Mantissa: Essays in Ancient Philosophy IV (Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 4) 0198709285, 9780198709282

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Mantissa Essays in Ancient Philosophy I V

JO N A T H A N BAR N E S ed ited b y M ad d alen a B o n elli

I Fa .-or no esarbir tii stihray r !os ti'iros y revistss fff:'*cio.s Sis:ema de Bibliotis..as Universi::!.d de !vs Andes

C L A R E N D O N P R E SS. O X F O R D

' Y-4·

C^RENDON PRESS. OXFORD Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries. © in this volume Jonathan Barnes 2015

Contents A cknowledgem ents P reface

vii ix

The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization, Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available

1. The size o f the sun in antiquity

1

2. Teaching virtue

21

3. Aristotle and political liberty

36

4. Cicero and the just war

56

5. Is rhetoric an art?

80

6. An Aristotelian definition o f comedy?

106

7. Plato’s three-parted soul

117

8. Aristotle’s concept o f mind

128

9. ‘Zeno says that the soul is a body ...’

142

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 978-0-19-870928-2 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CRO 4YY

10. a n im a C hristiana

163

11. Sensibility and the Stoics

182

12. Protagoras the atheist?

190

13. Ancient Plato

204

14. The Platonic lexicon ofTimaeus the Sophist

244

15. Antiochus ofAscalon

359

16. Roman Aristotle

*

40 7

17. The catalogue o f Chrysippus’ logical works

47 9

18. Cicero’s d e jato and a Greek source

495

19. Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrhonism

510

20. Nietzsche and Diogenes Laertius

584

C on ten ts 21. Pseudo-Clement and Greek philosophy

612

22. Menecles

63 7

23. Greek philosophy and the Victorians

653

Bibliography Index o f Passages G eneral Index

673 709 737

Acknowledgements The papers o f which the chapters in this volume are revised and sometimes translated versions first appeared in the following places. The editor and the author are grateful to those publishing houses who generously gave permis­ sion to use material w hich is in their copyright. 1. 2.

‘The size o f the sun in antiquity’. First published in A cta C lassica U niversitatis S cien tia ru m D eb recen sis 25, 19 89, 2 9 - 4 1 . ‘Teaching virtue’. First published in French: ‘Enseigner la vertu?’,

R evu e p h ilo so p h iq u e 4 , 1 9 9 1 , 5 7 1 - 5 8 9 . 3.

‘Aristotle and political liberty’. First published in G. Patzig (ed),

A ristoteles' ‘P o litik ’ (Gottingen, 19 9 0 ), p p .2 4 9 -2 6 3 . 4. 5. 6.

‘Cicero and the just w ar’. A version o f ‘C iciro n et la guerre juste’,

B u lletin d e la S o c ii t i fr a n fa i s e d e P h ilo so p h ie 80, 19 8 6 , 3 7 -8 0 . ‘Is rhetoric an art?’ First published in d a r g N e w s le tte r 2, 19 8 6 , 2 - 2 2 . ‘An Aristotelian definition o f comedy?’ A version o f ‘U ne definition aristotelicienne de la comedie?’, R evu e d e T h io lo g ie e t d e P h ilo so p h ie 13 2 , 2 0 0 0 , 2 1 - 3 0 .

7. 8. 9.

‘Plato’s three-parted soul’. First published in R h iz a i 4, 2 0 0 7 , 1 8 5 - 1 0 4 . ‘Aristotle’s concept o f m ind’. First published in PAS 7 2 , 19 7 2 , 10 1-114 . ‘ “Zeno says that the soul is a b od y ...” ’ Earlier versions o f this paper, which has n o t before been published, were given to audiences in Rome and in Budapest.

10.

‘a n im a C h ristia n a ’. First published in D. Frede and B. Reis (eds), B o d y a n d S o u l in A n cien t P h ilo so p h y (Berlin, 2 0 0 9 ), p p .4 4 7 -4 6 4 .

11.

‘Sensibility and the Stoics’. A version o f ‘La colere de Chrysippe’,

C ritiq u e 6 2 5 , 19 9 9 , 5 3 3 -5 4 2 . 12.

‘Protagoras the atheist?’ First published in H. LinneweberLammerskitten and G. M ohr (eds), I n ter p reta tio n u n d A rgu m en t (W iitzburg, 2 0 0 2 ), p p .1 1 -2 3 .

13.

‘Ancient Plato’. The three parts o f this piece first appeared as book reviews: ‘Philodemus and the O ld Academy’, A p eiron 22, 19 8 9 , 1 3 9 - 1 4 8 ; ‘T he Hellenistic Platos’, A p eiron 2 4 , 1 9 9 1 , 1 1 5 - 1 2 8 ; ‘Imperial Plato’, A p eiron 26, 19 9 3 , 1 2 9 - 1 5 1 .

viii 14 .

Acknowledgements ‘T he Platonic lexicon o f Timaeus the Sophist’. This piece is a version o f the introduction to M . Bonelli, T im e e l e S o p h iste: Lexique platonicien, Philosophia A ntiqua 10 8 (Leiden, 2 0 0 7 ), p p .1 -1 2 4 .

15.

‘Antiochus o f Ascalon’. First published in M. G riffin and J. Barnes (eds), P h ilo s o p h ia T o ga ta (Oxford, 19 8 9 ), p p .5 1 -9 6 .

16.

‘Roman Aristotle’. First published in J. Barnes and M. G riffin (eds), P h ilo s o p h ia T o g a ta I I (Oxford, 1996), p p .1 -6 0 . ‘The catalogue o f Chrysippus’ logical works’. First published in K.A. Algra, P .W . van der Horst, and D .T. Runia (eds), P o ly h isto r : s tu d ie s in

17.

18.

19.

Preface

This is the last o f four volumes o f E ssays i n A n c ie n t P h ilo s o p h y which collec­ tively contain most o f the things I have published on the subject over the last forty years and more. Pieces which were written for encyclopaedias and

th e h is to r y a n d h is to r io g r a p h y o f a n c i e n t p h ilo s o p h y p r e s e n t e d to J a a p

companions and the like have been excluded, and so too have most book reviews. I have suppressed one or tw o items which repeat or anticipate what

M a n s fd d o n h is six tieth b ir th d a y , Philosophia Antiqua 7 2 (Leiden, 19 96), p p .1 6 9 - 1 8 4 .

I have w ritten elsewhere — and also one or two items which no one w ill miss. T he papers have been assigned to volumes on thematic rather than on

‘Cicero’s d a fit t o and a Greek source’. First published in J. Brunschwig, C. Imbert, and A. Roger (eds), H is to ir e e t s tr u c tu r e : h la m im o ir e d e

chronological principles. But the theme o f a paper is, often enough, indeter­ minate or plural so that its assignment to one volum e rather than to another

V ictor G o ld s c h m id t (Paris 19 85), p p .2 2 9 -2 3 9 . ‘Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrhonism ’. First published in A N R W II 3 6 .6 (19 9 2 ), p p .4 2 4 1 - 4 3 0 1 . A n earlier version appeared under the title ‘Diogene Laerzio e il Pirronism o’ in E len ch o s 7, 19 8 6 , 3 8 3 -4 2 7 .

may be fairly arbitrary. (And the present volume, which might as well have

20.

‘Nietzsche and Diogenes Laertius’. First published in N ietz s ch e-S tu d ie n

21.

15 , 19 8 6 , 1 6 - 4 0 . ‘Pseudo-Clem ent and Greek philosophy’. A version o f ‘[Clement] et la philosophie’, in F. Amsler, A. Frey, C. Touati, and R. Girardet (eds),

been called O d d m e n ts or L e ft-o v er s , has no single theme.) Again, the papers are arranged w ithin each volum e prim arily according to the nature o f their subject-matter — though here chronology does play a part. N one o f the volumes has sufficient unity to constitute a book, the fourth least o f all. But each o f them (or so I like to persuade myself) hangs together in an informal sort o f fashion; and in any event, it is unlikely that any other arrangement w ould have offered m ore instruction or produced m ore amusement.

N o u v e lle s in t r ig u e s p s e u d o - c lim e n t in e s , Publications de l’Institut rom and ' des sciences bibliques 6 (Prahins, 2 0 0 8 ), p p .2 8 3 -3 0 2 .

Each o f the essays has been dusted down: I have, corrected misprints and other trivial errors where I have noticed them; I have eliminated a num ber

22.

‘Menecles’. A version o f ‘Pourquoi lire les anciens?’, L es P a p ie r s d u C o llo g e I n t e r n a t io n a l d a P h ilo s o p h ie 2, 19 9 0 , 1 - 2 9 . .

o f stylistic infelicities; and I have imposed a certain uniform ity on the mode o f reference to ancient texts and to m odern literature.

23.

‘Greek philosophy and the Victorians’. First published, by M .R.

H alf a dozen o f the pieces were originally w ritten and published in French. T hey have been Englished (and the translations are free). Citations from the

Stopper, in P h r o n es is 2 6 , 1 9 8 1 , 2 6 7 - 2 8 5 .

ancient authors, which in the original publications were sometimes in Greek or in Latin and sometimes in English, are now usually in English, the dead language being found (more often than not) at the foot o f the page. Several o f the papers have been revised, one or two o f them substantially: supplementary references to the ancient texts have occasionally been added, and so too have some references to the more recent scholarly literature (but I have made no attem pt — it would have been hopeless — to keep up with the vast amount o f stu ff which has been published since the essays first appeared). In a num ber o f places, a sentence or three has been added or subtracted o r transmuted, in the hope o f making an argument m ore cogent

x

xi

Preface

Preface

or less hazy. Occasionally a w hole paragraph has been reorganized in one way or another. O ne or tw o old paragraphs have been excised, and one o r two new ones inserted. But these revisions are neither uniform nor systematic. T he page-numbers o f the original publication are indicated w ithin square

political liberty. The next chapter, ‘Cicero and the just w ar’, turns to the branch o f politics now known as international relations. T ?e theory o f the

brackets and in a lighter type. Som e o f the original footnotes have been suppressed or incorporated into the text: those — the large m ajority —

been Christianized and then dechristianized, is still at the centre o f any thinking about the m orality o f war and o f wars.

which survive carry their original numbers. N ew notes are signalled by an asterisk or two, so that a sequence o f footnote markers sometimes looks dotty

C hapter 5, under the title ‘Is rhetoric an art?’, addresses a m atter to which several ancient thinkers devoted a surprising am ount o f attention. The

(all the better). Sim ilarly, reorganization has in one or tw o places disturbed the original order o f the pagination. References to ancient texts use abbrevia­

chapter analyses the principal arguments, p r o and co n tra , which they devised. Aristotle’s P o etics once had two books, the second o f which, now lost, dealt w ith comedy. A curious little docum ent (called by its friends the T racta tu s C oislin ian u s) consists o f a sequence o f short extracts from a Peripatetic

tions which I hope are perspicuous — and which in any event are explained in the Index o f Passages. References to m odern literature, which are collected in the Bibliography, are given in full on their first occurrence w ithin a chapter, and thereafter in a truncated form. The few abbreviations which are used throughout the volum e are explained at the start o f the Bibliography.

‘just ^war’, unknown to the Greek thinkers, is the only significant contribu­ tion made by the Romans to philosophy — a contribution which, having

account o f comedy: do the extracts derive, directly o r indirectly, from the lost

*****

Book o f the P o e tics ? Some scholars say Yes. Chapter 6 says No. Next, psychology. C hapter 7 analyses — and finds wanting — one part o f the argument which Plato elaborates in the R ep u b lic in favour o f the thesis

T he four volumes o f Essays w ould n o t have existed but for tw o people. Peter

that human souls have three ch ief parts to them. Chapter 8, on ‘Aristotle’s concept o f m ind’, attempts to set down clearly and concisely w hat seem to

M om tchiloff suggested, a decade and m ore ago, that I might like to collect some o f m y old papers. But for his discreet and persistent proddings and his

me to be the most significant features o f Aristotle’s controversial account o f animal souls. Chapter 9 moves on to the Stoics, discussing some o f the

generous and sympathetic encouragements nothing would ever have been done. M addalena Bonelli selflessly offered to act as a general editor. She undertook, w ith unflagging patience, the num erous and ungrateful tasks

problems — and in particular some o f the philological problems — raised by a celebrated syllogism which Zeno presented as a p ro o f that souls are

which are an editor’s lot. But for her frequent goad and her occasional carrot the w ork w ould never have been completed. ***** T he volum e starts w ith h a lf a dozen pieces on ethics and politics and aesthetics. Then there are some papers on souls. A n d the rest is prim arily o f

corporeal. T he syllogism is set out, not w ith out approval, byT ertullian in his d e A nima;, and ‘a n im a C h ristia n a ’ — C hapter 10 — examines some aspects ofT ertullian’s theory o f souls (which he too took to be corporeal). Souls are,

in te r alia, the hom e o f the emotions. The O ld Stoics urged that emotions, being false judgements, ought to be extirpated. Chapter 11 gently mocks that paradoxical opinion. The second h alf o f the book begins w ith a piece on Protagoras: Chapter

an historical and philological nature. , Chapter I, T h e size o f the sun in antiquity’, is concerned — as its title suggests — with a topic in Epicureanism where notions o f ethics and theories

12 considers the various ancient accounts o f the opening sentence o f his essay O n Gods, and pays particular attention to the version which Diogenes o f Oenoanda had chiselled into his vast Epicurean inscription. T he next two

o f natural science come together. Chapter 2, which starts out from a passage in Plato’s M en o, discusses a question which, from the time o f the Sophists

pieces concern Plato: Chapter 13 — stitched together from three book reviews — looks first at the account o f the O ld Academ y which appears in

onwards, engaged most ancient philosophers: C an men be taught to be good? Aristotle had a great deal to say about the art o r theory o f politics; but he is scarcely interested in the most pressing issue raised by that subject: Chapter

Philodemus’ A cadem ica , and then at the fo r t u n a o f the Platonic co rp u s in the Hellenistic age and under the early Empire; and Chapter 1 4 , on the Platonic lexicon o f Timaeus the Sophist, says something o f ancient lexicography

3 sets out — and criticizes — w hat can be discovered o f his attitude to

in general and something o f ancient Platonic scholarship in particular.

xii

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Preface

Chapter 15 turns to the syncretistic Platonist Antiochus o f Ascalon, and purports to offer a comprehensive account o f what is known about his life,

was read in the nineteenth century and has since disappeared. Chapter 2 2 is

■his writings, his philosophical position, and his general significance for the history o f ancient thought.

a punctilious com m entary on this curious little text. Finally, ‘Greek philosophy and the Victorians’ surveys the fortunes o f

Next, Aristotle: w hat was known about his views and w hat happened to his writings in the first two or three centuries after his death? and what occasioned the renascence o f Aristotelian philosophy at the end o f the m illen­

ancient philosophy in England during the reign o f the late Queen and Empress.

nium? The hero o f Chapter 16 is Andronicus o f Rhodes, Peripatetic scholarch and editor o f the Aristotelian co rp u s — and the chapter purports to demonstrate (among other things) that m odern scholarship has tended to ascribe a greater importance to his activities than the surviving evidence will countenance. The long and incomplete catalogue o f Chrysippus’ writings w hich Diogenes Laertius has preserved is in m any respects a puzzle: Chapter 17 first makes some general remarks about the nature and the origins o f the thing, and then offers a detailed analysis o f those sections o f it which are given to Chiysippus’ abundant logical works. Chapter

18 stays w ith

Chrysippus, and w ith his treatment o f the so-called Lazy Argument: after some general reflections on Cicero’s practices in his philosophical works, the chapter argues that in the d e f a t o Cicero gives us a close translation o f a piece o f Chrysippus. T he following tw o papers concern Diogenes Laertius and his L ives o f th e

P h ilosop h ers. Chapter 19 considers the chapters o f the L ives which are devoted to Pyrrho and Pyrrhonism. H ow good are they? H ow useful are they to us (given w hat we learn from other ancient texts)? W h at were Diogenes’ sources o f information, and how well did he exploit them? A n d how does he stand in relation to Sextus Empiricus? Chapter 2 0 takes up in m ore general terms the question o f Diogenes’ sources. It does so by looking at what Nietzsche had to say on the subject, both in his published papers and in his extensive N a ch lif;, for Nietzsche’s contribution to Laertian studies is greater than that o f any other scholar -— and greater than Nietzsche’s contribution to any other region o f thought. T he R eco gn itio n s or H o m ilies ascribed to Clem ent, an early bishop o f Rome, has been described as the first Christian novel. It contains a number o f pages in w hich pieces o f Greek philosophy are described, criticized, and occasionally praised. C hapter 2 1 examines those pages in an attem pt to discover how extensive and how profound a knowledge o f the subject they display. T he answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is: N ot very.

Menecles was a Pyrrhonist. He is known from an inscribed epitaph, which

ί

1 The size of the sun in antiquity* I T h e su n ’s rad iu s m easures 6 .9 6 x 1 0 10 cm , o r ab o u t 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 km . T h e su n is thus m o re th an one h u n d re d tim es th e size o f th e E arth , the radius o f w h ich is 6 .3 7 x 108 cm or 6 ,3 7 0 km . T h e figure for th e so lar rad iu s is stan d ard ly calcu lated b y trig o n o m etrical m eth o d s, an d d eriv ed from th e su n ’s estim ated distan ce from th e E arth, w h ich is ab o u t 1.5 x 1 0 B cm o r 150 m illio n k ilo m etres.i

II A cco rd in g to P to lem y, th e sun 's rad iu s is ap p ro x im ately 5.5 tim es th at o f th e E arth ( y n t V 16). H e d ed u ced h is figure, b y geo m etrical m eth o d s, from his figures for th e rad iu s o f th e m o o n an d for th e distances o f th e E arth from th e m o o n a n d from th e su n , thus:

* First published in Acta C/.asica Universitatis Scientiarum Debrecensis 25, 1989, 29-41. 1 I take this information from F.H . Shu, The Physical Universe (Mill Valley C A , 1982),

pp.83-84.

2

3

M antissa

The size o f the sun in antiquity

The triangles ESB and E M A are similar. Hence, given the distances ES, EM ,

much o f the w ork done by the G reek astronomers wwas neither ‘Platonic’, nor

and M A , it is a simple m atter to deduce SB, the radius o f the sun.2

superficial, and the existence and power o f astronomical theorems and proofs was fam iliar outside professional circles. Galen adduces such things as para­

Ptolem y’s calculations were the culm ination o f a series o f attempts by ancient astronomers to [30] w ork out the magnitudes o f the heavenly bodies. Archimedes, some centuries before Ptolem y, had remarked: I suppose the diameter of the sun to be thirty times the diameter of the moon and no greater, although among earlier astronomers Eudoxus states it to be nine times and my father Phidias twelve times, while Aristarchus tried to prove that the diam­ eter of the sun is more than 18 and less than 20 times the diameter of the moon (a ren 9)* A nd there was m uch w ork done between Archimedes and Ptolem y.3 Some o f the w ork was sloppy.45Some o f it hardly belongs to ‘real’ astronomy. Thus — to take a celebrated case — in his essay O n th e S izes a n d D ista n ces o f th e S un a n d th e M o or? Aristarchus explicitly bases his calculations on assumptions which he knew to be false. A reasonable inference is that he intended his essay as a contribution to what might be called ‘Platonic’ astronomy:6 ‘Aristarchus’ treatise on the sizes and distances is a purely m ath­ ematical exercise w hich has ... little to do w ith practical astronomy’.7 But

2 See G J. Toomer, Ptolemy'sAlmagest (London, 1984), pp.255-257.

* μ ετά δε ra ira τάν διάμετρον τού ά λίου τάς διαμέτρου TCi.S' σεληναζ Ws τριακονταπλασίαν είμεν Kal μ η μ είζονα, καίπερ τω ν προτερων άστρολάγων Ενδόξου μεν Ws Εννεαπλασίονα άποφαινομενου, Φειδία SE του άμοΰ π α -rpos Ws Sq δω δεκαπλασίαν, Ά ριστάρχου δε πεπειραμένου δεικνύειν ότι Εστιν ά διάμετρos του άλίου T&s διαμέτρου -riis σεληvas μείζων μεν η άκτω καιδεκαπλασίω ν, Ελάττων δε η είκοσαπλασίω ν. 3 See e.g. T. Heath, Aristarchus ofSamos (Oxford, 1913), pp.328-350; 0 . Neugebauer, AHistory o f Ancient Mathematical Astronomy (Berlin, 1985), pp.634-664. Neugebauer collects and discusses the different ancient estimates on pp.662-664. It should be said that the texts which record these figures are frequently corrupt (scribes were always liable to confuse numerals: see Galen, antidXlV 31-32), and that the authorswho report the estimates often have little understanding of what they report. 4 See below, n.16, on Posidonius. 5 Edited in Heath, Aristarchus. 6 See Rep 529C-530C for Plato’s insistence that astronomers should not look up at the sky; cf e.g. A.P.D. Mourelatos, ‘Plato’s “real” astronomy; RepublicVII.527D-53lD’, in J.P . Anton (ed), Science and the Sciences in Plato (New York NY, 1980), pp.33-73. 7 Neugebauer, History, p.643; cf G.E.R. Lloyd, The Revolutions ofW ufam (Berkeley CA, 1987), p.312. This view of Aristarchus first championed by Paul Tannery in 1883 — Heath found it ‘too ingenious’ (Aristarchus, p.311).

digm cases o f investigations successfully conducted by logical or demonstra­ tive methods (in s t lo g xii 3 -4 ) . Lufian, in the Ica ro m en ip p u s 1 - 2 , mocks the art o f celestial measurement. The ancient estimates are all wrong: they are all too small — by at least a factor o f 15.8 But the estimates were not bettered until the seventeenth century, and both Copernicus and Brahe accepted Ptolem y’s figures for the sun’s distance from the Earth. M oreover, the figures are o f roughly the right order o f magnitude (for they make the sun pretty vast in comparison with the Earth). Cleomedes observed that different men have affirmed different magnitudes for the sun, but none of the scien­ tists and astronomers has affirmed that it has a diameter smaller than the one I have reported. (II i 19 [152.2-5])* (He is referring to the figure o f 5 2 0 ,0 0 0 stades or 6.5 times the diameter o f the Earth.) M ore importantly, the figures and estimates are based on the self­ conscious application o f an appropriate scientific method: even i f they are wrong, they are wrong in the right way. [31]

III A stronom y began life as a part o f philosophy — o r rather, the early Greek philosophers regarded astronomical questions as part o f their remit. A nd we should expect that philosophers, in their capacity as φ υ σ ι κ ο ί or natural scientists, would edify us w ith their notions o f celestial dimensions. The late

8 See Neugebauer, History, p.634: 'It is not surprising that the early attempts at determining the size and distance of sun and moon in relation to the earth ended with wrong results. The ancient methods are of necessity based on trigonometric arguments in combination with visual estimates of very small angles and one naturally had the tendency to falsify such estimates in the wrong direc­ tion’ (i.e. to make the small angles too large). See in general G.E.R. Lloyd, 'Observational error in later Greek science’, i n j . Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M.F. Burnyeat, and M . Schofield (eds), Science and Speculation (Cambridge/Paris, 1982), pp.128-164.

* άλλοι άλλο μεγεθos περί τον ήλιον είναι άπεφηναντο, ονδεIs μεντοι τω ν φυσικών και άστρολόγω ν μείονα -r-rys πρoειpημενηs τη ν διάμετρον εχειν αΰτον άπεφηνατο.

4

5

M antissa

The size o f the sun in antiquity

doxographies transmit, in crude summary, the philosophers’ views about astronomical phenomena alongside their other thoughts, and they include a

in their role as natural scientists. A n d questions about th e magnitudes o f the heavenly bodies belong to the former branch o f the study.* The same divi­

section entitled ‘O n th e M agnitude o f th e Sun’.9 Y e tth is section is unusually and surprisingly short. Standardly, only four names are mentioned:

sion o f labour is implicit in Aristotle: for technical astronomical m atters he refers to the professionals — and specifically so for the question o f the magni­

Anaxim ander, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras — and Epicurus.10 W h y so? A healthy scepticism, perhaps? T he elder P liny, having purveyed

tude o f the sun (M eteo r A 3 4 5 b l - 3 V 2 The general point is plain and true. B y the middle o f the fourth century

garbled accounts o f various astronomical and meteorological estimates, comments thus: These things are not discovered and they cannot be disentangled: they are to be set out only because they have been set out. Yet in these matters geometrical argument, which is never fallacious, is the only method which cannot be rejected by anyone wanting to pursue such issues more deeply — in order to establish not a measure­ ment (to hanker for that is the sign of an almost deranged study) but rather a conjec­ tural guess. (N H II xxi 85)* Pliny’s scepticism might have commended itself. T h e astronomers did not agree am ong themselves, and occasionally made m ild ly sceptical comments on their own art.” A cautious philosopher m ight think that the whole busi­ ness should be avoided. But a better explanation fo r the philosophers’ silence is to hand. T he Stoics distinguished two parts w ith in that subdivision o f φ υ σ ι κ ή w hich concerns the universe: one part is the province o f the μ α θ η μ α τ ι κ ο ί or o f the technical astronomers, and the other is the province o f the φ υ σ ι κ ο ί or o f philosophers

’ See [Plutarch], p la c890C; [Galen], histphilXIX 276; Eusebius, PEXV xxiv 1-4; Stobaeus, eel I txxv (lc, Ig, 3e, 3f); Theodoretus, cur IV 22: cf H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin, 1879), pp.351-352. 10 [Galen] omits Heraclitus; Theodoretus adds Empedocles; Stobaeus substitutes Empedocles for Anaxagoras. Elsewhere, solar measurements are also ascribed to Thales (Diogenes Laertius, I 24) and to Archelaus (ibid, II 17). * incomperta haec et inextricabilia sed prodenda quia sunt prodita. in quis tamen una ratio geometricae collectionis numquam fallacis possit non repudiari si cui libeat altius ista persequi, nec ut mensura — id enim velle paene dementis otii est — sed ut tantum aestimatio coniectandi constet animo. 11 'It is not easy to grasp these things with accuracy; for neither the eyes nor the hands nor the instruments with which we must grasp them are reliable guarantees of accuracy’ (Archimedes, aren 11). The Delphine editor of Lucretius, Michel le Fay, listed (in 1680) twenty different estimates of the size of the sun, from Heraclitus to Kepler: tot ac tam diversae sunt opiniones de magnitudine sidernm ut vix aliquid certi de ea quis habeat (note on V 565).

bc , mathematical astronom y had become a technical discipline in its

own right. It had ceased to be a part o f philosophy, and philosophers no longer claimed any special expertise in the matter. The magnitude o f the sun was not a philosophical question. Philosophers w ould, o f course, be happy to affirm that the sun was ‘larger than the Earth’. 13 But the scientific questions — the serious, precise questions — belonged to the professionals. Arid there the m atter m ight happily have rested. T he philosophers had business enough o f their own. T hey could let the astronomers w orry about the measuring o f the heavens. [32]

IV But there were at least two notable exceptions to this established division o f labour: th e Stoic philosopher Posidonius w rote at some length about th e size o f the sun, Mand the Epicureans — though in general th ey had little time for the details o f natural science — bravely maintained a heterodox view about

* See Diogenes Laertius, VII 132; Seneca, ep l^xxviii 27; Simplicius, in Phys 291.21-292.31 [= Posidonius, frag 18 Edelstein-Kidd]. " See also e.g. CaelB291a29-32; 298al5-20; Meteor A 339b30-36; and esp Met A 1073b1017. For the distinction between philosophers and astronomers see also R. Goulet, Cliomtde: Theorie Mmentaire (Paris, 1980), p.39 n.31, with references. 13 For Aristotle, see Meteor A 345b1^3; An I' 428b4; for the Stoics, e.g. Diogenes Laertius, VII 144; Seneca, nat quaest I iii 10. Note that Cleomedes, despite the various calculations he records, is content to say that the sun is σχεδόν άπ ειρο μ ΐγόθ η ?. II i 19 [152.7-9]; cfII i 4 [126.18-20], 16 [142.12-15]. 14 See Diogenes Laertius, VII 144 (referring to Book VII of Posidonius’ lle p l φ ύ σ ΐω s); Cleomedes, I xi 9 [116.27-118.6]; Macrobius, in Cic somn ScipI xx 8-10 [= Posidonius, frag 9, 19, 116] (on the Cleomedes text see below n.28). It is disputed whether Posidonius wrote a separate work on the subject, as Cleomedes affirms (ίδια . .. 1re p l μόνου τούτου [sc the size of the sun] συντά γμα τα : I xi 9 [118.4-5]), or whether his remarks on the topic formed a section in some larger book.

6

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The size o f the sun in antiquity

the magnitudes o f the heavenly bodies. The two exceptions are not uncon­ nected: our chief source for Posidonius’ views is a passage in Cleomedes’

It is often said that, according to Epicurus, the sun is about one foot in diameter. For the sun’s apparent diameter is equal to its real diameter, and

E lem en ta ry T heory/ which stitches together a patchwork o f arguments against the Epicurean theory o f the magnitude o f the sun. It m ay be that a large part

its apparent diameter — so the ancients agreed20 — is about one foot. But in fact no Epicurean text states that the solar diameter is one foot. Cicero says that Epicurus ‘perhaps (fo(fortasse]’ took the sun to be a foot across (jin I vi 20) — w hich suggests he was m aking an inference or a guess. Cleomedes, alone

o f Posidonius’ argument consisted in an attack on the Epicurean view, and it is possible that his m otive for approaching the topic was less a professional interest in astronom y1516 than a desire to refiite — and ridicule — the Epicureans. Cleomedes introduces the Epicurean view in the following brisk fashion: Epicurus and most members ofhis sect stated that the sun is the size it appears: they relied on its actual appearance to sight, and made this the criterion of its magnitude. (II i I [120.7-11])* N umerous texts iterate the report.17 But we need not rely on secondary authors. Epicurus him self states the position clearly enough: As to the magnitude of the sun and the other heavenly bodies, in relation to us it is as great as it appears ... and in itself it is either greater than what is seen or a little smaller or the same size. (ad P yth 9 1)18

among our sources, asserts w ith out qualification that the Epicurean sun measures a foot in diam eter (II i 4 [12 8 .12 ]); but even Cleom edes’ [33 ] ascription is not explicit.21 T hat is surprising in a tradition which is always ready to m ock the Epicureans; and it suggests that no Epicurean committed him self to the determinate view that the sun is (about) a foot across. Thus the Epicureans held that the actual size o f the sun was the same as its apparent size, whatever that apparent size m ight be. T hey were not committed to any particular figure; and, in principle at least, they could have countenanced an enormous sun. Yet we should not be enthralled by such a speculation. Lucretius explicitly refers to the sun as ‘very small [ tan tu lu s]’ 591); and it is clear that the Epicureans were concerned to maintain that the sun was o f very m odest proportions in comparison to the Earth.

T he passage is echoed by Lucretius: nec nimio solis maior rota nec minor ardor esse potest nostris quam sensibus esse videtur. 0 1 56 4-565),19 T he sun is in reality m ore or less the size it appears to be.

15 For the correct title see Goulet, Cllomide, p.35 n.1. The date of the work is uncertain: see Goulet, pp.5-8 (rejecting the account in Neugebauer, History, p.960, who had argued seductively for a date of 370 ad plus or minus 50 years). As to the nature and status of Cleomedes' work, Goulet’s reference to the Reader's Digest (p.11) is not far from the mark. 16 Posidonius’ astronomical capacities have been variously assessed. Neugebauer is savage: ‘Posidonius’ attempts ... to determine the size of rhe sun are rather naive and make it difficult to understand that his astronomy was not ridiculed by authors like Cicero or Pliny who pretend to know the work of Hipparchus’ (History, p.655).

* Έ πίκoυρos SE Kal o l π ο λ λ ο ί τ ω ν τή ς a ip la e w s τ η λ ικ ο υ το ν Είναι τον ήλιον ά π ίφ ή ν α ν τ ο ή λ ί ^ φ α ίν ίτ α ι, αυτή TfJ δια τή ς otjJews φ α ντα σ ίψ ά κ ολου θ ή σα ντΐς κ α ί τ α ύ τη ν τοΰ μeγΕ θovs α ν το υ κ ρ ιτή ρ ιον π o ιη σ ά μ ev o ι. 17 See Cicero, fin I vi 20; Lucxxv/i 82; and the doxographers referred to above, n.9. 18 For the whole text see below, p.42. 15 'Nor can the sun's orb nor its heat be much greater or less ...': so C. Bailey, Lucretius: de rerum natura (Oxford, 1947), p.1410. Other scholars have seen a hendiadys in 'rota (et) ardor', or have emended 'ardor'. I find Bailey's translation hard to swallow.

V Epicurus did not imagine that his view about the sun would pass uncriti­ cized, and he hoped to forestall the opposition: And every objection to this point will readily be dissolved ifyou attend to the evident facts, as we show in the books On Nature, (ad Pyth 91)*

20 See e.g. Aristotle, An /’ 428b3—4; lnsomn 460b18-20; Cicero, Lucm/i 82; Cleomedes, I xi 9 [118.2]; and the texts collected by Marcovich in his commentary on Heraclitus B 3 DK: M. Marcovich, Heraclitus (Merida, 19 67 [Sankt Augustin, 20002]), pp.307—309. 21 He begins by reporting that Epicurus took the actual diameter to be the same as the apparent diameter; a few pages later he has slipped into talking of a diameter of one foot. He does not explicitly state that the Epicureans committed themselves to that figure, and I suspect that he has ascribed it to them without thinking.

* κ α ι π α ν SE το e l s τ ο ΰ το το μΕρος Ενστημα pq,Siws δ ια λ υ θ ή σ ΐτ α ι Εάν τ ις τοis Ε ναργήμασι προσΕχη, oTTep Εν n t s 7re p l rpVaews β ιβ λ ίο υ δeίκ vvμ ev.

8

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T he reference is to Book XI o f Epicurus’ I J e p i φ ύ σ ε ω ς , in which he explained and defended his astronomical theories and attempted to refute rival astronomical methods. Enough fragments o f the Book survive to enable us to see something o f its general character — and to learn that it attacked the technical pretensions o f the Eudoxan school o f astronomers.22 B ut the magnitude o f the sun is not directly alluded to in the papyrus remains. Despite Epicurus’ confidence, objections continued to be made — indeed, his view about the sun was rejected and reviled. A n d in turn it was defended by his later followers. Scholars have thought to reconstruct a part o f the debate. There are three main sources: first, the text in Cleomedes which paraphrases some Posidonian arguments against the Epicurean position; secondly, a passage in the papyrus remains o f Philodemus’ w ork O n S ign s which preserves an argument by the Stoic Dionysius o f Cyrene against the Epicureans and a reply to his argument elaborated by the Epicurean scholarch, Zeno o f Sidon;23 thirdly, another Herculaneum papyrus24 which contains fragments o f a work, generally ascribed to Demetrius o f Laconia,25 which likewise rebuts objections to the Epicurean view o f the sun. Thus in the second h a lf o f the second century bc — so the story goes — there was a vigorous cut and thrust. Dionysius attacked Epicurus’ heterodox ideas. Zeno defended the Master against [34] Dionysius. Posidonius counter­ attacked, attempting to rebut Zeno. A n d Demetrius in turn tried to over­ throw the arguments o f Posidonius.26 T he story is seductive — but it is short on evidence. 22 PHerc 154 and 1042, printed as frag [26] inG . Arrighetti (ed), Epicuro: Opere (Turin, 1973); see D.N. Sedley, 'Epicurus and the mathematicians of Cyzicus’, Cronache Ercolartesi6, 1976,23-54 (with a new text of certain columns). Further bibliography in M . Gigante, Catalogo eki Papiri Ercolanesi (Naples, 1979), pp.239-241. On the relation between Fie pi φ ύσεω ς XI and adPyth see Arrighetti, Epicuro, pp.691-705. 23 See IX 38-X I 8 (text in P.H . and E.A. de Lacy, Philodemus: OnMethods o f Inference (Naples, 1978)). On Zeno see A. Angeli and M . Colaizzo, ‘I ftammenti di Zenone Sidonio’, Cronache Ercolanesi % 1979, 47-132. 14 PHerc 1013, edited by C . Romeo, 'Demetrio Iacone sulla grandezza del sole (PHerc 1013)’, Cronache Ercolanesi^, 1979, 11-35. See also W . Cronert, Kolotes undM enedemos (1-eipzig, 1906), pp.100, 114-115; V. de Falco, L'epicureo Demetrio Lacone (Naples, 1923), pp.61-65. For further bibliography see Gigante, Catalogo, pp.223-224. 25 On Demetrius see C. Romeo and E. Puglia, ‘Demetrio Iacone’, in A A .W ., ΣΥΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ: stu d i... offerli a Marcello Gigante (Naples, 1983), pp.529-549. T. Dorandi, 'Ddmitrios Lacon’, DPhAU, pp.637-641. 26 See Romeo, 'Demetrio Iacone’, p. 16 n.37 — the story derives from Robert Philippson.

The size o f the sun in antiquity

9

It is certain that Zeno defended the Epicurean view against Dionysius — but it is n o t clear that the main point o f this debate was the magnitude o f the sun. O n the contrary, Dionysius and Zeno were disputing about a m atter o f logic and epistemology — about the soundness o f the so-called ‘similarity m ethod’ o f sign-inference.27 The case o f the sun’s magnitude provided a convenient and controversial illustration. Again, it is not evident that Posidonius was attacking Zeno: he fired a broadside at the Epicureans, but we need not infer that he was attacking a particular ship in the course o f a prolonged naval engagement. (Nor, it should be stressed, can we tell how much o f Posidonius is preserved by Cleomedes and in how pure a form .28) Finally, the Herculaneum papyrus is not certainly assignable to Demetrius,29 nor — m ore im portantly — does it certainly attack Posidonius. Posidonius is not named, and the allusions to him w hich some scholars sniff are dubious.30 T he papyrus does indeed name one adversary. H e was called D io (if the text

27 See ]. Barnes, ‘Epicurean signs’, OSAP suppt I (Oxford, 1988), pp.91-134 [reprinted in volume 3, pp.307-354]. 28 Cleomedes refers explicitly to Posidonius at I xi 9 [118.5-6] as one of his sources for the discussion of the size of the sun which occupies II i-ii (note the further references at II i 3 [124.20], 17 [144.18]); and at the end of the work he mentions Posidonius as his chief source for the whole matter (II vii 2 [228.4]: the authenticity of this sentence has been doubted — but see Goulet, Cliomide, pp.15, 44—45 n.127). It is plain that Cleomedes does not quote Posidonius. It is plain that he frequendy uses him. In the few places where Cleomedes gives explicit supplemen­ tary references we can ascribe particular lines of thought to Posidonius. But on the whole we must be content with the vague and disappointing notion that a given section may well reflect Posidonian ideas. 25 Romeo, ‘Demetrio Iacone’, p. 12, accepts the ascription to Demetrius, relying on the argu­ ments ofCronert, Kolotes, pp. 100-101. The arguments are frail, to say the least; and I think it more prudent to treat the text as anonymous. 30 Romeo in effect offers three reasons: (1) the fragmentary column VI adverts to the powers of the sun and to providence, and this ‘certainly refers to Stoic objections, taken up by Posidonius’ (p.22). (For the Stoic praise of the sun’s powers see the ‘hymn to the sun’ in Cleomedes, II i 20-23 [152.26-156.30]; but note Goulet’s*doubts {CUomide, p .2 13 n.269) about the Posidonian origins of the hymn.) It is plain that there is no need to invoke Posidonius here: the objections were surely a commonplace. (2) At XVII 3 we read ‘if anyone [n s ] is vexed th a t...’ (text below, n.31): Romeo inclines to identify the n s with Posidonius (p.25). But ‘n s ’ is indefinite. (3) In column XX (quoted below, n.36) the author ‘cites Posidonius’ syllogism faithfully’ (p.28). Certainly, the author states explicidy an argument, doubtless of Stoic provenance, which we also find in Qeomedes. But I do not think that anything warrants the specific thesis that the author is here citing Posidonius (there are, evidendy, several other possibilities). — I do not deny that PHerc 1013 specifically reacted to Posidonius; I claim that we do not have enough evidence to assert that it does.

10

M antissa

is right), and he probably wrote one or tw o books.3132W e have no idea who this D io was.32 [35] But none o f that matters much. For whatever the historical details, it is plain that there was, in the second century b c , a lively and polemical discus­ sion o f the Epicurean theory on the magnitude o f the sun. It w ould be laborious to comb through all three o f the main texts. It might also seem footling. For surely Epicurus’ view was silly?33 W h y did not the

The size o f the sun in antiquity

11

Column ^XII came at the end of the work: These w ere the lectures I gave when I undertook the task of briefly rehearsing the defence to what is said against the senses; and since you, m y dear friend, wished ... ( X I I 1 -8 )34 The work, then, contained a summary account o f the ways in w hich the

later Epicureans candidly adm it that Epicurus’ conjecture had been mistaken

Epicureans defended the veridicality o f the senses: it w ill presumably have set out the standard arguments against the reliability o f the senses, and have

and welcome the advances made by the professional astronomers? W hat, after all, did it matter to Epicureanism how large the sun really was? W ell, I shall look briefly at three o f the surviving columns o f PH erc 1 0 1 3 . T hat w ill

attempted to rebut them. The surviving columns deal w ith questions about the distance and magni­ tude o f the sun.35 C olum n reports and rejects a particular argument used

serve to illustrate some facets o f the ancient debate — and it m ay also indi­

by the Epicureans’ opponents:

cate to w hat extent the Epicurean account o f the sun was an adventitious idiocy, a wart on the fair face o f their philosophy.

‘Everything which appears is; b u t the sun appears stationary: therefore the sun is stationary.’ W e shall say here what we said earlier: the sun does not seem stationary — it is thought to seem stationary ... (^ X 1-9)36 [36]

VI PHerc 1 0 1 3 consists o f twenty-two fragm entary columns, o f w hich eight or ten are m ore or less readable. B ut w e never have a consecutive text o f more than ten lines, and all interpretation o f this papyrus must be tentative.

T he argument w hich the papyrus quotes is found, in almost the same form , among the cento o f Epicurean arguments in Cleomedes: If it is the size it appears, then it is such as it appears. Since it actually appears stationary, it w ill be changeless. But it is not motionless or changeless. Hence it is not the size it appears. (II i 7 [130.13-17])* T hus the opponents argued as follows:

31 See XVII 3-11: Aeiav δΕ tis άγα να κ τώ ν e l LI ίω να λEγoμev [€ 11 t τ]οσ ουτον ήμαρτ[ηκΕ ν]αι, β λ ε π ίτ ω [oa' Εστιν] Εν Tf)eyfavro· και ο μ εν τις αυτών είπε· π ο ύ οόν εύρησει τούτου διδάσκαλον; I7Tep τ ι κα'ι άλλο

και τούτο μαθητάν. 6 It is the subject of the sixth section ofthe .cl ίσσ οι λόγοι, a text which is usually dated to about 400 bc (but which some suspect to be a much later composition). 7 διδακτήν άπεδείκνυΕ την αρΕτην: Diogenes Laertius, VI 10.

‘T hat men d on’t become good by learning’.10 Isocrates took a similar line: I believe that an art which might produce temperance and justice in those who by nature are ill-disposed toward virtue does not exist and never has existed — and that those who make promises about such things will give up and end their babbling before any such sort of education is discovered. (antid 274)* The question did not go away: Aristotle discussed it, and he took the negative line (introducing a nuance or tw o along the w ay).n T he Stoics, on the other hand, took the positive road: Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Posidonius, Hecaton — all are said to have maintained that virtue can be taught. 12 C an virtue be taught? T he question was pondered by Socrates and by Plato and by Isocrates and by Aristotle and by the Stoics, and it was taken to be a poser. T he Master o f Balliol, on the other hand, thought that no-one need bother his head about it any more. W as Jow ett right? W as the question once difficult and now easy? O r was it always easy? O r is it still difficult?

II The answer depends, o f course, on w hat exactly the question is taken to mean. M eno’s question, which starts things o ff in the M en o, is put like this in the Greek: ά ρ α δ ι δ α κ τ ό ν ή α ρ ε τ ή ; (7 0 A ). W h at did Meno w ant to know? I shall say nothing about the w o rd ‘α ρ ε τ ή ’; [574] fo r there is no uncertainty about w hat it means. (There is an unanswerable question about the best way to translate it into m odern English.) Rather, it is the word ‘δ ι δ α κ τ ό ς ’ which merits a mom ent’s reflection. 8 αρεσκΕΐ δ ’ aΰτάΐs και την αρετην διδακτήν είναι, καθά φησιν Άvτισθεvηs Εν 74) Ήρακλει, και αναπόβλητον ύπάρχΕιν: Diogenes Laertius, VI 105. 9 περί αρετής ότι ου διδ α κτόν :‘Diogenes Laertius, II 122. 10 ότι ουκ Εκ τού μαθεΐν οι άγαθοί: Diogenes Laertius, II 121. * ή γοΰμαι SE τοιαύτην μΕν τέχνην η τις τ ά ΐs κακώ s πεφυκόσιν πpόs άρετην σωφροσύνην Ενεργάσαιτ’ αν καί δικαιοσύνην οΰ-re πρότερον ούτε νΰν ουδεμίαν είναι, τάύs te ra s ύποσχεσεις πάlάυμ€vάυs περι αυτών πρότερον άπερειν καί παύσεσθαι ληpάΰvτas πρίν Εύρεθηναί τινα παιδείαν τοιαύτην. — cf advsoph21. 11 See ENB 1103a14-l 7; c f M.F. Burnyeat, 'Aristotle on learning to be good', in A.E. Rorty (ed), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley c A, 1980), pp.69-92. 12 Diogenes Laertius, VII 91. — For a much later consideration of the matter see Clement, Strom I vi 34-35.

24

τ

25

M antissa

Teaching virtue

T he adjective derives from the verb ‘δ ιδ ά σ κ ε ιν ’ w ith the aid o f the ending ‘- τ ο ς ’. T he ending, very com m on in classical G reek,13 introduces an ambi­ guity:14 an adjective o f the form ‘V - r o s ’ m ay mean either ‘V -ed’ or ‘capable o f being V -ed ’. The ambiguity was remarked upon in antiquity: Galen, for

If something — whatever it might be: not just virtue — is Si8aKT6V, then mustn’t there be teachers o f it and learners? (89D)*

example, notes that ‘α ι σ θ η τ ό ς ’ m ay mean either ‘perceived’ or ‘perceptible’ ( d i f f p u l s V III 7 1 0 ); and Aristotle — in a passage which I shall shortly cite — says something similar about ‘ά φ θ α ρ τ ο ς ’. So 'δ ιδ α κ τ ό ς ’ w ill mean either ‘taught’ or ‘capable o f being taught’. A nd w hen M eno asks w hether virtue is δ ιδ α κ τ ό ν he m ay be asking w hether it is actually taught or w hether it is capable o f being taught. W h ich o f the tw o questions does M eno intend to ask? Jow ett opts for the second, and so do most o f the com m entators16 — that is w hy I have thus far translated ‘δ ιδ α κ τ ό ς ’ by speaking o f w hat can be taught o r is capable o f being taught. B ut th e text does n o t uniform ly support the orthodox transla­ tion. Here are two out o f several pertinent passages. First, the opening words o f the dialogue, which ask a disjunctive question: Can you tell me, Socrates, if virtue is 8i8aK-r6v? or is it not 8i8aK-r6v but rather ασκητόν? or is it perhaps neither α σ κ η τ ό ν nor μ a θ η τ 6 v but rather comes to men by nature or in some other manner? (70A)* [575] T he indicative, ‘com es to [ π α ρ α γ ιγ ν ε τ α ι] ’ indicates a fact and not a possi­ bility, and since ‘δ ιδ α κ τ ό ν ’ is on a par w ith ‘π α ρ α γ ιγ ν ε τ α ι’ it too ought to indicate a fact rather than a possibility, to m ean ‘taught’ rather than ‘capable o f being taught’. A fter all, the question ‘Is virtue teachable or does it come by nature?’ offers a false choice insofar as the two options do not exclude one another. Secondly, just before his discussion w ith Anytus, Socrates says this:

13 See C.D. Buck and W. Peterson, A Reverse Index to Greek Nouns andAdjeciives (Chicago IL, 1945), pp.469-529. “ cfJ. Barnes, The Toils ofScepti^m (Cambridge, 1990), pp.17-19. 16 So e.g. E.S. Thompson, The Meno ofPlato (London, 1901), p.59 - - who says that ‘- r o s ’ is equivalent to '-bilis, and that if ‘V-ros' is sometimes used to mean ‘V-ed’, that is only because people tend to overlook the difference between what is and what can be; Bluck, Meno, p.200, who notes the ambiguity and comes down in favour of ‘teachable’; R.W. Sharpies, Plato: Meno (Warminster, 1985), who translates by ‘teachable’ without discussion. * E'xeis fio i eiT eiv, W >T w K pares, dpa 8i8aKrov 0 aperr); η ov διδακτόν άλλ’ άσκ ητόν; η oVre α α κ η ^ ν oVre μ a θ η ro v ά λ λ α φύαει 1Ta ρ a γ ίγ ν era ι Tots άνθρω πο is η α,λλψ n v i rpόπq.>;

T he question expects the answer ‘Yes’, which it receives in a cautious form: ‘I th in k so’. Plainly, i f something is capable o f being taught, it doesn’t follow that there are teachers o f it. ^ δ ι δ α κ τ ό ν ’ here means ‘teachable’, then the discussion w ith Anytus starts out from something which is pretty evidently false.2i Perhaps in those passages, and one or tw o others, ‘δ ιδ α κ τ ό ν ’ means ‘taught’ whereas elsewhere in the M en o it means ‘capable o f being taught’? Perhaps. But to suppose that the sense o f the w ord oscillates does Plato and his argument little credit: better conclude that M eno is n o t w ondering w hether virtue is capable o f being taught, w hether it is possible to teach someone to be virtuous. So is he wondering whether virtue is in fact taught (in Thessaly and else­ where)? That is an empirical question, a sociological question. Some people are virtuous: did they become so by being taught or from some other cause? There is, to be sure, a sociological dimension to the M en o. (Notably in the discussion w ith Anytus.) But empirical questions are not philosophical, and it is difficult not to think that the M en o is prim atily concerned w ith philosophy. [576] A t this point it is w o rth remembering what Aristotle says in the T opics about the w ord ‘ά φ θ α ρ τ ο ς ’. He suggests that it has three senses, not two: Being now a6ap-rov is ambiguous: it means either that now it has not perished or that it can’t perish now or that it is now the sort o f thing that won’t ever perish. (Z

l45b24-27)** I f we set aside the complications w hich the negative prefix ‘α -’ and the w ord ‘now ’ introduce, and i f w e generalize the case, then we shall discover three senses for adjectives o f the form ‘V - r o s ’. T he first two senses — ‘V -ed ’ and ‘V -able’ — are already familiar. The third is ‘such as to be V -ed’. If, in the M en o , ‘δ ιδ α κ τ ό ς ’ doesn’t mean ‘teachable’, perhaps it doesn’t mean ‘taught’ either: perhaps it means ‘such..as to be taught’.

* τόθ€ γ α ρ μοι et, Earιν οιοα κ τον o rio vv π ρ α γ μ α , μ η μόνον aper^, oυκ α ν α γ κ α tov α υ το ύ κ α ί 8i8aaKcl\ovs κ α ι μ a θ η rά s είναι; 21 Bluck, Meno, pp.342-343, and Sharples, Meno, p.168, try to justify ‘teachable’ here — but their explanations are, I think, contrived. ** ά μ φ ίβ o λ ov γ α ρ r o ννν α φ θ α ρ ^ ν ε ίν α ι· η γ α ρ o r i oυκ εφ θα ρτα ι ννν σ η μ αίνει, η ό τ ι oU 8 ύ va ra ι φ θαρήναι ννν, η S ri r o ιo ν r ό v ε α π ννν o! ov μ η 8 επ ore φ θαρήναι.

26

27

M antissa

Teaching virtue

W h at is the difference between ‘such as to be V -ed ’ on the one hand and ‘V -ed ’ and ‘V -able’ on the other? In Book LI o f the M e teo ro lo g ica Aristotle sets out to distinguish among different kinds o f homogeneous stuffs. He

luck o r divine dispensation — play chess w ithout ever having learned the game. Nonetheless, competence at chess is as a m atter o f fact taught and so is ό ι ό α κ τ ό ν in one sense, and it is also the sort o f thing which is acquired by being taught, and so is δ ι δ α κ τ ό ν in a second sense too. Is virtu e the sort o f thing that is taught? That, I think, is the question

makes the distinctions w ith the help o f a group o f words o f the form ‘V - r o s ’. Every stu ffis either π η κ τ ό s or α π η κ τ ο ς , either τ η κ τ ό ς or ά τ η κ τ ο ς , either μ α λ α κ τ ό ς or α μ ά λ α κ τ ο ς , and so on ... (LI 3 8 5 a l 1 - 1 9 ) . W hen Aristotle

M eno was asking. The question is not empirical but philosophical — for the

says that copper is τ η κ τ ό ς , he means to say something about the nature o f the metal: copper is a stuff w hich is naturally subject to melting — it is such

answer depends on the nature o f virtue, and the nature o f virtue (if there is such a thing) is an object o f philosophical research. Socrates insists that, in

as to melt, it is the sort o f thing w hich melts. He doesn’t mean' that some lumps o f copper actually do m elt from time to time: he is not referring to w hat has happened or w ill happen, and w hat he says w ould be true even if — by chance or the decree o f Zeus — no piece o f copper ever melted.

order to tackle the question, we need to inquire into the nature o f virtue. I f w e were asking whether in fact virtue is acquired b y teaching, such an inquiry

Equally, he doesn’t mean that copper can be melted, th at it is possible that copper melt. (Though what he says no doubt implies that copper ^ be

would be superfluous. I f I wonder whether Lux really makes m y hands beautifixl, I have no need to inquire into the chemical constitution o f that celebrated soap.* [578]

melted.) A fter all, it is possible for lumps o f copper to be burned — the hypothesis o f such a happening contains no impossibility. But the possibility does not establish that [577] copper is κ α υ ο τ ό ς or such as to be burned. For it does not refer to the nature o f copper.24* T urn back to teaching. No doubt human infants start to walk by nature: they are determined by nature — by their human nature — to get up on their legs an d shuffle along. W alking comes by nature: it is n o t ό ιό α κ τ ό ν , it is not the sort o f thing w hich is acquired by teaching. O f course, it is possible for a child to be taught to walk, and for all I know some impatient parents m ay anticipate nature and teach their offspring to walk. W alking is ό ιό α κ τ ό ν in the sense o f being teachable. It is not ό ι ό α κ τ ό ν in the sense o fb ein g such as to be taught. Chess-playing, on the other hand, is not something w hich is norm ally acquired without being taught. T o be sure, a prodigy might — by

III The adjective ‘ δ ι δ α κ τ ό ς ’ comes from the verb ‘δ ι δ ά ο κ ε ι ν ’, ‘teach’. It is an everyday verb, and Plato offers no definition. But he does say something about w hat he takes teaching to be. Socrates explains to Anytus that we have been considering for some time whether virtue is taught; and in doing so what we have been considering is this: have good men, both now and in the past, known how to hand over to others the virtue by which they themselves are good, or is virtue not handed over to a man nor passed from one to another? That is the question which Meno and I have been inquiring into. (93B)** So teaching is a sort o f transmission: i f I teach you something, then I hand to you what I m yself already possess.

24 Take the formulas: (1) x is V-ed (2) x is such as to be V-ed (3) x can be V-ed (1) implies (3) but does not imply (2); (2) implies (3) but does not imply (1); and (3) implies neither (1) nor (2). — The Stoics hold that some sorts of syllogism are α ν α π όδεικ το ι. According to Sextus (PH II 156; M V III 223), they mean that the syllogisms don't need to be proved. It’s not that the syllogisms can't be proved (some at least of them can be — Galen, inst /ogviii 2); nor that people don't in fact prove them (logicians aren't interested in matters of that sort). Rather, the syllogisms are α να π ό δ εικ το ι insofar as they are such as not to be proved, insofar as their logical or epistemo­ logical nature neither requires nor invites a proof.

* I hold that, in the Meno, ‘διδακτό ?' means 'such as to be taught': I do not hold that translators ought to use that cumbersome expression, and were I Englishing Plato I should follow the other translators and use either 'teachable' or 'taught' or both: 'Copper melts' is a normal English way of saying that copper is such as to, melt, and 'Acacia is splittable’ expresses the notion that acacia is such as to be split. — A. Croiset, Platon: ThMtite (Paris, 1923), generally gives ‘δ ιδα κτό ?' by way of's'enseigner'; and that seems to me to do the job very well. M. Lamy, my local wine-merchant, used to have a sign on his door reading: Un bon vin s’achfcte chez un bon caviste. ** Ei διδ α κ τό ν εσ τιν αρετή π άλαι σκοπ οΰμ εν. τ ο ύ το δ€ σκ οπ ούντε? τόδε σκοποΰμεν,

&ρα ο ι α γ α θ ο ι ανδρ€? κ α ι τω ν νυν κ α ι τω ν π ροτερω ν τ α υ τ η ν τ η ν α ρετή ν ην α ν το ι ά γ α θ ο ι ή σ α ν ή π ίσ τα ν τ ο κ α ι α λ λ φ π αραδοΰναι, η ον π α ρ α δ ο το ν τ ο ύ το άνθρώ πφ ονδε π α ρα λη π τον άλλια π α ρ ’ άλλου· τ ο ΰ τ ' εστιν ο π ά λ α ι ζη τοΰ μ εν εγώ τε κ α ι Μενων.

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Socrates: And if virtue is a kind of knowledge, plainly it’s taught.

T hat is a narrow conception o f teaching. Com mentators sometimes claim that there is also a broader conception present in the M en o. In order to teach you something according to the broader conception, it is enough that I produce something in you, by some appropriate method, even i f th e thing I

Teaching and knowledge are spliced together.

produce in you is not anything which I possess myself. (Professors o f rhetoric undertook to teach their pupils how to speak well. T hey were, for the most

The passage is controversial, the point o f dispute being the identification o f Socrates’ hypothesis. It seems to me clear that the hypothesis is contained

part, incapable o f speaking well themselves. W h en they succeeded w ith their pupils, they did not transmit anything; but they instilled something.") That

in the antecedent o f the conditional sentence, ‘If virtue is a kind o f knowl­ edge .. .’. Hypothesis: virtue is a sort o f knowledge. Simple truth: I f virtue is a sort ofknow ledge, then it is taught. So if the hypothesis ^ be established,

broad conception has seemed particularly pertinent to the theory o f ‘recol­

Meno: O f course.*

lection’ or α ν ά μ ν η σ ι ς — and especially to a strange sentence at 87B: [579]

we shall infer that virtue is taught — and thereby answer M eno’ s question. But however that m ay be, on any account o f the m atter Socrates offers two

First let us ask whether, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, it is taught or (as we just put it) recalled — let it make no difference to us which of the two words we use.*

conditional propositions, not one: virtue is taught if and only if it is a sort o f knowledge.

Recalling is certainly not a m atter o f transmission, as Socrates himselfinsists: when he helps the slave to recall a geometrical truth, he is sure that he has not put his own knowledge into the slave’s head — it was there all along. So i f teaching is recalling — or rather, helping to recall — then it is not after all a sort o f transmission.2728 H owever that m ay be, teaching — whether it is broadly or narrowly conceived — is a matter o f producing knowledge. (And learning is a matter o f coming to know.) W hen I was taught Pythagoras’ theorem at school, I thereby came to k now that the square on th e hypotenuse is equal to the sum o f the squares on the other tw o sides. W h en m y grandfather taught me carpentry, I thereby came to know how to handle a saw and a plane. A t 87 B C , where Socrates introduces a hypothesis in order to advance the discus­ sion, there is this exchange:

:

Socrates: ... First let us ask whether, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, it is taught. ... Or isn’t this at least plain to everyone: a man isn’t taught anything but knowledge? . Meno: That’s what I think.

It is that hypothetical connection between virtue and knowledge which gives M eno’s question its philosophical bite. Scholars speak o f an ‘intellectualist’ conception o f virtue and m orality which shows up in various ancient texts from Plato onwards and downwards. The term ‘intellectualism’ covers several different vices. O ne o f them [580] is w hat I m ay call the ‘scien­ tific’ conception o f m orality. Here is a familiar paragraph from John Locke’s

E ssay: M orality is capable o f dem onstration, as well as mathematics. For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another: so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths; and I doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him. (Essay con cern in g Human U nderstanding IV xii 8) Locke conceives o f a m orality constructed m o r e g e o m e t r ic o : all moral truths are deduced from the first principles o f ethics. V irtue is a science — and hence, o f course, it is such as to be taught. According to the hypothesis o f the M en o, virtue is a kind o f knowledge. Is virtue, in the M en o , thought o f as a Lockean moral science?

27 See e.g. Sextus, M I I 19: Philodemus, rhet II 87.5-15. * π ρ ώ το ν μεν δ η e l όστιν αλλοιον η otov Ε πιστήμη, O.pa δ ιδ α κ τό ν η οΰ, η ο νυνδη

Ελ€γομ&> αναμνηστόν (διαφΕρΕτω Be μηδέν ήμΐ'ν όποτΕρψ αν τ φ ό νό μ α τι χρωμΕθα). 28 See Bluck, Meno, pp.20-22 and 325-326 (but Block speaks, unnecessarily, of a 'higher' sort o f teaching).

* ... η τοΰτό y e π α ν τ ι δηλον ό τ ι ουδόν άλλο ΒιδάσκΕται av8pwT os η Ε πιστήμην; — όμοιγΕ δοκΕΐ. — e l Be γ ’ Εστιν Ε πιστήμη τ ις ή αρΕτή, δη λον ό τ ι δ ιδα κ τόν αν Εΐη. — π ώ ς γ α ρ οΰ;

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knowledge there is no logical connection: the hypothesis may be false and the suggestion true, the suggestion may be false and the hypothesis true.

A n answer to that question might think to start from the fact that mathe­ matics, to which Locke adverts, plays an important part in the M en o. W hen Plato introduces the method by w hich Socrates and Meno are to advance their inquiries, he invokes explicitly the hypothetical m ethod o f the geometers (86E). W hen Socrates introduces the notion o f recollection, his discussion w ith the slave turns on a proposition o f geometry.29 Near the beginning o f the dialogue, when Socrates wants to explain to Meno what form a definition ought to take, he turns to geometry: the geometrical definition o f shape or ό χ η μ α at 7 6 A is not an explanation in ordinary language o f w hat the w ord ‘shape’ means — it is a technical definition which Plato presumably took from his geometrical contemporaries.30 (Socrates’ other example — the definition o f colour — is also done in technical terms, and by reference to the [581] theories o f Gorgias and o f Empedocles (76D ).3‘ I f Socrates hints th at he is not altogether satisfied w ith the definition (76E),32 that is perhaps because he is not persuaded by

[582]

V But i f the texts on definitions and on m ethod do not indicate that morality is a science, the hypothesis that virtue is a kind o f knowledge may itself do so. For w hat exactly is thereby being hypothesized? Presumably something like this: to be virtuous is to possess a certain kind ofknow ledge — to know how to behave, perhaps. (And to be courageous is to know how to behave in conditions ofdanger, to be generous is to know how to behave when it comes to offering things to other people, and so on.) A t first blush that may seem to be a m odestly plausible hypothesis — and so much the better for it.

the Empedoclean theory o f pores: as far as its style and structure go, the

The Greek w ord ‘e m o r ^ T ) ’, which — like everyone else — I have trans­ lated as ‘knowledge’, may be used to designate either a piece o f knowledge (my knowledge that Pythagoras’ theorem is true) or a body ofknow ledge (my

definition is irreproachable.) Thus according to the M eno— according to a theory towards which Plato

knowledge o f carpentry). W h en the w ord designates a body o f knowledge it is ofren translated as ‘science’; but I shall stick to ‘knowledge'. Then does the

gestures — ethics is a science. First, we must grasp the essence o f virtue (and also, no doubt, the essences o f other prim itive elements o f ethics). Then we

hypothesis suppose that to be virtuous is to own a piece o f knowledge or to

m ust deduce the theorems o f m orality and the precepts o f virtue. But that is not a Lockean theory. Locke compared m orality to mathe­

have mastered a body o f knowledge? W ell, when he is speaking o f the hypo­ thesis, Plato does not insist upon the w ord ‘ e m a r ^ T ) ’:33 he also uses ‘ r? (Here x is any agent: an individual, a couple,

* First published in G. Patzig (ed), Affltoteles’ 'Politik'(GOttingen, 1990), pp.249-263.

cost. O ther agents — in general, other things — can affect x’s decision in many ways and by many means. In particular, they may alter the range o f his options and they m ay change the costs he associates w ith a given option. External intervention m ay curtail or enlarge the range o f x’s options. It may increase or decrease the costs he associates w ith an option. Intervention m ay be direct or indirect. A n external agent intervenes [250] directly i f it addresses itself explicitly to x’s r/>-ing or to something o f which x’s rf>-ing is a special instance. Otherwise intervention is indirect. (It is not easy to define direct intervention. Som ething like this may be on the right lines: y directly intervenes in the question ‘Shall x rf>?’ just in case there are propositions ‘P’ and ‘Q ’ such that (i) ‘P’ is part o f the proper specification o f y ’s action, and (ii) ‘rf>x’ is a com ponent o f ‘Q ’, and (iii) ‘P’ entails ‘Q ’.) States intervene. L etth e question be: ‘Shall Barnes b u y a bottle ofG lenlivet?’ T he State m ay intervene by — for example — (la) prohibiting the sale o f spirits, (lb ) imposing an excise d u ty on whisky, (lc) banning imports from Scotland, (Id) exacting income tax on Barnes at a high level, (2d) offering Barnes a State pension, (2c) subsidizing Scotch distilleries, (2b) giving a taxrebate to alcoholics, (2a) itself distilling a rival malt. (If some o f those modes o f action seem U topian, consider a different question: Shall Barnes go forth and multiply?) Interventions (2a-d ) enlarge my range o f options or decrease m y costs. Such interventions raise interesting questions. T hey are not my interest here. Interventions ( lc -d ) — and (2c-d) — are indirect. Indirect State intervention, w hich norm ally takes the form o f taxation, bears im portantly on questions o f liberty. (A second measure o f political liberty is fixed by the proportion o f a citizen’s,.income or wealth which is not removed in taxation. T he tw o measures need not coincide — imagine a Lockean ‘minimal State’ w hich spends massively on defence. The converse case is possible, but harder to imagine. I suppose that in practice the two measures are usually fairly close to one another.) But I shall say nothing further about taxation, nor, in general, about indirect State intervention. It is a part o f the topic o f liberty separate from m y present concern. A nd m y concern is prior to it m this sense: the State can intervene indirectly in a question o f the form

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‘Shall x ?’ only insofar as it intervenes directly in some other question of the same form.

claim that rule is ‘natural’ is often questioned — at least in its relation to slavery. Yet in the absence o f any specification o f scope, the claim is worse

There remain (la), which curtails m y options, and (1 b), w hich increases

than questionable — it is unassessably vague. Numerous other issues in political theory are not raised in the P olitics. W e

m y costs. Both interventions are, I shall say, restrictive. Thus m y concern is with direct restrictive State intervention. And I say (quasi-stipulatively) that issues o f a kind K are political questions just in case the State is entitled to intervene, directly and restrictively, in any question o f the form ‘Shall x ? which falls within K, ' and that x enjoys political liberty w ith regard to issues o f kind K just in case the State does n o t intervene, directly and restrictively, in any question o f the form ‘Shall x ? which falls w ithin K. Thus the main m atter is this: O n what conditions an d in w hat circumstances is a State entitled to intervene directly and restrictively in questions o f the form ‘Shall x ?’ [251]

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should not expect to find there a discussion o f the problems o f m ulti-national corporations. But liberty is not a modern problem. Questions o f liberty must impose themselves on anyone who is ruled — and on every decent ruler. AB a surplus Aristotle knew o f tw o celebrated fictional incidents: I mean Antigone’s demand (in Sophocles’ play) that the State m ay not intervene in certain religious or ritual affairs and Socrates’ confession (in Plato’s A pology) that he w ould not heed the Athenians i f they forbade him to philosophize.* Perhaps Aristotle was well aware o f the issue, even if the P o litics does not (as they say) thematize it. A t an y rate, there are several ideas and various passages in the text w hich bear — or seem to bear — on the matter.

IV III First, two red — o r pinkish — herrings. Aristotle never attempts a form al analysis o f political liberty and he barely

There is a familiar theme from the E thics. Roughly: we achieve ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία only i f we act virtuously; we act virtuously only i f we act κ α τ ά π ρ ο α ιρ ε σ ιν ;

discusses the substantive question o f how much liberty a State may or must allow its citizens. Throughout the P o litics he speaks o f α ρ χ ε ιν κ α ι α ρ χ ε σ θ α ι, o f ruling and being ruled. He occupies him self constantly w ith the question

we act κ α τ ά π ρ ο α ιρ ε σ ιν only i f we act ε κ ο ν τ ε ? ; we act ε κ ο ν τ ε ? only i f we act freely. Hence ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία — which is the end o f the State no less than

o f who should rule whom. He scarcely touches on the question o f w hat the

o f the individual — has freedom as a pre-condition; and Aristotle [252] must therefore have inclined toward a libertarian, or at least a liberal, position.

limits o f rule should be. . Item: he distinguishes good constitutions from bad, natural from perverted.

T h at argument depends on a childish confosion. For the freedom which ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία requires is not political liberty. M ore precisely, x can κατά

The good look to the advantage o f the ruled, the bad to that o f the rulers (e.g. I' 1 2 7 % 6 - 1 0 ) . The good have willing subjects, the bad unwilling (e.g. I ' 12 8 5 a 2 8 -3 0 ). He never hints th at a good constitution m ightbe one which

π ρ ο α ιρ ε σ ιν even if the question ‘Shall x ?’ is political. A nd evidently that must be so; for otherwise law-abiding actions could never be virtuous — and

appropriately limits the scope o f government, or that one mode o f perversion

that is absurd. Nor can we pretend that Aristotle mistakenly supposed ‘free action’ to dem and political liberty. O n the contrary, in the E thics and in the

might consist in acting u ltra vires. Item: slavery is justifiable in that ‘ruling and being ruled are not only

P o litics he regards it as one o f the functions o f the legislator to outlaw

indispensable [avayK afov] but also advantageous; and some things are marked from their very birth for ruling or being ruled’ (A 1 2 5 4 a 2 2 -2 4 ). He develops the notion that rule is a natural phenomenon, but his argument does not indicate an y natural restrictions on the scope o f natural rule. T he

* If those two examples are — as I have been half persuaded — malapropos, then consider Pericles’ remarks in Thucydides, II 37, or Nicias’ exhortations in Thucydides, VII 69. And, as Richard Sorabji has reminded me, there were the Cynics.

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wickedness and enjoin virtue. W hatever may be thought o f that view, it is

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H owever that may be, one thing is plain: A ristotle’s private property will

not self-contradictory. The second herring is A ristotle’s attack on ‘com m unism ’. He argues against Plato that women and children should not be ‘com m on’; and he argues further that property should not be held in com m on. Hence one might infer

be closely regulated by public law. [253]

V

that he is against State intervention in certain areas o f life — women and goods do not raise political questions.

A m ore plausible starting-point is A ristotle’s notion o f VAevBepia; for JA w B ep ia is surely freedom o f some sort, and the concept o f political liberty

The inference is temerarious. A ristotle poses the question: ‘Is it better for a State w hich is to be w ell governed to m ake com m on [koivw vefv] every­

is included in the general concept o f freedom. 'EAwBepia first appears in the P o litics in contrast w ith slavery (A 1253b 4), and the contrast is common, applying not only to individuals but also

thing which can be made com m on?’ (P o l B 1 2 6 la 2 - 3 ) . A n d he answers unequivocally in the negative. But his opposition to communism does not

to States (e.g. E 1 3 1 0 b 3 7 - 3 8 ; H 13 2 7 b 2 5 , b 3 1; 1328a6). A slave is someone who has a master, and who is the possession o f that master.

entail, nor does he take it to entail, that questions o f property are not in the political domain. O n the contrary, he observes th at his own preferred economic system w ill be ‘improved by character and by the ordinance o f

Hence a man is JA eiB epo? just in case he has no master, is no-one’s

upright laws’ (B 12 63a 24), and he insists that ‘it is the peculiar task o f the legislator’ to see to these matters (l2 6 3 a 4 0 ). A clear analysis o f the concept o f property is needed in many parts o f political theory — not least in A ristotle’s o w n defence o f slavery. But

possession. (O r are free men self-possessed? I f property is the iu s u te n d i e t a b u ten d i, then a self-owner enjoys the right o f self-use and self-abuse — and is not that perfect freedom?) A master rules his slaves w ith an α ρ χ ή δ Ε σ π ο τικ ή . Som e people, according

A ristotle’s view is vague: ‘it is better for holdings to be private and for us to make them com m on in their use’ (12 6 3 a 3 8 ; c f H 1 3 2 9 b 4 l- 1 3 3 0 a 2 ) . In

to Aristotle, hold that a l rule is despotic (cf Plato, P it 25 9C ). He dissents, insisting that x m ay rule y w ithout being master o f y (P o l A 12 5 2 a 8 ; LI 1 2 9 5 b 2 1 ; H 13 2 4 b 3 2 , 1333a 6). Hence it is possible for there

w hat sense is this V ictoria plum tree m y private holding i f anyone may use its fruit? Property, as the Romans put it, consists in the right to ‘use and abuse’ (c f Plato, E u th yd 301E ). It is hard to see how private ownership can

to be rule over free men (Γ 1 2 7 7 b 7 -1 0 ) . Indeed, that is the definition o f ‘political’ rule, and a State is by definition a fellowship o f the free

consist w ith com m on use. As Aristotle him self puts it in the Rhetoric,

(I' 12 78a 3, 1280a5). (O r rather, an unperverted State is a fellowship o f the free: in tyrannies,

a condition of security is to possess things in such a place and in such a way that their use too is up to you, and a condition of something’s being yours or not i$ when it is up to you to alienate it (by alienation I mean giving or selling). (A 1361a19-21)* B ut Aristotle’s remarks in the P o litics are to o nebulous to sustain any serious

.

oligarchies, and democracies the rule is despotic (I' 12 7 9 a 2 1). But can we take that literally? Does Aristotle suppose that citizens in a democracy are all

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slaves o f the State?) Evidently the general notion o f JA w B ep ia is not the notion o f political liberty. The citizens o f an unP-erverted State are free men: that says nothing

critical discussion.**

whatever about the extent o f their political liberties, it does nothing to deter­ * opos δε α σφ αλεία ς μεν r o ενταύθα κ α ι οΰτω κ εκ τη σ θ at War' ErP’ avrcji Elvai την χ ρ η σιν αυτώ ν, τού SE οικ εΐα είναι η μ η όταν Erf/ αΰτω fi α π α λλ ο τρ ιώ σ α ί' λ έγω δε α π α λλ ο τρ ίω σ ιν δόσιν κ α ι π ραοιν. ** The Greek legal background — or at any rate, the Athenian legal background — would have offered him little food for reflection: see A.R.W. Harrison, The Law i f Athens I (Oxford, 1968), pp.200-205. Theophrastus may have done something on the subject in his Laws, see Stobaeus, ed IV ii 20 [= item 650 Fortenbaugh].

.

mine the scope o f political questions. But eAenBepia is frequently connected in a special way w ith the notion o f democracy. A nd political liberty m ay here seem to shamble on to the stage.

: ; ! : '

V

Just as the defining mark or opo? o f oligarchy is wealth and o f aristocracy virtue, so the defining m ark o f democracy is freedom (LI 1 2 9 4 a !0 - 1 l). In

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other words, the qualification for office in a democracy is ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ί α : a constitution (or particular office) is democratic just in case an y ε λ ε ύ θ ε ρ ο ς

that is dangerous; for one should think it not slavery but salvation to live with an eye to the constitution. (1310a28-36)

— and hence any citizen — is eligible. Every citizen is ‘equal’ in ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ί α — and, according to Aristotle, democrats typically and falsely argue that those who are equal in this one thing should be equal in all things (Γ 12 8 0 a 2 4 , 1 2 8 la 6 ; E 1 3 0 la 3 0 ; Z 1 3 1 8 a 9 —10)The connection between ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ί α and democracy is, thus far, trivially definitional. But some people supposed that ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ί α and equality were found especially in democracies (LI 1 2 9 1 b 3 4 -3 5 ) : A fundamental principle o f democratic constitutions is freedom (they are accus­ tomed to say that it is in that sort o f constitution alone that men partake o f freedom); for they say that every democracy aims at it. (Z 1317a40-b2)* [254] Such assertions ring familiar. M odern politicians often couple democracy and freedom as though they were Ptolemy and Cleopatra. So it is w orth stating that as a m atter o f logic there is no connection between a democratic constitution and political liberty: if a State is democratic it does not follow th at its citizens enjoy a high degree o f liberty; i f the citizens o f a State enjoy a high degree o f liberty, it does not follow th at the State is democratic. In general, views on the first issue in political theory, ‘W h a t questions are polit­ ical?’, neither determ ine nor are determ ined by views on the second, ‘H ow are political questions to be decided?’ As for empirical ties, it is plain from history th at more political liberty will be enjoyed under an egocentric m onarchy o r a self-indulgent oligarchy than

T he text is uncertain and the argument m urky. But it seems clear that Aristotle ascribes to the democrats a definition o f freedom as doing whatever you want, and that he regards that as a false definition. ‘D oing w h at you w ish’ — ο τ ι α ν β ο ύ λ η τ α ι π ο ι ε ι ν , ο τ ι Clv 8 ό ξ η π ο ι ε ΐ ν — is alluded to elsewhere in the P o litic s . It wwas, and remained, with one modification or another, a standard definition o f freedom.* (It is not a contemptible definition. In general, we might suppose that x is free to just in case x can if he wants to; so that x is free absolutely just in case, fo r any ef>, x can ifh e wants to. (‘Absolute’ freedom w ill, o f course, be either absurd o r worse unless some restrictions are put on the possible substituends for ‘’.) And x is politically free to

just in case so far as the

State is concerned x can i f he wants to. T hat is vague; but it deserves more thought than Aristotle awarded it.) A passage in Book Z, the beginning o f which I have already quoted, repeats the ‘democratic’ definition o f freedom and conjoins it with another. Since this is the longest discussion o f ε λ ε υ θ ε ρ ί α in Aristotle’s writings, it merits quotation.

the reason for this is that they define freedom wrongly. ... For justice seems to them to be equality, equality to demand that whatever seems good to the masses should be sovereign, and freedom to be a matter o f doing whatever you wish. Hence in such democracies each lives as he wishes and ‘to what end he lists’, as Euripides says. But

A fundamental principle o f democratic constitutions is freedom (they are accus­ tomed to say that it is in that sort of constitution alone that men partake o f freedom); for they say that every democracy aims at it. Now one form o f freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. For democratic justice is having equality according to numbers and not according to worth, and if this is justice, then the majority must be sovereign and whatever seems good to the majority must be the goal and must be justice — for they say that each o f the citizens must have equality. (Hence in democracies it comes about that the poor are more powerful than the rich; for they are the majority, and what seems good to the majority is sovereign.) This, then, is one sign [255] o f fr eedom, which all democrats lay down as a defining mark o f their constitution. Another sign is living as you wish. For that is the function o f freedom, they say, if it is the mark o fa man in slavery that he lives not as he wishes. Now this is a second defining mark o f democracy; and hence has come the idea o f not being ruled — best

* ύπ όθεσις μ εν οΰν τή ς δ η μ ο κ ρ α τικ ή ς π ο λ ιτεία ς ελευθερία (τούτο yd.p λέγειν είω θασιν ως εν μ ό νη τ η π ο λ ιτε ίμ τα ύ τη μετέχοντα ς ελευθερίας)· τ ο ύ το υ γα ρ σ τ ο χ ά ζ ε ο θ α ί φ α ο ι π ά σ α ν δη μ οκ ρα τία ν. — I construe with Newman; cf Plato, Rep 562BC.

’ See Newman’s note to PolE 1310a27 — cfog. ΡοΙΔ 1 2 9 4 a ll-1 2 ; E 13l6b24; Z 1319b30; Plato, Rep 557B; Justinian, Digest I iii 1, with Moyle’s note.

under a people’s democracy. Back to Aristotle. He holds that certain oligarchs and democrats make mistakes in their educational programmes: they do not educate their citizens ‘w ith an eye to the constitution [π ρ ο ς τ η ν π ο λ ι τ ε ί α ν ] ’ ( P o l E 13 10 a 2 0 ). In the case o f the democrats,

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of all by no-one, but if not then in turn. And it contributes in this way to freedom in respect of equality. (Z 1317b2—17)*

A n independent argument might lead directly from democratic equality to universal office-sharing: i f every citizen is to be equal, then none may rule

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Thepassage is opaque, and it requires a more detailed analysis than I can give it. There are two sorts o f freedom. (O r tw o ‘signs’ o f one sort? Aristotle wavers. I assume the vacillation is unim portant, and that we can properly talk o f two sorts o f freedom.) Does Aristotle recognize the tw o sorts? He seems to be speaking in p r o p ria p erso n a :, but given his rejection o f the ‘democratic’ definition o f freedom at E 1 3 1 0 a 2 7 - 3 6 , it m ay be that the present passage is in im plicit o r a tio o b liq u a — Aristotle is reporting, and not endorsing, a democratic view. H owever that m ay be, the second sort o f freedom is the familiar ‘dem o­

unless all rule. But this argument does not lead to Aristotle’s conclusion — nothing follows about ruling by turns. (W h y not have all citizens perpetually in office? W h y not determine all political issues by referendum?) The connection between ruling by turns and freedom is at first sight equally mysterious. Perhaps the second paragraph o f the text m ay solve the mystery — and also link ruling by turns to democracy: Another sign is living as you wish. ... Now this is a second defining mark of demo­ cracy; and hence has come the idea of not being ruled — best of all by no-one, but if not then in turn. And it contributes in this way to freedom in respect of equality. [256]

cratic’ sort: freedom is doing w hat you want. The first sort is ‘ruling and being ruled in tu rn’. This notion is a staple o f

Aristotle’s Greek is at least as confused as m y English. (The text may be

the P olitics. in Book A it defines political rule (A 1 2 5 2 a l6 ) , and in Book H it turns out to be a fundam ental feature o f A ristotle’s o w n Ideal State (H

corrupt.) But the general sense peeps through. It is this. The ‘democratic’ definition o f liberty suggests that no-one should rule — and hence, as a p i s

1 3 3 2 b 2 6 -2 7 ). Every citizen w ill have a tu rn in office and a turn out o f office. Perhaps that is a pretty idea. But w h y is it a form o f freedom? and w h y should

a ller, that all should rule in turn. The second sort o f freedom is plainly a kind o f political liberty and it is avowedly democratic. A n d in some fashion it leads to ‘freedom in respect o f equality’. Hence — or so we might tentatively infer — the first sort o f freedom too is both a form o f liberty and a feature o f

it be dear to democrats? D em ocratic justice and democratic equality require that each citizen shall count for one. (Votes go to share-holders, not to shares.) Hence — or so A ristotle infers — decisions w ill be made by m ajority vote among all citizens.

democracy. Then does the ‘democratic’ definition o f freedom suggest that no-one

(In every constitution, and trivially, they are made by m ajority vote: LI 1 2 9 4 a l l - 1 5 . ) But w hy should the principle o f rule-and-rule-about follow

should rule? It does. According to the definition, I w ill not be free to i f m y ef>-ing is a political question; hence I will not be free absolutely unless there

from the principle o f m ajority choice? (And what if a m ajority rejects the principle, preferring perhaps to pick all α ρ χ α ί by lot from all citizens?)

are no political questions; hence only under anarchism will I be free. I f dem o­ crats hold that the supreme political value is freedom (thus understood), then

* ελευθερίας Si εν μεν το εν μ ερει άρ χ εσθ αι κ α ί άρχειν. κ α ί γ ά ρ το δ ίκ α ιον το δη μ ο τικ δ ν το lVtoi' e%etv ε ο τ ι κ α τ ά αριθμόν ά λ λα μ ή κ α τ ' αξία ν, το ύ το ν δ ’ οντος το ύ δ ίκ α ιο ν το π λήθος ά ν α γ κ α ΐον είναι κύριον κ α ί ο τ ι αν δοξη τοΐς π λ ειο σ ι τ ο ΰ τ ’ είναι τύλος κ α ί τ ο ν τ ’ etva i το δ ίκ α ιο ν φ α σ ί γ ά ρ δειν ίσον εχειν έκ αστον τώ ν π ο λ ιτ ώ ν ώ στε iv τα ΐς δ η μ ο κ ρ α τία ις συμ β α ίνει κυριω τερους etva i τούς απ όρους τώ ν ε ύ π ο ρ ω ν π λeίoυς γ ά ρ d a t, κύριον S i το Tots π λ ε ίο σ ι δόξαν, εν μεν οΰν τ ή ς ελευθερίας αημ εΐον τ ο ύ το δν τίθ εντα ι π άντες ο ί δ η μ ο τ ικ ο ί τή ς π ο λ ιτεία ς ο ρ ο ν εν Se το ζήν ως β ο ύλετα ι τις. τούτο γ ά ρ τή ς ελευθερίας εργον είναι φ α α ιν , ειπ ερ τού δουλευοντος το ζην μ η ως βούλεται. ■ τή ς μεν οΰν δ η μ ο κ ρ α τία ς ορος αυτός δεύτερος· εντεύθεν S’ ελήλυθε το μ η αρχεσθαι, μ ά λ ισ τ α μεν υπό μηθενός, ε ί δε μ ή , κ α τά μέρος, κ α ί συ μ β ά λλετα ι τ ο ύ τη προς την ελευθερίαν την κ α τ ά το ίσον.

they have a suicidal goal. But in any case they cannot dispense w ith rule altogether (for then, trivi­ ally, there would be no π ό λ ι ς and hence no δ η μ ο κ ρ α τ ί α ) . A n d the second best option is allegedly ruling by turns. T h at allegation ought to seem queer — not because it is false but because it misses the point. I f I am theoretically committed to anarchism but recog­ nize that rule cannot be entirely abolished, then I am likely to seek out a ‘m inim al’ State, a State which rules as little as possible. I am likely, in other words, to seek to maximize political liberty. Aristotle does not see this. His democrats, anarchists in theory but aware o f the need for rule, proceed to ask themselves not how much rule there should be but w ho should rule. T heir

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answer betrays no concern, explicit or implicit, for the scope and range o f State activities.

the Priesthood, in its various forms; and finally the Organizers o f Public

The paragraph on democratic freedom tells us nothing positive about A ristotle’s attitude to political liberty. B ut it does confirm a negative point; for just w hen D am e Liberty beckons, A ristotle shyly diverts the discussion to talk about constitutions.

VI

'

A t Δ 1 2 9 7 b 3 5 - 1 2 9 8 a 3 he asserts that, in any constitution, there are three elements to which a good lawgiver must pay attention. The second o f these is to 7Tep t -rd s α ρ χ ά ς ; and Aristotle explains that ‘this is the question o f w hat offices there should be — i.e. over w hat should the offices be competent — and how should officers be selected’. T here is a prelim inary discussion o f the question at Δ 1 2 9 9 a 1 5 - 1 3 0 0 a 8 , and a formal answer at Z 1 3 2 1 a 5 - 1 3 2 3 a l0 . These passages seem to constitute an exception ra the general truth that Aristotle does not interest him self in political liberty; for w hat is th e question ‘O ver what should th e offices be competent?’ i f it is not th e question o f th e scope and range o f political power? But tam p down the fires o f excitement. W h en Aristotle answers the question he devotes less than two [257] Bekker pages to it. M oreover, his answer hardly touches on the issue o f political liberty. ' Offices are divided into tw o categories: those w hich are ‘indispensable [ α ν α γ κ α ίο ς ] , in the sense that w ithout them there cannot be a State at all; and those w hich ‘bear on good order and decency’, w ithout w hich a State cannot be well governed (Z 1 3 2 1 b6—9; c f Δ 12 9 9 a 3 2 ; Z 13 2 0 b 2 4 ). . T h e indispensable offices occupy most o f Aristotle’s b rie f discussion (Z 1 3 2 lb 1 2 —13 22b 37 ). They are these: Superintendents o f t h e Market, who deal w ith contracts and ζ ύ κ ο σ μ ί α ; T ow n Superintendents, w ho deal w ith public and private buildings, w ith streets, and w ith boundaries; C ountry Superintendents, w ith a corresponding competence in the rural districts; the Treasury, w hich receives, guards, and distributes public funds; the Record Office, w hich looks after the registration o f all legal contracts and decisions; the Bailiffs, who enforce court decisions, and the Gaolers, who guard prisoners; the M ilitary, concerned some w ith internal security and others w ith international matters; the Auditors, w ho scrutinize all public financial ' dealings; the Council, w hich prepares business for the sovereign assembly;

Festivals. To sum up, tfun, the indispensable superintendences deal with the following matters: religious affairsJ military affairs, taxes and expenditure, the market and town and harbours and the country, and also law-courts and registration o f contracts and collection o f fines and custody, and accounts and scrutinies, and examination of the officers, and finally the superintendences concerning the body which deliberates about public affairs. (1322b30-37) AI; for the useffu but dispensable offices, which are found only in ‘the more leisured and flo u ish in g States ’ (13 2 2 b 3 8 ), they are these: Superintendents o f W om en, Guardians o f the Laws, Guardians o f Children, C ontrollers o f the Gymnasia, Superintendents o f A thletic Games, Superintendents o f Cultural Contests. Aristotle concludes that ‘as for the offices, we have now given an outline account o f pretty w ell all o f them ’ (13 2 3 a 9 —10). There m ay seem to be omissions: where, say, is the M inistry o fT rad e, or the M inistry ofEducation? T he P o litics itselfsuggests supplements: a M inistry o f Health, perhaps (H 13 3 0 a 3 8 ), or a M inistry o f Morals (E 13 0 8 b 2 0 —24). But th e catalogue is long enough. It w ould not have surprised Aristotle’s contemporaries. T he various offices he m entions are not theoretical inventions: th ey existed in m any Greek States. (Newman’s notes supply a rich documentation.) N or w ill the list surprise — let alone outrage — any modern politician. It has not always been so. A hundred years ago, I guess, the reaction to the list might have been very different. W h o w ou ld then have thought that sporting questions might be political? that a branch o f government should be devoted to the conduct o f women? that private dwellings should be under the rule o f public planners? The Aristotelian and the modern State [258] are relatively similar in the scope and nature o f their com ponent offices. I find this a notew orthy fact — but I suspect that it is an historical accident. W h y should we accept the Aristotelian list? The indispensable offices are those without which there w ill be no State at all. O nly in the case o f two offices does Aristotle explain w hy that should be so. Here is the more inter­ esting o f the two explanations: The first o f the indispensable superintendences is that concerned with the market ... For it is pretty well indispensable in all States that people buy and sell things in rela­ tion to one another’s indispensable requirements, and this is the nearest path to

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self-sufficiency, on account of which they are thought to have come together into a single constitution. (Z 13 2 lb 12 -18 )*

alterations o r repairs I make to m y house which could in any w ay affect third parties? (e.g. may they require me to paint the external woodwork in a seemly colour? M ay they forbid me to build an ugly garage in m y front garden?) O r

T hat seems to be a mistake. Perhaps there could n o t be a State among whose citizens there was no buying and selling. But it does not follow that the State must regulate the buying and selling. There are m any relations which w ill grow up am ong fellow-citizens: they will play games together, they w ill form clubs and societies, they w ill make friendships. It does not follow that the State must — or m ay — supervise these relations. It is one m atter to observe that any society is likely to need a postal service, another to state that the Post Office must be State-controlled and the position o f Postmaster General a public office. Aristotle fails to see the distinction. In any event, even i f a State m ust possess (say) law-courts, police, and armed forces, most o f the items which Aristotle lists as indispensable are evidently not so. W h y must a State contain supervisors o f private buildings? or harbour guardians? or festival organizers? or a priesthood? I can dream up

49

may they [259] further (3) determine how I deal w ith the internal affairs o f m yh ou se, affairs which will affect only its occupants? (e.g. may they prohibit me from installing an electric socket in m y bathroom ? M ay th ey require me to fit a damp-course?) Those three possibilities m ark out, for an y m odern thinker, three different attitudes to political liberty. Possibility (1) illustrates an old fashioned liber­ alism. Possibility (3) illustrates a new fashioned paternalism. A ny theorist w ho interests him self in political liberty must take a stand on those questions. Aristotle takes no stand. T he question ‘O ver w hat should the offices be competent?’ appears to raise, and directly, the issue o f political liberty. The appearance is largely illusory.

no argument which even seems to show that such offices are necessary. And it is quite certain th at there is no good argument available. For numerous States have as a m atter o f fact existed w ithout offices o f those sorts. H ow ever th at m ay be, w hat light does the list o f offices shed on Aristotle’s attitude to political liberty? N o t much. The passage shows that certain areas o f life — sporting events, the behaviour o f wom en, the state o f the roads — might in Aristotle’s view be the locus for political questions. It shows (what hardly needs showing) that he was no adherent to a Lockean or a minimalist conception o f th e State.

V II B ut the generous list o f public offices does suggest that he had a tendency towards totalitarianism. A nd the suggestion is endorsed by the passages, rela­ tively few, in the P o litics which propose or hint at specific legislation. T here are, fo r example, revealing o b i t e r d icta .

But at every crucial point the passage is vague. The second o f the indis­

Com m unication between city and port is advantageous— ‘and if anything harmful threatens, it is easy to guard against it by the laws, by determining

pensable offices is said to be ‘that concerned w ith public and private property in the tow n — to ensure that there is good order and that dilapidated build­

and regulating w ho m ay and w ho m ay not mingle w ith one another’ (H 13 2 7 a 3 7 —40).

ings and roads are preserved and repaired’ ( 1 3 2 1 b 1 9 —21). W h at exactly is

‘In general th e lawgiver m ust banish foul talk from the State’ (H 13 3 6 b 3 —5) — and he m ust also forbid naughty plays and saucy postcards ( 1 3 3 6 b l3 —l4 ). Offenders will be punished, in some cases by flogging. ‘T hat it is particularly incumbent on the lawgiver to concern him self w ith

the flinction o f these officials w ith regard to private houses? M ay they do no more than (1) order the repair o f dilapidated property w hen it endangers neighbours or passers-by? (e.g. m ay they instruct me to mend m y tottering chimneys or to prop up m y garden wall?) O r may they also (2) regulate any

the education o f the young, no-one w ill dispute’ (El 1 3 3 7 a l l - 1 2 ; c f E N A 1 0 9 4 a 2 7 -2 ) . Aristotle perceives no room for debate on an em inently debat­ able issue.

* πρώ τη μΕν oOv Ε πιμίλΐΐα των αναγκαίω ν ή Tipi την αγοράν, Εφ’ f, 8if n v a αρχήν ΐΐν α ι τήν Εφορωσαν Tipi τϊ τα συμβόλαια και τήν Ευκοσμίαν· σ χ ΐδ ό ν γ α ρ αναγκαΐον Taaais Tdis π ό λ ίσ ι τα. μΕν ώ νΰσ θ α ι τα SE πωλΕιν π-pos τήν άλληλων αναγκαίαν. χρΕίαν, κ α ί.τ ο ΰ τ ’ Εστιν ΰπογυιότατον Tpos α υτάρκ α αν St’ ήν δοκοΰσιν els μίαν, π ο λ ιπ ία ν συνΐλθΐίν.

Those passages come from the account o f the Ideal State in Books H-El. There are similar passages elsewhere. Aristotle standardly assumes that the State will uncontroversially concern itself with education, with the birth-rate, with property regulations, with individual morality, with the decency o f women.

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The discussion o f marriage and procreation at H 1 3 3 4 b 2 9 -1 3 3 6 a 2 is striking. ‘Since the lawgiver must from the start see how the bodies o f those who are reared attain the best condition, he must first superintend copulation

(They are, o f course, questions which have a public and a political interest — issues o f population and procreation properly exercise scientists and philosophers and political theorists. But that is not at issue here: the point

— when and in w hat state people should have matrim onial intercourse with one another’ ( 1 3 3 4 b 2 9 -3 2 ). The correct age for marriage and procreation is

— a very different point — is that, in A ristotle’s view, such matters may

to be legally fixed. As for the proper time o f year, Aristotle is content to follow tradition and opt for the winter months (13 3 5 a 3 8 ). The couples

51

properly exercise the legislator.) Nor is there reason to suppose that the passage on copulation and birth is untypical. W h a t we possess o f Aristotle’s Callipolis — Books H and Θ o f

concerned must themselves consult w ith doctors and scientists to discover the proper meteorological conditions for the event.* Prospective parents

the P o litics — is o n ly a fragment o f a w o rk w hich was perhaps never completed. But the fragment is uniform ly interventionist in its approach to

must also ensure [260] that their own bodies are in the appropriate condi­

social life. Here, then, we do find Aristotle taking a stand, in a few particular cases,

tion; and proper care on the part o f pregnant wom en ‘is easy for the lawgiver to determine, by enjoining them to make a daily journey to worship the gods whose office it is to oversee childbirth’ ( 1 3 3 5 b l4 - l 6 ) .

on questions o f political liberty. A nd his answers encourage us to guess his general attitude to issues o f the same kind. W e should guess that he inclined

The law will forbid the rearing o f any deformed child, and deformed infunts must be exposed ( 1 3 3 5 b 1 9 - 2 1 ) . ‘And on grounds o f population, if

to totalitarianism — that he tended to treat a very wide range o f questions as political.

the rule o f custom forbids the exposure o f infunts, there must be a lim it to

But it is misleading to express the m atter thus. For he does not opt for totalitarianism as a result o f reflecting on general problems o f political liberty. He simply assumes that child-breeding, for example, is a λ ε ιτ ο υ ρ γ ία , a State

the num ber o f children a couple m ay have; and i f an y are conceived by couples in offence against this’, then there are to be compulsory abortions ( 1 3 3 5 b 2 1 -2 5 ) . Just as the law determines the ages at which couples may begin to breed,

service, and hence something to be governed by State regulations. Breeding a child is like fitting out a trirem e or paying for a tragic chorus. [261]

‘so let it be determined for how long it is fitting for them to do service [ λ ε ιτ ο υ ρ γ ε ί] as child-breeders’ ( 1 3 3 5 b 2 8 -2 9 ). Men may sire until they are fifty — after that, they m ay copulate only for the sake o f their health ‘o r for some other similar reason’ ( 1 3 3 5 b 3 7 -3 8 ). And as for extra-marital affairs, such things are forbidden — at least for husbands — on pain o f ‘the

W h y so?

dishonour suitable to the offence’ ( 1 3 3 6 a l- 2 ) . The passage is not as determinate as w e might wish. Aristotle never form u­

P olitics, offered a methodological explanation. Aristotle was so given to the

VIII

Brentano, whose general adulation fo r Aristotle did not encompass the

lates any specific law, and his words sometimes leave it open w hether a prac­

empirical m ethod that he took his innumerable observations o f past and

tice w ill be legally enjoined or m erely recommended. Nonetheless, it is plain that in his Ideal State almost all aspects o f child-breeding will be overseen and that numerous detailed laws will determine the sexual conduct o f married

present States to show not only how States are in fact constituted but also how they inevitably and naturally must be constituted. And w hat must by

citizens. Birth, copulation, and — no doubt — death, are political questions for Aristotle.

* But the 'κ α ί’ in ‘κ α ι a1}roVs' at 1335a39 suggests that their inquiries supplement the work of the legislator.

nature be, ought to be. H aving traced, empirically, the natural development o f political association, Aristotle inferred from the historically given to the necessary and the ideal.* N o doubt there is truth in that. But alongside Brentano’s methodological conjecture I should set a metaphysical diagnosis.

* See — from the NachlaJ— F. Brentano, Ober Aristoteles (Hamburg, 1986), pp.460-463.

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The State is a natural phenom enon. It has a goal, namely the welfare or ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία o f its citizens. T he means to that goal include customs and laws. Hence the task o fth elaw giver is to legislate for ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία . N ow ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία requires virtuous activity, so that the lawgiver must ensure that his citizens are virtuous (c f E N E l 1 3 0 b 2 3 -2 4 ) . Since the notion o f virtue — o f α ρ ε τ ^ (o f excellence, if you prefer) — is broad, the lawgiver w ill be entitled to

A ristotle an d p o litical liberty

53

his own legislation m ight be liable to the same objection, that inhabitants o f his Ideal State m ight emerge as less than ideal men. But the fact that legislation for ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία may be self-defeating does not refute the totalitarian principle:* it follows that legislation ‘concerning the whole o f life’ would be im prudent (and perhaps therefore not obligatory); it does not follow that the legislator is not entitled so to legislate — it is, after

legislate fo r m ost aspects o f citizen life. For whatever a citizen does o r fails to do, his actions and inactions are likely to display virtue o r to discover vice.

all, often irrational for us to do all that we have a tide to do.

A nd since most citizens live by their ( K l 1 7 9 b l 1 - 1 6 ) , the legislator w ill in effect be obliged to operate ‘concerning the whole o flife [π ε ρ ί π ά ν τ α

u ltra vires? ‘Aristotle could not have considered the charge; for it presupposes

τ ο ν {3tov]’ ( l 180a4; c f E 1 1 2 9 M 4 - 1 5 ) . T hat little argument purports to show how the fundamental axioms o f A ristotle’s political thought m ay lead, by a fairly direct route, to a totalitarian political stance. And the argument m ay thus explain w h y Aristotle did not see the need to discuss the liberal case. The premisses o f the argument might be assaulted — and I, for one, believe that the fundamental theses o f A ristotle’s political theory are viciously mistaken. But here I urge that even i f the premisses are granted, the totali­ tarian conclusion does not follow. Balliol College exists for the sake o f furthering learning in its undergradu­ ates and scholarship in its Fellows. (O r so let us pretend.) Is the College thereby entitled or obliged to legislate in whatever way m ay promote the achievement o f those noble ends? Should it require undergraduates to spend eight hours a day in the Library and oblige Fellows to read at least one book a m onth? Evidently not, and fo r two reasons. First, such regulations will never work. You may, as the proverb has it, lead a horse to water; but: i f you do it w on’t drink. Secondly, such regulations w ould be u ltr a v ir e s ; they exceed the authority o f the College and offend against the rights o f its members. Again, parents are sometimes concerned for the w ell being, o f their chil­ dren. Every parent knows that legislation for ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία backfires. M any parents also recognize that they are obliged to promote but forbidden to enjoin their offspring’s happiness. [262] A nd so too w ith the State. Even i f the State exists to prom ote the ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία o f its citizens, that does not license it to legislate for ε υ δ α ιμ ο ν ία . Such legislation m ay w ell be self-defeating. It w ill certainly be u ltra vires. Aristotle knew that legislation might be self-defeating: witness his argu­ ments against P lato’s communism. He does not consider the possibility that

W hat, then, o f the m ore powerfiil charge that such legislation w ould be some notion o f individual rights, and that notion was not packed in his conceptual kitbag.’ Perhaps. But we ^ , I think, see how he w ould have answered the charge had he been able to consider it. He begins Book Θ by observing th at education is the business o f the legis­ lator, that it must be the same for all citizens, and that it must be publicly, not privately, arranged. For of things common the supervision must be common. And at the same time we should not think that any of the citizens is of himself but that all are of the State — for each is a part of the State, and it is natural that the care o f each part should look to the care of the whole. (1337a26-32)** T he first sentence need not detain us: it is an untruism . Either it is trivially true (in that things will be called ‘com m on’ just in case they should be subject to public supervision) o r else it is substantially false (it is a m atter o f common interest that women should be elegantly dressed, but it is not a fit subject for legislation or public policy). T he rest o f the quotation, and the claim that a citizen is a part o f the State — there is the nub.*** The theme had been announced in Book A. Individuals are posterior to the State insofar as they are parts o f the State. A citizen stands to the State as a hand stands to a body (A 1 2 5 3 a l9 - 2 5 ) . Now ‘a part is not only a part o f something else — it is o f something else sim p licite r [κ α ί

* I thank Terry Irwin for forcibly drawing the point to my attention. ** δει Se τών κοινών κοινήν π οιεΐσθαι και τήν ασκησιν. αμα Se ουδέ χρή νομίζει' αυτόν αυτου τινα είναι τών πολιτώ ν αλλα παντας της πολεω ς · μοριον γαρ έκαστος τής 77όΑεως. ή 8' Επιμέλεια πέφυκεν έκαστου μορίου βλέπειν προς τήν του ολου επιμέλειαν. *** On the topic see further J. Barnes, 'Partial wholes’, Social Philosophy and Policy 8, 1990, 1-23 [reprinted in volume 1, pp.484-509].

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α π λ ώ ς ά λ λ ο υ ]’ (1254a l0). In this respect the term ‘part’ is similar to the

term ‘possession’: a slave is not merely a possession o f his master — he is o f his master simpliciter. And Aristotle also observes that a slave is in a way a part o f his master ( 1 255b 11). (A free man is ‘by nature o f himself [ φ ύ σ ε t α υ τ ο ύ ] ’, while a slave is ‘o f another’ (A 1 2 5 4 a l4 -1 5 ). A free man is ‘for the sake o f himself and not o f another [α υτο ύ eve κ α κ α ι μ η ά λ λ ο υ ]’ (M et A 982b 25-26). If a [263] citizen is not ‘o f himself but rather ‘o f the State’, does it not follow that citizens are slaves, that all rule must, despite Aristotle’s explicit denial, be despotic — and despotic in a literal sense?) W hat does it mean to say that a part o f x is not merely a part o f x but also ‘o f x sim pliciter’ ?* The best guess I can make is this: if Fs are parts o f Gs, then Fs can only be defined in terms o f G; hence Fs are o f Gs sim pliciter in the sense that to be an F is essentially to stand in some relation to a G (cf C at 6 a 3 6 -b l4 ). Thus a citizen is o f a State sim pliciter b the sense that to be a citizen is to stand in a certain relation to a State. Citizens are, if you like, logically dependent on States. But men are essentially political animals, i.e. they are essentially citizens. Citizens are logically dependent on States. Hence men are logically dependent on States. To be a man is, in ter alia, to be o f a State. Hence (or so it may seem tempting to infer) any care for the man must look to the good o f the State. If men are essentially o f States, what moral or political consequences follow? In particular, does it follow that any care for a man must look to the good o f the State? It does not obviously follow — and I have yet to find a plausible way o f elaborating the inference. In any event, are men o f their States? Am I a part of, and am I of, the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland? In a loose enough sense o f ‘part’, maybe I am a part o f the Kingdom. But I am not a part in any ordinary sense: I do not stand to the Kingdom as my arm stands to my body or as a piece stands to a jigsaw puzzle or as a sparking-plug stands to a motor-car engine. For I am an independent individual. That, in the end, is the crucial fact about me (and about you), and it is a fact which, in the Politics, Aristotle ignores or suppresses.

* The genitive construction comes from Plato, Laws 804D and 923AB, as Richard Sorabji has reminded me.

Aristotle an d p o litical liberty

55

Aristotle is not the only thinker, ancient or modern, to imagine that people are bits o f States. That view, too, is an untruism. In one sense it is trifling and true. In another sense it is substantial and false. Aristotle’s implicit totali­ tarianism rests ultimately on a questionable inference from a metaphysical untruism.*

* This is essentially the paper which I presented at the 1987 Symposium Aristotelicum, held at Friedrichshafen on the Bodensee. Section II was largely rewritten for publication, but the remaining sections were only lightly revised. My thanks to: Annette Barnes, Charles Brittain, and James Leach. And at Friedrichshafen to: Enrico Berti, Theo Ebert, and Mario Mignucci (for comments on the attempted definition of political liberty); Julia Annas, Jacques Brunschwig, and Carlo Natali (for remarks on property); Charles Kahn, Malcolm Schofield, and Michael Woods (for help with the ‘democratic’ definition of 4λευθερ£α); Terry Irwin, Wolfgang Kullmann, M.M. Mackenzie, Martha Nussbaum, Gerhard Seel, and Gisela Striker (on various aspects of Aristotle’s penchant for totalitarianism); and especially Richard Sorabji, for his sympathetic and constructive Korreferat.

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Some days later the Crusaders — moved m ore by the hope o f booty than by the moral exhortations o f the bishop — marched on Lisbon, which they took

4 Cicero and the just war

and sacked. T he bishop o f Porto had quoted the words o f his com patriot, Isidore o f Seville (who died in 636). He quoted from the chapter de b ellis in Isidore’s

E tym ologies. Here is the w hole o f the pertinent text: I In the June o f 1 1 4 7 the soldiers o f the second crusade broke their voyage to the H oly Land at Porto in Spain. 1 The bishop o f Porto, Peter Pitoes, welcom ed them ; and on Sunday he preached before the arm y piously assem­ bled in the cathedral. Their devotion (he said) deserved praise, their courage admiration; but beware a falling-off — let them bind themselves to their virtues. Spain, dominated by Moors and Moabites, is in a lamentable condi­ tion: [42] she begs the Crusaders to save her. Let them advance against the Moors in Lisbon. Such warfare will be glorious — and it will be just in the eyes o f God. For m any are the sacred texts which assure us that for acts of this sort you will not be charged with murder, nor accused of any crime: on the contrary, you will be condemned if you do not undertake the task. ‘Piety before God is not the same as cruelty’. Moved by justice, not burning with anger, you will wage a just war. ‘A war is just’, says our Isidore, ‘if, having been declared, it is waged on account of the reclaiming of rights or in order to expel enemy forces’. Since the punishment o f murderers and sacrilegious men and assassins is a just cause, the shedding of their blood is not murder.2

There are four kinds of war: just, unjust, civil, worse than civil. A war is just if, having been previously announced, it is waged on account of rights which have been reclaimed or in order to expel enemy forces. A war is unjust if it is undertaken in anger and not for legitimate reason. On this, Cicero says in his R epublic that unjust wars are those which are waged without cause. For, except to get reparation or to expel enemy forces, no just war can be waged. And he adds a little later that no war is counted just if it has not been notified, if it has not been declared, if it is not on account of rights which have been reclaimed. (etym XVIII i 2-3)3 [43] T he bishop cited Isidore, and Isidore cited Cicero. The two Ciceronian sentences come from the third book o f the R ep u b lic (which Cicero wrote between 54 and 51 b c ). They have dropped out o f the lacunose manuscript which contains the first five books o f the work,4 and they are known only thanks to Isidore.5 But the manuscript does contain a parallel passage. In Book II Cicero says that Tullus Hostilius, the third king o f Rome, determined the law by which wars are declared and sanctified the law, which in itself was perfectly just, by the fetial rite. And so any war which had not been notified and declared is regarded as unjust and impious. (Rep II xvii 31)6

3 quattuor autem suntgenera bellorum: id est iustum iniustum civile plus quam civile, iustum bellum est quod expraedicto geritur de rebus repetitis aut propulsandorum hostium causa, iniustum bellum quod de forore non de legftima ratione initur. de quo in Republica Cicero dicit: ilia iniusta bella sunt quae sunt sine causa suscepta, nam extra quam ulciscendi aut propulsandorum hostium causa bellum geri iustum nullum potest, et hoc idem Tullius parvis interiectis subdidit: nullum bellum iustum habetur nisi denuntiatum nisi indictum nisi de repetitis rebus. — The quadripartition is strange: does Isidore

* A version of‘Ciceron et la guerre juste’, Bulletin de la Socittifranfaise de Phiksophie 80, 1986, 37-80 — pp.37-40 were introductory politenesses and have not been translated; pp.59-73 recorded a discussion, some points in which have been incorporated into the text; pp.74-80 were occupied by end-notes, which have become footnotes. 1 The account is taken from De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, a work apparently written by an East Anglian priest shortly after the events which it records (see pp.40-46 of the edition by C.W. David, Records of Civilization 24 (New York, 1936)). — I am grateful to my Balliol colleague Randy Rogers for having drawn my attention to this splendid piece. 2 non enim in huiusmodi actionibus homicidio vel taxatione alicuius criminis notabimini: imo rei propositi vestri deserti iudicabimini. non est vero crudelitas pro Deo pietas. [Jerome, ep cix 3] zelo iustitiae non folle irae iustum bellum committite, iustum vero bellum, dicit Ysidorus noster, quod ex ,

suppose that civil wars are neither just nor unjust? and what are 'wars worse than civil’? (The phrase is taken from the first line ofLucan’s Pharsalia, but its function in Isidore is obscure.) 4 The MS is a palimpsest — see L.D. Reynolds, in L.D. Reynolds (ed), Texts and Transmission (Oxford, 1983), pp.131-132; Book VI, the somnium Scipionis, is independently preserved in several MSS (and also byway ofMacrobius’ commentary); and there are various fragment preserved by later authors, Isidore among them. See the Teubner edition of K. Ziegler (Leipzig, 19697). 5 They are III xxiii 35 in Ziegler’s edition.

indicto geritur de rebus repetendis authostiumpulsandorum causa, et quia iusta est causa homicidas et sacrilegos et venenarios punire non est ejfusio sanguinis homicidii, (p.80 David)

6 constituit... ius quo bella indicerentur, quod per se iustissime inventum sanxitfetiali religione, ut omne bellum quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset id iniustum esse atque impium iudicaretur.

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Ten years later Cicero took up the subject again in his d e officiis.

look into th e matter. A n embassy, religiously garbed, 10 visits the accused

Fairness in war has been laid down in the most sanctified manner in the fetial law of the Roman people. There you may learn that no war is just unless either it is waged after rights have been reclaimed or else it has been notified and declared beforehand. { off I xi 36)7

State. The embassy swears, several times and in places chosen for ritual reasons, that it has come to ask for justice. It then denounces the crime before the foreign magistrates, and demands reparation [res rep etu n t]. I f the magis­ trates are prepared to offer reparation, then the fe t ia le s leave in peace. I f the

In both texts Cicero refers to the fetial law. Thus the sermon delivered by the

magistrates deny or question the charge, they are given thrice ten days to consider the matter. I f after the thirty days the magistrates still refuse repara­

bishop o f Porto goes back beyond Isidore and even beyond Cicero — its ultimate source is the iu s f e t i a l e o f the R om an Republic.

II The f e t i a le s were an ancient college o f priests whose sphere o f competence was, roughly speaking, international affairs: before making alliances w ith other states, and before waging w ar or concluding peace, the Romans were obliged to consult the college o f fe tia le s .8*

tion, the embassy invokes the gods [testatio], and notifies the magistrates that they run the risk o f war [d en u n tia tio]. T he f e t i a l e s on their return to Rome assure the Senate that there is no religious or moral objection to a war against the offending State. I f the Senate and People decide for war, then a formal declaration [in d ic tio ] is made. R ep etitio, d en u n tia tio , in dictio·} 1 ‘if any o f those forms is om itted’ — so Dionysius — ‘then the Senate and the People have not the authority to make w ar’. The origin o f the iu s f e t i a l e is and was obscure: Dionysius and Plutarch say that it was instituted by K ing Numa; Cicero prefers Tullus Hostilius, Livy

W e m ay read two fairly detailed accounts o f the iu s fe tia le , one o f them in

Ancus M arcius.12 It was supposed that the rite had been im ported — from Ardea (so Gellius, a p u d D ionysius), or from Aequi (so Livy), 13 or from Falisci

Livy (I xxxii 5 -1 4 ) and the other in Dionysius o f Halicarnassus ( a n t R om II lxxii 1-9 ).9 The tw o accounts are independent o f one another; and they agree

(Servius). It has been suggested that the Roman iu s f e t i a l e represented a

on all the essential points. [44] W h en the Roman Senate suspects that the citizens o f another State have behaved unjustly towards the citi 1f''ns o f Rome, the fe t ia le s are required to 10 On the religious aspects of the business see Chapter 1 o fj. Bayet, Croyances et rites dens la 7 ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissimefetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est, ex quo intelligii potest

nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. — cf Cicero, leg II ix 21. 8 On the fetiales see e.g. G. Wissowa, Religion undKultusderRomer (Munich, 19122), pp.550­ 554; E. Samter, 'Fetiales1, REVI (1909), cols 2259-2265; C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom o f Ancient Greece andRome (London, 1911), vol II, pp.315-348; P. Bierzanek, ‘Sur les origines du droit de la guerre et de la paix‘, Revue hiitorique de droitfanfais et Ctranger 37, 1960, 83-123; H. Hausmaninger, “'Bellum iustum” und “causa iusta” im alteren l.-omischen Recht’, Osterreichische Zeitschriftfar Offentliches Recht 11, 1960/1, 336-345; R.M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5 (Oxford, 1965), pp.127-133; S. Albert, Bellumlustum , Frankfurter Althistorische Studien 10 (Kallmilnz, 1980), pp.12-16; T. Wiedemann, 'The fetiales·, a reconsideration', CQ 36, 1986, 478-490; F. Santangelo, 'The fetials and their ius', Bulletin o f the Institute ofClasical Studies 51, 2008, 63-93. ? See also Nonius, p.529M (citing Varro, de vita populi Romani— frag 75 and 93 Riposati); Varro, LL V xv 86; Plutarch, Numa xii 3-5; Servius, on Aeneid IX 52 and X 14; cfEnnius, ann VIII i 247-253 (quoted by Aulus Gellius, ^X x 4 — see O. Skutsch, The Annals o f Quintus Ennius. (Oxford, 1985), pp.430-437); L. Cincius, apud Aulus Gellius, XVI iv 1; Pliny, NH'XX.W iii 5;, Macrobius, I xvi 15.

Rome antique (Paris, 1971). n A l agree that the fetial rite had three parts, ofwhich the first is repetitio (or clarigatio, as Pliny and Servius cal it) and the third indictio. As to the second part, Ogilvie, Livy, identifies it as testatio, supposing that denuntiatio and repetitio are the same thing, whereas the 7LL identifies denuntiatio and indictio. Both the normal sense of the word 'denuntio' (‘announce‘, ‘give notice of’) and also its technical sense ('ante nuntiare ut aliquid faciat velfacere desinat ne fiat reus inque ius vocetur '·, so the 7LL) suggest that a denuntiatio w was a sort of ultimatum of which the testatio w was a part. (See e.g. A.H. McDonald and F.W. Walbank, 'The origins of the second Macedonian war‘, Journal o f Roman Studies 27, 1937, 180-207, on‘p.192.) The question is not merely terminological: if the denuntiatio is not the same as the repetitio, then the fetial procedure does not mention until (and unless) it reaches its second stage — at the start, the procedure is in principle an attempt to settle international disputes non-violently. There were cases in which the attempt succeeded: after the repetitio the res were redditae and war was avoided — e.g. Livy, VIII ^ i x 13; XXXVIII xlii 7. 12 Livy describes at I xxiv 3-9 the other chief function of the fetiales, that of making treaties and alliances. The description is attached to the reign of Tullius Hostilius. u See IL XIII 3, 66 (first century ad): Perter resius rex Aqueicolus. is preimus iusfetiale paravit,

inde p.R. discipleinam excepit.

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practice which had been widespread in Italy in the seventh century b c .14 W hether or not any o f those hypotheses is true, it is plain that the ius fetiale was antique.15 The later history o f the rite is also obscure. Livy notes several occasions on which it was invoked early in the Roman Republic.16 It has been supposed that the rite later fell into disuse for a period,17 and that its form was in various ways modified — though its tripartite structure ( repetitio,

14 For fetiales among the Iatin tribes see e.g. Livy, I xxiv 4; VIII xxxix 14; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, ant Rom II li 1-3; Servius, on AeneidVU 695; X 14. —Albert, Bellum lustum, p .15, says that ‘the declaration o f war in accordance with the ius fetiale presupposes that there is a similar institution on the side of the enemy’; and the formula cited by Livy at I xxxii 11 implies that the enemy also has a fetial college. But plainly, Roman fetial procedure might be instituted even if the potential enemy had no similar procedure. 15 The authenticity of the ancient descriptions of the fetial rites, and especially of the fetial formulas which they include, is much contested; and it has frequently been suggested that the descriptions rest upon the works of the annalists and antiquarians of the first century bc who had taken it upon themselves to invent the early history of Rome — the formulas copied down by Livy and by Gellius were invented by the annalists. (But in Chapter 9 of La Religion romaine atchai'que (Paris, 1966), G. Dumizil argues that the formulas are authentic.) However that may be, it is not disputed that the fetial rite, in one form or another, goes back at least to the early years of the Roman Republic. 14 Livy insists on the feet because it indicates that the Romans were a just and pious people. See espXLV xxii 5; certe quidem vos estis Romani qui ideo felicia bella vestra esse quia iusta sintprae vobti fertis; nec tam exitu eorum quod vincatis quam principiis quod non sine causa suscipiatis gloriamini (fiom the speech of the Rhodians to the Senate in 167 bc ). For examples of the fetial procedure see III xxv 6 (458 bc ); IV xxx 13-15 (427); VII vi 7 (362), ix 2 (361), xvi 2 (357), xxxii 1-2 (343); VIII xxii 8 (328), xxxix 13-14 (322), xlv 6 (304); X xii 1-2 (298), xlv 6-8 (293); XXI xvii 4 + xviii 1-14 (218); XXXI viii 1-4 (200); XXXVI iii 7-12 (191); XLII xxv 1 (172); (?) epit LXIV (111). It might appear that in 218 (against Carthage) and again in 200 (against Philip) the procedure was not correctly carried out. For in the two cases Livy fails to mention any repetitio and he writes as though the Senate first decided on war and then sent an embassy to give a show of justice (see XXI xviii I: ut omnia iusta ante bellum fierent). But XXXVIII xlv 5-6 shows that in the two cases there was in feet a repetitio — Livy presumably did not mention it because it went without saying. 17 The supposition is based largely on an argument from silence (which in this case has little force). In addition, there is a passage in Polybius — which has often been misread. According to Ogilvie, Livy, p.128, 'Polybius... says that in his time only a feint trace (βραχύ τ ι Ίχνος) of this rite survived’. What Polybius says is this; whereas the honourable rules of war have been pretty well forgotten by the Greeks, a feint trace of them survives among the Romans — ‘for they declare their wars in advance [π ρολ ίχ ου σι]’ (XIII iii 7). Wars, Polybius means, have become barbarous affairs; the Greeks have forgotten pretty well all the old decencies, and the Romans are not much better — but at least they still practise the fetial rite. That is to say, the passage from Polybius tells in favour of and not against the persistence of the fetial procedure.

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denuntiatio, indictio) remained unchanged.18 Certainly it was practised during the second century b c . And then it became an object o f antiquarian interest and o f national pride. Octavian invoked the iu sfetialem 32 bc when he made war on Cleopatra’s Egypt (Dio Cassius, L iv 5); and two centuries later Marcus Aurelius invoked it before his war against the Marcomanni (Dio Cassius, LXXI xxxii 3). Some scholars have looked for a more distant origin and a more philo­ sophical foundation for the ius fetiale. But the ius has no known Greek model, whether in theory or in practice. [45] To be sure, Greek States some­ times reclaimed lost rights, and sometimes gave notification before going to war.19 But the practice o f the Greeks was never as formal or as codified as the fetial procedure o f the Romans.20 As for the philosophers, there are a few scattered remarks about war in their writings. But the subject o f war was never a part o f philosophical investigation: neither Plato’s Republic nor Aristotle’s Politics contains a theory o f warfare; and although such a theory

18 Two modifications to the ancient rite have been supposed, (i) After 280 (the war against Pyrrhus), it was no longer necessary to make a formal indictio: instead, a piece of land near the temple ofBellona was declared to be part of enemy territoiy, and a javelin was thrown into it (see Servius on A eneidIX 52 and X 14; Ovid, fastiV I 201-208; Festus, s.v. Bellona), (ii) The second modification has no direct testimony in its favour but is inferred from the descriptions given by Livy and others; instead of the three visitations of the fetiales, plenipotentiary legati were sent to the enemy. When the question of war arose, the Senate and People debated, and if the cause appeared just, they made a conditional declaration of war. Then the legati were sent and demanded justice (repetitio). If the enemy refused the demand, the legati notified them of the risk of war (denuntiatio) and returned to Rome. After their return, the fetiales made the indictio. The two modifications answer in an evident way to the exigencies of an overseas war when it was scarcely practical to insist on the to-ing and fro-ing of the fetiales. It should be observed that the modifications scarcely affected the form of the ritual or the legal and moral status of the practice. — On all this see Ogilvie, Lily, McDonald and Walbank, 'Origins’, pp.192-197; F.W. Walbank, ‘Roman declaration ofwar in the third and second centuries’, Classical Philology44, 1949,15-19 [= Selected Papers (Cambridge, 1985), p p. 101-106]; S.I. Oost, ‘The fetial law and the outbreak of the Jugurthine war’, American Journal o f Philology 75, 1954, 147-159; J.W. Rich, Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period o f Transmarine Expansion (Brussels, 1976); W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism inRepublican Rome327—70s c (Oxford, 1979), pp.163-175. 15 Seee.g. Euripides, supp 385-394; Herodotus, V 81; VI 9; Thucydides, I 26.5, 126, 139; Xenophon, CyropaedW iv 32, cxxvi, cxxxix. Note also the occasional references to undeclared wars — e.g. Polybius, IV xvi 4; Livy, XXXV li 2 (192 bc ); Plutarch, Pyrrhxxvi 11; Pausanias, IV v 8; SEGXIX 468 (an inscription from the second century bc — see H. Bengtson, ‘Bemerkungen zu einer Ehreninschrift der Stadt Apollonia am Pontos’, Historia 12, 1963, 96-104). Dio Chrysostom says that 'most wars come about α κ ή ρυκ το ι' (XXXVIII 8); but that is rhetorical exaggeration. 20 Are there biblical antecedents? (For Jewish rules for the outbreak ofwar see Josephus, ant Iud V 151.) Deuteronomy xx is the passage of reference; but its bloody recommendations embarrass rather than enlighten.

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is sometimes ascribed to the Stoics — and to Panaetius in particular — the

In order to explain w hat a just war is, G ratian cites Isidore. (Not that Gratian

ascription is conjectural.21

had ever seen Isidore’s E tym ologies — here, as elsewhere in the D ecr etu m , he is copying the text o f lv o o f Chartres, and it is from Ivo that he has copied the piece oflsidore.'5) T here are differences between the text as Gratian cites III

it and the text which we read in the E tym ologies·, but it is certain that Gratian

The bishop o fP o rto cited Isidore. He had never read him. He knew Y sidorus n o ster by w ay o f a d e cr e tu m or com pilation o f canon law.22 It was in about

means to cite the passage which I have earlier quoted.26 G ratian’s text in its turn was used by m any later authors. Indeed, the prin­ ciples laid out in ca u s a ^ X III were discussed and adopted by every mediaeval

1 1 4 0 , and so a few years before the sermon in Porto, that the most influential

thinker [46] — whether he was theologian or philosopher or jurist — who

o f the d e cr e ta was put together: the C o n co rd ia d isco rd a n tiu m ca n o n u m made by a Benedictine monk, M aster Gratianus o f Bologna.23 G ratian’s D ecretu m

wrote on the theory o f the just war. The fetial form ula was not always preserved, in its strictly Roman form, in the mediaeval definitions o fju st war — it is absent from Aquinas, for example; but most authors stood by it. From

became

the

recognized

authority

fo r

canon

law

and

Christian

jurisprudence. C ausa XXXIII o f the second part o f the D ecr etu m deals w ith war. The second q u a estio o f the ca u sa begins like this: As to the question, What is a just war?, Isidore says, etym book ^X: C .l What is a just war? A war is just if, having been announced, it is waged either on account of the reclaiming of rights or in order to expel men.24*

21 For Plato see Rep 470AD; for Aristode, Pol A 1256b23-26. For the Stoics see F. Hampl, '“Stoische Staatsethik” und frUhes Rom’, Historische Zeitschrift 184, 1957, 249-271 [reprinted in R. Klein (ed), DasStatsdenken dtrROmer(Darmstadt, 1966), pp.116-142], who attempts to show that Cicero’s views on war are an amalgam of fecial law and the political notions of Panaetius; cf F.W. Walbank, 'Political morality and the fiends of Cicero’, Journal o f Roman Studies 55, 1965, 1-16 [reprinted in his Selected Papers, pp.157-180]. The question is intricate: it seems plausible to think that on certain points Cicero has leaned on Panaetius — but there is no direct evidence. In any event, the part ofthe theory with which I am here concerned depends entirely on the fetial law and on purely Roman ideas. — On Cicero see A. Michel, ‘Les lois de la guerre et les problfcmes de l’impdrialisme romain dans la philosophie de Cit:eron’, in J.-P. Brisson (ed), Prob/emes de la guerre a Rome (Paris, 1969), pp.171-183. 22 That is shown by the texts — sometimes ill-chosen — with which the bishop spatters his sermon: a l of them are found in causaXXIII ofGratian’s Decretum·, Ambrose, o ff I 36 = q 3 c 7; Matthew 52 = ad q 1; Jerome, ep cix 3 =q 8 c 13; the Amorites =q 2 c 3; Augustine, ep clxxiii 3 = q 4 c 38; John Chrysostom, hom in Matth 17 =q 8 c 14; Augustine, ep 4 -6 =q 1 c 3. 23 The text of the Decretum is edited by A. Friedburg: Magistri Gratiani Decretum, in Corpus iuris canonid I (Leipzig, 1879). On Gratian see G. Hubrecht, ’La “juste guerre” clans le Decret de Gratien', Studia Gratiana 3, 1955, 161-177; F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Mitddle Ages . (Cambridge, 1975), Chapter 3. 24 quod autem queritur quod sit be/tum iustum Ysidents Ethimol LXX.. inquit: C I. quidsit iustum. ■

bellum: iustum est bellum quod ex edicto geritur de rebus repetendis aut propulsandorum hominum causa.

an abundance o f texts27 I choose a paragraph by C hristine de Pisan: There are five principal reasons on which wars are based, three of them matters of right and three of will. The first reason of right why wars are to be undertaken and waged is in order to maintain right and justice. The second is to stand against the wicked who want to crush, overwhelm and oppress the country, the peace and the people. The third is to reclaim lands, territories and other things which have been taken and usurped by others with no just caused8 25 See Ivo [c.1040-1115], DecretumX 116; PanormiaVllI 54 (in PatrologiaLatinaCLXI). The two texts are the same, word for word, as the text in Gratian. Gratian continues, without a break, thus: cap. 1. iudex dictus est quia ius dictat popula ... Gratian is still copying Ivo; but Ivo indicates that he is now quoting from a different book of Isidore's etym (XVIII xv 6). Why Ivo — and then Gratian — chose to msert the remark about iudex I cannot guess. 26 See also Gratian’s preface to the first quaestio (milicia... instituta velob iniuriampropulsandam vel ad vindictam inferendam) and the note on the second canon (iustum bellum ... quod ex edicto geritur vel quo iniuriae ulciscuntur). The note has caused difficulties, and it has been proposed (by Russell, Just War. p.63 n.22) that the 'v el ' should be read with the force of a conjunction. But that cannot be correct: Gratian is citingAugustine, quaest in HeptVI 10, who maintains that an edictum is not a necessary condition for a just war. In the note, Gratian means that a just must satisfy either Isidore's conditions or Augustine’s conditions, and 'ex edicto geritur is intended as an abbre­ viated version of the Isidoran conditions. 22 See e.g. AlanusAnglicus, c. 1210 (cited by Russell, Just War, p.131 n.9); Raymond ofPefiaforte, c. 1180-1275, summa decadbus II v 17; William of Rennes (Russell, p.166 n.118, p.167 n.119); Johannes de Deo (Russell, p.199 n.198); Baldus de Ubaldis, c.1320-1400, consiliaV cons 439; John ofl.egnano, c. 1320-1382, tractatus de bello 76. 28 Christine de Pisan, c. 1364-1430, L'art de chevalerie selan V*Sgice, i 4: Cinq mouvements y a principaux sur quoi elles [sc guerres et batailles] sont fondles dont les trois sont de droit et les autres de volontd, Le premier de droit pourquoy doivent estre guerres emprises et maintenues est pour soustenir droit et justice. Le second est pour contrestre aux mauvais qui veulent fouler grever et oppresser la contr& la paix et le peuple. Le tiers est pour recouvrer terres seigneuries et autres choses par autrui ravies et usurpies a injuste cause.

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The ferial principle is only a part o f the theory o f just war, as the mediaeval thinkers developed it; but it is not the only part the origins o f which may be traced back to the Romans. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the mature theory o f the just war which is found in Alexander o f Hales or in Vitoria or in Suarez or in Grotius29 stands firmly on Roman foundations.3013 The laws o f war, the iu ra belli,51 were not drawn up by Greek philosophy or by Christian casuistry: they were drawn up in Rome and they come from an archaic pagan rite which was practised in the early Roman Republic.

IV So we may follow the career o f the iu ra belli from the old kings o f Rome to Hugo Grotius and beyond.32 Changes were — o f course — made, sometimes in expression but also sometimes in substance. Here I shall look at the texts o f Cicero, o f Isidore, and o f Gratian and so at six passages: the text in Book II o f the Republic, the two sentences taken by Isidore from Book III; the parallel passage in the de officiis·, Isidore’s own defi nition; the version o f that definition which Gratian (or rather, Ivo) presents. [47] From a logical point o f view, the four Ciceronian texts agree in proposing necessary conditions for a war’s being just. That is to say, each o f the four asserts that a war is just only if certain conditions are satisfied. The passages from Isidore and Gratian, on the other hand, appear to propose conditions which are both necessary and sufficient. But in the Decretum the passage which cites Isidore is set in the context o f an elaborate theory, and the context 29 See e.g. J. Barnes, 'The just war’, in N. Kretzmann, A.J.P. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (eds), The Cambridge History o f Later Mediaeval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982), pp.771-784. — In mediaeval theory there was an important distinction between a just war and a holy war. On holy wars (about which I have nothing to say) see e.g. T.P. Murphy (ed), The Holy War (Columbus OH, 1976). 30 Phillipson, International Law, pp.165-202, gives several Roman examples in which the medi­ aeval theory is anticipated. For 'international law’ in Rome see K.-H. Ziegler, ‘Das Volkerrecht der romischen Republik’, ANRW1 2 (Berlin, 1972), pp.68-114. 31 For the expression see e.g. Cicero, o ff I xi 34; Livy, XXXI xxx 2; in Greek, ‘oi τ ο ν π ολέμου ν ό μ ο e.g. Polybius, V xi 3. — According to Cicero, Pompey had singularem quondam laudem et praestabilem... scientiam in foederibus pactionibus condicionibus populorum regum exterarumnationum, in universo denique belli iure atque pacis (pro Balbo vi 15). Cicero adds that there are books which instruct us in such things. — The mediaeval theory distinguishes between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, the latter being concerned with the ways in which a just war may be justly waged. (‘Kill the boys and the luggage? ’tis explicitly against the law of arms.’) The fetial law concerns ius ad bellum. 32 Grotius’ de iure belli etpads — the title of which he took from Cicero, pro Balbo vi 15 — was first published in 1625.1have used the edition annotated by William Whewell (Cambridge, 1853).

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indicates clearly that the sentence in question was intended, despite its defi­ nitional form, to offer necessary conditions for a w ar’s being just and not conditions which are both necessary and sufficient. (And in other mediaeval texts, the fetial principle is regularly taken to supply a necessary condition.) In Isidore’s Etymologies there is no context to determine the interpretation o f the passage. Either he deliberately modified Cicero’s position, turning neces­ sary conditions into conditions which are both necessary and sufficient; or else — and, I think, more probably — he took him self to be repeating what Cicero had said. In any event, I shall suppose that the fetial principle is to be taken as setting necessary conditions. So a war isjust only ifX. As forX, there are differences among the texts, thus: A war is just only if (1) it both is notified and is declared (Cicero, Rep II) (2) it both is notified and declared, and it is waged on account o f rights which have been reclaimed (Rep III [a]) (3) its aim is either to get reparation or to expel enemy forces (Rep III [b]) (4) either it is waged after rights have been reclaimed or it is notified and declared (Cicero, o ff) (5) it is announced in advance and is waged either on account o f rights which have been reclaimed or to expel enemy forces (Isidore) (6) it is announced and is waged either on account o f the reclaiming o f rights or in order to expel men (Gratian) W hat is to be made o f the differences among those accounts? I begin with the four Ciceronian passages. There is no difficulty with item (1); for it is plainly no more than an abridgement [48] o f item (2). Item (2) proposes a conjunctive condition whereas the condition laid down in (4) is disjunctive — so that a war which was declared but did not concern reclaimed rights could never be just according to (2) but could be just for all that (4) stipulates.33 The disjunctive particles in the de officiis can scarcely be read in a conjunctive sense, and it is not easy to believe that the text is corrupt. (It would be nice to read 'e t ... e t ...’ — or better, ‘... a tq u e ...’ — for 'a u t ... a u t ...’; but I do not suggest that the text be emended in that sense.) Thus o f two 33 From a strictly logical point of view, the two conditions are not incompatible with one another, inasmuch as (4) does not formally exclude the conjunctive condition; but (4) plainly implies — in a perfectly normal sense of‘imply’ — that the conjunction is not a necessary condition of a war’s being just. And in that sense the two conditions are not in harmony. — In of f Cicero writes 'rebus repetitis’ rather than 'de rebus repetitis’·. I doubt if anything should be made of that difference.

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M a n tissa

I

things one: either Cicero changed his m ind between writing R ep and writing

|

Isidore claims to be interpreting Cicero — and in particular items (2) and

o ff, or else in o f f he intended to say w hat he had already said in R ep. T he second possibility is the m ore probable. In o f f Cicero isspeaking o f the fetial

I

(3). T he syntax o f his text is am biguous^ and it is w ith hesitation that I accept (5) as its interpretation. By ‘previously announced [p ra ed icto ]’, I

66

law. W e know that the fetial law gave a conjunctive condition like item (2) and not a disjunctive condition like item (4 ). So it is more likely that Cicero intended in j f t o express a conjunctive condition than that he deliberately

I

j j f

modified the correct view o f the fetial m atter which he had given in Rep. 3435*It is w orth adding that, from a theoretical point o f view, the disjunctive condition seems ve ry strange.

; ; ■

Item (3) offers a different problem. It is perfectly coherent with (2), but

?

w hat is its actual relation to that item? The context o f these fragments from the R ep u b lic is lost, and with it any hope o f giving a certain answer to the

j ;

question. Perhaps (3) means to specify the condition d e r eb u s r ep etitis which is stated generally in (2)? In other words, Cicero means that the condition d e

suppose that Isidore m eant ‘notified and declared’: unaware of, or uninter­ ested in, the details o f the fetial law, Isidore supposed that Cicero’ s double form ula ‘notified and declared’ in item (2) was rhetorical amplification, and that Cicero intended o n ly to require that a war be preceded by a declaration o f war. As for the rest o f item (5), it appears that Isidore took the rep etitio o f item (2) to be the same as the u ltio o f (3), and supposed th at the p r o p u lsa tio o f (3) was a supplement to the conditions laid down in (2). So the Isidoran Condition is this: [IC] A w ar is just only i f (i) it is announced in advance and (ii) either it concerns a dem and for reparation or else its goal is the expulsion o f enemy forces. G ratian claims to be quoting Isidore; but there are three differences

reb u s rep etitis m ay be satisfied in either o f two concrete ways — b y making w ar for the expulsion o f enem y forces (if the initial injustice was an invasion o f territory) or b y making w ar for reparation o r compensation (when the

: ,

between his text and the text o f Isidore. First, instead o f ‘ h o stiu m Gratian has 1h o m in u m . Is that a deliberate modification on the part o f Gratian (or

injustice did not involve m ilitary invasion). O r perhaps items (2) and (3)

(

rather, o f Ivo)? D id G ratian think that yo u m ight justly go to war in order

offer two independent conditions? In th at case, (3) presents a new condition, to be added to the condition stated in (2): the fetial principle itself dealt

;

\

simply w ith what ought to take place before a war was undertaken, and Cicero added a condition which fixed the permissible aims o f a war. 3?■

| *

to expel members o f a foreign State who were non-m ilitary squatters in you r land? O r is ‘h o m in u m a trivial error fo r ‘h o s tiu m — an erro r made in the copy o f Isidore which Ivo used (or an error introduced by Ivo himself)? I

The second o f those tw o possibilities seems to me the more attractive. In th at case, taking the four Ciceronian texts together, we m ay express the Ciceronian C ondition thus:

! ;

[C C] A war is just only i f both (i) it is notified and (ii) it is declared and

j.

(iii) it concerns [49] rights which have been reclaimed and (iv) its aim is the expulsion o f enem y forces or compensation fo r wrongs suffered.

i ΐ

incline, w ith no confidence, to th e second explanation, so that w e should suppose that Gratian, like his predecessors, is thinking o f wars undertaken to repel an invader. Secondly, where Isidore has ‘p r a e d ic t o ’, Gratian has ‘ e d ic to ’. Has G ratian deliberately modified his source in order to allow that a war m ay be just even i f i t is not declared in advance (so long as it is announced at some point)? O r has he changed the verb without intending to change the sense?37 O r did his copy — Ivo’s copy — have ‘e d ic t o rather than ‘p r a e d ic t o ’1 Once

34 For other attempts to interpret the text see e.g. Harris, WarandImperialism, p.165 n.2. Albert, Bellum lustum, p.12 n.7, says simply that 'Cicero's use of aut-aut here is not correct'.

3“ 'expraedicto’ might attach either to the clause ’de rebus repetitis’ or to the disjunction 'de rebus repetitis aut propulsandorum causa’. Gratian appears to opt for the second interpretation, and in the

35 According to Hampl, 'Stoische Staatsethik', the addition derives from Panaetius. — I suppose that Augustine's ultio and Gratian's vindicta are the same as Cicero's ultio. Russell, Just War, p.133, remarks that the Decretalists usually reject the notion of ultio because it suggests the unChristian. idea ofunrestricted revenge. But Augustine, for one, plainly — and correctly— takes Cicero's ultio to be a limited and legally determined way of gaining compensation for injuries received. — See also Cicero, Rep III xxiii 34 (apudAugustine, CD ^XII 6): nullum bellum mscipi a civitate optima

text I follow him; but see p.54 — formula [TC]. 37 Russell, Just War, p.62 n.24, opines that the word ’edictum’ was carefully chosen: an edictum is a decision made by a sovereign or prince, and Gratian means to underline the fact that a just war must be declared by the ruler of a State (compare Grotius, de iure, III iii 11, on the importance and nature of the indictio belli). The question of auctoritas was certainly important in mediaeval theories of just war (see Barnes, 'Just war', pp.775-777); and Russell's interpretation may well be right.

niti aut pro fide aut pro salute.

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again, I incline to suppose a trivial error on the part of a copyist rather than to ascribe to Gratian a deliberate modification to the doctrine.38 Thirdly, where Isidore has 'de rebus repetitis' Gratian writes 'de rebus repe­ tendis'. Once again, it is easy to imagine that a tired scribe o f the Etymologies miscopied his text. But in here it is perhaps more plausible to think of a deliberate modification made by Gratian [50] (that is, by Ivo), who may have seen that there was a certain lack o f symmetry between the two parts o f article (ii) in the Isidoran formula. In any event, the word 'repetendis', whether it was a careless error or a deliberate improvement — influenced all later texts, in which the gerundive is often found, the participle never. From a theoret­ ical point o f view, the change has significant consequences. Here, then, is Gratian’s Condition: [GC] A war is just only i f (i) it is announced in advance and (ii) its aim is either reparation or the expulsion o f enemy forces.39

V So much for the history o f the fetial principle — o f its career from Numa to Grotius, and o f the various modifications it underwent in the earlier part o f that career.40 There are dozens o f questions one might raise about the moral and political status o f the principle. I limit myself to a few which turn about the notion o f repetitio. , W hat does the word mean? Or better, what does ‘res repetere' mean? Literally, something like ‘reclaim’, ‘demand back’. Literally, res repetere presupposes res auferre and aims at res reddere. Your neighbour has taken your cow (vaccam abstulit). You reclaim it — you ask your neighbour to give it back to you {vaccam repetis). He does so {vaccam reddii). The idea is simple;

38 The bishop of Porto — according to the anonymous historian — used 1indicto’ rather than 'edicto' (or 'p raedicto’) and ‘hostium pulsandorum’ rather than ‘hominum (or hostium) propulsandorum'. 30 The summa Parisiensis— a commentaiy on Gratian dating fromthe end of the twelfth century — takes the text thus: a war is just if and only if either it is ex edicto or it is de rebus repetitu or its aim is ultio. That cannot be correct. (The passage may be found on p.211 of the edition by T.P. McClaughlin (Toronto, 1952).) 30 In outline: (i) there is the fetial principle — in the form given to it by Cicero; (ii) Cicero added conditions bearing on the aim of the war; (iii) Isidore tried to unify (i) and (ii), but the result produced an unpleasing asymmetry; (iv) Gratian removed the asymmetry by adopting a condition which mentions only aims and not also causes.

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and to understand the repetitio o f the fetial principle we need only remember in what a broad sense the word 'res was used in Roman law. A res may, o f course, be a concrete object like a cow. But it need not be: all my goods, all my effects, are res— my abstract possessions no less than my concrete posses­ sions. In particular, my various rights, moral and legal, are res. So rem auferre amounts in effect to a violation o f rights: your neighbour ‘takes some thing from you’ inasmuch as he does you a wrong or an injustice (iniurid), inas­ much as he violates your rights (jura). If rem aufene is a matter o f violating rights, then rem reddere is a matter o f giving satisfaction — it is the act, whatever it may be, which gives reparation to, or compensates, the victim whose rights have been violated. And rem repetere is to demand compensa­ tion, or reparation, or satisfaction.41 (Dionysius o f Halicarnassus Greeks 'res repetere' as ‘τ ά δ ίκ α ια α ίτ ε ιν : the translation is exact.42) So if your neighbour steals your cow and you make a repetitio, you are not asking for the cow back (after all, he may have butchered and sold it): you are asking that the wrong your neighbour has done you be righted, that you be given recompense or satisfaction. And he may satisfy you by giving you another cow, by paying you a sum o f money, or by doing pretty well anything else which might be deemed (by you, or by a reasonable man) to make up for the wrong. [51] You can demand satisfaction for any violation o f rights. The traditional theory o f the just war underlines the claim that you can, in principle, wage war on account o f any form o f violation: ‘There are as many causes o f w ar’, says Grotius, ‘as there are acts o f justice’.43 A just war is undertaken either de rebus repetitis (so Cicero and Isidore) or de rebus repetendis (so Gratian). The grammatical difference between parti­ ciple and gerundive makes for a large difference in sense. To wage war de rebus repetitis is to wage war on account o f injuries for which satisfaction has been demanded: the reference is to things already done — to a violation already allegedly made, to a claim already actually advanced. Nothing is said about the future. To wage war de rebus repetendis is to wage war in order to

41 cf Servius, on A eneidi. 14, where ‘res reddere' is glossed as ‘satis facere'. — In Livy, VII ix 1-2, the repetitio refers to an alleged wrong done by the Tiburtines when they refused to let Roman troops march through their territory (the ‘right of flee passage’ was to become a common theme in mediaeval and modern thought about war). The right being refused, the Romans ‘reclaimed the things’ inasmuch as they asked for compensation. 42 e.g. ant Rom II lxxii 4. 43 Grotius, de ture, II i 2.

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obtain satisfaction: the reference is, primarily, to the fixture inasmuch as it specifies the aim of the war. (There is, to be sure, also a reference to the past; for the specification supposes that a wrong has been done.) The two ways o f invoking repetitio thus lay down two conditions which are formally different from one another. The participial version has it that (i) a war is just only if it is waged after certain claims for reparation have been made. The gerundive version states that (ii) a war is just only if its aim is to gain reparation for certain injuries received. It is evident that condition (i) might be satisfied and condition (ii) not; for you might wage war after making certain claims and yet wage it in order (say) to annihilate the enemy or ‘to live in peace and justice’.44 It is equally evident that condition (ii) may be satisfied and condition (i) not; for you might make war in order to right wrongs without making any demand for reparation. No doubt there is some sort o f link between the two conditions. Perhaps it is likely that if you make war because o f unrighted wrongs, then you are making war in order to right those wrongs, and vice versa. But if that is so, it is contin­ gently so: logically speaking, conditions (i) and (ii) are independent. [52]

VI The tripartite fetial law — repetitio, denuntiatio, indictio — requires that a State go through a sequence o f acts if it is to wage a just war. It is contrary to the fetial law to go to war at the drop o f a hat, without advance notice and without giving the adversary State the opportunity to resolve the discord by peaceful means. That an interval must elapse between the repetitio and the beginning o f the war is implied by the very notion o f repetitio, which gives the adversary time to investigate the charge and to challenge it. It is frequently supposed that the fetial law is a piece o f theatre, or at least a piece o f ritual, rather than a thing o f moral or political importance. After all, the thirty day waiting period is purely conventional — why not

44 Cicero, o ff I xi 35: suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur. In any event, a just war must be non sine causa (Livy, XLV xxii 5; Cicero, Rep III xxiii 35). On the different sorts of causae see Albert, Bellum Iustum, pp.17-20. The notion of repetitio itself implies a certain element of causality: see below.

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twenty-five or thirty-five? No doubt a gentleman will not wage war without first giving a plain and unambiguous notice o f his intentions — but that is a matter o f fair play, not o f political morality or o f justice. W ar is not a game, and there is no obligation to wage it in accordance with the rules o f a game. On the contrary, the fetial rite, insofar as it allows thirty days o f reflection, gives the adversary the opportunity to strengthen its forces— and no prudent statesman will wish to do that. It is, o f course, true that the thirty days are an arbitrarily fixed period — any given number must be arbitrary. But the fact that the numerical deter­ mination o f the period is arbitrary does not mean that the existence o f some period or other is arbitrary. (And you might suggest that the law should not fix the period between repetitio and indictio but let it vary according to the nature o f the case.45) As to the requirement that a war be formally declared, a similar sort o f answer may be proposed: the indictio itself is a matter o f fair play rather than o f justice; for if you have given an advance notification o f a conditional intention there is no moral obligation to make, in addition, a formal declaration if the conditions obtain.46 The adversary is warned by the notification that there is a danger o f war: if he is attacked, he cannot claim that the attack was unexpected and therefore unjust. But that a war be noti­ fied — that the adversary State be told in advance o f the wrongs imputed to it, given the opportunity to acknowledge and right the wrongs, and plainly warned o f the consequences o f not so doing — that it might be thought, is something which political morality requires. As for the prudent statesman,

45 Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations reads like this: The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators of the judicial decision, or the report by the Council, In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute. 46 Against indictio see e.g. Augustine (see above, n.26) and Grotius (d eiu reIII iii 7.2— indictio is something exsuperabundantv, III iii 6.2.3— interpellatio is normally, but not always, required). The matter was much discussed at the end of the nineteenth century. The first article of the third Hague Convention of 1907 affirms that The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declatation of war. See e.g. A. Pearce Higgins, The Hague Peace Conference (London, 1909), pp.202-205; Lord McNair and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects o f War (Cambridge, 19664), p.7.

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he ought not to opt for war w ithout doing everything he can to maintain

|

So should the re p etitio condition o f the fetial law be replaced by the

peace: that is a counsel o f prudence which the fetial law endorses rather than opposes. [53]

| I

mediaeval necessity condition? I do not think so. Better, m odify the fetial condition — and m odify it in a sense which Cicero him self h a lf suggests.

•a

For the reference to the expulsion o f enemy forces may be regarded as a modification o f the fetial principle in the direction o f [54] the principle o f necessity. T hen w e m ight arrive at something like this:

V II

f

Even if you know that you have been unjustly treated, you cannot justly go

[

to war without ado: you must follow the fetial road to its end. The mediaeval theorists often observe that in order to be just a war must be ‘necessary’, and

j

[TC] A w ar is just only i f either it is notified and declared and its aim is reparation or else its aim is the expulsion o f enemy forces.48 In .any event, whatever made be thought about Hannibal and his elephants,

ί

there is no cause to abandon the condition d e reb u s repetitis.

there are similar statements in the Rom an texts/7 That is to say, you are justified in making war only i f you have tried all other ways o f getting justice.

|

W a r is the final court o f appeal; and you cannot appeal to the final court until you have been through the lower courts. It is true that, logically speaking,

\ \ \

the fetial law does not state o r im ply the view that a just war must, in that way, be necessary. But in practice the re p etitio condition would function in

)

the same w ay as a necessity condition. And in any event, it is plain that the fetial law does not permit war until pacific means have been tried.

j I

Surely the principle, required by justice and counselled by prudence, cannot be rejected? A nd yet there is at least one serious objection to it.

[

do, demand reparation for imaginary wrongs; but the fetial law speaks o f genuine wrongs.) T hat condition seems commonplace. It has two significant

Suppose an unexpected invasion. H annibal’s elephants have crossed the Alps. T hey are lined up in Italy, against our men. Hannibal has wronged us: his drunken soldiery has filched o ur horses, beaten our friends, assaulted our

j'; [ (

consequences for the theory o f the just war. First, certain sorts o f war are utterly excluded. For example, it is never just

sisters. I f we f ollow the fetial law , we must now ask Hannibal to right those

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wrongs — and sit on our backsides for a m onth w hile he decides whether or not to do so. During the m onth, Hannibal w ill conquer Italy. In such

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circumstances, the fetial business seems not m erely im prudent but absurd: it does not fiirther justice — it furthers the injustice o fa n unscrupulous enemy.

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are illegitimate. Com mercial wars, to gain trading advantages, are outlawed. W ars motivated by a love o f glory or explained by the desire to take prisoners and make slaves — wars o f the sort which both Plato and Aristotle found reasonable — are prohibited.

Here, perhaps, the condition o f necessity differs from the rep etitio condition. For is it not necessary to make war against Hannibal, and to do so at

!; ||

So too are wars o f humanitarian intervention. I f the internal politics o f a State are appalling — and there is no lack o f instances — that does not justify

once? Otherwise, Hannibal w ill w in and the wrongs which his arm y has done w ill remain forever unrighted. W a r is necessary although not all pacific means

| [

a w ar o f liberation. The kingdom o f Parthia, let us suppose, is a bloody and

have been tried. For in this case, war is the only possible means o f getting reparation.

ί j47

47 See e.g. Cicero, o ff I xi 34, xxiii 81; Livy, IX i 10 (iustum est bellum quibm necessarium et pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes). See Barnes, 'Just war', p.783.

;

V III The r e p etitio condition is strong. A war is just only i f you have demanded satisfaction for wrongs done; but you can demand satisfaction for wrongs done only i f wrongs have been done — hence you may justly war on a State only if that State has wronged you.45 (O f course, people can, and frequently

to wage a w ar o f conquest, or an imperialist war. W ars o f expansion, to unite a people or to secure L eb en sra u m or to acquire m ineral deposits or ... — all

repressive tyranny. Its subjects are treated in a barbarous and arbitrary fashion.

48 The formula [TC] is very close to one possible interpretation of Isidore: above, n.36. 49 unica et sola causa iusta infirendi bellum iniuria accepta — that is the determinatio omnium doctorum, according to Francisco di Vitoria [1492-1546], De Indissive de iure belli Hispanorum in barbaros, q 3.13. — But there were doctors who held that the imminent danger of a wrong being done might also justify war: see Barnes, 'Just war’, p.779.

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But Parthia has done no harm to Rome, nor to any Roman citizen. Since Rome has not been wronged by Parthia, Rome cannot demand reparation from Parthia; and were Rome to wage war against Parthia — in order to impose peace and democracy on that benighted place — then the war would be unjust. The question o f wars o f intervention is thorny, and it is intertwined with questions o f [55] national sovereignty. I shall not say anything about those complexities.* But there is one pertinent point which may as well be noticed. Thus fer I have taken the fetial law to say that a State A cannot justly war on a State B unless B has wronged A. But surely there are conditions in' which A may war on B even though B has not wronged not A but a third State, C. They are conditions of alliance. Suppose that A and C have concluded a defensive alliance, and that B and C are at war. Then if C is justly waging war against B, A too may justly war against B.50 So the reparation which the fetial law invokes had better be interpreted as referring to wrongs done either to A or else to an ally o f A. That is pertinent to the question o f humanitarian intervention; for the question may arise when a State is torn by civil war. Suppose, then, that A is allied to one o f the warring factions within B: then A may intervene in the civil war as an ally o f one o f the parties, and in that way a war o f intervention might be acceptable under fetial law. To be sure, that argument presupposes that a State may make an alliance with a faction within another State.

IX The second consequence o f the fetial principle is this: wars o f aggression may be just. Articles 2 and 51 o f the United Nations Charter are generally taken to outlaw all such wars.52 * See M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (London, 1978), pp.86-108. 50 e.g. Cicero, Rep III xxiii 35; o ff'll viii 26— further texts in Barnes, 'Just war’, p.778. 52 Article 2.4: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo­ rial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessaiy to maintain international peace and security. See e.g. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (Oxford, 1963), pp,74-92.

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The notion o f aggression is not a simple one. The ‘definition’ adopted by the United Nations in 1974, after long and painful discussions, is made up o f eight articles, some o f them o f labyrinthine tortuosity. The first article offers a general definition: Aggression is the use o f armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.

The second article declares that the use of armed force in violation of the Charter by a State initiating the action is sufficient p rim a fa cie proof of an act of aggression ... [56]

The third article contains seven specifications o f the definition, all o f them concerning the notion o f ‘the armed forces o f a State’. Article 5 is this: No reason o f any sort whatsoever, political or economic or military or other, can justify an act of aggression.

If B has not used armed force against A, then A cannot justly make war on B. The Roman theory implies that there may be just wars which are wars o f aggression.53 Suppose that Carthage attempts to destroy Roman commerce, that it impounds Roman ships, refuses to reply — or even to listen — to the demands o f the Senate for reparation. In such a case, the rights o f its citizens having been violated and due fetial procedure having been followed, Rome may justly make war on Carthage. Carthage is not the aggressor — it is Rome which is the first to use armed force. Nonetheless, the Romans have justice on their side. It seems to me that in this respect the fetial law is superior to the modern convention, and that the modern insistence on aggression is misguided. An act o f aggression is unjust insofar as it violates the rights o f the people who are attacked. But it is hard to think that one form o f violation, namely armed aggression, may justify war whereas other forms may not. For even in the case o f a defensive war against an aggressor, what justifies the war is not the fact o f aggression but the violations o f rights which such aggression causes. [57]

53 So Francisco Suarez [1548-1617], de triplice virtute theologica, tract III, disp XIII i 5: bellum etiam aggressivum non est p er se malum sed potest esse honestum et necessarium. — Some write as though the Roman theory excluded all non-defensive wars (e.g. Albert, Bellum Iustum, 19). True, if you give a broad enough definition of what is to count as aggression (e.g. by stipulating that any violation of any right is an aggression), then a war will be just according to the Roman theory only if it is defensive or in reply to an aggression. But such a stipulation is merely cranky.

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X The mediaeval condition de rebus repetendis is not explicitly laid down in the ancient texts — at any rate, I have not come across any passage which says that a war is just only i f it is de rebus repetendis.54 So in this way — thanks, perhaps, to the slip o f a copyist — the mediaeval theory added something to the Roman. If the participle ‘ repetitis’ sets certain restrictions on the outbreak o f war, the gerundive ‘ repetendis’ sets conditions on its end. State A has wronged B. B has waged a just war against A in order to right the wrong. A t the end o f the war, a victorious B may impose terms on A in order that the wrongs in question be righted. But that is all. B m ay not, for example, annexe the territory o f A, or transfer its population, or destroy its factories, or appro­ priate its scientists, or ... I f a war is justified by the fact that it is waged de rebus repetendis, then the justification cannot extend beyond the rectification o f the wrong. If a thief has stolen my wallet, I have the right to get it back — I do not have the right to deprive the thief o f all his goods, to kill him, to enslave his wife, ... (I do not have such rights even if the th ief is also a thoroughly unpleasant character who regularly beats his wife). It should be clear, first, that even i f a war is entirely just, the terms ofpeace are subject to certain conditions, and secondly that those conditions are to be explained by reference to the wrong which justified the war. Those two points are contained in the condition de rebus repetendis.

But the condition needs closer scrutiny. You might think that repetitio, strictly speaking, is concerned uniquely with the restitution o f the res in ques­ tion: i f you steal m y cows, those cows must be restored to me (or else I must be given other cows o f a comparable quantity and quality). That done, the repetitio is completed. Nonetheless, it is plain that the repetitio which the fetial law has in mind is not limited to what might be called simple restitution or compensation.

54 The closest passage is perhaps this piece of Polybius, V xi 5: οΰ γ ά ρ eir ά π ω λ ΐίψ Sei κ α ι ά φ α νισ μ φ τ ο ΐς ά γ ν ο ή σ α σ ι π ο λ ΐμ ΐΐν τούς αγαθούς άνδρας ά λ λ ’ iir l SiopOcuaei κ α ι μ ΐτ α θ ία ΐΐ τω ν η μ α ρτη μ ένω ν οΰδέ a vva va ip eiv τα μ η δ έ ν ά δ ικ οΰ ντα τοίς ή δ ικ η κ ό σ ιν άλλα σ υ σ σ ω ζ ΐΐν μάλλον κ α ι σ υ ν ΐξ α ιρ ίΐσ θ α ι τ ο ΐς ά ν α ιτίο ις τούς δοκ οΰντα ς ά δ ικ ΐϊν . The passage has been set alongside a celebrated paragraph in Plato’s Republic, 471A; but the diff erences are more striking than the similarities: Polybius, a civilized man, requires that even in time of war a certain amount of decency be preserved; Plato thinks that in wars between Greeks and foreigners there are no rules.

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First, war is expensive. An enemy who has been justly warred upon and justly defeated must foot the bill for his own defeat — otherwise, the victim, obliged to make war in order to defend himself or to right a wrong done him, would have to pay in order to get what is his right. The notion o f repetitio might perhaps be taken to include, implicitly, that sort o f payment. For if B must make war in order to get justice, then that very fact is another violation by A o f B’s rights — a violation for which B may justly require reparation. Secondly, criminals are punished; and an enemy defeated in a just war surely may — or even should — be punished. Insofar as the fetial law is a juridical procedure o f which punishment might seem to be an essential part, the concept o f [58] reparation, understood as a satis facere o f wrongs done, may be taken to include the element o f punishment. Thirdly, security is often invoked as pertinent to a just peace settlement: i f A has wronged B, m ay not B do its best to ensure that the wrong will not be repeated? May not Rome, the just victor, cut o ff Carthage’s supply o f elephants?55 But it is difficult to see how the claims o f security fit with the notion o f repetitio. Perhaps they are to be regarded as a part o f the punish­ ment o f the defeated State, as the most effective and the most appropriate form o f punishment? In that case, security will count as a part o f repetitio if punishment may so count. But I think that the demand for future security is a condition superadded to the condition o f repetitio·, and that it is better to say that after a just w ar the just victors have the right not only to repara­ tion (in a broad sense o f the word) but also to take measures to ensure their future security. At first sight the repetitio condition appears to place strict limits on the rights o f just victors. But if the three considerations I have just mentioned are read into, or added onto, the condition, then it may seem as though a just victor has a free hand. That is not so. There is at least one demand which is sometimes made on an enemy and which is excluded by the condition. I mean the demand o f unconditional surrender. That demand is implicitly rejected by the fetial law and by the mediaeval theory. W e don’t ask a thief to surrender unconditionally: the criminal law indicates what conditions are set on him after his surrender or capture. It seems — to us, now — perfectly evident that you should not hang a man for stealing a sheep. In the same way, a defeated enemy — a defeated enemy who has initiated an unjust war

55 See e.g. Cicero, o ff I xi 35 (above, n.43).

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— may say that there are certain conditions which circumscribe what may be done to him and which guard and preserve those o f his rights which he has not forfeited. The dem and for unconditional surrender is unjust: the condition d e reb u s rep eten d is requires that at the cessation o f a w ar the condi­

as a matter o f historical fact, done something to make the horrible circum­ stances o f war less horrible; and for so long as there are wars, it is better that they be regulated by rules than given over to a boundless barbarity. According to Clausewitz, war is the continuation o f politics by other

tions by which it was justified are respected.

means.58 I prefer the epigrams o f Christine de Pisan and o f Hugo Grotius: ‘W a r and battle which is made in just quarrel is nothing but a just execution

XI Lactantius says that the Romans by declaring war through the fetiales, by doing wrong legally, by constant theft and rapine, took possession of the whole world. (d iv inst VI xi 4)*

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o f justice’; ‘W a r begins where the law-courts en d ’.5? Those aphorisms corre­ spond better than the aphorism o f Clausewitz to the nature o f w ar and to the moral context in which it ought to be considered: war is the continuation o f justice by other means. The origin o f that legalistic account o f the justice o f war· is to be found in the Roman iu sfetiale.6 0 A n antique rite, practised by a semi-barbarous people, was the foundation o f a civilized attempt to make war less barbaric.ΰ1

He is alluding to a sentence in C icero’s R ep u b lic which chance has preserved: As far as our people are concerned, it is by defending its allies that it has now become the master of the whole world.5fi People w ho think o f themselves as realists declare that th e laws o f war are nothing but a disguise for personal am bition or political imperialism, that they are empty phrases, that they have no practical effect or value. People who think o f themselves as idealists condemn these same laws o f war. W ar, they say, is hell, it is outside the sphere o f morality, the laws o f w ar are an attempt to give bestial behaviour a hum an covering.57 It w ould be simple-minded to think that a legal code might abolish war or even make it less frequent o r less hellish — just as it w ould be simple-minded to think that a domestic penal code could abolish crime. But the realists and the idealists are, both o f them, no less simple-minded. The laws o f w ar have,

populus ipse Romanus... perfetia/es be/la indicendo et legitime iniuriasfaciendo semperque aliena capiendo atque rapiendo possessionem sibi totius orbis comparavit. 56 Rep III xxiii 35: noster autempopulus sociis defendendis terrarnm iam omniumpotitus est. — pace the commentators, the sentence must surely be heard with a touch of irony. 57 Historians have judged the fetial law in very different ways. It is the foundation of interna­ tional law — or a piece of antique superstition. It a mask for Roman imperialism — or a moral force which controlled and moderated Rome’s ambitions. It a purely formal practice — or the expression of a respect for law which wwas profoundly rooted in the Roman character. And so on. See e.g. Harris, War and Imperialism, who is largely sceptical (see esp pp.252-254) and Albert, Bellum lustum, who believes that ‘it can be shown that the theory of the just war had a very marked effect on Rome’s relations with foreign States’ (p.132). Such judgements no doubt reflect the char­ acter of the historian as much as the facts of history.

58 Carl von Clausewirz, Vom Kriege [1832/4], VIII vi B. 59 Christine de Pisan, L'an de chevalerie, i 2. Grotius, de iure II i 2; cf Cicero, o ff I xi 34 (cum

sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius si uti non licetsuperiore). 60 The commentators al note that there were close similarities between the fetial law and certain procedures in Roman civil law. Whatever may be the historical explanation for the similarities, it is plain that they were recognized by the Romans themselves and that they were deemed pertinent to the formulation and elaboration of the laws of war. 61 I thank Carol Clark, who generously read and carefully corrected an early version of this paper; Jacques Brunschwig, whose sharp and learned comments allowed me to make several improve­ ments; Benedict Kingsbury, who guided me through the minefield of international law.

Is rhetoric an a rt?

5 Is rhetoric an art?*

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T o w ard s th e en d o f th e second book o fh is I n stitu tio o ra to ria Q u in tilia n turns to th e questio n : Is rh eto ric an art? a n r h eto r ice a rs s i t ? H e is tem p ted to d ism iss the m atter — after a ll, everyone w ho has dealt p ro fessio n ally w ith the

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kn o w ledge o f the m ore im p o rtan t sub jects’ (I xi 4 6 ). S o .w h at, in fact d id the philosophers th in k ab o ut th e m atter? For the Stoics our evidence is am ple: rheto ric w as a reco gn ized b ranch o f p h ilo so p h y, b ein g o n e o f th e tw o parts o f lo g ic (e.g . D io gen es L aertiu s, V II 41). Z eno, th e fo u n d er o f th e School, h ad m u ch to say o n th e sub ject; an d his successors, C lean th es an d C h rysip p u s, both w ro te on rh eto ric (e.g. C icero, f i n IV iii 7), w h ich th e y defin ed as the a rt (τΕ χ νη — so m etim es or scien tia ) o fs p e a k in g w e ll (e.g. Q u in tilia n , II xv 3 4 ).2 D iogenes o fB ab y lo n , in th e gen eratio n a fte r C h rysip p u s, is so m etim es p resen ted as a ch am p io n o f rhetoric, an d it is clear th at he defen ded th e d iscip lin e ag ain st som e o f the accusations w h ich h ad been laid ag ain st it. B ut th e relev an t texts are corrupt an d h ard to in terpret, a n d it seem s lik e ly th at D iogenes w as not an u n q u ali­ fied frien d o f th e a rt.3 H o w ever th at m a y be, som e Stoics c e rta in ly set th eir heads ag ain st th e orators. P h ilo dem us refers g en era lly to ce rta in Stoic a rg u ­ m ents ag ain st rh eto ric.4 A risto n o fC h io s , the hetero do x p u p il o fZ en o , w ro te ‘ag ain st th e o rato rs’.5 P o sido n ius, w h atever his a ttitu d e to rh eto ric as a w hole

sub ject know s th at rh eto ric is an art; C icero asserts th at it is; the philosophers agree th at it is; y o u w o u ld h ave to be a fool, w a n tin g both eru d itio n an d sense, to d e n y th at it is; a n d even those foolish few w ho h ave d en ied it ‘d id n o t re a lly believe w h at th e y w e re say in g b u t ra th e r w an ted to exercise th eir in g e n u ity on a ta x in g topic’ (II xvii 1 - 4 ). N o neth eless, Q u in tilia n does

m a y have been, a tta c k e d th e rh eto rician H erm ago ras on a p articu lar tech n ical p o in t (P lu tarch , P o m p ey x lii 5), A n d am o n g the ‘m a n y ex cellen t p h ilo ­ so ph ers’ w h o rejected th e claim s o f rh eto ric C icero nam es M n esarch u s, th e

discuss the q u estio n , an d in six pages establishes to his o w n satisfactio n th at rh eto ric is in d eed a gen u in e art. It is p la in from Q u in tilia n ’s tex t th a t th e qu estio n w as a stan d ard o n e .1 It is p la in too — a n d th is is p erh ap s m ore in te re stin g — th a t it w as a question w ith w h ic h the philosophers co n cern ed them selves.

h ead o f th e Sto a in the la te second cen tu ry bc ( d e o r a t I xi 4 5 ). T h e Stoics

Q u in tilia n asserts th a t ‘th e p h ilo sop h ers, both th e Stoics an d m o st o f the P erip atetics, a g re e ’ th a t rh eto ric is a n art (II xvii 2 ). C icero h ad asserted the

z The texts are collected in SVFvol I, items 74-84 (Zeno), and 491-492 (Cleanthes), and vol II, items 288-298 (Chrysippus). 3 See S. Sudhaus, Philodemus: volumina rhetorica (Leipzig, 1892-1895), vol. III, p.XXXIX, who suggests, on the basis of [see below, n.4], that Diogenes argued against at least some forms of rhetoric. The testimonia to Diogenes' views on rhetoric are collected in SVF, vol III as items 91-126 of the section on Diogenes (al these texts are taken from Philodemus’ rhetorica, and their attribution to Diogenes is often dubious); see also items 17-24. 4 See rhet . — Philodemus’ rhetorical works survive only on charred papyri (and for several of the texts which will concern me, the papyri have been lost or destroyed and we have only modern copies to work from). Sudhaus' Teubner edition is still invaluable, though it has been superseded for Books I-II by Francesca Longo Auricchio’s text, which is printed as volume III of F. Sbordone, Ricerchesui Papiri Etcolemesi (Naples, 1977). My references to rhetI and II give, first, the number of the Book; secondly, within square brackets, column- and line-numbers in Longo Auricchio's edition; and thirdly, within angled brackets; volume-, page-, and (sometimes) line- (or fragment-) numbers in Sudhaus’ edition (note that ‘68.35' — say — refers to the line numbered 35 on p.68, not to the 35th line on the page). For other parts of rhet I give, within angled brackets, volume-, page-, and (sometimes) line- (or fragment-) numbers in Sudhaus. 5 Diogenes Iaertius, VII 163, presents a list of writings ascribed to Ariston of Chios — but he notes that ‘Panaetius and Sosicrates say that only the letters are genuine, the other items belonging to the Peripatetic Ariston’, Ariston of Ceos. See e.g. A.M. loppolo, Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico (Naples, 1980), pp.47-50.

opposite: ‘m o st p h ilo so p h ers’, he says, ‘d e n y th at rh eto ric is an a rt’ (d e o r a t I x x iv 11 0); fo r ‘a ll o f th em , as it [3] w ere w ith o n e voice, exclude the orator from th e go v ern m en t o f States a n d do not allo w h im a n y u n d erstan d in g or

* First published in ddrgNewsletterl, 1986, 2-22 (pp.15-22 were occupied by end-notes, which here have become footnotes). 1 For briefhistories ofthe business see e.g. G. Kennedy, TheArtofPersuasion in Greece (London, 1963), pp.321-330; J. Martin, Antike Rhetorik (Munich, 1974), pp.4-7; A.D. Leeman and H. Pinkster (eds), Cicero: de oratore libri ///(Heidelberg, 1981),vol I, pp.190-194. — Y.Z. Liebersohn, The Dispute concerning Rhetoric in Hellenistic Thought, Hypomnemata 185 (GOttingen, 2010), presents a reconstruction of the Hellenistic contribution to the question. He discovers a debate in two stages and with two aspects: the first stage, when Critolaus was the dominant figure, took place in the middle of the second century, and the second at the end of the second century under the leadership of Charmadas; one aspect of the debate was ‘external’, philosophers vs. rhetoricians, the other ‘internal’, Stoics vs. other philosophers.

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Is rhetoric an a rt?

held that only the ideal W ise M an, the σ ο φ ό ς , could be an orator (e.g.,

Philodemus, an Epicurean o f th e first century b c , reveal that there was

Sextus, M II 6): Mnesarchus explained that tru e oratory was a virtue, that the virtues form a unity (you possess one i f and only i f you possess all), and

considerable — and sometimes ill-tempered — disagreement within the [4] School over the status o f rhetoric. 10 Philodemus himselfinsists on the distinc­

that in consequence only the Sage could be an orator (d e o r a t I xviii 83). M ost ordinary ‘orators’ are m ere tradesmen, operarii·, rhetoric — at least the rhet­

tion between ‘political rhetoric’, which is concerned with speeches in the law-courts and the assemblies, and ‘sophistical rhetoric’, which is concerned with display speeches (or, in modern terms, w ith literary prose).n He main­

oric which ordinary men teach and practise — is no art. As fo r th e Peripatetics, Q uintilian refers to Aristotle’s Rhetoric·, no doubt he was thinking o f A 1 3 5 4 a l—11 (cf Sextus, M II 8).6 But he admits that

tains that political rhetoric is not an art but that sophistical rhetoric is an art; he maintains further, like any good Epicurean, that his own views are the

there wwas really no Peripatetic orthodoxy: in the G ryllus Aristotle him self ‘as usual thought up for the sake o f argument certain subtle considerations’ which suggested that rhetoric was not an art (II xvii 14);7 and Critolaus, a

views which were held by ‘the M en ’, by o i a v 8 p e s — by Epicurus, M etrodorus, and Hermarchus.i2 Quintilian does n o t refer to the Pyrrhonists; b u t from Sextus Empiricus,

Peripatetic contem porary o f Diogenes o f Babylon, was one o f th e most

who devotes a whole book to an attack on rhetoric (nam ely M I I ), we know that they were — as they were likely to have been — fierce opponents o f the claim that rhetoric is an art. N or does Q uintilian mention the Academ y as a

notable and influential o f the opponents o f rhetoric: m u lta C rito b u s co n tra (II xvii 14 ).89Critolaus’ pupil D iodorus followed his master (Cicero, d e o r a t I xi 45 ), and so too did D iodorus’ friend Ariston (Quintilian, II xv 19—20; cfSextus, M W 62). Staseas, a Neapolitan Peripatetic o f th e first century b c , was happy to debate the issue (Cicero, d e o r a t I xxii 104). T he Epicureans are m entioned briefly b y Quintilian: d e E picu ro q u i d is c i­ p lin a s o m n e s f u g i t n o n m ir o r (II xvii 15) — Epicurus rejected all the arts, so th at it is hardly remarkable i f he rejected rhetoric. Thus Plutarch notes that the Epicureans ‘w rite about rhetoric to deter us from oratory’ (a d v C ol 1 1 2 7 A ).’ But the issue is not quite so simple. The rhetorical works o f 6 Several of Aristotle’s successors wrote on rhetoric. For Theophrastus see W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples, and D. Gutas (eds), Theophrastus o f Eresus: sources for his life, writings, thought and influence, Philosophia Antiqua 54 (Leiden, 1992), items 666-713 (see e.g. D. Innes, ‘Theophrastus and the theory of style', in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed), Theophrastus o f Eresus, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 3 (New Brunswick NJ, 1985), pp.251-268; W.W. Fortenbaugh, ‘Theophrastus on delivery’, ibid,pp.269-288). For Demetrius of Phaleron see F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles IV (Basel, 19682), items 156-173. For Critolaus see below n.8. 7 The only other reference to the Gryllus is in Diogenes Laertius, II 55 (if indeed it is a reference); but it seems probable that there a close connection between the work and Aristotle’s celebrated attack upon Isocrates, the material on which is collected and discussed by I. Dilring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Ghteborg, 1957), pp.299-314. 8 On Critolaus see L. Radermacher, ‘Critolaus und die Rhetorik’, in Sudhaus, Philodemus III, pp.IX-XLII; F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles X (Basel, 1959), pp.45-74 (the texts on rhetoric are items 25-39); R. Goulet, ‘Critolaos de Phase.lis’, DPhA II (1994), pp.521-522. According to Radermacher, p.XVII, Critolaus is the real author of the case against rhetoric; but that judgement ignores both the long history of the dispute and also the part played in it by the Academics. . 9 Note too that two books (at least) προς Πλάτωνος Γοργίαν circulated under the name of Metrodorus: Philodemus, probably reporting the views ofZeno of Sidon, remarks that the second book not genuine: see Προς τούς ... [PHerc 1005], XI 13-15; cfA Angeli (ed), Filodemo: Agli amici delta scuota (Naples, 1988), pp.297-298.

School — although he does note that Hagnon, a pupil o f Carneades, devel­ oped arguments against rhetoric (II xvii 15). Sextus says the same o f Clitomachus and Charmadas (M II 2 0 ).u From Cicero too we hear o f

10 See esp rhet II [xxi 17-)xxvii 1] = . And see D.N. Sedley, ‘Philosophical allegiance in the Greco-Roman world’, in M. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds), Philosophia Togata I (Oxford, 1989 [1997']), pp.97-119. 11 κατ’ ά ληθααν ή σοφ ιστική ρητορική τέχνη τίς εστιν 7Tepi Te τάς em S elgeis οΐ'ας

αυτοί -ποιούνται και τάς των λόγων SiaOeaeis οϊ'ων αυτοί γράφουσίν 'Te και σχ ΐδιάζουσιν (rhet II [xxii* 29-36] = ; cf [xxi 17-27, xxii 25-34, xxiii 30-32, ^ v i i 22-21] = . — In quoting the papyri I indicate gaps and uncertainties onlywhen they raise genuine doubts about the reading. Thus I write here 'διαβέσίΐς’: Longo Auricchio puts the first iota in square brackets (to indicate that there is a hole in the papyrus), sets inverted commas round the alpha (to show that the letter was added above the line), and puts a dot under the second epsilon (since only a part of the letter is visible). — M. Gigante, Scetticismo e Epicttreismo (Naples, 1981), p.208, suggests that Sextus may be alluding to the Epicurean distinction at M II 43. It is also possible that the anonymous TivE"S' to whom Sextus ascribes his distinctionwere Stoics: the distinc­ tion makes essential reference to the σοφός, and if Sudhaus’ interpretation of Philodemus, rhet is correct (see Philodemus III, pOXXIX), then the distinction found in Diogenes of Babylon. A. Russo, Sesto Empirico: contra i matematici (Bari, 1972), p.XXII, n.35, ascribes the distinction to the Academics; but that can scarcely be correct, since the 'Twes who made the distinc­ tion are explicitly contrasted with the Academics. — The paradigmatical exponent of ‘sophistical’ rhetoricwas Isocrates: see e.g. rhet. In this context the word ‘sophis­ tical’ has, of course, no pejorative colouring to it. 12 Philodemus states his own views progr^arnmatically — and with uncharacteristic clarity — at end of the first book of rhet.. I [vii 9-29] = ; see also e.g. II [xxiii 33-xxiv 9, 13-23, xxvii 12-15, xliii 26-35, xlix 27-33) = ; cf [xxi 25-xxii 5l = . 13 On Charmadas see H. Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism? (Cambridge, 1985), pp.34-40; C. Brittain, Philo o f Larissa (Oxford, 2001), pp.312-328.

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Charmadas’ attack {de orat I xviii 84); and elsewhere Cicero adds the names o f Aeschines and Metrodorus to the list o f the enemies o f rhetoric {de ora t I xi 45). There can be little doubt that Carneades was the source and the inspiration for all those men, nor — more generally — that the Sceptical Academy played a lively part in the debate over the standing o f the subject.14 Mention o f the Academy recalls, finally, the fons e t origo o f the whole dispute. For the question, Is rhetoric an art?, was first raised — and given a controversially negative answer — in Plato’s Gorgias. Plato, in Cicero’s phrase, was harum disputationum inventor{de o ra t I xi 47), and the later argu­ ments look back, often explicitly, to the Gorgias as their starting-point.15

II W e possess four main texts on the topic. There are the pages o f Quintilian, dating from the first century a d . A little later, perhaps from the second half o f the second century, comes Book II o f Sextus’ Against the M athem aticians}6 Earlier, Cicero’s de oratore, written in 5 5 b c and with a dramatic date o f 9 1 , rehearses a part o f the dispute.17 And finally, roughly contemporary with Cicero’s text, come Books I and II o f Philodemus’ Rhetorica, which we possess in two different versions. There are the closest similarities among these texts,18 and it is plain that they are all drawing on a common stock. No doubt virtually all o f the i

14 Philo of Larissa, the last head of the Academy, is said rhetorum praecepta tradere (Cicero, Tuse II iii 9; cf de o r a tlll xxvii 110). The references are sometimes found embarrassing — or illumi­ nating. For how, it is asked, could a sceptic have taught rhetoric? So for as I can see, there is no inconsistency in a sceptical philosopher’s trying to get his pupils to speak in decent and effective prose. — When the three Athenian scholarchs went on their celebrated embassy to Rome in 155 b c , all of them — Carneades and Critolaus no less than Diogenes — were admired for their oratorical prowess: violenta et rapida Carneades dicebat, scita et teretia Critolaus, modesta Diogenes et sobria (Aulus Gellius, VI xiv 10). — Our texts do not say, and we should not suppose, that Philo regarded rhetoric as an art. — On Philo and rhetoric see Brittain, Philo, pp.328— 341. 15 For explicit invocations of the Gorgiassee Metrodorus [above n.9]; Philodemus, rhet; Cicero, de orat I xi 47 (Crassus read the Gorgias with Charmadas at Athens in 110 bc ): Sextus, ΆΠΙ 2; Quintilian, II xv 24-31 (24: pletique autem dum pauca ex Gorgia Platonis a prioribus imperite excerpta legere contenti neque hoc totum neque alia eius volumina evolvunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt. 14 M I-VI is generally supposed to be the latest ofSextus’ three surviving works; but we have only the vaguest knowledge of Sextan chronology. 17 See I xviii 80-xxiii 109, esp. xx 90-93 (Charmadas’ arguments against the thesis that rhetoric is an art) and xxii 102, with xxiii 107-109 (Crassus’ attitude to the question). 18 See Radermacher, ‘Critolaus’.

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material goes back to the middle o f the second century b c , when the three great scholarchs — Carneades and Critolaus and Diogenes — each tackled the question with vim and gusto. And much o f the material is still earlier: some o f it, as I have said, can be found in Plato’s Gorgias; were Aristotle’s Gryllus rediscovered, its contents would no doubt be largely familiar; and Epicurus certainly made some contribution.19 The dispute thus lasted for some five hundred years. But it had three periods o f particularly ebullient life: first, in the fourth century b c , in the debates between Plato’s Academy and the school o f Isocrates; secondly, from about 160 to about 100, in the tripartite argument among Carneades’ Academicians, Critolaus’ Peripatetics, and Diogenes’ Stoics — with Epicurean contributions from Zeno o f Sidon and his friends; and thirdly, iti the imperial period, with the discussions documented in Quintilian and in Sextus.20 [5]

III In the following pages I shall look at some o f the arguments against the thesis that rhetoric is an art; and I shall base my discussion on the latest o f our four main texts. For M l I has a clearly articulated structure. Sextus announces his theme (II 1) and reports a few analyses o f the concept o f rhetoric (II 2 -9 ; c f 6 1-6 2 ). He observes that those who have explained the concept have intended rhet­ oric as ‘an art or science o f speeches or o f speaking well, which produces persuasion’ (II 9). He proposes ‘by holding on to three elements, to show

19 Philodemus, rhet II [ix* 13] = . 20 The material in Sextus and Quintilian is, as I have said, mostly traditional, and it is tempting to suppose that they were merely reporting ancient battles. (The same temptation arises in connec­ tion with many of the arguments in Sextus’ works.) But see e.g. Russo, Sesto Empirico, pp.XXXXIII, who urges that Sextus was reacting to the renaissance of rhetoric in his own time. It is true that Μ II contains only a single, vague, contemporary reference to those who ‘in our own day [καθ' ή μάς]’ speak in the courts and the assemblies. But there is also some circumstantial evidence for contemporary interest in the issue: Radermacher, ‘Critolaus’, pp.XXIII-XXX, showed that Lucian’s Parasite parodies the arguments about rhetoric by applying them to the ‘art’ of being a parasite; and the arguments in Galen’s Protrepticus against the ‘art’ of athletics also contain echoes of the dispute over rhetoric (see protr I 20-39).

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the non-existence o f rhetoric’ (II 9).21 The Book then does indeed divide

o f Sextus’ objective: oth er opponents o f rhetoric simply urged that rhetoric was not an art; Sextus, like a good Pyrrhonist, argued that rhetoric does

into three parts: II 1 0 - 4 7 argues that rhetoric is not an art; II 4 8 - 5 9 argues that it has no subject-matter — that there are no such things as ‘speeches or speaking w ell’; and II 6 0 - 8 7 argues that it does not produce persuasion, or indeed possess any other end or τ.!λ ο ? .22 The argument is concluded at II 8 8 ; but Sextus then adds, as a sort o f Appendix, a set o f objections based upon the standard division o f rhetoric into three main branches (II 8 9 - 1 1 3 ) . Sextus’ arrangement o f his material is always clear, but i t is sometimes forced. In particular, some o f the arguments in his second and third sections might seem more appropriate to the first section. (Consider, for example, II 4 9 - 5 1.23) The explanation for this is no doubt to be found in the peculiarity 21 Επεί yd.p τέχνην η Επιστήμην λόγων η τού λεγειν και πειθοΰς π ε ρ ιπ ο ιη τ ι^ ν βούλονται τυγχάνειν την ρητορικήν ol την Evvoiav αυτής άποδιδόντες, πειρασόμεθα κ αι ημείς τω ν τριώ ν τούτω ν εχόμενοι διδάσκειν το άνυπόστατον αυτής· — The supple­ ment ‘εΰ’ is due to Radermacher: c f M II 6. — Numerous ancient definitions of rhetoric survive, most of them more or less the same as the one in Sextus: see e.g. Martin, Rhetorik, pp.2-4. 22 The structure of the Book thus shows how we should construe the syntax of the definition at II 9. Sextus must mean that rhetoric is (i) a τέχνη or Επιστήμη, (ii) the subject of which is λόγοι or to εΰ λεγειν, and (iii) the goal of which is 'TeJW. (Bury and Russo in their translations take the syntax differently: rhetoric is (i) a τέχνη or Επιστήμη, (ii) which is of λόγοι, or (iii) which is productive of το λεγειν and of 'TeiOW.) 23 Sextus states quite clearly that his άντίρρησις will have three components; and the divisions are themselves clearly marked (II 48, 60; cf88 — in 89 the Appendix is again plainly marked as such, ifBekker's ‘Επαπορήσειε' is correct [cf MIX 268]). The general object of the άντίρρησις is to show that rhetoric is dvu1TOOTa.Tov, non-existent (II 9; cf 88). The specific purpose of the first section is to show that rhetoric is not a τέχνη (II 12, 15, 16, 18, 24, 26, 43, 48). But at the start of the section, II 11, Sextus twice states his conclusion in its general form: ‘rhetoric does not exist'. The specific purpose of the second section is to show that rhetoric has no υλη (II■48; cf 88). Again, the conclusion is stated atthe start in the general form (II 48 — but Sextus here claims that the general conclusion follows from the specific conclusion). More puzzling is the fact that in this section the conclusion is sometimes stated as ‘rhetoric is not an art’ (II 49, 50 — and also 51 if, as I suspect, we should read ‘oVk εατιν Ενεκα του λεγειν τέχνη’ [the received text has ‘ρητορική ' rather than ‘τεχιιη']). The second section divides into two parts: at II 48-51 Sextus deals with the suggestion that rhetoric is concerned with λόγοι, and in II 52-59 with the' suggestion that it is concerned with το εΰ λεγειν or with καλη λεξις. It is remarkable that το εΰ λεγειν is treated as the supposed υλη of rhetoric rather than as its putative τέλος: the exponents of the view Sextus attacks (cfll 6-7) surely intended το εΰ λεγειν as a τέλος, and so other ancient authors take it. The specific goal of the third section is to show that rhetoric has no reAos. Again, the conclusion is (once) stated to be that rhetoric is not a τέχνη (II 60). The first part of the section contains a complex argument against the (standard) view that the τέλος of rhetoric is persuasion. Sextus ascribes this argument to ημείς (II 72), and proceeds in the second part of the section to give arguments which M.λοι have offered. At II 79-87 he produces specific arguments against other suggested τέλη for rhetoric. It seems clear that this constitutes a third part to the section and that the arguments of άλλοι are finished at II 78.

not exist. (M ore precisely, he produced arguments designed to induce suspension ofjudgem ent over the question w hether rhetoric exists.) Since his objective was different, he had to m odify w hat material he took over from philosophers o f other stripes. He24 did that in tw o ways: first, he introduced fresh and strictly Pyrrhonist arguments into the traditional mixture (see, for example, II 1 0 6 - 1 1 2 ) ; secondly, he redeployed some o f the old arguments, moving them from their original position over against the thesis that rhetoric is an art to a different — and less appropriate — argumentative station. I shall confine m y attention to the arguments w hich appear in the first o f Sextus’ three sections, the section in which he argues that rhetoric is not an art. From w hat I have just said, it will be clear that the restriction is somewhat arbitrary.

IV Before considering Sextus’ arguments, let us examine the view he is attacking. W h a t does it mean to hold that rhetoric is an art, a τ έ χ ν η ? Sextus him self begins by reporting a definition: Every art is a structure consisting ofitems ofknowledge which are mutually cohesive, and having reference to one of the ends which are usefil in life. (II 10)” [6] A n art is a structure or ‘system’ composed o f items o f knowledge: it is, in other words, a set o f theorems ( θ ε ω ρ ή μ α τ α ) or precepts (p ra ecep ta ). T o be

τ ε χ ν ικ ό ς , to possess an art, you need more than practical skill, more than

24 Or his source: on the difficult question of Sextus' relation to his sources see e.g. J. Barnes, ‘Diogenes Laertius IX 61-116:. the philosophy of Pyrrhonism', ANiRWII 36.6 (1992), pp.4241­ 4301 [reprinted below, pp.510-583]. 25 π ά σα τοίνυν τέχνη σύστημά Εστιν Εκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμιενων και Επί τέλος εΰχρηστον των Εν τψ β ίψ λαμβανουσών -ή ν άναφοράν. — Two small textual points. (i) Half the MS tradition omits ‘των Εν' before 'τώ β ίψ ’. The several parallel passages appear to support the filler text; but the sense of the definition is scarcely affected. (ii) 'λαμβανουσών' is Bury’s correction of the received ‘λαμβανόντων', which can hardly stand — you might also think οί^ αμβάνον' (cfll 60).

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‘know -how ’: a τ ε χ ν ι κ ό ς knows that so-and-so, and w hat he knows — the theorems which he has mastered — constitute his art. In that w ay, an art was

The definition cited by Sextus is found in a dozen other ancient texts.25 Its terminology is, in part, Stoic in origin, and several texts explicitly say that it was a Stoic definition — some claiming that it came from Zeno, the founder

traditionally distinguished from a knack, or mere skill, such as cookery or cosmetics. The items o f technical knowledge are ‘mutually cohesive’. The G reekw ord which that phrase rather loosely paraphrases is ‘α ν γ γ ε γ ν μ ν α α μ ^ α ι — 'having been exercised (or trained) together’ — is odd, and it has given rise to unintelligible translations. Cicero paraphrases by 'co lla te in te r se e t co m p a r a ta ■ ( ndW lix 148);26 and a pseudo-Galen offers the gloss: ‘contiguous and conso­ nant with one another, not disjointed’ (in tro d X lV 685). I suppose that they are more or less right; and that, whatever the precise sense o f the word may be (if indeed it has a precise sense), the point is that the items o f knowledge must be mutually coherent and cohesive, that they must form an organized system o f knowledge. (An axiomatized deductive system is — and wwas — the para­ digm o f such organization; but we need not suppose that only axiomatized systems o f knowledge count as ‘m utually cohesive’.) In that way, an art might be distinguished from disjointed bodies o f knowledge such as those which are contained in the G uinness B ook o f R eco rd s or in W hitaker's A lm anac. 2728* The mutually cohesive items o f knowledge must have reference to a goal

o f the Stoic School. But Quintilian states that it is a b o m n ib u s f e r e p r o b a tu s (II xvii 4 1 — where he contrasts it with Cleanthes’ definition), and we may believe him. No doubt some Stoic had first constructed, or at any rate popu­ larized, the definition; but it became com m on property — the dispute over the status o f rhetoric turns about the question o f whether it is a τ έ χ ν η in the normal Greek understanding o f that notion, not about the question o f whether it is a τ έ χ ν η in some special Stoic sense o f the word.30 Philodemus, like Sextus, recognizes the importance o f explaining precisely what a τ έ χ ν η is; and he reproves some o f his Epicurean opponents for misusing the term.31 This is his ow n definition: The Greeks conceive o f and call an art a state or condition deriving from the observa­ tion o f certain common and elementary items which pervade several particulars, a state which apprehends something and which produces something which those who have not learned it cannot produce in the same way, and which does so in a firm and stable fashion or else conjecturally. [7] (II [^avih 2-15] = ; cf 12-19] = )32

or end. That, presumably, is intended to mark practical arts o ff from theo­ retical sciences: arts and sciences are all organized bodies o f knowledge; but arts refer to some end — their bodies have some external goal beyond the amassing o f the truths which constitute them. Thus medicine aims at health: it is not m erely a collection o f medical truths. In that way, the art o f astrology might be marked o ff from the science o f astronomy. Finally, the goal o f an art must be a good or useful one; for every art refers to a goal which is ε υ χ ρ η α τ ο ν τ φ (cfH 49). That may seem a surprising condition; but it is there present in the text — and it was also subscribed to by Galen, among others, who says that ‘those practices the end o f which is not useful in life are not arts’ (p r o t r I 2 0 ).2S

26 cf Quintilian, II xvii 41: consentienta et coexerciMM. 27 Sextus does not explicitly state that the structure of an art must be explanatory, that the artist must know the reasons for the theorems to which he subscribes; but there is no doubt that this — which in the Gorgias is the prime requirement for a τέχνη — is implicit in the condition that an art be orderly. , 28 cf e.g. protr I 26: PHP V 784 (where Galen goes so far as to assert that ‘there is no other mark of an art than the utility of each of the parts of the thing it fashions’).

25 Some of them are printed in SVF — vol I, item 73 and vol II, items 93-97; see, more completely, K. Hilser, Die Fragmente zur Diakktik der Stoiker (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt, 1987), II, pp.420-427. In addition, there are numerous echoes of parts of the definition; e.g. in Sextus at PHIII 243, MVIII 291, XI 188. 30 pace Radermacher, ‘Critolaus’, p.XV, who says that 'the way in which Sextus brings his objec­ tions shows that the whole discussion is a unitary attack on the Stoics’; Liebersohn, Dispute concerning Rhetoric, p.54 n.131, who says that 'we shall prove ... that a considerable number of the arguments appearing in our sources were explicitly levelled against the Stoics, precisely for which reason they used the Stoic definition of art’ (cf p.210). 31 See rhet II [xxix 35-xx 35] = : the opponents use the word ‘τέχνη’ legitimately but catachrestically— cf [xviii 35-xix 11, xli 27-xliii 11, lii 3-10 (ομωνύμων)] = . See also Cicero, de orat I xxiii 109,-which contrasts a definitio subtilis (roughly, the Stoic defini­ tion of an art) with a definitio vulgaris (which corresponds to the catachrestic use mentioned by Philodemus). 32 voeirai τοίνυν και Xlye-rat τέχνη π α ρ ά -rois Έλλησιν egis f 8ia8eais από 1ra pa-r 71prfaew[s τιν]ων κoιvώ v και [a]-roi[xeiw]8Wv α διά πλeιόvω v διή κ eι -rWv έπι

μέpoυs καταλαμβάνουσά Tt και avvreAoiiaa ro tov rov olov 6μoίω s -rwv μ η μαθόντων o[V8ets], earTJK0Tws και fiefiaiw s [f κα]ι aroxao-riKWs. — The text contains two serious difficulties. (i) In line 13 Longo Auricchio reads ‘€[vioi]’ where Sudhaus had guessed ‘o[V8eis]’. Sudhaus’ text gives the required sense, whereas Longo Auricchio's is — to say the least — difficult to understand. (ii) On ‘[f κ α ]ί’ in line 14 see below, n.55.

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Philodemus claims to be giving not an Epicurean but a normal Greek account

stable fashion or else conjecturally’.33 T hat point will assume some signifi­

o f the notion o f a τ Ε χ ν η . A t first sight his definition is very different from

cance later on.

the one in Sextus. In fact, the differences are — at least in the present context — superficial. For the tw o men are defining rather different things. Sextus’ τ Ε χ ν η is an art o r branch ofknow ledge. Philodemus’ τ Ε χ ν η is a mental state or disposition (the state o f mind typical o f a τ ε χ ν ικ ό ς ) . The word ‘τ Ε χ ν η ’

V

has both uses in Greek, and the tw o are intim ately connected: a m an has a

A n art, then, is an organized body o f theoretical knowledge serving a practical

τ Ε χ ν η in Philodemus’ sense (i.e. he is τ ε χ ν ικ ό ς ) just in case he is master o f some τΕ χ ν η in Sextus’ sense. Once the difference o f approach is recognized,

end; and a man is an artist i f he possesses a certain system o f known truths by the help o f which he is capable o f achieving some end .34 (Henceforth I

the two definitions can be seen to be complementary. Sextan τ Ε χ ν η consists o f items o f knowledge or κ α τ α λ η φ ε ις . Philodeman τ Ε χ ν η is κ α τ α λ α μ β ά ν ο υ σ α τ ι — and its possessors are different from men

shall use the words ‘a rt’ and ‘artist’ fo r the Greek ‘τ Ε χ ν η ’ and ‘τ ε χ ν ι κ ό ς ’.

who have not ‘learned’ things. Sextan τ Ε χ ν η is organized. Philodeman τΕ χ νη ‘derives from the observation o f certain com m on and elementary items which pervade a number o f particulars’: in other words, someone who is τ ε χ ν ικ ό ς has an orderly grasp o f his subject which is based on general truths or ‘elem ents’ and proceeds through derived truths. (Philodemus’ text thus explicitly alludes to the paradigm o f organization, an axiomatized deductive structure.) Sextan τΕ χ νη , finally, has a goal or τΕ λος: Philodeman τΕ χ νη is σ υ ν τ ε λ ο ύ σ α something — it too is goal-directed. Philodemus does not say that the τΕ λο ς o f an art must be ε υ χ ρ η σ τ ο ν . Indeed, he explicitly asserts that we should leave aside in this context the question o f whether what comes about must be advantageous or not advantageous ,,, For we wanted to set out — and have indeed presented — that which holds o f everything o f whatever sort which is called an art. (rhet II [ ^ v iii 15 -18 , 24-29] = )*

T he norm al English senses o f the words should be forgotten.) Medicine was a paradigm art: there was a large and moderately well organized corpus o f medical knowledge; and by virtue o f his mastery o f the corpus a doctor was — or professed to be — able to achieve the goal o f producing or maintaining health. T hen is rhetoric an art like medicine? Some may think the [8] question trifling: others m ay find it antiquarian. T he latter will observe that, for the Greeks an d Romans, oratory had a vast practical importance: in the law-courts and the political assemblies speeches counted, and a good speaker gained cash and cachet. Today, public speechifying is both less common and less important. Rhetoric m attered in the past: it does not m atter now. A nd so the question o f its status has, so to speak, no living importance. — T hat view is w h o lly mistaken, for at least two large reasons. First, rhetoric concerns not only public speaking but also public writing. Even i f it were true that public speakers no longer had much importance or influence, public writers are (or so I should guess) more important and influential than ever. Every day produces thousands o f

Bad, o r neutral, ends are n o t to be excluded by definition: that is the one genuine point ofdisagreem ent between Philodemus and Sextus (and I confess

examples o f the subject-matter o f rhetoric; for every leading article in every

that I think Philodemus takes the superior line).

newspaper is, in principle, a piece o f oratory, as the ancient rhetoricians understood the term. (In most cases, to be sure, the oratory is contemptibly

There is also something found in Philodemus and lacking in Sextus: according to Philodemus, an art m ay approach its goal either ‘in a firm and

gauche and amateur — but that is beside the point.) Secondly, we should recall Philodemus’ references to the ‘sophistical’ branch o f rhetoric; fo r the

* drfoetaBw γα ρ em το[ν πα]ρόν[ to]s eiTe αυμφέρον e lr ου αυμφέρον

γινόμενον πάντως. ... αυτό γαρ ο πάατ) rfj καθ' όνδηποτε τρόπον πpoaaγopeυoμέvr) τέχνη πρόαεατι, τούτο eKQetvai βεβουλημεθα και δη πpoεvηvέγμeθa. to

33 But note that at MII 13 Sextus explicitly asserts that π&αα τέχνη ή τοι εατηκος έχει τό τέλος και πάγιον ... ή tod ώς τό πολύ εχόμενον. 34 See, e.g., M. Isnardi Parente, T^EXNH (Florence, 1966); A.M. loppolo, Opinione e scienza (Naples, 1986), pp.101-105.

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subject-matter of sophistical rhetoric is, roughly speaking, prose — or at least, literary prose. And (or so I should guess) there is as much prosing now as there ever was.3536So if the status o f rhetoric ever mattered, it still matters. Did it ever matter? In Cicero’s de oratore Crassus is asked for his view on the question o f whether rhetoric is an art. He grumbles in his bluff, Roman way that the issue is piffling — the sort o f thing to leave to the Greeks (I xxii 102). It all depends on how you define the word ‘art’: verbi controversiam diu torquet Graeculos, homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis (I xxiii 107). Probably rhetoric is a ‘thin art’, ars pertenuis 36 But it really doesn’t matter a hoot whether you call it an art or not. No doubt many w ill side with Crassus: the question is trifling — the sort o f thing to leave to the analytical philosophers. Should we side with Crassus? W ell, many people write prose. Some do it well, most do it badly. All possess a certain ability, some to a greater and some to a lesser degree. To ask whether rhetoric is an art is to ask whether the ability is, or can be, based upon systematic theoretical knowledge. Is there — or can there be — an organized body o f knowledge, mastery o f which will ground the ability to speak and write well? I can’t myself see how that could be a trivial question — I mean, how it could be a trivially terminological question, like the questions o f whether white is a colour or the ace a cotut card or cinematography an art form. Moreover, it seems to me to be a mildly interesting question. (Can all abilities be founded upon organized bodies o f knowledge? Does all know-how rest upon know-that? If so, w hy so? If not, what abilities do rest upon knowthat, and why do they do so?) In addition, I suppose that the question might well have some sort o f practical interest for people who habitually speak and write. (You might want to improve your ability; and if the ability may be grounded in some form o f systematic knowledge, then you might have a good reason to seek to acquire the knowledge. And certainly, were I myself convinced that rhetoric was an art, I should encourage — even bribe — my colleagues to become adepts. The pain o f reading their prose might be relieved.)

35 According to Cicero, rhetoric is even needed for polite conversation: de orat I viii 32. 36 I xxiii 107; cf 109 (ars vel artit quaedam similitudo— echoing Plato’s use o f βδωλον’: Gorgias 463D, etc); II viii 32 (... si non plane artem at quad artem quondam

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VI Sextus presents five arguments against the thesis that rhetoric is an art. I shall look at them in reverse order, and I shall be very brief with the first (or last) two o f them. [9] Sextus’ fifth — and so my first — argument turns on the idea that an art must be usefixl, ε ϋ χ ρ η σ τ ο ν . But rhetoric is useful neither to its possessors, who must consort w ith villains and lead a life o f constant worry (Μ II 2 6 -3 0 ),37 nor to States, since rhetoric encourages anarchy and contempt for the law (II 3 1 -3 4 ). The argument, which is ascribed to ‘the Academics’ (II43), is wittily turned. But it is absurdly one-sided: at I I 4 4 - 4 7 two groups o f objections are summarily dismissed; and Sextus does not for a moment consider the evident advantages which at least some practitioners o f rhetoric won from their practice. In addition, the fact that the argument relies on the stipulative claim that the end o f every art be ‘useful’ deprives it o f any substantial force. (What would you think o f the contention that black magic can’t be an art because its end is not a good one?) Quintilian discusses the argument; but he properly does so under the rubric an utilis rhetorice? (II xvi 1-6 ).38 Sextus’ fourth argument runs like this: ‘States do not expel the arts, which they know to be very useful for life ... but everyone has attacked rhetoric from all sides as a most dangerous enemy’ (II 20). This argument comes from ‘Critolaus and the Academics, including Clitomachus and Charmadas’ (II 20).39 It has, in Sextus, the same character as the fifth argument; and again Quintilian appropriately accommodates it under the rubric an utilis rhetorice? (II xvi 4). The argument appears in Philodemus.40 He rejects it — probably (the text is fragmentary) on the grounds that States have expelled such undeniably

37 The original source is Plato, Gorgias466BC·, cfTacitus, dialogus 13: inquieta etanxia oratorum vita. 38 Traces of this argument are probably to be seen in Philodemus: rhet . But the texts do not allow us to see how Philodemus decided to treat the issue. 35 And it is implicit in Plato: Gorgias 456C^457C (note 'ΐκ β ά λ λ ΐΐν ' at 456E2, 457B7, C2; cf 460D1). 40 rhet II [frag 9.6-26] = ; cf [frag 5] = ; . At Philodemus refers to some remarks by Diogenes of Babylon. It is not clear whether Diogenes advanced the argument or rejected it for reasons which Philodemus found feeble.

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bona fid e arts as music and philosophy. Sextus knows, and dismisses, this

point: there is, he alleges, no evidence for such expulsions; and if any States have expelled philosophers, they have been concerned to expel particular sects or Schools and not the art as a whole (II 25). Sextus’ objections are feeble. But then the whole thing is feeble.

VII The third o f Sextus’ arguments falls into two halves. First, he urges that ‘if it is possible to become an orator without partaking in rhetoric,... then rhetoric will not be an art’ (II 16); and secondly, he urges ‘conversely [ ά ν τ ισ τ ρ ό φ ω ς ] ’ that if the close students o f rhetoric are impotent in practice, then rhetoric is not an art (II 18).41 The premiss o f the former argument is established by appeal to the cele­ brated case o f Demades, an uneducated boatman who ‘is agreed to have become the best o f orators’ (II 16; c f I 295) — and if that story doesn’t move you, then look at the law-courts and the assemblies which are full o f able speakers who have never learned the precepts o f the rhetoricians (II 17).42 Quintilian was not impressed by the example o f Demades: he simply didn’t believe the story (II xvii 12); and Philodemus seems to have followed the same line.43 More importantly, both Quintilian and Philodemus rejected the principle on which Sextus’ argument implicitly relies. Thus Philodemus observed that ‘the evidence which they have set out presumably does not

41 The double argument is ascribed to Charmadas by Cicero: nam prim um ... neminem scriptorem arris ne mediocriter quidem disertum fuisse d iceb a telo q u en tissim u m autem homines qui ista nec didkissentnecomnino scirecurassent innumerabiles quosdam nominabat(de orati xx 91). —According to Liebersohn, Dispute concerning Rhetoric, p.67 n.32, ‘Barnes’ statement that II 18 deals with students is incorrect. The paragraph actually deals with teachers’. It does indeed deal with teachers — who were (I should hope) ‘close students’ of the subject they taught. 42 In a variant of the same argument the premiss is established by appeal to the Homeric heroes who spoke skilfully long before the inventions of the rhetoricians: see e.g. Philodemus, rhet ; Quintilian, II xvii 8. As Philodemus remarks, rhet , the variant is not substantially different from the version which appeals to Demades and his similars. See too the argument in Cicero, de orat I xx 90: we are born with an aptitude for persuasive discourse — rhetorical ability comes from nature and not by art. 43 See rhet (where Demades and Aeschines are mentioned together), and . Philodemus’ reference to Critolaus at rhet l-403a31; cf PA B 650b 35-651a4; Plato, Tim 70B); and elsewhere ‘x is afraid’ is taken to imply ‘the blood about x’s heart is cold’ {PA Δ 6 9 2 a 2 0 -2 4; R h etB 1389b 32).6

VI The beginning o f the de Sensu reduces the inseparability o f a large number 5 For a clear example see A 403bl 1: μα to εν τ φ θεάτρψ τιθέμενον i’ ου ϊσ τ α ν τ α ι ο ί τ α δ η μ ό σ ια λέγοντες- θυμόλη γ ά ρ οΰδέττω ήν. λ ί γ α γοΰν τις· λογειόν ε σ τ ι ττηξις εστορεσμ ένη ξύλω ν, ε ίτ α έξης οκ ρίβα ς δέ ονομ άζετα ι. 65 According to S.A. Naber (ed), Photiui: Lexicon (Leiden, 1864), pp. 116-117, the phrase ‘λέγει γοΰν τις’ is a dittography o f ‘λογειόν ε σ τι and should be excised. The suggestion has its charms; but with or without the phrase, there is an anonymous citation in the entry. 66 So E. Rohde, ‘Scenica’, Rheinisches Museum 38, 1883, 251-292 [reprinted in his Kleine Schriften (Tiibingen/Leipzig, 1901), II, pp.381-422], Rohde suggests, not implausibly, that the anonymous ‘τ ις ’ indicates that Helladius was still alive when the entry in Timaeus was written. — On Helladius see RA. Raster, Guardians o f Language: the grammarians and society in late antiquity, The transformation of the classical heritage 11 (Berkeley CA, 1988), pp.411-412.

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early fourth century. But o f course the citation from Helladius, like the citation from Porphyry, may be a later addition to the text; and I confess that the sentence ‘Aeyci τ ι ς ...’ does look to me rather like a later addition. The two cases o f Porphyry and o f Helladius point a moral: no general argument o f the form ‘O ur text o f the Lexicon refers to X: therefore Timaeus wrote after X' is sound; for it is always possible that the reference was added by a later reader. That moral may appear to be both arbitrary and cata­ strophic: catastrophic inasmuch as it condemns from the outset the most promising manner o f dating the Lexicon·, arbitrary inasmuch as it invokes a possibility, and once you start invoking possibilities you may invoke more or less anything you like. The moral may be catastrophic — if so, tantpis. But I do not think that it is arbitrary; for in fact — the fact will come up again and in some detail — the presence o f additions in a text like the Lexicon is a perfectly normal phenomenon. If explicit references offer neither a terminus post quern nor an interesting terminus ante quern, perhaps there are some implicit references which are more informative? Perhaps someone used Timaeus without saying so, and perhaps Timaeus drew upon someone and kept mum about it? W ell, no doubt that sort o f thing happened; but it is never easy to determine whether X drew upon Y — unless X confesses to doing so. The normal procedure is to discover striking similarities between X and Y. Sometimes there will be a passage — an expression, a sentence, a paragraph — which is found, word for word, both in X and in Y. More often, there will a resemblance which falls short o f identity but is so strong that it can hardly be due to chance. I shall call such things non-accidental similarities. Now if there is a non-accidental similarity between a passage in X and a passage in Y, then there are in principle three [26] ways in which it may be accounted for: either X copied (directly or by way o f one or more intermediaries) from Y, or Y copied (directly or indirectly) from X, or they each copied (directly or. indirectly) f rom some third author. If the relative chronologies o f X and Y are known, then one o f the three possibilities can be excluded. After that — and otherwise — decision depends upon a nice judgement about the nature o f the differences (if there are any) between X andY . An examination o f such non-accidental similarities and implicit references has suggested a terminus ante quern o f about 4 5 0 for the Lexicon. For Hermias — the fifth-century Platonist, father o f Ammonius — is judged to have made

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tacit use o f Timaeus in his commentary on the Phaedrus?7 In truth there is only one passage in the commentary which is at all close to anything in the Lexicon?* It concerns a note on the word ά ξ α ν τ η which occurs at Phaedrus 244E. Hermias explains it thus: He uses ‘έ ξ ά ν τ η for ‘pure’ . . for ‘healthy and free from sin’. The v is there for the sake of euphony. { inP haedr 97.25-27)*

The Lexicon has an entry for the word: ΐξ ά ν τ η : the v is there for the sake of euphony; for ‘healthy and free from sin’.** There is surely a non-accidental similarity between those two texts. Should we not suppose that Hermias used Timaeus? A t first blush, the supposition appears rather implausible. Hermias was a professor o f Platonic philosophy. Timaeus’ Lexicon was addressed not to Greek professors but to Roman gentlemen. It would be surprising i f Hermias had nevertheless made use o f the Lexicon — and then made use o f it only on one occasion. Then did Timaeus use Hermias? That supposition is less implausible — the compiler o f a Platonic dictionary might well consult Platonic commentaries. But if the entry in Timaeus does in fact derive from Hermias, we cannot — the point is already familiar — infer without ado that Timaeus wrote after Hermias. Or perhaps both Hermias and Timaeus used a third text? An earlier commentary on the PhaedruP. Such perhapses are pointless. The entry € ξ ά ν τ η does not help to date Timaeus. Implicit references do not serve to fix a terminus ante quern, do they help with a terminus post querril The evidence seems to be less meagre. After all, if you identify one o f Timaeus’ sources, [27] you thereby fix a terminus post quem\ and a Quellenforscher who occupies himself with Timaeus seems to have plenty o f material to work on. But — f or more reasons than one — the work is frustrating and its results disappointing. For the moment I offer a single illustrative example. Later, and in other contexts, other examples will be considered.678

67 So e.g. K. von Fritz, 'Timaios (8)’, Λ£ΎΙΑ (1936), cols 1226-1227, in col 1227. 68 von Fritz, ‘Timaios’, col 1227, refers in addition to in Phaedr 183.14-15. But there is no reason to invoke Timaeus there: see A.R. Dyck, ‘Notes on Platonic lexicography in antiquity’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 89, 1985, 75-88, on p.87 n.39. * ίξ ά ν τ η δε λ ί γ α α ν τ ί τοΰ κ α θ α ρόν κ α ί ί ξ ίν α ν τία ς ή δ ιίκ ε ιτ ο π ά λ α ι ποινηλατούμενος, ά ν τί τοΰ υ γ ιή κ α ί ίξ ω άτης- τό δε ν ε γ κ ίΐτ α ι δι’ ΐύ σ το μ ία ν . ** τό ν ί γ κ ΐπ α ι δ ι’ ΐύσ τομ ία ν· ά ν τ ί τ ο ΰ υ γ ιή καί ίξ ω άτης.

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Consider the dictionary to the Ten Orators which Valerius Harpocration put together. Harpocration flourished towards the end o f the second century ad.69 He and Timaeus share about 60 lemmas. In two o f the entries which the shared lemmas introduce Harpocration mentions Plato.70 The case looks promising. But the look is deceptive. In most o f the shared lemmas the content o f the entries is so different that there is no question o f any non-accidental simi­ larity — there is no similarity at all. In at most nine cases an optimist might think to find something more juicy; but in truth only two o f the nine can properly be deemed to show a non-accidental similarity. The first o f the two is this: Timaeus: άχαριστεΓν: not to gratify. Harpocration: ά χ α ρ ισ τεΐν: in the sense of ‘not to gratify’ — so Antiphon.*

The similarity is not accidental; and Harpocration did not take his gloss from Timaeus. But there is no reason to think that Timaeus went to Harpocration: both authors advert to a familiar sense o f a familiar Greek word, and neither need have relied on anything but his own knowledge o f Greek. The second case is different. Timaeus: κ ε ρ α μ ε ικ ο ί: two — one within the wall, the other without, where they gave burial to those who died in battle. Harpocration: κεραμα,κός·. Antiphon, in Against Nicocles, on boundaries. That there are two Kerameikoi, as the orator says, one of them in the city and the other outside where they gave public burial to those who died in battle and where they

® See J.J. Keaney (ed), Harpocration: Lexeis o f the Ten Orators (Amsterdam, 1991), pp.IX-X. — The edition is to be used with caution: see e.g. the review by R, Otranto, in Quademi di storia 38, 1993, 225-243. — POxy 2192 is part of a letter, author unnamed, about books; a PS refers to Harpocration and Pollio ('Harpocration says that they are among Pollio’s books’) and a PPS refers to Diodorus. The three have been plausibly identified as Valerius Harpocration, Valerius Pollio (a philosopher who flourished under Hadrian and who wrote a Collection o f Attic Expressions κατά, στοιχεΐον), and Pollio’s son, Valerius Diodorus (who had been a member of the Alexandrian Museum — PMerton 19 — and who wrote an Exegesis o f difficulties in the ten orators (see Suda, s.v. Π ωλίων)). See B. Hemmerdinger, ‘Deux notes papyrologiques’, Revue des Hudes grecques 72, 1959, 106-109; E.G. Turner, Greek Manuscripts o f the Ancient World, BICS 46 (London, 19872), pp.l 14-115 (with a photograph of POxy 2192); id, Greek Papyri: an introduction (Oxford, 1968), pp.86-88. 70 Namely ‘δ ευ σοπ οιός’ and 'διω λύγιον'. — In Harpocration’s Lexicon there are 18 explicit references to Plato. In 15 of them a particular dialogue is specified. In 3 of them Harpocration cites the text of Plaro. (His Lexicon contains in all about 1250 entries.) * Timaeus: μ η χ α ρ ίζ εσθ α ι; Harpocration: άντί τού μη χ α ρ ίζ ε σ θ α ι■ούτω ς Άντιφών.

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delivered the funeral orations, is shown by Callicrates (or Menecles) in his On

Athens* [28] The entry in Timaeus looks like an excerpt, lightly retouched, from the entry in Harpocration. So Timaeus used Harpocration — and therefore composed his Lexicon no earlier than the end o f the second century. The conclusion is seductive (and m ay well be true). But w hy think that the entry in Timaeus drew upon Harpocration rather than upon Harpocration’s source? Harpocration refers to a work On Athens : perhaps Timaeus used the same work?** And in any event, the entry in Timaeus was not written by Timaeus: the word ‘κ ^ ρ α μ α κ ο ί’ is not found in Plato, and the entry is one o f a group o f non-Platonic items which have somehow been interpolated into the original Lexicon.*** Harpocration offers no terminuspostquem. It would be tedious to examine all the entries in Timaeus’ Lexicon where an implicit reference to an earlier author might be suspected. Perhaps there are cases less discouraging than the two I have just described. But, so far as I am aware, no scholar has found a single example which stands up to scrutiny. Are there other ways o f fixing the date o f the Lexicon, apart from the refer­ ences, explicit or implicit, which it contains? In the prefatory letter, Timaeus says that the expressions he will explain ‘are unclear not only to you Romans but also to most Greeks’. The second part o f the remark is no doubt a polite­ ness. Nonetheless, we may believe that at the time when Timaeus wrote Plato had become, for many Greeks, a difficult author insofar as some elements o f his vocabulary were found obscure. So at the time when Timaeus was writing, each lemma was obscure whereas the expressions used in the glosses were (of course) current. Then if, for example, most o f the lemmas were current in the second century but obsolete by the fourth, that would be an indication that Timaeus wrote [29] during

* Timaeus: δύο· ό μεν ένδον τείχους, 6 δε εκτός ένθα r o v s εν π ολεμώ τελευτώ ντας εθαπτον. Harpocration: Άντιφών εν τ ώ π ρ ό ς Ν ικοκλεα π ερ ί όρων, ό τ ι δύο είσ'ι Κ εραμεικοί, ώ ς κ α ί ό ρή τω ρ φ η σ ίν, ό μεν ένδον τής πόλεω ς, ό δε ετερος εξω ένθ α κ α ι τούς εν π ολεμ ώ τελευτήσ αντα ς εθαπ τον δη μ ο σ ίψ καί τούς επ ιτα φ ίους ελεγον, δ η λοΐ Κ α λ λ ικ ρ ά τη ς ή Μ ενεκλής εν τώ περί Αθηνών. ** Harpocration refers to the On Athens again s.v. Έ ρμα t; see also Suda s.v. Κ εραμεικός; scholiast to Aristophanes, av 395 and pax 145. The work is ascribed to ‘Menecles or Callicrates’ or ‘Callicrates or Menecles’: F. Jacoby, ‘Kallikrates’, RE X (1919), cols 1639-1640, thinks that Callicrates revised a work first written by Menecles. *** See below, pp.95-99.

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or after the third century, and i f the glosses reek o f the third century, then that century would be corroborated. In the prefatory letter Timaeus notes that those expressions which Plato employs ‘according to the Attic usage’ are unclear, even to most Greeks. Now during the period in which ‘Atticism’ flourished — between, say, the first century bc and the third century ad — words in the A ttic dialect were a la mode. It was fashionable to spatter your prose with them. You and your readers would be expected to understand them.71 So — according to the argument o f the preceding paragraph — it is unlikely that Timaeus wrote his Lexicon during the Atticizing period. That is a tempting argument; but it is to be resisted. Atticism was an artifice. It was a mark o f refined writing. It was not the language o f ordinary commerce. Timaeus might well have said, at the apogee o f Atticism, that words in Attic dialect had become obscure to the Romans and even to most o f the Greeks. If that general argument fails, may not some particular cases succeed? Here is an example. Timaeus: α να κ ο γχ υλ ία α α ι· ά ν α γ α ρ γ α ρ ίσ α ι.

Pollux: What people now call ά να γ α ρ γ α ρ ίσ α σ θ α ι they used to call ά να κ ο γ χ υ λ ίσ α σ θ α ι, namely, clearing your throat. The comic poet Plato says ... (VI 25)* Thus at the time o f Pollux one o f Timaeus’ lemmas was out o f date and the expression Timaeus used to gloss it was [30] what people now say. So Pollux and Timaeus were more or less contemporaries. The argument has some force, and it might be joined by a handful o f others.72 But a minute

71 The Atticizing movement has been much debated. It seems that it began among the rhetori­ cians — in all probability in Rome, in the 50s bc . The movement aimed to replace the exotic style of the Hellenistic orators by something simpler and purer and more classical (the model was Lysias). The movement quickly spread from Latin to Greek and from rhetoric to literature in general; and the models came to be the prose-writers of classical Athens, among them Plato — to whom Herodotus was sometimes added. There is a tour d'horizon in J. Wisse, ‘Greeks, Romans and the rise of Atticism’, in J.G.J. Abbenes, S.R. Slings, and I. Sluiter (eds), Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle — a collection o f papers in honour o f DM. Schenkeveld (Amsterdam, 1995), pp.65-82. * d μ ά ντοι ά ν α γ α ρ γ α ρ ίσ α σ θ α ι o i νΰν λέγουσιν, ά ν α κ ο γ χ υ λ ίσ α σ θ α ι έλεγαν, το άνα κ λύσα σθ α ι την φάρυγγα· Π λάτων δ’ 6 κ ω μ ικός φησιν- ... 72 Note, for example, the presence of the word ‘φ ο υ ρ ν ο π λ ά σ τ ο ί as a gloss on ‘ίπ ν ο π λ ά θ α ι’: the gloss is a Latinism, and the word ‘φούρνος’ is not attested in Greek before Erotian (voc Hipp 78). But that does not tell us much about the date cf Timaeus; and it would, I fear, be a fantasy to think that the Latinism was an elegant — or a condescending? — gesture to a Roman friend.

M a n tissa

T h e P la to n ic lex icon o f T im a eu s th e S op h ist

examination o f the glosses and the lemmas yields no strong and general conclusion. It cannot (for example) be said that the glosses smell o f the third

I start w ith D idym us, fo r w hom w e have a text — o f sorts. In his M ela n ges d e littir a tu r e g recq u e, which appeared in 1 8 6 8 , Emmanuel M iller published

century rather than o f the second or the fourth, nor that the lemmas were current in the second century and obsolete by the fourth.

a Platonic lexicon w hich — in the only manuscript w hich has preserved

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it — bears the tide: [32]

I n fin e , there is no demonstrative p ro o f o f the date o f Timaeus and his L ex icon. Few w ill doubt that it was written between, say, 10 0 ad and 500

Didymus, On difficu lt expressions in Plato LIίδ ν μ ο υ 7Tep l τ ώ v ά π ο ρ ο υ μ ε ν ω ν π α ρ ά Π λ ά τ ω ν ι λ έ ξε ω ν .

ad , an d most w ill guess that it was w ritten between, say, 1 5 0 an d 3 5 0. But

I do not think that anything more precise ^

M iller thought that th e author was Didymus Bronzeguts, th e indefatigable Alexandrian grammarian, and he took him self to have uncovered a Platonic

reasonably be guessed. [31]

T im a e u s a n d h is colleag ues

lexicon which had been w ritten in Alexandria towards the end o f the first century bc / 4 (Perhaps he recalled that D idym us o f Alexandria had w ritten a

Tim aeus’ P la to n ic L ex icon is not the o n ly member o f its class: there are — there were — oth er dictionaries which specialized in Plato. A fter all, in the

work, in at least seven books, on D ifficu lt E xpressions Z5) But the text which M iller published is not a piece o f Hellenistic scholarship: the very first entry in the lexicon refers to an author w ho lived long after Dionysius — and the

im perial period, Plato was one o f the m ost w idely read o f classical authors, his text was not always easy to com prehend, numerous commentaries had been w ritten — so w h y not a dictionary?

whole production stinks ofB yzantiu m /6 T he piece contains some sixty entries. It begins w ith a curiously isolated notice. T hen comes the first part o f the work, which consists o f two distinct

Late authors occasionally refer to ‘those w ho are expert in the language’ o f Plato (e.g. O lym piodorus, in G org iv 9). Am ong the experts was Longinus:

sequences oflexical remarks, each sequence in alphabetical order. T he second part contains entries which are more elaborate in style and higgledy-piggledy

Proclus reports th at ‘Longinus does not look dow n on the study o f words’ (in T im . I 68 [19E]), and in connection w ith a particular passage in the T im a eu s he notes that ‘here too, Longinus shows that Plato was concerned

in arrangement. The lexicon ends like this: There are many other expressions o f the same sort, which it would take too long to consider. The ones I have given will be enough for a mastery ofPlato’s language. & for the interpretation o f the expressions, I have [33] run through whatever seemed to me to be straightforward and plausible and suggested by the context — following in all this the advice o f my teachers and not insisting that it is not possible to explain

about the appropriateness and the variety o f his expressions’ (I 8 7 [21A]). Proclus observes that Iamblichus criticized Longinus for ‘spending too much time over words’ (I 87 [21A]) — and earlier Plotinus had naughtily said that Longinus was a philologist not a philosopher (Porphyry, v i t P lo t xiv 19 -2 0 ). But no doubt m ost Platonists recognized that the study o f Plato’s language was a usefiil thing. In an y event Longinus w as an expert in the language o fP lato . But he never com piled a Platonic lexicon. A traw l for Platonic lexicographers nets five names: Timaeus — and (in alphabetical order) Boethus, Clem ent, Didymus, H arpocration/373

73

On Platonic lexicography see esp Dyck, ‘Platonic lexicography’; cf Dorrie and Baltes,

Platonismus III, pp.54-61,226-235; H. Alline, Hutoire du Texte dePlaton (Paris, 1915), pp.141­ 143; E. Miller, Melanges de Littiratu.re Grecque contenant un grand nombre de textes inJdits (Paris, 1868), pp.385-388; Ruhnken, Timaei Sophistae, pp.VII-VIII; Fabricius, BibliothecalV, pp.582­ 583; Menagius, a d Diogenes Laertius, III 63. — In this context scholars sometimes invoke the work of Ammonius, a pupil of Aristarchus, Hepi των ΰπο Πλάτωνος μετηνεγμενων. Jg Ό μηρου (scholiast on J/iadIX 540); but Ammonius was interested in Homer rather than in Plato.

i

74 On Didymus see e.g. J.-M. Flamand, 'Didymos Chalcenteros', DPhA II, pp.768-770 (Flamand accepts Miller's ascription of the lexicon); R. Pfeiffer, History o f Classical Scholarship from the beginnings to the end o f the Hellenistic age (Oxford, 1968), pp.274-279; L. Cohn, 'Didymos (8)', REV (1905), cols 445-472. See Harpocration, s.v. δερμηστης· Δ'δυμος ... ev , της άπoρoυμενηs λεξεως. Harpocration is certainly referring to the grammarian. For the title compare Boethus (below, p.279), Valerius Diodorus, 0 γράφας εξηγησιν των ζητονμενων παρά τοίς δεκα ρητορσιν (Suda, s.v. Πωλίων), Claudius Casilo (published by Miller in his Melanges·, jk τω ν Κλαυδίου Κασίλωνος παρά τοίς Ά ττικοΐς ρητορσι ζητούμενων). 76 See e.g. K. Latte, ‘Zur Zeitbestimmung der Antiatticista', Hermes 50, 1915, 373-394, on pp.392-394; Dyck, 'Platonic lexicography’, pp.82-83. — According to Dyck, the lexicon was written by a Byzantine student under the supervision of his professor in order to help less advanced students master Plato's language. Dyck fixes the second half of the ninth century as a terminus ante quem, since the lexicon was used by Photius — in a version fuller than the text we possess (p.83 n.26).

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each of the items in a different way. As for the other writers who ought to be read, I shall deal with them in a future memoir. (406.23-29)*

N or does the text give the slightest reason for thinking that he had also interested him self in Platonic lexicography.

This curious w ork raises several curious questions. Here I lim it m yself to two: w hat is the relationship between [Didymus] and Didymus? and w hat is- the relationship between [Didymus] and Timaeus? [Didymus] surely made use o f several earlier texts: was D idym us the gram­ marian among them? had Didymus the grammarian perhaps w ritten a Platonic lexicon a few fragments o f which are preserved in [Didymus]? So far as I can see, there is o n ly one en try in [Didymus] w hich has a n y known connection with Didymus. In Aristophanes’ W asps Bdelycleon says 11V 8 ' EgExn εΐ'λη κ α τ ’ ορθ όν, η λ ιά σ ε ι rp o s ή λ ιο ν . (v«p 772-773) A scholiast notes: It is a feeble play on words, Didymus says. For since the brightness of the sun is called ε 0.11 and the law-court is called η λ ια ία , he plays on the fact when he says to the litigatious man that ‘when the sun rises you’ll be able to go to court’. In Attic «0.11’ is spelled in this way, with an iota. Thus Didymus.** [35] D idym us here is the grammarian. H e said something about the w ord « ί λ η . A n d there is an entry for the w ord in [Didymus], nam ely this: ει>.11: the brightness of the sun and of its rays.*** Perhaps th e entry depends — at som e removes — on Didymus? W ell, perhaps it does. But the similarity between the two texts is slight; and even i f [Didymus] does depend on D idym us, he does not depend on a Platonic gloss by D idym us. For D idym us was concerned w ith a line in Aristophanes.

W h at about Timaeus? [Didymus] never cites him. But did he nevertheless make use ofhim ? O f the 6 0 lemmas in [Didymus], 35 are found in Timaeus. In more than h a lf the cases the glosses are so different that no question o f dependence arises. But there are also cases o f non-accidental similarity. One en try is found in exactly the same form in the tw o texts:

μ € τα π οΐ£ Ϊσ θ α ι· ά ντιπ ο ιεισ 0 α ι. But the gloss is banal and it proves nothing.77 M ore interesting are the cases in which the glosses in Timaeus and [Didymus] are similar but not identical. Here are three: [34] Timaeus: δ η μ ο ύσ θ α ι· δημοκοπεΐν, π α ιζειν, εύ^ ρα ινεσθα ι. [Didymus]: δημ ούσθαι· π α ιζειν. Timaeus: ά π οκναιειν· κ α τ ’ ολίγο ν ά π ο ζυειν κ α ι ώ σ π ερ ει διαψ^ειρειν. [Didymus]: άπ ο κνα ιειν· ά π ο λυειν 11 διαθειρειν. Timaeus: κατόπιν· μ ε τά τα ύ τα . [Didymus] : κατόπιν- μ ε τα το ύτο, ώ s Π λ ά τ ω ν Ev I'opyiq.· κ α τ ό π ιν EopTTJs 11'κομεν. In the first case, you m ight incline to judge th at [Didymus] had borrowed and abridged the entry in Timaeus. Sim ilarly for the second case — where the text o f [Didymus] must be corrected (aTTogVeiv’ for ‘aT T oA veiv’). But the third case seems to go in th e opposite direction: [Didymus] cannot depend on Timaeus since he has inform ation which Timaeus does not. W h a t is to be made o f that? 77 The situation is somewhat complicated. The Coislinianrn has:

p.iTa'ITotiiaOat dvrt roil 1Tote£a8at. * Kal άλλο 8e πλήθος Ea'Ti rWv o v rw s Εχόντων Ae^etBiwv wep ? Wv μακράν av e l j 8tEpxea8at· Kal raiJ'Ta yelp dnox p^ au 7Tpos την μ άθ η α^ 'Tijs IlAaruviKijs φ ράσΐω s. την 8’ E^y'r}atv d■πέ8paμov rWv Ae£eiSiwv dis Εφάνη ^iot Kara ro πρόχ€ΐρον Kal wt8avov Kal avveκφ aιvόμevov Ek rWv avμφ paζoμevω v, dκoλovθήσas rWv KaOyyrJrWv Tats icf>YJy^aeatv, ou Stϊaχvptζόμevos Ws ούχ Erepws Svvarov avrWv tK aarov Eg11y e la 8at· wept SE rWv άλλων Wv χρη 1TapaSiSoa 8a i rijs dvayvw aew s, E^s v 170[iv11p artad pevos

dvaSWaw. ** Jvx pw s SE nenaixe, ef>rjatv 6 Δ(Svμos, wpos τoΰvoμ a. EπetSή ya p eίλη AiyeTai ή -rov ή λ ίo v a ύyή , ή λ ιa ia SE to S ικ aaτή ptov,π aίζω v €φη 77pos rov · τα ο &λλα w s αν Ικαοτον ΐπΐλθτ] τά ξ 0μ ev.

^ rjp&pTov κα.ι Tepi τ·ην Tag it>, °ι μ €ν άσvμφ vλovs δvvάμ eιs avγκpovσavτes, ol ο€ κατα ο τοιχ ΐίον καταγράψ αντΐς ...

Timaeus imposed a strict alphabetical order on his lexicon, [72] were they not rather acting in accordance with the intention and wish o f Timaeus? W e re they not correcting the text o f C o islin ia n u s in such a w a y that the entries in the L ex icon were arranged ‘by the letter’ as Timaeus had promised? No — or at least, not quite. For ‘arranged by the letter’ does not mean the same as ‘in alphabetical order’; every alphabetical list is arranged by the letter, but a list arranged by the letter is not thereby alphabetical. Alphabetical ordering is something we all master easily and exploit constantly — when we consult an index or look up a telephone number. But i f alphabetical order is easy to use, it is not simple to define. H ere is a ridiculously elaborate definition. I call a list a finite sequence o f expressions, and an ex pression a finite sequence o f letters. A list is in a lp h a b e tica l o r d e r if and only if, for every pair o f expressions E and E* w hich it contains, E is before E* i f and only ifE is alphabetically prior to E*. A nd E is a lp h a b etica lly p r io r to E* if and only if two conditions are met: (a) the first n letters

* Similarly, the entries in the anonymous ancient lexicon to Herodotus, in its original version, were arranged according to the order oftheir occurrence in the Histories. Later, and more than once, theywere rearranged by the letter. See Ros4n, Laut- und Formlehre, p.219. The same thing happened to the Homeric Epimerismi, and no doubt to several other texts.

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o f E are the same as the first n letters of E* (where n 0), and (b) either (i) the n+ 1 th letter o f E is earlier in the alphabet than the n+1 th letter o fE * or else (ii) E has only n letters w hile E* has more than n. (Clause (ii) is necessary

T he underlying idea is simple. I f a list o f English words is ordered ‘by the first letter’, then ‘bear’, ‘beaver’, and ‘buffalo’ are all earlier than ‘camel’; but the o rder o f th e three words beginning w ith B is not determined. I f the list

to account for the fact that, alphabetically, ‘bye’ comes after ‘b y ’.) Am ong the lexicons which Photius knew was one by a certain Helladius.140

is ordered by the second letter, [74] then ‘bear’ and ‘beaver’ will com e before

[73] Read the lexicon of Helladius, arranged by the letter, the longest of all the lexicons I know. ... He does not observe the order of letters for all the syllables but only for the first. (bib! cod 145, 98b40-99a6)* Helladius’ lexicon was arranged ‘by th e letter’, but it was not in alphabetical order; for the order ofletters was applied only to the first syllable o f any entry: in a lexicon organized along Helladius’ principles, ‘chicken’ would come before ‘egg’, but between ‘chicken’ and ‘chickpea’ the order would not be

‘buffalo’, but the order o f ‘bear’ and ‘beaver’ will be indeterminate.* Say that a list is a r r a n g e d b y th e f i r s t le tte r i f and only i f fo r every pair o f expressions E and E* on the list, i f the first letter o fE is earlier in the alphabet than the first letter o f E*, then E comes before E*. In the same way, a list is

a r r a n g e d b y t h e s e c o n d le tt e r i f and only i f (a) it is arranged by the first letter, and (b) ifE begins w ith the same letter as E*, then E comes before E* if either (i) E consists o f a single letter or (ii) the second letter o f E is earlier in the alphabet than the second letter o f E*. A nd so on. It would be easy, but tedious, to define th e general notion o fb ein g a r r a n g e d b y th e n t h letter. A list is in alphabetical order if and only if, for every n, it is arranged by

determined by the letters. Sim ilarly, Galen refers to one o f his own writings as ‘a w ork in which

the nth letter.** The advantages o f ordering by the letter are evident; and ancient texts and

words used by the authors o f A ttic prose are collected by the first letter’ (o r d lib r p r o p X IX 60). Every expression beginning w ith an alpha precedes any

inscriptions from the H ellenistic and the im perial periods offer numerous examples o f lists so ordered — lists o f books and lists o f tax-payers, lists o f

expression beginning with a beta; but among expressions beginning with an

people and lists o f fish.142 A fter all, as Diogenianus said, it is easy to find an entry in a list arranged by the letter. T here are other advantages too: when

alpha no order is determined. 141 Again, in the preface to his L ex icon , Hesychius says that Diogenianus preferred an order of three or four letters at the beginning of each expression' so that anyone who decided to read the books might the more easily find the expression he was looking for.** Diogenianus organized his dictionary by the third or fourth letter — what does that mean?

;

Athenaeus wants to give a list o f texts pertaining to fish, he says that ‘I shall order the names by letter so that the items I mention w ill be easier to remember’ (277C ). If arrangement by the letter is advantageous anywhere, then it is surely advantageous in a word-book. The advantages o f alphabetical ordering are also evident. I f you are looking for an entry in an alphabetically ordered list, you can rapidly tell w hether it is there or not, since there is only one place where it could be. A telephone directory alphabetically arranged [75] is easy to consult. An unordered

140 On this Helladius (4th/5th century) see Kaster, Guardians o f Language, p.289. * άνεγνώσθη AegiKov κατά οτοιχΕίον Έλλαδίου, ών ισμεν λ egικ ώ v πολυστιχώ τa'Tov. ... oVSJ Kara π ά σα ς τάς συλλαβάς τ η ν tov otoιχΕίου ra giv φ υλάττei κατά μόνην

-την αρχουσαν. 141 So too for Galen's Hippocratic lexicon: The entries will be ordered, as you ask, according to the order of the letters with which the γλώσσαι begin. (voc Hipp XIX 62} He means that the order of the entries is (partially) fixed by the first letter of the lemmas. cf simp medtempXi 79 I. ** προέθηκΕ δ€ κ α τ ’ αρχήν έκάστης lilgew s τριώ ν ij reaacipw v στοιχΕίων rcigiv iv’ ούτω ς ΕυμαρΕΟτέραν Ιχοι τη ν ev p ea w ής έπιζητΕί rd g ew s 0 r o ts βιβλίοις έντυγχάνίΐν

προαιρούμΕνος.

* The order of 'bear' and 'beaver' might be arbitrary — or it might be fixed by some other principle, as it is in Eusebius' Place-names (below, p.75). ** Some scholars prefer a different terminology: where I speak of alphabetical order, they speak of strict or ful alphabetization; and an ordering by the letter which is not (strictly or fully) alpha­ betical they cal a partial or incomplete alphabetization. 142 I cannot refrain from citing this epigram on an undertaker:

el μέν τούς α τό άλφα μόνους κέκρικας κατορύσσΕΐν, AovKie, βουλΕυτάς, και τον αδΕλφόν ΙχΕίς· el δ’, άτΕρ Ευλογόν έστι, κ α τά οτοιχέΐον 08eVeis, ήδη, σοι προλέγω, Ωριγένης λέγομαι. (Anth PalXl 15)

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directory would be a nightmare. A directory ordered by the second or third letter would be, at best, vexatious to use. Or rather, a large directory arranged by the third letter would be vexing. But a small directory — a directory for the commune of Ceaulmont, for example — might be perfectly satisfactory and perfectly easy to use if it were arranged by the third letter. Or think of the index of a normal academic book: in fact it will be alphabetical; but it would serve its purpose just as effectively were it arranged by the third or fourth letter. In the prefatory letter to his dictionary of P la ce-n a m es, Eusebius says:

is it easily done: if you, or anyone else, should want to add farther entries, that be done without disturbing the items which are already there. Arranging entries by the second letter takes longer and is more tedious; arranging entries by the third letter takes still longer and is still more tedious; and so on. In antiquity alphabetization was a rare phenomenon, and even ordering by theletterwas less common thanmighthave been imagined: there are hundreds of lists where the order of entries is arbitrary and where ordering by a letter would have had practical advantages. The earliest reference to ordering by the letter occurs in an inscription from Cos which dates from the third century b c : there was a list of the votaries of Apollo and Hercules which was very old and hard to read; the citizens of Cos [76] decided to have a copy made; and it was decreed that the names be inscribed ‘by the letter, in order, beginning with alpha’.143 The decision suggests that ordering by the letter was already a familiar practice, and it is unlikely that it was peculiar to the Coans. The first word-book to be arranged by the letter was the Γ λ ω σ σ α ι of Zenodotus, the director of the Alexandrian Library. A scholiast on Homer who was worried by the word ‘α μ ν ώ ν ’ in Book III of the O dyssey says that ‘Zenodotus put this word among the γ λ ω σ σ α ι which begin with a delta’ (on Od\W 444). That is to say, Zenodotus read Ό α μ ν ίο ν ’ rather than ‘α μ ν ί ο ν ’ in his text of Homer, so that in his Γ λ ω σ σ α ι he put the word under Delta. The scholiast implies that the Γ λ ω σ σ α ι was organized by the letter: he does not indicate by which letter, nor, of course, does he imply that it was organ­ ized alphabetically. (And a cautious scholar will observe that the order in Γ λ ω σ σ α ι which the scholiast knew may not have been the order in which the author himself had set them down.) The papyri preserve some fragments of lexicographical works which were arranged by the letter. The oldest dates from about 250 B C : twenty entries (beginning with delta and epsilon) ordered by the second letter.H4 The most elaborate dates from about 200 a d : twenty or so entries (all beginning with mu), ordered alphabetically.^5 It is easy to imagine that authors of lexicons

1 shall take the items in question from all the Holy Scriptures, and 1 shall set them down each by its letter so that you will easily find them as they present themselves to you at haphazard in the course of your reading. (onorma Περί καθολικής προσω δίας. το μ€ν ya p vvv χρονικόν Επίρρημα τασσΕται Ε·πί τω ν τριώ ν χρόνων, Ενεστωτος, παρω χημινου και μέλλοντος, οϊον οτι άγω ν νυν Εστι, νυν Εσται το δ€ νυνι Επί μόνου Ενεστώτος. ** δήπουθεν' εκ τινος τόπου η α ντί τοΰ δηλονότι, ίσον τφ φανερόν.

K wA aK perat: the treasurers responsible for the payment of jurymen who also provided what was spent on the gods.*** IfPhotius took the entry from Timaeus, Timaeus surely took it fro m Pausanias. To be sure, he modified slightly the structure o f the gloss, and perhaps he miscopied the lemma; 157 but it is Pausanias from whom he took his entry. That is not the end o f the story. A scholium to Aristophanes’ B ird s (1 5 4 1 ) says that ‘Aristophanes the g r ^ ^ a r i a n ’ — Aristophanes o f Byzantium * το δ€ δήπου vilv μ€ν τοπικώ ς κεΐται. άλλως δ€ παρα τοις ύστερον Ά ττικοϊς, κ α ί αΰτο κ αί το δήπουθεν βεβαιω τικά ε ισ ιν ώσπερ το δηλαδή καί το πάντω ς καί το άμελει. καί αντο yap Ws τα π ολλα καθάπερ Εν ρητορικφ ευρηται λεζικφ , αντί τοΰ πάντως λαμβάνεται, συyκaτάθεσιv δηλονν. ** κωλayρε^aι· οι τα μ ία ι -τοΰ δικαστικον μισθοΰ καί τώ ν εις θεούς άναλωμάτων. *** κωλακρεται· τα μ ία ι τοΰ δικαστικού μισθον οι καί τα εις θεούς άναλισκόμενα παρείχον. 157 The misspelling — gamma from kappa — was in the text ofTimaeus which Photius read.

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— gave an explanation o f the w ord [84] ‘κ ω λ α κ ρ έ τ α ι . No doubt Aristophanes’ gloss was lifted by Pamphilus, w ho stuffed it into his ow n vast lexicon. No doubt Pausanias found it in his copy o f Pamphilus. Then

Perhaps Timaeus had a copy o fP lato marked up in the Alexandrian manner: a m arginal chi w ould alert him to the need for a note, and the margin might

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Timaeus found the item in Pausanias, and Photius found it in Timaeus. O r rather, Photius found it both in Tim aeus and also in another dictionary; for his L ex icon contains one entry under ‘κ ω λ α γ ρ Τ τ α ι ’ and another under ‘κ ω λ α κ ρ Τ τ α ι’. A n d o f course the scholiast on the B ird s found the thing som ewhere or other. A ll that is v ery pretty.158 But as a m atter o f fact, not a single text associates the gloss w ith Pausanias, and there is (so far as I can see) no particular reason to think that it appeared in his A ttic lexicon. M oreover, even if it did occur in Pausanias’ lexicon, w h y suppose that that was where Timaeus discovered it? W h y might he not have found it in Aristophanes o f Byzantium, or in Pamphilus, or in a Platonic commentary, ...? O ther questions might be posed. But I shall suppress them. For the en try ‘κ ω λ α γ ρ τ α ι ’ can tell us

also contain the germ o f a gloss. H owever th at may be, Tim aeus had his sources. H ow did he use them? M odern scholars sometimes w rite as though an ancient compiler w ould find h a lf a dozen appropriate books on his shelves, get out a pair o f scissors and a pot o f paste, and cut and glue his w ork together. No doubt things were sometimes like that. But not, surely, w ith Timaeus the Sophist. W e might rather imagine something like this. Timaeus read through his Plato. He looked out fo r a tell-tale chi in the margins, and he underlined other expres­ sions which seemed to him to be, or to have become, obscure. (‘I have chosen the items w hich the philosopher uses glossematically or according to the Attic usage ...’) Next, he copied the expressions onto tablets, or slips o f papyrus, organizing them semi-alphabetically. (‘I have arranged them by the letter ...’) There are the lemmas: now for the glosses. Some, perhaps, he had already

C oislin ian u s, and it cannot have been in the L ex icon w hich Timaeus compiled.

taken dow n from the margins o f his Plato; some he found in the commen­ taries on Plato w hich he possessed or could get his hands on; he also consulted various learned w orks — general lexicons, A tticist lexicons, antiquarian

Com m entaries and lexicons apart, w here else m ight Timaeus have gone

essays, ...; and o f course — something w hich scholars tend to forget — he

for his material? In a certain number o f entries the lemma is a term — often a proper nam e— relating to the political or social institutions ofAthens. T he glosses are often learned; and it is plausible to think that Timaeus used a

called upon the rich and varied stock o f his own memory. (‘... and added explanations.’) A n d then he had the whole thing copied out in a fair hand,

nothing whatever about Timaeus’ sources. T he w ord ‘κ ω λ α κ ρ Τ τ α ι never occurs in Plato’s writings: it is one o f the non-Platonic entries in the

and he posted it o ff to his friend. [86]

scholarly w ork such as the A tthis o f Philochorus or the A th en ia n C on stitu tion o f Aristotle (or else, o f course, some manual or lexicon which was itself founded on such learned works).

A bad dictionary?

A n d there is something else w orth recalling. T he Alexandrian scholars had invented a group o f signs w hich they put in the margins o f their copies o f

Suppose that that story is roughly correct: then there are some consequences. Since Timaeus started out by marking difficult passages in the dialogues, the

Homer to indicate [85] that there was something notew orthy about the text.

lemmas o f the L ex icon are not — or not normally — simply obscure words or expressions: rather, they are particular Platonic instances o f expressions

T hey did the same for Plato:

w hich are, or have become obscure. Timaeus is n o t concerned, or at an y rate Since certain signs are found in his books, we had better say something about them: a chi is used to indicate expressions and figures and, more generally, a Platonic usage; ... (Diogenes Laertius, III 65) 159*

not prim arily concerned, witQ. Plato’s use o f (say) the word ‘v v v i ’: he is concerned, or at least prim arily concerned, with Plato’s use o f ‘v v v { ’ in this

158 It is told by Erbse, Untenuchmgen, p.28. 155 e’TTet Se κ αι ση/ιεΐά τινα tois β ιβ λ ίoιs α ύτοϋ παρατιόνται, φέρε κ αι περί τούτων τ ι εΐπωμεν- χ ΐ λαμβάνεται προς τά$ AΕξεις κ αι r d σ χ ή μ α τα και ολως την Πλατωνικήν συνήθειαν,... — On these signs see A. Gudemann, ‘Kritische Zeichen', REXI (1922) cols 1916:­ 1927; DOrrie and Bakes, PlatonismusII, pp.92-96, 347-355.

that — it was so for m any ancient lexicons.160)

or that particular passage. T he lemmas concern, and the glosses gloss, particular passages in this or th at dialogue. (There is nothing unusual about

160 See e.g. Tosi, ‘Lessicografia greca‘, pp.386-387.

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N ow i f that is the sort o f lexicon you are compiling, then it is far from evident that ordering the entries by the letter is the best policy. A reader

supposition is false; and a sagacious user o f the L ex icon might perhaps have seen that it was false and inferred that Timaeus must have meant something

might prefer them to be arranged according to the order o f the occurrence o f the lemmas in Plato’s text — an arrangement adopted by Erotian for Hippocrates and by others for Herodotus and for Demosthenes. Consider, fo r example, this phrase from the R ep u b lic:

else — namely, that in Plato the w ord ‘φ α ύ λ ο ς ’ means not only ‘bad’ but also sometimes ‘sim ple’, sometimes ‘easy’, and sometimes ‘feeble’. T hat is

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τΟ ς ψ νχσ,ς σ ν γ κ ε κ λ ασμένοι r e κ α ί Ο π ο τ ε θ ρ υ μ μ ε ν ο ι Sta τ ά ς β α ν α ν σ ία ς τ ν γ χ ά ν ο ν σ ιν ... (495E) T he term ‘α π ο τ ε θ ρ υ μ μ ε ν ο ι is, in this context, rather obscure. Timaeus thought it needed a gloss. In the C o islin ia n u s there are tw o pertinent entries: Otot 60ρνωμ? and άκταΐνώσαι — where the philosopher is confused with the comic poet ofthe same name).

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and there is no means of picking out a group of Timaean glosses. In short, it is never possible to say, o f a particular gloss, that it was once a part o f Timaeus’ Lexicon. The lost entries are lost.

T h e form o f th e entries* The Coislinianus transmits a deformed version o f Timaeus’ Lexicon; and the deformations were no doubt the result o f a long and gradual process which may have started soon after the dictionary was written and have continued up [105] to the Byzantine period. Can anything more particular be said about the relation between the original Lexicon and the text in the Coislinianus} Can we perhaps even reconstruct one or two of the original entries? Ruhnken was optimistic. He says that Timaeus may have treated his subject with more generosity and more erudition — like Erotian in his lexicon to Hippocrates or Harpocration in his work on the ten orators; but perhaps he preferred to imitate Galen who, after the immensely learned works o f his predecessors, did not hesitate to explain the glosses in Hippocrates in a simple way and with no extrinsic erudition.186

Ruhnken refers, o f course, to the Galenic lexicon in the form in which we now read it. That is to say, he means to suggest that, in their original form, the entries in Timaeus’ Lexicon were.minimalist: rarely much more than 'X: Y ’. Ruhnken knew, o f course, that the Coislinianus does not present the Lexicon in its original form: he remarks the presence o f non-Platonic entries, and he refers to a ‘fuller’ version (of which certain entries in Photius and in the Suda give an inkling). Nonetheless, he thought that the Coislinianusvf&s not very far from the original: just as, in his view, we possess not a sequence o f extracts but rather a more or less complete work, so the entries (the nonPlatonic cases apart) represent what Timaeus wrote (with the exception o f a few gaps and garblings o f the sort which every ancient text suffers). Ruhnken offers no argument in support o f his optimistic assessment. There is no argument to be offered — and there are reasons to think that he is mistaken. A quick squint at the text o f the Coislinianus is enough to show that the entries are heterogeneous: some consist o f no more than a word or For a catalogue raisonnl of the forms of entry in ancient lexicons see Giuliani, ‘Glossario ippocratrico’, pp.110-129. 186 Timaei Sophistae, p.XII.

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two, others extend over a short paragraph; [106] some offer a simple synonym, others have explanations in the style o f an encyclopaedia. In Moeris’ Lexicon virtually all the entries show the same simple form; in the Lexicon o f Gregory ofNanzianus, all the entries are o f one or other o f two sorts (and the reason for there being two sorts is plain). Compared to such cases, the Lexicon o f Timaeus, in the form in which we have it, is a magpie’s nest. Could Timaeus have offered his Roman friend a work which was so in­ elegant, so ill-formed, so heterogeneous? He was a sophist, and therefore a stylist; and his Lexicon will surely have been stylish, its entries revealing some uniformity in extent and nature. On the basis o f that hypothetical homo­ geneity we might try to conjecture the original shape o f the entries. And yet we should recall the prefatory letter to the sixth book o f the Onomastikon of Pollux, who was also a sophist: To Commodus Caesar, from Julius Pollux: some of the words I have written down and given my approval to, others I have mentioned because I did not want to omit them. For some ambiguous words I have added references so that you may know who used them; sometimes I have indicated the place where the word is to be found; and in some cases I have cited the text. But I have not done the same in all cases, unless it was pressing, in order that the books should not be too bulky. (VI proem)*

Pollux insists on the heterogeneity o f his entries — homogeneity would lead to heaviness. Perhaps Timaeus took a similar view. There is a second reason, apart from a hypothetical homogeneity, for thinking that Ruhnken was mistaken. Timaeus’ Lexicon has a purpose: the text o f the Cosilinianus (as I have already said) cannot achieve the purpose. So either Timaeus was curiously incompetent or else the original version of the Lexicon was rather different from its present form. Suppose that the work which Timaeus wrote was in fact potentially useful to its potential users. On the basis o f that hypothesis we may guess at the f orm o f its entries. The core o f any useful entry must have been o f the form ‘X: Y ’, [107] where X is the lemma and Y the gloss. (Strictly speaking, that schema is not always present — sometimes, For example, the lemma and the gloss make up

* Κ ομ μ όδιρ Κ α ίσ α ρ ι Ιούλιος Π ολυδεύκης χαίρειν. τά μ ε ν τινα τω ν ονομ άτω ν ώς κ ρίνω ν έγραφ α, τ ά δ ’ ώς μ η τταριείς i μήνυσα, ενίοις Se τω ν αμφ ιβόλω ν π ροσεθη κα τούς μ ά ρ τυ ρ α ς ΐνα τούς είττόντας ειδής, ε σ τ ι δ’ όπου κ α ί το χ ω ρ ίον εν ι:1 τούνομ α, ε π ί δε τινω ν κ α ί την λεξιν αυτήν, ου μ η ν επ ί πάντω ν τ αυτόν τ ο ΰ τ ’ επ ενόησα όπου μη κ ατήπ ειγεν, ΐνα μ η το ΐς β ιβ λ ίοις π εριττός όγκος προσή.

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a single sentence;187 but it is always, and necessarily, possible to distinguish the element o f an entry which is the ex p lica n d u m and the element which is

In line 7 6 2 there occur both the Hesychian lemma and the first o f his two glosses. The entry exhibits the ancient exegetical principle: H om erus ex H om ero.

the ex p licans.) A round the core there are — usually but not invariably — oth er elements, so that the entry has the fo rm ‘X : Y, Z, W , ...’. W h at we find

One Hesiodic term is explained by invoking another which occurs alongside it; and then a second gloss is added so that all m ay be as clear as butter.

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in the C o islin ia n u s are the remains o f entries o f that sort: Timaeus wrote ‘X: Y, Z, W , ...’; the manuscript has ‘X· A, B, ...’, where ‘A , B, ...’ is (all or) part, perhaps in botched shape, o f ‘Y, Z, W , ...’. O r rather, let us suppose, more modestly, that things are so in the large m ajority o f cases. 188189 T he core is ‘X : Y ’. W h at are the other elements? First, an ancient lexicon will often provide tw o or even three glosses, so that the schema will be: ‘X· Y ,, Y 2, ...’. In the simplest cases all the glosses say (more or less) the same thing. Here is a trivial example:

There are numerous similar cases. Here is one from Timaeus:

α κ τ α ίν ε ιν : prance, and jump about irregularly [ά τ ά κ τ ω π η 8φ ν ]. T he entry is connected to a passage in the L a w s· κα1 Οταν ά κ τ α ιν ω σ 71 ε α υ τ ό τ α χ ισ τ α , α τ α κ τ ^ α υ ττη 8 φ . (Leg 672Q Timaeus has taken the second part o fh is gloss fr°m the text in which the lemma occurs (and which he apparently misunderstood). O r take this curious entry:

α γ ε ιρ ο ν σ α ν · Ws ιε ρ ε ια ν π ε ρ ιε ρ χ ο μ έ ν η ν .

α ν τ ικ ρ ύ · κ α τ ε υ θ ύ , ε π ’ EvOe.ias.

T hat makes little sense until you see that it is the remains o f a gloss on a In other cases it is rather the conjunction or combination o f the glosses which serves to explain the lemma. In such cases, the Ys m ay a l perform the same explanatory fiinction. But that is not always so. For example, one o f the glosses may o ffer— sometimes implic­ itly — an etymological explanation o f the lemma, as in this unexciting case:

passage in the R ep u b lic:

... μ .η 8 ' εν r o t s ClAAois π ο ιή μ α σ ιν είσα γ/ .τω Ή ρ α ν ή λ λ ο ιω μ έ ν η ν Ws Ιε ρ ε ια ν α γ ε ίρ ο ν σ α ν Ί ν α χ ο ν Ά p γ ε ίo v π ο τ α μ ο ύ π α ισ ίν β io 8ώ poiS . (381D) A nd here is a diverting case:

ε μ β ρ α χ ν ■ σ ν ν τ ά μ ω s κ α ι o'f'ov εν β ρ α χ ε ί.

α ,γαμ α ι: I accept, I greatly admire [α π ο δ έ χ ο μ α ι, θ α ν μ ά ζ ω αγαν] [109]

T he second element is both an explanation and a banal etymology. [108]

There are several occurrences o f the verb ‘α γ α μ α ι in Plato, one o f them in

A nother phenomenon o fth e same sort is more interesting. It often happens in ancient lexicons that one o f the elements in a gloss is lifted from the

this passage from the C litophon :

context in which the lemma occurs.

Here is an example from Hesychius:

α ρ γ α λ έ η - χ α λ ε π ή , 8 ε ιν ή . ‘X : Y,, Y ,’: a lem m a and two pretty w ell synonymous glosses. N othing very exciting there? B ut look at these two lines from Hesiod’s W orks a n d D ays :

φ ή μ η γ ά ρ 1'ε κ α κ ή π ε λ ε τ α ι κ ο ύ φ η μ ε ν a e lp a i p e ta μ ά λ ’ , α ρ γ α λ έ η §€ φ έ ρ ε ιν, χ α λ ε π ή S' α π ο θ ε σ θ α ι. (761-762)

κ α ι μ ά λ α α γ α μ α ι κ α ι θ a v μ a σ τ ώ s Ws ε π α ιν ώ . (407E) It is highly likely that Timaeus has this passage in m ind — for the gloss reflects the context o f the lemma. There is a distinction to be made between a plurality o f glosses and a disjunctive gloss, between ‘X : Y,, Y ,’ and ‘X : Y, o r Y2’. There are plenty o f disjunctive glosses in the ancient dictionaries. This is the first o f several such examples in Timaeus:

a.γp oίK os: rough and uncultivated, or one who lives in the country.* 187 See e.g. this entty: δεκάζει 0 κρίσιν ώνούμενος παρά δικαστοΰ — where it is a mistake to punctuate after the first word. 188 Nor in all: (i) there are entries which do not derive fiom the Lexicon of Timaeus; (ii) since additions may be made to an 'open' text, 'A, B, ...' may contain non-Timaean matter; (iii) some­ times, perhaps, the lemma in the Coislinianus wwas originally part of the gloss (see above, n.187); and (iv) it is possible that in one or two cases the whole of an entry has survived. 189 See Tosi, 'Lessicografia greca', pp.386-387; Degani, 'Problemi di lessicografia' — to whom I owe the Hesychian example.

The disjunction indicates that the word has tw o distinct senses. But does Timaeus mean to note that the Greek w ord is ambiguous? or that Plato uses it sometimes in one sense and sometimes in the other? or that, in this or that occurrence it is uncertain w hich sense Plato intended? The C oislin ia n u s offers

* See above, p.96.

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no h in t o f an answer. O ther entries and other lexicons suggest that disjunc­ tive entries usually mean to record the different uses or senses o f a w ord in the pertinent author or text or group o f texts.

T he sense — and indeed the' text — o f the entry are uncertain; but the general drift is clear enough. The last phrase o f the gloss explains the sense

Ambiguous terms often have more senses than two; and there are entries m ore elaborate than the en try fo r ‘α γ ρ ο ί κ ο ς ’. I shall discuss a complex case later on; but first there are one or two things more to say about the non-core elements in the glosses. A lexicographer w ill sometimes add various linguistic observations to the simple schema ‘X : Y ’ — an etym ology, a grammatical note, am orphological remark, a piece o f orthographical advice, ... For example:

d:rd.p: a conjunction, meaning ‘certainly’. T he sense o f the lem m a is explained, and a m ite o f grammar added. O r take this sequence o f entries, 190

/Jpaa-ros 8e Νηλεΐ 1Tap48wKE'v' 0 8’ els Eiji/Jiv κ oμ ίσa s -rois μΕτ’ avrov παρΕδωκεν, ίδιω τα is avdpw vois οι Kar0.K,\aaTa elxov r a βιβλίο, av 8 ’ EmJ.LE',\ws κείμενα· επΕίδη 8e jja eo v ro rrjv otov8t)Vtwv ArraAtKWv βασλΕων ύφ’ d s 'ljv ή 7ToAts 'y ro v v r w v f3if3Aia E'ls την κaraσκe:vηv rijs Ev Περγάμχα f3 if3 Au>6^K1Js, Kara y q s iKpviflav Ev 8iWpvy{ 'Tivi' Vn-o 8e: v o ria s Kal σητω ν KaKuAevra οφέ 1To'Te απΕδοντο οι a n o roV yEvovs ArreAAiKWVTi rW T ifw noAAwv άpγvpίω v r e ApiarorEAovs Kal rd. roil &e:orf>paarov f3if3Ata· 1}v 8€ 0 AtsAAikWvrf>iA6f3if3Aos poAAov η rf>iA6aorf>os· διο Kai ζητώ ν Enav0p6waiv rWv διαβρω μάτω ν e:is αντΐγραφ α koivO μΕτηνΕγκε ν γραφήν avan,\1JpWv otJK εΰ, Kai EgE8wKev άμapτάδωv πλημ>] τ α βιβλία. σννΕβη δ€ r o f Ek τώ ν nE'pi1Tdrwv r o ts μΕν πΟλαι ro ts J.Ler0 Θεόφραστόν oVk .εχονσιν 0,\us ia β ιβλία πλήν ολίγων κ αι μ άλιστα τών EgwrE'pwWv μηδΕν εχειν φιλoσoφεiv ■πρaγμaτικώs άλλα ΘΕσεκ Ait}Kv6i,eiv· ro ts S’ varepov ά φ ’ oil rd. β φ λ ία ra ilra rrporjA8ev, άμειvov μΕν EKE'ivwv 4'iA.oaorf>E'tv Kai άριστo^ελίζειv, άναγκάζεσΘαι μ b τ o ι τά noA.A.a eiKjj λΕγειν Sid ro 7T.\r8os τώ ν apapnW v. noW 8Ε E'ls roilTo κ αι ή 'Ρώμη ■πpoσeλάβετo' eil6ils γάp μ er ά r y v AnE'AAiKwvros reA .ev^v .EVA.Aas ήρε την Άτreλλικώvτos βιβλιoθηκηv 0 ra s A6^ a s Ελών, Seilpo 8Ε κoμισθεΐσav Tvpavviwv r e : one, written in a popular style, they called exoteric; the other, more elaborated, they left in the form o f com m entarii. 01 v 1 2 )** The distinction was traditional, going back to Aristotle h im self.^ Cicero indicates that he knows about Aristotle’s exoteric works; and although, strictly speaking, he does not claim in fin III to have read them, he gives the

195 pHerc 1428: the correspondence was noted in 1833 by C. Petersen (according to Madvig,

De finibus, p.844); the texts are printed in parallel in H. Diels, Doxographi Grdesri ffealm, 1879), pp.529-550. 2“ So e.g. R. Philippson, 'Die Quelle der epikureischen Ghtterlehre in Ciceros erstem Buche de natura deorwn', Symbolae OsWenses 19, 1939, 15-40. * tum ille: tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas quos hic tandem requiris? — commentarios

quosdam, inquam, Aristotelios quos hic sciebam esse veni ut auferrem quos legerem dum essem otiosus. ** de summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum quod efwTtpiKov appellabant, alterum limatius quodin commentariis reliquerunt... 201 A l the relevant texts are assembled in Gigon, Aristotelisfragmenta, pp. 154-200.

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impression — and evidently means to give the impression — that he was familiar with at least some o f Aristole’s more recherche [49] writings. (He also implies that he did not him self possess copies o f these works.) W e might wonder whdre the books in Lucullus’ library had come from. The younger Lucullus had presumably inherited them from his father, whose library was celebrated (Plutarch, Luc xlii 1-2 ). According to Isidore, ‘the first man to bring a library o f books to Rome was Aemilius Paulus, when he had defeated Perseus, king o f Macedon; then Lucullus e Pontica praeda ’ (VI v 1). Lucullus will have brought the books to Rome in 65 b c . I f his Aristotelian holdings formed part o f the booty,202 then he possessed — and Cicero perhaps read — certain Aristotelian com m entarii in a text which indubitably preceded Andronicus. However that may be, several Ciceronian texts might easily be taken to contain covert allusions to passages in the exoteric works. Is not div II lix 121 calqued on div somn 463b20? Does not Tuse I x 2 2 allude to GA B 736b 29-737a9? And surely fin II vi 19 is a reference to E N A 1096al8? Again, certain explicit but unspecified references to Aristotle find a clear echo in our Aristotelian texts: at T ux I xxxiii 80, Aristotle is said to have affirmed that men o f genius are melancholic, and we find just such a text at P rob l XXIX 9 5 3 a l0 - 1 2 ;203 T ux I xxxix 94 cites Aristotle for a remark about ephemeral insects in the Pontus, and exactly such a remark is found at HA E 5 5 2 b l7 -2 3 ;204 at d iv II lxii 128 Cicero invokes Aristotle for an account o f what dreams are made on, and such an account appears at Insomn 4 6 lb 2 1 — 22. A nd so on. But none o f that evidence withstands scrutiny. W hat appear to be covert allusions may be chance parallels. Genuine allusions, whether covert or overt, may derive from handbooks or from other sources. And the word may’ here does not mark a gratuitous scepticism. You might reasonably ask whence came Cicero’s knowledge o f Aristotle’s views on ephemeral insects if not from his reading o f HA ; and the reasonable question has a reasonable answer; the knowledge no doubt came through one o f [50] the many Hellenistic

202 Of course, they might have come from another source, e.g. Lucullus might have bought the Sullan library. (Note that in his will Sulla appointed Lucullus guardian of Faustus: Plutarch, Luc'w 6 [494C].) 203 Compare diu I xxxviii 81, which apparently alludes to the same chapter in Probl. 244 Note also nd\\ xlix 125 =frag 342 R3 (Aristotle on cranes). Most of the animal lore rehearsed in n^II xlviii-li 123-126 corresponds closely with texts in HA /: Moraux, ‘Ciciron’, p.91 n.28.

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zoological compilations, among them anthologies o f mirabilia;205 or perhaps it came from the rhetorical tradition — for Demetrius twice invokes passages from /£4,206 and he will hardly have taken them from his own reading o f Aristotle. Allusions o f that sort do not establish that Cicero had read the Aristotelian works to which he alludes.207208If we look for more solid evidence, there are only three Aristotelian treatises to consider: Rhet, Top, and EN.20S

R h eto ric There is most information about Rhet. The catalogue in Diogenes Laertius lists a τέχνη ρητορική in two books (item 78) and also a two-volume work entitled Περί λεξεω ς (item 87).209 Ptolemy’s catalogue contains a threevolume Rhetoric (item 3 Hein = 3a During).210 It has been supposed that Diogenes’ τέχνη corresponds to the first two books o f our Rhet, that his Περί λεξεω ς answers to the third book, and that Ptolemy’s three-volume work is identical to our Rhet* So Andronicus found the two separate items listed by Diogenes and united them into the single item listed by Ptolemy.211 Dionysius o f Halicarnassus cites Aristotle’s Rhetoric at first [51] hand. His Letter to Ammaeus is designed to show that Demosthenes did not owe his skill to a perusal o f Aristotle’s Rhetoric (as certain philosophers had falsely alleged); 205 See Moraux, ‘Ciciron’, p.92. On these compilations see esp During, ‘Transmission'; Keaney, Two notes’, pp.52-58— see above, p.15. 20ύ See above, n.182. 207 In the case of Plato, apparent allusions (e.g. Rep I ii 2 to Gorg 485D) do not establish anything. But inasmuch as we know from other, and impeccable, evidence that Cicero had read his Plato pretty thoroughly, we may properly treat such things as genuine reflections of Cicero’s knowl­ edge of the texts. 208 What of the lost Constitutions? Cicero refers to them at finV iv 11, but does not explicitly say how many (if any) he has read. In adA tt II ii 2, written at Antium at the end of 60, he says that he has a Constitution o f Pellene with him and thinks (‘puto’) that at home he has Constitutions of Corinth and Athens. But these are said to be works of Dicaearchus; and although such works are not otherwise attested, it is not clear that we should suppose that Cicero has simply got the author wrong. See further Pahnke, Ciceros Kermtnis, pp.38-39. 209 There are also several other rhetorical items including the Τεχνών συναγω γή. 210 It is not part of Ptolemy’s canon: During supposes, plausibly, that it is not Rhet but rather the Gryllus. — The first part of the anonymous list has a three-volume Τέχνης ρ η το ρ ικ ή ς (item 72) and a one-volume Περί λεξεω ς καθαρός (item 79); the second part has a Περί ρ η το ρ ικ ή ς without specification of book number (item 153). * But see above, n.210. 211 So first Rabe, de Theophrasti, pp.27-36. Note that our Rhet, according to marginal notes in some manuscripts, was sometimes divided into four books (Book B consisting of our A 10-15).

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for the Rhetoric was demonstrably written after Demosthenes’ great speeches had been delivered. In the course o f his argument, Dionysius quotes five paragraphs from RheP. in adAmmG he cites RhetA 13 5 5 a 2 0 -2 9 , ‘in the first book’; in 7 he cites A 1356a3 5-b 20; in 8 he cites Γ I 4 l 0 b 3 6 - l 4 ll a 8 , ‘in the third book’; in 11 he cites B 13 9 7 b 2 7 -13 9 8 a 3 , ‘in the second book’; in 12 he cites B 1 397a23-b 8.212 Dionysius certainly purports to have worked through the Rhetoric·, and there is no reason to disbelieve him — it is hardly likely that the passages which he cites and which are particularly apt to his particular needs should have been preserved for his use in'the rhetorical tradition.213 It is worth noting that the text o f Aristotle cited by Dionysius often dis­ agrees with the text known to our manuscript tradition. Nonetheless, it is plain that Dionysius had read something which was, at the very least, a close relative o f our three-volume Rhet. The Letter to Ammaeus is generally dated to the early 20s.214 And it is generally supposed that in the work we find the earliest unequivocal reference to any o f our ‘modern’ Aristotelian treatises. Andronicus had done his work, and Dionysius was one o f the first to profit from it.215 W ith that in mind, let us turn to Cicero. In the de Oratore (written in 55 b c ) Cicero presents Catulus as some sort o f Peripatetic (III xlvii 182) and has him say that it is ‘plausible’ that Antonius had read a work o f Aristotle’s on τόπ οι {de orat II xxxvi 152). He no doubt means a rhetorical work (Aristotle discusses τόποι in our Rhetoric);216 for a little later, at II xxxviii 160, Antonius is made to state that he has read both the work in which Aristotle collects the views o f his predecessors (presumably the lost Τ εχ νώ ν σ υ ν α γ ω γ ή 217) and also the work in which he expounds his own views on the art o f rhetoric. W e may doubt that, by 91 bc (the dramatic [52] date o f de orat), Antonius himself had actually read those works. But it cannot have seemed absurd to Cicero to imply that a Roman had read Aristotle’s rhetorical works in the first decade o f the century; and that in itself strongly 212 He also refers, without book-numbers or citations, to τά ς re το π ικ ά ς συντά ξεις κ α ι τάς ά ν α λ υ τικ ά ς καί τάς μεθοδικ ός (adAmm 6). 213 There are other specific references to Rhet outside the letter; see e.g. comp verb. 25: εν τ φ τρ ίτω βύβλω των ρη το ρικώ ν τεχνών. 2Μ On grounds which seem pretty slender. But the approximate date is not in doubt. 215 See Dliting, Biographical Tradition, pp.258-259. 2,6 During, ‘Transmission’, p.39, and Moraux, ‘Cicdron’, p.83, wrongly suppose an allusion to Top. 217 But see During, ‘Transmission’, p.39 n.l.

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suggests that such works were then available to the interested reader. It also and incidentally insinuates that by 55 Cicero himself had read the works.218* There is further evidence that Cicero had read the Συναγωγή·, for two paragraphs in the Brutus (written in 46 b c ) purportedly rehearse Aristotle’s account of the early history of rhetoric — and the Σ υναγω γή is the only plausible source.215 As for Rhet, the Orator, written in the same year as Brutus, contains a virtual translation of its opening sentence: And even before Zeno Aristotle, at the beginning o f his Art o f R hetoric, had said that this art so to speak corresponds to dialectic. {oratxxm 114)*

The Orator also contains several allusions to Aristotle’s remarks on prose rhythm,220 remarks which occur in chapter 8 o f Book Γ o f our Rhet. Vexingly, Cicero does not refer specifically to any Aristotelian work in these passages. But it is natural to suppose that he is thinking o f the Art o f Rhetoric, the work which he explicitly names at oratxxriii 114. And the supposition is reinforced by a passage in the earlier de orat: at III xlvii 18 2 Cicero refers briefly to Aristotle’s views on prose rhythm; again, he names no work, but again in an earlier passage he has clearly referred to the Art o f Rhetoric.221 Thus Cicero knew an Aristotelian A rt o f Rhetoric which began with the opening sentence o f our Rhet A and which contained at least some o f the material which occurs in our RhetF. It is natural to infer that Cicero knew o f a three-volume Rhetoric, or at any rate a Rhetoric which contained the

218 At fam I ix 23 he claims that the three books of his On the Orator omnem antiquorum et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam complectuntur. 218 Brutxii 46-48 = frag 137 RA cf In v II ii 6. Note that even Motaux, who is highly sceptical of Cicero's acquaintance with Aristotle’s works, allows that he had probably read the Σ υναγω γή: Aristotelismus, I, p.42; ‘Cicdron’, p.96. — But see K. Schopsdau, ‘Das Nachleben det Technon synagoge bei Ciceton, Quintilian und in det gtiechischen Prolegomena zut Rhetorik’, in W.W. Fottenbaugh and D.C. Mithady (eds), Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 6 (New Brunswick NJ, 1994), pp.192-216: Schopsdau argues that the Brutus displays only an indirect knowledge of the Σ υναγω γή (p.l 94), and that in any event Cicero did not know the work in its original, Aristotelian form (p.196). * atque etiam ante hunc Aristoteles principio artis rhetoricae dicit illam artem quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae. 220 See orat li 172; lvii 192; Ixiii 214; lxviii 228. 221 de o ra tll xxxviii 160. Note also II bc 32, a dose paraphrase of Rhet A 1354a6-l 1. The early de inv refers to Aristotle at I v 7 (reporting Rhet A 1358b8—9), and at 11 li 156 (repotting Rhet A 1358b20—29). And in I v 6, as Jean-Baptiste Goutinat pointed out to me, there may be echoes of Rhet A 1355b8—14 and 1356a25-27. [Cicero], ad A/fr XT11 xi 19, is tacitly modelled on R hetF l403b21-22. Numerous other, less striking, parallels can be found, most of them recorded in the apparatus to Kassel’s edition of Rhet.

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material which our [53] R h eto ric divides among three books. N ow it would offend M aster Occam to postulate a pair o f three-volume R hetorics. Hence

suggest that [54] the answer to the second question is affirmative; and against that suggestion the existence o f handbooks has no force. But an affirmative answer to the second question is all that m y unorthodox contention requires; for it implies that a three-volume R h eto r ic — something fairly like our three-

our three-volume R h etoric was known to Cicero — and must have been put together before Andronicus’ time.

volume R h eto ric — was known and used before the time ofA ndronicus. The contention is at least as probable, given the state o f our evidence, as the orthodox view that Andronicus was the first scholar to produce a three-

T hat is an unorthodox contention. M any scholars have denied that Cicero knew the R h eto ric in any form: he cannot (they say) have read the original, since he shows so little knowledge o f what it contains .222*2456His citation o f the opening sentence o f R h et at o r a t xxxii 1 1 4 must have been lifted from a handbook ^ 3 for he explains the ‘correspondence’ between rhetoric and

volume R h etoric. It is, to be sure, a fairly unexciting contention; in particular, it does not hint at any thesis about Aristotle’s other treatises; for it is clear that some knowledge o f Peripatetic rhetorical theory — and some interest in

dialectic in a w a y w holly different from Aristotle’s — in fact he gives the first sentence o f R h et an alien Stoic gloss.224 A nd a handbook was no doubt the source o f his knowledge o f A ristotle’s views on prose rhythm . For it is clear

Aristotle’s R h eto ric — was preserved by a tradition which had no concern to reach the other parts o f A ristotle’s philosophy.

that the sections o f our R h e t on prose rhythm had aroused some interest, independently o f the rest o f the work, in the rhetorical tradition; thus in On S tyle Demetrius cites from these s e c tio n s ^ and his knowledge surely did not derive from first-hand reading o f Aristotle. 226

W hat, next, o f the T op ics ? Here the evidence o f the catalogues is uncertain."'

I confess that I can find no text or argum ent w hich firm ly refutes the pessimistic conclusion that, despite his im plicit pretension, Cicero had never

Diogenes’ list, in the form in which it is transmitted, does not contain Top. But it does contain the following items, each o f which could conceivably

read a word o f R het. Yet the orthodox pessimism does not confute m y heterodox contention. It is one question w hether Cicero consulted, himself,

have become a part o fo u r T op : I l e p l elS W v κ α ί y ev W v A ' (item 31 = Top Ll), I l e p l l 8 t w v A ' (item 3 2 = T op E ), I l e p l e p w ' r r f a e w s κ α ί a 1To i< p ia e w s B ' (item 4 4 = T op El), 'O p o i 1Tp o τ ω ν τ ο π ικ ώ ν Z ' (item 55 = T op A )," ' I l e p l tov a l p e r o v κ α ί tov a v μ β e β η κ 6 τ o ς (item 58 = T op Γ ), T om u tW v

Topics

a three-volum e R h etoric. It is another question w hether Cicero knew — directly or indirectly — o f such a text, w hether there was or had been such

•προς

a text available in or before Cicero’s lifetime. The Ciceronian passages which I have rehearsed suggest that the answer to the first question is affirmative;

tovs op o vs B' (item 60 =

T op Z -H ). Ptolem y’s list contains a T op ics

in eight books."' Again, the guess lies near: Andronicus found some related but separate essays — those listed by Diogenes — and united them into a treatise: he invented the T opics. There are two obstacles which that guess must overleap. First, the anony­ mous catalogue contains items which correspond to Diogenes’ items 3 1 , 4 4 ,

but the suggestion is countered by the plausible appeal to handbooks as intermediate sources. The texts which I have rehearsed also and a fo r t io r i

and 58.230 But in addition it lists as items 51 [55] an d 52: 'O p w v {3if3Xiov A ', TomiiiXias Τ'), 30 (llep i Ta6ovs opyijs A'), 58 (Ilepl Εκουσίων A'), 64 (llep i 8tκαίω ν B').

but that view seems to me to be — if I may so put it — softer and more delicate than the power and weight o f virtue demand. So let us keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus — whose carefiilly written books on character are indeed ascribed to Aristotle, although I do not see why the son could not have been like his father. v 12) 247

The second sentence proves that Cicero knew of (at least) two Aristotelian works d e m orib u s , at least two Aristotelian One of them he — or rather Piso — is inclined to attribute to Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son, even though it is generally ascribed to Aristotle himself The other, it seems, was uncontroversially ascribed to Aristotle. What were the two works? Evidently the work which Piso ascribes to Nicomachus must have borne the tide ‘N ico m a ch ea n E thics ’; for why else should anyone have thought of ascribing it to Nicomachus? And in fact we hear of a tradition which inter­ preted the tide as meaning ‘written by’ (rather than ‘dedicated to’ or ‘edited by’) Nicomachus.249 So Cicero knew a N ico m a ch ea n E thics. (Or at any rate, 247 cf e.g. Tusc Vix 25. 248 So Kenny, Ethics, pp.15-17. 249 See Diogenes Laertius, VIII 88. 'It would no doubt be absurd to believe that Nicomachus — who died in battle as a p.eipa.KiaKos (Aristodes, apudEusebius, PEXV ii 15) — had written the EN but from a linguistic point of view, the tradition is on firm ground: “H6tKa N ιχoμάχeιa' and “H6tKd. Eΰδήμeta', 'Nicomachean' and 'Eudemian Ethics’, ought to refer to works called ‘Ethics' written by Nicomachus and Eudemus — just as the MvaXvrtKd. Eΰδήμeta (Alexander, in Top 131.15-16) were the AKab'tr'cJwhich Eudemus wrote, the larptKO. M evwveta, falsely ascribed to Aristotle, were written by Menon (Galen, in Hipp nat hom XV 24), and the Π poβλημara ATJJ.LoKpireia in the anonymous catalogue (item 116) were problems taken from and hence written by Democritus (the corresponding tide in Diogenes' list is IlpofiA ^aTa Εκ rWv J'Y}^Kpirov: item 124).

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he knew o f a N ico m a ch ea n E thics — even if he had never read it, or even come across it, him self.^0) W as this o ur ten-book EN? Perhaps it was; but

made a valuable contribution to Aristotelian scholarship, a contribution

466

there are at least two grounds for doubt. First, the earliest explicit evidence for a ten-book E thics is late — it is the evidence o f the anonymous cata­ logue . ^ 1 Secondly, our E N [59] is an absurdity, surely put together by a desperate scribe or an unscrupulous book-seller and not united b y an author or an editor .^ 2 But those grounds are not as solid as the rock. And the other work? T here are tw o easy guesses: it was a E u d em ia n E thics, o r else it was a M a gn a m o ra lia — it was one o f the works which later appear in Ptolem y’s catalogue. I f we must choose one o f them, then let us prefer the latter. Anyone w ho inclined to construe the title ‘EN ' as indicating Nicomachean authorship would surely have inclined to take the title ‘EE' as pointing to Eudemian authorship. (Som e ancient scholars, like some modern scholars, did indeed ascribe the w ork to Eudemus.·^3) Since Cicero does not let Piso hint that the second w ork d e m o rib u s might have been by Eudemus, it was probably not called ‘EE’; and hence perhaps it was called ‘M M ’. H owever that m ay be, it is reasonable to infer from this text that b y 45

b c

(the date o f fin ) a t least two Aristotelian treatises on ethics were in circulation, one o f them called ‘E N ’ and the other perhaps called ‘M M ’. Cicero’s M M

parallel to his own contribution to fiiture Plotinian studies. I f we assume that Porphyry was relying on Andronicus’ own Π ίν α κ ε ς as his authority, then m y argument seems to insinuate an infelicitous disjunction: either Porphyry was misreporting Andronicus’ claim or else Andronicus was shading the truth. W ell, I do not say that Andronicus was lying; but I do suppose [60] that either he was exaggerating pretty steeply or else Porphyry was simplifying pretty drastically. For although we possess dismally little evidence on the matter, w hat we do possess points consistently in one direction: Andronicus did not invent the R het, he did not invent the Top, he did not invent the ethical treatises. A n d it m ay now be urged that he did not invent the P h ysics or the M eta p h ysics either. As for Phys,™ he cannot even have claimed to have put it together, i f (as most o f his admirers suppose) he cited the letter from Theophrastus to Eudemus in order to show that the old Peripatetics knew a five-volume Φ ν σ ικ ά .250*255 But we m ay forget the letter. Eudemus him self wrote a P hysics, in which he ‘closelyim itated’ Aristotle (Simplicius, in P hys9 2 4 A S), ‘following

m ay w ell have been much the same as the spurious treatise which we read

the main topics o fp re tty well the whole treatise’ (in P h ys 1 0 3 6 .1 8 ). From the surviving fragments and testimonia it is plain that Eudemus’ P h ysics f ollowed

under that name; his EN, I suspect — I hope — was sensibly different from our pushm epullyou volume. In any case, there were ethical treatises before Andronicus. I f Andronicus did some com binatory w ork on the ethical

the pattern o f the Aristotelian P h ysics w hich we read. The conclusion is evident: Eudemus’ text o f A ristotle’s P h ysics did not differ very much from ours.

material, he was not inventing but enlarging.

O r did it differ in one not insignificant respect? B ook H o f our P h ys is generally regarded as odd — and perhaps as misplaced. A n d — o r so it is said

I have been cutting Andronicus down to size — but by now he m ay seem

— we happen to know that Eudemus did not find Book H in his text o f Aristotle. Hence it must have been added to the text o f P h ys at some later date; and w h y not point the finger at Andronicus?256 As a bonus, we can now

too dwarfish to be credible. A frer all, Porphyry plainly implies thatAndronicus

explain the curious fact that a m ajority o f ancient scholars supposed, against

Physics and metaphysics

all the odds, that the P h ysics divides at the end o f Book ET57 T he explanation 250 As Moraux, ‘Cicfron’, pp.93-94 urges. 351 Stobaeus, ec t II vii 3\ cites Aristotle E'v τώ h e tta r ω των Ν ιχομαχΐίων. The passage is

generally attributed to Arius Didymus (the date of whom is uncertain, once he ceases to be identi­ fied with the court philosopher of Augustus: see T. Goransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius &iq/mus, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia 61 (GOreborg, 1995)). But Kenny, EAlas, pp.21-22, rightly argues that there is no good reason to invoke Arius. So too J. Mansfeld and D.T. Runia, Aetiana !, Philosophia Antiqua 73 (Leiden, 1996), pp.259-260. 252 That our EN is not a unity is beyond controversy — the existence of two treatments of pleasure is enough to prove the fact. The only questions concern who invented our text, and when, and from what materials, and for what motives. 253 See e.g. Aspasius, in EN 151.24-26.

runs thus: Andronicus constructed an eight-volume P h ysics and observed (truly enough) that Eudemus had supposed that the last three books o f P h ys

254 On which see Brunschwig, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Physique’! ’. 255 But see above, p.36. 256 Certainly the book was added before Nicolas wrote his sununary of Aristotle's doctrines. But that may not mean very much: above, n.159. 257 See above, p.35.

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were π ε ρ ί κ ιν η σ ε ω ς . Eudemus, knowing only a seven-volume P hys, had o f course divided the w ork at the end o f Book LI; Andronicus and his successors, ignoring or forgetting this fact, took him to have divided it at the end o f

The present treatise is not as well organized as Aristotle’s other works, nor does it seem to possess orderliness and continuity. Rather, some things are missing which would make for continuity of expression, certain items have been imported whole­ sale from other treatises, and he often repeats himself. (Asclepius, in M et 4.4-8)

468

Book E — and also thought that the authority ofE udem us on such a matter could scarcely be challenged. Hence the absurd m ajority view, which depended on nothing but a misunderstanding o f Eudemus. [61] Thus we may after a l give Andronicus a hand in the construction o fo u r Phys. Yet I doubt if we m ay ascribe even that am ount o f activity to Andronicus. It is not uncontroversially evident that Book H is misplaced . ^ 8 I f Book H wwas indeed added by a later editor, there is no particular reason to think that Andronicus was the man.25? A nd, finally, it is far from plain that Eudemus did not find Book H in his copy o f Aristotle. T w o texts are s^^rnoned in evidence. One is the severed phrase from Damas, ‘and o f the three books about motion from A ristotle’s treatise on nature ’ ^ 60 T hat is transmitted w ithout the context needed to make it intelligible. The second text is this:

T here was an explanation for that wretched state o f affairs: [62] They defend him — and defend him well — by saying that after he had written the present treatise he sent it to Eudemus o f Rhodes, his associate, who deemed that it was not right that such a treatise should be made casually available to the general public. Now in the meanwhile he died and parts of the book were destroyed. H i s followers, not daring to add anything o f their own inasmuch as they fell far short of Aristotle’s genius, imported the missing parts from his other treatises, harmonizing things as well as they could. (in M et 4.8-15)* The whole treatise had been sent to Eudemus to vet. Bits were lost. Aristotle died. His followers w eren’t up to replacing the missing parts. They botched something up.

Hence some people thought that this book [i.e. Book HJ is redundant in the treatise and as for Eudemus, having followed the main topics o f pretty well the whole treatise up to this point, he passed over the book, implying that it is superfluous, and moved on to the matters contained in the last book. (Simplicius, in Phys 1036.11-15)*

Asdepius does n o t say — but perhaps he suggests — that Eudemus edited the first edition o f M et. A text by Michael o f Ephesus hints more definitely at a Eudemian edition. Referring to an apparent inconcinnity in the arrange­

T hat hardly implies that'Eudem us’ text o f Phys lacked Book H; on the contrary, Simplicius supposed that Eudemus’ text o f P h ys contained Book H and that Eudemus decided to ignore the book in his ow n P hys. Simplicius

But I think that the arrangement is correct — perhaps these items were put next to one another by Aristotle (in none of his other treatises do we find him doing what he appears to have done here) and were separated by Eudemus. (in Met 515.9-11)**

m ay be wrong. B ut there is no evidence that he was wrong — and in any event his text cannot be used as evidence for the very opposite o f what it

The general ‘defence o f Aristotle’ essayed by Asclepius is here applied to a

plainly implies.261 It implies that Eudemus’ text contained Book H. In short, there is no reason to think that Andronicus did anything for the

P hysics. W hat, then, o f the M eta p h ysics ? It was dear to scholars in antiquity that the fourteen-volum e M e t is a farrago.

2ie See R. Wardy, The Chain o f Change (Cambridge, 1990), for a defence. 255 Thus Ross, Physics, p.18, opines that Book H was in place by the third century bc. 260 See below, p.69. 8to και rapEAKetv ESofE τ ισ ι τούτο to βιβλίον Ev 'Tfi πpaγμaτeίq. μαλθακω τέραις

η, Ws φησιν AJ4).lfav8pos, λογικω τέρα^ χρώ μΐνον ra is arroSeifeai κ αι 5 y e Eυδημos μΕχρι τούδε axeSov ro is oA1Js rijs πpaγμ aτείas κεφαλαίο^ πapaκoλoυθήσas tovto παρελθων Ws περιττόν Em τα Ev rcj) τελευταίοι β ιβλίω μετήλθεν. 261 See Brunschwig, 'Qu’est-ce que la Physique?', p.27.

ment o f M e t Z 11, he concludes:

particular text — and Eudemus is fingered.

* d Se τρόπος τής συντάξεως, ότι εατιν ή παρούσα π ραγμ ατεία ούχ ομοίως ταΐς άλλαις ταΐς τον ΆριστοτΕλους συγκεκροτημΕνη ούδΕ το εύτακτόν τε και συνεχΕς εχειν δοκοϋσα αλλά τινα μεν λείπειν ώς προς το συνεχΕς τής λΕξεως, τ α δε αΛΛων πραγματειώ ν ολόκληρα μ ετε ν ψ ίχ θ α ι καί πολλάκις τά αυτά λΕγειν. απολογούνται δε ΰπερ τούτου καί καλώς απολογούνται ότι γράφας την παρούσαν πραγματείαν επεμφεν αυτήν Εύδήμω τώ Εταίρω αυτού τώ Τοδίω, εϊτα Εκείνος ενόμισε μή είναι καλόν ως ετνχεν Εκδοθήναι εις πολλούς τηλικαυτήν πραγματείαν. Εν τφ οδν μ εσψ χρονω Ετελεύτησε κ α ί διεφθάρησάν τινα τού β ιβλίου ■ μή τολμώντες δε προσθειναι οικοθεν οί μεταγενΕστεροι Sta τό πολύ πάνυ λείπεσθαι τής του άνδρος εννοίας μετηγαγον εκ των άλλων αυτού πραγματειώ ν τά λείποντα άρμόσαντες^ ώς ήν δυνατόν . ** καί οΐμ α ι καί ταύτα Εκείνοις εδει αυντάττεσθαι, καί ίσως ύπο μεν Άριοτοτελους συντΕτακται (Εν ούδεμιά γάρ τώ ν άλλων αυτού πραγματειώ ν εΰρίσκεται τοιοΰτον τι πεποιηκώ ς όποια Ενταύθα φαίνεται), υπό δε τού Εύδήμου κεχώ ρισται. — Michaels commentary goes under the name of Alexander.

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The story o f a Eudemian edition is generally dismissed by scholars. There is no evidence for it apart from the two passages I have just cited; and it is easy to suppose that it was invented to explain the puzzling state o f Aristotle’s text.* Then who did put the M et together? The thing was done by the time ofNicolas;262 and his text o f the work included one o f the most ‘detachable’ o f its books, Alpha minor.263 Perhaps, then, it was Andronicus who first produced the Metaphysics. Even if this was his only serious piece o f ordering and arranging, it is enough to earn him an honourable place in the history o f Aristotelianism. Yet there is not a word o f positive evidence in favour o f the suggestion. No text associates Andronicus’ name with the [63] creation o f the Metaphysics. And something tells against it. The story o f Eudemus’ edition o f M et doubt­ less found its justification and explanation in the purported correspondence between Eudemus and Aristotle. I suspect that this correspondence was known to Andronicus, and accepted by him as genuine. In that case Andronicus will have supposed that Eudemus had edited a text o f M et, a text which Aristotle himself had prepared; and then Andronicus cannot have claimed to have invented the treatise himself.264 The last point may be generalized. In a celebrated epistolary exchange, Alexander the Great reproached Aristotle for ‘publishing the texts o f your lectures — for how shall we differ from hoi polloi if the texts by which we were educated are common property for all?’265 And Aristotle replied that Alexander need have no worries: ‘They are both published and not published — for they are only intelligible to those who heard my lectures.’ The letters

* On the evidence of Asclepius and Michael see S. Menn, ‘The editors of the Metaphysics', Phronesis 40, 1995, 202-208. 262 See the rubrics to Books 2 and 3 of On the Philosophy o f Aristotle. Thescholiast to Theophrastus’ Met (above, n. 125) says that Nicolaus mentioned Theophrastus’ work iv rfj 9ewpiq των Ά ριστοτόλους μ ΐτ ά τ ά φ υσικά , i.e. ‘in his study ofAristotle’s Metaphysics'—-but, p a ce Drossaart Lulofs (Nicolaus, p.29), that does not in itself establish that Nicolaus knew and used the title ‘τά μ ΐτ ά τά φ υσικά' for Aristotle’s work. Note too that some version of M etwas known to Eudorus, Strabo’s contemporary (XVII i 5 [790]), who emended the text: Alexander, in M et 58.31-59.8 (see e.g. Donini, ‘Testi e commenti’, pp. 5075-5080). 263 See Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus, p.139. 264 Jaeger, on different grounds, deniesAndronicus a formative role in the making of Met: rather, Andronicus inherited a ten-volume Met, consisting of ΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΙΜΝ, and he interpolated α, Δ, K, and A (Entstehungsgeschichte, pp.174, 180). Thus our fourteen-volume Met results from risibly incompetent editorial work by Andronicus. 2ί5 έκδούς τούς ά κ ροα τικ ούς λόγους.

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are quoted in full by Aulus Gellius,266 who says that he took them ‘from a book by the philosopher Andronicus’ — no doubt from the Π ίνακες .267 The works to which Alexander and Aristotle allegedly refer are evidently the trea­ tises — the esoteric writings. O f course, the correspondence is spurious, and we shall not infer that the treatises had been published in Alexander’s lifetime. But Andronicus took the letters to be genuine — or at any rate, he published them (so far as we can tell) as though they were genuine. He must therefore have supposed, or at any rate have expected his readers to suppose, that Aristotle’s treatises had been published centuries earlier. And he cannot, in the same work, have claimed to be publishing the treatises for the first time. Whatever claim he actually made, whether it was true or whether it was false, it must have been — or at least have seemed to be — compatible with the thesis that the treatises had been published in Aristotle’s lifetime, long before Andronicus got to them. [64]

T h e A risto telian corpus While rejecting those informative letters, we may yet incline to the view that some at least o f Aristotle’s treatises were put together at an early stage, and that the corpus gradually evolved.268 Some consolidation evidently came from Aristotle’s own hand: he did not regard his esoteric work as a collection o f separate essays. Even if we regard most cross-references as later editorial addi­ tions, and even if we regard such programmatic texts as Sens 4 3 6 a l- 1 8 and Meteor A 3 3 8 a 2 0 -3 3 9 a l0 as referring exclusively to Aristotle’s uttered lectures, nonetheless SEI 18 3 a 3 6 -l 84a9 proves that, at least in logic, Aristotle thought o f himself as having produced a fairly substantial and continuous piece o f work.265 Aristotle’s immediate successors will have carried the consolidatory w orkfurther— hence thetitles ‘EudemianEthics', ‘Nicomachean Ethics’, which are in the end best explained on the supposition that Eudemus

2ίί XX v 11-12 (Gellius’ Latin translation precedes, in §§ 8-9): see also Plutarch, Alex vii [668BC]; Simplicius, inPhys 8.21-29. 267 Where they might have appeared in the Life of Aristotle. 268 Thus e.g. Jaeger, Entstehungsgeschichte, p.152, speaks of'the gradually developing process of consolidation’. But see below, n.272. 265 See e.g. Diiring, Aristotele, p.45.

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and Nicomachus were their editors.270271 And perhaps, too, there was a Theophrastan edition o f Pol.m It should not be thought that Diogenes’ catalogue stands against that suggestion. The catalogue is a fascinating document; but it has misled. Scholars have taken it to indicate the state o f Aristotle’s oeuvre in the third or second century BC.272 But there is no reason on earth so to read it.* The catalogue shows, inter a lia , that some library held a copy o f a short work by Aristotle entitled 77epi ίδ ιω ν. It is surely reasonable to guess that the short work corresponded fairly closely to the essay which forms Book E o f our Topics. The catalogue does not show that the library held a complete Top — and no doubt the absence o f Top from the list273 suggests that the library did not hold a complete Top. But it patently does not follow that no complete Top [65] existed when the library was catalogued or that the constituent books o f our Top were then available only as separate essays. But if the catalogues do not help us to chart the gradual consolidation o f the Aristotelian treatises, we are left w ith no evidence at all for the modes and methods by which the consolidation was gradually achieved. Indeed, we are left with no reason — apart from Porphyry’s remark about Andronicus — for supposing that there was any process o f consolidation, gradual or sudden. Rather, we have reason to believe, first, that some at least o f Aristotle’s major treatises were put together in something like their present form by Aristotle himself; secondly, that some o f the treatises were known in something like

270 See above, p.58. 271 So Jaeger, Entstehungsgeschichte, p. 157: with the title (item 74 in Diogenes’ catalogue) ‘π ο λ ι η κ -rjs ά κ ρ ο ά σ ΐω ς ώς ή Θ εοφράστου Η " Jaeger understands the noun ‘ΐκ δ ο σ ις ’. 272 So even Jaeger, Entstehungsgeschichte, p.152: 'Diogenes’ list, which goes back to the third century bc , is evidence for the gradually developing process of consolidation.’ But if the list shows what Aristotle looked like in the third century, then much of what Jaeger himself says about the development of the treatises is false. * Primavesi, ‘Blick in den Stollen’, pp.58-59, takes me to mean that the list is perhaps the catalogue of some poor-quality private library. He objects that Diogenes presents it as ‘a complete list of Aristotle’s known works’, and he thinks that everything tells for the view that it is a catalogue of the Aristotelian holdings in the Alexandrian library. Three comments: (i) I did not mean to suggest that the list relates to some inferior private library — on the contrary, to me too it seems highly plausible to link it to Alexandria, (ii) Diogenes does indeed present the things as a complete list of Aristotle’s known works. But, as everyone agrees, it isn’t a complete list of the works known in Diogenes’ time, (iii) It is, I suppose, possible the Alexandrian librarians presented the catalogue not as a list of their own holdings but rather as a complete list of Aristotle’s works. But there is no reason to believe that they did so present it; and did they so present it, there would be no reason to believe them. 273 If indeed it was absent: above p.55.

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their present form to Aristotle’s immediate successors; and thirdly, that some o f the treatises were available in some consolidated versions in Cicero’s time. There is no single treatise o f which we can say, with confidence, that it did not exist in its present version before the time o f Andronicus. Then what did Andronicus do? Not much. Perhaps he added bits and pieces here and there — paragraphs, or chapters, or even (in some cases) whole books? Perhaps he added some cross-references and generally tidied up the overall structure o f the treatises? Perhaps he was responsible for some titles, and for some o f the book-divisions? Perhaps and perhaps: here there is nothing but guessing. However that may be, Andronicus’ Π ίν α κ ε ς were surely his ch ef d ‘oeuvre: his edition o f Aristotle had little value, and his ‘arrangement’ o f Aristotle’s works — unlike Porphyry’s arrangement o f Plotinus’ works — was (at best) amateur tinkering rather than genial • 574 construction. Here is a recent summary o f the orthodox line on Andronicus. I cite it precisely because it does not purport to be a piece o f innovatory scholarship but a rehearsal o f received wisdom. Our own texts probably go back to an edition which was made by Andronicus of Rhodes before the middle o f the first century b c . It is virtually certain that he under­ took to edit a substantial set o f Aristotle’s [66] own manuscripts which had been out of circulation from the death o f Theophrastus (288/4) until they were recovered by an Athenian bibliophile, Apellicon, in the early first century b c . This is not impor­ tant simply as bibliographical history. To Andronicus can be assigned the ultimate responsibility for the present arrangement of Aristotle’s works, including the division into books and at least some titles, and his own philosophical preconceptions prob­ ably led him to give a more systematic organisation to the material than Aristotle would have used himself. Furthermore there is good reason to think that at least some o f the texts in Andronicus’ edition had not been available even in libraries after being taken to Asia Minor by Neleus of Scepsis in the early third century b c .2 74275

Much o f that I am fairly sure is false. Almost all o f it certainly goes far beyond the evidence.

274 And what did he do for Theophrastus? We have two miserable bits of evidence. One bears on Met, andassures us that Andronicus was unaware of its existence. The second bears on HP. the best guess here (see Keaney, 'Theophrastus’), is that Andronicus (a) divided one long book into the two we now call HP Z and H, (b) perhaps gave the work a new title, and (c) e r ... that’s it. 275 A.A. Long, in P.E. Easterling and B.M.W. Knox (eds), The Cambridge History o f Classical Literature (Cambridge, 1985), I, p.530. Similar remarks may be found in J. Barnes, 'Life and work’, in J. Barnes (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge, 1994), pp.1-26, on pp.9-12.

474

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Roman Aristotle

Aristotle reached Rome in the first century b c if not earlier.276278*Nothing suggests that his arrival made a splash, either in amateur or in professional circles. Nothing suggests that the ‘Roman edition’, done by Andronicus of Rhodes, revolutionized Aristotelian studies. His text of Aristotle left little mark on posterity. His work as orderer and arranger of the treatises w.S not epoch-making. It is true that there was a renascence of Peripatetic philosophy at the end of the first century b c . But Aristotle was reborn shortly after Plato. The Platonic renascence did not depend on a new edition of his dialogues or on an innovatory rearrangement of his ceuvre. There is no reason to think that the Peripatetic renascence was any more dependent on books; and there is no reason to think that Andronicus played midwife at the rebirth. No libations.277 [67]

I have said before that they call the five books before this one P h ysics and the last three O n M o tio n ™ That is how Andronicus28° arranges them in the third of his books on Aristotle.^1 [1 O] Theophrastus282 too283 gives evidence for the first books, when Eudemus wrote to him about one of his corrupt manuscripts in connection with the fifth book (he says:284*‘as for the passage in the [68] P h ysics about which in your letter you asked me to write and reply, either I do not understand it'85 or else it is a very minor hyperbaton for286

A p p en d ix

The Appendix contains an annotated translation of Simplicius, in Phys 923.3-925.2, the proem to the commentary on Phys Z (Greek text in a footnote). It is an important text, and a difficult one. I have used it in more than one context; and it seems best to present the thing as a whole, inasmuch as any selection of extracts is likely to insinuate a disputable interpretation. The Peripatetics normally tide the books, in order, by the letters of the alphabet, in order — alpha, beta, -gamma, etc; [5] and so of course they title the sixth book of the Lecture on Physics ‘Zeta’, which in the number system indicates the seventh number but in the alphabet holds the sixth placed8 276 Why not believe that Critolaus brought a copy of Rhefwith him on the embassy of 155? 277 I received stimulating comments from many members ofthe Oxford seminar for which this

paper was originally written. I am greatly indebted to Charles Brittain, Sylvie Germain, and Marek Winiarczyk, who each gave me invaluable bibliographical help, and to Miriam Griffin, Leofranc Holford-Strevens, Andrew Lintott, and David Sedley, who sent me quantities of written criticism. 1 warmly thank Maddalena Bonelli and Ben Morison for their sharp critical comments on a penul~ timate draft of the paper -— and also for a long and enjoyable discussion of Simplicius, in Phys 923-925. 278 cf e.g. 1117.3-5. — Numbers rather than letters were the rule throughout the Hellenistic peri°d, letters being occasionally used, with deliberate archaism, in the imperial period (see e.g. Primavesi, Blick in den Stollen’, pp.63-70). Now Andronicus used letters — and thus ‘the simple fact that no scholar of the first century bc would have adopted the ... letter system shows that came much too late to determine the shape or size of’ the constituent treatises of the corpus aristotelicum (M.F. Burnyeat, ‘Aristotelian revisions: the case of de sensu', Apeiron 37, 2004, 177-180, on p.178 n.3). The sixth book ofthe Physics is called Zeta. It wouldn't have been so called during the Hellenistic period. Hence it was so named long before Andronicus. Hence Andronicus

475

didn’t compile the Physics by putting different essays together. And so too for the other treatises. That is a strong and heady conclusion. Primavesi, 'Blick in den Stollen’, pp.68-69, sees that it is too strong: perhaps Andronicus found one or two composite treatises, in which the books were distinguished by letters — then, when he himself composed the other treatises, he gave them letter labels to conform with the existing works. Even that conclusion is too strong: perhaps Andronicus knew that the Peripatetics liked to use letters — so when he came to compose Aristotle's treatises he naturally did what a good Peripatetic would do. So in the end the letter labels don't allow any inference about Andronicus' editorial activities. 279 Simplicus has actually said several rather different things. At 4.11-16 he reports that 'Adrastus, in his work On the Order fAristotle's Writings, recounts that the treatise is entitled Π ίρι αρχών by some and Φυσική άκρόασις by others; and he says that some, again, entitle the first five books Π ίρί άρχών and the remaining three IJept κ ινήσ ίω ς’; at 6.9-10 Simplicius says that 'Aristotle usually calls the first five Π ίρ ϊά ρ χ ώ ν and the rest Π ίρι κ ινήσ ίω ς’; at 801.14-16 Simplicius affirms that 'Aristotle and Aristotle’s companions count the fifth book among those called Ta v e p i άρχών φυσικά just as they usually call the following three Π ίρι κινήσίω ς'; and at 802.10 he reports that 'everyone calls the five Φυσικά and the three Π ίρι κινήσίως'. 28° και Ανδρόνικος: ‘καί' is often used in fiont of proper names without any semantic force; but of course it sometimes means ‘also’ or ‘even’ or the like. I incline to take it in the sense of‘also’ at 923.10, 924.13, and 924.17; whereas here and at 924.18 I judge it to have no semantic force. But I have little confidence in such judgements — which in some cases make a significant difference to the overall sense of the text. 28' 1ν TcjJ τρίτω τώ ν Ά ριστοτίλους βιβλίων: so Diels, and so probably the archetype; but the text is impossible. I read ‘ Ά ριστοτίλους' (DUring); you might rather think of' τών' (cfPtolemy, vit Afist item 100 Hein [= 97 Diiring]). 282 Theophrastus, frag 157 Fortenbaugh et al = Eudemus, fi ag 6 Wehrli. The sentence from 'Theophrastus too .. .' to '... from the Physics’ is, in the Greek, a genitive absolute hanging on its predecessor (and itself containing a subordinate genitive absolute). The syntax is unlovely and the sense is unclear: is Simplicius himself adducing evidence in support of Andronicus’ arrangement? or is he rather reporting the evidence which Andronicus adduced in his own support? The text is indeterminate; but I incline to the former view (see next note). In any case, it is plain that Simplicius is speaking in propria persona at the latest by line 16 (‘Aristotle himself ... '). 283 κ αι Θ ΐοφράστου: here I take 'καί' to mean ‘also’ — and hence favour the view that Simplicius is supporting rather than citing Andronicus. ™ It is generally assumed that when Theophrastus became scholarch Eudemus retired to Rhodes, and that he took his books — including his copy of the Physics — with him: why should Eudemus have written to Theophrastus if they were both still living in Athens? But how trustworthy is the evidence? Surviving ancient letters are more often forged than authentic. 285 Or perhaps '... understand (your point)’ — so Fortenbaugh et al Theophrastus, I, p.319. 286 ή μικρόν τ ι π α ντίλώ ς ΐ χ ί ι το άνα μ ίσον: for this use of ‘dvd ^.Eoov’ see e.g. Phoebammon, fig 4.

476

477

M antissa

Roman Aristotle

“only of immobile items do I say that they are at rest; for rest is contrary to motion, so that it is a privation [15] in what can receive it’"287). So Theophrastus thinks that the fifth book too is from the P hysics. Aristotle himself at the beginning of the eighth book says: ‘Let us start first from the items which we have already discussed in the P h ysics: we say that motion is an actuality of a movable item q u a movable’288*2901 [924] — he had said that in the third book.289 And again: ‘We laid down in the P h ysics that nature is a principle of motion and rest"90 — he had said that in the second book.2 91 At the end of the eighth book he says: ‘That it is not possible for there to be an infinite magnitude has already been proved in the P h ysics" " — he had talked [5] about that too in the third book^93 That makes it plain that they called the five books P hysics. That the last three were called O n M o tio n is plainly indicated by Aristotle in the first book of O n th e H ea ven s , where he says: ‘It is evident that it is impossible to traverse an infinite extent in a finite time: hence in an infinite time — we have already proved that in O n M o tio n .294 And again: [10] ‘It is argued in O n M o tio n that nothing finite has an infinite capacity and nothing infinite a finite’.2°5 He discussed those matters in the three books^96 That the three are O n M o tio n and the five P h ysics is also evidenced by Damas297 who wrote the life of Eudemus.298 He says: ‘And of the books in Aristotle’s treatise O n N a tu re , the three O n M o tio n .. .’.299 [15]

They called P h ysics not only the eight books but also O n th e H ea ven s and O n th e S o u l and many more; but in the narrow sense the five books of the L ectu re o n P hysics.

287 Phys E 226b14-16: I suppose that Eudemus found in his corrupt manuscript of Phys a version of these lines which he could not understand. Theophrastus answers that the only way to understand the text is to hypothesize a mild hyperbaton — so that Eudemus' version (Which has not been transcribed) means the same as the version which Theophrastus gives (and which is the reading of the mediaeval manuscripts). ' &25la8-10. 28 See e.g. I' 202a7-8. 290 & 253b7-9: our modern text is slightly diff erent. 291 B 192b20-22. & 267b20-22. 293 r 204a34-206a8. CaelA 272a28-31. 29> CaelA 275b21-23. 2,s e.g. Z 233a3l-34; &266b25-27. 229 Unknown — so that his name, which is common enough, has been uselessly emended to 'Damascius' or ‘Damasius' or the like: see P. Hoffmann, 'Damas', DPhA II, pp.540-541. 228 Eudemus, frag 1 Wehrli. 222 Reading ‘rCi wept κιvήσeω s’ (Diels) for ‘των 7T . κ.'.

That the book now before us comes in order after the fifth is shown by Eudemus,3°° who follows Aristotle very closely and who connects to what is said in the fifth book the thesis that [69] nothing continuous is put together out of partless items. [20] Andronicus too gives this order to these books. And indeed at the very beginning of this book Aristotle makes use of the items which he has expounded in the fifth book — continuity, touching, contiguity. That this book comes before the seventh is clear from the fact that, having proved at the end of this book that nothing partless moves and that no [25] change is infinite, in Book Eta, which follows this and is the seventh book, he uses these theses as something proved. Similarly with the thesis that there is no infinite motion in [925] a finite time, whether the item moved is infinite or finite — he proves it here and uses it there as something proved.* 300 Eudemus, frag 98 Wehrli. * EOos eχ ovτes o l Εκ ToiJ Π eftπάroυ την rWv βιβλίω ν TO.gtv Eπtγfάφetv κατά την TO.gtv rWv roiJ λόγου σ το μ ίω ν άλφα, βήτα, γά μ μ α και Etj:iegijs, [5] elκ όrω s ro Ικ τ ov τής Φυσικής άκρo&aews E7Ttyp 6tf:iovat . ζήτα, 0■πef Ev ά ftθ μ oΐs τον Επτά αριθμόν δηλοΐ,

€ν 8ε ro ts arotx etots r ην ικ τη ν r>v απoκeκληpω τat. eιfyητat 8ε και πρό-repov οτι τά μΕν πΕντΐ β ιβλία τά προ τoύτoυ Φ υσ^ά ^A ovaiv, τά δΕ Evτeΰθev τρία Ilep l Kti^aews· oΰτω γάρ κ α ι :4v8p0vtKos Ev τ φ τ ρ ίιψ τω ν ΆρtoτoτEλoυs {Jt{JAiwv διατάττεται, [10 ] μ aρτυρoΰvτos 7Te^ τω ν πρώ τω ν και Θ eoφράστoυ γράφ avτos E ΰδήμoυ π eρ ί τtvos αύτφ τω ν ήμαρτημΕνων άνηγράφ ω ν κατά το πΕμπτον βιβλών- υπΕρ cLv, φησίν, EπEστetλas KeAevwv ^ie γράφ α ι και ά π oσ τeΐλa ι Εκ τω ν Φυσικών, ή τοι Εγώ oo ξυvίημt η μ^ ρόν τι π avτeλώ s exet το ανά μ€σov ο ^ ρ ήpeμetv καλω των dKtv^rwv ^6vov' Evavτίov γ ά ρ ήρτμία K ^ a e t ώ σ τe στEρrjσts αν [15] Εΐη τoΰ δeκτtκoΰ· ώ σ τe κ α ι το πΕμπτον {Jt{JAiov Εκ τω ν Φυσικων ο Θ eόφρaστos voμίζet. aΰτόs δΕ ό ΆρtστoτEληs Εν τφ όγδόψ κ α τ ’ άpχάs tf:iTJatv· ά pgώ μeθa δΕ π pώ τov Εκ τω ν δtωptσμEνωv ήμΐν Εν n f s .

1 7

T h e

c a ta lo g u e lo g ic a l

o f

C h r y s ip p u s ’

w o r k s *

A t the end o f his b rief L ife o f Chrysippus, Diogenes Laertius remarks that ‘since his books have a very high reputation, I have decided to record here the list o f them arranged by subject. They are these’ (VII 189).** There follows an articulated catalogue o f Chrysippus’ works. Diogenes has a standing interest in the writings o fh is subjects, an interest w hich he im plicitly avows in his preface (I 16). Alm ost all the L ives refer to what their subjects w rote , 1 and in the vast m ajority o f them Diogenes presents a book-list. The list o f Chrysippus’ writings stands out on three diverse counts. First, it is articulated into sections and subsections ,2 and the articula­ tion is based on philosophical principles .3 Secondly, it is incomplete: the end o f Book V II is missing from all surviving manuscripts ofD iog enes 4 — and

* First published in K.A. Algra, P.W. van der Horst, and D.T. Runia (eds), Polyhistor: studies in the history and historiography o f ancientphilosophy presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his sixtieth birthday, Philosophia Antiqua72 (Leiden, 1996), pp.169-184. — In writing the piece I was indebted to several friends and colleagues, and in particular to Keimpe Algra, whose comments enabled me to eliminate a number of errors in the penultimate version. ** Επεί δ’ EvOogότaτa τή β ιβλία Εστίν aύτφ,εO ogε μ οι και την προς etOoς άναγραφην

αυτών Ενταύθα καταχω ρίσαι. καί εστι τάδe■ 1 Exceptions: Myson, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Archelaus, Socrates, Eubulides, Diodorus, Menedemus ofEretria, Lacydes, Lycon, Menedemus the Cynic, Melissus, Leucippus, Anaxarchus. Occasionally — and particularly if the subject wrote nothing (e.g. Arc.esilaus, IV 32: Carneades, IV 65) — the reference is brief (e.g. Polemo, IV 20; Bion, IV 47; Clitomachus, IV 67; Eudoxus, VIII 89). Some at least of Diogenes’ predecessors had included book-lists in their Lives: see e.g. Diogenes Laertius, II 85 and VI 80 (Station's ΔιαΟοχαί). See 0 . Regenbogen, ‘Πίναξ', RE^X (1950), coll 1409-1482, in coll 1430-1433. 2 Other articulated lists: Plato (IV 57-66), Heraclides Ponticus (V 86- 88), Antisthenes (VI 15-18), Diogenes ofSinope (VI 80), and Democritus (IX 46-49). 3 Compare e.g. the list ofDemocritus' works (drawn up byThrasyllus): IX 46-49. Contrast e.g. the Platonic tetralogies: IV 57-66. 4 On the loss see J. Mansfeld, ‘Diogenes Laertius on Stoic philosophy', Elenchos 7, 1986, 295-382 [= Studies in the Historiography o f Greek Philosophy (Assen, 1990), pp.343—428}, on pp.308-312; T. Dorandi, ‘Considerazioni sull’ index locupletior di Diogene Laerzio’, Prometheus 18, 1992, 121-126.

480

481

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The catalogue o f Chrysippus' logical works

with it half the Chrysippean bibliography.5 T hirdly, it is exciting; for it

W h at do w e know aboutA pollonius? Next to nothing.’ His date is roughly fixed; for Strabo describes him as living ‘a little before us’, which presumably

appears to offer us inform ation about Chrysippus’ philosophical activities, and in particular about his logical activities, which we cannot find elsewhere — it parades his terminology; it shows where his interests lay; it indicates the structure which he gave to his philosophical w ork .6 [170] The catalogue appears to o ffer such information. But w hat is its pedigree? W h at authority does it possess? Diogenes does not name his source; but we can guess it. O ri the one hand, we know th atA p ollonius o fT y re ‘published the table o f the philosophers o f Zeno’s school and o f their books’ (Strabo, X V I ii 2 4 [757 C ]),7 a w ork which must have included a catalogue o f Chrysippus’ works. O n the other hand, Apollonius is an author w hom Diogenes cites more than once .8 Diogenes, like m any another scholar, sometimes cites sources w hich he knows only at second hand; but nothing hints that he did not him self read Apollonius; and in any event it is em inently reasonable to believe that his list came from Apollonius, either directly o r indirectly.

5 What survives lists some 350 tides: in all, Chrysippus wrote 'more than 705' works (VII 180:

novtκω τατος te '!Tap ovrtvow y iy o v e v ως ofjAov ek τω ν σvγγpaμμ arω v a v r o v τ ov αριθμόν y d p {nrEp -πέντε κ αι enraK oata eariv). A bizarre remark — change 'nevre' to 'πεντηκόντα' or delete '-πέντε καί'? 6 Odd then that it has accumulated so little literature. Numerous scattered comments, of course; and annotated translations in Italian (M. Gigante, Diogene Laerzio: Vite dei j i s ofi (Rome/Bari, 1983); M. Baldassarri, La Wgica stoica: testimonianze e fiammenti — II: Crisippo (Como, 1985)), German (K. Hiilser, Die Fragmente zurDialektik der Stoiker (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt, 1987-1988), and French (P. Hadot, 'Liste commentae des reuvres de Chrysippe (Diogenes Laertius, VII 189-202)', DPhA II, pp.336-356). But apart from A. Dyroff, Ueber die Anlege der stoischen Biicherkatalege, Programm des Gymnasiums zu Wi.inburg (WUnburg, 1896), and J. B:runschwig, 'On a book-title by Chrysippus: “On the fact that the Ancients admitted dialectic along with demon­ strations” in H.J. Blwnenthal and H.M. Robinson (eds), Aristotle andthe Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy supplementary volume (Oxford, 1991), pp.81-95 [French version in his Etudes sur laphilesophie helltnistique (Paris, 1995), pp.233-250], I know of no sustained study. 7 jk Tvpov δε AvTinarpos και μικρόν Tpo ημών AnoXXwvios 0 τον πίνακα έκθείς rWv από Z'ljvwvos cf>iXoaocf>wv και τών βιβΧίων. — There is no reason to think that Strabo's phrase is, or is intended as, a book-title; and the 17ivag wwas surdy presented in Apollonius' work On Zeno, which was in more than one book (see Diogenes Iaertius, VII 2, 6): so J. Mejer, Diogenes ^Laertius and his Hellenistic Background, Hermes Einzelschriften 40 (Wiesbaden, 1978), p.75, n.33; D. Hahm, 'Diogenes I.aertius VII: On the Stoics’, ANIRWW 36.6 (1992), pp.4076-4182, on p.4166 n.207. 8 See VII 1, 2, 6, 24, 28. (For the spurious correspondence between Antigonus and Zeno at VII 6 see W. Cronert, Koletes undMenedemos (Munich, 1906), pp.28-29; T. Dorandi, Filodemo: storia deifilosofi — '4 Stoi da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018), Philosophia Antiqua 60 (Leiden, 1994), p.9 and n.41.)

puts him in the first part o f the first century b c 10 and Philodemus cites him in the so-called In d ex S to ico ru m (PH erc 1 0 1 8 , X X X V II 1 -5 ), w hich cannot be dated much later than 5 0 .11 Scholars generally assume that he was a Stoic philosopher; and a popular view makes him a follower o f Apollodorus o f Seleucia .12 He w rote about the Stoics, and part o f the w ork betrayed at least a quasi-philosophical interest in the subject. No doubt you might [171] have a philosophical interest in the Stoics w ithout being a Stoic — or even a philosopher. Nonetheless, it is not a bad guess that Apollonius wwas a Stoic. W h y a follower o f Apollodorus? The argument is this. The catalogue regu­ larly uses the word ‘τ ό π ο ς ’ to mark areas or divisions o f its subject matter; and ‘Apollodorus calls these parts [i.e. the three parts o f philosophy] areas, while Chrysippus and Eudromus call them species and others call them kinds’ (Diogenes Laertius, V II 39).* So when Apollonius talks o f τ ό π ο ι he is using a term inology peculiar to Apollodorus; and hence he was probably a member o f his school. Evidently, the argument is at best frail. In fact it is worthless; for in the catalogue the w ord ‘τ ό π ο ς ’ is not used in the Apollodoran way. Apollonius speaks, say, o f ‘the logical τ ό π ο ς concerning σ η μ α ι ν ό μ ς ν α ’ (VII 190), thereby referring to that area o r part o flo g ic which deals w ith ‘objects signi­ fied’. Thus logic itself is not designated a τ ό π ο ς : rather, logic has τ ό π ο ι . Apollonius uses the w ord ‘τ ό π ο ι in a thoroughly normal way. He does not use it in its special Apollodoran way.

5 On Apollonius see e.g. R. Goulet, ‘Apollonios de Tyr’, DPhA I (1989), p.294; Dorandi, Fibdemo, pp.6, 33. — Hahm, 'Diogenes Laertius', argues that Apollonius was Diogenes' primary

source not only for the catalogue but also for the biographies of Zeno and his six followers and for the Stoic doxography: like most essays’ in Laertian Quellenforschung, that is unlikely to persuade anyone apart from its author. 10 Strabo uses the same phrase of Antiochus (XVI ii 29 [759 C]), whose dates are f.130-68/7; cfe.g. VIII vii 5 [387 C], XII iii 41 [562 C] — events datable to the early 60s. 11 Dorandi, Filodemo, pp.32-35; id, 'Filodemo storico del pensiero antico', ANRWII 36.4 (1990), pp.2407-2423, on pp.22412-2414. 12 So Dyroff, Biicherkataloge, pp.39-41; cf Cronert, Koletes, pp.8O, 180; Baldassarri, Logica stoica, pp.12-16 (see also Hiilser, Fragmente zur Dialektik, p.LXXXVII). * Taiira 8Erd /-.o?' here: I have translated it by ‘whole’; and I suppose that an account of the ολο? τρόπος of Pyrrhonism

Timon used often to say o f those who favour the senses together with the mind which confirms them: ‘Attagas and Numenius have joined fotces’.lw

The attagas is a bird — the francolin or black partridge; and the numenios is another bird, of uncertain identity.^8 The phrase which Timon liked to use was proverbially applied to a pair of thieves.109 Timon plainly means to say that if you trust — or take as your criterion of truth — the combination of the senses and the mind, then you are relying on a pair of rascals. What has that to do with Numenius? An eminent scholar has asserted that Timon’s satirical comment is only intelligible if we assume that the word ‘νο νμ η νιο ς’ carries a covert reference to a Pyrrhonist.uo But that is not so: such a reference is not only unnecessary — it makes the satire unintelligible. [4262] If I see a feminist and an ecologist in cahoots, and say ‘Birds of a feather’, you will not understand me the better if you suppose that I ^ covertly referring to Mr. Bird, my conservative bank-manager. What, then, are we to say of the Pyrrhonist Numenius? IX 114 does not refer to a Numenius at all. IX 68 refers to someone who passed a remark

‘04 See above, n.27. ‘05 One might also wonder how Diogenes knewthat no-one other than Numenius had advanced the charge. ' ‘06 It is tempting to suppose that it has been displaced in the course ofthe transmission. Thus it would fit well enoueyh a page or so later, at IX 70, as a comment on Theodosius’ claim that μ η δ ’

ίχ ΐίν τ ι δόγμα . l07 IX 114: avvex es te imX eyeiv elWOet npos tovs Td.s αίσθησεις μ ε τ 1Επιμαρτυρόΰντος τόΰ vov iyK pivovras, avvf)X6ev aTTayas te και vόvμήvιόs. " See W. d’Arcy Thompson, A Glossary o f Greek Bird, (Oxford, 1936), pp.59-61, 207; cf Menagius, observationes, pp.441--442. ‘09 The fullest explanation ofthe proverb is in [Diogenianus], paroem I 96: RrTayO.s Νόνμτρ>ίω avvqXOe· μόμνηται τ α υ τ ψ της πapόιμ£as 0 ΧόγόθΕτψ Ev ra ts αΰτόΰ μ ΐταφ ράσεσιν eis τον βίόν τού ά γιόν l}re ΰπνω και

UepiK..\Eovs Soh..\os Επ’ 0.κρον τοΰ rEyovs. For the text see Appendix II. 169 The Index Stoicorum, XLVII 1, names a Stoic Theo among the pupils of Chrysippus; the Suda, s.v. ΘΕων, mentions two Stoics of the name, one of them an Alexandrian of the first century sc and the other an Antiochean who wrote an Apology o f Socrates. The name is common, and there is no reason to identify our man with any of those three.

550

M antissa

by Pliny and by Plutarch;170 but it does not appear in PH . Diogenes’ style is telegraphic; it is not clear exactly what facts he means to relate; and it is in consequence unclear how he intends to illustrate the Fourth Mode, which depends on ‘conditions and common variations’.171 But two things are clear: first, Diogenes has not taken these illustrations from Sextus; and secondly, he has not himself added them to Sextus’ account. He must be following someone other than Sextus. A third difference concerns the Mode o f Relativity. A Mode by this name appears both in Diogenes and in Sextus — but the two Modes are quite [4275] different. The true situation is complicated; and here I shall state the case briefly.172 The Relativity Mode in Sextus {PH I 1 3 5 -14 0 ) differs utterly in character and in presentation from his other nine Modes. In the account o f the Five Modes, Sextus indicates that he has already discussed the Mode o f Relativity.173 The reference can only be to the discussion o f the Relativity Mode among the Ten Modes. Hence it is clear that Sextus used one o f the Five Modes twice: the Relativity Mode, which is properly third o f the Five he presented both in its original place and also as the Eighth o f the Ten Modes. In using the Third o f the Five as the Eighth o f the Ten, Sextus deposed and replaced what was originally the Relativity Mode among the Ten. And this original Mode survives, no doubt in truncated form, in Diogenes’ account. Thus Diogenes preserves Aenesidemus’ original Relativity Mode, which Sextus chose to replace by the homonymous Mode from Agrippa’s set. Diogenes did not copy his Relativity Mode from Sextus. A fourth difference invites a longer discussion. In certain Modes, the argu­ mentative structures o f the two accounts differ. As I have already said; the text of Diogenes is here uncommonly clipped and concise, and we must often confess that we cannot discern any argumentative structure at all.174

170 See Pliny, AWXXII xx 44; Plutarch, Periclesxiii [160C], 171 IX 82: παρά, τά ς ά ια θ ίο ε ις κ α ι κοινώ ς π α ρα λλα γά ς — Unless the examples are wholly misleading, they will have to be connected with the paired δ ια θ εσ εif of sleep and waking (the second pair in Diogenes’ list). Hence I have taken the ambiguous sentence about Theo to be concerned with dreaming rather than with sleep-walking (pace e.g. H. Diels, 'Reitkii animadver­ siones in Laertium Diogenem', Hermes 24, 1889, 302-325, on p.323; Hicks, Diogenes Laertius, p.495): Theo was doing one thing ‘in his sleep’ and another in fact. And perhaps the point of the reference to Pericles’ slave lies in the dream with which Pliny associates the incident. 172 For details and arguments see Annas and Barnes, Modes, pp. 138-144. 173 PH I 167: καθώ ς π ροειρήκαμεν. See above, p.4267. 174 See above, pp.4248-4249.

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Nonetheless, in some cases the structure can be conjectured; and in at least one case it is perfectly plain. The Ten Modes encourage us to collect and organize ‘oppositions’ or α ν τ ιθ έ σ ε ις o f the general form: x appears F in circumstances C x appears F* in circumstances C*. W e suppose that x cannot actually be both F and F*; and we are intended to think that we cannot prefer C to C*, or vice versa, as the more reliable circumstances in which to perceive x. Hence suspension o f judgement. The different Modes specify different values for C and C*; and the accounts of the Modes in Diogenes and in Sextus are, usually, made up o f particular illustrations o f the sort o f α ν τ ίθ ε α is in question. The First Mode depends on the differences among animals; thus in principle it collects oppositions o f the form: x appears F to animals o f kind K x appears F* to animals o f kind K*. Is the red flag really red? W ell, it looks red to humans — but then it looks grey to bulls. And we can have no reason for preferring one look to the other. Hence ε π ο χ ή . [4276] It is evident that a Pyrrhonist will have some difficulty in applying this Mode. We know how things appear to us. But do we know how things appear to other animals? I am aware that the wine tastes corked to humans: it tastes corked to me, and you tell me that it tastes corked to you. But how does it taste to the cat? W e do not know, and it is far from clear that we shall ever find out. But if we do not know, then we cannot set up a Pyrrhonian opposition o f the form ‘This wine tastes corked to humans and **** to cats’. It is not surprising, then, that the material which the accounts o f the First Mode assemble does not consist of illustrative examples. Rather, it consists o f arguments — and o f anecdotes — designed to show that things do in fact appear differently to different animals.175

175 Thus the First Mode will not in feet collect instances of the antithetical schema: x appears F in circumstances C and x appears F* in circumstances C*. Rather, we shall get something along these lines: x appears F to humans and x appears something other than F to cats. But it is clear that, from a Pyrrhonian point of view, the second schema will work equally well.

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553

It is plain that this passage offers a single, continuous argument. Diogenes’ remarks about modes o f reproduction are equivalent to premiss ( 1 ) in the

The m ain argument in P H is simple enough: First, as we said, is the argument according to which animals, depending on the differences among them, are not impressed by the same appearances from the same things. This we deduce from the differences in the ways they are produced and from the variation in the composition o f their bodies.176

Sextan argum ent (A); and his remarks about perception are grounded upon observation o f the different structures o f the organs o f perception, so that they are roughly equivalent to premiss (2) in the Sextan argument (B). But

T he passage prom ises tw o lines o f thought, which Sextus d u ly follows o u t .1771789

in Diogenes, (1) and (2 ) form consecutive parts o f one argument, which may perhaps be expressed as follows: (C) ( 1 ) Animals differ from one another in their modes o f

Thus: (A)

( 1 ) Anim als differ from

one another in

their- modes o f

reproduction. Therefore: (2 ) Anim als differ from one another in the structure o f their

Therefore: (3) Animals receive different impressions from the same

bodies. Therefore: (3) A nim als receive different impressions fro m the same

reproduction. things. (B) (2 ) Animals differ from one another in the structure o f their bodies.

things.

T herefore: (3) Anim als receive different impressions from the same things. The first o f the arguments is odd: its premiss has no apparent connection w ith its conclusion. T he second argument, on the other hand, seems rather

T he argument may not be w h o lly convincing; but it is, I take it, superior to the pair o f arguments which we find in Sextus. For (C) has all the virtues o f (B) and none o f the vices o f (A). It w ould be pleasant to believe that Diogenes has preserved the original

[4277] plausible — especially when we reflect that by ‘the structure o f their bodies’ Sextus has in mind the structure o f their organs o f perception . ^ 8

Aenesideman argument, w hich Sextus (or his immediate source) managed to distort. However that m ay be, there can be no doubt that Diogenes did not

In Diogenes, the parallel passage is m ore complex in its articulation: First is the mode depending on the differences among animals with regard to pleasure and pain and harm and advantage. Through this it is inferred that different appearances are produced by the same things, and that suspension o f judgement follows conflict o f this kind. For some animals are produced without copulation, like fire-creatures, the Arabian phoenix, and worms; others after intercourse, like humans and the rest. And some have one kind o f constitution, others another. Hence they differ in their perception too — hawks, for example, have very keen sight and dogs very keen smell. It is reasonable, therefore, that the appearances presented to animals with different kinds of eyes should themselves be different.^ 9

176 PHI 40: πρώτον ΕλίγομΕν Είναι λόγον καθ’ ον παρά την διαφοράν τών ζφων ονχ αι α ντα ι απο τω ν αυτών υποπιπτουσι φ αντασιαι. τούτο Se €πιλογι,όμΕθα ek te της TTepi τας γΕνΕσΕίς αντω ν διαφορας και ek της TTEpi τας συστασΕίς των σω μάτω ν παραλλαγής. m Line (A) at PHI 41-43, line (B) at PHI 44-54. 178 See PH I 44: dAAd κ αι ή διαφορα τώ ν κυριω τάτω ν μΕρών τοΰ σώματος, και μ ά λ ισ τα τώ ν προς το ΕπικρίνΕΐν καί προς το αίσθάνΕσθαι πΕφυκότων ... 179 IX 79-80: πρώτος ό παρα τας διαφοράς τώ ν ζφω ν προς ήδονην κα'ι αλγηδόνα ■ κα'ι βλάβην κα'ι ώφΐλΕΐαν. συνάγΕται δΕ δ ι’ αυτοΰ το μ η τας αντας dTTO τώ ν oVtWv προσπίπτΕΐν φ αντασίας και το διότι τή τοιαυτη μάχη ακολουθΕΐ το ΕπΕχΕιν' τών γαρ

draw his argument from Sextus. [5278] Finally, th e order o f th e Ten Modes is different in th e two texts. From our various sources, it emerges that th e arrangement o f th e Modes was not fixed: Philo and Aristocles each adopt or imply different orderings .^ 0 Diogenes h im self expressly mentions some o f these differences.^ H aving sketched the N inth M ode in a couple o f sentences, he remarks:

ζώων τα μΕν χωρις μίζΕως γίνΕσθαι, ώς τα πυρίβια κ α ό Άραβιος φοίΐΗ,ζ και Ευλαί* τά δ’ Eg Επιπλοκής· ως άνθρωποι κ α ι τα αλλα* κ αι τα μ Εν ουτως, τα S ουτως συγκΕκριται' διο και τη αισάήσΕί διαφ έρω ως κιρκοι μ^ν o g v αιπ^οτατοι, κυνΕς δ^ όσφ ρητικώ τατοι. Ενλογον οΰν το ίς διαφόροις τονς οφθαλ μ ον ς διαφορα και τα φαντάσμ ατα προσπίπτΕΐν. For the text see Appendix II. 180 See the table in Annas and Barries, Modes, p.29. 181 A sentence in Sextus has been taken to mean that he, too, recognized different orderings; for after a preliminary listing f the Ten, he observes: χρώμΕθα BE τη τάζΕι τα ντη θΕτικώς (PHI 38). The sentence has caused difficulties. The adjective ‘θΕτικός’ may mean 'artificial’ or 'conven­ tional' (e.g. PH II 256). But Sextus can hardly want to say that the order is purely conventional (pace Annas and Barnes, Modes, p.29): it plainly is not (see e.g. PHI 79, 91, 100; cf Mansfeld, 'Number nine’). The adjective often means 'affirmative’ (e.g. Diogenes Laertius, IX 75, 87); but Sextus can hardly mean to say that he insists on the order he is using. Hence I once conjectured ‘ον θΕτικώς' CDiogene Laerzio’, p.415 n.45). But 'θΕτικός’, in this sense, contrasts ‘αρνητικός’ or ‘negative’; and the conjecture is false (‘we use the order non-affirmatively' is

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Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrhonism

The ninth is called ei ghth by Favorinus and tenth by Aenesidemus and Sextus, while the tenth is called eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus. (IX 87)*

Diogenes is not thinking o f P H when h e here refers to Sextus-.^6 we know

W e are here given five distinct bits ofinform ation: (a) the ninth M ode in Diogenes is eighth in Favorinus; (b) the ninth M ode in Diogenes is tenth in Sextus; (c) the ninth M ode in Diogenes is tenth in Aenesidemus; (d) the tenth M ode in Diogenes is eighth in Sextus; (e) the tenth M ode in Diogenes is ninth in Favorinus. From Sextus w e k n o w that Aenesidemus gave an account — presumably the first account — o f the T en M odes;182 but we have nothing to confirm or to disconfirm item (c). W e know that Favorinus wrote ten books on the Pyrrhonian M odes;^3 but again we have nothing to confirm or to disconfirm items (a) and (e). Sextus has survived. I f w e consider th e order o f the M odes in P H I, then we find that item (d) is true — but item (b) false. In fact it is Diogenes’ fifth Mode which comes tenth and last in Sextus.184 W h at shall we make o f that? There are, I think, three possible explanations o f the mismatch between item (b) and the text o f P H First, w e m ay in fe r that Diogenes has made a careless [4279] mistake — such mistakes are, after all, easily made. Secondly, we may suppose that Diogenes’ scribes have miscopied their text — few things are more liable to corruption than n u m erals.^ T hirdly, we m ay imagine that

55 5

that Sextus w rote a much longer version o f the material contained in P H [ , a version now lost;^7 that text w ill have contained an extended account o f the T en M odes; th e o rd er o f th e M odes there m ay have been different from the order in PH·, and Diogenes’ item (b) m ay be true o f that order. I shall not attem pt to decide among those options. W hichever we prefer, it w ill rem ain the case that Diogenes was not using Sextus as his source for the T en Modes. T h at source, w hoever it m ay be, I dub Q 3.

Sceptical sources Q i was Diogenes’ source for the Five Modes, Q2 his source fo r IX 9 0 - 1 0 1 , Q 3 his source for the Ten Modes. Q i and Q2 were used both by Diogenes and by Sextus; Q 3 was used by Diogenes alone. These several Q s m ay all be parts o f a single w ork, as Jandcek holds; and any tw o o f them m ay be parts o f the same work. W e may, in other words, have one or tw o or three sources im mediately behind the Pyrrhonian antidoxography. Can we give a local habitation and a name to all or any o f them? I f we are to answer the question, then our starting-point should no doubt be the fourteen Pyrrhonian authorities cited by Diogenes in the course o f the L ijeofP yrrho;i88 for ifD iogenes used his Qs extensively, it seems reasonable to think that he w ill have nam ed them somewhere. O f the fourteen, one o f the initially most promising candidates has already been eliminated: Diogenes knew Sextus, but he did not copy him — Sextus, as we have seen, is not a Q [4280]

nonsense). Conjecture is in any case unnecessary; for ‘θετικός' is also used, especially in rhetorical contexts, to mean ‘in the manner of a θεσις’, where a θεσις is something put forward ‘for the sake of argument' rather than advanced as a positive assertion (see e.g. Cicero, parad Stoic proem 5; Strabo, II iii 7 [102]; Philostratus, VS 576.19-20). That is the sense in which Sextus is using the word here: he is making a typically Pyrrhonian disclaimer — 'I am not asserting that this is the right order of the Modes’. * τον ένατόν Φαβωρΐνος όγδοον, Σ εξτος δε και Λίνεοίδημος δέκατοι” άλλα και τον

δεκατον Σ εξτος όγδοόν φησι, Φαβωρΐνος δε ένατον. 182 See Sextus, MV II 345, quoted above, n.162. 183 See Aulus Gellius, V v 5, cited above, n. 164.

‘84 And hence there are fiirther differences between the order of the Modes in Diogenes and in

PH: the fifth Mode in PH is seventh in Diogenes, and the seventh Mode in PH is eighth in Diogenes. 185 Thus Hirz.el, Untersuchungen, p.116 n.1, adds ‘τόν πεμπτον' after ‘Λίνησίδ 1}μος\ Mansfeld, ‘Number nine’, who produces a pleasingly elaborate hypothesis, supposes that Diogenes misread his notes. Dumont, Le scepticisme, p.161 n. 16, supposes that the whole passage is an ilinformed gloss.

‘86 So E. Pappenheim, Die Tropen dergriechischen Skeptiker (Berlin, 1885), pp.18-19.

187 MVII-XI corresponds to PHII-III; and the five surviving books were originally preceded by material corresponding to PHI: see the compelling argument in K. JaniCek, ‘Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso erhalteii?’, Philalagus 107, 1963, 271-277 [reprinted in Studien, pp.124-131]. At IX 116, Diogenes refers to Σεξτος ο εμπειρικός, οΰ και τα δεκα των Σκεπτικών και άλλα κάλλιστα. The ten books of Sceptica must have been MVW.-X1 with their beginning, which will therefore have filled five books: see K. JaniCek, ‘τα δεκα τώ ν σκεπτικώ ν’, inj. lrmscher, B. Doer, U. Peters, and R. Mdller (eds), Miscellanea Critica (Leipzig, 1964), pp. 119— 121 [= Studien, pp.146-148]; J. Blomqvist, ‘Die Skeptika des Sextus Empiricus’, Grazer Beitrdge 2, 1974, 7-14; Mansfeld, ‘Number nine', p.237 n.8. Note that IX 116 thus establishes that Diogenes had heard of the whole work of which MVII-XI is the torso. ‘88 viz Sextus, Philo, Nausiphanes, Timon, Zeuxis, Antiochus, Apellas, Agrippa, .Ascanius, Numenius, Menodotus, Favorinus, Aenesidemus, Theodosius. For references see above, nn. 89 and 91.

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M antissa

T hree farth er names can be eliminated on chronological grounds .185*189190*Q 1, w h o described the M odes ofA grippa, m ust have been a tth e earliest a contem ­ porary o f Agrippa; Q 2 and also, surely, Q 3 were no earlier than Aenesidemus. Hence we m ay dismiss Philo o f Athens, Nausiphanes, and Timon, w ho were all younger contemporaries o f Pyrrho him self . ^ 0 And we can now affirm that Diogenes’ reference to the σ ύ ν τ α ξ η ς composed by Pyrrho’s σ υ ν ή θ η ς cannot, whatever its original fo rm and fanction, give us a n ytru e inform ation about Diogenes’ own sources:m if we delete the list o f names from the text, then none o f the σ υ ν ή θ η ς (so far as we know) were sources; arid if we retain the list, then atleast tw o o f the authors m entioned— T im on and Nausiphanes — were not sources. 192 W e can get no farth er w ith Zeuxis or w ith Antiochus or w ith Apellas, who ‘posited the phenomena alone’.i93 No doubt an account o f Agrippa’s Five M odes w ould have been in place in Apellas’ Agrippa — perhaps Apellas is Qi· But we know nothing about Apellas — or about Zeuxis and Antiochus — so that such speculation cannot be assessed. Agrippa seems m ore promising. It is tempting to suppose that the account o f the Five Modes was taken directly from Agrippa’s writings, and hence that Agrippa him self was Qi· But we do not even know whether Agrippa wrote anything — and here again speculation is idle .^ 4

185 Mejer, Diogenes Laertius, p.28 n.59 says that ‘it seems safe to assume that Diogenes used II cent.AD sources for at least the Platonic and Sceptical doxographies’. In that case we could eliminate several more names from the list. But I confess that Mejer’s assumption does not seem particularly safe to me. It is true that Diogenes names second-century thinkers, Sextus among them; but, as Mejer himself notes (p.7 n.16), we may reasonably alow that he could have added a few later names to the texts which he was using. 190 I might note here that there is no reason to doubt that Diogenes had read Timdn at first hand: see Mejer, Diogenes Laertius, p.29 n.61. 151 See above, pp.4260-4263. 152 No doubt some of the information putveyed by Diogenes may detive ultimately from Timon and Nausiphanes; but neither can be identified with any of our Qs. 153 IX 106: άλλά και Z evgts 0 ΛίνΕσιδήμον γνώ ριμος Εν TqJ lle p i 8tττώ ν λόγω ν και Αντίοχος 0 Aao8t1, the S^uda, a dozen M S S belonging to a recen sio v u lga ta , and a second class o fM S S o f which the chief representatives are the Florentine F, the Neapolitan B, and the Parisian P. B and P are twins. F is independent o f their hyparchetype. M arcovich asserts that is o f great importance for the reconstruction o f the text (p.X), that B is ‘best o fa ll the M S S ’ (p.X II), and that P is an excellent M S (p.XII). ‘In constituting the text I have preferred B and P to the other M S S , and I have made considerable use o f and o f D ’ (p.X VII — D belongs to the re ce n sio vu lga ta ). T hat editorial decision is scarcely consistent with M arcovich’s assessment o f the evidence. N or does it correspond to his practice. For he cites BPF!f> throughout the text (thus adding to the three authorities favoured by Long in the O C T ). As for D , he scarcely mentions it before Book V II: V , another representative o f the recen sio v u lga ta , is cited for Books

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them interesting, which it fails to record. As for the M S S , I have glanced at a few pages o f P, which Marcovich collated twice (p.X V II). A dozen variants are omitted from Marcovich’s apparatus, and there are a dozen false reports. Most o f these are, to be sure, no more than irritating trifles. (For example, the first hand in P generally spells ‘Pyrrho(nian)’ with a single rho, and a later hand frequently — but not always — corrects the spelling. M arcovich records some, but by no means all o f the single rhos; and he never mentions the corrections.) But there are a few less trivial errors. The apparatus differs from that o f the O C T in dozens o f places: M arcovich records numerous readings which the O C T ignores; he tacitly corrects several errors in the O C T ; and he adds some learned conjectures (but not nearly enough). T he form o f the apparatus is neither concise nor elegant. Use o f ‘Q ’ (M arcovich’s name for archetype o f all our witnesses) and o f ‘a ’ (his name for the archetype o f the M S S ) w ould have spared innumerable BPF!f>’s

I-V I (it gives out at V I 6 6 ), but far less often than is D thereafter. Readings in other M S S are occasionally noted, in aleatory fashion. Thus in IX 6 1 - 1 0 8

and B PF’s. There is no merit in an entry like ‘F D C obet’, or in the tag ‘... agn. X , Y , Z ’. As for ‘lacunam indicavere W achsm uth, W ilam ow itz e tD ie ls’:

Q , an apograph o f P , is cited some 5 0 times, never to any purpose. M arcovich offers no argument in favour o f the affiliations among the M SS

et avunculus T.C. et omnes. In the text o f ! X 6 1 - 1 0 8 , Marcovich differs from the O C T in about 65 places. In h a lf o f them he prefers a different, o r a new , M S reading; in h alf

which he proposes; and his sketchy stemma carries a bizarre footnote: there are better accounts o f these things elsewhere .254 It seems plain that the consti­ tution o f the text depends essentially B, P, and F together w ith Φ and the excerpts in the Suda. M arcovich says — the italics are his — th at ‘in the apparatus criticus I have recorded a l l the variant readings and errors o f the M S S BPF!f>’ (p.X VII). H e has not. In IX 6 1 - 1 0 8 — the part o f the w ork on which the following observations are based — the apparatus refers to about 1 0 0 times (against some 3 5 references in the O C T ); but there are at least 80 variants, h alf o f

he prints a different or a new emendation. By m y reckoning, he is right 3 7 times against the O C T . O fh is own conjectures, 13 in number, one is prob­ ably right. In 15 places M arcovich takes most, i f not all, o f these cases it is clear that conjecture.

to be right against all-comers. In represents not Q b u ta Byzantine

A ll in all, it is a disappointm ent— now we have tw o unsatisfactory editions o f Diogenes instead o f one. In the Preface, M arcovich avows that ill-health prevented him from putting the final touches to the work; and he died shortly after the edition came out. Instead o f publishing an o p u s im p erfectu m at an outrageous price, the house ofT eu bn er might have appointed a scholar to complete and polish the work.

254 Knoepfler, Vie de Mbiedeme, has a ful discussion of the evidence (there is a stemma on

p.154); further material in T. Dorandi, Laertiana: capitoli sulla tradizione manoscritta e sulk storia del testo delle Vite dei filosofi di Diogene Laerzio (Berlin, 2009), and in the introduction to his Cambridge edition (with a revised stemma on p.44); there is a useful summary in T. Dorandi, ‘La tradition manuscrite', in Goulet-Caze, Diogffle Lae'rce, pp.33-39. For some account of earlier work see Biedl, Textgeschichte, pp.7-41; see also e.g. U. Egli, Das Dioklesfiagment bei Diogenes Laertius (Constance, 1981), pp.1-5; Gigante, Diogene Laerzio, pp.XCVI-XCIX; Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae, IV, pp.17-25; M.G. Sollenberger, Diogenes Laertius' Life o f Theophrastus (diss. Rutgers, 1984); id, ‘Diogenes Laertius 5.36-57: theVitaTheophrasti’, in W.W. Fortenbaugh (ed), Theophrastus ofEresus, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 2 (New Brunswick NJ, 1985), pp.39-76; B.A. Desbordes, Dioglne Laerce, pp.108-153.

In the following notes, ‘M ’ stands for Marcovich. O ther abbreviations should be obvious. By ‘M eibom e t a l I m ean to refer to the m ajority o f editors from M eibom onwards. IX 6 1 [674.16] M prints Ws 8€ claiming the 8€ for PP': in fact P 4 adds afrer φ η σ i (where Meibom e t a l place it). — [675.2] Instead o f the puzzling Z riX 1 T w vos, the Suda has K X e i v o p a y o v μ α θ η τ ο υ : M does not

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note the fact in his apparatus — and in the text o f the Suda which he prints in volume II the phrase is replaced by IX 6 3 [676.11] rather than postulate a lacuna after τε (Diels, O C T ), M follows F and Ppc and Meibom e ta l in omitting the little word — rightly (cf Plato, Phdr 245B). 1 X 6 4 [677.8] π ο λ λο ύς είχε ζ η λ ω τ ά ς — so M , with BP: Meibom e ta l prefer F and the order ζ.ε.π. — [677.9-10] The received text can hardly stand {pace Meibom etal)·, but M ’s transposition o f ‘ούτω ς' does no good: mark a lacuna after Π νθω νι (Wilamowitz). IX 6 6 [678.9] εκάθαιρεν [Hesychius]; καθαροί a. Here [Hesychius] is right, as Menagius and all subsequent editors have seen. M refers to [Hesychius] a dozen times in his apparatus: he might reasonably have added readings at 675.2, 676.5, 6 7 8 .12 , 678.13/ 14, 6 7 8 .1 5 -6 7 9 .1 . But whether [Hesychius] is an independent witness for Ω I am not sure. — [678.12] Keep λαβόμενον, the reading o f Ω, against M and all editors (who take επιλαβόμενον from Kiihn, p .5 4 l): c f e.g. Plato, Laws 637C . — [679.2]

λόγα> + προς τ α δόγματα? IX 6 8 [679.18] For εμ π λεό ντω ν (α) see Thucydides, III 77.2. M follows Φ, σ υμ π λεό ντω ν α ύτω (which the O C T prints as though it were the reading o f all the witnesses). 1 X 6 9 [680.10] iih as, and M prints, the ungrammatical πέραν τον Α λφειόν: either omit πέραν (FΦ) or read τ ο ύ Α λ φ ειο ύ (cf Euripides, HF 386). — [680.14] α π ’ α νθρ ώ π ω ν άπόσχολον Ω; α π ’ α νθρ ώ π ω ν αύτόσχολον Meineke, followed by Μ inter alios. Casaubon had proposed άπ άνθρω πον και άπόσχολον (see Menagius, p.428 — M misreports him): the correction is palmary. IX 7 0 [6 8 1.8 -10 ] The text offered by a, ά π ο ρ η τικ η δ ’ α π ο τ ο ύ το ύ? δ ο γμ α τικο ύς άπορεΐν και α υτο ύς, can only mean ‘Scepticism is called aporetic from the fact that the Dogmatists themselves also raise puzzles’ (the alternative translations o f Hicks, p.482, and Decleva Caizzi, Pirrone, p.99, do not correspond to the Greek). But that is absurd {paceL. Couloubaritsis, ‘La probkmatique sceptique d’un impensi: ή σ κ ε φ ις’, in Voelke, Le scepticisme, p p .9-28, on p p .12-15). I have proposed ά π ο ρ η τικη δ ’ άπό τού π ερί π α ν τό ς άπορεΐν (see Sextus, PH I 7). The suggestion is supported with further argument by Brunschwig, p. 1 1 0 7 n.8. M prints ά π ο ρ ητικη δ ’

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άπό το ύ το υς δ ο γμ α τικ ο ύς άπορεΐν κ α ι α υτο ύς. That is inelegant, and pace M it is not supported by Sextus. — [681.10] Π υρρώνειοι δε άπό Πύρρωνος: the sentence was excised by Casaubon as a pointless repetition. Menagius concurred — adding that the sentence is not found in the pertinent entry in the Suda (see p.429). Most editors, including M, follow suit. But in that case, they ought to follow Menagius when, with the Suda, he reads ζ η τ η τ ικ ο ί etc. for ζη τη τικ η φ ιλο σ ο φ ία etc. Myself, I should print the text o f a: the repetition is explained by the fact that Diogenes is now going to remark that Theodosius says that sceptics shouldn’t be called Pyrrhonists from Pyrrho. It is o f course inelegant — no doubt that is w hy the Suda polished it up a little — [681.12] το ν σ κ επ τικ ό ν (Suda) for τη ν σ κ επ τικ ή ν (a) is tempting. — [682.2] Cobet’s addition o f τ ις is plausible (P had τ ι, which a corrector deleted) — and then (and in any case) read ομότροπος (BP Suda) rather than -ως (F). See Brunschwig, p .l 108 n.5.

IX 7 4 [685.6] τ ά τ ω ν ά λλω ν is plausibly deleted b y Brunschwig, p .l 1 11 n.2. — [688.13] π α ν τ ί λό γω λόγος ά ν τ ίκ ε ιτ α ι: Menagius, ρ ρ .4 3 2 -4 3 3 , adds ίσ ο ς after Aoyo?, thus getting the standard Pyrrhonian phrase (e.g. Sextus, PH I 2 0 2 -2 0 5 ). But the received text is defended by IX 7 6 [6 8 6 .15 -16 ].

1X 76 [686.16] M ’s capital lambda on Λ ό γω destroys the sense. And ώ ς for o? (Ω ) — Patillon, apud Brunschwig, p .l 1 1 3 n.3 — is tempting (and has persuaded Dorandi).

IX 7 7 [686.20-21] I incline to attach προς o ... π ρ ο σ επ ισ χ νρ ίζειν to the end o f § 76, and to begin the new section with μόνον οδν. (So Dorandi.) But if something has dropped from the text after οί δ ο γμ α τικ ο ί, as Cobet supposed, then the case is less plain: see Brunschwig, p .l 1 1 4 n.2. — [686.21] δια κ ο νία ις (ΒΡΦ) is scarcely possible; and διακόνοις (F, followed by Meibom et at) is no more than a stopgap. Perhaps διακενω ς or διακενής'ί — [687.1] ά π ό δ εικ τικ ώ ς is shocking, and Brunschwig’s explanation (p .l 114 n.5) does not stand up. Perhaps ύ π ο δ ε ικ τικ ώ ς ? ά π ο ρ η τικ ώ ς (cf Sextus, M I X 12)? ά π α γ γ ε λ τ ικ ώ ς (cf PH I 197)? Or can Diogenes perhaps use ά π ό δ εικ τικ ώ ς as equivalent to ά π α γ γ ε λ τ ικ ώ ς (see n.121)? IX

IX 78 [687.17] ‘W e propose κ α ί τ ά θανμ αζόμ ενα . Surprising things do not persuade, and the reference here must be to the Ninth Mode

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(in Sextus’ num bering)’ (Annas and Barnes, M o d es , p. 18 6). But there is no reference to any M ode; and θ α ν μ α ζ ό μ ε ν α means ‘adm ired’ rather than ‘surprising’.

0 Τ ιθ ο ρ α ι ε ύ ς 0 σ τ ω ΐ κ ό ς κ ο ι μ ώ μ ε ν ο ς π ε ρ ι ε π ά τ ε ι ε ν τ ώ υ π ν ω : Reiske thought that κ ο ι μ ώ μ ε ν ο ς and ε ν τ ώ υ π ν ω said the same thing twice over,

:

so he deleted the participle; Diels rem oved the supposed repetition by changing υ π ν ω to ύ π ε ρ ω (see Diels, p .323). But there is no repetition i f

IX 7 9 [687.19] Ω has κ α τ ά τ ά ς σ ν μ φ ω ν ί α ς . Hicks, p .4 9 3 , correctly trans­ lates by: ‘perplexities which arise from the agreements between appearances

the sentence means th at T heon w ent to bed and dreamed he was walking — and in the context dreaming is more apt than somnambulism.

or judgem ents’ — and that, p a c e Brunschwig, p . 1 1 1 6 n.2, is a nonsense. Reiske proposed τ η ς for τ ά ς (see Diels, ‘R eisk ii a n im a d v ersio n es', p .323), and M prints the genitive. But I cannot think that that is Greek. Annas and

IX 8 3 [689.20] κ α ί τ ε χ ν ι κ ά ς σ ν ν θ η κ α ς : the adjective can’t be right. Menagius, p .4 3 4 , emended to ε θ ικ ά ς , referring to Sextus, P H I 1 4 5 ; and the

Barnes, M odes, p .1 8 6 , change σ ν μ φ ω ν ία ς to δ ι α φ ω ν ία ς (anticipated, as I learn from Dorandi, b y von der M uehll) — and all is tickety-boo. — [ 6 8 7 .2 1 -6 8 8 .1 ] see above, p p .4 2 8 7 -4 2 8 8 .

emendation is compelling. (It has, o f course, been resisted — for example, b yA p elt, D io g en es L aertius, II, p .2 03; Gigante, D io g en e L aerzio, p.387.) The five items on w hich the Sextan mode depends can now be identified w ith the five items on w hich the mode in Diogenes depends, given that ε θ ι κ α ί σ ν ν θ η κ α ι are the same as έ θ η . T here is a twist to the story. T h e pertinent

IX 8 0 [688.9] T he received ο ξ ύ τ α τ ο ι would mean ‘sw ift’, as Casaubon noted; but swiftness is irrelevant, as Menagius pointed out (p.433). Menagius proposed ο ξ ν δ ε ρ κ ε σ τ α τ ο ι , and you m ight also think o f ο ξ υ ω π ε σ τ α τ ο ι (cf

passage in Menagius is printed as follows: e m e n d e κ α ί ε θ ν ικ ά ς σ ν ν θ η κ α ς e Sexti v e rb is su p ra alla tis. As the reference to Sextus shows, the printer has set ε θ ν ικ ά ς where Menagius had w ritten ε θ ικ ά ς . Later editors (among them Cobet, p .2 4 7 , Hicks, p .4 9 4 , and Long, p .480) have preferred the printer to

Sextus, M I X 6 5 ; Aristotle, HA. Θ 6 2 0 a 2 — von der M uehll again), each o f w hich is neater than < opav> ο ξ ι ί τ α τ ο ι w hich M accepts from Reiske (see Diels, ‘ R eiskii a n im a d v e rs io n e s', p .3 23). —

[688 .16] κ α τ ά έ θ ν η κ α ί σ ν γ κ ρ ί σ ε ι ς Ω (F has κ α ί έ θ ν η ) : th e nations are unwanted — M prints κ α ί τ ά έ θ η (from D ) κ α ί ί δ ι ο σ ν γ κ ρ ι σ ί α ς (after Menagius). But customs are no m ore wanted in the context than nations. Menagius suggested κ α τ ά ί δ ι ο σ ν γ κ ρ ι σ ί α ς , w ith a reference to Sextus, P H I 8 1 . (There is nothing w rong in itself w ith σ ν γ κ ρ ί σ ε ι ς (see e.g. Soranus, g y n I xxii 5); but perhaps someone will think that the words έ θ ν η κ α ί are the remains o f an original ίδ ιο . ) But the κ α τ ά is unconvincing, and C obet im proved on Menagius to read: κ α ί τ ά ς ί δ ι ο σ ν γ κ ρ α σ ί α ς (which D orandi ascribes to Menagius). IX 81

Menagius. There is a fiirther twist: in the original version o f this paper I reported Menagius incorrectly: em e n d o κ α ί τ ά ς ε θ ν ικ ά ς σ ν ν θ η κ α ς . T hat is w hat M prints — ascribing it to Menagius. — [690.2] π ε ρ ί ά λ η θ ώ ν ... κ α κ ώ ν is om itted b y (M ’s apparatus is misleading). :

sense. Annas and Barnes, M odes, p .1 8 7 , think that the received text m ay stand: it means that the sun looks different in different conditions; but see

[689.1] M adds δ ε after ά λ λ ο ς (Cobet); but see e.g. IX 85

[ 6 9 6 .5 -7 ]. IX 8 2 [ 6 8 9 .8 -1 0 ] π α ρ ά τ ά ς δ ι α θ έ σ ε ι ς κ α ί κ ο ιν ά ς π α ρ α λ λ α γ ά ς : M rightly prefers κ ο ιν ά ς (Φ ) to κ ο ιν ώ ς (a); and π ε ρ ι σ τ ά σ ε ι ς fo r π α ρ α λ λ α γ ά ς is hard to resist (Menagius, p .4 3 4 , referring to Sextus, P H I 10 0 ; cf Brunschwig, p .1 1 1 8 n.5). — [689.12] M prints π α ρ ά τ ο < δ ια > π ν ε ΐν [ π α ρ ά το ] π ι ε σ θ η ν α ι τ ο ύ ς π ό ρ ο ν ς : the additions are due to Reiske (Diels, p .3 23), the deletion is M ’s own. I have found π ν ε ΐ ν strange, and suggested ■πονεΐν. But that is perfectly mistaken: w e expect, and the received text gives, a pair o f contrasted conditions (breathing, having your pores blocked). There is nothing to change, to subtract, or to add to Ω, — [ 6 8 9 .1 7 -1 8 ] Θ ε ω ν 8 ’

IX 8 4 [690.20] M , like the O C T , prints o ή λ ι ο ς < δύνει> , ascribing the supplements to Kiihn: Kiihn says leg erem τ ε ή λ ι ο ς δ ν ν ε ι; si n on v erb a haec, sen su s ta m en ta lis fa it. There are other, and better, ways o f giving that

I i I

Brunschwig, p .1 1 2 0 n.2. — Hiibner, after M eric Casaubon, boldly wrote ν π ο So σ ι ν for ο ή λ ιο ς : that now seems to me to be right. I X 8 5 [ 6 9 0 .2 0 -6 9 1 .1 ] ύ π ο δ ν ο ΐ ν κ ο υ φ ι ζ ό μ ε ν ο ς w ill have to mean that the stone takes tw o men to lift it. "For that sense you w ould expect a μ ό γ ι ς v e l sim , and it is disconcerting to find that in the next clause κ ο υ φ ιζ ό μ ε ν ο ς means not ‘being lifted’ but ‘beingm ade lighter’. Hiibner excised ύ π ό δ ν ο ΐν , w hich he supposed to have started life as ύ π ό δ ύ σ ι ν in th e previous sentence. D orandi rightly follows him (but does not accept ύ π ό δ ύ σ ιν ) . — [6 9 1.9 — 1 0 ] (5 γ ο ν ν ή λ ι ο ς π α ρ α τ ο δ ι ά σ τ η μ α π ο ρ ρ ο ο θ ε ν φ α ί ν ε τ α ι ( a — Φ has τ ε τ ρ ά γ ω ν ο ς for π ο ρ ρ ώ θ ε ν ) . Numerous conjectures have been offered.

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M eric Casaubon changed π ο ρ ρ ω θ ε ν to π α ύ ρ ο ν (see M eibom, p .5 9 1 n.25),

IX 9 0 [693.18] δ ι α σ τ α ζ ο μ έ ν ο υ D: M , like all his predecessors (and the M S D ), writes δ ι σ τ α ζ ο μ έ ν ο υ : better delete the w ord (as a marginal note: ‘punctuate’)?

Menagius, p .4 3 5 , changed it to δ ί π ο δ η ς , K iihn added μ ι κ ρ ό ς after ■ π ορ ρ ω θ εν (p.542), Godfried Hermann added o v after π ο ρ ρ ω θ ε ν (see H .G. H iibner, D io g en es L aertiu s d e vitis, d o g m a tis e ta p o p h th e g m a tis cla ro ru m p h i lo ­ so p h o ru m lib r i d e ce m (Leipzig, 1 8 3 1 ) , II, p .V I). M ost editors replace ■ π ορ ρ ω θ εν by μ ι κ ρ ό ς (e.g. Hiibner, II, p .4 1 1; Cobet, p .248; Hicks, p .4 96; Long, p .4 8 1). But ‘Diogenes surely wrote π ο δ ι α ΐ ο ς ’ (Annas an d Barnes, M od es, p .1 8 8 — anticipated, as I have since discovered, by Triller: see Hiibner, II, p .4 1 1 ). T hat the sun looks a foot across is an ancient commonplace. I X 8 6 [ 6 9 1 .1 7 - 1 9 ] ο γ δ ο ο ς cl π α ρ ά τ ά ς π ο σ ό τ η τ α ς α υ τ ώ ν η θ ε ρ μ ό τ η τ α ς η φ υ χ ρ ό τ η τ α ς κ τ λ (so BP); but the corresponding M ode in Sextus, P H I 12 9 , deals w ith quantities and not w ith qualities; and Diogenes’ single illus­ trative example is quantitative. In F and π ο ι ό τ η τ α ς stands in place o f

π ο σ ό τ η τ α ς ; but that correction replaces one problem by another. Cobet, p .2 48, printed π ο σ ό τ η τ α ς κ α ι π ο ι ό τ η τ α ς (followed by e.g. Hicks, p .4 98, Apelt, I, p .2 04,A n n as and Barnes, M odos, p .18 8 ). B ut th atto o solves nothing: M rightly prints the text as B P offer it — and lets Diogenes stew. IX 8 7 [6 91.22] Delete η σ π ά ν ι ο ν ? T w o disjuncts, not three, are wanted; and σ π ά ν ι ο ν looks like a gloss on ξ έ ν ο ν . — [692.9] For ο υ κ ε τ ι P pc and have ο ν κ (not noted by M). IX 8 9 [692.21] a has κ α τ ά π ά ν τ α , w hich makes no sense. T he ed itio p r in ­ cep s w rote κ α τ ’ α ν -τ ό , which Stephanus im proved into κ α θ ' ε α υ τ ό . T hat has satisfied all editors — save M , w ho prints κ α τ ά π ά ν τ α Ι δ ίω ς . But w hat

κ α τ ά π ά ν τ α is intended to mean I do not know. — [693.1] α λ λ ά +■π ά ν τ α (cf Sextus, P H I 135)? (So, again, von der M uehll.). I f so, then th at might be pertinent to the odd κ α τ ά π ά ν τ α in the previous clause. — [6 9 3 .7 -10 ] Here a has this: ο ιο ν ε ι τ ο ε ί ν α ι π ό ρ ο υ ς τ ι ς β ε β α ι ο ΐ δ ιά τ ο α π ο ρ ρ ο ια ς γ ί ν ε σ θ α ι α υ τ ο π α ρ α λ α μ β ά ν ο ι π ρ ο ς β ε β α ί ω σ ι ν τ ο α π ο ρ ρ ο ια ς

γ ί ν ε σ θ α ι . That is both ungrammatical and nonsensical. It is plain w hat the sentence ought to mean, but unclear how best to get the required meaning.

I X 9 2 [694.14] The sense demands π α ρ ά φ υ σ ι ν f or κ α τ ά φ υ σ ι ν (Brunschwig translates ‘contraires a la nature’, but has no note on the phrase). — [694.16] α ν τ ι π ε ρ ί σ τ α σ ι ν makes no sense: read π ε ρ ί σ τ α σ ι ν (with D): c f Sextus, P H I 10 0 . — [694.19] ’ί σ ω ς (or ε π ’ ίσ η ς ) for ’ί σ ω ν (cfSextus, P H II 8 ; M V I I 400)? IX 9 3 [695.4] ε ν τ α ΐ ς κ α ί σ θ η σ ε σ ι κ α ι> ν ο η σ ε σ ι (Kiihn, p p .5 4 2 -5 4 3 ) is plausible. — [695.7] M prints η π ι σ τ ό ς , noting: η scripsi: ε ί Φ om B P F D

I π ι σ τ ό ς F P 4: π ι σ τ ό ν B P IXQ D .

also has π ι σ τ ό ν — its author tried to m end things by adding ε ί; the copyist o fF , from w hom P4 took its reading, mended things better (so e.g. Cobet, O C T ). M ’s conjecture is pointless. I X 9 4 [695.20] D elete κ α ι ψ ε υ δ ο ύ ς ? — [ 6 9 6 .1-2 ] ώ σ - r α ν ... κ ρ ίν ε ιν κ α ι κ ρ ίν ε σ θ α ι (a): Φ corrects the syntax by writing optatives for infinitives, and M follows

(so too Dorandi). Better keep the infinitives and delete αν?

IX 9 5 [696.7] M prints δ ι α φ ω ν ε ί τ α ι (D ). Cobet corrected to δ ια φ ω ν ε ί, which m ost editors accept. But fo r the passive see e.g. Sextus, P H II 14 5. IX 9 6 [696.17] ο ν κ ε σ τ ι ν ο η τ ό ν (a): that makes no sense. The ed itio p r in ­

cep s w r o t e τ ο for ο υ κ ε σ τ ι , w hich at least restores the syntax. Φ has ε ι ε σ τ ι (and so does D ), which also restores th e syntax — and more elegantly. But in either case the sense is hopeless. Something has dropped out after ν ο η τ ό ν : prin t ο ν κ ε σ τ ί ***. T he lacuna will have contained, first, an explanation o f w hy signs cannot be intelligible (parallel to the preceding explanation o f w hy they cannot be perceptible), and secondly something like ε τ ι δ ε -ro σ η μ ε ΐ ο ν (see also Brunschwig, p. 1 1 2 9 n.4). IX 9 7 [6 9 7 .11] The dative, τ φ α ί τ ι α τ φ m ay be defended: e.g. Sextus, PH II 1 1 9 . (Menagius, p .4 38, changed to the accusative: M , after all other editors, follows him.)

O ne point at least is clear: fo r τ ο α π ο ρ ρ ο ί α ς γ ί ν ε σ θ α ι we must read τ ο ν

I X 9 8 [ 6 9 7 .1 2 -1 4 ] ... κ α ι τ ο α ί τ ι ο ν ο υ ν ε π ι ν ο ο ΐ τ ο α ν μ ό ν ο ν ε π ε ι ε ί π ε ρ

α .γ . w ith !I>. The same Φ has β ε β α ι ο ΐ τ ο fo r β ε β α ι ο ΐ : that offers no help. M

ε σ τ ι ν α ί τ ι ο ν ο φ ε ί λ ε ι ε χ ε ιν τ ο ο ύ λ έ γ ε τ α ι α ί τ ι ο ν ε π ε ί οι5κ α ίτ ιο ν . So Ω. Diogenes is considering sceptical arguments against T he first argument (text cited above, n .14 7 ) plainly ends w ith κ α ι τ ο ο ΰ ν ε π ι ν ο ο ΐ τ ο α ν μ ό ν ο ν . T he next w ords are the start o f a

restores g r ^ ^ a r by placing a κ α ί before π α ρ α λ α μ β ά ν ε ι : Cobet had done ' so more stylishly by w riting β ε β α ι ώ ν in place o f β ε β α ι ο ΐ . I think, too, that

τ ο ύ τ ο should be added after α ν τ ό — C obet again.

εσται causes.

α ίτ ιο ν second

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argument, a precise parallel to which is found in Sextus at Μ IX 208 (see above, p.543). Early editions o f Diogenes rightly set a full stop after μ ό ν ο ν (e.g. Meibom, p.595 — modern scholars prefer an unintelligible comma: e.g. Cobet, p.250; Hicks, p.508). But cttci eitrep κ τ λ is ungrammatical: read e r i ei'nep κ τ λ (accepted by M, and by Dorandi) or, perhaps better, ei'nep r e κ τ λ . The last clause, i n e i ο ύ κ c a r a t α ίτ ιο ν , must be left untouched: it means ‘since otherwise it will not be a cause’. (The same clause occurs in Sextus, Μ IX 209, where after i-net Bekker added μ η ό χ ον and Bury ei μ η cyct.) — [697.16] ο ύ τ ω σ ι Sc (Ω) is impeccable (see Denniston, Greek Particles, p.180). But F and Φ omit Sc, and M changes it to 8 η . — [6 9 7 .19 698.1] κ α ι μ η ν ct έ σ τ ιν α ίτ ιο ν , ή τ ο ι σ ώ μ α σ ώ μ α τ ό ς c a r tv α ίτ ιο ν ή ά σ ώ μ α τ ο ν ά σ ω μ ά τ ο υ - ouSev Sc τ ο ύ τ ω ν ουκ α ρ ’ ό σ τ ιν α ίτιο ν . The disjunction contains only two members: it is evidently incomplete. The subsequent development o f the argument in IX 98 (and also the parallel in Sextus, M X 2 1 0 -2 1 7 ) shows that an exhaustive disjunction was intended. Read (with Hirzel, Untersuchmgen, III, p .139 n . l ) : ... ή'τοι σ ώ μ α σ ώ μ α τ ό ς eoTiv α ίτ ιο ν ή ά σ ώ μ α τ ο ν ά σ ω μ ά τ ο υ ή ά σ ώ μ α τ ο ν σ ώ μ α τ ό ς ή σ ώ μ α άσω μάτου.

IX 99 [6 9 8 .15 -16 ] Something was missing in at there is no doubt about what sense the supplement should bear; but scholars have found different ways to express it. M adopts the version in Φ, which is prettier than any other. — But Dorandi records a suggestion o f von der Muehll’s which invokes Sextus, M X 87, and is rather more elegant. IX 100 [698.21] ο ν τ ι (a and editors); but you might prefer ei να ι (Φ). IX 102 [699.18] On σ υ ν α γ ω γ ή ς see above, n .l 12: the word is unknown in the required sense, and it is tempting to emend to ά γ ω γ ή ς , the unwanted σ υ ν - falsely pre-shadowing the following atm S eiv and σ υ ν τ ό μ ω ν (cf Photius, bibl cod 2 12 , 1 7 0 b l-3 ) . — [700.1-3] For the difficulties see above, p p .4260-4263. M adds π ο λ λ ά at the end o f the sentence, which perhaps makes it easier to ‘supply’ ά π ό λ ιπ ο ν .

IX 104 [701.2] λβ γο μ ό ν ω ν οι) δ ο γ μ ά τ ω ν (a) is nonsense. The editio princeps wrote λ ό γ ο μ ε ν ώ ς for λ ε γ ο μ ό ν ω ν , and editors (among them M) have followed it. I doubt if that’s Greek: perhaps λ 4 γ o μ e v ο υ δ ο γ μ α τ ίζ ο ν τ € ς (Φ— followed by Dorandi)? or ο ν δ ο γ μ α τ ικ ώ ς ϊ — [701.6] For ό ρ ιζ ό μ ε ν

P and Φ have ό ρ ιζ ό μ € θ α (not noted by M).

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IX 105 [701.13] κ ιν ε ίτ α ι τ ι (Μ: τ ις Ω) is good. IX 106 [702.8] Has a book-title dropped out after Λαοδικεύς} — [702.11] μηδέν (a) makes no sense: Φ (anticipating Reiske) corrects to τ ά μεν. — But von der Muehll proposed to retain μηδέν, postulating a lacuna later in the sentence, which comes out as this: ‘Democritus says that none o f the phenomena hold; the Stoics and the Peripatetics say that some o f the phenomena hold and others do not’. That is persuasive.

IX 107 [7 0 2 .15 -16 ] W hat will a sceptic do when he receives different impressions from one and the same thing, ώ ς από του π ύργου ή στρ ο γγυλο ύ ή τετρ α γώ νο υ. The example is not a case o f different appear­ ances coming from the same object but (apparently) o f appearances coming from an object o f indeterminate nature. Change σ τρ ο γγυλο ύ and τε τρ α γ ώ ν ο υ from genitive to nominative? Add φ α ινο μ ένου to the end o f the sentence (so M)? O r take the received text to mean from a tower which appears rounded or square (so Brunschwig, p. 113 7 n.4)? — [702.18-703.2] προς οΰς οι σ κ ε π τ ικ ο ί φ α σ ιν ό τ ι οτε π ρ ο σ π ίπ το υ σ ιν ά λ λ ο ΐα ι

φ α ν τα σ ία ι, εκα τερ α ς ερούμεν φ αίνεσθαι· κ α ι δ ιά το ύτο τ ά φ α ινό μ ενα τ ιθ ε ν α ι ο τ ι φ α ίν ε τα ι. So α. The penultimate ο τ ι, whether it is taken as ‘that’ or as ‘because’, gives no reasonable sense. (Brunschwig, p .113 7 , trans­ lates: ‘The reason w hy they posit the appearances is because they appear’. But that is scarcely an intelligible reply to the dogmatic objection.) Read οτε, to pick up the οτε in the previous line (Φ, anticipating Barnes — accepted by M, and by Dorandi whose apparatus criticus misreports things). Thus: ‘The sceptics say that when different impressions strike us, we shall say that each appears — that is w hy we posit the appearances when they appear’. In the case o f the tower, a sceptic will never be obliged to say ‘It appears both rounded and square’; rather, when it appears rounded he w ill say ‘It appears rounded’, and when it appears square he will say ‘It appears square’.

IX 108 Section 108 presents — I think — a continuous argument, the course o f which is difficult to determine, in part because o f textual problems. W h at is needed is a commentary on the section as a whole: here, instead, are notes on three o f the textual problems. — [703.5-6] ο ντε γά ρ τά δ ε

ελο ίμ εθα ή τ α ΰ τ α φ ευξό μ εθα όσα π ερ ί η μ ά ς ε σ τ ν τ ά 8 ’ όσα μη ε σ τι π ερ ί ημάς ... (Ω): F polished the syntax by writing φ ευξο ίμ εθα , Cobet did the same by writing ελούμεθα: heads or tails. The phrase όσα π ερί η μ ά ς ε σ τι must mean ‘what depends on us’: Meric Casaubon’s π α ρ ’

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ή μ α ς is, to say the least, attractive. A pelt is n o t the only scholar to have f ound oiJ Te perplexing: surely a sceptic w ill choose and avoid w hat is up to

matters, n o t about everyday and ordinary things’ (so e.g. Brunschwig,

582

him? A fter all, a few lines later we read that ‘we both choose and avoid in accordance with convention’ [ 7 0 3 .1 3 - 1 4 ] . So A pelt suggested α υ τ ο ί for ο ύ τ ε ( κ α ί might be better). The suggestion merits, at the least, a place in the apparatus. [ 7 0 3 .9 -1 3 ] Α ε γ ο ν τ ω ν δ ε τ ώ ν δ ο γ μ α τ ι κ ώ ν ώ ς δ υ ν η σ β τ α ι β ιο υ ν 6 σ κ ε π τ ι κ ό ς μ71 φ ε ν γ ω ν τ ο ei κ ε λ ε ν σ θ ε ίη κ p e o υ p γ e ι v τ ό ν π α τ έ ρ α ,

φ α σ ι ν ό ί σ κ ε π τ ι κ ο ί π ε ρ ί τ ώ ν δ ο γ μ α τ ι κ ώ ν π ώ ς δ υ ν η σ ε τ α ι β ιο υ ν ζ η τ η σ e ω v anm [x eiv ο υ -π ε ρ ί τ ώ ν β ι ω τ ι κ ώ ν κ α ι τ η ρ η τ ι κ ώ ν (α). The sceptical reply is certainly corrupt (it is u n g r^ ^ a tic a l), and I find it hard to make sense o f the dogmatic objection. ‘The dogmatists say that sceptics will be able to live i f . . . ’: the Dogmatists usually say precisely the opposite — that sceptics w o n ’t be able to live at all. Brunschwig, p . 1 13 8 n. 1 , suggests that the participial clause, μ η φ e ύ γ ω v , is conditional: ‘The dogmatists say that a sceptic w ill be able to live on condition that he butchers his father i f he’s told to do so’, and he explains that ‘according to the dogmatists, a sceptic w on’t act unless he is obliged to ’. T h at is, I now think, correct at least to this extent: the dogmatists are not suggesting, in this passage, that sceptics can’t live at all — they are suggesting that sceptics, i f they live at all, w o n ’t be able to avoid doing perfectly appalling things. Even so, you w ould expect a negative: not ‘The sceptics w ill be able ...’ but ‘The sceptics w o n ’t be able „;’. So early editors w rote π ώ ς for ώ ς (e.g. M eibom , p .5 98), the question being rhetorical, Φ corrected ώ ς to o?J, and (ignorant o f κ ε φ α λ α ιω δ ώ ν κ α ι ιν α κ α ί κ α τ ά μ έ ρ ο ς ε ίπ ω μ ε ν , κ α ι τά δ ε α ν ε ρ α υ τ ω v eis τ ή ν ε ισ α γ ω γ ικ ή v τ ε ίν ε ι τ ε χ ν 17ν Km α ν τ α ε ν ι λ ε ζ ε ω ς τ ιθ η σ ι Δ ιο κ λ f}s d Μ ά γ ν η s εν Tfj Έ τ ιδ ρ ο μ η rW v φ ιλ ο σ ό φ ω ν , λ ε γ ω ν όντω ς· α ρ ε σ κ ε ι τ ο ΐς Σ τ ω ϊκ ο ΐς . .. [VII 48].

In logic the Stoics held (a) the summary view we have just given, and also (b) the detailed views we are about to give — these detailed views bear on the introductory art and are expounded by Diodes in the following words.

If Diogenes confesses that he owes κ α ι τ ά δ ε to Diodes, then he has already drawn other things from the same source: what could be plainer? And we [29] might ask after the meaning of κ α ι α υ τ ά . If you take those words to have the same force as κ α ι τ ά δ ε , I will not agree. Rather, κ α ί α υ τ ά is very closely connected to the following ε π ί λ ε ζ ε ω ς , and should be understood as follows: ‘Ifwe are to give a detailed account, Diodes of Magnesia in his Sum m ary o f the Philosophers sets them down roo — in so far as they bear on the introductory art — and them too verbatim, as follows’.48 Thus Diogenes indicates that he has already transcribed Diodes verbatim. (78.1-17]

The im portant thing is this: Diels' interpretation o f the text nowhere implies or suggests that Diogenes has a lrea d y used D iodes. The difference between Nietzsche and Diels is syntactical: ‘τά δ ε’ is, on Nietzsche's view, the object o f ‘τ ιθ η σ ι’ and, on Diels' view, the subject o f ‘δο κειν’. [30] D iels' interpretation is demanded by the ‘τ ε ’ after ‘ra V ra ’. But th e syntax o f the Dielsian sentence is at best tortuous. The problem is this: there are too m any ‘K a ts in the Greek. In particular, the ‘K a t before

U nfortunately, Nietzsche’s interpretation o f the Greek he cites is quite certainly mistaken. Hermann Diels, in his b rief but trenchant criticism o f

‘τάδε’ is strange. The ‘ Ka" before Tva ’, answering ‘τε ’, connects ‘τάδ e’ to ‘ra v ra ’; the ‘ Ka" before ‘τά δ ε ’ means ‘also'. These two ‘K a ts are separated b y a parenthetical

Nietzsche’s Laertian hypothesis,49 m ade the killing point. Nietzsche does not

clause. Remove the clause and you find:

translate o r explain the w ord ‘t E after ‘r a v r a ’. His punctuation o f the passage, with a f u l stop after ‘κ ε φ α λ α ι ω δ ω ς ’, in fact makes the ‘te ’ inex­

where the repeated ‘ K at is not Greek. W ith the insertion o f the parenthetical

r a v r a τε a v ro is δοκειν KEκοινούς Se είναι παιόας, κοινά Se χρή μ ατα συμπαντα ... 5 κ α ί 0 π ατήρ €φη' όρθώς €φης' κ α ι yά p ε ιρ η τα ί τ ιν ι Ελλήνων σοφφα ιτία έλομενων, θεος αναίτιος. — The citation is exact, save that Plato wrote the singular, ‘έλομενου·’.

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Rather, there is another god, unknown and highest of all as being ineffable and god o f gods. He sent two gods, one o f whom is the founder o f the world and the other the lawgiver. (hom III ii 2)6

‘only in shape’ (like the hands o f a statue) — that is to say, they are hands only homonymously. Secondly, there is Peter’s speech about philanthropy in the H o m ilies (XII xxv-xxxiii). The ideas which Peter there elaborates ow e nothing to pagan philosophy, as Peter him self insists (cf h o m X V v 3). But the speech begins

Three gods, the second o f w hom is the demiurge: who will not think ofP lato — or rather, o f the [Plato] who w rote the sixth Platonic L e t t e r In the corre­

w ith

sponding passage in the R eco gn itio n s Sim on asserts that ‘there are several gods, one o f whom is inapprehensible and unknown to anyone and god o f

a

distinction

between

philanthropy

and

friendship,

between

φ ι λ α ν θ ρ ω π ί α and φ ι λ ί α ; and there both the content and the mode o f expression smell strongly o f Aristotle’s N ico m a ch ea n E thics.

a l these gods’ (II xxxviii 3).7 Peter asks him ifh e has taken the idea from the Jewish Scriptures which everyone accepts, or from some other Scriptures, o r from ‘Greek authors’, or from his own [288] head. Sim on answers that he

Two Aristotelian echoes, audible to the sensitive ear? Perhaps— o r perhaps m erely tinnitus. Lastly there is A quila’s speciality, Pyrrhonism. T h e sceptical Pyrrho is never explicitly invoked by [Clement]; and there are v e ry few passages in

relies exclusively on the law o f the Jews — that is to say on the Pentateuch (ibid, xxxviii 4-x x x ix 1). But Peter’s allusion to Greek authors is a sign that [Clement] saw a similarity between Sim on’s hideous opinions and the notions

which you m ight think to see his shadow. Here are tw o o f them — a third w ill be adduced later on. In the H o m ilies Simon says that

o f the pagan philosophers; and it is difficult not to suppose th at [Clement] was thinking o f the Platonists.

perhaps nothing is either good or bad by nature, the distinction being a matter of convention and custom — among the Persians it is normal to marry a mother or a sister or a daughter, whereas by others such things are forbidden as the worst o f evils. (hom XIX xix 4)9

Next, Aristotle. A p art from a single sentence in the doxographical passage at recV x v 2 — a sentence which makes tw o mistakes in tw o lines — Aristotle is never mentioned. But there are one or two places where an acute ear might think to hear a Peripatetic echo. The most interesting o f them concerns dialectic, and I shall hold it in reserve. For the moment, here are tw o less

A sim ilar passage in the R eco gn itio n s characterizes that notion as ‘something very popular among the Greek philosophers’ ( r e c X v 1). Com m entators have

interesting cases. First, take the mawkish passage in w hich C lem ent’s m other explains w hy

thought o f the Cynics; but the nearest texts are Pyrrhonian, and I think it most likely that [Clement] had the Pyrrhonists in m ind. [289]

she lives as a beggar:

Earlier in the H o m ilies Peter criticizes th e pagan philosophers in these terms:

If only I had hands capable o f working. But they are only hands in shape — they are dead. (hom XII xiii 3;8 cf rec VII xiii 3)

That is why the Greek lovers o f argument — they are not philosophers — have tackled things byway of conjecture and produced a large number o f diverse doctrines: they think that what follows appropriately from their own hypotheses is the truth, not realizing that they have set themselves false starting-points and that their conclu­ sion is simply coherent with their starting-point. (hom II viii 3 )10

According to a fumiliar Aristotelian idea, things w hich have a fiinction are defined by reference to their f unction, so that a hand (it is a favourite example o f A ristotle’s) is no longer a hand once it becomes incapable o f grasping things and working (it is, as Aristotle puts it, a hand only homonymously). Surely [Clement] has that idea in mind? T h e m o th er says that she has hands

6 ... άλλ' άλλον -riva άγνω στον καί άνω τατον Ws Εν α π ορρή του όντα θeόv 6eWv- os δύο επeμφ e 8eoVs, di/J’ cLv 0 μεν e ls εατιν 0 κόσμον KTiaas, 0 δε IrEpos 0 τον νόμον SoVs.

,

7 egodico multos essedeos, unumautem esseincomprehensibilem atque omnibus ignotum horumque

omnium deorumdeum. 8 ή δε στενάξασα άπeκρίvaτο' Ei9e γάρ ήσάν μ οι xeipes vπoυργeΐv δvvάμevaι· νΰν δε μ οι σχήμα μόνον χeιρώ v φυλάσσουσιν, νεκραί τυγχάνουσαι.

9 μ ή τ ι οΰν ονκ εστι Tfj φύσει πονηρόν η άγαθον άλλα νόμω διaφερeι κ α ι E6ei. παρά Περσαis ίδιον το γαμ εΐν μητερas> dSeArfods, θvγaτερas, αλ.\οis δε ώσπερ χαλεπω τατον ά π ηγόρeυτaι. 10 δια τούτο κ αι οι τω ν Ελλήνων φ ιλόλογοι (ον φιλόσοφοι) δια στοχασμώ ν n t s πρά γμ α σιν επιβάλλοντες πολλά και διάφορα εδογμάτισαν, την ο ϊ^ ία ν τώ ν vπoθεσeω v ακολουθίαν άλήθeιav etvaι voμ ίσavτes, ονκ ειδότes ότι αντώ ν φeυδεis ά ρχάs Eaυτoΐs ορισαμενων, -rfi άρχή αντω ν -ro τελos συμφωνίαν eιληφev.

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The Greek thinkers are not philosophers: they are not φ ιλό σ ο φ ο ι but φ ιλ ό λ ο γ ο ι: th ey do not love w isdom — th ey like chopping logic. (Seneca’s

n o m ore than apparent? T hat when he refers, say, to Epicurus, he knows nothing at all about Epicureanism save w hat he has found in a handbook?

jibe comes to m ind — not that anyone w ill take [Clement] to have read Seneca.) T hey do not reach the truth: they reach w hat follows from their first premisses — and those first premisses are false. T hat claim is very close to

No. True, these passages, w hich are few in number, allow us to say a little about [Clement]’s mode ofcom position; but nothing at all follows about his distant sources. I f a colleague o f mine cites a text from D iels-K ranz or L o n g Sedley, I do not infer that he has never read H ippolytus o r Clem ent o f

one o f the eight modes o f Aenesidem us against aetiology w hich Sextus reports. But perhaps the sim ilarity is fortuitous?

So much for the scope o f [Clem ent]’s competence in G reek philosophy. W h a t o f its sources? Quellenforschung is as honest a practice as it is delicious; but it sometimes confounds tw o distinct questions. O ne question concerns an author’s education: w hat has he read? who did he study under? and so on. W h at — so to speak — are the distant sources for the knowledge which he displays in his works? A second question concerns the composition o fa work: when he was writing this or that passage? w hat did he do? D id he, for example, open one o f his classical texts in order to quote, or to paraphrase? D id he turn to a manual or to an anthology or to some doxographical compilation? D id he simply sum m on up the contents o f his memory? and so on. W h at — so to speak — are the immediate sources o f what we now read in his text? I f you look for sources for [Clement], w hether distant or immediate, and i f you restrict yourself to what the text itself makes certain or probable, then you w ill find little matter. First, you might recall that [Clement] cites Plato three times. Should you infer that he had read Plato, or at least three works by Plato, and that while he was w orking on the Homilies he looked up the passages in his Teubner Plato? No. T he three passages are am ong the most familiar o f all Platonic tags, they are cited by dozens o f authors, they were doubtless included in every pertinent anthology. T he fact that [Clement] cites such passages does nothing to show that he had once read Plato or that in writing his works he turned to his text o fP lato . [290] Secondly — and with an opposite tendency — yo u might remember that on two or three occasions at least [Clement] made use o f a doxographical work: parallels in other authors, as well as the style o f the passages in [Clement], prove the point beyond reasonable doubt (see e.g. rec V III xv; hom IX xix-xxix). There is nothing remarkable there — the use o f manuals and anthologies and the like was as normal among ancient scholars as it is among modern. Should it be inferred that [Clement]’s apparent learning is

Alexandria. (Such an inference would be invalid, though its conclusion w ould often enough be true.) Finally, there is a special case. It is the essay In favour o f Adultery by the grammarian A pion — an essay in w hich Apion undertook to show that ‘the most renow ned o f the wise have preferred pleasure and have made love w ith any wom en they desired’ (hom V xviii 1 ) .11 A n d he refers to Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes the C ynic, Epicurus, Aristippus, Zeno the Stoic, Chrysippus, ... C lem ent describes Apion like this: I know the man. He hates the Jews — he has written several books against them. It is not because ofhis erudition that Simon has accepted him as a friend but because he knows that he comes from Samaria, that he is anti-Jewish, that he has attacked the Jews. That’s why Simon associates with him — he wants to get some anti-Jewish ammunition. (hom V ii 4)12 T he m an is A pion the Victorious (o r the W icked): grammarian, author o f Homeric Glosses, orator and international celebrity, the target o f Josephus’

Against Apion. T he fact th at Apion had w ritten On the Mages no doubt encouraged [Clement] to make him an associate o f Sim on Magus.* In an y event, [Clement] purports to cite Adultery in its entirety (hom V x-xix). Is it a genuine citation o f a genuine w o rk by th e real Apion? Is it a version o f such a w ork, modified either superficially o r substantially? Is

11 κ αι τών σοφών οι πΕριβόητοι ουχ ήδονην προκρίνουσιν κ αι a ls Εβουληθησαν >ιγ/η σ α ν ; ΐμ ' 12 Εγώ Se τον αν8ρα ουκ άγνοών πάνυ 'IovSaiovs 8i 'd 1Tex6eia s Εχοντα Ws και πολλά β ιβλία κ α τ’ αυτώ ν συγγΐγραφΕναι, και αυτόν Σίμω να νΰν ου 8ιά φ ιλομάθΐΐαν αυτόν els φ ιλίαν πρoσEμeνoν &A.A’ Επΐΐ8η ΣαμαρΕα αυτόν dl8ev μισοιου8αΐόν Te οντα κ αί κ ατά Ίου8αίων προ€ληλυθότα, διά τούτο αυτόν προσιρκΕιώσατο ινα 8ύναιτο κατά Ίου8αίων τ ι π α ρ’ αυτού μανθάν€ΐν. * See e.g. L. Cohn, 'Apion', RE I (1894), cols 2803-2806; and Neitzel's contribution ΐο K. Linke, W. Haas, and S. Neitzel, Die Fragmente des Grammatiken Dionysios Thrax, Die Fragmente der Grammatiker Tyrannion und Diokles, Apions Glossai Homerikai, Sammlung griechischen und lateinischen Grammatiker 3 (Berlin, 1977).

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[Clement] citing, perhaps in m odified form, a forgery w hich he took — or

T he argument has a familiar ring to amateurs o f th e G reek sceptics. But it is not easy to follow. A t the beginning and again at the end o f the passage [Clement] ties scepti­ cism to fatalism — a connection which, to the best o f m y knowledge, is made in no ancient sceptical text. In his first rem ark, Peter states that i f nothing at

did n o t take — to be a genuine piece by Apion? O r is the whole thing a naughty invention on [Clement]’s o w n part? I cannot tell. B ut in any event, A d u ltery is a unique case; and whatever m ay be true o f it has no implication for [Clement]’s norm al writing habits. [291] O n [Clement]’s immediate sources i t seems to m e that there is very little to say — or at any rate, very little w orth saying. As to his distant sources, I am ready to bet that he had read some Plato and th at he had received some education in philosophy. A fter all, he was evidently not unlettered, and every lettered Greek had imbibed a little philosophy and cast his ears over a dialogue or tw o o f Plato.

all is in our power, then it is not in our power to find w hat we look for. True; but, p a c e Peter, it does not follow th at it is pointless to m ake inquiry. For whether o r not everything is fixed by fate, we do sometimes [292] discover things, and that we discover them because we have looked for them. Oedipus discovered that Jocasta was his mama. T hat, doubtless, was predetermined by fate. But it was Oedipus w ho made the discovery, and he made it because

***

he had made various inquiries — inquiries which, no doubt, he was fated to

He knew some philosophy: how well? and w hat were his philosophical abili­

make. Sim on’s last remarks suggest a different connection between scepticism and fatalism. T hey im ply that i f fate determines m y understanding o f things,

ties? A n adequate answer w ould need to dissect a dozen o r m ore passages. Here I lim it m yself to two. T he first concerns scepticism. In one o f his debates w ith Peter, Simon suggests that perhaps nothing is in our power: Peter: ‘Now if nothing is in our power, it is pointless for us to inquire about God, since it is not in our power to find things by inquiry. That is why I was right when I said that the first thing we must inquire into is whether anything is in the power o f our will.’

then I cannot know w hether or not I know anything. W h y ever think so? Fatalism, according to Sim on, does n o t exclude knowledge: rather, it entails that fate determines w hat is known by whom. But i f fate has brought it about that Sim on knows th at Peter is a redoubtable adversary, w h y cannot fate bring it about that he knows that he knows that Peter is a redoubtable adversary? T he beginning and the end o f the argument are thus perplexing. So too is the middle. Sim on says that we can’t grasp whether anything is in our power.

Simon: ‘W e can’t even grasp what you say, namely whether anything is in the power o f our will.’

(He means, I think, that we can’t know that anything is in our power rather than that we can’t understand the question whether anything is in our

But Peter saw that he was straying into a rather contentious area, and he was afraid that he would be defeated and that everything would, so to speak, be confounded in uncertainty. So he answered: ‘In that case, how can you know that it is not in a man’s power to know anything, inasmuch as you know that very thing?’

power.) P eter fears that, i f the argument goes further in th at direction, then he m ay be defeated — that is to say, that he w ill be led into a hopeless scepti­

And Simon said: 'I do not know whether I know even that very thing— for each of us acts and grasps and is affected in the ways in which fate has decreed.’ (rec III xxi 4-xxii 1)1’ 13

knows th at it is not in our pow er to k n o w w h eth er anything is in our pow er — but th at is self-contradictory.) T he question does n o t embarrass Sim on,

etPetrus: si ergo nihil est in nostra potestate, superfluum est nos quaerere aliquid de deo cum in potestate non sit quaerentibus invenire, unde bene dixeram hoc primo quaerendum est si est aliquid in arbitrii potestate. — tum Simon: non possumus, inquit, ne hoc ipsum quidem intellegere quod dicis si est aliquid in arbitrii potestate. — at Petrus videns quod adpartem se contentiosiorem declinat, superari metuens ut quasi in incertum confundat omnia, respondit: quomode ergo scias quia non est in hominis potestatesciie aliquid cum hoc ipsum scias? — et Simon: nescio, inquit, si vel hoc ipsum scio, unusquisque enim sicut ei fato decernitur vel agit aliquid vel intelligit vel patitur. 13

cism. A n d so he asks Simon how he knows that it is not in our power to know anything. (If Simon knows that nothing at all is in our power, then he

nor should it. T o be sure, he said that w e can’tk n o w whether anything is in our power; but he d id n ’t say, and he w o n ’t say, that he knows that w e can’t know w hether anything is in our power. Sim on knows nothing a t a l — not even (o f course) th at he knows nothing at all. Here Peter lets the discussion drop as though he had w on the argument and had nothing m ore to fear. B ut Sim on’s answer does n o t represent an abandonm ent o f his scepticism — quite th e contrary.

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It is difficult to talk coherently about scepticism — Sextus him self makes some horrid blunders. Nonetheless, this passage betrays little talent for philo­ sophical argumentation. The second passage is part o f Nicetas’ long speech in the R ecogn ition s. Its

which any body whatsoever must necessarily possess. In particular, atoms are neither hot nor cold, and they are neither wet nor dry — those are qualities which m ay belong to composite bodies but w hich cannot belong to their atomic constituents. Again, though Epicurean atoms do indeed have a

second section, V III xvii-xix, deals w ith Epicureanism, w hich Nicetas intro­ duces in this way:

tendency to move, they all have the same tendency: an atom, by its own nature, has a tendency to move downwards, in a straight line, at the maximum

Then if it is shown so plainly that God is the creator of the world, how can Epicurus introduce his atoms and claim that from imperceptible corpuscles are produced not only perceptible bodies but also intelligent rational minds? (rec VIII xvi 5)'4

speed. T o be sure, there are heavy atoms and light atoms; but their weight depends neither on their temperature nor on their hum idity (it depends on their volume), and th e difference in weight makes no difference to their

A bad start. Nicetas thinks that i f a providential G od created the world, then

m ovement. Everything w hich Nicetas has to say about atomism is based upon an error w hich is both capital and elementary.

atom ism must be rejected. Not so: you m ay consistently profess both atomism and Christianity, and there is no conflict between the corpuscular theory o f

In antiquity, atomism was more often ridiculed than seriously criticized, and it is often presented in caricatural form. But [Clement] does not o ffer a

matter and the doctrines o f the C hurch. W h at Nicetas must reject is the thesis that everything comes about from mechanical causes or by chance w ithout any intervention by the divine will. T hat is indeed an Epicurean

caricature: he make a grotesque error. The tw o texts which I have just discussed suggest a depressing conclusion: [Clement] wasn’t much good at philosophy. T o be sure, a conclusion drawn

doctrine, and Nicetas — like [293] any other Christian — must therefore reject Epicureanism. But between that doctrine and the theory o f atomism

from two cases is at best provisional. Still, I am ready to wager that further extensive researches will only serve to confirm it.

there is no logical link. Y ou can reject Epicurus and be an atomist — most atomists, I suppose, have rejected and do reject Epicureanism. Nonetheless, w hat Nicetas is about to explain — and to criticize — is not mechanism but atomism. This is how he presents the atomistic hypothesis: They say that the corpuscles themselves, which they call atoms, have different quali­ ties — some are damp, and therefore heavy and tending to move downwards; others are dry and earthy, and so they too are heavy; others are made of fire and therefore strive always to move upwards; yet others are cold and therefore slow and always betwixt and between. (VIII xvii 3)1415 The whole o f the criticism o f atomism which follows depends upon that sketch o f atomism. A nd the sketch is utterly mistaken. According to Epicurus, and to a l his successors, atoms possess only a lim ited num ber o f properties — the so-called prim ary qualities, the qualities

14 igitur si mundi conditor deus esse tam evidenter ostenditur, qui erit Epicuro locus introducendi atomos et adrerendi quod ex corpusculis insensibilibus non solum sensibilia corpora sed et mentes intel­ lectuales ac rationales fiant? 15 aiunt enim corpuscula ipsa quae atomos appellant diversis esse qualitatibus, et alia quidem umide et ob hoc gravia ac deorsum tendentia, alia vero aride et terrena atque ob hoc nihilominus gravia, alia autem ignea et ob hoc sursum semper nitentia, alia vero frigide et ob hoc pigpa et semper media.

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*** [Clement] was not particularly gifted for philosophy — or perhaps rather (for it is not quite the same thing), he was not sufficiently careful and not sufficiently interested. A fter all, what was his general attitude toward the wisdom o f the world and the culture o f the Greeks? [294] According to Clem ent, Peter was ‘imbued w ith the rites o f the Hebrews and the observance o f their laws’, and ‘he was not in the least contaminated by studying Greek learning’ ( r e c X xv 1).16 Greek learning — which includes Greek philosophy — is not a valuable thing: it contaminates. True, according to Nicetas, Peter is a man o f God, filled with all knowledge, from whom not even Greek learning is hidden ... (recVIII v 4 ) 17 ‘ B ut Nicetas does n o t mean that Peter has mastered the wisdom o f t he Greeks. For the sentence continues like this:

16 ··· Hebraeo ritu et observantiis propriae legis imbutus, Graecae eruditionis stadiis in nullo inquinatus. 17 homo enim dei est, plenus totius scientiae quem ne Graeca quidem latet eruditio...

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... from whom not even Greek learning is hidden, inasmuch as he is filled with the spirit o f God from whom nothing is hidden.18

sense o f a washerwoman was enough for them; they had no need for rhetoric — the simple blunt speech o f a fisherman was enough for them. [295]

T hat is to say, ifP eter is capable o f criticizing and refuting pagan philosophy, th at is not because he has studied the stu ff but because he has an implicit

But w hy should a Christian reject grammar? T o be sure, th e grammarian A pion is contemptible; but that is scarcely a reason for looking down on all grammarians — let alone for looking down on the science o f grammar. The

knowledge o f it (and o f everything else) thanks to the H oly Spirit. Som ething sim ilar is true ofB arnabas. He is a good m an, and powerfully persuasive. But he speaks w ithout knowing either dialectic or rhetoric ( r e c I vii 14). T h e philosophers o f Alexandria m ock him fo r his ignorance o flo g ic (h om I x 1). He doesn’t even know gram m ar (rec I ix 4; h o m I xi 4). Sim on Magus, on the other hand, had received a good pagan education in one o f the great centres o f Greek learning — ‘he was born in Alexandria and trained seriously in Greek culture’ (hom II xxii 3 ;19*c f rec II vii 1). He was a u f a i t with the techniques o f allegorization (hom II xxv 3). He was skilled in logic — always a bad sign (rec II v 4; c fIII 3 ^ ^ 1). His entourage includes a grammarian, an astrologer, and an Epicurean philosopher (hom IV vi 2). The grammarian, Apion, w e have already come across — and he was an

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Greek sceptics rejected grammar — that is to say, the technical discipline o f the grammarians — as something perfectly useless an d unnecessary: just as you can argue adequately w ithout having mastered the science o f logic, so you can communicate effectively w ithout any knowledge o f the science o f grammar. D id [Clement] share that sceptical position? Perhaps. B ut it may be pertinent to recall that one o f the defining tasks o f the Greek grammarian wwas the explication o f poetical texts, and in particular o f H omeric texts. Grammarians therefore spent much time on Greek mythology and Greek gods: perhaps [Clement] distrusted the science o f gramm ar not, or not only, because it busied itself about irrelevant questions o f Greek syntax but because it was forever discussing idiotic and dangerous questions o f pagan theology. Peter and Barnabas were unsullied by Greek culture. But the three brothers

unsavoury character. The astrologer was Anubio, an Egyptian — another bad sign. He is the m an whom Clem ent’s father once knew and to w hom he owed m ost o f his astrological lore (hom X I V xi-xii). (But it m ay be noticed

had studied philosophy and had mastered various other pieces o f Greek learning. Does not their case suggest that, despite w hat he says about Peter

th at at the end o f the story A nubio abandons Sim on: hom ^ X xxi 1.*) The

and about Barnabas, [Clement] had some tolerance for pagan ideas? No. For

philosopher is Athenodorus, an Epicurean.** He turns up again later in the story (hom X V I i); he is still w ith Simon in Book ^ X (see xi 3); and, like

Nicetas and A quila th e situation is clear: they have learned philosophy solely in order to refute the gentiles (rec V II xxxii 4), they have mastered ‘the godless teachings’ only in order to rebut th em (h o m X V iv 2). T h ey never

Apion, he remains faithful to the end (hom ^ X xxii 6). But he never spe^ s. G enerally speaking, an author dislikes w hat his heroes detest and his villains adore. [Clement], we m ay reasonably infer, was against logic, against rhetoric, against grammar. The same attitude towards logic and rhetoric — which are often coupled and frequently confounded — m ay be found in a dozen apologetical texts. Pagans m ight m ock th e Christians who possess Aoyo? in neither o f its forms — neither external Aoyo?, for they cannot speak well, nor internal A oyo?, for they cannot reason well. M any Christians took the m ockery w ith a smile: they had no need for logic — the simple good

admired G reek thought, they never imagined that it contained anything valuable. As for Clem ent, he learned about G reek culture w hen he was a boy. But he soon discovered th at the m yths w hich lie at its foundation w ere m orally repugnant, and he turned towards Judaism (hom IV xxii 2; V xxviii 2). It is true that, unlike his brothers, he did not frequent the philosophical schools in order the better to confute their doctrines: he frequented them in the hope o f solving certain problems. But all he found was bad logic and rhetorical exercises:

18 ··· quem ne Graeca quidem eruditio latet quia spiritu dei repletus est quem nihil latet. " οΰτος εν ΆλεξανΒρεΐφ T1J -προς Aϊγν tov yeyov w s, Ε λληνική παιΒείφ τάνυ

All I saw was the establishment and refiitation of doctrines, squabbles and dissen­ sions, syllogistic artifices and conceptions about assumptions. {hom I iii 1)20

εξασκησας εαυτόν ... * On Anubio see D. Obbink, Anubio: carmen astroWgicum (Stuttgart, 2003). · ** Praumably he is (based on) an historical character; but so far as I ^ aware there are no other ancient allusions to an Epicurean Arhenodorus.

20 κ αι οΰΟεν ε-repov εωρων δογμάτω v (ΐνασκενιας και κατασκευές και ερεις και φιλονεικίας και συλλoyισμώ v τεχνας και λημμάτω ν επίνοιας.

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(The establishment and refutation’, to which Clement refers again later on {hom V ii 2), is not obscure, nor are the ‘syllogistic artifices’. But what on earth are ‘conceptions about assumptions’? In the corresponding passage in the Recognitions that expression is replaced by ‘trickeries in argument’, ‘conclusionum versutias’ (I iii 1), which is easy. Does Rufinus’ Latin preserve what [Clement] wrote, some later copyist mangling the Greek text? O r did [Clement] write the strange phrase and Rufinus ‘correct’ it on his behalf? And i f so, should we infer that [Clement] didn’t know what he was talking about? or rather that he deliberately wrote nonsense in order to indicate his contempt for the whole matter?) However that may be, Clement w ent to the philosophers in order to resolve certain problems, and he was utterly disappointed by what he heard. So he gave up [296] Greek philosophy. In truth, he had never had any incli­ nation towards the subject; and the only person who had impressed him before he met Barnabas and Peter was a silk-merchant on a visit to Rome who gave him an account o f the monotheistic religion o f the Jews (hom IV xxviii 2). There is a harsh sentence in the Homilies which I take to represent the view o f [Clement]:

As for me, I say that all Greek culture is the worst invention of an evil demon. (hom IV xii l)21 Aquila would merrily burn all Greek books, which contain nothing but impious notions (recX xxxviii 2-3). I hear [Clement]’s voice there too. So must Greek learning be rejected entirely and whole-heartedly? Not quite entirely — for there is an exception. Not quite whole-heartedly — for there are a couple o f hiccoughs on the way to the bonfire. The two hiccoughs occur in Nicetas’ long speech in the Recognitions. He says:

Since we are now inquiring into the nature and the substance of the world, ... we shall arrive at the higher parts by starting from the lower. For we have been given a path which leads to matters which are intelligible and invisible and which starts from what we see and touch. (recV lll ix 7— 8)22 21 α ΰ τ ίκ α γοΰν εγώ την π άσαν Ε λλήνων π αιδεία ν κ α κ ού δαίμονος χ α λεπ ω τά τη ν ΰ π όθ εσιν είνα ι λέγω. 22 sed quoniam nunc nobis de mundi ratione quaeritur et de substantia eius, ... ab his inferioribus incipientes gradibus ad superiora veniemus, via enim nobis ad intellectualia et invisibilia ab his quae videmus et contrectamus datur.

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Nicetas is alluding, with approval, to the celebrated aphorism o f Anaxagoras: oifns α δ ή λ ω ν τ α φ α ιν ό μ ε ν α — things apparent give us a way o f seeing things obscure. There, it seems, is a small piece o f Greek wisdom which is not to be despised. Nonetheless, in the Homilies Peter seems to condemn it: This is what has happened even to the better philosophers, both Greek and foreign: looking at visible things they make statements based on conjecture about invisible things, holding that whatever presents itself to them in that way is be true. (hom II vii 1-2)23 Does Peter mean to reject all inference — all ‘conjecture’ — which starts from the visible and arrives at the invisible, thus condemning Anaxagoras and Nicetas? Or does he mean to criticize only those who follow Anaxagoras blindly, without troubling to ask whether the appearances from which they start out are veridical? A little later in his speech, when he turns to the question o f whether or not the w orld was created, Nicetas says this: Most of the philosophers, who were wise men, are witnesses for the view that this visible world was made. But lest we seem to have wanted to call witnesses because our claims are frail, let us (if you like) ask what are the first principles of the world, (rec VIII xiii l) 24 [297] Nicetas might have produced witnesses: he prefers to produce arguments, just like a Greek philosopher. But unlike Barnabas, who says that: we are commanded to do this one thing: to recount to you the words and the miracu­ lous deeds of him who has sent us, and instead of logical proof we offer you witnesses ... (hom I x 5-6)25 Barnabas does not go in for logical proofs: he summons witnesses. True, he adds, in an aside, that he could produce proofs if he wanted to — but only

23 τ ο ύ το οπερ π επ άνθ ασιν καί oi τω ν Ε λλήνω ν φ ιλόσοφ οι κ α ί βαρβάρω ν ο ΐ σπουδαιότεροι· εκ σ το χ α σ μ ώ ν γ ά ρ επ ιβ ά λλοντες τοΐς όρα τοϊς π ερ ί τω ν αδήλω ν άπεφ ήναντο, τό ό π ώ σ π ο τε π α ρ α σ τ ά ν α υ το ίς τ ο ύ το αληθές ε ίν α ι νομ ίσαντες. 24 nunc interim quia factus sit mundus iste visibilis testantur etiam philosophorum plutim i sapientes viri, sed ne videamur quasi egentes adsertionibus uti voluisse testibus, de principiis eius si videtur quaeramus. 25 ήμεΐς τ ο ύ π εμ φ α ντος ή μ ά ς τους λόγους κ α ί τάς θ α υμ ά σιους π ρ ά ξεις είπεΐν ΰμ ΐν μόνον εχομεν εντολήν, καί α ν τί τής λ ο γ ικ ή ς άπ οδείξεω ς μάρτυρας π αρεχομεν ΰμΐν.

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in order to resolve the petty problems w hich the Alexandrian philosophers had put to him (hom I x 8 -9 ). True, Peter speaks once or twice o f providing proofs o f the truth — but by a ‘p ro o f he means a reliable witness. In prin­

There, then is a part o f Greek wisdom, o r o f pagan philosophy, which [Clement] does not reject. Rather, he accepts it, w ith enthusiasm. You may, o f course, think that the rules o f dialectic to w hich [Clement] adverts are, at

ciple, Barnabas and Peter were not interested in proofs. So m uch for th e hiccoughs. N ow fo r the exception — a case in which

best, one small part o f one part o f philosophy— and that they are little more than organized com m on sense.

Greek learning is not rejected. In the Homilies, at the start o f one o f the debates between Peter and Sim on, Faustus makes some remarks: Thanks to Greek culture, I know how those who inquire into anything ought to conduct themselves, and I shall remind you of it: each o f you must present his own view, and the arguments must be produced on each side. (hom XVI iii 3)26

A n d in an y event, it is plain th at [Clement] was no fan o f G reek philo­ sophy. I f you despise a subject and think th at its teachings are o f no value, then you w ill not be too careftil in reporting w hat its champions think — even when you are in th e course o f criticizing them. I f [Clement] thinks little o f Greek philosophy, it is not astonishing that he reveals an imperfect command o f the matter.

In a debate you m ust follow Greek rules. True, it is Faustus w ho says so — but Peter accepts w hat he says w ithout argument.

***

A nd in the Recognitions it is Peter him self who requires that the Greek rules be observed — as he explains to Simon:

I f you reject Greek learning, does that, as it were, leave a gap which some­

If you really want to learn, then first learn how incompetently you have put your questions. You say: ‘Since God created everything, what is the source ofevil?' Before you ask that question, there are three sorts o f questions which precede it. First, is there evil? Secondly, what is evil? Thirdly, for whom is it evil? Only after that: What is the source of evil? (rec III xvi 1)2728 I f those are not quite the celebrated ‘fo u r questions’ o f Aristotle, they surely derive ultim ately from the Aristotelian text. A little later, Peter returns to the rules o f discussion: Since the things we must inquire into may be discovered very easily if the inquiry is orderly, and since the inexperienced are ignorant o f the order o f inquiry, it is right that the ignorant yield to [298] the knowledgeable and first learn the order ofinquiry so that tbey may then discover the art o f question and answer. (rec III >xxiv 5)28

thing else m ust fill? Perhaps it does; and perhaps [Clement] thinks th at it can and should be filled by something more Christian — I mean, by the theory o f the T rue Prophet or the Prophet o f Truth. Prophets o f truth are intro­ duced at the beginning o f the Recognitions (I xvi 2), and they reappear throughout the work. T hey also appear at the beginning o f the Homilies (I xix 1), and they are rarely absent for m ore than five pages. Their ch ief function is to supply w hat the G reek philosophers called a criterion o f truth; and i f [Clement] never uses the w ord ‘criterion’ in this context, he does use an equivalent expression when he speaks o f ‘the prophetic rule [cl π ρ ο φ η τικ ό ς κανώ ν]’ (hom II xvi 1). A prophet — a π ρ ο φ ή τη ς, a propheta — is an interpreter o r spokesman.

T h e a rt o f question and answer: that is the Platonic definition o f dialectic — and Simon speaks explicitly o f the ars disputandi, which is dialectic in

He is a mouthpiece, and so a mouthpiece for someone else — and in parti­ cular, for some divine being. His speaking is not lim ited to predictions, though he w ill frequently predict, and th e English w o rd ‘prophet’, which alludes strictly to prediction, is therefore inexact and potentially misleading. So although th e expression ‘true prophet’ is entrenched in th e literature, I

Latin costume (rec III xxxv 1).

shall prefer the phrase ‘tru e spokesman’. C lem ent had heard about true spokesmen from Barnabas, but he longed

26 Kai viiv Ef Ε λληνικής παιδείας ώς χρη το νs ζητούντας ποιεΐν εΐδως ύπομνησω.

EKarepos υμών το εαυτού δόγμα Εκθεσθω, Kai els iTepov ol λόγοι yevEaOwaav. 27 si ... vere vis discere, disce hoc primum quam imperite intemgaveris. ais enim: cum ideus universa creaverit, unde est malum? ante enim quam hoc rogares, tres interrogandi species praecedebant, primo si est malum, secundo quid sit malum, tertio cui sit. et post haec unde sit. 28 quia ... si per ordinem quae quaerenda sunt inquirantur inveniri facillime possunt, ordinem vero quaerendi imperitus ignorat, rectum est ut scienti cedat ignarns et primo quaerendi ordinem discat ut ita demum interrogandi et respondendi inveniat disciplinam.

to hear Peter descant on the subject (hom II iv 1). Peter duly descants in hom II v -x i and in rec V III lx-lxii. T he heart o f the m atter is this: First, you must examine the spokesman by every pertinent form of examination. And once you have recognized him as a true spokesman, from then onwards you must believe him in everything— you must no longer judge the tbings he says one by one but accept them all as certain, apparently on trust but in fact accepting them by a

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safe judgement. For by means of a single proof — the proof at the start — and of a exact and thorough examination, everything has been grasped by correct reasoning. That is w hy the first thing to do is to find a true spokesman — for without one, men can be sure o f nothing. (hom I xix 5-8)29 [299]

w h at academics like to call continuous assessment. M oreover, every authority has his domain o f competence, and there is no reason to accept w hat he m ay say outside that domain. H arry Tipster m ay be hot stuff on the gee-gees and quite hopeless about the weather.

A ll knowledge depends on spokesmen, so that the first thing to do, epistemo­ logically speaking, is to find a spokesman, a true spokesman.

So w hat is the domain o f competence o f a true spokesman? A n d whatever it m ay be, w hy should you not continue to test someone once you have accepted him as a true spokesman? Several passages suggest that true spokesmen are omniscient and that their

‘Beware o f false prophets, w hich come to yo u in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly th ey are ravening w olves’ (M atth vii 15).* I f someone introduces him self as a prophet o r spokesman, then he must be examined ‘by w ay o f every pertinent form o f exam ination’. For example, you must m ake sure that

dom ain o f competence has no bounds: after all, a true spokesman is a mouth­ piece o f a d ivin ity — and so, in a Christian context, o f an omniscient deity. Thus in the H o m ilies Peter states that

his words are truly prophetical, i.e. that they express a sure belief about the future, that they specify determinate times, that they place things in the right order (that they do not recount the first events last and the last first), that they contain no trickery nor anything put together with the aid of magic in order to delude, or that they do not arrogate to themselves, with the addition of a few falsehoods, what has been revealed to others. (rec VIII lx 5)30

it is not possible to gain knowledge without first recognizing a spokesman of truth; and a spokesman o f truth is someone who knows everything — he knows [300] of what has come about that it has come about, o f what is coming about that it is coming about, o f what will come about that it will come about, and he makes no mistakes. (hom II v 3 -v i I )31

Before accepting a candidate as a true spokesman, you must test his b on a

The true spokesman knows everything — and w e can know nothing w ithout

fid es.

his aid.

W h a t [Clement] says about spokesmen applies to any sort o f authority. I f you f ollow th e horses, you m ight look out for a tipster. But you w o n ’t accept

That is w hy the first thing to do is to find a true spokesman — for without one, men can be sure o f nothing. (hom I xix 8)

his tips until you have examined his b on a fid e s. T hat is good advice, and it is [Clement]’s advice. -

T hat seems plain enough. A n d if it is true, th en — though [Clement] never says so — the theory o f the true spokesman is a Christian substitute for the

But [Clement] says that once you have recognized a true spokesman, you must accept everything he says w ithout hesitation and without further exami­

theory o f the criterion o f truth which the pagan philosophers championed, each in his different way. But things are n o t in fact like that: the true spokesman cannot replace all the criterions o f the philosophers; for it cannot be true that ‘w ithout a true

nation. It is scarcely reasonable to accept everything a tipster m ay predict once he has passed his examination, even i f he has passed w ith top' marks. A fter all, he m ay lose his touch. It is better — more prudent — to go in for 25 ώστε πρώτον χρη τον προφήτην πάση τή προφητική εξετάσει δοκιμάσαντα Kal επιγνόντα αληθή, του λοιποΰ τα π ά ντα αυτψ πιοτεύειν κ αί μ ηκέτι τΟ καθ’ εν Εκαστον τώ ν υ π ’ αυτού λεγομένων άνακρίνειν αλλά λαμβάνειν α υτά β έβαια όντα, δοκού"1} μεν TTia-rei, ληφθεντα SE ασφαλει κρίσει· άποδείξει γάρ μιφ τή άπ’ άρχής και άκριβεί εξετάσει τή πανταχόθεν τα ολα ορθφ είληπ τα ι λογισμ ό ). διό προ πάντων τον αληθή προφήτην ζητεΐν Sεΐ ό τ ι άνευ τούτου βέβαιόν τ ι προσεΐναι άνθρωποις άSύvάτov. * προσΕχετε άπο των ψευSo'Tl'poφητων οιτινες έρχονται '1ρος υμάς εν €vSύμάσιv προβάτω ν εσωθεν SE εισιν λύκοι αρπαγες. ... si vere prophetica eius verba sunt, id est si indubitatam fidem continent faturorum, si tempora definita consignant, si rerum ordinem servant (si non quae prima sunt novissima et quae in novissimis gesta sunt prima nanarunt), si nihil versutum nihil magfca arte ad decipiendum compositum continent, aut si non quae aliis revelata sunt ad se transtulerint admixtis mendaciis.

spokesman, men can be sure o f nothing’. Indeed, the theory o f the true spokesman is inconsistent w ith the claim that without a spokesman we can j !

know nothing. For before we accept anyone as an authority we must check his b on a fid e s. So there are things which we must be sure o f before we have recognized a true spokesman, and hence there are things we can know w ithout relying on the aid o f a true spokesman.

31 τή ς SE γνωσεως ούκ άλλως τυχεΐν εστιν εάν μη πρότερόν τ ^ τον τής άληθείας προφήτην επιγνφ . π ρoφ ήτηs SEάληθείας ειη ιν ο πάντοτε πάντα ειSώς, τά μεν γεγονότα ως εγΕνετο, τά Se γινόμενα ως γινΕται, τά S€ εσόμενα ως εσται, αναμάρτητος.

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And despite the texts I have cited, [Clement] doesn’t think that everything we know depends upon our having found a true spokesman. W h en the spokesman first appears in the R eco gn itio n s, Peter says this:

T h e texts do not determine clearly an d distinctly the domain in which we must rely on a spokesman, and perhaps a clear and distinct determ ination is neither possible nor desirable. It is plain that the domain includes the last

It is impossible to know anything about things divine and eternal unless you. have learned them from a true spokesman. (rec I xvi 2)* Y o u need a spokesman w hen it comes to matters divine and eternal — not (for a l that Peter says) for every piece o f knowledge. O r consider this text: I have said that God’s plan and His will cannot be discovered by men because no man can infer what God is thinking by way of conjecture and speculation — unless He send a spokesman to announce it. So I have not said that no an and no science be discovered without a spokesman — after all, I know that the arts and sciences are known and practised by men who have learned them not from a true spokesman but from men who were their masters. (rec IX i 5-6)32

things, and all eschatological matters, that it includes anything to do w ith the salvation o f our souls and w ith the purposes o f the Lord. It also includes, I think, at least some philosophical questions — among them , those which worried the young Clem ent and which the Greek philosophers could not answer. According to Peter, there is a great difference between the discourses o f religion and those of philosophy. The discourse of the truth has its proofs founded the words o f spokesmen, while the discourses o f philosophy consists of fine phrases and apparent proofs based on conjecture. (hom X V v 3)34 P hilosophy — Greek philosophy — vainly tries to resolve its problems by producing logical proofs: the truth is revealed only from the m outh o f a true

W e need a true spokesman w hen it comes to knowing how God is working his purpose out — in other domains, hum an w it can reach knowledge unaided. T he same thing is said in the H om ilies, in a passage w hich I have thus far cited only in fragm entary form . The true spokesman, [Clement] says, is he who alone can illuminate the souls of men so that they may see with their own eyes the path to eternal salvation. Otherwise, they cannot — as you yourselfknow, since you have just said that all hypotheses are refuted and established ... (hom ■I xix 1-2 )33 [301] The true spokesman m ay be omniscient; b u t the domain w ithin w hich we know nothing w ithout his aid is n o t universal. A n d that, afrer all, is anything but surprising: it w ould be strange to m aintain that Euclid needs th eh elp o f a spokesman in order to do his geometry, or that M ary-A nn needs the help o f a spokesman in order to go a-milking.

spokesman. T hat is w h y philosophy is an im potent thing: Against what a spokesman says neither the arts of discourse nor the conceptions of sophisms nor syllogisms nor any other means have any force, so long as he who has heard a true spokesman really desires the truth. (hom I xxi 5-6)35 In any event, the dom ain o f the true prophet’s prophecies is limited. T he true spokesman is not a Christian substitute for the Greek criterions o f truth. Rather, he is a Christian supplement to the Greek criterions: he gives us a means o f acquiring knowledge in a dom ain — an infinitely im por­ tant dom ain — to w hich G reek philosophy offers us no access. A nd perhaps that special competence o f true spokesmen helps to explain the puzzling requirement that once we have recognized someone as a true spokesman, we must thereafrer accept whatever he says. For in fact we cannot test or control the claims o f a spokesman in the domain in which w e are obliged to rely upon him. W h en he speaks o f our p o s t m o rtem future — when he states that eternal happiness awaits those w ho do this and that and do not

* atitermim impossibile est de rebus divinis aeternisque cognoscere nisi quis ab isto vero propheta didicerit 32 hoc ego dixi consilium et hanc voluntatem dei ab hominibus inveniri non posse quia nemo

hominum potest sensum dei coniecturis et aestimatione colligere nisi propheta ab eo missus enuntiet, non ergo de quibuscumque disciplinis aut studiis dixi quia invenirisinepropheta autsciri non possint, quippe qui sdam et artificia et disciplinas sciri et exerceri ab ho minibus quas non a vero propheta sed a magistris hominibus didicerint. 33 τόν μεν ot3v βοηθόν ανδρα τόν αληθή προφήτην λόγω ος μόνος φ ω τίσαι φυχας ανθρώπων δύνατα civ αυτοΐς όφθαλμοίς δυνηθήναι ήμάς Ενιδεΐν Tijs αιωνίου σω τηρίας την οδόν. άλλως δε άδύνατον, ώς οίσθα και σύ, μικρω τάχιον είπών ώς πάσα VT08eais άvaσκeυάζeτaι καί κ a τa σ κ εvά ζeτa ι...

do that an d this — w e have no w ay o f testing his assertions. O r rather, if we

34 πολλη διαφορά, TTcfrep, μεταξύ τω ν θeoσeβeίaς λόγων και τω ν τή ς φ ιλoσoφ ίas. ο γ α ρ τή ς άληθeίaς aTT08eigw lx ei τη ν Εκ προφητείας, ο δε τή ς φιλοσοφίας καλλιλογίας παρΕχων Εκ στοχασμώ ν δοκεΐ παρισταν τας άπoδeίξeις. 35 πρός γ α ρ προφ ητείαν ουδόν δύνανται oΰτe τΕχναι λόγων οΰτε σοφισμάτω ν Επίνοιαι, ου συλλογισμοί, ουκ O.U .7 1 'Tts μηχανή, Εάν γ e ο Επακούσας προφήτου άληθοΰς άληθeίaς δvτω s όρίγη ται.

636

M antissa

can ever test them, we can only test them once we are dead — and then it w ill be too late. So once we have recognized our spokesman, we had better hang from his lips and hope. That explanation is not completely satisfactory, on at least two counts. First, it m ay be true that we cannot test the spokesman in the domain in which we most need him. Yet we can test him in other domains; and that being so, it seems only reasonable that we should give him an annual M O T to make sure that he is still in good working order. But that is a trifling matter. The second count is more substantial. A visitor arrived in Rome and gave it to be understood that he was a spokesman for the Lord God. A nd he spoke at, length about things divine and eternal— and at great length about the hope o f things to come. Clement’s friends wondered whether they should believe such extravagant news o f beyond the grave. Rational beings, they resolved to test the visitor. They asked him questions, numerous and various, about matters in which they themselves had, or might easily acquire, some sure knowledge. He answered every question correctly and without hesitation: he knew all their secret PIN codes, he gave them sure-fire tips for the Grand National. It was only reason­ able o f them to decide that he was what he said he was — a true spokesman o f the Lord God. And it was only reasonable for them to believe him on things divine and eternal, even though that was the one domain in which they had not tested him and could not test him. W as it only reasonable? A Christian, I think, ought not to find it reason­ able. For the visitor might well be Beelzebub: Beelzebub knows everything and has no difficulty with PIN numbers or the horses. But when it comes to things divine and eternal he will deceive us damnably. Common prudence should prevent a Christian from accepting the theory o f the true spokesman. And non-Christians, or Christians who have no truck with the devil — what should they think? I suppose that they too should think it unreasonable to believe the true spokesman when he talks o f things divine and eternal. But the question is hardly o f great practical importance; for there never was and there never will be a true spokesman.

22 Menecles* I In 1875, in the courtyard o f a house in the Turkish village o f Aliagha, there were discovered two fragments, in grey marble, o f a funerary stele. On them were inscribed four iambic verses. The stones have disappeared. Here is the transcription made in 1888 by Demosthenes Baltazzi:1 [2]

ΟΤΑΣΑΟΙΔΣ ΑΓΕΜΩΝΑΝΕ A ΑΑΔΑ·01ΊΑΝ ΤΑΠΑΣΙΝΕΞΙΣ Ω ΣΑΣΤΑΝΛΟΓΩ KAITANATA PAXONENBPO ΤΟΙΣΘΕΥΣΑΣ ΟΔΟΝ·ΐπΡΡΩ ΝΙΑΣΤΑΣ ΝΕΚΛΕΗΣ ΟΔΕΙΜΙΕΓΩ2 * A version of'Pourquoi lire les anciens?’, Les Papiers du Collige International de Philosophic 2, 1990, 1-29. The last six pages have been suppressed, and (as the bracketed numerals betray) the second half of the piece has been reordered. 1 D. Baltazzi, ‘Inscriptions de l’£olide’, Bulletin de correspondance helUnique 12, 1888,358-376: inscription 17 on p.368. — 1have not seen the first publication, in M ouaeiov (Smyrna) for 1876, on which G. Kaibel, Epigrammata Graeca (Berlin, 1878), relied (p.522, item 24lb). Kaibel’s text was used by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,/4na^«or vonEarystos, PhilologischeUntersuchungen 4 (Berlin, 1881), pp.290—291; see also G. Lafaye, Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes IV (Paris, 1927), item 1740. Baltazzi’s text is reprinted in W. Peek, Griechhche Vers-Inschrifien (Berlin, 1955); id, Griechische Grabgedichte (Berlin, 1960); H. Engelmann, Die Inschrifien von Kyme, Inschriften der Griechischen Stadte aus Kleinasien 5 (Bonn, 1976), item 48. 2 The dots in lines 3 and 9 indicate the end of a verse. The lambda in line 2 and the omega in line 4 are inscribed in the margin. The letters NE in lines 2 and 4, and NB in line 7 are in ligature.

638

Menecles

M antissa

T h e nam e is not rare; and although it is not [5] found on other inscriptions from C ym e,11 the stones o f Smyrna, the nearest city to C ym e and a flour­

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Index o f Passages

The index lists substantial references to the ancient texts: bold entries signal citation or discussion; and an asterisk marks textual comment. Against each work there is (usually) an English version of its abbreviated Latin title, an indication of the edition used, and an explanation of the style of reference. The indications use these symbols: GG GL OCT

Bibliotheca Teuberiana Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Corpus Medicorum Latinorum

BT CIAG CMG CML

Grammatici Graeci Grammatici Latini Oxford Classical Texts

The explanations use these abbreviations: b c ch f

book column chapter fragment

1 p s sb

line page section subsection

v vs w

volume verse work

Albinus

Aelian

'VH: Historical Miscellany, Wilson

isag: Introduction·, Hermann BT; s

(Cambridge XII25

4

1997), b + s . 361 n.8; 365 n.24

223 n.5O

Alcinous

didask: Didascalicus; Whittaker (Paris,

Aelius A mstides ad Capit·. Against Capito; Behr (Leiden, 1968); s 322 303 in Plat· Against Plato; Behr (Leiden, 1968); s 303 ll 5 428 303

1990); eh + [p + I (ed Hermann)] i [152.1-2] 240-1 and n.56 vi [159.43-44] 237

A elius Dionysius Atticist Lexicon; Erbse (Berlin, 195O) s.v. α8·ην 346 n.196 s.v. S^7T OU0£V 322 s.v. ιδ ι6 gevos 345 and n.192 s.v. π α ιδ ικ ά 337

fa t: On Fate; Bruns CIAG suppt II ii; p +l

AGATHIAS

Histories; Keydel (Berlin, 1967); b +s

in M et: Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics; Hayduck CIAG I; p + 1

II 29-32

58.31-59.8

651 n.67

A lciphron Letters; Schepers BT; b + s + sb N xvii 3 643 ^ ^ ^ ^ der of Aphrodisias 187.1 202.8-204.28

5O1 n.15 5O5 and n.24

in APr: Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics; Wallies CIAG II i; p + 1 160.29-161.2

435 n.133

470 n.262

710

Index o f Passages

Lives ·.

of A phrodisias (cant.) in Meteor. Commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorologica; Hayduck CIAG ΙΠ ii; p + 1

of Aristotle

1.5 - 12

46

A lexander

442 n.155

in Sens·. Commentary on Aristotle's On the Semes; Wendland CIAG III i; p + 1 58.3-12

14

in Top. Commentary on Aristotle's Topia·, Wallies CIAG II ii; p + 1 131.15-16 465 n.249 mant·. Mantissa·, Sharpies (Berlin, 2008); p + I (ed Bruns) 135.6-18 14 151.8 431 n.106 [A lexander]

Glossary·, Kapetanaki and Sharpies (Berlin, 2006) s.v. fpts

433 and n.121

vita Marciana·, During (Goteborg, 1957); s 43 433 and n.121 ' 45 433 n.22 of Euripides: Mdridier (Paris, 1925); p + 1 2.4-5 208 ofPersius: Clausen (Oxford, 1956); I 12-15 379 n,76 proleg·. Prolegomena to Plato·, Westerink (Paris, 1990); s + 1 (ed Hermann) 7 209 24.25-25.36 223 n.49 [see also lexicons]

AnthPal·. Palatine Anthology·, Beckby 297

in Met. Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics·, Hayduck CIAG I; p + I 515.9-11

vita latina·, During (GOteborg, 1957); s

469-70

(Munich, 1965-1968); b + w IX 188 223 n.47 1X358 213 n.4 XI 15 315 n.142

A mmonius

[A pion]

in APr. Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics·, Wallies CIAG IV vi; p + I

Homeric Glosses·, Neitzel (Berlin, 1977) s.v. το a β ρα χ ύ 308

31.11

A pollonius D yscolus

428 and *n,98

in Cat ·. Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories·, Busse CIAG TV iv; p + 1 6.5- 9

439-40

inlnt·. Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation ; Busse CIAG TV v; p + 1 5.28- 29 5.28- 6.4

428 and n.96 435 n.133

III 14

260 n.48

A ppian

he: Civil Wars; Mendelssohn BT; b + s I 104 II 100

424 n.80 427 n.92

A puleius

A mmonius

diff: On Differences between related Words; Nickau BT; s 150 253 366

synt: Syntax; Uhlig GG II ii; b + s

299 n.122 512 n.12 322; 512 n.12

ANONYMUS

in Tht: Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus; Bastianini and Sedley (Florence, 1995); c +1 223-4 III 28-37 XXXV 10-12 231 n.23 XLVIII 7-11 231 and n.23 LXVIII 7-36 237 LXX 10-12 231 n.23

apol: Apology; Helm BT; s 41

452 n.181

dog Plat: The Doctrines o f Plato; Moreschini BT; b + s + sb I iii 187 I iv 189

225 238

[A puleius]

int: On Interpretation; Moreschini BT; ch ■ Lp + IJ

iv [191.16-17]

238 n.49

A rchimedes

aren: Sand-reckoner; Heiberg BT; s 9 11

2 4 n .ll

711

Index o f Passages [A risteas]

ad Phil·. Letter to Philocrates; Pelletier (Paris, 1962); s 9

413 n.27

A ristobulus

fragment apud Eusebius, PE XIII xii 1-4 215 n.13 A ristocles

fragments; Chiesara (Oxford, 2001); f + s 1.1 224-5 1.8 215 n.10 2.15 465 n.249 3.13 417 n.46 4 513 n.17 4.2 532 n.95 4.9-12 516 and n.27 4.11 548-9 and 4.29 4.30

*n.l65 651 511 n.8

A ristophanes

Wilson OCT; 1

aw. Birds 1017-1018

198

vesp·. Waps 772-773

274

A ristotle

p + c + I (ed Bekker)

4 0 8b ll—15 408bl8 4l0a25 4l0b l5—41 la2 4l2 al6—19 4l2bl9 B 412b4-6 4l2b23-25 413a3—10 4l3 al3—16 4 13a21—25 4l3a26'bl0 4 l3 b ll—13 4l3 b l4-fl4a3 4l4b20 4l4b23 4l4b25-28 4l4b29 4l7b2-9 4l7b23-24 4l8a4 422bl 422a7 424al-4 424a8 424al8 424a32-b21 424b20 425b23

An·. On the Soul; Ross OCT

Γ

A 402a6 403a3-12 403a6 403a8-10 403al3 403al6-25 403a25-27 403a31 403bll 403bl7—19 403b25 403b30 404a29 404a30 404b5-6 405bl8 407b23

427bl6 428b3-4 429al 429al6 429al8-26 429a20 429a24-25 429b5-9 430al0 430al5 430al8 430a22-23 430a25 431al 431bl7 432a7 433bl9 434a29

130

133 131

137 130

133-4 134 134

134 n.5 132 130 135-6 134 n.6 139 129 130 130

180-1 139-40 136 129 129 130 129

135 131 n.4; 132

129 130 129

129-30 131 n.4 129 129

129 129 136

138 136 138 136 138 138 136 136 136 136 137-8 5 n.13; 7 n.20

137 138 138 138

138 139 138 138 138

140 138 138 138 137 135-6 136

712

Index ofPassages

.ARISTOTLE (cont.)

B

APst·. Posterior Analytics, Ross OCT A

999a6-7

E

B

81a38

1026a5

1261a2-3 1263a24 1263a38 1263a40

134 M eteor: Meteorologica; Fobes (Cambridge MA, 1919)

B

192b20-22 226b14-16

1103a14-17

23

r 1113b21-30

52 52 52 215 n.10

HA; History ofAnimals; Balme (Cambridge, 2002) I 6l8b25-26

349

Insomn· On Dreams; Ross (Oxford, 1955) 459b6

1275a34-38 1277a6 1277b7-10 1278a3 1279a21 1279b6-1O 1280a5 1280a24 1285a28-30

.cl 338a20-21 385all-19

442 n.155 26 PA: Parts ofAnimaS; Peck (Cambridge MA, 1961)

A 641a18

137

.cl 692a20-24

134

.cl

476 475-6

1291b34-35 1294a10-15 1297b35-1298a3 1299a15-1300a 8

Phys· Physics, Ross OCT

B

244b7-15

136 Int· On Interpretation; Minio-Paluello, OCT 16a3 642 n.** 18b31-33 501 n.16 : On the Movement o f Animals; Nussbaum (Princeton NJ, 1978) 70lb l9-23 138 M em· On Memory; Ross (Oxford, 1955) 450a27 136 Met· Metaphysics; Ross (Oxford, 1924) A 982b25-26 54 985b13-20 295

40 40 40 40 129 130 41 41 41 38 41 41 38 42 41; 44 46 46

E 1308b20-24 1310a20 1310a28-36 1310b37-38

137 n.8

251a8-10 253b7-9 267b20-22

475-6 *475-6 476 Poet· Poetics; Kassel OCT 1447a14 106 1447b24-28 112 1448al6-18 106 1448a28-38 106 1449b21-22 106 > 1449b24-29 109 1449b29-31 1 l l and *n.4 1450b34-145la15 113-14 1 4 5 lb ll-1 4 106 1453a35-39 106 1457b3-5 288 Pol· Politics; Dreizehnter (Munich, 1970)

A 1252a8 1252al6 1253al9-25 1253b4 1254a10 1254a14-15 1254a22-24

54 62 n.21

r

471 5 and n.13

@

K 1179b ll-16 1180a4 fragments; Rose BT 32

A

H 501 n.16

E 1130b23-24

1255bll 1256b23-26

129

137 Cael·. On the Heavens·, Allan OCT A 272a28-31 475-6 275b21-23 475-6 Cat· Categories; Minio Paluello OCT lal *437 6a36-bl4 54 EE·. Eudemian Ethics; Susemihl BT A 1218al-8 129 EN· Nicomachean Ethics; Bywater OCT A 1094bl9-23 33 129 1096a19-35 124 n.4 1102a28-31 124 1102b30-31

338a20-339a10 345bl-3

713

Index ofPassages

41

44 53-4 41 53-4 54 38 -9

47 42 42-3; 44 41

z .

1317a40-b2 1317b2-17 1321a5-1323a10 1321b6-9 1321bl2-18 1321b12-1322b37 132lb19-21 1322b30-38 1323a9-10

H

1327a37-40 1330a38 1332b26-27 1334b29-32 1335a38-39 1335b14-16 1335b19-21 1335b21-25 1335b28-29 1335b37-38 1336al-2 1336b3-5

42 43-4 46 46 47-8 46 48-9 47 47 49 47 „ 44 50 50 and n.* 50 50 50 50 50 50 49

1336b13-14

49

1337all-12 1337a26-32

49 53 Rhet·· Rhetoric; Kassel (Berlin, 1976)

A 1354al-11 1355a20-29 1356a35-b20 1361a19-21 1372al-2

82 458 458 40 106

B 1378a30 1389b32 1397a23-b8 1397b27-1398a3

134 n.6 134 458 458

r 1410b12 1410b36-1411a8 1419b5-6

288 458 106 SEl: Sophistical Refutations; Ross, OCT l83a36-184a9 471 Sens· On the Senses; Ross (Oxford, 1955) 436al-18 471 436a9 136 436a10 134 n.6 436b6-8 134-5; 136 445b16 137 Somn· On Sleep; Ross (Oxford, 1955) 136 454a7-11 455a20 135 Top: Topics; Brunschwig (Paris, 1967 and 2007)

z 145b24-27

25

[ARISTOTLE] MM: Magna Moralia; Susemihl BT 1205a23

*412 n.18

m und·· On the World, Lorimer (Paris, 391a2 39lb6

259 259

ARISTOXENUS fragment apud Diogenes Laertius III 37 215 n.13 fragment apudEusebius, PE Xl iii 8 215 n.10

714

Index ofPassages SOSA 508C 5B9C 616C 634D 656B 657E 699B

Aruus DiDYMus fragment dpt«/.Eusebius, PE XV’ xx 2 142 fragments apud Stobaeus, eel 176 I xvii 4 II vii 3h 466 n.231 ARTEMIDORUS

Interpretation o f Dreams; Pack BT; b + ch II 14

422 n.69

in Met: Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics·,Hayduck CIAG VI ii; p +I

468-70

in EN Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics; Heylbut C^G

[CAESAR]

Bailey (Cambridge, 2004); b +w +s I ix 23 459 n.218 VII xix 1 463 and n.238 ^AECIDIUS IXiv 1 500 n.14 in Tim: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus; X xx 3 386 n.91 Waszink (London, 1962); s + [p + 1] Brut; Brutus; Wilkins OCT; s +s ccxx [232.12-16] 148-9 xii 46-48 459 and n.219 xxxi 121 217 ^AELIMACHUS lxxxix 306 361; 383 n.84 fragments; Pfeiffer (Oxford, 1959) xci 315 359; 366; 370 215 420 n.55 de inv: On Invention; Stroebel BT; b +s +s CHOEROBOSCUS Iv 6 459 n.221 in Heph: Commentary on Hephaestion; Iv7 459 n.221 Consbruch (Leipzig, 1906); p + 1 II li 156 459 n.221 230.20 420 n.55 de orat: On the Orator; Wilkins OCT; b +s +s Cicero I vi 8 96 Acad: Academica; Plasberg BT; s + s I viii 32 92 n.35 ii 7 387 n.95; 389 I xi 45 81; 82; 379 n.76 iii 12 370 and n.47 I xi 46 80-1 iv 13 380 and n.79; 387 I xi 47 84 and n.15; 303 iv 14 370; 375; 377 I xviii 83 82 iv 14-xi 42 391 I xviii 84 84; 103 n.63 iv 16 391 and n.108 I xx 90 94 n.42 391 and n.109 v 19 I xx 90-93 84 n.17 viii 30-33 404-5 I xx 91 94 n.41 x 37 389 I xxii 102 92 x 38-39 389 I xxii 104 82 xii 43 380 n.82; 388 I xxiii 107 92 and n.36 xii 46 380 n.82 I xxiii 109 89 n.31; 92 n.36 adA tt: Letters toAtticus; Shackleton Bailey I xxiv 110 80 (Cambridge, 1965-1970); b +w +s II viii 32 92 n.36 II ii 2 457 n.208 II ix 32 459 n.221 IV iva 1 425 n.85 II xxvi 152 458 IV x 1 424 II ^xviii 160 458; 459 n.221 IV xvi 2 454 III xvii 62 615; 650 n.” 368 V x5 III xlvii 182 458;459 XII vi 2 425 div : OnDivination; Giomini BT; b +s +s XII xl 1 454 I v8 453 n.187 XII Ii 3 375; 497 n.6 I -xxv 53 454 XIII xii 3 370 II ii 4 497 XIII xii 5 369 II lix 121 456 XIII xiii 1 376 II lxii 128 456 XIII xvi 1 369 fa t: On Fate; Bayer (Munich, 1980); s +s XIII xix 5 375-6 i2 500 XIII xxia 1 221 n.39 vi 13-14 506 n.26 XIII xxv 3 370 xii 28-29 501— 2;507-8 XVI xi 4 500 n.12 xiii 30 504-5 xiv31 508 n.36

433 n.121 286 256 422 n.67 416 n.39 291

fragments apud Eusebius, PE XI i 2 234 XIi 3-5 225 XV xiii 1 234

P+1 44.20-24 151.24-26

432 n.114 466 n.253

ATIENAEUS Deipnosophists Kaibel (Leipzig, 1887-

1890); p +s (ed Conti) 411 n.14; 413; 3AB 414 209 4E 286 76F 292 97D 305 n.131 98DF 152-3 104B 286 114CD 644-5 186A 414 203E 416 214D 434 n.123 244A 315 277C 284D 287 292 n,110 329D 512 n. 11 336D 230 n.19 381F 292 485E 286 503D 504E 215 215 505B 215 505C 506A 215 215 507E

Acad: Against the Academics; Green

i;

(Antwerp, 1956); b +ch +s II vi 15 361 n.10 III xviii 41 361 nn. 10 and 11; 384 and n. 85; 386i 401-2 CD: City o f God; Dombart BT; b +ch

VIII 12 XJX 3 XX 6

463 n.240 395 n.114 66 n.35

quaest in Hept: Questions on the Heptateuch;

Zyeha (Vienna, 1895); b +eh VI 10 63 n.26 A ulus G ellius

Attic Nights; Marshall OCT; b +eh +s

I ix 10 III xvii 3 VI v 5

302-3

VI xiv 10 X xxiii 3 XI v 6 XlX v 4 xx v 11-12

84 n.14

411 n.14 · 548 n.164; 554 n.183 306 525 n.73 452 n.181 470-1

Boetiiius

div: On Division; Magee (Leiden, 1998);

p +s (ed Migne) 875D-877A

432 n.110

in ln f. Commentary onAristotle's On In^ ^ ^ dson (2'0 edicion); Meiser BT; p +1

11.16-17

adfam : Letters to his Friends; Shackleton

216

A ugustine A spasius

715

216

AiTicus

AscLEpius

4.4—15

Index ofPassages

434

bellAfr; African War; Klotz BT; s + ss

xlv 3

427 n.92

716

Index o f Passages

C icero (com.) fin·. On Ends; Schiche BT; b + s + s Ii 1 I i 1-2 I ii 4-7 I iii 7 I vi 20 II vi 19 II xi 36 II xiii 43 III ii 7-9 III iii 10 III vii 26 IV iii 7 508 n.37 IV xix 52 Vi 1 V ii 6 V iii 7 V iii 8

497-8 371 n.49 498-500 453 7; 18 n.51 456 650 n.** 650 n.** 369 n.43 455 153 81; 153;

153 366; 370 370 217; 388 370; 374; 395 395 V iv 9 395-6 V iv9-xxv 74 457 n.208 V iv 11 454; 455-6; V v 12 465-6 420 n.57 V v 13 V v 14 395 396 V vi 15 396 V vi 16 V viii 22 395 V xvi 44 391 396 n.117 V xx 55 398 V xxi 59 396 V xxiii 66 396 V xxiii 67 V xxiv 71 397 395-6 V xxv 74 370; 374; V xxv 75 395 V xxvi 76 385 Hon·. Hortensius·, Miiller BT 453-4 frag 43 leg·. Laws·. Powell OCT; b + s + s I xiii 37-38 390 n.107 370 I xx 54 360 I xxi 54 397-8 I xxi 55 *10 n.32 III V 13

Luc. Lucullus·, Plasberg BT; s + s i2 ii 4

376 360; 364; 367; 369; 400-1 ii 5-6 371 n.49 ii 7 369 n.40 iv 10 375 iv 11 360; 363; 368 iv 12 368; 373; 375. 376; 380 v 15 389; 391 n.108 vi 16 404 vi 18 377 n.72; 384 n.87; 394 vii 19 392 vii 20 392-3 vii 21 393 ix 27 384 n.87 ix 29 391; 392 xi 33 382 xv46 392 xvi 49 375 xix 61 367; 376 n.68 xix 63 377 xxii 69 362; 363; 371; 377 and n.71; 378 andn.75; 379; 386; 388 xxii 70 377 and n.72; 387 xxvi 82 7 n.20; 12 n.37; 18 n.51 xxx 97 391-2 xxx 98 391 xxxv 112 385 xxxv 113 360; 370; 385 n.89 xxxvi 115 388 xxxvi 116 391 and n.109 xxxviii 119 463 n.240 xiii 131 387; 389 n.106 xliii 132 388; 396 n.l 16 xliv 137 388 xlvi 143 391 nd·. On the Nature o f the Gods\ Ax BT; b +s +s Ii2 190; 193 n .ll I vii 16 370; 372; 388; 398 I xiii 33 454-5 I xxii 63 199 II lix 148 88

717

Index o f Passages

off. On Dudes·, Winterbottom OCT; b + s +s I ii 6 I xi 34

500 64 n.31; 72 ; 79 n.59 I xi 35 70 n.44; 77 I xi 36 58 I xxiii 81 72 74 II viii 26 II xvi 56-57 454 and *n,196 II xxiv 87 498 n.7 or at·. Orator, Wilkins OCT; S + s iii 10 301 xxxii 114 459; 460 li 172 459 n.220 parad Stoic. Stoic Paradoxes·, Schneider BT proem 5 553 n.181 pro Balbo·, Peterson OCT; s + s vi 15 64 nn.31 and 32 pro Caelio·, Clark OCT; s + s x 23-24 368 pro Ligario·, Clark OCT; s + s vii 21 403 Pep·. Republic·, Ziegler BT; b + s + s I ii 2 457 n.207 II xvii 31 57-8 III viii 2 454 and n.196 III xxiii 34 66 n.35 III xxiii 35 57 and n.3; 70; 74; 78 sen·. On O ld Age·, Powell (Cambridge, 1988); s + s viii 23 379 n.76 Tim·. Timaeus·, Giomini BT; s + s i1 429 and n.103 Top·. Topics·, Reinhardt (Oxford, 2002); s + 0 i 1-2 462-4 and nn.*** and 242 452 i3 498 n.8 i5 Tusc·. Tusctdan Disputations·, Pohlenz BT; b +s +s 1x22 456 I xxxii 79 207 and n.19; 302 I xxxiii 80 456 I xxxix 94 456 II iii 8 301 II iii 9 84 n.14; 383 n.84

III xxv 59 V viii 21 V viii 22 V xxxvii 107 V xxxix 113

371 370 371 361 500

[Cicero]

ad Her. To Herennius·, Marx BT; b + s + s XIII xi 19

459 n.221

C i-ement of Alexandria

paed·. The Teacher, Stahlin (Berlin, 1905); + ch + s +sb II vii 58.3

640 n.17

strom·. Stromata·, Stahlin and Frlichtel (Berlin, 19854); b +ch + s + sb I viii 40.1-2 298 n.120 I xvi 79.3 649 n.63 II xx 125.1 155 V xiv 97.6 216, 280 VIII iv 16.2 511 n.8 [C lement of R ome]

horn·. Homilies·, Rehm and Strecker (Berlin, 19923); b + s + sb I i 1-ix 1 I iii 1 Ix 1 1 x 5 -6 1 x 8 -9 I xv 6 I xvii 1 I xix 1-2 I xix 5-8 I xxi 5-6 II v 3-vi 1 II vii 1-2 II viii 3 II xvi 1 II xxii 3 II xxv 3 II xxxviii 3 III ii 2 IV vi 2 IV xii 1 IV xxii 2 V ii 4 V x-xix V xviii 1

612 627-8 626 629 629-30 612 612-13 634 631-3 635 633 629 619-20 631 626 626 618 617-18 626 628 627 621 621-2 621

[Clement of Rome], hom (cont.)

614 VI xi 2 618-19 XII xiii 3 619 XII xxv-xxxiii 614 X I vii 3-4 613 xv ii 2 627 XV iv 2 635 XV v 3 617 XV viii 4 626 XVI i 630 XVI iii 3 619 XIX xix 4 626 XXxxi 1 626 ^X xxii 6 rec·. Recognitions; Rehm and Strecker (Berlin, 19942); b +s +sb 612 Ii 1-3 628 I iii 1 626 I vii 1 626 I ix 4 612-13 I xiv 2-4 631, 634 I xvi 2 626 II v 4 616 II liv 5 630 Ill xvi 1 622-4 Ill xxi 4-xxii 1 630 Ill xxxiv 5 630 Ill xxxv 1 616 VII xv 1-4 627 VII xxxii 4 625-6 VIII v 4 614-15 VIII vii 4-6 628-9 VIII ix 7-8 629 VIII xiii 1 624 VIII xvi 5 623-4 VIII xvii 3 616-17 VIII xx 2-4 632 VIII lx 5 634 IX i 5-6 619 Xv 1 625 Xxv 1 628 X xxxviii 2-3

I xi 9 [118.5-6] II i 1 [120.7-11] II i 4 [128.12] II i 7 [130.13-17] II i 19 [152.2-5] II i 19 [152.7-9] II i 20 [152.27-28] II i 20-23 [152.26156.30] II i 23 [156.21-25] II i 24 [158.1-28] II vii 2 [228.4]

9 n.28 6 7 11-12 3 5 n.13 18 9 n.30

On the Heavens·,Todd BT; b +s +sb +

5 n.14 7 n.20 5 n.14

[Didymus]

On difficult expressions in Plato; Miller

(Paris, 1868); p +1 s.v. aTOKvaletv s.v. 8-ημ.οΰσθat s.v. s.v. ^ 8’ o s

'

19 19 9 n.28

s.v,

i

!

theol·. Compendium o f Greek Theology; Lang

BT; s 13

506 n.29

D ^ wscius

in Phaed·. Commentary on Plato's Phaedo;

Westerink (Amsterdam, 1977); b +s 231 I 100

I

Demetrius

doc·. OnStyle; Rade^^eher (Leipzig, 1901); s

11 16 28 157 164 225 Demetrius of Laconia

453 n.182 453 n.182 453 n.182 453 n.182 453 n.182 453 n.182

Dmappus

437

Didymus

in Dem·· Commentary on Demosthenes;

Pearson and Stephens BT; s +sb 412 n.22 v 53-54

Dio C hrysostom Speeches; von Arnim (Berlin, 1893 and 1896); w +s 26 301 301 ^ X X 27 ^XXIII 8 61 n.19 Diogenes Iaertius

Lives o f the Philosophers; Dorandi

I

1979); c +1 (PHerc 1013) 9 n.30 ; VI 9 n.30 XVII 3 10 n.31 XVII 3-11 18-19 XVIII 9 n.30; 11 and xx 1-9 *n.36 15 and n.43 XXI 2-11 11 XXII 1-8 CIAG N ii; p +l 21.18-19

i

I

On the Size o f the Sun; Romeo (Naples

κ α τό π ιν

s.v. κ ΐρ α σ β ό λ ο ν s.v. μ ΐτ α π ο ΐΐΐσ θ α ι s.v. φ αΰλον 406.23-29

275 275 274 280; 345-6 275 283 275 and n.77 352-3 273-4

Dio Cassius Histories; DindorfBT; b +eh +s Liv 5 61 xxxii 3 61

CoRNUTUS

in Cat·· On Aristotle's Categories; Busse

Cleomedes

[p +l] (ed Ziegler) Ixi 9 [116.27-118.6] I xi 9 [118.2] I xi 9 [118.4-5]

Index ofPassages

Index o f Passages

718

(Cambridge, 2013); b +s I 16 479 I 20 511 n.8 I 24 4 n.10; 540 n.132 II 17 4 n.10 II 43 540 n.132 II 45 215 n.10 II 49 533 n.99 82 n.7 II 55 II 64 280; 482 n.13 II 85 479 n.1; 482 n.13 II 121 23 II 122 23 ·III 2 215 208 III 5 III 25 215 n.10 III 37 215 n.13; 221 n.41; 482 n.13 III 38 217; 536 n.115 III 46 412 III 47 536 n.115 222; 225 III 56

III 56-61 III 57 III 58 III 61 III 63 III 63-64 III 64 III 65 III 66 IV 1 N5 N 14 N32 V 11-16 V24 V 29-33 V 33 V49 V 52 V 56 V 59-60 V 62 V73 V 94 VI 10 VI 80 VI 105 VII 2 VII 4 VII 6 VII 20 VII 30 VII 33 VII 36 VII 39 VII 39-41 VII 41 VII 41-48 VII 48

VII 49-82 VII 50 VII 54 VII 55 VII 60 VII 75

719 223 215 n.13 488 n.35 221-2; 261; 319 n.149 229; 305 351 n.203; 353 305 223; 230; 324-5 220 545 n.151 411 n.14 210 n.15 220 n.38 433 n.121 106 441 460 n.224 422 n.69 411; 412 411-12 421 411 n.17 411 n.17 649 22 479 n.1; 482 n.13 22-3 480 n.7 482 480 n.8 154-5 366 n.30 350 218 481 602 81; 491 490-1 536 n.115; *598602 and nn. *54, *55, *56, and *59; 606 490-1 485 n.27 485 n.27 492 484 nn.23 and 24 602

720

Index o f Passages

Diogenes Laertius (cont.) 604 VII 83 23 VII 91 184 V II115 19 n.* VII 132 5 nn.13 and 14 V II144 142 V II157 603-4 VII 160 81 n.5; 482 V II163 482 VII 166 482 V II167 482 V II174-175 482 V II178 217 n.20; 480 V II180 n.5; 506 n.25 350 V II187 350 VII 188 479 V II189 481 V II190 VII 198 483 V II199 485 VII 201 485 VIII88 465 n.249 643 1X15 223 n.48 1X41 223 n.48 1X45 1X48 285; 291 199 DC 51 199 n.23 DC 54 199 n.21 DC 55 DC 61 526 n.78; 557; *573-4 510 DC61-108 DC 62 5 l4 n .l9 *574 DC63 *574 DC 64 *574 DC66 DC 68 514 n.19; 533-4; 557 n.199; *574 514 n.20; 557 DC 69 n.197; *574 514 n.20; 534 DC 70 n.106; 561 and n.224; 563-5; *574-5 565 n.240 DC 70-73 531 n.90; 564 DC 71 n.236

DC 72 DC 74 IX 74-77 DC 74-89 DC 74-108 DC75 DC 76 DC 77 DC 78 DC79 DC 79-80 1X79-88 DC 80 DC81 DC 82

1X83 DC84 DC 85 IX 86 DC 87 DC 88 1X 88-89 DC 89 DC 90 DC 90-101 DC 91 DC 92 DC 92-94 DC 93 DC 94 DC 94-95 DC 95 DC 96 DC 96-97 DC 97 DC 98 DC 99 DC 100 DC 101 DC 102 DC 102-105

564 n.238 571 n.256; *575 560 515 531 553 n.181 524-5; *575 560 n.215; *575 528; *575 *565-7; *575-6 552-3 548-55 *576 *576 518; 549-50; 550 andn.171; *576-7 *577 *577 525; *577-8 518-19; 525; *578 539 n.129; 553-4; 558; *578 515 n.23; 525; 567 537-42 *578 *579 516 521; 525; 526; 563; 564 *579 519-20 *579 516 n.29; *579 526 525; 563; 564; *5?9 *579 521-2 543-4; *579 546-7; *579-80 559; *580 *580 519; 525 531 n.90; 532-7; 567; *580 *528-9; 560

721

Index o f Passages DC 102-108 DC 103 DC 104 DC 105 DC 106

DC 107 DC 108 DC 109 DC 114 1X115 DC 116

X2 X3 X 3-4 X8 X 21 X 25 X 27-28 X 29

516 560 n.215

*580 *581 516 n.29; 540 n.134; 556 and

*n.l93; *558; *581 *581 *581-3 511-13 and n .ll 534 558 andn.203 539 n.129; 555 n.187; 556 and n.193; *583; 651 n.66 379 n.76 205 n.3 595 540 n.132 411 n.17 219

594-5 *596-7

Diogenes of Oenoanda fragments; Smith (Naples, 1992); f +c +1 13 II 1-8 13 16 192-4 and n.10 198 16 II7-8 16 II 8-9 200 n.27 16 II 9-12 195-6 16 I I 11-12 193; 198 16 III 1-5 192-3 16 III 12-14 193 and n .10 Diogenianus fragments apud Eusebius, PE VI viii 26 505 n.20 * VI viii 28 505 n.22

paroem; Proverbs; Leutsch (Gottingen,

comp verb; On the Composition of'Words; Usener and Radermacher BT; s 221 and n.4l; 305; 458 n.213 31-32 488 Demosthenes; Usener and Radermacher BT; s 23 216 n.17 Pomp; To Pompey ; Usener and Radermacher BT; s + sb i 17 304 ii 5 304-5 Thucydides; Usener and Radermacher BT; s Usener and Radermacher BT; s 10 350 n.200 25

[Dionysius T hrax]

Art o f grammar ; Uhlig GG I i; s + [p +1] i [6.1] xii [31.6]

287 285

Dioscorides

mat med; On Medicines; Wellman (Berlin, 1907) proem 3

312

Elias

in Cat; Commentary on Aristotle's Categories; Busse CIAG XVIII i; p + 1 107.11-13 433 n.122 113.17-19 433 n.122 Epictetus

diss: Dissertations; Schenkl BT; b +ch + s I xxix 55-56

153

ench; Handbook; Schenkl BT; s 229 n.12

Epicurus

ad Men; Letter to Menoeceus; von der Miihll

1851); b + s

534 n.109

Dionysius of Halicarnassus ad Amm; To Ammaeus; Usener and Radermacher BT; s

6

458 458 458 ant Rom; Roman Antiquities; Jacoby BT; b + ch + s II lxxii 1-9 58 II lxxii 4 69 n.42

49

[Diogenianus]

196

7 11 12

458 and n.212

BT; s 128 135

640-1 640-1

722

(cont.) ad Pyth: Letter to Pythocles; von der Milhll

E picurus

BT; s 6; 7 -8 ; 16 and *n.45 18 93 fragments; Arrighetti (Turin, 1960) [24] [43] 8-15 13-14

91

E piphanius

Ancoratus; Holl (Leipzig, 1915); s 104

200

Erotian

voc Hipp: Hippocratic Lexicon; Nachmanson (Goreborg, 1918); p (ed Klein) 258-9 29 293; 294; 295 31 n.** 294 n.113 34 271 n.72 78 Eucud

Elements; Stamatis BT XI def 2

30 n.30

Eudemus

fragments; Wehrli (Basel, 1969') 1 475-6 475 and n.282 6 477 98 E uripides

VI viii 28 VI xi 36-37 XI i 2 XI i 3-5 X1 ii 7 XI iii 8 XI x 14 XIII xii 1-4 XIV iii 7 XIV iv 4 XN ix 4 XIV xviii XIV xviii 2 XN xviii 9-12 ^ N xviii 11 XIV xviii 29 XN xviii 30 XN xix 10 x v ii 15 x v xiii 1 x v xiii 13 x v xx 2

505 n.22 503 n.18 234 225 224-5 215 n.10 215 n.13 215 n.13 199 361 n.11 361 n:10; 383 n.84 513 n.17 532 n.95 516 and n.27 548-9 and *n.165 651 511 n.8 199-200 465 n.249 234 417 n.46 142

Eustathius

tn Od\ Commentary on Homers Odyssey Stallbaum (Leipzig, 1825-1826); v + p + l I 44.4-6 323 280 II 305.34-35

Diggle OCT; 1

Alcestis 48

Favorinus

198

Hercules Furens 386

574

Eusebius

HE: Church History; Schwanz (Leipzig, 1903-1909); b + ch + s 506 n.29 VI xix 8 506 n.27 VI xix 16 onomast: Biblical Place-names; Klostermann (Leipzig, 1904) 316 proem PE: Preparation far the Gospel; Mras (Berlin, 1954-1956); b +ch + s 501 n.15 VI vi 15 504 VI vii 22-28 505 n.20 VI viii 26

723

Index ofPassages

Index ofPassages

fragments ^«dDiogeines Laertius III 25 215 n.10 III 57 215 n.13

; .

Festus

indol·. On not Grieving·, Boudon-Millot (Paris, 2008), s 13 14

216 n.16; 222 n.*; 280 and n.87 222 and n.**

in Hipp fta ct: Commentary on Hippocrates’ Fracture" Kuhn (Leipzig, 1830) XVIIIB 318-319 XVIIIB 327-328

230; 233 230

in Hipp nat hom: Commentary on Hippocrates’ The Nature o f Man; Mewaldt CMG V 9.1 x v 9-11 348 X.V 24 465 n.249 inst log·. Introduction to Logic, Kalbfleisch BT; ch + s xii 3-4 3 xiii 5-12 237 n.46 xv 10-11 239 xviii 2-4 239 in Tim: Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus; Schroder CMG; p + 1 13.3-7 222

lib prop: On His Own Books; Boudon-Millot (Paris, 2007) XIX 10-11 483 n.16 XIX13 239 XIX47 238 XIX48 294 n.114 M ed ^ ψ : On M edical Experience, Walzer (Oxford, 1947); s + l II 3 *561 n.219

meth med·. On the Therapeutic Method; Johnston and Horsley (Cambridge 2011) X 26 239 and n.51

nat fac: On the Natural Faculties;

On the M eaning f Words; Lindsay BT 61 n.18 s.v. Bellona

Helmreich BT II 26-30 II 62

G.ALEN Kuhn (Leipzig, 1821- 1833); v + p — save where noted Antidotes; Kubn (Leipzig, 1827) 2 n.3; 484 n.20 XN 31-32 diffpuls: On Kinds o f Pulse; Kuhn (Leipzig, 1824) 24 VIII 710

ord lib prop·. On the Order o f his Own Books; Boudon-Millot (Paris, 2007) XIX60

390n.107 505 n.21

314

PHP On the Doctrines o f Hippocrates and Plato; de Lacy CMG V 4.1.2 V 255-256 V283 V287 V 366

154 142 176 185 n.9

185 n.9; 186 185 n.9 187 n.12 155 155 96 n.49 88 n.28 protr. Protrepticus; Boudon-Millot (Paris, 2000) I 20 88 I 20-39 85 n.20 V 367 V 379 V 397-398 V 654 V 656 V733 V 784

QjAM·. That the Passions o f the Soul Depend on the State ofth e Boqy; von Muller BT IV782 IV 785

432 and n.114; 434 390 n.107

simp med temp· On the Powers o f Simple Medicines; Kuhn (Leipzig, 1826) XI 593

197

subfemp: Outlines o f Empiricism; DeichgrSber (Berlin, 1930); p +1 (ed Bonnet) 64.13 558 and n.202 trem: On Palpitations; Kuhn (Leipzig, 1824) VII 631 233 us part: On the Use HYRIO ii 3 361 n.8 ; 368 in Hor: Commentary on Horace, Holder Cic. Life o f Cicero, Ziegler BT; ch +s (Berlin 1894) iv I 360 iv 2 3 7 7 ; 383 n.84 Epode II i 15 309 iv 5 365 Porphyry vii 2 500 n.13 fragment apadEusebius, HE' xxvii 6 424 VI xix 8 506 n.29 xl 2 506 n.28 fragments; Smith BT fart Alex: On the Luck o f Alexander, 159 442 n.156 Nachstiidt BT 226 *264 n.60 328E 305 in Cat: Commentary on Aristotle's Categories, Lamprias caralogue; Sandbach BT Busse CIAG Ni; p +1 158 548 n.163 55.10-14 292-3 Luc: Life o f Lucullus, Ziegler BT; ch +s vit Plot: Life o f Plotinus, Brisson et al (Paris, xix 8 425 1992); ch +l xxviii 8 367; 372 iv 483 n.16 [Piato] (corn.) Definitions

xlii 1 - 2 xlii 3

Index ofPassages

iv-vi xiv 4 xiv 18-20 xviii 8-19 xxiv 1-16

445 n.161 234-5 232; 272 234 n.35; 264 444-5 vit Pyth: Lift o f Pythagoras, Nauck BT; s xi 208 Posidonius fragments; Edelstein and Kidd (Cambridge, 1972) 18 5 116 5 and n.14 253 416 PruseIAN fig num: Numbers, Keil GL III; s

16

512 n. 1 2

inst: Grammar, Hertz GL II-III; b +ch +s

VI xi 63 XV iii 13

498 n.7 370 n.44

Proclus in Tim: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus,

Diehl BT; v +p +1 I 20.21-23 I68 I 75.30-76.4 I 87 I 305

231 n.27 272 319 n.149 272 276

Ptolemy synt: Almagest, Heiberg (Leipzig, 1898­

1903); b +ch V 16 1-2 Ptolemy the Unknown vit Atist: Life o f Aristotle, Hein (Fr^^tat, 1985); p‘ 418 433 n. 1 2 2 QUINTILIAN On Oratory, Radermacher BT; b +ch +s

I viii 15 I x 83 II xv 19-20 II xv 24 II xv34 II xvi 1-6 II xvii 1-4 II xvii 1 2 II xvii 14

288 463 n.240 82 84 n.15 81 93 80-1 94 82

731

II xvii 15 82; 83 II xvii 18-19 I01 n.59 II xvii 23 97-8 and n.53 VIII vi 64 221 n. 41 SCHOLIA on Aristophanes: Koster and Holwerda (Groningen, 1960-1999) Wasps 772-773 274 Birds 1541 323-4 Wealth 693 286-7 on Aristotle: Brandis (Berlin, 1836); p +c +l 94a21-47 435 n.133 on Demosthenes: Dilts (Leipzig, 1983-1986) Against Aristocrates 1 351 n.203 on Dionysius Thrax: Hilgard GG I iii; p +1 3.23-26 290 n.104 14.14-18 287-8 175.34-176.15 265 n.63 361.18-23 265 n.63 448.6-7 649 and n.63 469.10-12 288 on Epicurus: apud Diogenes Laertius X 91 15-16 on Hesiod: Pertusi (Milan, 1955) op 633. 287 On Homer: Iliad : Erbse (Berlin, 1969-1988) XXIII 65 176 n.* XXIII 81 291 Odyssey: Dindorf (Oxford, 1855) III 444 317 on Marcus Aurelius: Schenkl (Leipzig, 1913) II i 643 on Plaro: Greene (Haverford PA, 1948); Cufalo (Rome, 2007) Ale II 147D 353-4 Leg631A 354 Leg 955C 354 Rep 423C 351-2 Rep 600C 200 on Theophrastus M et : Fobes and Ross (Oxford, 1929) 12a4-b4 434 n.125; 470 n.262 SENECA ep: Letters, Reynolds OCT; w +s cviii 23 229

732

Index ofPassages

Seneca (cont.)

nat quaest· Questions in Natural Science; Gercke BT; b + s +sb 5 n.13 I iii 10 501 n.15 II ^vii-^xx:xviii 615; 650 VII xxxii 2 Servius

Commentary on Vergil's Aeneid; Thilo (Leipzig, 1878-1887) 61 n.18 IX 52 69 n.41 X 14 Sextus Empimcus

M : Against the Mathematicians; Mutschmann and Mau BT: b + s 647 I 272 647 I 282 646 and n.36 I 305 288 I 313 85-6 II 81-2 II 6 85-6 and n.22 II 9 87-8 and *n.25 II 10 100-3 and n.58 II 10-11 86 n.23 II 11 II 11-12 102-3 86 n.23; 100 n.58 II 12 91 n.33 II 13 II 15 86 n.23; 97 and . n.50 86 n.23; 94 II 16 94 II 17 94; 95 II 18 II 19 28 n.27; 96 II 20 83; 93-4 86 n.23 II 24 II 25 94 II 26-30 93 83 n.11; 93 II 43 86 n.23 II 48-59 86 n.23 II 60 98 n.52 II 61 86 n.23 II 72 86 n.23 II 79-87 II 86-87 97 n.50 546 n.154 III 4 647-8 VII 8 491 VII 22 491 VII 41

213 n.5 374; 393 394 n.113 373-4 372 381-2 and n.83 ' 393 548 n.162 26 n.24 521 190 n.2 190 n.2; 199; 200n.27 IX65 576 IX 208 543-4 580 IX 209 IX 214 546-7 IX 218 559 642 n.21 IX 323 XI 71-72 519 639-40 XI 141 PH Outlines o f Pyrrhonism; Mutschmann BT; b + s 568 and n.251 12 525 n.73 I3 514 nn.21 and 22 14 I 5-6 515 562-3; 574-5 17 523; 641 18 I 10 523 and n.55; 641-2 514 n.20 I 13-17 511 n.8; 562 I 16-17 n.227 640 I 30 I 36 540 n.133 553 n.181 I 38 552 and n.178 I 40 552 I 44 553 n.181 I 79 576 I 81 I 100 576; 579 541 I 135 550 I 135-140 I 145 577 537-42 I 164-169 I 167 550 n.173 541 andn.137 I 173 I 178-179 515 n.23

Index ofPassages I 180 I 180-186 I 187-209 I 200 I 202 I 204 I 215 I 235 II 13 II 69 II 79 II 96 II 100-102 II 119 II 140 II 145 II 156 II 256 III 60 III 64 III 74 III 124

Vil 93 Vil 162 VII 162-163 VII 201-202 VII 202 VII 247-252 VII 344 VII 345 VIII 223 VIII 337a IX 50 IX 56

! ! I

525 n.62 515 n.23 514 n.22 526-7 and n.79 642 642 525 and n.73 383; 388 491 523 and n.58 523 and n.56 519 and n.39 521-2 579 540 and n.135 579 26 n.24 553 n.181 642 n.21 519 and n.40 563; 564 642 n.21

Simplicius

in Cael· Commentary on Aristotle's On the Heavens; Heiberg CIAG VIII; p + I 226.19-23

442 n.157

in Cat· Commentary on Aristotle's Categories;, Kalbfleisch CIAG VIII; p + I 1.3-2.29 432 n.112 1.19-21 236 16.2 440 n.148 29.28-30.5 437 65.2-13 462 n.232 159.31-33 236 270.2 432 and n.111 379.8-10 440 n.147; 441

in Phys: Commentary on Aristotle's Physics; Diels CIAG IX and X; p + I 4 .1 1 - 16 475 n.279 6.9.10 475 n.279 ' 42.17 103 n.63 291.21-292.31 5 n.* 440.14- 17 437 80 1.14 - 16 475 n.279 802.7-13 442 n.156 923.3-925.2 442; 474-8 924.18 467 1036.11- 15 468

1036.18 1117.3-5

733 467 474 n.278

SORANUS gyn: Gynaecology; Ilberg CMG N; b + ch + s I xxii 5

576

Stephanus of By^ ^ tium Ethnica; Meineke (Berlin, 1849); Billerbeck (Berlin, 2004) s.v. Ά σκά λω ν 360; 362 s.v, Νίκαια 292 s.v. Tdptva 512n.12 s.v. Tpc.p&s 295 Stobaeus

eel·. Anthology; Wachsmuth and Hense (Berlin, 1884-1912); b + ch + s I xvii 4 176 I ^ 1-3 4 n.9 II vii 3 466 n.251 II vii 10 185 nn. 7 and 187 n.13 N ii 20 40 n.** IV ^xxv 72 208 n.13 Strabo

Geography; Meineke BT; b + c + s [+ p (ed Casaubon)] II iii 5 [101] II iii 8 [104] XI v 4 [505] XII iii 16 [548] XII vi 2 [568] XIII i 19 [589] XIII i 54 [608-609] XIII iii 2 [620] XIII iii 6 [622] XIII iv 2 [624] XN ii 13 [655] XIV iii 4 [670] XVI ii 24 [757] XVI ii 29 [759] XVII i 9 [790]

430-1 430 n.105 648 410; 431 431 n.107 286 408-9 and n.4; 426 and *n.89 409 n.4 649 415 430 and n.105 431 and n.106 410; 429; 435 n.132; 480 361 n.8; 481 n.10 470 n.262

Suda; Adler (Berlin, 1928-1938) s.v. Cl871v 346 n.196 s.v. a ip ea is 511 n.8

734

Index o f Passages

Suda (contj

T eles

s.v. Α ριστόξενος s.v. Ά ρποκρατίω ν s.v. Δ ιογενιανός s.v. είδε a s.v. ε π α γ γ ε λ ία ι s.v. ευ 7τράττειν s.v. ζάλη s.v. "Ηρας δεσμ ούς

412 n.20 231 and n.25; 276 281 351 n.203 339 261 277 n.80 278 n.81

s.v. Θεοδόσιο? s.v. Θεών s.v. Κ α λλίμ α χ ος s.v. /loyyfvo? s.v. μ ε τα π ο ιε ΐσ θ α ι s.v. Όρφεύς s.v. Ο νηστΐνος s.v. Π άμφιλος s.v. Π ορφΰριος s.v. Πωλίων s.v. Π ρω ταγόρας s.v. Σ ύλλας s.v. Σ ω ρανός s.v. Ταύρος s.v. Τήλεφος s.v. Τ ίμαιος s.v. Τυραννιών s.v. φαύλος s.v. χ α ίρειν

560-1 and n.217 549 n.169 295 292 275 n.77 285 263 263 n.56; 292 234-5 269 n.69; 273 n.75 200 410 n.8 144 234 307 258 n.45 427 n.94 351 n.203 261

t \ t/ V7TΟ

S uetonius

.