Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives from East and West 981334833X, 9789813348332

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Soraj Hongladarom Jeremiah Joven Joaquin   Editors

Love and Friendship Across Cultures Perspectives from East and West

Love and Friendship Across Cultures

Soraj Hongladarom Jeremiah Joven Joaquin •

Editors

Love and Friendship Across Cultures Perspectives from East and West

123

Editors Soraj Hongladarom Department of Philosophy Facult of Arts Chulalongkorn University Bangkok, Thailand

Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Department of Philosophy De La Salle University Manila, Philippines

ISBN 978-981-33-4833-2 ISBN 978-981-33-4834-9 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021, corrected publication 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Contents

Part I

Historical Perspectives: Ancient 3

1

Aristotle and Confucians on Friendship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Andrew Tsz Wan Hung

2

Aristotle’s and Buddha’s Notion of Happiness: A Comparative Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John B. Brotamante

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Friendship in Aristotle and Buddhism: Confluences and Divergences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kevin Taylor

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Philia and Agape: Ancient Greek Ethics of Friendship and Christian Theology of Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jonas Holst

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3

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Towards a Confucian Ethics of Humane Online Relations . . . . . . . Joseph Martin M. Jose

Part II 6

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Historical Perspectives: Modern and Contemporary

When Pompey’s Elephants Trumpeted for Mercy: Levinas and Solidarity for the Animal Face . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mira T. Reyes

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The Good in Articulation: Describing the Co-constitution of Self, Practice, and Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carlota Salvador Megias

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Nietzsche on Actively Forgetting One’s Promise (of Love) . . . . . . . 115 Jan Gresil S. Kahambing

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Love as an Act of Resistance: bell hooks on Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Hazel T. Biana

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Part III

Contents

Conceptual Analyses

10 Posthumous Love as a Rational Virtue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Theptawee Chokvasin 11 Awareness and Aloneness as Foundations of Love and Friendship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Laureen L. Velasco 12 Romantic Love as a Love Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Jerd Bandasak 13 For a Moment or for Eternity: A Metaphysics of Perduring Lovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Hazel T. Biana Correction to: The Good in Articulation: Describing the Co-constitution of Self, Practice, and Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Carlota Salvador Megias

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Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Soraj Hongladarom is a professor of Philosophy and the director of the Center for Ethics of Science and Technology, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University. He is currently serving as a president of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand. He has a wide-ranging interest in philosophy of technology and applied ethics. He is the author of The Ethics of AI and Robotics: A Buddhist Viewpoint, recently published by Rowman and Littlefield. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin is an associate professor of Philosophy at De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines, where he is also a research fellow at the Southeast Asian Research Center and Hub and a research affiliate at the Center for Language Technologies. He is the current president of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines and the founding secretary-general of the Union of Societies and Associations of Philosophy in the Philippines. He specializes in philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophical logic and metaphysics.

Contributors Jerd Bandasak Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand Hazel T. Biana De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines John B. Brotamante Bicol University, Albay, Philippines; De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Theptawee Chokvasin Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand

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Editors and Contributors

Jonas Holst San Jorge University, Zaragoza, Spain Andrew Tsz Wan Hung College of Professional and Continuing Education, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong Jeremiah Joven Joaquin De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Joseph Martin M. Jose De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines Jan Gresil S. Kahambing Leyte Normal University, Tacloban, Philippines Mira T. Reyes University of Pardubice, Pardubice, Czech Republic Carlota Salvador Megias University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway Kevin Taylor Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee, USA Laureen L. Velasco De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines

An Overview

This collection of essays is a product of the partnership between two Southeast Asian philosophical organizations: The Philosophical Association of the Philippines (PAP) and the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand (PARST). The partnership—the friendship—between PAP and PARST officially began in August 2018 at the 24th World Congress of Philosophy held in Beijing, China, where each organization had their respective inaugural society session meetings. Driven by the idea of making Southeast Asian philosophy relevant to the world stage, the representatives of the two associations agreed to hold biennial joint meetings together in order to foster continuing exchanges of philosophical insights between the members of the two organizations, as well as other philosophers interested in Southeast Asian philosophy. This agreement was formalized in December 2018, and in July 2019 the first joint meeting was held at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. The theme of the First Joint Meeting is “Love and Friendship Across Cultures: Perspectives from East and West,” a theme that this collection has embraced as well. This collection brings together different philosophical points of view discussing two important aspects of human life, namely love and friendship, within the broad context of comparative philosophy. These points of view differ in terms of their cultural orientations (East or West, ancient or modern), philosophical methodologies (analytical, historical, experimental or phenomenological, broadly construed) and motivation (explanatory, revisionary or argumentative). Most important in this collection is a comparative treatment of how diverse philosophical cultures view love and friendship, such as how Aristotle and Confucius’ views on friendship are similar and different; how the ancient Greeks and the Buddhists view friendship and happiness, and how posthumous love is possible. A diverse set of scholars from Europe, North America and especially Southeast Asia, all of whom presented their papers at the First Joint Meeting mentioned above, were selected and invited to contribute to this volume. This adds to a unique feature of the volume as it

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An Overview

represents emerging views of Southeast Asian philosophers, views that engage energetically with those of philosophers from the other regions. The collection thus provides a multifaceted way of understanding love and friendship across cultures, and invites others to join in the discussion. The collection is divided into three main parts. The first part consists of essays on Eastern and Western perspectives by ancient philosophers on love and friendship. In “Aristotle and Confucians on Friendship,” Andrew Tsz Wan Hung compares Aristotle’s theory of friendship with that of Confucius and Mencius. He argues that Aristotle’s utility and pleasure friendship would not be considered friendship for Confucians and that Confucians’ emphasis on trustworthiness and familism in his theory of friendship and Aristotle’s stress of equality among friends can be mutually supplementary. Two essays compare Aristotle’s theory and the ideas of the Buddha. In “Aristotle’s and Buddha’s Notion of Happiness: A Comparative Study,” John B. Brotamante identifies similarities and differences between the discourses on happiness by the Buddha and Aristotle and seeks to see how this leads to ideas about love and friendship. Writing on the same topic, Kevin Taylor’s “Friendship in Aristotle and Buddhism: Confluences and Divergences” argues that the Buddhist concept of friendship is necessarily a subcategory of Aristotle’s idea of friendship among members of a community. In “Philia and Agape: Ancient Greek Ethics of Friendship and Christian Theology of Love,” Jonas Holst presents a comparative study of the ancient Greek ethics of friendship (philia) and the Christian theology of love (agape). He argues that despite the fundamental differences between the two conceptions of love, they converge on the idea that love must be manifested as a caring concern for others. Finally, in “Towards a Confucian Ethics of Humane Online Relations,” Joseph Martin M. Jose considers how a particular reading of Confucius’s ideas could provide an ethics of online relationships. He argues that such a Confucian ethics of humane online interactions can address the present malaise of the online community. The second set of essays in this collection is concerned with modern and contemporary historical perspectives on love and friendship. In “When Pompey’s Elephants Trumpeted for Mercy: Levinas and Solidarity for the Animal Face,” Mira T. Reyes extends the Levinasian concepts of face and other toward animals. By using the slaughter of elephants during the reign of Pompey the Great as an analogy, she demonstrates the content and power of the animals’ faces in dissolving the boundaries of social prejudice. In “The Good in Articulation: Describing the Co-constitution of Self, Practice, and Value,” Carlota Salvador Megias elaborates a neo-Wittgensteinian, philosophical–anthropological alternative to classical Aristotelian approaches in the philosophy of friendship. She argues that the alternative is descriptively and prescriptively superior when what at issue is the status of a social practice like friendship. In “Nietzsche on Actively Forgetting One’s Promise (of Love),” on the

An Overview

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other hand, Jan Gresil S. Kahambing explores Nietzsche’s account of promising by delving into the problem of a culture of broken promises. He argues that this understanding of culture can be aptly analogized as a nihilistic one and creates a vapid state of promiselessness. In “Love as an Act of Resistance: bell hooks on Love,” Hazel T. Biana delves into bell hooks’ feminist theory and explores how it relates to her ideas on spirituality and love. She argues that hooks’s love ethic theory implies that love is more than just an act with intent toward care, commitment, trust, respect, responsibility and knowledge for oneself and the other; it is also an act of resistance. The third and final set of essays utilizes conceptual analysis in order to arrive at an understanding of love and friendship. In “Posthumous Love as a Rational Virtue,” Theptawee Chokvasin investigates the idea posthumous love from the historical writings of Christian Renaissance thinkers. He argues that keeping a promise of posthumous love can be considered a rational virtue given Nicholas Rescher’s definition of rationality as human resource and Huw Price’s anthropological explanatory power of concepts. Further on, in “Awareness and Aloneness as Foundations of Love and Friendship” Laureen L. Velasco claims that, unless one has been keenly aware of, confronted and embraced his aloneness, friendship or any other kind of authentic relationship is not possible. She argues that many people want love but do not realize what they really want is to control or be controlled, and we must, therefore, ask ourselves if we are in a relationship out of strength or out of weakness. In addition, Jerd Bandasak in “Romantic Love as a Love Story” argues that the mainstream conception of love in analytic philosophy, which tries to analyze the concept into necessary and sufficient components, is insufficient in light of the lived experiences that we concretely encounter in everyday world. Taking a cue from Paul Ricoeur, Bandasak argues that we should instead reconceptualize love as a kind of dynamic story, whose beginnings and endings can fluctuate as lovers struggle to write their own stories. Finally, and in a rather similar vein, Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Hazel T. Biana, in “For a Moment or for Eternity: A Metaphysics of Perduring Lovers,” provides a philosophical account of the relata of romantic love, the nature of the objects in a love relation. In their account, the lover who loves and the beloved who is loved are particular people who persist through time by having temporal parts. It is our hope that these diverse sets of topics in this collection may serve as an invitation for the global philosophical community to join in the continuing discussion on love and friendship through cultural perspectives. Furthermore, we also hope that the volume will also become a catalyst for scholars around the world to look at the philosophical scene that is happening in Southeast Asia. We would like to thank everyone who made this anthology possible. Our thanks to the officers of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP), especially President Luca Scarantino, Secretary-General Suwanna Satha-anand and Steering Committee Member Graham Oppy, the board of directors of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines and the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand, the administrators of Chulalongkorn University and De La

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An Overview

Salle University, and Chulalongkorn University’s Center for Ethics of Science and Technology and De La Salle University’s Southeast Asian Research Center and Hub. Many thanks to Ben Blumson, James Franklin, Brian Garrett, Alan Hajek, Stephen Hetherington and the editors and reviewers of Springer. Soraj Hongladarom Jeremiah Joven Joaquin

Part I

Historical Perspectives: Ancient

Chapter 1

Aristotle and Confucians on Friendship Andrew Tsz Wan Hung

Abstract This paper compares Aristotle’s theory of friendship with that of Confucius and Mencius. It shows that all of them are concerned with how friendship is related to virtuous cultivation. In light of Aristotle’s taxonomy of friendship, I argue that Aristotle’s utility and pleasure friendship would not be considered friendship for Confucians. Although Confucians’ discussion of friendship is not as systematic and theorized as Aristotle, Confucius’ biography and his relationship with his disciples show a vivid picture and idea of Confucian friendship. I also argue that Confucians’ emphasis on trustworthiness and familism in his theory of friendship and Aristotle’s stress of equality among friends can be mutually supplementary. In view of such comparison, I argue that while the family relationship is important in the formation of one’s virtuous character which is conducive to making virtue friendship, friendships can be considered a bridge between family and civil society in cultivating civic virtues. Keywords Aristotle · Confucius · Friendship · Companionship

1.1 Introduction Friendship is one of the crucial themes in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE).1 Friendship is significant because it “involves virtue… it is most necessary for our life” (NE, VIII.1 1155a3–5). Any ideal of human happiness must include enduring and satisfying friendship. As Aristotle states, “It is perhaps strange also to make the blessed person solitary: no one would choose to have all good things by himself, since a human being is political and is disposed by nature to live with others. So, this too belongs to the happy man, for he possesses the things good by nature, and it is 1 Unless stated otherwise, all quotes from Nicomachean Ethics come from the translation by Irwin (1999).

A. T. W. Hung (B) College of Professional and Continuing Education, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_1

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clear that it is better to pass the days together with friends and decent people than with strangers and people at random” (NE, IX.9 1169b16–22, trans. Bartlett and Collins 2011). Similarly, friendship is also related to moral cultivation for Confucianism. For Confucius, studying with friends is one of the important sources of enjoyment. Although there are many studies on Aristotle’s friendship (Biss 2011; Brink 1999; Cooper 1977; Curzer 2012; Pakaluk 2009; Pangle 2003; Sherman 1987), there are not as many studies on Confucian friendship (Hall and Ames 1998; King 2018; Kutcher 2000; Lu 2010; Rosenlee 2015); the comparative studies between Aristotle and Confucians on Friendship are still rare (Connolly 2012; Mullis 2010; He 2007; Sim 2007) and thus further investigation of such comparative studies is worthy. Aristotle wrote nearly a fifth of the whole Nicomachean Ethics (Books 8 and 9) devoted to friendship. Aristotle’s classification and analysis of friendship is systematic, abstract and clearly defined. He has shown how friendship is related to different goods, virtues and psychological features. Comparatively, Confucians have no such systematic, analytic analysis of friendship. The Analects and Mencius are collections of aphorisms, dialogs and ideas by Confucius, Mencius and their contemporaries. Confucian teachings about friendship are scattered in different places of these collections. However, gathering these teachings in addition to Confucius’ biography and his relationship with his disciples can give us a vivid picture and idea of Confucian friendship. This article attempts to compare the idea of friendship between Aristotle and Confucians mainly based on the Analects and Mencius and Confucius’s biography. This will demonstrate the similarities and differences between them, strengthen and weakness of each theory, and how these two theories can mutually enlighten, and are complementary to, each other.

1.2 Aristotle’s Three Concepts of Friendship and Goodwill The Greek term philia refers to a broader range of relationships than “friendship” does in English. The corresponding verb philein means “to get well with” which can cover various kinds of relationships, from the closest familial ties to business partnerships and political loyalties. Pangle (2003, p. 2) argues that philia in Aristotle’s argument mainly refers to friendship among mature virtuous persons which is the richest and highest kind of human relationship. However, Pakaluk (2009, p. 477) argues that Aristotle regards friendship as a much broader phenomenon than the intimate personal relationships that we usually call friendships. “These are not a treatise on friendship alone so much as Aristotle’s discussion of human sociability generally: personal friendships; romantic bonds; the nuclear family; the extended family; “voluntary associations”; political society; business partnerships; and the market.” It shows that Aristotle’s concern of friendship is not only about one’s ethical life, but also about constituting an ethical political society. Aristotle argues that a friendship is a relationship in which persons (a) are mutually aware of the fact that (b) they have goodwill (eunoia) towards each other, (c) wish good things for each other for one of the aforesaid reasons [virtue, pleasure,

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utility], and (d) have reciprocity of sentiment (NE, VIII.2 1155b31–1156a5); and such relationship must be voluntary (NE, VIII.13 1163a2). Pakaluk (2009, p. 472, 479) summarizes these characteristics of friendship as symmetry, reciprocity, and mirroring. Therefore, Aristotle defines the friend as another self, which demands each related oneself to the other, in affection and well-wishing, as one is to oneself (NE, IX.4 1166a29–33). According to Kraut (2012), the notion of the friend as another self means “with whom one has a relationship very similar to the relationship one has with oneself. A virtuous person loves the recognition of himself as virtuous; to have a close friend is to possess yet another person, besides oneself, whose virtue one can recognize at extremely close quarters; and so, it must be desirable to have someone very much like oneself whose virtuous activity one can perceive.” Aristotle distinguishes three types of friendship: friendship for utility; friendship for pleasure; and friendship for virtue. They correspond to three goals that are lovable for human beings: good or pleasant or useful (NE, VIII.2 1156b18–20). Utility and pleasure friendships are accidental in nature and are easily dissolved and short-lived, for if the friends do not remain useful or pleasant, the individual or the others will no longer be friends (NE, VIII.3 1156a20). Friendship for virtue is the perfect and genuine kind of friendship, because it is formed by similar virtuous persons based on the mutual appreciation of virtuous character, and they wish good to their friends for the friends’ own sake (NE, VIII.3 1156b7–11). Indeed, Aristotle’s taxonomy can be analyzed in terms of his two kinds of self-love: “vulgar and true self-love” (Hughes 2013, p. 203). While true self-love is expressed in the love of one’s own virtue, vulgar self-love consists in the pursuit of external goods, such as wealth and power. As natural resources are limited, the pursuit of these external goods inevitably brings conflicts among people. And only the virtue friendship is the perfect friendship because of its virtuous nature. Regarding pleasure, Pakaluk (2009 p. 473) argues that, in Aristotle’s theory, there are two ways in which a person is pleasant: pleasant in one’s own right and pleasant in relation to you. To say one is pleasant in one’s own right means one’s life and actions are inherently pleasant which can only be achieved by virtuous persons (NE, VII.13 1153b9–15); and befriending virtuous persons is virtue friendship. However, to say that one is pleasant only in relation to you means one is entertaining. And thus, befriending an amusing person is pleasure friendship. As Cooper (1977, p. 624) states, Aristotle usually refers to virtue friendship as “perfect” (NE, VIII.3 1156b7; NE, VIII.4 1156b34), “the friendship of people who are good and alike in virtue” (NE, VIII.3 1156b7–8) or “the friendship of good persons” (NE, VIII.4 1157a20, NE, VIII.5 1157b25), because it reveals fully and perfectly all the features that one reasonably expects about friendship. It also shows that Aristotle recognized virtue friendship as involving mutual recognition of moral goodness. Furthermore, a virtuous person does not only have good in oneself, but also is useful and pleasurable to others, because the practice of virtuous persons would also benefit and bring pleasure to those around them. Thus, this kind of friendship tends to endure because it is based on the intrinsic qualities of the person (NE, VIII.3 1156b20–24).

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In his widely studied articles, Cooper (1977, pp. 624–9) raises two questions against Aristotle’s taxonomy of friends. First, in reality, only a few of us are perfectly virtuous, and Aristotle’s theory of a perfect friendship seems to fail to explain our ordinary friendships. Second, Aristotle seems to hold an extreme psychological condition of human beings and to assert that nearly all friendships are expressions of self-centeredness, if a mutual goodwill can only be found in virtue friendship. Regarding the question of ordinary friendship, Cooper argues that Aristotle’s virtue friendship is an ideal type based on his teleological thinking; and our ordinary friendships in the real world partially approximate this ideal relation. For questions about goodwill, Cooper argues that all three kinds of friendship for Aristotle consist of mutual goodwill which functions as a starting point of friendship (NE, IX.5 1167a4). And he suggests that goodwill towards each other is unconditional in virtue friendship, while it is subject to certain conditions in utility and pleasure friendships. If friendship no longer provides utility and pleasure, mutual goodwill of utility and pleasure friendships cannot be maintained. Thus Cooper (1977, p. 626) argues that the motivation behind utility and pleasure friendships is “a complex and subtle mixture of self-seeking and unself-interested well-wishing and well-doing.” While Cooper’s argument of Aristotle’s teleological thinking is very convincing, his response to the question of mutual goodwill is very much controversial. Pakaluk (2009, p. 476) criticizes Cooper’s idea of a mixture of egocentric and altruistic well-wishing as dubious and inconsistent with Aristotle’s understanding of reciprocity. Curzer (2012) criticizes Cooper for performing an over-interpretation of Aristotle’s text. Aristotle never said that friendships for utility and pleasure tend to wish each other well for each other’s sake, nor did he say anything about the condition of goodwill. Rather, Aristotle states clearly that utility and pleasure friends love each other for the sake of utility or pleasure; they do not love each other for themselves (NE, VIII.3 1156a11–16). Thus, Curzer (2012, p. 256) explicitly concludes that utility and pleasure friendships do not meet Aristotle’s definition of friendship, so are not friendships. However, Kraut (2012) agrees that utility and pleasure friendships, for Aristotle, are also friendship with mutual goodwill. He argues that the essential nature of friendship is that “each person benefits the other for the sake of other.” Indeed, it is difficult to have definitive answers to the debates, because all these different contradicting positions can also find support from Aristotle’s writings. Aristotle himself states that as general people call people with utility and pleasure friendships ‘friends,’ we should say that such relationships are also friendship. And he says that only virtue friendship is “friendship in the primary and authoritative sense, the remaining friendships being such only by way of a resemblance” (NE, VIII.5 1157a31–32). This seems to imply that utility and pleasure friendships are also friendships, but just secondary friendships, which support Pakaluk’s and Kraut’s arguments. However, Aristotle also claimed that utility and pleasure friendship cannot produce goodwill (NE, IX.5 1167a14–15). It seems that, for Aristotle, goodwill can only arise from the appreciation of others’ virtuous character (NE, IX.5 1167a20), which is supportive of Curzer’s argument. Such seeming contradictory assertions make Aristotle’s idea of utility and pleasure friendships so ambiguous and controversial. Instead of exploring Aristotle’s original intention, I would rather

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explore Confucianism on friendship in light of Aristotle’s taxonomy and see how Confucians would assess utility, pleasure and virtue friendships.

1.3 Confucianism on Friendship Friendship in Chinese is formed by combining two characters: peng 朋 and you 友. According to Zheng Xuan, a famous Confucian scholar of the later Han period , peng 朋 means (206 BCE-8 CE), in his Commentary of the Analects《論語 》 having the same teacher while you 友 means having the same will or same purposes (as cited in Heyan et al. 1999, p. 3; see also Hall & Ames 1998, p. 261). Although nowadays the meanings of these two characters are not so different and they are usually used together as pengyou 朋友 to denote friendship, the original meaning of peng 朋 and you 友 seems to show that friendship in Confucius denotes friends learning together with the same will and same purposes. Indeed, Confucius’ and Mencius’ concern about friendship is similar to Aristotle’s virtue friendship. And there are many resemblances existing between their view of virtue friendship; both of them agree that virtue friendship is also useful and pleasant (Sim 2007, p. 200). Confucianism has no taxonomy of friendship such as Aristotle’s. In Confucianism, there is no debate over whether utility and pleasure friendships are friendships or not. Unlike Aristotle, Confucius and Mencius never give an abstract definition of friendship. However, they have given many advices about making friends. For instance, Confucius reminds us to distinguish virtuous and vice friendship. As in his words, Having three kinds of friends will be a source of personal improvement; having three other kinds of friends will be a source of personal injury. One stands to be improved by friends who are true, who make good on their word, and who are broadly informed; one stands to be injured by friends who are ingratiating, who feign compliance, and who are glib talkers. (Analects, 16.4)2

In short, one’s character will be influenced by friendship, no matter whether it is a good or a bad influence. One can benefit by making friends with trustworthy and wellinformed persons, and misled by boastful, insincere persons. Mencius (5B3) also suggests that “in making friends one should not rely on advantage (whether it grows out of the age, position, or power of the other) but should consider his or her virtue or moral goodness” (Mullis 2010, p. 393). This shows that like Aristotle, Confucians are very much concerned about virtue friendship. Confucius and Mencius never discuss friendship which is irrelevant to moral cultivation. Furthermore, in view of Confucius’ distinction between gentlemen and petty persons by saying, “gentlemen understand righteousness and petty person understand profit” (4.16 author’s own translation), and Mencius’ (1A1) idea of priority of righteousness over profit, it seems that Confucianism would not consider friendship for simply utility or pleasure as friendship. However, based on Mencius’ (6A6) idea of goodness of human nature, 2 Unless stated otherwise, all quotes from the Analects come from the translation by Ames and Rosemont (1998).

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there is no person who is purely egocentric in the real world. For Mencius, even in the Warring States Period, one of the cruelest times in ancient China, he still believes that people still had a sense of commiseration when seeing a child about to fall into a well. Thus, for Confucian, there would not be purely utility or pleasure friendship in Aristotle’s sense in the real world. Actually, the Analects start with a discussion on study, friendship and being a gentleman (junzi 君子). In the first eight passages of the Analects, there are five talking about friendship; and the rest talk about filial relationships and ren that have optimal value for Confucianism. It shows the significance of friendship in the formation of moral character for Confucians. In the first passage of the Analects, Confucius associates the joy of studying and the joy of friendship and being a gentleman without being acknowledged. As he states, The Master said: “Having studied, to then repeatedly apply what you have learned—is this not a source of pleasure? To have friends (peng 朋) come from distant quarters —is this not a source of enjoyment? To go unacknowledged by others without harboring frustration—is this not the mark of an exemplary person (junzi 君子)?” (Analects 1.1)

This seems to show that true friends are based on “common interests and a wealth of shared experience to draw upon” (Mullis 2010, p. 395). This also implies that, for Confucius, friendship provides a unique kind of joy and enjoyment that can only be achieved through cultural and intellectual exchange between friends. Such joy is not equivalent to the joy in Aristotle’s pleasure friendship, because such joy of friendship is not out of amusement, but out of a sense of companionship of studying with virtuous persons. As Lu (2010, p. 236) argues, “When friends, those who share a common goal in learning, come from a different social context to discuss and exchange learning with oneself, the joy resulting from this relationship and exchange appears to be more profound than the simple pleasure one acquires from learning and practicing on one’s own.” Indeed, such enjoyment of friendship and sense of solidarity can in turn enhance the motivation of studies and moral cultivation. It also gives gentlemen strength and capacity to resist the frustration and disturbance caused by lack of recognition and resentful attitude by others, in particular those who are in power and rich but are morally inferior. Indeed, apart from studying, Mencius (1B1) also stresses that enjoying music in the company of many is greater than enjoying music by oneself. This shows Confucians’ concern of relationship, companionship and sense of community.

1.4 Companionship Among Friends If the best expression of friendship for Confucius is to study and to self-cultivate together with friends, for Aristotle, such enjoyment of friendship is best expressed in living life together with virtuous friends. In Nicomachean Ethics 9.9, Aristotle asserts that to spend time and to live with friends help to achieve a kind of mutual sharing in perception and thought. As Pakaluk (2005, p. 260) states, “Friendship

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finds its greatest fulfillment when friends are thinking about the same truths, and each recognizes that the other thinks the same as he, and each recognizes that each recognizes this.” Furthermore, Aristotle argues, in adversity, our friends are not only useful in offering substantial help, but also sweet and pleasant through their companionship. Their presence could lighten pain because they share our distress. Such experience is puzzling for Aristotle as it is unclear whether our friend has taken part of the distress from us or our awareness of their presence helps relieve the pain (NE, IX.11 1171a25–33). According to Biography of Confucius in Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji) (史記. 孔子世家) by Sima (司馬遷) (2014, p. 2316), Confucius’ life had been one of enduring hardship and poverty. His political career was full of frustration. His political ideal was not endorsed by political leaders (the duke and three aristocratic families) of his own state of Lu. He then left Lu with a few of his disciples and went into exile. He traveled in different states aiming at looking for a ruler who might employ him with his political ideal. However, what he met was indifference and sometimes severe danger and hardship. When he got lost at the gate of the state of Zheng, a person there said that Confucius appeared to be depressed and in despair, and looked like a “stray dog,” which Confucius himself also admitted. And the gatekeeper at the Stone Gate also said that he was “the one who keeps trying although he knows that it is in vain” (Analects 14.38). Through the dialogs among Confucius and his disciples, it seems that during his exile and his whole political career, the companionship of his disciples as well as their friendship gave great support to Confucius’ insistence on his pursuit of the realization of his moral political ideal. Like Aristotle’s virtue friendship, Confucian friendship also provides mutual understanding and recognition (Lu 2010, p. 236) among friends. Although Confucius said that a gentleman should not be disturbed by being unacknowledged (Analects, 1.1, 1.16, 4.14), in reality, there are passages showing that he had been deeply distressed by being unappreciated and unrecognized (Lu 2010, p. 37), and he further lamented, “It is only tian (Heaven) who appreciates me!” (Analects, 14.35). According to Charles Taylor (1994, p. 25–6), recognition is a vital human need. Our identities are partly shaped by the recognition of others. A person or a group of people, who lack recognition by others, could be seriously hurt and distorted, if the people around them show contempt for them or mirror back a disdainful picture of them. If what Taylor said is true, it means that unless one has acquired certain recognition from one’s significant others, one cannot really be unbothered by a total lack of recognition. Thus, even though a gentleman should not be disturbed by being unacknowledged by the masses, s/he should firstly at least acquire certain appreciation and recognition from their significant others so that their psychological will power is strong enough to insist on one’s direction and to resist temptations and contempt from others. And these significant others are usually one’s family members and close friends, whose understanding and recognition can provide great support to one’s moral motivation. And it is believed that it is the companionship and recognition provided by his disciples which support Confucius’ spirit in his insistence of the moral ideal, by the fact that he “keeps trying although he knows that it is in vain” (Analects, 14.38).

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1.5 Virtue of Friendship: Equality or Trustworthy Another question which then follows is whether Confucius as a teacher can make friends with his disciples. In light of Aristotle’s ideal of friendship among equals, a relationship between Confucius and his disciples can hardly be a perfect friendship.

Aristotle’s Friendship Among Equals For Aristotle, equality and similarity are features of a perfect friendship (NE, VIII.5 1157b36, VIII.6 1158b1, VIII.8 1159b2). A perfect friendship is only possible between two persons who are symmetrical in their virtuous character and social status (Rosenlee 2015, p. 184). This is because equality and likeness constitute friendly affection, in particular those who are alike in virtues (NE, VIII.8 1159b2–4). And for this reason, Aristotle discusses asymmetrical friendship, such as that between father and son, husband and wife, and ruler and subject, in which “the friends make unequal contributions to the friendship” (Curzer 2012, p. 255; NE, VIII.13 1162a34– b4). And Aristotle argues that people who are unequal in status can make friends but by equalizing (NE, VIII.8 1159b1–2). Aristotle says that in unequal friendships, “Each person, therefore, does not come to possess the same things from the other, nor ought each to seek the same things” (NE, VIII.7 1158b20–21 trans. Bartlett and Collins 2011). Equalization does not mean that friends have to provide equal benefit, but the superior one or the person who can offer more benefit, should receive the feeling of friendly affection proportionally. This means that better persons should be loved more than they love. When friendly affection comes according to what one deserts, it achieves equalization (NE, VIII.7 1158b26–28). Aristotle admits that the effect of equalization is limited. If the differences are too great, no matter in virtue or utilities, between people, it is impossible for them to be friends. For example, a king can never be a friend to those who are too inferior. For an inferior to make friends with a great superior (king) would easily cause flattery (NE, VIII.8 1159a14–15). Indeed, Aristotle further asserts that unequal utility friendship easily causes accusation and blame, because they expect to receive more utility while finally they do not obtain as much as they want and they think merit. On the contrary, unequal pleasure friendship would not raise many accusations because both of them enjoy being together; otherwise they would not spend time together. Unequal virtue friendship creates no accusations or fighting because they are eager to benefit each other due to their virtue (NE, VIII.13 1162ba 5–21). According to Aristotle, Confucius can make friends with his disciples as long as the difference between their virtues is not too great. The question is, in practice, how can we measure the level of virtuous character? How great does the difference between them have to be for them to be considered unable to be befriended?

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Confucian Controversies About Hierarchical or Non-hierarchical Friendship Argument for Hierarchical Confucian Friendship Similar to the controversies regarding equality among friendship, there is a debate about whether friendship is hierarchical or non-hierarchical in Confucianism. A position of hierarchical friendship, articulated by Ambrose King, argues that all relationships in Confucianism are ultimately explained in terms of familiar relationship. As familiar relationship is hierarchical, friendship is therefore hierarchical too. As shown in one of the most famous quotes in the field of Confucian studies, Among the five cardinal relations, three belong to the kinship realm. The remaining two, though not family relationships, are conceived of in terms of the family. The relationship between the ruler and the ruled is conceived of in terms of father (junfu) and son (zimin), and the relationship between friend and friend is stated in terms of elder brother (wuxiong) and younger brother (wudi). (King 2018, p. 3)

Apart from friendship, other non-familial social relations are expressed and patterned after the family relationship, for instance, the teacher-student relationship is “operated on a simulated father-and-son basis and thus formed a quasi-kinship bond” (King 2018, p. 3). Indeed, Confucian family relations played foundational roles in constituting the social political network in traditional China and thus Talcott Parsons has termed China a “familistic” society (King 2018, p. 3). Following King, Hall and Ames (1998, p. 59) also argue for hierarchical friendship. They argue that a friend is a necessary condition for becoming ren, as Confucius advises, “make friends with those scholar-officials who are most ren” (Analects, 15.10, Hall and Ames 1998, p. 262). As the fundamental importance of friends in the existential project of becoming ren, Confucius repeatedly says, “Do not befriend anyone who is not as good as you are” (Analects, 1.8, 9.25). Unlike Aristotle or Plato, “Friendship is based upon appreciated differences between oneself and another person that present themselves as specific occasions for one’s character development, rather than upon perceived commonalities with the other person” (Hall and Ames 1998, p. 261). A true friend for Confucius must be someone better than oneself. This implies that an inequality of moral achievement is required among friends. Confucian friendship is “one-directional relationship in which one extends oneself by association with one who has attained a higher level of relation” (Hall and Ames 1998, p. 268). Hall and Ames describe Confucius portrayed in the Analects, as “peerless and, hence, friendless. To assert that Confucius had friends would diminish him” (Hall and Ames 1998, p. 266). Confucius can only be friends with the sages who have already passed away, such as the Duke of Zhou, Guanzhong, and Kings Wen and Wu. Lu (2010, p. 226–30) criticizes King’s and Hall and Ames’ argument of friendship construed in terms of the family relationship as too obscure with a lack of sufficient textual evidence. Friendship and family relationships are so different. Even though Confucians use similar words to refer to different relationships, “this does not necessarily mean that one kind of relationship is construed in terms of or patterned upon

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the other” and these analogical languages “should be treated as nothing more than a pleasing metaphor or an instance of effective rhetoric” (Lu 2010, p. 228). Lu (2010, p. 231) also criticizes Hall and Ames as problematic in that if friendship must be one-directional and better than the self, then there is no mutual friendship as one can only consider another a friend without being recognized as a friend by another. Indeed, in practice, it seems to be vice rather than virtuous, if one only befriends someone better than oneself and rejects befriending someone less virtuous. This violates our moral intuition of generosity and hospitality. One further problem, similar to Aristotle’s demand of equality, is that if virtuous character cannot be quantified, how can I judge whether a person is more or less virtuous than me when I am considering whether to make friends with that person? Indeed, I would argue that Hall and Ames’ argument is based on their interpretation of the sentence “Do not befriend anyone who is not as good as you are” (毋友不如己者), that is the same in both Analects, 1.8 and 9.25, as shown in Ames and Rosemont’s (1998) translation. However, I think that Hall, Ames and Rosemont have over-interpreted and over-translated this phrase. Indeed, I would argue that this whole sentence should be translated as, Hold loyalty and faithfulness as first principles. Do not befriend anyone who is not like you. And where you have erred, do not hesitate to mend your ways (「主忠信, 毋友不如 如己者, 過則勿 改」 Analects, 1.8, 9.25, emphasized and translated by the author by reference to translations by James Legge (1861) and Ames and Rosemont (1998)).

The character ru 如 should be simply translated as “like” rather than “as good as.” In what sense does Confucius talk about the notion that a friend should be like us? According to the context and other nearby passages in the Analects, 1.4, 1.7, Confucius was discussing loyalty and faithfulness. Thus, Confucius’ advice in the Analects, 1.9 and 9.25 should be understood as “Do not befriend anyone who is not as loyal and faithful as you,” rather than “as good as” you. With such interpretation, Confucius’ advice is more fitting with our ordinary life. While, in practice, it is impossible to compare one’s moral level with that of others in order to make friends, one should also be aware of others’ faithfulness and integrity in making friends. Confucius and his disciples, as well as Mencius, repeatedly emphasized that trustworthiness is the fundamental virtue of the self, friendship and all other social political relations (Analects, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.13, 2.22, 5.26, 7.25, 8.13, 8.16, 9.25, 12.7, 12.10, 13.4, 13.20, 15.6, 15.18, 17.6, 19.10, 20.1; Mencius, 1A5, 3A4, 4A12, 7A32).3 Smooth talk and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue (Analects, 1.3). For Confucius, to emphasize trustworthiness not only reminds us to make friends who are faithful, but also initiates our moral self-awareness, and urges us to cultivate the self to become trustworthy. And thus, Master Zeng claims that he will examine himself every day as to whether he has failed in loyalty and faithfulness in interactions with others (Analects, 1.4). It is true that one can be corrupted or hurt by making friends with people who are untrustworthy. On the contrary, if friends are sincere and faithful, mutual trust 3 Indeed,

Mencius admits that sometimes when virtues and justice are under the threat of being violated, one may have the discretion to reject keeping one’s word (Mencius 4B11).

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between friends is not only conducive to our moral cultivation, but it can also act as a mirror; as per what Aristotle says, they can give us advice when we have erred. Confucius argues that gentlemen attract friends through culture and refinement; and friendship thereby promotes ren, the supreme virtue (Analects, 12.24). And in his reply to Zigong’s statement about treatment of friends, Confucius replied, “Do your utmost (loyality, zhong 忠) to exhort them, and lead them adeptly (shan 善) along the way (dao 道)” (Analects, 12.23). In discussing how to be a scholar-apprentice (shi 士)? Confucius answers, “Persons who are critical and demanding yet amicable can be called scholar-apprentices. They need to be critical and demanding with their friends, and amicable with their brothers” (Analects, 13.28). Thus, the aim to make friends is not only to cultivate oneself, but also others (He 2007, p. 301). Mencius (4B30) also argues that it is better for friends to demand goodness from each other. If it is done by father and son, it will seriously undermine their relationship. As Mullis (2010, p. 393) states, “friendships tend to be characterized by a certain degree of social distance that renders them amenable to the cultivation of virtue outside of the familial context.” Through mutual moral advice between friends, we can achieve mutual moral enhancement, because friends know each other well and they can protect one from one’s own blind spots. Argument for Non-hierarchical Confucian Friendship Lu also criticizes Norman Kutcher for arguing for non-hierarchical friendship which stands against King’s and Hall and Ames’ argument. For Kutcher, friendship is very different from the other four among the Confucian five cardinal relationships. Friendship “was neither a family bond nor a state bond, and therefore [laid] outside the web of parallel devotions that bound these together. Moreover, it was voluntary. One was obliged to serve one’s family (and preserve it by producing offspring) and obliged to serve a virtuous ruler, but there was no requirement that one make friends. Finally, friendship was the one bond that could be non-hierarchical, and it was this feature that dramatically set it apart from other social relations” (Kutcher 2000, pp. 1615–16, see also He 2007, p. 297). According to Lu, Kutcher (2000, pp. 1619–22) argues that such non-hierarchical feature of friendship is potentially dangerous. While befriending the virtuous can improve the self, befriending the wicked can contaminate individuals. It is also at odds with the hierarchical nature of state-family. Thus, historically, Confucians, such as Zhu Xi and Wang Youliang, tend to undercut the significance of friendship and argue that friendship should be kept hierarchical and generally serve the moral advance of the individual; and they do this by modeling friendship on hierarchical fraternal bonds. Lu (2010, p. 233–5) criticizes Norman Kutcher for neglecting the mutuality of familial relationships, wrongly assuming that morality must be advanced through hierarchies and that friendships are politically subversive. However, Lu’s criticism appears to attack strawmen. Fairly speaking, Kutcher’s paper is a historical paper which surveys traditional Confucians’ view on friendship in history. It is not a philosophical ethical paper. While Lu’s criticism may be right to Confucians, such as Zhu Xi and Wang Youliang, in history, it is not applicable to Kutcher’s paper.

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Kutcher never asserts his position as supporting or rejecting Confucian friendship as non-hierarchical or not. Rather, the one who really supports non-hierarchical friendship in opposing traditional hierarchical relations is Tan Sitong, a reformist of the late Qing Dynasty. Tan (1981, p. 349–50) put forward the modern morality of fraternity, equality and freedom to replace the traditional hierarchical morality. He argues that friendship is the only one which is harmless and beneficial to individuals among the Confucian five cardinal relationships. The other four relationships are all unequal and oppress individual autonomy. The obligations imposed by these hierarchical ethics such as loyalty, filial piety, and ritual are all one-sided and unilateral obligations. They are actually the tools for monarchs, officials, and fathers to suppress their inferiors. On the contrary, friendship embodies the spirit of equality, freedom, and autonomy. Thus, he argues to transform the other four relationships according to the egalitarian nature of friendship which is not only consistent with the spirit of Western Christianity but also the spirit of ren of Confucius, whom, for Tan, originally advocated friendship of the ruler-ruled, father-son, couples and brothers. Basically, I agree that there is a certain aspect of friendship which is different from family relationships, such as non-biological linkage, voluntary, not based on hierarchy and not defined by specific duty. In contrast to familial relationships, friendship is comparatively equal, even though it is not absolutely equal. And in view of Biography of Confucius, we can see Confucius’ relation with his disciples, in particular Yan Hui, Zilu, and Zigong who had been exiled with him. They experienced life-threatening adversities together during exile, sharing weal and woe, and joy and sorrow. In view of Confucius’ dialog with his disciples as shown in the Analects, Confucius not only taught them, but also expressed his appreciation of the different strengths of the different disciples. Their mutual deep understanding, appreciation and recognition show that Confucius’ relationship with his disciples went beyond simply teacher-students relations and can be expressed by the Chinese idioms, “also a teacher and a friend” (yishi yiyou 亦師亦友) and “companion in adversity” (huannan zhijiao 患難之交). As Tu Weiming writes, “Classical Confucianism defines the ruler/minister relationship not simply as that of father and son, but as a combination of that relationship and that of a friendship as well” (Tu 1993, p. 154). He also writes, “Although their relationship to the power-holders was not adversarial, ministers could maintain an independent posture toward the king as a teacher, adviser, critic, or friend, but never as an obedient servant” (Tu 1993, p. 22). However, treating friendship as totally irrelevant to, or even as a guiding rule of, family relations as argued by Tan not only violates Confucius’ teaching, but is also unsupported by current psychological studies. According to Daniel Goleman (2006, p. 147–186), a social psychologist, our character and disposition are not determined by genes. Parenting can shape one’s disposition. Parental love, feedback, interaction and dialog with babies fundamentally build up one’s sense of security and social trust so that one can therefore interact with others freely. On the contrary, a parent’s disengagement would make children lack self-confidence and a sense of selfworthiness, while feeling lost and abandoned, and even suicidal. Children who grow up in an angry hostile family environment easily see angry and hostile expression;

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their empathy is distorted and therefore they easily bully others. Today’s psychology findings are supportive of Confucius’ emphasis on family in the formation of character which is fundamental in establishing healthy friendships. As familial bonding is biological and unconditional, parents naturally see their children as another self and take care of their children with natural affection such as love, intimacy, benevolence, sincerity, warmth, security and even spirit of sacrifice that other institutional care can hardly provide in the same nature or to the same degree (Fan 2010, p. 87). Family plays an irreplaceable role in establishing children’s self-esteem and selfconfidence in order to explore and to develop healthy relationships with the outside world. Family moral discipline is also the foundation of character formation for social ethics. For Confucius, filial piety (xiao 孝) and fraternal responsibility (di 弟) is the root of ren; it is rare for someone who is filial and fraternal to be fond of defying authority and initiating rebellion (Analects, 1.2). We cultivate our moral character at home through everyday interaction with our parents and siblings, through which we develop good habits and appropriate attitudes towards our family members as well as others in society. According to Sungmoon Kim, Mencius public reasoning is a kind of extension (tui 推) of moral sentiments, “it is kind of reasoning, precisely in the sense that ‘increased sensitivity to one’s existing moral feelings works together with recognition of analogical resonance to produce extension of these feelings to new cases’” (Kim 2014, p. 143). And such reasoning of extension is shown in one of Mencius’ famous passages: “Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families, and you can roll the Empire on your palm” (Mencius, 1A7, trans. Lau 2004, see also 7A15). Basically, Aristotle also agrees that family plays a significant role in the formation of the foundational characters of individuals (EE, 1242b:1–2). In NE, VIII 9–11, he relates the familial relationship to relationship in polis, in which the father-son relationship should be like a monarchy rather than tyranny; the husband-wife relationship is aristocratic rather than oligarchical; and the sibling relationship is like a timocracy. This is because, as Tim Connolly (2012, p. 85) argues, “the different relationships in the family prepare us for different sorts of friendships in the polis and the exercise of justice each entails.” Aristotle seems to be concerned more about relationships between family and polis because, for Aristotle (I.2 1252b10–1253a4), the ancient Greek polis was originally developed from groups of families, and later became villages and finally came together in cities. However, in comparison to Confucianism, the relationship between family and friendship is not considered as closely tied and emphasized in Aristotle’s philosophy. For Confucianism, fraternal relationships among familial relationships are the most similar to friendship. Therefore, Mencius talks about friendship right after fraternal relationships in his five cardinal relationships. Generally, Confucianism emphasizes ages and life experiences in constituting social relations; and Mencius (3A4) supports “precedence of the old over the young” among siblings. However, the demand to respect elder brothers and sisters is still very different from that of respecting parents or seniors. Overall, siblings are peers; they grew up together

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under the care and authority of parents. The virtues emphasized by parents among them are united, love and harmony more than hierarchical order. And such egalitarian loving character among siblings is a good ethical foundation to be extended towards friends outside the family. Using fraternal metaphors in defining friendship also makes Chinese friendship feel strongly connected, warm and sentimental, and perceiving close friends as one’s siblings. Indeed, even nowadays, Chinese like to call close friends ‘brothers’ or ‘sisters.’ In traditional society, close friends sometimes will even make a covenant with rituals, to become “sworn brothers.” This means that although they don’t have a blood relationship, they treat each other as siblings, as truly another self. Classical Chinese literature, such as Water Margin (Shuhu Zhuan 水 滸傳), otherwise translated as All Men are Brothers, and Three Kingdoms (Sanguo Yanyi 三國演義), contain many stories about such brotherly friendship. All these stories demonstrate loyalty and trustworthiness of brotherly friendship. One of the most famous stories is “the Oath of Brotherhood in the Peach Garden” (Taoyuan san jieyi 桃園三結義), sworn by Liu Bei, Zhang Fei and Guan Yu at the start of Three Kingdoms. In the story, the trio are highly united; they fight together and die for each other. There is a Chinese idiom calling such relationship “a friendship of life and death” (shengsi zhijiao 生死之交).

1.6 Friendship, Civic Relationship and Limitation of Confucian Familial Character Formation Indeed, I agree with Mullis (2010, p. 397–8) that Confucians are not very much concerned about equality. Instead Confucianism emphasizes loyalty and trustworthiness among friends. This manifests that traditional Chinese culture emphasizes relationships (guanxi 關係) more than individuality and equality. The recent discussions about equality of Confucian friendship were triggered by studies of Aristotle’s friendship and modern Western values. In Classical Confucianism, probably due to the ancient background culture, Confucians are concerned more about filial piety and familial relationships as the moral foundation rather than equality. And thus, equality among friends is downplayed in the face of family. However, overemphasizing familial relationships at the expense of friendship could also lead to adverse effects on one’s character, that is, the formation of nepotism which is unfavorable in establishing civil society and is widely criticized by modern scholars (Küng 2002, p. 83). And I would argue that Aristotle’s emphasis on friendship can be supplementary to potential dangers of falling into nepotism in Confucianism. Although family relationships are unconditional, intimate and benevolent, they are also hierarchical and exclusive towards non-familial members. While filial piety is considered the root of all social virtues (Mencius, 3B9, Analects, 1.2), Confucianism rejects equalizing the parent–children relationship to treat it as equivalent to friendship because it will cause children’s attitude towards parents to be disrespectful and unfilial, and finally make family discipline ineffective. However, civic relationship

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in political society is non-hierarchical and inclusive. Sticking to hierarchical familial ethics seems insufficient in dealing with the demand of civic relationships. As Mullis (2010, p. 399) argues, “Aristotle is right in seeing friendship as the relationship that connects familial virtue with civic virtue.” For Aristotle, friendship is valuable and essential for moral cultivation because it provides a context for mutual learning and mutual support among people who are common in their dedication to the cultivation of virtue; it also provides a safe and trustworthy environment in which friends, with different family backgrounds or moral frameworks, can exchange and deliberate together about social political issues (Mullis 2010, p. 401; Sherman 1987, p. 598). Dialog and deliberation require an attitude of openness to hear something new so as to form a connection with another. In such deliberation, our vision and horizons are also broadened and go beyond our families’ experience; and ideally such deliberation can move toward, what Gadamer (2004, p. 305) calls, a “fusion of horizons” among friends. According to Mavis Biss (2011, pp. 125–31), Aristotle’s idea of the friend as “another self” is understood in terms of “a partner in moral perception,” which contributes to our self-understanding. In our interaction with friends, I am necessarily confronted by them because of the differences among us. Such confrontations with someone different in a trusting relationship can enhance our self-knowledge. Such dialog and deliberation together is also an experience of transformation of the self, in which relations between individuals are “transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were” (Gadamer 2004, p. 371), and our concern for others is therefore expanded as friendship “provide[s] the opportunity for the extension of goodwill beyond the family” (Mullis 2010, p. 402). In friendship, individuals come to identify with each other through extension of the self in their shared activities, in which friends’ affections are mutually influenced and form a kind of what Aristotle call “singleness of mind” (EE 1240b2, b9–10. cited from Sherman 1987, p. 599) through sympathy as well as empathy. In light of the above discussion by Aristotelian scholars, Aristotle’s concern of friendship and civic relationship seems to shed light on Confucian reflection of familism, friendship and its relation to civic society in modern society. While we don’t have to model family-relations based on egalitarian friendship as suggested by Tan Sitong, equality among friends should also be affirmed in Confucianism. Confucianism should consider friendship as a bridge between family and civil society. Once we have learnt fraternal respect among siblings in the family setting, we should learn how to extend and transform this character in public as virtues of egalitarian friendship, such as being trustworthy, empathetic and respectful of differences, finally extended to relationships among citizens in civil society.

1.7 Conclusion This paper has demonstrated how Aristotle’s theory of friendship and Confucians’ teaching and Confucius’ friendship with his disciples can mutually shed light on and give us a more vivid picture and idea of friendship, which is not only warm and joyful,

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but mutually supportive in character formation and moral pursuit, even in adversity. I have also shown that while Confucianism stresses loyalty and trustworthiness of friendship, Aristotle emphasizes equality among friends. Confucianism stresses trustworthiness because it emphasizes relationships and solidarity and they tend to perceive close friends as siblings, as truly another self. Confucianism also emphasizes the role of family in one’s formation of character which is fundamental to establishing healthy friendships. Confucians’ emphasis on trustworthiness and familism can be supplementary to Aristotle’s friendship. Aristotle emphasizes equality because he considers friendship as a bridge between family and civil society; and through friendships individuals can prepare themselves for participation in civic relationships by deliberating with friends about social political issues. This political implication of friendship should also illuminate and stimulate Confucianism in their reflection of familism, friendship and civil society in modern society.

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Kraut, R. (2012). Aristotle’s ethics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter Edition). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/aristotle-eth ics/. Küng, H. (2002). Tracing the way: Spiritual dimensions of the world religions. London: Continuum. Kutcher, N. (2000). The fifth relationship: Dangerous friendship in the confucian context. American Historical Review, 105(5), 1615–1629. Legge, J. (trans.) (1861). The Chinese classics: With a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes, volume 1: Confucian Analects, the great learning, and the doctrine of the mean. London: Trübner. Lu, X. (2010). Rethinking confucian friendship. Asian Philosophy, 20(3), 225–245. Mencius, Lau, D. C. (trans.) (2004). Mencius (Penguin Classics). London: Penguin. Mullis, E. C. (2010). Confucius and Aristotle on the goods of friendship. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 9(4), 391–405. Pangle, L. S. (2003). Aristotle and the philosophy of friendship. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pakaluk, M. (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics: An introduction. Cambridge University Press. Pakaluk, M. (2009). Friendship. In G. Anagnostopoulos (Ed.), A companion to Aristotle (pp. 471– 482). Cambridge, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Rosenlee, L. H. L. (2015). Confucian friendship 友 as spousal relationship: A feminist imagination. International Communication of Chinese Culture, 2(3), 181–203. Sherman, N. (1987). Aristotle on friendship and the shared life. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 47(4), 589–613. Sim, M. (2007). Remastering morals with Aristotle and Confucius. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sima, Q. 司馬遷 (2014). Shiji: Dian Jiao Ben Er Shi Si Shi Xiu Ding Ben 史記: 點校本二十四史 修訂本 (Records of the Historians). Beijing Shi: Zhonghua Publishing, 北京市: 中華書局. Tan, S. T. 譚嗣同 (1981). Study of Ren (RenXue 仁學). In S. Cai 蔡尚思 & X. Fang 方行 (Ed.). Complete works of Tan Sitong (Tan Sitong quanji 譚嗣同全集). Beijing: Zhonghua Publishing 北京: 中華書局. Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition (pp. 25–73). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tu, W. M. (1993). Way, learning, and politics: Essays on the Confucian intellectual. New York: State University of New York Press.

Andrew Tsz Wan Hung is a Lecturer in the College of Professional and Continuing Education, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He teaches Critical thinking, political philosophy and Chinese culture at the Division of Social Sciences, Humanities and Design. His research focuses on Charles Taylor, Christian ethics, Western and Chinese philosophy.

Chapter 2

Aristotle’s and Buddha’s Notion of Happiness: A Comparative Study John B. Brotamante

Abstract The paper seeks to understand happiness in Aristotle’s and Buddha’s thought. This is not to argue about which of them has the best or greatest teaching on how to attain happiness. The research problems are the following: Is there a differences on the notion of happiness between Aristotle and Buddha? What are the approaches in attaining happiness? What is the end of happiness for both of them? What is the origin of happiness as conceived by them? And Is the Golden Mean the same as or different with Middle Path of Buddha. The paper also seeks to identify the possible similarities and differences in the ways on how to attain happiness. The framework to be used is the discourses on happiness by Eastern philosophy of Gautama Buddha specifically on The Four Noble Truths (dukkha) The Eightfold Path, anatta (egolessness), and anicca (impermanence) and the Western philosophy of Aristotle. Rather than using traditional philosophical method I used comparative study. The methodology to be used is comparative analysis in order to identify relationships on the notion, approaches and discipline on how to attain happiness. Similarities and differences from distinct traditions are to be discussed. Keywords Happiness · Buddhism · Eudaimonia · Golden mean · Middle path

2.1 Introduction Happiness is one of the hardest words to define. Ultimate happiness has nothing to do with the happiness of powerful people or with that of everyday people. In the daily lives of people, they encounter different definitions of the word happiness. Looking at philosophy, there is also a wide and diverse range of approaches to this concept. For Gandhi, “Happiness is when what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony”. Aristotle on the other hands says that happiness is the highest desire and ambition of all human beings. The way to reach it is through virtue. He believed J. B. Brotamante (B) Bicol University, Albay, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_2

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that it is more of a lifestyle. It is also necessary to practice prudence of character and have a good “daimon”, good fate in order to lead a full and truly happy life. Epicurus proposed the principle that balance and temperance were what created space for happiness. For Nietzsche, happiness is not constant well-being but it is the ideal state of laziness. Being happy means being able to prove the vital strength by overcoming adversity and creating original ways in which to live. Happiness is to have power. In Buddhism, equanimity, or peace, is achieved by detaching oneself from the cycle of craving that produces Dukkha. So, by achieving a mental state where you can detach from all the passions, needs and wants of life, you free yourself and achieve a state, a transcendent bliss and well-being. The concept of happiness has been under consideration among philosophers, theologians, mystics, psychologists and scholars since a long time ago. Many philosophers regard happiness as Summum Bonum of life. What is Happiness? Many of them consider happiness as the fulfillment of desires, passions, whims and aims. Many of them have attempted to define the term happiness but they could not succeed in finding an adequate and unified position. Sometimes it is conceived as ‘greater good’ and sometimes ‘pleasure’. It is sometimes taken as the highest level of satisfaction, or the power to overcome fears, or obeying the laws of God, or contented conscience. It is considered to be obtained by exercising reason or by hanging up reality or through the highest virtue or by achieving a target. None of these, however, have presented the satisfactory definition of happiness. People acquire money, fame, and power by they do not consider themselves happy. As a short history, the concept of happiness has been a subject of discussion among Ancient Greek philosophers. Before the late seventeenth century, people conceived happiness as a matter of fate or virtue or God’s favor. Etymologically, the ancient Greek and Indo-European languages designated the term happiness with the word ‘hap’ means ‘fortune’ or ‘chance’. This linguistic pattern suggest that happiness was out of human control and it was just in God’s providence. Most of the ancient people took happiness as a matter of ‘lack’ which is govern by the heavenly stars. As a matter of fact, happiness literally meant what occurs to human naturally and nothing in his hands. Hellenic philosophers defined the term in different context. The Greek word for happiness is ‘Eudaimonia’ means being true to one’s inner self (Shagufta et al. n.d.). Whatever our definitions of happiness, it certainly means a lot of things to different people. For Aristotle, “Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence. Happiness is something we feel, it is an internal experience of consciousness. Happiness is part of our awareness, our consciousness. It is a state of being; the Dalai Lama possibly one of the foremost advocates of happiness says, “Happiness is not a luxury, it is the purpose of our existence (Martin 2014). We all know happiness of course when we see and experience it. Webster’s Dictionary defines happiness as—“the state of being happy”. Synonyms include pleasure, contentment, satisfaction, cheerfulness, merriment, gaiety, joy, joyfulness, joviality, delight, good spirits, lightheartedness, and well-being (Alcorn 2015, p. 13). On the other hand, the East concept of happiness in Buddhism originates in Pali and is called sukkah, which is both as a noun meaning “happiness”, “ease”, “bliss”, or pleasure and an adjective meaning ‘blissful’ or ‘pleasant’. This paper utilizes

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comparative methodology where the topic is to be compared from different traditions, the Western and Eastern. Comparative differs from traditional philosophy which ideas are compared among the same traditions or particular traditions. This not also merely an act of comparing two or more things with a view of discovering something about one or all of the things being compared. For Aristotle, “Happiness depends on ourselves”. More than anybody else, Aristotle enshrined happiness as a central purpose of human life and goal in itself. He argues that virtue is achieve by maintaining the mean, which is the balance of two excesses. While material things has value but it cannot subordinate the higher value, the chief good for which humanity should aim. To be an ultimate end an act must be self- sufficient and final, “that which is always desirable for itself and never for the sake of something else” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1079a 30–34), and must be attainable by human person. Aristotle claims that nearly everyone would agree that happiness is the end to which meets all the requirements (Pursuit of happiness, n.d.). On the other hand, the Buddha taught many things, but the basic concepts of Buddhism can be summed up by the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. To attain the Enlightenment and ultimate happiness one must value the latter. Buddhism is the philosophy and practice that is extremely concerned with the mind and its various delusions, misunderstanding and cravings, but happily for us, sees a way out through higher consciousness and mindful practice. Middle Path is referred to a peaceful way of life which negotiated the extreme of harsh asceticism and sensual pleasure seeking. In addition, the contrast between collectivist and individualist value of happiness, on the latter people tend to believe internal efforts and pleasure-seeking lead to happiness while the former people tend to regards community and tradition as source of happiness. The ways people seek happiness differs across culture. Individuals within independent cultural contexts are more likely to be motivated to maximize the experience of positive effect and to seek happiness and this pursuit of happiness as seen as fundamental human rights to be protected in the society. Collectivist happiness tends to define in terms of interpersonal connectedness or balance between the self and others.

2.2 The Buddhist Concept of Happiness There are three marks of existence for Buddhism namely: the characteristics of impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness or suffering (dukkha), and non-self (anatta). Anicca or impermanence means that all conditioned things are in constant state of flux. Physical and mental events come into being and dissolve. Anatta, that there is no unchanging, permanent self while anicca and dukkha apply to all conditioned phenomena. Anatta has a wider scope because it is applied to all dhamma conditioned unconditioned qualification. Thus, Nirvana too is a state of “without self” anatta. (Dhammapada, nd.) On the first problem of this paper regarding, Is there a difference between the concept of happiness of Buddhism and Aristotle? The paper discusses the background of what Buddhism is and the concept of Buddhism about

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happiness from the latter teaching on the Four Noble Truths and Eightfold Path. Buddhism teaching is ambivalent in the sense that it claims as philosophy but preaches spirituality as religion but does not talk about God. Buddhism concentrates on the human person as interwoven with the whole cosmic cycle. It introduces humanity to a new focus of thinking that belabors on the phenomenon of man without having to create a myth of perfection and purpose. At the apex of this search for understanding of man is the message that the Buddha attained enlightenment and that the wish to share all sentient being. Just as the whole story of the Buddha involved a long transformative process to attain enlightenment and liberation, his great desires to cultivate authentic enlightenment for all beings having taught for forty-five years to embrace his doctrine. Instead, he warned his followers against a hurried conversion. The paper also does away with the short cuts explaining the Buddha’s teaching but rather the whole account of cause and effect, problem and solutions which is the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path that leads to liberation. Before discussing the latter teachings of Buddhism, some verses from Dhammapada chapters about happiness are enumerated: All that we are is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a shadow that never leaves him. (Chapter I, 2) The virtuous man is happy in this world, and he is happy in the next. He is happy in both. He is happy when he thinks of the good he has done; he is still happier when going on the good path… (Chapter I, 18) Let us live happily then, not hating those who hate us! Among men who hate us, let us dwell free from hatred. (Chapter XV, 197) Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He who has given up both victory and defeat, he, the contented, is happy. (Chapter XV, 201) Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvana, the highest happiness. (Chapter XV, 203) Health is the greatest of gifts, contentedness the best riches; trust is the best relationships, Nirvana, the highest happiness. (Chapter XV, 204) The sight of the elect is good, to live with them is always happiness; if a man does not see fools, he will truly be happy. (Chapter XV, 206)

Thus, it is said by the Buddha, the Enlightened One that it is through not understanding, not realizing four things that I, disciples, as well as you, had to wander so long through this round of rebirths. What are these four things? They are the noble truth of suffering, the noble truth of the origin of suffering, the noble truth of the extinction of suffering, and the noble truth of the path that leads to the extinction of suffering. As soon as the absolutely true knowledge and insight as regards these four noble truths had become perfectly clear in me, there arose in me the assurance that I had won the supreme enlightenment unsurpassed. The four noble truth is the existential human reality where all cannot deny it. No one and nobody passes this worldly experience without encountering such. Although all have different situatedness or circumstances, it is undeniably ever present. Next is the enumeration of eightfold path which the Buddha taught his disciples. In this, Buddha explains how Nirvana

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can result from the discipline of the eightfold path. In his teachings, Buddha did not claim divine authority, instead he emphasized that each person should trust his own experience (p. 2). These are the eightfold path: (1) right understanding and (2) right mindedness are about wisdom; (3) right speech, (4) right action, and (5) right living are about morality; (6) right effort, (7) right attentiveness, and (8) right concentration which together are about concentration. What do the various verses from Dhammapada say? All verses show hopeful, earnest, and self-efficient humanism. Mind is to be tamed and well-disciplined as the Buddha is modelled. Thoughts and acts are always interrelated. The verse on Chap. 1 manifests the Karmic effect which indicates the natural cause and effect formula of nature. If our thought is pure and regulates well our acts, then happiness follows. In addition, virtue and happiness is interconnected. A person experiences happiness in his virtue and experience happiness in his happiness. Happy for any good deeds and happier if he is observing the path of Buddha which is the middle path. It is a path between the experience of eternalism and asceticism. On chapter XV of Dhammapada section 197–208 the succeeding verses speak about happiness. Enumerated are the following key phrases of some verses: 197-dwell free from hatred; 198-free from ailments; 199-dwell free from greed; 200-call nothing our own, we should be like Gods, feeding on happiness; 201-gave up victory and defeat, the contented is happy; 202-there is no happiness higher than rest; 203-Nirvana, the highest happiness. These are all the manifestation of all human reality that all the Dhammapada’s verses specifically on happiness are doable but with constant repetition through time. The Buddha laid out the essence of the Dhammapada as a guide for living in one of his sermons. The word dharma means “the teachings of Buddhism”. The Buddha commanded, “One should be watchful over his speech, well-restrained in mind, and commit no wholesome deed with his body” (Dhammapada, n.d). The Dhammapada was written to help people follow the teachings of Buddhism, a key theme that runs through the Dhammapada is the idea that the human mind is not somehow a by-product of the physical universe. Rather, according to the Buddha, mind comes before all that exists. The destruction of the body is not the end of existence; instead the external world is a creation of the mind. The Buddha explained that the mind is unstable, changing, and indecisive. Dhammapada verses are truths applicable in daily lives.

2.3 Aristotle’s Concept of Happiness Aristotle argues that the function of man is the active exercise of the soul’s faculties in conformity with rational principle. This will lead to happiness. However, happiness requires deliberately choosing and living a life of virtue throughout one’s life (Alcorn 2015, p. 5). For Aristotle, the wise man, for instance, does not only know, love, and appreciate virtue—he practices virtue and lives a life of virtue. Thus, to the philosophic mind of Aristotle, true knowledge means wisdom which means in turn knowing and doing

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what is best for you, for the attainment of your own perfection and happiness. Man’s perfection and happiness therefore for Aristotle, consists of wisdom and virtue. Since reason is supreme in man, it should be given all of life’s activities. A good and happy life is a well-ordered one, guided by, and lived in accordance with reason. An unhappy life in contrast, is a disordered life dominated by passion and the lower nature of man. Happiness is the fruit of virtuous living, the constant and proper exercise of reason in all man’s actions and endeavors. While stressing the hegemony of reason in man, Aristotle does not ignore or neglect the development of man’s subordinate powers— man’s physical, economic, artistic, and social capacities. To him, human happiness comes harmonious exercise and development of the whole man—of all human faculties, powers, and potentialities, primarily, his rational prerogatives and secondarily, his physical and emotional attributes as already explained and stressed earlier. Happiness is the rationally organized activity of the whole man. Just as each organ of the body has its distinctive function and measures its well-being and happiness by the degree of excellence or virtue which it exercises that function so man’s happiness will go hand and hand, primarily with the exercise or the virtuous operation of the distinctive activity, which is reason, and secondarily with the harmonious exercise of the other activities of this composite and complicated nature. (Montemayor 1994, p. 197)

Happiness is the highest good for Aristotle. The highest good is supreme in hierarchy of Goods. Good corresponds to end every action and decision, seems to aim at some good; hence the good has been well described as that at which everything aims. However, there is an apparent difference among the ends aimed at. For the end is sometimes an activity, sometimes a product beyond the activity; and when there is an end beyond the action, the product is by nature better than activity. The hierarchy of goods correspond to the hierarchy of ends (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a). Most people identify the good with happiness, but disagree about the nature of happiness. As far as its name goes, most people virtually agree, since both the many and the cultivated call it happiness. Supposedly, living well and doing well are the same as being happy but they disagree about what happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer on the wise (Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a25). What are the characteristics of the good? The good is the end of action. The good is complete and the best good is apparently complete. An end pursuit in itself is more complete that the end pursued because of something else; an end that is never choice worthy because of something else is more complete than ends that are choice worthy both in themselves and because of this end; and hence an end that is always choice worthy in itself never because of something else is unconditionally complete. Happiness meets the criteria for completeness, but other goods do not. The good is self-sufficient; so is happiness (Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b). Anyway, we regard something is self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choice worthy and lacking nothing; and that is what happiness does. Moreover, happiness is most choice worthy of all goods since it is not counted as one good among many, it is one among many. Happiness then is apparently something complete and self-sufficient since it is the end of the things pursued in action (Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b25).

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A common conception of happiness—the belief that happy person lives well and does well in action agrees with our account, since we have virtually said that the end is a sort of living well and doing well in action. Happiness is virtue. Happiness then is best, finest, and most pleasant (Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b5).

2.4 Discussion on the Approaches, Origin, End, and Means of Attaining Happiness This portion discusses the approaches, origin, end and means of attaining happiness. This will further our understanding of both thinkers and a chance for us to explore the possible similarities and differences. Approaches on Attaining Happiness in Buddhism There were three approaches/teachings of the Buddha in order to attain happiness. First, the Buddha teaches the “middle way”. In metaphysics, or matters relating to being, becoming and non-being, the middle way of interdependent arising lies between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism (no thing or self or substance exists). In epistemology, or matters relating to knowledge, truth, belief, and ignorance (neither truth nor knowledge) and conventional belief, what is thought and said to be true but is not. In ethics, or matters relating to proper living, the middle way of the eightfold path lies between the extreme of sensual indulgence and ascetic mortification (Laumakis 2008, pp. 45–46). Siddhartha Gautama found a solution on how to act on the middle path. He meditated for 40 days in order to find and answer the human misery. He was not tempted and distracted. In meditation, he directed his mind towards the heavenly spheres and spheres beyond normal consciousness which the ascetic masters had taught him; but to the mysteries of death and rebirth in the world of appearance (Co 2003, p. 18). During one memorable night in deep meditation, while concentrating all his power of mind and spirit on the one goal he passed from state of meditation to another, he finally reached the highest state of consciousness—Nirvana. The knowledge of remembering his former lives, knowledge of birth and death, and certainty of having cast off ignorance and passion. These led to perfect insight on interdependent origination and Destruction, No-Self. Siddhartha said, “And thus perceiving, thus beholding, my mind was freed from desire, from cravings for life, and from delusion. And this knowledge come to me, rebirth is ended, the holy life is fulfilled, and what I was to do is done, this world is no more for me”. He no longer fears sickness nor death, old age, and impermanence. He became the Buddha which means the enlightened one (Co 2003, p.18). Here the Dharma and the Dharma wheel emerge, which leads to his sermon about the four noble truths. Following Siddhartha’s middle way or path which are either metaphysical, epistemological, or ethical will lead us to enlightenment or nirvana. The second teaching of the Buddha is about the new philosophical outlook

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of truth, a new way of understanding the world and its metaphysical structure. It is summarized in the four noble truths. In the noble truth of suffering, human existence is seen as formation, they are transitory, they arise, perish, change, are subject to diseases, etc. Feelings, perception, and volition changes. There are principles of suffering, suffering in itself, experienced as such; suffering of fact being conditioned and suffering arising from change (Co 2003, p. 47). The noble truth of the origin of sufferings, consists of threefold craving: sensual craving; craving for eternal annihilation and; self-annihilation. The noble truth of the extinction of suffering. This, is truly, is the peace, this is the highest, namely the end of all formations, for forsaking of every substratum of rebirth. The fading away of craving, detachment, extinction – Nirvana. (Carus 1915)

The fourth noble truth of the path that leads to the extinctions of suffering. There is an unborn, unoriginated, uncreated, and unformed. If there were not this unborn, this unoriginated, this uncreated, this unformed, escaped from the world of the born, the originated, the created, the formed, world not be possible. Gautama was convinced that suffering lies at the end of all existence. If one would want to be enlightened or receive salvation, he/she needs to know and understand the four noble truths which comprised the essence of Buddha’s teachings. In summary of the noble truths, suffering exists, it is a human reality, situated in man, it has a cause, it has an end; and it has a cause to bring about its end. The notion of suffering is not a negative understanding of experiences but rather a pragmatic perspective, perspective of dealing with human experience and finally know how to correct it. Understanding suffering through the noble truths is also understanding human realities. Finally, the logic of understanding happiness depends outside it and through achieving Nirvana. It is a transcendent state free from suffering and worldly circle of birth and rebirth. Spiritual enlightenment is achieved. Desire and ignorance lie at the root of suffering. The want that cannot be satisfied are craving for material goods, craving for pleasure, and mortality. “It is the noble eightfold path, the way that leads to the extinction of suffering (Carus 1915). The first two of the Eightfold Path are right understanding and right mindfulness. The previous is the moment of arriving at the truth about the meaning of life, the final attainment of wisdom. It is the awakening of the mind to truth. The latter gives thorough attention of what we do, directs the mind away from distractions caused by Samsara, gives attention to internal and external feelings and attention to mental state, and the hindrances of our mental quality (Co 2003, pp. 62–64). These are wisdom. Knowledge plus understanding equates to wisdom. For Buddhism, “wisdom” is realizing or perceiving the true nature of reality, seeing things as they are, not as they appear (O’Brien 2018). The succeeding three is referring to morality. Right speech, oral or written can inspire or cause harm. Buddha proposes four kinds of words: words of honesty; words of kindness; words that nurture; and words that are worthy of saying. The worth of our words is truly measured by how they improve in silence. A right action is an action that moral activity terminates. Buddha teaches man “to do not to harm”, actions should be directed to the preservation of all living beings and genuine compassion

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to all sentient life. Right livelihood—he is sustained by what he earned. One should not relish life for the sake of others. The last three of the paths are: right effort; right attentiveness; and right concentration. In right effort, discipline and diligence are the key to persevering the path to enlightenment. Right attentiveness shows that truth grows in the garden of thoughts. Careful if the thoughts are born of desire that causes suffering. Right concentration—single minded concentration on the path without hesitation or doubts towards the direction of Nirvana (Co 2003, pp. 62–64). For Buddha, the path to happiness starts from understanding of the root causes of suffering. Like a good doctor, he identifies symptoms which are the causes of sufferings and proactively prescribes the course of treatment which is the eightfold path. The Dharma and Sangha, the teachings and the believers of the Buddha are there to help an individual in attaining its liberation. The cure of illness or sufferings is the following of the path. It is not an easy task nor can it be done in a short period of time rather it is achieved by daily practice of mindful thought and action. Meditation is the most well-known tool for it. It is a tool to train the mind not to dwell from past or the future, rather live here and now, the realm in which we can experience peace the most and reality. Origin of Happiness in Buddhism The origin of happiness for Buddhism is the experience and recognition of our experience of the first noble truth that there is suffering. The Buddha says, “don’t just make it shut up, but recognize it, understand it”. This is the beginning of the path to happiness. Like the Buddhism notion of sukkha and ananda—bliss, joy in the Hindu tradition—flourishing is a sense of happiness that is beyond the momentary vicissitude of our emotional state. As observed, Buddhism talked about real, true, and experiential suffering which all human creatures are into it. Happiness is something, not nothing. Its origin is recognizable, livable, and changeable. In Buddhism, pursuing happiness is not just moving away from one thing—the acquisition of external object but moving towards another—dharma practice from physical to mental things which mislead greater freedom. End of Happiness in Buddhism Every individual act for an end. No same person acts for nothing or for any undetermined end. No one acted for the sake of unhappiness. Good or happiness is what everyone desires. The happiness that is being sought in Buddhism is not only the physical happiness just like the suffering that is not only physical but can also be psychological, mental, and spiritual. Buddha believed that dukkha ultimately arose from ignorance and false knowledge (delusion). Dukkha is defined as suffering, “mental dysfunction”. Because of mental misalignment, all movement, thoughts, and creation that flow out can never be wholly satisfactory. In short, it cannot be completely happy. The eightfold path is a practical and systematic way of ignorance, eliminating dukkha from our minds and our lifestyle through mindful thoughts. From the Dhammapada, “if by leaving small pleasures one sees a great pleasure, let a wise person leave the small pleasure and look great” (Dhammapada n.d.).

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Buddhism pursues happiness by using knowledge and practice to achieve mental equanimity. In Buddhism, equanimity or peace of mind is achieved by detaching oneself from the cycle of craving that produces dukkha. So, by achieving a mental state where you can detach from all the passions, needs, and wants of life, you free yourself and achieve the state of transcendental bliss and well-being. The Buddha encouraged his followers to pursue “tranquility” and “insight” as the mental qualities that would lead to Nirvana, the ultimate reality. The end is to achieve transcendental happiness. Nirvana is the highest state that someone can attain. A state of enlightenment, a person’s individual desires and suffering go away. This truly is the peace, this is the highest namely the end of all formations, the forsaking of every substratum of rebirth, the fading away of craving, detachment, extinction, Nirvana (Dhammapada n.d.). Buddhism—The Middle Path The Middle Way, the eightfold path, between the extremes of asceticism and sensual indulgence. It is portrayed not so much as prescriptions for behavior but as qualities that are present in the mind of a person who has understood nirvana, the state of cessation of suffering and the goal of Buddhism (Lopez 2019). Buddhist teaching is neither a path of denial nor affirmation. It shows us the paradox of the universe within and beyond the universe. It teaches us to be in the world not of the world. This is the middle way. “There is a middle way between the extremes of indulgence and self-denial, free from sorrow and suffering. This is the way to peace and liberation in this very life.” There is neither going forward, nor going backward, nor standing still. “Try to be mindful and let things take their natural course. You will see many strange and wonderful things come and go but you will be still. This is the happiness of the Buddha” (Kornfield 2019). The two extremes presented are the eternalist and the annihilationist or materialist. The Buddha teaches neither an eternal nor a temporary ego-identity. The concept of Ego-less is different from egolessness where the former is a psychophysical reality that changes from time to time while the latter is neither changes nor unchanged. Aristotle’s Approach in Attaining Happiness Aristotle taught that happiness is an essential motive of human life and an end in itself. He further maintains that happiness depends upon human beings. He was convinced that happiness is the key component for a happy life which requires physical and mental well-being as prerequisites. Aristotle argues that one can be happy if and only if one pursues a moral and intellectual virtue. Aristotle enshrines happiness as a central purpose of human life and a goal in itself. That happiness depends on cultivation of virtue. Aristotle was convinced that a genuinely happy life required the fulfillment of a broad range of conditions, including physical as well as mental well-being. Thus, Aristotle gives us his definition of happiness. … the function of man is to live a certain kind of life, and this activity implies a rational principle, and the function of a good man is the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed it is performed in accord with the appropriate excellence:

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if this is the case, then happiness turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a13)

Here shows the link between happiness and virtue. Aristotle tells us that the most important factor in the effort to achieve happiness is to have a good moral character. What he calls complete virtue. One must strive to possess all of them. He is happy who lives in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some change period but throughout a complete life. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1101a10)

Origin of Happiness in Aristotle Happiness is the fruit of virtuous living, the constant and proper exercise of reason in all man’s actions and endeavors. Happiness is the highest good. It originated from the good. Happiness meets the criteria for completeness. The good with completeness which is self-sufficient is the same as happiness. Happiness as self-sufficient is a choice-worthy act. The origin of happiness which is the good has three classifications: external, some goods of the soul and other goods of the body. There is a common conception of happiness that the happy person lives well and does well in action which also agrees with our account, since we have virtually said that the end is a sort of living well and doing well in action. Happiness came from virtue which are pleasant. Since happiness is an activity of the soul expressing complete virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b25). The End of Happiness in Aristotle In philosophy, the term “means” to an “end” refers to any action (means) carried out for the sole purpose of achieving something else (end). Everywhere, we see people seeking pleasure, wealth, and a good reputation. But while each of these has some value, none of them can occupy the place of chief good for which humanity should aim. To be an ultimate end, an act must be self-sufficient and final. “That which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1097a30–34); it must be attainable by man. Aristotle claim that nearly everyone would agree that happiness is the end which meets all these requirements. It is easy enough to see desire, money, pleasure, and honor because we believe that these goods will make us happy. It seems that the other goods are a means towards obtaining happiness, while happiness is always an end in itself. The previous literature and discussions justified and supported the claim that happiness is an end of man’s striving. Some happiness is complete, self-sufficient, desirable, good, pleasant, and a virtue. Although in Greek words, happiness is translated to eudaimonia. This is partly right but sometimes misleading. For Aristotle however, happiness is a final end or goal that encompasses the totality of one’s life. It is not something that can be gained in a few hours or easily lost like pleasures. It is more like the ultimate value of life as lived up this moment, measuring how well you have lived up to your full potential as a human being. For this reason, one cannot really make a pronouncement about whether one has lived a life until it is already over. As Aristotle says, “for it is not swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time

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that make a man blessed and happy” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a18) The happiness here as an end refers to the continuous doing of good act until perfection. It is an act of habituation of doing good not for any other reason but for its own sake. Aristotle—The Golden Mean and Happiness Aristotelian rationalism finds its crowning exemplifications in his theory of golden mean. Aristotle tells as that a function is properly exercised and an activity properly performed when done in consonance with reason within rational bounds which lie midway between two false and vicious extremes. Anything done or indulged in excessively, inordinately, or done inadequately or insufficiently would go out of bounds, becomes unreasonable, improper, and unfitting to man’s rational nature. Thus, over activity or complete inactivity are ruled out by reason as reprehensible and even injurious to man’s well-being. Aristotle counsels us to avoid extremes, the two “too’s” (too much and too little—in short practice moderation). This theory can be succinctly stated: truth and virtue are found midway between two false and vicious extremes. Vices are irrational and reprehensible because they often arise from passion which often go beyond, and contravene the counsels of reason (Montemayor 1994, p. 198). Aristotle maintains that virtue can be achieved by the ‘mean’: the balance between two excesses. Aristotle considers that happiness depends on the actions performed by the rational part which is the soul. Happiness is an activity which enhances virtue: He defines happiness as: …the function of man is to be a certain kind of life, and this is to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human goods turns out to be an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1098b)

Aristotle makes important distinction between right desire and wrong desire. According to him, what we naturally desire is the need and need is always a right desire while what we want is always apparently good, in reality, it is a wrong desire. There are some needs which people also want e.g. food and shelter. These are not just apparently good but is really good. Thus, the natural desire which is the right desire leads towards happiness. Aristotle considers that happiness is good as a whole for human life. What he means is that a life must be completed or ended before we judge whether it was a happy life or not. Wealth, friends, knowledge, fame, and power are good but the Summum Bonum (the highest good) is only happiness (Shagufta et al. n.d.). Equanimity, a deep sense of well-being and happiness is attainable through proper knowledge and practice of everyday life (Pursuit of Happiness, n.d.). Happiness for Aristotle and Buddha is the desire or attraction which is all and be all of the human person. Aristotle wrote that happiness is not just a feeling but a state one enters after utilizing the virtues to the fullest extent. The Greek term eudaimonia is translated as good-spirited, reiterating that happiness is not just to feel something but to be something. All aspects of a Buddhist lifestyle gear forwards working for

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the ultimate happiness, Nirvana. In order to enter Nirvana, one must overcome the natural suffering caused by being human. Not overcoming the natural state will lead to suffering and unhappiness. One must follow the eightfold path. The path is described as a paradox. One’s true nature is to be happy but one must remove themselves from the tendencies to go against that nature. When followed, the eightfold path will lead to nirvana, the ultimate end. Happiness is determined by one’s state of mind rather than external events. Both thinkers talked about external and internal events which are factors that affects happiness. The Eightfold Path of Buddha is equivalent to the virtues that one utilizes to achieve happiness. Aristotle teaches that in order to achieve his definition of happiness, one must perform their highest function of reasoning while utilizing their highest values. Both thinkers subscribe to the mean between extremes. The extremes between asceticism and physical indulgence for Buddhism and midway between two false vicious extremes. They are good habits achieved through practice and repetition until they instilled are instilled into one’s life. The golden mean for Aristotle and the middle way for Buddhism.

2.5 Comparison and Contrast on the Concept of Happiness in Buddhism and Aristotle Despite their different social and cultural contexts, there are many formal parallels between the ideals of human perfection conceived by Buddha and that of Aristotle. Both regard human nature as complex of intellectual and emotional factors and consider that the final good for man lies in the full development of his potential in these two dimensions. For both, the process is gradual and cumulative through one’s life. The state of perfection finally reached—Nirvana for Buddhism and Eudaimonia for Aristotle. In Buddhism, the Dhammapada is the known collection of Buddha’s saying that talk about suffering and happiness. Aristotle has the Nicomachean ethics which comprised all the writings about teaching on the components of life/human nature, virtues, and the good. Both thinkers taught that in order to attain a deeper form of happiness, it requires a deeper look into the face of reality. Both also encourages their followers to do good and recognizes the hierarchical elements of goodness. Aristotle and Buddha’s teachings in the latter sense can be considered either realist or humanist. Both discussed human realities and natures. Buddha’s teachings point thorough engagement with lived reality. It is through such engagement with one’s self, the world, and reality that one is able to achieve a transcendental happiness. Buddhism teaches that the ultimate evil/cause of suffering is ignorance, desires (dukkha) yielded around constant wants. Living without yearning for sensual pleasures among those who yearn for sensual pleasures (Parrish 2014). Both also believed on the method in attaining the ultimate end, which is happiness through meditation. Having said the similarities, I identified also some differences in their concept of happiness. First, Aristotle as a westerner, his direct subject of his teaching is focused on individual

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human person for his well-being and flourishing. The Buddha was focused on a more collective way of subject, like the virtue of compassion, generosity, and sense of community. In other words, it is more participative and cultural. The way of Buddhism is more extremely concerned with the mind and various delusions, cravings, and misunderstandings but it sees for us a way out through higher consciousness and mindful practices. The mind here is not referring to a kind of monism nor dualism of mind and matter but, rather Buddhism emphasizes the dependence of the mind with the body or matter. This is the reason also why the way of the Buddha is rigorous and a lifetime process. It does not tantamount that Aristotle’s way is easy. Buddhism utilizes heart, intuition, and feelings in the attainment of happiness. Aristotle uses more on reason, for him man is higher than other animal because of his reason.

2.6 Conclusion Whatever our definition of happiness, it certainly means a lot of things to different people. Different cultures, traditions, religions, beliefs, and geographical locations view happiness in various forms. Although differences occur in conception of happiness, there were notable similarities. These are the following: A. Aristotle and Buddha teach that happiness is human reality and is attainable; B. Both believed that happiness is the ultimate end and purpose of human existence; C. For Aristotle, happiness is not a pleasure nor is it a virtue instead it is the exercise of virtue—while for Buddha, it is avoidance to cravings and desire. Both in this sense suggest that it is an activity that involved process and habituation; D. Both believed that happiness is the perfection of human nature, its end is towards the highest, ultimate truth and goodness. For Aristotle (eudaimonia) and for Buddha (nirvana), the previous is human flourishing and well-being while the former is state of peace and bliss; E. Both believe that the origin of happiness are alive, active, and real human experiences; F. The way of attainment of happiness for Aristotle is the golden mean and for Buddha, it is the middle path. Both are midway between two extremes. For Aristotle, truth and virtue are midway between two false vicious extremes, while for Buddha, it is midway between asceticism and eternalism. For Buddha, the core of his teaching is understanding the four noble truths and eightfold path. Aristotle taught about virtuous living and exercise of freedom. Aristotle and Buddha require contemplation which the object is to see the eternal truth, the ultimate basis and rationale of all existence. For Buddha, is the renunciation of desire and craving which liberate the person and finally attain Nirvana; G. Knowledge and practice for both are encouraged to all human activity; H. Both requires the followers to the practice of contemplation. For Buddha, understanding and living the four noble truths and the eightfold path and; I. Both recognized the hierarchical aspect of good and happiness. The good for Aristotle and the happiness being conceived by Buddhism are related. The lower good to highest/ultimate good and the lower happiness which involved physical or the termed joy to highest/ultimate happiness.

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On the other hand, the following are identified as differences on Aristotle’s and Buddha’s teachings. Aristotle’s happiness is directed towards human nature’s perfection where it is dependent on the exercise of reason. Buddha’s teachings on happiness is more on intuition and sympathy. His teaching is not too much on mind or reason but, on emotion and actual experiences. Aristotle’s teaches about the duality in man of body and soul. He attributed that the soul is responsible for rational activity there exist also the individual self. On the other hand, the Buddha denies the existence of the self or the non-self (anatta) In Aristotle’s concept of happiness, it is more focused on the individual. The individual well-being and flourishing which is the end when shared will become societal happiness. For Buddha, it is more on collectivist perspective which is exemplified in his teaching on compassion. That the compassionate activity is a shared one, not only for the selected few but for all. While the self for Aristotle’s is the seat or locust of happiness for Buddha is the realization of the anatta or egolessness. The Buddha teaches that what we call ego, self are merely conventional terms not referring to any real independent entity. These are psychological process of existence changing from time to time. It is not possible to understand the Buddha world without understanding the egolessness of existence and without it, it is not possible to realize the goal of emancipation and deliverance of mind. Only through the middle path based on right understanding of egolessness and conditionedness, can alleviate and destroy these vain illusions of “self ‘’and craving which are the root causes of suffering. Self is an illusion. Similarly, self is often equated with Ego and the more we are attached to the latter the greater is our suffering. The Ego also is the originator of our desires which leads us to sufferings. We often thought that accidents, circumstances, honor, fame, status, etc. are same or one with the self but, it is not. Until and unless we denounce and clear our misunderstanding then liberation is just an illusion. Aristotle’s happiness is directed towards future life while, Buddha’s notion of happiness is the present or here and now. Dalai Lama said, “If you want others to be happy, practice compassion, and if you want to be happy, practice compassion”.

References Alcorn, R. (2015). Happiness. United States of America: Tyndale house Publishers Inc. Buddha’s “The four noble truths”. (n.d.). Retrieved, March 15, 2019, from https://philosophy.lan der.edu/oriental/reader/noble.pdf. Carus, P. (1915). The noble eightfold path by Buddha. Retrieved, March 15, 2019, from https://phi losophy.lander.edu/oriental/reader/reader/c1982.html. Co, A. P. (2003). Philosophy of the compassionate Buddha: Under the bo-tree… on the lotus flower. Manila: UST Publishing House. Kornfield, J. (2019). Finding the middle way. Retrieved March 16, 2019, from https://jackkornfield. com/finding-the-middle-way/. Laumakis, S. J. (2008). An introduction to Buddhist philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lopez, D. (2019). Eightfold path: Buddhism. Retrieved March 16, 2019, from https://www.britan nica.com/topic/Eightfold-Path.

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Martin, A. (2014). Is happiness the meaning of life? Retrieved March 23, 2019, from https://www. collective-evolution.com/2014/07/22/is-happiness-the-meaning-of-life/. Montemayor, F. (1994). Ethics: The philosophy of life. Navotas, Manila: National Book Store. O’Brien, B. (2018). Prajna or panna in Buddhism. Retrieved March 16, 2019, from https://www. thoughtco.com/prajna-or-panna-449852. Parrish, E. (2014). The Buddhist commity and hot it parallels with Aristotle’s views on happiness. Retrieved March 23, 2019, from https://bearmarketreview.wordpress.com/2014/05/06/the-bud dhist-commity-and-how-it-parallels-with-aristoles-views-on-happiness/. Shagufta, B., Shaista, J., & Aneeqa, B. A. (n.d.). Happiness: A psycho-philosophical appraisal. Lahore, PK: University of Punjab. The Dhammapada abridged. (n.d.). Retrieved, March 15, 2019, from https://philosophy.lander.edu/ oriental/reader/dhammapada.pdf. The noble eightfold path by Buddha. (n.d.) Retrieved, March 15, 2019, from https://philosophy.lan der.edu/oriental/reader/eightfold.pdf. The pursuit of happiness bringing the science of happiness to life: Aristotle. (n.d.). Retrieved, March 24, 2019, from https://www.pursuit-of-happiness.org/history-of-happiness/aristotle/. The pursuit of happiness bringing the science of happiness to life: Buddha. (n.d.). Retrieved, March 24, 2019, from https://www.pursuit-of-happiness.org/history-of-happiness/aristotle/.

John B. Brotamante is a graduate of AB Philosophy at University of Santo Tomas Legaspi City, Masters in Business Administration at San Sebastian College Recolletos, Masters in Philosophical Research at De La Salle University Manila and completed Academics for Ph.D. in Philosophy in the same institution. Currently, he is an Assistant Professor at Bicol University Tabaco Campus, Tabaco City Albay, teaching social sciences subjects and philosophy.

Chapter 3

Friendship in Aristotle and Buddhism: Confluences and Divergences Kevin Taylor

Abstract This paper aims at a cross-cultural comparison between friendship in Aristotle and friendship in Buddhist traditions. Aristotle’s thorough analysis of friendship results in Buddhist concepts of friendship necessarily a sub-category as Aristotle deems friendship within religious communities to be a niche category of friendship. Although Buddhist notions of love and compassion are universally prescribed, monastic friendship is necessarily highly selective to be between like-minded individuals within a Buddhist community pursuing the shared end of enlightenment. Buddhism however offers three categories of friendship: lay community friendship, monastic friendship and spiritual friendship. Buddhism, therefore, while unavoidably a sub-category of Aristotelian concepts of friendship, reveal nuanced approaches to friendship depending on an individual’s place in the Buddhist tradition. Keywords Friendship · Mitta · Aristotle · Buddhism · Eudaimonia · External goods

3.1 Introduction Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics situate friendship in what may upon initial reading seem similar roles. This is understandable insofar as both treat friendship as mutual reinforcing of virtuous characteristics only when friendship is sufficiently selective. Aristotle’s treatise of friendship presents a wide variety of friendships although the focus of his inquiry becomes an ideal friendship. During his investigation, Aristotle identifies a sub-category of friendships of which the Buddhist concept of friendship 1 Terence Irwin’s translation has Aristotle saying: “Some communities—religious societies and dining clubs—seem to arise for pleasure, since these are respectively, for religious sacrifices and for companionship.” NE 1160a20. Irwin adds in an endnote that “‘Religious societies’ are associated with dining clubs because the religious sacrifice of animals would be an occasion for a common meal” (Irwin 1985, 363).

K. Taylor (B) Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, Tennessee, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_3

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may meet the criteria for what Aristotle called friendship that arises in a religious society.1 Buddhism in turn extends its concept of friendship to society as a whole, encouraging friendships that cultivate positive virtues and discouraging friendships that perpetuate harmful attachment. For Aristotle, friendship is the glue that holds society together. He writes: [F]riendship would seem to hold cities together and legislators would seem to be more concerned about it than about justice. For concord would seem to be similar to friendship, and they aim at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil conflict, which is enmity. Further, if people are friends, they have no need for justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship. (NE 1155a24–30).

In this paper, I will compare Aristotle’s concept of friendship from the Nicomachean Ethics with Buddhist concepts of friendship. Whereas Aristotle’s concept of friendship is robust and systematic, Buddhist discussions of friendship appear piecemeal throughout the sutras. Bhikkhu Bodhi, an American Theravada Buddhist monk, has selected several sutras from his anthology of discourses from the Pali canon (Bodhi 2016) that can be instructive in this analysis in addition to other selections which I refer to throughout the paper. The role of friendship in Buddhism necessarily draws out a distinction between early Buddhism, Hinayana, and later Buddhism, Mahayana, which includes the reliance on individual effort and selfdiscipline required of Hinayana [or Theravada] teachings.2 Mahayana, as a ‘big vehicle’ teaching extends the net of teachings to go beyond the Theravada sa˙ngha. Koller explains: In Theravada, there was great emphasis on self-discipline and individual achievement. The goal was arhat-ship, which symbolized the extinction of the fires of lust and craving in the individual, brought about by his or her own efforts. In Mahayana, the goal was to become a Bodhisattva – a being whose only concern was helping others extinguish suffering. The compassion, shown by the historical Buddha was emphasized greatly and as a result, there came to be less reliance on individual effort and self-discipline, and more faith in the Buddha and the Bodhisattvas who would provide assistance in overcoming suffering. In time, these two different emphases in Buddhism came to be supported by two different metaphysics. The emphasis on universal salvation represented the Mahayana ideal of the Bodhisattva came to be underwritten by metaphysics of philosophical skepticism and absolutism. The ideal of the arhat came to be underwritten by a metaphysics of realistic flux, as formulated in the doctrine of momentariness. (Koller 1970, 121–122).

In the Nikayas, the role of monk friend is that they support one another’s individual achievements in pursuit of arhat-ship. An arhat is one who has achieved enlightenment, their personal salvation assured, and free from the cycle of suffering that characterizes existence. In Mahayana, the goal is not individual salvation but rather seen to be a higher, nobler goal: the path of the Bodhisattva. A bodhisattva 2 Early

Buddhism is “variously styled as ‘P¯ali Buddhism,’ ‘Canonical Buddhism,’ ‘Southern Buddhism’ and Therav¯ada (i.e. Sthavira-v¯ada, ‘the doctrine of the elders’).” Mysore Hiriyanna notes “it is clear from the inferiority indicated by the word h¯ına (‘low’) that the names were devised by followers of the Mahayana” (Hiriyanna 1993, 133).

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is understood to be one who has attained enlightenment (that is, an arhat) but foregoes final emancipation, willing to take many births, and dedicates themselves to helpings others in pursuit of enlightenment. “He is all compassion (karun.a¯ ) for the ignorant, sinful, and miserable human beings is ready to exchange his merits for their demerits, and suffer for them” (Raju 1985, 172). The bodhisattva, therefore, emphasizes concepts of love and compassion to other beings thus characterizing friendship more broadly. These selections from the Pali Canon distinguish between lay friendship, monastic friendship, and spiritual friendship. As I will discuss later in this paper, these three types of friendship distinguish between (1) friendship between everyday laypersons who are not monastics, (2) friendship understood as existing between monks with the monastic community, and (3) friendship as spiritually understood. This means that although the selected passages derive from Theravadin sources, the interpretation of this understanding involves the two truths doctrine as developed by the Yog¯ac¯ara, which distinguishes between ultimate reality (reality experienced by one who has achieved enlightenment) and provisional reality (the world commonly experienced ordinary life). Thus, the teachings of friendship to lay, Buddhist practitioners, aims at good friendships that cultivate good moral character whereas monastic friendship aims at good friendships that lead to enlightenment. In so doing, this account of friendship is basic to both Yog¯ac¯ara Buddhism and to Aristotle’s virtue theory in the Nicomachean Ethics. Not unlike Aristotle, the Buddhist concept of friendship is understood in terms of an external good, or as Damien Keown designates it, a non-moral good. Non-moral goods, the so-called “external goods” in the Nicomachean Ethics, include wealth, honor, political power, and friendship. Keown’s comparison asserts that “eudaimonia and nirv¯ana are functionally and conceptually related in that both constitute the final goal, end and summum bonum of human endeavor” (Keown 2001, 195). The greatest good in Aristotle is eudaimonia, happiness, whereas in Buddhism it is released from the cycle of reincarnation and suffering understood as nibb¯ana. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is described as the “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue… over a complete life” (NE 1098a16–20). In Buddhism, nibb¯ana is described as the culmination of the Noble Eightfold Path comprised of Wisdom, Meditative and Moral codes of conduct. Both traditions are characterized by the gradual transformation of the individual in both intellectual and emotional characteristics culminating in a state of perfection. Moral cultivation in Aristotle and in Buddhism is aspirational. David Kalupahana’s description of Buddhist ethics resonates with Aristotelian models stating that “a ‘perfect man’ is the final product of the cultivation of moral virtues starting from the very elementary ones” (Kalupahana 1992, 59). In the end, Keown argues that for both Aristotelian ethics and Buddhist ethics, friendship, while helpful, is not necessary for the good life, characterized as eudaimonia in Aristotle and nibb¯ana in Buddhism. Friendship is an important external good for Buddhism but possessing friendship is not a necessary condition for the attainment of nibb¯ana. The creation of the sa˙ngha was created to provide “opportunity for those who are willing to devote their lives not only to their own spiritual

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and intellectual development but also to the service of others” (Rahula 1974, 77–78). Monks come together in mutual spiritual and moral development.

3.2 External Goods Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an extended treatise on eudaimonia, or happiness, for eudaimonia is the highest good and the highest aim for humans. He writes, The human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue. And if there are more virtues than one, the good will express the best and most complete virtue. Moreover, it will be in a complete life. (NE 1098a16–20)3

In the beginning, Aristotle is clear that this account is only a sketch and that what follows is intended to fill in the details (NE 1098a22). Aristotle takes account of a common classification of goods writing that “Goods are divided, then, into three types, some external, some goods of the soul, others goods of the body” (NE 1098b14). He then, to determine who can experience eudaimonia, determines that surely not everyone can experience this highest good: animals and children for example (NE 1099b34–1100a4). What we might call happiness in animals is merely base pleasure in the Aristotelian account; mere pleasures being base because of nature (the case for animals) or base because of habit (the action of base human beings) (NE 1154a33–34). The kind of pleasure enjoyed by the soul’s activity in expressing virtue is a pleasure from unimpeded activity (NE 1153b10). As eudaimonia is a certain activity of the soul expressing virtue in a complete life, the child does not experience happiness because he is still developing as a person. Eudaimonia, according to Aristotle, requires that the soul expresses virtue in a complete life and the child lacks the moral cultivation that comes from a life of experience and education. Animals and children experience pleasure from the goods of the body (health, strength, etc.) and external goods (food, companionship, shelter). Goods of the body and external goods are external and prone to change so despite good fortune, Aristotle is hesitant to call happy those who benefit from these goods. Happiness, he argues, is enduring and definitely not prone to fluctuate, whereas the same person’s fortunes often turn to and fro. For Clearly, if we are guided by his fortunes, so that we often call him happy and then miserable again, we will be representing the happy person as a kind of chameleon, insecurely based. (NE 1100b1-7)

By contrast, Aristotle insists that goods of the soul (intellect, character, virtues) lead to eudaimonia because virtue is a stable and controlling element in happiness. Aristotle wants to count as happy those features that are under our own control, not subject to external forces so that the turning of fortunes cannot alter one’s happiness, 3 The

“Good” here involves both reason and the appropriate virtue for a given act. With regard to ‘soul’ or psuch¯e Irwin notes: “Aristotle does not regard soul and body, as Plato does, as two separable substances” (Irwin 1985, 426). Rather, the soul is a characteristic activity or function with rational and non-rational parts. Here, soul can be generally understood as one’s character.

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and permanent for he means a certain activity of the soul expressing virtue in a complete life. Although it may seem that eudaimonia includes only good of the soul, external goods, while subject to the turning of fortunes, play a crucial role. Nonetheless, happiness evidently also needs external goods to be added [to the activity], as we said, since we cannot, or cannot easily, do fine actions if we lack the resources. For, first of all, in many actions we use friends, wealth and political power just as we use instruments. Further, deprivation of certain [externals] – e.g. good birth, good children, beauty – mars our blessedness. (NE 1099a33-1099b3)

That is, while he seems to suggest that expression of the goods of the soul specifically lead to eudaimonia, he tells us that the other goods, the bodily and external goods, cannot be neglected. The lack of external goods or resources limits human development by removing the basic capacities for life. External goods are either necessary or immensely helpful for eudaimonia. A certain minimum of external goods is set in Aristotle’s survey of eudaimonia by means of an appraisal or survey of widely held beliefs. Aristotle’s sketch of the good life includes the belief that happiness is unimpeded and external goods facilitate this end: “…the happy person needs to have goods of the body and external goods added [to good activities], and needs fortune also, so that he will not be impeded in these ways” (NE 1053b16). The minimum level of necessary goods seems to be found at the point where the virtuous person is not denied happiness as a result of the lack of external goods. Yet the happy person does not require too many goods. A moderate amount will suffice for Aristotle. For self-sufficiency and action do not depend on excess, and we can do fine actions even if we do not rule earth and sea; for even from moderate resources we can do the actions expressing virtue. This is evident to see, since many private citizens seem to do decent actions no less than people in power do – even more, in fact. It is enough if moderate resources are provided; for the life of someone whose activity expresses virtue will be happy. (NE 1179a1-9).

As Roche explains, external goods “are beneficial up to a point because while living well requires external goods, there is a limit to their enhancing a person’s life and being put to good use” (Roche 2014, 43). What is of chief concern is that the virtuous person employs external goods properly. The virtuous person for Aristotle is understood by the Doctrine of the Mean which suggests that virtuous activity is an intermediate between excess and deficiency (NE 1106 27–30). For instance, bravery is the mean between the extreme of foolhardiness and the deficiency of cowardice. Similarly, generosity is the mean between the excess of wastefulness and the deficiency of stinginess. The measure of all things functions in accordance with reason and their habituated actions, ideally such that they are superior or virtuous actions: “having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue (NE 1106b21–24). This is what Roche means when he argues that external goods may promote happiness only if that person is a virtuous person (Roche 2014, 40). The virtuous man cannot be said to fulfill Aristotle’s conception of happiness if he is missing the most basic external goods; Aristotle characterizes these as wealth,

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honor, and especially friends. “In awarding the happy person all the goods it would seem absurd not to give him friends; for having friends seems to be the greatest external good” (NE 1169b9–10). Friends, he writes, are the greatest external good. With this in mind, let us now turn to Aristotle’s conception of friendship.

3.3 Friendship in Aristotle Aristotle outlines the conditions for friendship by exploring the mechanics of bonding that takes place between friends. Natural friendship is the bond between family members and the bond between like species. Aristotle extends this bond to animals but adds that this is even more so for humans (NE 1155a17–22). He notes that in cities friendship is more important than justice since we would have no need of justice if we were all friends. Agreed upon views within society hold a sort of wisdom that Aristotle holds in esteem as they make their way into his methodology wherein he presents commonly held beliefs without dispute. At this early stage in outlining beliefs about friendship, Aristotle begins that friendship is necessary writing that “[I]t is a virtue, or involves virtue, and besides is most necessary for our life” (NE 1155a1). He adds that the wealthy and the poor alike prefer a life with friends whether it is to aid in safeguarding other goods or as a refuge in difficult times. Friends are necessary for Aristotle always and everywhere and they come in all varieties. Not only in terms of like attracts like but also in terms of opposites attract. He muses with reference to Euripides’ meteorological example of rain and dry earth: “Euripides says that when earth gets dry it longs passionately for rain, and the holy heaven when filled with rain longs passionately to fall into the earth” (NE 1155b1). He ultimately dismisses Euripides however because he is concerned with friendship as it concerns human nature rather than the natural sciences (NE 1155b10). Aristotle outlines the varieties of friendship and is able to reduce the varieties to three species: (i) friendships of utility, (ii) friendships of pleasure, and (iii) friendships of good people similar in virtue. Aristotle deems the first two types of friendship to be incomplete. The first he describes as a friendship of utility and the second a friendship of pleasure. The friendship of utility is incomplete because it is by nature based on a certain timely advantage that each of the individuals reaps from the friendship. When the advantages gained from this friendship are exhausted, the friendship also dissolves. The friendship of pleasure is also incomplete because what the individuals in this friendship find pleasurable often change. Aristotle believed that friendships for pleasure were usually attributable to the young, sometimes erotic, and fast to change. By contrast, Aristotle believed that older people generally practiced friendships for utility “since they pursue what is advantageous, not what is pleasant” (NE 1156a25). The complete friendship for Aristotle is the friendship of good people: these types of friendship wish for goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good and are good in themselves. The nature of this complete friendship is good unconditionally for the friend, and therefore enduring and rare since such virtuous characters are rare and this friendship requires time.

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As stated above, Aristotle believed that friendship is a virtue or involves virtues. Friends are external goods but friendship is a relation between friends. Friendship as a virtue is therefore an activity guided by reason and so it must be performed towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way. The friendship of good people is the wish for good in the same way to each other in so far as they are good and are good in themselves (NE 1156b8). The nature of this complete friendship is good unconditionally and for the friend and therefore enduring and rare since such virtuous characters are rare and this friendship requires time. While the friendship of utility is temporary insofar as the friendship endures so long as it provides an advantage, the complete friendship is also advantageous but it is an advantage that springs from unconditional goodness. Complete friendship is also pleasurable but unlike friendship based on pleasure, the complete friendship finds pleasure from the actions of good people. The relation that is a complete friendship is one that wishes the go to their friend for their own sake. Further, they are pleasurable (NE 1156b15), enduring (NE 1156b19), and slow to mature (NE 1156b33).

3.4 Friendship in the Niyakas Texts that treat on friendship in the Pali language volumes of the Buddhist teachings, the Nikayas, distinguish across social divisions: (1) friendship in householder life (the commonly understood notion of friendship among the laity), and (2) friendship within monastic life (friendship among the monks within the sa˙ngha). I further identify the third type of friendship as a special sub-category of the monastic life: (3) spiritual friendship (here the Buddha asks practitioners to consider him a friend insofar as he revealed the Buddhadhamma). Before outlining these three types of friendships, it may be useful to specify the terminology being used. A Note on Language and Terminology The Buddhist term for friendship in this paper is taken from the Pali mitta in the Anguttara, Digha, and Samyutta Nikayas. All of the citations that follow utilize mitta or a combination of words that includes mitta such as kaly¯an.a-mittat¯a (translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi as “good friendship”). The Pali word mitta, in Sanskrit mitra, means ‘friend’ in the sense of everything from companion to associate to trusted friend (from a verbal root that means ‘firm’ or ‘pillar’ or ‘strong’). There is another sense of the term for “friend” and that is the word a¯ vuso as it appears in the Mah¯aparinibb¯ana (DN 16) translated as follows: ¯ Just as, Ananda, the bhikkhus now address one another with the word “Friend” (Avuso), they should not do so when I am gone. A senior bhikkhu, Ananda, may address a junior by his name, his family name or with the word “Friend”; a junior bhikkhu should address a senior as “Sir” (Bhante) or “Venerable”. (Ayasm¯a) (Rahula 1974, 137)

In the usage above, a¯ vuso is a technical term used within the Buddhist community, the sa˙ngha. Rahula explains:

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K. Taylor ¯ The term used is Avuso which means friend. It is a respectful term of address among equals. But disciples never used this term in addressing the Buddha. Instead, they use the term Bhante which approximately means ‘Sir’ or ‘Lord’. At the time of the Buddha, the members ¯ of his Order of Monks (sa˙ngha) addressed one another as Avuso ‘Friend’. But before his death the Buddha instructed younger monks to address their elders as Bhante ‘Sir’ or Ayasm¯a ¯ ‘Venerable’. But elders should address the younger members by name, or as Avuso ‘Friend’. (Rahula 1974, 7)

Due to the specific usage of this term, it will not receive the same kind of treatment as the term mitta although I will address this term more specifically in terms of the sa˙ngha and the spiritual friendship that takes place within the sa˙ngha.

3.5 Buddhist Friendships A common misconception of Buddhist practice is that the virtue of extending friendliness universally to all beings becomes conflated with friendship with all beings. It is in Mahayana Buddhism that the concepts of love and compassion are emphasized whereas in the early schools of Buddhism becoming an enlightened on, an arahant (literally ‘worthy one’), is the focus. Friendships in Theravada Buddhism are described as particular relationships among like-minded reciprocating individuals pursuing shared or similar goals. What this means in practice is that monks who aim at becoming an arahant surround themselves with like-minded individuals as a way to facilitate and encourage one another on the path of spiritual enlightenment. The sa˙ngha offers the conditions for the possibility of becoming and arahant through discerning good friends from bad friends. Friendship in the Buddhist Community The sa˙ngha is the Buddhist community of followers composed of monks and nuns who have undergone ordination and entered the world-renouncing phase of life; that is, they have abandoned the duties and responsibilities that come with a householder life often characterized by family life, in favor of religious life. The sa˙ngha is defined by the shared goal of the pursuit of the Buddhadhamma, the Four Noble Truths, and the Eightfold Path. While the sa˙ngha is often described as world renouncing, it is still embedded in and reliant on features of the everyday world, dependent on lay practitioners for support by way of food, clothing, and shelter. Lay people are generally adherents to Buddhist aims and goals (or willing to participate in subsidizing monastic life) but have not forsaken householder life and similarly adhere to the five precepts: abstaining from killing, theft, sexual misconduct, falsehood, and intoxication. The community can therefore be understood narrowly as the community of monks and nuns (the sa˙ngha) or more broadly as the community that also includes lay people who support the sa˙ngha. The sa˙ngha is described according to Kalupahana as referring to four characteristics of the disciples: “that they are well-behaved (supatipanno), straightforward

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(ujupatipanno), methodical (ñ¯ayapatipanno), and correct (s¯am¯ıcipatipanno)” (Kalupahana 1976, 117). Well-behaved is understood as pursuing the goal established by the Buddha; straightforward is understood as not being deceptive in any sense; methodical is understood as the gradual path often described as the middle path that denies absolute truth and nihilism with an understanding of dependent arising (paticcasamupp¯ada); and correct is understood as mindfulness that conforms to the nature of the world as impermanent, non-substantiality, and dependent arising (Kalupahana 1976, 117). The sa˙ngha is therefore understood as a community committed to discipline, morality, and a philosophical worldview characterized by causality and impermanence. As a teaching, Buddhism is elsewhere characterized by its emphasis on morality and psychology. Ethically, the eightfold path prescribes right livelihood, right speech, and right action whereas the psychological dimension of Buddhism is concerned with the problem of suffering caused by misguided desires for permanence. The awareness of reality as fundamentally impermanent is in fact the Right View component of the eightfold path so the coming together as a community of monks and nuns no less than people of like mind living together to cultivate moral virtues and work towards perfecting Buddhist practices. It may be helpful to make a distinction here between the Buddhist monastic community and Aristotle’s treatment of communities. With regards to friendship, Aristotle insists that friendship is found within communities based on common goals even if the relationship between community members and friendships fall along a spectrum. This common-sense approach to friendship describes friendships as degrees of advantage (NE 1160a10) with smaller communities nestled within large political communities aiming at partial advantages: “Some communities—religious societies and dining clubs—seem to arise for pleasure, since these are, respectively, for religious sacrifices and for companionship” (NE 1160a19–21). Friendships within religious communities imply the aims of the community but also the aim of the political community as a whole since the religious community emerges from the already established political community. The Buddhist monastic community does not map cleanly onto Aristotle’s idea of a religious community as arising for pleasure from religious sacrifice and companionship; this extremely limited description may have more in common with particular brahminical traditions depending on what is meant by “religious sacrifice”. Although ancient Greek religions differ in many ways from the Buddhist sa˙ngha, Aristotle’s off-handed comment does satisfy a thick description of the sa˙ngha as a religious community insofar as it consists of aims and advantages within a larger political community understood as the lay community that supports the existence of the sa˙ngha by providing external goods including food, clothing, and occasionally shelter. It has been observed often by Buddhist scholars that degrees of practice yield positive results for both lay and monastic adherents to the Buddhadhamma. As a community, “the Order provides an opportunity for those who are willing to devote their lives not only to their own spiritual and intellectual development but also to the service of others. An ordinary layman with a family cannot be expected to devote his whole life to the service of others, whereas a monk, who has no family responsibilities or any other worldly ties, is in a position to devote

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his whole life ‘for the good of the many, for the happiness of many’ according to the Buddha’s advice” (Rahula 1974, 77–78). Householder Friendships Among the lay Buddhist community, householder friendship is discussed in the context of a relationship that cultivates virtuous activity. Anguttara Nikaya 7:36 outlines seven factors found in a friend: (1) He gives what is hard to give. (2) He does what is hard to do. (3) He patiently endures what is hard to endure. (4) He reveals his secrets to you. (5) He preserves your secrets. (6) He does not forsake you when you are in trouble. (7) He does not roughly despise you. (AN 7:36)

These seven factors are meant for both ends of the friendship and thus not one sided; the Samyutta Nikaya attempts to explain the formation of communities with the understanding that “those of good a disposition come together and unite with those of a good disposition… Just as milk comes together and unites with milk, oil with oil, ghee with ghee, …” (SN 14:16). While the Nikayas assert that like attracts like, they allow for a spectrum of cultivation insofar as good friendship is one in which we emulate associates within our community when they are exemplary in one or more of four characteristics. Whether young or old, the virtuous are to be emulated in their accomplishments of faith, virtuous behavior, generosity, and wisdom (Anguttara Nikaya 8:54). Elsewhere, the Digha Nikaya describes four kinds of “kindhearted” friends: “the friend who is helpful; the friend who shares one’s happiness and suffering; the friend who points out what is good; and the friend who is sympathetic” (Digha Nikaya 31). This Nikaya employs a repetitive model the of the phrase mitto suhado veditabbo (dear-friend-understood/known which Bhikkhu Bodhi translates as “kinds of good friends.” The Pali text loosely reads: (1) upak¯aro (helpful) mitto suhado veditabbo; (2) sam¯anasukhadukkho (comfort-happiness-suffering) mitto suhado veditabbo; (3) atthakkh¯ay¯ı (beneficial) mitto suhado veditabbo; (4) anukampako (compassionate) mitto suhado veditabbo. The four good friends are therefore helpful friends, friends in both happiness and suffering, friends who point out what is beneficial and compassionate friends. Monastic Friends Among the community of Buddhist monks, the sa˙ngha, many friendship qualities valued for householder life carry over to monastic life but others are supplanted to the specific needs of the sa˙ngha. Monastic friendship shares the Digha Nikaya prescription above in the householder life, helpful, sharing in suffering, pointing out the good and sympathetic, while adding two more specific accounts. Whereas the previously mentioned Anguttara Nikaya 7:36 outlines seven factors found in a household friendship, AN 7:37 describes a monk-friend: “(1) He is pleasing and agreeable; (2) he is respected and (3) esteemed; (4) he is a speaker; (5) he patiently endures being spoken to; (6) he gives deep talks; and (7) he does not enjoin one to do

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what is wrong” (AN 7:37). It is not that the first seven qualities are absent in a monkfriend but rather that certain additional qualities are expected in a monk-friend.4 Elsewhere Ananda tells the Buddha that good friendship is half of the spiritual life, the Buddha responds: “This is the entire spiritual life, Ananda, that is good friendship, good companionship, good comradeship. When a monk has a good friend… it is expected that that he will develop and cultivate the noble eightfold path” (SN 45:2). Monks within the monastic community come together because of their shared belief in the teaching of the Buddhadhamma and in their shared goal they find mutual support. Here we may find resonance with Aristotle’s insistence that good friends improve one another. But the Buddha takes this statement one step further: …by relying upon me as a good friend, beings subject to birth are freed from birth; beings subject to old age are freed from old age; beings subject to death are freed from death; being subject to sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair are freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, and despair. By this method too, Ananda, it may be understood how the entire spiritual life is good friendship, good companionship, good comradeship. (SN 45:2)

To understand his meaning, it may be helpful to outline some core teachings of Buddhist thought which contrast with some views held by Aristotle.

3.6 On the Soul A point of departure between Aristotle and Buddhist thought has to do with the conception of the soul. Aristotle’s concept, popularly known as hylomorphism, seeks to explain what sort of substance a soul is. In De Anima, Aristotle is clear that humans, nonhuman animals, and plants all have different kinds of souls and that the human soul, blessed with intellect, is superior. He lambasts Pythagoras and others for suggesting that through reincarnation a human soul can inhabit an animal form. “[T]hey do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon with anybody—an absurd view” (De Anima 407b20). Aristotle rejects the Pythagorean notion of reincarnation for much the same reason he dismisses Euripides’ account of friendship; Aristotle’s concern is with human concerns: human friendship and the human soul which is tied necessarily to a human form.5 While the Nicomachean Ethics focuses exclusively on the human soul he does make comparative judgments to emphasize the superiority of the human soul. The activity of the soul expressing virtue is only practicable by mature humans in Aristotle’s telling. “It is not surprising, 4 Keown

writes, “The difference between the laity and monks, then, is not that the former are benefitted by non-moral goods while the latter are not, but that certain non-moral goods are incompatible with the monastic vocation”. 5 As mentioned in a previous footnote, Aristotle’s understanding of the soul is more closely understood as one’s character; activity in accordance with reason. Irwin explains that Aristotle did consider his multiple explanations to be analogous and that “the soul is the characteristic functions and activities that are essential to the organism and explain… the other features it has” (Irwin 1985, 426).

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then that we regard neither ox nor horse nor any other kind of animal as happy, since none of them can share in this sort of activity. And for the same reason a child is not happy either, since his age prevents him from doing these sorts of actions” (NE 1099b34–1100a4). The Buddhist worldview has a more intimate relationship with nonhuman animals. Animals are capable of suffering and happiness because all life exists in the same chain of being through the samsara. It is in part because of this radical conceptualization of the chain of being that Buddhists are able to project concepts of happiness and friendliness to nonhuman animals. Buddhist morality tales often talk about reciprocal relationships with animals that are, for the sake of this paper, based on friendliness. Friendliness, as Kaluphana explains, is an external projection that can sometimes be purely pragmatic. “When a monk died of a snakebite, the Buddha advised his disciples to practice ‘friendliness’ (mett¯a) toward all snakes as a protection from such danger” (Kalupahana 1976, 226). Kalupahana adds that friendliness reduces friction in society and can be exported to the natural world as in the metaphor for being friendly towards a snake. “If cultivation of friendliness can effectively eliminate the danger of conflict among human beings, there need be no absolute disbelief that friendliness and compassion would both work in the case of the relationship between humans and animals—unless, of course, we are to believe that a human is totally different from all other animals” (Kalupahana 1976, 226). In fact, Buddhist stories reveal time and again that Buddhists do not see animals as totally different from humans. Buddhist cosmology typically identifies six realms of rebirth and existence: three good realms (devas, asuras and human) and three evil realms (animals, preta and hell beings). With the accumulation of karmic merit one may be reborn in increasingly pleasing existences but through attachment the cycle of reincarnation remains intact. Conversely, the accumulation of karmic demerit can result in rebirth in one of the unfortunate realms of existence which includes the animal realm. It is therefore not merely a myth like Pythagoras that one may be reincarnated as an animal but rather a given in Buddhist teachings as it emerged from a society given to the notion of rebirth. Buddhism emerged from the world of Brahminical religious thought and in many traditions, this concept of the six realms of rebirth migrated with Buddhist philosophy and was used, sometimes negatively, in communicating karmic epistemology. In rejecting the Brahminical concept of self or soul, atman, Buddhism constituted a radical break from Brahminical thought. However, in the process of defining itself as a unique religious and philosophical tradition, Buddhism did not always jettison all of the beliefs from its spiritual predecessors. The interactions between Gotama the man and Gotama the Buddha with various gods were not uncommon in Buddhist literature. The inclusion of Brahminical deities in Buddhism is often attributed to the tolerant views of Buddhist philosophy with other religious views. Kalupahana insists that Buddhist views with regards to belief in heaven, hell, and the existence of gods were “accepted in Buddhism as regulative ideas or concepts only” (Kalupahana 1976, 66). He illustrates the use of gods as concepts or ideas with the story of the brahman monk who, baffled by the Buddha’s contradictory answers as to the existence of gods, was told by the Buddha, “The world, O brahman, is loud in agreement that

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there are gods.” (Kalupahana 1976, 66). The people believe that gods exist so when the brahman inquires about whether or not the Buddha thinks they exist his response is more democratic than theological: if the people believe strongly that there are gods, then the Buddha will not argue with them. Instead of debating the existence of gods, he works within the framework of already existing religious beliefs in order to deliver the Dhamma. The pragmatic approach is similar in many ways to the friendliness toward all snakes mentioned above. Friendliness and friendship are however two different relationships. Buddhist moral conduct is classified in two categories: avoid evil and cultivating good. Virtuous behaviors are often described in terms of restraint: refraining from taking life, false views, and false words among others. Differentiating good from bad is grounded on Buddhist concepts of causally conditioned phenomenon (pat.iccasamupp¯ada also known as dependent arising) and impermanence. Although some early Buddhists clung to the Hindu idea of Atman, i.e. a collective state (saccidananda), comprised of consciousness, existence, and bliss, Buddha had put forth his view on dependent arising, which denies a God, a self (anatman) or an abiding state of reality (anicca). So, the notion of an eternal self (Atman) did not meet with Buddha’s philosophy. Attachment, according to Buddhism, is the “housebuilder” or cause of the cycle of rebirth that is characterized by suffering. To escape the cycle of samsara, one must practice non-attachment. It is during the gradual path of practicing non-attachment that Buddhism has frequently been accused of world renouncing and not without reason. A life of monasticism and ascetic practice focused on meditative contemplation is often conceptualized as a solitary pursuit and indeed is often undertaken that way. Numerous Buddhist masters have retreated to the mountains to delve deep into meditative practice; Gotama himself attained enlightenment in solitary meditation. Even when in a group of monks in a Buddhist temple, meditation can be a solitary effort. Bhikkhu Bodhi notes that a great deal is said in the suttas that a monk is to wander alone like the horn of a rhinoceros. The sutta, Khaggavisana Sutta (SN 1.3), recommends that a monk, like the horn of a rhinoceros, remain alone so as to avoid the temptations of worldly pleasures and the suffering that follows. While the sutta is too long to cite in full, I will point out key passages as they pertain to this essay. At numerous points, the sutta states that one who wishes to realize the goal of Buddhism and become an arahant must wander alone. Not neglecting seclusion, absorption, constantly living the Dhamma in line with the Dhamma, comprehending the danger in states of becoming, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Intent on the ending of craving & heedful, learned, mindful, not muddled, certain — having reckoned the Dhamma —

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These passages extol the virtues of seclusion in pursuit of the Dhamma. Via negative, the first passage suggests that immersed in the world one finds it difficult to live in line with the Dhamma and become subjected to dependent arising, pat.iccasamupp¯ada, karmic causality that keeps one tied to samsara. The second passage is diagnostic; if one seeks to the goal of becoming an arahant, one ought to practice in seclusion. With regards to friendship the sutta has the following to say: For a sociable person there are allurements; on the heels of allurement, this pain. Seeing allurement’s drawback, wander alone like a rhinoceros. One whose mind is enmeshed in sympathy for friends & companions, neglects the true goal. Seeing this danger in intimacy, wander alone like a rhinoceros. (SN 1.3).

These passages seem to reinforce the notion of the world renouncing monk. An attachment that comes with socialization is bound to lead to suffering and attachment to friendship is counter to the Dhamma. It is also noteworthy that this passage emphasizes one who is enmeshed in sympathy, that is, attached to the fruits of friendship. The passages all indicate that these are prescriptive for the student of the Dhamma. To live in accordance with the Dhamma is no easy task and therefore one is encouraged to avoid temptations and distractions altogether until one reaches a point of spiritual maturity whereby one is unmoved by feelings of attachment. The sutta continues: We praise companionship — yes! Those on a par, or better, should be chosen as friends. If they’re not to be found, living faultlessly, wander alone like a rhinoceros. (SN 1.3).

Friendship is not discouraged per se. It is merely that the life of a monk requires a like-minded individual with whom to be friends. Echoing the concerns of the

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previously mentioned suttas on kinds of friends, the Khaggavisana prescribes that one ought to, Avoid the evil companion disregarding the goal, intent on the out-of-tune way. Don’t take as a friend someone heedless & hankering. wander alone like a rhinoceros. Consort with one who is learned, who maintains the Dhamma, a great & quick-witted friend. Knowing the meanings, subdue your perplexity, [then] wander alone like a rhinoceros. (SN 1.3).

As stated previously, the suttas are neither extoling universal friendship nor urging for disassociation from the possibility of friends. Rather, Buddhist monastic friendship is selective and like-minded. A community of monks who come together for the singular goal of arahantship, a goal that is fundamentally grounded in severing ties of attachment (which is itself almost inconceivable to lay people). People follow & associate for a motive. Friends without a motive these days are rare. They’re shrewd for their own ends, & impure. Wander alone like a rhinoceros. (SN 1.3).

In this regard, Aristotle and Buddhist friendship share a sense of skepticism with regards to friendship. Aristotle’s ideal friend is one who wishes the best for his/her friends as he does for himself. Diogenes attributes to Aristotle that a friend is a soul abiding in two bodies. For Aristotle, this kind of friendship is rare. Buddhist monastic friendship is in a similar way, highly selective and teleological insofar as they are friends working toward the same goal. Friendliness is an extension of compassion that is characteristic of Buddhist virtues. In determining good from bad, Buddhist morality determines that good actions lead to non-attachment whereas bad actions lead to attachment. By extending friendliness, one refrains from harsh speech and frivolous character but friendship can be a form of attachment and must be avoided to the extent that it may perpetuate suffering. This is why Buddhism distinguishes between householder friendship and monastic friendship. Realizing that not everyone can follow the Buddhist monastic path, a friendship is prescribed that avoids evil

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(avoiding bad friends who offer lip service, flatter and bring ruin) and cultivates good (learning to recognize good friends as in the friend who is helpful, shares one’s happiness and suffering, points out what is good, and is sympathetic). Monastic friendship adds to the characteristics a shared goal of arahantship. Therefore, the kind of friendship between monastics recognizes that attachment perpetuates suffering in causally conditioned phenomenon. Monastic friendship aims to cultivate a higher good by working together to pacify craving in a like-minded community of monks: the sa˙ngha. While Buddhism prescribes friendliness to all beings as a means to avoid suffering, friendship between monastics is friendship properly understood within the context of becoming an arahant that require the pacification of craving and non-attachment.

3.7 Confluences and Divergences Of the many similarities of the concept of friendship an indispensable feature is the ability to discriminate good friends from bad friends. Aristotle insists that among the three types of friendships (pleasure, utility and good friendship), the third type of friendship should share many virtues in common with ourselves and love one another for our own sake. Friends should be of like mind, like ghee with ghee. In Aristotle this is to assist one another on the path of moral cultivation and in Buddhism this is to refrain from harmful attachment while working towards nibb¯ana. The notion of the self in both Aristotle and Buddhist in some ways has little impact on the concept of friendship and in other ways turns out to be formative. Aristotle rejects many concepts inherent in the Indian tradition pertaining to reincarnation and consequences they have pertaining to the soul but one can argue in turn that Buddhism too shared these apprehensions. Buddhist concepts of self/soul assume a view of society that seeks to overcome harmful attachments but it weighed down by worldly attachments. This is one area where I have argued Buddhist concepts of friendship are often misunderstood. Buddhism does not prescribe universal friendship nor does Buddhism reject friendship based on ascetic grounds. Rather, the Buddhadhamma teaches that one ought to project friendliness as a social lubricant. Friendship however can bring with it harmful attachments, therefore monastic friendship is select and reserved for those exhibiting right mindfulness and right view. With a shared view of causally conditioned phenomenon and goal of becoming an arahant, monastic friendship is necessarily selective and a monk must be discerning in choosing friends. In considering the Buddha a friend, one is practicing moral virtues that seek to avoid evil characterized by harmful attachment and cultivate good through non-attachment.

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References Bodhi, B. (2016). Buddhas teaching on social and communal harmony. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. Hiriyanna, M. (1993). Outline of Indian philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Irwin, T. (1985). Nicomachean ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. Kalupahana, D. J. (1976). Buddhist philosophy: A historical analysis. Honolulu, HI: University Press of Hawaii. Kalupahana, D. J. (1992). A history of Buddhist philosophy: Continuities and discontinuities. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. Keown, D. (2001). The nature of Buddhist ethics. New York, NY: Palgrave. Koller, J. (1970). Oriental philosophies. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. McKeon, R. (1941). The basic works of Aristotle. New York, NY: Random House. R¯ahula, W. (1974). What the Buddha taught. New York, NY: Grove Press distributed by Random House. Raju, P. T. (1985). Structural depths of Indian thought. New York, NY: SUNY. Roche, T. D. (2014). Happiness and the external goods. In R. Polansky (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kevin Taylor is Instructor/Online Coordinator in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Memphis. His research covers the intersection of Asian philosophy and environmental ethics. He has developed courses on applied ethics including Data Ethics and Biomedical Ethics.

Chapter 4

Philia and Agape: Ancient Greek Ethics of Friendship and Christian Theology of Love Jonas Holst

Abstract Based on a philosophical interpretation of the Ancient concepts, philia and agape, the present contribution offers a comparative study of the ancient Greek ethics of friendship and the Christian theology of love. While the former tradition understands philia as a finite relationship between human selves within a sociopolitical context, agape is regarded by the latter tradition as the bond of love which God grants all humans who believe in Jesus Christ as the Messiah. Despite the fundamental differences between the two conceptions of love, they converge at one point, namely in the caring concern for the stranger, who humans are called upon to receive in hospitality. Keywords Philia · Agape · Christian theology · Ancient greek philosophy

4.1 Introduction In 1930 the Swedish theologian, Anders Nygren, published the first part of his seminal work, Eros and Agape, which exercised an immense influence on the debates of ancient understandings of love in the twentieth century. The title of his work refers to two main motives in ancient Greek thought and in Christian theology, respectively. According to Nygren’s narrative, the ancient Greek understanding of love is based on eros, which draws each human being towards fulfilling his or her desires egoistically, whereas agape in a Christian context is identified with God’s pure, unmotivated love for human beings.1 Nygren is surely right in drawing a distinction between the ways in which the two traditions view and portray love. Yet, it remains dubious, whether eros really played such a decisive role for ancient Greek culture, as Nygren sustains, and also whether 1 Nygren

(1936–1938, 11–20, 57–58). critical comments on Nygren’s account of eros, see Armstrong (1961), Rist (1964), Osbourne (1994), White (2004).

2 For

J. Holst (B) San Jorge University, Zaragoza, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_4

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it was always driven by selfish desires.2 His interpretation of the Christian theology of love is well-versed and insightful, although not without its own problems.3 Still, his focus on eros in ancient Greek thought is too one-sided, not only because of its simplistic rendering of this highly ambiguous concept,4 but also because it does not take into account other ancient Greek understandings of love. If we take the two most influential Greek thinkers of all time, then eros undoubtedly plays a key role in Plato’s philosophy, but its importance for ethics is reduced to a minimum by Aristotle, who views it as an excess of philia,5 traditionally translated as friendship. In its balanced state, friendship was considered paramount for the flourishing of communities in ancient Greek culture. What is lacking in Nygren’s book is precisely an account of philia, the interpersonal relationship, which Aristotle dedicates far more space than any of the virtues in his ethical treatises, and he highlights it as the human good which nobody would choose to live without, “even if he had all the other goods.”6 The purpose of the present contribution is to deliver an elaborate account of the ancient Greek ethics of friendship in order to contrast its main aspects with that of the Christian theology of love. The latter changed the intellectual landscape of the ancient world and may be said to foreshadow “a revaluation of all the values of antiquity”.7 Although Greek philia and Christian agape converge at some point, principally on the idea of hospitality as a fundamental gesture of caring for the stranger, the following interpretation intends to show that the Christian conception of love transforms the ancient Greek understanding of friendship into a promise of meeting again beyond death in the kingdom of God.

4.2 The Ancient Greek Ethics of Friendship In ancient Greece, the term philia covered all relationships of love and friendly feelings between intimate lovers, family members and citizens of one’s own community. Following an archaic custom of hospitality, which the French linguist, Emile Benveniste, has traced back to the Homeric epics, strangers could also be included among those who one holds dear.8 This meaning of philia is still present in classical times, where such “ritualized friendships” as guest friendships formed “an 3 Eberhard

Jüngel offers a different account of the Christian conception of love and raises doubts about Nygren’s clear-cut distinction between eros and agape, see Jüngel (1977, pp. 434–436). A thorough discussion of Nygren’s and Jüngel’s studies on love can be found in Jeanrod (2010, pp. 27–30). 4 Using Prodikos as an example, Dover offers a detailed account of eros as a double desire, see Dover (1989, p. 43). 5 Nicomachean Ethics IX, 9, 1171 a (2014). 6 Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1, 1155 a (2014). 7 Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 46; see also Nygren (1936–1938, p. 6) and Jüngel (1999, p. 1). 8 Benveniste (1969, pp. 335–353).

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extensive network of personal alliances linking together all sorts of apolitical bodies (households, bands, tribes)” across the Hellenic world.9 The presence of these ritualized friendships, which were usually reactivated by each new generation through age-old rituals of gift-giving and sharing tokens of trust,10 generated tension among the members of the more recent political communities: Whereas friends come together in smaller, selected groups to enjoy themselves and do each other favors, citizens uphold the larger political order of a whole society by promoting equality among themselves in order to avoid the sort of privileges which particular friends share with each other. Friendships between members of different states can run counter to the interests of one of the states involved, as the case of one of Socrates’ disciples, Xenophon, testifies to: He did not hide his sympathies for the Spartans, and after having received an invitation from a guest friend abroad he decided to join the forces of Persian ruler Cyrus, which was probably part of the reason why he was later exiled from Athens by his fellow-citizens. With regards to the favors which bound friends together all-over ancient Hellas, the philosophers, primarily Plato and Aristotle, detected a deeper problem: Like most values of ancient Greek culture, friendship was, to a large extent, built on material property, but the new ethical vision, which Plato was the first to promote, had the good in itself as its supreme goal. The first time Plato lets Socrates hint at a connection between ethics and friendship can be found at the end of the dialogue Lysis: Together with his two interlocutors, Socrates makes a not wholly convincing attempt at defining what it means to hold something dear (philos), which leads them to the conclusion that what one desires and loves so as to become a friend is somehow part of the ethos of one’s own soul.11 As it often happens in Plato’s dialogues, Socrates ends the dialogue by declaring that it brought no results, and he omits to go into a deeper investigation of how the friends can be said to belong to each other and share their ethos by becoming a kind of soul mates. It was left to Aristotle to tap into the ethical resources of friendship, only touched upon by Plato in his dialogues, which center more on the transcending power of eros. Mary P. Nichols has argued though that Plato still reserved a prominent place for friendship in the soul’s search for self-knowledge.12 Yet, it is a place which is located within a specific political and metaphysical context, where there is not much room for personal differences and dispute. On this point, Aristotle criticized his teacher for unifying all human aspirations under one overall principle of justice in the Republic, where all members become too alike.13 Plato offered a less idealistic utopia in his late political work, Laws, in which friendship helps people to live better lives through sharing, cooperation and consensus. This political conception of friendship has a certain similarity with the one Aristotle presents in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he embeds the question of living 9 Herman

(2002, p. 6). (1969, p. 343), Herman (2002, p. 50), Konstan (1999, p. 33). 11 Lysis 221e–222a (2001). 12 Nichols (2009, pp. 115–117, 150–152). 13 Politics 1261 b. 10 Benveniste

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well within the political sphere which appears to be held together by friendship,14 the potentially most virtuous of all human relationships. Aristotle dedicates two whole books to philia and its fundamental importance for the development of ethically and politically sound lives within a community. At times, Aristotle is about to reverse the Platonic order of things and announces that “when people are friends, they have no need of justice, while when they are just, they need friendship as well.”15 This is, of course, not meant as a disavowal of justice which remains one of the principal virtues in Aristotelian ethics. The point is rather that justice is introduced into friendship as one of its inherent virtues. Furthermore, it imbues human relationships with a form of well-wishing which justice in itself does not. Good friends, who see each other as they truly are and act well towards each other out of goodwill, also treat each other in just ways that can be extended to other people. Injustice is incompatible with friendship, which instead advances, in Alasdair MacIntyre’s words, “that measure in a community whose shared aim is the realization of the human good […].”16 In the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives his readers a first hint of how friendship extends to more people than just a close circle of intimate friends. The one, who is virtuous, Aristotle asserts, loves to see virtue embodied in real practice, and so the virtuous are in a certain sense drawn towards each other.17 In his two books on friendship he picks up on this insight and argues that insofar as one can better get to know other people than oneself and their actions rather than one’s own, good people will need to be friends with others who allow them to reach self-insight.18 One might infer from this quotation that Aristotle only considers ethically good friendships to be possible between virtuous people. This is not wrong. The Aristotelian ethics of friendship reaches its culmination point in virtuous people becoming friends and seeing each other as they truly are. This is the main difference to other kinds of friendships which are, according to Aristotle, built on either pleasure or utility, not on virtue. What is entailed in being a virtuous person? Having acquired all the virtues which Aristotle presents in his ethical treatises? Sometimes he seems to hold this position: The virtuous are the few truly impeccable people, who have established a well-orchestrated symphony between desire and reason in their own soul. However, this raises a question which Socrates had already posed in Lysis and which Aristotle reiterates, namely for what reason do the truly good and virtuous people need to be friends, if they are self-sufficient themselves?19 In Lysis Socrates discards that friendship can arise between good people. Considering the emphasis which Plato puts on the good in most of his dialogues, this appears to be one of those absurd conclusions which Socrates draws in order to throw his 14 Nicomachean

Ethics VIII, 1, 1155 a (2014).

15 Idem. 16 MacIntyre

(2000, p. 155). Ethics I, 7, 1099a (2014). 18 Nicomachean Ethics IX, 9, 1169b–1170a (2014). 19 Lysis 215a–b (2001); Nicomachean Ethics IX, 9, 1169b (2014). 17 Nicomachean

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interlocutors off the track. Still, it is not clear what truly good people would have to offer each other, and why they should want to get together to share what they already have by virtue of being truly noble. Aristotle resolves part of the problem by sustaining that they need to be active, as a flourishing life consists in carrying out activities actualized by reason, and so good friends share, out of magnanimity, a portion of their rich lives with their friends. However, there is another side to this problem of becoming fully virtuous, which casts doubt on the possibility of being completely self-sufficient. It is partly brought out in the passage in which Aristotle states that even good people need good friends in order to get an insight into the virtues which they themselves embody. Embodying a virtue is not the same as recognizing it and knowing that one possesses it, which is why Aristotle adds that in so far as one can better see what is good in other people than in oneself, virtuous people will need each other to see what they themselves entail. Out of this “need” may spring a friendship, built on virtue, between good people, who relate to each other as “other selves”.20 We shall return to the Aristotelian conception of the friend as “another self”, when we enter into the discussion of the Christian theology of love. What is clear from Aristotle’s account of the ethical significance of friendship is that human selfsufficiency does not refer to a divine state of perfect isolation, living idly on one’s own resources. Returning to the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, we read that the term “self-sufficient” is not applied to “a person on his own, living a solitary life, but to a person living alongside his parents, children, wife, and parents and fellowcitizens generally, since a human being is by nature a political being.”21 This implies that human flourishing is realized and renewed in relationships with others. Even the best people have a real human need of seeking the company of good friends, in so far as nobody has reached complete self-knowledge. There is something about being human which escapes the grasp of any single human being. This opens the way for a friend to serve as a sort of mirror for the one who cannot know himself all by himself. The comparison with the mirror is employed by the author of Magna Moralia.22 This may not be Aristotle himself. Yet, if it is not him, it must have been somebody who knew Aristotle’s work well. The lack of complete self-knowledge, which was first professed by Socrates, is also advanced, as we have seen, in the Nicomachean Ethics, not only in the above-cited passage, but already on the first pages of the two books on friendship: The people, who find themselves at the peak of their lives, have the possibility of improving their action and thought by accompanying each other along the way.23 If they had already reached complete self-insight, they would ideally act and think perfectly well all by themselves without any need of friendship. However, this is not the case, as Aristotle underscores. The ethical resources, to which Socrates had opened the door in Plato’s dialogues, are uncovered in Aristotle’s explanation of how the friends in their mutual interaction 20 Nicomachean

Ethics IX, 4, 1166a (2014). Ethics I, 7, 1097b (2014, slightly modified translation). 22 Magna Moralia 1213a (1962). 23 Nicomachean Ethics VIII, 1, 1155a (2014). 21 Nicomachean

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may come to share their states of mind, hexis, to such a degree that they can have a decisive effect on each other’s well-being.24 Accompanying and helping each other, acting and thinking together affect and influence friends so that they come to live even better than they would have if they had been on their own. Aristotle was also aware of the contrary effect: The Greek tragedies accomplish their dramatic effect by turning friends into enemies and letting prosperous people fall into disgrace.25 Although the result is the exact opposite of the flourishing lives of good friends enjoying each other’s company, the tragic reversal of turning friends against each other still tells a story of the fateful impact which people can have on each other’s lives. Aristotle believed in the stability of good friendships between virtuous people as a solid ethical bulwark against the tragic transformation from good to bad. He remains until today the founding philosopher of any reformulation of an ethics of friendship.

4.3 The Christian Theology of Love Turning to the conception of love, as it is presented in the Gospels, a contrasting, although not completely dissimilar view of what it means to do good to other people appears. Nygren did not err, when he differentiated between the ancient Greek and the early Christian understanding of love. No ancient Greek thinker ventured to extend love, as Jesus Christ does in the Gospels, to one’s enemies and to forgiving evildoers for their sins. Yet, when we now complement Nygren’s one-sided diagnosis of Greek eros as lacking in ethics26 with the ethical aspects of philia, the contrasts and similarities to Christian agape will appear in a different light. Seen from the perspective of Christian theology, whose followers do not aspire to acquire self-knowledge, ancient Greek ethics stands out as strikingly selfish. Christian love manifests itself through genuinely unselfish actions in the same way as God allows his love to reach all human beings independently of their sinfulness by sending his son, Jesus Christ, to save them from themselves and their finite existence. One of the paradigmatic parables, told by Jesus in the Gospel of Luke, has the merciful Samaritan as its protagonist: In contrast to a priest and a Levite, who pass by a wounded man at the side of a dangerous road leading from Judea to Jerusalem, the Samaritan is touched by the man’s suffering and approaches him in order to save him from sure death. The Samaritan does not think twice about what he should do or the risk that he runs, which proves to be a sign of true love or misericordia, as carrying other people’s misery in one’s own heart is called in Latin.27 The Samaritan is marked by the other’s suffering in his own flesh, which makes him act out of a truly felt compassion for the other’s life. He literally brings the 24 Nicomachean

Ethics VIII, 5, 1157b (2014). 14, 1453b (2005). 26 Nygren (1936–1938, p. 30). 27 Luke 10:25–37 (1982). 25 Poetics

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badly wounded back from the dead, after he had been left nearly lifeless by robbers. Curing his wounds and taking him to a place where he can recover, the Samaritan leaves nothing to chance and promises to come back and pay for the rest of the man’s stay. The love and mercy, which the Samaritan shows towards a stranger, spills over with goodness, not unlike God’s agape, characterized by giving life without holding anything back and without making distinctions between people. After having told the parable of the good Samaritan, Jesus turns the question around, which a learned man had posed at the beginning in an attempt to challenge him: “Who is my neighbor?” Now Jesus asks him: “Which of these three do you think was a neighbor to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?” For the learned man his neighbor is somebody, who is both outside and unknown to himself. By telling the parable of the good Samaritan Jesus reverses the order and confronts the learned man and every reader with being the brother of the unknown other, who is in a life-threating situation. Regardless of whether I know my neighbor or not, at the very moment when I am exposed to him or her dying, I am, at the same time, faced with being his or her keeper. It is this limitless form of love which Nygren identifies with agape, the all-powerful love which God gives spontaneously and unmotivated. Without giving any reasons, God offers love to humans who are unable to mobilize this sort of unselfish love willingly. Someone wanting to show love willingly would be about to undermine the very basis for its true expression. “When you give to the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing”,28 Jesus proclaims in the Gospel of Matthew, which conveys this notion of giving with one’s whole, undivided heart without thinking twice about it, like the Samaritan did. When Jacob disapproves of those, who have a divided mind and therefore also have second thoughts,29 he is arguably thinking of an ancient Greek philosophical mindset which questions everything twice before starting to act. As Paul recalls, it is practically impossible to make one’s own desire correspond with one’s intentions and actions: “I do not do the good I want to do, but the evil I do not want to do I keep on doing.”30 Sin thus infects human beings’ innermost resources and keeps them from acting well out of good will: We humans may have it in us, deep down in our hearts, to do what is best for our fellow human beings, but as we are, according to Paul, unable to reach down and tap into these deepest lying ethical resources, everybody has to pass through Jesus Christ to carry out deeds of love.

28 Matthew

6:3 (1982). Letter 1:8 (1982). 30 Romans 7:19 (1982). 29 Jacob’s

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4.4 Philia and Agape: A Comparative Discussion The ethics of the ancient Greek conception of philia is built on a finite understanding of human life. Being in the company of friends may make life more worth living. Yet, in its finite form, friendship cannot save any human being from death. The meaning of the Christian theology of love is precisely this: to redeem humanity from its sinful nature and show a way beyond death where life can continue in eternity. Jesus Christ symbolizes the door and the way, which may lead all human beings, who believe in him as their godsent savior, into an eternal communal life.31 Helping and taking care of others through unselfish actions prefigure the sort of community which Christians for more than two millennia have sought to consolidate and institutionalize through the church in order to prepare their community for the afterlife and make visible on earth what awaits all believers beyond death. Friendship has not had, in any of its informal manifestations, a similar institution to protect its members and promote its ideals, although some forms of friendship, such as guest friendship, lived on in certain customs and rituals which bridged the differences between people. Later we shall return to guest friendship, as this is one of the few cultural formations, which constitutes a link between ancient Greek and Christian traditions. As a finite phenomenon with its emotional and psychological drawbacks—friends can betray each other and become enemies—friendship is a relationship between selves, who will have to make room for the other, if they want to remain friends. Aristotle resolves the tension between oneself and other selves by developing an understanding of philia, according to which the selves are alike and recognize each other in virtue of their goodness. By recognizing each other as “other selves” they also recognize themselves as being good, which leads Aristotle to conclude that virtuous people love themselves, not selfishly and isolated from the rest of their community, but through their friendships and love for other people like themselves they consolidate their philia for themselves.32 In a passage from the ninth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle expresses his doubts about whether it makes sense to speak of a friendship with oneself, and many Christian theologians would not only confirm his doubts, but would call into question this part of his ethical framework which seems to be founded on selfish emotions. The Christian dictum of loving one’s neighbor like oneself is meant to break with all selfish love for oneself. This is how the Danish philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard, interpreted the sentence, affirming that the other is introduced into each individual self in order to break open the “self” and channel its love for itself away from itself and towards the neighbor.33 Friendship may be the timely good, which is most worthy of esteem, Kierkegaard concedes, but love in the Christian sense of the word—“God is love”—can transport humans beyond their own finite existence and their own time into a true community beyond death. 31 John

10:9, 14:6 (1982). Ethics IX, 8–9, 1168b–1170b (2014). 33 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, II C (1995). 32 Nicomachean

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After having highlighted two of the main differences between philia and agape related to self-love and temporal existence, we shall complement our analysis by focusing on a cultural phenomenon, which forms a link between the ancient Greek and the Christian tradition. In both traditions guest friendship and hospitality lie at the heart of what it means to express love and care for other human beings. Paul recalls in his Epistle to the Hebrews that in the past, i.e. in The Old Testament, people received angels without knowing it, so Christians should do the same.34 Among the early Christian theologians, Clement of Alexandria was probably the one, who went furthest in coupling the ancient Greek concept of philoxenia, love towards a stranger, with Christian agape.35 Even Aristotle recalls that to receive other people in one’s own house lays the basis for all friends to begin to trust each other,36 and in the Eudemian Ethics he compares the good, which friends share with each other, to a form of guest friendship.37 This symbol of the good as being in-between, mediating and bridging the gap between the friends, can also be found at a decisive moment in the Gospels, where Jesus tells his disciples, before they meet at the Eucharist, that “where two or three gather in my name, there I am in the middle of them.”38 Jesus is the bond between God and humans, and he seals this bond to his disciples at the Eucharist, which may look like any feast of friendship, as it was also known in the ancient Greek world, where friends gathered around a table to converse and share a meal. Yet, the Eucharist is no ordinary meal. Jesus prepares his disciples for what is going to happen, while they are sitting at the table: One of them will betray him, and they will not meet again, until their communion is completed in the kingdom of God.39 In the wake of the Eucharist, the ordinary sense of friendship—and Jesus addresses the disciples as his friends—is transformed into a broader understanding of love, which is meant not only to join Jesus and his disciples together, but all of mankind through a spiritual bond, symbolized by Jesus breaking the bread and sharing the wine, the blood of his own body. Thereby a transformation of ancient Greek philia into Christian agape has taken place, which points beyond life and death and changes the meaning of love and friendship for human beings. In the ancient Greek conception of friendship, a gap separated even the best of friends, who were still exposed to becoming enemies. They needed to show each other trust to bridge that gap and consolidate their bond every time they met. There was nobody like Jesus Christ to save them from themselves, if things went wrong between them. For the Christians, by believing in Christ as God’s son and loving their neighbor in the same way as he loves humans, something more than trust is being deposited: The bond of communion and love is being renewed, which leaves

34 Hebrews

13:2 (1982). Hiltbrunner (2005, pp. 164–165). 36 Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 1, 1155a (2014). 37 Eudemian Ethics 1239b (1961). 38 Matthew 18:20 (1982). 39 Matthew 26:17–30 (1982). 35 See

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no gap between the believers. Jesus Christ has closed the gap and constitutes the bond between the believers, who can partake in his eternal life. Although the ancient Greek word for trust and belief, pistis, is the same in Aristotle’s ethical treatises and The New Testament, there is a world of difference between the use of it in the ancient Greek and the Christian tradition. Christian friendship is always mediated by God’s love, as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas will also emphasize each in their own way,40 and so a different understanding of love and friendship opens up which it lies outside the scope of this article to pursue.41 The purpose has been to give an elaborate, although not complete account of the historical and conceptual differences between the ancient Greek ethics of friendship and the Christian theology of love. They converge on the idea of receiving the stranger, which the Christian Church transforms into a bond of communion with Jesus Christ, who tells his disciples that they have received him as a stranger and thus shown the love which they are supposed to disseminate to the rest of the world.

References Aquinas, T. (1969). Summa theologiae. London and New York: Blackfriars. Aristotle. (1932). Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Aristotle. (1961). Eudemian Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Aristotle. (1962). Magna Moralia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Aristotle. (2005). Poetics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Aristotle. (2014). Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, A. H. (1961). Platonic eros and Christian agape. Downside Review, 79(255), 105–121. Augustine. (2008). Confessions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benveniste, É. (1969). Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes I. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Dover, K. J. (1989). Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Herman, G. (2002). Ritualised friendship & The Greek city. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hiltbrunner, O. (2005). Gastfreundschaft in der Antike und im Frühen Christentum. Darmstadt: WBG. Jeanrod, W. G. (2010). A theology of love. London, New York: T & T Clark. Jüngel, E. (1977). Gott als Geheimnis der Welt. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Jüngel, E. (1999). Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christilichen Glaubens. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Kierkegaard, S. (1995). Works of love. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Konstan, D. (1999). Friendship in the classical world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacIntyre, A. (2000). After Virtue. A study in moral theory. London: Duckworth. Nichols, M. P. (2009). Socrates on friendship and community: Reflections on Plato’s symposium, phaedrus, and lysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (2014). Jenseits von Gut und Böse. De Gruyter. Nygren, A. (1936–1938). Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna: Eros och Agape. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkens Diakonistyrelses bokförlag. 40 Augustine

(2008), Book 4, “Death of a dear friend”; Aquinas (1969, vol. 29, q 9, a. 1 ad 2).

41 Steve Summers has elaborated further on the significance of hospitality for the Christian theology

of love, see especially Chap. 7 in Friendship.

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Osbourne, C. (1994). Eros unveiled: Plato and the god of love. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Plato. (2001). Lysis. In Werke I. Darmstadt: WBG. Rist, J. M. (1964). Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus and Origen. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Summers, S. Friendship: Exploring its implications for the Church in postmodernity. London, New York: T & T Clark. The Holy Bible. (1982). Nashville: Thomas Nelson. White, F. C. (2004). Virtue in Plato’s symposium. Classical Quarterly, 54(2), 366–378.

Jonas Holst is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Humanism and Society, San Jorge University, Zaragoza, Spain. Currently preparing conceptual studies on hospitality, plurality and melancholy.

Chapter 5

Towards a Confucian Ethics of Humane Online Relations Joseph Martin M. Jose

Abstract Internet technology brings exciting benefits as well as alarming dangers to our everyday life. The way Internet technology affects our relationship with our own self and with our fellow human beings is a pressing concern. Hence, there is a need for an ethical reflection and analysis on problems confronting the online community and the relationships established and maintained therein. Considering the alarming dangers, addressing ethical concerns becomes urgent. And since these dangers confront the online community every day, we might as well turn to a philosopher, whose wisdom was attuned to the everyday concrete ethical concerns of his time: Confucius. In this paper, I shall argue that a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions in the online community can be formulated. Such an ethics can aid in addressing the present malaise of the online community especially problems confronting human relations/interactions established therein. I shall argue for such claim in three steps. First, I shall establish that indeed the online world/online realm can be treated or viewed as a community, hence, an online community. Second, I shall establish that as a community it has certain problems that need to be addressed. Third, I shall establish that these problems may be addressed or seen in a different light by formulating a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions. Keywords Online communities · Online relations · Internet technology · Confucian ethics · Confucius

5.1 Introduction In our contemporary era, it is undeniable that the technology of the Internet, especially social networking sites or social media, have penetrated our everyday lives, both professionally and personally. Professionally, the Internet has played vital roles in the various functions of businesses such as in e-commerce; the academe such as in online journals, forums, discussion groups, and e-learning; and other professions J. M. M. Jose (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_5

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involving media and communications. Personally, the Internet has connected people globally through the use of e-mails, chats, video-calls, and the like. Spatial and temporal limits are now transcended. Indeed, we have become more connected and updated with the various life-events of our distant relatives, friends, and colleagues. To be more specific, the Internet has provided us with more avenues to be creative and innovative in presenting ourselves online. The same is true with how we relate to other selves online. One has the freedom to use various emoticons, images, and platforms to express what one wants to communicate to the other. At a larger scale, society has used the Internet as a place to voice out concerns, and has used it to bolster respective advocacies. Indeed, as Dreyfus (2009) notes: …given its new way of linking and accessing information, the Internet will bring a new era of economic prosperity, lead to the development of intelligent search engines that will deliver us just the information we desire, solve the problems of mass education, put us in touch with all of reality, allows us to have even more flexible identities than we already have and thereby add new dimensions of meaning to our lives. (p. 2).

The Internet and its social media are not just “unique environments that provide users with a platform that allows them to communicate with others in mediated space” and “an additional platform with which to share their lives with friends and acquaintance,” but also provides an array of economic, educational, and even existential promises of a more meaningful future (Kapidzic and Martins 2015, p. 280). But despite the benefits that such a technology brings, there are also dangers. Online deception and cybercrimes are prevalent. Although the self can be creative online, creativity can be used to deceive fellow online users by hiding in anonymity or using another identity to take advantage of others. In addition, various online crimes such as fraud, prostitution, child pornography, and the like are present. At the level of relationships, people spend more time online than with those who are actually around them, to the point that they neglect their existing actual relationships offline and would prioritize those with whom they interact online. Some would even consider relationships built online as more genuine and authentic than the ones they currently have offline. It is because of these complexities that various scholars from different fields engaged themselves in this emerging endeavor called Internet studies. Internet studies is an interdisciplinary field that aims to study the nature and issues surrounding the technology of the Internet involving as many disciplines as possible such as computer science and engineering, psychology, sociology and anthropology, media and communications studies, and even theology. Philosophy, on the other hand, did not allow itself to not participate in such an endeavor. In light of such, in this paper, I aim to contribute to on-going efforts of philosophizing about the Internet, specifically to contribute in efforts to look into Eastern wisdom as an alternative framework for understanding and analyzing online phenomena. In particular, I would like to focus more on online communities and the human relationships built therein. I have two reasons for such a choice. First, much of the problems relating to the Internet specifically on social media are those pertaining to human relationships per se. Although much of how we perceive and

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understand the nature of ourselves online affects the way we relate to other online selves (hence, the prevalence of philosophical studies on the online self), existing interactions online must be given attention as well, otherwise the alarming problems currently at hand would not be addressed. Second, some current ontologies of the online self seem to have forgotten that one of the facets of the self is its being relational; hence, to miss such relational facet in accounting for the online self makes one’s ontology incomplete and limited. For our purposes, I shall use Chinese philosophy, particularly the philosophy of Confucius (1999) as a framework for analyzing online communities and the human relationships built therein. This is actually not the first time where Confucian philosophy will be placed on the same line with the Internet. Bockover (2003) in her “Confucian Values and the Internet: A Potential Conflict” argues that China should not be pressured by critics to fully adopt and use the technology of the Internet. Bockover (2003) observes that critics often bank on the Western (American) first-world value of autonomy with its accompanying ideas of consumerism, free expression, equal opportunity, and free trade. All of these values, according to Bockover (2003), are in conflict with the long-held values of the Chinese people which are dominantly Confucian values. On the other hand, Pak-hang (2013) in his “Confucian Social Media: An Oxymoron?” agrees with Bockover in saying that the Internet especially social media are incompatible with Confucian values but Pak-hang provides an alternative way of arguing. Pak-hang (2013) shows that Bockover’s arguments fail because there have been numerous studies already that show that Confucian values can be compatible with Western concepts of autonomy. In addition, Bockover’s arguments also fail because what she was criticizing was Web 1.0 but due to advances in contemporary Internet technology, she failed to offer an argument against Web 2.0 which is primarily dominated by social media (Pak-hang 2013). In this regard, Pak-hang (2013), offers arguments to show that the features of Web 2.0 specifically its social media are incompatible with Confucian values. He (2013) ends by providing ways on how Confucians could adjust to the features of social media, and how social media can be modified to fit Confucian values. Another work that attempted to engage Confucian Philosophy is that of Soraj Hongladarom’s The Online Self: Externalism, Friendship and Games. Hongladarom (2016) aims at arriving at the nature of the online self by utilizing numerous philosophical theories from both West and East. When it comes to Chinese Philosophy, he (2016) argues that one way of understanding the online self is through the emphasis given by Chinese philosophy to roles that we play in the family and in society. Hence, our being a social being. Given that, Hongladarom (2016) argues that we can understand the online self as comprising the roles that we play online: roles such as being an online friend, online tutor, online suitor, online parent, etc. A preliminary critique is inevitable in order for us to arrive at the specific tasks that we aim to accomplish in this paper. As one can notice, Bockover focused on China alone and did not extend her arguments to other nationalities, more so to the whole of humanity. Pak-hang, on the other hand, focused on the compatibility or incompatibility of Confucian values with the technology of the Internet. Although he presented ways to recontextualize Confucianism and ways to modify social media,

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he was not concerned with the malaise that people are currently experiencing with regards to social media use. Lastly, Hongladarom’s use of Confucian philosophy was only a means towards his project of constructing an account of the nature of the online self. He, as well, was not concerned on how to address the current problems confronting the online community. When it comes to their use of Confucian values, Bockover limited herself to Ren and Li. On the other hand, Pak-hang focused on Xiao, Li, and roles. Lastly, Hongladarom focused on roles as constituting a possible ontology of the online self. All of them failed to exhaust other significant Confucian values. Lastly, it is essential to notice that both Bockover and Pak-hang focused on the technology of the Internet per se, not on the online self nor on the online relations established in the online community. On the other hand, Hongladarom focused on a conceptual analysis of the online self and did not venture much anymore into human relationships. In light of such preliminary critique, we can now lay down the specific tasks of this paper. In this paper, I specifically aim to make use of Confucian philosophy (not limited to the values used by Bockover and Pak-hang) to address the issues confronting human relationships in the online community. I will not focus on the technology per se which Bockover and Pak-hang pursued, nor ask whether or not such a technology is compatible to Confucian philosophy. It is because I find that such a question treats the philosophy as a package deal wherein all elements should match the circumstances to which it is applied. Rather, I will grant that there are aspects of Confucian philosophy which are helpful and insightful in addressing the malaise of the online community, while some other aspects are meant to be left behind. And I will not focus on ontology which Hongladarom endeavored. This paper aims to argue that a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions in the online community can be formulated which can aid in addressing the present malaise of the online community especially problems confronting human relations/interactions established therein. I shall argue for such claim in three steps. First, I shall establish that indeed the online world/online realm can be treated or viewed as a community, hence, an online community. Second, I shall establish that as a community it has certain problems that need to be addressed. Third, I shall establish that these problems may be addressed or seen in a different light by formulating a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions. It is important to note though that after having formulated a preliminary Confucian ethics of humane online interactions/relations, I shall not go as far as applying such a framework in every problem in the online community and then attempt to solve them all at once. Such an endeavor calls for another paper.

5.2 Online World/Realm as a Community In this section of the paper, I propose that another way of approaching the technology of the Internet specifically the online world or the online realm is by looking at it as a community. I have three reasons for that. First, I think that much of the

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problems, issues, and dangers that are confronting us today with regards to the Internet spring from the view that the Internet is nothing but a technology that has the capacity to overpower, dictate, and control the way we live our lives. Hence, much of the researches done in Internet studies attempts to see how the technology of the Internet per se can be modified and improved so that the dangers and problems that accompanies such a technology can be minimized. However, I think that viewing the Internet in such a way prevents us from realizing that human beings are participants in both the benefits and dangers of the Internet. It prevents us from admitting that the online world is not just composed of softwares, applications, social media, and the like but is also a human world. Hence, the problems and dangers brought about by the Internet cannot be addressed if we only focus on modifying and improving such a technology without taking into consideration the role and participation of human beings in such malaise. Hence, there is a need to re-assess the way we view the online world. If most of the problems and dangers online are pertaining to our human existence and relationships, then most likely these problems emerged from how human beings existed and related to one another online and not just arising from the technology of the Internet per se. Hence, if that is the case, it would be helpful if we now view the online world as a community, an online human community and not just a “world” which sprung from and solely composed of the technology of the Internet qua Internet. In addition, viewing the online realm as an online community can shed light to the quandary of Bockover and Pak-hang. Both philosophers focused on the compatibility and incompatibility of the technology of the Internet with Confucian virtues and values but failed to realize that the question of compatibility or incompatibility will dissolve if we view the technology of the Internet and the online realm as a community. Their analysis would now change perhaps into whether or not Confucian values and virtues are present in the online community or whether Confucian values and virtues can help in the improvement of the present problems of the online community. Hence, their polemics will not stay at the level of speculation and analysis of the technology alone but expands to include actual human experiences online. However, one of the problems that one faces when venturing into the nature and scope of the concept of “online community” is that the concept of “community” itself is problematic and difficult to define. The scope of what exactly makes a community is difficult to delineate. Sometimes the term “applies to very specific forms of social groupings tied to a common place and mutual interdependence” or sometimes is “applied to almost any form of social grouping” (Miller 2011, p. 184). However, Malcom Parks’ distinction between “strong” and “weak” sense of the term “community” in his “Social Network Sites as Virtual Communities” can shed some light on the matter, and provide an insight on whether or not online or virtual communities can be treated as a community. If one is to understand “community” in its strong sense, then online or virtual ones cannot be considered as a community since there should be shared physical space where people in such a space are relatively self-sufficient as well as mostly linked by kinship (Parks 2011). Hence, if one is to understand “community” as a geographic entity, online or virtual ones will surely fail to be one. On the other hand, if one is to understand “community” in the weak

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sense, then online or virtual ones can be accepted as a community. It is because in this sense the community is conceptualized in psychological terms or as a “quality of sociality” (Parks 2011). Community is “viewed as a culture, a set of ideas and interpersonal sentiments rather than as a physical space” (Parks 2011, p. 107). Hence, in this regard, online or virtual communities are now defined as “social groups that display the psychological and cultural qualities of strong community without physical proximity” (Parks 2011, p. 107). A summary of how online communities especially social networking sites may pass as a community is provided by Parks (201, p. 108) below: Defining elements of community

Associated social requirements on social networking sites

Less Relevant for Virtual Communities (“Strong Sense”) • Sharing geographic space • Self-sufficiency More Relevant for Virtual Communities (“Weak Sense”) • Ability to engage in collective action • Shared rituals, social regulation

• Users must create and visit their profiles with some regularity

• Patterned interaction among members

• Users must personalize their profiles

• Identification, a sense of belonging and attachment

• Users must make social contacts and respond to other users

• Self-awareness of being a community

Indeed, from the foregoing we have shown that there is merit in looking at the online realm or online world as a community and not just looking at it as comprising of softwares, webs, and the like. In addition, there is scholarly support to our proposal of looking at such online realm as a virtual community. Hence, given that we have now established the motivation as well as the basic nature of what an online or virtual community is, we can now delve into some current issues that confronts such an online human community.

5.3 Some Problems Confronting Contemporary Online Community To provide an exhaustive and comprehensive discussion of the problems that confront the online community at present is impossible for the purposes of this paper. We will have to be contented with some chosen problems that are most relevant to the wellbeing of the self and the self’s relation to other selves online. True to the interdisciplinary spirit of Internet studies, I shall utilize some psychological and sociological studies in elucidating the current problems prevalent in the online community.

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Brunskill (2014) in his “The Dangers of Social Media for the Psyche” identifies at least eighteen aspects of social media interactions that can pose potential dangers for one’s psyche. For the purposes of this paper, I will only focus on seven. They are: (1) over-sharing and the loss of privacy; (2) the problem of narcissism; (3) the creation of social media avatars; (4) celebrity worship; (5) promotion of destructive and unhelpful emotions; (6) taking over of social media in unexpected ways in one’s life; and (7) hosting antisocial behaviors. The loss of privacy due to oversharing is a concern especially when one thinks of how the psyche becomes too disintegrated because of pouring out various aspects of oneself some of which are meant only to be kept to oneself. Aspects of the self that are mostly in need of cultivation and improvement as well those aspects that people do not have to show to all especially online are often shared through posts online (Brunskill 2014). On the other hand, social media may also promote narcissistic tendencies through self-promoting content online which are often manifested in one’s obsession towards posting one’s attractive photos and writing superlative descriptions about oneself (Brunskill 2014). Selfies are also noted as the “ultimate emblem of the age of narcissism” (Brunskill 2014, p. 408). What is worse is that social media may even fuel the narcissism of those who are in actual fact clinically diagnosed with such because of the controlled self-representation, satiation of craving for attention, and shallow relationships that social media tends to promote (Brunskill 2014). On the other hand, the creation of social media avatars and one’s attachment to it may further widen the gap between one’s so-called “substance self” offline and one’s “idealized representation of the self” online (Brunskill 2014). Identity shifts and compartmentalization of the self leads one to struggle in integrating various aspects of one’s personal identity which should all be ideally intact and integrated as opposed to separating them into parts as in online and offline self (Brunskill 2014). Congruence and incongruence are also an issue here since people in social media are given the freedom to conceal or misrepresent obvious aspects of oneself which cannot be concealed offline (Brunskill 2014). One is in a constant compromise formation where one struggles to promote or project an ideal or hoped for version of oneself thus widening the gap between one’s offline and online identity (Brunskill 2014). Speaking of projecting idealized aspects of the self as well as excessive “showing off” of such aspects, modern fame and celebrity worship in its metaphorical sense is also a problem, specifically “empty celebrity cult.” Such a phenomenon online “worships people just because they are famous, regardless of whether fame is inherited, achieved, or ascribed” (Brunskill 2014, p. 406). Brunskill (2014) adds that “social media allows everyone to tweet, broadcast and blog as if they were celebrities, creating an alternate reality and turning friends, acquaintances, strangers into fans and followers” (p. 406). Thus, leading many to unhelpful emotional states such as envy, jealousy, and depression. Constant comparison with those “famous” online, fear of missing out, as well as relying on likes and affirmations from people online for one’s worth as a person contributes to these emotional states (Brunskill 2014). But the worse of these is the prevalence of antisocial behavior online and cyberbullying manifested in unwanted/inappropriate contact, posting of inappropriate or distressing

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information, trolling, revenge postings of a sexual nature, obituary defacements and the like (Brunskill 2014). Another major issue of interest in the online community is deception. Deception is very prevalent in the offline community as well but is subtler and more difficult to detect in the online world. Even relationships online tend to exist in some forms of deception. Tsikerdekis and Zeadally (2014) in “Online Deception and Social Media” defines deception as “a deliberate act intended to mislead others, while targets are not aware or do not expect such acts might be taking place where the deceiver aims to transfer a false belief to the deceived” (p. 72). Various deception techniques include bluffs, mimicry, fakery, white lies, evasions, exaggeration, webpage redirections, and concealment (Tsikerdekis and Zeadally 2014). In light of such issue, Tsikerdekis and Zeadally (2014) enumerates three challenges that have to be addressed. First is the “lack of a standard, unified theory and methods for online deception detection” (Tsikerdekis and Zeadally 2014, p. 78). Second is “lack of a universal or contextspecific, computationally efficient method for deception detection in large online communities” (Tsikerdekis and Zeadally 2014, p. 78). Last is the “lack of effort by social media developers in deception prevention” (Tsikerdekis and Zeadally 2014, p. 78).

5.4 Towards a Confucian Ethics of Humane Online Relations/Interactions Some Preliminaries Now that we have a fair understanding of the online world as a community, and the problems confronting such a community, we are now ready to sketch a preliminary Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions. From the foregoing discussion of the pressing problems confronting the online community, we, in one way or another, have shown that such a community is in a state of disorder and disintegration. One cannot help but recall the chaos and disorder that are characteristic of the community or society that Confucius belonged to in his time. Although, disintegration and disorder are always present in various communities throughout human history, those of the online community are much alarming today since it exists via a new technology and that almost the whole of humanity are members of such a community due to its non-reliance on geographic physical space. Hence, it is interesting to see how Confucius would approach the current disintegrating community and what sort of ethics can be formulated that can be of help to such an online community. In addition, it is disturbing that most of the solutions that scholars of Internet studies propose are focused on modifying or improving the technology of the Internet per se. One need not go so far and need only to look at how Tzikerdekis and Zeadally enumerated the challenges for future scholars. All of these challenges are focused on creating computational methods and tools for online deception detection. It seems

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that scholars of Internet studies again have forgotten that it is not only the technology of the Internet per se which contributes to these problems but the participation of human beings in this technology. Scholars have failed to look into people’s way of thinking about the online community and people’s way of living vis-à-vis the technology of the Internet and its online community. Hence, the need for an ethics of humane online relations/interactions and not just a modification or improvement of Internet technology. In this light, one realizes that these problems of the online community exist not solely because of the technology of the Internet per se but because of some lack of or forgetfulness of certain values and virtues. Now what are some of these values and virtues that most people in the online community do not have or have forgotten, and should obtain in order for the problems to somehow diminish? Aside from those fundamental Confucian values and virtues such as Ren, Yi, Xiao, and Li which are often the “standard” virtues and values used in various scholarly applications of Confucian thought to various phenomena as evidenced by Bockover and Pak-hang’s works, I find that there are other virtues and insights by Confucius that are of use, if not, more appropriate as elements for a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions. Although the fundamental virtues and values mentioned earlier are indeed part of Confucius’ thoughts on harmonious relationships, it is interesting to note that he also has specific although scattered thoughts on the concept of relationship per se that when unpacked and clustered into themes can provide insights as to how one can better relate to fellow online users in the online community. In the interest of space and time, this paper shall focus only on two themes: (1) prominence and acknowledgement, and (2) friendships and relationships in general. On Prominence and Acknowledgement vis-à-vis Online Community Confucius teaches than one should be concerned more about failing to acknowledge the deeds of other people rather one’s own. He says, “Don’t worry about not being acknowledged by others; worry about failing to acknowledge them” (Analects 1.16). In addition, Confucius admonishes that we should be concerned more about the corresponding duty attached to our Ming or names or titles, rather than on the title per se. We should worry more about the corresponding duty and not the acknowledgement one gets from doing one’s duty. Confucius says, “Do not worry over not having an official position; worry about what it takes to have one. Do not worry that no one acknowledges you; seek to do what will earn you acknowledgement” (Analects 4.14). The same spirit is found in Analects 14.30, “Do not worry about not being recognized; worry about not having any reason for them to recognize you.” Going back to the exemplary person (Junzi), Confucius says, “Exemplary persons (junzi) are distressed by their own lack of ability, not by the failure of others to acknowledge them” (Analects 15.19). On the other hand, Confucius provides a clear distinction between being prominent versus being known. Those who are prominent focuses on Yi or righteousness while those who are known focuses merely on appearances (Analects 12.20). Confucius’ insights on prominence and acknowledgement are important for the online community. Most online users have forgotten that there is a distinction between

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being known and being prominent. Many online users often do not see the difference of the two and thought that being known suffices. And this failure to distinguish the two causes the unhelpful emotions which Brunskill (2014) elaborated earlier which includes envy, jealousy, and even depression. People get jealous and envious from those who are famous online. People get resentful because they do not receive the same number of likes, affirmations, and validations that other people get from their friends and followers. People oftentimes focus on the person being famous rather than on the content of what the person posts and shares online. Confucius warns that people must not believe, accept, and gratify what a particular person says because it is that particular person who said it (Analects 15.3). The focus should be what the person said and the accompanying actions done by that person and not the person per se. Moral ascendancy is found in actions not in the appearances that this person projects. And this is what most people online fail to realize. The “celebrity worship” and “cult” which Brunskill (2014) emphasized earlier precisely commits this mistake. People online are often attracted to and follow people who are famous and deemed likeable by many and often despises and leaves out people who are not well known. Hence, again the feeling of being left alone online. Again, Confucius warns that one should be careful with people who are celebrated by everyone. In the same way that one should examine as well why a particular person is being hated by everyone (Analects 15.28). Failing to heed to this admonition of Confucius leads to the insecurity that some feel towards those famous online which Brunskill elucidated. In addition, the narcissism that plagues social media because of excessive self-promotion and showing off is contrary to Confucius’ admonition that one should be concerned not so much of one’s titles or one’s Ming but with the accompanying responsibility that it contains. One should not worry about being acknowledged, recognized, or known but should worry if one is being a righteous and proper person. The same is true online. It should not be the likes, affirmation, validation, and approval that one gets from other online users that should be of utmost importance in one’s online existence but one’s appropriate and right actions online. The obsession of online users in their appearances is what prevents people to be more conscious of the needs of other online users. It is their wanting for a reputation online which prevents them from transcending their selfish desires and be conscious of the presence of the human other. It is this unending desire for validation from others online as well as wanting to always be acknowledged that makes one fail to acknowledge other people who are indeed worthy of acknowledgement and credit. Indeed, the online community today is a disintegrating and problematic community. It is this forgetfulness that one is prominent only when one is righteous in one’s actions that makes one’s relationships and friendships with others online fake and inauthentic. On Friendships and Relationships vis-à-vis Online Community Confucius also has something to say about maintaining harmonious friendly relationships. After all, the relationships between a friend and another friend is one of the basic or cardinal relationships (Wu lun). In relation to prominence, Confucius says that one attracts friends by one’s refinement and moral virtues, and not by forcing oneself to people. “The exemplary person (junzi) attracts friends through refinement

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(wen), and thereby promotes authoritative conduct (ren)” (Analects 12.24). Forcing one’s self and insisting into friendships that are not meant to be will lead one to be ostracized in the end. “If in serving your lord you are unrelenting, you will bring on disgrace; if in your friendships you are unrelenting, you will find yourself ostracized” (Analects 4.26). While inside a friendly relationship, one should not feel ill will towards one’s friend otherwise to have and to do that would render one shameless and hypocritical. “To seek out someone’s friendship while harboring ill will towards them—Zuoqiu Ming thought this kind of conduct shameless” (Analects 5.25). The same is true with relationships in general, to love and hate someone at the same time will lead to perplexity. “To simultaneously love and hate someone, and thus to simultaneously want this person to live and to die, is to be in a quandary” (Analects 12.10). Contrast this to the type of relationships and friendships Confucius aims to establish which is characterized by trust and confidence and not deceit and hypocrisy. Confucius says, “I would like to bring peace and contentment to the aged, to share relationships of trust and confidence with my friends, and to love and protect the young” (Analects 5.26). And if friends commit a wrongdoing or an action that is contrary to Yi, Confucius advises, “Do your utmost (zhong) to exhort them, and lead them adeptly (shan) along the way (dao). But if they are unwilling then desist—don’t disgrace yourself in the process” (Analects 12.23). In other words, as a friend, one should not tolerate the wrongdoings of one’s friend. One should correct such wrongdoing, but if one’s friend still does not listen, one should not force oneself to the other. Confucius continues that there are three kinds of friends that one should have which will be “a source of personal improvement” (Analects 16.4). Those who are true. Those who are true to their word or those who practice Xin. And those who are wise. On the other hand, there also those kinds of friends that one should not have. Those who constantly wants approval, affirmation, and validation from others. Those who are pretentious. And those who are insincere. Confucius continues by adding the kinds of activities to achieve Zhi/Chin or wisdom, and one of them is to choose and be with friends who are of superior character. He says, Finding enjoyment in three kinds of activities will be a source of personal improvement; finding enjoyment in three other kinds of activities will be a source of personal injury. One stands to be improved by the enjoyment found in attuning oneself to the rhythms of ritual propriety (li) and music (yue), by enjoyment found in talking about what others do well (shan), and by the enjoyment found in having a circle of many friends of superior character (xian); one stands to be injured by finding enjoyment in being arrogant, by finding enjoyment in dissolute diversions, and by finding enjoyment in the easy life. (Analects 16.5).

This is affirmed by Confucius’ view on relationships in general. According to him, respect is of utmost importance in relationships as well as the effort to improve oneself by doing one’s utmost. He says, “At home be deferential, in handling public affairs be respectful, and do your utmost (zhong) in your relationships with others. Even if you were to go and live among the barbarians, you could not do without such an attitude” (Analects 13.19). Again going back to his discourses on the exemplary

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person (Junzi), Confucius notes that exemplary persons do gather together but do not form an elite, narrow, and exclusive circle in danger of being self-righteous and sanctimonious. Confucius says, “Exemplary persons (junzi) are self-possessed but not contentious; they gather together with others, but do not form cliques” (Analects 15.22). Indeed, Confucius is very much concerned with forming smaller “groups” or “friendships” in the community which often lead to the disintegration of the community when conflicts arise in these groups because of hearsays and rumors, reminiscent of the warring states which are small states fighting each other who are members of the whole Ancient China. Lastly, Confucius says that contrary to injuring individuals and disintegrating the community, the purpose of relationships is to bring out the best in each other. “The exemplary person (junzi) helps to bring out the best in others, but does not help to bring out the worst. The petty person does just the opposite” (Analects 12.16). Hence, Confucius’ emphasis on being with friends that brings out the best in oneself and not the worse. And he argues that one must relate only to people who are of the same moral level as oneself. Now, one of the prevailing issues in the Philosophy of Internet is whether or not online friendships can be considered as genuine friendships. Now through these insights by Confucius, we are able to gather another perspective that is not limited to the Aristotelian model that most philosophers use. Confucius’ insights on friendship also provides us with a guide on how to improve the kinds of online friendships that we have. As was mentioned by Brunskill earlier, one of the problems that social media gives is that people become so obsessed with showing off their best selves to others online. This leads online users to project an idealized self which are often disparate from who one truly is offline. Identity shifts, compartmentalization of one’s personality, as well as compromise formation between one’s offline and online self are done with the hope that people online will become more accepting. In other words, people online often change or modify aspects of their online self in order to gain more acquaintances and friends. This brings us to Confucius’ insights on how to actually gain friends and not through those narcissistic and celebrity attitudes mentioned by Brunskill. It is through one’s moral virtues and righteousness and not by flaunting it that makes one have genuine friends. It is not by directly and indirectly forcing oneself in some online group of friends that one can actually join such groups. It is not by mere appearances in one’s online avatar or online profile that one gets friends. This further brings us to Confucius’ insights on the kinds of friends that one should have. If applied to online friendship, Confucius admonishes that one should be friends only with people who are true to themselves and true to their words. Therefore, those who are pretentious in their online profiles, in their online posts and tweets, no matter how famous they are or attractive they are should be avoided as friends. In the same way such kind of people are those which in actual fact do not attract some following online because of their unrelenting desire for approval, validation, and affirmation from others online. Usually the online community can easily detect those who are insincere and pretentious through certain gestures and words. Fortunately, some people are wise enough to distinguish genuine and fake friends online even though they are absolutely far away from each other. Indeed, those who are truly morally

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virtuous are the ones who can gain more friends online than those who pretend to be one. On the other hand, in case one is inside a friendly relationship online, Confucius’ advice of not planting seeds of ill will as well as resentment also applies. Oftentimes online friendships get destroyed when an insecure online friend always stalks his or her friend’s social media or are always desiring for likes and comments from one’s friend. Oftentimes online friendship starts to disintegrate when a particular friend starts to flaunt one’s online friendship to other online users or in a particular online group. Indeed, the trust and confidence that Confucius wants to characterize a genuine friendship cannot flourish in such kind of set-up but only hypocrisy and contempt can. Confucius being wary about forming small groups, small friendships, and cliques are also very much significant in the online community. Usually the more online groups there is the more conflicts, envy, and jealousy. The more people try to cluster themselves instead of forming a truly harmonious online community, the more conflicts and confusions arise. Add to these are the prevalence of fake news, hearsays, and rumors that plague both offline and online communities as in group chats and forums. Indeed, online friendships of such kind will never last. In the end, Confucius reminds us that relationships and friendships must always bring out the best and not the worst of each other, no matter what social media one is using it must always be used with the goal of bringing out the best in all members of an online community and not its destruction.

5.5 Conclusion From the foregoing we have shown that indeed a Confucian ethics of humane online relations/interactions can be formulated and may provide insights as to how we can better understand the current malaise that the online community is experiencing and how we can better address such problems in the near future. Although we do not boast to have provided solutions to such problems in this paper, the mere fact, however, that we are able to see such problems in a different light as opposed to how scholars of Internet studies saw it, is enough to effect some changes for the future. What we have sketched out here is merely preliminary and is a challenge for future scholars to develop the preliminary ethics that we have formulated and apply it more specifically and intensively to other problems online. And it is hoped that whatever debates and discussions that will spring from such endeavors, and on this present work, will contribute not just to ongoing philosophizing about the online realm, but contribute to the improvement of the way we live our lives be it offline or online. Thereby, promoting love and friendship among ourselves and across cultures.

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References Bockover, M. (2003). Confucian values and the internet: A potential conflict. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 30(2), 159–175. Brunskill, D. (2014). The dangers of social media for the psyche. The Journal of Current Issues in Media and Telecommunications, 6(4), 391–415. Confucius. (1999). The analects of Confucius: A philosophical translation (R. Ames, & H. Rosemont, trans.). New York: Ballantine Publishing Group. Dreyfus, H. (2009). On the internet (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. Hongladarom, S. (2016). The online self: Externalism, friendship and games. New York: Springer. Kapidzic, S., & Martins, N. (2015). Mirroring the media: The relationship between media consumption, media internalization, and profile picture characteristics on Facebook. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 59(2), 278–297. Miller, V. (2011). Understanding digital culture. London: Sage Publications. Pak-hang, W. (2013). Confucian social media: An oxymoron? Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 12, 283–296. Parks, M. (2011). Social network sites as virtual communities. In Z. Papacharissi (Ed.), A networked self: Identity, community, and culture on social networking sites (pp. 105–123). New York: Routledge. Tsikerdekis, M., & Zeadally, S. (2014). Online deception in social media. Communication of the ACM, 57(9), 72–80.

Joseph Martin M. Jose is a Ph.D. graduate student at De La Salle University, Manila. He is also a research apprentice for the Office of the Assistant Dean for Research and Advanced Studies of the College of Liberal Arts of DLSU. He does research on the intersections of philosophy and the internet.

Part II

Historical Perspectives: Modern and Contemporary

Chapter 6

When Pompey’s Elephants Trumpeted for Mercy: Levinas and Solidarity for the Animal Face Mira T. Reyes

Abstract This work is an attempt to apply central ethical Levinasian concepts of face and other toward animals, in view of widening the circle of love and friendship beyond human species. The essay will move in three parts: first, by clarifying within the literature of Levinasian scholarship of animal ethics if the animal is a face and an other, and thus, is a moral agent; second, by using the concrete example of the slaughter of elephants in Circus Maximus during the reign of Pompey the Great to demonstrate the content and power of the animal face in dissolving the boundaries of social prejudice; and, third, an interpretation of Levinas’ idea of ethics as religion to describe the features of a universal living ethical piety for the animal that would guide contemporary animal ethics. The significance of the research is to contribute to the new trend of Levinasian animal ethics and a metaphysical groundwork for the ethics of care for animals which turns away from the utilitarian perspective of seeing animals in lump sums instead of individuals and from the abstract normative formulations of lifeboat dilemmas. Keywords Levinas · Face · Animal ethics

6.1 Introduction and Objectives Like Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas dislikes the word love in all its modern nuances of fickleness and promiscuity. “Love as a relation with the Other can be reduced to this fundamental immanence, be divested of all transcendence, seek but a connatural being, a sister soul, present itself as incest” (Levinas 1998a, p. 254). Shying away from the Platonic ideal of love as a search for one’s half, Levinas conceives of love as a structure of subjectivity in which the I is responsible for the other. Love in Levinas means an ethics for the other. Yet, is this ethics an affair only between humans?

M. T. Reyes (B) University of Pardubice, Pardubice, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_6

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This work is an experiment of sorts in two ways. First, it contributes to the new and growing scholarship of applying Levinasian ethics to environmental problems, specifically, to the question of the animal. Second, it explores the possibility of a universal witnessing of the animal face in history. Levinasian face-to-face has largely been understood not only as an ethics between humans but as private singular encounters that are sporadic and isolated because this is the scenario in World War II. The totalitarian power is ubiquitous; the eye in the tower is always watching and so Levinas had to speak of the power of little acts of goodness that are hidden (Levinas 1998a, p. 200). But this work will use the example of an animal face when it shines in a public space. How do we speak of the power of the face in this kind of ambush?1 When Iran downed Ukrainian Airlines Flight 752 with missiles, the ensuing discourse immediately took the color of a politics which picked on ‘what country struck down which.’ But koala bears being burnt alive in the Australian bushfires in the 2019 heat wave invoked a global compassion and support without any question of the nationality of the marsupials nor which country was to be held accountable for them. The problem of global warming and climate change point to something more basic and urgent than racial, sexual, and economic conflicts: all live on one planet and there is no substitute. Kinship on earth does not only include humans but other animal species. This paper is a rumination on the experience of a universal love for the animal that collapses the social boundaries of class, culture, and species within the philosophical framework of Levinas. It poses the following questions: (i) Does the animal reveal a face in Levinasian ethics? (ii) If so, what does it mean when the animal face is witnessed simultaneously by many (human) faces? (iii) If ethics is a religion for Levinas, what are the features of an animal piety that would have a universal appeal? This work will develop its ideas on the above in three strokes: first, by ferreting out the niche of the animal within current reviews of Levinasian thought for the environment; second, by demonstrating the reality of the social power of the animal face and an analysis of its content using a particular example of a spectacular historical event; and, third, by drawing insights from Levinas’s relation between religion and face to characterize the features of an ethical piety for the animal that would have a universal appeal.

6.2 Interrogating an Ethics Exclusively for Humans This initial part will clarify if the animal face could have a place within Levinasian ethics. The reason why ecological philosophy scholars are studying Levinas is to be able to advance the formal recognition that there is such a thing as a universal love for the animal that does not have to be justified in the political rhetoric of evaluating the value and priority of one species over another. They need to negotiate the status 1 Levinas

describes the ethical arrest of the face toward the I as an ‘ambush,’ the urgency of succor skips social prejudice.

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of the animal within a new framework of an ethics that would justify a universal and direct responsibility for the animal without qualification. Levinas’s ethics of face and otherness fits this requirement and proffers a chance to escape the anthropocentrism prevalent in utilitarian ethics that cradled the beginnings of contemporary animal ethics discourse. Levinas’s description of the face is the following: The face is present in its refusal to be contained…it is neither seen nor touched-for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. The Other is not other with a relative alterity…The alterity of the other does not depend on any quality that would distinguish him from me. (Levinas 1966, p. 194)

The criteria of face, though grounded in embodiment, transcend physiology, as Levinas claims that to see the face of the other is “not even to notice the color of his eyes” (1985, p. 85). To see the face is to behold the otherness of the other which is fully present in a privileged part of the human body which is the face. And yet, Levinas’s face does not always literally mean the physical face. Levinas (1998a) has already clarified this, citing a scene in the novel of Vasily Grossman’s Life and Fate, when Soviet people lined up to convey letters and packages to family members arrested for political crimes. From behind, what every person sees is only the nape and not face and yet, it reveals the full content of mortality and suffering (Levinas 1998a, pp. 231–232). The content of the face is precisely otherness, which is not really a substance but a relation wherein the other’s presence pressures the I with an “unforced force” to adjust her2 ways in order to accommodate the other’s presence, as one would greet an anonymous person or make way when she is walking along a corridor. Does the animal have this kind of unforced force? Does one stop the car for a cat or a dog who crosses the highway? Except for the nutcase, almost all people would agree to do this, even if they don’t always do it in real life. That the animal could have a face that imposes otherness is valuable to animal ethicists because they are seeking to justify a ‘personhood’ for the animal without the grueling labor of having to prove that the animal’s linguistic and rational capacities measure up to that of the human (not to mention the difficulty of drawing variations of data per species) because this is a significant determinant for moral considerability in normative ethics. But Levinas himself is reluctant to accept that the animal has a face. In an interview by students from the University of Warwick, Levinas (1988) was asked if the face also applies to animals. He replied that the dog has a face but that, “I do not know if the snake has a face” (Levinas 1988, p. 171) which obscures his earlier position in his writings that the face goes beyond the physical. Then he makes a concession: 2 The face has a force all its own. “The face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without

force. Your question seems to be based on the idea that God commands.” (Levinas 1988, p. 169). To clarify and fix the usage of pronouns in this essay, the word she will be used to refer to the human person and the word he to the animal. The she will neutralize the predominant gender of the human which is male and the he will neutralize that of the animal which is identified with the female. Also, the word animal is used to refer to the non-human animal. Supposedly, the politically-correct term used in animal ethics is non-human animal but it is cumbersome to be repeating the terms human and non-human animal throughout the text.

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“It is clear that, without considering animals as human beings, the ethical extends to all living beings. We do not want to make an animal suffer needlessly and so on”. Calarco (2010) values this affirmation, in that even if Levinas cannot verify if animals (and what animals) have faces, he at least, commits to a universal ethical consideration for all living beings: Rather than trying to determine the definitive criterion or criteria for moral considerability, we might…begin from the notion of “universal consideration that takes seriously our fallibility in determining where the face begins and ends. Universal consideration would entail being attentive and open to the possibility that anything might take on a face; it would entail taking up a skeptical and critical relation to the determinations of moral consideration that form the contours of our present modern-day moral thinking. (Calarco 2010, p. 113)

According to Calarco, the focus should not be on what species count and what do not but rather a critique of the foundational assumptions when ethics discerns what matters between species and what does not. It is important to leave the notion of face open in Levinas, because after all, it not an identity but a relation and the human-animal relationship has never been in a more dynamic flux than it is today when one of the effects of climate change is the collapse of categories between wild and tame animals and the boundaries between civilized space and the wilderness.3 But then again, Levinas subverts the concession for universality in the same text of the interview, saying, “Yet the priority here is not found in the animal, but in the human face” (1988, p. 168) but the prototype of this is human ethics” (p. 171). His explanation for the priority of the human species is that “…the human is only the last stage of the evolution of the animal. I would say, on the contrary, that in relation to the animal, the human is a new phenomenon…. This is my principal thesis. A being is something that is attached to being, to its own being. That is Darwin’s idea. The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without ethics” (p. 172). The above statement squashed the hopes of environmentalists in finding a way out of anthropocentrism and speciesism for the animal in Levinas. In his ethics, Levinas reinforces the animal-human divide in that the latter could detach from the evolutionary process and breed a new civilized species. Atterton (2011) criticized Levinas saying that he misunderstands Darwin because in The Descent of Man, altruism is a behavior that is also a product of evolution which has its beginnings in the sacrifice of self for the family and eventually, for the tribe. This is the reason why there is a wealth of ethological data of observations of conspecific and interspecific altruism in many species of non-human animals.4 Furthermore, Atterton (2012) said that even if the hermeneutics of animal suffering is based upon the experience of human suffering, there is no clear rule that explains the philosopher’s view why the prototype of animal ethics should be human ethics; “…even if we can agree that the human ability to introspect makes fellow-feeling possible, it still leaves unanswered the question of why animals that lack this mutual 3 This refers to the phenomenon of animals such as wolves and bears who are supposedly ‘wild’ but

have invaded urban spaces in search of food, e.g. polar bears. There is also an alarming rate of the abduction of big cats and other wild animals because they are being turned into exotic pets. 4 See von Kreisler’s (2001).

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‘understanding,’ but are sentient beings anyway, are morally inferior,” (p. 37). There are progressive anthropologists such as Burghart (2005) who labored to study animal play from a neutral stance across species. For example, he refused Piaget’s developmental theory of play in children as platform. His point of departure is a view of a broad spectrum of playful activities across species and mounted his definition of play from that neutral point. There is no sufficient reason why the framework for understanding the behavior of all non-human species should always follow the standards of the so-called ‘highest species.’ However, in some sense, Levinas still wins the argument in that while altruistic behavior may be present in many species, it is most reliable and predictable in humans. So, is it possible that the new phenomenon that Levinas speaks of may not be a detachment from evolution but the capacity to create normative and legal systems that make altruism an objectified practice? But on the plane of normative ethical systems, the animal cannot be a moral agent precisely because he does not share common reflective and intellectual capacities as humans in the deliberation of moral norms. Similarly, he cannot also have rights because one only acquires rights on a contractual basis if one could promise equal respect for others’ rights on pain of legal penalties (Scruton 1996, pp. 79–81). So, does Levinas’s face and otherness require the status of moral agency? No, it does not. One reason is that the ethics of Levinas (1998a) is a priori and does not move along the plane of the normative. Not only is it out of place within the ethics of a social contract but it is a priori a bizarre form that does not spring from Kantian categories nor the Husserlian lifeworld that condition the possibilities of understanding within the domain of reason and language. As Levinas argues, “the unity of the I think is the ultimate form of the mind as knowledge…I ask: is intentionality the only mode of the ‘gift of meaning?’ Is the meaningful always correlative to a thematization and representation?” (Levinas 1998a, pp. 126–127). It also evades a mystical relatedness to Being such as that of the Heideggerian dasein; “we cannot prefer a relation with beings as a condition for ontology to the fundamental thesis that every relation with a particular being assumes an intimacy with, or a forgetting of being…how can a relation to being be anything, initially, but an understanding of it as beingthe fact of freely letting it be as a being?” (5). For Levinas (1985), “The face is straightaway ethical…the face is signification, and signification without context…the face is meaning all by itself” (p. 86). The other reason is that Levinas requires only a capacity to give and not to return goodness. The moral subject is a giver without reservation and not a contractualist. Goodness does not ask for a return of the good. Levinas (1985) said that the relation between the I and other is asymmetrical; “the intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible to the other without waiting for reciprocity…Reciprocity is his affair” (p. 98). The movement of ethics is unilateral and not circular. So, in this, the animal passes as moral patient or object of moral considerability. But he passes also as moral subject in the sense of being author of the ethical event, as face and other. In Levinas, the I is amoral in a self-centered solitary world but becomes moral upon the entry of the other. But the host of the moral event is not the I but the other. The I decenters only upon the breach of the other into the I.

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However ambiguous the status of the animal face is in Levinas, there is something definite: whether or not Levinas was prepared (in his time) to answer the environmental question that challenged him to expand his ethical agenda beyond the holocaust, he cannot commit to the incest of an anthropocentric ethics because that would undermine his entire project of escaping from the omnipresence of being. It would be within the interest of Levinas to grant the animal, not only a universal moral considerability as a token of human benevolence as Kant would have it, but his own integrity as face and other who could author the ethical demand, not as a moral agent who negotiates a contract, but as channel of infinity in the midst of totality. The encounter of the animal face is still the beginning of animal ethics. But there is a need to quit thinking of face in terms of quality attributes and to focus on the trail of the other’s relation with the selfsame, not species’ differences but a phenomenological description of the power of the ethical demand: what does the animal face demand from the human I? What has the animal face done to the human ego entrenched in the selfsame? This is the a priori of animal ethics. The challenge, then, of the third wave of Levinasian scholarship for the environment, is to keep vigilance toward the multifarious ways that the animal continuously interrogates the anthropocentric structures that subtend the human-animal relation to ensure that ethics is not wasted to an incest of the human species. It carries the agenda of showing that the animal has the power of holding the ethical hostage not only on the personal but on the social plane. The animal face could also launch a thousand ships, so to speak; it has gathering force and a revolutionary potential. The next part will demonstrate a concrete historical example of this.

6.3 Animal Suffering and the Collapse of Social Prejudice The ultimate criterion of being face and other in Levinas is the power of the other to hostage the I-ego and make an ethical demand. This part will endeavor to demonstrate that power by using a testimonial story of an event that happened in ancient Roman times. It is important to dig out this testimony from ancient chronicles to underscore a significant idea that the face of the suffering animal is not a product of the contemporary animal ethics discourse. The animal face has always asserted itself since time immemorial. The discourse of animal ethics is not a war of verification for animal subjectivity but a critique of why it continues to be denied. Belozerskaya (2006) relates a spectacular event that happened in the Circus Maximus during the reign of the great Roman military and political leader, Gnaeus Pompeus Magnus (106–48 BC). In a gladiatorial fight between elephants and Gaetulian hunters, one hunter speared an elephant under the eye and into the brain with a javelin, killing it instantly. Another elephant in the arena, seemingly to avenge his companion, crawled on his knees, tossing the shields of the human combatants with the skill of a professional juggler and this spectacle caused the mammoth crowd to begin jeering. Then something happened. The other elephants, cornered by the Gaetulians, went on a stampede, scrambling for the iron railings which lined the arena. The

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people seated at the inner rim fled for their lives. The poor beasts looked up to the heavens and trumpeted their fear in chorus which conjured a miracle. The spectators pitied the animals and begged Pompey to stop the show and spare them. This was in keeping with the rules of the Roman games after all; supplication was possible (p. 81). This account is drawn from Pliny (1967) in his text Natural History, in the part which exhibits a rich collection of testimonial stories of elephant subjectivity. Also, in Pompey’s second consulship, at the dedication of the Temple of Venus Victrix, twenty, or, as some record, seventeen, fought in the Circus, their opponents being Gaetulians armed with javelins, one of the animals putting up a marvellous fight-its feet being disabled by wounds it crawled against the hordes of the enemy on its knees, snatching their shields from them and throwing them into the air, and these as they fell delighted the spectators by the curves they described, as if they were being thrown by a skilled juggler and not by an infuriated wild animal. There was also a marvellous occurrence in the case of another, which was killed by a single blow, as the javelin striking it under the eye had reached the vital parts of the head. The whole band attempted to burst through the iron palisading by which they were enclosed and caused considerable trouble among the public. Owing to this, when subsequently Caesar in his dictatorship was going to exhibit a similar show he surrounded the arena with channels of water; these the emperor Nero removed when adding special places for the Knighthood. Pompey’s elephants, when they had lost all hope of escape, tried to gain the compassion of the crowd by indescribable gestures of entreaty, deploring their fate with a sort of wailing, so much to the distress of the public that they forgot the general and his munificence carefully devised for their honor and bursting into tears rose in a body and invoked curses on the head of Pompey for which he soon afterwards paid the penalty (pp. 15–17).

This is the account of the same event by Dio (1916): During these same days Pompey dedicated the theatre in which we take pride even at the present time. In it he provided an entertainment consisting of music and gymnastic contests, and in the Circus a horse-race and the slaughter of many wild beasts of all kinds. Indeed, five hundred lions were used up in five days, and eighteen elephants fought against men in heavy armour. Some of these beasts were killed at the time and others a little later. For some of them, contrary to Pompey’s wish, were pitied by the people when, after being wounded and ceasing to fight, they walked about with their trunks raised toward heaven, lamenting so bitterly as to give rise to the report that they did so not by mere chance, but were crying out against the oaths in which they had trusted when they crossed over from Africa, and were calling upon Heaven to avenge them. For it is said that they would not set foot upon the ships before they received a pledge under oath from their drivers that they should suffer no harm (p. 363).

Belozerskaya wraps up the story in a morbid ending saying that Pompey, being the military man that he is, ignored the people’s appeals and ordered all the elephants killed on the spot. But how could this story attest to the reality that the animal is also a face? The proof consists in the analysis of content and power of the ethical demand made by Pompey’s elephants. The content of the ethical demand is the fourth commandment: do not kill! The killing does not refer only to the impending slaughter of the elephants but the implementation of suffering. Suffering, in Levinas, is essentially useless; it does not make sense because it is for nothing. It is more passive than receptivity of the senses in that there is nothing much one can do about suffering except to undergo it (p. 92).

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In Levinas, “the justification of the neighbor’s pain is the source of all immorality” (p. 99). The whole history of consciousness, in all its ingenuity in science and technology, has not succeeded in eliminating suffering. The only way one can make sense out of what is essentially senseless suffering is to willfully bear it for the cause of another. Then, it begins to assume a reason and value; “the just suffering in me for the unjustifiable suffering of the other, opens suffering to the ethical perspective of the inter-human” (p. 94). The elephants’ appeal to the Roman audience is not simply a suspension of their bloody entertainment but the sacrifice of laying down their social prejudice in exchange for the lives of what, supposedly, is an inferior and detestable species. The following presents an analysis of the concentric circles of social prejudice that the face of the animal is challenged to breach, which, at the same time, proves and measures the power of its ethical hostage. The first circle of totality consists of the prejudice of species division: that between beast and the human or the subject-object distinction. The history of how the animal came to land in the Roman arena would develop this point. Jennison (2005) traces the use of animals in the ludi to hunting for amusement as well as sacrifices for magical or religious rites (p. 42). The ludi featured many forms of entertainment such as “chariot-racing or horse racing, gladiatorial combats, and dramatic and musical performances” (p. 43). Supposedly, in the array of shows, animal combat served as preliminary trivia to usher in the later main event which was usually a theatrical or musical show, as it were, a poetic image of the hierarchy between faculties: the basic instincts of violence aligned with the beasts and artistic appreciation aligned with the humans. Like slaves, many of these animals were either captured in foreign lands or were given as tributes by neighboring countries to gain favors from and form political alliances with the Roman emperor. Pompey, for example, is reputed to have amassed large numbers of lions, elephants, leopards, Ethiopian baboons, Gallic lynxes, etc. which were tributes from the Numidian King Hiempsal and the Egyptian King Ptolem Auletes, who both owed their thrones to him. He also conquered Pontus, Armenia, Caucasus, and Syria and the rulers of these lands regularly send him beasts (Belozerskaya, p. 77). Politicians also sponsored these games which won them votes for seats in the government. Augustus records that 3,500 Africanae bestiae were killed in his 26 venationes (Jennison, p. 45). In Pliny, the number of lions totaled 600, of this figure, 500 were destroyed in 5 days. On top of this, 410 leopards and other large cats were also expended (p. 52). Caesar the Dictator was known to have expended a venatio of 400 lions (p. 56). Animal suffering began not in the arena but in the very process of their capture and transport. The two methods used to capture them were the pit and the net. Deer and antelope were caught with nets while the large cats were lured into pits by attracting them with bound live prey. Elephants and bison would be driven into ditches or chasms. They were trained into submission and a tamed disposition by means of starvation (142–143). The conditions for transport were no less tormenting. The cargo was transported on bullock carts which moved so slowly that many of the animals died before reaching their destinations (p. 150).

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According to Jennison, “In the period from the end of the second century B.C. to the death of Julius Caesar, the animal shows reflect the further expansion of Roman power, the increasing exploitation of the Mediterranean world by the Italians…” (p. 48). The fighting and dying animals nurtured feelings of power and pride for Roman glory and celebrated the human prowess to control nature (Belozerskaya, pp. 70–71). The second circle of totality that the animal face stands to overpass involves perspectival differences coming from a cross-section of social classes and regional cultures. These divisions are apparent in the very architectural construction of the Roman amphitheaters which indicates the demographics of spectators. According to Fagan (2011), the Roman games were a prime venue for affirming social identity and solidifying prejudice. “If the Romans indulged their social prejudices wholeheartedly in their wider society, they did so in an intense, microcosmic form at the arena” (p. 174). For example, the very seating arrangements were marks of social status. Fagan explains that “until the early second century…the audience was largely unclassified” but that in 194 BC “a lex Roscia reserved the first fourteen rows at the theater for knights” in the company of the emperor and his family (p. 101). The vestal virgins, magistrates, decurions and their sons, and other honored guests such as foreign ambassadors also occupied the viewing boxes closest to the arena. The classifications were so tedious: there were specified places for the resident citizens, and foreigners were divided into non-citizen inhabitants, public guests, and adventurers. The soldiers were distinguished from civilians as well as the single from the married men, the latter being of a higher status (pp. 102–103). The third edifice of totality is the most significant: that which has to do with the politics of the inside-outside. The circle of the arena was divided between the persecutors, who sat in the outer rim, and the damned, who stood within the ring.5 The arena was a stage for the exhibition of military skills as well as the punishment of criminals. Gladiators, as we know, were slaves, who received training for combat and who, for this, were treated to better living conditions than ordinary servants. To be sure, some of these gladiators were free men who simply wanted to exhibit their military prowess for fame but they differed from slaves because the latter only achieved stellar status in the arena but for most of their lives were subject to discrimination. The role of the animal was to serve as the means of transport for the combatant or as dummy contender intended to test the skills of the human fighter; the savagery of the felled beast became the measure of the crowning glory of military prowess. The animal also participated in the punishment of what society considered the enemies of the Roman state: “non-citizen outlaws, people of the lowest status, brigands, common murderers, fugitive slaves, rebels, captured enemy warriors” (p. 174). The deadliest punishment, as meted out to the Christians during those times, was to be condemned to the beasts. 5 The

circle is a symbol of totality. Levinas uses the images of Abraham and Odysseus in demonstrating the movements of totality and infinity. Infinity moves in a line where both ends do not meet such as in Abraham who moved out of the comforts of his home and country and stayed in exile. Odysseus, on the other hand, moves out of but returns to Ithaca. Similarly, Jesus Christ lived and died in exile.

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Berlozkaya reports that Pliny put the seating capacity of the Circus Maximus at 150,000 (p. 80). This was the number of people who begged their military champion and sponsor of the games to spare the lives of the poor beasts. The point being raised here is to champion the power of the animal face to summon and unite a people’s compassion. A mammoth crowd representing a vast heterogeneous mix of cultures, classes, and ages, in a theater constructed precisely to inculcate and calcify the order of prejudice in society: what more could be asked to validate the face and otherness of the animal? This is not myth but a testimonial historical event.6 The next question to confront is: if the elephants succeeded in appealing to the fourth commandment, then why is it that only the people were swayed by it and not Pompey? The historical answer would be that Pompey, being the iron hand that commanded the armies of Julius Caesar was no softie easily swayed. He was the imperial sentinel of the status quo. The phenomenal event in the Circus Maximus had revolutionary potential but for it to succeed, it required a great many other things that cannot be covered in this essay. But it suffices to say that the animal liberation movement of today had its beginnings in the face of the animal that has always manifested throughout history. There is no need to ask if the animal has a face. Perhaps, if a history of objectification of the animal were written from the point of view of the animal, it would not be a critique of the ideological mechanisms that suppress its face (since this is the focus of animal ethics), but an analysis of how animals protest tooth and nail against their suffering. What needs to be asked, rather, is how to practice a living ethical piety for the animal that could guide the norms of animal ethics. This will be discussed in the final part.

6.4 A Universal Ethical Piety for the Animal Levinas (1966) links ethics to religion in his critique of ontology. According to him, “Western philosophy has most often been an ontology; a reduction of the other to the same…that ensures the comprehension of being” (p. 43). Ontology as a study of the ultimate ground of things produced the idea of God as causa sui; he is the first cause, the uncaused cause who created all things (Kosky 1996, p. 236). What the history of philosophy calls the ‘death of God’ is also the death of ontology, the end of an epoch of thinking of God as an idea and the exhaustion of philosophy as a search for essence or being. Levinas conceives the idea of the infinite from Descartes’s argument about the idea of God: how could a finite mind behold an idea of the infinite? The popular objection against Descartes is his deduction of the reality of God from an idea of the perfectly existing. There is a difference between the idea of God and the reality that 6 It

is fitting to recall here Levinas’s (1990) essay The Name of the Dog or Natural Rights. He juxtaposes Ulysses’s hound, Argos, who, upon the hero’s return to Ithaca disguised as a beggar, recognised him, and Bobby, a stray dog in Auschwitz who greeted the Jewish prisoners joyously each morning, attesting to their humanity, which the Nazis denied. He says that Argos is a myth but that Bobby is real; “There is transcendence in the animal!” (p. 152).

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he is. This is the reason why in the way of the mystics, to move toward God is to abandon all idea of what God is. In Levinas (1998a, b), God is not an idea and the way to God is not only through thought. “What is it to have become conscious of God? Is it to have included him in a knowledge [savoir] which assimilates him…a learning and a grasping?” (p. xii). Levinas says (1982), “In Descartes, the idea of the Infinite remains a theoretical idea…a knowledge. For my part I think that the relation to the Infinite is not knowledge but a Desire” (p. 92). Levinas distinguishes desire from need. Need has an object and can be satisfied but desire is infinite; “In the access to the face there is certainly also an access to the idea of God…Desire in some way nourishes itself on its own hungers and is augmented by its own satisfaction.” According to Levinas (1998b), “The idea of the infinite would contain more than it was able to do. It would contain more than its capacity as a cogito. Thought would think in some manner beyond what it thinks…thought would also be de-ported, falling through, not arriving at the end…or at the finite” (p. xiii). It is here that Levinas proposes a Passover, a transcendence to a realm which cannot be thought and what ushers this movement is metaphysics. “We think that the idea-of-the-Infinite-in-me or my relation to God comes to me in the concreteness of my relation to the other man, in a sociality which is my responsibility to my neighbor” (p. xiv). Ontology is obsessed with the question: why is there something rather than nothing? Philosophy, as a contemplation of the abstract, authored the systems of totality and forgets the other for the sake of Being. For Levinas (1966), the more urgent question is: why is there evil rather than good? The priority is not ontology but ethics, an interrogation not of the meaning of things but of what one does for the other: “We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics” (p. 43). The God of Levinas is, thus, the host of the passover, encountered more intimately than thought when the I forgets the self and puts itself in service to the other. In place of the identity-seeking Cartesian ego, Levinas’s subjectivity is not an ‘I’ of self-representation nor the Heideggerian Dasein that contemplates the ontological difference, but one which displaces self and gives space for the concrete neighbor. The self of Levinas is fundamentally oriented toward the other, and is thus always in exile from the selfsame. In an obstinate effort to insert a permanent wedge on the door of a persistent self-circuiting ego, Levinas (1988), echoing Dostoevsky, describes an ethics of infinite responsibility in which the subject is always called to account for all without boundaries, indeed, to the extreme of going beyond what one is capable of doing: “We are all responsible for all, for all men and before all, and I more than the others” (p. 101). To return to the subject of the animal, the history of animal ethics follows the same trend as ontology, interrogating the substance of the animal as a claim for rights. It sprouted within the tradition of utilitarian ethics when Singer (2011) reprises the question of Bentham: “…the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (p. 50). Singer understands the animal’s capacity to suffer as a similar quality shared with humans that earns the animal equal rights. To deny animals their rights is to be speciesist. This leads the “Father of the animal rights movement” into two problems. One, there is a need to qualify which species really suffer because, while many species of animals experience pain, not all of them are

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known to suffer, since suffering requires capacities for reflection and representation which ultimately begs again the question of animal substance. Two, the notion of rights for Levinas poses the problematic claim when ethics is about giving and not receiving. Furthermore, the competition for rights prods normative ethics to solve species conflict by its fondness for thought experiments that commit the fallacy of false dichotomy, i.e., whether to save a boy or a dog, whether to dissect this rabbit for medicine or allow a girl to die from disease, which reinforces the animal/human divide instead of reimagining creative ecological solutions that would not have to do a Semitistic selection on Noah’s ark. Animal ethics begins not because animals are like humans that eat and breathe, but because the stray cat has his paw stuck in one’s door or that some pesky ants are foraging in one’s garbage can. Animals matter not because of sentiency or life value but because of their living relation to humans. How is this so? In Silent Spring (1962) Rachel Carson recounts the experience of American communities in the 1950s waking up one morning to find that all the birds have died due to the spraying of DDT.7 Would this be something that can be captured in principles of animal agency? But this is what Levinas would mean by animal face. Even without laws, it is possible not to harm animals upon cognizance of their sentiency and life value but without cognizance of relationship and proximity, as it were, norms without ethics, entrance tickets without hospitality, even empathy without compassion. Could ethics be ethics on the sole principle of just actions based upon principles, or just so things could be even between species? There must be something missing. An ethics for the other is what Levinas proposes as a religion that is non-numinous. He makes a distinction between what is sacred and holy. Levinas is suspicious of a religion as idolatry which has the function of giving ecstatic feelings and a preoccupation with rites and sacred objects that are purveyors of these ecstatic states; “for Levinas, the experiential states associated with the sacred are rooted in an evasive fantasy. The ecstasy and rapture that the participant of the sacred undergoes are not signs of divine transcendence” (Caruana 2006, p. 565). These affective states indicate a flight from the difficulty of ethical obligation. This preoccupation with the sacred, he aligns with Freud’s idea of religion as an infantile clutching on to a higher power for salvation and deliverance; “Levinas’s view of the sacred as the desire to lose oneself resonates with Freud’s famous assertion that the ‘oceanic feeling’ behind certain religious experiences is rooted in an infantile psychology of escape” (p. 566). What checks against the temptation of idolatry is a humble preference for traces of God rather than a direct experience of him. “Holiness, for Levinas, refers to a special religious orientation that sets for itself the goal of extinguishing, or at the very least, minimizing, sacred impulses—the temptation to participate directly in the absolute” (p. 570). The more authentic experience of God is not one found in heaven but in the concrete human situation: a life with the other. Holiness, then, contains a feature of the militant strife for moral rectitude because “…[t]here can be no “knowledge” 7 Rachel

Carson’s classic book is known to be the bible that launched the environmental movement in the United States.

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of God separated from the relationship with men” (Levinas 1966, p. 70). The good that is the holy act must also be sustained by local motivation; it cannot peg its hopes upon an eschatological vision such as heaven. The point where all this lead is that religious wars never end because people will never compromise their sacred dogmas but they are quick to heed a call for humanitarian aid in times of natural disasters and national calamities. An ethics that searches for the experience of God, a trace of God in the face of the neighbor in distress, could serve as a living piety which could unite all peoples no matter their religion. In a similar way, a living ethics for the animal that could have a universal appeal is one anchored in a living relationship with the animal that sees and serves the reality of his misery. Animal ethics also has its own temptations of idolatry. Allen (2016), for example, writes that the ancient world believed that the gods take animal form and that while animal piety demanded the worship and sacrifice of some animals, it did not know animal ethics. Going back to Pompey’s elephants, even a social witnessing of the animal face could still dwindle to a narcissistic mirroring of the self. Belozerskaya (2006) explains that the Roman people believed that the elephants could understand human language. They read Pliny’s writings that the elephant “understands the language of its country and obeys orders, remembers duties that it has been taught, is pleased by affection and by marks of honor, nary more it possesses virtues rare even in man, honesty, wisdom, justice, also respect for the stars and reverence for the sun and moon” (p. 82). Compassion must see suffering and not identity-similarities. These sentiments may have had some continuity with the way in which the Roman arena worshipped and applauded individual animals who displayed human traits and skills to stellar excellence. Belozerskaya also said that when Pompey was eventually murdered by Ptolemy’s henchmen, the Roman people blamed this misfortune on the slaughter of the elephants (p. 84). Again, Levinas says that ethics cannot fix itself on a superstitious belief in a kind of fate eschatology with echoes of sacred beliefs in some cultures of spirits oscillating up and down the ladder of human and animal forms. Modern versions of this kind of animal idolatry are seen in the way some religions protect or disapprove of certain animals depending on their associations with personages in sacred literature such as India’s cow. Japan’s Hello Kitty fad gives the impression that the Japanese people love cats but its shadow is Aoshima Island, which is teeming with felines that do not receive proper medical care. Another example is China’s political use of the panda under the banner of peace and ecological conservation. Modern literature and films popularize cartoon images of animals and ignite a commercial craze for their living counterparts: dalmatians, clown fish, white Persian cats, huskies, and basset hounds. To conclude, an animal ethics that would have a universal appeal would be one that arises out of the micro-praxis of living with animals, not only in the house or on the farm, but in a community space that is always co-inhabited by different neighboring animals such as pigeons, rabbits, and squirrels. It starts from the awareness that to live anywhere is to live-with-animals. Physical proximity with animals demands a lifestyle of constant attention to what they want. Warkentin (2010) calls this the

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‘etiquette of paying attention to animals.’ Etiquette here denotes a learning that is not taught by theory but praxis. This is an ethics concerned not with abstract rules nor principles but with manners and gestures of hospitality, most especially when animals communicate solely on the level of body language. It joins the wing of animal care ethics espoused by Donovan and Adams (2007), which sees animals as individuals and not as species. All of a sudden, love is not always spiritual but visceral. There is species’ love and friendship already beyond the mushy and adorable, in instinctive acts of guttural kindness such as in tolerating a dog’s sniffing one’s butt without shooing it away, or resisting the temptation to crush a squirming noodle on the ground because the squirt of entrails is utterly revolting.

References Allen, B. (2016). Animals in religion. London: Reaktion Books Ltd. Atterton, P. (2011). Nourishing the hunger of the other: A Rapprochement between Levinas and Darwin. Symplok¯e, 19(1–2), 17–33. Atterton, P. (2012). Facing animals. In W. Edelglas & J. Hatley (Eds.). Facing nature: Levinas and environmental thought (pp. 25–39). Oxford: Duquesne. Belozerskaya, M. (2006). The Medici giraffe: And other tales of exotic animals and power. London: Little Brown and Company. Burghart, G. (2005). The genesis of animal play: Testing the limits. Cambridge: Bradford Books. Calarco, M. (2010) Faced by animals. In P. Atterton & M. Calarco (Eds.). Radicalizing Levinas. (pp. 87–112). New York: University of New York Press. Carson, R. (1962). The silent spring. New York: Harcourt Publishing Company. Caruana, J. (2006). “Not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy”: Levinas on Ethics and Holiness. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 34(34), 561–583. Dio, C. (1916). Roman history (Vol. 37: 39). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Donovan, J., & Adams, C. (Eds.). (2007). The feminist care tradition in animal ethics. New York: Columbia Press. Fagan, G. (2011). The lure of the arena: Social psychology and the crowd at the Roman games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jennison, G. (2005). Animals for show and pleasure in ancient Rome. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kosky, J. (1996). After the death of God: Emmanuel Levinas and the ethical possibility of God. Journal of Religious Ethics, 24(2), 253–259. Levinas, E. (1966). Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (A. Lingis, Trans.). Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. Levinas, E. (1985). Ethics and infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo (R. Cohen, Trans.). Manila: Claretian Publications. Levinas, E. (1988). The paradox of morality: An interview with Emmanuel Levinas. In R. Bernasconi & D. Wood (Eds.), The provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the other (pp. 168–180). London: Routledge. Levinas, E. (1998a). Entre nous: On thinking of the other (M. Smith & B. Harshav, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press. Levinas, E. (1998b). Of God who comes to mind (B. Bergo, Trans.). California: Stanford University Press. Levinas, E. (1990). The name of the dog or natural rights. In S. Gilman & S. Katz (Eds.) Difficult freedom: Essays on Judaism (S. Hand, Trans.) (pp. 151–153). Baltimore, Maryland: The Athlone Press.

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Pliny. (1967). Natural history (Vol III, Books 8–11) (H. Rackham, Trans.). Mass: Harvard University Press. Scruton, R. (1996). Animal rights and wrongs. London: Metro Books. Singer, P. (2011). Practical ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Von Kreisler, K. (2001). Beauty in the beasts: True stories of animals who choose to do good. New York: Putnam. Warkentin, T. (2010). Interspecies etiquette: An ethics of paying attention to animals. Ethics and the Environment. 15(1).

Mira T. Reyes is a graduate of the Ateneo de Manila University and works as a researcher writing on animal ethics in the University of Pardubice Centre for Ethics, Czech Republic. She served in the board of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines for many years. She was also a scholar of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland and The Animal-Human Studies Institute of the University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign.

Chapter 7

The Good in Articulation: Describing the Co-constitution of Self, Practice, and Value Carlota Salvador Megias

Abstract This paper elaborates a neo-Wittgensteinian, philosophicalanthropological alternative to classically Aristotelian approaches in the philosophy of friendship. On the classic approach, the value of friendship, as a practice, and the value of particular friendships within the life of any given individual, are each subordinated to the ur-value of individual flourishing. That is, it starts with a value that it sees as frustrated or fulfilled by social practice. The alternative, meanwhile, moves from the articulation of social practice to the values these practices frame. I will argue that the alternative is descriptively and prescriptively superior when what’s at issue is the status of a social practice like friendship. By acknowledging the co-constitution of self, practice, and other, the alternative gives one the latitude to recognize and philosophize about relationships that tend to fall out of contemporary accounts of love and friendship as these are actually lived; produces descriptions and questions that are truer to lived experiences of friendship; and respects one of the most basic norms of friendship—that is, a friend’s irreducible particularity to oneself—without having to provide a self-defeatingly instrumentalist or reductionist argument for it. Keywords Self · Practice · Value · Wittgenstein There exists a curious tension between philosophers of friendship working in the Aristotelian tradition, on the one hand, and neo-Aristotelian/neo-Wittgensteinian ethicists in the vein of Martha Nussbaum and Cora Diamond, on the other. The former have developed a virtue ethical conception of friendship wherein the value of friendship, as a practice, and the value of particular friendships within the life of any given individual, are each subordinated to the ur-value of individual

The original version of this chapter was revised: The author’s last name has been updated. The correction to this chapter is available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_14 C. Salvador Megias (B) University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021, corrected publication 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_7

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flourishing1 —that is, the degree to which friends contribute to the development of each other’s virtue, be it in the pursuit of one’s life plans (i.e., one’s autonomy) or in the formation of good character.2 The latter, meanwhile, extract from Aristotle a notion of the “noncommensurability of valuable things;” an injunction to attend to the “particulars” of what demands one’s attention—ex., a challenging text, a conflict with a friend, a dissenting opinion; and a place within ethical reasoning for emotion and for circumstances beyond one’s control (Nussbaum 1990a, b, c, pp. 36–44). Taken together, these honor in our relations a “particularity” … “that could not even in principle give rise to a universal principle, since what is ethically important … is to treat the friend as a unique nonreplaceable being, a being not like anyone else in the world” (Nussbaum 1990a, b, c, pp. 72–73). I take this tension to be one of philosophical style. The first conception approaches Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as one that would hold across historical periods and cultures, and from it derives (1) a taxonomy of friendships within a society, according to their purpose (pleasure, utility, or virtue);3 (2) a ranking of more and less valuable friendships, with so-called “virtue friendships” topping the hierarchy4 ; and (3) a rationalist-instrumentalist conception of self and value undergirding this framework. Its philosophical purpose is prescriptive, and the questions that arise from it—ones inquiring after the justification of particular friendships in light of what justifies friendship as a social practice—aim at a definitive description of friendship’s value as a social and personal good from within a virtue ethicist perspective. The second style would rather encourage one approach the same text as a presentation of friendship at a particular time and place—that is, within Aristotle’s community. Despite deriving the same three “pieces” I list above, their purpose is descriptive, not prescriptive. Their adequacy turns not on the degree to which they serve one’s ethical viewpoint of choice, but on the degree to which they do justice to the practice of friendship as it is actually lived and understood by its participants. In so doing, one reads this portion of Aristotle’s text less as a work of prescriptive ethical philosophy and more as a work of philosophical anthropology—understood here to mean a work

1 See

Bennett Helm’s introduction and discussion (“Nature of Friends”) in his article “Friendship” from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017a edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2 See John M. Cooper’s “Aristotle on Friendship” in Essays on Aristotle’s Friendship, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) and Nancy Sherman’s “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4; 1987), 589–613 for examples of this reading. 3 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, Part 3, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 4 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, Part 4, trans. Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). For elaboration, see the paper I cited by Cooper in Footnote 2 and Helm’s “Friendship” article, cited in Footnote 1.

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the purpose of which is to capture the relations between self, other, and socioculture, and the values that emerge from these.5 We might say that the first style represents a top-down approach to ethics and the second a bottom-up one. The first starts with a value that it sees as frustrated or fulfilled by social practice; the second moves from the articulation of social practice to the values these practices frame. In what follows, I will argue that the second approach is descriptively and prescriptively superior when what’s at issue is the status of a social practice like friendship. It is descriptively superior for three reasons. First, it gives one the latitude to recognize and philosophize about relationships that tend to fall out of contemporary accounts of love and friendship as these are actually lived—ranging from friendships with and between very young children (who are not yet capable of rational autonomy) and very old adults (some of whom have lost their capacity for rational autonomy); to some friendships with and between non-neurotypical persons, persons with physical disabilities, and persons with mental illnesses and mood disorders, all of which are sometimes incompatible with philosophical ideas of rational autonomy and individual flourishing6 ; to friendships between institutional non-equals, such as teachers and students; to friendships with and between non-humans, such as pets and livestock—even plants.7 Second, the descriptions and ensuing questions such an approach produces are truer to lived experiences of friendship, and more alive to the problems that can make or break friendships, than the descriptions and questions that otherwise tend to preoccupy this subfield—that is, abstracted definitions of what a friendship is generated from lists of relationships, theories about interpersonal relations, or thought experiments; and questions that serve only to mystify friendship’s existence as a social practice and the competencies that form part of such a practice—most famously, regarding one’s justification for terminating or continuing a particular friendship and the justification of friendship as a social practice in general.8 Third—and what will form the bulk of this paper—this approach articulates and depends upon a picture of the relation between self, other, and social practice that understands these to be mutually co-constituted; a picture one finds at the intersection of neo-Aristotelian and neo-Wittgensteinian writers’ works on the 5 Compare

Nussbaum’s “reading strategies” in Part D (“Form as Content: Diagnostic Questions”) of “Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature” in Love’s Knowledge, 30–35. 6 This is a very rich area in its own right. For an example of how these discussions tend to proceed, see J. David Velleman’s “Love as a Moral Emotion” in Ethics 109 (2; 1999), 338–374, and Jeanette Kennett’s response, “True and Proper Selves: Velleman on Love” in Ethics 118 (2008), 213–227. 7 See Diamond’s “Experimenting on Animals: A Problem in Ethics” in The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991) and Santos-Granero’s “Of Fear and Friendship: Amazonian Sociality Beyond Kinship and Affinity” in The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 13 (1; 2007), 1–18 (in particular, p. 7). 8 For an overview and discussion, see Sect. 2 (“Value and Justification of Friendship”) in Helm’s “Friendship,” cited in Footnote 1, as well as his related discussion in Sect. 6 (“Value and Justification of Love”) of his article “Love” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017b edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.

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relationship between ethics and the philosophy of mind that is at the heart of the question, How do we—and how should we—come to articulate ourselves to each other? Indeed, the paper defends this position and the importance of this question by self-consciously adopting it in its philosophical examination and usage of anthropological-historical studies like Fernando Santos-Granero’s “Of Fear and Friendship: Amazonian Socialty Beyond Kinship and Affinity” and Martha Vicinus’ “Distance and Desire: English Boarding-School Friendships”—studies that would not do justice to their subject matter had they been guided by the philosophical approach to friendship I critique. Finally, this approach is prescriptively superior because it respects one of the most basic norms of friendship—that is, a friendship and a friend’s irreducible particularity to oneself—without having to provide a self-defeatingly instrumentalist (i.e., by my friend’s contribution to my flourishing) or reductionist (i.e., in terms of my friend’s properties or our shared history) argument for it. There is no justifying friendship as a social practice; and there is no philosophical answer to the question of what justifies a particular friendship that could be generalized beyond the specific situation that called for one to justify her decision to continue or terminate it—that is a personal matter. The account’s prescriptive superiority lies in the manner in which it sets aside these concerns and substitutes in their place questions about the structures by which people come together in a given community9 ; the reasons they are taught to give and to accept, reject, or find incomprehensible for what counts as betrayal, slight, abuse, or tragedy; the means by which they articulate themselves, in word and deed; and the values they hold and are responsible for in light of these—values to be tweaked, changed, or outright revolutionized only by individual reflection and initiative within particular relations.10 It is one of philosophy’s jobs to facilitate this reflection. Rather than elaborating each of the reasons I’ve provided for this approach’s superiority in turn, I will proceed by fleshing out the third reason—that of the coconstitution of self, other, and social practice—in light of the role the lattermost plays in John McDowell’s picture of self-development and self-recognition—the combination of which I will call self -articulation. This is a picture that is congenial to, and bears resonances with, Martha Nussbaum’s vision of neo-Aristotelian ethics and Cora Diamond’s meta-ethical claims and

9 By

“structures” I mean what we in the West would consider to be robust institutions, such as that of marriage, the family, school, and the workplace; more “informal” relationships without (or with much less of) a legal status, such as best friends, groups of friends, and roommates; the technologies by which we approach others, inclusive of social networking websites and platforms (ex., forums, blogs, Facebook, Instagram, Tinder); and the very layout of a city or town and what it offers. 10 On this point, see David Cerbone’s (as yet unpublished) essays, “Ground, Background, and Rough Ground: Dreyfus, Wittgenstein, and Phenomenology” and “Feckless Prisoners of Their Times—Historicism and Moral Reflection” , part of the 2017 curriculum for the University of Copenhagen’s Summer School in Phenomenology.

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ethical method11 ; and it is one I will ease the reader into by way of the anthropologicalhistorical studies I mentioned earlier. In so doing, I hope that the reader will see how the first two reasons I gave for this approach’s descriptive superiority—of the relationships it can recognize and thereby philosophize about; of the utility and richness of the descriptions and questions it produces about social practice—demonstrate themselves. I will return to the final reason regarding its prescriptive superiority at the paper’s conclusion. Towards the end of “Truth in Ethics: Williams and Wiggins” in Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going on to Ethics, Diamond describes what she calls an “Anscombian-Aristotelian but not entirely un-Wittgensteinian” approach to making sense of moral debates wherein two sides genuinely disagree with each other at the same time that they deny their opponents have a genuine—that is, sensical—point of view (Diamond 2019, p. 302). The development of this point is useful for introducing the relationship between ethics and philosophy of mind as it’s found in McDowell’s work and that is at the heart of what I’ve called ‘self-articulation’—all notions that can trace their origin to Iris Murdoch’s Sovereignty of Good, which claims that the style of thought and quality of attention we bring to the lives of others and our shared circumstances are as much a part of our ethical decision-making and behavior as the acts themselves.12 Paying attention and thinking well are the individual’s prerogative, sure; but what draws one’s attention and bounds one’s thinking? Murdoch and Diamond alike are concerned with the objective validity of one’s perceptions and judgments; but where the former subscribes to a Platonist conception of the good, the latter veers—like Nussbaum—in an Aristotelian direction—that is, one concerned with the truth of one’s beliefs that does not, at the same time, go beyond what’s behind belief formation (Diamond 2019, p. 300). To that end, she distills from Wiggins’ Wittgenstein “the idea of procedures that guide our conceptions;” procedures we develop in “a cumulative process [and] through which we construct a form of life, [inclusive of an understanding of] what is and isn’t rational” such that statements like “all men are created equal” … “come to be understood as … standing [rebukes] to justifications of slavery” (Diamond 2019, p. 301). What she (and Wiggins) mean by “form of life” here is not to be understood as a theoretical picture about the conditions that must obtain for there to be genuine moral conflict. Rather, there are—relative to a form of life, but not such that what it means to do justice to oneself or to others is itself relativized—“guides to right thinking” (like the statement I mentioned before) and “failed thought” (like pro-slavery arguments) (Diamond 2019, p. 304). The coherence of this position depends upon a minimal conception of personhood irrespective of one’s sociocultural scaffolding that would ground, ex., what it means to do justice to another person—in the form of accepting a victim’s testimony of 11 In particular, that articulation is itself a good. For elaboration of this point, please refer to Diamond’s “Losing Your Concepts” in Ethics 98 (January 1988), 255–277. 12 See, in particular, “The Idea of Perfection” in her Sovereignty of Good (New York: Routledge Classics, 2001).

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their own pain as just such an articulation of pain, say. It presupposes a minimally substantive, sustainable conception of value that is of a piece with its description of what it is to be human—what it is to be raised within a sociocultural and to participate in its practices—that would invite us to conceive of certain absurdities— certain alienations—that are now at risk of being seen as mere provisions of particular conceptions of the good as antithetical to morality, or to the good itself. Aspects of, or institutions belonging to, our conceptual-cultural life that would deny articulability to persons—and in so doing deny their humanity—are wrong on a conception of ethics that takes the relationship between conceptuality and culture, and the way it structures such articulability, as its starting point. This includes a conceptual-cultural structure like slavery. In order to sustain itself, slavery must deny articulability to the subjugated population, such that those who buy into it cannot admit arguments against it that are dependent—as they should be—on the testimony and lived experiences of its victims. What I want to do now is to move away from this minimal conception of personhood to the self that emerges from one’s development within, and interaction with, the resources of her own society and culture. How does one articulate oneself and come to know others? Or—to put it in slightly more McDowellian/Cavellian terms—how do we disclose ourselves and recognize each other? We can answer these questions in two ways: One, by describing the scenes and tools of self-disclosure and self-recognition—that is, of self-articulation—within particular societies at a given time and place, and with respect to particular cases; and another, by making more general comments about the co-constitution of self and practice. Both are philosophical. The thrust of the first is less easy to see, so I will begin with it, especially since the second becomes easier to understand in light of its example. It has a pedigree I have alluded to already: In a clear development from Murdoch, Nussbaum advocates for the singular utility of the novel as a demonstration of one (of a world of possible) way(s) of going about the attempt of doing justice to another person and to one’s relation to them in light of one’s circumstances,13 calling novels an “optical instrument” by which the reader is invited to imagine, reflect, and feel in the course of grasping the whole of the text on the terms it provides—that is, its style.14 Stanley Cavell adopts this approach in the presentation of his reading of King Lear in “The Avoidance of Love,” a work in the vein of what he calls “philosophical criticism”—the point of which is to “[bring] the world of a particular work to 13 See, in particular, Nussbaum’s “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination” in Love’s Knowledge (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1990b). Diamond makes a similar point from her own reading of Murdoch in “Losing Your Concepts,” 261. 14 Nussbaum, “Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,” 47. She is quoting Proust. Earlier in the paper, she writes: “Life is never simply presented by a text; it is always represented as something. This ‘as’ can, and must, be seen not only in the paraphrasable content, but also in the style, which itself expresses choices and selections, and sets up, in the reader, certain activities and transactions rather than others.” Provocatively, Nussbaum likens the reader-text relationship to that of a friendship in “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Public and Private Rationality,” 88.

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consciousness of itself” via description (Cavell 1958, p. 333). And Diamond depends upon it in characterizing the disagreement between those who would accept animal experimentation and those who would not as one of the “compartmentalization” of the individual’s imagination, such that it is the analogies we make about animals— as “delicate instruments” or as “persons with moral claims”—that tell us what, or whether, animal experimentation is permissible, via descriptions of the social practices (medical science, pet raising) that value what is different about humans and non-human animals in distinct (and, on the positions she criticizes, fundamentally contradictory) ways (Diamond 1991, pp. 346, 351, 355). Perhaps the place where this approach to the question of self-articulation is most at home is in anthropological-historical study. Consider, first, a society and culture much unlike the one you come from, assuming you are (as I am) an academic— if not born and raised in the West, then influenced by the inescapable ubiquity of Western intellectual history on contemporary academia. I’m thinking of the description of Amazonian sociality in Santos-Granero’s “Of Fear and Friendship,” which seeks to modify what has become a dualistic paradigm of Amerindian social life— between “kinship and affinity,” on the one hand, and “conviviality and predation,” on the other—by investigating an “interstitial” set of relations this paradigm does not usefully accommodate—that is, “relationships between non-kin that are phrased in the idiom of friendship,” or, more narrowly, “the formalized personal friendships that are established with enemy peoples”15 (Santos-Granero 2007, pp. 1–2). Santos-Granero’s aim in this article is to distinguish formalized personal friendships as a distinct type of relationship, with a distinct kind of value, from kin and affines within Amerindian social life—against those who would understand these to be “para-kinship relationships” on the dominant paradigm (Santos-Granero 2007, pp. 13–15). He accomplishes this by describing some common relationship types in the Amazons: Trading relationships between “socially and geographically distant,” “unrelated” men who co-establish unique, robust friendships with each other for different purposes, depending on the tribe—ones whose obligations “[exceed] those existing between cosanguines” or “provide a legitimate non-kin, non-enemy identity” to tribal strangers; shamanic alliances—mentorship networks spanning geographical and generational distances that enhance the power, security, knowledge, and dexterity of their constituents, with “rights and duties” distinct from those among kin and affines; and some mystical associations between shamans and otherworldly beings, with whom shamans engage in practices of friendship—“[hunting] together and [decorating] each other,” “[eating] and [drinking]” together, “making them gifts”— and, in exchange, enjoy greater supernatural power (Santos-Granero 2007, p. 3–8). By “[exploring] the social situations in which particular forms of friendship develop”— something to which philosophical and sociological research alike are resistant, he notes—Santos-Granero is able to (1) pinpoint a category of social relations and practices that are neither co-extensive with nor subordinate to kinship within the literature on Amazonian peoples; (2) carve out a specific purpose for these social 15 Please note I take the anthropological terminology, and his framing of this paradigm, for granted for the purposes of this paper.

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relations and practices relative to the whole landscape of sociality in the Amazons— that is, these formalized personal friendships “emerge [within]”—and transform— “contexts of great fear of (potentially) dangerous others;” and (3) show that such friendship “structures and encompasses” kinship in certain Amazonian societies, instituting relationships that would not otherwise be possible—or recognizable on the paradigm he criticizes (Santos-Granero 2007, pp. 11; 14–15). The picture of friendship Santos-Granero draws from his descriptions of Amerindian social life doesn’t just go beyond the existing anthropological literature about Amazon sociality; it bears fruitful resonances and tensions with the philosophical and greater anthropological literature about friendship to which he compares his own findings, and would not be derivable from these.16 This was work he was able to do—work that set aside or qualified what would have otherwise been useless or confounding presuppositions about friendship in philosophy and anthropology— in virtue of an attention that was at once holistically-minded (with respect to the whole organization of Amerindian society) and keenly detailed (with respect to the circumstantial significance of specific practices). To summarize in my own language: The formalized personal friendships this technique led Santos-Granero to see are a scene of self-development and self-recognition– of self-articulation—unique to the sociocultural landscape of the Amazons; and if one wants to do justice to this landscape, one will have to consider it the authority—it is what determines the salience of antecedent theories of value and accounts of practice, be they philosophical or anthropological.17 Another instructive case is that of the responsible reclamation of social practices and histories for which there were limited vocabularies or recourses to preservation at their time, such as the highly particularized friendships between female English boarding-school students and their fellow students and instructors described by Vicinus in “Distance and Desire.” These are friendships that we would recognize today—and were understood at the time—to be romantic. Similar to Santos-Granero, Vicinus writes against the grain of a historical literature that is obsessed with understanding such romance in terms of “external [expert] labeling”—ex., lesbian—and the impact this had upon how the general public, and the women involved, conceived of their relationships (Vicinus 1984, p. 600). Rather, she turns her attention to the rituals and testimonies surrounding “the adolescent crush during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,” or raves, within the English same-sex boarding school, examining how they depended upon—and broke with—“general social attitudes

16 Indeed, anthropologists have found counter-evidence against, ex., “the particular model of friendship enshrined by nineteenth-century romantics” that we might find in Montaigne. “Relations of friendship can be found in almost all human societies [but] models of friendship”— from Montaigne’s, to Aristotle’s, to the one Santos-Granero gives here—“vary substantially.” See Santos-Granero, 8–11. 17 Compare Cavell’s treatment of genre in his reading of King Lear in “The Avoidance of Love,” where the play’s success as just this tragedy depends on the degree to which readers/spectators give themselves to it fully as a tragedy. It is the genre, and the ways the characters are qualified by genre, that is authoritative here.

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towards women as public and private beings;” this, to the aim of beginning to ascertain when, and how, the discourse of homosexual deviance gradually became applied to raves (Vicinus 1984, pp. 601, 604; 621). Vicinus draws from her sources—Victorian manners books; the (semifictionalized or novelized) autobiographies of former students and headmistresses; archives and anthologies of students’ letters, recollections, and personal diaries; and representations of these friendships in film—a rich picture of the liminal quality of these raves: One where the Victorian ethos of self-control and spiritual purity combined to create “a paradox of self-fulfillment through unrequited love,” such that the rave could be justified and subjected to institutional regulation and control on account of the role it played in a girl’s “moral development” at the same that it permitted the girl to indulge in her fantasies and desires via performing services for her beloved; narrativizing and dissecting the rave with her school friends; and lending what had become “virtually meaningless [gestures]”—such as the good night kiss given by the head of the school to her students—a subversively intimate, “private yet public” significance reconnected to its original meaning of one’s uniqueness and anticipation for “future happiness” (Vicinus 1984, pp. 602, 608; 617, 607, 609–610). What is crucial in Vicinus’ account of these friendships is that to some extent, all her sources—inclusive of the literature to which her own is intended as an alternative—frustrate the recognition of what these relationships really were, at the time (for their constituents and observers) and in hindsight (for those seeking to reclaim a history there was no public interest in preserving).18 Doing justice to this relation means looking “at the specific preconditions [it required to] flourish”—the social norms the English same-sex boarding school served and inculcated in its students; the specific means for self-articulation, in word and deed, that this environment provided; and the latitude for self-knowledge, self-recognition, and self-expression these means afforded women at the time (Vicinus 1984, pp. 602, 621). As Vicinus is careful to illustrate, these women “[lacked] an appropriate language, or even an inappropriate one” to articulate the homosexual nature of their affections for their raves at the time (Vicinus 1984, p. 621). But it was just this lack that made these articulations possible, and that discloses the tragic dimension of a former ravee’s quote, with which Vicinus closes her paper—“Is this real? Is this sincere?” (Vicinus 1984, p. 622). I take cases like this one to show that one’s capacity to struggle with and stylize oneself in light of the reality of one’s life—its sincerity—is inseparable from its sociocultural scaffolding. Bearing these examples of the first way one might answer questions about selfarticulation in mind—that is, by the description of particulars—I turn now to the second, more straightforwardly philosophical way, about the self and socioculture’s co-constitution. For the discussion of a social practice like friendship to be complete, both ways are necessary. I have alluded to the interdependence of philosophy of mind 18 A favorite dismissal, from these women’s contemporaries and current critics alike, is calling such romantic friendships preambles to heterosexual relationships. See Vicinus, 609, and her writing on the denials and distortions of female sexuality in general, 619 and 621.

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and ethics at several points in this paper; and now, I want to cash out this interdependence in terms of the interconnectedness of the concepts of practice, criteria, and tradition in McDowell’s picture of self-development and—recognition—itself part of his account of rule-following. Diamond anticipates his position in her contribution to Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars, “Rules: Looking in the Right Place.” Here, Diamond takes Wittgenstein to demonstrate that holding a term’s conceptual or logical possibility apart from the life within which it features is to inaugurate a confusion about rules attributable to Saul Kripke and his sympathizers—that, in our lives, rules are simply a function of their assertion-conditions. ‘Simply,’ because such a position divorces the very notion of agreement from that upon which we agree: Conceptual and logical possibility, on the one hand, and the agreement in our perceptions and judgments that scaffold these, on the other.19 They cannot be taken separately or each (reductively) explained in terms of the other, on pain of regress or of trivializing the notion of convention. Rather, they are aspects of the same: To style it in terms of the common Wittgensteinian refrain, it’s not so much that the meaning of a term is its use—it’s that a term’s meaning and usage emerge together.20 The key notion in this development is that of practice as it is deployed in the body of commentary McDowell produced on the later Wittgenstein and rule-following from the early ‘80s, up to and inclusive of the publication of Mind and World in the early ‘90s. Like Diamond, McDowell situates rules’ normativity in our practices; but this is not to say—with Kripke and philosophers similar to him21 —that whether one has followed or deviated from a rule is merely a matter of convention. Here, we should understand “convention” to refer to sociocultural customs,22 statistics, societal majorities, and the like—all that is available to us when we ask if one of our peers has succeeded or failed in following a rule. But there is no necessary relationship between convention, so understood, and our commonsense conception of objectivity as something that exists “outside” of us—a conception that we (naively) take to justify an appeal to convention when we determine whether or not someone has (in)correctly followed a rule. McDowell’s rule-following papers endeavor to preserve this conception of objectivity against readings like Kripke’s and Wright’s. His task is to explain rules’ normativity in terms of a (thoroughly Wittgensteinian) notion of practice without forsaking our commonsense conception of objectivity as unknowable, unintelligible, or intarticulable, or—if it is knowable, intelligible, and articulable—inviting accusations of 19 Most succinctly: “The switch from ‘imaginable’ to ‘logically possible’ or ‘conceptually possible’ … is almost a guarantee that we shall miss the point.” Diamond (1990, p. 21). 20 I am grateful to supervisions with Kevin Cahill for the elaboration of this point. 21 I take Crispin Wright’s “authoritarial” or decision-based reading of those sections to be one example. See McDowell’s “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule” in Synthese 58 (1984) 325–363 and David H. Finkelstein’s “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism” in The New Wittgenstein, eds. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (Oxford: Routledge, 2000) 53–73. 22 Inclusive of hierarchical relationships set up by our sociocultural institutions, such as the teacherstudent relationship. See McDowell and Finkelstein’s discussions of Wright for more.

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a relativism that would undermine any notion of objectivity entirely.23 It is a conception of objectivity that anticipates Nussbaum’s, one she describes as “‘internal’ and human [in that its] raw material is the history of human social experience[;] it does not even attempt to approach the world as it might be ‘in itself,’ uninterpreted, unhumanized”—as if objectivity in that sense were possible.24 McDowell’s first shot at fulfilling this task comes in his paper “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” which pits the key point of his earlier essay “Virtue and Reason” against a conception of objectivity that he takes non-cognitivists and descriptivists to depend upon, i.e., one wherein we can conceive of the “genuine” features of a concrete/abstract object (like a rule or personal quality) independently of the value we give it in our practices. If this picture of objectivity were granted, McDowell points out that it should be conceivable for someone to grasp the extension (I prefer to say application) of, for example, a moral virtue like courage, without having to enter into the evaluative outlook of the community within which it is taught and learned. But McDowell argues that this is unintelligible: A rule or virtue must be learned and experienced within the bounds of those practices where it factors as a value and where we are sensitive/sensitized to others’ reactions and expectations. This is not also to say that it is not possible to develop criteria for correctly following a rule. It’s just that this criterion is relative to the standards of rationality scaffolding the practice to which the rule belongs, and for criteria to be properly understood or applied, one must be minimally involved with the practice to which it corresponds. So far, it’s not obvious how McDowell’s treatment of practice is substantially different from Kripke’s notion of convention. One could simply say that McDowell describes a conception of relative objectivity to which at least some aspects of Kripke’s reading could conform (for example, statistics, collected in accordance with our best social scientific practice, by which we have made successful predictions or constructed useful public policy; or institutions and cultural customs unique to our society and/or vital to its proper functioning, like standards for politeness). Sure, we may need to look at a rule or virtue from an evaluative outlook relative to our practices in order to grasp its objective content, as this content is bound by said practices; but this conception of objectivity is dead on arrival in the sense that it cannot admit of (or adjudicate) real disagreement—i.e., disagreement between 23 This summarizes his account of the unity of virtues, wherein the virtuous person is such because of the way in which she perceives what he calls situational “saliences”—i.e., what it is about any given circumstance that calls on her to act in the “right” way. If we want to understand her reasons for action, we must see as she does; her rationality is not discernible outside of the practice motivating it. See McDowell (1979, pp. 331–350). I take it that the whole of his work is in the service of this picture of virtue. 24 Nussbaum, “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination,” 164; my scarequotes. Compare Murdoch in “The Idea of Perfection:” “The idea of ‘objective reality’ … undergoes important modifications when it is to be understood, not in relation to ‘the world described by science,’ but in relation to the progressing life of a person. The active ‘reassessing’ and ‘redefining’ which is a main characteristic of live personality often suggests and demands a checking procedure which is a function of an individual history. Repentance may mean something different to an individual at different times in his life, and what it fully means is a part of this life and cannot be understood except in context.” (25).

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members of the same society with wildly different takes on a cultural value or norm, or members of different societies with incompatible cultural values and norms. McDowell begins to address this in “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.” There, he launches a parallel critique of Kripke and Wright’s interpretations of the later Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks, arguing that they fail to appreciate Wittgenstein’s primary target—that is, an anti-realist picture of meaning that assimilates interpretation to understanding and that extends to (what is on that picture) our fundamental inability to have any knowledge (i.e., justified true beliefs) of others. McDowell claims that we must deny such an assimilation if we are to preserve a notion of mutual/intersubjective intelligibility and bounds this denial up with a research program that takes our practices as intelligibility’s bedrock.25 This is consistent with his approach in “Virtue and Reason” (and, at least superficially, with “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”), but it does not reach its full articulation until his final paper on the topic, “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy.” Here, McDowell explicitly frames his approach by asking how it is a person would need to grasp the meaning of a rule in order for it to bear a normative relationship to her behavior. In it, he (once again) dismisses (a Kripkensteinian construction of Wittgenstein’s ‘master thesis’ on) interpretation as that by which the notion of “accord” gains its normative force, arguing instead that we should look to our practices of recognition and acceptance (as he has described these in his previous essays). But in order to preserve a realist conception of meaning on such a picture (i.e., one where its normativity is tied to the objective world—a kind of ‘ratification-independence’ divorced from the threat of regress in any appeal to interpretation), he appeals to a conception of accord tied to our training within different (albeit interconnected) social practices scaffolded by the very concepts of meaning and understanding they also instantiate. So, for McDowell, there appears to be a minimal/irreducible foundation for mutual intersubjectivity/intelligibility that bears a thoroughly objective relationship to the world without dependence on any strain of essentialism. This is easier to grasp if we conceive of it in terms of McDowell’s quietist (or non-metaphysical) realism: We simply cannot participate in practices, let alone (philosophically) reflect upon or discuss them, without presupposing the very concepts of meaning and understanding they require to get off the ground. They are not “grounded” in meaning or understanding taken independently of the concept of practice, as we necessarily find them in any given practice—where “grounding” would imply that “meaning” and “understanding” are independently knowable or conceptualizable outside of practice via reduction to, ex., sense-data or some scientific examination.

25 See, in particular, McDowell, “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule,” 342, where he refers to this as Wittgenstein’s program. Interestingly, he abandons this interpretation in Footnote 8 of his “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII (1992) 52, and later becomes hostile to the idea of “constructive philosophy” centered on our practices—see especially John McDowell (1994, p. 95). Sabina Lovibond nonetheless finds encouragement for such a philosophy in McDowell’s work in her “Second Nature, Habitus, and the Ethical: Remarks on Wittgenstein and Bourdieu” in Ethical Perspectives 22 (1; 2015) 131–149.

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The clearest articulation of this point comes in “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.” Here, McDowell discusses a common misreading of “criterion” as it is found in Wittgenstein’s later work, where it is taken to denote defeasible26 evidence for a claim according to “grammar” or “convention.”27 McDowell objects to this as a faithful reading of Wittgenstein’s later work and a successful response to the problem of other minds—but what matters most for our purposes is the defense he gives of a position he calls “M-realism” alongside these objections, “according to which, on a suitable occasion, the circumstance that someone else is in some ‘inner’ state can itself be an object of one’s experience,” and “not merely through behavioral proxies.” That is, “one can literally perceive, in another person’s facial expression or his behavior, that he is [for instance] in pain, and not just infer that he is in pain from what one perceives”28 (McDowell 2008, p. 876). This is not equivalent to an argument that every time someone expresses pain, they are in pain. What McDowell tries to show is that, for the appearance of someone’s being in pain to obtain as much as for the actual case of someone’s being in pain to obtain, the same criteria must be satisfied—i.e., that of what constitutes an expression of pain (McDowell 2008, p. 881). Whether one is in a circumstance where they perceive someone’s real pain (ex., as bystander to an accident) or are deceived about someone’s pain (ex., as audience member at the theater) is immaterial to just this point about M-realism: That the satisfaction of any given criterion (for, ex., telling that someone is in pain) is not equivalent to whether or not a statement dependent upon that criterion is true (ex., ‘he is in pain’). An exception to this disjunction is “[those] occasions which are ‘paradigmatically suitable’ for training in [a statement’s] assertoric use,” wherein the “satisfaction of criteria” must also involve “the realization of truth-conditions, properly so regarded” (McDowell 2008, pp. 876–877). I take these occasions to be those that are our ‘first contacts’ with the sociocultural stuff of self-articulation—that is, when we learn, within and by virtue of specific practices, what is meaningful—as an expression of, ex., pain, respect, love, etc.—and in so doing learn what they are and of their value.29 It is an idea we find in Nussbaum’s own conception of objectivity30 as much as in McDowell’s neo-Aristotelian conception of “second nature” in Mind and World, by which our rationality is both “integrally part of [our] animal nature” and constituted by sociocultural practices not isolated from how we understand what it means to 26 Where this means that “a state of information in which one is in possession of a ‘criterial’ warrant for a claim can always be expanded into a state of information in which the claim would not be warranted at all.” John McDowell (2008, pp. 876–890). 27 Here, these are roughly equivalent to “practice” as I’ve used them throughout this essay. 28 Emphasis mine. 29 Compare McDowell’s treatment of “initiation” into a tradition in Mind and World. Note that this is not equivalent to one’s babyhood. While the learning curve is steeper when we are younger, learning is not something we stop doing—consider, ex., moving to another country and familiarizing yourself with your new home’s language and customs. 30 “Value is anthropocentric, not fixed altogether independently of desires and needs of human beings.” Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Public and Private Rationality,” 62.

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be a human being and how we discourse with our fellow persons (McDowell 1994, p. 109). There, he stresses that it is not something we are born with—rather, we have it in virtue of the “tradition” within which we are raised, for which the language we learn is its “repository” (McDowell 1994, pp. 126; 184). I believe one of the best illustrations of this integrated conception of criteria, socioculture, and selfhood is Stanley Cavell’s work. Building up to the injunction that skepticism of other minds is the tragic denial of another’s personhood in Claim of Reason, he writes that “criteria are the terms in which I relate what’s happening, make sense of it by giving its history, say what ‘goes before and after.’ … This explicitly makes our agreement in judgment, our attunement expressed through criteria, agreement in valuing” (Cavell 1981, p. 93–94). He is adamant that it is not up to us—as beings somehow divorceable from the structures by which we’ve learned what it is to be ourselves, human—what the landscape of normativity looks like, in that “you may of course decide to make a moral issue out of a conflict[;] but you cannot decide what will be making it a moral issue, what kinds of reasons, entered in what way, to what effect, will be moral reasons” (Cavell 1981, p. 289). We cannot default on the sociocultural structure within which we have been raised because it constitutes our humanity in virtue of our training and upbringing—it marks the limits and latitude of one’s style of thought, as Diamond might say31 (McDowell 1994, p. 126). I mentioned I would conclude by defending this position’s prescriptive superiority—a position that extracts value from practice, rather than measures practice against value. In what’s come before, I’ve shown the inextricability of practice from value; fleshed this point out at the level of the particular, with anthropologicalhistorical studies, and at the level of the general, by delineating the co-dependence of philosophy of mind and ethics; and shown how self-articulability—what it is to be a self, to take someone else as other—is inseparable from sociocultural structure. Now, I want to tie this back to my criticism of philosophers of friendship who take themselves to work in the Aristotelian tradition. If one approaches a social practice like friendship in their style—extracting from Aristotle’s discussion an ur-value like individual flourishing, to which the value of friendship is measured and ultimately subordinated—one will not produce a description of friendship that reflects its normativity in practice. This is how one generates purely ‘philosophical’ paradoxes, like the ones that frame popular discussions of the justifications of particular friendships: If a person attempts to justify her friendship with another in terms of the friend’s properties, she will meet with the problem of fungibility, wherein the friend—an irreplaceable, special person in her life—should be traded for another, less problematic person with the same qualities, should she happen to meet them. And if she attempts to justify her continued loyalty to her friend in terms of their shared history, in spite of the existence of a ‘more perfect’ version of her friend or the friend’s loss of the properties she once admired, this is dismissed as a mere explanation for the relation’s endurance; it is—on the notion of

31 In particular, she implies that we should think of our “style of thought” as bearing on our “capacities

as [moral agents]:” Diamond, “Losing Your Concepts,” 271.

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justification attendant on philosophies of friendship that subject friendship’s value to some higher ur-value—arbitrary, illegitimate reasoning.32 But it is just this style of philosophizing that fails to do justice to the way justification actually works in our friendships—to the reasons we would accept for a friendship’s termination, continuation, and reconciliation alike, as ones that come from a friend, this friend (or someone we thought was a friend, a former friend, a potential new friend, etc.).33 The fundamental pieces—one’s properties; shared history—are still present in these paradoxes, but they are not given their due in light of, ex., how (what are taken to be) one’s personal properties emerge and are qualified in the course of a friendship, or how the course of that friendship depends upon socioculturally delimited exigencies (to respect another commitment, say), personal desires (to not respect that commitment), and norms (to conceive of our commitments as uniquely valuable, in kind as much as in their particular manifestations). In the context of a social practice, justification for one’s statements and behaviors are a skill one can become more or less competent at, depending on the resources available to her for making sense of her situation and articulating her perceptions; and, in being a skill, it is something for which one can develop a style, particular to herself and to her relations. If one wants to do well by herself and her loved ones—and better by the sociocultural resources that bound her approaches and alienations— she must start with the best description she can give, the most sincere reflection she can manage, and be responsible in the fullest sense of the word—“to the history of the commitment and to the ongoing structures that go to constitute her context; and especially responsible to these, in that her commitments are forged freshly on each occasion, in an active and intelligent confrontation between her own history and the requirements of the occasion.” (Nussbaum 1990a, b, c, p. 94) Contexts have their limitations as much as selves do; it is only by the stubborn attempt to honor both that they break and grow.

References Aristotle. (2002). Nicomachean ethics (S. Broadie & C. Rowe, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cavell, S. (1958). The avoidance of love: A reading of King Lear. Must we mean what we say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cavell, S. (1981). The claim of reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Diamond, C. (1988). Losing your concepts. Ethics, 98, 255–277. 32 In particular, refer to Sect. 2 (“Value and Justification of Friendship”) in Helm’s “Friendship” article, cited in Footnote 1. 33 The most incisive example of this is Nussbaum’s “Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Literature and the Moral Imagination.” Consider this quote: “For it to become a solution it has to be offered in the right way at the right time in the right tone, in such a way that she can take it; offered without pressing any of the hidden springs of guilt and loyalty in her that he knows so clearly how to press; offered so that he gives her up with greatness, with beauty, in a way that she can love and find wonderful.” (150).

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Diamond, C. (1990). Rules: Looking in the right place. In D. Z. Phillips & P. Winch (Eds.), Wittgenstein: Attention to particulars—essays in honor of Rush Rhees. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Diamond, C. (1991). Experimenting on animals: A problem in ethics. In The realistic spirit. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Diamond, C. (2019). Truth in ethics: Williams and Wiggins. In Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, going on to ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Helm, B. (2017a). Friendship. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/friendship/. Helm, B. (2017b). Love. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/love/. McDowell, J. (1979). Virtue and reason. The Monist, 62(3), 331–350. McDowell, J. (1984). Wittgenstein on following a rule. Synthese, 58(1984), 325–363. McDowell, J. (1992). Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XVII, 1992, 40–52. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. McDowell, J. (2008). Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge. In E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl & M. McGrath (Eds.), Epistemology: An Anthology (2nd ed.). Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. Murdoch, I. (2001). The sovereignty of good. New York: Routledge Classics. Nussbaum, M. (1990a). The discernment of perception: An Aristotelian conception of public and private rationality. Love’s knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. (1990b). Finely aware and richly responsible: Literature and the moral imagination. Love’s knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. (1990c). Form and content, philosophy and literature. Love’s knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Santos-Granero, F. (2007). Of fear and friendship: Amazonian sociality beyond kinship and affinity. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 13(1), 1–18. Vicinus, M. (1984). Distance and desire: English boarding school friendships. Signs, 9(4), 600–622.

Carlota Salvador Megias has an MA in philosophy from the University of Bergen, Norway. She has been active with the Bergen Network for Women in Philosophy, having started its program of graduate student workshop-symposiums, and is interested in the intersections between mindedness, socioculture, and intimacy.

Chapter 8

Nietzsche on Actively Forgetting One’s Promise (of Love) Jan Gresil S. Kahambing

Abstract In this paper, I explore Nietzsche’s account of promising by delving into the problem of a culture of broken promises, which includes the promise of love. I argue that this understanding of culture can be aptly analogized as a nihilistic one and creates a vapid state of promiselessness. I enter this account through the dialectical structure of memory and forgetting and propose the agency of forgetting as a viable renewal of promising. To do so, I first affirm life and history through Nietzsche’s aesthetics, born out of the Apollonian-Dionysian naturalistic duality. Second, I will attempt to forge a dialectics of promising through a responsibility of the impulses. And third, I will redirect the function of active forgetting as renewing broken promises. Keywords Nietzsche · Nihilism · Aesthetics · Dialectics · Promising · Active forgetting

8.1 Introduction One account of Nietzsche’s understanding of promising can be found in his “On the History of Moral Sensations” where he lays out the possibility and limitations of making a promise. He mentions as an example the promise of love. He says: “What one can promise—One can promise actions, but not feelings, for the latter, are involuntary. He who promises to love forever or hate forever or be forever faithful to someone is promising something that is not in his power” (Nietzsche 1996b, I, 58).1 The involuntariness of feelings in this regard implies a degree of powerlessness. Love, contiguous with its many other meanings in Nietzsche—as will to power, as greed, as animal instinct, as fictional as God—is fundamentally a feeling. And because “romantic love relationships are often not strong enough to endure a lifetime,” Nettleton says, “one has to acknowledge that Nietzsche is right in recognizing 1 Nietzsche’s

works here are quoted not by page number but by aphorism or section number.

J. G. S. Kahambing (B) Leyte Normal University, Tacloban, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_8

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the absurdity of promising a feeling” (2009, p. 3). Promising the feeling of loving someone forever leads to a broken promise when it considers on the outset the backdrop of an absurd political or outer structure (like what Camus sees in Nietzsche; see Illing 2017). Yet as what Foucault (1978) also learned from him, this reminds that the human for Nietzsche is set within the background of history and culture so that the genealogy of his moral constitution—including his ethical choices in promising— also implies a consideration of different forces. There is history, which ruminates on the temporal structure of man and his power over himself. And there is culture, which affects the way he promises. Bringing into mind that the ‘personal is political,’ one can argue that Nietzsche is aware of how this personal breaking of promises broadly reveals the nihilism of the problem of man and culture. If moral sensations can be historically construed and culturally embodied, then the task of redeeming a nihilistic culture of broken promises must rely inductively on a particular agency that jives with such powerlessness. This powerlessness finds meaning in forgetting. In this paper, I explore the implications of Nietzsche’s account of promising and argue that a rejoinder can be found in his paradoxical notion of active forgetting. To do this, I divide the paper in three thematic parts: aesthetics, responsibility, and agency. First, I affirm life and history through Nietzsche’s aesthetics from the ApollonianDionysian naturalistic duality. Second, I attempt to forge a dialectics of promising through a responsibility of the impulses. And third, I redirect the function of active forgetting as renewing broken promises. I thus navigate through his different works— from The Birth of Tragedy and Untimely Meditations to The Genealogy of Morals— to illustrate how the agency of forgetting can provide a viability for the renewal of promises. How, I ask, can the aesthetics of existence provide a responsible agency that renews the promise (of love) through forgetting?

8.2 Aesthetics: Affirming Life and History Why does the problem with a culture of broken promises relate to nihilism? The fundamental premise resides in the fact that nihilism negates life and bestows a descending perspective (Reginster 2006, p. 45; Solomon and Higgins 2000, p. 18). Since nihilism, generally, is a perspective that is descending, it pertains to the meaninglessness of existence. In effect, “the idea of a meaningful life is surprisingly elusive” (Reginster, p. 21). Reginster offers particular and general senses of the meaning of life. Particularly, it may refer to the quality of human lives that are distinct from each other. As such, one may view life as meaningless apart from another, since meaningfulness in this sense refers only to a “specific value,” such as “moral worth and well-being.” Generally, it views life as a whole to be meaningless, its highest ideals are no longer valuable. While acknowledging that nihilism also relates to the first, it is in the second sense that Nietzsche’s perspective leans more toward nihilism. For Reginster, the terms “meaninglessness and valuelessness are used interchangeably” where “the idea of a meaningful life is simply the idea of a life worth living” (Reginster, p. 23). Nihilism, therefore, can be defined thus: “all

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that happens is meaningless” (Nietzsche 1968, 36) and as “a kind of thoroughgoing pessimism” (Reginster, p. 31). What does value here mean? Nietzsche explains that value for man is conditioned to be a moral one: “everything of value in man, art, history, science, religion, technology must be proved to be of moral value, morally conditioned, in aim, means and outcome” (Nietzsche 1968, 382). In this sense, value posits a rationale or goal in life, so that the concept of ideal means a valuable goal. This goal makes life worth living because it makes the agent strive for something of value. Moreover, an agent strives for something because, aside from its moral value, there is also the factor of realizability. In this sense, a promise is a valuable goal—it presupposes value and realizability. It hinges on a pact that must be kept within a timeline until its fruition. Here, nihilism fits perfectly the description of goallessness: “The goal is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer” (Nietzsche 1968, 2; 55). In this state of goallessness, the activity of engaging in a promise is suspended by a vapid field of monotony. Consequently, there is a cut where the striving to fulfill promises simply detaches the factors of value and realizability, in which the loss of goals projects, as it were, the initial clichéd formulations and statuses of promiselessness: ‘promises are meant to be broken’, the despair of a futuristic outlook, disregard for emancipation, and so on. Although Arendt may well resolve this cut with forgiving the factors of irreversibility and unpredictability in actions (La Caze 2014), Nietzsche does not think that one should easily succumb to the use and abuse of forgiveness in promising. In order to affirm life once again, one should already go towards the end that nihilism, albeit reactive in the production of its forces into propagating the field of promiselessness, is, for Nietzsche, only “a transitional stage” (Nietzsche 1968, 7; Kaufmann 1974, p. 170). But in opposition to Darwin, he does not think that the movement of history is developmental as it goes on (Rogers 1960; Richardson 2002). Even when confronted with a transitory state of becoming, history tends to stop and even recede. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche points to how modern progress can be pictured as a product of empty multiplication or a multiplication of zeroes (Nietzsche 1997b, 14). As such, nihilistic culture breeds defective states of goals and further determines the contours of a culture of broken promises. In contrast to the current frame, genuine culture must be the “unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a people” (Nietzsche 1997c, 1). Here, Acampora (2008) notes how the Apollonian-Dionysian duality can be a “worthy point of departure” (p. 52). The cultural forging of aesthetics in the natural—but also in the constructive—making of plastic arts in the Apollonian, signals a truthful encounter with people who are uniquely themselves, caring and building altogether a community of masters. To affirm life is to enjoin a movement that aids in the continuance of cultural audacity in making something out of the chaos of one’s self. The Apollonian is that movement which pursues an identity despite its thrownness to a cultural polity that resists identity formations and constructions such as a conditional promise. Antiquity’s Greek tragedy offers a decisive lesson to man: that aesthetics shapes his existence.

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In The Birth of Tragedy, this aesthetic phenomenon of the Greeks, which is perceived “not merely by logical inference but with the immediate certainty of intuition,” channels its energies through the Apollonian and the Dionysian “continuous development of art” (Nietzsche 1927, 1). This means that they are not just notions, but they resemble the figures of their gods. On the one hand, we have Apollo, the god of the sun, of prophesies, and thus of the interpretation of dreams as a plastic art. On the other, we have Dionysus, the god of wine, of festivities, of the bountiful harvest and thus of drunkenness and the art of music. We conceive these energies through the perpetuation of the strife between the two, which are nonetheless complementary to each other. As identity-making, the ideal to present nature in masks through the Apollonian dream-world is a necessary element of continuity. In tragedy, the impromptu performance of the actors in masks signals the representation of their identities. The Apollonian signals the natural continuity of life because of its constant reflection of it. Its dictum is: “It is a dream: I will dream on!” (Nietzsche 1927, 1). The Apollonian impulse functions as knowing thyself and as the joyful satisfaction of the beauty of forms and appearances (a dream is an appearance of an appearance, a mirror of reality). The Apollonian art appearance is best explained in the lyrics since it is through language that one pictures and communicates reality (Young 1992, p. 35). In the folk-song, the Apollonian energy creates images through the lyrics. That is to say, language “is strained to its utmost that it may imitate music … This is the phenomenon of the lyrist: as Apollonian genius, he interprets music through the image of the will, while he himself is the pure, undimmed eye of day” (Nietzsche 1927, 6). But the Apollonian cannot work without the Dionysian. As Nietzsche says, “lyric poetry is dependent on the spirit of music just as itself in its absolute sovereignty does not need the picture and the concept, but merely endures them as accompaniments.” And because “language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music which stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction and primordial pain, a sphere which is beyond and before all phenomena,” (Nietzsche 1927, 6) every expression of the will will soon wither at the heart of the Dionysian forces of dissipation and dissolution. As drunken reality, the Dionysian art “seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling of Oneness” (Nietzsche 1927, 2). This primordial unity of being is the affirmation of man in nature, as a product of nature, which means that he is also at the disposal of nature—from dust to dust. In this same unity, the artist, the adorer of forms, is no longer him, but by the Dionysian “complete self-forgetfulness,” by these “paroxysms of intoxication” he has become one with nature—“he has become a work of art” himself (Nietzsche 1927, 1). At the beat of the celebration of life, the Dionysian musical ecstasy intoxicates man into drunken reality, forgetting his identity when everything will soon wither and fade back to nature. But this is equally necessary with the Apollonian since this part abolishes the prideful identity of the modern man and lets him recognize the limits of his epistemic drivel. The mind cannot carry everything. Thus, it cannot possibly imagine all the possibilities of the world—it is limited to reality. No matter how much man tries to know himself, he still cannot know it fully. The Dionysian reminds him

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again of life as it is. At some point, it discontinues, but only so that the Apollonian can continue again as an interchanging of loading and unloading. The ontological facet of this natural stream of becoming presupposes that life is not just about collecting and collecting. It has yet to trash the insignificant loads from time to time. Life as an aesthetical experience, the life of man as a work of art himself in stylizing one’s character (Nietzsche 1974, 290; 299) is, for the Greeks, the “contemplation” (Wilkerson 2006, p. 67) born out of the glorious mixture of both identity-formation as the Apollonian and as identity-discharging as the Dionysian.

8.3 Responsibility: Forging the Dialectics of Promising In the two artistic impulses of the Apollonian and Dionysian, there is a foregoing relationship that can be associated with what we call dialectics (Rampley 2000, p. 4). Nietzsche understands this dialectic not as banning the other impulse but rather as a process that works toward a “mediation,” which passes through the two impulses structurally (Rampley 2000, p. 6). This mediation is man himself, standing in between his fragile existence—man, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is a tightrope walker. It is crucial to note the dialectics of these art impulses because it sheds explicit light on the temporal structure of man and his promise. The dialectics of the Apollonian and the Dionysian configures the promise so that they together forge an art of promising. What does this art of promising fundamentally require? The idea is that because the two impulses are centered on a natural dialectics, promising requires the “naturalism of the will” (Bailey 2001, p. 114). Applying the naturalism of lyrics and music, we see in the act of promising that the Apollonian takes the form of the word, the image of language, as the words I shall, or more beautifully I promise, and also the Dionysian which concretizes the acts of the promise itself. The strong bond of continuity in the Apollonian forges a promise that directs the continuity of life. It should be noted, however, that the word used is shall rather than will. I will denotes something adverse for Nietzsche, for in it he finds coercion, an unconditional commandment, and weakness over conditions. In Daybreak, he says: What is willing! – we laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of his room, and then says: ‘I will that the sun shall rise’; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: ‘I will that it shall roll’; and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: ‘here I die, but I will lie here!’ But, all laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression: ‘I will’? (Nietzsche 1982, 124).

While it may suppose the farcical nature of free will and willing, it can nonetheless be implied that the construction I will for a future promise constitutes within it in the ephemeral presence of agency operating in a state of dysfunction or defective voluntarism: I will because it inevitably will. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he says, “To a good warrior, ‘thou shalt’ sounds more agreeable than ‘I will.’ And everything that is dear to you, you should first have commanded to you” (Nietzsche 1969, 10). With this insistence of a defective will, a consolation of I shall emerges to

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re-establish a rubric for man’s dreams and ideals. Dreams, says Nietzsche, come with responsibilities (Nietzsche 1982, 128). Thus, in such beautiful artistry of the Apollonian word I promise, we can find the unifying fuel of the Dionysian deed. From the aforementioned dialectical struggle, it can be surmised that art, this aesthetics born out of the profundity of natural existence, cannot be denied its strong bond to history (Talay-Turner 2019). This bond is at the center of two of Nietzsche’s early works: The Birth of Tragedy and The Use and Disadvantage of History for Life. The use of history greatly needs a skillful art in handling, such that, good use of art must be well-grounded in historical thinking. For Nietzsche, history itself is “a work of art” (Kaufmann, p. 148). This indicates that the dialectics of impulses creates the natural grounding for shaping a culture. Culture “is born of conflict, and the beauty of ancient Hellas must be understood in terms of a contest of two violently opposed forces” (Kaufmann, p. 129). Here, a culture of broken promises presupposes a cultural opposition that experiences suffering and meaninglessness— nihilism. However, Nietzsche thinks that nihilism too is a factor in artistic creation: “artistic creation is prompted by something which the artist lacks, by suffering rather than undisturbed good health, by ‘sicknesses great stimulants to his life’” (Nietzsche 1968, 1003). In Nietzsche, it is possible to claim that sickness in life is not something that must be deplored but “something that constitutes a promise” (Ansell-Pearson and Large 2006, p. 36). Nietzsche states, “Only if history can endure to be transformed into a work of art will it perhaps be able to preserve instincts or even evoke them” (Nietzsche 1997c, II, 7). The art of promising in the Apollonian and Dionysian finds a path in history when it touches the dialectical structure of memory and forgetting. In the second section of the Untimely Mediations, the Apollonian assumes the historical element or memory, and the Dionysian assumes the unhistorical element or forgetting. Which historiography will the art of promising constitute? Nietzsche reads history as monumental, antiquarian, and critical (Nietzsche 1997c, II, 2). Monumental history refers to the focus on past glories, the greatness and nobility arising from conquests, the victories that moved the history of humanity in order to commence a kind fortitude of the will to inspire—which is all to inspire that greatness is possible. Antiquarian history respects the past and aims to collect its historic information even to the point of being obsessed with it, a kind of collecting for collecting’s sake. Critical history ultimately is the arbiter of the past and mercilessly criticizes it. However, critical history has a tendency, at its most critical position, to see the past as better if it had not existed at all (Nietzsche 1997c, II, 3). These types of historiographies must be mediated by man himself for them to have a positive use on life. For instance, monumental and critical history should make the useless collection of antiquarian history into a critical selection of great information. The task of man in this regard is to critically assess his promise, his greatness, as a gap that calls out for his action. The dialectics or art of promising then requires a great kind of mediating “responsibility.” One cannot possibly imagine a human being with an excess or deficiency of the other impulse. Responsibility rests on the mediating role of man for the dialectical structure of himself. As Rampley states, “human existence is structured by a

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dialectic of memory and amnesia, temporality and atemporality, being and becoming” (Rampley 2000, p. 140). The Apollonian, presented as the historical element, is that memorial foundation of identity; it rests on man’s proclivity to remember the image of himself. The Dionysian on the other hand, as the unhistorical, is the forgetting element; it intoxicates man and thus lets him forget his identity by letting his drives occupy the stage of his existence. By dialectics, one cannot remember and forget all the time that one impulse subdues the other. Man, by excess or deficiency of the other, “will be incapacitated for life” such that “both are necessary” (Kaufmann, p. 145).

8.4 Agency: Renewing the Promise In response to the cultural problem of broken promises, we proceed to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality, which is regarded as his “most speculative discussion of critical history” (Talay-Turner 2019, p. 49). In it we find that modern culture, and modern man in particular, is a caricature of memory. Nietzsche is critical of modernity because it tends to valorize its idea of progress and petrifies, as it were, the gaze back to its achievements. In the historiographies presented, modernity and modern man fall on the binary of either monumental, when man focuses on his laurels, or antiquarian, when man simply obsesses over historical facts. Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals recognizes this modern procession of memory as fetishizing. In the second section, he emphasizes the animal that is capable of making promises—the most glaring account that brings to light the paradoxical nature of man when he said, “Man is entitled to make promises” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 1). He is not just capable of making promises but he is bound to do so as if it were the kind of willing that articulates I will. Nietzsche recognizes a paradox in this animal called man (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 1–2). He sees the dialectics of active remembering and active forgetting. The procession of memory in modernity has inculcated in man the “memory of the will” whose sole instigator is none other than pain and suffering. Moral codes and juridical establishments, showing off the power to dominate, conjured sovereign punishments all over the margins of these codes. Man was set into promising through fear and coercion. His promise extends thus: “I promise, I will never do it again!” Such a promise, although formulated with a Dionysian force of action, is nonetheless a product of the past. This is the promise of memory, which takes its existence as an escape from the experience of suffering. Nietzsche is aware that this kind of promise is connected to pain and memories: “the worse mankind’s memory was, the more frightening its customs appear; the harshness of punishment codes, in particular” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 3). Here, one can recall the showcase of sovereign power explicated in detail in the opening of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1979, p. 3). This promise of memory forged in man a different genealogy of mediation, a different origin of responsibility (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 2). This “responsibility” differs from the responsibility of man to strike a balance with his impulses since this is governed by an external authority.

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It is through this promise of memory that man allows himself to be calculated—to be domesticated by society’s “strait-jacket” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 2). But this is a crucial aspect of sovereignty. This reminds us that to be human means to be capable of actively remembering. To be human means that man must first establish within himself a sense of identity, a sense of memory from which he can start molding and improving in the impulse of the Apollonian. The “memory of the will” can be identified with the use of antiquarian history because it preserves the past and the customs of its culture. This is the same argument Socrates used when he refused to be illegally taken out of prison (Plato 1973). Nietzsche sees that man was transformed because of his customs and the juridical codes inhabiting them. Though he is valuated and accustomed to calculability, man nonetheless finds an avenue for self-mastery: to promise no matter what, to be faithful to the binding principle of his cult. Arendt (1958) also thinks that the promise of memory is an important factor in establishing the future. For this reason, active memory or “any use of memory which is both selected by the rememberer and tends to promote activity” (Short 2013, p. 21) makes for innovation and agency. The promise of memory shapes a sovereign man of self-discipline who is true to his word—“who is sparing with his trust, who confers distinction when he trusts, who gives his word as something which can be relied on, because he knows himself strong enough to uphold it even against accidents, even ‘against fate’” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 2). This is the conventional understanding of the promise—it pictures a faithful man who is true to his words and deeds. However, this is in a sense hostile towards the future, though it vows to secure the future because in this very security, the future becomes controlled by the past. In so doing, “the promise reverses the flow of time. Instead of being born into an uncertain future, one is born into a secured past” (Lemm 2006, 162; Arendt 1958, 244–246). If promising then is only a kind of reconfiguration to the past, where is the place of agency? The rejoinder, as it appears, points to the fact of man’s forgetting. Forgetfulness is important since it enables the human to escape the paralyzing tendencies of historical sensing (Short 2012). Man has not only passive forgetting but also the power of active forgetting—“inhibiting capacity, […] temporarily shutting of the doors and windows of consciousness, […] and making room for the new” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 1). The agency of forgetting is something that animals do not have. In fact, Nietzsche describes active forgetting as a “divine ability” (Hutchings 1941). Forgetting functions precisely as a reconciliation factor that warrants moving on: one forgets not the act but the pain, allowing one’s agency to proceed to action. Nietzsche’s sovereign individual does not only need memory but also forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is a “strength, a form of robust health” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 1). Active forgetting opens up a “possibility for the future together with a different understanding of what history is” (Ramadanovic 2001). However, how can forgetting be a factor of promising when it even comes to the point of forgetting the promise itself? It may even suspend the “active will (that does not let go), an ongoing will of what was once willed, a real memory of the will” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 1). For Nietzsche, to be able to promise is not just to remember but to re-evaluate the promise over and over. The promise for some responsibility constructed by morality

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just so that man can abide totally will be subject to re-evaluation. The vital question here is whether “the ‘long chain of will’ cannot accommodate fresh interpretations, adaptations, and re-evaluations” (Brandes 2010, p. 22). Nietzsche himself answers …that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning’ [Sinn] and ‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 12)

The essence of Nietzsche’s Genealogy then flourishes from the fact that “the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random” (Nietzsche 1996a, II, 12). To become sovereign and noble not only proceeds from a singular will that goes through and through and keeps a promise in the past, but the ability to re-interpret the promise to new ends. Rather than being an anarchic drive dismissing altogether the memory of will, active forgetting is a “life-force, a well-spring of creativity, a locus of meaning and a source of intoxication” (Begam and Soderholm 2015, p. 149). It points to an activity, a human agency capable of rethinking the contract of past promises into a force of action. The promise of memory is governed by the will of bad conscience, which sticks faithfully to the customs of morality in fear of eternal punishment, while the promise of forgetting is governed by the will of conscience, seeking the real intent of the doer itself (May 1999, p. 105). Nietzsche nonetheless is well aware of the fact that memory and morality are too strong in society because they make man indebted to his customary way of life. He then redeems man by prescribing to him the will to interpretation that re-interprets, again and again, his unconditional duties and moves on from being oppressed by them (Nietzsche 1997a). More particularly, actively forgetting one’s promise moves beyond re-interpretation—albeit through it—and goes towards renewal. This renewal seeks new ends of the promise, extending reinterpretation’s epistemological foundations to ontological implications. The very life of man along these lines assumes an active state. Herein lies the manner of actively forgetting one’s promise. It is not, ironically, to forget the promise, but to renew it to existential ends so that agency can once again be possible. In the same manner, the promise of love, for instance, moves away from a contractual pact and proceeds into an affirmation of life in all its artfulness and history. There are important nuances of this premise to counteract a culture of broken promises. First, the Apollonian element of the promise retains its significance in the formulation of action while the Dionysian element dispels the conditions that restrict the promise to new ends. Being historical in promising, however, is not linear but is dependent on the will’s capacity to interpretation. Interpretation is not necessarily forgiving the man who breaks the promise (as in Arendt), though it is open to it as a matter of perspective. Second, actively forgetting one’s promise of love does not forget the lover but the pains of loving. Moving on in life does not necessarily mean separation but an unloading of past hurts for a renewal of love. Active forgetting

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frees love from moral constitutions. Nietzsche says that “Whatever is done out of love takes place beyond good and evil” (1997a, 153). Third, a culture of broken promises can be renewed through agents who are willing to reconfigure themselves as higher men. These men, responsible in the art of promising, can be held accountable for themselves and qualify to be what Nietzsche calls “sovereign.” But these men are not yet equivalent to the Übermensch. Nietzsche’s hope of the Übermensch includes amor fati or loving one’s fate but this does not mean abject acceptance. Loving one’s fate is a promise of the future, one that needs active forgetting as well. To be precise, loving also accepts brokenness and sovereign individuals continually remain active nonetheless. While Nietzsche is not again explicit in the exact characteristics of such a man of the future or the Übermensch, finding no perfect example in history, he opens to us a course of action that avoids being trapped in moral considerations. In this sense, active forgetting guarantees a renewal of a culture plagued by broken promises. The promise of forgetting enables the pains of memory to be interpreted anew so that the future can manifest as it is.

8.5 Conclusion Promising invokes a dialectic between memory and forgetting and man has to use them for life. Life develops within the perpetual strife of remembering and forgetting where memories are only starting points, e.g., laws and customs, tradition, identification. Memories are there to orient man in living and to teach him how to be responsible, but sooner or later man has to reevaluate those memories and create new responsibilities for himself. Nietzsche then primarily banks on active forgetting because it is only through forgetting that man is renewed and that the future actually manifests. Likewise, man forgets the pain of nihilism as a kind of memory, and creates himself in it. If the promise of memory becomes a sole reference of promising, it will always be interpreted when it fails as “meant to be broken,” because the promise is only conceived of as a past pact, which by all circumstances mostly does not cater to its fulfillment. And Nietzsche recognizes this: “human beings cannot hear the tone of a promise and of fulfillment together” (Nietzsche 1878–1879). He then characterizes the open field in which the agency of man can redeem him through action (Nietzsche 1982, 350). Promising through active forgetting is truly a promise that opens the future and thereby restores the agency of man because when it does not conform to the past chain of wills, it undergoes interpretation anew not as “broken” but “renewed.”

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References Acampora, C. (2008). Forgetting the subject. In S. Hicks & A. Rosenberg (Eds.), Reading Nietzsche at the Margins (pp. 34–59). West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press. Ansell-Pearson, K., & Large, D. (Eds.). (2006). The Nietzsche reader. UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bailey, T. (2001). ‘The animal that may promise’: Nietzsche on the will, naturalism, and duty. Pli, 11, 103–121. Begam, R., & Soderholm, J. (2015). Nietzsche’s cow: On memory and forgetting. In R. Begam & J. Soderholm (Eds.), Platonic occasions: Dialogues on literature, art and culture. Stockholm: Stockholm University Press. Brandes, D. (2010). Nietzsche, Arendt, and the promise of the future. Animus, 14, 16–29. Foucault, M. (1978). Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In J. Richardson & B. Leiter (Eds.), Nietzsche (pp. 139–164). New York: Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (Trans A. Sheridan). Vintage. Hutchings, A. (1941). Nietzsche, Wagner and Delius. Music and Letters, 22(3), 235–247. Illing, S. D. (2017). Camus and Nietzsche on politics in an age of absurdity. European Journal of Political Theory, 16(1), 24–40. Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, psychologist, antichrist (4th ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. La Caze, M. (2014). Promising and forgiveness. In Hannah Arendt: Key concepts (pp. 219–232). Abingdon: Routledge. Lemm, V. (2006). Memory and promise in Arendt and Nietzsche. Revista De Ciencia Politica, 26(2), 161–173. May, S. (1999). Nietzsche’s ethics and his war on ‘Morality’. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nettleton, S. (2009). Ten tips for a great marriage according to Friedrich Nietzsche. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 9(2), 1–9. Nietzsche, F. (1878–1879). Unpublished fragments (Nachgelassene Fragmente) (D. White). Nietzsche, F. (1927). The Birth of tragedy (C. Fadiman, Trans.). New York: Modern Library. Nietzsche, F. (1968). The will to power (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1901). Nietzsche, F. (1969). Thus spoke Zarathustra: A book for everyone and no one (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1883–1891). Nietzsche, F. (1974). The gay science (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. Nietzsche, F. (1982). Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudices of morality (R.J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1996a). Genealogy of morals (D. Smith, Trans.). New York: Oxford University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1996b). Human, all too human, a book for free spirits (R. J Hollingdale, Trans.). UK: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, F. (1997a). Beyond good and evil: Prelude to the philosophy of the future (H. Zimmern, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications. Nietzsche, F. (1997b). Twilight of the idols: Or, how to philosophize with the Hammer (R. Polt, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. (Original work published 1889). Nietzsche, F. (1997c). Untimely meditations (R.J. Hollingdale, Trans.). UK: Cambridge University Press. Plato (1973). Crito. In B. Jowett (Trans.). The republic and other works. New York: Anchor Books. Ramadanovic, P. (2001). From Haunting to Trauma: Nietzsche’s active forgetting and Blanchot’s writing of disaster. Postmodern Culture, 11(2), https://doi.org/10.1353/pmc.2001.0005. Rampley, M. (2000). Aesthetics and modernity. USA: Cambridge University Press. Reginster, B. (2006). The affirmation of life. USA: Harvard University Press. Richardson, J. (2002). Nietzsche contra Darwin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(3), 537–575.

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Rogers, J. A. (1960). Darwinism, scientism, and nihilism. Russian Review, 19(1), 10–23. Short, T. (2012). The importance of forgetfulness for Nietzsche. Retrieved from https://timlshort. com/2012/02/04/the-importance-of-forgetfulness-for-nietzsche/. Short, T. (2013). Nietzsche On Memory. Unpublished Master of Philosophical Studies Thesis. UCL. Solomon, R., & Higgins, K. (2000). What Nietzsche really said. New York: Schoken Books. Talay-Turner, Z. (2019). Nietzsche on memory and active forgetting. The European Legacy, 24(1), 46–58. Wilkerson, D. (2006). Nietzsche and the Greeks. London: Continuum. Young, J. (1992). Nietzsche’s philosophy of art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jan Gresil S. Kahambing is Instructor of Philosophy, Curator, and Research Coordinator for the Social Sciences and Values Education at the Leyte Normal University. He joined Leyte Normal University in 2017 after his ecclesiastical studies from the University of Santo Tomas (2009– 2016). He pursued his Master of Arts in Philosophy at the Holy Name University (2017–2019).

Chapter 9

Love as an Act of Resistance: bell hooks on Love Hazel T. Biana

I try to expand my understanding with love to help build a more nonviolent world. I vow to live simply and offer myself to the oppressed. —Sulak Sivaraksa

Abstract Dubbed as one of the “100 Visionaries Who Could Change Your Life”, bell hooks or Gloria Jean Watkins tries to understand and define love in her numerous works. What makes her definition different from other thinkers is that she combines her own unique feminist theory with Engaged Buddhism to arrive at a framework for love. This paper aims to introduce bell hooks’ feminist theory, her pedagogy and ideas on spirituality, and clarify her notions on love. Through her love ethic theory, one uncovers that love is more than just an act of will with intent and action towards care, commitment, trust, respect, responsibility and knowledge for oneself and the other, but rather also an act of resistance. Since the vision of her feminist theory is to resist the dominant, oppressive structures and systems, one’s engagement in love must lead to such. There may be issues with this love ethic theory though, and this paper discusses them as well. Keywords Love · bell hooks · Engaged buddhism · Revolutionary feminism

9.1 Introduction One’s notion of love is usually romantic, with images of star-crossed lovers gazing at each other’s eyes unfettered by the circling of hearts and smiling emojis. Love, though, can be more than just romantic or erotic, it can be an ethic that instigates social and political change. Love, as a form of action, may even demolish systems and structures of hate, domination, and oppression. At least according to postfeminist and cultural critic bell hooks.

H. T. Biana (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_9

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Dubbed as one of the “100 Visionaries Who Could Change Your Life”, hooks began her work in 1981 with Ain’t I a woman. In this book, she challenged the way feminism was presented through the eyes of the white, middle-class, female whose primary concern was to be given the right to work outside the home. Other women after all, colored women in particular, have been working outside the home since time immemorial. In From margin to center (1984), hooks claimed that earlier feminism fell short for failing to include the plight of women from all walks of life. She also discussed the concept of interlocking oppressions wherein women were not only oppressed by virtue of them being female and being women, but rather because of many other factors such as their race, class, age, religion, and so on. Naturally, hooks proposed solutions to these interlocking oppressions and systems of marginalization through various means. She advocated the overhauling of perspectives, the criticizing of representations, she also suggested pedagogical approaches and methods, and put forth a code of ethics. While reform was apparent in earlier feminist works, hooks believed that a major change or a revolution was necessary to eradicate such structures of domination. Embedded in a single vision that is inclusive rather than exclusionary, radical rather than reformist, she called for a feminist revolution that would eventually eradicate all forms of oppression. This revolutionary ideal included the ethic of love. The practice of love is a way out of oppression. Love provides the power for transformation and struggle against the dominator culture. Loving kindness, and the spirituality that comes with it, motivates cultural revision (hooks 2000a, b, p. 105). Incidentally, if one chooses to be a feminist, or a postfeminist, one chooses love. To involve oneself in any form of feminist theorizing or work is to be immersed in and to spread this type of love. After all, “genuine feminist politics always brings us from bondage to freedom, from loveless-ness to loving” (hooks 2000a, b, p. 104). Every type of critique must begin and end with love. What this paper intends to do then is to do a close reading of hooks’ concept of love, how it is related to education, spirituality, ethics, and intersectionality. In almost all of her books, which counts to more than 40, hooks makes mention of the word love. How is her concept of love framed in her feminist theory and vice versa? How can one understand hooks’ concept of love? Through her love ethic theory, one uncovers that love is more than just an act of will with intent and action towards care, commitment, trust, respect, responsibility and knowledge for one’s self and the other, but rather also an act of resistance. Since the vision of her feminist theory is the toppling down of dominant, oppressive structures and systems, one’s engagement in love must lead to such. This paper also tackles the possibilities and/or impossibilities of this proposed type of love, and its implications on feminist and postfeminist politics. There may be issues with hooks’ love ethic theory and this paper discusses them as well.

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9.2 The Framework of Love In 1984, when various feminists were debating on feminism’s definition, what it stood for and what it meant to be part of the movement, hooks tried to find a compromise to these discussions. Since there were a lot of contrasting interpretations of feminist theory, she claimed that these contributed to the confusion (hooks 2000a, b, 6). In particular, there were a lot of misrepresentations that feminism can be reduced to simply women wanting to be men (hooks 2000a, b, p. viii) and women hating men. To clarify these misconceptions, feminism had to have a clear, solid, and well-grounded definition. The cause should unite all feminists without neglecting other members of society, and help them regain their voices in constructing theory (hooks 1984, p. 17). hooks arrived at what is referred to as Revolutionary Feminism. At the onset of the 1980s, feminism was simply known as the movement fighting for equal rights between men and women. This was problematic since it gave rise to the following questions such as: “which men do women want to be equal to?” and “do women share a common vision of what equality means?” (hooks 1984, p. 18). Liberal or reformist feminism fell short in its cause as it did not go beyond the plight of those oppressed because of their given sexes. The diversity of a person, which includes the combination of various factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, and many others also play vital roles in the oppression and abuse of individuals. Defining feminism as the fight for equality between men and women was too simplistic (hooks 1984, p. 18). The said definition belongs to the Bourgeois, white women. hooks claims that these women were content with such a definition since they did not see the importance of calling attention to their race and class privileges since their races and classes were privileged. (After all, when one is privileged, one does not know one is privileged.) Feminism should be more inclusive, it should include everyone exploited, discriminated, marginalized, and/or oppressed. Feminism started off as a movement to end sexist oppression but it would be better defined as “the movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” (hooks 2000a, b, p. viii). It is important to note that oppression here refers to any form of oppression such as racist oppression or classist oppression. In this case, the interlocking of these various oppressions. Using “special vantage points” and critiquing “the dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony” helps the creation of a counter-hegemony” (hooks 1984, 15). Changing society is more than a romanticized freedom of the self that fails to insinuate political action. More than just a reform, there should be a revolution—a struggle. This struggle is comprised of the fostering of a critical political consciousness, or the eradication of the underlying cultural basis and causes of sexism and other forms of group oppression. Without challenging and changing these philosophical structures, no feminist reform will have a long-range impact (hooks 1984, p. 31) Revolutionary feminism seeks to “revolutionize” the system that perpetuates any form of oppression. Their key goal is to transform the system. Challenging both social and philosophical structures, hooks proposes that the struggle be anchored on a global revolution of

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sustained freedom, justice and peace anchored on a human’s self-actualization. Part of the struggle presupposes the existence of love in and between human beings and the community.

9.3 The Love Ethic Theory Like feminism, love (in general) can only be theorized of, if there is a shared definition between the members of the community. When doing a rigorous and philosophical undertaking one must explore the “metaphysical meaning of love in everyday life” (hooks 2000a, b, p. xxix). How is love present on a day-to-day basis? While love is commonly defined as a noun, love would be easier used in everyday life if it were defined as a verb. Following M. Scott Peck’s definition of love, hooks believes that to love is to put one’s self out there for the flourishing of one’s self and the other’s inner growth. Specifically, “love is an act of will –namely, both an intention and an action (hooks 2000a, b, pp. 4–5)”. This type of love is not a romantic type of love but rather a “combination of care, commitment, knowledge, responsibility, respect, and trust” (hooks 2000a, b, p. 3) toward another. To love is to choose to love not because one has to love. One chooses to care for, commit, know, be responsible for, respect and trust the other when one chooses to love the other. Love is an invitation to truth that has been previously denied. All great social and political movements that fight for justice stress the importance of a love ethic. Every form of action should be geared towards liberation and eventually world peace. Love has a transformative power and harnessing this power can only happen if there is a culture of love. The current generation seems to be averse towards love because love is seen as only for the weak, the desperate, the fatally attracted, or the romantic. Anyone who talks about love will be perceived as weak or irrational. This is ironic, though, as more people seek to understand the meaning of being loved or seek to love or be loved. Human beings must strive to get better at loving. Love is not something that is unattainable or impossible to arrive at, while it is powerful one should acknowledge love both in theory and practice is to utilize its power. To love is to care and to nurture another and not to abuse nor ignore. Most of the time, the media portray wrong ideas of love and the community tends to embrace these notions. As part of a love ethic, one must also scrutinize how love is represented in media and culture. Love is presented as an unachievable fantasy (hooks 2000a, b, p. xxiii). This is quite evident in fairy tales, love poems, Hollywood movies and the like. hooks claims that most writers about love are male. Thus, popular understanding of love tends to be from a man’s point-of-view. To understand love, one must also be aware of lovelessness, or the absence of love. Patriarchal culture tends to contribute to a rather lacking of love in family set-ups (hooks 2001, p. xxvi). While hooks criticized representations of love in her book collection on love, the feminist criticisms on love are not new. From the 1960s to the present, feminists have already been criticizing love as a means to dominate, manipulate and oppress

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women. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, in The second sex, claims that love’s transcendence is an illusion. Women idealize love but rather than being liberated by it, they sacrifice too much of themselves and are made dependent on the objects (in this case subjects) of love. Similarly, Langford (1999) asserts that women may have the tendency to focus too much on their love relationships losing sight of the “wider political and social situation”. This type of love though is the romantic type of love. And this understanding and practice of love is the by-product of existing patriarchal systems. Which is why one should revise and revolutionize prevailing conceptions and definitions of love. hooks enumerates the types of love as familial, romantic, platonic, and sacred. While the love ethic is different from the romantic type of love, hooks acknowledges and makes mention of the former. In her book When angels speak of love (2007), she writes poems to and from the lover and the beloved. Like Beauvoir, hooks criticizes romantic love in its idealization of powerlessness and loss of control. Such type of culture condones abuse and misdirected passion (hooks 2001, p. 6). Media is somewhat inclined to glorify an ethic of domination and violence and critics should also demand for more images of love and loving human interactions. Accepting images of patriarchy and violence goes against the forging of a love ethic (hooks 2001, pp. 95–101). One must be critically aware of one’s actions in everyday life and look at how love’s reality is portrayed (hooks 2000a, b, pp. 89–94). Radically changing the portrayals of love in media, though, is not enough. One must also learn to love one’s self. Love does not start and end with loving others. If a person moves toward recreating or renewing one’s self, one is involved in an act of love. Loving is not easy. It is in fact an act of revolt or dissent, and this transformation may be embedded in fear. Thus, the mere act of daring to love is already an act of love. In a study that examines the connection of feminist spirituality and political activism (Finley 1991, p. 359), one respondent claims that loving oneself is not having to put up with inequalities nor “patriarchal disadvantages”, because to love oneself is “the first act of revolution”. Loving is an act of resistance.

9.4 Implications and Transformations The foundation of hooks’ love ethic theory is actually her feminist theory. Without a love ethic, the struggle against oppression will never end. A love ethic demands radical changes however. Transformations are quite difficult though as society is used to cultures of domination influenced commanded by white capitalist supremacist patriarchy. Loving is demanding a person to stand up for others thus this can be fearsome. To fight for anyone whose freedom or life is at stake is to put one’s freedom and life at stake. A culture of resistance can be forged wherein “eros takes on new meaning, as love and lovingness create an overall effort to be self-actualizing in ways that can invigorate discussion and excite the critical imagination” (Jaramillo and McLaren 2009, p. 23).

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Before one can embark on a journey towards love, it must be remembered that love is both theory and action. The love ethic is a “model of relationship-oriented activism encompassing dialogue, nonviolence, interconnectedness between people and between people and nature, reflexivity, shared power, and solidarity” (Godden 2017). hooks’ call for love comes in when she talks of critical consciousness and enlightenment. The cultivation of critical consciousness can only happen if there is a shift in power perspectives. Traditional reformist stands should be reviewed and feminists must be conscious of the bigger picture that surrounds oppressive structures. In order for the movement to succeed, feminists must engage in praxis that support the collective feminist struggle and the community must foster a critical consciousness. The end goal is the toppling down of power structures and everyone will live in a vision of mutuality. “Imagine living in a world where there is no domination, where females and males are not alike or even always equal, but where a vision of mutuality is the ethos shaping our interaction” (hooks 2000a, b, p. x). This is a community that is healed through love. A healed world is a world wherein there is no one oppressed. Influenced by Buddhist monk and peace activist Thich Nhat Hanh, hooks talks of the ethic of love as a tool towards a healed world. “There is no union of theory and practice, and real change is not sustained. That’s why cultivating the mind of love is so crucial. When love is the ground of our being, a love ethic shapes our participation in politics” (hooks 2020). Love is the experience of one’s existence on the basis of one’s difference with others. It is a love that is made in solidarity with another, which sees “the freedom of all as the freedom of each one”. (Munar 2018, p. 969). While feminists have been writing and talking about love for the longest time, recent literature show that discussions on the relationship of love and politics is given much attention to in the field of feminist love studies. Scholars of the field suggest that love does indeed have a transformational nature, it “has the capacity to change people and societies, and moreover, what love is seems to be constantly changing” (Ferguson and Toye 2017, p. 11). More aptly put, “love places us in (a) relationship, both parties are transformed through their interactions in the experience of love”. (Ferguson and Toye 2017, p. 12). Martha Nussbaum also relates personal experiences to feminist activism. Using Gandhi, Mandela and King as a jumping-off point, she criticizes anger and claims that it should not be the emotion that motivates activism. Nussbaum claims that a more just society is developed through the emotion of love (Munar 2018, p. 955). Having a love ethic nurtures freedom. It is a potent reserve for the freedom of the marginalized and broken (Vega-Gonzalez 2009, p. 226). After all, “there can be no love without justice” (hooks 2000a, b, p. 19). Karol Wojtyla declared the same in one of his addresses to a general audience. He stated that, “there can be no love without justice. Love surpasses justice, but at the same time it finds its verification in justice” (John Paul II, 1978). He also makes references to Catholic scripture in which Christ commands one to love thy neighbor. Wojtyla stresses that without justice though, love runs a risk. hooks believes although love may fail sometimes, people believe that love still prevails (hooks 2000a, b, p. xxvii). Knowing love and its truths may

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counter the obsession with power and domination. When one acts in accordance with the ethic of love, one believes that all human beings are entitled to freedom, a full life, and well-being (Hooks 2000a, b, p. 87). A culture of love demands that there is an ethic of love. Love and Education One way by which the practice of love can be encouraged is through critical pedagogy. In Teaching community: a pedagogy of hope (2003), hooks talks of how teachers should teach with love. The ethic of love is the ideal learning environment. Paulo Freire’s theory of education also discusses love as an act that encourages dialogue. His famous line, “teaching is an act of love”, like hooks, speaks of how “educators must risk acts of love, and that education should aim at establishing a world where it would be easier to love” (Schoder 2010, p. iii). hooks was very much influenced by Freire and it is not surprising that they have the same ideals. While Freire did not have a clear-cut definition of love, Schoder (2010, 60) uncovered that his works led to defining “love as a conscious moral appraisal and bestowal of value on a person or thing”. This same love was Freire’s educational framework as the pedagogical process and the teachers involved in it may consciously shape the world. Dominguez (2019, p. 122), who claims that critical pedagogy is a living-loving praxis, uses the term “critical love”. While examining and interrogating existing dynamics, and challenging and disrupting these relations, one realizes that there are multiple ways in how one may recreate and imagine relationships (Dominguez 2019, p. 124). Critical love actually embodies what hooks is trying to say. One should examine our relationships to others and the community, how we relate to each other and revamp the broken, oppressive systems. The classroom may be an apt venue to do so. Brooks (2017, p. 111), on the other hand, refers to this critical love as a critical theory of love. Love must be re-conceptualized, and it should affirm various social and cultural identities of human beings. Like hooks, Brooks believes that love is a “personal project” and a “political project” that can help save the community from itself. Educators must be able to reflect on the following matters in order to move toward a critical theory of love: how can love be can be redefined, embodied, performed, measured, and made holistic (Brooks 2017, p. 112)? Reflecting on love transforms the person and the community, and educators should be aware of this in their methods of teaching. hooks’ ideas on education are geared towards an acknowledgement of multiculturalism and diverse human experiences. The classroom is a site where students are encouraged to love themselves and their own and teachers are expected to care for their students. Accordingly, the emotional growth of students must be nurtured both emotionally and academically (hooks 2003, p. 130). Love flourishes in environments where people, in this case teachers, recognize the core foundations of love and embody them in proper relational contexts (hooks 2003, p. 131).

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Love and Spirituality When one enters the spaces of others, love ensures one’s full presence (hooks 2003, p. 162). This love is the love one creates in one’s self, and it connects one with the other. Thich Nhat Hanh talks of the recovery of oneself and one’s integrity through a renewal of one’s spirit (hooks 2003, 162). Based on this, hooks asks two questions, “what is the place of love in this recovery and what is the place of love in the experience of intimate otherness” (2003, 162)? Love is a social and political practice but it is also tied with spirituality. hooks justifies this with her practice of Engaged Buddhism. There is a meeting point between spirituality and politics. hooks was attracted to the practice of Buddhism, particularly that of Nhat Hanh’s ideas, because “he offered a spiritual vision of the universe that promoted working for peace and justice” (hooks 2020). This type of Engaged Buddhism is very similar to Sulak Sivaraksa’s idea of a socially-engaged Buddhism. Religion is a tool that should be used to cure society’s ills through “justice, democracy, and respect for human rights” (Hongladarom 1998, p. 98). hooks finds traditional patriarchal religions as problematic. As the feminist movement critiqued patriarchy, it also critiqued patriarchal religions (hooks 2000a, b, pp. 106–107). She claims that institutionalized religions encourage or implement imperialist, militarist, sexist or racist teachings. Although their main message to their followers should be about the message of love, this is denied through their fundamentalist assertions. hooks does not limit her critique to the Judeo-Christian religions, but to New Age spirituality as well (hooks 2000a, b, p. 73). Honoring interconnectedness with others and nature presupposes dedication to altering one’s thinking (hooks 2000a, b, p. 77). Love is about loving the universe. Spirituality demands that one becomes a lover of the universe. This means that one should commit oneself to the world and involve oneself in the world. One of the key influencers on hooks is Buddhist teacher and writer Sharon Salzberg. In her Loving-kindness (1995), Salzberg talks about Buddha’s teaching which encourages the actualization of love and truth. This path, according to Salzberg, commences if one appreciates her oneness with others. Oneness can be achieved through generosity, non-harming others, and right speech and action (Salzberg, 1995, p. 5). Love goes beyond self-love and love of others. It is “an ethos of connectedness, both with the spirit within ourselves and with others. Feeling connected very much contributes to the finding of wholeness and definitely to love” (Vega-Gonzalez 2009, pp. 224–225).

9.5 Discussion and Conclusion hooks’ theories of love can be broken down to four main points, but its main theme is that love is a practice that is both personal and political. Her first point is that love is an act of care, commitment, trust, responsibility and knowledge for one’s self and the other. Second is that parents, families, teachers, schools, media, and significant

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others influence and teach one how one acts in accordance to love. One emulates the love that one receives. Third, loving is an act of resistance against dominant, abusive, and oppressive structures. When one loves, one should challenge the status quo and the sexist, classist, racist systems that are evident in society and media especially. To love is to engage in a critique of culture. Lastly, loving is not only limited to persons, but to the world and/or universe in general. Love should lead to the eventual “healing” of the world. A healed world is a world wherein oppression has been eradicated. hooks feminist theory and theory of love complement each other. If each one loves the other and/or all others, then oppressive cultures or what she terms as white capitalist imperialist patriarchy will cease to exist. One issue here is how to teach human beings to love. With her critical pedagogy and takes on love and education, and the fostering of a critical consciousness along with the revamping of mass media’s portrayals on love, this appears as an easy possibility. Unfortunately, although this may be done in the long run with much hope, there is no guarantee that people will actually learn to love! This is the age-old theory-praxis gap. Theorizing and learning about love does not necessarily mean that one will practice love. hooks stresses the importance of bombarding human beings with the presence of love rather than the absence of it. If people are reminded that love exists, will it make the right kind of love the norm? As stated, most people are aware of the absence of love rather than the presence of it. Daring people to love is the main challenge, since most people are afraid to love. Love is a combination of self-love and love for others. When one has overcome all the hatred inflicted by oppression and one begins to love herself, she supposedly becomes an agent of cultural transformation. Similarly, when one loves herself only then can she be capable of loving and standing up for others. How does hooks’ theory of love and spirituality interplay towards a healed world? Love for one’s self and love for others if combined is a holistic love that leads to oneness, oneness with others and oneness with the universe. hooks refers to this action of love as a precursor to critical consciousness. The problem with this is that it seems too simplistic. By simply declaring that one should talk about love, or love one’s self and the community, or make “better” portrayals of love in media -will not make people more critical of existing dominating structures. The practice of love, that is why it is called practice, takes a lot of practice. If one desires to be better at something, one should devote oneself completely. These stages of love are easier said than done. When one is used to the practice of certain dominating mindsets, one needs more than a sermon on love. In her other works, hooks proposes a pedagogy of love. Revolutionary teaching calls for the reimagination of classrooms as sites of love (Johnson et al. 2018). hooks stresses the relationships and connections between teacher and students (Bessette 2019). Love is engaging in dialogue, dealing with students as subjects rather than objects. Love can only be practiced with proper training. hooks has a point with making sure that love is given to all fronts, but as a loving pedagogy requires, the relationship must also be present. There must be an eagerness for dialogue between the one who gives and receives love. Otherwise, the giver of love may fall back into the cycle of hate.

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Love acts as a tool for revolutionary feminism so that power structures may be toppled. In a nutshell, hooks work on love revolves around definitions, prescriptions, and criticisms. She defines love as a verb rather than a noun. It is a form of action that should influence change. She differentiates the stages of love: love for one’s self, love for the community, love for the universe and its interconnectedness. All these stages of love presuppose the devotion to care, commitment and respect for one’s self, one’s community and one’s universe. With the practice of love, one recognizes the flaws of various dominating systems, one questions one’s own predisposition to the various “isms” such as sexism, racism, and classism. One sees oneself as less judged based on these systems and one oppresses others less. Then, love becomes an act of resistance.

References Bessette, L. S. (2019). Contingency, staff, anxious pedagogy—and love. Pedagogy, 19(3), 525–529. https://doi.org/10.1215/15314200-7615502. Brooks, D. N. (2017). (Re)conceptualizing love: Moving towards a critical theory of love in education for social justice. Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis, 6(3). https://doi.org/10.31274/ jctp-180810-87. Dominguez, C. (2019). Each and everyday, love us free: Critical pedagogy as a living-loving praxis. International journal of critical pedagogy, 10(1), 117–139. Retrieved from http://libjournal.uncg. edu/ijcp/article/view/1532/1320. Ferguson, A., & Toye, M. E. (2017). Feminist love studies—editors’ introduction. Hypatia, 32(1), 5–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12311. Finley, N. J. (1991). Political activism and feminist spirituality. Sociological Analysis, 52(4), 349. https://doi.org/10.2307/3710851. Godden, N. J. (2017). The love ethic: A radical theory for social work practice. Australian Social Work, 70(4), 405–416. https://doi.org/10.1080/0312407X.2017.1301506. Hongladarom, S. (1998). Buddhism and human rights in the thoughts of Sulak Sivaraksa and Phra Dhammapidok. In W. R. Husted, D. Keown, & C. S. Prebish (Eds.), Buddhism and human rights. Surrey: Curzon Press. hooks, b. (1984). Feminist theory: From margin to center. New York: South End Press. hooks, b. (2000a). All about love. London: Womens. hooks, b. (2000b). Feminism is for everybody: passionate politics. London: Pluto Press. hooks, b. (2001). Salvation: Black people and love. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. hooks, b. (2003). Teaching community: A pedagogy of hope. New York: Routledge. hooks, b. (2007). When angels speak of love. New York: Atria Books. hooks, b. (2020, June 29). Toward a worldwide culture of love. Lion’s roar. https://www.lionsroar. com/toward-a-worldwide-culture-of-love/ Jaramillo, N., & McLaren, P. (2009). Borderlines: bell hooks and the pedagogy of revolutionary change. In L. Davidson & G. Yancy (Eds.), Critical perspectives on bell hooks (pp. 17–33). New York: Routledge. John Paul II. (n.d.). Retrieved February 21, 2020, from http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/ en/audiences/1978/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_19781108.html. Johnson, L. L., Bryan, N., & Boutte, G. (2018). Show us the love: Revolutionary teaching in (un)critical times. The Urban Review, 51(1), 46–64. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11256-018-0488-3. Langford, W. (1999). Love is all you need. Trouble & Strife, (38). Retrieved from https://www.tro ubleandstrife.org/articles/issue-38/love-is-all-you-need/.

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Munar, A. M. (2018). Dancing between anger and love: Reflections on feminist activism. Ephemera, 18(4). Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/eee3/b395830eb7d2e94f2562e817f2e0e2 12417d.pdf#page=264. Salzberg, S. (1995). Loving-kindness: The revolutionary art of happiness. Cambridge, MA: Shambhala Publications Inc. Schoder, E. M. (2010). Retrieved from https://rucore.libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/27183/PDF/ 1/play/. Vega-Gonzalez, S. (2009). Toward a love ethic: Love and spirituality in bell hooks’ writing”. In Critical perspectives on bell hooks (pp. 218–228). New York: Routledge.

Hazel T. Biana is Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. She was the previous chairholder of the Emerita S. Quito Chair in the History of Thought. She specializes in gender studies and feminist and postfeminist philosophy. In particular, she works on issues related to intersectionality and cultural criticism.

Part III

Conceptual Analyses

Chapter 10

Posthumous Love as a Rational Virtue Theptawee Chokvasin

Abstract Can posthumous love be rationally comprehensible for us to talk about? In this research article, I look into some Renaissance writings on Christian ethics that talk about posthumous love as if there are some virtues in it that deserve to be praised. I try to show that the most notable virtues that can be seen in posthumous love are honesty in love as well as the intention to keep a promise to cherish the eternal love in married couples even after their death. If it is accepted that posthumous love is considered a morally rational virtue for these Renaissance Christian writers, there will still be a question, namely, on what criterion it should be based for us to talk about that promise. In this article, I show that the reverence of true love and faithfulness in love can be found in medieval Christian and Renaissance philosophy throughout Christian theological writings, especially in Robert Grosseteste’s notion of caritas. Next, I argue, based on Nicholas Rescher’s definition of rationality as human resource and Huw Price’s anthropological explanative power of concepts, that keeping a promise of posthumous love is a rational virtue. My argument is based on an idea that rationality is durable. This is because, as I will also argue, love is invincible. durability thesis of rationality reflected in the invincibility-of-love thesis through Rescher’s erotetic principle in metaphysical questioning strengthened with Price’s respond-dependence. Keywords Posthumous love · Virtue · Rationality · Christian ethics

10.1 Introduction In this chapter, I discuss whether posthumous love is plausible. That is, I discuss whether love after death is rational. I will defend a thesis that it is; furthermore, I also offer a philosophical elucidation of why some kind of rationality is at work in talks about posthumous love.

T. Chokvasin (B) Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_10

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Can posthumous events, i.e., events that occur to someone after she is already dead, be rationally comprehensible, so that we can talk about them? The first thing that may come to our mind is that these events are incomprehensible, if not altogether inexistent. However, in contemporary settings, especially in novels, soap operas, or movies, posthumous events are often portrayed as mysterious, something that are encountered, and often feared by the living characters. Stories of love after death abound. In Thailand, for example, the story of Nang Nak is very popular. It is about the love that Nang Nak still has for her husband even after she died and had become a ghost. It has been pointed out that this sort of romantic love in the story is one of essential factors for the movie’s popularity (Panyasopon 2003, p. 97). Interestingly, it has also been shown that during this era of technological advances people are still fond of American and foreign films that contain stories of afterlife events (Shapiro 2011). A question then arises: why afterlife events, especially posthumous love stories, still are very popular? Moreover, posthumous love is not an unfamiliar theme at all in European literature, including that in the Renaissance period. Some of this literature can be found in Christian theological writings. In this article, I will investigate some Renaissance writings on Christian ethics that mention posthumous loves as a kind of virtue that deserves to be praised. Eternal love is believed to be conceived by God; therefore, those austere Christian practitioners are expected to understand it. If it is accepted that posthumous love is considered a morally rational virtue by these Renaissance Christian writers, there will still be some question left to ask about what the criterion is for us to talk about posthumous love as a rational virtue. In this article, I argue that posthumous love can be a rational virtue in terms of a neo-pragmatic interpretation of rationality found in Nicholas Rescher and Huw Price. I defend the thesis that posthumous love is rational (and not only moral in the sense of the Renaissance writers) because being so is a virtue; this is because love requires durability and invincibility; these two concepts imply that love transcends death.

10.2 Posthumous Love as a Christian Virtue in European Literature In Christian ethics, true love is emphasized as something that bonds people together. Stephen Charles Mott remarks: “…a Christian ethic, and with it a Christian basis for social action, obviously must be established in love” (Mott 1994, p. 217). Moreover, according to the Bible, “whoever claims to love God yet hates a brother or sister is a liar” (John 4:20 NIV). It can then be considered that social relationships between people and love of God should be related together from the perspective of Christian ethics. Love of other people and love of God should not be separated from each other. In any case, the question remains: What is the reason for the claim that true love should be forever, even after death?

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In Ramie Targoff’s Posthumous Love: Eros and the Afterlife in Renaissance England, Renaissance literatures on love after death are examined in length. Targoff mentions some sonnets written by Francesco Petrarca, also known as Petrarch, the father of Italian humanism, who holds a great influence on Sir Thomas Wyatt, an English poet (Targoff 2014, pp. 45–46). Some sonnets written by Petrarch can be found in a book-length study by Bernardo (1974). From Petrarch’s sonnet, The Triumph of Time, there is a story of a man who hopes to obtain bliss through beholding his woman and reuniting with her again, so that they can cherish their eternal love in heaven. There is a remark that for the man to “re-behold” his lover it means that he must somehow recognize her bodily identity and her heavenly beauty, and he truly believes that it would be blissful. It can also be interpreted that when they are in heaven, their heavenly look should be in a status of being greater in perfection (Bernardo 1974, p. 149). Targoff explains that a great deal of the Neoplatonic ideals of true love in Renaissance Italy is conceptualized based on Marcilio Ficino’s Neoplatonic philosophy of love. Neoplatonic philosophy of love emphasizes “the idealization of the beloved with a belief in the power of beauty to elevate the soul” (Targoff 2014, p. 46). It might be the case that Petrarch was looking for an ideal love in heaven with God, so he chose to mention a universalized love which was more abstract than a mundane love. However, it is explicated that here Ficino and his followers may have overinterpreted Petrarch’s sonnets that way when they are to support the belief in posthumous love in heaven (Targoff 2014, p. 47). In another writing, Targoff points out that there had been a tension between the pros and cons of believing in posthumous love within the Christian interpretations of the Bible. Some would say that death should put an end to the marital status and any hope of afterlife reunion, while the other would have hope and long for those afterlife events. Surprisingly, Targoff finds out that the tension itself can bring out one of the greatest stories of all time, Romeo and Juliet, which is to emphasize the tragically fatal results of forbidden love (Targoff 2015). It can be considered that talking about posthumous love is something full of inconsistencies. How can something which is called ‘a true love’ be truly eternal and be inconsistent when we are to ponder about it? Should a man believe that a woman in heaven, with her more perfect beauty than his beloved woman, be identical to his beloved? How could a man realize that the woman in heaven is the very one who was his beloved? According to Targoff’s remark, posthumous love was “something that many people longed to understand but for which there were no coherent or decisive answers” (Targoff 2014, p. 44). In an argumentative writing by Aaron Smuts, there are two camps when it comes to justification of love, namely “the no-reasons view” and “the reason views” (Smuts 2014, p. 95). Smuts argues that the no-reasons view is more plausible. His question is whether it is better to love better things. He points out that we may have reasons to love better people. However, the levels of appropriateness of people that we should give our love to, if there are any, are not the reasons why we have love for one another, especially when that one is in a lesser degree of appropriateness. Sometimes it is worse such as when we use that line of reasoning to convince a mother not to love

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her crippled child. Sometimes we find out that it is hard for us to explain why some persons have love for others who should stand condemned of being guilty. Finally, love is not involved with evaluation (Smuts 2014, pp. 101–104). If we are to use this line of reasoning, then it can be considered that it is rather difficult for us to have a strong reason for love, let alone to have a tenable reason to believe in love after death. The issue of love after death sounds like it is with a double-bind problem that will not see the light of rationality. However, I will show my developed arguments later to help us understand why the no-reasons view should be rejected.

10.3 Robert Grosseteste on the Invincibility of Love In fact, love as a relationship between man and God is already contemplated by philosophers for a long time. One interesting topic that should be mentioned here is the explanation of love as being invincible, as described by an thirteenth century English philosopher and theologian, Robert Grosseteste. In an extensive study on Grosseteste’s works, James McEvoy points out that, in Grosseteste’s interpretation of the Christian philosophy, love and intellect are to be given together because Grosseteste had “his own individual way of expressing the manner in which love shapes and extends the intellectual horizon” (McEvoy 2000, p. 136). For one to know God, one must love God in an immeasurable way. McEvoy explains that the line of reasoning in Grosseteste’s conception of God’s love and our love for God is based on his interpretation of “the invincibility of love,” or caritas, which is for us to conceptualize God’s characteristics of “the unmeasured measure.” The highest form of love is the love for God because this love is for the immeasurable, so it is to be pervasive without limit. If one is to love the neighbors meaningfully, then one must love God. This is the supreme good that can be conceived by our thoughts, and it is already contained in the First Commandment (McEvoy 2000, pp. 136–137). For a better understanding, there is a cue from a direct quote from Robert Grosseteste’s Letter 2 to Brother Agnellus of Pisa who was then the provincial minister of the Franciscans in England; You are men of true charity who know it has been written that where your treasure is, there also is your heart [Mt 6:21], and you do not question that every precious object of a person’s deeply felt love is called a treasure. You remember, too, that the word ‘heart’ stands for ‘love.’ Hence you acknowledge with complete certainty that love is in the same place as the precious object of that love. Furthermore, it is well known and indisputable that love and lover cannot be separated, and so it is obvious that a lover and the recipient of that love are together. So it is plain that the one who loves and the one who returns that love are together to a much greater degree, because for those who love one another the lover of the other is also the object of the other’s love, and because each of the two entirely enters the other at the moment, as it were, they look upon one another, and because they grasp each other in a mutual embrace and can never be parted. (Grosseteste 2010, pp. 49–50; the emphasized quote from Matthew 6:21 is Grosseteste’s)

It can be interpreted here that for Grosseteste the meaning of true love should be for eternity. Our love of God is to treasure Him supremely, so true love of God is

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eternal. Grosseteste did not talk about it by using our vocabulary and understanding of posthumous love as something that married couples should have, but it can be considered that the supreme goodness of the love of God does reflect a belief that there is a journey after death for every blessed one. In the eye of eternity, one and the precious object of one’s love are inseparable. Posthumous love is pervasively and profoundly mentioned in literature about ethical virtue. Grosseteste talks directly about God’s love and love of God. Other writers talk about posthumous love of love couples and married couples. Those talks share one thing in common about the belief in love after death. Grosseteste adds to his belief that God’s love and love of God can be considered a supreme knowledge both about oneself and one’s beloved. Therefore, there can be no other love which is greater. From his point of view, is this supreme knowledge a hint that someday we will know what is a rational virtue in this sort of posthumous love involved with God? What should be the characteristic of that supreme knowledge? Is it comprehensible? Nevertheless, if we still cannot find out what should be the very reason why we should believe in love after death, then for us to accept that posthumous love can be rational is still questionable. In the rest of this article, therefore, I assume that if something can be a topic of a meaningful conversation, then it can be rational. What interests me and is more relevant to the main topic here is to ask instead about what sort of conception of rationality it should be.

10.4 Bodily Love Versus Spiritual Love It seems that posthumous love confirms that love is not a matter of body. When death takes life out of a body and the body becomes a rotting corpse, things that are objects of love, if there are any, must be in some way spiritual. This spiritual entity about which words can be used must be related to the content of the latter. But what kind of content? It seems that those words have moral content when they are about faithfulness in love. From a philosophical reading, to believe that spiritual things are eternal and immortal is related to ancient Greek philosophy as reflected in Socrates and Plato. These spiritual things indicate that the concept of love and morality in love is considered spiritually. This idea also appears in the moral content of medieval Christian ethics. Bernhard Jussen’s analysis of medieval moral practice shows that being honest to one’s own husband who has passed away can be expressed by not paying attention to remarriage (Jussen 2015, p. 54). Therefore, it seems that for a Christian to cherish honesty and stability in love, it is automatically considered a virtue without having to worry about asking why. In other words, security in love is a part of the morality that couples should have in their marital status. The moral requirement is considered essential to the spiritual being of every married couple even after their bodily death. Is this to say that feelings of love can be motivated without a body? Moreover, we have already seen in the previous section that to continue the love affair beyond death is not necessarily the same as to be involved with the same

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bodily identity of the beloved. Bodily love is, therefore, not a necessary condition of posthumous love. A philosophical analysis of Ficino’s notion of love that humans have for God is also written by James A. Devereux, S. J., a work that aims to show that Christian doctrines prefer spiritual love to egoistic love (Devereux 1969). Devereux points out that Ficino’s notion of love of God can be explicated from basic self-love. This explication might sound paradoxical in the first place why self-love and love of God could be compatible with each other in Ficino’s philosophy. However, it is explicated that one’s love for the other should only be perfected when one and one’s lover mutually recognize oneself and the self of the other transformed into the beloved (Devereux 1969, p. 164). Therefore, when one truly loves God, it means that one has one’s own perfected self-love simultaneously. It entails further that self-love and love for God can be compatible with each other, and true self-love is not the same thing with egoistic love. However, he argues that Ficino’s did not elucidate the reason of God’s love for human beings which is disinterested (Devereux 1969, p. 170). From this point of view, I interpret that Ficino’s humanistic philosophy is an effort to establish a mutual foundation of love between one and the other. The perfect foundation is in God’s love and love for God, so, when one truly loves the other, that true love is to be indirectly perfected by God. Moreover, James T. Turner, Jr. also argues for the possibility of resurrection and afterlife in Christian belief. He points out that a philosophical interpretation of Christian doctrine reveals that there is a possibility of life after death in some sort of postmortem bodily existence. What is urgently required is that the interpretation of mind and body in substance dualism must be replaced by a hylemorphistic dimension of spiritual and bodily existence (Turner 2019). I consider that Turner’s view concerns an interesting and detailed argumentation for the possibility of afterlife. In other words, the afterlife can be studied philosophically. At least, it leaves room for the possibility of having a philosophical explanation of spiritual love in the post-mortem existence.

10.5 Neo-Pragmatic Conceptions of Rationality The philosophical concept of rational virtue was contemplated by Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, the highest good is the same as the true nature of the happiest life. However, a question remains as to how we are to understand what the true nature of the highest good is. Matthew D. Walker points out that to understand Aristotle correctly about the virtue we have to reflect it with the concept of “life-activity,” i.e., a set of virtues is to be understood via practical knowledge. Walker notices that Aristotle emphasizes the role of contemplation for practical reasoning; therefore, the rational virtues can be read both exclusively and inclusively. Attainment of happiness can be obtained through an exercise of any virtues, and rational virtues can be found in many sources of intellectual and ethical knowledge (Walker 2018, pp. 16–19). Moreover, according to Ralph Wedgwood, rationality in Aristotle’s schematization

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can be elucidated as a virtue of thought when one is capable of having theoretical wisdom as well as practical prudence. The capability is clearly shown in reasoning (Wedgwood 2017, p. 146). However, should the rational virtue of posthumous love be elucidated by the light of Aristotelian notion of rationality? I argue that it should not. When we are to talk about posthumous love it is already argued in the above section that this sort of love is not involved with the body. However, in his De Anima (On the soul), Aristotle does express the view that “there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body” and thinking cannot be existing without the body (Aristotle 1984, p. 642; 403a3–10). This sort of Aristotelian interpretation of rational virtue in worldly affairs seems to imply that there is no room for the possibility of talking about rational virtue in posthumous love. This is because the Aristotelian notion of rational virtue is limited for living beings who are contemplating about worldly affairs and act with their bodies. Therefore, I conclude that the Aristotelian conception of rational virtue is the best option to conceptualize the love after death. A more interesting conception of rationality, however, can be found in the works of neo-pragmatists such as Nicholas Rescher and Huw Price. While Aristotle thinks that being rational belongs to the essential characteristics of human beings, Rescher points out that the definition of rationality is involved with being a human resource. Rationality is for us to use when engaging in reasoning “to resolve choices in the best possible way” (Rescher 1988, p. 1). According to this interpretation, Rescher considers that rationality is suitable for those beings who know well how to use it and to make a living with it. According to Rescher, Rationality is not just a matter of thought, but of action as well…Rationality thus involves the capacity ‘to give an account’—to use one’s intelligence to provide a ‘rationale’ for what one does that establishes its appropriateness (Rescher 1988, p. 3).

Again, even when we are to make a judgment or an evaluation practically, rational judgment or rational choice must be involved with that capacity. Rescher adds that it is for us to make a universal judgment that can be accepted by others who are in the same scenario of making judgment (Rescher 2017, pp. 55–56). Moreover, even when we are to ponder about any metaphysical questions asking about the possibilities of posthumous events, we would already have some presupposition that there is an answer. According to the principles in erotetic perspective, it is in a mode of formulation with “is-it-possible question” asking about rationality of nature (Rescher 2000, pp. 1–3; his italics). In his perspective, it can be considered that rationality in this light is not that much involved with any truth criterion or any cognitive power to engage with the criterion in human beings. It is instead involved with the appropriateness in making a choice and how we are to explain it to the others. Success or failure would finally depend on the evaluation of making a choice rather than the evaluation of truth or falsity. Consequently, neither truth nor falsity of the metaphysical status of posthumous events can be ascribed to the question of the appropriateness in deciding of keeping a promise of love from the belief in the possibility of those events.

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Nonetheless, should it be better for us to still keep the ideal of truth? Something must be true or false even though in the present time we are not yet to know full well about it, and the truth out there must be represented in a true proposition. Huw Price points out that the ideal of representationalism must be rejected. What should instead be accepted is metaphysical quietism. His stance of metaphysical quietism is that from an anthropological point of view we can still be in a conversation talking about something without resorting to the commitments that those words in our conversation must represent the metaphysically real things. The conversation is still meaningful via response-dependence in our use of language. He says: So our pragmatists are metaphysical quietists. But note that they are not philosophical quietists tout court, if there could be such a view. On the contrary, they take some relevant theoretical matters very seriously indeed: in particular, some broadly anthropological issues about the roles and genealogy of various aspects of human linguistic behavior.” (Price 2011, pp. 236)

Looking at the quote, we can see that the new pragmatism conceived by Price is to involve with an anthropological method of doing philosophy. His antirepresentationalism needs a new way of considering the philosophical issue of language and reality. He argues for the anthropological explanative power of concepts when language is used in communication. The question is about in what way people use language, not about whether the statement represents something true or not. He offers his analysis of rationality from a response-dependence perspective when a language user is in conversation. When we are disposed to say something that is appropriate in the conversation, we are at least to depend on the response from the other one in conversation. This is what we are to interpret as rationality (Price 2011, pp. 84–85; 99–100). From the neo-pragmatist interpretation of truth and rationality, I argue that there is a way of talking about posthumous love rationally. This sort of neo-pragmatic conceptions of rationality is emphasized on the capability of making judgment instead.

10.6 Rationality of Keeping a Promise of Eternal Love What is the reason for a married couple to stay in love and to keep the promise of keeping their marital status as long as possible? Perhaps the reason that it is for them to spend their time constructing a family and a happy home is just only a worldly reason. If we are to look for a moral reason, it may be about the honesty and sincerity in love. Nevertheless, should the promise of eternal love be construed that it is to last long until the end of time, and that it is to last beyond death? What is the rationality of this line of thoughts? I offer that it is to be understood in its own anthropological conception of rationality in making a judgment of a promise of eternal love. The nub of this argument is that the answer is in the speech act of keeping the promise itself. The conception of rationality could not be successful if we choose a conceptualization of rationality as the capability of the soul that is existing in a body.

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In the light of Christian ethics, the eternity of true love and relationship between God and men is considered to be involved with each other according to Robert Grosseteste and the Neoplatonic philosophers. The idealization of love as caritas is to explain that love should be extended without limit, and true love for God must not be defeated by any other love for measurable things. True love is, therefore, to last eternally, and to be invincible. In my view, this is the interpretation of true love that is supported by many medieval and Renaissance writers. The outcomes of that interpretation are poems, sonnets, and stories about love after death. Love that should last long is not just a relativized happening being driven indeterminately from some sort of a dumb luck that cannot be fully explained. If something is to last longer, the very use of our conception of ‘longer’ would tell us that that thing is to stand the test of time for a while. Determination of the intent of love needs time; otherwise it would lose its strength of reason to explain why one’s love is always the same for the beloved one. The very strength of reason here can be considered some sort of rationality that can be elucidated from the very nature of invincible love via the anthropological conception of reason of love for its own sake. The ethical requirements for one to keep the promise of love, and to keep it meaningfully, are things that need durability and invincibility. The durability thesis of rationality in keeping the promise of eternal love here is what I term “the invincibility-of-love thesis.” For a married couple to keep their love and the promise of eternal love, the discourse of posthumous love can be considered as an appropriate way for the couple to think about the promise of love. The promise of eternal love for the beloved is meaningful as long as it is not defeated by dishonesty. Therefore, the promise of eternal love even after death can be considered something good for the married couple. Hence, the promise of posthumous love can be a virtue for the couple even in this lifetime that they are living their married life. Moreover, it is not that much difficult for us to understand why the promise of eternal love even after death has a moral content and can be in a rational conversation. The possibility of being a rational virtue for the posthumous love is, therefore, interpreted from its own meaningful discourse of keeping the promise of love. Finally, why this promise of eternal love should be considered rational even there are none of the proofs of truth or falsity of posthumous events? It is clarified from Rescher’s erotetic principle that this question is instead based on questioning about truth, not about the possibility which is at issue here. Rational talk about posthumous events can still be meaningful in the light of possibility questions. We can have reasons to talk about posthumous love, so the no-reasons view is rejected. Moreover, from Price’s conceptualization of respond-dependence, it can be explained neither poetic nor figurative language talking about eternal love needs with priority to represent the metaphysical reality for it to be meaningful. The talk about eternal love considered as a virtue can still be meaningful in conversations between those who have faith in it. So, the problem is solved.

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10.7 Conclusion Can philosophy be discussed in the case of the virtue of love which is related to love after death? If there should be a clear manifestation of these issues in philosophy, what should it be? I have argued that a way to answer these questions has to presuppose the view that posthumous love is rational. We should reinterpret the writings on posthumous love that are found in the Renaissance and medieval Christian cultures and ask what are the values of those words that are there in the literature. These words are there for us to contemplate about the ideal of sincerity and security in love, those that should not be taken away even by bodily death. The truth of spiritual love should eventually find its way out into the light of rationality. Acknowledgements This research work is under the support of Department of Philosophy and Religion, Faculty of Humanities, Kasetsart University. I am grateful to the Department for giving me an opportunity to do the research work. The first-draft document of the research article is read at The First Joint Meeting of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand, and the Philosophical Association of the Philippines under the topic of “Love and Friendship across Cultures” on July 26–27, 2019 at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. I truly appreciate all comments and constructive suggestions made by participants at the Meeting.

References Aristotle. (1984). The complete works of Aristotle, revised Oxford translation volume 1, J. Barnes (Ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bernardo, A. S. (1974). Petrarch, Laura, and the Triumphs. Albany: State University of New York Press. Devereux, J. A. (1969). The object of love in Ficino’s philosophy. Journal of the History of Ideas, 30(2), 161–170. Grosseteste, R. (2010). The letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. (Translated and annotated by F.A.C. Mantello & J. Goering). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Jussen, B. (2015). Posthumous love as culture: Outline of a medieval moral pattern. In B. Jussen & R. Targoff (Eds.), Love after death: Concepts of posthumous love in medieval and early modern Europe (pp. 27–54). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. McEvoy, J. (2000). Robert Grosseteste, Great medieval thinkers series. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mott, S. C. (1994). Love and society: God’s justice and ours. In D. K. Clark & R. V. Rakestraw (Eds.), Readings in Christian ethics: Theory and method (pp. 216–224). Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books. Panyasopon, N. (2003). The cultural and filmic elements that contribute to the popularity of the Thai film Nang Nak. BU Academic Review, 2(1), 94–103. Price, H. (2011). Naturalism without mirrors. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rescher, N. (1988). Rationality: A philosophical inquiry into the nature and the rationale of reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rescher, N. (2000). Nature and understanding: The metaphysics and method of science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rescher, N. (2017). Value reasoning on the pragmatic rationality of evaluation. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Shapiro, A. J. (2011). You only live twice: The representation of the afterlife in film. A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Miami in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Film Studies, University of Miami. Coral Gables: Florida. Smuts, A. (2014). Is it better to love better things? In C. Maurer, T. Milligan, & K. Pacovská (Eds.), Love and its objects: What can we care for? (pp. 91–107). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Targoff, R. (2014). Posthumous love: Eros and the afterlife in renaissance England. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Targoff, R. (2015). Burying Romeo and Juliet: Love after death in the English renaissance. In B. Jussen & R. Targoff (Eds.), Love after death: Concepts of posthumous love in medieval and early modern Europe (pp. 147–166). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Turner Jr., J. T. (2019). On the resurrection of the dead: A new metaphysics of afterlife for Christian thought. Routledge new critical thinking in religion, theology and Biblical studies series. London and New York: Routledge. Walker, M. D. (2018). Aristotle on the uses of contemplation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wedgwood, R. (2017). The value of rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Theptawee Chokvasin is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Faculty of Humanities, Kasetsart University, Thailand. His research examines a variety of issues in philosophy, such as philosophy of technology, religious ethics, and metaphysics.

Chapter 11

Awareness and Aloneness as Foundations of Love and Friendship Laureen L. Velasco

Abstract It is said that man is born alone and dies alone. No one can live his life for him. No one can die his death for him. But in between one can create various illusions in an attempt to escape from aloneness. This paper discusses how such futile attempts can actually be hindering the beautiful love and soulful relationships humans are longing for. It outlines the challenges one must go through, i.e., confronting precisely the existential fact of aloneness; waking up to some profound realizations about oneself, one’s hang-ups, and the various obstacles to loving and cultivating authentic relationships. It also shows that while there is a deep need to connect and feel connected with another being, this need or being needy is actually counterproductive, and will instead create problems and tensions and forms of imprisonment. While needs can help maintain so many relationships, it is not need that will keep the authentic fire and soulful connection between human beings. One is, therefore, challenged to transcend neediness, to confront fear of aloneness and loneliness, to become aware of the many projections and hindrances we set up, to learn and embrace independence, so that one can usher in the experience of a truly wonderful and soul-fulfilling relationship with another. Keywords Awareness · Aloneness · Attachment · Zen · Osho

11.1 Aloneness Let this paper begin with the claim that, unless one has been keenly aware of, confronted and embraced his aloneness, love is not possible, genuine friendship is not possible. Many people want love and friendship without realizing that deep down, what they really want is someone who will take care of them, someone on whom they can depend or who will depend on them, depending on their hang-up. Many people want love but many do not realize what they really want is to control or be controlled, depending on their inadequacies. We must, therefore, ask ourselves if L. L. Velasco (B) De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_11

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we are in a relationship out of strength or out of weakness. Are we in a relationship to escape from our aloneness? Is our relationship a dance or a wrestling? Is it fulfilling and enriching, or exhausting and debilitating? Does it allow freedom so that one can expand and grow, or does it imprison, limit, and define what one can do? The Zen master Osho says, Everybody is born alone, goes alone; in the middle of the two, coming and going, you may delude yourself that you are with somebody, but you still remain alone. Aloneness is your nature! You can delude, that’s all. You can have dreams, that’s all. But the other remains always the other and there is no meeting-point. (Rajneesh 1975, p. 263)

The aforementioned does not however mean that an authentic loving relationship or friendship is not possible. It is possible, but it will not change the fact that everyone is from the very beginning and ultimately alone. This aloneness, acknowledging and embracing it, is to Zen a very important thing. When you don’t need a person at all, when you are totally sufficient unto yourself, when you can be alone and tremendously happy and ecstatic, then love is possible. When you are really blissful on your own, you don’t want to use anybody. You simply want to share. You have so much…. You would like somebody to share it. And you will feel thankful that somebody was ready to receive. (Osho 2003, pp. 15–16)

I recall bumping into a former student once who was wearing a shirt that said: “YOU COM”. I read it aloud and she must have noticed how baffled I was, my eyebrows wrinkled and all, trying to make sense of the text on her shirt. She sheepishly smiled and said: “Miss, my boyfriend is wearing the shirt which says ‘PLETE ME’.” The Indian philosopher, Krishnamurti has a similar insight when he says, it is not genuine love when one is simply escaping from aloneness, from loneliness and isolation. There cannot be love when each is pursuing his or her own particular private pleasures (Krishnamurti 1993, p. 14). Other ways one can try to escape from aloneness include getting involved in a masochistic or sadistic relationship. The masochistic person escapes from the unbearable feeling of isolation and separateness by making himself part and parcel of another person who directs him, guides him, protects him. (And this happens when) a person has not reached the level where he has a sense of identity, of I-ness, rooted in the productive unfolding of his own powers. (Fromm 1963, p. 16)

In contrast to the masochist is the sadist whose form of union is domination. The sadistic person wants to escape from his aloneness and sense of imprisonment by making another part and parcel of himself. He inflates and enhances himself by incorporating another person, who worships him. (Ibid)

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For Erich Fromm, both have a psychological imbalance resulting from the presence of increased anxiety, loneliness, insecurity, lack of identity, etc. These feelings of inadequacy can motivate greed—a feeling which is highly egocentric because here, “the greedy person wants something for himself exclusively and that by which he satisfies his desire is only a means for his own purposes…where the other person becomes primarily an object” (Fromm 1965, p. 36). He explains that in this dynamic, the masochist “transcends the separateness of his individual existence by becoming part of somebody or something bigger than himself, and experiences his identity in connection with the power to which he has submitted” (Ibid.). On the other hand, the sadist tries to “unite himself with the world by having power over it, by making others a part of himself, and this transcending his individual existence by domination” (Ibid.). But in either case, …both persons involved have lost their integrity and freedom, they live on each other and from each other, satisfying their craving for closeness, yet suffering from the lack of inner strength and self-reliance which would require freedom and independence… They have a self-propelling dynamism, and because no amount of submission or domination is enough to give a sense of identity and union, more and more of it is sought…while these passions aim at the establishment of a sense of union, they destroy the sense of integrity. The person driven by any of these passions actually becomes dependent on others; instead of developing his own individual being, he is dependent on those to whom he submits, or whom he dominates. (Ibid.)

Fromm explains that the individual’s need to lean on someone, to feel rooted, to have a sense of identity as a part and not as separate has its root in the “depth and intensity of the irrational affective tie to the mother (and) the fear of emerging fully from her.” These individuals who never transcended the primordial bonds are the “eternally dependent ones, who are frightened and insecure when motherly protection is withdrawn but optimistic and active when a loving mother or mother-substitute is provided, either realistically or in phantasy” (Ibid, p. 44). But even after one has decided to cut the umbilical cord connecting one to the mother, who all those years represented care, love and affection, one can still continue to try to escape from aloneness. After the immediate family, it is the clan, or peers, or the state, or the church which will now assume the function of the mother. As a matter of fact, Many substitutes for a truly individual sense of identity were sought for, and found… (until) the sense of identity shifted more and more to the experience of conformity… (so that) instead of the pre-individualistic clan identity, a new herd identity develops, in which the sense of identity rests on the sense of an unquestionable belonging to the crowd. (Ibid, p. 63)

The existentialist Gabriel Marcel argues that, we could not exist merely like ants in an anthill. We go about our quiet business, moving like functional beings, but without genuine connections except that which is based on need, anxiety, loneliness, insecurity, dependency, etc. We are not simply objects to be used and consumed by one another. We are not merely creatures of instincts. But neither could our lives be dictated by concepts and ideas about what relationships ought to be, by definitions of love and friendships. All definitions are a limitation. A profound awareness of one’s

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aloneness must be accompanied by acceptance of it. A rational consciousness of the fact of aloneness will not suffice. In fact, a superficial or merely rational awareness could give rise to insecurity and all sorts of fear and even panic. The awareness must, therefore, be on an existential and soulful level, which can only happen in stillness, in silence, in meditation.

11.2 Awareness Awareness is of extreme importance—not only awareness of one’s isolation and aloneness, but awareness of many other things that hinder love. We must be aware of our wounds. We must be aware of how the mind works and its many projections. We must be aware of our feelings, our sentimentality, our many desires, where they tend to lead us, what unnecessary sufferings they tend to cause. We must be aware of how we can go around and around in emotions and vicious cycles. “The heart will give you all kinds of imaginings, hallucinations, illusions, sweet dreams” (Osho 2003, p. 93). “To be aware means not to dream” (Ibid, p. 114). We must be aware so that we are not imprisoned by them, controlled by them. We must be aware so that we do not get caught up in the very game we, our minds and emotions, are playing. Only when we become aware can we realize how much responsibility we have for everything that is happening in our relationships. For Osho, the mind is at the back of so many things; the mind is the projector (Ibid, p. 116). How many of us really look and see things as they are, look and see a person as s/he is? You never look at things as they are; you mix them with your illusions. You coat a person in dreams and you feel a person has become sweet. You mix it with dreams just to make it a little sweeter. When you are in love the person seems beautiful, no comparison. When you are in love, the person is a flower, a rose, a rose garden with no thorns. When you hate, the same person seems to be the ugliest. When you dislike, when you hate, the flowers disappear. There are only thorns, no more garden—the ugliest. This moment you are in love and the next moment you are in hate; the same person, the same screen, and the whole story changes. When you project love the person looks lovely, when you project hate the person looks ugly. You have not seen the real person at all. (Ibid, pp. 116–117)

This is why to Zen it is very crucial that we are aware of how the mind projects. To Zen, we can become aware if and when we can look at things without the mind. Look at the other. Do not let the mind say anything, contribute anything! Do not let the mind interpret! The mind will always color the vision. One must be aware of all that! That is our mind! Get close and see, but do not color the seeing! Desire

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colors the seeing—the desire to possess, the desire to have someone who will make us happy, who will fulfill our dreams. Desire clouds awareness. Desire is like a veil that covers it. The nature of desire is dreaming, and you can dream only when things are not there. Whatever is far away looks beautiful. Come closer and things start changing. Reality is shattering. To be aware means not to dream. That undercurrent of dreams goes on making our heads muddled. An undercurrent of dreaming goes on—and that undercurrent goes on corrupting our vision. If you look at a thing with desire, you never look at the thing as it is. Your desire starts playing games with you. Then your very desire creates a dream around the object. You start coloring the object… you start seeing visions, you start moving into fantasy. Only when the dreaming mind has stopped is there truth… because the dreaming continuously projects and distorts that which is. (Ibid, pp. 112–114)

There may be many pretensions in the beginning of a relationship. Or if not pretensions, there is much willingness to expend much effort on putting one’s best foot forward. But everyone has a bad hair day. Falsity cannot be sustained. The real color will eventually manifest. the whole falsity by and by disappears. Then the authentic, the real person comes into being, and there is a clash. Twenty-four hours if you have to be artificial, it will become such a tense state of mind, it will create so much anxiety, because you will feel confined, in prison, you will feel like the other is the responsible person. Then you take revenge, react…. you are angry. (Rajneesh 1975, p. 203)

Sometimes a person may feel cheated. But in Zen, “nobody is cheating you— nobody can cheat you except your own desiring and dreaming mind. You created the illusion” (Osho 2003, p. 113). This is why awareness is so important. The delusion is not there outside you… It is within you… It is in you. You create your illusion and then you live in it, then you are clouded by it. (Rajneesh 1975, p. 88)

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For Osho, awareness and dreaming cannot co-exist. One dreams because one is asleep. And “the greatest sleep is of reason, because reason creates such beautiful dreams, and so real that everyone is deceived by it” (Rajneesh 1975, p. 93). Furthermore, the tendency of the mind/reason is to interpret, to project. That is how listening becomes impossible (Osho 2003, p. 72). The mind projects so many things, which will color the seeing. Zen seeing is said to be a no-seeing in the sense that no preconceived notions color the perception. Zen seeing, is therefore, direct because nothing comes in between. A single projected thought and you are far away from seeing things as they, which in Zen is called suchness. Only a Zen consciousness or awareness will see suchness. This consciousness is also likened to a mirror—a popular Zen metaphor. “Mirror symbolizes being aware without imposing judgments on the contents of awareness. (It) simply reflects whatever comes before it, without judging or rejecting anything” (Cleary 1992, p. 175). If one is projecting, listening is impossible. And we cannot cultivate friendship without genuine and attentive listening. Communication and genuine interaction are also impossible because one cannot truly be there to participate. How can one be attentive if one is not really there but in one’s head? To live in thought is to live in a private world where no one can enter. The “time of revelation (and genuine communication) is when nothing is interposed; mind is naked, world is naked” (Cleary 1992, p. 181). Applying that to friendship means keeping open to everything—the cultivation of the relationship, the unfolding of a human mystery (your being and the other), and all the accompanying experiences, moods, emotions, realizations a relationship brings. Robert Linssen explains that “when our mind is filled when an idea to which it feels an attachment we find ourselves unable to respond completely to the requirements of a given moment” (Linssen 1958, p. 179). How many of us really look at things as they are without mixing them with our illusions, fears, insecurities, hidden agenda, selfish desires, expectations, motives, stubborn paradigms, pet theories, ideologies? Osho explains, An undercurrent of dreaming goes on—and that undercurrent goes on corrupting our vision…the dreaming mind continuously projects and distorts that which is. If you look at things with desire, you never look at a thing as it is. Your desire starts playing games with you. Then you cannot see the reality. Then your very desire creates a dream around the object. Then you start projecting—the other becomes a screen… You start coloring the object; then you don’t see that which is. (Osho 2003, pp. 112–113)

But the minute one wakes up, the dream ends. But in our daily lives, how many of us are still dreaming? How many of us are existential somnambulists, going through life asleep and constantly dreaming—daydreaming? Dreaming that we are in love, that we are loved, that we have love, that we are giving it, that we are receiving it; that we have genuine friends, that we are also genuine friends. But how many of us have genuine love and friendship instead of attachment? Unless there is genuine awareness,

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friendship and all other kinds of genuine relationships are not possible. Unless there is genuine awareness one also cannot respond. People will be enslaved by personal reactions that have colored and continue to color the actions and interactions. Only a man who is aware can act, not react. Action springs from awareness and freedom. Reaction arises from slavery, from manipulation. Osho explains that our whole life, we are surrounded by many relationships, which could be “a very subtle kind of psychological slavery. Either you enslave the other, or you become a slave yourself. (But) you cannot enslave somebody without becoming a slave yourself” (Osho 2004, p. 70). Osho elaborates that our transactions with other could either be one of two things. You can act in two ways—one is reaction, another is response. Reaction comes out of your past conditionings; it is mechanical. Response comes out of your presence, awareness, consciousness; It is not mechanical. And the ability to response is one of the greatest principles of growth. You are not following any order, any commandment; you are simply following your awareness. (Osho 2003, p. 11) Reaction … means you are acting unconsciously. Somebody is manipulating you. Somebody says something, does something, and you react. The real master of the situation is somebody else. Somebody comes and insults you and you react, you become angry. Somebody comes and praises you and you smile and you become happy. Both are the same. You are a slave and the other knows how to push your button. You are behaving like a machine. Act, don’t react. Don’t be a plaything in the hands of others. We react according to our surroundings. If you are awake, alert, conscious, no one can say what turn any situation will take. A thousand and one alternatives open for consciousness. Consciousness is total freedom—spontaneous, an act, totally in the present, not controlled by anybody else (including us, but) coming from one’s own being. (Osho 2004, p. 77)

With profound awareness comes freedom—freedom for yourself and freedom for the other to be him/herself, and unfold and reveal him/herself. “Awareness brings freedom” (Osho 2004, p. 82). “Awareness is the key” (Ibid, p. 80).

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11.3 Attachment Another crucial realization one must have is the difference between love and attachment. For Osho, attachment gives the appearance of love but the two are not the same. Nothing can be so poisonous as attachment. It kills love. Attachment is another word for possessiveness. Attachment is false love. Be aware which one you have! …a thing can be possessed easier than a person. Because a thing cannot rebel, cannot disobey, cannot go away without your permission, cannot fall in love with somebody else. ——————————————— This is the misery: if you want to possess, you kill. And the moment you have succeeded the whole glory is lost, because now the other cannot respond. The other can respond only in freedom, but you cannot allow freedom because you are not in love. Love can never be possessed; it is such a vital force, and such an infinite force. (Rajneesh 1975, p. 175; 177)

We must ask ourselves, therefore, if our happiness springs from genuine love that is voluntarily given, or are we satisfied only with the thought that we possess the other, that the other is exclusive to us? Do we only feel loved when the other yields to what we want, when we feel the other is under our control? Are we afraid the other may leave and we do all that is possible to avoid that from happening? Do we please the other because we desire his happiness or because we fear the other may be upset and leave? Rajneesh says, Love says: Dissolve into the other. Ego says: Possess the other. Let the other yield to you…. don’t allow the other to move in freedom… Love gives life to the other. Possessiveness/attachment kills the other, takes the life of the other. Lovers always kill each other—they are poisonous. They thought they were lovers and then they started killing each other. Now they are two dead persons, they have become imprisonment of each other… simply afraid and bored, scared of each other. They become spies on each other and they cut each other’s freedom. (Rajneesh 1975, pp. 173–175)

Is your relationship a dance or a wrestling—a wrestling of two egos just trying to indulge their own respective desires? But is also possible that both parties agree to settle for this kind of relationship, where the dynamics are based on attachment

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rather love and genuine friendship. They can have a relationship together for many years without experiencing genuine love or friendship. Yet they may think that they really are in an authentic relationship. In attachment there is much fear—fear of rejection (if the other is not yet yours), fear of the other leaving (if you think s/he is yours), fear of not possessing, fear of the other changing, fear of the other being seduced, fear of the other cultivating strong bonds also with others. We create prisons, the clinging, the protective walls, the doubts, the jealousy, the constant fighting. But two individuals can actually find satisfaction in this kind of set-up. They may believe that what they have is indeed a genuine loving relationship. At least they have the sense of security that they still have each other, are still friends with each other. Possessing and attachment can give that sense of security because that comes from the mind. When the mind thinks and believes it possesses, it is happy and content. Or the mind is simply lazy and resigns itself to what is familiar, to playing a role and conforming to stereotypes. In attachment, there is also guilt—the kind another person can use to get his/her way. Guilt is a way to enslave a person psychologically, to make him/her do something to please you. The Zen master Osho says, Never compel anybody to do something and never compel yourself to do something; let things happen, then existence will be doing them through you. (Osho 2003, p. 135)

To Zen, anyone who cannot say ‘No’ has no dignity. Anyone who says ‘yes’ only because s/he cannot say ‘No’, his/her ‘yes’ is meaningless. Attachment is after the ‘yes’ and desperate for it because only then is it assured it possesses. Love cares and protects your and the other’s dignity. Love does not force. Love cannot be forced. Only attachment will resort to such emotional blackmail. Attachment wants and demands proof. Love is a spontaneous phenomenon. You cannot manipulate it. If you manipulate (it becomes) artificial. Love is born only in freedom, because it is a spontaneous phenomenon. You cannot do anything about it. You cannot be trained for it. (Rajneesh 1975, p. 197; 202; 205)

In the beginning of a beautiful relationship, it is such a joy and thrill to talk, to be with each other. You cannot get enough of each other. If possible, you will not sleep anymore, just chat the hours away, enjoy each other’s company for as many hours as possible. When the intensity lessens, you become worried. You may panic. You may think: “Love has come. Is love slipping away or is it gone? I want it to remain!” And you do all sorts of things, sometimes hysterical, to keep it from dying/leaving. People can even compromise just to keep that loyalty from the other. And this is done because one is afraid to be alone.

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But love is a spontaneous phenomenon and experience. You cannot manipulate it to come, blackmail it to stay, or command it to leave. But when it happens, you can honor it, respect it, contribute to nourishing it, or try to run away from it, deny it. However just like any form of life, its growing or dying is not entirely in your hands. Otherwise man should have found a way to control it. Love and any loving relationship remain an inexhaustible mystery. There can be no hard and fast rules, no fixed formula, no fixed pattern. When loving emotions become less intense, does it automatically mean love is gone or slipping away? When one is criticized, corrected, admonished, could the relationship be in danger of dying? When the other does not take your side, does it mean one is being betrayed? Could it not also be possible that the relationship is now aching to evolve into something else? Perhaps the change is an invitation to evolve, to grow up, to experience love’s other faces and other dimensions. Perhaps the other is evolving and growing up, and you are stagnant or degenerating. Which one? There are no guarantees, no instruction manuals. One can only keep open, stay awake, allow freedom. “Know the ways of the mind” and how it thinks, clings, projects, panics, despairs… so as to understand love, friendship, and all other kinds of loving relationship! Attachment has conditions. “Love is surrender—unconditional, because even if there is even a single condition, then you are important, not the other” (Rajneesh 1975, p. 170). Or the other is important, not you! In genuine love, there is no conflict between you and the other. What hurts you, hurts the other. When the other suffers, you suffer. Furthermore, attachment also has expectations and demands, prefers pleasure and flattery to displeasure and insult. The mind that records no insult, no flattery, knows what love is. A mind that conforms to a pattern of pleasure, or what it thinks is love, can never know what love is. It can only happen when there are no longer all the things that are not love, like ambition, competition, wanting to become somebody. Know the ways of the mind, so as to understand the way of love. (Krishnamurti 1993, p. 5; 7; 14; 16)

Just like the Zen teacher Osho, the Indian philosopher, Krishnamurti echoes the realization that when the mind is no longer projecting itself, pursuing its particular sensations, demands, urges, hidden fears—only then is there a possibility of love” (Ibid, p. 28). So we must be concerned not with love, which comes into being spontaneously, without our particular seeking it, but we must be concerned with the things that are hindering love, with the things of the mind which project themselves and create a barrier. (Ibid)

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We must, therefore, be concerned with such profound level of awareness that is made possible only by silence. Jill Tweedie explains that the “inward journey of self-discovery must be taken by each individual in the course of a lifetime… because only by knowing ourselves and our necessities can we recognize another’s and love them. (In other words) …love (and friendship) cannot be found…before the self is found” (Tweedie 1979, p. 198). And one of the most important things to realize and accept about the self is one’s aloneness. After that, we must realize that such apparent autonomy may actually mean nothing unless he makes his self-acceptance, self-respect, integrity and the value placed on oneself as the new foundation for reaching out the others in a genuinely respectful way. Erich Fromm explains that respect means, The ability to see a person as he is, to be aware of his unique individuality. Respect means the concern that the other person should grow and unfold as he is… (it) implies the absence of exploitation… I want the other person to grow and unfold for his own sake and not for the purpose of serving me… (But) respect is possible only if I have achieved independence, if I can stand and walk without needing crutches, without having to dominate and exploit anyone else… (respect is) possible only when I can see… the other person in his own terms. (Fromm 1963, pp. 23–24)

11.4 On Sexual Attachment Sometimes friendship can become complicated when sexual attraction becomes part of the equation. It creates tension that was not present in a purely platonic relationship. Nonetheless, an undercurrent awareness of one’s aloneness must be maintained, if the relationship is to retain its beauty, depth, authenticity. To possess is to make one’s own. Of all the shades of love, this possession is the most common and the most human. Our senses must establish the reality of our beloved. We measure his reality with our eyes, our hands, our tongue. It is therefore that our longings become sexual. To enter into or be entered—this is an apprehension of the full dimension of the reality of the other. The lover must hope to enter or to engulf, to make the beloved forever a part of himself. (Richie 1982, p. 82)

Just like everything else in the world, humans can pervert things and make them ugly. Only humans have such capacity. Like love is made ugly by possessiveness and by using it to escape from aloneness. Sex is also made ugly by using it to manipulate or control the other, or used simply to satisfy oneself. The psychotherapist, Rollo May, says that there is …one element in the personality (which) usurps command and drives the person into disintegrative behavior. The erotic sexual urge, for example, pushes the person toward physical union with the partner, but it may, when it takes command of the total self, drive the person in

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many diverse directions and into all kinds of relationships without regard for the integration of himself (or) the self of his partner. (May 1969, p. 126)

We must, therefore, never forget, The other is eternally the other. We may sense this otherness, its authenticity, but we cannot become it, we cannot make it ours. And so we can only strive—strive to enter, strive to be entered. But one must also honor the doomed attempt that is being made. (Richie 1982, p. 82)

To honor it, one must be lost in the maze of desires. For Krishnamurti, when the mind becomes more and more possessive, more and more depending, it creates a pattern in which it gets caught… and so it destroys that very perfume of life, which is love (Krishnamurti 1993, p. 20). “If your love is just a means to something else and not the end, then it can be a game, but it cannot become a really meaningful existence that you play” (Rajneesh 1975, p. 204). Many people want love, desire love yet are not ready for it. What they really want is to control or be controlled, to possess or be possessed, depending on their hang-up. To Zen, the paradox and the irony is, only when one is ready to be alone is one ready for love. Only when one has accepted and embraced aloneness is one ready for love. You are alone in your deepest being…and once you know it…. once you accept your total loneliness, you are liberated, then there is no attachment— love can flow! —————————————————— At the very core innermost being, you are alone. When you have accepted it… now you can love without any condition. Now you can love without becoming dependent, or without making anybody dependent on you. Now love can be freedom. Only that love which gives you more freedom will never turn into hate. (Rajneesh 1975, pp. 157–158)

To summarize, we must ask ourselves: Are we aware of our profound aloneness—that we are and will always be utterly alone? Have we accepted and embraced aloneness, or are we trying to escape from it? Are we aware of our needs, hang-ups, desires, dreams, and ambitions? Are we aware how some of them could be hindering the spontaneous experience of love/loving? Are we aware how they influence our pursuit of love and of getting into a relationship? If we are in a relationship, are we aware if it is indeed love and not simply attachment? Attachment limits. Love expands. Attachment kills you and/or the other. Love encourages growth and rejoices in it. Be aware of your aloneness. In your aloneness, be aware!

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References Cleary, T. (Trans. and Ed.). (1992). The mind of Dogen Zenji. Cambridge, MA: Shambala Publications, Inc. Fromm, E. (1963). The art of loving. New York: Bantam Books Inc. Fromm, E. (1965). The Sane society. New York: Fawcett World Library. Krishnamurti, J. (1993). On love and loneliness. New York: HarperCollins. Linssen, Robert. (1958). Living Zen. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. May, R. (1969). Love and will. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc. Osho. (2003). Tarot in the spirit of Zen: The game of life. New York: St. Martin’s. Osho. (2004). Freedom: The courage to be yourself. New York: Martin’s Griffin. Rajneesh, S. B. (1975). No water, no moon: Talks on Zen stories. Oregon: Rajneesh Foundation International. Richie, D. (1982). Zen inklings. Tokyo: John Weatherhill Inc. Tweedie, J. (1979). In the name of love. London: Granada Publishing Limited.

Laureen L. Velasco is a graduate of De La Salle University-Manila, where she is currently an assistant professor in the Philosophy Department. She has done research on Japanese philosophy, religion, and culture at Waseda University, and Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan. She was a recipient of Monbusho research scholarship, and a Japan Foundation research fellowship.

Chapter 12

Romantic Love as a Love Story Jerd Bandasak

Abstract I will discuss in this chapter the philosophical concept of romantic love. I argue that the narrative theory can contribute to a more complete understanding of romantic love. Since romantic love is a dynamic relationship, we can understand it as a story that may have different beginnings and ends. How a love story varies is dependent on changes of the self and perspectives in life, which comprise a narrative identity. The chapter consists of following sections: (1) Philosophical Debates on the Concept of Romantic Love. In this section, I argue that conceptual analysis is inadequate and unnecessary as an explanation of romantic relationship. (2) Romantic Relationship. Here I discuss some of the issues and complexities arising from being in a romantic relationship. I will also show that romantic relationship is different from other kinds of relationships. (3) Love Story. I will discuss in this section how a romantic relationship can be explained in a narrative theory. By ‘narrative theory,’ I mean, essentially speaking, emplotment, i.e., an understanding events as narrative. Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity has some aspects that enable lovers to understand each other in their love story. (4) Conclusion. Here I will conclude and answer some possible objections. Keywords Romantic love · Story · Emplotment · Narrative · Relationships

12.1 Philosophical Debates on the Concept of Romantic Love Love is a complicated emotion, because we express love in different occasions and different forms of relationship. Love among friends, parents and love between lovers are very different. And also love has a different meaning that varies from culture to culture. Western countries typically associate love with happiness, but some eastern countries, such as China and Indonesia, associate love rather with yearning or sadness (Karandashev 2017). What is problematic, however and stands in need of a conceptual J. Bandasak (B) Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_12

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analysis is romantic love. Halwani (2010) argues that romantic love is distinguished from other kinds of love by having three characteristics, namely constancy, exclusivity, and uniqueness. He also argues that these features are unnecessary to understand romantic love. Moreover, he proposes his properties-based view, which is a kind of reason-based view—loving someone is a rational decision based on an evaluation on person’s different properties. Then, I will show that Halwani’s conceptual analysis view is inadequate to explain romantic love. Love as an Emotion Halwani argues that the first common explanation of love is emotion. He accepts that love is about an emotion, which means it has intentionality, the intentional state of mind toward its object. But he also says that emotion cannot explain love comprehensively. First of all, intentionality of emotion is caused by beliefs; for example, Anne loves Brandon because he is very kind to her. Anne’s love is about her belief about Brandon. But even if the belief has changed the lovers can still be in love. When Brandon sometimes is not being kind to Anne, it doesn’t mean that Anne will stop loving him. Another argument against emotion as an explanatory concept of love is that romantic love consists of two stages: falling in love and being in love (Halwani 2010, p. 17). These two stages are different in the intensity and depth of the emotion. We could say that they are different kind of feelings; here I mean the phenomenological feeling of emotion. Falling in love may have an intensity and excitement, but as the lovers keep their relationship the intensity and excitement may subside but their love nonetheless becomes deeper and more secure. Thus, the Emotion Theory of Love is problematic because it is unnecessary to explain love conceptually; this is because emotion can lose its feelings over time. Furthermore, there are stages of romantic love which change the aspects of love. So, emotion theory doesn’t pass the constancy requirement. Love as a Union According to Robert Nozick’s theory, love is the desire to form a we between lovers (Nozick 1989). Two major problems with this view are that the well-being of lovers are tied-up and that each lover has a limited autonomy. The first problem is about seeing lovers as one and the same entity. When something happens to a lover, either good or bad, the other lover will be in the same situation. This is problematic, however, because when something happens to someone it doesn’t necessarily happen in the same way to her lover. For example, when Brandon is promoted, he is very happy to tell Anne and he wants Anne to know first and share his happiness. This does not necessarily mean that Anne will be happy because their collective well-being is being promoted. Instead, Anne is happy because her lover is happy. It is very common for lovers to be there for each other, although they are not the same as each other. Another problem concerns the limited autonomy of each of the lovers. Since the we in the lovers is being together, it is like giving up being an individual (Helm 2017). One of Halwani’s objections to the Union Theory is that limited autonomy may not be the feature of the we that the lovers would like to have when they join their beings together. Rather it is a downside, or the price that the lovers pay for being

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in love (Halwani 2010 p. 36). This means that being a we together is not necessarily a thing that lovers desire. Love as Robust Concerns Loving someone involves having concerns for the beloved person’s well-being and happiness. But the problem is that the lover can be overprotected and that someone may overthink of her beloved, and it would thus not be different from parental love. Halwani mentions that one problem of robust concerns is the problem of sacrifice (Halwani 2010, p. 46). The problem of sacrifice results from disagreements between the lovers. When a lover has some different interests or a different lifestyle from the other, if they cannot reconcile with each other the option is for someone to tolerate it or else the relationship may have to be given up. If Brandon really love self-destructive habits like heavy drinking, heavy smoking, and speed driving, but he really loves Anne, then either one of them have to give up their preference for the other. And the reason to love a particular person, in this theory, is to have concerns for her happiness and well-being. This may look like love, but it seems rather selfish to have concerns only for a particular person. Love as Values Halwani discusses the value theory of love within the context of rational love. The reason-based view of love is related to the properties view of love. It is about loving someone for specific properties, like being humorous, witty, or kind. But the reasonbase view faces the problem of arbitrariness because anyone can have such properties. The values view may try to defend the reason to love by saying that loving means to bestow values on a particular person. Halwani still finds it unsatisfactory at the conceptual level (Halwani 2010, p. 76). This is because the value theory may secure constancy of love over a period of time: lovers love each other as long as they value each other. It is also exclusive because it is only the beloved one that has such value. And it is unique because it is only the beloved one that is special. But on the logical and conceptual ground the theory still needs to explain why one values the beloved rather than another especially when the other one does have the same properties. When we are in love, there are some properties in the person that we love. Loving someone may sometimes mean that one turns blind eyes on something she does not like. But loving someone is different from loving all of the properties that the beloved possesses. The difference is that loving someone as a person is to love who she really is, and not to love every single property comprising her, or to love everything about her (Halwani 2010, p. 82). In roughly the same vein, Ulrika Carlsson addresses the fungibility problem against rational-based view (Carlsson 2018), and this is to answer the problem of uniqueness in a different way. Carlsson argues that if we think of love as valuing some set of quality of beloved one, then it will face the fungibility problem—which quality is one that can be repeated and whether the same quality in one person may also be found in another. If someone has the same quality as the beloved person, then should the first one be loved equally? Carlsson discusses the concept of love in two aspects. Firstly, love is not rational because the valued quality is insufficient

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to cause a reflexive judgement of love (Carlsson 2018, p. 1400). Some quality may cause only an attraction but not love, like being smart, kind, having a good sense of humor, or caring. Secondly, the presupposition that quality appraisal is rooted in a folk metaphysics about seeing someone as bundles of quality is rejected (Carlsson 2018, p. 1405). Carlsson proposes that a solution to the fungibility problem is that love is to be imbued with reverence. It is seeing the beloved as a unique quality, not as a type of quality, and it is considering someone as a whole unique person, not as a bundle of qualities. When a person is unique, the problem about loving another person having the same set of qualities disappears because everyone is considered as a unique individual. Both Carlsson and Halwani, then, have some things in common: Both try to answer the question why we love a particular person. Halwani tries to give a rational account, so he introduces the idea of combination of properties. Carlsson, on the contrary, tries to give an account of a unique and irreducible person. I will argue, however, that both Halwani’s and Carlsson’s accounts are not tenable as a means fully to understand romantic love. Both try to give conceptual analyses of the idea of romantic love. But I think that giving a conceptual account is too complex and too distant from the practical aspects of romantic love. I will proceed with my argument on two main points. Firstly, I will discuss one-sided love, and then I will try to show that conceptual analysis does not work, because love has no exact beginning. As for one-sided love, there are differences between infatuation and love. Infatuation is a type of mistaken belief and unreciprocated feelings about a person. Infatuation, moreover, is not-succeeded relationship (Halwani 2010, p. 27). I think it is a different kind. Think of a case of a possible romantic love between friends. It may not develop to become a relationship of lovers if one sees the other as a mere friend. It is not a mistaken understanding that is at issue. Suppose Carl is a longtime friend of Anne. He loves Anne as much as Brandon does. Anne, on the contrary, loves Brandon but still remains a friend to Carl. I think Carl’s love and Brandon’s love are not of the same quality, because even though they love the same woman, only Brandon’s is truly qualified as romantic love because he is in a relationship with Anne. Being in a relationship is also different from being reciprocal; in a relationship reciprocation between lovers may be asymmetric. Brandon could be more concerned about Anne’s happiness than Anne’s concern for him. Thus, either the reason-based or the irreducible view of the person cannot give an account of a practical situation in love; they are both insufficient in helping us understand the nature of love. The reason is that lovers in a romantic relationship depend on each other’s mutual agreement to see the other as lover. I will explain further in next section. Love has no exact beginning, and how it ends can vary; love can only be recognized retrospectively, and the evaluation of love is only possible in a relationship. The conceptual analysis views described above try to pinpoint what love is. But I think that they are unsuccessful because in real life we only understand love retrospectively. Either love is reciprocated or not. No one can really tell when he or she begins to love someone. An action in itself doesn’t mean an act of love, especially romantic action. Friends may have an act of promoting one’s well-being, being there for someone, but that doesn’t mean it is romantic. Love is a kind of justification of how someone sees

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the other romantically. The retrospective evaluation of love, thus, shows that it has no exact moment when it begun. Conceptual analysis only helps to makes sure that it is really love or not, but it is only a kind of conceptual qualification. Love takes some time to fall into, time to grows, and time even to get out of. Being in love is a dynamic situation. Admiring someone a lot could develop into either romantic love or friendship. It has the same beginning but different ending. Even the end of love between lovers is still different from one pair of lovers to another: They could become friends, enemies, or the love could even become one-sided. Hence, the conceptual analysis views cannot capture how love is going on in our lives. Another kind of explanation of love does not involve giving a conceptual account at all. Richard Hamilton says that love is not a vague concept, which means that it may not have one precise explanation to say what it really is, or that there is not only one understanding of love. Love as a contested concept means that it may have a commonality between the ones who use the language of love in a way that shows some kind of family resemblance (Hamilton 2006). Though I have argued above that conceptual analysis on the whole may not be tenable, this does not imply that I am giving up on the conceptual understanding of love altogether. On the contrary, I will try to show that there is a way to explain the whole scenario of love. Lovers can fall in love and remain lovers without having to think about it conceptually. I will also show that my kind of conceptual account can answer the problem of uniqueness and irreplaceability in the next section.

12.2 Romantic Relationships Halwani argues that romantic love does not necessarily presuppose reciprocation and relationship. This is because love and relationship are different. One can love someone while being in a relationship with another (Halwani 2010, p. 52). I think, however, that this argument against the exclusivity of love is not valid. Firstly, romantic love’s exclusivity doesn’t mean that love is always for only one person; for instance, there are cases of polyamory. Secondly, loving and being in a relationship are inseparable—I will argue this point further in this section. As for reciprocation, Halwani says that it is conceptually unnecessary for love. However, I have already shown in the last section that love in a relationship can make a difference of quality, as in one-sided love and love in a relationship as I mentioned above. In this section, I will show that a relationship is important to a more complete understanding of romantic love. I will discuss romantic love as a kind of relationship by discussing voluntary relationships and being oneself. Many Kinds of Relationship Relationships come in many kinds. It does not necessarily mean that every relationship is a romantic relationship. Parental love and friendship are also relationships of love. Exclusivity is a feature that is unique to romantic love; parents can love many children and a friend can love many friends. However, I agree with Halwani that

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exclusivity fails to show that romantic love is different from the other kinds of love. It only shows that there is a limited number to the person whom one loves (Halwani 2010, p. 52). Fundamentally, a relationship refers to the state of a relation. Friendship and parental love describe how love does occur in a relationship. Romantic love, for one thing, is a voluntary relationship. Parental love or love among relatives and family members are given to us. Of course, some couple may plan to have children. But the object of love, the children, is the person who is born and raised. Parents are not in a relationship to their child in the same way as in a romantic love, which is characterized as an interaction between persons. Friendship is a semi-voluntary relationship. Becoming someone’s friend is for the two persons to get to know each other over a period of time. But the beginning of a friendship is not voluntary. No one really knows who will become one’s friends or not. In fact, we can only count who is our friend retrospectively or only on certain situations, such as when the friends undergo hardship which is understood to be a test of true friends. Thus, one thing that can single out romantic love from the other kinds of love is that romantic love is voluntary. When we love someone romantically, we want to be in his or her life. We want to relate to them as much as possible. Then, reciprocation acts as a marker that shows the difference between one-sided love and love in a relationship. In the latter, the love is reciprocated. Another point that marks the difference between friendship and romantic relationship is being oneself. Every healthy relationship involves getting to know each other. As parental love is involuntary, the parents do not choose who their children are going to be. As for the child, it is not necessary to know the character of her parents as a person. A child can always love their parents regardless of the type of person of their parents are. In a friendship, we do not choose who our friends will be. No one would expect that anybody whom we meet will be our friend; they only become our friend afterwards. We continue the friendship as long as they are still our friends. Friends and lovers have something in common: they don’t require the lover or the friend to be the same person in every aspect. But close friends require some more things in common, such as common interests, life background, education, or work. Lovers don’t require anything. The only thing that matters is how they met and how they fell in love. What lovers have in common is more profound than what friends have in common. Even with different education, background, work and lifestyle, what makes lovers keep the relationship with each other is that they share a common worldview and perspective toward life. That is why they decided to live together against many different factors. Worldviews and perspectives toward life are very personal. Not everyone shares their thoughts about the world as well as many other things with others. Close friends only can share some aspects of each other’s life. Thus, lovers’ relationship is the kind of relationship where one can totally be oneself. It is where one can share many thoughts and emotion with one’s lover. It is a kind of relationship that I have with someone whom I love for who she really is, and a kind of relationship that she has, where she loves me for who I really am. This means that I love my lover for the person she is, and not for the total of her qualities.

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Relationship Agreements Voluntariness and being oneself are the only properties that make romantic relationship different from the other types of love. There is still an issue of how romantic love and relationship are inseparable. As we have seen, romantic relationship is voluntary. We choose whom to love, but it will not be love until we are in a relationship with the one we love. We have to be related to our beloved in some way. If I really love a famous artist or a celebrity, I could do research on everything about her. Suppose that everything published about her is true, then can I say that my love for the famous person is romantic? Here I love, presumably, all the properties that belong to her, but it does not seem to be the case that there is love. It is more like an obsession or infatuation rather than love. One thing that can make a difference in this case is that she doesn’t know me as a person. I am just a fan to her. So, my relationship with her is not a lover’s relationship. If I have known someone personally for a long time, for example I know my neighbor very well, and she knows me the same way, it may not be romantic love either. We might not even be friends. This shows that being in romantic love has to be evaluated as to the kind of relationship it actually is. The evaluation of the relationship is a judgment about the whole relationship since the beginning. We never have an agreement with our friends in the beginning of the friendship that from now on we will continue treat each other as a friend, and we need not agree explicitly with the friend that the relationship with him or her is really a friendship. On the contrary, lovers have to make an explicit agreement about what kind of relationship they are going to be in. If Carl confesses his love to Anne, but Anne kindly rejects his love, she might still want to keep Carl as a friend. The relationship between the two can never be that of lovers when compared to the relationship between Anne and Brandon. Even if Carl and Brandon love Anne as a person she really is, Carl’s love and Brandon’s love are different because of the relationship they are in. The most important feature that makes a difference is how Anne views herself in each relationship; even when she is comfortably herself both with Carl and Brandon, Anne sees herself as a lover only with regards to Brandon. Another example might make all this clearer. Suppose Brandon has met a colleague Diana. The more they get to know each other, the more they develop their relationship as lovers. Brandon is already in a relationship with Anne, but he doesn’t want to break up with her. Diana totally understands that Brandon is already in a relationship, and she doesn’t want to hurt Anne’s feeling. She then makes an agreement with Brandon that they will keep their love a secret rather than dissolve it to only friendship. Can we then call Brandon and Diana lovers? Of course, Brandon can love Diana without asking for Anne’s permission. This could be more complicated since it seems to show that one can love more than one person, genuinely as a person. I will elaborate on this topic later on in the next section. In any case, these examples show that romantic love is inseparable from relationship. It has to be acknowledged by the person in the relationship, and there is also a need for both to agree mutually that they will see themselves together as lovers.

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Uncertainty of Relationship Another aspect of romantic love which makes it very problematic is uncertainty. Halwani says that romantic love has two stages, falling in love and being in love. The difference is the depth of emotion in the relationship. Being in a romantic relationship is to share world views and being oneself together over time. The development of the self between the lovers through time is the development of stages of love. In fact, no lovers can guarantee that their love will last; they cannot even guarantee that there will be a development from falling in love to being in love. Even when lovers try to analyze their love conceptually, it doesn’t help to keep their love so that it lasts longer. The uncertainty of romantic relationship occurs throughout the relationship, but it has different forms. Firstly, there is the uncertainty of confession. Love is an emotion that needs to be confessed. Unlike other emotions, one has to manifest or declare one’s love to the other. Since confession of love leads to being in a relationship as a lover, if the confession is rejected, then the love will become one-side. Falling in love also has its uncertainty, because falling in love is only the beginning of the relationship. If the lovers cannot get along, their love will not reach the state of being in love. Even lovers being in relationship for a long time doesn’t guarantee that their love will last till death separates them. So, uncertainty in a relationship is an explanation why genuine love needs constancy. As I mentioned earlier, love has many different beginnings and ends. The uncertainty usually happens on any occasion of life. We always anticipate things to happen in life, but the uncertainty of romantic love happens because we expect our beloved to be in the same kind of relationship as ours and we need this relationship last as long as possible.

12.3 Love Story I have argued above that love is a kind of relationship. However, I have not proposed what romantic love really is. In this section, I will argue that we can understand love as a story, a kind of story that happens in our lives. Love may begin and end differently in someone’s life, but it is the same kind of story, a love story. Dynamics of Relationship We have seen in the last section that relationships depend on being voluntary. How a relationship will last depends on many factors. That is why uncertainty in romantic love is crucial, because we choose it by ourselves and hope that it will last. However, the stages of a relationship also show that love is usually not the same one from the beginning. A relationship through time could either increase in depth or be dissolved altogether at the end. If a relationship has a dynamic element, then narrative identity is a proper account to explain romantic relationships. Narrative emplotment thus can help us identify love in romantic relationship as a love story.

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Narrative theory comes from Paul Ricoeur’s thought on personal identity; the idea is characterized by the view that the identity of person is understood as identity of character in the story (Ricoeur 1995). By ‘character’ Ricoeur means a set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being one and the same (Ricoeur 1995, p. 119), and being the agent who acts and suffers in the story (Ricoeur 1995, p. 145). A narrative arises from an understanding of connectedness of events and an attempt to organize the events in life together as well as an understanding of its discordances and concordances (Ricoeur 1995, p. 141). Ricoeur’s narrative theory can help us understand the identity through time and can explain the construction of self as the result of a narrative understanding which comes from an arrangement of events (Ricoeur 1995 p. 166). Ricoeur’s narrative identity, then, is a kind of understanding of ourselves. On one hand it helps us understand ourselves as a character in the story of life; on the other hand, it is an evaluation of ourselves as we live through the story of our life. Narrative theory helps a lot to understand relationships, especially romantic relationships. As mentioned above, we only know that we love someone retrospectively, and we try to be in the relationship with someone we love at any extent. The emplotment is the way we see ourselves from the moment when we know we fall in love. How we try to keep the relationship and how we deal with its uncertainties is the plot of story. Love story may start at any moment in our life and may end at any time, because everyone has her own story to live in. The narrative theory also has a contribution to make in our understanding of the dynamics of relationship. This comes in two aspects, namely the development of the self and the history of the relationship. Both features help us understand and evaluate our love story. The Development of the Self I mentioned earlier that being in a romantic relationship involves being one’s true self to one’s lover. Romantic relationships are different from the others because we want to be our actual self for our lover; we want to be acknowledged for our feeling and for who we really are. The narrative theory not only helps us understand ourselves, but it also helps us understand the lovers in a relationship. We identify ourselves as lovers as long as we are in the relationship. From the moment they fall in love with each other, lovers know each other more and more over time. All the bad habits or negative aspects of the lovers become exposed in the relationship. The lover may somehow be the same person, but he or she may not be the same lover throughout the relationship. Falling in love is the first stage of a relationship, which is like the first episode of a story. When they have been in the relationship for a while there is naturally an evaluation of the relationship. If they want to keep the relationship the negative personality has to be either adjusted or tolerated. Then, the evaluation is an evaluation of the whole story since the beginning of the relationship. There are many things happening in life that can change, including the self. Teenage lovers may not end up as a married couple down the road because when they grow up, their selves will have changed. All these changes of the self are the reason why a love story can come to an end.

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The History of the Relationship When we see a relationship as a story, there is then an explanation of the depth and quality of love. The history depends on the events within the relationship. Some couples may agree to be in a relationship and they eventually get married. If they do not know each other very well, they might decide keep the relationship going and tolerate all the negative qualities that are present. However, in this case there is no depth of love because their selves do not interact with each other and there is then no more plot in their story. This does not mean romantic relationships have to be very dramatic. The depth of the relationship depends on how the lovers see each other through the relationship, how their selves evolve through the changes, and how they maintain the quality of their relationship. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev and Luke Brunning say that emotional complexity in love has three aspects. This could explain why quality of love depends on depth and complexity. The first aspect is emotional diversity. This can be seen when lovers have an attitude toward their beloved person in various aspects. Romantic diversity has two senses. One is holistic diversity. This is very important to romantic love because being one person has many personalities; the profound romantic love is seeing someone as one with diverse personalities but still seeing her as a whole person. The other sense is type diversity: As one person can direct his love to various individual (Ben-Ze’ev and Brunning 2018, p. 99). This kind of diversity tries to explain that polyamory may also count as a profound romantic love. The second aspect of emotional complexity in love is emotional ambivalence. This is an evaluative sense of emotional complexity. It is the evaluation of positive and negative value of the same object of person altogether. And it is a capacity of human to hold multiple perspectives on a lover at the same time, both positive and negative (Ben-Ze’ev and Brunning 2018, p. 101). This can explain why lovers can tolerate each other’s bad habits or some negative personality. The third aspect is behavioral complexity. In a relationship, behavioral interaction between lovers is needed. Those emotional complexities mentioned above, in themselves, cannot lead to romantic action of lovers. Behavioral complexity generates consistency of action in a relationship. Consistency is an intellectual demand whose value is not clear in attitudes, which are generated by changes and are more sensitive to contextual factors (Ben-Ze’ev and Brunning 2018, p. 101). Emotional complexity is interesting, but it could be understood only in a love story. How we evaluate and understand the whole relationship and even propertiesbased love that Halwani proposes also needs a story so that changes in the characters are comprehensible. So, the depth of love and constancy of love depend on how lovers keep their story going. Even if it ends at some point or some time in their life, they can count on such story as a love story. And what Benzeev and Bruning have discussed cannot explain how love changes in life. How love contains changes is familiar in life. Someone can have many romantic relationships, and all of them may be qualified as being romantic because of its depth and complexity. How is this possible? In respect of the narrative theory, love may change many times throughout life because our lives are changed by many factors.

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When someone has grown up their perspective on life will have changed. Then, their self has changed and the self in such romantic story may not be the same. My point is that, despite the number of love stories in life, the ones that have ended may have the same depth and complexity as the one currently on going. If a story in someone’s life has already ended, and no more romantic story ever happens again in her life, then that story will be the only love story in her life. As every story is unique, each one depends on the nature of the relationship between lovers in within that story.

12.4 Conclusion My argument is that romantic love is a love story. It is the story between persons who form a romantic relationship together. The narrative theory identifies the person and self through changes. Romantic love as love story has three advantages. First, it makes evaluation more comprehensible because we can identify when love occurs in the story. Secondly, the theory can explain the changes in the self in the story, which contributes to why the relationship is uncertain. Thirdly, when love does not last, it does not mean it has lost complexity and depth. Maybe it is only the self of one lover that has changed. There are some remarks on about loving more than one person romantically. BenZe’ev and Brunning argue that polyamory is possible if it has depth and complexity (Ben-Ze’ev and Brunning 2018). Nonetheless, I think loving more than one person is possible only if the loves have different qualities. According to the story of Brandon and Diana alluded to above, even if Anne accepts Diana as another lover of Brandon, this does not mean theirs become the same love story. The differences between Anne and Diana means that their stories are not going to be the same. Diana met Brandon later, so the character of Brandon in Anne’s story is something that Diana can never share. Thus, what identifies romantic love is the history of the relationship, which is a narrative element. As for the reciprocation, a love story does not require that love be reciprocated in a relationship. One can love another person more than the other person loves him back, but even if that is the case, the two persons still have to be in some form of a relationship together. One-sided love is still a kind of relationship. It could be counted as a love story as it happens in one’s life. But it is not a healthy relationship because it lacks mutual agreements to form a love story together.

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References Ben-Ze’ev, A., & Brunning, L. (2018). How complex is your love? The case of romantic compromises and polyamory. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 48(1), 98–116. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/jtsb.12156. Carlsson, U. (2018). The folk metaphysics of love. European Journal of Philosophy, 26(4), 1398– 1409. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12398. Halwani, R. (2010). Philosophy of love, sex, and marriage: An introduction. Abingdon: Routledge. Hamilton, R. P. (2006). Love as a contested concept. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 36(3), 239–254. Helm, B. (2017). Love. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/love/. Karandashev, V. (2017). Romantic love in cultural contexts. Switzerland: Springer. Nozick, R. (1989). Love’s bond. In The examined life: Philosophical meditations (pp. 68–86). New York: Simon & Schuster. Ricoeur, P. (1995). Oneself as another (K. Blamey, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jerd Bandasak graduated with a Ph.D. in philosophy from Chulalongkorn University. He is working as a lecturer at Nakhonsawan Rajabhat University. He interested in philosophy of technology, philosophy of information, ethic issues in technology, philosophy of mind and issues on meaning of life.

Chapter 13

For a Moment or for Eternity: A Metaphysics of Perduring Lovers Jeremiah Joven Joaquin and Hazel T. Biana

To the beloved whose soul I love as my own.

Abstract This paper develops a philosophical account of the relata of romantic love, the nature of the objects in a love-relation. This account holds that the lover who loves and the beloved who is loved are particular people who persist through time by having temporal parts. We show how such a perdurantist account could provide models of different kinds of romantic love: from the love of transitory lovers to the love of immortal beings; from the love of lifelong companions to the love of soulmates. Finally, two possible issues raised against this view will also be addressed. Keywords Perduring lovers · Romantic love · Transitory lovers · Soulmates · Eternal lovers

13.1 Introduction We all have heard of professions of eternal love from the lover to the beloved through romantic stories, fictional or otherwise. The stories of Psyche and Cupid, Paris and Helen, Abelard and Heloise, Romeo and Juliet, and Tristan and Isolde, are prime examples of these. Some of us may also know of the intense and real-life romantic relationships of Bertrand Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell, of Virginia Woolf and Vita Sackville-West, of Oscar Wilde and Lord Alfred Douglas, and of Walt Whitman and Peter Doyle. These narratives not only exemplify idealized romantic love, but also a kind of love that poets could only dream of and write about. They make the notion of true love intuitive and easy to grasp, or even achievable.

J. J. Joaquin (B) · H. T. Biana De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] H. T. Biana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_13

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Though we do have some understanding of what romantic love is through these narratives, we could still ask deep philosophical questions about its very nature.1 In particular, we could ask about the relata of love or the nature of the objects bonded by a love relation. For instance, when couples declare their love to each other, and promise to love one another for the rest of their lives, or utter things like, ‘I will love you for the rest of my life’ and ‘Till death do us part’, what does that fundamentally mean? Who is this ‘I’ declaring the promise of love? Who is this ‘you’ receiving it? Who is this ‘us’ that would only part in death? What is their identity and nature? In this paper, we explore a perdurantist account that answers these questions. This metaphysical account implies that the lover who loves and the beloved who is loved are particular perduring people who persist through time by having temporal parts. Furthermore, a lover loves a beloved when all or some of his or her temporal parts are in an intense desire-relation to all or some of his or her beloved’s temporal parts. We argue that given this perdurantist account, we could model different kinds of romantic love, such as the love of transitory lovers, the love of lifelong companions, and the love of soulmates, among others. Finally, we consider and reply to two possible worries that can be raised against this account.

13.2 The Question About the Relata of Love Before getting deeper into the perdurantist account, let us first make more precise the question about the relata of the love relation. This question belongs to a wider class of questions in the philosophy of romantic love. Most work done on the subject mainly focuses on its nature. They seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish it from other positive emotions and attitudes, such as liking or infatuation. Furthermore, such conditions aim to distinguish romantic love from other kinds of love, like the love that one has for a relative or a friend (Helm 2017). Some philosophers, like Berenson (1993) and Bagley (2015), have argued that what distinguishes love from other emotional states is that it is ‘paradigmatically directed towards one, very particular object.’ Thus, one may like many different things at the same time, but he or she could only love one particular thing deeply. Others, like Nozick (1989) and Scruton (2006), have insisted that romantic love implies that the lover desires to form a ‘we’ with a beloved; a ‘we’ is the union of lovers and serves as a reciprocated bond between them. It insinuates that the lovers are profoundly concerned with each other’s sorrows, joys, and desires’ as if they are their very own. Contra this union, ‘we’ view, philosophers like Frankfurt (1999) have maintained that the key feature of romantic love is the overwhelming concern that the lover has for his or her beloved’s own sake. It is an individualistic robust concern of the lover for the beloved and the beloved’s welfare; a concern that is not grounded on 1 Throughout

this paper, we use ‘romantic love’ and ‘love’ interchangeably and as synonyms for ‘erotic love’ or ‘sexual love’.

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a conception of an entity, ‘we’. The lover’s concern is just for the beloved and not directed towards a ‘we’ which goes beyond the lovers themselves. With regard to the nature of love, some philosophers, like Velleman (1999) and Singer (2009), think that love is a kind of valuing. Singer claims that in order for love to be love, it must have two jointly sufficient characteristics such as appraisal and bestowal. To appraise is to discover the value of the beloved and to bestow is to create a new kind of value based on the supposed love relation. Another view on the nature of love is that it is a willful act. bell hooks (2000), for example, suggests that love is an action, it is an act of the will. Loving another is deciding, judging, and promising to love. Love should be approached with will and intentionality. The choice is made and there is an intention to keep choosing to love the beloved. Feelings cannot be the basis of the promise of love as feelings are fleeting. The foundation for the choice and intention to love is the acknowledgement of the lover’s reality. The lover must first be aware of his or her true self. Loving then is choosing to nurture both the lover and beloved’s growth physically, spiritually, and emotionally. Whatever the final verdict of the nature of romantic love is, the question about the relata of such a relation remains. Even if we could somehow have an account of what love ultimately is, the question about the nature of the objects related by it would still be left unanswered. Although there are a few exceptions, this relata question is somewhat left out in the discussions in the philosophy of love. And this is precisely why we raise it. The question about the relata of love is a metaphysical question about the identity and nature of the objects that are in a love-relation. Suppose that Bunny and Hunny are romantically in love, the relata question asks, what are Bunny and Hunny? What sort of things are they? What sort of identity do they have? Are they mental entities? Are they embodied entities? Are they spatio-temporally extended? Compare the metaphysics of love with the metaphysics of causation. Philosophers working in the metaphysics of causation are concerned with two broad questions, viz. the nature of causation itself and the nature of the objects which are causally related. Some philosophers answer the first question in terms of a regularity theory according to which A caused B just in case three conditions obtain: A is temporally prior B, they are spatially contiguous, and whenever A occurs, B occurs. Others offer a counterfactual theory according to which A caused B just in case had A not occurred, B would not have occurred. Whatever the correct answer to this question might be, it still does not tell us what A and B are. And this again is the relata question. What sort of things are A and B? What sort of identity do they have? Some claim that they are events; others that they are facts; still others that they are objects (in a very narrow sense of the word). Are these things finely individuated? Are they spatio-temporal?2 Yet again, whatever the right answers to these questions might be, they would not only tell us the nature of the objects in a causal relation, they would also inform the answer to the substantive issue about the nature of causation itself. By the same line 2 For

a discussion of these issues, see (Schaffer 2016) and (Garrett 2011, pp. 77–89).

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of reasoning, whatever the right answer to the relata question of romantic love might be, it would inform the answer to what the nature of romantic love itself ultimately is.

13.3 Perduring Lovers as Particular People So, what are the relata of romantic love? What sort of things does this kind of love relate? We submit that they are perduring lovers, particular people who persist through time by having temporal parts. When we talk about lovers, we ordinarily talk about two particular people in a romantic relationship: the lover and the beloved. The lover offers love; the beloved receives love. We take the lovers as people inasmuch as they at least have the mental capacity to desire to love and desire to be loved. The lover desires to love the beloved; the beloved desires to be loved by the lover. In this sense, the capacity to desire is a necessary property of both the lover and the beloved. This basic requirement of desire is shared by Nozick (1989), Frankfurt (1999), Scruton (2006), Bagley (2015), Berenson (1991), hooks (2000), Taylor (1975/1976), Jenkins (2017). Having this capacity, however, does not necessarily imply that the lovers are concrete, embodied people. Surely, it is possible for them to be purely fictional entities. From the stories we read about Romeo and Juliet, Cupid and Psyche, we do know that they desire to love and be loved; to be in each other’s arms, to cherish every moment with each other. But they are mere fictional entities. As far as we know, there is no real Romeo, no Juliet, no Cupid, and no Psyche. But Romeo loves Juliet; Cupid loves Psyche. Thus, lovers need not be embodied, concrete people. Yet, even if being embodied is not a necessary property of lovers, the desires of actual, real-life lovers do have some physical grounding. Real lovers desire one another. The desire to love and be loved may initially start in some physical attraction. When the lovers first meet, the initial spark of desire might be from a mutual recognition of physical features each finds attractive. The lovers might be attracted to each other’s facial features, bodily form, scent, voice, texture, taste and other such physical attributes. The initial spark of desire would then be grounded on the biochemical processes that happen in their bodies; from the stimuli impinging on their sense organs to the rush of neural information through the nervous system, and finally to the flooding of oxytocin and endorphins in their brains. The physical processes, therefore, serve as a physical base on which the lovers’ initial desire is grounded.3 This connective attraction serves as a catalyst for intimacy which may in turn lead to a stronger and more intense desire for each other. The intense desires would eventually blossom into love.

3 For the discussions on the biological grounding of sexual desires, see (Scruton 2006) and (Jenkins

2017).

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Not only are these lovers people in the sense just described; they are particular individuals. When a lover offers love to a beloved, his or her offered love is directed towards a particular individual and not to a general type of individual. On the other hand, when a beloved accepts the love offered, he or she accepts the love of a particular individual and not an idea of that individual. For example, when Russell proclaimed his love for Lady Ottoline, his love is directed towards Ottoline and neither towards any other thing nor any general idea. His love is neither directed towards some other person nor to some general idea of a loving, intelligent person. By the same token, when Lady Ottoline opened herself up to be romantically involved with Russell, she was to be involved with Russell, the individual person himself and not what she takes him to be, not her idealization of him.4 One might suggest that such idealizations and general ideas might be the objects of love. What the lover loves is not the beloved himself or herself, but a kind of idealization of him or her. Thus, according to this view, when Russell loves Ottoline, he in fact loves the idea of Ottoline, perhaps, as a caring and nurturing person and not Ottoline herself. When the lover, however, declares his or her love to the beloved, he or she is articulating love to a concrete individual and not to the idea of an individual. Thus, when Walt Whitman desired to be with Peter Doyle, he desired Peter Doyle and not a general idea of him. Perhaps, the idealization of the objects of love has more to do with the motivation or inspiration to be in love or to choose to continuously be in love than to the objects of love themselves. Accordingly, a lover’s idea of his or her beloved is what drove him or her to declare love to the beloved; the beloved’s idea of the lover inspired him or her to be open to love. Thus, Virginia Woolf’s idea of her beloved, Vita Sackville-West inspired her to continuously desire her beloved. It is commonplace that our idea of our beloved could inspire us to love or do further acts to intensify this love. We must still distinguish, however, between the object of this inspiration, to whom the lover directs his or inspiration, from the idea of this object of inspiration. The lover’s idea of the beloved may inspire him or her to do intense acts of love towards the beloved, like to passionately kiss and embrace him or her, or to inspire him or her to move mountains and rewrite the stars. But the object of these acts, the real object to whom the lover is doing these acts for, is still the beloved not the idea of the beloved. A lover cannot hold an idea in a tight embrace, nor passionately make love to it. The lover longs to be with the beloved and not just an idea of him or her.

4 The

view that the objects of love, the lover and the beloved, are particular individuals echoes the views of Bagley (2015) and Berenson (1991).

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13.4 Perduring Lovers as Persisting Through Time Lovers, the objects of a romantic love relation, are not just particular, individual people. They also persist through time by perduring, by having temporal parts at different times of each of their lifetimes. The view that things (including lovers) have temporal parts is a well-defended metaphysical view of persistence. Some of its defenders include Quine (1950), Lewis (1983), and Sider (2008). Temporal parts could be seen as time-analogs of spatial parts. Ordinary things, like a particular metro train, have spatial parts. Its smaller parts, its coaches, engine, gangway bellows, and dome make-up the train itself. By the same token, a particular person has spatial parts as well. His or her limbs, hands, torso, and head form the smaller bits that make-up the whole person. But according to perdurantists, just as ordinary things have spatial parts, they have temporal parts as well. For example, the train’s temporal parts, its past-part, present-part, and future-part, are momentary time-slices that make-up the whole time-continuant train. The train’s temporal part at a particular time is exactly the same as its spatial parts at that time, but its existence is momentary and is just limited at that time. By the same token, a particular person’s temporal part at a particular time is exactly the same as his or her spatial parts at that time, but its existence is momentary and is bounded at that time. For perdurantists, what makes an ordinary thing, a metro train and a person, the same thing throughout its lifetime are its temporal parts, parts that momentarily exist at particular times. That is, what makes an ordinary thing persist through time is by having time-slices, which makeup that time-continuant thing.5 Unlike ordinary things, however, people also have a special psychological feature, which factors in the development of this perdurantist account. People have the psychological capacity to believe, desire, hope, and dream. This capacity extends to things in time and over time. A person may believe a particular proposition about the past; desire present objects; hope and dream for future things to happen. He or she may also believe that proposition for a long period of time; hope for those future things for a shorter time; desire certain objects for the whole duration of his or her lifetime. This temporal facet of a person’s psychological capacity connects with the nature of perduring lovers. When lovers love each other, they desire each other. But the thing that desires and the thing they desire are each other’s temporal parts. Both the lover and the beloved are time continuants who each persists through time by having temporal parts. A lover’s particular temporal part is a particular person-time-slice desiring the beloved. By the same token, the beloved’s particular temporal part would be his or her person-time-slice desired at that time. As such, the love-relation can be pictured as a desire-relation between some or all of the lover’s temporal parts desiring some 5 This

is not to say, however, that everything that has spatial parts has temporal parts. We could imagine an object, say a soul, which does not have spatial parts, but has temporal parts (Garrett 2011, p. 55). For our purposes, the analogy of spatial parts and temporal parts only serves as a conceptual handle to understand what temporal parts are.

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Fig. 13.1 Love and Beloved Continuants

or all of the beloved’s temporal parts. Note, however, that though desire might come in degrees of intensity, the desire-relation that we employ here need not be defined in terms of it. In effect, we take the desire-relation as a constant intense longing for a beloved. Given the temporal parts picture of the love-relation, we could have certain models of different kinds of romantic love defined in terms of different desire-relation of the lovers’ temporal parts (see Fig. 13.1). Suppose, for instance, that our lovers’ temporal parts are as pictured above. We could then define the following desire-relations between them. The lovers could only have a one-one desire-relation wherein only one particular temporal part of the lover, say L2 desires one particular temporal part of the beloved, say B1. Accordingly, that singular moment where the lovers have an intense impact is the duration of their love for each other.6 Perhaps, this is true of lovers who though had just one chance meeting, had immediately shared an intense desire for one another at that particular, albeit short, moment. We could also have a one-some, a some-one, or even a some-some relation between the lovers’ temporal parts. A single temporal part of the lover, say L3 desires two or more temporal parts of the beloved, say B2 and B3. A lover who desires his or her beloved’s past self and present self could be cited as an example. Furthermore, in a some-one relation, two or more temporal parts of the lover, say L3 and L4 desire only one temporal part, say B3, of the beloved. A lover who still desires a beloved even after the beloved ceased to desire him or her would be an example of this. Finally, in a some-some relation, some of the temporal parts of the lovers desire each other. 6 We borrowed the idea of ‘moments of impact’ from the movie, ‘The Vow’ (https://www.imdb. com/title/tt1606389/?ref_=ttqt_qt_tt). Of course, each moment of impact could add up to the sum total of the lovers’ relationship. As such, this concept extends to the other desire-relations as well.

186 Table 13.1 Summary of Desire Relations

J. J. Joaquin and H. T. Biana Summary of desire-relations of the lovers’ temporal parts One-one

Some-one

Many-one

All-one

One-some

Some-some

Many-some

All-some

One-many

Some-many

Many-many

All-many

One-all

Some-all

Many-all

All-all

Lovers who sometimes fall in and out of love with each other, whose desire for each other come intermittently, would exemplify this relation. For example, the lover’s temporal parts, L2 and L4, desire the beloved’s temporal parts, B1 and B3. The perdurantist account developed here does not exclude this possibility since desirerelations need not just range over consecutive temporal parts; they may range over any temporal part. The perdurantist picture thus far accounts for love-relations in terms of desirerelations of the lovers’ temporal parts. For a complete elucidation, we could now list down all possible desire-relations as in Table 13.1. The desire-relations of the lovers’ temporal parts, as described so far, could now aid us to describe certain kinds of love relationships. For example, transitory love, a love borne out of a lover’s transition from one temporal part to the other may be modeled by a one-some relation. In a one-some relation, one temporal part of the lover desires only some of the beloved’s temporal parts. Accordingly, the lover loves for only one moment in order to transition to his or her next time-slice. To illustrate, the one-some relation models puppy love, which is a form of transitory love wherein the lover loves while in transition from adolescence to adulthood. Similarly, a lover on the rebound also loves some of the beloved’s temporal parts in order to move on to the next possible object of his or her love. A lover who only considers the practicality of being in love with his or her beloved may be characterized in a some-one relation and or many-one relation. For example, a lover may love only his or beloved because he or she won millions in the lottery at a given particular time. Thus, some or many of a lover’s temporal parts only desire a sole temporal part of the beloved. We may label such a love-relation as ‘practical love’ or ‘love for convenience’s sake’. Companionate lovers are modeled by a some-many, a many-some, or a manymany relations. The lover who is tied to the beloved by a vow, for example, may choose to desire either some or many temporal parts of the other in order to affirm his or her commitment to the beloved. These lovers might have been together for long periods of time. They both accept that they cannot love all the temporal parts of each other, but in order to sustain their relationship it is necessary to love at least some of each other’s temporal parts. Notice, however, that in such a case this desire, their longing, no longer hinges on their desire for each other, but on the desire to maintain the relationship. Thus, companionate love may collapse to a kind of love for convenience’s sake or, perhaps, a love-relationship brought by compromise rather than a desire for each other.

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On the other hand, companionate lovers who really desire each other, albeit, intermittently still ground their love on their desire for each other. Thus, their love would not collapse to a love for convenience’s sake since the foundation of their longing for companionship is still their desire for each other. An all-one, all-some, or all-many love relationship models the extreme case of immortal beings loving a mortal beloved. When Zeus fell in love with the mortal Io, for example, he made love to her by pretending to be a cloud. To protect Io from the wrath of his wife Hera, Zeus turned her into a heifer. Given Zeus’ immortality that cuts across time, it was an all-one relation that encapsulated desire, madness, and care. Perhaps, a more mundane example of an all-one, an all-some, or an all-many love relationship would be the case of undying love. A lover who from the early part of his or her life up to his or her dying days desired one beloved would be such a case. Imagine a lover who has loved one and the same person throughout his or her life. Though the beloved has not loved him or her, the lover nonetheless pushes forth with the relationship with undying love and devotion. Finally, there is an all-all desire-relation, where all temporal parts of both lover and beloved are bounded by love. Such a relation models eternal lovers. The socalled ‘soulmates’ is a species of this kind of love. These lovers do not just finish each other’s sentences, but rather speak the same sentences simultaneously. Since eyes are the windows of the soul, their souls fuse with every look or stare. Even if they are not together, they are still together. Even when they are apart, they are one. Soulmates desire to meld physically, spiritually, and emotionally. Perhaps, the best characterization of this intense longing and thirst to find each other can be found in Aristophanes’ description in Plato’s Symposium. After being separated by the gods, they spend the rest of their lives searching for their soulmates or each other’s halves. When they finally find each other, they throw their arms around one another and yearn to grow into one. They dream of each other’s temporal parts wherein time-slices blend. Described, thus, the love relation itself seems unnecessary for these soulmates because instead of saying ‘I love you’ to each other, they utter ‘I am you’ or ‘you are me’. This idea of I am you, you are me collapses to just the idea of love. If true love indeed exists, eternal love might be the best representation of it, a love where all the lovers’ temporal parts desire each other. Cupid and Psyche’s story, for example, is an all-all relation. Cupid is said to represent love, and Psyche the soul. Psyche’s attempt to find Cupid, despite many obstacles, eventually affords her Cupid’s love and her own immortality. In the end, the soul finds love and it becomes infinite. With this, eternal love defies the original model of love relations, since there is no longer a relation, there is just eternal love, or love infinitely squared.

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13.5 Conclusion and Some Reassurances In this paper, we explored the question about the relata of the love-relation, the nature of the objects loving each other. We developed a perdurantist account to answer this question. We claimed that the relata of the love-relation are particular people who persist through time by having temporal parts and that they have the capacity to intensely desire their beloved’s temporal parts. A point in favor of this account is its ability to provide models of different kinds of love-relation in terms of the number of the temporal parts that the lovers intensely desire of each other. Despite its deliverances, however, several worries could still be raised against this perdurantist account. One easily answerable worry is that its explanatory power rests on the controversial ontology of temporal parts. That is, the models that we have presented are grounded on the existence of these temporal parts. We reply that we are assured that temporal parts do exist given Lewis’ reasons for them (Lewis 1983, pp. 76–77). But even if Lewis’ argument does not hold water, we still reply that its ontology need not worry us, since if the perdurantist models that we have provided are somewhat plausible, then we could bite this non-fatal ontological bullet for now. A more serious worry, however, is that nothing really hangs on the perdurantist account of the relata of love, since one could just as easily translate its deliverances into the endurantist, three-dimensional account of persistence. According to endurantists, lovers, like any other persisting object, persist through time by enduring, by being wholly present at each time they exist.7 On this view, love would be a relation between these enduring objects. Thus, instead of talking about the relata of love as temporal parts of particular persons, we could talk about them as person-stages, or, if one prefers, persons-at-times, or persons-through-durations. We reply that this worry rests on the rather problematic thesis of the metaphysical equivalence between perdurantism and endurantism. According to this thesis, “two theories are metaphysically equivalent just in case the theories are two ways of describing the same underlying metaphysics” (Miller 2005, p. 92). Since perdurantism and endurantism are just two ways of describing the same underlying metaphysics, then it follows that they are metaphysically equivalent. We find this thesis problematic, since it seems to imply the metametaphysical position of ontological anti-realism; the view that (some) metaphysical disputes are non-substantive because they are merely verbal (Chalmers 2009). Given the suggestions of ontological realists, like Sider (2009), however, there would be ways by which we could make these disputes substantive and tractable. If this is right, then we could still be assured of the metaphysical inequivalence of perdurantism and endurantism, and of the difference between a perdurantist and endurantist account of the relata of the love-relation.

7 A discussion of the difference between perdurantism and endurantism can be found in (Haslanger

2003).

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We end this paper with this final note. What we have tried in doing this exercise is to situate love in time and space in order for us to somehow understand its eternal nature; perhaps, even to the point of possibly uncovering what true love really is.

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Jeremiah Joven Joaquin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines, where he is also a Research Fellow at the Southeast Asian Research Center and Hub and a Research Affiliate at the Center for Language Technologies. He is the current President of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines and the founding Secretary-General of the Union of Societies and Associations of Philosophy in the Philippines. He specializes in philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, moral philosophy, philosophical logic, and metaphysics.

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Hazel T. Biana is Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines. She was the previous chairholder of the Emerita S. Quito Chair in the History of Thought. She specializes in gender studies and feminist and postfeminist philosophy. In particular, she works on issues related to intersectionality and cultural criticism.

Correction to: The Good in Articulation: Describing the Co-constitution of Self, Practice, and Value Carlota Salvador Megias

Correction to: Chapter 7 in: S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_7 The original version of the book was inadvertently published with the following error: In Chapter 7, only ‘Megias’ was identified as the author’s last name. This has now been changed to ‘Salvador Megias’. Both the book and the chapter have been updated with the change.

The updated version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_7 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 S. Hongladarom and J. J. Joaquin (eds.), Love and Friendship Across Cultures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4834-9_14

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