M&A and Corporate Consolidation: A Study of the Role of Competitive Government Behavior 9811566747, 9789811566745

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Questions
1.2 Definitions of Key Concepts
1.3 Research Framework and Contents
1.4 New Findings and Significance of the Project
Bibliography
Chapter 2: Government Competition, M&A, and Corporate Consolidation: A General Analysis
2.1 Economic Transition and Government Competition
2.1.1 Government Behaviors in Economic Transition
2.1.1.1 The Connotation of Economic Transition
2.1.1.2 The Paths and Features of China’s Economic Transition
2.1.1.3 The Role of the Government in China’s Economic Transition
2.1.2 Government Competition and the Measurement of Government Competitiveness in the Economic Transition Period
2.1.2.1 Types of Government Competition
2.1.2.2 Means of Government Competition
2.1.2.3 Measurement of Government Competitiveness
2.2 M&A and Its Corporate Consolidation Effects
2.2.1 Value Creation and Impact Factors of M&A
2.2.1.1 Studies on Value Creation of M&A
2.2.1.2 Studies on the Impact Factors of M&A Performance
2.2.2 Corporate Consolidation and Its Impact Mechanism
2.2.2.1 An Interpretation of the Basic Theory of Corporate Consolidation
2.2.2.2 Different Perspectives for the Analysis of M&A and Corporate Consolidation
2.3 M&A and Corporate Consolidation from the Perspective of Government Competition: A New Analysis Framework
2.3.1 The Existence of M&A Wave in China: A Survey Based on Government Behaviors
2.3.2 Occurrence of M&A: Theoretical Model and Empirical Analysis
2.3.3 M&A and Corporate Consolidation Mechanism Under Local Government Competition, the Key Section of the Book
2.3.4 Measurement of M&A Performance Under Government Competition
Bibliography
Chapter 3: M&A Waves in China: A Survey from the Government Behavior Perspective
3.1 Existence of M&A Waves in China and the Macro Motivations for the Waves
3.1.1 Empirical Study and Description of China’s M&A Waves
3.1.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypothesis
3.1.1.2 Data Sources and Descriptions
3.1.1.3 Empirical Test
3.1.1.4 Analysis of the Cyclical Characteristics of the M&A Waves in China
3.1.1.5 Measurement of Cycles
3.1.1.6 Descriptive Analysis of M&A Waves in China
3.1.2 Analysis of Motivations for China’s Waves of M&A
3.1.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
3.1.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for China’s M&A Waves
3.2 Privatization of Local SOEs from the Perspective of Government Control Rights Transfer
3.2.1 Motivations for Government to Transfer Their Control Rights of Enterprises
3.2.1.1 Relevant Studies on the Government’s Motivations for Control Rights Transfer
3.2.1.2 Analysis of the Motivations of Government Control Rights Transfer from the Perspective of Regional Public Governance
3.2.1.3 Hypotheses of the Motivation for the Local Governments’ SOE Control Rights Transfer in China
3.2.2 Empirical Studies of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer
3.2.2.1 Obtaining and Screening Samples
3.2.2.2 Empirical Study Method and Descriptive Statistics of Data
3.2.2.3 Empirical Test of the Motivation for Government Control Rights Transfer
3.3 The “Connectivity” of Local SOEs with the Central SOEs: From the Perspective of Local Government Competition
3.3.1 “Connectivity” of Local SOEs and the Central SOEs: Progress and Current State
3.3.2 Transfer of Control Rights from Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: A Game Theoretic Model Analysis
3.3.2.1 Model Hypotheses
3.3.2.2 Model Derivation
3.3.2.3 Analysis of Factors Affecting Equity Transfer from the Local SOE to the Central SOE
3.3.3 Transfer of Control Rights from the Local SOEs to the Central SOEs: Empirical Test of Local Government Competitive Effects
3.3.3.1 Study Samples
3.3.3.2 Model and Variables
3.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
3.3.4 Regression Analysis
3.4 Reverse Takeovers: From the Perspective of Local Government Intervention
3.4.1 Current State of RTOs in China
3.4.1.1 Background Conditions for RTOs
3.4.1.2 Characteristics of RTOs in China
3.4.2 Analysis of the Motivations for RTOs in the Transition Period
3.4.2.1 Motivations from the Enterprises
3.4.2.2 Motivations from the Government
3.4.3 Empirical Studies on Government Intervention and the Probability of Local RTOs
3.4.3.1 Hypotheses
3.4.3.2 Research Design
3.4.3.3 Empirical Results and Analysis
3.4.3.4 Empirical Results
Bibliography
Chapter 4: The Mechanism of M&A Under the Impact of Local Government Competition: Models and Empirical Studies
4.1 The Game Theoretic Model of M&A Incorporating Government Behaviors
4.1.1 General Models of M&A Game
4.1.1.1 Hypotheses
4.1.1.2 The Game Process and Results
4.1.2 The Real Option Framework of M&A
4.1.3 M&A Model Incorporating Government Intervention
4.1.3.1 Building Theory and Model
4.1.3.2 Model Analysis
4.1.3.3 Summary
4.2 The Endogenous M&A Model of SOEs Under the Influence of Local Government Competition
4.2.1 Basic Models
4.2.1.1 Basic Hypotheses
4.2.1.2 Achievement of Cross-Regional M&A Promoted by Scale Effects
4.2.1.3 Result of Cross-Regional M&A: Oligopoly
4.2.2 Model Improvement I: Why Is It Difficult to Realize Cross-Regional M&A?
4.2.2.1 Description of Model Improvement
4.2.2.2 Failure in Cross-Regional M&A: The Control Rights Benefits as Stumbling Blocks
4.2.3 Model Improvement II: Why Intra-Regional M&A Flourish?
4.2.3.1 Description of Model Improvement
4.2.3.2 Intra-Regional M&A Prevail: Large Enterprises Built with Administrative Powers
4.3 The Impact Mechanism of Tax Competition Among Local Governments on M&A
4.3.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Tax Competition on M&A
4.3.2 Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Competition on M&A
4.3.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
4.3.2.2 Research Design
4.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis
4.3.2.4 Robustness Test
4.4 The Impact Mechanism of Local Government Expenditure Competition on M&A
4.4.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M&A
4.4.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Expenditure Competition on Inter-Regional M&A
4.4.2.1 Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis
4.4.2.2 Econometric Model Regression Results and Analysis
4.5 The Impact Mechanism of Local Governments’ Institutional Competition on M&A
4.5.1 Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M&A
4.5.2 Empirical Test on the Impact of Environmental Regulations on M&A
4.5.2.1 Data Selection and Descriptive Statistical Analysis
4.5.2.2 Variable Definition and Models
4.5.2.3 Empirical Results and Analysis
Bibliography
Chapter 5: Corporate M&A and Corporate Consolidation Under Government Competition: Regional Specialization and Industrial Agglomeration
5.1 Government Competition and Convergence of Regional Industrial Structure Based on an Extended Yardstick Competition Model
5.1.1 Questions Raised and Literature Review
5.1.2 Intra-Governmental Yardstick Competition and the Types of Competition
5.1.2.1 Extended Yardstick Competition and Convergence of Industrial Structure
5.1.2.2 Main Types of Yardstick Competition and Industrial Structure Convergence
5.1.3 Research Design
5.1.3.1 Sources of Data
5.1.3.2 Delimitation of the Economic Zones
5.1.3.3 Variable Design
5.1.3.4 Multiple Regression Model Design
5.1.4 Empirical Studies Results and Analysis
5.1.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis of the Variables in each Economic Zone
5.1.4.2 Multiple Regression Results and Analysis
5.2 Empirical Study on the Impact of Local Government Competitions on Regional Specialization
5.2.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
5.2.1.1 Incentive Structure and Competitive Behaviors of Local Governments
5.2.1.2 Local Government Competitions and Regional Specialization
5.2.2 Variables and Data
5.2.2.1 Measurement of Regional Specialization
5.2.2.2 Depiction of Local Governments’ Attracting Mobile Factors
5.2.2.3 Measurement of Local protectionism
5.2.2.4 Other Variables and Their Measurement
5.2.3 Econometric Model and Result Analysis
5.2.3.1 Basic Model and Results
5.2.3.2 Robustness Test
5.2.3.3 Discussions by Region
5.2.3.4 Discussion by Period
5.3 Industrial Paths of SOE M&A: Market Structure Effects and Industrial Structure Effects
5.3.1 Questions and Literature Review
5.3.2 Theoretical Model Analysis and Research Hypotheses
5.3.2.1 Definition of M&A Modes
5.3.2.2 Path Selection of M&A Modes
5.3.2.3 Industrial Selection of Intra-Industry M&A and Its Impact on Market Structure
5.3.2.4 The Choice of Inter-Industry M&A Path: Industrial Effects and Industrial Innovations
5.3.3 Research Design
5.3.3.1 Sample Selection
5.3.3.2 Operational Performance Measurement Index
5.3.4 Empirical Studies Results and Their Analysis
5.3.4.1 Performance Test Results and Analysis of Different Modes of M&A
5.3.4.2 Empirical Test and Analysis of the Impact of Intra-Industry M&A on Enterprise Performance and Market Structure
5.3.4.3 Empirical Test of the Performance of Inter-Industry M&A
5.4 Empirical Studies on SOE M&A and Industrial Agglomeration: A Case Study of the Manufacturing Industry
5.4.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
5.4.2 Sample Selection and Research Design
5.4.2.1 Sample Selection
5.4.2.2 Variable Design and Model
5.4.3 M&A in Manufacturing Industry and Their Impacts on Industry Performance: Status Description
5.4.3.1 Current State of M&A in Manufacturing Industry
5.4.3.2 Measurement Index for Industry Performance
5.4.4 Manufacturing Industry M&A and Their Impact on Industry Performance: Empirical Analysis
5.4.4.1 Correlation Analysis
5.4.4.2 Regression Analysis
Bibliography
Chapter 6: Government Competition and Intra-industry M&A: Studies on Micro and Macro Performances
6.1 General Methods for Studying the Impact of Intra-industry M&A on Company Performance
6.1.1 Definition of Intra-industry M&A
6.1.2 Research Methods of Micro Performance
6.1.2.1 Financial Evaluation
6.1.2.2 Event Studies
6.1.2.3 Other Evaluation Methods
6.1.3 Macro Performance Research Method
6.2 Studies on the Factors Affecting Affecting the Impact of Intra-industry M&A on Company Performance
6.2.1 Factors Affecting Micro Performance
6.2.1.1 Enterprise Dimension
6.2.1.2 Government Dimension
6.2.1.3 Other Factors
6.2.2 Factors Affecting Macro Performance
6.2.2.1 Conventional Factors
6.2.2.2 Governmental Factor
6.3 The Impact of Intra-industry M&A on Company Performance and Institutional Environment: The Perspective of Marketization Process
6.3.1 Impact of China’s Regional Marketization on M&A Performance: Theoretical Study
6.3.1.1 Analysis of China’s Marketization Process
6.3.1.2 Correlation of Marketization and M&A Performance
6.3.1.3 Impact Mechanism of China’s Regional Marketization Process on the M&A Performance: Based on the Framework of Fan Gang and Wang Xiaolu
6.3.2 Impact of China’s Regional Marketization on M&A Performance: An Empirical Study
6.3.2.1 Study Design
6.3.2.2 Empirical Study
6.3.2.3 Empirical Results and Robustness Test
6.4 Empirical Studies of Government Competition and the Impact of Intra-industry M&A on Company Performance
6.4.1 Government Competition and the Micro Performance of Intra-industry M&A
6.4.1.1 Samples and Variables
6.4.1.2 Statistical Analysis of Intra-industry M&A Performance
6.4.1.3 Multiple Regression Analysis of M&A Performance
6.4.2 Government Competition and the Macro Performance of Intra-industry M&A
6.4.2.1 Variables and Measurement
6.4.2.2 Statistical Analysis
6.4.2.3 Model Analysis
Bibliography
Chapter 7: Government Competition and Conglomerate Merger: Performance Extension Studies from the Perspective of Life Cycle Theory
7.1 Government Intervention and M&A Performance from the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle
7.1.1 Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
7.1.1.1 Enterprise Life Cycle Theory
7.1.1.2 Government Intervention and Enterprise M&A
7.1.2 Research Design
7.1.2.1 Sample Selection and Sample Sources
7.1.2.2 Periodic Division of Enterprise Life Cycle
7.1.2.3 Definition of Government Intervention Degree
7.1.2.4 Descriptive Analysis of Sample Characteristic Variables
7.1.2.5 Construction of the Corporate M&A Performance Score Model
7.1.3 Empirical Results and Analysis
7.1.3.1 The Impact of Government Intervention on M&A Performance of Enterprises at Different Stages of Their Life Cycles: A Univariate Descriptive Statistical Analysis
7.1.3.2 The Impact of Government Intervention on M&A Performance of Enterprises at Different Stages of Their Life Cycles: Multiple Regression Analysis
7.1.3.3 Robustness Test
7.2 Government Intervention and Conglomerate Merger Performance from the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle
7.2.1 Conglomerate Merger and Their Motivations and Effects
7.2.1.1 Definition of Conglomerate Merger
7.2.1.2 Industrial Motivations for Conglomerate Merger
7.2.1.3 Structure Effects of Inter-Industry M&A
7.2.1.4 Motivation for Government Intervention in Conglomerate Merger
7.2.2 Industry Life Cycle and Its Measurement
7.2.2.1 Industry and Industry Life Cycle
7.2.2.2 Stages of Life Cycle of China’s Industries
7.2.3 Industrial Life Cycle and Corporate M&A from the Perspective of Government Intervention
7.2.3.1 Industrial Life Cycle and Corporate M&A
7.2.3.2 Government Intervention and M&A Performance: Hypotheses Under Different Industry Life Cycles
7.2.3.3 Empirical Analysis of M&A Performance Under Different Industry Life Cycles
7.3 Industry Cycle and Performance of Conglomerate Merger: A Case Study of Emerging Industries of Strategic Importance in China
7.3.1 Analysis of the Environment for Emerging Industries of Strategic Importance
7.3.1.1 External Environment
7.3.1.2 Internal Environment
7.3.2 Strategic Emerging Industries and Conglomerate Merger
7.3.3 Analysis of the Quantity and Performance of Inter-Industry M&A for Emerging Industries
7.3.3.1 Quantitative Analysis of Conglomerate Merger
7.3.3.2 Analysis of Conglomerate Merger Performance
Bibliography
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Suggestions and Prospects
8.1 Major Conclusions
8.1.1 Conclusion on the Links Between the Wave of M&A in China and Government Behaviors
8.1.1.1 The Wave of M&A of Chinese Enterprises Is a Cyclical Economic Phenomenon Driven by Market Factors, Economic Factors and Institutional Factors
8.1.1.2 In the Process of Privatization of SOEs, the Transfer of Local Government Control Rights Is Motivated by Dual Factors, Economic and Political, and Has Presented a Trend of Transition from Economic Motivation to Political Motivation
8.1.1.3 The Central SOEs’ Preference for Expansion and the Competition Between Local Governments for “Economic Growth” Have Triggered an Upsurge of “Establishing Connectivity” of Local SOEs with the Central Enterprises
8.1.1.4 Local Government Intervention and Local Protection Has Heterogeneous Impact on the RTO Transactions of Different Corporate Ownership
8.1.2 Conclusions on the Impact Mechanism of Local Government Competition on Corporate M&As
8.1.3 Conclusions on the Impact Mechanism of Government Competition on Regional Industrial Structure and Specialization
8.1.3.1 Yard-Stick Competitions Between Local Governments Driven by Economic Incentives and Political Incentives Lead to Regional Industrial Structure Convergence
8.1.3.2 Local Government Competition Has a Double-Edged Sword Effect on Regional Specialization and Inter-Regional Market Integration
8.1.3.3 The Intra-Industry M&A of SOEs Highlight the Market Structure Effects and the Industrial Structure Effects
8.1.4 Conclusions on Micro-Performance and Macro-Performance of Government Competitions and Intra-Industry M&A
8.1.4.1 Among the Impact Factors of Government Competition on Micro Economic Performance, Industrial Policy Competition Has a More Significant Impact on the Micro Performance of Intra-Industry M&A Than Tax Competition
8.1.4.2 As an Important Institutional Environment Factor, the Process of Regional Marketization Is Significantly and Positively Correlated with the Performance of M&A
8.1.4.3 The Effects of Government Competition on Macroeconomic Performance: The Effects of Actions of Regional Concentration of High-Tech Industries Present a Difference in Means
8.1.5 Conclusions on Government Competition and M&A Performance Expansion from the Perspective of Life Cycle
8.1.5.1 Government Intervention and M&A Performance from the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle
8.1.5.2 Government Intervention and Conglomerate Merger Performance from the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle
8.1.6 Empirical Studies Conclusion on the Effects of Policies for Industrial Revitalization Plan
8.1.6.1 Impact of M&A on Industrial Structure Change and Quality of Industry Performance: An Empirical Study of China’s Manufacturing Industry
8.1.6.2 The Allocation Performance of Stock Resources in Conglomerate Merger: An Investigation of the Emerging Industries of Strategic Importance
8.2 Proposals for Government Participation in M&A of Enterprises and Corporate Consolidation
8.2.1 The Government Should Promote Marketization and Boost the Unrestricted Flow of Capital Through M&A
8.2.2 Local Governments Should Optimize the Competitive Modes and Paths to Realize the Sustainable Development of Regional Economy
8.2.3 Governments Should Respect the Law of Life Cycle When Intervening in Economic Activities and Improve the Dynamic Growth Performance of Industrial Economy
8.2.4 The Central Government Should Improve the Yard-Stick Competition Assessment Method and Optimize the Order of Government Competition
8.3 Limitations of the Study and Prospects for Further Studies
8.3.1 Limitations of the Project
8.3.2 Prospects for Further Study
8.3.2.1 The Measure Model and Methods for Government Competition (Intervention) Can Be Further Explored and Improved
8.3.2.2 The Corporate Consolidation Mechanism and Effects of M&A Under Government Competition Should Be Further Studied with More Samples from Various Industries
8.3.2.3 In-Depth Explorations Should Be Conducted on the Impact of Local Government Competition on the Mechanism of Capital Flow and Economic Growth Effects
Bibliography
Bibliography