Malebranche: A Study of Cartesian Idealism 9023215885

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DAISIE RADNER Assis tent Professor of Philosophy State University of New York at Buffalo

MALEBRANCHE A Study of a Cartesian System

VAN GORCUM ASSEN/ AMSTERDAM THE NETHERLANDS 1978

©

1978 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., P.O.Box 43, 9400 AA Assen, The Netherlands

No parts of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without written permission from the publishers.

ISBN 90 232 1588 5

Printed in The Netherlands by Van Gorcum, Assen

To Michael

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface . Chapter I. The Cartesian Framework . A. Substance and Modification . B. Mind and Matter . C. Consequences of the Dualism .

lX

1 1 5

10

15 15 24

Chapter II. Causality: The Doctrine of Occasionalism . A. Arguments Against the Causal Efficacy of Created Things . B. The Causal Efficacy of God. C. The True and General Cause and Its Determination by Occasional Causes. D. Some Critics' Objections to Occasionalism .

28 35

Chapter III. Vision in God . A. Arguments Against the Causation of Ideas by God. B. Arguments Against Ideas as Modifications of the Mind . C. Arguments for Ideas in God.

47 47 50 52

Chapter IV. Four Ways of Knowing . A. Knowledge by Idea. B. Knowledge by Immediate and Direct View. C. Inner Feeling. D. Knowledge by Conjecture.

60 60 64 69 75

Chapter V. Intelligible Extension. A. A Problem of Interpretation . B. Seeing Bodies. C. The General Idea of Extensron and the Ideas of Particular Bodies

78 78 84 90

Chapter VI. The Polemic Concerning Ideas . A. The Idea-Mind Relation: Criticism of Presence to the Mind.

95 95 VII

B. The Idea-Object Relation: Criticism of Representation . C. Intelligible Extension and the Charge of Spinozism .

101 111

Chapter VII. Will and Method . A. The Problem of Freedom. B. Judgment and the Search after Truth. C. Love and the Pursuit of the Good . D. Freedom: A Partial Solution.

1 19 1 19 1 21 1 28 1 32

Select Bibliography .

1 34

Notes.

1 36

Index.

1 48

Vlll

PREFACE

The philosophical career of Nicolas Malebranche spanned more than forty years, from the first appearance of the Recherche de la verite in 1 674 to his death in 1 71 5. One expects development during so long a period, and development there was. This is not a developmental study. I approach Malebranche's work as a unified whole. That his work can be so treated is fundamental to my interpretation, especially in regard to the doctrine of intelligible extension. Quotations are for the most part from the latest editions of Malebranche's writings. When they are from earlier editions I indicate it either in the text or in the notes. References are to the Oeuvres completes de Malebranche (Paris: J. Vrin, 1 958-1 967), the title list of which is included in the bibliography. The transla­ tions are my own, except for the quotations from the Entretiens sur la metaphy­ sique et sur la religion, where I use Ginsberg's translation.

IX

CHAPTER I

THE CARTESIAN FRAMEWORK

There are a number of positions which a seventeenth century philosopher could take with respect to Descartes. He could become a disciple, as Antoine Arnauld did. He could reject the Cartesian system outright and build from a different foundation, as Thomas Hobbes did. He could try to handle the problems to which Descartes' philosophy gives rise by dropping one or more of the most basic tenets of Cartesianism, as Spinoza did. He could try to solve the problems by retaining all the fundamentals of the Cartesian philosophy but without following Descartes all the way. This is Malebranche's approach. In this chapter we put Malebranche in his Cartesian setting. A. Substance and Modification Malebranche's ontology is the Cartesian ontology of substance and modification. Everything, he says, is either a being or a mode of being, either a substance or a modification of substance 1 • A being or substance is "that which subsists by itself" 2. A mode of being or modification of substance is "only the being or substance itself in a certain manner" 3. The latter definition gives rise to seven principles: (1) A modification cannot subsist without some substance. (2) A modification can only be a modification of one substance. (3) One cannot conceive a modification without conceiving the substance of which it is the modification. (4) A modification cannot be where its substance is not. (5) A modification cannot pass from one substance to another. (6) Only that which gives being can give modes of being. (7) A modification cannot have more extent than its substance. An examination of these principles will shed light not only on the nature of a modification's dependence upon substance, but also on what it means for a substance to subsist by itself. 1. In the Meditations chretiennes et metaphysiques Malebranche says that "no mode of being can subsist without some substance, since a mode of being is only the being or substance itself in a certain manner" 4. Malebranche here echoes Descartes' principle of natural light "that no qualities or properties pertain to nothing; and that where some are perceived there must necessarily be some thing or substance on which they depend" 5. If a modification subsisted without any 1

substance, there would be a manner of being without anything being in that manner, or, in Descartes' terms, there would be a property which pertained to nothing. There is no substance in a certain manner if there is no substance. 2. Not only can a modification not subsist without some substance or other; it cannot subsist without that one substance whose modification it is. Since a modification of substance is the substance itself in such and such a manner, each modification can only be the modification of one substance. In his Reponse au Livre des vraies et des fausses idles Malebranche says that ''the modality of one substance cannot be the mode of being of any other substance" 6. For any two substances S 1 and S 2 , S 1 in a certain manner is not S 2 in a certain manner, and thus the modification which is S I in a certain manner is not the modification which is S 2 in a certain manner. Even if S I and S 2 are modified in identical ways, their modifications are still numerically distinct. When two people look at the same object, their minds may be modified with identical sensations of color, but the sensation of color which modifies one mind is not the sensation of color which modifies the other; for "I cannot be modified with the same modality which modifies one who looks at the same object as 1" 7. 3. Malebranche says in the Entretiens sur la mitaphysique et sur la religion that the only way we have of distinguishing between substances and modifications is "by the different ways in which we think of them" 8. Malebranche's method for determining whether an entity is a substance or a modification has roots in the Principles of Philosophy of Descartes. According to Descartes, we recognize the modal distinction between a modification and the substance to which it belongs nby the fact that we can clearly conceive substance without the mode which we say differs from it, while we cannot reciprocally have a perception of this mode without perceiving the substance" 9. According to Malebranche, the way to determine whether something is a substance or a modification is to consider whether it can be conceived by itself. "All that is," he says, ''can either be conceived by itself, or it cannot" I o_ Whatever can be conceived by itself is a substance, and whatever cannot be conceived bv itself is a modification of substance11 . What can or cannot be "conceived by itself' is a logical not a psychological matter. Malebranche writes: Since the modification of a subsunce is only the subsuncc itself determined in J pHticular way, it is evident that the idea of a modificuion necessaril\' invnlves the ide:1. of the subsunce of which it is a modification. Ag:1.in. since a suhsuncc is tlut which subsists b\' itself. the idea of a substance does nor necess::iril\' involve the idea of an\' other being 1 �.

The idea of X necessarily involves the idea of Y if the definition of X makes reference to Y. The idea- of X does not necessarily involve the idea of any other thing if there is no other thing Y such that X is defined in terms of Y. Roundness is defined in terms of extension. Extension is not defined in terms of anything else; it is simply "extension in length, breadth and depth'' 13. Thus roundness is a modification and extension is a substance. 2

What cannot be conceived apart from another thing cannot be conceived as existing apart from that thing. On the other hand, what can be conceived alone ca� be conceived qas existing independently of every other thing" 14. A modifi­ cation cannot be conceived as existing without one particular substance, but there is no modification without which a substance cannot be conceived as existing. The roundness of a body cannot be conceived as existing without that body, but a material object can be conceived as existing without the property of roundness. Can a substance be conceived as existing without any modifications at all? Malebranche seems to think that material substance, at least, can. 4. Since· a modification of substance is only the substance itself in a certain manner, "it is a contradiction that the modification of a substance exist where this substance is not" 15. The modification of a substance can only be where the substance itself is. Thus, for example, modifications of the mind such as pain or color must be where the mind is. Since the mind does not occupy a material place, pain and color are not to be found in any material place 16 . 5. When Henry More asked Descartes how motion, "which cannot exist outside of its subject, like all modes, nevertheless can pass into another subject," Descartes acknowledged that "a motion, being a mode of a body, cannot pass from one body to another" 17. Malebranche, too, subscribes to the principle that there can be no transference of modifications from one substance to another. Since a mode is only the substance itself in a certain manner, "it is a contradic­ tion that modes go from substance to substance" 18. Suppose that there are two substances, S 1 and S 2 , and that S 2 comes to have modification M just as S I ceases to have an identical modification. Since the modification which is S I in a certain manner is not the modification which is S 2 in a certain manner, it cannot be one and the same modification which formerly modified S I and now modifies S2 . Thus modification M cannot be said to have passed from S 1 to S2 . 6. In the Traite de morale Malebranche says: Only the one who gives being can give modes of being, since the modes of beings are onlv the beings themselves in such and such a manner 1 9 .

Malebranche accepts Descartes' principle that the conservation of a thing is only its continuous creation 2°. A thing is brought into being and kept in being by the same action on the part of the creator. If a substance exists in a certain manner, that which created the substance will have created it in that manner. So long as the substance is conserved in that manner, it cannot exist in a different manner. If it does come to exist in another manner, it must be created in that manner. Nothing can make a substance exist in a certain manner if its creator _does _not produce it in that manner. Since a modification is only the substance itself m a certain manner, nothing can produce a modification except the creator of the substance whose modification it is. The principle that only the one who gives being can give mod�s of being serves to rule out any distinction between modes and substances m terms of 3

causal dependence. In the Principles Descartes defines a substance as "a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist." He acknowledges that, strictly speaking, God is the only being who needs no other thing in order to exist, for "all other things can exist only by the help of the concourse of God"21. He distinguishes between uncreated substance, to which the above definition applies without qualification, and created substances or "things which need only the concourse of God in order to exist"22. Similarly, he says in a letter to Hyperaspites that even though created beings cannot exist without divine co-operation, they may still be called 'substances', for they can "exist without any other creature". He adds, "and this is something that cannot be said about the modes of things" 23• The reason why creatures do not really count as things which need nothing else in order to exist is that they are causally dependent upon God. This suggests that at least part of what Descartes means by the phrase 'to need no other thing in order to exist' is 'not to be caused by another thing'. Created substances are not causally dependent upon any other created thing. This, Descartes says, is not true of modes. Thus at least one of the senses in which his modes need another creature in order to exist is that they need another creature to cause them. Malebranche's modes do not need another creature in this sense. In the matter of causal dependence, modes are on a par with substances. Both depend upon God alone as their cause; neither is produced by another created thing. 7. In the Entretiens sur la mitaphysique et sur la religion Malebranche says that nothing that "surpasses" a substance can be a modification of it. For the modifications of any beings cannot extend beyond those beings. since the modifi­ cations of beings are only those very beings determined in such and such a way 24.

Again, in the Reponse a Regis, he says: For since the modification of a substance is onlr its m:rnner of being. it is evident that the modification cannot have more extent than the substance itself25.

One thing X has more extent than another thing Y if X is unlimited and Y is limited or, where both are limited, Y is limited more. A substance may be limited in the number of modifications it can have at one time; or, in the case of modifications that admit of more or less, it may be limited in the degree to which it is capable of possessing them. The modifications of a substance would have more extent than the substance if they were there in a greater number or in a greater degree than the substance's capacity allowed. Both possibilities are ruled out on the grounds that there is no manner of being if there is no capacity for being in that manner. Malebranche uses the principle that the modifications of a substance cannot have more extent than the substance to prove that nothing infinite can be a modification of a finite substance and in particular that an infinite idea cannot be 4

a modification of the human mind. As it turns out, an infinite idea is not a modification of anything. It is like a modification in that it belongs to a substance, namely God, but it is unlike a modification in that the fact of its belonging to a substance does not preclude anything else from belonging to that substance. Descartes says in the Principles that modes "diversify" substances 26. Malebranche concurs. A modification is a substance in this or that (rather than another) manner. A substance's being in a certain manner precludes it from being in some other manner. In being round, a body is precluded from being triangular or square. Descartes says that ''because in God any variableness is incomprehensible, we cannot ascribe to Him modes or qualities" 27. Malebranche again concurs. God does not have modes or modifications; he has "perfections". The latter are not mutually exclusive: A being that has one perfection is not thereby precluded from having any other perfection28. The dictum 'everything is either a being or a mode of being' only applies to the created realm. B. Mind and Matter Malebranche accepts from Descartes that there are two kinds of substances, mental substance and material substance, and that their essences are thought and extension respectively. What is an essence? Descartes says in the Principles that it is the "principal property of substance . . . on which all others depend"29. Malebranche gives a similar definition in the Recherche de la verite. The essence of a thing, he says, is ''what is recognized as first in this thing, what is inseparable from it, and on which depend all the properties that belong to it". The way to discover the essence of a thing is to consider, of all the properties that belong to it, which are inseparable from it, and of these, which does not suppose any other 30. Extension is inseparable from matter. Thought is inseparable from mind. All other properties of matter suppose extension. All other properties of mind suppose thought3 1. Descartes says in the Principles that when we consider thought and extension as constituting the essence of mind and matter, "they must not be considered otherwise than as the very substances that think and are extended, i.e. as mind and body" 3 2 . Malebranche takes this suggestion at face value33 . He says that extension is a substance, the same substance as matter34 . He speaks of "substantial thought" or "thought capable of all sorts of modifications or thoughts" 35. There is something peculiar about the last phrase, which points up an incongruity in the application of the term 'essence' to both thought and extension. Descartes tried to deny the incongruity36 . Malebranche tries to ignore it. Thought' is a generic term for at least some of the modes of thinking. Sensing, imagining and conceiving suppose thought in that they are species of thought. 'Extension' is not a generic term for any of the modes of extension. Figure, motion and rest suppose �xtension in that being extended is a necessary condition for being figured, in motion or at rest. It is true that whatever senses, imagines or conceives is thinking, just as whatever has figure, motion_ or rest_ is extended. But it would be patently absurd to suppose that thought might exist 5

apart from any and all thoughts or modes of thinking, whereas it would not be absurd to suppose extension existing without any modes of extension. According to the Cartesian view, whatever is extended is divisible into parts. Any part of an extended substance is itself an extended substance which is in turn divisible into further parts. Parts of matter stand in relations of distance to one another. Malebranche analyses the modifications of matter in terms of the relations of distance of the parts of matter. He distinguishes two faculties of matter, that of receiving different figures and the capacity to be moved 37 . He says that figure is a stable and permanent relation of distance and that motion is a successive and changing relation of distance 38 . Some further characterization is needed; for rest, like figure, is a stable relation of distance, but a body's state of rest is not the same as its figure. The key is in what the relation of distance is a relation of distance to. Figure is a relation of parts of a whole to other parts of the same whole. Motion, as well as rest, is a relation of one thing to others which are not parts of the same whole. The roundness of a body consists in the equality of distance of all parts of its surface to its center. The movement or rest of a body is a relation that the body has to others in its vicinity 39 . Malebranche says that matter is capable of having two sorts of figures. The first he calls 'figure' proper. This is the exterior shape of the body, like the roundness of a ball of wax or the rectangular shape of an iron ingot. The second he calls 'configuration'. This is the shape of the parts of which the body is composed40 . Malebranche agrees with Descartes that "all the variety in matter, or all the diversity of its forms, depends on motion" 41. Extension without motion, or without any change in the relation of distance of its parts, would be nothing but a formless mass of matter. Introduce motion into this mass, and you get bodies with their different figures and configurations. Motion serves to differentiate one portion of matter from others surrounding it. My head and my neck maintain a stable relation of distance to one another while the air around them constantly changes. Thus my head and neck belong to a single body. The body's figure is defined by the outer limit of the contiguous parts of matter that remain stable with respect to one another. Within my body. some parts move with respect to others. The parts that remain stable in relation to their surroundings are themselves bodies with figures of their own. Within every sensible body there are other bodies too small to be sensible. It is the configuration and arrangement of these insensible bodies which makes the larger body the kind of thing it is, for example wax, and which accounts for what are commonly called nessential differences" between bodies, for example, between wax and gold42. Malebranche is thoroughly Cartesian in his insistance that all phenomena in the material world be explained in terms of the figures, configurations, magni­ tudes and motions of the parts of matter. Like Descartes, he classifies biological phenomena as material and believes that the physiology and behavior of plants and animals is explicable solely in terms of the motions of their parts. Although animals engage in many of the same kinds of activities that in men are accom6

panied by thought, these activities in animals are completely mechanical4 3_ One kicks a dog. It cries out but not because it is in pain. It runs away but not because it seeks t� avoid harm. Th�se actions are due solely to the motions of the parts of the machine, and the motions are communicated strictly in accordance with the laws of motion. While Malebranche agrees with Descartes that all events in the physical world take place in accordance with the laws of motion, he does not believe that Descartes was entirely successful in discovering the laws of motion. As Male­ branche sees it, Descartes' laws of motion are mainly based upon two principles, one of which is false and the other of which is at best ambiguous44 . The first is that rest has force. Descartes says in the Principles that a body at rest has "some force to remain at rest and consequently to resist anything which might change it", just as a body in motion has "some force to continue moving with the same velocity and in the same direction" 45. Malebranche denies that there is a force of rest in bodies at rest comparable to the moving force of bodies in motion. According to him, when a moving body strikes a body at rest, the latter body offers no resistance at all. A moving body always imparts motion to a body at rest, regardless of the relative magnitudes of the two bodies. Thus Descartes' fourth and sixth laws of impact are incorrect46 . Malebranche argues that bodies at rest have no force on the grounds that there is no force where there is no change. The following passage is from the sixth book of the Recherche de la veriti. I consider only that bodies in morion have a moving force and that those at rest do not have a force of rest. For since the relations of moving bodies to those surrounding them constantly change, J continual force is needed to produce these continual changes .... But no force is needed to do nothing. When a body's relation to those surrounding it remains the same, nothing happens: and the conservation of this relation ... is not different from that which conserves the bodv i tself4 7•

Malebranche's treatment of force diverges from Descartes' at two points. For Descartes, force is resistance to change, and change is change of state, e.g. from motion to rest or from rest to motion. Thus he says that each body has a force to remain in its state whether it be at rest or in uniform motion, and to resist anything which would change it. For Malebranche, on the other hand, force is that which produces change, and change is change in the relation of distance. Thus he says that a body in motion is a body undergoing change, whereas a body at rest undergoes no change, and that a force is needed to produce a change, _ whereas no force is needed to produce no change. Malebranche seems to think that in showing that a body at rest needs no force to keep it at rest, he has shown that it has no force to resist motion48. His reasoning seems to be: Only a body undergoing change can resist change. A body at rest is not undergoing cha�ge (i.e., change in relation of distance); therefore it cannot resist change (1.e., change of state). 7

The second principle upon which Descartes based his la� s o� motion is the _ _ principle that God always conserves an equal quantity of monon m the univers_e. According to Malebranche, this principle is true in one sense a� d false m _ another. If it is taken to mean "that the absolute quantity of motion always remains the same", it is false. This is the sense in which Descartes understood it. Descartes calculated the quantity of motion on the basis of the mass (i. e., geometrical magnitude) of bodies and their velocity, without regard to the direction of the motion. Thus he believed that the soul could change the direction of the motion of the animal spirits without thereby making any change in the quantity of their motion. Malebranche insists that the quantity of motion be treated as a directional quantity. The principle that God always conserves an equal quantity of motion, he says, is true in the sense that the center of gravity of two or more bod ies which c ollide. in whatever manner, always moves with the same velocitv before and afte r the collision. So th at it is true that God alw�ys conserves an equal quantity - of motion in the same di rection or rn equal transport of matter4 9 ;

Descartes thought that the principle of the conservation of quantity of motion could be derived solely from God's immutable nature. Such a derivation is insufficient to establish whether it is the quantity of motion taken absolutely which is conserved, or only the quantity of motion in the same direction. Descartes believed that the conservation of the absolute quantity of motion bespeaks an immutable nature. But would not God be equally unchanging in his conduct if he always conserved an equal quantity of motion in the same direction? In order to settle the question of whether God conserves an equal quantity of motion taken absolutely or only an equal quantity of motion in the same direction, one must consult experience ; and experiments performed by "able and very exact persons" reveal that it is the quantity of motion in the same direction which is conserved 5 0 . If figure and motion are the only modifications of which m�terial substance is capable, what becomes of heat, color and similar qualities which are commonl y attributed to bodies? Malebranche credits Descarte-s with having discovered the true status of these qualities. If one considers heat and color simply as motions of the insensible parts of bodies, then one may say that heat and color belong to bodies. If, however, one considers heat or color as what is perceived in the presence of bodies whose insensible parts are disposed in a certain way, then heat and color do not belong to bodies; ''for the heat one feels and the color one sees are only in the soul" 5 1 . Malebranche agrees with Descartes that soul or mind is a substance. He agrees that all modifications not belonging to matter are to be assigned to soul and that the modifications not belonging to matter include any that cannot be measured or described mathematically 5 2 . There are a number of souls or mental substances, as there are a number of bodies or material substances, but souls are not parts of a single mental substance 8

as bodies are parts of a single material substance. Mental substance is by nature indivisible 53 . Mental substance is by nature aware of its modifications. Malebranche writes in the third book of the Recherche de la verite: For by these words ' thought', 'mode of thinking' , or ' modifi cation of rhe soul' I mean generally all things -.v hich c:rnnot be in the soul without its perceiving them . . . , such as are its own sensations, its imaginations, its pure intellections or simply its conceptions, its passions even, and its natural inclinations� 4 .

The definition comes from Descartes. Thought' is defined in the Principles as "all that of which we are conscious as operating in us" and in the Replies to the Second Objections as ''everything that exists in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it" 5 5 . Whenever a mind has a thought or a mode of thinking, it is always aware of that mode; it would not have it if it were not aware of it. There are no unfelt pains, no unconscious imaginings, no wishes of which the agent has no awareness. Is the mind a thinking substance because all its modes are modes of consciousness or because it is conscious of all its modes? Is the act by which the mind is conscious of a mode distinct from the act of consciousness which is the mode? The problems are there for Malebranche as they were for Descartes. Descartes divides the modes of thinking into perceptions, or those related to the operation of the understanding, and volitions, or those related to the operation of the will. The former include "sense-perception, imagining, and conceiving things that are purely intelligible". The latter include "desiring, · holding in aversion, affirming, denying, doubting" 5 6 . Malebranche adopts a similar classification. The mind, he says, has two faculties, understanding and will. Understanding is the faculty "of receiving various ideas, that is to say, of perceiving various things". Will is the facu1ty ''of receiving various inclinations or of willing different things" 5 7 . Like Descartes, he includes sensation, imagi­ nation and npure in tellection" (thinking without the aid of corporeal images in the brain) among the operations of the understanding and assigns judgment (acts of assertion and denial), along with desiring and holding in aversion, to the faculty of will. For Descartes, the will is dependent upon the understanding in that "we cannot will anything without understanding what we will"58. It is the same for Malebranche. The mind can only will what it perceives in some manner. One cannot have an inclination toward a thing without having some prior know­ ledge of it 59 . In the opening chapter of the Recherche Malebranche compares the mental faculties of understanding and, will with the material faculties of receiving figures and motions60 . He maintains that perceptions are to the mind as figures are to matter and that volitions are to the mind as motions to matter. The comparison breaks down at several points6 1 . It would perhaps have been better if 9

Malebranche had not attempted it. That he does attempt it should not, however, be taken as evidence that he seeks in any way to undermine the difference between mind and matter. The dualism remains as radical as ever. Mind and matter are still "completely different and entirely opposed: what appertains to the one cannot appertain to the other"6 2 . The essence of the mind is thought while that of matter is extension ; and, as Descartes says, '' there is nothing at all common to thought and extension"6 3 . C. Consequences of the Dualism The theory of the dualism of mind and matter has consequences. Some could reasonably be considered advantages, at least for a Cartesian in the seventeenth century. Others would more aptly be designated problems. The consequences which occupied Descartes were, not surprisingly, the advantageous ones - the provisions for a mathematical science of nature and for the religious doctrine of immortality. The problematic consequences he tried to downplay or ignore. Malebranche takes cognizance of both sets of consequences. It is his handling of the problematic ones that gives his philosophy its distinctive flavor. In his Defense contre M. de la Ville Malebranche says that the dualism of mind and matter ''is of all truths the most fruitful and the most necessary for philosophy, and perhaps even for theology and for Christian morality" 6 4 . The dualism is advantageous to theology, because it provides a theoretical basis for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Since the soul is a substance, it can exist apart from the body; for any substance can exist apart from any other substance. The body, being extended and hence divisible, is subject to corruption and dissolution, while the soul, being unextended and indivisible, is not. There are two possible ways of destroying a body: either by corruption, which is the rearrangement of its parts so that they no longer form the same whole, or by annihilation. There is only one possible way of destroying a soul, namely by annihilation. No substance is ever annihilated or brought to nothing by natural means. Only modes come into existence and perish in the ordinary course of nature. Thus the soul is naturally indestructible6 5 . It can still be annihilated, however, by God's ceasing to will that it exist. We cannot demonstrate that God does not annihilate souls when they leave the body. Thus we have no rigorous proof of the soul's immortality. The belief in immortality gains support from God's revealed promise of eternal life66. While the philosophical theory of dualism provides for the possibility of the soul ' s immortality, the doctrine of immortality remains a religious doctrine, upheld by faith. The dualism is advantageous to the scientific enterprise, because it presents the scientist with a physical world all the characteristics and laws of which can be formulated in mathematical terms. Gone are the substantial forms, real qualities and attractive forces of the Scholastics. The major source of such fancies, Malebranche says, is the belief that bodies have sensible qualities - heat, colors, tastes, sounds, smells6 7 . The Cartesian theory, in taking sensible qualities out of 10

the physical domain and leaving in matter nothing bu t what is mathematizable, bri ngs to scien tific explanation a standard of rigor not previously attainable. W hen the dualism of mind and matter is considered in the context of other Cartesian doctri nes, it gives rise to problems. Combined with a Cartesian analysis of what it is for one thing to act upon another, it gives rise to the problem of how minds and bodies can in teract. Combined with a Cartesian analysis of what it is for one thing to perceive another, it gives rise to the problem of how minds can perceive bodies. According to Descartes, anything which acts as a cause must contain in itself what it produces in another thing. Why ? Because otherwise there would be a violation of the common tru th that something cannot come from nothing. For, if we allow that there is something in the effect which did not exist in the cause, we must grant also that this something has been created from nothing . . . 6 8 .

Causation, for Descartes, is a matter of communication or impartment, and a thing cannot commun icate or impart to another what it does not possess in itself69 . Given Descartes' view of causality, i t seems to follow that the substance which acts and the substance acted upon must resemble one another, at least to the exten t of being able to possess the same sorts of modifications. Nevertheless, Descartes wishes to main tain that minds and bodies act upon one another. When the mind has a sensation, the body supposedly produces a modification in it. When the mind wishes to remember or to imagine something, or when it wishes the body to make some movement, it supposedly produces changes in the direction of the motion of the animal spirits. Faced with the question of how the mind and the body can produce such changes in one another if they are totally differen t in nature, Descartes answers that the mind and the body in teract by virtue of their unio n . I n what the union of mind and body consists, he says he cannot explain ; i t "can only be understood by itself' 7 0 . The notion of this union , he says, is something nwhich everyone has in himself withou t philosophizing" 7 1 . To Malebranche, this is an unsatisfactory solution to the problem of mind­ body i n teraction. nThis word ru nion '," he says, "is one of the most ambiguous of words" 7 2 . I ts meaning differs, depending on what things are said to be united. The u nion of mind and body is differen t from the union of two or more bodies, and both of these are different from the union between the knower and the known. The phrase runion of mind and body' can be given meaning, but no meaning can be given it which will serve to explain how the mind and the body can act upon one ano ther in line with Descartes' account of what it is for one thing to act upon another. The mind does not become capable of motions by virtue of being united to the 6ody. The body does not become capable of sen sations by virtue of being united to the mind7 3 . Even united, the mind and the body remain incapable of possessing the same sorts of modifications. Thus, even united, they fail to meet Descartes' own necessary condition for causal . . in teraction . 11

The Cartesian mind-body problem has been stated above as a problem of how the following three claims can be consistently maintained: (1 ) that mind and body are totally different in nature; (2) that mind and body interact ; and (3) that the cause must contain in itself what it produces in the effect and hence must bear some resemblance to it. This way of putting the problem suggests that had Descartes not been committed to the radical dualism of mind and matter, an interaction between these two substances would not have been problematic for him. Such is not the case, however. For when one considers the reason Descartes gives for why the cause must possess in itself what it produces in another thing, namely, because otherwise it could not communicate it to the other thing, then causal in reraction between any two substances becomes problematic. How can a substance impart something of itself to another thing, even to one capable of having the same sorts of modifications, if modifications cannot go from sub­ stance to substance? Malebranche treats the Cartesian mind-body problem as part of the wider problem of how any substance can act upon any other substance. Taking on the wider problem, he tries to come up with an analysis of causation that does away with any suggestion of modifications being passed from one substance to another. His aim is not to make it possible for substances to interact but to provide an account of the relation between them which is consistent with the Cartesian ontology. Besides causality, the other main problem area for Cartesianism is the theory of ideas. Two principles are fundamental to Cartesian epistemology. The first is that whenever the mind perceives or knows anything, it is always directly acquainted with something. The second is that ideas, which are non-material, rep resent material objects. The relation of representation is a relation of making known. Material objects are made known to the mind by ideas. The second principle gives rise to two problems. First, how does an idea represent a material object? Descartes speaks of ideas as being "like [pictures or] images" of their objects 74 . The suggestion is that ideas represent their objects by resembling them in some way. But what resemblance can there be between a non-material idea and a material object? If the representation relation is not a relation of resemblance or similarity, then what is it? The second problem has to do with the manner of determining the accuracy with which ideas represent material objects. According to Descartes, not all ideas represent material objects as they really are. Those ideas that are clear and distinct give accurate represen rations of their objects, while those that are obscure and confused do not. The way to determine whether an idea represents its object as it really is, or in other wo�ds, whether an idea is true, is to determine whether the idea is clear and distinct. The statement �all clear and distinct ideas are true ideas' is not self-evident. The demon problem shows this. Having inserted a sceptical wedge between the clearness and distinctness of ideas and their truth, Descartes is obliged to appeal to God's veracity to bridge the gap. It was objected that there is a circularity in his reasoning. In order to establish that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true, he needs to 12

establ � sh th � t God is no deceiver; bu t that God is no deceiver can only be established 1f one assu mes that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is t �ue75 . � h � t � s i �portan t for the present discussion is not whether the charge of circulanty 1s J u stified bu t that Malebranche seems to think that there is some­ thing to it 7 6 . Malebranche's in terpretation of the first principle influences his approach to the problems generated by the second. He starts with the common notion that every act of perception has an object, or that to perceive is to perceive something. In his words, "nothing is not visible", ' ' to see nothing is not to see", '� to think of nothing is not to think", " to perceive nothing and not to perceive are the same thing" 7 7 . He takes this common notion to imply that whenever the mind perceives, there is some actually existing object which it perceives directly. He says, "Thus all that the mind perceives immediately and directly is something or exists"78 . Why the qualification 'immediately and directly ' ? One can perceive bodies which do not exist. This often happens, he says, during sleep and high fever. When I see a body which is not really there, something must exist as the object of my perception , for otherwise I would see nothing, which is to say, I would not see. There must, then, be something else which I perceive when I say I perceive the body79 . A distinction has to be made between the sense of 'perceive' in 'what one perceives must exist' and the sense of 'perceive' in 'one perceives a pink elephant'. The former Malebranche calls 'perceiving immedia­ tely and directly' or 'perceiving things by themselves'. Malebranche claims not only that we fail to have direct perceptions of non-existen t bodies, bu t that we fail to have any direct perceptions qf bodies at all. H is argu men t for the latter claim may be summarized as follows. In order for the mind to be able to have a direct perception of an object external to it, that thing must be present to or united with the mind. Bodies are not present to the mind in the requisite man ner. Therefore they are not directly perceived by the mind. At the begin ning of the second part of the third book of the Recherche, he gives the impression that the kind of presence required for direct perception is local presen ce. I believe eve rrnnc agrees tlut we do not perceive the objects outside us by themselves. We see the sun, the st:irs, and an infinitv of objects outside us ; and it is not likely that the soul leaves the bors, we see that our mind must exist since it is an object of our immediate and direct awareness. "I conclude that I am," Malebranche says, "because I feel myself and because nothing cannot be felt" 4 9 . I necessarily exist given that I think at all, just as God necessarily exists given that I think of him. But God's existence is necessary per se, and mine is not. I do not, like God, exist by my very nature. An object exists by its very nature only when there cannot be an idea of the object without the object existing, either because the idea and the object are one and the same or else because the idea is such that the existence of its object is deducible from it. There cannot be a direct perception of the mind without the mind existing, but there can be an idea of it without it existing. Our mind is not, like God, perceivable only in itself. It can be seen by an idea which is distinct from it and which does not necessarily involve its existence, even though it does not see itself in this manner. Malebranche says that inner feeling never deceives us 50 . Whatever we know by consciousness or inner feeling we may be sure, not simply that it exists, but that 70

it exists exactly as we feel it. Descartes remarks in the Second Meditation that even though �e may be dreaming when he sees light, hears noise or feels heat, ''still it is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that I feel heat" 5 1 . Malebranche follows Descartes in accepting consciousness as an infallible guide to what goes on in the mind. In the first book of the Recherche, for example, he writes that when we see light "we are not deceived in believing that we see it ; it is not possible to doubt it" 5 2 . Even if we are dreaming, it would still be true that we see it. Visionaries are not mistaken in believing that they see what they see. Madmen really do feel like what they think they feel. Their error comes not in identifying their sentiments but in judging that things without are like what they see or feel within 53 . At this point the following objection may arise. Granted that the error of the visionary or the madman does not consist in an incorrect identification of his modes of thought, surely an incorrect identification is possible. For example, I may think that I am conceiving of a triangle when in fact I am only imagining one. I may think that I feel contempt when what I really feel is fear. So it is not at all certain that my modes of thought really are as they seem to me to be. To this objection Malebranche has a ready reply. When I imagine a triangle, I am aware of my imagining, even though I may not know that 'imagine' is the correct word to designate what I feel. I may think that the word 'conceive' applies instead. In that case I err, and my error may be described as· an incorrect identification of my mode of thinking. Yet my mode of thinking is nonetheless exactly as I feel it to be. My error comes not from accepting the testimony of my inner feeling, but from not knowing what it is to imagine or how imagining differs from conceiving. Malebranche does not deny that we can be mistaken in believing that our act of thinking is an instance of conceiving rather than of imagining. On the contrary, he makes every allowance for the possibility of such an error by his insistence that we do not h�ve access to ideas of our modes of thought. Descartes distinguishes between the question of whether the mind exists and that of what constitutes the nature of the mind. All that I need in order to be certain of my own existence is an awareness of my own thinking, for natural light teaches that thought is an attribute and that every attribute must belong to a substance. In order to establish that thought constitutes my nature or essence, I must know for certain that I am no more than a thinking being; I must know for certain that I am not something corporeal. The cogito does not by itself prove that the nature of the self consists solely in thinking. Nevertheless it does afford us some knowledge of the nature of the self. In the Replies to the Second Objections Descartes observes that in being acquainted with a thing we never know for certain that there is nothing in it of which we are not aware. To see a thing is not neccessarily to see all of it. But the more we see in it, the better we say we know it 5 4 . Thus he maintains in the Second Meditation that we know the mind better than matter, since we cannot perceive any body without being all the more conscious of our own mind. Everything that contributes to our knowledge of 71

the nature of bodies, and even more besides, contributes to the elucidation of the nature of the mind 5 5 . Malebranche follows Descartes in distinguishing the question of the existence of the mind from that of its nature. He, too, believes that we can be certain of the existence of a thinking being without knowing whether or not thought alone constitutes its nature. He agrees with Descartes that we know something of the nature of the mind by virtue of our acquaintance with it. When I see a color or conceive of a triangle, my inner feeling tells me not only that I exist, but also that I am a sensing or conceiving being. Malebranche denies, however, that we know the nature of the mind better than that of matter. We know the nature of matter so well that we can discover all the properties of which it is capable. For any given property, we can easily determine whether or not it appertains to extension. We do not know the nature of the mind nearly so well. Though we may be certain that our mind really is what we feel it to be, we only feel it insofar as it is modified in various ways 56 . Inner feeling cannot reveal what modifi­ cations our mind is capable of having unless it has actually had them. One who has never felt pain or seen a· color cannot discover by introspection whether he is or is not capable of being so modified 5 7 • Malebranche grants Descartes mat m perceiving bodies we are conscious of our own mind. But he insists that the only point on which our perception of a body contributes more to our knowledge of the mind than to our knowledge of matter is with respect to the question of existence. Descartes was right in this. If I believe that the wax exists because I see it or touch it, I have even more reason to be persuaded, by the same fact, that I myself exist. Bodies need not exist in order to be perceived, but the mind must exist in order to be felt as perceiving them. Descartes went wrong when he went on to maintain that because we are aware of the mind whenever we perceive anything else, we know its nature or essence better than that of anything else. In order to know the nature of one substance better than that of another, it is not enough to observe more P!operties in it than in the other. Malebranche makes this point in the Eleventh Eclaircissement. When I perceive that 2 X 2 = 4, he says, I am conscious that I perceive it, but I do not know my perception of it as well as I know that 2 X 2 = 4. I know numbers and their relations by idea, but I know my perceptions of them only by consciousness or inner feeling. I can count three properties in my mind, that of perceiving that 2 X 2 = 4, that of perceiving that 3 X 3 = 9, and that of perceiving that 4 X 4 = 1 6. But one can count things without knowing their nature clearly. "In order to count them", Malebranche says, "it is sufficient to feel them" 58. Were the nature of the mind known even as well as that of matter, we should be able to define and compare the modifications of the mind as well as we can define and compare figures and numbers. We should be able to give as precise an explanation of the meaning of the words 'heat ' and 'pain' as we can give of 'triangle'. We should be able to discover the relation between pleasure and pain or between red and green as clearly as we can apprehend that between a circle and 72

an ellipse. We should be able to indicate the proportion by which one color is brighter than another, or one pain more intense than another, with as much exactness as we can state the proportion by which one figure is larger than another, or one motion faster than another. Such, however, is not the case. Aside from saying that pain is what one feels when one burns oneself, we cannot communicate to another person what pain is 59 . We cannot define 'heat' and 'cold' as sensible qualities60 . We cannot clearly discern what the relation is between pleasure and pain, heat and color, red and green, nor even between green and green. We feel that one color is brighter than another, but we do not know clearly how much brighter it is, nor even what it is to be brighter6 1 . One does speak of relations between sounds, of an octave being double or a fifth as three to two. But the relations are observed, not between the sounds as sensible qualities or modifications of the soul, but only between the vibrations of strings or disturbances of air6 2 . Malebranche traces Descartes' erroneous doctrine that the nature of the mind is known better than of that of matter to the thesis that we have a clear and distinct idea of mental substance. It was noted above that what Descartes means by the phrase 'clear and distinct' is not what Malebranche means by it. A clear and distinct idea or perception, for Descartes, need not be capable of making known all the properties of its object. But it must be sufficient to enable us to distinguish its object from all others6 3 . Malebranche denies that we have a clear and distinct idea of the mind on Descartes' own terms. In the Reponse a Regis he says that the inner feeling that the mind has of itself does not reveal to it that it is not extended, even less that color, that the whiteness it sees on this paper, for example, is real ly o n ly a modification of its ow n substance 64 .

Descartes was right in his belief that in being conscious of our mind we are not conscious of anything other than thought, but not in his belief that we apprehend that nothing other than thought pertains to it. We learn that the mind is a being totally distinct from matter, not by contemplating the mind and discovering that there is nothing in it that pertains to extension, but rather by contemplating the idea of extension and discovering that there is nothing in it that pertains to thought. Likewise, we learn that sensible qualities are modifi­ cations of the mind, not by examining the mental realm, but by consulting the idea of extension and reasoning as follows. Pain, heat and color cannot belong to extension, for extension is capable only of figures and motions. There are just two kinds of created substance, matter and mind. Therefore pain, heat, color and all other sensible qualities belong to the mind6 5 . When mental substanc� is considered directly, it is difficult, even for those who accept the fact that sensible qualities must belong to it, to see how colors and odors can be said to be _modes of thought or modifications ..of the soul. Malebranche comments m the Eclaircissements : One even makes oneself ridiculous among some Cartesi;rns if one says char the soul becomes actually blue. red , yel low . and that it is rin ced \v i rh the colors of the rainbow when it gazes

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upon it. There are many persons who doubt and even more who do not believe that when one smells a carrion the soul becomes fo rmally rancid, and that the flavor of sugar. pepper or salt is something that belongs to i t . Where, then, is the clear idea of the soul, that the Cartesians might consult it and that they might all agree on the matter of where colors, flavors and odors are to be found 66 ?

When we know a thing by its idea, if we do not actually discover all the properties it can have, it is not because the the idea is not capable of revealing them, but only because we do not pay it sufficient attention. In the case of the mind, however, our failure to discover all there is to know about its nature and properties is not due to any lack of attention on our part but to our lack of a clear idea of the mind. God knows, by the idea of the mind that is in his reason, in what the faculties or capacities of the mind consist. He knows what properties can and cannot belong to it. He knows how it must be modified to see white or to feel pain6 7 . But he does not disclose the idea of the mind to us so that we, too, may learn these things. We do not need a science of the mind comparable to geometry or mechanics in order to discover those attributes of the mind that it is important for us to know about, such as its immateriality, its immortality and its liberty68 . What we know of the mind by inner feeling together with what we know of matter by idea is enough to convince us of our immateriality and immortality. Inner feeling alone is enough to convince us of our liberty. We do not need the idea of mental substance to keep from being misled by what our inner feeling tells us about our mind, as we need the idea of extension to keep from being misled by the sentiments we have of bodies. When I see a green square, I am not mistaken in believing that what I feel to take place in me, viz. the act of sensing, really does take place in me. But I am mistaken in believing that what I see as belonging to the square, viz. the green, really does belong to it. It is only by consulting the idea of extension that I learn that a sensible quality cannot belong to a body. God would be a deceiver if he did not give me access to the idea of extension, but he is no deceiver if he does not give me access to the idea of my mind. God may be no less veracious in failing to show us the idea of mental substance, but it seems that he is less of a ('light to the mind". Surely he would enlighten us more by giving us access to the ideas of both mind and matter than by giving us access only to the latter. Malebranche does not refrain from speculation as to why God should see fit to keep the idea of mental substance from us. He says in the Recherche that if we had as clear an idea of our mind as we have of bodies, it would be difficult for us to understand or to accept the union of our mind and our body69 . In the Meditations chretiennes he adds that if we had a clear idea of our mind, we would be so taken with its richness and beauty, and we would become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of it, that we would neglect our duties. If geometers and physicists sacrifice all other pleasures to contemplate the idea of extension, how much more fascination the idea of one's own mind must hold 7 0 ! 74

D. Knowledge by Conjecture I f the only way of knowing the realm of the men tal were by consciou sness or inner feeli ng then no one could have any knowledge of minds or mental states other than his own . To know a mental state by inner feeling, one must have it. O ne could be said to have consciousness or inner feeling of another person's pain only if one actually felt his pain. It would not be enough to feel a pain like his. Suppose I am inflicted with the same sort of blow that gave rise to his pain. The pain I feel would still be my own and not his. In order to feel his pain, I would have to be modified by the nu merically same sen timen t which modifies him. O ne substance, viz. my mind, would have to take on the modification of another substance, viz. his mind. But this is impossible in a system in which a modifi­ cation can only be a modification of one substance. What goes on in other minds cannot, then, be known in the same way as what goes on in one's own mind. What Malebranche says about knowledge of one's own mind by idea also applies to knowledge of other minds. Other minds are knowable by idea, just as one's own mind is knowable by idea. This is how God knows them. But he does not reveal to us the ideas by which he knows them. He does not give us access to any ideas of minds or modes of thought. The same imperfection in our knowl­ edge of our own nature is to be met with in our knowledge of other minds. All that we fail to discover about ourselves for lack of a clear idea we also, for the same reason, fail to discover abou t them. Things external to the mind can be known directly and without the mediation of ideas provided that they are i n ti mately united to the mind. Can there be a u nion of minds such that one mind can im mediately and directly see what is going on in another? In the first three editions of the Recherche Malebranche does not rule out this possibility. Though he acknowledges that we do not in fact have knowledge of other minds in this manner, he suggests that this is the case only for man in his presen t state. B u t when.. . we are delivered from the captivity of our body, we shal l perhaps be able to make ourselves u nderstood to one another by our intimate union, in the same way as there is some appearance that the angels in heaven can do 7 1 .

He remarks that this sort of knowledge of other minds would be "very imper­ fect". The imperfection would be parallel to that in the case of inner feeling. If I knew other minds by immediate and direct view, I could be as certain of their existence as I am of my own, since all that I perceive directly necessarily ex ists; bu t I could discover no more about their nature than I can discover by inner feeling abou t my own . There is a problem here. The minds o f men and o f angels are all creat� d substances, and created substances cannot act upon or produce changes rn anything. In the discu ssion of knowledge by im mediate and direct view, it was said that the only things not in ourselves which can be objects of our im mediate acquain tance are things which are in telligible by themselves, that is to say, thin� s 75

which are capable of acting upon and thereby revealing themselves to our mind. Thus it would seem that other minds cannot be known by immediate and direct view since they are not intelligible by themselves. An addition to the fourth edition of the Recherche (1 678) shows that Malebranche was aware of this difficulty. For he in effect takes back his earlier suggestion that it is possible for one mind to have direct knowledge of what goes on in another. I do not examine here how two minds can unite with one another. and whether they can in this manner mutually reveal their thoughts to one another. I believe, however, that there is no purely intelligible substance except that of God, . . . and that the union of minds cannot render them mutually visible. For although we are very united with ourselves. we are and shall be unintelligible to ourselves until we see ourselves in God . . . . Thus. although it seems that I concede here that angels can, by themselves, manifest to one another both what they are and what they think, which in reality I do not believe true, I give notice that it is onl�· because I do not wish to dispute it, provided that one grants me what is indispu table. namely, that one cannot see material things by themselves and without ideas� " .

We are unintelligible to ourselves in that we cannot discover our own nature clearly. We are also unintelligible by ourselves in that we cannot make ourselves known, either to our own mind or to any other. No mind can communicate with another in such a way that the other sees directly what it is or what it is thinking. For in order to do so, it would have to be united to the other mind in a way that enabled it to produce perceptions of itself in the other mind. But no created substance can enter into this kind of union with another created substance. Only God is capable of such a union with a mind. We cannot, then, know other minds directly, either by inner feeling or by immediate and direct view, and we do not know them by idea. There is need of another way of knowing. Malebranche says that we know by conjecture nwhen we think that certain things are similar to others that we know''73 . Knowledge by conjecture includes analogical reasoning from an observed similarity between one's own bodily states and another's, or between one's own utterances and another's, to a corresponding similarity between the mental states one observes in oneself and the mental states of another, which one does not observe. Knowledge of other minds based on this sort of analogy is extremely liable to error. I cannot be at all certain that others feel pain like I feel or that they see colors as I see them74 • Knowledge of other minds by conjecture includes not just analogical reason­ ing from similar bodily states to similar mental states but also reasoning from God's nature to the sorts of minds he will create. In my own case I see that twice two are four and that it is better to be just than to be rich. I tend to love what appears good to me and to hate what appears evil to me. Furthermore, I know that God would never create a mind which did not perceive ideas in him or which did not have a natural inclination toward him. Not being immediately aware of other minds, I cannot be as sure of their existence as I am of my own. But given what I know of the divine nature, I can be quite certain that if there 76

are other minds, they will see the same ideas and truths that I see and will have the same natural inclinations that I have 7 5 . Suppose I hear a voice say, "Twice two are four". Analogical reasoning alone may lead me to judge that there is an intelligence behind these words. But if I am convinced that this alleged intel­ ligence sees the same truth I see when I utter these words, my certainty owes more to the fact that God's mathematical ideas are accessible to all minds alike than it owes to the mere utterance of the words. Were it not for the vision in God, I could no more be sure that another sees the same truth as I when he says ''Twice two are four" than I can be sure that he feels the same sensation as I when he says "I am in pain".

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C H A PTER V

INTELLIGIBLE EXTENSION

A. A Problem of Interpretation Behind the theory of ideas presented in the Recherche is the supposition that there are particular ideas representative of particular objects. In calling for a distinction between the idea and the material object, Malebranche speaks of the things we see when we look into the heavens as being a sun and stars which, unlike the material sun and stars, are '·'immediately united to the soul" 1 • The suggestion is that the ideal world is populated with particular representations corresponding to individual bodies in the material world. Elsewhere in the Recherche, he says that when we think of something which does not exist, such as a golden mountain, an entity called "the idea of this mountain" is present to our mind 2 . The suggestion is that the ideal world also contains representations of particular objects which God could have created but in fact did not. The supposition of a multitude of particular ideas figures prominently in the arguments leading to the vision in God. In the course of his refutation of the hypothesis that ideas are created in us, he says that because there is an infinitely infinite number of figures, "the mind must have an infinity of infinite numbers of ideas in order to know figures alone" 3 . The suggestion is that a different idea is needed for each determinate figure. Again, arguing against the hypothesis that ideas are modifications of the mind, he gives as examples of the ideas whose status is at issue "the ideas of the sun, of a house, a horse, a river, etc. " 4 Finally, arguing for the hypothesis that ideas are in God, he refers to ''all the ideas of particular beings" 5 and "all the particular ideas we have of creatures" 6 and considers it part of his task to put these ideas, along with infinite and general ideas, in the divine reason. In the Tenth Eclaircissement, however, Malebranche denies that there are particular ideas in God, each corresponding to a particular being he has created or can create and serving to represent that being to us. It m u st not be i magi ned that the i nt e l l igi ble world bea rs such a relation to the m a terial and sensible world that there is, fo r example, an intell igible su n . horse. t ree desti ned to represe n t t o us t h e su n . a h orse a n d a tree. and t h a t a l l w ho see t he s u n neccssari lr see this su pposed in telligible su n 7 .

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The teaching of the Tenth Edaircissement is that instead of a separate representation for each corporeal object, God contains in himself a single idea of extension which suffices to make known all possible bodies and all possible modifications of bodies.Malebranche calls this idea intelligible extension- extension, because it is an entity enough like created matter to represent it, and intelligible, because it is capable of revealing itself to the mind. Particular bodies such as the sun, a horse and a tree are represented by various portions of this intelligible extension. No portion is of itself more suited than any other to represent a given body. On the contrary, any portion can represent any body. Since the parts of intelligible extension are all of the same nature, they can all represent any bodv whatever8 .

A portion of intelligible extension serves to represent one body or another to me insofar as my mind is affected with one set of perceptions or another. Since all intelligible extension can be conceived as circular, or as having the intelligible figure of a horse or a tree, all in telligible extension can serve to represent the sun, a horse. a tree, and consequently to be the sun, horse, tree of the intelligible world, and even to become a visible and sensible sun, horse, tree, if the soul has some sentiment on the occasion of bodies to attach to these ideas, that is to say , if these ideas affect the soul wi th sensible perceptions9 .

The vision in God, by which we have knowledge of corporeal objects, is really a vision of intelligible extension. But I say that we see all things in God by the efficacy of his substance, and sensible obj ects in particular, by the application God makes of intelligible extension to our mind in a thousand different ways .. . 1 0•

Moreover, this view is no different from that expressed in the Recherche. Thus, when I said that we see different bodies by the view we have of the perfections of God which represent them. I did not exactly mean tl�at there were in God certain particular ideas represen tative of each body in parti cular and that we saw such an idea when we see such a body .... I spoke in another manner : but one should judge that this was only to render some of my proofs stronger and more sensible, and one should not judge from the things I have just said that these proofs no longer stand 1 1 .

Arnauld, in Des vraies et des fausses idies, calls into question Male�ranche's claim that the theory of intelligible extension presented in the Tenth Edaircissement is merely an elaboration or elucida-tion of the doctrine of the Recherche. Arnauld sees Malebranche as having proposed two entirely different manners of seeing things in God, the first being n that God reveals to us each of his ideas" 1 2 and the second being "to see them in an infinite intelligible extension that God contains" 1 3 •

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I_?espite his protestations to the contrary, Malebranche's denial in the Tenth Eclaircissement that there are "particular ideas in God representative of each body in particular" constitutes a retraction of his earlier view. Arnauld also contends that, insofar as the theory of intelligible extension has to do with God's own knowledge of his creatures, it is contrary to the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, both of whom expressly maintain that God has a particular idea of each thing he has created 1 4 . In his reply to Arnauld, Malebranche distinguishes between the question of whether we see things in God and that of the manner in which we see things in God, and insists that his concern in the Recherche was with the former question rather than the latter. All he shows in the Recherche is that we see things in God by that in him which represents them. What he shows in the Tenth Eclaircisse­ ment is that that in God which represents bodies is intelligible extension or the idea of extei:sion and not a plurality of particular ideas, one for each body. Thus the Tenth Eclaircissement "was never a retraction, but rather an explanation" of the doctrine of the Recherche 1 5 . Its purpose is to correct a misunderstanding on the part of a number of readers of the earlier work. Nevertheless, having discovered th rough the communication I have had with several persons that there were some who imagined that there was in God , fo r example, an intelligible sun to represent to us the material sun, I believed that I shnuld explain my thought in more detail, making it understood that by these general words 'whJt there is in God that represents bodies' I meant the intelligible extension on which God hJs formed them : which extension i s determined to represent a sun, J horse, a tree as existing only by the sentiment of color or light that is attached to it in consequence of the laws of the union of soul and body . . . 1 6 .

As for Arnauld's contention that it is contrary to the teaching of Augustine and Aquinas to deny that God has ideas of the sun, a horse and a tree, according to which he has created these things and by which he knows them, Malebranche answers that he has never doubted that, so far as God is concerned, the intelligible world has such a relation to the material world that there is an intelligible sun, horse and tree representative of a material sun, horse and tree 1 7 . What he denies is only "that God reveals his works to us by each of his ideas" 1 8 • In his Defense contre la Reponse aux V F I Arnauld expresses puzzlement at Malebranche's reply to his charges. How can he acknowledge that God has in himself ideas of all his creatures, and at the same time deny that to see things by that in God which represents them would be to see them bv each of God's ideas of them? For to establish as a principle th