour of early general elections. It would be a challenge to the country and the people, thought Nehru.54 The most convenient time to dissolve the Constituent Assembly, suggested Patel, would be after the next legislative session so that the elections could be held sometime in the months of December 1949 and January 1950, and the new legislature could meet after 26 January 1950.55 Patel wrote to Nehru on 9 July 1949 that they could go ahead with the question of elections to the Central Parliament. However, G.B. Pant had urged Patel against the elections. The problem of discipline in the Congress could not be solved by elections. It was an internal organizational problem which was better solved before the elections.56 This, and the other difficulties mentioned by Pant, appear to have influenced Patel and Nehru to drop the idea of early elections. Two years later, Jawaharlal Nehru was educating the people about the forthcoming elections. In his report of 6 July 1951 to the AICC, he had talked of the broad policies pursued by the government and the Congress. He referred to the difficulties in the early months after Partition: exodus and rehabilitation, raid from Pakistan on Kashmir, and assassination of Gandhiji on 30 January 1948 as a clear ‘evidence of the powerful communal and anti-social forces at work in India’. The new Constitution for the Republic of India was completed and adopted on 26 January 1950. There was a very large measure of unanimity in the country about the basic objectives: a strong Central government, democracy with the essential features of socialism, a secular state as the very basis of the Constitution, a welfare state to give special care to religious minorities, the backward and unprivileged classes, and women. There was an urgent need for economic development, which called for a mixed economy with a public sector and a private sector. A Planning Commission had been set up. Top priority had to be given to agriculture and rural economy, among other things, to solve the food problem. It was also necessary to check the tremendous growth of population. The old administrative machinery was retained with a minor modification because of its advantages. Nehru justified the suspension of normal constitutional government in the Punjab on the plea of putting an end to ‘factional strife’. There was ‘communal strife’ too, and Nehru looked upon the communal groups with their ‘narrow and reactionary ideals’ as a challenge to the secular aspect of the state.57

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Understandably, Jawaharlal Nehru thought of the Congress as the most suitable political party to lead the country towards realization of the basic objectives laid down in the Constitution. In the past the Congress had been something much more than a narrow party: (p.465) ‘It functioned as a national forum.’ The coming of independence made a difference but there was still plenty of room for the Congress to be a platform to achieve many common purposes. With reference to the charge that the Congress desired to perpetuate its power, Nehru agreed that a democratic legislature should have an effective opposition. ‘But it is equally true that in times of crisis a large measure of unity and national purpose is essential.’ It was every man’s duty to combat ‘disruptive and antisocial forces’. On the one side of the Congress were the Communists who followed a path of violence and open warfare against the state. On the other side of the Congress were the communalists who were essentially reactionary. Both, the Communists and the communalists, were ‘disruptive’. The Congress was at the centre, standing for peace and progress.58 There was enough justification, thus, for Nehru to weaken or suppress the opposition parties. In reply to the debate on his report, Nehru emphasized that on a matter like a secular state ‘we cannot speak with two voices or with a wavering voice or a hesitant voice or with any voice that produces any impression other than this that we stand till death for a secular state and nothing else but a secular state’. In response to the question whether it was in consonance with the idea of secular state to talk of Muslim, Sikh, Christian, or other such religious minorities, Nehru said that a minority did not disappear, nor did it become a majority in a secular state; nor did a person give up his religion, his customs or his culture in a properly run secular state. In short, ‘religious’ communities did exist. Nehru went on to say that, ultimately, there should be no minority or majority. ‘We are all just human beings.’59 It is not clear what would then happen to the religion, customs, and culture of a human being in the Republic of India. In his message to the All India Shia Conference Jawaharlal Nehru clarified ‘what we stand for and what we aim at’. In India we have declared ourselves, firmly and unequivocally, in favour of what is called a secular democracy, that is, a state where people of all religions or denominations have the same rights and same opportunities in practice. Nehru added that all of our people may not live up to this ideal and might be swept away occasionally by misguided notions. That makes it all the more incumbent that we have our minds clear about our aim. This larger vision alone could create a strong and progressive nation at peace with itself, with its neighbours, and the rest of the world.60 Nehru wished this larger vision to develop but did not know what to do if it failed to develop.

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ The Congress election manifesto, prepared by Jawaharlal Nehru, was adopted by the AICC on 14 July 1951, and again on 16 October. It was later published in newspapers. The objectives and achievements of the Congress embodied in the manifesto were explained to the people by Nehru in his election speeches.61 In the elections, spread out over six months from October 1951 to March 1952, with seventy-seven political parties and contest over 3,772 seats, campaigning was vigorous and enthusiastic. Nearly a million official prepared registers of 172 million voters. Nehru covered 25,000 miles and addressed in all about thirty-five million or a tenth of India’s population. All his speeches, according to S. Gopal, were part of a process of adult education, of teaching the masses that they had minds which they should use.62 The first general elections in free India were also of (p.466) crucial importance for Jawaharlal Nehru. His policies and measures as the Prime Minister and the supreme leader of the Congress were to be judged by the people. On their verdict would depend the continuation of his power and his policy of nation-building. The heading given by the editor to Jawaharlal Nehru’s speech at Ludhiana on 30 September 1951 is ‘An All-Out War on Communalism’. Among other things, he refers to ‘communalism’ as political ‘poison’. It created Pakistan. The young people did not realize that communalism was ‘the most dangerous poison’ for India at the time. Communalism was as bad when practised by Hindus and Sikhs as by the Muslims. The people of Pakistan started the practice of ‘one nation for the believers of one religion’. The people in India had started imitating them by forming communal organizations among Hindus and Sikhs. To the protagonists of ‘a Hindu nation’ Nehru said: It is obvious that Hindus are in a majority here and it is equally obvious that the country will be run to a large extent according to their views. But the moment you start associating this country with one particular religion, you start digging the roots of the country’s stability and sow the seeds of dissension that will break up the country further. The communal organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS followed principles which could result only in dissension and disunity. Pakistan was created on the basis of the two-nation theory, the two nations being Muslims and Hindus. ‘If you take it that way, there are not two but dozens of nations in India.’ Pakistan was still being run on that principle and it was extremely difficult for any non-Muslim to live there.63 In other words, communalism could lead to Balkanization of India. Nehru did not visualize that the ‘communal’ majority could become fascistic. Much of Nehru’s speech at Ludhiana related to the Punjab. The problem of communalism, which created unnecessary barriers and destroyed the country’s unity, was ‘a very special problem’ for the people of the Punjab. In the first Page 16 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ place, it was a border state. Second, the majority of the Muslims had gone, or had been thrown out, and there was no harmony between the Hindus and the Sikhs of the Punjab. If this state of affairs continued, ‘all of them will be ruined’. The Sikhs had a special place in the Punjab. Therefore, they asked for special rights in the Punjab. But they should work together with the same rights and status. All efforts should be made for the growth of both Hindi and Punjabi. The elections were important ‘because the future depends on whom you choose’. Nehru had no doubt that the Congress was indispensable. ‘If the Congress were not in existence the country would be divided into numerous little parts and organizations, each pulling in different directions, thus weakening us.’ The Congress alone had the ability and the strength to run the affairs of the country.64 Master Tara Singh had written to Jawaharlal Nehru on 28 August 1951 about the situation in Pepsu. Nehru responded to his criticism simply by saying that the arrangements made were transitional. More permanent arrangements would be possible after the elections. ‘We are determined that elections should take place impartially and peacefully. If any unfair tactics are adopted anywhere, we shall certainly interfere and try to stop them.’ Nehru expected Master Tara Singh to appreciate that the country was facing serious problems and crises and in this situation ‘whatever our political differences might be, we should not (p.467) encourage disruptive tendencies which weaken the country and cast discredit upon us’.65 In other words, Nehru was asking Master Tara Singh to drop the idea of Punjabi Suba, or at least not to make it an election issue. His letter sounded like a warning. On 29 October 1951, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Partap Singh Kairon that it was a good thing that Giani Kartar Singh had gone out of the Congress. However, the Sikhs were a major factor in the Punjab situation. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh with others would form a strong combination. The Congress had to meet this challenge. It seemed obvious to Nehru that it was highly important for Kairon to have the full cooperation and support of Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke. To meet the challenge of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, it was necessary to forge ‘a close linking up’ and not a half-hearted approach. It was important in itself and it would have an important effect on the general elections to ensure Nagoke’s success in the elections of the office-bearers to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). Nehru attached more importance to this than to winning a few seats in the elections. ‘Therefore, every effort should be made to help Nagoke in the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’s elections.’ Nehru advised Kairon that his friends and colleagues in the SGPC should throw all their weight in favour of Nagoke and induce others also to do so. For anyone to support Tara Singh was to support ‘not only reaction but also the opponents of the Congress’.66 It should be noted that Nehru was in favour of active participation in the affairs of the SGPC to keep it under control in the

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ interest of the Congress. This was the beginning of a policy that would surface from time to time subsequently. On 4 January 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru addressed a meeting at Patiala. He was interrupted by slogans in favour of ‘Punjabi Suba’. He declared: ‘I will not allow India to be divided again. I will not allow any further trouble. If there is trouble in any part of India, I would put it down with all my strength.’67 It is quite evident that Nehru was equating the demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ with demand for a separate State. Or, was it a deliberate insinuation? In any case, he was prepared to use the might of the Indian state to suppress the demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’. Speaking at a public meeting in Delhi soon after, Nehru said that he had been touring all over India during the last two months, covering vast distances and visiting almost every corner of a huge country. There was no other example of general elections on such a vast scale as were going to take place in India. The people in their millions would decide the fate of the country. Nehru was concerned professedly with principles and ideals and not with personalities. Nevertheless, he talked of Master Tara Singh quite frequently. He talked also of his own position: ‘I am responsible for whatever the Government and to a large extent the Congress does.’ He did not do everything himself. There were thousands of cogs in the wheel, ‘but the ultimately responsibility is mine’.68 Nehru did not deny that Pakistan came into being with the concurrence of the Congress. He was prepared to admit his responsibility. It was a bitter pill to swallow. So much poison had been spread in the country that ‘we were afraid it would annihilate the nation’s very existence’. Freedom was receding further and further, making the Congress weaker. ‘We were fed up and so decided to accept partition.’ Many others who were now raising their voice against the Partition were also (p.468) responsible for it. Among them was Master Tara Singh. In fact, ‘the greatest responsibility’ for the Partition lay with the policy followed by the Akali Dal.69 Nehru had nothing to say against their courage and bravery. But they had achieved ‘the feat of never saying the right thing, and secondly of never learning from their mistake’. Nehru asked the audience to mention a single thing ‘done by them in the last twenty years which may have benefited the Sikhs or the Punjab or India’. They had done great harm to the Sikhs by their mistakes. The Akali leadership was so narrow-minded that invariably it took the wrong step without thinking of the consequences.70 Nehru bracketed the Akali Dal with the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha, and all the three with the Muslim League. But the Akalis were projected as the worst. Having said at the outset that he talked of principles and ideals whereas others criticized persons, Nehru presented Giani Kartar Singh as an unprincipled leader. He had been in and out of the Congress many times. He left it once again two months ago. It had become a joke. It did not occur to Nehru that this ‘joke’ Page 18 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ was on the Congress as well which allowed individuals to come in and go out at will. In fact, to absorb the Akalis was a well-considered policy of the Congress. Nehru ridiculed Master Tara Singh for saying that ‘secular state’ was ‘a state of atheists’. Nehru advised him to look up an English dictionary. The word ‘atheist’, said Nehru, had nothing to do with secularism. Nehru forgets that his own definition of ‘secularism’ did not come from an English dictionary. It carried a peculiarly Indian connotation, like the word ‘communalism’. Master Tara Singh was alleged to have said also that if he failed to win by votes, he would overthrow the government by force. Nehru drew the inference that Master Tara Singh was opposed as much to democracy as to secular state.71 This oversimplification of Master Tara Singh’s position was actually a gross misrepresentation and a sophisticated tirade against him. On 14 January 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Lord Mountbatten that all the parties in opposition, including the Akali Dal, looked upon Nehru as the chief obstruction in their way and regarded him as their enemy number one.72 On 26 January, Nehru wrote to C.D. Deshmukh that the Jan Sangh in the Punjab grew suddenly weak because of its alliance with the Akalis. ‘Opportunism did not pay with the public.’73 On 31 January, Nehru noted that the elections had been a powerful medium for political education. Many of the Congress Ministers were defeated. They failed in ‘the art of democratic government’. On the other hand, ‘persistent, continuous and aggressive hard work’ was rewarded with success even in difficult situations. The purely communal parties, including the Akali Dal, had suffered considerably. These parties were not likely to grow in strength.74 Nehru felt gratified with the success of the Congress which was his success. On 8 February 1952, he wrote to S.K. Patil that the policy of no compromise with communal organizations paid the Congress: ‘We have inflicted a severe defeat on the Hindu Mahasabha, the Akalis, etc. For the first time, we have curbed Sikh and Hindu communalism in the north by giving a straight challenge.’75 Indeed, the Congress won 364 seats for the Lok Sabha and 2,248 seats for the State Assemblies, representing nearly 75 per cent of seats at the Centre and over 68 per cent seats in the states. It was ‘a triumph for the Congress’. No other political party was close to the Congress in terms of electoral success. The Socialist Party won twelve seats in the Lok Sabha and 124 seats in the states. The (p.469) Kisan Mazdoor Party, formed by Kriplani in June 1951, won nine seats in the Lok Sabha and seventy-seven in the states. The Communist Party of India (CPI), which aspired to present an alternative to the Congress, won twenty-three seats in the Lok Sabha and emerged as the largest opposition party. The Muslim League, which lay dormant in the north, was revived in Kerala and in parts of Madras. The Hindu Mahasabha was on the decline. It won only four seats in the Lok Sabha and faded from the political scene to be replaced by the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, which had been founded in October 1951 as the ‘front organization’ of the RSS. Strongly anti-Pakistan, the Jan Sangh criticized the Page 19 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Congress for placating the Muslims, and raised the slogan of ‘one country, one culture, one nation’. It won only three seats in the Lok Sabha in 1952.76 Nehru congratulated the Congress members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly over their recent election. ‘In these elections’, he said, ‘we have put up a straight and square fight against communalism and we have won.’77 The salient feature in the election manifesto of the Akali Dal was a unilingual state in the Punjab. Its rationale and its importance for the Sikhs were clearly stated. The true test of democracy, in the opinion of the Shiromani Akali Dal, is that the minorities should feel that they are really free and equal partners in the destiny of the country. To bring home this sense of freedom to the Sikhs, it is vital that a Punjabi-speaking province should be carved out from the different States of the country on the basis of the Punjabi language and culture. This will not only be in fulfilment of the pre-partition Congress programme and pledges, but also be in entire conformity with the universally recognized principles governing the formation of provinces. The Shiromani Akali Dal is in favour of the formation of provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis throughout India, but holds it as a question of life and death for the Sikhs that a new Punjab is created immediaty.78 Thus, the Punjabi Suba emerged as the foremost demand of the Akalis before the general elections of 1952. Master Tara Singh observed that the Congress leaders were puffed up by their success in the elections. But the Akalis had won all the seats in the Ludhiana district and the majority of the Sikhs had supported the Akali Dal in every constituency. The Sikh support for the Akalis was their source of inspiration. Even the Sikhs in general were in their usual high spirit.79 Sardar Hukam Singh attributed the defeat of the Akali Dal to the division created by the Congress between the Sikhs and the Hindus. The latter voted solidly against the Akali candidates on account of the Punjabi Suba issue. ‘But I want to tell the Congress leaders’, he said, ‘that the masses are determined to have a Punjabi-speaking province.’ They would not rest ‘till they have achieved their objective’. He went on to add that no amount of deception or double-dealing, crookery or cajolery, intimidation or threats, promises of promotion or patronage could lead the Sikhs astray. In Sardar Hukam Singh’s view, the defeat of the Akali Dal was ‘engineered’. The Sikhs had come to know their real friends and their worst foes, and this was a great gain for ‘a community in its fight for a self-respecting existence and citizenship’. Despite his frank admission that the issue of Punjabi Suba had alienated the Hindus, Hukam Singh reiterated: The formation of the Punjabi-speaking province is the most fundamental demand of the Sikhs. To give it up would have been nothing short of Page 20 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ signing our own death warrants. And to postpone it would constitute opportunism and a clear (p.470) violation of the sacred Sikh traditions of open fight and chaste policies.80 Sardar Hukam Singh left no doubt that the demand for the Punjabi-speaking state was the first item on the future agenda of the Akalis. With Nehru and Master Tara Singh ranged on opposite sides, the struggle for Punjabi Suba was destined to be a long drawn out battle.

In Retrospect With no political safeguards in the Constitution, the idea of a Punjabi-speaking state became more important for the Akalis. The first Sikh leader to offer ‘a plea’ for a unilingual state in East Punjab was a moderate Sikh leader, Bawa Harkishan Singh. His plea was addressed primarily to the Constituent Assembly as a lasting solution of the Punjab problem. Bawa Harkishan Singh was quite close to Master Tara Singh but it is not clear whether he wrote independently or in consultation with him. In 1949, Master Tara Singh himself wrote from jail to Nehru and Patel that a linguistic state should be created on the basis of the Punjabi language alone. He complained that the Hindu leaders of the Punjab who professed to be ‘nationalists’ were actually ‘communal’. Their support for Hindi and their hostility towards Punjabi were two sides of the same coin. Master Tara Singh was convinced that ‘Punjabi Suba’ was the only alternative left for them. At a Panthic conference on 26 March 1950, Sardar Hukam Singh, President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, referred to the worsening position of the Sikhs. The Punjabi language was denied a rightful place and the principle of linguistic states was rejected. Some of the Akali legislators who had joined the Congress Legislative Party issued public statements against the demand for a linguistic state. Master Tara Singh asked all the Akali legislators to state why they should not resign from the Congress Legislative Party. Sardar Patel advised Bhargava to deal sternly with Master Tara Singh’s tactics to create a rift among the Congress legislators. Nehru wrote to Patel that Master Tara Singh was making speeches in support of his demand for ‘a separate homeland’ for the Sikhs, and it was necessary to orchestrate opposition to the demand. Patel wrote back that not only his demand for ‘a Sikh homeland’ but his entire policy should be opposed. He suggested that Baldev Singh should take the lead. Baldev Singh failed to persuade the Akali Dal but he succeeded in persuading the Akali legislators, with only one exception, not to resign. Sardar Patel was convinced that these legislators alone were ‘the answer to Master Tara Singh’s activities’ and they should be strengthened. Thus, the erstwhile Akalis were to be used to weaken Master Tara Singh. The Punjab Government used the Public Safety Act as the pretext for arresting Akali workers who acknowledged allegiance to Master Tara Singh. Master Tara Page 21 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ Singh was arrested, tried for spreading hatred against the government, and sent to jail on 7 September 1950. But he had to be released on 29 November because the High Court rejected the validity of the application of the article under which he was imprisoned. Partap Singh Kairon declared at a convention held in Amritsar on 15 December 1950, the day of Patel’s death, that the Congress and the ‘nationalist’ Sikhs would take a firm stand against the creation of Punjabi Suba. At a Panthic convention held at Amritsar on the following day Master Tara Singh declared that the foremost grievance of the Sikhs against the Congress Government was its refusal to (p.471) create Punjabi Suba. The Sikhs were asking for no favour and no concession because they were demanding territorial reorganization on the basis of language and not a separate state or even a Sikhmajority area. The widening gulf between Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjabi zone could be seen during the census operations of 1951. The Hindus by and large were returning Hindi as their mother tongue and asking the Scheduled Castes to do so too. There were incidents of violence. Much concerned with this grave situation, Nehru declared that census with regard to the language was ‘not going to be counted at all’. Master Tara Singh attributed the lawlessness and disorder to the role that the Congress leaders, ministers, and officials of the government played during the census. By now, the issue of language was enmeshed with the demand for Punjabi Suba. In June 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru was thinking of early elections so that the new legislatures could meet after 26 January 1950. But the elections were held two years later, at a time regarded favourable to the Congress leadership. As usual, Nehru toured the country, speaking on behalf of the Congress as the only party to lead the country towards realization of the basic objectives laid down in the Constitution. His speech at Ludhiana on 30 September 1951 was ‘An All-Out War on Communalism’. Nehru emphasized that communalism could lead to Balkanization. It was ‘a very special problem’ in the Punjab as a border state with no harmony between Hindus and Sikhs. To ensure success of the Congress, Nehru went to the extent of advising Partap Singh Kairon that he should take serious interest in the election of the officebearers of the SGPC to meet the challenge of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, who were now working together. This matter was more important for Nehru than winning a few seats in the general elections. Therefore, he advised that ‘every effort should be made to help Nagoke in the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’s elections’. Kairon and his friends and colleagues in the SGPC should throw all their weight in favour of Nagoke. To support Master Tara Singh was to oppose the Congress. On 4 January 1952, Nehru declared at Patiala that he would not allow India to be divided again. For him, thus, to concede the demand for Punjabi Suba was to divide India. He would use the might of the Indian state, he said, to suppress the demand. Nehru ridiculed the Akali leaders, Page 22 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ saying that they never said a right thing and never learnt from a mistake; they were opposed to both democracy and a secular state. After the elections, Nehru felt gratified that the Congress had ‘curbed Sikh and Hindu communalism in the north by giving a straight challenge’. For Jawaharlal Nehru as much as for Master Tara Singh, Punjabi Suba was the basic issue in the Punjab. The manifesto of the Akali Dal upheld the principle of reorganization on the basis of language and culture for the entire country. For the Sikhs, it was a question of life and death. Hukam Singh attributed the defeat of the Akali Dal to the division ‘engineered’ by the Congress between the Sikhs and the Hindus. He went on to add that no amount of deception, double-dealing, crookery, cajolery, intimidation, threats, and promises of promotion or patronage could lead the Sikhs astray. Formation of the Punjabi-speaking province, he said, was ‘the most fundamental demand of the Sikhs’. Akali confrontation with the Congress became almost a certainty. Notes:

(1.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, fifth impression), pp. 190–1. (2.) Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1974), vol. IX, p. 360. (3.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 354–7. (4.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 164–5, 376. (5.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 376–8. (6.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 377–9. (7.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 387–8. (8.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 395–6. (9.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, General Editor, S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund), 1994, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 296–7. (10.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 298. (11.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 299. (12.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 299–300. (13.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 301–4. (14.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 305–6. Page 23 of 26

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ (15.) The Statesman, 1 December 1951, quoted, Satya M. Rai, The Punjab Since Partition (Delhi: Durga Publishing, 1986), p. 260. (16.) Quoted, Rai, The Punjab Since Partition, p. 261. (17.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur & Sons, 1970), p. 189. (18.) Kapur Singh goes on to add that not many months later the Home Secretary, who was also a Sikh, was replaced by a Hindu Home Secretary and the portfolio of law and order was transferred to the Chief Minister, who happened to be a Hindu. Thus, all vestiges of Sikh influence in the central direction of the general administration of the province were removed. Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī (Amritsar: Gurmat Pustak Bhandar, 1978, Bhumika), pp. 200– 1. The letter of 10 October of 1947 is given as ‘Exhibit D, 11/7’ in Kapur Singh’s written statement in the Departmental Enquiry instituted against him (Application no. 2 of 1956, Supreme Court Records, vol. II, pp. 97–119). (19.) For a detailed account of the case, see Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī, pp. 1–47. (20.) Sardar Patel to Gopi Chand Bhargava, 4 June 1950, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 360. (21.) Gopi Chand Bhargava to Sardar Patel, 21 June 1950, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 360–1. (22.) Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī, pp. 223–4. (23.) Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī, p. 9. (24.) Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī, pp. 10–12. (25.) Kapur Singh, Sāchī Sākhī, pp. 6, 30–1. (26.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 206. (27.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, in Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, ed. Jaswant Singh, (Amritsar: Religious Books, 1945), pp. 244–6. (28.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 210. (29.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 349. (30.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 367–9. (31.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, pp. 369–70. (32.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. IX, p. 444.

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ (33.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. X (1974), pp. 444–5. (34.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. X, p. 446. (35.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. X, pp. 447–8. (36.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. X, pp. 449–52. (37.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. X, p. 452. (38.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 246–7. (39.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 209–10. (40.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 215–16. (41.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 291–3. (42.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 294. (43.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 295. (44.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, pp. 295–6. (45.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 296. (46.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 298. (47.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 247. (48.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 219. (49.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 218. (50.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 1, p. 571. (51.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), pp. 184–5, 194. (52.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, pp. 195–6. (53.) Walia, Praja Mandal Movement, p. 197. (54.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII (1973), p. 249. (55.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 252. (56.) Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. VIII, p. 309. (57.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 399–416.

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Crystallization of the Demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ (58.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 417–18. (59.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 419–20. (60.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, p. 759. (61.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 3–13. (62.) Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012, second impression), vol. II, p. 162. (63.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 90–4. (64.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 96–102. (65.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, p. 192. (66.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 223–4. (67.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 221. (68.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII (1996), pp. 82–3. (69.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, pp. 86–8. (70.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, pp. 87–8. (71.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, p. 88. (72.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, pp. 33–5. (73.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, p. 98. (74.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, 100–4. (75.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, p. 357. (76.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence, p. 134. (77.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVII, p. 368. (78.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 221. (79.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 255–6. (80.) Quoted, Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 222.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Akali–Congress Confrontation (1952–5) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0020

Abstract and Keywords The movement for the Punjabi Suba was gaining momentum after the general elections of 1952. Nehru became anxious now to ensure that the Punjab Government had its indirect control over the SGPC. This became almost a policy matter for the Punjab Government. Master Tara Singh rightly blamed ‘the secular sarkar’ for interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. He was keen to re-establish the control of the Akalis over the SGPC. He succeeded in winning the SGPC elections towards the end of 1954 on the issue of Punjabi Suba. The success of his morchā in 1955 resulted in great popularity of the demand for a unilingual state. Nehru put an end to what he called the ‘Sikh ministry’ in Pepsu by imposing President’s rule rather unconstitutionally. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Punjabi Suba, general elections of 1952, Nehru, Punjab Government, SGPC, morchā of 1955, Pepsu, President’s rule

Jawaharlal Nehru liked to believe that the elections of 1952 had demonstrated a general support for the Congress throughout  the country and its triumph over communal forces, including the Akali Dal. His indirect control over the Punjab Congress was strengthened by the selection of Bhim Sen Sachar, known to be Nehru’s man, as Chief Minister of the Punjab. Nehru declared a war against Akali ‘communalism’ in order to weaken Master Tara Singh and his demand for Punjabi Suba. However, he was obliged by Master Tara Singh to concede for the Sikh Schedule Castes the same rights which had been created for the Hindu Scheduled Castes. Nehru succeeded in keeping the Akalis out of the Pepsu Page 1 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Ministry by imposing President’s rule, which could be used also for strengthening the Congress position in Pepsu in the subsequent elections. Nehru also tried to see that the Congressite Sikhs had control over the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) but failed to do so in 1954. Master Tara Singh launched an agitation against the ban on shouting slogans in favour of Punjabi Suba and Sachar was obliged to lift the ban in July 1955. The States Reorganisation Commission (SRC) recommended creation of Mahapunjab as against the Punjabi Suba. This created a situation with a potential for further confrontation between the Akalis and the Congress.

Political Developments Jawaharlal Nehru was at the height of his popularity and power before the end of 1951, with ‘complete mastery of policy and politics’. Apart from the President, the Congress Working Committee (CWC), and the Parliamentary Board, the Congress ‘High Command’ included the trusted political confidants of Nehru who also acted as his mediators and arbitrators in factional conflicts at the state level which threatened ‘the ability of the Congress to retain power in (p.475) a state’.1 The High Command chose Bhim Sen Sachar to be the Chief Minister of the Punjab. He lost his hold on the Congress legislators before the end of 1955 and was asked by the High Command to resign in January 1956. Nehru continued his war against ‘communalism’ represented in his opinion by the Shiromani Akali Dal as much as by the Hindu Mahasabha and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh. Master Tara Singh regained control over the SGPC, ousting the Nagoke group which was supported by the Punjab Government. The Akali morchā of May–July 1955 obliged Bhim Sen Sachar to lift the ban on shouting slogans in favour of Punjabi Suba, leading to his resignation from Chief Ministership. The movement for Punjabi Suba was really strong when the SRC gave its recommendation against the formation of a unilingual Punjab state. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Bhim Sen Sachar on 26 February 1952: ‘We have come to the conclusion that we should suggest your name for the leadership of the Congress Legislative Party.’ The Punjab required the greatest tact and perseverance and it required unity even more. ‘We have to put down corruption and nepotism at all levels.’ Nehru advised Sachar to ensure full cooperation of Kairon.2 According to Pandit Mohan Lal, Sachar had hardly a dozen followers in the Congress Legislative Party but the Congress High Command did not care to observe some of the well-known democratic traditions. Instead of giving a free hand to the legislators to elect their leader, the High Command imposed a leader upon them. His ‘election’ led to discord and disharmony, giving rise to aggressive factionalism within the party.3 Bhim Sen Sachar set aside the convention of parity between Hindu and Sikh Ministers when he formed his Cabinet in May 1952. ‘If parity means Page 2 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation communalism’, he said in the assembly, ‘I will not let it continue.’ He went on to add that he was glad to ‘have put an end to a wrong thing’.4 The Congress Party in the Punjab was divided mainly into two groups: the Sachar group and the Kairon–Jagat Narain group. The objective of the Kairon– Jagat Narain group was to show to the Prime Minister and the Congress High Command that Sachar had ‘little following and cannot carry a team together’. About ten members of Bhargava’s group were also opposed to Sachar.5

Nehru’s War against Akali ‘Communalism’ Nehru wrote to Kairon on 17 June 1952: ‘We started in the Punjab with a fairly clean state this time and, to begin with, all was well. Now I understand that there is more and more cleavage between what is called your group and Sachar.’ He added that ‘the Akalis and opponents of the Congress’ were happy over this cleavage, and Bhargava was pulling strings to create more trouble. After the success of the Congress in the elections, Nehru had hoped that the Akalis and other communal groups ‘would be kept in check and not allowed to grow in strength’. He was surprised at the rapidity with which crises were coming to the Punjab after such a great victory of the Congress.6 In his letter to Y.S. Parmar, the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, on 14 October 1952, Nehru expressed his surprise over the Himachal Pradesh Assembly’s resolution recommending integration of certain territories of the Punjab and Pepsu with Himachal Pradesh. Apart from the question of its merit, this recommendation would give ‘a great deal of strength to Master Tara Singh’. He had (p.476) scored a victory in the SGPC elections, and the demand for a Punjabi-speaking province would become stronger. Altogether, it was a move which would help the Akalis. The Government of India was not going to take up any step at all on the basis of this recommendation. He told Parmar that ‘we were in favour of Bilaspur going to Himachal Pradesh’ in spite of opposition from the Punjab. The thoughtless act of the Himachal Assembly ‘will now create grave difficulties even about Bilaspur’.7 The Punjab, obviously, had a very high stake in Bilaspur because of the location of the Bhakra Dam in the state. Jawaharlal Nehru was much concerned with a ‘joint front’ that the ‘communal’ parties were evolving in north India. He wrote to B.C. Roy on 13 December 1952 that Master Tara Singh was delivering ‘the most violent speeches’ against him and the Congress Government. Nehru wanted Roy to keep in touch with these developments and remain vigilant.8 On 14 December, he wrote to Presidents of the Pradesh Congress Committees to draw their attention to widespread agitation led by the RSS against cow slaughter. There was another agitation in regard to East Bengal refugees, and yet another about Jammu. The Hindu Mahasabha, the Jan Sangh, and the Akali Dal were behind them all, and the RSS was supporting them. Their recent speeches and other activities showed that their intention was to create trouble on a large scale.9 On 19 December, Nehru Page 3 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation wrote to J.B. Kriplani: ‘You know Master Tara Singh and what he aims at. He has lined up completely with the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS, and he openly talks of violence.’10 Nehru sent a copy of this letter to Jayaprakash Narayan and wrote that the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS, and the Akali Dal had joined hands in Jammu and proposed to spread out in the Punjab. ‘Oddly enough, Master Tara Singh is cooperating with the Communists in Pepsu. There are no principles only ambition and hatred.’11 The Praja Parishad of Jammu had started an agitation on 23 November 1952, demanding complete accession of the state to India, use of the Indian flag in place of the state flag, and self-determination for the people of Jammu if the first demand was not conceded.12 Master Tara Singh issued a statement supporting the Praja Parishad’s agitation. On 7 and 10 December at Amritsar, he referred to this agitation as ‘a fight for freedom’.13 On 19 December, Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers that Master Tara Singh and his Akali Dal had lined up with other communal organizations for various agitations. In another context, the Akali Dal was lined up with the Communists in Pepsu. Master Tara Singh had been delivering very virulent speeches. He was frank at least and constantly talked about ‘finishing’ this or that person, ‘whatever that might mean’.14 On the 1st of January 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Home Minister, Kailas Nath Katju, that Master Tara Singh had ‘openly preached my assassination’ in a speech delivered at the Jallianwala Bagh. This matter called for a prompt action. The Home Ministry should start immediate investigation. Master Tara Singh had clearly infringed the written law and ‘we should take action’ even if it led to ‘some untoward consequences’.15 Nehru had already written to C.M. Trivedi that the recent activities and speeches of Master Tara Singh had crossed ‘all limits of decency’. He was raving ‘almost like a lunatic’, and there were enough foolish people in the world to be affected. Nehru felt that by the combination of the Akali Dal with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh an atmosphere was being created of the type (p.477) in which Gandhiji was assassinated.16 He appears to have been genuinely frightened. ‘I do not like the look of things in the Punjab,’ wrote Nehru to Partap Singh Kairon on 25 January 1953. What worried him was the low tempo at which the Congress functioned and remained busy with its internal squabbles, while the Akali Dal and others were going ‘full steam ahead’ and creating trouble. Even the defeat in the by-election in the Nakodar general constituency on 30 December 1952 had made no difference to the Congress leaders of the Punjab. All types of communal elements were joining the Jammu Praja Parishad agitation and its effect was spreading. It was affecting Sikh politics and had certain allIndia repercussions. Nehru made it clear that ‘on no account are we going to surrender to this communal agitation’. In the struggle against ‘the combined forces of communalism’ they should fight aggressively and should not give in on any vital point.17 On the same day Nehru wrote a note for the Minister of Home Page 4 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Affairs, emphasizing the need of early action against the threat of agitation in Delhi. The Parishad movement, which was supported by the Akali Dal, among others, was ‘a revolt against the country’, and the people must realize its ‘sinister implications’.18 The Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad met in Delhi on 7 February 1953 to discuss the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu and the arrests of party workers in the Punjab on 6 February. Later, they met separately and set up a five-member committee to continue talks for three days. Master Tara Singh attended these meetings. On 8 February, Master Tara Singh condemned the government for suppressing public opinion on Kashmir by misusing the Preventive Detention Act. At a public meeting in New Delhi on 9 February, Master Tara Singh said that Indians should not rely upon Shaikh Abdullah and the Kashmiri Muslims. He said that no agitation could be stopped by resorting to violence. Writing to Shaikh Abdullah on 10 February, Nehru refers to the resolution received from Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and N.C. Chatterjee, on the basis of the meetings with which Master Tara Singh was associated, and said that the agitation they proposed to start in the Punjab and Delhi, and parts of UP, was a challenge to the government and its whole policy. To prevent any big agitation, Nehru wanted ‘early implementation of the agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government’.19 Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers on 15 February 1953 that the agitation in Jammu was supported by the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Ram Rajya Parishad openly and by the RSS quietly. Master Tara Singh had promised support but not committed himself too far. He was arrested at Amritsar on 24 February for what Nehru regarded as defiance of the law. It was such a clear defiance that the government had to take action. The situation was well in hand but ‘all of us should be fully alert’. The Akali Dal agitation could become a part of the larger agitation being planned by the communal organizations.20 Master Tara Singh was arrested for attending a meeting held in commemoration of the martyrs of Nankana Sahib in spite of the prohibitory order issued by the government. The Akalis looked upon the arrest of Master Tara Singh for addressing a meeting to observe the Martyrs’ Day as interference in their religious affairs. The cases against Master Tara Singh and other Akalis were withdrawn on 14 March 1953 as the result of an agreement (p.478) by which the government gave assurance of no interference in the religious affairs of any religious group.21

The Issue of Sikh Scheduled Castes According to Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh wrote to the President of India on 4 April 1953 to do away with the distinction made between the Sikh and Page 5 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Hindu Scheduled Castes in terms of constitutional safeguards, requesting him to respond by 13 April. There was no response. On 13 July 1953, Master Tara Singh wrote again to the President to concede the demand in two months. There was no response. On 1 October 1953, Master Tara Singh left Anandpur with a jathā of twenty-five Akalis to march towards Delhi. He gave a message to the Sikh Panth at the time of leaving Anandpur. This message was published in the daily Akālī of 3 October 1953.22 This message indicates that Guru Tegh Bahadur’s departure from Anandpur for Delhi in 1675 loomed large in Master Tara Singh’s imagination. ‘I have come to the Darbar of Sri Guru Gobind Singh Ji’, he says, ‘to take the vow that I shall follow the path of Sri Guru Tegh Bahadur Ji Maharaj to lay down my life.’ Like Emperor Aurangzeb, the Congress Government deliberately discriminated on the grounds of religious differences, even though it claimed to be secular. Aurangzeb imposed jizya on the Hindus, and when a Hindu became a Muslim he was exempted from the jizya. The Congress Government had also given certain concessions to Hindus which were denied to others but became available to them if they declared to be Hindus. Master Tara Singh refers to his days in jail (in 1949) when he had intimated the government about his intention of going on hunger strike if the concessions given to the Hindu Scheduled Castes were not extended to the Sikh Scheduled Castes. On behalf of the government then, he was told by Sardar Bhag Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Bawa Harkishan Singh that his demand was conceded and the Sikh Scheduled Castes all over India would have the same safeguards as the Hindu Scheduled Castes. But ‘the secular sarkār’ turned its back on its commitment. It was Master Tara Singh’s duty to remind the government to fulfil its promise. The only hindrance in his way could be a war with Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. He was a Sikh of Guru Tegh Bahadur who was called Hind dī chādar (sheet of protection for India) and had given his head for the protection of Hindu dharam. It was Master Tara Singh’s duty to give priority to the protection of desh, dharam, and kaum over everything else. The survival of the Sikh Panth could be ensured only by protecting the country, the dharam of its people, and the nation.23 According to Niranjan Singh, Master Tara Singh had good relations with some of the Hindu leaders, especially Veer Savarkar, and used to attend the annual sessions of the Hindu Mahasabha. The leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha regarded the Sikhs as ‘Hindus’. At the annual session of the Hindu Mahasabha at Indore (1953), Master Tara Singh raised the question that if Sikhs were Hindus why the constitutional safeguards given to the Hindu Scheduled Castes were not given to the Sikh Scheduled Castes. Consequently, a unanimous resolution was passed in favour of giving the same concessions to the Sikh Scheduled Castes.24

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Master Tara Singh left Anandpur on the 1st of October and moved towards Delhi through Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, Jalandhar, Patiala, Ambala, Nabha, and Sangrur. He was close to Delhi on 15 November 1953 when the (p.479) government announced its decision to extend the concessions to all the Sikh Scheduled Castes. Thus, the morchā ended in a victory.25 Master Tara Singh’s letter of 4 April 1953 had urged the President to get the schedule in the Indian Constitution which provided special protection and rights to the depressed classes so amended that those privileges were extended to the Sikhs of the same classes. In a ‘professedly secular’ government there should be no discrimination on grounds of religion. He requested for a reply by 13 April because he had to give some ‘decisive advice’ to the Sikhs who were in a restive mood and it was necessary to give them some proof of the government’s ‘fair and non-discriminatory’ attitude. Otherwise, he would be obliged to ‘adopt some measure which may be interpreted as an ultimatum’. Rajendra Prasad sent Master Tara Singh’s letter to the Prime Minister on 5 April. On the same day, Nehru wrote back that Master Tara Singh’s letter ended with an ultimatum and it did not deserve a reply. The Secretary to the President could acknowledge the letter and say that it had been referred to the Home Ministry. Later, however, he said that ‘we should probably have no special objection to our considering this matter, provided the Punjab Government was willing to do so’. The President’s letter with its enclosure was sent to the Home Minister, K.N. Katju. In his reply on 10 April, Katju wrote that though it was generally believed that when a person converted to Sikhism he became equal with other Sikhs, yet a Dalit did not get rid of his backwardness and ignorance ‘by merely becoming a Sikh’. Therefore, Katju had no objection to reconsideration of the matter by the Government of India.26 On 12 October, Nehru wrote to K.N. Katju that Master Tara Singh was marching slowly towards Delhi with his jathā with the intention of launching a morchā in Delhi. The Shiromani Akali Dal had held a convention at Anandpur Sahib on 30 September 1953 and passed a resolution demanding equal treatment to the Sikh depressed classes by amending the President’s order of 1950. It was decided to start a morchā to press for the demand. Master Tara Singh talked vaguely of starting a hunger strike with his jathā in front of Nehru’s house in Delhi. Meanwhile, he was trying to build up a Sikh agitation. His stock, in Nehru’s assessment, had gone down recently and he was trying to build it up.27 In any case, it was necessary to work out a strategy to deal with Master Tara Singh. Nehru had discussed it with C.P.N. Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar. The question was at what stage to interfere and in what way. Nehru did not want things ‘to advance so far as to have Master Tara Singh at my gate’. He wanted Katju to consider all this and to confer with the Punjab and Delhi Governments on this subject.28

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Nehru himself wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 18 October that no steps should be taken against Master Tara Singh in Pepsu or in the Punjab now. It was too late and there was little reaction to Master Tara Singh’s morchā in Pepsu. In fact, the Akali Dal of Sampuran Singh Raman had called it a stunt and started a counter-morchā for a Punjabi-speaking state. Nevertheless, Master Tara Singh should not be allowed to enter Delhi. An order prohibiting his entry should be served to him, whatever the consequences.29 On the question of the so-called Sikh Scheduled Castes, they had been given all the privileges given to Hindu Scheduled Castes, with only one exception. This exception related to elections. The Government of India had no objection to their being (p.480) permitted to stand for the reserved seats. ‘We left it to the Punjab Government to decide.’ Sachar was inclined to think that nothing should be said or done that ‘might be construed as a triumph for Master Tara Singh’. In fact, Sachar had announced that this matter was being given favourable consideration by the Central Government. Therefore, in Nehru’s view the Central Government could issue a note to the effect that ‘we are considering this matter as well as some demands from other parts of India of certain castes (nonSikh) for inclusion in the list of Scheduled Castes favourably’. A reference could be made to an enabling provision for the next general elections. C.P.N. Singh agreed with Nehru and sent a draft statement on the lines suggested by him. But he added that the Punjab Cabinet appeared to be ‘very sensitive about letting any credit go to Master Tara Singh in this matter’. Some of the senior leaders could be invited for consultations before announcing the decision for a change in the Constitution, and a bill could be introduced in the Parliament session in March 1954.30 Katju confirmed that Kairon and Sachar did not wish to concede ‘a victory for Tara Singh’. Nehru told him that the matter should be treated as purely a Punjab and Central Government issue and there was no need to bring other states into the picture. There were two separate questions, one of the Sikh Scheduled Castes and the other of Master Tara Singh. The first was for the Punjab Government to decide. The more important question was the second: how to prevent Master Tara Singh from entering Delhi. It should be discussed with P.S. Rau and, if necessary, with the Punjab Government. Which of the governments was to arrest Master Tara Singh? That was the question. In any event, the Delhi administration should be instructed immediately that they should take all steps to issue a proper order to him.31 Gian Singh Rarewala informed Raghbir Singh that before Master Tara Singh and his jathā reached Delhi, his demands were likely to be met by the government because the Congress High Command wanted to reach a settlement with the National Front leaders in Pepsu before the elections. Nehru told Raghbir Singh that there was no such proposal. Rarewala was ‘wholly unreliable’. There was ‘no question of political settlement with Master Tara Singh’. The point he had Page 8 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation raised for the present was very minor. It had been under consideration for some time past and some decision would be taken irrespective of what Master Tara Singh might desire. ‘In any event, we do not propose to go out of our way to please Master Tara Singh.’32 On 6 November 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers that Master Tara Singh threatened to go on hunger strike so that ‘a trivial change’ might be made in regard to the Sikh Scheduled Castes.33 Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers on 15 November that he had paid a three-day visit to the Punjab. ‘The impression I get of East Punjab is that it is a stout, energetic and progressive State, which is going ahead at a fair pace.’ Nehru went on to add that Master Tara Singh’s demand about the Sikh backward groups had ‘absolutely no substance in logic or fact’. The question was such a trivial one that it was surprising that ‘it should be raised in this way’. The only question that remained to be taken up was that these Sikh backward classes might stand for election from the reserved seats. The general elections in the Punjab were not going to be held for three years. Therefore, the matter was not urgent. ‘I imagine that Master Tara Singh will not carry (p.481) out his threat of a hunger-strike. In any event, we are not going to submit to it.’34 Jawaharlal Nehru did not stop at minimizing the importance of the demand. He went on to ridicule and denounce Master Tara Singh. It was a misfortune of the Sikhs, he said, that one of their prominent leaders was Master Tara Singh whose outlook was ‘excessively narrow and limited’. His record of the past dozen years or more had shown a ‘remarkable consistency in doing the wrong thing’, which had done harm to the Sikhs. Before the Partition, he had flirted with the British Government, the Congress, and the Muslim League by turns with the result that ‘no one trusted him’.35 Nehru was not only trying to save faces but also to ensure that Master Tara Singh got no credit for obliging Nehru to extend political concessions to the Sikh Scheduled Castes, which was the crux of the whole issue.

President’s Rule and Elections in Pepsu (July 1952–May 1954) In a note for the Cabinet, Nehru wrote on 21 July 1952: There is at present a considerable agitation among Punjabi and the Pepsu Hindus, chiefly living in the plains part of the State for a merger with the Punjab. But any attempt to have this merger would immediately raise another problem, that of the Sikhs. Pepsu is the only State in India with a Sikh majority. If we merge it with another State, it will be said that we could not tolerate even one State with a Sikh majority. It would be unwise, for obvious political reasons to create this impression. On the other hand, the logic of the situation demanded that a great part of Pepsu should go to the Punjab, a bit of it might go to Delhi, and its mountainous part might go to Himachal Pradesh. Nehru looked upon the cultural features of the Page 9 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation mountainous areas of India as distinct from that of the plains. Himachal Pradesh, therefore, represented a distinct entity.36 The Pepsu Congress Workers Convention at Bhatinda on 20 July 1952 was attended by the Congress leaders like Lal Bahadur Shastri, Balvantray Mehta, Partap Singh Kairon, and Swaran Singh. A resolution was passed, demanding abolition of the office of the Rajpramukh and stoppage of privy purses. But the resolution for the merger of Pepsu with the Punjab was disallowed by the President of the convention ‘in the broader interests of the country and the organization’. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Partap Singh Kairon and Brish Bhan that though much could be said for this merger and perhaps ultimately it would have to take place, in the present it seemed to be an unwise step. The issue of ‘provincial redistribution’ was likely ‘to raise a storm in many parts of India’. Nehru had already written to Balvantray Mehta: ‘The real difficulty is that Pepsu today is the only province with a Sikh majority. To put an end to it would become a matter for considerable agitation among the Sikhs and would give a handle to Master Tara Singh.’37 The United Front Ministry of Gian Singh Rarewala survived a no-confidence motion in July 1952. The second session of the Pepsu Legislative Assembly, which started on 19 November, was to continue up to the 28th. However, on 25 November the opposition tabled a notice of no-confidence against the Speaker who, on the Chief Minister’s authority, adjourned the House sine die. Nehru told K.N. Katju that the Rajpramukh too was a party to this game. The case should have been referred to the States Ministry. Nehru advised Katju to demand an explanation from them. ‘If we (p.482) delay in taking action, the Central Government’s reputation in Pepsu will disappear.’38 On 3 December 1952, Nehru wrote to Gian Singh Rarewala that he was deeply shocked by recent events in Pepsu which revealed a low standard of behaviour in our public life and ‘the absence of any standard in Pepsu’.39 Nehru wrote to the Rajpramukh of Patiala on 9 December that he was much exercised at ‘the progressive deterioration of the situation in Pepsu’. The problem of general law and order and communalism was becoming increasingly serious. He had not interfered in any way because there was a non-Congress government in Pepsu. But this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue for long.40 This was a serious warning. Nehru soon discovered that ‘our own people’ (the Pepsu Congress) could also descend to low levels in their attempts to become Ministers. They had offered a Ministership to Manjitinder Singh, the younger brother of the Raja of Faridkot, who was an independent member of the Pepsu Assembly. In this respect the Congress leaders were no different from Gian Singh Rarewala who had offered Home Ministership to Manjitinder Singh to save his Ministry from falling.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Master Tara Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh had also appealed to Manjitinder Singh to extend his support to Rarewala. Nehru decided to impose President’s rule on Pepsu. He told Balvantray Mehta on 17 December that it would not be possible for any Ministry to carry on in Pepsu. Therefore, the President will have to take charge. On 22 December, the House reassembled on the demand of the majority. Tirath Singh and Brish Bhan were allowed to make no-confidence motions on the charge of failure to maintain law and order in the state, resulting in constant danger to the life and property of the people.41 The motions failed because two members of the opposition crossed over to be sworn in as Ministers.42 Nevertheless, the President dissolved the assembly under Article 356 on 5 March 1953 and declared President’s rule. Rarewala had resigned on 1 March 1953.43 Nehru justified the imposition of President’s rule in Pepsu in a letter to the Chief Ministers on 3 March 1953. After the elections of 1952, the parties in the Pepsu Assembly were rather evenly balanced. Some members were always prepared to offer their support to the highest bidder. Public life in Pepsu became a nasty affair. Furthermore, a number of members were unseated by the election tribunals, including the Chief Minister and some other Ministers. A large number of election petitions were still pending. Out of sixty-five members, twenty-five were likely to be unseated. ‘To have twenty-five by-elections and then possibly to have to face instability still in government hardly appears desirable. ‘We are therefore, driven to the conclusion that there should be general elections in Pepsu and we hope they will result in some party emerging with a majority.’ Actually, not ‘some party’ but the Congress Party in Nehru’s calculation was expected to win after the President’s rule. Nevertheless, Nehru asserted that the President’s rule in Pepsu had ‘nothing to do with showing favour or disfavour to any party or group’. It was ‘the natural consequence of the present impasse’. Nehru had no doubt that it would be criticized ‘as if it was meant to discriminate against a Sikh Ministry’.44 Whether or not against a Sikh Ministry, the decision was certainly in favour of the Pepsu Pradesh Congress. On 8 March 1953, eighty-two Akali members of the SGPC issued a statement that the imposition of President’s rule in Pepsu was (p.483) a ‘gross misuse’ of the Emergency powers of the President, and warned the government of ‘serious consequences’ of the action on the minds of the Sikhs and in the country as a whole. They underlined that Rarewala’s election had been set aside when the United Front still had twenty-seven out of fifty-one members in the assembly and expected to win the by-elections in Nalagarh and Lehra Gaga. There was a huge demonstration in Patiala led by a former Minister, Bhupinder Singh Mann, against the imposition of President’s rule. It was rightly contended that the United Front Party should have been allowed to elect a new leader or Gian Singh Rarewala should have been allowed to continue to be the Chief Minister with the direction to get elected from another constituency within six months. But this Page 11 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation was not done. The imposition of President’s rule was unconstitutional, and it was imposed for some ulterior motive.45 The Spokesman of 16 March 1953 presented the Sikh point of view on the position of the Rajpramukh in this episode. The Congress did not have a majority in the Pepsu Assembly after the elections of 1952 but the Rajpramukh installed a Congress Ministry. There was a hue and cry. The Congress Party could not survive the first budget. Since the Rajpramukh could not lend undue support to them now, he was dubbed as an ally of the Akalis, ‘a red rag to the Congress bulls’. Efforts were made to displace the Rajpramukh. The Akalis raised their voice in his favour because he was being made a victim of communalism, even though he had done his best to placate his Congress bosses. He had been lauded as the biggest patriot for his role in the integration of princely states. He was a nice man when he installed the Congress opportunists in the saddle in spite of their being in minority. But he was not needed when he refused to act unconstitutionally.46 The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal passed a resolution in protest against the suspension of the Constitution despite the fact that the United Front Party had the majority, and it could run the government. ‘There is a calculated design’, it was said in the resolution, ‘to suppress the Sikh community.’ It was clear now to everybody that the Sikhs were not communal but victims of communalism and ‘the aggressive tyranny of the Congress majority’. The Congress appeared now in its true colours.47 The sequence of events suggests a deliberate design. The Rajpramukh was pressurized to write to the States Ministry that President’s rule had become necessary in view of the law and order situation in Pepsu. He, in turn, put pressure on Gian Singh Rarewala to resign without taking the Cabinet into confidence. When the United Front Party of the assembly met on 5 March to elect a new leader, it found that the Constitution had been suspended. Therefore, the resolutions of the Party related to condemnation of this ‘unconstitutional act’ of the Government of India. The strength of the Party was still twenty-six in the house of fifty-one, apart from the Speaker. The United Front was in a position to carry on the work of the government and to pass the budget in the session scheduled to be held on 16 March. But the Government of India disallowed the representatives of the people of the state to form their own government. ‘There remains no doubt that this action has been taken with deliberate design to suppress and eliminate non-Congress elements and rehabilitate the decaying Congress in the State.’48 It is interesting to note that the arguments of the United Front and their supporters were constitutional, and Jawaharlal Nehru was (p.484) underscoring, for a change, what he regarded as the moral dimension of the situation to justify an unconstitutional act.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation The Lok Sabha approved of the President’s rule in Pepsu on 12 March 1953 and the Rajya Sabha approved of it on 26 March. In both the Houses, several members criticized the imposition of President’s rule on various grounds. The law and order situation in Pepsu was not exceptional; therefore, the action taken by the government was an ‘arbitrary intervention’. The Rajpramukh had sent his report under pressure from the Centre. The suspension of Constitution was ‘undemocratic and unconstitutional’. Kailas Nath Katju merely reiterated what Nehru had been saying. P.S. Rau, who had come to Patiala as Adviser to the Rajpramukh, stated his objectives in terms which implied that there was hardly anything right in the state. The rule of the President, he said, was a temporary measure designed to put down violence and lawlessness, re-establish the rule of law, discourage communalism, eradicate corruption in the public services, and generally, restore decencies of public life in the state.49 No justification for President’s rule could be given in terms of its constitutional validity. In September 1953, Presidential rule was extended for six months more. The old pattern of debate followed in both the Houses. B.R. Ambedkar was emphatic that the government had failed to provide adequate basis for the measure. An undue advantage of Article 356 was being taken. Sardar Hukam Singh said that the government had adopted this course to ensure that the Congress returned to power. The government was encouraging ‘communalism’ in the state by importing officers of the Adviser’s choice from outside and victimizing officers of the Sikh community. Another MP referred to President’s rule as a ‘smoke screen’ for consolidating the position of the Congress in Pepsu. During the first three months of Rau’s administration, 161 outlaws were declared to have died in armed encounters. But it was suspected that all such ‘encounters’ were not genuine. Bhupinder Singh Mann underlined that the administration was trying to get undue credit in its report on the prevalence and suppression of crime. For civil administration, the number of districts was reduced from eight to five, and the number of tehsils from twenty-four to sixteen. Action was taken against a score of ‘inefficient’ officers, and some junior officers were given promotions. A number of Acts were passed by the President in exercise of the powers conferred on him by the Pepsu Legislative (Delegation of Powers) Act 1953. Rau helped the Pradesh Congress leaders consolidate their position in Pepsu. D.K. Baroah and some of the Punjab Congress leaders, like Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir and Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, visited Pepsu in order to strengthen the local organization. The ‘Congressization’ of the state helped the Pradesh Congress to perform better in the elections of February 1954.50 Before the elections, Jawaharlal Nehru came to campaign in Pepsu. In the last week of December 1953 he was in Fatehgarh Sahib, ‘a famous gurdwara in Pepsu’, as he told the Chief Ministers. What happened there was ‘serious enough’ to be taken notice of by the press. ‘It was a deliberate attempt by the Page 13 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation violence of a few to prevent the great majority from functioning.’ That was not only violence but violence of the fascist type. A challenge of this kind could not be ignored by any government. Though Master Tara Singh played an important part at Fatehgarh Sahib, the real organizer of the agitation was Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala. He had organized all (p.485) that happened and then quietly slipped away. Nehru concluded that it would be difficult to hold the general elections if such violence continued.51 Actually, Maharani Mohinder Kaur of Patiala had written to Jawaharlal Nehru that the incident at Fatehgarh Sahib was engineered by Gian Singh Rarewala. Nehru wrote back that he had no high opinion of Rarewala even earlier but after this incident he sank still lower in Nehru’s estimation. It was sad that ‘people of his type and Master Tara Singh’s utter irresponsibility should play an important role in public affairs’.52 Maharani Mohinder Kaur had also stated that the Akali Dal leaders and Gian Singh Rarewala were planning a demonstration at Fatehgarh Sahib during Nehru’s visit, and her father (Sardar Harchand Singh Jeji, who had known Master Tara Singh for many years) had tried to convince Master Tara Singh that the Prime Minister’s visit was ‘purely official’. Master Tara Singh said that his leadership was at stake and he could not withdraw his move. However, he gave his word that ‘nothing would be done inside the Gurdwara’.53 Master Tara Singh had his own view of the Fatehgarh Sahib incident. He does not refer to the actual incident which, he says, was well known. It was clear that Nehru had come to the gurdwara at Fatehgarh Sahib not on his own volition but on the invitation of the Rajpramukh of Pepsu. In other words, he did not come with any sense of devotion. He had never come to this gurdwara before on his way to Ropar or Bhakra. He came on the eve of the elections. He did not go inside the gurdwara building for offering bhet to Guru Granth Sahib. Also, nazrānas were presented to him by Congress leaders. This was a denigration of the Sikh faith. Indeed, flowers were showered on him and slogans were shouted in his honour. The gurdwara was being treated as a platform for Congress propaganda. Master Tara Singh appealed to Pandit Nehru and other Congress ‘rulers’ not to follow the colonial practice of using the Sikh gurdwaras and Gurpurabs for flattering ‘the rulers’ of the day. He warned the sycophants not to misuse and desecrate gurdwaras for their political and personal purposes. The real issue was whether or not the Sikh sacred spaces could be used for personal or secular purposes. Master Tara Singh’s own answer was an emphatic ‘no’.54 Nehru wrote to Katju on 29 December 1953 that he had been warned before the incident and made up his mind not to lose his temper. Therefore, he was rather amused at the folly of other people, ‘notably that clown, Tara Singh’. But some aspects of this matter deserved further consideration. Master Tara Singh and his Akalis were saying that they would make it impossible for the Congress to hold meetings, putting a premium on violence. This could not be allowed to go on. Page 14 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Nehru had gone to Fatehgarh Sahib because the Maharani of Patiala had personally conveyed to him the request of the Maharaja of Patiala. Therefore, the visit was in a sense official. Intelligence had reported that Master Tara Singh wanted to create trouble. P.S. Rau himself telephoned from Fatehgarh Sahib at midnight to tell him that the Akalis were bent on trouble. Yet adequate security arrangements were not made. Though the intelligent people were disgusted with Master Tara Singh, ‘the hooligan elements’ were possibly encouraged to think: Here is the Prime Minister, the Rajpramukh, the Administrator, all the senior police officials and others challenged face to face by Tara Singh and Tara Singh succeeded in preventing what had been arranged. (p.486) It rankled. Master Tara Singh had been given ‘too long a rope’. His pretentions should end now. Nehru told the Home Minister that the Government of Pepsu should be asked about the action they proposed to take in regard to Fatehgarh Sahib. The Punjab Government was to be consulted about possible future action. The Bombay Government should also be asked what they proposed to do about Master Tara Singh’s speech in Bombay in which he had openly advocated violence. Master Tara Singh was reported to have said that if the Central Government did not accede to Akali demand for a Punjabi-speaking state then they would get it through ‘the force of their arms’.55 Incidentally, ‘the force of their arms’ was a metaphor, but it was taken literally by Nehru. On 12 February 1954, Jawaharlal Nehru was again touring Pepsu, addressing crowds at several places. He referred to the miserable failure of the United Front and reestablishment of law and order under President’s rule. Some other parties exploited the people in the name of religion but the Congress thought of their poverty and backwardness in order to improve their economic position: ‘In free India we have given equal status to all men and women, irrespective of their creeds or their religions.’ They should all help in building a bigger and a greater India of which they could feel proud. They could do this by returning the Congress to power so that they had a stable government to do something constructive. Nehru said that he felt sure that the people of Pepsu would desire to have the kind of peaceful atmosphere brought about by President’s rule. ‘This would happen if the Congress is returned to power.’56 Thus, Nehru invoked the blessings of President’s rule as an argument for bringing the Congress into power. Indeed, P.S. Rau was suitably rewarded for his services to the Congress. Nehru wrote to Colonel Raghbir Singh on 20 May 1954 that Rau had done excellent work in Pepsu. Therefore, he was given ‘a very unusual reward by the President for his work in Pepsu’. This was Padma Vibhushan, ‘our new award which was rarely given’. Rau had established ‘efficient administration’ and introduced ‘progressive legislation’. Nehru expected Colonel Raghbir Singh as the Congress Chief Minister to keep up the tempo and ‘go ahead with the land legislation Page 15 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation initiated during Rau’s regime by Presidential orders’.57 Nehru had the satisfaction of keeping the Akalis out of power in the ‘Sikh Homeland’ created by Patel.

Akali–Congress Tussle over the SGPC Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his anxiety about ‘the question of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee’. The election of its President was scheduled for 29 June 1952. Nehru wrote to Kairon: It is patent to anyone that a victory of Master Tara Singh would be bad. It is also patent that in order to avoid this, you and Udham Singh Nagoke must pull together. Again, your dislike of Nagoke prevents any cooperation with him. Meanwhile things go from bad to worse. Recent developments clearly show that Tara Singh’s nominees are gaining strength and Nagoke’s men are being pushed out. The obvious course was for you and Nagoke to come to an understanding and stand by it. I am not interested in any individual. But I am interested in larger forces and in communalism not being allowed to gain the upper hand.58 Nehru suggested that Kairon should devote himself to ‘the SGPC matter’ instead of coming for the meeting of the Congress Working Committee, which was scheduled to be held (p.487) on 28 June, a day before the SGPC elections. According to the information received by Nehru, Nahar Singh, who was elected temporarily as President of the SGPC, had aligned himself with the Akali group or, at any rate, he was opposing the Nagoke group. This could ‘result in the Akalis gaining control’.59 On 19 June, Nehru wrote to Udham Singh Nagoke, the former President of the SGPC, that nomination of Ishar Singh Majhail as a candidate for Presidentship was likely to meet with considerable opposition. The question was not whether or not it was justified. ‘You will remember the difficultly we had in selecting him as a candidate during the last elections. I hope, therefore, the candidate put forward would be one who could claim the confidence and good will of as large a section of the Sikhs as possible and more particularly you and Sardar Partap Singh will agree about it.’60 On 29 June, Nahar Singh, acting President of the SGPC, who was regarded as a nominee of the Nagoke group, was elected President. Master Tara Singh’s nominee, Jathedar Achhar Singh, was defeated by seventy-five against seventy-two votes.61 Nehru was so keen on curbing ‘communalism’ that he set aside his secular stance and interfered in the affairs of the SGPC as a matter of course. He created a legacy to be cherished by Partap Singh Kairon as the Chief Minister with Nehru’s support. There is enough justification for Ajit Singh Sarhadi’s observation that the socalled nationalist Sikhs headed by Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke, who exercised control over the SGPC, were ‘kept in power by the ruling party in the State by all possible means’. In the annual elections of the SGPC in October Page 16 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation 1952, certain members of the SGPC broke away from the Nagoke group due to the growing Sikh support for Punjabi Suba. The nominee of the Akali Dal, Jathedar Pritam Singh Khuranj, was elected President in December 1952.62 Thus, the Akalis regained control of this major statutory body of the Sikhs which could play a major role in the body politic of the Punjab. Before the elections of the SGPC in October 1952, there was a report of talks between Partap Singh Kairon and Master Tara Singh. Nehru was surprised to read this report. He wrote to Kairon, simply asking him what it was all about. He also pointed out that it was not a safe business even to have talks with Master Tara Singh because ‘he would exploit them to his advantage’. Nehru told Sachar that it was ‘our definite policy’ not to have any dealing with ‘communal groups’. His mind was very clear in this matter. ‘Recently there was a faint attempt in Madras and talks with the Muslim League there. I objected to this very strongly.’63 He wrote to Kairon on 14 October that he was sorry to learn that their joint efforts ‘did not succeed in the SGPC elections’. This was unfortunate but ‘we need not take it too tragically’.64 War against ‘communalism’ was to continue. Early in 1953, Sardar Darbara Singh, a member of the Congress Party, introduced a Bill in the Legislative Assembly to provide for no-confidence motion against the officebearers and the members of the executive committee of the SGPC if they lost majority. Wazir Singh, an Akali member, pointed out that the sole object of the proposed amendment was to take away the control of gurdwaras by an indirect method. But the Bill was passed, followed by a noconfidence motion by Jathedar Ishar Singh Majhail as the leader of the proCongress group in the SGPC. He was able to assume control over the SGPC.65 In October 1953 the Congress Party passed another amendment Bill to empower the SGPC to co-opt eight members from Pepsu. (p.488) These members were earlier nominated by the Rajpramukh on the advice of the Chief Minister. An Akali member, Sardar Sarup Singh, pointed out that the Congress leadership was misusing its power in the Legislative Assembly in the interest of the Party. Through yet another amendment proposed by Bhim Sen Sachar as the Chief Minister in March 1954, the government was authorized to remove any member of the Sikh Gurdwara Judicial Commission on the grounds of incompetence. Sohan Singh Josh pointed out that the Bill was meant to help the ruling Congress group in the SGPC by providing a Commission that would be submissive to the government. In other words, the Congress Party was using its power to enable the Congressite Sikhs to establish a firm control over the SGPC. Soon after the amendment was passed, Buta Singh, Chairman of the Judicial Commission, was informed telegraphically that he was removed from office. Two more amendments showed clearly that the tactics of the Congress Government were aimed at winning the elections of 1954.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation In the elections held towards the end of 1954, the Khalsa Dal led by the Congressite Sikhs contested all the 132 seats but won only three. The Akali Dal headed by Master Tara Singh won all the 111 seats it contested. As an ally of the Akali Dal, the Desh Bhagat Board won seventeen seats. Within the Akali Dal, Master Tara Singh led the official group but Giani Kartar Singh headed an unofficial group. Both the leaders had worked hard for the success of their candidates. In the Khalsa Dal too there were two groups. The official group was led by Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke and the unofficial group by Sardar Partap Singh Kairon. They appealed to the voters on the basis of the schemes of the Congress Party for development, especially agriculture, and emphasized that politics should be separated from religion. Thus, they championed the ideals of economic development and secularism. The Shiromani Akali Dal fought the elections on the issues of the Punjabispeaking state, discrimination against the Sikhs, and the autonomy of Sikh gurdwaras. Master Tara Singh underlined that the existence of the Sikhs as a collective entity was in danger. The voters were asked to choose between Guru Gobind Singh and Mahatma Gandhi. Master Tara Singh asserted that the Congress Government was interfering in the gurdwara elections as if a great political issue was involved in the control of gurdwaras. The results of the elections showed that Master Tara Singh had re-emerged as the supreme leader of the Sikhs. At the end of the elections Master Tara Singh observed that the government had used its influence and patronage in favour of the Khalsa Dal. Even the non-Sikh ministers canvassed for its candidates, and many government officials helped them ‘at the instance of their masters’. The elections could be seen as a vote of no-confidence against the Sikh ministers who had supported the Khalsa Dal. There was no justification for them to remain in office. He declared that the gurdwara elections had secured Panthic unity and the Sikhs were in favour of creating a Punjabi-speaking state. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Chief Ministers on 9 December 1954: The recent elections for the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee have come to everyone, including I think the Akali Dal, as a surprise. I know little about them and was in no way directly concerned. I viewed the prospect distantly. It is no concern of mine what the Sikhs or others do in connection with their religious faith. But it is very (p.489) great concern of all of us how far communal and separatist tendencies grow in this country. There can be no doubt that the forces that triumphed in the SGPC were intensely communal, even though they might not be wholly separatist. They represent a mentality which has no place today in India and which can only lead to evil results.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation We can see how Nehru justified to himself, and tried to justify to others, his intervention in the affairs of the SGPC through his instruments in the Punjab. To influence the opinion of Governors in all the states of the Indian Union he went on to compare the Akali Dal with the Muslim League: ‘The activities of the Akali Dal and its leaders are singularly like those of the Muslim League.’66 It seems that Nehru did not mind hitting his opponents below the belt.

The Issue of Linguistic States At Calcutta on 20 October 1952, Sardar Hukam Singh mentioned three demands of the Akalis. The first was a Punjabi-speaking state. He clarified that the Akalis were not asking for a separate state. Their demand for the redistribution of the present Punjab had ‘a cultural and linguistic basis’. According to Hukam Singh, ten out of thirteen districts were Punjabi-speaking. The proposed Punjabispeaking state would include the Punjabi-speaking districts of the Punjab, Pepsu, and the Punjabi area of Rajasthan. Evidently, he was not thinking of a Sikhmajority state. The second demand of the Sikhs, he said, was that the Sikh Scheduled Castes should have the same privileges as the Hindu Scheduled Castes so that there was no fear of conversion of Sikh Scheduled Castes to Hinduism. The third demand of the Sikhs was that some competent officer might be appointed to ensure that there was no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of religion in relation to government service.67 In a statement at Patna on 30 December 1952, Master Tara Singh elucidated the stand of the Akali Dal. It had been grossly misrepresented, he said, by certain sections of the press in the Punjab which gave a communal tinge to the demand for Punjabi Suba. All that he had demanded all these years was ‘the creation of a Punjabi-speaking State by taking certain portions of the present Punjab and Pepsu and forming them into one administrative unit’. His proposal was expected to foster peaceful relations between Hindus and Sikhs and to result in greater administrative efficiency and better economy. However, there was no urgency because ‘war clouds are gathering on the Indian horizon’.68 Sardar Ajit Singh, an MP from Pepsu, wrote to the Prime Minister on 27 October 1953 to express his concern for Sampuran Singh Raman’s fast unto death on the issue of Punjabi-speaking state. Nehru responded promptly that it had been announced in Parliament that a high-powered commission should be appointed to consider the question of reorganization of states in India. As Prime Minister he could not function in defiance of Parliament. He could not take any important decision due to some particular pressure on him. He expected Ajit Singh to appreciate the Prime Minister’s position and explain it also to Jathedar Raman.69 The principle of linguistic states had a long history since 1920. The Constituent Assembly rejected the principle but the issue did not die. The oldest case of the demand for a linguistic state was that of Andhra; it became a crucial case for others. Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers on 16 June 1952 that the question Page 19 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation had been raised by a three-week (p.490) fast of Swami Sitaram of Andhra. In Nehru’s view, the matter of linguistic states was too complicated to be resolved by fasts. It was obvious that linguistic provinces could not be created ‘at the point of the bayonet’. A general agreement between the parties concerned was necessary. In the case of Andhra, the government was prepared to help in its formation but the people of Rayalaseema were opposed to it and the people of Madras were opposed to the inclusion of the Madras city in Andhra.70 In the Parliamentary debate on 7 July 1952, Nehru reiterated: ‘I am all in favour of the Andhra province. But what will happen if you take the votes of the Andhras and the Tamilians and others in regard to the issue and conflict like Madras?’71 On 21 July, Nehru intervened in the debate on a resolution for the immediate formation of Andhra state. He reminded the House that such a recommendation was made in November 1949 and a Partition Committee was appointed, but it could not be implemented because the people of Tamil Nadu would not give up Madras city and the people of Rayalaseema were opposed to the formation of such a state unless Madras city was included in it. Nehru was strongly opposed to coercion.72 On 3 December 1952, Nehru wrote to C. Rajagopalachari that some kind of a fast was going on for the Andhra province and he was getting frantic telegrams. But he was ‘totally unmoved’ and proposed to ignore the threat. Nehru wrote to V.V. Giri on 7 December that he could not announce government’s decision in such matters simply because a fast was undertaken. On the same day, he wrote to the Governor of Madras, Sri Prakasa, that it was ‘impossible for a Government to function under threats of hunger strikes and the like’. Sri Prakasa had informed him that the condition of Sriramula (who was on fast unto death) was very grave and he would listen to none except Nehru.73 On 8 December, Nehru made a statement in Parliament and appealed to Sriramula and all those who were interested in this matter to achieve their objective by ‘more legitimate ways’.74 On 9 December again Nehru stated that the government could not impose its will ‘on any large section of the people’. The method of fasting to achieve administrative or political changes, once accepted, was likely to lead to great difficulties. ‘In the ultimate analysis it really puts an end to parliamentary or democratic government.’75 On 12 December, he wrote to Rajagopalachari that a formal commission could be appointed ‘to go into the question fully from every point of view’.76 Potti Sriramula, who had undertaken his fast on 19 October, died on 15 December. In his statement in Parliament on 16 December, Nehru said, ‘we are perfectly prepared to go ahead’ with the creation of Andhra on the basis of the Report of the J.V.P., the committee formed by the Indian National Congress, consisting of Jawahar Lal Nehru, Vallabh Bhai Patel, and Pattabhi Sitaramayya, which had been published some two and a half years ago.77 On 17 December, Nehru referred to certain disturbances and large-scale destruction of property Page 20 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation following Sriramula’s death but he stuck to his view that grave situations were not met by the government ‘being hurried into action without due thought’.78 However, on the same day he wrote to Rajendra Prasad that ‘things have blown up’ and as a first step ‘we should appoint a high judicial officer to look into the matter to suggest the next step’. There would be other demands for linguistic provinces in the near future and Nehru was prepared to consider them on the same basis. However, he would like to keep the Andhra (p.491) quite separate from others.79 On 19 December, Nehru stated in the Lok Sabha that the government was appointing Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice of the High Court in Rajasthan, to consider and report on the financial and other implications of this decision and the questions to be considered in implementing it. Justice Wanchoo submitted his report on 7 February 1953, and after its consideration by the government it was published with Nehru’s comments on 25 March 1953.80 After the creation of the Andhra state there were demands for linguistic states all over India: Madras, Kerala, Gujarat, Kannad-speaking people, and Marathispeaking people. Addressing the Congress legislators and workers of Chennai on 2 October 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru said, ‘we are going to appoint a high-powered commission’ to go into the matter of reorganization of states. He admitted that he had been overtaken by events for he had hoped that the appointment of such a commission would be delayed for at least ten years. He added that linguistic divisions could turn out to be ridiculous from the economic and administrative points of view. Therefore, language alone could not be the criterion for reorganization. Nehru went on to say that he was opposed to the ‘emotional slogan-raising approach’ and even more to the ‘hunger-striking approach’ to this problem.81 Nehru selected the Chairman and two members of the Commission in November–December 1953. He wrote to Saiyid Fazl Ali on 16 November that he had consulted the President and the Home Minister for inviting Fazl Ali to be Chairman of the proposed Commission for the reorganization of states. It was meant to draw up a new map of India and, therefore, it was of the highest importance. On 25 November, Nehru thanked Fazl Ali for accepting the Chairmanship and said that he would like him to return to Orissa as Governor after the work of the Commission was over. He added that the Commission would have to face major problems in relation to Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Kerala. Then there were some demands in the north. There was Pepsu, rather absurd with little bits and patches all over. The primary considerations were ‘the unity and security of the country plus the economic development’. The criterion of security applied specially to the border areas, like the Punjab, and ‘obviously we have to take into consideration a number of special factors’.82 Was Nehru deliberately giving informal guidelines to the Chairman?

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation To K.M. Panikkar, Nehru wrote in a friendly tone. The work of the proposed Commission was vital enough ‘to affect the whole future of India’. The Commission would have the widest discretion ‘to consider the whole problem of India in all its aspects’. Apart from its formal terms of reference, there might be ‘an instrument of instructions for the guidance of the Commission’. The linguistic or rather cultural aspect was there, and it had to be faced. The other considerations were, first of all, the unity of India; then the national security and defence; financial considerations and economic progress. There were boundary problems, as between Andhra, Mysore, Madras, and Orissa; similar problems between Orissa and Bihar; between Bengal and Bihar. There was ‘a talk of the Punjabi-province’ and the ‘incongruity of Pepsu’. Panikkar could be of great service in this matter as a member of the Commission.83 The third member of the Commission was Hriday Nath Kunzru, who was well-known to Nehru and who was familiar with his views. On 22 December 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement on the appointment of the ‘Commission for the Reorganization of States’. (p.492) He was averse to the use of the term ‘linguistic states’. ‘The language and culture of an area’, he said, ‘have an undoubted importance as they represent a pattern of living which is common in that area.’ In considering reorganization of states, however, there were other important factors which had to be borne in mind. The essential considerations were the preservation and strengthening of the unity and security of India. Almost equally important were financial, economic, and administrative considerations, not only from the point of view of each state but for the whole nation. In this statement language and culture are mentioned first of all, but they appear to be the last in terms of importance. The Government of India had come to the conclusion that the whole question of reorganization of the states ‘should be carefully examined, objectively and dispassionately, so that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit, as well as of the nation as a whole, is promoted’. The Commission consisting of Saiyid Fazl Ali, Governor of Orissa, Hriday Nath Kunzru, Member of the Council of States, and K.M. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador in Egypt, was expected to make its recommendations to the Government of India as early as possible and not later than 30 June 1955.84 The SRC (States Reorganisation Commission) invited memoranda from the public, individually and collectively, on 23 February 1954. All concrete suggestions were expected to be ‘supported by historical and statistical data’. Any proposal relating to reorganization could be made to the Commission. Therefore, all kinds of representations were made by individuals and organizations. On 26 December 1953, Rai Bahadur Badri Dass, an Arya Samajist leader, had initiated the idea of Maha Punjab, laying stress on the merger of East Punjab, Pepsu, and Himachal Pradesh. Presiding over the Vishal Punjab Samelan at Ambala, Badri Dass posed five questions to be seriously considered: whether or not a new linguistic province would result in administrative Page 22 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation convenience; whether or not the people would gain in any manner from its creation; whether or not the demand was unanimous; whether or not the demand was based on any communal or religious consideration; and whether or not it would have a good effect on India as a whole.85 Significantly, in view of the ideas expressed by Nehru in public, all these questions are loaded. The language factor is eliminated and the Sikh demand for Punjabi-speaking state becomes a ‘communal’ demand as it was not acceptable to a large section of the population. It had no justification. The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal drew up its memorandum. Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Senior Vice-President of Shiromani Akali Dal, says that there were certainly a few members who thought in terms of Sikh percentage in the proposed Punjabi-speaking province, but the majority were keen to have an area where Punjabi was spoken by the overwhelming majority of the people irrespective of their religious affiliation. That the demand was primarily linguistic is evident from the fact that the Sikhs were not more than 40 per cent in the area covered by the proposed Punjabi Suba.86 The Akali memorandum quoted figures from the census reports of the forty years from 1891 to 1931 when the returns were most authentic. In the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana, and Ferozpore the Punjabi-speaking population was more than 90 per cent. In the area covered by the districts of Patiala, Barnala, Bathinda, Fatehgarh Sahib, Kapurthala, and Sangrur the Punjabi-speaking population was no less than 80 per cent. The Ganganagar (p.493) colony in Rajasthan was predominantly Punjabi-speaking. Parts of Ambala, Karnal, and Hissar were also included in the proposed linguistic state. What is important here is not the accuracy of the figures but the fact that the argument presented by the Akali Dal was based on language and not the percentage of Sikhs in the proposed area. The Arya Samaj and the Jan Sangh submitted memoranda in favour of Maha Punjab. What is more significant, the Punjab Pradesh Congress and even the Punjab Government supported the proposal for integration of Punjab, Pepsu, and Himachal Pradesh. Thus, their position was very close to that of the Arya Samaj and the Jan Sangh. The Pepsu Government in its memorandum to the SRC argued in favour of retaining Pepsu as a separate state. One of the arguments put forth in this memorandum was that if Pepsu was merged with the Punjab, the Sikhs of Pepsu, more than one and a half million, were likely ‘to fall an easy prey to the communal politics of the Akali Dal and Master Tara Singh’. Colonel Raghbir Singh, the Chief Minister, strongly pleaded in November 1954 for the retention of Pepsu. The Pepsu Pradesh Congress was divided between those who wanted Pepsu to be merged with the Punjab and those who advocated the merger of Himachal Pradesh, Pepsu, and the Punjab. Brish Bhan was among the former, Page 23 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation and Hans Raj Sharma among the latter. The Akali leaders in Pepsu were in favour of merger of the Punjabi-speaking areas of Pepsu, Rajasthan, and the Punjab. Jathedar Sampuran Singh Raman of the Riasati Akali Dal stood for the merger of the Punjabi-speaking areas of Pepsu with the Punjabi-speaking areas of the Punjab. He rejected the idea of Maha Punjab on the argument that a Punjabi-speaking state would surely stimulate Punjabi consciousness of the Punjabis ‘irrespective of their caste and creed’ and it would ensure ‘their social and political solidarity’. The memorandum of the Riasati Akali Dal underlined that it was in national interest to create a strong, contented, and prosperous state ‘inhabited by the people who are animated by common ideals, can think alike, then act alike and do not suffer from mistrust and distrust of each other’. Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran favoured an expanded Pepsu, merging with it the Punjabi-speaking areas of the Punjab and Rajasthan.87 This proposal was almost the same as that of the Shiromani Akali Dal, but with a difference in its implication. Jathedar Gojran’s proposal was meant to ensure that the Pepsu language formula should prevail in the proposed Punjabi-speaking state. There were other parties and other proposals in both Pepsu and the Punjab but, on the whole, the two major contending ideas which appeared to emerge were a Punjabi-speaking state and Maha Punjab. The leaders of both these opinions were guided by their respective political aspirations and concerns for language. Tension was mounting between the two groups before the end of 1954.

Master Tara Singh’s Triumph: The Akali Morchā of 1955 On 31 December 1954, a procession taken out at Ludhiana on the birth anniversary of Guru Gobind Singh was subjected to brickbats from rooftops in a congested Hindu residential area. Several days before the incident, a local Arya Samajist leader, Kali Charan, had been threatening that he would not allow the Akalis to shout any objectionable slogan. After the incident, it was deliberately given out that the Akali processionists were shouting provocative slogans, like ‘khandākhaṛkū, (p.494) Nehru bhajjū’, and ‘dhotī topī Jamnā pār’, and also that they looted shops and resorted to violence. But even the government admitted that the attack on the procession was totally unjustified. Nevertheless, the government did not want the Akalis to shout slogans in favour of Punjabi Suba in view of the expected visit of the SRC during March–April 1955. Kali Charan was reported to have said that he was a Congressman and his leader was Bhim Sen Sachar. They were campaigning for Maha Punjab in order to oppose the ‘communal demand’ for Punjabi Suba. The Akali newspapers wanted Sachar to confirm or to deny, but he remained silent. The Home Secretary of the Punjab had interfered with the functioning of the SGPC in January 1955. The new leaders of the SGPC asked the government to undo what the Home Secretary had wrongly done. Master Tara Singh asked Nehru for a personal meeting to sort out the Akali grievances. Nehru suggested a meeting with the Punjab Chief Minister in view of his own preoccupation with Page 24 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation an international conference abroad. A meeting between Sachar and Master Tara Singh was arranged on 21 January 1955. Sachar’s attitude was anything but friendly. He began to talk about the demand for Punjabi Suba and declared after the meeting that Master Tara Singh’s demand was for a Sikh state. The Congress and the Arya Samajist press began to denounce the Akali Dal and its leaders. During February and March 1955, Hindus and Sikhs went twice to Lahore to watch cricket matches. The Muslims of Pakistan treated the Sikhs better, which gave rise to stories carrying the implication that there was some kind of a conspiracy between the Sikhs and Pakistani Muslims. Even the Punjab Governor, C.P.N. Sinha, was so affected by this propaganda that he asked the Sikhs to clarify whether they were ‘Indian’ first or ‘Sikh’ first. Master Tara Singh proposed that land equal to the land owned by the gurdwaras in Pakistan should be attached to Kartarpur (Dera Baba Nanak), or some other gurdwara close to the border, and its management should be entrusted to the SGPC. This proposal had been made earlier by Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke as President of the SGPC, but now it was projected as another proof of conspiracy between the Akalis and Pakistan. The mud-slinging campaign was at its height when the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar imposed a ban on the shouting of slogans on 6 April 1955. Master Tara Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh issued an appeal to the Sikhs that they should not shout Punjabi Suba slogans in the procession to be taken out in Amritsar on the day of Baisakhi. When the procession reached the Clock Tower Chauk some mischief-mongers, brought by Kali Charan from Ludhiana, began to pelt pieces of bricks on the procession. Some young men in the procession began to shout ‘Punjabi Sūbā zindābād’, but the procession remained disciplined. The procession ended at Burj Akali Phula Singh where a huge dīwān was held. Master Tara Singh declared that attacks on processions would not be tolerated any more. He held Bhim Sen Sachar responsible for what had happened at Ludhiana earlier and now at Amritsar. The shouts of ‘Sachar murdābād’ were also raised. The police arrested only a few young men from amongst the attackers, but it arrested thirty-four Sikh young men. They made strong speeches after their arrest and refused to be released on bail. On the following day, a dīwān was held in Guru-ka-Bagh and Master Tara Singh gave the ultimatum that if the ban on slogans was not lifted the Akali Dal would launch a morchā against the ban. On 24 April 1955, (p.495) the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal resolved to launch a morchā if the government did not lift the ban within two weeks. Master Tara Singh was declared to be the ‘dictator’ of the morchā and authorized to conduct it in the way he liked. Bhim Sen Sachar could not take a decision on the ultimatum on his own. Diwan Chaman Lal called a meeting of the representatives of all the parties at Ludhiana on 1 May 1955. Kali Charan represented the Maha Punjab lobby and the Akalis Page 25 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation were represented by Gopal Singh Khalsa, Ram Dial Singh, and Ajmer Singh. It was decided that no slogans would be shouted in reaction to slogans shouted by any party. Bhim Sen Sachar indicated that he would lift the ban on slogans. He travelled to Delhi several times for three or four days and then, on 7 May, announced at Chandigarh that the government was not prepared to favour ‘the Akali communalists’ by withdrawing its orders. Presumably, this was the view taken by the Congress leaders at the Centre. The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal met on 7 May. It was attended by the district Jathedars and secretaries and a programme for the morchā was chalked out. An all-parties Convention was held at Ludhiana on 9 May under the Presidentship of Kidar Nath Sehgal, and it declared its support for the morchā. Late in the evening it was announced at the Akali headquarters that a jathā led by Master Tara Singh would court arrest on 10 May 1955. A dīwān was held at Manji Sahib at Guru-ka-Bagh in Amritsar in the evening. In the presence of about 200,000 people Master Tara Singh declared that time had come to make sacrifices for the honour and freedom of the Sikh Panth. He recommended four slogans for the morchā: ‘Punjabi Sūbā zindābād’, ‘Hindu–Sikh ektā zindābād’, ‘Āzād Bhārat zindābād’, and ‘Haryana prānt zindābād’. He also commanded that Section 144 should not be infringed. Shouting slogans, he led ten volunteers to court arrest. The morchā had begun. Before his arrest on 10 May 1955, Master Tara Singh left a message for the Sikhs. We want freedom but efforts are being made to put the chains of slavery on us. We ask for Punjabi Suba but we are not allowed even to mobilize support for the demand. We cannot even raise a slogan in its favour. Khalsa Ji! you must understand that all this is being done to destroy your sense of honour. This is the time to follow the path shown by Guru Tegh Bahadur, to offer your head in a peaceful manner. The fight was against the rulers who were full of pride but the Sikhs had faith in the Guru who had said that the oppressor of the poor shall be destroyed by God. This message, according to the contemporary chronicler of the morchā, electrified the whole Panth. This was the first sustained and successful morchā of the Akalis under Master Tara Singh’s leadership after Partition. The objective of the government was not merely to maintain peace and order but to crush the movement for the linguistic state and thereby to crush the Akalis. The Akali leaders were arrested to prevent them from mobilizing support for the morchā. Among those who were arrested in the first week of the morchā were Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara, VicePresident of the SGPC, and Ajit Singh Sarhadi. Principal Iqbal Singh, who had been made ‘dictator’ of the morchā after Master Tara Singh’s arrest, offered Page 26 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation himself for arrest a month later. During this one month, jathās were taken out every day and the size of the jathā had to be enlarged from time to time due to pressure from volunteers. On (p.496) 25 May, chosen as the ‘Punjabi Suba Day’, Jathedar Sampuran Singh Raman led a jathā of about 250 volunteers to court arrest. Bibi Joginder Kaur, a radio singer who used to inspire the volunteers, led a jathā of sixteen women volunteers. The movement spread to other parts of the Punjab, and Akali workers courted arrest in Ludhiana, Jalandhar, and Hoshiarpur. The suggestion of a round table conference, which originated from Sachar, was rejected by Principal Iqbal Singh. On 3 June, fiftyfour Singhs were arrested along with their Jathedar, Pritam Singh Khuranj, a former President of the SGPC. On 6 June, chosen as the ‘Miri-Piri Day’, 132 volunteers were arrested. The ‘dictator’ of the morchā, Principal Iqbal Singh, courted arrest on 10 June with 200 volunteers. Among the other ‘dictators’ who conducted the morchā in the absence of Master Tara Singh and Principal Iqbal Singh were Bhupinder Singh Mann, Mihan Singh Gill, Gur Raj Singh, Narinder Singh Bhuler, and Pritam Singh ‘Mofar’. Among the leaders who courted arrest during these days were Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran, Principal Ganga Singh, and Bhupinder Singh Mann. Sachar tried to persuade the ‘nationalist’ Sikhs to diffuse the morchā but they did not have the courage. On 24 June, the seventy-first birthday of Master Tara Singh, 271 (71 + 200) volunteers courted arrest. By 30 June 1955, more than 8,000 persons had been arrested. The government was becoming desperate day by day. Finally, in the first week of July it resorted to drastic measures. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ashwini Kumar, was allowed to have a free hand for suppressing the morchā. On the night of 3 July the police arrested Giani Bhupinder Singh, Head Granthi of the Darbar Sahib, and Jathedar Achhar Singh, Jathedar of the Akal Takht, along with the manager of the Darbar Sahib and two secretaries of the SGPC. Early in the morning on 4 July, Ashwini Kumar entered the building called Guru Ramdas Saran with thousands of armed policemen and arrested all the Sikhs who had come as volunteers from different parts of the Punjab, Pepsu, and other states. All the employees of the SGPC were arrested. Bawa Harkishan Singh, President of the SGPC, and Sardar Hukam Singh were also there when the SGPC office was invaded. Ashwini Kumar’s idea was to ensure that no volunteers should be there on 4 July to court arrest. For this purpose, he wanted to establish his own control over the Manji Sahib. In broad daylight, a large number of policemen, armed with lāṭhīs, revolvers, guns, and tear gas shells, surrounded the Manji Sahib and it was announced that Section 144 was in force there. Thousands of Sikh men and women had come during the day, and there was the possibility of some reaction. Sardar Hukam Singh and Bawa Harkishan Singh remained calm till the arrival of troops for flag march in front of the SGPC office. Bawa Harkishan Singh started shouting ‘Sat Sri Akal’. The Sikh men and women responded with enthusiasm. The army officers agreed to leave the premises. Now the police came forward. Sardar Page 27 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Hukam Singh addressed the Singhs in a loud voice: ‘It is clear that we have to face bullets today. Only they who are prepared to face bullets should stay, and the others should leave.’ Not a single man or woman left the place. The police resorted to lāṭhī charge, tear gas shells, and firing in order to occupy Manji Sahib. Bawa Harkishan Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh were confined to the office. A dīwān was held in front of the Akal Takht, which was addressed by a few young men (p.497) from the sangat. Then Jathedar Mohan Singh Tur and two other Jathedars arrived and asked for volunteers. In all, sixty-three young men came forward and courted arrest. On the night of 4 July, the police took action to ensure that the Prabhat and the Akālī did not appear on the following day. The Ajīt and the Akālī Patrikā were treated in the same way. None of the four papers came out from 5 to 9 July. On 5 July, fifty-two volunteers courted arrest. On 6 July, forty-four volunteers courted arrest. On 7 July, fifty-six volunteers took out jathās to court arrest but they were not arrested. However, Bawa Harkishan Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh were arrested. No arrest was made on 8, 9, and 10 July. Bawa Harkishan Singh had already appointed Gian Singh Rarewala as President of the SGPC in his place. Sant Fateh Singh and Sant Chanan Singh reached Amritsar on 11 July, and 600 volunteers took out jathās to court arrest under the leadership of Pritam Singh ‘Mofar’, the seventh dictator of the morchā. On 12 July, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar came to the office of the SGPC to tell the President, Gian Singh Rarewala, that the government had withdrawn the ban on the shouting of slogans. Withdrawal of the ban by Bhim Sen Sachar was meant to mark the great occasion of Nehru’s ‘triumphal return from peace mission abroad’. In his statement to the press Sachar contrasted the efforts of ‘our leaders’ to bring about ‘world peace’ with a situation of tension between ‘the communities and the parties’ in the Punjab. ‘I feel it behoves each one of us to utilize the occasion of the home-coming of the apostle of peace to do all we can to bring about conditions of peace in the State.’ However, Master Tara Singh, who was undergoing trial for defiance of the ban, was not released. The Shiromani Akali Dal passed a resolution that expressed pleasure and relief over the withdrawal of the ban and reiterated the justness of its demand. For a decision on the series of sacrilegious acts committed in the Golden Temple complex, the Akali Dal would wait for the release of its leaders. On 17 July, the SGPC demanded a judicial probe into the incidents of 4 July, listing ten acts of sacrilege. Master Tara Singh was released on 8 September. On 10 September, Gian Singh Rarewala met the Chief Minister at Chandigarh to discuss with him the question of sacrilege. On 20 September, Master Tara Singh declared that the Sikhs would not rest until the Punjab Government made amends for the 4 July

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation incidents. The Chief Minister came to the Akal Takht and apologized on behalf of the government for the acts of sacrilege committed on 4 July 1955.88 The sixty-four-day morchā was about slogans, but slogans for the Punjabi Suba. Therefore, the Punjabi Suba was very much the issue, and for this issue Master Tara Singh had mobilized Sikh support. The success of the morchā was a loud and clear argument in favour of a unilingual Punjab state.

In Retrospect The movement for Punjabi Suba gained considerable momentum from 1952 to 1955. The general elections of 1952 had a silver lining for Master Tara Singh: large number of Sikh votes even for the Akali candidates who did not win the election. Nehru became all the more keen to ensure that the Punjab Government had its indirect control over the SGPC. Master Tara Singh’s nominee for its Presidentship was defeated in June 1952, albeit by only three votes. In December 1952, however, the Akali candidate, Pritam (p.498) Singh Khuranj, was elected President. Sardar Hukam Singh at Calcutta and Master Tara Singh at Patna told the Sikhs that their main demand was a Punjab state based on the Punjabi language. Master Tara Singh made strong speeches against the Congress and its tallest leader, Nehru. Master Tara Singh gave support to the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS in their anti-government programmes. However, he was arrested for some other alleged offence but had to be released about three weeks later on 14 March 1953. The Akalis were given assurance that there would be no interference in their religious affairs. In Pepsu, however, Nehru was able to weaken the Akalis by imposing President’s rule rather unconstitutionally, dispensing with what he himself saw as ‘the Sikh Ministry’. President’s rule was used by the Congress in order to ensure the success of the Pepsu Congress Party in the elections. Master Tara Singh was able to oblige Nehru to extend the same principles to the Sikh Scheduled Castes as was given to the Hindu Scheduled Castes. Nehru conceded this quietly with a bad grace, trying to save his face and to ensure that Master Tara Singh got no credit. In fact, he tried to belittle Master Tara Singh in the eyes of the Chief Ministers of India. Master Tara Singh’s thumping success in the SGPC elections on the issue of Punjabi Suba towards the end of 1954 gave boost to the morale of his followers and entitled him to demand the creation of ‘Punjabi Suba’ with great emphasis. Another important factor that gave him strength was the formation of the SRC. Significantly, the Sikhs in the areas proposed to be included in the Punjabi Suba in the Memorandum of the Akali Dal did not have a majority. The morchā of 1955 was eminently successful and this reflected the popularity of the idea of the Punjabi Suba among the Sikhs.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Finally, we may take note of the fact that despite his persistent denials throughout his life Nehru encouraged Kairon and the Akalis in the Congress Party to ensure that the control of the SGPC remained in their hands. This became almost a matter of policy for the Punjab Government. Master Tara Singh was absolutely right in blaming the ‘secular sarkār’ for interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. Notes:

(1.) Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, part 1), (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1994), p. 70. Also, Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, [1999] 2003), p. 191. ‘After the overwhelming victory of the Congress under Nehru’s leadership in the 1952 elections’, observes Brass, ‘there was no longer any doubt about Nehru’s supremacy in the party and the government and he remained the unchallenged leader of both until his death in 1964’. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, p. 36. (2.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, General Editor, S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1971), vol. XVI, part 2, pp. 368–9. (3.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab (Chandigarh: Sameer Prakashan, 1984), p. 15. (4.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 224–5. (5.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII (1996), p. 319 n. 3. (6.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, pp. 319–21. (7.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX (1996), pp. 420–1. (8.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX (1997), pp. 267–8. (9.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 303–4. (10.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 312. (11.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 313–14. (12.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 369. (13.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 371 and n. 8. (14.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 373–4. (15.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI (1997), p. 347. Page 30 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation (16.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, pp. 347–8. (17.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, pp. 349–50. (18.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, p. 187. (19.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, pp. 196 and n. 2, 209. (20.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, pp. 204–6. (21.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 231. (22.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), p. 251. (23.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 251–3. (24.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 167. (25.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 253. (26.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (1998), vol. XXII, p. 306 and nn. 2–4. (27.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV (1999), pp. 294–5. (28.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 295. (29.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 295–6. (30.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 296–7 and n. 5. (31.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 297–9, n. 2. (32.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 299–300. (33.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 667. (34.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 669. (35.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 669–70. (36.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX, pp. 415–16. (37.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX, pp. 417 and n. 3, 418. (38.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 275–6. (39.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 276–7. (40.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 278. Page 31 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation (41.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 280–1 and nn. 2–7. (42.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, p. 407 and n. 32. (43.) Ramesh Walia, Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972), p. 197. Gursharan Singh, History of Pepsu (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1991), p. 131. (44.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXI, pp. 590–1. (45.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 229–30. (46.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 230. (47.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 230–1. (48.) Gursharan Singh, History of Pepsu, pp. 147–51. (49.) Gursharan Singh, History of Pepsu, pp. 151–5. (50.) Gursharan Singh, History of Pepsu, pp. 155–74. (51.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 691. (52.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 301 and n. 3. (53.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 301 n. 3. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Rozāna Akālī, 18 January 1954 in Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh, ed. Jaswant Singh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 259–63. (55.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 302–3 and n. 7. (56.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXV (1999), pp. 186–93. (57.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXV, pp. 218–19. (58.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, pp. 319–20. (59.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, p. 321. (60.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, pp. 320 and n. 6. (61.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, p. 321 n. 7. (62.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 225–6. (63.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX, p. 535. (64.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX, p. 422.

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation (65.) For this and the following four paragraphs, Satwinder Singh Dhillon, SGPC Elections and the Sikh Politics (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2009), pp. 76–82. (66.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXVII (2000), p. 556. (67.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 226–7. (68.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 225–6. (69.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, p. 237 and n. 3. (70.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, pp. 629–30. (71.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XVIII, pp. 262, 264. (72.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XIX, pp. 403–5 and nn. 4–5. (73.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 235 and n. 3, 235–6 and n. 2, 236–7 and n. 4. (74.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 238. (75.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 240. (76.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 245. (77.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 247–8. (78.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 252–3. (79.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, p. 254. (80.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XX, pp. 256–7 and n. 3. (81.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 231–4. (82.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 241–4. (83.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 249–51. (84.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIV, pp. 253–4. (85.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 234. (86.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 235–8. (87.) Gursharan Singh, History of Pepsu, pp. 223–40. (88.) For a short account, see Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 240–51. For a detailed contemporary account of the sixty-four-day morchā of 1955 against the ban on shouting slogans in favour of ‘Punjabi Suba’, see Karam Singh Jakhmi, Akālī Page 33 of 34

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The Akali–Congress Confrontation Morche Dā Itihās (Amritsar: Panthak Tract Society, 1955). It has been reprinted as Tawarikh Punjabi Sūbā Morchā 1955, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1998).

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The Akali–Congress Compromise

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Akali–Congress Compromise (1955–6) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0021

Abstract and Keywords Authorized by a convention of all Sikh parties, Master Tara Singh, with four other Sikh leaders, met Jawaharlal Nehru on 24 October 1955. Maulana Azad and G.B. Pant were also present. The talks were ‘friendly but rather vague’. On 8 February 1956, a plan, generally known as the Regional Formula, was discussed by the Sikh leaders. In his address to the All-India Akali Conference on 11 February, Master Tara Singh dwelt on Punjabi Suba as the real solution for the Punjab problem. But the Akali Dal accepted the Regional Formula in March 1956. Furthermore, the Akali Dal Working Committee resolved in September 1956 to implement the Formula. The constitution of the Akali Dal was suitably amended and the Akali legislators joined the Congress party. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, G.B. Pant, All-India Akali Conference, Punjabi Suba, Akali Dal, Regional Formula, Congress party

The year 1956 was marked by a rare concord between the Congress and the Akali Dal, between Nehru and Master Tara Singh, resulting in the merger of Pepsu with the Punjab. The compromise between the Congress and the Akali Dal was embodied in the Regional Formula evolved through a series of talks. Nehru’s idea was to contain the demand for Punjabi Suba and Master Tara Singh looked at the compromise as a halfway house to Punjabi Suba. The Akali legislators joined the Congress Party. The constitution of the Shiromani Akali Dal was amended for this purpose and the Akali Dal was shorn of its political identity. The new state was inaugurated on the 1 November. The future relations Page 1 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise between the Akalis and the Congress, and between Master Tara Singh and Jawaharlal Nehru, depended primarily on the implementation of the Regional Formula.

Master Tara Singh’s View Master Tara Singh states in his Merī Yād that the SRC Report published in October 1955 was a great disappointment for the Akali leaders. All the states of the Indian Union were to be reorganized on linguistic basis but not Bombay and the Punjab. The report was most strongly opposed to the creation of a Punjabispeaking state. A Panthic convention was organized and it was resolved that a deputation should meet the Congress High Command to press the demand for creating ‘Punjabi Suba’ along with other linguistic states. A copy of the resolution was sent to the government. Jawaharlal Nehru invited Master Tara Singh for discussions. He went to meet the Prime Minister with four other leaders: Sardar Hukam Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala, and Bhai Jodh Singh. At the time of their talk with (p.502) Nehru, Maulana Azad was also present. Only one or two such meetings had taken place before the annual session of the Congress was announced to be held at Amritsar. The Akalis decided to hold the All-India Akali Conference there at the same time. The Jan Sangh too decided to hold a conference at Amritsar.1 All the three parties took out processions to demonstrate their strength. The Hindi and Urdu newspapers of Jullundur projected the Jan Sangh procession as larger than that of the Congress, estimating its strength at 70,000. Actually, however, it was no larger than 13,000. It was difficult to estimate the number of Akali workers who started their procession from the Burj Akali Phula Singh near the walled city and marched to the pandāl for the Akali Conference at a point beyond Khalsa College on the Grand Trunk Road. The blue-turbaned volunteers of the Akali Dal marching for several hours looked like waves of the sea. Their strength in the police estimate was 250,000. This procession and the presence of a large number of Singhs in the conference demonstrated the organizational strength and unity of the Khalsa to the rest of India and, indeed, to the world. It was a source of encouragement to the Akalis.2 After the conference the Congress offered a formula to the Akali Dal. To consider this offer, a Panthic meeting was held at Teja Singh Samundri Hall at Amritsar to which, apart from the Akalis, representatives of all other Sikh organizations were invited. There were two views among the Sikhs. A considerable number of Akalis were opposed to the formula. However, all the four members of the Sikh deputation other than Master Tara Singh stressed the need for accepting it. Master Tara Singh kept quiet. He wanted to know the genuine view of the Sikh people instead of influencing them with his own view. Giani Kartar Singh emphasized that acceptance of the official formula did not mean that the objective of ‘Punjabi Suba’ was discarded. He compared the offer with the ceremony of ‘betrothal’ leading eventually to ‘marriage’. The non-Sikh leaders of Page 2 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise Haryana, like Sri Ram Sharma and Chaudhari Sri Ram, also pressed for its acceptance.3 Finally, Master Tara Singh was asked to express his view. He said that the offer was not satisfactory but it was necessary to put an end to mutual mistrust. ‘If we accept the formula and thereby express our trust in the government, this might induce them also to trust us. Punjabi Suba was not being accepted because of mistrust, and if mistrust was removed it might pave the way for Punjabi Suba.’ Therefore, Master Tara Singh was inclined to give it a fair trial. Equally important was to preserve unity among the Sikhs at this critical juncture. Master Tara Singh added that Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh had given him the commitment that if the government failed to implement the formula and a morchā became necessary, they would lead the struggle, whatever their personal views. Master Tara Singh expressed the hope that the formula, which came to be called the Regional Formula, would be implemented in a manner that would convince the Sikhs that they were no less trustworthy citizens of India than were the Hindus. On 11 April 1956, the Regional Formula was unanimously accepted by the Akali Dal on a trial basis.4

Jawaharlal Nehru’s Perspective Sardar Bahadur Sardar Teja Singh, retired Chief Justice of Pepsu, met Jawaharlal Nehru on 25 May 1955 with a deputation of eleven (p.503) Sikh leaders. Their main demands related to (a) the Sachar Formula, which had not been fully implemented, (b) support given by the Punjab state to the Hindu demand for Maha Punjab, (c) a commission to go into the complaints of the Sikhs in services, (d) the issue of Sikh Scheduled Castes, (e) a university to be established in Pepsu, and (f) the dominance of some Hindu families in politics, trade, education, and the press. Nehru remarked that all these issues were minor in the context of the morchā that was going on. He gave suitable response to the demands and then went on to talk about Master Tara Singh. He had established a record, he said, in the past fifty or twenty years of always being in the wrong. ‘Others made mistakes occasionally but Master Tara Singh had the knack of always saying or acting wrongly.’ Giani Kartar Singh appeared to have no principles. ‘Were there no better Sikh leaders?’ asked Nehru. For him, the Congressite Sikhs were far preferable to Master Tara Singh and his Akalis. Nehru added that ‘one of the major reasons for partition was the policy of Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh’. Master Tara Singh might be a man of honesty and integrity ‘in a narrow field’ but in the Indian context he was misleading the Sikh people.5 Nehru conceded that it was not right for the Punjab Government to support the demand for Maha Punjab and admitted that there were Hindu communal elements in the Punjab. ‘But the basic fact was the policy which was advanced from time to time by Master Tara Singh.’ He threatened to liquidate the Congress, the Government of India, and Nehru himself. It was impossible for the Page 3 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise government to come to terms with the Akalis under threat of the morchā. Nehru would sooner let the government go to pieces ‘than surrender to these tactics’. He made it a point to underscore that he was opposed not merely to a difference of opinion but to ‘anti-national policies’. What had been done from time to time during the past years could lead only to injury as much to the Sikhs as to the country. Sardar Teja Singh assured Nehru that they were all against the morchā and they would help to put an end to it. He referred to the last Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) elections but Nehru said as usual that he was not concerned with ‘religious elections’.6 This was patently a false statement. Nehru wrote a note to the Home Minister, G.B. Pant, that Sardar Teja Singh (who had met him again) said that if the Sikhs were coerced and repressed as in Amritsar, the result would be bad, and asked Nehru if there could be ‘a simultaneous withdrawal of the ban and the agitation’. Nehru assured Teja Singh that the Home Minister was ‘the last person to wish to repress anybody or to create ill will, and he would no doubt like to put an end to all this trouble, but all this must be done in a proper way.’ A day later, Nehru wrote to Bhim Sen Sachar that Sardar Teja Singh came mainly to appeal for something to be done to put an end to the Akali morchā. Nehru added that he would be going away in a few days for five weeks, and he was concerned, but not worried, about the morchā. He advised Sachar to think of the present difficulty and also of the future. There should be no trail of bitterness after the morchā. No government should allow itself to be browbeaten and, therefore, must stand up to any such attempt. His government ‘should accept the challenge of Master Tara Singh’. However, the ultimate object was to make friends, or at any rate to remove a sense of grievance. ‘One should not go too far or overdo things.’ A proper balance had to be kept, remaining firm but friendly and finding a suitable way (p.504) out, without giving way to threats. Sachar was to consider the situation carefully from day to day, keeping in mind all these angles.7 Moderation combined with firmness appears to be the essence of Nehru’s vague advice. At a press conference two days later, Nehru justified the ban on slogans. He said that the Akalis had defied a regulation against shouting a particular slogan at a particular place. This rule was meant to obviate the kind of trouble which had arisen in Ludhiana, leading to stoning and head injuries. Two groups were shouting slogans against each other, aggressively and offensively. On one side were the Akalis and on the other, some ‘Hindu groups’. The rival slogans in processions in public streets created a law and order situation. The limitation imposed was very small even though it might be called a limitation on civil liberty. The same slogans could be shouted in public meetings but not in processions. The ban order was not confined to the Akalis. Moreover, they had met the SRC when it went to the Punjab and given evidence. Nehru saw the morchā as ‘completely infantile’, grown-up people behaving in ‘a childish manner’. Nevertheless, he was keen to remove any sense of genuine grievance Page 4 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise of the Akalis. On the language question he was perfectly agreeable, and so was the Punjab Government, to see that the Sachar Formula was implemented 100 per cent. Similarly, he was prepared to look into all complaints related to services.8 This was perhaps an illustration of the principle of moderation. However, in the absence of Nehru, Bhim Sen Sachar showed neither moderation nor firmness. As we noticed earlier, Sachar used the police and the army to suppress the morchā in the first week of July 1955 and then he lifted the ban on slogans on 12 July. On 17 July, the SGPC demanded a judicial probe into the incidents of 4 July, protesting against the ‘sad, unprovoked, illegal, sacrilegious and uncalled for acts of the Punjab Government and its officers’. The SGPC demanded enquiry by a judge. Otherwise, a committee of Sardar Bahadur Sardar Teja Singh, Kanwar Dalip Singh, and Sardar Jodh Singh would go into this matter.9 On 24 July 1955, forty-one members of the Punjab Assembly signed a requisition for a Party meeting to have its verdict on withdrawal of the ban by Sachar without consulting his Cabinet colleagues. The requisition was withdrawn on 5 August after several rounds of talks with Congress leaders at the Centre. On 5 August itself, Nehru wrote to Sachar that he was uneasy about the state of affairs in the Punjab. He had learnt on his return that the ban on slogans was suddenly withdrawn. His initial reaction was that it was a right move. With more information now, he was quite clear that the manner of dealing with the whole situation was not right. It was not enough to do a thing that was right but also to show to the people that it was right. Using the police for meeting the situation was wrong because of Sachar’s failure to demonstrate that the Akalis were doing something essentially wrong even from the Sikh point of view. In a matter affecting the Sikhs Sachar should have consulted Kairon and Musafir all the time. He should have used the Party organization and ‘Sikh officers’ even if he did not wholly trust ‘their non-communal spirit’. Nehru reminded Sachar that when his government was formed he had been told by Nehru to work in cooperation with Partap Singh Kairon. Indeed, from some points of view, Kairon was ‘the more indispensable of the two’. The rift between Sachar and Kairon was ‘fatal for the Punjab’. Nehru went on to add that ‘if you cannot succeed in getting (p.505) the cooperation of Partap Singh, then it is you who have principally failed’. When Jagat Narain and Partap Singh fell out some months earlier, Sachar helped Jagat Narain but Partap Singh was far more important as an individual and a Congressman, particularly in the larger context of conditions in the Punjab. There were hard times ahead and the problems were not easy to face. Sachar should not act as the leader of a group. It was of the highest importance that he should ‘cooperate fully’ with Partap Singh’.10 Evidently, Nehru was getting disillusioned about Bhim Sen Sachar’s capacity to handle the Akalis under the leadership of Master Tara Singh.

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The Akali–Congress Compromise Sardar Hukam Singh met Nehru on 13 August 1955 and talked mostly about the past for about an hour. He said that the Sikhs had blind faith in Nehru and an assurance could be taken from them against violence even if the decisions were against them. Nehru asked him how far his view was shared by other Sikh leaders, notably Master Tara Singh. Sardar Hukam Singh said that Master Tara Singh would say the same thing to Nehru if he had the chance; he was still in prison. Then Sardar Hukam Singh complained of people maligning the Sikhs, calling them anti-national and accusing them of treasonable activities. If both the Sikhs and the Hindus in the Punjab were communal-minded, the Sikhs as a minority suffered at the hands of the majority. Jagat Narain was in charge of the Punjabi Department of the government but his paper openly wrote against the Punjabi language. Vishnu Bhagwan, who had the reputation of having an animus against the Sikhs, was now Chairman of the Punjab Public Service Commission. Hukam Singh referred also to the non-implementation of various decisions. Finally, he mentioned the Akali prisoners who had not yet been released. Nehru advised Sachar to get all the Akali prisoners released.11 On 13 September 1955, Nehru wrote to the Punjab Governor, C.P.N. Singh, about the proposal to have an enquiry into the incident of 4 July at the Golden Temple. The report of the Commissioner of Jullundur Division would not satisfy the Sikhs unless it was in their favour. In all such matters there should be an enquiry and the government should never be afraid of it. Sachar had told Nehru that a number of facts had been admitted and there was no point in enquiring about admitted facts. In regard to the rest, if the Sikhs wanted an enquiry he would agree to it. The decision taken by the Punjab Government about the examination of the grievances of the Sikhs in services would be considered satisfactory by all parties concerned. The main thing was to create ‘a sensation of fairness’.12 Bhim Sen Sachar had invited the SGPC representatives to discuss the matter with him on 10 September, and a deputation headed by Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala met him, but nothing came out of it. After his release from jail in the second week of September 1955, Master Tara Singh gave a statement to the press that the Sikhs would not rest until the Punjab Government made amends for the 4 July incidents. Bhim Sen Sachar came to the Akal Takht to apologize on behalf of the government for the sacrilege on 4 July.13 On 5 October 1955, Sachar made a statement about the language formula—that he was simply implementing an old decision, which was now being opposed by those very people who had made the recommendation. It amounted to an admission that the Sachar Formula had not been implemented. He stated further that this formula was based on the recommendations of a committee (p.506) appointed by the Oriental Arts, Sciences, and Education Faculty of the Panjab University and the resolution of the Congress Working Committee. If some Congress workers could not accept the Sachar Formula they should resign from Page 6 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise the Congress and join the Jan Sangh or the RSS. Sachar felt sorry about the state of affairs in which a campaign was launched by various organizations to get Hindi wrongly recorded as their mother tongue. ‘What can be the future of such a land’, he asked, ‘where enlightened citizens behave in this manner?’14

Negotiations Resulting in Regional Formula The report of the SRC was published on 10 October 1955. The Akali demand for a linguistic state was rejected by the Commission. It recommended the creation of Maha Punjab consisting of the Punjab, Pepsu, and Himachal Pradesh areas. The criterion of language was totally set aside. The SRC emphasized that the Sikhs had a stake in the whole area to be covered by Maha Punjab and, at 30 per cent of its population, they would be safer than with a precarious majority in a Punjabi-speaking state. As Sarhadi points out, the Akalis had not demanded a Sikh majority area, and it was not clear how they would be safer in Maha Punjab. Furthermore, the SRC accepted disowning of the mother tongue by a large section of the people as a matter of fact, giving an aura of reality to an artificial contrivance. Paradoxically, the Akali demand for a linguistic state was dubbed as communal and those who dishonestly disowned Punjabi in favour of Hindi were seen as ‘nationalist’.15 Master Tara Singh said that the report was ‘a calamity’ for the Sikhs. It challenged them to ‘do or die’. All the resources at the command of the followers of Guru Gobind Singh in the world should be used for survival.16 Nehru wrote to V.K. Krishna Menon that the report of the SRC had let loose all kinds of forces, mostly bad. But that was not due to any fault of the Commission. ‘The forces and disruptive tendencies were there. In fact, it was because of them that we appointed this Commission nearly two years ago.’ While the Commission was functioning, these tendencies were held in check. The moment the report was out, that check was no longer there and ‘now we face the flood’. The two most troublesome areas were the Punjab and Bombay. Master Tara Singh was issuing ‘all manners of threats and I am afraid they are not empty threats’.17 On 16 October 1955, a convention of all parties and organizations of the Sikhs was held at Amritsar. The main resolution referred to the crucial support given by the Sikhs to the Congress in 1946–7 and their decision to throw in their lot with India. After Independence the Congress set aside all the assurances given to the Sikhs and treated them unfairly. They were discriminated against in all walks of life and a campaign of vilification was carried on against them. In view of all this, the Shiromani Akali Dal pleaded for the formation of a Punjabispeaking state as a secular and democratic solution. But the SRC had rejected this just and reasonable demand. The dominant group in the Punjab was aggressively hostile to the Sikh minority. The Commission had blindly and arrogantly rejected the remedies suggested by the Sikhs without a satisfactory solution of its own. The convention called upon the Government of India to disregard the recommendation of the Commission concerning the North-Western Page 7 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise (p.507) Zone, and to devise ways and means for the creation of the Punjabispeaking zone of the Punjab and Pepsu. The convention authorized Master Tara Singh to take suitable steps to convey the views of the Sikh community to the Government of India.18 Master Tara Singh wrote a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru that he wanted to see him with a deputation. As Nehru wrote to Bhim Sen Sachar, he fixed 24 October for meeting the deputation. ‘We have very vital matters to discuss’, he wrote, ‘and, among them, probably the most difficult one is that of the Punjab.’ Diwan Chaman Lal, who had known Master Tara Singh for a long time, wrote to Nehru on 22 October that the best way of handling Master Tara Singh was ‘to appeal to his good nature alone and not in the presence of his followers’. He urged Nehru to ‘try and get him by himself. I see no reason why he should not come back to the Congress fold’. Nehru asked Sachar about the state of the enquiry with regard to the 4 July incident and the language issue. This issue was one of the most important Sikh issues and delay in this would be harmful. The Legislative Party of the Punjab Congress must be made to understand this clearly. The matter could not be postponed. The announcement made on behalf of the government must be followed up.19 On 24 October 1955, Master Tara Singh met the Prime Minister accompanied by Sardar Hukam Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala, and Bhai Jodh Singh. Present at the meeting were also Maulana Azad and Pandit G.B. Pant. Nehru wrote to C.P.N. Singh on the same day: ‘It appears that Tara Singh was very pleased at the friendly reception he got from me. In fact he has sent me a message through a common friend that he was greatly pleased and that he would not come into conflict with me in future.’ With reference to C.P.N. Singh’s message that Kairon wanted to be certain whether Himachal Pradesh was to be merged with the Punjab as recommended by the SRC, so that the Akalis did not have opportunity to take political advantage if modifications were to be made, Nehru said that within a fortnight or so ‘we shall be more definite’.20 On the same day Nehru wrote to Kairon that he met Master Tara Singh for a few minutes in the morning and then they had a two-hour-long talk. The talking was done mainly by Hukam Singh and, to some extent, by Giani Kartar Singh and Principal Jodh Singh. ‘We listened without saying much. Probably we shall have to meet them again some days later.’ Nehru added that Master Tara Singh was pleased with his reception. This was conveyed to Nehru by Ram Narayan Chaudhuri, a Congressman from Rajasthan, who had said that Master Tara Singh was ‘well satisfied’ with the talks, and he had assured Chaudhuri Ram Narayan that ‘in his lifetime there would not be any conflict between him and the Prime Minister’.21

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The Akali–Congress Compromise On 20 October C.P.N. Singh had brought to the notice of Jawaharlal Nehru an editorial from the daily Prabhāt in which Master Tara Singh wrote that a Pathan remained a Pathan under slavery and a Jatt remained a Jatt, but for the Sikhs it was not merely a question of slavery but of complete annihilation. ‘The reason is that Sikhs under Hindu domination may part with their long hair and beard, the symbols of Sikhism, and thus lose their very entity and existence.’ Nehru wrote back on 24 October that a mere friendly meeting with Tara Singh had created a good impression upon him. ‘I think it is best to avoid argument with people who do not understand it. At any rate, this should be avoided publicly. Privately, of course, it would help.’22 (p.508) Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Partap Singh Kairon on 28 October: ‘Naturally, we have been thinking a good deal about the Punjab and we shall continue to do so’. Finally, of course, the matter would be considered by the Working Committee. Meanwhile, Kairon could lay great stress on the Sikhs and Hindus of the Punjab pulling together to build up a common life, each respecting the other. He could lay stress also on the arrangements being made to ensure that legitimate grievances of any group or community were properly considered and remedied.23 When Nehru visited Amritsar on 11 November 1955, he was warmly received by the Akalis. On his return, he wrote to Master Tara Singh: ‘I am grateful to you and to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee for the warm and exuberant welcome that I got when I visited the Darbar Sahib today. I was much moved by it.’ On the same day Nehru informed Kairon of another meeting with Master Tara Singh and his colleagues to be held after 22 November, and added that before meeting Master Tara Singh he would like to meet the Committee constituted by the Punjab State Congress to discuss the question of reorganization.24 On 17 November 1955, about forty to fifty persons, including a number of MLAs and MPs met Jawaharlal Nehru at Nangal. He found that this was ‘a Hindu gathering’. Even the Chief Minister and the Pradesh Congress President, Giani Gurmukh Singh, were not there. Thakur Das Bhargava, Member of the Lok Sabha, spoke on behalf of the others and told Nehru that the decision of the convention held a few days earlier was to support the SRC proposals about the Punjab. Actually a split had occurred in the Punjab Congress Party at a convention of MLAs and MPs. Thakur Das Bhargava said that the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state ‘in reality, was one for a Sikh State’. This was dangerous and showed the ‘separatist mentality of the Sikhs’. He developed this argument at length. After about twenty-five minutes Nehru’s patience was exhausted. He wanted to know in what ‘capacity’ those people were speaking to him. They were ‘a Hindu group advancing what might be considered Hindu claims’. This was very bad from the Congress point of view. They talked of Akalis being communal but they themselves were behaving in a communal way. Their attitude would Page 9 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise make the Akalis more hostile. ‘The Congress attitude should be to win the confidence of all, without giving up any vital principles.’ They had argued in favour of Maha Punjab but a great majority of the people of Himachal Pradesh did not want to be merged with the Punjab.25 Master Tara Singh, Sardar Hukam Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala, and Bhai Jodh Singh met Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, and Pandit G.B. Pant on 23 November 1955. Master Tara Singh had lunch with Nehru before the meeting, which lasted for an hour and a half. Nehru laid stress on the ‘absolute necessity’ of the people of the Punjab, whether Sikhs or Hindus, cooperating with each other if the Punjab was to prosper. Neither the Sikhs nor the Hindus could prosper if there was conflict. To remove specific grievances it was necessary to have some kind of machinery to deal with them. The government had, therefore, adopted almost all the safeguards of the SRC Report. It was not easy to bypass the Commission of able and impartial men ‘unless there was very special reason or some agreed arrangement’. Master Tara Singh and his colleagues repeated that they could not have full security unless their demands were more or less conceded. They were told that (p.509) others had to be consulted, while their own consultation would continue. The talks were ‘friendly, though rather vague’.26 Early in 1956, Sachar was replaced by Kairon. Nehru had written to Sachar on 10 January that he had not got the popular touch and was rigid in his thinking and in his actions. He functioned more as an official than a politician ‘in touch with the people’. Nehru had no confidence in his judgement. Sachar sent his letter of resignation to Nehru, which he forwarded to the Home Minister. It was accepted on 14 January and Kairon succeeded him on 23 January 1956.27 Master Tara Singh had written to Jawaharlal Nehru on 10 January 1956 about the delicate communal situation in Amritsar since the last morchā. The members of Jan Sangh and some officials sympathetic to them had been trying to bring about a clash between Hindus and Sikhs. It was rumoured that on 19 January, the birth anniversary of Guru Gobind Singh, the ‘Maha Punjabists’ might attack the Akali Dal procession. He sought Nehru’s intervention for providing military protection to the procession to avert a possible clash. Nehru requested G.B. Pant to speak to the Punjab Chief Minister for making special police or military arrangements. ‘I entirely agree with you’, wrote Nehru to Master Tara Singh on 15 January, ‘that we should avoid any conflict or disharmony.’ Guru Gobind Singh was a great man and a great son of India who deserved respect from all. Nehru added that he had been hoping to meet Master Tara Singh and suggested that they could meet on the morning of 22 January at his house.28 On 28 January 1956, it was reported in the press that the parleys between the Akali delegation and the government for settlement of the Punjab problem had broken down. Till this time the Working Committee of the Akali Dal had not been Page 10 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise taken into confidence. Sarhadi received messages from Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Sardar Hukam Singh to reach Delhi on 8 February. Apart from the members of the Akali delegation, six other Sikh leaders were present at the residence of Sardar Hukam Singh. A plan proposed by the Cabinet subcommittee was discussed. Giani Kartar Singh unfolded the plan, giving a historical review of the talks to the leaders present. On a question from Sarhadi, Giani Kartar Singh admitted the possibility of a decision of the Regional Council being ruled out by the Cabinet with the concurrence of the Governor. Master Tara Singh listened to the discussions and stated that the proposed plan could not be a final solution. Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala gave full support to the proposal. Sardar Hukam Singh too was in favour of its acceptance, but added that he would join Master Tara Singh if he wanted to launch a movement. The other members who gave support to the proposal were Giani Kartar Singh, Bawa Harkishan Singh, and Sardar Bahadur Singh (MP). Master Tara Singh seemed distressed and did not express any opinion. Giani Kartar Singh asked Sarhadi to prepare a representation to the Prime Minister for adding more subjects to the regional list.29 The annual session of the Congress scheduled to be held at Amritsar in December 1955 had been rescheduled to be held in February 1956. The Akali Dal too decided to hold the tenth All-India Akali Conference at the same time in Amritsar in order to demonstrate Sikh support for the Akalis. ‘It seemed as if the whole Sikh nation had turned out,’ wrote Professor Teja Singh. At least five lakhs had come to join the procession. Another eyewitness, Brecher, the biographer of Nehru, (p.510) recorded that the Sikhs presented ‘the most impressive and peaceful demonstration’ he had ever seen. Hour after hour, mile after mile, they marched, eight abreast, down the main streets of Amritsar, a hallowed name in the Indian Nationalism because of the shooting in 1919. Old and young, men and women, of determination and sadness in their eyes, many still remembering the ghastly days of 1947, when their homeland was cut into two and hundreds of thousands of their coreligionists died or were maimed. They marched in orderly file, portraying their ‘unity of purpose’. ‘On they came for five hours. None who watched them could doubt their genuine fear of being swallowed up in a vice-like embrace of rabid Hinduism.’ Brecher goes on to add that Nehru was ‘sympathetic to Sikh fears’ but he was ‘under strong pressure from communal minded Hindu Congressmen’: they were not prepared ‘to place the Punjabi Hindus in an inferior political position’. In other words, they were strongly opposed to the creation of a Punjabi linguistic state on the plea that it would reduce the Punjabi Hindus to minority.30

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The Akali–Congress Compromise In his presidential address to the tenth All-India Akali Conference at Amritsar on 11 February 1956, Master Tara Singh referred to the critical and complex situation in which the Sikhs had to think of their future in India. For this, it was necessary to keep in view the present as well as the past. It was absolutely necessary first of all to be clear about their objective. And for this it was essential for the Sikhs to know the purpose for which Guru Gobind Singh had created the Khalsa. In Master Tara Singhs’s view, the Khalsa was created by the Guru for the protection of dharam and the oppressed people. In the present crisis it was necessary to save the Panth from ‘Hindu domination’. Only then could the Panth work for its fundamental purpose protecting dharam and the oppressed. Based on dharam, the Khalsa constituted an army for the protection of dharam. If there was no army there would be no nation. The weapons of this army were service of the Panth, selfless service of others, and love for humanity. Guru Tegh Bahadur gave his head for the protection of dharam, not merely his own but also of others. For the first time in human history Guru Gobind Singh created a Panth for the protection of all faiths. Only on this principle was it possible to establish peace on earth. The Khalsa presented an example to the rest of the world. If their example was followed by other peoples in other countries, the purpose of human life on earth would be fulfilled. Therefore, the Khalsa should never allow this high ideal to be forgotten.31 Master Tara Singh talked about the Akali demand for a state on the basis of language. All over the country such states had been created or were being created. But in the Punjab the creation of a linguistic state was being opposed by some people who actually spoke Punjabi. Apparently enemies of the Punjabi language, they were actually enemies of the Sikh faith. That was why it was all the more important to have a Punjabi-speaking state. Elsewhere it was a question of preserving culture or having political safeguards but in the Punjab the religious as well as the political identity of the Sikhs was at stake. If no state was created for the Marathas, the Bengalis, or the Andhras they would retain their culture though subject to political domination. But if the Sikhs remained subject to political domination, their very existence as a religious community would be endangered. Therefore, it was all the more necessary for the Sikhs to have a linguistic state. The basis (p.511) of their culture was the Sikh faith and the Punjabi language, which was not the position elsewhere in India.32 The opponents of a linguistic state in the Punjab were putting forth false arguments deliberately to stall its creation. One such argument was that a border state should not be small but large. Another argument concocted by them was that the Hindus would have to leave the state if it was created. If some Hindus did not want the Hindus to be in a minority, why were they keen to keep the Sikhs in minority? Master Tara Singh pointed out that Hindu–Sikh tension in the Punjab was created by the Arya Samajists. Yet another fantastic argument was put forth by the Maha-Punjabis. They alleged that if the Sikhs came into power, they would align with Pakistan to destroy India. The Sikhs were as much Page 12 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise the citizens of India as the Hindus. If there was any difference, it was precisely this that the Sikhs were more deeply committed to the protection of dharam and desh. They would discharge this duty with greater responsibility as the guardians of India’s borders. They could perform this role not by discarding the principles enunciated by Guru Gobind Singh but by upholding them.33 Master Tara Singh appealed to ‘the brother Hindus’ to understand the Sikh psyche and help him to create Hindu–Sikh unity, which had been there before the birth of the Arya Samaj. ‘Think, and understand, and let us live. We want to serve but not as slaves.’ As the Khalsa of Guru Gobind Singh, the Sikhs needed space for the exercise of their faculties in the service of the country and the service of others. In any case, to say that 70 per cent of the people of the Punjab were opposed to ‘Punjabi Suba’ was to distort the realities. In fact, 70 per cent of the people would favour the creation of three states: the Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. With reference to the suggestion by some newspapers that if Master Tara Singh wanted Hindu–Sikh unity, he should drop the demand for Punjabi Suba, he said: ‘I want unity and they offer death. I implore them to trust me and they tell me to keep the fetters put on my hands and feet to win their trust.’ But the Sikhs wanted to live, and to live as free citizens. They would achieve this goal by the Guru’s grace and by their sacrifices. They were not beggars, depending on the charity of others. ‘We want a settlement through negotiations and in a peaceful manner.’ The opponents of the Akalis had created an atmosphere of mistrust. But the Sikhs should not mistrust the government simply because their negotiations with the government had been prolonged. ‘The pain in the hearts of the Sikhs was so great that it would never diminish with delay. It would rather increase and could not then be ignored. A remedy had to be found for it. ‘I am opposed to the Congress’, said Master Tara Singh, ‘and I am opposed to the present Congress Government even more, because it has spread so much corruption that it has become the cause of moral degeneration of the nation. I want to change this Government and to throw it out, but I do not want to disturb peace.’ At the same time, Master Tara Singh wanted the Punjab Government and the Government of India to take action against those officials who had engineered Hindu–Sikh riot in Amritsar during the morchā of May–July 1955.34 Master Tara Singh had no hesitation in stating that the Sikhs had enjoyed more religious freedom in the time of colonial rule than now. The Minsters of the Punjab Government and agents of the Government of India tried to influence the members (p.512) of SGPC in favour of the Congress candidates every year from 1948 to 1953 by holding out threats or offering favours. The Punjab Government made amendments in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act of 1925 without the consent of the SGPC in order to help the Congress Party to retain or establish its control over the gurdwaras. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon frankly said in the Legislative Assembly that the Punjab Government was not bound by the conventions of British times. In 1954, when the Congress Party was badly Page 13 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise defeated in the SGPC elections, the Punjab Government removed the President of the Gurdwara Judicial Commission by a telephonic order to induct a stooge of the government. The Golden Temple was desecrated on 4 July 1955, and so was the Gurdwara Kalghidhar in Ludhiana, to remind the Sikhs of their political subordination (ghulāmī).35 The English version of Master Tara Singh’s presidential address released on the same day says that ‘we cannot be satisfied unless we get rid of the present communal domination of the Punjab Hindus led by the Aryas Samajists who in their efforts to destroy our religion went so far as to deny their mother-tongue’. A Punjabi-speaking state appeared to Master Tara Singh to be the only permanent solution to the Punjab problem, and the problems of communal domination and the language. Master Tara Singh goes on to add that some ‘modified forms of our proposal are suggested by some well meaning gentlemen, but to me all these solutions appear to be temporary and not conducive to permanent peace and settlement’.36 Master Tara Singh’s presidential address was written with an eye on the Akali–Congress negotiations. The Akali delegation led by Master Tara Singh had talks with Nehru, Azad, and Pant during 22–25 February 1956. Talking to pressmen at Amritsar on 28 February, Master Tara Singh described the press reports as baseless. Agreement had been reached, he said, only on one point but he refused to mention which point. What he denied was that an agreement had been reached on the language formula, Chief Ministership by rotation, and distribution of subjects between the zonal councils and the Cabinet of the new Punjab. ‘I am afraid the Akalis have not behaved at all decently,’ wrote Nehru to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur on 29 February 1956. She had written to Nehru that Pepsu and Himachal Pradesh were now going to be merged in the Punjab and the Sikhs might feel that their point of view would not be adequately safeguarded by zonal councils, which were going to be purely advisory bodies. She suggested that a decision on subjects relating to a minority might be decided by the Cabinet Ministers and legislators of the area concerned. Nehru told her that the Akali delegation had definitely given the impression that they were ‘on the whole satisfied with the lines we were adopting’. They suggested one or two other matters for ‘our consideration which, we said, we would consider’. Master Tara Singh’s statement came to him as a shock: ‘What we have suggested to them satisfies every possible legitimate fear or claim.’ In fact, it caused ‘apprehension to others’.37 This was a measure of the gulf between the two sides (see Map 20.1).

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The Akali–Congress Compromise On 10 March 1956, Sardar Hukam Singh urged Nehru that when the list of subjects for the regional committees for the Punjab would be considered by the Home Minister, consolidation and minor irrigation should be placed with agriculture. Nehru replied that it would not be proper for him to make any fresh suggestions without consulting the Home Minister, who had been dealing with this matter. The Regional Council, he added, (p.513) (p. 514) could ‘always send us recommendations in this, as in other subjects, within the scope of development and economic planning’.38 Sarhadi recorded in his diary what had happened in the General Body meeting of the Akali Dal on 11 March 1956. Gian Singh Rarewala unfolded the plan. Bhai Jodh Singh was most eloquent in its justification. Sarhadi could see

Map 20.1 The Punjab in 1956 Source: A.S. Narang, ‘Movement for the Punjabi Speaking State’, in Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal), ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000, reprint), p. 250.

that the speakers were chosen to carry the resolution through and to silence the critics. Some persons from Haryana, who had nothing to do with the Akali Dal, were invited to expound the good points of the plan. Giani Kartar Singh had brought a few of his followers to shoot down any serious critic of the proposals. Professor Satbir Singh was one such citric who had to face this treatment. Sardar Pritam Singh Gojran was most eloquent in his opposition but he was rather sentimental without much rational argument. Sarhadi noticed a sudden change in Gian Singh Rarewala’s views—he was now saying that ‘Punjabi Suba’ was not in Sikh interest. On the whole, it was clear that the proposals could be rejected only at the cost of unity in the Akali Dal. Sarhadi was not in favour of a total rejection.39 Master Tara Singh made his position clear. ‘Our object is not to create trouble,’ he said. ‘The proposal offered by the Government does not constitute the Punjabi Suba but under the present circumstances, I do not want to fight.’ He left it to the General Body to decide the issue. Many members of the Working Committee Page 15 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise were against acceptance of the proposals. The younger elements of the Akali Dal were prepared to revolt. It seemed that the Akali Dal would split if a division was pressed on the issue. Apart from pressure, canvassing was done on the plea that the proposals were a seedling that would grow into a tree, that is, a full-fledged Punjabi-speaking state. On this assurance was the resolution carried through the General Body of the Akali Dal. Sarup Singh did not attend the meeting, and Amar Singh got his dissent recorded. The resolution refers to the wellconsidered view of the Sikh community that a unilingual Punjabi-speaking state was the solution for the difficulties they experienced in India after Independence, and it was in consonance with the democratic principles enunciated by the ruling party. However, after discussions with the delegation, the government evolved a different plan. In view of the national situation, and in the belief that ‘the new plan may solve some of the difficulties which the Punjabi Suba was expected to remove’, the Akali Dal gave its general support to the principle of the plan and was prepared to work it honestly.40 The deputationists were authorized to accept the final draft. Some points had already been conveyed to the Prime Minister for elaboration, clarification, revision, and amplification within the principles agreed upon. The deputationists were asked to have these improvements made. The Akali Dal hoped that in the interest of communal harmony, and to work the scheme formulated after a long and patient discussion, all concerned would maintain the same spirit of goodwill and sympathetic understanding. The main points raised in the General Body meeting for ‘improvement’ were three: (a) to increase the number of subjects within the purview of the regional bodies, (b) to enable the regional bodies to initiate recommendations on the subjects allocated to them, and (c) to allow a question hour in the regional bodies as in the Legislative Assembly.41 On 14 March 1956, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chief Ministers that the work of reorganization of states, though delayed, had at last arrived at the stage of finalization of the (p.515) Bill and its circulation to the states. It was a happy omen that a difficult and ticklish question had been settled in a more or less satisfactory manner.42 On 17 March 1956, Sardar Hukam Singh wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru that the list of subjects for Regional Committees detailed by the Home Minister was not wide enough. He sent his suggestions for additions to this list of subjects. Nehru discussed these subjects with Sardar Hukam Singh and they covered the same ground with Giani Kartar Singh on 23 March. They considered each suggestion separately, and Nehru pointed out the difficulties in adding further subjects. Nehru’s note gives detail of all the seven or eight points taken up. He was not in favour of any of these being added to the list.43 On 26 March 1956, Master Tara Singh explained his stand on the scheme which came to be called the Regional Formula. The scheme did not give the substance of the Punjabi Suba, he said. He was indecisive for many days. Not sure ‘if the scheme will give us protection against the aggressive communal domination Page 16 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise under which we have been groaning during the past 8 years’, he could not make up his mind. He was afraid that this Formula might fall far short of the Akali demand and, consequently, divide and weaken the Akali Dal. But rejection of the scheme could be justified only if it was followed by a non-violent direct action. That could be risky in view of the internal and external situation. Between the devil and the deep sea, Master Tara Singh remained hesitant till he heard the speeches in the meeting of the Akali Dal on 11 March.44 With reference to the Akali understanding with the government Master Tara Singh wrote in the daily Akālī of 26 March 1956 that it had brought the Sikhs out of despair, and an atmosphere was created in which he could work for Hindu– Sikh unity. Without Hindu–Sikh unity no agreement could bring any gain. Therefore, it was a great gain that an opportunity for Hindu–Sikh unity had been created. He exhorted the Sikhs to take up the challenge and be ready.45 The reorganized state of the Punjab was to have one legislature and one Governor who was to be advised by a Council of Ministers responsible to the state assembly for the entire field of administration. The state was to be divided into two regions for a more convenient transaction of the business of government with regard to some specified matters. A Regional Committee (not Council) was to be formed for each region, excluding the Chief Minister. Specified matters were to be referred to the Regional Committees for legislation, and proposals could also be made by a Committee to the state government for legislation. The advice tendered by the Committee was to be normally accepted by the government and the state legislature. In case of any difference of opinion, reference was to be made to the Governor for final decision. The state was to be bilingual, with Punjabi in Gurmukhi script and Hindi in Devanagri script as the official languages of the state.46 The Regional Formula, on the whole, was much closer to Nehru’s thinking on a solution for the Punjab problem than to Master Tara Singh’s conception of Punjabi Suba. The Punjabi Region at best could enable the Akalis to preserve and promote Punjabi language and Sikh culture, and to have a subordinate share in political power. Hukam Singh, believed to be the chief architect of the Regional Formula, said at the end of April 1956 that the success of the scheme would depend on how it was implemented. The major role in its implementation was to be played by the head of (p.516) the Punjab Government, the Chief Minister. His antipathy to all such schemes was well known. The Regional Committees, without the Chief Minister, would make a large dent in his power. Partap Singh Kairon was not the man to renounce power.47 In other words, the success of the Regional Formula depended primarily on Karion and eventually, therefore, on Nehru.

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The Akali–Congress Compromise The Akalis Join the Congress Some of the Akali leaders were keen to join the Congress. Gian Singh Rarewala was the first to state that the Akali Dal did not need a separate political existence after the Regional Formula had been accepted. In view of his statement the Working Committee of the Akali Dal reiterated on 7 June 1956 that the Akali Dal strongly believed in the maintenance of ‘a distinct entity’ and condemned all moves from any quarters that are contrary to this basic policy of the Akali Dal. Nevertheless, Rarewala and his followers joined the Congress early in August 1956. When the question of his expulsion from the Akali Dal came up before the Akali Dal Working Committee, Giani Kartar Singh expressed the view that it would be good for the Akalis to join the Congress on three conditions: (a) that there should be Congress Committees on regional basis, (b) that the Akali Dal should be allowed to maintain a certain political status, and (c) that there should be proper adjustment of seats.48 In consultation with Sardar Hukam Singh, who was made Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha within ten days of the Akali acceptance of the Regional Formula on 11 March 1956, Giani Kartar Singh had started negotiations with Maulana Azad. He told Sarhadi that the Congress was prepared to allow the Akali Dal to continue but to confine its activities to cultural, religious, and social matters. Master Tara Singh agreed with Sarhadi about cooperation with the Congress but without giving up the basic right of the Akali Dal to agitate whenever the Sikhs as a minority were treated unfairly. On the 1st of September 1956, Giani Kartar Singh wrote to Maulana Azad that he would place his advice before Master Tara Singh and the Akali Dal for their consideration. But if grave injustice was done to the Sikh community, would the Akali Dal have the right to raise its voice to get the discrimination or injustice removed?49 Maulana Azad wrote to Giani Kartar Singh on 12 September 1956 that he was surprised at the question being raised. ‘The constitution of India has guaranteed freedom of expression, association and press. If there is any infringement of any legitimate rights or liberties, every citizen of India has the right to raise his voice, in a legitimate and constitutional manner against the infringement.’ Maualna Azad went on to write explicitly that the Akali Dal, ‘as a religious and cultural organisation of the Sikhs’, would certainly have the right to raise its voice if there was any injustice or infringement of legitimate rights or liberties. It was not necessary for an organization to be political for the exercise of this right. Maulana Azad clarified the position further on 21 September. Master Tara Singh was reported to have declared that members of the Akali Dal would join the Congress on their own conditions. Therefore, Azad would make it very explicit that only those were welcome to join the Congress who accepted the Congress principles and policies without any conditions. The Shiromani Akali Dal, as a purely religious and cultural organization, would have the right to raise its voice, ‘but the individual Sikhs who are members of (p.517) the Congress

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The Akali–Congress Compromise party will not participate in any action in defiance of the Congress party decision’.50 Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Hukam Singh were in favour of joining the Congress on the terms proposed by Maulana Azad on behalf of the Congress. For the Akali Dal to accept these terms it was necessary to amend its constitution. Sarhadi was asked to persuade Master Tara Singh to agree to joining the Congress. Giani Kartar Singh was keen to have the resolution in favour of joining the Congress adopted by the Akali Dal Working Committee before 23 September 1956 when Jawaharlal Nehru was to leave for Saudi Arabia. Sarhadi found that Master Tara Singh was indecisive but he felt satisfied after meeting the Prime Minister before 23 September. The Working Committee of the Akali Dal met on 30 September at Amritsar. Master Tara Singh revealed that Nehru had settled all issues by saying that Master Tara Singh’s honour was his own thereafter. Master Tara Singh had been so gratified that he declared that he would never forsake Nehru.51 At the Working Committee meeting on 30 September, Sarhadi moved a resolution that had been shown to Hukam Singh and corrected by him at places. It started with the background of cooperation between the Akali Dal and the Congress in the struggle for freedom and the early phase of cooperation with the Congress after August 1947. The Congress did not meet the Sikh demands while framing the new constitution, and the Akali Dal manifesto of 1951–2 dwelt on the demand for the creation of ‘Punjabi Suba’, which remained the chief objective of the activities of Akali Dal for five years. The climax was reached in 1955. Then came the negotiations resulting in the formulation of a scheme called the Regional Formula. This formula fell far short of the Akali demand but it was accepted ‘in the larger interests of the country, in the hope that with goodwill and mutual accord, this might afford the protection that we had been asking for all these years’. Unfortunately, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Jan Sangh, and the Arya Samajist leaders pooled their resources to wreck the Regional Formula. The Akali Dal wanted the Formula to be successfully implemented. The Haryana Front had joined the Congress as a body to work for the implementation of the Regional Formula. It was desirable in this situation that the Akali Dal should repose full confidence in the Congress for the political programme and concentrate its energies on economic, religious, social, and cultural activities.52 The Akali Dal Working Committee resolved on 30 September 1956 that it ‘would not have any separate political programme of its own’. The Dal would concentrate on the protection and promotion of religious, educational, cultural, social, and economic interests of the Panth, and guard against any violation or infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. The Akali Dal would actively participate in the implementation of the Regional Formula and of various plans for the development of the country. The General Page 19 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise Body of the Akali Dal met in November 1956 with 322 delegates from within and outside the Punjab. Sarhadi spoke on the resolution which had been passed unanimously by the Working Committee. Five members of the Akali Dal voted against the resolution, including Master Sujan Singh of Sarhali, Amar Singh of Ambala, and Gubakhsh Singh of Gurdaspur. Master Tara Singh supported the resolution. The Akali legislators joined the Congress Party.53

(p.518) In Retrospect For the first time after Independence the Akali Dal and the Congress worked out a major accord embodied in the Regional Formula worked out between October 1955 and March 1956. After the publication of the Report of the SRC on 10 October 1955, a convention of all Sikh parties resolved to disregard the recommendation of the SRC and to ask for the creation of a Punjabi-speaking state. Master Tara Singh was authorized to approach the Government of India. With four other Sikh leaders, Master Tara Singh met Nehru, Azad, and Pant on 24 October and felt satisfied with the talks. On 23 November, Nehru stressed the difficulty of bypassing the SRC recommendations and the Sikh delegation underlined the necessity of meeting the Sikh demands. The talks were ‘friendly but rather vague’. On 8 February 1956, the plan proposed by the Cabinet subcommittee was discussed by the Sikh delegation and some of other Sikh leaders. Kartar Singh, Giani Singh Rarewala, Bawa Harkishan Singh, and Hukam Singh were in favour of its acceptance. Master Tara Singh did not express any opinion. In his address to the All-India Akali Conference on 11 February, written with an eye on the proposed plan, Master Tara Singh was emphatic that Punjabi Suba alone was the permanent solution of the Punjab problem. However, the General Body of the Akali Dal accepted the formula on 10 March 1956. Master Tara Singh regarded the possibility of Hindu–Sikh unity created by the formula as the greatest gain. Hukam Singh underlined that its implementation would depend primarily on Kairon who was known to be opposed to such schemes. Giani Kartar Singh and Gian Singh Rarewala were in favour of joining the Congress. The latter was the first to say that the Akali Dal needed no separate existence after the Regional Formula. The Akali Dal Working Committee reiterated its resolve to maintain its distinct identity. Rarewala joined the Congress early in August 1956. In the meeting of the Akali Dal Working Committee to consider the matter of his expulsion, Giani Kartar Singh argued that the Akalis should join the Congress on certain terms, including the political status of the Akali Dal. He then negotiated with Maulana Azad, who eventually clarified that the Akali Dal as a religious and cultural organization would have the right to raise its voice against any injustice to the Sikh community but the Sikh members of the Congress would not participate in any action in defiance of the Congress Party’s decisions. The Akali Dal Working Committee resolved on 30 September 1956 to discard the political status of the Akali Dal and to work for implementation of the Regional Formula. The Akali Dal Working Committee in its meeting of 30 September, and the General Body of its Akali Dal in its meeting in Page 20 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise November 1956, resolved to join the Congress. The constitution of the Akali Dal was suitably amended and the Akali legislators joined the Congress Party. Notes:

(1.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh; Jīwan Sangharsh Te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 275–7. (2.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 276. (3.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 276–7. (4.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 277–8. (5.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, General Editor, S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), vol. XXVIII, pp. 497–9. (6.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXVIII, pp. 499–500. (7.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXVIII, pp. 502–3, n. 2. (8.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXVIII, pp. 303–5. (9.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur & Sons, 1970), pp. 245–51. (10.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIX (2001), pp. 179–82. (11.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXIX, pp. 170–1 and n. 7. (12.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX (2002), pp. 276–7. (13.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 249. (14.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 249–50. (15.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 251–4. (16.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 255. (17.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, pp. 249–50. (18.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 255–8. (19.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 258. (20.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, pp. 280–1. (21.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, p. 256. (22.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, p. 282 and n. 2. Page 21 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise (23.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, pp. 262–3. (24.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, p. 268. (25.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXX, pp. 268–71. (26.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXI (2002), pp. 156–7. (27.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXI, p. 265 and n. 2. (28.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXI, pp. 285–6. (29.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 262–4. (30.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 259–60. (31.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address to the 10th All India Akali Conference, Punjabi version (Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 11 February 1956), pp. 1–8. (32.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address (Punjabi version), pp. 8–9. (33.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address (Punjabi version), pp. 9–10. (34.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address (Punjabi version), pp. 11–14 (35.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address (Punjabi version), pp. 17–19. (36.) Master Tara Singh, Presidential Address to the 10th All India Akali Conference, English version (Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 11 February 1956), p. 7. (37.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXII (2003), p. 193 n. 4. (38.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXII, p. 196 n. 4. (39.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 265–6. (40.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 267–8. (41.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 268. (42.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXII, p. 196 and n. 4. (43.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXII, pp. 203–6. (44.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 268–70. (45.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 279–80. (46.) For the text of the Regional Formula, see Appendix VIII. Page 22 of 23

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The Akali–Congress Compromise (47.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 270. (48.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 271–2, 276–7. (49.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 272, 278–9. (50.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 279–80. (51.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 281, 286. (52.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 281–4. (53.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 284–5.

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Failure of the Compromise

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Failure of the Compromise (1957–8) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0022

Abstract and Keywords On the basis of the Regional Formula, Pepsu was merged with the Punjab and the new state was inaugurated on 1 November 1956. The other provisions of the Regional Formula were diluted or indefinitely delayed. Apart from the ‘Save Hindi’ agitation, Master Tara Singh differed widely with Nehru on three major issues. The first related to their understanding about the number of seats to be given to the Akali candidates. The second issue was the defection of Gian Singh Rarewala to join the Congress before the decision of the Akali Dal in favour of merger. The third issue was Nehru’s all-out support to Partap Singh Kairon despite serious charges of misuse of office. By October 1958, the Regional Formula was dead so far as Master Tara Singh was concerned. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Regional Formula, Pepsu, merger with Punjab, ‘Save Hindi agitation’, Gian Singh Rarewala, Akali Dal, Congress, Nehru, Partap Singh Kairon

The merger of Pepsu with the Punjab proved to be the most important result of the Congress–Akali compromise in 1956. The other provisions of the Regional Formula were diluted or indefinitely delayed. The first major setback to the compromise came with the general elections of 1957. It was followed by the Save Hindi agitation. The administration of Partap Singh Kairon began increasingly to be criticized, and his defence by Jawaharlal Nehru added to the differences between the Congress and Master Tara Singh. Kairon tried to

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Failure of the Compromise establish his indirect control over the SGPC in order to weaken Master Tara Singh’s position.

The Issues Involved According to Baldev Raj Nayar, the era of close and cordial relations between the Congress Party and the Akali Dal, which seemed to have begun with the Regional Formula, did not last long. Hardly two months had passed after a solemn agreement to give up political activity before the Akali Dal asserted itself in the political field. The occasion for the reversal of a policy so recently decided upon was allocation of party tickets for the elections in February 1957. The Congress Party offered about twenty-five tickets to the former Akalis, whereas they wanted a quota closer to forty. Their idea was to have a powerful group in the Regional Committee for the Punjabi-speaking region. After much bargaining, the Congress party decided to give twenty-six tickets to the former Akalis. Master Tara Singh set up more than fifteen independent candidates on his own against the non-Akali Congress candidates. He made strong speeches against the Congress during the election campaign, accusing the Congress of deception. The Congress leaders on their part charged Master Tara Singh with ‘breach of faith’. The Congress won 120 seats in the House (p.521) of 154. The seats won by the Akali Congress candidates were twenty-two and about six more seats were won by the Rarewala group. Giani Kartar Singh and Gian Singh Rarewala were taken into the Ministry.1 After the elections, Master Tara Singh declared that the fundamental aim of the Akali Dal was to retain ‘separate entity of Sikhs’. Sardar Hukam Singh pointed out that it was not correct to say ‘that the Akali Dal never intended to eschew politics’. Master Tara Singh had not been misled by his colleagues or friends; he himself was ‘impressed with the necessity of amending the constitution’. In fact, he piloted the amendment of the Akali constitution after meeting Nehru and the Congress President, unaccompanied by any other Sikh leader.2 Nayar underlines that all the Akali leaders came together when the Hindi agitation was launched by ‘some Hindu communal organizations’ in 1957. The Akali leaders in the Congress Party threatened to revive the demand for Punjabi Suba ‘if the Hindi agitation continued’. The agitation was finally suspended unconditionally. Master Tara Singh now attacked not only the Congress Party but also Kairon personally. The Akalis joined hands with the Hindu members who had been disaffected by Kairon’s handling of the Hindi agitation to dislodge Kairon from leadership of the Congress Party. A motion of no-confidence was brought against Kairon in 1958, but he survived the motion and continued to stay in power. Master Tara Singh announced in June 1958 that the Akali compromise with the Congress ‘might be stopped at any minute because the Congress was not acting up to the terms of the compromise’. So far as he was concerned, there was no Congress–Akali agreement. Master Tara Singh began to

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Failure of the Compromise revive the demand for Punjabi Suba because the Regional Formula had not been implemented.3 According to Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Sardar Partap Singh Kairon and Master Tara Singh had remained opposed to each other for over a decade and the attempts to effect conciliation between them ended in failure now. Therefore, Kairon tried to stand in the way of the selection of Master Tara Singh’s followers for the Congress ticket. The subject of seats had been broached with Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad, and it was stressed that 75 per cent of the seats allocated to the Sikhs should be given to the Akalis. Neither Nehru nor Azad had controverted this claim. The Akali leaders carried the impression that their view was accepted. Giani Kartar Singh, Sardar Hukum Singh, and Ajit Singh Sarhadi were associated with the Provincial Election Board. But they were treated as ‘intruders’ rather than regular members. They were not invited to its final meeting at Jalandhar on 18 December. The Central Election Board met in January 1957 to finalize the list of candidates. Master Tara Singh was in Delhi, expecting to be consulted, but in vain. The Akali entrants got only twenty-two tickets for the Punjab Legislature and three for the Parliament. This was a shock to Master Tara Singh. But the consensus in the Akali Dal Working Committee was not to withdraw from the elections. All the twenty-five candidates fought the elections on the Congress ticket. Master Tara Singh, in his individual capacity, announced the names of twenty-three Akalis who would contest the elections as independent candidates.4 On 14 February 1957, Master Tara Singh stated in a press conference that he was not bound by the Akali–Congress compromise. He said: The members of the Congress High Command had assured us of giving representation to the (p.522) Akalis in accordance with their position amongst the Sikhs, and had promised that the list of the Congress nominees for the general elections would be finalised in consultation with me, but these assurances were not respected. How ridiculous to consider our position amongst the Sikhs to be such as to entitle us to not more than 1/3rd seats in the Vidhan Sabha [Legislative Assembly] which the Congress has allowed us. He complained bitterly that the list had been finalized by Partap Singh Kairon, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and Brish Bhan. However, Master Tara Singh was not in favour of breaking away ‘without a more crucial issue’.5 Partap Singh Kairon was elected leader of the Congress Assembly Party on 3 April 1957 and he formed the Congress Ministry with Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala in his Cabinet. Soon afterwards, the Arya Samaj embarked on the Hindi Raksha (Save Hindi) agitation. The Arya Samajists had not implemented the Sachar Formula in their institutions for seven years. Page 3 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise Because of the language issue involved in the Regional Formula they felt obliged to oppose the new scheme for ‘saving’ Hindi in the Punjabi-speaking region. The Congress Ministry tried to placate them by promising to reconsider ‘a settled matter’. They put forth seven demands which were meant not merely to protect Hindi but to establish its dominance in the whole state. The government conceded several of their demands. It was a subtle move on the part of the Congress Ministry to unsettle the Regional Formula. These moves obliged Master Tara Singh to state on 13 May 1957 that in due course the Pepsu formula should be implemented in the Punjabi-speaking region.6 Master Tara Singh made an earnest appeal to the ‘Hindu brothers’ in July 1957 to abandon the intention of domination over the Khalsa Panth which was a defender of Hindu dharam. There were several instances of sacrilege in Sikh sacred places. Master Tara Singh wrote to The Tribune on 8 August that the ‘Save Hindi’ agitation was ‘anti-Sikh in character’, citing actual instances of sacrilege. On 10 August, the Shiromani Akali Dal warned the Punjab Government that it had no authority to reopen the issue of Punjabi, and called upon the Sikhs to observe complete haṛtāl on 22 August in protest against the reopening of the language question. Master Tara Singh declined to meet Gopi Chand Bhargava, who had been inducted into the Cabinet, to explore the possibility of an agreed solution. On 14 September, Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the Parliament that the agitation of the Arya Samaj had done great damage to the unity of India and, ‘whether it succeeds or fails’, it would disintegrate the Punjab. The agitation was eventually suspended unconditionally but its leaders tried to create the impression that there was a covert understanding on issues related to the language. Sarhadi himself suspected that there was a move by the Punjab Ministry to sabotage the Regional Formula.7 The Regional Committees were constituted in November 1957 and the rules and regulations were notified. No restriction was placed on the use of a language other than Punjabi. English and Hindi could be used for almost all purposes. The Chief Minister had the impression that opposition to him within the assembly and the Congress Party was orchestrated by Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh. The charges levelled against him by the Congress leaders had to be taken up by the Congress High Command. Though he was bailed out by Nehru, Kairon knew that the dissident group had the active support of most of the former Akalis led by (p.523) Giani Kartar Singh.8 Their presence in the assembly did not suit Kairon. To wreck the Regional Formula was to safeguard his own position. In June 1958, Master Tara Singh stated that the government was forcing him to give preference to the Punjabi Suba over the Regional Formula. He was emphatic that he had never wanted a Sikh state. ‘I do not want to usurp the rights of another community, I want the freedom of the Sikhs,’ he said. On 16 September, he announced at Delhi that the Regional Formula had not been Page 4 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise satisfactorily implemented and he would be ‘compelled to reopen the demand for Punjabi Suba’. The first Punjabi Suba Conference was held at Amritsar on 12 October 1958. Sant Fateh Singh, Senior Vice-President of the Shiromani Akali Dal, said that Punjabi Suba was meant to ensure that the Punjabi language and culture were developed and the religion of the Sikhs was protected. The demand was justified because life had been taken out of the Regional Formula and what was now left was the corpse. Master Tara Singh said among other things that he was prepared to accept arbitration on the issue ‘that the Regional Formula had not been implemented and that Government had backed out of the settlement’.9 Thus, whereas Baldev Raj Nayar empathizes with the Congress and looks upon Master Tara Singh’s attitude as rather erratic, Sarhadi identifies himself with the Akali Dal and regards Master Tara Singh’s policy as rather consistent. Both Nayar and Sarhadi recognize the importance of the question of representation of the former Akalis on the assembly and they mention three issues: (a) ‘Hindu’ opposition to the Regional Formula, (b) Nehru’s all-out support for Kairon in the face of mounting criticism of his administration, and (c) Master Tara Singh’s disillusionment with the Congress High Command. Jawaharlal Nehru’s correspondence with a number of participants in these developments clarifies the issues involved.

‘Hindu’ Opposition to the Regional Formula On 30 May 1957, some of the Arya Samajist leaders met the Chief Secretary, Punjab, and on 6 June they met Pandit Mohan Lal, a Punjab Minister. On the following day they met the Punjab Cabinet to press for the acceptance of seven demands of the Hindi Raksha Samiti. Their discussions failed and Swami Atmanand Saraswati, President of the Hindi Raksha Samiti, released his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 8 June. At the same time he announced the launching of a non-violent agitation to save Hindi. On 10 June he courted arrest at Chandigarh along with other volunteers. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Partap Singh Kairon on 13 June that Pandit G.B. Pant had advised him to reply to Swami Atmanand’s letter before leaving for Europe, and he enclosed a copy of his reply so that this too was released to the press if Swami Atmanand failed to publish it. Kairon released Nehru’s reply on 23 June 1957 to remove the ‘misunderstandings being deliberately spread by the leaders of the movement’.10 In his letter to Swami Atmanand, Nehru refers to the Arya Samaj as a religious and cultural organization which, for the first time, was associating itself with ‘a movement of defiance’ on a political plane aligning with ‘the most confirmed communal groups’. The Regional Formula was evolved after consulting many persons of various shades of opinion to meet conflicting opinions. It was (p.524) fair and just. The controversy had arisen due to some misunderstanding ‘or some closing of the mind’. The Punjabi language in Gurmukhi script had been Page 5 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise given an honoured place in the Indian Constitution. Hindi in the Punjab was a regional as well a national language. The use of a particular script was not ‘a matter of principle’.11 Nehru goes on to add that he knew some points which Swami Atmanand had raised with the Chief Minister. One of these carried the implication that the language formula of the old Pepsu should now be the same as that of the Punjab. This matter, says Nehru, had been settled in Pepsu many years earlier. Therefore, the demand could not be accepted. About compulsion in teaching the second language, the only relevant point was the stage, which must be decided on academic basis. The demand about Hindi replacing English in the Punjab was a matter of policy for India as a whole. That the government notifications at the district level and below should be in both Punjabi and Hindi had already been conceded. It was also conceded that applications could be given in any of the two languages and replies should be given in the same language. No principle was involved in the demand for keeping records in both Punjabi and Hindi at the district level and below, but it was inconvenient. Nehru reiterates that the language issue was being used as a pretext for ‘purely political issues’.12 On 15 July 1957, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Ghanshyam Singh Gupta, President of Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (and Chairman of a seventeen-member committee formed by the Sabha to give an all-India character to the Save Hindi agitation in the Punjab) that he had already written to Swami Atmanand on the subject of Gupta’s letter of 9 July. He emphasized that a religious and cultural organization had drifted in a wrong direction and, whatever the underlying motive, it could do itself or the country no good.13 In reply to another letter of Swami Atmanand, Nehru wrote on 22 July that he was wholly unconcerned with much that Atmanand had written in justification of the language agitation. The agitation was bound to become political; it was most likely to become violent; it was doing disservice to the cause of national unity and communal harmony in the Punjab; it was a disservice to the cause of Hindi; and the issue was not important enough to justify agitational approach. Swami Atmanand seemed to think that ‘there should be no compulsion about the teaching of a language’.14 Nehru wrote to Kairon on 25 July that his letter created some slight upset among the Hindi Raksha leaders and they were wondering what to do. Yash Pal gave Nehru a message from his brother, Ranbir Singh of the Milap, suggesting that Nehru might send for Mehar Chand Mahajan for negotiations. But Nehru told him, ‘I see nothing to negotiate about. We cannot possibly give up what we have decided upon.’15 On 30 July 1957, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir that the Congress must carry on a vigorous campaign to explain the government’s position and to meet the wrong and false charges put forth by the Arya Samajists and others. The meetings held by the Congress leaders in the rural areas were not enough; such meetings should be held in the big cities like Amritsar, Page 6 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise Jullundur, Ludhiana, and Ambala.16 On 10 August, Nehru responded to yet another letter of Swami Atmanand who had written that all their hopes to get a fair deal for their demand to use Hindi in all educational and administrative matters were shattered. The volunteers of the Hindi Raksha Samiti, he (p.525) asserted, had committed no illegal act in their peaceful agitation. Nehru reiterated that the agitation was communal in character and an unfortunate reflection on the Arya Samaj. He pointed out that Atmanand talked of shackles placed on Hindi in the Punjab, but actually he wished ‘to put shackles on the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script’. He added that the Samiti volunteers had committed violence. The Jan Sangh, which now chiefly carried on the agitation, was not Gandhian in its methods.17 Responding to two letters of Pandit Algarai Shastri on the same day, Nehru said that the police had behaved with extraordinary restraint in the so-called Save Hindi agitation but the agitation was becoming increasingly violent in the hands of the Jan Sangh. Apart from being anti-government it was anti-Sikh in character. ‘The Sikhs are now beginning to rouse themselves and there are grave dangers of considerable communal clashes.’ Nehru added that the Arya Samaj would have no sympathy from him in this matter. What they were doing was wholly indefensible and anti-national. The Sikhs had complained that they were not being protected against the Jan Sangh agitators who had gone inside their houses and done a lot of damage. The Punjab Government was being accused by the Sikhs of being too lenient towards this agitation.18 With reference to a letter from C.P.N. Singh, the Punjab Governor, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to him on 11 August 1957 that he was prepared to meet a deputation of the Arya Samajists. But the situation was a difficult one, not only due to the Hindi agitation but also because of the reaction of the Akalis. The Hindi agitation was senseless and objectionable and the government had to proceed with caution. Minor arrangements, which did not offend the formula, could certainly be made. ‘But, it would be unfortunate if we gave the impression to the Akalis that we were going behind what we agreed to.’19 On 24 August 1957, more than 400 Hindi Raksha prisoners and 26 Jail Warders were injured in a clash between them. This was shocking.20 On 6 September 1957, Nehru wrote to Gopi Chand Bhargava, who had joined the Punjab Ministry, that the real objective of the Hindi agitation was to weaken the Punjab Government and, more particularly, the Chief Minister, Kairon. Even some Congressmen encouraged this anti-Kairon movement, directly or indirectly, both among the Sikhs and the Hindus.21 In his speech to the Congress Parliamentary Party on 14 September 1957, Nehru referred to the Punjab situation in which he had taken deep interest. What troubled him more than anything else was that there were very few persons in the Punjab, whether they were in the Congress or outside, whether they were Page 7 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise Hindus or Sikhs, who had not functioned, to some extent, ‘communally in this matter’. The Congressmen had drifted away from their principles and moorings ‘in communal directions’ by their verbal expressions and feelings, and sometimes their actions. Nehru was convinced that the so-called Hindi agitation had nothing to do with saving Hindi; in fact it had done more injury to Hindi than anything else. It had encouraged ‘bad tendencies’ in regard to Hindi in the south . In the Punjab, people complained of ‘Sikh Raj’ because Partap Singh Kairon was the Chief Minister.22 In reply to a letter from the Hindu Mahasabha leader N.C. Chaterjee, Nehru told him on 24 September 1957 that the Arya Samaj, and others who were carrying on the so-called Save Hindi movement, had done enormous injury to Hindi and to the (p.526) Punjab.23 He wrote a week later that the agitation was utterly wrong and misconceived and deserved no sympathy whatever. He would take no action contrary to this conviction.24 At the end of October he wrote to Mauli Chandra Sharma that there had been nothing so vicious and harmful in India as the so-called Save Hindi agitation in the Punjab.25 He wrote to Rajendra Prasad a day later that the Arya Samaj agitation had created very harmful results, more especially in south India.26 Nehru wrote to Mauli Chandra Sharma on the same day that he was not prepared to consider any proposals for a so-called compromise over this agitation.27 He made it clear to Ghanshyam Singh Gupta, who had come to see him on 19 November, that it was impossible for him to go back on the settlement arrived at in regard to the Regional Formula, partly because he thought it was right, but chiefly because he could not go back on ‘his word’. The only suggestion he could make was that ‘the movement should be withdrawn’.28 Ranbir of the Milāp went to see Jawaharlal Nehru on 25 November 1957 and said that Ghanshyam Singh Gupta was pleased with the interview he had with Nehru, but he was in a fix as to what he should do. Nehru told Ranbir that one thing should be clearly understood: ‘I was not going to move from my position by a hair’s breadth, whatever the consequences to the Punjab or India, that is to say that I would not go back on the Regional Formula and I would not take any step to ask other people to reconsider this matter.’ His advice to Ghanshyam Singh Gupta and the Arya Samajists was that ‘they should withdraw this agitation unconditionally and completely’. If they did so, he was prepared to congratulate them ‘for having at last done the right thing’.29 In reply to a letter from Ranbir on 27 November, Nehru asked his Secretary to write that in regard to the language agitation in the Punjab, ‘no question of any assurance, even though it may be unwritten or verbal or confidential, can arise’. Whatever he had to say, he would gladly say in public.30 On the last day of 1957, Nehru wrote to Ghanshyam Singh Gupta that he was very glad to learn of the withdrawal of the language agitation.31 Gupta had actually announced suspension of the seven-

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Failure of the Compromise month-old Save Hindi agitation on 27 December with immediate effect pending final settlement of the issue.

Nehru’s All-Out Support for Kairon Jawaharlal Nehru told the Congress MPs in 1957: ‘The Congress Party is weak and getting weaker.’ He went on to add: ‘Our strong point is the past. Unless we get out of our present rut, the Congress Party is doomed.’ The authors of India after Independence add that Nehru was ‘no party organizer or reformer’, nor did he and other tall leaders have time to devote to party organization. Nehru was compelled to rely on the state party ‘bosses’ for running the party machine. In the Punjab, he gave full support to the Chief Minister, Partap Singh Kairon, who was dealing ‘firmly with both Hindu and Sikh communalism’.32 The Hindu ‘communal’ opposition to the Regional Formula was seen by Jawaharlal Nehru as an indirect attack on Partap Singh Kairon. However, his support for Kairon was not confined to the language issue. As allegations of various kinds began to surface, Nehru reacted to all such allegations because of his concern for Kairon and the role he was playing. His correspondence of 1957– 8 shows that he advised Kairon in all matters and stood by him in all crises. (p.527) Nehru wrote to Kairon on 5 June 1957 that he disliked many of the activities of Prabodh Chandra, and told Kairon that he was not acting rightly and was partly responsible for his frustration. Nehru suggested to Kairon that he might call Prabodh Chandra and tell him that he bore no ill will. A ‘friendly and elderly approach’ could do a great deal of good.33 Nehru’s suggestion was meant to minimize opposition to Kairon in the assembly and in the Congress Party. It was reported in the newspapers that Kairon’s son, Surinder Singh, had got into some trouble with the customs authorities. Nehru did not want people to injure Kairon because of these matters. He wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 25 July 1957 that he was worried at the news about Partap Singh’s son being charged with smuggling and getting into trouble with the customs authorities. This was ‘just the kind of thing which may be used in an attempt to discredit Partap Singh’. Nehru hoped that Kairon would ‘not allow his natural affection for his son to lead him into some wrong step’.34 This confidential letter was meant to imply that the Punjab Governor should remain watchful of the situation that was developing. Nehru sent to Kairon a cutting from The Tribune which criticized the working of the Punjab police. He emphasized that the difficult situation which Kairon was facing left ‘no room for criticism in regard to the administration, more especially the Police’. There was also a complaint about Budhi Singh Bindra: he was considered unfit for selection grade as Superintendent of Police four months earlier but now made DIG (CID), a very responsible post. A large number of important departments had been grouped together under one Secretary, Ranbir Singh, whose past record was not outstanding. There were complaints about two Page 9 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise police officers, Naurang Singh and Chaudhari Ram Singh, connected with smuggling activities, and also about Narain Singh Shahbazpuri, one of Kairon’s MLAs. ‘I am anxious to help you’, said Nehru, ‘in dealing with a difficult situation.’ He wanted Kairon to enquire into these matters.35 On 17 August 1957, Nehru reminded C.P.N. Singh of the allegations and defamatory statements which had been made against Surinder Singh, son of Sardar Partap Singh Kairon. Nehru hoped that Surinder Singh would go to the court. Kairon had told him that his lawyers thought that there was nothing very actionable in the charges made. Nehru advised that their view could be disregarded: not to go to the court of law was very bad indeed. Whatever might be the truth in the allegations, and probably there was very little, they were doing a lot of injury to the Punjab Government and to the Punjab Congress. In the present state, this could be worse than harmful. The only way to deal with these matters was ‘to go to court and challenge the defamers’.36 On 28 August 1957, Nehru suggested to Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant that a secret enquiry could be conducted by the Intelligence into the matter of smuggling in the Punjab, without any reference to the Punjab Government. A senior Congressman from the Punjab had spoken to Nehru about smuggling being conducted on a large scale. The chief of the smuggling ring was said to be Hazara Singh Gill of the village Ratoke but the police did not touch him because, for some reason, he was ‘protected’. The smuggling racket included some legislators of the Punjab. Chaudhari Ram Singh was put in charge of the Border Range, which had been separated from the Jullundur Range under the charge of Ashwani Kumar. This had given (p.528) a great fillip to smuggling. A case of murder, related in a way to the police and a Congress MLA, was allowed to fade out. On objection from Darbara Singh, Secretary of the Punjab Pradesh Congress and MLA from Nurmahal, the Superintendent of Police responsible for investigating the case was transferred, and the Inspector of Police who was actually investigating was demoted and transferred.37 Nehru wrote to Kairon that it was a good thing to have taken Gopi Chand Bhargava in his Ministry but some of the statements made by Bhargava were likely to create a wrong impression in the minds of the people. Nehru advised Kairon to keep in close touch with him so that mischief-makers might not come between the two of them. Nehru added that a deliberate attempt was being made by many people, including some of Kairon’s former friends, to discredit him. ‘I do not like this at all’, he said, ‘and whenever an opportunity offers itself, I shall make my views clear on this subject.’38 There could hardly be any doubt that this strong expression of faith in Kairon strengthened him in more ways than one.

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Failure of the Compromise On 11 September 1957, Nehru was informed that smuggling of gold had started on the old scale again. The signatory to this letter was Anant Ram of Amritsar. He stated that Madan Lal, popularly known as Bijli Pahalwan, was arrested on charges of gold smuggling but all the charges were withdrawn within two days under political pressure. It was believed that Pandit Nehru had visited his house in 1955 to receive a donation of Rs 110,000 for the Congress Session at Amritsar. It was also believed that other Congress leaders like U.N. Dhebar, Indira Gandhi, and Partap Singh Kairon had collected election funds from Madan Lal. All this had caused great resentment among the people. Nehru wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 14 September that the local Congressmen had taken him to a party given by Bijli Pahalwan for the Amritsar Congress, and he gave Nehru a cheque for the Congress. But that had nothing to do with any charge of smuggling now. It should be worthwhile to find out ‘why the case against Bijli Pahalwan has not been proceeded with’.39 The Governor talked to the Chief Minister who said that he had explained this matter to the Prime Minister. Nehru wrote to Kairon on 26 September 1957 that he remembered something said about the matter but he did not connect it with the man at that time. ‘I am rather worried over this matter’, he added. ‘Bijli Pahalwan has had an unsavoury reputation all this time.’ Nehru had gone to his house with great reluctance at the time of the Congress session at Amritsar. ‘The idea that we protect those who give money for Congress purposes has to be checked.’ It was far better for the courts to decide whether or not there was adequate evidence for prosecution than for any executive action to be taken to withdraw the case. Even when such actions were right, they were likely to be misjudged by the public.40 In the matter of Daljit Singh Grewal, Superintendent of Police, Karnal, Nehru was in favour of proceeding in the normal way through enquiries and ‘the procedures that follow them’. The charge against him was of shooting some people in cold blood. Whether or not they were criminals did not affect the charge. A warning had been sent to him that a fake encounter was likely to happen and he himself was warned that this must not happen. In spite of this, and that very day, the shooting incident took place. His plea was that this was done in self-defence, but actually there was no encounter. The shooting had been decided upon before the incident. (p.529) Both direct and circumstantial evidence was clear on this point.41 Evidently, there was no justification for shielding the Superintendent of Police. The opponents of Kairon, including Prabodh Chandra, Gopi Chand Bhargava, and Giani Kartar Singh, submitted a chargesheet to the Congress President, U.N. Dhebar, in the first week of March 1958, accusing him of adopting corrupt practices, ruling despotically, and victimizing his political rivals. On 20 April, the Congress Central Parliamentary Board decided to hold an enquiry. Kairon had sent his replies and explanations to the charges. On 18 May, Nehru drafted a Page 11 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise note for the consideration of the Parliamentary Board. He referred to some situation in the past year which Kairon had handled ‘with courage and determination’. He emerged from a long trial of strength ‘with credit and with enhanced reputation so far as the administration was concerned’. A group had gathered round Prabodh Chandra and carried on a kind of vendetta against the Chief Minister who, in his long career of public service, had been ‘a man of personal integrity and of complete freedom from communal bias’. As a man of the people, he relied on the people more than on slow-moving administrative methods. This procedure produced immediate results but, in the long run, it was bound to produce difficult situations.42 Nehru did not doubt Kairon’s honesty of purpose. After saying the best possible things in favour of Kairon, Nehru mentioned twenty-five charges preferred against the Chief Minister. These charges could be classified as: (a) charges insinuating corruption, (b) charges alleging misuse of power in the interests of his family or friends, and (c) charges alleging irregularities in the administration. Some of the charges in the third category were pending in courts or under investigation otherwise. Out of the seven charges considered in this category, only in one case the action taken by the Chief Minister was ‘improper’: withdrawal of the case against Shri Kulwant Rai under the Arms Act and the Opium Act. None of the five charges in the first category had any substance. In the second category there were nine charges. Some of these were established in the sense that ‘improprieties were committed’. Kairon had pleaded lack of knowledge, which could well be true. ‘Normally we cannot consider him responsible for the failings of some members of his family, but a person in his high position cannot rid himself of such responsibility.’43 The note ended with the observation that all the charges against Kairon were considered separately and fully, and that we have come to the conclusion that there is no basis at all for any corruption; that in some of the charges relating to his family members or others associated with him, certain improprieties were committed; while Sardar Partap Singh Kairon might not have been personally aware of these, a person in his position must be deemed to be constructively responsible; and that there were some procedural irregularities in administrative matters. Kairon spoke frankly in regard to all these matters and ‘offered to resign from his high office, should this be considered necessary’. It was not for the Parliamentary Board to accept or reject this offer of resignation. ‘It was for the Congress Party in the Legislature to indicate in the normal way whether they

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Failure of the Compromise have confidence in him as Chief Minister or not.’ An early meeting of the Party should be held for this purpose.44 On 4 June 1958, Nehru responded to some searching questions at a press conference. There was a general feeling that the (p.530) Congress High Command’s verdict on the charges against the Punjab Chief Minister suffered from too many ambiguities. He was held ‘constructively responsible’ for some of the improprieties committed by his family members, and also for several administrative irregularities, and yet he had been asked to seek a vote of confidence. The question was, could he now stay in office undisturbed even if he won the confidence vote by an overwhelming majority? Nehru said that he had little more to say than what had been stated in the report of the Parliamentary Board. To the second question, Nehru replied that the vote of confidence had nothing to do with the charges of irregularities. These charges had been disposed of. Now the vote of confidence simply meant that ‘if people want him as their leader, let them have him, or let them not have him’. This actually meant that the charges had been set aside. Another question raised was whether the Congress High Command was competent to go into a judicial matter like the charges of corruption. Nehru simply reiterated that there was no evidence of corruption at all, ‘not the faintest, slightest shadow of it’. Indeed, Nehru had never seen ‘anything more fantastic and frivolous’. But, if it was so, it would have emerged from a judicial enquiry as well. Yet another question was, why did Kairon offer to resign? ‘You better ask him or the Congress President’, said Nehru, making it clear that it was not his suggestion, anyway. It was pointed out that when one of Mahatma Gandhi’s sons became troublesome, he publicly dissociated himself from his son. ‘All of us are not Mahatma Gandhi,’ said Nehru.45 His replies were surely unsatisfactory. It was evident that the Congress Central Parliamentary Board had taken its decision on political grounds and not on any legal or moral basis. Its decision was virtually Nehru’s decision. The Congress Legislative Party held its meeting on 5 June 1958. Nehru wrote to C.P.N. Singh on the following day that the meeting seemed strongly in favour of Partap Singh. He won the confidence vote by 102 votes to 54. But the difference would not have been so great if the assembly, which counted much more than the council, had met separately. Also, there were a number of small groups hesitating for some time before voting for Kairon. ‘If they had voted the other way, as they might have done, but for certain circumstances, the majority might well have vanished.’ In other words, Kairon’s position in the party was not so strong as it appeared on the surface. It was extraordinary, said Nehru, how in a few months Kairon had alienated so many different types of persons.46 Nehru’s intervention in the whole affair was vital. He went all out to keep Kairon in power.

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Failure of the Compromise N.V. Gadgil, the Governor-designate for the Punjab, was briefed by Nehru on the various problems in the province. He spoke about the Akalis and some of the Hindu groups like the Arya Samaj, ‘both of which had given so much trouble’. In this process the Congress Party lost its unity. Nehru spoke to Gadgil ‘a good deal’ about Kairon and how he had struggled successfully ‘to meet these various problems and difficulties’. In his letter of 28 August 1958, Nehru told Kairon that Gadgil would give cooperation and help to him. He advised Kairon to meet the Governor frequently and keep him informed of developments. ‘It is necessary that your contact should be close and that he should know how you are feeling about matters.’47

(p.531) Master Tara Singh’s Disillusionment Master Tara Singh met Nehru on 11 January 1957 and talked about various matters. He complained of growing corruption in the Punjab. More direct was his charge that Gian Singh Rarewala had entered into a bargain with Partap Singh Kairon: ‘Not only was Rarewala to get certain number of seats but was to be consulted in the selection of candidates for the Pepsu area and particularly the Akalis.’ This explained why Rarewala, who had been elected on the Akali ticket, had joined the Congress with his followers in the Pepsu Assembly.48 Gian Singh Rarewala’s case was the basis of Master Tara Singh’s charge that attempts were being made ‘to create division among the Sikhs’. Nehru wrote to U.N. Dhebar that Master Tara Singh talked about Gian Singh Rarewala having been purchased by the High Command through some promises made to him. Master Tara Singh said clearly that Maulana Azad had told him so. Nehru felt sure that Maulana Azad could never have said this. Rarewala had joined the Congress ‘without any kind of promise or assurance being given to him’. Probably he was told later on that he would be consulted with regard to the seats from Pepsu.49 Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on 23 January 1957 that the word ‘merit’ served as ‘a smoke-screen’ for the nomination of candidates, and that Kairon interfered illegally in the administration of the state. He was guilty of contempt of court in one case. Nehru was sorry that Master Tara Singh was dissatisfied with the allotment of tickets for the Parliament and the Punjab Legislative Assembly. But he had practically nothing to do with this matter; he did not even know who had been chosen. But he claimed to know that his colleagues had taken enormous pains over this matter and tried their utmost to choose the most suitable persons, keeping various points of view in mind. Nehru went on to add: ‘As you know, they had the advantage of frequent consultations with you and your colleagues.’ About Kairon’s illegal interference in administration, Nehru said that quite often it became necessary for the head of the state to interfere in small matters. In any case, even if there was some undesirable interference, it had little to do with the basic merits of a person. Nehru certified: ‘I have known

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Failure of the Compromise Sardar Partap Singh many long years and have a high opinion of his capacity and integrity.’50 At a press conference in Amritsar on 16 February 1957, Master Tara Singh charged the Congress High Command with breach of faith on four counts: (a) he was not consulted at the final preparations of the list of the Congress candidates from the Punjab, (b) merit was used as a smokescreen but actually disregarded, (c) the Akalis had not been given seats in accordance with their position in the Sikh community as proved in the general elections of 1952 and the gurdwara elections of 1955, and (d) the Congress High Command had not disclosed to him at any stage during his negotiations that some assurances were given to Gian Singh Rarewala, the former Chief Minister of Pepsu. Master Tara Singh expressed his surprise over the High Command refuting his charges of corruption against some Congress nominees without giving him the opportunity to substantiate them.51 On 28 February 1957, Nehru spoke at a public meeting in Gurgaon in the presence of Kairon. Now that the elections were round the corner, he said, it was necessary to make sure that everything should go off smoothly. It did (p.532) not seem right that parties were formed on communal lines. There had always been Sikh stalwarts in the Congress, and the Congress aimed at an amicable settlement with the Akali Dal and the Sikh elders. ‘Unfortunately, after everything was settled, Master Tara Singh backed out though he had participated in the talks at every stage. I am very unhappy that in his anger he is opposing the Hindu and Sikh candidates put up by the Congress.’ It was regrettable, he said, that Master Tara Singh was not willing to cooperate after all the talks that they had with him. He was claiming that he was opposed to the corrupt and dishonest candidates. But the candidates whom Master Tara Singh was supporting also needed scrutiny. ‘One of them was dismissed from Government service during British rule on charges of corruption.’ It was absurd, he said, to level charges of corruption at the Congress candidates. The Congress was a huge party with good and bad elements in it. ‘But I do not know of any other party in the world, let alone India, which has consistently made an effort to maintain a high standard.’ Nehru was happy to mention that Kairon had already won the election. He advised the people to vote for all the Congress candidates at the elections ‘to eliminate communalist tensions and casteism from Punjab’.52 Sardar Lal Singh, an Akali Dal member of the Lok Sabha, was not given the Congress ticket now, and he wrote to Nehru about it. Nehru replied that he would have been happy to have Lal Singh as a colleague, but he had not been concerned with the choice of candidates from the Punjab. He remembered ‘the straight forward and courageous attitude’ which Lal Singh had taken when Master Tara Singh was attacking the Congress. Nehru hoped that the Congress would not enter into ‘marriages of convenience’. ‘In the Punjab, it was our earnest wish to put an end to communal outlook of both the Hindus and the Page 15 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise Sikhs.’ He went on to add: ‘You know we insisted on the Akali Dal giving up politics, and this was agreed to. Unfortunately, Master Tara Singh did not act up to the assurances given to us.’53 Nehru was keen to give this impression to all and sundry that if the Congress–Akali compromise eventually failed it would be due to Master Tara Singh’s non-cooperation. After the elections, Nehru addressed the outgoing Congress Parliamentary Party on 18 March 1957. The large majority of the electorate, he said, had sided with the Congress. That was a clear indication that the Congress was still a very strong and united body functioning effectively. The progress of the country was bound to suffer so long as the evils of ‘communalism, casteism, and parochialism’ continued. Therefore, Congressmen had to put up an effective fight against these. ‘The elections have amply demonstrated that a large majority of the people are not in favour of parties which are trying to perpetuate these evils.’ In the interest of the country, the Congress should function ‘still more effectively and tackle all the problems boldly and in a dynamic way’.54 The success of the Congress gave Nehru the mandate to pursue his old policies with the same old attitudes. On 15 July 1957, Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru again that the Congress High Command had failed to keep promises made to Sardar Hukam Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. It had been agreed that for constituencies with Sikh majorities the Akali Dal group would get nominations in accordance with its position in the Sikh community, and that the list of Congress candidates from the Punjab would be shown to Master Tara Singh for his satisfaction before the final selection and, if (p.533) need be, he could express his view against a decision. Furthermore, Lal Bahadur Shastri had declared in one of his speeches that the Congress was prepared ‘to refer the matter of allegations of dishonest negotiations and bad faith to arbitration’. This offer was accepted by Master Tara Singh and he had suggested that either Vinoba Bhave or Jaya Prakash Narayan should be appointed as arbitrators for they commanded ‘universal respect’.55 But nothing was done. Master Tara Singh was convinced that the Congress leaders had not kept faith. In his reply to Master Tara Singh on 21 July 1957, Nehru said that he was wholly unable to agree with Master Tara Singh in his appraisal of what happened in the course of the negotiations between the Congress and the Akali Dal. Nehru was not personally involved in the negotiations except that he was present on certain occasions. But he was kept informed. He pointed out that Sardar Hukam Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, both of whom were with the Congress, did not agree with Master Tara Singh’s interpretation of events. There might be misunderstandings on minor matters but Master Tara Singh was unfair to the Congress in the charges he had been bringing against the Congress. Nehru had

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Failure of the Compromise no idea of what Lal Bahadur Shastri had said but any proposal for arbitration in this matter seemed to him very extraordinary.56 The only arbiter can be public opinion. Even before the last General Elections, the public had before it your charges. The elections took place after those charges had been repeatedly made by you and after you had worked against Congress candidates in various constituencies. We should, therefore, accept the verdict of the electorate in this matter.57 This was an astounding statement for Nehru to make, virtually affirming that success at the polls was a proof of honesty and integrity. Master Tara Singh’s reference to the case of Gian Singh Rarewala was particularly important and Nehru explained his position at some length. He reiterated that there had been nothing improper or disgraceful in the way in which the Congress and Rarewala dealt with each other. Everything was completely above board. Nehru had objected to Sardar Gian Singh’s behaviour when he formed a government in Pepsu. Many years later he came to Nehru and explained the circumstances of that incident. His explanation made some difference but Nehru was not satisfied. About a year and half ago, Gian Singh asked Nehru if he could join the Congress. Nehru told him that this was a matter that should be discussed with the Congress President. He should be sure that he accepted ‘the Congress viewpoint’. It was long after this, said Nehru, ‘that we had talks with you and your colleagues, among whom was Sardar Gian Singh’. In other words, Rarewala had thought of joining the Congress before the Akali– Congress negotiations. Those talks ended in some kind of agreement. Later, Sardar Gian Singh came to Nehru and said that he had decided to join the Congress. Nehru told him that since he had so decided after full consideration, he could do so as far as Nehru was concerned. ‘Again there was no commitment to him of any kind by the President of the Congress or by me.’ Therefore, there was nothing improper about the Congress allowing Sardar Gian Singh to join the Congress.58 Master Tara Singh had written to Nehru again on 24 August 1957 about gold smuggling and Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala. He referred to charges of gold smuggling against Kairon’s son levelled by the General Secretary of the Punjab Pradesh Praja Socialist Party, who was prepared to establish his charges in an (p.534) independent enquiry. Nehru said that the case ‘had gone to court on a criminal charge of defamation’. Master Tara Singh referred to Rarewala’s role during the merger of the Akali Dal with the Congress and also afterwards. Nehru said that their views with regard to facts were so different that there was no purpose in carrying on correspondence. It was not true that ‘any commitments were made to Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala or inducements held out to him for him to leave the Akali Party’.59

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Failure of the Compromise Nehru was not telling the whole truth. Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala had met Nehru on 7 June 1956 when he saw no objection to his joining the Congress. But it was for the Congress President to take the final decision. Rarewala met Maulana Azad too. The Congress President, U.N. Dhebar, had left it to Nehru and Azad to give the final word. Nehru told Azad that he thought ‘we should accept Rarewala’. The question arose about ‘our two-year rule’. According to the Congress Constitution, primary membership for at least two consecutive years was essential for a person to become eligible for election to a primary Congress panchayat. Nehru said: ‘We are not being asked to give any assurance or guarantee. Rarewala is coming in without any conditions. But I do think that the two-year condition should not be rigidly applied in regard to all newcomers to the Congress.’ Nehru was in favour of relaxing the rule. When the Private Secretary of the Congress President telephoned Nehru on 9 June to know his opinion, he had the message sent that Rarewala ‘should be accepted as a Congress member’.60 It is true that in this account no assurance or guarantee was asked for, but there was a tacit understanding that Rarewala would be able to hold responsible positions on joining the Congress. It seems that Nehru was not so upright as he claimed to be. At any rate, Gian Singh Rarewala confirmed his joining the Congress after meeting Nehru. He was expelled from the Akali Dal on 15 July 1956 for his defection. The Akali Dal had not yet merged with the Congress Party. It was bad faith in a way to encourage, if not to induce, a leader among the Akalis to defect. It is not surprising that Rarewala was saying that there was no purpose in the Akali Dal staying in politics after its demand for a Punjabi-speaking state had been given up. There was a certain degree of ‘indecent haste’ with which he was allowed to join the Congress. On 23 July, when the Pepsu Assembly was in brief session, he sat on the treasury benches along with eight of his supporters, seven of whom had been elected on the Akali Dal ticket.61 The Punjab Governor wrote to Nehru on 29 August 1956 that the decision of some members of the Akali Dal to join the Congress ‘would eliminate one of the difficult factors in the politics of Punjab’. He went on to add that even if the Akalis did not stick to their decision, ‘it will have served the purpose of easing the tension at present and also rendering Akalis very much weaker for any subsequent mischief’. In any case, admission of the Akalis into the Congress would ‘do more good than harm’. Master Tara Singh met Nehru on 31 August and Nehru wrote to C.P.N. Singh that it was more of a social call than anything else, but Master Tara Singh did refer to the Akalis joining the Congress. He wanted the Akali Dal to retain certain individuality if the necessity arose. Nehru told him that Maulana Azad and the Congress President were dealing with this matter. However, he pointed out that under the Congress Constitution it was not possible for members of another political body to join the Congress. The Congress Central Parliamentary Board (p.535) had opined on 13 August 1956 that the Akalis should cease to work as a separate political organization. Nehru Page 18 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise wrote to C.P.N. Singh that, on the whole, ‘it would be a good thing for the Akalis to join the Congress’. There were some risks but this was ‘the only way gradually to eliminate this communal outlook’. Significantly, Nehru had little doubt that it was ‘due to Rarewala’s initiative and the success he has had that the other Akalis have felt rather left out and want to join the Congress now’. C.P.N. Singh agreed with Nehru about Rarewala taking the lead and added that he would not have been successful if Yadvindra Singh ‘had not played his part properly’.62 Evidently, there were several players in the game and Rarewala’s decision to join the Congress was not so innocent a move as Nehru was projecting it to Master Tara Singh. Soon after the decision of the Akali Dal in favour of its merger with the Congress Party, Nehru wrote to Kairon on 7 October 1956 that he was glad that the Akalis had decided to join the Congress ‘more or less unconditionally’. Kairon welcomed the decision of the Akalis but added that the struggle within the Congress would increase. Nehru said that ‘we shall have to be vigilant in future. We shall not have easy sailing’. He added that he had told Master Tara Singh that if the Akalis joined the Congress, their ‘izzat’(honour) was his ‘izzat’ and not, as Master Tara Singh maintained, that Master Tara Singh’s izzat was his izzat.63 Nehru’s contention was meant to absolve him of the charge of dishonouring his word. Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on the 1st of January 1958 about the aggressive attitude of Hindus against Sikhs. Nehru wrote to Master Tara Singh on 10 January that he had already expressed his view repeatedly in public that the Arya Samaj functioned in ‘a wrong and anti-national way’ during the socalled Save Hindi agitation. No doubt there were some Hindus in the Punjab who were narrow-minded and communal and who had often behaved badly. There were also some Sikhs who were narrow-minded and communal. But this description did not apply to the great majority of the Hindus or the Sikhs. Misbehaviour against the Sikhs by certain known or unknown persons was highly reprehensible and the miscreants should be adequately punished. However, ‘we cannot judge communities’ on the basis of the actions of a few individuals. The Hindus, as much as the Sikhs, should make it perfectly clear that they looked upon such misbehaviour as highly objectionable.64 Nehru appears to be offering pieties as a substitute for action. On 30 May 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to C.P.N Singh from Manali that Master Tara Singh had sent a long letter (dated 24 May) through a messenger which consisted chiefly of attack on Kairon but also on the Congress Parliamentary Board. He threatened to publish it, and probably he would. Nehru had written a fairly long reply on 26 May.65 ‘I have the misfortune to disagree with your views in many matters,’ says Nehru at the outset. Master Tara Singh had underlined that the Congress High Command was following ‘anti-Tara Singh and anti-Akali policies’. Nehru assured him that he had ‘personal regards’ for Page 19 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise Master Tara Singh and the Congress was not ‘anti-Tara Singh’. The Congress was opposed to communalism, whether it was Sikh or Hindu. It had demonstrated its opposition to Hindu communalism in the Punjab only recently. Master Tara Singh was convinced that Nehru and the Parliamentary Board had been partial to Kairon. They bailed him out. (p.536) He had been accused of corruption, nepotism, jobbery, and maladministration but ‘the Parliamentary Board had intentionally bypassed all canons of high public conduct, parliamentary democracy, justice and fair play in order to shield a man who suits them’. Nehru defended the Parliamentary Board by invoking the background of events in the Punjab and in the Congress Parliamentary Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. ‘This background was not a pleasing one, nor did the persons who brought charges against Sardar Partap Singh come with clean hands.’ The decision of the Central Parliamentary Board was based on all such considerations. Referring to the three categories of charges, Nehru reiterated that they were flimsy in the extreme, and there was nothing to substantiate them. Making a clear distinction between ‘corruption’ and ‘administrative irregularities’, Nehru stated categorically that he stood by the report of the Parliamentary Board. Nehru’s statement conceals the fact that the decision of the Parliamentary Board was his own decision. Master Tara Singh had asked Nehru what he would have done in a similar situation: ‘quit or appear before the Parliamentary Board for explanation and seek a vote of confidence’. He would certainly not quit, said Nehru. He was talking on the assumption of his innocence and, thereby, giving benefit to all politicians. Master Tara Singh had asked Nehru what would happen if the Parliamentary Board did not completely exonerate him after an enquiry. ‘That is a difficult question for me to answer,’ said Nehru. He could leave office of his own accord to do active work. But he was anxious also that ‘every Minister in the country should set the highest standards’. Master Tara Singh’s focus was on Kairon, and Nehru defended him in no ambiguous terms. He said that he had known Kairon for over a score of years rather well, as a colleague and a comrade, and formed a high opinion of ‘his integrity and freedom from communalism’. He had his failings, but in the land where communalism was always raising its head in various forms, it was a relief to have a comrade who was above this failing. Nehru closed his letter with the following words: ‘As you will notice, your letter has failed to convince me and I fear that my letter will not succeed in convincing you. But since you did me the honour of writing to me fully, I am sending you this reply.’ Nehru’s letter was professedly written with an eye on the press. By this time the Regional Formula had become a minor thing for Nehru. At a press conference in Delhi on 7 September 1958 the last subject listed for discussion was implementation of the Regional Formula. But Nehru wanted to Page 20 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise ‘dispose of some of the minor things’ first, and the first among these minor things was implementation of the Punjab Regional Formula. Nehru’s answer was simple: ‘Let it be implemented as rapidly as possible…. It is a very good formula, an excellent formula. It should be implemented.’ There was a question about the statement made by Master Tara Singh that the formula was not being implemented, and that he wanted to start an agitation. Nehru replied, ‘I am sorry I cannot keep pace with Master Tara Singh’s statements.’ Anyway, it was a question for the Punjab Government to answer. ‘Where do I come into the picture?’66 In other words, it was left to Kairon to implement the Regional Formula and if it was not implemented Nehru could do nothing about it. Eight months later Gurdial Singh Dhillon, Speaker of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha, wrote to the Prime Minister that the Regional Committees were creating problems of a serious (p.537) nature. Late in 1957 some legislators had maintained that these Committees should have their own rules of procedure. The matter had to be referred to the Home Ministry, and the Punjab Government was informed on 14 December 1957 that the Regional Committees were governed by the same rules as the other committees of the Legislative Assembly except in matters covered by the Presidential Order. Subsequently, both the Committees decided to have a regular ‘Question Hour’. On a reference made to the Home Ministry it was clarified that the Regional Committees could not have a ‘Question Hour’. In the meantime, both the Committees began to publish their proceedings in detail. They also claimed that the Regional Committees were sublegislatures. Ironically, Master Tara Singh and others, for whose satisfaction and reconciliation these Committees were created, took every opportunity to denounce them. On the other hand, Gaini Kartar Singh and some other Akali legislators proclaimed that they would create ‘a real Punjabi Suba’ by seeking more and more powers for the Regional Committees. The advocates of Haryana Prant too were supported by the Congress dissidents in the assembly. The Regional Committees were becoming a constitutional anomaly in the speaker’s view. If they were left unchecked and uncontrolled ‘we will be faced with the inevitable calamity of partitioning of our present Punjab’.67 Nehru sent copies of this letter to the Punjab Governor, the Law Minister and the Home Ministry on 9 May 1959. On 14 May, he wrote to the Punjab Governor that there was no question of winding up the Regional Committees. But the attitude adopted by these Committees appeared to Nehru to be quite extraordinary, and their attempt to copy the procedure of the Legislature was ridiculous. It had been made quite clear after a long discussion at the time of forming these Committees that they could not over-ride the Legislature, and their advice was advisory, though in matters completely under their kin, their advice would normally be accepted. But the final authority would inevitably be that of the Legislature’. Nehru added that the matter had been referred to the Law Minister.68 Nehru wrote to Kairon on 23 May that there was no intention of putting an end to the Regional Committees but they had to function within the Page 21 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise law. The Governor had already pulled up the Regional Committees in some matters.69 The Additional Secretary in the Law Ministry gave a detailed note on the issues raised by the Speaker of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to conclude that the ambit of consultation with the Committees was limited to fourteen subjects and one Regional Committee could not block legislation in the other. In matters involving disagreement between the Punjab Legislature and a Regional Committee it was not obligatory for the Governor to uphold the view of the Regional Committee; he had to take a decision on merits and to seek the advice of the Home Ministry on important matters.70 The Law Secretary gave similar views to hammer the point that the Regional Committees were committees of the assembly and not independent legislative authorities. The Union Law Minister, A.K. Sen, agreed with the Law Secretary. He could see no substance in the contention of any of the Regional Committees seeking to arrogate to themselves the status of a legislature.71 Nehru sent this information to the Governor, the Chief Minister, and the Speaker of Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 28 May, requesting confidentiality.72 The Regional Committees were to be kept on suspended animation, so as to not give a handle to Master Tara Singh.

(p.538) In Retrospect The Punjab was reorganized on the basis of Regional Formula and inaugurated on 1 November 1956. Gian Singh Rarewala had joined the Congress Party already in early August. Giani Kartar Singh too was in favour of joining the Congress on certain conditions. Maulana Azad clarified that the Akali Dal could continue to function confining its activities to cultural, religious, and social matters, and the Akalis who joined the Congress would be subject to its discipline. Giani Kartar Singh and Hukam Singh were in favour of joining the Congress on these terms. Master Tara Singh’s strong commitment to the idea of an independent Akali Dal was a hindrance. Master Tara Singh had reservations about the whole issue. He met the Prime Minister personally and felt satisfied. He revealed on 30 September that Nehru had settled all issues by saying that Master Tara Singh’s honour was his own honour. Master Tara Singh declared that he would never forsake Nehru. The Working Committee of the Akali Dal resolved to concentrate on the protection and promotion of religious, educational, cultural, social, and economic interests of the Panth, and guard against any violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. The General Body of the Akali Dal met in November. Only 5 out of 322 delegates voted against the resolution. Master Tara Singh bowed to the wishes of the majority in the light of his personal talk with Nehru. However, the only lasting result of the Congress–Akali compromise of 1956 was the merger of Pepsu with the Punjab. The other provisions of the Regional Formula were diluted or indefinitely delayed. The first major setback to the compromise came with the general elections of February 1957. The rest of the Page 22 of 27

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Failure of the Compromise year was marked by the ‘Save Hindi’ agitation against the Regional Formula. Opposition to the Chief Minister, Kairon, which had started in 1957 gathered strength in 1958 and obliged Nehru to give all-out support to him within the Congress and in public. Differences between Master Tara Singh and Nehru went on growing till the Punjabi Suba Conference at Amritsar on 12 October 1958 at which the demand for Punjabi Suba was revived. Master Tara Singh made it clear that the Regional Formula for him was dead. The ‘Save Hindi’ agitation against the Regional Formula, which had been started formally in June 1957, was suspended towards the end of December. Nehru talks of his conviction that the Congress Party should not go back on its commitment. However, minor concessions, which did not infringe the Regional Formula in any important way, could be given, like the stage at which the second language was to be introduced in schools, or parity of Hindi with Punjabi up to the district level. It was clear to Nehru that the essential motivation for the agitation was the Arya Samajist antipathy to Punjabi and the Gurmukhi script. In their zeal for Hindi the Arya Samajists and their supporters did not realize that their agitation was harmful not only for communal relations in the Punjab but also for the cause of Hindi in the country, especially in the south. The agitation was essentially political and not free from violence; it was not only anti-government but also anti-Sikh in character. Kairon’s Ministry was dubbed as ‘Sikh Raj’ and even Congressmen had drifted in communal directions in word and deed. The Regional Formula was derailed. The Hindu ‘communal’ attack on the Regional Formula was seen by Nehru as an indirect attack on Kairon. Opposition to the (p.539) Chief Minister within the Punjab Assembly and the Congress Party, which had appeared during the time of the agitation for Hindi, continued to increase in 1958. Initially, Nehru had advised conciliation but, whether or not it was tried, there was no improvement. Nehru advised Kairon on all matters that could be used against him by his opponents. The chargesheet prepared by Probodh Chandra, Giani Kartar Singh, Bhargava, and others was serious enough to be taken up by the Congress High Command. The decision taken was clearly on political rather than legal or moral grounds. The press was not impressed by Nehru’s explanation, and yet he persisted in keeping Kairon in the saddle. The message that went across to the people was not exactly favourable to the Congress High Command or to Nehru. There were other dimensions of the situation, suggestive of deterioration in governance. Master Tara Singh was convinced that the Central Parliamentary Board of the Congress had been partial to Kairon and had bailed him out. He told Nehru that despite serious charges of corruption, nepotism, jobbery, and maladministration, the Board had ‘intentionally bypassed all canons of high public conduct, parliamentary democracy, justice and fair play in order to shield a man who suits them’.

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Failure of the Compromise Master Tara Singh and Jawaharlal Nehru differed widely on three major issues. The first related to elections about which Master Tara Singh was convinced that the Congress Party had deviated from the understanding arrived at during the negotiations between the top Akali leaders and the Congress High Command. Nehru’s refusal to have arbitration on this point lends support to Sarhadi’s statement that neither Jawaharlal Nehru nor Maulana Azad had countered the Akali expectation of about 75 per cent seats for the Akalis among the Sikh candidates. The second issue was the defection of Gian Singh Rarewala to join the Congress even before the Akali decision in favour of merger. There is hardly any doubt that there was a tacit understanding between Rarewala and the Congress leadership on this point in which the Maharaja of Patiala had also played a part. The third issue was the attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru towards Partap Singh Kairon. There is absolutely no doubt that Nehru openly supported Kairon in spite of the serious charges of misuse of office against him. Nehru’s attitude in all the three issues disillusioned Master Tara Singh not only with him but also with the Congress High Command. The first Punjabi Suba Conference was held on 12 October 1958. Notes:

(1.) Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 227–9. (2.) Nayar, Minority Politics, p. 229. (3.) Nayar, Minority Politics, pp. 230–2. (4.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 286–91. (5.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 292. (6.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 293–6. (7.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 300–3. (8.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 303–6. (9.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 309–10. (10.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, General Editor, S. Gopal (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Fund, 2007), vol. XXXVIII, pp. 215–16. (11.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 217–19. (12.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 221–2. (13.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 223.

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Failure of the Compromise (14.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 227–31. (15.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 231–2. (16.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 236. (17.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX (2007), pp. 385–8. (18.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 388–9. (19.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 390. (20.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 395–6. (21.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 411. (22.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 466–70. (23.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 399–400. (24.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 401. (25.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 403. (26.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL (2009), p. 412. (27.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, p. 413. (28.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, pp. 430–1. (29.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, p. 432. (30.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, p. 433 n. 5. (31.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, p. 435. (32.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1999), pp. 326–7. (33.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 390. (34.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 233 and n. 3. (35.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 235. (36.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 404–5. (37.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 408. (38.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, pp. 409–10.

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Failure of the Compromise (39.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 413 n. 2. (40.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 414. (41.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XL, p. 324. (42.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII (2010), pp. 436–7 n. 2. (43.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII, pp. 438–41. (44.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII, p. 441. (45.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII, pp. 770–3. (46.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII, pp. 452–3. (47.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIII (2011), p. 358. (48.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVI (2005), p. 307 and n. 7. (49.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVI, pp. 307–8. (50.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVI, p. 313. (51.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVII (2006), p. 90 and n. 9. (52.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVII, pp. 89–90. (53.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVII, pp. 345–6. (54.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVII, pp. 108–9. (55.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, p. 225 and nn. 5–6. (56.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 225–6. (57.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 226–7. (58.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 407 and n. 2. (59.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIX, p. 407 n. 2. (60.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIII (2004), pp. 360–1 and nn. 3–4, 6. (61.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXIV (2005), p. 197 and nn. 2–4; also vol. XXXIII, pp. 360–1. (62.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XXXV (2005), p. 240 and nn. 2, 4, 6–7.

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Failure of the Compromise (63.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLI (2010), pp. 518–19. (64.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII (2010), p. 449. (65.) For this and the following three paragraphs, see Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLII, p. 443–4, nn. 3–4, 12, 14–16. (66.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIV (2012), pp. 96–7. (67.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX (2013), pp. 666–70. (68.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, pp. 303–4 (69.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, p. 306. (70.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, pp. 670–3. (71.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, pp. 673–5. (72.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, p. 675.

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The Gulf Widens

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Gulf Widens (1958–60) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0023

Abstract and Keywords Partap Singh Kairon tried to establish indirect control over the SGPC. Master Tara Singh pointed out that there was credible evidence of interference but Nehru was ignoring it because both the Congress party and the government were involved in it. On 7 April 1959, Master Tara Singh appealed to ‘all men of good conscience’ to take notice of the gross injustice being done to the Sikhs. Nehru invited Master Tara Singh for talks on 12 April 1959. Soon afterwards he declared that there would be no Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh announced on 7 May that he would fight the SGPC elections on the issue of Punjabi Suba. The Akali Dal won all the 132 seats it contested in the 1960 SGPC elections. As the editor of the Tribune remarked, this was a ‘clear proof of the great hold of Master Tara Singh on the Sikh masses’. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Partap Singh Kairon, control over SGPC, Nehru, Congress party, Punjabi Suba, Akali Dal, 1960 SGPC elections, Sikh masses

Three issues widened the gulf between Master Tara Singh and Jawaharlal Nehru from the Punjabi Suba Conference of 1958 to the SGPC elections of 1960. The most important issue was the effort of the Congress government in the Punjab to establish its indirect control over the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). Contemporary records show that the language issue was not dropped by the Hindi Rakshak Samiti. Gaini Kartar Singh, a Minister in Kairon’s

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The Gulf Widens Cabinet, began to interfere in the affairs of Delhi gurdwaras. The SGPC elections of 1960 gave Master Tara Singh the mandate to battle for Punjabi Suba.

Congress Bid to Take Control of the SGPC Outlining the Gurdwara legislation after Partition, Surjit Singh Gandhi gives considerable attention to the legislation during 1958–9 before the SGPC elections of 1960. The Congress attitude towards the Regional Formula obliged Master Tara Singh to raise once again the demand for Punjabi Suba, and the first Punjabi Suba Conference was held in October 1958. Immediately afterwards, the entire government machinery was moved to oust Master Singh from the Presidentship of the SGPC. Giani Kartar Singh played a major role in this game at the instance of Partap Singh Kairon and the Congress High Command. He was able to gather support of all the groups in opposition to Master Tara Singh, including twenty-two Communist members of the SGPC, by promising them important offices in the executive of the SGPC. In the election of the office bearers on 16 November 1958, Master Tara Singh was defeated by a nominee of the Congress Ministry with a margin of three votes.1 It was apprehended nevertheless in Congress circles that Master Tara Singh would be able to regain his position if measures were not taken to keep him out of power. (p.543) For this purpose, a delegation headed by the newly elected president of the SGPC met the Chief Minister of the Punjab to persuade him to call a special session of the assembly for pressing an amendment Bill on the plea of giving representation to the Pepsu areas of the Punjab. To begin with, it was proposed to nominate thirty-five additional members from these areas by (a) the executive of the SGPC, (b) thirteen members of the Interim Gurdwara Board of the erstwhile Pepsu area, and (c) twelve co-opted members from the Pepsu area for the SGPC. Under pressure from the Sikhs led by Master Tara Singh, this provision was changed in favour of an electoral college of about 3,000 Sikh voters from the Pepsu area. These voters consisted of (a) the sitting Sikh Members of Parliament and the Punjab legislators from the Pepsu area, (b) heads of the registered Singh Sabhas and Sikh educational institutions, (c) Sikh members of municipal committees, (d) Sikh Sarpanches and heads of Nagar Panchayats and Nagar Adalats, and (e) all members of the Interim Gurdwara Board and its executive. The Sikh Gurdwara Amendment Bill was passed in early January 1959 in a specially convened session of the Punjab Legislative Assembly.2 The Punjab Government claimed that its concern was to extend democratic rights to the Sikhs of Pepsu, but the majority of the Sikhs, especially the Akalis, regarded this legislation as a clever ploy of the government to increase the strength of the pro-Congress Sikhs in the SGPC and to safeguard its interests in the SGPC elections.3 Another amendment made in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act in April 1959 was presented by the government as a cunning device to nominate its own men to committees of management on the pretext of streamlining the Page 2 of 23

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The Gulf Widens gurdwara administration; it was seen by the Akali leaders as an interference of the government in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. Atma Singh, an Akali legislator, pointed out in the Punjab Assembly that one of the Ministers had made gurdwaras his Public Relations Department and used their funds for his personal propaganda. ‘The religious places have been controlled with governmental force and these are being used for stabilising ministries.’ The Minister referred to was presumably Giani Kartar Singh. At this time the SGPC was controlled by pro-Congress Sikh Members and they nominated their own supporters for different committees to utilize the administrative structure to serve their own interests in the forthcoming elections.4 On 15 December 1958, the Punjab legislators (Sarup Singh, Hargurnad Singh, Atma Singh, Udham Singh, and Umrao Singh) had met Nehru and accused Giani Kartar Singh of misusing his position in the government and the Congress Party by sponsoring an amendment to the Sikh Gurdwaras Act to enable twelve coopted members of the SGPC and thirteen government nominees from the Gurdwara Interim Board of the former Pepsu area to elect thirty-five more members to the SGPC. They wanted Nehru to put a stop to this and to allow the SGPC to frame proposals for representation of the Pepsu Sikhs on the SGPC. Nehru wrote to Kairon that it was odd to introduce this type of amendment suddenly in a special session and to enable twenty-five nominated members to co-opt even more than their own number. It appeared that the government wanted to pack the SGPC with its own nominees, and that too when the elections to the SGPC were due to be held shortly. Nehru added, however, that he was concerned only with avoiding ‘unnecessary ill will and trouble’.5 Master Tara Singh met Nehru on 30 (p.544) December 1958 and presented a memorandum to him, alleging that the Congress Government in the Punjab was interfering with the administration of Sikh gurdwaras, and urged that the Amendment Bill should be withdrawn. Nehru wrote to Kairon that Master Tara Singh complained particularly of the hurry with which things were being done without consulting the SGPC, referring to the convention that no amendment should be made to the Act without mutual agreement of the SGPC and the government. Moreover, some of the basic principles of the Gurdwaras Act had been bypassed—for instance, non-Sikhs had been included in the elections and the qualifications laid down in the Act were ignored. Nehru told Master Tara Singh that it was the government’s policy not to interfere in religious matters. He would send the memorandum to Kairon because he did not pretend to understand, he said, the matter in detail. It seemed to him, however, that ‘this was some kind of a conflict between the Sikhs inter se’.6 The Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act was passed by the Punjab Legislative Assembly on 31 December 1958 and by the Punjab Council on 3 January 1959 to provide for control and management of about 181 Gurdwaras by the SGPC in the erstwhile Pepsu. On 3 January 1959, Nehru addressed a press conference and Page 3 of 23

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The Gulf Widens replied to questions on the Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act. He referred to Master Tara Singh’s explanation of his viewpoint on the subject on 30 December 1958. Before that some MLAs had met him. After their return to Chandigarh they had thanked Nehru for the change made by the government in the electoral college. Nehru sent Master Tara Singh’s memorandum to the Punjab Government with a covering letter. He could not overrule the Punjab Government, he said; he could only point out things for their consideration. He went on to add that he was not competent ‘to bring any kind of pressure’ on people responsible for legislation in the Punjab.7 Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on 3 and 5 January 1959, deploring the increased intrusion of the Congress Government into Sikh religious affairs after the introduction of the Gurdwaras Amendment Act and asking him to instruct the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, to issue a passport for him with ‘a car, driver, and another attendant immediately’. He wanted to go on pilgrimage to all the Sikh holy places in Pakistan, starting with Nankana Sahib. He would go alone, he said, and refuse to speak with anyone in Pakistan ‘lest his mission be misunderstand’. His mission was to seek ‘inspiration and blessings’ to counter the activities going on in the Punjab. Nehru wrote to Master Tara Singh on the 7th that he did not see any necessity of attaching someone with him. This was not ‘our custom’. However, he had spoken to the Chief Minister of the Punjab who would issue instructions for the passports required. As for matters in the Punjab Legislature, it was not desirable for Nehru to intervene. ‘That would be interference in provincial autonomy.’ Furthermore, as explained to him by Kairon, he added, there was no intention on the part of the Punjab government to interfere in Sikh religious affairs. In any case, somewhat better arrangements were being made for representation of Pepsu Sikhs on the SGPC, and only till the elections.8 Early in February 1960, Atma Singh and Harbans Singh Gujral wrote to Nehru that the Four-Man Committee had not been able to do anything due to the attitude of the government nominees, who did not allow it to function. Interference from the government in the gurdwara affairs had become worse. (p.545) The Chief Minister had made the state Congress organization subservient to his wish to fight the gurdwara elections. The excuse trotted was that the Ministers were taking part in their individual capacity. After their defeat in the elections they were resorting to underhand means to undo the verdict of the Sikh public. They were giving official sanction to unauthorized acts of the outgoing SGPC. After the results of the SGPC elections were declared on 18 January 1960, the outgoing SGPC had submitted to the government a panel of three names on the 21st for the selection of members to the Judicial Commission before the new SGPC was constituted. This was a fraud on the law and the electorate. Similarly, the outgoing SGPC constituted new committees for over eighty gurdwaras with the connivance of the government. The letter ended with the earnest hope that Nehru would look into these matters. Nehru sent a copy of Page 4 of 23

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The Gulf Widens the letter to Kairon, asking him to send some particulars so that an answer could be provided.9 Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on 16 February 1960 that the Sikhs disliked very much the attitude of the Punjab Government, particularly that of going back on promises, pacts, and conventions solemnly made with the Akalis. He enumerated ten instances in support of his charge, notably the Regional Formula, the pledge of 12 April 1959 for non-interference in the SGPC affairs, the Four-Man Committee, the Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act, and direct participation in the SGPC elections of January 1960. In the last para of his letter Master Tara Singh said that the Chief Minister and other Ministers who derived their authority from the Prime Minister were misusing it to maintain a wide gulf between the Sikhs and the government, between the Sikhs and the Hindus, and indeed between Sikhs and Sikhs, subjecting Nehru’s name to public criticism.10 Master Tara Singh left it to Nehru to do or not to do anything about this situation. Nehru wrote to Master Tara Singh on 7 March 1959 that he had read his letter of 5 January with care but he had nothing to add to what he had written on 7 January. The arrangements were to the advantage of the Sikhs of the old Pepsu and more or less temporary till fresh elections were held. The new arrangements gave greater opportunities to the Sikhs. The fact that a Minister happened to be a Sikh did not deprive him of his right as a Sikh.11 Evidently, Nehru saw nothing wrong in the way in which a Sikh Minister of the Congress Government in the Punjab sought to strengthen its hold on the SGPC. Master Tara Singh reacted strongly to this legislation by the Punjab Government. Referring to Nehru’s reply on 7 January 1959 to his letters of 3 and 5 January, Master Tara Sigh appreciated Nehru’s stand of non-interference with ‘provincial autonomy’ but he ventured to give a short history of the Gurdwaras Amendment Act for his information. The Punjab Government had appointed an Advisory Committee on 22 February 1957 to report on the management of gurdwaras in the erstwhile state of Pepsu. On the basis of its report on 14 September, a Bill was introduced in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 8 April, and referred on the 28th to the Joint Sub-Committee of both the Regional Committees, with Giani Kartar Singh as its Chairman. The Joint Sub-Committee submitted its report on 30 October. No new procedure was given for election in this clause, Clause 148(B), duly signed by the Chairman. On 16 November, ‘dissidents’ from the Akali Dal and the Communist members defeated the nominee of the Akali Dal in the Presidential (p.546) elections by three votes. The report of the Joint Sub-Committee came up before the Regional Committees on 27 December when the Committees adopted clause 148(B) of the Bill, and the Bill was passed on 31 December 1958. The Punjab Vidhan Sabha passed the Bill on 3 January 1959, and the Governor gave his assent on the 8th.12

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The Gulf Widens Master Tara Singh made it clear that the proceedings were hurried from 16 November 1958 to 3 January 1959 to ensure passage of the Bill; the controversial provisions of clause 148(B) were proposed on 27 December 1958, and party whip was issued in the meetings of the Regional Committees not to be absent at the time of voting and not to attack the provisions of clause 148(B); the Amending Act had the support of the Punjab Government at every stage; the electoral college under Section 148(B) consisted of persons who were directly or indirectly under the influence of the government; and under the new rules the electors actually numbered less than 1,400 instead of over 600,000 under the existing rules of the SGPC. Nehru could form his own judgement, added Master Tara Singh, as to the bona fide or mala fide of the Punjab Government. To protest against its interference in the management of Sikh shrines, Master Tara Singh proposed to lead a ‘silent procession’ in Delhi on 15 March 1959. Therefore, he wanted to have Nehru’s reply before formulating his future course of action to right the grievous wrong done to the Sikh community.13 In his letter to Nehru on 14 March, Master Tara Singh asserted that the Punjab Government had used its power to strengthen the hold of the pro-government party in the SGPC, not to give representation to the Pepsu Sikhs but to save it from the no-confidence motion expected to be moved soon. The step taken by the Punjab Government was clearly mala fide. The issue was moral and it had to be decided on moral grounds. Arbitration by a person ‘commanding universal confidence and respect’ had become absolutely necessary. Master Tara Singh named three such persons: Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Rajagopalachari, and Jai Prakash Narayan. All the three or any two of them, or even any one of them, could be requested to arbitrate. They would surely help ‘in solving such a fundamental issue having bearing upon freedom of religion’. If Nehru did not agree to arbitration by any of these persons, or any other person trusted by Master Tara Singh, he would go on a fast unto death on 23 March 1959.14 Master Tara Singh was in jail when the silent procession was taken out in Delhi on 15 March. It ended with a conference at which a resolution was passed to express resentment over the ‘wholly unwarranted’ arrest of Master Tara Singh. On 16 March, Nehru received Master Tara Singh’s letter of 14 March from Dharamsala Sub-Jail through a special messenger sent by the DIG of Police, Chandigarh. Nehru informed Kairon of this letter and added that he would speak to Kairon on the phone. On 18 March, Kairon met Nehru in Delhi to discuss among other things the Akali agitation against the Gurdwaras Amendment Act. On 19 March, Nehru replied to Master Tara Singh’s letter of 14 March that ‘the normal constitutional procedures’ had been followed by the Punjab Government and it had no desire to interfere in religious matters. ‘It would be an odd thing, without any precedent, to refer a law passed by a Legislature to arbitration.’ There was nothing that could be specified for arbitration except a vague inquiry into the motives of some individuals. No religious issue was directly involved.15 Page 6 of 23

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The Gulf Widens (p.547) Master Tara Singh received Nehru’s letter in Dharamsala Sub-Jail on 21 March, the day of his release. It was placed before the Akali Dal Working Committee which took the view that the principle involved in the controversy was the scope of religious freedom conferred upon religious denominations by Article 26 of the Constitution. The dispute to be settled by arbitration was whether the Punjab Government had acted mala fide or bona fide in the matter of the Gurdwaras Amendment Act. Full particulars of the dispute were given in an annexure (the first seven paras of his letter of 5 March 1959) to enable the arbitrator or arbitrators to pronounce their verdict. Master Tara Singh added that the Amending Act was not the first instance of government interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. More instances could be supplied if and when required. The Shiromani Akali Dal requested Nehru to save the situation that had arisen due to the action of the Punjab Government.16 Nehru wrote to Pandit G.B. Pant on 28 March 1959 that Mouli Chandra Sharma (a Congressman) had a long talk with him in the morning and had left a note, which apparently Master Tara Singh had passed on to him, giving instances of ‘so-called interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs’. Nehru told Mouli Chandra that he did not wish to encourage Master Tara Singh in any way in these arguments. There was no question of Nehru relying on him. Some such letter might come from Master Tara Singh.17 Meanwhile, Nehru had sent a copy of the note enclosed to Partap Singh Kairon, asking for his ‘comments’ on the note.18 According to Master Tara Singh, the Akali Dal had an overwhelming majority in the SGPC at the time of Partition. Immediately after, the government encouraged some of its members to break off from the parent body to form the Nationalist Sikh Party to take possession of the SGPC. Jathedar Udham Singh (Nagoke) became President of the SGPC. The non-Sikh Ministers of the Punjab Government had openly interfered in these elections and a Minister of the Central Government had instructed the DC of Nander to see that the mahant of Huzur Sahib (Nander) voted for Jathedar Udham Singh against the Akali Dal. The Nationalist Sikh Party was defeated later, and Pritam Singh Khuranj became President of the SGPC with the support of the Akali Dal. Though in minority, the Nationalist Sikh Party used the government to pass an amendment in the Gurdwaras Act to the effect that a vote of no-confidence could be moved against the President after three months. After the general elections to the SGPC in 1954, the Punjab Government dismissed the President of the Judicial Commission, Sardar Buta Singh, without giving him a chargesheet or an opportunity to defend himself. That was the reason why Sardar Buta Singh was removed from the Judicial Commission. The outgoing committee of the SGPC wanted to incur a huge expenditure before handing over charge but the Judicial Commission issued an injunction against it. In December 1958, Sardool Singh

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The Gulf Widens issued an injunction against the requisition of a meeting after the election of Prem Singh Lalpura as President of the SGPC.19 The Rajpramukh of Pepsu had appointed an Interim Board in his state without consulting the Sikh community or the SGPC. This Board was replaced by Brish Bhan as the Chief Minister of Pepsu on the basis of a settlement between the two main parties of the Sikhs. On the merger of Pepsu with the Punjab in 1956 the Punjab Government appointed a new Board ignoring the Akali Dal. Now the Gurdwaras Amendment Act (p.548) was passed without consulting the SGPC or any other representative body of the Sikhs. This had broken all previous conventions. The Sikhs in Pepsu were not given the right to elect their representatives to the SGPC. The method of indirect election was introduced against the wishes of the Panth to strengthen the majority of the ruling party by adding forty-nine members to make a no-confidence motion impossible. Indecent haste in passing the Act exposed the intention of the government.20 Nehru replied to Master Tara Singh’s letter of 28 March on 4 April 1959. He referred to the unanimous and insistent demand of the Sikh community for legislation with regard to the gurdwaras in Pepsu. Master Tara Singh himself had met the Chief Minister on 7 August 1958 to urge upon him the need of a speedy accomplishment of the object. It appeared to him that it was only after the Presidential election for the SGPC on 16 November 1958 that objection began to be raised. In any case, the normal processes of consultation were followed and approval of the Sikh legislators and the elected President of the SGPC was obtained. Section 148(B) dealt with an entirely short-term arrangement and was, therefore, a minor point. Nehru reiterated that the vague charges of mala fide of the government could not be made the subject of arbitration. He was unable to accept this proposal. However, if there were any individual cases of government interference in religious matters, these certainly could be examined.21 At a press conference at Delhi on 5 April 1959, Nehru was asked whether he had accepted Master Tara Singh’s request for referring the matter to arbitration. ‘What matter?’ asked Nehru in turn and added: ‘There is no matter to refer to. There is a lot of talk of arbitration but what matter is to be referred I just cannot understand.’ He was particularly keen to remove misapprehensions about what was called ‘religious interference’. Everything about legislation was going on smoothly to give proper representation to the Sikhs of Pepsu in the SGPC. Objections began to be raised when the elections to the SGPC took place and a change in leadership came about in the SGPC. All the fuss was about an amendment of the Gurdwaras Act for a temporary period to make provision for the representation of Pepsu before the full elections early in 1960. It was not even a permanent change. First of all, there was no precedent for referring an Act passed by Legislature to arbitration. Secondly, there was nothing to refer

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The Gulf Widens except what was supposed to be the mala fide or the bona fide of individuals in government.22 On 5 April 1959, Master Tara Singh wrote to the Prime Minister that his letter of 4 April was painful to read. Nehru had frequently expressed his faith in settlement of disputes through arbitration, mediation, or negotiation. Why was he not prepared now to refer the points raised to ‘independent judgement’? In the larger interests of the country and its democratic growth, it was his duty to apply unexceptionable methods even when his own government or his own party was involved. The insinuation that Master Tara Singh had his eye on the Presidentship (of the SGPC) reflected low thinking. What he was fighting for was ‘the preservation of the people’s faith in the functioning of our Government’. The charge of interference by the government in gurdwaras was not paltry or vague. Master Tara Singh gave several concrete examples of flagrant and motivated interference of the Punjab Government in the affairs of the SGPC. He underlined: ‘The essential (p.549) concomitant of secularism is noninterference in the religious affairs of a community.’ Even the High Court of the Punjab and the Supreme Court of India had not cleared the Punjab Government of the charge of interference. ‘I have, therefore, decided to start a fast unto death with effect from 16 April unless you agree to get the issues settled through either arbitration, mediation, enquiry or negotiation.’23 Two days later, on 7 April 1959, Master Tara Singh wrote for ‘all men of good conscience’ that the Prime Minister had closed on him all doors of mediation, inquiry, arbitration, and negotiation. The only way open to him was to go on a fast unto death. Before starting his fast on 16 April at Delhi he wanted to clarify his position on an issue that was simple and clear to anyone whose approach was honest and impartial. ‘India’s Constitution is secular. All minorities, whether religious or linguistic, have been guaranteed (in form at least) fullest liberty subject only to morality and public order.’ But these constitutional provisions remained dormant. Professions were not followed by actions. In spite of protests and demonstrations, government interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs had increased. The real purpose was political subjugation of the Sikhs. Within one week (22–30 December 1958), the Punjab Congress Party had rushed through a wholly religious measure to increase its political strength in a religious body by issuing a party whip. An electoral college formed for electing thirty-five members of the SGPC from the erstwhile Pepsu consisted of nominated persons of the government and its officially paid agents. There were earlier examples of serious interference since 1953. The Prime Minister of the country in his wisdom said that the charges were vague, though there could be no charges more precise and specific. ‘Before we shed tears over Tibet’s loss of religious autonomy, we must sweep before our own doors—at Amritsar.’ Master Tara Singh reiterated that he was not disputing a secular law ‘but only a religious law which concerns us only and not the whole people’. No legal

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The Gulf Widens quibbling could cloud ‘a wholly moral issue’. He ended his appeal to ‘all men of good conscience’ in the following words: I am as patriotic as Pandit Nehru is. I have suffered about as much for the cause of national freedom, though he is in power and I, by choice, am not. I seek as much to consolidate India’s freedom as he, and I would be, as ever, in the forefront of any struggle that the country may have to launch in order to preserve its honour and integrity. Then why heap insults upon us in order to demoralize us and break our little nest? Is this moral?24 Nehru wrote to Master Tara Singh on 8 April 1959 that it was not his intention to imply that the Presidential election alone was the basis of his struggle. He apologized if what he wrote was liable to any other interpretation. However, the proposal of arbitration seemed indirectly to override the parliamentary and constitutional procedures. The function of the Prime Minister was to uphold the letter and spirit of the Constitution. That there should be no interference in religious matters was the common ground for all. There could be a difference of opinion as to what constituted interference. This matter could be discussed and conventions developed for the future. ‘I am not in the habit of closing doors’, said Nehru, ‘least of all in your case. I trust that you will appreciate my position and give up the idea of fasting indefinitely.’25 On 11 April 1959, Master Tara Singh received a letter from Nehru for personal talks (p.550) at his residence on the 12th. Immediately after the meeting Master Tara Singh drove to Gurdwara Rakabganj and consulted his colleagues, including Mukhbain Singh, Gopal Singh Kaumi, and Harcharan Singh Hudiara. Master Tara Singh then said that he would not resort to fast on 16 April. Later, a statement was issued by the Prime Minister’s Secretariat that it was ‘common ground among all concerned that there should be no governmental interference in religious affairs’. However, there were complaints of such interference in the past in regard to gurdwara management and amendments made in the Gurdwaras Act. It was suggested that a committee should be constituted to devise some machinery to ensure the implementation of the policy of noninterference in gurdwara management. This committee would have two persons nominated by the Punjab Government and two others nominated by Master Tara Singh as President of the Shiromani Akali Dal. It would consider any allegations of interference and suggest remedial action wherever possible. In case of disagreement among the members of the committee, the matter could be referred to the Punjab Governor. Any amendment in the Gurdwaras Act should be undertaken only after obtaining the approval of two-thirds of the General Body of the SGPC, by convention. The general elections to the SGPC should be held as early as possible. Jawaharlal Nehru would be glad to help if ‘any difficulty arises in the implementation of the above proposals’.26

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The Gulf Widens Nehru wrote to Kairon on 12 April 1959 about Master Tara Singh’s meeting with him and enclosed the statement proposed to be issued. Master Tara Singh, he said, was keen that neither Kairon nor Giani Kartar Singh should be nominated to the committee but Nehru made it clear that he could not agree to a particular exclusion or inclusion. He also told Master Tara Singh that the Punjab Governor and not the Prime Minister was the right person to whom the matter should be referred in case of disagreement among the committee members.27 On 13 April, the day of Baisakhi, addressing a dīwān at Gurdwara Majnu ka Tilla in Delhi, Master Tara Singh dwelt on the sacrifice made by Guru Tegh Bahadur for the protection of Hindu dharam and paid tributes to the Prime Minister for appointing a committee to enquire into the allegations of official interference in the management of gurdwaras. Master Tara Singh repeated the demand for ‘Punjabi Suba’ and said that the government should trust the Sikhs. ‘So long as they mistrusted the Sikhs and declined to accept the demand for “Punjabi Suba”, the Sikh problem would remain unsolved.’ He went on to add that the freedom in religious affairs could not be maintained without political power.28 Significantly, Maulana Mohd Zubair Qureshi, a former Municipal Commissioner of Delhi, and the Ahrar leaders Maulana Mohd Sami Ullah Qasmi and Abdul Sattar met Master Tara Singh at Gurdwara Rakabganj on 13 April and congratulated him for his success in his dispute with the government over the gurdwara affairs. They requested Master Tara Singh ‘to represent the minority communities in the country’ as the government, they alleged, was interfering in the religious affairs of other minority commiunities.29 On 19 April 1959, Nehru wrote to the Punjab Governor that Master Tara Singh was trying to exploit the fact that Nehru had agreed to a certain procedure, and called it a great victory for himself and for the Akali Dal. ‘Also, immediately after, he goes and talks about a separate Sikh State.’ He was ‘quite (p.551) incorrigible’. He should be made to realize that ‘we have merely suggested a procedure for him to place his complaints before the Punjab Government’. He was not being put on the same pedestal as the Punjab Government. He should not be encouraged in his wrong ways. Whatever was agreed to was done after consulting Partap Singh Kairon. Nehru was going to answer a question in the Parliament about the statement and proposed to say that, in accordance with constitutional procedure and propriety, he acted only after consulting the Chief Minister.30 Only the questions raised by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a Jan Sangh MP and future Prime Minister of India, in the Lok Sabha were taken seriously by Nehru. He replied that the statement issued as a result of his talks with Master Tara Singh was placed on the Table of the House; the Prime Minister had consulted the Punjab Chief Minister on several occasions and issued the statement after a broad agreement; the Central Government had no reason to think that there had Page 11 of 23

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The Gulf Widens been any official interference in the management of gurdwaras, and the statement was meant principally to lay down a procedure for the future. Master Tara Singh was not asked to give any assurance that he would accept the verdict of the Governor. ‘Normally speaking, Government’s will prevails in all such matters.’ As to why the Akali leader had been treated as if he was ‘the sole spokesman’ of the Sikh community, Nehru replied that in the given context only he had to be invited.31 Master Tara Singh nominated Jai Prakash Narayan and Malik Mukhbain Singh for the ‘four-man committee’, but when Jai Prakash Narayan was unable to serve on this committee Master Tara Singh nominated Sardar Bahadur Buta Singh. The nominees of the Punjab Government were Giani Kartar Singh and Jathedar Mohan Singh. On 2 October 1959, Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru that the Four-Man Committee was getting nowhere with its task. The government nominees did not agree to anything, and the Governor and the Chief Minister were not helpful. In the meantime, interference was becoming more acute. The idea, obviously, was ‘to prolong the matter until the coming elections to the SGPC are over’. Nehru alone could give redress.32 Nehru replied on 7 October that he had read Master Tara Singh’s letter carefully more than once and he could not find any specific instance of non-cooperation by government nominees.33 Nothing came out of the Four-Man Committee. Nehru was not indifferent to the general elections to the SGPC to be held early in 1960. Master Tara Singh had announced on 7 May 1959 that he would fight the SGPC elections on the issue of Punjabi Suba. Nehru wrote to the Punjab Chief Minister in May 1959 that, contrary to what he had been saying, Master Tara Singh had now brought the SGPC elections fully into the political arena. This was a matter that the present SGPC and other Sikhs should emphasize. It was really a bad thing that Master Tara Singh should be allowed to get away with lining up the SGPC election with the Punjabi Suba and the like. This was dangerous from the point of view of the Sikhs themselves. ‘So far as I am concerned’, added Nehru, ‘Master Tara Singh can be assured that even if his party wins the SGPC election, Punjabi Suba will not come.’34 With reference to a letter from Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Nehru wrote to him on 8 July 1959 that he would certainly like the gurdwaras and the SGPC insulated from political controversies. However, Sarhadi’s proposal to keep out every member of the Legislature, Parliament, or local bodies legally from the SGPC seemed (p. 552) rather far-reaching. But he could have no objection if people agreed to it.35 Giani Kartar Singh saw Nehru in October and told him personally that he had decided to resign from the Punjab Cabinet in order to devote himself particularly to gurdwara elections. Nehru appreciated Giani Kartar Singh’s decision, adding that there was no question of Nehru bringing any pressure on Giani Kartar Singh. It was entirely his own decision.36

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The Gulf Widens With keen interest in developments related to the SGPC elections, Nehru wrote to Kairon on 3 November 1959 that a deputation from the Malwa Akali Dal had met him a day earlier to keep him informed and present their point of view. He told them that the matter was entirely for Kairon to deal with and he did not interfere in any way. The Malwa Akali Dal, one of the three constituent units of the Sadh Sangat Board, had decided to contest the gurdwara elections under its own election symbol of a bus. The deputation told Nehru that this symbol would attract far more people than any other symbol. They also said that there was no justification for preventing MLAs from becoming members of the SGPC.37 Nehru wrote to Kairon on 30 November that Darbara Singh had met him to inform him of developments in regard to the gurdwara elections, and Giani Kartar Singh too had spoken to him. Nehru advised Kairon to keep in touch with Giani Kartar Singh and have talks with him from time to time. He was glad to learn that (General) Mohan Singh was doing well; he was a fine worker.38 Before the end of 1959, on 23 December the Congress High Command decided to bifurcate the Bombay state to create Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Punjab alone was left as a bilingual state in the country. This added a new fervour to the preparations being made by both sides for the SGPC elections. Not only Giani Kartar Singh but also Hukam Singh, then Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, was ranged in opposition to the Akali Dal. However, Sardar Gurnam Singh worked for its candidates. The Tribune tried to belittle the importance of the SGPC elections, suggesting that the results could not be considered as ‘a verdict on all political issues’.39 For the SGPC elections of January 1960, there were three main contenders: the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Desh Bhagat Board (Communist), and the Sadh Sangat Board (Congress). The Sadh Sangat Board was a combination of the Dasmesh Khalsa of Partap Singh Kairon, the Panth Sewak Dal of Giani Kartar Singh, and the Malwa Akali Dal of Gian Singh Rarewala. The convener of the Sadh Sangat Board was General Mohan Singh of the INA, who was a great supporter of Kairon. The Desh Bhagat Board was aligned with the Sadh Sangat Board against their ‘common enemy’, Master Tara Singh. Giani Kartar Singh resigned from the Ministry to devote himself wholly to the SGPC elections.40 General Mohan Singh and Jagjit Singh Anand spoke against Master Tara Singh for his view that politics could not be separated from religion. General Mohan Singh said that the Sikhs would have to decide whether they stood for the Panth created by the ten Gurus or the one created by Master Tara Singh. He went on to add that Master Tara Singh had confined religion to the Sikh shrines, and the Sadh Sangat Board wanted to put an end to this tendency. Master Tara Singh swore by democracy but he was intolerant of opposition. Anyone who opposed him was declared to be a traitor to the Panth.41

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The Gulf Widens Jagjit Singh Anand underlined that political parties should not be formed on the basis of religion, and that religion should be (p.553) separated from politics. Both the Communist Party and the Congress Party were opposed to communalism. Master Tara Singh had brought a religious matter into politics. He fought elections on the issue of the Punjabi Suba instead of talking about gurdwara management. His slogan was not related to all Punjabis. He talked of the Punjabi Suba but dreamt of Sikh dominance. His slogan divided the Punjabis. Both the Congress and the Communists were opposed to this approach. To keep religion separate from politics was to save the Punjab from communal holocaust. That was why the Congress and the Communist Party had come together to oppose the politics of Master Tara Singh.42 The Sadh Sangat Board stood for the sanctity of gurdwaras as religious institutions, propagation of the Sikh faith and the Sikh traditions, and publication of Sikh literature in different languages. Closely connected with this was the objective of securing an All-India Gurdwaras Act for the management of all gurdwaras in the country. For the gurdwaras in Pakistan, emphasis was laid on proper maintenance and free access for pilgrimage. Then there was emphasis on the development of Punjabi language and literature and promotion of education, especially for adults and backward classes. Improvement of agricultural industries was yet another objective.43 The Shiromani Akali Dal in its election manifesto reiterated the demand for Punjabi Suba, asserting that Master Tara Singh’s ouster from the Presidentship of the SGPC was not a verdict of the Sikhs against this demand. The Akali Dal would keep the gurdwaras free from the government and anti-Panthic influences. Promotion of the Punjabi language in Gurmukhi script was an important objective of the Dal. Maintaining the separate identity of the Sikh Panth, the Shiromani Akali Dal would work for the economic, social, religious, and educational betterment of the Sikh community. It would raise its voice against the injustice done to the Sikhs in the services, and remove untouchability from amongst the Sikhs.44 Addressing the All-India Akali Conference at Patiala early in November 1959, Master Tara Singh laid stress on the creation of Punjabi Suba as the only solution for the complicated problems of the Punjab. The gurdwara elections were a trial of strength between the government and the Sikh Panth. In opposition to the Shiromani Akali Dal, three Ministers had formed their own parties to form a coalition called the Sadh Sangat Board. This was a blatant interference in the religious affairs of the Sikhs. The elections would be a sort of referendum on the demand for Punjabi Suba.45 The Shiromani Akali Dal contested 136 seats, the Sadh Sangat Board contested 108 seats, and the Desh Bhagat Board 38. However, there was a triangular contest only for 11 seats. The Sadh Sangat Board managed to get the support of Page 14 of 23

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The Gulf Widens Baba Jiwan Singh’s Mazhabi Dal. The All-India Ramgarhia Darbar too declared its support for the Sadh Sangat Board. Similarly, the Sikh Sant Samaj, headed by Sant Hari Singh, decided to support the Sadh Sangat Board. The total number of Sikh voters in the Punjab was more than 1,850,000. Master Tara Singh was contesting from Amritsar Sadar and Ludhiana, and Prem Singh Lalpura, President of the SGPC, from Rasulpur in Amritsar. The Shiromani Akali Dal won all the 136 seats it contested. The Sadh Sangat Board won only 4. The Desh Bhagat Board failed to win any seat. More than 61 per cent of the total votes (p. 554) were polled (1,144,289 out of 1,853,300), and the Shiromani Akali Dal got over 68 per cent of the votes polled (779,118 out of 1,144,289). The Sadh Sangat Board got less than 28 per cent votes and the Desh Bhagat Board less than 7 per cent.46 The editor of The Tribune remarked that the victory of the Shiromani Akali Dal was a ‘clear proof of the great hold of Master Tara Singh on the Sikh masses’. On 24 January 1960, Master Tara Singh called upon the Congress High Command and the Government of India to see the Sikh verdict and concede the demand for Punjabi Suba. If they failed to concede the demand, agitation would be started initially through constitutional means. All the Akali members elected to the SGPC took the pledge at the Akal Takht to sacrifice their property and their lives for the achievement of this objective.47

The Language Issue In November 1958, Nehru wished the Punjab Governor success in his efforts to find a solution to the language problem in the Punjab. However, he was anxious to make it clear that he had given no assurance whatever to Ghanshyam Singh Gupta, nor had Pandit Pant, except that he would be happy if the people concerned agreed. ‘Logically it would of course be much better to adopt Nagari script for Punjabi, but the whole trouble is about the script and some of the Sikhs at least think that the Gurmukhi characters are a part of their religion.’ They would not agree at this stage to give up Gurmukhi characters in favour of Nagari. ‘If there was no controversy about this, the Nagari characters would undoubtedly replace the Gurmukhi characters.’ But that should take place only ‘spontaneously and not under pressure’.48 On 17 August 1959, Nehru wrote to Amar Nath Vidyalankar that he had read the papers sent by him. It seemed that the approach of Bhai Jodh Singh and Jai Chandra Vidyalankar (the two members of the Good Relations Committee) was reasonable and rather good in the given circumstances. This committee had been appointed in June 1958 to suggest a new language formula by 31 July. It was given two months’ extension and the Hindi Samiti leaders, who had postponed their proposed agitation for three months in May, were put out by this delay. Nehru hoped that there would be broad agreement on the proposals made.49

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The Gulf Widens Nehru wrote to Kairon on 7 October 1959 that Master Tara Singh was carrying a big campaign against the Punjab Government and the Congress. He was often talking about the Punjabi language and saying that no step had been taken by the government to encourage Punjabi. It was not desirable to give him any cause for criticism.50 Ghanshyam Singh Gupta was in communication with Nehru. On 14 October 1959, he wrote to Gupta that the Punjab Government was anxious to deal with the matters raised by him. But Master Tara Singh had started an agitation on some other issues. Nehru hoped that the Punjab Hindi Raksha Samiti did not wish to strengthen the hands of Master Tara Singh at this juncture in his demand for a Punjabi Suba. ‘I would advise patience.’ This letter was personal and not meant for publication.51 On 30 November 1959, Ghanshyam Singh Gupta gave Nehru a copy of the resolution passed by the AllIndia Bhasha Swatantriya Samiti not to launch an agitation in the Punjab on the question of Hindi. Gupta had worked very hard to get this resolution passed and he wanted something to be done for Haryana over the issue of compulsory teaching of Gurmukhi. Nehru (p.555) told him that ‘these matters should rest for a while’.52 Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru that the Punjab Chief Minister had announced the appointment of a committee of twenty-six members with the Governor as its chairman to solve the ‘language problem’. It was (a) to consider the recommendations of the Good Relations Committees and (b) to recommend to the state government measures necessary for a satisfactory solution of the language problem and to suggest a programme for implementing the recommendations. It was the second attempt of its kind, said Master Tara Singh. The first one was the formation of a Good Relations Committee, consisting of Bhai Jodh Singh and Pandit Jai Chand Vidyalankar. The hidden agenda was to carry on propaganda against the Gurmukhi script. A question settled at the level of the Central Government was being reopened, without consulting the Akali Dal, an organization most concerned with the issue.53 In his reply to Master Tara Singh on 7 March 1960, Nehru confirmed that a new committee was being appointed by the Punjab Government to consider the language issue. The Chief Minister had informed Nehru of his intention as the Punjab Government did not require authorization from the Government of India in this matter. This effort to evolve a friendly agreement should be welcome. The committee constituted now was in continuation of the Good Relations Committee, and it was a high level and a fairly representative one, with the Punjab Governor as its chairman.54 At a press conference in Delhi on 24 June 1960, Nehru was asked to give his views on the merits of a linguistic state in the Punjab, particularly the status of the Punjabi language in relation to the script. He was opposed to division of the Punjab, he said, but the Punjabi language was one of the fourteen national languages mentioned in the Constitution of India. Practically everybody in the Page 16 of 23

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The Gulf Widens Punjab spoke Punjabi and the argument arose only about the Gurmukhi script, which was not difficult to learn. Nehru emphasized that to divide the Punjab would be a misfortune from the economic and political points of view. Undoubtedly, this agitation was communal. Nehru was quite convinced that the language question had been largely solved. If anything remained, it could be solved effectively and peacefully.55 Four days later, however, Nehru wrote to Kairon that he was getting rather lost in the maze of the language problem in the Punjab. The formation of Hindi and Punjabi Regions had not been a good thing. The Punjab should have been treated as a bilingual state with both Hindi and Punjabi as official and compulsory languages in the schools.56 On 24 July, he expressed his appreciation for the achievements in the Punjab with regard to languages. It was clear that if the Punjab was to develop any kind of integration and unity, both Hindi and Punjabi (in Gurmukhi) had to be learnt by everybody. He saw no difficulty about it.57 He wrote to Bhim Sen Sachar that it was not the language that was the issue but the politics behind it.58 Sachar had met Dr Radhakrishnan and sent a letter to Nehru at his instance on the 26th with some old papers. Nehru passed on these papers to Kairon.59

The Delhi Gurdwaras Giani Kartar Singh appears to have extended his interest to the gurdwaras in Delhi. Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on 25 May 1959 that Giani Kartar Singh, along with the President of the SGPC, Prem Singh Lalpura, (p.556) established his headquarters at the Canal Rest House of the Punjab Government in Delhi. They had brought 300 men with them from Amritsar with the intention of forcibly taking control of the historic gurdwaras in Delhi. Their attempt to occupy Gurdwara Sisganj was repulsed, but their men occupied Gurdwara Bangla Sahib. ‘To me it is crystal clear’, said Master Tara Singh, ‘that the whole object of these manoeuvres of Giani Kartar Singh and those who support him is not only to destroy the goodwill created among the Sikhs by your statement of 12th April, 1959, but to bring about a clash between the Sikhs and the Central Government and thus to make himself indispensable.’ It was hard to believe that all this could happen without the knowledge of the Punjab Government. The matter being so serious, Master Tara Singh wanted to see Nehru.60 On Nehru’s reply on 26 May 1959, Master Tara Singh wrote that somebody had been deliberately misinforming him. The Sikh Gurdwaras Act did not extend to the Delhi gurdwaras and the SGPC had no jurisdiction over them. The Delhi Gurdwara Committee was an autonomous registered organization and not a part of the SGPC. Indeed, the Delhi Gurdwaras Committee had dissociated itself from the SGPC. Master Tara Singh wanted to underline that the SGPC under the leadership of a Government Minister, Giani Kartar Singh had chosen to resort to violence to take possession of the Delhi gurdwaras. The second point to which he wanted to draw Nehru’s attention was that Giani Kartar Singh was not acting Page 17 of 23

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The Gulf Widens as merely a Sikh but using his position and authority as a Minister. That was why Master Tara Singh called this interference by Giani Kartar Singh a direct interference of the government in Sikh religious affairs.61 Master Tara Singh wrote to Nehru on 27 August 1959, enclosing a copy of a letter from Sardar Gian Singh Vohra, President, Delhi Gurdwaras Committee, to the arbitrators for the dispute, presumably Sardar Baldev Singh and Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir. The text of their award was also sent by Master Tara Singh with his letter. Nehru sent Master Tara Singh’s letter, but not the enclosures, to Partap Singh Kairon on the same day, asking for Kairon’s ‘advice’ on how he should deal with this letter from Master Tara Singh.62 At the same time Nehru sent a copy of Master Tara Singh’s letter to the Punjab Governor, saying that he was not inclined to be dragged into the Sikh disputes again. ‘But I must say’, he added, ‘that I do not like much that Giani Kartar Singh is doing now. I feel that especially a Minister should not do this kind of a thing.’63 It is evident that Nehru had come to know of Giani Kartar Singh’s ill-advised interference in Delhi gurdwaras. But Nehru was not inclined to intervene.

In Retrospect The primary interest of the Hindi Raksha Samiti was to make the Hindi region unilingual and the Punjabi region bilingual. The Chief Minister and the Governor of the Punjab had the support of the Prime Minister to solve the language problem. Two committees were appointed successively for this purpose, the Good Relations and the Goodwill Committee. But nothing came out of these committees due to the opposition of Master Tara Singh to the Congress and the Punjab Government. These proceedings, however, made Master Tara Singh all the more firm in favour of a Punjabi Suba. Revival of the demand for Punjabi Suba by Master Tara Singh in October 1958 was (p.557) taken up as a challenge by Kairon. His first step was to establish his indirect control over the SGPC. He succeeded in getting his own candidate, Prem Singh Lalpura, elected as President before the end of the year. Keen to maintain his control, Kairon tried to increase through legislation the number of SGPC members amenable to official influence. To protest, Master Tara Singh announced a silent procession to be taken out in Delhi on 15 March 1959. He was arrested on 14 March but the procession was taken out, culminating in a conference at which a resolution was passed against his unwarranted arrest. He was released after a week. His proposal to the Prime Minister for arbitration on the question of official interference in the gurdwara administration was rejected on 5 April. There was nothing in the proposal, said Nehru, to be referred for arbitration except the bona fides of the Punjab Government. Master Tara Singh pointed out that there was concrete and serious evidence of interference. He referred to the provision in the Indian Constitution for non-interference in the religious affairs of a community and charged Nehru with ignoring it because both the Congress Party and the government were involved in it. On 7 April Page 18 of 23

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The Gulf Widens 1959, Master Tara Singh wrote to ‘all men of good conscience’ to take notice of the gross injustice being done to the Sikhs. Some ‘men of good conscience’ interceded with Nehru. He invited Master Tara Singh for talks on 12 April 1959. They agreed to form a Four-Man Committee for arbitration. A section of the Hindus asked Nehru to clarify his position with regard to the Punjabi Suba. He declared categorically that ‘there would be no Punjabi Suba’. Master Tara Singh felt obliged to announce on 7 May that he would fight the SGPC elections on the issue of Punjabi Suba. At the All-India Akali Conference at Patiala in November he said that the gurdwara election was a trial of strength between the government and the Sikh Panth. The Akali Dal won all the 132 seats it contested in January 1960. The editor of The Tribune looked upon the results as a ‘clear proof of the great hold of Master Tara Singh on the Sikh masses’. On 24 January 1960, Master Tara Singh called upon the Congress High Command to concede the demand. Notes:

(1.) Surjit Singh Gandhi, Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation (New Delhi: APD Computer Graphics, 1993), p. 227. (2.) Gandhi, Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation, pp. 227–8. (3.) Gandhi, Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation, p. 228. (4.) Gandhi, Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation, pp. 230–1. (5.) Nehru to Kairon, 15 December 1958, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2012), vol. XLV, pp. 355–6. (6.) Nehru to Kairon, 30 December 1958, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLV, pp. 357–8. (7.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVI (2012), pp. 116, 126–7. (8.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 7 January 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVI, p. 338 n. 284. (9.) Nehru to Kairon, 10 February 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LVII (2013), p. 102. Also Atma Singh and Harbans Singh Gujral to Nehru, Appendix 14, pp. 479–82. (10.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 16 February 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LVIII, Appendix 30, pp. 526–30. (11.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 7 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII (2013), p. 216.

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The Gulf Widens (12.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 5 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, Appendix 8, pp. 572–3. (13.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 5 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, Appendix 8, pp. 572–5. (14.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 14 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, Appendix 12, pp. 581–2. (15.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 19 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, pp. 217–19. (16.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 28 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII (2013), Appendix 4, pp. 569–72. (17.) Nehru to G.B. Pant, 28 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, p. 223. (18.) Nehru to Kairon, 28 March 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, p. 224. (19.) Master Tara Singh’s Note on Governmental Interference, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, Appendix 24, pp. 601–3. (20.) Master Tara Singh’s Note, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVII, Appendix 24, pp. 602–3. (21.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 4 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 299–301. (22.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 206, 228–30. (23.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Letter to the Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’, To All Men of Good Conscience (New Delhi: Shiromani Akali Dal [April 1959]), pp. 6–8. Also in Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 598–601. (24.) Master Tara Singh, To All Men of Good Conscience, pp. 1–4. (25.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 8 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 301–2. (26.) Report of Superintendent of Police, CID, 14 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, Appendix 12, pp. 590–1. (27.) Nehru to Kairon, 12 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 304–5. (28.) Report of Superintendent of Police, CID, 14 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, Appendix 12, p. 591. Page 20 of 23

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The Gulf Widens (29.) Report of Superintendent of Police, CID, 14 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, Appendix 12, pp. 591–2 (30.) Nehru to Gadgil, 19 April 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 305–6. (31.) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 307–9. (32.) Master Tara to Nehru, 2 October 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, Appendix 3, pp. 544–5. (33.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 7 October 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLVIII, pp. 355–6. (34.) Nehru to Kairon, 18 May 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX (2013), p. 305. (35.) Nehru to Sarhadi, 8 July 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. L (2014), p. 99. (36.) Nehru to Giani Kartar Singh, 19 October 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIII (2014), p. 361. (37.) Nehru to Kairon, 3 November 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIV (2014), p. 296 and n. 71. (38.) Nehru to Kairon, 30 November 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIV, pp. 300–1. (39.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 317–18. (40.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 316–17. (41.) Satwinder Singh Dhillon, SGPC Elections and the Sikh Politics (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2009), pp. 89–90. (42.) Dhillon, SGPC Elections, pp. 90–1. (43.) Dhillon, SGPC Elections, pp. 91–2. (44.) Dhillon, SGPC Elections, p. 92. (45.) Dhillon, SGPC Elections, pp. 92–3. (46.) Dhillon, SGPC Elections, p. 94. Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 318. (47.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 318.

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The Gulf Widens (48.) Nehru to Gadgil, 23 November 1958, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLV, pp. 353–4. (49.) Nehru to Vidyalankar, 17 August 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LI (2014), pp. 296–7 n. 293. (50.) Nehru to Kairon, 7 October 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIII (2014), pp. 354–5. (51.) Nehru to Gupta, 14 October 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIII, p. 359. (52.) Nehru to Kairon, 30 November 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LIV (2014), p. 301. (53.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 6 March 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LVIII (2014), pp. 413–15. (54.) Nehru to Master Tara Singh, 7 March 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LVIII, p. 79. (55.) Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LXI (2015), pp. 92–9. (56.) Nehru to Kairon, 28 June 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LXI, p. 409. (57.) Nehru to Amar Nath Vidyalankar, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LXI, pp. 414–15. (58.) Nehru to Sachar, 29 July 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LXI, p. 415. (59.) Nehru to Kairon, 29 July 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LXI, pp. 415–16. (60.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 25 May 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, pp. 696–8. (61.) Master Tara Singh to Nehru, 26 May 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLIX, pp. 698–9. (62.) Nehru to Kairon, 27 August 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LI (2014), p. 297. (63.) Nehru to Gadgil, 27 August 1959, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. LI, p. 298.

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The Gulf Widens

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The Second Battle

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Second Battle (1960–2) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0024

Abstract and Keywords In May 1960, Master Tara Singh declared that the Sikhs would win or die in the battle for ‘Punjabi Suba’. Arrested two days later, he was released on 4 January 1961 for consultation with Sant Fateh Singh who was on fast. After Master Tara Singh’s assurance that the demand had been accepted in principle, Sant Fateh Singh broke his fast. But nothing came out of his talks with Nehru. Now Master Tara Singh went on fast on 15 August 1961. After his meeting with Jai Prakash Narayan, he was willing to accept arbitration. Three names suggested for a commission were acceptable to him and he broke his fast on 1 October. The Das Commission, instituted by the government with totally different personnel, was boycotted by the Akalis. Its verdict came in February 1962 that there was no discrimination against the Sikhs. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, arrest, ‘Punjabi Suba’, Sant Fateh Singh on fast, Jai Prakash Narayan, Nehru, arbitration, Das Commission

The period from early 1960 to early 1962 was marked by (a) the Punjabi Suba agitation in which thousands of Akali volunteers courted arrest, (b) Sant Fateh Singh’s fast unto death in December 1960 which was broken in January 1961 on Master Tara Singh’s advice, (c) failure of the talks between Sant Fateh Singh and Nehru, (d) Master Tara Singh’s fast in August 1961 which was broken on the 1 October, and (e) the appointment of the Das Commission and the boycott of its proceedings by the Akalis. The Commission came to the conclusion that no

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The Second Battle discrimination had been made against the Sikhs. The second battle for the Punjabi Suba was lost by the Akalis.

The Morchā Is Launched Early in 1960, Master Tara Singh went for pilgrimage to Sikh gurdwaras in Pakistan. He was received well in Pakistan. He went also to his village, Harial, escorted by the police, and met his old friends and companions. They offered a gold embroidered pair of shoes as a gift. The houses were in ruins. But there was a slab in front of his dilapidated house with the inscription ‘Master Tara Singh was born here’.1 On 7 March 1960, Master Tara Singh was unanimously elected President of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) after the election was fought on the issue of Punjabi Suba. The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal directed its nominees and other persons who had joined the Congress Party in or after 1956 to resign from the Congress Party and all its committees because the Congress Government had gone back on the promise given to the Akal Dal in 1956 and had done its worst to interfere with the administration of Sikh religious places. On 30 April 1960, Master Tara Singh resigned from Presidentship of the SGPC to devote his entire time to mobilize support for Punjabi Suba.2 (p.561) Master Tara Singh declared on 10 May 1960: ‘We are determined to obtain Punjabi Suba. We shall either win or die. We shall not be defeated.’3 Three Sikh Congress members of the assembly issued a statement to the press on 16 May that the atmosphere was not conducive to the establishment of a state on linguistic basis. Some other Sikh Congress members made similar statements, suggesting that Master Tara Singh had accepted the Regional Formula and his demand for Punjabi Suba was baseless. On 22 May, Master Tara Singh called a Punjabi Suba Convention which was attended by representatives of several political parties besides the Akali Dal. Prominent among them were Pandit Sunder Lal and Saifuddin Kitchlew. The main resolution for Punjabi Suba was moved by Sardar Gurnam Singh. It was strongly supported by the General Secretary of the All India Linguistic States Conference, K.G. Jodh.4 Sardar Darbara Singh, President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee, made a false statement that Master Tara Singh was involved in a conspiracy with Pakistan to create a tense situation in the Punjab. Ajit Singh Sarhadi says that the statement was ‘presumably inspired by some leaders from the Centre’.5 Master Tara Singh announced that he would take out a procession at Delhi on 12 June 1960 to demonstrate Sikh support for the Punjabi Suba. The Chief Minister, Kairon, got Master Tara Singh and many other Akali leaders arrested on 24 May. The crisis was precipitated by him due to the increasing opposition to him within the state Congress. The Prime Minister made it clear that he would support Kairon in dealing with agitation for Punjabi Suba.6 Page 2 of 27

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The Second Battle The Akali newspapers, the Prabhāt and the Akālī, were suppressed and all the members of their staff were arrested. The All India Journalists Association protested and forced the Punjab Government to withdraw the cases against the staff. Master Tara Singh had been arrested under the Preventive Detention Act. In his absence, the Akali Dal stuck to the programme of sending a jathā of eleven to Delhi on 20 May 1960. It was arrested soon after leaving Amritsar. The total number of arrests by 7 June was more than 1,700. ‘The second battle for the Punjabi Suba had begun.’7 On 7 June 1960, Sardar Gurnam Singh and four other Sikhs made a representation to the President of India on the subject of Sikh unrest. They outlined the Sikh position before the transfer of power in 1947 and underlined the discriminating treatment meted out to the Sikhs after Independence. All promises made to the Sikhs were ‘cynically ignored’ at the time of framing the Constitution for free India. Despite the high sounding democratic postulates, the Indian Constitution in actual practice was bound to facilitate ‘gradual submergence and annihilation of the Sikhs as a political entity and cultural minority’. The deliberate policy of opposition to a linguistic state in the Punjab, both at the Centre and in the state, was patently discriminatory. ‘The basic policies discriminating against the Sikhs as a people have inevitably led to certain most undesirable psychological complexes, administrative trends and public attitudes.’ Even the attenuated political arrangement embodied in the Regional Formula was opposed by the Arya Samajists and other Hindus so that it became virtually extinct. The Sikhs were a proud and sensitive people, ‘devoted to their country’. It was for the President of India and his colleagues to ensure impartial application of ‘justice and truth’ to all groups of people in the country. The President of India was the symbol of the true conscience of the people of India. Therefore, they had ventured to place (p.562) this representation before him in the hope that he would evaluate the true significance of facts and ‘use his good offices for securing reorientation of the high level policies, and redressal where possible’.8 But the President of India hardly had in his power to change the policies of the Congress Party or the Congress Government. On 12 June, the police resorted to lāṭhī charge at Delhi, and hounded out the Sikhs even from restaurants and shops. Nearly 2,000 Sikhs were arrested. The Delhi Akali Dal started sending jathās of eleven instead of four. By 25 July, nearly 2,400 persons had been arrested. Meanwhile, a number of Hindu leaders from the Punjab had met the Prime Minister to hammer the point that the Punjabi Suba demand must be resisted because it was actually a step towards an independent Sikh state.9 On 30 June 1960, Sardar Gurnam Singh asked the Prime Minister in an open letter to institute a formal enquiry into the serious allegations against Master Tara Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal that they had entered into some kind of liaison with a foreign country against the interests of the motherland and had Page 3 of 27

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The Second Battle agreed upon a policy of violence to achieve their political ends. These allegations were made by the Chief Minister of the Punjab and the President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress, and repeated by others. The issue concerned all the citizens of the country and it carried grave implications. Therefore, an enquiry by the government or a body appointed by the government was called for.10 This letter was written on the assumption that the allegations were false and they were meant merely to create prejudice and hostility against the Akali Dal and Master Tara Singh. On 5 July again, Sardar Gurnam Singh addressed an open letter to the Prime Minister, drawing his attention to the question of the Sikhs in India. The political atmosphere of India had become oppressive. Only they could breathe in it who lived in accordance with the wishes and prejudices of the majority, which was ‘communal’ in its outlook and attitudes. ‘This, the Sikhs resent profoundly and intensely.’ To smear them as ‘communal’ or unpatriotic was not the best way of relieving tension. Outlining the developments after August 1947, Sardar Gurnam Singh underlined that the rhetoric of India as a secular state was no cure for the ills faced by the Sikhs. He gave examples of how the laws were infringed by actual action. The policies being pursued could never solve the Sikhs’ problem. Gurnam Singh appealed to the Prime Minister to handle the situation with courage, insight, and sympathy so that the Sikhs were able to grow to their true stature as ‘an integral and living limb of the Indian nation’.11 Nehru wrote to Sardar Gurnam Singh on 8 July 1960 that his ‘open letter’ was meant more for the public and, therefore, he did not have to answer it at length. He would take up only one or two matters. About the Punjab Governor’s secret policy directive soon after Partition, he had heard nothing and he could not conceive of any such directive having been issued. As for the eviction of the Sikhs from the Tarai in Uttar Pradesh, both Sikhs and others who had occupied land without permission or justification were removed. With regard to ‘undifferentiated franchise’ clamped on the Sikhs, Nehru stated that no objection had been raised to joint electorates at any time earlier. In any case, joint electorates were necessary ‘if there is to be any nationalism at all’. This was ‘a fundamental principle of Indian national thinking’. No compromise could be made about (p.563) fundamentals. However, Nehru was always prepared to remove any grievances of Sikhs and others because he was ‘anxious to build up a united India and an integrated nation’.12 On 8 August 1960, Sardar Gurnam Singh wrote another letter, stating that thousands of citizens had been arrested and imprisoned and freedom of expression had been denied to them on the ground that they were going to demand formation of a unilingual Punjabi state. The government’s policy involved ‘a punishment of thought, and not of deed’. The major premise of the government was its false reasoning that any overt act or expression in favour of the demand was likely to trigger off resentment among its opponents. But the Page 4 of 27

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The Second Battle act or expression was constitutional and intrinsically legitimate. Furthermore, it was premised that the accused were likely to indulge in such acts and, therefore, they were guilty of having broken the law of the land. This undemocratic attitude was adopted simply to crush opposition.13 All possible objections to the formation of a Punjabi-speaking state were met in a booklet. A few of the comments relate to Master Tara Singh. It was said that Master Tara Singh was not clear about his demand. It is clarified that the demand for a unilingual Punjabi state was for creating an administrative unit on the basis of the Punjabi language ‘like any other state within the constitutional frame-work of the Indian Union’.14 It was said that Master Tara Singh had been loudly bemoaning official interference in the management of gurdwaras but he had failed to prove it. Therefore, this could not become an argument for creating a Punjabi-speaking state. In response to this comment, it is stated that ‘Master Tara Singh’s hold on the Sikhs is grounded precisely in his fearless advocacy of the grievances and aspirations of the Sikhs. The moment the Sikh masses find that he has abandoned or betrayed them, they, the Sikhs, will almost certainly disown him’.15 On the question of statutory equality before the law, which rules out discrimination, it is clarified at length that the law was not what the state said it was but what the courts said it was. If there was a conflict between the law enacted and the law interpreted by the courts, the law was what the courts laid down.16 The ground realities were different from the provisions in the Constitution. On 15 August 1960, the Prime Minister referred to the Punjabi Suba agitation as a comic show (tamāshā). At the same time, however, he said that it was a ‘danger to the freedom of the country’. The Punjabi language was a great language, he said, and every Punjabi should learn both Hindi and Punjabi, but it could not be made the basis of bifurcation. Kairon bluntly declared that he would maintain the bilingual character of the Punjab. On 28 August, he presided over a convention of the Congress Sikhs at Rohtak and declared that the demand for Punjabi Suba was purely a communal demand and ‘a danger to the defence of the country’. He went on to add that Master Tara Singh was aiming at ‘a Sikh state’ under the veil of Punjabi Suba.17 As if in pursuance of the Regional Formula, the Punjab Governor issued an ordinance declaring Punjabi as the official language at the district level with effect from 2 October 1960. But this ordinance was more an indication of the fact that virtually nothing had been done for implementing the Regional Formula. On 21 October, the Prime Minister said most emphatically: ‘We shall not have any Punjabi Suba. It is a communal demand and would be stoutly resisted.’ In view of the increasing number of prisoners, Kairon (p.564) gave direction to the jail authorities to release those who dissociated themselves from the movement. Undertakings of dissociation were forged and the morchā prisoners began to be released. When the prisoners became aware of the tactics Page 5 of 27

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The Second Battle used to get rid of them they refused at places to leave the jail. At Bathinda, for example, the police resorted to firing in support of the jail authorities. Three prisoners died on the spot and another died later.18 On 28 November, Master Tara Singh wrote to Justice G.D. Khosla that he was suffering on account of misuse of the law, coining the term ‘kanungardi’ (misapplication of the law), which gave right to the government to arrest him on a false and baseless charge and to keep him in detention. It was alleged that he had given directions to Bir Khalsa Dal (actually non-existent) to resort to armed revolt at the right time. No person, place, or date was mentioned in the chargesheet supplied to him. No opportunity was given to him to disprove the charge. Justice Khosla was expected to see that rights guaranteed to every citizen were reasonably protected. Several cases had been started against Master Tara Singh in various courts but the government did not allow his lawyer to see him for consultation. In his letter, Master Tara Singh referred to his intention to lodge a libel suit against the Punjab Governor, N.V. Gadgil, who had said falsely in a meeting of the Governors on 9 November 1960 that Sant Fateh Singh had gone on fast because Master Tara Singh had refused to do so. Another suit was to be lodged against Darbara Singh, President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee, for his baseless and mischievous statement against Master Tara Singh. As the chief guardian of justice in the state, Justice Khosla could certainly advise the government to give Master Tara Singh and his lawyer full facilities in all these cases, especially the one against the Governor which was the most important of all for Master Tara Singh.19 Master Tara Singh had written a letter to the Prime Minister about the Governor’s calumny and sent a copy to Gadgil on 2 October 1960. The Governor acknowledged the receipt of the copy on 5 October. On 11 November, he wrote to Master Tara Singh’s lawyer that the proceedings of the Governors’ Conference being strictly confidential, ‘it will not be proper for me to say anything as to what was said by this Governor or that Governor’. What appeared in the press was not ‘authorized’.20 Gadgil appears to have taken shelter behind the veil of confidentiality. The veil has been lifted by now, and it is clear what N.V. Gadgil had said at the annual meeting of the Governors in New Delhi on 9 November 1960. Sant Fateh Singh was undertaking the fast ‘because Master Tara Singh had refused to go on fast himself’. Gadgil’s statement is important also for his assessment of the situation and the government’s attitude towards it. He stated that ‘there was no question of holding talks with anyone on the Punjabi Suba’. Law and order would be maintained in the state with utmost moderation under the circumstances, and suggestions on the implementation of the Regional Formula would be considered. Over 14,000 Akalis had been released on ‘either tendering apologies or declaring that they were dissociating themselves from the agitation’. This was not true. Gadgil told the Conference that ‘there was no question of allowing Page 6 of 27

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The Second Battle anyone to see Master Tara Singh in jail’. His detention order had been upheld by an Advisory Board consisting of one High Court Judge and two retired District Judges. The government was trying to solve the language issue, and fully implement the Regional Formula, with the (p.565) language revisions in it. The ordinance on the district-level implementation of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script and Hindi in Devanagri would be issued immediately after the sanction from the Centre. The government had been compelled, he said, to meet the Akali challenge which had created tension among the Hindus and Sikhs.21 Gadgil stood firmly in support of Partep Singh Kairon and his high-handed and dubious methods. Sant Fateh Singh, dictator of the morchā in the absence of Master Tara Singh, had stated on 28 October 1960 that the Sikhs did not want a Sikh majority area. ‘We want the Punjabi Suba to comprise an area, where the Punjabi language is spoken regardless of the fact whether the Sikhs are in majority or in minority.’ On 29 October, he wrote to the Prime Minister, drawing his attention to the malicious charges brought by the Congress leaders that Master Tara Singh had conspired with Pakistan and started the Punjabi-Suba agitation. Thousands of Sikhs had been arrested on false charges. It was against the democratic principles for the Prime Minister to pronounce that there could be no Punjabi Suba in India. Sant Fateh Singh warned the Prime Minister that he would have to go on a fast-unto-death. In a statement to the press in November he said that there was no question of calling off the agitation. It had become necessary in fact to lay down his life ‘to save the country from the dictatorial rule in the garb of democracy’. He condemned the repression let loose by the government to launch a reign of terror. ‘It is entirely in the hands of the Government to end this agitation by accepting the legitimate demand for the Punjabi-speaking state on purely linguistic basis.’22 There was no response from the Prime Minister. In Dharamsala Jail, Master Tara Singh was first kept in solitary confinement. He was getting weak due to ill health in old age. His son, Jaswant Singh, who was in Nabha Jail, was transferred to Dharamsala to share his confinement with his father. Despite restrictions of all kinds, Master Tara Singh was able to send messages to Sant Fateh Singh and Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara in Amritsar. The burden of his messages was to remain peaceful and within the bounds of the law. Whether the demand for Punjabi Suba was right or wrong, good or bad, it was not unconstitutional. Since several other states had been created on the basis of language, it was not unconstitutional to demand a state on the basis of the Punjabi language. But this right was being denied to the Sikhs. Therefore, the high-handedness of the government on this issue had to be exposed. The slogans ‘Punjabi Sūbā zindābād’ or ‘Punjabi Suba is our legitimate demand’ were appropriate. The government had attacked civil liberties. This was its weak point. Therefore, it was easy to defeat the government on this issue. When the news of Sant Fateh Page 7 of 27

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The Second Battle Singh’s intention of going on fast was published in the newspapers, Master Tara Singh advised him to go on a fast on the issue of civil liberty and not on any other issue.23 Before the news of Sant Fateh Singh’s intention to go on a fast became public, Master Tara Singh himself had thought of going on a fast. But after Sant Fateh Singh’s announcement about fasting, there was no point in sending the letter which Master Tara Singh had drafted for the President of India. But this draft letter is not without interest. Master Tara Singh wanted to draw the President’s attention to the critical condition in the country. The President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress, Sardar Darbara Singh, was making a public allegation that (p.566) Master Tara Singh had met General Ayub in Pakistan and come to an understanding that 10,000 Akalis should be trained to start a guerrilla war in India. The Punjab Government had put Master Tara Singh in jail on a similar charge: it was written in the chargesheet, ‘you have given instruction that if the morchā appears to fizzle out, the Bir Khalsa Dal should not wait for any further instruction and start violent activity, and you have also said that Bir Khalsa Dal should learn to wield lathi and to use fire-arms so that it does not betray weakness in the end’. This was a total concoction. Since the government was empowered to keep anyone in detention for a year on the basis of suspicion alone, the law of the land stood in the way of the court deciding whether an allegation was true or false. That was why Master Tara Singh could be kept in prison on account of a concocted charge.24 Master Tara Singh had a hunch that this baseless charge could not be the work of any official; rather, it had been concocted on a signal from an individual who was holding a high position in the government. That made it all the more serious. The Punjab Government had become a source of conspiracies. Therefore, Master Tara Singh requested the President to oblige the Punjab Government to go to the court with the charges levelled by the President of the Pradesh Congress and the Punjab Government against Master Tara Singh. If it was proved that Master Tara Singh had any such links with a foreign power he should be punished severely. But if these charges turned out to be false, then the conspirators should be stopped immediately in their nefarious activity. Master Tara Singh apologized for writing directly to the President because he did not know whether he should or should not have done so. But it was absolutely essential to bring this matter to the notice of the President. If the President was not in a position to intervene, Master Tara Singh could be informed by a certain date. He did not wish to die but if the President felt helpless in the matter, the only alternative for Master Tara Singh would be to go on a fast-unto-death in order to draw the nation’s attention to a grave situation.25 According to Niranjan Singh, 57,219 Akalis were imprisoned in eight months. He visited the jails in Gurdaspur, Dharamsala, and Sangrur. He was deeply disturbed by what he saw and what he heard there. He had been a supporter of Page 8 of 27

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The Second Battle Nehru and Kairon till then but the high-handed and harsh treatment meted out to the Akalis turned him against Nehru, Kairon, and the Congress. It had never occurred to him that Nehru would adopt the methods of O’Dwyer to suppress the Sikhs. No doubt a mere puppet in the hands of Nehru, Kairon had his own merits and faults. He was a strong and hard-hearted man, totally partisan. He did not bother about the means to achieve his ends in whatever he chose to do. Nehru and Kairon left no stone unturned to break the back of the Akalis. Principal Niranjan Singh, along with other three principals—Bawa Harkishan Singh, Harbant Singh, and Malik Amar Singh—published a statement against the high-handedness of the government. Kairon became hostile towards them too.26 Sardar Sarup Singh met Kairon and Pandit Nehru, and then he asked Niranjan Singh whether or not some understanding could be reached on certain terms. Niranjan Singh met Sant Fateh Singh, who said that only Master Tara Singh could decide the terms of agreement. When Niranjan Singh mentioned this to Master Tara Singh at Dharamsala, he was not prepared to drop the demand for Punjabi Suba under any circumstance.27

(p.567) Sant Fateh Singh’s Fast Sant Fateh Singh announced that he would start his fast on 18 December 1960. The time had come for him to follow the example of the Gurus to lay down his life for a noble cause. A constitutional and peaceful movement was being suppressed by setting aside the law. His sacrifice might move the Prime Minister and the Government of India to concede the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state purely on linguistic basis like the other linguistic states.28 Jai Prakash Narayan met Master Tara Singh in Dharamsala Jail before he had an interview with the Prime Minister on 10 December 1960. The Prime Minister ruled out the possibility of any compromise or mediation between the government and the Akalis. He could not be ‘a party to any negotiations’. Sant Fateh Singh started his fast on 18 December in the presence of a huge crowd at the Manji Sahib. He directed the Sikhs to remain peaceful and loyal to the country. He hoped that his selfless sacrifice would move the government. It was also announced that ten Akali leaders would fast unto death after Sant Fateh Singh.29 The Prime Minister showed his first reaction at Chandigarh on 20 December: ‘Punjabi is the main language of the Punjab,’ he said. ‘It should be promoted in every way.’ There was no conflict between Hindi and Punjabi but Punjabi was particularly the language of the Punjab. On 23 December, he made a personal appeal to Sant Fateh Singh to give up his fast and invited him to talks at Delhi. Sardar Sarup Singh, who had met Nehru at Chandigarh, conveyed his impression to the Akali leaders at Amritsar that the Prime Minister seemed to be ready to agree to a unilingual Punjab. The General Body of the Akali Dal declared that the appeal was unsatisfactory, self-contradictory, and based on Page 9 of 27

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The Second Battle ignorance. The Shiromani Akali Dal strongly demanded ‘acceptance of the Punjabi Suba to save the country from a dangerous situation’.30 Sant Fateh Singh, however, was rather conciliatory in his statement. ‘I firmly grasp the hand of friendship and goodwill,’ he said. ‘I am prepared to go and discuss the matter arising out of the Punjabi Suba agitation if he paves the way for it.’ Chief Minister Kairon orchestrated condemnation of Sant Fateh Singh’s fast unto death. Several Sikh members of the assembly declared that the fast was an un-Sikh move, presumably with reference to its Gandhian mode. Many other members deplored the fast as opposed to the tenets of the Sikh faith and democracy. Baldev Singh regarded the Chief Minister as responsible for the situation that had developed due to the failure of the Regional Formula. Prabodh Chandra supported Baldev Singh’s view, but Giani Kartar Singh and Gian Singh Rarewala said that it was ‘a sick statement from a sick man’. Reports from Delhi indicated that the Prime Minister would not agree to bifurcation but he could be persuaded to declare the entire Punjab as unilingual.31 Sarup Singh and Satbir Singh, who had stood with Sant Fateh Singh throughout the morchā, persuaded a certain section of the Akalis inside the Golden Temple to accept the proposition of a unilingual Punjab. Kairon used to get inside information from informers in Sant Fateh Singh’s camp and some Akali leaders in the pay of the police. He had the impression that Master Tara Singh wanted a Punjabi Suba with Sikh majority. He released Master Tara Singh on 4 January 1961 on the plea that this would enable the Akali Dal and Sant Fateh Singh to consider the Prime Minister’s request in consultation with Master Tara Singh.32 (p.568) The Working Committee of the Akali Dal met under the Presidentship of Master Tara Singh on 5 January 1961. The Prime Minister’s statement of 31 December 1960, asking Sant Fateh Singh to justify the demand, was considered by the Working Committee. It was resolved to seek further clarification. The Prime Minister’s reply was considered on the following day. Master Tara Singh and some other Akali leaders met Sant Fateh Singh to apprise him of the whole matter and to seek his advice. He said: ‘As I have taken the pledge to break the fast only after the principle is accepted, I cannot go back on my words.’ It was then decided that Master Tara Singh should meet the Prime Minister at Bhavnagar in Orissa to find a solution.33 Accompanied by Harbans Singh Gujral and Lachhman Singh Gill, Master Tara went to Bhavnagar and had a talk with the Prime Minister for two hours on 7 January 1961. He found it disappointing. After Master Tara Singh’s departure from Bhavnagar, the Prime Minister announced that it was not out of ‘any discrimination against Punjab or distrust of the Sikhs’ that a linguistic state was not being formed in the Punjab. He explained that language was an important criterion but not the sole consideration. A division of the Punjab, he thought, would be harmful to the Punjab, the Sikhs as well as the Hindus, and to the Page 10 of 27

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The Second Battle whole of India. Punjabi essentially was the dominant language of the Punjab and it should be encouraged in every way. He went on to say that Master Tara Singh had mentioned to him Sant Fateh Singh’s vow not to break his fast without an assurance. Nehru’s statement should be ‘enough for Sant Fateh Singh to meet this difficulty, and give up his fast’.34 Master Tara Singh was apprised of the Prime Minister’s statement when he was in Delhi. He sent a telegram to Sant Fateh Singh: ‘Request to break your fast. It fulfils the requirements of vow.’ Master Tara Singh made the statement that the purpose of his visit to Bhavnagar was to request the Prime Minister to declare that ‘it was not on account of any discrimination against or distrust of Punjab or the Sikhs that the linguistic principle was not being applied to Punjab, but for other reasons which can be discussed and considered by mutual discussion’, and that ‘any other matter arising out of the Punjabi Suba would be discussed between the Government and the Akali Dal’. Since the vow of Sant Fateh Singh had been fulfilled he advised Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast immediately. Master Tara Singh’s advice was reinforced by the panj-piāras who commanded Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast.35 In Jaswant Singh’s account of Sant Fateh Singh’s fast there are indications of differences between the ‘well-wishers’ of Sant Fateh Singh and the Akali leaders close to Master Tara Singh. The former were in favour of saving Sant Fateh Singh’s life and they treated Nehru’s statement and his messages as satisfactory. They felt that Master Tara Singh was reluctant to advise Sant Fateh Singh to end his fast. Their view of the situation was supported by some of the Congress legislators of the Punjab. They saw Master Tara Singh as playing with the life of Sant Fateh Singh to save his own leadership.36 After the end of the twenty-two-day fast of Sant Fateh Singh on 9 January 1961, Kairon lifted all restrictions and released all the prisoners, estimated at 30,000. Professor Sher Singh of Haryana declared that the people of Haryana would not accept the whole of Punjab as a unilingual state. Master Tara Singh said that ‘suspension of the struggle is only a truce or cease-fire to create a good (p.569) atmosphere for talks’. This gave the impression to the Sikhs in general that the battle for the Punjabi Suba had been lost. Since the pledge of Sant Fateh Singh had been broken at his instance, Master Tara Singh was seen as the person responsible for the fiasco. He was hooted in the Sikh gathering at Manji Sahib on the night of 11 January 1961. On the following day he had to end his speech abruptly again due to disturbance in the gathering. At Muktsar, later, the Sikhs refused to hear him. ‘His influence as a leader was on the wane.’37 The Shiromani Akali Dal condemned the hostile reaction against Master Tara Singh and appreciated his wisdom in having the fast broken. In its meeting on 16 January 1961, the Akali Dal demanded early discussion on all the aspects of

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The Second Battle the Punjabi Suba to arrive at ‘a satisfactory agreement’. Kairon told the press on 23 January that the whole movement had failed.38 The text of Master Tara Singh’s statement after the fast of Sant Fateh Singh was distributed in the form of a poster and published in the Sant Sipāhī of January 1961. It explained that negotiations with the government regarding the fast of Sant Fateh Singh were going on through the mediation of Seth Ram Nath and Sardar Harcharan Singh, a former Minister of Pepsu, before Master Tara Singh’s release. They were expected to return from Bhavnagar on 5 January. In their presence, on 6 January, the matter was discussed for several hours but there was no way in which the Sikh sangats could be reconciled to the ending of the fast. Master Tara Singh offered to go on fast if the government created any problems even after the end of Sant Fateh Singh’s fast. Giani Chet Singh read out the vow taken by Sant Fateh Singh before going on fast. There were two different views about ending the fast. Master Tara Singh suggested that the time was running short and he should personally go to Bhavnagar to persuade Nehru to make the kind of statement they required. This was agreed to, and Master Tara Singh left for Bhavnagar with Sardar Harbans Singh. On the way, they drafted a statement of the Akali demand. They had a long discussion with Nehru but Nehru did not agree to make a modified statement. They came out disappointed and gave the written statement of the Akali demand to the press. It was published in the newspapers on 8 January 1961. Before leaving Bhavnagar on the morning of 8 January, Master Tara Singh made the announcement that he would go on fast if Sant Fateh Singh was allowed to die. On reaching Delhi, they found that many well-wishers and good people wanted Sant Fateh Singh’s life to be saved at all costs, and that he should be asked to end his fast. Master Tara Singh said that he was not competent to take a decision on such a grave religious issue. Only the persons thoroughly familiar with Sikh religion and Sikh history could decide on the issue. A meeting of such religious persons could be called immediately for a decision. Master Tara Singh added that he would not go to Amritsar before this meeting was held because he had made an announcement of his own fast and had become personally involved.39 Soon after this, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s statement reached the offices of the newspapers and a news reporter brought it to Master Tara Singh’s notice. It was clearly stated that the principles used for the creation of linguistic states would be applied for the Punjabi Suba as well and there would be no discrimination against the Sikhs or the Punjab. This statement was clearer even than the one prepared by Master Tara Singh and Sardar Harbans Singh. Immediately, (p. 570) therefore, a message was sent to Amritsar that Sant Fateh Singh should end his fast.40 On 5 February 1961, the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal, under the Chairmanship of Master Tara Singh, adopted a memorandum that demanded bifurcation of the Punjab. Talks between the Prime Minister and Sant Fateh Page 12 of 27

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The Second Battle Singh took place on 8 February.41 Why the Prime Minister had talks with Sant Fateh Singh and not with Master Tara Singh is not clear, nor is it clear why the Akali Dal accepted the change. Whether this was done deliberately or unwittingly, Sant Fateh Singh now appeared to represent the Akali Dal and the Sikhs. At a reception after his meeting with the Prime Minister, Sant Fateh Singh said: ‘I had a very free and frank talk with the Prime Minister this morning. We discussed a number of matters and the remaining things will be discussed in the next meeting.’ He went on to add: ‘We should not expect a quick decision from the Government, or from the Prime Minister, as big people have bigger problems. The Prime Minister has to keep in view, and consider the interests of other communities before taking this decision.’42 As before so now, the Prime Minister was wary about opposition from the Hindu leaders of the Punjab to its bifurcation. On 1 March 1961, Master Tara Singh was re-elected President of the Shiromani Akali Dal. At this meeting, the Akali Dal demanded that non-Punjabi speaking areas should be separated to create a unilingual Punjab. Sant Fateh Singh declared on 28 March that he did not want ‘any boundary wall between the various religions; rather he wanted that the areas where the Punjabi language was spoken by the majority of the people should recognize Punjabi with Gurmukhi script as a state language’.43 Sant Fateh Singh was to meet the Prime Minister on 12 May 1961. On 11 May, Master Tara Singh said that the Prime Minister in his last meeting with Sant Fateh Singh had said that ‘he was not prepared to hand over the Punjab to irresponsible persons like Master Tara Singh’. This showed that ‘lack of confidence’ was the main hurdle in the way of meeting the demand for Punjabispeaking state. Master Tara Singh offered ‘to retire completely from public life’. On 12 May, the Prime Minister told Sant Fateh Singh that it was a considered view of the Government of India that formation of the Punjabi Suba was neither in the interest of the Punjab nor in the interest of the country. The demand for the creation of a Punjabi Suba was finally turned down. This ended the talks.44 Sant Fateh Singh had three rounds of talk with Jawaharlal Nehru: on 8 February, 1 March, and 12 May 1961. In the first meeting Nehru referred to the religious minority in the Punjabi speaking zone which would not be willing to cooperate; what safeguards could be given to that minority? If Punjabi Suba was formed, there would be psychological and sentimental barriers against the Sikhs in other parts of India. In the second meeting, Nehru again talked of the Hindu minority in the Punjabi Suba. Moreover, the government had a number of problems on its hands—border dispute with China, threat from Pakistan, mob violence in Karachi, and communal riots in Madhya Pradesh. Power could not be handed over to an irresponsible person like Master Tara Singh. How could Nehru hand Page 13 of 27

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The Second Battle over power to an enemy? In the third meeting Nehru said that people were going to the moon, why should the hardworking people of the Punjab ask for Punjabi Suba? The Five-Year Plan would be obstructed. Pakistan and China had encroached upon Indian (p.571) land. Urban Hindus in the Punjab were annoyed because they did not have so much influence in public life now as before, because more and more people from rural areas were participating in public life. Sant Fateh Singh said, ‘Pandit Ji you are considering as if some Sikh State was being carved out. I may make it clear that Punjabi-speaking state would be like other states of Bharat.’ Sant Fateh Singh said finally that Nehru, who could solve international problems, should have no difficulty in resolving a small domestic problem. After keeping quiet for a few minutes Nehru said that there would be no Punjabi Suba during his regime.45 The net result of the talks was that Nehru closed the issue and became more rigid in opposition to the Punjabi Suba.

Master Tara Singh’s Fast The Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal demanded a high-level probe into the allegations of collusion with Pakistan against Master Tara Singh by Kairon and other Congress leaders. This ‘false and malicious’ charge was a part of the government’s efforts ‘to find every possible excuse for refusing to create a Punjabi-speaking State’. Both Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh offered to go on fast unto death. The Working Committee resolved on 17 May 1961 that the views of the General Body of the Akali Dal and other prominent men of the nation should be heard before taking any decision about the fast-unto-death to be undertaken by Master Tara Singh or Sant Fateh Singh.46 On 27 May 1961, the Akali Dal Working Committee met to consider Master Tara Singh’s offer for fast unto death and formed a committee to advise the General Body. The special invitees to the General Body meeting on 28 May were Saifuddin Kitchlew, Kali Charan Sharma, Pandit Sunder Lal, Harcharan Singh, Seth Ram Nath, Udham Singh Nagoke, Harbhajan Singh, and K.G. Jodh. None of them was an Akali. They supported the demand for the Punjabi Suba. Sant Fateh Singh moved the main resolution. It was supported by Sardar Gurnam Singh. He gave reasons for the failure of talks between Sant Fateh Singh and the Prime Minister.47 The resolution referred to the ‘distinct and indissoluble entity’ of the Sikhs who thought of themselves as ‘a living and dynamic limb of the Indian Nation’ and presumed good faith on the part of the Congress leaders. However, after coming into power the Congress leaders began to treat the Sikhs as an alien people to be subjugated and absorbed. The developments in post-Partition India arose largely from this basic attitude of the Congress leaders. The latest event in the chain was the refusal of the Prime Minister to fulfil the promise given to the Sikhs for the creation of a Punjabi Suba. The ruling elite of India refused to alter their fundamental attitude towards the Sikhs, saw no use in placing any faith in Page 14 of 27

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The Second Battle them, and continued to base their tactics on mendacious propaganda and brute force. Under these circumstances, the alternative before the Sikhs was to make a supreme sacrifice to ensure an honourable place for themselves in their country.48 After profound and careful consideration of all aspects and implications of the situation, the General Body of the Shiromani Akali Dal resolved that ‘Master Tara Singh be allowed to follow the dictates of his conscience in the matter and the manner of undertaking the fast unto death at a proper time’. This process was to continue till the conscience of the Indian citizens in particular and the world in general was aroused so that (p.572) the ruling elite were compelled to abandon their undemocratic and anti-Sikh policies, and conceded the just and legitimate demand of a unilingual Punjabi-speaking state. Master Tara Singh said that he did not want to die but he did not want to see ‘the Sikh Panth insulted and the Sikhs treated as inferior to other communities’. He declared that he would begin his fast unto death on 15 August 1961 and continue it till the demand for the Punjabi Suba was conceded.49 Master Tara Singh referred to the two opposing views among the Akali workers on ending the fast of Sant Fateh Singh early in January. Master Tara Singh was in a dilemma. If Sant Fateh Singh was allowed to die, the Akalis who were in favour of his ending the fast would be exploited by the government and opponents of the Akali Dal. The group of Akalis who were not in favour of ending Sant Fateh Singh’s fast were convinced that the Congress Government was dishonest and no trust could be placed in their assurances until the formation of Punjabi Suba was announced. Considering the risk involved in both these views, Master Tara Singh thought that it was more important to save Sant Fateh Singh’s life. That was why he declared that if no satisfactory result emerged from talks with Pandit Nehru after ending the fast, he would stake his own life. By now, those who had no trust in Pandit Nehru were proved to be right. Therefore, it had become necessary for Master Tara Singh to stake his life. There was no other way in which discrimination based on mistrust of the Sikh Panth could be removed to establish a respectable status of the Panth. It was absolutely essential to save the Panth from the dishonour involved in the denial to create the Punjabi Suba on the basis of suspicion of Sikh loyalty to the country. There could be no other reason for denying the formation of Punjabi Suba. The talks of Sant Fateh Singh with Pandit Nehru had revealed that Nehru himself entertained this suspicion. He went so far as to say that he could not transfer power to his enemies. To remove this suspicion, Master Tara Singh would go on fast on 15 August unless a declaration was made about the creation of Punjabi Suba.50 On the eve of his undertaking the fast, Master Tara Singh appealed to the Sikhs of the Guru to think of the Tenth Master who had sacrificed his body, mind, wealth, and family for the sake of the Panth, and who had declared with Page 15 of 27

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The Second Battle reference to his Sikhs: ‘My house, my mind, my body, my head, and my wealth are dedicated to them.’ ‘Do not be confused, do not worry,’ said Master Tara Singh. ‘The Master of the Panth himself is the protector of his Panth.’ It had emerged stronger from every misfortune, every crisis, and every oppression, and now too it would emerge stronger. Master Tara Singh reminded the Sikhs of the time when the price of a Sikh head rose to eighty rupees and reports were sent to the Mughal Darbar that the Sikhs had been finished. They should think of the time when Guru Gobind Singh had left Anandpur Sahib, left the gaṛhī of Chamkaur Sahib, and after passing through Machhiwara had come to stay in the jungle area of Malwa. The Sāhibzādas had become martyrs and some of the Singhs had given him in writing that they were no longer his Sikhs. Even at that time the Guru wrote the Zafarnāmā (an epistle of victory), and not a letter of apology to Aurangzeb. The Sikhs had now to dedicate themselves to the Guru. For the rest, the ‘Master of the Panth’ would protect his Panth.51 On the following day, Giani Kartar Singh said that the government would boldly face (p.573) the situation arising out of the decision taken by Master Tara Singh. The Punjab Government banned publication of any material relating to the Punjabi Suba, bifurcation of the Punjab, the language controversy or any other fact connected with the agitation in the Akali papers, Jathedār and Prabhāt. Fifty prominent Akali leaders were arrested. Master Tara Singh advised the Sikhs not to court arrest. The agitation now was of individual martyrdom. The Hindi Raksha Samelan resolved on 12 June 1961 that a solution to the problem must recognize the bilingual character of the Punjab in which both Hindi and Punjabi should flourish. Hukam Singh, Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, stated on 2 August that he and many of his friends had the misgivings that the proposed state ‘will be detrimental to the community, harmful to the country, and directly opposed to the basic beliefs which are so sacred to us’. Gian Singh Rarewala suggested creation of Greater Punjab. On 10 August, the Prime Minister wrote to Master Tara Singh that he should give up the idea of goimg on a fast. Sant Fateh Singh wrote back that the Prime Minister should have talks on the basis of Punjabi Suba.52 On 15 August 1961, a huge dīwān was organized in front of the Akal Takht. Ardās was performed and kaṛāh parsād was distributed. Master Tara Singh received the parsād and ate it. The entire sangat then followed Master Tara Singh to the room where he was to start his fast. Niranjan Singh was in the sangat, sad and silent. Master Tara Singh entered the room and sat on the cot. He requested the people to leave the room. Only Sant Fateh Singh and Niranjan Singh were left with him. Addressing both of them he said, ‘I do not know when I would become unconscious and incapable of thinking. You should not accept anything undignified nor should you remain rigid without reason. Whatever happens would be in accordance with the Guru’s pleasure, we have to remain steadfast in our faith.’ He was in high spirits.53 Page 16 of 27

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The Second Battle Master Tara Singh had studied thoroughly a book entitled Fasting. Every morning three persons used to massage his body with almond oil for three hours before he was bathed with hot water. There was no effect of fasting on his face for ten or twelve days. He used to take only saline water mixed with fresh juice of lemon. Colonel Amir Chand examined him thoroughly on the twelfth day. Thereafter, he was regularly examined by the hospital doctors and reports were sent to the government. He used to hold consultation with Sant Fateh Singh every day for about an hour.54 Sant Fateh Singh met the Prime Minister on 24 and 25 August, accompanied by Sardar Gurnam Singh. After the meeting, Sant Fateh Singh made the statement that there was ‘no meeting ground’. No reasonable or honourable proposal was made by the Prime Minister. On 28 August, the Prime Minister referred to his correspondence with Master Tara Singh and declared that it was not necessary to create of a Punjabi Suba to give facilities to the Punjabi language. The demand for a Punjabi Suba was ‘a communal demand’ even though it was given ‘a linguistic basis’. Therefore, the acceptance of a basically communal demand would be wrong. But if there was apprehension of discrimination against the Sikhs, ‘a high level enquiry could be made into the matter to find out if there was any such discrimination’.55 The door to further talks on the basis of bifurcation was closed, with a window kept open for enquiry into discrimination. On 28 August, thirteen Congress members of the Lok Sabha moved a motion to (p.574) strengthen the hands of the Prime Minister to fight the Punjabi Suba demand. In the debate on the following day, Hukam Singh referred to his earlier advocacy of a Punjabi-speaking state but at this moment, he said, Hindu–Sikh harmony was more important than getting this demand conceded. ‘Communal harmony between the Hindus and the Sikhs is more dear to me than any demand for a linguistic state.’ The Prime Minister warned that the creation of Punjabi Suba would be ‘absolutely a disaster leading to trouble in the State’. Passions had been roused. About 45 per cent of the population was opposed to Punjabi Suba because the demand had grown up as ‘a communal issue’.56 On the following day, the Prime Minister spoke in the Rajya Sabha even more unequivocally: ‘We have come to the firm conclusion that we cannot agree even in principle to the Punjabi Suba demand.’ The consequences of agreeing to it would be far graver and far-reaching, affecting the whole future of the Punjab and India. The Prime Minister added that the Punjabi Suba would ‘not be resisted by the outsiders, but by the people in that Suba’. Evidently, Nehru had in mind the Arya Samajist leaders of the Punjab. His speech had a stunning effect on the Akali leaders and all their hopes of a settlement were dashed to the ground.57

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The Second Battle The Akali Dal declared that it had come forward ‘to lay down the life of its dearest leader’ as a last resort. A statement was made to the press that the Akali Dal would follow its programme, and other Sikh leaders would go on fast after Master Tara Singh. The Prime Minister’s speech in the Rajya Sabha was ‘a source of positive incitement’ against the Sikh community. He had thrown ‘all principles of democratic conventions to the winds right in his own country’, and yet he subscribed verbally to ‘the highest principles of secularism’.58 Jai Prakash Narayan met Master Tara Singh on the 1st of September 1961 and made a statement to the press representatives that he was so sad that he could not say anything. All that he could say was that he wanted to save the life of his friend who was lying at the door of death. He added that, though weak, Master Tara Singh seemed to be happy. On the following day, Master Tara Singh gave a statement to the press representatives that at one time he had said that he would accept the arbitration of Rajagopalachari, Ajoy Ghosh, and Ashok Mehta on the formation of Punjabi Suba. But his proposal had no effect on the government. Even now he was prepared to have arbitration by an impartial person like Jai Prakash Narayan. On 4 September Master Tara Singh addressed a press conference. The Tribune reported that Master Tara Singh was convinced that his demand for Punjabi Suba accorded well with the accepted principles. Nevertheless, he was prepared to accept arbitration as a seemingly honourable way for the government to meet the demand. But arbitration could be entrusted only to an independent person because Pandit Nehru did not concede the demand to save his false prestige. Master Tara Singh added that in this matter, Nehru was uniquely unprincipled. Even a dictator could not be so arbitrary. When a reporter said that the government was not prepared for arbitration, Master Tara Singh said that if it was true then the government would have to change its attitude: ‘Punjabi Suba is our right and, for the Sikhs, it is question of life and death.’59 Another reporter said that people were worried more about Master Tara Singh’s life than about Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh said that he was fighting for the honour of the (p.575) Sikh Panth: ‘If I die, my people would remain alive. I wish my people to live with honour.’ Master Tara Singh reiterated that he had not seen any person in such a high position who was so totally indifferent to principles as Nehru. In reply to another question, Master Tara Singh reaffirmed that the government should first make up its mind to form a state on the basis of Punjabi language before the constitution of a Commission. ‘We need no such commission that is constituted to reject the demand for Punjabi Suba.’60 On 5 September 1961, Bhikhu Sri Chaman Lal had a meeting with Master Tara Singh. He had met Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Morarji Desai before leaving Delhi. It was reported in The Tribune that he had a special message from S. Radhakrishnan for Master Tara Singh. The essence of the message was that a high-powered Commission would be constituted to go into Page 18 of 27

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The Second Battle the matter of discrimination against the Sikhs. The members of this Commission would be individuals who had no link with any party or the government and who would be acceptable to all communities, including the Sikhs. He told the reporters that Radhakrishnan wished to save the life of a selfless leader of the Sikhs and this could be done if the Commission started its work immediately. In his message to Master Tara Singh Radhakrishnan had said, ‘I am also a Sikh. Like the Sikhs I accept the teachings of the Gurus. We all feel proud of the old and new deeds of the Sikhs. It was very unfortunate that there was tension between the Sikhs and the Hindus.’ On 6 September, Bhikhu Sri Chaman Lal had a meeting with Master Tara Singh for 70 minutes and sent a telegram to Radhakrishnan to the effect that the idea of a Commission was not acceptable to Master Tara Singh; he did not wish to take the slightest risk of the demand being rejected.61 Hardit Singh Malik met Nehru on 25 September 1961 and, after a long talk, devised a plan that was placed before the Akali Dal Working Committee on 26 September. It was rejected by the Working Committee. Sardar Gurnam Singh told the reporters that talks in Delhi had broken down because the members proposed for a high-powered Commission to go into the complaints of the Sikhs were not acceptable to the Akalis. Sardar Gurnam Singh had suggested to the Home Minister that the President, Rajendra Prasad, and Rajagopalachari should nominate members of the proposed Commission and formulate the terms of reference for it. But this was not acceptable to the government. Commenting on the talks, Master Tara Singh told the press reporters that the Akalis would gain victory: ‘It is a different matter whether this victory is gained while I am alive or after I am dead.’ On 27 September, Malik Mukhbain Singh, an old friend of Master Tara Singh, told the reporters that agreement was possible only if all the members of the Commission were acceptable to Master Tara Singh.62 On 29 September, Hardit Singh Malik had a long meeting with Nehru and then an hour-long discussion with the Home Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. He said to the press representatives that he would go to Amritsar to make the last effort to end Master Tara Singh’s fast. On the morning of 30 September, Hardit Singh Malik went to see Master Tara Singh with the Maharaja of Patiala and Mauli Chand Sharma. They mentioned three names for the proposed Commission. These names were acceptable to the Akali leaders. The daily Ajīt, which was seen as a pro-Congress paper because of the close understanding between its editor and Giani Kartar Singh, published the news that the possibility of ending Master Tara Singh’s (p.576) fast had turned into a certainty because the mediators returned to Delhi immediately after their talks with the Akali leaders. The Akalis had consulted Jai Prakash Narayan about the members of the Commission proposed by the government.63

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The Second Battle On 29 September, the Shiromani Akali Dal issued the statement that the government did not appear to be honest about resolving the issues, as if they had positively decided on Master Tara Singh’s death. Therefore, the Akali Dal made it very clear that a linguistic state would be acceptable to the Sikhs irrespective of the percentage of population of Hindus and Sikhs. This was done to remove all ambiguity about the demand.64 Master Tara Singh gave a statement to the press that he had been obliged to go on fast because the linguistic principle was followed for the reorganization of all states but not for a Punjabi-speaking state. Now the government had conveyed its assurance through eminent persons on two points: to constitute a highpowered Commission to go into the issue of Punjabi Suba and to nominate members acceptable to the Akalis. Master Tara Singh thanked all those people in the country and abroad who had expressed their sympathy with him and prayed for him. At a huge dīwān at Manji Sahib in the late evening, Malik Hardit Singh said that the government had given the assurance that all restrictions on civil liberty would be removed, all the Akali prisoners would be released, cases against them would be withdrawn, and restrictions placed on the press would be removed. Sant Fateh Singh thanked the mediators for their efforts to get a Commission of eminent and impartial members.65 After consultation with the Prime Minister, Hardit Singh and the Maharaja of Patiala flew to Amritsar on the 1st of October. The Prime Minister sent a telegram to Master Tara Singh that he had learnt with much pleasure and satisfaction that Master Tara Singh proposed to end his fast in the afternoon. He hoped this would take place and Master Tara Singh would soon return to health. The Prime Minister sent his good wishes. Hardit Singh Malik and the Maharaja gave assurances about the broad terms of reference for the Commission and about its personnel. The Working Committee of the Akali Dal discussed the matter for 90 minutes. Master Tara Singh broke his fast on the 1st of October 1961, with lemon juice and honey mixed with water offered to him by Sant Fateh Singh and Maharaja Yadvindra Singh. On 2 October 1961, the press reporters met Master Tara Singh and he told them that the Sikhs would come to an agreement with the government: ‘The names of three members to be nominated for the commission have been mentioned to me.’66

The Das Commission The Ajīt published the news on 8 October that the Akalis were again being arrested. Master Tara Singh was in the V.J. Hospital at Amritsar. His younger son, Mohan Singh, who was looking after him in the hospital, was arrested by the police on the charge that an objectionable poem published in the Prabhāt had been edited by Mohan Singh during Master Tara Singh’s fast. This charge was never proved. The offices of both the Prabhāt (Urdu) and the Jathedār

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The Second Battle (Punjabi) were raided by the police on 18 October and searched for several hours.67 On 19 October, news appeared in the Ajīt that Lachhman Singh Gill, Jagdev Singh Talwandi, and Bhag Singh Jaid, all members of the Akali Dal Working Committee, had rebelled against Master Tara Singh. (p.577) Lachhman Singh Gill’s hostile attitude towards Master Tara Singh was the common subject of talk. It was certain that Master Tara Singh’s Presidentship of the SGPC would be contested in the coming election. Many of its members had joined hands with Lachhman Singh. On 23 October, again, the Ajit reported that Master Tara Singh would be removed from the Presidentship of the SGPC next month. The ‘Sant group’ had become more active and ninety members of the SGPC were with them. Such news were published in other papers as well. However, no candidate was put forward against Master Tara Singh in the elections.68 It was important nonetheless that the Punjab Government and some Akali leaders had started hostilities against Master Tara Singh before he met Nehru. The Akalis were getting divided. Gopal Singh Kaumi, who was a former student of Master Tara Singh and his sincere follower and well-wisher, had a hot conversation with Master Tara Singh at Gurdwara Rakabganj about a month after the end of Sant Fateh Singh’s fast. Gopal Singh was insisting in very strong terms that Master Tara Singh should step down from the Presidentship of the Shiromani Akali Dal. Niranjan Singh did not like the tone in which Gopal Singh spoke to Master Tara Singh. Bringing Gopal Singh out of the room, Niranjan Singh discussed the whole matter with him for about an hour. On the following day, Niranjan Singh asked Master Tara Singh to give up the Presidentship of the Akali Dal for Sant Fateh Singh. Master Tara Singh agreed to do so in April 1960 when fresh elections were to be held. However, he had not done this. Niranjan Singh surmised that the supporters of Master Tara Singh had put pressure on him to retain the office.69 Master Tara Singh had an interview with the Prime Minister on 30 October 1961. Hardit Singh Malik was also present. In accordance with the announcement made by the Prime Minister in the Parliament, the Government of India had announced that a Commission would be appointed to go into the general question of discrimination. The government learnt with much satisfaction that Master Tara Singh had ended his fast which, strangely enough, was stated to be ‘neither called for nor justified’. Now the necessary steps were be taken for the appointment of a Commission. After the meeting, Master Tara Singh told the press that the Prime Minister was in a better mood than at Bhavnagar, and announcement of a Commission would be made shortly. It was announced on the following day. It consisted of S.R. Das, C.P. Ramaswami Ayyer, and M.C. Chhagla. It came as a shock to Master Tara Singh. He protested that the personnel of the Commission was not what had been indicated to him. The Prime Minister denied that any assurance had been given with regard to the Page 21 of 27

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The Second Battle personnel. Lal Bahadur Shastri said that there was some discussion about the names but no assurance was given. The Prime Minister too now admitted that there was some discussion but no assurance was given. Neither Hardit Singh Malik nor the Maharaja of Patiala contradicted Master Tara Singh. On 7 December, the Prime Minister refused to enter into further debate about the Commission and its members.70 Gopal Singh writes that the Commission was ‘the best which could be constituted to hear the case of Sikh grievances’. Master Tara Singh boycotted it on the ‘strange plea’ that the names suggested by him had not been accepted by the government. The accuser wanted ‘a judge of his own choice’. Gopal Singh goes on to write that he presented the Sikh case before the Commission on behalf (p.578) of fifty Sikh intellectuals, including MPs and MLAs, and listed eight cases of discrimination, especially in regard to Punjabi language, the treatment of Sikh farmers in UP, and the absence of heavy industry in the Punjab. ‘As for the Punjabi-speaking State, it was asserted that this was a discrimination against the whole Punjabi people, and not only against the Sikhs.’71 Sangat Singh observes that Gopal Singh was brought in by Partap Singh Kairon to appear before the Commission. He contended that there was no discrimination. Rather, preferential treatment was being accorded to the Sikhs. He later mentioned instances of discrimination as an afterthought. He was rewarded with nomination to the Rajya Sabha.72 Khushwant Singh also refers to Gopal Singh’s listing of ‘privileges’ enjoyed by the Sikhs. He was nominated to the Rajya Sabha and then sent as ambassador to Bulgaria and the Carribean. He was made Chairman of the high-power committee on minorities. ‘He was among the handful of Sikhs who supported the army action in the Golden Temple and was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Goa.73’ The Das Commission held its first meeting on 11 December. The Akali Dal resolved to boycott the Commission, which shortened its proceedings. The opponents of the Akalis made representations in terms familiar by now. The Commission submitted its report on 9 February 1962, on the eve of the general elections. In the Commission’s view no discrimination was involved in not forming a Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh was stated to have demanded a state for the Sikhs because the Hindus and the Muslims had got their states. This statement was baseless. But the government accepted the report and notified its findings.74 The second battle for the Punjabi-speaking state was lost by Master Tara Singh.

In Retrospect The essential interest of the Hindi Raksha Samiti was to make the Hindi Region unilingual and the Punjabi Region bilingual. The Chief Minister and the Governor of the Punjab had the support of the Prime Minister to solve the language problem. Two committees were appointed successively for this purpose, the Good Relations Committee and the Goodwill Committee. But Page 22 of 27

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The Second Battle nothing came out of these committees due to the opposition of Master Tara Singh to the Congress and the Punjab Government. These proceedings made Master Tara Singh all the more firm in his demand for a Punjabi Suba. On 10 May, Master Tara Singh declared that the Sikhs would win or die in the battle for Punjabi Suba. On 22 May, he called a Punjabi Suba Convention which endorsed his programme. At this juncture, the President of the Punjab Pradesh Congress made a statement that Master Tara Singh had conspired with Pakistan to create trouble in the Punjab under the cloak of the demand for Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh was arrested on 24 May. The number of arrests of the Akali leaders and workers amounted to 1,700 by 7 June. Sardar Gurnam Singh and his colleagues made representations to the President and the Prime Minister to explain the position of the Sikhs. In justification of the demand for Punjabi Suba they met all kinds of objections raised against it. Nehru ridiculed the demand as a tamāshā in his speech from the Red Fort on 15 August 1960, but declared this tamāshā to be a ‘danger to the freedom of the country’. Gadgil issued an ordinance to give the impression that the Regional Formula was not dead. The Punjab Government, he said, would remain firm in handling the Punjabi Suba agitation. (p.579) He stated further that the Punjabi Suba movement was on the wane. The Congress Government at the Centre and in the state were using not only power but also unconstitutional means, deliberate misinformation, and false propaganda to deal with the Punjabi Suba movement. Sant Fateh Singh began his fast in December 1960. Nehru conceded that Punjabi was the main language of the Punjab and made a personal appeal to Sant Fateh Singh to give up the fast to have talks. Nehru was thinking of the Punjab being declared as unilingual. Master Tara Singh was released on 4 January 1961 for immediate consultation with the Akali Dal and Sant Fateh Singh. After Master Tara Singh’s assurance that the demand had been accepted in principle, Sant Fateh Singh broke his fast on 9 January. In his talks with Nehru on 8 February, 1 March, and 8 May, several considerations against the creation of Punjabi Suba came up in the discussions but the most important was opposition from the Hindus of the proposed Punjabi Suba. Second, Nehru was extremely reluctant to strengthen the position of Master Tara Singh on account of his ideological position which was opposed to Nehru’s own assumptions. At the same time, Sant Fateh Singh’s emphasis on the purely linguistic nature of the demand and his own mild manners and attitude could make him more acceptable to Nehru as a Sikh or Akali leader. But this could not be the deciding factor. In the end, Nehru said that there would be no Punjabi Suba under his regime.

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The Second Battle Master Tara Singh started his fast on 15 August 1961. Sant Fateh Singh met Nehru during 24–25 August but found that there was no ‘meeting ground’. A few days later, Nehru stated that though given ‘a linguistic basis’ the demand for Punjabi Suba was actually ‘a communal demand’. On the issue of discrimination ‘a high level enquiry could be made’. Nehru was emphatic in the Rajya Sabha that ‘we cannot agree even in principle to the Punjabi Suba demand’. He reiterated the same old consideration that the people of the Punjabi Suba itself would resist the demand. After his meeting with Jai Prakash Narayan, Master Tara Singh stated that he would accept arbitration as a seemingly honourable way for the government to meet the demand. S. Radhakrishnan sent the message that a high-powered Commission could be constituted to go into the matter of discrimination. On 30 September, finally, Hardit Singh Malik met Master Tara Singh after a long meeting with Nehru and an hour-long discussion with Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister. Hardit Singh was accompanied by Yadvindra Singh and Mauli Chand Sharma. They mentioned three names for the proposed Commission which were acceptable to the Akali leaders. After another round of consultation with Nehru, Hardit Singh Malik and Yadvindra Singh flew back to Amritsar on the 1st of October to give assurances about the personnel of the Commission and the broad terms of reference for it. The Akali Dal Working Committee discussed the matter for an hour and a half. Master Tara Singh broke his fast on the 1st of October 1961. The Das Commission actually appointed was totally different in personnel than what had been agreed upon by Master Tara Singh. The Akalis decided to boycott the Commission. Its verdict came on 9 February 1962 as a foregone conclusion that no discrimination against the Sikhs was involved in not forming the Punjabi Suba. It was a serious blow to Master Tara Singh and the Akali Dal. Notes:

(1.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 177. (2.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 319–20, 322. (3.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 323. (4.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 323–4. (5.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 324. (6.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 324–5. (7.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 325–6.

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The Second Battle (8.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State and the Sikh Unrest (New Delhi: n.d.), pp. 27–37. (9.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 329–31. (10.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State and the Sikh Unrest, pp. 89–91. (11.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State, pp. 38–43. (12.) Nehru to Gurnam Singh, 8 July 1960, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. XLI (2010), pp. 411–12. (13.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State, pp. 92–3. (14.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State, p. 45. (15.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State, p. 60. (16.) Gurnam Singh, A Unilingual Punjab State, pp. 63–71. (17.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 331–2. (18.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 332–3. (19.) Master Tara Singh to Justice G.D. Khosla, 28 November 1960, in Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism (Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2000), pp. 66–7. (20.) N.V. Gadgil to Harbans Singh Gujral, 11 November 1960, Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh, p. 157. (21.) Valmiki Choudhary (ed.), Dr Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1995), vol. XXI, p. 356. (22.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 333. (23.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh: Jiwan Sangharsh Ate Udesh (Amritsar: 1972), pp. 306. (24.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 307–8. (25.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 308–9. (26.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 178–9. (27.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 179–80. (28.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 335. (29.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 335–6. Page 25 of 27

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The Second Battle (30.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 336–7. (31.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 337–9. (32.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 339–40. (33.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 340–2. (34.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 342–4. (35.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 344–5. (36.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 313–20. (37.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 345–6. (38.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 346. (39.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 316–18. (40.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 318. (41.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 346. (42.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 346–7. (43.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 347. (44.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 347–8. (45.) Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996, second edition), pp. 317–18. The Prime Minister sent the minutes of the talks to Akali leaders, which he wanted to place on the table of the Parliament. Sant Fateh Singh sent to the Prime Minister the notes taken by his party with the request that these should also be incorporated in the Prime Minister’s note. This request was not accepted. Sant Fateh Singh published these notes separately as Synopsis of the Nehru–Fateh Singh talks on the Issue of the Formation of a Punjabi-speaking state. (46.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 348–9. (47.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 349–50. (48.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 350–2. (49.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 352. (50.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 321–4. (51.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 324. Page 26 of 27

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The Second Battle (52.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 353–4. (53.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 185–6. (54.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 186–7. (55.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 354–5. (56.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 355–7. (57.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 357–8. (58.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 358. (59.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 326–8. (60.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 328–9. (61.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 329–30. (62.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 330–1. (63.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 332–3. (64.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 360–1. (65.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 333–4. (66.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 361–2. (67.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 339–40. (68.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 340–1. (69.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 183–4. (70.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 363–4. (71.) Gopal Singh, A History of the Sikh People (1469–1988) (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1993, reprint), pp. 728–9 n. (72.) Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, p. 322. (73.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, reprint), 2 vols, vol. II, p. 301 n. 22. (74.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 372–6.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Master Tara Singh Loses Ground (1962–4) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0025

Abstract and Keywords After the failure of the Punjabi Suba agitation in 1960–1, Master Tara Singh began to lose ground in Akali politics. Sant Fateh Singh attributed this failure to him, and declared that his own conception of the Akali demand was fundamentally different from that of Master Tara Singh. Throughout 1963 the Sant conducted a systematic campaign against Master Tara Singh, underlining his weakness as a leader and highlighting his own commitment to the cause of the Sikh Panth. He claimed to represent the majority of the Akalis. The success of his nominee in the election for Presidentship of the SGPC in June 1964 confirmed his claim. It appeared before the end of the year that Master Tara Singh would never recover the lost ground. Early in 1965 he left the field free for Sant Fateh Singh and went to some unknown place. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Punjabi Suba agitation, Akali politics, Sikh Panth, Sant Fateh Singh, Sikh Panth

Master Tara Singh could not retain his position as the foremost leader of the Akalis after his failure to get the demand for Punjabi Suba conceded. The process by which Sant Fateh Singh became the top Akali leader in place of Master Tara Singh was somewhat drawn out. His campaign against Master Tara Singh in 1963 was important in deciding the issue of leadership. There were several causes of Master Tara Singh’s failure, both personal and impersonal.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Punjab Politics Khushwant Singh remarks that Master Tara Singh ‘saved his life’ when he gave up his self-imposed ordeal of fast unto death ‘but killed his political career’. It was ‘a grievous blow to the cause of a Sikh-majority state’. Arraigned at the Akal Takht, he was found guilty of proving false to his oath and the tradition of martyrdom. He was sentenced to clean the shoes of the congregation for five days. He carried out his penance but he was not forgiven by the Sikh community. A few months later he was voted out of power by both the Akali Dal and the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). Sant Fateh Singh took over the leadership of the Sikhs.1 Harbans Singh refers to the verdict at the Akal Takht on 29 November 1961 and adds that Master Tara Singh’s pictures scrubbing dishes in the Guru-ka-langar and cleaning shoes of the sangat were widely circulated. His acts of humility and expiation evoked popular admiration but Master Tara Singh could not climb up the ladder again. Sant Fateh Singh had emerged as a serious rival. ‘The story of Sikh affairs henceforward is the story of the gradual eclipse of Master Tara Singh and the steady ascendency of Sant Fateh Singh.’ Harbans Singh suggests that Master Tara Singh’s authority had begun to be challenged earlier, in 1961, when he became a party to the decision in favour of Sant Fateh (p.583) Singh abandoning his fast. On 15 November 1961 Jathedar Jiwan Singh Umranangal, a member of the Akali Dal Working Committee, had notified Master Tara Singh to vacate the Presidentship of the Akali Dal and the SGPC. The Akali Dal went into the general elections in a ‘state of simmering dissent’ in February 1962. The struggle for leadership among the Akalis was long drawn out. Only after the SGPC elections of January 1965 did Master Tara Singh step aside, ‘withdrawing himself from active politics to leave the field open for Sant Fateh Singh’.2 Master Tara Singh’s withdrawal from politics was temporary. He never recognized Sant Fateh Singh as the leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, which, for him, was represented by the Akali Dal led by Master Tara Singh himself. It is clear, however, that the majority of the Akalis were supporting Sant Fateh Singh before the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in May and the exit of Partap Singh Kairon in June 1964. In a comprehensive chargesheet against Kairon submitted to the President of the Congress by Gian Singh Rarewala, Gurdial Singh Dhillon, and Chaudhari Hardwari Lal, Kairon had been accused of concentrating all power into his own hands. A memorial enumerating thirty-two charges of corruption, nepotism, and favouritism was submitted by the Punjab legislators to President Radhakrishnan. Master Tara Singh, Chaudhari Devi Lal, Maulavi Abdul Ghani Dar, and some other leaders in opposition also presented a memorandum against Kairon to the President of India. Eventually, on 22 October 1963, the Prime Minister recommended to the President an enquiry into the charges levelled against Kairon. Ironically, the commission appointed for enquiry was again known as the Page 2 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Das Commission. Its findings were against Kairon, and he resigned on 21 June 1964 before the Das Commission report was published.3 Pandit Mohan Lal says with a fair degree of certainty that the report of the Das Commission was written under the shadow of the new regime. People were saying indeed that certain portions of the report were rewritten after the death of Nehru. A revolutionary who was closely associated with S.R. Das had brought many things to the notice of Pandit Mohan Lal. On the basis of his talk, Pandit Mohan Lal could say with confidence that S.R. Das ‘repented subsequently for having made certain observations in the Report’.4

Rift in the Akali Dal The Shiromani Akali Dal fought the general elections of February 1962 on the issue of the Punjabi Suba, but won only 19 out of 154 seats, with 12.3 per cent of votes. However, the candidates fielded and supported by the Akali Dal secured 1,541,185 out of the 2,139,913 Sikh votes in the Punjabi Region. The Congress polled less than 30 per cent of the Sikh votes. It won ninety seats with the support mainly of non-Sikh voters. Partap Singh Kairon won with a narrow margin of thirty-four votes on the basis of a dubious counting. He was made the Chief Minister on the Prime Minister’s insistence. He declared that he was determined to destroy ‘communalism’ (the Akali Dal and its demand for a Punjabi Suba).5 The Akalis were convinced that Kairon had actually been defeated but the election officer declared his victory by thirty-four votes. Master Tara Singh reached Tarn Taran and sat on dharnā in front of the office of the polling officer, demanding recounting of votes. Thousands of Akali workers sat in dharnā with him. The police used tear gas shells to (p.584) disperse them. However, Master Tara Singh did not move and became unconscious. The police took him to Amritsar and left him at his residence.6 According to Dhanna Singh Gulshan, three Akali leaders had been opposed to Master Tara Singh becoming President of the Election Board: Lachhman Singh Gill, Jiwan Singh Umranangal, and Bhag Singh Jaid. In the meeting of the Working Committee, there was some opposition to Master Tara Singh but no other name was proposed. The majority of the members were in his favour. Sant Fateh Singh had not come for the meeting but he had sent his supporters fully prepared to oppose Master Tara Singh. With the majority support in the Working Committee of the Akali Dal, Master Tara Singh proceeded with the nomination of candidates. He did not wish to give Panthic ticket to Lachhman Singh Gill, but due to his feigned submission and the pressure of Akali workers he got the ticket. Sant Fateh Singh was not in favour of giving ticket to Dhanna Singh Gulshan for the Bathinda reserved seat for the Lok Sabha but Master Tara Singh was in his favour and he got the ticket. After the elections, Lachhman Singh Gill

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground wanted to become the leader of opposition but Master Tara Singh nominated Sardar Gurnam Singh.7 As the elected leader of the Akali legislative party, Sardar Gurnam Singh traced the history of the struggle for the Punjabi Suba since May 1960 and demanded a plebiscite on the issue of Punjabi Suba in the Punjabi Region. The debate went on for five days. Giani Kartar Singh replied on behalf of the government. On 19 April 1962, he urged the Akalis to give up the demand for Punjabi Suba.8 Though Master Tara Singh thought that the Sikh vote on the whole was in favour of Punjabi Suba, he declared that the time was not appropriate for launching an agitation in view of the threat from China. This gave the impression that the movement for Punjabi Suba had been abandoned. Therefore, he stated on 7 June 1962 that Punjabi Suba was ‘our life and our religion’. To abandon this demand would be to commit political suicide. It was a demand not merely of the Akali Dal ‘but of the whole Sikh Panth’.9 No leader could abandon the demand and remain the leader of the Akali Dal. The Punjabi University at Patiala was inaugurated by President Radhakrishnan on 24 June 1962, and Partap Singh Kairon, its chief architect, spoke in praise of the Punjabi language which the University was meant to promote. ‘Punjabi is the language of rebels and revolutionaries,’ he said. It had never sung ‘eulogies of oppressors, usurpers and pretenders’. It had sung the songs of ‘the spear, the sword and of arrows’.10 The creation of Punjabi University was linked in a way with the Regional Formula. The Punjabi Sahit Akademy had demanded a university with Punjabi as the medium of instruction in 1956 at its annual conference in Delhi. In a meeting of the Punjabi Regional Committee later it was proposed that Punjabi should be adopted as the exclusive medium of instruction in schools of the Punjabi zone. Giani Kartar Singh was under pressure to have the resolution withdrawn. He agreed on the condition that a university should be created in the name of Punjabi. The leader of the House, Pandit Mohan Lal, consulted the Chief Minister, and with his approval declared on the floor of the House that the government would initiate measures to bring into being a Punjabi University. Kairon requested the former Maharaja of Patiala, Yadvindra Singh, to accept chairmanship of Punjabi University Commission to be appointed by the Punjab (p.585) Government. Among the members of the Commission were Bhai Jodh Singh, Sardar Hukam Singh, Sardar Ujjal Singh, Hardit Singh Malik, Dr Anup Singh, Dr P.S. Gill, Dr A.C. Joshi, Hardwari Lal, and Harbans Singh. The Commission submitted its report in 1961, and a Bill was passed before the end of the year. The University was opened in one of the old palaces of Patiala.11 In the meeting of the Working Committee of the Shiromani Akali Dal on 8 July 1962, Sant Fateh Singh pleaded for reconciliation with Lachhman Singh Gill and Jiwan Singh Umranangal who had been charged of indiscipline and disruptive activities. Master Tara Singh was not prepared for leniency, and they were Page 4 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground expelled from the Akali Dal. Sant Fateh Singh and Harcharan Singh Hudiara walked out of the meeting. Sant Fateh Singh declared later that he would place this matter before the Sikh Panth. In open revolt against Master Tara Singh, he summoned a convention on 22 July and placed before it his version of what had happened in the meeting of the Working Committee on 8 July. Master Tara Singh issued a statement to contradict this version. The growing rift between the two Akali leaders became public. Each group began to garner support among the Sikhs for a showdown.12 At the Convention of 22 July itself, a resolution attributed ‘the downward trend in the general morale of the Sikh community’ to Master Tara Singh’s failure ‘to keep the solemn pledge for the attainment of Punjabi Suba taken by him before the Akal Takht Sahib’. The Convention reiterated the demand for the formation of Punjabi Suba on ‘a purely linguistic basis completely free from communal virus with the full cooperation and coordination of other communities residing in the area’. The Convention sought support for Sant Fateh Singh ‘in this noble task’. Another resolution appreciated the services rendered by Sant Fateh Singh to the Sikh Panth. Sant Fateh Singh agreed to take up the leadership and promised to do his best for attaining the Punjabi Suba of his conception. This carried the implication that there was something wrong with Master Tara Singh’s approach.13 On the 1st of August 1962, Sant Fateh Singh declared at Delhi that he had fundamental differences with Master Tara Singh from the very beginning over the nature and concept of the Punjabi Suba. Whereas Punjabi Suba was a Sikh issue for Master Tara Singh, it was a linguistic issue for Sant Fateh Singh. He said that he had all along expressed his conviction that there could be no Punjabi Suba at the cost of Hindu–Sikh unity. The Hindu press of the Punjab began to give wide publicity to the policies and programmes of Sant Fateh Singh. They were not in favour of Punjabi Suba but they wanted to build up Sant Fateh Singh in order to destroy Master Tara Singh.14 Master Tara Singh stated at a press conference in Delhi on 3 August that Sant Fateh Singh’s declaration conceded veto to the Hindus of the Punjab, who would never agree to any such proposition. According to Master Tara Singh, the formation of Punjabi Suba involved only the implementation of an accepted principle applied to the rest of India but not for the Punjabi-speaking areas because ‘the Sikhs may thereby secure a slight majority in the proposed state’.15 Nevertheless, due to the differences in approach to the issue, the Hindu press and the Punjabi Hindus were in favour of Sant Fateh Singh. Master Tara Singh’s tenacity of purpose was well known and, in comparison, Sant Fateh Singh appeared to be flexible. He was presenting the issue in cultural rather religious terms.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground (p.586) A meeting of the General Body of the Akali Dal was requisitioned by Gill, Umranangal, and their supporters. Master Tara Singh fixed 19 August 1962 for a meeting of the Akali Dal. On the plea that Sant Fateh Singh had been elected President at the Convention of 22 July, Lachhman Singh Gill announced that the General Body of the Akali Dal would meet under the Presidentship of Sant Fateh Singh (and not under the Presidentship of Master Tara Singh) on 18 August. This was patently unconstitutional. The President of the SGPC, Kirpal Singh Chaksherewala, announced that he would not allow a separate meeting to be held in the precincts of the Darbar Sahib, and called the police.16 At this time, there was an understanding between the Akali leaders who supported Sant Fateh Singh and the Congress Government.17 Pandit Mohan Lal, the Home Minister in Kairon’s Cabinet, says that he sought Kairon’s advice who simply said that he would watch how his Home Minister handled the situation. Pandit Mohan Lal consulted the Home Secretary and the Inspector General of Police. On 17 August 1962, directions were issued to district authorities at Amritsar ‘to tactfully persuade the parties to give up the idea of holding the meetings and if they were unable to achieve any success then quietly round up all the members of the Akali Dal, as a preventive action, to maintain peace, law and order’. As expected, the parties did not agree, and every Akali coming for the meeting was arrested on his way. Master Tara Singh and other leaders in Amritsar were arrested on the night of 17 August. Guru Ram Das Sarai was searched that night and eighty-five Akalis were arrested. Sant Fateh Singh and Lachhman Singh Gill were arrested at Jandiala Guru on their way to Amritsar on the morning of the 18th. ‘Anybody suspected of disturbing the peace of the city was rounded up.’ Master Tara Singh was sent to Dharamsala and Sant Fateh Singh to Gurdaspur. They were released on 20 August 1962. The anticipated clash was averted and ‘there was no bloodshed’. Pandit Mohan Lal’s professed neutrality and his concern for obviating ‘bloodshed’ conceals his partiality to Sant Fateh Singh. His supporters were allowed to hold a meeting before the Akal Takht and to elect Sant Fateh Singh as President of the Akali Dal on 18 August. The supporters of Master Tara Singh met on the 19th as scheduled and reelected Master Tara Singh as President.18 According to Niranjan Singh, Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Sardar Partap Singh Kairon were determined to divide the Akalis, and they succeeded.19 A letter from Kairon, dated 30 August 1962, offers some credible evidence on this point. Kairon wrote to ‘Santjee’ (Sant Fateh Singh or Sant Channan Singh): ‘Now the time is ripe and you must initiate the action decided by us. Every sort of help as intimated previously is at your disposal. In general masses, too, Masterjee already stands most demoralized and that action, as early as possible, is sure to bring you up in the position.’ The bearer of this letter was to provide further detail.20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Fifteen members of the SGPC demanded a special meeting. The motion of noconfidence against Kirpal Singh Chaksherewala as President came before the SGPC on 2 October 1962. Kairon used his power and influence in support of Sant Fateh Singh. The Hindu press had become more vocal in his favour. The noconfidence motion was carried by seventy-six votes to seventy-two. The margin of four was, nonetheless, decisive in ending the supreme leadership of Master Tara Singh in the Sikh Panth. Sant Fateh Singh’s control over the SGPC enabled him to play the main (p.587) role in Sikh politics. At this juncture, the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee of Delhi severed its connection with the SGPC.21 Ajit Singh Sarhadi observes that Master Tara Singh’s leadership had been very much affected by his breaking the fast without the fulfilment of his pledge. His announcement to suspend all activities and agitation for the Punjabi Suba in view of the Chinese aggression ‘further weakened Master Tara Singh’s hold over the Sikhs’. Even the rift in the Akali Dal is seen by Sarhadi as partly the result of Master Tara Singh’s failure to get the Punjabi Suba issue settled even though he was ‘able to take the community to the highest pitch of fervour’. Some of his critics genuinely felt that emphasis on the linguistic aspect of the issue was the right thing to do.22 Niranjan Singh mentions another dimension of the situation. Sant Fateh Singh not only had the support of the government but also of the Sikh people. He used to perform kīrtan in the villages and the Sikhs of the countryside were impressed by his performance and his piety. He spoke against Master Tara Singh’s failure to keep his sacred pledge. A true Sikh of the Guru was not supposed to do this. Therefore, Master Tara Singh had lowered the prestige and honour of Sikh dharam. The Sikhs were divided into two groups: the rural people, who supported Sant Fateh Singh, and the urban Sikhs, who supported Master Tara Singh.23 The rural Sikhs formed an overwhelming majority of the Sikhs. On 9 October 1962, the Working Committee of the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh Jan Sangh demanded that the Regional Formula should be completely scrapped by the government. Sant Fateh Singh reiterated his stand on the Punjabi Suba and appealed to the Punjabis for support. The Chinese attack on Indian territory on 22 October 1962 induced the Akali leaders to suspend all talk of Punjabi Suba and to prepare for the defence of the country. Master Tara Singh felt that the Akali Dal under his Presidentship was losing ground due to opposition to his person. On his initiative, Jathedar Achhar Singh was elected President in his place on 4 November 1962.24 At the end of 1962, thus, Master Tara Singh was heading neither the Shiromani Akali Dal nor the SGPC. Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh were present at a gathering of Sikh organizations at Patiala on 24 December 1962 when Yadvindra Singh was elected Maha Jathedar of the Sikh people for the defence of the country and the glory of the Sikh people. On 7 February 1963, Sant Fateh Singh met the Prime Page 7 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Minister and presented a cheque for Rs 50,000 on behalf of the SGPC as its contribution to the National Defence Fund. On 16 February, he declared that the Punjabi Suba issue would be taken up only after the Chinese were driven out. On 18 June, the General Body of the SGPC rejected the vote of no-confidence moved by Master Tara Singh’s group by eighty-one votes to sixty-two.25 Sant Fateh Singh was consolidating his position at the cost of Master Tara Singh.

Systematic Campaign against Master Tara Singh Master Tara Singh was seventy-seven years old now and Sant Fateh Singh was in his early fifties. Understandably, Sant Fateh Singh was far more energetic and active. He addressed a large number of conferences and issued a large number of statements, published regularly by his own newspaper, Kaumī Dard, more than once a week on average. Apart from Amritsar, he spoke at Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Anandpur Sahib, Damdama (p.588) Sahib, Huzur Sahib (Nander), Khadur Sahib, Baba Bakala, Fatehgarh Sahib, and Muktsar. He spoke at Puhla, associated with Bhai Taru Singh, the well-known Sikh martyr; at Buddha Jauhr in Ganganagur, associated with Bhai Mehtab Singh and Bhai Sukha Singh; and at Mastuana, associated with Sant Attar Singh. He spoke at conferences in Jaito and Sabhrawan; and his native place Badiala, Barnala, Abohar, Ambala, Banga, and the villages Atla Kalan, near Bathinda, and Malikpura near Nawan Shahar. Apart from New Delhi, Sant Fateh Singh visited Calcutta and Bombay. At all these places, he talked mostly on themes related to Master Tara Singh, his own position, unity in the Panth, Punjabi Suba, and Hindu–Sikh unity. The basic issue for both Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh was the supreme leadership of the Sikh Panth. Early in January 1963, it was claimed that the demand for Punjabi Suba, which was espoused by Master Tara Singh, had now been taken up by Sant Fateh Singh.26 With reference to Master Tara Singh’s suggestion for arbitration by panchas, Sant Fateh Singh said at Calcutta in the first week of February that the whole world knew that there was no higher arbitrator than the Guru Panth and the SGPC. The SGPC had already given its verdict by electing Sant Channan Singh as President, and delegates of the Panth had elected Sant Fateh Singh as President of the Shiromani Akali Dal. The leaders of Akali jathās and eminent religious Sikh personages had appealed to Master Tara Singh to leave politics but he was still talking of arbitration.27 At a huge Akali conference in village Malikpura, Sant Fateh Singh reiterated on 24 February that the Supreme Court in the Sikh world was the sādh-sangat and its majority served as the arbitrator. Master Tara Singh’s demand for arbitration was misleading. Three days later, Sant Fateh Singh said at Jalandhar that if Master Tara Singh honestly desired unity among the Sikh he should dissolve his ‘bogus Dal’ and retire from politics.28 On 17 March 1963, Sant Fateh Singh issued a statement to the press that he was surprised to read the charge against him in the newspapers of Master Tara Singh’s family that Sant Fateh Singh had conspired with Nehru to ‘kill’ Master Page 8 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Tara Singh. This was totally baseless, said Sant Fateh Singh. Sardar Gurdial Singh Dhillon, who was supposed to be the source of this information, denied that he had said any such thing to Master Tara Singh. Actually, Master Tara Singh was much disturbed by his defeat in the budget session of the SGPC on 3 March 1963 and resorted to falsehood to deceive the people. Sant Fateh Singh wanted to tell Master Tara Singh with due respect that the ‘glass’ of juice he had taken to break his fast proved to be ‘a cup of poison’. This was the real cause of his ‘death’. There was no need to ‘kill’ a person who was already dead. No conspiracy was required for this purpose. The verdict of the panj-piāras announced by Giani Bhupinder Singh and Jathedar Achhar Singh further ensured Master Tara Singh’s political death. Master Tara Singh, in their judgement, had imprinted a blot on Sikh history by trivializing the martyrdom of Baba Deep Singh, Akali Phula Singh, and Sardar Sham Singh Atari. In the presence of 50,000 people Master Tara Singh had declared that he would be a traitor to the Punjabi Suba if he lived without getting the Punjabi Suba conceded. Master Tara Singh should not blame others but his own actions for his fate.29 According to Sant Fateh Singh, Master Tara Singh was being misled by his selfish followers to stick to politics. He was wrong (p.589) in saying that only a well-wisher of the Panth was his man. His followers were actually working against the followers of the Panth. The Akali legislators, who were with Sant Fateh Singh, formally represented and acted as the Opposition Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly. Sant Fateh Singh accused Master Tara Singh of deliberate intention to keep out the delegates from Ganganagar, Bathinda, Sangrur, Patiala, Ludhiana, Firozpur, Amritsar, Jalandhar, and others for the general body meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal scheduled for 19 August 1962. Master Tara Singh was, thus, guilty of inviting only selected members. Actually, he who was with the Panth was not with Master Tara Singh and he who was with Master Tara Singh was not with the Panth. For Sant Fateh Singh, the Guru Panth was everything: his father, his mother, his brother, and his protector. Everything he possessed was dedicated to the service of the Panth.30 On 10 June 1963, Sant Fateh Singh responded to threats supposed to have been given to him by Master Tara Singh. He was said to have told some Sikhs that it was necessary to ‘kill’ Sant Fateh Singh to destroy his party. He wanted to tell Master Tara Singh that this fratricidal policy could not succeed because Guru Gobind Singh was the protector of this party. It was supported by sants and mahants, and he had complete trust in God’s protection for it. Sant Fateh Singh lists sixteen qualities of a good leader and asks Master Tara Singh to introspect and judge if he possessed any of these. If he found himself devoid of the qualities of leadership, he should renounce politics.31 By implication, Sant Fateh Singh possessed these qualities.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground On the same day, Sant Fateh Singh addressed an Akali Conference at Phagwara. He was keen, he said, about unity in the Sikh Panth but the question did not arise now that a no-confidence resolution had been proposed against Sant Channan Singh as President of the SGPC. No talks on unity could be started in view of ‘the sword of no-confidence’. Sant Fateh Singh referred to the situation of July 1962 when he had requested Master Tara Singh to give him twelve hours to check the rift but Master Tara Singh was not prepared to do this. Sant Fateh Singh was confident that the proposed resolution of no-confidence would be defeated. He mentioned four basic qualities of a leader and left it to the sangat to judge whether or not Master Tara Singh possessed any of these. It was unethical on his part to criticize Sant Fateh Singh for his going into seclusion (agiātvās). Master Tara Singh should undergo penance for his sins.32 On 19 June 1963, the day following the defeat of the no-confidence motion against Sant Channan Singh in the general meeting of the SGPC, an appeal was made to Master Tara Singh in a dīwān at Manji Sahib that he should realize that the Panth did not want him as its leader any more. Sant Fateh Singh underscored the need for Panthic unity and asked Master Tara Singh to stop being an obstacle. Master Tara Singh, however, held the government responsible for his defeat. On 27 June, Sant Fateh Singh stated at a press conference that this charge was baseless. In fact, Master Tara Singh had admitted in a public statement that the former Minsters Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala and some other Congressmen had openly supported Master Tara Singh. In reality, Sant Fateh Singh’s victory in the SGPC was a verdict of the Sikh Panth in his favour. True to the Sikh tradition, the Akalis did not want weak leadership, and they needed only those leaders who were prepared to make sacrifices for the Panth.33 (p.590) Sant Fateh Singh blamed Master Tara Singh for expressing no appreciation for the work of other leaders. In fact, he charged Master Tara Singh with an extreme kind of partisanship in which personal allegiance to Master Tara Singh was the basic requirement. The slogan ‘Master Tara Singh zindābād’ was actually the test of loyalty. All sins were washed by shouting this slogan. Sant Fateh Singh gives a long list of faults, demerits, and ill deeds that had been condoned by shouting this slogan. They who did not shout this slogan were dubbed as traitors of the Panth, stooges of the government, slanderers, and sinners, and all their merits were ignored. Sant Fateh Singh goes on to add that a slanderer of sādhs (devotees of God) could never be redeemed. He challenged Master Tara Singh to contest the forthcoming by-election to the Legislative Assembly to test his position in the Sikh Panth. False accusations were brought against Sant Fateh Singh precisely because he did not shout the slogan of zindābād for Master Tara Singh when he came out of the jail early in January 1961 to betray the cause of the Panth. Sant Fateh Singh was opposed not only to the Congress but also to those parties which were opposed to Punjabi Suba. But Master Tara Singh was friendly with Kriplani and Devi Lal, who were opposed to Page 10 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Punjabi Suba. His pretention to leadership of the Panth had to be exposed. He kept the Panth on the run but when the crucial hour came he ran away for fear of death.34 Not Sant Fateh Singh but Master Tara Singh was hobnobbing with the opponents of Punjabi Suba. In the Jathedār of 26 August 1963, Master Tara Singh admitted in his own way that he had abandoned the demand for Punjabi Suba. He said that there was no pressure on the government for Punjabi Suba now and there was no chance of its creation. Master Tara Singh did not hear, or did not like to hear, the slogan of ‘Punjabi Sūbā zindābād’ being shouted by others. In fact, he was afraid of the Punjabi Suba being created. He said that he would not deceive his followers, supporters, and friends by being taken in by any mischievous offer of Punjabi Suba by the government. This, for Sant Fateh Singh, was a clear evidence that Master Tara Singh was warning the government against the creation of Punjabi Suba (demanded by Sant Fateh Singh and his party). He had formed a united front (Sanjha morchā, Mutahidah Mahāz) to oppose the government. Its General Secretary was Jagat Narain. His statement in the Hind Samāchār of 26 August was very significant. The entry of Master Tara Singh in the Mutahida Mahāz, he said, made it clear that he had relegated the Punjabi Suba demand to the background. He said further that if the Mahāz worked successfully for four years, the demands like Punjabi Suba would become an old story. Sant Fateh Singh asked Master Tara Singh to clarify his position with regard to Punjabi Suba.35 Sant Fateh Singh wrote on 2 September 1963 that Master Tara Singh claimed to be fighting for preserving the independent entity of the Panth but his actions did not support this claim. First of all, he put an end to the independent identity of the Panth by placing the Akali legislators under Congress leadership and by changing the constitution of the Shiromani Akali Dal in 1956. Now he was trying to place it under the Jan Singh and Jagat Narain. Where was now the slogan of ‘Panth Azad’? For the first time, Sant Fateh Singh and his supporters had made the Akali Party the Opposition Party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, with ‘Justice’ Gurnam Singh as the leader of the Opposition. But (p.591) Master Tara Singh was unhappy over it. To hand over the leadership of the Panth to others was nothing short of ‘infidelity’ (kufr). Sant Fateh Singh told Master Tara Singh that he was not ‘master’ of the Panth: its master was Guru Gobind Singh. No one had the right to entrust the reins of the Panth to others.36 A week later, Sant Fateh Singh brought against Master Tara Singh the most serious charge. Master Tara Singh had stabbed the movement for Punjabi Suba in the back by deceiving Sant Fateh.37 Ten days later, Sant Fateh Singh spoke again about Master Tara Singh’s role in that critical situation. It was on the request of his family members, he contended, that Master Tara Singh was released from Dharamsala Jail. He went to Bhavnagar to meet Nehru against the wishes of Sant Fateh Singh, and the way in which he spoke to Nehru spoilt the Page 11 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground situation. After his meeting with Nehru, Master Tara Singh stated that negotiations had failed and he would go on fast after Sant Fateh Singh. But soon afterwards he raised the question whether or not it was desirable to go on fast unto death and wrote letters to the learned in Sikh faith. This was a strange situation. Sant Fateh Singh was close to death, he said, and Master Tara Singh was raising the issue of the validity of the fast. He himself had thought of going on fast in the cause of civil liberty. Was a fast valid for civil liberty but invalid for Punjabi Suba? Furthermore, Master Tara Singh announced in Delhi that the demand of the Akalis had been conceded and sent this message to Sant Fateh Singh. But Sant Fateh Singh insisted that he would break his fast only after Master Tara Singh’s return to Amritsar and his assurance that the demand had been conceded. Master Tara Singh spoke to ‘Singh Sahib’ (Jathedar Achhar Singh?) on the phone to confirm that the demand had been conceded and, if the fast was not broken, there would be serious complications for which he would not be responsible. Yet two days later, Master Tara Singh made a statement at Manji Sahib that if the Punjab Government did not create Punjabi Suba he would go on fast. The sangat reacted spontaneously to do physical harm to Master Tara Singh. Sant Fateh Singh’s men came to his aid and brought him safe to Sant Fateh Singh’s cottage. Master Tara Singh was still trembling. Sant Fateh Singh added that this was not the only occasion on which Master Tara Singh had betrayed the Panth.38 On 25 October 1963, Sant Fateh Singh issued a statement at Jalandhar that he felt sad on reading reports of the speeches by Master Tara Singh and Giani Bhupinder Singh in the Jathedār. He was totally opposed to the policies of Master Tara Singh because he believed that his policies were not in the interest of the Panth. ‘My dharam’, he said, ‘is manukhvād’ (humanism) and ‘my caste is insaniyat’ (humanity). These were the principles of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh, and Sant Fateh Singh as their servant wanted to live his life in accordance with their mission. Master Tara Singh was no more a leader of the Panth because his personalized leadership to serve his own interests was not acceptable to the Panth. He did not like the Sikh sangat turning towards Sant Fateh Singh, forgetting that the sangat was a little more important even than the Guru. ‘The sangat is the abode of the Guru.’ The Sikh sangats had kept on respecting Master Tara Singh for forty years but now they could not support him because he was taking the Panth towards its downfall. A run-away from sacrifice, he was no longer a selfless leader of the Panth. In any case the Panth supported only self-sacrificing leaders.39 (p.592) On 11 December 1963, Sant Fateh Singh stated that he was in favour of unity in the Panth. He was being wrongly accused of being an obstacle to Panthic ektā. Jathedar Mohan Singh Tur was appointed Acting Jathedar (of the Akal Takht) with authorization to work for unity. It was now to be seen whether or not Jathedar Achhar Singh would be given such authorization. Sant Fateh Singh emphasized that he was prepared for unity, even though in the general Page 12 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground meeting of the SGPC on 29 November 1963, all his nominees were elected unopposed. Sant Fateh Singh believed that he should work for unity all the more and in all humility because of his successes. His effort was generally appreciated. Jathedar Achhar Singh also made a public statement that he was willing to work for unity. But when Jathedar Achhar Singh met Master Tara Singh at Karnal he found that Master Tara Singh was not in favour of talks. Sant Fateh Singh refers to other situations in which Master Tara Singh had sabotaged the efforts of unity by several Sikh leaders: Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara and ‘Justice’ Gurnam Singh, Jathedar Pritam Singh Gojran, Sardar Rachhpal Singh of Delhi, and a group of seven leaders of Sant Fateh Singh’s party, headed by ‘Justice’ Gurnam Singh.40 In his presidential address to the fifteenth All-India Akali Conference at Karnal on 7 December 1963, Jathedar Achhar Singh emphasized the need for unity as the most important question confronting the Sikh Panth. He attributed disunity among the Akalis to the policies pursued by the government. Master Tara Singh was prepared, he said, to make any sacrifice to bring about unity, even to leave the country. Jathedar Achhar Singh himself and Giani Bhupinder Singh had entered the field of politics to work for unity. He invited the estranged ‘brothers’ to come under the standard of the Akali Dal. On behalf of the Conference, and Master Tara Singh, he offered to make all kinds of sacrifice for the sake of unity. In the rest of his address he underlined the prevalence of corruption in the Congress, the need for Hindu–Sikh unity, the duty of the Khalsa to protect dharam and to live and die for parupkār, the role of Sikhs in the Indian army, and the inevitability of the creation of Punjabi Suba.41 On 28 December 1963, Sant Fateh Singh stated at Fatehgarh Sahib that in the larger interests of the Panth he was prepared to come to an understanding with Master Tara Singh on the issue of Panthic ektā, but the agreement should be ‘honourable’. He warned Master Tara Singh that he should not make the mistake of regarding this offer as a sign of weakness. Nor should he think of putting an end to the aspirations of Sant Fateh Singh and his supporters. During the past year they had defeated Master Tara Singh and his supporters several times. Sant Fateh Singh was keen for unity because of his belief that the majority was morally bound to be generous to the minority. Obviously, Sant Fateh Singh was assuming that he represented the majority and Master Tara Singh represented the minority.42 Undoubtedly, Sant Fateh Singh was speaking from a position of strength. On the resignation of Jathedar Achhar Singh on 22 January 1964, Giani Bhupinder Singh became the President of the Akali Dal of Master Tara Singh. Ironically, Sant Fateh Singh now accused Master Tara Singh of sabotaging the unity efforts, especially the proposal of arbitration by Jathedar Achhar Singh and Jathedar Mohan Singh Tur. In any case, the popularity of Sant Fateh Singh was increasing and the influence of Master Tara Singh was on the decline. This was Page 13 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground reflected in the by-election for the Patti seat in which (p.593) the candidate of Master Tara Singh got 2,745 votes and the nominee of the Sant got 18,747. The seat was won by the Congress candidate with 22,442 votes. In the election of the President of the SGPC in June 1964, Master Tara Singh’s nominee was defeated by a margin of twenty-six votes.43

Change in Akali Leadership In June 1964, Master Tara Singh was seventy-nine years old and his health was no longer good. He had played an increasingly important role in the Sikh affairs for over four decades since 1921. Now he stood virtually replaced by Sant Fateh Singh, with little chance of a return. This was a major change in Akali politics. However, no historian has tried systematically or consciously to account for this change, though several factors have been noted in passing. Ajit Singh Sarhadi remarks that in January 1961 Master Tara Singh’s ‘influence as a leader was on the wane’. He had committed ‘a Himalayan blunder’ when after having told Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast he said that the battle for the attainment of Punjabi Suba would continue. ‘The suspension of the struggle is only a truce or cease-fire to create a good atmosphere for talks.’ This statement gave the impression that the battle had been lost.44 Sarhadi remarks again that Master Tara Singh’s leadership was ‘much affected’ when he broke his fast on the 1st of October 1961 ‘without the fulfilment of his pledge’. The Shiromani Akali Dal was soon in turmoil.45 A section of Hindus and their press played ‘the most prominent part’ in this situation. They started giving wide publicity to the policies and programmes of Sant Fateh Singh to build up his personality and raise his image. Though meant to divide the Akalis, this unexpected support was ‘a godsend’: ‘the vacuum created in Sikh leadership was quickly filled by the personality of Sant Fateh Singh, and the Sikhs as a community were not being left without leadership. Furthermore, Sant Fateh Singh hammered the point that he had fundamental differences with Master Tara Singh ‘over the concept and the nature of the suba from the very beginning’. For him, the issue was ‘purely linguistic and must be treated as such’. At the same time, he espoused the cause of Hindu–Sikh unity. This declaration increased the support of the Hindu press for Sant Fateh Singh.46 The Chief Minister, Kairon, was also on the side of Sant Fateh Singh in his tussle with Master Tara Singh.47 Kairon’s attitude was in consonance with that of the Prime Minister, whose preference for Sant Fateh Singh as the Akali leader for negotiations was absolutely clear. It may be added that Sant Fateh Singh was a popular Sikh leader in his own right before Master Tara Singh recognized his importance as an asset to the Akali Dal. Sant Fateh Singh was born on 27 October 1911 in village Badial of the Nabha state, one of the villages of Sidhu-Brars near Rampura Phul. His father, Sardar Channan Singh was a devout Sikh who practised meditation, self-control, and selfless service. In his early age, Fateh Singh learnt the Sikh discipline of devotion and service at the derā (establishment) of Sant Sham Singh, and spent Page 14 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground more than ten years in the cottage of Sant Sadhu Singh, practising meditation in seclusion. In 1931, he organized social work in Ganganagar district of the Bikaner state with Bhai Bakhtawar Singh, building gurdwaras, opening schools, and digging wells and pools for water. He worked for some time in village Dholan of Ludhiana district, where he built a gurdwara in 1944 and opened a primary school for girls in 1947. He worked (p.594) in some other villages of the district and started amrit parchār. Back in Ganganagar, he built a gurdwara at Buddha Jauhr, the place associated with the famous Sikh warriors Bhai Sukha Singh and Bhai Mehtab Singh. It became a centre of pilgrimage. By 1956 Sant Fateh Singh had built fifty-three middle schools, twenty-seven high schools, and Guru Kashi College at Damdana Sahib, Talwandi Sabo, besides numerous gurdwaras.48 Sant Fateh Singh was one of those Sikh sants who took active interest in the affairs of the Akalis. He had sent several jathās for the Akali agitation against the Pepsu Government in 1949, and himself courted arrest at the head of a large jathā. His participation in the agitation was entirely voluntary, and as a leader. He continued to perform kīrtan and kathā of Bhai Santokh Singh’s Nanak Prakāsh. He persuaded the jail authorities to lift the ban on the Sikh religious slogan (jaikārā). In Ganganagar later on he launched a morchā against the water tax in Bikaner. He courted arrest with 200 volunteers and remained in jail for a month and a half. On his persuasion, the jail superintendent introduced some reform related to the physical and spiritual health of the prisoners, and some articles of Sikh rahit. In 1955, Sant Fateh Singh courted arrest with a jathā of 100 at Amritsar on 4 July in connection with the Akali morchā against the ban on shouting the slogan ‘Punjabi Sūbā zindābād’. He persuaded the Punjab IG Prisons to introduce reforms for both Sikh and non-Sikh prisoners during his visit to the jail on 3 September. He was released on 10 October. On 16 November 1957, he was with Master Tara Singh leading the procession for the Akali Dal Conference at Bathinda. On 12 October 1958, he reiterated the demand for Punjabi Suba as the Vice-President of the Akali Dal. On 15 March 1959, he led a silent procession of about three lakhs of people from the Red Fort to Gurdwara Rakabganj in Delhi in the absence of Master Tara Singh, who had been arrested on 12 March. After Master Tara Singh’s arrest in May 1961, Sant Fateh Singh led the agitation for Punjabi Suba till he was asked by Master Tara Singh to break his fast early in January 1961.49 Thus, Sant Fateh Singh was next only to Master Tara Singh among the top leaders of the Akali Dal. Niranjan Singh, as we noted earlier, mentions the division among the Akalis largely on rural–urban lines. The rural Sikhs mostly supported Sant Fateh Singh and the urban Sikhs generally supported Master Tara Singh. Niranjan Singh does not say so but the implication of this statement is clear. Since the rural Sikhs formed the bulk of the Sikh population Sant Fateh Singh’s success in his open fight with Master Tara Singh was a foregone conclusion. However, to postulate a rural–urban dichotomy is not the same thing as to propose a Jatt– Page 15 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground Khatri caste conflict among the Sikhs. It must be remembered that no Sikh leader could talk in terms of caste from a Panthic platform, or even elsewhere in public. In the whole range of mutual criticism by the supporters of Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh there is no hint of invoking caste affiliation. Joyce Pettigrew rightly remarks that among the Sikhs there was no caste system which gives sanction to, and justifies on religious basis, the principles of inequality and hierarchy, and which is accepted by the entire society as a model. The Sikh community repudiated the concept of caste ‘officially’ and ‘in its system of religious belief’. It gave no recognition to ‘the concept of hierarchy as such’.50 However, Sardar Partap Singh Kairon had no such constraints and quite deliberately he brought in the question of Jats. ‘He aimed (p.595) particularly at securing the mass support of Sikh farmers.’ As a means of associating the Jatt section of the community with himself, and indirectly with the Congress, he would say that he was the first Jatt to have brought power to Jats in the Punjab since Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He would associate Master Tara Singh’s Akali Dal with ‘vested interest from Rawalpindi’ (in Pakistan), playing on the Jatt dislike of the trading classes of this area, who were synonymous with money grabbing at the farmers’ expense. The majority of the development plans initiated by Kairon were immediately of benefit, or would ultimately be of benefit, to the Jats.51 Kairon was consistent in wooing away farmers from the Akali Dal. After each agitation he would point out the cost of ‘disturbance’ in terms of reduction in the funds for installation of tube wells, building of schools, and road building. He associated Akali ‘communalism’ with economic backwardness. Pettigrew mentions five areas of Kairon’s special interest: (a) seed farming as a part of the Five-Year Plan, (b) construction of metalled roads, consolidation of landholdings, provision of electricity to villages, and of loans to cultivators for tubewells, (c) poultry farming and cultivation of grapes, (d) development of an agricultural university in Ludhiana, and (e) ceiling on the number of standard acres an individual could hold and encouragement to enterprising farmers to move into towns to start machine tool workshops.52 On the whole, nearly 22 million acres had been brought under consolidation by 1964–5, more than 5,000 villages were supplied with electric power, and nearly 13,000 kilometres of metalled roads were under the wheels of buses and trucks. Agricultural production increased by 42 per cent. The number of tenants decreased from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands. More than 5,000 factories were registered. The growing prosperity of the Punjab and Kairon’s policies won many rural voters for the Congress. ‘The increasing alienation of the Akalis, however, was alienating the Sikh peasantry also from the Congress.’53 The universal suffrage introduced by the Constitution of India, coupled with the growing prosperity of the Punjab countryside, sharpened political consciousness among the rural Sikhs and many of them began to aspire for political leadership. These were the people largely behind Sant Fateh Singh. Page 16 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground The decline in Master Tara Singh’s political influence was intimately linked with this larger socio-political change.

In Retrospect Master Tara Singh began to lose ground in Akali politics after the failure of the Punjabi Suba agitation in 1960–1. In the summer of 1962, there was an open revolt against him, led by Sant Fateh Singh, who had gained much in stature during the agitation. Attributing its failure to Master Tara Singh he began to espouse the cause of the Punjabi Suba on ‘a purely linguistic basis’. He declared that from the very beginning his concept of the Akali demand had been fundamentally different from that of Master Tara Singh. In 1963, he conducted a systematic campaign against Master Tara Singh, underlining Master Tara Singh’s weakness as a leader and highlighting his own selfless commitment to the cause of the Punjabi Suba to the point of sacrificing his life. He hammered in the point that the majority of the Akali leaders and Akali workers were with him. He was keen nonetheless, he said, to work for unity among the Akalis, but on his own terms. Master Tara Singh was unwilling (p.596) to concede the legitimacy of the Akali Dal formed by Sant Fateh Singh, who, in turn, invoked the verdict of the Panth in his favour. The success of his nominee in the election for the Presidentship of the SGPC in June 1964 put a stamp on his claim. By the middle of 1964, it was clear that Master Tara Singh would never recover the lost ground. Apart from the ‘mistakes’ made by Master Tara Singh, and the personality of Sant Fateh Singh, there were also impersonal forces at work. The opponents of Master Tara Singh at the Centre and in the state projected Sant Fateh Singh as a better leader of the Akalis. Kairon, in particular, supported Sant Fateh Singh in his efforts to overthrow Master Tara Singh. Deliberately, Kairon raised the issue of Jatt Sikhs versus the ‘vested interests from Rawalpindi’ with reference to the leadership of Master Tara Singh. The agriculturalists formed an enormously larger proportion of the Sikhs than the Sikh trading communities. By the 1960s, the increasing alienation of the Akalis from the Congress was alienating the Sikh peasantry from the Congress represented by Kairon in the Punjab. The leaders of the Sikh peasantry had political aspirations of their own. They were the first to become impatient with Master Tara Singh and to support Sant Fateh Singh in his bid for the Punjab Suba. Early in 1965, Master Tara Singh himself left the field free for Sant Fateh Singh and, subsequently, began to support his programme. Notes:

(1.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999, paperback), 2 vols, vol. II, pp. 300–1. (2.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), pp. 333–5. Page 17 of 20

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground (3.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab (Chandigarh: Sameer Prakashan, 1984), pp. 205–9. (4.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 209. (5.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 376–7. (6.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jiwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), p. 343. See also Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 176. (7.) Dhanna Singh Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī (1947–1977) (Rampura Phul: Dhaliwal Gurcharan Singh, 1978), pp. 129–30. (8.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 377–8. (9.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 381. (10.) Inscription on the foundation slab, Punjabi University, Patiala (opposite Guru Tegh Bahadur Hall). See also Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 382. (11.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, pp. 326–8. (12.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 382–3. According to Dhanna Singh Gulshan, Sant Fateh Singh suggested that another meeting of the Committee may be held on 16 July and he would persuade Gill and Umranangal to submit their resignations. But they never came back, and Sant Fateh Singh began to support them. At the Conference on 22 July, they all decided to displace Master Tara Singh from leadership of the Akali Dal and to have no understanding or compromise with him. Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī, p. 130. (13.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 383–4. (14.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 386. (15.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 386. (16.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 387. (17.) Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī, p. 130. (18.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 181–3. (19.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), p. 196. (20.) Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism (Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2000), p. 158.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground (21.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 388. Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 131–2. (22.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 379, 381, 385. (23.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 197–8. (24.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 388–90. (25.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 390–2. (26.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar (Buddha Jauhr [Ganganagar]: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh, 1967), p. 9. (27.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 40–1. (28.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 59–61. (29.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 66–8. (30.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 76–82. (31.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 89–92. (32.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 92–5. (33.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 95–7. (34.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 107–21. (35.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 133–7. (36.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 140–3. (37.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 157–9. (38.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 163–6. (39.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 177–8. (40.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 222–4. (41.) Jathedar Achhar Singh, Pardhāngī Address (Pandharvīn Sarb Hind Akali Conference) (Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1963). (42.) Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 227–8. (43.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 396–7. (44.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 345.

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Master Tara Singh Loses Ground (45.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 379. (46.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 385–6. (47.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 388. (48.) Arjan Singh Budhiraja, ‘Sankhep Jīwani Sant Baba Fateh Singhji’, in Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar, pp. 1–16. (49.) Budhiraja, ‘Sankhep Jīwaṇī Sant Baba Fateh Singhji’, pp. 1–16. Harjinder Singh Dilgir, Shiromani Akali Dal (Jullundur: Punjabi Book Company, 1978), pp. 235–41. (50.) Joyce Pettigrew, Robber Noblemen: A Study of the Political System of the Sikh Jats (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 45. (51.) Pettigrew, Robber Noblemen, pp. 98, 246 n. 39. (52.) Pettigrew, Robber Noblemen, pp. 98–9. (53.) J.S. Grewal, The Sikhs of the Punjab (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. II, part3) (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2014, reprint), p. 202.

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

At Last a Unilingual Punjab State (1964–6) J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0026

Abstract and Keywords Prime Minister Shastri was not willing to deviate from the policy of Nehru. Sant Fateh Singh declared that he would go on fast unto death on 10 September 1965. But in view of the war with Pakistan he decided to postpone his fast. The Home Minister, Gulzari Lal Nanda, announced the creation of a Cabinet SubCommittee to advise a Parliamentary Consultative Committee for ‘a co-operative solution’. Before this Committee could present its report, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution on 9 March 1966 in favour of constituting a Punjabi-speaking state. Due to the terms of reference given to the Boundary Commission using the census of 1961, the Bhakra Dam and Chandigarh fell outside the Punjab. Subsequently, Chandigarh was made a union territory and the Bhakra Dam was placed under the Government of India. A ‘crippled’ state was inaugurated on 1 November 1966. Keywords:   Prime Minister Shastri, policy of Nehru, Sant Fateh Singh, Parliamentary Consultative Committee, Congress Working Committee, Punjabi-speaking state, census of 1961, Bhakra Dam, Chandigarh, ‘crippled’ state

Sant Fateh Singh had to justify his position by pursuing the demand for Punjabi Suba which had been brought to the Centre of Sikh politics by Master Tara Singh. The war with Pakistan in 1965 hastened the process, and Lal Bahadur Shastri took steps to initiate the procedure for creating a unilingual Punjab state. Indira Gandhi, who succeeded Shastri early in 1966, had to carry forward

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State the procedure against her wishes. Her decisions resulted in a crippled Punjab state and created problems which complicated Punjab politics.

The Context The years between Jawaharlal Nehru’s death on 27 May 1964 and the consolidation of power by Indira Gandhi in 1971–2 constituted ‘a prolonged succession crisis and struggle for power’. Towards the end of Nehru’s life the central party organization had re-emerged as a powerful force. Kamraj Nadar, the former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, was elected President of the Congress in 1963. He formed a group, called the Syndicate, with four other party leaders from different states (Atulya Ghosh from Bengal, S.K. Patil from Bombay, N. Sanjeeva Reddy from Andhra Pradesh, and S. Nijalingappa from Karnataka). The Syndicate played a critical role in the succession of Lal Bahadur Shastri and of Indira Gandhi.1 This carried the implication that the Prime Minister’s position was not strong. There were two main contenders for leadership of the Congress and Prime Ministership at Nehru’s death: Morarji Desai and Lal Bahadur Shastri. Desai was not acceptable to the Syndicate. Shastri had a wider acceptability. He was elected unopposed as the Parliamentary leader, and sworn in as Prime Minister on 2 June 1964. The most memorable event of his brief tenure was the Indo-Pak war of August–September 1965. Accused generally of being ‘a prisoner of indecision’, he was (p.599) eminently decisive in his reaction to the Pakistanbacked infiltration into the Kashmir valley. He ordered the army to cross the ceasefire line to seal the passes used for infiltration. On the 1st of September, Pakistan launched a massive attack in the Chhamb sector to intercept the only road to Kashmir from the Indian side. Shastri ordered the Indian army to move across the border towards Lahore and Sialkot. On 23 September India and Pakistan agreed to ceasefire under pressure from the United Nations Security Council. Through the good offices of the Soviet Union, General Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri signed the Tashkent Declaration on 4 January 1966. Suddenly on 10 January, Shastri died of a heart attack. Morarji Desai was again a contender for Prime Ministership in 1966. But the Syndicate was in favour of Indira Gandhi, who was expected to be ‘more pliable’. Desai insisted on a formal contest in which he was defeated by 355 votes to 169. Kamraj had stagemanaged Indira’s election. She was sworn in as Prime Minister on 24 January 1966.2 It is not generally known that more than half a dozen volumes of Sant Fateh Singh’s poetry, essays in prose, and his speeches, published in 1965–6, were meant primarily to inform, instruct, and to inspire the readers in the cause of the Sikh faith, ethics, and politics. A collection of more than 100 poems, called Channaṇ Ban (Sandalwood Forest), has some poems written in 1945. A wellknown writer from Amritsar, Narinder Singh ‘Soch’, wrote a foreword appreciating Sant Fateh Singh’s poetry and his politics.3 Another collection of Page 2 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State 170 poems, called Piār Sunehṛā (Message of Love), includes more than 50 poems written in 1946–8. An appreciation of this collection is given as ‘Sant ji di Kav Kala’ by Harsa Singh ‘Chātar’, another poet from Amritsar.4 A collection entitled Mitthiān Ramzān (Sweet Secret Messages) has nearly fifty poems written in 1945. It has a foreword by Professor Satbir Singh, who was closely associated with Sant Fateh Singh; ‘Kujh Satrān’ (A Few Lines) by Harcharan Singh Hudiara, General Secretary Shiromani Akali Dal; ‘Do Rāvān’ (Two Views) by Chet Singh, Head Granthi, Sri Darbar Sahib, Amritsar; ‘Meriān Nazrān Vich’ (In My Eyes) by Kirpal Singh, Granthi, Sri Darbar Sahib, Amritsar.5 The second edition of Sant Fateh Singh’s Aṇkhī Valvale (Emotional Upsurge for the Sake of Honour) is a collection of forty-five poems of religious, devotional, and patriotic character. It is dedicated to those who died for the sake of honour. Principal Harbant Singh of Guru Kashi College wrote ‘Do Shabad’ (A Few Words), an introduction to Sant Fateh Singh’s Aṇkhī Valvale, and Principal Harbhajan Singh, Sikh Missionary College, Amritsar, wrote an appreciative foreword. A collection of twenty-five poems, called Machdiān Lāṭān (Flames Ablaze), was dedicated to Sikh martyrs, with a foreword written by Sadhu Singh ‘Bhaura’, Jathedar, Sri Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar.6 The Charbī de Deive (Lamps Lit by Fat) is a collection of seven poems, ten essays and three speeches of Sant Fateh Singh. Unlike the poems, the essays are more or less political. In one of the essays, Sant Fateh Singh argues that the label ‘communal’ (phirkū) was not applicable to the Sikhs in any way.7 In another essay he describes the various ways of discrimination against the Sikhs.8 In the third essay he expresses his keenness for Panthic unity. He asserts that his sole concern is with the service of the Guru Panth. He wants to sacrifice his life for the sake of the Sikh kaum. He has no family and has acquired no property. He has brought about (p.600) considerable unity among the Sikhs, and he is equally keen for Hindu–Sikh amity. As enjoined by the Guru, he believes in universal brotherhood.9 In the fourth essay he refers to the great sacrifices made by the Sikhs in the struggle for independence but their love for the country was still suspected by the Hindus. They were ‘communal’ in their attitude towards the just and constitutional demand for Punjabi Suba. He appeals to the Sikh to be ready for sacrifice. In the fifth essay, Sant Fateh Singh appeals to all the people of the country to support the demand for a unilingual state in the Punjab. He appeals to ‘the rulers’ to be just, and quotes from the Zafarnāmā of Guru Gobind Singh to the effect that God who gave rulership to Aurangzeb also gave Guru Gobind Singh the strength to protect dharam.10 In the sixth essay, Sant Fateh Singh argues that his Hindu brethren of the Punjab should not oppose the use of Gurmukhi script. It was a wrong assumption on their part that Hindus would turn to the Sikh faith by learning Gurmukhi. There was much Hindu lore in Guru Granth Sahib and it contained compositions of Hindu bhagats. Hindus and Sikhs were brothers, both members of one family. Page 3 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State They could not be separated. In all other provinces of India the mother tongue of the people was learnt, and there was no reason why it should not be so in the Punjab. Sant Fateh Singh appealed to all opponents of Gurmukhi that they should discard their prejudice.11 In the essay ‘Mein Ghulām Hān’ (I Am a Slave), Sant Fateh Singh says that even after eighteen years of India’s independence, and despite having made the greatest sacrifices for it, the Sikhs were still essentially slaves. Their sacred scripture was being burnt or torn up but no one was bothered about the injustice. The symbols of their faith were being denigrated. There was no free speech for the Sikhs. Their language was ignored. It was better for them to die than to live under such humiliation. Sant Fateh was happy that he had got the opportunity by the grace of Guru Gobind Singh to sacrifice his life. In a short essay later, Sant Fateh Singh says that after his immolation, the cottage built for the days of his fast and the trough (havan kund) constructed for his immolation should be demolished so that no sign of his sacrifice was left behind.12 Finally, Sant Fateh Singh wrote that he was looking forward to the day of his death in confirmation of his faith. He quotes several verses from Guru Granth Sahib in support of this ideal.13 The title of the collection comes from the title of an address included in it: ‘Charbī de Deive’ (the earthen lamps in which human fat is used instead of oil). The idea comes from the loss of weight due to the fast unto death observed by Sant Fateh Singh for twenty-two days. Human fat becomes a symbol of suffering and sacrifice, with a personal compliment to Sant Fateh Singh built into it. Addressing the Sikh gathering on the Diwali day, Sant Fateh Singh says, ‘Nations are made not by burning oil but fat.’ He refers to the Sikh martyrs who made sacrifices in the past, both distant and recent. Sant Fateh Singh extols martyrdom as an essential element in the Sikh faith, citing a number of verses from Guru Granth Sahib and the Dasam Granth. The seeds of life, he says, were in the blood of the martyrs. A Sikh sacrificed his life for the survival of the Panth. He was thankful to the sangat for erecting a cottage for his fast and for raising a havan kund (sacrificial trough) to burn himself alive. He was determined to die for Punjabi Suba, which was an issue of life and death for the Panth. Addressing the men and women gathered at the time of Diwali, (p.601) he appealed to them all to remain true to the Sikh faith.14 In a speech at the Akal Takht, Sant Fateh Singh refers to the sanctity of Sri Akal Takht. This was the place where the valiant warrior Guru Hargobind, the master of the temporal and the spiritual realms (mīrī-pīrī), gave a new turn to the history of the Sikh faith by resorting to the use of sword in order to defend the Sikh Panth. Guru Nanak had identified himself with the wretched of the earth and expressed his sympathy with the disprivileged, whether men or women, and those who suffered violence and injustice at the hands of autocratic or irresponsible rulers. Guru Arjan demonstrated that God’s will was sweet even in martyrdom. The younger Sahibzadas courted martyrdom, following the example of their grandfather, Guru Tegh Bahadur. This tradition of martyrdom was kept Page 4 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State up by a number of Singhs in the morchā for Punjabi Suba. Courting arrest in a peaceful manner 57,129 Singhs had gone to jail. The Akali prisoners included all the members of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), all the respectable leaders, parchāraks, rāgīs, dhādīs, giānīs, sants, mahants, senior members of the Panth, lawyers, professors, and principals. The Sikhs knew the two injunctions of their Gurus: conquer or die fighting. Sant Fateh Singh exhorted the audience to act: ‘Rise, to save your honour and self-respect. Rise, to protect your faith. Rise, to preserve the symbols of your faith: the honour of your turbans, flowing beards and short breeches. Rise, to remove the restrictions imposed on (the code of) Guru Gobind Singh. Rise, to disprove that the government can suppress the Sikhs by force.’15

A Unilingual State Is Conceded The authors of India after Independence have argued that Indira Gandhi dealt effectively with the Punjab problem by accepting the demand for Punjabi Suba. Nehru had refused to concede the demand mainly because of its communal underpinnings. He felt that the acceptance of ‘a communal demand’ would threaten ‘the secular fabric of the state and society’. Moreover, a large section of Hindus and two eminent ‘Sikh leaders’ (Kairon and Darbara Singh) were strongly opposed to this ‘communal’ demand. But Nehru should have accepted the demand because ‘it was inherently just’ and it was being supported on a secular basis by the CPI, the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), and a number of intellectuals. Moreover, the rest of India had been reorganized on a linguistic basis by 1960.16 The way for the creation of Punjabi Suba, in consonance with Nehru’s criteria, was cleared for Indira Gandhi by two developments: (a) Sant Fateh Singh declared that the demand for Punjabi Suba was based entirely on language and (b) the major political leaders and organizations in Haryana asked for a Hindispeaking Haryana, and those in Kangra asked for its merger with Himachal Pradesh. In March 1966, Indira Gandhi announced that the Punjab would be split into two states and Kangra would be merged with Himachal Pradesh. Indira Gandhi appointed the Punjab Boundary Commission with terms of reference accepted by both sides. The authors of India after Independence look upon the acceptance of the Punjabi Suba demand by Indira Gandhi as ‘a correct step’. But they believe that it was not a solution of the Punjab problem. ‘The heart of that problem was communalism and unless that was eradicated the problem would remain though it might take ever newer forms.’17 Both Nehru and Indira Gandhi stand vindicated, in fact admirably justified, and the Akalis are made responsible for the later ‘Punjab crisis’. Nothing could be (p.602) more misleading than this seemingly rational account of the creation of the Punjabi-speaking state. The SGPC elections held on 17 January 1965 went clearly in favour of Sant Fateh Singh. There were 372 candidates for 139 seats. There was straight contest on seventy-five seats between the parties of Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Page 5 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State Singh, triangular contest for forty-nine seats, and more than three candidates for fifteen seats. Sant Fateh Singh had tactical support from the Congress, the two Communist parties, the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (M), and the Republican Party. His party won a decisive victory, with ninety seats against thirty-six of Master Tara Singh’s party. With reference to ‘a complete rout’ of Master Tara Singh, Sardar Gurnam Singh said that it would be proper for Master Tara Singh now to retire from politics. On 20 January 1965, Master Tara Singh left for an undisclosed place, telling journalists that he did not wish to stand in the way of Sant Fateh Singh’s achieving the Punjabi Suba or improving the administration of gurdwaras. Accepting the verdict of the Panth, he would like to give full opportunity to Sant Fateh Singh to run the Panthic affairs.18 After the SGPC elections of January 1965, Sant Fateh Singh had the field open to him in the absence of Master Tara Singh, but he did not make any move with regard to the demand for Punjabi Suba for about six months. Besides a few occasional conferences to keep the issue alive, a Panthic Convention was held at Patiala on 29 April 1965. However, the main resolution of this Convention was about the incidents of sacrilege committed by non-Sikh elements hostile to the idea of a Punjabi-speaking state. There was no indication of starting a struggle for Punjabi Suba.19 During these months the Punjabi Jathedār and the Urdu Prabhāt of Master Tara Singh did not criticize Sant Fateh Singh and, on behalf of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Master Tara Singh’s party) Giani Bhupinder Singh offered cooperation to Sant Fateh Singh who wrote to the government for talks. At this stage, Lal Bahadur Shastri was not keen to have any talks about Punjabi Suba.20 On 4 July 1965, a Conference was held at Ludhiana in commemoration of Hari Singh Nalwa, the legendary General of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, to remind all concerned that ‘the Sikh people were ‘makers of history’ and ‘conscious of their political destiny in a free India’. The purpose of this Conference was to remove frustration among the Sikhs by ‘a new ideology’. A resolution drafted by Sardar Kapur Singh (the well-known Sikh intellectual and ideologue who had been dismissed from the ICS and was now an MP of the Shiromani Akali Dal) was moved by Sardar Gurnam Singh (leader of Opposition in the Punjab Assembly at this time) and seconded by Giani Bhupinder Singh (President of Master Tara Singh’s Dal). This resolution refers to the explicit assurance given to the Sikhs that they would be accorded ‘the constitutional status of co-shares in the Indian sovereignty along with the majority community’. This understanding was totally repudiated by the present rulers of India. In fact, the Sikhs were systematically reduced to a ‘sub-political status in their homeland’ and to an insignificant position in India, their Motherland. The Sikhs were in a position to establish before an international tribunal that ‘the law, judicial process and executive action of the Union of India were heavily weighted against the Sikhs’. There was

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State no alternative left for the Sikhs but to frame their demand (p.603) for securing ‘a self-determined political status’ within the Union of India.21 Sarhadi says that this was a major event in the history of the Sikhs. It created a stir, and the Hindu press dubbed it as a demand for a sovereign Sikh state.22 In any case, the demand for a self-determined political status was far more radical than the demand for a Punjabi Suba, and it ‘stimulated the process of history’.23 Master Tara Singh returned from Salogra (the unnamed place) on 24 July 1965 and announced his re-entry into politics. He made a public statement in Chandigarh that he was over eighty years old, acutely aware that he was close to the end of his life. He had dedicated his life to the service of the Panth ever since he became a Singh. For forty years, he had received respect and honour from the Sikhs, which could not be repaid adequately in many lives. He had more demerits and shortcomings than what was pointed out by his well-wishers or detractors. But he had complete faith in the Panth to forgive him and he earnestly hoped that the Tenth Master would not take his merits or demerits into account and would give him a place at his feet.24 Master Tara Singh went on to say that after the gurdwara elections, he had left the field open to those who claimed to be keen to solve the problems of the Panth and regarded his presence as a hindrance. The Prime Minister of India referred them to the Chief Minister of the Punjab for talks about their demand for Punjabi Suba. The Chief Minister told them that their political demand was dead and buried. The Prime Minister was unwilling to give any time to them. They who claimed to be the captains of the boat of Sikh politics were now saying that they would not ask for any political power for the Sikhs, nor would they allow anyone else to demand and acquire such a power. This open insult to the Sikhs and dishonour for the Panth was intolerable. ‘What kind of a face would I show to the Tenth Master if I go on silently watching the naked dance of ignorant anti-Panthic forces?’ In response to his inner voice, said Master Tara Singh, he was re-entering the field. ‘May the Panth live long. May the standards of the august Panth keep flying forever.’25 On 2 August 1965, Master Tara Singh addressed a press conference in Delhi. He referred to the ill-treatment of the minorities in India: Muslims in Kashmir, Christians in Nagaland, and Sikhs in the Punjab. The Congress leadership refused to create the Punjabi Suba because the loyalty of the Sikhs to their country was suspected. The Sikhs were not prepared to live under this shadow of suspicion. Master Tara Singh demanded that they should be given the right to determine their political status in a state of their own creation. He read out a written statement, a thesis for the future guidance of the Sikhs. Sarhadi regarded this thesis as the ‘last testament’ of Master Tara Singh. His guidelines covered all aspects of the government of ‘the Sikh Homeland’.

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State Master Tara Singh says that he wanted to share with the Sikhs and the political workers of other communities, certain conclusions he had reached after ‘quiet contemplation’ at Salogra. Before the Partition of India in August 1947, the Sikhs, along with Hindus and Muslims, were recognized as ‘legitimate inheritors of the sovereignty of India’. They accepted solemn assurances of the Hindu leaders that they would be accorded ‘a free political status in a free India through a constitution accepted by the Sikhs’. But when power passed into the hands of the majority community, ‘these solemn promises were (p.604) forgotten and cynically repudiated’. Indeed, militant Hinduism took complete control of the new situation in free India. Aggressive attitude towards minority communities had become the order of the day. The threat posed had assumed the most alarming proportions in the case of the Sikhs due to their common cultural roots and social integration with the Hindus. Direct and indirect attempts had been made for eighteen years to suppress and absorb the Sikhs into ‘the inchoate mass of the Hindus’.26 However, the Sikh people were ‘makers of history’ and their identity could not be wiped out by the orders of political leaders or through the policies of the Congress ‘in the name of National unity’. What God had ordained and history had built could not be allowed to be destroyed by ‘the new rulers of India’. The tacit consensus of Sikh attitudes and opinions had been spontaneously echoed in the resolution adopted in the Sikh Conference at Ludhiana in which the political goal of the Sikhs was clearly laid down as self-determined political status within the Union of India. ‘I endorse this resolution in its entirety,’ said Master Tara Singh. He referred to the escalating friction between India and Pakistan. The Sikhs felt seriously concerned about this matter. Detrimental to overall interests of the subcontinent, this friction was especially harmful for the Sikh people who cherished open and easy access to the historic gurdwaras in Pakistan. Furthermore, in the Sikh tradition based on the teachings of the Gurus, there was no room for inter-communal strife or discrimination. The Sikh people also knew clearly that their traditions ‘militate against the concentration of wealth in individual hands and abuse of the means of production by private agencies’. They were passionately devoted to the preservation and protection of the autonomy of the individual. These ideals could be pursued only if the Sikhs acquired decision-making powers. Therefore, the Sikhs demanded ‘a space in the sun of free India’ in order to ‘breath the air of freedom’.27 For the first time after Independence, Master Tara Singh placed before the Sikhs the goal of a Sikh homeland within their motherland, giving a tangible shape to his belief that there was no incompatibility between Panthic autonomy and patriotism. He wanted the Sikhs to be ‘partners in freedom’. Khushwant Singh makes no reference to Master Tara Singh’s announcement on 2 August 1965. But, according to Sangat Singh, he had accompanied Master Tara Singh to the press conference as an ‘interpreter’. In the Sikh Review of Page 8 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State September 1965, Khushwant Singh supported the demand for ‘self-determined political status’ by pointing out its conformity with the Sikh litany ‘rāj karegā khālsā’ (Khalsa shall rule). He was convinced that ‘only in a state where the Sikhs can assure themselves of the continuance of their tradition, can they play their full role as citizens of India’. He went on to add that the resurgence of Hindu right-wingthreatened to engulf the minorities, and the administration was unwilling or unable to suppress it. In the given situation, the creation of an autonomous state ‘will strengthen India and not weaken it’. Every Sikh would have a chance to say proudly, ‘I am a Sikh. I am an Indian.’28 Master Tara Singh’s announcement of a more radical programme for the Sikhs as an alternative to Punjabi Suba goaded Sant Fateh Singh into action. In a speech at Muktsar on 3 August 1965, he charged the Central government of ‘communalism’ for it refused to accept a just, legitimate, and constitutional demand for the creation of a (p.605) Punjabi-speaking state. The Prime Minister was now inclined to meet Sant Fateh Singh. An account of their talks during 7–8 August was published in the Sikh Review of December 1965 as ‘Shastri–Fateh Singh Dialogue on Punjabi Suba’. Sant Fateh Singh said at the outset that the demand for a Punjabi Suba was constitutional as it was based purely on language. Its non-formation was discriminatory against the people of the Punjab when linguistic states had been created in the rest of India. Sant Fateh Singh claimed that the number of Sikhs arrested in the morchās of 1955 and 1960 was double the number of persons who courted arrest during ‘the entire course of freedom struggle in India’. Ironically, the country was free but the Sikhs did not have even a linguistic state. There was silence for about three minutes. Then Shastri referred to the talks between Sant Fateh Singh and Nehru and said that Punjabi was ‘the language of the whole of Punjab’, and efforts were being made for its development. Sant Fateh Singh said that it was progressing only towards its annihilation. Even the religion of the Sikhs was no longer safe. The government had done nothing about the incidents of sacrilege. He referred to several other ways in which the Sikhs were discriminated against, suppressed, or neglected. Shastri mentioned Nehru’s views, again, pointing out that it would be dangerous to create a Punjabi Suba with a Sikh majority. Gulzari Lal Nanda, the Home Minister, who was present during the talks, conceded once or twice that the demand was constitutionally justified but pleaded that its consideration should be postponed in view of the present situation. Finally, Shastri gave his reasons for keeping the Punjab united.29 He was unwilling to deviate from the policy pursued and propagated by Jawaharlal Nehru after Independence. The note prepared by the Prime Minister’s secretariat as the official version of the talks was placed before the Working Committee of the Sant Fateh Singh’s party on 14 August 1965. Expressing its disappointment and pain that the Government of India did not trust the Punjabis, especially the Sikhs, in spite of their patriotism and loyalty, the Working Committee reiterated the demand. On Page 9 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State 16 August 1965, Sant Fateh Singh addressed a General Conference of the Akali Dal at the Akal Takht. He reiterated the idea that the Sikhs were still facing discrimination, eighteen years after Independence and despite exemplary sacrifices in the struggle for freedom and their contribution to the economic, social, and political progress of the country. The principle of linguistic states, which had been applied in the whole country, was not being accepted in the Punjab simply because the Punjabi-speaking people included the Sikhs. Even to get the ban on the slogan for the Punjabi Suba lifted, 12,000 Sikhs had to go to jail. Out of the forty crores of Indians, twenty-three to twenty-four thousand went to jails to persuade the British rulers to leave the country, but 57,129 Sikhs in jails were not seen as enough to persuade the new rulers of India to form a linguistic state in the Punjab. Some people honestly suggested that the Akalis should place their case before the people. But it was impossible to awaken those who merely pretended to be asleep. There was no other option now than undertaking fast unto death. Therefore, Sant Fateh Singh declared that he would go on fast on 10 September 1965, and if Punjabi Suba was not conceded within fifteen days, he would burn himself alive on 25 September. He appealed to all the people to support this good, right, constitutional, and democratic cause which was in the interest of all the Punjabis. More (p.606) than 100 persons offered their names for sacrifice for the cause. On 23 August, Nanda stated in the Lok Sabha that the Government of India could not change their views which had been formulated and discussed in the past decade.30 Nehru’s views on Punjabi Suba had acquired political sanctity. In view of the worsening situation on the borders of India, fifteen MPs appealed to Sant Fateh Singh to suspend his fast until the crisis developing in Kashmir was resolved. The Akali Dal headed by Master Tara Singh announced its full support to Sant Fateh Singh’s programme to arouse the conscience of the rulers of India in favour of Punjabi Suba. Furthermore, it would be an important step towards the realization of ‘the final destiny of the Sikh people in free India’. On 21 August 1965, Sant Fateh Singh made it clear to the press that he could not accept the appeal made by the legislators or the Prime Minister. He reaffirmed his demand on 25 August. On 27 August, Gulzari Lal Nanda and the Prime Minister clarified that the Punjab could not be divided but all the genuine grievances of the Sikhs could be redressed, and the doors were open for further talks. The situation on the Kashmir frontier was deteriorating. On 31 August, fifteen Congress legislators of the Punjab gave their view to the press that the demand for Punjabi Suba should be accepted in principle now and implemented later. Giani Kartar Singh was among them. On the 1st of September 1965, Sardar Ujjal Singh took his oath as Governor of the Punjab. This was seen as an indication of change in the policy of the Government of India.31 The Indian army entered the Lahore sector from three sides on 6 September 1965 and Gulzari Lal Nanda announced in the Lok Sabha that the Government of India would hold further talks with Sant Fateh Singh to examine the Punjabi Page 10 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State Suba issue all afresh and with an open mind. On behalf of the Prime Minister, Nanda appealed to Sant Fateh Singh not to undertake the proposed fast. On 8 September, a deputation of five emissaries sent by Sant Fateh Singh met the Home Minister. On their report and on the advice of the Working Committee, Sant Fateh Singh decided on 9 September to postpone his fast in view of the Pakistan aggression on the Punjab border. Two days later, in a broadest about the armed conflict with Pakistan, President S. Radhakrishnan referred to Sant Fateh Singh’s decision to postpone his fast and said: ‘I dare say he will be satisfied with the eventual solution of this problem.’32 Radhakrishnan, ‘a nonparty man and a philosopher outside the bustle of politics, regarded his role as president to be one of both giving friendly advice to the Prime Minister in private and speaking out in public even if it implied criticism of the administration’.33 It may be added that Radhakrishnan was appreciative of Sikhism in his own way and he did not share Nehru’s view on the Punjab problem. A large number of Sikh soldiers were fighting all along India’s border with Pakistan. Almost all the senior Sikh commanders were in the Punjab sector: Lieutenant Generals Harbakhsh Singh and Joginder Singh Dhillon; Major Generals Joginder Singh, Narinder Singh, Mohinder Singh, Rajinder Singh ‘sparrow’, and Gurbakhsh Singh; and Brigadiers S.S. Kalha and Bant Singh. The Indian Air Force was under the command of Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh.34 Of all the states of the Indian Union, the contribution of the Punjab towards the defence was the highest. Of all the districts of India, the top contribution came from Ganganagar in Rajasthan, largely populated by Sikh farmers. This was also the district in which Sant Fateh Singh had (p.607) strong support. The author of Twenty-Two Fateful Days extolled the way in which civilians of the Punjab responded to the war. Both men and women exhibited rare qualities of resourcefulness, forbearance, and fortitude. The public services of all categories played their role magnificently.35 The Sikhs were conspicuous among the ‘people of Punjab’. All insinuations of Sikh disloyalty, which were assiduously spread by the anti-Sikh elements, appeared to be false.36 On the announcement of the ceasefire, and within a fortnight of the President’s broadcast, the Union Home Minister gave a statement that efforts would be made to find ‘a co-operative solution’ to the problem of Punjabi Suba. He announced the creation of a Cabinet Sub-Committee, consisting of Indira Gandhi, Y.B. Chavan, and Mahavir Tyagi, to advise from time to time a Parliamentary Committee to be set up with Sardar Hukam Singh, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, as President. The Parliamentary Consultative Committee (PCC) was constituted on 28 September. It consisted of twenty-one members, fourteen from the Lok Sabha nominated by the Speaker and seven from the Rajya Sabha nominated by its Chairman. Apart from the Akali and Congress Members of Parliament, the Communist, Socialist, and Swatantra legislators were

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State represented on the PCC. The time fixed for receiving memoranda from various parties and individuals was from 1 October to 5 November 1965.37 Opposition to Punjabi Suba began almost immediately after the constitution of the PCC. The Working Committee of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha in its meeting on 3 October 1965 warned all concerned that any change in the Regional Formula would be resisted. An Ekta Committee of Hindu organizations was constituted to take necessary steps to oppose the formation of Punjabi Suba.38 Chief Minister Ram Kishen expressed his opposition to bifurcation of the Punjab in a statement to the press, and the executive of the Punjab Legislative Party endorsed his view on 6 October 1965. Representatives of the dominant group in the Punjab Legislative Party met Kamraj on 8 October. He advised them to discuss the issue in the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee and present a memorandum to the PCC. The Congress Committee constituted a subcommittee, with Pandit Mohan Lal as its convener, to prepare a memorandum to be submitted to the PCC. A draft memorandum prepared by the sub-committee was discussed by the Executive Committee of the Punjab Congress Committee on 16 November 1965 and approved by a substantial majority. The memorandum submitted by the Punjab Congress Committee pleaded strongly that there should be no partition of the Punjab on linguistic or any other basis. To do so would be detrimental to the unity and security of the country and harmful to all sections of the people of the Punjab, including the Sikhs. The memorandum invoked the authority of the SRC and Jawaharlal Nehru. At the same time, it demanded the merger of Himachal Pradesh with the Punjab. Seven representatives of the Punjab Congress Committee appeared before the PCC in support of the memorandum. But the Punjab Congressmen were divided into several groups: (a) those who were opposed to partition of the Punjab, (b) those who supported the demand for Punjabi Suba, (c) those who were in favour of a separate state of Haryana, and (d) those who wanted all the hilly areas to be merged with Himachal Pradesh. Pandit Mohan Lal regrets that confusion continued to prevail amongst the Punjab Congressmen.39 The Working Committee of the Sant Fateh Singh’s party, in its meeting held on (p.608) 11 October 1965, had considered the statement of the Union Home Minister. The resolution passed by the Working Committee stated that the Government of India should have accepted the demand for the formation of Punjabi Suba to satisfy the brave Punjabis in general, and the Sikhs in particular, soon after the ceasefire instead of forming the two committees. ‘This should have been all the more necessary, when the Hindi and Punjabi regions are already in existence and there appears to be no difficulty in the formation of Punjabi Suba.’ In other words, it was not clear why the government had not accepted the Punjabi region as the Punjabi Suba. Nevertheless, in view of the assurances given by the President of India, the Working Committee demanded that a target date should now be fixed for the formation of Punjabi Suba without Page 12 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State any delay. For the present, Sant Fateh Singh would not fix any date for the implementation of his programme of fast and self-immolation.40 On 30 October 1965, Arjan Singh Budhiraja laid emphasis on the purely linguistic basis of the demand for the Punjabi-speaking state in ‘Facts about Punjabi Suba’ to represent the view of Sant Fateh Singh’s party. He argued that Punjabi was the mother tongue of the Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims of the Punjab, and despite the false returns in favour of Hindi in 1951 and 1961 it remained the language of the large majority of the Punjabi Region. It was, therefore, a democratic and a secular demand, and it was discriminatory not to concede it. There was no problem of reorganization because the Punjabi and the Hindi Regions had already been demarcated.41 On 2 November 1965, Master Tara Singh’s party welcomed the announcement of the Government of India and supported the demand for setting up a unilingual Punjab state, underscoring the fact that the government had demarcated the present Punjabi-speaking region and that should have formed ‘the basis of the reorganisation of the Punjab on linguistic basis’. It was pointed out that acceptance of the demand for Punjabi Suba should not be confused or equated with the demand for a Sikh homeland.42 The All-party Haryana Action Committee joined hands with Sant Fateh Singh’s party and demanded the division of the Punjab into two separate linguistic states. In Himachal Pradesh too, the All-party Samiti demanded the creation of a Hill State, covering Himachal Pradesh, Kangra, Kulu, Simla, Lahaul, and Spiti districts, and the adjoining hilly areas of the Punjab. These demands strengthened Sant Fateh Singh’s demand for Punjabi Suba.43 The original announcement about ‘a co-operative solution’ had been made on the assumption that the PCC would find a solution in consultation with the Cabinet Sub-Committee, carrying the further implication that its recommendations would be considered by the government. But the PCC insisted that a Parliamentary Committee, presided over by the Speaker, was expected to make its recommendations to the Parliament and not to the government.44 On 23 December 1965, Pandit Bhagwat Dayal Sharma and four other leaders made a strong representation to the Home Minister that the Speaker should be restrained from exceeding the limits of the original announcement. They alleged that he was trying to influence others in favour of Punjabi Suba. On 28 December, Pandit Bhagwat Dayal gave a press statement demanding dissolution of the PCC and formation of a purely government committee.45 (p.609) Pandit Mohan Lal and others had met Indira Gandhi for the first time on 8 October 1965, and she was quite frank and communicative. She expressed her unhappiness over Gulzari Lal Nanda’s mishandling of a sensitive issue, placing the government and the Congress Party in a very awkward situation. She Page 13 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State appeared to be sympathetic to the views presented by Pandit Mohan Lal and others. However, she indicated that the Cabinet Sub-Committee could play no important role. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi continued to hear ‘with due care and caution’ the views of the Punjab Congress leaders opposed to the creation of Punjabi Suba.46 She was committed to the legacy of Nehru on the issue of Punjabi Suba far more strongly than Lal Bahadur Shastri, lending support to the view that the Nehruvian line was back with a vengeance.47 Sant Fateh Singh told the pressmen on 8 February 1966 that the PCC had taken too much time and he could not wait any longer. If the report was not submitted at the beginning of the Budget Session he would fix the date for his selfimmolation. He demanded that the Punjabi Region should be so enlarged as to include the contiguous Punjabi-speaking tehsils, thanas, and districts to form a Punjabi Suba purely on linguistic basis.48 Indira Gandhi suggested to Sant Fateh Singh that a committee appointed by him may discuss the question of Punjabi Suba with the Cabinet Sub-Committee and assist in finding a solution. Sant Fateh Singh turned down the suggestion so that a settlement of the issue was not delayed by a prolonged process of negotiations.49 On 24 February 1966, the SGPC issued the ‘Punjabi Suba Demand’, a pamphlet prepared by a five-member committee ‘to clarify the correct position’ on the Punjabi Suba demand. It hammered the point that the demand enunciated by Sant Fateh Singh was within the framework of the accepted principles. ‘It seeks the formation of a State on the basis of its language without any condition or attempt at securing a numerical majority for any particular class or community.’ Citing the population figures of the Punjabi Region officially demarcated in 1956, the authors pointed out that ‘no single community would be in the absolute majority in Punjabi-speaking State and nationalism in the real sense would prevail in this state’.50 At a conference of Master Tara Singh’s Dal in Jalandhar on 26 February, it was declared by the President of the Dal that the establishment of Punjabi Suba could not be the final solution of the Sikh problem. A resolution passed on 27 February stated that all decision-making power at all levels of the state apparatus had been securely gathered in the hands of the Hindus, and these powers were used consistently to discriminate against the Sikhs to demoralize them with the ultimate objective of submerging them into the Hindu mass. Therefore, it was resolved that the Sikh people were entitled to demand a selfdetermined political status within the Indian Union freely to live and prosper. This was in conformation of an earlier resolution of the Akali Dal Working Committee. In another resolution, the Congress policy of discrimination against the Sikhs was condemned.51

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State The Punjab Ekta Samiti announced in a public meeting at Amritsar on 27 February 1966 that Swami Satya Nand Saraswati and Ram Gopal Shawlwala, President of the Samiti, would go on fast unto death in Delhi on 15 March and commit self-immolation if the Union Government failed to assure them that it would not go against Jawaharlal (p.610) Nehru’s assurances against further division of the Punjab. The Jan Sangh and Samiti leaders warned the government that Sant Fateh Singh and Master Tara Singh were endangering the solidarity of the country. It was declared at the meeting that thousands of people were prepared to make any sacrifice for resisting the formation of Punjabi Suba.52 On 28 February 1966, Sant Fateh Singh wrote to the Prime Minister that he would wait for the decision on the Punjabi Suba till the end of March and if no decision was taken, he would go on fast unto death to secure justice for the people of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, and the Punjab.53 In the Lok Sabha on 1 March 1966 in the course of her reply to the debate on the President’s Address, Indira Gandhi made a reference to the Punjabi Suba and an MP enquired whether the PCC would submit its report to the government. The Speaker, Sardar Hukam Singh, immediately intervened to say that the PCC would submit its report to the Parliament and not to the government. Some Members challenged the interpretation given by the Speaker. Pandit Mohan Lal ridiculed the response of the Home Minister and remarked that he was completely out-manoeuvred by Sardar Hukam Singh at every stage.54 In the Rajya Sabha on 2 March 1966, Indira Gandhi gave a kind of assurance to the opponents of the Punjabi Suba that the decision taken would give maximum satisfaction to the largest number of people and it would not create new problems or difficulties in the country.55 It is not clear how she could bring about such a decision. On 9 March 1966, the CWC met to consider the issue and passed a resolution recommending to the Union Government to constitute a state, with Punjabi as the state language, out of the existing state of the Punjab, and requesting the government to take necessary steps for this purpose. The majority of the members supported the resolution. Morarji Desai, Biju Patnaik, and Ram Subhag Singh denounced the demand as ‘communal’. Kamraj defended the resolution. ‘How can the Punjabis be denied’, he said, ‘the benefit of the very national principle which the people of other states were already enjoying, the right to have, live and work under their own linguistic state?’ Defence Minister Chavan supported Kamraj. He said: ‘A decision on the demand for a Punjabi State could not be delayed because of the geographical position of the Punjab.’ Indira Gandhi simply said that the CWC had passed a resolution and now ‘we have to implement it’.56

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State Pandit Mohan Lal, a staunch opponent of the Punjabi Suba, said that the majority view in the meeting of the CWC on 9 March was in favour of the partition of the Punjab and the formation of a Punjabi Suba on linguistic basis. The pleading of Sardar Swaran Singh for Punjabi Suba as a special invitee weakened the opposition of Sardar Darbara Singh and Ram Kishen. In fact, the latter lost the possibility of his remaining the Chief Minister for long and Sardar Darbara Singh lost the opportunity of replacing him. More important, however, was the implication of the resolution of the CWC for the report of the PCC submitted a week later, on 15 March. It lost ‘much of its value and utility’.57 According to Khushwant Singh, it was ‘a deliberate attempt’ to bypass the PCC and to undermine its importance.58 Finalized on 15 March 1966, the PCC report was presented to the Parliament on 18 March. It contained the recommendation that the Punjab region specified in the First Schedule of the Punjab Regional Committee’s Order, 1957 should (p.611) form a unilingual Punjab State, the hill areas of Punjab included in the Hindi Region of the Punjab which were contiguous to Himachal Pradesh and have linguistic and cultural affinity with that territory, should be merged with Himachal Pradesh. The remaining areas of the Hindi-speaking Region of the Punjab should be formed as a separate unit and called the Haryana Prant. Furthermore, a ‘committee of experts be set up immediately to suggest the necessary adjustments (in boundaries)’.59 Atal Bihari Vajpayee commented that the Parliamentary Committee had failed to find ‘a cooperative solution’. The Committee did not even try to explore the possibilities of such a solution and seemed eager instead to produce a report which suited ‘the predilections and prejudices of its own members’. The Committee appeared to be ‘loaded’. That was why the Jan Sangh, Hindu Sabha, Sanatan Dharma Pratinidhi Sabha, the Punjab Depressed Classes League, and the Punjab Ekta Samiti had declined to appear before the Committee. Language was not the only basis for the creation of other states in India. The Committee did not debate the detailed arguments advanced by the SRC against a Punjabispeaking state. Nor had the Committee given serious thought to ‘the implication it had for the country’s defence’. Vajpayee quoted Nehru to show that the demand for Punjabi Suba was ‘a communal demand’. He concluded his statement by stressing the need still of an effort to arrive at a ‘cooperative solution’ after ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the people in order to harmonize them.60 The degree of convergence in the views of Vajpayee and Nehru is remarkable. Yagya Dutt Sharma, General Secretary of the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh Jan Sangh, had gone on a fast unto death on 9 March 1966 to protest against the Page 16 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State proposed partition of the Punjab. Atal Bihari Vajpayee issued a press statement that both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister had given an assurance to preserve the unifying features and provide all safeguards to the minorities, and that demarcation would be done purely on linguistic basis. The demand of the Jan Sangh for a common Governor, a common High Court, and a common Power and Irrigation Board had been accepted by the Government of India.61 On 20 March 1966, a deputation of leaders of the Jan Sangh, Ekta Samiti, Arya Samaj, and the Congress, including Balramji Das Tandon, Verinder, Yash, and Baldev Prakash, met the Home Minister and other members of the Cabinet SubCommittee. After long discussion, the Law Minister made the statement that certain proposals made by representatives of the Punjab Ekta Samiti, the Jan Sang, and the Arya Samaj would be considered by the government and further discussions would take place in the future. The Home Minister appealed to the deputationists to persuade Yagya Dutt Sharma to give up his fast.62 He ended his fast on 23 March. On 31 March 1966, the Home Minister announced in the Parliament that the Government of India had accepted in principle the reorganization of the Punjab on linguistic basis, and a Boundary Commission would be appointed to demarcate the Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking areas for the formation of two states: Punjab and Haryana.63

Creation of a ‘Crippled’ State Seventeen Congress legislators from Haryana demanded that reorganization should be based entirely on the census figures of 1961. On 10 April, twenty-five leaders of Haryana demanded that Chandigarh and Kalka sub-tehsil should be included in Haryana. Sant (p.612) Fateh Singh sent a telegram to the Prime Minister on 13 April, demanding that the basis of reorganization should be census figures of the pre-Partition reports, and not the census figures of 1961, which were known to be bogus. In his later letters to the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Defence Minister, and the President of the Indian National Congress, Sant Fateh Singh said that the CWC deserved congratulations for its just and fair decision on the Punjabi Suba issue but if the Boundary Commission was directed to use the census of 1961 for reorganization, it would be ‘very bad indeed’. Other Sikh organizations also warned the government against the census of 1961 as the basis for reorganization.64 The implication of the acceptance of the census figures of 1961 was further shrinkage of the Punjab Region (see Map 25.1).

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State In the last week of April 1966, the Home Minister announced the appointment of a Commission, with Justice J.C. Shah, a Judge of the Supreme Court, as Chairman, and S.K. Dutta and N.M. Phillip as members. The Commission was required to make its recommendation to the Government of India by 31 May 1966. For the terms of reference, it was stated that the Commission shall examine the existing boundary of the Hindi and the Punjabi Regions of the present state and recommend adjustments, if any, to secure the linguistic homogeneity of the states of Punjab and Haryana. The Commission shall also indicate the boundaries of the hill areas of the present state of Punjab which are contiguous to Himachal Pradesh, and have linguistic and cultural affinity with that

Map 25.1 The Punjab in 1966 Source: A.S. Narang, ‘Movement for the Punjabi Speaking State’, in Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal), ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000, reprint), p. 264.

territory. The Commission shall apply the linguistic principle with due regard to the census of 1961 and other relevant considerations. The Commission may also take into account such other factors as administrative convenience and facility of communications, and will ordinarily ensure that the adjustments they may recommend do not involve the breaking of existing Tehsils.65 The two most important criteria thus were the census of 1961 and the tehsil as the unit for consideration. Both these criteria had the same implication, and the result was not very difficult to anticipate, particularly for the government. Master Tara Singh’s Dal protested against the decision of the government in favour of the census figures of 1961 as the basis for the demarcation of boundaries of the Punjabi Suba. Master Tara Singh declared boycott of the proceedings of the Commission. The Working Committee of Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal adopted a resolution stating that the decision was not acceptable, but Page 18 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State decided to put its case before the Commission in view of the reference to ‘consideration of other factors’. The Ministers of the Punjabi Region decided to present the claim of the Punjab before the Commission. A sub-committee of seventeen members appointed by the Punjab Pradesh Congress strongly opposed the decision. Its resolution of 4 May stated that ‘the 1961 census was based on communal consideration, and even Nehru had declared it as incorrect and bogus’. When the Commission invited representations from individuals and organization, Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal claimed the entire district of Ambala, all the tehsils of Karnal district except Panipat, and also the tehsils of Sirsa and sub-tehsils of Fatehabad and Guhla in Hissar district, in addition to the Punjabi Region. Evidently, Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal was not trying to form a Sikh majority state. But the Hindu members of the Cabinet from the Punjabi Region were not prepared to sign a similar claim drafted by the Ministers (p.613) (p.614) of the Punjabi region, ‘presumably on the inspiration of the Central leadership’.66 On 12 May 1966, in his first public speech after 277 days, Sant Fateh Singh congratulated ‘the Punjabi people and specially the brave Sikhs’ for their ‘grand victory’. He was personally grateful to President Radhakrishanan, Vinoba Bhave, Jai Prakash Narayan, Pandit Sunder Lal, K.G. Jodh, C. Rajagopalachari, K. Karanjia, and the Nawab of Melerkotla; he was thankful to the Communist parties, Praja Socialist Party, Swatantra Party, Republican Party, the PCC and the CWC, the Congress President K. Kamraj, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan. Respectfully, he acknowledged the sacrifices made by thousands of men and women in the cause of Punjabi Suba. He assured the people of the lower strata of the society, the non-Jatt Sikhs, and the Punjabi industrialists of fair treatment in the new Punjab that was being created. These were the sections who felt afraid, or were made to feel afraid, of the Punjabi Suba. Sant Fateh Singh laid stress on Hindu–Sikh unity and appealed to politicians not to start controversies in the name of religion or language for ‘their own personal and selfish ends’. Punjabi was no threat to Hindi, the ‘National Language’, which would take the place of English. Language and religion should not be confused. Sikhism was not opposed to other religions. Sant Fateh Singh, like Gandhiji, believed that politics divorced from religion meant ‘imperfection’. ‘Some of us’, he said, were apprehending foul play in the demarcation of boundaries but there was nothing to worry: ‘We are wide awake to check any clever move against our interest.’67 Sant Fateh Singh was blissfully unaware of the implications of the terms of reference given to the Boundary Commission. On 30 May 1966, on the eve of his travels abroad, Sant Fateh Singh spoke like ‘a victorious General’. A party had been organized in his honour at the Imperial Hotel by the Mayor of Delhi, and a number of eminent leaders of the Congress were also present. Sant Fateh Singh expressed his delight over the work assigned to the Boundary Commission and thanked the Prime Minister and other Central leaders. Overtly criticizing Master Tara Singh, he said that Master Tara Page 19 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State Singh had failed to get even a Punjabi Suba, how would he establish ‘Sikh Raj’? Perhaps deliberately, Sant Fateh Singh used to equate ‘Sikh Homeland’ with ‘Sikh Raj’. During his stay abroad, the Indian ambassadors everywhere tried to make him feel comfortable, happy, and important.68 Dhanna Singh Gulshan attributed all this to a deliberate and clever move of the government, especially Gulzari Lal Nanda, to keep Sant Fateh Singh away from the Indian scene. The Boundary Commission presented its report to the Government of India on 31 May 1966. It confirmed the fears entertained by some Akali leaders. It recommended that the Punjabi Region should constitute the new Punjab state, but with the following exceptions: (a) the Development Blocks of Gagret, Amb, and Una (excluding five villages) of Hoshiarpur district, (b) Dalhousie, Balun, and Bakloh in tehsil Pathankot of Gurdaspur district, and (c) the entire Kharar tehsil of Ambala district. The report also recommended that the districts of Simla, Kangra, Kulu, and Lahaul and Spiti should be merged with Himachal Pradesh, along with the areas mentioned in (a) above and Nalagarh tehsil of Ambala district. It recommended further that the remaining areas of the existing Punjab state should constitute the Haryana state along with the areas mentioned in (c) above, which included Chandigarh, the capital (p.615) of the Punjab. There was a wave of resentment among the people of the Punjab state, resulting in protests and representations. The Government of India included Kharar tehsil in the Punjab state but declared Chandigarh to be a Union Territory.69 In a formal meeting on 8 June 1966, the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, said that the government had accepted the report, and the only major difference which related to Chandigarh was resolved by making it a Union Territory. On the whole, it offered a workable solution. A common capital was in consonance with so many common links between the Punjab and Haryana and it would assist in the development of cooperative relations, particularly in the initial phase. The Congress Parliamentary Party decided that the report should be accepted in toto. It was contended that if it was not accepted in toto, it was likely to reopen other questions. Within a fortnight, Ram Kishen’s Ministry resigned to pave the way for Governor’s rule. Dharam Vira was sworn in on 27 June and Ujjal Singh was appointed to officiate as the Governor of Madras.70 It is not clear why the Governor was changed. Dhanna Singh Gulshan says that Sardar Ujjal Singh himself had suggested that Governor’s rule might be better for the state in view of the deterioration of law and order in the Punjab due to internal tensions in the Ministry. His suggestion was accepted and through an ordinance Dharam Vira was appointed as the Governor.71 But this does not explain why the Governor was changed. In an interview with the press on 27 July 1966, Sant Fateh Singh stated that he was satisfied with the formation of Punjabi Suba but not with its shape. Chandigarh was not included in the Punjab and some other Punjabi-speaking areas were also excluded from it. ‘The proposed Punjabi Suba will become Page 20 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State crippled without these areas.’ He would try to get these areas included in the Punjab, he said. The party of Sant Fateh Singh appointed a nine-men committee with Sant Channan Singh as President, with Sardar Gurnam Singh, Lachhman Singh Gill, Harcharan Singh Hudiara, Parkash Singh Badal, and Gurcharan Singh Taura among its members, to hold talks with the leaders of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. At the same time Sant Fateh Singh said, ‘I am definitely opposed to Master Tara Singh’s demand for independent Sikh state or for selfdetermined political status of the Sikhs. Our demand has been Punjabi Suba as part of India. Bharat is my country and each particle of this land is sacred to me.’72 The Punjab Reorganisation Bill was presented by the Home Minister to the Parliament in the first week of September 1966. The three Akali legislators presented thirty-two amendments with regard to the proposed common links between Haryana and the Punjab and the Punjabi-speaking areas excluded from the Punjabi Suba. Only one of the amendments proposed was accepted, to make Anandpur Sahib a sub-tehsil instead of Nangal. Chandigarh was kept under Central administration. The Punjab was required to pay 1 crore of rupees as the annual rent, and Haryana to pay 75 lacs. On the whole, the Bill was patently unjust to the Punjab. The three Akali Members of Parliament (Sardar Kapur Singh, Buta Singh, and Dhanna Singh Gulshan) rejected the Bill and walked out.73 Master Tara Singh made a statement that the formation of Punjabi Suba had been declared in a situation of war with Pakistan and the government’s attitude went on changing after the war. Consequently, the position of the Sikhs was made worse than before. They were asking for a Punjabi Suba on the basis of language for improving their position (p.616) but the manner in which the Punjabi Suba was formed had made the Sikhs weaker than before. The legs and arms of the Suba were cut off due to mistrust of the Sikhs. It was put in chains. ‘I feel today that the possibility of war is not yet over and this is what has happened. When the possibility of war is clearly gone, I do not know how the present rulers would treat us.’74 Master Tara Singh was inclined to think that the decision to create Punjabi Suba was due to the exigencies of a particular situation and not due to any change in the outlook of the Congress or the Congress Government. Indira Gandhi refers to ‘a tricky problem’ she had inherited from her predecessor, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Since Independence, the Sikh community had been pressing for a linguistic partition of the bilingual Punjab state and the creation of a state in which they would have predominance. ‘My father’ had been strongly opposed to the idea. However, Shastri made a ‘startling reversal’ of this policy and appointed Sardar Hukam Singh, the Speaker of the Lower House, as Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee ‘although he was very biased in favour of Punjabi Suba’. She was ‘very worried’, and so was Chavan as a Page 21 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State member of the Cabinet Sub-Committee. When she heard that ‘Sardar Hukam Singh was going to give a report in favour of Punjabi Suba’, she thought that ‘he should be stopped’. She tried several times to talk to Shastri about it, but he never discussed the matter and once he simply said that ‘he was fully in touch with the situation and we needn’t bother’. Chavan said to Indira Gandhi that if Shastri was not bothered, ‘why should we bother?’ But she went around ‘seeing everybody’. She believed that ‘if there is strong public pressure anything will work’. But once the PCC had submitted its report, it would be very difficult to change it.75 ‘Sant Fateh Singh—the politico-religious leader of the Akali Dal, the party of militant Sikh nationalism—served notice of his intention to fast to death unless Punjabi Suba was conceded.’ The Congress found itself in a dilemma: ‘To concede the Akali demand would mean abandoning a position to which it was firmly committed and letting down its Hindu supporters in the proposed Punjabi Suba; not to do so would precipitate a Sikh agitation which would certainly turn violent.’ In this predicament, Indira Gandhi reached the conclusion that ‘only a linguistic reorganization could solve the Punjab problem’. She made a personal appeal to Sant Fateh Singh and he agreed to postpone his fast for a month. ‘And then, on 9 March, the Congress Working Committee passed a unanimous resolution in favour of the creation of Punjabi Suba’. This, according to her, was an ‘unpopular decision’. But it was necessary for minimizing the damage done by Shastri. According to Khushwant Singh, Indira Gandhi in her dealings with the Punjab and the Sikhs, ‘practised a kind of duplicity more becoming of a small-time politician than a far-sighted statesman’.76 Sardar Hukam Singh wrote in retrospect that, in accordance with the promises made during the war of September 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri appointed a Parliamentary Committee with Hukam Singh as its Chairman. Shastri was dead against the demand for Punjabi Suba, like Nehru. ‘The intention of Government then was to use me against my community, secure an adverse report, and then reject the demand.’ When the report of the PCC was nearly ready, Indira Gandhi went to Chavan and said that she had heard that Sardar Hukam Singh was going to give a report in favour of Punjabi (p.617) Suba, and he should be stopped. Shastri called the Home Minister, Gulzari Lal Nanda, to his residence and conveyed to him their concern about the report. Every effort was made by Indira Gandhi, Shastri, and Nanda ‘to stop me from making my report’. When nothing succeeded the Congress forestalled the PCC Report by agreeing to recognize the Punjab by a vague resolution on 9 March 1966, that is, about a week before the Report was submitted. ‘It was a deliberate attempt to by-pass this Committee and undermine its importance.’ The subsequent reference to the Shah Commission was ‘loaded heavily against Punjab’. Sardar Hukam Singh went on to remark that if Punjabi Suba had been demarcated simply on linguistic basis and not on

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State the false returns of 1961, ‘there would not have been any extremist movement’.77 Indira Gandhi says that the ‘Hindu minority’ in the proposed Punjabi Suba felt let down. There was rioting, instigated by the Jan Sangh. Three Congressmen were burnt alive in Panipat. Violence was suppressed. She felt gratified that her ‘bold decision on the Punjab paid off’. The Sikhs were ‘delighted with the unexpected concession of their demand’ and the Hindi-speaking population of the Punjab was ‘satisfied with the creation of a new State of Haryana’. The dispute over the capital city of Chandigarh was ‘side-stepped’ by a quick decision to make the city a Union Territory. Indira Gandhi claimed credit for solving the ‘tricky’ Punjab problem. Indira Gandhi, eventually, set aside all the important considerations which had weighed with Jawaharlal Nehru. One of these was that a border state should not be small. But the Punjab state created in 1966 was much smaller than the East Punjab, smaller even than the Punjabi-speaking region of the Punjab formed in 1956. Another consideration was opposition of the Punjabi Hindus to the formation of Punjabi Suba. But the Hindus of Punjabi Region, who were opposed to the demand, remained unhappy over its creation. All their wishes and aspirations were set aside and their political position was made much weaker. Perhaps the most important consideration with Jawaharlal Nehru was what he called the communal character of the demand for the Punjabi Suba with a Sikh majority. Ironically, however, the terms of reference given to the Shah Commission enabled it to create a state with more than 50 per cent Sikhs in its population. The decision taken by Indira Gandhi created a state in which the percentage of Sikhs was far larger than they had expected. Indira Gandhi took credit for solving the Punjab problem but her solution became a link in the chain of events which led to the militant movement for Khalistan. The problems created by her decision are yet to be solved.

In Retrospect The SGPC elections of January 1965 went clearly in favour of Sant Fateh Singh. Master Tara Singh retired from politics to leave the field open for Sant Fateh Singh. Prime Minister Shastri was not inclined to meet Sant Fateh Singh for talks. At a conference held at Ludhiana in July, a resolution was passed in favour of ‘a self-determined political status’ for the Sikhs within the Indian Union by the supporters and well-wishers of Master Tara Singh. He returned to politics and endorsed the resolution for self-determined status. He put forth his own conception of ‘a Sikh Homeland’ as his political objective. He saw no incompatibility between Panthic autonomy and Indian nationalism. He wanted the Sikhs to be partners in freedom. Prime Minister Shastri discussed the demand with Sant Fateh Singh in August (p.618) 1965. Whereas Sant Fateh Singh underscored that the creation of a Page 23 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State unilingual Punjab state would be constitutional and just, Shastri reiterated the old familiar arguments against the idea. He was not willing to deviate from the policy of Nehru. Sant Fateh Singh addressed a conference at the Akal Takht to declare that in view of the persistent policy of discrimination against the Sikhs by the government he would go on fast on 10 September and if Punjabi Suba was not conceded within fifteen days, he would burn himself alive on 25 September. The Home Minister, Gulzari Lal Nanda, stated in the Lok Sabha that the Government of India would not change the view formulated in the past decade. Evidently, Nehru’s policy with regard to the Punjabi Suba had acquired a kind of political sanctity. Sant Fateh Singh reaffirmed his demand on 25 August. The appointment of Sardar Ujjal Singh as Governor of the Punjab on the 1st of September was seen as a sign of change in the outlook of the Government of India. On 9 September, Sant Fateh Singh decided to postpone his fast. S. Radhakrishnan said in his broadcast to the nation that Sant Fateh Singh would be satisfied with the eventual solution of the problem. The new factor in the situation was India’s war with Pakistan. The Sikhs supported the war so enthusiastically that all insinuation of disloyalty to the country proved to be false. Before the end of September, Nanda announced the creation of a Cabinet Sub-Committee to advise a Parliamentary Consultative Committee to be set up, with the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as its President, to find ‘a co-operative solution’. The party of Master Tara Singh welcomed the announcement of the Government of India and supported the demand for setting up a unilingual Punjab state on the basis of the Punjabi Region. But this demand for Punjabi Suba was not to be confused with the demand for ‘a Sikh Homeland’. Sant Fateh demanded that the Punjabi Region should be enlarged to include the contiguous Punjabi-speaking areas. The PCC finalized its report on 15 March and it was presented to the Parliament on 18 March. The Government of India accepted the reorganization of the Punjab on linguistic basis in principle, but set aside the recommendation in its implementation. As the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi felt committed to the legacy of her father on the issue of the Punjabi Suba. Efforts were made to ensure that the PCC submitted its recommendations to the Government and not to the Parliament. But the Speaker, Sardar Hukam Singh, pointed out the glaring infringement of the Constitution by any such action. When Indira Gandhi felt sure that the PCC would make recommendations in favour of the creation of the unilingual Punjab state, she decided to bypass the PCC. On 9 March 1966, the CWC passed a resolution in favour of constituting a state with Punjabi as the state language, and requested the Government of India to take necessary steps in this connection.

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State A Boundary Commission was constituted to demarcate the Punjab-speaking and Hindi-speaking areas. It was directed to use the census of 1961 for reorganization and to ensure that the recommendations did not break the existing tehsils. As a result, the favourite projects of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Bhakra Dam and Chandigarh, fell outside the boundaries of the Punjab recommended by the Commission, like many other Punjabi-speaking areas. Subsequently, the Union Territory of Chandigarh was created to serve as the common capital of the Punjab and Haryana, like many other common links between the two states. The water resources of the erstwhile Punjab were to be controlled by (p.619) the Government of India. The constitutional status of the new Punjab was inferior to that of the other linguistic states. Ironically, Indira Gandhi created a unilingual Punjab state with a Sikh majority, which Nehru had opposed and Master Tara Singh had espoused. Her decision was not acceptable even to the Akali supporters of Sant Fateh Singh. Criticism began soon after the Punjab state was inaugurated on 1 November 1966. Discrimination against the Punjab became a major issue of Sikh politics. Notes:

(1.) Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence (The New Cambridge History of India, vol. IV, part 1) (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1990, second edition), p. 38. (2.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, fifth impression), pp. 217–21. (3.) Sant Fateh Singh, Channaṇ Baṇ (Buddha Jauhr Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bhagga Singh, 1966), preliminary pages. (4.) Sant Fateh Singh, Piār Sunehṛā (Buddha Jauhr Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh, 1965), preliminary pages. (5.) Sant Fateh Singh, Mitthiān Ramzān (Amritsar: Sant Channan Singh), pp. 5– 45. (6.) Sant Fateh Singh, Aṇkhī Valvale (Buddha Jauhr Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh), preliminary pages. (7.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive (Buddha Jauhr Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh, 1966), pp. 1–8, 35–54. (8.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 57–77. (9.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 80–9. (10.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 128–39.

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State (11.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 171–205. (12.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 206–11. (13.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 225–39. (14.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 145–69. (15.) Sant Fateh Singh, Charbī de Deive, pp. 106–27. (16.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence, p. 327. (17.) Chandra, M. Mukherjee, and A. Mukherjee, India after Independence, pp. 327–8. (18.) Satwinder Singh Dhillon, SGPC Elections and the Sikh Politics (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2009), pp. 98–105. (19.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 400–1. (20.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 351–2. (21.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 401–2. (22.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 402. (23.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), p. 336. (24.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 352–3. (25.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 353–4. (26.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 403–4. (27.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 404–6. (28.) Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History (New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996, second edition), p. 330. (29.) Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, pp. 331–2. (30.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 407–8. (31.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 409–10. (32.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 413–14. Page 26 of 28

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State (33.) Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), vol. III, p. 267. (34.) Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, p. 338. (35.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 414–16. (36.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991, paperback), 2 vols, vol. II, p. 303. (37.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 292–4. Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, pp. 339–40. Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 417–18. (38.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 296. (39.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 296–302. (40.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 417–18. (41.) Arjan Singh Budhiraja, Facts About Punjabi Suba (Amritsar, 1965). (42.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 418. (43.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 305–6. (44.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 420–1. (45.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 309–10. (46.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 302. (47.) Sangat Singh, The Sikhs in History, p. 335. (48.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 295. (49.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 421–2. (50.) Punjabi Suba Demand (Amritsar: SGPC, 24 February 1966). (51.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 422–4. (52.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 295. (53.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 295. (54.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 311. (55.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 424. (56.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, pp. 305–6.

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At Last a Unilingual Punjab State (57.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, vol. II, pp. 313, 318–19. (58.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, p. 304 n. 27. (59.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 313. (60.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 314–16. (61.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 320. (62.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 433–4. (63.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 320. (64.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 434–5. (65.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 436–7. (66.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 437–9. (67.) Sant Fateh Singh, Next Step (First Public Speech after the achievement of Punjabi Suba) (Amritsar: SGPC, 12 May 1966). (68.) Dhanna Singh Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī (1947–1977) (Rampura Phul: Gurcharan Singh Dhaliwal, 1978), pp. 166–7. (69.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, p. 321. (70.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 447–8. (71.) Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab, p. 157. (72.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 448–9. (73.) Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab, pp. 167–8. (74.) Gulshan, Aj Dā Punjab, p. 174. (75.) For Indira Gandhi’s statements on the issues, see My Truth (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1980), pp. 115–19. (76.) Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, p. 304 n. 28. (77.) Quoted, Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II, pp. 303–4 n. 27.

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The Last Year

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

The Last Year J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0027

Abstract and Keywords The unpopularity of Master Tara Singh’s idea of a Sikh homeland was reflected in the elections of 1967 when his candidates won only two seats. Master Tara Singh denounced the United Front ministry of the Akalis for shielding Sant Fateh Singh who was keen on preserving the firepit (havan kund) as a symbol of his willingness to sacrifice his life for the Sikh Panth. By contrast, Master Tara Singh praised the deliberate self-immolation of Bhai Nand Singh as genuine martyrdom. It seems that Master Tara Singh’s own decision to break his fast unto death due to weakness or a mistaken view of his situation remained a heavy burden on his mind. He died on 22 November 1967 with the hope that the lapses of his life would be condoned by his death in firm faith. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Sikh homeland, United Front ministry, Sant Fateh Singh, Sikh Panth, Bhai Nand Singh

Sant Fateh Singh went on fast over the issue that injustice had been done to the Punjab by the way in which it was created. Master Tara Singh supported the demands made by Sant Fateh Singh. However, all the Sant got was arbitration over Chandigarh by Indira Gandhi. Master Tara Singh was willing to work out a compromise with Sant Fateh Singh about the general elections but Sant Fateh Singh was not very keen. Master Tara Singh expressed great appreciation for the martyrdom of Bhai Nand Singh to uphold the honour of the Sikh tradition. He was inactive only in the last few months of his life due to illness, before he died on 22 November 1967.

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The Last Year Political Developments The fourth general elections of February 1967 had a radical impact on Indian politics. A number of opposition parties coming together formed anti-Congress fronts in some states. The Congress suffered a serious setback, winning only 284 out of 520 seats for the Lok Sabha, and losing its majority in eight state Assemblies. Indira Gandhi’s position in the Congress was strengthened because the Syndicate received a major blow.1 The Punjab Pradesh Congress faced the elections in ‘a rather disorganized manner’. There was no planned strategy. When the results were announced the Congress found for the first time after Independence that it had lost its absolute majority. It had contested 103 out of 104 seats and won 48. Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal won twenty-four seats and the Master Tara Singh’s Dal only two. The Jan Sangh and the Independents got nine seats each, the CPI won five, the CPI (M) and the Republicans three each, and the SSP only one seat. There was a possibility of the Congress forming a government but no leader of the Congress Legislative Party was elected until 7 March 1967, when the choice fell upon Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala. But it (p.622) was too late for him to form a government. On 7 March, fifty-three of the elected members formed the ‘United Peoples Party’ and met the Governor at 12:30 p.m. The leader of the Party, Sardar Gurnam Singh, was invited by the Governor to form the government. The new Ministry was sworn in on 8 March 1967. For the first time after Partition the Congress was out of power.2 The new Ministry of the United People’s Party evolved a ten-point programme to give a degree of cohesion to the working of the United Front of the United People’s Party with members from several parties and independents. The first and the foremost objective of the Front was amity between various communities. The second was to provide clean and efficient administration. The third objective of the Front was to get Chandigarh, Bhakra and other projects, and the Punjabispeaking areas left out of the unilingual state included in the Punjab. Hindi was to be recognized as the link language with the Centre, eventually to replace English. Both agriculture and industry were to be developed as the base of the state economy, ensuring maximum production of electricity for both. The tax structure was to be re-examined to eliminate inequitable burden. Special steps were to be taken for improving the lot of the Scheduled Castes. Finally, the welfare of ex-servicemen was to be kept in view. This programme could reconcile some differences but it could not strike deep roots for the Front.3 The United Front Ministry was defeated on the first trial of strength in the Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) on 5 April 1967. Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala’s proposed amendment to the motion of thanks to the Governor was carried by fifty-three votes to forty-nine. The opposition benches demanded the Chief Minister’s resignation but Sardar Gurnam Singh refused to yield. No business could be conducted on two consecutive days and the Speaker Page 2 of 19

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The Last Year adjourned the House sine die. Already a few members of the Congress Party had defected to the United Front. More defections were encouraged by offering ministerial berths on 4 May 1967, a day before the Budget Session was to start. The Congress members were agitated over the threats held out to the Deputy Speaker, Sardar Baldev Singh, who had voted against the government. The trouble persisted and the Speaker adjourned the House on 8 May 1967.4 A no-confidence motion was brought against the United Front Ministry on 26 May 1967 as a result of the political intrigues of the Congress Party in the Punjab Legislature. Sardar Harcharan Singh Hudiara, Sardar Hazara Singh Gill, and Yadvindra Singh cast their votes against Sardar Gurnam Singh. The Ministry was saved by a margin of seven votes. Sant Fateh Singh as President of the Akali Dal expelled Hudiara and Gill from the Dal. At the same time, he expelled Sardar Arjan Singh Budhiraja and Sardar Shiv Singh Jhawan from the Working Committee of the Akali Dal. These members formed a party of their own, with Hudiara as its President. Thus, there were three Akali Dals now in the Punjab.5 In due course, internal difference within the United Front came to the surface, as on the use of Hindi as the medium of school education, the common links with Haryana, and the status of Chandigarh. In the rift between the Chief Minister and the Education Minister, Sardar Lachhman Singh Gill, the latter was supported by Sant Fateh Singh. Some Congress leaders were also encouraging Gill to think of Chief Ministership. In the negotiations between Gill and the Congress (p.623) leaders (Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala, Giani Zail Singh, Sardar Harcharan Singh Brar, and Sardar Dilbagh Singh) on the night of 21 November 1967, a bargain was struck. Pandit Mohan Lal and Sardar Darbara Singh joined the talks at this stage. Pandit Mohan Lal says that after the settlement of the deal, they met together and decided that Lachhman Singh Gill should give a statement prepared by them. On 22 November 1967, Gill announced in the assembly that he had parted company with the United Front and formed a new party his own with sixteen other members. Sardar Gurnam Singh was asked to resign.6 Pandit Mohan Lal felt gratified over the end of the ‘unprincipled alliance’ called the United Front Ministry, justifying to himself the sordid role played in this intrigue by nearly all the top leaders of the Congress.

Master Tara Singh Supports Sant Fateh Singh’s Fast There was a general feeling among the Sikhs that injustice had been done to them by the kind of Punjab state created by Indira Gandhi. The Sikh press took a serious view of the deprivation of territory, water, power, and status. On 5 November 1966, Sant Fateh Singh declared that he would take steps to undo the injustice done to the Punjab, and that he would announce his programme on 12 November for the abolition of common links between the two states, restoration of control over power and water sources, and inclusion of Chandigarh and other Punjabi-speaking areas in the Punjab state.7

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The Last Year Among the leaders of several parties, Sant Fateh Singh invited Giani Bhupinder Singh, President of Master Tara Singh’s Dal, telegraphically to a conference to be held on 10 November 1966. In reply, Giani Bhupinder Singh published a pamphlet for wide circulation. He was in favour of unity, which, he said, was the panacea for all Panthic ills. But was not disunity in the Panth due to the fact that Sant Fateh Singh had captured the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) with the support of Jawaharlal Nehru and Partap Singh Kairon? Some of Sant Fateh Singh’s supporters were always keen, he added, to hobnob with the government for personal gains. He went on to say that Sant Fateh Singh went to thank the Prime Minister and the Home Minister when the arms and legs of the Punjab were being cut off. Then he went abroad, and went on saying that all problems would be solved through negotiations. Giani Bhupinder Singh asserted that Sant Fateh Singh was playing in the hands of the government and perpetuating disunity. While three Akali members of the Lok Sabha (Sardar Kapur Singh, Sardar Buta Singh, and Sardar Dhanna Singh Gulshan) walked out over the Reorganisation Bill, Sant Fateh Singh celebrated his success. He reminded Sant Fateh Singh of the resolutions of the Working Committee of the Akali Dal passed on 20 July and 15 August 1966. Going against those resolutions, Sant Fateh Singh watched the Punjab being truncated and went on singing praises of the government.8 Sant Fateh Singh announced on 10 November 1966 that he would send jathās to Chandigarh to press his demands. Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, Chief Minister of the new Punjab, declared on 14 November that the government would deal firmly with the agitation. On 30 November 1966, three jathās started from the Akal Takht after an ardās, consisting of seventy-six volunteers led by Jathedar Mohan Singh Tur, Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara, and Jathedar Jagdev Singh Talwandi. (p.624) Sant Fateh Singh stated on this occasion that he had to revive the agitation because of discrimination against the Punjab. The jathās were arrested on the way and sent to jail. Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir said that this was done by local authorities, and Giani Zail Singh, President of Punjab Pradesh Congress, said that the people at large had taken no notice of the arrests and that the movement was a stunt.9 The Punjab Cabinet decided to bifurcate the Electricity Board and to disrupt all common links under their jurisdiction. The Government of India also announced that it had an open mind on the future of Chandigarh. Indira Gandhi wrote a letter to Sant Fateh Singh on these lines. The Working Committee of the Sant’s Dal met on 5 December and announced its decision to observe 12 December as the ‘protest day’. Sant Fateh Singh announced his decision to go on fast on 17 December and, if his demands were not conceded, to immolate himself on 27 December. He outlined the developments of 1966 and regretted that his efforts to get justice through negotiations had failed. Therefore, he had no other option Page 4 of 19

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The Last Year but to fast unto death. It may be added that 17 December was the day of Guru Tegh Bahadur’s martyrdom and 27 December, the day of martyrdom of the younger Sahibzadas.10 Master Tara Singh declared that he was ‘in agreement with the Sant’s demand for abolition of common links and the inclusion of Punjabi-speaking areas in Punjab besides Chandigarh and the Dam projects’. However, Master Tara Singh went a step further: he demanded ‘an autonomous status for Punjab in order to provide a real Homeland for the Sikhs’.11 On 8 December 1966, the Home Minister Y.B. Chavan appealed to Sant Fateh Singh to reconsider his demand. The government was ready, he said, to concede a separate Governor and a separate High Court, but not any reorganization of territories. The Chief Minister of Haryana stated in the Vidhan Sabha on 9 December that he was determined not to allow the areas given to Haryana by the Shah Commission to go out of Haryana. On 16 December, Sardar Swaran Singh, Union Defence Minister, and Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir issued a joint statement at Chandigarh that the government was not prepared to accept Sant Fateh Singh’s ‘unreasonable’ demands.12 Sant Fateh Singh went on fast on the morning of 17 December. He declared that his programme of self-immolation would be halted only if the government agreed to abolish the common links, to return Chandigarh and the dam projects to the Punjab, and to add the Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the unilingual state to the new Punjab. He asserted that he was a patriot and a true custodian of his country of which every particle was dear to him. At the same time, the Punjabi Suba was dearer to him than his life. As a follower of Guru Gobind Singh, he could not accept injustice; his sacrifice, he believed, would bring success to ‘our cause’. He was asking for the Punjab nothing more than what was given to the other states in the country.13 Sant Fateh Singh received a letter from the Prime Minister on 23 December and he replied on the same day that his fast was not meant to be a threat. No other course was left open to him. Therefore, he could change his decision only if his demands were met. On the President’s appeal to give up his fast, he expressed his gratitude for his sentiments but he could not abandon his demands, which were based on ‘truth and justice’. Efforts (p.625) were being made in Delhi to save Sant Fateh Singh’s life. In Amritsar, a forty-eight-hour curfew was imposed in the walled area of the city in view of the intended self-immolation on 27 December. An official spokesman of the government in Delhi said on 27 December that the proposal for arbitration by the Prime Minister on the claims of the two new states arose out of the approach made to the Prime Minister by both the Chief Ministers.14

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The Last Year Sardar Hukam Singh came to Amritsar in a special plane on 27 December at 3:00 p.m., an hour before the scheduled time for self-immolation. There was a huge gathering in the precincts of the Darbar Sahib. Sardar Hukam Singh remained closeted with Sant Fateh Singh for about two hours and then addressed the sangat gathered there, giving them the assurance that there was no reason why Chandigarh should not come to the Punjab through Indira Gandhi’s arbitration. He also announced that the government would appoint a committee to recommend the future of the Punjabi-speaking areas left out of the unilingual state. The dissenting voice in the audience was silenced, and a general acclamation of the assurance coming through Sardar Hukam Singh was orchestrated. Sant Fateh Singh broke his fast with a glass of fruit juice from the hands of Sardar Hukam Singh. In the evening, Sant Fateh Singh said that Sardar Hukam Singh ‘had given almost a solemn assurance from the Akal Takht that Chandigarh would go to Punjab’. However, Indira Gandhi denied on 8 January 1967 that she had given any such assurance; she had agreed only to take up arbitration. Sarhadi refers to this development as a ‘sad and sordid’ chapter in the history of the Akali struggle for Punjabi Suba. Indira Gandhi had really given no solemn assurance about Chandigarh.15 Jathedar Darshan Singh Pheruman wrote an open letter to Sant Fateh Singh in July 1969 that he had accepted the Prime Minister’s arbitration on 27 December 1966, after accepting the mediation of Sardar Hukam Singh. She was a party to the earlier decision about Chandigarh: ‘Who accepts the defending party in any case, as an arbitrator?’ Pheruman asked further: ‘If Shrimati Indira, on the precedent of the Shah Commission, gives a decision in favour of Haryana, what do you propose to do?’ Pheruman pointed out that Sant Fateh Singh resorted to the lie that the Prime Minister had sent him a letter giving assurance about Chandigarh. Indeed this had been contradicted by the Prime Minister, Sardar Hukam Singh, and the Home Minister, Y.B. Chavan, in the Lok Sabha on 14 June 1967. Talking to the press, Sant Fateh Singh again lied that the letter he received had been lost.16 Like thousands of other people, Dhanna Singh Gulshan had come to Amritsar on 25 December 1966 to witness what would happen on the 27th. He found jeeps, tanks, armoured cars, guns and machine guns, and horsemen and foot soldiers on the roads of the city. There was no way of reaching the Darbar Sahib. He went to the house of Master Tara Singh and met his son, Sardar Jaswant Singh. There he talked on the phone to Giani Ajmer Singh, Secretary of the Akali Dal, and he was told that there was serious risk involved in trying to reach the Darbar Sahib. Dhanna Singh went back to his town, Rampura Phul. The workers of Master Tara Singh’s Dal were being arrested all over the Punjab.17 On 27 December, Dhanna Singh heard on the radio that Sardar Hukam Singh had persuaded Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast. He reached Amritsar again and went to the office (p.626) of the Akali Dal. He found Giani Bhupinder Page 6 of 19

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The Last Year Singh, Jathedar Darshan Singh Pheruman, Sardar Basant Singh of Patiala, and many other leaders and workers discussing the act of breaking the fast by Sant Fateh Singh and the ways of cementing Panthic unity. There were two views: one dwelling on the failure of Sant Fateh Singh and the other, on the fact that his life was saved. Returning to his home town from Amritsar, Dhanna Singh observed a general sense of despair among the people. However, Sant Fateh Singh told the press: ‘We have won total victory. I have the written assurance of the government in my possession.’ But the ‘written assurance’ was merely a note by Sardar Uttam Singh Duggal on the basis of his telephonic talk with Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir. Sant Fateh Singh’s claim was contradicted by Bhagwat Dayal Sharma, Chief Minister of Haryana, and Home Minister Chavan. Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, who met the Prime Minister on the evening of 31 December, told the press that no written or oral assurance had been given to Sant Fateh Singh. The only offer given was arbitration.18

Master Tara Singh and the General Elections Sant Fateh Singh was unhappy over the attitude of the government and appealed to the Panth for unity. Giani Bhupinder Singh now met Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara, Secretary of the Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal, and after much discussion they reached an agreement for unity. They met Sant Fateh Singh together, and the way for unity was paved. Giani Harcharan Singh Hudiara declared at the Manji Sahib in the evening that unity had been forged. This was confirmed by Giani Bhupinder Singh. The people present were jubilant. However, the government in Delhi did not like it. Sardar Hukam Singh was sent to Amritsar but he failed to persuade Sant Fateh Singh to change his mind.19 Giani Ajmer Singh, a former Secretary of Shiromani Akali Dal, gave an exaggerated report to Master Tara Singh about the keenness of Sant Fateh Singh for unity. Master Tara Singh agreed to have talks in the interest of the Panth. Giani Ajmer Singh had persuaded the supporters of Master Tara Singh to justify in public the decision of Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast on the assurance that Chandigarh would go to the Punjab. Bhai Narain Singh Kang came to Master Tara Singh’s residence on 16 January 1967 with the proposal that a committee (called the Unity Board by Master Tara Singh) of five members might be constituted to nominate suitable candidates from both sides for contesting the forthcoming elections. Of the five members of the committee, two were to be nominated by Master Tara Singh and two by Sant Fateh Singh, and the fifth member was to be an unaligned person. This committee was also to constitute the Akali Legislative Party after the elections.20 On his way to Delhi on 17 January 1967, Master Tara Singh stopped at Ludhiana and told the press reporters that Hargurnad Singh and Giani Ajmer Singh would represent Master Tara Singh’s Dal on the Unity Board and two representatives of Sant Fateh Singh would join the Board, and then the four members would Page 7 of 19

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The Last Year nominate the fifth member. The elections were to be fought under one banner and on one symbol. It was necessary from the point of view of Master Tara Singh that Sant Fateh Singh should sign this agreement because he had been opposing Master Tara Singh’s demand for a Sikh homeland. Sant Fateh Singh was reluctant to sign the (p.627) document and, on his behalf, it was signed by Jathedar Mohan Singh Tur on 21 January. Giani Ajmer Singh did not reveal this to Master Tara Singh. Giani Ajmer Singh and Sardar Ravel Singh, as the nominees of Master Tara Singh, met Sant Channan Singh and Sardar Gurnam Singh, as the nominees of Sant Fateh Singh, at Ludhiana on 22 January. Lachhman Singh Gill arrived there and insisted that no agreement could be worked out without him. Ravel Singh apprised Master Tara Singh of what had happened, and Giani Ajmer Singh now admitted that Sant Fateh Singh had not signed the agreement. Furthermore, he insisted that his driver, Kikkar Singh, would be a candidate for the Bathinda Parliamentary seat instead of Dhanna Singh Gulshan, who had earlier been elected to the Lok Sabha. Giani Ajmer Singh and Ravel Singh went again to Sant Fateh Singh, along with Kirpal Singh Chaksherewala, but Sant Fateh Singh insisted on having Kikkar Singh.21 Dhanna Singh Gulshan came to know that Kikkar Singh was to contest from Bathinda in his place. He rang up Master Tara Singh to know if he should withdraw his candidature. Master Tara Singh said that he should see him personally. Dhanna Singh reached the Akali Dal office on 23 January. Bhai Narain Singh Kang came with over a score of Akali workers and told Dhanna Singh that agreement had broken down. He suggested that Dhanna Singh should see Master Tara Singh to reconsider his decision.22 At his residence, Master Tara Singh advised Dhanna Singh to contest the election from Bathinda, telling him that Kikkar Singh did not deserve to be nominated. His only qualification was that he was Sant Fateh Singh’s driver and this was no qualification in the eyes of Master Tara Singh. Dhanna Singh Gulshan’s services to the Panth and his sacrifices were known to all. Therefore, there was no question of a compromise. The proposed agreement between the two leaders finally broke down. Sant Fateh Singh came to an understanding with the Communists.23 In the elections of 1967, Master Tara Singh’s followers demanded a special status for the new Punjab, like Jammu and Kashmir. This idea of a Sikh homeland did not go well with the mass of the Sikhs, and Master Tara Singh’s Dal got only about 4.5 per cent of the votes. The Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal, however, got about 20.5 per cent of the votes. But a sizeable section of the Sikh peasantry still supported the Congress which got over 37.5 per cent of the votes.24 On 25 March 1967, the SGPC under the Presidentship of Sant Channan Singh passed a resolution to welcome the political change coming through the elections of 1967, and to express its happiness over the formation of a new Page 8 of 19

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The Last Year government led by Sant Fateh Singh’s Akali Dal. It was hoped that the longcherished desires of the people of the Punjab would be fulfilled through the Ministry of the People’s Front, with ‘secular’ intentions and emphasis on Hindu– Sikh unity. It was also hoped that all Punjabis would give their support to the United Front Ministry.25

Master Tara Singh’s Appreciation for the Martyrdom of Bhai Nand Singh On 13 April 1967, the day of Baisakhi, a granthī of the village Bahadurpur in Amritsar district, Bhai Nand Singh, burnt himself alive. Before this deliberate act he had written a few letters, including one to Sant Fateh Singh. ‘For a long time now’, he wrote in one of his letters, ‘the Sikh leaders have rescinded solemn vows of self-immolation on one pretext or the other. I cannot bear this insult to the Panth.’ Born (p.628) and brought up as a Telugu-speaking person, Bhai Nand Singh mentions in his letter that he had heard of the great glory of the Khalsa and come to the north to be initiated as a Singh. He became acutely aware of the tradition that a Sikh should die in a righteous cause and become a martyr. He decided, therefore, to court martyrdom to keep the tradition alive and to bring sense to the Sikh leadership. Sant Fateh Singh’s newspaper Kaumī Dard referred to his martyrdom as ‘an incidental death’. Master Tara Singh extolled his sacrifice in the Jathedār of 25 April. Bhai Nand Singh, he said, had followed the example of the great Sikh martyrs to remove the accusation of cowardice brought against the Sikhs. ‘He expected no good word no praise or honour and for the sake of his faith proceeded to bring glory to Sikhism.’26 In the Jathedār of 1 May 1967, Master Tara Singh praised Bhai Nand Singh, again, for presenting a contrast to the ‘imposters’ who were ‘inventing perverted untruths’ to protect a false reputation. The unique martyrdom of Bhai Nand Singh exposed those who used the good name and glory of the Panth ‘as a cover for their own faked glory’. The reference clearly is to Sant Fateh Singh and his supporters. They were criticizing Master Tara Singh for supporting Sardar Gurnam Singh earlier and calling him a traitor now. ‘That is right,’ wrote Master Tara Singh. ‘If someone stands by me on shared respect for certain principles, I do trust him. But when he abandons those principles for selfish reasons, he becomes a traitor.’ An opponent by definition could never be a traitor. The real issue, he said, was being confused. The genuine martyrdom of Bhai Nand Singh deserved all praise from the Khalsa Panth. It had no connection with either any weakness of Master Tara Singh or the vow of Sant Fateh Singh.27 Master Tara Singh reinforced the point in the Jathedar of 2 May 1967. He believed that in a critical time in Sikh affairs a selfless follower of Guru Gobind Singh appeared to restore the optimistic spirit of the Sikhs. ‘Today Bhai Nand Singh, the martyr, has become the light house of the panth’s ascendant spirit.’ Sant Fateh Singh and his party were denigrating his martyrdom but they themselves were not capable of making such sacrifice. To misrepresent the fact of a Sikh’s martyrdom was downright degradation. ‘To slander a martyr was to Page 9 of 19

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The Last Year spit at the moon; the spittle would fall back on the face of the slanderer.’ Master Tara Singh was all praise for Bhai Nand Singh who maintained the glory of the Khalsa of Guru Gobind Singh.28 On 27 August 1967, Master Tara Singh’s Dal held a Sikh Conference at Amritsar. A resolution was passed to the effect that Sant Fateh Singh had failed to get Chandigarh and Bhakra for the Punjab and, thus, his vow had not been fulfilled. Therefore, the sacrificial trough (havan kund) prepared for his self-immolation at the Akal Takht should be demolished. A committee of twenty-one members was constituted to ensure that this resolution was implemented. It gave fifteen days to the Shiromani Prabandhak Committee to demolish the trough.29 The newspapers were harping on Sant Fateh Singh’s silence after having spoilt the Punjabi Suba, suggesting his secret understanding with the government. Sant Fateh Singh asserted that Master Tara Singh’s papers were bent on ‘publishing falsehoods’. On 27 October 1967, he published a statement in the Kaumī Dard that he would take no more trips to Delhi. He warned the government that the movement would take a dangerous turn. He blamed the government for taking advantage of his absence (p.629) from India. Addressing the Akali workers at Amritsar he declared that the common links were not acceptable.30

Master Tara Singh’s Illness and Death In July 1967, Master Tara Singh went to see Niranjan Singh in Delhi and talked about a plan that he wanted to discuss with Sardar Swaran Singh and, through him, to place it before the government. He was thinking of a state with full internal autonomy within the Indian Union, with only defence, foreign affairs, and communications under the jurisdiction of the Centre, with the right to secede from India. Master Tara Singh was not talking of a Sikh homeland this time. He was thinking of Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and the Punjab as the constituents of this state. This was a way of retaining Kashmir in India to the satisfaction of all the three communities concerned: Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh. Niranjan Singh kept quiet because he thought that the proposition was an idle thought. He was left wondering (presumably) whether Master Tara Singh was really serious.31 In the mid-summer of 1967, Master Tara Singh was eighty-two years old. Frequent travel and indifference to food in old age aggravated the problems of health. He got up one night and went to the bathroom where he fell down and could not get up. He was lifted by his son Jaswant Singh and other members of the family and brought back to his bed. He went to sleep again and began to snore. In the morning he got up as if nothing had happened and sat down near the ber tree where he used to read and write, receive visitors, and eat. He would go inside the house only to sleep. On the second night he went to address a conference at Kot Baba Deep Singh and came home late. After sunrise in the Page 10 of 19

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The Last Year morning he went for a bath and fell down while changing his kachhera (short breeches which a member of the Khalsa order was expected to wear all the time). Jaswant Singh and Bhai Harnam Singh helped him to sit on a chair and changed his kachhera. On the next day, Master Tara Singh started for Chandigarh and Delhi against the advice of Dr Wirsa Singh. Even the bruise that he had received on falling the day before was allowed by him to be dressed on the way, at Ludhiana, and that too on the insistence of his followers.32 Master Tara Singh reached Delhi late in the night, with high fever. Jathedar Santokh Singh called Dr Randhir Singh who asked Dr Udham Singh also to come. On their advice, Master Tara Singh was admitted to the Ram Tirath Hospital. There, Dr Udham Singh operated upon him to insert a tube for urine to flow out. Master Tara Singh’s younger son, Mohan Singh, was with him already and now Jaswant Singh and his mother also reached there. The daily expenditure in the hospital was Rs 500. Jaswant Singh says that they had spent Rs 15,000 before Jathedar Santokh and Akali workers brought him to Gurdwara Rakabganj on 3 September 1967.33 On the fourth day, Master Tara Singh was taken to Amritsar. He was feeling much better. However, it was necessary now to reduce his prostate gland by surgical operation. He was hospitalized in the Post-Graduate Institute of Medical Research at Chandigarh. He had great trust in Dr Santokh Singh, who was, however, reluctant to take the risk of an operation. But Master Tara Singh was becoming increasingly impatient of his inactivity and persuaded Dr Santokh Singh to proceed with the operation even if there was only a 10 per cent chance of success. The operation (p.630) appeared to be very successful. But Master Tara Singh remained in a state of delirium, trying to get out of the bed, and saying, ‘I have never bowed to anyone, who are you to compel me?’ On 21 November, after 10:00 p.m. the doctor on duty asked Master Tara Singh how he was and he answered he was well. He was visibly happy. Three hours later, at half past one at night, he breathed his last.34 The Punjab Government declared that schools, colleges, and government offices would remain closed for a day. The Government of Pakistan observed national mourning for two days. The Government of India did not announce any official mourning.35 On the morning of the 22nd, Master Tara Singh’s body was placed in a funeral van and taken to Amritsar. On the way, thousands of people lined up to have his last darshan. All the shops in Ludhiana were closed and people in tens of thousands took out a mourning procession. Similarly, at Phagwara there was a huge mourning procession. The funeral procession passed through Jalandhar, Kapurthala, and other places to reach Amritsar at night. At Master Tara Singh’s house thousands of people kept on coming throughout the night, and kīrtan was performed all the time. On 23 November at 10 in the morning, Master Tara Page 11 of 19

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The Last Year Singh’s body was placed in a trolley. People in hundreds of thousands followed the procession passing through the city bazaar. It reached the cremation ground of martyrs (shahīdānwālī shamshān) in the evening at about 5 p.m. There it was cremated in the presence of his devoted followers from all parts of India. Some followers had come from abroad.36 Rajagopalachari, an opponent turned friend, said that the story of Master Tara Singh’s life had not ended; it was to continue after his death. ‘I implore the leaders of the Sikhs, the nation, and the whole of Bharat to search for the goal of Masterji’s life and to discover his ideals.’ He went on to add that the glow of Master Tara Singh’s love for the Panth and the Nation remained steadfast till his last breath. The editor of the Pratap, Verinder, who had criticized Master Tara Singh in his life perhaps more than anyone else, said that for half a century no Sikh leader had done so much for the Panth as Master Tara Singh. He was a real servant (dās) of the Panth. He lived for the Panth and died for the Panth. His service to the Panth was absolutely selfless. Yash, editor of the Milāp, said that Master Tara Singh always did exactly what he said. The light of success did not dazzle his eyes and the darkness of failure did not dim his mind. His qualities sprang from selflessness.37 Ranbir of the Milāp (Delhi) said that his heart wept on hearing the news of the death of the grand old man of the Punjab. His life’s achievements fell short of his aspirations. He was not merely a person but an institution: he groomed many leaders, writers, literary figures, and national workers. All the Sikh leaders were his creation. In a history of the past sixty years, his name would come first in the boldest letters. He never thought of himself; he always thought of others.38 Master Tara Singh’s last public interview was with D.P. Kumar of the The Statesman. The self-assurance of Master Tara Singh in the darkest days of his political life was amazing, wrote Kumar. His steadfastness even in illness was equally wonderful. He did not know how to lose courage. In his talk with Kumar, occasionally he struck his fist on his palm, with the spirit of a young man despite his ill health and old age. Master Tara Singh had a profound faith in the bright future of India and the Sikh Panth. However, he was not happy with the Constitution and the government in contemporary India. He was (p.631) so disillusioned with the kind of democracy established in the country that he thought of dictatorship as the solution of all its political and economic problems.39 Master Tara Singh talked of his three prophecies which had turned out to be correct: war with China and Pakistan, Partap Singh Kairon’s humiliation and his ignominious death, and the decline of the Congress due to corruption. Referring to the Partition of the country he said that Sardar Patel knew that Pakistan’s boundary would have been the River Sutlej if Master Tara Singh had not brandished his sword at Lahore (in March 1947). Master Tara Singh was sorely Page 12 of 19

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The Last Year disappointed with the kind of Punjabi Suba that had been created. It should have been larger and genuinely ‘a homeland’ for the Sikhs, with internal autonomy. ‘We do not wish to separate from India,’ he said. His concept of Sikh homeland was like Shaikh Abdullah’s concept of Kashmir or the Pakhtunistan of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Among the Indian leaders, Master Tara Singh had the greatest respect for Rajagopalachari. Jai Prakash Narayan too commanded his respect. Master Tara Singh believed Gandhiji to be a great leader who always remained faithful to his words.40 We can see that Master Tara Singh’s last public interview was important in several ways. However, far more important was ‘the last note’ he wrote on the eve of his operation on 19 November 1967.

The Last Testament Master Tara Singh’s ‘last notebook’ starts with the statement that once again he wished to express himself freely. He says, Today I feel the need for an absolutely clear statement. I regard dharam as my first and foremost concern. I have never become a politician, nor have I ever wished to be a politician. Undoubtedly, for the protection and honour of dharam, I feel obliged sometimes to take part in politics because, just as the soul and the body cannot be separated so politics and dharam cannot be completely isolated from each other.41 As written in Sri Guru Granth Sahib, says Master Tara Singh, ‘no worship can be performed in hunger’. Bhagtī was the supreme purpose of human life. But hunger had to be appeased for pursuing bhagtī. Similarly, bhagtī could not be pursued in subordination to others. ‘My politics do not go beyond this concern.’ Master Tara Singh had never become, or wished to become, a member of any municipal committee, district board, or legislative body. Apart from Panthic organizations, like the Singh Sabha, the Khalsa Young Men’s Association, and the Akali jathās, he had become a member only of the Congress when it started helping the Akalis during the Gurdwara Reform Movement. He was born in a home where the Guru Granth Sahib was always kept in view. He had inherited profound faith in the Gurus from his parents. However, his parents belonged to the category of Sikhs who did not favour the idea of becoming keshdhārī. They thought that this was against their family tradition. ‘Against their wishes and in revolt against them I took amrit of the double-edged sword. They were angry but because of their basic beliefs they did not snap their ties with me. This was my first act of rebellion in which I rose against my parents.’42 In my very young days I used to listen to the kathā of the Panth Prakāsh and feel inspired to propagate the Sikh faith. In those days the best means of parchār in favour of religion were educational institutions, and I wanted to become a school teacher for propagating the Sikh faith. When I passed the matriculation examination my family wanted me to join Medical College (at Lahore). (p.632) But I wanted to become a teacher. I evaded Page 13 of 19

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The Last Year joining Medical College somehow and, instead, got admitted to F.A. in Khalsa College, Amritsar. I used to play hockey very well. Therefore, the English Principal of the College told me to get commission in the army. But I declined to do so because I wanted to become a teacher.43 It did not behove him, says Master Tara Singh, to talk about himself and his aspirations. It was enough to say that he was so keen to serve in Sikh schools that he became Headmaster of Khalsa High School at Lyallpur at Rs 15 a month. He felt ashamed to say this himself but he felt obliged ‘to make it absolutely clear’ that the goal of his life had been to work for dharam. I might have made many mistakes in achieving this goal and I might have stumbled on the path but I have never closed my eyes to this ideal. Even if I could not move towards my goal, I never set it aside completely. I wish to die for the goal for which I lived: ‘I have cherished death at the door of God’.44 Here Master Tara Singh addresses the Tenth Master (Guru Gobind Singh): ‘The pledge I took at the time of my initiation, I have not been able to fulfil in my life. I have come to your door by accepting death as penance to fulfil my pledge. Forgive my trespasses and my weaknesses, and accept the offer of my life and extricate the Panth from its state of ill-faith (kudharam)’.45 Many friends and well-wishers of Master Tara Singh had told him that he was deceived by clever and crafty men, for which he suffered and put others also in difficulties. It is true that I have been deceived many a time and exploited by crafty men disguised as well-wishers. But I have been the deceived one and not the deceiver. By being deceived one suffers the consequences in this life but by deceiving others one suffers in the life hereafter. Even so, it is my duty to warn others against those who have deceived me. If I meet a snake on my way, it is my duty to inform others of the danger. Even Rama, Jesus Christ, and Guru Gobind Singh had been deceived. Only GuruKartar (God) makes no mistake. ‘The mistakes made by great men of the world show that one should not panic after making a mistake’ (but face the consequences).46 I repeat that if I have made mistakes and shown weakness in fulfilling the pledge I had taken at the time of initiation, you are my forgiver for these lapses. I have no excuse to offer. One is capable of making mistakes every moment and cannot come out well if all these are taken into account. For the mistakes I have made in my life I wish to do penance at the time of my death.47

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The Last Year Addressing Guru Gobind Singh, Master Tara Singh says: Today I have come to your door to get my sins washed off. If any kind of selfishness still lingers in my mind, it behoves you to wash it off. If I wish to sacrifice my life for a selfish purpose, remove it from my mind; if I am doing it out of hankar, roll me in the dust like a straw; if I am doing it for seeking praise, let me be cursed from all sides; but if I am doing it for the sake of the protection of the Panth in accordance with my pledge, enable me to fulfil my pledge. I do not know what else to say. Master Tara Singh quotes from Guru Granth Sahib: I have cherished death at the door of God, For He might ask who is lying at our door.

‘I have heard from the learned in Gurbāṇī that the lapses of life are condoned by death in faith.’48 Here Master Tara Singh turns to the contemporary situation in which Sant Fateh Singh insisted on keeping intact the havan (p.633) kund for self-immolation, supported by the government led by Sardar Gurnam Singh. The government did not take any action against those who held out the threat that ‘they would not allow anyone who came to demolish the trough to return alive’. Whether it was the government which was directly or indirectly responsible for this devilish idea or it originated in the mind of the false Sant (asant) who passed it on to the government. Whether or not deliberately to suppress the Sikh spirit, it was becoming increasingly clear that both of them regarded this issue as a question of life-and-death. The boat of sins sinks when it is full. The false mahant who is bent upon retaining a false memorial of his fake pledge to immolate himself, thinks of himself as the equal of Sri Darbar Sahib and the Akal Takht, and he is challenging the Panth which had destroyed the mighty Mughal government root and branch for desecrating the Darbar Sahib.49 We get the impression that Master Tara Singh’s fast unto death remained a heavy burden on his mind. Was it his weakness to have agreed to break it to save his life? The focal point of his life was the vow he had taken at the time of initiation of the double-edged sword to sacrifice everything for his faith. His politics sprang from this conviction of total dedication to the Panth. The contrast with Sant Fateh Singh comes out clearly in his attitude of admiration for the martyrdom of Bhai Nand Singh. At the same time, Master Tara Singh was utterly disillusioned with the Akali leaders for their unprincipled pursuit of power. They supported Sant Fateh Singh and, in turn, were supported by him. The insistence of the Sant and the Akali Ministers to preserve the symbols of his intention to make the supreme sacrifice of his life exasperated Master Tara Singh. It Page 15 of 19

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The Last Year appeared to be a fraud played on the Sikhs who held the ideal of martyrdom in great veneration. As a penance, Master Tara Singh offered his life to the Guru, a belated sacrifice. Master Tara Singh had a firm belief that the lapses of a life lived in faith were forgiven by death accepted in faith.

In Retrospect On 5 November 1966, Sant Fateh Singh declared that he would take steps to get the injustice done to the Punjab undone. He invited leaders of several Parties to a conference and it was decided to send jathās to Chandigarh. The Punjab Cabinet and Indira Gandhi were inclined to make some concessions. However, Sant Fateh Singh declared that he would go on fast on 17 December and immolate himself on 27 December if his demands were not conceded. Master Tara Singh supported Sant Fateh Singh’s demands for abolition of the common links, and inclusion of Punjab-speaking areas in the Punjab, ‘besides Chandigarh and the Dam projects’. He demanded at the same time ‘an autonomous status for Punjab in order to provide a real Homeland for the Sikhs’. Sant Fateh Singh went on fast on 17 December. On the 27th, he broke his fast, stating that Sardar Hukam Singh had given almost a solemn assurance that Chandigarh would go to Punjab. However, Indira Gandhi denied on 8 January 1967 that she had given any such assurance. All that she had agreed to do was to take up arbitration. The followers of Master Tara Singh fought the general elections of 1967 on the demand for a special status for the Punjab, like Jammu and Kashmir, but won only two seats. Sant Fateh Singh’s Dal won twenty-four. The Congress lost its majority in the reorganized Punjab. The non-Congress United Front (p.634) Ministry was formed on 8 March 1967, with Sardar Gurnam Singh as the Chief Minister. It proved too unstable due to internal differences within the United Front on the issues like the use of Hindi as the medium of school education, the common links with Haryana, and the status of Chandigarh. In the rift between the Chief Minister and the Education Minister, Sardar Lachhman Singh Gill, the Congress legislators egged on the latter to become the Chief Minister with their support. On 22 November, the day of Master Tara Singh’s death, Gill announced his defection from the United Front with sixteen other members to form a new Party. Sardar Gurnam Singh was asked to resign to make room for Gill. Master Tara Singh was much moved by the self-immolation of a little known granthī, Bhai Nand Singh, who tried in his own way to redeem the honour of the Sikh Panth by offering his life on the Baisakhi of 1967 as a proxy martyrdom for the leaders who had rescinded their solemn vows. The newspaper of Sant Fateh Singh presented it as death by accident but Master Tara Singh extolled it as a brave act to remove the accusation of cowardice against the Sikhs by his selfless death for the sake of his faith. He presented a contrast to the ‘imposters’ who were inventing ‘untruths’ to cover up their ‘faked glory’. This referred clearly to Sant Fateh Singh and his supporters. But Master Tara Singh was also bracketed

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The Last Year with Sant Fateh Singh as a leader who had rescinded his vow. Bhai Nand Singh’s martyrdom touched him personally. More than four months after this incident Master Tara Singh’s Dal passed a resolution that the havan kund, projected as the symbols of Sant Fateh Singh’s determination to sacrifice his life for the Panth, should be demolished because his vow had not been fulfilled. Bhakra and Chandigarh were still outside the Punjab. A committee of twenty-one members was formed to implement this resolution but the United Front Government shielded Sant Fateh Singh. Master Tara Singh was bitter against both Sant Fateh Singh and Sardar Gurnam Singh for what he regarded as their unprincipled pursuit of glory and power. It seems that Master Tara Singh’s own decision to break his fast unto death remained a heavy burden on his mind. Was it his mistake or weakness? As a belated sacrifice, he offered his life as a penance to the Tenth Master. He died, as he had lived, in faith with the conviction that the lapses of life lived in faith were forgiven by death accepted in faith. His vow to live and die for the Panth was thus fulfilled. Notes:

(1.) Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, India after Independence 1947–2000 (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Ltd, 2003, reprint), pp. 225–7. (2.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab (Chandigarh: Sameer Prakashan, 1984), pp. 335–40. (3.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapur and Sons, 1970), pp. 463–4. (4.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 341–4. (5.) Dhanna Singh Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab Te Sikh Rājnītī (1947–1977) (Rampura Phul: Dhaliwal Printing Press, 1978), p. 191. See also Divinder Singh, Akali Politics in Punjab (1964–1985) (New Delhi: National Book Organization, 1993), p. 75. (6.) Pandit Mohan Lal, Disintegration of Punjab, pp. 349–50. See also Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 192–3. Ironically, the legislators passed a resolution expressing their homage to Master Tara Singh. (7.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 452. (8.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 176–7. (9.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, p. 178.

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The Last Year (10.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 452–5. (11.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 455. (12.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 455–7. (13.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 457–8. (14.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 458–9. (15.) Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, pp. 459–61. (16.) Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism (Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2000), pp. 95–7. (17.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 181–2. (18.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 183, 184 and n. 185. (19.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 179–81. (20.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 186–7. (21.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 187–8. (22.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, p. 188. (23.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 188–9. (24.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, p. 189; Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, p. 462. (25.) Shamsher Singh Ashok, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kameti dā Punjāh Sālā Itihās (From 1926 to 1976) (Reprint, Amritsar: SGPC, 2003), p. 367. (26.) Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh, pp. 80–1, 84, 89. (27.) Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh, pp. 81–2. (28.) Gurtej Singh, Chakravyuh, p. 83. (29.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 190–1. (30.) Gulshan, Aj dā Punjab, pp. 191–2. (31.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), pp. 209–10. (32.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangarsh te Udesh (Amritsar, 1972), pp. 390–2. (33.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 392–3. Page 18 of 19

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The Last Year (34.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 393–4, 398, 399. (35.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 399. (36.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 399. (37.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, 400–4. (38.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 224–6. (39.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 228–30. (40.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 231–2. (41.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 394. (42.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 394. (43.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 394–5. (44.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 395. (45.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 395. (46.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 395–6. (47.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 396–7. (48.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 396–7. (49.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 397.

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Conclusion

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

Conclusion Sikh Identity and Pluralism J.S. Grewal

DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199467099.003.0028

Abstract and Keywords Master Tara Singh was drawn into Sikh politics by the Gurdwara Reform Movement as a form of service for the Sikh Panth. Around 1930 he regarded ‘service of the country as an integral part of the Sikh faith’. For him there was no clash between Sikh nationality and Indian Nationalism. Statutory dominance of one community over another, in his view, was opposed to the spirit of democracy and moral justice. He favoured a system of government in which political safeguards were provided for all religious communities, particularly the minorities. Master Tara Singh stood for a state that would ensure freedom for all the social and cultural ethnicities of India to enable them to play a significant role in national affairs. His vision of free India was very different from that of Jawaharlal Nehru. They cherished two different ideologies and two different visions of the national state. Keywords:   Master Tara Singh, Gurdwara Reform Movement, Sikh Panth, Indian Nationalism, Jawaharlal Nehru, national state

For an overall assessment of Master Tara Singh’s political life and the Sikh situation, we may start with Sardar Kapur Singh’s address to a convention of the Sikh intelligentsia at Chandigarh on 23 December 1967.1 Master Tara Singh, he said, had dominated Sikh politics for many decades, ‘putting up firm tracks over which the future politics of the Sikhs must move for many decades to come’. Going against the current of the times, he persisted in his own way to hold an image of Sikh destiny before the Sikhs and the world. He wanted the Sikh people Page 1 of 13

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Conclusion to be recognized ‘as co-equals of the ruling community in a united India and within a single Indian nation’. In a rather impassioned than precise language, Master Tara Singh asserted that the Sikh Panth must be treated as ‘a fundamental entity in the political arrangements of India and not an irrelevant mass of atomised citizens of a so called, secular nation’. For putting forth this demand, Master Tara Singh was subjected to smear campaigns of vilification and misrepresentation and he was persecuted for nearly two decades, ‘labelled as a communalist, obscurantist, a Pakistan-guided quisling, and a mental case’. He was sentenced to imprisonment and detention in free India ‘almost as many times as the foreign rulers had done in punishment for his fighting the freedom-battle of India’. The new Sikh leaders who came in place of Master Tara Singh abandoned his concept. They put forth the idea that ‘the Sikhs as a people’ were ‘disentitled to have political aspirations or make demands of their own’. They also declared that the demand for Punjabi Suba was wholly grounded in language and not in the political aspirations and demands of Sikh people through the Khalsa. Master Tara Singh’s demand for a Sikh homeland as an integral part of the Union of India was ‘mischievously misrepresented’ as a demand for a sovereign Sikh state, as a demand which was ‘anti-national, anti-Indian, and inspired by the foreign enemies of India’. (p.637) The essential legacy of Master Tara Singh was to ‘uphold the banner of Dharma, the banner of Freedom for everybody, the banner of establishing tolerant, plural societies and the banner of peace and mutual understanding among men, so that the entire mankind may progress and prosper’. Master Tara Singh’s life of over eighty-two years falls into two unequal parts, separated by the Partition of India and the creation of two independent states on 15 August 1947. His early life and career of about thirty-five years served as the background for his politics. From 1921 to 1947, he had made common cause with the Congress for the freedom of the country. At the same time, he stood for political autonomy for the Sikh Panth, which the Congress leadership was not prepared to concede. After Independence, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Indian National Congress became mutually antagonistic. Political autonomy for the Sikhs remained the ideal of Master Tara Singh after the Independence of India as before. Master Tara Singh’s political ideas were based on an elemental view of Sikh faith and Sikh history. Guru Nanak founded a new faith and bequeathed mastery of the spiritual realm (pīrī) to his successors. After the martyrdom of Guru Arjan, his son and successor, Guru Hargobind, began to maintain armed men, built the Akal Takht, and assumed mastery of the temporal realm (mīrī) as well. Guru Gobind Singh created the Khalsa as a politico-religious community to hold power for the defence of the Sikh faith. ‘Rāj karegā Khālsā’ became the guiding Page 2 of 13

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Conclusion principle of Keshdhārī Singhs. During the eighteenth century the Khalsa had to wage a long struggle against the Mughals and the Afghans to establish sovereign Sikh rule over the Punjab. In the early nineteenth century, Maharaja Ranjit Singh subjugated Sikh and non-Sikh territories to create a large sovereign state. For Master Tara Singh, all this was a legacy of the Sikh past: religious, social, and political. In his Merī Yād Master Tara Singh gives some clues to the decisive influences in his early life. As a young boy in the village he was so impressed by the stories of Sikh martyrs and brave warriors that he wished to get initiated as a Khalsa through pahul of the double-edged sword. This urge grew stronger when he started going to the Singh Sabha at Rawalpindi. He was actually initiated by Sant Attar Singh at Dera Khalsa. This proved to be the second decisive influence in his early life.2 A few days before his death, he recalled the vow he had taken at the time of initiation (to serve the Panth).3 At Khalsa College, Amritsar, he was good in religious studies. He decided to dedicate his life to teaching as the best service of the Panth.4 He made his first pronouncement on Sikh politics in the thick of the Gurdwara Reform Movement in 1921: Sikh politics must be based on Sikh faith and Sikh ethics.5

Master Tara Singh’s Political Ideology before 1947 For explicit statements on politics we have to turn to Master Tara Singh’s essays, addresses, speeches, and pamphlets—the sort of material that has been ignored by the biographers of Master Tara Singh and others who have written about him. In the early 1920s, he made the observation that the nation (kaum) which maintains its honour remains alive but the nation which loses its honour is treated as dead. So long as the Sikhs remember that their life depends on the honour of their dharam and their entity as a community, the Sikhs would remain a nation of brave (p.638) warriors.6 Those Sikhs who claimed to be ‘purely religious’ and dubbed others as political extremists were not prepared to stake their life for the Panth. In their eyes whatever was opposed to the government was ‘political’. Actually, their claim served as a cloak for a selfish attitude. True faith led to service and sacrifice.7 Around 1930, Master Tara Singh gave expression to his political ideas more forcefully: ‘I regard service of the country as an integral part of the Sikh faith.’ The two go together. There was no question of which came first. Desh bhagtī was inseparable from dharam. Asked by a friend whether he was a Sikh or an Indian first, he replied that he was a Sikh and nothing else. Desh bhagtī was subsumed in the Sikh faith. If there was any desh bhagtī outside the Sikh faith he was not concerned with it.8 In other words, to be a Sikh was to be a patriot. In another essay he says that the Sikhs were a nation based on dharam. It was the glory of the Sikh faith to suffer and to bear with cruelties for the sake of the oppressed. The Sikhs were born to fight against injustice and oppression.9

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Conclusion There was no clash between Sikh nationality and Indian Nationalism. In fact, to make sacrifices for the freedom struggle was the best means of propagating the Sikh faith. Following Sikh principles, the Sikhs should lead the Indian struggle for independence. ‘Our greatest wish is that we fight for the freedom of India so much so that there is no need of others making any sacrifice.’ Those who shun politics and incite the Sikhs to remain aloof from the struggle for freedom were cutting at the roots of the Sikh faith. ‘Let us be firm on Sikh principles and propagate the Sikh dharam by our actions.’10 Master Tara Singh was opposed to statutory dominance of any community because it was opposed to the spirit of democracy and moral justice. The Sikhs did not wish to dominate, nor to be dominated. They would never submit to communal domination over them. He requested the Muslims as the largest minority to lead all minorities of India to evolve common demands for all minorities. The Muslims did not support the idea because they were keen to establish their own political dominance over other minorities. Master Tara Singh then wanted the minorities of the Punjab to jointly oppose the unjust and undemocratic demands of the Muslim majority. The Central Sikh League proposed a conference of the minorities of the Punjab, and other minorities welcomed the idea. Its purpose was to work for the best interests of ‘the motherland’. Depending on the bureaucracy and the British, the Muslims were likely to remain obdurate, but they who were fighting for independence would not accept their dominance in any form.11 Master Tara Singh analysed the political situation in September 1940. The war years after the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League in March 1940, he said, were a critical time for India and for the Sikhs. The Congress wanted to get rid of foreign rule but it was necessary to decide who would take its place. The Muslim League was in favour of a division of the country. The Congress appeared to be inclined to accommodate the Muslim League with total disregard to its assurance given to the Sikhs in 1929. The Sikhs were with the Congress on the question of freedom but they were not prepared to leave it to the Congress to take decisions on their behalf. The Sikhs wanted freedom and ‘not a change of masters’. The Congress could not take the Sikhs for granted. They were with the Congress to fight for freedom but not for creating Pakistan. Indeed, they (p. 639) would fight against the creation of Pakistan. Master Tara Singh emphasized that the Sikhs had to organize themselves so well that no other party should be able to take any step without their consent.12 When any Sikh asked Master Tara Singh whether or not he should remain in the Congress, his reply was that he should remain a Sikh and sacrifice everything for the sake of the Sikh faith. ‘I am a desh-sewak’, he said, ‘because I am a Sikh, and service of the country is a part of the Sikh faith.’ The Sikhs should join hands with those who wanted to serve the country but not with those who wanted to sacrifice Sikh interests. The Sikhs should fight in the forefront for the Page 4 of 13

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Conclusion freedom of the country but not if the result of freedom was subordination. Freedom did not mean simply the ouster of the British. If their place was to be taken by a single community it was no freedom. The real freedom for Master Tara Singh was freedom of all nationalities and individuals. ‘We want real freedom and not subjection of any kind.’ In his opinion, it was necessary for the Sikhs to strengthen themselves and to keep the power in their own hands. They should work in tandem with the Congress if its objective was freedom for united India, including freedom for the Sikhs.13 In March 1943, Master Tara Singh talked about ‘Azad Punjab’ as a demand for territorial reorganization of the Punjab in such a way that the Sikhs did not remain under Muslim or Hindu domination. As an example of non-communal government the proposed reorganized province of ‘Azad Punjab’ was most likely to promote nationalism in the whole country. No community in the Punjab would be dominated by another, and the Sikhs would be free from the prospect of not only Muslim but also Hindu domination. Master Tara Singh had no objection to any other name for the province, or to any other mode of achieving the same end.14 His basic idea was to create a situation in which the Sikhs were not at the mercy of others. In 1945, Master Tara Singh wrote a pamphlet on Pakistan in which he equated ‘Pakistan’ with Muslim domination, whatever its form. The Congress had no objection to the division of the country but it was not willing to concede that all the areas claimed by the Muslim League could go into Pakistan. The Congress proposal could bring some gain for the non-Punjabi Hindus but it would make the position of the Sikhs even worse than the demand of the Muslim League for Pakistan. The Congress proposal left the Sikhs under Muslim domination in one half of the Punjab and under Hindu domination in the other half. It was, therefore, more dangerous than the scheme of Pakistan. The Communists were frankly in favour of Pakistan. Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs not to remain under the subjection of Muslims, Hindus, or the British. If the Muslims could not trust the Congress, how could the non-Muslims trust the Muslim League? If the Muslims were a nation, the Sikhs by the same token were also a nation. The will of the one could not be imposed on the other.15 In a pamphlet on the relations of the Congress with the Sikhs, Master Tara Singh dwelt on the background since 1916 in greater detail to come to the conclusion that the Congress was prepared to concede the right of self-determination to Muslims but not to the Sikhs. Sardar Patel had made a statement in favour of the Sikhs, but with an eye on the elections. He could not be taken seriously, particularly when the leaders of greater status in the Congress maintained silence on this point. The Sikhs had to stand on their (p.640) own feet to struggle simultaneously for the freedom of the country and to preserve the distinct political identity of the Panth. If the Sikhs did not possess an independent identity, whom would the Congress ask for consent to any Page 5 of 13

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Conclusion communal understanding (with the Muslim League)? The only alternative open to the Sikhs was to maintain independent identity (azād hastī) of the Panth and to build its own strength.16 The Sikhs were constantly being asked to make sacrifices for the freedom of the country. The country did not mean merely the land but also its people, and the people included the Sikhs. It was commendable to sacrifice everything for a good cause, but to make any sacrifice for the sake of the people who wanted to put an end to the freedom of the Sikhs had no justification. Every Sikh was free to make sacrifice for the country but no Sikh had the right to sacrifice the Sikh Panth. The most important thing for a Sikh was his faith; for its preservation it was necessary to have the Panth; and for the preservation of the Panth it was necessary to have freedom. Any Sikh who asked the Sikhs to sacrifice the Panthic identity or Panthic freedom was either gravely mistaken or wanted to sell the Panth to others. The British had left for the Indians to decide their future for themselves. For a unanimous decision it was necessary to accept the basic principle that no nationality should aspire to rule over another. The desire to escape the domination of another community was not opposed to Indian Nationalism. The aspiration of domination over others was the essence of ‘communalism’. The Sikh scheme of ‘Azad Punjab’ and ‘a Sikh state’ were meant only to escape ‘Muslim and Hindu Raj’.17 The choice of the Congress candidates for the Sikh seats in the general election of 1945–6 impelled Master Tara Singh to write that the cat was out of the bag. None of the Sikh candidates chosen was in favour of an independent Panth. They could fight for the freedom of the country with total disregard for Sikh interests. Most of the Panthic candidates, on the other hand, could fight for the freedom of the Panth as well as the freedom of the country. Their slogan was ‘Panth āzād te desh āzād’. The Congress slogan was ‘desh azād’. The Congress did not recognize an independent political status of the Sikh Panth. Therefore, the Congress slogan was virtually ‘desh āzād te panth ghulām’. Master Tara Singh told the Congressite Sikhs that they were needed only so long as the Panth existed as an independent entity. The demise of the Panth would be their death too.18 In January 1946, Master Tara Singh wrote that the Hindus (Congress) and the Muslims (the League) would come to an understanding soon after the elections on the basis of Pakistan, and the Sikhs would be faced with a most critical situation. The existence of ‘the third panth’ (tīsar panth) created by Guru Gobind Singh as a distinct political entity would be threatened. By far the most important question before the Panth, therefore, was whether or not the Khalsa Panth should be kept alive as an independent entity. Master Tara Singh’s answer could only be in the affirmative. Indeed he said that he could not live if the Panth became extinct. He was working for Panthic unity but the Congress was trying to atomize the Panth. In Master Tara Singh’s view the Congress was no longer a Page 6 of 13

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Conclusion national party fighting for freedom. It had become ‘a Hindu party’. Practically all Hindus were Congressmen now, just as all Muslims were Leaguers. Sikh interests would not be safeguarded by the Congress. It was imperative for the Sikhs to forge unity among themselves (p.641) so that they could influence decisions for the future as one of the three ‘main elements’ in Indian politics.19 Master Tara Singh’s article in the Sant Sipāhī of December 1945 refers to the communal tangle in India. The Hindus wanted to have a democratic government on the basis of adult suffrage for men and women. This was the ideal in England but not yet a reality. This radically liberal view suited the Hindus because democracy based on adult suffrage would ensure Hindu majority in the government and a statutory Hindu Raj in the whole country. Therefore, all the Hindus were in its favour. The Congress too looked upon such a democratic system as the ideal. However, the Congress talked of reservation of seats and some other safeguards for the satisfaction of the Muslims, the Sikhs, and the other minorities.20 The Muslims were not satisfied with the assurances or safeguards offered by the Congress. Their demand was a separate state for Muslims in the Muslimmajority provinces. There was injustice involved in their scheme. The greatest injustice was to the Sikhs. The Muslims were not prepared to give the same concession to the Sikhs and to create a separate province for them. Understandably, the Sikhs did not trust the Muslim majority, just as Muslims did not trust the Hindu majority. The mutual distrust of centuries stood in the way of Hindu–Muslim unity.21 In Master Tara Singh’s view, it was necessary to evolve a system of government in which no community should be able to oppress others. There were other countries in the world which had more than one nationality and they had evolved such a system. He mentions Switzerland as an example. It had 70 per cent Germans, about 15 per cent Italians, and about 15 per cent French. Each nationality elected the same number of its ministers for the Parliament. If and when they failed to resolve an issue, all of them had to resign and new ministers were elected for the Parliament in the same way. If any nationality did not elect new ministers, the Parliament was dissolved and fresh elections were held. Consequently, the ministers tried to work in tandem and the Parliament was keen to ensure as far as possible that the ministers worked in harmony. Some such system could be evolved in India on the basic principle of parity. Master Tara Singh believed that the whole problem arose from the aspiration of one community to rule over the others.22 Paradoxically, the crux of the problem was adult suffrage with a majoritarian democracy.

Political Ideas after Independence After Independence, Master Tara Singh published a few articles and addresses in 1948 which were re-published as a booklet entitled Sikh Rājnītī (Sikh Politics). Page 7 of 13

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Conclusion In its preface he says that he wanted to preserve independent identity of the Panth. The Khalsa Panth was the Guru of the Sikhs. The reference here is to the doctrine of Guru-Panth that had emerged in the eighteenth century. It was the religious obligation of the individual Sikhs to obey the authority of the Panth as the Guru. There was nothing ‘communal’ about maintaining the independent identity of the Guru Panth. The Panth was needed for the protection of the Sikh faith, and political power was necessary for keeping the Panth independent.23 The first article was written early in 1948 when some of the Akali leaders were feeling perturbed over the decision of the Constituent Assembly to have adult suffrage with joint electorates. Master Tara Singh was (p.642) convinced that independent identity of the Sikhs was a question of life and death for them. He argued that the Sikhs had nothing in common with the Congress in terms of their politics after the Independence of India. The Akali Dal was a communal organization for the Congress, and the Congress had nothing to do with it. Therefore, the Akali Dal should have no concern with the Congress as such but with the country as a whole. The Congress had totally failed to create a single Indian nation of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others, having bowed before the two-nation theory of Jinnah. Now it was incumbent upon the Panth to determine its own destiny and not to hand over this responsibility to any other party. Master Tara Singh knew very well that the Congress dubbed this claim as ‘communal’. He did not mind being called ‘communal’. The Congress had the right to persuade the Sikhs but not to hold out threats. It did not behove the past fighters for freedom to hold out such threats to those who cherished freedom.24 Master Tara Singh wrote another article to comment on the views expressed or objections raised against his views. Never before had any Sikh party thought, he said, of entrusting leadership of the Panth to a non-Sikh party. The Panth was the name of an organization, and if there was no organization there could be no Panth. To think of religion without politics was to separate mīrī from pīrī and, thus, to deviate from the legacy of Guru Gobind Singh. Master Tara Singh pointed out that when the Hindu Mahasabha was opposed to weightage for Muslims, it was called ‘communal’ by the Congress leaders. Now the Sikhs were called ‘communal’ for supporting weightage. The Congress used to recognize the political entity of religious communities in the past but now the Congress leaders were denying it. Master Tara Singh declared that he would never compromise the issue of identity of the Panth even if all other Akalis joined the Congress. Having accepted the two-nation theory, the Congress had no justification for denying national identity to the Sikhs who represented a ‘politico-religious brotherhood’ based on the ideals of mīrī and pīrī. The Panth could not entrust its destiny to the Congress. ‘The authority of the Guru-Panth and its rights could not be handed over to the Congress or any other non-Sikh party.’25

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Conclusion In his address to the second annual session of the Sikh Students Federation in April 1948, Master Tara Singh exhorted young men to gird up their loins to save the country as well as the Sikh faith and the Sikh Panth. These were the purposes for which the Khalsa Panth was created by Guru Gobind Singh. He pointed out that dependence gave false power but independence gave real power. An office under the Congress gave false prestige and power but an office as co-partners in power gave real strength. The Panth could gain power only if it continued to exist as an independent entity. Master Tara Singh clarified that he was not opposed to the alignment of the Panthic party with the Congress but he was opposed to its merger in the Congress Party. It was his conviction that the power of the Panth alone was the answer to all dangers.26 In his presidential address to an Akali political conference held at Patiala in June 1948, Master Tara Singh advised the Sikhs to disregard their personal interests in order to think clearly about the future of the Sikh Panth. They had not yet realized the implication of joining the Congress. Before 1947 they could join the Congress and remain members of the Akali Dal. But now they (p.643) were obliged to choose between the Congress and the Akali Dal. To join the Congress was to weaken the Akali Dal as an independent political party and the chief organization of the Sikh Panth. It was ludicrous and dishonest to recite the anthem with Rāj Karegā Khālsā and to empower the Congress to take decisions on behalf of the Panth. The Sikhs should act as a wall and not remain scattered like bricks. The Panth could be saved not by the support of the Congress but by the grace of Guru Gobind Singh who enabled them to stand on their own feet.27 Before these articles and addresses came out as a booklet, Master Tara Singh’s address to the Sikh Conference in Delhi on 20 February 1949 had been published. Both Niranjan Singh and Jaswant Singh give extracts from this address.28 Political power could not be maintained, said Master Tara Singh, without zeal for the Sikh faith. The Sikh faith itself would weaken without political power. Purushotamdas Tandon’s advocacy of Hinduttava as President of the Indian National Congress was ominous. The political entity of the Panth and the Sikh faith were under attack from the Congress. The objective of the Congress was to occupy the citadel of the Sikhs through traitors among them. Master Tara Singh reassured the Sikhs that he would surely win despite the opposition of the enemies of the Guru Khalsa. The monthly Sant Sipāhī had ceased publication during Master Tara Singh’s detention in 1949. It was restarted after his release. In its issue of December 1949 appeared Master Tara Singh’s statement that the best way now to preserve the independent identity of the Sikhs was a linguistic state in which the Hindus should not be in majority in the Legislative Assembly. He wanted to clarify again, he said, that the objective of the Akali Dal was to liberate the Sikhs from Hindu domination. The demand of the Akali Dal was to create a linguistic state with full internal autonomy, like Kashmir. The states had been reduced to the position of Page 9 of 13

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Conclusion large district boards. All the states of the Indian Union should have internal autonomy. The reorganized Punjab state could be called a linguistic state, a Sikh state, or even a communal state, but Master Tara Singh’s purpose was to do away with Hindu domination in its legislature. He wanted to save the Sikhs from ‘Hindu communalism’. The Sikhs must have such a freedom for the sake of their dharam, their culture, their Panth, and their Guru. ‘We do not wish to separate [from the Hindus] and we shall never be separate.’ It was for mutual benefit to remain together. If not territorial reorganization, some other way could be formulated to ensure that the Sikhs were not subordinated to a non-Sikh majority.29 Fifteen years later, after his return from Salogara on 24 July 1965, Master Tara Singh asserted that the Congress was ill-treating the minorities, suppressing the Muslims in Kashmir, the Christians in Nagaland, and the Sikhs in the Punjab. On 2 August 1965, Master Tara Singh read out a statement at a press conference in Delhi that the Sikhs had been recognized as legitimate inheritors of the sovereignty of India along with Hindus and Muslims. Before India was partitioned, the Hindu (Congress) leaders had given them the assurance that they would be accorded ‘a free political status in a free India through a Constitution with their acceptance’. All solemn promises were repudiated when power passed into the hands of the majority community. The resurgence of militant Hinduism since 1947 presented the gravest threat to the Sikhs due to their common ‘cultural roots and social integration with the (p.644) Hindus’. Master Tara Singh did not want to see the Sikh community’s identity obliterated ‘in the name of national unity’. He wanted for the Sikhs ‘a space in the sun of free India, wherein they can breathe the air of freedom’ (echoing Nehru’s assurance). This was the basis of a Sikh homeland.30 In his speech to the All India Akali Conference during 26–7 February 1966 at Jalandhar, Master Tara Singh said, ‘We want to live as brothers and not as slaves.’ With reference to the majority he added that these people thought of themselves as bestowers of charity and of the minorities as beggars. The ‘communal Hindus’ were holding out threats of all sorts. But the followers of Guru Gobind Singh were not prepared to bow before anyone. The Sikhs did not trust these Hindus because these Hindus did not trust the Sikhs. The Sikhs were not satisfied with a ‘Punjabi Suba’ any more. They wanted to have equal status with the Hindus (through a Sikh homeland). Master Tara Singh told the Sikhs not to entertain any hope of a national life from them. The Sikhs could live only by their own efforts, sacrifices, and merits. ‘Accursed is the life of those who depend upon others.’ On this point, he quoted a verse of Shaikh Farid from Guru Granth Sahib. He ended his speech with a long quotation from a Vār (heroic poem) describing how ‘the third panth’ (the Khalsa) created by Guru Gobind Singh had established their political power with the strength of their arms.31

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Conclusion We can see that Master Tara Singh stood for an Indian national state very different from the one established in India on the basis of the new Constitution adopted on 26 January 1950. Majoritarian democracy based on adult suffrage in a centralized state was weighted against religious and ethnic minorities. Political domination of the majority community was built into the apparently egalitarian Constitution. There were no political safeguards for the minorities and they had to survive on the goodwill of the majority. Master Tara Singh stood for a state that could ensure freedom for the social and cultural ethnicities of India to enable them to play a significant role in national affairs. Master Tara Singh’s vision of free India was very different from that of Nehru. There was, therefore, a clash not only between two strong personalities but also between two different ideologies, and two different visions of the ‘National State in India’. Notes:

(1.) Kapur Singh, ‘The Sikh Situation after the Death of Master Tara Singh’ (A paper read by Sardar Kapur Singh [Ex-MP] at the convention of the Sikh Intelligentsia held at Chandigarh on 23 December 1967), pp. 1–19. (2.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, ed. Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 2001), pp. 24–5, 30–1. (3.) Jaswant Singh (ed.), Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangarah te Udesh (Amritsar: 1972), p. 394. (4.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, pp. 35, 38. (5.) Master Tara Singh, Merī Yād, p. 51. (6.) Harjinder Singh Dilgir (ed.), Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, 2 vols (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), 2 vols, vol. I, p. 74. (7.) Dilgir, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. I, pp. 86–9. (8.) Dilgir, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 76–7. (9.) Dilgir, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 166–7. (10.) Dilgir, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 183–6. (11.) Dilgir, Master Tara Singh ji de Lekh, vol. II, pp. 189–91. (12.) Master Tara Singh’s ‘Pardhānagī Address’ (at Kila Didar Singh on 17 September 1940), in Jaspreet Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920– 1947’, PhD thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 2005, Appendix III, pp. 1–8.

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Conclusion (13.) Master Tara Singh’s ‘Pardhānagī Address’ (at Kila Didar Singh on 17 September 1940), in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix III, pp. 8–14. (14.) Master Tara Singh’s ‘Pardhānagī Address’ (on 14 March 1943 at Patiala), in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix IV, pp. 3–5. (15.) Master Tara Singh, Pakistan (Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1945), pp. 2– 10. (16.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix V, pp. 2–10. (17.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Congress te Sikh’, in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix V, pp. 10–14. (18.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Billī Thelion Nikkal Āī’, in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920–1947’, Appendix VI, pp. 1–4. (19.) Master Tara Singh, ‘Hindu Musalman Samjhautā Pakistan dī Buniād Utte March Vich ho Jāwegā’, in Walia, ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics 1920– 1947’, Appendix VII, pp. 2–14. (20.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 156. (21.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, p. 157. (22.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 157–8. (23.) Master Tara Singh, Sikh Rājnītī (Amritsar: Manjit Singh, n.d.), pp. 2–4. (24.) Master Tara Singh, Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 5–16. (25.) Master Tara Singh, Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 17–32. (26.) Master Tara Singh, Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 33–54. (27.) Master Tara Singh, Sikh Rājnītī, pp. 55–84. Also Niranjan Singh, JīwanYātrā Master Tara Singh (Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968), pp. 155–7. (28.) Niranjan Singh, Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh, pp. 159–64; Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 235–9. (29.) Jaswant singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 229–35. (30.) Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle (Delhi: U.C. Kapoor and Sons, 1970), pp. 403–a6. (31.) Jaswant Singh, Master Tara Singh, pp. 366–9. Page 12 of 13

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Conclusion

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.646) Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī J.S. Grewal

Master Tara Singh was well-versed in gurbāṇī from his early life. He uses verses from Guru Granth Sahib in his essays and ar ticles on religion, ethics, and politics. It is important to know the kind of interest he had in gurbāṇī and his understanding of the Sikh faith. Our idea is not to bring in every line and verse he quotes but to consider a sufficiently large number of his quotations from Guru Granth Sahib to see their import for his own life and the lives of his contemporaries whom he tried to inform and educate. This is important, particularly in view of the fact that Master Tara Singh claimed to be first and foremost a man of faith. His understanding of the Sikh faith is as important to know as is his understanding of Sikh history. These were the two sources on which he generally based his arguments. A line from the Japujī emphasizes that God cannot be comprehended intellectually—He is beyond human understanding. He was true in the beginning, He was there in all the four cosmic ages, He is there now, and He shall be there forever. ‘You may think of Him a hundred thousand times but you cannot enfold Him in your thought.’1 ‘Only he may know Him who is as great as He is.’2 Not greatness in the world but nearness to God is the source of honour. ‘If any one lives for all the four cosmic ages and even longer, if all others follow him in all the nine regions of the earth, and if he earns a good name and is praised by all, even so he is nothing if he gets no recognition from God.’3 In the So-Dar of Guru Nanak, the whole of creation sings God’s praises: the water, the fire, and the Dharam Raj (who takes account of good and bad deeds of human beings after death).4 God alone comes to the help of a devotee.5 In the Sukhmaṇī

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī of Guru Arjan, it is underscored that a created being cannot know the wisdom of God; whatever He likes comes to pass.6 Several quotations from Guru Granth Sahib relate to the Guru. Guru Amar Das advises the woman to realize there is no (p.647) peace without the Guru. She runs madly after things of the earth; attached to māyā she remains subject to suffering; she adopts many other ways and means but there can be no peace without the True Guru. She cannot complain to God who ordains everything, who determines the path for everyone as He likes, who is the kind bestower of peace, and runs the universe as He likes.7 Human beings are advised by Guru Arjan to discard their self and become the dust of the feet of the Sadhu; leaving all other means, they should turn to the feet of the Guru.8 In his Sukhmaṇī, Guru Arjan advises human beings to follow the Guru’s teaching and not their own uninformed inclinations.9 He exhorts women to make the Guru’s shabad their lamp and to make fidelity (sat) their bridal bed; they should join their hands in supplication all the eight pahars of the day to meet God.10 In some of the verses quoted by Master Tara Singh there are references to nām. In the Japujī, the dirt of sin can be removed only by the love of nām.11 Guru Amar Das says that all siddhs and sādhiks are in search of nām but they merely tire themselves by meditation. None can find nām without the True Guru who alone makes it possible. He postulates opposition between nām and haumai (selfcentredness): the two are mutually exclusive.12 Siddhī and miracles are a curse, just as eating and dressing are fruitless without nām. He who receives the gift of His praises from God is the siddh and the wielder of supernatural powers. Through the Guru’s kindness, nām is lodged in the heart: this is siddhī and this is karāmāt.13 In his Vār in Rāg Sorath, Guru Ram Das talks of the Gurmukh (one who has turned to the Guru) who meditates on nām as instructed by the Guru and sings God’s praises. This is the true path ordained by God.14 Guru Arjan says that everything is false without nām.15 Kabir advises men to recite only two words, Rām and nām, so that they are redeemed by the Master (God).16 Nām and the Guru’s shabad helped human beings to follow the path towards God and, ultimately, to see Him, meet Him, or unite with Him. This was the supreme purpose of life. Guru Arjan exhorts human beings to take refuge with God for attaining the greatest peace. They should discard all other ways and means, and take refuge with Him. He is the Master of both the worlds, of life and death, and of union and separation. They should remember the True one, who is the bestower of all gifts.17 In the Vār in Rāg Ramkalī, Guru Arjan says that to ask for anyone other than God is to invite sorrow and suffering.18 Elsewhere he says that the father out of kindness told the child to ask for anything he liked and the child said that he wanted to have the sight of the Lord and that he might cherish His face in his heart.19 Many claim to know but rare are the persons who

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī know the essence of union.20 Kabir says that no one can describe the state of union with God, just as the dumb who eats sugar cannot say how sweet it is.21 However, it is not easy at all to attain the state of union or liberation. Human beings remain attached to māyā. Guru Arjan says that all greatness achieved by remaining engrossed in māyā would be reduced to dust (in the divine court).22 In the Vār in Rāg Mārū, Guru Arjan says that he who is engrossed in māyā thinks of nothing else; every moment he asks for earthly things to no end.23 Self-centredness is equally a great obstacle, if not greater than māyā, in the path towards God. The two are intimately linked. Guru Arjan advises human beings to discard the selfish inclinations and to banish the other (p.648) (māyā) from their minds.24 The self-centred person is called manmukh in contrast with the Gurmukh (who has turned to the Guru). Guru Arjan uses the female voice in which the woman regrets that as a manmukh engrossed in māyā she remained wholly mistaken.25 He says explicitly that one should discard one’s selfish inclinations and listen to the Guru’s instruction.26 He reminds men of the shortness of life in order to emphasize that there is no occasion for feeling proud of anything on this earth.27 Kabir says that it does not matter if one has discarded only māyā; pride is the bane even of great munīs and consumes everyone.28 To follow the right path it was necessary to lead a highly ethical life. Ethical values and conduct were in a way more important than anything else. Without good deeds there was no possibility of liberation. Concern for all human beings, and not their denunciation or condemnation, was the highest excellence. Guru Nanak underlines the importance of actions by hammering in the idea that we reap the fruit of whatever we sow; we cannot blame others. ‘Blame your own actions and not someone else.’29 In the Vār in Rāg Āsā, Guru Nanak describes the simmal tree to make the point that the essence of goodness is humility, genuine humility and not merely its outward demonstration.30 None could assume that one would find a place in the divine court; ‘everyone shall be treated in accordance with his deeds.’31 In the Vār in Rāg Rāmkalī, Guru Nanak stresses the importance of ethical conduct. ‘Listen to the right instruction’, he says, ‘God would ask for accounts with the account-book in front. The defaulters will be asked to balance the arrears. The angel of death would take charge. The defaulters would not know how to traverse the narrow path. Ultimately the truth prevails and falsehood goes down.’32 Guru Arjan says that none can be judged as good or bad because all human beings are created by God.33 Farid advises men not to denigrate dust: it is under your feet in life but over your head after death.34 Elsewhere, he says, that he who sows the seed of kikkar cannot hope to have dried grapes as its fruit. He who takes wool to the spinner cannot hope to wear silk.35

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī Ethical living is necessary but not sufficient for attaining liberation. Guru Arjan says that one should remember God all the time, even when working with hands and feet.36 Love of God is absolutely essential. Guru Arjan says that he does not wish for Rāj or muktībut for the love of God’s feet.37 He prays for the light of intelligence which leads to the love of the Lord.38 In the Vār in Rāg Rāmkalī, Guru Amar Das says that the Lord gives the cup of love to whom who likes.39 The path of love is very hard. In the vār in Rāg Sārang, Guru Nanak says that the discerning mind makes it clear that honour comes from the service of God.40 Willing acceptance of God’s will is the test of one’s love for God. In the Vār in Rāg Mājh, Guru Nanak says that peace and suffering are the two dresses ordained by God for human beings. To ask for peace and not to accept suffering is futile. The only alternative is to accept suffering willingly.41 In the Vār in Rāg Mārū, Guru Arjan tells the potential novice to accept death and discard all hope of life first become the dust of the feet of all and then ‘come to us’.42 In the last resort, one has to be prepared to die on the path of love. Kabir refers to the widow who wishes to become a satī and takes the coconut in her hand; now she cannot turn away from the funeral pyre.43 When all is said and done, liberation depends on the grace of God. It cannot be earned. In the Vār in Rāg Āsā, Guru Nanak (p.649) says that God fashions all vessels and fills them up. Some are filled with milk and others remain over the fire all the time. Some sleep under a quilt (in winters) and others stand watching over them. They upon whom God looks with kindness are redeemed.44 Guru Ram Das says that God would become merciful to him on His own and lead him to the love of God.45 In his Sukhmaṇī, Guru Arjan says that all gifts come from God and none can do anything on one’s own.46 He did not find God through hard austerities and service but he did find God suddenly through his grace: only he lives in accordance with the Guru’s instruction to whomever the Master shows kindness.47 God is omnipotent. Nothing can happen against His will. The only way in which any gift can be received is through His grace. Therefore, what is open to human beings is to supplicate. Guru Arjan says that the only gift he prays for is that God may never be away from his heart.48 Sadhna refers to the redemption of a sinner.49 Guru Arjan says that by reading the Veda and reflecting upon it, or by performing yogic practices one does not get rid of the five adversaries (kām, krodh, lobh, moh, and hankār). Tired of all others means he turned to the Lord’s door to supplicate that God might bestow the gift of discerning intellect upon him.50 Finally, Guru Nanak refers to Babur who comes from Kabul with a marriage party of sin and extorts charity by force.51 The soldiers of Babur’s army raped Indian women and no one stopped them. Innocent people were murdered. Such

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī political activity was devoid of ethics. It was immoral on the part a of ruler to allow the rape of women and murder of civilians in a war. We can see that the gurbāṇī quoted by Master Tara Singh is only a very small part of Guru Granth Sahib. An exposition of gurbāṇī was not his purpose. Nevertheless, it is clear that he had a good understanding of the whole scripture. At the centre of the universe is God, and in this God-centric universe the primary duty of human beings is to aim at receiving honour in His eyes. The love of God and living in conformity to His will are the antidotes to attachment, māyā, and haumai. Good conduct is absolutely essential for the goal of liberation. The state of liberation is not the end of the journey but the beginning of the life of selfless service (parupkār). All activities of human beings, from the prince to the pauper, are to be judged in the light of the new values which, at the same time, formed the basis of a new social order. We have looked at the ideas in the verses of Guru Granth Sahib cited by Master Tara Singh without any reference to their context in order to appreciate his understanding of gurbāṇī. Now we propose to examine how Master Tara Singh uses verses from gurbāṇī in his exposition of themes discussed in his work. We may turn to the collection of essays entitled Pirm Piālā first. The title itself comes from gurbāṇī. The relevant verse is quoted twice in the essays related to bhagtī. ‘This cup of love (pirm piālā) is given by the Master to whomever he likes.’52 As it may be expected, certain verses are quoted more frequently than the others. The Pirm Piālā contains nineteen essays. The titles of three essays come from gurbāṇī.53 Seven essays have no quotation from gurbāṇī.54 In the rest, the number of quotations ranges from one to seven. In the first essay, ‘the lone woman cries for help but no one can help except the Beloved’ (God). A human guide at best can give some indication of the truth, as the map of a country can give some idea of its terrain. For true knowledge, (p.650) however, one has to see the country for oneself. True guidance comes ultimately through God’s grace.55 The verse quoted in the fifth essay suggests a spiritual remedy for moral degradation: ‘to wash off sins by the Name Divine’.56 Devotion is a form of expressing love. The unseen God is made manifest through love. Externally, devotion is similar to superstition but there is a basic difference between them, as between nectar and poison. Devotion is based on selflessness but superstition springs from selfishness. A devotee offers himself to the Guru, and a superstitious person pretends to offer himself but actually wishes to use the Guru for his own purpose. A Sikh should read bāṇī, remember God, and observe the rahit in a spirit of dedication to the Guru in order to become acceptable to him. In the end, a devotee drinks nectar, a superstitious person drinks sherbet, and a pretender drinks poison. A devotee listens to bāṇī and turns towards its author; a superstitious person hears bāṇī and goes to wander in the wilderness; and a pretender hears bāṇī and runs away from its author. Page 5 of 12

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī Rarely though, the feeling of devotion concealed in pretention may lead to the right path. Here Master Tara Singh quotes the verse of Dhanna in which a pretender in the guise of a prince marries the daughter of a king. Though a lustful and selfish man, he was redeemed when he turned to God with genuine devotion.57 In the eleventh essay there are four quotations of one line each from four different compositions in the Granth Sahib. Entitled ‘Man kī Mat te Gur kī Mat’ (Inclination of the Self and the Guru’s Instruction), this essay emphasizes that it is foolish to regard one’s own understanding as complete. Human intelligence is a lamp that shows the way but its light is dim and keeps on changing its colour. Its range is limited. Human beings need a guide, a guru, not any guru, but one who knows the path. He is found through the Guru’s grace: ‘I may recognize You (O’Lord) by Your grace.’ ‘Becoming kind in His own pleasure, God would turn me to His love.’ The most intelligent thing to do is to regard one’s own intelligence as weak. ‘Discard the inclination of your own mind and listen to the instruction of the Guru.’ The ignorant and the young are asked to ‘appropriate the Guru’s instruction’.58 The largest number of verses are quoted in the essay ‘Prema Bhagtī’ (Loving Devotion). Every action of a human being, says Master Tara Singh, is the external form of an inner feeling or thought. It is difficult to separate thought and action because thought leads to action and actions produce new thoughts. That is why it is difficult to separate bhajan (remembrance of God), sewā (services of all kinds), and dān (charity). Nobler than thought and action, however, is love, the source of all other feelings and thoughts. Master Tara Singh quotes Guru Gobind Singh: ‘I tell the truth for all of you to hear: only he who appropriates love finds God.’ Remembrance of God (bhajan) is helpful if performed in humility and love, and not for a selfish purpose or under some kind of an illusion. It purifies the mind of all self-centredness (haumai). Here Master Tara Singh quotes a line from Guru Amar Das to the effect that haumai and the divine Name are mutually exclusive: ‘Haumai stands in opposition to nāv, the two cannot be together in one place.’ Like a vessel, the mind getting filled with love is simultaneously emptied of haumai. As Guru Amar Das says in Rāmkalī kī Vār noticed earlier: ‘This cup of love comes from the Master who gives it to whomever the likes.’ In a chaupada (a unit of four verses) of Rāg Kalyān Guru Amar Das, (p.651) says: ‘God Himself becomes kind and gives the gift of love.’59 Bhajan (nām japṇā), sewā, and dān can mislead if practised in greed or pretention. Offered in love, devotion, and humility even an apparently bad deed turns out to be good. Generally, the desire for supernatural power (riddhī-siddhī) is mixed with the feeling of love but the lure of supernatural power lends support to haumai and takes one away from God. It is important to note that Master Tara Singh does not reject the belief in the possession of supernatural Page 6 of 12

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī power by a human being. It is the intention of acquiring supernatural powers that becomes a hurdle; supernatural powers can come as a gift from God, unsought and unintended. Guru Amar Das in the Rāg Sorath Vār of Guru Ram Das states this position clearly: Siddhs and sādhiks tire themselves vainly in search of nāv. Without the True Guru none can find it. But he who turns to the Guru might receive it and be the medium of this gift for others. Without the Name, no fine dress or dainty food has any meaning; accursed is siddhī and accursed is karāmāt. True siddhī or true karāmāt is a gift from God given to one, unsought and unknown. The Name of God lodged in the heart is a veritable siddhī and a veritable karāmāt. Guru Arjan addresses God: ‘I can recognize You only through Your grace.’ ‘Not through austerities, nor through service, I found God suddenly without a conscious thought (achintā). To whomever the Master is kind, he gives the word of the Guru.’60 Another collection of Master Tara Singh’s essays, Kio Varnī Kiv Jāṇā, has sixteen essays in all and six of these have no quotations. In the remaining eleven essays the number of quotations ranges from one to twenty. Seven essays, together, have eleven quotations, two other essays have twelve, and remaining two have thirty-nine. In the introduction (bhūmika), which has no quotation, Master Tara Singh talks of atheists and believers as the two opposite poles, and speaks in favour of faith, telling the reader that he has tried to throw light on the existence of God and renunciation of the self. He underlines what the Gurus have said again and again that no logic, no argument, no scripture, and no instruction can be of any use if only heard or read; we can move towards the path of purity only by an honest acceptance of the principles embodied in Guru Granth Sahib. The emphasis in this collection of essays is on how we can avoid following wrong paths and wrong principles.61 In the first essay, Master Tara Singh argues in favour of faith in the existence of God. The wonderful creation, with its perfect order and limitless forms, is manifestation of God. ‘Air, water and fire sing Your praises’ (O’God). ‘Nanak’s Master is made manifest.’ God can be experienced but this experience cannot be described. As Kabir says, ‘the dumb has tasted jaggery, but what can he say when asked?’ A human being does not know ‘who he is’ and ‘where he has come from’. The helplessness of human beings is a proof of the existence of the One who is all powerful.62 In the second essay, Master Tara Singh tries to meet the objections raised by the atheists. Under the influence of western learning, some people become sceptical about God’s existence. They think of God in terms of their own image. They do not realize that God is beyond limitations of any kind. ‘Only he can know the Great One who is as great as God.’63

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī The third essay, ‘Bhagtī’, has the largest number of quotations. Bhajan does not mean uttering Vāhegurū, Vāhegurū but to be absorbed in devotion to God. Reading of scriptures and reflection on the Veda or (p.652) the practices of Yoga are of no avail; the five adversaries (kām, krodh, lobh, moh, and hankār) do not disappear and one becomes all the more haughty. All these, and numerous other such devices, do not enable one to meet God. ‘At last I fell at the door of the Master and prayed for discerning intelligence.’ Bhajan is not possible through self-effort alone: ‘God Himself becomes kind to turn one to devotion.’ Therefore, one should meditate on the True One ‘who has everything’. He is the Master of both the worlds and sets all thing right. ‘Discard all other means and take refuge with Him. Fall at His feet, and remember Him all the time to attain and enjoy peace.’ The essence of the matter is that there can be no liberation without God’s bhajan. Only through God’s grace can one know God. Therefore, one should pray for such an intelligence that leads one towards the love of God. It is repeated that ‘this cup of love is given by God to whomever he likes.’ He comes on His own to meet. ‘He, to whom my Master is kind, appropriates the Guru’s word and lives in accordance with it.’64 Nām and shabad figure explicitly in Master Tara Singh’s exposition of bhagtī. ‘Everything is false and meaningless without the Name.’ One should remember God even while working: ‘With hands and feet at work, God should remain lodged in the mind.’ Earthly boons are not the object of loving devotion to God. Indeed, to ask for anything other than God is to ask for sorrow and suffering. No amount of earthly gifts can bring peace.’65 Master Tara Singh takes up the issue of freedom of the individual and fate or determinism in several of his essays with some quotations from gurbāṇī. Logically, if God is all powerful a human being cannot have any power on his own. In any case, he is not the creator of his own powers or his circumstances. There are many verses which underline that whatever happens is done by God. On the other hand, many other verses underscore that human beings reap the fruit of their actions. ‘Whatever I did I received back; no other can be blamed.’ But it is also frequently stated that whatever happens is done by God, and human beings have nothing to do with it. Master Tara Singh suggests that the concepts of karam, kirpā, and kismat are interrelated.66 Some people question the need to pray if their fate is already determined. This question arises from the wrong assumption that prayer (ardās) is not an act. Master Tara Singh emphasizes that ardās is very much a deed like an act of service or cutting wood. Ardās is an action that influences thoughts. Therefore, prayer in itself is an important deed. A good deed exalts the soul and an evil deed lowers it. Lest anyone should think that reward or punishment is received only after death, the Guru says that the effect of a deed is instantaneous: it affects the actor in accordance with the nature of the act. Dirtied clothes can be

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī washed with soap. ‘If you are replete with sins, only the Name can wash them off.’67 Another question is raised: if fate is determined by God why does it vary from person to person. This becomes a reflection on God’s justice. Master Tara Singh points out that every human being experiences sukh and dukh. The two are complementary. Master Tara Singh quotes Guru Arjan. Many have the reputation but rare are the devotees of God who know the essence of union with God. With their gaze on the One they experience no dukh; there is only sukh for them. There is no evil but all good, no defeat but only victory, there is no sorrow but only happiness which they prefer over everything else. Man (p.653) in essence is God and with this realization there is no coming and going (rebirth).68 The tenth essay in this collection is entitled ‘Karman da phal Hukmi kar’ (The Fruit of Actions is Divinely Ordained). Master Tara Singh states that many a verse in Guru Granth Sahib clearly state that every human being reaps the fruit of his own actions. On the other hand, there are many other verses in which it is explicitly said that everything happens in accordance with God’s pleasance and will. For the first proposition four single lines are quoted, and for the second there are three single lines and four other verses. Master Tara Singh points out that people see these two principles as contradictory and get worried. But, actually, both these principles are valid. They represent two points of view, like seeing the same building from the front and the rear. A better view of the whole is possible by looking at it from a high vantage point. Essentially, it is not a question of rational argument but of experience. With genuine acceptance of divine dispensation, it is possible to say honestly ‘whatever You do is sweet to me’.69 In the last essay entitled ‘Antam Nachoṛ’ (In Nutshell Finally), Master Tara Singh refers to the three principles he has stated: (a) human beings reap the fruit of their actions, (b) they may be saved by God’s grace, and (c) there is nothing in the control of human beings. These three principles look at the truth from three sides. The best understanding possible through words is conveyed in Guru Granth Sahib. No human being knows the whole truth and no one can understand it because of the limitations of human intelligence. A created being cannot know the Creator. What God ordains comes to pass. No amount of wisdom can lead to God. All gifts come from God. None can find anything by himself. All depends on God’s grace. God, who is kind to the lowly, shows mercy and enables them to repeatedly recite His Name. ‘Light comes from meeting the sangat, and all hopes are realized by remembering God.’70 Master Tara Singh’s understanding of gurbāṇī remains very close to the scholarly view. Important in itself, this becomes all the more significant when we realize that this understanding was conveyed to the readers of Master Tara

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī Singh’s essays and articles. He educated them in the Sikh faith as much as in Sikh politics. Notes:

(1.) Shabdārth Sri Guru Granth Sahib ji (Amritsar: SGPC [standard pagination]), p. 1. (2.) Shabdārth, p. 5. (3.) Shabdārth, p. 2. (4.) Shabdārth, p. 8. (5.) Shabdārth, p. 243. (6.) Shabdārth, p. 285. (7.) Shabdārth, p. 1,047. (8.) Shabdārth, p. 45. (9.) Shabdārth, p. 288. (10.) Shabdārth, p. 400. (11.) Shabdārth, p. 4. (12.) Shabdārth, p. 560. (13.) Shabdārth, p. 650. (14.) Shabdārth, p. 644. (15.) Shabdārth, p. 761. (16.) Shabdārth, p. 329. (17.) Shabdārth, p. 521. (18.) Shabdārth, p. 958. (19.) Shabdārth, p. 1,266. (20.) Shabdārth, p. 1,302. (21.) Shabdārth, p. 334. (22.) Shabdārth, p. 745. (23.) Shabdārth, p. 1,093. Page 10 of 12

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī (24.) Shabdārth, p. 763. (25.) Shabdārth, p. 779. (26.) Shabdārth, p. 814. (27.) Shabdārth, p. 999. (28.) Shabdārth, p. 1,372. (29.) Shabdārth, p. 433. (30.) Shabdārth, p. 470. (31.) Shabdārth, p. 730. (32.) Shabdārth, p. 953. (33.) Shabdārth, p. 383. (34.) Shabdārth, p. 1,378. (35.) Shabdārth, p. 1,379. (36.) Shabdārth, p. 1,376. (37.) Shabdārth, p. 534. (38.) Shabdārth, p. 712. (39.) Shabdārth, p. 947. (40.) Shabdārth, p. 1,245. (41.) Shabdārth, p. 149. (42.) Shabdārth, p. 1,102. (43.) Shabdārth, p. 338. (44.) Shabdārth, p. 475. (45.) Shabdārth, p. 1321. (46.) Shabdārth, p. 271. (47.) Shabdārth, p. 672. (48.) Shabdārth, p. 824. (49.) Shabdārth, p. 858. Page 11 of 12

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Appendix 1 Master Tara Singh’s Interest in Gurbāṇī (50.) Shabdārth, p. 641. (51.) Shabdārth, p. 722. (52.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, ed., Harjinder Singh Dilgir (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 45, 54. (53.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 2, 3, 7. (54.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 4, 10, 13, 15–18. (55.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, p. 20. (56.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 28–30. (57.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 35–7. (58.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 50–2. (59.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 43–5. (60.) Master Tara Singh, Pirm Piālā, pp. 45–7. (61.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī Kiv Jāṇā (Amritsar: SGPC, 1999), pp. 5–7. (62.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 23–36. (63.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 37–40. (64.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 41–4. (65.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 44–7. (66.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 49–52. (67.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 64–7. (68.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 68–71. (69.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 72–8. (70.) Master Tara Singh, Kio Varnī, pp. 86–8.

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.655) Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh J.S. Grewal

Scholars and historians of Punjabi literature and some biographers of Master Tara Singh have taken notice of Bābā Tegā Singh but not analysed this historical novel in detail.1 However, it is necessary for us to know the work in some detail in order to appreciate its political implication for the colonial period. The essential theme of Bābā Tegā Singh is the loss of Sikh sovereignty. Master Tara Singh dedicated his Bābā Tegā Singh to the late Sardar Harbans Singh Atari who, like his grandfather Sardar Sham Singh Atari, had a great sense of self-respect, concern for the honour of the Sikh faith, spirit of sacrifice, love of freedom, and fearlessness even in ‘these times of slavery’. The novel was written in 1934. Its professed purpose, as Master Tara Singh says in the introduction, was to describe in detail the wars between the Singhs and the English. The title of the novel also refers to the ‘Dogra Conspiracy’. Master Tara Singh did not find any detailed information on this subject in the language of the country, but it was available in books written in English. Or, it was known to Baba Tega Singh (who was supposed to have participated in the Sikh wars). Dr Rajinder Kaur states in her ‘Foreword’ to the novel in 1968 that Baba Tega Singh was an old man of the village from whom her father, Master Tara Singh, in his boyhood used to hear about Sikh Raj and the Sikh wars.2 Master Tara Singh himself places Tega Singh in his village. Therefore, the information given by Dr Rajinder Kaur is not new, nor perhaps independent. Baba Tega Singh appears to be a character imaginatively created by Master Tara Singh. He says that he should state exactly what he had heard from Baba Tega Singh even if the statement was wrong.3 The dialogic form enabled Master Tara Singh to give a free play to his imagination, bridging the past and the present.

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Significantly, Baba Tega Singh makes ample use of Shah Muhammad’s vār and (p.656) some use of Giani Gian Singh’s Panth Prakāsh. Master Tara Singh makes ample use of books in English (which surely were not available to him as a boy and he could not literally have read them out to Baba Tega Singh). The authors quoted by Master Tara Singh are J.D. Cunningham, General Thackwell, William Edward, and B.D. Basu who quote a number of original sources. Thus, Master Tara Singh tries imaginatively to reconstruct the history of the last ten to fifteen years of Sikh rule in the Punjab on the basis of tradition, literary works, and formal histories or memoirs written in English. As it may be expected, his reconstruction is highly selective. His primary purpose was not to depict the past empirically in all its detail, but to create an ideal that could serve as a source of inspiration in the present. Baba Tega Singh is apparently the hero of the novel, but his own hero is Sardar Sham Singh Atari who, as an ideal Sikh, cherishes Sikh values, is just as a Sardar in his treatment of the common people, is a brave soldier and a good leader, and above all, sacrifices his life for the honour of the Panth in his commitment to Sikh Raj. That the novel was read by the people is evident from the fact that it was printed for the seventh time in 1969. The last chapter of Bābā Tegā Singh is ‘additional’ (vādhū). It is not a part of the dialogue between Baba Tega Singh and Master Tara Singh. Extracts from books in English are given to make the reader aware of the power of the Sikhs and to explain the anger of Baba Tega Singh. These extracts are largely from B.D. Basu’s Rise of the Christian Power in India, J.D. Cunningham’s A History of the Sikhs, and William Edward’s Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian. Punjabi translation of all the extracts is also given. Master Tara Singh selected these extracts carefully to convey the impression that the subversion of the Sikh state was the result of a deliberate policy and design of the British, that some of the Sardars proved to be traitors, and that the true Sikhs defended the state with courage and bravery to the point of sacrificing their lives.4 For the British designs to take over the Punjab, Master Tara Singh quotes the statement of the Duke of Wellington dated 6 February 1842: ‘If we are to maintain our position in Afghanistan we ought to have Peshawar, the Khyber Pass, Jalalabad.’ On 18 October 1842, Lord Ellenbrough said that he had agreed to the Sikh occupation of Jalalabad after the British had retired from the place so that the Sikhs were obliged to keep their main force in that region, with insufficient garrisons at Lahore and Amritsar. In such a situation he could muster sufficient forces to occupy the Punjab. ‘The State of Punjab’, he said, ‘is therefore, under my foot. The conflict of parties in the Punjab will render it more dependent every year.’ In his assessment, the Sikh government could last no longer than a year. A year later, the British Friend of India wrote with reference to events in the Punjab: ‘we strongly suspect the Company’s corrupt influence has been employed in framing and fomenting these plots.’ On 20 April 1844, the Page 2 of 13

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Duke of Willington stated that he earnestly hoped that ‘nothing would compel the English to cross the Sutlej’ till November 1845. ‘I shall then be prepared for anything. In the meantime we do all we can in a quiet way to strengthen ourselves.’ On 9 May 1844, Lord Ellenbrough said: ‘Everything is going on there the way as we could desire, if we look forward to the ultimate possession of the Punjab.’5 In order to show that Lal Singh and Teja Singh were traitors to the Sikh state, Master Tara Singh invokes the authority of (p.657) Cunningham who says that it was ‘sufficiently certain and notorious at the time that Lal Singh was in communication with Captain Nicholson, the British agent at Ferozepore’. The author of the Career of Major Broadfoot writes that the Sikhs did not take ‘advantage of the disasters they had inflicted at Ferozeshah’. Cunningham remarks that perhaps ‘neither the incapacity nor the treason of Lal Singh and Teja Singh were fully perceived or credited by the English chiefs’. William Edwards says about the Sikhs: ‘Had they advanced during the night, the result would have been very disastrous for us.’ Subsequently, at Lahore he was informed that ‘their leaders had restrained the men on the pretext that the day was inauspicious for the battle, it by no means being the intention of the Regency that their troops should be successful, but, on the contrary, be destroyed by the British, so as to get rid of them forever’. Before the battle of Sabraon, according the Cunningham, the English informed Gulab Singh that if the army was disbanded, a Sikh ruler in Lahore would be acknowledged. Gulab Singh told them that he was unable to deal with the troops. An understanding was reached between Gulab Singh and the English that the Sikh army would be attacked by the English and, when beaten, it would be openly abandoned by the Sikh government; the passage of the English across the Sutlej would not be opposed and the road to Lahore would be laid open to the English. ‘Under such circumstances of discreet policy and shameless treason was the battle of Sabraon fought.’ William Edwards says that emissaries from Raja Lal Singh arrived and ‘gave us valuable information respecting the enemy’s position’. He goes on to add that, by previous consent, both Raja Lal Singh and Teja Singh broke down the bridge of boats.6 For the courage and bravery of the Sikhs, Master Tara Singh quotes Cunningham’s comment on the battle of Sabraon: ‘Although assailed on either side by squadrons of horse and battalions of foot, no Sikh offered to submit, and no disciple of Govind asked for quarters. While many rushed singly forth to meet assured death by contending with the multitude.’7 For the second Sikh war, Master Tara Singh uses the authority of Thackwell. In the battles of Gujrat and Chillianwala, ‘the Sikhs caught hold of the bayonets of their assailants with their left hand and closing with their adversary dealt furious sword blows with their right’. A Sikh soldier at Chillianwala repulsed three British lancers. All this demonstrates ‘the rare species of courage possessed by these men’.8 Page 3 of 13

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh The full title of the novel is Dogrā Sājish Ate Angrezān Te Singhān De Jang Zubānī Bābā Tegā Singh (The Dogra Conspiracy and the Wars of the English and the Singhs as told by Baba Tega Singh). The first chapter tells us how ‘Teja’ Singh meets Sardar Sham Singh Atari and becomes Tega Singh due to his swordmanship. The second chapter relates to the manner in which Sardar Sham Singh administered justice. The third chapter narrates how Maharaja Ranjit Singh treats one dacoit and how Sardar Sham Singh treats another. The fourth chapter relates to the first Sikh war. The fifth chapter dwells on the martyrdom of Sardar Sham Singh. The sixth chapter relates to what happened after the battle of Sabraon in which Sardar Sham Singh had courted deliberate martyrdom. In the eighth chapter, Baba Tega Singh talks of the battle of Gujrat. In the remaining four chapters, he narrates his adventures after the Sikh forces surrender to the British. ‘I am living on to atone for my deeds’, says Baba Tega Singh in the opening sentence of (p.658) the novel. He goes on to explain: ‘I proved to be a traitor to my Master, the lion-hearted Sant Sardar, Sardar Sham Singh.’ He was being humiliated by all for betraying the Sardar. He remained occupied in taking out mud from the pond he was excavating. Then he begins his story. As a young man named Teja Singh, he was interested in sports, always keen to demonstrate his superiority over the other young men. His father told him to become a Ghurcharha and to fight for a righteous cause (dharam-yuddh). With a horse given by his father, Teja Singh goes to Sukho to approach Sardar Sham Singh for being enlisted among his Ghurcharhas. There he meets Gulab Singh who challenges him to a sword fight. Gulab Singh has the upper hand but he is impressed by the swordsmanship of Teja Singh and promises to recommend him to Sardar Sham Singh.9 They returned to Sukho and told Sardar Sham Singh exactly what they had done. He asked Teja Singh whether he knew only to fight or had cultivated some love of the Sikh faith (sikhī) and humility. Teja Singh kept quiet. Then the Sardar told Gulab Singh that he was the culprit and added that the power of the Mughals was weakened by the pride of the functionaries of the state; now the haughty men like Gulab Singh were weakening the Sikh Raj. The influence of the Dogras was increasing in the Darbar; Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa had become a martyr and the Dogras were trying hard to keep Sardar Sham Singh away from the Darbar. Addressing Gulab Singh, he added that the body, mind, and wealth of a Sikh should be dedicated to the Guru; ‘The Raj belongs to the Khalsa and not to you or me; nor to the Maharaja.’ Ranjit Singh himself was aware that the Raj was to conform to the principles anunciated by Guru Gobind Singh: to destroy evil and to promote dharam. The Maharaja was not greater than Guru Gobind Singh who had emphatically declared his debt to the Khalsa: ‘Through their grace I am what I have become; otherwise there are millions of poor people like me in the world.’ The Guru also made it clear that the Khalsa had no enemy but the evildoer. To draw the sword in anger was to insult the sword. The Guru had Page 4 of 13

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh made it clear that weapons are not our sewaks but we are sevaks of the arms as ‘our pīr’. Guru Gobind Singh had no enmity towards anyone. He took up the double-edged sword (khandā) to defeat the evil and to protect the poor and the pious. He took up the khandā as the last resort when there was no other alternative. A Singh who does not look upon the sword as a symbol of his faith (dharam) does not deserve to be called a Sikh. Gulab Singh was so affected by Sardar Sham Singh’s scolding that he wept bitterly and fell at the feet of the Sardar who told him to seek forgiveness from the Guru. Teja Singh also fell at the Sardar’s feet. He told the young man that he was brave but to draw the sword in haste was not proper for a Sikh. The Sardar asked him what was his name and he said ‘Teja Singh’. The Sardar said jokingly that he was actually ‘Tega Singh’. The new name stuck to him and Teja Singh became Tega Singh.10 Tega Singh tells Master Tara Singh that there was no separate police in those days, and the army police took no bribe. This presented a contrast to the police force of the British times. Sardar Sham Singh put a stop to robbery and theft and never allowed the powerful to oppress the weak or to do any harm to them. Baba Tega Singh narrates the case of a murder in which the Sardar punishes the haughty Sayyads who were the culprits, but spares their lives; at the same time, he helps the aggrieved widow of the barber. At (p.659) one stage, the Sardar asks one of the accused to come out with the truth because he was authorized by the Maharaja to punish the offenders in any manner he liked. He tells both the Sayyads and the barbers that the rich and the poor were equal in the Khalsa Raj; no caste was higher or lower than another; and the one who oppressed another in any way was properly punished.11 Master Tara Singh asked Tega Singh that since the Sardar had spared the life of a murderer, was he not accountable to the Maharaja? Baba Tega Singh said that the Maharaja himself did this kind of justice. Then he tells the story of a robber named Man Singh who was humbled in a sword fight by the Maharaja in disguise, and was enlisted in the army and attached to the troops of Hari Singh Nalwa. He was killed in Hazara. However, Sardar Sham Singh did not spare the life of another robber. He had joined five others to rob some women of their ornaments and to murder them, but he alone had dishonoured them. Rape was too heinous a crime to be punished in any way other than death.12 On the following day, Master Tara Singh asked Baba Tega Singh about the Sikh wars with the English. Baba Tega Singh remarked that he was ninety years old now and yet he was prepared to challenge any young man to equal him in the use of the spade (kahī). ‘The English rule has drained young men of their vigour.’ The Singhs in those days were superior to the English soldiers in horsemanship and in the use of both the matchlock and the sword. At Chillianwala the English soldiers begged for life with blades of grass in their mouths (as if they were cows). Master Tara Singh asked Baba Tega Singh to first talk about the first Sikh war. Baba Tega Singh remarked that in the first Sikh war all the eminent Page 5 of 13

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Sardars, Ministers, and even the Rani Jindan conspired with the English to destroy the Khalsa army. Sardar Sham Singh alone sided with the Khalsa. Sikh ‘sovereignty was destroyed by the Dogras’. Sick and tired of the deception and trickery of the (Dogra) Wazirs, the army constituted its own panchayat but the Dogras used the army panchayat too for their own nefarious purposes.13 Baba Tega Singh quotes Shah Muhammad on the excesses committed by the Singh soldiers when they were instigated by the (Dogra) Wazirs. Rani Jindan proved to be foolish. Misled by the traitors Lal Singh and Teja Singh, she conspired with the enemy to destroy the Khalsa; otherwise, the Khalsa would never have been defeated. Instead of gunpowder she sent bags full of linseed. She did not realize that if the army was destroyed she would not be allowed to rule. Baba Tega Singh quotes eight lines of Shah Muhammad, ending with the statement that Rani Jindan denuded the entire country of its cover. Seeing the lawlessness of the soldiers, Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia sent his man to Sardar Sham Singh with the message that they were two of the old Sardars alive; they had seen the glory of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and now they could not bear the destruction of Khalsa Raj due to internal feuds and free use of the sword. ‘I am going to Benares’, he said, and invited Sardar Sham Singh to accompany him. Sixteen lines of Shah Muhammad depict the situation in which Sardars were being killed one by one and they were frightened of the army which had lost all restraint.14 On getting Sardar Lehna Singh’s message, Sardar Sham Singh became pensive. After some time he returned the message that what Sardar Lehna Singh said was right and no one knew what would happen, but he had committed himself to live and to die with the (p.660) Khalsa. Then Sardar Sham Singh asked Tega Singh about his view of the situation. Tega Singh said that both the Sardars were wise. ‘In the beginning whoever sat on the gaddi was murdered and now whoever becomes the Wazir is killed. You too are sitting at home. If you wish to live in peace then Benares is a better place.’ Sardar Sham Singh smiled and said: ‘We can fight against the enemies of the Khalsa, and the wicked oppressors. But we do not know how to fight against our own people. We are sitting quiet but we cannot forsake the army. If my body can serve the Khalsa in any way, I am ready for the service.’15 The infighting went on increasing and weakened the Sikh power. The English took over the territory of ‘the Singhs’ across the Sutlej. Rani Jind Kaur called the army panchayat to say that she had no money and the English had usurped ‘our country’; the Khalsa army could conquer the territory up to the Jamuna and get their reward. Baba Tega Singh again quotes Shah Muhammad to describe this situation. The Singhs did not realize that the she was in league with the enemy. She wanted to avenge the murder of her brother. This situation is described in twenty-four lines of Shah Muhammad. Baba Tega Singh remarks that no army can fight if its leaders are in league with the enemy. But the Singhs Page 6 of 13

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh demonstrated that they could fight even when their commanders had run away from the battle. ‘Every soldier of the army looked upon the Raj as the Raj of Guru Khalsa and gave his life for the sake of his faith (dharam).’ They could fight but there could be no coordination without the commanders.16 The English believed that no nation (kaum) in the whole of Hindustan could contend with them. They had defeated the Rajputs, the Marathas, and the Afghans. In a short time the Sikhs would be on the run. But their eyes were opened by the battle of Pheru Shahr. Despite their larger army and the larger number of their guns, they suffered great losses: ‘four thousand chairs became empty’. The Governor General (Tundī Lāt) was present in the battle. He was worried, but he was brave. He drew his sword and said, ‘we shall either win or die’. The English army gained courage. Sardar Lal Singh arrived with 20,000 fresh troops. The English trembled with fear but the traitor Lal Singh did not allow the troops to fight. He quietly retired from the scene with all the fresh troops and all the new guns. It was said that the Governor General had sent a message to Lal Singh to take his troops back and not to allow them to attack the exhausted English army. In support of Baba Tega Singh, Master Tara Singh quotes B.D. Basu, William Edwards, and J.D. Cunningham in a footnote.17 Encouraged by the Tundī Lāt, the English artillery resorted to heavy cannonade and the Singhs were hit hard. Their Sardars started shouting ‘run away, run away’. The English were also on the run but Pahara Singh (of Faridkot) told them that the Khalsa had fled. The English returned to claim victory. Then, for two months they collected more guns and more men. Tega Singh was not present in this battle but he heard its account when the Singhs who had taken part in the battle narrated it to Sardar Sham Singh at Atari. The Sardar was visibly sad. After sometime he said that it was time now to save the honour of the Sikh faith. The Wazir, Lal Singh, and the Commander-in-Chief, Teja Singh, had secretly joined hands with the enemy and the traitors had misled the Rani too. It was difficult now to gain victory. But to be called a Singh of Guru Gobind Singh and to leave the field of battle was to stain the Guru’s name. (p.661) He could not see the Khalsa Raj destroyed before his very eyes.18 On the following day, a messenger of Rani Jindan came to Sardar Sham Singh and delivered her message: ‘Where have you hidden yourself Sardar Ji? The Maharaja is not going to return.’ Tears began to flow from the eyes of the Sardar; he kissed his sword and said that much though he wished, the Rani would not escape from the evil influence of the traitors. The army was the arms of the Khalsa. If the arms were cut off, neither the Rani nor her advisors would survive. ‘Come what may, I have to live and die for the Khalsa.’ The Sardar returned the message to the Rani, ‘I am ready; if the Maharaja cannot return, we have to go to him sooner or later, and I am ready here and now.’ Baba Tega

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Singh stopped suddenly and said that he had to take mud out of the pond; he would tell the rest of the story on the following day.19 The fifth chapter of the novel dwells on the martyrdom of Sardar Sham Singh. He prayed: ‘O True King, the honour of the Khalsa is in your hands. If it is your will to bring us back here bring us back with bright countenances; if not, give us a place at your feet.’ Putting on the robe of a martyr, he remained close to the standards in front, with twenty horsemen, including Tega Singh. Near the village ‘Sabhran’, the whole army crossed the River Sutlej. The Singhs wanted to attack the English but the new Wazir, Gulab Singh, was in league with them. He was sending the message again and again that the Singhs should not launch an attack before his arrival. He was an old traitor. Teja Singh was in the rear, looking at Sardar Sham Singh fighting valiantly against all odds. Instead of sending the army for his support Sardar Sham Singh crossed the Sutlej with his army and broke the bridge. To describe the situation, Baba Tega Singh quotes Shah Muhammad and the Panth Prakāsh (of Giani Gian Singh). Master Tara Singh quotes Baba Tega Singh’s remarks but only partly. No printer would print the exact words uttered by Baba Tega Singh against the English.20 After Teja Singh’s flight from the battle, Sardar Sham Singh fought more vigorously and desperately. Many horses he rode were killed. The gunpowder was exhausted and the powder bags sent from Lahore were full of linseed. Sardar Sham Singh addressed the army in a loud voice: ‘O Singhs of Guru Gobind Singh, draw your swords now. The traitors of Lahore have played their last trick, but we have to fulfill the vow of fighting unto death.’ He received nineteen bullets on his body and he was bleeding all over; his clothes and his horse had become blood red. His groom had to help him to another horse. He told the groom to go to Atari now and tell them, ‘we shall not return’. He became a martyr in the saddle and then fell from his horse. There was no Sardar to lead the men. They ran towards the river. The enemy shot at them even when they were crossing the river, or drowning. Tega Singh was among these Singhs. He was saved by a Singh of the village ‘Sabhran’. In high fever, he saw Sardar Sham Singh and heard him saying that Tega Singh had left the field alive in a cowardly manner; he would be cursed by the Guru for his betrayal to his initiatory vow. Baba Tega Singh explains his guilt to Master Tara Singh: ‘In the first place I left the dead body of Sardar Sham Singh and ran away. Secondly, the Sardar had told us to fight unto death and not to turn back. I turned back and thus betrayed him like a cowardly fellow.’ Master Tara Singh tells him that Cunningham admired the bravery of the Singhs and attributed their defeat to the treachery of (p.662) Gulab Singh who had come to an understanding with the British through correspondence with them. For revealing this, Cunningham was removed from service. Baba Tega Singh says, ‘it is true, the English would have been easily defeated by us but we were defeated by the traitors, the Sardars at the court’. Here, Shah Muhammad is quoted to the effect that the Khalsa

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh suffered defeat because Maharaja Ranjit Singh was not there to lead them and to appreciate their valour.21 After the battle, Tega Singh wished to lighten the burden of his guilt by paying homage to the Darbar of Guru Ram Das. On reaching Amritsar he found that thousands of Singhs had gathered there with all kinds of weapons, including some guns. Every day ardās was performed at the Akal Takht and Sri Darbar Sahib that the Guru may save the honour of his Khalsa and keep the soul of Sardar Sham Singh in peace. Meanwhile, Gulab Singh met the English at Kasur on their way towards Lahore. He sent a message to the Khalsa at Amritsar that they should remain ready for a battle and he would tell the English to go back. The panchas of the army went on waiting and Gulab Singh came to an understanding with the English by which he got the territories of Kashmir and Jammu. The news reached Amritsar and it became clear that Gulab Singh had gained his end by holding out the threat of the Khalsa army gathered at Amritsar. There was a surge of anger against Gulab Singh. The panchas resolved that in view of the collusion between the English and the Lahore Darbar, the Khalsa should first get rid of the traitors and then fight the English. Many of the Khalsa soldiers were disappointed and went home. On his way home, Tega Singh thought of seeing the family of Sardar Sham Singh at Atari but he felt ashamed of himself and thought of visiting the spot where Sardar Sham Singh was cremated. There, he wept bitterly and sought forgiveness for his betrayal. He prayed for the soul of Sardar Sham Singh to find rest at the feet of Vaheguru and also prayed that another Sham Singh should come for the restoration of the glory of the Khalsa. At last he fell asleep and saw the English running before the Khalsa in his dream. He was awakened by Bhai Sant Singh Giani who said: ‘Everyone thought that you would have become a martyr along with the Sardar but you are alive. Go home and tell them how you remained alive.’ But Tega Singh did not enter Atari; he went towards Lahore and reached his home.22 After a few years there were forebodings of war between the English and the Sikhs. Sardar Sher Singh had risen in revolt and a large army had started from Bannu to join his standards. Tega Singh sold his buffalo and bought a horse with the intention of joining the Khalsa. Before crossing the Jhelum he learnt that a battle had already been fought at Ram Nagar and the English had suffered heavily at the hands of only a part of the Khalsa army. Sardar Sher Singh did not want to fight near Lahore where the English were well provided with war materials and food supplies. His movement towards Lahore was a ruse to draw them out. Though Sardar Sher Singh had collected more than 100 guns, the English had a much larger number. In the wooded lands away from Lahore the guns of the English army could be less effective than in the plains of Lahore. Tega Singh joined Sardar Sher Singh, who too belonged to Atari and knew him; he got a matchlock as one of the Sardar’s cavalry men.23

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh The English army stopped near Chillianwala. The Khalsa opened fire with their guns. One shell fell close to the Lāt and in his pride (p.663) he ordered the cavalry to attack. A Khalsa Ghurcharha cut off the head of the English officer in charge of the whole brigade. The English cavalry took to flight, closely pursued by the Khalsa horsemen. They entered the area of the English artillery. Tega Singh was not among them but he heard that 200 Khalsa ghurcharhas (cavalry men) had forced four English risalas (cavalry units) to flee. But for their small number they would have killed the Lāt. In the second attack, much of the English army was killed and the rest escaped with the support of the artillery. The Sardar had told the Khalsa not to kill the wounded or those who surrendered. Tega Singh killed about ten Englishmen. Wherever there was a duel between the English and the Khalsa, the Singh had the upper hand. After hours of fight the English found respite in the fall of the night.24 Sardar Sher Singh was inclined to attack the English during the night. However, some Sardars were in league with the English and they suggested that it was necessary to take care of the wounded and to cremate the dead before launching an attack. The soldiers were eager to take advantage of the situation and to fight. But the Sardars decided not to attack. Master Tara Singh tells Baba Tega Singh that Thackwell, who was present in the battle, later expressed his admiration for the bravery of the Khalsa as well as the English. Baba Tega Singh says contemporaneously that the English were no match for the Khalsa. The Khalsa would have won the battle at Chillianwala had they been led by Sardar Sham Singh. Sardar Sher Singh was brave but he was misled by the Sardars. Also, he was not determined on victory or martyrdom. There was no substitute for Sardar Sham Singh. Master Tara Singh gives a large number of quotations from Thackwell’s work and Baba Tega Singh comments that, being an English man, Thackwell could not tell the whole truth. The battle was fought more than fifty years earlier and Baba Tega Singh did not remember all the detail but he often thought that if they had launched the night attack at Chillianwala, they would have finished the English army and reached Lahore in a few days. Indeed, Hindus and Muslims then would have reached Delhi.25 Master Tara Singh asked Baba Tega Singh why the Khalsa did not fight for a month after the battle of Chillianwala. The essential reason, says Baba Tega Singh, was that there was no Sardar Sham Singh among them. Sardar Sher Singh was made hesitant by others and he tried to negotiate terms with the English. They kept him in suspense, holding out favourable terms. Meanwhile they went on collecting more men and more guns. Here, the Panth Prakāsh (of Giani Gian Singh) is quoted. The Pathans ditched the Khalsa. Sardar Sher Singh sent away some guns to be used after the battle of Gujrat, if necessary. The Khalsa suffered heavily in the battle of Gujrat. Had Sardar Sher Singh taken out his sword, like Sardar Sham Singh at ‘Sabhran’, the Khalsa would have been victorious. Master Tara Singh quotes Thackwell on the rare courage of the

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Khalsa. The victory of the English over them was comparable to their victory against Napoleon in the battle of Waterloo.26 After the battle of Gujrat, the Singhs were scattered and Tega Singh went towards his village. Near Rawat, he learnt that Sardar Chattar Singh and Sardar Sher Singh were left with no army and they would surrender to the English. It was being proclaimed that the Singhs would hand over their swords to the English at a darbar in Rawalpindi and anyone who surrendered in this manner (p.664) would be forgiven. On the following day, Tega Singh saw hundreds of Singhs gathered at Rawalpindi. They were all sad and morose. One by one they began to give up their swords with tears in their eyes. Tega Singh’s turn came and he was asked to throw his sword on the heap of weapons. He reacted sharply, snatched the bridle of a horse from a groom, rode away, and reached Attock. From there he rode along the River Indus and crossed over to the country of the Baloches. He sold the horse for Rs 150 and purchased a gun for Rs 100. With his gun and ammunition added to his sword and shield he wandered in Baluchistan. His adventure is described in the rest of the ninth chapter.27 In the tenth chapter, Tega Singh meets Gulab Singh who had become the leader of a gang of Pathan robbers. Gulab Singh narrates how he joined the gang after the battle of ‘Sabhran’. Tega Singh points out that robbery was no occupation for a Singh of the Guru. Gulab Singh tells him that his gang did not kill anyone; they only plundered the rich to help the poor and the helpless. Even so, says Tega Singh, it was better to beg than to rob. Nevertheless, Tega Singh agrees to go with Gulab Singh to the secret place where the gang remained hidden.28 On the following day, Tega Singh talked to Gulab Singh about the battles of Ram Nagar, Chillianwala, and Gujrat reiterating that the real cause of the defeat of the Khalsa was the absence of a leader like Sardar Sham Singh. Tega Singh did not wish to go back but he could not take to robbery. If a member of the society did not get any work to do, the whole society was responsible for this. A person who is out of work has the same right (to food and shelter) as the one who earns. The whole human kind was like a family, and in each family there was a member who did not work but shared food and shelter. To gather wealth in excess of one’s needs was a sin. Intelligence should not be used to deceive, and power should not used to rob. Anything that increased pain and suffering in the world was sinful. Much of the suffering of the people was due to the pursuit of wealth. The game of love means to work together and to eat together. Gulab Singh accepted these ideas without much resistance but not the Pathans. But they too agreed after discussion for three days more. Again and again, the conversation with Gulab Singh turned to the point ‘how to oust the English from the Punjab and who would prove to be a true Sikh of the Guru’. In any case, the rule of dharam shall spring in the land of Guru Gobind Singh with the Guru’s grace.

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh Tega Singh does not stay with Gulab Singh, and goes back to the field in which he had sown bājrā with his own effort.29 In the last chapter, Tega Singh joins Gulab Singh’s gang on the understanding that only the rich would be robbed to help the poor but none would be killed. This ideal could not be pursued in practice and Tega Singh tells Gulab Singh that he cannot go on like this. His firm resolve induces Gulab Singh to disband the gang. Both of them return to the Punjab. Gulab Singh did not go home and lived as a Nihang in the area of Shahpur. Tega Singh told him not to live on the charity of others, and he had started digging a well. Tega Singh himself dug a pond and planted trees. At the end, Baba Tega Singh is grateful to Master Tara Singh for writing his story. He also requested Master Tara Singh to convey his message to the Khalsa to trust the Guru and to remember him all the time; to remain united and not to yield to arrogance for that would lead them to death. If they remained (p.665) united, the world shall bow to them.30 Master Tara Singh was writing this historical novel at a time when the Akalis were divided into several factions and parties. They needed unity more now than ever before in their struggle against the colonial rulers. Notes:

(1.) For example, Sant Singh Sekhon and Kartar Singh Duggal, A History of Punjabi Literature (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1992), p. 240. Bimla Anand, Master Tara Singh (Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995), pp. 88–90. (2.) Master Tara Singh, Dogrā Sājish ate Angrezān te Singhān de Jang Zubīnī, Bābā Tegā Singh [cited hereafter as Bābā Tegā Singh] (Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1999), p. 7. (3.) Bābā Tegā Singh, advertisement at the end. (4.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 124–35. (5.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 124–7. (6.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 127–31. (7.) Bābā Tegā Singh, p. 132. (8.) Bābā Tegā Singh, p. 79. (9.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 9–12. (10.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 12–17. (11.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 18–26. (12.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 27–33.

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Appendix 2 Bābā Tegā Singh (13.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 34–5. (14.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 35–7. (15.) Bābā Tegā Singh, p. 37. (16.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 38–9. (17.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 39–43. (18.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 41–2. (19.) Bābā Tegā Singh, p. 42. (20.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 43–9. (21.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 49–53. (22.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 53–8. (23.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 59–60. (24.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 60–4. (25.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 64–74. (26.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 75–80. (27.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 81–94. (28.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 95–107. (29.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 108–14. (30.) Bābā Tegā Singh, pp. 115–23.

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.666) Appendix 3 Prem Lagan J.S. Grewal

Master Tara Singh’s Prem Lagan (Dedication in Love) was dedicated to Teja Singh Samundri, ‘an old friend’ whose life was characterized by humble, untiring, unperturbed, well-informed, and selfless service of the Panth. The novel opens with the year 1906 and comes up to 1925 when the Jaito morchā had ended. The hero of the novel, whose life is characterized by prem lagan, is Mohan Singh. Educated at Khalsa College, Amritsar, he participated in the Akali Movement. The prototype of Mohan Singh was Bhai Gurdit Singh, an ideal Sikh of the earlier generation. Master Tara Singh uses the word itihās for his narrative and many historical persons, events, and institutions figure in the work. It gets divided, informally, into three interrelated parts: (a) the last year of Bhai Gurdit Singh’s life, (b) Mohan Singh’s life at Khalsa College, Amritsar, and his interest in the Gurdwara Reform Movement, and (c) the Akali Movement as such. Surain Singh, a soldier in the British Indian army, received one ‘square’ (5 × 5 acres) of land in the canal colony in a village (Chak) of Lyallpur District and purchased another ‘square’ with his hard-earned money. He had two sons: Sajjan Singh and Gurdit Singh. Sajjan Singh was an average Jatt who would joke with Dalit women, occasionally drink liquor, and sing folk songs while working on the plough. But he was not a thug or a thief; he used to give faslānā to the patwārī and used to bribe the canal officers as a matter of routine. He amassed no property, nor did he lose any. He was fond of carrying a staff with an iron ring at it lower end, but he was completely under the control of his wife, Dalip Kaur, who was a very cunning and scheming woman. Sajjan Singh had four sons: Kishan Singh, Gulab Singh, Mangal Singh, and Sohan Singh.

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan Kishan Singh was closest to his mother in cunningness, but he was courageous. Jealousy, amounting to malignity, was the consuming passion of Dalip Kaur and Kishan (p.667) Singh. It was directed primarily against Gurdit Singh who was a simple man, like his father. Gulab Singh too was under the control of Dalip Kaur. Mangal Singh was a clever thief. The youngest brother, Sohan Singh, was studying at Khalsa College, Amritsar, and he had great affection for the family of his uncle, Gurdit Singh.1 Gurdit Singh is introduced rather dramatically. On the night of 8 January 1906, he was on duty as a sentry in the Sikh battalion at Peshawar. The Pathans of the frontier used to snatch firearms from the sentries whenever they could. Gurdit Singh was attacked by two Pathans but he overpowered both of them. One of them gave a call to six others. One of those six responded in Pashto. Gurdit Singh fired at the source of that voice and the Pathan fell down. Another attended to him and the rest ran towards Gurdit Singh. The gunshot alarmed the whole Company and Captain Dobson reached the spot with his men. They searched for Gurdit Singh and found him lying in a pool of blood. One Pathan was found dead but three others were captured alive. Captain Dobson ordered a halt. The unconscious Pathan was sent to the hospital. Gurdit Singh was the best wrestler and one of the best athletes of the Indian army. He was called ‘Bhai Ji’ in the battalion because he was a strict follower of Khalsa rahit and performed daily recitation of the prescribed banis; he was a true Sikh of the Guru.2 The news of Bhai Gurdit Singh’s critical condition reached his village on the day of Lohṛī. It was a Sikh village of about thirty households. On Gurpurab and other important days, the Sikhs used to go the dharamsāl which was looked after by a middle-aged granthī who appeared to be a pious Sikh. The centre of the regular gathering of the panchayat was the takht-posh (a wooden bed or seating) which was used every day by a varying number of persons, including the retired army men who used to play chess and others who could openly talk of distilling illicit liquor. Today, half a dozen young men were talking of celebrating Lohṛī by eating meat of a freshly slaughtered he-goat and drinking a pitcher of liquor. A letter written by a friend of Bhai Gurdit Singh from Peshawar was delivered to the daramsāliā by the village Numberdar, Gehna Singh. Gehna Singh was Bhai Gurdit Singh’s collateral cousin, but more than that he was his good friend and regarded Bhai Gurdit Singh as an even-tempered, a brave, and wise Gursikh who served others, especially the indigent. The question now was how and when to convey the message to Bhai Gurdit Singh’s family so that they should reach Peshawar at the earliest. It was agreed that if the news was broken even after the celebration of Lohṛī by the entire village, the family members of Bhai Gurdit Singh would still be able to catch the morning train.3 Bhai Gurdit Singh’s wife, Sheel Kaur, their daughter, Uttam Kaur, and their three-year-old son, Balbir Singh, went to Peshawar even though Sheel Kaur had received a telegram that Bhai Gurdit Singh was ‘out of danger’. Within twelve Page 2 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan days, he had begun to sit on the bed and talk. After five more days, he was allowed to receive visitors. The first to see him was Captain Dobson. Among other things, he asked Bhai Gurdit Singh why he did not shoot the two Pathans whom he had overpowered. Bhai Sahib said that they were unarmed, and ‘to kill an unarmed person was not the dharam of a Sikh, or a soldier’. Captain Dobson was still there when Sheel Kaur, Uttam Kaur, and Balbir Singh entered the room. He was feeling annoyed before he came to know who they were. Then he praised Bhai Gurdit Singh for his strength, bravery, and goodness. He (p.668) was a true Sikh. Captain Dobson also hinted that he would be rewarded.4 In the evening the General of the army at Peshawar, accompanied by the Colonels of all the battalions and all British officers, came to congratulate Bhai Sahib. All of them garlanded Bhai Sahib and the General presented to him a sword, a pistol, and a gun. He told Bhai Sahib that he had recommended to the Commander-in-Chief the award of land for Bhai Sahib, and that the Colonel of his battalion would think of his promotion. About twenty days later, Bhai Gurdit Singh came to his village with his family.5 Every morning Bhai Gurdit Singh used to perform kathā while Sant Ishar Singh would sing shabads along with a few boys of the village. These were the days of leisure and even zamīndārs came to the dharamsāl every day. In the moonlit nights the young men played kabaddī or hide-and-seek. Bhai Gurdit Singh would come there to encourage the boys. He had a healthy influence on the social and religious life of the people. He was good in every way, but he had one grave defect: he made no distinction between good and evil men and he was easily taken in by clever people.6 Dalip Kaur and Kishan Singh were conspiring to have Bhai Gurdit Singh murdered. Secretly they invited three outsiders to devise a plan. Their leader, Sunder Singh, was not prepared to be a party to the murder of a good man like Bhai Gurdit Singh. Kishan Singh and Dalip Kaur first hammered in the point that Gurdit Singh had spoilt the kamins by his good treatment; he was popular among them but they no longer performed any begār for others. Sunder Singh told them that they could follow theBhai’s example. Gulab Singh defends Bhai Sahib by pointing out that he made payment for the work done for him by the kamins. Kishan Singh tells him to keep his mouth shut. Dalip Kaur talks of the humiliation they had to suffer at the hands of even the sweepers. Gurdit Singh had inherited one ‘square’ of land and purchased another. Now he had been awarded two ‘squares’ of land by the government. With 100 acres of land he would become a ra’īs and ‘my four sons’ with only 25 acres of land would be reduced to the status of kamins. Gulab Singh points out that the Bhai had promised to give 25 acres to them. Dalip Kaur says that her husband had arranged for Gurdit Singh’s education, his marriage, and his service. Therefore, the 25 acres he was giving was no gift. In any case, he would still be left with 75 acres of land. She was not prepared to see herself and her daughter-in-law Page 3 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan becoming the slave-girls of Sheel Kaur, and her son Kishan Singh holding the reins of Gurdit Singh’s horse (as a groom). Sunder Singh tells them to work hard like Bhai Gurdit Singh. Dalip Kaur reminds Sunder Singh that he had a home, land, and wealth and yet he was wandering as a dacoit and a fugitive from law because he killed the man who had joked with the widow of his friend. Sunder Singh says that he would do this again for his friends but he would never be a party to any scheme against Bhai Gurdit Singh. On his refusal to raise his hand against the Bhai, Dalip Kaur says that their idea was merely to threaten Bhai Gurdit Singh so that he took the award of 50 acres elsewhere and not in the same village. She wriggled out by saying that Sunder Singh was right and they should do what he says: to talk to Gurdit Singh. However, when Sunder Singh and his two companions leave after the meal, Dalip Kaur tells Kishan Singh on the way home that Sunder Singh was of no use to them and they should think of some other scheme.7 Gehna Singh, the Numberdar, was overhearing their conversation. He told everything (p.669) to Bhai Gurdit Singh in the morning. Gurdit Singh was enraged at first but then recited Farid’s couplet on kissing the feet of those who hit us. Gehna Singh was very emphatic that he should not feed the snakes with milk. But Bhai Gurdit Singh thought that his father too would have asked him to give some land to his nephews because their land was to be divided among them and divided among their sons. On the following day, he gave 25 acres of land he had promised to his nephews, and he told Dalip Kaur that he would give 12.5 acres more when he got possession of 50 acres awarded to him by the government. Gehna Singh was convinced, however, that Dalip Kaur and Kishan Singh would not be appeased and he warned Bhai Gurdit Singh against their design.8 Dalip Kaur went on goading Kishan Singh to get rid of Bhai Gurdit Singh. ‘A good plan is the one that succeeds’, she would say. Or, ‘success itself is goodness’. They misinformed the local thānedār that Gehna Singh had illicit relations with Sheel Kaur and wanted to get rid of Bhai Gurdit Singh. Their plan was to persuade a man called Sant Brahm Das to inject the poison of a snake in Gurdit Singh’s leg with a syringe and kill him on the spot. Dalip Kaur exhorted Kishan Singh to act with courage, and he assured her to ‘have no worry’.9 The plan worked. The corpse of Bhai Gurdit Singh was found in the mortuary of Lahore early in the month of Poh. A police inspector of the CID, Partap Singh, was appointed to investigate the case and to trace the murderer. Gehna Singh was the first suspect, because the local thānedār, Mihar Ali, insisted that the village Chaukidar, Fattu, had informed him much earlier of the illicit affair between Gehna Singh and Sheel Kaur and their intention to murder Bhai Gurdit Singh. Gehna Singh himself had gone to the thana to report the absence of Bhai Gurdit Singh. The hot conversation between the Numberdar and the thānedār was overheard by Partap Singh. He came to Gehna Singh’s rescue. Partap Singh Page 4 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan belonged to the original village of Gehna Singh near Patti. In his talk to Partap Singh, Gehna Singh was adamant that he did not even know that Bhai Gurdit Singh had been murdered. He also explained why he was convinced that Gurdit Singh’s murder was the work of Dalip Kaur and Kishan Singh. Then Partap Singh took out a letter from his pocket and asked Gehna Singh if this was his letter. It was addressed to Gurdit Singh. Gehna Singh admitted that it was his letter but he did not remember when he had written it and why. Later on it was discovered that he had written this letter much earlier and also sent a verbal message with Fattu, the Chaukidar. Fattu had given the verbal message to Gurdit Singh but he gave the letter to Kishan Singh. This letter was kept by Kishan Singh all this time and handed over now to the thānedār, asserting that Gehna Singh had planned with the dacoit Sunder Singh to murder Gurdit Singh and that there was a talk of personal relationship between Sheel Kaur and Gehna Singh. Partap Singh discovered that no one else in the village had actually heard of any such talk. Meanwhile, a woman told Sheel Kaur and Uttam Kaur of the murder of Bhai Gurdit Singh. When Partap Singh reached their house he found that Sheel Kaur was deeply distressed by the death of her husband; her sorrow was unbearable. She appeared to be genuinely faithful to her husband. But who was then the murderer?10 Partap Singh talked to Dalip Kaur later. She suggested that generally there were three reasons for murder: gold, woman, or land. In the present case, it could only be (p.670) a woman. ‘Women are very deceitful. But, I cannot say anything in this matter. It is better kept under the carpet.’ Partap Singh was intrigued by the fact that only three persons talked of Sheel Kaur’s illicit relation with Gehna Singh: Fattu, Kishan Singh, and Dalip Kaur. He threatened Fattu with drastic action if he did not tell the truth. It turned out that Dalip Kaur had told all this to Fattu, asking him never to mention her name but to inform the thānedār. Fattu also told Partap Singh that Gehna Singh’s letter to Bhai Gurdit Singh had been handed over to Kishan Singh and not to Gurdit Singh.11 Sant Brahm Das had been found dead in a compartment of the train in which Bhai Gurdip Singh was found dead. Partap Singh could trace the gurdwara where Sant Brahm Das was staying when he received a message from a Sikh boy that a Sardar wanted to meet him immediately. The boy could be the missing link but he could not be traced. Eventually, Partap Singh closed the investigation with the remark that he was fully convinced that Kishan Singh and Dalip Kaur were responsible for the death of Bhai Gurdit Singh but no proof was available due to the complexity of their conspiracy. He hoped, however, that the proof would turn up later in some other case.12 Many years later a dacoit named Billy was caught. Questioned by Partap Singh as Superintendent of Police in the CID, he turned out to be the Sikh boy who had given Kishan Singh’s message to Sant Brahm Das. His real name was Baldev Singh. He knew all about the crime

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan because he was travelling in the same train as a pickpocket at that time. Confronted with this evidence Kishan Singh felt obliged to confess his crime.13 Mohan Singh is introduced as the first cousin of Randhir Singh who was married to Kishan Singh’s daughter Harbans Kaur. Mohan Singh was about twenty years old and he had passed Formative Assessment (FA) examination at Khalsa College, Amritsar. He was a handsome athlete, good at kabaddi and long jump. He also sang shabads in the village gurdwara. Bhai Gurdit Singh liked the young man. He was still unmarried. His father, Gulzar Singh, owned 25 acres of land and he was a good man, but he was under the thumb of his wife, Amar Kaur, who was likely to be a harsh mother-in-law.14 On his return from Bhai Gurdit Singh’s village, Mohan Singh joined the BA class at Khalsa College where he was the best athlete and the best player of hockey and football. He was better than other students in all subjects, though more inclined towards religious study. With all the physical, moral, and intellectual traits of an ideal young man, Mohan Singh was at the head of a small group of boys who supported whatever was good and opposed whatever was evil. The goondās (rascals) of Amritsar were afraid of Mohan Singh and his group. He used to play practical jokes with the students in a spirit of comradery. He was always helpful to the weak. Bhai Gurdit Singh came to know of all this when he visited Khalsa College and stayed there as the guest of Sohan Singh, the youngest son of Kishan Singh.15 On his return to the village, Bhai Gurdit Singh consulted Gehna Singh about Uttam Kaur’s marriage to Mohan Singh, telling him that he had discussed this matter with Sheel Kaur. The marriage was performed in accordance with Gur-maryādā. The Anand marriage was rare in those days in the canal colony. Bhai Gurdit Singh did not incur much expense on marriage, but invited the best rāgīs (singers of gurbāṇī), Bhai Man (p.671) Singh and Bhai Bhan Singh, on this occasion. Bhai Man Singh gave a moving exposition of Guru Nanak’s idea of doing good even to the evil and an affective narration of the martyrdom of the Sahibzadas.16 Mohan Singh’s father, Gulzar Singh, had a profound trust in Gursikhi. He had a great contempt for sants, mahants, bhais, ragis, and the like. He had committed five pauris of the Japjī to memory and he used to recite these stanzas every morning. Before going to sleep he would recite Vāhegurū, Vāhegurū, a few times. He used to send the ‘first fruit’ of every crop to the gurdwara. He respected the village granthī who was a good man. Amar Kaur, Mohan Singh’s mother, was greedy and miserly but not devoid of love and faith. Like most other women of those days, she used to keep fasts and follow other such practices suggested by Brahmans but her real dedication was to the Guru’s house. She wanted Mohan Singh to be initiated at the Akal Takht but Gulzar Singh did not like the idea of going to the greedy pujārīs of the Akal Takht.17

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan However, Mohan Singh was much impressed by the zeal and sacrifice of the Singhs in the past as narrated by Bhai Nirvair Singh who used to perform kathā of the Panth Prakāsh in the village gurdwara. Mohan Singh was in the tenth class at Government High School, Lyallpur, when he took amrit from a parchārak who emphasized: ‘from now on regard your body, mind and wealth as the Guru’s’. While mentioning the four proscriptions (kurehitān), he had underlined that a Sikh of the Guru should never dream of a woman other than his wife. Mohan Singh was determined to follow these injunctions faithfully. This resolve was confirmed by his study of the two books he had received in prize: Character by Smiles and The Students Manual by Todd. He read some more books by Smiles and noted down in his diary the eight vows he had taken.18 One of these vows was to follow the path of Sikhi and to propagate this faith. Another was to speak the truth. Since his body, mind, and all his possessions were dedicated to the Guru he would protect them: the body, through regular exercises and healthy diet; the mind, by reciting the prescribed bāṇīs every day, reading of the Granth Sahib, and associating with pious men; and the possessions, by using them in the service of the body and the mind, but never for any sensual pleasure, never allowing even the thought of a women to enter his mind. He would never read anything about women and speak or hear of women in a sexual context. He would not go to any theatre, dance performance, or any other form of entertainment till the age of forty. He would never indulge in ostentation. The way in which Mohan Singh fulfilled these vows in his life was quite exceptional. In word and deed, he never allowed sensual pleasures to enter his life.19 Mohan Singh’s marriage introduced some change in his attitude. He did not avoid light talk about women, but his jokes were refined and subtle and not crude and vulgar. The repressed desires now found a release in the form of intense yearning for his wife. He could not concentrate on his studies. But their love was not yet true. Here Master Tara Singh brings in his own Grihast Dharam Sikhiya to clarify the distinction between ‘false love’ and ‘true love’. In one case the basis of love was instant physical attraction and the lure of sensual pleasure. That was why love stories ended with marriage. The serious problems of mutual relationship arise later in married life. Conjugal love, on the other hand, grows slowly but steadily on the basis of moral (p.672) qualities, mutual regard and consideration, and willingness to make sacrifice.20 Mohan Singh was present at the bhog ceremony of the late Bhai Gurdit Singh. He stayed in the village to look after the arrangements for bringing the new 50 acres under cultivation. Principal Cole of Khalsa College sent Mohan Singh’s friends to persuade him to return to studies. Half-heartedly, he went back to the College and tried to find solace in sports. He was half through the third year examination when he received a letter from Sheel Kaur, informing him that Uttam Kaur was suffering from typhoid fever. He wanted to go to the village but Page 7 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan his friends insisted that he should complete the examination. Finally, he decided to go. Uttam Kaur was in a bad state but still in her senses. She asked Mohan Singh to promise that he would take care of her brother, Balbir Singh, after her death. He told her that he had already given this promise to ‘Singh Sahib’, the late Bhai Gurdit Singh. Uttam Kaur was now satisfied that he would keep his promise. She died three months after the death of her father.21 Mohan Singh was different from Bhai Gurdit Singh in two ways: he was not as calm and cool as Bhai Gurdit Singh and he could make a clear distinction between a good and an evil person. After Bhai Gurdit Singh’s death, his resolve to oppose the evildoers had become firmer. His first duty now was to protect Balbir Singh and to enable him to stand on his own two feet. And then, he would dedicate his life to the Panth. Despite pressure from his parents, he did not remarry. He and his wife had become ‘one light in two bodies’ after their marriage and he could not marry any other woman. His friends from the College, including ‘stone’ (patthar, the nickname of Tara Singh), came to the village to persuade him to complete his BA. Eventually, he came to Amritsar with Balbir Singh and Sheel Kaur so that he could resume his studies and also ensure Balbir Singh’s safety.22 Seven chapters of the novel here dwell on the intrigues of Dalip Kaur and Kishan Singh against Balbir Singh and Mohan Singh with the intention of getting them killed. Even more than the chapter on the investigation of Bhai Gurdit Singh’s murder, these chapters engage the reader as a detective story that highlights the moral and physical strength of Mohan Singh and his intelligence. It may be enough to note that Balbir Singh was kidnapped and taken to the River Ravi by the kidnappers who were challenged there by Mohan Singh and his college friends, including Tara Singh, but the kidnappers escaped in the darkness of the night. Balbir Singh was left behind and taken home in the morning by a rich but childless industrialist of Lahore who was a Sikh of Guru Nanak. He adopted Balbir Singh as a son and brought him up as a Sikh. Deliberately misinformed by Dalip Kaur, the industrialist put the idea in Balbir Singh’s mind that Mohan Singh had killed his father and he wanted to kill Balbir to get hold of his property. Mohan Singh failed to find him but he was able to save himself from some hired assassins.23 Mohan Singh joined the Gurdwara Reform Movement after the massacre at Nankana Sahib in February 1921. He was in Mianwali Jail with Master Tara Singh and others in connection with the Keys morchā. He told his story of the past fifteen years and closed it by telling others that Balbir Singh was alive and now nineteen years old. Master Tara Singh said that now that Balbir Singh was safe Mohan Singh could whole-heartedly plunge into the Gurdwara Reform Movement. The struggle was to last long. He reminded Mohan Singh of the college days when they (p.673) used to talk of the future to make sacrifices like the Singhs of old days. That time had come. Mohan Singh said that he would not Page 8 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan lag behind anyone in this struggle but he would not join any committee. He would regard the purpose of his life fulfilled if he lost his life in a morchā.24 The Keys morchā ended because of the strength demonstrated by the Akalis. The only argument that counted with the British Government, and in politics, was strength. The prisoners were released with the declaration that the government had decided to return the keys to the SGPC because the Sikh states were in favour of this idea. The victory of the Akalis went to their heads and they started condemning the government in very harsh terms. Mohan Singh left Master Tara Singh, with the parting remark that their attitude would harm the Akali cause. Tara Singh valued Mohan Singh’s advice and tried to act upon it. But he could not restrain burchhā-gardī which ended only with the well-planned and simultaneous arrests of 1,800 Akalis.25 Thinking that the Akalis were cowed down, the government went to the other extreme. The Guru-ka-Bagh morchā was the result of its aggressive policy. The jathā that became the most famous in the morchā was that of Lyallpur. Mohan Singh was in this jathā and he received the heaviest blows of lāṭhīs before he fell down unconscious. He was lying unconscious in Guru-ka-Bagh when Dalip Kaur tried in vain to poison him. After the morchā, in the office of the SGPC, Mohan Singh asked the members present what was to be done about Nabha. His own view was that disunity on this issue would be fatal to the Panth.26 Mohan Singh joined the first shahīdī jathā in the Jaito morchā. He was arrested and imprisoned. Balbir Singh, now in his early twenties, joined the third jathā as ‘Balwant Singh’ and came to the same jail. His intention was to take revenge on the assumption that Mohan Singh was the murderer of his father, Bhai Gurdit Singh. Balwant Singh identified Mohan Singh before the jathās were released and marched towards Amritsar. On the way to Tarn Taran, Balwant Singh challenged Mohan Singh to a fight. They fixed the place of their duel outside Tarn Taran. They started with a wrestling match. Mohan Singh overpowered Balwant Singh, and in the process he saw ‘Balbir Singh’ tattooed on his arm. When Mohan Singh told Balwant Singh that he was Balbir Singh, son of Bhai Gurdit Singh, Balbir Singh thought it was merely a confession of recognition and still insisted on sword fight. Partap Singh, who had come to know of Dalip Kaur’s whole scheme to get Mohan Singh killed during his fresh investigation into Gurdit Singh’s murder, reached the spot, stopped the fight, and explained everything. Balbir Singh was deeply grieved to realize how gravely he was mistaken.27 Mohan Singh received a sword cut in the fight. After dressing the wound at Tarn Taran he was brought to the Meo Hospital, Lahore. Sheel Kaur also came there besides Balbir Singh’s father, Lala Lorindi Ram, and his wife, Pritam Kaur. Mohan Singh developed fever and the doctors did not know its cause. Mohan Singh’s father and mother and his brother also came there. And then Dalip Kaur’s sons, except Kishan Singh, and Kishan Singh’s daughter Harbans Kaur Page 9 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan reached there. One night Mohan Singh suddenly sat up and announced that he had seen Bhai Gurdit Singh and he would join him. He exhorted Balbir Singh to follow the path of Sikhi and serve the Panth. There was the need to give a new direction to the Panth. A Sikh (p.674) of the Guru performs selfless service. Then Mohan Singh performed ardās and praying for the welfare of the whole of human kind, he breathed his last.28 Khalsa College, Amritsar, figures frequently in the novel. There are two chapters on the College. The author is nostalgic about the College of 1906 and talks of physical and moral changes which had about since then. New buildings had come up but the vigour of life was absent. He had spent four years in the College. He could say with confidence that the old youthful vigour was there no longer—neither courage nor generosity, neither physical strength nor spiritual force. Even the teachers presented poor models. A slavish mentality had got hold of people and they had come to believe that whatever was done by the British was good. The robust and lively spirit of 1906 was reflected in the nicknames given to a large number of students, depicting the dominant trait of the personality and character of each. Thirty-five examples are given. The interests and activities of the students are described in detail in connection with Mohan Singh.29 The life of the College is depicted as realistically as the life of the village in the canal colony, both of which fell within the imaginative range of Master Tara Singh. In connection with the Gurdwara Reform or the Akali Movement, the life of the political prisoners in Mianwali Jail, Amritsar Jail, Nabha Jail, and Lahore Fort Jail is described. In Mianwali Jail, they could sit in the sun, read books, and play. Above all, they could share their views and their experiences. Sardar Amar Singh of Jhabal narrated his story. The national movement, according to him, had acquired a rapid pace after the Martial Law and the Congress session in Amritsar. At a dīwān held at Wachhoa, all those who had honoured O’Dwyer at a farewell function were declared to be tankhāhiyās (defaulters, liable to undergo penance prescribed by the Khalsa). The decision at a dīwān held at Manji Sahib to take out a mock funeral of Sardar Arur Singh, the sarbrah of the Golden Temple, obliged him to resign. Amar Singh was the leader of the Singhs who took possession of Gurdwara Babe-di-Ber in Sialkot which was handed over to the Central Majha Diwan on its arrival. Amar Singh joined Teja Singh Bhuchar, and Kartar Singh Jhabbar went to Panja Sahib to take over the Gurdwara.30 The influence of Teja Singh Bhuchar over the Central Majha Diwan was on the decline and it was proposed to form a new organization. A dīwān was held at the Manji Sahib. Sardar Balwant Singh Kulla was elected Jathedar of Shiromani Akali Dal and Teja Singh Bhuchar as General Secretary, and it was resolved that they should arrange regular elections to the Shiromani Akali Dal; it was also resolved that the Shiromani Akali Dal would not take over any gurdwara without orders from the SGPC. On the following morning, however, Teja Singh Bhuchar, Page 10 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan Kartar Singh Jhabbar, and Balwant Singh went to Tarn Taran to take over the Darbar Sahib without the consent of the SGPC. Amar Singh Jhabal went to his village because he did not approve of this indiscipline. Later on he came to know that a Singh had died there, and he went to Tarn Taran. The Darbar Sahib had been taken over by them. Against his advice, they decided to occupy Gurdwara Guru-ka-Bagh and, against his wishes, he accompanied them. The mahant of the Gurdwara handed over the keys to the sangat. A (p.675) managing committee was appointed, with Dan Singh Wachhoa as President and Amar Singh himself as Vice-President. The jathā stayed behind and on the following day, Amar Singh received the misinformation that the mahant was likely to create a problem. He went to Guru-ka-Bagh and found that Kartar Singh Jhabbar was asking for reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred. Amar Singh borrowed Rs 70 from the village, gave Rs 20 to him and Rs 50 to the rest of the jathā.31 A dīwān was held at Ramdas and it was decided to take over the Gurdwara at Teja. Amar Singh insisted that permission should be sought from the SGPC. A Singh was sent to the office of the SGPC who returned in the evening and said there was no responsible person in the office and he had sent twenty to twentyfive persons towards Teja. In view of the possible loss, if they were not supported, Amar Singh felt obliged to go there. The jathā was sent to Teja and Amar Singh stayed with a relative in the village Man. He found that 700 Sikhs of the area were in favour of the mahant. Amar Singh gave detail of the procedure by which the Sikhs of the area were won over.32 When the jathā reached Dera Baba Nanak, the mahant was not there. He came on the following day and said that he was prepared to come to a settlement. Negotiations went on during the day and in the evening came the news that the mahant at Nankana Sahib had massacred 200 Singhs. The Singhs of the jathā were persuaded to leave Dera Baba Nanak and to go to Nankana Sahib. Amar Singh took money from his house in Jhabal and reached Patti with the jathā, and the Gurdwara there was taken over. Much later, a settlement was made with its Nirmala Mahant and the management was entrusted to him. For some time, Amar Singh stayed at Nankana Sahib. Two Singhs of the jathā were arrested and imprisoned for six months. At Amritsar, Amar Singh spoke against the ban imposed on meetings: ‘the Government presses our throat, we feel suffocated and our eyes bulge out, and the Government says “you are threatening us”.’ He was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and sent to Gurdaspur Jail. The issue of kachhehrā cropped up and Amar Singh remained adamant and he be allowed to wear kachhehrā. The same thing happened in Rohtak Jail when he was sent there. For a whole night the constables and Numberdars showered abuses on him and he was confined to solitary cell for nineteen days. Sardar Kharak Singh, Sardar Teja Singh, and others saw Amar Singh at Rohtak and told him that he had been elected President of the Sikh League of Lyallpur. On their insistence he accepted the office. When Amar Singh was being taken to Amrtisar, he came to know at Kasur that Teja Singh Bhuchar and Kartar Singh Page 11 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan Jhabbar had sought forgiveness. Taunted by a Muslim youth, Amar Singh said, ‘we feel ashamed on their account’. Soon after his release from the jail, the Keys morchā started and Amar Singh was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1,000. He was sent to Mianwali Jail.33 The story narrated by Master Tara Singh in the Mianwali Jail outlines the history of the Akali movement as seen by Master Tara Singh. When Sardar Arur Singh was removed from Sarbarahi, Master Tara Singh was the headmaster of Khalsa High School, Lyallpur. The Akal Takht came under the control of the Central Majha Diwan. Master Tara Singh was elected a Member of the SGPC the previous year. Teja Singh Bhuchar and Kartar Singh Jhabbar were taking over gurdwaras at various places. They were supported by the Central Majha Diwan. The SGPC was not (p.676) in favour of such activities but there was no strict discipline and the Jathedars who took over gurdwaras did not care for the SGPC.34 The case of Nankana Sahib was a clear demonstration of the lack of any coordination between the SGPC and the individuals or the groups who used to take over gurdwaras. The mahant of Nankana Sahib was notorious for his reprehensible conduct and, since such mahants were being turned out of the gurdwaras, he was apprehensive of his expulsion. He had a lot of money. The bad characters of Majha and some Pathans were ready to work for him, and he was close to the officials. He had acquired firearms too. It was generally known that there would be a bloody fight if an attempt was made to take over Gurdwara Janam Asthan. The mahant on the one hand and Kartar Singh Jhabbar and Bhai Lachhman Singh Dharowalia on the other were preparing for action. The SGPC was keen to avoid a violent collision. For this reason, the dates of a dīwān at Nankana Sahib were announced, appealing to the Sikh rulers and the government to help the SGPC in taking up the management of the gurdwaras. The mahants fixed an earlier date for their conference on the initiative of Narain Das, the mahant of Nankana Sahib. The meeting of the SGPC at Amritsar was fixed for 19 February 1921.35 On 18 February, Sardar Teja Singh Samundri came to Khalsa High School, Lyallpur, and told Master Tara Singh that Bhai Kartar Singh Jhabbar and Bhai Lachhman Singh Dharowalia were ready to go to Nankana Sahib on the night of the 19th and enter the Gurdwara in the early morning of the 20th. Sardar Teja Singh was afraid that they would be murdered there; they should be stopped. Meanwhile, Bhai Buta Singh of Chak No 204 came in and said that his duty was to reach Nankana Sahib to arrange wooden ladders to climb over the walls of the Gurdwara because the gates would be shut at that time. Master Tara Singh and Sardar Teja Singh sent a telegram to Kartar Singh Jhabbar at Khara Sauda that he should meet them at Chuharkana Station on the 18th night. Kartar Singh

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan Jhabbar could not come but he sent Bhai Sucha Singh to meet them. They told him that Kartar Singh should be stopped from going to Nankana Sahib.36 At the Lahore Station, Master Tara Singh and Sardar Teja Singh met Bhai Dalip Singh who had come to catch the train for Amritsar. They told him that he, as Jathedar of the Sheikhupura District, should stop Kartar Singh and Lachhman Singh from going to Nankana Sahib. Bhai Dalip Singh went to the office of the Akālī newspaper and found Sardar Jaswant Singh Jhabal. Both of them went to Chuharkana. Master Tara Singh and Sardar Teja Singh informed the members of the SGPC at the meeting on 19 February that they had made arrangements for stopping the jathās but if they did not stop no action should be taken with regard to them. The SGPC refused to pass any resolution (gurmatā). But a message was telegraphed to Bhai Lachhman Singh by a person who had earlier consulted him and decided upon some code words which meant that the SGPC had accorded its permission for action.37 Bhai Dalip Singh and Sardar Jaswant Singh had to work hard to persuade Bhai Kartar Singh Jhabbar not to go to Nankana Sahib. Jaswant Singh returned to Lahore. Kartar Singh was to inform Bhai Lachhman Singh and others, and Bhai Dalip Singh was to stop any Singh or a jathā still going to Nankana Sahib. Kartar Singh failed to inform Lachhman Singh who reached Nankana Sahib on the morning of the 20th. Throughout the night, Bhai Dalip Singh and Bhai Buta Singh (p.677) had remained on the watch out for any Singh or a jathā going to Nankana Sahib. No one came and they thought that no one would come. They went to the kārkhānā of Bhai Uttam Singh. Shortly afterwards they heard shots and ran towards the Gurdwara. Buta Singh was stopped on the way by a mistrī Singh but Dalip Singh reached the Gurdwara and he was killed.38 It was learnt later that Bhai Lachhman Singh Lyallpuri had actually met Bhai Lachhman Singh Dharowalia and given the message that the jathā should return. Bhai Lachhman Singh Dharowalia agreed but Bhai Tehal Singh said that they had performed ardās and could not stop now. All the Singhs of the jathā handed over cash or some other article to a Singh and moved forward. The Gurdwara was open. They entered and sat inside. Mahant Narain Das sent his men to fire at the Singhs from the roofs. With the exception of one Singh, who defied the assailants and jumped out of the Gurdwara, the entire jathā was killed. About 130 Singhs were found dead.39 Master Tara Singh, Sardar Teja Singh, and Baba Kehar Singh were going back to Lyallpur by train. At Chicho-ki-Malhian, they heard of the martyrdom of the Singhs at Nankana Sahib. The train did not stop at Nankana Sahib. They decided to get down at Sangla Hill and to walk to Nankana Sahib with some other people during the night. They reached the fall (jhāl) of Chander Kot in the morning. The jathā of the Virks under Jathedar Kartar Singh Jhabbar was already there. Other jathās also arrived and they marched towards Nankana Sahib, about 800 Singhs Page 13 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan in all. When the jathā reached Nankana Sahib, some troops had already arrived. The Commissioner of the Division was also there. Along with Sardar Mehtab Singh, he met the jathā and asked the Jathedar to stop. The jathā stopped. Negotiations followed. The control of the Gurdwara was entrusted to the SGPC and a sub-committee was formed for its management, with Sardar Harbans Singh Atari as its President.40 After the success of the Keys morchā, the Akalis became aggressive. The SGPC could impose no discipline over them and the leaders of the SGPC were worried about this situation. The arrests of Akalis were helpful to the SGPC. On the wrong assumption that the SGPC too had become weak, the government arrested the Akali workers collecting wood from the Guru-ka-Bagh for the langar of the Gurdwara. The SGPC called a general meeting and the government arrested some of the leaders on this occasion. A jathā of 100 was now sent from Amritsar to Guru-ka-Bagh. It was stopped on the way and beaten with lāṭhīs to unconsciousness. Jathās continued to start from the Akal Takht every day to be beaten and carried to the hospital. This brutal action against peaceful agitators created a stir in the whole of India. About 5,600 Singhs were arrested and 1,500 wounded. At last, the government used the face-saving mediacy of Sir Ganga Ram to riggle out. The Guru-ka-Bagh morchā brought discipline to the Akalis.41 The office of the SGPC in Amritsar was located in the rooms on the first floor of a building near Baba Atal Sahib. The room meant for the meetings of the Working Committee of the SGPC was called ‘kameti-ghar’. Before and after the meeting of the Working Committee, some members used to take a nap here, eat food, hold consultations, joke, and dispute and quarrel about various issues. The Committee was well known even in England but its members were very ordinary men. Around 9:00 p.m. one day, (p.678) some members were talking about Maharaja Ripudaman Singh of Nabha. ‘This Maharaja’, said one member, ‘was sympathetic to the Panth from the very beginning. He was praised in a pamphlet of the Khalsa Tract Society’. ‘But now the Chief Khalsa Diwan people are opposed to him’, said another, ‘and this opposition goes back to the time of the Anand Marriage Act’. The third member said that the Maharaja had never opposed the Panth, and at the time of the Nankana Sahib tragedy he had worn black turban in accordance with the resolution of the Panth, and then in 1922 he gave no harsh treatment to the Akalis of his state. The fourth member said impatiently that there was no point in meaningless talk day after day. The real issue was whether or not to take up the matter of his abdication. It was a tough matter but if they succeeded no Sikh ruler would ever become a renegade. The second member spoke again: ‘But it is dangerous, though there is no doubt that injustice has been done to the Maharaja of Nabha and this has been done because he worked for the welfare of the country and the Panth, and several British officers were displeased with him.’ The fourth member pointed out that the newspapers and public meetings had created a great enthusiasm among the people, and even if the SGPC did not take up the Nabha issue, the Shiromani Page 14 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan Akali Dal would. If the Shiromani Akali Dal did not succeed, the SGPC would also be finished. It was in the interest of the Panth, therefore, that the SGPC should side with the Shiromani Akali Dal. ‘If we do not take up this issue, it would surely be our defeat. But if we take it up, there is a possibility of victory.’ ‘But these Maharajas cannot be trusted’, said a fifth member. The second member suggested that they could have a written statement from the Maharaja. The third member said that only two days were left for the general meeting of the SGPC but the Working Committee had not come to a final position.42 With regard to the Jaito morchā, it is stated that the Akhand Pāṭh at Jaito was initially started in connection with removal of the Maharaja of Nabha from his gaddī. The police cordoned off the place and the Singhs started Akhand Pāṭhs. In desperation, the police arrested the Akalis and the readers (pāṭhīs), including the pāṭhī who was reading aloud the Granth Sahib at that time. Thus, the Akhand Pāṭh was interrupted. The police maintained that the pāṭh was not interrupted because another pāṭhī had picked up the reading in place of the one removed. But the Akalis maintained that the pāṭh was interrupted. The granthī of the Gurdwara was not clear. First he had written to the SGPC that pāṭh was interrupted, but later in the court he said that it was not. The Akalis remained convinced that the pāṭh was interrupted and this was the view of the people.43 The SGPC thought of sending a jathā of 500 Singhs to Jaito. But soon it was decided to wait for the reaction of the government. The Committee knew that the government was planning to take action against the SGPC. Unaware of the wait-and-see policy of the SGPC, the government declared the SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal to be unlawful associations. The leaders of both the organizations were arrested.44 The first shahīdī jathā of 500 Akalis was accompanied by a large number of other Sikhs, the sangat, and they did not leave the jathā even when the Jathedar asked them not to come with the jathā into the Nabha state territory. Wilson-Johnston, the British Administrator of Nabha, tried to announce his order but no one listened to him. The (p.679) jathā and the sangat were pushing forward and the Administrator ordered firing. About 40 to 50 persons were killed and more than 100 were wounded. The jathā and the sangat entered the Gurdwara Tibbi Sahib. The jathā was tried for opening fire. The Singhs were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Both the allegation and punishment were wrong. The attempt to correct one mistake with another created a great misunderstanding between the Sikhs and the government.45 The first shahīdī jathā was not ineffectual. The government thought of a negotiated settlement. The task was assigned to General Birdwood. Through his efforts, a written document was prepared in consultation with the Akali leaders detained in the Lahore Fort Jail. Essentially, the government agreed to pass a Gurdwaras Act and to release the Akali prisoners. But the wording of the Page 15 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan document was not clear on the second point. What it said was that after the Act was passed a joint committee of Sikh leaders and Government officials would review the cases of Akali prisoners but the persons imprisoned for the use of violence would not be released. The Akali leaders suspected that the government had no intention of releasing the Akalis of the first shahīdī jathā. Therefore, the Akali leaders insisted that it should be clearly stated that these Akalis would be released. The government thought that the Akalis were trying to show that they had the upper hand. The negotiations broke down on this point. The government could not afford to admit that the Akalis of the first shahīdī jathā were unjustly penalized, and the Akalis looked at the clause as a device to divide the Akalis. It did not occur to anyone that this matter could be entrusted to the Birdwood Committee for a mutually acceptable decision. Some people were saying that the Birdwood proposal was better than the settlement agreed upon later, but they did not really know what that proposal was.46 The Prem Lagan is interesting and important in several ways. Master Tara Singh’s primary purpose was to inform and instruct the reader and secondarily, to please. His depiction of the economic, social, and religious life of the Sikhs of the canal colony in the early decades of the twentieth century appears to be based on personal observation and experience. It is certainly perceptive. The increasing influence of the Singh Sabha movement is suggested, both directly and indirectly. It is convincing. The image of a good Sikh of the Guru is created through Bhai Gurdit Singh and Mohan Singh, especially the latter who becomes a protagonist of the Gurdwara Reform Movement. The Sikh ideals as interpreted by Master Tara Singh are projected through their lives. Indeed Mohan Singh appears to be the ideal self of Master Tara Singh himself. Besides the explicitly didactic features of the novel, its plot sustains the interest of the reader till the end. The novel has the elements of a detective fiction in a considerable measure. More important, however, is the attempt at selfunderstanding. Master Tara Singh talks of the political events in which he had participated. At one level, he is keen to clarify what happened but there is no overt attempt to justify himself or to project himself as more important than what he was. His own perception and understanding of politics and political situations gets reflected in the novel. There is an effort, perhaps unconscious, to understand his own role and his own position in Sikh politics. On the whole, Prem Lagan is a precious document for the (p.680) emotional, intellectual, and political life of Master Tara Singh when he was emerging as the foremost Sikh leader. Notes:

(1.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan (Amritsar: Sikh Religious Books Society, 1934), pp. 42–9. (2.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 9–19. Page 16 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan (3.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 20–5. (4.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 25–38. (5.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 39–41. (6.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 42, 46–8. (7.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 51–8. (8.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 80–3. (9.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 86–90. (10.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 100–21. (11.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 122–36. (12.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 137–45. (13.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 275–8, 295–300. (14.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 48–9. (15.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 67–9. (16.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 83–7. (17.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 91–2. (18.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 92–4. (19.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 94–5. (20.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 95–9. (21.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 146–57. (22.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 160–7. (23.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 167–208. (24.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 203–8. (25.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 236–44. (26.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 244–9, 265, 268. (27.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 268, 302–9. (28.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 309–13. Page 17 of 18

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Appendix 3 Prem Lagan (29.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 67–79. (30.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 209–11. (31.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 212–13. (32.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 213–15. (33.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 216–17. (34.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, p. 218. (35.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 218–19. (36.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 219–20. (37.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 220–1 (38.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, p. 221. (39.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 221–2. (40.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 222–3. (41.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 242–9. (42.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 260–8. (43.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, p. 270. (44.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 270–1. (45.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 271–2. (46.) Master Tara Singh, Prem Lagan, pp. 281–2.

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Appendix 4 Seventeen Demands of Central Sikh League*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.681) Appendix 4 Seventeen Demands of Central Sikh League* J.S. Grewal

1. The Sikhs are anxious to secure a national government and are, therefore, opposed to any communal majority by statute or any reservation of seats by law for a majority community. 2. The Sikhs occupy an unrivalled position in Punjab as is reflected by their sacrifices in the defence of India and in the national movements and their stake in the province. They, therefore, demand 30 per cent representation in the Punjab legislature and administration. 3. The Sikh community should have a one-third share in the Punjab cabinet and Public Service Commission. 4. If an arrangement is reached on the above basis, the boundaries of Punjab may be so altered by transferring the predominantly Mohammedan areas to the Frontier Province as to produce a communal balance. In this reconstituted Punjab there should be joint electorates with no reservation of seats. 5. If neither of the above alternatives is acceptable, Punjab may be administered by the newly constituted responsible central government till a mutual agreement on the communal question is arrived at. 6. Punjabi should be the official language of the province. It should be optional for the Sikhs and others to use the Gurmukhi script, if they so desire. 7. The Sikhs should be given 5 per cent of the total number of seats reserved for British India in each of the Upper and Lower Houses of the central legislature. 8. There should always be at least one Sikh in the central cabinet.

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Appendix 4 Seventeen Demands of Central Sikh League* 9. In case any army council is constituted the Sikhs should be adequately represented on it. 10. The Sikhs have always had a special connection with the army and, therefore, the same proportion of the Sikhs should be maintained in the army as before the war. (p.682) 11. The Sikhs should have effective representation in all-India services and should be represented on the Central Public Service Commission. 12. All residuary powers should rest in the central government. 13. The central government should have special powers to protect the minorities. 14. The Sikhs should have the same weightage in other province as is accorded to other minorities. 15. The provincial and central governments should declare religious neutrality and while maintaining the existing religious endowments, should not create new ones. 16. The government should provide for the teaching of the Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forthcoming. 17. Any safeguards guaranteed in the constitution for the Sikhs should not be rescinded or modified without their express consent. Notes:

(*) Kailash Chander Gulati, ‘Seventeen Demands of Central Sikh League’ (Reported in The Tribune of 27 March 1931), in The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), Appendix I, pp. 238–9.

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Appendix 5 Akali Party’s Election Manifesto*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.683) Appendix 5 Akali Party’s Election Manifesto* J.S. Grewal

1. The party will fight for the attainment of complete independence for the country and will cooperate with those politically advanced parties whose programme and ideals approximate to those of its own. 2. It will offer strong opposition to the Communal Award and strive to replace it by a joint and national solution. 3. It will work for the repeal of all repressive laws. 4. It will oppose all measures, legislative and executive, which are opposed to the best interests of the country. 5. It will work for the release of all political prisoners and detenues. 6. It will work for the removal of untouchability. 7. It will work for the uplift of the masses and the depressed and backward classes. 8. It shall fight for the declaration of fundamental rights granting full freedom for the profession, practice, and propagation of religion with due regard to public morality. 9. It will work for the relief of rural indebtedness. 10. It will impose more taxes on the rich for the benefit of the poor sections of the country. 11. It will work for the assessment of land revenue on income tax basis. 12. It will oppose the formation of a ministry by those parties which do not agree to amend the Communal Award and replace it by a joint and national solution and will work for abrogation of the constitution embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935. The Akali Party would work for its amendment and replacement by a new constitution acceptable to the people of India. Page 1 of 2

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Appendix 5 Akali Party’s Election Manifesto* 13. It will work for the Indianization of the Army. 14. It will protect and safeguard all legitimate rights and interests of Sikhs. (p.684) 15. It will work to secure full freedom for Sikhs to carry or possess kirpans. 16. It will oppose tooth and nail all attempts on the part of Muslims throughout India to regain possession of Shahidganj. 17. It will work for the amendment of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, in accordance with the wishes of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. 18. It will try that the water rate (abiana) is reduced. 19. It will work for the removal of unemployment by encouraging industries and all Swadeshi enterprises. Notes:

(*) Kailash Chander Gulati, ‘Akali Party’s Election Manifesto’ (Reported in The Tribune of 20 June 1936), in The Akalis Past and Present (New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974), Appendix II, pp. 239–40.

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.685) Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* J.S. Grewal

31 March 1942 Dear Sir Stafford Cripps, May we begin by stating that after giving careful consideration to the proposals which have now been published from the point of view of: (1a) India’s integrity; and (2b) the Sikh position, we find them unacceptable because: (a1) instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India, specific provision has been made of separation of Provinces and constitution of Pakistan; and (2b) the cause of the Sikh community has been lamentably betrayed. Ever since the British advent, our community has fought for England in every battlefield of the Empire and this is our reward, that our position in the Punjab, which England promised to hold in trust and in which we occupied a predominant position, has been fully liquidated. Why should a Province that fails to secure a three-fifth’s majority of its Legislature, in which a religious community enjoys statutory majority, be allowed to hold a plebiscite and be given the benefit of a bare majority? In fairness this right should have been conceded to communities who are in permanent minority in the Legislature. Further, why should not the population of any area opposed to separation be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit?

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* We are sure you know the Punjab proper extended up to the banks of the Jhelum excluding Jhang and Multan Districts, and the Trans-Jhelum area was added by the conquest of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and retained by the British for administrative convenience. It would be altogether unjust to allow the extraneous Trans-Jhelum population, which only accidentally came into the Province, to dominate the future of the Punjab proper. We give below the figures which abundantly prove our contention. From the boundary of Delhi to the banks of the Ravi river the population is divided as follows: (p.686) Muslims: forty-five lakhs five thousand, Sikhs and other nonMuslims: seventy-six lakhs forty-six thousand. From the Delhi boundary to the banks of the Jhelum river excluding Multan and Jhang districts: Muslims: eighty-two lakhs eighty-eight thousand, Sikhs and other non-Muslims: ninety-thee lakhs forty-eight thousand. To this may be added the population of the Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala, and Faridkot, which is about twenty-six lakhs. Of this the Muslims constitute barely twenty per cent, and this reduces the ratio of Muslim population still further. We do not wish to labour the point any more. We have lost all hope of receiving any consideration. We shall resist, however, by all possible means separation of the Punjab from All-India Union. We shall never permit our motherland to be at the mercy of those who disown it. Yours sincerely, Baldev Singh (President, All-Parties Committee) Tara Singh Jogendra Singh Ujjal Singh Mohan Singh (ex-Adviser to the Secretary of State for India)

Enclosure On behalf of the Sikhs we wish to place the claims of the Sikh community in the proposed scheme of His Majesty’s Government for the governance of India. We begin by giving a historical background of our case. The Sikhs are an important and a distinct community mainly concentrated in the Punjab of which they were the Rulers until 1849. Sikhism recognizes no caste and strictly enjoins upon those who profess it to treat all human beings equal. Page 2 of 7

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* Sikhs play an important role in the economic and civic life of the country and a leading part in its defence. In the British Punjab with their 33/4 million population (13.5 per cent of the whole) the Sikhs pay 25 per cent of the land revenue and 40 per cent of the land revenue and water rates combined, the main source of the Provincial Exchequer. They maintain at their own expense over 400 schools and 4 colleges open to all communities and classes without distinction. The percentage of literacy among the Sikhs is higher than any other community in the Punjab. They have got a large number of Sikh shrines with big landed estates attached to them which are the centres of Sikh culture and tradition. The authors of the Montford Report recognized the importance of the Sikhs and ‘the difficulty of denying to the Sikhs in the Punjab a concession which is granted to Mohammedans’. The Simon Commission states: ‘Sikhism remained a pacific cult until the political tyranny of the Mussalmans and the social tyranny of the Hindus converted it into a military creed. It is a striking circumstance that this small community contributed no less than 80,000 men’ (actually 89,000 combatant recruits in addition to 32,500 already serving when the war broke out) to serve in the Great War, a larger portion than any other community in India. With a population of over 60,00,000 in India the share of Sikhs in the defence forces of the country has always been out of all proportion to their population. The Sikhs are, perhaps, the only community which is making an organized war effort by the establishment of (p.687) the ‘Khalsa Defence of India League’ to maintain its glorious tradition in the Army. We do realize that with our past traditions and the excellent fighting material that can be found in the Sikh districts, we should have done still better in mobilizing our manpower, but we are constrained to remark that nothing has been done by the Government to rouse the enthusiasm of the Sikh community in the way of recognition of its status in the sphere of the Central Government or of providing effective safeguards for it in the Punjab, to which it was entitled on account of its unrivalled position, historical, political, and economic. The Sikhs were deeply disappointed at the differential treatment meted out to them under the so-called ‘communal award’ of 1932. In spite of their unique position in the Punjab they were not given the same weightage in the Legislature as the Moslem minorities were given in other Provinces. By way of illustration it may be stated that Muslims with 14.8 per cent population in the United Provinces were given 30 per cent seats in the Provincial Assembly as against 18.8 per cent seats to the Sikhs in the Punjab with their 13.5 per cent population. Their influence in the administration and political life of the Punjab was further weakened in the formation of the Provincial Cabinet. Whereas in the days of dyarchy out of three Punjabees appointed as Ministers and Members of the Governor’s Council there was one Sikh from 1921 to 1926 and one Sikh out Page 3 of 7

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* of four Punjabees form 1926 to 1937, since the advent of the Provincial autonomy there has been only one Sikh out of a total of six Ministers. It will thus be observed that in the sphere of the Supreme Executive of the Province, the representation of the Sikhs was reduced from 33 per cent in 1921 to 25 per cent in 1926 and to 16 per cent in 1937. This progressive deterioration of the share of Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet is strongly resented by the community as it has led to encroachment of the religious and cultural rights and the waning of their influence on the political and economic life of the country. We submit that under the existing constitution the strength of the Sikhs in the Punjab Cabinet should be maintained normally at 33 per cent and in no case below 25 per cent, so that there may always be at least two Sikh Ministers in the Cabinet. We also feel that so long as communal electorates continue to be the method of representation in the Legislature, Cabinet should to be formed on a coalition basis in the true sense of the word. We may here point out that when ministers were functioning in all Provinces, in the United Provinces where the percentage of the Muslim population is nearly the same as that of Sikhs in the Punjab, there were two Moslem Ministers in a Cabinet of six. In the sphere of the Central Government, the Sikh Community in spite of its important stake in the country, its sacred shrines scattered all over India and the valuable services that the Sikh soldiers and technicians are rendering, has been unjustly treated. The Sikh have suffered a great disillusionment by the deliberate neglect of their claims and omission of any reference to the Sikh minority by British statesmen and the Viceroy of India in their statements made from time to time during the last ten years on the Indian question. It seems as if in their opinion, Muslims alone or the depressed classes sometimes, constitute the important minorities of India. Although for seventeen years a Punjabee has been appointed on the Viceory’s Council, no Sikh has ever been considered for such an appointment. Even at the time of the (p.688) last expansion of the Executive Council, the claims of the Sikhs were entirely ignored. In this connection we should like to invite attention to the decisions of the Allahabad Unity Conference which were arrived at between Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs in November 1932. Resolution number 4 regarding Cabinets read as follows: (a) ‘In the formation of the cabinet of the Central Government, so far as possible, members belonging to the Muslim, Sikh and other minority communities of considerable numbers forming the Indian Nation shall be included by convention’. (b) ‘Further during the first ten years in the formation of the Central Government, a seat shall be offered to a member of the Sikh community.’ Page 4 of 7

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* Resolution No. 7 reads as under: II. ‘It is agreed that in the Central Legislature out of the total elected seats allotted to British India 33 per cent shall be reserved for Muslims, 42/3 per cent or 14 seats out of 300, for Sikhs.’ It will thus be observed that leading Indians of different communities recognized the importance of the Sikh minority and agreed to accommodate it in the Central Cabinet, and also to give it nearly 5 per cent representation in the Central Legislature. We favour immediate transfer of power to Indian hands, entrusting all portfolios including defence to Indians with experience of public life. We feel that in this way alone, the moral and material resources of India can be tapped to the fullest extent and Indians can participate in the war with full vigour and enthusiasm. The Sikhs stand for national unity and the integrity of India. They would like the provinces to enjoy as wide a measure of autonomy as may be compatible with good government in the country as a whole but they also feel that any weakness at the centre will expose India to internal and external dangers. They are strongly opposed to the vivisection of India into two or three rival dominions or sovereign states as it is contemplated in the British proposals. They feel that such a step would lead to a state of perpetual strife and civil war in the country. If the object is to give self-determination to the provinces in the matter of accession to the ‘Union of India’, the right to stand out and break the unity of India should not be exercised by a bare majority but by at least 65 per cent of Indian members present at the meeting of the provincial assembly when the resolution is considered. A plebiscite on the issue of secession is certain to lead to intercommunal riots of a most serious character and magnitude and should in no case be resorted to. We are constrained to remark that the proposed scheme does not make any provisions for safeguarding the interests of the Sikh minority. The decisions of the constitution-making body are to be by a bare majority and no provision is made for recourse to arbitration by the aggrieved party as was even assured by Mahatma Gandhi in his statement on the Congress scheme of Constituent Assembly. The treaty which is proposed to be negotiated between the constitution-making body and His Majesty’s Government for protecting the religious and racial minorities in accordance with undertakings given by the British Government, will have no sanction behind it. Besides, we are not sure how political rights which relate mainly to a share in the Legislature and the administration of the country will be incorporated in the Treaty. The Treaty might cover the cultural, religious, and linguistic rights of minorities as such Treaties (p.689) in Page 5 of 7

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* European countries after the last Great War did. But the undertakings given to the Sikhs by His Majesty’s Government from time to time relate to the position and status of the Sikhs in the governance of the country and not merely regarding the exercise of their religious or cultural rights. The Sikhs, therefore, feel that they cannot attain rightful position or effectively protect their interests unless the Punjab is redistributed into two Provinces with the River Ravi roughly forming the boundary between them. We might invite attention to the All-India Moslem League Resolution of the Lahore session held in March 1940, which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, that no Constitution would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial re-adjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. A careful reading of the Resolution discloses the fact that the Muslim League itself visualized the re-adjustments of areas and the inclusion in their separate state of only those areas in which the Muslims were in a majority. The population of the Punjab is so distributed that the two western divisions of Rawalpindi ad Multan are predominantly Muslim and the two eastern divisions of Ambala and Jullundur predominantly non-Muslim. The three central districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Lahore have a balanced population. The separate figures of population for each district of the Punjab are attached as appendix to this statement. If a new Province of a contiguous area of two divisions of Ambala and Jullundur plus the three districts of Lahore, Gurdaspur, and Amritsar is carved out, it will have a total population of 1,21,51,000 (according to 1931 Census) with non-Muslims forming 63 per cent and Muslims 37 per cent of population. The other Province to the west of the River Ravi comprising the Multan and Rawalpindi divisions plus the three districts Sheikhupura, Sialkot, and Gujranwala will have a total population of 1,14,29,000, with Muslims forming 77.3 per cent and non-Muslims 22.7 per cent of the population. The Sikhs do not want to dominate but they would certainly not submit to the domination of a community which is bent upon breaking the unity of India and imposing their personal laws and culture on the other sections of the population.

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Appendix 6 The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps* We submit that in any interim arrangement or in the permanent scheme the following safeguards should be provided either in the Treaty which might be enforceable or in the Constitution itself: 1. By delimiting the present Provincial boundaries of the Punjab, a new Province comprising of Ambala and Jullundur divisions with the three districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Lahore be constituted. 2. The Sikh minority in the Provinces be given the same weightage and measure of protection as the Muslim minority. 3. So long as communal electorates exist, Provincial Cabinets should be formed on a coalition basis. 4. The Sikhs should be given 5 per cent representation in the Central Legislature. 5. A Sikh should always be given a seat in a Cabinet of the Central Government. (p.690) 6. A Defence Advisory Committee should be set up for advising the Indian Defence Minister and a Sikh should be given a seat on that Committee. 7. The position of the Sikhs in the Defence Forces of India should be maintained in keeping with their past traditions and strength in those forces. 8. The share of the Sikhs should be fixed in Provincial and All-India Services on the lines it has already been provided or may be provided for the Muslims. 9. Religious laws of Sikhs enacted may only be amended by the votes of majority of the Sikh members in the Legislature. 10. No restrictions should be imposed by the State in the exercise of the religious rights of the Sikhs in the matter of eatables and religious performances. 11. The State should provide for the teaching of Punjabi in Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forthcoming. Baldev Singh (President) Notes:

(*) ‘The Sikh All-Parties Committee to Sir S. Cripps’, in Master Tara Singh (Political Thinkers of Modern India, vol. XXVIII), ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), Appendix III, pp. 427–34.

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Appendix 7 The All-India Akali Conference (14–15 October 1944)*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.691) Appendix 7 The All-India Akali Conference (14–15 October 1944)* J.S. Grewal

1. This session of the All-India Akali Conference is of the opinion that the last eight years’ working of the Provincial Autonomy set up under the scheme of the Government of India Act, 1935, with an unalterable statutory Muslim majority as a result of the Communal Award, has adversely affected the vital Sikh interests and has seriously injured the Sikh community. The Sikh interests have suffered greatly in economic, political, religious, and cultural spheres. Even the reserved powers of the Governor given to him under the constitution have failed to protect them. It is for the first time after the annexation of the Punjab by the British that the Sikhs have been reminded that their homelands are being again passed over to the Muslims under the protection of the British bayonet. The Sikh masses feel very keenly that they have been sacrificed at the altar of political expediency to appease the Muslims. 2. Mahatma Gandhi’s offer of Pakistan to Mr Jinnah and subsequent talks for communal settlement without taking the Sikhs into confidence notwithstanding the assurance given to the Sikhs by the Congress in its resolution of 1929, have greatly perturbed them. When the proposal to vivisect their very homelands is under active consideration, it is an undeniable fact that in this matter the Sikhs are the most vitally affected community in India. They should, therefore, be treated as major party in the negotiations, but they are nowhere in the picture. Neither in his offer to Mr Jinnah, nor in his long correspondence with the Muslim League leader, any reference has been made to the Sikhs. Thus, they have been completely ignored. Mahatma Gandhi has also followed the policy of Muslim appeasement at the expense of the Sikh community. Page 1 of 2

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Appendix 7 The All-India Akali Conference (14–15 October 1944)* (p.692) 3. As regards the communal settlement this session of the AllIndia Conference wishes to unequivocally declare on behalf of the Sikh Panth that the Sikhs are prepared and willing to support any scheme of communal settlement which provides for them ample scope for their political, cultural, and religious development to their satisfaction. The Conference further declares that along with the Hindus and Muslims, they are prepared to live like brothers as an equally free community in a free united India and that they shall not submit to the domination of any other community. 4. This Conference after full consideration of the various terms of the Raja–Gandhi formula, as well as the proposal of Mahatma Gandhi contained in Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence have come to the conclusion that this scheme of communal settlement is greatly detrimental to the interest of the Sikhs, in particular, and the country in general. Therefore, this Conference rejects it, and calls upon the Sikhs to carry on ceaseless agitation unless the scheme in finally dropped and the Sikhs are assured that no similar proposal will be put forward. This Conference further declares that no communal settlement will be acceptable to the Sikhs unless it is approved by the Shiromani Akali Dal. Notes:

(*) ‘The All-India Akali Conference (14–15 October 1944)’, in Master Tara Singh (Political Thinkers of Modern India, vol. XXVIII), ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), Appendix XI, pp. 447–53.

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Appendix 8 Memorandum Submitted by Master Tara Singh*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.693) Appendix 8 Memorandum Submitted by Master Tara Singh* J.S. Grewal

The position of the Minorities has changed since the Cripps Mission. As conceded by Major Attlee, Indians cannot be made responsible for governing themselves, and at the same time, power retained in the hands of an partAuthority outside India for intervention on behalf of such Minorities for ensuring their proper treatment by the majority. This makes it all the more necessary for the Sikhs to safeguard in the Constitution itself their political status in the future policy of the country. The draft declaration provides for the right of non-accession of Provinces. The Sikhs make it plain that they are opposed to any possible partition of India as envisaged in the draft declaration. As stated above, the Sikhs form a compact cultural nationality of about six millions. They further maintain that, judged by any definition or test, the Punjab is not only their homeland but their holy land. They were the last rulers of the Punjab and before the advent of the British they enjoyed in the Punjab independent economic and political status which has gradually deteriorated under British rule. They wish, however, to point out that, with the inauguration of provincial autonomy on the basis of the Communal Award, they have been reduced to a state of complete helplessness. If the existing provincial political setup is continued, the transference of power to the people would perpetuate the coercion of the Sikhs under what in practice has come to be Muslim rule. That setup is unjust to the Sikhs. Its working has meant Muslim communal rule in the Punjab which has almost exasperated the Sikhs to the point of revolutionary protest. The intervention of war conditions alone has been responsible for the Sikhs acquiescing temporarily in this communal tyranny. They cannot by Page 1 of 2

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Appendix 8 Memorandum Submitted by Master Tara Singh* expected to continue to submit to it as a permanent arrangement in any new scheme of Indian polity. Akali demands: The statutory Muslim majority in the Legislature of the Province (p.694) must go and the position of the Sikhs must be strengthened by an increased representation therein so as to ensure to the Sikhs an effective voice in the administration of the country. In the alternative, out of the existing province of the Punjab a new Province may be carved out as an additional provincial unit in the united India of the future in such a way that all important Sikh gurdwaras and shrines may be included in it as also a substantial majority of the Sikh population in the existing Province of the Punjab. The Sikhs cannot, however, be blind themselves to the fact that the Muslims have declared that they are a separate nation as distinct from the Sikhs, the Hindus, and others, and that on that basis they are entitled to Pakistan. We have already expressed unequivocally our opposition to the establishment of such a state. In view of the rumours that are current we are obliged to take note of the possibility of the Cabinet Mission giving serious consideration to the Muslim League claim. Before the Mission arrives at a decision on this question, we would emphasize that the Sikhs have as good a claim for the establishment of a separate sovereign Sikh state as the Muslims for Pakistan and that the Mission should not concede the claim for Pakistan without conceding, at the same time, the claim for a separate state made on behalf of the Sikhs. The Sikhs are in favour of a single constitution-making body in which they should be represented as already indicated above. In case the Mission should think of taking into serious consideration the proposal that has been made for two constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and the other for the rest of India, we wish, in the light of what has been said by us above, to make our position clear that there should be a separate constitution-making body also for the Sikh state. Notes:

(*) ‘Memorandum Submitted by Master Tara Singh (to the Cabinet Mission)’, in Master Tara Singh (Political Thinkers of Modern India, vol. XXVIII), ed. Verinder Grover (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995), Appendix XIII, pp. 456– 7.

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.695) Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* J.S. Grewal

Mr President, Sir, I must start with paying my earnest and sincere tribute to our worthy President whose patience, forbearance, and sense of justice have guided us throughout these proceeding and have contributed mostly to our successfully going through all these stages. I join my other friends in congratulating the Drafting Committee and particularly its leader for cheerfully carrying though this heavy strain during these months. It was a gigantic task and they must be feeling relieved after it. Of course we have produced the bulkiest Constitution in the world. The Constitution of other countries are much simpler. I am not happy at all over this achievement. The glamour of our present leaders, I am afraid, has dimmed the vision of our experts. We should have looked beyond the present. We have presumed that the Union will be equally blessed with such heroes in the future as well. In this Constitution, no particular pattern has been followed. A Constitution moulded out of different types will not endure because it is neither indigenous nor a complete copy of any other single type. It is neither federal nor unitary. It is an enigmatic production, with every part stranger to the other. The English make of Indian frame was already there as the Government of India Act, 1935. We have substituted an American head in the form of a President, replaced the old limbs by an English parliamentary system, poured Australian flexibility in the bones and flesh, infused the Canadian look of a single judiciary, and added an Irish appendix of Directive Principles and thus brought out a Page 1 of 7

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* hybrid which we have been pleased to name the Indian Constitution. How it develops and what it bears is not known to (p.696) anybody. I submit, Sir, we have overdone ourselves in certain respects and particularly in the Preamble. Besides justice, liberty and equality we have resolved to secure fraternity which is impossible of enforcement at this stage. Then again we have assured liberty of thought, which is funny. Thought is an inner working of the mind and the individual does not come into contact with another or with the state until he expresses himself. Such moral virtues are impossible of achievement particularly in a secular State. Further equality of status is an empty boast under the present Constitution. It could only be claimed in a Communist State. Then I come to Fundamental Principles. On a first glance it would appear that the safeguarding of the Fundamental Rights set forth in Part III of the Constitution is complete. The charter is very exhaustive in description and the protection of these rights is also entrusted to the Supreme Court and ostensibly guaranteed. But on closer examination it would be found that these Rights and particularly the Rights to Freedom in Article 19 are hedged round with exceptions and reservations that make them ineffective in those situations when their impairment can ordinarily be apprehended. Like other constitutions, ours also has assigned separate spheres to Government and liberty, but in doing so it has allowed so much latitude to the Legislature in the matter of defining inalienable rights as to make them exceedingly precarious, and robbed them of the guarantee which could make them secure. In his opening speech moving for the introduction of the Constitution on 4 November 1948 Dr Ambedkar had observed: ‘Democracy in India is only a topdressing on Indian Soil, which is essentially undemocratic.’ ‘In these circumstances,’ he said, ‘it is wiser not to trust the legislature to prescribe the forms of administration.’ I wish that conviction had guided our decisions. But I find that the pervading spirit all through is the greater trust and confidence in the Legislature rather than in the Judiciary. In my view this is an incorrect and a wrong foundation on which this structure has been built. The Judiciary can be more safely entrusted with the holding of the balance between the individual and the State. Practically all the rights in Article 19 are based on one fundamental provision, namely, that the various rights are subject to the existing restrictive law or laws which may be made hereafter. What change that a citizen would feel by the commencement of this Constitution? We were told that even in USA the rights are not unqualified, and for every limitation enacted in Article 19 it was said that at least one ruling of the Supreme Court could be quoted in support of that. What a funny logic! If in an extreme case, under particular circumstances, the Page 2 of 7

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* Supreme Court declared any limitation, does it stand to reason that the same limitation ought to have been made a provision of the Constitution to be enforced at all times whenever it suited the Legislature so to do? The crucial difference is that in USA the Supreme Court is the final judge of the circumstances when any restriction is to be imposed, while in our Constitution it is the Legislature that would be the final one. We could choose either of the two methods, one in which constitutional safeguards are wholly lacking just as in UK and the other in which such safeguards are as complete as human ingenuity could make them, as in USA. In our Constitution a compromise has been effected which is impossible. We have imposed prohibitions (p.697) on the Legislature, thus conceding that there is danger from that side, and then proceeded to permit the legislature itself to restrict the liberty. The feared robber is made the judge and the possible trespasser the sole arbiter. This is clear deception. Then again there are emergency provisions. As soon as there is a declaration under 358 on the report of a Governor or Rajpramukh, all liberties worth the name come to an end. The mere Proclamation of emergency ought not to have been allowed to abrogate civil liberties. Civil liberty should come to an end only when civil authority comes to an end. These rights are incomplete without a right to work. Can you imagine of any liberty being enjoyed by a citizen who goes about hungry for want of employment, who is haunted by the fear that his family would be without food as he has not got work? Have we made any provision for such an individual? Can such a man have any interest in the administration except to blow it up? Unless material insecurity is eliminated personal freedoms are paper safeguards and worth nothing. So far as the Directive Principles are concerned, I have already referred to this part as a useless Appendix. (An honorable Member: Is it appendix or appendicitis?) It is ‘appendix’; I accept that I am wrong; after all it grows on the appendix and therefore it is called appendicitis. I believe rights are no rights unless enforceable. It was admitted in the beginning that it was not proper to insert them in the midst of the Constitution but the mistake has persisted. The perusal of these principles in Part IV leads one to believe that ours is going to be a Socialist State. But there is nothing in the rest of the Constitution in support of these pious platitudes. Then we come to the President, Part V. He is to be the executive head of the Union. In the introductory speech the President was described to occupy a position similar to the king of England; the head of the State but not of the Executive; to represent the nation and not to rule it as the symbol of the nation. His place in the administration was stated as that of a ceremonial device on the seal. But under Constitution now settled he has been given enormous powers. Elected by the members of the Legislatures under Article 54 he would most probably be the choice of the majority party. He can only be impeached for Page 3 of 7

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* breach of the Constitution under Article 61 and not for any other misbehaviour. That, in my opinion, is a grave defect in the Constitution. My second objection is about Article 68(2). This can be misused. The President might, in the interest of the Party which placed him in power, resign his office a few months before the expiry of his term and may get himself re-elected for another full term of five years though the party might be defeated in the impending elections. Then again under Article 75 the President is authorized to appoint the Prime Minister. It is not clearly laid down that he must necessarily be the leader of the majority or even be an elected member of the House of the People. Strictly according to the provision a non-member may be appointed. In a written constitution it should not have been left to conventions which are still to grow in our country. There are other provisions under Articles 123, 358, 75(2), and others which may provide an ambitious politician an opportunity to assume dictatorial powers while professedly acting within the strict letter of the settled Constitution which can be interpreted by its plain words and not unexpressed spirit. The possibility of a virtuous dictator being corrupted by power may be remote in the case (p. 698) of our present leaders, but these immortals of history cannot be immortals of physical bodies as well, and the Constitution has not taken that fact into account. We have been misled by the present. We should have realized that the Constitution would survive our present leaders. We have not guarded against the emergence of dictators. I have grave misgivings against investing a single individual with such wide powers, however great he might be. Then I come to the special provisions relating to the minorities. It would be interesting to know how an ordinary Sikh mind is working in these days. If the sacrifices for freedom were to be looked back upon, the Sikhs can feel well proud of their contributions. In 1872 in the well-known Kuka rebellion more than sixty-eight Sikhs were blown off with cannons. In 1907 S. Ajit Singh, Kishen Singh, and others played a very important part in the movement. During 1912– 16 the Ghadar movement got considerable momentum by the advent of revolutionaries brought in by Kamagata Maru and other ships. Most of them were Sikhs who died cheerfully on the gallows for the love of their country. During Martial Law Regime in 1919 the Sikhs raised a bold and an open revolt against the British and underwent many hardships. The Gurdwara movement, though directly organized for religious reform in Gurdwaras had its political aspect no less important, as by the huge sufferings and strict restraint the Sikhs lowered the prestige of the rulers. In 1937 the Akali Dal formed an alliance with the Congress and succeeded in elections on national programme against the Unionist alliance with the Page 4 of 7

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* bureaucracy. That union must have grown closer and had been further cemented but for the Congress wooing the Muslim League in order to put up a concerted fight. The Sikhs grew apprehensive that the Congress, in their anxiety to win freedom, otherwise very commendable, might hand over their homeland to the Muslims and they might be subjugated forever. These fears led a section of the Sikh community to chalk out an independent line of action. But, even after that, preserving their individual identity, this small community supported the Congress very faithfully in the negotiations during 1942, 1945, and 1946. The Cabinet Mission Plan was unjust and unfair for the Sikhs and it was so acknowledged by the Congress Working Committee in their resolution dated 25 June 1946. The Sikhs got indignant and the Panthic Prathinidhi Board boycotted the Constituent Assembly by their resolution dated 5 July 1946 when the Muslim League had accepted it. The Congress Working Committee in their meeting on 10 August 1946 appealed to the Sikhs to reconsider their decision and participate in the Constituent Assembly. The Working Committee assured the Sikhs that the ‘Congress will give them all possible support in removing their legitimate grievances and in securing adequate safeguards for the protection of their just interests’. Immediately the Sikhs, on this assurance, reversed their decision and directed their Sikh representatives to raise the question of safeguards in the Assembly at the proper time in the hope that the Congress would support the Sikh demands in accordance with the assurances dated 10 August 1946 and their promises earlier in 1929. Since that day, the Sikhs made common cause with the Congress and stood firmly by it. Then again on 6 January 1947, the Congress, in accepting the interpretation put forward by the British Government on the Cabinet Mission Plan, made it clear that the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should (p.699) not be jeopardized. Later, on 8 March 1947, the Working Committee assured the Sikhs that ‘they would keep in close touch with the representatives of the Sikhs and other groups with a view to cooperating with them in the steps that may have to be taken and in safeguarding their interests’. The Congress was announcing again and again that all minorities shall have proper safeguards. The Muslims refused to be contented with any safeguards, but insisted on having a home for them. They got Pakistan, and can have no further grievance. The Anglo-Indian community has been sufficiently protected. They can have no grouse. The Parsees and the Christians are far more advanced educationally and economically and have declared that they do not want any safeguards. It is only the Sikh community that earnestly desired, repeatedly requested, and constantly cried for safeguards. But they were not given any consideration. They fail to understand why they have met this treatment. The majority can oppress, it can even suppress the minority; but it cannot infuse contentment or satisfaction by these methods.

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* Separate electorates have been done away with; the Sikhs submitted to it cheerfully. The reservation on population basis in the legislatures was abolished. Their representatives fell in line with the others. But the economic safeguards about services were never voluntarily given up. On scrutiny, it appears to be a very trivial thing. But it was a test case where the majority was on trial. It was said that it was a blot to acknowledge any religious minority; but the AngloIndians have been given safeguards in the Constitution. They are a religious as well as a racial minority according to Government’s own publication. The entry about consideration of claims of Sikh community to services would have disfigured the constitution, we were told here; but a similar entry about the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and the Anglo-Indians does not impair its beauty. The whole economy of the Sikh community depended upon agriculture and army service. Lands have been left in Pakistan and their proportion in the army since the Partition has been greatly reduced and is being reduced every day. Their demands were very simple. They wanted a Punjabi-speaking province. That has been denied. It was not a communal demand, but a territorial one. But the majority community in the province went so far as to disown their mother tongue. That language is in danger on account of aggressive Communalism of the majority. Andhra province is a settled fact; other cases are to be looked into; but North India cannot even be considered for it. The next was this consideration for services. That has also been denied. Mr Khandekar today referred that there was no untouchability among the Sikhs, and that seats had been taken out of the scheduled castes seats. I may briefly refer to these observations of his. Certainly according to the Sikh religion, there is no untouchability. But does it stand to reason that if there are two sons of one father and they are Untouchables and one embraces the Sikhs religion, he should be neglected simply because he professes that religion different from the one which he originally professed? Would that not have been discrimination on account of religion? I think that injustice has been removed and the scheduled castes should have no complaint about it. Then again, he made a remark that Sikhs have been given seats out of the scheduled castes’ quota. That was what I could not comprehend because reservation for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is to be made on the basis of population. (p.700) If certain castes have been included in the scheduled castes, then, certainly they would bring in their population and their seats will be increased. It does not stand to reason that the Sikhs have taken away any part of their quota which the scheduled castes possess. Naturally, under these circumstances, as I have stated, the Sikhs feel utterly disappointed and frustrated. They feel that they have been discriminated against. Let it not be misunderstood that the Sikh community has agreed to this

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Appendix 9 Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly* Constitution. I wish to record an emphatic protest here. My community cannot subscribe its assent to this historic document. I now come to centralization of powers. For the last thirty years, the policy had been progressing towards provincial autonomy. There were valid reasons for it. The vastness of the country—its multifarious population organized in units having different languages, varied social systems, uneven economic development—made it impossible to have uniformity everywhere. Even in old regimes whenever centralization was attempted in India, the system cracked under its own weight. Independent units with greater responsibility and willing cooperation would have lent greater strength. In our Constitution, each article tends to sap the local autonomy and makes the provinces irresponsible. To sum up, our Constitution does not give anything substantial or concrete to the individual. It only gives solemn promises and pious platitudes. The Fundamental Rights are worthless as they have so many restrictions and are left at the mercy of the legislature. The right to work is not guaranteed. There is no assurance for old-age maintenance or provision during sickness or loss of capacity. Even free primary education has not been provided for. The minorities, and particularly the Sikhs, have been ignored and completely neglected. The Provincial units have been reduced to Municipal boards. The common man has been squeezed out of politics and the President has been enthroned as the Great Moghul to rule from Delhi with enough splendour and grandeur. Any ambitious President would discover a rich find in this Constitution to declare himself as a dictator and yet, apparently, be acting within this Constitution. The discontent and dissatisfaction is sure to grow without any economic solution of difficulties of the masses. This shall consequently facilitate the development of administration into a fascist State for which there is enough provision in our Constitution. May we be saved from such contingencies! Notes:

(*) ‘Sardar Hukam Singh’s Last Speech in the Constituent Assembly’, in Constituent Assembly Debates on 21 November 1949.

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Appendix 10 Regional Formula*

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.701) Appendix 10 Regional Formula* J.S. Grewal

Following prolonged negotiations between Mr Nehru and other government and Congress leaders on the one hand and representatives of the Akali Dal on the other, an agreement was reached early in March (1956) on the reorganization of the Punjab, Pepsu and Himachal Pradesh, and approved on 11 March by the General Council of the Akali Dal. The main provisions of the agreement, which represented a compromise between the Hindu demand for the union of all three states in a Greater Punjab and the Akali Sikhs’ demand for a separate Punjabispeaking state, were as follows: 1. The Punjab and Pepsu should be merged in a single bilingual state with a common governor, ministry, legislature, public service commission, and high court. The predominantly Hindu state of Himachal Pradesh would provisionally become a Union Territory. 2. For the transaction of government business with regard to certain specified matters the state would be divided into two regions, one Hindispeaking and the other Punjabi-speaking. 3. For each region there would be a regional committee of the Punjab State Assembly consisting of members of the assembly, including the ministers belonging to the region, but excluding the Chief Minister. 4. Legislation regarding the specified matters would be referred to the regional committees, who would also make legislative proposals to the state government. Advice rendered by the regional committees would normally be accepted by the government and the state legislature but in the event of difference of opinion the matter would be referred to the governor, whose decision would be final and binding. 5. The regional committees would deal inter alia with development and economic (p.702) planning (within the framework of general Page 1 of 2

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Appendix 10 Regional Formula* development plans formulated by the state legislature), local government, public health, primary and secondary education, agriculture, cottage and small scale industries, livestock, fisheries, cooperative societies, and charitable and religious institutions. 6. The demarcation of the Hindi and Punjabi regions would be carried out in consultation with the state government and other interests concerned. 7. Both Punjabi and Hindi would be recognized as official languages of the state. At district level and below, the official language of each region would be the regional language. The state government would set up two different departments for promoting the Punjabi and Hindi languages. The proposals contained in the State Reorganisation Bill were unanimously approved by the Pepsu Legislative Assembly on 22 March. Notes:

(*) Joyce Pettigrew, ‘Regional formula’, in Robber Noblemen: A Study of the Political System of the Sikh Jats (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), Appendix II, pp. 221–2.

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.703) Master Tara Singh in Photographs J.S. Grewal

1. Master Tara Singh as a young man

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

2. Master Tara Singh (in chair on the extreme left) as a member of the hockey team, Khalsa College, Amritsar

3. Master Tara Singh (fourth from the right in the row of chairs), Headmaster, Khalsa High School, Kallar, in 1917, with Sant Teja Singh on the right

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.704)

4. Master Tara Singh (second from the left in the row of chairs) with some Akali leaders after their release from jail in September 1926. The chair in the middle has a photograph of Sardar Teja Singh Samundri who had died in jail

5. Master Tara Singh leading a jathā of 100 Akalis from Amritsar to Peshawar amidst a huge crowd in 1930

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.705)

6. Master Tara Singh leading the jathā for Peshawar near Khalsa College, Amritsar

7. Master Tara Singh (in the middle) with Akali leaders at the time of a meeting of the Central Sikh League at Amritsar on 8 April 1931

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

8. Master Tara Singh (third from left) listening to Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942. Sitting from left to right are Sardar Ujjal Singh, Sardar Jogendra Singh, and Sardar Baldev Singh

9. Master Tara Singh at a party after meeting Sir Stafford Cripps

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

10. Master Tara Singh sitting in a rickshaw amidst a crowd of people in Simla at the time of the Simla Conference in June–July 1945

11. Master Tara Singh (third from right) in conversation with Jinnah while Lord Wavell is talking to the other Indian leaders at the time of the Simla Conference

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.706)

12. Master Tara Singh (third from left) listening to Lady Wavell at the time of the Simla Conference

13. Master Tara Singh talking to Maulana Azad at the time of the Simla Conference

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

14. Master Tara Singh with Jinnah and Khizar Hayat Khan at the Simla Conference

15. Master Tara Singh in discussion with Sardar Mangal Singh at the time of the Simla Conference

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.707)

16. Master Tara Singh (in chair in the middle) as Commander of the Akal Regiment, with Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke, Ishar Singh Majhail (on the left), and Darshan Singh Pheruman and General Mohan Singh (on the right) in 1947

17. Master Tara Singh (on the mike) addressing the annual conference of the All India Sikh Students Federation at Ludhiana on 24 April 1948

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.708)

18. Master Tara Singh (seated fourth from the right, facing the camera) addressing a Press Conference at Delhi on 2 August 1948

19. Master Tara Singh after his release from jail in October 1949

20. Master Tara Singh with Jathedar Pritam Singh Khuranj on the right and Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala on his left

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs after the election of Jathedar Khuranj as President of the SGPC in 1952

21. Master Tara Singh addressing a joint meeting (in connection with the general election) sponsored by the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh, and the Shiromani Akali Dal on 8 January 1952

22. Master Tara Singh with visitors from Pakistan in May 1955

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.709)

23. Akali procession at Amritsar on 11 February 1956 at the time of All India Akali Conference

24. Master Tara Singh welcomed by his friends in his native village, Harial, in Pakistan early in 1960

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.710)

25. On behalf of Master Tara Singh, Sardar Bakshish Singh is thanking the residents of Harial

26. Master Tara Singh listening to C. Rajagopalachari during the latter’s visit to the Golden Temple in March 1960

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

27. Master Tara Singh sitting by the side of Sant Fateh Singh on fast on 5 January 1961

28. Master Tara Singh accepting juice from Yadvindra Singh of Patiala and Sant Fateh Singh to break his fast on 1 October 1961

29. Master Tara Singh and Sant Fateh Singh listening to the verdict of the Panj

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.711)

Pyaras at the Akal Takht on 29 November 1961

30. Master Tara Singh performing penance at the Golden Temple after the verdict by the Panj Pyaras

31. Master Tara Singh cleaning shoes of the sangat at the Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in Delhi as part of his penance

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

32. Master Tara Singh cleaning utensils at Gurdwara Rakab Ganj in Delhi as part of his penance

33. Master Tara Singh with U.N. Dhebar at the Golden Temple in February 1966

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

34. Master Tara Singh having a walk in the park near the Post Graduate Institute for Medical Education and Research at Chandigarh on 13 November 1967

35. Giani Bhupinder Singh and Sardar Atma Singh looking at the face of Master Tara Singh before his funeral

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs (p.712)

36. The funeral procession of Master Tara Singh at Amritsar on 23 November 1967

37. Master Tara Singh busy writing in his home at Amritsar sitting on a cot, the seat of his day-long routine

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

38. Master Tara Singh with his wife, Shrimati Tej Kaur

39. Master Tara Singh with his family

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Master Tara Singh in Photographs

40. A popular portrait of Master Tara Singh

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Glossary

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.713) Glossary J.S. Grewal

ahlkār a workman, a clerk; an official Akal Takht an eternal throne, a high platform opposite the Harmandar (Golden Temple) in Amritsar constructed by Guru Hargobind to conduct temporal affairs of the Sikh Panth; called Akal Bunga in the eighteenth century, it is now known as Akal Takht, the highest seat of authority for the majority of the Sikhs Akali(s) a believer in Akal, Immortal God; the staunch followers of Guru Gobind Singh in the eighteenth century known also as Nihangs; the epithet appropriated by the advocates of Gurdwara Reform and antiBritish politics in the 1920s, giving rise to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and the Shiromani Akali Dal Akhand Pāṭh an unbroken reading of the Sikh scripture known as Guru Granth Sahib amrit nectar; water used in the rite of initiation into the Khalsa order, known as pahul of the double-edged sword (khande kī pahul) amrit-sarovar the pool of nectar (used for the pool at Ramdaspur) anand kāraj the Sikh form of marriage in which the composition of Guru Amar Das, known as the Anand, is sung at the end ardās

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Glossary supplication; the Sikh prayer in which some of the most memorable events of Sikh history alluded to in a set form are recalled before making a specific supplication bājrā millets (p.714) bāṇī utterance; revealed word; composition; the Guru’s composition; a verse of Guru Granth Sahib bārānī land entirely dependent on rain for cultivation batāī division of produce, generally half and half between the cultivator and the owner of land or between the cultivator and the government bhagat a devotee of God bhagtī dedication to God in love and devotion, conceived differently from the Vaishnava bhakti bhajan an act of worship; a recitation, especially of the praise of God; a composition in praise of God or expressing devotion to God; a song in praise of God, singing of God’s praises; uttering God’s name bhog conclusion; reading of Guru Granth Sahib as the final rite after the death of a Sikh bighā a measure of land equal to about five-eighth of an acre darbār a court; the court of a prince; the court of the Guru; a Sikh gathering in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib Darbar Sahib the Harmandar in the midst of the sacred tank (amritsar), now popularly known as the Golden Temple dān charity; to give away something from one’s honest earnings for the use of others daswandh one-tenth; the contribution of a Sikh towards the Guru’s treasury, one-tenth of his net annual income or profit derā an establishment desh one’s country; used for India as well as for its regions and sub-regions desh bhagat Page 2 of 12

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Glossary a person dedicated to his country; a patriot devī a goddess; the Goddess as the supreme deity dharam religious and ethical principles of the Sikhs dharamsāl a place of Sikh congregational worship and community meal, where way farers could be lodged, and some social functions could also be performed dharma the appropriate moral and religious obligations for any particular section in Hindu society; duty, moral obligation; a righteous cause dharnā squatting in protest dīwān a Sikh gathering for a religious or a political purpose dukh sorrow; suffering inherent in existence without attaining the state of liberation faqīr a dervish; a Muslim mendicant; a beggar faslānā literally, relating to the harvest; a cess for the patwārī; a cess for giving the ‘first fruits’ (p.715) firangī a Frank, an Italian, a European, particularly an Englishman firkādārī partiality for one’s sect or community gaddī a cushioned seat; a throne; the seat of a religious leader; the seat of the Guru gaṛhī a fortress ghallūghārā a stream of blood; used for two carnages in Sikh history, one in 1746 and the other in 1762 ghulāmī slavery; political subjection golak a box for depositing cash offerings to the Guru, generally kept in a gurdwara Granth a book; a sacred scripture granthī Page 3 of 12

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Glossary the reader of a Granth, used especially for the Sikh who reads the Sikh scripture Guru Granth Sahib gurbāṇī an utterance of the Guru gurdwara ‘the door of the Guru’; a Sikh place of worship, generally the centre of social activity too (see also dharamsāl) Gur-maryādā principles laid down by the Guru for Sikh worship and practice; the norms of Sikh beliefs and practices, based on the Guru Granth Sahib and the Sikh tradition Gurmat the Guru’s instruction, the Guru’s wisdom; Sikh thought as a whole gurmatā decision of a general body of Sikhs, generally taken in the presence of Guru Granth Sahib Guru preceptor; religious teacher; an epithet used for the founder of Sikhism and each of his nine successors, and also for the Granth Sahib and the Panth Guru Granth Sahib the Sikh scripture authenticated by Guru Gobind Singh; the doctrine that the Sikh scripture authenticated by Guru Gobind Singh is the Guru and not any individual other than the ten Gurus from Guru Nanak to Guru Gobind Singh hankār pride of personal position, merit, or possessions as a hindrance in spiritual pursuit haqūq-i-kamiāna the customary dues paid to the kamīns (menials) by the cultivators for the services rendered as the village servants haṛtāl a demonstration of peaceful protest in a passive form haumai ‘I am’; the psychic state of self-centeredness in oblivion of God’s omnipotence; giving primacy to the self to the exclusion of God’s will havan kund a sacrificial pit of fire, a fire altar Hind dī chādar India’s sheet of honour (used for Guru Tegh Bahadur with reference to his martyrdom for religious freedom) hukamnāmā a written order; used generally for a letter of the Sikh Guru to his followers, regarded by them as an order Page 4 of 12

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Glossary (p.716) ‘ilāqā a dependency; a district; a particular area ishtihār public notice, poster itihās as it happened; history izzat honour, social repute jāgīr a piece of cultivated land with its revenue alienated by the state in favour of a servant in lieu of his salary jāgīrdār the holder of a jāgīr who is entitled to collect revenues from a given piece of land in lieu of salary for service to the state jāgīrdārī the system of jāgīrs by which payment of service to the state was made through an assignment of revenue instead of cash Japujī the composition of Guru Nanak regarded as the most important, used for the morning prayer; in the Guru Granth Sahib this composition includes a shalok of Guru Angad at the end jathā a band, a fighting band jhatkā literally, a sudden jolt; a sudden stroke; the meat of an animal slaughtered by one stroke of the sword jizya capitation tax; tax imposed on non-Muslims by the Muslim rulers of India kabaddī a sport popular in the Punjab kachhā (kachhehrā) short breeches, prescribed as an article of dress for the Keshdhārī Singh kahī a form of spade kām a desire, especially sexual; regarded as one of the four gifts of life, the other three being dharma, artha, and moksha kamīn literally, inferior; the village workmen such as sweepers, potters, cobblers, water-drawers, barbers, and washermen; the low in social scale; a village menial kaṛāh parsād Page 5 of 12

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Glossary the sacred food distributed in a Sikh dharamsāl or gurdwara, generally prepared with equal quantities of flour, ghee, and sugar karam kindness, grace karāmāt a supranatural happening, a miracle; the power to perform a miracle kārkhānā a manufactory, a workshop kār-sewā the service performed for taking out mud deposited over the years at the buttom of the sacred sarovar at Amritsar kathā a narrative; an exposition; an exposition of the Guru’s bāṇī kaum a distinct social group; a community; a nationality; a nation keshdhārī a person initiated as a Singh who keeps long unshorn hair khandā a double-edged sword kikkar, Acacia Arabica hardy tree with thorns used as a hedge for orchards kirpā kindness, grace, mercy (p.717) kirpān a sword, one of the five weapons to be borne by a Singh kīrtan singing in praise of God kismat a portion ordained for one; fate kos a measure of distance, about 2 miles or about 3 kilometres krodh anger as one of the five adversaries of human beings langar a Sikh community kitchen; an open kitchen for charity lāṭhī a staff; a club, prop, support lobh greed, avarice lūchī a kind of thin loaf made of fine flour and cooked in ghee mahant the head of a religious establishment, generally celibate but not in all cases; therefore, succession in some cases could be hereditary; used Page 6 of 12

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Glossary for the custodians of gurdwaras to whom recognition and support was given by the British administration Majha a tract in the Bari Doab; originally used for the lower portion of the upper Bari Doab, the term was extended to the upper portions of the Bari and Rachna Doabs manmukh one who goes by his own inclination as opposed to the Gurmukh who follows the Guru’s instruction and cares for others as well mantar a holy text; a mystic formula; a magical spell, a charm masnad a throne; a seat of authority māyā material world; illusory phenomena; worldly entanglement mīrī temporal leadership; rulership mīrī-pīrī temporal and spiritual authority rolled into one mistrī an artisan; a mason moh affection, love, attachment to kith and kin and attachment to worldly things as opposed to prem or love for God monā one who cuts off the hair of his head morchā an entrenchment, a battle; an agitational mode of protest muhallā a separate locality in a town or a city munī a person of high spiritual state muktī liberation, freedom from the chain of death and rebirth, or the cycle of transmigration nām name, the name of God; the revealed word; God in his transcendent and immanent form nitnem compositions of the Gurus prescribed for a Sikh for daily recitation, consisting of the Japuji, the Jap, Tav Prasad, Savvayye Patsahi 10, Chaupai Patsahi 10, the Anand, the Rahras, and the Sohila pahar a unit of three hours; an eighth part of the day Page 7 of 12

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Glossary pahul water used for initiating a person as a Sikh (charan pahul) or a Singh (khande ki pahul) panchāyat a body of five persons to represent a whole group, section, caste, or community (p.718) panj-piārās the ‘five beloved’ so called for offering their heads to Guru Gobind Singh who were initiated all afresh and who, in turn, initiated the Guru Panth a path, the people following a particular path; collectively the followers of the Gurus; the Sikh community parchā a newspaper; a periodical parchār propagation of religion; propaganda parikarmā the path for circumambulation around a sacred structure parupkār service of others, a cardinal principle of Sikh ethics; welfare of others; the epithet par-upkāri used for God and the Guru pāṭh reading or recitation of the Sikh scripture; reading of the Granth Sahib on a particular occasion pāṭhī one who performs pāṭh; a professional reader of the Guru Granth Sahib patit an apostate, a renegade patwārī a keeper of revenue records on behalf of the government, a local community or a zamīndār pauṛī a stanza, a form of poetic composition pīrī the status of a Pir; spiritual leadership pirm piālā the cup of love, used for martyrdom as the seal of the love of God prem lagan pursuit of the path of love pujārī the attendant of a shrine; a Brahman priest who conducts rituals; used also for the Sikh granthīs Page 8 of 12

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Glossary Punjabi Suba a unilingual Punjabi-speaking state within the Indian Union purohit a priest, a family priest rahit way of life, essentially in terms of ethics and religious beliefs and practices Rahirās a composition of Guru Nanak recited in the evening in a gurdwara or at home ra’īs an affluent person with a recognized social status rāj karegā Khālsā ‘The Khalsa shall rule’, an ideal that goes back to the days of Guru Gobind Singh and is now a part of the anthem daily recited by Sikh congregations the world over sachā pātshāh the true king (used for God and the Gurus) sādhik from sādh, a renunciate Sahajdhārī a Sikh who is not initiated as a Singh and does not observe the Khalsa code of discipline sanātana dharma the pristine Hindu faith Sanātni Sikhs an epithet appropriated by the Sikhs who did not subscribe to radical reform among the Sikhs during the colonial period sangat an assembly, a religious congregation; a congregation of Sikhs; the collective body of Sikhs at one place (p.719) sant a seeker of God; a devotee of high spiritual status; a Sikh; an acknowledged religious leader among the Sikhs Sant Khalsa a term used for a person admitted into the order of the Khalsa Singhs saropā literally from head to foot; a robe of honour savvayyā a unit of poetry of at least four rhyming lines, and it may consist of eight, twelve, sixteen, or twenty such lines sewā service; especially manual service; service of God; service of the Guru; service of the Sikhs; service of others Page 9 of 12

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Glossary sewādār a person who performs a certain service shabad/sabda the word; equated with bāṇī; a sacred song; a hymn; a verse from Guru Granth Sahib sewak a servant ; one who offers voluntary service out of faith shahīdī dīwān a general gathering of the Sikh to pay homage to a Sikh martyr shahīdī jathā a band of Sikhs who are prepared to die for a particular cause shrādh funerary rites in honour of the departed, in which Brahmans are fed and given gifts which are supposed to reach the dead shuddhī purification; used for reconversion to the Hindu fold in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century siddh one who has attained siddhī or the state of liberation; a person who has attained high spiritual state so as to command superanatural powers siddhī the status of a siddh or a Shaiva renunciate who has attained liberation; possession of supernatural powers Sikh homeland an area in which the Sikhs have political autonomy slok a form of verse; generally rather short, like a doha or a couplet, but could have several lines smādh a structure raised over the spot of cremation of an important person So-Dar a composition in Guru Granth Sahib sukh comfort, peace Sukhmaṇī a well-known composition of Guru Arjan swarāj self-rule; independent political power takht a throne, a seat of authority; one of the four (now five) Sikh seats of authority: Akal Takht, Keshgarh Sahib, Huzur Sahib (Nander), Patna Sahib (and Damdama Sahib) takht-posh Page 10 of 12

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Glossary a bed-like wooden seat to lie down or to sit on thānā a garrison; a police station; a garrison stationed usually in a newly conquered territory; a place where troops are posted for maintaining peace and order, and for assistance in the collection of revenues; a garrison in fort thānādarī literally, the office of the thānedār; also a cess for him (p.720) thānedār the commandant of a garrison or a fort tīsar panth the third path; the third collective entity; used for the Khalsa as a community representing the third dispensation as distinct from the Islamic and the Hindu Udāsīs a category of renunciates who used the Sikh scripture as one of their religious scriptures ‘ulamā plural of ‘ālim’, a learned Muslim, especially in Islamic law and theology vāk an utterance; the words spoken by the Guru; the ‘order’ taken daily from Guru Granth Sahib Vāhegurū praise be to the Guru; an epithet used for God Vār a literary genre; generally used for heroic poetry; Guru Nanak used it for his religious compositions; the most famous vārs in Sikh literature were composed by Bhai Gurdas in the early seventeenth century for celebrating Sikh Gurus and the Sikh Panth varnāshrama the ideal social order with four castes and four stages of dharma human life Zafarnāmā a written account of victory; used for a communication addressed by Guru Gobind Singh to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb zamīndār literally, the holder of land; applied alike to the intermediary who collected revenue on behalf of the state, a vassal chief, and a peasant proprietor

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Glossary

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Bibliography

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.721) Bibliography J.S. Grewal

Unpublished Records and Documents

Baldev Raj Nayar Papers, Personal Collection of Sohan Singh Punni, Surrey (Canada). ‘Facts About the Punjabi Suba Agitation’ (May–September 1960). National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi: F. No. 262, Home Political 1921. F. No. 383 & K.W., Home Political 1921. F. No. 861, Home Political 1922. F. No. 914/II, Home Political 1922. F. No. 148/IV, Home Political 1923. F. No. 191, Home Political 1923. F. No. 1 & K.W., Home Political 1924. F. No. 95, Home Political 1924. F. No. 235, Home Political 1924. F. No. 1/II, Home Political 1924. F. No. 1/III, Home Political 1924. F. No. 1/IV, Home Political 1924.

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Bibliography Published Documents

Ahluwalia, M.L., ed. Select Documents Gurdwara Reform Movement 1919–1925: An Era of Congress-Akali Collaboration. New Delhi: Ashoka International, 1985. Ashok, Shamsher Singh. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kametī dā Panjāh Sālā Itihās (1926–1976). Amritsar: SGPC, (1982) 2003. Carter, Lionel ed. Mountbatten’s Report on the Last Viceroyalty 22 March–15 August 1947. New Delhi: Manohar, 2003. ———, ed. Punjab Politics 1936–1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy (Governor’s Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents). New Delhi: Manohar, 2004. ———, ed. Punjab Politics, 1940–1943: Strains of War. New Delhi: Manohar, 2005. ———, ed. Punjab Politics, 1 January 1944–3 March 1947: Last Years of the Ministries. New Delhi: Manohar, 2006. ———, ed. Punjab Politics, 3 March–31 May 1937: At the Abyss. New Delhi: Manohar, 2007. ———, ed. Punjab Politics, 1 June–14 August 1947: Tragedy. New Delhi: Manohar, 2007. Census of India, 1951. vol. VIII, part I-Report. Simla, 1953. (p.722) Choudhary, Valmiki, ed. Dr Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents. 21 vols. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1986–95. Coupland, R. The Indian Problem 1833–1935. London: Oxford University Press, 1943. Das, Durga, ed. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (1945–1950). 10 vols. Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publishing House, 1971–4. Gazetteer Rawalpindi District 1907 (part A). (Reprinted in District and State Gazetters of the Undivided Punjab). Delhi: D.K. Publishers, 1993. Gwyer, Maurice and A. Appadorai, eds. Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921–1947. 2 vols. Bombay, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. Mansergh, Nicholas (Editor-in-Chief). Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942–47. 12 vols. London: HMSO, 1970–83.

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Bibliography Mitra, N.N., ed. The Indian Annual Register. 28 vols. (2 parts each). Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1920–47. Reprint. New Delhi: Gian Publishing House. Moon, Penderel, ed. Wavell The Viceroy’s Journal. London: Oxford University Press, 1973. Nehru, Jawaharlal. Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches (March 1953–August 1957), 3rd vol. Reprint. New Delhi: Government of India, 1970. Philips, C.H., H.L. Singh, and B.N. Pandey, eds. The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858–1947 (Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan, vol. IV). London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Prasad, Bimal, ed. The Ideas and Men Behind The Indian Constitution: Selections from the Constituent Assembly Debates (1946–49). New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2001. Report of Guru ka Bagh Congress Inquiry Committee. Lahore: Ruchi Ram Sahni, 1924. Report of the Linguistic Provinces Commission. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1948. Report on the Firing into the Gurudwara Sis Ganj, Delhi on May 6, 1930. Amritsar: SGPC, n.d. ‘Report on the Census’ (1855), reprinted in The Panjab Past and Present vol. XVII, part 1 (April 1983), pp. 179–200 and tables. ‘Census of the Punjab, 1868 and of India, 1871–72’ (Extracts), vol. VIII, part 2 (October 1974), pp. 346–50. Report of the Gurdwara Sisganj Enquiry Committee. Amritsar: SGPC, 1928. Singh, Amarjit, ed. Jinnah and Punjab: Shamsul Hasan Collection and Other Documents 1944–1947. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2007. Singh, Ganda, ed. Some Confidential Papers of the Akali Movement. Amritsar: SGPC, 1965. ———, ed. Deportation of Lala Lajpat Rai and Sardar Ajit Singh. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1978. Singh, Ganda, Devinder Kumar Verma, and Parm Bakhshish Singh, eds. Seditious Literature in the Punjab. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1988. Singh, Jaswinder. Kuka Movement: Freedom Struggle in Punjab (Documents, 1880–1903 AD). New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1985.

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Bibliography Singh, Kirpal, ed. Panthic Mate. Chandigarh: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 2002. ———, ed. Hardinge Papers Relating to Punjab. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2002. ———. Select Documents on Partition of Punjab-1947: India and Pakistan, Punjab, Haryana and Himachal-India and Punjab-Pakistan. Revised and enlarged. Delhi: National Book Shop, 2006. Singh, Nahar, ed. Gooroo Ram Singh and the Kuka Sikhs. New Delhi: 1965. Singh, Nahar and Kirpal Singh, eds. Rebels Against the British Rule (Guru Ram Singh and the Kuka Sikhs). New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1995. Singh, Roop. Edicts of Sri Akal Takhat Sahib. Translated by J.S. Jogi. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2012. ———, ed. Hukamnāme Ādesh Sandesh Sri Akal Takht Sahib. 2nd ed. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2012. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. Vols 16–30. Edited by S. Gopal. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1994–2002. Vols. (p.723) 31–5. Edited by H.Y. Sharda Prasad and A.K. Damodaran, 2002–5. Vols. 36–9. Edited by Mushirul Hasan, 2005–7. Vols. 40–3. Edited by Aditya Mukherjee and Mridula Mukherjee, 2009–11. Shaheedi, M. Akram (Editor-in-Chief). Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers: Call for Unity, Faith and Discipline, 1 August 1941–31 March 1942. Islamabad: Ministry of Culture, n.d. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. 90 vols. New Delhi: Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcast, 1984. Towards Freedom (Documents on the Movement for Independence in India). Vol. I. Edited by P.N. Chopra. New Delhi: ICHR, 1985. 1938. 3 parts. Edited by Basudev Chatterji. New Delhi: ICHR and Oxford University Press, 1999. 1939. Parts 1–2. Edited by Mushirul Hasan, 2008. 1940. Parts 1–2. Edited by K.N. Panikkar, 2009–10. 1941. Part 1. Edited by Amit K. Gupta and Arjun Dev, 2010. 1943–44. Part 1. Edited by Partha Sarathi Gupta, 1997. 1945. Edited by Bimal Prasad, 2008.

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Bibliography 1946. Part 2. Edited by Sumit Sarkar, 2009. 1947. Part 1. Edited by Sucheta Mahajan, 2013. Zaidi, A.M. and S.G. Zaidi, eds. The Encyclopaedia of the India National Congress. New Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1977. Zaidi, Z.H. (Editor-in-Chief). Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan 20 February–2 June 1947. Vol. I. Reprint. Islamabad: Ministry of Culture (Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing), 2009. Vol. II. Pakistan in the Making, 3 June–30 June 1947. 1994. Vol. III. On the Threshold of Pakistan, 1 July–25 July 1927. 1996. Vol. IV. Pakistan At Last, 26 July–14 August 1947. 1999. Vol. V. Pakistan: Pangs of Birth, 15 August–30 September 1947. 2002. Vol. VII. Pakistan: Struggling for Survival, 1 January–30 September 1948. 2002. Second Series Vol. X. Quest for Political Settlement in India, 1 October 1943–31 July 1944. 2004. Vol. XI. Consolidating the Muslim League for Final Struggle, 1 August 1944–31 July 1945. 2005. Vol. XII. The Verdict for Pakistan, 1 August 1945–31 March 1946. 2005. Vol. XIII. Cabinet Mission’s Parleys for Shaping India’s Future, 1 April 1946–31 July 1946. 2006. Vol. XIV. League-Congress Deadlock, 1 August 1946–19 February 1947. 2006. Third Series Vol. XV. Pakistan: The Goal Defined, 1 January–31 August 1940. 2002. Vol. XVI. Muslim League: Striving for Consolidation, 1 September 1940–31 July 1941. 2008. Memoirs and Other Contemporary Works

Ahmad, Waheed, ed. Letters of Mian Fazl-i-Husain. Lahore: University of the Punjab, 1976. Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. The Emergence of Pakistan. Lahore: University of the Punjab, (1967) 2009. Page 5 of 33

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Bibliography Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam. India Wins Freedom. Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1988 (complete version). Bajwa, Harcharan Singh. Fifty Years of Punjab Politics (1920–1970). Chandigarh: Modern Publishers, 1979. Barrier, N. Gerald. The Sikhs and Their Literature. Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1970. Campbell-Johnson, Allan. Mission with Mountbatten. London: Robert Hale, 1951. Cooper, Frederic. Crisis in Punjab From the 10th of May Until the Fall of Delhi. Chandigarh: Sameer Prakashan, 1977. Darling, Malcolm Lyall. The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. London, 1928. (p.724) Das, Durga. India: From Curzon to Nehru And After. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., (1981) 2004. Dilgir, Harjinder Singh, ed. The Struggle for Freedom of Religious Worship in Jaito. Amritsar: SGPC, (1924) 1998. Douie, James. The Panjab, North-Western Frontier Province and Kashmir. Reprint. Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1994 (rpt.). Gandhi, Indira. My Truth. Edited by Emmanuel Pouchhadass. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1981. Gandhi, M.K. Delhi Diary (Prayer Speeches from 10.9.’47 to 30.1.’48). Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948. ———. Linguistic Provinces. Edited by Bhartan Kumarappa. Ahemdabad: Navajiwan Publishing House, 1954. ———. An Autobiography: The Story of my Experiments with Truth. Boston: Beacon Press, (first paperback ed. 1957) 1962. Garett, H.L.O., ed. A History of Government College, Lahore (1864–1914). Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1914. Griffin, Lepel. Rajas of the Punjab. Reprint. Patiala: Punjab Languages Department, 1970. Hardinge, Lord of Penhurst. My Indian Years 1910–1916: The Reminiscenses of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst. London: John Murray, 1948. Hodson, H.V. The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. 2nd impression. London: Hutchinson, 1969. Page 6 of 33

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Bibliography Kapur, Prithipal Singh. Master Tara Singh and His Reminiscesses. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2015. Khosla, Gopal Das. Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India. Paperback. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989. Menon, V.P. The Transfer of Power in India. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1957. ———. The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. 3rd ed. New Delhi: Orient Longmans 1961. Mohan Lal, Pandit. Disintegration of Punjab. Chandigarh: Sameer Prakashan, 1984. Moon, Penderel. Divide and Quit. London: Chatto & Windus, 1961. Nanda, B.R. Witness to Partition: A Memoir. Paperback. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2003. Nehru, Jawaharlal. An Autobiography. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, (1936) 1982. Pavate, D.C. My Days as Governor. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1974. Punjabi Suba Demand. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1966. Randhawa, M.S. Out of the Ashes: An Account of the Rehabilitation of Refugees from West-Pakistan in Rural Areas of East-Punjab. Bombay: New Jack Printing Works Ltd., 1954. Report of the Gurdwara Sisganj Enquiry Committee. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1928. Sahni, Ruchi Ram. Memoirs of Ruchi Ram Sahni. Edited by Narender K. Sehgal and Subodh Mahanti. 2nd ed. Paperback. New Delhi: Vigyan Prasar, 1997. ———. Struggle for Reform in Sikh Shrines. Edited by Ganda Singh. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, n.d. Sarhadi, Ajit Singh. Punjabi Suba: The Story of the Struggle. Delhi: U.C. Kapur & Sons, 1970. Sarsfield, Landen. Betrayal of the Sikhs. Lahore: Lahore Book Shop, 1946. Singh, Bawa Harkishan. A Plea for a Punjabi-Speaking Province. Qadian, 1948.

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Bibliography Singh, Bhagat Lakshman. Autobiography. Edited by Ganda Singh. Calcutta: The Sikh Cultural Centre, 1965. Singh, Durlab. The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh. Lahore: Hero Publications, 1942. Reprinted in Master Tara Singh. Edited by Verinder Grover. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995. Singh, Ganda, ed. Bhagat Lakshman Singh, Autobiography. Calcutta: The Sikh Cultural Centre, 1965. ———. History of the Gurdwara Shahidganj Lahore. Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1935. ———, ed. Maharaja Duleep Singh Correspondence. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1977. Singh, Gurbachan and Lal Singh Giani. The Idea of the Sikh State. Lahore: The Lahore Book Shop, 1946. Singh, Gurcharan. Muslim League Attack and Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947. Amritsar: SGPC, 1950. (p.725) Singh, Khuswant and Satindra Singh. Ghadar 1915: India’s First Armed Revolution. New Delhi: R&K Publishing House, 1966. Singh, Sadhu Swarup. The Sikh Demands their Homeland. Lahore: Lahore Book Shop, 1946. Singh, Teja. The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Sikh Awakening. Jullundur: Desh Sewak Book Agency, 1922. Sitaramayya, Pattabhi. A History of the Indian National Congress, (1885–1935). Vol. I. Bombay: Padma Publications, n.d. Tanwar, Raghuvendra. Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923–1947. New Delhi: Manohar, 1999. ———. Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and Other Opinions. New Delhi: Manohar, 2006. Tendulkar, D.G. Mahatma: Life of Mohan Das Karam Chand Gandhi. Reprint. Delhi: Publications Division (Government of India), 1969. Thorburn, S.S. The Punjab in Peace and War. Reprint. Punjab Languages Department, Patiala, 1970. Truth About Nabha. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1923. Page 8 of 33

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Bibliography Yadav, Kirpal C. Elections in Panjab 1920–1947. New Delhi: Manohar, 1987. Books in English

Afzal, M. Rafique. A History of All India Muslim League 1906–1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013. Allinwood, Dewitt C. and S.D. Pradhan, eds. India and World War I. New Delhi: Manohar, 1978. Aujla, G.S. A Few More Patriots. New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 2013. Aziz, K.K. The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus, 1967. Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar, ed. Nationalist Movement in India: A Reader. Reprint, paperback. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, (2009) 2010. Banga, Indu, ed. Ports and Their Hinterlands (1700–1950). New Delhi: Manohar, 1992. ———, ed. Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture, c. 1500– 1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Banga, Indu and Jaidev, eds. Cultural Reorientation in Modern India. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996. Bal, S.S. Political Parties and Growth of Communalism in Punjab (1920–47). Chandigarh: Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1989. Bal-Riar, Sukhmani. The Politics and History of the Central Sikh League 1919– 1929. Chandigarh: Unistar, 2006. ———. The Politics of the Sikhs 1940–47. Chandigarh: Unistar, 2006. Banerjee, Himadri. Agrarian Society of the Punjab (1849–1901). New Delhi, 1982. Barrier, N.G. and Paul Wallace. The Punjab Press, 1880–1905. Michigan, 1970. Brass, Paul R. Language, Religion and Politics in North India. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974. ———. The Politics of India since Independence (The New Cambridge History of India, IV.1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 2nd ed. (published in India by Foundation Books, New Delhi: 1994). Brecher, Michael. Nehru: A Political Biography. London: Oxford University Press (paperback, 1959), 1998. Page 9 of 33

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Bibliography Brown, Judith M. Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. ———. Gandhi and Civil Disobedience: The Mahatma in Indian Politics 1928–34. London: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Budhiraja, Arjan Singh. Facts About Punjabi Suba. Amritsar, 1965. Chandra, Bipan, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee. India after Independence 1947–2000. 5th impression. New Delhi: Penguin Books (India), 2003. Chandra, Bipan, Mridula Mukherjee, Aditya Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, and K.N. Panikkar. India’s Struggle for Independence 1857–1947. Reprint. New Delhi: Penguin Books (India), 1989. Chetan Singh, ed. Social Transformation in North-Western India during the Twentieth Century. New Delhi: Manohar, 2010. (p.726) Clarke, Peter. The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire. London: Penguin Books, 2007. Copland, Ian. The Princes of India in the Endgame of the Empire 1917–1947. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Das, M.N. India Under Morley and Minto: Politics Behind Revolution, Repressiom and Reforms. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964. Datta, V.N. Jallianwala Bagh. Ludhiana, 1969. ———. Ideology of the Political Elite in Punjab (1900–1920). Patiala: Punjabi University, 1977. Davis, Emmett. Press and Politics in British Western Punjab 1836–1947. Reprint of 1983. Delhi: Academic Publications, 2006. Davis, Kingsley. The Population of India and Pakistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Deol, Gurdev Singh. Sardar Sundar Singh Majithia: Life, Work and Mission. Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1992. Dhami, M.S. Minority Leaders’ Image of the Indian Political System: An Exploratory Study of the Attitudes of Akali Leaders. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975. Dhillon, Satwinder Singh. SGPC Elections and the Sikh Politics. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2009. Page 10 of 33

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Bibliography Domin, Dolores. India in 1857–59: A Study in the Role of the Sikhs in the People’s Uprising. Berlin: Akademic-Varlaj, 1977. Draper, Alfred. Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj. London, 1961. Dungen, P.H.M. van den. The Punjab Tradition: Influence and Authority in Nineteenth-Century India. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972. Fischer, Louis. The Life of Mahatma Gandhi. London: Jonathan Cape, 1951. Fox, Richard G. Lions of the Punjab: Culture in the Making. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Gandhi, Surjit Singh. Perspectives on Sikh Gurdwaras Legislation. New Delhi: APD Computer Graphics, 1993. Gill, Rupinder Kaur. Partap Singh Kairon: His Vision and Conviction. Ludhiana: Jaswant Printers, 2002. Gopal, Sarvepalli. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography. 3 volumes. Reprint. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012. Grewal, J.S. Historical Writings on the Sikhs (1784–2011): Western Enterprise and the Indian Response. New Delhi: Manohar, 2012. ———. The Akalis: A Short History. Chandigarh: Punjab Studies Publications, 1996. ———. History, Literature and Identity: Four Centuries of the Sikh Tradition. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011. ———. The Sikhs of the Punjab (The New Cambridge History of India, II.3). Paperback reprint of 2nd ed. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, (1999) 2014. ———, ed. Baba Dayal: Founder of the First Reform Movement Among the Sikhs. Chandigarh: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 2003. ———, ed. Bhagat Singh and His Legend. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2008. Grewal, J.S. and H.K. Puri, eds. Letters of Udham Singh. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1974. Grewal, J.S., Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, eds. The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacy. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. Grewal, J.S. and Indu Banga, eds. Punjab in Prosperity and Violence: Administration, Politics and Social Change 1947–1997. Chandigarh: K.K. Publishers for Institute of Punjab Studies, 1998. Page 11 of 33

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Bibliography ———, eds. Lala Lajpat Rai in Retrospect: Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Concerns. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 2000. Grover, Verinder, ed. Political Thinkers of Modern India: Master Tara Singh. Vol. XXVIII. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995. Gulati, Kailash Chander. The Akalis Past and Present. New Delhi: Ashajanak Publications, 1974. Hardy, Peter. Partners in Freedom and True Muslims: The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India 1912–1947. Lund: Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, 1971. Hasan, Mushirul, ed. India’s Partition Process, Strategy and Mobilization. 4th impression (p.727) 1998. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993. Husain, Azim. Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography. Bombay: Longmans Green & Co. Ltd., 1946. Jakobsh, Doris R. Relocating Gender in Sikh History: Transformation, Meaning and Identity. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003. Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. ———. Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (A Comparative and Historical Perspective). Reprint, paperback. New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1996. Johnston, Hugh. The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh Challenge to Canada’s Colour Bar. Revised ed. of 2014. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979. Jones, Kenneth W. Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th Century Punjab. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. ———. Socio-religious Reform Movements in British India (The New Cambridge History of India, III.1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Jorden, J.T.F. Dayananda Sarasvati: His Life and Ideas. 2nd impression. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979. Josh, Bhagwan. Communist Movement in Punjab (1926–47). Delhi: Anupama Publications, 1979. Kahol, Om Prakash. Hindus and the Punjabi State. Ambala Cantonement: The Hindu Prachara Sabha, 1955.

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Bibliography Kapur, Prithipal Singh. ‘Master Tara Singh—A Biographical Sketch’. In Master Tara Singh. Edited by Verinder Grover. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995. Kapur, Rajiv A. Sikh Separatism: A Politics of Faith. 2nd impression, paperback. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1987. Kaura, Uma. Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The Emergence of the Demand for India’s Partition 1928–40. New Delhi: Manohar, 1977. Kerr, Ian J. Building the Railways of the Raj 1850–1900. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997. Lavan, Spencer. The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective. New Delhi: Manohar, 1974. Mahajan, Ganeshi. Congress Politics in the Punjab (1885–1947). Shimla: K.K. Publishers, 2002. Malhotra, Karamjit K. ed. The Punjab Revisited: Social Order, Economic Life, Cultural Articulation, Politics and Partition (18th–20th Centuries). Patiala: Punjabi University, 2014. Malhotra, S.L. Gandhi: An Experiment with Communal Politics. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1975. ———. From Civil Disobedience to Quit India. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1979. ———. Gandhi, Punjab and the Partition. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1983. ———. Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1988. ———. Gandhi and the Punjab. 2nd ed. 2010. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 1970. Mirza, Sarfaraz Hussian. The Punjab Muslim Students Federation (1937–1947). Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1991. Moore, R.J. The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917–1940. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1974. Nayar, Baldev Raj. Minority Politics in the Punjab. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Nirankari, Man Singh and Dewan Singh, eds. Baba Dayal: Crusader of True Sikhism. 2nd ed. Amritsar: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 1997. Page 13 of 33

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Bibliography Oberoi, Harjot. The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994. Page, David. Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920–1932 (The Partition Omnibus). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pettigrew, Joyce. Robber Noblemen: A Study of the Political System of the Sikh Jats. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Puri, Harish K. Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organization and Strategy. Enlarged 2nd ed, 1993. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1983. (p.728) ———. Ghadar Movement: A Short History. Paperback. New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2011. Rai, Satya M. Partition of the Punjab. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965. ———. Legislative Politics and Freedom Struggle in the Panjab 1897–1947. New Delhi: India Council of the Historical Research, 1984. ———. Punjab Since Partition. Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986. ———. Punjabi Heroic Tradition 1900–1947. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995. Ramusack, Barbara N. The Indian Princes and Their States (The New Cambridge History of India, III.6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Robb, P.G. The Government of India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the Constitution, 1916–1921. New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1986. Sandhu, Jasdev Singh, ed. Giani Kartar Singh. Patiala: S. Jasdev Singh Sandhu Foundation, 2001. Sarhadi, Ajit Singh. Nationalisms in India—The Problem. Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1975. Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India 1885–1947. Reprint. Madras: Macmillan India, 1995. ———. Modern Times: India 1880s–1950s Environment, Economy, Culture. Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2014. Sekhon, Sant Singh and Kartar Singh Duggal. A History of Punjabi Literature. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1992. Singh, Amarjit, ed. Jinnah and Punjab Shamsul Hasan Collection and other Documents 1944–1947. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2007.

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Bibliography ———. Punjab Divided: Politics of the Muslim League and Partition 1935–1947. New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2001. Singh, Amrik, ed. The Partition in Retrospect. New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and National Institute of Punjab Studies, 2000. Singh, Anita Inder. The Origins of the Partition of India 1936–1947 (The Partition Omnibus). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Singh, Divinder. Akali Politics in Punjab (1964–1985). New Delhi: National Book Organisation, 1993. Singh, Fauja. Jawaharlal Nehru in Punjab. 2nd ed. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1992. ———. Kuka Movement: An Important Phase in Punjab’s Role in India’s Struggle for Freedom. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965. Singh, Fauja and others, eds. Who’s Who: Punjab Freedom Fighters. Vol. I. 2nd ed. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2000. Singh, Ganda. A History of the Khalsa College Amritsar. Amritsar: Khalsa College, 1949. ———, ed. The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. 3rd ed. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1997. Singh, Gopal. A History of the Sikh People (1469–1988). Reprint. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1993. Singh, Gurcharan. The Sikh Homeland: The Myth and Reality. Patiala: Guru Nanak Dev Mission, 1987. Singh, Gurharpal. Communism in Punjab. Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1994. Singh, Gurmit. Failures of Akali Leadership. Sirsa: Usha Institute of Religious Studies, 1981. Singh, Gurnam. A Unilingual Punjab State and the Sikh Unrest. New Delhi, n.d. Singh, Gur Rattan Pal. The Illustrated History of the Sikhs (1947–78). Chandigarh: Author, 1979. Singh, Gursharan. History of Pepsu. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1991. Singh, Gurtej. Chakravyuh: Web of Indian Secularism. Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 2000.

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Bibliography ———. Tandav of the Centaur: Sikhs and Indian Secularism. Chandigarh: Institute of Sikh Studies, 1996. Singh, Harbans. Bhai Vir Singh. Paperback, 2nd ed. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1984. ———. The Heritage of the Sikhs. 2nd revised ed. New Delhi: Manohar, 1994. Singh, Harbans, ed. The Encyclopaedia of Sikhism. 4 vols. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1992, 1998, 2001 (2nd ed), 2002 (2nd ed). Singh, Harnam. Punjab: The Homeland of the Sikhs. Lahore, 1945. (p.729) Singh, Joginder. Punjab Journalism: Issues and Concerns. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2014. Singh, Kapur. Some Documents on the Demand for the Sikh Homeland. n.p., 1969. Singh, Kashmir. Law of Religious Institutions: Sikh Gurdwaras. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1989. Singh, Khushwant. A History of the Sikhs. 2 vols. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978. Singh, Khushwant and Satindra Singh. Ghadar 1915: India’s First Armed Revolution. New Delhi: R&K Publishing House, 1966. Singh, Kirpal. The Partition of the Punjab. Revised and enlarged. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1989. ———. The Sikhs and the Transfer of Power (1942–1947). Patiala: Punjabi University, 2006. Singh, Mohinder. Baba Kharak Singh and India’s Struggle for Freedom. New Delhi: National Book Trust India, 2005. ———. The Akali Movement. Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India, 1978. ———. The Akali Struggle: A Retrospect. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 1988. Singh, Parm Bakhshish and Devinder Kumar Verma, eds. Punjab and the Freedom Struggle. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998. Singh, Parm Bakhshish, Devinder Kumar Verma et al., eds. Who’s Who: Punjab Freedom Fighters. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2007. Singh, Partap. Biography: Sardar Hakam Singh. New Delhi: 1989. Page 16 of 33

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Bibliography Singh, Ram. Betrayal of Sikh Nation. Ludhiana: Punjab Publications, 2014. Singh, Sangat. The Sikhs in History. New Delhi: Uncommon Books, 1996. Sohal, Sukhdev Singh. The Making of the Middle Classes in the Punjab (1849– 1947). Jalandhar: ABS Publications, 2008. Talbot, Ian. Khizr Tiwana, The Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India. Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996. Talbot, Ian and Gurharpal Singh. The Partition of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Tan, Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya. The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Tanwar, Raghuvendra. Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923–1947. New Delhi: Manohar, 1999. Tripathi, Amales. Indian National Congress and the Struggle for Freedom 1885– 1947. Translated by Amitava Tripathi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014. Tuteja, K.L. Sikh Politics (1920–40). Kurukshetra: Vishal Publications, 1984. Uprety, Prem Raman. Religion and Politics in Punjab in the 1920s. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1980. Walia, Ramesh. Praja Mandal Movement in East Punjab States. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1972. Wallace, Paul and Surendra Chopra, eds. Political Dynamics of Punjab. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981. Wasti, Syed Razi. Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. Webster, John C.B. The Christian Community and Change in Nineteenth Century North India. Delhi: Macmillan, 1976. ———. The Nirankari Sikhs. Delhi: Macmillan, 1979. ———. A Social History of Christianity: North-West India since 1800. Reprint. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008. ———. Historiography of Christianity in India. 2nd impression 2014. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012. Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah of Pakistan. Paperback. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985. Page 17 of 33

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Bibliography Articles and Pamphlets in English

Ahluwalia, M.L. ‘Bhai Maharaj Singh and His Role in the Freedom Struggle’. In Punjab and the Freedom Struggle. Edited by Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma, 51–62. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998. (p.730) Ali, Imran. ‘Canal Colonization and Socio-Economic Change’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal), 341–57. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Anon. ‘Bhai Jawahar Singh—Arya Samaj—Singh Sabha’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 92–5. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. ———. ‘Chief Khalsa Diwan: Fifty Years of Service (1902–1951)’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 59–68. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Bajaj, S.K. ‘Role of the Sikhs in the Revolt of 1857 in Punjab’. In Punjab and the Freedom Struggle. Edited by Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma, 77–84. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998. Bajaj, Y.P. ‘Sikhs and the First General Elections (1936–37) to the Punjab Legislative Assembly: An Analysis’, The Panjab Past and Present 21, part 1 (April 1987): 103–8. Banga, Indu. ‘Lajpat Rai on the Arya Samaj: An Insider’s View’. In Lala Lajpat Rai in Retrospect: Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Concerns. Edited by J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga, 299–317. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 2000. ———. ‘Karachi and Its Hinterland Under Colonial Rule’. In Ports and Their Hinterlands in India (1700–1950). Edited by Indu Banga, 337–58. New Delhi: Manohar, 1992, pp. 337–58. ———. ‘The Crises of Sikh Politics (1940–47)’. In Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Joseph O’ Connell, Milton Israel, and Willard Oxtoby with W.H. McLeod and J.S. Grewal as visiting editors, 233–55. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988. Barrier, N. Gerald. ‘The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: The Response of the British Government in India to Agrarian Unrest’, The Panjab Past and Present 8, part 2 (October 1974): 444–76. ———. ‘Mass Politics and the Punjab Congress in the Pre-Gandhian Era’, The Panjab Past and Present 9, part 2 (October 1975): 349–59. ———. ‘The Formulation and Enactment of the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill’, The Panjab Past and Present 13, part 1 (April 1979): 193–215. Page 18 of 33

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Bibliography ———. ‘Sikh Politics in British Punjab Prior to the Gurdwara Reform Movment’. In Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Joseph T. O’Connell, Milton Israel, and Willard G. Oxtoby with W.H. McLeod and J.S. Grewal as visiting editors, 159–90. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988. Baxter, Craig, ed. ‘The 1937 Elections and the Sikander-Jinnah Pact’, The Panjab Past and Present 10, part 2 (October 1976): 359–60. Bhattacharya, N.N. ‘Indian Revolutionaries Abroad (1891–1919)’, The Panjab Past and Present 8, part 2 (October 1974): 351–65. Brar, J.S. ‘Master Tara Singh and the Demand for Sikh Homeland’, The Panjab Past and Present 21, part 2 (October 1987): 363–71. Brown, Emily C. ‘The Ideology of Har Dayal’. In Political Dynamics of Punjab. Edited by Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, 345–69. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981. Caveeshar, Sardul Singh. ‘The Sikh Kanya Mahavidyala’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 99–112. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Churchill, Edward D. Jr. ‘Muslim Societies of the Punjab, 1860–1890’, The Panjab Past and Present 8, part 1 (April 1974): 69–91. ———. ‘The Muhammadan Educational Conference and the Aligarh Movement 1886–1900’, The Panjab Past and Present 8, part 2 (October 1974): 366–81. De, Amalendu. ‘The Shahidganj Agitation and the Khaksars’, The Panjab Past and Present 9, part II (October 1975): 360–86. Dhami, M.S. ‘Punjab and Communalism’, Punjab Journal of Politics 9, no. 1 (January–June 1985): 25–38. (p.731) Dhanki, J.S. ‘The Swadeshi Movement in the Punjab and Lala Lajpat Rai 1905–1907’. In Lala Lajpat Rai in Retrospect: Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Concerns. Edited by J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga, 31–9. Chandigarh: Panjab University, 2000. Dhillon, Rajwant Kaur. ‘Master Tara Singh and the Indian National Congress 1920–47’, The Panjab Past and Present 21, part 2 (October 1987): 343–54. Farquhar, J.N. ‘The Arya Samaj’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 213–40. Reprint. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Grewal, J.S. ‘Raja Lakhdata Singh as a National Drama’. In Khoj Darpan. Ambala: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1986. Page 19 of 33

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Bibliography ———. ‘The Jallianwala Bagh Tragedy: The Official Attitude and its Significance’. In Jallianwala Bagh Massacre. Edited by V.N. Datta and S. Settar. Delhi: Pragati Publications/ICHR, 2002. ———. ‘Agrarian Production and Colonial Policy in Punjab’. In India’s Colonial Encounter: Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes. Edited by Mushirul Hasan and Narayani Gupta, 293–308. New Delhi: Manohar, 1993. ———. ‘An Interpreter of the Early Sikh Tradition’. In Baba Dayal: Founder of the First Reform Movement Among the Sikhs. Edited by J.S. Grewal. Chandigarh, 2003. ———. ‘Cultural Reorientation in India under Colonial Rule’. In Cultural Reorientation in Modern India. Edited by Indu Banga and Jaidev, 13–23. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1996. ———. ‘The Doctrines of Guru Panth and Guru Granth’. In Sikh Ideology, Polity and Social Order: From Guru Nanak to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, 223–38. New Delhi: Manohar, 2007. ———. ‘The Prem Sumarg: A Sant Khalsa Vision of the Sikh Panth’. In The Sikhs: Ideology, Institutions and Identity. 158–85. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009. ———. ‘An Argument for Sikh Nationality: Nabha’s Ham Hindu Nahin’. In History, Literature and Identity: Four Centuries of Sikh Tradition, 275–97. 2nd impression. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012. ———. ‘Sardar Swaran Singh: Emergence as an Eminent Leader’, The Panjab, Past and Present 44, part 2 (October 2013): 123–35. Grewal, J.S. and Indu Banga. ‘Deconstructing Colonial Constructions of 1857 in Relation to the Punjab’. In The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies. Edited by J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, 40–52. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. ———. ‘The War of Liberation’. In The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies. Edited by J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, 15– 24. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. ———. ‘The War of Resistance’. In The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies. Edited by J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, 3– 15. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. ———. ‘The Kuka Movement’. In The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies. Edited by J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, 55– 66. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. Page 20 of 33

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Bibliography ———. ‘Bhai Maharaj Singh’ and ‘Maharani Jind Kaur’. In The Ghadar Movement: Background, Ideology, Action and Legacies. Edited by J.S. Grewal, Harish K. Puri, and Indu Banga, 24–38. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2013. Grewal, J.S. and Harish C. Sharma. ‘Political Change and Social Readjustment: The Case of Sikh Aristocracy Under Colonial Rule in the Punjab’. In Proceedings Indian History Congress, 377–82. 1988. Grewal, Reeta. ‘Urban Revolution Under Colonial Rule’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). Edited by Indu Banga, 438–54. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. (p.732) Grover, Verinder, ed. ‘All Parties Conference, 1928 (Nehru Committee Report)’ in Master Tara Singh (Political Thinkers of Modern India—28). New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1995. Hardy, P. ‘Wahhabis in the Panjab, 1876’, The Panjab Past and Present 15, part 2 (October 1981): 428–32. Hodder, Reginald. ‘The Sikh and the Sikh Wars’, The Panjab Past and Present 3, part 1 (April 1970): 86–105. Jones, Kenneth W. ‘Ham Hindu Nahin: The Arya-Sikh Relations 1877–1905’, The Panjab Past and Present 11, part 2 (October 1977): 330–55. Kanal, S.P. ‘The Dev Samaj’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 241–52. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Kerr, Ian J. ‘The British and the Administration of the Golden Temple in 1859’, The Panjab Past and Present 10, part 2, (October 1976): 306–2. ———. ‘Fox and the Lions: The Akali Movement Revisited’. In Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Joseph T. O’Connell, Milton Israel, and Willard G. Oxtoby with W.H. McLeod and J.S. Grewal as visiting editors, 211– 25. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988. ———. ‘Sikhs and State: Troublesome Relationships and a Fundamental Continuity with Particular Reference to the Period 1849–1919’. In Sikh Identity: Continuity and Change. Edited by Pashaura Singh and N. Gerald Barrier, 147– 74. New Delhi: Manohar, 2001. ———. ‘British Rule, Technological Change, and the Revolution in Transportation and Communication: Punjab in the Later Nineteenth Century’. In Textures of the Sikh Past: New Historical Perspectives’. Edited by Tony Ballantyne, 158. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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Bibliography Komma. ‘The Sikh Situation in the Punjab (1907–1922)’, The Panjab Past and Present 12, part 1 (October 1978): 425–38. Kumar, Ravinder. ‘Urban Society and Urban Politics: Lahore in 1919’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). Edited by Indu Banga, 180–220. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Lavan, Spencer. ‘Communalism in the Punjab: The Ahmadiyah Versus the Arya Samaj During the Lifetime of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’, The Panjab and Present 5, part 2 (October 1971): 320–42. Macmunn, Major G.F. ‘The Martial Races of India’, The Panjab Past and Present 3, part 1 (April 1970): 75–7. Malik, Ikram Ali. ‘Muslim Anjumans and Communitarian Consciousness’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). Edited by Indu Banga, 112–25. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Maynard, John. ‘The Sikh Problem in the Punjab, 1920–23’, The Panjab Past and Present 11, part I (April 1977): 129–41. Mittal, S.C. ‘Political Consciousness and the Role of the Punjab Provincial Political Conferences (1895–1906)’, The Panjab Past and Present 19, part I (April 1985): 139–45. Narang, Surjit Singh. ‘Chief Khalsa Diwan: An Analytical Study of its Perceptions’. In Political Dynamics of Punjab. Edited by Paul Wallace and Surendra Chopra, 67–81. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1981. Nirankari, Man Singh. ‘The Nirankaris’. In The Singh Sabha and Other SocioReligious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 1–11. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Oren, Stephen. ‘The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937– 1945’, Modern Asian Studies 8, part 3 (1974): 397–418. Pall, Mohinder Singh. Chandigarh: A Case for Haryana or Punjab. Chandigarh, 1967. Perrill, Jeffrey. ‘Dyal Singh Majithia’. In The Encyclopaedia of Sikhism. Vol. I. Edited by Harbans Singh, 606–7. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1992. Petrie, D. ‘Recent Developments in Sikh Politics’, The Panjab Past and Present 4, part 2 (October 1970): 302–79. (p.733) Pradhan, S.D. ‘Indian Army and the First World War’. In India and World War I. Edited by Devitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan, 49–67. New Delhi: Manohar, 1978. Page 22 of 33

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Bibliography ———. ‘The Sikh Soldiers in the First World War’. In India and World War I. Edited by Devitt C. Ellinwood and S.D. Pradhan, 213–25. New Delhi: Manohar, 1978. Singh, Bhai Jodh. ‘Two Letters of Bhai Jodh Singh addressed to Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru’, The Panjab Past and Present 16, part 2 (October 1982): 505–6. Singh, Durlab. ‘The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master tara Singh’. In Master Tara Singh. Edited by Verinder Grover, 3–102. New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1995. Singh, Fauja. ‘Akalis and the Indian National Congress’, The Panjab Past and Present 15, part 2 (October 1981): 463–4. Singh, Ganda. ‘A Diary of the Partition Days’, Journal of Indian History (Extract in Dr Ganda Singh Collection, Bhai Kahn Singh Library, Punjabi University, Patiala): 244–83. ———. ‘Was the Kuka (Nāmdhārī) Movement A Rebellion Against the British Government?’, The Panjab Past and Present 8, part 2 (October 1974): 325–41. ———. ‘Sikh Education Conference’. In The Singh Sabha and Other SocioReligious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925, 69–77. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. ———. ‘The Origin of the Hindu-Sikh Tension in the Panjab’, The Panjab Past and Present 11, part 2 (October 1977): 325–29. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Singh, Gurdarshan. ‘Origin and Development of Singh Sabha Movement: Constitutional Aspects’. In The Singh Sabha and other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 45–58. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Singh, Harbans. ‘Fragments from Giani Kartar Singh’s Memoirs’. In Giani Kartar Singh: A Commemorative Volume. Edited by Jasdev Singh Sandhu, 25–6. Patiala: S. Jasdev Singh Sandhu Foundation, 2001. ———. ‘Origins of the Singh Sabha’. In The Singh Sabha and Other SocioReligious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 21–30. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. ———. ‘The Bakapur Diwan and Babu Teja Singh of Bhasaur’, The Panjab Past and Present 9, part 2 (October 1975): 322–31. Singh, Harjot. ‘From Gurdwara Rakabganj to the Viceregal Palace—A Study of Religious Protest’, The Panjab Past and Present 14, part I (April 1980): 182–98.

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Bibliography Singh, Joginder. ‘Resurgence in Sikh Journalism’, Journal of Regional History 3 (1982): 99–116. ———. ‘The Sikh Community: Demography and Occupational Change 1881– 1931’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500– 1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). Edited by Indu Banga, 271–95. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Singh, Kapur. ‘The Sikh Situation after the death of Master Tara Singh’ (Paper read at the Convention of the Sikh Intelligentsia held at Chandigarh on 23rd December 1967). Chandigarh: K. Smaraj and Co., n.d. ———. Sikhs and Sikhism. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 2002 (Lecture delivered at Vancouver on 7 October 1974). ———. ‘Sikhism and Politics’, The Sikh Review (August 1971): 38–51. Singh, Master Tara. To All Men of Good Conscience. New Delhi: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1959. ———. ‘Letter to the Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’. In To All Men of Good Conscience. New Delhi: Shiromani Akali Dal, n.d. ———. Address to the Tenth All India Akali Conference 1956. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1956. Singh, Prem. Sikh Homeland! Why Not a Sikh State? Patiala: Author, 1970. Singh, Sant Fateh. Synopsis of the Nehru-Fateh Singh Talks on the Issue of the Formation of a Punjabi-Speaking State. Amritsar: SGPC, n.d. ———. Next Step (First Public Speech after the achievement of Punjabi Suba). Amritsar: SGPC, 12 May 1966. (p.734) Singh, Teja. ‘Khalsa College Amritsar’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 78–85. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. ———. ‘The Singh Sabha Movement’. In The Singh Sabha and Other SocioReligious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 31–44. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. ‘The Ahmadiya Movement’. In The Singh Sabha and other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 258–62. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1973. Sohal, Sukhdev Singh. ‘Politics of the Middle Classes in the Colonial Punjab’, The Panjab Past and Present 20, part 1 (April 1986): 195–207. Page 24 of 33

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Bibliography ———. ‘The Swadeshi Movement in the Punjab (1904–1907)’, The Panjab Past and Present 26, part 1 (April 1986). ———. ‘Emergence of the Middle Classes and Forms of Political Articulation’. In Five Punjabi Centuries: Polity, Economy, Society and Culture c.1500–1990 (Essays for J.S. Grewal). Edited by Indu Banga, 455–70. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Talib, Gurbachan Singh. The East Punjab Language Problem and Its Solution. Amritsar: Sikh Publishing House, 1948. Talwar, K.S. ‘The Anand Marriage Act’, The Panjab Past and Present 2, part 2 (October 1968): 400–10. Tanwar, Raghuvendra. ‘Master Tara Singh and Punjab’s Partition’, The Tribune, 6 August 2014, p. 9. ———. The Partition of Punjab (1947): The Sikh Case for Popuation Exchange and Resettlement. Patiala: Punjabi University, 2014. ‘The Judgment of Lahore Conspiracy Case, Decided by the General Summary Court Martial, Lahore on 5th July 1919’, The Panjab Past and Present 15, part 2 (October 1981): 374–406. ‘Truth about Gurdwara Shahid Ganj Affair’, The Panjab Past and Present 9, part 2 (October 1975): 387–98. Tuteja, K.L. ‘The Sikhs and the Nehru Report’, The Panjab Past and Present 15, part 1 (April 1981). ———. ‘Jallianwala Bagh’. In Punjab and the Freedom Struggle. Edited by Parm Bakhshish Singh and Devinder Kumar Verma, 215–28. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1998. Verma, Devinder Kumar. ‘The Brahmo Samaj’. In The Singh Sabha and Other Socio-Religious Movements in the Punjab 1850–1925. Edited by Ganda Singh, 207–12. 3rd ed. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1997. Books in Punjabi and Urdu

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Bibliography Aujala, Karamjit Singh. Aṇkhīle Sardār dī Gaurav Gāthā. Ludhiana: Seva Lehar Publishers, 2011. Bajwa, Kulwinder Singh, ed. Akālī Dal Sachā Saudā Bār. Amritsar: SGPC, 2000. Batra, Surinder Singh. Master Tara Singh: Jīwan te Rachnā. n.p., n.d. Budhiraja, Arjun Singh. ‘Sankhep Jīwaṇī Sant Baba Fateh Singhjī’, Sant Fateh Singh, Suljhe Uttar: 1–16. Dard, Hira Singh. Meriān Kujh Itihāsik Yādān. 2nd ed. Jullundur: Dhanpat Rai & Sons, (1955) 1957. Dardi, Kirpal Singh. Akālī Lehar dā Sanchālak Master Sunder Singh Lyallpurī (Jīwaṇī). n.p.: Shahid Udham Singh Prakashan, 1991. Dilgir, Harjinder Singh. Shiromani Akali Dal. Jullundur: Punjabi Book Company, 1978. ———. Punjabi Sube de Morche di Tawārīkh (1955). Amritsar: SGPC, 1998. ———. Jaito Morche de Akhīn Ditthe Hāl (By Jathedar Udham Singh Warpal). Reprint. Amritsar: SGPC, 2000. Gill, Tejwant Singh, ed. Swa-Jeewaṇī Sant Singh Sekhon. Chandigarh: Lok Geet Prakashan, 2011. (p.735) Gulshan, Dhanna Singh. Aj dā Punjab te Sikh Rājnītī (1947–1977). Rampura Phul: Dhaliwal Gurcharan Singh, 1978. Hamdard, Sadhu Singh. Yād Baṇī Itihās. Jalandhar: Ajit Prakashan, 2001. Idris, Mohammad. Yug Purush: Sardar Swaran Singh (1907–1994). Delhi: Government of India, 2011. Jakhmi, Karam Singh, ed. Punjabi Sube de Morche di Twarikh (1955). Amritsar: SGPC, n.d. ———. Akali Morche dā Itihās. Amritsar: SGPC, n.d. Josh, Sohan Singh. Akālī Morchiān dā Itihās. Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1972. Kapur, Prithipal Singh. Shrī Mān Master Tara Singh: (Itihasik Pakh Ton). Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968. ———, ed. Akālī Darshan. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2015. Kasel, Kirpal Singh, ed. Ghadar Lehar dī Vārtak (compiled by Giani Kesar Singh). Patiala: Punjabi University, 2008. Page 26 of 33

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Bibliography ———, ed. Ghadar Lehar dī Kavitā (compiled by Kesar Singh Novelist). Patiala: Punjabi University, 1995. Maftun, Diwan Singh. Nā-Qābil-i Farāmosh (Urdu). Delhi: 1957. Mahān Ānand Prakāsh. Patiala: Malwa Pratinidhi Khalsa Diwan, n.d. Nabha, Bhai Kahn Singh. Hum Hindu Nahīn. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, (1892) 1995. Nirankari, Man Singh, ed. Baba Dayal: Crusader of True Sikhism. 2nd ed. Amritsar: Dr Man Singh Nirankari, 1997. Pooni, Sohan Singh. Canada de Gadrī Yodhe. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2009. Punjabi Sube de Morche dā Itihās. Amritsar: 1960. Rahi, Rajwinder Singh. Gadar Lehar dī Aslī Gāthā-1. Samana: Sangam Publications, 2012. ———, ed. Merī Rām Kahāṇī: Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna. Samana: Sangam Publications, 2012. Sahota, Dharm Singh. Siyāsat dā Dhanī, Giani Kartar Singh. Jullundur: New Book Company, 1982. Sant Sipāhī. August 1950, pp. 38–44; September 1950, pp. 31–5; October 1950, pp. 27–9; November 1950, pp. 47–50; May 1951, pp. 7–9; June 1951, pp. 58–61; March 1955, pp. 15–18. Singh, Ganda, ed. Kukiān dī Vithiā. Reprint. Patiala: Punjabi University, (1944) 2000. Singh, Giani Gurcharan. Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Likhtān. Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988. Singh, Giani Lal. Nīli Dastār dī Dāstān. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1994. Singh, Giani Partap. Akālī Lehar de Mahān Netā. Amritsar: 1976. ———. Gurdwara Reform Arthāt Akali Lehar. 3rd ed. Amritsar: Khalsa Brothers, 1983. Singh, Gurcharan. Jīwan Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1970. ———. Aṇkhī Sūramā (Jīwan Master Tara Singh Jī). Amritsar: 1950.

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Bibliography Singh, Gurdit. Zulmī Kathā. Edited by Darshan S. Tatla. Chandigarh: Unistar Books, 2007. Singh, Jagjit. Gadar Party Lehar. Reprint. New Delhi: Navjuy Publishers (1955) 2000. Singh, Jaswant, ed. Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh. Amritsar, 1972. Singh, Jathedar Achhar. Pardhāngi Address (Pandarvīn Sarb Hind Akālī Conference). Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1963. Singh, Kapur. Sāchī Sākhī. Amritsar: Gurmat Prakashan, n.d. ———. Bikh Meh Amrit. 3Rd Ed. Amritsar: Printwell, 2009. Singh, Kirpal. Punjab dā Batwārā te Sikh Netā. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1997. Singh, Mahinder. Sardār-i ‘Āzam (Jīwan Master Tara Singh Jī). Amritsar: Panthak Tract Society, 1950. Singh, Master Tara. Dogra Sājish ate Angrezān te Singhān de Jang Zubānī Bābā Tegā Singh. Amritsar: SGPC, (1934) 1999. ———. Merā Safarnāmā. Edited by Rajinder Kaur. Amritsar: Master Tara Singh Publications, 1969. ———. Prem Lagan. Amritsar: Sikh Religious Books Society, (1934). ———. Kis Varnī Kiv Jāṇā. Reprint. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1999. (p.736) ———. Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh. 2 vols. Edited by Harjinder Singh Dilgir. Amritsar: SGPC, 1999. ———. Merī Yād. Amritsar: Sikh Religious Book Society, 1945. ———. Merī Yād. Edited by Harjinder Singh Dilgir. Amritsar: SGPC, (1945) 1999. ———. Merī Yād (Master Tara Singh: Jīwan Sangharsh te Udesh. Edited by Jaswant Singh). Amritsar, 1972. ———. Pirm Piālā. Edited by Harjinder Singh Dilgir. Amritsar: SGPC, 1999. ———. Vartmān Sikh Rājnītī. Amritsar: Manjit Singh, n.d. Singh, Munsha. Jīwan Bhāī Sāhib: Bhai Mohan Singh Ji Vaid. Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1989.

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Bibliography Singh, Narain. Jathedār Kartar Singh Jhabbar. Patiala, (1959) 1967. Singh, Niranjan. Jīwan-Yātrā Master Tara Singh. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 1968. Singh, Piar. Teja Singh Samundri. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1965. Singh, Pritam. Bhāī Kahn Singh Nabha: Pichhokaṛ, Rachnā te Mulānkan. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University, 1989. Singh, Ram, ed. Master Tara Singh dā Sikh Kaum nal Wisvāshghāt. Jalandhar: Punjab Publications (Ludhiana), n.d. Singh, Roop. Panth Sewak: Shiromani Kameti de Pardhān. Amritsar: Singh Brothers, 2010. Singh, Sant Fateh. Channaṇ Baṇ, Buddha Jauhr (Ganga Nagar): Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh (1966), preliminary pages. ———. Piār Sunehṛā. Buddha Jauhr (Ganga Nagar): Channan Singh Sant, 1965, preliminary pages. ———. Mitthiān Ramzān. Amritsar: Channan Singh (Sant), 1966, pp. 5–45. ———. Aṇkhī Valvale. Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh, preliminary pages. ———. Charbī de Deive. Buddha Jauhr, Ganga Nagar: Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh, 1966, pp. 1–8, 35–54. ———. Suljhe Uttar. Buddha Jawhr (Ganganagar): Sant Channan Singh and Bhai Bagga Singh, 1967, p. 9. Singh, Sant Teja. Jīwan Kathā Gurmukh Piāre Sant Attar Singh jī Mahārāj de Annan Sewak Sant Teja Singh jī. 10th reprint. Gurdwara Baru Sahib: Kalgidhar Trust, 2008. Singh, Teja. Ārsī. Amritsar: Lok Sahit Prakashan, 1958. Singh, Trilok. Giani. Āzād Punjab. Amritsar: Ajit Book Agency, 1944. Shabdārth Srī Gurū Granth Sāhib Jī. 4 vols. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Kameti, 1999 (standard pagination). Varpal, Jathedar Udham Singh. Jaito Morche de Akhī Dithe Hāl. 2nd ed. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 2002. Vidyarthi, Devinder Singh. Bhāī Kahn Singh Nabha: Jīwan te Rachnā. Patiala: Punjabi University, 1987.

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Bibliography Articles and Pamphlets in Punjabi

Gujran, Pritam Singh. Swāgatī Address (at the Fourth All India Akali Conference at Bhawanigarh on 14 March). Bhawanigarh: Swagat Kameti Sarb Hind Akali Conference, 1943. Punjabi Bolde Sube Laī Memorandum. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, n.d. (submitted to the States Reorganisation Commission). Singh, Giani Sher. ‘Nehru Report te Mein: Galat Fahimī Dūr kar lao’. In Gurcharan Singh, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Lekh, 46–9. Delhi: Navyug Publishers, 1988. ———. ‘Āzād Punjab te Khālistān’, Punjab, 6 June 1944, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Lekh: 121–2. ———. ‘Dr. Ashraf te Pakistan’, Punjab, 6 June 1944, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Lekh: 122–3. ———. ‘Imtihān dī Ghaṛī’, ‘Sikhān dī Position te Hindostan dī Rājnītī’, ‘Sikhān diān Mangān’, ‘Asīn Bā-Izzat Samjhautā Chaunhde Hān’, and ‘Sikhān dī Nahn’, Punjab, 29 August 1944, Giani Sher Singh: Jīwan ate Lekh: 123–31. ———. ‘Kalkatte vich Sikh League de Pratīnidhān ne kī Kītā? Hindi Leaderān dā Watīrā kī sī?’, Aslī Kaumī Dard, 7 January 1929. ———. ‘Karmān diā Baliā Ridhī Khīr te ho giā daliā. Sikhān Hinduān nāl be-insāfi dā namūnā’, Sikh Sewak, 25 March: 82–4. (p.737) ———. ‘Kaumī Jhande vich Sikhān dā Rang pauṇ ton Inkār: Pandit Nehru dī Chitthī par vichār’, Aslī Kaumi Dard, 1 November 1930: 68–71. ———. ‘Master Tara Singh Ji’. In Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh. Edited by Harjinder Singh Dilgir, 19–20. Vol. I. Amritsar: SGPC, 1999. ———. ‘Sarb Hind Sarb Party Vich Sikh Swāl Sanbandhī kī hoiyā’, Aslī Kaumi Dard, 5 September 1928: 1–6 (Giani Sher Singh: Jiwan te Lekh, 43–5). ———. ‘Sikh Pahāṛ dī Tarā Atal Rehaṇ’, Sikh Sewak, 8 August 1932: 80–2. ———. ‘Wazīr Āzam de Firkādārī Faisle Virudh Panth dā Zabardāst Faislā—Sikh Hakkān dī Rākhī laī Kamarkase’, Sikh Sewak, 28 March 1934: 86–8. Singh, Jathedar Achhar. Pardhāngī Address (Pandharvin Sarb Hind Akālī Conference). Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1963. Singh, Master Tara. Pardhāngī Address Akālī Conference. Bannu, 23 January 1946.

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Bibliography ———. Congress te Sikh. Amritsar, n.d. ———. Billee Thelion Nikkal Āī (The Cat has Come Out of the Bag). Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, n.d. ———. Pakistan. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, n.d. ———. ‘Akāliān nun Kuchlan dā Yatan’. In Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, 2 vols, Harjinder Singh Dilgir, vol. 1, 66–8. Amritsar: SGPC, 1999. ———. ‘Anandpur Sāhib dā Samā Āgiā’. In Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 53–4. ———. ‘Babbar Akaliān de Mukaddme dā Faislā’ . In Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 107–12. ———. ‘Central Sikh League de Kalkatte Jāṇ Wāliān Pratīnidhān Pratī’. In Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 2, 92–4. Amritsar: SGPC, 1999. ———. ‘Gurdwara Sudhār te Asāde Dharmic Hakk’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 50–57. ———. ‘Guru ke Bagh de Kaidi Kion Chhade gaī haṇ’ Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 93–4. Singh, Master Tara. ‘Ik dūn ik kar Devo: Shiromani Gurdwara Kametī de Vichār Yog’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol.1, 69–73. ———. ‘Imtihān dī Ghaṛī’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 63–5. ———. ‘Kaumī Izzat Nūn Rakhan dā Velā’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 74. ———. ‘Khālsā Jī dā Khūnī Janam dujī vār’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 91–2. ———. ‘Kī Sādā Ros koī Asar Pā Sakdā Hai?’ Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 98–9. ———. ‘Kuke kis Tarān Gir Rahe Haṇ’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol 1, 101– 3. ———. ‘Kurbānī Keh Kairtā’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 2, pp. 64–5. ———. ‘Maut Bāhron Nahīn Aundī Andron Jamdī hai’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1,75–80. ———. ‘Nehru Report’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol 2, 66–7.

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Bibliography ———. ‘Nirol Dhārmic Kauṇ Hai’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 86–8. ———. Presidential Address to the 10th All India Akali Conference. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 11 February 1956 (Punjabi version). ———. ‘Prem dī Gangā Samundron Kailāsh Nūn tur Pāi’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 2, 21. ———. ‘Shantmaī Bahādarī Kih Buzdilī’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 89– 90. ———. ‘Sikh kī Kurbānī Kar sakde Haṇ’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 2, 61– 2. ———. ‘Swarāj keh Sikh Rāj’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol. 1, 59–62. ———. ‘Swarāj te Nāmilvartan’, Master Tara Singh Ji de Lekh, vol 1, 55–8. ———. Pardhāngī Address (Read at Kila Didar Singh on 17 September 1940), published and freely distributed by Mota Singh Kalowali, General Secretary, Reception Committee. ———, Saprū Kametī de Dhakwanj dī kī Loṛ Hai’ (What is the need of Sapru Committee’s subterfuge?), Rozāna Akālī, 17 April 1945. ———. ‘Punjab Vichon Phirkedārī Udā Dittī Gaī de Dhole dā Pol’, Akālī te Pardesī, 7 October 1928. (typescript copy). ———. Samjho te Sambhlo. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, 1958. (p.738) ———. Pardhāngī Address for the Fouth All India Akali Conference. Bhawanigarh: Swagat Kameti, 1943. Singh, Sant Fateh. Memorandum jo kih Shri K Kamraj Nidar Pardhān All India Congress Kametī nūn 10 September 1964 nūn Dittā Giā. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1964. Documents, Dissertations, and Theses

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Bibliography Walia, Jaspreet. ‘Master Tara Singh and Sikh Politics (1920–1947)’. PhD thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 2005.

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Index

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.739) Index Abbotabad 66 Abchal Nagar/Huzur Sahib (Nander) 41, 66, 185, 259, 547, 588 Abdul Sattar 551 Abdullah, Shaikh 477, 631 Abell, Sir George 311–12, 316, 318, 322, 330, 332, 336, 339, 371–2, 375 Abohar 588 Afghanistan 220, 656 Agnihotri, Pandit Shiv Narayan 21 Ahluwalia, Kanwar Harnam Singh 42 Ahluwalia, Partap Singh 53 Ahmadiya movement 20, 34 Ahrar 194, 215–8, 280, 284–5, 551 Ajīt 259, 277, 341, 448, 497, 575–6 Ajnala 101 Akal Sena 343 Akal Takht 38, 56–7, 93–4, 101, 103–4, 117, 119–20, 136, 138, 144, 146n.25, 154–6, 159, 180, 198, 314, 437, 442, 496–7, 505, 554, 573, 582, 585–6, 592, 599, 601, 605, 618, 623, 625, 628, 633, 637, 662, 671, 675, 677 Akālī 88, 89, 478 Akali movement 1, 3–4, 6, 76, 86, 89, 94, 103–8, 110, 111, 112n.40, 113n.73, 114, 119, 121, 124, 127, 130, 132, 134, 136–7, 139, 140–1, 144, 149, 152, 155, 157, 183, 192, 196, 666, 674, 675 Akālī Patrikā 66, 497 Akali Sahayak Bureau 332, 334 Akarpuri, Jathedar Teja Singh 210, 235 Akhand Pāṭh 74, 114, 118–19, 121, 123–6, 137–9, 144, 157, 678 Alakhdhari, Kanhiya Lal 23 Allahabad 115, 132, 180 Allahabad Unity Conference 688 All-India Akali Conference 644 All-India Bhasha Swatantriya Samiti 554–5 Page 1 of 28

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Index All-India Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu Mahasabha) 3, 115, 149–51, 161, 196, 239, 253–4, 261, 266, 277, 280, 284, 288–9, 296, 466, 468–9, 475–8, 498, 517, 525, 642 All-India Muslim League (Muslim League) 3, 8, 32, 78, 199, 203–6, 208, 210, 215–17, 219–20, 222, 227–30, 236, 239, 249, 251, 255, 259, 261–3, 265–7, 274–80, 282, 284–5, 287–90, 293–6, 300–3, 306–11, 314, 316–19, 321–6, 330–44, 346–7, 349, 355–8, 360, 364–5, 373, 376–7, 379, 391–2, 403, 414–15, 417, 420, 469, 481, 487, 489, 638–40, 689, 694, 698 (p.740) All-India Ramgarhia Darbar 554 All-Parties Sikh Conference 176, 326 Amb 614 Amba Parshad 27 Ambala 50–1, 176, 208, 258, 280, 304, 343, 345–6, 361–2, 379, 388, 397, 400–2, 439, 442, 448, 459, 478, 492–3, 517, 524, 588, 612, 614, 689 Ambedkar, B.R. 173–4, 195–9, 204, 484 Amery, L.S. 226, 239, 250–3, 262, 271n.7, 276, 277 Amir Chand, Colonel 573 Amrit Bazār Patrikā 132, 166 Amrit maryādā 156 Amritsar 20, 23–4, 26, 30, 32, 34n.44, 37, 39, 40, 42–5, 47, 49–50, 54–5, 57, 58, 62, 65–7, 69–73, 75–8, 82, 86–9, 91–4, 96–111, 113n.73, 115–18, 120, 122, 131–2, 134–6, 141, 153–4, 157, 163, 175, 177, 184, 187–8, 191, 197, 203, 208, 210–14, 222, 232, 234–5, 241, 251–3, 256, 258, 261, 266, 300, 304, 310, 318, 326, 340, 342–3, 345, 357, 362, 364– 7, 372–5, 379, 390–1, 394, 397, 429–33, 441–2, 446–8, 460–1, 470, 476–7, 492, 494–5, 497, 502–3, 506, 508–12, 517, 523–4, 528, 531, 538, 544, 549, 553–4, 556, 561, 565, 567, 569–70, 575–6, 579, 584, 586–7, 589, 591, 594, 599, 609, 625–30, 632, 637, 656, 662, 666–7, 670, 672–7, 689, 692 Anand, Jagjit Singh 552–3 Anand kāraj 70, 73, 83 Anand Marriage Bill 40 Anandpur, Sahib 40, 41, 108, 154, 478, 479, 572, 587, 615 Andaman Islands 227 Andrews, C.F. 103 Anjuman-i Islamia 190 Ansari, M.A. 168 Anti-Pakistan Day 340 Arya Dharam 22 Arya Messenger 47 Aryā Musāfir 77, 79 Aryā Patrikā 47 Arya Pradeshak Pratinidhi Sabha 22 Arya Pratinidhi Sabha 22–3, 524, 607 Arya Samaj 22–4, 26, 31, 33n.23, 34, 43, 46–8, 64–5, 67, 70–1, 77, 82, 400, 403, 410, 441, 493, 511, 522–3, 525–6, 530, 535, 611 Aryas 22–3, 25, 31, 44–5, 47, 67, 70, 77, 82, 512 Asli Kaumī Dard 156 Assembly Bomb Case 150 Atari, Sardar Sham Singh 49, 588, 655–64 Atariwala, Sardar Harbans Singh 89, 93, 95, 181, 569 Atla Kalan 588 Page 2 of 28

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Index Attock 340–1, 387, 664 Ayangar/Iyengar, Srinivas 103, 160 Ayyer, C.P. Ramaswami 577 Azad Punjab 2, 8, 248, 254–61, 263, 270, 290, 639–40 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam 106, 228, 280, 414, 418, 421 Azhar, Maulavi Mazhar Ali 215 Baba Bakala 588 Baba Dayal 39, 40, 42 Babbar Akalis 103–5, 118, 157, 207 Babe-di-Ber 91, 94, 674 Badal, Parkash Singh 615 Badial 593 Badiala 588 Badshahi mosque 193, 215–16 Bahadurpur 627 Bahawalpur 220 Bajwa, Harcharan Singh 267 Bakloh 614 Balkanization 331, 333, 466, 471 Baluchistan 161, 205, 664 Balun 614 Banga 588 Bar Akali Jatha 94 Bar Zamindar Association 26 Bara Dari 45 Barkat Ali, Malik 216–17 Barnala 187, 492, 588 Basu, B.D. 656, 660 Batala 24, 210, 243 Bathinda 492, 564, 584, 588–9, 594, 627 Battle of Gujrat 657, 663 Beaumont, Christopher 370, 372 (p.741) Bedi, B.P.L. 209 Bedi, Baba Gurbakhsh Singh 53, 75 Bedi, Baba Kartar Singh 94, 99 Bedi, Baba Khem Singh 45–6, 53, 64, 75 Belgaum 115 Bengal 20, 26, 29, 31–2, 70, 82, 161–2, 181, 204–5, 219–20, 233, 249, 282–3, 306–7, 331–3, 344, 349, 358, 368, 370–1, 401, 415, 421, 423, 476, 491, 598 Bhagwan Das 97 Bhaini Sahib 184, 185 Bhakra 9, 485, 622, 628, 634 Bhakra Dam 398, 476, 618 Bhangani 184 Bhargava, Gopi Chand 282–3, 285, 388, 395–400, 430, 454–5, 457, 461, 522, 525, 528–9 Bhargava, Thakur Das 283–4, 457, 508 Bhartiya Jan Sangh 3, 469, 475 Bhasaur 156, 169 Bhasaurias 185 Page 3 of 28

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Index Bhatti, V.S. 228 ‘Bhaura’, Sadhu Singh 599 Bhaura, Ujagar Singh 189, 212 Bhavnagar 568–9, 577, 591 Bhuchar, Teja Singh 94–5, 104, 136, 155, 674–5 Bihar 165, 204, 301, 340, 418, 491 Biharigarh 185 Bijai Singh 44, 92 Bikaner 370, 403, 593–4 Birdwood, General 123, 135, 137, 679 Birla, Seth Jugal Kishore 196, 257 Bishambar Das, Lala 65 Bombay 16, 22, 31, 87, 132–3, 150–1, 160–1, 174, 187, 196–7, 199, 201–2n.100, 204, 206, 211, 232, 248, 251–2, 263, 287, 301, 431, 449, 486, 501, 506, 552, 588, 598 Bose, Sarat Chandra 285 Bose, Subhash Chandra 2, 150, 167 Boundary Commission 346–50, 353–6, 358–63, 365, 368–70, 372, 375, 378–9, 601, 611– 12, 614, 618 Brahmo Samaj 21, 31 Brar, Harcharan Singh 623 Brish Bhan 404–6, 408, 463, 481–2, 493, 522, 547 British Common Wealth 308 British Parliament 30, 167, 314 Buddha Jauhr 588, 594 Buddhism 21, 128 Budge Budge 27, 74, 83 Budhiraja, Arjan Singh 608, 622 Bullhe Shah 81 Cabinet Delegation 301, 303–4, 306, 309, 312, 314–15, 317, 319–20 Cabinet Mission 30, 301–3, 305, 308–11, 313–21, 325, 332, 339, 345, 419, 694, 698 Calcutta 21, 27, 74, 87, 150, 163, 165, 167, 217, 301, 390, 489, 498, 588 Cambridge 205 Campbell-Johnson, Allan 358, 366 Campbellpur 192, 255 Campbellpuri, Kartar Singh 267 Canadian, Bhag Singh 152, 168 Cave-Browne, Rev. J. 49, 50 Caveeshar, Sardul Singh 52, 88, 136, 164, 178, 189, 284–5, 442, 450 Central Khalsa Orphanage 42 Central Majha Diwan 94, 674–5 Central Sikh League (Sikh League) 7, 30, 55, 57, 76, 88–9, 92, 98, 105, 110, 118, 125, 128–9, 134, 139, 143, 151, 155, 160–1, 163–9, 176, 181, 256, 638, 675 Central Training College 18, 62, 82 Chakralwi, Abdullah 24 Chaksherewala, Kirpal Singh 586, 627 Chaman Lal, Bhikhu Sri 575 Chaman Lal, Diwan 284, 495, 507 Chamkaur Sahib 572 Chandarkot 100 Page 4 of 28

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Index Chandigarh 9, 495, 497, 523, 544, 546, 567, 603, 611, 614–15, 617–18, 622–6, 628–9, 633–4, 636 ‘Chatar’, Harsa Singh 599 Chauri Chaura 87, 109 Chavan, Y.B. 607, 614, 624–5 Chetanpuri, Sohan Singh 140 Chhagla, M.C. 577 Chhotu Ram 116, 151, 191, 207 Chief Khalsa Diwan 5, 42–4, 52–3, 55, 57–8, 71, 73–5, 82, 88, 91–3, 110–11, 134, 141, 143, 163, 209, 242, 256, 261, 267, 293, 678 (p.742) Chillianwala 657, 659, 662–4 Christian missionaries 18–19, 24, 31, 42, 44, 46, 57 Chuharkana 54, 58, 99, 389, 676 Chuharkana, Teja Singh 140, 152 Chuhras 19 Churchill, Sir Winston, Prime Minister 205, 226, 227, 274 Civil disobedience 2, 87, 106, 150, 159, 168, 170, 173–8, 190–2, 194, 197, 198, 214, 216, 218, 227, 233, 235, 251–2, 254, 342 Cochin 195 Colonization of Land Act of 1893 25 Communal Award 173–4, 179, 180–1, 186, 195, 197–8, 203, 209, 252, 267, 683, 687, 691, 693 Communist parties 602, 614 Communists 208, 227, 231–2, 260, 265, 280–1, 284–6, 288–90, 292–3, 296, 334, 404, 463, 465, 476, 553, 627, 639 Congress High Command 220, 234, 252, 316–17, 475, 480, 501, 521–3, 530–2, 535, 539, 542, 552, 554, 557 Congress Socialist Party 175, 208, 223 Constituent Assembly 199, 205, 220, 250, 281, 288, 300–2, 308–26, 331–3, 344, 348, 353–4, 359, 378, 387, 391, 403–4, 413–17, 422, 424–7, 429, 436, 445–7, 464, 470, 489, 641, 688, 695, 698 Constitution of India 3, 231, 266, 307, 309, 310, 319, 458, 516, 555, 557, 595 Constitution of Switzerland 269 Cooper, Frederic 39, 49 Corbett, Sir Geoffrey 176 Craik, Sir Henry 212, 217, 220 Crerar, J. 120, 121 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 324 Cripps Mission 226, 236, 245, 248–50, 254, 256, 693 Cripps, Sir Stafford 226, 237, 239, 245, 255, 303, 320, 348, 369, 686 Cunningham, J.D. 49, 128, 656–7, 660–2 Currie, Sir Frederick 95 Curzon, Lord 68, 69 Cust, Robert Needham 39, 49 Dalhousie, Lord 49 Dalits 19, 48, 173, 195–7, 199, 391, 455, 461–2 Damdama Sahib 45 Dane, Sir Louis 69, 136 Danewalia, Jaswant Singh 158 Page 5 of 28

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Index Dar, Abdul Ghani 583 Darbar Sahib 38–9, 46, 55, 57, 91–2, 94, 101–2, 104, 110, 154–6, 210, 397, 441–2, 496, 508, 586, 599, 625, 633, 662, 674 Dard, Hira Singh 73–6, 88–9, 92, 154 Das Commission 560, 576, 578–9, 583 Das, C.R. 30, 87, 115 Das, S.R. 577, 583 Dasam Granth 156, 600 Daska Gurdwara 179 Daska morchā 178, 198 Daulat Ram 77 Daultana, Ahmad Yar Khan 206, 207 Daultana, Mumtaz Mohammad Khan 262 Dayanand, Swami 21–2, 47, 76, 422 Dayananda Anglo-Vedic Trust and Management Society 22 Dehra Dun 116, 118, 185, 439, 443 Delhi 24, 50, 52, 57, 59, 89, 115–16, 122, 130, 150–1, 177, 187, 195, 236–7, 252, 254, 266, 275, 278, 280, 288, 293, 306, 320, 333, 338, 342–3, 346, 354, 360, 369–70, 376–7, 389, 390, 394, 399, 407, 415, 431, 433, 438–42, 450, 455–6, 460, 462, 467, 477–81, 495, 509, 521, 523, 536, 546, 548–9, 551, 555–7, 561–2, 564, 567–9, 575–6, 584–5, 587–8, 591–2, 594, 603, 609, 614, 625–6, 628–30, 643, 663, 685–6, 700 Delhi gurdwaras 542, 556–7 Depressed Classes 19, 174, 195, 313, 497, 611, 687 Dera Ghazi Khan 66, 102, 387 Desai, Bhulabhai 274 Desai, Morarji 575, 598, 599, 610 Desh Bhagat Board 488, 552–4 Dev Dutt 72 Dev Samaj 21, 31 Devi Lal, Chaudhari 583 Dharam Raj 646 Dharam Vira 615 Dharamsala 45, 64, 190, 432, 546–7, 565–7, 586, 591 (p.743) Dhillon, Gurdial Singh 536, 583, 588 Dhillon, Joginder Singh 606 Dholan 593 Dhuri 94, 208 Din Mohammad, Justice 365 Diwana, Kartar Singh 159, 177 Dominion Status 29, 150, 164, 167, 174, 205, 226–7, 231, 333, 354–5 Douie, James 15, 17–18, 38 Duggal, Uttam Singh 626 Duke of Willington 656 Duni Chand, Lala 116 Durga Das, Lala 80 Dutt, B.K. 150 Dutt, Chaudhry Ram Bhuj 30 Dutta, S.K. 612 Dyer, General 30, 54, 92 Page 6 of 28

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Index Dyrachy 204 Earl of Listowel 332, 362 Edwards, William 656–7, 660 Ellenborough, Lord 656 Emerson, H.W. 140 Farid 648, 669 Faridkot 42, 45, 343, 354–5, 388, 405, 482, 660, 686 Fascist 7, 209, 231, 432, 466, 484, 700 Fatehgarh Sahib 484–6, 492, 588, 592 Fazl-i-Husain, Sir 29, 32, 88, 116, 175, 181–3, 190–1, 205–7 Fazlul Haq 29, 205 Firozpur 21, 44, 50, 122, 208, 266, 342, 362, 365–6, 370–3, 447–8, 492, 589, 657 Firoz Khan 182, 191 First Round Table Conference 176 Fitzpatrick, J.A.O. 160, 187 Fox, Richard G. 39 Gadgil, N.V. 530, 564–5, 578 Gagret 615 Gandhi, Indira 528, 598–9, 601, 607, 609, 610, 614–19, 621, 623–4, 633 Gandhi, Mahatma 2, 5, 9, 29–30, 48, 86–7, 90, 94–5, 105–9, 111, 114–15, 123–30, 132–3, 136, 138–9, 142–3, 145, 150, 165, 167–8, 170, 173–4, 176–8, 185, 195–9, 211, 227, 233– 5, 244–5, 248–9, 254, 256, 260–6, 270, 275, 277, 279, 282, 289–91, 314, 342, 378, 421– 3, 431–2, 438, 477, 488, 530, 688, 691–2 Gandhi–Irwin Pact 174 Gandhi–Jinnah talks 249, 263, 265–6, 274 Ganesh Datt, Goswami 255 Ganga Ram, Sir 97, 103, 677 Ganganagar 492, 589, 593–4, 606 Gargaj Akalis 153 Gargaj, Arjan Singh 209 Garhmukteshwar 301 Gauba, Khalid Latif 191, 216 Gauba, Lala Harkishan Lal 73 Germany 205 Ghadar (weekly) 27 Ghadar movement 27–8, 57, 178, 698 GhadarKirtī 151 Ghallūghāra 341 Ghasitpura 102 Ghazanfar Ali Khan 337, 458 Ghaznavi, Maulana Daud 281–2, 284, 286 Ghosh, Ajoy 574 Ghosh, Atulya 598 Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza 24–5, 34 Ghulam Rasul Khan 219 Gidwani, A.T. 131–2 Gilani, B.S. 282, 284–6 Gill, Hazara Singh 527, 622 Gill, Lachhman Singh 568, 576–7, 584–6, 615, 622–3, 627, 634 Page 7 of 28

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Index Gill, Mangal Singh 88, 125, 128, 134, 136–7, 139, 143, 152–3, 157, 160–4, 168, 180, 188, 192, 278, 284, 667 Gill, Niranjan Singh 314, 316–7, 326, 430 Gill, P.S. 585 Glancy, Sir Bertrand 236–7, 239, 242–4, 249–54, 259–60, 263–5, 269, 276, 278–81 Gojran, Jathedar Pritam Singh 265, 270, 406, 408, 433, 464, 493, 496, 514, 592 Gokhale, Gopal Krishan 71 Golden Temple 17, 38–40, 47, 52, 55, 87, 91–4, 96, 106–7, 116, 124, 126, 152, 232, 360, 497, 505, 512, 567, 578, 674 Government College (Lahore) 18, 70–1 (p.744) Government of India Act of 1919 15, 29, 32, 35, 87 Government of India Act of 1935 174–5, 240, 339, 683, 691, 695 Government of India Act XX of 1863 (Religious Endowment Act) 39 Great Britain 221, 231, 253, 275 Great Calcutta Killing 301 Grewal, Sardar Bahadur Gajjan Singh 53, 55, 97 Gujjar Khan 46, 62, 73 Gujral, Harbans Singh 544, 568 Gujranwala 10, 30, 37, 45, 72, 84n.37, 105, 153, 155–6, 163–4, 175, 228–9, 281, 362, 365–6, 387, 689 Gujrat 30, 65, 176, 178–9, 197, 213–14, 259, 266, 269, 432, 657, 663–4 Gulshan, Dhanna Singh 584, 614–15, 623, 625–7 Gupta, Ghanshyam Singh 524, 526, 554–5 Gurdas, Bhai 43, 80–1 Gurdaspur 26, 37, 117, 208, 210, 243, 266, 341, 343, 345, 347, 365–6, 369, 373, 447–8, 492, 517, 566, 586, 614, 675, 689 Gurdwara Babe-di-Ber 91, 94, 674 Gurdwara Bill 98, 123–4, 136, 140–1 Gurdwara Gangsar 114, 118, 123–6, 144, 155, 169 Gurdwara Gazette 155, 169 Gurdwara Interim Board 543 Gurdwara Kot Bhai Than Singh 213 Gurdwara Majnu Ka Tilla 550 Gurdwara Reform Movement 5, 6, 90, 120, 133, 153–4, 181, 305, 631, 637, 666, 672, 679 Gurdwara Sisganj 177, 556 Gurdwara Toka Sahib 184 Gurgaon 344, 364, 372–3, 379, 447–8, 531 Gurmat Granth Pracharak Sabha of Amritsar 42 Gurmat Granth Sudharak Sabhas of Amritsar and Lahore 42 Gurmat Mārtand 43 Gurmat Parkāsh Bhāg Sanskār 44 Gurmat Prabhākar 43 Gurmat Rahu-Riti Committee 156 Gurmat Sudhākar 43 Gurmatā 93, 240, 676 Gurmukhi script 44–5, 48, 57, 79–80, 239–40, 244, 399–400, 410, 515, 524–5, 538, 553, 555, 565, 570, 600, 681–2, 690 Gursewak Sabha 173, 183–4, 186–8, 198 Page 8 of 28

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Index Guru Amar Das 78–9, 93, 646–8, 650–1 Guru Angad 78 Guru Arjan 78–9, 88–9, 109, 601, 637, 646–9, 651–2 Guru Datta, Pandit 22 Guru Gobind Singh 7, 40–2, 44–7, 50–1, 57, 63–4, 77, 79–80, 93, 108–10, 127–8, 142–3, 185, 195, 228, 234–5, 245, 292, 341, 432–3, 435, 440, 478, 488, 493, 506, 509–11, 572, 589, 591, 600–1, 624, 628, 632, 637, 640, 642–4, 650, 658, 660–1, 664 Guru Granth Sahib (Granth Sahib) 39, 40–1, 43–4, 48, 56–7, 63, 67, 74–5, 78, 82, 89, 92– 3, 119, 127, 143, 156, 179, 185, 214, 484–5, 600, 631–2, 644, 646, 649–51, 653, 671, 678 Guru ka Bagh 23 Guru-ka-Bagh Gurdwara 97 Guru-ka-Bagh morchā 94, 97–9, 103–5, 111, 126, 130, 136, 157, 673, 677 Guru Kashi College 599 Guru Nanak 25, 40–2, 46–7, 63–4, 80–1, 91–2, 99, 105, 127–8, 143, 195, 228, 362, 591, 601, 637, 646, 648–9, 671–2 Guru Raj Darbar Khalsa Board 228 Guru Ram Das 78, 93, 586, 647, 649, 651, 662 Guru Ram Das Sarai 586 Guru Tegh Bahadur 77, 79, 89, 109, 142, 435, 478, 495, 510, 550, 601, 624 Gurukul Kangri 23 Guru-Panth 44, 48, 56–7, 641–2 Gyanananda, Swami 24 Hailey, Sir Malcolm 98, 114, 116–17, 119, 121, 123, 130, 136, 138, 140, 142, 152, 168 halāl 241 Ham Hindu Nahīn 43, 47, 57 Hamdard, Sadhu Singh 259, 277, 282, 293, 335 Hans Raj, Raizada 116, 284 Har Dayal, Lala 73 Hardinge, Lord Henry 49 Hardwar 23 Hardwari Lal, Chaudhari 583, 585 Hargobind, Guru 77–9, 104, 601, 637 Harial 62–4, 66–7 Harijan 195, 235, 245 (p.745) Haryana Prant 379, 495, 537, 611 Hasrat Mohani 30, 418 Hasrat, Bikrama Jit 49 Hill, Major John 69 Himachal Pradesh 475–6, 481, 492–3, 506–8, 511–12, 587, 601, 607–8, 610–12, 614–15, 629, 701 Hindi Raksha Samiti 523–4, 542, 554–7, 578 Hindi Raksha Sammelan 573 Hindu Electoral Board 210 Hindu Nationalist Party 116 Hindu Sabha 23, 611 Hinduism 21–3, 37, 48, 127–8, 145, 174, 196, 489, 510, 604, 643 Hindustan Republican Association 150 Hindustan Socialist Republican Army 150 Hissar 226, 304, 344, 364, 379, 395, 493, 612 Page 9 of 28

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Index Hoare, Sir Samuel 174, 180 Hodson, H.V. 264–5, 369 Hola Muhalla 108 Hoshiarpur 118, 208, 218, 362, 365, 373, 447–8, 457, 478, 492, 496, 614 Hudiara, Harcharan Singh 495, 550, 565, 585, 592, 599, 615, 622–3, 626 hukamnāmā 39, 93, 155 Ibbetson, Sir Denzil 25–6, 34 Iftikhar-ud-Din 324 Imperial Council 29 INA (Indian National Army) 280, 288, 326 Indian Council 275 Indian Interim Government 377 Indian National Congress (Congress) 2, 5–10, 24–6, 28–32, 34n.32, 48, 51–2, 55, 57–8, 73, 76, 83, 86–7, 103, 105, 107, 111, 114–16, 119, 130–3, 136, 142, 144–5, 149–51, 160, 163–4, 166–70, 171n.42, 173–6, 178, 183, 195, 198–9, 203–10, 213, 219–23, 226–36, 239–40, 243–5, 248–56, 259–63, 265, 271, 274–7, 279–96, 300–3, 306–9, 311–12, 314– 23, 326, 327n.5, 330–2, 334–8, 344, 348, 349–50, 355, 357–8, 364–6, 368, 373–4, 378–9, 392, 394–6, 398–401, 403, 405–6, 408–10, 413, 420–2, 424–7, 431–6, 438, 440–2, 444–5, 447, 449–50, 453–7, 459–71, 474–8, 481–8, 490–1, 494–5, 498, 501–4, 506–9, 511–12, 516–18, 520–35, 537–9, 542–5, 549, 552–3, 555, 557, 560–3, 565–6, 568, 571–3, 575, 578, 583, 590, 592–3, 595–6, 598, 602–4, 606, 609, 611–12, 614, 616–17, 621–4, 627, 631, 634–5, 637–43, 674, 688, 691, 698–9, 701 Indian Penal Code 95 Iqbal, Sir Muhammad ‘Allama 179, 182, 198, 205–6, 220 Irwin, Lord 150 Ishar Das, Bhagat 76, 77 Islam 21–2, 24–5, 42–3, 67, 127, 191, 196, 280, 340–1 Ismay, H.L., Lord 332, 339, 346, 364–5, 369–71, 377 Itihad-i Millat 210, 218, 223n.14 Jaid, Bhag Singh 576, 584 Jainism 21, 128 Jaito 114, 117–19, 121–5, 127, 130, 133, 138–40, 144, 588, 678 Jaito morchā 6, 114, 116, 134–6, 155, 169, 666, 673, 678 Jalalabad 656 Jalal-Usman, Sohan Singh 235, 265, 286 Jalandhar (Jullundur) 8, 18, 23, 75, 118, 208, 240, 258, 266, 304, 343, 345–6, 362, 365– 6, 373, 379, 388–9, 400, 429, 447–8, 461–2, 478, 492, 496, 505, 521, 524, 527, 587–9, 591, 609, 630, 644, 689 Jallianwala Bagh 30, 32, 54–5, 58, 76, 83, 132, 153, 157, 176–7, 476 Jamarai, Hazara Singh 153 Jami‘at Ali Shah, Pir 192–3 Jamna Lal, Seth 185 Jan Sangh 468–9, 476–7, 493, 502, 506, 509, 517, 525, 551, 587, 610–11, 617, 621 Jandiala Sher Khan 213 Jaranwala 72, 100 jathā 2, 89–90, 92, 94–5, 100, 103, 104, 106, 112n.11, 117–19, 121–5, 127, 130–6, 140, 144, 157, 179, 193–8, 208, 214, 228, 241, 363, 388, 430, 439, 478–80, 495–7, 561–2, 588, 594, 623–4, 631, 633, 673, 675–9 Jawahar Mal, Bhagat 40, 77 Page 10 of 28

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Index Jawala Parshad, Rai Bahadur 141 Jayakar, M.R. 115 (p.746) Jeji, Harchand Singh 159–60, 169, 187, 189, 212 Jenkins, Sir Evan 306, 310–11, 315–21, 323–5, 330, 332–41, 343–7, 349, 358, 361–3, 369, 371–8 Jhabal, Amar Singh 91, 152–3, 164, 674 Jhabal, Jaswant Singh 91, 101, 676 Jhabal, Sarmukh Singh 135 Jhabbar, Jathedar Kartar Singh 54, 58, 95, 99, 100, 159, 192, 674–7 Jhajjar 23, 31 jhatkā 75, 179, 240–1, 243, 257, 267–8 Jhawan, Shiv Singh 622 Jind 37, 50, 56, 187, 388, 404–6, 686 Jinnah, M.A. 5, 9, 123, 150, 165, 174, 203–8, 219–23, 229, 238, 243, 248–9, 253–5, 259, 261–6, 269–70, 275–7, 280, 282, 287, 294–5, 300–2, 305–6, 310, 313–15, 317–23, 330, 332, 337–8, 342, 345–7, 349–50, 354–6, 359–60, 363, 365, 368, 372, 375–8, 389, 403, 430, 642, 691–2 Jodh, K.G. 561, 571 Joga, Jagir Singh 209 Joseph, George 129 Josh, Sohan Singh 209, 262, 488 Joshi, A.C. 585 Jubbulpore 115 Kabir 78, 127, 647–8, 651 Kadian 24 Kairon, Partap Singh 228, 235, 438, 456, 461, 467, 477, 484, 487–8, 512, 516, 520–1, 583 Kalha, S.S. 606 Kallar 46, 75, 83 Kamla Akali, Lal Singh 75 Kamraj, K. 614 Kangra 400–2, 457, 601, 608, 614 Kanpur 258, 285 Kanwar Sain 370 Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (Firozpur) 44 Kanya Mahavidyalaya (Jalandhar) 23 Kapur, Jawahar Singh 42, 46–7, 68 Kapurthala 23–4, 37, 42, 45–6, 50, 53, 196, 258, 335, 388, 405, 407, 478, 492, 630, 686 Karachi 375–7, 432, 570 Karanjia, R.K. 614 Karnal 304, 344, 364, 379, 460, 493, 528, 592, 612 Kashmir 4, 205, 220, 370, 404, 431, 464, 477–8, 599, 603, 606, 627, 629, 631, 633, 643, 662 Kasur 622, 675 Kaul, Daya Kishan 157 Kaulan 78 Kaumī Dard 156, 587, 628 Kaumi, Gopal Singh 135, 188, 256, 550 Kaur, Amar 670–1 Page 11 of 28

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Index Kaur, Bibi Niranjan 156, 169 Kaur, Dalip 666–70, 672–3 Kaur, Harbans 670, 673 Kaur, Maharani Jind 49 Kaur, Mai Ram 92 Kaur, Rajinder 184, 655 Kaur, Rajkumari Amrit 254, 390 Kaur, Sheel 667–70, 672–3 Kaur, Tej 70 Kaur, Uttam 667, 669–70, 672 Kelkar, N.C. 115 Keshdhārī 38, 70, 156, 637 Keshgarh Sahib 40 Keys morchā 94, 106, 672–3, 675, 677 Khadur Sahib 588 Khaksars 218, 280, 343 Khaliquzzaman 206 Khalistan 5, 228, 239, 261, 347, 355, 617 Khalsa Advocate 43, 79, 91–2 Khālsā Akhbār 43, 46, 91 Khalsa College 44, 47, 62, 65, 67–8, 70–3, 82, 83n.24, 88–90, 100, 105, 110, 157, 197, 199, 201n.100, 203, 211–13, 222, 228, 314, 502, 632, 637, 666–7, 670, 672, 674 Khalsa Defence of India League 230, 236, 238, 245, 305, 687 Khalsa Dharam Parcharak Sabha 46 Khalsa Diwan 48, 52–3, 55, 57–8, 71–4, 84, 88, 92–4, 110–11, 134, 156, 163, 242, 267, 293, 678 Khalsa High School 62, 71–2, 74–6, 82–3, 99, 228, 632, 675–6 Khalsa National Party 203, 207, 210, 217, 220, 228–9, 243 Khālsā Samāchār 43–4, 91 Khalsa Sewak 91, 228, 259, 442 Khalsa Tract Society 42, 81, 678 (p.747) Khalsa Young Men’s Association 631 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar 175 Khan, General Ayub 599 Khan, Kazi Rustam 77 Khan, Malik Khizar Hayat 334, 349 Khan, Sir Muhammad Nawaz 276 Khan, Sir Shafa’at Ahmad 183 Khan, Sir Sikander Hayat 2, 175, 181–2, 203, 205–8, 210, 213–22, 226–8, 230–1, 239– 43, 245, 250, 253–4, 256, 374 Khan, Sir Syed Ahmed 31–2 Khan, Zafarulla (Zafarullah) 207, 366, 372, 374 Khilafat 86, 151 Khilafat Committee 87 Khosla, Justice G.D. 387, 564 Khuranj, Pritam Singh 487, 496, 547 Khyber Pass 656 Kifayatullah, Mufti 178 Kila Didar Singh 229 Page 12 of 28

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Index King, C.M. 89–91, 95 Kirti Kisan Party 151, 223n.14 Kirtis 175 Kitchlew, Saifuddin 30, 561, 571 Kohat 66, 115 Kohli, Sita Ram 49 Komagata Maru 27, 58, 74, 83, 153, 228 Kot Fateh Khan 214 Kot Moman 255 Kriplani, J.B. 395, 453, 476 Kukas/kūkās 40–1, 50–1, 57, 143, 186 Kulu 608, 614 Kunjah 65 Lahaul 608 Lahore 18, 20–7, 30–1, 37, 42–9, 51, 54, 62, 67–73, 77–8, 82, 88, 90, 94, 99–102, 105, 122, 135–7, 139–41, 149–50, 152–4, 157, 167–70, 173, 176, 179, 189–91, 193–4, 198, 203, 205–6, 208, 212, 216, 218–19, 222, 232, 250, 253, 257–8, 265, 267, 283, 304, 324, 333, 335–6, 339–40, 342–7, 364–7, 372–5, 387–9, 431, 434, 494, 599, 606, 631, 656–7, 661–3, 669, 672–4, 676, 679, 689 Lahore Arya Samaj 22 Lahore Conspiracy Case 150 Lahore Division 37, 69, 346 Lahore Fort 122, 135–7, 139–40, 152, 674, 679 Lahore Indian Association 25 Laithwaite, Sir Gilbert 253 Lajpat Rai, Lala 25–7, 79–81, 83, 87, 116, 124, 150 Lalpura, Prem Singh 547, 554, 555, 557 Lawrence, John 38–9 Lawrence, Sir Henry 38 League Working Committee 276 Lekh Ram, Pandit 22, 67 Liaqat Ali Khan 302, 332–3, 343, 354, 372, 376–7, 388, 431 Liberal Federation 150 Linlithgow, Lord 202, 218, 226, 236 Lohat Baddi 28 London Conference 323 London Plan 333 Longowalia, Bhagwan Singh 158, 189, 209 Lowrie, John C. 18 Lucknow 25, 28–9, 32, 53, 115, 150, 205, 207–8, 216, 220 Lucknow Pact 28–9, 32, 53, 76 Ludhiana 18, 50–1, 187, 209, 228, 266, 280, 342, 362, 448, 459, 466, 469, 471, 492–6, 504, 512, 524, 554, 587, 589, 593, 595, 602, 604, 617, 626–7, 629–30 Lyallpur 17–18, 26, 45, 54, 62, 71–6, 82–3, 99, 101–2, 110, 176, 211, 217, 250, 258–9, 266, 304, 344, 346, 361–3, 365–6, 387, 390–1, 430, 632, 666, 671, 673, 675–7 Lyallpuri, Master Sunder Singh 71, 211 Macauliffe, Max Arthur 48 Macdonald, A.A. 310 Macdonald, Ramsay 150, 174, 179–80 Page 13 of 28

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Index Machhiwara 572 Madras 151, 160, 165, 204, 417, 423, 469, 487, 490–1, 615 Mahajan, Justice Mehar Chand 365–6, 524 Mahajirs 150 Mahants 38 Majhail, Ishar Singh 184, 186, 235, 256, 265, 267, 281, 395, 430, 438, 442, 444, 459, 487 Majithia, Dyal Singh 21, 51, 57 Majithia, Kirpal Singh 237 Majithia, Lehna Singh 51, 659 (p.748) Majithia, Sir Sunder Singh 42, 46, 52–3, 67, 73–4, 82, 89, 93, 96, 98, 116, 134, 159, 179, 198, 203, 208–12, 216–17, 220, 222, 236, 242–3 Majithia, Sardar Surjit Singh 267 Majlis-i Ahrar 210, 218, 223n.14 Majumdar, Pratap Chandra 21 Malaviya, Kapil Dev 131 Malaviya, Pandit Madan Mohan 48, 97, 102–3, 121, 123, 126, 149, 165–6, 174, 180, 196 Malik, Amar Singh 566 Malik, Hardit Singh 577 Malik, Mukhbain Singh 551, 575 Malikpura 588 Malwa 91, 258, 572 Malwa Khalsa Diwan of Dhuri 94 Malwai Bunga 92 Mamdot, Iftikhar Husain 364 Mandal, Jogendra Nath 301 Mandi Bahauddin 269 Mandi Hydroelectric Scheme 367 Manji Sahib 495–6, 567, 569, 576, 589, 591, 626, 674 Mann, Joginder Singh 250 Mann, Karam Singh 209 Mann, Naunihal Singh 238, 242–3 Martial Law 30, 54, 76, 83, 88, 92, 338, 374, 674, 698 Mashobra 333 Mastuana 588 Maynard, Sir John 183 Mazhabi 50, 268, 416 Mazhabi Dal 554 Meerut 74, 208, 232, 439, 448 Mehar Shah, Imam 190 Mehta, Ashok 574 Mehta, Niranjan Singh 68 Menon, Krishna 331, 506 Menon, Rao Bahadur V.P. 333 Meos 372 Merī Yād 2–3, 9, 66, 99, 152, 157, 189, 230, 239, 252, 335, 429, 432, 501, 637 Mewat 372 Mieville, Sir Eric 332–3 Minchin, A.B. 116, 118, 122, 137, 144 Page 14 of 28

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Index minorities 7, 150, 160–2, 165–6, 168–70, 176, 180, 213, 231, 237–9, 244, 266, 268–9, 288, 296, 305, 307–9, 312, 315, 319, 322, 334–5, 342, 347, 358–9, 413–21, 424–6, 435, 437, 439, 449, 464–5, 469, 549, 578, 603–4, 611, 638, 641, 643–4, 687–8, 693, 698–700 Minto, Lord 69 Mochi Gate 195 Moderates 6, 22, 25, 87, 145, 446 Moga 21, 177 Mohan Lal, Pandit 475, 523, 583–4, 586, 607, 609–10, 623 Montagu–Chelmsford (Montford) Report 29, 53, 238, 686 Montgomery 68, 176, 267, 304, 344–6, 361, 365–6, 387, 389 Mookerjee, Shyama Prasad 253, 423, 477 Moon, Penderel 227, 232, 245, 254, 363, 370 Moonje, B.S. 115 Mountbatten Plan 353, 356–7, 378 Mountbatten, Viscount 331 Mouton, Captain 49 Mudie, Sir Francis 372, 375, 389 Muhammad Ali, Chaudhri 264, 369 Muhammad Ashraf 261 Muhammad Hussain, Maulavi 24 Muhammad Munir, Justice 365 Muhammad Shafi, Mian 28 Muktsar 154, 156–7, 569, 588, 604 Mulan Devi 63 Multan 87, 115, 176, 238, 258, 266, 304, 339, 340, 346, 358, 366, 387, 685–6, 689 Munshi Ram, Lala (later Swami Shraddhananda) 22–3, 150 Munshi, K.M. 256 Musafir, Giani Gurmukh Singh 438, 484, 508, 522, 524, 556, 624, 626 Muslim League Council 301, 302 Muslim League National Guards 324, 343 Muslim League Resolution of March 1940 203, 222 Muslim League Working Committee 221, 262–3 Muslim Unionists 204, 206, 220 222, 296 Mussourie 357 Mutahidah Mahaz 590 Mutiny of 1857 26 Nabha 1, 6, 28, 37, 42–3, 46, 50, 56, 68, 114, 116–27, 130–4, 136–41, 144–5, 155, 157, 160, (p.749) 168, 175, 187, 347, 388, 404–5, 463, 478, 565, 593, 673–4, 678, 686 Nabha, Bhai Kahn Singh 47, 57, 154 Nagoke group 280–82, 433, 442, 454, 460, 487 Nagoke, Jathedar Udham Singh 265, 270, 281–2, 317, 395, 405, 430, 433, 437, 442, 450, 456, 462, 467, 486–7 Nahan 184–5 Nakodar 366, 477 Nalagarh 483, 614 Nalwa, Hari Singh 659 Nanak Prakāsh 594 Nanda, Gulzari Lal 605–6, 609, 614, 617–18 Nankana Martyrs’ Day 134 Page 15 of 28

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Index Nankana Sahib 54, 58, 90, 94–5, 99–100, 105–6, 110, 123, 125, 154, 157, 177, 188, 210, 228, 344, 361–3, 379, 477, 544, 675–7 Narain Das, Mahant 94–5, 106, 677 Narang, Gokul Chand 128, 175, 181–2, 208, 210, 255, 261 Narayan, Jai Prakash 546, 551, 567, 574, 576, 579, 614, 631 Narendra Nath, Raja 181, 210 National Defence Fund 587 Nationalist Party 115–16, 149 Nationalist Sikh Party 547 Nationalist Sikhs 164, 286, 317, 460, 487 Naujawan Bharat Sabha 151, 175 Nawab of Malerkotla 614 Nawab of Mamdot 303 Nawan Shahar 588 Naz, Nanak Chand 259 Nazi 209, 231 Nazim-ud-Din, Khwaja 333–4 Nehru Committee 151, 161–3, 166–7, 169, 447 Nehru Committee Report (Nehru Report) 149, 162 Nehru, Jawaharlal 2, 9, 130–2, 149–50, 167, 178, 204, 209, 218, 274, 277, 282–3, 287, 301, 331–2, 338–9, 349, 357, 378–80, 388–9, 390, 394–6, 399–403, 405, 409–10, 413, 415, 420–1, 423–4, 430–1, 438–9, 443–6, 448–50, 453, 456–8, 460–8, 471, 474–7, 480–1, 483–6, 488, 491, 501–2, 507–9, 514–15, 517, 520–6, 535, 539, 542, 550, 554–5, 569, 570, 575, 583, 586, 598, 605, 607, 617–18, 623 Nehru, Pandit Motilal 87, 124, 131, 159, 161–2, 165–6, 168 Nicholson, Captain John 657 Nihang 94, 185, 214, 229, 664 Nijalingappa, S. 598 Nirankari movement 39 Nirankaris 20, 40, 42, 44, 52, 56 Nirguṇiārā 43 Nirmalas 186 Non-cooperation Movement 6, 86–90, 95, 101, 105–6, 108–10, 115, 130, 142, 167, 173, 209, 323, 532, 552 Noon, Sir Firoz Khan 175, 190, 206–7, 341, 364 Nur Ahmad 189 NWFP (North-West Frontier Province) 161–2, 176, 204, 220–1, 332, 342 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael 30 Ogilvie, G.D. 118 Orissa 204, 491–2, 568 Pakhtunistan 631 Pakistan 5, 8, 161, 203, 205–6, 220, 222–3, 226–30, 236, 238–40, 243, 249, 251–5, 258– 71, 276–82, 287–96, 300–1, 303–7, 309–10, 313–14, 319, 325, 331–3, 335, 338, 340, 343, 345–9, 355–6, 359, 363–6, 368–72, 376, 378–9, 387–9, 391–2, 394, 399, 404, 409, 415, 423, 425–6, 429–32, 434, 444, 446, 448–9, 458, 464, 466–7, 469, 478, 494, 511, 544, 553, 560–1, 565–6, 570–1, 578, 595, 598–9, 604, 606, 615, 618, 630–1, 636, 638–40, 685, 689, 691, 694, 699 Panch Khalsa Diwan 94, 156 Panchāl Panditā 23 Page 16 of 28

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Index Panikkar, K.M. 133, 370, 491–2 Panipat 87, 612, 617 Panja Sahib 94, 154, 259, 674 Panth Prakāsh 44, 64, 82, 631, 656, 661–3, 671 Panthic Board 316, 318–9, 414 Panthic Pratinidhi Board 318, 358 Paonta 184 Parliamentary Board 206, 208, 219, 284, 397–9, 455–6, 474, 529–30, 534–6, 539 Parmanand, Bhai 47, 73 Parsi 31, 129, 165 (p.750) Parupkār 592, 649 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai (Sardar Patel) 9, 274, 282–6, 291, 302, 314, 354, 375, 378–9, 388–90, 394, 396–9, 401–10, 413–20, 426, 429–31, 436–46, 448, 450, 454–5, 457–61, 464, 470, 631, 639 Patel, Vitthalbhai 87 Pathankot 614 Patiala 3, 37, 50, 56, 93, 116, 118, 122, 134, 144, 157–60, 169, 175, 177, 184, 187–9, 196–7, 212, 236, 256, 258, 260, 276, 345, 387–8, 390–1, 403–10, 429, 435, 441, 443, 463, 467, 471, 478, 483–4, 492, 553, 557, 584–5, 587, 589, 602, 642, 686 Patiala state 1, 66, 118, 157, 159, 160, 187–9, 208, 256, 258–9, 390, 405–6, 463 Patil, S.K. 468, 598 Patna Sahib 41, 259 Patnaik, Biju 610 Patrick Spens, Lord 368 Pearl Harbour 227 Pepsu (Patiala and the East Punjab States Union) 387, 405, 408–10, 437, 439, 442, 450, 460, 462, 464, 466, 474–6, 479–87, 489, 491–3, 496, 498, 501–3, 506–7, 512, 520, 522, 524, 531, 533–4, 538, 543–9, 569, 594, 701–2 Peshawar 2, 18, 65, 117, 175–6, 197, 262, 656, 667–8 Pethick-Lawrence, Lord 278–9, 303–5, 310, 312–13, 316–17, 320, 324–5, 336–7, 339–40, 344, 414 Pheru, Bhai 139 Pheruman, Jathedar Darshan Singh 235, 256, 265, 625–6 Phillauri, Pandit Shardha Ram 23 Phillip, N.M. 612 Pir 64, 280, 658 Pirm Piālā 649 Poona 132, 160, 281, 283, 293 Poona Pact 174, 195–7 Post Graduate Institute of Medical Research 629 Pothohar 66, 341 Prabhāt 259, 497, 507, 561, 573, 576, 602 Prabodh Chandra 527, 529, 567 Prahladpur pothī 41 Praja Mandal 158, 187–9, 209, 212, 390, 404–10, 463 Praja Socialist Party 533, 601, 614 Prakrit 81 Prem Sumārag 40 Preventive Detention Act 477, 561 Page 17 of 28

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Index Prince of Wales 69, 87 Privy Council 215–16, 218 Provincial League Councils 208 Provincial League Parliamentary Board 219 Provincial Parliamentary Board 208 Provisional Government 250, 255, 322 pujārīs 44, 92, 671 Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 31 Punjab and Sind Bank 42 Punjab Boundary Commission 359, 365, 601 Punjab Colonization Bill 25, 32 Punjab Depressed Classes League 611 Punjab Disturbed Areas Act 1947 373 Punjab Ekta Samiti 609, 611 Punjab Hindi Raksha Samiti 555 Punjab Kisan Committee 208 Punjab Legislative Council 25–6, 87, 95, 140, 151 Punjab Pradesh Congress 493, 528, 561–2, 564–5, 578, 607, 612, 621, 624 Punjab Provincial Congress Committee 178, 234–5, 245 Punjab Provincial Parliamentary Board 206 Punjab Reorganisation Bill 615 Punjab Riasati Praja Mandal 158, 186–7, 208–9 Punjab Swadeshi Association 25, 32 Punjab Workers Assembly 280 Punjabi Sahit Akademy 584 Punjabi Suba/Punjabi-speaking state 6, 9, 378–9, 427, 429, 446–7, 467, 470, 479, 486, 488–9, 492–3, 501, 506, 508, 510, 512, 514, 518, 534, 542, 550–1, 553–4, 557, 563, 565, 567, 570–2, 574, 576, 578, 582, 583, 594–5, 598, 600–12, 614–18, 624–5, 628, 631, 636, 644, 701 Pūran Swarāj 150 Qasmi, Maulana Mohd Sami Ullah 550–1 Quit India movement 248, 251–2, 254, 288 Qur’ān 280 Qureshi, Maulana Mohd Zubair 551 (p.751) Radcliffe, Sir Cyril 371 Radhakrishnan, S. 575, 579, 618 Raja of Faridkot 342–3, 354, 405, 482 Raja, N.C. 174, 196 Raja–Gandhi (Rajagopalacharia) Formula 260–1, 268, 270, 626, 692 Rajagopalachari, C. 229, 266, 397–8, 443, 490, 614 Rajaji–Jinnah talks 248 Rajendra Prasad 9, 233–4, 244, 421, 456, 479, 490, 526, 575 Rajguru 150, 175 Rajindra Hospital 188 Rakabganj agitation 52, 74, 83 Rakabganj gurdwara 52, 57–8, 75, 88, 110, 112n.11, 439–40, 550–1, 577, 594, 629 Ralia Ram 166 Ram Kishen 607, 610, 615 Ram Mohan Roy 127 Page 18 of 28

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Index Ram Nath, Seth 409, 569, 571 Ram Tirath, Swami 81 Ramdasia 44, 268 Ramgarhia, Sunder Singh 93, 96 Rampura Phul 593, 625 Ranbir 526, 630 Rangoon 227 Rarewala, Gian Singh 409–10, 463–4, 480–5, 497, 501, 505, 507–9, 514, 516, 518, 521– 2, 531, 533–4, 538–9, 552–3, 567, 573, 583, 589, 621–3 Ratta Ji, Sahib 39–40 Rattigan, Justice 69 Rau, Sir B.N. 339 Rawalpindi 18, 26, 39–40, 42, 44–7, 62, 64–7, 69–70, 73–4, 82–3, 95, 101, 176, 213, 261, 304, 338–41, 343, 346, 358–9, 362, 364, 374, 387–8, 595–6, 637, 663–4, 689 Red Fort 288, 578, 594 Reddy, N. Sanjeeva 598 Rehatia Sikhs 22, 44 Rehmat Ali, Chaudhari 205 Republican Party 602, 614 Rivaz, Sir Charles Montgomery 68 Rohtak 344, 364, 379, 395, 447, 563, 675 Roosevelt, Franklin 227 Ropar 44, 485 Round Table Conference 5, 150, 170, 174, 176–7, 198, 251, 256, 496 RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh) 324–3, 432, 443, 466, 469, 476–7, 498, 506 Rurka Kalan 240 Russia 227 S. Partap 190 Sabraon (Sabhrawan) 49, 588, 657 Sachā Dhandorā 73, 83 Sacha Sauda 100 Sachar, Bhim Sen 303, 335, 339, 346, 397–402, 409, 456, 474–5, 479, 488, 494–5, 497, 503–5, 507, 555–6 Sadh Sangat Board 552–4 Sadhna 649 Sahajdhari 73, 82, 133, 156, 169 Saharanpur 184–5, 448 Sahni, Professor Ruchi Ram 21, 116 Salogra 603 Samundri, Teja Singh 72, 99–101, 103, 117, 136, 141, 152–3, 168, 502, 666, 676 Sanatan Dharma 20, 23 Sanatan Dharma Pratinidhi Sabha 611 Sanatan Dharma Sabhas 23, 31 Sanatan Dharmis 65 Sanatanist(s) 32, 43, 45, 65, 67, 133 Sandhanwalia, Raghbir Singh 250 Sandhanwalia, Shamsher Singh 50 Sangla 100, 677 Sanjha morchā 590 Page 19 of 28

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Index Sant Fateh Singh 5, 7, 9, 497, 523, 560, 564–73, 576–7, 579, 580n.45, 582–96, 598–602, 604–10, 612, 614–19, 621–8, 632–4 Sant Khalsa 40–2, 51, 57 Sant Sipāhī 2–3, 448, 569, 641, 643 Santanam, K. 178 Sapru Committee 248–9, 269, 271, 274–5 Sapru, Sir Tej Bahadur 160, 171n.50, 249, 266 Sarbat Khalsa Conference 153 Sardar Bahadur party 154, 180 Sargodha 228, 240–1, 255 Sarhadi, Ajit Singh 255, 439–40, 442, 457, 487, 492, 495, 521, 552, 561, 587, 593 Sarhali, Master Sujan Singh 75, 363 satyāgraha 30, 103, 126, 129–30, 185, 195, 227, 404–5 Satyapal 30, 250 (p.752) Saunders 150 Savage, Captain G.R. 375 Savarkar, Veer 257, 296, 478 Scheduled Castes 196, 204, 266, 268, 275–6, 285, 301, 308, 325, 335, 337, 396, 415–20, 425, 440, 446, 449, 461, 471, 474, 478–81, 489, 498, 503, 622, 699–700 Seetalvad, Sir Chimalal 366 Seistani, Harbans Singh 181 Sen, Keshab Chandra 21 SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee) 1–2, 6, 10, 90, 93–106, 108, 110– 11, 114, 116–22, 124–6, 129–44, 149, 151–7, 168–9, 173, 177–81, 186, 188–9, 191–5, 197–9, 203, 209–11, 213, 217, 222, 228, 240–1, 260, 267, 270, 281–2, 340, 361, 433, 437, 441–2, 450, 467, 471, 474–6, 482, 486–9, 494–8, 503–5, 508, 512, 520, 542–54, 555–7, 560, 577, 582–3, 586–9, 592–3, 596, 601–2, 609, 617, 623, 627, 673–8 Shah Chiragh Mosque 190 Shah Commission 617, 624–5 Shah Husain 81 Shah Muhammad 655, 659–62 Shah, J.C. 612 Shahabuddin, Khan Bahadur Chaudhari Sir 207 Shahidganj 173, 190, 192–5, 197–9, 215–18, 220 Shahidganj Day 191 shahīdī jathā 89, 121–5, 127, 131, 133–6, 673, 678–9 Shahkot 54 Sham Lal 283 Shankaracharya, Swami 126 Sharma, Kali Charan 571 Sharma, Mauli Chand 575, 579 Sharma, Pandit Bhagwat Dayal 608 Sharma, Pandit Din Dayalu 23 Sharma, Ramrup 285 Sharma, Yagya Dutt 611 Shastri, Lal Bahadur 481, 533, 575, 577, 579, 586, 598–9, 602, 605, 609, 616–18 Shaukal Ali, Maulana 180, 191–3 Sheikhupura 49, 54, 94, 100, 101, 175, 214, 263, 266, 361–3, 365–6, 387, 389, 676, 689

Page 20 of 28

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Index Shiromani Akali Dal 1, 2, 5–8, 10, 90, 94, 100, 110, 130, 132–3, 135, 144, 151, 153, 158, 168, 173, 177–81, 184, 188–9, 191, 193, 197–9, 200n.22, 203, 209–10, 213, 217, 222, 226–7, 229–31, 235–6, 239, 241–2, 245, 251, 255–6, 258–62, 266–7, 270, 274, 277, 284, 286–7, 289, 292, 294, 322, 334, 344, 349, 354, 358, 360, 362, 366, 378, 404, 406, 408– 10, 415–16, 426, 430, 432–7, 440–2, 445, 448–50, 459–61, 468–71, 474–7, 479, 483, 485, 487–9, 492–5, 497–8, 501–2, 506, 509, 514–18, 520–3, 532–5, 538, 545, 547–55, 557, 560–2, 567–72, 574–9, 582–90, 592–6, 599, 602, 605, 609, 616, 622–8, 634, 637, 642–3, 674, 678, 692, 698, 701 Shiromani Malwa Pratindhi Diwan 188 Short, Major J.M. 369 Sialkot 18, 37, 91, 94, 168, 178, 192, 266, 366, 387, 599, 674, 689 Sidhu, Pritam Singh 187 Sidhwan, Mohinder Singh 152, 267 Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact 240, 244–5, 250, 254 Sikander–Jinnah Pact 207, 219 ‘Sikanderi Sikhs’ 229 Sikh Education Conference 42 Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act 543–6 Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act (Gurdwaras Act) 6, 102, 114, 135, 137, 141, 153–5, 168–9, 183, 190, 543–4, 553, 556, 679 Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Bill 94–5 Sikh Homeland 311, 333, 378–9, 470, 486, 603–4, 608, 614, 617–18, 626–7, 629, 631, 636, 644 Sikh minorities 296, 342 Sikh Missionary College 163, 599 Sikh National College 203, 212, 222 Sikh Raj 1, 51, 57, 124–6, 134, 143, 228, 258, 261, 289, 395, 407, 443, 458, 525, 538, 614, 655–6, 658 Sikh Reform Movement 136, 144 Sikh Sudhar Committee 141 Sikhism 4, 21, 37–8, 43, 47, 48, 57, 70, 81, 91, 93, 95, 126–8, 133, 145, 229, 390, 479, 507, 606, 614, 628 Sikhistan 252, 303, 333, 369 Simla 138, 179–80, 183, 190, 194, 198, 277, 178, 304, 333, 366, 370, 388, 391, 401–2, 430, 433, 608, 614 (p.753) Simla Conference 275, 277–8, 280–1, 287, 293–4 Simon Commission 150–1, 174, 179, 686 Sind 150–1, 161, 176, 180, 205, 220, 249, 257, 364 Sindh Sagar Doab 36, 40, 66 Singapore 49, 227 Singh Sabha (Sabhas) 20, 42–3, 45–6, 48, 52, 55, 57, 62, 65, 67, 69–70, 75–6, 82, 91–2, 95, 99, 110, 157, 228–9, 261, 543, 631, 637, 679 Singh Sabha movement 36, 42, 45–6, 48, 52, 57, 62, 67, 82, 157, 679 Singh, Air Chief Marshal Arjan 606 Singh, Ajit 27, 70, 71, 73, 255, 269, 489, 698 Singh, Akali Phula 88 Singh, Amar 91, 152–3, 160, 164, 177, 674 Singh, Anup 585 Singh, Arjan 140 Page 21 of 28

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Index Singh, Arur 92, 675 Singh, Atma 543–4 Singh, Attar 42, 68 Singh, Avtar 228–9 Singh, Baba Balak 40–1, 50, 77 Singh, Baba Darbara 487, 528, 552, 561, 564, 601, 610, 623 Singh, Baba Deep 588, 629 Singh, Baba Gurdit 40, 73–4, 153, 228 Singh, Baba Partap 184, 186, 188 Singh, Baba Ram 40, 42, 57, 143 Singh, Baba Rur 29 Singh, Babu Teja 42, 156, 169 Singh, Baldev 211, 227, 235, 237–8, 240, 242–5, 250–1, 253–4, 271n.7, 280, 282, 284, 286, 294, 302–3, 305, 309–22, 324, 326, 332, 341–5, 347–50, 354–61, 363–6, 368–9, 377, 397–8, 433, 437–41, 445, 459–60, 470, 522, 556, 567, 622, 670 Singh, Bant 606 Singh, Basakha 267 Singh, Basant 286, 626 Singh, Bawa Arjan 47 Singh, Bawa Chhajju 47 Singh, Bawa Harkishan 90, 93, 100, 102–3, 117, 136–7, 152, 154, 183–4, 187, 197, 212, 433, 441, 447, 470, 478, 496–7, 509, 518, 566 Singh, Beant 101 Singh, Bhag 117, 141, 152, 178, 184, 186, 192, 210, 341, 433, 441, 478 Singh, Bhagat 150, 175 Singh, Bhagat Lakshman 44–8, 52, 67, 71, 75, 193 Singh, Bhai Alam 109 Singh, Bhai Bakhtawar 593 Singh, Bhai Balwant 73 Singh, Bhai Bir 41 Singh, Bhai Buta 100, 676 Singh, Bhai Dalip 100, 676 Singh, Bhai Ditt 42–3, 196 Singh, Bhai Gurbachan 185 Singh, Bhai Gurmukh 46 Singh, Bhai Harchand 156 Singh, Bhai Hari 40 Singh, Bhai Jodh 42, 66–8, 71, 89, 101, 120, 137–40, 153–4, 267, 501, 507–8, 514, 554– 5, 585 Singh, Bhai Joga 262 Singh, Bhai Kahn 42–3, 47, 57, 68, 154 Singh, Bhai Lachhman 95, 99, 676–7 Singh, Bhai Maharaj 41, 49 Singh, Bhai Mani 109 Singh, Bhai Mehtab 588, 594 Singh, Bhai Nand 73, 621, 627–8, 633–4 Singh, Bhai Narain 73, 626–7 Singh, Bhai Partap 92 Singh, Bhai Ram 40–2, 50–1 Page 22 of 28

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Index Singh, Bhai Ram Rakha 65, 67 Singh, Bhai Randhir 28, 74–5, 178 Singh, Bhai Santokh 43, 79, 594 Singh, Bhai Sucha 99, 676 Singh, Bhai Sukha 588, 594 Singh, Bhai Takht 44 Singh, Bhai Taru 109, 588 Singh, Bhai Uttam 100, 677 Singh, Bhai Vir 42–4, 57, 92, 154 Singh, Buta 100, 175, 267, 488, 615, 677 Singh, Buta 155, 547, 623 Singh, Captain Bahadur 96, 101 Singh, Captain Ram 104 Singh, Chattar 64, 663 Singh, Chaudhri Lahri 379 Singh, Chet 599 Singh, Colonel Raghbir 188, 405–6, 409, 444, 463, 486, 493 Singh, Colonel Shamsher 254 (p.754) Singh, Daljit 53 Singh, Darbara 487, 551–2, 561, 566, 610, 623 Singh, Dasaundha 238, 240, 242, 244 Singh, Daulat 137–8 Singh, Dharam 68–9, 71, 82 Singh, Dhian 229 Singh, Dilbagh 623 Singh, Fauja 49 Singh, Gajindra 52 Singh, Ganda 49, 91 Singh, Ganga 66–7, 69, 188, 197, 362, 496 Singh, General Mohan 552–3 Singh, Giani Ajmer 625–7 Singh, Giani Bhupinder 496, 588, 591–2, 602, 623, 626 Singh, Giani Chet 569 Singh, Giani Gian 44, 656, 661, 663 Singh, Giani Kartar 54, 76, 182, 192, 215, 230, 235–6, 243, 245, 253–4, 256, 258–60, 262, 265–6, 270, 281–2, 305, 309–10, 315–17, 320, 324, 326, 333–4, 336, 338, 341–2, 344, 346–7, 349, 355, 358–9, 361–4, 370, 376, 378–80, 397, 402, 404, 433, 436, 439–40, 441, 443, 445, 454, 459–62, 467–8, 471, 478, 501–3, 507–9, 514–18, 521–3, 529, 532–3, 538–9, 542–3, 545, 550–3, 555–7, 567, 572, 575, 584, 589, 606 Singh, Giani Nahar 156 Singh, Giani Sher 136, 152–4, 159, 163–8, 171n.50, 177–81, 183–6, 188–9, 192, 197–8, 203, 209, 217, 228, 255, 259, 261, 263, 270 Singh, Giani Zail 410, 438, 623–4 Singh, Gulab 121, 146 Singh, Gulab (Raja) 657–8, 661–2, 664, 666–8 Singh, Gurbakhsh 259 Singh, Gurcharan 140 Singh, Gurdial 118–9, 455 Singh, Gurdit 228, 262, 666–70, 673 Page 23 of 28

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Index Singh, Gurmukh 42 Singh, Gurnam 552, 561–3, 571, 537, 575, 578, 584, 602, 615, 622–3, 627–8, 633–4 Singh, Harbakhsh 606 Singh, Harbant 582, 585 Singh, Harbhajan 571 Singh, Harchand 72, 74–5, 101, 159, 160, 169, 187, 189, 208, 212, 485 Singh, Harcharan 569 Singh, Hardial 122 Singh, Hardit 64 Singh, Hargurnad 543, 626 Singh, Hari 72, 186 Singh, Harnam 165–6, 188, 192, 258, 260, 266–7, 304–5, 346, 362, 366, 414 Singh, Hira 68, 155 Singh, Hukam 418–19, 423–7, 446, 449, 459, 469–71, 482, 484, 489, 494, 496–8, 501–2, 505, 507–9, 512, 515–18, 521, 532–3, 538, 552, 573–4, 585, 607, 610, 616–18, 625–6, 633 Singh, Inder 258 Singh, Jagjit 228, 442, 553 Singh, Jamadar Partap 180 Singh, Jamadar Sadhu 72 Singh, Jathedar Achhar 487, 496, 587–8, 591–2 Singh, Jathedar Channan 256 Singh, Jathedar Mohan 256, 362, 430, 433, 442, 497, 551, 592, 627 Singh, Jathedar Pritam 265, 270, 408, 433, 493, 496, 592 Singh, Jathedar Santokh 629 Singh, Jathedar Sohan 252 Singh, Jathedar Tara 190 Singh, Jathedar Teja 156, 235 Singh, Jawand 72 Singh, Jodh 38, 42, 66–8, 71, 89, 101, 117, 120, 137–8, 140, 153, 228, 267, 314, 501, 504, 508, 514, 554–5, 585 Singh, Justice Teja 365–7 Singh, Kanwar Bikrama 45 Singh, Kapur 5, 284, 453, 457–8, 602, 615, 622, 636 Singh, Karam 44, 178, 209 Singh, Karan 122 Singh, Kartar 120, 192, 258 Singh, Kharak 2, 89, 96, 101–2, 106–7, 111, 117, 149, 151–9, 164, 167–9, 173, 177–81, 189, 194, 196–8, 227, 258–9, 261, 469, 675 Singh, Khazan 71, 74, 210 Singh, Kikkar 627 Singh, Kirpal 237, 243, 370–1, 463, 586 Singh, Kishan (Babbar) 105 Singh, Kishen 698 Singh, Kundan 155 Singh, Labh 340 (p.755) Singh, Lachhman 100, 568, 576–7, 584–6, 615, 622–3, 634, 677 Singh, Lal 153, 160, 210, 532, 656–7, 659–60 Singh, Mahant Harnam 91 Page 24 of 28

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Index Singh, Mahant Tirath 177 Singh, Maharaj Pratap 118 Singh, Maharaja Bhupinder 116, 157–60, 169, 186–7, 189, 197, 212 Singh, Maharaja Dalip 42, 49, 71 Singh, Maharaja Hira 46, 68 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit 38, 217, 238, 637, 657, 659, 685 Singh, Maharaja Ripudaman 58, 116, 123, 134, 158 Singh, Maharaja Yadvindra 208, 342, 407–8 Singh, Major General Joginder 606 Singh, Major General Mohinder 606 Singh, Major General Narinder 606 Singh, Major General Rajinder 606 Singh, Man 95, 97 Singh, Mangal 125, 128, 134, 139, 152–3, 157, 160–4, 168, 171n.42, 180, 188, 192, 284 Singh, Master Bishan 65 Singh, Master Hari 208 Singh, Master Narain 72 Singh, Master Sujan 210, 363, 518 Singh, Master Tara 1–10, 36, 48–9, 51, 56, 62–3, 66–7, 70–83, 86, 94, 99–105, 107–9, 111, 114, 117–19, 122, 128, 134–6, 138, 140–5, 149, 151–60, 162–5, 167–70, 173, 175– 81, 183–9, 191–9, 203, 209–18, 222–3, 226–45, 248, 251–63, 265–6, 268–71, 274–82, 284, 286–7, 289–96, 304–5, 309–16, 320, 322, 324–5, 330, 333–5, 338–45, 347, 349, 353, 356–8, 360–5, 368, 370–1, 375–9, 397, 409–10, 429–50, 453, 457–63, 466–71, 474–82, 484–9, 493–8, 501–3, 505–12, 514–18, 520–3, 531–9, 542–57, 560–79, 582–96, 598, 602– 4, 606, 608–10, 612, 614–19, 621, 623–34, 636–44, 646–7, 649–53, 655–61, 663–6, 671– 7, 679 Singh, Maya 46 Singh, Mehtab 103–4, 117, 120, 136, 141–2, 152–4, 157–9, 165, 177, 188, 197, 677 Singh, Milkha 64 Singh, Mohan 238, 552, 576, 629, 666, 670–4, 679 Singh, Narain 72–3, 137–8, 153, 155, 168, 176, 527, 626 Singh, Naunihal 238, 242, 250 Singh, Partap 155, 487, 531, 536 Singh, Harbans 599 Singh, Niranjan 3, 62, 67, 75, 90, 100–101, 136, 183, 203, 211–12, 222, 430, 450, 478, 566, 573, 577, 586–7, 594, 629, 643 Singh, Sher 568 Singh, Teja 90, 100, 136, 154, 183, 509 Singh, Rachhpal 592 Singh, Rai 140 Singh, Rai Bahadur Sujan 64 Singh, Raja 117, 137 Singh, Raja Harbans 91 Singh, Raja Sher 49, 64 Singh, Raja Tej 38, 50 Singh, Ram 68 Singh, Ram Subhag 610 Singh, Randhir 28, 74–5, 178, 267, 629, 670 Singh, Ravel 627 Page 25 of 28

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Index Singh, Risaldar Ranjodh 152 Singh, Risaldar Sunder 152 Singh, Sadhu 72, 232, 259, 277, 282, 294, 335, 593, 599 Singh, Sampuran 175–6, 182, 194, 284, 406, 464, 493, 496 Singh, Sant 55, 67, 140, 202, 212, 231, 258–9, 270, 284, 286, 347–8, 431, 626, 662 Singh, Sant Attar 1, 42, 66, 68, 83, 151, 588, 637 Singh, Sant Channan 589, 627 Singh, Sant Didar 134 Singh, Sant Hari 554 Singh, Sant Sadhu 593 Singh, Sant Teja 53 Singh, Santokh 43, 49, 258, 460, 594, 629 Singh, Sardar Bahadur Gurbachan 250 Singh, Sardar Bahadur Mehtab 102–3, 117–18, 122, 137, 139, 142, 153, 168 Singh, Sir Jogendra 61n.64, 97, 140, 175, 179, 181–3, 194, 198, 209, 231, 237, 242, 244, 249–51, 686 Singh, Sarmukh 135 Singh, Sarup 488, 514, 543, 566–7 Singh, Satbir 567 Singh, Sewa 140, 157–9, 169, 183, 187–9 (p.756) Singh, Sewa Ram 44, 188 Singh, Sher 102 Singh, Sobha 122 Singh, Subedar Gurdit 156 Singh, Swaran 310, 325, 334–6, 339, 346–7, 363, 388, 395–6, 430, 433, 457, 481, 610, 624, 629 Singh, Tara 177 Singh, Tej 153 Singh, Teja 68, 90, 92, 94–5, 119, 136–7, 140, 656–61 Singh, Tikka Partap 141 Singh, Trilochan 42 Singh, Ujjal 155, 175–7, 182, 236–8, 346, 413–4, 585, 606, 615, 618 Singh, Umrao 543 Sirsa 612 Sitaramayya, Pattabhi 51, 130, 406, 490 SoDar 646 Soviet Union 449, 599 Spate, O.H.K. 366 Spiti 608 Sri Anandpur Sahib 154 Sri Guru Singh Sabha of Amritsar 42 Sri Muktsar Sahib 154 St John, Colonel 157 Sukhdev 175 Sukhmaṇī 646–7, 649 Sultan of Turkey 87 Sultanwind, Sant Singh 140 Sunder Das, Mahant 97 Sunder Lal, Pandit 561, 571, 614 Page 26 of 28

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Index Swadeshi Vastu Pracharak Sabha 25 Swaraj 87, 99, 106 Swaraj Party 86, 114–16 Swarajists 115, 142, 149–50 Swatantar, Teja Singh 223n.14, 262 Swatantra Party 614 Tagore, Debendranath 21 Talwandi Sabo 594 Talwandi, Jathedar Jagdev Singh 623 Tandalianwala 100 Tandon, Balramji Das 611 Tarsika, Ranjodh Singh 228 Tashkent Declaration 599 Taura, Gurcharan Singh 615 Tawārīkh-i Gurū Khālsā 44 Temple, Sir Richard 37 Thackwell 657, 663 The Khālsā 43–4 The Tribune 51–2, 80, 96, 132, 164, 175, 181, 250, 395, 398, 432, 438, 456, 522, 527, 552, 554, 557, 574–5 Thikriwala, Sewa Singh 149, 157, 173, 198 Third Round Table Conference 177 Thompson, J.H. 354 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar 28, 30, 127 tīsar panth 53, 292, 296, 640 Tiwana, Sir Khizar Hayat Khan 207 Todd, James 671 Tosha Maru 74 Toshakhāna 96, 99, 101, 110 Travancore 129 Treaty of Bhyrowal 49 Trivedi, Sir Chandulal 375 Tur, Mohan Singh 497, 592, 623, 627 Turkey 86–7, 220 Tyagi, Mahavir 607 Udāsīs 44, 91, 186 Udham Singh 543, 629 Umranangal, Jathedar Jiwan Singh 583–5 Una 614 Union of India 307, 325, 359, 365, 378, 602–4, 636, 688 Unionist Party 6, 115, 151, 175, 203, 206–8, 219–20, 231, 242–3, 256, 267, 280 United Front Ministry 464, 481, 622–3, 627 United Kingdom 308, 326 United Nations Security Council 599 United Provinces 20, 21, 24, 29, 176, 204, 301, 340, 378, 418, 422, 687 Urdu 19–21, 27, 45, 65, 81, 89, 205, 259, 267, 282, 341, 400, 421–4, 426, 447, 502, 576, 602 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 551, 611 Vāk 93 Page 27 of 28

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Index ‘Vande Mātram’ 204–5 Viceregal Lodge 52, 74, 89, 288 Vidyalankar, Amar Nath 554 Vidyalankar, Pandit Jai Chand 555 Vincent, Sir William 95 (p.757) Vinoba Bhave, Acharya 546 Vohra, Gian Singh 556 Vykom (Vaikom) 129 Wachhoa, Dan Singh 101 Wadda Khiala 54 Wardha 185, 248–9, 252, 317 Waris Shah 80–1 Wathen, G.A. 90 Wavell, Lord 249, 260, 262, 269, 274–9, 281, 294, 300–6, 308–10, 312–26, 331, 335–7, 340, 345, 403 Wazirabadi, Abdul Minan 24 White Paper 174, 180, 183, 198 William, Rushbrook 98 Willingdon, Lord 256 Wilson-Johnston 678 Working Committee of Shiromani Akali Dal 358 Working Committee of the Congress 130, 173, 227 World War I 37, 42, 116 World War II 183, 208–9, 226, 230, 300, 434 Wyatt, Major Woodrow 314 Zafar Ali, Maulana 194, 216, 218 Zafarnāmā 572, 600 Zetland, Lord 218 Zira 123, 366, 370, 372, 459–60

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About the Author

Master Tara Singh in Indian History: Colonialism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sikh Identity J.S. Grewal

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199467099 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199467099.001.0001

(p.758) About the Author J.S. Grewal

J.S. Grewal was until recently Professor of Eminence at the Punjabi University, Patiala, and is presently Life Fellow of the University. He is former Professor of History (1971–81 and 1984–7) and Vice Chancellor (1981–4), Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, and Director (1989– 93) and Chairman (2004–5), Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. A recipient of PhD and DLit from the University of London and several academic and cultural awards, he has written extensively on historiography, medieval India, and the Punjab and Sikh history. His major publications on Sikh history include Guru Nanak in History (1969); The Sikhs of the Punjab (1990); Sikh Ideology: Polity and Social Order (2007); A Study of Guru Granth Sahib: Doctrine, Social Content, History, Structure and Status (2009); The Sikhs: Ideology, Institutions and Identity (2009); History, Literature, and Identity: Four Centuries of Sikh Tradition (2011); Recent Debates in Sikh Studies: An Assessment (2011); and Historical Writings on the Sikhs (1784– 2011): Western Enterprise and Indian Response (2012).

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