Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970 0262622114, 9780262622110

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Making

Silicon Valley

Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970

Christophe Lecuyer

/

Soston Pubilc

Making Silicon

Valley

Inside Technology

edited by Wiel:)e E. Bijker,

A

list

of the series will

VV.

Bernard

(.arlson,

be found on page 385.

and Trevor

Pincli

Making Silicon

Valley

Innovation and the Groxuth of High Tech, 1930-1970

Christoplie Lecuyer

The MIT

Press

(>anil:)ri(lge,

Massacliuselts

London, England

First

MIT

© 2006

Press paperback edition, 2007

Massachusetts Institute of Technolo^'

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The MIT

Press. Printed

and hound

in the

United States of

America. 4

Lihrar\’ of

Uongress (kitaloging-in-Publication Data

Tecuyer, (4u istophe.

Making

Silicon \'alley

:

inno\ation and the growth of high tech, 1930-1970 /

Uhristophe Lecuyer. p.

cm.

— (Inside technolog\

)

Includes hihliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-262-12281-8 (he.

lSBN-10: 0-262-12281-2 (he.

:

;

paper)—978-0-262-6221 1-0 (ph. alk. paper) paper)— 0-262-6221 1-4 (ph. alk. paper)

alk.

alk.

:

:

— Ualifornia— Santa Cdara Valley (Santa (4ara Microelectronics (k)untv) — Histon — 20th century. — Ualifornia Santa (4ara Valley (Santa Ulara (x)untv) — — 20th centun-. — Santa Clara Valley (Santa Clara Counu Entrejjreneurship — Military-industrial complex — California — Historv— 20th century. Santa Clara Valley (Santa Clara C>ounty, — Historv— 20th centui). I.

High technologN' industries

industr\'

2.

Histoi)'

Cktlifornia

3.

).

4.

5.

Ckilif.)

II.

I.

Title.

Series.

HC107.C22S395 2006 338.476’0979473— dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3

2005047877

lo the nieiiiorv of Elisabetli

Henry

Digitized by the Internet Archive in

2017 with funding from

Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/makingsiliconvalOOchri

Contents

.A ch n oiuled^meti Is

Inti'oduction

ix

1

1 13

Defiant West

2 53

Diversification

3 Military Cooperative

91

4 Rei’olution in Silicon

129

5 Opening Up

New Markets

6 Miniaturization

211

7 Valley of Silicon

Conclusion

295

253

169

i>iii

Notes

(U)ut(’uts

305

Bibliography Series List

Index

387

367 385

Acknowledgments

book would not have been possil)le without the su[)port of Timothy Lenoir and the Department of History at Stanford University; Jed Bnchwald, Evelyn Simha, and the Dibner Institute for the History of Seience and Technologv at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Michael (iorman and the Department of Science, Technolog)’, and Society at the Uniyersity of X'^irginia. Robert McGinn and Merritt Roe

Tliis

Smith provided material support

at critical junctures.

I

yvould also like to

thank the (diaries Babbage Institute and the IEEE History Center for financial assistance. I

oyve a

deep debt of gratitude

to

Barton Bernstein for his steady sup-

and yvise counsel. yvould also like to extend a special yvord of thanks to \\’. Bernard (>arlson for his great help in shaping my preliminary manuscrijit into a book and for the many stimulating conversations we had on

jiort

I

the history of Silicon

standing

of

X'alley.

Sheila

Hochman

shared

yvith

me

her under-

high-tech firms. This book yvould not have been completed

and her generous help. am also deejily grateful for Judith Zakaria’s encouragement and sujiport over the course of this project. Finally, Sara Meirowitz of Tlie MIT Press graciously shepherded a manuscript that she inherited from another editor. This book has also greatly benefited from discussions yvith Amir Alexander, Babak Ashrafi, Antonio Barrera, Ross Bassett, Patsy Baudoin, yvithout her friendship

I

Leslie Berlin, David Brock, Jack Broyvn, Jane (Arison, Cathryn (kirson,

LariT (k)hen, Paul David, Margaret Graham, William Hausman, fhoinas

Hugh es, Bryan

Martin Kenne)

Pfaffenberger,

Massimo Mazzotti, Philippe Reymond, Michael

Krige, Stuart Leslie,

L.aurent

Pierrot,

Riordan, Nathan Rosenberg, Henry Royveu, Phillip Thurtle,

Scranton, Petei remin,

Takahiro Ueyama, Steven Ussehnan, Peter W’estwick,

Jameson Wetmore, and I'homas Zakai the insightful

Philij3

comments

I

ia.

I

yvould also like to acknoyvledge

received from the audience

at talks at

the

.Y

\ rl
(lu( lion

roots in the Peninsula’s vihranl electronics hobbyist eominiinity establisbecl

firms specialized in the manufacture of power-gi id tubes.

technical

communitv made up

who had been

at

of

the forefront of

during World War

Another

inicrowave engineers and physicists,

component

technolog)' on the East

formed the microwave tube industry on the Peninsula in the j)ostwar period. Similarly, scientists and technologists skilled in the design and processing of silicon components started a large number of semiconductor firms on the Peninsula in the second half Of the 195()s and in the 19b()s. ('oast

II,

Although these groups were industries, their

enabled them

late entrants in the electronic

component

growing manufacturing and managerial capabilities

to gain a significant competitive

advantage over their East

Coast competitors. Because of their technological and social innovations, firms

on the militarv’s growing high-performance electronic components during

on the Peninsula were able

demand for reliable World War II and the Ciold War.

to capitalize

Sexeral major electronics inno\’ations were

demands

stimulated by the perceived difficulty of meeting the military’s for reliability, by the

demands of creating

a

broad consumer base, and by

the challenges of commercial production. Thus,

Defense ctU back

curement

its

when

component expenditures and

the Department of

radically revised

policies in the early 196()s, the rapid adaj^tation of a

its

pro-

wave of

innovations allowed local corpc^rations to redirect their technologies and organizations to commercial markets. As a result, they penetrated a wide

range of industrial sectors, transforming the San Francisco Peninsula into a

major manufacturing center. Thus, the

industrial

rise

of Silicon Valley

is

not a simple story about the military-

complex. During World War

and

II

for

much

of the

I95()s,

the

vacuum tubes and semiconductors made on the San Francisco Peninsula. The militarv senices supported the development of microwave tubes and financed the construction of new factories. Because of its strict quality standards, militaiT was the largest

and often the

sole

customer

of the

the Department of Defense also acted as a catalyst for innovation. But the militaiT was also a tough customer.

control

its

The Dej^artment

suppliers’ manufacturing lines

tual propertv.

It

and gain

of

And

the

to

rights to their intellec-

also got access to their accounting

reduce their bargaining powers.

Defense sought

books

in

volume requirements

order

to

of the mil-

change dramatically from one year to the next. .Many firms found it so risky to work for the Department of Defense that the)' sought to reduce their de])endence on it, and in the 196()s and the early I97()s itaiT cf)uld

thev

moved

into

commercial markets.

In short, the militaiT sustained the

hilrodurtiou

(S’

formation and growth of’Silicon Valley, but firms to

open up new markets

The

of Silicon Valley

rise

relations either.

To be

is

at

the

same time

it

forced local

for their products in the civilian sector.

not a simple story about nniversity-indnstiy

sure, Stanford University trained physicists

microwave engineers who

later

worked

for firms

and

on the Peninsula.

Stanford was also a sonice of important innovations in the design of

microwave tubes, and these innovations were

later exploited

and com-

mercialized by local corporations. But university-industry relations in Silicon \hlley

were

to build active

much more complex

programs

than these one-way flows. In order

in electronics,

Frederick Terman, an electrical

engineer, and other Stanford administrators relied heavily gies, especially

on technolo-

manufacturing process technologies, developed

in Silicon

They appropriated these technologies and built their research and teaching programs in vacuum tube and solid-state electronics on the basis

\ alley.

of these transfers. In

other words,

it

was because of their close relations

with Silicon V^alley firms that engineering groups at Stanford nological innovations of their

own and

made

tech-

that the university was able to train

a skilled engineering workforce in electronics.

To

trace the district’s

growth and reconstruct

Stanford and the Department of Defense,

I

complex relations with examine the dominant techits

nologies and the dominant firms on the San Francisco Peninsula. especially

on Eitel-McCullough, Litton

known

as

focus

Industries, Varian Associates,

Fairchild Semiconductor, Signetics, Intel,

Fitel-McCaillough (informally

I

and National Semiconductor.

Eimac) made power-grid tubes

and high-frequency radar systems. Litton Industries and X'arian Associates designed and fabricated microwave vacuum tubes magnetrons and klystrons. These microwave tubes were the key components in advanced radar sets, radar countermeasure systems, and intercontinental communication systems. Fairchild Semiwhich were used

in radio transmission

—

conductor and

its

spinoffs such as Intel

and Signetics specialized

in the

and integrated circuits, which were used in electronic products ranging from high-speed computers to television monitors and kitchen appliances. These firms were the largest and most influfabrication of silicon transistors

ential electronics

manufacturers on the Peninsula from the 1940s

early 197()s. Eitel-McCullough, Litton, Varian, Fairchild, also

dominated the

L^S markets for

and

its

to the

spinoffs

advanced tubes and semiconductors.

main production and design innovations on the Peninsula. They were also sources of new management practices, marketing techniques, and financial arrangements. They provided a model for other electronics corporations, and they were the incubators .Moi e ini|3ortant, they created the

Inlr()(lu( lion

many

of

othei' conij^onenl

and

systoin vcMiturcs

on

examine Kilel-Mc( aillongh, laiion Associates, Fairchild, Signetics, Intel, and National at (heir history and in Silicon X'alley’s deyelopment. IVninsnla.

I

will

Indiyidual chapters

the stoi

tell

deyelops a major theme relating to ter

1,

examine the emergence

I

of

I

how

of

San Francisco

(lie*

Indnslries, V'arian critical

peiiods

in

these firms. Fach chapter

Silicon Valley eyolved. In chap-

an indigenous j^ower tube industry on

the San Francisco Peninsula in the

on Fitel-Mc(aillough,

ies

9

mid

193()s

and the

194()s.

F'oeusing

argue that the |)ower tube industry grew out

of

the area’s yihrant amateur radio community. Established by two radio

amateurs, Fitel-McCaillough concentrated on the manufacture (juality

ment

of high-

The develop-

transmitting tubes for other electronics hobbyists.

advanced manufacturing technirpies and the very unusual })ertormance and reliability requirements of amateur radio put Eitelof

McCaillough the

at

the forefront of the tube business. Taking advantage of

enormous demand

McCaillough largest

vastly

expanded

its

activities

during World War

and became one

II,

Eitel-

of the nation’s

manufacturers of vacuum tubes. In turn, Eitel-McCullough’s

growth created an

ra])id

for radar tubes

components

inf rastructure for

in the area.

the

manuf acture of electronic

This infrastructure facilitated the growth of

another military-related industry, microwave

tid)es,

the postwar

in

|)eriod.

In

chapter

2,

I

investigate the

economic and

political forces that sus-

War

tained the emergence of the microwave tube industry after W’oiid

by focusing on Eitton Industries. Eittou Industries was a

II

sj^litoffOf Eitton

Engineei'ing, a supplier of tube-making e(|uipment to Eitel-McCaillough

and other vacuum tube coiporations. At first, the new firm (started bv C'-haiies Eitton) concentrated on the design of exotic magnetrons for radar countermeasure systems. Eater it benefited from the surge iu the military demand for microwave tubes during the Korean War. It expanded into the manufacture of inagnetrons for radar systems, and it engineered innovative manufacturing techniques for the j)roduction

of

these tubes. This manufacturing ))rowess enabled Eitton Industries to

make \’eiT

the highest-quality magnetrous in the United States and to

low

cost.

The

government. As a

Southern

so at

firm’s high profits attracted the scrutiny of the federal result,

(California

its

founder sold Eitton Industries

businessmen,

military conglomerate. critical for

do

who then transformed

The growth of

Eitton’s

the Peninsula’s mauufacturiug

to a

it

group of

into a

major

magnetron business was

district.

Eittou Industries cre-

ated a model of the successful startuj) in microwave tubes.

It

also

helped

10

lutroductiou

local

eiUrepreneurs to establish their own microwave tube businesses,

thereby seeding the growth of

Among

this industry in the area.

the startups sponsored by (Charles Litton was Varian Associates,

and this company is the focus of chaj^ter S. Varian was established by a group of physicists and engineers who were influenced by California’s utopian tradition. These men shaped Varian Associates into an engineering cooperative that specialized in the making of klystrons for the Department of Defense. In the late 194()s, Varian Associates acquired unique competence in the design and the processing of klystrons through the develojDinent of a fuse for atomic bombs. In turn, this competence enabled it to secure a large number of engineering contracts and production orders from the Department of Defense dtiring the Korean War. In the

second half of the 1950s, Varian Associates benefited from a

shift in

Department of Defense procurement from low-performance magnetrons to high-quality klystrons.

corporation

As a

result,

in the Lhiited States.

it

became the

The

rise

largest

microwave tube

of Varian Associates, Litton

and other microwave tube firms further enriched the Peninsula’s industrial infrastructure and facilitated the emergence of another component indtistiy: semiconductor manufacturing. In chapter 4, I examine the ways in which Fairchild Semiconductor re\olutionized the semiconductor industry and transformed the San Francisco Peninsula into the main center for the production of advanced silicon devices in the United States. Established by a group of semiconductor scientists and engineers in alliance with a New York investment bank, Fairchild adopted and refined new semiconductor manufacturing techniques recently developed at the Bell Telephone Laboratories. These Industries,

techniques enabled Fairchild to be the

first

firm to introduce high-

frequency silicon transistors to the market. These transistors met a rapidly

growing demand for aircraft

and

missiles.

silicon devices in

guidance and control systems for

Because Fairchild’s transistors did not meet the

reli-

Minuteman missile program), the firm’s founding engineers made a second round of major process and design innovations; the planar process and the inteability

standards of the military (especially those of the

grated circuit were the results. (Apitalizing on

its

advances

in design, pro-

and manufacturing, Fairchild gained a large share of the militaiT market for high-reliability silicon components in the late I95()s and the

cessing,

early 1960s. As a result, the firm

advanced

silicon devices in the

emerged

United

as the leading

States. Fairchild also stimulated

the formation of venture capital partnerships

equij^ment businesses in the region.

producer of

and semiconductor-

hUrodiK iion

C-liapter 5 traces liow

markets after a major

The

on the Peninsula moved

i'lrnis

defense procurement

shift in

into

in

II

commercial

the early 19()0s.

and microwave tube corporations were hit esj)ecially cutbacks. Eitel-Mc(aillongh and Varian Associates had t(^

local power-t^rid

hard by militaiT

merge

in

order to survive. Varian also diversified into the manufacture of

became a producer of equipment for the manufacture of semiconductors, and it also entered the business of scientific and medical instrumentation. Fairchild, in contrast, opened up new markets for its silicon transistors in the commercial com|)uter and consumer electronics industries. To do so, it acquired expertise in mass production from the electrical and automotive industries. It also seeded new markets commercial systems;

for

its

it

transistors by designing electronic systems (such as television sets)

around its cc:>mj)onents and by giving the designs to its customers at no cost. With these innovations in marketing and manufacturing, Fairchild developed

markets for

vast

its

transistors in the civilian sector.

It

also set a

pattern for the later growth of the integrated circuit business on the San

Francisco Peninsula. (Chapter 6 narrates the growth of the integrated circuit business on the

San Francisco Peninsula

in the first half

of the 1960s. Because Fairchild’s

managers did not understand the potential of integrated circuits, the engineers who had developed the first planar microcircuit left the firm to start new semiconductor corporations, including Amelco and Signetics. These men further refined the technolog)' of integrated circuits and helped create a small market for them. When Fairchild’s managers recognized the promise of microcircuits, they resolved to crush Signetics.

To do so, Fairchild’s engineers copied Signetics' circuits and introduced them to the market at very low prices. They also used the innovative marketing techniques they had developed a few years earlier to create commercial markets for integrated Fairchild to establish

US

the

itself

circuits.

This course of action enabled

as the largest supplier of integrated circuits to

civilian sector.

But starting

in the late 196()s,

Amelco and

of new integrated circuit firms, including

Intel,

conductor. As chapter 7 reveals, these startups,

venture

local

capitalists, relied

on the

on

this

know-how

For example, trial

The new wave to

open up

of

its

spinoffs

and

had developed since

semiconductor corporations

large

in the late 19()()s

many of them financed by

rich repertoire of techniques

managerial practices that Fairchild and the late 1950s.

spawned a number Intersil, and National Semi-

Fairchild

ca|)italized

commercial markets for microcircuits.

National Semiconductor seeded the indus-

market (automobiles, telecommunication, conij)uter

])eripherals) for

12

Inlwdiirlioti

new process and design techmetal oxide semiconductors, Intel and Intersil helped

iniegrated circuits. Taking advantage ol

nologies sncli as

create markets lor microcircuits that could be used in electronic watches

and

in

memoiT systems.

most industrial technolog)'.

In the next lew years, these corporations entered

sectors, transforming silicon electronics into a ubiquitous

By the early

197()s, Silicon Valley

technological and commercial center.

had become a major

1 Defiant West

In 1947, Eitel-Mc(4illoiigh, a nianuracliirer of radio transniitling tubes

located on the San Francisco Peninsula, sued the Radio Corporation of

Company, alleging patent infringement. CiE and RCLA., the giants of American electronics, had coj^ied EitelMcCailloiigh’s new line of tubes for EM radio and television broadcasting, file giants lost the lawsuit and were forced to halt production of these tubes. Exploiting its legal victoiT for commercial advantage, Eitel-

America and the Cieneral

Electric

Mc(ailloiigh transformed these mighty corporations into sales force

and

them buy

distribution network by letting

its

its

own

virtual

products and

them under their own names.' Such a lawsuit and its outcome would have been inconceivable 20 years earlier. RCA and (iE thoroughly dominated American electronics in the late 1920s. They controlled all ])atents on vacuum tubes, and, along with Western Electi ic and Westinghouse, they dominated the manufacture of resell

transmitting tubes in the United States.

nance were sued

How

was Eitel-McCaillough able to emerge

facturer of transmitting or “power” tubes?

and

and driven

for patent infringement

GE and

partially disj:)lace these

power tubes? Wiiat forces national arena

made

at

work

into bankruptcy.

such a prominent manu-

as

How

did

it

comj)ete with R(7\

mighty corporations

in industry,

domi-

that attacked their

Fii ius

in the field of

government, and the

inter-

the rise of Eitel-Mc(aillough possible (Norberg

1976; Sturgeon 2000)?

Arthur Norberg facturing

briefly

sketched the early

on the San Francisco Peninsula

histor\’ of

j^ower tube

in his article

manu-

on the origins

of

the West Ckjast electronics industrv. However, Norberg did not examine the uni(]ue social

and economic context

that sustained the rise of Eitel-

McCullough. Nor did he ex])lore Eitel-McCaillough’s history during

World War

this chapter,

when

emerged as a major electronics manufacturer. In going beyond Norberg’s analysis, examine the emergence

11,

it

1

14

( Juipler I

ot Eitel-McCXilloiigli

and of a

closely allied coiiijDany, Litton

Engineering

Laboratories, by following the careers of three innovator-entrepreneurs

William

Eitel, Jack

McCnllongh, and Charles Litton

—from the

early 192()s

to the late 194()s.

These men started and grew the power tube industry on the San

and McCullough had become acquainted with the technologv' of power tubes through their activities in amateur (“ham”) radio and their venture into tube production at local radio Erancisco Peninsula.

Eitel, Litton,

lirms in the late 1920s

Depression,

these

and the

men

early 1930s. In the midst of the Great

established

Eitel-McCidlongh

and Litton

Engineering Laboratories. While Litton Engineering specialized

in tube-

making equipment, Eitel-McCullongh fabricated transmitting tubes for radio amateurs. The unusual requirements of radio amateurs and their innovative use of Litton’s equipment put Eitel and McCullough at the cutting edge of the tube business. As a result, they were well positioned to supply

advanced tubes for radar development programs

1930s. Benefiting

World War tions

II,

in the late

from the enormous demand for radar tubes during

Eitel-McCullough vastly expanded the scale of

and became one of the

largest

US

its

opera-

producers of vacuum tubes. In

and other firms heavily relied on Litton Engineering’s machineiT, Litton emerged as a major supplier of tubeturn, because Eitel-McCullough

making equipment during the

war.

Training

William

Eitel,

Jack McCullough, and Charles Litton, unlike

many

subse-

quent electronics entrepreneurs on the San Erancisco Peninsula, had

deep roots

in the

area and

of entrepreneurship. These

came from

families with a strong histoiw

men had been born and

raised in, variously,

San Erancisco and the small communities of San Mateo and Santa Clara counties. Their families also shared class ial

common

traits:

thev were middle j

or lower middle class and had a strong technical and entrepreneur-

bent. McCullough’s parents

had

ness in San Erancisco. (His uncle Eitel’s

built a small wholesale

owned

a sawmill

lumber

busi-

on the Peninsula.)

family had a strong mechanical orientation. His father had ven-

tured into the design of aircraft engines in the 191 Os.

When

the

company

developing his engine faltered because of a shortage of funds, he took a job

managing

a granite quarry. Subsequently,

carving business. Eitel’s uncle, E.

Motor

(’.ar

j.

Hall,

he ran a small stone-

had established the Hall-Scott

(’.ompany in Oakland, one of the

first

automotive corpora-

15

Ih'fianI West

on the West

tions

C.oasl.

production of sports

One

cars.

of Hall-Seott’s s})eciallies

The

was the small-scale

firm also designed and built an aircraft

engine, the “Liberty engine,” which was used in most American aircraft

during World War

In addition to

riiilitaiy

I.‘

coming from comparable

social

backgrounds,

Kitel,

and McCdillough received similar technical training in radio technolog) and metalworking. These men acquired a solid education in the mechanical arts by working in their families’ enterprises and attending Litton,

mechanically oriented educational institutions.

Eitel,

an energetic and

resourceful youngster with limited interest in academics, gained his

mechanical

skills in

quariy as an assistant blacksmith and machine operator.

in his father’s

One

the shop of Los Ciatos High School and by working

of Eitel’s favorite places to

\’isit

was the shops of the Hall-Scott Motor

Company. There he learned about machine-shop operation of complex inachinenA (’>ar

While

Eitel

gained

his

mechanical

skills

practice

and the

mostly by doing, Litton and

McCaillough attended the California School of Mechanical Arts in San

One

Erancisco.

of the best technical high schools on the West Coast,

offered rigorous training in the mechanical trades

solid education

humanities and the sciences. At the school, Litton and

the

in

and

McCaillough became excellent machinists. They also gained, later recalled, “a realistic ‘feel’ of materials

and

at

no

sacrifice to a

continued

ened

it

his

his technical

sound

liberal arts

education

at a local

as Litton

and processes coupled with background.”^ McCaillough junior college. Litton deep-

knowledge of mechanics and metalworking by enrolling

in

Stanford University’s mechanical engineering department in the early 1920s.

The department’s curriculum

flavor.

It

at

was organized around courses

the time had a strong practical

in

shop work and administration,

machine drawing and design, and power plant engineering. It also included chemistry courses. The mechanical and chemical expertise Litton acquired at Stanford helped him greatly in his subsequent vac-

uum

tube endeavors.

engineering

L.itton

received a bachelor’s degree in mechanical

in 1924."’

and McCaillough, like many technically minded middleyoungsters, became interested in radio in the mid 1910s and the

Litton, Eitel, class

The San Erancisco Bay Area was an excellent new field of electronics. Since the turn of the

early 1920s.

place to dis-

cover the

centurv, this

region had been, like Boston, one of the main centers of itv

in

ham

radio activ-

America. By the mid 1920s, the Bay Area had more than 1,200

licensed amateurs, about 10 percent of

all

the radio operators in the

/6

('hapter

I

Ignited Stales.

The ham comnuinity its

own

Northern

(^ialifbrnia

and Oakland had radio

ably (Ivnamie. San Francisco

University also had

in

was remark-

chibs. Stanford

radio group. In addition, the Bay Area’s ama-

community generated a large share of the electronics hobbyist literature. Local chibs produced newsletters on “wireless” technologv'. Radio, one of the two magazines dedicated to amateur radio in the

teur radio

United

States,

One might

was based

in

San

Francisco.'*

why an isolated and peripheral region, a continent away from important urban and industrial centers, nurtured such a large and vibrant ham radio community. A number of' geographical and cultural factors seem to have played a role in the high concentration of radio ask

Bay Area. Northern California

amateurs

in the

entation,

and San Francisco was one of the

C'-oasl.

local to

luixl

a strong maritime ori-

on the West The Na\y and

largest seaports

San Francisco Bay also had several militaiw

bases.

commercial shipping firms relied heavily on radio communication

monitor their operations

erable

visibility to

191()s,

when

the

new

in the Pacific. .As a result,

technology'

—especially

they gave consid-

and the and ship-

in the f9()0s

radio was used almost exclusively for ship-to-ship

to-shore communication. In addition to exposing San Francisco youths

new technology, the Na\T and the shipping companies employed significant number of radio operators, some of whom were involved in

to the

a

amateur radio

(Pratt 1969).

The presence of a

small but

vital

electronics industiy in the area also 4

contributed to the strength Ualifbrnia.

The Bay

.Ai

of the

ham community

in

Northern

ea was an active center of radio manufacturing in

the 191()s and the 1920s.

It

was

including Remler (which

made

American manufacturer

of

home

to a

radio sets)

number of electronics firms, and Magnavox (the leading

loudspeakers). Another small

company,

and Kaufinan, designed custom radio equipment. Federal Telegraj^h, one of the earliest radio companies in the United States, operated a radio-telegraph system on the West Coast and produced radio transmitters in the 191()s. These firms made radio parts available to local hobbyists and hired radio amateurs (Norberg 1976; Morgan 1967). Ileintz

Cieneral attitudes toward technical

change

in California

may have

rein-

forced the local interest in radio. Technological innovation seems to have

been especially valued lor examj)le, in

in (Alifornia since the 189()s. California farmers,

mechanized

other parts

of

their operations earlier than their counterparts

the country. In similar fashion, CAlifornians rapidly

embraced new technologies such as the automobile and the aiiplane the 19()()s and the 191()s (Pursell 1976).

in

Drfid}! West

17

I

Introduced to ainateur radio

tliroiigli their families

and

and McCaillough embraced the new lioi)l)y. congenial environment for theii' ladio interests at

Litton, Eitel,

found

and

a

communities.

in their

Eitel

was tutored

mathematics teacher, a radio enthusiast.

in the

Eitel also

new

their friends, I

hey rapidly

their schools

technologv' by his

learned about the

new

QS f, an amateur radio magazine, in his school's library. These young men also became active in the Ikw Area’s radio clubs. In the process, they became acculturated to the woild of amateur radio, and they soon acquired many of its values and beha\'ior by reading radio books and

field

patterns.'

Ham First,

radio was an unusual technical subculture in a

was characterized by camaraderie and intense

it

way

make

number of ways. sociability.

Hams

communi-

used radio primarily

as a

cating “over the

radio amateurs socialized face to face in radio clubs

and of

at

air,”

to

friends. In addition to

conventions. They organized “hamfests” that attracted hundreds

amateurs

living in the

same area

as well as

commercial suppliers of

radio equipment. By the early 1980s, an observer of the amateur com-

munin' reported

that radio

amateurs

in

the United States organized

more than twenty regional conventions and hundreds of “hamfests” annually. It was at one of these social gatherings that McCullough, Litton, and Eitel met (De Soto 193(3; Douglas 1987). Second, the ham culture was chaiacterized by egalitarianism and a democratic

amateurs gave tional

heed

little

to traditional distinctions of class

The Santa Clara Ck)unU’ mid 1920s, counted among

attainment.

chaired

in

the

ideolog)'.

radio club, its

Radio

and educawhich Eitel

members farm

boys,

Stanford students. Federal Telegraph’s technicians, and retired executives.

Moreover, hams saw themselves as part of the “peoj)le.” In their

recurrent conflicts with the military services and with large corporations

such as

RCA

over control of the airwaves, radio amateurs presented

themselves as representatives of the citizenry against the interests of large

and undemocratic organizations (Douglas 1987). Third, radio amateurs greatly valued technical innovation and resourcef ulness. I'hey were interand performance of radio technologs’. In improve radio cii cuits and to explore new radio

ested in extending the range particular, they

sought to

frequencies for long-distance communication. In short, radio amateurs built reputations

among their brethren

by innovating

new circuitry,

devis-

ing clever transmitter designs, and establishing contacts with faraway lands (Morgan 19(37;

De Soto

193(3). Lastly,

the

ham

culture was charac-

mix of competitiveness and information sharing. “The

pre-

terized by

its

dominant

characteristic of the amateur,” a radio hobbyist observed at the

IS

(]haf)ter I

time,

altruism.

“is liis

public to share in plish

something

and benefit by

he wants

how

to

show

they also can do

his discoveries. is

The

it.

brother amateurs not only

The

slightest

advance

in

rivahy to accom-

intense. But

and no sooner does one make

his

all

eveiw other amateur and the

been done before

that has not

the friendliest sort,

of'

The amateur wants

it is

new record

a

how

it

that

was done, but

technique, eveiy indi-

vidual discoveiT, any observation that promises improvement, ately the propertv of all.”

rivahy

is

immedi-

(De Soto 1936) Ca)mpetitiveness and free

sharing of information were institutionalized by the Amateur Radio Relay

League (.ARRL), the main association of radio amateurs States.

The ARRL published

azine, QST.

It

In 1926, for

the most advanced amateur work in

its

mag-

also gave awards for important technical accomplishments.

example, the

prize for amateurs Asia,

in the Lhiited

ARRL

who had

established a “worked-all-continents”

established radio contact with stations in

Europe, and Australia (De Soto 1936).

tandem with their acculturation in the world of amateur radio, Eitel, Litton, and McCullough gained a solid knowledge of electronics and radio systems. They read hobbyist literature and radio textbooks and experimented relentlessly with their radio equipment. Through this intense work, these young men gained a thorough knowledge of radio circuitiy. They also learned to design and build their own radio stations. Ultimately, they encountered the new field of short-wave radio. The short waves were then a largely forsaken portion of the radio specIn

trum. Judging the short waves (under 200 meters) to be worthless, the

US

Department of Commerce had given them over to radio amateurs in 1922. Waxes over 200 meters, which seemed at the time to have more potential for long-distance

RCA,

to

to

communication, were assigned

to the military',

American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), and

to broad-

casting networks. As a result, electronics hobbyists explored the untrod-

den part of the radio spectrum. In 1923, radio amateurs discovered that they could use 100-meter waves to communicate with Europe. Eurthermore, the radio amateurs soon found that short waves were to long waves for long-distance radio transmission. Short

far superior

waves

made com-

munication possible over distances greater than had ever been reached before.

wave in

They

stations.

power used by the longThis revolulionaiy discoveiT opened a new field of inqniiT

also required only a fraction of the

which radio amateurs participated prominently. Intent upon furthering

their exj^loralions, radio

They defined the tial

amateurs experimented with ever shorter waves.

characteristics of such waves

for long-distance

and evaluated

their poten-

communication (De Soto 1936; Douglas

1987).'*

I)('fi(iul \\'('st

Interested in joining this revolution, Kitel, Litton, Mc(hillongli,

many

of their

ham

friends

on the San

F'rancisco Peninsula

with short waves. In the process, these

19

and

experimented

young men made notable

contri-

butions to the art of high-frequency or short-wave radio. In 1924, Litton

and a fellow member of the Stanford radio chib were among the first American amateurs to establish commnnication in the high ffecpiency bands with Australia and

New

Zealand. In 1928, Eitel j)ioneered the use

of lO-meter waves for transcontinental commnnication. This important

accomplishment opened the veiT high fre(|nency (VHF) bands commnnication.

“1

to radio

was bringing np the rear when the movement [toward

the higher frequencies] started,” Eitel later reminisced, “but by the time

was np with them.

them all in spanning the continent on 10 meters. In order to do this work, I had to build even thing mvself. This took an understanding of circuits and other components because most of them were marginal. In fact, they were inadequate. So I had to improvise with what was available. worked with the circuits until I got the performance w^anted. Since built eventhing myself, it was a matarranged the coils and condensers in the circuits.”'" ter of how' In conjunction with the design of transmitting stations and their innovative work in short-wave radio, Eitel, Litton, and McCullough learned about vacuum tubes, the main components of radio circuits and systems. \acuum tubes made it possible to generate, to detect, and to amplify' radio signals. A vacuum tube consisted of a glass enveloj^e and a set of they got to 20 meters

I

I

beat

I

I

I

1

electrodes: a filament or cathode, which emitted a stream of electrons; a plate or anode,

which collected them; and,

which controlled the plate.

The

flow’

finally,

an open mesh grid,

of electrons between the filament and the

grid acted as a vahe,

opening or closing the passage of

When

elec-

vacuum tube was used as an amplifier, radio waves interce])ted by an antenna came to the grid as a weak alternating current oscillating with the radio waves’ frequency. The trons according to the voltage

on

it.

a

oscillating voltage thus applied to the grid

trons crossing the tube to the

modulated the flow

of elec-

same frequency. The electron stream then

delivered an alternating current at the plate, which reproduced with great amplification the

evacuated of

all

good school

signal

on the

Tubes had

to

be carefully

in

especially the “exploration” of the short waves was

which

to learn

about these complex de\ices. ‘A'acuiim

tubes,” Eitel later recalled, “were the tricky to get

grid.

gases to allow the flow’ of electrons between the cathode

and the plate. Amateur radio and a

weak

them

to

weak

perform properly

at

links in the chain.

It

was rather

[high] frequencies, fhey were

20

('h(if)ter I

Pfofo «upport 5

’;*f

rinj

Control prld

o»>

plo1«

Plotc

Shield

^OrM connect Jon Stom

.Fjlomcnt ond grid

connectione

Figure 1.1 I'he struciure of the Heintz

and Kiuifman 354 power-grid

tube. Souree: 4'ernian

1938.

one of the components that recjiiirecl a sixth sense to get them to work. They had not been designed for these frequencies. They had been designed for the lower frequencies.”" To ptish the tubes to their limits and get them to work at the higher frequencies, latton, Eitel, and McCaillough gained a solid knowledge of their construction and operating principles. Litton went

one step

further.

and, especially, jiower-grid

He

tid)es.‘‘^

learned to fabricate vacuum tidies

Mastering the fabrication of transmit-

ting or “jiower” tidies was a remarkable

achievement for an independent

experimenter. These devices, which were used to generate strong radio signals

for

long-distance

Indeed, (ieneral Electric,

transmission, were veiT difficidt \\ 'estinghou.se,

to

and AT&T, which had

make. devel-

21

Defiant West

oped high-power

transniitling tubes in the early 1920s,

stantial difficulties in

fashion.

The

producing them

in a consistent

encountered sub-

and reproducible

power tubes required precise machining.

fabrication ol

also required a masteiw of glass blowing: transmitting tubes

special Pvrex glass. Their

techniques.

To

were made of

manufacture also rested on complex proce.ssing

create the high

vacuum required

for their operation, the

tubes had to be baked at high temperatures for hours to release the gases

It

occluded

at a

in their metallic elements.

time in order

Power tubes

also

required the use of exotic materials and sophisticated sealing techniques to

make

ments.

tight Joints

between the

Finally, the fabrication

the use of “getters”

glass

envelope and the metallic

ele-

of high-vacuum power tubes necessitated

— magnesium

pellets,

attached to the inside portion

of the tube envelope, that absorbed residual gases after the tube had

been evacuated (Fagen 1975). Although practice,

little is

it is

known about

likely that

Litton’s apprenticeship in

he learned

to

make

vacuum tube

transmitting tubes by reading

the technical literature and by playing with power-grid tubes.

He

also

may

have received technical advice from his neighbor Otis Moorhead.

Moorhead, a radio amateur and a \'acuum tube entrepreneur, had

estab-

vacuum tube firm, Moorhead Laboratories, in San Francisco in 1917. Moorhead manufactured receiving tubes for radio sets until a patent-infringement lawsuit put him out of business in the early 1920s. Litton was fascinated by the complex techniques required to make power-grid tubes. In the early and mid 1920s, he experimented with materials and with tube processing techniques in his home laboratoiy. In parallel to this work on glass and metals, Litton mastered the design and construction of the specialized vacuum equipment required to make power tubes. He built, for instance, the vacuum pumps with which he evacuated his tubes. Litton also constructed his own ovens. By the mid 1920s, after years of trial and error, Litton was making sophisticated lished a

(vacuum tubes with

tubes: high-power triodes

ode, plate, and grid) as well as thermionic

own

tliree electrodes

rectifiers.

He used

—cath-

these in his

them to other radio amateurs on the San and Scofield 1925; Norberg 1970; Sturgeon

radio transmitter and sold

Francisco Peninsula (Litton

2000 ).'-' In 1925, to

work

in

complement

electrical

his training in electronics, Litton did

engineering

at

graduate

Stanford University. At that time,

Stanford’s small electrical engineering department was oriented toward

graduate education.

Its

three instructors offered a limited range of

courses on electric circuits,

AC

machineiT, and power transmission.

One

22

('J}(ij)lcr I

might speculate that

took two

in addition to these classes, Litton also

of

the few electronics-related courses that the universit)' was offering at the time: a physics course

on “ions and

electrons,”

which covered, among

other things, the theoiy of vacuum tubes, and a course 1925) on “communication engineering fundamentals.”

offered in

(first

The

latter

course

included a brief treatment of electromagnetic theory and went into radio

more depth. For his engineering thesis, designed an instrument that recorded and helped visualize short

and telephony engineering Litton

radio waves.

.\f'ter

graduating with an engineering degree

many West

engineering, Litton, like

He

East.

in

Coast engineers

accepted a junior engineer position

at that time,

at the

Bell

new engineering group

Laboratories. There he joined a

went

Telephone

that was devel-

ojDing a short-wave radio system for transatlantic telephony. 2 years, Litton designed

in electrical

Over the next

measuring equipment and short-wave

receivers.

His work at the Bell Telephone Laboratories and his training in electrical

engineering

at

Stanford transformed Litton into a professional radio engi-

abandoned his ham radio roots and continued to with radio transmitters and talk “over the air” for most of his life.‘'^

neer. But Litton never

play

Tube Design and Manufacture

In the late 1920s, Litton, Eitel,

and McCullough found jobs with small

on the San Francisco Peninsula. .After two lonely years at the Bell Telephone Laboratories, Litton longed to return home. He had had a nervous breakdown, and he did not like the

electronics corporations

Eastern climate. In 1927 he

moved back

Philip Scofield, a Stanford friend radio,

whom

Litton secured a research

Telegraph Company.

He

to California.

With the help of

he had known through amateur

engineer position

at

the Federal

negotiated a contract which stipulated that he

would work only on the San Francisco Peninsula.

Eitel too

foothold in the Peninsula’s electronics industry through his

gained a

ham

radio

Kaufman Incorporated hired Eitel as a mechanic on the recommendation of C^olonel Foster, a wealthy radio amateur who was a customer of Heintz and Kiiufman. One vear later, Fitel recruited McCaillough to work with him at Heintz and Kaufman. Litton, Eitel, and McCullough put considerable efforts and energ\' into their new jobs so much so that Litton soon became known as “Cftarles X’igorous Litton” among his co-workers. Eitel and McCullough, who were industrious, put in many all-nighters at Heintz and Kaufman connections. In 1929, Heintz and

—

(Southworth 1962; Millman 1984; Layton 1976).

23

Defiaril West

The

Federal Telegraj)h (a)nij)any and MeiiUz and Kiudinan Incor-

porated offered attractive opportunities for ambitions young to

prove themselves

in electronics.

tronics firms in the Bay Area.

neering programs

been formed It

had

also

They

to

had

also

in short-wave radio.

in 1909,

helped

These were the most

men

eager

resj)ected elec-

active research

and engi-

Federal Telegraph, which had

had pioneered continnons wave radio develop vacnnm tube technologv'.

It

in the 1910s.

was

at

Federal

Telegraph that Lee de Forest had invented the audion oscillator and amplifier, the

first

vacuum

tube. Exploiting these innovations for

com-

became an important supplier of radio equipment to the US Navy during World War I. After these notable beginnings. Federal Telegraph declined in the 1920s, becoming a rather insignificant supplier of radio-telegraph senices on the West CA)ast. To mercial advantage. Federal Telegraph

revive

its

sagging fortunes, the firm sought to gain a position in short-

wave radio,

as

commercial

it

became apparent

that the

possibilities for long-distance

In 1927, to finance

its

new

technologv^ offered great

communication."'

research and development efforts in short-wave

radio. Federal Telegraph secured a large contract

Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T), a

from International

New York-based telecommunication

Europe and South America. IT&T was interested in building a global short-wave radio communication network. It contracted out the development of the required high-frequency trans-

conglomerate with operations

mitters

and

in

receivers to Federal Telegraph. Lhider the terms of the agree-

ment, Federal Telegraph became the sole supplier of short-wave radio

equipment

to

IT&T. In return, IT&T financed a large share of Federal

Telegraph’s research and engineering program and paid royalties to Federal Telegraph on

its

sales

of radio communication services. With

this

and 1928 Federal Telegraph built a large R&D organiwith more than 60 engineers and scientists working on all aspects

contract, in 1927

zation

of short-wave radio.'’

Heintz and Kaufman was also an important player short-wave radio.

It

had

actually

of short waves in the mid 1920s.

in the

new

field

of

pioneered the commercial exploitation

The

firm had been established in 1921

bv Ralph Heintz, an inventive radio amateur and electro-mechanical engineer. At

duced radio

first,

sets

Heintz had repaired scientific instruments and pro-

and broadcasting

transmitters. Sensing the future

com-

mercial importance of short-wave radio, Heintz re-oriented the firm

toward the design and manufacture of high-frequencv radio equij)ment in

1924.

receivers

The corporation produced high-frequency on a custom

basis for a

wide varietv

of users.

transmitters

Among

and

these were

24

llie

(Ihapter

/

Army, the Navy, the Ik)eing Airplane C>ompany, and wealthy radio

amateurs. Heintz and Kimfman’s transmitters were also used in various expeditions to Antarctica and the North Pole. In addition to these cus-

tom jobs, Heintz and Kaufman secured a large procurement contract from the Dollar Steamship Company. Dollar, a large shipping company based in San Francisco, asked Heintz and Kiiufman in 1929 to build an extensive short-wave radio network in the Pacific. These transmitters would connect its fleet with shore stations in Hawaii, Guam, China, and the Philippines as well as major ports in the United States. In conjunction with this large contract. Dollar also acquired a controlling interest in

Heintz and Kaufman, transforming

it,

of radio equipment (Olson and Jones

in effect, into 199(5;

Niven

its

in-house supplier

1987).’'^

Working for Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kiiufman, Litton, Eitel, and McCullough soon gravitated toward the design and production of power-grid tubes. In less than a year, Litton and Eitel respectively became the heads of Eederal Telegraph’s and Heintz and Kitufman’s tube shops. The manufacture of transmitting tubes was a new activity for these corporations. Until then, Eederal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman had specialized in the operation of radio-telegraph systems and the manufacture of radio transmitters and receivers for long-distance transmission. It was only in the late 1920s that they moved into power tube manufacturing. They did so because they could not procure transmitting tubes on the open market. RCA, GE, Western Electric, and Westinghouse the sole producers and distributors of power-grid' tubes in the United States refused to sell these tubes to Eederal Telegraph or Heintz and Kaufman. RCiA went one step further and threatened to sue Eederal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman for patent infringement in case they jDrocured transmitting tubes from European suppliers.-" The reasons for this refusal were clear. R(iA, which had been set up in 1919 at the instigation of GE and the Navy to ensure American predominance in radio, controlled ship-to-shore and transoceanic communication in the United States. It considered Eederal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman threats

—

—

to

its

domination of long-distance radio communications. Allowing

Federal Telegraph and Heintz and

would permit them

Kaufman

to

buy power-grid tubes

to establish transoceanic radio circuits for

the Dollar Steamship

Company

in direct

IT&:T and

competition with RCA.

RCA

could deny the sale of transmitting tubes to Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kiiufinan because of

which was

partially

its

RCA, (AT&:T’s manu-

control of radio technologv’.

owned by GE and

M’estern Electric

lacturing arm), had signed a series of exclusiv'e cross-licensing agree-

I)(’lin}il

iiients

with ATX:T, (iE, and Westinglioiisc.

ments gave R('A control including

of niore tlian

hese cross-licensing agree-

I

2,000 patents

vacuum tube

the important

all

25

West

in

the field of radio,

Making the most of infiinged on its intellec-

j^atents.

these patents, R('A aggressively sued firms that

propertv rights and put them out of business.''

tual

and

R(^A’s monoj)olistic j^ractices forced kAderal Telegraph

and Kaufman

to

leintz

manufacture their own power-grid tubes. Litton’s and

Eitel’s

job was to produce

ferent

from Cieneral

power tubes and

Electric’s,

devices so that they would not Eitel

I

Western fall

make them

to

Electric’s,

under RCiA’s

sufficiently dif-

and Westinghouse’s and

patents. As Eitton

soon realized, designing and making transmitting tubes that

flid

not

on the patents of the radio monopoly was an enormously diffitask. RCA had a seemingly impregnable patent position. It con-

infringe cult

trolled

more than 250

patents which covered

aspects of tube design

all

and manufacture. Furtheimore, RCA held the ftmdamental patents on device structures and tube elements stich as cathodes, getters, and glassto-metal seals. Ciircumventing these patents was highly 192()s, large

risky.

In the late

electronics firms such as Sylvania tried to manufacture trans-

mitting tubes that would bypass RCA’s intellectual properU' rights, but they failed to circumvent

some of RCA’s key

patents.

As a

result,

RCA

sued Sylvania and forced the firm to stop manufacturing power-grid tubes (Stokes 1982). Litton

and

Eitel also

to their location

had

to confront

some challenges

on the West Coast. Unlike

Svlvania,

that

were

specific

which was located

Massachusetts and had ready access to a workforce skilled in

vacuum tube

manufacture. Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kitufman operated industrial backwater. in the

Though

Litton

and

Eitel

There were

few'

and

Eitel

an

skilled in

vacuum tube

operators with a know'ledge of xaciium tech-

niques and chemical handling in the Bay Area, rare,

in

could find good mechanics

Bay Area, they lacked access to a workforce

})ractice.

in

/

(ilass

blowers too were

considered the local ones incompetent. Furthermore, most

suppliers of the special materials required for the fabrication of j)ow'er

tubes w'ere located on the East

(’.oast.

For instance, the Corning

Works, w'hich produced the Pyrex glass used

main plant expensive

in

in

Cilass

tube envelopes, had

its

New' York State. Ordering materials required long and

trips to the East

and entailed high

ship|)ing costs. In other

words, the Bay Area’s industrial infrastructure was inadequate for the

manufacture of complex electronic devices such Btit Litton, Eitel,

and

and McCaillough had access

as power-grid tubes." to significant technical

financial resources. Because the production of transmitting tubes was

26

Ch(if)ter 1

essential for llie

development of short radio communication systems, the

managers of Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman allocated

sig-

nificant resources to the tube laboratories. Litton, for instance, directed

group made of ten college-trained engineers and scientists as well as a number of draftsmen and machinists. He had an ample budget, which

a

allowed scouting

trips to the East

Coast to identify potential suppliers.

Litton received considerable support from IT&T’s legal department

the engineering groups of

its

European

subsidiaries.

A

and

group of Erench

engineers, for example, was dispatched from IT&T’s research laboratoiT

tube-development

in Paris to aid with Federal Telegraph’s

.\lthough the Dollar Steamship

Company

resources, Eitel was able to build a ers,

and radio amateurs

at

efforts in 1930.

did not have IT&T’s financial

team of a dozen mechanics,

Heintz and Kaufman.

He

glass blow-

could also rely on the Heintz,

who

and construction of transmitting tubes.''' Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman

also

counsel of patent lawyers and on the inventive

mind of Ralph

participated in the design

The two groups

at

collaborated with each other in the late 192()s and the early 193()s. Their

common

They had to solve similar legal and design problems and solve them fast. They also had to make power-grid tubes, a difficult undertaking. The collaboration was also facilitated by the fact that they did not compete directly with each other and by the fact that they had a common enemy: RCA and the tight collaboration

was predicated on

Eastern radio monopoly.

built

can also speculate that the cooperation

and Heintz was also shaped by the friendships they and the values they had acquired through amateur radio. In the

between Litton,

had

One

interests.

late 192()s

Eitel,

and the veiy

early 1930s, these

men

shared substantial infor-

mation on tube design and production. Litton, who had more experience with transmitting tubes than

his

counterparts

at

Heintz and

Kaufman, taught them the fundamentals of tube processing and manufacture. He also gave them production blueprints of tube-making machineiy and detailed information on material suppliers. Heintz, and

McCullough became more

groups frequently discussed the

.-Vs

Eitel,

proficient in the tube art, the two

difficulties they

were facing. “We learned

“We went through the same agonies of decisions on how' to do this and on how to do that. [Litton’s] mind and mine were running pretty parallel.”-^ The cooperation was so close that federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufman jointly ordered from each other,” Heintz

their glass blanks

from

later reminisced.

Corning.-"’

The development and manufacture of a legal

endeavor

as a technical one.

pow'er-grid tubes was as

much

To engineer transmitting tubes

that

l)('/ianl

would not infringe on R(Ws patents, closely with their patent attorneys. foi'iner

engineering manager

at

Litton, Lite!,

“The patent

and

Meint/.

worked

de[)artinent,” recalled a

Federal Telegraph, “would point out

proposed high-power tube would have

that the elements of a

21

West

to

be

designed to avoid infringing upon RCA’s patents. The actual method we followed was to

with a group conference with two or three engi-

start

neers and one or two

men from

would discuss tube problems.

the patent department. All present

At these meetings, latton would pro-

pose ways of circumventing RLA’s patents, which the patent experts

would then

discuss.

Based on their response, Litton would then work on

the tube’s detailed design. Eitel at

and Heintz proceeded

same way

in the

Heintz and Kiuifman.’"

These for

legal constraints

guided the design of transmitting tubes. Litton,

example, de\ised a clever tube design that bypassed an important

RCA. The patent covered

structure patent controlled by

a tube with a

grid that “surrounded” the cathode. Taking advantage of the patent’s

phrasing, Litton devised a grid that, instead of encircling the filament,

went 179° around to

it.

Because of the

grid’s

unusual shape, Litton decided

support both the grid and the plate from the side rather than

end of the tube envelope. He extremities.

shape) was

was also

The

much more

than

it

made

(nicknamed “the crying pig” for

its

odd

and General Electric’s products. It make. But it did a reasonable job at the

Bell’s

difficult to

high frequencies, and

the

also attached the filament to the tube’s

resulting tube

less efficient

at

possible the building of IT&T’s short-wave

radio communication system. Similarly, Eitel and Heintz

old tube design that had fallen into the public

domain

made

use of an

—a design with

a

filament and two plates instead of the standard filament, grid, and plate.

Experimenting with

this old design,

Heintz, Eitel, and McCullough engi-

neered the gammatron, a rugged power tube that worked well

at

high

Eitel

were

frequencies.-”

Because of the complexity of these designs, Litton and forced to use

new

materials

and develop new manufacturing techniques.

They also had to circumvent manufacturing-process patents held by RCA. That corporation had a solid portfolio of patents on tubemanufacturing processes and evacuation techniques. Eor example, it had patents on the manufacture of special metal-to-glass seals intended to withstand high thermal stresses.

RCA

also controlled the use of getters.

To circumvent these patents, IJtton, Heintz, Eitel, and McCaillough used new materials and developed novel techniques. To replace getters, Eitel and Heintz made tube plates of tantalum, a rare and exotic metal. When

2(V

(

'Ji

a f)!(')'

1

high temperatures, tantalum acted as a getter and

pre-lieatc(l at very

absorbed

tlie

j)atented a

gases released by the tube elements. Litton invented

new technique

for

making

qualiu of the

high vacuum

vacuum was

The use of They made it

shock-resistant seals.

tantalum and Litton’s seals were important innovations. jDossible to create a

and

in the tubes’

envelopes. Because the

new were more

closely related to tube reliability, these

techniques allowed the fabrication of transmitting tubes that reliable than those distributed by R(L\.-''

Litton also

made

innovations in tooling. Relying on his mechanical

and glass blowing expertise, he invented the glass lathe, an apparatus that mechanized tube-making operations such as assembly, glass blowing, and sealing. Litton

developed

this

new machine

to

overcome the production

and manpower difficulties he was encountering at Federal Telegraph. The tube he had designed to bvpass RCA’s patents was hard to make: because the grid and the plate were attached to the side of the glass enve-

complex glass work. Most glass blowers in the Bay Area did not have the advanced skills required. Furthermore, they were not amenable to strict industrial discij)line. Cilass blowers had the habits of pre-industrial craftsmen: they worked irregular hours and got drunk in the shop. As Litton and Eitel attempted to discipline them, some turned violent. In 1929 an irate and drunken glass blower at Heintz and Kiiufman destroyed Heintz’s new automobile and ransacked the shop.'^" To rid himself of rebellious glass blowers and make complex tubes in large quantities, Litton invented the glass lathe, an ingenious machine that made it possible to simultaneously form a complex glass envelope and seal it to the tube’s elements. A glass lathe’s two heads rotated in synchronism and supported the glass blank as well as the tube’s filament, grid, and plate. The machine operator would fabricate the tube envelope by applying a fire to the glass blank and blowing gas into it. At the same time he would join the metallic elements to the glass and seal them into lope rather than to

its

the tube envelope. precision tubes.

It

extremities, the tube required

The

glass lathe

was soon adopted

became one of the most important in the

power-grid tube

enabled the production of highat

Heintz and Kiuifman and later

pieces of manufacturing

equipment

industi'y.’'

and producing power tubes and tubemaking machineiy at Federal Telegraph, Eitel, Litton, and McCullough gained expertise in product engineering and vacuum tube manufacturing. They learned about the importance of process technologv’ for the In the j)rocess of designing

engineering of high-quality, high-precision transmitting tubes. They also

Dt'liatil

West

29

Figure 1.2 Litton's glassworking lathe, late 1930s. Ck)iirtesy of Bancrolt Library, Lhiiversit)’ of ('.alifornia,

Berkeley.

gained intuitive knowledge of materials and a deep understanding of the functioning of pow'er-grid tubes. For example, Litel and McCaillongh

gained the

ability to visualize

the

erned the design of vacnnm tubes.

complex interrelationships that govLitton became an exj^ert in materials

and manufacturing processes. One

of Litton’s associates later

reported

that at Federal Telegraph “Litton [gained] a fantastic feel for

Mother

could do with what Mother Nature gave him in the wav of phvsical materials: the elements, tungsten, copper, to wheie glass, and so forth; just how far he conld push Mother Natnie Nature.

He knew exactly w'hat he

she finally cried ‘uncle’ and gave up.

He developed

this at

Telegraph building the tubes, how^ to get a high vacnnm. factnring expertise shaped

much

Federal

This mann-

of their lattei caieeis in electionics

and

informed their approach to the vacnnm tube business. At Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kiuifman, Litton, Eitel, and McCnllongh also acquired solid management skills. They learned to direct engineering production of transmitting tubes, and to handle technolog]:)ersonnel relations. These sni^ervisoiw skills, along with their manufacturing processes, ical competence and the development of new projects, to oversee the

helped them greatly

in their

subsequent entrepreneurial

activities.'^

30

('hauler

I

Building Power Tube and Tube Machinery Businesses

The Cheat Depression had Heintz and Kimfman and credit was hard to get.

on Federal Telegraph and their power tube-making operations. Bank Sales of manufactured goods plummeted. IT&rT, a severe impact

and the small electronic corporations they controlled in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties were deeply affected by these economic conditions. In the early 1930s, IT&rT ran into the Dollar Steamship C'ompany,

severe financial difficulties. In 1931, to reduce solidated

its

its

operating

costs,

manufacturing operations on the East Coast.

Federal Telegraph, which technical staff to

it

New Jersey

had recently acquired,

to

move

at this time. Similarly, the

its

it

con-

forced

It

plant and

Dollar Steamship

Ck^mpany, Heintz and Kaufman’s parent company, experienced huge

To avoid bankruptcy. Dollar sharply cut its operating expenses. Dc^llar’s management forced Heintz and Kaufman to fire 75 percent of its fifty-odd workers in September 1930. Four months later. Dollar dismissed the remaining employees. Only Heintz and Eitel were retained to do maintenance work on Dollar’s radio system. In late 1931, Eitel was allowed to hire back McCullough and a few other employees to repair losses.

transmitting tubes. But their position remained precarious, as

dependent on the evolution of the

trans-Pacific trade

and

it

was

Dollar’s ship-

ping business.

The

economic conditions of the early 1930s compelled Litton, Eitel, and McCullough to start new businesses. WTen Eederal Telegraph moved to New Jersey, Litton, who had no interest in living in the East, dire

decided to

stay in California. In 1932, with |6,0()0 in savings,

he

lished a small proprietorship, Litton Engineering Laboratories. built a

Around

\’acuum tube shop on

same

his parents’

estab-

He

also

Redwood City. new commercial

property in

and McCullough built a business at Heintz and Kaufman. Their primaiT incentive was to create new revenue streams and thereby safeguard theirjobs. To generate these the

time, Eitel

monies, they commercialized a new transmitting tube, which they had

developed for their own use

in

amateur

under the Heintz and with the power-grid tubes that were radio,

Kaufman brand name. Dissatisfied then on the market, Eitel and McCaillough set out to engineer a ham radio tube for their own use in early 1932. They wanted to make a power tube that would be more reliable than the one marketed by RCA. The RCA tube had the added disadvantages of operating poorly at the veiT high frec|uencies and working only at low voltages. These were serious limitations for

ham

radio use. At the time, radio amateurs applied high

Defiant West

voltages to their tubes in order to get a liigh output.

31

I^y

doul)ling the volt-

age applied to the tube, they could increase the power

of their raclio fre-

quency

signal by a factor of 4.'^

To make a better tube, Eitel and McCaillough used the unique tools and processes they had developed for their first tube project at Heiiitz and Kitufmau. They assembled and sealed the tube directly on a glass lathe. They also used tantalum for the grid and the plates. But Eitel and McCullough also appropriated the latest vacuum tube innovations developed on the East (^oast. They used a new tube structure, developed at R(L\, that enabled the electrons to better focus on the plate. They also took advantage of the development of new cathodes at General Electric. In the early 1930s, engineers at GE devised new filaments made of thoriated tungsten. Thoriated filaments emitted more electrons than conventional cathodes. They also could last a long time, and they were resistant to high voltages. As a result of these design and processing choices, Eitefs and McCullough’s new power tube lasted longer and withstood higher voltages than R(>A’s products. Unlike

its

East Coast counterparts,

it

could

and veiT high frequencies. In other words, was an excellent amateur radio tube, as Eitel and McCullough soon ver-

also operate efficiently at high it

ified

by using in their

own

radio

transmitters.'^'’

and McCullough thought this tube would sell well in the ham radio market. They also felt that the time was ripe for commercializing power-grid tubes. RCA, GE, Western Electric, and Westinghouse had lost Eitel

some of

their control of

several of the

vacuum tube

technolog)' with the expiration of

most important tube patents

1930 the Department of

Commerce

filed

in the early 1930s. .\nd in

an antitrust lawsuit charging

RCW, GE, Western Electric, and Westinghouse with violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In its brief to the court, the government claimed that these corporations had conspired to restrain competition. According to the Department of Commerce, they had “continuously refused except on terms prescribed by them to grant licenses to any indix'iduals, firms,

engage

merce

or corporations for the purpose of enabling the latter to

in radio

communication, radio broadcasting, or

in radio apparatus,

independently or

defendants.” After 18 months of negotiations,

in

agreements were made non-exclusive.

RCA

GE and

com-

competition with the

RCA and

rations accepted to sign a consent decree by which

interstate

all

the other corpo-

the cross-licensing

Western Electric also

became an independent company manufacturing its own power tubes and radio equipment. Though RCA, Westinghouse, GE, and A’estern Electric divested themselves of

all

their

holdings. In addition, R(’A

32

('haf)ter

/

remained major players

more

in tlie

vaciuim tube business, they had to use

restraint vvlien dealing with their smaller competitors.

They could

not put them out ol business as easily as before (Sobel 198b; Maclaurin 1949).

Taking advantage of

this

change

in the legal

environment,

McCaillough convinced the Dollar Steamship ("ompany

Eitel

to allow

and

them

to

on the open market under the Heintz and Kiuifman name. They advertised their product in ham radio magazines and rapidly built a small tube business. But Eitel and McCaillough soon met substantial resistance from Dollar when they sought to expand the scope of their tube activities and introduce more products to the market. Dollar had no interest in building a substantial component business, which lay outside ol its core activities. It may also have been concerned about a possible lawsuit from RC^A. Dollar’s lack of interest in the ham radio tube business led Eitel and McCaillough to consider starting their own tube operation. Their determination to form a new firm was reinforced bv Dollar’s decision to lay off some of their subordinates in the tube shop in 1934. At this time, the Dollar Steamship Company suffered from a general strike on the San Francisco waterfront. This strike and the financial crisis that it brought about led Dollar’s managers to lay off 25 percent of Heintz and sell

their tube

j

Kiuifman’s workforce in the spring of 1934. In spite of its profitabilitv, the

tube shop saw Eitel later

its

manpower reduced by onedburth. “McCullough and

reminisced, “figured out that

ated, there was not veiT

our time tndng

to

much

if

that was the

future there.

We

I,”

way [Dollar] oper-

decided we were wasting

develop a complete line of tubes and market

them.”'^'

September 1934, Eitel and McCullough left Heintz and Kaufman to up their own transmitting tube corporation, Eitel-McCullough Inc.,

In set

with the financial support of two small businessmen, Walter Preddey

Bradshaw Harrison. Harrison was

a real-estate agent

Preddey operated a chain of movie theaters to the

each

how

in

in

and

San Bruno;

San Francisco. According

terms of the agreement, Harrison and Preddev invested $2,500

in the partnership,

to the table.

The

and

first

Eitel

profits

and McCullough brought were

to

their

know-

be shared equally between the

two investors until they had reached $2,500;

Eitel

and McCullough then

would become equal partners. Preddey was the president,

Eitel a vice-

president.'^”

Establishing

Depression was

shrank

in

a

power tube business

risky

if

not foolhardy.

the

midst of the (heat

The market

for transmitting tubes

in

the early 1930s. Furthermore, in spite of the partial breakup of

the radio monopoly, RC A, CE,

and Westinghouse thoroughly dominated

33

Df'fianl Wksl

tlie

main markets

for

power

tulx*s

used

in

commercial

i)i'oadcasting

and

long-distance radio comimmicalion. lb survive in this inauspicious emi-

and Mc(aillough focused on niche markets, which large East (>>ast firms did not fully control. To compete in these markets, Eitel, Litton, and McTiullough emphasized quality, customer service, and technological innovation (esj)ecially through the development ronment, Litton,

of

Eitel,

new manufacturing

series of products,

They adjusted

processes).

The entrepreneurs

which met the multifaceted needs

also introduced a

customers.

of their

new business opportunities and exploited them aggressively. Following the practices they had started at Federal Telegraph and Heintz and Kaufinan, Litton, Eitel, and McCullough also cooperated closely. Litton helped Eitel and McCullough set up their own vacuum tube shop by giving them the castings and engineering blueprints of his glass lathe. This gift enabled Eitel and McCullough to construct their own high-quality glass lathe at low cost. In the next few years, Litton, Eitel, and Mcfaillough freely exchanged technical and comflexibly to

mercial information in order to reduce the

manufacturing

risks,

many

risks,

including the

associated with the running of small tube-related

businesses.

Litton Engineering Laboratories had a difficult start

lapsed in the early

193()s. “Litton,”

and nearly

col-

an employee recalled, “was struggling

very desperately. That was at the depth of the Depression.

He

struggled,

making various tubes, doing a little bit of research work and development work, and so forth, some for RC^A and some for Federal Telegraph. He had to scrounge around and look for business.”^" Litton’s situation started to imj^rove in 1935. At this time,

demand among

East Coast tube manufacturers for the glassworking

apparatus he had invented instance, asked

New Jersey

him

to

Federal Telegraph. Federal Telegraph, for

at

produce precision glassworking equipment for

plant. Similarly,

RCA and

from Litton Engineering. As in

of glass lathes

glass lathes

and other

for precision glassworking

designed four different types

shop

})ieces

of

transmitting tubes of a specific seal irregularly

equipment, IJtton

of glass lathes in close consultation with

East Coast manufacturing concerns.

later

its

tube manufacturing.^'

To meet the demand

could

Westinghouse ordered

a result, Litton re-oriented his small

toward the design and production

machineiT used

he discovered that there was a

size.

Each lathe was de\'eloped

Latton also developed a

shaped tubes.

A manager

at Litton

to

make

machine

that

Engineering

reported that “each year, as new tubes were developed, changes in

the design of the glass working lathes were

made

by Litton Engineering

34

(]h(if)(er I

Laboratories.

New

type glass working lathes were designed

and manufac-

tured and consultations with leading tube manufacturers were held to obtain

their reactions

requirements

of' its

to

To meet the

proposed design changes.

customers, Latton produced high-quality glass lathes.

and produced with the utmost precision. To enable the fabrication of advanced tubes, the lathes had tolerances on the order of 0.001 inch very unusual in machine-shop

These machines were

carefully designed

—

practice at the time.

These machines were

also characterized by their

near-perfect alignments.^-' Litton later diversified into the manufacture 193(S,

he designed and constructed a new

pressure

oil as its

punij),

c:)f

vacuum pumps.

In

which used low-vapor-

evacuating medium. Until then, most

vacuum pumps

on mercuiT. MerciiiT pumps required, among other disadvantages, that the mercuiT vapor traps be cooled by liquid air. This made them bulky and ineffective. Lhilike its mercun-based counterparts,

relied

Litton’s

vapor

oil

pump

was compact.

It

also operated at higher

speed

and made possible the attainment of higher vacuum. Because low-vaporpressure

oils

were not available on the market, Litton invented a new

distillation apjDaratus

and produced

mercial brand of motor small manufacturing

oil.

his

own pumping

oil

out of a com-

Exploiting these inventions, Litton built a

equipment

business.

By the

late

1930s,

Litton

Engineering devoted 90 percent of its activity to equipment manufacture. The other 10 percent was devoted to tube development and consulting, notably for Eederal Telegraph. .$2r7,000 in sales

and employed

five

By 1939, Litton Engineering had

machinists.

on the design and production of glass and vacuum pumps, Eitel and McCaillough oriented their new

W'hile Litton concentrated lathes

business toward the production of transmitting tubes. Their objective was to

manufacture high-quality tubes for radio amateurs.

Eitel

and

.Mc(aillough viewed product reliability and performance as key to survival

in

the

ham

radio

business

—for

a

number

of reasons.

Eitel-

compete with the tube they had developed themselves at Heintz and Kaufman, .\fter Eitel’s and McCaillough’s de|)arture, the managers of the Dollar Steamship Company actively commercialized the tube the pair had recently designed for radio amateurs. Eitel and Mc('aillough also faced direct competition in the radio-amateur market from RUA., from CiE, from Raytheon, and from Tavlor Tubes (a new Chicago-based venture). In addition to their brand names, financial resources, and intellectual property rights, these firms had a definite cost McCaillough had

to

advantage over Eitel-McCaillough; they were located close to their mar-

35

Ih'lhnil West

kets

had

and material suppliers and, real handicaj^s to

as a lesull,

overcome

in

had lower shipping

company on

building [a

Francisco Peninsula],” Fitel later reflected.

had

“\A'e

costs. “V\'e

to shij)

the San

onr goods

we had to pay disproportionately many of the commodities we tised for production. We had

further, to the big centers of use; there

high costs for

to learn to offer

something better

to the world.”''’

In addition to these competitive pressures, Kitel

a further incentive to

produce

and Mc(>nllongh had

high-qnalit)’ products.

were the most demanding users of power tubes

mid

They increase the power out-

in the

applied veiy high voltages to their components to

Radio amateurs 19S0s.

put of their transmitters. Radio amateurs also recjuired tubes, which

operated efficiently

in the short-wave

portion of the radio spectrum. In

1936, 82 percent of all radio amateurs in the United States used high

f

re-

quencies. Another 10 percent were active in the veiy-high-frequency (\'HF) band.'"’

To compete with RCA and Heintz and Kaufman and to meet the reliability and performance requirements of radio amateurs, Eitel and McCaillough concentrated their efforts on improving manufacturing. They perfected the processing techniques they had developed at Heintz and Kiuif man and devised new ones. In particular, they developed a novel sealing and a.ssembly technique, which relied heavily on the use of Litton ’s glass lathe. The new assembly procedure worked as follows: using their glass lathe, Eitel and McCullough first sealed the plate to the top of the glass envelope. They would then hold the filament and grid on one head of the glass lathe while attaching the glass enveloj)e and plate assembly to the other. The grid was aligned with the plate by carefully melting the glass stem to which the filament and grid were attached. In the final step of the process the two heads were joined together, which

allowed the insertion of the grid

at the

center of the plate. This was an

important technique and one of Eitel-Mc(aillough’s most closely

guarded

secrets.

This technique enabled the close spacing of the tube

elements. Because the spacing of the cathode, grid, and plate was closely related to tube performance, this process

made

possible the fabrication

of VHF transmitting tubes.

The dose alignment of the tube elements

enabled radio amateurs

operate the tube

Paralleling

this

to

at

new assembly technique,

also

high voltages.^" Eitel

and McCaillough

designed a highly efficient system to evacuate transmitting tubes.

I

heir

svstem enabled them to outgas the power tubes thoroughly and thereby create

a

very

high vacuum. At Heintz and Kaufman,

McCTillough had removed the occluded gases

in

Eitel

and

the tube’s metallic

36

('.haptn

I

parts by shooting electrons at

tlie

and the

grid

plate. Electrons

emitted

by the filament would heat a tube’s elements to remove the occluded gases (gases that were contained in the tube’s metallic parts before

operation). This technique, however, did not drive

The

all

its

the gases out of

would receive fewer electrons than the plate and, as a result, would be heated to lower temperatures. To attain identical temperatures for both the plate and the grid, Eitel and McCnlloiigh devised the grid.

grid

new technique. They heated the grid and then alternately bombarded the grid and

a

the plate separately.

They

the plate with electrons,

thereby effecting the independent but concurrent heating of the plate

and the

grid.

As a

temperatures, and

This

result, all

new technique, soon patented by

The new procedure

oughly for greater

at

veiy high

occluded gases were eliminated from the tube.

major process innovation. ture.

both elements were maintained

It

and McCnllongh, was a decreased the time and cost of manufac-

also

made

it

Eitel

possible to evacuate tubes thor-

reliability.^^

These new manufacturing techniques enabled

Eitel

and McCullough

power triodes (tubes with three elecradio amateurs. They first produced the 150T, an improved

to design a series of high-quality

trodes) for

had developed at Heintz and small and a large version of this

version of the amatenr-market tube they Kaufman.^-'

They

tube to

differing needs of radio amateurs. Because of their unique

fill

also

developed both a

jjrocessing, Eitel-McCnlloiigh’s tubes

and had better

were substantially more reliable

electrical characteristics

ket (including the radio tube they

than products then on the mar-

had designed

Eitel-McCnllongh’s tubes operated efficiently

at at

Heintz and Kaufman). the high frequencies.

They could resist tremendous overloads and were characterized by long lifetimes. The average life of a power tube was then between 600 and 1,000 hours. Eitel-McCaillongh’s tubes could In 1936 the firm introduced

more powerful

last as

long as 20,000 hours.

tubes for airline radio trans-

and McCAilloiigh distributed their tubes through manufacturing representati\es and ham radio shops. They also actively ad\'ertised their jDrodncts in QSI] the journal of the Amateur Radio Relay League, mission. Eitel

and

in RadioJ'^^

Eitel-Mc(aillongh’s tubes soon gained wide acceptance

among

radio

amateurs and small manufacturers of aircraft radio equipment. By 1937,

and half to radio amateurs. It was also highly profitable, which enabled Eitel and McCnllongh to finally become full partners. To meet the growing demand for their products, Eitel and McCaillongh gradually enlarged their workforce. the firm’s sales reached $100,000, half to airlines

De/idtil West

31

3000 watts or 20 times the normal plate dissipation of this EIIVfAC

150T was neces-

sary to melt this tantalum

anode.

•

Absolutely no gas

was released during

this tre-

mendous overload! • EIMAC exclusive exhausting process

permits an unconditional guarantee of complete free-

dom from gas during tube life.

BUY EIMAC EITEL-MCCULLOUGH, INC. PLAY SAFE

-

San Bruno, California, U.

S. A.

At Leading Dealers Everywhere Figure 1.3

An advertisement

featuring Eitel-McCiillough’s

(x)urtesy of Varian, Inc.

first

tube, the

15()T (1936).

3S

('Ji(if)ter I

Tlie two entrepreneurs

had started

tlie

hrni with just

one meclianic

in

To fill the new positions, Eitel and McC'aillough relied almost exclusively on the electronics hobbyists they had met at radio clubs on the San Francisco Peninsula. Radio amateurs had the skills Eitel and McCaillough needed; familiarity with transmitting tubes and expertise in the design of radio systems. Furthermore, they had an intimate knowledge of Eitel-McCullough’s ham radio market. As their new hires had no prior knowledge of vacuum tube practice, Eitel and McCullough trained them on the job in glass blowing, assembly, evacuation, and .sealing. As a result of the founders’ employment and training practices, Eitel-McCullough was an unusual firm. Most of the employees were in their early twenties. The culture of amateur radio was influential. Technical re.sourcefulness and innovation were valued highly. Other important characteristics were camaraderie, competitiveness, and a democratic ideology. 1934.

Three years

later,

they had 15 employees.

Wartime Expansion In the late 193()s, because of

growing threats

to international

peace from

japan and Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administra-

and naval power, expanding the Army and the Navy and procuring new airplanes, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. A significant aspect of this rearmament effort was the development and deployment of an entirely new electronic system: radio detection and ranging (radar). This new .system came out of secret research programs in short-wave radio at the Naval Research Laboratory' (NRl.) and the tion rebuilt

American

military

Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories (SCEL) at Fort Jersey. In the late 1920s, radio

engineers

Monmouth, New

at these militaiy laboratories dis-

covered that ships and airplanes reflected high-frequency radio This finding had great militaiy potential: location of

enemy

ships

and airplanes

it

promised the detection and

at great distances.

their strength in short-wave radio, engineering ries

developed experimental radar systems

tems used \44F radio pulses the.se

groups

in the

mid

Building on

at these laborato-

1930s.

These

.sys-

approaching airplanes. Though

radar sets hel])ed identify incoming aircraft, they could only do

at close

Zahl

to detect

signals.

range

(\'an

Keuren 1994;

Alli.son 1981;

Gebhard

.so

1979; Page 1988;

1972).'^“

To extend the reach of engineering groups could function

at

at

their radar systems to 100 miles or

NRL and

high voltages.

SC'.EL

The

more, the

needed transmitting tubes

that

transmitting tubes for radar had to

I)efi(nil

()j)erate

momentary

with

normal voltage

tlie

voltages

apj^lied to radio

tubes also had to work effleientlv

tubes

many thousands

manufactured by

RC'.A,

at

39

\\'('sl

than

of volts liigher

eonnmmieation

tubes.

I’he

radar

verv high frequencies. Noiu* of the

Westinghouse, Western

Klectric,

or

Raytheon met these requirements. Only the new Eitel-Mc(aillough tube,

which the firm introduced

to the

amateur market

in

1937, had the

desired performance and reliability characteristics. Engineers

and

SC'>EL,

procured

who knew about

the tube through their

from electronics parts dealers on the East

it

incorporated

it

.\llison 1981;

Ciebhard 1979; Page 1988; Zahl 1972).

In

December

to adapt

ham

its

NRE and

NRE

radio activities,

and soon Keuren 1994;

(x)ast

into their exj^erimental radar systems (\'an

1937,

at

SC'EE engineers asked Eitel-Mc(aillough

tubes to the specific requirements of their radar systems.

and McCaillough to make modifications to their transmitting tubes so that these tubes would better fit the electrical characteristics of their radar circuits. To better understand the radar svstems, Eitel

They wanted

Eitel

and Mcfaillough

visited the militaiw laboratories

Out of

their requirements.

these discussions

and conferred about

came two

of Eitel-McCaillough’s amateur tube. Because the

different versions

SCEL engineers wanted

tubes with short leads, Eitel and McCaillough changed the tube’s shape

and lead arrangement. The new tube had a rectangular envelope. Its leads came from each side of the glass envelope rather than from extremities. Eitel

its

the

same tube

When

and McCaillough

for the

hostilities

also

developed another version of

Na\y.'’'^

began

in

Europe, the

Army and

the Na\y decided to

bring their prototype radar systems to production and oj^ened bidding for

manufacture of the radar systems

that

had been developed

at

NRE

and at SCEL. The militaiy services selected R(’A and Western Electric to do the job. The award of these production contracts to RCA and Western Electric created both an opportunity and a challenge for EitelMcCaillough. It opened a large potential market for the firm’s radar tubes. But Eitel-McCAillough Electric to use

its

would have

to

RCA and

Western

A and Western

Electric,

convince

tubes in their radar systems. RC

which produced their own power-grid tubes, had no transmitting tubes from Eitel-McCaillough.

interest in

They wanted

buying

to use their

own

tubes in their radar transmitters. Only the steadfast support of radar engi-

NRE and SCTiT helped Eitel and McCaillough secure large sulv contracts from RCA and Western Electric in the summer of 1940. The tube orders they received from RCA and Western Electric were signifineers

at

cant indeed for a firm as small as Eitel-McCaillough. Western Electric, for

40

('ll apin' I

example, ordered annual

1

tubes for $500,000

(),()()()

—

five

limes die company’s

sales in 1959."’^

These large orders created considerable dissension between

McCullough and

their

financial

backers. Walter Preddey,

helped finance the firm’s formation and who was its

going into high-quantity production for the

ried that these large militaity contracts

dent on a few customers.

He

execute such large contracts.

also

On

its

Eitel

and

who had

president,

militaity services.

opposed

He

wor-

would make the firm too depen-

thought the firm was not ready to

the other hand, Eitel, McCullough,

and

the other investor, Bradshaw Harrison, were eager to transform Eitel-

They forced Preddey to resign from the presidency of Eitel-McCullough in December 1939. Eitel replaced him as president, and McCullough became the firm’s vice-president. In May 1941, Preddey sold his shares to Eitel and McCullough for $57,5()(). Eitel and McCullough were now in full control of their business."’'’ In 1940 and the first half of 1941, to meet RCA’s and Western Electric’s large orders for radar tubes, Eitel and McCullough converted their firm to volume production. With financing from the Bank of America, they constructed a new plant in San Bruno. Eitel and McCullough also greatly expanded their workforce, from 17 employees in July 1940 to 125 in May 1941 and to 170 in July 1941. The entrepreneurs hired local radio amateurs and machinists. (There were many precision machinists in the Bay Area, many of Swiss or German origin.) As Eitel and McCullough soon exhausted the supply of radio amateurs on the Peninsula, they increasingly hired women for delicate assembly operations such as the making of grids, plates, and filaments. To train and manage the fast-growing workforce, Eitel and McCullough relied heavily on the crew of radio amateurs they had assembled in the 1930s. These men instructed the new hires in the complex techniques of power tube production. They also built large departments around specific manufacturing processes such as pumping, glass working, and assembly.'^'’ In 1939 and 1940, labor unions based in San Erancisco sought to organize the plant. The Bay Area was the largest and most active center of McCullough

into a larger operation.

trade unionism in the western United States. ticularly

Its

labor unions were par-

powerful and militant. They were also eager to extend their sway

on the Peninsula. Unwilling to relinquish control of the shop floor to union organizers, Eitel and McCaillough fought vigorously against the unions. To thwart these organization efforts, they adopted managerial techniques that had been developed in the 193()s at Eastman Kodak, at Sears, Roebuck, at Thomson Products, and at other to the electronics industry

//

Ih'lia}il Wf'.sl

large corporations.

These

sought to define the world

of

employer and emj)loyee, hut tions

work not in

would be distributed

programs,

Fiitel

to

jol)

its

in the

of'

firm.

To do

a j:)ortion of the

set uj) a

hey

between so, these

They also

company’s

medical unit, and a cafe-

December 1939

that transferred one-third

the plant in the

kiitel

they instituted a

each year’s profits to

of'

and Mc(ailloiigh

to

keep the

larger workforce

and the

194()s.'’"

much

In conjunction with the hiring of a

development of new personnel

I

employees. lns])ired by these corpo-

the employees. These policies enabled

labor unions out

same

whereby

and McCaillough

program

a sharj) divide

security to their emj)loyees.

teria that offered subsidized meals. In

profit-sharing

in nature.

terms of cooperation and mutual obliga-

established j^rofit-sharing programs, profits

terms of

in

between managers and workers

corporations gave pensions and

ratist

were corpoialist

teclinicjues

j)ractices, Eitel

and McCaillough reengi-

neered their radar tubes and their manufacturing processes. Producing radar tubes in quantip', as Eitel and McCullough soon discovered, was particularly difficult. tion.

The

tubes regularly failed after 50 hours of opera-

The high peak powers required by radar

elements

to

unprecedented temperatures. As

the filaments would evaporate grids

out

and deposit

would emit electrons, which led

the plates. of'

systems heated

To

solve this problem, Eitel

platinum, a material

known

as a

to

itself

a result, the

on the

They would

short the filaments

when

in large quantities,

process

and

in

it

had

grids. In turn, the

new

grids lacked rigid-

and thereby ruin the

the firm started to

in

and McCaillough made the grids poor emitter of electrons. The use

McCaillough also discovered that their seals would tures. Finally,

thorium

uncontrolled current flows to

of platinum eliminated electron emission, but the iU'.

up the tube

make

difficulty in

tubes. Eitel

fail at

and

high tempera-

thoriated tungsten filaments

maintaining uniformity

producing filaments with

comparable

in the

electrical

characteristics.’^^

To

tackle these difficulties, Eitel

and McCaillough exj)anded the

firm’s

research laboratoiy, which they had established in 1938 to develoj)

new

They also hired some chemistr\' graduates from the Lhiiversity of Cialifornia, and some inventive radio amateurs. These men concentrated their efforts on the reliabilip’ j^roblems of radar tubes. To develop non-emitting grids, the laboratoip’s chemists developed a new gridmaking process. They coated molybdenum wires with carbon, j)latinum, and zirconium, and later they sintered these elements into the wires in a products.

high-temperature furnace. Cirids fabricated with

this

process were

mechanically strong and emitted fewer electrons than the standard grids.

42

(IhdfHer

I

Eitel-McCkillough chtMiiisls also jDcrfectcd

and worked out

men developed

tantalum

made

a

in the tubes’ plates. Pyrovac,

zirconium and carbon, absorbed gases as a result,

filainent-niaking {process

a series of j)rocedures that could be followed by inexpe-

rienced operators. Finally, these to replace

tlic

much

new

material, Pyrovac,

which was made out

of

better than tantalum and,

possible the fabrication of tubes with

much

longer

lives.

These important process innovations were carefully patented. The new manufacturing processes enabled the firm

produce

to

reliable radar

tubes in quantity and to obtain good manufacturing yields. (The yield

is

coming out of the manufacturing line.) In turn, these tubes enabled the Ainiy and the Navy to deploy a significant number of radar systems in late 1940 and the first half of 1941."’^ The rapid expansion of Eitel-McCullough and the growing militaiy the proportion of good products

j

demand

encouraged others

for transmitting tubes

grid tube business. In

May

to enter the

power-

1941, Charles Litton, Philip Scofield,

and

Ralph Shermund established a new power tube corporation, Industrial

and Commercial Electronics (ICE). At Stanford, Litton had befriended Scofield and Shermund through their common interest in amateur

Shermund, who had graduated from Stanford with a bachelor’s degree in bacteriology', had gained substantial experience in tube manufacturing. Because of a recommendation from Litton, Shermund found a job at Raytheon, a Massachusettsbased tube maker. He later directed Heintz and Kaufman’s tube shop after Eitel’s and McCullough’s departure in 1934. After several years at Heintz and Kiiufman, Shermund, like his predecessors, ran into difficulties with Dollar’s management. He sought to convince Dollar to spin out the tube shop and sell it to him to no avail. Seeing the great commercial potential of power-grid tubes, Shermund decided to leave Heintz and Kaufman and start a company of his own. Litton soon joined the project. radio. In the

second half of the

193()s,

—

He was

he could not jjroduce power-grid tubes

that his

keenly interested in the power-grid tube business, but he knew

own name.

in his

own shop and under

Litton Engineering supplied glass lathes

and other pieces

of manufacturing equipment to most makers of transmitting tubes.

Producing power tubes under the Litton label would make him compete directly with his his

own customers and would soon

ecjuipment business. Investing

creetly

I(>E

and

assisting

Shermund

dis-

on the manufacturing side of the business would permit Litton

partici|)ate in the financial

his

in

lead to the downfall of

own

rewards of tube manufacture without losing

glass lathe business. Litton,

a third of the

new

to

corporation.''"

Shermund, and

Scofield each

owned

Df'fianl WesI

In the suininer of 1941,

Shennuncl and Litton incoiporated the new

organization and built a tnhe-inaking shoj) inent

came from

program

Litton Engineering).

for their

'^3

employees

—mostly

(Litton Engineering Laboratories also

(all

the inanufaeturing ecjuip-

They

also set

as a

way

up

a profit-sharing

to avoid lal)or unrest.

had a profit-sharing plan, which

gave half of the profits to the employees.) Thanks to Litton’s reputation

and

his

wide contacts

in the L^S electronics industiT,

he and Shermimd

soon received contracts from Bendix and the Na\y for the manufacture N'acuum relays and power-grid tubes. Litton worked

supenising

ttibe

at ICT.

of

Uvo days a week,

production and working on manufacturing processes.

He

and Shermund had a business running by the end of the year.'’’ The attack on Pearl Harbor led to expansion of the transmitting tube companies on the San Francisco Peninsula. The Army and the Na\y procured and deployed tens of thousands of high-frequency radar systems

They also built a worldwide network of radio communication stations. These systems required millions of transmitting tubes every year. Eitel-McCullough, ICE, and Heintz and Kaufman, with their competence in the manufacture of reliable tubes, benefited from the enormous growth in the militaiy demand for transmitting tubes. They were inundated by tube orders from the Navy and the Army, and also from prime military contractors such as RCA, Bendix, CE, Hallicrafters, and Wilcox Electric. For example, ICE received a large number of production orders for power-grid ttibes from the Navy and the Army. These tubes had often been designed elsewhere, including at EitelMcCullough. Because Litton became the manager of Federal Telegraph’s vacuum tube division in November 1942, it was Shermund who ran ICE during much of the war.*’- Under Shermund’s direction, ICE expanded during the

first

rapidly. Its sales

years of the war.

grew from $51,142

in

1942 to $1,333,693 in 1944. By that

hundred employees. It was also enormously profitable. With sales of $81 7, ()()() in 1943, ICE had a net profit of $305,693. Similarly, in spite of recurrent managerial infighting, Heintz and Kaufman expanded substantially during the war. By January 1943, Heintz and Kaufman had 300 employees.'’-^ But it was Eitel-McCaillough that benefited the most from the explodtime,

ing

ICE had

demand

several

for transmitting tubes during the war. After Pearl Harbor,

Eitel-McCullough received very large orders for

The

its

transmitting tubes.

firm also secured second-source })roduction contracts for comj)o-

nents designed by Ceneral Electric and other East Caiast manufacturers (including receiving tubes that could operate at very high frequencies).

These huge orders led

Eitel

and McCaillough

to

expand

their workforce

44

In'

Chdpter

I

20 Ix'tween Pearl Harbor and mid 1943. By the

a lactor of

summer

of

1943 they employed 3,000 operatois and technicians. Extensive training

programs

for supervisors,

foremen, and operators were needed. In con-

junction with the rapid growth of

expanded

its

plant in San Brnno.

its

workforce, Eitel-McCaillongh hastily

It

opened

also

a

new factory in Salt this new plant came

The primary impetus for the hnilding of from the military services. The services were concerned about EitelMcCnllongh’s proximitv to the Pacific (k)ast, which made it vulnerable Lake

City.

to a japane.se attack. In the spring of 1942, Eitel

the

The

of the

site

Salt

new

factory.

The

and McCnllongh chose

plant was operational by August 1942.

Lake Caty plant was financed by the Defense Plant Corporation

(a federal

agency recently established

to

fund the construction of man-

nfactnring plants for the war effort) and was 'owned by the federal

govern men t.'’^

To handle ma.ss production of power-grid tubes, Eitel, McCnllongh, and their a.ssociates thoroughly transformed their manufacturing methods. In particular, they reinforced the production-control function. They set lip a traffic department to schedule and expedite the flow of materials, tube elements, and semi-assembled tubes thronghont the plant. In an effort to better control

also split ple, in

punch Eitel

np

manufacturing, Eitel-McCnllongh’s management

large production departments into smaller ones. For

exam-

1943 the as.sembly department was divided into three divisions: press, grid

making, and plate

and Mc(Aillongh

also

assembly.'’"’

mechanized the manufacture of power-grid

tubes. Until that time, transmitting tube

manufacture had been,

to a

large degree, a craft-based activity requiring highly skilled workers.

mechanize the production of power

tubes, Eitel

mechanical engineers with solid experience

Many had worked

in local

To

and McCnllongh hired

in

machine-tool design.

shops producing machine tools for canneries

and other Bay Area industrial establishments. .Among the production bottlenecks they mechanized were the exhaust process and the fabrication of grids.

The

be delicately

lattei'

was a very labor-intensive operation. Each grid had to

wound and

spot welded. Becan.se the production of a single

grid required tens of operations, Eitel-McCaillongh’s grid

could not meet the the firm n.sed

demand

more than

for

its

department

products. At the peak of production,

250, OOO grids per

month. The mechanical engi-

neers developed a machine that could automatically produce grids of

remarkable uniformity Eitel,

in

huge

quantities.'’'’

Mc(aillongh, and the head of the

pump department

designed an

ingenious machine to evacuate and de-gas transmitting tubes. “We used

45

Di'f untl \\ )'sl

stand

recalled,

j)iinips,” Eitel lalei

“when onr volume was

small.

[

I

he

pumps] were arranged in rows and one operator could man four sections, which at most meant sixteen tubes. This was a bottleneck because skilled operators were required to constantly monitor and adjust the current to the tubes. There was no way we could have attained the volume necessaiT to meet onr commitments with that system.”''" To solve this /

/

problem, Eitel-McC'adlongh’s rounders invented a rotary exhaust machine. This machine was made

of sixteen

exhaust setups attached to a

vacuum pumps. The rotaiy machine could evacuate 768 tubes in 24 hours and could be tended bv a relatively unskilled worker. Because the exhaust schedules weie pre-pi ogrammed, the operator’s only task was to seal the ttibes on the exhaust setup and seal them off when the wheel had made its revolution. As a result of these and other innovations, Eitel, McCullough, and rotaiy wheel. Each setuj)

their associates

tubes per

peak

of

were able

month

in

had

to raise j^roduction rates

mid 1941

production, in

five

to 150,0()() tubes

late 1943,

from a few thousand

per month

in 1943.

At the

Eitel-McCullough had sales revenues of

about $2 million a month. By the end of World War

11,

Eitel-McCullough,

having manufactured more than 3 million transmitting tubes for militaiy ap|)lications,

and by

was one of the largest

US manufacturers

far the largest electronics firm

of vacuum tubes

on the San Francisco

Peninsula."''

Because of large orders from Eitel-McCullough and other transmitting tube firms, in

L.itton

Engineering grew substantially

1939 to 85 employees

demand

for

its

—from a few machinists

in 1944.’" In early 1942, to

lathes, Eitton built a

new

plant in

meet the growing

Redwood

City

and

tooled up for larger-scale production. Litton also transformed the orga-

Whereas lathes had been built one at a time in the firm produced batches of standard machines during the

nization of production.

the 193()s, war.

As a

result,

its

output increased substantially. Before 1940, Litton

Engineering fabricated fewer than 10

produced 222. These

lathes

glass lathes a year; in

1943,

it

were allocated by the War Production Board

R(W, M'estinghouse, Raytheon, Heintz and Kaufman, Western Electric, (iE, Sperry Ciyroscope, and Federal Telegraph. By making possible a dramatic surge in the production of power to Eitel-McCullough, ICE,

tubes, they played an important part in the

war

effort.’’

Postwar Crisis and Renewal

.Mter the

enormous boom brought about by the

experienced a

difficult

transition

to

war, the Peninsula firms

peacetime production. In the

46

('li(if)tn' I

iiiiniediate

postwar period, Litton Faigineering saw

orders for tube

its

machinery decline. But the power-grid tube firms were even liarder than Litton Engineering. Starting

which had large inventories jDrodnction contracts

it

of

in

March

hit

1944, the Signal C'.orps,

power-grid tubes, canceled

many

of the

had placed with Eitel-McCullough, ICE, and

Heintz and Kaufman. As a direct result of these contract cancellations, Eitel

and McCaillough

laid off 1,100

workers and closed their

Salt

Lake

With the capitulation of Japan, the military services canceled most of their remaining contracts with tube manufacturers. As a result,

C'itv

plant.

vacuum tube corporations drastically reduced their workforce. By December 1945, Eitel-McCullough had only 390 employees, a far cry from the 3,600 it had had in mid 1943. ICE and Heintz and Kiiufman also slashed their workforces.

But the worst was

dumped

still

to

come. Starting

in late

1945, the militan'

enormous inventories of surplus vacuum tubes on the market. Radio amateurs and manufacturers of electronics equipment could now buy advanced vacuum tubes for roughly 10 percent of their original price. As a result, Eitel-McCullough, ICE, and Heintz and Kaufman saw their tube sales decline to almost nothing in late 1945 and 1946. The military essentially killed the market. ICE and Heintz and Kitufman never recovered. ICE, also weakened by fights between Shermiind and Litton its

over stock ownership, went bankrupt in 1949. After years of anemic

Heintz and Kaufman closed

down

sales,

in 1953."“

Eitel-McCullough survived and prospered by developing a new line

new tubes made

components produced during the war obsolete. Eor example, Eitel and McCullough introduced new triodes to the market in late 1945 and 1946. They also commercialized a family of power tetrodes that could operate at verv high frequencies. A tetrode (a tube with four electrodes) had the usual plate, cathode, and control grid. In addition, it had a screen grid, which helped screen or isolate the control grid from the plate. With this additional grid, a tetrode had lower capacitance than a triode. The screen gi id also had an electron-accelerating effect and increased the gain draof

power-grid tube products. These

the

matically. In other words, tetrodes amplified signals better than triodes.

Eitel-McCnllough engineers had designed their in

1941. But after Pearl Harbor, they

duration

of the war.

When

it

first

had shelved

became imperative

to

four-electrode tube this

design for the

introduce new prod-

ucts to the market, Eitel-McCaillongh engineers resurrected this tube

design. In 1945 tetrodes."'^

and 1946, these men

also

engineered more powerful

47

Dffiartl West

The more powerful

modulation) radio broadcasting had been developed

Edwin Armstrong, an independent inventor.

AM

over

interference,

(less static, less station

of a wide range of tones), late

The war

193()s.

Numerous

FM

tetrodes found a ready market.

FM

years,

radio had

more

little

the 1930s by

in

In sj)ite of

(frec|uency

its

advantages

reproduction

faithful

commercial success

in the

however, brought a surge of interest.

business groups applied to the Federal (x)mmunications

(T)mmission for licenses to the war. In the

last

set

up

FM

radio broadcasting stations after

years of the war, the growing

demand

for

FM

equip-

ment led many electronics firms to develop FM radio transmitters and the vacuum tubes they required. But in June 1945, in a surprise decision, the FCC> decided to change the frequency band it had allocated for FM radio from 42-50 megacycles to 88-108 megacycles.

pected

at

the time that the FC(^

made

this

It

was widely

decision at the request of

sus-

AM

radio stations and the Radio Corporation of America, which wanted to thwart or at least slow

had the immediate

down

FM radio. The FCC decision FM transmitters that had been

the adoption of

effect of

making the

developed during the war obsolete. Electronics firms had to design new

FM

They

transmitters capable of operating at ver)' high frequencies.

also

needed new power-grid tubes for them.”^ The decision of the FCC had the unanticipated consequence of creating a large market for Eitel-McCullough’s new line of power tetrodes. Eitel-McCullough’s products were among the rare vacuum tubes on the market that had the frequency and power characteristics needed for the

new FM radio

transmitters. Eitel-McCullough also benefited

from

had acquired during the war among many electronic system designers for making high-quality products. As a result, many system firms chose to design their FM radio transmitters around Eitelthe reputation

it

McCullough’s tetrodes. transmitter designs to

When

these corporations

volume production

(in

moved

new

their

194b and 1947),

Eitel

and

McCullough received large orders for their power-grid tubes. Not surprisingly, the commercial succe.ss of Eitel-McCullough’s tetrodes encouraged R(>A, GE, and other companies to produce similar tubes. To protect their sales, Eitel and McCullough sued these corporations for patent

infringement.

Because of the strong patent position

Eitel-

McCullough had acquired during the war, Eitel and McCaillough won the patent lawsuits and forced RC’A and CiE to halt the production of tetrodes. Exploiting their victory for

RCA and GE buy their products and own brand names. RCA and CiE had become

preneurs their

commercial advantage, the entre-

let

resell

them under

Eitel-McCaillough’s

~fiS

(le

('.haf)ter I

facto distributors. Tliese conuiicrcial

and

legal victories

McCaillough the largest American manufacturer In 1947, with sales of

about $1.5 million,

cent of the LfS market for power-grid

it

of'

made

Eitel-

transmitting tubes.

controlled

more than 40

per-

tubes.'"’

Conclusion

on Eitel-McCaillough’s rise to prominence in the 19.3()s and Jack McCullough attributed its success to its ahilitv' to meet

Reflecting

the 194()s,

component needs of new electronics

the

were able

to supply the missing link.

tubes used in radar and in ply reliable

EM

that first

radio.” Eitel-McCullough’s ability to sup-

and other was predicated on

high-performance power-grid tubes for radar

advanced systems (including its

“We were the ones For instance, we made the systems:

EM

radio transmitters)

sets

unique assemblage of competencies. Because of their training

amateur tise in

radio, Eitel,

McCullough, and their employees had

electronic circuit

and system design. They

in

solid exper-

also acquired

compe-

tence in high-vacuum processing and electron tube manufacturing.

and McCullough developed some of these processing methods at Heintz and Kaufman in order to bypass RCA’s patents. They then improved upon them to meet the requirements of radio amateurs, and later to meet the requirements of the radar-development groups at the Naval Research Laboratory and at the Signal C.orps Engineering Laboratories. They also made innovative use of Litton’s advanced tubemaking equipment. Eitel-McCullough’s manufacturing processes had no counterparts on the East Coast. East Coast engineers who had visited Eitel-McCullough’s San Bruno factory during the war had been struck by the unusual production methods. “Engineers from Westinghouse,” Eitel later recalled, “came to our plant to familiarize themselves with our production methods. .Mter they had gone through our plant and saw how we made our tubes, we met with them to see if they had any questions on our methods. One engineer spoke up and commented that we could not make tubes the way we were making them! Everything he saw in our plant was Eitel

foreign to

him and he was unable

making.”''’

With

tise,

and

its

its

comprehend our approach

innovations in tube manufacturing,

its

to tube

system exper-

leadership in processes and in products, Eitel-McCullough

rose to jDrominence in the

and R(!A."

to

power tube industry and outcompeted

GE

Drpanl West

Eitel

and McCaillough,

in collaboration with Litton, not

strong j)ower tube industry on the Peninsula but also diove area’s

tronic

subsequent growth

components.

in the

In the late

only built a

much

engineering and nianufacturing 193()s

and the

first

half

49

of the

of elec-

of the 1940s,

make Stanford University an important player in vacuum tube technology'. In the mid 193()s, Frederick Terman, a young and Litton helped

ambitious professor of radio engineering

neering department, became interested

in Stanford’s electrical engi-

up a teaching and research program in vacuum tube engineering. Terman knew Litton well through amateur radio and had become acquainted with Eitel and McC’aillough by consulting at Heintz and Kaufman in the late 1920s. Terman closely followed Litton’s, Eitel’s, and McCaillough’s work and their development of new j)ower tube designs and high-vacuum processing techniques. Terman reasoned that their presence on the Peninsula offered a wonderful opportunity to build a program in vac-

uum

tube engineering

at

Stanford.

The

in setting

acquisition of tube-making tech-

niques from local firms would enable him to establish a research

program on electron tubes and transform vacuum tube electronics into an academic discipline. His goals were to create new courses, to write new textbooks, and to establish a well-equipped research and teaching laboratory."”

Terman enticed

Litton to join Stanford’s teaching

staff.

In 1936

he

aj)pointed Litton a lecturer in the electrical engineering department. In

and again after World War II, Litton lectured regularly on vacuum tubes and their processing techniques to electrical engineering students. He also shared his knowledge of vacuum tube making with faculty members at Stanford. For example, Litton trained Karl Spangenberg, a young instructor whom Terman had recently hired, in the fabrication of vacuum tubes. He also helped Spangenberg establish a vacuum tube laboratory on campus. This new laboratory and his knowledge of vacuum tube production techniques enabled Spangenberg to initiate and conduct research projects on electronic phenomena and vacuum tube design in the late 193()s and the early 194()s. These projects were funded by IT^'T and by Sj)err\ (ivroscope, a military contractor based on the East Uoast.'-' Litton also supported the tube program in the electrical engineering dej)artment by giving a $1,999 grant to Terman in 1938.”" With this grant, Terman brought one of his favorite students, David Packard, back to the university for fin ther studies. During his year at Stanford, Packard worked with Latton on vacuum tubes and established a close friendship the late 193()s and the early 1940s,

did j) ter

50

witli liini.

1

With anotlier Slanford student, William Hewlett, Packard also

established Hewlett-Packard, an electronic instrumentation company, at this time. Litton

was their business mentor. In

Terman and

ration with

another research group a revolutionary

his

group

c:)f

with his collabo-

electrical engineers, Litton

in the physics

vacnnm tube

j^arallel

department develop the

helped

klystron,

that could operate at extremely high

and the writing of highly respected textbooks on vacnnm tubes enabled Stanford Lniversitv to rise to prominence in vacnnm tube electronics after World

frequencies. These innovative research

War

projects

11."'

addition to sharing their production expertise with Stanford

In

and McCaillongh also applied their unique tubethe development and manufacture of an entirely new

Lhiiversitv, Litton, Eitel,

making

skills to

Vacuum tubes capable of generating microwaves were even more difficult to make than power-grid tubes. They required a higher vacuum, tighter tolerances, more complex processing procedures, and a much higher level of cleanliness than the transmitting class

of vacuum tubes.

tubes for radio transmitters and high-frequency radar sets that Litton,

and McCullough had fabricated in the 193()s and during World War 11. Litton, Eitel, and McCullough pioneered the microwave tube industry ou the San Erancisco Peninsula. In the late 1930s and the early 194()s, Litton diversified into the development of klystrons for IT&T. He Eitel,

later established Litton Industries,

which specialized

in the

manufacture

of magnetrons (another tvpe of microwave tube used primarily in radar

and McCaillough conducted a few magnetron-development projects during World 11. In 1951, they branched out into the production of microwave devices. They applied their firm’s manufacturing competence to the production of klystrons for longtransmitters). Similarly, Eitel

distance communication

and

television broadcasting.

Eitel-McCullough and Litton Industries were

among

By the

late 195()s,

the largest

manu-

facturers of microwave tubes in the United States."-

and McCaillough created an infrastructure and a predisposition for electronic component manufacturing on the San Francisco Peninsula. They attracted suppliers of specialized inputs, and thev Litton, Eitel,

trained a workforce skilled in dling.

They

vacuum techniques and chemical han-

also helj^ed develop a culture of collaboration in the region.

In the postwar period, this infrastructure itated the

and

formation of other corporations

(Hara (’.ounties. Litton,

Eitel,

this

in

and McCaillough

possible to build successful electronic

modus operandi

facil-

San Mateo and Santa also

component

showed

that

it

was

businesses in the

Defidut Wes!

51

area. Local Linns, in order lo eslahlish tlieinsel\es in industries pio-

neered by large East inent

had

(x)ast linns,

and constant iniprovenient

to

had

ol

to

concentrate on

tlu*

develo[)-

niannlactnring |)rocesses. d hey also

commercialize high-qnality products. These lessons were not

on other innovator-entrepreneurs 1950s, product quality

became ponent

and

a

in the area. In the late 1940s

commitment

to

lost

and the

manufacturing processes

the hallmarks of the San Francisco Peninsula’s electronic comindustries.

V

2 Diversification

111

1953 the British

niilitaiT

released a report that rated the magnetrons

produced by Latton Industries the best in the Western world. Litton’s magnetrons were more reliable and had better electrical characteristics than those

made

bv European firms.

The

British militaiw also

these magnetrons better than the tubes produced by large tions such as Raytheon, Sylvania,

General

Electric,

considered

US

and Western

corporaElectric

(BMiie 1993). This ranking was surprising because Eitton Industries was a relatively

new entrant

that Cihaiies Eitton, a

in

the magnetron business.

It

was only in 1944

manufacturer of tube-making equipment, had

diversified into the design of

began producing these tubes

in

advanced magnetrons. In 1951 Litton volume. By

this time,

magnetrons were

They had been mass produced by Raytheon, Cieneral Electric, Westinghouse, and Sylvania during

well-established products. XA’estern Electric,

World War

How

II

in the

product

lines of

many US

electronics firms.

did Eitton diversify into the development and manufacture of

magnetrons?

and

and were

How

did he establish himself in the magnetron business

partially displace

Raytheon, Western Electric, and Sylvania, which

had dominated the production of magnetrons during World War

What did Litton owe to Stanford University and The emergence of Latton Industries and

II?

the military?

the

formation

of

the

microwave tube business on the San Erancisco Peninsula have attracted little

book and a series of pioneering articles on War research programs and the emergence (^f Silicon

historical attention. In a

Stanford’s Ciold

\alley, Stuart Leslie has

argued that the Peninsula’s microwave tube

and teaching proengineering and later

industiT grew out of Stanford Lhiiversity’s research

grams. Erederick Terman, the university’s dean of its

provost, the

argument

goes, built strong research groups in microwave

tube engineering with militaiy patronage Building on their technical achievements,

in

the immediate j)ostwar era.

Terman sought

to strengthen

^4

( 4} if)!(')'

llic

Peninsula’s electronics industry by encouraging Stanrord’s engineers

new microwave tube

to establish

coi'porations in the area. Like Stanlbid,

these firms, Leslie argued, were highly

dependent on

military patronage

and were oriented nearly exclusively toward technologies of direct interest to the Department of Defense (Leslie 1992, 1993; Kiirgon et al. 1992; Kargon and Leslie 1994; Leslie and Kargon 1994). Though Leslie has argued coinincingly that the local microwave tube and

industry was closely connected to Stanfoi d Lhiiversitv

that

its

expan-

sion was llnanced hv military funding, the rise of Litton Industries can-

not he explained solely by military patronage and universit)’ research,

innovations in

Litton’s

Litton,

emergence and expansion were (iharles magnetron engineering and manufacturing.

Industries’

to l.itton

(’ritical

one

of the

foremost experts

in

tiihe-manufacturing processes in

the Ihiited States, approached the design of'magnetrons in a novel way.

He

took into account j^roduction techniques

and engineered them

in

in the

such a way that they would maintain a veiy high

degree of vacuum (high vacuum was essential also develojDed

innovated

new processing techniques

in the

manufacture

ness in tube processing

design of his tubes

to tube reliability). Litton

make magnetrons and

to

of these devices by

and establishing

emphasizing

cleanli-

effective qualitv-control proce-

dures. These innovations enal)led Litton to produce the highest-qualitv

magnetrons on the market.

Litton’s relations with Stanford

tant for Litton’s success in this business.

complex than

is

often argued.

were impor-

But these relations were more

They were not

unidirectional. Instead they

involved the nvo-way flow of people, ideas, and processing techniques

between

l.itton’s

xentnre and the university. CHiaiies Litton learned about

microwave tube design from a Stanford group klystron in the late 193()s,

members

to his

developed the

and he recruited Stanford students and

magneti'on business

in the

and granted subcontracts

facultv'

posUvar period. But Litton

also gave engineering assistance to Stanford’s

gronjvs

that

microwave tube research

to the university. In short, Litton’s rela-

tions with Stanford benefited the imiversiU' as

much

as they benefited

Litton.

emergence as an important manufacturer of magnetrons was further shaped by the evolution of international relations and the Litton’s

changing 193()s,

strategies of large electrcmics firms in the East. In the late

Litton

first

entered the microwave tube business by designing

klystrons for the French subsidiary of

International Telephone

and

lelegrajih. Because of (iermany’s growing military threat, Il'^-T’s subsidiary in Baris urgently

needed microwave tubes

for

its

radar systems.

It

55

/ )nmsifi((ili()n

was on the basis

of this

experience

tliat in

1944 Litton obtained a large

contract Iroin the National Defense Research (a)nnnittee to develop an

advanced magnetron. In the immediate postwar period, Litton expanded his fledgling magnetron-engineering business. It was a propitious time to do so. Electronics corporations in the East, that had dominated the microwave tube business during World \Aar

11,

drastically

curtailed their activities in this area in the second half Of the 194()s. This

window of opportunity for Litton. To exploit these opportunities, Litton set up a new corporation, Litton Industries, that concentrated on the design and manufacture of magnetrons. (His old firm,

opened

a

Litton Engineering Laboratories, continued to produce tube-making

machinery.) With military research contracts, Litton designed a family of

continuous-wave magnetrons for electronic warfare

of the

The Korean War enabled

194()s.

in the

second

half

Litton to transform his small

magnetron engineering business into a first-class manufacturing operation. At the Naw’s request, Litton manufactured pulse magnetrons that other corporations could not fabricate processes and these tubes

at

management

effectively.

Using innovative

techniques, Litton Industries produced

very high yields and therefore very low cost. At the

the Korean War, Litton Industries’

enormous

profits attracted the

of the

Renegotiation Board. This led Litton to

group

of

businessmen who proceeded

end of

sell his

wrath

company

to use the profits of his

netron business to build a large conglomerate under the Litton

to a

mag-

name

in

Southern California. Pioneering

(diaries

Litton

first

became involved

microwave tubes because of

with

the

his association with

who developed

new

technolog)' of

Russell

and Sigurd at

Stanford

University in 1937. Litton was a friend of the \^arian brothers

and often

\’arian,

the two inventors

the

klystron

discussed engineering with them. Russell X^arian, like Litton, was a

Stanford graduate. After obtaining a master’s degree in physics from the university in 1927, Russell Varian had worked on the design of television tubes

and

circuits at the Tele\'ision

Laboratory

in

San Erancisco.

This laboratory, established by Philo Farnsworth, pioneered the devel-

mid

and the early 193()s. Russell \arian did ccmsulting work for Heintz and Kaufman and for other Bay Area electronics firms. Sigurd X'arian, Russell’s adventurous and charis-

opment of

television in the

matic younger brother, was a

192()s

}>ilot as

well as a

mechanic.

A barnstorming

56

('}iaf)ln2

worked for Pan American Airways where he supervised the airline’s Mexican operations. Sigurd \arian had also opened new routes into Mexico and South America. By repairing his own airplanes, Sigurd Varian had gained an excellent knowledge of the mechanical arts (Varian 1983; Everson 1949; j^ilot

in the early

and mid

192()s,

he

later

Farnsworth 1989).

and

In 1935, Russell Varian

his

up their own labocommunity in which they

brother Sigurd

ratorv at Halcyon, the socialist-theosophist

set

had grown up. At Halcyon, located on the central (Alifornia

worked on inventions of iron

and

coast, they

own: a process for reducing iron ore

their

to

a ruling engine for diffraction gratings. This engine was an

extremely precise machine used for the making of optical devices for

The

spectroscopic research.

interested in developing a

enemy bombers

detect

this project

at

became increasingly radar system that would make flying safer and great distances. They were motivated to start \^arian brothers also

by their deep concerns about Ciermany’s increasingly aggres-

sive foreign policy

and

who were not aware

its

swift

buildup of a strong

of the radar programs

air force.

at

The Varians,

the Naval Research

Laboratorv and the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories or of related

work on tube development at Eitel-McCtillough, decided to use microwaves (under 1 meter in wavelength) to detect approaching aircraft.

was only by using these frequencies, they reasoned, that they

It

would be able

to precisely

determine the location and direction of an

attacking airplane.’

Their problem was how to generate these very short waves with cient power.

No vacuum

suffl-

tube then on the market had the power and the

wavelength required to drive a radar transmitter. To build microwave radar systems, the Varians would have to develop a radically

who had

tube. Russell Varian,

new vacuum

kept in close touch with the work ol

William Hansen, a friend of his and a young physics professor Stanford, realized that a

new

at

device invented by Hansen, the rhumba-

The rhumbatron can be best metallic shell. The rhumbatron res-

tron, could help generate very short waves.

described as a cavitv enclosed bv a

onated

waves of a certain frequency, so that an oscillating electric

to

was created within the it

could resonate

with

at

cavity.

in April

1937.

the

rhumbatron was of the

microwave frequency. Interested

Hansen and getting

N^arian brothers

When

field

right size,

in collaborating

access to Stanford’s phvsics laboratoiT, the

entered into an unusual partnership with the universitv

Under

the terms of the agreement, Stanford gave the

Varian brothers access to the physics laboratorv and the right to consult

57

I )hinsifi((ili(ni

Hansen and with

with

\\Vhstc*r,

I)a\i(l

department. The nni\eisit\ also

most

j)i()\’ided

(hainnan

$100

of

inateiials

(oi

pliysirs

the*

and sup-

\arians supplied their serviees without eharge and brought

riie

plies.

tlu‘

shop e(|nipment

of theii

letm ns from the

to Stanford. Finaneial

group’s iruentions were to he divided ecjually between the imi\eisity and

and Sigmd Varian moved

the \arian brothers. Russell

Mav 10S7 (Hansen In

order

1038; Bloeh 1052; (ialison

to

detection and landing, Hansen and the Varians

in

1002; Hevly 1004).

et al.

mierowave signals they needed

to obtain the

Stanford

at first

fbi

aiiplane

thought

of

com-

bining the rhumbatron with the multiplier vacuum tube that Philo

Farnsworth had deveIoj)ed for

which Russell

N'arian

knew

through

well

secondarv emission as a wav

bombarded

his tele\'ision system.

his

Fhe multiplier tube,

work with Farnsworth, used

generate electrons. (VA'hen a metal

to

with electrons, electrons

may be emitted

bom

the surface of

Fhe hombarding electrons are called j^rimary and the

the material.

emitted electrons are designated secondary.) Because of oj)eration,

is

tlu*

multi|)lier tube

was an excellent

am|)lifier,

mode of which made this

it

an interesting candidate for the \urians’ microwave generator. To build their

combination

multiplier tube

of

relied, as they often did, \isited Litton at Litton

on

Fngineering Laboratories

vacuum tube

to the

X’arians

Fitton’s technical expertise.- Russell \’arian

situation regarding Farnsworth’s

new

and rhumbatron, the

vacuum

art, also

to discuss the patent

tube. Sigurd X'arian,

who was

conferred with Litton several times

about N’acuum technicpies, vacuum ecjuipment, and the design of cath-

From these free consultations, Sigurd \arian learned a great deal about \acuums and vacuum techni(|ues. At this time, Sigurd \arian later odes.

re|)orted,

wonder

to

“I

learned firsthand the wonders of the vacuum, the main

me

at that

time l)eing that anyone ever got a vacuum

at all.”

xacuum system and

tested

With Litton’s ad\ice, Sigurd

X^aiian built a

cathode stiuctures for the multiplier tube.^ Before Sigurd Varian started building the multiplier tube and ihumbatron combination, his brother found a more promising way of generating microwaxes. In June

1937, Russell \arian conceixed of

klvstron. In the next fexv xveeks,

he refined

this idea xvith

the

Hansen’s the-

/

oretical

and mathematical

j)hysical intuition, but his

assistance. (Russell Varian

knoxvledge

of

had considerable

mathematics

xvas lacking.)

In

and August 1937, using his nexviy acejuired knoxxledge of xacuum tube practice and xvithout direct in|)ut from Litton, Sigurd X'arian fabricated the first klvstron. Fhe klvstron xxas significantlv different from conxentional gridded tubes of tlu* sort produced by Fitel-McC’ullough. |uly

(Ifuipter

5orps gave a large contract to Litton in 1951 to

magnetron

these pulse

received

make

contracts, starting in 1951 Litton Industries also

growing number of sole production contracts lor the

a

continuous-wave magnetrons the

3,750 4|52 magnetrons. In parallel with

had designed

it

in

the second half of

194()s."’

To make these tubes, Litton and his grouj) developed an innovative approach to magnetron manufacturing.” Their goal was to produce high-qualitv products at low cost. “We are tr\’ing to do two things,” Litton wrote to a Na\T procurement officer in 1952. “(1) Make the best [magnetrons] bv as wide a margin as j)ossible by this mean long life good shelf life and no aging. (2) Be the low cost producer in the field.”'- To fabricate highly reliable magnetrons at low cost, Litton made the most of his long experience with vacuum tubes. He used many of the lessons he had learned at f ederal IVlegraj^h during World War 11. He also relied on the magnetron labrication techniques he had developed since the mid 194()s. The end result was a unique way of manufacturing magnetron

—

—

1

tubes in volume.''

One

of the most salient characteristics of Litton’s manufacturing oper-

ation was

its

focus on cleanliness and the removal of tube contaminants.

Operators systematically baked

all

tube

j)arts at

very high temperatures in

order to remo\’e gases and other contaminants "and obtain a veiT high

\acuum. At the end of the piocess, the magnetrons were exhausted for 1

1

hours

temperatures oscillating between

at

vent the contamination of the tube

44()°Ci

and

65()°C.

at

stej) in

them and

the [production process. “At Litton, tweez-

and gloves are mandatory,”

ers

“Each part

and

at

a visitor to the plant reported in 1951.

cleaned with ether cojpiously and often, by each operator,

is

each bench.”" Litton also asked

metallic parts that

no

and

that

use.

vacuum

his

theii'

proc(*ssed part should be in the

no

lube

part should [Parts,

jars in

cleanliness was o[perat(prs to

employees

components as little as would oxidize and dust would

assemblies and

its

each

j3re-

during the manufacturing

jDarts

process, Litton’s workers avoided direct j)hysical contact with

cleaned them

To

aii'

to leave the tube

possible in outside air (the fall

on them). His

for

more than

be produced more than three days

which were not used immediately, were

older to als(p

[protect

rule was

three hours

in

ad\ance

st(pred in small

them from outside contaminants.

im[Portant for Litton. Ever\’ Friday,

of

Littcpii

ihoioughly clean their workstations (whether

it

Plant

asked his

was

in the

HJ

/ )iTn\sifi(ali(>n

machine

or in the luhe-asseinhly part of the

slioj)

afternoon, workers floor

and waxed

at

|)lant).

Kveiy Fiiday

latton cleaned their tools. I'hey also scrubbed the

it.^'’

To ])roduce components with very high precision and to obtain good yields, Litton and his engineers also tightly controlled the manufacturing process by imposing a tight discij^line on the workforce. As a first step, they

developed process sheets, which described

various steps in the production process.

They

also asked the operators to

No

deviations were allowed.

follow these procedures very carefully.

“Ninety percent of the success

reminded of

his

tube manufacturing,” Litton often

engineer-managers, “depends upon the exact procedures

processing and fabrication of parts and

will

sink or swim.

The one

the change

is

is

know how

we be painted on the door is

it is

sign that has to

‘Don’t change anything.’ For this if

in

the

in great detail

in this

one great cause of trouble,

not subject to discussion.

Indeed,

this

that

especially

process disci-

and undocumented process changes They led to significant yield losses and

pline was essential. Lhicontrolled

often had catastrophic results.

decreases in product quality. They also identify the causes of tube failures

and

made fix

it

much more

difficult to

them.^'

In conjunction with these moves, Litton also established

an unusual

quality-control system at Litton Industries in order to obtain highly reliable

high-performance tubes. This

s)’stem

was based on worker

inspection. At Litton, each worker inspected his responsil)le for

its

quality.

self-

own work and was

At other microwave tube plants, inspection

was distinct from production and was performed by a different group of people. In 1952, speaking to

some Air Force

officers,

Moore described

Litton Industries’ approach to (|uality control as follows:

Our whole company philosophy and son who performs the act, whatever

around the fact the manufacture

jxilicy revolves it

may

be, in

responsible for that act and, as doer of the deed,

that the perof

Our

prod-

most qualified to judge whether or not it has been done according to directions. Each worker is thus his own inspector. Each worker is expected to determine that the j:)ai t is correct both ucts

is

is

and leaves his station and this system of |)nsh-j:)ull gi\'es in essence a double check at each station by the people most (jualified to know, the actual workers on the part. The system presumes that there is no j)ressure on any employee to make more parts possible in a given time or to sacrifice anything for C|ualitv, and no such pressure is ever exerted. No j)iece work basis is ever used, as

it

arrives

actually or implied.^”

This tmusual “quality-control” system had a

pensed with the need

to hire

number

of benefits.

It

dis-

tube inspectors and the need to organize

(V2

2

(Ihdpter

an indepeiultMit inspection department. As a

oxerhead exj)enses.

It

also sliowed that

This system

reduced the firm’s

it

management

trusted operators

on worker morale,

wiiich in turn liad an excellent effect prodnctivitv'.

result,

pride,

and

contributed to high man-

of self-inspection also

nlactnring yields, as bad tube parts were identified

at

the earliest possible

time in the maiuifactiiring process.

Because product quality and manufacturing yields depended

degree on

his

employees’

skills

To motivate

ative workforce.

techniques developed

at

and

his workforce, Litton relied

in

on managerial

It

also

had

liberal

personnel

an effort to bridge the gap between capital and labor and to

give financial incentives to

under which

its

year. Inspired

its

workforce. General Radio set up a plan

employees received a share of the company’s

profit every

by Cieneral Radio’s example, Litton shared half of Litton

Industries’ profits with his workforce.

He

also attended to his employees’

recreation needs. In 1949, Litton bought a cabin

snrronnding Jackson Lake

High

in the

Sierras.

employees and invited them

for his

summer

cooper-

Cambridge, Massachusetts. Cieneral

Radio was an engineer-owned corporation.

ground

a

General Radio, a maniifactiirer of electronics

measurement apparatus located policies. In

needed

motivatic^n, Litton

to a large

vacations there. In the

summer

to

and a

He

large tract of land

later built a

camp-

spend their weekends and

of 1950, Litton posted

this

notice in his plant; I

wish to extend to

this location their

as

of oiii employees and to their families a welcome to

all

make

headquarters for the vacation period, and to their families for

long as they wish to

available but there

is

stav,

both before and

ample room

will

come and go

be three large tents

your own.

your use and

facilities, etc.,

xery far this season. Feel free to

There

to pitch a lent of

to set aside a sizeable area pei iuanently for

food storage, power, laundry

after.

to

It is

have

but probably these as yoti wish

our intention

it

will

ecjuipped for not proceed

throughout the

summer

or on week-ends."’" In addition to

proxiding a serxice to his employees, Litton’s stimmer

camj)grotmd enabled him personal relations

enable him to

Because

had one in

of

xvith

identifx’

to get to

the Ihiited States.

indixidtially

and

them. Litton expected that these close

establish

ties

xvould

discontented xvorkers and to thwart unionization."’’

these managerial

of the best,

know them

if

It

and technological innoxations, Latton

not the best plant in the microxvaxe tube industry

produced high-qualitv magnetrons

at

high

xields.

name became a synonym for quality in the microxvaxe community. Magnetrons made by Litton Industries had good electrical characteristics and, more important, a xerx “hard” xacnum. In the early 195()s, the Litton

S3

DHnrsifiralion

This higli

same

vaciiiini

mack* llu*m highly

time, Litton obtained

l

carefully

And

The

usual proj)ortion of

time was around 30

j)i

in

cost. I'aking

ices

of

man-

—fO

good

j^ercent.

advantage

of these

low

in 1953.

purchased for $165

in

The

\'ielcl

for the

it

to

of the litie

much

could often be

It

microwave

coming out

tnl)es

of

lower.

produce magnetrons reduced

costs, Litton steadily

his

from $400

of the 4|50

which sold for $270

at

in 1951, cc^uld

be

These price reductions enabled Litton

to

4J52,

1953.

reached a high

yields

on pulse magnetrons. He lowered the price

1950 to $238

Because

the yields kej)t climbing np. As the |)lant’s engineers

Litton Industries’ remarkable yields enabled

low

yields.

the order of 80 percent in

1953. This was an extraordinary

in

tube industry. at this

in

improved manufacturing |)rocednres,

95 percent

lasting. At the

c|nality-control system, Litton’s

nfactnring yields on pulse magnetrons were early 1952.

and long

emarkahle mannlactni ing

advanced processes and imnsnal

his

rc'liahlc*

and 4J52 business. By the end of the Korean War, Litton Industries was the sole producer of these pulse magnetrons for the militaiT services. At the same time, the plant’s yields were

drive his competitors out of the 4|50

so high that Litton garnered enormc:)us profits. In 1953, Litton Industries

made

$1.2 million in

prc:)fits

ewer sales of $3

million.'’^

The Sale of Litton Industries Litton was almost too successful.

mons

profitability

financial risks.

The

firm’s rapid

had the paradoxical

During the Korean

effect of increasing

W’ar, Litton

became so great that Litton could not finance his own funds and had to rely on bank loans. use the firm’s profits to finance

its

growth and

its

its

enc^r-

owner’s

growth rate

Industries’

the firm’s expansion out of Litton also could not safely

expansion

either.

Because Litton

Industries was overwhelmingly a military business, a large share of its profits

was subject to reviews from the Renegotiation Board. The Renegotia-

tion

Board had been organized by (kingress

militaiT contractors. Starting in 1951, Litton

to reclaim excess profits

became

fiom

increasingly worried

about the Renegotiation Board’s future rulings regarding

his

company.

Litton Industries’ j^rofils far exceeded the profits usually allowed by the

Renegotiation Board (10 j)ercent or

less),

latton

knew

well that

face a large financial liability in the next few years. At the

he might

same

time,

becoming more risk averse. Now 49 and remarried, he had three small children. (He had diNorced his first wife, Ciertrude, in 1944.) Litton was increasingly worried about what would ha|)j)en to his family Litton was

and

to his

company

in the

event of his death.

He wanted

to create

an

(' li a f)!(ry

(S’6

2

With ihc monies fund for

his family.

he kept for himself, Litton

lliat

He

also invested in his equijDment business, Litton

Kngineering Laboratories. In 1954, Litton,

wanted

establisliecl a trust

who had

to live close to the Sierras, reloeated Litton

for a long time

Engineering from San

(knios to (irass \alley, a small town in the Sierra foothills. In (irass \alley, Litton, ever the eccentric,

refurbished jDart of

it

bought an abandoned hospital building. He

and transfbinied

He

into his residence.

it

also converted

the building into a well ecjuipped machine shop and

vacuum tube

development laboratoiT. Over the next 15 years, Litton conducted his glass lathe and tube-making machinery business from Cirass Valley. He kept the corporation relatively small. In the second half of the 195()s and in

the 196()s, he employed between 25 and 80 technicians and machin-

ists.

Much

of the firm’s business was in glass lathes. In particular, Litton

introduced new glass lathes designed especially for the manufacture of

microwave tubes. But Litton also desimied microwave tubes for Litton o

and consulted on vacuum tubes with Hughes

Industries

Federal Telegraph.

He

also

made hermetic

transistor

Aircraft

and

packages for

Semiconductor and other semiconductor firms on the San

Fairchild

Francisco Peninsula. In addition to running his business, Litton attracted small electronics enterprises to Cirass Valley cluster in the

The

sale

glomerate fited

from to

built a small electronics

area."’-'

of Litton Industries also led to the emergence of a large conin

Southern California. Thornton’s and Ash’s new firm bene-

Litton’s excellent reputation in the

His reputation was so

decided

and

good

that in

the

Naw' and the Air Force.

summer

of 1954 Thornton

drop the name of Electro D\ namics and

call his

corporation

magnetron company was renamed Litton this time.) Critical to the rise of the conglom-

Litton Industries, Inc. (The Industries of C5ilifornia at

coming out of San Carlos. Under Moore’s, W'oenne’s, and Caapuchettes’ direction, the magnetron business flourished in the mid and late 1950s. By 1957, the microwave tube division in San (>aiios had 700 employees and did roughly $12 million in business. It was the second-largest maker of magnetrons (behind erate was also the profit stream

Raytheon)

in the

United

States.

The microwave tube

division also was

and Ash in JanuaiT 1950, the Renegotiation Board awarded the microwave tube division a 27.4 percent profit on military business (the division recei\ed such a high highly profitable. After a hearing with Moore, Litton,

profit

allowance because

those of

its

conij^etitors).

its

magnetrou

These

profits

prices were

went straight

much

lower than

to Litton Industries’

headcjuarters in Beverly Hills. But the actual profits diverted from the

H7

Dhx'rs ificnlion

magnetron

l:)usiness

Woenne

liigher.

and reinvested by Litton

later recalled that the

group

Industries, Inc. in

San

were even

(iaiios “was putting

money into Litton Industries, Inc. in all wavs that looked like ex|)enses and money was pouring out of San ('.arlos into the main office.” fhe microwave tube division had become a cash cow and Thornton hied of it

most of

The

its cash.'^’

millions of dollars generated by the microwave tube di\ision

financed the building of Thornton’s conglomerate. With the profits

made on magnetrons, Thornton and tions (they

1959).

numerous corporapurchased or merged with 27 corporations between 1954 and

These firms tended

tions such

as

the

to

Monroe

of mechanical calculatoi's,

.\sh acqtiired

he small or

medium

sized (with a few excep-

Machine (Company, a maker which Litton merged with in 1957). Most of (Calculating

Litton Industries’ acquisitions manufactured specialty products for the military sector. For example. Aircraft Radio, Inc. specialized in militaiw

communication equipment. The Ahrendt Instrument Company in (College Park, Mankind produced servomechanisms and differential analyzers. Other companies manufactured resistors, transformers, and navigation equipment. Thornton and Ash bought these firms at a low price. Most of them had aging founders who were interested in retiring and transforming their corporations into

cash.*’’

Thornton and Ash invested the profits of the magnetron business in the development of new militaiw avionics systems, especially airborne computers and inertial guidance systems. In 1954, they recruited Henry Singleton and Heinw Kozmetsky, two alumni of Hughes Aircraft, to build these businesses. As an additional incentive, Thornton and Ash gave them liberal stock options. At Litton Industries, Singleton established and directed an inertial guidance lahoratoiT. This laboratory developed a small and light inertial guidance system that was later used in many militan' aircraft. Kozmetsky started a digital computer design group. The computer lahoratoiy developed airborne systems that automated many of the tasks associated with the In parallel with these acquisitions,

and control of a given airspace. By 1960, the electronic eqtiipment division headed by Singleton and Kozmetsky had 5,()()() employees and $80 million in sales. As a result of Thornton’s numerous acquisitions and the rapid exjiansion of the electronic system division, Litton Industries became very large indeed in the late 1950s. The corporation, which had $8.5 million in sales surveillance

in 1955,

had revenues

sion enabled

in the

order of $180 million

Thornton and Ash

to bring their

in 1960.

company

This expan-

jiuhlic. In 1956,

('li(if)ter

(S’cV

2

Litton ’s stock was listed

on the American stock exchange, before

ing on the board of

New York

tlie

aj^pear-

stock excliange the next year. Because

Litton Industries’ stock gained considerable value in the second half Of

the

195()s,

Thornton, Ash, and the other early investors

DMiamics made a

killing.

Electro

Moore, Woenne, and Crapnchettes, who

rapidly vested their stock options, also

became

multi-millionaires at this

who had turned down Thornton’s

time. Litton,

in

offer of buying Electro

Dvnamics’ stock, became the laughing stock of the business press

and the

late I95()s

entrepreneur

had played a Francisco

I96()s.

This was indeed a curious fate for the innovator-

who had pioneered microwave

vital

in the

tube manufacturing and

part in the creation of an electronics district

on the San

Peninsula.'’-'

Conclusion

Litton ’s diversification into microwave tubes was a long process. full-scale

It

and checkered

took Litton almost 14 years to move from klystron design to

production of magnetrons. Entering

establishing himself in

it

this

did not prove easy for Litton.

new

business

Some

of the chief

magnetron

obstacles that he faced were the large capital requirements of

manufacturing and the

fact that the militaiT services

and

tended

to give

research and, even

contracts to large

lished

more so, procurement corporations. To build a magnetron

business, Litton mobilized a

\'ariety

of resources.

He

used

his close relations

\\«ith

and

estab-

Stanford researchers

members. Through Stanford, Litton gained access to design theoretical knowledge. (He also relied on the theoretical expertise of the Radiation Laboratoity and the Bell Telephone Laboratories.) In

and and

faculty

1944, Litton relied

on Terman

to get

an important development contract

from the National Defense Research Committee. Litton

magnetron contracts from the NDRC and the capital to finance his

also

used public

and development enabled him to form

business. Research military services

new engineering teams and develop

a line of continuous-wave

netrons. Similarly, the large profits that Litton

made on

mag-

fixed-price pro-

duction contracts financed the building of his manufacturing plant in

San Carlos. But the most important resource that Litton mobilized to establish himself in the microwave tube business was the manufacturing process

and i^roduct engineering expertise he had acquired since the This expertise, which he shared with various research groups allowed him to devise

new and

late 192()s.

at

innovative wavs of engineering

Stanford,

and

fabri-

S9

Dwnsifh (ition

eating advanced magnetrons. In the LKS microwave tnl)e industry, I.ilton

was imic|ne

tube designs. To obtain materials

high vacimin as

in identifying

and baked

veiT

this

tlie

primaiy

oi)jective of

liis

vaciinm, Litton used only certain

Itigli

Ins tube parts to very

high tem|)eratures. d'hese pro-

cessing technicjues guided the magnetrons’ mechanical and electrical designs. Litton also innovated by developing new, highly clean manufac-

turing j^rocesses and adopting self-inspection as his primaiw tool for quality

control. Because of these innovative engineering

methods, Litton received a

series of

and manufacturing

development contracts from the

mil-

itan services in the second half Of the 194()s

major supplier

as a

and later established himself high-quality magnetrons to the Department of

of

Defense. Litton’s successful entiv into the

microwave tube business opened a

path for other local electronic entre])reneurs to follow. Litton provided these

men

with a “recipe” on

tle initial capital:

taiT research

how

to build a

build engineering teams

and development

microwave tube firm with

and

contracts, then

a

product line with

move

lit-

mili-

production

to the

of these tubes, again with militaiy funding. Most microwave ttibe entre-

preneurs followed

path in late 194()s and the 1950s. They also

this

emphasized the development of new manufacturing processes and the

some of

design of high-qualit)' products. Litton also trained

entrepreneurs their firms.

It

in

the

new

tube-making technologies and helped others establish

was Litton

wave tube entrepreneur,

who

trained

Raymond

Stewart, an early micro-

high-precision machining

in

and vacuum tube

fabrication techni(]ues. Stewart established Stewart Engineering in 1952.

At

first,

Stewart focused

ufacture of

vacuum

on the production of furnaces used

tubes.

He

microwave tubes. Litton also prises.

later diversified into the

assisted other

For example, he acted as an ad\ isor to

Huggins Laboratories, and invested helped Russell

\'arian,

specialists with

whom

their

men

man-

manufacture of

to start their

own

enter-

Huggins, the founder of

tube venture. In 1948, latton

Sigurd Varian, and Edward Ciinzton (the klystron

he had collaborated since the

own microwave tube

mendation

in his

R.

in the

that Ciinzton

microwave tube contract

corporation.

It

late 19S()s) to start

was because of Litton’s recom-

and the Varian brothers received in

the

summer

of

their

first

1948. This was a contract

from the Airborne Instruments Laboratory (AIL) for the fabrication of traveling-wave tubes. This contract brought much-needed cash to the

new

venture. In the 1950s, Varian Associates

became

of microwave tubes on the San Francisco Peninsula.'’^

the largest

maker

I

4

5 Military Cooperative

W’lien the \arian brothers, their

new

Edward (anzton, and Myrl Stearns opened

klystron plant in the Stanford Industrial Park in the

1957, Robert Williams, the undersecretaiT of

commerce

of

fall

in the Eisen-

hower administration, declared at the factory’s opening ceremonies that “this j)lant [was] one of the most important facilities stipporting [the] and was

national [defense] effort

a strong factor in

making the Stanford

University area the ‘Microwave Capital’ of America.”' By 1957, Varian was

indeed a major supplier of advanced electronic components

Department of Defense and the American defense were important

to L^S air

industrv.

Its

to

the

klystrons

defense and to the development of ballistic mis-

and other weapons. X^arian Associates was also the main producer of microwave tubes on the San Erancisco Peninsula. It created manv of the local inchistn’s technical and social innovations and controlled more than one-third of its sales, \arian also had a major impact on other microwave tube firms in the area. It provided a model lor other tube startnj)s such as \Vatkins-Johnson. Varian also emerged as a major source of engineering talent and j^rocess and design knowledge for these firms as well as more established corporations such as Eitel-Mc(aillough and Litton Industries. In short, \arian Associates became the dominant microwave tube firm on the Peninsula and the largest manufacturer ol siles

/

such tubes

How

in the L’nited States.

did \’arian

tronics district i'aj)id rise

to

Litton, the

become such

a powerful force iu the growing elec-

on the San Erancisco Peninsula?

prominence

in the

How

can one explain

its

microwave tube business? hike (ihaiies

founder of Litton Industries, Russell \arian, Sigurd \arian,

Edward Ginzton, and Myrl Stearns benefited from the growing demand lor microwave tubes during the (iold War. But these men also came to electronics entrepreneurship with an unusual backgrouud and a rich set of inilitaiT

connections that gave them a significant com|)etitive advantage

92

3

('/i(i/)lrr

postwar period. Tlie V^arian brolliers,

in the

utopian

socialist tradition in C.alifornia,

who were

shaped

tlieir

inlliienced

l)y tlie

venture into a coin-

nuinal and employee-owned laboratory, where engineer-owners had a stake in the financial well-being of their firm.

The Ibimding group

ol

\arian Associates also included a few Stanford faculty members, which tjave the firm direct access to the university’s best

students and research

findings. Perhaps

more important,

experience

microwave tube industry on the East

in the

worked during World War firm based on

Long

II

the founders had substantial prior (a:)ast.

They had

at Speri}’ (iyroscope, the military

Island. At Sperry, they

system

had developed new klystron

process and design technologies and built close contacts with the military services.

The \^arians, Stearns, and Ginzton made the most of these re.sources when they recei\'ed an important contract from the Diamond Ordnance Fuse Laboratory in 1948 to develop an exotic klystron for the fuse of

atomic bombs. This contract helped Varian gain a unique competence in the

design and ultra-clean processing of advanced klystrons.

enabled the firm j)i

to secure a large

number of engineering

It

also

contracts

and

oduction orders during the Korean Wdv. Because the militaiy shifted

its

]3rocurement of microwave tubes from low performance magnetrons to high-quality klystrons in the second half of the 195()s, Varian Associates

expanded

into

volume production of microwave tubes

requirements. By doing

opened cial

itself to

It

gradually

it

needed

to

expand. Varian’s founding group also

built

manufacturing organization, which met the militaiy demand for

complex tubes bility',

the firm transformed itself

meet these

outside investors in order to mitster the necessarv finan-

resources that

a flexible

scj,

to

in short

production runs. This flexible production capa-

the firm’s unique engineering competence, and

with user needs helped Varian

become

its

close coupling

the largest microwave tube firm in

and displace established corporations such Raytheon, and RCA in the late 195()s and the eaiiv 1960s.

the Lhiited States

Progressive Politics

X'arian Associates

and

GE,

the Fonnation of Varian Associates

was established

Edward Ginzton, Myrl

as

in

1948 bv Russell and Sigurd \arian,

Stearns, Frederick SalisbuiT,

and Donald Snow.

These men were an unusual group, different from the entrepreneurs who had established Eitel-Mc(aillough and Litton Industries. Unlike Bill

and Jack Mcf’aillough who were from the middle the founders of Varian Associates came from families of im^dest

Eitel, (diaries Litton, class,

M Hilary ('.oaprralhr

93

r

V

Figure

3.

Founders and close associates

of X'arian Associates in front of tlie firm’s first build-

ing, early 195()s. Left to right: Russell Varian,

Dorothy

N'arian,

Salishnry,

Sigurd \arian, Marvin Lhodorow,

Richard Leonard, Esther Salishnry, Edward Ciinzton, Erederick

Donald Snow, Myii Stearns. Ckinrtesy of

\’arian, Inc.

and Stanford

Lhiiversitv Archives.

means and

progressi\’e politics. This

grounds led them

to

shape their firm

and McCaillough. Snow, gin. Stearns’ father

Workers

was imj)ortant becaitse these backin a different

and Stearns were of working-class orilumberman and belonged to the Industrial

was a

of the W’orld (IWAV), the

came from

Eitel,

Salisbttry,

most radical labor tmion

war period. His older brother worked (iinzton

way than Litton,

as

a socialist family. His

an

IWW

in the inter-

organizer. Similarly,

mother had participated

in

the

revolution of 1905 in Rttssia. After the Bolshevik revohition, the family

had

lived in the Ukraine, in

Manchuria, and

in Cdiina

before migrating

to California in 1929.-

The \^arian brothers, however, had the most tmusual backgrotmd. They came from an impecttnioits Theosophist family and had been brotight up in Halcyon, a utopian comnumity on the central Ckilifdrnia coast.

Their father had a small and unprofitable chiropractic practice

and wrote

socialist tracts

and

religious poetry for "Lheosophist jotiruals.

94

3

('haf)l(')

many Utopian communities

Halcyon, one of

in C.alifornia,

had been

established in 1905 by a group of Theosophists. Their goal was to “spiritualize material conditions”

and prepare

Halcyon’s founders also aimed

“wherein

all

at

the land [would] be

for the

coming of

community

constructing a socialist

owned

all

of the time by

a messiah.^

all

of the peo-

means of production and distribution, tools, machinery and natural resources, [would] be owned by the people and where C5ipital and Labor [would] meet on equal terms with no privileges to either.”^ The community permitted individuals to own houses and other personal objects. But the pottery' factory' and the farm were owned and ple,

where

operated

As a

r

the

all

collectively.'^

esnlt of their unnsiial upbringing,

i\ssociates

had progressive

Democr at.

Ciinzton was an

politics.

most of the founders of Vat ian

Stearns wits a staunch

nltr a-liber al

who

New

Deal

associated himself with long-

shoremen, labor organizers, and communist sympathizers

in

San

Francisco. Russell Varian and, to a lesser degree, Sigurd Vardan

had

The Varian brothers

strong socialist leanings. big business

and

critical

which alienated wor ker s workers woirld be

in

fr

wer e deeply distrustful of

of the distinction between capital and labor

om

their wor k.

control of their

They longed for a system where work and woirld share in the

owner ship of the means of pr odirction. Russell Varian was also a friend of liber al causes.

American Dor othy

He

member

was a

Civil Liberties Lhiion.

cooper ative, Ladera,

participated, along with his wife,

most members of the in the hills

In addition to their unusual

men belonged

of these

He

of the Sien a Club. By the time of Varian

X’arian, in the activities

Associates’ foimding,

of the League for Civic Unity and the

gr oirp

belonged

overlooking Stanford

backgrounds and

to a hoirsing

Lhiiversitv.*’

political oirtlook,

to different technical subcultirres

than

most Eitel,

and McCarlloitgh. While the founders of Eitel-McCulloirgh and Litton Indirstries had been introdirced to electronics throirgh amaLitton,

teirr'

r

adio, thr ee

training

irr

the 1920s

members of

physics

and the

and

the \arian groirp had received advanced

electrical

engineering

I93()s. Russell X'arian,

at Starrforxl

University in

an inventive and independent-

man, had received bachelor’s and master’s degrees in physics from Stanford. While at the universitv, he had done research in spectroscopy and in x-ray physics. Stearns and Ginzton had also received a nrirrded

and electronic engineering. After obtaining irndergradnate degrees in electrical engineering from the Liriversity of Galifbrnia at Berkeley and from the Lhiiversity of Idaho, (iinzton and Stearns had stirdied electronics under Erederick Ter rnan thorough education

in

electrical

M Hi (ary doopera/ixu' at

Stanford

in

the late

193()s.

Stanford in 1938, Stearns,

found a

neurial,

j)osition

After receiving an engineering degree from

who was remarkably as a designer of

Brothers in Los Angeles. Ciinzton stayed in

95

at

energetic and entrepre-

television sets at

(iilfillan

Stanford for further research

radio theoiw and received his doctorate the following year." I'he other

members

of the

group had a strong mechanical orientation.

Sigurd Varian, RnsseU’s adventurous and fim-loving younger brother, was

He had worked

a pilot as well as a “mechanic.”

as a pilot for

Pan

/Vmerican Airways. Because he repaired his airplanes on his own, Sigurd \arian had gained an excellent knowledge of the mechanical also interested in precision manufacturing, or as factiire of the veiy small. Similarly,

Snow and

he called

and

as a

bank

clerk, Salisbury

it,

He was

the manii-

Salisbury were self-trained

mechanics (they were also the only radio amateurs working

arts.

group).

in the

.After

had learned the machine trades

and innovation at Heintz and machinist by training and had worked as a

cultivated a taste for experimentation

Kiuifman.

Snow was

mechanic

at

also a

Federal Telegraph, before being trained in engineering in

Heintz and Kitnfman’s shop.

Snow and

Salisbury

edge of metalworking techniques and were

These men had come together

to

had an excellent knowl-

skilled glass blowers.”

develop and engineer klystrons and

related microwave radar systems at Stanford UnixersiU'

and the Spern

(iyroscope CA)mpany in the late 193()s and the early 1940s. Five of the

group

— Russell and Signrd Varian, Ginzton, Snow, and

had participated impetus for

in the early

this j)roJect

development of the

members

Salisbiiiy

klystron.

The main

was the Varian brothers’ concern about the

expansionist policies of the Third Reich. They were interested in devel-

oping a defensive weapon, the microwave

radar, that

would protect

urban centers from bombing raids by the Luftwaffe. To develop the

elec-

tron tube that would drive this microwave radar, Russell and Signrd \'arian

partnered with W’illiam Hansen and the physics department

at

Stanford in 1937 (see pre\'ions chapter). With Hansen’s theoretical back-

June 1937. His brother

ing, Russell A'arian

conceiNed the klystron

Sigurd reduced

idea to practice in the next few months.''

The 1938,

Spern

this

in

klystron soon attracted the attention of Sperry Gyroscope. In

Hansen and the to further

\'arian brothers

secured a large contract from

develop and patent their klystron invention. In return,

SperiT got an exclusive license on Stanford’s klystron patents. Sperry’s

patronage enabled Hansen and the Varians klvstron project.

to substantially

They hired doctoral students

expand

in the electrical

ing department, including Ginzton, as technicians.

They

their

engineer-

also recruited

96

(lhaptn

Snow and

3

SalisbuiT from Hcintz

and Kaufman, the

local

maker

of

power-

and radio equipment, to build klystrons. Benefiting from this influx of talent, the Stanford group designed new klystrons for radar and blind landing systems. It also worked out the device’s theoiw and devised

grid tubes

novel microwave measurement techniques."’ At Sperry’s urging, the Varian brothers, Hansen, Ginzton, Snow, and

Salishmy mewed

to the East (x)ast in

1940 to strengthen the firm’s micro-

wave tube and radar operations. Recruited by Ginzton, Stearns joined the

known about their activities at Sperrv, it is clear that these men directed many of the firm’s tube and radar activities during World War II and in the immediate postwar period. While Hansen and Russell Varian were in charge of Spern ’s “invention department,” Ginzton rose to the leadership of three group

SperiT shortly thereafter. Although relatively

at

different laboratories devoted to klystrons, radar systems,

measurements

respectively. Similarly, Stearns

opment programs during tube department

These

men

in

managed

in the

rapidly

is

and microwave

large radar devel-

the war, before heading Spern’s microwave

1946."

oriented SperiT Gyroscope toward the develojDinent and

small-scale production of high-qnality klystrons during

and

little

World War

II

immediate postwar period. This decision was motivated by the

evoking competitive situation

in the klystron

and radar

field in

the early 1940s. In 1940, the National Defense Research Gommittee,

which funded most research and engineering on microwave radar during

on tlie development of pulse microwave radars. It also chose to use the magnetron to power these radar transmitters. The klystron, which could generate less power than the magnetron at that time, was used in the radar systems’ receiving sets. These technological policies and the large-scale production of microwave radar the war, decided to concentrate

its

efforts

systems during the war created a large market for receiving klystrons. RCL\, Raytheon, CiE,

ence

in

and Western

Electric,

which had substantial experi-

the mass production of electron tubes, rapidly established them-

selves as leading suppliers of these klystron

ty

pes during the war."^

Speriy (iyroscope, which could not compete with these firms in the

mass production cialty

approach

field

but had strong engineering teams, adopted a spe-

to the klystron business.

produced high-precision tubes

in small

The corporation developed and quantities. The Varian group, for

example, designed high-quality reflex klystrons. Reflex klystrons were single-cavity tubes (most klystrons

reflex klystrons, the electron

had two

beam was

cavities

or more). In these

reflected hack through the cavity

resonator by a repelling electrode with a negative voltage. These small

97

Mililary (loopn alive

and complex vaciuim lubes were dilficult to make. Dm in^ llie war, Sigurd Varian, Hansen, Snow, and Salisbuiy developed seven liigh-performance reflex klystrons.

Some

would be used

of these

microwave communication equipment.

radar systems, others

in

In addition,

in

Hansen and Marvin

Chodorow (a physicist who later would direct Stanford’s klystron development efforts) developed a theoiy of the reflex klystron’s operation at S|)erry.''^

The Varian group

high-power klystrons

also designed

in

conjunction

with the development of novel radar transmitters during the

Avar.

They

pioneered the development of Doppler continuous-wave radar. Unlike pulsed radar svstems, Doppler radar

sets relied

on continuous waves.

They could calculate the speed of a moving vehicle such as an airplane and distinguish targets from stationary background objects. In conjunction with this work on Doppler radar, the Varian group developed highpower klystrons. In particular, Salisbury and Ginzton worked on a three-cavity klystron in 1943. This klystron could generate 2 kilowatts of

power. This was a very high output power for the time.'^

When

they were

SalishuiT

made

still

at Sperrv, the V^arians,

plans to establish

their

Ginzton, Stearns, Snow, and

own company on

the San

Francisco Peninsula after the war. Tlie Varian brotliers initiated the project

and

carefully selected the firm’s

motivations for setting up a Stearns, Salisbury, Snow, after the war. ings.

founding members. The group’s

new corporation were

and the Wirians wanted

They longed

for

to

diverse. Ginzton,

go back

more congenial and

to Galifornia

familiar surround-

This sentiment was not specific to the \arians and their friends.

was shared by

in the late 193()s

go back

to the

who had moxed to the and during World War II. Most of these men

many

western engineers

West and were

“Galiforniaitis”

afflicted by

— the intense desire

what was often called

Goast

Electric, Bell

moved back

to the West.

ple with their experience /

had

desired to at

the time

at

Sperry, Raytheon,

Telephone, and other electronics firms on the East

San F'rancisco Peninsula was

Salisbuiw

East Goast

to relocate to (ktlifornia. In the post-

war period, most western engineers who worked General

It

still

and

to create their

Because the electronics industry on the

embryonic and offered few jobs for peo-

training, the Varians, Ciinzton,

own. Thev decided

Snow, and

to establish their

own

/

on the San Francisco Peninsula.''^ The group also wanted to create a working environment to pursue their technical and scientific interests and be in control of their work. At Speny, the Varians had chafed at the firm’s light rules and procedures and resented having to report to managers who had little knowledge or firm

('ha/)ler 3

9(S’

unclersianding of iheir work. Ch eating a

new

firm would enable

them

to

be their own bosses and work on the science and technology' of their

“The Varian brothers,” one of their associates later recalled, “wanted to have independence with new research, new development, and earn enough money to pay for what they were doing, and have con-

choice.

trol

over

it.”"’

Finally,

Ginzton and Russell Varian saw the

foi

niation of a

new

firm as

an excellent opportunity to work out their ideas on how to organize and

manage an engineering

firm.

The group wanted

to build a small

erative-like lahoratoiT closely linked to imiversin’ research.

operation of the

new

partnership

among

new

and

devices

scale,

“The mode of

laboratory,” Russell Varian wrote in 1946, “will he a

members. The activities will he to develop patents or manufacture the devices on a small

five to

to sell

whichever appears

ten

to

were particularly interested

he the most advantageous.”'" The founders in

transforming ideas coming from acade-

mic research into innovative and high-quality products. In they wanted to exploit the results

research

programs. “Many

recalled, “were being

number

coop-

coming from Stanford’s expanding

[academic]

expanded and

of practical applications.

particular,

laboratories,”

rebuilt,

Ginzton

later

and these would uncover

The unique

characteristic of

all

a

of

these projects at universities was that they were novel, interesting, hut

ven’ difficult for a lavperson to understand.

Those of us who could hope

to grasp the practical significance of novel discoveries in versities

were

to

he sure

to

he in close proximkv

to a

American

uni-

gold mine.”'” To

finance their research and engineering efforts, the group envisioned

securing development contracts from

the

government and

private

corporations.

The

founders, especially the Varian brothers, were also interested in

company different from SperiT and other tradicorporations. “We did not want to have the hierarchy

building an engineering tional electronics

company owning facilities and employing employees,” Ginzton later reminisced. “We wanted to he a cooperative. We wanted to create a cooperative organization.”'^ The new firm would he owned and managed hv of a

engineers and

scientists.

It

would

also he

an “association of equals” where

“everyone would consider himself a true participation

[Vr].”-"

name: Varian Associates, (iinzton and the Varian brothers build a social institution, which would

fulfill

its

wanted

to

“human needs of its providing emplovment

the

emjDloyees.” In particular, they were interested in

and constructing “an environment conducive to one’s daily work and pride in one’s accomplishments.”-' security'

also

Hence

satisfaction in

M Hilary shaped by

VMiile tliese j)r()jects were

and the

(iinzton

\'ai

would he conducive

llieii

99

( '.oofunfit ivr

ideological eoiiiniitnienls,

ians believed that such a coo|)erative organ i/al ion

Kinployee owneiship and the

to business success.

good work environment would strongly contribute to employee morale and helj) bring forth each person’s creative abilities. In other words, the firm’s progressive j^olicies would enhance its productivity and com})etitiveness. Russell X'arian, Signrd V^arian, (iinzton, and Stearns were comforted in these beliefs by the example of (ieneral Radio, the Massachusetts-based electronic instrumentation corporation that had creation of a

inspired (diaries Litton to share half Of his profits with his employees at Litton Engineering a few years earlier. (General Radio was an employee-

owned company.

It

belonged

jirodnction supervisors.

No

to

its

managers, engineers, and senior

outside investor could buy General Radio’s

and employee-owners had to sell their stock back to General Radio when thev left the company. The \'arian brothers and most obser\ers at the time believed that General Radio’s unorthodox owner-

shares,

ship structure was critical to the corporation’s rise as a major mannfac-

measurement instruments." Although the \arians, Ciinzton, and Stearns shared a common institutional vision, the entrepreneurs had divergent views regarding the firm’s tnrer of electronic

future field of

and

In spite of their solid expertise in klystron design

small-scale production, Ciinzton

liitnre its

activitv.

and

Russell \^arian felt that the

corporation should stay away from the microwave tube

meager

capital of $22, ()()(), \^arian Associates

field.

would not be able

to

With

com-

pete with large tube firms such as Western Electric, Raytheon, and Sperry Civroscope, which had large product lines, solid engineering teams, efficient

production

and have limited

facilities.

“Since the laboratory would be quite small

capital,” Russell Varian later recalled,

eliminated klystrons from the j)roposed field of onr

because

I

thought that

have a considerable

in

“1

more or

less

This

w'as

acti\'ity.

order to compete any comj)any would

number

quite expensive to develop

of klystrons, I

and

and since

1

knew’ that they were

did not see any possibility

entering the klystron business.

ha\'e to

at that

time in

But Stearns and Signrd \'arian

dis-

Spern that the government was increasingly fimding klystron research and engineering. .As many industrial laboratories had dropped their klystron develo|)ment efforts immediately after the war, these men thought that there would be a agreed.

They knew' through

demand

their acti\ities at

for their tube-development

in ex])loiting

other

fields in

skills.

The group was

also interested

high-frequency electronics. I'hey envisioned

working on microwave communication systems, electronics measuring

1(H)

('.hdpter 3

instruments, and linear accelerators. Russell Varian was also interested in

developing practical applications for unclear magnetic resonance, which

had been recently discovered

Stanford by William Hansen and Felix

at

Bloch.-'

Xarian’s founding gionjD returned to C^alifdrnia in two waves. In 1945, Russell Varian

of the

new

moved

He

firm.

Stanford’s phvsics

to the Peninsula to

was followed,

faciilt)’

in

prepare for the establishment

1946, by Ginzton,

and assumed the

who joined

associate directorship of the

new Microwave Laboratory. The other founders, who had

stayed at

SperiT to bring the tubes they had developed during the war to production,

moved

Bay Area

to the

in the

new head of

Schiff, the

of 1948. At the same time,

group of directors such

Xarian’s founders gathered a

Leonard

summer

as

Hansen and

the physics department at Stanford.

Richard Leonard, a lawyer, and Francis Farqnhar, the head of an accounting firm,

whom

board

of directors,

tise to

the

new

knew from the Sierra Club, also joined the bringing much-needed legal and managerial exper-

Russell Varian

conijjany.

and David Packard, (iinzton, Stearns,

of

(Terman, the dean of engineering

at Stanford,

Hewlett-Packard, joined \5irian’s board in 1949.)

and the Varians

also

brought

in consultants

such as

Marvin (diodoiow, the Sperry physicist who had recentlyjoined Hansen’s

and Ginzton’s group

in the physics

department

at Stanford.-"’

Contract Engineering 4

The entrepreneurs

set

up shop

in

San Carlos

in July 1948.

Their firm was

located only a few blocks away from Litton’s magnetron plant. Besides the establishment of suitable

clearance for the tracts.

new

The founders

facilities

firm, their

also

needed

first

and the acquisition of task

a security

was to secure business con-

to acquire additional capital.

They soon

discovered that the $22, ()()() they had invested in the venture was insuffi-

machine shop and vacuum tube laboratoiy. (This money came from their own savings and from the royalties the \'arian brothers had received on the klystron patents.) The founders spent much of that sum solely to ecjiiij) the shop with second hand machine tools and specialized equipment such as vacuum furnaces and a Litton gla.ss lathe. They needed fresh funds to survive and put themselves on a more secure footing so that they would be able to undertake large projects. “W'e had to overcome some extremely difficult things in the early days,” Stearns later recalled. “The first thing was just staying alive from a financial standpoint. It was really hand to month.”'-*’ cient to establish a

lOl

Military daopnalixx'

To keep the firm going, tal.

tlie

founders needed to

raise additional ca|ji-

But since Russell Varian was adamant about building a

trolled by

its

fiini

con-

employees, they could not get funds from outside investors.

(Some New York investors bad shown interest in Varian Associates, but Russell \^arian bad vetoed their investing.) I bis led the entrepreneurs to raise funds from their friends. (In the fall of 1948, Hansen mortgaged bis bouse also

in

order to invest $17, ()()()

decided

Varian A.ssociates.) \4irian’s founders

in

to grant stock-ownership privileges to all current

and future

same time, realize their goal of building an employee-owned fn m. Employees could buy these shares at the same price as the founders had bought them themselves. The \'arians, Stearns, and Ciinzton also agreed that all the corporation’s stock should be kept in the hands of employees, consultants, and directors. Shareholders who wanted to sell their stock had to offer it employees,

to other

in

order to

raise additional capital

employee-owners, before

.selling

it

and,

at

the

to the highest outside bidder.

This ensured that no external investor would take control of the com-

pany and re-orient friends, employees,

it

and

in a

more conventional

on

direction. Relying

local investors sympathetic to Varian ’s goals, the

entrepreneurs raised $120,000 between October 1948 and June 1950.

Snow and

Salisbury decided not to ])articipate in the

company. They were content

to

remain

rate responsibilitv'. In essence, the

management of the

as technologists with

no corpo-

company was run by only four of

the

and the Varian brothers. Stearns ran X'arian on a day-to-day basis and was the company’s chief sales and marketing man. Sigurd X'arian headed engineering, while Ginzton, who worked only part time at Varian achised Russell \4u'ian, the company’s original founders, Stearns, Ginzton,

head, regarding strategic

issties.-^

In parallel with the search for additional capital, the

development contracts,

group looked

especially in the military sector.

The

for

entrepre-

neurs sent announcements of the company’s formation together with a

brochure on

its

capabilities to

government agencies. Stearns and Ginzton

also visited militaiT laboratories to solicit busine.ss for the

new

firm.

“I

up and down the East Goast, visiting laboratories, in the Air Force and Navy, and .so on,” Stearns later reminisced. “1 visited as many of them as could, just to touch base and .see what was going on. Then drove all the way acro.ss the country. stopped at left Washington and WVight Field [in Dayton] on the way out, and at the Air Force laboratoknew a lot of people.” ries, where Benefiting from the Dej)artment of Defense’s rearmament efforts early went

all

1

I

I

I

”'

I

in the (’old

War, \arian Associates received two microwave tube contracts

I(i2

('/inf)lrr 3

in Sej)lcnibei

1948. Tlie firni,

which had been reconnnended by (4iarles

Litton, obtained a small production order

Laboratoiw, an East Cx)ast avionics firm.

produce

tra\'eling-wave

six

from the

Under

Aii

borne Instruments

the contract, Varian was to

tubes (another type of velociUHiiodnlated

microwave tube), which had recently been designed by a research group in the electrical

\'arian also

engineering department

at Stanford.'"

Diamond

obtained a highly classified contract from the

Ordnance Fuse Laboratory to develop an exotic reflex klystron, the R-l. The R-l was the main component of the radar svstem that monitored an atomic bomb’s distance from the target and triggered the explosic^n. “This radar,” Chodorow, a Varian consultant, later recalled, “would transmit a radar signal. reflected signal

When

how

it

close

it

got close to the target, was,

and when

it

it

could

tell

was close enough,

from the it

would

detonate the [bomb].”'' Because of its nniisnal application, the tube had to

be extremely

tions.

DOFL

reliable.

had

also to withstand high shocks

and

vibra-

Because no existing reflex klystron met these requirements, the solicited bids

\ arian Associates

contacted for It

It

from RCA, Speriy, and CiE for such a tube

in 1948.

was not one of the firms that the Diamond Fuse Lab

this project.

was because of Ginzton’s consulting

activities

with

DOFL

that Varian

on and secured the development contract for the fuse of atomic bombs. In addition to his assistant professorship at Stanford, Ginzton worked as a consultant for the Diamond Ordnance Fuse Laboratoiy “I was asked as a consultant to come over to the Diamond Ordnance Laboratoiy to tell them whether the proposals by Speriy and RCA [for bid

the tube] were sound,” Ginzton later recalled.

He

continued:

Each one said they could do what was needed but it would cost a million dollars (or the Joi). looked at the proposals and decided that the problems were not nearly so se\ ere as Speny and RCA perceived them to be and I said: “let me think about it.” then went home, showed the requirements to Sigurd \arian and the rest of the group, and we all agreed that what needed to be done could be done very easily. In a week’s time, our laboratory was able to build a model of a klystron which 1 look back to the Fast with me in my j^ocket. When I was once again asked if it was possible to deyelop the kind of tube they needed for $1 million, said: Aes of course, here’s a sample. \bu can haye it for free.” That was dramatic staging, hut that was how \arian got inyoKed in its first major contract.''' I

I

I

Benefiting from Ciinzton’s showmanship, \arian .Associates received a

$21,400 cost-reimbursement contract from feasibility.

the

DOFL

to establish the tube’s

This contract was later renewed and enlarged several times. By

summer

of 1950, \ arian

had received nearly half a million dollars

to

103

Military (loojmdthw

Fii(iire

3.2

successor, the R-2 (left). Ck)iirtesy ol \'arian,

riic*

R-l reflex klystron (right) aiul

Inc.

and Stanfotd University Archives.

develop the

R-l.

I'liis

klystron

lished V'arian flrtnly in

One

tlie

its

became the cotnpany’s

tnaitistay

and

tnicrowave tube business.'^

might ask why the Varian brotheis, Steai ns, and Ciinzton,

progressive political views

estab-

and had

justified their earlier

who had

tube work on the

groimcls that klystions were defensive weapons, accepted such a contract

and became involved

in the

development

One

can speculate that obtaining

The

firm had to secure

tracts, in

of

weapons of mass destruction.

this contract

and renew govei iiment

order to sur\ive.

I

he

DOFL

was a matter of necessity. contracts, whatever con-

contract also offered challenging

technical problems, especially in fabrication techniques, which these relislied.

In addition, Stearns, (iinzton,

and the

X'arian brothers

men were

They were not Marxist socialists, and they had little sympathy for the Soviet Union. There is substantial cwidence, however, that .some members of the group, esj)ecially Ru.ssell and Sigurd \'arian, later sorely regretted their imolvement in the development of fu.ses for atomic bombs. “In Russell’s and my opinion,” wrote Siguicl X'arian with much anguish patriots.

in

1958 “we thought that the klystron could be nothing but a defense ,

104

(Mniptn' 3

and

gacliijet,

itary] just

to

defend yourself

turned

lied lip with the killing

it

around

on how you look

at

von

or

yon awake

a noble process, but

it.

it’s

not

aren’t saving anybody,

bothers our conscience quite a

this

[The mil-

so.

an offensive weapon and we helped.

atom bomb. Yon

them. Of course

[will] kill 20,

to

is

You look

3(),00(),()()0

pessimisticly

[

w],

as

was

yon are just

bit. It

do once

I

It

depends

in a while,

people, or been partly responsible. Keeps

night sometimes.”'"’ These scruples contributed to Sigurd

at

\arian’s severe mental problems in the late 195()s. Ginzton himself seems to

have

him

that this discomfort led

to direct the

erator for cancer therapy at Stanford Associates in the 1950s

The

One

uncomfortable about the R-1 program.

felt

and the

can speculate

development of a linear

and commercialize

it

accel-

Varian

at

early 1960s.^‘’

and technology.

R-1 contract was critical in terms of business

funded the acquisition of tube-making equipment.

It

also

It

enabled the

founders to recruit excellent microwave tube engineers to the company.

For instance, they hired

Cliff

microwave tube technologist klystron

all

co-workers

Stanford

Gardner, a western engineer and the best

at

Raytheon. At Raytheon, Gardner headed

development work.

X'^arian’s

founders also recruited former

Speriw Gyroscope and they hired graduate students from

at

—especially

those

who worked on

doctorates under

their

Ginzton and (diodorow. These students had an excellent mastery of microwa\'e theoiT and klystron design. By 1950, half of the Varian group

was composed of Stanford facultv members and recent students. The was

made up

rest

of experienced engineers and mechanics from Speriw and

Ra\’theon.

The R-1 contract also led Varian Associates’ founders and their recruits to make innovations in tube fabrication. The reflex klystron had unusual reliability

and

testing specifications.

“The

R-1

the equivalent of having a half-ton weight

from the top

of a two-story building

had

to

be able to survive

on

it,

or having

fall

it

drop

onto a hard surface,” Chodorow, the

tube designer, later reminisced. “That was the

test.

It

was put

in

some-

thing like a shock machine.”''" Reflex klystrons built with traditional pro-

duction techniques inherited from the receiving tube industn’ did not withstand such rough treatment: the tube envelope would bend, and

cathodes and grids would

fall off.'^

Snow, Salisbury, and other Varian engineers experimented with new f

abrication processes under the overall guidance of Sigurd \"arian. In par-

ticular,

they built the R-1 out of

shift in klystron practice.

ing tubes, had been

machined

parts.

This was an important

Until then, klystrons, like conventional receiv-

made

out of stamped sheet metal parts. Machined

A li/ilfiry

Nov. 25, 1952

s. f.

varian etal

('oof/rraliiK'

105

2,619,438

METHOD OF MAKING A GRID STRUCTURE Filed April 16, 1945

Figure 3.3

Sigurd X'arian’s process for making honeycoml) grids. Source: Sigurd A'arian and Russell \'arian,

“Method

Ajiril 16, 1945,

granted November 25, 1952.

of

Making a

Cirid Structure,” U.S. patent 2,619, fS8, filed

106

(Ihdpter 3

conijjonents enal)led the construction of rigid tube structures capable of

withstaudiug the shocks and vibrations to which further ruggedize

tlie

was subjected. To

tlie R-1

tube, Variau’s engineers pioneered

make

ceramics, instead of glass, to

use of

tlie

body. Finally, because traditional

its

cementing processes did not withstand the tube’s mechanical

Gardner developed new ceramic-to-metal ceramic body. Under

to the

of

this

new

molybdenum would be applied

tests,

gun

seals to attach the electron

process, a metallizing paint

to the metal

made

out

and ceramic components.

This coating would then be reduced to a metal in a high-temperature

hydrogen furnace and create

new

In parallel to their use of his

a strong bond.''*'

materials for the R-1, Sigurd Varian

group perfected a complex process

and

had devised

Russell Varian

making

dropped

klystron grids. Sigurd

process while at SperiT Gyroscope.

this

many production

But SperiT encountered so that the firm eventually

for

and

it.

difficulties with the

process

Wlien faced with the problem of

developing a veiw rugged tube for atomic bombs, Sigurd \arian, along

Snow and

with

Salisbuiy,

went back

and transformed them

Sj)err^

had

Until then, grids

to the ideas

he had developed

at

into a practical manufacturing process.

traditionally

been made by crocheting tungsten

wire into an intricate pattern. Because the tungsten wires were not fine

enough, they intercepted the electrons emitted by the cathode. Furthermore, these grids lacked mechanical rigidity and vibrated when the tube was exposed to shocks. These vibrations caused modulation of the signal current flowing through the grids.

Sigurd \arian’s new grid-making process, which he developed Sperry and perfected lurgical techniques.

V)u

start

that

it

with

can be

at Varian, relied

A Varian

aluminum later

wire.

engineer

it

from 20

to

later

The aluminum .

.

.

and metal-

described the process:

wire must be of a certain temper so

and

must be good copper Plating copper out of aluminum was not that

normal a thing early on, but we did wire, cut

a variety of chemical

manipulated. You copper plate

defined thickness.

j)latitig to

on

at

it.

\V)u

it

it

then carefully straighten

into lengths of six, eight inches; you then

make

this

plated

a bundle of anwhere

70 aluminum coj^per-plated wires, depending on the size of the

final

swage it, hammer it, and draw it through drawing dyes, to finally get it into a dense mass of copper and aluminum that is inside a coppei tube. You have to saw it into disks. Then you etch out the aluminum in a chemical bath." grid. \'ou

I'his

now compact

that bundle,

pioccss enabled the making of a

grid” (so called because of

new

grid structure

had webs

its

new n pe of grid,

the

“honevcomb

honeycomb-like structure). Because the

as thin as

().()()()

1

inch,

it

was “transparent”

i\I Hilary

to electrons. Tliis grid

collected in result,

could take the heat out as the spent electrons were

much more

was also

It

it.

As a

rigid than traditional giids.

did not introduce noise into the electromagnetic signal.

it

honeycomb

grid was an important departure in klystron design.

small rugged reflex klystrons possible tacular

107

(ioafM'ralwr

and accounted

It

I

he

made

for the R-l’s s|)ec-

reliability.^'^

In |anuary 1949, \^arian Associates received a contract for the develoj>

ment

another high-end klystron from (ieneral

of

F.lectric.

(IK contracted

with \arian to develop the {prototype of a high-power klystron for ultra-

high-frequency (UHF) television transmitters. tions

Commission had recently approved

and (iF was eager to solve

to establish itself in this

an important bottleneck.

generate enough power

at

UHF

The

UHF

Fedeial

Communica-

television broadcasting,

new market. To do

No conventional

so, CiE

had

power-grid tube could

frequencies for television broadcasting.

do the Job. But GE’s mass production-oriented microwave tube division had little interest in developing such a tube. It viewed the demand for this tube as limited and estimated that manufacturing it in short production runs would not make the most efficient use It

of

needed

a klystron to

The

its facilities.

substantial share of

division was also in short supply of engineers, as a its

professional staff

o})ment of color television. As a plier of tube

engineering

result,

had been diverted

GE had

to look for

an outside sup-

services.^'’

X'arian Associates received the contract for the

UHE

to the devel-

development of the

klystron because of Stearns’ contacts at General Electric. Stearns

good

had

built

war.

He was

relations with GE’s

microwave tube division during the

also well acquainted with the firm’s

upper management

vacuum tube standard committee of the Electronics Industry Association. The tube’s power (5 kilowatts) and its other unusual specifications led Snow and Salisbury to make further innovations in klystron design and processing. “This project was a chalthrough

his participation in the

lenge to

us,” a

Uarian employee reminisced, “the engineers ran into a

lot

of difficult technical problems; Sigurd Varian and Salisbury sweated out

how

to put their

200 pound, four foot tube together.”^^ In particular, the

tube’s high temperatures led to the release of occluded gases

the metallic elements. These gases poisoned the oxide cathode to short

and

led

To overcome this, Sigurd \arian. Snow and Salisbury new cathode, the bombarded cathode. The cathode was made

tube

designed a

from

life.

out of sheet of tantalum, an element, wliich absorbed, rather than released gases at high temperatures. (The use of tantalum in

tubes had been pioneered

at

Heintz and Kaufman

vacuum

in the early 19S()s.)

By

KKS

(]haf)ler 3

on

bonil^ai'ding electrons

heated fnl

iijD

llie

backside of

sheet of tantalnin, tliey

this

the cathode to an emitting temperature

stream of electrons. In addition to

engineered a water-cooled

collector,

and created a

j)ower-

novel cathode design, they also

this

which allowed for the tube’s proper

cooling. This tube represented an important breakthrough in klystron

design and performance. tube, along with (iE’s

It

UHF

attracted considerable attention

transmitter,

were shown

the

annual meet-

at the

ing of the Institute of Radio Engineers in the winter of

when

1951.^"’

This development contract along with the contract from the

Ordnance Fuse Eahoratorv helped the Varian group

Diamond

to

further

strengthen the design and fabrication expertise in reflex and high-j)ower

which thev had acquired

klvstrons,

a

unique competence

in the

at

Sperry during the war. They gained

engineering and production of reliable and

rugged tubes for demanding military applications. These contracts enabled the firm

to

and technicians, acquire equipment, and develop new skills and

hire expert engineers

and testing techniques. But the R-1 and UHF

exjDensive processing

television contracts also

.Associates considerable visihilicv in die military

The UHF-T\^ tube emerging

field

gained Varian

and commercial

sectors.

established Varian as an important player in the

of high-power klystrons, and the R-1 project

made

it

an

important supjilier to the Department of Defense.^'’

Advancing the Klystron Art i

The Korean War

led to rajiid expansion of Varian Associates’

custom engi-

neering business and oriented the firm almost exclusively toward the militaiT sector. In the early 1950s, the

Department of Defense

greatly

vacuum tube research and engineering. It needed achanced klystrons to drive novel radar systems. The radar sets developed and deployed during World War II had clear limitations. They could not detect large homhers more than 200 miles away. Neither could they detect enlarged

its

siqiport for

aircraft flying at

objects.

low altitude and distinguish these planes from stationaiT

These shortcomings

strengthen

its

air

left

major gaps

had been pioneered motion nal.

aiT

II,

defense system. To

defense systems, the Department of Defense funded the

development of a new technology, Dop|)ler

World Whr

in the air

relied

of a target

at

radar. This technolog\’,

which

Sperry (iyroscope (among other places) during

on the

caused a

DojDj^ler effect, shif t in

the

fi

namely the

fact that the steady

equency of a reflected radio

Doppler radars could distinguish moving vehicles from

background and thev could calculate

their speed.

sig-

their station-

109

Mili/firy (looperalixir

The

clevelopnienl of

l)()])|)ler

new

radars refjuired eiiliiely

tyf)es of

transmitting tubes. Magneti'ons, whieh liad been used in radar transmitters

during World War

II,

could not he easily emj^loyed

in

Doppler

e(|ni[)-

ment. Their frequencies were not stable enough for Doppler radar. Only

had the desired

klystrons

frecjiiency stability. But the klystrons used in

ladar transmitters in the late 194()s could not generate kilowatts.

Major engineering work was required

klvsti'ons.

At the same time, the Air Force and the

in

funding research and development

needed new

The

j^rojects

more than

higher power

to obtain

on

Naw

were interested

reflex klystrons.

and

reflex klystrons for the radars used in aircraft

ture differentials.

They

missiles.

1940s were

reflex klystrons emj^loyed in airborne radars in the

highly unreliable.

a few

They did not withstand severe pressure and temperaNeithei' did they did survixe the shocks and vibrations

characteristic of jet aircraft.

As a

result, reflex klystrons failed regtilarly

and incapacitated the planes’ and missiles’ avionics systems. The militan had an urgent need for more rugged and reliable reflex klystrons.’*^ Because \arian Associates liad a unique competency

in klystron engi-

neering, the Department of Defense pressed the firm to tackle these

engineering problems and take on new R&:D projects It

also asked \'arian to

produce

its

in the early 195()s.

tube designs, including the R-1, in

small quantities at this time. Although these military

of slow and careful expansion,

against

the founders’

N'arian’s

management complied

of their

operation considerably in the early

goal

original

demands went

with this request and enlarged the scale 195()s. In

1951,

one of the

firm’s directors wrote the following:

Fortunately for

nation but unfortunately for onr private

tlie

j)lans,

\arian

Associates’ basic technical abilities are of great value to the national defense effort

and critically needed. Although we would have innch j^referred to continue on a moderate expansion program, reaching a modest size with interesting and profcan state that the officers and directors of Aarian itable commercial business, I

Associates recognize fully their obligation to contribute to the to the

defense

raj)id a rate as this

effort.

Extreme pressure has been put nj3on ns

onr management

urgent need for increased

as rapidly as

we

To finance needed more fi'iends of

maximum

ability will j^ermit.

facilities

We

extent

to exj)and at as

are trying to comj)ly with

by j)nshing onr ex|)ansion program

just

possibly can.^^ this

rapid expansion, Stearns, (iinzlon, and the \arians

They again collected ftmds from employees and the company. They also sold the sales and maiuifacturing rights

to a line of

capital.

microwave meastiremeiu instrtimeiUs, which

neers had recently developed, to

I

X'arian’s engi-

lewlett-Fackard for .f2(),909. Hewlett-

IK)

ChafHer 3

l\ickar(l

was then a small electronic ineasiirement and testing equipment

corporation.

The

sale of \arian’s family of

microwave measurement

instruments enabled Hewlett-Packard to enlarge stantially increase \ arian Associates

revenues

its

were

still

in

its

and

testing

August 1951.

own

jDlant

and

new

to finance

factories that

defense

to the nation’s

efforts.

The

One

from the Defense Production Administration

third of the loan was

production equipment for the shop to

their

Diamond Ordnance Fuse Laboraton- (which needed klystron, the R-1, for A-bomb fuses) enabled Varian to

receive a loan of $1,520, ()()() in

up

equipment. V-loans had been estab-

Korean War

were deemed of crucial importance \arian’s reflex

and sub-

short on funds, they resorted to public capital.

lished at the beginning of the

support of the

line

the 195()s. Because the founders of

In early 1951, they applied for a Victory loan to set

j)urchase tube processing

product

the construction

and

fitting

in

earmarked

for the purchase of

San Carlos. The

rest

was allocated

of an engineering building on the

Stanford campus. Stearns, Ginzton, and the Varian brothers were interested in relocating the engineering staff to Stanford to reinforce the firm’s close In

connection with the tmiversity’s research programs."’"

tandem with the construction of a new

pus, Mtrian A.ssociates enlarged

its

engineering

trons specified by the militaiy By the

fall

on the Stanford cam-

staff to

develop the

klys-

of 1952, Varian As.sociates had

125 physicists, engineers, and technicians in firm’s

facilitv

its

managers raided Sperry’s engineering

engineering division. The staff

and hired Ginzton’s

and Chodorow’s best doctoral students. They also recruited East Coast microwave tube engineers from Raytheon, Sylvania, and Western Electric. The technicians came from Raytheon, Eitel-McCullough, and the Microwave Laboratorv at Stanford. Stearns, Ginzton, and the Varian

Diamond

brothers also recruited skilled contract officers from the

Ordnance Fuse Laboratory tracting.

to deal with the complexities of militaiT con-

These men were attracted by the caliber of the fotmding group,

the corporation’s ideology

and progressive

was owned and managed by technologists. j)rospect of living

on the San Francisco

policies,

and the

Some were

fact that

it

also enticed by the

Peninsula."’'

To organize this much enlarged engineering workforce, Varian’s management .set up new tube development teams. These teams were patterned after the model established for the development of the R-1 and L^HF tubes in the early days of the company. \"arian’s klvstron-development

teams differed sharply from those of Litton Industries, the other notable

microwave tube firm on the San Francisco Peninsula

at

the time.

of Narian’s engineering teams was to push the state of the

The

uoal

ti in

would meet

(lie

high sjieed rc(]uirenients ol digital

research jirojecls

When and

to

through their

Mil, Philco, and the Stanford Research

at

the dissidents failed to convince

Beckman

redirect the lab toward the jirodnction of

clif

au applica-

circuits,

which nienibers of the grouj) had been sensitized

tion

135

Silicon

Institute.

to leinove

Shockley

fused silicon transistors,

they found themselves in an uncomfortable position. Unwilling to stay

Shocklev Semiconductor, thev could not

The

tube and instrumentation firms had

local

Intent

upon

and pursuing

their

with their together,

skills.

rebels contacted

rebels asked the

them

other iobs

demand

little

in

the area.

for people

staying in the area, keeping the groiqi

work on diffused

silicon transistors, the

Hayden Stone

New York with which ing

easilv find

at

Kleiner’s

bank

to lielj)

and

collectively

Uompany, a small investment bank in father had an accotmt. In a bold move, the them find a corporation interested in hir-

in setting tip a silicon

operation on the San

Francisco Peninsula.’ “Because of seemingly insuperable problems with ’

the present

Stone

in

management,” the Shockley insurgents wrote

to

Hayden

June 1957,

this grouj)

wishes to find a corj)oralion interested in getting into the advanced

seinicondnctor device business.

If

such suitable backing can be obtained the pre-

them other senior |)eo|)le and an about thirty ])eo|)le. Thus a backer has the

sent gronj) can reasonably exj)ect to take with

excellent snj)j)orting staff totaling

one time a well trained technical grouj) by suj)j)lving enlightened administration and snj)j)ort. It is the aim of the grouj) to negotiate with a comj)any which can suj)j)ly good management. We believe that we could get a comj)any into the semiconductor business within llu ee months which would rej)resent a considerable saving in cost and time. The initial j)roducl will be a line o|)j)orlunity to obtain at

of silicon diffused transistors of

unusual design

both high-frequency and high-j)ower devices.

It

aj)j)lical)le to

the j)roduciion of

should he j)oinled out that the

comj)licated techni(jues necessary for j)roducing these semiconductors have already been worked out in detail by this grouj) of

by any obligation to the j)resenl organization.

Because

We

and are not

j)eoj)le,

[also]

and

restricted

have an excellent

suj)-

ofThe grouj)’s own attachment to the lower San Francisco Peninsula area, we would want to establish the oj)eration here south of San Francisco. It is estimated that the establishment of this new enterj)rise and its efficient oj)eration in the first year will require an exj)enditure in the neighborhood of .$750, ()()(). j)orling staff.

of this exj)erienced staff,

also because

Sent to the clerk in charge of the elder Kleiner’s account, the letter

soon a

atti

acted the attention of a young security analyst, Artlitir Rock, and

managing

j)artner,

Alfred (atyle,

who had

a

keen

interest in science-

based industries. While Havdett Stone had been traditionallv oriented toward established industrial sectors, the bank, under

(style’s leadershij).

1)6

('.fidpter

4

rcceiulv exj^anded into electronics. In ])articnlar,

liacl

had arranujed the public financing of Cleneral

Rock and

(k)yle

Transistor, a inaniifactnrer

of gerinaniiiin transistors, and seen a small investment in the firm’s seenrities

multiply over a short period of time. These

men had

also followed

emergence of the venture capital industry and in particular firms such as (. H. Whitney & C’.o. and American Research and Development, which had provided financing to new chemical and instrumentation firms since the late 194()s. Inspired by these examples. Rock and C>oyle the

were interested

in

developing new types of financial senices for such

firms and, in })articular, in helping

rounds

ol

new

electronics firms secure early

financing from established corporations. While riskier than

the underwriting of securities, these activities might bring in large financial returns.’'’

They were impressed by the defectors’ intellectual abilities and their capacity to work as a group and were aware ol the potential of the semiconductor business. The Hayden Stone representatives made them an unusual proposition. At a time when few scientists and engineers started new business enterprises. Rock and Coyle suggested that the group establish its own corporation rather than look for collective employment. Furthermore, they offered to secure capital for the new venture among corporate backers. In return, they asked for a small interest in the new company. Their proposal was a startling one for the group. Socialized in academic science rather than entrejjreneurship, they had never thought of establishing their own firm and assumed that they would always work in corporations. The group, however, Idund Rock’s proposal appealing for personal and professional reasons. They saw the formation of a new firm as a way of staying in Rock and

(

California,

(k)yle fiew to California in July 1957.

controlling their

“being their

own

own

technical work, and, as Last put

it,

boss.”"’

Acting as the group’s agent. Rock approached more than thirU' poten-

many

and large aerospace corporations such as IT&rT, SperiT Rand, and North American Aviation. He also contacted Litton Industries and Eitel.McLullough. Rock encountered considerable difficulties in raising the needed capital. Some firms aj)j)roached by Rock were taken aback by the risks inx’olved in supporting a group with no product and little management exj^erience. Others had already started their own research programs in silicon and did not feel a need for the defectors’ expertise. Most tial

corjDorate backers, including

corporations

deemed

East Cx)ast electronics firms

the project impractical

they had never financed a

company

if

not disruptive. Because

outside of their

own

business,

manv

Rmo/ulion

managers did not see how they eonld stmetnre

siieh a deal.

worried about the elleet on their own emj)loyees. 'Diey feared ular

tliat

it

would lead them

to set uj) their

own

137

in Siliron

businesses and

I

hey also

in parlie-

compete

with their former employer.'"

Only Fairchild (-amera and Instiument, a medium-size on Long

traetor based

Island, expressed

Lacking internal silicon expertise,

it

an active interest

wealthy son

ol

manufacture

in

the idea.

was willing to consider unoi thodox

Established in the early 1920s by

|3roj:)osals.

military eon-

Sherman

(the

Fairchild

an IBM executive, and then IBM’s largest stockholder)

aerial

cameras, the firm had expanded

in

to

the immediate

postwar period into other military businesses such as high-precision

potentiometers

foi'

analog computers and military avionics equipment.

After undergoing rapid growth during the Korean War, Fairchild C>amera

had ex])erienced

mid 195()s. It had suffered procurement of aerial cameras and

substantial setbacks in the

from severe cutbacks

in the military

inemred heaw losses on militaiT development contracts. As a result, Fairchild (nmera had seen its sales decline from $42 million in 1954 to $5(1 million in 195(1. Its earnings dwindled from $1.6 million to $260,000 during the same

period.''^

To reverse the sagging fortunes of Fairchild Camera and Instrument, Sherman Fairchild redirected the comj^any toward electronics and especially toward technologies for gathering, transmitting, and storing data. He hired a group of young managers such as John Carter from Corning Class. He also hired Richard Hodgson, a Stanford electrical engineer who had headed a small West Coast company that made television tubes.

The

Fairchild firm then acquired a ntnnber of system businesses, includ-

ing the teleU pesetter division of

AT&T

and

a

tape transports for digital computing. These

manufacturer of magnetic

men were

also looking for

opportunities in the transistor business, but were taken aback, as they later recalled, ital

by “[the scarciU’ of] qualified personnel, the very large cap-

investment [required], and the pros])ect of years

j)roduction might be feasible.”"' rebels.

The

They were

Hence

of'

research before

their interest in the Shockley

defectors offered what Fairchild (Camera was looking

for.

ac(|uainted with the latest silicon techniques, they had nearly

mastered the manufacturing processes, and they were reasonably close j)roduction.

conductor

They provided

a fast

and

relatively

cheap entry into

tlie

to

semi-

industry.'"

Exj)loiting Fairchild (camera’s

keen

interest in the rebels’ jtroposal,

Hayden Stone negotiated, on their behalf, one of the first venture cajntal agreements on the West ('.oast. Fairchild (’.amera financed the

I3H

(’Jia/)ln4

csial^lislinient of a

new

(Inn, Fairchild Seinicondnclnr Cx)rporalion, with

a loan of $1.38 million (dr

firm was jointly

its First

year and a half of operation.

owned by Hayden

The new

Stone, the seven rebels, and Noyce,

the shrewd and charismatic assistant director of research at Shocklev,

who

joined the group as

its

Hayden Stone owned

technical leader.-'

roughly one-fifth of Fairchild Semiconductor; the remaining shares

among

were distributed equally

the eight entrepreneurs.

C-amera controlled the firm’s board of directors and,

in

Fairchild

conjunction

Hayden Stone and the (dlifornia group, had the right to choo.se its general manager." The contract further specified that, in case the new firm became siicce.ssfnl and met certain profitability requirements, Fairchild Camera had the option of acquiring it for $3 million after 2 years or $5 million after 8 years. The group signed the agreement with Fairchild Camera in September 1957.“'^ Around the same time, the entrepreneurs approached James Gibbons, one of their co-workers at Shockley Semiconductor, and asked him to join the group as the company’s ninth founder. Gibbons, a junior faculty in the electrical engineering department at .Stanford, worked at .Shockley Semiconductor on a part-time basis. Frederick Terman, Stanford’s provost, and John Linvill, the head of the Solid-State with

Laboratory, had recently apprenticed Gibbons to William Shockley.

They had asked Gibbons

to learn the

techniques required for the fabri-

cation of silicon devices from Shockley

and then

niques back to the university. This was not the

first

transfer these tech-

time that Terman had

sought to appropriate process technologies from local firms. Twenty years earlier, he electrical

Kiirl

Spangenberg, a young instructor

engineering department, to learn

Litton about

emerge

had asked

as

making vaennm tubes

an important player

in

—

all

in the

he could from Charles

move which enabled Stanford microwave tubes after World War a

to 11.

At Shockley Semiconductor, Gibbons learned silicon processing from

Noyce, Moore, Kleiner, and their technicians. cations for Shockley’s Fairchild’s

diodes and

made

also

calls

developed appli-

on customers.

who was

interested in an academic career, declined

Over the next few

years, Ciibbons

reproduced Shocklev’s

oratory on campus. As a result, Stanford was prc^ibably the to

When

founders approached Gibbons regarding joining their

startnj), (iibbons,

their offer.

PNPN

He

first

lab-

nniversitv

ha\e the capabilitv of making silicon diodes and transistors. This pro-

cessing expertise enabled (iibbons

and

Linvill to build a large

and research program in solid-state electronics 195()s and the first half of the 19b0s.-'^

at

teaching

Stanford in the

late

139

l{ni()hth()U in Siiiron

Fairchild Semiconductor, the ei^ht roinukas

would make high-j)erfdrmance

and

theii

hackers agreed,

silicon transistors for the militaiy sectoj.

Although the group had done no formal market research prior

to the

firm’s establishment, they sensed that the military sector offered by far

the most j^romising market. Interested in the high-temperature operational characteristics of silicon comj)onents, the

was the largest user

had expressed to the

of silicon transistors

Department

and diodes by the mid 1950s and

The

of silicon transistors.

Signal (a)r[)s, for instance,

had given large engineering development contracts Pacific

Semiconductors

to develoj)

to firms

tem contractors,

Fairchild’s founders reasoned,

financial resources to its

such as

and produce diffused

icon transistors in 195b. Finally, only the military and large

Besides

Defense

a strong inteiest in the aj)plication of solid-state diffusion

manufacture

Hughes and

of

weapon

sil-

sys-

would have the necessan'

buy the complex and expensive products.

orientation

toward

the

military

market,

Fairchild

Semiconductor, the entrepreneurs decided, would be a manufacturing organization. Unlike Litton Industries and Varian Associates, which had started as contract engineering firms, Fairchild was to concentrate

on

the profitable high-volume production of silicon transistors. Indeed, the

founders had no interest reasons. Benefiting

in militaiw

research contracts

from generous private financing, Fairchild Semi-

conductor did not need military j^atronage uct

—for a number of

to finance research

and prod-

development. Furthermore, the entre})reneurs deemed military

research contracts detrimental l)ecause they would give the Department of'

Defense control

ing

it

of the firm’s research

program and product

in directions of direct interest to the military

j)otential. Finally,

because

of their

but of

Briugitig a

The

and market

New

industrial

one- to three-year duration, military

research contracts would restrict the firm’s ability to technical

little

line, lead-

acljust rapidly to

new

opj)ortunities in a fast-evohing industry.'"

Product

to

Market

eight entrepreneurs set uj) shop in Palo Alto in October 1957.

Besides the establishment of suitable cialized

equipment such

fusion furnaces, their

facilities

as crystal growers,

first

management team, lo do

task

and the building

vacuum

evaporators,

of spe-

and

dif-

was to build a strong technical and

so, the grouj)

hired former co-workers fioin

Shockley’s lab such as David Allison, a solid-state diffusion expert. I'he

founders also recruited

worked

local electronics technicians, d'hose

in the Peninsula’s

who had

tube industries brought with them knowledge

140

(Ihdpter 4

of chemical handling, glass working, and vacnnm techniques. Under

Hodgson’s guidance, the founders also recruited managers from com-

They aj3j)ointed Tlumias Bay, a bright and easy-talking salesman who had worked as marketing manager at Fairchild (kimera’s jDotentiometer division in Los Angeles, as the head of sales and marketing. Edward Baldwin, a Hughes executive, was recruited as the firm’s general manager in February 1958 by giving him a share of the new comj^any. Baldwin was an important recruit. A physicist by training, he had directed product engineering at Flughes Semiconductor, one of the largest silicon diode manufacturers in the United States. Baldwin brought with him a large contingent of manufacturing and instrumentation engineers from Hughes. Bay also hired some of Hughes Semiconductor’s best and most aggressive salesmen.-’ The new team proceeded to identify' potential users for the firm’s products before developing their first transistors. To determine the component requirements of militaiT system manufacturers, Noyce and Bay, benefiting from Sherman Fairchild’s close contacts with IBM, visited its Federal Systems division. This division specialized in the design and manufacture of advanced military computers. Noyce and Bay also toured large military contractors on the East Caiast and Southern California such as Hughes, TRW, Arma, and Sperry Gyroscope. Wliile conferring with design engineers and project managers at these firms, they discovered that there was an emerging market for double diffused silicon transistors in military avionics, especially in new digital-based guidance and llightponent firms

in

Sonthein

(’alifdrnia.

control svs terns.-” j

championed the digitalization of avionics equipment to bolster the reliability and capabilities of its weapon svstems. Until that time, aircraft and missiles had been controlled by analog techniques, especially analog computers. These computers solved numerical problems by setting up equivalent electric circuits or mechanical systems to calculate the position of airplanes, control their mechanical subsystems, and determine their best flight trajectorv for weapon delivery. Analog-based avionics systems, however, depended on failurejjrone vacuum tubes and a multitude of moving parts that were sensitive to vibration and wear and tear. As a result, analog autopilots, bombsights, and navigation instruments failed on average even' 70 hours, which severely impaired the military’s oj:)erational readiness and led to enormous repair and maintenance costs for the Department of Defense. Fui'thermore, analog computers offered aj)j)roximate and often inaccurate results and were therefore unfit for use in guidance svstems of interStarting in 195b, the Air force

—

Ml

limolulion in SHiron

contincMital

ballistic

missiles,

Analog computers had the

which

iiu thei

rc‘(|iiire(l

tlu*

utmost

piecision.

disadvantage' ol lacking Ilexibility, as

they had to be torn ajxirt and ix'conlignred to sohe

new

problems.'”'

and capability of jet airplanes and ballistic missiles, the Air Force encouraged avionics Ih ins to digitali/e their (lightcontrol and navigation systems and to incoiporate digital computers Id imj)rove the reliability

had a

into their ecjiiipment. Digital comj)nters, the Air Foixe reasoned,

number

ol ad\antages.

Fhey were more accurate and could calculate the

trajectory ol ballistic missiles

more

j)recisely.

oj)erate at sj^eeds far ontsti ip|)ing those ol

computers could

Digital

mechanical and electro-

mechanical machines and could therelbre control complex weapon tems

in real time.

sys-

Fhey were general purpose machines and could be

used lor a variety of Imictions: the calculation of the the determination ol the best llight trajectory for

monitoring of a plane’s or a

aircraft’s position,

bomb

deliveiT,

missile’s various subsystems.

and the

Furthermore

more de])endable than analog machines.'^" Anna, Hughes Aircraft, and other manufacturers of

they promised to be

As Sperry, tion

and

llight-control systems gradually shifted

from analog

na\iga-

to digital

techniques, they started building high-sj)eed digital computers. As a result, a

market for high-performance

digital

comj)onents emerged

in

the militan a\'ionics industry, (ioing further, the Air Force insisted that

employ silicon transistors as much as j)ossible. \’acnnm tubes and germanium components did not meet the reliabilit^ and

a\'ionics firms

miniaturization recjuirements ol the military. X'acnnm tubes were fragile

and had short

lifetimes,

(iermaninm

high temperatures and, as a ditioning e(jnij)ment.

Only

transistors failed

result, recjuired

silicon

when exposed

hea\T and bulky

to

con-

air

com|)onents withstood the high

temperatures of airborne systems. Ik'canse they recjuired no

air

condi-

tioning, silicon de\’ices also lent themselves to the design of miniaturized

—

equipment an inq^ortant characteristic for aerospace systems where space and weight were at a j)remium.'^' W'ithin this emerging market for high-fre(|uency silicon conq^onents in military avionics, l^ay and Fairchild’s founders identified a j)ressing need for switching transistors in conq)uter memories, fhe engineers at IBNFs Federal System Division were designing a ])rotot\pe na\'igational coma\ionics

puter for the B-70 aircraft and urgently needed a transistor that could drive the machine’s core

memory. No germanium

transistor could

the ap])lication’s tenq^erature specifications. Similarly,

con

transistors then

none of

fulfill

the

sili-

on the market met the designers’ j)erformance

re(|uirements. d'he devices had to operate at high switching speeds

and

142

('Iia/)ltr4

drive laim" currents in order to store data in

tlie

core ineinoiA.

IBM

needed a device faster and more powerful than any silicon transistoi' then on the market. Such a device, Fairchild’s founders realized, would fill “a vacant area in transistors”'^- and find a ready market in military airborne computers.''-^

The

Fairchild

group decided

to

develop “core driver” transistors that

would meet IBM’s engineering specifications and negotiated the terms a

of

purchase order with IBM’s Federal System Division. Because the engi-

neers

who designed

firm’s

production capabilitv and financial soundness, the Fairchild gronj3

the navigational computer had concerns about the

Hodgson and Sherman

enlisted the help of Richard

men went mote

to see

Thomas Watson

Fairchild Semiconductor’s offer

from the new firm] was a

transistors

as a result of this timely

mesa

IBM’s chief executive

|r.,

visit,

and

(NPN

officer, to j3ro-

“convince him that

safe thing to do.”'^ In

[

buying

FebrnaiT 1958,

Fairchild received a purchase order for 100

transistors at the hefrv price of

exact configuration

to

These

Fairchild.

or PNP) was

$150 each. Although the device’s left

for the

group

to decide,

IBM’s

engineers carefnllv specified the transistor’s electrical j3arameters. Fur-

thermore, they impressed upon the Fairchild group the importance supplying reliable components. They asked that Fairchild “cut out

random

catastrophic failures” in

ages for

its

transistors,

and apply

To engineer these complex

its

production

lots,

of all

use high-qnalitv pack-

special procedures to test them.'^'’

transistors, the Fairchild eight

organized

themselves in a loosely integrated fashion reminiscent of Varian’s team

approach to

to klystron engineering.

They could draw on

be responsible for their part of development

their varied skills

of the first transistor.

.Moore (assisted by Allison) worked on diffusion, metallization, and

assembly

technicjiies.

Roberts was responsible for crystal growing. Last

and Noyce developed photolithographic processes, which had been recently developed at the Bell Labs and the Diamond Ordnance Fuse l.aboratory to control the lateral dimensions of dif fused regions. Last also

developed the wax deposition techniques dimensions, worked on j)roblems. Hoerni

crystal

worked on

to delineate the

etched mesa

surface prejxiration and on assemblv

solid-state diffusion, (irinich, with a greater

needed for transistors than provided needed input for device design.

apj)reciation of the operating requirements

other

He

members

of the gronjD,

also develoj^ed transistor test

Hewlett-Packard to design and cjnote was

.so

equipment. (The founders had asked

make

a transistor tester for

them, but the

high that they decided to develop their tester

in house.)

Kleiner designed the ecjnij)ment needed for device develojjinent and

143

Nnutlulion in Silicon

evciUual produclion and oiilsoiirccd shojxs. Blank, in addition to

its

c

machine

oiistriK (ion to local

working on c(jihj)mcnt design,

installed the

such as gas and electrical distribution, and clean rooms, to allow

facilities,

the development woik to j^roceed lapidly. After the diffusion furnaces

and

were

installed

oped

in |)arallel.

in operation,

The main

version of the Il^M core di

two transistor configurations were devel-

headed by Moore, worked on the

effort, ixer.

1

loerni engineered

its

NBN

i^NP coun(er})art.'^’

Developing these radically new transistor |)roducts j)resented substantial

difficulties.

developed

The group could

at Bell

made

of

mesa

make them were on

develoj) a j^rocess aj)j)licable

founders

on sophisticated

Tabs for the design

duction techni(|ues reejuired to

To

rely

j)hysical theories

transistors, but the |)ro-

fraught with difficulties.

a j)roduction scale, the Fairchild

which contrasted

risky aiul innovative |)rocess choices,

sharply with those of Western Flectric, Bell’s manufacturing arm. W’liile

Western Flectric em})loyed j)roven technicjues such

and gallium

diffusion, the Fairchild

processes that had been de\eloj)ed

decided

group chose

at Bell

as metal

to exploit

masking advanced

Tabs. Specifically the

group

oxide masking and photolithography. Although these

to use

more complex and difficult to use than metal masks, ])romised more |)recise control of the lateral dimensions of transis-

technicjues were

they

tor structures.

It

was expected, as a

result, that

they would vield transistors

with better electrical chaiacteristics. In addition to |)hotolithograj)hy, the Fairchild

minum con

group

settled

deposition,

all

on boron and j)hosj)horus techni(|ues that later

diff

usion as well as alu-

became standard

in the

sili-

industn’.'"

In less than 5

months, the team transformed these and other labora-

and economical fabrication j^rocesses. and rehing on their rich and varied sci-

toiT technicjues into rej)roducible

Fx|)erimenting by

trial

and

error,

and technological skills, these men made numerous j^rocess innovations ranging from im|)rovements in crystal growing technicjues to the entific

cleveloj^ment of a novel j^rocedure for attaching gold wires to (he transistor

cliij)s.

j^rocess

and

They its

also

clevelc)j)ecl

a

controllable

attendant ecjuij3ment. In

designed, along with Kleiner, a

stej)

and

j)articular,

rej)eat

j)hotc)lithograj)hv

Noyce and Fast

camera

to

make masks

and devised an innovative method foi aligning them (Moore 1998). In conjunction with their work on masking. Fast and Noyce imj)roved uj3on existing j^hotoresists, the j)hotogi aj)hic emulsions used to selectively

Kodak lor the manufacture of j^rinted ciicuit boards, j)hotoi esists did not meet the exacting recjuirements of silicon j)rocessing. FIkt did not stick to the wafers and as

etch the wafers. Originally cleveloj)ecl by Kastman

144

4

('Ji(if)t(’r

Base Contact

Figure 4.2 Fairchild's

flist

Nl’N

a result could not

duced

transistoi.

be used

j)hotoresists’

Moore

to etch the

1998. (a)pvright 1998 IEEE.

oxide layer properly. They also intro-

the silicon cnstal.

ini]Durities into

Noyce, working

Source:

in collaboration with

To

and

solve these prohleius, Last

Eastman Kodak, transformed the

chemical composition and purified them so as to eliminate

contaminants and make them adhere

The group sought fusion jDi'ocesses

to better

and

to the silicon wafer.'^”

understand the boron and phosphorus

dif-

engineer controllable and economic diffusion

to

technic|ues. Hoerni, for instance,

developed a new boron process using a

gaseous source rather than the boron oxide powder then currently enijjloyed. “I’he diffusion of boron,”

because people used

it

as a

a boat, put the boat at high \’aj)or of

a lot of

boron would

boron oxide

Hoerni

recalled, “was veiw difficidt

source of boron oxide. They would put

temperature

diffuse.

The

in the tube,

[in a diffusion

after a

in

and the would create

furnace],

only problem was that

and

it

it

couple of runs the tube was

and we could not push the boat to j)ut the wafers in because it was sticking.”'^'' To avoid constant replacing of the tube (which was expensi\e), Hoerni developed a complex gaseous

completely soggy with

j)rocc\ss.

I’nder the

new

that oxide

process, pre.ssurized gases of nitrogen, oxygen,

and boron trichloride were introduced into the diffusion tube boron oxide. By carefully controlling this explosive mixture, thev

lu'drogen, to foi in

all

145

Rniolulion in Si/iron

dope the silicon wafer hut not enough to clog the tube. Fhe new process had the additional advantage of being nioie i'ej)i'odncible and controllable than the boron oxide j)owder process^" could create boron oxide

Finally, the Fair child

in lari^e enoui^li fjiiantilies to

gronp developed

a novel fabrication technic|ue to

deposit contacts on top of the transistor dice,

them

nect

ent metals,

aluminum and

ahtmirum'r pr'ocess.

pr'oduction

Hoer

of’

pr'ocess.

ahrrrrirnrrn for

to use.

for errors in

alurninitm. Moore’s

both contacts was a

ial birt cr

eate a jirnction

between

Hoer rii wanted

to use

argument

when

make

pre-

move:

coirnterintiritive

ahrrninitm, a P element, coirld be reasonably expected to

contact to a P-tv])e mater

all

diminishing the mrrnber of

Roberts recalls heated discussion

Moore had decided upon

Using

Moore developed an

and therefore reditcing the potential

r

siher but

Electric used two differ-

contacts,

and Moor e egar'ding which metal

rii

\ailed.

silver', for' its

had the advantage

It

rnanufactirring steps

the

While Western

to the package’s wir es.

chips, in or'der to con-

or'

a

good

alloyed to a N-type

orre,

To avoid making the contact with the N-type material a rectifving Moor e develoj^ed a corrrplex pr ocess in which alloving an aluminum

filnr

at

region.

bOO'X’ eliminated the irnwanted

do])ed the emitter sired P-t\’pe

became

laver'.

layer' as

a

PN

jirnction.

He

also heavilv

way of avoiding the formation of an irnde-

This was an inrportant innovation as alumir'rum later

the metal of choice for

making contacts

in the sernicondirctor'

indust r'vT' hr

addition

to

j)r'ocesses, Fair child’s

diffused transistors.

development

the

of

reproducible rnanirfacturing

engineer s faced the pr'oblern of packaging double

The

contaminants and had

transistors

needed

to withstand the

be shielded

to

fr'orn oirtside

high temperatur es and

that are characteristic of military aircraft. At

vibr ations

IBM’s request, Fairchild’s

engineers itsed the highest-quality packages then on the market: hermetic metal cans with advarreed seals factirr

or iginally

developed for the

e of power-grid tirbes. Fair child engineer s also devised

attaching the

tr

ansistor chip or die to

its

package. Texas

Instr

rnanir-

new ways of irments had

attached the silicon chips to their cans thr'oirgh dangling wires, which

made

its tr

them

a repirtation for irmeliabilitv. Instead, Fairchild engineers directly

ansistor' pr odircts sensitive to

shock and

vibr ations

and earned

soldered the chips to their containers. As a result of these innovations arrd the irse of high-qiralitv |)ackages, Fair child’s transistor' j)r'oditcts

rmrch mor e

r

ugged than those

Because the design than

its

of

its

were

competitors.

NPN

version of the core dr iver was

I’NP

coimter'j:)ar't,

Fairchild

first j)irt

more advanced it

in

its

into |)r'odirction in

146

('li(i/)l> 'A'/'jsJJ7/////yA'yyy/yyyA'//^^^^^

v 'j ///'.

U7777?

Ti TTyyy^

1 '

M ^7777777

e a

i>

«.

— Sup«

1

f

TE

G Fi{. 2.

j

La

PHear TraASUtor

FabrieatLcn

Figure 4.4

The planar

process. Source: Hoeriii 1960. (Courtesy of Fairchild

and Stanford University Archives.

Semiconductor

I

‘y

2

('ll

a

4

/)!(')-

Exploiting tlicse basic ideas, Hoenii built his process around seven

Hoerni carefully oxidized

basic steps. Starting with an N-tvpe wafer (a),

by exposing

to

it

an oxygen carrier gas

high-temperature furnace.

in a

Using the photolithographic techniques developed for Fairchild’s

mesa

he then

transistor,

selectively

Hoerni exposed the wafer

(c),

etched the oxide to a

and

and the base moved

(b). In the

first

next step

boron vapor, another standard

j)rocess at Fairchild, to create the transistor’s base.

diffused both vertically

it

As the boron atoms

horizontally, the junction

between the

collec-

and was protected from outside contaminants by the oxide layer. Hoerni later re-oxidized the exposed area. Applying another masking and etching process (d), he opened a window tor

into the

laterally

regrown oxide of the base area.

form the emitter

(e),

He

then diffused phosphorus to

creating a base-emitter junction. This junction, like

the base to collector junction, was protected from outside contamination

by the silicon oxide. After diffusing the emitter, Hoerni again selectively

etched the oxide layer

to provide for alloy contacts (f). Finally (g),

deposited contacts on the etched areas and alloyed them

Applying the planar process

face

—a

feature that gave

Hoerni discovered, was lar, it

transistor

much

had a low

better.

NPN mesa

It

started to

superior to

its

new mesa

or planar sur-

process. This device,

equivalent. In particu-

electrical characteristics.

also

had very

little

leakage.

While Fairchild’s

first

“The specs

[for Fairchild’s

were ten microamperes for leakage count,” Hoerni

“and here were devices with ten nanoamperes.

change the units

I

I

remember

was using to measure leakage counts

because they were a thousand times

much more

to the

its flat

NPN

gain, the planar transistor amplified electrical signals

transistor]

later recalled, I

vastly

had much-improved

name

its

in."’-*

to the fabrication of Fairchild’s first

Hoerni obtained a device characterized by

transistor,

he

less.”'*”

Planar transistors also were

mesa counterparts. “The most interesting thing [with these devices],” Hoerni reminisced, “was once they were sealed then you could tap forever, nothing would happen.”*’' Noyce and Moore, who had emerged as the company’s main managers, decided to proceed with the development of the planar process and bring it to j^roduction. Although this decision might appear obxious with hindsight, it was not evident at the time and involved much technological risk. reliable than their

In particular, planar transistors yield,”

Hoerni

later recalled, “was terrible.”*’- At

development, the yield in the

were extremely

make. “The

an early stage

in their

me.sa transistors

had been

yield of planar devices did not

exceed 5

of Fairchild’s first

25-30 pei cent range. The

NPN

difficult to

percent, a fact that cast doubts about their ultimate manufacturabilit\’.

133

in Silicon

Indeed, the Bell Teleplione Laboraloi to Hoerni’s

about

meiit l)ecause of

devised a process similar

ies, wliieli

same time, decided to forego its seeming lack of manufacturability.

tlie its

agement chose otherwise however.

It

liirdu*! develoj)-

Fairchild’s

saw the j)lanar j)rocess as the

solution to the com|)anv’s severe tap failure j)rohlem

and

way

as a

ufacture the highly reliable transistors specified by Autonetics.

son why [Noyce and Moore] eventually went to reminisced, “was because

Marketing was after

had

tliey

damn

Bell’s

“

to

man-

I'he rea-

Ifoerni later

tlie j)lanar,”

to solve this

Unlike

them.”'"'

man-

taj) test

problem.

comj)onent groups, which

served the needs of a telephone monopoly, Faircliild was oriented mainly

toward avionics applications,

wliicli liad

very higli

and put enormous pressure on the company

reliabilitc'

to eliminate

reejnirements its

products’

catastrophic failures.

Two other

factors further

process to production. potential of

encouraged the decision Autonetics

First,

planar process

tlie

and bring it development of the jirocess

— impressed

— pushed

Moore

by the

reliabilit)’

Fairchild to perfect the

to production. “Autonetics

planar,”

to bring the planar

new

was a big force behind the

later recalled.

“They wanted us

go

to

with planar technologv.”'''^ Crucial in the decision was Autonetics’ willingness to buy Fairchild’s future planar transistors.

new components would help jirocess

tion in active

Fairchild recoup

A its

market for the

large

heavy investments in

and product engineering. Second, Fairchild faced new comjietithe mesa transistor field. Motorola and Texas Instruments had

engineering programs

Fairchild’s

first

NPN

competitive threat,

mesa

in

mesa

transistor to

however,

and introduced copies of the market in late 1959. The main

transistors

came from

own

Fairchild’s

engineers.

Enticed by the large profits in the silicon business, Baldwin (the firm’s general manager) and the engineers he had brought in from

Hughes

left

Rheem Semiconductor in March 1959. Bringing with process manuals, these men set out to produce the firm’s

Fairchild to start

them mesa

Fairchild’s

transistors at lower cost than Fairchild.

Fairchild

had

transistor to

to

To compete with Rheem,

introduce new and better devices. Bringing the planar

market would give the company a major competitive

edge.*’*’

Because of these pressures, Noyce and Moore dedicated substantial engineering and financial resources to the further development of Hoerni’s fragile })rocess and the design of planar products. Although tle is

known about

into a stable

Fairchild’s effort to transform Hoerni’s lab techni(|ues

and reproducible manufacturing

firm’s research laboratoiy this

complex

lit-

process.

process,

it

is

clear that the

devoted substantial efforts to understanding

They

especially

needed

to isolate

and analyze

its

154

('Jiaffln4

laiilly steps.

tor yields

A

grouj:) lieacled

were partly due

by Hoerni discovered that

to imperfections in the

oxide

tlie

poor

transis-

Tiny holes

layer.

and create highly doped regions in the collector, putting in effect an emitter on the collector side. This finding led to the development of new oxidation techniques which enabled the growth of cleaner and more uniform in the

oxide

phosphorus atoms diffuse into the

let

ciystal

oxide films on top of the silicon wafers. conjunction with the development of a stable manufacturing

In

process,

Hoerni and other engineers

ultra-reliable planar products.

at Fairchild

designed a series of

These men planarized

Fairchild’s transis-

They designed planar variants of the firm’s first transistors as well as versions of fast-switching, gold-doped mesa de\'ices the company had introduced for logic applications in mid 1959. (Hoerni had developed the new technique of gold doping to improve the switching speeds of silicon transistors. Cioing against the conventional wisdom that saw gold as a contaminant reducing transistor gain, Hoerni diffused gold on the tor line.

back of the silicon wafer.

Much

to the surprise

of the other Fairchild

founders, gold-doped transistors turned off faster (2 microseconds, versus

1

nanosecond). David Allison and some other Fairchild engineers

soon applied

technique to new switching transistor products used in

this

computing. They

designed planar versions of these

later

Fairchild’s planar transistors as

had exceptional

transistors.)

electrical parameters,

such

high gain and low leakage currents. Furthermore, while the electrical

characteristics of

mesa

transistors drifted

nar devices were remarkably stable. resistant to

shock and impervious

during operation, those of

Finally,

pla-

planar transistors were highly

to outside contaminants.

As a

result,

they were extremely reliable. Planar devices represented a major break-

through

in transistor technologv.*’^

Hoerni knew

mesa silicon diodes manufactured by Hughes and Pacific Semiconductors had the same tap failure problem as Fairchild’s first transistors. He then went one step further in the commercial that

exploitation of his process in the spring of 1959 by designing a planar

diode for computing applications, which was faster and more reliable than any mesa product on the market. Seeing a ready market for such a

diode

at

Autonetics and in the avionics industry, Hoerni and Frank

(irady, the

new head

of operations,

urged Fairchild’s management

to

enter the diode business. As a result of their efforts, Fairchild’s engi-

neering groujrs designed a large family of ultra-reliable planar diodes. I'he

company

ufactui e in

also set

up

a

new

plant dedicated exclusively to diode

Marin Hounty, north of San Francisco,

in

October

man-

1959.'’-'

I{ni()liiti(>ri

Figure 4

155

in Silicon

.

The

first

and

Isv

planar integrated circuit (1900), designed and built by Lionel Kattner

Haas under the direction

Fairchild’s engineers also

the integrated

circtiit.

and

of Lionel Kiittner.

developed a radically new planar component,

Unlike discrete

porated an entire electronic capacitors,

ol }ay Last, (-onrtesy

circtiit,

de\’ices,

the integrated circuit incor-

which included

transistors, diodes,

resistors into the silicon crystal. Avionics reliabilit)’ w'as

once again the main drixer

of this

circuit into the silicon slice, tliese

development. By integrating a whole

men

sought hirther improvement

the reliability of axionics and other electronics systems. tires xvere dtie

either to

fatilty

Many

system

in

fail-

connections betxveen the silicon die and

component packages or to errors in the assembly of electronics components to the systems’ j^rinted circtiit boards. By integrating a xvhole circtiit into a silicon die and by depositing an aluminum the electric xvires of the

film to interconnect

its

xariotis

components, the potential

for such

fail-

ures xxus substantially reduced.”" Fairchild’s engineers also saxv integrated circuits as a xvay to further

miniaturize electronics .sxstems.

The

use of discrete silicon devices had

7

56

('/iaf)tn4

helped avionics inanuracUirers miniaturize their systems by dispensing with the hnlkv

conditioning eqnipinent required by germanium com-

aii'

ponents. Integrated circuits represented a

fiirtlier

step in that direction.

Bv cramming more components into the same package, Fairchild’s engineers reduced the board space required for a particular electronics f unction

and helped diminish the

overall size of electronics systems. Fairchild

also saw integrated circuits as a

way of “automating”

transistor

and diode

intensive.

The assembly of transistor dice to their packages was labor By integrating a number of components into the same silicon

die, they

would reduce the workforce and improve the productivity of

assembly

stations."'

assemhlv.

But competitive pressures also fostered and sustained Fairchild’s research and engineering program on integrated circuits. In 1958, Texas

new group around Jack

Instruments, Fairchild’s archrival, constituted a

work on the miniaturization of electronic circuits. By September of the same year, Kilby had made an integrated linear circuit, an oscillator, using mesa techniques. This mesa circuit was made of germanium. Kilby to

To interconnect the various devices on the germanium chip, Kilby employed flying wires. In the next few months, Kilby and his group informed the militan' services about their breakthrough and received a research contract from the Air Force to further develop the concept of the integrated circuit. It was anmnd this time that the Fairchild group first

heard of

Kilby’s circuit.

Texas Instruments soon publicized

inte-

its

grated circuit program. In March 1959, the coinpany organized a news

conference

to

promote

its

mesa integrated

circuits.

At

this

conference,

Patrick Haggerty, TI’s chief executive officer, claimed that the microcircuit

used

was a major invention and that integrated

weapon systems and consumer

in

circuits

would soon be

electronics products. Kilby’s

work

and especially the publicity that surrounded it put considerable pressure on Fairchild’s managers to start their own integrated circuit project and

They had

show that, like Texas Instruments, Fairchild Semiconductor was working on the technical frontier. Noyce, who was well aware of these market and competitive pressures,

obtain

fast results

for

it.

to

conceived of the planar integrated circuit

Hoerni had to learn

just

about

in

Januan’ 1959. By then,

developed the planar process and Noyce was the

it

(it

first

was only a few weeks later that Hoerni revealed

one his

process to the whole founding group). Exploiting his advance knowledge of the jilanar process,

circuit rather

Noyce thought of using

it

to fabricate a

complete

than individual components. This process, Noyce reflected,

had two unusual

features:

it

permitted the manufacture of hundreds of

I{ni(>lnli()n in Silicon

devices

on the same

slice of silicon.

Il

also

left

the wafer. This oxide layer, in addition to

a layer of Oxide*

its

157

on lop

of

masking and passivating

properties, could also act as an electrical insulator. As a result,

Noyce

lea-

soned, one could electrically connect the different comj)onents on the

same wafer by evaporating and |)ro|)eiiy etching an aluminmn film on lop of the silicon oxide. To obtain a functional electronic circuit, Noyce also devised ways of making other standard components such as resisloi s and capacitors with diffusion and j)hotolithographic techni(|ues. Finally, he conceived of using diodes mounted hack to back to electrically isolate the different devices on the same die."’ Noyce filed a patent for his planar integrated circuit idea in July 1959. This idea was pul into silicon and productized in the next 2 years by a group directed by Jay Last. Interestingly, Noyce played no role in this effort. It was Last and his engineers in the micrologic section of the research laboratory

who made

the revolutionary step of engineering

and fabricating planar integrated circuits. Building a functional integrated circuit. Last and his group discovered, was extremely difficult. To obtain the close tolerances that were required, they had to substantially improve Fairchild’s diffusion and photolithographic processes. They also had to develop new techniques to evaporate aluminum so as to properly interconnect the different components on the same wafer. The main problem they encountered, however, was how to electrically isolate the transistors, diodes, resistors, and capacitors on the same die or silicon chip.'^ To solve the isolation problem. Last and his engineers explored two different approaches. In the lating transistors

fall

of 1959, Last thought of electrically insu-

on the same die with

plastic fillings to

a digital circuit used for counting purposes. device,” Last later recalled. “You

would

“It

make

a flip-flop,

was a rather implausible

diffuse in

all

the transistors [Iw

using the oxide layer as a mask]. You would then turn the device over and

you would etch

all

the way

down

to the silicon until

So the device was supported only by the

you got

oxide.”"'’ In

to the oxide.

the closing

ste]) of

the process, the openings, which had been etched between the transistors

on the back of the

wafer,

the devices electrically the spring

were

filled

with an epoxy resin. This insulated

and gave mechanical strength

and summer of 1960,

Least’s

to the silicon die. In

engineering team further devel-

oped this technique. Lionel Kiittner, whom Last had recently reemited from Texas Instruments’ manufacturing organization, experimented with different materials, glass j)owders and epoxies, for the filling of the grooves in the silicon ciystal. Fhe material had to be non-conduclive,

/

5 (S’

('.h(if)ter

4

and

contaniinant-free,

expansion

as silicon

at

(tliis

same time have the same

the

was particularly imjKirtant since the oxide

which supported the whole dexice, was veiw Last’s grc:)np

developed an infrared

jig to

on the top of the

wafer. Last

fragile).

and

his

In

be plagued by breakage of the oxide

to

September 1960, Kattner and

child)

began work on an

Isy

Other engineers

interstitial

physically isolated devices. But these circuits

ued

layer,

in

properly align the etching of the

grooves on the back of the wafer with the transistors

coefficient of

Haas

space between the

group made lumdreds of

had poor

yields

and contin-

layer.'*’

engineer

(a circuit

at Fair-

alternative solution to the isolation problem.

physically isolated microcircuits could not

be manufactured

in

The

volume.

Kattner and Haas decided to use diffusion regions to isolate the different

on the same

devices

wafer.

They did

so with Last’s approval

and support

and with the help of Allison, Fairchild’s foremost diffusion expert. Critical to this approach was their use of a new boron diffusion technique developed workers

in tlie

in the

ing through

end of the gas,

pre-production group and refined by one of their co-

micrologic section. Lhider this process, a carrier gas pass-

liejuid

borate was mixed with oxygen and then burned at the

diffusion furnace.

The combustion produced

which was carried over the wafer. This technique permitted the

dif-

more than 24 hours without destroying

the

fusicjn

of P-type dopants for

silicon

oxide layer.”

Taking advantage of

this

new

diffusion technique, Kattner

developed a complex fabrication process first,

a cloud of boron

to

make

and Haas

a planar flip-flop. At

they etched thin bands or windows in the oxide layer on top of an

N-type wafer. Kattner and Haas then diffused boron atoms, a P-t)pe ele-

ment, both through these openings and from the entire back of the wafer for

more than 20

both sides of the silicon wafer. lation regions.

The atoms They met in

hours.

Having made these

diffused simultaneously from

isolation regions, Kiittner

then processed planar transistors, diodes, and resistors N-type material

left

good isoand Haas

the middle, creating

in the

pockets of

by the boron diffusion. They later interconnected

aluminum

on top of the wafer. Kiittner and Haas made the first operating flip-flop in the last week of September. In the next few months, Kattner, Haas, and other engineers in Last’s group cleaned up and troubleshot the process. By the end of the year, it was clear that they had a solid method for making planar intethese devices by depositing an

grated

film

circuits.'**

Using

this

new

process, Kiittner, Haas,

developed a family of digital integrated

and other engineers circuits in late

at Fairchild

1960 and the

first

159

Rn'olulion in Silicon

half

of

and

half-adder, tliis

By

addition to the nip-flop, they desi^^ned a gate, a buffer, a

19()1. In

a lialf-shift register circuit.

micrologic family

this time, Fairchild

at a

Noyce and Moore announced

news conference

in

New York

was the only firm with a family

in

Mai ch

19(')1.

planar integrated

of

on the market. (Texas Instruments introduced its own family of planar microcircuits in October 1961.) In 1961, Fairchild developed a

circuits

small market for

microcircuits. Because of their high price

its

performance, these

circuits

could only be used

in a small

and low

number

of

applications. However, they constituted an important breakthrough in

and promised major improvements performance, and miniaturization."-'

silicon technolog) ity,

Maunfa ctii ri ng

in

system

reliabil-

Ultia-Rel iahili ty

tandem with designing reliabilit)' into its products at the component and circuit level, Fairchild’s engineers perfected their production systems to meet the tight reliability sj)ecifications of military avionics. In

Autonetics forced Fairchild to improve setting high reliability criteria.

It

its

manufacturing operations by

also financed

and

closely supervised

enhance its production systems by instituting a comjirehensive “reliability improvement program.” The goal of this proFairchild’s efforts to

gram, which applied

improve the

to all Autonetics’ subcontractors,

reliability

was to drastically

of solid-state components by transforming the

ways in which they were manufactured. Autonetics sought to reinforce suppliers’

augment

manufacturing

disciplines, tighten their j^rocess controls,

its

and

their testing procedures.'^"

Autonetics’ program was |)atterned

af ter

similar efforts at the Bell Tele-

ph one Laboratories, which developed reliable repeater tubes for undersea telephone cables in the 194()s and the early 195()s. Adopting many of Bell’s

methods and applying them

Autonetics required ability

all its

to

suppliers to

improvement program”

that

semiconductor manufacturing,

implement a comprehensive

touched

all

aspects of their manufac-

turing operations. Suppliers of solid-state de\'ices were asked to carefully their

“reli-

manufacturing processes. They also had

document

to build “high

reliability lines”

using such techniques as “assembly in dust-free environ-

ineiiLs, carefully

spelled out operator instructions,

and

close monitoring

by Quality (Control personnel.” (Smith 1963; Scheffler 1981)”'

Modeling apply of

serial

each

j^ai

its

j^rogram after

numbers t

to their

Bell’s,

Autonetics recpiested

components

in

so they could trace those that

order

had

its

vendors

to

to follow the history

failed to the materials

I(}()

(]h

Nnt’ Mdthels

I

HI

procluclion of electronic systems for commercial users. I'hese were

businesses where the tube firms could use their competence in higlij)recisiou

manufacturing and vacuum processing

edge of electronic components and Industries’

on the also

circuits.

as well as theii

For example,

basis of

it

in 19()3 Litton

microwave tube division branched out into microwave its

o\'ens

expertise in low-cost magnetrons. Watkins;[ohnson

manufactured furnaces for the semiconductor

But

knowl-

industry.

was Varian Associates that had the most ambitious diversifica-

program in the first half Of the 196()s. The firm expanded into vacuum equipment and medical and scientific instrumentation. Varian did so through acquisitions and internal research and develoj^ment. Edward tion

(iinzton, \'arian’s chairman, drove these diversification efforts.

determined

to

wean the firm awav from

militarv sales /

;

toward the entific

civilian sector. In (iinzton’s view,

and

He was

re-orient

vacuum equipment and

it

sci-

instrumentation were particularly promising commercial busi-

nesses for Varian. Beginning in the

mid

1950s, the firm

significant technical expertise in these areas.

that large

had acquired

Ginzton also anticipated

commercial markets would soon emerge for vacuum products

and scientific instruments. .Alter the launch of Sputnik, the Eisenhower and Kennedv administrations invested heavilv in scientific research and in the training of engineers and scientists. They also considerably enlarged the US space program. In May 1961, President Kennedy committed the United States to landing a man on the moon. This decision led to the Apollo Program and the growth of NASA. In Ciinzton’s view, these various federal programs would stimulate the demand for scientific instruments. They would also enlarge the demand for ultra-highvacuum components and systems that would simulate conditions in outer space. In the

ment

also increased

late I95()s its

and the

early 196()s, the federal govern-

investments in medical research and the provi-

sion of health care, which

would open up new markets

for medical

instrumentation. A'arian’s diversification efforts did not

go without

conflicts. Ginzton’s

plans were stronglv resisted by Myii Stearns, Sigurd Varian, and other

managers

at X'arian.

Stearns and Sigurd Azarian argued that \ arian was a

component company. Its strength was in the design and manufacture of microwave tubes. Expanding into other fields, especially scientific and medical instruments, would be costly and would di\ert financial and engineering resources away from the tube business. Stearns and \ arian impeded Ginzton’s expansion plans as much as they could. Mid-level managers also opposed (iinzton’s plan of making medical instruments on the

IS2

( ',/iaf)lrr 5

grounds

that the

market Ibr them was too small. The tenacious (iinzton

overcame such opposition and forced the linn cial

to diversify into

commer-

electronic systems.'^

To expand

into the civilian market, Ciinzton in\ested $16.8 million in

the develojDinent of

new system products

at

Varian from 1960 to 1965.

This represented a large share of Varian’s overall R^’D spending during

A significant portion of these monies was invested into building the vacuum pump and svstem business. The basis of this new business this period.

was an important innovation X'arian. In 1956,

vacuum pump,

made

in

the microwave tube division at

Lewis Hall, a research engineer at\brian, invented a new

pump

known

pump), to evacuate klystrons. Unlike other pumps, the Vaclon pump depended on electronic rather than mechanical means to create a vacuum. It operated by entrapping gas molecules and atoms through the formation of chemically stable compounds. The pump consisted of a magnet and of an enclosure containing an anode grid placed between two cathode plates.

The

the Vaclon

process bv which the

pump

(also

as the sputter-ion

entrapped gases was comjDlex. At

voltage was introduced between the

anode

grid

and the cathode

first,

a

plates.

Electrons tending to flow towai d the anode were forced into a spiral path

by the presence of a strong magnetic

field.

The

increased length of the

electron path caused a high rate of collision between free electrons gas molecules. These collisions produced gas ions. gas ions

bombarded

The

positively

and

charged

the titanium cathode plates, which knocked the

tita-

nium atoms from the plate. These knocked or “sputtered” atoms were deposited on the anode grid, forming chemically stable compounds with gas atoms such as oxygen and nitrogen. Finally, chemically inert gases were removed by ion burial in the cathode and by entrapment on the anode. In other words, these gases remained within the

pump

enclosure.

Because each collision produced an increasing number of electrons with long effective path lengths, the Vaclon

pump

could evacuate an enclo-

sure to verv low pressures.-’’

The Vaclon punijD had several advantages over mechanical oil pumps. It created a much higher vacuum than any other device on the market. The \ aclon pump also produced a ver)’ clean vactium. This was a major impnnement, as oil pumps tended to contaminate the inner surfaces of the enclosures they evacuated with hydrocarbons. In addition, the new |)umj3 did not re(|uire cooling water, which made it easilv portable. The Vaclon i^umj) had no moving parts and was vibration teristics

made

the V'aclon

pump

free.

These charac-

useful for space chambers. Space

bers simulated conditions in outer space

and enabled the

cham-

testing of the

( )l>ni ijifr [

Ij)

Nnu

coniponeiits of satellites and other sj^aee systems. Vaelon also

be used

research,

in

vacuum

Markrts

I

H3

pumps could

metallurgy, high-euergy acceleratois for physics

and the manufacture

of

aj)plicatious required a very high

semiconductor compoueuts.

and veiy clean

All these

vacuum.-"’

Variau Associates rapidly exploited these market op|:)ortuuities. (Central to the

company’s aggressive exploitation

was Louis Maker, a physicist

Maher was

who had

of sputtei-iou

at

techuolog)'

recently joined Variau Associates.

He had headed

a veteran of the electronics industry.

netron design team

pump

R('A during World War

II

a

mag-

before becoming the

chief engineer of the corporation’s semiconductor division. Variau

Maker to direct its recently formed central research laboratoiy. But Maker rapidly became more intrigued by the Vaclon pump and its

recruited

commercial potential than by the challenge of building an research laboratoiy.

He thought

that the

pump

industrial

offered the opportunity

an entirely new vacuum products and systems business for Variau.

to build

He pressed hard for \krian’s entiy into the vacuum business and recommended that Variau commercialize the Vaclon pump and related com])onents and systems. (Until then, the Vaclon

pump

was only used to

evacuate Variau ’s klystrons.) Ginzton supported Maker’s

strategy'

judged that Maker was the most qualified employee to cany

januaiy 1959, he asked him

to direct the

it

and

out. In

Vaclon group. Six months

later,

vacuum products. Maker left the central research laboratoiy and became the new di\'ision’s general manager. Ciinzton gave Maker the mandate of building a large vacuum business and making it profitable within 3 years. These decisions angered Lewis Hall, the Vaclon pump’s inventor. Hall had hoped to head \krian’s vacuum business. Wlien his hopes were dashed, he left the company and started his own firm, the Ultek Corporation, in 1959. Ultek made and marketed Vaclon pumps in direct competition with Variau.-’" To establish itself in the vacuum market and to compete with Ldtek, Ciinzton established a

\^arian Associates

new

division for

developed

a

broad product

work was done by engineers who had worked duction and moved to the new division direction, these engineers designed

ent sizes liters

neers

and pumping speeds. The

per second. In the at \’arian

late 195()s

line.

Much

of the design

in klystron

design and pro-

in the late 195()s.

Lhider Maker’s

numerous

\

aclon

original Vaclon

and the

first

pumps

of differ-

j)ump operated

at 10

half Of the 1960s, engi-

developed pumps with evacuation speeds ranging from

0.2 liter to 10,000 liters per second.

Each j)umj) was engineered with

a

different application in mind. In conjunction with this broad family of

X’aclon

pumps, engineers

at X^arian also

developed a new

line of

vacuum

IS -4

Figure

('Ji(if)l(’r

5

5.

Louis Maltci (.ourtesy of

and William Lloyd with a larj^e \aclon pump, \arian, Inc. and Stanfoixl I ni\ersit\ Arcln\es. (liglit)

early 19()0s.

( )f)('>iin^ I

conipoiRMits. Vaciumi

not ^00(1

enough

c'()ni))()iu*nts

oUcMcd by

result,

a

were

otlicr iiianulacturcrs

and coin|)ression

engineering group also developed

1H5

Marhrls

Vaelon pumps

new

Vaiiau engineers designed

llanges, llttings, feed-throughs,

poits.

In

valves,

the

19()2,

vaennni leak deteetoi and an ion

conjunction with the develo|)ment

In

Nnn

ior the ultra-high vaeunin that the*

eould generate. As a

gauge system.

’!>

of a line of

vacuum

com|)onenls, X^arian’s engineers assembled their products into whole systems. At |)articular

first,

they

made custom

systems that met the specifications of

customers, such as Re|)uhlic Axiation or the Atomic Energy'

C-ommission. But

19hl X'arian also introduced standard

in

tems. These systems were suitable for environmental testing

evaporation apj)lications, especially X'arian’s

vacuum product

semiconductor

in the

vacuum sysand vacuum

industry.-'^

line did well in the marketplace. In the late

and the 19h()s, three markets emerged for ultra-high-vacuum devices and systems. The United vStates’ growing investments in space 195()s

technology', es])ecially the Apollo

Program, created a large demand for

systems that could simulate conditions found in deep space. Physics and

and other research institutions constituted the second market for X arian’s vacuum prodticts. Many research groups embraced the X'aclon pumps and coupled them yvith sensitixe chemistry laboratories

at universities

analy tical instruments such as mass sj^ectrometers, electron microscopes,

and

x-ray diffiaction systems.

High-energy

j)hysics laboratories in the

United States and Europe also became large users

The

X'aclon

ing. Eairchild

buying

pump

xvas

seeing

more

of silicon devices xvere

pumj)s for their RX:1) laboratories. Ehey xvere also pur-

chasing the firm’s vacuum evapoiators

in

greater

1 hese eva|)orators xvere used for the dej)osition of silicon

Vaclon pumps.

use in semiconductor manufactur-

Semiconductor and other makers

X'arian’s

of

transistors,

a

numbers than before. aluminum contacts on

teclmicjue that had been partially developed at

Eairchild Semiconductor. Exaporators could also he used to

make hybrid

or thin film circuits. Hybrid circuits are miniaturized electronic circuits

made

of thin film dexices

and

active

semiconductor components.

XX’ith

these exaporators, manufacturers of hybrid circuits could deposit thin films

on the

circuits’

ceramic substrates under a very high vacuum. Ehese

thin films

formed

IVansistors

and diodes were then mounted on the

|)assive

elements such

as resistors

and

capacitors.

substrate.''*

Eierce comj)etition with Ultek, X^arian’s spinoff, further stimulated the groxvth of the maiket for ultra-high-vacuum products. Starting in 1959,

Ultek develo|)ed

its

oxvn line of sputter-ion

fabricated environmental

pumps.

chambers simulating deej)

It

also designed

sj)ace

and

enxironments.

1S6

('/ia()t('r 5

To gain market

share, Ultek introduced

than \ arian Associates. As a

As an example,

its

much lower price sputter-ion pumps tumbled.

products

result, prices for

at a

Vaclon pump, which sold for $795

V^arian’s five-liter

in

1958, could be purchased for $195 in 1960. This price war substantially cut into \4u'ian’s

and

Ultek’s profits. (Varian’s

vacuum products

division

money until 1961.) But falling prices significantly stimulated the demand for ultra-high-vacuum pumps and systems. As a result, Varian’s sales of vacuum products increased from $211,000 in 1958 to $1 1,287,000 in 1966. By mid 1965, the vacuum products division employed 315 engilost

neers, technicians,

and operators.

in $1.7 million in profits.

and 1966,

In 1965

that dhision

brought

By that time, Varian was the largest producer of

vacuum equipment in the United States. Ultek caiwed out a significant market for its vacuum pumps and systems as well. Its sales reached $3.5 million dollars in 1965 and more than $4 million in 1966. In the mid 1960s, X^arian and Ultek monopolized the high-vacuum market. Instruments

tandem with their successful foray into vacuum products, Varian’s managers built a large commercial instrumentation business in the late 1950s and the second half of the 1960s. Again their goal was to reduce the firm’s dependence on military contracts. To build these businesses, In

they took advantage

of innovative research

programs

in

an electron

University’s physics department. For example, Ginzton built

linear accelerator business

Laboratory

on the

basis of his

work

Stanford

in the

Microwave

1940s and the 1950s, Ginzton had

at Stanford. In the late

directed the construction of ever larger and

more powerful

erators for high-energ\' physics at Stanford.

These

efforts

linear accel-

culminated

in

the late 1950s with the planning of a two-mile-long linear accelerator to

be

on the Stanford campus. Ginzton and

built

group also concancer therapy. In the mid 1950s,

structed a linear accelerator for

Ginzton urged Varian Associates

to enter the linear accelerator business.

In spite of considerable resistance

Varian’s

management

to design

and

his

from Mvrl Stearns and Sigurd Varian,

established a

new

division, the radiation division,

consti uct linear accelerators. This division

made

research

accelerators for DuPont, the Danish Atomic Energ\’ Gommission,

They

and

produced accelerators used in the treatment of deep-seated cancers. But these machines failed to find a large market in LkS hospitals. The medical accelerators were expensive. the Frascati Laboratorv in

Italy.

also

Small medical centers could not afford them, and few radiotherapists

(

and radiation

had the

leclinicians

skills

I

nccdcfl to

’j)

use*

IH7

AW/' Marhets

lluan. Ik’cansc* of

the connnercial flop of the medical acceleratoi' and the mixed success of

research machines, the radiation division was barely |)rofltahle, with

its

sales of Only $4.7 million in the

Cialison et

pr()ject of

(iottrell

199.5;

of the research

two Stanford physicists, William Hansen and Felix Bloch, on

known

1946, Bloch, Hansen,

and

observed the

phenomenon

as nuclear

magnetic resonance (NMR).

their graduate student Martin Packard of

nuclear magnetic resonance

which Bloch received the Nobel Prize at

act like tiny

magnets and

them

In

first

—an observa-

in j)hysics in 19.52. In their

Stanford, Bloch, Hansen, and Packard found that nuclei

experiment causes

and

chemical instrumentation business grew out

nuclear induction, also

tion for

19h()s ((iinzton

1992).^“

al.

X'arian’s

mid

that a strong

to rotate (prece.ss).

W hen

magnetic

field exerts a force that

the natural fiecjiiency of the

cessing nuclear magnets corresponds to the frec]uency of a

radio signal striking the matcnial, energv'

is

|)re-

weak external

absorbed by the radio wave.

This selective absorption (also called resonance) was produced by timing the natural frecjiiency of the

weak radio wave

to that of the nuclear

Russell

and Hansen’s innovative experiment j)icpied the \arian, who had recently returned from the East

worked

as

nets. Bloch’s

an unpaid research associate

in the physics

mag-

curiositv of

and

(ioast

department. After

number of chemists, Russell \'arian came to believe that the phenomenon of nuclear magnetic resonance could he used to analyze chemical compounds. He urged Bloch and Hansen to file a patent on the “Method and Means for (Chemical Analysis by Nuclear Induction.” He also offered to prej)are the patent a|)|)lication in return

discussions with

for

Hansen and

an exclusive license

company was

to

established.

the patent application in Russell \arian’s 195()s,

a

he transferred

to Xiirian Associates

Hansen and Bloch December 1946.-^“^

optimism bore

fruit in

accej)ted the offer

once the

and

filed

the next few years. In the eaiiy

doctoral students in the Bloch lab discovered that the value of the

magnetic

field at the

nucleus depended to some extent on the chemical

environment, the so-called chemical organic

compounds had

different

NMR spectra).

shift.

They

also

found

that different

different magnetic fingerprints (in the

form

of

This was an important finding. Magnetic fingei-

prints could help analyze

new organic compounds and determine

the

structure of these molecules. S})urred by these results in the Bloch lab, in

Edward Ciinzton decided to stai a new business around NMR. 4'he company would build au entirely new chemical instrument, the NMR s|)ectrometer. To develoj) this chemical 1951 Russell \arian, Sigurd \ arian, and

t

ISS

(]h(if)ter 5

inslriinient, Varian’s

managers

on the apparatus designed Stanford experiments. They also

relied heavily

by Bloch, Hansen, and Packard for their

some of Bloch’s most talented students, including Martin Packard and Emery Rogers. They also hired James ShooleiT, an entrepreneurial physical chemist who had recently received his doctorate from Caltech. In the first half of the 1950s, the new recruits engineered a series of NMR spectrometers. To do so, they drew on the firm’s experrecruited

tise in

radar

(The

circuits

used

in

NMR spectrometers are

simi-

They also incorporated the latest innovations technolog)” enhanced magnet technolog)' and advances in fre-

those used in radar.)

lar to

NMR

in

circuits.

quency nally

stabilization.

at

Some

Others came from Stanford and the industrial

\'arian.

laboratories that used the

were

of these innovations were developed inter-

difficult to operate.

first

NMR spectrometers.

They were devices

But these machines

for research chemists with

considerable knowledge of physics. Moreover, the spectrometers were expensive. As a

result,

remained modest

in the first half

.$41

(),()()()

Varian’s

chemical instrumentation business

of the 1950s. In 1956, the firm sold only

NMR spectrometers.-'^ market for NMR spectrometers,

worth of

To expand the

in the late

1950s and

the early 1960s Varian Associates (at the instigation of Ginzton Russell Varian) invested heavily in the

and

development of new instruments.

CVntral to these efforts was the design of the A-60 spectrometer. In 1957,

made

Shoolery and Rogers struct

an entirely new

a proposal for a four-year

NMR spectrometer.

create an instrument simple

enough

The

program

to con-

goal of this effort was to

for any organic chemist or graduate

student to operate with the aid of a manual.

It

would be affordable,

reli-

and conveniently sized and shaped. The company funded the project and formed a team of chemists, physicists, and electronic engineers to design the new machine. To tackle this complex task, John Moran, an electronic engineer who headed the project, adopted new management techniejues that had been pioneered in the aerospace industr)'. He used critical path analysis and Program Evaluation Review Techniques charts to coordinate the design and production of all the spectrometer’s features and components and at the same time keep the project on schedule and within budget. The end result, the A-60 (A for analytical and 60 able,

foi'

the frequency), easily

introduced

it

to the

market

rejDroducible results,

used it

in

lit

into an ordinarv chemistry laboratorv. \^arian in 1961.

and was

The machine was

user-friendly. In

most organic chemistrv laboratories.

affordable for universitv chemists.

reliable,

other words,

Its jjrice,

venerated

it

could be

$23,750, also

made

()fn'nin}r

Fii(iire

( ’j)

Nnv

IS9

Marht'ts

5.2

The A-60

NMR spectrometer.

(

Courtesy of \ arian, Inc.

and Stanford University

Archives.

conjunction with the design of a iiser-friendly instrnnient, the

In

developed innovative marketing techniques

X'arian grotip

create a

demand

opened

his

group

To convince chemists of the power spectroscopy, Shoolery and other chemists at

NMR

several Applications Laboratories.

LaboratoiT was located

and

order to

for this machine.

and nsefniness of X'arian

in

at

The

first

Applications

the firm’s headcpiarters in Palo Alto. Shoolerv

later established similar laboratories in

Zurich and

at

the

Pittsburgh International Airport. These laboratories had several functions.

They helped outside chemists

These chemists would submit

would then use this

service

its

NMR

function,

approaches for

solve their chemical problems.

their samples to X'arian Associates,

which

spectrometers to analyze them. In addition to the Apj)lications

eliciting

Lal)oratories

devised

new

information from nuclear radiosj^ectra and

communicated this information to the chemical community. In the second half of the 195()s, X'arian’s scientists pid)lished (15 articles on NMR spectrometric methods and their applications to chemistry. To further publicize their work and promote NMR spectroscopy, Shoolery and his colleagues introduced the

“NMR

at

work”

series. Starting in

1957, this

190

('h(if>l(r5

appeared

series

and information sheet on the

as a regular advertisement

hack cover of the Journal of the American Chemical Society. The advertisements described exemplaiy solutions of chemical problems using NMR.

They

typically

included an

NMR spectrum

and

a structural analysis of a

chemical compound. The series eventually numbered over 100 solutions.

This work of the Applications Laboratories culminated with the

publication of a catalog of 700 spectra in 1962 and 1963. These spectra

represented a carefully selected variety of chemical

were meant

to

compounds and

help chemists develop a feel for the interpretation of

NMR data. \'arian gave

this catalog to

its

able to other laboratories at a nominal

customers.

It

also

made

it

avail-

cost.^'’

To educate chemists about the power of NMR as an analytical tool, the group innovated further by organizing an annual workshop series on NMR spectroscopy. Varian Associates held its first workshop in October 1957. The workshop lasted four days and attracted more than 100 American and foreign scientists from industry, government agencies, universities, and research foundations. Convinced of the value of this workshop for disseminating the techniques of NMR, Varian Associates organized three more workshops in Palo Alto. To encourage European adoption of the instrument, a similar workshop was organized in Zurich during the 1960s and continued for a decade. Conducted like an academic course, with lectures and laboratory sessions, this workshop became a major vehicle for informing chemists about NMR instrumentation. The workshop was divided into three parts. The first part was an introductory day of lectures on NMR instrumentation followed by hands-on laboratory instruction. The second and third parts of the course were devoted to more advanced topics. As an example, in one section Shoolerv offered step-by-step instruction in the use of

NMR as a

tool for structural analysis, the difficult business of translating spectral lines into

chemical

structures.'^'

These marketing programs proved veiw

effective in creating a

The wide acceptance of Varian’s spectrometers

for \'arian’s instruments.

was also greatly facilitated by the federal government’s growing

ments

in

chemical research and chemical instrumentation

half of the

19(i()s.

market

During

this period, the

invest-

in the first

National Science Foundation,

the Atomic Energ)’ (5)mmission, and the National Institutes of Health

made

substantial investments in chemistry, offering grants specifically

for the acquisition of chemical instruments. For

Science Foundation ga\e 1959.

Three years

later,

its first

it

example, the National

two chemical instrumentation grants

awarded

21 such grants.

The Atomic

in

Fnerg\’

( )f)(')iin^ I

Jf)

Nno MarhHs

1

91

and the National Institutes of Health administered similar programs. As a result of these |)rograms, ehemistry de|)artments at American nnixersities greatly increased their investments in chemical (A)niniissi()n

instruments

in the first half of the

chemistry departments

in the

between 1954 and 1959.

tation

US had

spent $14 million on instrumen-

In the next 5 years, they invested

lion in scientific instrumentation.

The European market

instrumentation also grew rapidly in the the United

Kingdom

(Cx)mmittee for the Survey

sales

of

Much

1965.

pany

NMR

engaged

in

France, (iermany, and

in scientific research

from these public investments

instruments go from $1,163, ()()()

of these sales

gap with the

and education

came from

in

saw

its

1957 to $1 1,045, 000

in

in science.

the A-60 spectrometer.

NMR spectrometers

to the

in the

fundamental research. By the mid 1960s, Varian Associates

and European firms owned the

was thus a significant force troscopic techniques

results

spectroscopy had

in the discipline

became

1964, 18 percent of

on

The com-

These machines were designed for chemical laboratories

trometers. ([apanese

relied

It

market

NMR

controlled roughly 70 percent of the worldwide market for

In

mil-

Chemistry 1965; Stine 1992).

of

also introduced high-end

early 1960s.

196()s, as

$56

for chemical

tried to close the perceived scientific

United States and invested heavily \'arian benefited

I'he top 125 Phl)-granting

19h()s.

all

rest.)

spec-

The company

NMR

of chemistry as

spec-

increasingly used in chemical laboratories.

papers published

obtained from

NMR

in

US

chemical journals

spectroscopic techniques.

become an indispensable

To com])lement the development of

NMR

tool in chemistry.^”

NMR

spectrometers

at

Wnian,

Ginzton acquired several instrumentation and vaciimn companies

in

mid 1960s. His goal was again to reduce \'arian’s dependence on the Department of Defense. He bought firms that strengthened \'arian’s market position in vacnmn equipment and chemical instruments. In 1964, X'arian purchased Mikros, a vaciinm company based in Portland, Oregon. Mikros produced vacnmn oil pumps and oil-pnm})-based vaciiiim systems. These products extended Varian’s product offerings into the low-vacnnm market. Building on Xarian’s strength in NMR spectroscopy, Ciinzton acquired firms making other types of chemical instruthe

ments.

In

1965,

he bought Wilkens Instrument,

mannfactnrer of gas chromatographs used pounds.

He

also j^nrchased a small

a

('.alifdrnia-based

to separate organic

com-

Cierman firm, which made mass spec-

trometers. In 1966, X'arian further enlarged

its

instrument

j)ortfolio

by

merging with Aj^plied Physics (Corporation. Aj^plied Physics was an important maiuifactiirer of UV spectrometers, used

in

organic chemistry.

(

/92

I

'ha f>!(’)'

licsc ac(|uisili()ns significantly

and made the company one ments

in

strengthened

V'arian’s instrninent line

leading suppliers of chemical instru-

ol the

the Ihiited States.

By the mid

19()()s,

the beginning ol

\^arian

the

was a different company than

“McNamara

depression.”

It

was

had been

it

now

at

oriented

toward commercial markets. In 1959, more than 90 percent of Varian’s

had come from the

sales

military sector. Eight years later, militaiy sales

accounted lor only 40 percent of the firm’s

total

revenues.

Iroin civilian customers. \'arian’s diversification policy,

instrumentation businesses, and greatly

changed the

firm’s

its

product

its

The

rest

came

acquisition of

merger with Eitel-McCnllongh

line. In 1959,

also

Varian was a microwave

tube firm with a small instrumentation business. Seven vears

later, X^arian

was a science-based conglomerate, mannlactiirihg vactmm pumps, evaporators lor semiconductor mannfactnring, medical

and

scientific instru-

ments, and a wide range of specialtv vacuum tubes. Because of re-orientation toward commercial markets, Varian

grew from $38.1 million

sales

lime, \arian was

in

one of the 500

expanded

1959 to $145.1 million

rapidly.

in 1966.

largest corporations in the

By

United

its

Its

that

States.

come without a price. In the became more bnreaiicratic and lost some of its entre-

But Varian’s diversification efforts did not

mid

1960s, the firm

j)renenrial impulse. X'arian,

anism and

its

which had once prided

sharing of information with

all

itself for its egalitari-

employees, became

much

The share of the company owned by its employees also shrank. In 1965, employees owned only 30 percent of the company’s stock. In other words, by the mid 1960s Varian .Vssociates was not the engineering cooperative it had once been. It was more of a conventional more

hierarchical.

electronics corporation.’"

Silicon for Industry

While \hrian Associates diversified into commercial systems, Eairchild Semiconductor, the main mannfactnrer of silicon devices (Jara \

alley, built

file instability

markets for

of the military

its

istic

demand

for silicon transistors

during the

Eairchild’s reorientation

this re-orientation

toward

was also shaped by a capital-

urge to exploit new market opportunities. In the

19()()s,

Santa

transistor products in the civilian sector,

“McNamara depression” encouraged commercial markets. But

in the

first

half of the

Robert Noyce, Eairchild Semiconductor’s general manager, and

fhomas

Bay, his

that the firm’s

head of marketing and

high-performance j^lanar

sales, increasingly

silicon transistors

understood

were

in

grow-

( )f)(’nin{r [

demand among

ing

//;

Nno

M a) hr

Is

/

93

eominereial computer and consumer elecltonics

coiporalions. As a result, tliey gradually re-oiiented the firm toward the civilian

before deciding

sector,

1963 to concentrate Fairchild’s

in

resources on the conij^nter and consumer electronics mai kets."

marketing and

In 1960, the

sales dej^artment discovered that recent

Communications (’commission were oj^ening high-|)erformance and high-reliability silicon compo-

regulations of the Federal

up

market for

a

nents

television broadcasting. Alter

in

decided

at this

time to

fully ex])loit the

much

tergiversation, the FCXc

ultra-high-frequency

(UHF)

j)or-

The VTfF’ bands then in use could number of television broadcasting sta-

tion of the electromagnetic s])cctrum.

accommodate the increasing tions. The F(X’ decided to take advantage of not

order to meet the gnwving FC(’ to require

UHF

all

demand

for television stations. This led the

monitors

television

the higher frequencies in

to

have the capability of receiving

channels. This ordnance had the unintended consequence of cre-

ating a market for silicon transistors. Because tional radio tubes

tuners using conven-

could not handle the higher frequencies, television

manufacturers became increasingly interested

in planar silicon transis-

Unlike standard vacuum tubes, planar transistors cotild

tors.

UHF

ate in the transistors, istic

TV

range.

They had

the

added

benefit, unlike

easily oper-

germanium

of being dependable and temperature resistant, a character-

that was

important

Similaiiy, Fairchild’s

to the reliability-oriented television industry.^-

salesmen identified a new market opportunity

com-

the commercial comjiuter industiy fn the early 1960s, commercial

puter firms became increasingly interested in silicon

devices.^”'

in

By that

computer architectures had largely stabilized, and manufacturers of commercial computers increasingly competed by improving the speed and reliability of logic circuits. As the performance of these circuits depended to a large degree on electronic components, computer manufacttirers that had previously used germanium transistors became time,

increasingly interested in j^lanar devices. Planar transistors could with-

germanium

stand higher temperatures than

transistors.

They

had

also

equal or greater frequency characteristics.^^

(CDC), which made high-end computers

(k)ntrol Data Corporation for computationally

demanding

Seymour Cray and

his

\A'isconsin,

their

new

compete At

first,

group

applications,

directly with IBM’s

(aay had designed

Falls,

silicon transistors for the protot\pe of

The 6600 was

machines his

a case in j)oint. In 1961,

Cd)(fs laboratory in (Hiippewa

at

decided to use j)lanar

comj^uter, the 6600.

is

a supercomj^uter

in the scientific

meant

to

computer market.

computer around standard packaging

194

('Jia/flrr 5

he soon ran into substantial

leclinic|ucs. Ikil

tcciniical (liH'icnlties. Early

design experiments revealed noise and oseillation problems in the back

deemed

panel wiring which were

The

nnacce|)table for a system ol that

size.

switching speeds re(|nii'ed were so high that wave lengths present in

the signals were shorter than the wire lengths in the hack panels. In othei'

become

words, the physical size ol the computer had

a limitation

on

speech^'’

To shorten the wiring

j)aths, (a

ay

and

made

his groiij)

drastic

changes

packaging configurations. The firm replaced traditional building

in

blocks with a

new

nicknamed the “cordwood package.” This

j:)ackage,

package had innch higher innetion

printed circuit hoards hack to hack with nally.

Up

to

made of two components mounted

densities. all

64 transistors could he assembled

It

iii

was

small inter-

each module, fhis was

a tenfold densitv inij^rovement o\er previous j)ackaging techniques at

and oscillation problems, thev imposed severe temj)eratnre constraints on transistors. The germanium transistors that the (4)U. group used in its cordwood Cn('..

While these

j^iackages solved the com|)nter’s noise

j)ackages did not withstand these high temperatures. As a result, in 19()1

the engineering team designing the (’ontrol Data hhOO looked at planar silicon devices,

which were more temperature

resistant than

germanium

transistors.^'’

Noyce and Bay were

sumer

understand that the comj^nter and con-

(jiiick to

electronics markets had great potential.

I

he computer market was

especially promising. Because ol the growing requirements for ers in science, industrv,

and government, the commercial computer

industrv exj^loded in the early 1, ()()()

ers

in

1957 to 4,500

in 191)2.

19()()s.

By

U.ompnter shipments swelled from

191)7,

the total j)roduction ol comput-

had reached 18,700. Because com|)nters such

1)000 used

more than

half a million transistors, the

industry represented a

\’erv large

dwai'fed the militarv sector. verv sizable

and

fast

comput-

I

grew from 5

was additional

demand

Data

commercial computer

market indeed, one that potentially

he consumer electronics indnstiT offered

expanding market

television sets

as the U-ontrol

to 7 million

as well.

The

total

consumer

products, such as transistor radios and stereo systems, rise

production of

between 1958 and 1908. There

for silicon devices in other

markets were supported by the

a

electronics

fhese growing

of consnmei' culture. In the I951)s

and the first half of the 1901)s, Americans used their new affluence to hnv household aj)j)liances and entertainment devices. In this consumerist age, radios and tele\isions were seen as basic necessities. \'ast markets for achanced electronic comj)onents opened up (Flamm 1988).

( )f)('niu^ I

To

tliese

ex|)l()it

oj^portunitics,

Noyce

aiul

>f>

Nno

l^ay

Markrts

i

/

95

eslriic tiirecl

and marketing organization. Up to 19()(), Fairchild had had a relatively small and military-oriented marketing and sales force. Noyce and Bay greatly strengthened the sales and marketing organization in the early and mid 196{)s. Bay recinited a group ol bright and aggressive salesmen and marketing specialists. Among them were Jerry Sanders and Floyd Kvamme, each of whom would rise to a leadership position in the semiconductor industry on the San Francisco Peninsula. These newcomers transformed Fairchild’s sales and maiketing department into one of the most effective in the semiconductor industrv. To complement his intei nal sales force, Bay established a network of distributor representatives in 19(51. The internal sales force focused on the Fairchild’s sales

larger accounts, while the distiibntors served the smaller customers.

Noyce and Bay

also gave the sales

and marketing department strong

technical backing by transferring the applications engineering laboratory

from RNd)

to

marketing

in 19(51. Pre\’ionsly, applications

ing had concentrated on characterizing and evaluating

new

engineer-

devices for

military apj)lications. iAiter the restructuring, applications engineering

increasingly gave technical support to sales a technical interface with

Fairchild

19(5()s.

To

as

commercial customers.^'

Bay also reconfigured the

and mid

and marketing and acted

better

and marketing department in the early understand the needs of commercial users, sales

Semiconductor restructured product marketing

regional sales offices along market lines in really started getting into the

19(53.

“When

commercial markets,” Bay

as well as the

[the

company]

recalled,

“we [the

management group] reorganized to not only regions but market area. For instance, on the West Ck)ast, we had a computer guy who handled Scientific Data Systems and CiE Phoenix, and we had a consumer guy. And then we had product marketing organized similarly: we had a product marketing group for each of those markets to keep our finger on what the [users]

were looking for and so what products we needed various market segments.”'”

Two

to

continue to grow

in

years later, Fairchild, in an innovative

and marketing dej^artment around four markets: computer, consumer, industrial, and militaiy. FnjoNing substantial autonomy, each market division had its own sales, product marketing, aj)plications engineering, and product planning groups and its own legal move, restructured

office to draft

its

entire sales

production contracts with customers.^”

In conjunction with the building of a strong sales

commercial marketing and

department, Noyce, Bay, and Ciordon Moore (the head

Fairchild Semiconductor) gained a better understanding of

of

RNl)

at

commercial

1

96

(',h(if)ler 5

requirements by hiring system engineers. In 1962, Moore estal^lished a high-speed to

memon

develop a

memoiT system. He

puter division.

ment

engineering department

A

year

later,

staffed

Moore

it

in the

research laboratoiT

with engineers from GE’s

com-

established a digital systems depart-

under Rex Rice, a computer engineer from IBM, to learn about new computer architectures and packaging techniques. Management also recruited a large number of circuit and sysin the research laboratory

tem engineers with experience

in the

computer and consumer electron-

They were assigned to beef up the device development, marketing, and applications engineeiing departments. Indeed, most engineers in the applications engineering laboratory had previously worked at computer and consumer electronics firms before joining Fairchild. A large contingent of applications engineers had been schooled in computer technologv' at IBM and at Philco’s Western Development Laboratoiy Others came from Zenith and various consumer ics industries.

electronics companies. As Fairchild brought in system engineers

from

user sectors and built a strong sales and marketing department, the firm

gained a solid system and marketing expertise

sumer

electronics industries. Because of

Fairchild

tem

Semiconductor knew nearly

as

its

much

in the

computer and con-

strong system expertise, as system firms

about

sys-

design.'"’"

Exploiting this system competence as well as the strong interface with

commercial

mance

users, Fairchild’s device engineers

developed high-perfor-

and diodes that met the complex circuit and system requirements of computer and consumer electronics manufacturers. To do so, they collaborated closely with in-house applications engineers. These applications engineers identified the needs of commercial and military manufacturers by relying on their circuit and system expertise and by conferring with customers. Based on these requirements, they determined the devices’ characteristics. “We sought to understand the circuit and system requirements of the customer,” reminisced John Huhne, the head of the applications engineering laboratory, “and from there define the product. We would start by asking: What does the system need to do? How can we do it with what we have?”'’* Having identified the circuit and system needs of the users, applications engineers, in collaboration with the research and development laboratory, designed components that fit the firm’s manufacturing processes and met the system needs of commercial users. Following this approach to component design, Fairchild developed a broad line of system-oriented products in the early and mid 196()s. In transistors

’"

( )f)('n in}r I

1960 the it

had eight

firni

military-type transistors

manulaetnred 130 diflerent

cial

applications.

Each

transistors,

transistor was

many

meant

to

of

197

Nnt> Matiwis

on the market;

1964

in

which had commer-

a particular circuit or

lit

system niche. For example, Fairchild designed,

Jf)

among

others, transis-

tors for saturated switching circuits, non-saturating switching circuits,

and amplifier and

oscillator circuits.

automatic gain control

Particularly noteworthy was an

which a grou}) of research engineers

transistor,

designed in 1962. Automatic gain control (A(X^)

is

a feature critical to

the design of intermediate frequency (IF) modules widely used in radio

and

television applications, hhitil then, engineers designing radios

television sets could obtain this electronic function

vacuum

tubes. Fairchild engineers

silicon transistor.

The design of

were the

first

this transistor

and

through the use of

ones

to design

made

all

an

AGC

transistor IF

and thereby improved the reliability and manufacturability of consumer electronic products. This transistor gave the firm a substantial competitive advantage in the consumer electronics market. Going one step further in its efforts to meet the circuit and system needs ot commercial users, Fairchild customized its transistors for individual computer manufacturers. For example, the device development group modules

practical

at Fairchild su

designed new switching transistors for Control Data’s line of

p e rc o m p u te rs Fairchild Semiconductor seeded a market for

ing

new

applications

around

its

its

products by develop-

diodes and transistors and by giving these

and system designs to its customers at no cost. Its goal was to broaden markets for existing products and to develop markets for new

circuit

products.

The

this effort.

It

applications engineering laboratoiy, again, was central to

concentrated on writing applications notes and designing

prototvpes of commercial equipment around the firm’s diodes and transistors. Fairchild’s

applications notes were

meant

to

show commercial

customers how their problems could be solved better with silicon devices than with vacuum tubes, germanium transistors, and electromechanical

components. The applications notes described the functions commercial manufacturers could perform with Fairchild’s diodes and transistors and

make with the firm’s components. They also explained in great detail how these circuits and systems could be designed. They included circuit diagrams, board layouts, and, in some the systems they could

cases, a

mathematical analysis of the

system’s mechanical design.

A

note on a “transistor stereo

It

showed how

to build a

FM

multiplex

good examj^le of these aj)plications new kind of adaj^ter for nuilti})lex and

adapter,” published in 1962, offers a notes.

circuit or a short discussion of the

('/uiffler 5

/9arbide Electronics. This operation specialized in

and

the manufacture of special assemblies

competed directly with Amelco. Amelco Semiconductor’s situation

field-effect transistors

and

thus

its

grew from $2 main product

and

special assem-

stabilized. Its sales

million in 1963 to $3.6 million in 1964. At that time, lines

were bipolar

blies.

The

transistors, field-effect transistors,

firm also sold $396,000 worth of standard

OMIC microcircuits

and another $367,000 in custom circuits to outside customers. Amelco became profitable that same year, vindicating Singleton’s expectations. .Amelco also helped Teledyne emerge as an important manufacturer of electronic systems. The sole-source development contract for the IHAS was a major breakthrough for the company. It transformed Teledyne into a significant force in the avionics business and enabled Singleton to build a large military conglomerate. ious

IHAS

The

great publicity given to the var-

contracts raised the value of Teledyne stock. This enabled

buy medium-size privately held companies with the

Singleton

to

company’s

stock, following Litton’s recipe,

specialty

Teledyne acquired 21 small

companies between 1963 and 1965. These firms included man-

ufacturers of aircraft fittings, telemetry equipment, radar systems,

microwave tubes.

One

of these acquisitions was

MEC,

a manufacturer of

microwave tubes on the San Francisco Peninsula. As a

and the rapid expansion of the system went from $4.9 million in 1961 to $86 million

and

result of these

acquisitions

business. Teledyne’s

sales

in 1965.-^'

Making

User-Oriented Integrated Circuits

The group different

that established Signetics

from those

that Last

made

strategic decisions that

and Hoerni made. While Amelco Semi-

conductor evolved into a broad-based manufacturer of specialty tors

and miniaturized

circuits, Signetics

manufacture of integrated

were

circuits. In

transis-

concentrated exclusively on the

the weeks that followed the firm’s

establishment, the founders revisited their original business plan and

company should venture into. David .Allison proposed that the corporation make bipolar transistors as well as integrated circuits. They knew how to design and manufacture transistors debated which

fields the

very well. .Allison argued that the market for microcircuits was verv small.

229

Mi)iialinizalio7i

which made

it

l

members of tlie group capital

coiuentrate on integrated ciienits alone. Other

isky to

They reasoned that, with the little they had, they could not compete with Fairchild in the low-cost, felt differently.

high-volnme transistor market. Instead they

that they

felt

should con-

on microcircuits and attack that market. David James, who had been nominated president by Lehman Brothers, decided to focus Signetics on microcircuits alone. This was a significant decision centrate their resources

because

put the firm on a different trajectoiT than

it

conductor. Signetics was the

first

corporation to

Amelco Semi-

sj^ecialize in integrated

circuits in the Ihiited States.

Implementing

their original business plan, the

out to produce custom

circuits.

tomers design electronic in silicon

to

circuits.

They also intended in the

be a job shop,” James declared

we don’t think

come

ple to

that

we

to

put these circuits

requested quantities. “We intend

to a Business Week reporter in April

have too

will

much

to us early in the design stage of

once we prove

at Signetics set

Their goal was to help their system cus-

and manufacture them

1962, “and

group

trouble getting peo-

equipment development

we can produce. I'o engineer and produce custom circuits, Signetics mobilized the same resources as Amelco. They hired some engineers from Fairchild Semiconductor and Hewlett-Packard, and they recruited others from that

Texas Instruments. All these joined Signetics.

men were

The founding group

equipment manufacturers

to

offered stock options

also used local

when

machine shops and

equip their plant. Hiey procured the

sion furnaces from Electroglas

and employed the

bought

their

diffu-

services of the local

industiT for the fabrication of high-precision assembly equipment. also

they

Thev

photo-masking equipment from Electromask, a newly

company

To set up the plant and build a functioning organization, the core management group organized them-

established

selves in ways that

the group took bilities

as

well.

in

Los

Angeles.-'^

were reminiscent of early Fairchild. Each

member

of

on a set of technical tasks and had functional responsiThey assigned among themsehes the setting iq) of

processes such as diffusion and photolithography. In addition to these tasks,

each

member

of the group had managerial responsibilities. David

Allison was in charge of technical development. Orville Baker cuit design. Lionel Kiittner directed

headed

cir-

manufacturing. Mark W'eissenstern

took on quality control, testing, and, for a time, marketing. Jack Yelverton set

up the

firm’s

administrative services,

introducing

many

of the

management-employee-relations techniques he had helped develop Fairchild Semiconductor.'^'’

at

231)

(Ihdplrr

(-)

Ib inlcract with

llic

orgauized the

{'inu in

iug was mostly

done

be

and develop custom

circuits, tliese

men

au iuuovalive way. At Fairchild, product eugiueer-

iu the

diiricult to interface

as the Firm grew.

cusloiiiers

R^d)

labs at that time. This

made

it

sometimes

development work with market demands, especially

Because of

much more aware

its

custom orientation, Signetics needed

to

of and oj)en to customer inputs. As a result, the

up an independent R&D laboratoiy All product engineering was to be done in the “technical development department.” This department was made up of two sections: device development (under Allison) and circuit development (under Baker). Baker’s group was closely tied to marketing. It also collaborated with the device development group. This new organization enabled the close coupling of process and design engineers with marketing specialists.'^'’ In the firm’s first b months of operation. Baker, Weissenstern, and other members of the group went on a fact-finding mission to a number of electronic system corporations, hoping to drum up custom business. To their surprise, they discovered that the demand for custom integrated circuits was more limited than they had originally thought. Very few svstem firms were interested in having anyone engineer and manufacture specific circuits. Those rare corporations that were interested wanted circuits that required transistors and resistors that Signetics could not produce with its existing processes. (Signetics was developing its own variant of the Fairchild process for making integrated circuits.) As a result of these field studies, the founding group reexamined the premise on which they had founded the company. They decided to produce a family of standard integrated circuits in addition to custom circuits. The idea was that this standard family would bring in muchneeded revenues and also act as a form of advertisement for Signetics’ custom circuit capability. The founding group approached the development of standard microcircuits in an original and innovative fashion. Unlike the micrologic group at Fairchild, which had given little attenSignetics

group decided not

tion to the

to set

needs of customers when

circuits, Signetics

it

developed

its

first

integrated

integrated the users’ requirements into their designs.

This was consistent with Signetics’ orientation toward custom circuits

and customer focus. lb meet the needs of

potential .system users. Baker

ent logic configuration than the

RTL/D(TL

Amelco, and Texas Instruments.’” Baker Fhis was a circuits

form of

made

logic that

of discrete

Baker knew

components

at

logic

utilized

employed a

differ-

used by Fairchild,

diode transistor

well, fie

had worked on

IBM. In

his view,

logic.

DTL

DTL had

a

231

Minialiiiizalion

Figure 6.2 Signetics' DTI. gate,

number of

('.ourtesy ofT.ionel Rattnci'.

aclvanlages over

DTT

and RTF producls,

RTL and DCd

circuits

L.

Unlike Fairchild’s

had good noise imnuinily.

In

DU

I

I.

other

words, external electrical signals did not interfere with their runctioning.

This was important since the end user, the military, had an unyielding interest in reliahiliU’.

used form

of logic.

Furthermore,

nents, they

was an established and widely

Most design engineers did not know and were not

interested in learning about

DC^TT and

were already using

tronics firms

DTL

knew how

DFT

to evaluate

Rl’T. Since

circuits

made

many

military elec-

of discrete

them and design them

compo-

into their

systems. The\’ could easily adjust their testing ecjuipment to integrated

forms

oi l)

because

Baker

it

I

T

circuits. In shoi

was reliable and

later \isited

t,

D FT was a good

familial" to

engineers

at

most

candidate

circuit

loi

integration

and system engineers.

system firms and talked with them about

232

('/iaf)lrr6

DI'L

circuits. I'hc rcsj:)()nsc

l)uy 1) ri. circuits

hi tlie winter

was ovcrwlieliuiiigly

and

spring of 1962, Baker and Allison developed a

tlie

six circuits that

included gates,

needed

They would

these were ou the market.'''

if

family of 1)TL circuits. Baker began with a

neered

positive.

DTL

and

gate

used different combinations of

flip-flops,

this gate.

and binaiw elements. These were

for the design of the central processing unit of a

later engi-

all

These

the circuits

computer. Baker

designed these circuits so as to make them easy to use and place on a printed circuit hoard. These circuits were remarkably complex for that time. Bor example, the binaiy

element was made of twenty

ments: two transistors, ten diodes, eight

and two

resistors,

circuit ele-

thin-film capac-

Making these circuits was particularly difficult, not only because of their complexity and use of thin films but also bt^cause of their logic configuration. Thev were made of a greater variety of elements than RTL circuits. They also required tighter device tolerances, more exacting process control, and new ways of isolating devices on the same silicon chip,^'' lb overcome these difficulties, .Allison developed new processes. In itors,

particular,

he developed a

triple-diffusion process. (Texas Instruments’

first

microcircuit family also used triple diffusion.) At Fairchild, Kiittner

and

I

had previously

bias

isolation regions j)rocess

on the same chip by diffusing

from the top and the back of the

had serious

sides, they

isolated devices

were diffused from both

limitations. Since the wafers

were very

thin.

As a

result, they

broke

N-ty])e well in a P-tvpe

triple diffused.

wafer to

make

At

first,

The process also Under Allison’s new

easily.

introduced undesirable electrical characteristics.

scheme, the wafers were

silicon wafer. This

Alison diffused a deep

the collector; he then diffused the

base and the emitter in this well. James and Allison also developed ways of integrating thin-film resistors

elements

in

the

and capacitors

same monolithic

as well as diffused active

substrate. Signetics introduced

its first

show in March 19()2. They announced the whole DTT family in July of the same year, fhis was a remarkable accomplishment. They had designed an innovative line of circuits in less than a vear. Thev had also integrated complex circuits that no other firm had put into silicon before. Almost at the same time as the introduction of the DTT familv, Signetics was running out of money, having expended most of its capital. A second round of funding was recjuired. Lehman Brothers and the other investors, who had recently been battered by a decline in the stock D'l'T gate to the

market

at

the Institute of Radio Engineers

market, were not inclined to invest tlu'

founders to their own devices.

more money in the startup. This left They approached potential investors.

233

Minialnrizalion

Fid^tre 6.3 Sii>iu‘ti('s’ 19(')S.

San Franeiseo airport, circa laonel Kattner, Ainory Houghton (chairman of C>orning),

louiuU'rs greeting (x)rning exeenlives at

Lelt to right:

I)a\i(l jaines,

Malcolm Hunt (vice-president

tiie

ol (iorning). (ioiirtesy ol l.ionel

Kattner.

iiu'htdiiig Litton

|oseph \'an

Ihey were sitpporied

Indtistries.

in this

an anibitiotis bitsitiessinan

l’opj)elen,

endeavor by

whom

they

had

and marketing. \an Poppelen Motorola. W'heti none of his cotitacts bore

recently hired as vice-president of sales

bad

j)reviotislv

litiit,

headed

the sittiation

sales at

became

critical.

It

Brothers ad\'ised the lotmding giotip

Works was interested time client ol

Lehman

in bitying a

was at

at

that

time that

Signetics that (iorning (ilass

controlling interest, ('orning, a long-

Brothers, was an old, established corporation with

a long tradition of technological iniKwation. (atrningwas tlu'

Lehman

electronics field as

it

no stranger

prodticed telcwision bulbs as well as specialty

glass

used by vacntim tube maiuifacttirers. (iorning had recently

fied

into the production of resistors, capacitors,

Malcolm

I

hint, the

bead

to

and hybrid

ol their electronic division,

Signetics lor a variety of reasons.

He

diversicircuits.

was interested

in

feared that integrated circuits would

234

( Jidpler

6

soon displace discrete components such

He wanted

ones he was producing.

as tlie

complement his line of thin-film circuits with digital intecircuits. Hunt was eaijer to establish a foothold in this new and

ijrated

to

promising industry."

on buying into

Intent

Signetics group.

He

Signetics,

Hunt paid

a

visit

and courted the

assured them that (Corning would support Signetics

and technically and leave it completely autonomous. Van Poj)pelen and the management group voted as to whether they would ally themselves with Corning. Five voted in favor of the deal. Van linancially

Popi^elen and Kattner dissented on the grounds that Corning was not a

good

fit

for

an integrated

circuit

staid Eastern firm, ii^norant

company. In

their view,

Corning was a

about semiconductors and antithetic to the

ways and culture of the electronics industry on the West Coast. Their view later

proved

to

he correct. In November

19(32,

following the vote, the

founders and original investors signed an agreement with Corning.

Under

the terms of the agreement. Corning invested $1,700,000 in the

semiconductor firm. In return, they got 51 percent of the company’s stock and a majority on the company’s board. Hunt became Signetics’

chairman while Da\id James remained president. The agreement also included an innovative arrangement whereby Signetics’ original stockholders could

be

set

sell

their shares to Ciornintj.

by an independent appraiser at the

(k)rning’s cash kept the firm afloat.

It

The value of the stock would end of every fiscal year.^-

also financed

an aggressive

sales

and marketing campaign, that advertised Signetics’ custom circuit capability and its family of DTE circuits. In late 19(32 and 19(33, Van Poppelen built up the mai keting and sales department by hiring some of his for-

They publicized their DTL circuits through seminars and articles in the trade and engineering press. They also sought to build a custom business by developing “preFEBs” and

mer

associates at Motorola.

“variFEBs.” PreFEBs were

made

of groups of transistors, diodes, resistors,

or capacitors on the same silicon chip. Van Poppelen and his group dexised these preFEBs to help engineers at system houses get a feel for

and

familiarize

themselves with integrated

circuits.

These engineers

could also design their own circuits by arranging these elements. \

ariFEBs offered a different aj^proach to custom circuit design. V’ariFEBs

These dice were

were integrated

circuit dice.

excejjtion of the

aluminum interconnection

to those

used bv Signetics for

its

standard

fully j^rocessed

They were identical Under this scheme, the

pattern.

circuits.

customers would choose their own pattern and ask Signetics

on the

dice.*-'

with the

to deposit

it

A lit! id hi rizd I io n

\A'hile

developing these new produels, Van

Po|)j:)elen also

sought to get

Signetics’ circuits officially aj^proved by the Departiueut of

Lhider the procureuieut system

in force since

235

Defense.

the late 1940s, the Army,

the Na\y, and the Air Force independently certified supplier's of electi'onic

components.

It

was only after these supj^liers had been certified

that system contractors could use their products.

Hunt

Van Poppelen and

promoted Signetics’ circuits to the officers in charge of system development programs at the De])artment of Defense. Fhey concentrated their efforts on Arthur Lowell, a j)owerful Marine colonel who was in charge of the development and procurement programs of the Na\v’s Bureau of Weapons. Lowell was one of the main champions of integrated circuits in the militarv in the early 1960s. Winning him over was essential. To do so, \'an Poppelen and Hunt cultivated their relationshi])s with Lowell by making frequent visits to Washington. This involved a lot of dining and drinking. The campaign was a success as Signetics was approved as a supplier by the Navy in 1963.^^ In spite of these efforts and Signetics’ product innovations, the firm had great difficult}' generating sales. “It was like shouting in the void,” James later recalled. “Nobody was buying except the Army and the Naw and their purchases were veiT small, disappointingly small for qtiite a while.

actively

Signetics sold circuits to a few military contractors stich as

and Martin Marietta, but these orders were mostly in samj^le quantities. Signetics was no more successful with custom circuits. The only significant custom contract that the company received in 1963 was for the development of high-speed circuits for the National Hone\vvell, Lockheed, R(iA,

(iash Register

(

Company. System firms were not buying. Firms that did so

purchased their

circuits

from established manufacturers rather than

from untried startups such

as Signetics. Autonetics

and the Instrumen-

tation Laboratory at MIT, the two organizations that selves to microcircuits in 1962,

committed them-

bought their comj)onents from Fairchild

and Texas Instruments. Autonetics awarded a large contract to TI for the development of a family of 22 planar microcircuits. These were to be used in the guidance and control system of the Minuteman II, the suc-

Minuteman missile. The Instrumentation LaboratoiT designed the guidance computer for the Apollo rocket around a circuit from Fairchild’s micrologic family. The Instrumentation Laboratoiy cessor to the

chose

first

this circuit

because Fairchild was the onlv firm able to deliver

microcircuits in quantity at

that

(Fairchild Semiconductor’s general

might have figured

in this

time.

The

fact

that

Robert Noyce

manager) had graduated from MIT

decision as well. As sales languished, Signetics

2 36

('ha/)li'r

6

incurred

lieaw

shunned

military

losses.

In

desj^eralion,

R&:D contracts

the

management, who had

until that time,

began

pursue

to actively

those contracts. Van Poj:)jDelen hired a military sales specialist from

Motorola, whose sole responsibility was to ferret out

R&D

contracts from

the Department of Defense. As a result of these efforts, Signetics received a development contract for

new packaging techniques.

$159,000 contract to develop a high-speed C'-orps

DTL

In 1963

it

got a

family for the Signal

Engineering Laboratories.^'’

Signetics’ fortunes

Starting circuits

around

began

to

change

in the spring

that time, Signetics received a surge of orders for

because of a significant change

In April 1963,

and summer of 1963.

in

James Bridges, the Director

its

Department of Defense for Research

DTL

policy.

and Engineering

DoD, sent a memorandum to the militaiw services urging them to embrace microelectronics. Like silicon components a few years before, microelectronics would enable the militaiy to procure more reliable weapon systems. Increased reliability would enable the militaiy to perform missions successfully, reduce maintenance costs, and ultimately expand the use of electronics in militaiy systems. “This gain in reliability, coupled with reduction in size, weight, and power requirements, and probable cost savings,” wrote Bridges, “makes it imperative that we at

the

encourage the itaity'

electronic

earliest practicable application of microelectronics to mil-

equipment and

proven technology

systems.

It is

recognized that the currently

in microelectronics generally limits

developments for service use extensively in computers

to digital circuks

its

application in

such as are employed

and other data processing and handling

devices.

new developments for these types of equipment, it is suggested that they be examined carefully to determine the applicability’ of the new technology.”^' This directive had a profound effect on militaiT In

initiating

procurement

policies. Until that time, the militaity

sendees had supported

the development of integrated circuits. But with the exception of the Na\’y’s

Bureau of W eapons, the sen ices had been reluctant

their systems. In

an about

Militan agencies

let

it

face, they

now embraced

the

to use

new

them

in

technology'.

be known that system proposals had to incorporate

integrated circuits or hybrid circuits in order to be funded. This led

man-

on design teams to incorporate integrated circuits in their new systems. Not surprisingly, militaiT contractors and especially avionics firms became much more receptive to integrated circuits. In other words, the Department of Defense created a agers at system firms to put substantial pressure

large market for integrated circuits in the militaiw sector that

beyond the Apollo and Minuteman

II

programs.

went well

237

A linialu rizalio ri

Signelics was the

main henefkiary

ol the creation ol this niaiket.

demand lor DTL eircnits grew rapidly and l)eeame mneh the demand foi' RTL and IXTI L comi^onents. As Baker had

I

he

greater tlian (oieseen,

sys-

DTL eircnits because of tlieir electrical j)erformance and DTL eircnits were also easy to use and their logic config-

tem firms chose noise margins.

uration was lamiliar to most digital circuit engineers. Signetics circuits

were being designed into most new electronics systems

Now

that Signetics liad a market,

could not

fill

orders lor

problems. In the

its

summer and

These low

yields

Those

j^ercent.

it

firm experienced severe yield

of 19(33, yields

fall 1

encountered a second hurdle:

The

circuits.

elements were on the order of cent.

it

at that time.^'*

on

flip-flops

and binary

for gates reached 10 per-

were caused by photoresist problems and disloca-

tions in the silicon ciTstal. Signetics also ran into substantial difficulties in

fabricating circuits with thin-film capacitors.

by growing a thin oxide layer between

These capacitors were made

aluminum and

silicon.

The oxide

often developed pinholes, which led to device failure. Signetics’ dexices also

had the “purple plague,” a problem

that

it

shared with .Amelco, Fair-

that

and other manufacturers of integr ated cir cuits. The aluminum film interconnected the different elements would take on a purple color

and

later dissolve.

child,

This also led to the

failur

e of the device.

Under Kiittner’s

direction, Signetics’ engineers devoted considerable effort to sohing these

and standardizing the process. These sales and manufactrrring troirbles had important conseqitences for the unning of the company. They caused a rift between the founder s impr oving

difficulties,

yields,

r

and

main

their

lems and

its

investor,

inability to

Corning. In light

meet

its

sales

of Signetics’ persistent

and prodirction

forecasts,

prob-

Malcolm

Hunt and other Corning execirtives lost their confidence in Signetics’ management and gradirally became more involved in the company’s affairs. At first. Hunt sent a financial specialist and a j^rodirclion expert,

Don

Liddie, to Signetics. Liddie

Signetics’ president.

He

worked

an

assistant to

David James,

also organized the prodirction-control depart-

more

ment and

introdirced

intervened

at the highest levels of the

tive,

as

discipline in mamifacturing.

he demoted him from president

Hunt

company. Judging James

later

ineffec-

to vice-president of research

and

Van Poppelen, the vice-president for marketing, became execirtive vice-president and general manager'. He ran the corporatiort for (Corning, (x)rning also forced Weissenster ri, one of the foirnders, to leave the company, and bought oirt his inter est. These moves led to gr'owing tensions between the remaining foirnders on the development

one hand and

in the fall of

(ari'iiing

19(33.

and \kn Poppelen on the

other."’’

23S

('Jiaf>lt’r6

In spile

()1

(Ills

nianagcM'ial instability

and the growing tensions

l:)etween

('orning and Signetics’ founders, the company’s sales revenues grew rapidly in the

Signetics

of 19h!^ and in

fall

became

much

This surge

|)rof'itahle.

in

allrihnled to substantial imj:)i'ovements in

clean

iij)

made an

and standardize the

19(H. After years of losses,

of

j)rocess finally

revenues and \'ields.

bore

The

frnil.

jjrofits

can he

firm’s efforts to

David Allison also

imj)ortanl innovation in |)rocessing by eliminating

one of the

main causes of device failure: dislocations in the silicon ciystal. Silicon wafers would often undergo a lot of stress when introduced into hightemj3eratnre diffusion furnaces.

The high temperatures would cause

locations in the crystal. Because these dislocations transistors, they

of the

furnace to

Later he raised the temperature hack to tal

would rim across the

would destroy them. Before putting the wafers

lowered the tenij^eralure

1,2()()°C.

dis-

in,

from the usual

Allison

1,2()()°C>.

Dislocations in the crys-

decreased dramatically, and the yields went up right away. This simple

jirocedure was quickly adopted by other firms on the San Francisco Peninsula.

To meet the growing demand for standard circuits, Signetics hired more emj)loyees and enlarged its plant space. Its staff grew from 179 in mid 19(L^ to S5() in 1994. Signetics also expanded its facilities by renting another l)uilding in Mountain View in the summer of 1963. A few months later,

Signetics leased an additional 14,()0()-square-foot facility specifically

for R^4), reliability engineering, circuit design,

the

machine shop.

a large plant in

Signetics also planned

Sunnwale

in 1964.

started the construction of

By then, Signetics had become the

largest su))plier of integrated circuits sales

and

equipment design, and

on the Peninsula.

were substantially larger than Fairchild’s or

Its

microcircuit

Amelco’s."’-'

Dumping and Market Building

The emergence growth

of

1) I

L

of Signetics did

as a j30j)ular logic configuration

and the rapid

not go unnoticed at Fairchild Semiconductor.

These successes sparked a major coutro\ersy between the marketing de|)ai'tmenl and the integrated circuit development grouj3 about which course

of action to

pursue

in integrated circuits. Prior to this, Fairchild’s

managei's were not aggressively pushing the de\’elopment and marketing of microcircniis.

As they viewed the success

growing number of iiujuii

ies

and received a regarding integrated circuits from their cusof Signetics

tomers, they changed course. By early 1963, the firm had finally begun to beliexe in the future of integrated circuits, (iordon .Moore, the

head of

A li Ilia Ik riza I io n

now convinced

R^'D, was

that intei^rated circuits liad a

fiituix*. Ilis

239

opin-

ion was reinforced by the marketing dej)artment.

To position Fairchild lavorably in tlie integrated ciicnit llc'ld, Noyce and other top managers resolved to devote significantly greater financial and engineering resources to the development of integrated circuits and related processing techniques than they had done in the past. Fhe him also created a new section in the R&D department devoted solely to digital systems research. To head this section, Noyce and Moore recruited Rex Rice, a former IBM engineer. The goal of this new section was to develop new computer architectures and j)ackaging teclmicjiies. It was also meant to help the company evaluate which digital functions should be integrated

in a silicon chip.'’'

Although there was a general agreement about the fhtnre importance of microcircuits, the various groups

which direction

to ])nrsne.

circuits

were having considerable

elicited

much

Fairchild fought ferociously over

The marketing department thought

growing market for integrated sales

at

greater interest

would go DTL. Marketing and

difficnltv selling

among

D('TL

customers. Taking

market place, the marketing department advocated diice

and commercialize

lines.

On

DTL

that the

circuits in addition to

the other side of the debate was a gronj) of

circuits.

its

DTF

cue from the

that Fairchild |)roits

cii

DCfFL and RTF cnit

engineers

in

the R^'D laboratoiy These engineers had replaced Last, Allison, Kattner,

and Haas

group was led invented

Amelco and Signetics. The microcircuit by Robert Norman and Phil Ferguson. Norman had at Speriy Gyroscope in the mid 195()s and had helped to

after their departure to

DCTL

develop the

first

family of integrated circuits at Fairchild. Ferguson was

the head of the device development section (where he had rej)laced Allison). trate

these

its

men argued vehemently that Fairchild should concenresources on DCTL and RTL circuits. Norman maintained that These

logic

configurations offered

suj^erior

characteristics

to

D'FL.

Norman, they were faster and could be |)roduced at higher vields. The group headed by Norman and Ferguson was then de\'elo|)ing a new family of low-power RTL circuits with financing rom the National Security Agency.'’^ The NSA contract supported the development of integrated circuits for the agency’s spy satellites. Norman and Ferguson felt that these circuits would compete easily with DTL and find a large marAccording

to

f

ket in aerospace

programs beyond tbe NSA’s immediate needs. Noyce

and Moore sided with the marketing department, fhey decided that Fairchild would develop DTL circuits to compete directly with Signetics and they had the power

to

enforce their

decision.'''’

240

(',h (I pier

6

many odier

This decision enraged Norman, Ferguson, and

circuit

Fairchild to start their

own

semiconductor company. General Micro Electronics (GME). These

men

engineers. In die

summer

oi

were joined by Howard Bobb

1963 they

left

(a Eairchild

salesman with close

ties to

the

NSA) and Towell (the newly retired head of avionics at the Bureau of W eapons, who had championed the use of integrated circuits in naval systems in the early 196()s). The new startup was supported by Pyle National, a

Midwestern manufacturer of

electrical

cables.

Like CMrning, Pvle

National was concerned that integrated circuits would

nent business obsolete. The founding group

at

GME

make

its

compo-

out to produce

set

and commercialize the family of low-power circuits they had engineered at Fairchild. Thev also obtained contracts from the NSA contracts for further development of RTL circuits. To replace Ferguson, Noyce asked Pierre Lamond, a tough French engineer who had made a name for himself by overseeing the producj

’*’

tion of the switching transistor for Gontrol Data, to direct the device

development

Robert Seeds, a talented

section.

IBM, was appointed the head of the integrated group. These

men

directed

engineer from

circuit

circuit

development

much-enlarged microcircuit

Fairchild’s

de\'elopment program. They gave considerable emphasis to the develop-

ment of DTE integrated circuits. Since Signetics’ DTE family was rapidly becoming the standard in the market, Lamond and Seeds elected to copy it.

Given the nature of the market,

choice. However,

it

did not

fit

this

decision was a highly rational

with Fairchild’s U adition of industry lead-

Not only were they emulating Signetics’ circuits, but five other semiconductor corporations decided to second source Signetics’ DTE line around the same time. Like these other firms. Seeds and his group ership.

engineered

DTE circuits fulfilling the same

electronic functions

and

hav-

ing the same pin configuration as Signetics’. Wliat was unusual about Fairchild’s family was

and

processing, which relied

company had employed

process that the sistors

its

a few low-power

Fairchild to design

DTE

RTL

solely for

on its

epitaxy, a fast

complex

switching tran-

microcircuits. This process enabled

products that performed faster and better than

Signetics’.'’'

In June 1964, first

elements

in

when its

the RN*D laboratory at Fairchild completed the

DTE microcircuit

family, the

was thoroughly dominated by Signetics. This players.

(3iaiies in

It

was

in

this

market for these

left little

context that Robert Noyce,

circuits

space for other

Thomas

Bay,

and

Sporck (the manufacturing manager who had played a big part

the firm’s expansion into commercial transistors a few vears earlier)

24 /

Miriialurizaliofi

cleterniined to

clump

Fairchild’s devices

on

introduce Fairchild’s

DTL

products. This

represented roughly half

|)rice

pated would be the cost

market. Fhey decided to

tlie

circuits at less than half the

ice of Si^rnetics’

j)r

what Fairchild

of

of manufacturing the dcwices. In so

men had two goals: to establish Fairchild as the dominant of DTL circuits and to drive Signetics out of the market. first

antici-

doing, these

manufacturei' It

was not the

time that Noyce had attempted to put Signetics out of business.

months

earlier,

Fairchild in the

he had unsuccessfully attempted

hope

that the departure of

development engineer would deal

a lethal

its

also

went

after (General

blow

to Signetics.

same

tlie

to

would

It

sued

GME

finally cripple the

GME

Eor Fairchild’s upper managers, Signetics and

Now, Noyce

time, Fairchild

Micro Electronics.

for the theft of trade secrets, expecting that this firm.

back

to lure Allison

expert prcjcess and device

sought to grab Signetics’ only market. Around

Semiconductor

A few

were danger-

ous competitors that had to be destroyed. Noyce also intended these actions to convey a strong message to Eairchild’s engineers

who might be tempted

and start had another

to defect

Noyce’s pricing tactics also

their

own

and managers

business.'^”

goal: to stimulate the

demand

and thereby create a market for them in the commercial sector by making them cheaper than ecjuivalent circuits made of individual diodes and transistors. The company had used this technique

for integrated circuits

to great effect in the transistor business a

assembly sistors.

the

in

Hong Kong had

few years

enabled Eairchild

to slash

earlier. its

Low-cost

prices for tran-

This in turn had enabled the firm to create markets for them in

computer and consumer

electronics industries.

Noyce knew

that low-

ering prices for integrated circuits would have a similar effect. Users

would adopt them because they were

less costly

crete devices. In other words, price reductions

demand that

for microcircuits, especially

than circuits

would

made

of dis-

greatly enlarge the

among commercially oriented hrms

were more price conscious than military contractors.

Not

surprisingly, Eairchild’s drastic pricing of

destructive effect

on

offered by Eairchild,

its

DTL

line

had

a

Signetics. In order to take advantage of the price

many Signetics customers canceled

their orders.

To

Van Po])pelen, Signetics’ executive vice-president, along with Baker, Yelverton, and the three remaining founders, decided to match Eairchild’s prices. This meant that, after only a few profitable months, Signetics would return to the red and incur heavy losses. The corporation made this decision in the hope that it would keep some of its customers and maintain some cash flow. But this move was not well received at (kirning. Hunt and other (kirning save what

remained of the

firm’s backlog.

242

CJiapIrr 6

managers saw

vSignetics’ decision as additional

proof

of

poor inanage-

inent. Delerinined to solve the firm’s perceived managerial

once and

for

all,

Hunt demoted Vdn Poppelen

president in Se|Dtember C’orning’s electronic

to

jim Riley, a seasoned

1964.

component

problems

marketing

vice-

manager from

division, took over as Signetics’ presi-

dent and general manager. Riley placed (’-orning engineers and managers in the most responsible positions at Signetics. As an example,

kiddie

became

('-orning lines.

the head of manufacturing

To stem

Signetics’

cutting measures. In the

workforce and slashed

its

fall

heaw

and reorganized

losses, Riley

it

along

took radical cost-

of 1964, he laid off nearly half of Signetics’

product-development expenses. The firm con-

on stabilizing and standardizing the process in order to improve yields and reduce manufacturing costs.’’*' By winter, Signetics needed some urgent refinancing. Corning used Signetics’ dire condition to increase its share of ownership. At the same time, Cx)rning’s managers would humiliate the founders and punish them financially. In late December, a few days before the firm had to close its doors for lack of funds. Coming’s management convened a meeting with Kattner and Allison in Corning, New York. The treasurer offered to bring in additional capital by buying a new issue of stock at 5 cents per share. This would give Corning an 82 percent equity position in Signetics. The offer would dilute the founders’ stock and the stock options granted to employees to almost nothing. Kattner and Allison turned this proposition down. In last minute aiegotiations. Corning and Signetics’ representatives agreed that new shares be issued at the price of centrated

its

efforts

50 cents a share. Subsequently, an independent evaluator determined that the real

worth per share was hard bargaining

(Morning’s

in the

tactics

neighborhood of $3.50.'’"

and the growing presence of

(a)rning people at Signetics further alienated the founders. In the spring of 1965, disillusioned

they had established. ager.

Under

cuit sales basis).

and disheartened, James and Kiittner left the firm Kiittner Joined Amelco as assistant general man-

his watch, in the

next year and a half i\melco’s integrated

grew from $1.2 million

Amelco’s

became the

total

to

more than $4

million (on an annual

revenues reached $9.8 million in 1966. James

vice-president for research

Varian A.ssociates spinoff that

vacuum systems

cir-

and development

made Vaclon pumps and

at Ultek, the

various types of

semiconductor manufacturers. Velverton started a head-hunting agency in San Francisco, while Van Poppelen became gen-

eral

manager

of

was complete."'

for

ITT Semiconductor. By March 1965, Coming’s takeover

2^3

Miflialurizaliou

rcduclion also cMiahlcd

Faircliikl’s j^rice tlie iJjrowinjr

niarkei for

1)

TL circuits

to capture a lar^c shaie of

il

and

the military and space sector

in

to disj)lace Signetics as the largest j)roducer of integrated circuits in the

United

States. In late

1964 and

1)44. circuits skyrocket, while

remained

level.

Fairchild’s

DTL

Many

its

shipments

and

military

system

firms

Fairchild was successful at selling

DTL

circuits,

it

circuits.

was

j)arts

designed

Spern

for the j)rototvpe of the lunar orbiter.

designed a new T()Ru\N system around Fairchild’s

its

FOr example,

circuits into their systems at that time.

Boeing ado|)ted them

for

RTF and I)(TL

of

s})ace

demand

saw the

19()5, Fairchild

But while

less successful at

making them. V\ hen the firm announced its products’ pi ices, it had yet to transfer them to production. Not unlike Signetics a year before, Fairchild ran into severe manufacturing problems with

and 1965, the firm

Several times in late 1964 yields

plunged

to zero.

As a

result, Fairchild

caused serious production delays for

its

“lost

was

its

D4 L

the process”

late in

circuits.

— that

deliveries.

its

is,

This

customers. Fairchild’s manufac-

turing problems saved Signetics. Because of Fairchild’s poor delivery record,

some customers switched

Signetics.

Strong

sales,

their purchases of

it

back to

and radical cost had been permanently

the cash infusion from Corning,

cutting enabled Signetics to survive. But Signetics

wounded, and

DTL circuits

would never regain

its

leadership in the integrated

circuit business.

Once

Fairchild

Semiconductor improved

leading manufacturer of

D LL. circuits, which

itaiw contractors. Fairchild also

which

until

made

made

began

yields,

it

emerged

were widely adopted by mil-

then had been closed to microcircuits. Because of the drastic

of discrete comj)onents. In

now cheaper late 1964, a

to use Fairchild’s circuits in their systems

than ecjuivalent

cial

had used integrated users was

Scientific

minicomputers located firm

and

announced

circuits.

and subsystems. This was

its

in

Southern

use of Fairchild’s

digital-to-analog converter of

control industrial

Prominent among the

Data Systems

its

cir-

few commercial firms

an imj)ortant development. Until then, only militan’ and tors

as the

inroads in the commercial market,

price cut, DTL. integrated circuits were cuits

its

sj)ace contrac-

early

commer-

(SDS), a manufacturer of

(California. In

D4T circuits

December

1964, the

in the analog-to-digital

SDS-92, a new computer designed to

j^rocesses.'’-^

and 1966, building on this foothold in com|)uter applications, Fairchild’s managers focused on the development of commercial markets for integrated circuits. They relied on the conij^any’s strengths in manufacturing and especially its recently ac(|uired mass-production In 1965

244

('4ia/)l(>r

capahililv.

6

Fairchild

made

also

use of

the applications engineering

group’s knowledge of the silicon process and the design of commercial electronic systems.

Many

of the

men

in the

group had been hired

to sup-

port Fairchild’s push into commercial transistors a few years earlier. At

Lamond’s

Pierre

DTL

of

request, the applications engineers developed a series

circuits that

would meet the requirements of a

variety of

com-

(Lamond, who had directed the development of Fairchild’s first DTL circuits in the R&:D laboratoiy, had recently become the director of the mannfactnring plant in Mountain View.) Applications engineers also identified users’ circuit and svstem needs and, in collabomercial

users.

ration with the firm’s

R^'D laboratory, designed integrated

circuits that

fit

the

mannfactnring processes and met the system needs of commercial

customers. Their goal was to engineer “building blocks,” namely circuits that designers

Thev

also

would use

to construct a

wide range of electronic systems.

developed increasingly complex

needs and open np new

circuits in

applications.'’^

In conjunction with the

development of customer-oriented

numerous

the applications engineering group published

notes that explained systems.

how

devices,

applications

the customers could use these circuits in their

These applications notes were meant

their technical

order to meet new

to

show customers how

problems could be solved better with integrated

circuits

than with transistors, vacuum tubes, or electromechanical components.

The ers

applications notes described the functions commercial manufactur-

could perform with Fairchild circuits and the systems that they could

make with the firm’s components. They how these systems could be designed. But the design of commercially oriented

also explained in great detail

DTL products and

of applications notes did not suffice to build a large circuits. Potential

customers

in a varieU’

the writing

market for integrated

of commercial industries had to

be further convinced. With the exception of SDS and a few other firms,

many cuits.

electronics corporations were at best

Like militaiT contractors a few years

reluctant to use a

complex technology'

and buying integrated circuits its.

circuits

composed of discrete

lukewarm toward microcir-

earlier,

commercial firms were

that they did not

understand

well,

from outside vendors (instead of making

dey ices in house) yvonld cut into their prof-

(Commercial firms yvorried too about production

costs.

Because

inte-

grated circuit packages yvere expensive to solder to printed circuit boards, they increased the overall cost of system mannfactnring.

To convince commercial cuits, Fairchild

firms of the great future of integrated

lannched an aggressive marketing campaign

in

cir-

1965.

2^ 5

Min/alurizalion

campaign inciiicU'd prc'scmtations at tc*clinical mcHMings and artic les tlic‘ ti ade j)rc‘ss l)y Rohen Noyce, (ioi clon Mooi e, Vic tor (irinic ii, and

riiis

in

t

other Fairelhld managers.

Moore

titled

aj)peared

in

had hc'c'ome dex

ices.

exam|)le, in

Foi'

more

that the

number

of transistors

silicon circuits

first

claimed that they would continue to do so

|)redictecl that the

number

c^f

in the

transistors

had dou-

microcircuit in 1960.

foreseeable future

statement later known as “Moore’s L.aw”). Applying

Moore

by

devices on a silicon chip.

on

bled ewerv Year since the development of the

(a

aiticle

Integrated circuits were also going to lower the price of digital

Moore noted le

an

“(aamming More (-omj)onents onto Integrated (areihts” FJrrlwfiirs. In this article, Moore argued that mierocireihls cheaper and more reliable than circuits made of discrete

electronics dramaticallv by incoiporating

I

19(')5

A|)ril

on

this obserxation,

a silicon chip

would

increase from 50 in 19(x5 to 65,000 in 1975

(Moore

claimed that the ex])onential growth

complexity of microcircuits

and the corresponding decline

in the

in the cost

1965).''"’

Mc^ore also

of electronic functions would

revolutionize electronic system engineering. “The future of integrated c'lectronics,”

adxantages

of'

he contended,

the future of electronics

The

itself.

integration will bring about a proliferation of electronics.

Integrated circuits least

“is

will

home computers

lead to such wonders as

terminals connected to a central computer

—or

at

—automatic controls for

automobiles, and j^ersonal j)ortable communications equipment. But the biggest ))otential

lies in

the production of big systems. In telephone

communications, integrated

circuits in digital filters will separate

chan-

on multiplex ec|uipment. Integrated circuits will also switch telej)hone circuits and j^erform data processing. Computers will be more powerful and will be organized in completely different ways. Machines nels

similar to those today will be built at lower costs

around.” (Moore unleash a wave

19(i5)

of

Moore suggested

and with

faster turn-

that integrated circuits

would

innovation in electronic system design. Firms that

condemned themselves who exploited the enormous

The

refused to use microcircuits

to oblivion.

world belonged to those

potential of inte-

grated electronics Fairchild that

(ibid.). In

(

lowered the assembly cost to the

of

marketing campaign,

were sold

in flatpacks.

circuit

packages

electronic systems. Packaging was

widespread use

computer and consumer electronics

ircuits

this

Semiconductor developed new integrated

indeed the chief Obstacle the

conjunction with

of integrated circuits in

industries. At that time, micro-

Flatpacks were small rectangular glass and

ceramic |)ackages with close lead spacing. Fhey could be stacked

and had good

easily

theiinal dissipation characteristics. But they were too

246

('.ha/fter

cunihcrsoiiic

6

and expensive

for volinne production.

developed for military applications

(They had been

in the early 19b()s.)

Moreover,

flat-

packs required the use of printed circuit boards with narrow traces,

which were flatpacks

close

to

and expensive

were also

“Flatpacks,”

hard

difficnlt

difficult

complained

and bend

to insert

easily.”'"*’

stantial labor costs. In

As a

produce. Adding insult to

solder to

to

a Scientific

handle and hard

to

injury,

printed circuit boards.

Data Systems engineer

in 1964, “are

The

leads are too

on the

result, the

circuit cards.

use of flatpacks entailed sub-

order to produce integrated-circnit-based systems,

and highly paid operators who would solder each individual flatpack by hand to the printed circuit boards. firms

had

to

employ very

skilled

Few commercial firms were willing to incur these expenses.'"' To stimulate the commercial demand for integrated circuits, engineers in the digital systems and device development sections of Fairchild’s R&D department set out to develop a new package. They were interested in designing a package that would lend itself to “easy industiy use in automated insertion systems or very rapid hand insertion.”*"” To facilitate circuit-board layout and to reduce the assembly costs of electronics systems, Rex Rice, a computer engineer and the head of the digital systems laboratory, de\ised a new lead configuration for integrated circuit packages. The new configuration had pins that were 100 rather than 50 mils apart (as they were in flatpacks).

The

pins were also in a line, rather than

coming from each of the package’s four

sides as in the flatpack. Before

putting the in-line package into production, Fairchild’s marketing spe-

on computer manufacturers, especially Control Data and Ceneral Electric. They discovered that customers did not like packages standing np in one line, but were willing to take two. xAs a result, Fairchild’s device development group transformed the in-line prototvpe cialists

tested

it

into a package with two parallel rows of

The end

result

pins.'"-'

was a radically new package, the dual in-line package

Whereas the flatpack was small and its leads spaced 50 mils apart, the DIP was larger and had wider lead spacing. This configuration facilitated the use of cheap printed circuit boards. The DIP allowed for wire routing under the package and permitted a more efficient use of board space. Its in-line arrangement simplified the layout of printed circuit (DIF).

boards. to

The new package

automated assembly.

It

also was easier to

handle and more adaptable

plugged into the board and thereby could be

soldered using mass-production techniques. As a

result,

packages reduced assembly costs by a factor of

4.

dual in-line

Fairchild Semi-

247

Minialinizalion

Figure 6.4

and uncapped dual in-line packages with integrated circuit die, 1967. (lonrtesy of Fairchild Semiconductor and Stanford University Archives. ('.a))j)e(l

condtictor introduced the dtial in-line package on ctiits

in

19(35.

The

in the

cir-

dual in-line package was a major innovation.

opened up the commercial market major role

DTL

line of

its

for integrated circuits

evolution of integrated electronics

f

It

and played a

rom innovation

to

large-scale mannfacttire.'"

In part because of def t

demand cantly

for

in

DTL and

19(35

and

marketing and the introdtiction of the DIP,

other 19(3(3.

expanded from $35 million

digital integrated circtiits

The

overall

in 19(34 to

market for

$90 million

conductor firms shipped very few integrated

Of

lialf

United States were

commercial

was the prime beneficiary it

was the largest supplier

of this

digital

semi-

commercial

circuits to

sector. Fairchild

market expansion.

of microcircuits to

militarv market.) In addition to selling

custom

circuits

in 19(3(3. In 19(34

Semiconductor

In 19(35

circuit business.

its

and

19(3(3

comj)uter and otlier com-

mercial users. (Texas Instruments and Motorola focused

built a large

signifi-

the sales of integrated circuits in the

users, hut by 19(3(3 nearly to the

increased

tlte

line of

DTL

more on

the

circuits, Fairchild

CA)mputer manufacturers were

increasingly interested in custom circuits because they

felt

that

custom

24S

( 'Ji(if)ter

circuits this

tom

6

would give

demand,

tlieiu

Faircliild

au advantage over

Data Systems were

and

among

They approached

these circuits.

To meet

developed and produced entire families of cus-

circuits with flip-flops, gates,

Scientific

tlieir conij^etitors.

IBM, Honeywell, and

buffers.

Fairchild’s largest customers for

Fairchild with proprietary circuits that

the firm’s engineers transformed to meet the constraints of the silicon

more and more computer corporations wanted their own Fairchild became a major manufacturer of custom products for

process. As circuits,

selected companies."'

Linear Circuits

In parallel with the building of a

commercial market for

Fairchild developed analog circuits (in doing so,

pioneering work done by Amelco’s engineers

it

digital circuits,

followed

some of the

in linear circuits in

and 1963). The applications engineering laboratory played role in this development. In 1963, John a voung, aggressixe, tions laboratory.

Hulme

a central

recruited Robert Widlar,

and independent-minded engineer,

Hulme

1962

to the applica-

gave Widlar the job of designing an operational

amplifier that would be compatible with Fairchild’s manufacturing process. circuit.

An It

operational amplifier

cotild

is

a particular kind of linear or

analog

be used for signal processing, signal generation, and

Hulme asked Widlar

feedback control applications. At the time when

to

design an operational amplifier, there were no^good amplifier microcir-

on the market. Texas Instruments had introduced operational amplifiers in 1962, but their performance was very limited. .A.melco had also designed a monolithic operational amplifier for the IHAS program, but this circuit had not yet been commercialized. Hulme cuits available

was determined that Fairchild take adxantage of

this interesting

market

opportunity.

Building an

operational amplifier with

Fairchild’s

manufacturing

process was no easy task. This process had been optimized for the making of digital circuits, namely circuits where the switching speed of transistors

was

essential. This process

was

now

to

be used for the production

of microcircuits, iu which other electrical characteristics, such as leakage currents and beta (current gain), were severe constraints this imposed

on

tions in integrated circuit design

Among other

more important. To

circuit design,

Widlar made innova-

(some of which he

innovations, he put active devices to

ponents, used special configmations to

make

deal with the

work

later patented). like passive

com-

a low-beta transistor to

249

Mitiialurizalion

behave

like

high-beta

a

and created

unit,

source

constant-ciii rent

rej)laceinents lor the large resistors. Widlar also pai tneied closely with l)a\id Talbert, a |)rocess

engineer

in the inaniilactnring plant. At Widlar’s

and

urging, Talbert carelnlly tweaked

tightly controlled the inanulactnr-

ing |)rocess in order to produce better transistors and resistors lor analog circuits.

Making

much more

linear circuits was

dillicnlt

than producing

digital circuits.'-^

W'idlar’s iicls,

and

Talbert’s collaboration N'ielded two rcwolntionary [)i'od-

the pA7()2 (pA standing lor “micrologic amplifier”) and the pA7()9.

Fairchild introduced the 702 to the market in 1904. that

improved

W'idlai' hea\ilv

snbstantiallv

on the 702, followed

publicized the 709.

He

circuit

1905.'^

gave a series of lectures and wrote

papers and applications notes on the 709 microcircuits

in

The 709, a Ncnember

— thereby popularizing linear

and convincing svstem engineers

that these circuits could

When

be used. Militarv contractors rapidly adopted the 709.

the 709

became cheaper than similar circuits made of discrete components, it was adopted in numerous aj)|)lications from jet engines to process controls and a wide variety of instruments. In other words, the 709 became the standard operational amplifier. Raytheon, Amelco, and Union ('.arbide Electronics soon copied it and brought it to production. Bv 1967, more than a dozen US corporations sold this circuit. The 709 oper-

—

ational amplifier initiated the linear circuit business in the United States

and gave Fairchild Semiconductor By 1967, Fairchild was the

a j^rominent place in

largest

maker

San Francisco Peninsula. Flaving sold in 1966, circuits.

it

It

of integrated circuits

.fS5 million

controlled about SO percent of the

was particulaiiv strong

and custom

digital

in

it.'”’

worth of microcircuits

US market

DTT circuits,

on the

for integrated

operational amj^lifiers,

products for mainframe computers. Signetics

fol-

lowed Fairchild’s exam|)le and moved into the computer market. In 1966, Signetics

had $12.6 million

maker of integrated

in sales

and was the second-largest

(Amelco sold

circuits in the area.

.$9.8

million worth

of semiconductors that year.) Fairchild’s integrated circuit business was also highly profitable.

As production \()lumes increased, the manufac-

turing staff gradually improved

its

control of the process and obtained

better production vields. As a result, manufacturing costs decreased. In

1965 and the

first

ing a substantial Fairchild’s

half of 19()6, Fairchild was j^robably the only firm j^rofit

dumping

on integrated

strategy’

in

the Lhiited States.

had succeeded.'"

4 he rise of integrated circuits sula’s electronics

circuits

mak-

had

significant effects

on the Penin-

manufacturing com|)lex and on Stanford

Ihiiversitv’s

250

(Hi apt in

elecirical

6

Following Fairchild, Signetics, and

engineering program.

new lechnologv', Stanford and electronics systems firms rapidly learned how to design and make integrated circuits. Partially hecairse of their close proximity to Fairchild and Signetics, the.se organizations became keenly aware of the potential of microcircuits. This propinqiiitv afso allowed them to acquire an expertise in the manufacture of microcircuits. At the forefront of this move into microelectronics

Amelco

in the

was Hewlett-Packard. In 1965, Hewlett-Packard, a manufacturer of elec-

measurement instruments, acquired the capability to make integrated circuits. At this time. Bill Hewlett and David Packard decided that their corporation would design and maniifactnre microcircuits for its own use. To do so, the firm hired local technicians as well as design and process engineers from semiconductor firms’in the Santa CHara Valley. It also retrained hundreds of its own engineers in the new technolog)' and built facilities for the production of integrated circuits. These substantial investments enabled the firm to introduce new integrated-circnit-based tronic

instruments to the market in the

late 196()s.''

In parallel with Hewlett-Packard’s venture into integrated circuitry,

Stanford Universitv incorporated the

new technology

into

its

cnrricnlnm

and research program. This was not the first time that Stanford had sought to capture innovations coming from industry. It had done so with microwave tubes in the immediate postwar period and silicon devices in the mid 195()s. In 1964, John Linvill, the chairman of the electrical engineering department, recognized that microcircuits would revolutionize the engineering cnrricnlnm as much as transistors had revolutionized it 10 years earlier. As a result, he encouraged his faculty to develop a series of courses on integrated circuits. For example, in 1964 a junior faculty

member developed the

complex

a laboratory course that familiarized students with

proce.sses used in the

making of integrated

circuits.

He

also

established the Integrated Carcuits Laboratorv. This teaching laboratorv

was small and could fabricate simple

circuits.

A

few years

later, Linvill

spearheaded the development of a research program on integrated cuits at Stanford.

To obtain the advanced processing expertise

nece.ssary Ibr such

cir-

that was

an endeavor, he hired a research engineer from

Shockley Semiconductor and

made him

the

Integrated

Carcnits

Laboratory’s chief engineer. With this inllnx of processing know-how, Stanford’s

Laboratory fabricated photo-transistor arravs and high-

voltage integrated circuits in the late 1960s. j3layer in integrated circuit technologv."^

The

universitv was

now

a

Minialurizalion

25

Conclusion

the

(Irilical to

on

tlie

emergence and growth of the integrated

San Francisco IVninsiila was the cadre

oj)ed the

first

integrated circuit

at

of

circuit business

engineers

who

devel-

Fairchild Semiconductor. Because

management showed limited interest in inicrocircuiLs, the group splintered and many engineers left the conij^any to start new Fairchild’s

microcircuit oj^erations. These

and pushed

men adopted

different business

models

and design technologies in a variety of directions. Jay Last and Jean Hoerni formed the semiconductor subsidian’ of a startuj) system firm and made custom microcircuits for their parent company. Lionel KiUtner, David James, and David Allison established Signetics, a stand-alone company that specialized in the making of standard digital circuits. This grouj) devised a new approach to product engineering and made a major product innovation by developing a family of DTL circuits. When the Department of Defense forced its prime Fairchild’s process

contractors to incorporate integrated circuits in their systems, these firms

turned to Signetics’ j^roducts and bought them It

was only

at this

in significant quantip'.

time that Fairchild’s managers recognized the busi-

ness potential of the

new

technology.

To grow

their integrated circuit

sales,

they asked their engineering staff to copy Signetics’ products.

later

commercialized these

They

than half of Signetics’ price.

circuits at less

Fhis major price reduction enabled Fairchild to

expand

revenues and displace Signetics as the largest supplier of

its

microcircuit

DTL

circuits to

the militaiT sector. Price cuts, along with the dexelopment of the dual inline package, stimulated the

demand

for microcircuits

among computer

manufacturers. Fairchild also innovated by introducing linear circuits to the market. As a result, Fairchild Semiconductor

ducer of integrated

circuits in the

United

States,

became

the largest pro-

ahead of Signetics and

Amelco.

The

rise

of integrated circuit manufacturing was a turning point in

on the San Francisco lAninsula. The pioneering work on integrated circuits done at Fairchild, Amelco, and Signetics formed the basis for the extraordinary growth of the integrated circuit business on the Peninsula in the late 1960s and the early the histoiT of the electronics cluster

197()s.

By 1966, the main ingredients for

|)lace.

Firms on the Peninsula knew

this

how

to

major expansion were

make many

in

circuit tvpes

They had strong circuit design and marketing capabilities. Many managers and engineers understood the microcircuit business in (juantity.

well.

The demand

for integrated circuits was also

growing

fast.

Military

252

('Iiaf>l

riques collectives” in the 1800s.

On

industrial clustering, see

Le Flay 1864, 302-315;

LeFlay 1878, 288-307. 3.

On

the importance of manufacturing in electronics, see Lecuyer 1999

and

Leslie 2001.

Chapter

1.

1

Charles Litton to Harold Buttner,

75/7c, box

1

1,

December

31, 1946, (4iarles Litton Fapers,

folder Letters written by Litton, 1946, Bancroft Library, Universitv

of C^alifornia, Berkeley; Frederick Terman to Harold Latin, Frederick

Terman

(k)llections,

SC

December

17, 1953, in

box 6, folder 13, Archives and Special Stanford LJniversity; Jack McCullough, interview by Arthur Norberg, Fapers,

160, series V,

1974, 90-92, Bancroft Libraiy 2.

known about Litton’s background. The family exidently had some finanmeans; they owned a fairly large property in Redwood City and supported

Little

cial

is

Litton through 5 years of college.

interview

by Arthur Norberg,

McCullough’s 1974, 1-5. 3.

Eitel,

On

social

On William 1974,

Eitefs background, see William Patel,

Bancroft

Library,

1-2 and 5-7.

On

background, see McCullough, interview by Arthur Norberg,

Charles Litton, see Morgan 1967, 95-97.

interview by Arthur Norberg, 1974, Bancroft Library.

306

Notes

to

pf).

15-23

Litton to Arthur

4.

Wvnne,

Fehriian' 9, 1954, Charles latton Papers, 75/7,

box

1

3,

lokler letters written by IJtton Jannary-Augnst 1954, Bancroft Libraiy

Wvnne, Febrnaiw 9, 1954; Stanlbrcl Lhiiversity Register for 1924—1925 (Stanford .Archives and Special ('.ollections), 202-209; McCaillongh, interview by Litton to

5.

Arthur Norberg, 1974, 1-5. Dej:)artnient of

6.

Connnerce 1928; Morgan 1967, 22-30, 58-61;

Eitel,

interNiew

bv Norberg, 1974. Eitel,

7.

inteniew by Norberg, 1974, 8-9, Bancroft Libraiw; McCaillongh, inteniew

bv Norberg, 1974, 1-5. 8.

Eitel,

9.

On

inter\iew by Norberg, Bancroft Libraiy, 8-18.

the role of radio “experimenters” in the “exploration of the short waves,”

see the monthly see also

QST'm the 1920s and the early 1930s; historical treatment of the development

column on experimenters

De Soto

1936; Merritt 1932. Eor a

in

of short wave radio, see Headrick 1991, 1994.

inteniew by Norberg, 10-11. Eor a description of Eitel’s work on transmission at 10 meters, see Westman 1928; Hull 1929. On Litton’s short wave radio 10.

Eitel,

activities,

Morgan

see

1967, 95-96; Eitel, interview by Norberg, 19.

Eitel,

interview by Norberg,

12.

Ibid.,

9-1

13.

Erederick

1 1

.

1 1

7.

Terman

SC160, series XI, box

1,

to

Norberg, March

folder

1977, 124-126, 167-180;

4,

6,

1978, in Erederick

Terman

Papers,

Stanford .Aichives and Special Collections; Tyne

Moorhead

1917, 1921. 4

14.

See also

Eitel,

interview by Arthur Norberg, 19;

Leonard

Enller, interview

by

Norberg, 1976, 133, Bancroft Library. 15.

and Annual Report of the President of Stanford the 34th Academic Year Ending August 31, 1925, both in Stanford

Register for 1924—1925

Universitv’ for

Archives and Special (k)llections.

Norberg, “Report on an Interview with Mr. Philip Scofield,” September 25, 1973, 75/502 no. 13, Bancroft Librarv'; Leonard Enller, inteniew by Norberg, 1976, 27-1 28, Bancroft Libraiy; Harold Buttner inteniew by Norberg; Roy Woenne and 16.

1

Norman Moore,

interview'

by Norberg;

Eitel,

interview by Norberg, 13-18.

Lee de Eorest developed the aiidion oscillator and amplifier at Eederal Telegraph in the early 1910s. Although de Eorest patented the audion oscillator under his own name, Eederal Telegraph retained shop rights to this important invention. In turn, these shop rights helj^ed Eederal Telegraph secure the 1T&:T contract in 1927. On Eederal ILlegraph’s histoiy see Pratt and Roosevelt 1944; Leib, Keyston, and (aimpany 1928; Mann 1946; Aitken 1985. On the histon of the Mackay Radio and Telegrajth (Company, ITik-T’s radio subsidiaiy see “Histoiy of the .Mackav R;idio and Telegraph (aimpany” and “A Brief Fhstorical Outline and Description of the 17.

Notes

Mackay Radio and Telegra|)h l)ox 4, folder

Radio History

Haraden

('.-131, Bancroft Library labraiT. P'or a

18.

On

copy

of the

Heintz and Kaufman’s contract with the Dollar Steamshij:) Conij^any, see

“Dollaradio, (4ironolog\’” in carton 13, Polder Dollaradio, Simj)son Radio

(]orj)..

Radio Comj)any; “(ilobe Wireless, Chronolog),” in box 14, folder Cilobe Wireless, Ltd Dollaradio, History of Oj^erations, 1928-1960; W. P. Boatwright, “(ilobe Wireless Ltd. Reestablished (communication Circuits, ” Paripr Marine Rn>ierv, june 1946: 61-68, all in Dollar Paj^ers, 69/1 13e, Bancroft Library; Ralj^h Heintz, interview by Norberg, 1977, 53-55, 73-74, 77-80, Bancroft Library. Pacific

19.

Norberg,

“Rej^rort

on an InterMew with Mr.

Philij^ Scofield,”

September

25,

1973; Eitel, inteniew by Norberg, 13-18; Fuller, interview by Norberg, 127. 20.

Heintz, interview by Norbei

21.

On

g,

54 and 63;

Fuller, inter\iew

RCcA’s early histoiw, see Aitken 1985, 302-513.

On

RCA’s policies regard-

ing conijDetition in international radio communication and

tube

j:)atents,

see Federal Trade

22. McCaillough, interview by

bv Norberg, 128.

its

control of vacuum

Commission 1924.

Norberg,

1

1;

Patel,

interview by Norberg, 20.

“Monthly Men in the Tube Lab,” ca. January 1930, Charles Litton Paj^ers, 75/7c, box 3, folder Federal Telegraj^h, 1929-1931; Litton, “Notebook,” no date, Reference Notes ca. in Charles Litton Paj:)ers, 75/ 7c, carton 5, folder Notebooks 23.

—

192(i-1929; Deloraine 1976, 83-86. 24.

Heintz, interview by Norberg, 1977, 67, Bancroft Library.

25. Heintz, interview by

Eitel,

interxiew by Norberg, 27

and

38.

Norberg, 1976, 128-129, Bancroft Libraiy

26. Fuller, interview by 27.

Norberg, 68;

Heintz, interview by Norberg, 1977, 8(W87, 96-97; Eitel, interview by Norberg,

30; Euller, interview by Norberg, 1976, 128-129. 28. Euller to A. (dokey,

October

13,

—

1930

Februan'

all in

6,

1930; Fuller to John Farrington, October 6

Charles Litton Paj^ers, 75/7c, box

3,

and

folder Fuller, Lceonard;

Heintz, testimony to the commission on communications, Ihiited States Senate,

Januan' 23, 1930,

in Hearings before the (lorrirnitlee on Interstate (hrnrrierre, United States

volume 2 (Covernment Printing Office, 1930), 1917; Fuller, interview by Norberg, 128-130; Moore and Woenne, interxiew by Norberg, December 19, 1973, Senate,

1;

Heintz, inteniexv by Norberg, 95-98; Patel, interxiew by Norbt'rg, 25-29.

3()S

N()l(\s lo

2S—3

f)/).

29. Litton’s seal used a reinldi ein^

metal to expand and eontraet. As a glass

the

element

of excessive stresses,

new copper

wliieh eouiiteraeted the leudency ot the

'

result,

it

lelievt'd tlu' seal’s

which resulted

to glass seal, Litton

and

its

breakage. In conjunction with

in

developed a new process for an open-air einironment, Litton

his grotip

making pure copper. Instead of casting coppta in cast pellets of cojtj^x'r in a \acuum to axoid tin* introduction per elements. Lhis j^rocess enabled the production

made

main weld and

of Oxygen into the coj3-

pure copper and

of

as a result

new “Some

possible the production of high-(|uality seals. Litton also developed

processes to b\|)ass RLA's j)atents on oxide-coated cathodes. See Fuller, research experiences,” notes

engineering faculties

of

fdi a talk

and mechanical December 2, 19,‘0

given before the electrical

the lhh\ersit\' of

(

lalifornia at Berkeley,

Leonard Fuller lkij)ers, 79/9 Ic, box 1, folder Reference Material, misc. On Litton's work on coj)|)er to glass seals, see Oharles Litton, “Metal-to-(ilass Seal,” L^S Ikitent 1,940,870, filed Se]:)tember 1.^), 19,8.4, granted December 2b, 19,8.8; Heintz, interview by Norberg, 4.8-44. On the work at lleintz'and Riuifman on tantalum, see Heintz, intei view bv Thorn Mayes, 1974, 2.8, Bancroft Library; F. Hunter, “A Discussion of the LKses and Advantages of 4'antalum in the Manufacture of A'acuum in

Tubes,”

|ul\’ 18,

1928, (Charles Litton Rajters, 7.8/7c, carton

1,

folder Tubes, mis-

cellaneous data ca 1928-1980; Kohl 19.81,21.8-221. 80.

Preist

1992,

.8;

Mc(aillough, inti‘r\iew by Norberg,

interview by

12; Eitel,

Norberg, 20 and 28. 81.

J.

(/)pelin, “Histoiw of Litton Fugineeriug Laboratories

Ci.

1942,” April 19, 1944, (ihaiies Litton Pajters, 78/7c, carton

Heintz, interview by Norberg, .87-88, 48, 82—8.8, and

Norberg,

1

1-12 and

.84; Fitel,

Woenne, interview by Norberg, December

.88.

Woenne, l)y

,

fdi \'ear

lolder renegotiation;

McT'aillough, interview by

9(i;

interview by Norberg, .81-82.

82.

interview

1

and Report

19,

1978,

.8,

Bancroft Libraiy

interview by Norbt'ig, 4—8; Heintz, interview by Norberg, 68; Eitel,

Norberg;

1

larold Buttner, interview by NorlKM g, Februaiy 8, 1974, 41

Bancrof Library. t

84. Pratt 1969, 46; Deloraine 1976; Fuller, interview by crisis at

mid

Heintz and Ivmf man and the Dollai .Steamship

1980s, see Niven 1987, 10.8-1 10;

I

leintz, interview

On

the

the early

and

Norberg, 188-184.

Oompany in

by Norberg, 102-108;

Eitel,

interview by Norberg, 41; McCaillough, interview by Norberg, 18-14. 88.

Perrine

19.82;

view by Norberg, 8().

Eitel

Romander 1

19.8.8; Eitel,

interv iew by

Not berg, 86-87;

Fuller, inter-

88-184.

and Mc('.ullough learned

to

make

thoriated tungsten filaments, a

plex and delicate jjtocess, by exj)ei imenting in

com-

and Kiuifinan’s tube laboratory and by exchanging information with technicians working at the National Lube (iompany. Lhe National Fube (Company, a small San Francisco outfit, specialized in the repaiiof power tubes. Eitel and McCaillough met employees of the National Fube Oompany at amateur radio clubs in .San Francisco. On their use of thoriated tungsten filaments, see McOullough, interview bv Norberg, 40. On FateFs I

leintz

Notes

and McCaillough’s dcvcloj^inent

31—34

j)f).

309

of a Iriodc* for ainaleiu' radio transmitlcMs, sec

interview by Norberg, 35-40; Me(aillongb,

Kitcl,

to

iiiK'i

view by Noii)erg, 11,1

f),

and

40-41; connnuniealion from Jack Strother, July 21, lOOb. On the tube’s electrical sjjecifications, see “(iannnatron: Tvpe 354,” circa 1035, in Obarles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

2,

folder Tubes iniscellaneons, gaminatron, bancroft Libraiy.

37. Eitel, interview by

On

Norberg, 40.

and Kiuifman and the establishment of LilelMcC'aillough, see “First Directors’ Meeting of Fitel-Mc(aillongb Inc.” October 1, 1934, in Fitel-Mc('ullongh Records, 77/1 10c, box 7, folder Minutes Fitel.McCaillougb 10/34—10/45; McC'aillongh, interview by Norberg, 14-15 and 3.5-36; McOnllough, inteniew bv jack .Strother and Robert Herdman, November 25, 1999, tapes and 2, Stanford Archives and Sj)ecial Oollections; Eitel, interview by Norberg, 39-41 and 44—45; Heint/, interview by Norberg, 101-103; Norberg, “Report on an InterMew with Mr. Philip Scofield,” September 25, 1973, 75/.502, no. 38.

the conflicts at Heint/,

1

13,

Bancroft Libraiy

39.

The market

for transmitting tubes shrank

from .$1,410,000

to

$1,300,000

between 1931 and 1933. For statistics on power tube manufacture, see the US Dejxirtment of (/immerce’s (Tnsus of Manufacture for 1931 and 1933. On the history ol sj^ecialty manufacturing in the Lhiited States, see Scranton 1989, 1991, 1997. 40.

Woenne, interview by Norberg, 4 and

6.

June 30, 1953, Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 13, folder Letters written by Litton, January-August 1953. On Litton’s early work

41. Litton to Albert Jason,

at Litton

Engineering, see also Litton to A. Fuchs, December

Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

Historic Site,” Redwood

('Aty

13, folder Irihutie,

17, 1953, Cdiaiies

Fuchs; Peter Benjaminson,

August

12, 1965,

“Homes

Fill

13-15, in collection 7T423,

San Mateo Countv History Museum, Redwood (aty; Packard 1995, 37. For a description of Litton’s glass lathes, see “The Model E Class Working Lathe,” no glass working lathe. date, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 4, folder model E

—

42. J.

(i.

(>opelin, “History of Litton Engineering Laboratories

Operations for Year 1942,”

Ajiril 19,

and Report on

1944, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/ 7c, carton

1,

folder renegotiation. 43.

Ibid.

44.

On

Litton’s oil vapor

pumps, see

Litton,

“High \'acuum

jiunip,”

US

Patent

2,289,845, filed Januaiy 12, 1939, granted July 14, 1942; Litton, “\acuuni Distillation

Method,” US patent 2,266,053,

filed July 31, 1939,

1941; Litton to F. D. Phinney, January

Packard 1995, 37; (dipelin, Laboratories and Report on Operations or Year 1942”; f

1984.

Litton Papers, 7.5/7c,

F.

17, 1942, (diaries Litton

folder renegotiation. For a history of

16,

box “History of Litton Engineering

5, 19.39, (diaries

11, folder 1931-.39;

eering Laboratories,” October

granted December

vacuum

J.

Walsh, “Litton Engin-

Papers, 75/7c, carton

1,

j)umj) technologv', see Hablaiiian

310

Nolrs to

f)f).

3 5—4

45. Eilel, “P'lectronics ('.oiisidered Pace-Setter in Region’s

December Mnsenm.

(jty Irihuue,

History

Development,” Redxuood

27, 1962, l(v\, in collection 64—94,

San Mateo Clonnty

Norberg, 45; Mc( aillongh, interview by Norberg, 50-55; De Soto 1936, 130-131. The radio amateur market offered attractive opportunities. I be number of licensed radio amateurs more than doubled betw'een 1929 and 46. Kitel, interview

1933, growing

f

h)’

rom

On

16,000 to 41,000.

the Cheat Depression, see

De Soto

47. McCaillough, inter\'ic*w by

the expansion of amateur radio during

1936.

Norberg, 54;

Eitel,

intemew by Norberg, 51-53 and

61.

48. William Eitel

Tubes,”

US

and

jack McCaillough,

“Method and Apparatus

patent 2,134,710, filed jime

McCaillough, interview by Jack Strothers 1997, tape

November 1, 1938; and Robert Herdman, Ncivember 25, 1,

1936, granted

Archives and Special Ca)llections, Stanford University; McCullough,

2,

inter\iew by Norberg, 56; Eitel, interview by Norberg, 53, 62, 49.

for Exhausting

To bring

a

new

version of their

ham

and

77.

radio tube to the market, Eitel and

working at Heintz and Kiiufman. fhis task proved easy, however. They discovered both to their relish and their dismay that their patents were narrowly written. It was easy to bypass them. On Eitel-McCaillough’s legal wranglings with Heintz and Kaufman, see Eitel, interview by Norberg, 47-48; McCaillough, interview by Norberg, 29. McCaillough had to bypass the patents they had

filed while

September 9, 1944, 6-1 1, collection 739, San Mateo Ca)unty History Museum; McCullough, interview by Norberg, 18-20 and 26-27; McC aillough, intemew by Strother and Herdman, tape 50.

“Tenth Anniversary Edition,” Edel-Mcilullou^i

2; Eitel,

51

.

52.

inteiaiew by Norberg, 51-55.

“Tenth Anniversary Edition,” 34—41

On

Nezv.s,

;

Eitel,

interview by Norberg, 73.

the choice of Eitel-McCaillough’s tubes by the Naval Research Laboratory',

see Allison 1981, 102-103; Eitel, interview by Norberg, 65. 53. Tayloi' 1961; Eitel, interview by

Norberg, 64-65; McCullough, interview by

Norberg, 76.

“Tenth Anniversary Edition,” Eitel-McCAiUough Nexus, 4—5; Eitel, interview by Norberg, (38-72; McCaillough, interview by Norberg, 7(3; McCaillough, inteniew by

54.

Strothers 55.

and Herdman, tape

Minutes

of

board

in Eitel-McCaillougli

5(3.

“

2.

of Eitel-McCaillough,

December

Records, 77/1 10c, carton

7,

2(3,

1939 and

Mav

20, 1941,

Bancroft Libraiy

fenth Anniversarv' Edition,” Eilel-McCAillough

Nexus,

4—5, 17-25, 44—47; Eitel,

interview by Norberg, (38-72.

Minutes of board of Eitel-McCaillough, December 2(3, 1939, in EitelMcCaillough Records, 77/ 10c, carton 7; McC’aillough, interview by Strothers and

57.

1

Notes

Herdinan, tape

2;

McCaillougli, interview

fare eoi poratisin, see 58. Kitel, interview by

l)y

Noiixag,

7().

to pj).

On

41-45

31

the liisiorv of wel-

Brandes 1976 and jacohy 1997. Norberg, 74—76; McC'aillongh, interview by Norberg, 46 and

76.

Norberg, 74-76; McOnllongh, interview by Norberg,

59. Kitel, interview by

17,

44-46, 52.

Sherninnd to Philip Scofield, April 28, 194 Shernuind to Scofield, Mav all in Ohaiies Litton Papers, 75/7c, 5, 1941; Shernuind to Scofield, May 16, 1941 box 8, folder Ralph Shernuind; Litton to Scofield, Ajiril 1, 1945, (ihaiies Litton PapiM's, 75/7c, box 11, folder jannary-May 1945; Litton to Harrison (]all, Ral|)li

(id.

1

;

—

1

September

1945, in (diaries Litton Pajiers, 75/7c,

27,

box

11, folder

Deceiuber 1945; Norberg, “Report of an interview' with Mr. Septeiubei 25, 1973, 75/502 no. 13, Bancroft Libraiw.

Shernuind

61.

to Scofield, Ajiril 28, 1941,

(diaries Litton Papers,

April

1

1,

8,

(/ill,

Sejitember 27, 1945,

folder |iine-l)eceniber 1945.

On

3,

and May

1941,

Phil. Scofield,”

16, 1941

—

all

in

folder Ralph Shernuind; Litton to Scofield,

1945, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c,

1,

Idtton to Harrison 1

75/ 7c, box

May

June-

box

11,

folder January-May 1945;

in (diaries Litton Papers,

75/7c, box

Litton’s profit-sharing programs, see Walsh,

“Litton Kngineering Laboratories,” (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

1,

Folder

renegotiation; Litton to Melville Easthani,Jaiuiai'\’ 17, 1950, (diaries Litton Papers,

75/7c, box

1

1,

folder letters written by Litton.

62.

On

63.

Herbert Thielmayer, “Report,” March

Littoifs tenure at Federal Telegraph, see chapter 2.

for 1944,”

March

6,

18,

1944 and Arthur Andersen, “Report

1945, (diaries Litton I’apers, 75/7c,

box

4,

folder KiE; minutes

and (duuniercial Electronics, September 27, 1943, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 11, folder 1940-1944; “Heintz and Kaufman: S. E. Electronic Inventors in War Seriice,” San Francisco ChroniiF, |anuan

of

board

of directors of Industrial

21, 1943, in

Ralph Heintz Papers, 77/ 175c, carton

2,

folder clipjiings, Bancroft

Library. 67. 64. 1

1,

Minutes of board of directors of Eitel-Mc(dillough, March 17, 1942 and jiine all in 1942; “Eilel-McCullough Lncompleted (dmtracts,” January 16, 1943

—

Eitel-Mc(dillough

Records,

carton

7,

folder

Eitel-Mc(dilloiigh

10/34—10/45; Tenth Anniversary Edition,” Filel-McFnIloufrh \'iew by Norberg, 68-72 and 85. 65.

“Tenth AnniversaiT

Minutes

Netos, 4—5; Eitel, inter-

falition,” Kitel-Mc(AiUough Nenis, 17-25.

“Marking \ertical Bar (b ids by Machine,” Filel-McFnllough Nnos, March-April 1945, 3-7 in Eitel-Mc(ailloiigh Papers, M 1017, box 2, folder january-jnne 1945,

66.

Stanford Archives and Sj^ecial Collections; “Tenth Anniversary Edition,” McFnllongli Nervs, 18; Eitel, interview' by Norberg, 68 Eitel, interview'

by Norberg, 69.

and

81.

Filel-

312

Xoif.s lo

“Rotai'N'

(is.

43—49

f)j).

Exhaust Mac hine,”

AW/cv,

Eehruary 1945, 5—5 and

“I'he H\'-I ()il-l)iHusi()n Ihiinj),” Eilel-Md'.ullouirh Nnas, Mavylnne 1945,

M

in Kiiel-Me('aillough Pajteis,

Archi\es and Spec Xtni’s, 1

1

7; Eitel,

lerchnan, tape Eitel,

(i9.

intei

ial ('-ollc'ciions; “

intei\ie\v

In'

box

1017,

2,

I4l('l-M((U(H(>ii(rh

Me( aillongh, interxiew by Strotheis and

(i9;

2.

x

iew by Noi berg, 72; Mednllongh, intei

Mc( aillongh, interxiew bv Strothers and

1

lerchnan, tape'

70.

Walsh, “Litton Engineei ing Laboratories.”

71.

On

l4tton Engineei ing

Laboratories”;

— both

1

lolder lannaiy-June 1945, Stanloicl

lenth Anniversaiy Edition,”

Noi beig,

!i-l

15;

Oopelin,

dm ing

Wot Id War

11,

v

ievv

by Not berg, 78;

5.

see Walsh, “Litton Engineering

Engineering Laboratories and

“Litton

Report on

Operations toiA’ear 1942.” “(Contract Oancellations,” Ijlrl-M((4(ll()iig/i Xtivs,

72.

Mc(aillough

Raj)ers,

M

box

1017,

I,

March

11,

1944, in Eitel-

loldei March-Ajiiil 1944, Stanloicl Archixes

and Sjjecial Oollections; Mc'( aillough, “Rost-W'ai Eitel-McOullongh,” EilelM( (Uillotigh XniKs, September 2, 1947, in Eitc'l-MeOnllough Papers, M 1017, box 2, x'olume 5; Litton to Scofield, A|)ril 1, 194.5, Lhaiies Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 1, folder Jaiutarx'-Max’ 1945; Litton to lari ison ('.all, Se|)tenibc'r 27, 1945 and Litton to Scofield, December 18, 194.5 both in ('.harles Litton Pa[)ers, 75/7c, box 11, 1

1

1

—

folder |tine-December 1945.

“The 4-125A

7.5.

in

—A Nexv Poxver

Eitel-McLullongh Papers,

Archixes and .Special

M

l

et

rode,” Eitcl-McCUillou^li Xnv.s, Eebruarx' 1945,

1017,

(’.ollections;

box

101 7,

box

folder Jannary-|mie 1945, Stanford

“Eitel-McLiillongh Impresses

Meeting,” EUcl-MdUiUougli Xnvs, April

M

2,

at

IRE I'echnical

1947, 5-14 in Eilel-Mc('aillongh Papers,

4,

2, x'olmiie 5.

“Address by Paul W'alker; fhe Entnre of Eelecommnnications as Aflecled

74.

War Dexelopments,” Decembe-r

“REL Demonsti ates EM M((]ull()u^h Xncs, Noxember

7.5.

box

2,

X'olume

5;

M((4ill()it(),

series

II,

box

I)(‘(

II,

box

S,

folder

Deeeinher

19,

in

I9.‘^('),

Fiederick

9.

grant involved a complex transaetion by vvbieh Litton gave his rights on

had

certain tube ideas that he

to Sjterrv (ivroseojie. In retni n, Sj)en v gave

.SI

,fHH)

Ferman’s radio engineering |)rogram.

to

On

81.

no

k rcnnaii

3, Ibldei 9.

Terinan I’apers, SC' KiO, series 7'liis

313

‘4^)-57

f>f).

cmiiIkm 19, 19.S(), in

79. Teniian, “(a)innuinicatioM at Stanford,”

80.

U)

Litton’s role in Stanford’s tube jtiograins, see Litton, “\arian Frijts to Lai),”

dale, folder Tubes, technical notes 192(^1938, carton

—

Packard 1995,

7r)/7c;

lished by Mc('.raw-I

13.

Karl Spangenberg’s textbook

among

Helm, Roy Woenne, and Joseph Oordon,” Api versations about tubes, 1945, carton

box

1

1

—

box

194b,

all in

Fitel,

Preisi

1

1;

1;

On

Vacuum

7’;//)c.s

was

pnl)-

Litton, Jack Oopelin, Robert

25, 1945,

il

f

older telejthone con-

Litton to Bnttner, July

1,

194b, folder Jiine-

November 19, 1947, 75/7c; Moore and Woenne,

Litton to F. Phinnev,

(lharles Litton Papers,

Norberg, 10-25.

(Ihaiies Litton Fa|)ers,

in 1948.

lill

82. “Transcript of a tele|)hone conversation

December

1,

folder 194b,

interview by

Fatel-McOnllongh’s venture into klystion engineering, see

interview by Norberg, 90-92; McOnllongh, interview by Norberg, 70-72; 1

992,

1

2-1

3,

1

iV-

1

9, 22.

Chapter 2

box 1, series: Russell \arian, Russell and Sigurd \ arian Pajters, SO 345, Archives and Sj)ecial Oollections, Stanford Lhiiversitv; Hansen, “Statement of W’illiam Hansen,” no date, folder statement of William Hansen, box 19, Falward (iin/.ton Papers, SO330, Archives and Special Oollections, Stanford LhiiversiU’; Sigurd N'arian, hand-written notes on the develoj)ment of the klvstron, no date, in folder 23, box 1, series: Sigurd \ arian, Russell and Sigurd X'arian Papers, S0345, Archives and Special Oollections, 1.

Rn.ssell

\arian to John Mattil,

Aj)ril 18, 1948,

folder

7,

Stanford Lhtiversity; Frederick Tei inan, “Events /Associated with the Invention of the Klystron Tube,” October 20, 1958, folder 12, box Russell

5, series:

Russell \'arian,

and Sigurd \arian Papers, S0345, Archives and Special Oollections,

Stanford Lhiiversilv; (iin/ton 1975; \arian 1983, 171-218. See also

C'.alison et al.

1992; Hevly 1994. 2.

The X'arian

brothers of ten called on Litton for technical advice. For example, in

193b Sigurd \arian consulted him

.several

times regarding his ruling engine pio-

Ject. 3.

“Statement

Examiner

of

William Hansen

of Interferences,” 1945;

States Patent Office Before the

Sigurd X'arian fei

in the Lhiiled Stales Patent Office

in

“Statement

Examiner

Before the

of Russell \'aiian in the L'nited

of Interferences,” 1945;

“Statement

of

the Fhiited States Patent Office Before the Examinei of Inter-

ences,” 1945, b8

—

all in

Sj)ern (ivroscope collection, 1915,

I

lagiey

Museum and

314

Sales

to

5

pf).

7-6

no

(diaries Litton, “Vaiian Trips to Lab,”

I. ihrarv;

7r)/7e, carton

date, (diaries latton l^ipers,

lolder Tubes, Technical Notes, 1926-1938, Banci'olt Library;

1,

Exerson 1974, 137-141. 4.

many

Like

radio engineers on the San Francisco Peninsula, Litton was

extremely interested

in the

new tube

similar ideas in the early 193()s but

—

all

more

the

so since he had played with

had never patented or reduced them

to

practice. 5.

There

is

make

exidence that the Stanford group asked Litton to

a sealed-off kly-

stron at that time. But the group later decided not to go ahead xxath the project.

See Ginzton and folder 12,

box

2,

Caittiell 1995; (iinzton 1975;

II,

to Wilhnr, July 20, 1939,

William Han.sen Papers, SG. 126, Stanford Archives and Sj^ecial

(Collections; Litton to S(C 160, series

Hansen

box

Hugh Jackson, May 4,

22, 1939, in Frederick

Terman

Papers,

folder 16; John Woodyard, interview by Arthur Norherg,

1974 and 1975, Bancrof t Lihraiy 5.

Terman

II,

box

3;

to Willis, Februarx’ 23, 1939, in Frederick

Terman

Papers, S(C 160,

.series

Harold Bnttner, intemexv by Arthur Norherg, FebruaiT 5, 1974, Frederick Terman, interxiexv by Norherg, Charles Susskind, and Roger Hahn, 3,

folder

5;

1974—1978, 61, Stanford Archixes and Special Collections; John Getting, “The Patent Position of Charles \". Litton,” April 21, 1954, in Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

ume 7.

4,

folder Patents

—

Litton.

The

Patent Position of Charles Litton, vol-

1.

Sperry Gyroscope established a xacuum tube shop in San (Carlos to design and

make

sealed-off klystrons.

The shop,

xvhich

employed about

mechanics, redesigned a klystron developed

at

fifteen engineers

and

Stanford for a blind landing system

Spern ’s engineers also xvorked on a nexv sealed-off klystron that could operate at higher frequencies. They completed this design in the fall of 1940. Litton to E. Phinney, October 29, 1939, November 22, 1939, and December all in (Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 11, folder 1912-1939; Litton to 15, 1939 Phinney, JanuaiT 3, 1940 and FehruaiT 2, 1940, Litton to Bnttner, Januarx’ 17, 1940, and RejDort on Dexeloj^ment Program for Month ofjanuaiy 1940 all in Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 1, folder: 1940-1944; Terman to Willis, FehruaiT 23, 1939, in Frederick Tei inan Papers, S(C 160, series 11, box 3, folder 5; Bnttner, interxiexv by Norherg, FehruaiT 5, 1974, Bancroft Lihraiy; Frederick Terman, inteniexv by Norherg, Charles Susskind, and Roger Hahn, 1974-1978, Stanford Aixhixes and Special (Collections. On the San (Carlos shop, see R. Wathen, “The Sperrx' (Company and Research,” March 15, 1944, in Speriy Gyro.scope Papers, 1915, box 37, folder 25, Hagley Museum and Library; Biyant 1990. into a ,sealed-off dexice.

—

—

1

8.

On

Litton’s xvork

on radaiTriodes,

.see

minutes

(Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 2, folder

of ineeting

Tubes

heldjnne 17 [1941],

— txpe L200, L400, L600;

“Meeting on CHFV'acunm Tubes, Noxemher 25''' [1941],” Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 4, folder I miscellaneous; (ilauher 1946.

Notes

“The Patent Position

jolui (Getting,

9.

10.

vohune

f}j).

61— 67

315

of (Hilaries V. Litton,” A|)iil 21, 1954, in

(4iarles Litton Paj^ers, 75/7c, cai ton 4, folder Patents of (4iaiies Litton,

to

—

I

Tton.

he Patent

I

Positioti

1.

now

Federal delegraph was

officially the

Federal

lelephone and Radio

(-oiporation. 1

1.

November

Litton, “Review of \ acnnni Tithe Division,

1943,” (4iaiies Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

15,

1942-Noveinl)er

15,

folder Federal Telegraph, 1942-1943;

3,

Bnttner, interview by Norberg; Jack Mc(aillongh, interview by Norberg, April 15

and

24, 1974, Bancroft Libraiy

12.

Litton,

“The Management Policy ofAacnnm Tube

Division, Federal

Telephone

and Radio (Corporation” [circa 1942]; Litton, “Review of A'acnnm Tube Division, November 15, 1942-November 15, 1943” both in (Charles Litton Papers, 75/ 7c, box 3, folder Federal Telegraph, 1942-1943; Litton to (fertriide Litton, November

—

28, 1943, (Charles Latton Papers, 75/7c, l)ox 11, folder Letters written by Litton,

1940-1944; j. Copelin, “Litton Engineering Laboratories,” April Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 13.

Litton, “Review

1,

ofMicimm Tube

November

Division,

box

3,

New

15,

1942-November

15,

folder Federal Telegraph, 1942-1943;

Communication: 1940-1945, Part

(Corporation, Newark,

Charles

folder Renegotiation.

1943,” (Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, “FClectrical

19, 1944,

lersey,” Electrical

II,

Federal Telephone and Radio

Communication, volume 23, 1946,

221-240. 14.

hox

Litton to Sosthenes Behn, August 20, 1945, in Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, 1

1,

On

folder June-December 1945.

magnetron and elated adar systems, see Buder 1996; (Coupling 1948; (Cirerlac 1987; Boot and Randall 1976. (On the design and production of magnetrons at Feder al Telegr aph dur ing the war, see Vannevar Bush to C. Suits, July 1, 1943, July 1, 1943 and “OSRD Policy with Respect to International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and Its Subsidiaries Including Federal Telephone and Radio Cor por ation for the Ciridance of the (Chiefs of Divisions 13, both in Frederick Terrnan Papers, S(C 160, 14, and 15 of NDRC,” July 1, 1943 ser ies \^, box 3, folder 11, Stanfor d Ar chives and Special (Collections; “Electrical Communication: 1940-1945, Part II, Federal Telephone and Radio (Corporation, Newar k, New Jersey,” Electrical Communication, volume 23, 1946, 221-240; William 15.

the history of the

r

r

i

—

Eitel, “Electr

Tribune, 16.

On

onics Consider ed Pace-Setter in Region’s Development,” Redwood City

December

Japanese adar dur ing World r

meiisures during World

War

II,

I,

box

4,

folder

3; Pr ice

Labor atory,” Mar ch 21, 1946, folder

1;

Harr is

et al. 1978.

War

II,

(Conntv' History

see Partner 1999.

On

Museum.

radar connter-

see “Radio Research Laboratory

NDR(C Review Meeting,” Eebruary ser ies

San Mateo

27, 1962, collection 64—94,

and ABL-15,

21, 1945, Frederick Terrnan Paj^ers, S(C 160,

1984; “Administr ative History of the Radio Research in Fr eder ick Ter

rnan Paper s, S(C 160,

ser ies

1,

box

9,

Notes

31(1

17.

to

f>f).

(iS—7

William (iray to Litton,

folder I'S Na\’al-U/,.

On

May

22, 1944, in (4iarles latton Papers, 75/7c,

see Isaac Rabi, “Meeting with (ieneral Electric,

(’.K,

Schenectady, on March 20, 1944,” March 29, 1944 Papers;

in folder 14,

box

18.

4, series

I,

Perkins and K. Diensi, “Cieneral Electric (>ompany. Speed of

|.

Develojiinent of Electron lubes,” August 10, 1945, in folder 14, box

dVrman

9,

the develo|)ment of continnons-wave magnetrons for elec-

tronic conntermeasnres at

Terman

box

4, series

I,

box

9,

Papers.

William

Litton,

('.ray to

May

22, 1944, in (4iaiies Litton Papers, 75/7c,

Moore, December 27, 1944, in (Charles Litton Pajjers, 75/7c, box 5, folder l.itton Engineering 1944-^Jannary 1945; Litton to .Moore, Jannan’ 2b, 1945, Lhaiies Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 1 1, folder Letters written by Litton, |annary-May 1945; Litton to Ckiptain Hutchins, February 6, 1945, Lharles l.itton Papers, 75/7c, box 111, folder Januai')'-May 1945. folder L^S Naval-Ll/.;

J.

Oopelin to

|.

box 11, folder June-December 1945; Winfield Wagener, “Historical Report,” September 2b, 1945, in ('.harles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 2, folder Tubes Type bJ21 Historical Report; “Win Wagener Retires from WCEMA Leadership,” Varian Associates AL/gr/i/V/c, JanuaiT 1957, Russell and Sigurd \ arian Papers, series: Varian .Associates, box 7, folder 2, Stanfoi d .Archives and Special Collections. 19.

Litton to Behn, Augtist 29, 1945, in ('.harles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

20. Litton to Isaac Rabi,

June

2b, 1943, Charles Litton Papers, 75c/7c,

in

11,

1940-1944; Wagener, “Historical Report,”

folder Letters written by Litton,

Sej)tember 2b, 1945,

box

Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

b|21 Historical Report; Litton Engineering Laboratories,

2,

folder Tubes Type

“Development of 1000

Watt Tunable Magnetron for S Band,” September 30, 1945, in Charles Litton 1000 watt tunable magnetron; Litton to A. Papers, 75/7c, carton 2, folder Tube.s

—

November

Turner,

8,

1945, (Aiarles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

11, folder

June-

Decembt'r 1945.

Wagener, “Historical Report,” September 2b, 1945, in Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 2, folder Tubes Type bJ21 Historical Report; Litton

21. Winfield

Engineei'ing Laboratories, “Development of 1000 Watt Tunable Magnetron for S

Band,” September 30, 1945, in (Aiarles L.itton Papers, 75/7c, carton 2, foldei' 1000 watt tunable magnetron; L.itton to .A. Turner, November 8, 1945, Pubes

—

Charles 22.

R.

l.itton Papers,

75/7c, box

1

1,

Morris to Phinney, December

folder

June-December 1945.

18, 1944, (diaries L.itton

Papers, 75/7c,

box

Moore to Litton, .March 1, 1945, in Charles Litton Pajiers, 75/7c, box 9, folder ()SRD/NDR(k Wagener, “Historical Report”; “W'in Wagener Retires horn W(]E.MA L.eadership,” Varian Associates A January 1957, Russell and Sigind \ arian Papers, series: X'arian Associates, bo.x 7, folder 2, 3,

folder Federal Telegraph;

.Stanford Archives

J.

and Special

23.

Wagener, “Development

24.

Copelin

box

5,

(

of

aillections.

1000 Watt Tunable Magnetron for S Band,” 1-9.

Bureau of .Ships, januan’ 19, 1945, (diaries L.itton Papers, 75/7c, folder Litton Engineering 1944— Januan 1945; J. ('.ordon to US Nan; .August to

Notes

21, 1945

and Seplcinber

10, 1945, in ('-haiies

IJnon

to

71-75

ffj).

75/7c, box

Pa|)(‘r.s,

5,

Litton Pai^rineei ing, Angnst-Septeniber 1945; “()SRI)-\''ri)L Minutes,” Api

May

1944— 1945; Ciordon to 75/7c, box

Minutes,

Army Air P'orce, November

Papers, SL. IbO, series

December

I,

box

of

box

13,

OSRl)

14,

12, folder Letters written

t

folder

24 and

il

DC; ininnles

V'l

1945, (diaries Litton Papers, t

RRL,”

July 15, 1945,

folder 17.

11, 1945, (4iarles Litton Pa|)ers,

Kngineering, miscellaneous; Litton to Albei Pajxu's,

10, (older

folder Jnne-December 1945; “Progress Re|),

Ted

4’aylor,

box

box

5,

San Carlos, California,”

folder Litton Engineering 1947-1968.

interview by Lecuyer, January 24, 1996, Februan’ 12, 1996,

and April

1996, Mai ch 29, 199(),

Litton to L. Bedell,

December 24,

18, 1996.

1947, (4iarles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

1

1,

fdkler Letters written bv Litton, 1947. 47.

Ibid.;

Mortimer, “Tiip to Litton Industries, San (drlos, California,” July

1951, C.barles Litton Papers, 48.

Moore

to Office

box

5,

19,

folder Litton Engineering 1947-1968.

of Air Regional Representative, December 23, 1952, C.harles

Litton Paj)ers, 75/7c, carton

1,

folder Litton Papers.

and recorded detailed information on each of them during the manufacturing process. Litton to (irantham, Februan 18, 1952, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton, 49.

Litton Industries also serialized

its

tul)es

Januan-April 1952; Moore to Oflice of Air Regional Rejiresentative, December 23, 1952, in Charles latton Papers, 75/7c, carton 1, folder Litton Papers; Moore, ’’(^ualitv C.ontrol in

Power Vacuum Tube Manufacture,” November

(diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

1,

5,

1953,

folder Litton Industries; Mortimer, “Trip

San Carlos, (dilifornia,”Jnly folder Litton Engineering 1947-1968.

to Litton Industries,

box

18,

19, 1951, (diaries

Litton Papers,

50. Litton, “Notice” [circa 1950], in (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton

1,

folder

Litton Engineering Bulletin Board Notices. 51. Litton to (irantham,

August

folder Letters written bv Litton,

Home

on

7,

May-November

Redwood Cdty Mateo (d)unty Histoiy Mirseum. a Hilltop,”

— both

in

'Dibuue,

box

12,

1952; Marian ('.oodnian, “Litton’s

May

9, 19()3,

collection 74-423, San

1952 and Litton to (irantham, December 29, (diaries Litton Papers, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton, May-

52. Litton to (irantham, June

1952

1952, (diaries Litton Pajiers, 75/7c,

Deceniber 1952; Litton

to

1

1,

(irantham, Februan' 25, 1953, (diai

les

Litton Papers,

320

Xotes fo

75/7c, liox

f)l).

12, loldei Letters written

Magnetron

4J5()

75/7c, carton

June

S3— SO

1,

— Contract

by Litton, January-August 1953; “Type

Sunnnary,”

tblcler l.itton Industries

1953, (diaries lattoji Papers,

miscellaneous; Litton to Admiral Fox,

75/7c, box

10, 1953, (-harles l>itton Papers,

Litton,

A]3ril 23,

JAN

12,

folder Letters written by

Januan-Angust 1953; Moore and Woenne, interview by Norberg.

53. L.itton to National Security Industrial Association,

Metzger, April 16, 1953, Litton to Reed, June 1953, Litton to Fox, June 10, 1953

—

all in

2,

March

3,

1953, Litton to E.

1953, Litton to Cirantham, June 8,

Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box

folder Letters written by Litton, January-August 1953; C. Fox to Litton, June 1953, in (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, to

David Combs, October

5,

2,

folder L^S Navy Department; Litton

Moore and Woenne,

box

13,

folder

inter\iew by Norberg.

1952 and Litton to Joseph Rand, May 23, both in (diaries Idtton Papers, 75/7c, box I^, folder Letters written by

54. Litton to (h

—

9,

1966, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c,

Letters written by Litton, 196(^1971;

1952

box

12,

antham, August

7,

May-November 1952; Litton to Albert Ja.son, June 23, 1953, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton, January-August 1953; Litton to R. Fuchs, December 17, 1953, Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 12, folder Letters written bv Litton September-December 1953; Litton to Alphonse Dalton, Sejiteniber 27, 1954, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/ 7c, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton, September-December 1954. Litton,

Februair 25, 1953, in (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton January-August 1953; Frederick Ternian to Harold Laun, November 5, 1953, in Frederick Ternian Papers, S(- 160, series V,

55. Litton to (»ranthani,

box 6, folder 13, Ai chives and Special (Wllections, Stanford Woenne, interview’ by Norberg. 56. Litton to (xiiiibs, Pajiers,

75/7c, box

57. Litton to hies

October

5,

1966,

Combs, October

13, folder Letters written

Mahon, May

2,

University;

5,

Moore and

1966, Charles Litton

by Litton, 196(^1971.

1957, Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c, carton 13,

Idlder Letters written by Litton 1957; Lay 1969; B\'rne 1993;

Rodengen 2000.

Dennis Robinson, “Visit to Nathan Levin’s Office, September 10, 1957,” in Dennis Robinson Papers, M(H81, box 5, folder July-December 1957, MIT Aichives and Special (dillections; Tex Thornton to Litton, March 26, 1954, (diaries Litton Pajiers, 75/7c, box 9, folder (diaries Thornton; Lav 1969; B\’rne 1993; Rodengen 2000; .Myrl Stearns, interMew by Lecuyer, June 13, 1996. 58.

59.

Litton to (iranthani.

May 5,

1954, (diaries Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

12, folder

box 12; Litton to Dalton, Sejiteniber 27, 1954, Litton to (irantham, October 6, 1954, and Litton to R. luggins, December 30, 1954 all in (’diaries Idtton Pajiers, box 12, folder Letters written by Litton, Sejitember-Deceniber 1954; Marian (ioodman, “Litton’s Home on a Hilltoji,” lit'dxiHxxl (lily I'ribnne, May 9, 1963, in collection 74-423, San Mateo l.etters

written

by Litton, January-August

—

1

Count)’ History

Museum.

1954,

Noh's

Moore, interview by Norberg,

(iO.

28.

See also Litton

1954, (Ibarles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

Sej)tenibei-I)eceinber 1954;

W illiam

Terman

Paj)ers, S('

rei

inan to

series \\ 1k)x 7,

1(')0,

Collections; Litton to Thornton, FebruaiA

box

13,

f

12,

okler 7,

to

J)f).

H7~94

to (irantbain,

Oetolxa

(

Cooley, Aj)i

5,

il

5,

1955

Stanf ord At ( hives

in

Frerka

61. Litton to 12,

Herman

7,

Kiithe,

Mahon, May 1

3,

2,

1957,

fokler Letters writ-

Terman

folder 8, Stanford Archiyesand Sjjecial Collections.

March

5,

box Radio

1954, in (4iarles Litton Paj^ers, 75/7c,

folder Letters written by Litton, January-August 1954; “Litton, Aircraft

Merger

k

and Special

ten by Litton, 1957; 4'ennan to William ('-ooley, June 5, 19bl in Fredei ick

box

ic

195(L in (4iarles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

(Charles Litton Paj)ers, Charles Litton Paj^ers, 75/7c, carton

\',

(i,

fokler LetttMs wiittcMi by Litton

folder Letters written by Litton, 195(>; Litton to Ines

Papers, S(^ 160, series

32!

OK

Pending Holder A|)proyal,” ilrclrouic Nnvs, October 14, 1957, 3; “Litton, Monroe (Calculating Agree to Merger Terms,” Electrouic Nnos, October 21, 1957, 7; Rodengen 2000; Ted Taylor, interview by Lc'cuyer, February 12, March (i, and March 29, 1996. 62. Jay Last to parents, Last; 63.

no date (probably

early February 1961

),

courtesy

of'

Jay

Rodengen 2000, 30-33.

Litton to (Combs,

October

5,

1966, (Charles Litton Papers, 75/7c,

box

13, fokler

Letters written by Litton, 1966-1971. 64.

In the early 1960s, Litton was

on the board

of

Huggins Laboratories. See

“W’atkins-Johnson Ac(]uires (Control of Santa (Cruz Firm,” Palo Alto limes, FebruaiT 28, 1963, collection of

(C.

LTcuyer.

Chapter 3

1.

Sj3eech bv undersecretary of

No\’ember 1957 2.

On Edward

commerce Robert Williams re|)roduced

in

the

issue of Varifui Associates Magazine.

Cinzton’s family background, see (iinzton and

Ciinzton, interview bv

Sharon Mercer,

M0708, Archives and

Sj)ecial (Collections,

1-9, \'arian Associates Oral

Stanford

Lhiiversitv.

background, see Myrl Stearns, inteniew by Sharon Mercei, 1-10,

(Cottrell

1995;

Histon Project,

On

Myii Stearns'

\'arian Associates

Oral Histon’ Project, M()7()8, A] chiv(^s and Special (Collections, Stanford Lhiiversity;

communication from Mvrl 3.

Stearns, June 13, 1996.

Ernest Harrison, “The Mi.ssion of the Temple,” I'emple Artisan, ]u\\ 1908, 22-25,

25, Bancroft Library. 4.

“Temj)le

Home

Association Notes,” I'emple Artisan, ]u\y 1907, 36, Bancroft

LibraiT. 5.

As the community ran into substantial financial

diiriculties,

it

gradually intro-

duced a modicum of private enterprise in its economic activities in the 1910s. “ Fhe Temple Home Association. Report and Message of the President Read at Last .Annual Meeting,” I'emple Artisan, August 1911, 198-201; “The Femple Home

322

Xoirs

to

W-96

f)f).

May 1918, .881—832, both at the hancroft Lihrary. See Koran example ol john Xaiian’s socialist writings, see John

Association,” I'emfAc Artisou,

nine 1981, 1988. \'ai ian, “A Letter on Socialism,” also

remf)l(‘

Artison,

Angnst 1908,

48-.50.

7.

On

h.

the gronj)’s

j)olitical

outlook, see (iin/.ton and

1988, 6.5-78, 14(>-150, 284—285;

(>)ttrell 199.5,

commnnication from

.Stearns,

jnne

71-72; X'arian 18, 1996.

and 18.5-l(i8; Dorothy Marian, “Kxcerpts from RH\’ letters while employed hy Hnmltle Oil,” Rii.ssell and .Sigurd Varian Paj)ers, .S0845, series: Russell \’arian, box 2, Ibldei 7, Archives and .Sj)ecial (.ollections, Stanford Lhii\’ersitv. On Philo Farnsworth’s lelevision Laboratory, see Lverson 1949 and Farnsworth 1989. On ('.in/ton’s and Stearns’ studies at .Stanford, see (iinzton and X’arian 1988, (x5-95

(’ottrell 1995, ()7-(i9; (iin/.ton,

McMahon,

interview hy Mercer, 9-1

1;

(iinzton, interview

h)'

IFFE hstoiT Oenter; .Stt'arns, interview hy Mercer, 10-12. On Frederick Terman’s electronics program in the 1980s, see Frederick Terman, inteniew hy Artluir 1.. Norherg, (4iaiies .Snsskind, and Roger lahn, 1984, Archives and Special (-ollections, Stanford Lhiiversity; Leslie 1998, 4()-51; Leslie and Hevly Michal

1984,

I

I

1985; Gillmor 2005.

\arian 1988, 9(^185;

8.

11,

SC345,

series:

“Don .Snow

Retires,” \arian AssorialKs Magazine, April 1961,

\arian Associates, box

box

and Hansen

2,

Hansen Papers,

S(' 126,

to L.

folder

Hansen

6,

Archives and .Special

Ray Wilbur, July 20, 19.89, Applegate, folder 18, box 2, both in William

Collections, Stanford Lhiiversity; William

folder 12,

7,

to

Archives and .Special Collections, .Stanford University;

and Sigurd X'arian Papers, .S(345, series: Russell \ai ian, box 1, folder 9, Archives and Special (aillections, Stanford Lhiiversity; Marvin ('.hodorow, inter\iew by Sharon Mercer, 1989, 7-9, \arian Associates Oral Historv Project, M0708, Archi\'es and Sjiecial Collections, .S ta n f b rd Lh \'e rs Russell Vbrian to Richard Jenkins, Ajiril 9, 1958, Russell

i

i

i

t\’.

10. 9.

i

\arian and \brian 1989; Russell \arian to John Mattil, April

and Sigurd \arian Papers,

box

18, 1948, Russell

Hansen, “Statement of William Hansen,” no date, Fdward Cinzton Papers, .SC880, box 19, folder statement of William Hansen; Sigtird Varian, hand-written notes on the development of the klystron, no dale, Russell and .Sigurd X'arian Papers, .S(’.845, series: .Sigurd \arian, box 1, folder 28; Fredei ick 4'erman, “Events Associated with the Invention of the Klystron 4\ibe,” October 20, 1958, Russell and .Sigurd \arian Papers, .S(7845, series: Rii.ssell \'arian, box .5, folder 12; (anzton 1975; \brian 198.8, 171-218. See afso ('.alison et al. 1992; Hevly 1994. .SC 845, series: Russell \ai ian,

and (a)tlrell 1995; Hansen to Wilbur, July 12(), box 2, folder 12, Stanfoicl Archives and

(iinzton

Papers, .SC

1,

folder

7;

20, 19.89, William

Hansen

.Sj)ecial (Collections;

Bloch

1952.

Fhe klystron department of the .S|)erry (ivi'osco|)e (Companv was small in the immediate |)ostwar period. It sold $15.8,00() worth of klvstions in 194(x 44ie.se sales grew to .$294,819 in 1947 and .|47(),94 in 1948. Ciinzton and (Cottrell 1995,81-86; 1

1.

1

(iinzton, interview by Mercer, 18-27; (iinzton, interview bv lleniA'

Lowood, Peter

Notes

and Bruce

(ialison,

November 12.

On

Hevly, February

3,

to

f)p.

96-99

323

1988, 2-5; Steams, interview by Lecuyer,

25, 1996; Varian 1983, 221-233.

microwave radar during the war, see (inerlac 1987 and Bnderi 1996.

“The Sperry C'.ompany and Research,” March 15, 1944, Sperry (iyroscope collection, 1915, box 37, folder 25, Hagley Museum and Libraiy; Sperr)’ Ciyroscope, “Klystrons and Accessories,” 1946, Speri'y (iyroscope collection, 1915, box 5, Hagley Mnsenm and LibraiT; Ciinzlon, interview by Henry Lowood, Peter (ialison, and Brnce Hevlv, FebrnaiT 3, 1988, 2-5; ('.bodorow, interview by Mercer, 13.

R. VVathen,

8-9; Steams, inter\iew by Mercer, 20-25; Steams, interview by Lecnyer,

November

25, 1996.

Wathen, “The Sperry Company and Research,” March 15, 1944, Sperry Cyroscope collection, 1915, box 37, folder 25, Hagley Mnsenm and Libraiy; Sperr\' Gyroscope, “Klystrons and Accessories,” 1946, Sperry Gyroscope collection, 1915, box 5; Ginzton, interxiew by Mercer, 22-23; Ginzton, interview by Henrv Lowood, Peter Galison, and Brnce Hevly, February 3, 1988, 2-5; Chodorow, interview by 14.

R.

Mercer, 8-9; Steams, interview by Mercer, 20-25; Stearns, interview by Lecnyer,

November 15.

On

25, 1996.

the reverse migration of western engineers, see Arnold Wihtol, interview

by Lecnyer, March 5 and March

8,

1996.

On

the group’s interest in returning to

230-233 and 237-238; Ginzton and Cottrell 1995, 92-93; Stearns, interview by Mercer, 25; commnnication from Stearns, June 13, California, see \’arian 1983,

1

996.

16. .

.

.

(4iodorow, interview by Mercer, 46. See also Russell

A New

Bom,” Papers, SC

Indnstn’

and Sigurd

\ arian

Is

\ arian,

“Ten Years Later

September 1958, Russell Associates, box 7, folder 4.

Varian Associates Magazine,

345, series: \'arian

James Luck, November 5, 1946, Russell and Sigurd Papers, SC 345, series: Russell Varian, box 1, folder 6. 17.

Russell \ arian to

18.

Ginzton, interview by Mercer, 27.

On

\ arian

the group’s “business plan,” see

(ihodorow, inter\iew by Mercer, 42-47; Stearns, inter\'iew by Mercer, 24—26. 19.

Ginzton, interxiew by Mercer, 30.

20. Russell \’arian, “Outline of Talk before Shareholders’ Meeting,”

1951, Russell

and Sigurd

\’arian Papers, series: Russell X’arian,

box

December

3,

41, folder 28,

sc: 345.

21. Ginzton, interxiew by Mercer, 85. Russell \'arian, the

most radical

member of

and

agricnltnral

the group, went as far as promoting the formation ol an industrial

comnnme 22.

centered around the nexv firm.

Rnssell Varian,

“Company

Philosophy, Clompany Objectives,

Management

Functions” [circa 1953], Edxvard Ginzton Papers, SC330, box 3, folder \hrian Associates. On the General Radio C’.ompany, see Thiessen 1965 and Sinclair 1965.

324

23.

Notes

X'ai iau, “

to

pf).

Icn

99—102

Wars

Lalca,” 10.

24. “X'ai ian.s of Klv.stron

1948, new.spaper

Fame

c'li|)ping,s

up

to Set

Lai^ in

San

Claiios,” Palo Alto

V'/we.v,

July

2,

collection, folder \'anan As.sociates, Palo .\lto Hi.stoi ical

Association. 25.

On

et al.

the Microwave Laboratory, see Han.sen’s accelerator jjroject,

1992; Bloch 1952; Leslie 1992.

On Terman’s support

McMahon,

(hn/.ton, interview hv Michael

1984,

of the

IEEE History

.see (iali.son

new venture,

see

('.enter.

26. Stearns, inter\iew hy Mercer, 39. 27. Stearns, C'.inzton,

X'arian Associates.

and the \hrians did not

As a

result,

they

owned

get founders’ stock

when

they started

a relatively small share of the company’s

stock.

godoetween between Stearns and the X^arian brothers

28. (iin/.ton also acted as a

who had

a

profound

distrust of professional

managers and worried

that Stearns

would take control of the company. On X^arian’s ownership policies, “Stock Option Agreement,” November 30, 1948, Russell and Signrd Varian Papers, SC’ 345, series: X'arian Associates, box 5, folder 1; Rn.ssell X'arian, “Report on Stock Policies,” May 27, 1952, Russell and Signrd X'arian Papers, SC'. 345, series: X'arian .Associates, box 1

5,

folder

1

1;

Rn.ssell X'arian,

Stock,” circa 1952,

“Ideas C'oncerning X'arian Associates’ Policy in Sale of

Edward Ciinzton Papers,

SC’.

330,

box

8,

folder 1948

—organiza-

minutes of executive committee. May 25, 1949; Rn.ssell X’arian, “To the Shareholders of X'arian Associates,” ."Xpril 6, 1950, both in Edward (iinzton Papers, SC'. 330/95-179, box 17, volume 2; X'arian 1983, 25.5-256. On stock tion of X'arian .Associates;

subscriptions, see “X/irian Associates, onr Cirowth,”

Signrd X'arian Papers, SC^ 345,

series: X'arian .Associates,

29. Stearns, inter\ iew by Mercer, 27.

summer

May

On

box

17, 1951, Russell 3,

and

folder 17.

Stearns’ tour of government laboratories

meeting of board of directors of X'arian .As.sociates, September 27, 1948, Edward Oinzton Papers, SC^l 330/95-179, box 17, N'olnme 2. Eor the brochure sent by X'arian to military agencies, see “History, Personnel, and Plant Eacilities of Varian Associates,” 1948 and “X'arian Associates, Microwave Engineering,” 1948 both in Ricssell and Signrd X'arian Papers, SC'. 345, series: X'arian A.s.sociaie.s, box 3, folder 13. in the

of 1948, see

minutes

of special

—

30.

The

gi'onp also solicited contracts to develop Doppler radars

and

traveling-

wave tubes from the Air Eorce and the Naval Research Laboratory. See Russell X'arian to Airborne Instruments Laboratorv, July 22, 1948 and Russell X'arian to P. Hagan, SejJtember 30, 1948 both in Rn.ssell and Signrd X'arian Papers, SC'. 345, series: X'arian A.s.sociate.s, box 2, folder 1 1.

—

31.

Lhodorow, interview by Mercer,

17.

meeting of board of directors of X'arian Associates, .Septembei 27, 1948, Edwai cl Ciinzton Paj3er.s, SC' 330, box 17, volume 2, .Archives and Special Connections, Stanford University; X'arian, “Ten X'ears Later”; Uhodorow, inter\’iew l)y Mercer 1989, 16-18; ('»inzt(3n, i!iter\iew by Mercei. 32.

Minutes

of

special

Noirs

to

f)f).

)2— 107

325

I(

33. Ciinzton, iiittM'view by Mercer, 32.

seems

Irom most lari^e Kasi (>)ast firms because of its technical difficulties and its low overhead (7%). In the late 194()s and the eaiiv 195()s, \arian received $1,492,638 from DOFl. and the National Bureau of Standards for this contract. Minutes of Special meeting of board of directors of' V'arian Associates, Se|)tember 27, 1948, Kdward (iinzton Papers, S(- 339/9.5 179, box 17, volume 2; \'arian, “Ten Years Later,” in Varian

34. Thi.s conlracl

to

have attracted

interest

little

September 19.58, series: \'arian Associates, S(/34.5, box 7, folder 4; (4iodorow, interview

Associates, Varian Associatrs Ma^azi}i345, series:

volume

18,

17, 1958,

(iin/.ton Papers,

6;

box 4, folder 26; Emmet ('.amerou to Malter, July 17, 1958; Maher to Stearns, September 12, 1958; Malter to Stearns, September 18, 1958 all in Russell and Sigurd \^ariau Papers, S(7345, series: \uriau Associates, box 3, folder 1; Malter to Stearns Jauuar)' 7, 1959 and Robert Jepseu to Malter, May 21, 1959 both in Russell and Sigurd Variau Papers, S(7345, series: Variau Associates, box 3, folder 2; Malter to Myrl Stearns, July 9, 1958, in Russell and Sigurd \ariau Pajiers, SC-345, series: X'ariau Associates, box 3, folder 1; “Dr. Malter to Head \acuum Products Clroup,” Variau Associates Magazine, January 1959, 8;

X'ariau Associates,

—

—

“Management

Profiles:

On

Paul Emerson, “Idtek Makes Big Strides in Field,” Palo Alto Times,

L'ltek, see

February

1,

1963,

4,

28. “\arian \'aclon

Lou

Malter,”

aria n Associates Magazine, ]u\y 1965, 10-11.

collection of C7 Lecuyer.

Pumps and High \acuum

Associates Records, 73/65c, carton

High-Vacuum

\

3,

Accessories,” circa 1960, \arian folder catalogs, Bancroft labrary; “2 More

March

Firsts!” Solid-State Journal,

1961, 49;

“The \4icuum Products

May 1961, (5-8; “Ever Lose a Vacuum? This New Black Box from \'arian Finds \ acuum Leaks without Expensive Down Time,” Solid-State journal, FebruaiT 1962; “New \ acuum Flange Developed,” Varian Associates Magazine, May 1962, 7; “Vacuum Products Division,” Varian Associates MagDi\ision,” Varian Associates Magazine,

azine,

September 1964, 7-9; “The \'acuum Products

Division,” Varian Associates

May 19(51, (5-8; “Off the Shelf Ultra-High X'acuum Systems,” Solid-State journal. May 1961, 47; “An Exceptional New Vacuum System,” Varian Associates Magazine, December 1961, 13; “\7icuum Products DiMsion,” Va nan Associates MagaMagazine,

!

September 1964,

zine,

7-9.

“The Vacuum Products

May 19(51, (5-8; “Off the Shelf! Ultra-High Vacuum Systems,” Solid-State journal. May 19(51, 47; “-Vn Exceptional New Vacuum System,” Varian Associates Magazine, December 19(51, 13; 29.

Di\'ision,” Varian Associated Magazine,

“X'acuum Products Dixision,” Mirian 30. Malter to series: \'arian

Associates Magazine,

September

19(54, 7-9.

CAmeron, May 25, 1959, Russell and Sigurd \^arian Papers, -SC 7345, -Associates, box 3, folder 4; “The Vacuum Products Division,” Varian

Associates Magazine, -May 19(51, 6-8; “Off the Shelf! L4tra-High

\hcuum

Systems,”

May 19(51, 47; “An Exceptional New \iicuum System,” Varian Associates Magazine, December 19(51, 13; “V'acuum Products Division,” Varian AssoSolid-State journal.

ciates

Magazine, September

February 31.

On

7,

board

19,

-Aj)ril

23, 199(5,

7-9; \5ctor Orinich, interview by Lecuyer,

and May

14, 199(5.

the e\’olution of Vaiian’s sales, see minutes of board of directors,

November of

1996,

19(54,

17, 19(50, in

Oin/ton Papers,

S(!33()

95-179, box

18,

volume

9;

minutes

Edward Oinztt)!! Papers, SC!33() 95-179, box see Paul Emerson, “fhtek Makes Big Strides in Field,”

of directors, July 25, 19(5(5,

\()lume

15.

On

Ultek,

Palo Alto Times, February

1,

19(53, 4;

“Ultek Outs

it

C!lose,” Palo Alto Times, Januar\’

22, 1964; “Ultek Receives SL-VU- (Contract,” Palo Alto 77wc,s,JanuaiT 27, 19(54; “l’ltek (iets

Ewo S|)ace

(Contracts,” Palo Alto YVwc.v,

June

24, 19(56; “Increase in Sales

IS6—I92

Nolf's lo pf}.

Reported by Ldtek,” Palo Alto Lecuyer. ()u the use of

August

Piuies,

\acuum

9, 19(>()

—

347

collc'ction of

all in llu“

(i.

teclinologies iu the seiuieonductor industry, see

32.

Waits 1997, 105. 33. F'or a histoiT of Stanford’s medical linear accelerator, see

flevama and Lecuyer

(in press).

On

NMR business, see

Lenoir and l.ecnyer; Lenoir 1997, 239-294; Bloch 1940; Bloch et al. 1940; Bloch, “History of the Invention of Nuclear Induction by Bloch and Haitsen,” June 1959, in 90-099, box 15, folder 1, Stanford X'arian’s

Archives and Special (collections; Bloch and Hansen, “Method and Means for 34.

(diemical Analysis by Nuclear Induction,” jjatent 2,501,489, filed

“On Use

December

23,

Nuclear Induction for (3iemical Analysis,” July 23, 1940, and entn for August 10, 1940 in his “Research Notebook,” \ arian Papers, S(c 345, series: Russell Varian, box 3, folder 8. 1940, issued Jnlv 24, 1951; Russell \arian,

of

35.

Arnold et al. 1951; Elliott Lcevinthal, “Memorandum,” January 22, 1951, Edward Oinzton Papers, SC- 330, box 3, folder \^arian Associates; Shoolen 1993. John Onllen, “ASP Pricing,” January 17, 1901; Emery Rogers, “Report for both in Marian Associates Records, Instrument Division,” January 18, 1901 73/05c, box 4, folder Minutes Board of Directors 1901, Bancrof Library; “The \'arian A-00 NMR Spectrometer as an Instrument and a Technical Achievement,” Februan 27, 1901, \ arian Associates Records, 73/05c, box 4, folder Promotional

—

t

Materials; Shoolen' 1993. 30.

“Instrument Field Engineering Story:

ments,

”

.Airport,”

New

\

aria n Assoeiales Magazine,

”

Augusi 1903,

1

How

2-1

4;

Opens Applications

Facility at Pittsburgh

Shoolery 1993.

\arian Sells Electronic Instru-

Varian Associates Magazine, February 1957, 4—5; “Fourth

shop,” Varian Associates Magazine, Presented at Varian

’s

Phird

Annual

Paramagnetic Resona)ice, held 38.

Instrument Division

“Instrument Field Engineering Story:

ments,

X’arian Sells Electronic Instru-

Varian Associatf's Magazine, Februan' 1957, 4—5; “\ 'arian

Laboratory and Service (kmter:

37.

How

November

1900, 8-9;

NMR-EPR Work-

NMR Spectroscop's: Papers

Workshof) on Nuclear Magnetic Resonance

at Palo Alto, (California

and Rlectron

(Pergamon, 1900).

Rogers, “Report for Instrument Division,” February

15,

1901: “Repoi

t

for

“Report for Instrument Division,” June 15, 1901: “Report for Instrument Division,” July 27, 1901; “Rej)ort for Instrument all in \'arian A.ssociates Records, 73/05c, box 4, Division,” September 20, 1901

Instrument Division,”

Aj)ril 20, 1901:

—

folder Minutes Board of Directors 1901; “The July 1902, 4—0; 5;

Meiboom

“New

1903;

NMR Sj^ectrometers,”

Uommittee

1

lR-100,” Varian Associates Magazine,

Varian Associates Magazine,

for the Survey of ('.hemistry, National

Science National Re.search (k)uncil,

(Chemist)-y:

Opportunities

May

1904,

.Academy

and Needs

of

(19(75).

Maker, “Vacuum Research (’.orpo ration,” November 30, 19()4, Fdwaid (iin/ton Papers, S( .330/95-1 79, box 19, volume 13; “Dedication of Portland Plant,” Varian Associates Magazine, June 1900, 8-9; minutes of regular meeting of board of direc-

39.

tors,

December

22, 1904,

Edward

Ciinzton Papers,

SU330

9.5-179,

box

19,

volume

39S

Xoli'.s lo

13; niinules

ff/).

192-195

of regulai' meeting ol board ol directors, February 24, 1966, Edward

(iin/.ton Papers, S(;33()

95-179, box

19,

volume

15;

Emmet

(Cameron, intemew by

Mercer, October 1989.

Edward Ciinzton Papers, S(] 330, box 14A, folder Shareholders’ Sj^eech 2-15-68; Hanw Weaver to Ciinzton, July 17, 1969, Edward (iinzton Papers, S(> 330, box 3, folder personal correspondence; 40. Shareholders’ meeting,

February

15,

1968,

(iinzton, interview by Mercer; Stearns, interview by Mercer.

and Instruments, Annual Refxnt for 1963, 18-20; Fairchild C'.amera and Instruments, Annual Rrforl for 1964, 18-20; Moore and Davis 2001, 18-21, Stanford Ihiiversity; Sporck 2001; Sporck, interview by Rob Walker, February 21, 2000, Silicon (ienesis, M 0741, box 2, Archives and Special C’.ollections, Stanford University; communication from Sporck, July 8, 2002; communication from Thomas Bay, March 16, 1999; Pierre Lamond, interview by 41.

Fairchild (7unera

Lecuyer, August 12, 1997. 42.

For a more detailed treatment

of Fairchild

Semiconductor’s move to the com-

mei cial markets, see Lecuyer 1999a,b; Fairchild Semiconductor, A Solid Stale of Process, ca. 1978, Technical Reports and Progress Reports, Ml 055, box 4, folder 9, Archives and Special Uollections, Stanford Ehiiversity; Herbert Kleinman, interview with Robert Novee, November 18, 1965, Herbert Kleinman collection, M827, Archives and Special ('collections, Stanford University. Don Yost, interview by l.ecuyer, August 12, 1997; \7ctor Cirinich, interview by Lecuyer, Eebruaiw 7, 1996; Reed 19(')2; Martinez 1973. 43.

By “commercial computers”

weapon

1

mean computers

that

were not part of larger

.systems.

44. Marshall (7)x, interview by Lecuyer,

October

Uamera and Instruments, Annual

25, 1^)96.

W. ^Allard, “Product Line Historv (control Data EDP Systems, ’’July 21, 1980, Charles Babbage Institute; Fhomton 1970; Thornton 1980; Flamm 1988; MacKenzie and Elzen 199(k (4)x, interview by Lecuyer, October 25, 1996; Floyd Kvamme, interview by Lecuyer, September 25, 1996; Lamond, interviews by Lecuyer, November 17, 1995, 48. December 6, 1995, and cAugust 12, 1997. On computer packaging in the 1960s, see Harper 1969; Staller 1965. 45.

f'airchild

Report for 1962, 20; R.

Camera and Instruments, Annual Report for 1963, 19; Lecuyer, July 2, 1996; Lamond, inteniew by Lecuyer, November 7, 6, 1995, and August 12, 1997. 46. Fairchild

Bay, interview by

1995,

December

and (irinich, “RK4) Progre.ss Report,” December 12, 1961, Technical Reports and Progre.ss Reports, M 1055, box 6, folder 9, cAj chives and Special Collections, .Stanford Universitv; Moore, interview by Ross Bassett and Lecuyer, Lebruarv 18, 1997; (irinich, interview by Lecuyer, February 7 and April 23, 1996; Jack

47. .Moore

(iifford, interview

by Lecuyer,July 23, 1996; Bay, interview bv Lecuver, July

Bay, interview, July 2, 1996.

2,

1996.

Nolrs

l(>

f)f).

195—200

349

49.

Bay 1961; (iiliord, interview, July 23, 1996; (]()x, interview, Oc tober Kvanime, interview by Lecuyer, September 25 and October 10, 1996; Bay,

2.6,

1996;

inlei

view

50.

by Lecuyer, July

2,

1996.

John Hulnie, inter\iew by Lecuyer, March 18, 1997 and May 7, 1997; Moore, inteniew, Februan 18, 1997. “Application Engineering Personnel,” 1964, courtesy of John Hulme. 51. 53.

Hulme,

interview,

March

18,

1997

("ommnnications from Hulme, January intei'Mew, March 18, 1997 and May 7, 1997.

52.

13,

1997 and

Aj:)i'il

8,

1999;

Hulme,

Data sheets for the 2N709 and the 2N2368, Fairchild folder, computer

Babbage Institute; Moore and (irinich, “R&:D Progre.ss Report,” April 13, 1962, box 7, folder 3; Moore and Cirinich, “RK:l) Progress Report,” May 11, 1962, box 7, folder 4; Moore, “R^'D Progress Report,” July 6, 1962, box 7, folder 6; Moore and Grinich, “Rix-D Progress Report.” April 13, 1962, box 7, f older 4; Moore, “R&D Progress Report,” August 9, 1962, box 7, folder 5; Moore, “Research and Development Progress Report for 1962,” January 24, 1963, box 7, folder 6; Progress report. Device development section, July 1, 1962, 54. box 7, folder 5 all in Technical Reports and Progress Reports, M 1055; Fairchild ('.amera and Instruments, Annual Rrporl for 1964, 20; “Dr. Noyce Presentation to F('4,” December 1964, Photographic Files of Steve Allen, 91-167, box 1963-1964, Archives and Special Collections, Stanford Lhiiversity; Bay, interxiew, July 2, 1996; Hulme, interxiew, March 18 and May 7, 1997; communication from Hulme, April 8, 1999; Lamond, interxiexv, November 17, 1995, December 6, 1995, and August 12, 1997; Roger Smullen, interxiexv by Lecuyer, May 12, 1996.

ephemera

collection,

CBI

12, C4iarles

—

“Fairchild Semiconductor,”

1967,

Ephemera

Stanford Unixersitx Lai n Bhiser, “A Transistor Stereo ;

collection, Jackson Library,

FM

Multiplex Adapter,”

.\I’P-

March 1962, in Fairchild Semiconductor, Product Catalo^r^ 1962, courtesy ofJay Last; Kvamme, interxiexv, September 25 and October 10, 1996; Hulme, interxiexv, March 18 and May 7, 1997; Kvamme, interxiexv, September 25 and October 10,

44,

1996. 55.

Hulme, intemexv. May

56.

MacDougall 1967; Jay

7,

1997

Last, “Visit to C.ontinental Dexices

Hulme, 1997; communication from Hulme, January

Noxember

28, 1966, courtesy of Jay Last;

SejJtember 25, 1996; Gifford, 57.

Kxamme,

interxiexv,

interxiexv, 13,

1997;

— Hong

Kong,”

March 18 and May

Kxamme,

7,

interxiexv,

interxiexv, July 23, 1996.

October

10, 1997.

and Instruments, Annual Report for 1963, 19; Progress Reports, Application Engineeiing, August 1, 1961, box 6, folder 6; August 31, 1961, box 6, folder 7; Sej)tember 30, 1961, box 6, folder 8; October 31, 1961, box 6, all in Technical Reports and Progress Reports, M 1055; Richard Lane, folder 8 “A Svnchronously Tuned 60 M(^ I.F. Amplifier with A.C'».C7,” APP-26, circa 1961 in

58. Fairchild G.amera

—

,

3^0

i\'()lr.s

to

200—206

PI).

Faircliild SciniroiKliu lor, I^oduct (Mlaloa;, 19()2, courtesy of Jay Last; “All Transistcir

I'W’ L(’(i(hom\ 199();

1

courtesy of Michael Brozda; (a)x, interview, October 25,

19(L2,

fall

March

Inline, interview,

^bst, interview,

October

10, 1997;

12, 1997; Bay, interview, July 2, 199(>.

59. For later price cuts, see 5()-59; (iox, interview,

Kvannne, interview, October

18, 1997;

“Mannfactnrers Outlook,” EDN, volnnie

October

1

1

,

July

196(i,

25, 1990.

Spoick 2001; Sporck, interview by Rob Walker, February 21, 2000, Silicon (ienesis, M 0741, box 2, Stanford Archives and Special C>ollections. (>().

(il.

Fngene

and jnne (72.

15,

Kleiner, inter\iew by (ihristojDhe Lecnyer,

10, 1998.

Sj)orck 2001; Sj:)orck, interview.

and December

1995,

Sporck, interview. (i4.

Noyce

“Dr.

1990, June 5, 1990,

May21,

(7

May

May

15, 1995;

Lamond,

inter\’iew,

November

1995. 15, 1995;

talk to F(-l,”

Smnllen, interview. May

photographic

files of

12, 1990.

Steve Allen, 91-107, box:

May 21, 1990 Jnne 5, Smnllen, internew. May

190‘1-1904; Reithard 1907; Kleiner, inteniews.

May

1990,

and June

12, 1990.

10,

1998; Sj)orck, interview.

05.

“Inrning a Science into an Industry, an Interview with Dr. Robert Noyce, a

15, 1995;

5'onng Scientist-Fxecntive of the Integrated Circuits Industry,” IEEE Spectrum, Jannarv 1900: 99-102, 101; “Reliabilitv 475,” Fairchild Semiconductor folder, com-

puter e|)hemera collection, (4M

Charles Babbage Institute; Yost, interview,

12,

Angnst 12 and September 23, 1997; Smnllen, interview. May 12, 1990. For a more detailed treatment of Fairchild’s process-engineering efforLs, see Lecnyer 1999a, b.

Noyce

00. “Dr.

talk to F('4,”

|)hotographic

of Steve Allen, 91-107, box:

files

1903-1904; Vbst, interview, Angnst 12 and September 23, 1997. 07.

Julius

M

Reports, 15, 1995;

Blank

Noyce, January

to

box

1055,

7,

0;

Last, “\isit to

May

70.

(4ien 1971; Sporck 2001; Sporck, interview, .May

15, 1995.

Continental Devices

tesy of Jay Last; .Stone, interview,

20, 1990;

Technical Reports and Progress

Blank, interview by Lecnyer, June 20, 1990.

08. Sporck, interview. 09.

folder

15, 1903,

.Y[)ril

communication from Fred

MacDongall 1907;

— Hong Kong,” November 28, 1900, cour-

21, 1995; Blank, interview by Lecnyer, Jnne

Bialek,

Angnst

20, 1997.

Last, “\isit to (a)ntinental Devices

communication from

— Ffong Kong”;

Bay, inter-

October 2, 1997; Yost, interview, .\ngnst 12 and .Sejttember 23, 1997. On early work at Fairchild on plastic packages, s(‘e Moore to Noyce, Jannaiy 8, 1900, box 5, foldei' 3; Moore and Cirinich, “R^-D view, July 2, 1990;

Progress Report,” Angnst .Sev

in

tion, Fee

Jannarv

I,

1

1,

1901, l)ox 0, folder

1900, Febrnarv'

hnical Reports

Bay,

1,

1900,

and Progress Reports,

March

M

7; 1,

10.55,

Progress Reports, Cdiemistry 1900,

box

5,

and

.Aj^ril

folder

1.

1,

1900

—

all

Notes

to

71. (-hen 1971; “Fairchild Seinicoiuliictor,” Solid-State Desi^rn^

Fairchild (-aniera 21,

and

Instrnnients,

May

1995; Sporck, interview.

November

9,

1995,

Ana an I

November

351

7

St'plemher 19h4,

4?e,

Report pir lWi4; Stone, interview, April

1995; Laniond, interviews by Feciiyer,

15,

17, 1995,

207-21

pf).

December

h,

and

1995,

Anirust 12, 1997.

Chapter 6 5.

Bob Lindsey, “Minnscnlar Miracles Boom Huge Payrolls" San jose Meirun, no date [circa 1.

2.

On

Electronics; Little Things

1965] courtesy of ,

Don

Making

Liddie.

the marketing of the micrologic family, see Robert (irabam, “Micrologic

sales situation,”

December

1,

1961, courtesy of Jay Last.

Moore, “Approximate Distribution Forecast," January

1 inte-

grated circuits, see Last “Research Meeting,” Febrnan’

19(52;

Bioposal for

US .Army

.Monmouth “High Efficiency transistor structures,” “Microcircuitry,” October 19(52; Last to Michael Wolff,

signal snpj)ly agency, P'ort

March 5, 19(52; Last, December 7, 19(52; Last, “Integrated “.Management Meeting,” April 28,

“OMKC Sales

—

19(5(5

all

annual

19(53

—

all

27. Last, 9,

(C.

(Craighead, April

On

other hybrid

Ko/metsky and

to

18,

“Logic (Comparison,” April 28,

lUledvne, annual re])ort for 2(5, 19(53,

the cardiac monitor, see

10, 19(53.

.Aj:)ril

19(53; 19(54;

to Date,”

rej)ort for 19(52;

On

19(53; Last,

Broduction,”

June 19(55; Jim Battey, “The Transistor Business,” December courtesy ofjay Last; “OMKC,” SoHd-sia((’ 19(54, (5(5; Teledyne,

25. Last to 2(5.

(Circuits in

l.ast to

courtesy of jay Last.

Richard

circuits, see Last to

Battey, .August

2(5,

19(53.

(C.

19(53; Last,

.Allen, .August 9, 19(52

(Ciaighead,

“R^D

27, 19(53;

19(53; Last

Income,” December 27,

courtesy of Jay Last. (Communication from Jay Last,

“R^4) Income,” December

.Aj)ril 2(5,

and June

.Aj)ril 9,

communication from

2002.

Jay Last, .April

2002.

28.

.A.

Aharez, “Brogram Blau and Schedule for

fll

1X-(CBU Mechanization Study,”

.August 15, 19(53; Teck Wilson to (5eoige Kozmetsky,

September

18, 19(53;

Koz-

Kozmetsky to Wilson, Se|)tember 27, 19(53; Wilson, “H-H(X) .Microelectronics Summary,” September 30, 19(53; Kozmetsky, “.Mountain \'iew\'isit by .Meggs Brearley, Bu Weaps,” October 1(5, 19(53; Leledyne, Annual Report foi 19(53; Last to Battey, December 13, 19(53; “.Making Big Waves melsky

to Wilson,

Sej)tember

19, 19(53;

Notes

35~f

to

pp.

226—230

widi Small Fish,” Business Week, 29. “Teleclvne Operational Amplifier

December

Oompanies,”

1907; Miller 1964a, 79;

30,

Aut^iist 3, 1967,

“Packaging of Integrated (arcnits,” February

Last,

Memorandum, October

5,

1964; Last to Battey,

limited partners, Angnst

3,

1964; Miller

L.ast,

courtesy of Jay Last.

12,

1964;

Isy

Haas,

June 2, 1964; Davis and Rock to 1964b, 79 and 81; “Avionics (^rder Nears

November 16, 1964, 37-38; Teledyne, annual report for 1965; Last to Battey, “IHAS Carcnits,” February 9, 1965; Battey, “IHAS Program,” .Aj^ril 2, 1965; Last, “Long Term Cioals for Amelco Semiconductor,” April 27, 1965; for Telcdvne,” Electronies,

Mr. Madland,” LSI without LSD,” Electronic Products, Angnst 1967, 10

“Making Big state

\Va\'es with

Small Fish,” Business Week,

of Amelco’s processing capabilities

December

in early 1964, see

and

30, 1967.

On

April

1,

and Rock

September

1963; courtesy ofjay Last; Minutes,

32.

management meeting,

Minutes,

1963

ing, Aj^ril 29,

31.

to limited partners,

Last.

1962; KozmeLsky to Hoerni,

6,

management meeting,

April 17, 1963;

April 25, 1963; Minutes, sale.s-prodiiction meet-

—courtesy ofjay

Last.

On sales of Amelco products, see Teledyne, annual

report for 1962; Teledyne,

annual report for 1963; “OMIC^ sales,” April 1963-^Jnne 1965, courtesy ofjay Amelco, “Device Analysis, 1964,” courtesy ofjay Last. Alli.son,

December 33.

interview by Leciiyer,

14,

the

Haas, “Microcircuit

Design Rules and Production Techniques,” circa May 1964, courtesy ofJay 30. Davis

113;

June

Last;

23, 2000; James, interview by Lecnyer,

2000.

James, cited

in

“The New Shape of Electronics,” Business

Week, April 14, 1962.

semiconductor processing equipment in order to reduce its expenses. On proce.ssing equipment, see Allison, interview by Lecnyer, June 23, 2000; James, interview by Lecnyer, December 14, 2000; Kiittner, interview by Lecnyer, October 13 and 14, 2000. For Yelverton’s and Baker’s backgrounds, see Signetics, “Facilities and ^capabilities Report” [circa 1962], courtesy of David 34. Signetics leased

4

Allison; Yelverton, interview by Lecnyer,

Lecnyer,

December

35. T. Pitts,

December

18,

2000; Baker, interview by

15, 2000.

“Production Report,”

May 8,

1962, courtesy of Onille Baker; Signetics,

and (capabilities Report,” probably September 1962, courtesy of David James 1962; Kiittner, interview by Lecnyer, October 13 and 14, 2000; interview by Lecnyer, June 23, 2000; James, interview by Lecnyer,

“Facilities

Allison; .Allison,

December 36.

On

14,

2000; Baker, interview by Lecnyer,

Signetics’

early

orientation

December

toward custom

15,

2000.

circuits,

see

Signetics

Loiporation, “0)ncej)t,” 1961, courtesy of Don Liddie; press release, no date, cour-

“The New Shape of Electronics,” Signetics advertisement in Proceedings of the I PE, Electronic Daily, and Electronic News, March 1962, courtesy of Orville Baker; (cunningham & Walsh; “Signetics Integrated Carcuits Seminar,” spring 1963, 59 and 74; Kattner, “Signetics Histoiy”; James, inteniew by Lecnyer, December 14, 2000; Baker, interview by l.tVuyer, December 15, 2000; .\lli.son, interte.sy

of Lionel Kiittner;

view by Lecnyer, June 23, 2000.

Notes

37. Signetics, F'acilities

and

('-apal)ilities

of l)a\id Allison.

38.

Texas Instruments had introduced a lamily earlier.

230—236

f)f).

Report, pr()baf)ly September

lesy

months

to

RTL

of

19()2,

355

coui-

integrated ciicnits a few

RTl. and l)(TL circuits are closely related.

39. Signetics, “Facilities

and

no

(^aj^abilities Rej^ort,”

date, probably Sej)tember

December 14, December 15, 2000;

1962, courtesy of Lionel Kattner; Baker, autobiographical note,

2000; Kattner, “Signetics Histoiy”; Baker, interview by Lecnyer, Allison, interview bv Lecnyer, June 23, 2000. 40.

On

the development of the

Electrc:)nics

Company Unveils

24; Signetics, “Facilities

and

first

Its First

DTL

family

Product,”

and

.SV/??

(Capabilities Report,”

tesy of Lionel Ki^ttner; Signetics, Press release,

related processes, see

jose Mercury, Febriian’ 27, 1962,

probably September 1962, cour-

December

19, 1963,

Lionel KiUtner; Signetics, “Process Specifications,” February Lionel Kiittner; “A Big Industn That Thinks Small,” Coririug

courtesy of

Don

December

15,

41.

5,

courtesy of

1964, courtesy of

Gaffer-,

March

21, 1967,

Liddie; Kiittner, “Signetics Histoiy”; Baker, inter\iew by Lecnyer,

2000; Allison, interview by Lecnyer, June 23, 2000.

(iraham and Shnldiner 2001, 271-274; Lay 1969, 146; James, interview by

December

Lecnyer,

\’elverton, inter\iew

42.

“New

14,

2000; Allison, interview by Lecnyer, June 23, 2000;

by L.ecnyer, December

“Agreement between C>orning

Stockholders,”

November

19,

Glass,

18,

2000.

Lehman

Brothers, and the other

Graham and

1962, courtesy of Lionel Kiittner;

Shnldiner 2001, 271-274; Baker, autobiographical note, December 14, 2000, conrtesv of Orville Baker; Yelverton, inteniew by Lecnyer, December 18, 2000; Kiittner, interview by Lecnyer, October 13 and 14, 2000; James, interview by Lecnyer,

December

14,

2000; Baker, interview by Lecnyer,

December

15, 2000.

For Signetics’ sales literature, see Mark Weissenstern and Robert Beeson, “CxmstrainLs in Designing Integrated Gircnits,” Electronic Design, February 15, 1963; Signetics, “Spring Seminar,” 1963, courtesy of Lionel Kiittner. On preFEBs and variFEBs, see “Signetics variFEBs,” Jannary 1963; “Signetics preEEBs,” Jannaiy all cour1963; “Signetics Integrated (arcnits: Gondensed ('.atalog,” March 1963 43.

—

tesy of Orville Baker; Joseph

2000

Van Poppelen, interview by Lecnyer, December

6,

.

44.

Van Poppelen, interview by Lecnyer, December

45.

James, inter\'iew by Lecnyer, December

46. “Signetics Receives 15, 1963.

On

Army Contract

14,

6,

2000.

2000.

for Integrated C.ircnits,” Electronic Neies,]u\\

early attitudes regarding integrated circuits, see

(amningham

N-

Walsh, “Signetics Integrated (arcnits Seminar,” spring 1963, courtesy of Lionel Kiittner; Baker, interview by Lecnyer, December 15, 2000; Yelverton, interview by Lecnyer,

December

18,

the use of Fairchild’s 1

996, 2000.

2000; James, interview by Lecnver,

D(TL circuits

December

14,

2000.

On

by the Instrumentation LaboratoiT, see Hall

356

Notes

to

f)f).

236-240

47. edited in Bridges 1963,

31-32

48.

Kleinian 19()6; Tneker 1968,

tesy

of Lionel Ivittner.

1

1-18; Signelics, “Spring Seminar,” 1963, eoiir-

might have also benefited from the fact that TI and Fairchild concentrated their effort on the large contracts they had received from Autonetics and 49. Signetics

the Instrumentation Laboratory respectively. 50. Allison, interview by Lecuyer,

Lecnyer,

December

6,

June

23,

2000; Liddie, inter\'iew

Van Poppelen, interview by by Lecuyer, December 6, 2001.

20()();

(iraham and Shuldiner 2001 271-274; .\llison, interview by Lecuyer,June 23, 2000; \ an Poppelen, inter\iew by Lecnyer, December 6, 2001 Liddie, interview by

51.

,

;

Lecuyer,

December

Kiittner, interview

6,

December

2001; James, interview by Lecuyer,

bv Lecuyer, October 13 and

14,

52. “Signetics Starts Expansion,” Electronic News,

14,

2000;

2000.

November

14, 1963, 36; “Signetics

$5 Million Complex in Sunnvvale, Calif.” Electronic News, ]'c\nw’ 6, 1964, box 9, brown folder; March 3, 1964, box 9, folder 2; April ;Jime 3, 1964, box 10, folder 1, 1964, box 9, folder 3; May 5, 1964, box 10, folder 2; June 30, box 10, folder 3; November 3, 1964, box 1 1, folder 1; Angiist 7, 1964, box 10, folder 4; September 2, 1964, box 10, folder 6; October 1, 1964, box 10, folder 6 all in Technical Reports and Progress Reports, M 1055. See also Progress Reports, De\'ice Development Section, July 1, 1964, box 10, folder 3; August 1, 1964, box 10, folder 4; September 1, 1964, box 10, folder 5 in Fairchild Semiconductor Papers, 88-095. On the redesign of the package from a single to a dual in-line configuration, see Progress Reports, Digital Systems Research Department, November 3, 1964, box 11, folder 1; December 2, 1964, box 11, folder l;JanuaiT 4, 1965, box 1 1, folder 2; Progress Reports, Device Development Section, November 1964, box 10, folder 7; December 1, 1964, box 1 1, folder all in Technical Reports and Progress Reports, January 1965, box 1, folder 2 M 1055. For a more detailed treatment of the development of the dual in-line package, see Lecuyer 1999a,b. 69. For early

in

1

1

—

1

1

70.

On

1

,

—

1

,

the adoption of the dual in-line, see

1968; “Microelectronics Cioes Commercial,”

Kvamme and

EDN,

Bieler 1966; Rogers

vol. 11, July 1966.

Camera and Instruments, Annual Report for 1964, 20; Kvamme, inter\iew by Lecuyer, September 25, 1996 and October 10, 1996; Lamond, inter\iew by 71. Fairchild

Lecuyer, October 23, 2001. 72.

C.ommunication from John Hulme, June

73.

Robert Widlar, “Biasing Scheme Especially Suited/or Integrated Circuits,”

patent 3,364,434 filed April

19, 1965,

granted Januan

Current Source for Integrated Carcuits,” granted May

16, 1967;

(iifford, inter\iew

74.

The 709 had

75.

US sales

25, 2003.

US

16, 1968;

US

Widlar, “Low-\'aIue

patent 3,320,439 filed

communication from John Hulme, June

May

26, 1965,

25, 2003;

Jack

by Lecuyer, July 23, 1996. 14 transistors

and 14

resistors.

of linear circuits grew from $6 million in 1964 to $31 million in 1966

(communication from John Hulme, June 25, 2003; Jack Gifford, interview by Lecuyer, July 23, 1996). For a contemporan discussion of the linear circuit business, see

Leeds 1967.

76. “W'hat

1965,

1

-Made a High Flier Take Off

18-122. Jim Riley, Signetics’

at

Top Speed,”

Business Week,

new general manager,

October

30,

re-orierited Signetics

toward the commercial business. To penetrate the commercial market, Allison and

Baker developed a new family of DTL circuits, the 600 series. Signetics also adopted Fairchild’s dual in-line package. In order to lower its production costs and meet the pi ice requirements of commercial users, Signetics set up a plant in South Korea in 1966.

Notes

77.

“H-P

“Ids:

Aclixity in ICls Stirs Speculalion,” /'7/Y7ro//?V-7V«m, July

New (ieneration

!()

250-260

f)f).

1965;

.5,

of Mightx^ Midgets,” Measure, july I9()7, 2-5;

359

Pamey

Band

19()7;

et al. 19()7;

O’Brien and McMains 1967; Rotsky 1988. 78.

Linvill et al. 1964; Pritchard 1968; Linxill,

September

25, 1972, in Frederick

Terman

“Notes for (Conversation with FKl',”

Papers, S(C 160, series XI\', box

1

1,

and Hogan 1977; Linvill, interview by Lecnyer, Aj)ril 25 and May 30, 2002; communication from Jacques Beaudoin, December 7, 1995; communication from Linvill, August 21, 2002. On the solid-state electronics program al folder

Linxill

1;

Stanford, see Lecuver 2005.

Chapter 7

1

.

2.

For accounts of Intel, see

Ba.ssetl

2002; Berlin 2001b;

Moore

1994;

Moore

This entrepreneurial flowering was not exclusive to the Peninsula.

1996a.

New

inte-

grated circuit firms sprung up in other parts of the countiy For example, a group of

Texas Instruments engineers formed Mostek.

cuit firms

IBM spawned

a few integrated cir-

such as SEMI and CCogar Corporation. General Instruments spun off

MOS Tecbnologv'.

But most of the

new corporations entering

the semiconductor

industiT located in the Santa Clara Valley. 3. [ 1

Jean Hoei

ni,

“Proposal for Custom Integrated (Circuit Organization,” no date

966] courtesy of Jack Yelverton. ,

Thomas Bay and other

and marketing managers at Fairchild invested Data General, a spinoff of Digital Equipment (Corporation. A sales manager Fairchild also became Data (ieneral’s first marketing manager.

4.

.sales

in

at

Kenney and Florida 2000; Eugene Kleiner, interview by Lecuyer, May 21, 1996, June 5, 1996, and June 16, 1998; Sheldon Roberts, interview by Lecuyer, July 6, 1996; Marshall (Cox, interview by Lecuyer, October 25, 1996.

5.

6.

John Hulme, telephone conversation, June

“Molectro (4pens

New Plant,

25, 2003.

L>ab in Santa Clara,” Palo Alto Times,

collection of (C. Lecuyer; “Santa (Clara Firm Acquired by

Palo Alto Times, ]u\y 26, 1965, collection of As.sets,”

Circuits

(C.

Only from Molectro,”

Solid-state Design,

September 1964,

August

16, 1963,

East (Coast,”

Lecuyer; “NS(C A.ssumes Molectro

Solid-state Desi^s^h

1964, 74; “Molectro

Molectro, see

(Company on

Palo Alto Times, August 8, 1966, collection of (C. Lecuyer;

Solid-state Desist, July

On

“New

Digital

Logic

1964, 59; “Molectro (Corp.”

Announces RTL Integrated

(Circuits,”

39.

Lamond had an option for 1,()()() shares. Roger Smullen had an option for 50 shares. “What Made a High Flier Take off at Top S|jeed,” Business Week, October 7.

and 120; Prospectus “Fairchild (Camera and Inslmments,” June 7, 1966, ephemera collection, Jackson Libran, Stanford Lnixersity; Hoefler 1968a; Sporck 2001; Sporck, interview by Lecuyer, May 15, 1995; Lamond, interview by Lecuyer, November 9, 1995, November 17, 1995, December 6, 1995, and August 12, 1997, October 23, 2001; Roger Smullen, interview by Lecuyer, May 12, 1996; 30, 1965,

1

18

360

Notes to

260—267

f)f).

Floyd Kvaniiiie, interview by Leciiyer, September 25, 1996 and October 10, 1996; Rogei' Borovov, interview by Lecnyer, Jnne 14, 1996 8.

and October

Sporck 2001; Sporck, inter\iew by Lecnyer; Lamond,

23, 1996.

inter\'iew by Lecnyer.

Sporck 2001; Kvannne 2000; National Semiconductor Corporation, “Proxy Statement for the Annual Meeting of Stockholders to be Held on September 24, 1971,” August 20, 1971, ephemera collection, JacLson Libraiw; Sporck, inteniew

9.

bv Lecnyer; Lamond, interview by Lecnyer; Regis McKenna, interview by Lecnyer, Ross Bassett, and Henry L.owood, Jannan’ 29, 1996. 10.

On

the impact of Sporck’s de[Dartiire at Fairchild, see Borovoy, interview by

Lecnyer; Joseph \7m Poppelen, inter\'iew by Lecnyer,

December

6,

2001.

On

and 1968, see “Reshaping Fairchild,” LJ/cr/ro/t/Vs, July 24, 1967, 44; “Cioing Down,” Electronics, October 30, 1967, 46; “FCN'I Resigns; Earnings Plummet,” Electronic Nexus, October 23, 1967, 3; “Fast Footwork in an Indiistrv Talent Hunt,” Business Week, March 11, 1967; \4ctor McElheny, “Dis.sati.sfaction as a Spur to Career,” Nein York Times, December 15, 1976; Fairchild Semiconductor’s growing dilficnlties in 1967

Thomas 11.

Bay,

There were

“cooked 12.

its

books”

no

Bassett,

Moore

On

October

Electronics,

1996.

Moore

30, 1967, 46;

Museum; Ciordon Moore,

18, 1997;

1996a; Noyce, inter-

and Ross

interview by Lecnyer

Nelson Stone, interview by Lecnyer, April 21, 1995.

1996a; Noyce, interview,

Lecnyer and Ross 14.

in

date, Intel

EebrnaiT

2,

rumors in the business press that Eairchild Ckimera had 1965 and 1966. See articles cited in previous note.

also

“Going Down,”

view,

13.

interCew by Lecnyer, July

no

date, Intel

Museum; Moore,

interview by

Ba,ssett.

and managers, see Hoefier Week, October 5, 1968, 10(i-108,

the ma.ssive hirings of Motorola engineers

1968b; “The Eight That Fairchild Won,” Business

112-115. 15.

On

the Ibrmation of Intersil, see Hoerni “Proposal for

no date 1966), courtesy of Jack Velverton; “Dr. jean Hoerni Semiconductor Company,” Palo Alto Times, August 3, 1967, collection

Circuit Organization,”

Starting

Own

(

of (7 Lecnyer; “Ht)erni:

May

21, 1973,

interview

l)y

September

Custom Integrated

1

and

8;

From

the

.\lj)s

Hoerni, interview by Lecnyer, February

Lecnyer, September

16,

2003.

to the Mesas,” Electronic Engineering Times,

On

the

first

5,

4,

1996;John

Hall,

2003; Luc Bauer, interview by Lecnyer,

quartz watch, see

“IC.

Time,”

Electronics,

March

6,

1967, 357; Forrer 1969. 16.

Fields 1969a, 129-130, 132,

view by Lecnyer, .May 17.

On

transfer

and

137;

Murray 1972; Sporck 2001; Sporck,

inter-

15, 1995.

problems

at Fairchild, see Bassett

2002; Berlin 2001a;

Moore

1996a,b. 18.

Kvamme

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Cuidance

Donald Mackenzie,

Knou>i}ig Machines: Essays on leclurical

Donald Mackenzie, Mechanizing Proof Computing,

Maggie Mort, Building Knoxeh’dge, and Machines Nelly

Trident Netxeork:

the

Ondshoorn and Trevor

of Users

and

A

Risk,

Change

and

Trust

Study of the Enrolmeyd of People,

Pinch, editors, Hoxo Users Matter: The Co-Construction

Technologies

Paul Rosen, Eraming Production: Technology, Culture, and Change in the British Bixycle Industry

Susanne

k.

Schmidt and Raymund Werle, Coordinating

Technology: Studies in the

Intx'rnational Standardization of Telecommunications

(-haris

Thompson, Making

Parents: Ihe Ontological Choreography oj Reproductive

lechnology

Dominique In novation

\'inck, editor. Everyday Engineering:

An

Ethnography

of Design

and

1

Index

Airborne Instruments LaboratoiT,

73,

89, 102 ,

117,

122, 123, 140, 141, 149, 156, 165, 75,

Warning System,

122, 123, 175

Air Force, 71-74, 77, 79, 86, 101

1

Ballistic Missile Early

235

Bank of America, 40, 85 Bay, Thomas, 140, 141, 148,

161,

192-196, 200, 214, 240, 261

Allison, David, 139, 142, 154, 158, 212,

213, 217-220, 228-242, 251

Amelco Semiconductor,

1

1,

212, 213,

Beckman, Ai nold, 132-135 Bell Telephone Laboratories,

10, 22,

27, 66, 76, 79, 80, 88, 97, 129-134,

216, 217, 220-230, 237-239, 242,

142, 143, 150, 153, 159, 160, 164,

248-252, 255, 263, 269

221, 255, 279

American Micro Systems, 263, 264,

Bialek, Fred, 260,

267

Blank, Julius, 128, 131-134, 143, 262

280, 292

American Telephone and Telegraph,

BMEWS.

137

18, 20, 24, 25,

Apple ('omputer,

1

,

Bloch, Felix, 100, 187, 188 Ballistic Missile Early

Warning System

302, 303

Aj)j)lications notes, 148,

.SVc

197-200, 207,

244, 249, 271, 299

Bradshaw, Harrison, 32, 40 Buttner, Harold, 60-63

Apollo program, 181, 185, 235, 236

Arms

race,

1 1

7,

296

Calculators, 87, 199, 257, 263,

Army, 38, 39, 71, Signal Corps

77, 235. See also

Ash,' Roy, 84, 85,

88

273-276, 279, 286, 288, 291, 302 C'alifornia Institute of Technologv’,

Atomic bomb, 102-104, 110, Atomic Energ\ Cx^mmission,

131, 188 1

1

1,

225

185, 190,

.S>c

American Telephone and

125, 174, 176

Autonetics, 149, 150, 153, 159-161,

Avionics, 78, 109, 140, 148, 149, 155,

236

Baker, Orville, 220, 229-232, 237, 241

Baldwin, Edward, 140, 153

104,

1

10-1 13

Christensen, (4ayton, 21

235

156, 159, 165, 215, 225, 226,

Cxaitre Electronique Hoiioger, 277, 278

(diodorow, Marvin, 76,93, 100, 102,

Telegraph 165,

113, 114, 121, 124,

Carter, John, 137, 215, 257, 259-261

191

AT^T.

Cameron, Emmet,

C.leanliness, in

manufacturing, 50, 63,

70, 75, 80, 81, 89, 92, 114, 115, 146,

147,204 (^lean rooms, 115, Clevite, 84, 227

1

l(k 143,

147

3SS

Index

(l()nij)lcnu'ntary (-()ni|:)uters,

MOS,

Eaggin, Federico, 279, 286, 289

278, 279

Fairchild, Shei nian, 137, 140, 142,

87, 140-142, 148,

261, 262

193-195, 224, 225, 235, 245, 249,

Fairchild (camera

274, 276, 282-285, 288, 291, 303 ('.onglonierates, 84-87, 192, 215, 228,

and Instrument,

137-140, 164, 166, 173,215,216, 220, 257-262

259 C'-onlrol

Data (corporation, 193, 194,

246 Cx)rning Cilass Works, 233, 234, 237-243

Fairchild Semiconductor, 8-1

128-130, 135-165, 169-174, 180,

197, 240,

25, 26, 137, 212,

185, 192-208, 212-215, 223, 229,

235-269, 272-275, 279, 280,

("orporatisni, 40, 41, 163, 265, 299,

300

Coyle, Allred, 135, 136, 216

284-289, 292, 297-303 Farnsworth, Philo, 55, 57

85-88

(a'aj)uchettes, Paul, 75, 78,

Federal Communications

Cray, Seymour, 193, 194

Commi.ssion, 47, 107, 193 Federal Telegraph Company,

and Rock, 166-169, 220 Davis, Thomas, 166-169 Department of Commerce, 18, 31 Department ol Defense, 5, 7, 10, 77, Davis

89, 92, 101, 108, 109, 118, 119, 122, 1

23, 127-1 29,

1

39,

1

1

40,

1

69- 1 80,

16,

22-30, 34, 43, 45, 60-67, 73, 74, 84, 86, 95,

1

Ferguson,

13 Phil, 239,

240

Flatpack, 245, 246

Ford Motor Company, 1, 199, 201 Frequency modulation, 13, 47, 48, 198

207, 212, 216, 222, 226, 235, 236,

251,283,295,296 Department of Justice,

General Accounting Office, 123, 175 General Electric, 3, 13, 20, 24-26,

179, 180

Diamond Ordnance Fuse

Laboratoiy,

92, 102, 103, 108, 110, 114, 142

31-34, 45-48, 53, 6(^74, 77, 79, 84, 92, 96, 97, 102, 107, 108, 113, 119,

Discipline, in manufacturing, 81, 115,

125, 127, 173, 177, 178, 195,

200-202, '246

147, 160, 163

Steamship Company, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 42 Dual indine package, 213, 246, 247, 251

Dollai'

General Micro Electronics, 240, 241, 256, 263, 264, 273, 275 Cieneral Radio, 82, 99 (iinzton,

Fimac.

.SVc

Eitel-McCnllough Inc.

Fitel-McCaillongh Inc., 8-14, 32-50, 1

10-1 14,

1

19-128, 136, 169, 170,

174, 175, 178-180,

1

182,297-299

William, 14-19, 22-50, 92,

13,

1

19, 120, 174, 178,

294-297 Electro Dymunics 88.

175-182, 186-188, 191, 293 Glass bk)wers, 25, 28, 95

171

Eitel,

75, 76, 89-104,

109-113, 116, 117, 121-125, 170,

Eisenhower administration, 91, 117,

91,

Edward,

.S>c r//,vo

1

12,

208,

Glass lathes, 28-35, 42, 45, 59, 63, 72, 73, 76, 78, 84, 86, 100

Gold doping, 154 Government Committee on Operations of the Senate, Gi ady,

(a)i

poralion, 84—85,

Ei

1

16

ank, 146, 147, 154, 164

(h inich, \5ctor, 131-134, 148

Latton Industries

Electroglas, 166, 221,

Electronics hobbyists, 302, 303 Epitaxy, 203, 240,

229 1,

6, 7, 18, 38,

Haas,

Isy,

155, 158, 213, 217, 221, 224,

226, 239

Haggerty, Patrick, 156, 219

280

Halcvon communitv', 56, 93, 94

,

3H9

hi (lex

Hall, John, 276,

278

221-225, 229-232, 23f)-243,

Hall, Lewis, 121, 182, 183

Hall-Scott

24(i-251

Motor Lar (7)nipany,

Hansen, William, 56-60,

14, 15

75, 95, 96,

100, 101, 187, 188

Hayden Slone

261

,

262, 268-270,

274-279, 282-286, 289, 291 284, ,

286. See also Mici'oprocessors

Integrated Helicopter Avionics

Lompany, 135-138,

166,215,216

System, 225-228, 248 Intel,

Heintz, Ralph, 23, 26, 27, 30

Heinlz and Kanfman

,

8-12, 252,

264, 279-291

2.53,

.302, .303

International Business Machines, 137,

Inc., 16, 20,

23-32, 35, 36, 42-49, 55, 59, 68, 95,

140-149, 194, 196, 220,

96, 107

240, 248, 273, 274, 282, 291

Hewletld'ackard,

5, 50, 100, 109, 110,

124, 129, 142, 163, 175, 180, 208,

229, 250, 260, 273, 285, 302

and

Telegra|)h, 23-27, 30, 50, 54, .59-62,

36,242

I.

Hewlett, William, 50, 72, 250

Hodgson, Richard,

International Telephone

2.30, 2.39,

Intersil,

137, 140, 142, 257,

1

1

,

284-293,

12, 252, 263, 264, 27(3-279, .303

261, 262

Hoerni, Jean, 131-134, 142-145,

James, David, 212, 217-220, 229,

150-156, 166, 212-217, 220-228,

2.32-237,242,251

251-254, 262-265, 273, 27(^279,

Jobs, Steve, 1,302, .303

286, 289, 292

Hogan,

Lester, 262, 269, 284,

Honeycomb

grid, 105-107,

1

286

217-220, 229,

12

Honewell, 225, 235, 248, 274, 282

Hong Kong,

170, 199, 204-208, 241,

272 Huggins Laboratories, 89, 174

Hughes

Aircraft, 78, 79, 84—87,

12,

129, 139, 140,

196, 198,

237, 2.39,

218

Eugene, 131-135,

142,

1.38,

1(30, 1(3(3, 1(37,

201,

202, 21(3, 217, 2(32

Kleiner Perkins,

1(37,

Klv'stron, 10, 50,

54— (31,

202, 2.58 (34,

(3(3,

78, 79,

91,92,9.5-97, 104, 107-112,

146, 153, 154, 165

Hulme, john,

Kilby, Jack, 15(3,

143, 14(3, 147, 1

2.33, 2.34,

242, 251

Kleiner,

140, 141, 149

Hughes Semiconductor,

Kattner, Lionel, 1.5.5-1.58, 212, 213,

248

Hunt, Malcolm, 233-237, 241, 242 Hybrid circuit, 185, 221, 224, 225, 277

118-125, 173

Korean War,

55, 77, 83, 92, 108,

1

10,

II.3, 11(3, 117, 119, 137, 29(3

Kozmetsky, Henrv, 87, 215, 216, 222,

IBM. .SVr International Business Machines IHAS. .SVc Integrated Helicopter .Avionics System Industrial and (7)mmercial Electronics, 42-46 Initial

public offerings, 124, 264, 273,

Kvamme,

Floyd, 195, 2(30, 2(39-272

Labor unions, 40, 204, 272, 299

Lamond,

41

,

82,

9.3,

94,

1(33,

Pierre, 240, 244, 253,

259-2(31, 2(3(3-273, 285, 292 Last,Jav, 131-13(3, 142-144, 15.5-159,

287 Instrumentation Laboratoiy, MIT, 222,

1(36,

212-217, 220-228,

2.39, 2(32,

292

235 Integrated circuiLs, 8-11, 129, 130, L50, 155-159,

227

165,213,214,219,

Lehman

Brothers, 85, 219, 220, 229,

232, 233

hi (lex

53, 54

2 14,21 5, 2 8, 238, 239, 245, 253,

Liddie, Donald, 237, 242

254, 262, 2(55, 26(5, 273, 276, 279,

Linear accelerators, 75, 100, 170, 186,

280, 285, 292, 302

Ix'slie, Stuart, 3, 4,

1

Moore, Norman,

187 Linvill,John, 138, 250

MOS.

Litton, Cdiarles, 9, 10, 14—30, 3^L-35,

Motorola, 153,

42-43, 48-50, 53, 59-85, 88-92,

.S>c

23(5,

85-88

Metal oxide semiconductor 1(52,

173, 207, 222, 234,

247, 2(51, 2(52, 284, 292

Moyle, Ken,

99-102, 138, 219, 294, 297, 299

75, 78-81,

2(50,

286

Litton Engineering Laboratories, 9, 14, 30, 33, 34, 42, 45, 46, 55, 57, 61,

Administration, 181, 222, 25(5

67-72, 84, 86, 124, 300, 301 Litton Industries,

8, 9, 50,

National Aeronautics and Space National Defense Research

53-55,

73-88, 91,110,111,114,119,1 25, 127, 136, 139, 174-178, 208, 215,

216, 222, 297-301

Committee,

55, (5(5-71

,

88, 9(5

National Security Agency, 239-240, 25(5

Lowell, Arthur, 235, 240

National Semiconductor, 8-1

1,

252,

259-2(51, 2(54-273, 279, 283-292,

Machine shops, Magnetron,

297, 302, 303

125, 127, 143

64-83, 8(>-89, 96,

1

Naval Research LahoratoiT, 38, 39, 48,

53-55, 61,

9, 10, 50,

73

5(5,

120

Maker, Louis, 183, 184 Markknla, Mike, 302, 303

Na\T, 23, 24, 38, 39, 43, 55,

Marshall, Allred, 4

Nixon administration, 283

Massachusetts Institute of Technology’,

NMR.

(58,

6(5-68, 131,1 35, 2 1 7, 222,

Mass production, 44, 170, 201, 202, 207, 208, 243, 292, 297 \ I c Ca rth)’, Joseph, 116

1

71-79, 84, 86, 101, 225, 235, 236

.S>c

Nuclear magnetic resonance

Norherg, Arthur, 13

235

McCullough, jack, 14-19, 22-50,

(52, (53, (57,

92,

12, 113, 119, 120, 174, 178, 208,

294, 297

Norman, Robert,

213, 239, 240

North .\merican Aviation, 136, 149 Noyce, Rohen, 129-134, 138, 140-144, 148-153, 15(5-159, 162-164, 170, 192, 194-196, 200, 201, 204, 205,

215, 220, 235, 239-241, 245, 253,

McNamara, Robert,

171, 172

Metal oxide semiconductor, 253-259, 262, 2(53, 2(56, 273-283, 287-288, 292, 301, 302. See also

254, 261-266, 273, 276, 279, 280, 285, 292, 302

Nuclear magnetic resonance, 100, 170, 187-191, 207, 299

(a)mplementar\’ M(4S Microprocessor, 286, 289

Olivetti, 263, 27(5,

Microwa\'e Electronics Corporation,

Operational amplifier, 224, 248, 249,

1

(56,

1

77,

228

277

2(59

Microwave Laboratory, Stanford University,

1

Missiles,91, 119, 121, 130, 131, 140, 141, 149, 1(50-1(52, 235, 23(5

MIT.

.S>c

.Massachusetts Institute of

205, 20(5, 213, 222, 23(5, 239, 244, 245.

.SVc (7/.SO

Elatpack; Dual in-line

package

Teclnujlogv’

Moore, (iordon, 131-134,

Semiconductors, 139, 154, 1(55 Packages, semiconductor, 142, 145, Pacific

10, 18(5

138,

142-145, 150, 170, 195, 196,200,

Packard, David, 49, 50, 72, 100, 250 Packard, Martin, 187, 188

1

Index

PaieiiLs, 13,

24-27, 31, 42, 47, 59-61,

95, 100, 105,

187,248

Rhnmbatron, 56-59 Rice, Rex, 196, 239,

Philco, 131, 135, 173, 196

391

246

Roberts, Sheklon, 131-134, 142, 145,

Photolithography, 142, 143, 157,203,

229

1

66,

1

67, 2 6, 2 7, 22 1

1

1

,

262

Rock, Arthur, 135, 136, 166, 167,215,

Photoresist, 143, 144,237

216, 258, 262, 264, 303

Piore, Michael, 4

Roosevelt, Lranklin

38

1).,

Planar process, 10, 130, 150-154, 156,

165,214-218,224,297

PNPN

Sabel, (4iarles, 4

diode, 134, 138

Salisbury’, Lrederick,

104-107

Porter, Michael, 5

Power-grid tube,

2, 8,

20, 21,

24—50

Don,

1

120

19,

Sanders,

263

195,

Jerry’,

Saxenian, AnnaLee,

Preddey, Walter, 32, 40 Preist,

92-97, 101,

3,

4

Leonard, 100, 117 Scientific Data Systems, 167, 195, 243-248 Schiff,

Profit sharing, 5, 41, 43, 82, 99, 127,

300

Scofield, Philip, 22, 42

Security clearance, 100, 117

Quality control, 81 89, 147, 148 ,

Seiko, 277-279

R1 fuse, 101-110, 113, 114 Raflar, 8, 14,

38-43, 48, 50, 56, 60, 62,

67, 79,96,97, 108, 109,

1

12, 119,

188,228 Ratliation LaboratoiT, MIT, 66-68, 75, 80, 88

34-41, 48, 95,

1

19, 295, 296,

301

Radio, high-frequency (short-wave),

7, 18,

24-27, 30-35, 39, 45-48, 66,

74, 77, 79, 92, 96, 102,

1

19, 125, 173,

278 Radio Engineering Laboratories, 120, 298 Radio Research Laboratory, Harxard 1

296 Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory’, 1 28-134, 50, 220, 250, 30 Shermund, Ralph, 42, 43, 46 ShooleiT, James, 188-190

74, 235, 255,

University',

Sierra fdub, 94, 100

Signal (k)rps. Army, 74, 80, 139

23

Raflio C'.orporation of America, 2, 13, 1

Shockley, William, 131-134, 138, 139,

1

Radio, amateur, 14—18, 22, 26, 30, 31,

18, 19,

Semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 10, 165, 293, 294

Laboratories, 38, 39, 48, 56, 222, 236 Signetics, 8-11,212, 213, 220,

228-243, 249-252, 255, 257, 269, 284, 287, 288, 292, 293 Silicon, 133, 141

Silicon gate jn'ocess, 279, 280, 286,

287

Singleton, Henry, 87, 215, 216, 222,

67-71, 74, 75

Raytheon, 34, 39, 42, 45, 53, 66, 74, 78, 79, 86, 92, 9(^99, 104, 110, 116, 125,

173,249 R(LA. .SVc Radio (x)rporation of

227, 228

Smnllen, Roger, 260, 267, 286 Snoyv, Donald, 92-97, 101, 104-107, 1

1

1

Societe Suisse cf Industrie florlogere,

America Reliability, 42, 53, 76, 102, 107, 111,

112, 130, 140, 142, 145, 149, 150,

263, 276-279 Solid-state diffusion, 130, 133, 139,

142-147, 157, 158, 164, 166,203,

154

Renegotiation Board, 55, 83, 86,

Rheem Semiconductor,

Signal (k)rj)s Engineering

1

13

128, 153, 165

213, 221, 229, 258 Sorg, Harold,

1

19,

120

Index

Sj)angenhtM'g,

Kiirl,

Union Uarbide

Sj:)ern (ivr()sc()|)c (x)nipany, 45,

59-61 74-76, 79, 92, 95-99, 102,

254, 2(33,

,

104, 106, 108,

1

10,

1

16,

140, 141, 149, 239, 243,

1

242

I'ltek (iorporati()n, 183-18(3,

49, 13tS

Electronics, 228, 249,

2(34,

2 73,

27(3,

2 78

Ihiiversity of (4ilifornia, Berkeley, 41,

19, 125,

295

(38,

75 94 ,

Sporck, (4iarles, 201-205, 208, 240, 253, 254, 259-261, 264-269, 272,

\4iclon pnnij:), 121, 122, 182-18(3

273, 284, 285, 291, 292

\acnnm

evaporator, 139, 185, 192,

293

Sputnik, 122, 181

Stanford Industrial Park, 91, 132, 255

\acnnm pumps,

21, 34, 45, 59,

Stanford Research Institute, 131, 135

84, 121, 122, 127, 182-18(3, 192,

Stanford Universitv,

293

2, 8, 15, 16, 21, 22,

\alentine, Donald,

42, 49-53, 56, 59-61, 75-78, 88,

91-104, 110, 113, 11(3-119, 125, 131, 132, 137, 138,

1(3(3,

18(3-188, 249,

72,

(33,

270-272, 302,

2(37,

303 \'an

Poppelen, Joseph, 233-237, 241,

242

250, 301 Stearns, M\’rl, 91-103, 107-1 10,

121-1 25,

1

74,

1

7(3,

Tarian Associates, 8-11, 89, 9

181,1 86, 208

97-128, 139,

1

1(32, 1(33, 1(39,

170,

Stewart Engineering, 89, 174, 177

174-192, 207, 208, 293, 294, 297,

Stock o])tions,

298, 300

5, 85, 87, 124, 1(34, 21(3,

Dorothy, 93, 94

221, 229, 257-2(35, 273, 291, 294,

\'arian,

299, 303

\'arian, Russell,

Sylvania, 25, 53,

(3(3,

74, 78-80, 84,

119, 127, 173, 177,

1

10,

200,284

55-59, 75, 89-103,

109, 110, 113, 121-125, 187, 188 \'arian, Sigurd,

55-59, 75, 89, 93, 94,

102-107, 121-124, 181, Talbert, David, 249, 259, 260, 2(38, 2(39,

273 Tantalum, 27, 28, 31, 42, 107 Tap failure, 149, 150, 154 Teledyne,

1(37,

16(3,

167,

265, 286, 294, 299, 302,

X'ietnam War, 226

212, 215, 21(3, 220-228

Terman, Frederick, 7(3,

2(34,

187

303

3, 8,

Watches, electronic, 254, 263,

274-279, 288, 302

193, 194, 199, 200, 233, 299

75,

\'entnre capital, 10, 11, 137, 258,

Television, 8, 74, 95, 107, 108, 120,

(38,

18(3,

49, 50, 53, 54,

88, 94, 100, 117, 132, 138

Watkins^Johnson, 91, 127, 177, 180, 181,

1(33, 1(3(3,

208

Tetrode, 46, 47, 112, 120

Weissenstern, Mark, 217-220, 229, 237

Texas Instruments, 129, 130, 134, 145,

Western Electric Ciompany,

153, 15(4-159, 1(32, 1(35, 173 200,

39, 45, 53, 74,

207, 214, 218-223, 226, 229, 230,

143, 145, 148

,

247, 248, 2(31, 2(38-2 72, 284, 292

9(3,

99,

1

10,

13, 20, 24, 25, 31, 32, 45,

Transistor, 8, 10, 133, 134, 143, 150,

1

Travel ing-wa\'e tube,

7(3,

78, 102,

1

18,

3(3, 4(3, (31

Troposj)hei'ic scatter 120, 125,

298

-(33

communication,

1

31

73,

1

74,

2(38, 2(39,

74, 79,

(3(3,

225

Widlar, Robert, 248, 249, 259,

173 Triode, 21,

1 1 (3,

Westinghonse Electric Corporation,

Thornton, Tex, 84-88, 215, 218 152-154, 197, 223, 224, 228

13, 24, 31,

2(30,

271-2 73

Woenne, Roy, World War II,

(38,

72, 78,

7, 14, (37,

85-88

91, 97, 295,

29(3

WTzniak, Steve,

1,

302, 303

Indf'x

VelveiU)n,Jack, 162, 163,220,229,

241,242 Meld,

manufaciuring, 42, 83, 152, 154, 161, 203, 204, 227, 237-239, in

242, 243, 249, 256, 298

Zenith, 196, 200

393

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t

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Bale ol this material benefits the Librarv

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technology

history of

Making

Silicon Valley

Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970

Christophe Lecuyer

Making Silicon Valley, Christophe Lecuyer shows that the explosive growth of the personal computer industry in Silicon Valley was the culmination of decades of growth and innovation in the San Francisco-area electronics industry. Using the tools of science In

and technology studies, he explores the formation of district,

from

shadow

of

beginnings as the

its

RCA and

home

of a

other East Coast firms through

He traces the emergence

an industrial

few radio enterprises that operated

electronics industry and a leading producer of

'^semiconductors.

Silicon Valley as

its

the

in

establishment as a center of the

power grid tubes, microwave tubes, and

of the innovative practices that

made

this

growth possible by following key groups of engineers and entrepreneurs. He examines the forces outside Silicon Valley that shaped the industry

—

particular, the effect

in

and procurement on the growth of the industry and on the development of technologies and considers the influence of Stanford University and of military patronage

—

other local Institutions of higher learning.

The largest Silicon Valley firms

— including

Industries, Varian Associates, Fairchild

-

Semiconductor, and

Intel

—dominated

the

advanced tubes and semiconductors and, because of their Innomanufacturing, design, and management, served as models and incubators

American markets vations

Eitel-McCullough (Eimac), Litton

in

for

for other electronics ventures in the area.

Christophe Lecuyer

is

a Historian at the Chemical Heritage Foundation.

Inside Technology series “Silicon Valley

wannabes search

sively informed

— Thomas

P.

o

for the Valley’s secrets of success. Lecuyer’s impres-

response reminds them that God

Is in

Hughes, author of Human-Built World:

the manufacturing details.”

How to

Think about Technology

and Culture “Meticulously researched and cogently written equally at in

home

in

understanding

being.

Making

Is

business history and the history of technology. For those interested

how

Silicon Valley

Silicon Valley

— Martin Kenney,

Lecuyer has written a book that

is

and

its

pioneering business practices

came

into

required reading.”

Isis

and nuanced discussion of how and why Silicon Valley emerged as a center of manufacturing, product engineering, and management.” Harvard Business School Working Knowledge “A detailed

—

The MIT Press

—

Massachusetts

http://mitpress.mit.edu

—

Institute of

Technology

978-0-262-62211-0

—

—

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

0-262-62211-4 nil

Cover image; Integrated (DTL master-slave

90000

circuit

flip-flop circuit),

courtesy of Fairchild Semiconductor.

II

9 780262 622110

III!

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