Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Conciousness as the Key to Philosophy 9781442688513

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy

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GERARD WALMSLEY

Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS Toronto Buffalo London

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© University of Toronto Press Incorporated 2008 Toronto Buffalo London www.utppublishing.com Printed in Canada isbn 978-0-8020-9855-9

Printed on acid-free paper Lonergan Studies

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data Walmsley, Gerard, 1954– Lonergan on philosophic pluralism : the polymorphism of consciousness as the key to philosophy / Gerard Walmsley. (Lonergan studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-8020-9855-9 1. Pluralism. 2. Difference (Philosophy). 3. Consciousness. 4. Lonergan, Bernard J.F. (Bernard Joseph Francis), 1904–1984. I. Title. II. Series. b995.l654w34 2008

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c2008-906011-3

Publication of this volume has been made possible by a grant from the Lonergan Institute at Boston College. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial assistance to its publishing program of the Canada Council for the Arts and the Ontario Arts Council. University of Toronto Press acknowledges the financial support for its publishing activities of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP).

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Contents

Acknowledgments / xi Introduction: Contextualizing the Inquiry into Polymorphic Consciousness and Philosophical Pluralism / 3 1 The Aim of the Inquiry / 4 2 Lonergan’s Approach to Philosophy: Self-Appropriation and Cognitional Analysis / 7 2.1 Introduction: The Method of Self-Appropriation and Cognitional Analysis / 7 2.2 Self-Appropriation and the Nature of Consciousness: ‘Consciousnessin’ and ‘Consciousness-of’ / 11 2.3 What Does Self-Appropriation Discover? Levels of Consciousness and the Human Subject as a Movement of Self-Transcendence / 14 2.4 Why Is Self-Appropriation So Important? Cognitional SelfAppropriation and Intellectual Conversion / 23 2.5 The Further Dimensions of Self-Appropriation / 26 2.6 The Philosophical Significance of Patterns and Differentiations / 29 1 Aims/Relevance/Procedure / 32 1 A Metaphilosophical Project? / 32 2 Ambiguities about Polymorphism / 39 2.1 A Typical Example of Ambiguity / 39 2.2 Polymorphism and the Moving Viewpoint / 40 2.3 The Dialectical Application of Polymorphism / 42 2.4 An Ontological or Cognitional Account? / 43 2.5 The Range of Patterns: Bimorphism or Polymorphism? / 44 2.6 Polymorphism: Mixing and Blending of Patterns, or Shifts in Orientations of the Subject? / 45

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2.7 The Confusion between Patterns and Differentiations / 45 2.8 Is Polymorphism the One and Only Key to Philosophic Difference? / 46 Responding to the Difficulties: Basic Aims / 47 The Shape of the Argument / 51 Questions of Interpretation / 53 Self-Appropriation and Interpretation / 53

2 Grounding Polymorphism: Polymorphism and the Structure of Human Being / 55 1 Introduction / 55 2 The Structure of the Human Being / 56 3 Human Beings and the World Process of Emergent Probability: Chapter 4 of Insight / 57 4 Levels of Science and Levels of Human Being: Chapter 6 of Insight / 59 5 The Human Being and the Human Community: Chapter 7 of Insight / 61 6 Things, Bodies, and Human Beings: Chapter 8 of Insight / 64 7 A Further Level of Freedom: Full Self-Transcendence? / 68 8 Self-Affirmation and the Unity of Consciousness: Chapter 11 of Insight / 70 9 Human Development: Chapter 15 of Insight / 71 10 Development and Human Development / 74 11 The Unity of the Human Person: Chapter 16 of Insight / 80 12 Insight and File 713: Human Solidarity and the Concrete Universal / 83 13 Grounding Polymorphism? / 88 Polymorphism in Insight: Patterns of Experience / 96 1 Introduction / 96 2 The Initial Context of Chapter 14 / 97 a the patterns of experience in chapter 6 / 99 3 What Is a Pattern of Experience? / 99 4 Further Clarifications: Patterns as ‘Intelligible Relations’ in the Subject’s Conscious Flow / 100 b particular patterns of experience / 105 5 The Biological Pattern / 105 6 The Aesthetic Pattern and the Artistic Pattern / 113 6.1 The Aesthetic Pattern / 113 6.2 The Artistic Pattern / 115 6.3 The Aesthetic–Artistic Patterns and Creative Freedom / 117 7 The Intellectual Pattern / 119 7.1 The Intellectual Pattern and Self-Transcendence / 121 3

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7.2 The Intellectual Concern of the Intellectual Pattern / 122 7.3 The Exigencies of the Intellectual Pattern / 123 7.4 The Intellectual Pattern and Full Human Living / 125 8 The Dramatic Pattern / 127 8.1 The Dramatic Pattern and Ordinary Human Living / 127 8.2 The Dramatic and Ethical Patterns: Questions of SelfTranscendence / 128 8.3 The Dramatic Pattern and Rational Self-Consciousness / 131 8.4 The Dramatic Pattern and the Human Person / 132 9 Concluding Remarks / 137 4 Further Patterns of Experience? / 138 1 Introduction / 138 2 The Practical Pattern / 142 3 The Mystical Pattern / 150 4 The Symbolic Pattern: The General Case / 153 5 Appropriating Symbolic Consciousness / 157 6 The Ethical Pattern / 160 7 Concluding Remarks / 168 5 Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? / 170 1 Introduction / 170 a the initial context: polymorphism and the dialectic of philosophy / 174 2 Context and Questions / 174 3 Philosophical Dialectics – Negative and Positive / 174 b a basic survey of lonergan’s meanings of polymorphism / 177 4 Polymorphism and Pluralism: The Underlying Problem / 177 5 The Intellectualist Orientation of the Heuristic Structure of Philosophical Unity / 181 6 Polymorphism and the Definition of Metaphysics / 182 7 Polymorphism and Method in Metaphysics / 184 8 The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics / 190 8.1 Deductive Methods / 191 8.2 Cartesian Methods / 191 8.3 Empiricism / 192 8.4 Commonsense Eclecticism / 193 8.5 Hegelian Dialectic / 193 8.6 Scientific Method and Philosophy / 194 c towards integral polymorphism and a comprehensive metaphilosophy / 197 9 Towards Integral Polymorphism / 197 10 Towards a Comprehensive Metaphilosophy / 200

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6 Polymorphism in Method in Theology / 204 1 Introduction / 204 a what is differentiation of consciousness? / 206 2 Method / 206 3 The Human Good / 206 4 Meaning / 209 4.1 Early Language / 210 4.2 Functions of Meaning / 211 4.3 Realms of Meanings and Exigences / 212 5 Stages of Meaning – The Main Differentiations / 214 5.1 Early Language and Undifferentiated Consciousness / 215 5.2 The Greek Discovery of Mind / 216 5.3 Common Sense to Theory / 217 5.4 Theory to Interiority / 217 5.5 Ongoing Undifferentiated Consciousness / 219 6 Functional Specialties / 221 7 Dialectic / 222 8 Horizons / 222 9 Horizons and Fully Differentiated Consciousness / 223 9.1 Transcendent Differentiation / 224 10 Foundations / 224 11 The Movement of Differentiations / 225 11.1 The Range of Differentiations / 225 11.2 Key Differentiations / 225 11.3 Advancing and Receding Differentiation / 227 11.4 Towards an Integral Account of Modalities of Consciousness / 227 12 Doctrines / 228 12.1 The Basic Differentiations / 228 12.2 The Ongoing Discovery of Mind / 229 12.3 Communications among Differentiations / 230 b emerging positions on differentiation / 230 13 What Is Differentiation of Consciousness? / 231 14 Differentiation as Developmental Polymorphism / 234 15 Differentiations as a Key to Philosophy / 238 An Additional Note on Conversions / 241 Concluding Remarks: Towards a Lonerganian Metaphilosophy / 242 1 Preliminary / 242 2 The Scope of Polymorphism / 242 3 Can Polymorphism Bear the Weight of a Developed Metaphilosophy? / 247 4 A Survey of Lonerganian Metaphilosophers / 247 4.1 Michael McCarthy / 248

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4.2 Michael Vertin / 249 4.3 Matthew Lamb / 250 4.4 Mark Morelli / 252 4.5 Frank Braio / 253 5 Towards a Lonerganian Metaphilosophy / 256 6 Relevance of Polymorphism for Contemporary Philosophy / 256 6.1 Postmodernism / 256 6.2 Lonergan and Postmodernism: Polymorphism and Difference / 258 6.3 Comparative Philosophy / 261 6.4 A Lonerganian Contribution / 264 Bibliography / 269 Abbreviations / 269 Works by Bernard Lonergan / 269 Works by Other Authors / 270 Index / 277

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Acknowledgments

The completion of this book would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. I would like to thank Professor Patrick Byrne, the director of my doctoral dissertation, for his patience and guidance. Professor Frederick Lawrence provided encouragement and inspiration both at the beginning of this project and throughout the process. My thanks are due to him and his wife Sue for their personal support during my years of doctoral studies. My thanks go also to Professor Joseph Flanagan, S.J., for many discussions at Saint Mary’s Hall. Special thanks are due to Kerry Cronin of the Lonergan Institute at Boston College. She not only kept me provided with books but also showed great understanding for the trials of doctoral students. John Boyd Turner also provided invaluable help both through many conversations on the thought of Bernard Lonergan and through his editing and formatting skills. Professor Mark Morelli gave encouragement and advice in the early stages of this investigation and continued to help as the project unfolded. I am grateful to Professor Frank Braio for stimulating discussions at various times. Professor F. Crowe, S.J., was unfailingly charming and enthusiastically encouraging whenever I visited the Lonergan Research Institute in Toronto. My thanks go to him and everyone at the Institute. I must also express my appreciation to Professor John Stacer, who repeatedly encouraged the publication of this manuscript and acted as a first reader. Finally I would also like to thank the official readers provided by the University of Toronto Press for their generous and close reading, which helped me avoid many stylistic infelicities. This dissertation is dedicated to my father, John Gerard Walmsley, and my mother, Maria Walmsley. In many ways they and my sisters, Frances and

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Margaret, and my brothers, John, Bernard, and Wilfred, have motivated this project. My special thanks to them for all they have done. I would also like to dedicate this book to my friends and students in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy

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The polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy. Insight, 452 The category into which a given philosopher really falls will depend on the degree of his self-appropriation. Topics in Education, 238 The importance of the theory of philosophic difference is that, if one gets a sufficient grasp of it, one can read fruitfully all sorts of materials without losing one’s way. Topics in Education, 177 The diversities of philosophies express the polymorphism of the subject and the diversities of culture express the polymorphism of the subject. Understanding and Being, 374

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Introduction: Contextualizing the Inquiry into Polymorphic Consciousness and Philosophical Pluralism

In this introduction I want to do two things. In the first place I want to clarify the aims of this investigation into Lonergan’s intriguing but problematic claim that ‘the polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy’ (I 452).1 My basic aim is to clarify, critique, and also develop Lonergan’s position in order to show that he provides powerful resources for responding to the problems raised by philosophical and cultural pluralism. I want to communicate Lonergan’s achievement to those new to his thought as well as to those already familiar with his thinking to some extent. In the second place I want to provide an outline of Lonergan’s distinctive approach to philosophy, based mainly on his principal work Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. The point here will be to communicate what is special about his approach to the philosophy of consciousness and about his method of ‘self-appropriation.’ I focus on the account of cognition and the levels of consciousness that constitute human knowing, noting that in Insight he seems to privilege this account of cognitional structure. This outline will serve, I hope, as a helpful introduction for new readers of Lonergan. But also, given that my main argument will be that the dominant account of the levels of consciousness and cognition should be resituated in a broader account of polymorphism, I hope that the outline will serve as a context for the detailed critique and development, which follows, of Lonergan’s account of polymorphic consciousness as the key to philosophy.

1 Bernard Lonergan’s major works are cited in the text with abbreviation and page number. A list of abbreviations can be found on page 269.

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The Aim of the Inquiry

My main aim is to investigate directly and in detail Lonergan’s thoughtprovoking claim that ‘the polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy’ (I 452). Two main questions arise in this connection: What is meant by the polymorphism of consciousness? And in what way is polymorphism a key to philosophy? In what follows I argue that polymorphism is best understood as involving all the different modalities of human consciousness identified by Lonergan in his various writings. These include not only the ‘patterns of experience’ that are most directly linked, by Lonergan, to polymorphic consciousness but also the ‘levels of consciousness’ that are basic to Lonergan’s account of cognition and the ‘differentiations of consciousness’ that emerge as human intelligence develops in history, as well as the shifts in horizons arising from intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. In arguing this I am suggesting that Lonergan’s own account of polymorphic consciousness is not always sufficiently developed or integrated, especially if it is to bear the weight of his claim that polymorphism is the key to philosophy. To establish my position I examine Lonergan’s treatment of polymorphism in close detail. Ambiguities in his treatment are noted, and I attempt to fill out and expand his account in various ways, all the time aiming to keep in touch with the basic thrust of his thought. My second concern is to clarify the ways in which polymorphism is the key to philosophy. I argue that only when all the modalities of consciousness are considered, in an integral account of polymorphic consciousness, is Lonergan’s basic claim found to be convincing. Only then do we find a claim to possess a key to philosophy that is adequate to the postmodern philosophical context and to the context of comparative philosophy/ world philosophy as well as to modern philosophy. Here I suggest that in Insight Lonergan tends to consider only the role of the levels of consciousness involved in cognition and only the roles of the intellectual and biological patterns of experience in generating philosophical pluralism. That is, he does not develop the roles of the other patterns as factors that generate philosophical diversity. Nor, of course, does he consider the role of differentiations of consciousness that are only fully discussed in later writings. One result of this is that while Lonergan gives a good account of philosophical difference in the modern period, he is not able to give an account of philosophical pluralism that would address the postmodern context or culturally based differences in philosophy. If the focus is only on cognitional self-transcendence, on empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness (and the influence of the biological pattern as it interferes with

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cognition), then indeed we arrive at a powerful tool for philosophical dialectic but one that is mainly confined to dealing with modern philosophy – empiricism, idealism, and rationalism. I argue that a fuller appreciation of all the patterns of experience, and of all the differentiations of consciousness, would provide a basis for dialogue with romanticism, postmodernism, and world-cultural philosophies (including Eastern and African philosophical traditions). Though I criticize various aspects of Lonergan’s account of polymorphic consciousness and the way he applies this to an account of philosophic diversity, I hasten to add that I hold, nevertheless, that his approach to philosophical pluralism is fundamentally correct. His core argument is that all philosophical positions, and all cultural frameworks, are generated by inquiring human minds. Hence a grasp of the structure, the dynamism, the modalities (the polymorphism) of human consciousness may provide at least an anticipation of the range of philosophies likely to be found, as well as a basis for interpreting and evaluating the many philosophical positions that we encounter. To grasp the polymorphism of consciousness is to discover a way of entering other positions, a way into a broad range of philosophical and cultural frameworks. The key to philosophy (to philosophical pluralism), therefore, is the selfappropriation of all the modalities of human consciousness (polymorphism). Sufficient self-knowledge in a sufficiently developed consciousness enables us to enter into and evaluate and relate diverse philosophies. If the key to philosophy is not found here, suggests Lonergan, it will not be found anywhere. This argument is relatively clear and has, I think, a certain immediate plausibility. However, conviction lies in the details. Such a considerable claim needs to be examined thoroughly. Hence I have attempted to take into account everything that Lonergan has said about polymorphism in order to see whether an integral account is possible that would ground more completely the claim that polymorphism provides a key to philosophy. While criticizing Lonergan’s account, I have sought to develop it and to produce a more systematic account of ‘polymorphism’ as the ‘key to philosophy,’ one that is true to the overall thrust of his thought. In this way I have attempted to make available to a wider audience the resources provided by Lonergan for dealing with both philosophical and cultural pluralism. In the final chapters of this book I offer some evidence to justify my claims in relation to postmodern pluralism and comparative philosophy. In all of this I hope to address both those who are already familiar with Lonergan and those who may be new to his thought. For those who already know Lonergan, I want to show the need to work towards a better integration of everything he said about the diverse

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

modalities of consciousness. I hope to show that the cognitional subject should not be allowed to overshadow the polymorphic subject. Here I believe I have the support of a well-known commentator on Lonergan who argues that Lonergan’s cognitional theory and his later account of transcendental method need to be resituated in ‘an earlier, more encompassing doctrine of the polymorphism of human consciousness.’2 I would add that the later account of the differentiations of consciousness also needs to be resituated in this earlier doctrine of polymorphism. This is especially so for Lonergan scholars who wish to engage with the wider philosophical world. For those who are new to Lonergan, I hope that the growing interest in philosophical pluralism, questions of metaphilosophy, and world philosophy will encourage them to take Lonergan’s contribution seriously. Philosophers today cannot fail to be confronted by the clash of apparently incommensurable philosophies that fragment the discipline and frustrate the search for a wisdom that might give orientation and meaning to human life. They know the difficulty that philosophers from different traditions experience as they attempt to speak to one another. A few seem unconcerned, but arguably, an authentic philosopher should not dismiss other traditions without serious reflection. And the ‘clash of civilizations’ that is much spoken of surely involves a clash of philosophies as well. In addition, I hope that at least some of the details that Lonergan provides when speaking of the particular patterns (e.g., the aesthetic or the dramatic patterns) or of the differentiations of consciousness (e.g., the shift from common sense to theoretical consciousness) will resonate with the experiences and inquiries of those unfamiliar with Lonergan. If those new to Lonergan take philosophical pluralism seriously, or if they are involved in any way in reflection on the modalities of human consciousness, then I believe they will find that if Lonergan does not address all the questions or provide all the answers, he offers at least a key and some powerful resources for thinking about philosophical pluralism.

2 M. Morelli, ‘Lonergan’s Unified Theory of Consciousness,’ 172. Morelli says this even after noting that Lonergan himself took his account of judgment as his most significant philosophical contribution. According to Morelli, ‘the cognitional theory of which the doctrine of judgment is a part is itself a component of a still more encompassing account of transcendental method … Moreover, the doctrine of transcendental method, in its turn, is subsumed by a doctrine of the polymorphism of human consciousness’ (171).

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Lonergan’s Approach to Philosophy: Self-Appropriation and Cognitional Analysis

In this section I offer a summary of Lonergan’s approach to philosophy that highlights his notion of ‘self-appropriation.’ I focus on the appropriation of the levels of consciousness that constitute human knowing because this is the dominant theme of Insight. My hope is that this summary will provide a point of entry into Lonergan’s project as a whole. In particular, I wish to communicate a feeling for his overall project that might motivate those new to Lonergan to persevere through the detailed analysis that follows. Finally, I hope that this outline will provide a context for the main argument. In the following chapters I will argue that the dominant account of cognition needs to be related to the understated and underdeveloped account of polymorphic consciousness. The initial outline of cognitional self-appropriation given in this Introduction should prepare the way for the later account of the appropriation of polymorphic consciousness as a whole. 2.1 Introduction: The Method of Self-Appropriation and Cognitional Analysis What is self-appropriation? Self-appropriation for Lonergan is a way of grasping what really goes on as we come to know. It involves a sustained selfattention as we engage in the process of coming to know. It involves a heightened self-awareness of our concrete performance. Lonergan’s distinctive approach to the philosophy of knowledge, then, involves ‘cognitional analysis’ rather than ‘conceptual analysis.’ The justification for this is that knowing is a conscious act that should be investigated as such. Cognitional performance is part of human experience. Hence the philosophy of knowledge should begin by attending to our experience of coming to know. The basic question for Lonergan is: What am I doing when I am knowing? (What am I consciously doing when I am coming to know?) Lonergan holds that if we heighten our attention to our cognitive performance, we will come to grasp more adequately what knowing involves and what knowledge really is. In other words, becoming self-conscious about our cognitional activity leads to self-appropriation of ourselves as knowers: The aim is not to set forth a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge, but to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities. (I 11)

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The point … is appropriation; the point is to discover, to identify, to become familiar with, the activities of one’s own intelligence; the point is to become able to discriminate with ease and from personal conviction between one’s purely intellectual activities and the manifold of other ‘existential’ concerns that invade and mix and blend with the operations of intellect to render it ambivalent and its pronouncements ambiguous. (I 14) Lonergan maintains that only a prolonged exercise of self-attention will result in the distinctive kind of self-knowledge that he calls self-appropriation. He holds that such self-appropriation is the most basic way of grasping what knowing and knowledge involves. What Lonergan aims at is an approach to the philosophy of knowledge that is foundational or basic. It is basic in the sense that it goes beyond any particular ‘theory’ of knowledge, or any conceptual formulation of a philosophy of knowledge, to discern the cognitional activity/activities that give rise to any theory or philosophy. The aim is to arrive at an account of knowing that explains itself and its own emergence. Lonergan wants to grasp what it is to be a knower and what it is to act as a knower. He aims to point us to the built-in dynamism that constitutes us as knowers and that generates all knowledge and all accounts of knowledge. Lonergan’s argument, then, is that it is only by going beyond the products of an intelligent mind to the operations of the intelligent mind itself that we avoid abstract accounts and theories. Most theories of knowledge either do not account for themselves or are involved in performative self-contradiction. Only an account of knowledge that focuses on cognitive performance avoids these difficulties. An adequate philosophy of knowledge is really an articulation of the performance we are always already engaged in as knowers. It begins with ‘cognitional facts,’ the data of conscious cognitional performance. Self-appropriation then aims at discerning the ‘prepredicative, preconceptual, pre-judicial’ operations of the human mind as such (UB 15). As we shall see, this is only possible because we are simultaneously present to ourselves as well as being present to the objects of knowledge. Indeed, presence-to-self is basic, for other things could not be present to me if I were not present to myself in some way: ‘A person has to be somehow present to himself for others to be present to him’ (UB 15). Lonergan builds up his philosophy of knowledge by explaining how human consciousness includes both presence to self and presence of objects. He explains how we may attend to and partially give expression to preconceptual self-presence. And he identifies and points out different types of self-presence that indicate the different levels of consciousness involved in human knowing. Self-appropriation makes demands. Lonergan argues that it only begins in a ‘sufficiently cultured consciousness’ (I 22; my italics). By this he means

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that there must be some initial awareness of the diversity and tensions in human knowledge. There are many types and ways of knowing – for example, common sense differs from science, and cultural perspectives seem to contradict one another. A sufficiently cultured consciousness is aware of the complexity of human knowing and is willing to tackle this problem. It is willing to make an effort to familiarize itself with diverse areas of knowing in order to grasp fully the nature of knowing: While all acts of understanding have a certain family likeness, a full and balanced view is to be reached by combining in a single account the evidence obtained from different fields of intelligent activity. (I 4) Thus the precise nature of the act of understanding is to be seen most clearly in mathematical examples, the dynamic context in which understanding occurs can be studied to best advantage in an investigation of scientific methods; the disturbance of that dynamic context by alien concerns is thrust upon one’s attention by the manner in which various measures of common nonsense blend with common sense. (I 4) Self-appropriation, then, involves paying attention to what one is doing in a variety of contexts. In this way we become more sensitive to variations in our conscious cognitional activities. And we become able to discern what we are really doing as we come to know. The complexity of explicit knowledge is then found to be a reflection of the complexity of implicit performance. If moral/ethical and religious and mystical ways of knowing are also considered, the difficulty of a comprehensive self-appropriation becomes evident. Also, we discover that cognitive self-appropriation has eventually to be placed in a wider context of full personal self-appropriation. Lonergan aims, then, to identify the ‘procedures of the human mind’: ‘a basic pattern of operation employed in every cognitional enterprise’ (M 4) But the aim is not to arrive at an abstract theory. The aim is to put us in contact with the structured dynamism immanent in our own consciousness, for this is the normative foundation of cognitional activity. Nor is the aim to make us mathematicians or scientists as well as commonsense thinkers. Rather, Lonergan’s aim is to provide readers with opportunities to ‘catch themselves in the act of performing cognitional operations.’3

3 M. Morelli and E. Morelli, ‘Introduction,’ 19.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

[Insight is] an essay in aid of the personal appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness. (I 764) The aim is to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activity. (I 11) The known is extensive, but the knowing is a recurrent structure that can be investigated sufficiently in a series of strategically chosen instances. (I 12) The dynamic cognitional structure to be reached is … the personally appropriated structure of one’s own [spontaneously unfolding] experiencing, one’s own intelligent inquiry and insight, one’s own critical reflection and judging and deciding. (I 13) The crucial issue is an experiential one … It will consist in one’s own rational self-consciousness clearly and distinctly taking possession of itself … No one else … can do it for you. (I 13) It is important to realize that none of this is meant to be taken on authority. What is offered is an invitation, an encouragement, to self-attention (and an example to compare your own efforts with). All the claims Lonergan makes are meant to be tested in the cognitional details that all people can identify in their own conscious performance. However, it may be added that some dialogue with others may be a necessary condition for evoking the appropriate heightened self-awareness. Lonergan is clear that such self-appropriation requires a considerable investment of time and energy on the part of the reader. First of all, willingness is required to acquire a degree of familiarity with a range of cognitional contexts (mathematics, science, common sense, philosophy, religious knowing). An effort is needed to grasp the dynamics of human consciousness, the movement of self-transcendence as the person advances from experiencing to understanding and judgment in cognitional selftranscendence. In addition, as we shall see, there is the difficulty of becoming aware of the variability of the stream of consciousness as it shifts to and fro between different interests (for as well as the intellectual concern there are dramatic, practical, artistic, biological, and religious concerns, which are already introduced in Insight but not fully exploited). Furthermore, there is also the wider appropriation of the whole person, which involves attention to evaluation and responsible decision, and to the experience of falling in love in an unrestricted way proper to religious and mystical con-

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sciousness (this is dealt with more fully in the later work Method in Theology). Beyond this, there is the difficulty of appropriating what goes on as human consciousness develops in history and differentiates itself into symbolic-mystical modes of thinking followed by commonsense-practical modes, theoretical, empirical-scientific modes, and self-reflective and critical-philosophical modes (again, something that is only developed in Method in Theology). All these dimensions must be included in a full appropriation of polymorphic (many-sided) human consciousness. At the moment only a limited appreciation of Lonergan’s position can be communicated – little more than an invitation. The reason for this is evident: ‘[Self-appropriation] is a development of the subject and in the subject … and like all development it can be solid and fruitful only by being painstaking and slow’ (I 17). The complexities will be returned to later. The point here is to appreciate the distinctive approach to the philosophy of knowledge. Lonergan’s chosen method is self-appropriation through heightened awareness of cognitive performance in diverse areas. 2.2 Self-Appropriation and the Nature of Consciousness: ‘Consciousness-in’ and ‘Consciousness-of’ Lonergan holds that self-appropriation is possible because, as well as the ‘data of sense,’ there is also the ‘data of consciousness.’ He argues that the availability of such data implies that human inquiry is not confined to empirical method as understood in the natural sciences. There is also a possibility of developing a ‘generalized empirical method’ based on both types of data (I 95–6; my italics). For Lonergan, this is the core of philosophical method, particularly in the philosophy of knowledge. Lonergan advances this position on the basis of a very distinctive account of the nature of human consciousness. He claims that consciousness has two aspects or dimensions that are always found together. Few other contemporary figures identify the two aspects so clearly or explain their interrelations. Lonergan holds that every conscious experience of data or of some object is always accompanied by ‘a concomitant experience of the experiencing.’4 As well as consciousness-of some data or content or object, there is consciousness-in our operations of the self that is attending to data or understanding some content or judging about some object.

4 M. Morelli, ‘Lonergan’s Unified Theory of Consciousness,’ 179.

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Another way of putting this is to say that consciousness is both conscious and intentional. As intentional, human cognitional operations are directed to some object and thereby make the object present to us. As conscious, such operations make us present to ourselves. So consciousness as intentional makes us aware that we attend to something that we come to understand and judge, something we intend and seek that remains to be known. Consciousness is directed to some object: to empirical (sounds, tastes, smells) or intellectual (intelligible patterns or ideas or concepts) or real (things) or moral (values, goods, evils) objects. But consciousness as conscious is self-presence. We are aware of ourselves consciously seeking, consciously understanding, consciously judging, consciously evaluating. Note that in some operations we may be more intensely aware of the subject as subject. For example, the empirical operations of sensation may be evident but the focus is on the object. By contrast, the operations at the level of responsibility (conscience) make us more intensely aware of the self as a whole. Generally, however, consciousness is both conscious and intentional. Hence we are able, with effort, to discern what we are doing when we come to know: [Consciousness is] of two quite distinct kinds. There is the presence of the object to the subject, of the spectacle to the spectator; there is also the presence of the subject to himself, and this is not the presence of another object, dividing his attention, of another spectacle distracting the spectator; it is the presence in, as it were, another dimension, presence concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of the object. Objects are present by being attended to; but subjects are present as subjects, not by being attended to but by attending [or by operating in any way]. (CS 209–10) This presence to self involves an awareness of the self precisely as subject. It is elusive, and yet without such awareness it would be impossible for objects to be present to us. Furthermore, unless we advert to it we are liable to misinterpret our performance and ourselves as knowers or responsible agents. The experience of self-presence is often overlooked. We tend to be much more aware of the ‘external’ object and of practical involvement with what Lonergan calls ‘the already-out-there-now-real’ (I 276). Or we focus on particular thoughts and feelings or images and not on the self as thinking or feeling. We focus on the objects of consciousness rather than on the consciousness by which and in which we apprehend objects. Consciousness of objects predominates; consciousness of self in its perform-

Introduction

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ance is overlooked. This is so at least among empiricist philosophers and in positivism. Phenomenology as well tends to emphasize the content of consciousness (though there is recognition of the transcendental ego or of Dasein). In ordinary life there may be a strong sense of the ‘self’ and of personal dignity, but this tends to be undifferentiated. It does not amount to an awareness of the subject as subject as such. It quickly becomes an expression of the subject as object. On the basis of this distinct account of consciousness, we can understand more clearly what self-appropriation involves. Self-appropriation generally is the effort to grasp self-presence in our conscious performance. But exactly how is this done? Now it becomes clear that it involves a shift of attention from the object to the self in its engagement with the world. ‘Self-appropriation, in the first instance, is a shift of attention from objects, including the subject-as-object [me, myself], to the subject-as-subject and the realm of interiority [the ‘I’ as agent or operator].’5 Self-appropriation is only properly grasped, then, on the basis of a correct understanding of the twofold nature of consciousness. Presence to self is always concomitant with the presence of an object. We are aware of the self at the same time we are aware of the object. Hence we do not grasp ourselves as subjects by cutting ourselves off from external objects, as Cartesianism suggests. We are not disembodied ‘thinking things’ somehow located within physical bodies. Hence we become self-appropriated not by ‘disengagement from the world of objects’ but by ‘a development of understanding in the widest possible range of cognitive and moral engagements.’6 It is for this reason that Lonergan shifts away from the term ‘introspection’ in relation to self-appropriation, for the self is not found by taking an inner look: I have been attempting to describe the subject’s presence to himself. But the reader, if he tries to find himself as subject, to reach back and, as it were, uncover his subjectivity, cannot succeed. Any such effort is introspecting, attending to the subject; and what is found is not the subject, but only the subject as object; it is the subject [as subject] that does the finding. To heighten one’s presence to oneself, one does not introspect; one raises the level of one’s performance. (CS 210) Self-appropriation, we now see, requires that one raise the level of one’s activity. This involves, in the first place, heightening attention to one’s con-

5 M. Morelli and E. Morelli, ‘Introduction,’ 18. 6 Ibid., 19.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

scious performance. But also we may take it as involving an extension of the range of one’s performance by shifting to operations at higher levels of consciousness. Self-presence will vary in quality and intensity according to the level or type of conscious activity we are involved in. Arguably we are more intensely and integrally present to ourselves at the higher levels of judgment and responsible action, for these levels of consciousness include a self-reflective dimension. (On the other hand, I can be highly conscious of being in pain! Still, this is more an experience of being acted upon than of acting as an agent.) However, it should be noted that the process of self-appropriation is incomplete without ongoing conceptual articulation. Both cognitional performance and cognitional theory may be needed for a firm, integral, and complete self-appropriation. Again it is the structure of consciousness as both conscious and intentional that makes it possible. For the structure enables us to ‘apply the operation as intentional to the operator as conscious’ (M 14). The subject as subject (as consciously operating) can become the subject as object (as intentionally grasped). The experience of oneself operating in different ways as a cognitive agent can become the object of knowing. Then, rather than inquiring about something in the stream of consciousness (some sensory data, some image, idea, concept, emotion or feeling, or any other ‘content’), we inquire about the inquiring, the questioning, the rearranging of data or images, the grasping of intelligible relationships, the weighing up and reflecting on the sufficiency of evidence, the judging. We ask ourselves what we are doing when we are knowing: What diverse activities do we engage in and how are they related? We ask how these activities culminate in knowledge. And all of this may be given expression in cognitional theory. An initial expression of cognitional theory may then be compared with actual performance and, after that, continually and indefinitely refined. We still have to present the details of what self-appropriation discerns in cognitional performance, in human knowing. The point at the moment is that recognizing the distinction between ‘consciousness-in’ and ‘consciousness-of’ is fundamental to self-appropriation. Indeed, it is this that enables us to discover the structure of knowing. For as we shall see, it is by attending to variations in the quality of our self-presence that we are able to differentiate diverse cognitional activities and their different contributions to full cognitive self-transcendence. 2.3 What Does Self-Appropriation Discover? Levels of Consciousness and the Human Subject as a Movement of Self-Transcendence What is discovered through self-appropriation? What is found, Lonergan argues, is a deeper and more detailed appreciation of the human person

Introduction

15

and of human agency, as well as a grasp of human conscious operations in all their polymorphic complexity. This includes in the first place: • • •

the discovery of the human person as a self-transcending being; an opening up to moral and spiritual transcendence and, thus, to the other person; and a detailed grasp of the basic levels of consciousness that ground cognitional and moral self-transcendence.

Then, as this book will argue, there follows: •

•

a grasp of the complexity of embodied consciousness: an awareness of the flexibility and variability of consciousness, of the concrete shifts to and fro between diverse patterns that mix and blend in ways that may complement or interfere with one another; and a grasp of the complexities of historical consciousness: an appreciation of how human consciousness develops and differentiates itself in history and of how diverse differentiations emerge to cope with different realms of meaning. This begins to explain how different cultures and world views and philosophies coexist in tension.

I will offer an account of how self-appropriation discovers the human person as self-transcending; then I will focus on cognitional self-transcendence. With regard to the latter I will offer an overview of the cognitional process as involving three dynamically related levels of conscious intentionality. To ground this overview I will then add further details concerning the quality of consciousness found at different levels of the cognitional process. This will prepare for a consideration of the important consequences of cognitional self-appropriation for the knower. 2.3.1 Discovering the Human Person as Self-Transcending First of all, there is the discovery of the human person as a self-transcending being. In the beginning Lonergan focused on cognitional transcendence (including scientific understanding). Later he developed a fuller account of the higher levels of transcendence: moral and religious. I will briefly present the fuller position as given in Method in Theology and then focus on cognition. Self-appropriation reveals the human person as a self-transcending being. It discovers an underlying dynamism within human consciousness that may be characterized as an unrestricted infinite desire to know (I 659) or as an unrestricted desire to grasp what is truly good (M 35). Ultimately

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the dynamism is a desire to be in love in an unrestricted way in religious and mystical consciousness (M 105–6). Hence as a natural desire to see God! The human person may also be characterized as a movement of transcendence that unites dynamically related levels of consciousness. For selfappropriation discovers and distinguishes and also relates the level of experiencing data, the level of intelligence grasping intelligibility and meaning, the level of critical reflection and judgment that apprehends the real, the level of evaluation and decision in responsible agency, and, finally, the level where the dynamism of human consciousness as a whole is brought to its ‘proper fulfilment.’ This highest level sublates and integrates and fulfils the lower levels. The search for intelligibility and meaning and knowledge, the desire for genuine values and relationships, and especially the human desire for being in love, all find their fulfilment in religious consciousness. For Lonergan, ‘the many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit’ (M 13). At each stage and in each situation this dynamism ‘calls forth and assembles the appropriate operations’ as it attentively and intelligently and reasonably and responsibly heads towards a ‘fuller and richer apprehension of the yet unknown or incompletely known totality, whole, universe’ (M 13). And beyond this is the fulfilment that may be experienced but that is never fully possessed, for it always remains a gift: Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted way. All love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfilment of that capacity. (M 106) With this background in place I can now move on to the details of cognitional self-appropriation. 2.3.2 Cognitive Self-Transcendence Self-appropriation is only achieved through a considerable prolonged effort of heightened self-attention. Lonergan claims that eventually selfappropriation discovers the human subject as a conscious ‘unity, identity, whole’ (I 271), whose consciousness unfolds through a number of dynamically related levels, each level involving distinct and irreducible kinds of conscious operations. The unity of consciousness is grasped as well as the

Introduction

17

diversity of conscious operations and their interrelations. In the first place, self-appropriation grasps the self as a knower. Later we will need to look in more detail at the levels of consciousness and at the operations proper to each level. For the moment I will present them in summary form as levels (a) of experiencing or presentation, (b) of inquiry, understanding, and insight, and (c) of reflection and judgment. And beyond the merely cognitional lies (d) the level of responsibility and decision. Lonergan explains how these levels unfold under the influence of a fundamental dynamism within the human spirit. This unfolding reveals a core structure to human consciousness (or alternatively expressed, it reveals human consciousness as a structured dynamism). According to Lonergan there is an underlying dynamism in human consciousness that may be characterized first of all as an unrestricted desire to know (I 659), and then as an unrestricted desire to grasp what is truly good (M 35). Ultimately, Lonergan holds that the dynamism, as found in religious and mystical consciousness, is a desire to be in love in an unrestricted way (M 105–6). As we have said, ‘The many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit’ (M 13). This underlying dynamism, as infinite desire to know, as desire for the truly good, as desire to be in love in an unrestricted way, manifests itself in different ways. In relation to cognition it first manifests itself as the ‘wonder’ that takes us from an initial level of empirical presentation, involving sensation and imagination, to intelligent inquiry and insight into data. Wonder, the desire to understand, provokes questions for intelligence: What is the intelligibility (if any) within the given data? Then the dynamism of the infinite desire to know takes the form of a critical reflection that takes us from the level of understanding to the level of full knowledge and truth. It provokes questions about the sufficiency of evidence or reasons for judging the correctness of insight. At this stage we attain cognitive self-transcendence as the desire to know is fulfilled, at least in relation to some particular point. Lonergan argues that at this stage we grasp human knowing as a dynamic structure. We are conscious of the underlying desire to know. We are conscious that each level contributes towards the fulfilment of the desire to know, identifying and attending to data, grasping intelligibility as possibly immanent in and emergent from data, judging the correctness of insight as explanatory of all the relevant data. Further knowledge would require additional data, new insights, further judgment, but the dynamic structure is then found to reoccur. This is Lonergan’s basic discovery. ‘Human knowing involves many distinct and irreducible activities’ (CS 206). And we are conscious of these

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activities as constituting a dynamic structure wherein lower levels and operations call forth higher-level operations. Human knowing is a structure assembled or actualized under the exigence of the infinite desire to know: Human knowing, then, is not experience alone, not understanding alone, not judgment alone … One has to regard an instance of human knowing … as a whole whose parts are operations. It is a structure and indeed a materially dynamic structure. But human knowing is also formally dynamic. It is self-assembling, self-constituting. It puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached. (CS 207) Cognitional inquiry, then, involves three dynamically related levels of conscious intentionality. These levels of consciousness are qualitatively distinct. So awareness of experiencing is not like awareness of understanding or consciousness of judging. However, they form a unity in diversity that is also consciously given. We are conscious of the transition between one level and another. We are conscious of the wonder or of the critical doubt or of the conscience that shifts us to higher levels. We grasp all three levels and the dynamism of consciousness as elements of our conscious self-presence and as held together by the unity of consciousness that is also consciously given: We do not experience the operations in isolation and then, by a process of inquiry and discovery, arrive at a pattern of relations that link them together. On the contrary, the unity of consciousness is itself given; the pattern of operations is part of the experience of the operating; and inquiry and discovery are needed, not to effect the synthesis of a manifold that as given is unrelated, but to analyze a functional and functioning unity. (M 17) We grasp a unity-in-diversity that is assembled or called forth, under the influence of the desire to know, manifested in wonder and critical reflection. Moreover, we are conscious of how our desire to know is fulfilled through the related operations of these levels of consciousness. In this way we appropriate human consciousness as a dynamic structure that enables us to achieve cognitive self-transcendence in particular judgments and that continually operates to keep us open to further self-transcendence: [Cognitive] operations, then, stand within a process that is formally dynamic, that calls forth and assembles its own components, that does so [consciously], intelligently, rationally, responsibly. (M 16)

Introduction

19

[The dynamic pattern of knowing] is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible; it is a conscious intending ever going beyond what happens to be given or known, ever striving for a fuller and richer apprehension of the yet unknown or incompletely known totality, whole, universe. (M 13) Human consciousness, then, is found to be a structured dynamism involving a set of irreducible components. In relation to knowing this structured dynamism is manifested as a cognitional structure uniting the first three levels of consciousness. What is given or experienced is inquired about. What inquiry discerns, grasps, and articulates is judged upon. And in judgment the unity-in-diversity of human consciousness is brought out. It is in judgment that the fact that the knowing is conscious throughout, and the unity in diversity of the different levels, becomes evident. To sum up: self-appropriation enables us to grasp human consciousness as a structured dynamism that aims for and partly achieves self-transcendence. At the level of cognition we discern cognitional structure that leads to cognitional self-transcendence. At the level of life and action we discern a structure of responsible agency that aims at moral self-transcendence. And beyond this we discern the full structure of personal consciousness that aims at intersubjective self-transcendence. If a further level of religious consciousness is recognized we begin to glimpse how the movement of self-transcendence, the dynamism of human consciousness, reaches its ‘proper fulfilment’ in an unrestricted love of God. This discovery of and focus on human consciousness as a structured dynamism is distinctive of Lonergan’s approach to the philosophy of knowledge. It enables him to integrate empiricist, idealist, and rationalist approaches to knowledge. It is also capable of opening out to discussions of contextualized knowledge, if patterns of experience and differentiations of consciousness are added to levels of consciousness. The unity of consciousness and of its conscious operations has to be experienced if we are to appropriate ourselves as knowers in an integral way. The whole process of knowing must be grasped as a whole. 2.3.3 Qualitatively Diverse Levels of Consciousness Having considered the process of cognition as a whole we can now return to the details. It is essential that the different levels of consciousness be appreciated as qualitatively distinct. Also, we have to grasp the different intensity of self-presence associated with each level. This is important because only such sensitivity to the quality of our cognitional operations will allow us to be effectively directed by the inner exigences of dynamic

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human consciousness, something we shall examine in the next section. We need to be aware that now we are failing to be attentive, now we are failing to be intelligent, now we are failing to be rational, and also and crucially that these are different failures. Lonergan says that ‘there is no reason to expect the several cognitional activities to resemble each other’ (CS 208). Experiencing is not like understanding, understanding is not like judgment. There is no simple analogy between the different operations: seeing a physical object is not like seeing the point of an argument (by some kind of inner look). Hence ‘if one is to proceed scientifically, each cognitional activity must be examined in and for itself and, no less, in its functional relations to other cognitional activities’ (CS 208). Lonergan warns us that this qualitative difference between levels of consciousness means that ‘different cognitional activities are not equally accessible’ (CS 208). To see, one has only to open one’s eyes: visual experiencing involves the sensibly given. But grasping intelligibility, discerning intelligible relationships in the data, is not so easily grasped, and the act of understanding is overlooked. Similarly, people often do not advert to exactly what is involved in making a judgment. Acts of seeing, of understanding, and of judging occur consciously. Yet for most people the act of seeing is more evident and obvious. Most people tend to be mystified when asked to say what understanding is. The reality of acts of understanding and of acts of judging only becomes evident for those who are willing to engage in the process of self-appropriation and raise the level of their performance and extend the breadth of their self-reflexive engagement in a variety of fields. Being attentive means different things in different contexts (a scientist and an artist are both attentive). Being intelligent in different fields makes different demands, and as we extend the range of fields our intelligent alertness and perceptiveness develops. Being rational and reasonable requires an appreciation of different kinds of evidence and of different ways of assessing sufficiency of evidence. Though the level of experience may be more evident than the levels of judgment, we can increase our awareness of cognitive operations at all levels. And we can do this in every realm of knowledge and of life, including science and religion. We not only clearly differentiate the levels but also can continuously deepen our sensitivity to these levels by exploring different fields. What, then, does cognitional appropriation discover? It discovers that human knowing is constituted by a set of qualitatively distinct conscious operations. We are aware of the complexity of given data that impinge on our consciousness. We find that they attract our attention in different ways. We respond to

Introduction

21

them according to our intellectual concerns (or aesthetic or practical or other concerns). We are conscious of exploring the data, selecting them according to our concern. We are aware of raising the question for intelligence in relation to the given data: What is this? We are aware of imaginatively exploring the data or of suggestively rearranging it in order to discover some kind of intelligibility within it. If we are intelligent, there may occur an insight into the data: we discover some intelligibility that may possibly be immanent in the data. Notice here that on Lonergan’s position we are conscious of ‘discovering’ intelligibility rather than ‘projecting’ or ‘constructing’ it. We find that we have moved from inquiry to understanding, from experiencing and investigating data to discerning intelligibility within them and to actualizing our understanding (and it is the latter that we are above all conscious of). We are aware of the act of judging. The dynamism of our intelligence moves us on to return to the data in light of the insight and ask whether we have sufficient reason and sufficient evidence to affirm the intelligibility as actually immanent in the concrete. We raise the question for reason: Is it so? It is here that we are conscious of ‘discovering’ intelligibility rather than projecting it. We are conscious of verifying or judging our understanding as existing objectively. This, again, is a conscious and rational process that can be explored. In judgment the process of knowing comes to a term and is completed in the achievement of cognitional self-transcendence. This reaching of the goal is experienced in rational self-consciousness. Surprisingly, it is this aspect of knowing that is most often overlooked. Yet it is crucial, for it brings out the unity of the whole process: ‘The reflective act … demands a [conscious] sweeping and critical review of the whole range of cognitional elements – the direct act itself [of insight], the dependability of the original image and sense experience; and, above all, the critical function of the constitutive force of the intellect itself [giving rise to the judgment].’7 The very process of reflection again indicates that the process of knowing is conscious throughout. There are diverse operations that are conscious in different ways. But they are all found in the unity of consciousness and they are all related in a conscious way. What is sensed can be imaginatively rearranged; what is sensed and imagined can be intelligently explored and understood; what is understood can be formulated and expressed; what is understood and conceptualized can be judged. The unity in diversity of consciousness in knowing becomes clear at this stage.

7 Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 71.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

The realizations that we can ‘discover’ intelligibility through insightinto-data and that we can grasp sufficiency of evidence through judgment are of great importance. This is what allows Lonergan to argue for critical realism against Kantian idealism or Humean empiricism. This has implications, for example, in philosophy of science, which has been influenced by both extreme empiricism and by insufficiently critical Kantian perspectives. By contrast, Lonergan’s critical realism provides a better basis for a proper understanding of how observation is related to hypothesis and theory, and for articulating exactly what is involved in verification and scientific judgments. The full force of Lonergan’s position is only appreciated if we consider the detailed treatment of experiencing, understanding, and judging given in the relevant sections of Insight. At the moment it is sufficient to appreciate the existence of the different levels and to be aware of their dynamic interrelations and to note how we consciously make the transition from one level to the next. This already indicates how nuanced Lonergan’s position is. It is important also to grasp that not only are we conscious of each level but also we are conscious of how we make the transition from one level to another. Our awareness of the ways in which we make the transition from one level of consciousness to the next comes out clearly if we examine the interactions of the first three levels. Data stimulate inquiry, inquiry includes the imaginative exploration that generates images to facilitate the production of insight, intelligence consciously makes the effort to conceptualize and express understanding, understanding is expressed hypothetically, and reflection consciously reviews the whole range of cognition elements (insight, images, sense data) to see whether the conditions are fulfilled for affirming a truth claim. 2.3.4 Achieving Cognitional Self-Appropriation: Self-Affirmation as a Knower Finally, through self-appropriation we discover ourselves as knowers. We not only transcend ourselves cognitionally to grasp being, we also discover ourselves as knowers. We come to know explicitly that we are knowers. If we are to become cognitionally self-appropriated in a definite way we need to apply consciousness as intentional to consciousness as self-presence. In relation to human knowing, this means we should reduplicate the structure of knowing in order to know knowing: • •

Am I a knower? Do I experience these conscious acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging?

Introduction

• •

23

Do I understand an intrinsic intelligibility and unity and relatedness among these operations? Am I able to judge and affirm that together these acts are sufficient for and culminate in full human knowing?

Lonergan holds that anyone can attend to his or her own acts of conscious intentionality and discover these diverse acts within. Moreover, he holds that anyone can be conscious of his/her dynamic relationship and discern a meaningful pattern in the dynamic sequence at hand. The meaningfulness of the pattern or structure is indicated especially in the nature of judgment as a reflective survey of the diverse acts and their implications. Finally, it is possible to judge that these are related in producing knowledge, that nothing else is required, and hence that you know yourself as a knower. Self-affirmation as a knower is a basic case of knowing. The aim of inquiring into the cognitional process is to arrive at the correct judgment that we can make correct judgments and arrive at knowledge. Self-affirmation of the knower is precisely this basic judgment. By ‘self’ is meant the concrete and intelligible (and intelligent) ‘unity, identity, whole.’ Self-affirmation of the knower involves the self-affirmation of the self as characterized by a set of operations (experiencing, understanding, judgment) that culminate in knowing. If knowing involves experiencing and understanding and judgment, then knowing knowing must reduplicate this structure. It must involve (a) awareness of experiencing, understanding, and judging, (b) an intelligent grasp of the intelligible relations among experience, understanding, and judgment, and (c) a judgment that this intelligible structure or relationship really is found and arrives at knowing. Lonergan argues that we can arrive at this self-affirmation because as well as being aware of the different kinds of operations, we are also aware of their unity in the unity of consciousness. My experience is taken up in my inquiry and is understood and judged by my intelligent and rational operations. Self-affirmation inevitably emerges when we reflect on our performances. 2.4 Why Is Self-Appropriation So Important? Cognitional Self-Appropriation and Intellectual Conversion What follows from self-appropriation? Why is it so important? Lonergan holds that a heightened awareness of a non-reflexive, preconceptual selfpresence leads to performative self-appropriation. When this stage is reached, our self-presence or consciousness-in performance constitutes a

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

guiding exigence, a normative dynamism that orients and judges performance (unless interfered with by external factors). We become experientially sensitive to whether or not particular cognitional operations are in harmony with cognitional self-presence. We experience irrationality as a ‘performative contradiction’ that frustrates our underlying orientation to truth. Selfappropriation should make us sensitive to our orientation to or intention of being and truth. It puts us in touch with the cognitional structures that are always operative in our consciousness. In this way we discover an underlying foundational, immanent ‘method’ that functions normatively in all our seeking for reality and truth. We find that sensitivity to the quality of our cognitional operations allows us to be directed effectively by the inner exigences of dynamic human consciousness. And, to repeat a point made earlier, we become aware that now we are failing to be attentive, now we are failing to be intelligent, now we are lacking judgment, and also and crucially that these are different failures. If we become appropriated in this way, intellectual conversion follows. Conversion is a personal and conscious change of outlook that determines all our responses and judgments. In the case of cognitive self-appropriation, to become sufficiently aware of the way in which consciousness is structured and the way it unfolds dynamically enables us to evaluate all knowledge claims in terms of a fundamental structure. Intellectual conversion implies that we are willing to measure assertions by the standard set by the structure immanently and dynamically unfolding within our consciousness, standards that we have both followed and appropriated in the act of self-affirmation as a knower. We choose to check all assertions by asking whether we have been sufficiently attentive, sufficiently intelligent, and sufficiently rational. We choose to follow the transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be rational – and then be reasonable. And we know what is involved at each level. At this stage, self-appropriation makes explicit the normative basis for human inquiry. Not, however, a basis or foundation in self-evident propositions. The basis is in the dynamic structure of consciousness. It may be asked whether or not these operations really exist. Lonergan insists that they are found in conscious performance. He points out that few want to admit to being inattentive, unintelligent, unreasonable, or irresponsible. He notes that the unity of the structure is also given. Few deny that they engage in both sensing and understanding and that what they experience is what they come to understand. Furthermore, in situation after situation the unity is presumed. The structure then is relatively irrevisable and is performatively invoked in every situation. It is concretely and immanently normative. This points to the most basic philosophical test: performative

Introduction

25

self-contradiction. A philosophical position should not deny the intelligent performance that gives rise to it. And particular concrete performance is most fruitful when it respects the inner exigence. A specific benefit, therefore, of self-appropriation is that it brings to light a fundamental criterion for assessing knowledge claims. Lonergan claims to have found a vantage point that is not confined to a fixed logical system. He has a different kind of basis, a different ground for normativity than logical consistency. What emerges as basic is performative consistency. His philosophy of consciousness points to levels of consciousness that are dynamically related in a structure that is always already operative in our conscious being, prior to our theorizing about them. The fixed basis is not a fixed theory or set of logical axioms or postulates; rather, it is a normative dynamism constituting us as intelligence-in-action. To that extent, it is misleading to call it ‘fixed.’ It is a dynamic orientation to truth and reality that unfolds spontaneously, that we are conscious of even if this is not reflected on, that is part of what we are. Lonergan suggests that if we get in touch with that immanent orientation we will become sensitive to any departure from it in particular intellectual inquiries or in mistaken theory. On this view, mistaken positions on basic philosophical issues will not be challenged merely from outside. Rather, the more effective move will be to point out a performative self-contradiction: a contradiction between an explicit (mistaken) theory and the aspects of the theorist’s intelligent cognitional performance that contradict his own claims: The scandal still continues that [philosophers] tend to disagree in the most outrageous fashion on basic philosophical issues. So they disagree about the activities named knowing, about the relation of those activities to reality, and about reality itself. However, differences on the third, reality, can be reduced to differences about the first and second, knowledge and objectivity. Differences on the second, objectivity, can be reduced to differences on the first, cognitional theory. Finally, differences in cognitional theory can be resolved by bringing to light the contradiction between a mistaken theory and the actual performance of the mistaken theorist. (M 20–1) An example of performative self-contradiction is found in Hume’s position on personal identity. Hume denies any personal identity or ‘I’: he says that if there were such a thing as personal identity, it could be discovered by introspection, by an inward look at the stream of consciousness. But all he discovers is a flow of disparate sensations and images – nothing to be identified with personal identity. Therefore, he concludes that there is no such thing.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Lonergan’s reply is to ask: Who raised the hypothesis ‘If there is personal identity, it will be found by looking within’? Who looked within to attempt to find relevant data? Who made the judgment that the evidence indicated the non-existence of personal identity? He points out that to raise a hypothesis is intelligent performance, that to consider evidence is rational performance, and that to attend to data is conscious performance. In other words, there is a subject of these performances and that subject is conscious, intelligent, and rational. The conclusion is that Hume’s performance implies what his theory denied (so much the worse for the theory). This completes the initial account of Lonergan’s philosophy, a philosophy of self-appropriation, as it concerns cognition. However, if we are looking for a key to philosophy in the contemporary world we need to consider the full range of human consciousness. That will be my argument in the main body of this work. Hence I add the following sections, which (a) introduce the patterns of experience that Lonergan identifies with polymorphic consciousness and the differentiations of consciousness that I present as further dimensions of polymorphism and (b) point out their potential significance for philosophical investigation and philosophical diversity. 2.5 The Further Dimensions of Self-Appropriation 2.5.1 Patterns of Polymorphic Consciousness (the interest-contexts of conscious intentionality) I have already pointed out that self-appropriation discovers that, while consciousness has a core structure, in addition it unfolds in flexible and diverse ways. Consciousness shifts to and fro between different concerns that redirect its attention and modify its basic structured dynamism in various ways. Hence, while in Insight Lonergan concentrates on cognition, he also presents a more comprehensive account of human consciousness as ‘polymorphic’ (I 410, 204–14). A good part of this book will be given over to a closer look at such polymorphism. Here I sketch out the position as preparation for the later details. To repeat a point made earlier, it is arguable that the polymorphism of human consciousness is the real focus of Lonergan’s enterprise. For selfappropriation extends beyond simply cognitional self-appropriation, and the differences between cultures that provoked his investigations into selfappropriation are not merely intellectual. Hence from the account of the levels of consciousness we must now turn to an account of the patterns of consciousness within which the levels unfold.

Introduction

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Initially Lonergan characterized polymorphism in terms of a range of ‘patterns of experience’: biological, aesthetic, artistic, intellectual, practical, dramatic, mystical, and religious. ‘Each of the patterns is named for the governing or dominant interest which organizes the flow: biological survival; beauty and aesthetic liberation from practical or intellectual routine; intellectual understanding of truth, dignity and self respect in the drama of life; efficiently getting things done; worshipful openness.’8 This polymorphic diversity is in many ways a familiar phenomenon. We are not merely knowers devoting ourselves only to the search for truth, in the intellectual pattern. Sometimes we focus in our knowing and doing on biological needs or on the exercise of embodiment. We may give ourselves over to the joy of experiencing for its own sake in an aesthetic mode. Alternatively, we immerse ourselves in a dramatic interpersonal encounter. At times we may allow the unrestricted desire to know to dominate. Full self-appropriation involves appreciating what we are doing in all these patterns. Cognitional self-appropriation is only one dimension of a more encompassing account of the polymorphism of human consciousness. The significance of recognizing polymorphism comes out if we realize that operating in different patterns modifies the unfolding of the core dynamic structure of consciousness. Operating within a particular pattern, under the influence of its dominant concern, affects our presence to self at the various levels of consciousness. Our awareness at the levels of experiencing, understanding, judgment, and deciding ‘advances or recedes’ according to the pattern we are in. So, for example, in the biological pattern we are keenly aware of experiencing but the operations of understanding and judging recede into the background or do not even emerge. In the dramatic pattern we may be intensely aware of decisions and interactions with others. In the aesthetic and artistic pattern intelligence is there and even a straining after truth, but the aim is not to define or acquire theoretical understanding or to verify truth; rather, the aim is to manifest meaning and truth in the work of art. The further significance comes out when we notice also that patterns may coexist and support one another or conflict and interfere with one another. The patterns coexist in tension. So the aesthetic pattern may provide images leading to insight in the intellectual pattern. On the other hand, an aesthetic concern may resist the movement towards the conceptualization of truth and insist on indulging in the movement of exploration of experience for the sake of experience.

8 M. Morelli, ‘Lonergan’s Unified Theory of Consciousness,’ 184.

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Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

The implications of polymorphism are considerable. Each of us as a human being or a scientist or a theologian or even a philosopher is affected by it. Differing combinations of patterns shape different cultures, different philosophies, and different characters. Recognizing polymorphism is a first step in appreciating differences and in facilitating a dialogue between diverse positions. Here it is important to appreciate that as well as discovering particular truths, philosophy is also about discerning sources of meaning and about illuminating different dimensions of human life and culture. 2.5.2 The Differentiations of Developing Consciousness In Method in Theology (M 302–5) Lonergan examines the developments in consciousness, which he calls differentiations. He points out how historically the resourcefulness of human intelligence has led to the emergence of symbolic consciousness, practical and dramatic common sense, and theoretic and scientific understanding as well as artistic and religious modes of consciousness. Differentiations of consciousness emerge as we develop the ability to apply basic operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and evaluation and deciding in the specialized ways appropriate to diverse contexts. Again I offer a brief anticipation of what will be presented and analysed in much greater detail later. Beginning with a relatively undifferentiated symbolic consciousness, we become able to operate efficiently in a commonsense context and we may go on to develop the cognitional skills required for theoretical thinking. As we do so the horizon of our understanding and our action is extended. Human consciousness then may be undifferentiated to some greater or lesser degree. We can operate mainly in a symbolic mode or we can acquire practical common sense or theoretic and systematic ways of thinking or aesthetic and religious outlooks. We can be scholars or experts in practical action. Differentiations are dynamic skills. They can emerge, advance, or recede (M 98, 273, 278). A later scientific-theoretic differentiation can modify common sense. The non-scientist has some awareness at the level of common sense of computers and genetic science and scientific advance. The specialist can lose the ability to operate in the commonsense mode. There are many ways to and many degrees of differentiation. The significance of adverting to the differentiations of consciousness is as great as that of noting the patterns. The differentiations help explain how specialists will struggle to communicate with people of common sense. They are particularly important in explaining diversity of cultures. ‘Conflict within a culture is partly a matter of clashes of persons of vari-

Introduction

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ously differentiated consciousness … Conflicts between cultures are often a function of differing combinations of conscious differentiations [for these] exercise a prevalent influence in establishing operative sets of meanings and value to guide different ways of life.9 Cultures may focus on symbolic modes of thinking; they may develop an ecological differentiation that involves an awareness of the rhythms of the natural world. They may focus on the practical dimensions of socio-political life. Equally they may be dominated by a theoretical outlook or be further specialized by giving priority to the empirical sciences. Tensions may arise between commonsense modes and theoretic modes (or between religious modes and scientific modes). This tends to give rise to critical self-reflection and self-appropriation (and the differentiation of ‘interiority,’ the differentiation that deals with differentiations). For example, the recent focus on the ‘clash of civilizations’ has stimulated thinking about cross-cultural communication. For Lonergan what is needed in such situations is a higher level of differentiation: a differentiation that reflects on differentiations. This is the differentiation of ‘interiority’ that ‘provides the standpoint from which all the differentiations can be explored’ (M 305). A fully differentiated mind shifts to a new level of selfappropriation that is able to appreciate the emergence of new, different differentiations as well as the continuing relevance of earlier differentiations. Such a mind remains open to the value of different perspectives and has a greater ability to cross over into other horizons. Later I will argue that the differentiations of consciousness may be seen as developmental polymorphism and as such constitute part of the key to philosophy. 2.6 The Philosophical Significance of Patterns and Differentiations 2.6.1 Discriminating Intellectual and Existential Concerns In the first place, this extended self-appropriation enables one to grasp the complexities of consciousness proper to embodied consciousness. It enables one to discriminate between diverse cognitive and other concerns and so avoid ambiguity and confusion: The point here … is [self-]appropriation; the point is to discover, to identify, to become familiar with, the activities of one’s own intelligence; the point is to become able to discriminate with ease and from

9 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 537.

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personal conviction between one’s purely intellectual activities and the manifold of other ‘existential’ concerns that invade and mix and blend with the operations of intellect to render it ambivalent and its pronouncements ambiguous. (I 14) Another way of putting the point is that self-appropriation enables one to appreciate how diverse patterns of experience may coexist and support or complement one another or conflict and interfere with one another. Hence to appreciate how diverse modes of knowing can complement one another as well as conflict with one another. If levels of consciousness and patterns of experience and differentiations of consciousness are not explicitly appropriated they mix and blend in unhelpful ways. Hence unnecessary opposition and tensions emerge between intellectual concerns in science and religious concerns in theology, for example. 2.6.2 Discovering the Historical Development of Human Understanding The account of the differentiations of consciousness reveals the historicity of human consciousness. It shows how self-appropriation discovers that human understanding may occur in symbolic-mythical modes (or ecological), or in practical and commonsense ways, or in interpersonal and dramatic ways, or in theoretic ways, or in theoretic-empirical specializations, or in mystical modes. Different cultures manifest and develop these in different combinations and to different degrees. A sufficiently differentiated consciousness will be well placed to appreciate the distinctiveness and difference of other cultures as well as the complementarity of all these modes. Philosophy does not escape the influence of differentiation as it arises in individual minds or in cultures. Hence in order to enter into a wide range of philosophies we need to appropriate the differentiations of consciousness that emerge as human minds develop in history. 2.6.3 The Fundamental Significance: Critical Mediation between Horizons To sum up, we can say that the most significant thing about self-appropriation is that it provides the ability to critically mediate between different modes of knowing and different horizons of meaning. The appropriation of the dynamic structure of cognition, the qualitively distinct levels of consciousness, the different patterns of experience, and the diverse differentiations of consciousness all contribute to this.

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This integral self-appropriation brings about an increased ability to ‘know by connaturality’ – that is, the ability to enter into other perspectives precisely because these perspectives are generated by the same structured dynamism that I also possess. There is a greater ability to go beyond conceptual end products and fixed concepts so as to interpret in a deeper way (both the hermeneutics of suspicion and of retrieval are affected). There is an increased sensitivity to performative self-contradiction; there is an ability to re-express other positions in a way that brings out openings to dialogue. The more we can appropriate what we are doing in different realms of knowledge, the more we will discover that they are open to one another. In terms of the theme of this book, integral self-appropriation amounts to a grasp of polymorphic consciousness that gives us a key to philosophical and cultural diversity. This completes the overview of Lonergan’s philosophy of self-appropriation. It highlights the core achievement, cognitional self-appropriation, and also offers pointers to the other dimensions of self-appropriation that are relevant to full human living (and possibly to the full spectrum of diverse philosophies). I hope that it has provided both an entry point for newcomers to Lonergan’s philosophy and also a point of departure for the following critique, evaluation, and development of Lonergan’s account of polymorphic consciousness as the key to philosophy.

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1 Aims/Relevance/Procedure

The aim of this book is to take a few initial steps towards clarifying and evaluating a basic claim made by Lonergan in Insight. There Lonergan appears to make the intriguing but problematic claim that ‘the polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy’ (I 452). The main question to be addressed is this: What precisely is meant by polymorphism? However, given the nature of Lonergan’s claim we must also ask another question: Can polymorphism bear the weight of Lonergan’s claim? What kind of key is it? Would other philosophers recognize it as a key? Does the notion of polymorphism provide the basis for a fruitful approach to metaphilosophy?1 1

A Metaphilosophical Project?

First of all there is a preliminary question. Is Lonergan serious in his assertion? Is this a throwaway line or a serious claim that polymorphism is the basis of, or at least the key component of, a comprehensive metaphilosophy? As I hope to show, Lonergan does indeed make a serious claim to possess an important key to philosophy. However, a clarification is in order. What Lonergan is claiming to provide is a key to philosophical pluralism and to dialogue about philosophical pluralism. I will argue that Lonergan 1 For a useful discussion of the nature of metaphilosophy, see Grisez, ‘Toward a Metaphilosophy.’ James Parker was the first commentator to apply the notion of metaphilosophy to Lonergan. See his ‘The Scandal of Philosophy: The Contributions of Bernard J.F. Lonergan to Metaphilosophy.’ I seek to clarify the notion of metaphilosophy in the next section.

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makes a significant contribution in this regard, though I would also suggest that there are other keys to the contemporary pluralism in philosophy. In the first place I will argue that Lonergan, for various reasons, does not succeed completely in establishing his position, even in the area he chooses to focus on. But I will also argue that a more fully developed account of polymorphism is possible, one that would be more convincing than the account presented in Insight. I note that the claim to have ‘the key to philosophy’ is especially problematic in the contemporary postmodern and postcolonial context, which hesitates over any metanarrative that overlooks difference and heads for closure. Is Lonergan offering a paradigm of totalization or a nuanced and radical and responsible concern for the ‘other’?2 In other words, does polymorphism provide a basis for a postmodern metaphilosophy as well as a standard account of philosophical difference? I will suggest that this is the case. Lonergan has the beginnings of a metaphilosophy that is able to respond to postmodern concerns. A related aim will be to show how Lonergan provides the basis for an approach to comparative philosophy that goes beyond cultural imperialism and that avoids being unnecessarily Eurocentric (M 25).3 Is Lonergan serious in his claim? For some commentators, polymorphism is simply the chaos of consciousness that we overcome or escape from by intellectual conversion. Lonergan’s writings themselves give this impression at times. But to understand polymorphism in this way does not, I will argue, leave intact polymorphism’s role as a key to philosophy. I will show, first of all, how the claim is too strong to dismiss easily in this way. Polymorphism is explicitly proposed as the ‘one and only key’ to philosophy. Hence we need to consider the possibility that it is a proper outcome of his thought, that it is intrinsic to his overall position (and also that the claim survives the transposition to Method in Theology, where it is strengthened by the treatment of the differentiations of consciousness). Second, given the centrality of the claim, the term ‘polymorphism’ must be closely examined in order to show how and why the claim has weight. Here I argue that despite ambiguities in Lonergan’s account, a very definite meaning of the term emerges that can be shown to have metaphilosophical implications. In the first place, then, I hold that far from being a throwaway line, the claim reflects a life-long project of methodological reorientation and the integration of knowledge.4 Lonergan from very early on was concerned

2 Lawrence, ‘The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other.’ 3 See also Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, ch. 17. 4 McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 227–90.

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with problems of pluralism, relativism, and diversity of viewpoints and with the development of speculative thought and wisdom. In Gratia Operans,5 he showed how the human mind is always the human mind: it is always able to link the diverse series of speculative investigations as stages on the way to systematic theological theorems. In Verbum he deals with introspective rational psychology and with the wisdom that integrates partial viewpoints. In Insight he treats of polymorphism and of the philosophy of philosophies that can explain philosophic difference. At each stage he advances on two fronts: at the level of self-awareness and at the level of methodological and philosophic reflection. Hence we may see the claim as emerging, in the first place, from the unfolding of Lonergan’s original and early talent for self-attentiveness (primarily in the cognitional realm but extending into the moral and religious realms).6 The claim, then, is an extension of Lonergan’s earlier appreciation of the fundamental importance of the self-awareness by which intelligence or spirit is aware of its own activity (V 47). The later emphasis on polymorphic consciousness is a natural extension of the earlier achievement. It involves a fuller grasp of the many dimensions of human conscious and intentional life. This establishes a basis for anticipating diversity in human development and hence in philosophy. Second, the seriousness of Lonergan’s claim is consonant with the beginning of Insight, in both the Preface and the Introduction. Lonergan speaks of ‘insight into insight’ leading to a ‘philosophy of philosophies.’ Insight into insight involves ‘a unification and organization of other departments of knowledge’ (I 5), which is philosophy. Furthermore, it leads to an explanation of ‘the existence of a multiplicity of philosophies’ and of ‘the series of mistaken metaphysical and anti-metaphysical positions’ (I 6). In addition it throws light on ‘the meaning of meaning.’ Lonergan argues that he had to extend his inquiry to the limit: ‘In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way, an effort that is in principle incomplete is equivalent to a failure’ (I 7). Third, his intention of producing a philosophy of philosophies and an integration of all areas of knowledge is evident in the later sections. It is evident in the account of metaphysics as ‘the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being’ (I 416). Such a heuristic structure ‘would contain in itself the order that binds other departments into a single intelligible whole’ (I 417). The intention of a comprehensive metaphilosophy is par5 See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of Subject Thomas Aquinas. See also idem, ‘The Gratia Operans Dissertation.’ 6 For a detailed account of Lonergan’s intellectual development until the writing of Insight, see Liddy, Transforming Light.

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ticularly evident in chapter 17 of Insight. As Doran points out,7 this chapter begins and ends with a reference to Hegel’s challenge to account in a sympathetic yet convincing way for a multiplicity of philosophies (I 553, 617). The Hegelian requirement is for an account of other views that goes beyond a negative critique. It seeks to appreciate the positive contribution of other positions towards a deeper appreciation of the nature of philosophy and of the philosophic mind.8 Lonergan’s response to Hegel’s requirement is to develop his account of the ‘universal viewpoint’ (I ch. 17), in which the notion of polymorphism plays a central role. His account of philosophical hermeneutics, which invokes the universal viewpoint and polymorphism, is aimed at understanding diverse philosophical texts and at explaining how a multiplicity of philosophies may be integrated. All this is clearly part of the metaphilosophical exercise. Fourth, the extension of the project may be found in Method. Lonergan was originally motivated to develop a metaphilosophy because his theological concerns demanded this prior clarification. The search for a fundamental method of philosophy continues inasmuch as it is part of the search for an adequate theological method. There is, then, a theological motivation for Lonergan’s concern with philosophic difference and method. The disputed questions of philosophy are said to ‘strangle theology’ (LE 32). Lonergan takes up the issue in Method: ‘The scandal still continues that men, while they tend to agree on scientific questions, tend to disagree in the most outrageous fashions on basic philosophical issues’ (M 20). Furthermore, Method clarifies Lonergan’s distinctive characterization of philosophy. It makes explicit the transposition effected by generalized empirical method and by transcendental method. The intimate connection between philosophy and the self-appropriation of interiority is clearly laid out: ‘Philosophy finds its [most] proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the root of philosophic differences and incomprehensions’ (M 95). 7 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 592. 8 Hence in some ways the Hegelian challenge may be deeper than the postmodern challenge. On this see Rapp, Fleeing the Universal. Rapp argues that the main problems with post-rationalism (postmodernism) were already recognized by Hegel and Santayana. A similar stance is taken by William Desmond in Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness. Desmond attempts to show how sameness and difference may be held in dialectical tension. Lawrence E. Cahoone, in The Ends of Philosophy, takes up the question of how to relate postmodernism and the tradition. He argues that postmodern relativism raises serious questions but does not show that the tradition need be rejected wholesale.

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Lonergan also makes explicit a second role of philosophy, which is to distinguish, relate, and ground the several realms of meaning and to ground the method of the sciences and so promote their unification (M 95). This secondary role is also expressed in terms of interdisciplinary collaboration: It is in the measure that special methods acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms common to all the sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be attained for attacking interdisciplinary problems, and that the sciences will be mobilized within a higher unity of vocabulary, thought and orientation, in which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the solution of fundamental problems. (M 23) This way of approaching philosophy by means of transcendental method, understood as ‘a heightening of consciousness that brings to light our conscious and intentional operations’ (M 25), has transcultural significance: Clearly [transcendental method] is not transcultural inasmuch as it is explicitly formulated. But it is transcultural in the realities to which the formulations refer, for these realities are not the product of any culture, but, on the contrary, the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. Moreover since it is to these realities we refer when we speak of homo sapiens, it follows that these realities are transcultural with respect to all truly human cultures. (M 282) There is, then, in Lonergan’s writings, evidence for a serious metaphilosophical enterprise. The term is not Lonergan’s, but characterizing his enterprise in this way links it to a wider dialogue. In this wider discussion, witnessing to a relatively recent metaphilosophical turn, the underlying concern is to situate philosophy in an explanatory way. Lonergan’s concern was to characterize the nature and method of philosophical modes of thinking in a way that would clarify the place of philosophy in culture,9 and that would throw light on the relationship between ‘philosophy and its other.’10

9 M. Morelli, Philosophy’s Place in Culture: A Model. 10 Desmond, Philosophy and Its Others: Ways of Being and Mind.

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A strong case may be made, then, for holding that Lonergan was engaged in a project that aimed at a new account of the nature and method of philosophy and of its relationship to other disciplines and to human life, including cultural diversity. Lonergan clearly intended to deal with such a complex of interrelated issues. And such a project clearly fits into the type of inquiry designated ‘metaphilosophical.’ In the first number of Metaphilosophy, the editors noted the growing number of publications on topics such as the ‘justification or characterization of philosophical methods and arguments’ and ‘the relations between philosophy and other disciplines.’ Such metadiscussions, they pointed out, were growing in number. This indicated the ‘emergence of a new cluster of problems and interests,’ which it seemed appropriate to call ‘metaphilosophy.’11 However, they held back from any definition, preferring to leave the concept loosely characterized and open-ended. A particular and definite characterization of metaphilosophy was, however, given by Morris Lazerowitz, who seemed to have coined the term.12 In a brief note written for the first number of Metaphilosophy, he explained his own understanding of the term. It refers to ‘the special kind of investigation which Wittgenstein had described as one of the “heirs” of philosophy.’13 He went on to interpret Wittgenstein in a narrow way: metaphilosophy is a method of detecting philosophical and metaphysical misuses of language. Wittgenstein, then, is placed in the category of a metaphilosopher. But here a difficulty arises. A survey of recent philosophy gives evidence for thinking of the present age as ‘the age of metaphilosophy.’ Heidegger, for example, may also be seen as offering a metaphilosophy, a metaphilosophy that reveals the tradition as a ‘forgetfulness of Being.’ The pluralism of philosophies has now become a pluralism of metaphilosophies, certainly a pluralism of attempted critiques of the whole of previous philosophy (with postmodernism as the latest and most extreme critique, sometimes calling for the end of metaphysics and the end of philosophy). This raises the problem of how to assess metaphilosophies. Perhaps one of the best tests remains that of Hegel. A metaphilosophy should be able to sympathetically explain the emergence of diverse positions: it should explain how they are generated and be able to retrieve what is genuine in 11 Terrell Ward Bynum and William L. Reese, ‘Introduction,’ Metaphilosophy 1, no. 1 (January 1970): XX. 12 In his ‘A Note on “Metaphilosophy,”’ 91, Lazerowitz claims that he coined the term in a book review published in Mind (July 1942). 13 Lazerowitz, ‘A Note on “Metaphilosophy,”’ 91.

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them before exposing them to negative dialectical critique. A geneticodialectical account is called for.14 How does Lonergan relate to this? His project, I would argue, is a serious response to the widespread felt need to rethink the relationship between culture and philosophy. It is part of a movement of thought that emerged in Kant and Hegel; that gathered momentum in Marechal, who influenced Lonergan’s reading of Aquinas, as well as in the later thinkers Heidegger and Wittgenstein; and that reached a crisis point in Rorty, Derrida, and Foucault. In my view, Lonergan is moving towards a comprehensive, critical, nuanced (genetic and dialectic) metaphilosophy that scores highly in comparison with Wittgenstein and Heidegger when tested according to Hegel’s criterion. Furthermore, Lonergan has resources for responding to the apparently more radical metaphilosophies (or antiphilosophies) that call for an ‘end to philosophy’ or for a dissolving of philosophy back into the multiplicity of life or into literature. In other words, he is able to meet the challenge of a postmodernism that would deconstruct all metanarratives.15 For radical postmodernism, any attempt at an all-inclusive ‘system’ is seen as a regression to philosophical imperialism. The search for cognitive foundations is immediately suspect in an antifoundational age. Lonergan, I believe, offers a basis for a metaphilosophy that is not dictatorial or reductionary of the ‘other,’ and he shows how a project of cognitive integration need not deny legitimate plurality. My main task, which is challenge enough for one book, will be to clarify the role of polymorphism in Lonergan’s own metaphilosophy. Hence I will not be able to engage other approaches to metaphilosophy in a detailed way. However, I will mention some other approaches in order to throw light on the possible relevance of Lonergan’s work to the contemporary concern with metaphilosophy.

14 As Mark Morelli indicates in his important reflections on ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness and the Prospects for a Lonerganian History of Philosophy.’ 15 Here again, Lonergan’s approach overlaps with that of Rapp (Fleeing the Universal), Desmond (Desire, Dialectic and Otherness), and Cahoone (The Ends of Philosophy). His thought also has similarities with that of Roochnik, who, in The Tragedy of Reason: Towards a Platonic Conception of Logos, defends ‘logos’ against postmodern critiques. Roochnik argues that though ‘the specifically technical conception of reason developed in the last 400 years is dehumanizing, classical logos is not the culprit’ (xi). He finds Cartesianism and postmodernism to be simply ‘flipsides of a single coin’ (xii). The Platonic conception of logos can be shown to be richer and more humane than either. The same may be said, I would argue, of Lonergan’s notion of logos.

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Ambiguities about Polymorphism

The case for Lonergan’s concern with a metaphilosophical project is now evident. But what is polymorphism? And how is polymorphism the key to this project? Lonergan explicitly affirms it as the key. It first appears at the beginning of the chapter on ‘The Method of Metaphysics’ (I ch. 14). It is significant that the original title of this chapter was ‘The Dialectic of Philosophy’ and that the first subheading was ‘The Ground of the Dialectic’ (I 798). Polymorphism is here presented as the primary factor in the origin of philosophic difference and in the tensions among diverse philosophies. But what exactly is polymorphism? Indeed, the meaning is surprisingly difficult to pin down. There are a number of ambiguities in Lonergan’s own presentation, which constitute an obstacle to a clear, coherent, and integral account of polymorphism. Lonergan fails to provide a coherent account of the various ways in which the term is used. Hence the overall account remains undeveloped. This has the serious implication of drastically reducing the effectiveness of the use of polymorphism as the key. Therefore, this book will aim at a more systematic account of polymorphism that will resolve ambiguities in the presentation of Lonergan’s philosophy as a whole and so begin to reveal the full potential of his metaphilosophical key. The range of ambiguities in Lonergan’s treatment of polymorphism is now outlined. 2.1 A Typical Example of Ambiguity There are no interpreters without polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. (I 590) There is, then, a universe of meaning, and its four dimensions are the full range of possible combinations (1) of experiences and lack of experiences, (2) of insights and lack of insights, (3) of judgments and of failure to judge, and (4) of the various orientations of the polymorphic consciousness of man. (I 590) In the measure that one explores human experiences, human insights, human reflection, and human polymorphic consciousness, one becomes capable, when provided with the appropriate data, of approximating to the content and context of the meaning of any given viewpoint. (I 590) These passages place polymorphism at the centre but also reveal a certain ambiguity. They leave unclear the relation between basic intentionality,

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unfolding in the levels of consciousness, and the orientation due to the patterns of experience. Do these passages imply that levels of consciousness and the dynamic structure relating them are something apart from the polymorphism of consciousness rather than something included within polymorphism? For Lonergan there is a dynamic structure relating the three levels of consciousness that is foundational. Yet much depends on how we relate this structure and these levels to polymorphism. Is this an account of a structure at the core of a comprehensive polymorphism, an embedded intentionality therefore? Or is polymorphism simply an extrinsic factor that impinges only negatively, as Lonergan sometimes seems to imply? Furthermore, there is a tension between the first passage, which speaks of polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness, and the other two passages, which seem to separate polymorphism and intentionality – that is, polymorphism and ‘human experiences, human insights, and human reflection.’ Is this an incipient ‘dualism’ of intellectual subject and engaged, existential, subject? Hence questions arise as to whether we should be looking for a way of expressing the unity of all the elements and structures and modalities and exigencies and dynamisms of consciousness prior to emphasizing distinctions relevant to normative concerns. My answer is that more attention needs to be given to the unity of the unity-in-tension of the polymorphic human subject. We need a phenomenological, positive account that allows us to appreciate the range of polymorphism of consciousness as a fact, as a given, before we focus on what might be the negative implications. These passages exemplify the kind of ambiguity that is pervasive in Lonergan’s account of polymorphism. In particular they point to a general difficulty with Lonergan’s presentation. The focus on the intellectual pattern aids clarity, but in these passages and elsewhere it also overprivileges the intellectual pattern in a way that makes it difficult to appropriate the concrete, existential, historic, engaged polymorphic subject. 2.2 Polymorphism and the Moving Viewpoint When first encountered, at the beginning of chapter 14 of Insight, polymorphism is presented in a way that refers us back to, or seems to refer us back to, the patterns of experience treated in chapter 6. A polymorphic mind is a mind found to be patterned in diverse ways. These ways ‘blend or mix’; they may ‘interfere’ and ‘conflict’; they may endure, collapse, or become distorted (I 410); they may support, or mediate, or act as condi-

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tions of possibility for one another;16 they may succeed one another, or alternate between one another. Polymorphism refers to this diversity of patterns that orient consciousness according to different concerns. The remark that ‘polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy’ makes it seem that they are the only cause of diversity. However, the reference to ‘polymorphic unities’ (I 590) in the passage just quoted shows that chapter 6 has not said the last word on polymorphism. Morelli suggests that this reference and the mention of dynamic structures (I 591) bring to mind chapter 11 of Insight,17 which deals with self-affirmation and the unity of consciousness and also introduces the notion of the invariant dynamic structure. He argues that if we bring the results of chapter 11 forward, we begin to take more seriously the mention of the unity-in-tension of human consciousness found in chapter 14. Light is also thrown on the reference to ‘polymorphic unities’ given in chapter 17. We find that reason reflects on the unity or the unity-in-tension of the patterns. Here we begin to see a relationship between patterns of experience and levels of consciousness. Together they constitute a single dynamic structure: a polymorphic unity. Hence Lonergan is able to say that ‘philosophy rests not on the account of experience, of insight, of judgment, and of polymorphic consciousness but on the defining pattern of relations that bring these four into a single dynamic structure’ (I 591). This single dynamic structure is the polymorphic subject. If this is so, then we can begin to see levels of consciousness as elements in a wider and more integral account of polymorphism. The argument will be considered in more detail later. The point at the moment is that a full account of polymorphism must take into consideration the moving viewpoint. This is supported by another link between chapter 14 and chapter 17. Towards the end of chapter 14, Lonergan introduces the theme of the historical development of consciousness and connects this with polymorphism. He speaks of ‘the historically developing but polymorphic consciousness of man’ (I 453). This may be taken as a reference to chapter 17, which takes up the theme of developing consciousness in relation to the dialectic of philosophy. Chapter 17 in turn may be taken as pointing forward to the new context of Method. At each stage polymorphism needs to be rethought.

16 Lonergan neglects these positive aspects of the relations among the patterns. In my view the positive aspects are essential for appreciating how polymorphism is the key to philosophy. 17 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 388–99.

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2.3 The Dialectical Application of Polymorphism The need to take note of the moving viewpoint becomes evident when we examine closely how the term polymorphism is introduced. As has been mentioned, the term is first encountered at the beginning of chapter 14 of Insight. It is referred to constantly throughout this chapter on ‘The Method of Metaphysics.’ However, the context in which the term is introduced raises many questions so that interpretation is difficult. The context is that of an important dialectic in philosophy: the dialectic of position and counterposition. Chapter 14 begins by referring back to three previous chapters that treat knowing, being, and objectivity. Lonergan states that we can set up ‘antitheses’ (I 410) to the positions established. Against the objectivity reached by intelligent inquiry and critical reflection stands ‘the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness.’ Against the concrete universe of being stands the ‘already out there now real.’ Against self-affirmation as a knower there stands the ‘native bewilderment of the existential subject’ (I 410). Lonergan points out that these are not ‘pure logical alternatives’ (I 410). It is at this point that we first hear of polymorphism: But in each case both the thesis and the antithesis have their ground in the concrete unity in tension that is man … For human consciousness is polymorphic. The patterns in which it flows may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual or mystical. These patterns alternate, they blend and mix, they interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down. (I 410) The first and main point to make here is that the context in which polymorphism is introduced determines the way in which it is treated. The concern is with the dialectic of position and counterposition. This means that the primary aim is not to elucidate the meaning of polymorphism but to apply it in the realm of philosophical issues. The result is a narrowing down of interest to the biological and intellectual pattern. The other patterns are not invoked. Furthermore, the biological pattern is developed in a narrow and negative way. On the whole, then, we should not look to chapter 14 for a complete account of polymorphism or of the meaning of the patterns.18 The second issue concerns the relationship (or identification) of polymorphism with the patterns of experience. The polymorphism of consciousness means, apparently, that consciousness is ‘variously patterned’

18 Ibid., 385–8.

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and that these patterns alternate and blend and mix and interfere and conflict. At first glance the text seems to unambiguously make polymorphism a matter of patterns and their interrelations. Hence to understand polymorphism we need to be very clear on how we understand the patterns. This implies that we must return to chapter 6 of Insight and examine what is said there about the patterns and how they are concretely related (though the details of the practical and mystical patterns at least must be added). However, caution is needed in accepting the identification of patterns and polymorphism. The identification should not be taken at face value, says Morelli,19 especially if we are basing our understanding of the patterns solely on the treatment of the patterns in chapter 6. Morelli makes the point, already mentioned in connection with the moving viewpoint, that we need to relate patterns of experience and levels of consciousness if we are to understand polymorphism more adequately. This again takes us back to the discussion of polymorphic unities (I 590). It also involves us in the discussion of the ‘basic invariant structure of cognitive process’ (I 389) and of the ‘other equally dynamic structures’ (I 422) that may be identified with the patterns. 2.4 An Ontological or Cognitional Account? Even if we take the link between polymorphism and patterns as unproblematic, there is another obstacle to a clear account of polymorphism. The issue may be seen to arise if we examine a brief passage in Lonergan’s exposition that is often overlooked. Lonergan says that thesis and antithesis are both rooted in ‘the unity in tension’ (I 410) that is man. These words may be taken as pointing to the tension between the evolutionary inherited biological pattern and the patterns derived from intelligence. But they may be taken as referring to a more basic duality in human consciousness and hence to a tension in the structure of human being. This more basic tension is that between the psyche and unfolding intentionality. Shute puts it this way: ‘The demands of sensitive living and the exigencies of intellectual development create in the human being a conscious tension which requires negotiation.’20 Lonergan may be read, then, as suggesting that the more basic tension will manifest itself in the relationship between the patterns. The point I want to emphasize here is that the account of the tension may be taken in cognitional or ontological terms. Generally the account of

19 Ibid., 388. 20 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectics of History, 21.

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the patterns is presented in both descriptive and phenomenological terms and also in an explanatory and ontological way in terms of the organicpsychic-intellectual structure of the human being. However, Lonergan does not fully articulate the metaphysical background. Hence the patterns are not fully understood. It seems important to provide a more detailed account in order to throw light on what is meant by pattern of experience. As well, this may be of great value in showing how the patterns treated or mentioned by Lonergan are non-arbitrary: they arise out of the embodied nature of consciousness. 2.5 The Range of Patterns: Bimorphism or Polymorphism? There are further difficulties in the account of polymorphism in terms of patterns. Lonergan is not clear on the range of patterns contributing to polymorphism, nor are the patterns given equal treatment. At different places in Insight, Lonergan offers different lists of patterns. Some of the patterns are treated in detail, some are mentioned without being developed, some seem to be implied but are never made explicit. This lack of a detailed treatment tends to obscure the non-arbitrary nature of the patterns and also severely reduces the possible relevance of polymorphism as a key. The small group of patterns treated in detail provides too narrow a base for a developed nuanced metaphilosophy. This becomes clear in chapter 14 of Insight, where polymorphism seems almost to be reduced to bimorphism. Despite the reference to polymorphism, Lonergan can often appear to be emphasizing only a bimorphism of human consciousness. The focus is on the basic opposition between the intellectual pattern and the biological pattern. There seems to be an overprivileging of the intellectual pattern. By contrast, the other patterns are simply sources of ‘interference’ (I 432–3). There is no discussion of selfappropriation in the other patterns. The biological pattern is presented as the main source of negative influence (again, this is due to the dialectical context). It is concerned with immediate biological goals and constitutes the main obstacle to the unfolding of the desire to know and to the selftranscendence of the human spirit. Hence we arrive at a bimorphism that considers only the contrast between human knowing in the intellectual pattern and animal knowing in the biological pattern (I 439–44). A more systematic account of polymorphism would involve a fuller account of the other patterns and of their role as a key to philosophy. It may also allow a more positive account of polymorphism. The restriction to bimorphism inevitably results in a negative understanding of polymorphism. The opposition between the biological and the intellectual patterns leads to an interpretation of the other patterns as largely negative inter-

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ference. A more developed account of the patterns leaves room for the positive implications of polymorphism to be brought out. 2.6 Polymorphism: Mixing and Blending of Patterns, or Shifts in Orientations of the Subject? Polymorphism is not simply the fact that a range of patterns of experience are possible. Patterns are elements and factors within polymorphism, but polymorphism itself is constituted by a unity-in-tension within human consciousness. It involves the way in which the tension between the patterns is negotiated by the subject. Lonergan speaks of polymorphism as the ‘mixing and blending’ of patterns. This way of expressing the nature of polymorphism is problematic and misleading. Some clarification of the term is needed. More properly, we should speak of the orientation of the subject who shifts his or her concern. The important factor here is the manner of the shifting. Confusion arises if the shifting occurs on the basis of free association rather than self-consciously and methodically on the basis of self-appropriation and interiority. Without self-appropriation the subject may and often does respond to the content of experience by the standards, operations, images, and judgments relevant to an inappropriate pattern. So, for example, though concerned with truth, the subject may evaluate experience in terms of criteria appropriate to biological survival.21 Lonergan’s presentation of the mixing and blending is not fully developed, and we must be careful not to allow it to misdirect us from a recognition of the polymorphic subject. This polymorphic subject is self-transcending and operates at different levels of consciousness; the subject not only operates to pattern experience according to different concerns but also develops historically by differentiating its mode of operations within the diverse orientations. 2.7 The Confusion between Patterns and Differentiations A very important and much needed clarification concerns the relationship between patterns of experience and differentiations of consciousness. Should we regard differentiations as elements or constituents of polymorphism? Lonergan is unclear on the relationship that is touched on in both Insight and Method. The first link between these two notions is found in chapter 7 of Insight. Lonergan seems to be suggesting that differentiations occur within the dif21 Parker, ‘The Scandal of Philosophy,’ 64. This work was an early inspiration for the present investigation.

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ferent patterns of experience: ‘Such are the biological, artistic, dramatic and intellectual forms of experience, moreover, our previous studies of mathematical and scientific thought would regard particular cases of the intellectual form of experience; and similar differentiations could be multiplied’ (I 268). The passage concerns only differentiations of the intellectual pattern. Mathematics and science both involve specialization of the intellectual pattern. Common sense is another specialization of the intellectual pattern. Does the emergence of diverse differentiations extend the scope of polymorphism? The same issues come up again if we consider Method. Patterns are barely mentioned. The central theme concerns differentiations. What happens, then, to the theme of polymorphism? Does it disappear? Lonergan gives only a few clues. Furthermore, the change of context from Insight to Method makes it difficult to evaluate the contribution of Method towards an account of polymorphism. There is definitely some connection between differentiations and patterns, but the passage establishing this link is not easy to interpret: Corresponding to different degrees of development and different worlds mediated by meaning, there are similar differences in the differentiation of consciousness. It is only in the process of development that the subject becomes aware of himself and his distinction from his world. As his apprehension of his world and as his conduct in it develop, he begins to move through different patterns of experience. (M 29) Is Lonergan equating patterns and differentiations? Do differentiations emerge out of patterns, or do differentiations of consciousness produce new patterns? Should we regard differentiations as an extension of polymorphism? The issue is relevant in evaluating the nature of the key to philosophy. As we shall see, different differentiations give rise to diverse approaches to philosophy. If polymorphism is the one and only key, it should somehow include differentiation. More clarity is needed in this regard. 2.8 Is Polymorphism the One and Only Key to Philosophic Difference? Finally, there is a certain ambiguity to Lonergan’s overall metaphilosophical position in relation to polymorphism. A central purpose of a metaphilosophy is to give an account of philosophic difference. Hence, when Lonergan claims that polymorphism is the key to philosophy he is, in effect,

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saying it is the key to philosophic difference. But does he consistently present polymorphism as the one and only key? A difficulty arises when we consider his explicit treatment of philosophic difference in a section of Topics in Education that deals precisely with that issue (TE 176–92). There Lonergan considers only levels of conscious intentionality as factors in philosophic diversity. This stance is developed at length by various commentators, such as Vertin.22 But this produces an account of philosophic difference that does not mention polymorphism. Furthermore, in Method the main factor in philosophic diversity seems to be ongoing differentiation of consciousness. Differentiation, then, is a key to philosophy as well. The ambiguity over the account of philosophic diversity is interrelated with the ambiguity over the range of polymorphism. An integral account of polymorphism – one that relates levels of conscious intentionality with patterns of experience and differentiations (and ultimately conversions) – may enable a more systematic and comprehensive metaphilosophical account of philosophic difference. 3

Responding to the Difficulties: Basic Aims

This book will attempt to respond to some of these difficulties. I will examine Lonergan’s basic claim as set forth in Insight and then investigate how that claim should be understood and perhaps modified in light of the wider content of Method. The first and main line of response will involve giving ‘prolonged analytical attention’ to Lonergan’s own treatment of polymorphism in Insight. Such attention, according to Mark Morelli, has generally been lacking.23 I will offer a reading of Insight that focuses explicitly on the polymorphic subject in the hope of showing the extent to which Lonergan succeeds in giving due emphasis to ‘the entirety of polymorphic consciousness.’24 However, I recognize that to some degree the full range and significance of polymorphism is obscured. This reading, I believe, will better reveal the significance and potentialities of Lonergan’s thought taken as a whole, besides providing a more balanced account of Insight. With regard to Insight, a proper emphasis on polymorphism would correct a misleading emphasis on the levels of consciousness. In his important article on polymorphism, Morelli criticizes Tracy and McCarthy for

22 Vertin, ‘Diverse Readings of Evil: Philosophical Underpinnings.’ 23 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 383. 24 McKinney, ‘The Role of “Conversion” in Lonergan’s Insight,’ 268.

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neglecting polymorphism in favour of ‘the triadic structures of normative cognitive intentionality.’25 This is almost universal in commentators. Moreover, it seems justified given that this is apparently Lonergan’s own emphasis. With Lonergan also, polymorphism can appear as a secondary factor. Chapter 11 of Insight, which focuses on this triadic structure, is given prominence as the hinge between Part One (Insight as Activity) and Part Two (Insight as Achievement). Furthermore, Lonergan confirms this account of self-affirmation as a knower in later writings such as ‘Cognitional Structure.’ How, then, can the emphasis on the three levels of consciousness be misleading if it expresses the main discovery of Insight? My argument is that neglect of polymorphic consciousness leads to a noncontextualized, abstract presentation of the transcultural operations of experiencing and understanding and judgment and to a loss of appreciation of the subject as embodied and engaged. It leads to an overprivileging of the intellectual pattern and of the subject as knower. This obscures the unity of the concrete subject who operates in many patterns. This is a concern of a number of critics, who hold that the intellectualist bias of Insight leads to a distorted and reductionary account of the human subject. Even sympathetic commentators accept that there is a difficulty here. Hence they are concerned to show that Lonergan’s ‘position on the subject’ unfolds in stages.26 The subject as knower in Insight is transcended in Method by the full recognition of the existential, historical, engaged agent: In Insight [Lonergan] highlights [the] intellectual pattern for, as he has said, his purpose was a study not of human life but of human understanding. But the overall impression conveyed by Insight – an impression which will, of course, find no verification in Lonergan’s explicit utterance but which is none the less communicated – is that the intellectual pattern of experience is the privileged pattern of experience.27 This changes in Method, where the distinct idea of the good emerges and the fourth level of consciousness is recognized explicitly. Cognitional analysis is then recast as intentionality analysis. Then, according to Doran, ‘what is privileged is not some one pattern of experience but a self transcendence that can be attained in any of several patterns of experience.’ Doran adds that ‘Lonergan is probably quite correct that this self tran25 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 383. 26 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 19. 27 Doran, Subject and Psyche, 236.

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scendence is best grasped [understood] in a discussion of the intellectual patterns of experience.’28 Hence Lonergan is ‘probably quite justified’ in discussing intellectual conversion prior to moral and religious conversion. But the shift to Method allows a better characterization of Lonergan’s thought as a whole: ‘As self-transcending subjectivity defines human authenticity, so Lonergan’s thought as a whole is not primarily cognitional theory but an elucidation of the drama of the emergence of the authentic subject. It is a basic semantics of human desire.’29 Clearly, there is much to be said for Doran’s account. Insight does seem to privilege the intellectual pattern. There clearly is a dramatic shift between Insight and Method. The subject as knower is only one dimension of the self as agent. However, with McKinney, I would argue that we should not concede too much too quickly to the critics. On this point, McKinney holds that even Lonergan may have sold Insight short by virtually admitting that moral and religious conversion is absent from this work. In response, McKinney claims that there is much more continuity between Insight and Method than is usually allowed. Not only may the existential subject be found already present in Insight, but also ‘the fourfold process of conversion is quite explicit in Insight and may even be more adequate in its presentation than in Method in Theology.’30 I want to follow up the claim that the existential subject is already found in Insight by investigating Lonergan’s treatment of the polymorphic subject. The significance of the polymorphic subject, however, is adequately appreciated only if we realize that the central notion in Insight is ‘self-appropriation.’31 In both the Introduction and the Epilogue of Insight, Lonergan indicates that this is the basic theme. Thus in the Introduction, McKinney notes, Lonergan says that his aim is to ‘assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation of the concrete, dynamic structures immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities’ (I 11). But we should notice that this includes ‘one’s own critical reflection and judging and deciding’ (I 13). Similarly, the Epilogue speaks of this ‘present essay in aid of a personal appropriation of one’s own rational selfconsciousness’ (I 769). These passages, along with others, reveal not only that self-appropriation is the fundamental theme but also that it includes ‘the affective/moral operations of “rational self-consciousness.”’32 McKinney draws an important conclusion: 28 29 30 31 32

Ibid. Ibid., 237. McKinney, ‘The Role of “Conversion” in Lonergan’s Insight,’ 268. Ibid. Ibid., 271.

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Cognitional self-appropriation is a much wider concept than the mere self-affirmation of the knower, i.e., intellectual conversion. It includes the taking possession of not only the intellectual pattern of experience but the operations of the biological-organic, aestheticaffective, practical-moral, and mystical-religious patterns of experience as well. Indeed it also includes the objectification of the operations of sensitive and volitional self-appropriation.33 This is supported by a passage from Insight that McKinney quotes earlier: To appropriate truth is to make it one’s own. The essential appropriation of truth is cognitional. However, our reasonableness demands consistency between what we know and what we do, and so there is a volitional appropriation of truth that consists in our willingness to live up to it, and a sensitive appropriation of truth that consists in an adaption of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decisions. (I 581–2) Lonergan’s reference to the need for ‘willingness’ leads McKinney to equate the existential subject with the subject of the dramatic pattern. The existential subject is equated with the ‘whole man,’ who performs for the most part in the dramatic pattern of living, which combines and blends the other patterns: Far from being another complementary pattern alongside the others, the dramatic pattern is rather the style in which people live out lives by blending or mixing the other patterns. Indeed, Lonergan argues that the making of one’s own living into a work of art, i.e., the achievement of the dramatic pattern, requires all the following: (1) the ‘practical schemes’ of common sense; (2) ‘blueprints for human behavior’ devised by ‘pure intelligence,’ (3) a grounding in ‘aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity,’ and (4) a consideration of the limitations imposed by ‘biological exigence.’34 According to McKinney, then, the basic theme of Insight is self-appropriation, which includes an appropriation of rational self-consciousness. Furthermore, this self-appropriation involves an appropriation of the existential or dramatic subject (the concrete subject) in all its dimensions.

33 Ibid., 272. 34 Ibid., 269.

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My argument is that, ultimately, self-appropriation involves an appropriation of the polymorphic subject. Such integral self-appropriation includes an appropriation of all the patterns in their interrelations and historical unfoldings. My concern will be to show the extent to which this position emerges naturally from Lonergan’s text. In order to do this in a relatively complete way, I will also follow through Lonergan’s thinking in the context of Method. An integral account of integral self-appropriation involves reflection on the historically developing differentiating subject. Polymorphism then will be seen to involve first of all (a) operational polymorphism and the levels of conscious intentionality, and (b) orientational polymorphism and the patterns of experience. To these dimensions of polymorphism, which Morelli discusses in detail, I would add (c) developmental polymorphism and the differentiations of consciousness. A complete account would also have to deal with conversions and what I would call (d) foundational polymorphism, along with biases, which may be termed deviant polymorphism. In the limited space available I can only mention these further aspects. Generally the aim will be to substantiate and develop a position expressed by Edward Braxton: ‘In our view there are positive as well as negative demands to man’s polymorphic consciousness with regard to the philosophic enterprise … and the question of symbolic language.’ Braxton continues: ‘The whole of Insight is a campaign against the negative dimension while the positive dimensions are only obliquely indicated.’35 My aim, then, will be to bring out the positive dimensions by showing how a comprehensive account of polymorphic consciousness provides a basis for a nuanced and flexible and perhaps unique metaphilosophy. I will suggest that such a metaphilosophy is able (a) to appreciate the postmodern concern for the other even while retaining a positive, non-relativistic, account of truth and (b) to ground an approach to comparative philosophy that respects the diverse cultural contexts in which philosophies develop without denying the possibility of cross-cultural or transcultural communication. 4

The Shape of the Argument

To respond in equal detail to all of the difficulties raised earlier is beyond the intention and scope of this project. By focusing on the following issues, however, I hope to contribute to a more systematic account of polymorphism.

35 Braxton, ‘Images of Mystery,’ 541.

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Chapter 2 aims at providing a grounding for an account of polymorphism by developing in outline Lonergan’s implicit position on the structure of the human being. This will clarify the ontological dimension and throw light on the cognitional/phenomenological dimension. The chapter will give some reason for holding that the patterns Lonergan selects are not arbitrary. This is a central theme throughout the whole book. Chapter 3 begins to clarify the most basic elements of polymorphism: the patterns of experience. Here the focus will be on the patterns treated at some length by Lonergan. An attempt will be made to extend the accounts provided by Lonergan. The limitations of his account of the patterns treated in chapter 6 of Insight will be brought out, and an attempt will be made to develop the original account of the biological, intellectual, aesthetic (artistic), and dramatic patterns. Chapter 4 continues to clarify patterns of experience by considering patterns mentioned but not discussed by Lonergan. In this, as in the previous chapter, some details of the relationship between the patterns will be laid out. Some indications of the implications for philosophic difference will also be presented. As well as the practical and mystical patterns, this chapter will consider the additional symbolic and moral/ethical patterns introduced by the commentators. Chapter 5 provides an account of polymorphism as the dynamic mixing and blending of patterns. Here the focus will be on chapter 14 of Insight, which will be closely examined. Chapter 14 is the chapter in which Lonergan introduces the term polymorphism, defines it (apparently) in terms of patterns, and applies it to the problem of philosophic difference. Since it is the place where Lonergan uses the term polymorphism most often, this chapter cannot be overlooked. However, the limitations of the treatment will also be noticed. On the basis of an extended survey of the way Lonergan refers to polymorphism, I will argue that he does not here succeed fully in providing a comprehensive key to philosophy. Still, there are openings to a fuller treatment, and these will be pointed out. Though Lonergan does not fully establish that polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy, it can be said that he is on the way to developing such a key. Chapter 6 investigates polymorphism in the context of Method. An attempt is made to clarify the relationship between patterns of experience and differentiations. Differentiations, it is argued, may be seen as a further dimension of polymorphism. The significance of differentiations as a key to philosophic and cultural difference will be brought out. The Concluding Remarks will gather up the results of the investigation. The claim will be made that there is emerging in Lonergan’s thought an integral account of the polymorphic subject, and hence an emerging

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metaphilosophy. This metaphilosophy promises to be flexible, sensitive, and non-totalizing – a metaphilosophy for a postmodern age. 5

Questions of Interpretation

The first step in rereading Lonergan’s main texts in terms of polymorphism will be attention to detail. The aim is to acquire a firm grasp of Lonergan’s actual position. This is to be distinguished from later developments and additions as far as possible. Such a project is complicated by the fact that we are necessarily drawn into interpretation. We are drawn into a hermeneutical spiral that revolves around both the written text and our own interiority. Furthermore, Lonergan invites interpretation inasmuch as (a) he calls for self-appropriation and instructs us to test his text against our self-understanding and (b) he writes from a moving viewpoint that draws on his own genius for self-attention without always being fully thematized. This focus on the primary texts is not meant to deny the achievements and contributions of the commentators. Indeed, it would contradict Lonergan to do so. It would be to accept the ‘Principle of the Empty Head’ (M 157). Still, we may, as far as possible, take care to distinguish among the following: (a) what is direct and explicit in the text; (b) what is a further development but is clearly emergent in the text; (c) what is a further development but in harmony with the text (Doran on ‘psychic conversion’); (d) what is restructuring and extension (Braio); and (e) what is an addition or supplement. 6

Self-Appropriation and Interpretation

The call to comprehensive self-appropriation has important consequences. If we take this seriously then we will be less likely to take partial appropriation as the whole. Thus self-affirmation as a knower will be grasped as only an initial stage of self-appropriation. Beyond this there is first of all the appropriation of oneself as a responsible agent and as a fully self-transcendent person able to enter deeper human commitments. The call should also send us back to the account of the patterns with the realization that we are involved in a many-sided project of integral self-appropriation. Furthermore, the emphasis on Lonergan’s invitation to self-appropriation should liberate us from taking the texts as a fixed authority. We will be able to assess for ourselves whether or not Lonergan, at times, has failed to fully thematize his own basic position. It may be that tensions arise between what is said and how it is said. There may be regressions and relapses or oversights in which earlier insights are not brought forward

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and sublated into later stages of the argument. The text may not always reflect Lonergan’s deepest intentions or support his basic claims. It may fall below the proper expression of a self-appropriated or interiorly differentiated mind. This may suggest that human polymorphic consciousness requires us constantly to negotiate the tensions between the patterns and to repeatedly regain the achievements of differentiation, as intellectual (and moral) conversion is precarious and self-appropriation is never achieved once and for all. I believe, however, that the reader of this essay will come to realize how remarkably consistent Lonergan is in operating at the level of selfappropriation.

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2 Grounding Polymorphism: Polymorphism and the Structure of Human Being

1

Introduction1

In this chapter I will present an account of the structure of the human being in Lonergan’s philosophy. This account is intended to provide a background to the examination of the patterns that follows. Such a background needs to be provided if we are to establish that the patterns discussed by Lonergan are not arbitrarily chosen. Furthermore, it is necessary given the fact that Lonergan presents his account of the patterns in both cognitional and metaphysical terms. The patterns are presented descriptively/phenomenologically and also in an explanatory way in terms of the human being’s threefold structure: organic–psychic–intellectual. The general relationship in Lonergan’s thought between the cognitional and the metaphysical has been investigated at length by Paul Kidder.2 While that inquiry cannot be repeated here, I would argue that it is very difficult to appreciate the significance of the patterns unless we grasp the underlying structure of the human being. Lonergan himself points to this when he says that the levels of integration in the structure of the human being explain the concrete possibility of the patterns (I 467) – a point I will return to. Hence a ‘logic of issues’ (I 479) is involved here. The patterns

1 This chapter contains material that may be more accessible to those already familiar with Lonergan. My hope is that other readers will appreciate the importance of this account of the structure of human beings if they return to it in a second reading. 2 Kidder, The Relation of Knowing and Being in Lonergan’s Philosophy.

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as descriptively presented in chapter 6 of Insight are better understood if we relate them to the metaphysical/explanatory account of the structure of human beings given especially in chapters 15 and 16. The structure is only accessible in a limited way to consciousness; we need the distinctive contributions of science and metaphysics in order to grasp the structure of human beings fully. Hence I provide an outline of that structure as a background to the account of the patterns. This background will help us relate and order the patterns that, in different ways, reflect or manifest that structure. The patterns are not simply a list of alternatives, nor are they arbitrarily chosen. By linking the patterns and the structure of human beings (as organic–psychological–intellectual) we throw light on their relevance for philosophy and for philosophic difference. We begin to see how the patterns relate to the level of unfolding intentionality and how the human being is a unity in tension. There is also a sense in which we discover philosophical anthropology as the underlying theme of Insight. 2

The Structure of the Human Being

In order to develop an adequate account of the structure of human being we need to take into account the moving viewpoint. An adequate account involves drawing from relevant sections throughout the whole of Insight. A general background is found in Lonergan’s world view of emergent probability, introduced in chapter 4. The details are filled in, first of all, in chapter 6, which finds in the order of the sciences a reflection of the order in the universe of proportionate being, including a reflection of the order in human being. This includes an account of the interplay between the neural-biological level and the level of psychic integration. Chapter 7 takes up the social dimension of human being. In chapter 8 emergent probability is applied to the evolution of things. The complexity of the thing as a unity–identity–whole is brought out. The application of this to human beings is begun but not completed. Chapter 11 discusses the unity of human consciousness and the human subject. The issue is treated metaphysically in chapter 15, which deals with development and human development. Chapter 16 adds to this by clarifying the nature of the principle of unity in human being. The result is a comprehensive account of the unity-in-tension, the compound dynamic unity of the human being. However, the account so far mainly concerns the individual human being. It fails adequately to address another extremely important aspect of human being: the concrete unity or the ‘concrete universal’ of humanity. The notion of the ‘concrete universal’ is mentioned in Insight (I 764), and the issue is treated implicitly, in chapter 7, for example. However, to do

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justice to it we need to consult as well the early writings found in File 713 at the Toronto Lonergan Research Institute.3 I will focus especially on the ‘Philosophy of History’ manuscript – which seems to be part of ‘An Essay in Fundamental Sociology’ – and also on ‘Panton Anakephalaiosis: A Theory of Human Solidarity.’ These writings set the unity of the individual person in the wider context of the concrete unity of humanity as a whole. Furthermore, the concrete unity of humanity is itself set in the context of emergent probability and of history. Human nature is more concretely understood when the unity of humanity and its situatedness in the universe of proportionate being is grasped. Hence to round off the account of human being I will briefly treat of Lonergan’s notion of the ‘concrete universal’ and his account of human solidarity. My hope is that this will contribute to an appreciation of the significance of the patterns. Setting them in this wider context will enable us to evaluate Lonergan’s account of the patterns in terms of his own foundational perspective. 3

Human Beings and the World Process of Emergent Probability: Chapter 4 of Insight

Chapter 4 of Insight gives a first indication of the world order of emergent probability within which human beings/humanity emerge and develop. Lonergan develops the notion on the basis of the complementarity of classical and statistical methods of science. Classical methods involve a presupposition or anticipation of systematic process. Within systematic process, classical method grasps an intelligibility, which may be expressed in the form of classical laws. Classical laws then give expression to regularities in data. Statistical methods anticipate data that reveal non-systematic process. Such methods deal with what is left over by classical inquiry: the aggregate of events and their concrete conditions. Statistical methods grasp an intelligibility in non-systematic process. This intelligibility consists in probability, in the ideal frequency of events (from which actual frequencies differ only randomly). Lonergan argues that classical and statistical methods are complementary and together deal with systematic and non-systematic aspects of data. Together they cover a broad range of knowing and hence of the known. Lonergan emphasizes here the isomorphism or correspondence between 3 These early papers were written around 1933 to 1938 and give insight into Lonergan’s struggle to come to a position on the dialectic of history. The contents of this file are discussed in detail by Michael Shute in The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History.

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the structure of knowing and the known (I 138). This is foundational for his whole project. Lonergan proceeds in building up his account of emergent probability by asking, ‘What world view is involved by our affirmation of both classical and statistical laws?’ (I 138). He eventually concludes that emergent probability is ‘the successive realization, in accord with successive schedules of probability, of a manifold of conditioned series of schemes of recurrence’ (I 149). The notion of ‘schemes of recurrence’ (I 140) is crucial. As world process unfolds, we find that sometimes one event leads to another and another and then finally to an event or situation of the same kind as the one that initiated the process. In this situation there is a strong probability that the cycle will recur indefinitely. By way of examples, Lonergan points to such cycles as (a) the thermonucleosynthesis in the stars that transforms hydrogen in a way that produces a series of higher elements and then circles back round to produce hydrogen, and (b) the hydrological cycle that circulates water from sea to cloud and back. These cycles are constituted by regularly recurring events within the overall manifold. They provide a clue for relating classical and statistical laws, for (a) as recurrent they relate to combinations of classical laws expressing regularities in data, and (b) as conditioned they relate to statistical laws that determine the probabilities according to which the conditions for recurrence are fulfilled. The notion of schemes also relates to stages in the unfolding of world process. Here we consider a conditioned series of schemes in which prior schemes condition the emergence and functioning of later schemes (thus, earlier schemes fulfil the conditions of possibility of later schemes). At each stage of world process there exists a manifold of actual schemes and a range of possible and probable further schemes, some of which are more probable than others (I 142). To ground this, Lonergan shows how schemes of recurrence have probabilities (as their component events certainly have). He considers the probability of emergence and the probability of survival of schemes. The actual unfolding of world process is conditioned by an interplay of these. In this way we arrive at the notion of emergent probability. The notion of a conditioned series of schemes together with the idea that schemes have probabilities leads us to understand world process as an open-ended yet upwardly directed unfolding of proportionate being. The account is generic and incomplete but is open to verification in that it makes sense of the general features of cosmological and biological development. It allows us to recognize a discernible direction in the unfolding of world process despite breakdowns and blind alleys (for later schemes are possible only where certain earlier schemes already function) (I 147). It allows an alternative

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to Darwin’s account of natural selection, an alternative based on the probability of survival and emergence rather than on a ‘gradual accumulation of small variations’ (I 290). Furthermore, ‘the advent of man does not abrogate the rules of emergent probability’ (I 235). This is Lonergan’s account of the ‘immanent intelligibility of the universe’ (I 139). Later that account will be developed in terms of the notion of purpose and ‘finality’ (I 470–6). The point to be emphasized here is that it holds from the subatomic level to the level of human cognitional process and to the level of ethical living and culture. Hence it is relevant both to the account of individual human being and to the account of humanity (and hence to the account of polymorphism). 4

Levels of Science and Levels of Human Being: Chapter 6 of Insight

Lonergan’s detailed account of the structure of human being begins to emerge in his discussions of the ‘Elements in the Dramatic Subject’ and of ‘Dramatic Bias.’ Here we find the first details on the interplay between the neurobiological and psychic integration. The details are presented in an explanatory mode at the end of the chapter, in a methodological note on the level of scientific inquiry. The argument is that these levels of inquiry correspond to levels of schemes of recurrence in world process and hence to real levels in the structure of human being. As we have seen in the general account of emergent probability, the argument is based on a recognition of the implications of the ‘non-systematic.’ An ‘acknowledgment of the non-systematic leads to an affirmation of successive levels of scientific inquiry’ (I 229). So, for example, if the non-systematic exists at the level of physics there will be materials forming a coincidental manifold. What are merely coincidental occurrences for physics may be integrated – as intelligent inquiry and higher insight reveal – into a higher chemical system that supervenes on but leaves intact the order of physics (I 229–30). Similarly, the non-systematic at the level of chemistry may be ‘systematized’ by the higher biological level. Furthermore, the psychic level may integrate the organic neural level, and finally the level of ‘insight and reflection, deliberation and choice’ may systematize coincidental manifolds at the level of the psyche, again without violating the integrity of the psyche. Furthermore, the levels of integration are real: ‘An acknowledgment that the real is the verified makes it possible to affirm the reality no less of the higher system than of the underlying manifold. The chemical is as real as the physical … the psychic as real as the biological, and insight as real as the psychic’ (I 230). Thus a full account of the structure of human being shows that ‘at any stage of his development a man is an individual unity differentiated by

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physical, chemical, organic, psychic and intellectual conjugates’ (I 495). Our concern will be mainly with the higher integrations of the organic, psychic, and intellectual levels. These are ‘systems on the move’ (I 555) that are dynamically ‘interlocked’ (I 494). An important consequence of this, as we shall see, is that a principle of correspondence is operative. It indicates that a change at one level calls for corresponding development at the other levels (I 497). We will return to this later. The point here is to present in outline the basic position and to give a sense of what will emerge from the first indications provided in chapter 6. It is important to realize that the dynamic interlocking of the organic psychic and intellectual system is manifested in consciousness. This is shown first of all in what Lonergan calls ‘the dialectic of the dramatic subject’ (I 243). This is concerned with ‘the entry of neural demands into consciousness’ (I 243). The dialectic of the subject concerns, first of all, the tension between the unconscious and the conscious level in human being, the tension between the organic and the psychic/intellectual levels. The organic level in itself is generally unconscious and enters consciousness when organic processes are disturbed.4 With regard to the tension between the unconscious and the conscious, this enters consciousness in situations of breakdown. Thus the dialectic of the subject is revealed in the case of dramatic bias when the ‘exigence of the organism for its conscious complement’ is frustrated in a way that invites ‘the anguish of abnormality’ (I 214). Normally the materials that enter consciousness are already patterned by the psyche and the intellect: a preconscious selection has been at work (I 212, 213). But in the case of dramatic bias the normal functioning is disturbed and this is manifested in aberrations of understanding, which Lonergan calls scotosis. This is ‘not hidden from us’ (I 215): ‘The scotosis can remain fundamentally unconscious yet suffer the attacks and crises that generate in the mind a mist of obscurity and bewilderment, of suspicion and reassurance, of doubt and rationalization, of insecurity and disquiet’ (I 215). This manifestation of dramatic bias into consciousness or semiconsciousness reveals the importance of dreams, which ‘secure a balance between neural demands and psychic events’ (I 219). However, there is a further explicit manifestation of the interlocking of levels that has to do with the psychic and intellectual levels. Here we have to recognize a secondary dialectic of the subject, an explicitly ‘conscious dialectic of the subject.’5 This may be expressed as the tension between the pure desire to know and other human desires (I 447). This is where we must 4 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 19. 5 Whelan, ‘The Development of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History,’ 285.

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situate the conscious tensions between the patterns of consciousness. This interconnection between the structure of human being and the tensions among patterns of consciousness is something I will continually return to. 5

The Human Being and the Human Community: Chapter 7 of Insight

Chapter 7 of Insight is more concerned with the social dimensions of human being than with the individual human being. However, it will be useful to outline here the contribution of chapter 7 inasmuch as its treatment of human solidarity (and human disunity) throws light on the individual structure of human being. Chapter 7 is concerned with the ‘transformation of man and his environment’ (I 232), which is effected by practical intelligence along with the primordial bond of intersubjectivity. This results in a change in us (individually and socially) as well as a change ‘in the things which are related to us’ (I 233), that is, the material things made by us. ‘The practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics, and culture that not only separate man from nature but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships’ (I 233). Lonergan reflects on the dynamic unfolding of these developments in human life. Though the account here is not as ontologically focused as in File 713, nevertheless it may be taken as mediating the structure of human solidarity. This is already implied in the link that Lonergan makes between human action and emergent probability: ‘As in the field of physics, chemistry, and biology, so in the field of human events and relationships there are classical and statistical laws that combine concretely in cumulating sets of schemes of recurrence. For the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability’ (I 235). However, Lonergan notes that ‘if human affairs fall under the domain of emergent probability, they do so in their own way’ (I 235). Human schemes involve human intelligence, so the analogy with ‘merely natural process becomes less and less relevant’ (I 236). What counts is not the probability of circumstances but ‘the probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communication, persuasion, agreement, decision’ (I 236). The insights ‘accessible, persuasive, and potentially operative in the community’ become the significant operators: Just as in the individual the stream of consciousness normally selects its own course out of the range of neurally determined alternatives, so too in the group commonly accessible insights, dissemi-

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nated by communication and persuasion, modify and adjust mentalities to determine the course of history out of the alternatives offered by emergent probability. (I 236) Lonergan develops his account of the social order by introducing the notion of ‘the dialectic of community’ (I 242) or the dialectic of history (I 291). Again we must keep in mind that though the discussion is primarily cognitional there is an ontological orientation. The dialectic of community is explicitly related to a ‘duality’ (I 240) in human nature. A grasp of this duality opens up the possibility of an ontological interpretation of social unity. The dialectic of community involves a tension between the two opposed aspects of the social dimension of human beings: these are ‘intersubjectivity’ and practical intelligence considered as a group possession (I 243). The dialectic of community is related to the manifold of individual dialectics of the subject. Furthermore it is the major factor in the unfolding of human life: ‘The dialectic of community holds the dominant position, for it gives rise to situations that stimulate neural demands, and it moulds the orientation of intelligence that preconsciously exercises the censorship’ (I 243). The core tension is between ‘intersubjectivity’ and practical intelligence. First of all there is the key element of ‘intersubjectivity.’ This spontaneous link with others is the primordial basis of community: ‘Its schemes of recurrence are simple prolongations of prehuman attainment, too obvious to be discussed, too closely linked with more elementary processes to be distinguished sharply from them’ (I 237). Furthermore this intersubjective community not only ‘precedes civilization and underpins it’ but also remains if civilization decays (I 238). At base, intersubjectivity may be taken as the shared psychic level of the social dimension of human being. It is a reality operative prior to intellectual reflection.6 Second, there is an intellectual level to the social dimension of human life. It is found in practical intelligence: Though civil community has its obscure origins in human intersubjectivity, though it develops imperceptibly, though it decks itself out with more primitive attractions, still it is a new creation … The discoveries of practical intelligence, which once were an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living, now penetrate and overwhelm its every aspect. (I 238)

6 Whelan, ‘The Development of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History,’ 289.

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The ‘structure of interdependence’ devised by practical intelligence constitutes a ‘good of order’ (I 238) in civil society. This good of order is concrete, real, and operative. It is not simply a product of society but also reveals something of human nature and of the unity of humanity. At this point Lonergan explicitly relates the dialectic of community to the dialectic of the subject (hence, to human being): ‘Intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order have their ground in a duality immanent in man himself’ (I 240). As individuals, human beings spontaneously follow their personal desires simply because they are personal. As intelligent, human beings originate and propose social systems and consent to be constrained by them. There is a tension between psyche and intelligence in the individual. But there is a further complication in the social realm. There are the bonds of intersubjectivity, ‘which make the experience of each resonate to the experience of others’ (I 240). There is the drive to understand, which operates to ‘generate and implement common ways, common manners, common undertakings, common commitments’ (I 240). Hence a tension arises: ‘Intersubjective spontaneity and intelligently devised social order possess different properties and different tendencies yet to both by his very nature man is committed’ (I 241). Thus we begin to appreciate what the dialectic of community involves: ‘Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense’ (I 243). Unless the tension between them can be successfully negotiated, bias results. Humanity is a ‘compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity’ (I 261), just as individual human being is a ‘duality’ of intelligence and psyche. I will return to these issues later. There are irreducible and inevitable social dimensions of human life, and the root of these is in the psyche and intellect of individual human being. The treatment in chapter 7 has not been as ontologically developed as in File 713, yet there is a definite indication of the ontological. Finally, note should be made of an intriguing passage, towards the end of chapter 7, which concerns generalized empirical method. Lonergan says of this method that ‘as applied solely to the data of consciousness it consists in determining patterns of intelligible relations that unite the data explanatorily’ (I 268). These are the biological, artistic, dramatic, and intellectual ‘forms of experience,’ which were dealt with in chapter 6. Lonergan goes on, first, to mention the possibility of differentiations within the intellectual pattern. This will be discussed in chapter 6 of the present book. The next few remarks relate more to present concerns. Lonergan argues that general method has a wider relevance that relates individual consciousness to other selves, to preconscious levels of human being, to the environment and the social milieu: ‘Generalized method has to be able to deal, at least comprehensively, not only with the data within a single

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consciousness but also with the relations between different conscious subjects, between conscious subjects and their milieu or environment, and between consciousness and its neural basis’ (I 269). The account is very compact, but the point seems to be that we are dealing with incarnate consciousness set in a universe of proportionate being and engaged with this universe at every level. The account points, then, to a ‘holistic metaphysics’: the structure of the individual human being is related to the structure of humanity and the whole account is set in a context of emergent probability. Lonergan has here developed further the background which allows us to ground the patterns and to evaluate their significance. 6

Things, Bodies, and Human Beings: Chapter 8 of Insight

More details on the structure of human being are presented in the account of ‘Things’ in chapter 8 of Insight. This carries on from the methodological note at the end of chapter 6. Lonergan claims that we shall ‘be in a position to say what is meant by the thing, the man, the person’ as well as ‘extend to things and persons the notions of emergent probability’ (I 230). First of all, Lonergan proposes that we make a basic distinction between the notion of ‘thing’ and the notion of ‘body.’ The notion of a thing is said to involve a ‘new type of insight’ (I 271) that grasps a ‘unity, identity, whole’ (I 271) in data taken in their ‘concrete totality and in the totality of their aspects’ (I 271). This unity–identity–whole is differentiated by experiential and explanatory conjugates. Explanatory conjugates are defined by ‘empirically established correlation, function, laws, theories, systems’ (I 103). By contrast, a ‘body’ is primarily a focal point of extroverted biological anticipation. It is grasped as an ‘already, out, there, now, real’ without the benefit of intelligent questions and reasonable answers. After introducing the basic terminology, Lonergan goes on to discuss ‘Genus as Explanatory’ (I 280). His aim is to refute ‘mechanistic determinism.’ This reductionist position combines mechanism, which is based on an extroversion that holds the real to be ‘body,’ and determinism, which overlooks the abstractness of classical physical laws and so excludes the possibility of ‘a succession of higher systems’ (I 280). Lonergan’s response is to show how higher levels of integration emerge out of lower levels. This is established by showing how the succession of sciences corresponds to the succession of higher genera. Lonergan argues that our grasping of how there are different kinds of things, investigated by different sciences, is based on insights relating the sciences. The transition from a lower-level science to a higher-level one is not a logical transi-

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tion: ‘This transition of the main sciences runs parallel to the notion of successive higher viewpoints’ (I 282). The shift to a higher level becomes necessary when a lower viewpoint ‘has to’ regard as coincidental what is in fact regular. A higher viewpoint is justified because it is based on an insight that grasps new conjugates and schemes that make regular what would appear to be merely coincidental if we were restricted to the lower viewpoint.7 The higher-level science does not interfere with the autonomy of the lower level, for ‘it enters the field of the lower’ only to make systematic that which would be left coincidental by the lower science (I 281). The distinction between levels of integration was broached in earlier chapters of Insight. The emphasis is on how the higher level sublates what it systematizes. Hence, says Lonergan, there are no ‘things in things’ (I 283). ‘It is one thing to prove that conjugates of the lower order survive within the higher genus; it is quite another to prove that things defined solely by the lower conjugate also survive’ (I 284). The point is that a unity–identity–whole remains a unity even if it is differentiated by conjugates of different levels (and this will hold for the human being): ‘There is an intelligible concrete unity differentiated by conjugates of both the lower and the higher order, but there is no further intelligible concrete unity to be discerned in the same data and to be differentiated solely by conjugates of some lower order’ (I 284). This leads to an affirmation of ‘the emergent probability of things as well as of schemes of recurrence’ (I 284). The extension follows when we unite the account of the ‘thing,’ noting particularly that there are no things in things, with the original account of emergent probability: ‘The extended affirmation … rests on the principle that data are to be understood, that understanding grasps concrete unities, systematic relations, and nonsystematic probabilities of existence and occurrence’ (I 287). Generally, the extended affirmation rests on the fact that there are statistical residues at every level. Such residues imply not only (a) that events at any given level cannot be deduced in systematic fashion from the combination of all the laws and all the schemes of recurrence of that and of all prior levels (I 631), but also, (b) that higher viewpoints may grasp higher conjugates and higher genera in the data (I 285–7). Generally, the extended affirmation affirms that ‘inquiry moves in a determinate direction,’ and it is this which implies the ‘emergent probability of things and schemes’ (I 287). Lonergan moves on to discuss explanatory species. This section is particularly relevant to the inquiry into the structure of human being, for it 7 Matthew Lamb, ‘Discussion: Towards a Synthetization of the Science,’ Philosophy of Science 32, no. 2 (April 1965): 88.

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offers details on the dynamic and flexible relationships among levels of integration. It reveals the nature of species as dynamic and flexible and evolutionary. Explanatory series can be grasped once we understand that any lower species of things, with their conjugates and schemes, admit a series of coincidental aggregates that stand in correspondence with a series of conjugates of a higher genus of things (I 287). Thus if we begin with the range of subatomic particles we may grasp the possibility of (a) a series of relationships constituting the periodic table, which define the conjugates that differentiate the chemical elements, and so establish the higher system, and (b) a further series of possible chemical compounds of the elements in the system. Similarly, if we begin with the aggregates at the chemical level we may find clues leading to insights at the biological level that grasp (a) the possibility of different kinds of cells and (b) the possibility of different kinds of multicellular living things and hence (c) different kinds of biological species (I 288). It is important to grasp the ‘dynamic’ aspect of the transitions. Lower levels may be suitable for higher integration but not in all respects. There may be resistance to integrations and hence a probability of non-emergence. For example, atomic elements may be stable or unstable, they may readily combine or resist combination. In other words, the relationship of integration is a flexible one. Lower levels are open to but do not necessarily give rise to higher levels. Higher levels are ‘limited, though not controlled by underlying materials’ (I 291). This is discussed more fully and metaphysically in the treatments of ‘Potency’ and of ‘Finality’ in chapter 15, where the Aristotelian source of Lonergan’s thinking will be clear. Here, in chapter 8, the emphasis is on how levels differ in terms of the ‘immanent intelligibility,’ and on the ‘degrees of freedom’ that increase in significance as we progress from lower to higher levels. As we advance from lower to higher levels, the degree of freedom increases; this is manifested most fully at the levels of intelligence and of deliberation and choice (I 291). The notion of degree of freedom is important not only in the account of the structure of human being and the account of the relationship between levels in that structure, but also in allowing us to situate the patterns of experience in relation to that structure. A first degree of freedom arises as chemical compounds ‘render subatomic limitations indirect’ (I 289). A second degree appears in the multicellular organism ‘determined by its own laws of development and growth’ (I 289). A third in the animal, which is ‘an intelligible solution to the problem of living in a given environment’ (I 290). It is here that we begin to see the complex interrelations among the levels in human being and among the degrees of freedom. At the third

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level, animal sensitivity is the higher system of the biological organism. Lonergan refers back to the biological pattern of experience, which corresponds with underlying neural demand functions (I 289) and identifies these with ‘the laws of psychic stimulus and psychic demands’ (I 289). But he points out also that the lower level is transformed even on its own terms: ‘These neural events occur within an already constituted nervous system, which in great part would have no function if the higher psychic system did not exist to inform it’ (I 289). This transformation of the lower level makes it possible for the organic nervous system to be ‘exploited to provide the materials for the higher system of biological consciousness’ (I 289). Later Lonergan will express this in terms of how increased differentiation leads to higher integration. Hence we find that ‘as it is not in the plant but in the animal that the full potentialities of organic diversity are realized, so it is not in the animal but in man that the full potentialities of a richly diverse and highly integrated sensitive consciousness are attained’ (I 481). Note also how control shifts to the highest level: ‘While the chemical elements appear as dominated by the manifolds that they systematize, a multicellular structure is dominated by an idea that unfolds in the process of growth, and this idea can itself be subordinated to the higher idea of conscious stimulus and conscious response’ (I 289). The highest level of freedom is found at the level of the intelligent and responsible human spirit, which is the higher system for sensitive process: Inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher system, so that human living has its basic task in reflection on systems and judging them, deliberating on their implementation and choosing between possibilities. (I 291) There can be in man a perennial source of higher systems because the materials of such systematization are not built into his constitution … A new viewpoint in science … a new philosophy, has its base, not in a new sensibility, but simply in a new manner of attending to data … Understanding is not another type of sensation with another sense organ, it operates with respect to the content of sensation and imagination; it represents a still further degree of freedom … In man there occurs the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent. (I 292) This shift is first of all a shift to the level of understanding that is the level of cognitive freedom. It is the freedom of intelligence to reach out and ‘integrate’ the whole universe at least in an anticipatory way (I 497). This does not mean that the lower levels are entirely left behind. Intelli-

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gence integrates sensitive process (or more precisely the ‘content’ of sensitive experience), and we must cope with ‘the tension between incompletely developed intelligence and imperfectly adapted sensibility’ (I 291), a tension that ‘grounds the dialectics of individual and social history’ (I 291). This ‘duality’ between psyche and intelligence draws attention to the fact that this tension is permanent. It has constantly to be negotiated, and the patterns of experience will be involved in this tension and negotiation. The term is used by Lonergan to refer to the immanently experienced tension between the human being as intelligent and the human being as subject to personal ‘needs and wants’ (I 240). 7

A Further Level of Freedom: Full Self-Transcendence?

To complete the discussion on degrees of freedom we need to anticipate later stages of the argument of Insight. At the highest level there is the freedom proper to the human being as morally or rationally self-conscious. Beyond cognitive self-transcendence there is moral or full self-transcendence: Freedom is a special kind of contingence. It is contingence that arises, not from the empirical residue that grounds materiality and the nonsystematic, but in the order of spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will. (I 642) The laws of the spirit reside in the dynamic structure of its cognitional and volitional operations. (I 641) Decision … is a new emergence that both realizes the course of action … and realizes an effectively rational self-consciousness. (I 642) Freedom at this level is not simply freedom within the universe of being: it is a freedom of the universe. Here human freedom takes responsibility for what will be and not just for what already is. That is to say, human decision sets in motion activities that are part and parcel of the ongoing evolution and unfolding of world process. It is at this level of freedom that we discover something about the patterns of experience. We are able to situate them in an explanatory way in relation to the structure of the human being. Lonergan makes the point explicitly in his account of the different ways in which the intellect is a higher system for sensitive living. The argument concerns the distinctive degree of freedom that comes in the transition to the level of intelligent consciousness.

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Freedom at the levels of intelligence and rational self-consciousness raises the question of ‘control.’ The higher levels actively provide the higher system: spirit actively supervenes over the psyche. Lonergan says it does so both unconsciously and consciously: Human intellectual activity provides the higher system for sensitive living both unconsciously and consciously. It does so unconsciously inasmuch as it grounds the pattern in which sensitive experience occurs, and in this sense it is a higher system to sensitive living as sensitive living is a higher system to organic living. (I 538) Here we have an explicit statement concerning the way in which the structure of the human being grounds the patterns of experience. The intellect works on and with the psyche to produce the patterns. The conscious control is a further development. Here the control is made possible by the freedom of intelligence manifested in cognitive selftranscendence. This freedom arises as conscious intelligence grasps intelligible systems that are relevant to ‘the contents of one’s sensitive experience’ rather than to sensitive living as such. For here the higher system of intelligence ‘develops not in a material manifold but in the psychic representation of material manifolds’ (I 494). The shift from concern with subjective acts to objective contents of the acts allows, as we have said, the integration and systematization of the universe of being rather than of myself as a particular rational animal (I 539). Intelligence integrates the level of psychic representation in a way that mediates knowledge of the universe of being and of ‘ourselves as parts within that universe’ (I 539). It is not just a matter of a further integration within the human being as an isolated thing. This freedom from material limitations tells us something about the human being as such. It constitutes the cognitive self-transcendence, which allows intelligence to supervene on the psychic and the organic in a conscious way. This is because the knowledge of the universe includes knowledge of ourselves and of ‘our function in the universe’ and furthermore of ‘the grounds for willing the execution of that function’ (I 539). As spiritual we not only are oriented to the universe of being, not only know ourselves as a part of that universe, but also ‘guide our living by that knowledge’ (I 539). This points forward to the full self-transcendence and higher-level ‘control’ found in rational and self-conscious and responsible freedom. It ‘is through willing that the conscious intellectual control of sensitive living is effected’ (I 539). Here we are dealing with the human being as the embodied engaged agent who self-consciously participates in society and world process.

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Chapter 8 has advanced our grasp of human being considerably. It has extended our understanding of individual human being (persons), and it has, even if implicitly, said something about the unity of the species and about concrete humanity. There is one further aspect of this stage of Lonergan’s presentation to be noted. He points out that the human being is ‘at once explanatory genus and explanatory species,’ for intelligence is not just a higher system beyond sensitivity; it is also ‘a source of higher systems’ (I 292): ‘In man there occurs the transition from the intelligible to the intelligent’ (I 292). This may be more fully expressed as a transition to the fully personal, to the spiritual level, which includes the moral as well as the cognitive. The account of the patterns will have to be situated in relation to these defining dimensions of being human. 8

Self-Affirmation and the Unity of Consciousness: Chapter 11 of Insight

In chapter 11, on ‘Self Affirmation of the Knower,’ Lonergan adds further details on the unity of the human being. However, this is not directly a question of metaphysical unity. It deals more with the cognitive side of unity: the unity of consciousness and the unity of the subject. The account of the unity of consciousness given here will be relevant not only to the later account of the unity of the human being but also to the account of the patterns and polymorphism. Lonergan is concerned to point out that the unity of consciousness is a given (I 349–52). He claims that ‘just as there are unities on the side of the object, so there are unities on the side of the subject’ (I 349). Furthermore, ‘consciousness is much more obviously aware of this unity in diverse acts thanof the diverse acts’ (I 349): ‘It is within the unity that acts are found and distinguished, and it is to the unity that we appeal when we talk about a single field of consciousness and draw a distinction between conscious acts occurring within the field and unconscious acts occurring outside it’ (I 349). This identity or unity between my various conscious acts ‘extends all along the line’ (I 349). Lonergan’s emphasis here is on the unity as a necessary presupposition of self-affirmation. He argues that if it were not given, the unity of consciousness would have to be postulated. My purpose in drawing attention to the unity of consciousness has to do with polymorphism. I suggest that extending the identity ‘all along the line’ (I 349) will ultimately involve polymorphic consciousness: the unity is not just the unity of consciousness in a knower (though this has a certain kind of priority); it is the unity of consciousness in a human being.

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This wider understanding of the unity of the human being-as-subject allows room for a fuller appreciation of self-appropriation. This is indicated, for example, in the chapter on ‘The Possibility of Ethics’: ‘The same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing’ (I 622). This exigency gives rise to self-appropriation at the level of rational selfconsciousness or ethical self-consciousness. Furthermore, there is room for development of self-appropriation from self-affirmation to the full selfappropriation of the polymorphically conscious human agent. If the unity of the knower can be affirmed, along with the invariant structure of consciousness that it presupposes, still it is a dynamic structure that operates as/in history. It operates from a polymorphic base and opens up to ongoing differentiation. The human being as historical must eventually be acknowledged. The unity of consciousness allows for the possible integration of a polymorphically complex and historically differentiated consciousness. 9

Human Development: Chapter 15 of Insight

The properly metaphysical treatment of human being begins in chapter 15. This deals with the notion of development and with the heuristic structure of genetic method ‘both in general and as applied to the organism, to the psyche, to intelligence and to the combination of all three in man’ (I 456). The discussion of development again clarifies the nature and unity of the structure of the human being. It provides further details on the dynamic interplay among the different levels of the structure. Above all it explicitly shows how the structures of human being are related to the patterns of experience (I 467). I will focus especially on the conscious levels of human being, which are treated in the section on ‘Human Development.’ The chapter opens with a discussion of the metaphysical elements: central and conjugate potency, form, and act. Here as elsewhere Lonergan selects and uses valuable insights from Aristotle, albeit transposing Aristotle to fit into a different framework. This discussion allows further clarification of the notions of explanatory genus and species. The earlier account is recapitulated but is now recast ‘in terms of the metaphysical elements’ (I 463). These metaphysical categories allow Lonergan to give an account of the unity of a developing being. The argument invokes the isomorphism of knowing and the known. Just as ‘the three levels of cognitional activities constitute a unity,’ so ‘potency, form, act constitute a unity’ (I 458). This holds for the different levels of science and the levels of being human that the sciences investigate: ‘the structure of the successive genera run parallel to the structures of successive higher viewpoints’ (I 465).

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Lonergan now is able to argue that his position is ‘uniquely probable’ (I 465), that it is the ‘one and only’ way to unify logically unrelated sciences, and that it is the ‘one and only’ way to explain how higher orders of reality are ‘immanent in’ lower orders without violating their integrity (I 465). This position on explanatory genus rests ‘not on the present state of empirical sciences but on the fundamental properties of insight’ (I 466). It rests on ‘basic and permanent factors that hold their ground in subsequent modifications’ (I 466) and hence may be applied to developing things. Towards the end of the section on ‘Explanatory Genus and Species,’ Lonergan explicitly makes a connection between patterns of experience and levels of being. This will eventually provide a basis for understanding and evaluating his account of the patterns as well as for critiquing the accounts of various commentators. Having presented the account of explanatory genus, Lonergan asks whether it could be radically challenged. He then answers that any revision must appeal to experiencing, understanding, and judgment. Any reviser must be a concrete and intelligible unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness (I 467). However, any human reviser must also be capable of experience in patterns other than the intellectual. He must, then, be more than a unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. Lonergan asks: ‘What else will he be?’ He answers: One has to invoke at least one other genus of conjugate forms to account for the concrete probability of other patterns of experience, to account for preconscious and subconscious influence upon consciousness, to account for the fact that the hypothetical reviser eats and breathes and walks on other things besides men. (I 467) The basic point is that consciousness is incarnate. If the ultimate ground of the patterns is the human spirit, still the organic and psychic levels also have a role in the generation of the patterns. The patterns reveal the possibilities open to the embodied spirit of wonder. The human being is shown to be both rooted in the physical universe and open to the whole universe of being. The self is related to the non-conscious and the preconscious, to the unconscious depth, to other incarnate persons, to being, and to the transcendent. Hence the different patterns emerge as the incarnate human spirit extends itself and engages its world. As I have suggested already, this points to philosophical anthropology as the best context for a discussion of patterns. Lonergan proceeds to an important discussion on ‘Potency and Finality’ or, more accurately, on potency as the ground of both limitation and finality (I 467–76). This is important because it explains further the tension

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between different levels of concrete being that becomes consciously manifested in human beings. First, Lonergan shows how potency is properly the principle of limitation in proportionate being: ‘Each higher genus is limited by the preceding lower genus’ (I 468). Ultimately, the lowest genus provides the principle of limitation ‘for the domain of proportionate being’ (I 468). Furthermore, this principle of limitation must ‘reside in the potency of the lowest genus’ (I 468). Any insight or set of insights will be restricted to ‘the pattern of the data to be understood’ (I 468). Hence Lonergan refers to ‘prime potency’ as the metaphysical element corresponding to intellectually patterned experience of the empirical residue. Second, there is also the positive side to potency. As indeterminate, potency is open to being ‘informed’ or ‘actuated’ at higher and higher levels. Hence ‘objective process’ (I 470) is dynamically oriented towards emergence and development. The parallel of knowing and the known is once again invoked. Just as the process of knowing is dynamically related to the yet to be determined goal, so objective world process is oriented to a completion that only becomes determinate as the process unfolds (I 470). The parallelism of the dynamism of the mind and the dynamism of proportionate reality is given full and complete generality (I 470). Just as cognitional activity rises to higher viewpoints, so also objective process heads for higher levels of systematization. Just as cognitional activity at first only knows being heuristically, so that the known becomes determinate only in and through the knowing, so also ‘what is to be becomes determinate only through its own becoming’ (I 471). ‘As present knowing is not just present knowing but also a moment in process towards fuller knowing, so also present reality is not just present reality but also a moment in process to fuller reality’ (I 471). The objective side of the parallel is the ‘finality’ of the universe. ‘Finality is the dynamic aspect of the real’ (I 472). It is the ‘directed dynamism’ of the universe that is open to every possible ‘otherness’ (V 162). It is a fact verified fundamentally in our knowing, which is also an event in the universe (I 472). ‘Cognitional activity is itself but part of the universe, so its heading to being is but the particular instance in which universal striving towards being becomes conscious and intelligent and reasonable’ (I 470). Finality is a directed dynamism that is not determinate but is an ‘effectively probable realization of possibilities’ (I 473). It is the concrete, universal, differentiated, and flexible unfolding of the whole of proportionate being on the way to some ‘indeterminate betterment’ (I 472–6). This explains how there can be not only development but also tension in development. Potency is the ground of both limitation and finality. Its ‘proper contribution to the constitution of proportionate being’ (I 476) is

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limitation. But in its indeterminate relation to form, as open to being ‘informed,’ it is ‘the principle of the tendency to transcend limitation’ (I 476). ‘Potency is a tension of opposites’ (I 476). This tension is present at every level of the universe of emergent probability; and as we have said, it becomes conscious in the human. 10

Development and Human Development

This brings us to the core sections on development, which culminate in the account of human development (our main focus of interest). I will briefly treat of organic, psychic, intellectual development and then focus on conscious development in the human being. In human development we are dealing with a complex threefold development (I 484), a triply compounded development (I 503). This will bring out how the human being is a unity in tension of dynamically interrelated levels of integration, a whole that is simultaneously organic, psychic, and intellectual, developing in an environment that itself changes (I 480, 479). The account will also reveal the growing control of higher level over lower level: the increased freedom of the higher level from material limitation constitutes its transcendence over the lower level. This adds to the account of the degrees of freedom already given. It reveals more clearly the freedom proper to the developing human being, particularly in the account of ‘genuineness.’ Again I see this as relevant to an account of the patterns which will manifest the tensions between the levels, which will reveal different degrees of freedom from material limitation and which will emerge as the human being develops. Lonergan begins his account of development by presenting the basic ‘principles of development’ (I 476–81). The account opens with a presentation of the principles of emergence, correspondence, and finality. The principle of emergence is the familiar principle that ‘coincidental manifolds of lower conjugate acts invite the higher integration effected by higher conjugate forms’ (I 477). The principle of correspondence is as follows: ‘significantly different underlying manifolds require different higher integrations’ (I 477). But there is a measure of flexibility, so ‘within limits the same higher integration will systematize differing manifolds’ (I 477). The principle of finality indicates that the ‘underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization of being’ (I 477). On the basis of these principles a very important distinction is made between static and dynamic higher integrations (I 477). In dynamic higher integrations there is ongoing development as lower levels continue to ‘invite’ the higher integration. The higher integration is not content simply to systematize the lower level; rather, ‘it keeps adding to it and mod-

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ifying until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is eliminated and by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced’ (I 477–8). This notion of ‘dynamic higher integration’ will be directly relevant to organic, psychic, intellectual development and hence to the unity of human development. Lonergan is now able to introduce the principle of development itself: It is the linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations. An initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second … and so on, until the possibilities of development along a given line are exhausted and the relative stability of maturity is reached. (I 478) The details of development are filled out. Development will be ‘marked by an increasing explanatory differentiation’ (I 478). It is only in a more differentiated stage of development that something is fully understood. The unrestricted desire to know does not at first reveal the ‘intelligible differentiations’ of mathematics, common sense, science, philosophy. Development will have a major and minor flexibility, for either ‘it can pursue the same ultimate goal along different routes’ (I 478) or there can be ‘a shift or modification of the ultimate objective’ (I 479). In the case of the latter there is the biological example of adaption or the cognitional example of a shift in focus due to the ‘logic of issues’ (I 479). Minor flexibility is related to potency as limitation. Major flexibility is related to potency as finality. They are not opposed, for the higher integration operates not merely to integrate the lower level (with minor flexibility) but also to solve the ‘compound problem of systematizing a coincidental manifold in a given milieu or context’ (I 479), involving major flexibility. Major flexibility involves a relationship of the developing organism to the milieu or context or environment (I 480). This brings us to Lonergan’s definition of development: ‘A development may be defined as a flexible, linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence’ (I 479). With this background, Lonergan moves on to an inquiry into the genetic method that takes the notion of development as its heuristic base. Lonergan aims to work out a method adequate to the field of development (finality). This field will be the field of generalized emergent probability (I 487). What is required is the working out of the structures of recurring accumulating insights, including different structures for the study of the organism, the psyche, and intelligence.

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In his account of organic development, Lonergan introduces the basic tension between what he calls the ‘integrator’ and the ‘operator’ (I 489). These are first illustrated at the organic level, but they apply also to higher levels. These are not two systems but two aspects of systems that manifest potency as limitation and potency as finality in particular beings, including the human being. The organism-as-integrator is the organism aiming at consolidation, at a unified set of functions, at regulative process, at operative unity. The integrator is the higher system precisely as systematizer of the lower manifolds. The organism-as-integrator is the organism as primarily concerned with consolidation and preservation at that stage of development (I 489). The organism-as-operator is the higher system continuing to modify the underlying manifolds to call forth ‘its own replacement by a more specific and effective integrator’ (I 490). It is the organism as self-assembling and self-directing. It is finality, the upwardly directed dynamism of proportionate being, manifesting itself as/in the organism. ‘[The operator] is conditioned by instability in the underlying manifold, by incompleteness in the higher integration, by imperfection in the correspondence between the two. It is constituted inasmuch as the higher system not merely suffers but provokes the underlying instability’ (I 490). At the further levels of the psyche and the intellect the higher integrations are conscious. The psyche now supervenes over the organic and the intellect over the psychic (I 492). The conscious nature of the higher integrations of the psyche and the intellect show these higher levels to be more than simply the introduction of a greater complexity into the lower. They reveal a real emergence and transcendence in which there is greater freedom from the material level and in which the dynamic aspect of the operator is more evident (I 492).8 The first conscious level is the level of the psyche. The psyche is a definite level in the structure of human beings (I 496). It is the site of communication between the unconscious and the conscious. In psychic development the underlying neural manifold is unconscious and the supervening higher system is conscious (I 492). As we move from the neural-organic to the psychic we find a greater freedom from material limitation. The operator is more evident in the conscious response of the psyche to the environment. Also we see how not only is there development to a higher level but also the lower level reaches a development it would not have if it were not the underlying manifold of the higher level. So 8 It is significant that the higher integration brings also fuller development at the lower level: ‘Thus, organic differentiation reaches its maximum in animals, and psychic differentiation reaches its maximum in man’ (I 492).

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organic differentiation and complexity reaches its maximum within the higher level (I 492). Above the level of the psyche is the intellectual (or spiritual) level. It includes both the level of the underlying sensible presentation and the higher level of insight (I 492). Here intelligence as integrator is revealed in ‘habitual perceptiveness’ and ‘habitual modes of aggressive and affective response’ (I 493) and in the habitual insights that underpin behavioural skills and habits of thought and action. The operator may be seen as intelligence inquiring, transforming psychic contents in search of understanding, having insights, and constructing conceptual formulations of understanding already achieved. The operator is the conscious subject raising further questions (I 494). At this level there is ‘exceptional freedom’ from material limitation. This is owing to the fact that the lower manifold here is not the material as such, but the psychic representations of the material manifold (I 494). This brings us to the compound development of the human being. It returns us to the basic position outlined at the beginning of this section on the structure of human being. The human being is seen as a unity differentiated by a variety of conjugates (I 495), characterized by a series of interlocking organic, psychic, and intellectual processes (I 494). Lonergan now advances to present the three basic laws of human development. These bring out the dynamism of the structure of human being. First is the ‘Law of Integration,’ which holds that development at one level calls for development at all levels. The law shows what is involved in human integral development. It draws attention to the ‘dynamic unity of the subject’ (I 497): ‘The initiative of development may be organic, psychic, intellectual, or external, but the development remains fragmentary until the principle of correspondence between different levels is satisfied … The initiation of a development is one thing and its integrated completion is another’ (I 496). This follows from the unity of the human being. The initiation of development at one level will call for ‘complementary adjustments’ at other levels. If they are not forthcoming, the initiative is discarded by the established dynamic unity or, alternatively, the unity suffers deformation as unintegrated developments, particular to one level, establish themselves (I 497). The ‘Law of Limitation and Transcendence’ follows. This concerns the relationship between the two conscious levels of the psyche and intelligence. Here the ‘tension that is inherent in the finality of all proportionate being becomes in man a conscious tension’ (I 497). Lonergan points out how the different functionings of psyche and intelligence lead them to operate in tension. There is a basic ‘duality’ in human consciousness that cannot be eliminated completely. It arises out of the tension between the

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self as self-centred psyche and the self as open to the universe of being as intelligible and intelligent and to being as value and the good. On the side of the subject it is the opposition between a center in the world of sense operating self-centeredly and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligibly ordered universe of being to which one can belong, and in which one can function, only through detachment and disinterestedness. (I 498) The opposition is inescapable: ‘As a man cannot divest himself of his animality, so he cannot put off the eros of his mind’ (I 498). The basic tension in the human being and in human development, then, is between the psyche and the intellect. In human development at the conscious level there will be a concrete point of departure, the subject ‘as he happens to be’ at that stage of development. This is ‘the self-centered psyche which is content to orientate itself within its visible and palpable environment and to deal with it successfully’ (I 499). There will also be actual development and transcendence, which is ‘anticipated immanently by the detachment and disinterestedness of the pure desire’ (I 499). The result is a tension between present limitations and future transcendence. The tension is unavoidable because psyche and intellect are a unity in tension. ‘Nor are the pure desire and the sensitive psyche two things one of them “I” and the other “It.” They are the unfolding on different levels of a single, individual, unity, identity, whole. Both are “I” and neither is merely “It”’ (I 499). Furthermore, they need each other, for the psyche invites its own higher integration and the intellect requires the materials that human sensitivity provides. The tension must be negotiated to preserve a creative tension that gives both sides their due. This is directly relevant to the patterns of experience, which reflect this tension in various ways. This leads to the ‘Law of Genuineness.’ It is concerned with how we deal with the tension in human being, in developing human being. The tension of limitation and transcendence is ‘no vague tension.’ It is ‘the unwelcome invasion of consciousness by opposed apprehensions of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be’ (I 502). If we are to negotiate the tension in conscious development, we have to apprehend it correctly in ‘its starting point, its process, and its goal’ (I 500). If we are to develop, we have to be willing to allow the operator to decentre or deconstruct the integrator in order to make room for reconstruction. We have to allow intellectual and rational self-consciousness to raise the further questions and to call for development towards the self we can be. This involves the guidance of genuineness. ‘Genuineness is the

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admission of that tension into consciousness and so it is the necessary condition of the harmonious cooperation of the conscious and unconscious components of development’ (I 502). Genuineness involves a developed wisdom and a commitment to properly human development. Lonergan says that such genuineness ‘goes far beyond the natural endowment of detachment and disinterestedness that we possess in the pure desire to know’ (I 502). This is a remarkable claim. On this showing, genuineness does not just guide development but is itself a development, a new emergence (I 503). It involves a movement into the realm of moral and rational self-consciousness and self-appropriation. It involves, we may say, an appropriation of the laws of the spirit that ‘govern spirit in the exercise of its legislative function’ (I 641). ‘The laws of spirit reside in the dynamic structure of its cognitional and volitional operations, and their concrete application is effected through spirit’s own operations within that dynamic structure’ (I 641). Genuineness is the concrete commitment to the exigence of the human spirit. It is the human person acting with complete integrity, allowing the self-correcting process of learning to bring him to intellectual and moral maturity. It is the willingness to persevere in the constant negotiation between the neuro-psychic level and intelligence, between limitation and transcendence. Finally we note that this tension cannot be avoided or escaped from. It is built into the structure of human being. It can only be appropriated in a creative negotiation or misappropriated in destructive opposition: To fail in genuineness is not to escape but only to displace the tension between limitation and transcendence … Such a displacement is the root of the dialectical phenomenon of scotosis in the individual, of the bias of common sense, of basic philosophical differences, and their prolongation in natural and human sciences, in educational theory and history. (I 503) At this point we are moving ahead into dialectics. The dynamic structure of human being, the tensions among the levels of that structure, and the degree to which we commit ourselves to negotiating that tension in a genuine way have important implications for human life and for philosophy. Inasmuch as the tension of limitation and transcendence is concretely manifested in the patterns of experience, then genuineness is involved in guiding the blending and mixing of the patterns and in overcoming the conflicts and oppositions among them. If polymorphism is the key to philosophy, then genuineness will involve the appropriation of polymorphic consciousness. This is a crucial point that I believe has been neglected. It

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is in the discussion of genuineness that Lonergan shows the unfolding of intelligence in the concrete. Here we begin to appreciate intelligence as embodied and incarnate. This opposes the tendency to overlook the engaged subject. It is as polymorphic that the subject is engaged. 11

The Unity of the Human Person: Chapter 16 of Insight

To complete the account of the structure of the individual human being we need to treat the ‘unity of man’ (I 538). The question of unity has already been addressed to some extent. The theme of unity was important in the discussion of development. The principles of correspondence and integration, for example, revealed the human being as a compound in tension. It is only inasmuch as a living thing possesses a certain unity that development at one level calls for development at other levels. Similarly, the theme of genuineness was concerned with preserving a harmonious unity in tension. In chapter 16, Lonergan now considers directly the question of the metaphysical unity of the human being. The question is this: What can ground the unity of a being that is both material and spiritual (I 538)? First of all, Lonergan insists that there is a unity to be understood: ‘Man is one yet both material and spiritual … Man is one. Man is individuated by his central potency, one in nature by his central form, existent by his central act’ (I 538). Lonergan then points out that ‘this basic unity extends to the distinctive conjugates of human intellectual activity’ (I 538). The implications of this are not clear yet, but evidently Lonergan wants us to keep in mind the ‘unity’ of the intellectual/spiritual level. He goes on to remind us that ‘the conjugate forms of human intellectual activity constitute the higher system of man’s sensitive living’ (I 538). The ‘coincidental manifold of lower conjugate acts’ at the sensitive level are ‘rendered systematic by conjugate forms on the higher level’ (I 538), by forms at the intellectual level. This relationship between higher and lower levels in the human being is then shown to be in need of further investigation: ‘Still, if we ask in what manner precisely the conjugate forms of human intellectual activity constitute the higher system of man’s sensitive system, we are confronted not with a single but with a twofold array of acts’ (I 538). As we have mentioned earlier, Lonergan argues that ‘human intellectual activity provides the higher system for sensitive living both unconsciously and consciously’ (I 538). First we consider the unconscious way: ‘It does so unconsciously inasmuch as it grounds the pattern in which sensitive experience occurs, and in this respect, it is a higher system to sensitive living as sensitive living is a higher system to organic living’ (I 538).

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This is not developed any further at this point. It seems to refer back to the point already made: that ‘the materials that emerge in consciousness are already patterned and the pattern is already charged emotionally and conatively’ (I 538). That is, ‘there must be exercised some preconscious selection and arrangement’ (I 213). In the intellectual patterns the detached spirit of inquiry ‘cuts off’ emotion and conation inasmuch as they interfere with inquiry. However, there is still the desire for knowledge and the thrill of discovery. Emotion and conation are disciplined in order to allow the detached spirit of inquiry to penetrate observation ‘with the abstruse classifications of science’ and to put the unconscious to work (I 213). Similarly, before explicit and conscious reflection our imagination and intelligence already collaborate in the dramatic pattern (I 212). The ‘censor’ is operative in constructive or repressive ways. The intellect is already active, though conditioned by the organic and psychic levels that it systematizes. This indicates a unity of organic–psychic–intellectual levels, the unity of higher and lower systems. It is intelligence-as-wonder that grounds all the patterns (except, perhaps, the biological). Patterns are grounded in the potentialities of embodied intelligence or incarnate spirit. They are the ways in which incarnate spirit is able to operate and actualize itself. Lonergan moves on to discuss the conscious control that brings out the difference between higher system and lower system, between the controlling and the controlled system: ‘There is also a conscious control of one’s living, and this differs enormously from the former … For conscious intelligence is engaged primarily in grasping the intelligible systems relevant, not to one’s sensitive living, but to the contents of one’s sensitive experience’ (I 539). Here we are concerned with intelligence as heading towards conscious cognitive self-transcendence, towards a grasp of the whole universe of being (and beyond this to full moral self-transcendence). The shift from subjective acts of living to objective contents aims at a systematization ‘not of the particular animal that I am, but of the whole universe of being’ (I 539). ‘And it is within its knowledge of the universe that knowledge of itself is attained, knowledge of its function in the universe is acquired, and the grounds for willing the execution of that function provided. Finally, it is through willing that conscious intellectual control of sensitive living is effected’ (I 539). Lonergan then brings out the implication of this conscious and unconscious ‘dual control’ of sensitive living. The significance is that it not only points to the distinction between spiritual and material in human being but also raises a question about the nature of the central form that grounds the unity: ‘Now if we go to the root of this duality of control over sensitive living, we are brought to the contrast between the intelligible and the intelligent’ (I 539).

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The contrast emerges when we realize that ‘we too are,’ that we exist in the universe of proportionate being and can know ourselves along with everything else. We too are a unity of potency, form, and act. But as knowing subjects we are a unity of ‘the potential intelligence of the disinterested, detached, unrestricted desire to know,’ of ‘the formal intelligence that consists in insight,’ of ‘actual intelligence that grasps the unconditioned’ (I 539). Hence in knowing ourselves we grasp ‘intelligence and knowing,’ we grasp ourselves as spirit: Inasmuch as we are material we are constituted by otherwise coincidental manifolds of conjugate acts that unconsciously and spontaneously are reduced to system by higher conjugate forms … But inasmuch as we are spirit, we are oriented towards the universe of being, know ourselves as parts within that universe, and guide our living by that knowledge. (I 539) The material and the spiritual differ inasmuch as the material is constituted by the empirical residue or is conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue (I 540). The spiritual is not intrinsically conditioned by the empirical residue, but rather abstracts from it. It is conditioned by the empirical residue, for understanding presupposes the materials of sense experience. But this is only extrinsic conditioning. With this in mind we can ‘advance a further step in our study of man’s nature’ (I 542). Man, the concrete being, is both material and spiritual; he is material by his physical, chemical, organic and sensitive conjugates; he is spiritual by his intellectual conjugates. Still man is not just an assemblage of conjugates; he is intelligibly one, and that unity has its metaphysical ground in his central form. (I 542) We have seen that there is a unity of the knower grasped in self-affirmation. This ‘prior unity on the side of the subject’ is required as well on the side of the object. This brings us to the question of the central form that ‘constitutes the ground of the truth of affirming that unity’ (I 542). ‘But are we to say that man’s central form is material or spiritual?’ (I 542). Lonergan argues that we must recognize that it is spiritual. For if man’s central form were material it could not be intelligent and so ‘could not be the center and ground of man’s inquiry and insight, reflection and judgment’ (I 543). On the other hand, a spiritual central form could be the ground and centre of our physical, chemical, organic, and sensitive conjugates. For ‘the spiritual is comprehensive,’ and ‘what can embrace the whole universe through knowledge can provide the center and ground of

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unity in the material conjugates of a single man’ (I 543). The spiritual, then, is not simply an emergence from below. It is transcendent. It is ‘higher’ not merely as a higher ordering but also because it is not conditioned intrinsically by the empirical residue, as lower levels are. Still, it is ‘extrinsically’ conditioned by the lower levels and by the empirical residue. It is conditioned by lower levels in its actualization and development. The human being remains a unity, and the biological, organic, and psychic levels must be given their due. Hence the higher level of the spirit not only ‘controls’ the lower levels but also is responsible for them. The above account should have made it clear what their due is and how and in what measure spirit is responsible for them. 12

Insight and File 713: Human Solidarity and the Concrete Universal

To round off the account of human being I want to relate the unity of the individual human being to the concrete unity of humanity. The account of human being will reach its proper completion when ‘humanity’ is shown to be more than simply an aggregate of individuals (and more than an abstraction). In a sense this is already implied in Insight. The account of the dialectic of community in chapter 7 points to the irreducibility of the social dimension of human life. The account of explanatory genus and species in chapter 8 points towards the reality of concrete humanity by showing how it is the species as a whole that develops dynamically and flexibly. The treatment of the ‘Notion of Being’ implies a solidarity in the community of inquirers. The account of the unity of man in chapter 16 is also relevant to an account of the unity of humanity as a whole. Finally,the notion of the concrete universal is mentioned in the Epilogue. However, for a more explicitly ontological account we need to return to the earlier writings collected in File 713. These writings reveal Lonergan’s important (and often neglected) contributions to both the philosophy and the theology of history. Moreover, they present an account of the unity of humanity – an account that, I believe, contributes to our understanding of the patterns of experience. The notion of human solidarity, for example, contributes to a grounding of a ‘we-consciousness’ that corresponds to ‘the ontological structure of Christian community.’9 This may also help ground our understanding of the dramatic pattern.

9 Dunne, ‘Consciousness in Christian Community,’ 293.

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Lonergan presents File 713 as concerned with a ‘metaphysics of history’ and a ‘metaphysics of human solidarity’ (or a ‘fundamental sociology’). The metaphysics of history is inseparable from the metaphysics of human solidarity, for it is human beings who collectively create history. The immediate goal of the writings in File 713 was to give an account of human solidarity that would oppose the anthropology implicit in liberal individualism and in Marxist collectivism.10 The related goal of the metaphysics of history was to correctly identify the ‘controls’ of history indicated by a proper understanding of human solidarity. Shute quotes Doran as holding that what Lonergan ‘most wanted to say’ concerned ‘the role of human intelligence in history and society’ and concerned also ‘the relation of intelligence to social and cultural progress.’11 Lonergan set out, therefore, to ‘restore the integrity of the social order.’12 He does this by showing how human solidarity operates concretely, by making its presuppositions explicit or by showing how it operates within history for a purpose. Even though File 713 contains an early account, its ontological outlook contributes to a better reading of the later account in Insight and Method. I will present an outline of the early position, drawing mainly on ‘Philosophy of History,’ which is apparently part of an unfinished ‘Essay on Fundamental Sociology’ that has not survived.13 The key notion is that of the ‘concrete universal.’ For the following account I will rely on Shute and Lamb.14 According to Shute, ‘Philosophy of History’ is concerned with specifying the ‘upper blade’ of historical inquiry. This involves acquiring an understanding of what history is and an understanding of how human action constitutes that history.15 Specifying the upper blade of historical inquiry will involve ‘a metaphysics of history, a differential calculus of progress’ (PH 95), and hence a ‘pure theory of external human action’ (PH 95). Lonergan first shows how individual human action constitutes history. The account involves the notion of premotion. External events premove sensitive experiential consciousness, which in turn premoves the intellectual forms that emerge and premove the will. The act of will then inhibits or modifies or extends the material flow of external events. It selects or fails to select the concrete good. This premotion of sensitive consciousness

Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 76–8. Doran, ‘Lonergan: An Appreciation,’ 7. Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 74. Ibid. Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History; Lamb, ‘The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology.’ 15 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 78.

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by external events implies that every human act is ‘statistically determined.’ This preserves freedom yet leaves room for an intelligible link between human action and world process. In this way the human agent participates in or frustrates the unfolding of world process. Second, in addition to individual human action there is the ongoing collaborative action of humanity. It is in understanding how this is possible that we come to grasp humanity as the reality of each and every human being who ever was, is, or will be,16 humanity as the ‘concrete universal.’ In order to attain this understanding, and so adequately grasp what history is, we need to consider the complex relationships between ‘the immanent (and internal) acts of persons and the external actions that result.’17 The concrete universal of humanity is constituted by these relationships. It is here we find the intelligible unity of the human species. Lonergan argues here that material multiplicity does not exclude intelligible unity, for it does not introduce any intelligible difference. Hence we can recognize human beings as having the ‘same’ nature and the ‘same’ intelligible form. The human species is intelligibly one even if materially many.18 Furthermore, premotion applies also to collaborative action and provides ‘a principle of unity for the human solidarity operative in history.’19 The actions of a previous generation will constitute premotion for the present generation. Hence ‘men are one in their action’ (PH 97). Everything we do and everything we think depends on the premotion of other things and, above all, of other people.20 Finally, Lonergan notes that on this position human beings remain free, even if conditioned by premotion. Premotion does not imply total predetermination but only a predetermination according to statistical law.21 Premotion influences human choice mainly by the inviting final causation of the human good, not merely by the determination of efficient causation. I will consider the nature of the human good further in chapter 6 of the present work. This adds up to a distinctive view of history. It indicates how human solidarity operates across history; thereby it reveals the concrete universal as a reality. ‘[History is] the flow of human acts, proceeding from the one human nature, materially individuated in space-time, and all united [in solidarity] according to the principle of premotion’ (PH 98).

16 Lamb, ‘The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology,’ 55. 17 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 80. 18 Ibid., 80–1. 19 Ibid., 81. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 82.

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The basic claim is that ‘Human beings are both one in nature and one in action.’22 Humanity is involved in an ongoing unfolding historical causality in a totality of interpersonal relations. There is a complex of intelligible relations among human beings and between them and the universe of which they are a part. This is the concrete universal of humankind embedded in the concrete existing universe of being.23 The unfolding of history and the unfolding of the concrete universal of humanity are explained by Shute in terms of the link between internal acts of persons and the external flow of actions. The external flow incarnates and mediates the intelligibility grasped by any individual member of the human species. This in turn may lead to the fulfilment of some of the conditions of possibility of the emergence of understanding in another member of the species. The external flow thereby mediates intelligibility and provides a basis for intelligent collaboration and communication and solidarity. However, the ultimate condition of possibility of human collaboration and communication and solidarity is the intelligible unity of nature found in the intelligible form of the species. It is difficult to convey the significance of this unity of human nature without transposing the argument into cognitional terms. Lonergan effects this in Verbum and then in Insight. The condition of possibility of human collaboration and solidarity is ultimately found in the nature of intelligence, which is capable of becoming the ‘other as other’ (V 162). This occurs on the basis of ‘apprehensive abstraction.’ What can be apprehended by way of apprehensive abstraction can also be communicated to and appreciated by an intelligent ‘other,’ for whom it becomes a point of departure for the development of further understanding. Lamb expresses the position in this way: Our experiences and our ideas are not only our own. ‘Our experiences are embedded within the flow of human action in history. Without our adverting to it, our experiences are intrinsically related to complex physical, chemical, biological, neurological, zoological, and cultural schemes of recurrence.’24 Similarly, we should be ‘aware of how deeply our personal insights are communal.’25 Lonergan was quite explicit on this point in the early writing in File 713: ‘Human achievement or progress is not that of individuals but of the species … The individual genius is but the instrument of the race in

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid., 55. 24 Lamb, ‘The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology,’ 56. 25 Ibid.

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its expansion … Intellectual achievement is the achievement of the race, of the unity of human action’ (PH 100). This communal nature of thinking does not, however, mean that we are determined by the community. That would rule out progress and development (as well as communication between one local community and another). In drawing from the community we are enabled to contribute to the community, and in this the nature of intelligence is again the significant point. Braio puts this neatly when he affirms that ‘learning from the community goes forward on the same basis as discovery for the community.’26 In order to properly appreciate the relationship of individual thinker and communal understanding, we have to grasp the ‘differentials’ of ongoing collaboration. This involves above all grasping the distinctiveness of our shared nature as intelligent beings along with our consequent ability to grasp intelligibility in the external flow of events and human actions. Our nature is such that we are active intellects able to achieve insight into phantasm (i.e., images based on sense experience). This is brought out more clearly in the later writings, which express human nature in terms of the dynamic normative structure of human consciousness. Lamb shows the relevance of the concrete universal by treating it in the context of a discussion of cultural pluralism. He shows how it provides an alternative to both the ‘dominant universality’ of the West and the equally inadequate historicist pluralism that arises in reaction.27 He argues that the universality of the human genus and species is ‘not opposed to the myriad flowering of millions and millions of profoundly different cultures.’28 As humanity develops, human experience and understanding and knowledge and action are differentiated in many cultural contexts. Hence ‘concrete universality is the matrix of such cultural flowering. Yet this is no historicism, for the concrete universality of cultural creativity is constituted by human operations which are normative.’29 Finally Lamb clarifies the notion of the transcultural. Here the early account of the common nature of humanity is transposed onto an account of the related and recurrent operations of conscious intentionality. The dynamic structure reveals the common nature, which is the same for all members of the species. Lamb draws on the later developments found in 26 Braio, ‘Twine in the Labyrinth,’ 81. 27 Lamb, ‘The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology,’ 48–9. 28 Ibid., 58. 29 Ibid.

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Verbum and Insight to show how this dynamic normative structure constitutes the transcultural. Lonergan himself is explicit on this: The transcendental method outlined … is, in a sense, transcultural. Clearly it is not transcultural inasmuch as it is explicitly formulated. But it is transcultural in the realities to which the formulation refers, for these realities are not the product of any culture but, on the contrary, the principles that produce cultures, preserve them, develop them. Moreover, since it is to these realities we refer when we speak of homo sapiens, it follows that these realities are transcultural with respect to all truly human cultures. (M 282) The reality of human intelligence and love is transcultural: ‘It is not the product of any culture but rather the principle that begets and develops cultures that flourish, as it also is the principle that is violated when cultures crumble and decay’ (M 283). The transcultural, then, is ‘the creative reality of humankind in each and every culture creating, preserving, neglecting, or dismantling the culture in which they live.’30 Cultures are grounded in the unity of humanity. They are not simply aggregates of products of individuals in isolation. 13

Grounding Polymorphism?

In this section I want to sum up what has been established concerning the structure of human being and, at the same time, show its significance for grounding our understanding of the patterns of experience (and polymorphism generally). The preceding sections have been concerned to establish in detail this account of the human being as incarnate consciousness, as a compound-in-tension of the organic, psychic, and intellectual. They have revealed how the human being develops in solidarity with other human beings and in relation to the whole universe of being. I now want to highlight the main points and relate them to the patterns of experience (and the differentiations of consciousness). First, I will emphasize the way in which Lonergan’s metaphysics provides a basis for an account of embodied consciousness. Second, I will recall how Lonergan brings out the dynamic relationships among the organic, psychic, and intellectual and spiritual levels in human being. Third, I will relate the structure of human beings to the patterns of experience.

30 Ibid., 61–2.

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Lonergan has situated his metaphysics of human nature and of human solidarity within a ‘holistic metaphysics.’31 The human being is rooted in the concretely unfolding world process of emergent probability. Furthermore, emergent probability extends into the properly human realm, where we discover how every human being is related to other human beings in the unfolding of concrete humanity. Finally the human being is open to the whole universe of proportionate being, and ultimately to the transcendent, by the unfolding of conscious intentionality. ‘According to Lonergan’s holistic metaphysics, human reality consists of atomic, chemical, biological, psychic, and intentional levels of integration, in which higher levels are conditioned by lower levels but also sublate them.’32 This implies that for Lonergan the human subject will be ‘a field of tension with its own unconscious depths, with other selves, and with the transcendent beyond.’33 There is, says McPartland, a dynamic integration of ‘nature and spirit’ manifesting the finality of proportionate being. The unconscious neural basis is an upwardly directed dynamism that seeks fuller realization not only on the sensitive level but also ‘on higher artistic, dramatic, philosophic, cultural, and religious levels’ (I 482). Given this interconnection of nature and spirit in the human being, the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, and behaviouristic psychology will still be relevant to the higher level of conscious intentionality. Hence sensations, images, and feelings will be ‘integral with the functioning of intellectual and moral projects without determining them.’34 The most important result of Lonergan’s holistic approach is a better appreciation of the human being as incarnate embodied consciousness, situated in the world process of emergent probability. The theme of embodiment has recently emerged as an important question, but the treatment is often unsatisfactory. In Bereft of Reason, Eugene Halton argues that the incarnate body is made ‘epiphenomenal’ in the sociobiological positions that reduce human concerns to ‘ethereal rational self interest.’35 He adds that postmodernism continues this ‘rational reduction’ when it reduces human beings to texts with its proclamation of ‘the flesh made word.’36 The same inadequacy is found even in Habermas: ‘Habermas’s theory of communicative action … says much about rational talkers talking

31 32 33 34 35 36

McPartland, ‘Consciousness and Normative Subjectivity,’ 121. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 122. Halton, Bereft of Reason, 84. Ibid., 87–8.

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but very little about actors acting: felt, perceptive, imaginative, bodily experience does not fit these theories.’37 A lack of appreciation of embodiment leads to the separation of nature and culture or to a view of culture as merely construct.38 This is also the position of Alexander Argyros in A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos. He argues that postmodernism tends towards a ‘dualism between human culture and prehuman nature.’ Hence he offers in reply ‘a systematic view of human culture situating it within a larger natural framework.’39 Argyros explains that his main premise is that ‘the natural world, as revealed by the natural sciences, channels human interpretations of both culture and nature as much as human interpretations of culture and nature are channeled by sociohistorical pressures.’40 Much of what Argyros has to say is supportive of Lonergan’s position, but he misses the roles played by insight, by conscious intentionality, and by self-affirmation and self-appropriation. His account is less explanatory than that of Lonergan, who more clearly relates levels of integration. The human being as sensitive, intelligent, rational, and responsible consciousness links nature and culture. Lonergan’s holistic metaphysics and his account of embodied consciousness challenge prevailing postmodern assumptions at many levels. In particular, it shows how embodied consciousness mediates between nature and culture. Moving on to the details of the three-level structure of human beings, we begin with the organic level. The bodily-organic level of human being needs to be properly appreciated. In and through the body, the human being is already engaged with the surrounding environment. External stimuli act on organic process in the human being. This allows for an external initiative in human development (I 496). Inasmuch as the psyche is the higher-level integration of the underlying neural manifold, external stimuli will be manifested in sense consciousness: in this way ‘things force themselves upon us, upon our consciousness’ (TE 83). The origin of the biological pattern may be placed here (I 289). This does not involve a relationship between an internal subject and an external world in any Cartesian sense. The human being is already organic and so already engages the physical and organic world. The organic body situates human being in the physical and chemical and biological realms and in physical and chemical and biological relations to other human beings. The organic/neural level is not external to the psychic and intellectual 37 38 39 40

Ibid., 88. Ibid., 82. Argyros, A Blessed Rage for Order, 2–3. Ibid., 2.

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levels but is always already potency for the higher integrations of psyche and intellect. As we have already said, the lower level of the organic must not be thought of as separate from the higher levels that sublate it and extend it. Geertz expresses the interrelationship of lower and higher levels in this way: Man’s nervous system does not merely enable him to acquire culture, it positively demands that he do so if it is going to function at all. Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop and extend organically based capacities, logically and genetically prior to it, it would seem ingredient to those capacities. A cultureless human being would probably turn out to be not an intrinsically talented though unfulfilled ape, but a wholly mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity.41 Geertz intends to challenge the nature/culture dualism that remains so established in contemporary thought. However, he does not establish the dynamic relationship between nature and culture in an explanatory way. He overlooks the role of the psyche as it relates to the organic and the role of the spirit as it relates to the cultural. Lonergan’s notion of a series of explanatory higher integrations and his account of increasing degrees of freedom and control, along with the distinction between intelligible and intelligent reality, provides a more successful account of the relationship of the organic to the spiritual, the material to the intellectual, the natural to the cultural. This brings us to the dynamic relation between the biopsychic/sensitive levels and the intellectual/spiritual levels. Lonergan points out how a selfcentred psyche exists in tension with self-transcending spirit (I 457, 447). The term ‘self-centred’ should not be taken in a moralistic sense. There is an inescapable and legitimate self-centredness involved here. The real issue is negotiating balances among the proper requirements of each level. Lonergan clarifies the relationship, giving each of the sides its due but also establishing the legitimate natural hierarchy in which they are found. The spiritual/intellectual is over and above the psychic. It is a higher integration that sublates and goes beyond the lower. Hence within the order of the universe, within the order of proportionate being, and within the order in human being, the lower integration of the psyche has the function of serving the higher integration of the spirit.

41 Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (1973), quoted in Halton, Bereft of Reason, 89.

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However, it should be clearly understood that to serve this purpose the psyche must retain its own proper function. There is no doubt that the psyche has a vertical finality to participate in and serve the spirit (I 246, 571). But also it must retain a horizontal finality that conserves and develops its own identity (I 496). A balanced human development gives both psyche and intellect their due. The spirit/intellect has the role of integrating, ordering, controlling, and setting in context the functioning of the psyche (for it grasps the horizon of being and not just the horizon of psychic feeling and sensitive operation). But the psyche can only be of service to the spirit if it is allowed its own character and autonomous functioning. Hence we have to distinguish aspects in the psyche that are patterned and disposed according to the purposes of the spirit and aspects that are proper to its own functioning and becoming. On the other hand, we must be clear that horizontal finality of the lower level also has a vertical finality towards service of the higher level. Hence feelings, for example, not only manifest our sensitivity but also reveal the organic and psychic as participating in the spiritual.42 Given that the psyche has its own proper character and functioning, then the human spirit must acknowledge this and be responsible for its flourishing. To be human is to be more than intellectual. The psyche is always a partner and not simply an instrument of the spirit. Both are ‘I’ and neither is merely ‘It.’ Hence the feeling dimension of the psyche should not be minimized.43 With this background understanding of the nature and dynamic structure of human beings, we can now return to the issue of the patterns. I argue that the account of human being provides a basis for clarifying the account of the patterns. Not only does it reveal the nature of the patterns but also it provides a basis for ordering them and for evaluating their significance. It allows us to evaluate Lonergan’s own account of the patterns and the accounts of the commentators. The argument being proposed is that this account of the structure of human beings grounds the account of the patterns. I argue that patterns will reflect or manifest some level in the structure of human being or some aspect of the dynamic relations among the levels in the structure. If intelligence as wonder is the fundamental generative principle of the patterns, there is also the fact 42 Alternatively, we may say that the psyche reveals or manifests the embodied operation of spirit. In this way it also mediates a felt apprehension of integral conscious intentionality. On this see Tallon, Head and Heart. 43 Lonergan does not develop this in Insight. He expands his account of feeling in Method but does not adequately show the role of feeling in the patterns or in conscious intentionality as a whole.

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that consciousness is embodied. It is incarnate intelligence discovering its own possible modes of operation and its own possibilities of development that generates the patterns of experience as well as the differentiations of consciousness. This is already explicitly indicated in two important passages that have already been quoted. First of all there is the claim that different genera are needed to ground patterns other than the intellectual (I 467). I would argue that they are also needed for the intellectual pattern, but Lonergan does not seem to recognize this. Second there is the claim that the intellect patterns the psyche unconsciously as well as consciously (I 538, 570). There are other supporting details, such as the mention of the correspondence between the biological pattern and the underlying neural demand functions (I 289), and the way polymorphism generally is spoken of in terms of the mixing and blending of patterns (I 410). I hope to add further confirmation in the detailed account of the individual patterns in the next chapter, but already there is at least a case for investigating the claim that the patterns will reflect the structure of human being. The tension inherent in all of proportionate being becomes a conscious tension in human beings. It is manifested above all in the tension between the biological-psychic and the spiritual-intellectual levels of human being. The patterns of experience are directly related to this tension and these levels. The working of the pattern may be compared to the working of the censor. Just as the censor is not an agent but a rule relating the organic and the psychic levels (I 482), so the patterns may be seen in terms of an operational relationship between spirit and psyche. All the patterns are patternings of the psyche by the spirit, and they are patterns of the psyche as higher integration of the organic. The whole person is involved. In each case both the biological-psychic and the spiritual-intellectual are involved. Also in each case the relationship of patterning spirit and patterned psyche is found. However, there will be variations in the degree of freedom of the spirit from the limitations of the organic and psychic. The psyche will serve and participate in the spirit in different ways. If it serves the intellect it will be to direct feelings and focus attention so as to facilitate intellectual inquiry. If it serves the level of interpersonal love it will motivate the spirit and encourage communion with the ‘other.’ However the spirit will also give the organic and the psychic their due. There is a place for the biological pattern. There is a place for the unity of spirit and body in physical expression in exercise and play and dance. The patterns are patterns of the human subject/person/being. They mark the main possibilities and potentialities within the human. In light of these considerations I will argue for a modification of the list of patterns of experience given by Lonergan. In addition to the biological, aesthetic,

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artistic, dramatic, practical, and mystical patterns mentioned by Lonergan, I give reasons for accepting also a symbolic and a moral pattern. I will give my reasons for this listing in chapter 4. These may not be the only patterns, and there is room for debate on how we divide up the patterns. Still, these patterns generally mark out important dimensions of being human and indicate both the horizontal and the vertical potentialities open to us. The patterns then reveal the potentialities of the human being as incarnate embodied spirit. This is Lonergan’s explicit position in Understanding and Being (UB 322). Commentators such as Frank Braio and Kenneth Melchin argue that Insight is best seen as an extended account of the nature of human being.44 However, the link between patterns and human nature is not always appreciated, and the account of the patterns is not developed. Too often the brief account in chapter 6 is taken as complete or as unproblematic. The treatment of patterns in chapter 6 is not related to the treatment in chapter 14 or to the account of human development in chapter 15. The epistemological-normative then displaces the anthropological theme and curtails the unfolding of the account of polymorphic consciousness. This has negative consequences for the account of philosophic difference. In the next chapter of this book I want to attempt a more detailed account of the individual patterns. I will critique and extend Lonergan’s presentation of the patterns by keeping in mind the structure that grounds the patterns. I am convinced that reflecting on the patterns in terms of the relationship of spirit–psyche–organism, given in Lonergan’s holistic metaphysics, will continue to throw light on the patterns as a whole and on individual patterns. For example, it clarifies the distinction between the proper finality of the psyche (the fullness of sensing and feeling in passionate living, along with the play of images) and the vertical finality of the psyche (to serve the higher concerns of the spirit in various ways). It also gives us a way of reflecting on the unity and order of the patterns, whether considered from below upwards or above downwards. There is much unexplored territory here. Finally I argue that as well as grounding the patterns, the account of the structure of human being grounds the differentiations of consciousness. The notion of differentiation is commonly treated only in connection with Method in Theology, where it is a dominant theme. However, we have found that the notion of differentiation already emerges in Insight. It is mentioned in chapter 7, where Lonergan speaks of ‘particular cases of the

44 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being; Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability.

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intellectual form of experience’ and ‘similar differentiations’ (I 268). It is found again in chapter 15, where development is said to be marked by ‘increasing explanatory differentiation’ (I 478). Here Lonergan talks of the differentiations such as natural science, common sense, philosophy, and human science. Finally, differentiation is treated in chapter 17, where Lonergan talks of the differentiation of the objective of intelligent and rational consciousness (I 578). A chapter in this book will be given over to a discussion of the differentiations of consciousness, and a case will be made for holding these to be aspects of polymorphism. First we must consider the patterns in detail.

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3 Polymorphism in Insight : Patterns of Experience

1

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to begin the project of mapping out the contours of the subject’s polymorphic consciousness by presenting a detailed account of the various patterns of experience. Whatever other elements or aspects there may be to polymorphism, Lonergan’s most basic way of characterizing polymorphism is developed in terms of the patterns and their interrelations (I 410). Hence, this chapter will, for the most part, focus on the particular patterns in relative distinction from one another. However, in the concrete, polymorphic consciousness is constituted by the dynamic interplay of the patterns. Therefore this detailed analytical presentation of the individual patterns is only a preparation for a more dynamic and integral account of polymorphism. Still, it is a necessary preparation that is often neglected. In what follows I will first discuss how Lonergan introduces the term ‘polymorphism’ and apparently links it with the patterns. Second, I will attempt to give an initial clarification of the notion of ‘pattern of experience.’ Third, the notion of a pattern of experience will be refined further through a detailed examination of the patterns treated in chapter 6 of Insight. Though the primary aim will be to develop a deeper appreciation of the distinctiveness of each pattern, the interrelations among the patterns will be touched on. This is unavoidable, in fact, and has the merit of preparing for an account of polymorphism as the mixing and blending of patterns. This detailed comprehensive survey is meant to point forward to an account of how polymorphism can be the key to philosophy.

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The Initial Context of Chapter 14

Lonergan introduces the term ‘polymorphism’ at the beginning of chapter 14 of Insight, ‘The Method of Metaphysics,’ and refers constantly to polymorphism throughout the chapter. However, the way in which the term is introduced and treated in chapter 14 raises many questions and makes interpretation difficult. To bring this out I will give some details of the context in which we first encounter the term and then indicate the difficulties. It is significant that the original title of chapter 14 was ‘The Dialectic of Philosophy’ and that the original title of the first section was ‘The Ground of the Dialectic’ (I 798, note a [410]). The context in which the term ‘polymorphism’ is introduced, then, is that of dialectic in philosophy: the dialectic of position and counterposition. The chapter begins by referring back to the three previous chapters, which treated knowing, being, and objectivity. Lonergan states that we can set up ‘antitheses’ (I 410) to the positions established. Against the objectivity reached by intelligent inquiry and critical reflection stands ‘the unquestioning orientation of extroverted biological consciousness.’ Against the concrete universe of being stands the ‘already out there now real.’ Against self-affirmation as a knower there stands the ‘native bewilderment of the existential subject’ (I 410). Lonergan points out that these are not ‘pure logical alternatives’ (I 410). It is at this point that we first hear of polymorphism: But in each case both the thesis and the antithesis have their ground in the concrete unity in tension that is man … For human consciousness is polymorphic. The patterns in which it flows may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical. These patterns alternate; they blend and mix, they interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down. (I 410) The first point to make is that the context in which polymorphism is introduced determines the way it is treated. The concern is with the dialectic of position and counterposition. This means that the primary aim is not to elucidate the meaning of polymorphism but to apply it in the realm of philosophical issues. The result is a narrowing down of interest to the biological and intellectual pattern. The other patterns are not invoked. On the whole, then, we should not look to chapter 14 for a complete account of polymorphism or of the meaning of the patterns. The main point at this stage of the present study is that chapter 14 should not be read in isolation. The second issue concerns the identification of polymorphism with the

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patterns of experience. The polymorphism of consciousness means that consciousness is ‘variously patterned’ and that these patterns alternate and mix and interfere and conflict with one another. At first glance is seems clear that polymorphism is above all a matter of patterns and their interrelationships. Hence to understand polymorphism we should be very clear on how we understand the patterns. This implies that we need to go back to chapter 6 of Insight and examine what is said there about the patterns and how they are concretely related (though the details of the practical and mystical patterns must be added). However, caution is needed in accepting the identification of patterns and polymorphism. The identification should not be taken at face value, says Mark Morelli,1 especially if we are basing our understanding of the patterns solely on the treatment given in chapter 6. He argues that we need to relate patterns of experience and levels of consciousness if we are to understand polymorphism adequately. The point is that after the initial account of patterns in chapter 6, Lonergan moves on to objectify and affirm the ‘basic invariant dynamic structure of cognitive process.’2 It is only with this background that we can fully understand the later talk of ‘other equally dynamic structures’ (I 422) and of ‘polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness’ (I 590). So chapter 6, no less than chapter 14, cannot be read in isolation. A third point concerns a phrase that is often overlooked. Lonergan says that thesis and antithesis are both rooted in ‘the unity in tension’ that is man. This also requires a careful study of chapter 6 of Insight. These words may be taken as pointing to the tension between the evolutionary inherited biological pattern and the patterns derived from intelligence. But generally it may be taken as referring to a more basic duality in human consciousness and hence to the structure of human being. This more basic tension is that found between the psyche and unfolding intentionality. Shute puts it this way: ‘The demands of sensitive living and the exigencies of intellectual development create in the human being a conscious tension which requires negotiation.’3 Lonergan may be read, therefore, as suggesting that the more basic tension will manifest itself in the relations among the patterns. To explore this further we will need to examine chapter 6 in detail.

1 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 388. 2 Ibid., 389. 3 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectics of History, 21.

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the patterns of experience in chapter 6

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What Is a Pattern of Experience?

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Lonergan claims here that it is not difficult to say ‘just what we mean by such a pattern’ of experience (I 205). I will argue that his account is not so unproblematic as he suggests. There are difficulties with his general account of the patterns of experience, and his accounts of the particular patterns also raise questions. Furthermore, as well as the problem of saying just what a pattern is, there is the problem of explaining why we should be interested in such things at all in a philosophical context. Part of the difficulty may be that Lonergan is trying to give simultaneously a descriptivephenomenological account and an explanatory account. The phenomenological account is aimed at self-appropriation. The explanatory account ‘contrasts the patterns of consciousness with the unconscious patterns of neural process’ (I 204), indicates how the patterns emerge, and finds a role for them in an explanatory metaphysics. Before considering such questions, however, I want to present Lonergan’s account in his own terms. The account of the patterns of experience is introduced as part of an investigation into the ‘subjective field’ of the commonsense subject. It is meant to throw light on the ways in which acquiring and developing common sense involve ‘a change in us’ (I 204) and hence a change in how we continue to experience the world and develop in diverse ways. We are dealing with ‘the continuum of experience’ (UB 106) within which different kinds of changes may be introduced. Lonergan first of all notes that it is quite abstract to speak of ‘a sensation’ (I 204). He points out, first, that familiar acts of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, ‘never occur in isolation both from one another and from all other events’ (I 205): ‘On the contrary, they have a bodily basis; they are functionally related to bodily movements; and they occur in some dynamic context that somehow unifies a manifold of sensed contents and of acts of sensing’ (I 205). Second, both bodily movements and the sensations related to them are subject to the ‘organizing control’ of human ‘concerns.’ ‘Besides the systematic links between senses and sense organs, there is, immanent in experience, a factor variously named conation, interest, attention, purpose’ (I 205). The stream of consciousness involves not just a succession of contents of experience but also ‘direction, striving, effort’ (I 205). Furthermore, the direction may vary. This variability of direction, brought about by variability of concern, manifests the ‘selectivity of consciousness.’4 Lonergan 4 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 14.

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argues that ‘normally consciousness is a directed organization of selected data’ (TE 83). ‘There are all sorts of impressions made upon our sense organs, but not all of them get into consciousness. It is what you are interested in that gets into consciousness. Consciousness selects; it floats upon the series of demands for attention’ (TE 84). Our concerns ‘orientate’ us, and this determines the selectivity of consciousness. ‘The orientation determines how: (1) the subject will become sensitive to the series of “demands” for attention issuing from her environment and mediated by the neuro-organic substrate of her waking consciousness; (2) her sensitive contents will be selected, organized, “patterned” and dealt with.’5 In Topics in Education, Lonergan adds that though consciousness is normally patterned in this way, we should also recognize that ‘things force themselves upon our consciousness’ (TE 83). Patterns may be habitual or regular, but they can be interrupted, and as well, new patterns are forced upon us. Furthermore, consciousness ‘cannot run off in any direction it pleases’ (TE 83). In other words, consciousness is the consciousness of an embodied subject, and organic, psychic, and intellectual levels are interlinked. Lonergan concludes this initial section on the patterns by stating exactly what he means by a pattern of experience: ‘As conceived, it [the meaning of ‘pattern of experience’] is the formulation of an insight; but all insights arise from sensitive or imaginative presentations, and in the present case the relevant presentations are simply the various elements in the experience that is organized by the pattern’ (I 205). 4

Further Clarifications: Patterns as ‘Intelligible Relations’ in the Subject’s Conscious Flow

It is here that the problems begin. It is very difficult, relying only on what has been said so far, to get a fix on the patterns. Some details are evident. Lonergan presents patterns as having to do with the selectivity of consciousness and the variability of the organizing ‘concern.’ Here the account of ‘experiential patterns’ in Topics in Education proves to be a useful supplement to the account in Insight. Lonergan is very clear that normally human consciousness is patterned (as distinct from differentiated): Consciousness is a selecting, an organizing … Patterning is essential to consciousness. What we experience is patterned because to be conscious of something involves a patterning of the feelings that flow out of and are connected with the perceiving … Conscious-

5 Ibid.

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ness, basically and commonly, is undifferentiated, not in some specialized pattern such as the intellectual. But on the sensitive level it is patterned. (TE 212) What is not clear is whether we deliberately produce the patterns. Moreover, it is not clear what are the ‘various elements’ that are organized into a pattern. A third question is this: What kind of intelligibility is grasped by an insight into the ‘sensitive-imaginative’ presentations that concretely constitute the pattern? Until we resolve these matters we really do not know what a pattern of experience is. I will address these questions in turn. First, there is the question of whether the patterns are deliberately produced. The account of the varying concerns and consequent selectivity of consciousness seems to suggest that the patterns are something we deliberately produce, as if we first had the materials and then constructed the pattern. However, to understand a pattern is to have an insight into the given sensitive or imaginative presentations, into the various elements that have already been organized by that pattern. To grasp a pattern is to come to understand something about the pre-patterning of experience. This seems to be the point of a later passage in the section on the dramatic pattern: ‘In ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the patterns … On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already charged emotionally and conatively’ (I 212). In other words, patterns are not deliberately produced after deliberate reflection; they are prior to any conscious and deliberate operations of consciousness. As we have noted earlier, they may be best seen in terms of a functional relationship between the psyche and the intellect or spirit, just as the censor is not an agent but a rule relating the organic and the psychic (I 482). The patterns, then, are always already in place, as rudimentary ways of being in the world according to the various concerns of engaged intelligence. Note also that the ‘concern’ that organizes or patterns elements of experience is not limited to that patterning alone, for it is the whole subject disposing the whole self.6 It calls forth higher-order elements of knowing and activities of living. So, for example, the intellectual

6 It is important to keep in mind that the concern is a concern of the spirit in relation to the psyche. Hence there will be various dimensions of the concern that may be distinguished. The aesthetic pattern, for example, is concerned both with sensible delight and with the freedom to explore sensitivity outside of the constraints of practical need or biological necessity. Similarly, the intellectual pattern is concerned with what is ‘given’ in consciousness and sensitivity and also with intelligibility and also with truth. Each pattern reflects the order of spirit as well as the disposition of the psyche.

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pattern of experience calls forth ‘the emergence, survival and/or implementation of insights, reflections, deliberations of the relevant kind.’7 Hence to operate in a certain pattern of experience means to take that pattern as a point of departure and as a condition of inquiry or as an element in the whole of living. In terms of the structure of human being, the human spirit structures the psyche to serve its purpose, which may be specifically cognitional or a concern of the whole person. The concern, and hence the pattern, initiates an inquiry and gives direction to the search for meaning in the movement of life, and this is prior to particular decisions. This seems to clarify an ambiguity about patterns of experience raised by commentators such as Mark Morelli. Morelli argues that ‘the intellectual pattern … cannot be construed as determining the sequence of empirical operations and contents only.’8 It must involve operations at the second and third levels of consciousness also. Hence he finds ‘the apparent restriction of what is patterned by varying orientations to operations and contents of the first level of consciousness’ to be a problem.9 However, what is patterned is not the same as what it is patterned by. So the wonder by which the subject intelligently patterns the data of sense is beyond what it patterns. In patterning experience it begins a pattern of operation that aims at fulfilling the desire to know. To operate in a pattern of experience does not confine us to the level of experience but only selects the way in which the subject begins to build on experience, the way in which we begin to engage the ‘diffuse given’ (I 406). The same concern that establishes the pattern calls forth the further acts and operations. So to ‘operate in a pattern’ means to operate on the basis of the concern that gives rise to the pattern. The fulfilment of the concern will require the calling forth of the higher operations. Second, we can now turn to the question of what is involved in grasping a pattern. What are the ‘various elements’ in sensitive-imaginative presentations that enable us to identify a pattern? In the section on the biological pattern, Lonergan adds the following details: ‘The pattern is a set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements’ (I 206). Towards the end of chapter 7 he expresses this in terms of generalized empirical method, making it clear how intelligible relations constitute different patterns: As applied solely to the data of consciousness, it [generalized empirical method] consists in determining patterns of intelligible

7 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 15. 8 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 390. 9 Ibid., 389.

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relations that unify the data explanatorily. Such are the biological, artistic, dramatic and intellectual forms of experience; moreover our previous studies of mathematical and of scientific thought would regard particular cases of the intellectual form of experience; and similar differentiations could be multiplied. (I 268) Third, the question arises as to what kind of ‘intelligible relations’ Lonergan has in mind. How do they link the data in an ‘explanatory’ way? Braio suggests that we think in terms of intelligible relations that ‘dynamically’ link together sequences of sensitive and affective ‘contents’ in identifiable ways.10 But what exactly is the ‘set of intelligible relations’ (I 206) that is added to the elements of experience? The solution has to do with the terminal activities on which sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements converge. What links them dynamically is that they converge on the terminal activity that fulfils the concern. They lead towards, prepare for, and facilitate the fulfilment of the concern. We may say that they are elements in the schemes of recurrence, which fulfil the ‘concerns’ of the pattern or which dispose us to fulfil the concerns of the pattern. For example: ‘In several of the patterns, the sensitive flow to the consciousness of the subject may be so “ordered” as to facilitate the emergence, survival, and/or implementation of insights, reflections, deliberations of the relevant kind.’11 Hence we should take the patterns of experience in an active sense as patternings of experiencing. These ways of patterning experience are the first stage of ways of experiencing–understanding–judging and/or deliberating–deciding–acting–living and/or transcendent openness. Hence, Morelli may be misleading when he says that the intellectual patterns must involve operations on the second and third levels. Rather, operations at all three levels are contained within the ‘concern’ that underlies the patterns. The pattern in itself is ‘of’ experience, but it results from the prior patterning of the psyche by the spirit and is oriented towards the higher operations that follow. Hence, as we have said, we may speak of ‘operating in a pattern’ as including also the subsequent higher-level operations. The ‘concern’ proper to each pattern calls forth and assembles the further operations that head for the goals of biological satisfaction, or of creative and free aesthetic self-expression, or of understanding and grasp of sufficiency and release of tension of inquiry, or of responsible action, or of fully human living, or of openness to mystery.

10 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 15. 11 Ibid.

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The immediate point to the account of the patterns is that experience is always already patterned by some concern of the human spirit. In a sense the patterns all have to do with some aspect of the relationship between the psyche and intentionality (or between the biopsychic and the human spirit). Our experience is always already patterned and so always already structured according to basic concerns, desires, and exigencies. In the concrete we deepen and reinforce the patterns to different degrees and in different combinations. We then operate on the basis of the dominant developed patterns. Hence we always already tend to structure our present experience in a certain way; hence we tend to arrive at certain kinds of insights and to make judgments in certain areas and certain ways and to perform according to certain forms of life. We find we have been operating in these patterns and are disposed to or able to continue operating in these patterns. The patterning of experience sets the range of the kinds of further operations as well as the patterns of further operations that can emerge. That said, the ultimate determining factor is the type of concern or desire that the human spirit brings into play. The patterns indicate the lines of development in human growth, which is conditioned by organic and psychic factors but which is ultimately rooted in the actuation and unfolding of the human spirit (in development from above). To fill this out we need to draw from the accounts of particular patterns. These offer details on the nature of a pattern of experience not given in the preliminary account. But the clarification of particular patterns will involve also considering the relations among them. Hence we need to consider the different ways in which the subject may pattern experience. Multiple patterns may be operating in a subject; alternatively, a narrow range of patterns may dominate. Different patterns dominate owing to different developmental situations as different performances by different people with different talents and different spirits make something of themselves. This is brought out in Understanding and Being: Perhaps the most relevant thing with regard to those patterns of experience is this: the ones I give are simply indications of the fact that people differ from one another, that they live in different ways, that this or that is a possibility … What I’m trying to indicate is the possibility of different components that can enter into human living … I wish to indicate the potentialities of man in a general way. (UB 309) The emphasis on the anthropological–developmental significance of the patterns shifts later to an emphasis on the cognitional significance:

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The point in the book [Insight] is to draw attention to the fact that the account we’ve been giving of insight in mathematics and science isn’t the whole man, that man is intelligent in quite other ways, that ordinary living is intelligent, that exercise of intelligence occurs within the context or the orientation of a mode of living. (UB 322) In Insight it is the cognitional aspect that dominates. The focus is on the disinterested knower, not the engaged agent. This comes to the fore when we consider the problems that arise when we shift from one pattern to another. A pattern may interfere with other patterns or impose a misleading influence on other patterns. Referring back to Insight, Lonergan adds that ‘the business of position and counterposition is definitely an attempt to deal with that problem’ (UB 323). Here we begin to touch on the philosophical implications of the patterns. Inasmuch as philosophers are human beings who reflect on their experience, there will be such implications. We have to ask about the philosophic importance of reflection within the patterns and about the patterns. Also, we have to inquire into the ways in which patterns blend, mix, interfere, and contradict one another and how this affects philosophical thinking. This includes looking at the ways in which shifts in patterns may be spontaneous or induced or habitual or deliberate. People may differ in degree of flexibility and rigidity in shifting (owing to differing degrees or ranges of self-appropriation). An appreciation of the ways in which patterns are blended and mixed enables us to enter other philosophical positions with greater sensitivity. b

particular patterns of experience

The account of particular patterns will be given in stages. First I will treat the four patterns introduced by Lonergan in chapter 6 of Insight. Then I will consider the later list, provided in chapter 14, and add patterns treated implicitly or explicitly elsewhere in Insight. Finally I will consider the ‘additions’ of commentators. Throughout I will keep in mind the overall account of the structure of human beings, as treated in the previous chapter, as a context for interpreting what is said about each pattern. In each case Lonergan’s account of a particular pattern proves to be problematic in some way. The background context will then provide a basis for clarification. 5

The Biological Pattern

Lonergan begins by considering what he names the biological pattern of experience. In some ways this is the most problematic pattern. It is dis-

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tinctive in that it is not so much a result of the intellect or spirit patterning the psyche; rather, it results from the underlying biological exigences when these overwhelm the spirit or when the spirit abdicates its legitimate control.12 Lonergan describes it as a flow of experience that may be ascribed to animals: ‘If we endeavor to understand the sudden twists and turns both of fleeing quarry and pursuing beasts of prey, we ascribe to them a flow of experience not unlike our own’ (I 206). In this pattern, (a) outer senses point out ‘biological opportunities and dangers’ (I 206), (b) memory provides ‘supplementary information,’ (c) imagination is the ‘projection of courses of action,’ (d) ‘conation and emotion are the pentup pressure of elemental purposiveness,’ and finally (e) ‘the complex sequence of delicately coordinated bodily movements is at once the consequence of striving and a cause of the continuous shift of sensible presentations’ (I 206). Lonergan argues that insight may grasp the intelligible relations linking these elements and so come to understand the patterns of experience. The pattern is grasped as we recognize how ‘sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions and bodily movements’ are intelligibly linked. The sequence is characterized by the terminal activities on which the elements converge: ‘To name the pattern biological is simply to affirm that the sequences converge upon terminal activities of intussusception or reproduction, or, when negative in scope, self-preservation’ (I 206). The character and nature of the biological pattern of experience is further clarified by comparing it to the biological schemes of recurrence at the organic level. These only enter into consciousness ‘when their functioning is disturbed’ (I 207). The biological pattern of experience (i.e., the pattern of animal sensitivity), by contrast, is a higher system of the biological organism. In this higher system, conjugates are ‘defined implicitly by the laws of psychic stimulus and response’ (I 289). This results in the relationship between the biological subject and its object being structured into ‘a fairly routinized, relatively inflexible order of conation, stimulus, and response.’13 The biological pattern involves a narrow, inflexible fixation on external conditions, the conditions that meet the needs of biological 12 A clarification is needed here. Lonergan defines the pattern in relation to non-human animals and then extends it to human animals. In the human animal the biological patterning is part of our evolutionary heritage, which spirit has to accommodate and integrate. It is only in the human where we find the possibilities of underlying biological exigence overwhelming the spirit. Lonergan is clear in defining the biological pattern in relation to other animals. He is not always clear in his account of how the pattern operates in human beings. 13 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 18.

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organic processes: ‘In the biological pattern of experience, where both unconscious vital process and conscious striving pursue the same end, there is, indeed, little room for diversification of psychic content’ (I 214). A basic feature of the biological pattern, then, is that it functions regularly to ‘deal rapidly, effectively and economically with the external situation in which sustenance is to be won and into which offspring are to be born’ (I 207). It is clear that ‘elementary experience [is] concerned not with the immanent aspects of living, but its external conditions and opportunities’ (I 207). This may not be permanent in human life, but, says Lonergan, it is always a possibility. This shows ‘extroversion’ to be ‘a basic characteristic of the biological pattern of experience’ (I 207). It is clear that elementary experience is concerned not with ‘the immanent aspects of living, but its external conditions and opportunities’ (I 207). ‘Within the full pattern of living there is a partial, intermittent, extroverted pattern of conscious living’ (I 207). Lonergan continues that ‘this extroversion of function’ underpins ‘the confrontational element of consciousness itself’ (I 207). The point seems to be that this functional extroversion of the pattern results in an overemphasis on what is only one aspect of consciousness/experience. It is an undeniable aspect. But this stimulus–response aspect of experience leads us to take the stimulating elements as ‘the elementary object’ that is grasped by an ‘elementary subject’ (I 207). This will have philosophical consequences if biological extroversion is ‘construed as the paradigm of human intentionality.’14 A reductionary account of the self and of its world results: The self as perceiving and feeling, as enjoying and suffering functions as an animal in an environment, as a self-attached and selfinterested center within its own narrow world of stimuli and response. (I 498) The self-centered sensitive psyche [is] content to orientate itself within its visible and palpable environment and to deal with it successfully. (I 495) If biological needs remain unfulfilled, then the spirit hands over control and allows the psyche to function merely in the service of the organic as it enters consciousness. The biological self operates merely as a higher biological integration of the organic, forsaking the greater degree of freedom proper to the human psyche and the human spirit. Consciousness in the

14 Ibid., 20.

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biological pattern becomes then merely ‘a higher technique for attaining biological ends’ (I 276). It is oriented narrowly to such ends, and it operates by ‘anticipating’ means to fulfil the ends. It anticipates that the means will be found in the external environment. Further light on the implications of the biological pattern is found in chapter 8 of Insight, which extends the discussion on extroversion. Biological consciousness is now found to be concerned with the ‘already out there now real,’ within which are found ‘bodies’ rather than ‘things’ (I 276). Here Lonergan makes it clear that though he is trying to give an account of the intelligibility of the biological pattern, concretely the pattern is not an intelligent procedure but ‘a merely biological and non intelligent response to stimulus’ (I 277). It is a spontaneous non-intellectual knowing (a) that finds its environment as ‘already’ given, ‘already constituted, already offering opportunities, already issuing challenges,’ (b) that is aware of objects ‘out’ there, rather than of ‘its own ground,’ (c) that is spatio-temporally determined by what is ‘there,’ what exists ‘now,’ and (d) that takes as ‘real’ what appears able to, or what actually does, bring ‘biological success, pleasure or pain’ (I 277). Lonergan holds that ‘not a few’ people take ‘things’ to be simply part of the ‘already-out-there-now-real,’ rather than as intelligible unities grasped by intelligent insight. They do not differentiate between the elementary knowing, belonging to the human as animal, and the full properly human knowing that results from questions for intelligence and reflection. Elementary knowing is ‘constituted completely on the level of experience’ (I 278). It knows by biological assimilation or external manipulation rather than by ‘intentional conversion of otherness into identity.’15 It has a certain validity demonstrated by the survival and evolution of the animal species (I 278), but it is not full human knowing. Problems arise when we fail to distinguish the two kinds of knowing. ‘The difficulty lies, not in either type of knowing by itself, but in the confusion that arises when one shifts, unconsciously from one type to the other’ (I 278). The problem is, says Lonergan, that human beings, including scientists, besides being intelligent and reasonable, also are animals. Hence they may regress from full human knowing to wanting that elementary ‘knowledge’ gained ‘at least by imagination’ if not by the senses (I 278). This results in the development of a dialectical tension between elementary and full human knowing (between the biological and intellectual patterns). The philosophical consequences of this are treated more fully in chapters 14 to 17 of Insight, which deal directly with polymorphism and philosophical

15 Ibid., 21.

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dialectic. Here our concern is with the prior detailing of the biological pattern. However, it is important to realize that Lonergan’s exposition has the later issues in mind. It is worth keeping in mind that the later dialectical concerns may distort the earlier phenomenological presentation. For this reason I would argue that Lonergan’s account of the biological pattern is problematic. In some ways the account is underdeveloped. It is biased towards a negative treatment that anticipates the later account of position and counterposition. When we examine the way the pattern is characterized in relation to the full account of the structure of human being, a number of questions arise. Is the pattern properly called ‘biological’? Is a purely biological pattern found even in animals? Is it found in humans in the same way it is found in animals? Lonergan may be relating what is a possible human pattern too closely to animal patterns of living, and he may be relating animal patterns too closely to the merely biological. In the case of animals, Lonergan observes that without stimulus they tend to sleep. But they may also play. The psyche is a distinctive level of living that goes beyond the fulfilment of biological needs. Animals are not simply concerned with the already out there now of extroverted consciousness. Even less so are human beings: ‘Man is never just an animal … Intelligence is present’ (UB 106). Hence, we need to be very careful how we interpret this pattern. The important issues and ambiguities may be seen emerging in a passage from Understanding and Being. This seems at first to say that there is a sense in which the biological pattern is basic. Lonergan says that ‘at the root, the lowest possible base’ of the continuum of experience there is simply ‘the response of extroverted consciousness to an external central force’ (UB 106). This is the ‘already out there now,’ which can be ‘conceived simply in terms of a biological pattern of experience’ (UB 106). But is this lowest base to be found as such in humans? In what circumstances do humans operate at this lowest level? Lonergan goes on to add a detail that complicates the account and that invites such further questions concerning the biological pattern: ‘Because the consciousness is practical and because practical consciousness is concerned with dealing with situations, and because the situation is already there to be dealt with, we have the “already”’ (UB 106). This seems to confuse the biological with the practical patterns and fails to distinguish different senses of ‘situation.’ There is the ‘situation’ of needing to acquire what is already out there to satisfy immediate biological needs, and there is the situation that practical intelligence responds to with more long-term considerations. The account of the biological pattern, then, needs to be reformulated and placed in proper perspective. Lonergan’s account is too abstract and undifferentiated. He is not sufficiently clear on how to characterize the

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biological pattern in human beings. I suggest that we may be able to interpret the pattern more adequately if we take into account the full structure of the human being. Then we can grasp how the biological pattern in the human animal differs from the biological pattern in the non-human animal. This in turn will throw light on how the biological pattern concretely ‘mixes and blends’ with, for example, the practical pattern, and how it relates in the concrete to the intellectual pattern. We can now recognize the underlying problem with Lonergan’s account. The patterns are presented under a measure of abstraction (UB 106). They are almost set out as ‘ideal types,’ which then have to be ‘mixed and blended’ when applied to concrete situations. Lonergan is not always clear when he is treating the patterns in an explanatory way and when he is applying them concretely. Taking into account the structure of human being as a series of higher integrations that sublate and transcend lower integrations enables us to avoid misunderstanding what ‘mixing and blending’ really involves. Human beings are organic–psychic–spiritual unities. This has implications for understanding what the biological-pattern-in-the-human can possibly be. Human beings are almost never in a purely biological mode. They only approximate to that when biological and physical needs become so extreme that they overwhelm the intellect. Alternatively, the intellect abdicates control and we regress to the biological mode with the aim of satisfying biological needs by any means. Self-preservation is an extreme case where we switch into a purely biologically patterned mode of behaviour. The biological pattern then covers different modes of human behaviour. The significant factor is the way in which the spirit is involved, or not. This shows how the human being can be more than or less than an animal but rarely just an animal. In the context of the full structure of human being, the biological level of operation is a lower scheme of recurrence that retains its own identity but that is sublated by higher levels of aesthetic and intelligent and practical behaviour. There will be a dialectical tension between higher (spiritual and psychic) and lower (organic) integration that will underlie the mixing and blending of the biological pattern with other patterns, the intellectual pattern in particular. The relationship between other patterns will not have to cope with this kind of tension. The biological pattern involves the organic in a special way (and this accounts for its prominence as the pattern in greatest tension with the intellectual pattern). Hence, where the biological pattern is involved, there is the possibility of regression to the biological level as a restricted and reduced dimension of human operation. The legitimate concern with whatever fulfils biological needs may be allowed to dictate when (a) the subject abdicates intellectual control or (b) the subject lacks the self-awareness to dis-

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tinguish among biological and intellectual operations and so overemphasizes the biological. Then extroversion dictates what is ‘real,’ and objectivity is established by the fulfilment of vital anticipation in successful manipulation and biological assimilation and bodily satisfaction (I 413). Then the good is simply the enjoyable or the satisfaction of appetite (I 619). In sum, it is clear that the underlying factor in Lonergan’s presentation is the concern with philosophical counterpositions. This is explicit in Understanding and Being. There Lonergan says that the apprehension of ‘real’ objects or the ‘global attitude’ towards them as part of the ‘already out there now real’ is ‘philosophically irrelevant’ but that this does not mean it is mistaken (UB 107). Such a notion of reality is ‘perfectly satisfactory and functional.’ Furthermore, ‘there is nothing whatever to be said against it’ (UB 107). However, Lonergan warns that it is not a ‘philosophic notion.’ If we import it into philosophy we risk all kinds of philosophic confusion. Such confusion arises almost inevitably because ‘before we develop in intelligence and reasonableness, we develop as animals’ (UB 108). The result, Lonergan claims, is that we often fail to distinguish an extroverted apprehension of things, a ‘global attitude,’ from a properly intelligent apprehension. But is Lonergan correct to see the biological pattern as a source of error in this way? It is true that empiricists take what is obvious in knowing to be what knowing obviously is (I 441). However, this is not due simply to an importation of the ‘already out there now’ of practical dealings. It has a basis in the confrontational aspect of consciousness itself (I 207). Furthermore, the empirical level is given theoretical weight owing to particular understandings of science and reason. Lonergan says that empiricists take the criteria of success when operating in the biological pattern to be fundamental in all of human knowing, including philosophy. But extreme positivists are not people who are trapped in animal knowing. They give weight to sense experience for theoretical reasons. They focus on sense data as quantifiable, and they work with a minimal understanding of ‘reason.’ The empiricist’s search for foundations focuses on the primary qualities that are accessible to more than one sense and that when quantified and measured can be made use of in empirical science. By contrast, the role of insight is more elusive and can be overlooked. What goes wrong is much more at the higher level of mistaken theory (the real is the quantifiable) than at the lower level of overwhelming biological concerns (the real is what provides biological satisfaction). We may notice also that the notion of the ‘given’ is not philosophically irrelevant: Lonergan dealt with this in his account of objectivity (I ch. 13). Hence I would suggest that the real tension in human knowing is not between ‘elementary knowing’ and

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full human knowing but between commonsense knowing (which recognizes biological needs but is not confined to them) and scientific knowing (which selects particular data on the basis of theoretical considerations).16 Despite the ambiguities and lack of clarity in the account of the biological pattern, Braio is correct to point out that Lonergan has provided us with clues and images that lead to a better self-understanding. We learn to identify a possibility in human consciousness that is not properly human. We learn to identify a ‘never fully eradicable tendency’ to regress from full human knowing to elementary or subhuman ways of knowing. We grasp the possibility of failure to sublate lower into higher schemes of recurrence. We learn ‘to discern the absence of a fully intentional engagement’ with the object.17 This is certainly a factor in the polymorphism of human consciousness. However, it must be added that the positive aspect of the pattern must be retrieved. The biological pattern may be regarded as the subject-asspirit ordering the psyche so as to ensure that biological ends are properly attended to. This goes beyond the unconscious routines of biology and concerns itself with the body as human. In this way the subject is recognized as incarnate. The biological pattern may also be seen as involving a recognition of ecological participation and of vital values. A clear example of this is the role performed by the biological in serving the authentic integration of sexuality in fully human love.18 Lonergan overlooks such considerations and treats only the negative influence of the biological pattern. Generally his use of the term ‘biological pattern’ seems too compact and hence tends to be misleading.19

16 Other commentators disagree, holding that the real tension is between knowing as looking and knowing as a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging. I would still hold that there is a more direct tension between common sense as it considers things in relation to me (including direct seeing) and science as it considers things in relation to one another (hence through observation, theory, and verification). Later this may be philosophically interpreted as a tension between knowing as looking and knowing as a compound operation. 17 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 17. 18 A perceptive reader suggested that a careful reading of ‘Finality, Love, Marriage,’ in Collection, 17–52, reveals a positive aspect of the biological pattern. However, I still think that in terms of cognition and questions about philosophical counterpositions, Lonergan tends to take the influence of the biological pattern as mainly negative (UB 106). 19 With regard to the biological pattern in particular, I am grateful to John Boyd Turner for discussions on the patterns and for personal communications regarding the patterns.

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6

The Aesthetic Pattern and the Artistic Pattern

The next patterns to be treated are the aesthetic pattern and the artistic pattern. Again the treatment is suggestive, but again there are difficulties with Lonergan’s presentation. The main difficulty is that the two patterns are not sufficiently differentiated. There is a section in chapter 6 of Insight titled ‘The Aesthetic Pattern.’ No separate treatment is given to the ‘artistic pattern,’ yet in chapter 14 the two patterns are listed separately. A closer look shows Lonergan shifting from one pattern to the other. In the following I will attempt to clarify the difference between the two patterns while also showing how closely they are related. 6.1 The Aesthetic Pattern First, Lonergan points out how, in the aesthetic pattern, consciousness finds itself liberated from biological necessity. It involves ‘an exuberance above and beyond the biological account-books of purposeful pleasure and pain’ (I 207). In this pattern we find that ‘conscious living is itself a joy.’ Spontaneously, children play and people are caught up in experiencing for its own sake: ‘One is led to acknowledge that experience can occur for the sake of experience, that it can slip beyond the confines of seriousminded biological purpose, and that this very liberation is a spontaneous self-justifying joy’ (I 207–8). The aesthetic pattern, then, brings with it a liberation from the restrictions of biological concerns, a freedom from the rigid structuring of consciousness within the limits of stimulus and response. Whereas biological experience is dominated by organically motivated routines and concerns, aesthetic experience reveals the liberty of the subject to explore the possibilities of experience for its own sake (and so to enter a new ‘world’ of meaning). The implications of this for the subject in the aesthetic pattern are profound. The aesthetic pattern brings with it a revelation as the self previously overlooked by extroversion, the self overwhelmed by biological demands, comes into view and takes possession of itself. (It is here where the first moves to self-appropriation take place.) The release from the ‘biologically determined, practically instrumentalized, and socially assimilated’ self is at the same time a ‘revelation’ and a ‘freeing of the self.’20 The self is freed for ‘expanded possibilities of existing and developing.’ The account in Insight is extended in Topics in Education, where Lonergan introduces the notion of a ‘purely experiential pattern’ (TE 212). This

20 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 33.

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implies the ‘exclusion of alien patterns that instrumentalize experience’ (TE 213). As purely experiential the pattern is ‘of the seen as seen, the heard as heard, the felt as felt’ (TE 214). The emphasis is on sense in act and not the sensed in act. Lonergan adds that the purely experiential pattern includes an operator, corresponding to wonder, as the pure desire to know, in the intellectual pattern. Of this operator he says that ‘with it are associated feelings of awe, fascination, the uncanny. It is an openness to the world, to adventure, to greatness, to goodness, to majesty’ (TE 214). The important point, says Lonergan, is that this ‘purely patterned and purely experiential experience is a “release”’ (TE 215). ‘It is allowed [by spirit] its full complement of feeling. Experience falls into its own proper pattern and takes its own line of expansion, development, organization, fulfillment’ (TE 215). To develop this further, Lonergan introduces the notion of ‘elemental meaning’ (TE 215). This level of meaning is at the level prior to the distinction of subject and object. It is being-in-the-world, the level of ontic meaning. This elemental meaning involves a transformation both of one’s world and of oneself. First of all it is a transformation of one’s world. Because it rejects the instrumentalization of experience, it is an escape from ‘the ready-made world of one’s everyday living’ (TE 215). ‘It is an opening of the horizon’ (TE 226). This ‘different type of experience’ presents something that is ‘other, different, novel, strange, new, remote, intimate’ (TE 216). Lonergan adds that here one moves to a more ‘elementary apprehension of aspiration and limitation, of help from outside and hope’ (TE 216). His meaning is not entirely clear, but it may link up with the point made in Insight that there is a straining for truth and value in artistic experience. There is an exploring, a search, a discovering but not a defining. The psyche strains to participate in the spirit. On the side of the subject there is also transformation: ‘The subject in act is the object in act on the level of elementary meaning’ (TE 217). The subject is liberated from ‘being a responsible inquirer in search of exact knowledge of some aspect of the universe’ (TE 217). ‘He is just himself – subject in act, emergent, ecstatic, standing out. He is his own originating freedom’ (TE 17). He is exploring a dimension of his own being by participation rather than by confrontation. Returning to Insight, we can now grasp how aesthetic consciousness involves ‘wonder in its elemental sweep.’ Such wonder is prior to ‘the neatly formulated questions of systematizing intelligence.’ In this ‘deep-set wonder’ lies the ‘source and ground’ of all questions. Above all the aesthetic subject wonders at his own originating freedom. This takes us to the artistic pattern, for this is the pattern in which we experience creative freedom, where we realize that the chief work of art is our own self.

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6.2 The Artistic Pattern The artistic pattern advances beyond the aesthetic pattern. The ‘spontaneous joy of conscious living,’ proper to the aesthetic pattern, gives way to the ‘spontaneous joy of free intellectual creation,’ proper to the artistic pattern (I 208). The presence to self of the subject in the aesthetic pattern opens up to a further liberation in and through artistic creation. And such free intellectual creation will involve intelligence and reasonableness and will open us to the level of responsibility. Again, Topics in Education makes a contribution. Lonergan begins his account of artistic consciousness by distinguishing differentiations of consciousness from patterns of experience. Differentiated consciousness is contrasted with ‘ordinary living’ (TE 208). Any differentiation such as mathematics, science, or philosophy is ‘simply a withdrawal for a return’ (TE 209). And ‘what one returns to is the concrete functioning of the whole’ (TE 209). Art is said to be important in that it stays close to the concrete patterns of living. ‘Art mirrors the organic functioning of sense and feeling, of intellect not as abstract formulation but as concrete insight, of judgment that is not just judgment, but that is moving into decision, free choice, responsible action’ (TE 209). Lonergan says that to deal with art adequately we must shift ‘to thinking of a concrete flow of consciousness, and to thinking of that concrete flow in terms of the subject and his concern that defines the horizon of his world’ (TE 210). He relates this to Binswanger’s account of the dreams of the morning, when the existential subject begins to ‘posit himself in the world’ (TE 210). ‘The subject with his concern will be in his world; the world and the subject are simultaneous’ (TE 210). It is here that we realize that ‘if we are to know anything about anything it is through meaning, through the intentional order’ (TE 210). ‘Consciousness is not the whole of reality; there are such sciences as biology and neurology, physics and chemistry; but anything we are above the biological level, and anything we know, is contained within a field of intentionality, a field that includes the sensitive, intellectual, judicial and voluntary’ (TE 210). In the artistic pattern, then, the field of intentionality, the world of meaning opened up by the aesthetic pattern develops further. The intentionality of the free aesthetic–artistic subject unfolds in a way that contrasts with that of the intellectual subject. Intelligence is involved, but it is not confined to discovering theoretical systems to relate and unify empirical data; it is not constrained by ‘mathematical proofs, scientific verification, and common sense factualness’ (I 208). ‘The artist exercises his intelligence in discovering ever new forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of aesthetic experience’ (I 208). It uncovers, relates, and manifests these new

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forms in the artistic creation. The ‘validation’ of the artistic idea, says Lonergan, is in the artistic deed. This is the artistic equivalent of ‘judgment’: aesthetic discovery is transformed and embodied successfully (or not) in artistic creation. ‘The artist establishes his insights, not by proof or verification, but by skillfully embodying them in colors and shapes, in sounds and movement, in the unfolding situations and actions of fiction’ (I 208). The artistic pattern then goes beyond the aesthetic in aiming at the production of a successful objectification of what is discovered by elemental wonder (though the aesthetic serves the transcendent differentiation while the artistic pattern contributes to the categorical). The artistic pattern aims at objectifying the purely experiential pattern. The experience is basic. It is not fully known even to the person who has the experience. But there is a concern ‘to get hold of it’ (TE 218): ‘[The subject] would behold, inspect, dissect, enjoy, repeat it; and to do that he has to objectify, unfold, make explicit, reveal’ (TE 218). Lonergan compares this to the process whereby insight leads to the inner word of definition, which is an unfolding of what is apprehended in the act of understanding (TE 218). And there is a parallel also to the further unfolding of judgment. However, in this case intelligence and reasonableness will be manifested in ways proper to the aesthetic–artistic modes of experience. They are manifested in symbols and works of art: The aesthetic and artistic also are symbolic. Free experience and free creation are prone to justify themselves by an ulterior purpose or significance. Art then becomes symbolic, but what is symbolized is obscure. It is an expression of the human subject outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation or appraisal. It seeks to mean, to convey, to impart, something that is to be reached, not through science or philosophy, but through a participation, and in some fashion a re-enactment of the artist’s inspiration and intention. Prescientific and prephilosophic, it may strain for truth and value without defining them. Post biological, it may reflect the psychological depths, yet by that very fact it will go beyond them. (I 208) What is produced as art remains at the symbolic level, which does not determine a fixed meaning but accommodates multiple meaning (M 66). In this way it reflects and stays true to its origins. The objectification respects the original experience: Indeed, the very obscurity of art is in a sense its most generic meaning. Prior to the neatly formulated questions of systematizing intelligence, there is the deep-set wonder in which all questions

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have their source and ground. As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep. (TE 208) Hence the pattern in the work of art will be ‘similar’ to the pattern of free experience. It will not be a conceptual pattern, for it is closer to the concrete: ‘The symbolic meaning of the work of art is immediate’ (TE 219). It manifests itself as an invitation to participate, to explore, and to see for oneself. To that extent, aesthetic–artistic consciousness does not involve reflective, critical consciousness (TE 220). It lacks ‘the reflexivity of conceptual meaning’ (TE 219). But this does not mean it is without reasonableness and validation. These are possible because art involves a certain ‘psychic distance,’ a certain ‘detachment, distinction, separation from experience’ (M 63). Lonergan holds that ‘artistic composition recollects emotion in tranquillity.’ It is ‘a matter of insight into the elemental meaning’ (M 63). The insight has been worked on and developed into ‘an idealization of the original experiential pattern’ (M 64). The result will be ‘truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point’ (M 64). Furthermore, the result is open to validation. In responding to the invitation it offers to participate in the experience, the subject is able to discern the adequacy of the objectification. Braio develops this when he says that the evaluation of art has its own ‘immanent criteria.’21 The subject as aesthetic may encounter the product of the subject as artist and experience dissatisfaction with what is presented. This evokes a withdrawal to the original aesthetic experiences that were meant to be related and unified and objectified in the work of art. In turn this gives him the means to return to a less inadequate objectification of the original experience. In this cycle of withdrawal and return experience, intelligence and reflection and judgment all come into play.22 6.3 The Aesthetic–Artistic Patterns and Creative Freedom In the artistic–aesthetic experience, then, there is a liberation of intelligence and reasonableness and hence a movement to self-appropriation. The symbol, the work of art, expresses meaning in a way that does not bring the movement of free exploration to an end, but rather invites it to go further. The appropriateness of the symbolic form is shown in the way in which symbols can grow, develop, and accumulate meanings in corre-

21 Ibid., 35. 22 Ibid., 35–8.

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spondence with deepening and ongoing experience. The ‘psychic distance’ required for aesthetic exploration and creativity leaves room for a growing self-possession: ‘Art is an exploration of the potentialities for human living’ (I 222). In this exploration the artist seeks to get hold of, repeat, deepen, extend the aesthetic experience. This brings with it a movement to a deeper self-awareness. This does not seek to analyse and dissect. Rather it aims to enlarge and deepen the ongoing exploration of one’s own being, it aims at preserving elemental freedom and creativity. There is something here that can give rise to distinctive modes of philosophizing. I would suggest that the philosophical approaches of thinkers such as Bergson, Nietzsche, and Heidegger (as well as aspects of African and Chinese philosophy) have roots in the aesthetic and artistic patterns. Such philosophies seem to enter the realm of interiority in different ways and to involve self-appropriation of some kind and of some degree. Some would focus on the ‘world’ of aesthetic meaning; others would draw attention to the freedom of the creative subject; but all reflect in some way the aesthetic–artistic possibilities of human experience. All raise questions such as, ‘What are we to be?’ ‘Why?’ The importance of art, says Lonergan, is that it communicates the moods in which such questions arise (I 208). It reveals and explores the possibilities of human living and so opens up to modes of philosophy that are concerned to reflect on such aspects of being human. The aesthetic–artistic pattern is best appreciated if we see it in light of the basic structure of human being. As in the case of any pattern, we have spirit as a higher system for sensitive living. Here the higher system is wonder, in its elemental form, constituting the world as it extends itself in free exploration of experience. The psyche tastes the potency of the intellect aesthetically and seeks to actualize this in art. The aesthetic pattern manifests our original elemental wonder that explores every possibility of its own becoming. It exercises, manifests, and develops original freedom by refusing to be confined to the rigidity of biological experience. The aesthetic–artistic–symbolic pattern may be seen as the most basic properly human pattern of experience. It is the first manifestation of the freedom of the spirit in harmony with the psyche. In this pattern, human experience is always already informed by human spirit and is always already symbolically potential (able to create symbols). There is a fundamental exigence in elemental wonder for being-more-alive, for creative becoming. Human experience in its most original form is not neutral because the human spirit is engaged. If the biological pattern is the pattern in which the human spirit is constricted, the aesthetic pattern is the pattern of liberation and the pattern of creative concern to be. It is the pattern of concern to be-in-the-world as open to what is ‘other’ and different. Again this points to the possible rel-

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evance of this pattern to philosophy in the mode of Nietzsche and Heidegger. But we need also to be aware of the possibility of a distorting effect. An aesthetization of the intellect can result when intelligence, in rejecting a distorted or reductionary thematization of itself that denies freedom, loses sight of its own character. Having no authentic self-recognition, intelligence pours itself into freedom and creativity in an unbalanced way. So, for example, the emphasis on freedom reveals the creative becoming and ‘otherness’ of the spirit as it unfolds; but, it may be argued, the ‘otherness’ of the other that transcends us may not be grasped. There is an attempt to appropriate the subject as subject without acknowledging that this is mediated by a grasp of the subject as object. We can see in this way how the aesthetic/artistic patterns may be taken as standing in for a thematized intellectual grasp of conscious intentionality. Those who spontaneously shift to the realm of interiority, or who have developed luminosity of self-consciousness to a high degree, may become aware of conscious intentionality through aesthetic consciousness.23 Such people, finding themselves in an anti-intellectual environment that is positivist and conceptualist, may rightly critique their milieu on the basis of the self-knowledge provided by aesthetic self-consciousness. Here aesthetic awareness provides a basis for grasping the reality of the subject as spirit: the communicative function of the aesthetic may be understood as providing indications and hints of the subject as subject. But this does not imply the absolute priority of the aesthetic. The freedom of aesthetic exploration remains under the subtle and proper ordering of the subject as concerned with understanding and truth and goodness, the subject as oriented to transcendence. The unity of the whole subject provides a context for the aesthetic. This should not be denied owing to an overreaction to narrow rationalism.24 This is a point to keep in mind in connection with the metaphilosophical implications of the patterns. 7

The Intellectual Pattern

The intellectual pattern is treated by Lonergan in the least detail. This may be because the pattern dominates the whole of Insight. However, the brevity of the account is unfortunate. It leaves important details undevel23 In the ‘Lectures on Existentialism’ Lonergan says that Heidegger, for example, finds the subject-as-subject, and to that extent enters the realm of interiority. But Lonergan adds that Heidegger failed to find anything normative there (LE 124), perhaps because he overreacts to Cartesianism. 24 I draw on conversations with John Boyd Turner for this reflection on the aesthetic pattern.

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oped and hence renders the pattern open to misinterpretation. Throughout Insight, Lonergan clearly gives priority to this pattern, but the summary treatment leaves the nature of this priority uncertain and problematic. Hence it is often held that the emphasis on the unrestricted desire to know, the ‘concern’ that defines this pattern, leads to a ‘bypassing of human feeling.’25 Lonergan himself seemed to admit this at one point. Shortly after the publication of Insight he tried to correct it. Thus in Understanding and Being he writes that our ‘total concern,’ which includes affectivity, is not just a matter of ‘this tiny thread of the desire to know that is found in us at times’ (UB 387). He even says that though necessity forces us to sit down and think out a problem in detail, this is ‘just an interruption of normal living’ (UB 387).26 Melchin comments that Lonergan recognized the intellectual pattern of experience as ‘a relatively infrequent element in human life.’27 This comment, along with Lonergan’s own remarks, seem to be an overreaction that does not adequately communicate the role of intelligence in all the patterns. What we need to do is to show (a) how the account of the patterns as a whole provides a balanced account of the whole person and (b) how a correct understanding of the intellectual pattern, while still recognizing a ‘legitimate priority’ for this pattern, reveals also the openness of this pattern to the other patterns (from which it takes nothing away). We see here how, with the intellectual pattern, questions about the relationships of the patterns to one another cannot be avoided. Furthermore, it becomes clear that patterns are not simply alternatives along a horizontal spectrum. There are vertical relationships of mediation and transcendence among them. Hence, Melchin links emergent probability and the patterns of experience. He claims that ‘the dynamism of finality’ is ‘manifested in the relations among the various patterns of experience.’28 This shows how abstract it is to talk about the patterns, as Lonergan himself notes: ‘Insofar as you’re able to tie down a pattern … you arrive at something that’s abstract’ (UB 321). What we are really talking about is the subject and its concerns. The subject operates intelligently, reasonably, responsibly, and personally in all the patterns. The subject as unfolding 25 Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 134. 26 In addition, Lonergan says that the point of the account of the patterns ‘is to draw attention to the fact that the account we’ve been giving of insight in mathematics and science isn’t the whole man, that man is intelligent in quite other ways, that ordinary living is intelligent, that exercise of intelligence occurs within the context or the orientation of a mode of living’ (UB 322). 27 Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 136. 28 Ibid., 144.

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conscious intentionality is found within all the patterns. The ‘basic pattern’29 of cognitional structure, extended to include the level of responsible commitment, is found in every aspect of life. Once we recognize the basic pattern of cognitional operations we can appreciate the priority proper to the intellectual pattern. We realize how ‘the role of the controlled scheme of operations which yield insights and judgments is markedly different in the various patterns of experience.’30 In the intellectual pattern this scheme is given central place. 7.1 The Intellectual Pattern and Self-Transcendence In the intellectual pattern, then, a key phase of the unfolding of conscious intentionality is given full attention. It involves a crucial phase in self-transcendence that completes the initial exploring of the subject in the aesthetic pattern and that underlies or is sublated into the dramatic or ethical pattern. In other patterns intelligence is at the service of other concerns and desires and so is appreciated not in terms of cognitive self-transcendence but rather in terms of the exploration of one’s own aesthetic being or in terms of practical utility or in terms of being a condition of responsible decision. To appreciate this fully, we need to grasp in detail how the subject operates in this pattern and appreciate the full range of concern proper to this pattern. Here more than ever we need to ground the pattern in the structure of human being. The key point is that the intellectual subject exercises its full freedom with respect to the lower integration of the psyche. Hence the subject as intelligent disposes the phantasm in order to seek out the intelligibility in the material. It abstracts from the material manifold to reach insight and so, by apprehensive abstraction, comes to know the other as other (not simply the ‘other’ as possibilities of aesthetic experience or of the aesthetic self). In the intellectual pattern the schemes linking sensations, images, intelligently grasped unities, and motor skills are able to ‘regularly arrange themselves so as to focus and refocus questions on a controlled body of empirical data.’31 Because the subject in this pattern operates by abstraction from the empirical residue, the range of the intellectual pattern opens up to include the whole of being (including the reality of conscious intelligence within being). With this as background, let us consider the details of the pattern as given, adding to them when necessary.

29 Ibid., 138 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid.

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7.2 The Intellectual Concern of the Intellectual Pattern The intellectual pattern is defined by the pure unrestricted desire to know. This desire calls for a transformation of sensitive spontaneity that brings this sensitivity into a partnership with the spirit of inquiry. What this involves is seen by relating the intellectual to the aesthetic. Hence, Lonergan begins his account of the intellectual pattern by relating it to the aesthetic pattern. Aesthetic liberation ‘not merely breaks the bond of biological drive but also generates a flexibility that makes it a ready root for the spirit of inquiry’ (I 209). Hence, suggests Melchin, the proper functioning of the intellectual pattern may require a regular return to experience in the aesthetic pattern, as well as an ability to shift to and fro from the intellectual pattern to any other pattern.32 In the intellectual pattern human experience acquires a flexibility that serves the concerns of the spirit of inquiry. The liberation releases the spirit of inquiry, which extends to all that can be known. It can take many forms. In each case we have the human spirit taking possession of itself and disposing itself and the psyche. Hence in the ‘seasoned mathematician’ we find that sensitive process contracts ‘to an unruffled sequence of symbolic notations and schematic images’ (I 209). In empirical science ‘outer sense forgets its primitive biological function to take on a selective alertness that keeps pace with the refinement of elaborate and subtle clarification’ (I 205). In the theorist ‘even the unconscious goes to work to yield at unexpected moments, the suggestive images and clues and missing links … that evoke the desiderated insight’ (I 209): In reflection there arises a passionless calm. Memory ferrets out instances that run counter to the prospective judgment. Imagination anticipates the shape of possibilities that would prove the judgment wrong. So deep is the penetration, so firm the dominance, so strange the transformation of sensitive spontaneity, that memories and anticipations rise above the threshold of consciousness only if they possess at least a plausible relevance to the decisions to be made. For the stream of consciousness is a chameleon; and as its pattern can be biological or artistic, so too it can become the automatic instrument, or rather the vitally adaptive collaborator, of the spirit of inquiry. (I 209)

32 Ibid., 141.

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This, then, is the intellectual pattern of experience as such. It is a transformation of sensitive spontaneity by the intellect to serve the interest of intelligence. Lonergan adds that ‘the frequency, intensity, duration, and purity of the intellectual pattern is subject to great variation’ (I 209) owing to natural ability, training, development, circumstances. For some (the talented), ‘experience slips easily into the intellectual pattern,’ and, as we have mentioned, ‘sensitive spontaneity responds quickly and precisely to the exigencies of mind’ (I 209–10). 7.3 The Exigencies of the Intellectual Pattern The notion of ‘exigencies of mind’ needs to be explored if we are to appreciate the unfolding of the pure unrestricted desire to know (the desire that defines the intellectual pattern) in a differentiated way. The desire manifests itself as an all-inclusive wonder that gives rise to question after question and that seeks correct understanding of whatever enters experience and attracts our attention. The desire is not to be understood by analogy with other desires (I 373). It is grasped only by ‘giving free reign to intelligent and rational consciousness’ (I 373). It is ‘the prior and enveloping drive’ that carries cognitional process from particular acts of experiencing, understanding, and judgment to ‘the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge’ (I 372). ‘The desire to know then is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man’ (I 372). This desire ‘prevents us being content with the mere flow of outer and inner experience.’ Furthermore, it involves us in ‘the self-correcting process of learning in which further questions yield complementary insights’ (I 392). It is satisfied only with the unconditioned and rests (temporarily) only in verified knowledge. It is here that the notion of the exigencies becomes relevant. There is not simply a horizontal or sequential unfolding of one fact followed by another. There is also the possibility of inverse insights and higher viewpoints as intelligence explores all possibilities of intelligibility. The understanding ‘works round and up a spiral of viewpoints’ to embrace the whole field (I 210). In Method in Theology, Lonergan speaks of the systematic exigence that distinguishes (differentiates) the realm of theory from the realm of common sense (M 81). The systematic exigence leads to questions concerning the relations of things to one another (of things of a certain kind to others of the same kind). The realm of theory concerns objects known ‘by their internal relations, their congruencies, and differences, the functions they fulfill in their interactions’ (M 82). In the intellectual pattern, first of all, sensitive spontaneity selects and focuses on what is relevant to this kind of

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knowledge. In the empirical sciences, for example, the focus is on quantifiable data. This in turn leads to the critical exigence: ‘to meet fully the systematic exigence only reinforces the critical exigence’ (M 83). Questions arise about the range and inclusiveness of each realm of knowing. Is common sense made redundant when empirical science appears? Is science merely a matter of pragmatic usefulness or does it reveal something real about nature? It is this that gives rise to foundational questions: ‘What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?’ (M 83). This draws attention to a new range of data and leads to the realm of interiority: ‘With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities’ (M 83). Lonergan says that this appropriation ‘resembles theory’ when it is expressed technically as ‘cognitional theory.’ But most basically, it is really ‘a heightening of intentional consciousness’ (M 83) that involves ‘an attending not merely to objects but [also] to the intending subject and his acts’ (M 83). This heightened awareness provides the unique evidence for grounding a theory of knowledge. In this we see again the priority of the intellectual pattern. The dynamic structure in which it unfolds is the normative self-assembling structure of spirit as intelligence (M 16–17). It is in this pattern, particularly, that selfappropriation occurs in a way that can be thematized. Self-appropriation follows almost inevitably when we enter fully and regularly into this pattern.33 There is also a methodical exigence. The withdrawal into interiority is followed by a return to the realms of common sense and theory. The subject is now enabled to analyse common sense and differentiate the sciences more clearly, and refine their methods. At this stage the construction of the integral heuristic structure of metaphysics becomes possible, given the sufficient resourcefulness of intelligence in act (I 417–18). Finally there is the transcendent exigence. In human judgment is a desire for the unconditioned, and in deliberation ‘a criterion that criticizes every finite good’ (M 84). There is no complete rest for the human spirit unless it moves beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and even interiority. The intellectual pattern, then, will inevitably become differentiated as the pure desire to know unfolds. It will uncover its own basis in the dynamic structure of consciousness, it will elaborate a generalized empiri-

33 Self-appropriation may occur while operating in other patterns but it could be argued that this will lead back to the intellectual patterns.

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cal method, it will extend itself to devise an integral heuristic structure, it will acquire a universal viewpoint that opens the subject to the world of being. In doing so it will explore the full and diverse range of data in all their aspects. Each pattern has its own correlative realm or world, but with the intellectual pattern the ‘correlative becomes the universe’ (TE 88). 7.4 The Intellectual Pattern and Full Human Living We can now return to the question of the priority of the intellectual pattern. Lonergan is not advocating rationalism or ‘abstract intellectualism.’ He acknowledges that the intellectual pattern withdraws us from ‘ordinary practical concerns’ (TE 87). Also, the concern of the pattern has certain limits. The concern for ‘understanding and truth’ is limited in that it does not reach to a concern for value or for personal commitment. Our responsibility for correct understanding in judgment is ‘a limited responsibility’ (TE 87). It does not reach the full self-transcendence of rational self-consciousness where decisions ‘set the objectives of one’s total activity’ (I 641). Still there remains a priority of a certain kind for the intellectual pattern, as Lonergan himself suggests in reply to a question on ‘the superiority of the speculative pattern of experience’ (UB 321): What is the superiority? I don’t hold that the intellectuals are a superior race. But I think that with regard to all human conduct, there is a dependence upon knowledge. And insofar as human life enters into the complexities that develop in cultures, and develop in civilizations, and so on, general knowledge becomes a necessity. And the way to arrive at it is through the intellectual pattern of experience. I think, in other words, that there is a primacy of the intellect in the human makeup, and it leads anyone who tries to get away from it to contradict himself. (UB 321) A related point here is that the intellectual pattern is of service for the rest of human life precisely by being disinterested and objective. If there is a withdrawal from concrete living it is for the sake of return: ‘The purely intellectual pattern is intermittent even in the most intellectual person … It is not the whole of life, but it is an important, because guiding and directing part’ (TE 89). I would add that it is still a part of life and not simply a means to an end. There is a sense in which it is not a ‘withdrawal’ from life, for it is a legitimate and proper part of life. To understand, to come to know the other as other, to attain self-transcendence, is part of life. To wonder, to inquire, to seek understanding and knowledge and wisdom (especially in dialogue) is a desiring, a living, a way of life.

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Furthermore, there is a sense in which the intellectual pattern is transparent and open to the other patterns in a way in which they cannot be open to it or to one another. Its range is wider and deeper. Intelligence is able to grasp its own operation in the other patterns. In this regard, Melchin argues that the account of the patterns is ‘Lonergan’s effort to sketch the various ways that intelligence functions as a mediator throughout the course of human life.’34 Furthermore, for Lonergan, the intellectual pattern is needed to think all the patterns with ‘complete objectivity’ (UB 328). It is also the pattern that generates the horizon equivalent to the field of being (LE 117). However, we may grant the need for some assistance from the aesthetic pattern, which helps keep the subject open to the intellectual pattern. Furthermore, operations at the sensorimotor level may be said to mediate the higher cognitive levels.35 There are also the communal, the moral, and the personal dimensions of the process of coming to know. Human beings develop the latent ability to understand only in the presence of other human beings. There are different kinds of priorities to be considered. Still, the distinctive priority of the intellectual pattern may be recognized without opening the way for rationalistic, logocentric totalizing. There is nothing in the account of the intellectual pattern that excludes the distinctive aspects of the other patterns. The intellectual pattern only appears to exclude other patterns and to be abstract and reductionary when it is equated with its theoretical-scientific differentiation, or with its conceptual by-products. Lonergan is clear that all the patterns contribute to full human living. The intellectual pattern recognizes this and throws light on their interrelationships. We may even say that the subject in the intellectual pattern can recognize the limitations of that pattern. For the subject grasps itself as spirit that shifts into the appropriate pattern according to the demands of the situation. That Lonergan is far from being a rationalist or an abstract intellectualist may be seen in his account of the Law of Genuineness. Human intelligence has constantly to cope with the tensions of limitation and transcendence, the tensions between psyche and spirit. The intellectual pattern in the concrete is the Law of Genuineness, which does not brush questions aside and does not rationalize weaknesses (I 502). Finally, we may acknowledge that there are difficulties in operating authentically in this pattern. It can happen that the intellectual pattern proper may be misidentified with some limited specialization or differentiation or application of itself. Then intelligence may become one-dimen-

34 Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 138. 35 Ibid., 129.

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sional. This is seen in Enlightenment mechanomorphism.36 Instead of a truly open, inventive, creative, self-transcending spirit we have a truncated intelligence that exists only as calculative external reason. It is the prevalence of such a narrow view of reason that provides the rationale for the postmodern rejection of ‘reason.’ But there is no need to take the intellectual pattern as restricted to its empirical-scientific differentiation. The intellectual pattern is much more than this. 8

The Dramatic Pattern 8.1 The Dramatic Pattern and Ordinary Human Living

Lonergan introduces the dramatic pattern in terms of ‘ordinary human living’ (I 210). Ordinary human living cannot be dealt with only in terms of the patterns treated so far, or in terms of the practical pattern. A distinctive dramatic pattern must be recognized. It is related to the aesthetic pattern inasmuch as it is employed in direct participation in life rather than with ‘reflectively mediated’ living.37 The dramatic pattern is also related to the practical pattern, for it has to do with concrete behaviour. However, its focus of concern has to do with the ‘motives and purposes’ of human action and reaction rather than with merely ‘getting things done’ (I 210). It has to do with the manner and style in which human living is carried out. Hence, Lonergan says that ordinary human living reveals ‘an artistic, or more precisely, a dramatic component’ (I 210). The dramatic pattern is the most difficult to interpret and to characterize adequately. It is not easy to determine its range or scope. It may be taken, in a general way, to be the pattern in which we operate as social beings, or it may be taken as opening to a moral dimension, or it may be seen as the pattern in which we operate personally and interpersonally as fully human agents. The lack of clarity has to do with the notion of ‘ordinary human living.’ What counts as ordinary human living for Lonergan? Is it equivalent to the undifferentiated or compact consciousness mentioned in Method in Theology? What type and degree of self-reflection enters into the dramatic pattern? On the one hand, the dramatic pattern deals with ordinary human living as a whole. It integrates not only experiences and physical movement, images and memories, insights and judgments, but also decisions and human actions and interactions. Hence, Braio says that it ‘manifests a

36 Lamb, History, Method and Theology, 278. 37 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 102.

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pre-reflective “vital” or “organic” unity.’38 This is the unity of the concrete human agent or person immersed in living. On the other hand, the dramatic pattern seems to involve a thrust towards some degree of ‘reflexively operative’ self-consciousness.39 It involves the emergence of a sense of the unity of the self in the process of self making. There is a sense of the self in its performance before and with others. The rudimentary intersubjective dimensions of human interrelationships are transformed as the properly interpersonal dimensions come into play. In the dramatic pattern, then, there emerges a profound if unthematized sense of responsibility for oneself, a distinctive sense of freedom and a sense of oneself as a social being and a properly human and personal agent. Such an agent, concerned with the ‘motives and purposes’ of human action, will head towards increased self-consciousness and sense-transcendence in some degree and some manner. The dramatic subject will head for self-appropriation and the realm of interiority. But this is not evident in Lonergan’s explicit account. A related difficulty emerges when we investigate the relations between the dramatic and the other patterns. How do these enter into or contribute to the dramatic pattern? In what way and in what measure does the dramatic pattern integrate the other patterns? Should we distinguish a ‘social pattern,’ a ‘moral pattern,’ an ‘interpersonal pattern’ within the dramatic pattern, or should we take the moral and interpersonal patterns as going beyond the dramatic as presented by Lonergan? Is the dramatic pattern equivalent to the ‘mixing and blending’ of the other patterns? Are the other patterns specialized developments of aspects of the dramatic pattern? How are the specialized developments, or the findings of the specialized developments, reincorporated into ordinary human living? Are they cases of withdrawal for the sake of return? Are the findings ‘sedimented’ into the dramatic pattern? 8.2 The Dramatic and Ethical Patterns: Questions of Self-Transcendence The issues at stake become clear when we consider the relationship between the dramatic pattern and the ethical dimension of human living. It could be argued that in the dramatic pattern there is a rudimentary ethical pattern. However, there is also a sense in which the ethical pattern is in tension with the dramatic pattern. For the ethical pattern involves rational self-consciousness in a way that opens the subject to self-criticism.

38 Ibid., 102. 39 Melchin, History, Ethics and Emergent Probability, 141.

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The ethical pattern may call for a revision of the present unfolding of the dramatic pattern. To this extent a distinction between the dramatic and the ethical patterns seems to be implied. The dramatic pattern can fall short of the self-transcendence proper to the ethical pattern. But is this inevitable? What is the scope of the dramatic pattern when it is allowed to unfold without bias and distortion? What does the dramatic pattern become in the mature dramatic subject? The question of development is important here. The dramatic pattern is the pattern of the engaged subject coping with its environment and milieu before and with others. It is the pattern in which the subject ‘transforms and sustains the transformation’ of its life.40 Melchin argues that it aims at ‘the ongoing actuation and reconstitution of the pattern of relations of the subject in his or her ‘external’ and ‘internal’ environment.’41 However, this leaves unclear the motivation for and the purpose of constituting the pattern of relationships. And the question of ‘motives and purposes’ is crucial. A first motive may well be to ‘cope’ with everyday life and to attain ‘well-being’ at the level of comfort. The dramatic pattern may remain too quickly satisfied with a comfortable sense of being ‘at home’ in the immediate environment. But when we take the dramatic pattern as a pattern of personal development, there is room for understanding the pattern in terms of an orientation of one’s whole concrete being to ongoing self-transcendence. When we focus on the properly dramatic (interpersonal) character of the pattern, the possibility of self-transcendence comes to the surface. A genuine interpersonal encounter calls for a degree of self-transcendence that transforms the dramatic subject. There is a dialogical and dialectical element here. Human development takes place in human interaction. We find here a mode of self-transcendence proper to the whole person. Such self-transcendence is concrete and occurs only in involvement with others. There may be, then, in the dramatic pattern, an openness to and an exigence for an appropriation of the self as a whole, an appropriation of the developing self. Along with this is found an awareness of one’s total situation. The mature dramatic subject is able to ‘place’ himself or herself in his or her environment with and before others. Questions remain. Is this a natural unfolding of the dramatic pattern or is it the result of a partnership between the dramatic and the ethical patterns? Does Lonergan’s own account of the dramatic pattern permit this interpretation or does it tend towards the minimal account of the dramatic pattern as a ‘coping-with-one’s-environment-with-style’? With these

40 Ibid., 142. 41 Ibid., 141.

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questions in mind, I seek to present Lonergan’s account as accurately as possible. In the first place, we find that there is a concern for ‘dignified living,’ for ‘human living.’ In the dramatic pattern, the subject responds to biological exigencies and performances in order to dignify eating and drinking ‘by their spatial and psychological separation from the farm, the abattoir, the kitchen’ (I 210). In ordinary human life ‘the contents and affects, emerging into the consciousness of the dramatic subject … have always already been aesthetically “dignified.”’42 The dramatic subject has a concern for his own being and well-being that goes beyond the biological. The biological concern for ‘sustenance’ and ‘nutrition’ becomes a properly human concern for the well-being of the whole person. This includes receiving and engaging in the benefits of culture and civilization.43 The dramatic subject is always at least ‘elementally’ aware of his living, his feeling, of his own desires and purposes. However much human life is rooted in the physical and the biological, there is still also a conscious striving for self-development, for being ‘more alive,’ for a human quality in everyday life. There is a striving for liberty from biological needs, a liberation from subhuman responses to basic needs and desires. The dramatic subject exercises his freedom for shaping his own human life in a way that integrates and sublates lower biological needs into properly human concerns and ways of living. Clothing is no longer simply a matter of need but of dignity and selfexpression. This may be ‘relatively unreflected upon,’44 but the conscious striving is there, along with a concern for what one is making of oneself. Second, this striving is for the self-development of the human agent as an integral whole: ‘Not only, then, is man capable of aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity, but his first work of art is his own living’ (I 210). The dramatic subject is concerned to develop his own ‘style’ of being human. The possibilities of ‘styles’ available are limited by the ‘exigencies of the underlying material’ (I 211). Still the creative transformation of the underlying materials remains possible: ‘The biological cannot be ignored, and yet in man it can be transformed’ (I 211). The way this occurs will be conditioned by locality, period, social milieu. But such cultural conditioning and variation does not deny the ‘transcultural constancy’ of human striving towards self making.45 Third, this artistry is ‘dramatic.’ The dramatic subject is always ‘in the presence of others’ (I 211). Furthermore, ‘others too are also actors in the 42 43 44 45

Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 103. Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 142. Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 102. Ibid., 104.

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primordial drama’ (I 211). Human beings are social animals. They are born in one family and go on to produce another of their own. We develop always in relation to others. Our dramatic development is ‘inspired by example and emulation, confirmed by admiration and approval, sustained by respect and affection’ (I 211). So basic is our interrelationship that Lonergan even says that ‘the style that is the man is not something individual. It belongs to the group’ (LE 10). The mutual mediation of person and community continues in history. There are ongoing dialogical and dialectical relations among different dramatic subjects. This leads to a further point. Fourth, in this drama of living the characters are ‘molded by the drama itself’ (I 211). For there arise and accumulate insights that ‘govern the imaginative project of dramatic living’ (I 211–12). Each person ‘under the pressure of artistic and affective criteria’ works out his or her own roles. Gradually from ‘the plasticity and exuberance of childhood’ there is formed ‘the character of the man’ (I 212). This includes a certain selfunderstanding, a style of everyday living, a habitual orientation, and a determinate ‘role in society.’46 8.3 The Dramatic Pattern and Rational Self-Consciousness This brings us back to the question of what type and degree of self-consciousness and self-reflection is to be found in the dramatic pattern. Lonergan emphasizes the non-thematic or pre-thematic character of the pattern. He points out that the process by which character is formed (developed) goes on whether we reflect on it or not. For ‘past behavior determines our present habitual attitude’ (I 212). He notes that explicit good resolutions in the past often have little effect on future ‘spontaneity.’ Necessarily we begin to develop dramatically long before explicit reflection emerges: ‘Before there can be reflection or criticism, evaluation or deliberation, our imagination and intelligence must collaborate in representing the projected course of action that is to be submitted to reflection and criticism, to evaluation and decision’ (I 212). The dramatic pattern is operative from the beginning ‘in the prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence’ (I 212). It outlines ‘how we might behave before others’ and how we might charge the outline with ‘an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity’ (I 212). We spontaneously learn to anticipate possible ways of behaving, and these ways of behaving are already invested with a depth of feeling. Lonergan is clear that ordinary living is

46 Ibid., 105.

132 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

more than ‘ordinary drama’: ‘In ordinary living there are not first the materials and then the pattern … On the contrary, the materials that emerge in consciousness are already charged emotionally and conatively’ (I 212). However, there is another side to the matter. As the subject develops, explicit reflection and deliberation enter the process: ‘rational consciousness with its reflection and criticism, its deliberation and choice, exerts a decisive influence’ (I 212). Lonergan does not develop this, but it seems of crucial importance. Without rational consciousness, character would be confined to the role assigned by the approval of society. We would be conditioned or socialized into ‘good habits,’ but virtue as such would be ruled out. The point is that character does not develop only spontaneously. Character is also a product of explicit reflection and deliberation. There is a dynamic process involving both prereflective and reflective aspects. This raises again the question of the relations between the dramatic pattern and the other patterns. 8.4 The Dramatic Pattern and the Human Person In this regard, McKinney has suggested that the dramatic pattern is the basic integrating pattern. It is not simply ‘another complementary pattern’ but is rather ‘the style in which people live out their lives by blending or mixing the other patterns.’47 McKinney makes a case for holding that making one’s life into a work of art – achieved in the dramatic pattern – involves several elements: (a) the ‘practical schemes’ for which we need the collaboration of others, (b) ‘aesthetic liberation and artistic creativity,’ (c) an awareness that ‘the artistry is limited by biological exigence’ and (d) in a secondary if not primary way, ‘blueprints for human behavior’ devised by ‘pure intelligence’ (I 211). In other words the practical, aesthetic, intellectual, biological patterns are blended and mixed in the dramatic pattern. Again I have reservations about this way of taking the dramatic pattern. It does not seem adequate to talk merely about ‘the style in which people live out their lives.’ Furthermore, McKinney misses the distinctive feature of the dramatic pattern: it involves dramatic interplay among persons working with different purposes and motives. It is a higher-level ‘integration’ that is concerned with living before and with others in a shared environment. It is not merely a mix or blend of the other patterns. In addition, McKinney is not clear on the relationship of the intellectual pattern to the dramatic pattern. The intellectual pattern is not simply a source of ‘blueprints’ for human behaviour.

47 McKinney, ‘The Role of Conversion in Lonergan’s Insight,’ 269.

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I am not sure whether Lonergan’s dramatic subject is the same as McKinney’s dramatic subject. There is evidence for distinguishing them in a later remark in Insight, where Lonergan speaks of subdivisions in the dramatic pattern: ‘While the dramatic pattern of one person dealing with other persons draws upon all one’s resources, still it subdivides, like the successive coating in an onion, into a series of zones from the ego or moi intime to the outer rind of the personal’ (I 495). This suggests that the dramatic pattern is not ‘integral’ in the way McKinney thinks it is. On the other hand it may be argued that the zones could be integrated and that here Lonergan is addressing the case where they are not. In other words, we could still hold that the concerns of authentic, dramatic subjects correspond to the full sweep of their personhood. The authentic, dramatic subject is a fully integrated person. McKinney does in fact propose this kind of position. I will outline his argument and then indicate my continuing reservations. McKinney argues that the ‘Law of Integration’ (I 497) has important implications for the dramatic pattern. It reveals the need for a sensitive blending of the patterns, and it indicates that the genuine subject heads towards a comprehensive self-appropriation: It follows that, for the dramatic subject to achieve the integration requisite for being a living work of art, every development within one pattern of experience must continually be met with complementary adjustments in the other patterns. It is the task of the dramatic subject to govern consciously the developing interplay of these complementary patterns of experience.48 However, if the subject in the dramatic pattern is to govern the outcome of the blending of patterns, there is need for ‘some apprehension of the starting point, the term, and the process’ (I 500) of human development. But this apprehension may be correct or incorrect, as Lonergan notes. McKinney, therefore, argues that the dramatic subject requires genuineness, a full commitment to truth, in order to reach a correct apprehension of its own development. He goes on to quote Lonergan on what deeper appropriation of truth involves: To appropriate truth is to make it one’s own. The essential appropriation of truth is cognitional. However, our reasonableness demands consistency between what we know and what we do; and

48 Ibid., 270.

134 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

so there is a volitional appropriation of truth that consists in our willingness to live up to it, and a sensitive appropriation of truth that consists in our adaption of our sensibility to the requirements of our knowledge and our decision. (I 581–2) Given that to appropriate means ‘to take possession,’ McKinney goes on to make an important claim: ‘In so far as the dramatic subject must appropriate the truth about itself in order to achieve genuineness, it must perform not only cognitional self-appropriation, then, but volitional and sensitive self-appropriation as well.’49 McKinney’s argument is at first glance very plausible. It offers an attractive account of the dramatic subject developing in a genuine and integral fashion. However, I wonder if it overlooks the complexity of the issue. There seems to be, in McKinney’s argument, a shift from talking of development in the dramatic subject to talking of the human subject as such. When McKinney brings in ‘the Law of Integration,’ he fails to see that this is primarily a law of human development and not directly a law of dramatic development. The difference between the two may be brought out if we ask what is the main ‘concern’ of the subject in the dramatic pattern. It is to make the self a work of art. It is to seek ‘well being’ in a life lived before and with others. But what is entailed by this? Lonergan’s account makes it clear that this work of art is the self as defined by artistic and affective criteria. It is the self choosing a ‘style’ under the influence of society. It is a self defined by the internal relationship to a society or group. But then the dramatic subject, as Lonergan has presented it, is not the human subject in its basic identity: the self as defined by the social drama is not the self as fully (inter)personal. It is not the self as incarnate spirit open to the whole human race and open to self-transcendence in a fully self-conscious and self-critical way. This self is only fully appropriated thematically when one is in the intellectual pattern (in its philosophical differentiation) and in the moral pattern (in its ethical differentiation). The mystical pattern also reveals a further dimension that cannot so easily be ‘domesticated’ by the dramatic pattern. The human self is a unity-intension that cannot be fully appropriated in the dramatic pattern, for genuineness requires the ongoing unfolding of the intellectual, moral, and mystical patterns. Perhaps, however, we could say that the dramatic pattern is the pattern in which we may choose to communicate the self as appropriated at any given stage. Furthermore, while the full development of the self does not occur within the dramatic pattern as such, we may say that the

49 Ibid.

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dramatic pattern sets the conditions for the full development of the subject. It motivates the ‘withdrawal’ to the intellectual and ethical patterns and is open to the transformation of the mystical pattern. McKinney would have seen this had he examined more closely Lonergan’s account of the conscious apprehension of human development. Lonergan says that apprehension of the starting point, terms, and process of development may be ‘minimal or less extensive’ (I 500), as well as correct or incorrect. He continues: ‘They are more or less extensive when one begins to delve into the background, the context, the premise, the interrelations, of the minimal series of conscious acts, and to subsume this understanding of oneself under empirical laws and philosophic theories of development’ (I 500). This surely goes far beyond the range of the dramatic pattern as Lonergan described it. McKinney has redefined the dramatic pattern as the comprehensive pattern of human existence that calls for an equally comprehensive self-appropriation. But to appropriate human development in its full dimension involves the genuineness proper to the intellectual pattern and the moral pattern. It requires the unfolding of these patterns into philosophic differentiations (it needs interiorly differentiated consciousness). Furthermore, the transformation proper to the religious and mystical patterns is involved. It might still be insisted that the dramatic pattern can integrate the intellectual and the moral and the mystical patterns into the unfolding of ‘ordinary living.’ The dramatic pattern, when properly developed, unfolds into the ethical. At the moment I am hesitant to accept this, because it allows a ‘unity’ in the dramatic pattern that does not seem to be evident. The dramatic pattern does indeed draw from other patterns, and it is concerned to blend and mix them. But this partial integration may have a limited motivation and concern: it may operate at a categorical–horizontal–social level. In this case it integrates or draws from other patterns under the concern for self-development with/before others but not under the concern of the pure desire for knowledge and for the good (or under the concern for the ontic value of the person one is or under the concern for the ontic value of the other person). McKinney has advanced the discussion in an important way. He points out the need to make the ‘volitional/ethical’ pattern of human living explicit. The basic pattern of human experience is not simply ‘intellectual.’ But perhaps he has not sufficiently revealed the basic pattern of experience as the pattern in which unfolding human intentionality opens up to self-transcendence in its full sweep. It could be said that the subject in the dramatic pattern, as intending a full integrated living, as concerned with ‘full living,’ will come to appropriate the basic dynamic pattern of

136 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

human existence. There is an exigence for fitting all the parts of one’s life together, and this will evoke the critical concerns of the intellectual pattern and the self-critical concerns of the ‘ethical pattern.’ It will ideally evoke self-transcendence. Furthermore, an existential crisis can call for the self-transcendence that requires invoking the mystical pattern. But there remains a tension between the ‘dramatic’ and the ‘intellectual.’ The dramatic does not give full reign to the movement of self-transcendence. On the other hand, we may discover the convergence of the dramatic pattern and the basic pattern of self-transcendence in genuine interpersonal encounter. I would argue that even an intellectual dialogue is part of human living and not just a withdrawal from living. It is a meeting of persons and not just of minds. However, the most complete convergence of the dramatic pattern and the dynamism of self-transcendence is found in human friendship and love. The other person offers a challenge and an invitation to a new possibility of living that is grasped as achievable and is available as a gift. (Friendship is between equals or makes equals). Given that one person in the encounter has reached a sufficient level of intellectual, moral, and personal self-transcendence, there is the possibility and probability of personal self-transcendence in his or her partner. In this way the dramatic pattern may be said to head towards conversion. From this point of view, developments in other patterns are sedimented or sublated into the dramatic pattern. When there is no developed reflection, ongoing experience is sedimented into everyday living. When there is explicit and self-conscious reflection, this continues as sublated into the concerns of an explicitly and fully personal engagement with life. But then we are talking of an intellectually, morally, and perhaps religiously concerned person who has appropriated himself or herself as a person (who is heading for the authenticity of conversion). So at this point we can talk of the dynamism of finality as being manifested in the relationship between patterns of experience.50 It is clear that more reflection needs to be done on the dramatic pattern (especially if we are to work out its philosophical implications). As it stands, it is not clear how much ground it covers. It is open to minimal and maximal interpretations. Is it the pattern in which we give style to our way of life or is it that way in its deepest orientation? It is the pattern in which we choose our way of being-in-the-world. It is particularly the pattern in which we engage other human beings. It is the pattern in which we develop in character and in which we enter communion with others. It is the pattern in which the human being incarnates itself in the world and in

50 Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability, 144.

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the human community. In its most genuine and authentic form it is the pattern of ongoing self-transcendence, which personally appropriates the intellectual and moral and religious patterns. Perhaps it is best seen as the pattern of the human person as person and the pattern in which the person is with others. The dramatic pattern may be seen as the pattern of the embodied person transcending any specialization. It is the pattern of the person as an irreplaceable unity but a unity in community with others. It is the pattern of the person always already in the communal and ecological and cosmic drama. It is the pattern in which the person has care and concern both for the self and for the self before others. Hence it may be highly relevant to discussions in African philosophy, which focus on the communal aspects of being human. In the authentic person it is the pattern of concrete self-transcendence in which the person forms and gathers himself or herself in order to seek truth and goodness and love along with fellow human beings. The key issue seems to be that of authenticity and genuineness, but this raises questions about foundations and conversions that cannot be treated here. We can only note that a comprehensive account of the patterns and of polymorphism could not neglect such issues. 9

Concluding Remarks

This completes the first stage of the survey of the patterns. It has examined the patterns that Lonergan thought worthwhile treating in detail. The following chapter extends the survey to consider the practical and mystical patterns, along with the ethical and symbolic patterns. Then polymorphism as the dynamic interplay of the patterns will be examined on the basis of chapter 14 of Insight. The preceding survey and development of the patterns will then be invoked to assess the account of the mixing and blending given by Lonergan in the context of his account of philosophic difference in chapter 14.

Recto Running Head 138

4 Further Patterns of Experience?

1

Introduction

The list of patterns in chapter 14 of Insight differs from that in chapter 6. In chapter 14 Lonergan clearly differentiates the aesthetic pattern from the artistic pattern. He also adds a practical pattern, already mentioned in chapter 8 (I 293), and a mystical pattern (I 411). What is the point of these additions? What justifies the addition of these patterns? Similarly, when commentators add the ‘symbolic’ pattern or speak of an ‘ethical’ pattern, on what basis should we allow this extension? Lonergan offers a response to the questions about the range of patterns in Understanding and Being. I will present this and then argue that Lonergan’s response may not do justice to his overall position. It may obscure the deeper significance of the patterns. There is a sense in which Understanding and Being offers only a minimal interpretation. I will attempt to provide a reasonably detailed account of the additional patterns. The aim will be to provide a more differentiated base for the account of polymorphism at the level of patterns. When asked if there were other patterns besides the ones listed in Insight, Lonergan replied that there might be. He said that he did not attempt to give an exhaustive list. Rather, his concern was with the developmental possibilities of human being: Quite possibly. I am not attempting an exhaustive account of possible patterns of experience. I’m trying to break down the notion that a man is some fixed entity … Psychologically we develop. And for every stage of development, in every stage of human culture and

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history, and society, and so on, you have different developments … What is the possibility of that? What are the types of factors that enter in? (UB 320) The first remark can seem to imply that the patterns in Insight have no special significance over and above any other possible patterns that might be distinguished. The second suggests that there are patterns for all stages and aspects of development in culture and history. Taken together they imply that the account of the patterns in Insight gives only a small sample from a potentially very great number of possible patterns. The problem with this is that it seems to minimize the possible explanatory significance of the patterns. Patterns may manifest the diversity of culture, but can they place the diversity in an explanatory framework? In an earlier part of Understanding and Being, Lonergan offers other remarks that again tend to suggest a minimal interpretation of the patterns: ‘Let’s go back to our self appropriation. I think we will get to the root of these patterns of experience that way’ (UB 308). What we find within us is not anything ‘determinate’ but something to be achieved. ‘In other words, we develop’ (UB 309), and the patterns manifest this development. This development involves the patterns of experience: Our intellects at the start of life are like a board on which nothing is written, and intellect is gradually actuated. The process of actuating intellect involves a new component in the man. And as that intellectual component develops, the total balance changes, and you get a change of orientation in living … Now the more the intellect is developed, and the more the balance is changed, the more the orientation also is changed; and the patterns of experience that we describe in Insight are just rough indications of the possibilities of diversity and differences in combinations in modes of living. (UB 309) This leads to an overall account of the relevance of the patterns: Perhaps the most relevant thing with regard to those patterns of experience is this: The ones I give are simply indications of the fact that people differ from one another, that they live in different ways, that this or that is a possibility … What I’m trying to indicate is the possibility of different components that can enter into human living. (UB 309) I would suggest that this is less than a full account of the significance of the patterns. Lonergan has shown how the patterns in fact make pos-

140 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

sible great diversity in common sense, in personal development, in cultures. But can Lonergan’s account of a limited but well chosen range of patterns provide a framework for evaluating cultural (and philosophic) diversity? To answer this question we need to look at the basis of the patterns themselves. My claim is that the patterns reflect the structural complexity of human being and have relevance at the level of philosophical anthropology. Hence they will have relevance for an account of philosophic difference. Inasmuch as they reflect important dimensions or aspects of the complex structure of human being, the patterns provide different bases for diverse contributions to the philosophical enterprise (though some of the original accounts of the patterns may need developing and extending for this to become evident). This points forward to the discussion of the metaphilosophical implications of the patterns. My point here is that if they have such implications, then the patterns Lonergan identifies are not arbitrarily chosen. This is shown in Lonergan’s argument in chapter 15 on the existence of explanatory genus and species. In that argument he makes the connection between the patterns of experience and levels in the structure of human being. He says of someone who would revise the account of explanatory genus and species that he will be capable of experience in those other patterns or in some blend or alternation of them, for otherwise he would not be a man. It follows that the hypothetical reviser, if he is not a man, will be more than a concrete unity of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness. What else will he be? … One has to invoke at least one other genus of conjugate forms to account for the concrete possibility of other patterns of experience, to account for preconscious and subconscious influences upon consciousness, to account for the fact that the hypothetical reviser eats and breathes and walks on other things besides men. (I 467) In other words, other patterns are possible only because there are in fact different levels in the structure of human being. The patterns indicate the levels or have to do with the relations among the levels or with the unityin-tension of the psychic–biological and the intellectual–spiritual. Another indication of the connections among levels in the structure of human being and patterns of experience is found in the claim that intellectual activity is a higher system for sensitive living ‘both consciously and unconsciously’ (I 538). Inasmuch as intellectual activity ‘grounds the pattern in which sensitive experience occurs’ it is said to be unconsciously providing a higher system (I 538).

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These passages are only indications of the connection. However, a detailed look at the structure of human being provides further support. A closer look at individual patterns confirms the value of this perspective. I contend that the patterns Lonergan is offering were chosen for a reason. I hold that they reflect important aspects of the unity in tension that is the human being. There may be room for the important addition of an ‘ethical’ pattern, but the structure of human being does not provide grounds for multiplying patterns excessively. There may be many possible subdivisions, but the structure and unity in tension of polymorphic consciousness becomes the basis of philosophical discrimination only when we focus on the core patterns. The main patterns will be those grounded in the structure of human being. It may be objected that invoking the connection between patterns and the structure of human being does not show that the patterns selected by Lonergan are non-arbitrary. The points Lonergan makes in the argument over the existence of explanatory genus and species (I 467) presumably apply to any pattern. I do not think this objection is so forceful once we appreciate how the patterns chosen cover the whole range of operations open to a being with such a structure. There is room for some refinement of the original listing, but it is difficult to see what major areas have been left out – that is, what major degrees of freedom or levels of operation or levels of integration and sublation have not been covered. Reflection on the structure of human being as organic–psychic–spiritual reveals how a being of this kind is able to generate these kinds of patterns and this range of patterns. These patterns will be at least latent possibilities in any human being. It is true that patterns are discovered historically and that not all cultures or individuals manifest them fully. However, in a sufficiently developed person or culture a sufficiently broad range of patterns will be found. It is this which allows us to verify the claim that patterns and the structure of human being are related. There will be variations and specializations and differentiations of the core patterns, but these do not introduce an indefinite number of patterns as such. There arise questions of the philosophical relevance of the patterns. I have suggested that the motive for identifying the basic patterns is their philosophic implications: polymorphism is the key to philosophy. But can a reasoned case be made for this? In fact Lonergan attempts to provide such a case in chapters 14 to 17 of Insight. He focuses on the biological and intellectual patterns because these offer a powerful dialectical tool for approaching basic philosophical problems having to do with core philosophical variables. However, this leaves open the question about the role of the other patterns. Are they irrelevant to philosophic difference? My

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claim is that to focus only on the intellectual and biological patterns is to consider only the negative aspects of polymorphism. An appreciation of the other patterns may provide a basis for a wider appreciation of philosophic difference. This has been hinted at already in the claim of a possible relevance of the aesthetic–artistic patterns to the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Still, it would be premature to claim too much at this stage. At the moment I am engaged in simply clarifying what is involved in polymorphism-as-patterns. With this in mind I want to propose four further additions to the four patterns already treated. First I consider the patterns that Lonergan himself introduces, without elaboration, in the later list of patterns. 2

The Practical Pattern

This pattern is explicitly mentioned only later in Insight, and few details are provided. Apart from being mentioned in the list of patterns linked with polymorphism (I 410, 602), there are only two or three other explicit treatments. There is also a hint of the existence of a practical pattern in chapter 6 of Insight, where Lonergan speaks of ordinary life as including a ‘concern to get things done’ (I 210). This may be taken as the underlying concern that defines the pattern. The remark is found in the section on the dramatic pattern. The practical and dramatic patterns are closely linked and together underlie the commonsense mode of operation. However, the practical pattern, inasmuch as it deals with concrete ‘bodies,’ is also linked with the biological pattern. Again, the question of interrelations among the patterns is raised. I will touch on the brief explicit treatments and then turn to chapter 7 of Insight, which evidently deals with the practical pattern even if it is not mentioned. Though the problem of interpretation is not as great as with the dramatic pattern, there are difficulties with determining the scope of the practical pattern. The first explicit mention of the pattern links it with the ‘already out there now’ of bodies: As soon as anyone moves from [the intellectual pattern] to the dramatic pattern of his intercourse with others or the practical pattern of his daily tasks, things as intelligible unities once more will take on for him the appearance of unreal speculation, while ‘bodies’ or instances of the ‘already out there now real’ will resume the ascendancy that they acquired without opposition in his infancy. (I 293) This passage is helpful in that it shows Lonergan making a clear distinction between the dramatic and the practical pattern; it also links the practical pattern more closely to the biological pattern. To ‘get things done’

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involves the daily task of dealing with ‘bodies.’ This marks out the pattern in an apparently straightforward way. But does this characterization hold as practical intelligence develops? Does it hold as practical intelligence devises an intelligible order for production that includes a division of labour? This is an issue we will have to return to. The second passage relates the practical and the aesthetic patterns. Lonergan argues that ‘aesthetic experience and the pattern of practical activity tend to be mutually exclusive’ (I 495). Does this hold for the craftsman working with his material to produce something that is both elegant and functional? Earlier on in Insight, Lonergan states that ‘man is an artist’ and continues: ‘His practicality is part of his dramatic pursuit of dignified living’ (I 213). The third passage occurs late in Insight (I 744), where Lonergan argues that in the main the flow of consciousness is practical and dramatic. These brief references to the practical pattern leave many issues unresolved. The emphasis is on this pattern as a pattern of ‘practical activity,’ the pattern of ‘daily tasks.’ But what exactly is the motive or concern for getting things done? How does it differ from the concern in the biological pattern to deal quickly and efficiently with situations in the immediate environment? Is the practical pattern what the biological pattern becomes when intelligence enters into the picture? How is the practical pattern transformed as practical intelligence develops? What is the relation of the practical pattern to the dramatic pattern, which is concerned with relations with other people? Together they constitute common sense, but how does their interplay change as common sense develops? Questions arise also in regard to the aesthetic pattern and the practical pattern. Are these mutually exclusive, as Lonergan says? Finally, we can anticipate the philosophical implications. If the flow of human consciousness occurs mainly in the practical and dramatic patterns, as Lonergan says, rather than in the biological, should we not expect these patterns to be significant factors as polymorphism gives rise to philosophic diversity? For example, is there a connection between the practical pattern and the philosophical tradition of pragmatism? (I believe there is.) To investigate further we need to examine chapter 7 of Insight, which discusses practical intelligence or practical common sense at length. This sets the practical pattern in a much wider context. It allows us to see the transformation of the practical pattern as practical intelligence develops. Furthermore, the notion of the ‘good’ is introduced here and related to practical action and practical intelligence. In this way, Lonergan relates the practical pattern to the developing human community. The notions of the ‘good’ and of human ‘community’ become central in his account of practical activity.

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Lonergan first of all points out that common sense ‘is practical’ (I 233). It seeks knowledge not for its own sake but ‘to use knowledge in making and doing’ (I 232). There is a development of intelligence for practical purpose, and this development results in the ‘transformation of man and his environment’ (I 233). To what extent this involves a continuing concern with ‘bodies’ is not clear. The desire to get things done intelligently introduces technological, economic, political and cultural dimensions to human life. Perhaps we may say that the concern with ‘bodies’ as such is sublated into higher-level concerns of human living. The point of departure for the development of the practical pattern is the need to cope with the given environment that engages our sensitive consciousness. To this extent we must recognize the possibility of the biological pattern blending with the practical pattern. There is always a ‘sensate component’1 to human consciousness (except, perhaps, in the mystical pattern). Hence the concern of the commonsense subject will at first tend to focus on basic particular goods as responding to bodily needs. These goods will be made available by relatively simple practical action. Even in relatively undeveloped human societies, this coping with the environment is still a collective enterprise. At first, social relationships are ‘simple prolongations of prehuman achievement’ (I 237). They are based on ‘spontaneous intersubjectivity,’ which involves a prereflective awareness of community. As Braio points out, in its early stages commonsense living will be relatively undifferentiated and unspecialized.2 The social community will be fairly basic and simple in structure. Social life will involve a limited range of common activities. The daily task of getting things done will be uniformly shared. But the ‘relatively static’ structure of such a society will be transformed as practical intelligence develops, and a more complex and dynamic human society will emerge. ‘The practicality of common sense engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics and culture, that not only separate man from nature but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationship’ (I 233). The concern of practical intelligence is first of all to acquire basic particular goods that respond to bodily needs. Gradually it is realized that the obtaining of these goods is done more effectively when practical intelligence ‘takes time out’ (I 232) to put order into practical action and production and so gains more complete and widespread satisfaction. The intervention of intelligence in making production easier is ‘recurrent’ (I

1 Braio, Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being, 79. 2 Ibid., 80.

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233). Gradually the order of the schemes by which practical concerns may be met is grasped and implemented. The result, first of all, is that as the practical schemes of efficient production grow in complexity, technology emerges. The required means of production are devised and reproduced, and there is growth in ‘capital equipment’ (I 233). This consists of things that are desired not in themselves but because they ‘accelerate the process of supplying the goods and services’ that are directly wanted (I 233). Second, the technological advance changes human society in a way that leads to the emergence of an economic order. This is seen when we perceive that this ‘concrete realization of the succession of new practical ideas does not take place without human cooperation’ (I 233). It requires and structures the division of labour. Cooperation must be organized and different roles assigned. Skills must be taught, and members of the community must be formed to make their proper contributions. Furthermore, the production of goods raises questions about ‘what quantities of what goods and services are to be supplied’ (I 234) as well as questions about what the distribution of goods should be. The economic system is evoked in this way. Third, this complexity of practical ideas, human interaction, desire for goods, and economic issues creates the need for a political ordering of human interaction, a need for ‘the political specialization of common sense’ (I 233). The aims of overcoming division, negotiating different claims, and satisfying different desires are fulfilled by evoking a common understanding of the practical ways of meeting the demands of the concrete situation. A political order is needed to bring about ‘effective agreement’ (I 234). Such an order requires some knowledge of industry and commerce, but ‘its special field is dealing with men’ (I 235). The politician specializes in effective persuasion that leads to a social response to the concrete social situation. He may draw on intersubjective feeling, or he may presume a certain amount of intelligence in his hearers. In this way we see how the intelligent practicality of common sense evokes a series of higher practical viewpoints that ‘not only separate man from nature, but also add a series of new levels or dimensions in the network of human relationships’ (I 233). This development of the social order reveals the distinctiveness of the practical pattern. Its concern is to get things done with others. It seeks the concrete good available to the human community. This involves an interdependence among human subjects that we may see as both postbiological and predramatic. It extends intersubjectivity by holding spontaneous feeling in tension with practical intelligence. It evokes a network of human relations and calls for the skills of ‘dealing with men.’ But it does not reach the concern for living before and with others that belongs to the dramatic

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pattern, though it is open to it. The unfolding of the practical pattern involves, then, a relationship of interdependent subjects to the common world that their combined efforts bring about. It reveals a distinct dimension of our social being. It constitutes the unfolding of the concrete community that is changed by what it produces. Lonergan develops this in terms of emergent probability: ‘the advent of man does not abrogate the rule of emergent probability’ (I 235). Human events and relationships and actions are ‘regularly recurrent’ and occur in schemes, in patterned sets of relations, which indicate that ‘if x occurs, then x will recur’ (I 235). These schemes are not inevitable, but they do exist and function as long as conditions arise. However, ‘if human affairs fall under the dominion of emergent probability they do so in their own way’ (I 238). Human affairs will depend more on ‘the probabilities of the occurrence of insight, communications, persuasion, agreement, decision’ (I 236). Human beings are not passive with regard to the environment. Technological, economic, and political developments are ‘not only intelligible but also intelligent’ (I 236). Hence the analogy of human events with natural process becomes less relevant. Practical insights are made available by communication and persuasion, and as commonly accessible, they ‘determine the course of history out of the alternatives offered by emergent probability’ (I 236). Human affairs require the continuous exercise of practical intelligence: ‘the practical common sense of a group, like all common sense, is an incomplete set of insights, that is ever to be completed differently in each case.’ Such common sense must develop continuously. Its origins and growth are never fully apprehended explicitly, ‘for the practical common sense operative in a community does not exist entire in the mind of any one man’ (I 236–7). Hence we need to enter into dialogue with people from many walks of life in order to discover ‘the fundamental unity that organically binds together’ the dynamic diversity of human society (I 237). At this stage we discover the hidden complexity in human society and in the constitution of human beings. The practical pattern reveals in a distinctive way the fundamental tension between spirit and psyche. There is a basic tension within the practical pattern between the spontaneous desires and the spontaneous intersubjectivity that characterize a primitive community and the practical intelligence that comes to the fore in developed communities. This tension may be seen in terms of the contrast between the spontaneous desire for a particular good and the intelligent long-term desiring of the good of order. There is, then, the ‘radical tension of community’ (I 241). The relationship of interdependence in a developed community has two related aspects. First, there is the spontaneous intersubjectivity that is the ‘pri-

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mordial basis’ of community and ‘the dynamic premise for common enterprise’ (I 237). This allows ‘the experience of each to resonate to the experience of others’ (I 240). It coexists with the intelligently devised social order that manifests itself in the technological, economic, and political structures in which members of a community participate. As society develops it may shift away from ‘its initial basis in intersubjectivity’ and base itself instead on an intelligently devised order, which then becomes an ‘indispensable constituent of human living’ (I 239). Hence ‘the discoveries of practical intelligence which once were an incidental addition to the spontaneous fabric of human living now penetrate and overwhelm its every aspect’ (I 238). This transformation gives rise to ‘a new notion of the good’ as a developed civil community comes to recognize the ‘good of order.’ This ‘consists in an intelligible pattern of relationships that condition the fulfillment of each man’s desires by his contributions to the fulfillment of the desires of others, and similarly protects each from the object of his fears in the measure he contributes to warding off the objects feared by others’ (I 238). This is not something abstract. It is not an external framework; rather, it is concretely constituted by human actions and attainments. The good of order is a single order that operates in the whole community ‘to constitute the link between conditioning actions and conditioned results and to close the circuit of interlocked schemes of recurrence’ (I 239). When practical intelligence devises arrangements for human living, the good becomes possible. For it to be actualized all the members of a community must participate in it: ‘In the measure that such arrangements are understood and accepted, there necessarily results the intelligible pattern of relationship that we have named the good of order’ (I 239). This order eventually becomes indispensable, for its loss could only result in a decrease in the quality of human life. However, spontaneous intersubjectivity remains, for not only does it precede civilization and underpin it, ‘but also it survives it’ (I 238). And the feelings of a particular may clash with ‘the larger pattern of social order’ (I 241). Hence the tension remains, and this results in a ‘dialectic of community’ (I 242) that must constantly be addressed. Lonergan says that the tension of community is rooted in a ‘duality immanent in man himself’ (I 240). In each person there arise spontaneous desires that have an immediacy for him alone. However, there is also an equally spontaneous intersubjectivity that allows a rudimentary awareness of belonging to a social community and that hence forms a basis for practical cooperation. Moreover, it allows practical intelligence to unfold at least in the context of a group. Practical intelligence unfolds, however, and devises ever more comprehensive solutions to recurrent problems in human living, whether these concern material development, technological

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tools, economic systems, or political structures. Detached and disinterested intelligence considers the place of any human being in the structures of human living. It resists the bias of the individual or group. Above all it resists the general bias that would deny its competence in meeting the problems of human living. There is, then, immanent within the members of the human community, a ‘duality’ (I 240) that grounds the tension of the community. Though intersubjectivity and intelligently devised social order have ‘different properties and different tendencies’ (I 241), still by our very nature we are committed to both and hence are committed to negotiating between their claims. Where does this leave the practical pattern of experience? What does it become in a developed society? What properly belongs to the subject of the practical pattern? Is it the subject in the practical pattern or the subject in the intellectual pattern that devises intelligible social orders (as objectively as possible)? It would seem that it is the collectivity of subjects who devise an intelligible social order collectively. They do so using practical intelligence, working out of the practical pattern of experience. The intellectual pattern may, then, be invoked when it comes to investigating the invariant structure of the social order or of the order of history. In this way the practical pattern may be ‘reoriented.’ But how does the development of a society affect the practical subject? Within the social system the practical subject as individual ‘desires and labors, enjoys and suffers’ (I 240). Similarly he must cope with the consequences of new technology, be subject to laws he may have helped devise, and cope with the fluctuations in prevailing economic structures. But what becomes of the daily tasks to be performed? What ‘objects’ must the practical subject deal with and in what way? What is the ‘field’ of practical common sense in a developed society? First of all, we may say that practical common sense relies on spontaneously accumulated related insight (I 197). It must draw on the various sustained communications that disseminate and test and improve every advance as the social community develops (I 198). In order to grasp the complex world that impacts on practical life in many ways, the subject in the practical pattern will dialogue with people from many walks of life (I 158, 237). Secondly, common sense will grasp something of the wider structures that affect ordinary life. Common sense is a specialization in the concrete (I 199). It is concerned with what makes a palpable difference to our material and general well-being. It is wary of theory and may suffer from general bias unless it is reoriented (I 423–44). Still the commonsense subject must have some understanding of the socio-cultural situation in

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which it finds itself. There must be at least sufficient understanding of intelligently devised schemes in order to accept and implement the good of order (I 239). Common sense will understand, in its own way, something of the scientific, social, economic, environmental, and historical factors that impinge on ordinary life. This includes grasping something of long-term and theoretical factors. Braio puts this well: The subject of practical common sense is content to act after having learned only enough about the institutions, values, and disvalues which inform her society and culture, about their history and prospect and tensions, about the horizon of her practice etc., to make it possible for her to attend to her own affairs and perform the task associated with her public duties.3 To this extent the linking of the practical pattern to the already out there now real of ‘bodies’ may be misleading (I 293). This is far too narrow an understanding of the ‘objects’ of the practical pattern. Rather, the ‘field’ of common sense involves ‘the potential totality of socio-cultural “objects” which call forth and answer to the ‘action’ of the common sense subject.’4 The field will concern particular objects of desire, particular goods as set in the context of a sufficiently understood ‘good of order.’ There will be a distinct focus to the reflection and evaluation proper to this pattern: ‘The “field” imposes a “pragmatic” and, therefore, relatively short-sighted criterion on the understanding and judgment of practical possibilities.’5 The field of operation will vary according to geography, occupation, social arrangement, personal development, and historical developments (I 203). It will become increasingly differentiated, and the increasing complexity will have a feedback effect on the practical common sense of every person. In all this the subject in the practical pattern increasingly comes to ‘know’ his or her concrete situation. But this means knowing how to deal with it practically rather than knowing it thematically. Common sense knows ‘but because it does not have to be articulate, can operate directly from its accumulated insights’ (I 199). This is its strength but also its limitation: ‘common sense knows, but it does not know what it knows nor how it knows nor how to correct and complement its own inadequacy’ (I 241). It is restricted to a continual process of informed trial and error. Often only the destruction of the social order can precipitate con3 Ibid., 97n1. 4 Ibid., 95. 5 Ibid., 96.

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sequences that convince commonsense practicality of its own limited competence (I 241). There is, then, a definite mode of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding that arises out of a concern for responding to the practical situation. There will be a selective attention to available data that focuses on what leads to insights, judgments, decisions that can make a difference. This is the practical pattern, which may be seen as another dimension of polymorphic consciousness. It is irreducible to the theoretical– intellectual pattern. It is closely related to the dramatic pattern in that it is properly grasped in the performance rather than in thematization. Finally, it constitutes another mode of being human and so becomes another possible factor in philosophic difference. 3

The Mystical Pattern

Though Lonergan mentions a ‘mystical’ pattern of experience (I 410), he devotes no section to articulating it. The details have to be filled out by drawing from the account of ‘Special Transcendent Knowledge’ in chapter 20 of Insight. There is also relevant material in chapter 17 of Insight, in the account of mystery and myth. Finally, the account of religious experience in Method also needs to be kept in mind. The discussion on ‘Special Transcendent Knowledge’ deals with the ‘solution’ to the problem of evil. Lonergan’s detailed account of the solution throws light on what he means by the mystical pattern. I will give a brief account of what, according to Lonergan, is involved in the problem of evil, and then outline his account of the ‘solution,’ showing how it involves the mystical pattern. The problem of evil arises, in part, because of the inescapable limitations of human existence. It arises owing to an inauthentic response to the basic conditions of human existence. These conditions include the fact that we have to live before we know how to live; we have to live before ‘acquiring the willingness to live rightly’; we have to live before ‘developing the adaption that makes right living habitual’ (I 715, 711). Hence ignorance or bad will or ineffectual self-control produces a ‘social surd.’ The situation in which human development occurs becomes sporadically unintelligible. Intelligence attempts to deal with this. But if the absence of intelligibility is not acknowledged, if there is no inverse insight that recognizes the absence, if it is assumed that the world is ‘a homogenous array of intelligible facts’ (I 712), then further action only compounds the social surd. It is mistaken for intelligibility and is then systematized and perpetuated. Then pragmatists and ‘realists’ come to disregard intelligence and reasonableness as abstract idealism (I 712).

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What would begin to meet the problem would be a cosmopolis underpinned by critical human science and by acceptance of a correct philosophy. But the ambiguity caused by polymorphism makes these difficult to come by: ‘As the history of philosophy rather abundantly confirms, the polymorphism of human consciousness loses none of its ambivalence because men have turned to philosophy … On the contrary, the many philosophies are but the adequate expression of the inner polymorphic fact’ (I 712). The problem is that philosophers are also human and so many will cling to some blend of positions and counterpositions (I 713). Counterpositions expand, unite, shift ground, evade reversal. They come to occupy a ‘vast territory.’ Though Lonergan feels he has developed a philosophy of philosophies that takes polymorphism into account, he realizes that this will not be enough to overcome fundamental counterpositional differences. Still less will it solve all the problems of human living. A correct philosophy will be too complicated to be appreciated by most people, and it will be lost as one among many incorrect positions (I 715). Furthermore, ‘not only human intelligence and reasonableness but also human will and the established routines of human sensitivity and inter-subjectivity are involved’ (I 713). There is a deeper level to the problem, says Lonergan. There is ‘man’s awareness of his plight and his self-surrender to it’ (I 715). The problem is deeper than polymorphism. It involves a surrender by the human spirit that is implicitly a rejection of the solution (which is always already available). It involves a lack of love, of hope, and of self-control. The solution and any anticipation of the solution at the level of general transcendent knowledge are despaired of: The secret of the counter-positions is not the superficial confusion generated by the polymorphism of human consciousness, but the deeper hopelessness that allows man’s spirit to surrender the legitimate aspirations of the unrestricted desire, and to seek comfort in the all too human ambition of the Kantian and the positivist. (I 723) Sin, the option for despair, is almost inevitable: ‘The reign of sin, then, is the expectation of sin’ (I 715). What kind of solution is possible given the pervasiveness of the problem? Lonergan lays out the basic elements of any possible solution. The solution to the problem of evil will be ‘universally accessible and permanent’ (I 740) and so will have to be more than a correct philosophy. It will have to involve ‘some reversal of the priority of the actual order of the

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universe’ (I 718, 740). It will have to involve ‘some reversal of the priority of living over the knowledge needed to guide life, and over the good will needed to follow knowledge’ (I 740). It will have to be ‘a new and higher integration of human activity’ (I 719, 740). It will have to involve the introduction of ‘new conjugate forms in man’s intellect, will, and sensitivity’ (I 719). The solution will have to be transcendent and supernatural (I 719); it will have to involve ‘some type of charity, of hope and of belief’ (I 740). However, Lonergan concludes, if the solution is to be a higher integration of the whole of human living, it must involve also human sensitivity. It is here where the mystical pattern comes into play: Though the solution as a higher integration will be implemented principally in man’s intellect and will through conjugate forms of faith, hope, and charity, it must also penetrate to the sensitive level and envelop it … For in the main, human consciousness flows in some blend of the dramatic and practical patterns of experience, and as the solution harmoniously continues the actual order of the universe, it can be successful only if it captures man’s sensitivity and intersubjectivity. (I 744) The solution is said to ‘capture’ human sensitivity. The solution reaches down into the depth of the human being. It will be ‘a mystery that is at once symbol of the uncomprehended and sign of what is grasped and psychic force that sweeps living human bodies’ (I 745). It will include ‘the ecstasy and unbounded intimacy that results from the communication of the absolute love that is God himself and alone can respond to the vision of God’ (I 747). The communication of absolute love, received by the human spirit, will have implications for the whole of human being. The psyche will participate in the solution, for it is ‘a lower manifold under the higher integrations of intellectual and volitional acts’ (I 719). ‘It should be noted that this transformation of sensitivity and intersubjectivity penetrates to the physiological level, though the clear instance appears only in the intensity of mystical experience’ (I 763). The mystical pattern results when we are swept up and oriented towards or taken into the realm of the ‘wholly other.’ It is the psychic correlative of the higher integrations of the will and the intellect found in faith and charity. In terms of Method in Theology, it is the psychic correlative of ‘being in love with God’ or ‘being in love in an unrestricted fashion’ (M 105). Though such religious experience is properly consciousness at the fourth level, and though such consciousness ‘as brought to fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion’ (M 10), still the psyche is involved.

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However, the way the psyche is involved will vary with the degree of development in the mystical life of the religious subject. At first the psyche will need the aid of suitable symbols to reorient it towards the known unknown and to bring it into harmony with the love of God. This points to a close relationship between the mystical pattern and the symbolic pattern: ‘Since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends; since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man’s sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope and of self-sacrificing charity’ (I 745). Religious experience, then, must capture human sensitivity and intersubjectivity, and for this it needs appropriate symbols. However, this does not mean that images and symbols are absolutely necessary in mystical experience. Rather, ‘mystical absorption tends to eliminate the flow of sensitive presentations and imaginative representations’ (I 495). But, then, the way the psyche is involved shifts. In the higher forms of mystical experience the role of the psyche is to participate in stillness in the joy of the spirit. And this is a gift from God. The mystical pattern, then, reveals a further dimension to human being. It reveals the human person as radically oriented as a whole to transcendent truth and goodness. It occurs inasmuch as the human spirit, itself transformed by the love of God, is brought into a more perfect harmony with itself. In this way we come to appreciate another dimension of polymorphism, and we grasp from a different perspective the interrelationship of spirit and psyche. Again, this has philosophic implications. For if mystical experience involves a conversion that reorients the spirit, still careful discernment is needed to interpret what may have to be expressed symbolically. 4

The Symbolic Pattern: The General Case

For Lonergan, a symbol is ‘an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling’ (M 64). In this section I want to argue the case for recognizing a ‘symbolic pattern of experience’ that, even if closely related to the aesthetic and mystical patterns, is different in concern and scope from either. It is true that there is no mention of a symbolic pattern in Insight, though there is a hint of it in the section on mystery and myth (and perhaps it is implied in the account of the dramatic subject and dramatic bias). Still it is worthwhile asking whether the explicit identification of this pattern would make a significant addition to Lonergan’s list. First of all, there is widespread agreement among anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, and theologians that symbols are very important in

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human life. If Lonergan’s account of the patterns of experience is to be comprehensive, it needs to find a place for symbolic consciousness. Second, Lonergan treats symbols in Method in Theology where he shows a growing awareness of the importance of symbolic consciousness. Third, a number of commentators argue for the need to identify a symbolic pattern that is distinct from the aesthetic pattern. Joseph Flanagan argues that the symbolic pattern is ‘the form of knowing generating all other forms of knowing.’6 McPartland claims that the symbolic pattern reveals an elemental openness of the ‘whole’ person to the ‘whole’ universe of meaning.7 In this way, with Flanagan, he argues that the scope of the symbolic pattern extends far beyond the concerns of the aesthetic pattern: ‘Although wonder is revealed in its “elemental sweep” by art, it is more directly, intensely, and spontaneously expressed in the symbolic pattern of experience.’8 McPartland finds the symbolic pattern implicit in Lonergan’s thought. To recognize it as a distinct pattern is a legitimate extension of Lonergan’s own position. He has in mind Lonergan’s suggestion that to the four levels of conscious intentionality we may add ‘a unique lower level, at the very depth of consciousness, in which a “symbolic operator” shapes the development of sensibility.’9 Garrett Barden also argues that there is a case for the symbolic pattern. In a number of articles he applies Lonergan’s position on polymorphism to issues in cultural anthropology. He seems to think that the patterns generally provide a transcultural key allowing us to compare cultures in a way that avoids unnecessary misunderstanding. For example, in ‘Method and Meaning’ he relates the patterns of experience to the topic of witchcraft and magic, and in an earlier article on ‘The Symbolic Mentality’ he focuses on the questions of symbolic consciousness. He argues strongly that the symbolic mentality is not confined to ‘primitive people.’ He links symbolic consciousness to the fact that conscious life is lived at many levels and in many different patterns: Our conscious life is lived at many different levels. It is true that one level or pattern may predominate, but other patterns are always

6 Flanagan, ‘The Basic Patterns of Human Understanding according to Bernard Lonergan,’ 163. See also idem, Quest for Self-Knowledge. 7 McPartland, ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography’; idem, ‘Consciousness and Normative Subjectivity.’ 8 McPartland, ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography,’ 278. 9 McPartland, ‘Consciousness and Normative Subjectivity,’ 123; he refers to Lonergan’s paper, ‘Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,’ 134.

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possible. It is this many-sidedness of human consciousness that accounts for the permanence of the symbolic mentality and shows why it is not confined to the primitive. By acknowledging the nature of human consciousness we have managed to avoid the rationalistic error that the symbolic mentality is something confined to the past, a merely historical phenomenon.10 Barden almost suggests that the symbolic pattern is the pattern in which we first come to terms with the polymorphism of human consciousness. It is the pattern of patterns at a basic level. The human mind, human consciousness, is inescapably symbolic inasmuch as it is a unity in tension. We can say that while Barden does not express himself in the same terms as Lonergan, he is clear that symbolic thinking is proper to all human beings. However, what is distinctive in Lonergan is the emphasis on the ‘internal communication’ within the subject, which enables the subject to respond to and to create symbols (M 67). Symbolic consciousness involves the total ‘integral’ orientation of feelings and images and intellect towards the ‘known-unknown,’ towards the whole of reality in which we find ourselves participating. It involves body, mind, and heart in a relationship of immediacy to the mystery of reality. It includes a concern for binding together every meaningful experience into the ‘whole’ of living. Inasmuch as it involves the whole person there is involved an ‘internal communication’ within the symbolic subject: Organic and psychic vitality have to reveal themselves to intentional consciousness and, inversely, intentional consciousness has to secure the collaboration of organism and psyche … Again our apprehensions of value occur in intentional responses, in feelings: here too it is necessary for feelings to reveal their objects and, inversely, for objects to awaken feeling. It is through symbols that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate. (M 67) This internal communication fulfils a basic need that logic and dialectic cannot meet. The symbol is able to recognize and express aspects of human life with which logic cannot deal: ‘the existence of internal tension, incompatibilities, conflicts, struggles, destructions’ (M 66). Furthermore, symbol goes beyond dialectic to meet the internal need for communication. In this, symbols have their proper meaning (M 67).

10 Barden. ‘The Symbolic Mentality,’ 36.

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Such symbolic meaning is elemental and preconceptual. There is no distinction made between meaning and meant. Symbolic consciousness does not include a reflective stance involving conceptual interpretation. It is participatory, and as it participates it integrates every aspect into a complex whole. Symbolic consciousness, which manifests the ‘generic wonder which is the root of all philosophy and science,’ is able to represent the object of that wonder, something that ‘neither philosophy nor science is capable of doing.’11 Symbolic consciousness goes beyond the concerns of the aesthetic pattern for exploring possibilities of experience, for experiencing beauty, for free play. The symbolic concern is for integrating disparate elements of experience into a meaningful world. It aims at experiencing and giving expression to the felt meaning of the world. Symbols express the ways in which we participate in a complex world of many meanings. The concerns of symbolic consciousness are those of the whole person, of the integrally engaged person. These concerns can only be met because symbols obey the laws of ‘image and feeling’ and not the laws of logic: For the logical class the symbol uses a representative figure. For univocity it substitutes a wealth of multiple meanings. It does not prove but it overwhelms with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. It does not bow to the principle of excluded middle but admits the coincidentia oppositorum, of love and hate, of courage and fear, and so on. It does not negate but overcomes what it rejects by heaping up all that is opposite to it. It does not move on some single track or on some single level but condenses into a bizarre unity all its present concerns. (M 66) The internal communication between body and mind and heart allows the psyche to participate in the orientation of intellect to the ‘knownunknown’ of the universe of being. It enables the subject to situate the mystery of human existence within the mystery of the cosmos. Without this the tension between sensitive psyche and intellect would collapse into opposition. With it we are able to grasp the ‘whole’ in a way that explicit reflection can never do. By this internal communication we apprehend our way of being in the world as incarnate spirit. Such symbolic consciousness and internal communication is closely related to knowing by ‘connaturality’ as developed in the Aristotelian–Thomistic tradition.12 We know

11 McPartland, ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography,’ 281. 12 Tallon, Head and Heart, ch. 9.

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through feeling as well as by reasoning. The whole of consciousness, feeling and cognition, by internal communication cooperates to reveal ‘the felt meaning of the world.’13 It is this holistic way of inquiring and knowing that symbols manifest. Hence Lonergan says: ‘To proclaim with Vico the priority of poetry is to proclaim that the human spirit expresses itself in symbols before it knows, if ever it knows, what its symbols literally mean.’14 The truth of symbols lies in their effectiveness at orienting the subject at every level of his being. Symbolic consciousness allows for the production of mythic expressions that give direction in the search for meaning in life in a way that engages every level of our being in that search. It is grounded in the ability of human consciousness to know by feeling as well as by understanding. In this way we are placed in the field of mystery. ‘The symbolic pattern involves an orientation of feeling and images to the “knownunknown” and the mystery of existence; the subject in the symbolic pattern interprets or explores ultimate value and meaning in ways that cannot be expressed theoretically.’15 Appropriating Symbolic Consciousness

5

A useful contribution towards our understanding of a possible symbolic pattern is found in Eidle’s The Self-Appropriation of Interiority. Eidle’s concern is to provide the foundations for human psychology. He claims that these are found in (a) rational intentional consciousness and (b) what he calls the ‘non-rational intelligent symbol-forming psyche.’16 He postulates that together these comprise the full range of human interiority. A comprehensive self-appropriation will include the appropriation of the symbol-forming psyche. It will involve personal experience and heightened awareness of ‘the meaningful and creative directives provided by psyche’s intelligently formed symbols.’17 Eidle considers the psyche as a whole and almost equates it with ‘the realm of image/symbol formation that produces the familiar ongoing flow of our conscious imaginings.’18 He recognizes that psyche is an elusive term. It is ‘the internal organ of personality’ involved in the initial adapting of the individual to his social and physical environment.19

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Smith, The Felt Meanings of the World. Lonergan, ‘Dimensions of Meaning,’ in Collection, 241. McPartland, ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography,’ 82. Eidle, The Self-Appropriation of Interiority, xviii. Ibid., xvii. Ibid., 8. Ibid., 51.

158 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Psyche provides the materials that are sublated by the higher levels of spiritual inquiry. There follows a continual interplay between the symbolic level of the organic/psychic and the higher levels of conscious intentionality. The person operating at the higher levels, after sublating the experiential image-forming psyche, then calls for a further creative operating of the psyche in the ongoing drama of life. Eidle draws on Doran to develop his account.20 Doran presents the psyche as ‘the whole realm of the imaginal.’21 It is the site of a ‘preconscious collaboration of imagination and intelligence,’22 which gathers and shapes materials, which it then provides for the insights and judgments and decisions by which one moulds one’s life. The psyche is said to be non-rational because it is preconsciously or prethematically involved with organizing imaginal data and also because of its feeling dimension.23 But where do the imaginal data come from? Here Doran follows Lonergan in recognizing the realm of the organic and that our nature is a ‘compound-in-tension of organism, psyche, and spirit.’24 Doran builds on Lonergan’s account of neural demands for psychic representation. With Lonergan he recognizes that ‘man develops biologically to develop psychically, and he develops psychically to develop intellectually and rationally’ (I 648). Human decisions and actions occur in the context of what has been sublated from the organic and psychic and in turn provide new material for the psyche to integrate: ‘Both covert cognitive activity and overt behavioral activity provide experiential imagery which is incorporated into the realm of the psychic and is reflected in the drama of psyche’s ongoing stream of consciousness.25 Doran sees the psyche as that which ‘unites spirit and matter in the image.’26 On this basis we could take symbolic consciousness as the spontaneous first stage in the ‘seeking and finding direction in the movement of life,’27 proper to embodied consciousness. The imaginal data out of which symbols are formed is produced as the organic is integrated or sublated into the psychic and as the psychic is integrated into the consciously intentional. 20 Among the works of Doran used by Eidle are ‘Psyche, Evil, and Grace,’ ‘Christ and Psyche,’ and ‘The Theologian’s Psyche.’ 21 Doran, ‘The Theologian’s Psyche,’ 130. 22 Doran, ‘Psyche, Evil, and Grace,’ 196. 23 Eidle, The Self-Appropriation of Interiority, 55. 24 Doran, ‘Psyche, Evil, and Grace,’ 198. 25 Eidle, The Self-Appropriation of Interiority, 56. 26 Doran, ‘Christ and Psyche,’ 120. 27 Doran, ‘Psyche, Evil, and Grace,’ 198.

Further Patterns of Experience? 159

Feelings are an important part of symbolic consciousness. There is a psychosomatic response to what has been imagined (and what is understood, judged, valued, decided). Feelings arise because the organic and the psychic are an inseparable part of the unity-in-tension of human beings. They are evaluative responses to personal symbolic meaning. They are ‘the medium for unifying body, psyche, and spirit.’28 Furthermore, they orient us and give direction to the movement of life. They reveal the story or drama of life. This story is truly revelatory of how we find (feel) ourselves in a certain situation. The adequacy and appropriateness of our feeling response must, however, always be tested and fitted into the truth grasped by conscious intentionality. The appropriateness of feelings will depend on psychic conversion.29 Our symbolic response, our feeling response will be open to correction or modification by rational conscious intentionality. But explicit rational consciousness cannot replace the appropriation of the preconscious process of symbol formation and affective development. Hence we can say that psychic conversion fills out and completes intellectual conversion, for it grasps the intelligent but non-rational functioning of the psyche as patterned by the spirit. The symbolic pattern, then, is an authentic part of authentic self-constitution. It reveals something important about the structure of human being, for it is ‘the correspondence of the psychic level with the intentionality of basic horizon’30 and it is the basis for representing properly religious knowledge. Given the polymorphism of human consciousness, it remains a permanent feature of manifesting the unity of the unity-intension of consciousness. We could say that symbolic consciousness is both more than and less than philosophy. It reveals manifestly that there is always ‘more’ to be wondered about and that we are always involved with and ‘know’ more than we can say. But it is less than philosophy, for it is too involved to rise to the level of self-reflection and remains open to bias and distortion and misinterpretation because of this. Still, though philosophical critique is needed, the opposite error of eliminating mystery and of ‘treating the transcendental object of basic horizon as though it were an object within the world’31 must also be avoided. For when we eliminate mystery we also diminish ourselves. Symbolic consciousness as mythic consciousness tries to preserve everything and relate everything within the field of mystery.

28 29 30 31

Eidle, The Self-Appropriation of Interiority, 57. Ibid., 58. McPartland, Horizon Analysis and Historiography, 283. Ibid., 295.

160 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Finally, though here I cannot pursue the point in detail, it is important to appreciate the connection between symbolic consciousness and recent attempts to provide a comprehensive account of consciousness that integrates feeling, cognition, and volition. Andrew Tallon (Head and Heart), W. George Turski (Towards a Rationality of Emotion), Quentin Smith (The Felt Meaning of the World), and Sue Capaldi (Emotion, Depth, and Flesh) offer such accounts. Tallon’s account of ‘triune consciousness’ draws on the notion of ‘affective connaturality,’ which he affirms has been retrieved by Ricoeur, Rousselot, Maritain, and Lonergan. In different ways these writers show the permanent relevance of symbolic thinking. To include a symbolic pattern, then, is in line with these important attempts in Western thought to develop a more comprehensive account of consciousness. It may be that it will also provide common ground for a dialogue with Asian and African philosophy. In the case of African philosophy, symbolic consciousness may be important in understanding the contemporary relevance of ‘ethnophilosophy’ and ‘philosophical sagacity,’ trends in African philosophy that focus on traditional thought and traditional wisdom. 6

The Ethical Pattern

Some commentators have felt the need to include an ‘ethical pattern.’ Should the ethical pattern be accepted as one of the core patterns? If so, should it be treated as a separate pattern or as an extension of the dramatic? There is, I think, a strong case for admitting that this as a separate pattern. As we have already seen in the discussion of the dramatic pattern, relationships between persons can take place at many levels. Persons can relate at the social level. They can relate personally but not necessarily in an explicitly moral way. They can fall in love and encounter one another in a very distinctive mode. The moral relationship seems to involve an irreducible mode of encounter as well as a distinct mode of self-awareness. It is an essential addition that fills a serious gap. Without it, important dimensions of human being would be neglected and the distinctive level of rational self-consciousness, the level of freedom and responsibility, would not be appreciated. In what follows I will describe moral consciousness at length in order to provide a background for defining a possible moral/ethical pattern. I will attempt to outline some of the main characteristics of moral consciousness, keeping in mind that ‘we have only begun to explore Lonergan’s work on the many facets of moral consciousness.’32 Though it is not

32 E. Morelli, ‘Reflections on the Appropriation of Moral Consciousness,’ 164.

Further Patterns of Experience? 161

explicitly mentioned by name, the ethical pattern may be said to be implicit in chapter 18 of Insight, ‘The Possibility of Ethics.’ It is also hinted at in related passages such as the section on ‘Human Development’ (particularly the treatment of ‘Genuineness’) in chapter 15. Method in Theology helps fill out the details, especially concerning the role of feeling in the apprehension of value and the differentiation of a fourth level of consciousness. In Method in Theology, value is recognized as a distinctive transcendental notion and the nature of moral self-transcendence is clarified. In Insight, moral consciousness is referred to as ‘rational self consciousness’ and Lonergan presents ‘a parallel and interpenetration’ (I 626) of metaphysics and ethics. Just as the basis of metaphysics lies in ‘the very structures of our knowing’ (I 627), so the roots of ethics are found ‘in the dynamic structures of rational self-consciousness’ (I 627). Some ambiguity arises where Lonergan says that moral consciousness involves ‘the level of reflection and judgment, of deliberation and choice’ (I 620). However, ethics is said also to involve an ‘extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will’ (I 619). In this approach to ethics, ‘value’ acquires a distinctive meaning: ‘It is in rational, moral self-consciousness that the good as value comes to light, for value is the good as possible object of rational choice’ (I 624). At this stage Lonergan minimizes the role of feelings and emotions. They are merely ‘concomitants,’ not to be confused with ‘moral consciousness itself’ (I 624). This seems to fall below a full recognition of the distinct level of value and to neglect the role of feeling in apprehending values and in motivating moral action. Furthermore, in comparison with Method in Theology (M 121), in Insight the emergence of the moral subject in full self-transcendence is not recognized, the level of responsible freedom is not appreciated. In Method in Theology, the fourth level ‘of freedom and responsibility, of moral self-transcendence’ is distinguished. This level, which presupposes, complements, and sublates the other three, is the principle of self-control that is ‘responsible for proper functioning on the other three levels’ (M 121). Lonergan comments: ‘Therewith vanish two notions: the notion of pure intellect or pure reason that operates on its own without guidance or control from responsible decision, and the notion of will as an arbitrary power indifferently choosing between good and evil’ (M 121). In Insight such recognition of the fourth level of intentional self-consciousness is not so evident. Lonergan is clear that ‘it is through willing that conscious intellectual control of sensitive living is effected’ (I 538), but the shift to a new level is not made explicit. Similarly, though Lonergan allows that as the subject develops ‘rational consciousness with its reflection and criticism, its deliberation and choice, exert a decisive influ-

162 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

ence’ (I 212), this does not adequately distinguish the level of intellectual reflection from the level of moral decision. However, a careful reading of Insight shows that a distinctively moral dimension is clearly emerging and that the gap between Insight and Method is not so wide. Lonergan is explicit in envisaging ethics ‘from the viewpoint of freedom and responsibility’ (I 618). He even speaks of decision as setting ‘the objectives of one’s activity’ (I 641). Hence, in order to do justice to Insight, we need to look more closely at the way he presents ‘willing’ and freedom. We need to re-examine his notion of value and work out how this relates to freedom. In his account of ‘will,’ Lonergan tries to explain how the ‘rational exigence’ for consistency between knowing and doing arises and leads to rational and moral willing. The exigence arises as the detached desire to know extends itself to consider not just facts but ‘practical possibilities’ (I 622). These possibilities include transformations not just in the environment but also in ‘man’s own spontaneous living’ (I 622). Man can introduce by deliberate choice a higher system into human living. Lonergan characterizes this as the detached desire extending its influence into ‘the field of deliberate human acts’ (I 622). In this way ‘the rationally conscious subject of self affirmation becomes a morally self-conscious subject’ (I 622). ‘Man is not only a knower but also a doer, the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for selfconsistency in knowing and doing’ (I 622). The argument is very compact. How does the ‘identity of consciousness’ give rise to the exigence for consistency between knowing and doing? I suggest that the moral subject grasps itself as an emerging value that is preserved by consistency or destroyed by inconsistency. The moral experience includes grasping what one is becoming in deciding and acting. It is this distinctive self-appreciation, peculiar to moral consciousness, that Lonergan seems to be hinting at when he warns against playing fast and loose with the pure desire to know. To corrupt the pure desire is dangerous because it is self-destructive. Similarly, moral renunciation is said to be ‘inhuman.’ It suppresses the dynamic demand for consistency between knowing and doing and frustrates the extension of detachment and disinterestedness ‘into living’ (I 623). In this way it truncates the subject. If we recognize the emerging subject as the ‘value’ that is at stake, the argument becomes more intelligible. The rational exigence for consistency between knowing and doing ultimately concerns self-consistency, consistency with the dynamic unfolding of one’s own being. To lack that consistency is to head towards self-destruction. Lonergan goes on to discuss values. As we have said, ‘value is the good

Further Patterns of Experience? 163

as the possible object of rational choice’ (I 624). It is again important to keep in mind that possibilities include possibilities for the self. For Lonergan goes on to show how an understanding of value reveals again how the rational exigence for responsible decision emerges. The argument depends on the recognition that choice includes always a choice of the self as a value and as well as a choice of a secondary value. This is clear in Understanding and Being: ‘choice is a determinant in personal development and in objective process’ (UB 229). It is the underlying point in Insight also. This is suggested when Lonergan distinguishes terminal and originating values and sets them in hierarchical order. Terminal values are ‘objects of possible choice.’ Originating values are values that when chosen ‘modify our habitual willingness, our effective orientation to the universe’ (I 624). They are prior because they ‘ground good will and good will grounds the realization of terminal values’ (I 624). If we ask what originating values are in the concrete, the answer seems to be that they include the higher cultural, personal, and religious values mentioned in Method in Theology (M 39). But the central original and originating value is the ontic value of the person and the moral self. It is the ‘immanent good of order in the selfdeveloping subject’ (UB 233). With this in mind, Lonergan’s argument makes sense. He argues that the account of the hierarchy and divisions of values reveals how the dynamic exigence in moral consciousness emerges and unfolds into a body of operative moral precepts. What is operative ultimately is the original and originating value of the moral subject. Lonergan argues that we are always already involved in unfolding a body of moral precepts. This is so because (a) already we are involved in spontaneously desiring potential values, (b) already we choose them under the intelligible orders required to satisfy our desires, and, above all, and (c) we are rationally self-conscious of ourselves as actual rational knowers and potential rational doers (I 625). It follows that we cannot choose ‘not to choose’ and that rational consciousness ‘demands in the name of its own consistency its extension into the field of doing’ (I 625). This, says Lonergan, is ‘the dynamic exigence, the operative moral imperative’ (I 625). Again, Lonergan’s argument is compact; and again, the basis of the argument is not made explicit. I would argue that it is only when we appreciate the self as becoming fully self-transcendent in the moral subject that the argument holds. The ‘consistency’ required is consistency in self-transcendence. We cannot avoid choosing. What counts is consistent choosing. Consistent choosing facilitates further self-transcendence. Inconsistency destroys self-transcendence. We get a hint of the distinctiveness of moral self-consciousness in this notion of self-constituting consistency. Finally, note how this consistency is ‘not abstract’ but is imma-

164 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

nent in ‘my consciousness’ (I 625). It is apprehended in the felt awareness of the unity in tension of the whole self as deliberately oriented to self-transcendence and self-completion (in the self-acceptance of a good conscience). This understanding of moral self-consciousness as involving a grasp of the emerging self as fully self-transcendent and as original and originating value seems to be confirmed in the section on ‘the method of ethics.’ This shows the parallel between metaphysics and ethics to be a matter of finality-become-conscious. Moral consciousness not only is conscious of finality but also fulfils it in responsible freedom. Lonergan’s earlier discussion of the tension of limitation and transcendence is especially relevant at this point. He claims that ‘the tension inherent in the finality of all proportionate beings becomes in man a conscious tension’ (I 497). This is most fully evident in moral consciousness as it seeks to follow the law of genuineness: There emerges into consciousness a concrete appreciation of an obviously practicable and proximate ideal self; but along with it also there emerges the tension between limitation and transcendence … and it is no vague tension between limitation in general and transcendence in general, but an unwelcome invasion of oneself as one concretely is and as one concretely is to be. (I 502) Why is there a tension? There is a tension because one grasps the possibilities for oneself as dynamically related to the self that one already is. But the possibilities are realized only if we respond to the challenge of selftranscendence, if we realize that self-transcendence is central to being human. Hence we must overcome the tendency to fall into settled routines and habit and inertia that derive from ‘the self-centered sensitive psyche’ (I 499). We must meet the requirement of genuineness. Genuineness holds out for development and transcendence. The ‘obligatory structure’ of our rational self-consciousness ‘is itself finality on the level of intelligent and rational consciousness’ (I 626). Also it ‘is finality confronted with the alternatives of choosing either development and progress or decline and extinction’ (I 626). Finality becomes responsible freedom. It is responsible for itself and for the whole cosmos. The roots of ethics are revealed, then, in ‘the dynamic structure of rational self-consciousness’ (I 627). This is ‘latent and operative’ and hence ‘universal.’ It is not abstract but concrete. The real basis of ethics is ‘existing people’ (I 627). The method of ethics takes its stand on ‘the ever recurrent dynamic generality that is the structure of rational self consciousness’ (I 627–8).

Further Patterns of Experience? 165

The account of ethics in Insight is based above all on the section on freedom. This again shows Lonergan on the verge of recognizing the distinct moral level of consciousness and the distinctive value of the emerging subject, even if this never becomes fully explicit: ‘The final enlargement and transformation of consciousness consists in the … subject (1) demanding conformity of his doing to his knowing and (2) acceding to that demand by deciding reasonably’ (I 637). In this enlargement the term is not judgment but decision. Decision confers actuality on possible courses of action (I 638). But as well, decision constitutes the self as a moral agent. It brings about a higher integration of human living (I 640). It is a ‘new emergence’ (I 642). In other words, ‘choice is a determinant in personal development and in objective process’ (I 229). Moral consciousness in Insight involves several elements: (a) becoming conscious of the tension of limitation and transcendence; (b) an awareness of the rational exigence for consistency between knowing and doing; (c) a sense of the self as one is and an anticipation of what one can be; (d) an insight that grasps that we are always already inescapably involved in this; (e) an apprehension of the subject’s responsibility for the developing self and for world process; (f) an apprehension of the responsibility of freedom for progress or decline; (g) an emerging awareness of and judgment concerning the value of the emerging self; and (h) a realization that only the human spirit can freely and responsibly extend rational consciousness to rational self-consciousness and so constitute itself as a fully self-transcendent moral subject that grasps its own value, the value of other moral agents, and the other values of the world process, in relation to itself. Method in Theology makes all of this more explicit. The ‘ethical pattern’ is related to the intellectual pattern in that its emergence may be seen as a further unfolding of the ‘basic pattern’ of human intentionality (M 9). Here the term ‘pattern’ is used by Lonergan for the structure of cognitional and intentional operations. This is not the same as ‘pattern’ in ‘pattern of experience,’ where the term refers to an intelligibility relating to the level of sensibility. In Method in Theology, the fourth level of consciousness is explicitly recognized and given prominence (M 121). The role of feelings in apprehending values is developed (M 31–2). Value is recognized as a transcendental notion (M 34). Value is what is intended in questions for deliberation. Values are apprehended in self-transcendence. Self-transcendence at this level involves being ‘principles of benevolence and beneficence, capable of genuine collaboration and of true love’ (M 35). We reach ‘sustained self-transcendence’ when we head ‘for a goodness that is beyond criticism’ (M 36). Lonergan is now much clearer on

166 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

the nature of values, which includes the ontic value of the person (M 38). He is clearer also on the hierarchy of values from the vital, to the social, to the cultural, to the personal, and to the religious (M 39). The central shift, however, is recognition of the existential discovery of one’s self as a ‘moral being’ who ‘not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one’ (M 38). ‘With that discovery, there emerges in consciousness the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility’ (M 38). To complete this account of the moral pattern I want to draw again from Elizabeth Morelli’s account in ‘Reflections on the Appropriation of Moral Consciousness.’ This begins with a general account of consciousness, clarifying the point that consciousness is not identical with cognitional acts or even with intentional acts. Consciousness is also a characteristic of nonintentional and pre-intentional affective, volitional, and cognitive phenomena.33 Consciousness, then, is not just a characteristic of discrete acts or operations. This is important to realize given the tendency to read Lonergan’s account of the dynamic self-assembling structure of cognitional acts as implying such a view of consciousness. In correcting this tendency Morelli concludes that Lonergan does not hold the ‘essential principle of phenomenology’ found in Brentano and Husserl and Sartre, which presupposes that ‘all consciousness is consciousness of something.’34 Not only are there conscious and intentional cognitional, affective and volitional states but also there are ‘conscious non-intentional affective states and trends’ and ‘conscious pre-intentional acts of attention.’ Consciousness is a quality immanent in intentional and non-intentional acts; it is not itself an act. To appreciate consciousness as both conscious and intentional helps ‘ground the possibility of the appropriation of moral consciousness.’35 Morelli then goes on to give an account of moral consciousness in terms of three characteristics. First of all, moral consciousness is heightened. With regard to the operations and states of each level of consciousness, she argues that ‘there is a progressive awakening as the exigencies of the human spirit emerge.’36 This seems to be related to Lonergan’s own claim about the progressive enlargement of consciousness (I 636). For Morelli this involves a variation in intensity: ‘Moral consciousness is more aware

33 34 35 36

E. Morelli, ‘Reflections on the Appropriation of Moral Consciousness,’ 166. Ibid., 167. Ibid. Ibid., 170.

Further Patterns of Experience? 167

than rational intelligent and empirical consciousness.’37 The intensity increases in religious experience, which ‘fulfills’ our conscious intentionality (M 105). Second, moral consciousness is subsumptive. That is, lower operations are taken up into higher levels and so moral consciousness is attentive, intelligent, rational. As intelligent it grasps practical possibilities and thus encounters freedom. As rational it grasps the sufficiency of evidence for affirming the value of consistency between knowing and doing. The evidence lies in the possibility of progress or decline, self-development or selfdestruction. This motivates moral action. Reflection does not produce decision but it does motivate it. Third, moral consciousness is distinctive. It is most distinctive in the decision that it terminates in, in the act of free responsibility that constitutes the moral subject and that achieves actual self-transcendence. The decision is motivated by an apprehension of value or disvalue, but it remains a new beginning and has to be made in anxiety and contingency.38 The decision chooses a true good and constitutes the self as originating value (M 50). The decision brings real and not merely cognitive self-transcendence. It involves ontological self-transcendence. It brings to clarity an emerging sense of the self and takes responsibility for the changes in the self that are called for if self-transcendence is to be brought to maturity. Furthermore, moral consciousness is conscious development. We experience the ‘heightened tension of human development.’39 We have an exigence towards the self to be constituted in the decision, and we are pulled back to the settled routines already established. We become aware of the starting point, the process, and the term of development. Moral consciousness requires a profound apprehension of what one has become owing to past decisions as well as a readiness to undo those decisions to open the way to alternative decisions and fuller self-transcendence.40 In other words, self-appropriation is proper to moral consciousness. Hence Lonergan refers to it as rational self-consciousness. For Lonergan, then, the ‘act of decision is at once self-transcending and selfappropriative.’41 It both seeks and constitutes the good. Finally, Morelli brings out a distinctive feature of the fourth level of consciousness and of moral self-appropriation. In moral self-appropriation we grasp the self we are becoming as a value, but also we grasp the freedom of con37 38 39 40 41

Ibid., 171. Ibid., 177. Ibid., 178. Ibid., 179. Ibid., 180.

168 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

sciousness. When we heighten our awareness in moral self-appropriation, we are dealing with a consciousness that is ‘already heightened.’ Moral consciousness is already ‘reflective and self-conscious as self-appropriative.’42 What is distinctive is the awareness of the freedom we possess to choose what we will become: ‘To heighten one’s consciousness on this level is to attend to oneself as concerned with value, as responsible, as free, as anxious’ (I 185), Morelli suggests that it is here that we grasp that consciousness is essentially free and that we identify consciousness as effectively free. Consciousness is essentially free in that we are free to be attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible, to love or not. However, consciousness is only effectively free when we are morally conscious and make a deliberate decision in relation to value, especially in relation to the value of the person. Still, any act of essential freedom can bring development in effective freedom, for there will always be a value at stake in the decision, and heightening our awareness of the act will bring this out. This completes our account of moral consciousness. The moral pattern of experience may be seen as the corresponding pattern found within human sensitivity. We operate out of the moral pattern whenever we are oriented by a concern for oneself as free, as responsible, and as responsible for value and the concrete good, including the value and good of the self and other people. This way of characterizing the pattern suggests that the moral pattern is a developed form of the dramatic pattern. It is the dramatic pattern of a mature, genuine, human agent. Living our lives before others involves living our lives as responsible, free agents. Still, whatever the proper relationship between the dramatic pattern and the moral pattern, it has been worthwhile making explicit the nature of moral consciousness. If polymorphism is the key to philosophy, the moral/ethical aspects of human consciousness need to be clarified.43 7

Concluding Remarks

This also completes our account of the core patterns. It is important, I believe, to supplement and elaborate Lonergan’s account in the way I

42 Ibid., 195. 43 If we take the ethical pattern as focused on the existential task of choosing the results of a judgment of value, and of choosing to constitute the self as a chooser, then the distinctiveness of the pattern becomes clearer. It is more focused than the dramatic. Also it is more calm and dispassionate in its choosing. In this it resembles the intellectual pattern. Feeling is involved but feeling as refined. In the ethical pattern the practical is at rest, the aesthetic is still. It may be seen as on the interface with the mystical.

Further Patterns of Experience? 169

have suggested. Not only may a case be made for each particular pattern, but taken together the extended set forms a relatively complete account showing how the patterns are structurally related. Together the patterns manifest the full structure of human being and the full range of human living. This extended account provides a sounder basis for deciding whether, and if so in which manner, polymorphism is the key to philosophy. However, it should be noted that what has been laid out is mainly an account of the elements of polymorphism and not polymorphism itself. Polymorphism in the concrete is the interplay, the ‘mixing and blending,’ the dialectical tension among the patterns. In the next chapter I will examine Lonergan’s understanding of polymorphism as the dynamic interplay of patterns. The focus will be on chapter 14 of Insight. This is the chapter in which the term is introduced and in which it occurs most frequently; it is also the chapter where it is implied that polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy.

Recto Running Head 170

5 Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy?

1

Introduction

In this chapter I intend, first of all, to examine Lonergan’s understanding of and use of the term ‘polymorphism,’ focusing primarily on chapter 14 of Insight, where the term first appears. The preceding two chapters of this book discussed patterns of experience as the basic elements of polymorphism. Here the aim is to examine how these patterns concretely combine to constitute polymorphic consciousness. In particular, an attempt will be made to clarify what Lonergan means by the ‘blending and mixing’ (I 410) of the different patterns of experience. Second, I will investigate how Lonergan understands polymorphism as the key to philosophy. Lonergan makes this apparently far-reaching claim towards the end of chapter 14 of Insight. Here I will be concerned (a) to show how Lonergan leads up to that claim, and (b) to judge to what extent Lonergan succeeds in giving an account of philosophic diversity. I will argue that Lonergan does not completely establish his claim that polymorphism is the ‘one and only key,’ and that a reason for this lies in the incomplete exposition of polymorphism. Above all, the limitation lies in the way the account of the ‘mixing and blending’ of the patterns of experience fails to treat the full range of patterns in their distinctiveness. There is a sense in which the cognitional subject takes priority over the polymorphic subject, whose wider dimensions are overlooked. It is this, in the end, that prevents Lonergan from making a more convincing claim about finding the key to philosophy. I argue that inasmuch as the previous chapters of this book have enlarged the account of the patterns, a corresponding enlargement of Lonergan’s metaphilosophy is called for.

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 171

Towards the end of chapter 14 of Insight, Lonergan himself seems to recognize the limitations of his argument when he says in effect that he is still searching for a metalanguage by which to express adequately the nature of polymorphic consciousness (I 452). Furthermore, in chapter 17 of Insight Lonergan recognizes explicitly the metaphilosophical limitations of chapter 14. He argues that the earlier account of polymorphism, though facilitating ‘a series of brief but highly effective refutations of contrary views’ (I 553), was restricted to allowing only ‘piecemeal’ analysis of other philosophies. By chapter 17 Lonergan feels able to provide a more complete account of philosophic difference, one capable of dealing with ‘the field of concrete historical process’ (I 554). He proposes the establishment of ‘a heuristic structure for a methodical hermeneutic’ (I 554), which would allow a greater approximation to ‘concrete historical particularity.’1 With regard to this shift from chapter 14 to chapter 17 of Insight, I would agree that some extremely important advances are made. In chapter 17, Lonergan is able to address the development of consciousness, and this treatment anticipates the account of differentiation in Method. I would also point out, however, that there is little advance in terms of a more detailed account of a wider range of patterns of experience or in terms of a detailed exposition of polymorphism as the ‘mixing and blending of patterns.’ A complete exposition of the unfolding of Lonergan’s understanding of metaphysics and his methodological hermeneutics in chapters 14 through 17 of Insight is not within the focus of this essay. My concern is with the role of polymorphism in this wider metaphysical account. I intend to show how Lonergan neglects the resources that polymorphism provides. I will also try to account for why he neglects these resources. One basic reason for this neglect may be mentioned briefly. Earlier I pointed out that we should not expect a complete exposition of polymorphism and the patterns of experience in chapter 14, or similarly in chapter 17. Chapter 14 is more an application of polymorphism than an account of the nature of polymorphism. The concern for philosophical dialectic in terms of positions and counterpositions effectively obscures the wider relevance of polymorphism. Why this is so needs to be explained. I will argue that Lonergan fits polymorphism into a view of philosophy and a view of philosophical dialectic that is already settled, rather than allowing polymorphism to reshape his understanding of philosophy. For example, Lonergan’s starting point is cognitional analysis and the basic positions – which arise out of operating in the intellectual pattern – on self-affirmation, on knowing, on being, and on objectivity. Attention to polymorphism would

1 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 618.

172 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

transpose this by pointing out the need to shift from cognitional analysis to intentionality analysis. Perhaps we may say that Lonergan is moving towards this shift but at this stage has not completed the shift. Hence polymorphism is taken as the merely negative influence of other patterns on the intellectual pattern, an intellectual pattern that is implicitly given an uncontextualized priority. Lonergan may not explicitly assert this priority, but the impression that he assumes it to be so is difficult to shake off. The model of philosophy he presupposes is, of course, intellectualist rather than conceptualist or rationalist, but this model is open to being interpreted as merely modern. Linked with this is a view of philosophical dialectic that neglects genetic considerations. The emphasis on opposing a normative view to ‘contrary’ perspectives, on opposing positions and counterpositions, tends to overlook a genetic approach that would be sympathetic to the emergence of diverse positions. The account of philosophic difference becomes reduced to an account of philosophic mistakes. This, however, is not the whole story. Chapter 14 remains the original context in which the notion of polymorphism is introduced and applied. Despite its ambiguities and limitations we cannot bypass the section of Insight that contains Lonergan’s most concentrated use of the term. Hence, while pointing out the limitations, I will also go on to argue that the beginnings of a more positive presentation of polymorphism may be discerned in that text. There are openings to a better appreciation. While the ambiguities and limitations are evident, nevertheless there are clues that, combined with pointers from later chapters and from post-Insight writings, lay the ground for a more positive account of polymorphism. With regard to the limitations of this notion, I will note the different ways in which the wider dimensions of polymorphism are neglected: (a) the tendency to give a generalized and reductionary account of polymorphism as simply the chaos in which the patterns mix without distinction; (b) the way in which particular accounts of the effect of polymorphism tend to mention only the interplay of the biological and the intellectual patterns; (c) how only the influence or ‘interference’ of the biological patterns on the value of basic philosophical variables is shown; and, consequently, (d) how the other patterns are lumped together indiscriminately as sources of interference leading to ‘contradictory’ philosophical stances that somehow are contained between the extreme opposites of the basic positions and basic counterpositions. The distinctive character of the other patterns and the distinctive nature of their influence on the unfolding of conscious intentionality are not adverted to. With regard to the (implicit) positive account of polymorphism, I will focus on what Lonergan has to say about the ‘polymorphic unities of

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 173

empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness’ (I 590). This draws attention to the polymorphic engaged subject. To focus on the diverse concerns and desires of the polymorphic subject leads to an understanding of patterns as orientations of the self-transcending subject. This provides a basis for rethinking what the mixing and blending of patterns might be. Such a rethinking invites a return to the details on the patterns of experience found in chapter 6 of Insight, and beyond this to an enlargement of the account of particular patterns along the lines attempted in the preceding chapters of this book. It facilitates the transition from cognitional analysis to intentionality analysis that allows philosophy to find its proper base in interiority. In other words, a more detailed emphasis on polymorphism heads towards Lonergan’s mature position in Method in Theology. I am suggesting also that a more positive account of polymorphism provides the basis for a more complete account of metaphilosophy. It enables us to explain more fully the sense in which polymorphism is the key. In the chapters leading up to and within chapter 14, Lonergan presupposes a view of philosophy that focuses on the basic variables of ‘knowledge, reality, and objectivity’ (I 451). This leaves untouched the arguably equally basic variable of the ‘good,’ thus neglecting the level of responsible consciousness and freedom. As is well known, in his later writings Lonergan expands his horizon to take in this further variable. My point here is that a fuller attention to polymorphism already moves in the direction of a more comprehensive view of philosophy. It preserves while going beyond the intellectualist and cognitional view that Lonergan presupposes in Insight. Cognitional analysis is preserved in intentionality analysis, while the aesthetic and ethical and religious dimensions of human experience, of human knowing, and of truth may be given a positive role in the unfolding of philosophy. I argue, therefore, that what is said about the polymorphic subject calls for a return to the patterns of experience in their positive particularity, and to reflection on the unity-in-tension of polymorphic consciousness, hence to the patterns in their interrelations. By drawing on such resources, Lonergan may be able to provide a nuanced response to the postmodern call to respect difference, while retaining a non-relativistic approach to truth. In this way we may show how Lonergan fits into what has been called ‘constructive postmodernism.’2 Lonergan may then be understood to have a key to philosophy that can sensitively appreciate figures such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who offer models of philosophical thought that cannot easily be contained by traditional approaches. As the same time,

2 Griffin, Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy, viii.

174 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Lonergan is able to avoid the tendency to ‘antiphilosophy’ that these thinkers feel they cannot avoid. To provide support for these claims I will now offer a survey and critique of the ways in which Lonergan uses the term ‘polymorphism.’ The survey confirms the claim that the account of polymorphism is generally negative and is often reduced to an account of bimorphism. Also it reveals that the limited model of philosophy presupposed in the beginning is still operating at the end. I will also point out, however, those openings towards a positive treatment of polymorphism that point in turn towards a broader model of philosophy. To begin we examine the context in which the term ‘polymorphism’ is introduced. a

the initial context: polymorphism and the dialectic of philosophy

2

Context and Questions

What exactly does Lonergan mean by polymorphism? What role does polymorphism actually play in Lonergan’s metaphilosophy? What role might it play if adequately appropriated? Can polymorphism bear the weight of a developed metaphilosophy? In this section I will show how the context in which Lonergan introduces polymorphism throws light on these closely related questions. The way above all in which the context dictates the treatment of polymorphism is shown in the limited manner in which the diverse patterns of experience are invoked in chapter 14. Though a fuller range of patterns is outlined in this chapter than in chapter 6 of Insight, Lonergan does not go on to exploit them all. His cognitional–dialectical concerns narrow down the perspective and dictate the ways in which polymorphism is invoked. He allows a presupposed view of philosophy/metaphilosophy to dictate the treatment of polymorphism, instead of allowing a broader appreciation of polymorphism to give rise to a more comprehensive metaphilosophy. His procedure is understandable given his decision to focus on ‘insight into insight’ and given his decision to adopt a pedagogically based moving viewpoint. The consequences of this procedure, however, and its possible limitations need to be acknowledged if the metaphilosophical potential of insight is to be realized. 3

Philosophical Dialectics – Negative and Positive

Lonergan opens chapter 14 of Insight by setting up antitheses to the theses on self-affirmation, being, and objectivity, developed in the preceding

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three chapters. These are set up in ‘a clear and sharp formulation’ (I 411). Here Lonergan correctly emphasizes the inevitable dialectical nature of philosophy. However, the emphasis at this point is on dialectic as oppositional rather than dialogical. It concerns dialectic at the level of philosophical theses. Furthermore, cognitional concerns are presented without qualification as constituting the core of philosophy. From the beginning the intellectual pattern is given a certain priority and the biological pattern is given definite prominence. Lonergan says that the ‘intellectual pattern of experience is supposed and expressed by our account of self-affirmation, of being, and of objectivity’ (I 411). Also, evidently, the antitheses are largely rooted in the biological consciousness, the world of sense, the ambiguity of animality associated with the biological pattern. Moreover, Lonergan posits a fundamental opposition between the intellectual and the biological patterns, and this fundamental opposition is given central place as the argument unfolds. Finally, it is significant that the other patterns are modelled on the biological patterns, inasmuch as they are taken as operating in opposition to the intellectual pattern. Speaking of the intellectual pattern, Lonergan says: But no man is born in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently; and when some other pattern is dominant, then the self of our self-affirmation seems quite different from one’s actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal as Plato’s noetic heaven, and objectivity spontaneously becomes a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are ‘really out there.’ (I 411) This sets the tone for the rest of the chapter. The main concern is with philosophical dialectic between position and counterposition. Positions are reached by operating without distraction in the pure intellectual pattern. Counterpositions arise when, first of all, the biological pattern interferes with the intellectual pattern, or second, when other patterns distort the findings and applications of the intellectual pattern. A survey of Lonergan’s uses of the term ‘polymorphism’ confirms this. However, there is also the other side of the picture. There is a more positive aspect of polymorphism to bring out. This may be illustrated in connection with the passage in which the term is introduced: The peculiarity of these anti-theses is not to be overlooked. They are not merely conflicting propositions. They are not pure logical alternatives, of which one is simply true and the other is utterly false. But in each case both the thesis and the anti-thesis have their

176 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

ground in the concrete unity-in-tension that is man. For human consciousness is polymorphic. The pattern in which it flows may be biological, aesthetic, artistic, dramatic, practical, intellectual, or mystical. These patterns alternate; they blend and mix; they can interfere, conflict, lose their way, break down. (I 410) It is important to grasp from the beginning that polymorphic consciousness is the consciousness of a concrete unity in tension that is a human being. Human beings are polymorphic subjects who must constantly negotiate the tension of polymorphic consciousness. Furthermore, polymorphic consciousness involves at least the mixing and blending of a wide range of patterns, which are best understood as orientations of the subject. At this point a positive treatment of polymorphism seems to be emerging. Lonergan adverts to the aesthetic and artistic patterns, to the dramatic, practical, and mystical patterns, as well as to the intellectual and biological patterns. He points to polymorphic consciousness as the ground of theses and anti-theses and to that extent makes the full spectrum of consciousness the basis for any philosophical position. The mixing and blending of all the patterns is the key to philosophy. Though much less in evidence than the negative treatment, this emerging broader and more positive treatment is sufficiently manifest to reveal the deeper trajectory and potential in Lonergan’s thought. It shows Lonergan already moving beyond the ‘breakthrough’ (I 508) of self-affirmation towards the further breakthrough marked by his essay on ‘The Subject’3 and to the consolidation found in Method in Theology. However, this positive treatment is not generally evident. Immediately after presenting the wide spectrum of patterns of experience, Lonergan returns to the more prevalent negative and less comprehensive treatment. The mixing and blending of patterns is characterized in terms of interference and conflict rather than mediation and complementarity. This interplay of a generally negative with an emergently positive account of polymorphism is confirmed in a survey of the ways in which the term is used. The survey also reveals the influence of a view of philosophy tied to the cognitional and epistemological dimensions of inquiry and even to the propositional mode of expression (I 451). This accounts for the predominantly narrow and negative account of the mixing and blending of the patterns. Yet if polymorphism is to provide a comprehensive and nuanced key to philosophy, a more detailed account of how all the pat-

3 Lonergan, ‘The Subject,’ in A Second Collection, 69–86.

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 177

terns are involved in the mixing and blending is needed. Otherwise polymorphism is only a key to interference and to philosophical mistakes. Such a state of affairs reduces the significance of polymorphism as an account of difference and plays into the hands of those who would see Lonergan as just another modern thinker who attempts to totalize all other approaches as merely counterpositional victims of the ‘already out there now.’ b

a basic survey of lonergan’s meanings of polymorphism

4

Polymorphism and Pluralism: The Underlying Problem

In the first main subsection of chapter 14, ‘The Underlying Problem,’ Lonergan introduces polymorphism and argues that it is the source or cause that explains the existence of many ‘contradictory and disparate’ philosophies. Polymorphism is the basic source of philosophical pluralism. An early characterization presents polymorphism as the original disorientation from which we must escape. Polymorphism is the bewildering fact of a protean consciousness: ‘Not merely are the antitheses based on the polymorphic fact of a protean consciousness but initially there is the bewildering fact without the clear antitheses’ (I 411). This emphasis would make the account of polymorphism something like Lonergan’s version of the Allegory of the Cave in Plato. Until polymorphism is uncovered and adverted to and appropriated, the subject operates out of a compact consciousness that is unable to distinguish adequately among different patterns of experience. This identification of polymorphism with an initial disorientation is repeated later when Lonergan talks of ‘the polymorphic subject in his native disorientation and bewilderment’ (I 422). Such passages lead commentators to identify polymorphism with the original chaos of consciousness. For Robert Fitterer, polymorphism ‘keeps the subject in a noetic flux such that commonsense bias cannot help but be the result.’4 For Michael McCarthy, polymorphic consciousness implies that ‘hunger and thirst; dreams and fears; desires and emotions; religious, aesthetic, and moral experiences claim equal place with inquiry in the stream of human consciousness.’5 David Tracy says that everyone in their ‘first awakening to wonder’ tends to operate ‘in an essentially undifferentiated [i.e. polymorphic without its polymorphism explicitly noted] horizon.’6

4 Fitterer, ‘The Notion of Common Sense in Bernard Lonergan’s Insight,’ 79. 5 McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 273. 6 Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 153.

178 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Lonergan seems to imply that we escape from this chaos by a self-affirmation that allows ‘a clear and sharp formulation of the anti-theses.’ This, he claims, made it ‘necessary for us to begin with insight,’ to study insight in mathematics, empirical science, and common sense, and then to ‘turn to reflective understanding and judgment’ (I 411). Moreover, in practice if not in principle the project towards self-affirmation required the prior development of mathematics, a maturing of the empirical sciences, the emergence of depth psychology, modern epistemology, and cognitional analysis. Interestingly, Lonergan also says that, along with these other areas, an ‘interest in historical theory’ (I 411) facilitates and illuminates the investigation into ‘the mind of man’ (I 411). The judgment of selfaffirmation may be seen as the breakthrough that overcomes negative or chaotic polymorphism. According to Mark Morelli, commentators such as Tracy and McCarthy interpret Lonergan in this way. For Tracy, polymorphism is ‘the root problem to be overcome in the development of explicit metaphysics’; for McCarthy, it is ‘the normative kernel to be dislodged by the process of self-appropriation.’7 Here I would suggest that the emphasis on polymorphism as chaos or noetic flux should not be overplayed. Chaotic consciousness cannot be the key to anything. Nor is it clear, if chaotic consciousness is the original state of the subject, how a judgment of self-affirmation capable of lifting the subject out of the chaos could possibly emerge from ‘disorientation and bewilderment.’ In this regard McCarthy is careful to point out that consciousness is not simply ‘haphazard’ or ‘rhapsodic.’ Consciousness flows in ‘distinctive patterns.’8 For consciousness to be patterned is already a step beyond chaos or bewilderment. At first it may be that the subject shifts spontaneously and unreflectively between different patterns of experience, but this performance is not chaotic, even if confusion results at the level of philosophical interpretation. In Understanding and Being Lonergan presents patterns of experience arising as the subject discovers that the intellect can be actuated in various ways, giving rise to different orientations in living. Hence ‘contrasting eroses and exigences’ are evoked and different concerns establish themselves. It could be argued that the tensions among equally legitimate orientations will become increasingly noticeable. Eventually the tension provokes a crisis that can only be resolved by a self-reflective inquiry that leads to self-appropriation. We could conclude that there is a sense in which polymorphism overcomes itself. All the legitimate concerns of polymor-

7 See M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 383. 8 McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 233.

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 179

phic consciousness will seek their own distinct identity and their proper place and order in the integral subject who has achieved the differentiation of interiority. In each case the subject has to work out what it is doing while it is operating in a particular pattern. Tracy comes close to making this point in saying that ‘original polymorphism attempts to overcome itself by moving into some kind of systematization (symbolic or scientific) of its performance.’9 In Lonergan’s text there seems to be an equivocation between undifferentiated polymorphism and differentiated polymorphism. He is clear that undifferentiated polymorphism needs to be overcome. My point is that differentiated polymorphism is the ‘key to philosophy.’ I would also emphasize the point that the tension of undifferentiated polymorphism calls for differentiation. In this sense polymorphism may be said to overcome itself, or call for its own explicitation. My point is that the whole of polymorphic consciousness and the various tensions within it contribute to this shift. Lonergan’s own account of problematic metaphysics heads in this direction (I 421–6). Also, the account of ‘the Law of Genuineness’ (I 499–503) seems pertinent here. Such genuineness ‘goes far beyond the native endowment of detachment and disinterestedness that we possess in the pure desire to know’ (I 502). Genuineness is the subject admitting into consciousness the tension between limitation and transcendence. Should we not see this as the recognition of all the diverse tensions among the patterns of experience and their admission into consciousness? Generally I argue, first, that ‘chaos,’ ‘bewilderment,’ and ‘disorientation’ are not suitable terms for polymorphic consciousness. These terms are not adequate for the blending and mixing and shifting of patterns even where this is spontaneous and unmethodical. Second, self-affirmation is not simply an overcoming of polymorphism. Self-affirmation is a product of polymorphism or of genuineness giving due recognition to the tensions of polymorphism. In the next mention of polymorphism we are told that polymorphism finds itself as the source of philosophic difference (I 411). Lonergan argues directly ‘that philosophical pluralism is to be expected given polymorphism’: to be surprised by this is to assume incorrectly that ‘the task of philosophy lies in the observation or utterance of some simple entity by some simple mind’ (I 411). Lonergan continues: ‘In fact, the mind is polymorphic; it has to master its own manifold before it can determine what utterance is, or what is uttered, or what is the relation between the two; and when it does, it finds its own complexity at the root of antithetical solutions’ (I 411). Lonergan notes that some conclude from this pluralism, this ‘babel of endless

9 Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 153.

180 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

philosophical arguments,’ that ‘the object of philosophy either does not exist or cannot be attained’ (I 411–12). Here he touches on contemporary debates on the ‘end of philosophy,’ on philosophic diversity and relativism. Positively Lonergan’s argument may be taken as suggesting that the new end/goal of philosophy is to master its own complexity and so to come to appreciate the complementarities as well as the contradictions among different philosophical approaches. But with regard to polymorphism, no further details are given concerning the nature of the complexity of the human mind. Hence at this juncture it is difficult to assess the implications of Lonergan’s position. The next reference to polymorphism complements the preceding references. Lonergan now says that disparate philosophies contribute to the clarification of the polymorphic fact of the human mind: ‘The many contradictory, disparate philosophies can all be contributions to the clarification of some basic but polymorphic fact; because the fact is basic, its implications range over the universe; but because it is polymorphic, its alternative forms ground diverse sets of implications’ (I 412). It is polymorphism that gives rise to different philosophies, but also these different philosophies lead back towards a clarification of the polymorphic mind that generated them. It is to be expected that different philosophers will draw upon different aspects of human experience and consciousness. When correctly interpreted and evaluated, these different philosophies will reveal complementary aspects of ‘the human mind.’ There will be ‘a unity not only of origin but also of goal’ (I 412) in the activities of philosophers. This is an intriguing claim that suggests a sensitive openness to philosophic diversity. Again, however, polymorphism is not addressed in itself, and this makes it difficult to evaluate the claim. Lonergan points out that, as in earlier chapters of Insight, ‘the one goal of our inquiry is the nature and fact of insight’ (I 412). Furthermore, he says that we are interested in philosophers ‘inasmuch as they are instances … of inquiring intelligence and reflecting reasonableness’ (I 412). This gives priority to the intellectual pattern. Also it leaves unclear how exactly polymorphism gives rise to diverse philosophies, and it fails to clarify completely how these philosophies contribute to clarifying the polymorphic fact. Lonergan does give some details of how a philosopher is able to survey and evaluate diverse philosophies. The process involves combining direct and inverse insights. Inasmuch as both types of insight are employed, the philosopher finds that ‘his mind and grasp become the single goal in which contradictory contributions attain their complex unity’ (I 412). But this throws no light on how different patterns contribute to philosophic

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diversity or how different philosophies reveal the influence of the patterns. Polymorphism is mentioned but not put to work. 5

The Intellectualist Orientation of the Heuristic Structure of Philosophical Unity

The intellectualist emphasis is further manifested as Lonergan explains how the heuristic structure of the complex unity of diverse philosophies is determined: ‘the heuristic structure of that unity admits determination through the principle that positions invite development and counterpositions invite reversal’ (I 412). Cognitional theory is said to be the basis of ‘any philosophy.’ The basis finds its expression in ‘its pronouncements on metaphysical, ethical, and theological issues’ (I 412). The basis has two aspects: the first is ‘an appeal to the data of consciousness’ and the second is an appeal to ‘the historical development of human knowledge’ (I 412). Lonergan states that the formulation of cognitional theory requires that ‘some stand [be] taken on basic issues in philosophy.’ The complete formulation of cognitional theory – the basis of any philosophy – requires that we draw out the implications for self, being, and objectivity. Lonergan goes on to point out that we can misinterpret the data and incorrectly formulate the implications. In this default we arrive at what Lonergan calls basic counterpositions. A basic counterposition contradicts one or more of the basic positions on the real, the knowing subject, objectivity. Positions are arrived at when we operate in the intellectual pattern without distraction or interference. I do not want to deny or minimize Lonergan’s achievement here. Nor would I deny that the account of cognitional theory is in some sense the core of a methodical philosophical approach. But what is first in terms of method or in the order of cognitional discovery need not be first absolutely or in all respects. Furthermore, the account of counterpositions is again simply an account of the implications of the influence of the biological pattern. There is no development on polymorphism. The focus is exclusively on the intellectual and biological patterns. The emphasis is continued in the account of the pronouncements on metaphysics, ethics, and theology, which expand the cognitional basis. Generally, positions are whatever is coherent with basic positions on the real, on knowing, and on objectivity. Counterpositions are coherent with one or more of the basic counterpositions. The discernment by which we decide whether we are dealing with a position or counterposition is made on the basis of the principles of reversal and of development. Ultimately the test is one of self-referential adequacy: ‘All counterpositions invite reversal. For any lack of coherence prompts the intelligent and reasonable

182 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

inquirer to introduce coherence. But counterpositions, though coherent with one another … nonetheless are incoherent with the activities of grasping them intelligently and affirming them reasonably’ (I 413). The activities of grasping and defending counterpositions in any way will always ‘contain the basic positions.’ They involve ‘grasping and accepting one’s [intelligent] grasping and [reasonable] affirming.’ Hence to maintain a counterposition allows no coherent position, outside silence (I 413). On the other hand, there is the case of positions: ‘All positions invite development. For they are coherent not only with one another but also with the activities of inquiring intelligence and reflective reasonableness; because these activities are coherent with existing attainment, their exercise is possible; because existing attainment is incomplete, further development is invited’ (I 413). Lonergan concludes that the historical series of diverse philosophies may all contribute to ‘a single but complex goal’ even if they are not all produced by ‘completely successful philosophers’ (I 414). Significant discoveries may be expressed as counterpositions or as positions. Those expressed as positions ‘should form a unified cumulative structure that can be enriched by adding the discovery initially expressed as counterpositions’ (I 414). But those discoveries expressed as counterpositions will require a reversal that separates the discovery from initial bias (I 414). Again, this is extremely valuable and on the whole convincing. My aim is not to deny what Lonergan is arguing, but to point out its incompleteness and its abstraction. The omission of details concerning other patterns means that Lonergan may overlook different modes of reversal that arise as the different patterns influence the unfolding of conscious intentionality. Counterpositions may involve more than cognitional incoherence. Responding to and appreciating Nietzsche and Heidegger may involve something different from appreciating and responding to Descartes or Hume. For example, the aesthetic pattern is relevant to Nietzsche while the biological pattern is overplayed in Hume. The response may involve more than ‘a stronger affirmation of the basic [cognitional] position’ and more than ‘an explicit negation of the basic [biologically influenced] counterposition’ (I 414). 6

Polymorphism and the Definition of Metaphysics

In the next section of chapter 14, Lonergan shows in more detail how cognitional theory underlies metaphysics. Metaphysics is understood as ‘the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments’ (I 415). This definition already indicates that the focus is on cognition and knowledge; hence attention will be

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 183

drawn to the intellectual pattern and the biological pattern. Left out of consideration, as we might expect, are other forms of knowledge such as the aesthetic, the mystical, the interpersonal, and the dramatic. Hence, though the term ‘polymorphism’ is mentioned, no account is given of the full range of patterns of experience, and there is no development of any treatment of diverse realms of knowledge or truth or meaning. The main theme is the shift from the latent, through the problematic, to an explicit metaphysics. Polymorphism is only adverted to as what tends to keep metaphysics hidden, latent, undeveloped, or problematic. For example, Lonergan holds that as polymorphic, the consciousness of human beings tends to formulate discoveries as counterpositions (I 415). This is mentioned but not developed. Similarly, Lonergan states that polymorphism makes metaphysics problematic (I 416, 420–1). He points out that at first metaphysics is latent. Then the need emerges to relate explicitly different areas of knowledge. But polymorphic consciousness distorts the attempt to unify different areas and so makes metaphysics problematic: The need for a systematic effort at unification is felt; studies of the nature of knowledge abound; but these very studies are involved in the disarray of positions and counterpositions that result from the polymorphic consciousness of man. (I 416) [Metaphysics as a heuristic structure] is immanent and operative in all human knowing, but initially it is latent, and the polymorphism of human consciousness makes it problematic as well. (I 420-1) There is some ambiguity in Lonergan’s position. When he says that metaphysics becomes problematic, he seems to be implying that what is problematic are the attempts to express the unification of knowledge. These studies are involved in counterpositions. But prior to the studies and their involvement in positions and counterpositions there is present a felt need to relate different areas. This could be related to polymorphic consciousness becoming aware of the tensions within itself. These tensions may be among modes of knowing relating to the different patterns or among kinds of knowing corresponding to different differentiations. On this view, polymorphic consciousness itself is problematic (in tension), while the lack of clarity on this basic level leads to the confusions, the counterpositions, in the articulated metaphysics. But Lonergan does not follow this line of thought. The treatment of polymorphism remains negative. The section is completed by an account of explicit metaphysics as the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. Lonergan’s presenta-

184 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

tion of the shift from a latent through a problematic to an explicit metaphysics again places the intellectual pattern in a place of prominence. Latent metaphysics is the immanent and operative detached, disinterested desire to know. It is the dynamism of self-transcendence that ‘imposes a normative structure upon man’s cognitional acts’ (I 420). Eventually this latent metaphysics may work through the problematic stage, and finally it ‘succeeds in conceiving itself [and] in working out its implications’ (I 416), thus becoming explicit. Then progressively metaphysics is able to implement the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being: ‘Explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being’ (I 416). In this triple task towards integration, metaphysics is materially dependent on the sciences and on common sense (I 421). It integrates all the heuristic notions and structures that ‘result from the resourcefulness of human intelligence in operation’ (I 417–18). It integrates what it transforms and reorients, to build up ‘the ordered set of all heuristic notions’ (I 417) and in this manner to gain knowledge of ‘the organizing structure of proportionate being’ (I 421). All of this is a powerful argument for the importance of the intellectual pattern, but it leaves unacknowledged the significance of the other patterns of experience. 7

Polymorphism and Method in Metaphysics

The next section of chapter 14 of Insight discusses the movement from latent to explicit metaphysics in more detail. Polymorphism continues to be presented as the obstacle to this movement, but there are some openings to a positive rethinking of polymorphism. Metaphysics is said to begin with ‘people as they are’ (I 421). Explicit metaphysics is a personal achievement of the subject who has worked his way through the process of self-discovery. The process begins with latent metaphysics, where people, though they operate sensitively, intelligently, rationally, (and responsibly), do not advert to these ‘concrete and factual inevitabilities’ (I 422). They do not grasp how these inevitabilities form a normative dynamic structure that generates common sense and scientific knowledge, as well as providing ‘a normative principle that governs the outcome of all inquiry’ (I 422). Furthermore, at this stage the subject does not realize how polymorphism may be recognized from the interference of the normative dynamic structure by other equally dynamic structures. Here we gain another perspective on polymorphism. People may be unable to ‘discover in themselves other equally dynamic structures that can interfere with the detached and disinterested unfolding of the pure desire to know, or conclude to the polymorphism of

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 185

their subjectivity and the untoward effects it can have on their efforts to reach a unified view of the universe of proportionate being’ (I 422). Related to this is a point made on the following page of Insight. Lonergan says that the attentive reader will be able to know how experience (internal and external), insight, and reasonableness ‘form a patterned orientation that differs from other orientations that commonly are more familiar and more frequent’ (I 423). The notion of dynamic structures has important and positive implications. The negative side is not neglected: the other orientations still ‘interfere’ with the unfolding of the pure desire to know. But now there is room for a positive reading also. According to Mark Morelli, the notion allows us to rethink what is involved in polymorphic consciousness. It draws attention to the subject who orients himself or herself in different ways. It provides a basis for recognizing a cognitive aspect within all the patterns of experience. It provides a way of relating levels of consciousness and patterns of experience, and in this way it lays the foundation for an integral account of polymorphism. Morelli argues that the contrast between ‘the dynamic structure of cognition’ and the ‘other equally dynamic structures’ – the differences among patterned orientations of experience, insight, reasonableness, and the ‘other orientations’ – cannot be a contrast between a cognitive process and other merely empirical non-cognitive processes.10 This is all the more evident when we realize that the flow of consciousness in any pattern or combination of patterns will involve a sequence of operations as well as a procession of contents.11 Given this, the contrast between the dynamic structure of cognition and other dynamic structures, the contrast between the intellectual pattern and the other patterns of experience, must be seen in the following manner: It seems … to be a contrast between … the intellectual pattern of experience, in which knowledge is sought before all else and in which the invariant structure of cognitive consciousness achieves virtually uninhibited realization, and other patterns in which knowledge also plays a role, but in which it is not sought for its own sake and as single mindedly.12 Morelli holds that this perspective allows us to overcome many of the ambiguities in the commentators who variously identify polymorphism 10 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 390. 11 Ibid., 391; Insight, 344. 12 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 390.

186 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

with levels of consciousness, with pattern of experience only, or with merely empirical consciousness. It allows an integration of what is said of the patterns in chapter 6 of Insight with what is said of levels of consciousness in chapters 9 and 10 of Insight. For Morelli, polymorphism is best understood in terms of levels of consciousness (operational polymorphism) and patterns of experience (orientational polymorphism) taken together. An integral account of polymorphism becomes possible when we make explicit the unobjectified relationship of patterns to levels in the subject. The important point is to realize that it is the experiencing subject who is oriented: ‘It is not experiential operations per se which are oriented one way or the other, but rather the experiencing subject; it is not the empirical operations and their contents alone that are variously patterned, but the lived experience, empirical and conscious (‘internal’ and ‘external’), of the operating subject.’13 The result of this is a more comprehensive account of polymorphism, one that shows how the structure of the human spirit is integrated with the structure of being human: By polymorphism of consciousness is meant the variable range of dynamic structures evoked by the variable domination by different orientations and blends of orientations, of the entire three-levelled structure of operations or of some number of the three level structure inasmuch as the dominance by a specific interest may, in virtue of the end, make specific operations irrelevant, suppress others, reinforce others, etc.14 Morelli is arguing that the entire three-level structure, the basic structure of consciousness, is always involved, but that operations at one level or another may recede and become less explicit while others become more prominent, more noticeable, according to the prevailing concerns of the subject. When Method in Theology is taken into account, other levels of conscious intentional operations enter the picture: the levels of responsibility (decision and action) and of love. Oyler offers a similar position. Along with Morelli he presents patterned consciousness in terms of operations. He then explains how consciousness can be patterned and unpatterned at the same time and how one pattern can give way to the next. In different patterns different operations are dominant, but other operations are always possible:

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 392.

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 187

But while you are in that pattern there are other patterns that are occurring, that is, background things are going on. This is all in the stream of consciousness. So consciousness itself, even if it is patterned, is also unpatterned. There is an unsystematic element and that is the potentiality, all the time in the background, for another pattern to emerge … and you enter various patterns by shifting your attention, shifting your concern.15 The most important implication of this is that it is the subject who orients itself. The subject is able to actualize itself in diverse dynamic structures that are both ‘functions of dominant orientations’ and ‘partially functions of operations.’16 In this way Morelli shows the complementarity of chapter 6 of Insight, which deals with patterns or orientations of the subject, with chapter 11 of Insight, which points out the dynamic unity of the subject’s operations along with the variations in kinds of awareness as a function of the operations. He finds evidence for this interpretation in chapter 17 of Insight, where Lonergan speaks of ‘polymorphic unities of empirical, intelligent, and rational consciousness’ (I 590). Further evidence is given in a passage in which Lonergan sums up the character of his philosophy: ‘The philosophy rests, not on the account of experience, of insight, of judgment, and of polymorphic consciousness, but on the defining patterns of relations that bring these four into a single dynamic structure’ (I 591). This basic dynamic structure may be taken as the polymorphic subject that is able to organize itself into a great range of distinguishable dynamic structures. Ontologically this is possible because the human being is a unity. Cognitionally this may be adverted to and appropriated because of the given unity of consciousness. A passage found very late in Insight adds further confirmation that the polymorphic subject has a central place in Lonergan’s account: ‘The whole man is … a malleable polymorphic fact’ (I 653). Morelli concludes his account in this way: ‘Accordingly we must speak of practical, dramatic, aesthetic, artistic, intellectual, and mystical subjects, and not merely of practical, dramatic [patterns of] experience … we must speak of practical, dramatic … unities of empirical, intellectual, and rational operations.’17

15 Quoted in the West Coast Methods Institute Newsletter (May 1989), 6. The report is one of a series giving details of a conference on the Patterns of Experience that took place on 17–19 March 1989 at Santa Clara University. 16 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 391. 17 Ibid., 392.

188 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

It may appear that we have made progress in advancing towards a complete account of polymorphism. Morelli has made a significant contribution in relating patterns of experience, as well as in relating patterns to levels of conscious intentional operations and in locating both in the unity of the polymorphic subject. Nonetheless we must realize how much remains to be done to establish a fully integral account of polymorphism, hence to develop foundations for a comprehensive metaphilosophy. Morelli’s account is largely formal and heuristic. It presents the three levels of operations as a dynamic unity, as being open to modification by seven different orientations. However, few details are provided on how the three-level structure is differently modified by the various concerns and orientations. No account of the distinctive character of the various patterns is provided. In addition, little is said on the manner in which patterns mix and blend. Furthermore, what Morelli says of the various dynamic structures and unities needs to be filled out by a treatment of the unity of consciousness from chapter 11 of Insight. Discussion of the Law of Integration, the Law of Limitation and Transcendence, and the Law of Genuineness seems relevant to the account of the mixing and blending of patterns within the unity-in-tension of polymorphic consciousness. Also it would be useful to allow the account of the unity of the human being in chapter 16 of Insight to throw light on the dynamic structures of polymorphic consciousness. Finally, Morelli also does not deal with the developing subject or with differentiations of consciousness. These topics are already touched on in chapter 17 of Insight, but only in Method in Theology does Lonergan give a comprehensive treatment. In the next chapter of this book I will argue that differentiations are certainly a key to philosophy and that they may be regarded as a dimension of polymorphism. For the moment, however, we return to the treatment of polymorphism in Insight chapter 14. The point of discussing Morelli’s position was to bring out the potential for a positive account of polymorphism. The next mention of polymorphism, in Insight chapter 14, returns to a negative account of polymorphism as chaos. Polymorphism involves the confusion between animal and human ways of knowing: The process, then, to explicit metaphysics is primarily a process to self-knowledge. It has to begin from the polymorphic subject in his native disorientation and bewilderment. It cannot appeal to what he knows, for as yet he has not learnt to distinguish sharply and effectively between the knowing men share with animals, the knowing that men alone possess, and the manifold blends and mixtures of the two. (I 422)

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 189

The method of metaphysics, then, must involve not an appeal to disoriented consciousness but to ‘the desire that is prior to knowledge, that generates knowledge, that can effect the correction’ (I 422) to this disorientation and bewilderment. The appeal is to the desire as operative and not as known. In the initial stages of moving to self-knowledge the polymorphic subject requires manifold support. There is need for pedagogical and interpersonal support. Manifestly this support needs to be from another subject who has in some measure overcome polymorphism, who can motivate in the student self-attention and self-direction, who can set the student on the road towards self-affirmation. Generally there is need for a sustaining tradition that by the mutual support of its participants is enabled to become self-correcting. ‘The method, then, of metaphysics is dictated by the self-affirming subject in the light of his pedagogically acquired selfknowledge. For the self-knowledge is dynamic. It has revealed the source of disorientation and bewilderment. Spontaneously it moves towards the attainment of reorientation and integration’ (I 423). Lonergan moves on quickly from the mention of pedagogical support to talk instead of the self-direction of the subject emerging from polymorphic confusion. Perhaps here he minimizes the role of the other in bringing the subject to self-transcendence, self-direction, self-affirmation. In fact he is making a point of tremendous importance. Self-transcendence is initiated when a person is addressed by an other, self-transcending person. Here Lonergan may miss another opportunity to invoke the other patterns and to bring out their role in the self-transcendence of the subject. The interpersonal dimension of knowing emerges from various patterns. Knowledge plays a role in the other patterns, as Morelli says. But the reverse is also true: other patterns contribute to knowing. There are aesthetic and dramatic and ethical aspects to the process of seeking knowledge for its own sake. Had Lonergan enlarged on the pedagogical dimension of knowing, he might have thrown light on the positive polymorphism of concrete inquiry. The emphasis, however, continues on the negative side. Polymorphism is said to generate bias and to introduce confused notions of reality, objectivity, and knowledge into science (and philosophy). But only the subject who has become self-directing and who has achieved self-affirmation can appreciate this: The subject knows the polymorphism of his own consciousness; he knows how it generates a dramatic, an egoistic, a group, and a general bias in common sense; he knows how it intrudes into science confused notions on reality, on objectivity, and on knowledge … As the subject’s advertence to the polymorphism of his con-

190 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

sciousness leads to a transforming reorientation of his scientific opinion and his common sense, so his advertence both to his detached and disinterested desire to know and to the immanent structure of its unfolding lead to an integration of what is known and of what is to be known of the universe of proportionate being. (I 424) This is not the place to go into the deduction by which latent metaphysics gives way to explicit metaphysics. My point again is the incomplete account of polymorphism at work here. It does not advert to the full spectrum of polymorphic consciousness, to other tensions between, for instance, the aesthetic and cognitional interests or between dramatic and intellectual concerns. This emphasis on polymorphism as negative is again found in the connection made between polymorphism and antiphilosophy. Polymorphism allows antimetaphysics to mix with metaphysics. This brings to a close the section on method in metaphysics: ‘Because of the polymorphism of human consciousness, there are latent in science and common sense not only metaphysics but also the negation of metaphysics, and only the methodical reorientation of science and common sense puts an end, at least in principle, to this permanent source of confusion’ (I 426). 8

The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics

In the final section of chapter 14 of Insight, Lonergan returns to the dialectic by which the reversal of inadequate and the development of adequate philosophical stances are brought about. His aim is to articulate the ‘basic alternatives’ and to indicate ‘the outlines of a heuristic scheme for historical investigation’ (I 427). Polymorphism is repeatedly invoked in the dialectical critique of deductive methods, universal doubt, commonsense eclecticism, Hegelian dialectic, and scientific method. Here we begin to address more directly the metaphilosophical implications of polymorphism. It is in this section that Lonergan arrives at his basic claim: that polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy. The problem is to estimate the strength of this claim and to evaluate its viability. Results of the survey so far may suggest a more restricted interpretation of this claim. Lonergan again emphasizes the cognitive focus of his enterprise: ‘the only question to be settled in metaphysics is the general nature of the goal of knowledge, for all questions of detail are to be met by the sciences and common sense’ (I 426). Does Lonergan offer the ‘key to metaphysics’ or ‘the key to philosophy’? Is polymorphism the key first to

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 191

metaphysics and then, via metaphysics, the key to other expansions of this basic position?18 Here I believe we should again look for openings to a fuller and more positive conception of polymorphism and of philosophy than may be explicit in the text. The inner, dynamic logic of Lonergan’s position suggests that self-appropriation beyond self-affirmation requires a more complete account of polymorphism, and that, in turn, this may lead to a revision of our understanding of the philosophical enterprise. In what follows I will continue the survey of the uses of polymorphism, commenting briefly on most of the relevant passages. It will not be possible, however, to examine each case of dialectic in detail. 8.1 Deductive Methods In the course of a response to and critique of deductive methods, Lonergan argues that such approaches require synthetic a priori premises that only insight produces. Behind any deductive methods and underlying any metaphysics there is the wisdom that ‘generates the principles on which metaphysics is to rest’ (I 432). Hence we discover that ‘it is not so easy to leave the subject outside one’s calculation’ (I 433). Once this is discovered we realize also that polymorphism must be taken into account. Polymorphism interferes with the construction of the account of wisdom. The dominant negative characterization of polymorphism appears once more: ‘If … there is to be pieced together from Thomist writing, a sufficient number of indications and suggestions to form an adequate account of wisdom in cognitional terms, it cannot be denied that the polymorphism of human consciousness interferes with the performance of this delicate operation’ (I 432–3). 8.2 Cartesian Methods Lonergan goes on to respond to the Cartesian method of universal doubt. His main point is that to accept the criterion of indubitability is to ‘deprive oneself of the means of ascertaining what precisely that criterion implies’ (I 435). To accept this method means that ‘all concrete judgments of fact are to be excluded’ (I 433), including all deliverances of common sense and of science. Moreover, this excludes also the facts of human cognitional 18 I hold that this is an important distinction. Metaphysics is about being. Philosophy includes more than metaphysics. Hence a more nuanced account of polymorphism is required if a more adequate key to philosophy is to be provided.

192 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

activity that are the basis on which we clarify polymorphic consciousness (I 434). Hence to adopt universal doubt leaves the meaning of basic terms and judgments obscure and unsettled: For the meaning of a judgment can be clear and precise only if one can assign a clear and precise meaning to such terms as reality, knowledge, objectivity. A clear and precise meaning can be assigned to such terms only if one succeeds in clarifying the polymorphic consciousness of man. (I 434) Little is added to the account of polymorphism as such. Polymorphism is presented merely as something that needs to be clarified, for negative polymorphism obscures the meaning of basic terms and judgments. In the next mention of the term the same point is made once more. In universal doubt the confused existential polymorphic subject survives. The existential subject survives as prior to the question ‘Am I?’ The meaning of the ‘I’ remains confused until polymorphism is clarified (I 435). Note also that the subject is found mainly in the intellectual pattern and that other patterns are not sufficiently recognized. Lonergan concludes that universal doubt is merely a ‘leap in the dark’ that results in unacceptable consequences. The account he gives of ‘the structure of human knowledge and of the polymorphism that besets it’ (I 435) is said to throw light on the consequences and explain why we need not accept them. 8.3 Empiricism Lonergan proceeds to consider the methods of empiricism. Empiricism emerges in many ways as Lonergan’s main target. From empiricism derive the fundamental antitheses to his account of objectivity, being, and selfaffirmation. Empiricism operates primarily out of the biological pattern of experience and overlooks the implications of the intellectual pattern. From this stems the tendency to reduce polymorphism to bimorphism. Lonergan takes the method of empiricism to be ‘observe the significant facts’ (I 437). Empiricism assumes that ‘what is obvious in knowing is what knowing obviously is’ (I 441). He distinguishes his own position from this when he says that ‘what can be observed is merely a datum; significance accrues to data only through the occurrence of insights’ (I 437). There are other versions of empiricism that occur at ‘the level of understanding’ and ‘the level of critical reflection’ (I 437). Hence, Scotism is said to involve ‘taking a look at a conceptual content’ (I 438). This problem, the ‘conflict between objectivity as extroversion and intelligence

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 193

as knowledge,’ is said to have ‘provided a fundamental theme in the unfolding of modern philosophy’ (I 438). This continues, Lonergan holds, through German idealism, neo-Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology. Hence he concludes that ‘it would seem necessary to revert to the beginning and distinguish two radically distinct types of knowing in the polymorphic consciousness of man’ (I 440). Polymorphism involves two radically different types of knowing – that belonging to humans as animal, prior to wonder and questions, and that properly belonging to humans as spirit, as the result of asking and correctly answering questions. This characterization of polymorphism seems to reduce it to bimorphism. It is significant that in this subsection Lonergan works almost exclusively in the paradigm of modernity. All the philosophers discussed dialectically are within this spectrum. Here Lonergan finds no reason to address philosophical issues outside a limited – mainly epistemological – paradigm. It follows that there is no call to invoke a wider approach to polymorphism. 8.4 Commonsense Eclecticism Lonergan moves on to a long discussion of ‘commonsense eclecticism,’ which he holds ‘remains the inertial center of the philosophical process’ (I 441). Polymorphism is only mentioned at the end of the subsection: Commonsense eclecticism is incapable of criticizing common sense. It is not by discouraging theoretical understanding that the polymorphism of human consciousness can be grasped, and it is not by appealing to what common sense finds obvious that the correct meaning of such terms as reality, knowledge, and objectivity is reached. (I 445) The main point is that commonsense eclecticism discourages the theoretical understanding that would lead to self-affirmation and the overcoming of polymorphism. Again the emphasis is on the intellectual pattern. Though Lonergan does not take up the issue, there also is the point that polymorphism encourages commonsense eclecticism. Commonsense eclecticism could be taken as a reflection of the mixing and blending of patterns of experience according to spontaneous association. 8.5 Hegelian Dialectic The account of Hegelian dialectic does not mention polymorphism but implicitly it is present. Lonergan argues that the survey of philosophical positions has shown that ‘philosophical method must concern itself with

194 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

the structure and the aberration of human cognitional process’ (I 446). In other words there is a fundamental dialectical aspect to philosophy. But this differs from Hegelian dialectic. In Lonergan’s opinion, Hegel’s dialectic is ‘conceptualist, closed, necessitarian and immanental’ (I 446). By contrast, Lonergan’s dialectic is intellectualist, open, factual, and normative. Hegel deals with heuristically defined conceptual content, while Lonergan deals with heuristically defined anticipations and real aberration and contradiction. The differences between the two accounts of dialectic are spelled out in detail. The unfolding account throws some light on polymorphism: Hegel’s dialectical opposition is a contradiction within the cognitional field, but our dialectical opposition is the conflict between the pure desire to know and other human desires. Hegel’s sublation is through a reconciling third concept, but our development is both the accumulation of insights moving to a higher viewpoint and the reversal of aberrations that were brought about by the interference of alien desires. (I 447) Here Lonergan seems to be implying that polymorphism is best seen as a conflict of human desires. This is partly a continuation of the negative characterization. Polymorphism is a source of interference that produces aberrations. Extroverted consciousness is still the main source of confusion (I 448). But the account of polymorphic consciousness as the unity-in-tension of diverse concerns links up with the account of dynamic structures. The other desires are human desires and not simply interference. For example, they motivate progress, including progress in freedom and the establishment of relationships within the community, in the way that Hegel rightly appreciated. 8.6 Scientific Method and Philosophy The remaining mentions of polymorphism are found in the subsection of ‘scientific method and philosophy.’ This survey of philosophical method is completed in comparing and contrasting scientific method and philosophy. This brings out the relevance of polymorphism in both negative and positive ways. It reveals the negative results of overlooking polymorphism – in the case of scientism – and also, I would argue, points to the positive implications and benefits of appreciating polymorphism in its full range, even if this is not made fully explicit. With regard to science, Lonergan notes that ‘the scientist’s dedication to truth and his habituation to the intellectual pattern of experience are

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 195

more than propaedeutic to philosophy’ (I 449). Also, given that ‘every mind by its inner unity demands the integration of all it knows,’ the scientist will seek this integration in a typically ‘economic and effective way’ (I 449). Science, however, can also overreach itself and become scientism or ‘scientific monism’ (I 449). Then the integration of knowledge is equated with the unification of the sciences. Furthermore, the hidden influence of the biological pattern lead scientists to assume that ‘objectivity was extroversion, knowing was taking a look, and the real was a subdivision of the “already out there now”’ (I 449). They failed to suspect that ‘there was an extrascientific supposition in the pronouncement on the meaning of objectivity, knowledge, and reality’ (I 499). Mechanistic determinism was assumed. Lonergan recognizes that this was partly corrected by recent advances in science. Darwin introduced probability. Freud investigated psychogenic disease. Einstein went beyond imaginable space and time. This took science beyond extroversion to a stance that took the real as the verifiable. More was needed, however, because scientific monism left a legacy. This was the assumption that ‘the method of science must be the method of philosophy’ (I 450). Hence Lonergan feels it is necessary to explain the differences between ‘the methods of empirical science’ and the method that must be followed if ‘the detached and disinterested desire to know is to attain an integrated view of the universe’ (I 450). Philosophy will arrive at this integrated view ‘by relating the heuristic structures [of the various sciences] to one another’ (I 451). At this point the problem of polymorphism is introduced. It is polymorphism that makes especially difficult the articulation of philosophical positions in a language that comes close to the clarity of scientific language. ‘Further, the polymorphism of human consciousness seems relevant to the problems of philosophy, for philosophy is concerned with knowledge, reality, and objectivity, and these terms take on different meanings as consciousness shifts from one pattern or blend of patterns of experience to another’ (I 451). Here an earlier point is repeated: polymorphism affects the meanings of basic terms in philosophy. But this may be taken in a positive way. The diverse meanings assigned to knowledge, reality, and objectivity need not be taken in a purely negative way as deviations or lapses from meanings assigned by the intellectual pattern. There may be aesthetic ways of knowing, dramatic and interpersonal ways of knowing. Lonergan does not seem to leave room for this. Hence he gives no details on how the meanings of the terms vary as consciousness shifts to other patterns or blends of patterns. This seems to be another illustration of how a presumed model of philosophy limits the account of polymorphism and fails to let a comprehen-

196 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

sive grasp of polymorphism lead to a reshaping of our understanding of the philosophical enterprise. In the passage just quoted, Lonergan expressed the view that ‘philosophy is concerned with knowledge, reality, and objectivity’ (I 451). He goes on to propose a view of language, and thus a view of philosophy, that appears to be unnecessarily restricted. ‘But the meaning of every other term changes with changes in the meaning of the terms “knowledge,” “reality,” “objectivity,” for the function of all language is to express presumptive knowledge of presumptive reality and affirm or deny the objectivity of the knowledge’ (I 451). This passage offers a view of the nature and role of philosophy that seems a paradigm of the logocentrism scorned by postmodernists. It offers a view of ‘the function of all language’ that would be strongly rejected by contemporary philosophers, whether analytical or hermeneutical or postmodern. On this view the meanings to be found when operating in the other patterns can only be seen as merely impoverished or distorted versions of the meanings of objectivity, reality, and knowledge found in the intellectual pattern. This implication is moderated a little in the discussion that follows. In effect, Lonergan recognizes that the present account is unfinished and underdeveloped. There is still a need, he admits, to discover ‘the meta-language in which one would express with technical accuracy just what is meant by the polymorphism of consciousness and by different meanings in the range of basic variables’ (I 452). In addition, Lonergan notes that to explain this to non-philosophers may require literary language, inasmuch as the explanation ‘has to be adapted continuously to the changing mentality of successive generations’ (I 452). Furthermore, ‘a philosophy which integrates the personal knowledge of living and changing minds’ (I 452) cannot limit itself to technical language. I suggest that this implies that language and philosophy have a variety of tasks and that this opens the way for a fuller and positive account of the influence of all the patterns. It is here that Lonergan implicitly makes this claim: polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy (I 452). Taken at face value, this seems a very strong claim. On the other hand, the survey made so far shows how difficult it is to interpret and assess this claim. It could be taken to imply that polymorphism, as the source of the conflict between the biological pattern and the intellectual pattern, is the key to understanding the basic variables and hence is the key both to metaphysics and to further expansions of ethics and theology. It could be taken also as saying that polymorphism, as source of the conflict between the intellectual pattern and all other patterns of experience, is the key to philosophical mistakes. However no details are provided on how the other patterns affect the basic variables. However, an opening exists, I suggest, to interpret Lonergan as saying that advertence to and appropriation of all the patterns in their distinctness and

Polymorphism: The One and Only Key to Philosophy? 197

interrelationships is the key to philosophy. This would involve a transposition in the way philosophy is understood. But which is the correct interpretation? The likely interpretation seems to be that Lonergan’s thinking is in a transition period between a stage when the cognitional subject is given priority and a later stage in which the concrete subject as a whole – the polymorphic subject – is appropriated. Here, in Insight, the tension between the intellectual pattern and the biological pattern is dominant. At the same time, the dynamic logic of Lonergan’s argument is pointing towards a new breakthrough. After a prolonged survey and discussion of Lonergan’s uses of polymorphism, it is significant that the range of his claim is not totally clear. Lonergan is certain that self-affirmation in the intellectual pattern is a breakthrough. He is clear on the pervasive influence of the biological pattern of experience. He is concerned to recognize the diversity in developing human beings. But he has not yet integrated all of this into a new synthesis that effects the change from cognitional analysis to intentionality analysis. Thus he has not fully developed a key to the actual diversity of philosophical positions in the concrete, but only a key that considers them abstractly from the point of view of the intellectual pattern. Lonergan’s key provides illumination in the measure that the concerns of these philosophies are cognitional or epistemological. Where their concerns are for the aesthetic or the interpersonal or the volitional, the present account of polymorphism as a key will be less relevant. Nevertheless, Lonergan is moving in the direction of a more inclusive and comprehensive approach:19 ‘In philosophy a single allinclusive goal is sought by as many different orientations of the historically developing but polymorphic consciousness of man’ (I 453). c

towards integral polymorphism and a comprehensive metaphilosophy

9

Towards Integral Polymorphism

In the final references there may be discerned a move towards a positive and integral exposition of polymorphism. Lonergan explains how the appropriation of polymorphism opens the philosopher to other positions.

19 Here I am arguing, with Mark Morelli, that cognitional theory is part of a more encompassing account of transcendental method, which in turn ‘is subsumed by a doctrine of the polymorphism of human consciousness’ (‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 171). I hold that in Lonergan’s later writings the importance of the polymorphic subject becomes more evident. This should lead us back to a re-examination of the claims about polymorphism in Insight.

198 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Philosophic evidence is within the philosopher himself. It is his own ability to avoid experience, to renounce intelligence in inquiry, to desert reasonableness in reflection. It is his own detached, disinterested desire to know. It is his own advertence to the polymorphism of his own consciousness … It is his own grasp of the dialectical unfolding of his own desire to know in its conflicts with other desires that provides the key to his own philosophical development and reveals his own potentialities to adopt the stand of any of the traditional or of the new philosophical schools … Philosophy is the flowering of the individual’s rational consciousness in its coming to know and take possession of itself. (I 454) Lonergan is, of course, interested mainly in establishing the distinctiveness of philosophy in contrast to science. He is not directly engaged in developing a comprehensive metaphilosophy or a full account of philosophic difference. Still he does claim that grasping ‘the dialectical unfolding of the desire to know in its conflicts with other desires’ provides a key that reveals the ability of the philosopher to ‘adopt the stand of any of the traditional or of the new philosophical schools’ (I 454). The question is this: Does Lonergan have in mind a philosophical spectrum that includes philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Foucault? Is the account he provides able to consider such positions? Does his account at least have the potential for being extended in order to appreciate and respond to these other positions and philosophers? It is difficult to say. Insight is a work in progress. In chapter 14 of Insight the philosophical positions Lonergan tackles are confined for the most part to the modern paradigm. On the other hand, the call to self-possession, and the way in which the notion of the polymorphic subject emerges in terms of the dynamic structures of consciousness, opens the way to other paradigms. The dynamic logic of the call to self-appropriation points forward to an appropriation of all the patterns in their interrelationships. At the very least this logic points towards the integral view of polymorphism outlined by Morelli. This integral view begins to be able to dialogue with a wider range of philosophies. Lonergan’s post-Insight writings move towards such a comprehensive, integral view. But the same tension is also found in these writings. In Topics in Education, where Lonergan explicitly treats philosophical difference, he considers only the levels of consciousness (TE 158–92). In effect he gives an account of philosophic difference that does not mention polymorphism. On the other hand, he states that ‘the category into which a given philosopher really falls will depend on the degree of self-appropriation’ (TE 238). This may be regarded as being open to an appropriation of all

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the patterns. Furthermore, Lonergan begins to explain how the basic philosophic differences ‘radiate through the whole of life’ (TE 179). Fundamentally positions are philosophic, ethical, artistic, practical views that are in harmony with the full implications of the three levels. Counterpositions are views, whether philosophic, ethical, practical, or artistic, that involve a blind spot, a limited horizon where the limitation is either to the intellectual level or to the experiential level. (TE 179) Priority is still given the philosophic-intellectual dimension. But Lonergan also treats the Good, Art, and History more directly. Generally he does not link this back to polymorphism. One interesting connection, however, is found in the lecture notes Lonergan used in his original presentation in the Education Lectures at Halifax. He wrote of theology that as ‘a religious science, it has to contend not only with the philosophic polymorphism of man but also with the further dimension of polymorphism that results from the acceptance, the partial rejection, or the total negation of faith’ (TE 241n20). This seems to point to conversion as another dimension of polymorphism – foundational polymorphism. To develop this remark we would have to consider what Lonergan says about conversion in Method. In Topics in Education he is still in a transitional stage. The ‘Lectures on Existentialism’ are significant in revealing the sequence of stages through which Lonergan enlarged his perspective. His investigations into the issues raised by existentialist and hermeneutical philosophers are laid out in those lectures. Lonergan focused on the existential subject rather than on the cognitional subject. The moral and religious subject comes into view and the fourth level of conscious intentionality begins to be prominent. However, only in the pivotal lecture, ‘The Subject,’20 does the primacy of the fourth level of the responsible, evaluating, and choosing subject become fully explicit. This breakthrough is then consolidated in Method in Theology. These post-Insight developments confirm an interpretation that in Insight Lonergan was in a transitional mode. The cognitional dimension dominates, but an exigence for a wider self-appropriation becomes increasingly evident. The exigence for self-appropriation in the concrete subject includes also, I believe, an exigence for a retrieval and development of an account of the patterns of experience, an account of polymorphism at the level of the patterns. This also is called for given the fact that

20 In A Second Collection, 69–86.

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in Method in Theology Lonergan arrives at a new understanding of the role of philosophy – one focused on interiority. A sufficiently detailed and differentiated grasp of interiority would include a sensitive awareness of the blending and mixing of the patterns. In the measure that Insight lacks a detailed account of all the patterns in their interrelationships, it does not provide a fully developed key to philosophy. This is true even if we acknowledge the correctness and power of the cognitional analysis. For philosophies concerned with or motivated by the aesthetic or dramatic dimensions of life or by the dimensions of freedom and responsibility will tend not to be dealt with on their own terms. They will be considered only in terms of their defective epistemologies or their inadequate and implicit cognitional theory.21 On the whole, then, we must conclude that in Insight Lonergan is only on the way to providing a key to philosophy. The ‘one and only key’ to philosophy is the self-appropriation of polymorphic consciousness. In Insight Lonergan has made a breakthrough that decisively begins this movement of self-appropriation. He presents this in terms of the self-affirmation of the knower. Furthermore, he is correct to emphasize the importance of this and the centrality of what he calls the normative structure of consciousness. We must say, however, that, though correct, this is incomplete as an account of concrete inquiry and as a basis for evaluating philosophic diversity in the concrete. 10

Towards a Comprehensive Metaphilosophy

Throughout the present chapter the focus has been primarily on chapter 14 of Insight and on polymorphism, understood mainly in terms of patterns, as the key to philosophy. However, there is a further aspect to Lonergan’s account of philosophic diversity that points towards an integral account of polymorphism, one that includes differentiations of consciousness. This further aspect is found in chapter 17 of Insight. It is not possible here to enter into the full complexities of chapter 17, which deals with Lonergan’s philosophical hermeneutics, including the notion of the ‘universal viewpoint.’ I am concerned simply to establish a connection between chapter 14 and chapter 17 and Method. This prepares for the treatment of polymorphism in Method, the focus of the next chapter of this book. 21 An example of this limitation may be found in Meynell, ‘Philosophy after Philosophy.’ He presents a forceful dialectical critique of postmodern positions but tends not to address the concerns of postmodernists at their own level. Meynell offers an Insight-level response to a Method in Theology–type problematic.

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The connection between chapter 14 and chapter 17 is found in a reference in chapter 14 to the ‘many different orientations of the historically developing but polymorphic consciousness of man’ (I 453). The issue of the historical development of consciousness is taken up again in chapter 17, where Lonergan attempts a more concrete approach to philosophical diversity. It is significant that Lonergan opens and closes chapter 17 with direct references to Hegel and his metaphilosophical challenge, a challenge calling for a philosophy of philosophies. The whole of this chapter 17 may be taken as an extended response to Hegel. There is even a case for regarding the whole of Insight (I 713) likewise. After introducing the challenge, Lonergan claims that the account of polymorphism is directly related to meeting this obligation: If Descartes has imposed upon subsequent philosophers a requirement of rigorous method, Hegel has obliged them not only to account for their own views but also to explain the existence of contrary convictions and opinions. Accordingly, our appeal has been not only to the isomorphism between the structure of cognitional activity and the structure of proportionate being but also to the polymorphism of human consciousness. (I 553) Here Lonergan points to isomorphism and polymorphism as together providing a basis for explaining the variety of philosophical positions. Isomorphism grounds the core positions while, apparently, polymorphism throws light on the counterpositions. With respect to polymorphism Lonergan says: ‘From the polymorphism of consciousness there follows a series of brief but highly effective refutations of contrary views’ (I 553). To some extent this continues to present polymorphism in apparently negative terms. It appears, then, that Lonergan does not fully respond to the challenge to enter into other positions sympathetically before critiquing them. However, this is not the whole story. In chapter 17 Lonergan revises his approach to philosophic difference in a way that has consequences for our understanding of polymorphism. As Lonergan begins to examine historically developing consciousness as a factor in philosophic diversity, he shifts focus from polymorphism as patterns of experience to polymorphism as differentiations. In the first place, Lonergan acknowledges that he has performed only a ‘piecemeal’ analysis of contrary opinions. Hence he attempts to advance a general theorem about philosophic diversity: Not only is it possible to deal piecemeal with opposed opinions but also there is available a general theorem to the effect that any phi-

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losophy, whether actual or possible, will rest upon the dynamic structure of cognitional activity either as correctly conceived or as distorted by oversights and by mistaken orientation. (I 553) In the second place Lonergan raises difficulties about the hermeneutical adequacy of this general theorem. This leads him to change significantly his approach to philosophic difference. He recognizes that the abstract method of deducing metaphysics from cognitional activity is hermeneutically inadequate to the historical unfolding of philosophy. He admits that ‘considerable resistance would meet the claim that the procedure yielded results that were strictly coincident with the views of other philosophers’ (I 553). The most that could be established, he concedes, would be a ‘general similarity of structure and of tendencies’ (I 553–4). In the concrete, actual philosophies produce ‘less general responses to problems peculiar to particular places and times’ (I 554). Lonergan tries to meet this difficulty by shifting ‘from the field of abstract deduction to the field of concrete historical process’ (I 554). This involves a different way of examining alternative philosophies. ‘Accordingly, instead of asking whether the views of a given philosopher follow from assumptions of a specified type, we propose to ask whether there exists a single base of operations from which any philosophy can be interpreted correctly’ (I 554). In this ‘the a priori element of cognitional analysis’ will be joined to ‘the a posteriori element of historical data’ in order to arrive at ‘a heuristic structure for a methodical hermeneutics’ (I 554). How exactly does Lonergan advance from chapter 14 to chapter 17 of Insight? According to Doran the shift is made possible by the account of the metaphysical elements and the account of metaphysics as a science found in chapters 15 and 16.22 The key elements are those concerning human development. Drawing on these earlier sections, Lonergan is able to elaborate an account of ‘The Genesis of Self-Knowledge’ (I 558–60), of ‘The Appropriation of Truth’ (I 581–5), and of ‘The Notion of a Universal Viewpoint’ (I 587–91), in which we find an anticipation of the discussion of differentiations in Method in Theology. The account of the genesis of self-knowledge reveals ‘the conditioning of metaphysics by self-knowledge and of self-knowledge by human development’ (I 559). This account reveals ‘a tension between the community and the individual’ in which developing individuals as ‘systems on the move’ may find themselves opposed by the ‘inertial routines’ accepted

22 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 618.

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without question by a community that no longer develops. Lonergan holds that this tension brings about ‘an awareness and an ever more distinct formulation of the nature of the originating subject’ (I 560). Metaphysics as a corollary to self-knowledge will also be concerned with its own genesis and development (I 560). The section on the appropriation of truth also emphasizes the development of understanding and knowledge. It refers back to ‘genuineness as the operator of human intellectual development’ (I 584). For Lonergan the ‘cognitional appropriation of truth is solidary with volitional and with sensible appropriation’: furthermore, the ‘appropriation of truth even in the cognitional field makes demands on the whole man’ (I 584). In the section on ‘The Truth of Interpretation,’ especially the subsection on ‘The Notion of a Universal Viewpoint,’ Lonergan touches directly on differentiations as constitutive of developing understanding: What is ordered is itself advancing from the generic to the specific, from the undifferentiated to the differentiated, from the awkward, the global, the spontaneous to the expert, the precise, the methodical. Our distinctions between mathematics, science, common sense, and philosophy are based on the different manners in which insights can be accumulated. (I 589) Note also that already in chapter 7 of Insight Lonergan had mentioned differentiations: ‘Our previous studies of mathematical and of scientific thought would regard particular cases of the intellectual form of experience; and similar differentiations could be multiplied’ (I 268). At this stage the notion of differentiations is relatively undeveloped. Still, it shows Lonergan beginning to explore new directions of investigation that come to maturity in later writings. In Method in Theology it becomes clear that differentiations are also a key to philosophy. In fact the notion of differentiations as a key to philosophy takes over from the notion of polymorphism-as-patterns as the key. In light of the fact that patterns of experience, certainly in the measure they are developed in Insight, do not provide a comprehensive key to philosophy, some reason emerges to ask this question: Does not an integral view of polymorphism need to be formed, one that includes differentiations and perhaps conversions, as well as patterns of experience and levels of consciousness? In the next chapter the notion of differentiation will be treated as a dimension of polymorphism.

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6 Polymorphism in Method in Theology

1

Introduction

In this chapter the aim is to clarify the contribution of Method in Theology to the account of polymorphism. Given the minimal reference to polymorphism in the text, this move is controversial.1 However, if the project of Method in Theology is properly appreciated the inclusion becomes intelligible. The fundamental shift from Insight to Method may be seen as a shift from a focus on knowledge, truth, being, to a focus on meaning and values, and on interpretation and culture. Theology mediates faith to a culture. Hence we find in Method in Theology a shift to rationality as rooted in culture and history.2 The search for rationality and intelligibility becomes a search for direction and meaning in the movement of life. We begin to recognize how the ‘historical dimension of human living enters into consciousness.’3 In this way the scope of Lonergan’s project is greatly extended. The task will be to see what this might add to his account of polymorphism and hence to his account of metaphilosophy. Method in Theology, as we shall see, has significant implications for the claim that ‘polymorphism is the one and only key to philosophy.’4 1 Only one reference is given in the index. Patterns of experience are mentioned twice (M 29, 268). 2 Parker, ‘The Scandal of Philosophy, 72. 3 Shute, The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History, 11. 4 Almost every chapter of Method in Theology could contribute to a fuller, more detailed philosophy/metaphilosophy. Such a metaphilosophy would encompass a ‘philosophy of culture’ as well as a ‘philosophy of history.’

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In this chapter I want to focus attention primarily on the notion of ‘differentiation of consciousness’ (while also touching on the notion of conversion). I will argue that the notion of differentiation contributes to and extends Lonergan’s account of polymorphism and plays a key role in the extension of his metaphilosophical project. While it is most directly addressed in Method in Theology, chapter 12, the notion of differentiation is in many ways the central theme of the whole of Method in Theology. Hence for a firm grasp of its meaning we need to survey the main passages that discuss the notion of differentiation. Why should we regard differentiations as constitutive of or as related to polymorphism? My argument is that the account of differentiations is clearly an extension of the philosophy of consciousness found in Insight. This account deals with developing consciousness, with the history of consciousness; Lonergan calls this the ‘ongoing discovery of mind’ (M 305) in history and culture. The exact relationship between patterns of experience, which evidently constitute polymorphism, and differentiations of consciousness, which may be relevant to polymorphism, has yet to be determined. I will suggest later that differentiations are actualizations arising out of the broad fields indicated by the patterns of experience. However, whatever the relationship between patterns and differentiations, differentiations are important modalities of the human mind that must be included in a comprehensive philosophy of consciousness; furthermore, they seem to add a different dimension to the polymorphism of consciousness, to the ‘many-shapes’ of human consciousness. In addition, such developments within consciousness are manifestly relevant to the emergence of diverse philosophical outlooks. Given this, we can argue that if polymorphism is the key to philosophy and to philosophic diversity, then differentiations are part of polymorphism. In effect I want to argue here that the term ‘polymorphism’ is best used for all the modalities and variations of changing human consciousness. Alternatively, I argue that if differentiations are not part of polymorphism, then polymorphism as understood in Insight is not a complete key to philosophic diversity. To substantiate this in Lonergan’s case I now want to survey the main sections in Method that deal with differentiation. In offering this account I want to draw attention to the process of differentiation. I want to foster an appreciation of the differentiating mind as well as present a full account of the main differentiations that result from the process. Furthermore I want to highlight the manner in which different differentiations relate to one another and to show how they interact, modify, and merge with one another. If Method in Theology is an extension of the invitation to selfappropriation, then such details must be investigated. Throughout the survey the following questions will be kept in mind:

206 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

(a) What is the relationship of patterns of experience to differentiations of consciousness? (b) What are the causes, conditions, reasons, motives for such differentiations? What underlies the ongoing process of differentiation? (c) How are differentiations related historically and hierarchically? Do some differentiations mediate others? (d) What is the relationship of differentiations to self-appropriation? (e) What is the relationship of differentiation to polymorphism generally? (f) How does the account of differentiation contribute to an extended metaphilosophy? a

what is differentiation of consciousness?

As with the notion of pattern of experience, there is a problem in saying exactly what is meant by differentiation of consciousness. To appreciate the nuances of Lonergan’s account we need to survey and piece together the various treatments of differentiation found throughout Method in Theology. 2

Method

A very early mention of the term ‘differentiation’ is found in the first chapter of Method in Theology (M 13). This early reference is not discussed in detail. However, it is of interest in that it presents a first list of important differentiations. Lonergan states that from ‘ordinary living’ we withdraw by a ‘specialized differentiation of consciousness’ to (a) ‘a moral pursuit of goodness,’ (b) a ‘philosophic pursuit of truth,’ (c) a ‘scientific pursuit of understanding,’ and (d) ‘an artistic pursuit of beauty’ (M 13). Even such a brief account raises many questions. How does this account of artistic differentiation relate to the account of the artistic–aesthetic pattern? Is the moral pursuit of goodness a differentiation? How does it relate to the ethical pattern of experience? Are differentiations further developments and particular actualizations of the broad fields of human potentialities revealed by patterns? Why link science with understanding rather than with truth? Why link philosophy primarily with truth? At this stage the reader of Method does not have enough detail to answer such questions. 3

The Human Good

Significant progress in understanding differentiation is made in the chapter on ‘The Human Good.’ Here the notion of differentiation is

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reflectively considered in the section on ‘skills’ (M 27–30). The focus is on the process of differentiation. Lonergan, following Piaget, explains the acquisition of a skill as a series of adaptations ‘to some new object or situation.’ This involves (a) assimilation, which draws upon spontaneous and previously learned operations and directs them to similar situations, and (b) adjustment, which by a process of trial and error modifies or supplements previously learned operations. Differentiation is directly related to the process of adaptation to new situations. The process of adaptation results in ‘an increasing differentiation of operation’ and ‘an ever greater multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations’ (M 27). The term for the process of adaptation is ‘mastery’ of the combinations of operations ‘at some level of development’ (M 28). To be differentiated in action, then, is to have acquired mastery, to know what one is doing, in carrying out a distinctive group of distinctive operations. To explain this further, Lonergan introduces the term ‘mediation.’ This points to a distinction between operations that are immediately related to their objects and operations that relate to worlds mediated by meaning. To apprehend a world mediated by meaning we have to operate in a ‘compound manner.’ We operate ‘immediately with respect to image, word or symbol’ and ‘mediately with respect to what is represented or signified’ (M 28). This enables us to operate not only in relation to ‘the present and actual’ but also in relation to ‘the absent, the past, the future, the merely possible or ideal or normative or fantastic’ (M 28). The developing child comes to appreciate what is revealed/mediated by (a) the memories of other men, (b) the common sense of the community, (c) the pages of literature, (d) the labours of scholars, (e) the investigations of scientists, (f) the mediations of philosophers and theologians, (g) the experience of saints. As the subject develops, the more he or she acquires a differentiated grasp of these worlds. The process begins when the child shifts from early immediacy to participate in the world of common sense. This is still relatively undifferentiated, but it is a condition of possibility of further development. Literature also has a role in the unfolding process of differentiation, as does the work of scholars. Together they extend or modify common sense so that its diversity and variety bring forth an exigence for system and theory. Eventually science and philosophy emerge (and beyond these realms lies the transcendence of mystical experience). An important aspect of the development towards fuller differentiation is greater ‘control of meaning’ (greater ‘mastery’ of operations). According to Lonergan a ‘higher culture’ will ‘develop reflexive techniques that operate on the mediate operations themselves in an effort to safeguard

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meaning’ (M 28). This control of meaning includes that provided by alphabets, grammars, logic, but also, more importantly, that provided by philosophies which ‘explore the more basic differences between worlds mediated by meaning’ (M 29). Here Lonergan distinguishes classical and modern types of control: classical thought takes the control as ‘a universal fixed for all time’; modern thought takes the controls ‘as themselves involved in an ongoing process’ (M 29). Lonergan also emphasizes the point that with increased development, with greater familiarity with a range of worlds, there come explicit differentiations of consciousness within the subject. The greater the mastery of groups of operations, the greater the ‘control of meaning.’ The development of reflexive techniques brings about an increased self-awareness. It is this that constitutes differentiation proper. Personal development, differentiations, and self-possession are interrelated. The differentiation process heads towards interiority and self-appropriation: Corresponding to different degrees of development and different worlds mediated by meaning, there are similar differences in the different differentiations of consciousness. It is only in the process of development that the subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction from the world … As his apprehension of his world and as his conduct in it develop, he begins to move through different patterns of experience. (M 29) The general position is clear. The more a person develops, the more selfaware he becomes and the more differentiated is this self-awareness. It is this that facilitates a greater, a firmer, and a more detailed grasp of the controls of meaning that ultimately are grounded in the subject. It is this that allows the subject to be at home in a range of worlds of meaning. What is not clear is the link between differentiations and patterns of experience. Development results both in increasing differentiation and in movement through different patterns. But what is the distinction between patterns and differentiations? What is their relationship? Should we take patterns as indicating general fields in which human development is possible and take differentiations as the specialized actualizations by which resourceful intelligence constitutes and enters different worlds of meaning? This seems a reasonable position to hold. As a human being develops spontaneously he discovers new concerns and new ranges of patterns of experience. But as he assimilates the different areas and adapts to and gradually masters new situations, so differentiations develop that allow the subject to constitute and be at home in a variety of realms of meaning. Patterns and differentiations are distinct, but they are also closely related

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in the process of human development. It is worthwhile keeping in mind that patterns relate more closely to experience, and differentiations to understanding. Before moving on to the next section it is worthwhile acknowledging that questions arise in regard to the notion of ‘control of meaning.’ For some the very notion of ‘control’ is problematic. It seems to leave the way open to ‘logocentric’ exclusive rationalism. Particular controls can claim absolute priority as, for example, with Enlightenment scientism. Postmodernism seems to respond by calling for the deconstruction of controls. However, in reacting to what they see as totalizing control, thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida tend to abandon any judgment of meaning and fall back too easily into a cultivated dedifferentiation.5 From a different, cross-cultural perspective, Eastern Enlightenment seems also to involve the abandonment or rejection of any ‘control’ through intellectual reflection, though through disciplined contemplation there arises a profound control of praxis. It could be argued that Eastern ‘enlightenment’ involves a contemplative entry into interiority and thus a performative appropriation of differentiation, this as an appropriate response to the prevailing concrete situation. However, this would seem to neglect theoretic and scientific differentiations. It would be difficult to appropriate these differentiations without the development of the relevant operations. Despite these questions it would seem that real advance has been made in our understanding of differentiation. We can now appreciate how differentiation involves (a) a differentiation of operations and of different combinations of operations, (b) an increasing mastery or control of operations, (c) a greater awareness of the techniques of reflexive control, (d) an increasing awareness of the self and of the distinction of the self from the world, (e) a growing familiarity with the different realms of meaning discovered or constituted by human operations adapting to different objects and situations, and, possibly, (f) the actualization of experience within diverse patterns. 4

Meaning

A further treatment of differentiation is found in the chapter on meaning. First, the role of language, of signs and symbols, in the differentiation 5 See Heelas, ‘Introduction.’ Habermas also discusses this issue in his The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 336–41. Note also how in the ‘Lectures in Existentialism’ Lonergan acknowledges that Heidegger finds something of the subject-as-subject and interiority, while claiming that Heidegger fails to find anything normative there (LE 124).

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process is brought out. Lonergan then discusses the distinctive role of the exigences of human intelligence in generating differentiations. Here he also relates differentiations to stages of meaning that unfold historically. The role of language is again examined, and the Greek discovery of mind is presented as a crucial moment in the unfolding of meaning. Details of the main historically significant differentiations are provided. In addition, Lonergan outlines the retreat from differentiation as well as the way in which different differentiations may ‘interpenetrate and merge’ (M 98). 4.1 Early Language The discussion on differentiation arises in connection with an inquiry into the embodiment of meaning in language (M 70–3). This embodiment of meaning seems to be a crucial factor in the emergence of differentiations of consciousness. Lonergan seems to be implying a mutual mediation of sign and differentiation of consciousness.6 He argues as follows. The embodiment in language is said to liberate meaning. Signs can be ‘differentiated and specialized to the utmost refinement’ (M 70). Furthermore, they may be used reflexively to analyse and control linguistic meaning. Language allows the discovery and construction of an ordered world in which we can orient ourselves. This in turn facilitates self-possession and self-reflection: Prizing names is prizing the human achievement of bringing conscious intentionality into sharp focus and, thereby, setting about the double task of both ordering one’s world and orienting oneself with it … Just as the dream at daybreak may be said to be the beginning of the process from an impersonal existence to the presence of a person in his world, so listening and speaking are a major part in the achievement of that presence. (M 70) So conscious intentionality is said to develop in and be moulded by language, which is even said to ‘take the lead.’ Language ‘structures the world about the subject’ (M 71). Language develops, and then ‘there emerges a distinction between ordinary, technical and literary language’ (M 71). Ordinary language is that by which the human community ‘conducts its collaboration in the day to day pursuit of the human good’ (M 71). It is

6 This builds on Insight, where Lonergan argues for the mutual interpenetration of thought and language (I 576–81).

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based on commonsense habitual insights. Technical language emerges with the division of labour, the differentiation of tasks, and the gradual emergence of specialists. This involves ultimately a shift from the commonsense to the theoretical operation of human intelligence. Literary language is a further development of language that aims at a more ‘permanent’ communication between concrete subjects than is possible with ordinary language. It is language that ‘attempts’ to make up for the lack of mutual presence by evoking feeling as well as by communicating understanding. In this it goes beyond technical language and ‘tends to float somewhere in between logic and symbol’ (M 72). All these uses of language give expression to diverse human interests and evoke great self-awareness in some way. However, literary language has a special role. Feeling is expressed in symbols that ‘follow the laws of image and affect.’ Hence Lonergan follows Vico in holding for ‘the priority of poetry’ (M 73) as the basic and concrete communication. This seems to be a precondition or basic requirement for further differentiation of consciousness. It should be noted that while this account shows the important role Lonergan gives to language in the ongoing differentiation of consciousness, it is clear that he also holds for the priority of the sources of meaning (in consciousness) over the carriers of meaning (language).7 4.2 Functions of Meaning Before discussing differentiation directly, Lonergan considers the functions of meaning (M 76–81). This is important in bringing out the communal dimension of differentiation. The section helps us understand differentiation as an achievement of both community and individual. Lonergan identifies four functions of meaning. First, meaning has a cognitive function in that it places us in, and allows us to apprehend, a larger world that is mediated by meaning. This larger world is ‘insecure,’ for ‘meaning can go astray’ (M 77). Nevertheless the world mediated by cognitive meaning is the ‘real’ world in which we live our lives. Lonergan mentions here the special cases of ‘the mediation of immediacy by meaning’ and of ‘a mediated return to immediacy’ (M 77). These lead to the differentiations of interiority and transcendence:

7 Sources of meaning are all conscious acts plus all intended contents (M 73); carriers of meaning include human intersubjectivity, art, symbols, language, and the actions of people (M 57).

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Besides the immediate world of the infant and the adult’s world mediated by meaning, there is the mediation of immediacy when one objectifies cognitional process in transcendental method and when one discovers, identifies, accepts one’s submerged feelings in psychotherapy. Finally, there is a withdrawal from objectification and a mediated return to immediacy in the mating of lovers and in the prayerful mystic’s cloud of unknowing. (M 78) Second, meaning is efficient. It functions to inform and direct action that transforms the environment as human beings construct their own ‘artificial world’ (M 78). Third, meaning is constitutive. It functions as an intrinsic component of social institutions and human cultures. Religion, art, languages, science, philosophies, histories, along with the state, the family, law, the economy – all change with change in meaning. A fourth function of meaning is communicative. Whatever a person means (intends) can be communicated intersubjectively, artistically, symbolically, linguistically, incarnately. Common meanings may have originated in single human minds, but they become common ‘only through successful and widespread communication’ (M 78). Lonergan then emphasizes how the constitutive and communicative functions together ‘yield the three key notions of community, existence, and history.’ Community is ‘an achievement of common meaning’ (M 79). The developing individual is nurtured by this common meaning. But Lonergan is clear that he does not mean that the individual is determined or totally conditioned by his or her culture: ‘It is only with respect to the available common meanings that the individual grows in experience, understanding, judgment and so comes to find out for himself that he has to decide for himself what to make of himself’ (M 79). Becoming educated, socialized, acculturated is not opposed to becoming a person who exists and acts authentically. With regard to history, Lonergan argues that history is constituted by the developing content of meaning. While meaning ‘has its invariant structure and elements,’ still ‘the contents of the structures are subject to cumulative development and cumulative decline’ (M 81). The individual has a role in this. As a historical being he shapes his own life but does so ‘only in interaction with the traditions of the communities in which he happens to have been born’ (M 81). 4.3 Realms of Meaning and Exigences Lonergan then turns more directly to differentiation. The distinctive feature of the account here is the relationship of ‘different exigences’ to

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differentiations and realms of meaning. ‘Different exigences give rise to different modes of conscious and intentional operation, and different modes of such operations give rise to different realms of meaning’ (M 81). The first exigence to be considered is the systematic exigence, which separates (differentiates) the realm of common sense from the realm of theory. The systematic exigence is proper to human intelligence, to human reason in the full sense. When questions arise that common sense cannot deal with, the systematic exigence ‘demands’ a new context, the context of theory (M 82). Human intelligence, drawing upon its own resourcefulness, combines insights, higher viewpoints, and inverse insight to grasp a distinct realm of meaning. It seeks to understand things ‘by their internal relations, their congruences, and differences, the functions they fulfill in their interactions’ (M 82). It will express this theoretical understanding in a technical language and not in ordinary language. The realms of common sense and theory are related, for ‘one can invoke common sense to correct theory’ (M 82). But they also are distinct, and the connection will be effected in theoretical language. The next stage of ongoing differentiation involves also the critical exigence: ‘to meet fully the systematic exigence only reinforces the critical exigence’ (M 83). The question is how the realm of theory is critically related to the realm of common sense. How can both realms be taken as providing a truthful account? Is common sense simply ‘primitive ignorance’ compared to science? Is science merely a tool for control that says nothing about what is real? Such critical questions force us back to more basic questions: (a) What am I doing when I am knowing? (b) Why is doing that knowing? (c) What do I know when I do it? (M 83). Lonergan claims that it is here that we enter the realm of interiority: ‘With these questions one turns from the outer realms of common sense and theory to the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structure, their norm, their potentialities’ (M 83). This appropriation may be expressed in a way that ‘resembles theory,’ but directly it involves a heightening of intentional consciousness in a way that involves attending to ‘the intending subject and his acts’ as well as to objects (M 83). This ‘withdrawal into interiority’ prepares for a return to the realms of common sense and of theory ‘with the ability to meet the methodical exigence’ (M 83). The critical exigence leads to the self-appropriation by which the subject enters the realm of interiority. The methodical exigence is an exigence for a return to the realms of common sense and theory, a return that will reorient methodological praxis and lead to a more adequate articulation of the methodologies proper to the different sciences. The grasp of interiority is a grasp of transcendental method. It enables the subject to become aware of what he or she is doing in every field. This

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includes the ability to methodically differentiate the sciences and construct their derived, particular methods. Finally, Lonergan mentions the transcendent exigence. This is the exigence for unrestricted intelligibility, for the unconditioned, for a good beyond every finite good. This exigence is fulfilled ‘only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which God is known and loved’ (M 84). Lonergan completes this section by offering a few remarks on the process of differentiation. A key movement is the emergence of a ‘troubled consciousness,’ when different realms of meaning appear to be opposed and yet, separately considered, seem to be reliable sources of knowledge. For example, the emergence of modern science resulted in a ‘sharp opposition’ between common sense and theory (previously theory was not advanced enough to bring about an epistemological crisis). There followed the turn to the subject and the movement towards fuller differentiation. ‘Differentiated consciousness appears when the critical exigence turns attention upon interiority, when self-appropriation is achieved, when the subject relates his different procedures to several realms, relates the several realms to one another, and consciously shifts from one realm to another by consciously changing his procedures’ (M 84). The differentiation of consciousness does not rule out the unity of consciousness. Lonergan argues that differentiated consciousness has a distinctive kind of unity. ‘The unity, then, of differentiated consciousness is, not the homogeneity of undifferentiated consciousness, but the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift from any one to the other’ (M 84). The differentiated mind grasps what it seeks and how it seeks in the different realms and hence appreciates that there is no fundamental contradiction between those realms. The complementarity of the different realms will not be apparent to the undifferentiated consciousness, which ‘insists on homogeneity’ (M 84). Such consciousness insists that either common sense or theory is correct but not both. Differentiated consciousness has no such problem. By virtue of ‘a long and confused twilight of philosophic initiation’ it finds its way to interiority and, by self-appropriation, acquires ‘a basis, a foundation,’ from which to distinguish and to critically ground diverse realms (M 85). 5

Stages of Meaning – The Main Differentiations

In this section Lonergan gives an account of the main stages of meaning found in the temporal unfolding of the Western tradition. The stages are

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explained in terms of the unfolding of the process of differentiation. The three key stages are said to be those of common sense, theory, and interiority. However, there are further complications. Early language and myth are interlinked with common sense. Literary language is found to contribute to the initial Greek discovery of mind (M 90). Also, undifferentiated consciousness remains an influence, even in the later stages of meaning. Such complications are relevant to philosophic diversity. 5.1 Early Language and Undifferentiated Consciousness Lonergan offers an account of the genesis of language that explicitly recognizes the role of language, of sign and symbol, in the process of differentiation. Language is not ‘optional adjunct’ (M 86). Rather, some sensible expression is ‘intrinsic to the pattern of our conscious and intentional operations’ (M 86). Just as inquiry supposes sensible data, just as insight occurs with respect to some schematic images, just as the reflective act of understanding occurs with respect to a convincing summation of the relevant evidence, so inversely the interior acts of conceiving, of judging, and of deciding demand the sensible and proportionate substrate we call expression. (M 86) Lonergan insists on the importance of this demand. Some symbolic or linguistic expression, some embodiment of meaning, is essential to the proper unfolding of conscious intentionality. The account of the ‘development of proportionate expression’ grounds language in ‘indicative signification’ (M 86). Then generalization is grasped and extended to imitation. To this mimesis is added the ability to develop analogy. Finally, language proper emerges as ‘the work of the community that has common insights into common tasks’ and can build on the communication already found in ‘intersubjective, indicative, mimetic and analogical expression’ (M 87). The community goes beyond understanding smiles and gestures and imitative responses to ‘endow vocal sounds with signification’ (M 87). At this stage myth and common sense are merged, and this hinders the discovery of mind. Early language is a condition of the possibility of the discovery of mind, but it must be developed if it is to facilitate the actual discovery. In its undeveloped stage it has difficulties with the generic, with temporal relationships, and it can only represent inner mental processes by ‘personified interchanges’ (M 88).

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Furthermore, at this stage the various functions of meaning – communicative, constitutive, efficient, and cognitive – are not clearly distinguished. Hence mythic and magical and symbolic modes of expression pervade ‘primitive living,’ though this does not prevent the development of practical understanding (M 89). Human consciousness remains relatively undifferentiated, and even great developments in practical intelligence stand upon the cosmological myth that ‘depicted as continuous and solidary the order of society, the order of the cosmos, and the divine being’ (M 90). 5.2 The Greek Discovery of Mind The Greek discovery of mind builds on this. It begins with an initial differentiation out of myth. Myth lacks a clear distinction between ‘mere “representation” and “real” perception, between wish and fulfillment, between image and thing’ (M 92). It has not discovered the mind able to make distinctions and to judge truth: Man must discover mind. He has to sort out and somehow detach from one another feeling and doing, knowing and deciding. He has to clarify just what it is to know and, in the light of that clarification, keep the cognitive function of meaning apart from its constitutive and efficient functions and from its role in the communication of feeling. (M 90) This begins with ‘the literary revelation of man to himself’ (M 90). Again, language is shown to be involved in mediating the discovery of mind. So simile, lyric poetry, tragedy reveal sources of human action, personal human feeling, human decisions and conflicts. Also, the beginnings of reflection on knowledge become possible and with it a shift away from anthropomorphic myth. Language and thought develop in mutual mediation. Lonergan is clear that ‘the development of thought and language depends on insight’ (M 92). But insight in turn depends on sensible presentation and representations. The limitations of early language, which cannot cope with ‘the generic, the temporal, the subjective, the divine,’ are overcome as ‘linguistic explanations and statements provide the sensible presentations for the insights that effect further development of thought and language’ (M 92). Moreover, as language develops there emerges ‘the reflex movement in which language comes to mediate and objectify and examine the linguistic process itself’ (M 92). And this movement produces the logic, the hermeneutics, and the philosophies that follow.

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5.3 Common Sense to Theory The discovery of mind involves more than a separation of common sense from myth. It involves also the beginning of a transition to a second stage of meaning. The world of common sense is still minimally differentiated. The ongoing discovery of mind results in further differentiation: ‘In the second stage the world mediated by meaning splits into the realm of common sense and the realm of theory. Corresponding to this division and grounding it, there is a differentiation of consciousness’ (M 93). In the first stage the subject pursues the concrete good by attending, understanding, and judging. ‘But he does not make a specialty of these activities’ (M 93). In other words, he does not formulate a ‘theoretic ideal in terms of knowledge, truth, reality, causality’ (M 93). He does not formulate the proper norms for pursuing such ideals. In the second stage, the theoretic specialization, ‘the good that is pursued is the truth’ (M 94). Lonergan acknowledges that the pursuit is willed but argues that in itself it is a specialization of attending, understanding, and judging. As common sense develops and diversifies and as literary forms develop, the second stage of meaning emerges. The cosmic mythic world view is transformed as philosophy emerges out of (a) myth and story and epic and poetry and (b) reflection on the tensions of social and political and the moral aspects of human life. This emergence is reflected in Plato’s distinction between the world of sensible appearance and the world of transcendent form. But the philosophy that emerges is philosophy of the second stage, where science has not been differentiated from philosophy. To clarify what is proper to the second stage we need to characterize accurately the emerging third stage of meaning (M 94). 5.4 Theory to Interiority The second stage emerged out of developments in the first stage. Equally, the third emerges from developments in the second. The concern here is principally with developments in science. ‘In the third stage, then, the sciences have become ongoing processes. Instead of stating the truth about this or that kind of reality, their aim is an ever better approximation towards the truth, and this is attained by an ever fuller and exacter understanding of all the relevant data’ (M 94). In the second stage, theory was ‘a specialty for the attainment of truth’; in the third stage, scientific theory has ‘become a specialty for the advance of understanding’ (M 94). Furthermore, the sciences have become ‘autonomous’ from philosophy. They insist that a question is scientific only if it can be settled by ‘appeal to sensible data’ (M 94). This criterion is

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made increasingly effective as sciences work out their proper respective methods. Lonergan is clear that ‘there is no higher discipline [e.g., philosophy] that could discover their proper methods for them’ (M 94). Though the differentiation of the sciences constitutes them as autonomous from philosophy, the emergence of the sciences has important repercussions for philosophy. Ongoing differentiation is, therefore, a key for interpreting contemporary developments in philosophy. But such ongoing differentiation is not achieved without great difficulty, nor is it free from disorienting interpretation: Since the sciences between them undertake the exploration of all sensible data, one may conclude with the positivists that the function of philosophy is to announce that philosophy has nothing to say. Since philosophy has no theoretic function, one may conclude with the linguistic analysts that the function of philosophy is to work out a hermeneutic for the clarification of the local variety of everyday language. (M 94) In view of these distortions, Lonergan points to the alternative that his own work reveals: But there remains the possibility – and it is our option – that philosophy is neither a theory in the manner of science nor a technical form of common sense, nor even a reversal to pre-Socratic wisdom. (M 94) Philosophy finds its proper data in intentional consciousness. Its primary function is to promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the roots of philosophic differences and incomprehension … It has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification. (M 95) Lonergan regards himself as having made an important contribution to the breakthrough into the third stage. However, it remains true that ‘many learned people may remain in the second stage when a culture has reached the third’ (M 85). The culture reaches the third stage mainly in a few representative figures. The question arises, in what sense can we say that the culture as a whole has reached the third stage, especially when many may remain in undifferentiated consciousness? This is an issue to which we shall have to return.

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Lonergan is well aware that in the concrete, the shifts from one stage to another are prolonged and complicated. There is a considerable gap even between the second and third stages of meaning. ‘What in the third stage are differentiated, specialized, moving towards an integration, in the second stage are more or less undifferentiated’ (M 95). The second stage of ‘more or less’ undifferentiated consciousness lasted, says Lonergan, at least from Plato to Descartes. It is true that the worlds of common sense and theory were differentiated in some way by Plato and Aristotle. But their accounts of the differentiation were not fully methodical. Furthermore, for Aristotle ‘the sciences are conceived not as autonomous but as prolongations of philosophy and as further determinations of the basic concepts philosophy provides’ (M 95). Though Aristotelian psychology clearly had ‘profound insight into human sensibility and intelligence’ (M 95), its basic concepts are derived from metaphysics rather than intentionality. Lonergan insists that the ‘continuity of philosophy and science’ could only be ‘transitional’ (M 96). A decisive shift to the third stage began when modern empirical science established its proper identity and autonomy and so ‘gave a new form to the opposition between the world of theory and the world of common sense’ (M 96). This evoked a whole range of new philosophies, which struggled to explain or resolve this opposition: Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant were key figures in the first part of this struggle. The turn to the subject, which could be said to begin with Descartes, then became more evident in Hegel. Further advance in the appropriation of the subject was made by progress in the human sciences, by Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Newman, Blondel, the pragmatists, Brentano, and Husserl, and above all in Lonergan’s own cognitional analysis and analysis of intentionality. 5.5 Ongoing Undifferentiated Consciousness Lonergan closes his account of the stages of meaning with a discussion of ‘undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages’ (M 97). This reveals something of the flexibility and the dynamics of differentiated consciousness in the concrete. Lonergan argues that there is a ‘mode of survival of undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages’ (M 97). Commonsense operations continue to occur in the carrying out of ‘the world’s work’ (M 97), in everyday life, in teaching, in business, in government. However, predifferentiated common sense differs from postdifferentiated common sense: ‘the very existence of another [theoretical] mode is bound to shift concerns and emphases’ (M 97). The consequences are several and various:

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(1) Antitheoretic literary humanism. Common sense refined by literary reflection may be repelled by technical abstractions. It prefers to base culture on eloquent speech. An antitheoretic literary differentiation (or bias!) results, which identifies being ‘educated linguistically’ and becoming human. It may withdraw from or impede the theoretic differentiation. (2) Moral humanism. Related to antitheoretic humanism is a moral humanism. This emphasizes ‘respect and devotion to man as man’ (M 97). It focuses on others precisely as fellow human beings, particularly if they have suffered (M 97). This contributes much to education, but again it may resist the emerging theoretic ideal. (3) Merging of common sense and theory. Perhaps more important and interesting and still relevant, for the present situation, is the tendency of common sense and theory to merge in less than fully differentiated minds. Creative thought in philosophy and science is disseminated by commentators and popularizers, who ‘illuminate, complete, transpose, simplify’ (M 98). In this way, says Lonergan, ‘the worlds of theory and common sense partly interpenetrate and partly merge’ (M 98), with ambivalent results. Theory can combine with common nonsense, with disastrous results. Generally a dialectic of educated and uneducated, theoretical and pretheoretical consciousness is generated. The discoveries of theory may permeate common sense to produce a post-theoretic differentiation in which society as a whole participates in the discoveries. This allows the ‘mutual comprehension’ necessary for social unity. But the more educated (and more differentiated) may turn in upon themselves and lose contact with general common sense. The less educated may fail to appreciate a differentiated tradition beyond their capacity. Society as a whole may degenerate and fragment (M 99). This kind of discontinuity between common sense and theory may occur also with respect to modern science. As a separate realm of specialized knowledge, science is for the few. But as technology it fuses with common sense and becomes a powerful force for shaping culture (M 99). Though a third stage of meaning may be emerging in the contemporary period, undifferentiated consciousness is not eliminated. It coexists with partially and fully differentiated consciousness in a situation of tension. This may be taken as a Lonerganian analysis of our postmodern condition. ‘Never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater’ (M 99).

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6

Functional Specialties

Some interesting further details on differentiation are found in the chapter on ‘Functional Specialties,’ in the section on ‘A Dynamic Unity.’ In this section Lonergan reflects on the unity of a developing and increasingly differentiated consciousness. He argues for a dynamic unity in the developing subject and offers a positive account of how differentiations may form an integrated unity (M 138). ‘Development, then, seems to be from an initial state of undifferentiation through a process of differentiation and specialization towards a goal in which the differentiated specialties function as an integrated unity’ (M 138). The main discussion focuses directly on method in theology. However, within the main discussion may be found important remarks on the nature of differentiation in individual consciousness and on the communal and historical aspects of differentiation. The remarks on the nature of differentiation in individual consciousness form part of the reply to the question of the relationship of differentiations to ‘real life.’ Lonergan gives an account of the initial differentiation of Christian theology from Christian religion. He points out that a theoretic formulation was needed to preserve scriptural truth. However, once the differentiation occurs the question may arise as to whether academic theology is not ‘merely a cultural superstructure, divorced from real life’ (M 139). Lonergan replies by arguing that we should ask ‘whose “real life” is in question. There is the real life of undifferentiated consciousness and the real life of differentiated consciousness’ (M 139). The latter will require a differentiation of theoretic consciousness. Furthermore, Lonergan argues that differentiation is for integration. Differentiations are integrated into the whole of life by a process of ‘withdrawal for the sake of return.’ Just as inquiry follows the ‘logic of issues’ so development follows the ‘logic of differentiation.’ ‘Development is through specialization but it must end in integration’ (M 140). Theological withdrawal ‘always intends and in its ultimate stage effects a return’ (M 140). It returns with an understanding and deeper self-possession that enriches the further experience of Christian living. It returns in witness and communication. Properly understood, theoretical understanding does not detract from ‘real life’ but contributes to its deepening. This section also provides details concerning the social and historical dimensions of differentiations. Human living and human movements in history are concerned above all with meaning. Meaning develops in history as a group – or a movement constituted by a number of groups – reflects and develops its self-understanding.

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There is a dialectical aspect to this: It follows more or less inevitably that the further any movement spreads and the longer it lasts, the more it is forced to reflect on its own proper meaning, to distinguish itself from other meanings, to guard itself against aberration. Moreover, as rivals come and go, as circumstances and problems change, as issues are driven back to their presuppositions and decisions, to their ultimate consequences, there emerges the shift towards system. (M 139) In the preface to Gratia Operans, Lonergan shows how the community collaborates in arriving at a theological theorem.8 The emergence of fully systematic thinking is a process of differentiation that involves thinkers collaborating in a tradition. Succeeding generations of thinkers draw from and then contribute to the tradition. A genius may be needed to bring a certain line of development to relative fulfilment. Inasmuch as a human movement may advance or suffer reversal, or may fragment, the process of differentiation becomes extremely complicated and may even break down. A fully differentiated consciousness is required to interpret the historical complexity. 7

Dialectic

Though the main topics of discussion in the chapter on ‘Dialectic’ are the notions of horizon and conversion, the topic of differentiation receives some attention. First of all, the notion of horizon is linked to differentiation. Second, an account of the different realms of meaning open to a ‘fully differentiated consciousness’ provides further details on the main differentiations, including the transcendent differentiation. 8

Horizons

The notion of horizon is an important one for Lonergan. He indicates the meaning of the term by analogy with a visible horizon. Just as the visible horizon changes with change of position, so also the horizon of meaning changes according to ‘the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests’ (M 263). Our horizon of meaning – that is, our cognitional horizon and our horizon of value – is at any given moment bound by certain limits. The horizon of our interests and knowledge varies ‘with the

8 Lonergan, ‘The Gratia Operans Dissertation: Preface and Introduction.’

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period in which one lives, one’s social background and milieu, one’s education and personal development’ (M 236). Horizons differ. The differences may be complementary or genetic or dialectical. So, for example, farmers, plumbers, and medical doctors may live in different worlds but they also know about one another’s worlds and recognize the need for them. To that extent their horizons ‘in some measure include one another and, for the rest, they complement each other’ (M 236). A whole range of horizons are needed for ‘the functioning of a communal world’ (M 236). Horizons may also be related genetically as successive stages of development. Then ‘later stages presuppose earlier stages, partly to include them, partly to transform them’ (M 236). The different horizons are parts of ‘a single history.’ Horizons may also conflict and oppose one another. So what is intelligible, true, good in one is unintelligible, false, evil for the other. Such horizons may still have awareness of one another and so ‘in a manner may include the other’ but only as a negation or rejection (M 236). Lonergan argues that ‘all learning is, not a mere addition to previous learning, but rather an organic growth out of it’ (M 237). Hence our present intentions, statements, and deeds occur in the context of present horizons. We appeal to such fundamental contexts whenever we ‘outline the reason for our goals, when we clarify, amplify, qualify our statements, or when we explain our deeds’ (M 237). We resort to our fundamental horizon whenever we are forced to give an account of ourselves or to justify our actions at the deepest level. As well as growing or developing, horizons may contract or become distorted. Past achievements may be neglected or denied. Some genuine part of past cultural achievement may be destroyed, and present culture may as a whole become unbalanced (M 244). This may not be realized, and then what is really breakdown may be promoted as progress (M 244). The ‘about face’ (M 237) of authentic conversion is required. Clearly, this relates to differentiation. The differentiation process brings about a shift of horizon. New differentiations extend the scope of our interests, as they add to the worlds of meaning that together constitute our horizon. As horizons can break down so differentiations can recede. Again, the dynamic nature of the differentiation process is brought out. 9

Horizons and Fully Differentiated Consciousness

Towards the end of the chapter on ‘Dialectic,’ Lonergan returns directly to the topic of differentiation. The connection between horizon and differentiation is clarified, and then Lonergan offers a list of the realms of meaning open to a ‘fully differentiated consciousness’ (M 257). This sums

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up the position already given in previous chapters, but there are some additional nuances and further details. Lonergan begins by making the important point that a differentiated horizon enables a more explanatory account of ‘mental acts’ and, therefore, a more explanatory account of the relationship between consciousness and language: ‘The more differentiated the horizon, the fuller, the more accurate, and the more explanatory will be the talk’ about mental acts (M 257). Given the foundational significance of talk of mental acts, it follows that a more differentiated horizon will facilitate a more explanatory approach to philosophical talk generally. If this is so, then differentiation will clearly be a key to philosophy – though such implications are not developed at this point. Lonergan moves on to state that fully differentiated consciousness is open to four realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence. He emphasizes the point that such differentiation ‘is the fruit of an extremely prolonged development’ (M 257). The details of the development are then outlined. The largely familiar account of the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority is presented, but Lonergan then adds a supplementary note on the transcendent differentiation. 9.1 Transcendent Differentiation After substantially repeating his earlier account of the shift from undifferentiated consciousness to theory, and of the shift from theory to interiority, Lonergan deals with the transcendent realm of religious experience. Here we have ‘the emergence of the gift as a differentiated realm’ (M 266). The transcendent is the basic differentiation in the East and in the Christian West. Lonergan finishes this section by contrasting the most familiar differentiation of the contemporary secular West with the predominant differentiation of the East and of the Christian West. The first ‘distinguishes and relates theory and common sense’ while the second ‘has set in opposition and in mutual enrichment the realms of common sense and transcendence’ (M 266). In this way the contrasting horizons of the secular West and the East/Christian West are established. On each side, different differentiations predominate and relations among different realms are established in different ways. This has great significance in a comprehensive account of philosophic difference. 10

Foundations

Chapter 11 of Method in Theology focuses mainly on the topic of conversion. However, Lonergan notes that conversion manifests itself according to dif-

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ferentiation. This gives him the opportunity to add further remarks on the range of possible differentiations and to give additional details on key differentiations and their interrelationships. Even more important is that it gives Lonergan an opportunity to develop further his account of the differentiation process. 11

The Movement of Differentiations 11.1 The Range of Differentiations

While conversion manifests itself in deeds and in words, still the manifestation will vary with the presence or absence of differentiated consciousness. (M 271)

This variation in differentiation leads to pluralism in expression and so to a multiplicity of theologies expressing the same faith. With regard to the range of different realms of meaning, Lonergan now adds the realm of art and the realm of scholarship. He notes that a realm is differentiated when (a) it develops its own language, (b) it acquires its own distinct mode of apprehension, and (c) it is shared by a distinctive cultural or professional group (M 272). Taking common sense, theory, interiority, transcendence, art, and scholarship as basic, Lonergan goes on to envisage the total range of possibilities of differentiated consciousness. He states that undifferentiated consciousness is able to operate only in the realm of common sense. Differentiated consciousness then adds to common sense one or more of the other realms. Lonergan calculates that there are five cases of singly differentiated consciousness, ten cases of doubly differentiated consciousness, ten cases of triply differentiated consciousness, and five cases of fourfold and one of fivefold differentiation. This yields thirty-one different cases in all. 11.2 Key Differentiations Lonergan surveys the main differentiations in a way that helps bring out the dynamic nature of differentiating consciousness. The dynamic nature of the interrelationships among the key differentiations is further revealed. First of all, the point is made that while common sense as a ‘style of developing intelligence’ is common, as a ‘content,’ as a body of accumulated determinate understanding, it is local and so endlessly diverse. Lonergan also makes the important point that common sense is ‘not unaware’ of the other realms. However, it can only grasp them in a rudimentary way and is only capable of giving them vague expression (M 273).

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As consciousness develops and becomes differentiated, new realms are grasped more firmly and clearly. This has an effect on common sense, for ‘each new differentiation will involve some remodeling of one’s previous commonsense views on matters in which common sense is not competent’ (M 273). The more differentiated mind is able to ‘master more realms’ and to understand and be at home in those realms (M 273). Lonergan suggests that a less differentiated consciousness is at a disadvantage. It is susceptible to the attitudes of ressentiment when threatened by what is beyond its horizon. The religiously differentiated consciousness is then treated. It is said to be ‘approached by the ascetic and reached by the mystic’ (M 273). It is added to common sense. The result is ‘two different modes of apprehension, of being related, of consciously existing’: common sense operates in the world mediated by meaning, while mysticism ‘withdraws’ from that world to enter a contemplative state that responds to the gift of God’s love. Lonergan accepts that the ‘mystical attainment is manifold’ (M 273), but he does not take this further. Artistically differentiated consciousness specializes in recognizing and responding creatively to beauty. Theoretically differentiated consciousness is presented as involving a grasp of things in their verifiable relationship to one another. At first, philosophy was taken as the paradigm of theoretical inquiry, but eventually the sciences claimed this realm, leaving interiority to philosophy. The scholarly differentiation of consciousness is identified with the consciousness of ‘the linguist, the man of letters, the exegete, the historian.’ It is a specialization in entering the common sense of ‘another people, another place, or another time’ (M 274). Interiorly differentiated consciousness is the most crucial development. It shifts from sense experience to find its basic terms and relations in the conscious operations of the human subject and in the dynamic structure that relates them to one another. This is the basis of Lonergan’s whole approach. He argues that modern philosophy has been groping towards this since Descartes: It has been towards such a basis that modern philosophy has been groping in its efforts to overcome fourteenth-century skepticism, to discover its relationship to the natural and human sciences, to work out a critique of common sense which so readily blends with common nonsense, and to place the concrete and sublating context of human feeling and of moral deliberation, evaluation, and decision. (M 275)

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11.3 Advancing and Receding Differentiation At this point Lonergan touches more directly on the dynamic process of differentiation. Differentiations are achievements to be won, often in collaboration with others, and they may be lost. ‘Each of the foregoing differentiations of consciousness can be incipient, mature, or receding’ (M 275). Wisdom literature can foreshadow developed philosophical theory. Equally, ‘psychological introspection’ can begin to reveal ‘the materials of interiorly differentiated consciousness’ (M 275). But development can give way to decline, and this is relevant to the state of philosophy. ‘Modern philosophy can migrate from theoretically to interiorly differentiated consciousness but it can also revert to the undifferentiated consciousness of the Presocractics and of the analysts of ordinary language’ (M 275). Lonergan also emphasizes again the point made earlier about the feedback effect of differentiated consciousness, which ‘remodels previous common sense’ (M 273). Differentiations interact with one another. Hence as each differentiation takes over a realm of the universe it ‘requires of previous attainments a readjustment of their previous practice’ (M 275). Thus theoretically differentiated consciousness ‘enriches religion with a systematic theology’ and ‘liberates natural science from philosophic bondage’ (M 276–7). Later, Lonergan gives the example of how postsystematic and postscientific and postscholarly literature grounds a critique of common sense and shapes the present common sense of educated people (M 304). Another important observation made here points out that diversity results from the fact that ‘there are many different routes through which one might advance to the fivefold differentiation’ (M 275). There is a great flexibility in the development of consciousness to full differentiation. 11.4 Towards an Integral Account of Modalities of Consciousness Finally there is an important passage in the chapter on ‘Foundations’ that points towards an integral account of the modalities of consciousness. It is found in the section on ‘General Theological Categories’ (M 285–8). Here Lonergan gives a comprehensive account of the ‘basic nest of terms and relations’ to be found in his account of the human subject. He says that these can be ‘differentiated in a number of manners’ (M 286). There follows a detailed list of the modalities of consciousness, including patterns of experience, levels of consciousness, differentiations of consciousness, and conversions. There seems to be justification here for understanding

228 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

‘polymorphism’ as including all the modalities of consciousness. I will return to this question shortly. 12

Doctrines

In the chapter on ‘Doctrines,’ Lonergan returns to the issue of differentiation. He recognizes that he has already ‘said not a little on this topic’ (M 302). Here in the section on ‘Differentiations of Consciousness’ he says he intends to offer a fuller account. On the whole he repeats what has already been said, but there are some interesting additional emphases. Now method is presented as a differentiation. Also, Lonergan discusses communications among differently differentiated consciousnesses. This is developed in the context of the discussion on the development of doctrine. Doctrine develops because human understanding develops over time. This development is cumulative. Particular developments ‘respond to the human and environmental conditions of … place and time’ (M 302). But how is development possible? This is where differentiations apply. Lonergan again lists the basic differentiations and then uses them to characterize ‘successive stages in cultural development’ (M 305) and to give an account of the ‘ongoing discovery of mind’ (M 305). 12.1 The Basic Differentiations The list of basic differentiations corresponds closely to previous accounts. However, there are additional details worth mentioning: (1) Common sense is presented as the basic spontaneous entry into the world mediated by meaning. Its variety is emphasized: ‘there are as many brands of common sense as there are differing places and times’ (M 303). (2) The transcendent differentiation orients us to what is ‘transcendent in loveableness.’ Again, the variety is emphasized: ‘This orientation manifests itself in uncounted manners and it can be distorted or rejected in as many more’ (M 303). (3) Lonergan seems to suggest that there is a differentiation which specializes in expression (which completes human knowing and feeling). He says that the ‘development, then, of symbols, of the arts, of a literature, is intrinsic to human advance’ (M 303–4). (4) The emergence of method seems to be seen as a differentiation specializing in apprehending dynamic meaning (M 304). (5) Postsystematic, postscientific and postscholarly literatures are shown to be important influences on common sense (M 304-5).

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(6) Finally, interiority is now seen as providing ‘a standpoint from which all the differentiations of human consciousness can be explored’ (M 305). 12.2 The Ongoing Discovery of Mind The account of the ‘ongoing discovery of mind’ also goes over familiar ground. The differentiations are used to characterize successive changes in cultural development: (1) Lonergan first examines the shift in consciousness from early symbolic apprehension, as prephilosophic and prescientific thought, to the refinements of symbolic thinking in the Old and New Testaments and in the philosophic critiques of anthropomorphism. (2) He points to the Greek Councils as marking the movement to systematic meaning that gradually became dominant in medieval theology. Church doctrines are distinguished from theological doctrine. Lonergan presents church doctrines, interestingly, as examples of postsystematic meaning (M 312). (3) A key shift came with the emergence of modern empirical science, which differentiated itself from philosophical theory and from a general science of being (M 316). (4) The shift to interiority is again seen as decisive. It reveals general science as finding its data in the data both of sense and of consciousness. The shift is seen as taking place in various ways ‘from Descartes through Kant to the nineteenth-century idealists’ (M 316). However, it takes place most decisively in the shift to the fourth level of consciousness. This shift to faith, deliberation, evaluation, decision, action is found in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Newman, Nietzsche, Blondel, the personalists and existentialists, and the pragmatists. Perhaps it reaches a fulfilment in Lonergan’s own work. Lonergan concludes the survey by pointing to the scholarly differentiation, to the differentiation of modern science, and to interiority as the fundamental modern and contemporary differentiations. They have changed (a) our image of the human being and its world, (b) science and our conception of science, (c) history and our view of history and, above all, (d) philosophy and our view of philosophy (M 317). Lonergan adds that to appreciate these changes, intellectual conversion is needed in churchmen and in scientists; for ‘science is one thing and the extrascientific opinions of scientists are another’ (M 317).

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12.3 Communications among Differentiations Some final details on differentiation are provided in a section on ‘Pluralism and the Unity of Faith’ (M 326–30). Lonergan takes up the question of communications among variously differentiated consciousnesses. There is already a problem of communication given the diversity within common sense. Many forms of common sense are ‘generated by the many languages, social forms, and cultural meanings and values of mankind’ (M 328). The difficulty of communication increases when further differentiations are considered. Communication is said to be ‘to each of the various differentiations of consciousness’ (M 326). Hence effective communication has certain presuppositions. ‘An exact grasp of another’s mentality is possible only if one attains the same differentiation and lack of differentiation. For each differentiation involves a certain remodeling of common sense’ (M 328). In general the more differentiated consciousness has the advantage. Lonergan argues that as further differentiations occur, ‘more and more realms are controlled in the appropriate fashion’ (M 328). There is a shift away from the limitations and inadequacy of common sense. For a fully differentiated consciousness ‘common sense is confined entirely to its proper realm of the immediate, the particular, the concrete’ (M 329). The omnicompetence that common sense assumes and presumes because it does not know any better is eventually broken down (M 328). A very positive evaluation is given to differentiated consciousness. Lonergan does not recognize the possibility of differentiations degenerating into mere specialization or the possibility of a lack of common sense in the narrow specialist, but these are certainly dangers to be guarded against. Still, we can recognize that on the whole a more differentiated consciousness has a greater freedom to explore diverse realms of meaning. A more differentiated mind is more likely to be able to communicate with a wider range of people. Hence there is required ‘a many-sided development in those who govern or teach’ (M 329). Only such minds appreciate that ‘there are many routes to full attainment’ and ‘many varieties of partial attainment’ (M 329). A less differentiated consciousness is not able accurately to understand a more differentiated consciousness (M 330). b

emerging positions on differentiation

The purpose of the preceding survey has been to prepare the way for (a) a clarification of the nature of differentiation and of particular differentiations, (b) a showing of how differentiations may be seen as an extension of polymorphism, and (c) giving some indication of the sense in which dif-

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ferentiation is the key to philosophy. These are the concerns of Part B of this chapter. These three goals are interconnected. To clarify the nature of differentiation involves bringing out the dynamic nature of the process of differentiation as well as establishing clarity on the range of differentiations and on the nature of their interrelationships. This allows us to compare the modalities of consciousness that constitute differentiation with the modalities constituted by patterns of experience. It is this comparison that provides reasons for recommending an inclusive use of the term ‘polymorphism.’ I will argue that polymorphism may reasonably be used to mean the mixing and blending of the various modalities of consciousness. Finally, to acquire a fully differentiated consciousness, to be interiorly differentiated and so able to relate to all the differentiations, is to acquire a basis for evaluating philosophic difference. We are able to situate in an explanatory way the range of philosophies found in history: those rooted in a commonsense approach, those adopting a theoretical stance, and those reaching for and attaining interiority as their critical base. 13

What Is Differentiation of Consciousness?

In order to grasp more clearly what differentiation involves, we need to return to the connection between differentiation and ‘skill.’ Differentiations constitute a distinctive type of development in human being. They constitute the development of the conscious and intentional subject, which transcends itself to enter realms of meaning and realms of being and value. But in what exactly does this development consist? The discussion on ‘skills’ (M 27–30) presents differentiation in terms of adaptation, assimilation, and adjustment to some ‘new object or situation’ (M 27). So differentiation is for adaptation to what is given or discovered by spontaneous performance. But in itself, differentiation concerns differences in human operations. Essential to adaptation is (a) the differentiation of operations and (b) the multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations (M 27). Adaptation involves the ability to differentiate and combine operations so as appropriately and skilfully to respond to diverse situations. Eventually the subject attains ‘mastery’ of the operations at ‘a certain level of development’ and in a certain realm of environment. Lonergan gives the example of the oral, visual, manual, and bodily skills combined by the developing infant; but ultimately he has in mind the conscious and intentional operations of the human subject. Hence he goes on to discuss operations that are mediate as well as immediate.

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At this point Lonergan emphasizes the notion of ‘control of meaning’ (M 28). This involves in the first place ‘reflexive techniques that operate on the mediate operations themselves’ (M 28). Again, examples are given. In this case he points to alphabets, grammars, and logics, as well as hermeneutics and, above all, the philosophies that ‘explore the more basic differences between worlds mediated by meaning’ (M 29). What counts most, however, is the type of control. Lonergan has in mind controls that are ‘themselves involved in a type of process’ (M 29). Ultimately he is thinking of the dynamically interrelated operations of transcendental method. This points to another important aspect of the differentiation process. The differentiation and combination of operations, the increasing control of meaning, the devising of reflexive controls of meaning, the growing familiarity with diverse realms of meaning, all involve self-awareness and evoke a heightened self-awareness and self-attention in which ‘the subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction from the world’ (M 29). Increasingly this self-awareness heads for self-appropriation as well as for increasing facility with the world(s) mediated by meaning. This occurs as earlier differentiations – or the tensions between differentiations – prepare for and evoke later differentiations. The crucial later differentiation is interiority, which provides ‘a standpoint from which all the differentiations can be explored’ (M 305). Entry into interiority is the decisive move in arriving at a fully differentiated consciousness and, therefore, at self-appropriation. Perhaps it is useful here to distinguish different differentiations. Clearly, if interiority is the differentiation that specializes in differentiations, then it is not simply a specialization alongside other specializations. We need at least to distinguish (a) common sense and theory, which give entry into worlds mediated by meaning, from (b) interiority, which results from the mediation of immediacy by meaning, and (c) transcendence, which involves a mediated return to immediacy (M 79). Differentiation, then, is the resourcefulness of the human spirit taking possession of itself within the environment it adapts to and within the world of meaning it discovers and constitutes by its manifold operations. This self-appropriation allows an awareness and a flexibility by which the subject can operate in different realms and areas of life in appropriate ways. The subject is able to participate in, to be more fully in, different worlds. It is able flexibly and deliberately to shift attention from one mode of operation to another. A differentiated mind knows what it is doing; it knows its way around diverse realms of meaning; it has acquired explicit knowledge of its different modes of apprehension and its different modes of being in the world. Hence the differentiated subject has the advantage

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of being able to focus its mode of operation in a way that avoids ambiguity and confusion and so is able to realize its full potential: Consciousness is undifferentiated where the whole person is involved, operating simultaneously and equally with all of his [as yet undeveloped] powers. Differentiated consciousness, on the other hand, is capable of operating exclusively, or at least principally on a single level, while the other levels are entirely subordinated to the attainment of the goal of that level, or at least are held in check, so that they do not hinder its attainment.9 This account of differentiations allows us to answer the first of the questions raised concerning it at the end of the first section of this chapter. The differences between patterns of experience and differentiations of consciousness have become clear. Patterns have to do with the immediate first stage of the unfolding of human concerns at the level of sensitivity. They are patterns of experience that are points of departure and conditions of further inquiry, further operations, further developments. Moreover, the patterning is preconscious: ‘the materials that emerge in consciousness are already charged emotionally and conatively’ (I 212). Experience is always already patterned by some concern of the human spirit (apart, perhaps, from the biological pattern, which is a special case). Patterns of experience are initial openings to the field of experience. Differentiations go far beyond patterns. Differentiations are actualizations or developments that take as points of departure experiences in particular patterns and add further operations. They involve a growing awareness of the combination of operations. They are what arise as the underlying concerns of the patterns unfold and are transformed in the unfolding. The motivating concern becomes a concern to explore a realm of meaning. Differentiation begins spontaneously and prereflectively, but a growing awareness and increasing control give rise to an increasingly identifiable concern with the distinct realm of meaning. To operate in a pattern regularly and consistently, to respond to and adapt to one’s situation from within that pattern, leads to a related differentiation. ‘A person of artistically differentiated consciousness is one who consistently gives himself over to the aesthetic pattern of experience’ (M 243). In a sense we could say that we know patterns of experience through the corresponding differentiations:

9 Lonergan, The Way to Nicea, 132.

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Corresponding to different degrees of development and different worlds mediated by meaning, there are similar differences in the differentiation of consciousness. It is only in the process of development that the subject becomes aware of himself and of his distinction from his world. As his apprehension of his world and as his conduct in it develop, he begins to move through different patterns of experience. (M 29) The relationship between patterns and differentiations may be expressed in terms of self-appropriation. Self-appropriation is achieved by the higher differentiation (interiority); by means of interiority one is able to appropriate the other differentiations (common sense and theory), and hence the patterns. (The transcendent differentiation adds further complications, which for now I will put aside.) 14

Differentiation as Developmental Polymorphism

To further establish and appreciate the sense in which differentiation is an extension of polymorphism, the nature and ambiguities of the developmental process of differentiation must be appreciated. This involves addressing the second of the basic questions raised earlier. What are the causes, conditions, relations, and motives for differentiation? We will also need to again address the questions concerning the relationships among different differentiations and their influences on one another. How do earlier differentiations mediate or influence later differentiations? How do later differentiations modify or affect earlier differentiations? These are questions about how the process begins and continues and also about how the process may reverse itself and regress towards dedifferentiation. In other words we are asking how and why an individual human consciousness and the human community develop from undifferentiation towards fuller differentiation, or fail to do so. In the course of this we will have to consider in more detail the relationship of differentiations to self-appropriation. Only after this will the relationship of the process of differentiation to polymorphism become evident. How, then, does differentiation begin and continue? What are the conditions, causes, reasons, and motives for the process? The starting point is undifferentiated consciousness, which as we have seen is characterized by being able to operate equally with all its powers. But precisely because it operates equally with all its powers, these powers remain undeveloped. They are not controlled or directed in any methodical way. Significant development is possible only when operations are differentiated and combined in various ways and when awareness is sufficient to allow decisions to

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be made about how to implement or apply them to the demands and concerns of human life. At first the shift from undifferentiated (or compact) consciousness involves the spontaneous performance of the subject responding to external stimuli, and to a range of sensible experiences, as it adapts to, reacts to, and tests out the environment. But significant differentiation occurs or is achieved only when definite means of control are discovered or devised that will control or govern how meaning is grasped and evaluated. Only then does the subject head towards mastery of his operations and of the situation in which he operates. However, for this to occur spontaneous human performance must be (a) animated and directed by the unfolding exigences of the human spirit and (b) informed and engaged by the human and cultural contexts in which the subject develops. Differentiations are ongoing achievements of both the individual inquirer and the human community. Differentiations are personal achievements in that they involve the exigences of the intelligent, rational, responsible human spirit. They are proper to an intelligent resourceful human subject as it asks further questions, as it explores different ranges of experience and different modes of operations, as it shifts direction and seeks higher viewpoints, as it self-consciously possesses itself and chooses what it will become. The degree or type of differentiation will vary with the ability of individuals to respond to these exigences. There will be a plurality of differentiated minds and the consequent problem of communications among them (M 238). Equally, differentiations are a communal achievement. Besides the controls found in the dynamism of the human spirit there are the controls of meaning discovered or devised by the community in collaboration. Lonergan is clear that ‘human meaning develops in human collaboration.’10 Differentiations unfold historically in ways that require prolonged collaboration and communication. Generally, participation in a developing tradition is required. Once achieved, however, differentiations may be appropriated in an accelerated way through education, acculturation, and socialization. Again, there will be room for great variation in the degree and type of differentiation reached by diverse communities and hence the possibility and probability of confused communications among them. Further complications arise in the relationship between individual and community. In principle the individual and communal aspects of differentiation are not opposed. This may be seen in terms of language. It is sig-

10 Lonergan, ‘Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,’ in A Third Collection, 176.

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nificant, yet often overlooked, how often Lonergan mentions language in connection with differentiation. The embodiment of meaning is crucial to the emergence of language (M 73). Language is the work of the community (M 87). It provides a fundamental connection between the individual and society. Lonergan talks of the child learning to speak as a first differentiation.11 The individual begins to become differentiated only with respect to the available common meaning (M 79). But this does not mean that the community totally conditions the individual. The child learns the language because it is able to respond intelligently. It is the intelligence of poets and writers that enables them to expand the resources of language and make it the vehicle of further discovery. Moreover, the developing subject may eventually become capable of raising the further questions that call for change in the nurturing tradition. The same intelligence with which it learns from the culture continues to operate as it transcends the cultural and calls for further differentiation. To repeat a point made earlier, the sources of meaning (acts and contents of consciousness) are prior to the carriers of meaning (including language). It remains that any particular thinker at a certain stage of development may not be able to appropriate the full resources of the culture. Equally, a culture may lag behind the genius who gathers the resources of a culture to initiate a new development. Generally, there will be many degrees and types of partial differentiation in both individual and community, and many routes to full differentiation in individual and community. There will result an ongoing dialectic of higher and lower differentiations, of educated and non-educated, of individual and community or culture (M 97–8). Against this background I will consider some of the basic features of the process of differentiation that resemble the polymorphism found with regard to the patterns. (1) A very important aspect of the polymorphism of differentiation is found in ongoing undifferentiated consciousness. Lonergan’s account reveals the dynamism and complexity of differentiation and the consequent ambiguity that affects even later stages of meaning. Undifferentiated consciousness survives because it is indispensable for everyday life and for carrying out ‘the world’s work’ (M 97). But it is not unaffected by, for example, the emergence of the theoretic differentiation. Possible results of their coexistence include the interpenetration and merging of common sense and theory with ambivalent results (M 98).

11 Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology, 1.

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This dynamic interplay of theory (or science) and common sense is a feature of contemporary culture. Thomas McPartland has argued that this interplay is a contribution to an analysis of postmodernism: ‘the consciousness of most men and women today, who inherit the products of scientific and scholarly differentiation without achieving those differentiations, may be characterized as “post-modern.”’12 There is, then, a continual interplay of earlier and later differentiations with positive or negative consequences. (2) This is taken up in the account of communication. Unless both sides possess the same range and level of differentiation, the result tends to be confusion. A less differentiated consciousness tends to misinterpret a more differentiated consciousness. In general, a more differentiated mind has an advantage. But also – a possibility not discussed by Lonergan – a mind that has acquired a higher differentiation may lose contact with lower differentiations and be overcommitted to particular systems and fixed theories. Common sense is then not allowed to correct theory in any way. (3)It is also necessary to note the pluralism – inherent in both common sense and in the transcendent differentiation – that is ‘manifested in uncounted manners’ (M 303), even though the transcendent differentiation is transcultural. Moreover, as Lonergan points out, just as common sense may be bound up with common nonsense, so also the religious differentiation ‘can be distorted or rejected’ in many ways (M 303). As initial and basic, the plurality of these differentiations will complicate the emergence of later differentiations. (4)There are many ways to interiority, just as there are many routes to full differentiation (M 329). A good example of this is found in the contrast between the basic differentiation found in the East and the Christian West and that found in the modern secular West. The former, as we have seen, set both in ‘opposition’ and in ‘mutual enrichment’ the realms of transcendence and common sense; the latter distinguishes and relates common sense and theory (M 266). In both cases the tension between differentiations can evoke an entry, more or less reflective, into interiority. But this entry occurs in different ways. The transcendent differentiation involves a mediated return to immediacy that goes beyond or leaves behind the ongoing mediation of immediacy by meaning. It can tend to minimize the role of theory and of thematization. For its part, the theo-

12 McPartland, ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography,’ 246.

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retic differentiation may tend to restrict the entry into interiority to a cognitive, intellectual dimension that overlooks the fourth level of consciousness. These differences contribute to the philosophic differences between East and West and between North and South. (5) Lonergan’s most direct way of pointing out the complexity of the process of differentiation is found where he says that differentiations ‘can be incipient or mature or receding’ (M 275). They can be acquired or lost. As well as differentiation there is dedifferentiation. Again, the philosophical implications are emphasized. Philosophy ‘can revert to undifferentiated consciousness of the Presocractics and of the analysts of ordinary language’ (M 275). All of this, I argue, has relevance to polymorphism. Polymorphism, of course, designates the alternating, blending, interfering, and conflicting of patterns of experience (I 410). But it seems reasonable also to include such factors as the merging of common sense and theory (M 98), the instability of differentiations that can advance or recede (M 273), the ambiguity of more or less differentiated consciousness that survives even in the later stages of meaning (M 97), the pluralism inherent in common sense and in the transcendent/religious differentiation (M 303), the confusions that arise in communication between more differentiated and less differentiated minds (M 328), and the ambiguities owing to the fact that there are many degrees of partial differentiation and many roads towards fuller differentiation (M 329). These features of differentiation resemble features of the patterns of experience. Both differentiations and patterns are modalities of consciousness that can interact to generate ambiguity and confusion in a less than fully self-appropriated mind. Hence we can conclude that as well as the fundamental polymorphism associated with patterns of experience, there is a developmental polymorphism that is a factor in philosophy and cultural difference. 15

Differentiations as a Key to Philosophy

Throughout his exposition of the process of differentiation, Lonergan explicitly and repeatedly indicates its philosophical significance. In some respects differentiations are even more a key to philosophical difference than patterns of experience. Philosophy is born in wonder but only reaches maturity in differentiation. It can only manifest itself at the level of the available differentiation. Hence only gradually does it discover and differentiate its real base in interiority. Given this, we can expect the history of philosophy to reflect the complexities of the process of differentiation. The main differentiations will generate families of similar philosophical approaches: com-

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monsense philosophies, theoretically oriented philosophies, philosophies arising out of self-appropriation. (The artistic differentiation is neglected in Lonergan’s exposition of the philosophical import of differentiation, but it should be included.) Similarly, tensions or narrowness in the differentiations may lead to ambiguities and narrowness in the emerging philosophy. So postsystematic and postscholarly consciousness contributes to postmodern pluralism, while the differentiation of empirical science may lead to positivist restrictions in modern philosophy. The account of differentiation, therefore, provides a framework for interpreting philosophical development as well as for interpreting cultural development. The evidence for this has been provided in the detailed survey already given. Here we only need to record some of the main stages. (1) At first the philosophical search must attempt to express itself on the basis of the undifferentiated consciousness of myth and common sense. Already in myth there is an intention of truth and concern for an order of meaning. But it is confined to ordinary language and to story and proverb. It lacks distinctions. It has no explicit theoretical ideal of control. The commonsense mode of philosophy is not simply a thing of the past. It is always possible for philosophers to revert to this level of undifferentiation or, more fully, to shift focus to common sense and then return to theory or interiority (M 275). Might this not be what occurs in some ordinary language philosophers and in the (Heideggerian) return to Presocratic outlooks? Furthermore, this shifting is inevitable, for undifferentiated consciousness remains operative even in later stages of meaning. At times Lonergan does not seem to see how this reverting to undifferentiated consciousness or to common sense is not only inevitable but also healthy. Moreover, it accounts for some of the basic differences in Eastern, Western, and African modes of thinking. Stanley Rosen,13 in particular, has argued for the permanent significance of ‘ordinary experience’ as the ground of a plurality of philosophies. (2) As common sense develops, as language develops, myth is transformed into systematic reflection. As human life becomes complex, questions arise that call for systematic meaning. Distinctions are made between belief and knowledge, between scientific and nonscientific knowledge. Philosophy becomes theoretical and scientific.

13 Rosen, ‘Philosophy and Ordinary Experience.’ See also his ‘The Metaphysics of Ordinary Experience.’

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It becomes ‘technical philosophy’ (M 258). At this stage, large-scale theory predominates. Metaphysics assumes priority in the classical Greek period. It continues to dominate in the Mediaeval period, albeit modified by the influence of religious differentiation. Other sciences tend to be treated as prolongations of metaphysics (M 95). (3) A new stage begins with the rise of modern empirical science. The sciences become autonomous as particular empirical sciences are differentiated from general science. They ‘discover their own basic terms and relations’ (M 274). They clarify their methods and identify more precisely the range of data they operate with. This has a great impact on the way philosophy is understood. The effectiveness of scientific inquiry led philosophers to take science, as empirical and mathematical, as the paradigm of knowledge. Science dictated to philosophy what it should be. Moreover, when science claimed to explain all data, it began to seem that ‘philosophy has nothing to say’ (M 94). At best, philosophy was the ‘clarification of the local variety of everyday language’ (M 94). (4) However, the restriction of experience to quantifiable experience raised further questions and evoked further differentiations. It facilitated the flourishing of natural science to the point that it clashed with common sense, provoking an epistemological crisis. It overlooked the wider dimensions of human experience and thus evoked the crisis of the human sciences. All of this led to an increasing and fuller ‘turn to the subject’ and to interiority. For Lonergan, philosophy is best identified with this further and basic differentiation of interiority. Its real base and most proper function becomes evident at this point. A fully (interiorly) differentiated consciousness recognizes that the role of philosophy is (a) to ‘promote the self-appropriation that cuts to the roots of philosophic differences and incomprehensions’ and (b) to ground the several realms of meaning and the methods of the sciences (M 95) and to facilitate their integration. It might be argued that philosophy is, strictly speaking, concerned only with the questions of objectivity and reality treated in Insight. However, this overlooks the difficulties of philosophic pluralism stemming from cultural diversity. It fails to appreciate the concerns of comparative philosophy and cross-cultural philosophy. Neither does it respond to the postmodern concern for diversity and difference. History and culture must be given their due, even if we seek to establish ‘transcultural’ foundations to philosophy. Attention to differentiations may provide an important key to certain kinds of philosophic difference.

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In Method, therefore, Lonergan has extended his project to deal with reason in culture and history, and the notion of differentiation is central to this. In this, his project comes close to that of Voegelin, who presents the historical development of consciousness as ‘the fundamental advance from compact to differentiated consciousness and its distribution over a plurality of ethnic cultures.’14 This approach is extremely important for comparative philosophy. I would claim that what John Ranieri says of Voegelin is equally true of Lonergan: ‘We find in Voegelin’s philosophy a genuinely multicultural perspective, a deep concern for the tolerance necessary to sustain a pluralistic society, and, at the same time, a rejection of moral and cultural relativism.’15 Ranieri argues that sensitivity and openness to cultural diversity need not avoid ‘questions of cultural, moral and religious authenticity.’16 This can only be done if we go deeply enough into ‘the fundamental sources of reason and community.’17 Liberal ‘toleration,’ he concludes, was too weak a basis for sustaining ‘the life of reason as it manifested itself in diverse and varied traditions.’18 What is needed is an account of the life of reason that shows how it can encompass diversity through intelligent development. For both Lonergan and Voegelin the notion of differentiation of consciousness is at the heart of resourceful human reason. Lonergan’s account of differentiation provides, then, a significant key for grasping the history and nature of philosophy. Evidently it is an essential component of an integral account of polymorphism and of a comprehensive account of Lonergan’s metaphilosophy. An Additional Note on Conversions To complete the account of polymorphism in Method, close attention would have to be paid to conversion and to the process of conversion. This would build on such works as that of Rende.19 The justification for including conversion as an aspect of polymorphism comes from Lonergan himself. He speaks of ‘the further dimension of polymorphism that results from the acceptance, the partial rejection, or the total negation of faith’ (TE 241n20). Given the constraints of a single book, this dimension can only be mentioned; it cannot be adequately developed.

14 15 16 17 18 19

Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, 58. Ranieri, ‘Eric Voegelin, Liberalism, and the Life of Reason,’ 48. Ibid. Ibid., 49. Ibid. Rende, Lonergan on Conversion.

Recto Running Head 242

Concluding Remarks: Towards a Lonerganian Metaphilosophy

1

Preliminary

The aim of this book was to clarify Lonergan’s apparently far-reaching claim that ‘the polymorphism of consciousness is the one and only key to philosophy’ (I 452). This involved clarifying the nature of polymorphism and its role in accounting for philosophic difference. Two main questions were raised: What precisely is meant by polymorphism? And can polymorphism bear the weight of a developed metaphilosophy? In these concluding remarks I will sum up the results of the inquiry, while indicating what remains to be done if the present project is to be completed. Also, I will touch on the relevance of the present work for contemporary philosophy. First I briefly address the questions of the nature and scope of polymorphism; then I consider whether the account of polymorphism has the strength to bear the weight Lonergan places on it; then, finally, I indicate the potential of Lonergan’s position for addressing the concerns of postmodernism and comparative or cross-cultural philosophy. In this final exploration the wider relevance of Lonergan’s work will begin to emerge. 2

The Scope of Polymorphism

Much of this book has been devoted to a systematic account of polymorphism capable of resolving some of the ambiguities in Lonergan’s own presentation. I argued that polymorphism is best understood in terms of the complete range of modalities of human consciousness, including patterns of experience, levels of consciousness, differentiations of consciousness, and the basic shifts in horizon that result from conversion. Given

Concluding Remarks 243

their status as the most evident component of polymorphism, the patterns of experience were treated most extensively. They were treated both metaphysically and phenomenologically. Chapter 2 laid out the metaphysical approach. Included in this was the understanding that the metaphysical perspective illuminates and motivates the phenomenological approach. The philosophical anthropology implicit in Insight has not received the attention it deserves. Hence this second chapter sought to gather the elements out of which a more systematic account of human nature may be built. Though not fully developed, this account of human being provides an important background to the phenomenologically oriented chapters that follow it. It draws attention to the embodied nature of consciousness. It provides a basis for ordering the patterns and evaluating their significance. It also enables us to evaluate Lonergan’s own account of the patterns of experience. In particular, it aids in the reassessment of the biological pattern. Finally, it provides a basis for reflecting on whether further patterns may be added to Lonergan’s list, such as the symbolic pattern of experience. The next two chapters aimed at clarifying the nature of a pattern of experience, at providing a fuller phenomenological account of the individual patterns, and at addressing the ambiguities over the range of patterns. After an initial clarification of what a pattern of experience is, chapter 3 concentrated on the four patterns treated in some detail by Lonergan. A first concern was to deepen and extend Lonergan’s account of the biological pattern in order to retrieve the positive aspects. A second concern was to differentiate the aesthetic and artistic patterns by drawing on Lonergan’s later works. The metaphilosophical implications of these patterns were touched upon. Then the intellectual pattern of experience was treated at length. Here the concern was to show how Lonergan could give this pattern such prominence in Insight without committing himself to a rationalistic position that would bypass human feeling or restrict full human living. The dramatic pattern was also treated at length in an effort to clarify its relationship to the other patterns, especially to the ethical pattern. As the pattern of ‘ordinary human living’ (I 210), the dramatic pattern covers a lot of ground. For this reason it proved the most difficult pattern to characterize adequately. Here especially more investigation is needed. Chapter 4 responded to the ambiguities over the range of patterns. A major concern here was to establish the point that the list of patterns selected by Lonergan, though needing some modification, is not arbitrary. The spectrum of basic patterns corresponds to the structure of human being. The discrepancy between the list of patterns in chapter 6 of Insight and the list in chapter 14 was noted. An account of the practical and mys-

244 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

tical patterns, named only in the later list, was then shown to be implicit in Insight. Following this it was argued that there is some justification for adding the symbolic and ethical patterns. The symbolic pattern brings out the embodied nature of consciousness and also allows a role for the feeling dimension of consciousness. The ethical pattern reveals the orientation of the human spirit towards the good. It also brings out the exigence for selfappropriation within human consciousness. Both patterns were shown to have metaphilosophical significance. Any convincing metaphilosophy cannot leave them out of consideration. This account of the individual patterns was presented only as a beginning. Each pattern requires a deeper phenomenological appropriation. Tad Dunne gives an example of this in his treatment of the aesthetic and artistic patterns.1 I would suggest also that the unfolding of the patterns in different cultural contexts would reward investigation. What, for example, is the aesthetic dimension of African or Chinese experience? How does the dramatic pattern unfold in these cultures? Such investigations would deepen Lonergan’s account greatly. The account of the patterns needs to be developed in another way. The individual patterns are elements in polymorphic consciousness. However, polymorphism concretely is the mixing and blending of multiple patterns. What exactly is meant by this? Chapter 5 of the book touched on this issue, arguing that Lonergan’s treatment of the patterns in Insight, chapter 14, is limited and misleading. Lonergan does not investigate the mixing and blending of the whole range of patterns. Also, he does not make it clear that the mixing and blending involves shifts in orientations of the subject. Much further work needs to be done on what these shifts in orientation involve. What provokes, evokes, motivates the shifts? Are shifts spontaneous or deliberate? In which ways can the subject fail to shift completely from one orientation to another? How can earlier orientations complement or interfere with later orientations? At first it seems that shifts may occur spontaneously and that the developing subject comes to appreciate the range of possibilities open to it. Certain orientations may come to be habitually dominant. Shifts in orientation may occur in deliberate, intelligent response to the environment, or through personal responses to others in the drama of life, or, perhaps, because of an exigence for wholeness in the human spirit.2 Difficulties arise if the shifts occur merely on the basis of free association or under the undue 1 Dunne, ‘What Do I Do When I Paint?’ 2 Here I suggest that there is an exigence for integral development in human beings. This exigence directs the way in which tensions among different developed dimensions of human beings are negotiated.

Concluding Remarks 245

influence of habitually dominant orientations. These difficulties are only overcome when the subject, directed by an exigence for wholeness and engaged in dialogue with others, comes to appropriate a sufficiently wide range of patterns and enters the realm of interiority. The second aspect of polymorphism is constituted by the levels of consciousness. Chapter 5 of this book, following Mark Morelli,3 argued that operational polymorphism, understood as variations in emphasis of the different levels of consciousness, should be recognized as a further dimension of polymorphism. This development is called for given that Lonergan’s account leaves unclear the relationship between conscious intentionality, unfolding in the levels of consciousness, and the orientations due to patterns of experience. A more integral account of polymorphism emerges when operational polymorphism is related to orientational polymorphism. The different orientations bring about either a heightened awareness of operations at different levels, or the receding of operations so that they are not adverted to, or the conflation of operations.4 This integral account has important metaphilosophical significance. There remains to be done a great deal of further reflection and elaboration if this account of operational polymorphism and the consequent integral account of polymorphism are to be established. Many questions remain concerning the notion of ‘levels’ of consciousness, the number of levels, the relations among levels, and the process of shifting from one level to another. The manner in which lower levels are sublated by higher levels needs to be clarified. Only then will the integral account of polymorphism be established convincingly. Chapter 6 of this book argued that differentiations of consciousness also constitute a dimension of polymorphism. This may be called developmental polymorphism. It encompasses the modalities of consciousness that arise as consciousness develops historically. The case for including differentiations as a dimension of polymorphism was based on establishing a parallel between the process of differentiation and the mixing and blending of patterns. If this argument for accepting differentiations as elements of polymorphic consciousness is accepted, then a more elaborate, integral account of polymorphism is called for. Polymorphism may then be taken as (a) the flux of patterns that blend and mix; (b) the shifting to and fro across differentiations with different degrees of flexibility and range, as well as the generally upwardly directed development of further differentiations provoked by our situation of living in a world of emergent probability, along

3 M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness.’ 4 Ibid., 352.

246 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

with the ever-present possibility of dedifferentiation (as cultivated or by neglect); and (c) the degree of self-appropriation of the levels of consciousness and of the whole range of patterns and differentiations. Finally, self-affirmation and self-appropriation are never permanent achievements; hence there is the need for conversion. Lonergan seems to propose such a position in an important passage in Method in Theology (M 286–7). There he argues that the account of the subject, of its operations and of the dynamic structure within which the operations occur and through which the subject transcends itself, provides ‘the basic nest of terms and relations’ for understanding basic theological/philosophical categories. But this basic set of terms and relations ‘can be differentiated in a number of ways’ (M 286). Lonergan explains this in a passage that needs to be quoted in detail: So one can distinguish and describe: (1) each of the different kinds of conscious operations; (2) the biological, aesthetic, intellectual, dramatic, practical, and worshipful patterns of experience within which the operations occur; (3) the different quality of the consciousness inherent in sensing, in operating intelligently, in operating reasonably, in operating responsibly and freely; (4) the different manners in which operations proceed towards goals: the manner of common sense, of the sciences, of interiority and philosophy, of the lift of prayer and theology; (5) the different realms of meaning and the different worlds meant as a result of the various manners of proceeding: the world of immediacy, given in immediate experience and confirmed by successful response; the world of the sciences; the world of interiority and philosophy; the world of religion and theology; (6) the diverse structures within which operations accumulate towards the attainment of goals: the classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic structures and, embracing them all, the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a metaphysics; (7) the contrast between differentiated consciousness that shifts with ease from one manner of operation in one world to another manner of operation in a different world and, on the other hand, undifferentiated consciousness which is at home in its local variety of common sense but finds any message from the worlds of theory, of interiority, of transcendence both alien and incomprehensible; (8) the difference between those that have or have not been converted religiously, or morally, or intellectually; (9) the consequent dialectically opposed positions and counterpositions, models, categories. (M 286–7)5

5 See also Method in Theology, 273, 326.

Concluding Remarks 247

This seems to be moving towards an integral account of polymorphism. However, this comprehensive enrichment of the ‘initial nest of terms and relations’ is not yet a truly integral account, because the interrelationships among the different elements have not yet been worked out in detail. Working out the details would be a major task. My hope is that the present work has shown the worthwhileness of the project and that it is a proper development of Lonergan’s thought. 3

Can Polymorphism Bear the Weight of a Developed Metaphilosophy?

Chapter 5 of this book raised directly the question of the adequacy of Lonergan’s metaphilosophy. It was argued that, in chapter 14 of Insight, Lonergan did not completely succeed in establishing his claim that polymorphism is the key to philosophy. This was due, at least in part, to the uncontextualized priority given to the intellectual pattern of experience and the consequent neglect of other patterns. While Lonergan may have provided a key to metaphysics (based on the intellectual pattern), he does not offer a comprehensive key to philosophy, which involves all the patterns. However, I also suggested that the beginnings of a more complete account of the patterns, and more adequate metaphilosophy, could be discerned even in chapter 14 of Insight. Furthermore, chapter 6 of the book brought out the metaphilosophical relevance of differentiation. Hence, drawing on the results of the present inquiry, I would suggest that there are resources in Lonergan’s nuanced and many-sided account of consciousness for developing a more convincing account of philosophic difference. An integral account of polymorphism offers hope of a heuristic anticipation of the modalities of experience, meaning, truth, and value open to the human being. Arguably it provides a foundation for entering into, interpreting, and ordering a wide variety of philosophical stances. In other words, an integral account of polymorphism may be able to bear the weight of a developed and comprehensive metaphilosophy. 4

A Survey of Lonerganian Metaphilosophers

Such a metaphilosophy has to be pieced together from Insight and Method and the work of commentators. In a set of concluding remarks this claim cannot be fully established. However, I will attempt to show that it is plausible by making a survey of the work of leading Lonergan commentators who have begun to investigate a Lonerganian metaphilosophy.

248 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

4.1 Michael McCarthy In The Crisis of Philosophy, McCarthy offers the most sustained metaphilosophical reflection by any Lonergan commentator. He examines the crisis of self-understanding in contemporary philosophy as it ‘finds itself in the midst of a cultural transition.’6 This crisis is said to have its origins (a) in the emancipation of natural science from philosophy, which led Kant to delineate the boundaries of reason, and (b) in the emergence of the human sciences, following Hegel’s emphasis on historical consciousness and culture. Then philosophy as a whole was discredited from within as ‘Nietzsche, Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Rorty, in their different ways, have turned against the philosophical tradition in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.’7 These thinkers may be seen as antiphilosophers who called for a ‘postphilosophical culture’ (xii). Rorty is an extreme example of those who would deconstruct ‘philosophy’ into ‘philosophies.’ Such philosophy/ philosophies would be more closely concerned with literary criticism than with science,8 or with poetry and art than with knowledge.9 McCarthy addresses the crisis, as exemplified by Rorty, by offering an extremely powerful defense, extension and application of the basic intellectualist approach that Lonergan develops in Insight. McCarthy insists that there still is a role for philosophy. ‘Philosophy’s permanent theoretical function is the distinction and critical unification of the existing modes of human knowledge.’10 In Insight’s account of the invariant but dynamic structure of human cognitional process, Lonergan, says McCarthy, provides a ‘new integrative strategy.’11 This account is claimed to be equal to the problems raised by the contemporary context of historical consciousness.12 In an important section on ‘The Matrix of Cognitive Meaning – An Orienting Map,’13 McCarthy develops a metaphilosophical framework for exploring and evaluating diverse accounts of the role left to philosophy after science became autonomous. He outlines Lonergan’s account of the core of cognitive meaning in the unrestricted desire to know, and he presents Lonergan’s treatment of the sources, acts, terms, norms, realms, and 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, xi. Ibid., xii. Ibid., xvi. Ibid., xvii. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 10. Ibid., 10–19.

Concluding Remarks 249

stages of cognitive meaning. A special feature of this framework is the way McCarthy clarifies the relationship between intentional operations, as sources of meaning, and intentional signs, which are linguistic mediations of meaning. This is a critical issue in the encounter with the linguistic-analytical tradition. McCarthy goes on to trace the development of ‘a continuous metaphilosophy from the nineteenth century naturalism to Rorty’s linguistic and pragmatic holism.’14 He engages Frege, Husserl, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Sellars, Dewey, Quine, and Rorty in a critical dialogue, discussing psychologism, naturalism, intentionality, the linguistic turn, and philosophical and cultural conflict. In this manner he demonstrates convincingly Lonergan’s ability to contribute, at a high level of sophistication, to a whole range of topics in contemporary philosophy. Any account of Lonergan’s overall contribution to an exploration of philosophic difference would have to take note of this rigorous defence of Lonergan’s intellectualism. If a comprehensive and integral Lonerganian metaphilosophy is to be developed, McCarthy’s work will provide much of the core position. However, the strong emphasis on the cognitional core, and the way McCarthy prescinds from hermeneutical and postmodern developments,15 leads him to underplay the role of polymorphism as a factor in philosophical difference. Though aware of polymorphism as a factor in philosophical pluralism, he does not proceed to a close examination of the influence of the diverse individual components of polymorphism. 4.2 Michael Vertin According to Vertin, the construction of a Lonerganian metaphilosophy should focus on the a priori operations of human consciousness. He argues that if an analysis of philosophical diversity is to be ‘both accurate and manageable,’16 we must concentrate on what Lonergan calls the ‘basic nest of terms and relations’ (M 286) that define the subject and its operations. Different philosophical assertions must be evaluated in relation to the normative structured dynamism that moves us to self-transcendence. In this Vertin takes himself to be following Lonergan, who explicitly links self-appropriation of the levels of the subject’s conscious intentional operations with philosophic difference. ‘The category into which a given philosopher really falls will depend on the degree of his self-appropriation’ (I 238). ‘Three basic types of philosophy [empiricism, idealism, rational14 Ibid., xxi. 15 Ibid., 339n4. 16 Vertin, ‘Diverse Readings of Evil,’ 97.

250 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

ism] are organized, respectively, about the level of experience, about the level of intelligence, and about the level of rational reflection’ (I 178). In other words, families of philosophies will be centred around levels of consciousness. Vertin extends Lonergan’s own suggestion by taking into account the fourth, and perhaps a fifth, level of consciousness, and makes this the core of his whole approach to metaphilosophical analysis. Different positions may be evaluated and ordered according to the accuracy and clarity with which they interpret concrete subjectivity as a whole. For example, empiricism attends to the given but neglects the role of the intellect. Platonism and Kantianism recognize the level of intelligence but objectify intelligibility as forms or categories of understanding, and both overlook judgments. Hegelianism recognizes the dynamism of consciousness but fails to distinguish understanding and conceptualization. Nietzsche recognizes the level of freedom but fails to grasp how it sublates lower levels. Each of these positions will be performatively self-contradictory in some way, inasmuch as they ignore one or more levels of consciousness. Vertin believes that the framework provided by a grasp of normative consciousness is flexible enough to be applied to a wide range of philosophical issues. He provides a valuable account of operational polymorphism. However, his exclusive attention to the levels of consciousness results in a metaphilosophy that does not invoke polymorphism as a whole. His approach needs to be complemented by a more comprehensive account of polymorphism such as that developed in this book. 4.3 Matthew Lamb Lamb offers a distinctive account of the patterns, giving some details of their metaphilosophical relevance. He explicitly discusses the patterns as a ‘foundation for meta-method.’17 In themselves, patterns are different aspects of the ‘self-presence-in-world.’18 But as they objectify themselves in social and cultural and scientific and philosophic and doctrinal contexts, they may be explicitly appropriated and differentiated. They become a ‘meta-contextual key.’19 Lamb argues that the patterns ‘can be used to elaborate a functional typology of historical differentiation’20 and thus to indicate the shifts in cultural outlook by identifying the pattern that is explicitly recognized in 17 18 19 20

Lamb, History, Method and Theology, 254. Ibid., 360. Ibid., 362. Ibid., 272.

Concluding Remarks 251

the culture and that underlies the dominant mode of knowing. Though the cultural spectrum presented is not explicitly a philosophical typology, it indicates the kinds of cultural influence on philosophy. Lamb recognizes the biological, aesthetic, intellectual, ‘ethical or moral,’21 ‘religious,’22 and dramatic patterns. He develops the following typology: (a) In primitive societies the biological pattern has ‘a functional primacy within the dramatic pattern.’23 The religious and aesthetic patterns are operative but are dominated by the biological pattern. The intellectual and moral patterns are at a rudimentary stage. (b) In ancient high civilizations the aesthetic pattern becomes central. The intellectual and moral patterns begin to emerge. (c) In the axial period (800–200 BC) major cultural shifts occur in Greece, Israel, Persia, India, and China as the intellectual and moral patterns emerge prominently. Greek philosophy develops, and in China Confucianism and Taoism manifest ethical concerns. (d) In Western medieval civilization the religious pattern dominates, together with a more developed intellectual pattern. The religious pattern becomes more clearly differentiated from the moral. (e) In the Enlightenment or modern period a narrow specialization of the intellectual pattern comes to dominate. Calculative reason, which Lamb calls mechanomorphic rationalism, takes priority over original wonder. Other patterns are distorted or suppressed. To Lamb’s typology we can add a further stage: (f) In the postmodern period the neglected patterns reassert themselves simultaneously and the intellectual pattern is demoted and deconstructed. Polymorphic desires are acknowledged, but so far contemporary thinkers are struggling to find a way to negotiate the claims of and tensions among the patterns. Even in its manifest underdeveloped state, this typology is illuminating. It is suggestive of the potential of the patterns for understanding both cultural and philosophic difference. It gives grounds for holding that a return to the patterns and a fuller appropriation of them would reveal more convincingly that polymorphism is a key to philosophy.

21 Ibid., 265. 22 Ibid., 266. 23 Ibid., 272.

252 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

4.4 Mark Morelli Morelli understands polymorphism in terms of ‘a variety of dynamic structures’24 that are functions of the dynamically unfolding levels of consciousness and of orienting patterns. Operational and orientational polymorphism are combined to give ‘the complex notion of a variable range of dynamic structures or polymorphic unities.’25 On the basis of this integral account of polymorphism, Morelli develops a ‘genetico-dialectical analysis and reconstruction’26 of the ways in which a pluralism of philosophies emerges. The aim is to retrieve the positive aspects of philosophies that, from a purely dialectical point of view, may be evaluated as counterpositional. Morelli argues that positional philosophy arises out of the intellectual pattern of experience or out of the ‘pristine normative structure’ of conscious intentionality. He points out, however, that the normative structure remains operative even within the other dynamic structures, even where it serves concerns proper to other patterns.27 The consequences of this are significant: ‘Accordingly, from them [the other dynamic structures] as well the philosopher may derive notions of knowledge, objectivity, and reality which, because of their apparent philosophic significance, in turn may be employed as critical guides in the construction of epistemology and metaphysics.’28 In other words, various philosophies, each with its own understanding of the basic philosophical variables, will arise out of the different dynamic structures. The problem is to show how such ‘putative’ philosophies have value even if they do not reflect the ‘pristine normative structure’ of consciousness. Morelli argues that even counterpositional philosophies may be based on ‘the accurate objectification of polymorphic unities other than the intellectual.’29 To that extent they will reveal concretely some aspect of human consciousness, human development, or human living. Such philosophies will extend our grasp of the range of human consciousness and, when properly interpreted, will also reveal something of the normative structure of human consciousness in the concrete. A clue as to how this happens is found in Morelli’s claim that the normative notions ‘unfold without inhibition or reinforcement in the intellectually governed subject’30 – more generally, in the subject committed to

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

M. Morelli, ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness,’ 391. Ibid., 392. Ibid., 393. Ibid., 394. Ibid. Ibid., 395. Ibid.

Concluding Remarks 253

the transcendental precepts (be attentive in experiencing, be intelligent in understanding, be reasonable in judging, be responsible in deciding). By contrast, in the other patterns the normative stages and levels of unfolding conscious intentionality will be inhibited or reinforced in different ways.31 The reinforcement of some aspects of consciousness has the positive effect of enabling them to be grasped in greater concrete detail, detail that would otherwise be lacking. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, for instance, draw attention to the artistic and aesthetic modes of consciousness and to the freedom of personal selfconstitution. In this way they rightly oppose rationalism by revealing dimensions of consciousness that are irreducible to calculative thinking. They enlarge our grasp of polymorphic consciousness and hence contextualize our grasp of rational consciousness. On the other hand, if these orientations are taken uncritically as the ground of basic philosophic values, or as motivations for denying the possibility or desirability of normative values, then the counterpositional dimensions of these approaches become prominent. Morelli holds that these considerations are enough ‘to suggest the potential heuristic fruitfulness of Lonergan’s complex notion of polymorphism in accounting for the many, contradictory, disparate philosophies.’32 He recognizes, however, that though Lonergan laid the groundwork for a genetic consideration of diverse philosophies, ‘he has not seriously undertaken it.’33 Nevertheless, we can reasonably expect that Lonergan’s genetic metaphilosophy will reveal ‘seven families’ of philosophic systems based on the seven patterns of experience. Furthermore, ‘when it is written, if it is written well, it should rival Hegel’s in its sympathetic reconstructive perspicuousness and surpass Hegel’s in its critical discrimination.’34 It must also be said that Morelli himself has not undertaken the genetic account in detail. The members of the ‘seven families’ of philosophy need to be identified. Still, Morelli’s account of integral polymorphism provides useful and important indications of how a Lonerganian metaphilosophy may be developed. 4.5 Frank Braio Braio’s concern in ‘Twine in the Labyrinth’ is with pluralism and relativism generally. He attempts to reply to the antifoundationalism that underlies 31 32 33 34

Ibid., 399. Ibid., 396. Ibid. Ibid.

254 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

relativism. In responding to these issues he implicitly offers the basis for a relatively complete Lonerganian metaphilosophy. A first contribution to the metaphilosophy is found in his account of the dynamic structure of consciousness as it unfolds in history. Braio makes clear that ‘the intentional life of human beings is neither solitary nor atemporal.’35 Hence, a first order pluralism arises from the historical and social aspects of the unfolding of conscious intentionality.36 In the first place this pluralism unfolds as the community mediates the subject, the subject as receptive member of the community. The subject develops by learning, by appropriating the ‘specific sets of questions, sensibilities, symbols, methods, answers and capacities for insight, expression, judgment, and action which the community has judged to be cognitive, constitutive, and/or efficient in the particular context.’37 However, as the mediated subject becomes mature, and more self-directing and assertive, it may discover those further questions that reveal the oversights of the mediating community, culture, or tradition. This calls for the ‘correction, destabilization, or progressive transformation’38 of the culture. The mature subject emerges and now comes to mediate for the culture. A relative transcendence of the person over culture makes this possible. The consequence is that the conditions for learning and teaching are ‘progressively reset.’39 A new generation of learners enter the culture and tradition as it attains a higher stage of development or embarks on a different line of development. Pluralism is the inevitable result as different people in different contexts in different generations raise different questions. ‘The flexibility of human query and action yield a plurality of intricately related relative contexts and subcontexts.’40 As Braio is concerned to point out, however, from a Lonerganian perspective this pluralism is not radical, though it is also not eradicable. The general form of such pluralism ‘can be heuristically specified in advance.’41 Furthermore, given that learning from the community takes place on the same basis as discovery for the community, we can expect limits to the divergences. Moreover, we can find ways of crossing over into other perspectives. A self-correcting process operates in both individual and community owing to the common underlying structure of conscious intentionality. ‘It is this common struc-

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Braio, ‘Twine in the Labyrinth,’ 74. Ibid., 79–83. Ibid., 80. Ibid. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 82. Ibid., 83.

Concluding Remarks 255

ture which makes entry into, operation within, transformation of, and exit from contexts possible.’42 A second form of pluralism is due to the ongoing process of differentiation. Consciousness operates in predifferentiated, undifferentiated ways and in multiple and integrally differentiated ways. Predifferentiated ways include (a) spontaneous intersubjectivity and (b) biological extroverted immediacy. Common sense is taken as undifferentiated. Braio notes the plurality of common sense due to generation gaps, social classes, and culture. Finally, he discusses at length the aesthetic–artistic, scientific, scholarly, and properly philosophic differentiations. This gives another order of pluralism. Again, Braio sets out to show that this pluralism is nonradical. It is not radical ‘because the routes exist by which the relevant differentiations … can be, in one way or other, learned or spanned.’43 The routes have a common basis in the dynamic structure of basic operations. They can be traversed by subjects willing to develop and differentiate their consciousness in appropriate ways. A third form of pluralism is said to arise in connection with what Braio calls ‘displacement.’ He affirms that ‘the intentional life of the human subject is “displaced” when its [effective] dynamic orientation corresponds to the transcendental precepts.’44 This gives rise to a radical pluralism of incommensurable horizons. No higher viewpoint exists in terms of which differently displaced subjects can reconcile their differences. Differently displaced subjects possess different sensibilities, raise different questions, come to different judgments, arrive at different values. They live in different worlds. Such pluralism, however, is eradicable in that further displacement – or conversion – is possible. Further self-appropriation enables the subject to operate consistently on the basis of all the transcendental precepts. The subject attains comprehensive self-transcendence in more complete conversion – ultimately religious conversion. Braio concludes that a polymorphically self-appropriated subject, who is fully and explicitly converted, is well aware of proliferating pluralism. But such a subject ‘does not confuse that difficulty with the belief that there is not a non-relative matrix to be appropriated, that there is no twine in the labyrinth.’45 Braio’s account is valuable in that it deals with different aspects of polymorphism. He brings out the social and historical dimensions of operational polymorphism. He touches on orientational polymorphism and gives a helpful treatment of developmental polymorphism. He discerns also the role of conversion. Generally Braio provides a basis of or guide for 42 43 44 45

Ibid., 80. Ibid., 98. Ibid., 98. Ibid., 119.

256 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

the construction of a metaphilosophy that accounts for pluralism without concluding to relativism. 5

Towards a Lonerganian Metaphilosophy

Braio and the other commentators point to what the complete dimensions of a Lonerganian metaphilosophy might be. Together they provide grounds for holding that Lonergan’s treatment of polymorphism opens up to a nuanced and comprehensive account of philosophic difference. It offers hope that a heuristic anticipation of the most important lines of philosophic development might be achieved. This heuristic anticipation would allow us to enter sympathetically into alternative positions and enable us to read fruitfully even radically different philosophies. ‘The importance of the theory of philosophic difference is that, if one gets a sufficient grasp of it, one can read fruitfully all sorts of material without losing one’s way’ (TE 177). The heuristic anticipation does not minimize the contribution of any philosopher or philosophic tradition. It does not diminish the need for serious dialogue. Rather, it calls for a dialogue that reaches down to the level of interiority and a dialogue that is open to polymorphic difference. Such a metaphilosophy has considerable implications for recent developments in contemporary philosophy. 6

Relevance of Polymorphism for Contemporary Philosophy

The wider relevance of the inquiry may be seen in the context of recent developments in contemporary philosophy. Here I have in mind (a) the radical self-criticism of philosophy found in postmodernism and (b) the related phenomenon of developments in comparative or cross-cultural philosophy – including post-colonial philosophy. A full engagement with these developments is not possible. Still it is possible to indicate briefly how the emerging Lonerganian account of polymorphism is able to address the real concerns of these developments. 6.1 Postmodernism Accounts of postmodernism are notoriously diverse, and a definition acceptable both to postmodernists and their critics is hard to come by.46 46 In my account of postmodernism I rely on the following treatments: May, Reconsidering Difference; Rosenau, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences; Swamikannu, ‘Deconstruction and Inter-Religious Dialogue’; Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy, After Philosophy; Cohen and Dascal, The Institution of Philosophy; McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics; White, Political Theory and Postmodernism.

Concluding Remarks 257

Critics of postmodernism tend to caricature and demonize it just as much as postmodernism caricatures and demonizes the logocentrism of modernity. Still there are concerns that may be recognized on all sides as constitutive of postmodernism. One way of characterizing postmodernism is to take it as a series of second thoughts on the Enlightenment. Postmodernism rejects what it takes to be the oversights and excesses of the Enlightenment. In the first place, it rejects the notion of the subject as ‘atomistic, autonomous, disengaged and disembodied’ and as ‘self-transparent.’47 Postmodernism refuses to identify the subject with rationality. The Cartesian notion of the self-sufficient rational self is de-emphasized and deconstructed. In different ways the one-dimensional Enlightenment account of the subject is rejected. The postmodern subject as passionate, engaged, embodied is taken as transcending reason. In emotion, feeling, and spontaneous freedom the subject becomes elusive. For some postmodernists the subject has no fixed identity: it is entirely a construct of society or culture or history.48 In the second place, postmodernism rejects the Enlightenment’s excessive focus on the power of reason, which is assumed capable of attaining universal truth and of integrating all knowledge into a comprehensive system. The focus on the power of pure reason resulted in the neglect of diverse aspects of human consciousness: aesthetic awareness, emotions and feelings, imagination and mystical experience.49 For ‘calculative reason’ these dimensions of consciousness are marginalized as the ‘irrational.’ Such reason is reductive of everything it encounters. It tends to overlook or deny differences arising from diverse contexts, epochs, and cultures. It reduces otherness to sameness in order to bring everything under rational control. Such a view of reason has social and political consequences. Universal reason can be used to rationalize and legitimize established systems of control. It may be used to justify cultural imperialism and may become an agent of oppression when it identifies rationality with the modes of thought of the technologically dominant culture. Postmodernism rejects the arrogance of pure reason as it attempts to ground everything by itself. It rejects the attempts of reason to create an all-inclusive metanarrative. It is sceptical about the claim of reason to be 47 Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy, After Philosophy, 4. 48 For a good account of the issues involved here, see Levine, Constructions of the Self. 49 ‘Nietzsche’s celebration of and yes to artistic beauty as a final redemption or liberation of life and its vital forces was due to the fact that the categories of reason, in their myriad of metamorphoses, level down excesses in culture that do not fit in with their preordained, strict, logical structure’ (Swamikannu, ‘Deconstruction and Inter-Religious Dialogue,’ 24–5).

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free of prejudice or preconception.50 Above all, postmodernism rejects the denial of difference that is the inevitable consequence of the ambition of universal reason. To universal reason, [postmodernists] oppose the irreducible plurality of incommensurable language games and forms of life, the immediately local character of all truth, argument and validity – to the a priori, the empirical, to certainty, fallibility, to invariance historical and cultural variability, to unity heterogeneity, to totality the fragmentary, to selfevident givenness (‘presence’) universal mediation by a differentiated system of signs, to the unconditioned a rejection of ultimate foundations in any form.51 According to Todd May this emphasis on difference is the most basic theme of postmodernism. The central issue is ‘how to conceive difference and how to valorize it.’52 Reversing modernism, which marginalized difference, postmodernism privileges difference over identity. For May this overprivileging of difference is as problematic as the logocentrism it replaces. The rejection of reason and theory makes it difficult for postmodernism to present its case convincingly. Any giving of explanation is equated with logocentrism and universal reason. Postmodernism, as it gives an account of itself, encounters the problem of ‘self-referential adequacy.’ Furthermore, postmodernism is reluctant to make comparative judgments or evaluations, which would privilege one position over another. But this results in a privileging of all difference, precisely and simply as difference. This leads to an abstract account of difference that makes no difference. There is no basis for deciding what counts as reasoned action on behalf of another.53 Hence postmodernism cannot effectively resist concrete oppression or engage particular histories of domination.54 This issue must be kept in mind as we consider the Lonerganian response to postmodernism. 6.2 Lonergan and Postmodernism: Polymorphism and Difference A number of Lonergan commentators, including Martin Matustik, Jerome Miller, and James Marsh, have contributed to a growing dialogue with post50 51 52 53 54

Cohen and Dascal, The Institution of Philosophy, 225. Baynes, Bowman, and McCarthy, After Philosophy, 3–4. May, Reconsidering Difference, 2. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism, 20. Sardar, Postmodernism and the Other. See also Harris, ‘Postmodernism and Utopia, an Unholy Alliance.’

Concluding Remarks 259

modernism. Matustik offers a reading of Lonergan intending to place Lonergan in the company of such figures as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, and Rorty. He argues that Lonergan’s account of ‘mediation’ and of ‘human operational development’ is a kind of deconstruction. Different discourses in the history of theology, in mathematics and science, in art and religion, are deconstructed to find a dynamic ‘point of assembly’ in the structures of human polymorphic consciousness. Furthermore, deconstruction is related to the reorganization of one’s operational development found in conversion.55 In all this we discover ‘a more radical Lonergan.’ Miller agrees that there is a sense in which ‘Insight seems to be a paradigm kind of work that deconstruction was invented to undermine.’56 Nevertheless he is convinced that Lonergan goes beyond the modern/postmodern problematic: ‘Lonergan’s way of thinking is neither trapped inside modernist presuppositions nor satisfied by the postmodern deconstruction of them but points to a kind of wisdom beyond both.’57 The real message of Insight is a call to live with the radical tension that constitutes us as limited yet self-transcending. In accepting this with genuineness we ‘deconstruct’ the self-centred, truncated self and remain open to the universe of being – and to the polymorphic possibilities of human being.58 James L. Marsh provides a very useful overview of the similarities and contrasts between Lonergan and postmodernism. He also notes that Lonergan appears, at first sight, to be an ‘enthusiastic modern.’59 He argues, however, that a deeper reading reveals how Lonergan can meet the postmodern challenge and in turn challenge it. Marsh argues that at the level of descriptive or phenomenological adequacy, postmodernism may even seem ‘one-dimensional’ in comparison with Lonergan. This is surprising in view of the postmodern concern with difference and plurality. But the emphasis on the other can be formal and abstract. By contrast, Lonergan offers ‘a phenomenology of the different forms of rational activity that allows him to claim against postmodernism that he is the true or truer friend of difference.’60 Lonergan’s application of difference is shown in (a) the account of the self operating at multiple levels of consciousness, (b) the affirmation of the different patterns of experience, (c) the recognition of various forms of bias, (d) the acknowl-

Matustik, Mediation of Deconstruction, xi. Miller, In the Throe of Wonder, iii. Ibid., 110. Miller supports this by opening up lines of communication between Lonergan and Heidegger (In the Throe of Wonder, ch. 3). 59 Marsh, ‘Postmodernism,’ 159. 60 Ibid., 165.

55 56 57 58

260 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

edgment of multiple differentiations, and (e) the different kinds of conversion and the distinction between authentic and inauthentic subjectivity. By contrast, in identifying reason with calculative reason, postmodernism tends to overlook ‘the experienced lived difference in forms of rationality.’61 It misses the operation of intelligence in different forms of life. Furthermore, this greater phenomenological adequacy is combined with greater self-referential adequacy. In his account of polymorphism, Lonergan finds a place for intelligent and rational performance while recognizing the multiple orientations of intelligence and reasonableness owing to diverse patterns. Marsh insists that ‘one cannot, without self-referential inconsistency, deny knowing, the value of rationality, and the reality of the self.’62 Marsh goes on to argue that Lonergan provides greater ‘hermeneutical adequacy.’ The account of the differentiations of consciousness provides a nuanced account of cultural history. This account does more justice to the concrete unfolding of history than does postmodernism. The postmodern account of history and modernity is too undifferentiated and so, in fact, minimizes difference.63 Moreover, Lonergan is able to provide criteria for progress and decline in history. These criteria are found in the ‘normative exigences of the subject giving rise to four transcendental precepts.’64 Lonergan also develops an account of genetic and dialectical methods that reveal how positions lead to progress and how counterpositions lead to reversal. This allows Lonergan to give a nuanced account of the unfolding of modern philosophy that avoids placing figures such as Descartes, Kant, and Hegel indiscriminately under ‘logocentrism.’ It would be going too far to say that Lonergan is a postmodernist in the same sense as Derrida or Foucault. Still, by drawing on the full range of Lonergan’s account of polymorphism, Marsh and other commentators show how Lonergan may be able to meet and transpose the postmodern challenge in unexpected ways. As this dialogue with postmodernism continues I believe that it will increasingly reveal the importance of Lonergan’s account of polymorphic consciousness. Mention should be made here of the remarkable survey and recontextualizing of postmodernism provided by Fred Lawrence.65 This sets the postmodern project in a wider context that avoids its relativistic and nihilistic tendencies while providing a better basis for its positive concern for the ‘other,’ for difference, and for concrete liberation. Lawrence concludes that 61 62 63 64 65

Ibid., 166. Ibid., 164. Marsh develops this point in ‘Strategies of Evasion.’ Marsh, ‘Post-modernism,’ 167. Ibid. Lawrence, ‘The Fragility of Consciousness.’

Concluding Remarks 261

[if] we recontextualize the postmodernist’s moral and aesthetic sense of responsiveness to otherness within Lonergan’s framework, then the decentering, detotalizing and becoming heterogeneous of the self can be reinterpreted as the basic and radical displacement of the subject that occurs most paradigmatically in religious conversion.66 I am hinting at a context of God’s glory by which the postmodernist taste for excess, extravagance, and intensity is made good in the light of God’s astonishing desire for the flourishing of each and every person and thing in all their specificity and particularity.67 6.3 Comparative Philosophy Ongoing developments in comparative philosophy also provide an important context for evaluating Lonergan’s account of polymorphism as the key to philosophy.68 By drawing attention to the tremendous diversity of culturally based philosophies, comparative philosophy greatly extends the range of philosophic difference that needs to be accounted for by Lonergan’s key. Comparative philosophy is a relatively recent development. Comparative studies in religion and ethnology, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were not matched by comparative studies in philosophy.69 Histories of philosophies tended to marginalize non-Western thought as simply the prehistory of philosophy.70 It was left to Paul Masson-Oursel to formulate explicitly the notion of comparative philosophy. His position was that ‘no one philosophy has the right to put itself forward as coextensive with the human mind.’71 MassonOursel hoped to show how comparative philosophy led to an understanding of ‘the unity of the human mind under a multiplicity of aspects.’72 Such a project, he thought, was ‘capable of ultimate progress.’73 Much pioneering work on comparative philosophy was done in a series of conferences at the University of Hawaii. At first comparative philosophy aimed optimistically at a synthesis of diverse philosophies that would con66 Ibid., 205. 67 Ibid., 206. 68 My main sources for this account of comparative philosophy are Scharfstein et al., Philosophy East/Philosophy West; Larson and Deutsch, Interpreting across Boundaries; Deutsch, Culture and Modernity; and Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment. 69 Larson and Deutsch, ‘Introduction,’ Interpreting across Boundaries, 6–9. 70 Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment, 113. 71 Masson-Oursel, Comparative Philosophy, 35. 72 Ibid., 200. 73 Ibid., 203.

262 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

stitute a world philosophy of universal relevance. This was the approach of the first conference (1939) and of the second (1949). Later conferences were more aware of the difficulties of such a project. There was increasing wariness over Eurocentric pseudo-universalism, which tended to assimilate the thought of other cultures to its own categories.74 Universalism gave way to careful and detailed comparative studies. In the sixth conference (1989) the focus was on ‘the plurality issuing from difference.’75 Questions about relativism and incommensurability came to the fore. There was also a concern for ‘mutual cross-cultural understanding through careful interpretation and frank critical engagement.’76 At this stage, as comparative philosophy became more reflexive and self-critical, important hermeneutical and methodological questions emerged ‘about the nature and validity of the comparative process itself.’77 The methodological questions are discussed at length in the report of the fifth conference on comparative philosophy (1984).78 The report intends to outline the ‘state of the art’ in the discipline. Particularly useful in clarifying the methodological questions is Raimundo Panikkar’s ‘What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?’ He holds that most comparative studies are limited by the ‘thrust towards universalization characteristic of western culture.’79 Too often the appeal to the universalism of knowledge and truth involves a Eurocentric account of rationality and truth. The legitimacy of other conceptual frameworks is then difficult to establish. Hence the repeated questioning of the philosophical status of Asian and African thought.80 ‘Africa may have its psychology, India religion, China ethics, and so forth, but philosophy is viewed exclusively as the genial invention of the Greek mind, set forth by the European genius and grafted later onto other parts of the world.’81 It is this concern to do justice to Asian and African positions, and so to avoid cultural imperialism, that leads Panikkar to say that ‘comparative philosophy is an impossible independent discipline.’ His point is that it is impossible to find neutral ground. Almost inevitably one culture will be assimilated to the categories of another. Panikkar tries to resolve the difficulties by clarifying the methodology of comparative philosophy: ‘a critical comparative philosophy will have to ask Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment, 121. Deutsch, ‘Preface,’ Culture and Modernity, xii. Ibid. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment, 125. Larson and Deutsch, Interpreting across Boundaries. Panikkar, ‘What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?’ 116. This was also pointed out by Daya Krisha in his contribution to this conference, ‘Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be.’ 81 Panikkar, ‘What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?’ 135.

74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Concluding Remarks 263

about the kind of philosophy or philosophical attitude it assumes when doing comparative philosophy.’82 This comes very close to the Lonerganian question: ‘What are we doing when we are doing comparative philosophy?’ Panikkar examines a number of possible approaches. The first he calls a transcendental approach. This seeks to uncover the conditions of its own philosophizing. These conditions are taken as conditions for all philosophizing: they are taken as transcultural. Panikkar then evaluates this approach. It is valid as far as it goes, but it is not truly comparative as it assimilates other views to my way of philosophizing. Structuralism, linguistic philosophy, and phenomenology are also discussed and shown to be insufficient bases for comparative philosophy. Finally, Panikkar examines the dialogical or comparative method. This he holds to be the most adequate as it consciously intends being open to the philosophic experience of others. It does not claim that there is a neutral ground, but it recognizes that any approach has its own presuppositions. Furthermore, Panikkar argues that it is only in the encounter and in the effort to communicate that we overcome misunderstandings, cross boundaries, and forge ‘a common universe of discourse.’83 This is only possible for those who ‘have existentially crossed the borders of at least two cultures.’84 In this way the key methodological issues are made explicit by Panikkar and other contributors: (a) How can we be sure that the Western emphasis on rationality and the universality of truth does not involve a merely Eurocentric view of rationality? (b) Is a neutral standpoint for evaluating cultures and their philosophies impossible? (c) How can we best appreciate and characterize the differences between Western, African, and Asian philosophies and so recognize all as properly philosophical? (d) What kind of dialogue will allow us to cross over and appreciate other cultures and their philosophies? Panikkar’s discussion is valuable and raises important questions. In some ways, however, his discussion does not go far enough. Despite the theme of ‘interpretation across boundaries’ there is little explanation of how this is possible. Good intentions do not translate into adequate methodology. 82 Ibid., 121. 83 Ibid., 132. 84 Ibid., 131. This condition puts new light on Lonergan’s claim that selfappropriation begins with a ‘sufficiently cultured consciousness’ (I 5).

264 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

Panikkar talks of those who have ‘existentially crossed the borders of at least two cultures,’ but he gives no account of how this occurs. Also, he seems to minimize the contribution of the transcendental approach, which he perhaps takes in a Kantian manner. From a Lonerganian point of view he does not take seriously enough the questions of ‘What, in fact, am I doing when I am philosophizing?’ and ‘What am I doing when I am doing comparative philosophy?’ Hence the judgment from the Preface, quoted here, still seems to be applicable: ‘Comparative philosophy as an openminded, methodically rigorous, hermeneutically alert, and yet existentially committed comparative study of human orientations is still in a nascent stage.’85 6.4 A Lonerganian Contribution Lonergan’s account of polymorphic consciousness, I believe, may contribute to the maturing of comparative philosophy. (a) In the first place Lonergan asks, in a more concrete way than Panikkar, ‘What are we doing when we are doing philosophy?’ and ‘What are we doing when we are doing comparative philosophy?’ Lonergan goes beyond the level of concepts to the subject’s preconceptual performance and invites all participants in the dialogue to do the same. (b) Second, properly understood, Lonergan is against any intellectual imperialism. He invites all participants in the dialogue to perform their own self-appropriation and to articulate their own understanding of philosophizing. His special contribution is found in his concern that the dialogue be based on the level of conscious intentional performance and not at the level of conceptual products. (c) Third, Lonergan’s account of the dynamic structure of consciousness shows how interpretation across cultural boundaries goes forward on the same basis as did the appropriation of one’s own culture. Intracultural learning and intercultural communication are not different in principle.86 (d) Fourth, in the account of the patterns of experience Lonergan already has a nuanced account of important factors leading to cultural diversity. Different combinations and differentiations of pat85 Larson and Deutsch, ‘Preface,’ Interpreting across Boundaries, xiii–ix. 86 This is implied in Lonergan’s treatment of humanity as a ‘concrete universal.’ The same point is also made by Lampert in ‘Gadamer and CrossCultural Hermeneutics.’

Concluding Remarks 265

terns ground the tremendous variety in cultures and in the philosophies emerging out of these cultures. The diverse cultures are shown to be human possibilities, accessible in principle to any human. (e) Fifth, the account of the main historical differentiations of consciousness further clarifies the factors giving rise to cultural variation. Again these differentiations are developmental possibilities for any human and thus any culture. (f) Sixth, Lonergan is able to give a detailed account of the factors leading to tremendous variation in cultures and in culturally based philosophies, without concluding to relativism as the inevitable implication of difference. Lonergan finds in self-appropriation and in interiorly differentiated consciousness a basis for negotiating the differences and for crossing the boundaries. The greater the degree of self-appropriation of polymorphic consciousness, the greater the possibility of fruitful dialogue leading to the crossing of cultural and philosophical boundaries.87 Doran brings this out well in his account of ‘world-cultural consciousness.’88 Acquiring an interiorly differentiated consciousness involves ‘the self-appropriation of the cross-cultural constituents of human integrity.’89 Doran develops Lonergan’s account of differentiation and considers nine main differentiations. Starting from compact consciousness or ‘Prehistoric Undifferentiation,’ he treats (i) Realistic Common Sense, (ii) Artistic Differentiation, (iii) Ecological Differentiation, (iv) Transcendent–Religious Differentiation, (v) Theoretic Differentiation, (vi) Scientific Differentiation, (vii) Scholarly Differentiation, (viii) Mystical–Soteriological Differentiation, and (ix) Interiorly Differentiated Consciousness (Philosophical Differentiation). This account of differentiation is then developed into a basis for assessing cultural conflict, into a way of appreciating cultural diversity, into a basis for measuring cultural integrity and a way of evaluating cultural progress and decline.90 Doran makes the further important point that though a culture is a function of ‘a given structure of differentiation,’ in fact ‘no empirically given culture as such is normative for genuine human87 Braio’s discussion in ‘The Twine in the Labyrinth’ was concerned to show how pathways between diverse positions may be established. 88 Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, ch. 17. 89 Ibid., 169. 90 Doran’s analysis already much advances discussion in comparative philosophy. The overreaction to Western cultural imperialism leads too often to the avoidance of any questions concerning the evaluation of cultural progress and decline.

266 Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism

ity.’91 Rather, genuine humanity is normative for culture. Here genuineness involves a commitment to growth and to further differentiation – and to differentiated self-transcendence. Such genuineness is open and sensitive to diversity in a way that overcomes cultural conflict: Conflict within a given culture is partly a matter of clashes of persons of variously differentiated consciousness … Conflicts between cultures are often a function of differing combinations of conscious differentiations as [these] exercise a prevalent influence in establishing operative sets of meaning and value to guide different ways of life.92 Tensions between cultures arise when one culture is more differentiated than another, or when one culture is more specialized than another in its differentiation. Doran is careful to point out that these two situations are not the same. A person operating largely at the level of common sense will struggle to comprehend a religiously or artistically or interiorly differentiated person. But there is another side to this. A more specialized differentiated consciousness may be tempted to a presumption of superiority (the bias of the specialist). For example, ‘a scientifically differentiated consciousness may be quite compact in other realms’ and yet presume superiority over technologically undeveloped cultures. In fact this (merely) scientifically differentiated consciousness is ‘quite impoverished’ when compared to a consciousness that is operationally differentiated ecologically or artistically or religiously.93 The scientifically differentiated consciousness will be ‘prone … to the instrumentalization of reason’ as well as to the ‘dismantling of the integral scale of values.’94 The scientific culture may be functionally one-dimensional and hence inferior to as yet non-scientific cultures that more integrally embody a wider range of differentiations. The measure of cultural integrity is judged in terms of the harmonious and integral coexistence of a range of differentiations.95 Such considerations are relevant to debates in African philosophy and in comparative philosophy generally. They justify the caution of African philosophers in regard to the supposedly ‘universal’ standard of rationality proposed by Western thought. Also, they provide a partial justification for the ethnophilosophical trend in African philosophy, as well as for the 91 92 93 94 95

Doran, Theology and the Dialectics of History, 536. Ibid., 537. Ibid., 539. Ibid. Ibid., 540.

Concluding Remarks 267

development of ‘Ubuntu philosophy’ in South Africa.96 They provide support for claims that the starting point for African philosophy must include the ‘African difference.’97 It may be argued, for example, that African philosophy and African culture have distinctive roots in the dramatic and symbolic patterns of experience and in the artistic and ecological differentiations of consciousness. Generally, Doran’s account of the differentiations of consciousness enables us to appreciate sensitively the rich variety of experiences found in other cultures. This account of differentiation also avoids some of the extreme reactions to Western cultural imperialism. It allows us to see cultures and intercultural dialogue in a dynamic way. This avoids the need to defend non-Western cultures by arguing that cultures are incommensurable. There is no need to claim complete autonomy of cultures in a way that rules out cross-cultural communication. Doran’s account encourages an ongoing dialogue that aims at a world-cultural consciousness of integral differentiation. It allows that integral differentiation to be approached from many different directions. There is more than one pathway to integral differentiation. Already a number of studies have been done applying Lonergan’s thought to culture and cultural difference.98 I believe that a developed account of polymorphism would contribute greatly to further developments in comparative philosophy and to cross-cultural dialogue. The account of polymorphism developed in this book is only a first stage in the long-range project of demonstrating that Lonergan has provided an important key, or a set of keys, to philosophy. A more detailed account of polymorphism in all its dimensions is called for if Lonergan’s claim is to be established. However, I hope that enough has been said to illustrate the plausibility of that claim. If the concerns of postmodernism and comparative philosophy can be illuminated by polymorphism, there is reason to hope that a more developed account of polymorphic consciousness would be of great value for the establishment of a comprehensive metaphilosophy. The aim of the present work has been to motivate such a project.

96 See Okafor, ‘In Defence of Afro-Japanese Ethnophilosophy’; Shutte, Philosophy for Africa; see also Eze, Postcolonial African Philosophy. 97 Owomoyela, The African Discourse. 98 Valera, ‘Towards a Transcultural Philosophy I’; Coehlo, ‘Et Judaeus et Greacus et Methodo’; Cronin, ‘The Relevance of Pluralism in the Writings of Bernard Lonergan, S.J., to African Christian Theology’; Klein, ‘Dimensions of Culture in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan.’

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Recto Running Head 269

Bibliography

Abbreviations in Text

I UB M CS V TE PH PA LE

Insight: A Study of Human Understanding Understanding and Being Method in Theology ‘Cognitional Structure’ (in Collection) Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas Topics in Education ‘Philosophy of History’ ‘Panton Anakephalaiosis: A Theory of Human Solidarity’ ‘Lectures on Existentialism’

Works by Bernard Lonergan Books Collection. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. J. Patout Burns. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Vol. 3 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. Method in Theology. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism. Ed. Philip J. McShane. Vol. 18 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

270 Bibliography Philosophy of God, and Theology. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1973. A Second Collection: Papers by J.F. Lonergan, S.J. Ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1974. A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan S.J. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. New York: Paulist Press, 1985. Topics in Education. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Vol. 10 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. Understanding and Being: The Halifax Lectures on Insight. Ed. Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli. Revised and augmented by Frederick E. Crowe with the collaboration of Elizabeth A. Morelli, Mark D. Morelli, Robert M. Doran, and Thomas V. Daly. Vol. 5 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. Vol. 2 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. The Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology. Trans. Conn O’Donovan. London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1976.

Published Articles ‘The Gratia Operans Dissertation: Preface and Introduction.’ Ed. Frederick E. Crowe. Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 3, no. 2 (1985): 9–46. ‘Panton Anakephalaiosis: A Theory of Human Solidarity.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9, no. 2 (1991): 134–72. ‘Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 12, no. 2 (1994): 125–46.

Unpublished Manuscripts (available at Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto) ‘Lectures on Existentialism.’ Institute at Boston College, 15–19 July 1957. These lectures are available as a transcript (made by Nicholas Graham) of tapes of the original lectures. The transcript is found in File 113 at the Boston College Lonergan Center. ‘Philosophy of History.’ Included in File 713, which contains Lonergan’s early writings on the philosophy and theology of history.

Works by Other Authors Argyros, Alexander J. A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and Chaos. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991. Barden, Garrett. ‘Method and Meaning.’ In Zande Themes: Essays Presented to Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, ed. André Singer and Brian V. Street, 105–29. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972. – ‘The Symbolic Mentality.’ Philosophical Studies 15 (1966): 28–57.

Bibliography 271 Baynes, Kenneth, James Bohman, and Thomas A. McCarthy, eds. After Philosophy: End or Transformation? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989. Braio, Frank. Lonergan’s Retrieval of the Notion of Human Being: Clarifications of and Reflections on the Argument of Insight, Chapters I–XVIII. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. – ‘Twine in the Labyrinth: Lonergan, the Non-relative, and the Horizon of Three Pluralisms.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 9, no. 2 (1991): 72–133. Braxton, Edward K. ‘Images of Mystery: A Study of the Place of Myth and Symbol in the Theological Methodology of Bernard Lonergan.’ PhD diss., Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1975. Cahoone, Lawrence E. The Ends of Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995. Capaldi, Sue L. Emotion, Depth, and Flesh: A Study of Sensitive Space. New York: SUNY Press, 1993. Clarke, J.J. Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. Coelho, Ivo. ‘Et Judaeus et Graecus et Methodo: The Transcultural Mediation of Christian Meaning and Values in Lonergan.’ Paper presented at the Lonergan Workshop, Boston College, June 1999. Cohen, Avner, and Marcelo Dascal, eds. The Institution of Philosophy: A Discipline in Crisis? La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989. Cronin, Brian. ‘The Relevance of Pluralism in the Writings of Bernard Lonergan S.J. to African Christian Theology.’ PhD diss., Boston College, 1986. Desmond, William. Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. – Philosophy and Its Others: Ways of Being and Mind. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990. Deutsch, Eliot, ed. Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991. Doran, Robert M. ‘Christ and Psyche.’ In Trinification of the World, ed. T.A. Dunne and J. LaPorte, 112–43. Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978. – ‘Lonergan: An Appreciation.’ In The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan. Edited by Vernon Gregson. New York: Paulist Press, 1988. – ‘Psyche, Evil, and Grace.’ Communio 6 (1979): 192–211. – Subject and Psyche, 2nd ed. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994. – ‘The Theologian’s Psyche: Notes toward a Reconstruction of Depth Psychology.’ In Lonergan Workshop 1, ed. Frederick Lawrence, 93–142. Missoula: Scholars Press, 1978. – Theology and the Dialectics of History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. Dunne, Tad. ‘Consciousness in Christian Community.’ In Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, ed. Matthew L. Lamb, 291–303. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981. – Lonergan and Spirituality: Towards a Spiritual Integration. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985. – ‘What Do I Do When I Paint?’ In Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 16, no. 2 (1998): 103–32.

272 Bibliography Eidle, William R. The Self-Appropriation of Interiority: A Foundation for Psychology. New York: Peter Lang, 1990. Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi, ed. Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Fitterer, Robert John. ‘The Notion of Common Sense in Bernard Lonergan’s Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.’ MDiv thesis, Regent College, 1996. Flanagan, Joseph F. ‘The Basic Patterns of Human Understanding according to Bernard Lonergan.’ PhD diss., Fordham University, 1976. – Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Griffin, David Ray, ed. Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 1993. Grisez, Germain. ‘Toward a Metaphilosophy.’ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 37 (1963): 47–70. Habermas, Jürgen. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Halton, Eugene. Bereft of Reason: On the Decline of Social Thought and Prospects for Its Renewal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Harris, Leonard. ‘Postmodernism and Utopia, an Unholy Alliance.’ In I Am Because We Are: Readings in Black Philosophy, ed. Fred Lee Hord and Jonathan Scott Lee, 367–82. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995. Heelas, Paul. ‘Introduction: On Differentiation and Dedifferentiation.’ In Religion, Modernity, and Postmodernity, ed. Paul Heelas, 1–18. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Kanaris, Jim. Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy of Religion. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. Kidder, Paul E. The Relation of Knowing and Being in Lonergan’s Philosophy. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1987. Klein, Dennis. ‘Dimensions of Culture in the Thought of Bernard Lonergan.’ PhD diss., Boston College, 1975. Lamb, Matthew L. History, Method, and Theology: A Dialectical Comparison of Wilhelm Dilthey’s Critique of Historical Reason and Bernard Lonergan’s Meta-Methodology. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978. – ed. Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981. – ‘The Notion of the Transcultural in Bernard Lonergan’s Theology.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 8, no. 1 (1990): 48–73. Lampert, Jay. ‘Gadamer and Cross-Cultural Hermeneutics.’ Philosophical Forum 27/29 (1997): 351–68. Larson, Gerald James, and Eliot Deutsch, eds. Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Lawrence, Frederick G. ‘The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other.’ In Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, 173–211. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1993. Lazerowitz, Morris. ‘A Note on “Metaphilosophy.”’ Metaphilosophy 1, no. 1 (January 1970): XX–91.

Bibliography 273 Levine, George, ed. Constructions of the Self. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992. Liddy, Richard. Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993. May, Todd. Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, and Deleuze. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Marsh, James. ‘Strategies of Evasion: The Paradox of Self-Referentiality and the Postmodern Critique of Rationality.’ International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 3 (1989): 339–49. – ‘Postmodernism: A Lonerganian Retrieval and Critique.’ International Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1995): 159–73. Masson-Oursel, Paul. Comparative Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926. Matustik, Martin J. Mediation of Deconstruction: Bernard Lonergan’s Method in Philosophy: The Argument from Human Operational Development. Lanham: University Press of America, 1988. McCarthy, Michael. The Crisis of Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990. McGowan, John. Postmodernism and Its Critics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. McKinney, Ronald. ‘The Role of “Conversion” in Lonergan’s Insight.’ Irish Theological Quarterly 52 (1986): 268–78. McPartland, Thomas J. ‘Horizon Analysis and Historiography: The Contribution of Bernard Lonergan toward a Critical Historiography.’ PhD diss., University of Washington, 1976. – ‘Consciousness and Normative Subjectivity: Lonergan’s Unique Foundational Enterprise.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 13, no. 2 (1995): 111–29. Melchin, Kenneth R. History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability: Ethics, Society, History in the Work of Bernard Lonergan. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987. Meynell, Hugo. ‘Philosophy after Philosophy.’ In Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, 137–52. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1993. Miller, Jerome A. In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Postmodern World. Albany: SUNY Press, 1992. Morelli, Elizabeth M. ‘Reflections on the Appropriation of Moral Consciousness.’ Lonergan Workshop 13 (1997): 161–88. Morelli, Mark D. ‘Lonergan’s Unified Theory of Consciousness.’ Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 17 (1999): 171–88. – Philosophy’s Place in Culture: A Model. Lanham: University Press of America, 1984. – ‘The Polymorphism of Human Consciousness and the Prospects for a Lonerganian History of Philosophy.’ International Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 4 (1995): 379–402. Morelli, Mark D., and Elizabeth A. Morelli, eds. ‘Introduction.’ In The Lonergan Reader, ed. Morelli and Morelli, 3–28. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997. Okafor, Fidelis O. ‘In Defence of Afro-Japanese Ethnophilosophy.’ Philosophy East and West 47, no. 2 (1997): 363–81.

274 Bibliography Owomoyela, Oyekan. The African Discourse: Discourses on Africanity and the Relativity of Culture. New York: Peter Lang, 1996. Panikkar, Raimundo. ‘What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?’ In Interpreting across Boundaries, ed. Gerald J. Larson and Eliot Deutsch, 116–36. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Parker, James. ‘The Scandal of Philosophy: The Contributions of Bernard J.F. Lonergan to Metaphilosophy.’ Thesis for Licentiate in Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1976. Ranieri, John. ‘Eric Voegelin, Liberalism, and the Life of Reason.’ Budhi 1, no. 1 (1998): 27–49. Rapp, Carl. Fleeing the Universal: The Critique of Post-Rational Criticism. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998. Rende, Michael L. Lonergan on Conversion: The Development of a Notion. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991. Roochnik, David. The Tragedy of Reason: Towards a Platonic Conception of Logos. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990. Rosen, Stanley. ‘The Metaphysics of Ordinary Experience.’ Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1995): 41–57. – ‘Philosophy and Ordinary Experience.’ Bradley Lecture, Boston College, 27 October 1995. Rosenau, Pauline Marie. Postmodernism and the Social Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Sardar, Ziauddin. Postmodernism and the Other: The New Imperialism of Western Culture. London: Pluto, 1998. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami, Ilai Alon, Shlomo Biderman, Dan Daor, and Yoel Hoffmann. Philosophy East/Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic and European Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Shute, Michael. The Origins of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan’s Early Writings on History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993. Shutte, Augustine. Philosophy for Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press, 1993. Smith, Quentin. The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1986. Swamikannu, Stanislaus. ‘Deconstruction and Inter-Religious Dialogue.’ PhD diss., Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1995. Tallon, Andrew. Head and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness. New York: Fordham University Press, 1997. Tracy, David. The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan. New York: Herder and Herder, 1979. Turski, W. George. Towards a Rationality of the Emotions. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994. Valera, J. Eduardo Perez. ‘Towards a Transcultural Philosophy I.’ Monumenta Nipponica 27, no. 1 (1970): 39–64. Vertin, Michael. ‘Diverse Readings of Evil: Philosophical Underpinnings.’ Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America 50 (1995): 93–104.

Bibliography 275 Voegelin, Eric. The Ecumenic Age. Vol. 4 of Order and History. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974. West Coast Methods Institute Newsletter (May 1989). A report on the conference on the Patterns of Experience, Santa Clara University, 17–19 March 1989. Available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto. Whelan, Gerard. ‘The Development of Lonergan’s Notion of the Dialectic of History: A Study of Lonergan’s Writings, 1938–1953.’ PhD Diss., University of St Michael’s College, Toronto, 1997. White, Stephen. Political Theory and Postmodernism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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Recto Running Head 277

Index

Act(s): conscious 70, 135, 211n7; conscious intentionality 18, 26, 47, 51, 87, 89, 90, 92n42, 119, 121, 154, 159, 172, 210, 215, 253, 254; of judging 20, 21; of seeing 20, 99; of understanding 9, 20 Aesthetic-artistic-symbolic pattern, as the most basic and properly human pattern 118 Aesthetic Pattern 27, 93, 101n6, 113–14, 115, 118, 119n24, 121, 122, 126, 127, 138, 143, 154, 156, 183, 206, 233, 251; and the artistic pattern 113, 117–19, 138; and creative freedom 117–19; and the dramatic pattern 127; and elemental wonder 118; and the joy of conscious living 115; and liberation from biological necessity 113; as assisting the intellectual pattern 121, 122, 126; and the practical pattern 143; and Nietzsche 182; in primitive societies 251; and the symbolic pattern 154, 156; and stimulus-response 113; and awareness of the self 113 Aesthetization, of the intellect 119 African difference 267 African experience, aesthetic dimensions of 244

African modes of thinking 229; philosophical status of 262 African philosophy 5, 118, 267; and the dramatic pattern 137; and universal rationality 266; trends of 160, 266 African psychology 262 Already-out-there-now-real 12, 97, 108, 111, 142, 149 Ambiguity, due to animality and the biological pattern 175; and the need to discriminate between cognitive and other concerns 29; in the more or less differentiated consciousness 238; as avoided by the differentiated subject 233; in the treatment of metaphysics as problematic 183; about moral consciousness 161; and patterns of experience 102; as pervasive in Lonergan’s account of polymorphism 40, 46; in the account of philosophical diversity 47; in the range of aspects of polymorphism 47; as caused by polymorphism 151; in the later stages of meaning 236; in a less than fully self-appropriated mind 238 Analysts, of ordinary language 227, 238

278 Index Analytical philosophers 196 Ancient high civilization 251 Animality 78, 175 Antifoundational age 38 Antiphilosophies 38 Antithesis 42, 43, 97, 98 Argynos, Alexander 90, 270 Aristotelian, sources of Lonergan’s thinking 66; psychology 219 Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition 156 Aristotle 71, 219 Art, and moods 118; as revealing and exploring the potentialities of human living 118; immanent criteria for evaluating 117 Artistically differentiated consciousness 226 Artistic creation 116, 117 Artistic pattern 27, 101n6, 113, 114, 115–17, 244; as advancing over the aesthetic pattern 115; and free intellectual creation 115; and creative freedom 117–19; as objectifying the purely experiential pattern 116; and the field of intentionality 115; and African and Chinese philosophy 118; as straining for truth 114 Asian philosophy 160, 263 Asian thought 262, 271 Authenticity, defined by self-transcendence 49; and conversion 136; and genuineness 137; and cultural diversity 241 Axial Period 251 Barden, Garrett 154, 155, 270 Basic Pattern, of cognitional operations 9, 21; of cognitional structure 121; of human experience 135; of human intentionality 165; of selftranscendence 136

Basic patterns, and the structure of human being 243; of human understanding 154n6; philosophical implications of 141 Baynes, Kenneth 256n46, 257n47, 258n51, 271 Being 22, 24, 42, 73, 78, 81, 97, 121, 171, 175, 204; as divine 216; intention of 24; field of 126; and finality 74; forgetfulness of 37; horizon of 92; notion of 83; realms of 231; science of 229; whole of 229; world of 125; universe of 42, 68, 69, 78, 86, 88, 97, 156, 175, 259 (See also Being, proportionate) Being, proportionate 34, 56, 57, 58, 64, 73, 82, 89, 91, 185, 191n18, 192; and the conscious tension in man 77, 93; and finality 77, 89, 164; and human nature 57; human being as open to 89; and incarnate consciousness 64; integral heuristic structure of 34, 183, 184, 201; and potency 73; as unfolding 58; universe of 185 Being in love with God 152 Being-in-the-world 114, 136; modes of 232 Belief 152, 240 Bergson, Henri 118 Bias, and antitheoretic literary humanism 220; and the biological pattern 109; and counter positions 182; of common sense 79, 177, 189; as deviant form of polymorphism 51; different forms of 259; general 148; generated by polymorphism 189; intellectualist b. in Insight; of the specialist 266; and symbolic consciousness 179 (See also Dramatic bias)

Index 279 Biological consciousness 67, 175; as extroverted 97 Biological pattern 4, 27, 42, 44, 66, 67, 90, 93, 105–12, 132, 197, 233; and the aesthetic pattern 118; and animal knowing 44, 109, 110; and biological schemes of recurrence 106; and ecological participation 112; as evolutionarily inherited 98, 106n12; as higher system to biology 106; and the intellectual pattern 44, 110, 172, 196, 197; problematic aspect of Lonergan’s account 109; and neural demand functions 90; and the operations of the human spirit 110, 112; and the organic 110; origin of 90; and the practical pattern 109; and philosophical pluralism 4; positive aspects of 243; and primitive society 51; and sexuality 112 Blondel, Maurice 219, 229 Braio, Frank 53, 87, 88n26, 94, 94n44, 99n4, 102n7, 103, 103n10, 106n13, 112, 112n17, 117, 127, 127n37, 130n42, 144, 144n1, 149, 253–6, 265n87, 271 Braxton, Edward 51, 151n35, 271 Bynum, Terrell Ward 37n11 Cahoone, Lawrence E. 35n8, 38n15, 271 Calculative thinking 253 Capaldi, Sue 160, 271 Cartesianism 13, 38n15, 90, 119n23, 191; notion of the self 257 Chemical elements 66, 67 Chinese philosophy 118 Clash of civilizations 6, 29 Classical laws 57, 58 Classical methods 57 Classical physical laws 64

Cognitional: analysis 7, 48, 171, 172, 173, 178, 197, 200, 202; appropriation 20, 202; operations 9, 12, 24, 121; structure 3, 9, 19, 24, 121; theory 6, 6n2, 14, 25, 49, 124, 181, 200 Cognitive: agent 14; activity 158; concerns 29; freedom 67; foundations 38; functions of meaning 216, 248, 249; integration 38; intentionality 48, 144; operations 18, 19; performance 7, 8, 11; phenomena 166; process 43, 98, 185; self-transcendence 16–19, 69 Coincidental aggregates 66 Coincidental manifold 59, 74, 75, 80 Common sense 6, 11, 28, 29, 30, 99, 112, 142, 144, 148, 150, 177, 211, 220, 239; field of 99, 149; and its limitations 149; grasping something of the long-term and theory 149; and the world mediated by meaning 232; mode of philosophy 239; and the practical pattern 142, 150; realm of 213; and science 112; and the specialist 28; tension with theory 29; and transcendence 224; world of 207 Commonsense Eclecticism 190; as spontaneous mixing and blending of patterns 193; and polymorphism 193 Communal thinking, 87 Communication 61, 62, 86, 87, 146, 148, 215, 222, 235, 237; between body and mind and heart 156; and common meaning 212; cross-cultural 29, 51, 267; among differentiations 230, 237; between more and less differentiated minds 238; and emergent probability 61; of feeling 216; internal to the subject 155–7;

280 Index and literary language 211; between Lonergan and Heidegger 259n58; and poetry 211 Compact consciousness 177, 265 Comparative philosophy 4, 33, 240, 241, 261–4, 264–7 Conceptual analysis 7 Concerns 10, 21, 41, 101, 120, 121, 130, 233; alien 9; and the aesthetic pattern 156; conscious shifting between 26; cognitive and other 29; existential and other 29; and personal life 137; normative 40; and organizing control 99; as orienting us 100; patterns and 45, 103; practical 125, 154; of the spirit of inquiry 122; of symbolic consciousness 130; theological 35 Concrete universal 57, 83–8; and humanity 56, 85; notion of 56; and human solidarity 57, 83–8; and cultural pluralism 87 Conditions for learning and teaching 254 Conflict between cultures 266 Conjugates 60, 64; experiential 64; explanatory 64; of lower and higher orders 65; and intellectual activity 80, 82 Connaturality 31, 156, 160 Conscious intentionality 90; acts of 23; and aesthetic consciousness 119; feeling and 159; and language 210; levels of 18, 47, 51, 154; integral 92n42; and intellectual pattern 121; patterns of experience and 26, 121, 172; structure of 254; unfolding of 89, 216, 253, 254 Consciousness 8, 11–14, 26, 63, 68, 69, 84, 90, 95, 100, 106, 107, 117, 160, 166, 168, 180, 183; as chaotic 33, 178; confrontational aspect of

106, 111; compact 127, 177; as conscious and intentional 11, 12, 13, 14; developing in history 41, 204, 205; dynamism of 19, 140; embodied 15, 29, 44, 100, 158; empirical 186; extroverted 194; modalities of 6, 40, 238; moral 160–8; mystical 17; neural base of 64; as variously patterned 42, 60; and presence to self 8, 12, 22; protean 177; as shifting between different concerns 26, 195; stream of 26, 62, 122, 143; structure of 19, 24, 27, 196; sufficiently developed 5; sufficiently cultured 9, 263n84; symbolic 28, 153–9; tension within 179; unity of 18, 41, 56, 70, 72, 140, 188, 194; Unified Theory of 6n2; world-cultural 267 Consciousness-in 11, 14, 23 Consciousness-of 11, 14 Consistency, between knowing and doing 50, 71, 133, 162, 163, 167; exigency for 71, 162, 165; logical 25; self-referential 260 Contemporary philosophy 242; crisis in 248; Lonergan’s contribution to 249; metaphilosophy and 256; polymorphism and 256 Control(s) of meaning 207, 208, 209, 232, 235 Conversion 4, 47, 54, 137, 155, 203, 222, 227, 228, 246, 259; and authenticity 136, 223; and the dramatic pattern 136; and differentiation 225; as foundational polymorphism 51; intellectual 23–6, 33, 49, 50, 54, 159, 229; and mystical experience 153; psychic 53, 159; and pluralism 255; as a dimension of polymorphism 199, 241; and shifts in horizon 242; religious 49, 255, 261

Index 281 Counterpositions 111, 112n18, 151, 171, 172, 175, 181, 182, 183, 199, 201, 246, 260; inviting more than cognitional incoherence 182; inviting reversal 181; philosophic discoveries formulated as 183 Creative freedom, in aesthetic and artistic patterns 114, 117 Crisis of Philosophy 33n4, 177n5, 178n8, 248, 248n6, 273 Critical exigence 124, 213, 214 Cronin, Brien 267n98, 271 Cross-cultural philosophy 240, 242, 256 Cultural anthropology 154 Cultural-based philosophies 261 Cultural conflict 249, 265, 266 Cultural diversity 37, 240, 241, 265 Cultural integrity 265, 266 Culture, as constructed 90; and nature 90; lagging behind a genius 236 Darwin, Charles 59, 195 Data, of consciousness 8, 11, 26, 35, 64, 181, 229; complexity of 20; empirical 115, 121; given 17, 20; and the generalized empirical method 102; imaginal 158; imaginative exploration of 21; insight into 17, 75, 192; intelligible relations in 20, 57, 58; quantifiable 111, 124; as selected 100, 112; of sense 11, 14, 215, 217, 218; systematic and non-systematic 57; unification of 103 Dedifferentiation 234, 238; as cultivated 209, 246 Degrees of Freedom 66, 68, 74, 91, 141 Derrida, Jacques 198, 209, 259, 260, 271

Descartes, Rene 182, 201, 219, 226, 229, 260 Desmond, William 35, 35n8, 36n10, 38n15, 271 Determinism 64, 195 Development: biological 38; and choice 163; and culture 139, 140, 229, 254; and decline 227; definition of 75; and differentiation of consciousness 28, 75, 206, 208, 224, 227, 231, 233, 241, chapter 6; of doctrine 228; and the dramatic pattern 128, 129, 131, 133–7; and the field of finality 75; and Genuineness 135, 164, 203; as human 34, 56–61, 71–4, 74–80, 90, 92, 104, 134, 135, 150, 161, 167, 202, 204, 252; and incarnate intelligence 93; of intelligence 144; and the Law of Integration 134; and moral consciousness 167–8; and patterns of experience 93, 104, 133, 139; in philosophy 218; and the practical pattern 144, 145; and practical understanding 216; principle of 75; in science 217; and selfappropriation 11, 71; of social order 145; of speculative thought 34; of understanding 19, 30, 87 Developmental polymorphism, 29, 51, 234–8, 255 Deviant polymorphism 51 Dewey, John 248, 249 Dialectic 39; of community 62, 63, 83, 148; and conversion 222; and differentiation 222, 236; of the dramatic subject 60, 63, 68; Hegelian 193–4; of history 62; and horizon 222, 223; of method in metaphysics 190; of philosophy 39, 97, 171, 172, 174–7; and polymorphism 42; of position and counterposition 42,

282 Index 62, 97, 171, 175, 246; symbol and dialectic 155 Dialogue, with African and Asian philosophies 160; with other cultures 263, 267; and heightened self-awareness 10; intellectual 136; about philosophical pluralism 32; with a wide range of philosophies 5, 198, 249, 265; with postmodernism 261; and self-appropriation 264; and world-cultural consciousness 267 Differentiation(s) of consciousness 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 45, 46, 51, 93, 94, 95, 188, 208, 210, 227, chapter 6; as advancing and receding 227; as a communal achievement 235; and conflicts between culture 28–9; and developing understanding 203; as developmental polymorphism 29, 51; as a dimension of polymorphism 26, 29, 51, 205; ecological 267; and the embodiment of meaning 210; and the historicity of consciousness 30; and incarnate intelligence 95; nature of 230–2; as a key to philosophy 188, 203, 224, 238–41; and patterns of experience 45, 46, 205, 208, 223, 238; relationships between 206, 225, 230, 234; and specialists 28; main types of 214–20, 225; and the unity of consciousness 214 Discovery of Mind 205, 210, 215–18; and differentiation 229; and separation of common sense and theory 229 Displacement 255 Doran, R. 29n9, 33, 33n3, 35, 35n7, 48, 48nn26, 27, 49, 55, 84, 84n11, 158, 158nn20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 171n1, 202, 202n22, 265,

265nn88, 89, 90, 266, 266nn91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 267 Dramatic bias 59, 60, 153 Dramatic pattern 6, 27, 50, 52, 81, 83, 101, 127–37, 267; and African philosophy 137; and authenticity 133, 137; and being-in-the-world 136; and degree of self-consciousness 131; and the engaged subject 129; and conversion 136; and the ethical pattern 128, 129, 135; and the existential subject 50; and the exigence for appropriating the whole self 129; and friendship and love 136; in tension with the intellectual pattern 136; and interpersonal relations 128; and the mature subject 129; as mixing and blending other patterns 132; and the mutual mediation of person and community 131; and the mystical pattern 135; integrating other patterns 128, 132; and the practical pattern 127; and ordinary human living 127, 243; and sense of oneself 128; and self-transcendence 136 Dramatic subject 50, 59, 129–34, 153; as authentic 133; as the concrete subject 50; dialectic of 60; and genuineness 133, 134; and self-appropriation 128 Duality, between psyche and intelligence 68; in human consciousness 43, 77 Dunne, Tad 83n9, 244, 244n1, 271 Dynamic structure(s) of consciousness 7, 10, 17, 18, 24, 27, 40, 41, 49, 68, 71, 79, 87, 92, 98, 125, 161, 164, 184–8, 194, 198, 202, 226, 246, 248, 252, 254, 255, 264; and other equally dynamic structures 43, 98,

Index 283 184, 187, 188; immanent and recurring 7, 10, 49; as invariant 98; and the law of the spirit 68, 79; as normative 124, 184; and the polymorphic subject 187 Early language 210, 215, 216 Eastern philosophy 5 Ecological differentiation 29, 265 Elemental meaning 114, 117 Embodied consciousness 15, 88, 158; mediating between nature and culture 90 Embodiment of meaning 210, 215, 236 Emergent probability 56, 57–9, 61, 62, 64, 65, 74, 75, 89, 120, 146, 245; as generalized 75; and human beings 59, 61, 64, 65, 89, 146; and patterns of experience 120; universe of 74; world order of 57; world process of 89 Empirical residue 68, 82, 83, 121 Empiricism 5, 22, 192–3, 249, 250 Engaged subject 80, 129, 173 Enlightenment, Eastern 209; European 251, 257; mechanomorphism 127; scientism 209 Eros of the human spirit 16, 17, 78, 178 Ethical Pattern 52, 121, 128, 136, 160–8, 206, 243, 244; and the commentators 138; and the dramatic pattern 128–31; as a further unfolding of intentionality 165; as implicit in Insight (See also Moral Pattern) Ethical self-consciousness 71 Eurocentrism 33 Evidence 25; sufficiency of 22 Evil 12, 150, 161, 223; the problem of 150, 151 Exigence 18, 24, 50, 71, 118, 123–5,

162; biological 50, 106, 106n12, 132; critical 124, 213, 214; and elemental wonder 118; of human consciousness 24; of the infinite desire to know 18; of intelligence 210; for integral development 244n2; and the intellectual pattern 123–5; methodical 124, 213; for self-appropriation 244; for self-consistency between knowing and doing 71, 162–3; for system and theory 207; systematic 124, 213; for wholeness 245 Exigencies 40, 43, 98, 104, 123–5, 130, 166, 212; biological 130; of consciousness 40; and differentiations 212; of intellectual development 43, 98; of the human spirit 166, 235 Existential subject 49; as ‘whole man’ 50; positing itself 115 Explanatory genus 70–1, 83, 140–1 Explanatory species 65, 70 Explicit metaphysics 183, 184, 190; and the integral heuristic structure 184 Extroversion 64, 107, 108, 111, 192, 195; and the biological pattern 107, 113; and the confrontational aspect of consciousness 107; as a global attitude 111; and the real 111 Faith 152, 153, 199, 204, 225, 229, 230, 241 Families of philosophies 250, 253 Feelings 12, 89, 92, 93, 100, 114, 147, 155, 159, 161, 165, 212, 257 File 713: 57, 61, 63, 83–6 Finality 59, 66, 72–6, 89, 92, 94, 120, 136, 164; as directed dynamism 73; of proportionate being 89; of the universe 73

284 Index Fitterer, Robert 177, 177n4, 272 Flanagan, Joseph 154, 272 Flow of consciousness 115, 143, 185; mainly practical and dramatic 143 Foucault, Michel 38, 198, 259, 260 Foundational polymorphism 51, 199 Freedom 66–70, 74, 76, 77, 85, 91, 93, 107, 113, 114, 117–19, 128, 130, 141, 160–8, 173, 194, 200, 230, 250, 255, 257; and the aesthetic and artistic patterns 68, 114, 117–18; degrees of 66–8, 74, 91, 93, 107; and the dramatic subject 130; effective 168; essential 168; and the ethical pattern 160; and condition 85; in the order of spirit 68 Frege, Freidrich 249 Freud, Sigmund 195 Functions of meaning 211–12, 216 Fundamental sociology 84 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 264n86, 272 Geert, Clifford 91 Generalized empirical method 11, 35, 63, 102; and elements of patterns 102; and patterns of experience 63 Genetic metaphilosophy 253 Genetic method 71, 75 Genetico-dialectical analysis of philosophical pluralism 79 Genuineness 74, 78–80, 126, 134, 135, 161, 164, 179, 203, 259, 266; and human development 79; as a new emergence 79, 126; and patterns of experience 79; and polymorphism 179; and wisdom 79 Genus 64, 65, 66, 70, 72, 73, 83, 87, 140, 141; explanatory 64, 70, 71, 72, 83, 140, 141; higher 65, 66, 73; human 87; lowest 73 German Idealism 193

God 16, 152, 214 Good of Order 63, 146, 147, 149, 165 Grace and Freedom 34n5, 269 Gratia Operans 34, 34n5, 222, 222n8, 270 Greek Councils 229 Greek Discovery of Mind 210, 215, 216 Griffin, Paul 173, 173n2, 272 Habermas, Jürgen 89, 209n5, 272 Halton, Eugene 89, 89n35, 91n41, 272 Heelas, Paul 209n5, 272 Hegel, Frederick 35, 35n8, 37, 38, 190–4, 201, 219, 248, 250, 253, 260; challenge of 35; and dialectic 190, 193–4; and metaphilosophy 37 Heidegger, Martin 37, 38, 118, 119n23, 142, 173, 182, 198, 209, 209n5, 239, 248, 259n58; as entering interiority 119 Heightened awareness 11, 23, 124, 245; and dialogue with others 10; of moral consciousness 166, 168; of self 10, 232; of self-attention 17; of self-presence 23 Hermeneutics 31, 35, 171, 200, 202, 216, 232; cross-cultural 264n86, 274; and Lonergan 171, 200, 260; as methodical 202; of suspicion and retrieval 31 Heuristic structures 195, 246 Hierarchy of Values 166 Higher integration 60, 66, 67, 74, 75, 76, 76n8, 91, 93, 110, 152, 165 Higher system 59, 64, 66–70, 76, 80, 81, 106, 118, 140, 162 Higher viewpoints 65, 71, 73, 123, 194, 213, 235, 255; as successive 65

Index 285 Holistic metaphysics 89, 90 Horizon 4, 28, 29, 30, 92, 94, 114, 115, 120, 123, 126, 135, 149, 154n7, 156n11, 159, 173, 177, 199, 222, 223, 224, 226, 237n12, 242, 255, 271; of being 92; crossing over between 29; mediation between 30 Horizontal finality of the psyche 92 Human being(s) 56, 57–9, 59–61, 61–4, 64, 68, 68–70, 71–4, 74–80, 83–8, 88–95, 98, 102, 105, 108, 109, 138, 146, 148, 197, 208, 212, 220, 229, 231, 243, 244n2, 247, 254; and community 61–4, 121, 131; as embodied agent 69, 89; and development 74–80; and dialectic of community 63; and of the subject 63; and the concrete universal 57; and differentiations 94, 95; and diversity 197; and emergent probability 57–9, 89; and freedom 68–70; levels of 59–61, 68, 80; and the mystical pattern 152–3; as organic-psychic-intellectual 44, 110, 141; and patterns 71, 72, 89, 92, 93, 94, 107, 121, 140, 141; as polymorphic 176, 183, 259; as grounding polymorphism 88–95; social dimensions of 56, 62, 126; and solidarity 57, 61, 83–8, 89; structure of 43, 44, 52, 56–7, 64–8, 68–70, 80, 90, 93, 109, 110, 140, 159, 169, 243; and the symbolic pattern 154, 155, 159; unity of 56, 70, 74, 80–3, 86, 110, 159, 176, 187, 188 Human community 137, 143, 145, 148, 210, 234, 235 Human desire 16; semantics of 49 Human development 34, 71–80, 90, 92, 94, 129, 133–5, 150, 161, 167, 202, 208, 209, 252

Human good 85, 206–9, 210 Humanity 57, 59, 70, 83, 85–7; as compound-in-tension of intelligence and intersubjectivity 63; concrete 70, 89, 264n86; as concrete universal 56, 85, 86; as normative for culture 268 Human person 14, 79, 153; and the dramatic pattern 132–7; as self-transcending 15–16; unity of 80–3 Hume, David 22, 25, 26, 182; on personal identity 25; and performative self-contradiction 25 Humean empiricism 22 Husserl, Edmund 166, 193, 219, 249 Immanent intelligibility 66; of the universe 59 Incarnate consciousness 64, 88 Incarnate spirit 81, 134, 156 Insight 10, 17, 21, 22, 27, 39, 41, 53, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 73, 75, 77, 82, 88, 90, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120n26, 121, 122, 123, 127, 131, 146, 148, 149, 150, 158, 165, 174, 178, 180, 185, 187, 191, 192, 194, 203, 211, 213, 215, 216, 219, 254; into data 21; into elemental meaning 117; human 39, 40; source of higher system 67; and lack of insights 39; fundamental properties of 72 Insight 22, 26, 32, 33, 34, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 56, 65, 86, 100, 105, 108, 113, 114, 119, 120; essay in aid of personal appropriation 10 Insight into insight 34, 174 Insight into phantasm 87 Integral account of polymorphism 185, 245, 247

286 Index Integral heuristic structure 34, 124, 125, 183, 184, 246 Integrator 76, 77, 78 Intellect 21, 63, 76, 78, 81, 93, 110, 123, 125, 139, 152, 155, 156, 178; and artistic pattern 115, 119; and psyche 63, 76, 78, 92, 101; as higher system 80; operations of 8, 30; or spirit 92, 101, 106; pure 161; working on and with psyche to produce patterns 69 Intellectual concern 10, 21, 30; in the intellectual pattern 122–3 Intellectual conversion 23–6, 50, 229 Intellectualism, Lonergan’s 249 Intellectual pattern(s) 4, 27, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 63, 81, 93, 97, 101n6, 102, 103, 108, 110, 114, 119–27, 124n33, 132, 134, 135, 136, 141, 142, 148, 150, 165, 168n43, 171, 172, 175, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 243, 247, 251, 252; and aesthetic liberation 122; and exigences of the mind 123; bypassing human feeling 120; and flexibility in human experience 122; differentiations of 46, 63, 124; as dominating Insight 119; in mathematics and empirical sciences 122; and other patterns 93; and the pure unrestricted desire to know 122; as having legitimate priority 120; as overpriviledged 44; as privileged 48; and self-transcendence 121; as transformation of sensitive spontaneity 123; not rationalistic or logocentric 126; transparent to other patterns 126; as underdeveloped 119 Intelligence 8, 21, 22, 29, 34, 43, 62, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 75, 79, 82, 84,

98, 105, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 120n26, 121, 123, 124, 126, 143, 144, 145, 150, 180, 182, 192, 198, 208, 219, 225, 236, 250, 260; and aesthetic and artistic pattern 27, 115; conscious 69, 81, 121; detached and disinterested 148; and dramatic pattern 81; embodied 81; engaged 101; freedom of 67, 69; human 4, 28, 61, 84, 88, 126, 151, 184, 210, 211, 213; incarnate 93; and imagination 81, 131, 158; as integrator and operator 77; and intelligibility 16; as distinct from intelligibility 81; nature of 86, 87; and psyche 68, 77; and reasonableness 111, 115, 116, 117, 150, 151, 260; practical 61, 62, 63, 109, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 216; pure 50, 132; question(s) for 17, 21, 108; tension with intersubjectivity 63; tension with psyche 63, 77; truncated 127; unfolding of 80; as wonder 81, 92 Intelligibility 16, 17, 20, 21, 23, 57, 59, 66, 86, 87, 101, 101n6, 108, 121, 123, 150, 165, 204, 214, 250; as embodied and incarnate 80; discovery of 21, 22; as possibly immanent in data 17, 21; projected or constructed or discovered 21 Intentionality 39, 40, 43, 159, 219, 249; analysis 48, 172, 173, 197; of the artistic pattern 115; conscious 15, 18, 23, 26, 47, 51, 87, 89, 90, 92n42, 119, 121, 154, 158, 159, 167, 172, 182, 199, 210, 215, 245, 252, 253, 254; field of 115; human 107, 135, 165; normative cognitive 48; and polymorphism 40; and psyche 104; unfolding 43, 56, 98 Interiority 53, 124, 173, 200, 209n5,

Index 287

213, 214, 215, 224, 225, 226, 229, 231, 232, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 246, 256; as the differentiation dealing with differentiations 29; differentiation of 29, 179, 211, 240; entry into 209, 238; human 157; and philosophy 246; realm of 13, 118, 119, 119n23, 124, 128, 213, 245; self-appropriation and 35, 45, 208 Intersubjective spontaneity, tension with intelligently devised social order 63 Intersubjectivity 61, 62, 63, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152, 153, 211n7, 255 Introspection 13; in Hume 25; psychological 227 Introspective rational psychology 34 Isomorphism 57, 201; of knowing and known 71 Judging 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 49, 67, 103, 112n16, 150, 215, 217, 253; act(s) of 20, 21 Kant, Emmanuel 38, 219, 229, 248, 260 Kantian idealism 22 Kidder, Paul 55, 55n2 Knowing 7, 8, 9, 10, 19, 21, 23, 25, 30, 42, 57, 71, 73, 82, 97, 101, 108, 111, 112n16, 124, 149, 154, 156, 157, 162, 165, 171, 181, 189, 192, 195, 213, 216, 251, 260; animal 44, 111, 188; common sense 12; common sense versus scientific 9; as conscious act 7; as involving distinct and irreducible activities 17; and doing 27, 71, 162, 165, 167; as dynamic structure 17; human 3, 7,

8, 9, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 44, 108, 111, 112, 173, 183, 188, 228; and the known 58, 71, 73; modes of 30, 183; object of 14; process of 19, 21, 73; as recurrent structure 10; scientific 112; structure(s) of 22, 161; types of 9, 193 Knowing subject 181; as unity of potency, form, and act 82 Knowledge 7, 8, 14, 16, 19, 20, 23, 25, 33, 34, 50, 69, 81, 82, 87, 108, 114, 123, 124, 125, 134, 144, 145, 151, 152, 173, 183, 184, 185, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196, 203, 204, 214, 216, 217, 220, 222, 232, 239, 240, 248, 252, 257, 262; as contextualized 19; claims 24, 25; desire for 81, 135; human 7, 9, 181, 182, 192, 248; realms of 31, 183; religious 159; special transcendent 150 Lacan, Jacques 259 Lamb, Matthew 65n7, 84, 84n14, 85n16, 86, 86n24, 87, 87nn27–9, 88n30, 127n36, 250–1 Language 37, 51, 171, 195, 196, 209–18, 224, 227, 239, 236, 239, 240; analysts of ordinary 1, 227, 238; consciousness and 224; and differentiations 211, 215, 236; early 210; as embodiment of meaning 210; literary 1, 196; language games 258; as mediating the discovery of mind 216; and patterns of experience 196; and realms of meaning 225; as work of the community 215 Law of genuineness 78, 126, 164, 179, 188 Law of integration 77, 133, 134, 188 Law of limitation and transcendence 77, 188

288 Index Lawrence, Frederick 33n2, 35n8, 260, 260n65 Lazerowitz, Morris 37, 37nn12, 13 Level of rational self-consciousness 69, 71, 160 Levels of consciousness 4, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 40, 41, 47, 102, 186, 198, 227, 242, 245, 246, 250, 252, 259; as advancing and receding 27; appropriation of 7; and cognition 3, 4; and human knowing 8; and the human subject as a movement of self-transcendence 14–15; and patterns of experience 27, 30, 41, 43, 98, 185, 186, 203; and philosophic diversity 47; and polymorphic subject 45; as qualitatively distinct 18; as qualitatively diverse, 19–22; as successive stages 16 Levels of intelligence 66, 69 Liberal individualism 84 Liberation of intelligence, in artistic and aesthetic experience 117 Liddy, Richard 34n6 Logic of issues 55, 75, 221 Lonergan 9, 11, 22, 31, 32, 36, 38, 43, 44, 47, 49, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 91, 118, 119, 131, 135, 137, 138, 140, 142, 143, 146, 150, 152, 154, 158, 160, 162, 165, 176, 178, 179, 181, 185, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 207, 210, 211, 213, 214, 219, 221, 222, 226, 227, 231, 233, 235, 248, 259, 263; approach to philosophy 3; as constructive postmodernist 173; as truer friend of difference 259; as integrating empiricist, idealist, and rationalist approaches 19; lifelong project of methodological reorientation 33; talent for self-attentiveness 34

Love 16, 88, 93, 112, 137, 151, 152, 156, 160, 165, 168, 186; being in l. in an unrestricted way 10, 16, 17, 152; being in l. with God 16, 52, 153; human friendship and 136; God’s 153, 226; that is God himself 152 Luminosity of self-consciousness 119 Man 61, 63, 64, 67, 70, 71, 76n8, 77, 78, 83, 104, 109, 123, 130, 131, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 158, 162, 164, 175, 178, 199, 216, 220, 226; advent of 59, 61, 146; as both material and spiritual 80, 82; polymorphic consciousness of 39, 41, 183, 192, 193, 197, 201; as (concrete) unity in tension 42, 43, 97, 98, 176; as individual unity 59; unity of 80, 83; whole 50, 105, 120n26, 187, 203 Marechal, Joseph 38 Maritain, Jacques 160 Marsh, James 258, 259, 259n59, 260, 260nn62, 63, 273 Marxist collectivism 84 Masson-Oursel, Paul 261, 261n71, 273 Material manifold 77, 121; psychic representations 69 Matustik, Martin 258, 259, 259n55, 273 May, Todd 258, 258n52, 273 McCarthy, Michael 33n4, 47, 177, 177n5, 178, 178n8, 248–9 McKinney, R. 47n23, 49, 49nn30–2, 50, 50nn33–4, 132, 132n47, 133, 134, 135 McPartland, Thomas J. 89, 89n31, 154, 154nn7, 8, 9, 156n11, 157n15, 159n30, 237, 237n12 Meaning 209–14; control of 207–8

Index 289 Mechanistic determinism 195 Mechanomorphic rationalism 251 Mediation 30, 120, 131, 176, 207, 210, 212, 233, 237, 249, 259, 259n55, 271, 273; as deconstruction 259; between horizons 30; of immediacy 211, 212, 233, 237; linguistic 249; of meaning 207; mutual 210, 217; between patterns 120, 176 Melchin, Kenneth 94, 94n44, 120, 120nn25, 27, 122, 126, 126n34, 128n39, 129, 130n43, 136n50 Metanarrative 33, 38, 257 Metaphilosophy 6, 32–8, 44, 170, 173, 174, 188, 198, 204n4, 206, 241, 242, 244, 249, 250, 253, 254, 256; age of 37; approaches to 32, 38; emerging 53; Lonergan’s account of 204, 256; and polymorphism 247; postmodern 33, 38, 53; towards a comprehensive m. 200–3; as unique 51 Metaphilosophy, Journal of 37, 37n11 Metaphysical: account of the structure of human beings 56; and antimetaphysical positions 34; misuses of language 37; unity of the human being 80 Metaphysical elements: and the account of metaphysics as science 202; and the structure of human being 71 Metaphysics 34, 56, 178, 181, 202, 203, 239n13, 240, 246, 247, 248, 252; and ethics 161, 164; end of 37; explanatory 99; explicit 183, 184, 188, 190; holistic 64; integral heuristic structure of 34, 124; latent 183, 184, 190; Lonergan’s (understanding of) 88, 171, 179;

polymorphism and method in 184–90; polymorphism and the definition of 182–4; the dialectic of method in 190–7 Metaphysics of history 84 Metaphysics of human history 84 Metaphysics of human nature 89 Metaphysics of human solidarity 84 Methodical exigence 124, 213 Methodic differentiation 228 Method in Theology 11, 15, 28, 33, 35, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 84, 92, 92n43, 94, 123, 127, 150, 152, 154, 161, 162, 163, 165, 171, 173, 176, 186, 188, 199, 200, 200n21, 202, 203, 246, 246n5, 247, chapter 6 Method of the sciences 36 Method(s) 181, 201, 202, 228; Cartesian 191–2; classical 57; dialogical or comparative 263; of empiricism 192–3; of ethics 164; generalized empirical method 11, 35, 63, 102, 125; genetic 71, 75; as immanent 24; meta-m. 250; metaphilosophy as a 37; of metaphysics 39, 42, 97; of philosophy 11, 35, 37, 293, 294; of self-appropriation 3, 7–11; scientific 190, 194–7; theological 35, 221; transcendental 6, 6n2, 35, 36, 88, 187n19, 212, 213, 232 Meynell, Hugo 200, 200n21, 273 Miller, Jerome 258, 259, 259nn56, 57, 58, 273 Modalities of consciousness 4, 5, 6, 40, 205, 227–8, 231, 238, 242, 245; as including levels of consciousness, patterns of experience, differentiation of consciousness and conversions 4 Modern philosophy 4, 193, 226, 239, 260; empiricism, idealism, rationalism 5

290 Index Moral consciousness 160n32, 161, 162, 164–6, 166n33, 167; distinctiveness of 162; as finality 164; as heightened 166; and law of genuineness 164; as rational self-consciousness 161; as subsumptive 167 Moral conversion 49, 54 Moral pattern 94, 128, 134, 135, 166, 168, 251 (See also Ethical Pattern) Morelli, Elizabeth 9n3, 13n5, 160n32, 166, 166n33, 167, 168 Morelli, Mark 6n2, 9n3, 11n4, 13n5, 27n8, 36n9, 38n14, 41, 41n17, 43, 43n23, 47, 47n23, 48n25, 51, 98, 98n1, 102, 102n8, 103, 178, 178n7, 185, 185nn10, 12, 186, 187, 187n16, 188, 189, 197n19, 198, 245, 245n3, 252–3 Moving viewpoint 40, 42, 43, 53, 56, 174; and polymorphism 40–1 Mutual mediation: of community and subject 254; of language and thought 216; of sign and differentiation of consciousness 210 Mystical pattern 43, 52, 94, 98, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 144, 150–3, 176; and the dramatic pattern 134, 135, 136 Mystical-Soteriological Differentiation 265 Natural desire to see God 16 Natural science 11, 90, 95, 227, 240, 248 Negotiation, of tensions in consciousness 98 Neural basis of consciousness 64, 89 Neural demand functions 67, 93 Neural demands 60, 62, 158 Newman, John Henry 219, 229 Nietzsche, F. 118, 119, 142, 173, 182, 198, 209, 219, 229, 248, 250, 253

Non-systematic process, intelligibility of 57 Objectivity 25, 42, 97, 111, 126, 171, 173, 174, 175, 181, 189, 192, 193, 195, 196, 240, 252; and extroversion 192, 195 Okafor, Fidelis O. 267n96, 273 Ongoing discovery of mind 205, 228, 229 Ongoing undifferentiated consciousness 219–20, 236 Ontic value of person 163, 166 Operational polymorphism 51, 245, 250 Operator 13, 14, 61, 76–8, 114, 154, 203 Organism-as-integrator 13, 14, 76, 77, 78, 114, 154, 203 Organism-as-operator 76 Orientational polymorphism 51, 186, 252, 255 Parker, James 32n1, 45n21, 204n2 Patterns of consciousness 26, 61, 99; conscious tension between 61 Patterns of experience 4, 5, 19, 26, 30, 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 66, 68, 69, 72, 78, 79, 83, 88, 93, 106, 120, 121, 133, 136, 138, 139, 140, 154, 170, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184, 185, 187n15, 188, 195, 199, 203, 204n1, 205, 208, 227, 231, 233, 234, 238, 242, 243, 245, 246, 253, 259, 264, 267; as abstract 110, 120; as always already in place 101; as blending and mixing 40, 42; deliberately produced or produced prior to deliberation 101; as setting the lines of development 104; and differentiations of consciousness 45, 47, 52,

Index 291 88, 98, 115, 206, 208, 233; distinguished from differentiations 115; and dynamic finality 120; as grounded in embodied intelligence and incarnate spirit 81; and emergent probability 120; emerging as the human spirit engages the world 72; explanatory versus descriptive account 99; and genuineness 79; and the structure of human being 71, 88, 140; as interfering or conflicting 40; and levels of being 72; and levels of consciousness 27, 41, 43, 98, 185, 186; ontological account or cognitional account 43; and polymorphism 42, 88, 171, 201; as basic way of characterizing polymorphism 96; as coexisting in tension 27; as patternings of the psyche by the spirit 93; as revealing the potentialities of embodied spirit 72, 94; as rudimentary ways of being in the world 101; relationships of mediation and transcendence 120; spontaneous or habitual or deliberately chosen 105; understood as a functional relationship between psyche and intellect 101 (See also Aesthetic, Artistic, Dramatic, Ethical, Intellectual, Moral, Mystical, Practical, and Symbolic Patterns) Pedagogy, and the movement to selfknowledge 189 Performative consistency 25 Performative contradiction 24 Performative self-contradiction 8, 25, 31 Periodic table 66 Person 8, 10, 14, 57, 64, 93, 116, 125, 128, 131, 135, 136, 137, 141, 147, 149, 156, 158, 163, 166, 168,

189, 208, 210, 212, 233, 254, 261, 266; and appropriation of the whole person 10; as movement of self-transcendence 16; as self-transcending 15, 53, 79, 189; human 14, 15, 79, 80, 132, 137, 153; ontic value of 163, 166; transcendent over community 254; whole 10, 93, 102, 120, 129, 130, 133, 154, 155, 233 Phenomenology 13, 166, 193, 259, 263 Philosophical hermeneutics 35, 200 Philosophical pluralism 3, 4, 5, 6, 32, 33, 240, 249 Philosophical positions 105, 193, 195, 197, 198, 201; as generated by the human mind 5 Philosophic difference 2, 4, 33, 34, 35, 39, 46, 47, 52, 94, 137, 140, 171, 172, 179, 199, 202, 224, 247, 249, 256, 261; comprehensive account of 256; and differentiations 224, 231, 240; and levels of consciousness 198, 199; and patterns 140, 141, 150; polymorphism as the key to 39, 40, 47, 179, 242; and self-appropriation 218 Philosophy, crisis of 248, 249; comparative 4, 5, 33, 51, 240, 241, 261–4, 265n90, 266, 267; cross-cultural 240, 242, 256; culturally based differences 4; dialectic of 41, 42, 97, 174, 194; and differentiations 30, 203, 224, 231, 238–41; end of 38, 180; families of 252; goal of 197; finds its data in intentional consciousness 35; and interiority 173, 180, 226; the key to 3–5, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 41, 44, 46, 52, 96, 141, 169, 173, 174, 176, 188, 190, 196, 205, 224, 231, 241, 242,

292 Index 247, 251; Lonergan’s approach to 3, 7, 39, 41, 55, 187; modern 4, 5, 193, 226, 227, 239, 260; and patterns 44, 56, 118, 119; p. of philosophies 34, 151, 201; and polymorphism 171, 190, 191, 196, 239; scandal of 45n21, 204n2; and self-appropriation 26, 31, 198, 240; and symbolic consciousness 159; and theory 226; world 4, 6, 262 Philosophy of consciousness 3, 25, 205 Philosophy of history 204n4 Philosophy of knowledge 7, 8, 11, 19 Philosophy of philosophies 34, 151, 201 Philosophy of science 22 Pluralism 34, 225, 230, 237, 238, 253, 254, 255, 256, 267n98; and polymorphism 177–81; cultural 87; historicist 87; of philosophies 37, 252; postmodern 252 Polymorphic consciousness 3, 4, 5, 7, 31, 34, 39, 41, 47, 51, 54, 71, 79, 94, 96, 141, 150, 170, 171, 173, 176, 177, 179, 183, 185, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 194, 197, 200, 201, 244, 245, 253, 259, 260, 264, 265, 267; as historically developing 41; neglect of 48; patterns of 26–8; as understated and underdeveloped 7 Polymorphic mind 40, 180 Polymorphic subject 6, 40, 41, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 170, 173, 177, 187, 188, 189, 192, 197, 197n19, 198 Polymorphic unities 39, 40, 41, 43, 98, 172, 187, 252 Polymorphism 38, 40; ambiguities about 39; as the key to philosophy 2, 3, 4, 5, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 41n16, 44, 46–7, 52, 79, 96, 141, 168, 169, 170, 173, 176, 179, 188,

190, 191n18, 196, 197, 200, 203, 204, 205, 242, 247, 251, 261; as differentiations of consciousness: chapter 6; and the structure of the human being: chapter 2; as patterns of experience: chapters 3 and 4; developmental 29, 51, 234–8, 245, 255; grounding 55; operational 51, 186, 245, 250, 255; orientational 51, 186, 245, 252, 255 Polymorphism in Insight: chapter 3 Polymorphism in Method in Theology: chapter 6 Polymorphism of consciousness 2, 40, 186, 196, 201, 205, 242; a problematic claim 32; and bimorphism 44; and dialectic 97; and different cultures’ philosophies and characters 28; and the method of metaphysics 97; as adequate to modern and postmodern philosophy 4; and orientations of the subject 45; as identified with patterns of experience 42–3; as mixing and blending of patterns 96; as more encompassing than cognitional theory or transcendental method 6; as providing a way of entering a range of positions 5; need for positive account 44; positive dimensions of 51; as resource for responding to philosophical and cultural pluralism 3; as the real focus of Lonergan’s enterprise 26; identified with patterns 98; need for an integral view 4, 5, 47 Position 42 Position and counterposition 42, 97, 105, 109, 175 Positivism 13 Postcolonial philosophy 33, 267n96 Postmodernism 5, 35n8, 37, 38,

Index 293

38n15, 89, 90, 209, 237, 242, 256–8, 267; constructive 173; and Lonergan 258–61; without relativism 51 Postmodern philosophy 4, 33, 173n2 Potency 66, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 82, 91, 118; principle of limitation, 73 Practical intelligence 61, 62, 63, 109, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 216 Practical pattern 43, 94, 110, 127, 138, 142–50; relation to aesthetic pattern 143; relation to biological pattern 142; as postbiological and predramatic 145; and bodies 143; and common sense 148; and the concrete good 143; and the concern to get things done 142; and coping with the environment 144; and developed society 148; as factor in philosophic difference 150; and practical intelligence 143; and pragmatism 143; and the tension between psyche and spirit 146 Pragmatists 219, 229 Premotion 84, 85; of sensitive consciousness 84 Presence, of object to subject 12; of subject to himself 12 Presence of self, as concomitant and correlative to presence of object 13 Presence to objects of knowledge 8 Presence to self 8, 12, 13, 27, 115 Presocratics 227, 238 Principle of correspondence 60, 74, 75, 77 Principle of development 75 Principle of emergence 74, 75 Principle of finality 74 Priority of living over knowing 152 Probability 57, 58, 61, 66, 72, 136, 195, 235; schedules of 58

Probability of emergence 58 Probability of survival 58, 59 Problem of evil 150; solution as universally accessible 151 Proportionate being 34, 56, 58, 73, 76, 77, 89, 91, 93, 183, 184, 201; universe of 57, 64, 82, 89, 185, 190 Psyche 43, 68, 69, 71, 75, 76, 77, 78, 90, 91, 92, 92n42, 93, 94, 98, 101n6, 102, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 118, 121, 122, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 164; feeling dimension 92; and intelligence 63, 68, 77; and intentionality 104; and the intellect 60, 63, 76, 78, 91, 92, 101, 156; and mystical life 153; proper function of 92; and the realm of the imagined 158; and spirit 93, 101, 103, 126, 146, 153, 158, 159; tension with intelligence 63 Psychic conversion 159 Psychic representation 69, 158 Pure desire to know 60, 79, 114, 124, 162, 179, 184, 185, 194 Purely experiential pattern 113–14, 116; and operator 114 Pure unrestricted desire to know 122, 123 Quine, Willard 249 Rapp, Carl 35n8, 38n15 Rational self-consciousness 10, 21, 49, 50, 68, 69, 78, 79, 125, 128, 131, 160, 161, 164, 165, 167 Realms of meaning 15, 35, 36, 208, 209, 212, 213, 214, 218, 222, 223, 224, 225, 230, 231, 232, 240, 246 Reese, William L. 37n11 Relativism 34, 35n8, 180, 241, 253, 254, 256, 262, 265

294 Index Religious conversion 4, 49, 255, 261 Romanticism 5 Roochnik, David 38n15 Rorty, Richard 38, 248, 249, 259 Rousselot, Pierre 160 Schemes of recurrence 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 86, 103, 106, 112, 147; as recurrent and conditional 58 Scholarly differentiation 28, 226, 229, 237, 265 Sciences 36, 56, 64, 65, 71, 72, 115, 124, 184, 190, 195, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 226, 240, 246; empirical 29, 72, 124, 178, 240; and the succession of higher genera 64; human, 79, 219, 226, 240, 248; method of 36, 240; natural 11, 90 Scotosis 60, 79 Selectivity of consciousness 99, 100, 101 Self 11, 12, 13, 23, 27, 49, 72, 101, 107, 113, 115, 121, 128, 129, 134, 137, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 175, 181, 209, 257, 259, 260, 261; as our chief work of art 114; as a knower 17; as self-centred psyche and as open to the universe of being 78 Self-affirmation 41, 50, 82, 90, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 189, 191, 193, 197, 246; and unity of consciousness 70–1; as a knower 22, 23, 24, 42, 48, 53, 97; of the knower 23, 50, 200 Self-appropriation 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 71, 79, 90, 99, 105, 117, 118, 124, 124n33, 128, 134, 167, 178, 191, 198, 199, 206, 213, 214, 218, 232, 234, 239, 240, 246, 249, 255,

264, 265; cognitional 7, 9, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 31, 50, 134; and familiarity with a range of cognitive contexts 10; and ongoing conceptual articulation 13; comprehensive 9, 53, 133, 135, 157; and knowing by connaturality 31; as development of the subject and in the subject 11; and intellectual conversion 23; as providing a criterion of knowledge 25; and interiority 45, 208; and interpretation 53; as basic theme of Insight 50; as integral 31, 51, 53; as providing mediation between horizons 30; the method of 7, 11; as the method of philosophy 3; and the nature of consciousness 11; and raising the level of one’s performance 14; cuts to the root of philosophical difference 35; of the full polymorphic agent 71; as appropriating the polymorphic subject 51; and self-attention 7; and heightened self-awareness 7; at the level of rational self-consciousness and ethical consciousness 71; of self as a knower 7 Self-attention 8, 10, 16, 189, 232; Lonergan’s genius for 53 Self-consistency 162; between knowing and doing 71 Self-knowledge 5, 8, 119, 188, 189, 202, 203, 214 Self-presence 8, 12, 14, 18, 19, 22, 24, 250; as non-reflexive and preconceptual 23; as varying in quality and intensity 14; in conscious performance 13 Self-transcendence 15, 16, 18, 19, 48, 68, 121, 125, 129, 134, 135, 136, 137, 163, 164, 165, 167, 184, 189, 249, 255, 266; cognitional 4, 14,

Index 295

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 68, 69, 81, 121, 167; cognitive and moral 15; full 68, 69, 125, 161; in freedom 69; intersubjective 19; moral 19, 81, 161; movement of 10, 14, 19, 136; personal 136 Semantics: of human desire 49 Sensation 12, 17, 67; as abstract 99 Sense data 22; as quantifiable 111 Sensitive process 67, 68, 122 Shute, Michael 43, 43n20, 57n3, 60, 60n4, 84, 84nn10, 12, 14, 15, 85n17, 86, 98, 98n3, 202n3 Social order 62, 84, 145, 147, 148, 149; intelligently devised 63, 147, 148 Sociobiology 89 Spirit 34, 68, 69, 79, 82, 83, 89, 92n42, 101n6, 103, 106n12, 107, 110, 114, 118, 124, 126, 158, 159, 193; and psyche 93, 146, 153; embodied 72, 94; human 16, 17, 44, 67, 72, 79, 92, 102, 104, 107, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 151, 152, 153, 157, 165, 166, 186, 232, 233, 235, 244; incarnate 81, 94, 134, 156; self-transcending 91, 127; as transcendent 83 Spirit of inquiry 81; and sensitive spontaneity 122 Statistical law 58, 61; and pre-determination 85 Statistical method 57 Statistical residues 65 Stream of consciousness 14, 61, 99, 122, 158, 177, 187; and diverse interests and concerns 10; and Hume 25 Structure of consciousness 14, 27, 71, 87, 124, 200, 252, 254, 264; as immanently normative 24 Structure of human being 43, 55, 59,

61, 64, 65, 66, 76, 77, 79, 90, 93, 98, 102, 105, 109, 110, 118, 140, 141, 159, 169, 243; and differentiations of consciousness 94; as grounding patterns 88; as organic, psychological, and intellectual 56; basis for ordering the patterns 92; manifested by the patterns 92 Subject 2, 11, 26, 46, 63, 68, 77, 78, 90, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 110, 113, 114, 117, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 132, 135, 144, 148, 149, 155, 156, 157, 178, 179, 184, 185, 186, 189, 191, 207, 208, 212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221, 232, 234, 236, 244, 246, 249, 252, 254, 257, 260, 261; as authentic 49; as embodied and engaged 48; as existential 40, 42, 49; as intellectual 40; cognitional 170, 197, 199; dramatic 50, 59, 60, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 153; engaged 80, 129, 173; existential 49, 50, 115; human 14, 16, 40, 48, 56, 89, 93, 116, 134, 145, 226, 227, 231, 235, 255; moral 161, 162, 163, 165, 167; polymorphic 6, 40, 41, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 170, 173, 176, 177, 187, 188, 192, 197n19, 198; as oriented to transcendence 119 Subject-as-object 13, 14, 119 Subject-as-spirit 112; grasped in aesthetic consciousness 119 Subject-as-subject 12, 13, 14, 119, 209n5 Subject of conscious intentionality: found in all patterns 121 Sufficiently cultured consciousness 8, 9, 263 Symbolic consciousness 28, 156, 159 Symbolic pattern 94, 118, 137, 153–7, 159, 160, 243, 244, 267

296 Index Systematic exigence 123, 213 Systematic process 57 System(s) 59, 60, 67, 82, 91, 145, 148, 207, 258; higher 59, 67, 68, 70, 76, 80, 81, 106, 118, 140, 162 Tension(s) 9, 15, 27, 29, 30, 35n8, 39, 42, 45, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 89, 93, 97, 98, 108, 110, 112n16, 126, 128, 136, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 156, 164, 165, 167, 169, 176, 178, 179, 183, 190, 197, 202, 203, 217, 220, 232, 237, 239, 244n2, 251, 259, 266; between incompletely developed intelligence and imperfectly adapted sensibility 68; between psyche and intellect 78; between psyche and intelligence 77; psyche and spirit 91; between sensitive living and intellectual development 43; of limitation and transcendence 79 Theological method 35 Theoretic consciousness 6, 221 Thesis 42, 43, 97, 98, 175 Thing(s) 13, 61, 65, 66, 69, 72, 80, 111, 112n16, 123, 142, 145, 175, 213, 216, 226, 261; and bodies 64; as unity-identity-whole 56, 64 Topics in Education 2, 47, 100, 113, 115, 198, 199 Tracy, David 21n7, 47, 177n6, 178, 179n9 Transcendental method 6, 6n2, 35, 36, 197, 212, 213, 232; transcultural significance of 36, 88 Transcendental precepts 24, 253, 255, 260 Transcultural 36, 48, 51, 88, 130, 154, 237, 240, 263; the notion of 87

Turner, John B. 112n19, 119n24 Understanding 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 37, 43, 44, 48, 53, 60, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 92, 98, 103, 110, 111, 116, 119, 120, 123, 125, 129, 135, 145, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 157, 160, 163, 164, 169, 170, 171, 173, 178, 191, 193, 196, 200, 201, 203, 206, 209, 213, 216, 217, 221, 225, 227, 228, 246, 250, 251, 253, 262, 264; precise nature found in mathematics 9; dynamic character found in science 9 Understanding and Being 2, 94, 104, 109, 111, 120, 139, 178 Undifferentiated consciousness 28, 214, 218, 219, 221, 225, 227, 234, 238, 239 Unification 34, 36, 183, 195, 218, 248; of logically unrelated sciences 72 Uniquely probable, Lonergan’s position as 72 Unity 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 56, 57, 59, 63, 65, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 94, 98, 119, 128, 137, 140, 141, 146, 155, 156, 158, 164, 176, 180, 181, 187, 188, 195, 214, 221, 258, 261; of concrete humanity 70; of developing being 71; of human person 80; of species 70 Unity-identity-whole 16, 23, 56, 64, 65 Unity of consciousness 16, 19, 21, 23, 41, 187, 188; and polymorphic and historically differentiated consciousness 71; as given 18, 70 Unity of Man 80, 83

Index 297 Universal viewpoint 35, 125, 202, 203 Universe of proportionate being 56, 57, 64, 82, 89, 185, 190 Unrestricted desire to know 17, 27, 75, 82, 120, 122, 123, 153, 248 Upper blade, of historical inquiry 84 Verbum 34, 86, 88 Vertical finality 94; of psyche 92 Vertin, Michael 47n6, 249n16, 250 Whelan, Gerard 60n5, 62n6

Wisdom 6, 34, 79, 125, 160, 191, 218, 227, 259 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 37, 38, 198, 248 Wonder 17, 72, 81, 92, 102, 114, 116, 117, 118, 123, 125, 154, 156, 177, 193, 238, 251, 259nn57, 58 World-cultural philosophy 5, 6 World philosophy 4, 262 World process 58, 59, 69, 73, 85, 89, 165; as upwardly directed 58; of emergent probability 57, 89; oriented to completion 73; unfolding of 58, 68, 89